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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

Nil Obstat.

F. INNOCENTIUS APAP., O.P., S.T.M.,
CENSOR. THEOL.

Imprimatur.

EDUS. CANONICUS SURMONT,
VICARIUS GENERALIS.

WESTMONASTERII.

APPROBATIO ORDINIS.

Nil Obstat.

F. RAPHAEL MOSS, O.P., S.T.L.,
F. LEO. MOORE, O.P., S.T.L.

Imprimatur.

F. HUMBERTUS EVEREST, O.P., S.T.B.,
PRIOR PROVINCIALIS ANGLIÆ.

HAWKESYARD,
Die 7 Martii, 1912.

THE
“SUMMA THEOLOGICA”
OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

PART I.

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY
FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN
PROVINCE

SECOND NUMBER
(QQ. XXVII.—LXXIV.)

THOMAS BAKER
72, NEWMAN STREET, LONDON

1912

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LETTER FROM THE CARDINAL SECRETARY OF
STATE.

THE VATICAN,
February 24th, 1912.

*To the Very Reverend Father Humbert Everest, O.P., Prior
Provincial of the English Dominican Province.*

REVEREND FATHER,

I am desired to inform you that the Holy Father has been pleased to express his gratitude on receiving from you the first volume of the *Summa* of St. Thomas Aquinas, which, with the assistance of your beloved brethren of the English Province, you have most wisely determined to translate into your mother-tongue. I say "most wisely," because to translate into the language of one's country the immortal works of St. Thomas is to give to its people a great treasure of human and Divine knowledge, and to afford those who are desirous of obtaining it, not only the best method of reasoning in unfolding and elucidating sacred truths, but also the most efficacious means of combating heresies. Therefore, without doubt, you have undertaken a task worthy of religious men—worthy of the sons of St. Dominic.

The Venerable Pontiff, in graciously accepting your gift, returns you most cordial thanks, and earnestly prays that your task may have a successful result and produce abundant fruit. In token of his appreciation, he most lovingly imparts to you and your fellow-workers the Apostolic Benediction.

And for myself I extend to you the right hand of fellowship, and thank you for the special volume of the translation which you presented to me.

I remain, Rev. Father,
Yours devotedly,

R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL.

LETTER FROM THE MASTER-GENERAL OF THE
FRIAR PREACHERS.

COLLEGIO ANGELICO,
ROMA, *May 21st, 1911.*

*To the English Translators of the 'Summa Theologica' of
St. Thomas.*

VERY REV. AND DEAR FATHERS,

In translating into English the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, you undertake a work which will bring profit to the Church and honour to the Dominican Order, and which, I hope, will be acceptable even to the laity; for what was said of the great doctor by his contemporaries is true for all time—that everybody can gather fruit from his writings, which are within the grasp of all. As a matter of fact, St. Thomas appeals to the light of reason, not in order to weaken the ground of faith, which is the Divine Reason, infinitely surpassing the reason of man, but, on the contrary, in order to increase the merit of faith by making us adhere more firmly to His revelation. For we see thereby how reasonable is our submission, how salutary it is to the mind, how profitable for our guidance, how joyful to the heart.

May your work contribute to this end! Thus it will be a sermon, preached through the press, by reason of its diffusion and duration more fruitful than that preached by word of mouth.

I bless you in our Holy Father, St. Dominic, and ask the help of your prayers for the Order and for myself.

FR. HYACINTH M. CORMIER, O.P.,
Master-General.

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TREATISE ON THE TRINITY

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

FIRST PART.

TREATISE ON THE TRINITY.

QUESTION XXVII.

THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS.

(In Five Articles.)

HAVING considered what belongs to the Unity of the Divine Essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the Persons in God. And because the Divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to the Relations of Origin, the order of doctrine leads us to consider firstly, the question of Origin or Procession; secondly, the Relations of Origin; thirdly, the Persons.

Concerning Procession there are five points of inquiry:—

(1) Whether there is Procession in God? (2) Whether any Procession in God can be called Generation? (3) Whether there can be any other Procession in God besides Generation? (4) Whether that other Procession can be called Generation? (5) Whether there are more than two Processions in God?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS PROCESSION IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection I. It seems that there cannot be any procession in God. For procession signifies outward movement. But

in God there is nothing mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in God.

Obj. 2. Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity ; but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.

Obj. 3. Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown above (Q. II.). Therefore in God there is no procession.

On the contrary, The Lord says, *I proceeded forth from God* (John viii. 42).

I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which signify procession. This procession has been differently understood. Some have understood it in the sense of an effect proceeding from its cause ; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God : and this is contrary to what is said of the Son, *That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is the true God* (1 John v. 20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, *Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost ?* (1 Cor. vi. 19). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it ; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, *The Son cannot of Himself do anything* (John v. 19); while many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act ; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God Himself ; whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as

there is an outward (*ad extra*) procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward (*ad intra*) procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent. Whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the spoken word ; and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice.

As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances ; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in the representation of Divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement, or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or to an exterior effect ; which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we have explained.

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds : whereas, whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct ; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent ; for the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with

the object understood. Thus, as the Divine Intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God (Q. XIV.), the Divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the Source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity.

Reply Obj. 3. To proceed from a principle, so as to be something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle ; whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art ; and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the architect is to things designed.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY PROCESSION IN GOD CAN BE CALLED GENERATION ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no procession in God can be called generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption ; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God.

Obj. 2. Further, procession exists in God, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained. But such a process is not called generation in us ; therefore neither is it to be so called in God.

Obj. 3. Further, anything that is generated derives existence from its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the Divine Existence is self-subsisting (Q. III., A. 4), it follows that no generated existence can be the Divine Existence. Therefore there is no Generation in God.

On the contrary, It is said, *This day have I begotten Thee* (Ps. ii. 7).

I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning ; one common to every-thing subject to generation and corruption ; in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things ; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle ; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is called begotten ; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the formality of generation and of sonship, but only that which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice ; for a worm which is generated from animals has not the formality of generation and sonship, although it has a generic similitude ; for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature ; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of generation ; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the procession of the Word in God is generation ; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a vital operation :—from a conjoined principle (as above described) :—by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived :—and exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His existence are the same, as shown above (Q. XIV., A. 4). Hence the procession of the Word in God is called generation ; and the Word Himself proceeding is called the Son.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act ; in which sense it is not found in God.

Reply Obj. 2. The act of human understanding in ourselves

is not the substance itself of the intellect ; hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds ; so the idea of generation cannot be properly and fully applied to it. But the Divine Act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the One Who understands (Q. XIV.). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same Nature ; and so is properly called Begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to signify the Procession of the Divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth ; as is declared in the Person of the Divine Wisdom, *The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived ; before the hills, I was brought forth* (Prov. viii. 24). In our way of understanding we use the word ' conception ' in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no identity of nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Not everything derived from another has existence in another subject ; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God receives its existence from the Generator, not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with the Divine Self-Subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives Divine existence from another ; not, however, as if He were other from the Divine Nature. For in the perfection itself of the Divine Existence are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the Principle of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection (Q. IV., A. 2).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY OTHER PROCESSION EXISTS IN GOD BESIDES
THAT OF THE WORD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no other procession exists in God besides the Generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we admit another Procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infinitude ; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God.

Obj. 2. Further, every nature possesses but one mode of self-communication ; because operations derive unity and diversity from their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the Divine Nature. Therefore, as there is only one Divine Nature (Q. XI., A. 4), it follows that only one procession exists in God.

Obj. 3. Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession of Love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as the Will in God is the same as His Intellect (Q. XIX.). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession of the Word.

On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (John xv. 26) ; and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, *I will ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete* (John xiv. 16). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word.

I answer that, There are two processions in God ; the procession of the Word, and another.

In evidence whereof we must observe that Procession exists in God, only according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself. Such action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within

ourselves involves also another procession, that of love, whereby the object loved is in the lover ; as, by the conception of the word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him another procession called the procession of Love.

Reply Obj. 1. There is no need to go on to infinitude in the Divine processions ; for the procession which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will.

Reply Obj. 2. All that exists in God, is God (Q. III.) ; whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the Divine Nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and this does not apply to other natures.

Reply Obj. 3. Though Will and Intellect are not diverse in God (Q. XIX.), nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the procession of Love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the Word ; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the Substance of the intellect and its concept are the same ; so, although in God the Will and the Intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of Love and the procession of the Word in God.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PROCESSION OF LOVE IN GOD IS GENERATION ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the procession of Love in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of Love proceeds in the likeness of nature ; otherwise it would be extraneous to the

Divine Nature, and would be an external procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of Love, proceeds as generated and born.

Obj. 2. Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that *every beast loves its like* (Ecclus. xiii. 19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems becoming that Love should proceed by way of generation.

Obj. 3. Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So if there is a procession of Love in God, there ought to be some special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of Love in God is generation.

On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost Who proceeds as Love, would proceed as Begotten ; which is against the Athanasian Creed, *The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding.*

I answer that, The procession of Love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual (*fit in actu*) by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect ; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation ; because every generator begets its own like ; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but is rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object.

So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or as son ; but proceeds rather as spirit ; which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.

Reply Obj. 1. All that exists in God is one with the Divine Nature. Hence the proper notion (*ratio*) of this or that

procession, by which one procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of this Unity : but the proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from the order of one procession in regard to another ; which order is derived from the nature of will and intellect. Hence, each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and intellect ; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is ; and so it is that the Person proceeding as Love receives the Divine Nature, but is not said to be born.

Reply Obj. 2. Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator ; but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow that Love is begotten, but that the One begotten is the Principle of love.

Reply Obj. 3. We can name God only from creatures (Q. XIII.). As in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name ; but it can be called Spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE MORE THAN TWO PROCESSIONS IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are more than two processions in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power. Therefore if two processions exist in God, of Intellect and Will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of power.

Obj. 2. Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness in God.

Obj. 3. Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity

than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but there are many ; for in us from one word proceeds another ; and also from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two processions.

On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed—the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions.

I answer that, The Divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the Agent. In a nature which is intellectual, and in the Divine Nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of feeling, which also appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions ; for the act of feeling is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love.

Reply Obj. 1. Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the Divine power does not imply the procession of a Divine Person ; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. As Boëthius says, goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object of the will.

Thus, as the Divine processions must be denominated from certain actions ; no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of Love, accordingly as God understands and loves His own Essence, truth, and goodness.

Reply Obj. 3. As above explained (QQ. XIV. and XIX.), God understands all things by one simple act ; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love ; for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love ; thereby being manifested His perfect fecundity.

QUESTION XXVIII.

THE DIVINE RELATIONS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

THE Divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are real relations in God? (2) Whether those relations are the Divine Essence itself, or are extrinsic to it? (3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other? (4) The number of these relations.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE REAL RELATIONS IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there are no real relations in God. For Boëthius says (*De Trin. IV.*), *All possible predicaments used as regards the Divinity refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively.* But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.

Obj. 2. Further, Boëthius says that, *Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the same.* But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the Divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind.

Obj. 3. Further, the relation of Paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore Paternity in God is not a real relation; while the

same applies for the same reason to the other relations in God.

Obj. 4. Further, the Divine generation proceeds by way of an Intelligible Word. But the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. Therefore Paternity and Filiation in God, following upon generation, are only logical relations.

On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from Paternity; and the Son only from Filiation. Therefore, if no real Paternity or Filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.

I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other *genus*; forasmuch as other *genera*, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre (*locum medium*); and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the Divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q. XXVII.), these relations, according to the Divine processions, are necessarily real relations.

Reply Obj. 1. Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boëthius did not wish to exclude relation in God ; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation ; but rather by way of relation to another.

Reply Obj. 2. The relation signified by the term *the same* is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing ; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boëthius likens the Divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.

Reply Obj. 3. As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise from His nature ; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His Intellect and Will, as is above explained (QQ. XIV. and XIX.). Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature ; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God ; because creatures are contained under the Divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the Divine Processions are in one and the same Nature. Hence no parallel exists.

Reply Obj. 4. Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding

and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations ; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly ; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus Paternity and Filiation are real relations in God.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELATION IN GOD IS THE SAME AS HIS ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Divine relation is not the same as the Divine Essence. For Augustine says (*V. Trin.*) that *not all that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son : but such things do not refer to the substance.* Therefore the relation is not the Divine Essence.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*VII. Trin.*) that, *every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man.* Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only be His Essence. Therefore Essence differs from relation.

Obj. 3. Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to another, as the Philosopher says (*Praedic V.*). So if relation is the Divine Essence, it follows that the Divine Essence is essentially itself a relation to something else ; whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of the Divine Essence, which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting (*Q. III., A. 4*). Therefore relation is not the Divine Essence.

On the contrary, Everything which is not the Divine Essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God ; and if it is not the Divine Essence, it is a creature ; and it cannot claim the adoration of *latria* ; contrary to what is sung in the Preface : *let us adore the distinction of the Persons, and the equality of Their Majesty.*

I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porrée erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the

Council of Rheims. For he said that the Divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.

To see the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident ; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the *genera*, apart from that of *relation*, as in quantity and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject ; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something external. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be assistant, and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects the thing related and tends from that thing to something else ; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porrée considered relation in the former mode only.

Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence ; for there is no accident in God ; for all in Him is His Essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the Divine Essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term.

Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His Essence ; and only differs in its mode of intelligibility ; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and Essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Augustine do not imply that

Paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the Divine Essence ; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied ; but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, forasmuch as other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken, both in their generic and specific nature ; but nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists, or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity ; and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity.

Reply Obj. 2. As the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also an absolute element, so the same applies to God, but not in the same way. What is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation, is something else besides that relation ; whereas in God there is no distinction, but both are one and the same ; and this is not perfectly expressed by the word 'relation,' as if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained (Q. XIII.), in treating of the Divine Names, that more is contained in the perfection of the Divine Essence than can be signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality ; but only in the various names imposed by us.

Reply Obj. 3. If the Divine Perfection contained only what is signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect, being thus related to something else ; as in the same way, if nothing more were contained in it than what is signified by the word *Wisdom*, it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of the Divine Essence is greater than any name can comprehend, it does not follow that if a name of relation or any other be said of God signifying something not perfect, that the Divine Essence is in any way imperfect ; for the Divine Essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every genus (Q. IV.).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE RELATIONS IN GOD ARE REALLY DISTINGUISHED FROM EACH OTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine Essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

Obj. 2. Further, as Paternity and Filiation are by name distinguished from the divine Essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction of Paternity and Filiation.

Obj. 3. Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

On the contrary, Boëthius says that in God *the Substance contains the Unity; and Relation multiplies the Trinity*. Therefore, if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real Trinity in God, but only an ideal Trinity, which is the error of Sabellius.

I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when *man* is attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to another, accordingly as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation (A. 1) there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute—namely, Essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity—but according to that which is relative.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (*III. Phys.*),

this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be in reality and in idea ; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment ; but not if they differ in idea. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion ; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same ; because action implies reference as of something *from which* there is motion in the thing moved ; whereas passion implies reference as of something *which is* from another. Likewise, although Paternity, just as Filiation, is really the same as the Divine Essence ; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

Reply Obj. 2. Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures ; and hence there is no parallel argument.

Reply Obj. 3. Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed according to the procession of one from another.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN GOD THERE ARE ONLY FOUR REAL RELATIONS
—PATERNITY, FILIATION, SPIRATION, AND PROCESSION ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in God there are not only four real relations—Paternity, Filiation, Spiration, and Procession. For it must be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent agent to the object understood ; and of the one willing to the object willed ; which are real relations not comprised under those above specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in God.

Obj. 2. Further, real relations in God are understood as coming from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there exists an infinite series of real relations.

Obj. 3. Further, ideas in God are eternal (Q. XV.) ; and are only distinguished from each other by reason of their

regard to things, as above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations.

Obj. 4. Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations are eternal in God than the above named.

Obj. 5. Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the Philosopher, *It is the same way from Athens to Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens.* By the same way of reasoning there is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of Paternity, and from the Son to the Father, that of Filiation; and thus there are not four relations in God.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*V. Met.*), every Relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master and the servant; and the like. As there is no quantity in God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says, it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures are not real in Him (Q. XIII.). Hence, it follows that the real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in God. These processions are two only, as above expounded (Q. XXVII.), one derived from the action of the Intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action of the Will, the procession of Love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is the relation of the Person proceeding from the Principle; the other is the relation of the Principle Himself. The procession of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is applied to living things. The relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own (Q. XXVII.); and so neither have

the ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of the Principle of this procession is called Spiritation ; and the relation of the Person proceeding is called procession ; although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations.

Reply Obj. 1. There can be a real relation in those things in which there is a difference between the intellect and its object, and the will and its object ; a relation of science to its object, and of the willer to the object willed. In God, however, the Intellect and its object are one and the same ; because by understanding Himself, God understands all other things ; and the same applies to His Will and the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of relations are not real ; as neither is the relation of a thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation ; because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action ; and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a stone, what the intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the word.

Reply Obj. 2. Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by another act understands that he understands the stone, and again by another, understands that he understands this ; thus the acts of understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He understands all things by one act alone.

Reply Obj. 3. Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in God ; but that God knows these many relations.

Reply Obj. 4. Equality and similitude in God are not real relations ; but are only logical relations (Q. XLII.).

Reply Obj. 5. The way from one term to another and conversely is the same ; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the same as that of the son to the father ; but we could only conclude this of something absolute, if there were such between them.

QUESTION XXIX.

THE DIVINE PERSONS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

HAVING premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the Processions and the Relations, we must now approach the subject of the Persons.

First, we consider the Persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other. We consider the Persons absolutely, in common ; and then singly.

The general consideration of the Persons involves four points : (1) The signification of this name *Person* ; (2) the number of the Persons ; (3) what is involved in the number of the Persons, or is opposed thereto ; as diversity, and similitude, and the like ; (4) what belongs to our knowledge of the Persons.

Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point : (1) The definition of *Person*. (2) The comparison of Person to Essence, Subsistence, and Hypostasis. (3) Whether the name of Person is becoming to God ? (4) What Person signifies in God.

FIRST ARTICLE.

THE DEFINITION OF " PERSON."

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the definition of Person given by Boëthius is insufficient—that is, *Person is an individual substance of a rational nature*. Nothing singular can be subject to definition. But Person signifies something singular. Therefore Person is improperly defined.

Obj. 2. Further, Substance as placed above in the defini-

tion of Person, is either 'first' substance, or 'second' substance. If it is the former, the word *individual* is superfluous, because 'first' substance is individual substance; if it stands for 'second' substance, the word *individual* is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since 'second' substances are the *genera* or *species*. Therefore this definition is incorrect.

Obj. 3. Further, a name of 'intention' must not be included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man as *a species of animal* would not be a correct definition; for man is the name of a thing, and *species* is a name of intention. Therefore, since Person is the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word *individual* which is an intentional name comes improperly into the definition.

Obj. 4. Further, *Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally*, as Aristotle says (*II. Phys.*). But Person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the Angels. Therefore the word *nature* ought not to enter into the definition of Person, but the word should rather be *essence*.

Obj. 5. Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a Person. Therefore Person is not properly defined, as above.

I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the *genus* of substance. For substance is individualized by itself (*per se ipsam*); whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; for this particular whiteness is called *this*, because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called *hypostases*, or 'first' substances.

Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves (*per se*); for actions belong to singular

things. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances ; which name is *Person*.

Thus the term *individual substance* is placed in the definition of Person, as signifying the singular in the *genus* of substance ; and the term *rational nature* is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances.

Reply Obj. 1. Although this or that singular thing may not be definable, still what belongs to the general idea of singularity, can be defined ; and so the Philosopher gives a definition of ' first ' substance ; and in this way Boëthius defines person.

Reply Obj. 2. In the opinion of some, the term *substance* in the definition of Person stands for ' first ' substance, which is the hypostasis ; nor is the term *individual* superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or ' first ' substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor the hand since it is only a part. But where *individual* is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded from person ; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater—that is, by the Word of God. It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into ' first ' and ' second ' and when *individual* is added, it is restricted to ' first ' substance.

Reply Obj. 3. Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least beyond the reach of any name we can impose, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in the place of substantial ; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body ; for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term *individual* is placed in the definition of Person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances.

Reply Obj. 4. According to the Philosopher, the word

'nature' was first used to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of motion. In that sense he defines *nature*. And since this kind of principle is either formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature. And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boëthius says that, *nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing*, for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of *Person*, which means the singular in a determined *genus*, it is more correct to use the term *nature* than *essence*, because the latter is taken from being, the most common genus.

Reply Obj. 5. The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, forasmuch as it ever retains its nature of *unibility*, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or 'first' substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of *Person* belongs to it.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER 'PERSON' IS THE SAME AS HYPOSTASIS, SUBSISTENCE, AND ESSENCE

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that *Person* is the same as *Hypostasis*, *Subsistence*, and *Essence*. For Boëthius says that *the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis*. But this with us signifies *person*. Therefore *person* is altogether the same as *hypostasis*.

Obj. 2. Further, as we say there are three *Persons* in God, so we say there are three *Subsistences* in God; which implies that *Person* and *Subsistence* have the same meaning. Therefore *Person* and *Subsistence* mean the same.

Obj. 3. Further, Boëthius says that *οὐσία*, which means Essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form. Now, that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called *hypostasis* and *person*. Therefore all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning.

Obj. 4. *On the contrary*, Boëthius says that *genera* and *species* only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent, but also substand (*substant*). But *subsistences* are so called from subsisting, as *substance* or *hypostasis* is so called from substanding (*substando*). Therefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the same as *subsistences*.

Obj. 5. Further, Boëthius says that matter is called hypostasis, and form is called *ουσιωσις*—that is, subsistence. But neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs from the others.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*V. Met.*), *substance* is twofold. In one sense it means the *quiddity* of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks *οὐσία*; to which we can apply the term *essence*. In another sense substance means a subject or *suppositum*, which subsists in the *genus* of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called the *suppositum*. It is also named by three names signifying a reality—that is, a *natural thing* (*res naturæ*), *subsistence*, and *hypostasis*, according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself (*per se*), and not in another, it is called *subsistence*; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called a *natural thing* (*res naturæ*); as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called *hypostasis*, or *substance*. What these three names signify in common to the whole *genus* of substances, this name *Person* signifies in the *genus* of rational substances.

Reply Obj. 1. Among the Greeks, the term *hypostasis*, taken in the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any

individual of the genus substance ; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that nature.

Reply Obj. 2. As we say *three Persons* plurally in God, and *three Subsistences*, so the Greeks say *three hypostases*. But because the word 'substance,' which, properly speaking, corresponding in meaning to 'hypostasis,' is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis ; in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use *subsistence* for hypostasis, rather than *substance*.

Reply Obj. 3. Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. The definition comprises the principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the *essence* signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of *hypostasis* and person. For soul, and flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man ; whereas this soul, and this flesh, and this bone belong to the nature of this one man. Therefore *hypostasis* and *person* add the individual principles to the idea of essence ; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of Divine simplicity (Q. III.).

Reply Obj. 4. Boëthius says that *genera* and *species* subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves subsist ; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To *substand*, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to the accidents, which are outside the essence of *genera* and *species*.

Reply Obj. 5. The individual composed of matter and form *substands* in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boëthius says, *a simple form cannot be a subject*. Its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of

its form, which does not supervene to the thing subsisting, but gives actual existence to the matter, and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account, therefore, he ascribes *hypostasis* to matter, and *ουσιωσις*, or subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of *standing*, and the form is the principle of *subsisting*.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NAME OF 'PERSON' SHOULD BE SAID OF GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the name 'Person' should not be said of God. For Dionysius says: *No one should ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the Sacred Oracles.* But the name 'Person' is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore 'Person' is not to be applied to God.

Obj. 2. Further, Boëthius says: *The name of Person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through (personando), since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask. These 'persons' or masks the Greeks called πρόσωπα, as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes.* This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the name of Person is applied to God only metaphorically.

Obj. 3. Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the name of hypostasis does not apply to God, since, as Boëthius says, it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome also says that, *in this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey.* Therefore the name Person should not be said of God.

Obj. 4. Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of Person, as given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God (Q. XIV.); and thus God cannot be said to

have a *rational nature*. And also because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the principle of individuation is matter ; while God is immaterial : nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the name of Person ought not to be attributed to God.

On the contrary, In the Athanasian Creed we say : *One is the Person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost.*

I answer that, *Person* signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His Essence contains every perfection, this name *Person* is fittingly applied to God ; but nevertheless, not as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way ; as other names also, which, given by us to creatures, are attributed to God ; as we showed above when treating of the Names of God (Q. XIII.).

Reply Obj. 1. Although the word *Person* is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be declared of God in many places of Scripture ; as that He is the Supreme Self-subsisting Being, and the most perfectly intelligent Being. If we could speak of God only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned ; since it is not by any means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid *profane novelties of words* (1 Tim. vi. 20).

Reply Obj. 2. Although this name *Person* may not belong to God in the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name *Person* was given to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be

called *persons*. Thence by some the definition of person is given as *hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity*. And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called *person*. The dignity of the Divine Nature excels every other dignity ; and thus the name *Person* pre-eminently belongs to God.

Reply Obj. 3. The word *hypostasis* does not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents ; but it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the Subsistence. Jerome said that *poison lurks in this word*, forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many essences [in God], as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word *substance*, which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.

Reply Obj. 4. It may be said that God has a rational *nature*, if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. God cannot be called an *individual* in the sense that His individuality comes from matter ; but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. *Substance* can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There are some however, who say that the definition of Boëthius (Art. 1), is not a definition of Person in the sense we use when speaking of Persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding that *Person* in God is *the incommunicable existence of the Divine Nature*.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME 'PERSON' SIGNIFIES RELATION ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this name *Person*, as applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says : *When we speak of the Person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for*

Person is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son (VII. Trin.).

Obj. 2. Further, the interrogation *What (Quid)* refers to the essence. But, as Augustine says: *When we say there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three Persons.* Therefore Person signifies Essence.

Obj. 3. According to the Philosopher (*IV. Met.*), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of Person is this: *the individual substance of the rational nature*, as above stated. Therefore Person signifies substance.

Obj. 4. Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels.

On the contrary, Boëthius says that *every word that refers to the Persons signifies relation.* But no word belongs to person more strictly than the very word person itself. Therefore this word *Person* signifies relation.

I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word *Person* in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the Essence; nor does it in itself refer to another (*ad aliquid dicitur*), as do the words which express relation.

Hence some have thought that this word *Person* of itself expresses absolutely the Divine Essence; as this name 'God,' and this word 'Wise'; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we say, *Three Persons*, or, *one is the Person of the Father, another of the Son*, etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word 'Person,' by force of its own signification, expresses the Divine Essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of *Three Persons*,

so far from the heretics being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this, others maintained that this word 'Person' in God signifies both the Essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly the Essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as 'Person' means as it were *by itself one* (*per se una*); and Unity belongs to the Essence. And what is '*by itself*' implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist '*by Himself*,' as relatively distinct from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation directly; and Essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of 'Person' the term Nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth.

To determine the question, we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in the more common term; as *rational* is included in the meaning of *man*, and not in the meaning of *animal*. So that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word *animal*, and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question is a man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word *Person* in general; and another to ask the meaning of *Person* as applied to God. For *Person* in general signifies the individual substance of a rational nature. The individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore *Person* in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature; as in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to *Person* in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person.

Now distinction in God is only by relations of origin (Q. XXVIII.), while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the Divine Essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the Divine Essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God, so the Divine Paternity is God the Father, Who is a Divine Person. Therefore a Divine Person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a

hypostasis subsisting in the Divine Nature, although in truth that which subsists in the Divine Nature is the Divine Nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name *Person* signifies relation directly, and the Essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the Essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the Essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the Person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signification of the name *Person* was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this name *Person* was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this name *Person* means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.

Reply Obj. 1. This name *Person* is said in respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way of a substance—which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the Essence, inasmuch as in God Essence is the same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is (*quod est*), and whereby He is (*quo est*) are the same.

Reply Obj. 2. The term *what* (*quid*) refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we answer; A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the subject (*suppositum*), as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three Persons.

Reply Obj. 3. In God the individual substance understood formally as such—that is, as distinct and incommunicable—includes the idea of relation, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 4. The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass have their own proper defini-

tions, nevertheless they agree univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification of Divine Person, but not in that of an angelic or of a human person, that the name *Person* is used in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures (Q. XIII.).

QUESTION XXX.

THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE are now led to consider the plurality of the Persons ; about which there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether there are several Persons in God ? (2) How many are they ? (3) What the numeral terms signify in God ? (4) The community of the name *Person*.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL PERSONS IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not several Persons in God. For Person is *the individual substance of a rational nature*. If there are several Persons in God, there must be several substances ; which appears to be heretical.

Obj. 2. Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of Persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God there is no plurality but of relations (Q. XXVIII.). Therefore there cannot be several Persons in God.

Obj. 3. Further, Boëthius says of God, that *this is truly one which has no number*. But plurality implies number. Therefore there are not several Persons in God.

Obj. 4. Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus, if in God there exist a number of Persons, there must be whole and part in God ; which is inconsistent with the Divine Simplicity.

On the contrary, Athanasius says : *There is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost.* Therefore the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several Persons.

I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several Persons in God. It was shown above (Q. XXIX.) that this name *Person* signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the Divine Nature. It was also established (Q. XXVIII.) that there are several real relations in God ; and hence it follows that there are also several realities subsistent in the Divine Nature ; which means that there are several Persons in God.

Reply Obj. 1. The definition of *Person* includes *Substance*, not as meaning the Essence, but the subject (*suppositum*) which is made clear by the addition of the term *individual*. To signify the substance thus understood, the Greeks use the name *hypostasis*. So, as we say *Three Persons*, they say *Three Hypostases*. We are not, however, accustomed to say *Three Substances*, lest we be understood to mean *Three Essences or Natures*, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.

Reply Obj. 2. The absolute Properties in God, such as Goodness and Wisdom, are not mutually opposed ; and hence, neither are they really distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist, nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities—that is, several Persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as whiteness and sweetness ; on the other hand, the relative properties in God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other (Q. XXVIII.). Hence the plurality of such properties suffices for the plurality of Persons in God.

Reply Obj. 3. The supreme Unity and Simplicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations. Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not import composition in that of which they are predicated, as Boëthius also teaches.

Reply Obj. 4. Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as

two and three and four ; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Hⁱm, and thus number [in Him] is only in our way of understanding ; forasmuch as number regarded apart from things numbered exists only in the intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things numbered, in that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man is part of two men, and two of three ; but this does not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the whole Trinity (Q. XLII.).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE MORE THAN THREE PERSONS IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are more than Three Persons in God. For the plurality of Persons in God arises from the plurality of the relative properties. But there are four relations in God (Q. XXVIII.) : Paternity, Filiation, Common Spiration, and Procession. Therefore there are four Persons in God.

Obj. 2. The Nature of God does not differ from His Will more than from His Intellect. But in God, one Person proceeds from the Will, as Love ; and another proceeds from His Nature, as Son. Therefore another proceeds from His Intellect, as Word, besides the one who proceeds from His Nature, as Son ; thus again it follows that there are not only Three Persons in God.

Obj. 3. Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior operations it has ; as a man has understanding and will beyond other animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not only is there a Person proceeding from the Will, and another from the Intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are an infinite number of Persons in God.

Obj. 4. Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that He communicates Himself infinitely in the pro-

duction of a Divine Person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost produces a Divine Person ; and that Person another ; and so to infinity.

Obj. 5. Further, everything within a determinate number is measured, for number is a measure. But the Divine Persons are immense, as we say in the Athanasian Creed : *The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy Ghost is immense.* Therefore the Persons are not contained within the number Three.

On the contrary, It is said : *There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost* (1 John v. 7). To those who ask, *Three what?* we answer, with Augustine, *Three Persons.* Therefore there are but Three Persons in God.

I answer that, As was explained above, there can be only Three Persons in God. For it was shown above that the several Persons are the several subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real distinction between the Divine relations can come only from relative opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two Persons : and if any relations are not opposite, they must needs belong to the same Person. Since then Paternity and Filiation are opposite relations, they belong necessarily to two Persons. Therefore the subsisting Paternity is the Person of the Father ; and the subsisting Filiation is the Person of the Son. The other two relations are not opposed to either of these, but they are opposed to each other ; therefore these two cannot belong to one Person : hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid Persons ; or one must belong to one Person, and the other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them ; for thus it would follow that the procession of the intellect, which in God is Generation, wherefrom Paternity and Filiation are derived, would issue from the procession of Love, whence Spiritation and procession are derived, if the Person generating and the Person generated proceeded from the Person spiriting ;

and this is against what was laid down above (Q. XXVII.). We must consequently admit that Spiration belongs to the Person of the Father, and to the Person of the Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to Paternity or to Filiation ; and consequently that procession belongs to the other Person who is called the Person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of Love, as above explained. Therefore only Three Persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1. Although there are four relations in God, still one of them, Spiration, is not separated from the Person of the Father and of the Son, but belongs to both ; thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a property, because it does not belong to only one Person ; nor is it a personal relation—*i.e.*, constituting a Person. The three relations—Paternity, Filiation, and Procession—are called personal properties, constituting as it were the Persons ; for Paternity is the Person of the Father, Filiation is the Person of the Son, Procession is the Person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.

Reply Obj. 2. That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word, proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way of nature ; thus, as above explained (Q. XXVII.), the procession of the Divine Word is the very same as Generation, by way of nature. But love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it proceeds ; although in God Love is co-essential as being Divine ; and therefore the procession of Love is not called generation in God.

Reply Obj. 3. As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one Real Operation—that is, His own Essence. How there are in Him two processions was above explained (Q. XXVII.).

Reply Obj. 4. This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed another goodness apart from the good-

ness of the Father ; for then if the Father produced a Divine Person by His goodness, so the Holy Ghost also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the same goodness. No distinction exists between them except by the personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as derived from another ; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle of its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation of principle of another Divine Person ; because He Himself proceeds from the other Persons who are in God.

Reply Obj. 5. A determinate number, if taken as a simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a number of things as applied to the Persons in God, the notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the Three Persons is the same (Q. XLII.) : and the same is not measured by the same.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NUMERAL TERMS DENOTE ANYTHING REAL IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the numeral terms denote something real in God. For the Divine Unity is the Divine Essence. But every number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the Essence ; and therefore it denotes something real in God.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms denote something real in creatures ; therefore much more so in God.

Obj. 3. Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality ; it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and obscuring the

truth ; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.

On the contrary, Hilary says : *If we admit companionship—that is, plurality—we exclude the idea of oneness and of solitude ;* and Ambrose says : *When we say one God, unity excludes plurality of gods, we do not admit quantity in God.* Hence we see that these names are applied to God in order to remove something ; and not to denote anything positive.

I answer that, The Master of the Sentences considers that the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.

In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a consequence of division. Now division is twofold ; one is material, and is division of the continuous ; from this results number, which is a species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms ; and this kind of division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.

Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God, asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity.

But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from number, the species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only a metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as length, breadth, and the like ; but that they are taken from multitude in a trans-

cent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to the many of which it is predicated, as *one* convertible with *being* is related to being ; which kind of oneness does not add anything to being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of Divine Unity (Q. XI.) ; for *one* signifies undivided being. So, of whatever we say ' *one*,' we imply its undivided reality ; as, for instance, *one* applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things, multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself.

But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident added to being ; the same as regards *one* which is the principle of such number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which they are said, and beyond this they add negation only ; in which respect the Master of the Sentences was right. So when we say, the Essence is one, the term *one* signifies the Essence undivided ; and when we say the Person is one, it signifies the Person undivided ; and when we say the Persons are many, we signify those Persons, and their individual undividedness ; for it is of the very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.

Reply Obj. 1. One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude ; hence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to the context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a negation of division, beyond substance and relation ; as was explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God : unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable to God.

Reply Obj. 3. *One* does not exclude multitude, but division, which logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity, but division from each of the individuals which compose the multitude. This was explained when we treated of Divine Unity (Q. XI.). It must be observed,

nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not follow that the names express this signification alone. Blackness is excluded by whiteness ; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME ' PERSON ' CAN BE COMMON TO THE THREE PERSONS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this name ' Person ' cannot be common to the Three Persons. For nothing is common to the Three Persons but the Essence. But this name ' Person ' does not signify the Essence directly. Therefore it is not common to all the Three.

Obj. 2. Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable. But the very meaning of Person is that it is incommunicable ; as appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Q. XXIX.). Therefore this name ' Person ' is not common to all the Three Persons.

Obj. 3. Further, if the name ' Person ' is common to the Three, it is common either in reality, or in idea. But it is not so in reality ; otherwise the Three Persons would be one Person ; nor again is it so in idea ; otherwise Person would be a universal. But in God there is neither universal nor particular ; neither genus nor species (Q. III.). Therefore this name ' Person ' is not common to the Three.

On the contrary, Augustine says that when we ask, *Three what?* we say, *Three Persons*, because what a person is, is common to them.

I answer that, The very mode of expression itself shows that this name ' Person ' is common to the Three when we say *Three Persons* ; for when we say *three men* we show that *man* is common to the three. Now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one essence were

common to the Three ; otherwise there would be only one person of the Three, as also one Essence.

What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community of exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of Person contains the word *incommunicable*. Others thought it to be a community of intention, as the definition of Person contains the word *individual* ; as we say that to be a *species* is common to horse and ox. Both of these explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that ' Person ' is not a name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name ' Person ' is common by a community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and species, as man or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of those common natures, signified by the names *genus* or *species*. The vague individual thing, as *some man*, signifies the common nature with the determinate mode of existence of singular things—that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from others. But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing ; as the name Socrates signifies this flesh and this bone. But there is this difference—that the term *some man* signifies the nature, or the individual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of singular things ; while this name ' Person ' is not given to signify the individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common in idea to the Divine Persons, that each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the Divine Nature. Thus this name ' Person ' is common in idea to the Three Divine Persons.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument is founded on a real community.

Reply Obj. 2. Although Person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the community is an idea and not a reality, yet it does not follow that the universal exists in God, or the particular, or genus, or species ; both because neither in human affairs is the community of person the same as community of genus or species ; and because the Divine Person form one existence ; whereas genus and species and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in existence.

QUESTION XXXI.

OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY AND PLURALITY IN GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now consider what belongs to the Unity or Plurality in God ; which gives rise to four points of inquiry : (1) Concerning the word Trinity. (2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father ? (3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude the idea of another, can be joined to an essential Name in God ? (4) Whether it can be joined to a Personal Term ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS TRINITY IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems there is not Trinity in God. For every name in God signifies substance or relation. But this name *Trinity* does not signify the Substance ; otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the Persons ; nor does it signify relation ; for it does not express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word Trinity is not to be applied to God.

Obj. 2. Further, this word *Trinity* is a collective term, since it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God ; as the unity of a collective name is the least of unities ; whereas in God there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word *Trinity* does not apply to God.

Obj. 3. Further, every trine is threefold. But in God

there is not triplicity ; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither is there Trinity in God.

Obj. 4. Further, all that exists in God exists in the Unity of the Divine Essence ; because God is His own Essence. Therefore, if Trinity exists in God, it exists in the Unity of the Divine Essence ; and thus in God there would be three essential Unities ; which is heresy.

Obj. 5. Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is predicated of the abstract ; for Deity is God and Paternity is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine ; otherwise there would be nine realities in God ; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the word Trinity is not to be applied to God.

On the contrary, In the Athanasian Creed we say : *Unity in Trinity ; and Trinity in Unity is to be revered.*

I answer that, The name *Trinity* in God signifies the determinate number of Persons. And so the plurality of Persons in God requires that we should use the word Trinity ; because what is indeterminately signified by plurality, is signified by *Trinity* in a determinate manner.

Reply Obj. 1. In its etymological sense, this word *Trinity* seems to signify the one Essence of the three Persons, according as Trinity may mean Trine-Unity (*Trium unitas*). But in the strict meaning of the term it rather signifies the number of Persons of one Essence ; and on this account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not Three Persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of Persons related to each other ; and hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another.

Reply Obj. 2. Two things are implied in a collective name, plurality of the subjects (*suppositorum*), and a unity of some kind of order. For *people* is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense, this word *Trinity* is like other collective words ; but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the Divine Trinity not only is there Unity of order, but also with this there is Unity of Essence.

Reply Obj. 3. *Trinity* is taken in an absolute sense ; for it signifies the threefold number of Persons. *Triplicity* signifies a proportion of inequality ; for it is a species of unequal proportion, according to Boëthius. Therefore in God there is not triplicity, but Trinity.

Reply Obj. 4. In the Divine Trinity is to be understood both number and the Persons numbered. So when we say, *Trinity in Unity*, we do not place number in the Unity of the Essence, as if we meant three times one ; but we place the Persons numbered in the Unity of Nature ; as the subjects (*supposita*) of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the other hand, we say *Unity in Trinity* ; meaning that the Nature is in its subjects (*suppositis*).

Reply Obj. 5. When we say, *Trinity is trine*, by reason of the number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself ; since the word trine imports a distinction in the subjects (*suppositis*) of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine ; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be three subjects (*supposita*) of the Trinity ; as when we say, *God is trine*, it follows that there are three subjects (*supposita*) of the Deity.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON IS OTHER THAN THE FATHER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Son is not other than the Father. For *other* is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If, then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the Father ; which is contrary to what Augustine says, that when we speak of Three Persons, *we do not mean to imply diversity*.

Obj. 2. Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, it follows that He differs from the Father ; which is against what Ambrose says, that *the Father and the Son are one in Deity ; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any diversity*.

Obj. 3. Further, the term alien is taken from *alius* (other). But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says that *in the Divine Persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable*. Therefore the Son is not other than the Father.

Obj. 4. Further, the terms *other person* and *other thing* (*alius et aliud*) have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the Father.

On the contrary, Augustine says : *There is one Essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another ; although the Father is one Person, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another*.

I answer that, Since, as Jerome remarks, a heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we must proceed with care and with befitting modesty ; because, as Augustine says, *nowhere is error more harmful ; the quest more toilsome ; the finding more fruitful*. Now, in treating of the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously between them—namely, the error of Arius, who placed a Trinity of Substance with the Trinity of Persons ; and the error of Sabellius, who placed unity of Person with the Unity of Essence.

Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the Unity of Essence : we may, however, use the term *distinction* on account of the relative opposition. Hence, whenever we find terms of *diversity* or *difference* of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of *diversity* or *difference* are taken to mean *distinction*. But lest the simplicity and singleness of the Divine Essence be taken away, the terms *separation* and *division*, which belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided : and lest equality be taken away, we avoid the use of the term *disparity* : and lest we remove similitude, we avoid the term *alien* and *discrepant*. For Ambrose says that *in the Father and the Son*

there is no discrepancy, but one Divinity. According to Hilary, In God there is nothing alien, nothing separable.

To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term *singularity*, lest we take away the communicability of the Divine Essence. Hence Hilary says : *It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son are separate in Godhead.* We must avoid the adjective *only* (*unici*) lest we take away the number of Persons. Hence Hilary says : *We exclude from God the idea of singularity or uniqueness.* Nevertheless, we can say *the only Son*, for in God there is no plurality of Sons. Still, we do not say *the only God* (*unicum Deum*), for Deity is common to several. We avoid the word *confused*, lest we take away from the Persons the order of Their Nature. Hence Ambrose says : *What is one is not confused ; and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference.* The word *solitary* is also to be avoided, lest we take away the society of the Three Persons ; for, as Hilary says, *We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God.*

This word *other* (*alius*), however, in the masculine sense, means only a distinction of subject (*suppositi*) ; and hence we can properly say that *the Son is other than the Father*, because He is another subject (*suppositum*) of the Divine Nature, as He is another Person and another hypostasis.

Reply Obj. 1. Another (*alius*), being like the name of a particular thing, refers to the *suppositum* ; and so, there is sufficient reason for using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is another.

Reply Obj. 2. *Difference* implies distinction of form. There is one form only in God, as appears from the text, *Who, when He was in the form of God* (Phil. ii. 6). Therefore the term *difference* does not properly belong to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Still, Damascene employs the term *difference* in the Divine Persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each other in

substance, but according to determinate properties. But *difference* is taken for *distinction*, as above stated.

Reply Obj. 3. The term *alien* means what is extraneous and dissimilar ; which is not expressed by the term *other* (*alius*) ; and therefore we say that the Son is *other* than the Father, but not that He is anything *alien*.

Reply Obj. 4. The neuter gender is formless ; whereas the masculine is formed and distinct ; and likewise the feminine. So the common Essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man ? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the subject ; whereas, if we ask, What is he ? we reply, A rational and mortal animal. So, because in God distinction is by the Persons, and not by the Essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son, but not something else ; while conversely we say that they are one thing (*unum*) ; but not one Person (*unus*).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EXCLUSIVE WORD 'ALONE' SHOULD BE
ADDED TO THE ESSENTIAL TERM IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the exclusive word *alone* (*solus*) is not to be added to the essential term in God. For, according to the Philosopher, *He is alone who is not with another*. But God is with the Angels and the souls of the Saints. Therefore we cannot say that God is alone.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every Person absolutely (*per se*), and of all the Persons together ; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise God ; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says : *We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone*. Therefore God cannot be called alone (*solus*).

**Obj.* 3. Further, if this diction 'alone' is joined to the

essential term, it would be so joined either as regards the personal predicate or the essential predicate ; but it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, *God alone is Father*, since man also is a father ; nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this were true, *God alone creates*, it would follow that the *Father alone creates*, as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father ; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this diction *alone (solus)* cannot be joined to the essential term in God.

On the contrary, It is said, *To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God* (1 Tim. i. 17).

I answer that, This term *alone (solus)* can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given *suppositum* ; as, for instance, *white* to man, as when we say a white man. If the term *alone* is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in God ; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is joined ; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is above stated. A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject ; as this diction *every one* or *no one (omnis vel nullus)* ; and likewise the term *alone*, as excluding every other *suppositum* from the predicate. As when we say, *Socrates alone writes*, we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way nothing prevents the term *alone* being joined to any essential term in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God ; as if we said, *God alone is eternal*, because nothing but God is eternal.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the Angels and the souls of the Saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of Persons did not exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature ; as anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary, though Angels and men were with Him, supposing that

several Persons were not within Him. Therefore the society of Angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from God ; much less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.

Reply Obj. 2. This diction *alone (solus)*, properly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the *suppositum*, as excluding any other *suppositum* from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb *only (tantum)*, being exclusive, can be applied either to subject or predicate. For we can say, *Only Socrates*—that is, no one else—*runs* : and *Socrates runs only*—that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is alone God, or the Trinity is alone God, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, *The Trinity is God who alone is God*. In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the *suppositum*. So, when Augustine says that the Father is not alone God, but that the Trinity is alone God, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, ‘*To the King of ages, invisible, the only God,*’ as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone.

Reply Obj. 3. In both ways can the term *alone (solus)* be joined to the Essential term. For this proposition, *God alone is Father*, can mean two things, because the word *Father* can signify the Person of the Father ; and then it is true ; for no man is that Person : or it can signify the relation only ; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates ; nor, does it follow, *therefore the Father alone creates*, because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term : for instance, from the premiss, *Man alone is a mortal rational animal*, we cannot conclude, *therefore Socrates alone is such*.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN EXCLUSIVE DICTION CAN BE JOINED TO THE PERSONAL TERM ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the exclusive diction can be joined to the Personal term, even though the predicate is common. For the Lord said to the Father, *That they may know Thee, the only true God* (John xvii. 3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.

Obj. 2. Further, our Lord said, *No one knows the Son but the Father* (Matt. xi. 27) ; which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common [to the Persons]. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3. Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the universal ; for it does not follow that if we say *Socrates alone is white*, that therefore *his hand is not white*, or that *man is not white*. But one Person is in the concept of Another ; as the Father is in the concept of the Son ; and conversely. Therefore, when we say, *The Father alone is God*, we do not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost ; so that such a mode of speaking is true.

Obj. 4. Further, the Church sings, *Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus Christ*.

On the contrary, The proposition that the Father alone is God includes two assertions—namely, that the Father is God, and that no other besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is another besides the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is false, the Father alone is God ; and the same of the like sayings.

I answer that, when we say, *The Father alone is God*, such a proposition can be taken in several senses. If *Alone* means solitude in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense ; but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it can

again be understood in several ways. For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the sense being *the Father alone is God*—that is, *He who with no other is the Father, is God*. In this way Augustine expounds when he says : *We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they who are together with Him are not the Father*. This, however, is not the usual way of speaking, unless we understand by way of implication that *He who alone is called the Father is God*. But in the strict sense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes Another in the masculine sense ; but true if it excludes it in the neuter sense ; because the Son is Another Person than the Father, but not another thing ; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost.

But because this diction *alone (solus)*, properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another (*alius*) rather than other (*aliud*). Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work.

Reply Obj. 1. When we say, *Thee the only true God*, we do not understand it as referring to the Person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds. Or, if understood of the Person of the Father, the other Persons are not excluded by reason of the Unity of Essence ; as the word *alone* or *only (solus)* excludes only another thing, as above explained.

The same Reply can be given to Obj. 2. For an essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the Unity of Essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the term *no one (nemo)* is not the same as *no man*, which the word itself would seem to signify (for the Person of the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The exclusive diction does not exclude what

enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ in *suppositum*, as part and universal. But the Son differs in *suppositum* from the Father ; and so there is no parity.

Reply Obj. 4. We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High ; but that He alone is Most High *with the Holy Ghost, in the glory of God the Father.*

QUESTION XXXII.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the Divine Persons ; and this involves four points of inquiry : (1) Whether the Divine Persons can be known by natural reason ? (2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the Divine Persons ? (3) The number of the Notions ? (4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these Notions ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE TRINITY OF THE DIVINE PERSONS CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Trinity of the Divine Persons can be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things about the Trinity of Persons, for Aristotle says : *Through this number—namely, three—we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all things created.* And Augustine says : *I have read in their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,* and so on, in which passage the distinction of Persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in the Gloss. on *Rom. i.* and *Exod. viii.* that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third wonder—that is, as regards

knowledge of a third Person—*i.e.*, of the Holy Ghost—and thus it is clear that they knew at least two Persons. Likewise Trismegistus says : *The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself its own heat.* By which words the generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the Divine Persons can be obtained by natural reason.

Obj. 2. Further, Richard of St. Victor says : *I believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth.* So even to prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the Divine Persons ; while some are moved by the consideration that *no good thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership.* Augustine proceeds (*De Trin. IX*) to prove the Trinity of Persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind ; and we have followed him in this (Q. XXVII., A. 1, 3). Therefore the Trinity of Persons can be known by natural reason.

Obj. 3. Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the Divine tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the Trinity of Persons can be known by natural reason.

On the contrary, Hilary says (*De Trin. II*), *Let not man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind.* And Ambrose says (*De Fide I*), *It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent.* But the Trinity of the Divine Persons is distinguished by origin of generation and procession (Q. XXX.). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that the Trinity of Persons cannot be known by reason.

I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (Q. XII.), man can obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason only from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the

knowledge of God, as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason can we know of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the principle of all things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating of God as above (Q. XII.). Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the Essence, and not to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the Essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the Persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the Trinity of Persons by natural reason, derogates from Faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of Faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that *Faith is of things that appear not* (Heb. xi. 1) [and the same Apostle says also, *We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden*] (1 Cor. ii. 6, 7). Secondly, as regards the utility of drawing others to the Faith. For when anyone in the endeavour to prove the Faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers. For they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such grounds.

Therefore, what is of faith can be proved by authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards others it suffices to prove that what Faith teaches is not impossible. Hence it is said by Dionysius, *Whoever wholly resists the word, he is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the truth of the word (i.e., the Divine Word), we too follow this rule (Div. Nom. II).*

Reply Obj. 1. The philosophers did not know the Mystery of the Trinity of the Divine Persons by its proper attributes, such as Paternity, Filiation, and Procession, according to the Apostle's words, *We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the world knew* (1 Cor. ii. 6)—*i.e.*, the philosophers. Nevertheless, they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the Persons, as power to the

Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost ; as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, *By this number*, etc., we must not take it as if he affirmed a three-fold number in God, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, *In the beginning was the word*, not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but as meaning the knowledge (*ratio idealis*) whereby God made all things, and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated to the Three Persons, still they are said to have failed in the third sign—that is, in the knowledge of the Third Person, because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that knowing God *they did not glorify Him as God* (Rom. i.) ; or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently maintained the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called *mind* or the *paternal intellect*, containing the idea of all things, as Macrobius describes in "Scipio's Dream." They did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, *Monad begot Monad*, etc., this does not refer to the Generation of the Son, or to the Procession of the Holy Ghost ; but to the production of the world. For one God produced one world by reason of His love for Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point : firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in

astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained ; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In the first way we can prove that God is one ; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity ; as, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the Trinity of Persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point ; for the infinite Goodness of God is manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite Goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from God : but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive the Divine Goodness. Likewise, also, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness : hence it needs to share some other's good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. Hence Augustine says that ' by faith we arrive at knowledge,' and not conversely.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two reasons why the knowledge of the Divine Persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by necessity. When we say that in Him there is a Procession of Love, we show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of His own Goodness. So Moses, when he had said, *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*, subjoined, *God said, Let there be light*, to manifest the Divine Word ; and then said, *God saw the light that it was good*, to show the proof of the Divine Love. The same is also found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly,

that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE NOTIONS IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in God there are no notions. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. I*) : *We must not dare to say anything of God but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture.* But Holy Scripture does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in God.

Obj. 2. Further, all that exists in God concerns the Unity of the Essence or the Trinity of the Persons. But the notions do not concern the Unity of the Essence, nor the Trinity of the Persons ; for neither can what belongs to the Essence be predicated of the notions : for instance, we do not say that Paternity is wise or creates ; nor can what belongs to the Persons be so predicated ; for example, we do not say that Paternity begets, nor that Filiation is begotten. Therefore there do not exist notions in God.

Obj. 3. Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition : for they are known of themselves. But the Divine Persons are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God.

On the contrary, Damascene says : *We recognize difference of hypostases (i.e., of persons), in the Three properties ; i.e., in the paternal, the filial, and the processional.* Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God.

I answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the Persons, said that in God there were no Properties or Notions, and wherever they were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, *I beseech your kindness—i.e., you who are kind—so when we speak of Paternity in God, we mean God the Father.*

But, as was shown above (QQ. III., XIII.), the use of concrete and abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the Divine simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it. Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the Divine Essence; considered in Itself, and therefore, our human intellect apprehends and names Divine things, according to its own mode, that is by terms drawn from the things of sense, whence its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete terms. Hence also we signify Divine things, as above stated, by abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.

But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say Paternity and Father.

Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be one God and Three Persons, to those who ask: *Whereby are They one God? and Whereby are they Three Persons?* as we answer that they are one in Essence or Deity; so there must also be some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the Persons are distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an abstract term, as Paternity and Filiation. Therefore the Divine Essence is signified as *What*; and the Person as *Who*; and the property as *Whereby*.

The second motive is because one Person in God is related to Two Persons—namely, the Person of the Father to the Person of the Son and to the Person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two Persons.

Nor can it be said with Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the Father is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost ; whereas these two Persons are related to the Father by two relations. For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another, it must be said that two relations are not specifically different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For the relation of lord and father must differ according to the difference of filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His creatures by one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are not related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence there is no parity.

Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the creature (Q. XXVIII., A. 1 and 3) ; while there is no reason against our admitting in God, many relations of idea. But in the Father there must be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, whereby they are related to the Father, we must understand two relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is necessary that the relations should be separately signified in the abstract ; and these are what we mean by properties and notions.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy Scripture, still the Persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of notions ; as the abstract is contained in the concrete.

Reply Obj. 2. In God the notions have their significance not after the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the Persons are known ; although in God these notions or relations are real (Q. XXVIII.). Therefore whatever has order to any essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions ; forasmuch as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we cannot say that Paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, or is intelligent.

The essentials, however, which are not ordered to any act, but simply remove created conditions from God, can be predicated of the notions ; for we can say that Paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So also on account of the real identity, substantive terms, whether personal or essential, can be predicated of the notions ; for we can say that Paternity is God, and that Paternity is the Father.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the Persons are simple, still without prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the Persons can be abstractly signified, as above explained.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE FIVE NOTIONS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not five notions. For the notions proper to the Persons are the relations whereby they are distinguished from each other. But the relations in God are only four (Q. XXVIII.). Therefore the notions are only four in number.

Obj. 2. Further, as there is only one Essence in God, He is called one God, and because in Him there are Three Persons, He is called the Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be called quinary ; which cannot be allowed.

Obj. 3. Further, if there are five notions for the Three Persons in God, there must be in some one Person two or more notions, as in the Person of the Father there is Innascibility and Paternity, and common Spiration. Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they really differ, it follows that the Person of the Father is composed of several things. But if they differ in idea only, it follows that one of them can be predicated of another, so that we can say that as the Divine goodness is the same as the Divine Wisdom by reason of the common reality, so common Spiration is Paternity ; which is not to be admitted. Therefore there are not five notions.

Obj. 4. Further, *on the contrary*, It seems that there are

more (than five notions) ; because, as the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of Innascibility ; so from the Holy Ghost no other Person proceeds. And in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion.

Obj. 5. Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one Notion is common to the Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a Divine Person. The Divine Persons are multiplied by reason of Their origin. Now, origin includes the idea of something from which another comes, and of something that comes from another (*a quo alius, et qui ab alio*), and by these two modes a Person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be known by the fact that He is from another ; but by the fact that He is from no one ; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called *innascibility*. As the source of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the Son is from Him, the Father is known by the notion of *Paternity* ; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by the notion of *Common Spiration*. The Son can be known as begotten by another, and thus He is known by *Filiation* ; and also by another Person proceeding from Him, the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as the Father is known, by *Common Spiration*. The Holy Ghost can be known by the fact that He is from another, or from others ; thus He is known by *Procession* ; but not by the fact that another is from Him, as no Divine Person proceeds from Him.

Therefore there are Five notions in God : *Innascibility*, *Paternity*, *Filiation*, *Common Spiration*, and *Procession*. Of these only four are relations, for *Innascibility* is not a relation, except by reduction, as will appear later (Q. XXXIII.). Four only are properties. For *Common Spiration* is not a property ; because it belongs to two Persons. Three are personal notions, *i.e.*, constituting Persons,

Paternity, Filiation, and Procession. Common Spiration and Innascibility are called notions of Persons, but not personal notions (Q. XL.).

Reply Obj. 1. Besides the four relations, another notion must be admitted, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. The Divine Essence is signified as a reality ; and likewise the Persons are signified as realities ; whereas the notions are signified as ideas notifying the Persons. Therefore, although God is one by Unity of Essence, and trine by Trinity of Persons, nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions.

Reply Obj. 3. Since the real plurality in God is founded only on relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they are not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor again are they predicated of each other, because they are different ideas of the Persons ; as we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge, although we do say that Knowledge is Power.

Reply Obj. 4. As Person implies dignity (Q. XIX.), we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact that no Person is from Him. For this does not belong to His dignity ; as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one.

Reply Obj. 5. The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special mode of existence derived from the Father ; as the Father and the Son agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on which a notion is based must be something special ; thus no parity of reasoning exists.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO HAVE VARIOUS CONTRARY
OPINIONS OF NOTIONS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not lawful to have various contrary opinions of the Notions : For Augustine says, *No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity ; to which mystery the Notions assuredly belong.* But con-

trary opinions must be in some way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions of the notions.

Obj. 2. Further, the Persons are known by the Notions. But no contrary opinion concerning the Persons is to be tolerated. Therefore neither can there be about the notions.

On the contrary, The notions are not articles of Faith. Therefore different opinions of the notions are permissible.

I answer that, Anything is of Faith in two ways ; directly, where any truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the Trinity and Unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like ; and concerning these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if it be held obstinately. A thing is of Faith, indirectly, if the denial of it involves as a consequence something against Faith ; as for instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it follows that the Divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such things anyone may establish a false opinion without danger of heresy, before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences against Faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown ; whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided that consequences follow against Faith, then the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as heretical which were formerly not so considered, as their consequences are now more manifest.

So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with Faith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the Notions, knowing or thinking that consequences against the Faith would follow, he would lapse into heresy.

By what has been said all the objections may be solved.

QUESTION XXXIII.

OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now consider the Persons singly ; and first, the Person of the Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry : (1) Whether the Father is the Principle ? (2) Whether the Person of the Father is properly signified by this name *Father* ? (3) Whether *Father* in God is said personally before it is said essentially ? (4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE FATHER TO BE THE PRINCIPLE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Father cannot be called the Principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For Principle and cause are the same, according to the Philosopher. But we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that He is the Principle of the Son.

Obj. 2. Further, a principle is so denoted from the thing principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created ; which appears false.

Obj. 3. *Further*, the word principle is taken from priority. But in God there is no *before* and *after*, as Athanasius says. Therefore in speaking of God we ought not to use the term principle.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *The Father is the Principle of the whole Deity* (*De Trin.* iii.).

I answer that, The word *Principle* signifies only that whence another proceeds. Everything whence anything proceeds in any way we call a principle; and conversely. As the Father is the one whence Another proceeds, it follows that the Father is the Principle.

Reply Obj. 1. The Greeks use the words *Cause* and *Principle* indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use the word *cause*, but only *principle*. The reason is because *principle* is a wider term than *cause*; as *cause* is more common than *element*. For the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the principle; but not the cause. Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God (Q. XIII., A. 11), because, the more special terms are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature. Hence this name *cause* seems to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is not implied in the word *principle*. For in all kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power. But we use the term *principle* even in things which have no such difference, but have only a certain order to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or also when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of a line.

Reply Obj. 2. It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father something of authority by reason of His being the Principle, still we do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this way, Hilary says: *By authority of the Giver, the Father is the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of nature is given* (*De Trin.* ix.).

Reply Obj. 3. Although this word principle, as regards its derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does

not signify priority, but origin. What a term signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing (Q. XIII., A. 8).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME ' FATHER ' IS PROPERLY THE
NAME OF A DIVINE PERSON ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this name *Father* is not properly the name of a Divine Person. For the name *Father* signifies relation. Moreover Person is an individual substance. Therefore this name *Father* is not properly a name signifying a Person.

Obj. 2. Further, a begetter is more common than father ; for every father begets ; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is more properly applied to God (Q. XIII.). Therefore the more proper name of the Divine Person is begetter and generator than Father.

Obj. 3. Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically said to be begotten, or the offspring ; and consequently, He of whom is the Word, is metaphorically called Father. Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not properly called Father.

Obj. 4. Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to creatures before God ; because generation seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not only by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name *Father* taken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any Divine Person.

On the contrary, It is said, *He shall cry out to me : Thou art my Father* (Ps. lxxxviii. 27).

I answer that, The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and soul belong to the nature of man, so to the idea of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular body ; and by these is this particular

man distinguished from all other men. Now it is Paternity which distinguishes the Person of the Father from all the other Persons. Hence this name *Father*, whereby Paternity is signified, is the proper name of the Person of the Father.

Reply Obj. 1. Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this name *father* among us does not signify a person, but the relation of a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought ; for in God the relation signified by the name *Father* is a subsisting Person. Hence, as above explained (Q. XXIX.), this name *Person* in God signifies a relation subsisting in the Divine Nature.

Reply Obj. 2. According to the Philosopher, a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now generation signifies something in process of being made ; whereas paternity signifies the complement of generation ; and therefore the name *Father* is more expressive as regards the Divine Person than generator or begetter.

Reply Obj. 3. In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the Divine Word is something subsistent in the Divine Nature ; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father.

Reply Obj. 4. The terms *generation* and *paternity*, like the other terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence also the Apostle says, *I bend my knee to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all Paternity in heaven and on earth is named* (Eph. iii. 14), which is explained thus. It is manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is the form of the thing generated ; and the nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation ; as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence the very fact that in the Divine Generation the form of the Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same, shows that

generation, and consequently Paternity, is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of the Divine Generation and Paternity.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME ' FATHER ' IS APPLIED TO GOD,
FIRSTLY AS A PERSONAL NAME ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this name *Father* is not applied to God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common precedes the particular. But this name *Father* as a personal name, belongs to the Person of the Father ; and taken in an essential sense it is common to the whole Trinity ; for we say *Our Father* to the whole Trinity. Therefore *Father* comes first as an essential name before its personal sense.

Obj. 2. Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is no priority of predication. But Paternity and Filiation seem to be of the same nature, according as a Divine Person is Father of the Son, and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's ; since, according to Basil, to receive is common to the creature and to the Son. Therefore *Father* in God is not taken as an essential name before it is taken personally.

Obj. 3. Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason of Filiation or generation, according to Col. i. 15 : *Who is the Image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature.* Therefore Paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same concept as, Paternity taken essentially.

On the contrary, The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is the Father of the Son from eternity ; while He is Father of the creature in time. Therefore Paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the creature.

I answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is per-

fectly contained its signification, before it is applied to that which only partially contains it ; for the latter bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the signification of the name ; since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things. Hence this name *lion* is applied first to the animal containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so called, before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's nature, as courage, or strength, or the like ; and of whom it is said by way of similitude.

Now it is manifest from the foregoing (QQ. XXVII. and XXVIII.), that the perfect idea of Paternity and Filiation is to be found in God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the Nature and Glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator and the creature have not the same nature ; but by way of a certain likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some creatures by reason only of a trace (*vestigium*), as that which is found in irrational creatures, according to the words, *Who is the father of the rain ? or who begot the drops of dew ?* (Job xxxviii. 28). Of the rational creature (He is the Father) by reason of the likeness of His image, according to the text, *Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and created thee ?* (Deut. xxxii. 6). And of others He is the Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received, according to the text, *The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God ; and if sons, heirs also* (Rom. viii. 16, 17). Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according to the text, *We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God* (Rom. v. 2). Therefore it is plain that *Paternity* is applied to God first, as importing regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports the regard of God to creatures.

Reply Obj. 1. Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our intelligence, come before proper terms ; because they are included in the understanding of proper terms ; but not conversely. For in the concept of the Person of the Father, God is understood ; but not conversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature come after proper terms which import personal relations ; because the Person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is first understood to proceed from the artist before the thing designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist's mind ; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words, *Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the Image of His Son* (Rom. viii. 29).

Reply Obj. 2. *To receive* is said to be common to the creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence the authority quoted subjoins : *That He may be the First Born among many brethren*, after saying that some were conformed to the Image of the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses a position of singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as Basil also declares ; hence He is called the only Begotten (John i. 18) : *The only Begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared unto us.*

From this appears the Reply to Obj. 3.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO THE FATHER TO BE
UNBEGOTTEN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it is the property. But *unbegotten* supposes

nothing in the Father ; it only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of the Father.

Obj. 2. Further, *Unbegotten* is taken either in a privative, or in a negative, sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten ; neither is the Divine Essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the Essence ; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that the Person of the Father is imperfect ; which cannot be.

Obj. 3. Further, in God, *unbegotten* does not signify relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance ; therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore the Father ought not to be called Unbegotten.

Obj. 4. Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since, then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another. Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.

Obj. 5. Further, as the Father is the principle of the Person begotten, so is He of the Person proceeding. So if by reason of His opposition to the Person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten, it follows that it is proper to Him also not to proceed (*improcessibilis*).

On the contrary, Hilary says, *one is from one*—that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten—namely, by the property in each one respectively of *innascibility and origin*.

I answer that, As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary principle, so also in the Divine Persons, in whom there is no before or after, is formed the Principle not from a Principle, Who is the Father ; and the Principle from a Principle, Who is the Son.

Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways ; in one way as the first *principle*, by reason of its having a relation to what proceeds from itself ; in another way,

inasmuch as it is a *first* principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the Father is known both by Paternity and by Common Spiration, as regards the Persons proceeding from Himself. But as the Principle, not from a Principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word *unbegotten*.

Reply Obj. 1. Some there are who say that Innascibility, signified by the word *unbegotten*, as a property of the Father, is not a negative term only, but either that it means both these things together—namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the Principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct from Paternity and Spiration; but would include them as the proper is included in the common. For source and authority signify in God nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with Augustine that *unbegotten* imports the negation of passive generation. For he says that *unbegotten has the same meaning as 'not a son.'* Nor does it follow that *unbegotten* is not the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are notified by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as what has no part.

Reply Obj. 2. *Unbegotten* is taken sometimes in a negative sense only, and in that sense Jerome says that *the Holy Ghost is unbegotten*—that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise *unbegotten* may be taken in a kind of privative sense, but not as implying any imperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way when a thing has not what naturally belongs to another; even though it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so called when something has not got what naturally belongs to some members of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in which sense, privation imports an imper-

fection. In this sense, *unbegotten* is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain Person of the Divine Nature is not begotten, while some person of the same nature is begotten. In this sense the term *unbegotten* can be applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper to the Father alone, it must be further understood that the name *unbegotten* belongs to a Divine Person as the Principle of another Person ; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of Principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in the name *unbegotten* that He is not in any way derived from another ; and not only that He is not from another by way only of generation. In this sense the term *unbegotten* does not belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by Procession, as a subsisting Person ; nor does it belong to the Divine Essence, of which it may be said that it is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from another—namely, from the Father.

Reply Obj. 3. According to Damascene, *unbegotten* in one sense signifies the same as *uncreated* ; and thus it applies to the Substance, for thereby does the created substance differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term ; just as negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as *not man* is reduced to the genus of substance, and *not white* to the genus of quality. Hence, since *begotten* implies relation in God, *unbegotten* belongs also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten, but only by relation ; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.

Reply Obj. 4. In every genus there must be something first ; so in the Divine Nature there must be some one principle which is not from another, and which we call *unbegotten*. To admit two innascibles is to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two Divine Natures. Hence Hilary says, *as there is one God, so there cannot be two Innascibles*. And this especially because, did two innascibles exist, one would not be from the other, and they

would not be distinguished by relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of nature.

Reply Obj. 5. The property of the Father, whereby He is not from another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of the Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost; both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name (Q. XXVII.), and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being denied of the Father that He is begotten, although He is the Principle of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does not proceed by the procession of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the Person begotten.

QUESTION XXXIV.

OF THE PERSON OF THE SON.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE next consider the Person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son—namely, *Son*, *Word*, and *Image*. The idea of Son is gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image.

Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry :
(1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a Personal term ? (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son ? (3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER WORD IN GOD IS A PERSONAL NAME ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Word in God is not a personal name. For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on the text, *In the beginning was the Word*. Therefore Word is not a personal name in God.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine, *The Word is knowledge with love* ; and according to Anselm, *To speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought*. But knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God. Therefore Word is not a personal term in God.

Obj. 3. Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according to Anselm, as the Father is intelligent, and the Son is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so

the Father speaks, and the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks ; and likewise, each one of them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term in God and not in a personal sense.

Obj. 4. Further, no Divine Person is made. But the Word of God is something made. For it is said, *Fi* hail, snow, ice, the storms which do (make) His Word (Ps. cxlviii. 8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is.* But Son is a personal Name, since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word.

I answer that, The Name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense, is a personal Name, and in no way an essential Name.

To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning ; while in a fourth sense it has a meaning improper or figurative. The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice ; and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word—that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For, according to the philosopher, vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect ; and again the vocal sound proceeds from the imagination. The vocal sound, which has no definite signification, cannot be called a word. For the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact that it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word ; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called ; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words, saying that *word* is called *the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light and splendour ;* which is the first kind. Again, he says, *the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word,*

t is pronounced in the heart; which is the third kind. Again also, the word is the angel—that is, the messenger of intelligence; which is the second kind. Word is also used a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected by a word; as we are accustomed to say, *this is the word I have said to thee*, or *which the King has commanded*, alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command.

Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says: *Whoever can understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some likeness of that Word of whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word.* The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself—namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence Word, according as we use the term strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the Divine Persons are distinguished by origin (Q. XXVII.). Hence the term *Word*, according as we use the term strictly of God, is not to be taken as said essentially, but personally.

Reply Obj. 1. The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavoured to maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same substance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within him. But supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation; either it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly

manifests, what (thus) it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except Word alone; for Word alone signifies what proceeds from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the word. And the intellect itself, according as it is made active by the intelligible species, is considered in an absolute sense; likewise the act of understanding (*intelligence*) which is to the actual intellect what existence is to actual being; for the act of understanding does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says that the word is *begotten wisdom*; for it is nothing but the concept of the wise man; and in the same way it can be called *begotten knowledge*. Thus can also be explained how *to speak* is in God *to see by thought*, forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of the Divine Thought. Still the term *Thought* does not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says: *Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless.* For thought consists properly in the search after truth, and this has no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm takes *thought* in an improper sense for *contemplation*.

Reply Obj. 3. As properly speaking Word in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise to *speak*. Hence,

as the Word is not common to the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says that, *He who speaks in that co-eternal word is not understood as alone in God.* On the other hand, to be spoken (*dici*) belongs to each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in this manner to one Person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the Father, by understanding Himself and the Son, and the Holy Ghost and all other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is *spoken* in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone, expresses (*dicit*) a stone. Anselm took the term *speaking* (*dicere*) improperly for the act of understanding (*intelligere*); whereas they really differ from each other; for *to understand* means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin is conveyed; but only a certain information of our intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete identity, because in God the Intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same (Q. XIV.). But *to speak* means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for *to speak* is nothing but to pronounce a word. But by means of the word it imports a habitude to the thing understood which in the word pronounced is manifested to the intelligent agent. Thus, only the Person who pronounces the word is *speaker* (*dicens*) in God, although each Person understands and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.

Reply Obj. 4. The term word is there taken figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus creatures are said to do the word of God, as exe-

cuting any effect, whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the Divine Wisdom ; as anyone is said to do the word of the King when he does the work to which he is appointed by the King's word.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ' WORD ' IS THE SON'S PROPER NAME ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that ' Word ' is not the proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting Person in God. But word does not signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the proper name of the Person of the Son.

Obj. 2. Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by a pronouncement. Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from the Father by way only of pronouncement ; which is the heresy of Valentine ; as appears from Augustine (*De Hæres.*).

Obj. 3. Further, every proper name of a person signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper Name, it signifies some property of His ; and thus there will be several more properties in God than those above mentioned.

Obj. 4. Further, Whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs to the Son : and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.

Obj. 5. Further, it is said of the Son : *Bearing all things by the word of His Power* (Heb. i. 3) ; whence Basil infers that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the Son.

On the contrary, Augustine says : *By Word we understand the Son alone.*

I answer that, *Word,* said of God in its proper sense, is used personally, and is the proper name of the Person of the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect : and the Person who proceeds in God, by way of emanation

of the intellect, is called the Son ; and this Procession is called generation, as we have shown above (Q. XXVII., A. 2). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God.

Reply Obj. 1. To be and to understand are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our nature. But in God to be and to understand are one and the same : hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His ; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be something subsistent ; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists ; and so Damascene says that *the Word of God is substantial and has a hypostatic being ; but other words* (as our own) *are activities of the soul.*

Reply Obj. 2. The error of Valentine was condemned not because he asserted that the Son was born by pronouncement, as the Arians calumniously said, and as Hilary relates (*De Trin.* vi.) ; but on account of the different mode of pronouncement put forth by its author, as appears from Augustine (*De Hæres.*).

Reply Obj. 3. In the name Word the same property is comprised as in the Name Son. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* vii.) : *Word and Son express the same.* For the Son's nativity, which is His personal property, is signified by different names, which are attributed to the Son to express His Perfection in various ways. To show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son ; to show that He is co-eternal, he is called the Splendour ; to show that He is altogether like, He is called the Image ; to show that He is begotten immaterially, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be expressed by only one Name.

Reply Obj. 4. To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God essentially (Q. XIV.). Now the Son is God Begotten, and not God Begetting ; and hence He is intelligent, not as producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding ; forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ

really from the Divine Intellect, but is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by Relation.

Reply Obj. 5. When it is said of the Son, *Bearing all things by the word of His power* : word is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word. Hence the *Gloss* says that word is here taken to mean command ; as by the effect of the power of the Word, things are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively in applying word to the Holy Ghost ; in the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He manifests the Son.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NAME ' WORD ' IMPORTS RELATION TO
CREATURES ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Name ' Word ' does not import relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to creatures.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in time ; as *Lord* and *Creator*. But Word is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.

Obj. 3. Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds. Therefore if it imports relation to the creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from the creature.

Obj. 4. Further, Ideas (in God) are many according to their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many.

Obj. 5. Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know beings only ; He knows also non-beings.

Therefore in the Word are implied relations to non-beings ; which appears to be false.

On the contrary, Augustine says, that *the Name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power.*

I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the Word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of all creatures.

And as the knowledge of God, is only cognoscitive as regards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cognoscitive and operative, so the Word of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and operative of creatures ; and therefore it is said in Ps. xxxii. 9 : *He spake, and they were made* ; because in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes.

Reply Obj. 1. In the name of the Person nature is also included indirectly ; for person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore the Name of a Divine Person, as regards the personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what belongs to the Nature. There is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in its meaning : for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten ; and in this way the name Word imports relation to creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the relations result from actions, some names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern ; and the like are applied to God in time. But others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect,

but abides in the agent—as to know and to will ; and such are not applied to God in time ; and this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time ; but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect.

Reply Obj. 3. Creatures are known to God not by the knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own Essence. Hence it is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures.

Reply Obj. 4. The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures ; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God ; and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify relation to the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature ; and so there is only one Word in God, and that a personal one.

Reply Obj. 5. God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about non-beings are the same ; because the Word of God contains no less than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says. Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings.

QUESTION XXXV.

OF THE IMAGE.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE next inquire concerning the Image : about which there are two points of inquiry : (1) Whether Image in God is said personally ? (2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IMAGE IN GOD IS SAID PERSONALLY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Image is not said personally of God. For Augustine (*Fulgentius—De Fide ad Petrum i.*), *The Godhead of the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one.* Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally.

Obj. 2. Further, Hilary says (*De Synod.*) : *An image is a like species of that which it represents.* But species or form is said of God essentially. Therefore also is Image.

Obj. 3. Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies (something) before and (something) after. But in the Divine Persons there is no before and after. Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. vii.*) : *What is more absurd than to say a thing is the image of itself ?* Therefore the Image in God is a relation, and is thus a personal Name.

I answer that, Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of Image, but (only) similitude of species, or at least of some

specific sign. In corporeal things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see that the species of different animals are of different figures ; but not of different colours. Hence if the colour of anything is depicted on a wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species nor of figure is enough for an image, which requires also the idea of origin ; because, as Augustine says (*Lib. lxxxiii. Quæst.*) : *One egg is not the image of another, because it is not derived from it.* Therefore for a true image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species, or at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession or origin in God, belongs to the Persons. Hence the name *Image* is a personal Name.

Reply Obj. 1. Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything proceeds, is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (*Fulgentius*) uses the name of Image in this sense when he says that the Divine Nature of the Holy Trinity is the Image to whom man was made.

Reply Obj. 2. *Species*, as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of image, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this sense image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like form.

Reply Obj. 3. Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but only assimilation.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NAME OF IMAGE IS PROPER TO THE SON ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the name of Image is not proper to the Son ; because, as Damascene says, *The Holy Ghost is the Image of the Son.* Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone.

Obj. 2. Further, Similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an Image, as Augustine says (*Lib. lxxxiii. Qqu.*).

But this belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude. Therefore the Holy Ghost is an Image ; so to be Image does not belong to the Son alone.

Obj. 3. Further, man is also called the image of God, according to the text, *The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image and the glory of God* (1 Cor. xi. 7). Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.) : *The Son alone is the Image of the Father.*

I answer that, The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost is the Image both of the Father and of the Son ; but the Latin Doctors attribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the canonical Scripture except as applied to the Son ; as in the words, *Who is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures* (Col. i. 15) ; and again : *Who being the brightness of His Glory, and the figure of His substance* (Heb. i. 3).

Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not in nature only, but also in the notion of principle : whereas the Holy Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion. This, however, does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by reason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in God, as Augustine says, so neither (by reason thereof do we consider) that similitude which is essential to image. Hence others say that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the Son, because there cannot be an image of an image ; nor of the Father, because again the image must be immediately related to that of which it is the image ; and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father through the Son ; nor again is He the Image of the Father and the Son, because then there would be one image of two ; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof : for the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost, as we shall explain further on (Q. XXXVI.). Hence there is nothing to prevent there being one Image of the Father and of the Son, inasmuch as

they are one ; since even man is the one image of the whole Trinity.

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the Holy Ghost, although by His Procession He receives the Nature of the Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be *Born* ; so, although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is not called the Image ; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is essential to word to be of like species with that whence it proceeds ; whereas this does not essentially belong to Love, although it may belong to that Love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the Divine Love.

Reply Obj. 1. Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and the Son, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways ; in one way it is found in something of the same specific nature ; as the image of the King is found in his son ; in another way it is found in something of a different nature, as the King's image on the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father ; in the second sense man is called the image of God ; and therefore in order to express the imperfect character of the Divine image in man, man is not simply called the image, but *according to the image (ad imaginem)*, whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said that the Son of God is *according to the image*, because He is the perfect Image of the Father.

QUESTION XXXVI.

OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now proceed to treat of what belongs to the Person of the Holy Ghost, Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of God. Concerning the name *Holy Ghost*, there are four points of treatment: (1) Whether this Name, *Holy Ghost*, is the Proper Name of one Divine Person? (2) Whether that Divine Person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds from the Father and the Son? (3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son? (4) Whether the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME, 'HOLY GHOST,' IS THE PROPER NAME OF ONE DIVINE PERSON?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that this Name, 'Holy Ghost,' is not the proper name of one Divine Person. For no name which is common to the Three Persons is the proper name of any one Person. But this Name of 'Holy Ghost'* is common

* It should be borne in mind that the word 'ghost' is the old English equivalent for the Latin *spiritus*, whether in the sense of *breath* or *blast*, or in the sense of *spirit* as an immaterial substance. Thus we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x. 7), *The Gost of Storms (spiritus procellarum)*, and in the latter *Trubled gost is sacrifice of God* (Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and *Owe wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre* (More, "Comfort against Tribulation"); and in our modern expression of *giving up the ghost*. As applied to God, and not specially to the third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder, *Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good*.

to the Three Persons ; for Hilary (*De Trin.* viii.) shows that the term *Spirit of God* sometimes means the Father, as in the words of Isaias (lxi. 1) : *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me* ; and sometimes it means the Son, as when the Son says : *In the Spirit of God I cast out devils* (Matt. xii. 28). He demonstrates that He cast out devils by His own natural power ; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the words of Joel (ii. 28) : *I will pour out of My Spirit over all flesh*. Therefore this name *Holy Ghost* is not the proper Name of a Divine Person.

Obj. 2. Further, the Names of the Divine Persons are relative terms, as Boëthius says (*De Trin.*). But this name *Holy Ghost* is not a relative term. Therefore this Name is not the proper Name of a Divine Person.

Obj. 3. Further, because the Son is the name of a Divine Person He cannot be called the Son of this one or of that. But the spirit is spoken of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, *The Lord said to Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give to them* (Num. xi. 17), and also, *The spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus* (4 Kings ii. 15). Therefore *Holy Ghost* does not seem to be the proper Name of one Divine Person.

On the contrary, It is said, *There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost*. As Augustine says (*De Trin.* vii.) : *When we ask, Three what? we say, Three Persons*. Therefore the Holy Ghost is the Name of a Divine Person.

I answer that, While there are two processions in God, one of these, the procession of Love, has no proper name of its own (Q. XXVII.). Hence the relations also which follow from this procession are without a name (Q. XXVIII.). So also the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name, for the same reason ; but as some names are accommodated by custom of the speakers to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we use the names of procession and Spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the notional acts than the relations ; so to signify the Divine Person, Who proceeds by way of Love, this name

Holy Ghost is by the use of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from the fact that the Person who is called *Holy Ghost* has something in common with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.), *Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that properly which both are called in common. For the Father also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy.* Secondly, from the proper signification of the name. For the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we call the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover towards the object loved. Further, holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the Divine Person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved, that Person is most properly named *The Holy Ghost*.

Reply Obj. 1. The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: because by *spirit* the immateriality of the Divine Substance is signified; for corporeal spirit (*breath—wind*) is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this term to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the word *holy* we signify the purity of Divine Goodness. But if Holy Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the usage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the Three Persons, the one who proceeds by way of Love, for the reason above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. Although this name *Holy Ghost* does not indicate a Relation, still it takes the place of a Relative term, inasmuch as it is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by Relation only. Still, this Name may be understood as including a Relation, if we take *spiritus* (breath) as though it were *spiratus* (breathed).

Reply Obj. 3. In the name *Son* we understand that relation only which is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but in the name *Father* we understand the relation of principle; and likewise in the name of

Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving Power. But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a Divine Person ; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say *Our Father*, and *our Spirit* ; but we cannot say *Our Son*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS FROM THE SON ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. For as Dionysius says : *We must not dare to say anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely expressed to us by the Sacred Oracles.* But in the Sacred Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son ; but only that He proceeds from the Father, as appears from the words : *The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the Father* (John xv. 26). Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Obj. 2. Further, In the Creed of the Council of Constantinople we read : *We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Lifegiver, Who proceeds from the Father ; with the Father and the Son to be adored and glorified.* No addition, then, should be made in our Creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son ; and those who added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says, *We say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the Spirit of the Father ; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him the Spirit of the Son.* Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Obj. 4. Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son ; for it is said in the legend of St. Andre : *Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son.* Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Obj. 5. Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our

breath (*spiritus*) in ourselves does not seem to proceed from our word. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Obj. 6. Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son.

Obj. 7. *The actual and the possible do not differ in things perpetual* (III. Phys.) : and much less so in God. But it is possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (*De Process. Spir. Sancti*) : *The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the Father : but each in a different way ; one by Birth, the other by Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another.* And further on he says : *For even if for no other reason were the Son and the Holy Spirit distinct, this alone would suffice.* Therefore the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.

On the contrary, Athanasius says : *The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son ; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.*

I answer that. It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished from Him ; as appears from what has been said above (QQ. XXVIII. and XXX.). For it cannot be said that the Divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense ; for it would follow that there would not be One Essence of the Three Persons : for everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the Unity of Essence. Therefore it must be said that the Divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the Persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations ; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost ; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two Persons, but belong only to the one Person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two

relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the Person of the Father is one, it would follow that the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin (Q. XXVIII.). And opposed relations of origin are to be understood as of a *Principle*, and of what is *from the Principle*. Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost ; which no one says ; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.

Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above (QQ. XXVII. and XXVIII.), that the Son proceeds by way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one without order except in those which differ only by their matter ; as for instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other materially, with no order to each other ; whereas in things in which there is not only a material distinction we always find that some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures produced, the beauty of the Divine Wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of the Father, two Persons proceed, the Son and the Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any other be assigned except the order of their nature,

whereby one is from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material distinction; which is impossible.

Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son; and that He is from the Father *through the Son*. Some of them are said also to concede that *He is from the Son*; or that *He flows from the Son*; but not that He proceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Reply Obj. 1. We ought not to say about God anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost, *He will glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine* (John xvi. 14). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive term; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations, whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For when the Lord says, *No one knoweth the Son, but the Father*, the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby be at all excluded; because as regards being the Principle of the Holy Ghost,

the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is the Son.

Reply Obj. 2. In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congregated together in the council of Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their predecessors who had gathered together at Nicæa, but explaining what those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, later on, when certain errors rose up, in another council assembled in the West, the matter was explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.

Reply Obj. 3. The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him, among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is not to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by some that while Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither do those words of his express a denial thereof.

Reply Obj. 4. When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or remain in the Son, it does not mean that He does not

proceed from Him ; for the Son is said also to remain in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of the lover abides in the beloved ; or in reference to the human nature of Christ, by reason of what is written, *on whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes* (John i. 33).

Reply Obj. 5. The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath (*spiritus*) does not proceed ; for it would then be only metaphorical ; but after the similitude of the mental word, whence proceeds love.

Reply Obj. 6. For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power belongs to the Father and the Son ; and because whatever is from the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property of Filiation ; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from the Father.

Reply Obj. 7. The Holy Ghost is distinguished personally from the Son, inasmuch as the origin of the one is distinguished from the origin of the other ; but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son ; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other, as explained above, and in Q. XXVII.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS FROM THE FATHER THROUGH THE SON ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from

the Father through the Son, He does not proceed immediately from the Father ; which seems to be unfitting.

Obj. 2. Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of the Father. But *whatever causes a quality in something else, must possess that quality in a higher degree.* Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.

Obj. 3. Further, the Son has His Being by Generation. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds ; and thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is heretical.

Obj. 4. Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be said conversely. For as we say that the King acts through the bailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the King. But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son.

On the contrary, Hilary says (*De Trin.* xii.) : *Keep me, I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father—namely, Thyself : that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee : and that I may deserve Thy Holy Spirit, Who is through Thy Only Begotten.*

I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through another, this preposition *through* (*per*) points out, in what is covered by it, some cause or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition *through* (*per*) is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent ; and in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of another. Sometimes, however, that

which is covered by this preposition *through* (*per*) is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing done ; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition *through* (*per*) sometimes denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king works through the bailiff ; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through the king.

Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, which has the same meaning.

Reply Obj. 1. In every action two things are to be considered, the subject (*suppositum*) acting, and the power whereby it acts ; as, for instance, fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean, for this power is one and the same [in both]. But if we consider the Persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son ; and thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father ; and mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam ; although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the Divine Persons.

Reply Obj. 2. If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause ; and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son ; whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the

Father and to the Son ; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father.

Reply Obj. 3. As the begetting of the Son is coeternal with the Begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is coeternal with His Principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost proceeded ; but each of the operations is eternal.

Reply Obj. 4. When anyone is said to work through anything, the converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the mallet works through the carpenter ; whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place to act, since he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act, but only to be made to act (*agi*), and hence it is used only as an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the king, although this preposition *through* (*per*) denotes a medium, for the more a subject (*suppositum*) is prior in action, so much the more is its power immediate as regards the effect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect. Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order of the subjects acting, the king is said to work through the bailiff ; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives the bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of power between Father and Son, but only order of subjects ; and hence we say that the Father spirates through the Son ; and not conversely.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON ARE ONE PRINCIPLE
OF THE HOLY GHOST?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Father and the Son are not one Principle of the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father and the Son as they are one ; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is one in nature with Them ; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one Principle of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, in this proposition *the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost*, we do not designate personal unity, because in that case the Father and the Son would be one Person ; nor again do we designate the unity of property, because if one property were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one Principle of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one Principle as regards any other Divine Person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son.

Obj. 4. Further, if the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father. But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father ; and if the one is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 5. Further, if the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one Principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for this word *principle* stands either for the Person of the Father, or for the Person of the Son; and in either sense it is false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 6. Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father and the Son are the one Principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that they are the same Principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot concede that the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 7. Further, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are called one Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the Father and the Son are not one Spirator, but they are two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees also with what Hilary says (*De Trin.* ii.) that *the Holy Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as Authors*. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one Principle of the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* v.) that the Father and the Son are not two Principles, but are one Principle of the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since there is no relative opposition between them as the Principle of the Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost.

Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: *The Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost*, because, they declare, since the word *Principle* in the singular number does not signify *Person*, but *property*, it must be taken as an adjective; and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost unless *one* be taken as an adverb,

so that the meaning should be : They are one principle—that is, in one and the same way (*uno modo*). But then it might be equally right to say that the Father is Two Principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost—namely, in two ways. Therefore we must say that, although this word *principle* signifies a property, still it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words *father* and *son* even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the form that it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this word *God* ; so they are one Principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this word *Principle*.

Reply Obj. 1. If we consider the Spirative Power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the Spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see later. Nor is there any reason against one Property being in two subjects that possess one common nature. But if we consider the subjects (*supposita*) of the Spiration, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct ; for He proceeds from them as the Unitive Love of both.

Reply Obj. 2. In the proposition *the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost*, one property is designated which is the form signified by the name. It does not thence follow that by reason of the several properties the Father can be called several Principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not by reason of relative Properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the Essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to the Son ; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 4. These two propositions, *The Father and the Son are one Principle which is the Father*, or, *one Principle which is not the Father*, are not mutually contradictory ; and

hence it is not necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father and the Son are one Principle, this word *principle* does not stand for one determinate (person) ; but rather it stands indeterminately for two Persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of *figure of speech* as the argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate.

Reply Obj. 5. This proposition is also true :—The one Principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son ; because the word *principle* does not stand for one Person only, but indistinctly for the Two Persons as above explained.

Reply Obj. 6. There is no reason against saying that the Father and the Son are the same Principle, because the word *principle* stands confusedly and indistinctly for the Two Persons together.

Reply Obj. 7. Some say that although the Father and the Son are one Principle of the Holy Ghost, still there are two Spirators, by reason of the distinction of subjects, as also there are two Spirating, because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name *Creator* ; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct Persons, as above explained ; whereas the creature proceeds from the Three Persons not as distinct Persons, but as united in Essence. It seems, however, better to say that because spirating (*spirans*) is an adjective, and Spirator a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two (Persons) spirating, by reason of the plurality of the subjects, but not two spirators by reason of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the subjects (*supposita*), but substantives from themselves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that *the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son as His authors*, this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective.

QUESTION XXXVII.

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST—LOVE.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE now inquire concerning the name 'Love,' on which arise two points for consideration: (1) Whether it is the proper Name of the Holy Ghost? (2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER 'LOVE' IS THE PROPER NAME OF THE
HOLY GHOST?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that 'Love' is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.): *As the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I know not why the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost should not be called Charity, and all together one Charity.* But no name which is predicated in the singular of each Person and of all together, is a proper name of a Person. Therefore this name, *Love*, is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting Person, but Love is not used to signify a subsisting Person, but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, Love is the link between lovers, for as Dionysius says (*De Div. Nom.* iv.): *Love is a unitive force.* But a link is a medium between what it joins together, not anything proceeding from them. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as was

shown above (Q. XXXVI.), it seems that He is not the Love nor link of the Father and the Son.

Obj. 4. Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a Lover : therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must be love of love, and spirit from spirit ; which is not admissible.

On the contrary, Gregory says, in a homily for Pentecost : *The Holy Ghost Himself is Love.*

I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost ; as Word is the proper name of the Son.

To see this, we must know that since there are two processions in God (Q. XXVII.), one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of Love ; forasmuch as the first is the more known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the procession of the Will. Hence, we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the Person who proceeds ; while the relations following from this procession are called *Procession* and *Spiration* (Q. XXVII.), which express the origin rather than the relation, in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider each procession similarly. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the intelligent agent a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word ; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover ; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover ; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands ; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the intelligent agent to the object understood, as appears in

the word *to understand*; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception—namely, *to speak*, and *word*. Hence in God, *to understand* is applied only to the Essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas *Word* is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term *to speak* (*dicere*) is a notional term as importing the relation of the Principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the verb 'to love' (*diligere et amare*), which expresses the relation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by the fact that he loves—to the principle of that impression, or *vice versa*. And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the word love (*amoris et dilectionis*): just as if we were to call the Word *intelligence conceived*, or *wisdom begotten*.

It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, *love* and *to love* are said of the Essence, as *understanding* and *to understand*; but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the relation to its principle of what proceeds by way of love, and *vice versa*, so that by *love* is understood the *love proceeding*, and by *to love* is understood the *spiration of the love proceeding*, in that sense *love* is the name of the Person, and *to love* is a notional term, as *to speak* and *to beget*.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the Divine Essence, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2. Although to understand, and to will, and to love signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are actions that remain in the agents (Q. XIV.), yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves is something that remains in the lover, and the word of the heart is something remaining in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there is more

than this ; because both Word and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father to the Son, or to something else ; we do not mean anything that passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved ; as also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by the Word.

Reply Obj. 3. The Holy Ghost is said to be the link of the Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love ; because, since the Father loves Himself and the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love each other, it necessarily follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the Third Person in the Trinity ; whereas as regards the aforesaid relation He is the link between the two Persons, proceeding from both.

Reply Obj. 4. As it does not belong to the Son, though He understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand as the word proceeding ; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves, taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to Him to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term ; because He loves essentially as love proceeding ; but not as the one whence love proceeds.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON LOVE EACH OTHER
BY THE HOLY GHOST ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. Augustine (*De Trin.* vii.) proves that the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten. But as the Son is wisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as explained above. There-

fore the Father and the Son do not love each other by the love proceeding—that is, by the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, in the proposition, *The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost*, this word *love* is to be taken either essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the same way we might say that *the Father understands by the Son*; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like manner, it might be said that *the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Ghost*, or *that the Father generates by the Son*. Therefore in no way is this proposition true: *the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost*.

Obj. 3. Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; for it cannot be said that *the Father begets Himself*, or that *He spirates Himself*. Therefore, neither can it be said that *He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost*, if *to love* is taken in a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy Ghost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs to the Essence. Therefore this also is false: *the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost*.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. vi.*): *The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His Begetter*.

I answer that, A difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say, *the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost*, since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the Son; which cannot be admitted.

In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that *the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost*; and they add that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that *the Father is wise by the Wisdom Begotten*. Others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as that *the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost*—that is, by *His Essential*

Love, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, *the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son*; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect; and these approach nearer to the truth.

To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its form, as *white* from whiteness, and man from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. So when I say, *this man is clothed with a garment*, the ablative is to be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action—that is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For, as we say, fire warms by heating, although heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not the tree's form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in God *to love* is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their Essence. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.): *Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost?* The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than *to spirate love*; just as to speak is to produce word, and to flower is to produce flowers.

As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures ; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding.

Reply Obj. 1. To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in God ; therefore we cannot say that *the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son*. But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional sense ; and in this way we can say that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. When the idea of an action includes a determined effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action, and from the effect ; so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So when we say, *spirates* or *begets*, this imports only a notional act. Hence we cannot say that the *Father spirates by the Holy Ghost*, or *begets by the Son*. But we can say that the *Father speaks by the Word*, as by the Person proceeding, and *speaks by the speaking*, as by a notional act ; forasmuch as *to speak* imports a determinate person proceeding ; since *to speak* means to produce word. Likewise to love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love ; and so it can be said that *the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost*, as by the Person proceeding, and by *Love itself* as a notional act.

Reply Obj. 3. The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost ; because, as above explained, to love, taken in a notional sense, not only imports the production of a Divine Person, but also the Person produced, by way of Love, which has relation to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by His Begotten Word, inasmuch as the

Word Begotten adequately represents the Father and every creature ; so He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as the Love of the Primal Goodness whereby the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the Divine Truth and Goodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures.

QUESTION XXXVIII.

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT.

(*In Two Articles.*)

THERE now follows consideration of the Gift ; concerning which there are two points of inquiry : (1) Whether ' Gift ' can be a personal name ? (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ' GIFT ' IS A PERSONAL NAME ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Gift is not a personal name. For every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of Gift does not import a distinction in God ; for Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.) : that *the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, that He also gives Himself as God.* Therefore Gift is not a personal name.

Obj. 2. Further, no personal name belongs to the Divine Essence. But the Divine Essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son ; as Hilary says (*De Trin.* ix.). Therefore Gift is not a personal name.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Damascene, there is no subjection nor service in the Divine Persons. But gift implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by whom it is given. Therefore Gift is not a personal name.

Obj. 4. Further, Gift imports relation to the creature, and it thus seems to be said of God in time. But Personal

Names are said of God from eternity ; as *Father*, and *Son*. Therefore Gift is not a personal name.

On the contrary Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.) : *As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh ; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing but the Holy Ghost.* But the Holy Ghost is a personal name ; so also therefore is Gift.

I answer that, The word *gift* imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give ; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a Divine Person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father ; or as possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please : and in this way a Divine Person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other creatures can be moved by a Divine Person, not, however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the Divine Person, and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto ; as when it is made partaker of the Divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know truly and rightly to love God. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the Divine Person. Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, its own power avails nothing : hence this must be given it from above ; for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source. Thus a Divine Person can *be given*, and can be a *gift*.

Reply Obj. 1. The name *gift* imports a personal distinction, in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself ; as also a free man belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (*In Joan.* xxix.) : *What is more yours than yourself ?* Or we might say, and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase, *this is this one's*, can be understood in several senses. In one way it means identity, as Augustine says ; and in that sense *gift* is the same as *the giver*, but not the same as the one to

whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that sense. In another sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third sense *this is this one's* through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both. Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal name.

Reply Obj. 2. The Divine Essence is the Father's gift in the first sense, as being the Father's by way of identity.

Reply Obj. 3. Gift as a personal name in God does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the one to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 4. Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the Divine Person is called Gift from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor need it be an essential name because it imports relation to the creature; but (it suffices) that something that belongs to the Essence be implied in the idea of Gift; as the Essence is included in the idea of Person (Q. XXXIV., A. 3).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER 'GIFT' IS THE PROPER NAME OF THE
HOLY GHOST?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Isaias says, *A Son is given to us* (ix. 6). Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, every proper name of a Person signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost. Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man ; but *God's Gift* only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.) : As ' to be born ' is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, to be the Gift of God ' is to proceed from Father and Son. But the Holy Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says—*i.e.*, a thing which is not given with the intention of a return—and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is love ; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, in strength whereof all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love (Q. XXVII., A. 4 ; Q. XXXVII., A. 1), He proceeds as the First Gift. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.) : *By the Gift, the Holy Ghost, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ.*

Reply Obj. 1. As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds by way of the Word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father ; so also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as Love, He is properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given is from the Father's love, according to the words, *God so loved the world, as to give His only Begotten Son* (John iii. 16).

Reply Obj. 2. The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin ; and thus it imports the

property of the origin of the Holy Ghost—that is, His procession.

Reply Obj. 3. Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver ; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, because *Gift* does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man ; but the Gift of God giving. But when it has been given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.

QUESTION XXXIX.

OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

THOSE things considered which belong to the Divine Persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the Person in reference to the Essence and to the properties, and to the notional acts; and the comparison of these with each other.

As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Essence in God is the same as the Person? (2) Whether we should say that the Three Persons are of one Essence? (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the Persons in the plural, or in the singular? (4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense? (5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract? (6) Whether the names of the Persons can be predicated of concrete essential names? (7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the Persons? (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each Person.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN GOD THE ESSENCE IS THE SAME AS THE PERSON?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that in God the Essence is not the same as Person. For whenever essence is the same as person or *suppositum*, there can be only one *suppositum*

of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one Essence and Three Persons, as is clear from what is above expounded (Q. XXVIII., A. 3 ; Q. XXX., A. 2). Therefore Essence is not the same as Person (in God).

Obj. 2. Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of Essence and of Person. For Person is distinct, whereas Essence is not. Therefore Person and Essence are not the same.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But Person is subject to Essence ; whence it is called *suppositum* or *hypostasis*. Therefore Person is not the same as Essence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* vii.) : *When we say the Person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father.*

I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the Divine Simplicity. For it was shown above (Q. III., A. 3) that the Divine Simplicity requires that in God Essence is the same as *suppositum*, which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the Divine Persons are multiplied, the Essence nevertheless retains its Unity. And because, as Boëthius says, *relation multiplies the Trinity of Persons*, some have thought that in God Essence and Person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be 'adjacent' ; considering only in the relations the idea of *reference to another*, and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Q. XXVIII., A. 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the Divine Essence itself. Thence it follows that in God Essence is not really distinct from Person ; and yet that the Persons are really distinguished from each other. For Person, as above stated (Q. XXIX., A. 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the Divine Nature. But relation as referred to the Essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking ; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real dis-

inction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are (in God) one Essence and Three Persons.

Reply Obj. 1. There cannot be a distinction of *suppositum* in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles ; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the *supposita* ; but nevertheless the Essence is not distinguished (from the Persons), because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the Essence.

Obj. 2. As Essence and Person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other ; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.

Obj. 3. Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained (Q. XIII., AA. 1, 3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called *subjects* or *supposita*, or *hypostases*. So the Divine Persons are named *supposita* or *hypostases*, but not as if there really existed any real *supposition* or *subjection*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT MUST BE SAID THAT THE THREE PERSONS
ARE OF ONE ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems not right to say that the Three Persons are of one Essence. For Hilary says (*De Synod.*) that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost *are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony*. But the substance of God is His Essence. Therefore the Three Persons are not of one Essence.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (*De Div. Nom. i.*). Now Holy Writ

never says that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are of one Essence ; therefore this should not be asserted.

Obj. 3. Further, the Divine Nature is the same as the Divine Essence. It suffices therefore to say that the Three Persons are of one Nature.

Obj. 4. Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence ; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the Three Persons are of one Essence.

Obj. 5. Further, Augustine says that we do not say that the three Persons are *from one essence*, lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the Essence and the Persons in God. But just as prepositions imply transition, so does the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three Persons are *of one essence*.

Obj. 6. Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. To say that the Three Persons are of one Essence or Substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (*De Synod.*) : *One substance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one Subsistent, with two denominations ; or one Substance divided into two imperfect substances ; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two.* Therefore it must not be said that the Three Persons are of one Substance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Maxim.* ii.) that the word *ὁμοουσιον*, which the Council of Nicæa adopted against the Arians, means that the Three Persons are of one Essence.

I answer that, As above explained (Q. XIII., AA. 1, 3), Divine Things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not ; but in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the subject (*suppositum*) of the form ; so also in God the Essence is taken as the form of the Three Persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every

form belongs to that whereof it is the form ; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form ; as when we say : *that woman is of a handsome figure*, or : *this man is of perfect virtue*. In like manner, as in God the Persons are multiplied, and the Essence is not multiplied, we speak of one Essence of the Three Persons, and Three Persons of the one Essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form.

Reply Obj. 1. Substance is here taken for the *hypostasis*, and not for the Essence.

Reply Obj. 2. Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the Three Persons are of one Essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning of the doctrine, as, for instance, the words, *I and the Father are one* (John x. 30), and *I am in the Father, and the Father in Me* (*ibid.* 38) ; and there are many other texts of the same import.

Reply Obj. 3. Because *nature* designates the principle of action, while *Essence* comes from being (*essendo*), things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat ; but only those things can be said to be of *one essence* which have one being. So the Divine Unity is better described by saying that the Three Persons are of *one Essence*, than by saying they are of *one Nature*.

Reply Obj. 4. Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say *the virtue of Peter*. On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, *Peter is of great virtue* (*magnæ virtutis*), or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, *he is a man of blood*—that is, he is a man who sheds much blood (*multi sanguinis*). So, because the Divine Essence signifies a form as regards the

Person, it may properly be said that the Essence is of the Person ; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the Essence ; as, for instance, the Father is a Person of the *Divine Essence* ; or, the Three Persons are of *one Essence*.

Reply Obj. 5. The preposition *from* (*ex vel de*) does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause ; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own maker, not its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, *Three Persons of one Essence*, taking Essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that Essence is different from Person, which we should mean if we said, *Three Persons from the same Essence*.

Reply Obj. 6. As Hilary says (*De Synod.*) : *It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand ὁμοουσιον, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ESSENTIAL NAMES SHOULD BE PREDICATED IN THE SINGULAR OF THE THREE PERSONS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Essential names, as the name *God*, should not be predicated in the singular of the Three Persons, but in the plural. For as *man* signifies *one that has humanity*, so *God* signifies *one that has Deity*. But the Three Persons are three who have Deity. Therefore the Three Persons are *three Gods*.

Obj. 2. Further, in the book of Genesis it is said, *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*, in which passage the Hebrew text has *Elohim*, which means *Gods*

or *Judges*. This word is used on account of the plurality of Persons. Therefore the Three Persons are *several Gods*, and not *one God*.

Obj. 3. Further, this word thing (*res*), since it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the Three Persons in the plural. For Augustine says, *The things (res) that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost*. Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the Three Persons.

Obj. 4. Further, as this word *God* signifies a being who has Deity, so also this word *Person* signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are Three Persons. So for the same reason we can say there are *three Gods*.

On the contrary, It is said, *Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God* (Deut. vi. 4).

I answer that, Some essential names signify the Essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the Three Persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify the Essence as adjectives are predicated of the Three Persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their subjects (*supposita*). In creatures, one form does not exist in several subjects (*supposita*) except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they are adjectives. For we say that many

men are a college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in God the Divine Essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained (A. 2), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above (QQ. III., A. 7; XI., A. 4). So, names which signify the Divine Essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the Three Persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, and Plato, and Cicero are *three men*; whereas we do not say the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are *three Gods*, but *one God*; forasmuch as in the three *supposita* of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the Three Divine Persons there is but one Divine Essence. On the other hand, the names which signify Essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the Three Persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of subjects (*supposita*). For we say there are three *existent* or three *wise beings*, or three *eternal, uncreated, and immense Beings*, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say *one uncreated, immense, eternal Being*, as Athanasius declares.

Reply Obj. 1. Though the name *God* signifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name *God* is used substantively; whereas *having Godhead* is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are *Three having Godhead*, it does not follow that there are three Gods.

Reply Obj. 2. Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of subjects the Greeks said *three hypostases*, so also in Hebrew *Elohim* is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to *God* or to *substance*, lest plurality be referred to the substance.

Reply Obj. 3. This word *thing (res)* is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far as is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that *the same Trinity is a thing supreme*.

Reply Obj. 4. The form signified by the word *person* is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three Personalities—that is, three personal properties in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost—it is predicated of the Three, not in the singular, but in the plural.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CONCRETE ESSENTIAL NAMES CAN STAND FOR THE PERSON ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the Person, so that we can truly say *God begot God*. For, as the logicians say, *a singular term signifies what it stands for*. But this name *God* seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained (A. 3). Therefore, since it signifies the Essence, it stands for Essence, and not for Person.

Obj. 2. Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification ; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, *God creates*, this name *God* stands for Essence. So when we say *God begot*, this term *God* cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for Person.

Obj. 3. Further, if this be true, *God begot*, because the Father generates ; for the same reason this is true, *God does not beget*, because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget ; and thus it follows that there are two Gods.

Obj. 4. Further, if *God begot God*, He begot either God (who is) Himself or another God. But He did not beget God (who is) Himself ; for, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* i.) *nothing begets itself*. Neither did He beget another God ; as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say, *God begot God*.

Obj. 5. Further, if *God begot God*, He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If

God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father : which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that *God begot God*.

On the contrary, In the (Nicene) Creed it is said, *God of God*.

I answer that, Some have said that this name *God* and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the Essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the Divine simplicity, which requires that in God, He *who possesses* and *what is possessed* be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word *God* signifies the Divine Essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name *man* signifies humanity in a (human) subject, others more truly have said that this word *God*, from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for Person, as does the word *man*. So this word *God* sometimes stands for the Essence, as when we say *God creates* ; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified—that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the Person, either for only one, as when we say *God begets*, or for two, as when we say, *God spirates* ; or for three, as when we say : *To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God*, etc. (1 Tim. i. 17).

Reply Obj. 1. Although this name *God* agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied ; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several subjects (*supposita*). So it need not always stand for the Essence it signifies.

Reply Obj. 2. This holds good against those who say that the word *God* does not naturally stand for Person.

Reply Obj. 3. The word *God* stands for the Person in a different way to that in which this word *man* does, for since the form signified by this word *man*—that is, humanity—is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of

itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person—that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term *man* does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, *man is a species* ; whereas the form signified by the name *God*—that is, the Divine Essence—is really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the Person. So, when we say, *God generates*, by reason of the notional act this name *God* stands for the Person of the Father. But when we say, *God does not generate*, there is no adjunct to determine this name to the Person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the Divine Nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the Person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, *God begotten does not beget*, is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a *God generator*, and a *God not generator* ; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the Persons ; as, for instance, if we were to say, *the Father is God the generator*, and the *Son is God the non-generator* : and so it does not follow that there are many Gods ; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. 4. This is false, *the Father begot God (who is) Himself*, because the word *Himself*, as a reciprocal term, refers to the same subject (*suppositum*). Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (*ad Maxim.*) that *God the Father begot another self*, forasmuch as the term *self* is either in the ablative case, and then it means *He begot another from Himself*, or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, *He begot another most like to Himself*. Likewise also it is false to say, *He begot another God*, because although the Son is another than the Father, as above explained (Q. XXXI., A. 2), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is *another God* ; forasmuch as this adjective *another* would

be understood to apply to the substantive God ; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition *He begot another God* is tolerated by some, provided that *another* be taken as a substantive, and the word *God* be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error.

Reply Obj. 5. To say, *God begot God Who is God the Father*, is wrong, because since the word *Father* is construed in apposition to *God*, the word *God* is restricted to the Person of the Father ; so that it would mean, *He begot God, Who is Himself the Father* ; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten ; which is false. Wherefore the negative of this proposition is true, *He begot God Who is not God the Father*. If, however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false ; so that the meaning would be, *He begot God Who is God Who is the Father*. Such a rendering, however, appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative *Who* in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the subject (*suppositum*) ; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the subject. Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that *to be God the Father* is befitting to the Person of the Son ; and in the negative the sense is that *to be God the Father*, is to be removed from the Son's Divinity as well as from His Personality. This, however, appears to be irrational ; since, according to the Philosopher, what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ABSTRACT ESSENTIAL NAMES CAN STAND FOR
THE PERSON ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that abstract essential names can stand for the Person, so that this proposition is true, *Essence generates Essence*. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* vii.) : *The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one Essence ; and taken singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as Essence from Essence.*

Obj. 2. Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the Divine Essence is in the Son, it seems that the Divine Essence is generated.

Obj. 3. Further, God and the Divine Essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained (Q. III., A. 3). But, as was shown, it is true to say that *God generates God*. Therefore this is also true :—*Essence generates Essence.*

Obj. 4. Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the Divine Essence ; therefore Essence can stand for the Person of the Father. Thus the Essence generates.

Obj. 5. Further, the Essence is *a thing generating*, because the essence is the Father who is generating. Therefore if the Essence is not generating, the Essence will be *a thing generating*, and *not generating* : which cannot be.

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.) : *The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead*. But He is Principle only by generating or spirating. Therefore the Father generates or spirates the Godhead.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* i.) : *Nothing generates itself*. But if the Essence generates the Essence, it generates itself only, since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the Divine Essence. Therefore the Essence does not generate the Essence.

I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say *God begot God*, so we can say,

Essence begot Essence: considering that, by reason of the Divine simplicity God is nothing else but the Divine Essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification, as was above explained (A. 4). Although *God* is really the same as *Godhead*, nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since this word *God* signifies the Divine Essence, in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for Person. Thus the things which properly belong to the Persons, can be predicated of this word *God*, as, for instance, we can say *God is begotten* or is *Generator*, as above explained. The word *Essence*, however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the Essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the Persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the Essence. For that would imply distinction in the Divine Essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the subjects (*in suppositis*).

Reply Obj. 1. To express unity of Essence and of Person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them; as, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find *Essence from Essence*; or *Wisdom from Wisdom*; we should take the sense to be, *the Son* who is Essence and Wisdom, is from the Father who is Essence and Wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the Persons because actions belong to subjects (*suppositorum*). So *Nature from Nature*, and *Wisdom from Wisdom* are less inexact than *Essence from Essence*.

Reply Obj. 2. In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another

nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally ; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the Begetter. So the Divine Nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally (*neque per se, neque per accidens*).

Reply Obj. 3. Although God and the Divine Essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.

Reply Obj. 4. The Divine Essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the Divine simplicity ; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.

Reply Obj. 5. The difference between substantive and adjectival names consists in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of *suppositum*, whereas the adjective indicates something added to the *suppositum*. Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the Essence, because they are really the same (as the Essence) ; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence ; but it (the personal property) belongs to the subject (*suppositum*) implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the Essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the *Essence is generating* ; yet we can say that the *Essence is a thing generating*, or that it is *God generating*, if *thing* and *God* stand for Person, but not if they stand for Essence. Consequently, there exists no contradiction in saying that *Essence is a thing generating*, and *a thing not generating* ; because in the first case *thing* stands for Person, and in the second it stands for Essence.

Reply Obj. 6. So far as Godhead is one in several subjects (*supposita*), it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, *the Father is the Principle of the whole Godhead*, the term Godhead can be taken for all the Persons together, inasmuch as it is the Principle in all the Divine Persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own Principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PERSONS CAN BE PREDICATED BY THE
ESSENTIAL TERMS ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, *God is three Persons*; or, *God is the Trinity*. For it is false to say, *man is every man*, because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, *God is the Trinity* cannot be verified of any one of the subjects (*supposita*) of the Divine Nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, *God is the Trinity*, is false.

Obj. 2. Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, *animal is man*; for it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name *God* as regards the Three Persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says. Therefore it seems that the names of the Persons cannot be predicated of this name *God*, except in an accidental sense.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in his *Sermo de Fide*, *We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity*.

I answer that, As above explained (A. 5), although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the Essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be

so predicated, owing to the real identity of Essence and Person. The Divine Essence is not only really the same as one Person, but it is really the same as the Three Persons. Whence, one Person, and Two, and Three, can be predicated of the Essence as if we were to say, *The Essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost*. And because this word *God* can of itself stand for the Essence, as above explained; so, as it is true to say, *The Essence is Three Persons*; so likewise it is true to say, *God is Three Persons*.

Reply Obj. 1. As above explained this term *man* can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature. So it is false to say, *Man is every man*; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the contrary, this word *God* can of itself be taken for the Divine Essence. So, although to say of any of the subjects (*supposita*) of the Divine Nature, *God is the Trinity*, is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the Divine Essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction.

Reply Obj. 2. When we say, *God or the Divine Essence is the Father* the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. So as this proposition, *The Father is God* is of itself true, so this proposition *God is the Father* is true of itself and by no means accidentally.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ESSENTIAL NAMES SHOULD BE APPROPRIATED TO THE PERSONS ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Essential Names should not be appropriated to the Persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of Divine things; for, as Jerome says, *careless words involve risk of heresy*. But to appropriate to any one Person the names which are common to the Three Persons, may verge

on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the Person to whom they are appropriated, or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the Persons.

Obj. 2. Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one Person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the Persons.

Obj. 3. Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the Persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the Persons.

On the contrary, The apostle says, *Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God* (1 Cor. i. 24).

I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the Persons. For although the Trinity of Persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded (Q. XXXII., A. 1), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. The essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (*ibid.*). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the vestige or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the Divine Persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the Divine Persons by the use of the essential attributes is called *Appropriation*.

The Divine Person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and

thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of Intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude ; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble ; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God.

Reply Obj. 1. The essential attributes are not appropriated to the Persons as if they exclusively belonged to them ; but in order to make the Persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the truth.

Reply Obj. 2. If the essential attributes were appropriated to the Persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow that one Person would be as a form as regards another ; which Augustine altogether repudiates (*De Trin.* vii.), showing that the Father is wise, not by the wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom ; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom ; and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own Essence.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to Person, according to our way of understanding ; nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated. As colour is posterior to body considered as body ; but it naturally is prior to *white body*, considered as white.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES ARE APPROPRIATED
TO THE PERSONS IN A FITTING MANNER BY THE HOLY
DOCTORS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Essential Attributes are appropriated to the Persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (*De Trin.* ii.) : *Eternity is in the Father, the species is in the Image ; and use is in the Gift.* In which words he designates three names proper to the Persons : the name of the *Father*, and the name *Image* proper to the Son (Q. XXXV.), and the name *Gift* (*muneris sive doni*), which is proper to the Holy Ghost (Q. XXXVIII.). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates *eternity* to the Father, *species* to the Son, and *use* to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For *eternity* imports duration of existence ; *species*, the principle of existence ; and *use* belongs to the operation. But Essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any Person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the Persons.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* 1) : *Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and unity.* This does not, however, seem fitting ; because one Person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above explained (Q. XXXVII., A. 2). But, as Augustine subjoins, *All these three are one by the Father ; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost.* The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the Persons.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed *Power*, to the Son, *Wisdom*, to the Holy Ghost *Goodness*. Nor does this seem fitting ; for *strength* is part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, *Christ the strength of God* (1 Cor. i. 24). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy

Ghost, according to the words, *strength came out from Him and healed all* (Luke vi. 19). Therefore *Power* should not be appropriated to the Father.

Obj. 4. Likewise Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.) : *What the Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in a confused sense. And (Contra Maxim. ii.) "From Him" refers to the Father, "by Him" to the Son, "in Him" to the Holy Ghost.* This, however, seems to be incorrectly said ; for the words *in Him* seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is *the Principle from no Principle*.

Obj. 5. Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to the text, *I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life* (John xiv. 6) ; and likewise *the book of life*, according to the words of the Psalm, *In the beginning of the book it is written of Me* (Ps. xxxix. 9), and according to the Gloss, *that is, with the Father Who is My head* ; also this word *Who is* ; because on the text of Isaias, *Behold I go to the Gentiles* (lxv. 1), the Gloss adds, *The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am.* These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For *truth*, according to Augustine (*De vera Relig.* xxxvi.), *is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude.* So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a Principle. Also the *book of life* seems to be proper to the Son, as signifying *a thing from another* ; for every book is written by someone. This also, *Who is*, appears to be proper to the Son ; because if when it was said to Moses, *I am Who am*, the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, *He Who is the Father and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you* ; so also he could have said further, *He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you*, pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false ; because no Person is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.

I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the

mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.

According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His Being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which *Eternity* is appropriated to the Father, *Species* to the Son, *Use* to the Holy Ghost. For *Eternity* as meaning a *Being* without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is a *Principle without a Principle*. *Species* or *Beauty* has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three conditions, *integrity* or *perfection*, for those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; and then due *proportion* or *harmony* is required; and lastly, *brightness*, or *clarity*, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright colour.

The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.): *Where—that is, in the Son—there is supreme and primal life.*

The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (*ibid.*), *Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality, etc.*

The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and splendour of the intellect, as Damascene says. Augustine alludes to the same when he says (*ibid.*): *As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God, etc.* *Use* has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided that

use be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of *to enjoy*; according as *to use* is to take something at the beck of the will, and *to enjoy* means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* x.). So *use*, whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.): *That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him* (Hilary). But the *use* by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (*ibid.*): *In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begetter and the Begotten, pours out upon us His bounty and richness.* Thus it is clear how eternity, species, and use are attributed or appropriated to the Persons, but not *Essence* or operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons.

The second consideration of God regards Him as *One*. In that view Augustine appropriates *unity* to the Father, *equality* to the Son, *concord* or connection to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For unity is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other Person is not presupposed, since He is the *Principle without a Principle*. *Equality* implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has one same quantity as regards another. So equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the *Principle from a Principle*. *Connection* implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is from Two. And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says that *The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost.* For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now, *unity* is perceived at once in the Person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other Persons were

removed. So the other Persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other Persons be removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal ; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son : for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the Two, be excluded, we cannot understand the unity of the connection between the Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost ; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be connected.

According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of *power*, *wisdom*, and *goodness*. This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the Divine Persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For *power* has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the Principle of the whole Divinity. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. *Wisdom* has likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, Who is nothing but the concept of Wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. *Goodness*, as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost, Who is Love ; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to the words, *The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall* (Isaias xxv. 4).

Strength is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not in the sense of power (as a principle), but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power ; for instance, we say that the work done by an agent is its strength. According to the fourth consideration, *i.e.*, God's relation to His effects, there arises

appropriation of the expression *from Whom*, *by Whom*, and *in Whom*. For this preposition *from* (*ex*) sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition *by* (*per*) sometimes designates an intermediate cause, as we may say that a smith works *by* a hammer. Thus the word *by* is not always appropriated to the Son, but properly and strictly belongs to the Son, according to the text, *All things were made by Him* (John i. 3); not that the Son is an instrument, but as *the Principle from the Principle*. Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form *by* which an agent works; as we say that an artificer works *by* his art. So, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression *by Whom*. The preposition *in* strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes, as things are said to be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In that sense the expression *in Him* should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in that sense the expression *in Him* is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is goodness. Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is *the Principle without a Principle*; because the Divine Persons, of whom the Father is the Principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power.

Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since *truth* belongs to the intellect (Q. XVI., A. 1), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For truth, as above explained (*ibid.*), can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing itself. So,

as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to the Essence, and not to the Persons ; so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The book of life directly means knowledge ; but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained (Q. XXIV., A. 1), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son ; although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered as such ; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply origin ; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a Person. The expression *Who is* is appropriated to the Person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch, as in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the liberation of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word *Who* is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the Person of the Son ; and in that sense it would be taken personally ; as, for instance, were we to say, *The Son is the begotten " Who is,"* forasmuch as *God begotten* is personal. But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun *this (iste)* seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person ; as we may say, *this stone*, and *this ass*. So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word *God* signifies and stands for the Divine Essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun *This*, according to the words : *This is my God, and I will glorify Him* (Exod. xv. 2).

QUESTION XL.

OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE now consider the Persons in connection with the relations, or properties; and there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether relation is the same as Person? (2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the Persons? (3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the Persons leaves the hypostases distinct? (4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding, presuppose the acts of the Persons, or contrariwise?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELATION IS THE SAME AS PERSON?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that in God relation is not the same as Person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others are multiplied. But in one Person there are several relations; as in the Person of the Father there is Paternity and Common Spiration. Again, one relation exists in two Persons, as Common Spiration in the Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as Person.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Phys. iv.*), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the Person; nor can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be also in the Essence.

Therefore relation, or property, is not the same as Person in God.

Obj. 3. Further, when several things are identical, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is predicated of Person is not predicated of property. For we say the Father generates; but not that the Paternity is generating. Therefore property is not the same as Person in God.

On the contrary, in God *what is* and *whereby it is* (*quod est et quo est*) are the same, according to Boëthius. But the Father is Father by paternity. Therefore He is the same as Paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the Persons.

I answer that, Different opinions have been held on this point. Some have said that the properties are not the Persons, nor in the Persons; and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which do not indeed signify existence *in* something, but rather existence *towards* something. Whence, they styled the relations *assisting*, as above explained (Q. XXVIII., A. 2). But since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the Divine Essence Itself, and the Essence is the same as Person, as appears from what was said above (Q. XXXIX., A. 1), relation must necessarily be the same as Person.

Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties were indeed the Persons; but not *in* the Persons; for, they said, there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking (Q. XXXII., A. 2).

We must, however, say that there are properties in God; as we have shown (*ibid.*). These are designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the Persons. So, since the nature of a form requires it to be *in* that of which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in the Persons, and yet that they are the Persons; as we say that the Essence is in God, and yet is God.

Reply Obj. 1. Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We

must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the Divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the Divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as *Godhead* and *God*. And as the Divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His Essence Itself; and so, Wisdom and Power are the same in God, because they are both in the Divine Essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same as Person. For personal properties are the same as the Persons by reason that the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; for they are the subsisting Persons themselves, as Paternity is the Father Himself, and Filiation is the Son; and Procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal properties are the same as the Persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own Essence. Thus, Common Spiritation is the same as the Person of the Father, and the Person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting Person; but that as there is one Essence in the Two Persons, so also there is one property in the Two Persons, as above explained (Q. XXX., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. The properties are said to be in the Essence only by mode of identity; but in the Persons they exist also by mode of identity, not only in reality, but likewise in mode of signification; as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the Persons, but not the Essence.

Reply Obj. 3. Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a *suppositum*. Now, properties are not designated as *supposita*, but as forms of *supposita*. And so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being predicated of the properties.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PERSONS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THE
RELATIONS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Persons are not distinguished by the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the Persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and not by the relation.

Obj. 2. Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But *hypostasis* signifies an individual in the genus of substance. Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.

Obj. 3. Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But the distinction of the Divine Persons is the primary distinction. Therefore the Divine Persons are not distinguished by the Relations.

Obj. 4. Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which comes into its definition ; for a relation is essentially what is towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God cannot be relation.

On the contrary, Boëthius says, *Relation alone multiplies the Trinity* of the Divine Persons.

I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction. So, as the Three Persons agree in the Unity of Essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the Divine Persons, and these are *Origin* and *Relation*. Although these do not really differ, still they differ in mode of signification ; for *Origin* is signified by mode of act, as *Generation* ; and *Relation* by mode of the form, as *Paternity*.

Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that the Divine hypostases are distinguished by Origin, so that we may say that the Father is distinguished

from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or Persons as resulting therefrom ; as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the material principles.

This opinion, however, cannot stand—for two reasons. Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both ; as in things created it results from their matter or their form. But origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic ; but it means the way from something, or to something ; as generation signifies the way to the thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator. Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone ; but in the generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other. In a Divine Person there is nothing to presuppose but Essence, and Relation or Property. Whence, since the Persons agree in Essence, it only remains to be said that the Persons are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly : because the distinction of the Divine Persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided, because the common Essence remains undivided ; but the distinguishing principles themselves must constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or Persons, inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting Persons ; as Paternity is the Father, and Filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of Origin that it should constitute hypostasis or Person. For Origin taken in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting Person, so that it presupposes the latter ; while in a passive sense Origin, as *nativity*, signifies the way to a subsisting Person, and as not yet constituting the Person.

It is therefore better to say that the Persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both ways they are distinguished; nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this name *Father* does not only signify a property, but also the hypostasis; whereas this name *Begetter* or *Begetting*, signifies property only; forasmuch as this name *Father* signifies the relation which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this name *Begetter* or *Begotten* signifies the origin which is not distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis.

Reply Obj. 1. The Persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the Divine Persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.

Reply Obj. 2. The Divine Persons are not distinguished as regards Being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction.

Reply Obj. 3. The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction. So the distinction of the Persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.

Reply Obj. 4. Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation by nature is to be towards another, the word *another* signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HYPOSTASES REMAIN IF THE RELATIONS ARE
MENTALLY ABSTRACTED FROM THE PERSONS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the hypostases remain if the Properties or Relations are mentally abstracted from the Persons. For that to which something is added, may be

understood when the addition is taken away ; as man is something added to animal which can be understood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis ; for person is *a hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity*. Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a person, the hypostasis remains.

Obj. 2. Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is some one, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity, supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be *someone (aliquis)*. So when Paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains *Some one*—that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed from Person, the hypostasis remains.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin. v.*) : *Unbegotten is not the same as Father ; for if the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten.* But if He had not begotten the Son, there would be no Paternity in Him. Therefore, if Paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father as unbegotten.

On the contrary, Hilary says (*De Trin. iv.*) : *The Son has nothing else than birth.* But He is Son by *Birth*. Therefore, if Filiation be removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains ; and the same holds as regards the other Persons.

I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is twofold,—when the universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from man ; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which the abstraction is made does not remain ; for when the difference of rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect ; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from brass, there remains in our intellect separately both the under-

standing of a circle, and of the brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality ; nevertheless, as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God ; and thus Damascene says that *substance is common and hypostasis is of particular*. So, if we speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular, the common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed ; but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a particular.

But, as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases and Persons remains : as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father, the Father's hypostasis or Person remains.

If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not to be understood as added to the Divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject ; but they carry with them their own subjects (*supposita*) : inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting Persons ; as Paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God : since hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above explained (A. 3), it follows that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however, think, as above noted, that the Divine hypostases are not distinguished by the relations, but only by Origin ; so that the Father is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from another by generation. And that the consequent relations which are to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of Person, and are thus called personalities. Hence, if these relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases, but not the persons, remain.

There are, however, two fatal objections to this opinion ;

first, because the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases ; as shown in the preceding article ; second, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as appears from the definition of Boëthius that, *person is the individual substance of a rational nature*. So, to have hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.

Reply Obj. 1. Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this *distinguishing property* is one of *dignity* precisely because it is understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property be removed from person, the hypostasis no longer remains ; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature removed ; for both person and hypostasis are individual substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially to both.

Reply Obj. 2. By Paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a Person, and is *Some one*, or a hypostasis. It does not follow, however, that the Son is not *Some one* or a hypostasis ; just as it does not follow that He is not a Person.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if the Paternity were removed, as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father ; for this would be impossible, since *being unbegotten* says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other Persons, but only as distinguished from creatures ; as the Jews understand it.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PROPERTIES PRESUPPOSE THE
NOTIONAL ACTS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the notional acts are understood before the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (1 *Sent.* xxvii.) that, *the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the Son.* So it seems that Generation precedes Paternity in the order of intelligence.

Obj. 2. Further, in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes that on which it is founded ; as equality presupposes quantity. But Paternity is a relation founded on the action of generation. Therefore Paternity presupposes generation.

Obj. 3. Further, Active Generation is to Paternity as Nativity is to Filiation. But Filiation presupposes Nativity ; for the Son is so called because He is born. Therefore Paternity also presupposes Generation.

On the contrary, Generation is the operation of the Person of the Father. But Paternity constitutes the Person of the Father. Therefore, in the order of intelligence, Paternity is prior to Generation.

I answer that, According to the opinion that the properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest them as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that *because He begets, He is the Father.* A distinction, however, is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the Divine hypostases. For Origin has in God an active and passive signification—active, as generation is attributed to the Father, and Spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son ; passive, as Nativity is attributed to the Son, and Procession to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, Origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the Person pro-

ceeding; because Origin, as passively understood, signifies the way to a Person constituted by the property. Likewise, Origin signified actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal relation of the person originating; as the notional act of Spiration precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative property common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of intelligence it precedes the notional act; for relation, as such, is founded upon an act; secondly, according as it constitutes the Person; and thus the notional act presupposes the Relation, as an action presupposes a person acting.

Reply Obj. 1. When the Master of the Sentences says that *because He begets, He is Father*, the term 'Father' is taken as meaning relation only, but not as signifying the subsisting Person; for then it would be necessary to say conversely that because He is Father He begets.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection avails of Paternity as a relation, but not as constituting a Person.

Reply Obj. 3. Nativity is the way to the Person of the Son; and so, in the order of intelligence, it precedes Filiation, even as constituting the Person of the Son. But active generation signifies a proceeding from the Person of the Father; so, it presupposes the personal property of the Father.

QUESTION XLI.

OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE now consider the Persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the Persons? (2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary? (3) Whether as regards these acts, a Person proceeds from nothing or from something? (4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts? (5) What this power means? (6) Whether several Persons can be the term of one notional act?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NOTIONAL ACTS ARE TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PERSONS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the Persons. For Boëthius says (*De Trin.*): *Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, always is converted into the Divine Substance, except what pertains to the Relation.* But action is one of the ten genera. Therefore, any action attributed to God belongs to His Essence, and not to a notion.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* v.) that, *everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His Substance, or Relation.* But whatever belongs to the Substance is signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the names of the Per-

sons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be attributed to the Persons.

Obj. 3. Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. But we do not place passions in God. So neither are notional acts to be placed in God.

On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius) says (*De Fide ad Petrum*) : *It is a property of the Father to beget the Son.* But to beget is an act. Therefore notional acts are to be placed in God.

I answer that, In the Divine Persons distinction is founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. So, to signify the order of origin in the Divine Persons, we must attribute notional acts to the Persons.

Reply Obj. 1. Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin : one, forasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him, and this is common to the Three Persons ; and so those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him, belong to His Essence. Another order of origin in God regards the procession of Person from Person ; wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional ; because the notions of the Persons are the mutual relations of the Persons, as is clear from what was above explained (Q. XXXII., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. The notional acts differ from the relations of the Persons only in their mode of signification ; and in reality are altogether the same. Whence the Master of the Sentences says that *generation and nativity in other words are Paternity and Filiation* (1 *Sent.* xxvi.). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement : for that anything be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause. So action, in its primary sense, means origin of motion ; for, as motion derived from another into a mobile object, is called *passion*, so the origin of motion itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved,

is called *action*. So, if we take away motion, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God no motion exists, the personal action of the one producing a Person is only the habitude of the Principle to the Person who is from the Principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of Divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply motion, differ from the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the Persons separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of signification.

Reply Obj. 3. Action, so far as it means origin of motion, naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking; as we attribute *to beget* to the Father, and to the Son *to be begotten*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NOTIONAL ACTS ARE VOLUNTARY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary says (*De Synod.*): *Not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son.*

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says, *He transferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love* (Col. i. 13). But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily.

Obj. 4. Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the Intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a

speaker : therefore the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.

Obj. 5. Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. So, if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity ; and this is against what Augustine says (*Ad Orosium*).

On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, *the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity.*

I answer that, When anything is said to be or to be made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will—that is, I will to be a man ; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot the Son by will ; as also He is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle, as it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work ; and thus in that sense it must be said that God the Father begot the Son, not by His will ; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the book *De Synod.*, it is said : “ *If anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema.*” The reason of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to one, while the will is not determined to one ; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists ; and hence such as it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the will’s action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent’s will and understanding. So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way ; whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the Divine Nature, whereas it belongs to the nature

of a created being ; because God is of Himself the necessary Being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (*De Synod.*) : *The Will of God gave to all creatures their substance : but perfect birth gave the Son a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created are such as God willed them to be ; but the Son, born of God, subsists in the perfect likeness of God.*

Reply Obj. 1. This saying (of Hilary) is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Father's Will in the generation of the Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting ; just as we ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity—as, for instance, death, old age, and such ills. This appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we read : *Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son.*

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the Love of God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God ; not, however, as if love were the principle of the Son's generation.

Reply Obj. 3. The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness ; and likewise God naturally wills and loves Himself ; whereas in regard to things other than Himself, the will of God is, in a way, undetermined in itself, as above explained (Q. XIX., A. 3). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of the will.

Reply Obj. 4. Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of the Divine Word is natural.

Reply Obj. 5. A thing is said to be necessary *of itself*, and *by reason of another*. Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning : firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is violent ; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. In neither of these ways is the Divine Generation necessary ; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. A thing is said to be necessary *of itself* which cannot but be, and in that sense it is necessary for God to be ; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NOTIONAL ACTS PROCEED FROM SOMETHING ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the notional acts do not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (*De Trin.* vii.) that, *In them nothing diverse or different exists*. If the Father begets the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom ; just as we say, *The man is white*, since the man remains, when from not white he is made white ; it follows that either the Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing.

Obj. 2. Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from His own Essence or nature, it follows that the Essence or nature of the Father is the Principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, because in God

nothing material exists ; and therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the Essence generates, which was disproved above (Q. XXXIX., A. 5).

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says that the Three Persons are not from (*ex*) the same Essence ; because Essence is not different from Person. But the Person of the Son is not different from the Father's Essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father's Essence.

Obj. 4. Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son is called a creature ; as in Ecclus. (xxiv. 5), is expressed from the mouth of the Wisdom begotten, *I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures* : and further on it is said from the mouth of the same Wisdom, *From the beginning, and before the world was I created*. Therefore the Son was not begotten from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said : *Thus saith the Lord who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him* (Zach. xii. 1) ; and further (according to one version), *I who form the earth, and create the spirit* (Amos iv. 13).

On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius) says (*De Fide ad Petrum*) : *God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself*.

I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the Father's substance. For it was explained above (Q. XXVII., A. 2 ; Q. XXXIII., AA. 2 and 3) that Paternity and Filiation and Nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true *generation*, whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and *making*, that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as will be shown later on (Q. XLV.), not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a thing is

produced by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of Filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is mentioned in the text, *That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ* (1 John v. 20). Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but He is begotten.

That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the *only begotten*, according to the text, *The only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him* (John i. 18); and so far as others are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the *first begotten*, according to the words, *Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many brethren* (Rom. viii. 29). Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the Divine Nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father in generating the Son does not transmit any part of His Nature, but communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin remaining, as explained above (Q. XL., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1. When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the preposition *of* designates a consubstantial generating principle, but not a material principle. For that, which is produced from matter, is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the Divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptible of another form.

Reply Obj. 2. When we say the Son is begotten of the Essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (1 *Sent.* v.), this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, *the Son is begotten of the Essence of the Father*—that is, of the Father Who is Essence; and so Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.): *When I say of the Father Who is Essence, it is the same as if I said more explicitly, of the Essence of the Father.*

This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is Essence; but not that it is from the Essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing that the preposition *of (de)* always denotes consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is *of (de)* the builder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that something is *of* another, if it is its consubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the son is said to be *of* the father, or a material principle, as a knife is *of* iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say that an angel is *of* an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is begotten *of* the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the Essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.

Reply Obj. 3. When we say that the Son is begotten of the Essence of the *Father*, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we say that the Three Persons are *of* the Divine Essence, there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition, so there is no parity of argument.

Reply Obj. 4. When we speak of *Wisdom as created*, this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, *He created her* (namely, Wisdom) *in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works* (Ecclus. i. 9, 10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created

is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense (of the text quoted) be, *From the beginning and before the world was I made*—that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the Divine Generation ; for in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator, and in this consists its perfection ; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (*De Synod.*). The other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible substance.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN GOD THERE IS A POWER IN RESPECT OF THE NOTIONAL ACTS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active, or passive ; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we call passive power, as above explained (Q. XXV., A. 1) ; nor can active power belong to one Person as regards another, since the Divine Persons were not made (*preceding article*). Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts.

Obj. 2. Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the Divine Persons are not regarded as possible ; but as necessary. Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the Divine Persons proceed, there cannot be power in God.

Obj. 3. Further, the Son proceeds as the Word, which is the concept of the Intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, which belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect and will (Q. XXV., A. 1). Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Maxim.*): *If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?* Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.

I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also a power in God regarding these Acts; since power only means the principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every generator generates by something. So in every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.

Reply Obj. 1. As a Person, according to the notional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the Power in God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a Person as if made, but only as regards the Person as proceeding.

Reply Obj. 2. Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. So, in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it can be said that as God's existence is *possible*, so also that the Son should be generated is possible.

Reply Obj. 3. Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by His Essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle

by creation : just as one Person is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating. But *to understand* and *to will* are not such actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe Power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking : inasmuch as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very Essence which has no principle.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE POWER OF BEGETTING SIGNIFIES A
RELATION, AND NOT THE ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the Essence. For Power signifies a principle, as appears from its definition : for active power is the principle of action, as we find in the *V. Metaphys.* But in God, principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God, power does not signify Essence but relation.

Obj. 2. Further, in God, the power to act (*posse*) and *to act* are not distinct. But in God, generation signifies relation. Therefore, the same applies to the Power of generating.

Obj. 3. Further, terms signifying the Essence in God, are common to the three Persons. But the power of beget-

ting is not common to the three Persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the Essence.

On the contrary, As God has the power (*potest*) to beget the Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the Will to beget signifies the Essence. Therefore, also, the power to beget (signifies the Essence).

I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter.

Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the Divine Nature. Wherefore the Divine Nature in the Father is in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary says (*De Trin.* v.): *The birth of God cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other than God, who subsists from no other source than God.*

We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the Divine Essence as the Master says (*1 Sent. Dist.* vii.), and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the Essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although Paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the Person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can Paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the Person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the Divine Nature, in which the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says that generation is the *work of nature*, not of nature as

generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of begetting signifies the Divine Nature directly, but the relation indirectly.

Reply Obj. 1. Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation ; but it signifies that which is a principle ; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the generator from that which it generates : but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator, and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the Divine Generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact that we say that the Divine Essence *is the principle by which the Begetter begets*, it does not follow that the Divine Essence is distinct (from the Begotten) : which would follow if we were to say that the Divine Essence begets.

Reply Obj. 2. In God, the power of begetting is the same (in reality) as the act of begetting, just as the Divine Essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or Paternity ; but there is a distinction of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. When I speak of the *power of begetting*, power is signified directly, generation indirectly : just as if I were to say, the *Essence of the Father*. Wherefore in respect of the Essence, which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three Persons : but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the Person of the Father.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SEVERAL PERSONS CAN BE THE TERM OF ONE NOTIONAL ACT?

Objection 1. It seems that a notional act can be directed to several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But (He can) not (beget) Himself: therefore (He can beget) another son. Therefore there can be several Sons in God.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Contra Maxim.*): *The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him not.*

Obj. 3. Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting the Son.

On the contrary, In God that which is possible, and that which is do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons in God; which is heretical.

I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only *one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost.* For this four reasons may be given.

The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the Divine Persons are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there were more than one Paternity, or more than one Filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there can be but one subsistent Filiation in God: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness.

The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one Person proceeding after the manner of Word, which Person is the Son; and but one Person proceeding after the manner of Love, which Person is the Holy Ghost.

The third reason is taken from the manner in which the Persons proceed. For the Persons proceed naturally, as we have said (A. 2), and nature is determined to one (effect).

The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the Divine Persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire Divine Filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. . . . The argument is similar in regard to the other Persons.

Reply Obj. 1. We can concede, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot concede that the Son has the Power *generandi* (of begetting) thus taking *generandi* as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the *power to beget*. Just as, although Father and Son have the same Being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word *generandi* (of being begotten) is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power *generandi* is in the Son—that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be *the power of generation*—that is, a power by which *it is generated by some person* (i.e., by which there is a generation in some Person).

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son could beget (another) Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He could not, as we shall see later on (Q. XLII., A. 6 ad. 3).

Reply Obj. 3. Divine Perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father.

QUESTION XLII.

OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE now have to consider the Persons as compared to one another : firstly, with regard to equality and likeness ; secondly, with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry :

(1) Whether there is equality among the Divine Persons ? (2) Whether the Person who proceeds is equal to the One from Whom He proceeds in eternity ? (3) Whether there is any order among the Divine Persons ? (4) Whether the Divine Persons are equal in greatness ? (5) Whether the one Divine Person is in another ? (6) Whether they are equal in power ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS EQUALITY IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that equality is not becoming to the Divine Persons. For equality is in relation to (things which are) one in quantity as the Philosopher says (*V. Metaph.*). But in the Divine Persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two Persons are more than one. Therefore equality is not becoming to the Divine Persons.

Obj. 2. Further, the Divine Persons are of one Essence, as we have said (Q. XXXIX., A. 2). Now essence is

signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the Divine Persons, but not of equality.

Obj. 3. Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the Divine Persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (*De Trin. vi.*): *If an image answers perfectly to that whercof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image.* But the Son is the Image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the Divine Persons.

Obj. 4. Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the Three Persons; for the Persons are distinct by reason of the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the Divine Persons.

On the contrary, Athanasius says that *the Three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another.*

I answer that, We must needs admit equality among the Divine Persons. For, according to the Philosopher (*X. Metaph.*), equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the Divine Persons; for as Boëthius says (*De Trin. i.*): *They must needs admit a difference—namely, of Deity, who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who ascribe degrees of merit (in the Divine Persons), thus destroying the Trinity, and involving a plurality (of Essence).* Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His Essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the Divine Persons, they would not have the same Essence: and thus the Three Persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the Divine Persons.

Reply Obj. 1. Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of *bulk* or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and has, therefore, no place in God. There

is also quantity of *virtue*, which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form : to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less, hot ; forasmuch it is more, or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source—that is, by the perfection of that form or nature : such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.) that *in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better*, for the more perfect a thing is, the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is existence, for everything has existence by reason of its form. The second effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both in regard to existence and in regard to action : in regard to existence, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration ; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*) says, we understand equality to be in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, *inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power.*'

Reply Obj. 2. Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form, may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate that form equally, just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat ; but they cannot be said to be equal, if one participates the form more perfectly than another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius.

Reply Obj. 3. Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two ways—namely, by nouns and by verbs.

When designated by nouns, equality in the Divine Persons is mutual, and so is likeness ; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because the Divine Essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (*De Div. Nom.* ix.), *Equality and Likeness are not mutual.* For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes : but not conversely, for the form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.

But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not in God, there is something that *receives*. Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely.

Reply Obj. 4. In the Divine Persons there is nothing for us to consider but the Essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both—namely, distinction of Persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself ; and unity of Essence, since for this reason are the Persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and Essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation : for when we say that Paternity is opposed to Filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between Paternity and Filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the Divine Persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations : but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the Persons, and the unity of Essence. For this reason the Master says (I Sent. xxxi.) that in these *it is only the terms that are relative.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PERSON PROCEEDING IS CO - ETERNAL WITH HIS PRINCIPLE, AS THE SON WITH THE FATHER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Person proceeding is not co-eternal with His Principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point ; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the emission of rays from the sun ; wherein is absent equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a seal ; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is the infusion of a good will from God ; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject ; but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives the species from the sensible object ; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made of brass ; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a mover ; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera ; but this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea (*ideatio*), as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father ; which implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.

Obj. 2. Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not eternal ; nor is the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, everything which is corrupted ceases

to be. So everything generated begins to be ; for the end of generation is existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.

Obj. 4. Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which are always in process of being made (*in fieri*), as time and motion, it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.

On the contrary, Athanasius declares that *all the Three Persons are co-eternal with each other.*

I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons : one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents on account of the choice of time ; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect (Q. XLI., A. 2), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time ; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what precedes (Q. XLI., A. 2), that the Father does not beget the Son by Will, but by Nature ; and also that the Father's Nature was perfect from eternity ; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the

Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement ; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed ; and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*De Verbis Domini*), no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the Divine generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied from another ; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus, *Let splendour tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the Father ; let the Word announce the impassibility of His Birth ; let the name 'Son' insinuate His Consubstantiality.* Still, above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly ; the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality to act ; and this cannot be said of God.

Reply Obj. 2. Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin.

Reply Obj. 3. Every corruption is a change ; and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The Divine Generation, however, is not changed (Q. XXVII., A. 2). So the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.

Reply Obj. 4. In time there is something indivisible—namely, the instant ; and there is something else which endures—namely, time. But in eternity the indivisible *now* stands ever still, as we have said above (Q. X., A. 2 ad 1, A. 4 ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in the *now* of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that *He is ever being born*, as Origen said. But as Gregory and Augustine said, it is better to say *ever born*, so that *ever* may denote the permanence of eternity, and *born* the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor *was there a time when He was not*, as Arius said.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE DIVINE PERSONS THERE EXISTS AN
ORDER OF NATURE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that among the Divine Persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the Essence, or a Person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the Essence, nor any of the Persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of nature in God.

Obj. 2. Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the Divine Persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the Divine Persons there is no order of nature.

Obj. 3. Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the Divine Nature. Therefore it is not subject to order ; and order of nature does not exist in it.

Obj. 4. Further, the Divine Nature is the Divine Essence. But there is no order of Essence in God. Therefore neither is there of nature.

On the contrary, Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the Divine Persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius testifies. Therefore in God order exists.

I answer that, Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle—namely, according to site, as a point ; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration ; and according to each individual cause—so are there many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we have stated (Q. XXXIII., A. 1) : so there must likewise be order according to origin, without priority ; and this is called *the order of nature* : in the words of Augustine, *Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another.*

Reply Obj. 1. The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin.

Reply Obj. 2. In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is coeval in duration with its principle, the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the Persons subsisting in one Nature. So, neither on the part of the Nature, nor on the part of the relations, can one Person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason.

Reply Obj. 3. The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the Divine Persons according to natural origin.

Reply Obj. 4. Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but Essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of Essence.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON IS EQUAL TO THE FATHER IN GREATNESS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness. For He Himself said, *The Father is greater than I* (John xiv. 28); and the Apostle says, *The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put all things under Him* (1 Cor. xv. 28).

Obj. 2. Further, Paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father.

Obj. 3. Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts;

as three men are more than two or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a part ; for under relation or notion, several notions are included. Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father.

On the contrary, It is said, He thought it not robbery to be equal with God (Phil. ii. 6).

*I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His Nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of Paternity and Filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the Nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should otherwise happen. From what precedes (Q. XXVII., A. 2 ; Q. XXXIII., AA. 2 and 3), it is evident that in God there exists real true Paternity and Filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father was defective, or that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change. So we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, says Hilary, *Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature (De Synod.).**

Reply Obj. 1. These words are to be understood of Christ's human nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him ; but in His Divine Nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, *Equal to the Father in His Divinity ; less than the Father in humanity :* and by Hilary (*De Trin. ix.*), *By the fact of giving, the Father is greater ; but He is not less to Whom the same Being is given ; and (De Synod.), The Son subjects Himself by His*

inborn goodness—that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas *creatures are subject by their created weakness*.

Reply Obj. 2. Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained, and belongs to the Essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the Essence; nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations. So Augustine says (*Contra Maxim.*), *The question of origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what kind, or how great, is it?* Therefore, Paternity is the Father's dignity, as also the Father's Essence. For dignity is something absolute, and pertains to the Essence. As, therefore, the same Essence, which in the Father is Paternity, in the Son is Filiation, so the same dignity which, in the Father is Paternity, in the Son is Filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue—*the Father has Paternity, therefore the Son has Paternity*, for there is a transition from substance (*quid*) to relation (*ad aliquid*). For the Father and the Son have the same Essence and dignity, which exist in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by the relation of receiver.

Reply Obj. 3. In God the relation is not a universal whole, although it is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. Person likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above (Q. XXX., A. 4). Whence all the relations together are not greater than only one; nor are all the Persons something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the Divine Nature exists in each Person.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON IS IN THE FATHER, AND CONVERSELY ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Son and the Father are not in each other. For the Philosopher (*IV. Phys.*) gives eight modes of one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in the Father, or conversely ; as is patent to anyone who examines each mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing that has come out from another is within it. But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to the text, *His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity* (Micheas v. 2). Therefore the Son is not in the Father.

Obj. 3. Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in the other.

On the contrary, It is said, *I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me* (John xiv. 10).

I answer that, There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son ; the Essence, the relation, and the origin ; and according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His Essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own Essence, and communicates His Essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's Essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son ; likewise, since the Son is His own Essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His Essence. This is expressed by Hilary (*De Trin. v.*), *The unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own Nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the Nature of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God.* It is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of

the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1. What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle, except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.

Reply Obj. 2. The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation.

Reply Obj. 3. The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, of relative opposites one is in the other.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON IS EQUAL TO THE FATHER IN
POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in power. For it is said, *The Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing* (John v. 19). But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's.

Obj. 2. Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and listens. But the Father commands the Son, as it is said, *As the Father gave Me commandment, so do I* (John xiv. 31). The Father also teaches the Son; *The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things that Himself doth* (John v. 20). Also, the Son listens: *As I hear, so I judge* (John v. 30). Therefore, the Father has greater power than the Son.

Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to

be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (*Contra Maxim.*), *Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the omnipotence of God the Father?* But the Son cannot beget a Son (Q. XLI., A. 6). Therefore the Son cannot do all that belongs to the Father's omnipotence; so He is not equal to Him in power.

On the contrary, It is said, *Whatsoever things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner* (John v. 19).

I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection of nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (A. 4) that the very notion of the Divine Paternity and Filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness—that is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both.

Reply Obj. 1. The words, *the Son cannot of Himself do anything*, do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it is immediately added, *Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner*: but their meaning is to show that the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His Nature. Hence, says Hilary (*De Trin.* ix.), *The unity of the Divine Nature implies that the Son so acts by Himself (per se), that He does not act of Himself (a se).*

Reply Obj. 2. The Father's *showing* and the Son's *hearing* are to be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as He communicates His Essence. The command of the Father can be explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature.

Reply Obj. 3. As the same Essence is Paternity in the Father, and Filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it

does not follow that the Son can beget ; for to argue thus would imply transition from substance (*quid*) to relation (*ad aliquid*), for generation signifies a Divine relation. So the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation ; the Father possessing power as *giving* signified when we say that He is able to beget ; while the Son possesses the power as *receiving*, signified by saying that He can be begotten.

QUESTION XLIII.

THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE next consider the mission of the Divine Persons, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry : (1) Whether it is suitable for a Divine Person to be sent ? (2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal ? (3) In what sense a Divine Person is invisibly sent ? (4) Whether it is proper that each Person be sent ? (5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent ? (6) To whom the invisible mission is directed ? (7) Of the visible mission. (8) Whether any Person sends Himself visibly or invisibly ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A DIVINE PERSON CAN BE PROPERLY SENT ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a Divine Person cannot be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one Divine Person is not less than another. Therefore one Person is not sent by another.

Obj. 2. Further, what is sent is separated from the sender ; hence Jerome says, commenting on Ezechiel xvi. 53 : *What is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent.* But in the Divine Persons there is nothing that is separable, as Hilary says (*De Trin.* vii.). Therefore one Person is not sent by another.

Obj. 3. Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes anew into another. But this does not apply to a Divine Person, Who is everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a Divine Person to be sent.

On the contrary, It is said, *I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me* (John viii. 16).

I answer that, The notion of mission includes two things : the habitude of the one sent to the sender ; and that of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the sender : either according to command, as the master sends the servant ; or according to counsel, as an adviser may be said to send the king to battle ; or according to origin, as a tree sends forth its flower. The habitude to the term to which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to be present there : either because in no way was he present before in the place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a Divine Person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another ; as the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature ; whereas *He was previously in the world* (John i. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel ; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to equality, as explained above (Q. XLII., AA. 4 and 6).

Reply Obj. 2. What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent ; hence it is necessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a Divine Person ; for the Divine Person sent neither begins to exist where He did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a separation, having only distinction of origin.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion, which is not in God.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MISSION IS ETERNAL, OR ONLY TEMPORAL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that mission can be eternal. For Gregory says, *The Son is sent as He is begotten.* But the Son's generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something temporally. But a Divine Person is not changed. Therefore the mission of a Divine Person is not temporal, but eternal.

Obj. 3. Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of the Divine Persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal.

On the contrary, It is said, *When the fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son* (Gal. iv. 4).

I answer that, A certain difference is to be observed in all the words that express the origin of the Divine Persons. For some express only relation to the principle, as *procession* and *going forth*. Others express the term of procession together with the relation to the principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as *generation* and *spiration*; for generation is the procession of the Divine Person into the Divine Nature; and passive Spiration is the procession of the subsisting Love. Others express the temporal term with the relation to the principle, as *mission* and *giving*. For a thing is sent to be in something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but that a Divine Person be possessed by any creature, or exist in it in a new mode, is temporal.

Hence *mission* and *giving* have only a temporal signification in God; but *generation* and *spiration* are exclusively eternal; whereas *procession* and *giving*, in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification; for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by dwelling in man according to his invisible mission.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from His mother; or it

may be taken to mean that He could be sent because eternally begotten.

Reply Obj. 2. That a Divine Person may newly exist in anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the Divine Person, but from change in the creature ; as God Himself is called Lord temporally by change of the creature.

Reply Obj. 3. Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession. Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a Divine Person to His Principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INVISIBLE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSON IS ONLY ACCORDING TO THE GIFT OF SANCTIFYING GRACE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the invisible mission of the Divine Person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the sending of a Divine Person means that He is given. So if the Divine Person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, then the Divine Person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts ; and this is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but His gifts are given.

Obj. 2. Further, this preposition, *according to* denotes the habitude of some cause. But the Divine Person is the cause why the gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according to the text, *the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us* (Rom. v. 5). Therefore it is improperly said that the Divine Person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.) that *the Son, when temporally perceived by the mind, is sent.* But the Son is known not only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith and knowledge. Therefore the Divine Person is not sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

Obj. 4. Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the Apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a gift of sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the Divine Person is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says that (*De Trin.* xv.) *the Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification.* But mission is a temporal procession. Since the creature's sanctification is by sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of the Divine Person is only by sanctifying grace.

I answer that, The Divine Person is fittingly sent in the sense that He exists newly in anyone ; and He is given as possessed by anyone ; and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace.

For God is in all things by His essence, power, and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its own operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode, God is said not only to exist in the rational creature, but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the reason why the Divine Person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace. Hence, the Divine Person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace.

Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy : but to have the power of enjoying the Divine Person can only be according to sanctifying grace. Moreover,

the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.

Reply Obj. 1. By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself, but enjoy also the Divine Person Himself ; and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace ; and yet the Divine Person Himself is given.

Reply Obj. 2. Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the Divine Person ; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy Ghost is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost ; which is meant by the words, *the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost.*

Reply Obj. 3. Although the Son can be known by us according to other effects, still neither does He dwell in us, nor is He so possessed by us according to those effects.

Reply Obj. 4. The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence grace freely given is called the *manifestation of the Spirit* (1 Cor. xii. 7). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the Apostles for the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace itself, it would not be simply said that the Holy Ghost was given, except with some qualifying term ; just as we read of certain ones receiving the gift of the Spirit of prophecy, or of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying or of working miracles.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FATHER CAN BE FITTINGLY SENT ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is fitting also that the Father should be sent. For being sent means that the Divine Person is given. But the Father gives Himself since He can only be

possessed by His giving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, the Divine Person is sent according to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us according to the words, *We will come to him and make our abode with him* (John xiv. 23). Therefore each one of the Divine Persons is sent.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever belongs to one Person, belongs to them all, except the notions and Persons. But mission does not signify any person ; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions (Q. XXXII.). Therefore every Divine Person can be sent.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* ii.), *The Father alone is never described as being sent.*

I answer that, The very idea of mission means procession from another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above expounded. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent ; but this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.

Reply Obj. 1. In the sense of *giving* as a free bestowal of something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to be enjoyed by the creature. But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what is given, *to be given* only applies in God to the Person who is from another ; and the same as regards *being sent*.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the effect of grace is also from the Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. So Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.) that *The Father, when known by anyone in time, is not said to be sent ; for there is no one whence He is, or from whom He proceeds.*

Reply Obj. 3. Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes the signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in general, as *to be from another* is common to two of the notions.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS FITTING FOR THE SON TO BE SENT
INVISIBLY?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the Divine Person is according to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, as it is said, *One and the same Spirit worketh all things* (1 Cor. xii. 11). Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.

Obj. 2. Further, the mission of the Divine Person is according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held without the gift of charity, according to the text : *If I should have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing* (1 Cor. xiii. 2). Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent invisibly.

Obj. 3. Further, the mission of the Divine Person is a procession, as expounded above. But the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions, if both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous, since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification.

On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom : *Send her from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness* (Wisd. ix. 10).

I answer that, The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying grace, according to the words, *We will come to him, and will make our abode with him* (John xiv. 23). But that a Divine Person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies both that this Person dwells in a new way within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore

belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently He is not sent.

Reply Obj. 1. Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the First Gift, since He is Love (Q. XXXVIII.), some gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong to the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of the Son. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.) that *The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone.*

Reply Obj. 2. The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a Divine Person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a likening of the soul to the Divine Person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity : hence the mission of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but One Who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* ix.) : *The Word we speak of is knowledge with love.* Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love, as is said : *Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath learned, cometh to Me* (John vi. 45), and in the Psalm (xxxviii. 4) : *In my meditation a fire shall flame forth.* Thus Augustine plainly says : *The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone.* Now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge ; and this is properly called wisdom (*sapientia*), as it were a sweet knowledge (*sapida scientia*), according to the words : *The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name* (Ecclus. vi. 23).

Reply Obj. 3. Since mission implies the origin of the Person Who is sent, and indwelling by grace, as above explained, if we speak of mission according to origin, in that

sense the Son's mission is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as generation is distinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the effect of grace, in that sense the two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be without the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying grace, nor is one Person separated from the other.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INVISIBLE MISSION IS TO ALL WHO PARTICIPATE IN GRACE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the invisible mission is not to all who participate in grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their share of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission ; for it is said : *The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified* (John vii. 39). Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers in grace.

Obj. 2. Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue ; because progress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or decreases ; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all who share in grace.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ and the blessed have fulness of grace. But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace.

Obj. 4. Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all who have grace.

On the contrary, According to Augustine, the invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Every creature

which has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission is to every such creature.

I answer that, As above stated, mission in its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not before, as occurs to creatures ; or begins to exist where he was before in a new way, as occurs in the mission of the Divine Persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain kind of new indwelling made by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be found these two conditions.

Reply Obj. 1. The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.) that the invisible Mission of the Son is *in man and with men.* *This was done in former times with the Fathers and Prophets.* Thus the words, *the Spirit was not yet given,* are to be applied to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day of Pentecost.

Reply Obj. 2. The invisible mission takes place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.), that, *The Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him.* Such invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace ; as, for example, the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of prophecy, or in the fervour of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his possessions, or to undertake any arduous work.

Reply Obj. 3. The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made to them subsequently, not by *intensity* of grace, but by the further revelation of mysteries ; which goes on till the Day of Judgment. Such an increase is by the *extension* of grace, because it extends to a greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent

at the first moment of His conception ; but not afterwards, since from the beginning of His Conception He was filled with al wisdom and grace.

Reply Obj. 4. Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent to the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to its term. Hence the mission of the Divine Person is not sent to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS FITTING FOR THE HOLY GHOST TO BE
SENT VISIBLY ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said to be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner.

Obj. 2. Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature ; and hence it cannot be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the Sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place in all these things.

Obj. 3. Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason of those visible creatures more than any other Person.

Obj. 4. Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest kind of creature—namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures.

Obj. 5. Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the ministry of the angels ; as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.). So visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 6. Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission ; as invisible things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the invisible mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible mission ; and to all who received the invisible Mission, whether in the New or in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise to be sent ; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent visibly.

On the contrary, It is said that the Holy Ghost descended in the shape of a dove upon the Lord baptized (*Matt.* iii. 16).

I answer that, God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. The nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things (*Q. XII., A. 12*). So the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible creatures, according to certain signs ; so was it fitting that the invisible missions also of the Divine Persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures.

This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanctification ; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it belongs to be the author of this sanctification. Thus the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification ; the Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification.

Reply Obj. 1. The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He appeared, into the unity of His Person, so that whatever can be said of that creature can be said of the Son of God ; and so, by reason of the nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into

the unity of His Person ; so that what is said of it cannot be predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the Father by reason of any visible creature.

Reply Obj. 2. The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy ; because, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* ii.) : *The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire, saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same relation to these images that the Son has to the rock (because it is said, ' The rock was Christ ') (1 Cor. x. 4). For that rock was already created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it typified ; whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people followed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing forth when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily appearances of those things was that they might signify, and then pass away.* Thus the visible mission is neither displayed by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament, wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify something. But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that Person. For as the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are signified by diverse names, so also can they each one be signified by different things ; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.

Reply Obj. 4. It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible Mission of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of sanctification ; whereas any other creature could

be the sign of sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His Person, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action, but only for the purpose of a sign ; and so likewise it was not required to last beyond what its use required.

Reply Obj. 5. Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not an angel.

Reply Obj. 6. It is not necessary that the invisible mission should always be made manifest by some visible external sign ; but, as is said, *the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit* (1 Cor. xii. 7)—that is, of the Church. This utility consists in the confirmation and propagation of the Faith by such visible signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the Apostles, according to the words, *which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard* (Heb. ii. 3).

Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to Christ, to the Apostles, and to some of the primitive saints on whom the Church was in a way founded ; in such a manner, however, that the visible mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of His conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual regeneration ; hence the Father's voice spoke, *This is My beloved Son* (Matt. iii. 17), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the Only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine ; and hence it was said, *Hear ye Him* (Matt. xvii. 5). To the Apostles was the mission directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their ministry in the

dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said, *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven* (John xx. 23): and again under the sign of fiery tongues, to show forth the office of teaching; whence it is said that, *they began to speak with divers tongues* (Acts ii. 4). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished, and before that of the Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the Divine Persons were, however, given to the fathers of the Old Testament, which, however, cannot be called visible missions; because, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* ii.), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the Divine Person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A DIVINE PERSON IS SENT ONLY BY THE PERSON WHENCE HE PROCEEDS ETERNALLY?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that a Divine Person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.), *The Father is sent by no one because He is from no one.* Therefore if a Divine Person is sent by another, He must be from that other.

Obj. 2. Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But there can be no authority as regards a Divine Person except from origin. Therefore the Divine Person sent must proceed from the One sending.


Obj. 3. Further, if a Divine Person can be sent by one whence He does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although He proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.). Therefore the Divine Person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds.

On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to the words, *Now the Lord God hath sent Me and*

His Spirit (Isa. xlviii. 16). But the Son is not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a Divine Person is sent from One whence He does not proceed.

I answer that, There are different opinions on this point. Some say that the Divine Person is sent only by the One whence He proceeds eternally ; and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine, however, says (*De Trin.* ii.) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by the Holy Ghost ; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son ; so that to be sent in God does not apply to each Person, but only to the Person proceeding from another ; whereas to send belongs to each Person.

There is some truth in both of these opinions ; because when a Person is described as being sent, the Person Himself existing from another is designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the mission of the Divine Person. Thus if the Sender be designated as the Principle of the Person sent, in this sense not each Person sends, but that Person only Who is the Principle of that Person who is sent ; and thus the Son is sent only by the Father ; and the Holy Ghost by the Father and the Son. If, however, the Person sending is understood as the Principle of the effect implied in the mission ; in that sense the whole Trinity sends the Person sent. This reason does not prove that a man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect of grace. The answer to the objections appears from the above.



TREATISE ON THE CREATION



QUESTION XLIV

THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER treating of the Procession of the Divine Persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration is threefold : (1) of the production of creatures ; (2) of the distinction between them ; (3) of their preservation and government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered : (1) the first cause of beings ; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause ; (3) the principle of the duration of things.

Concerning the first there are four points to be considered : (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings ? (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent co-ordinate principle with Him ? (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings, or whether there are other exemplar causes ? (4) Whether He is the final cause of things ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY THAT EVERY BEING BE
CREATED BY GOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear

to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it ; therefore they can exist without it ; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by God.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (*Metaph.* iii.) ; therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.

On the contrary, It is said (Rom. xi. 36) : *Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things.*

I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Q. III., A. 4) when treating of the Divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being ; and also it was shown (Q. VII., A. 1 *ad* 3, A. 2, Q. XI.) that subsisting being must be one ; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.

Hence Plato said (*Parmen.* xxvi.) that unity must come before multitude ; and Aristotle said (*Metaph.* ii.) that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth ; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.

Reply Obj. 1. Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows as a conse

quence on what belongs to its essence ; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (*Phys.* viii.). But this is manifestly false in demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (*Metaph.* v.), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.

Reply Obj. 3. The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRIMARY MATTER IS CREATED BY GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It appears that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else (*Phys.* i.). But primary matter has no subject ; therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God.

Obj. 2. Further, action and passion are divided against each other. But as the first active principle is God, so the

first passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the other.

Obj. 3. Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself: therefore it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Conf.* xii.), *Two things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself—viz., angels—the other nigh unto nothing—viz., primary matter.*

I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted motion, did not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the 'oblique circle' (*the zodiac*), according to Aristotle (*De Gener.* ii.), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species is contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by (becoming) white. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered *being* under some particular aspect, either as *this* (being) or as *such* (being); and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others there were who arose to the con-

sideration of *being*, as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as *these*, or as *such* (beings), but (simply) as *beings*.

Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are *such* by accidental forms, nor according as they are *these* by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher (*Phys. i.*), is speaking of becoming (*feri*) in particular—that is, from form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.

Reply Obj. 2. Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (*Metaph. xii.*).

Reply Obj. 3. The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything created is actual, still it is not pure act (*actus purus*). Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EXEMPLAR CAUSE IS ANYTHING BESIDE
GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the exemplar cause is something beside God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire (*Art. 1*). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all sensible things is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as, for instance, a self-existing (*per se*) man, and a self-existing horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist beside God.

Obj. 3. Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion stands as in the former objection.

Obj. 4. Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (*Div. Nom. v.*) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.

On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (*Lib. 83 qq.*), are the master forms, which are contained in the Divine Intelligence: therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.

I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorly conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the Divine Wisdom as its first principle, for Divine Wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the Divine Wisdom are the notions (*rationes*)

of all things, which we have called ideas—*i.e.*, exemplar forms existing in the Divine Mind (Q. XV., A. 1). And these ideas multiplied by their relations to things, still in reality are not apart from the Divine Essence, accordingly as the likeness to that Essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is the First Exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.

Reply Obj. 1. Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the Divine idea, as a material house is like to the house in the architect's mind.

Reply Obj. 2. It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man is a man by participation of the species, still he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.

Reply Obj. 3. Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars.

Reply Obj. 4. As Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.), by *self-existing life and self-existing wisdom* he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It appears that God is not the Final Cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God needs nothing ; therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.

Obj. 2. Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, cannot be identical with the (generating) agent (*Phys. ii.*), because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the First Agent producing all things ; therefore He is not the Final Cause of all things.

Obj. 3. Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the end of all things.

Obj. 4. Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows that before and after (*prius et posterius*) exist in Him ; which is impossible.

On the contrary, It is said (*Prov. xvi. 4*) : *The Lord has made all things for Himself.*

I answer that, Every agent acts for an end : otherwise one thing more than another would not follow from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time : these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end ; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness ; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the

Divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the Divine goodness is the end of all things.

Reply Obj. 1. To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong to God, and therefore He is alone the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own utility, but only for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 2. The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness ; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, since the end is more noble than the means to the end.

Reply Obj. 3. All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, *i.e.*, without knowledge ; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.

Reply Obj. 4. Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him, some of which come into our mind before others.

QUESTION XLV.

THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

(*In Eight Articles.*)

THE next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points of inquiry : (1) What is creation ? (2) Whether God can create anything ? (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things ? (4) To what things it belongs to be created ? (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create ? (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person ? (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things ? (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO CREATE IS TO MAKE SOMETHING FROM
NOTHING ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (*Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph.* i.) : *To make concerns what did not exist at all ; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already.*

Obj. 2. Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions : therefore it is not from nothing to something ; but rather from being to being.

Obj. 3. Further, the preposition *from (ex)* imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause ; as when we say that a statue is made from brass. But *nothing* cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing.

On the contrary, On the text of Gen. i., *In the beginning God created,* etc., the Gloss has, *To create is to make something from nothing.*

I answer that, As said above (Q. XLIV., A. 2), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God ; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation ; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from *not-man*, and white from *not-white*. Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the *not-being* which is *not-man*, so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the *not-being* which is *nothing*.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things ; as when we say that a bishop is created. But in that way we do not speak of creation here, but as it is described in this article.

Reply Obj. 2. Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term *whence*, but from the term *whither*. Therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term *whither* of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term *whence*, corresponding to the term *whither*, may be more imperfect, as generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form ; and yet the privation of the substantial form, which is the term *whence* in generation, is more imperfect than the

contrary (accident), which is the term *whence* in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and more excellent than generation and alteration, because the term *whither* is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term *whence* is simply not-being.

Reply Obj. 3. When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition *from (ex)* does not signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, from morning comes midday—*i.e.*, after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition *from (ex)* can comprise the negation implied when I say the word *nothing*, or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, It is made from nothing—*i.e.*, *it is not made from anything*—as if we were to say, *He speaks of nothing*, because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition *from (ex)* implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN CREATE ANYTHING ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (*Phys. i.*), the ancient philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that *nothing is made from nothing*. But the power of God does not extend to the contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation (about the same thing) are both true at the same time: therefore God cannot make anything from nothing, or create.

Obj. 2. Further, if to create is to make something from

nothing, therefore when anything is created it is made. But for a thing to be made means that it is changed. Therefore creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of motion : for motion is the act of what is in potentiality : therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God.

Obj. 3. Further, what has been made has at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created is, at the same time, both becoming and made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is : and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained : therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.

Obj. 4. Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing : therefore it does not happen that something is made from nothing.

On the contrary, It is said (Gen. i. 1) : *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.*

I answer that, Not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created by God, as appears from what precedes (Q. XLIV., A. 1). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action ; as the artificer works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above (Q. XLIV., AA. 1 and 2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the Universal Cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God produces things into being from nothing.

Reply Obj. 1. Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Q. XLIV., A. 2), only considered the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action; whence came their common opinion that *nothing is made from nothing*. But this has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of things.

Reply Obj. 2. Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being but in potentiality, as in substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and previously according to intellect only, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (*Phys. iii.*), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (Q. XIII., A. 1), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing; though *to make* and *to be made* are more suitable expressions here than are *to change* and *to be changed*, because *to make* and *to be made* import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and import change only as a consequence.

Reply Obj. 3. In things which are made without motion, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the term of motion, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of motion, as the word is being made in the heart and is made at the same time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its being

made, it is signified to be from another, and not to have been previously. Hence since creation is without motion, a thing is being created and is created at the same time.

Reply Obj. 4. This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were any infinite medium between nothing and being; which is plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two terms.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CREATION IS ANYTHING IN THE CREATURE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the creature.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both: since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.

Obj. 3. Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.

On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in the thing created.

I answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only ; because what is created, is not made by motion, or by change. For what is made by motion or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without motion. Now when motion is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A. 2 ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies motion, is implied a relation to the principle of motion.

Reply Obj. 1. Creation signified actively means the Divine action, which is God's Essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason ; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (Q. XIII., A. 7) in treating of the Divine Names.

Reply Obj. 2. Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (A. 2 ad. 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation ; because relations, of their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations, but by themselves ; as was also shown above (Q. XLII., A. 1 ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons.

Peplly Obj. 3. The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO BE CREATED BELONGS TO COMPOSITE AND
SUBSISTING THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, *De Causis*, it is said, *The first of creatures is being*: But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.

Obj. 3. Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.

On the contrary, It is said (Gen. i. 1) : *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*. But the heaven and the earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation belongs to them.

I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (Q. XLIV., A. 2, ad 2 & 3). But to be made is ordered to the being of a thing. Hence to be

made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs ; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or whether they are composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being—that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are not called beings, as if they themselves were ; but because something is (qualified) by them ; as whiteness is called a being, forasmuch as by it its subject is white. Hence, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* vii.) accident is more properly said to be *of a being* than *a being*. Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather *concreated* than *created* things ; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.

Reply Obj. 1. In the proposition *the first of created things is being*, the word *being* does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is *this* being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above (A. 1). We use a similar way of speaking when we say that *the first visible thing is colour*, although the thing coloured is what is, strictly speaking, seen.

Reply Obj. 2. Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles ; but it means that the *compositum* is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles.

Reply Obj. 3. This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation ; for creation is the production of the whole being, and not only of matter.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT BELONGS TO GOD ALONE TO CREATE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (*De Anima* ii.), what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man generates man. Therefore immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But immaterial substance can only be made by creation, since it has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.

Obj. 2. Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a *contrary* resists more than *nothing*. Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this.

Obj. 3. Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we proved above when treating of the Infinity of God (Q. VII., AA. 2, 3, 4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other creatures.

I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes (A. 1) that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and

hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (*De Causis*) that *neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by Divine operation*. Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.

It happens, however, that something participates in the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of the inferior bodies. And in the same manner the Master says (*Sent. iv.*) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can create not by its own power, but as administering (the power of the Creator). But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain instruments for certain actions.

Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power, or instrumentally—that is, ministerially.

And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving ; and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or be moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.

Reply Obj. 1. A perfect thing participating in any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of himself ; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten ; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man participates in human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, in the nature of being ; for God alone is His own Being, as we have said above (Q. VII., AA. 1 and 2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes *being* in *this* (individual) : and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is an individual thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is an individual thing ; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some added perfection ; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier.*). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (Eph. iii. 15) : *From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named.* From which it evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless something is presupposed ; which is against the very idea of creation.

Reply Obj. 2. A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (*Phys. i.*), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the

agent intends to induce, as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act ; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.

Reply Obj. 3. The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made ; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, still to create it from nothing does show an infinite power : which appears from the preceding reply. For if a greater power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that agent is infinite (which produces something) from no presupposed potentiality ; because there is no proportion between *no potentiality* and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent, as there is no proportion between *not being* and *being*. And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an infinite being, as appears above (Q. VII., A. 2), it follows that no creature can create.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO CREATE BELONGS TO ANY PERSON ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after ; and what is perfect is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the Divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature : and is more perfect, because the Divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle ; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude.

Therefore the processions of the Divine Persons are the cause of the processions of [created] things, and so to create belongs to a Person.

Obj. 2. Further, the Divine Persons are only distinguished from each other by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever difference is attributed to the Divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the causality of creatures is diversely attributed to the Divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that *He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible*; to the Son is attributed that *by Him all things were made*; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that *He is Lord and Life-giver*. Therefore the causality of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.

Obj. 3. Further, if it be said that the causality of the creature is derived according to some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person, this does not appear to be sufficient; because every Divine effect is caused by every essential attribute—viz., by power, goodness, and wisdom—and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causality ought not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they [the Persons] are distinguished in creating according to relations and processions.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. ii.*) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Divinity.

I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God according to His Being, that is, His Essence, which is common to the Three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.

Nevertheless the Divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as was said above (Q. XIV., A. 8; Q. XIX.,

A. 4), when treating of the Science and Will of God, God is the cause of things by His Intellect and His Will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son ; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the Processions of the Persons are the type (*rationes*) of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge, and will.

Reply Obj. 1. The processions of the Divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Divine Nature, although common to the Three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives the Divine Nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both : so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the Three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the power of Creation from another. And of the Son it is said (John i. 3), *Through Him all things were made*, inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition *through* usually denotes a mediate cause, or a *principle from a principle*. But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His sway He governs, and vivifies what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (Q. XXXIX., A. 8, *Reply* 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts ; and therefore it is said : *Through whom all things were made*. As to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings

things to their proper end, and the giving of life,—for life consists in a certain interior motion ; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.

Reply Obj. 3. Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, every effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally connected ; as the order of things is reduced to *wisdom*, and the justification of the sinner to *mercy* and *goodness* poured out superabundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to *power*.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CREATURES IS NECESSARILY FOUND A TRACE OF THE TRINITY ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its traces. But the Trinity of Persons cannot be traced from creatures, as was above stated (Q. XXXII., A. 1). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these (properties) : and so on to infinitude.

Obj. 3. Further, the effect represents only its own cause, But the causality of creatures belongs to the common Nature, and not to the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the Unity of Essence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.), that *the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures*.

I answer that, Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the

causality of the cause, but not its form ; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a *trace*; for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire generating ; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury ; and this is called the representation of *image*. Now the processions of the Divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was said above (Q. XXVII.). For the Son proceeds as the Word of the Intellect ; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love of the Will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.

But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the Divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle ; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the *principle from no principle*. According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the artificer. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.), that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according as *it is one individual*, and according as *it is formed by a species*, and according as *it has a certain relation of order*. And to them also are reduced those three things, *number*, *weight*, and *measure*, mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (chap. xi.). For *measure* refers to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, *number* refers to the species, *weight* refers to the order. And to these three are

reduced the other three things mentioned by Augustine (*De Nat. Boni*), *mode*, *species*, and *order*, and also those he mentions (Lib. 83 *qqu.*): *that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees*. For a thing exists by its substance, it is distinct by its form, it agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.

Reply Obj. 1. The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge of the Trinity of the Divine Persons from creatures, as we have said (Q. XXXII., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2. A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.

Reply Obj. 3. The processions of the Persons are also in some way the cause and type (*ratio*) of creation; as appears from the above (A. 6).

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CREATION IS MINGLED WITH WORKS OF NATURE AND ART?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation.

Obj. 2. Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be produced by creation.

Obj. 3. Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other things.

Obj. 4. Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.

On the contrary, Augustine (*Super Gen.* v.) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.

I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from the forms, which some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter, for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, *in potentiality*, they asserted that they pre-existed *simply*. Others, however, said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above (A. 4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be *concreated*. What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the *compositum*, which is made from matter.

Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.

Reply Obj. 1. Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made *directly*, but *only indirectly*.

Reply Obj. 2. The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not

only produces its like according to quality, but according to species.

Reply Obj. 3. For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent. But for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator.

Reply Obj. 4. The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles ; and thus what nature produces are called creatures.

QUESTION XLVI.

OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES.

(*In Three Articles.*)

NEXT must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment : (1) Whether creatures always existed ? (2) Whether that they began to exist is an article of Faith ? (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE UNIVERSE OF CREATURES ALWAYS EXISTED ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists : otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence, which it may receive from a form, and to non-existence, if deprived of that form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist without form : while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist : which is impossible.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not ; because so far as the power of a thing extends so long it exists. But every

incorruptible thing has power to be always ; for its power does not extend to any determinate time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not : but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some time is not ; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist.

Obj. 3. Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (*Phys. i.*) proves that matter is unbegotten, and also (*De Cælo et Mundo i.*) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.

Obj. 4. Further, a vacuum is where no body is, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body where the body of the world now is ; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vacuum ; which is impossible.

Obj. 5. Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new motion there was a previous motion. Therefore motion always was ; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because motion is only in a movable thing.

Obj. 6. Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For nature always moves in the same manner : hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a motion which was not there before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do ; but this can be only by some change, which (man) imagines, at least on the part of time ; as he who wills to make a house to-morrow, and not to-day, awaits something which will be to-morrow, but is not to-day ; and at least awaits for to-day to pass, and for to-morrow to come ; and this cannot be without change, because time is the

measure of motion. Therefore it remains that before every new motion, there was a previous motion; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 7. Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not in its end, and what ceases, is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no time except *now* which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can motion, the measure of which is time.

Obj. 8. Further, God is either before the world in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only, therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in duration constitutes time, therefore time existed before the world, which is impossible.

Obj. 9. Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above (Q. XLIV., AA. 2, 3, 4): since therefore God is eternal, the world also is eternal.

Obj. 10. Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world is eternal.

On the contrary, It is said (John xvii. 5), *Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was;* and (Prov. viii. 22), *The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning.*

I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (Q. XIX., A. 4) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of

the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (*Metaph.* v.). Now it was shown above (Q. XIX., A. 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always exist ; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always ; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration (that the world always existed).

Nor are Aristotle's reasons (*Phys.* viii.) simply, but relatively, demonstrative—viz., in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both in *Phys.* viii. and in *De Cælo* i., he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (*Topic.* i.), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, *whether the world is eternal.*

Reply Obj. 1. Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but according to the active power of God ; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other ; in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (*Metaph.* v.).

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, it cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be ; but before it received that power, it did not exist.

Hence this reason, which is given by Aristotle (*De Cælo* i.), does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist ; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin.

Reply Obj. 3. Aristotle (*Phys. i.*) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive its existence; and (*De Cælo et Mundo i.*) he proves that heaven is unbegotten, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (Q. XLIV., A. 1 ad 2).

Reply Obj. 4. The notion of a vacuum is not only *in which is nothing*, but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (*Phys. iv.*). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the world was.

Reply Obj. 5. The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing (*mobile*) was not always so, because it began to be whereas hitherto it was not. But this was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (Q. XLV., A. 2 ad 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (*Phys. viii.*), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal motion, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things began to exist motion also existed.

Reply Obj. 6. The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say that (such an agent) introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But

it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together : whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. But a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time *after* and not in time *before*, according to an imaginary succession of time (coming) after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action ; but He must be considered as giving as much time to His effect as He willed, and according to what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the Divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been ; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause ; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was.

Reply Obj. 7. As is stated (*Phys. iv.*), *before* and *after* belong to time, according as they are in motion. Hence the beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in motion. Now, supposing the eternity of motion, it is necessary that any given moment in motion be a beginning and an end of motion ; which need not be if motion has a beginning. The same applies to the *now* of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant now, as being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and motion. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (*Phys. viii.*) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of motion.

Reply Obj. 8. God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word *prior* does not signify the priority of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing ; as, when we say that above heaven there is nothing, the word *above* signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 9. As the effect follows, from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (Q. XIX., A. 4; Q. XLI., A. 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, still we should not say that the world was produced by Him, except as it is in the predefinition of His Will—that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare its author.

Reply Obj. 10. Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents acting by will, what is conceived and predefined is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not being.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS AN ARTICLE OF FAITH THAT THE
WORLD BEGAN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers: therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.

Obj. 2. Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing, or from something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of Aristotle (*De Cælo* i.), who held that heaven was unbegotten.

Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing ; and thus it has being after not being : therefore it must have begun.

Obj. 3. Further, everything which works by intellect, works from some starting-point, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by intellect : therefore His work has a starting-point. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.

Obj. 4. Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always : therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.

Obj. 5. Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration : therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.

Obj. 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium : therefore we should never have arrived at this present day ; which is manifestly false.

Obj. 7. Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (*Phys.* ii.) : therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved (*Metaph.* ii.).

Obj. 8. Further, if the world and generation always were, an infinite number of men preceded [the present]. But man's soul is immortal : therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible : therefore it can be known with certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.

On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things not seen (*Heb.* xi.). But that God is the Creator of the world, so that the world began, is an article of faith ; for we say, *I believe in one God*, etc. And, again, Gregory says (*Hom.*

Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*: in which words the newness of the world is stated: therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.

I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity (Q. XXXII., A. 1). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from *here* and *now*; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Q. XIX., A. 3). But the Divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xi.), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. *For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was always made. And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei. x.): for as, if the foot were always in the*

dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker always existed. To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time ; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration, as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration ; because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change, as was said above (Q. XLV., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything ; and so also some of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (*Metaph.* ix.).

Reply Obj. 3. This is the argument of Anaxagoras (*Phys.* viii.). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like motion. Such is the human intellect, but not the Divine intellect (Q. XIV., AA. 7 and 12).

Reply Obj. 4. Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and *vice versa*, and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (*Metaph.* i.), that it is absurd from such particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.

Reply Obj. 5. Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boëthius says (*Consol.* v.) ; because the Divine Being is All being simul-

taneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.

Reply Obj. 6. Passage always means from term to term. Whatever past day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.

Reply Obj. 7. In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to absolute infinity; for example, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are absolutely required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to accidental infinity as regards efficient causes; as for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental; as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes—viz., the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

Reply Obj. 8. Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from Algazel (*Metaph.*), who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But this was disproved above (Q. VII., A. 4). And some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as Augustine says, assert on this account a circuit of souls—viz., that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of

time ; a fuller consideration of which matters will be given later (Q. LXXV., A. 6 ; Q. LXXVI., A. 2 ; Q. CXVIII., A. 6). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or at least some creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CREATION OF THINGS WAS IN THE BEGINNING OF TIME ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not in any part of time. But the creation of things was not in time ; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being ; and time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things : therefore, creation was not in the beginning of time.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* vi.) that everything which is made, was being made ; and so to be made implies a *before* and *after*. But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no *before* and *after*. Therefore, since to be created is a kind of being made, it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time.

Obj. 3. Further, time itself is also created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible : therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.

On the contrary, It is said (Gen. i. 1) : *In the beginning God created heaven and earth.*

I answer that, The words of Genesis, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth,* are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and time had no beginning ; and to exclude this the words *In the beginning* are expounded—viz., *of time.* And some said that there are two principles of

creation, one of good things and the other of evil things, against which *In the beginning* is expounded *in the Son*. For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. ciii. 24), *Thou hast made all things in wisdom*, it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning—that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle (Col. i. 16), *In Him—viz., the Son—were created all things*. But others said that corporeal things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth—i.e., before all things*. For four things are placed or created together—viz., the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.

Reply Obj. 1. Things are not said to be created in the beginning of time, as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation; but because together with time heaven and earth were created.

Reply Obj. 2. This word of the Philosopher is understood *of being made* by means of motion, or as the term of motion. Because, since in every motion there is *before* and *after*, before any one point in a given motion—that is, whilst anything is in the process of being moved and made, there is a *before* and also an *after*, because what is in the beginning of motion or in its term is not in the being moved. But creation is neither motion nor the term of motion, as was said above (Q. XLV., AA. 2 and 3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not previously being created.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing is made excepting as it exists. But nothing exists of time except *now*. Hence time cannot be made except according to some *now*; not because in the first *now* is time, but because from it time begins.

QUESTION XLVII.

OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL.

(*In Three Articles.*)

AFTER considering the production of creatures, we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration is threefold—first, of the distinction of things in general ; secondly, the distinction of good and evil ; thirdly, the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature.

Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry : (1) The multitude or distinction of things. (2) Their inequality. (3) The unity of the world.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MULTITUDE AND DISTINCTION OF THINGS
COME FROM GOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q. XI., A. 4) : therefore He produces but one effect.

Obj. 2. Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (Q. XLIV., A. 3) : therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.

Obj. 3. Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of the creation is one—viz., the Divine goodness, as was shown above (Q. XLIV., A. 4) : therefore the effect of God is but one.

On the contrary, It is said in Genesis (i.) that God *separated the light from the darkness, and divided waters from waters.* Therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God.

I answer that, The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter.

But this cannot stand, for two reasons; first, because, as was shown above, even matter itself was created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is without form, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.

Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, as did Avicenna, who said that God, by the intelligence of Himself, produced the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as will appear later (Q. L., A. 3). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as an act, it produced the soul of the heavens.

But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons: first, because it was shown above (Q. XLV., A. 5) that to create

belongs to God alone, and hence what can only be caused by creation is produced by God alone—viz., all those things which are not subject to generation and corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such an effect we can only describe as being produced by chance. Therefore, thus the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of things, would be a thing of chance, which is impossible.

Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He produced things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the Divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided; and hence the whole universe together participates in the Divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.

And because the Divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read in Genesis (i. 3): *God said: Let there be light. . . . And He divided the light from the darkness.*

Reply Obj. 1. The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was shown above (Q. XIX., A. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand many things, as was shown above (Q. XV., A. 2), it follows that, although He is one, still He can make many things.

Reply Obj. 2. That reason would apply to the repre-

sentation which perfectly reflects the exemplar, and which is multiplied by reason of matter only ; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no creature represents perfectly the first exemplar, which is the Divine essence ; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things. Still, accordingly as ideas are called exemplars, the plurality of ideas corresponds in the Divine mind to the plurality of things.

Reply Obj. 3. In speculative things the medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one only ; whereas probable means of proof are many. And likewise when operation is concerned, if the means, as I may say, be equal to the end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, which is God ; and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INEQUALITY OF THINGS IS FROM GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the inequality of things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.

Obj. 2. Further, equality is the effect of unity (*Metaph. v.*). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.

Obj. 3. Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives being to things, it seems that He has made all things equal.

On the contrary, It is said (*Ecclus. xxxiii. 7*) : *Why does one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun another sun ?* (Vulg., 'when all come of the sun'). *By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished.*

I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God. For he asserted that God first created only the rational creatures, and all equal ; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some being turned to God more and some less, and others turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin ; and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said : *God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good* (Gen. i. 31). And, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xi.*) : *What can be more foolish than to say that the Divine Architect provided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened through the sin of one soul ; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would be a hundred suns in the world ?*

Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their inequality. This appears from the following. A twofold distinction is found in things ; one is a formal distinction as regards things differing specifically ; the other is a material distinction as regards things differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species is sufficiently preserved in the one ; whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the preserva-

tion of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction is of greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinction always requires inequality, because, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* viii.), the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be ranged in degrees ; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men than other animals ; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the Divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so is it the cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.

Reply Obj. 1. It is the part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety ; but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole ; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a creature ; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we find it said of each creature, *God saw the light that it was good* (Gen. i. 4) ; and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, *God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good* (Gen. i. 31).

Reply Obj. 2. The first effect of unity is equality ; and then comes multiplicity ; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to Augustine, is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds, to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality ; but nevertheless even creatures share in a certain equality—namely, of proportion.

Reply Obj. 3. This is the argument that persuaded Origen : but it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of which is due to unequal merits. But in the

constitution of things there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality, either of merits or of the disposition of the matter ; but inequality comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also in works done by art ; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, not because it is made of other material ; but in order that the house may be made perfect of different parts, the artificer seeks different material ; indeed, he would make such material if he could.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE WORLD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is not only one world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (Lib. 83 *qqu.*), it is unfitting to say that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason that He created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited to the creation of one world ; but rather it is infinite, as was shown above (Q. XXV., A. 2). Therefore God has produced many worlds.

Obj. 2. Further, nature does what is best, and much more does God. But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God.

Obj. 3. Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. For as when I say *man* I mean the form, and when I say *this man*, I mean the form in matter ; so when we say *world*, the form is signified, and when we say *this world*, the form in matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many worlds.

On the contrary, It is said, *The world was made by Him* (John i. 10), where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.

I answer that, The very order of things created by God

shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself, as shown above (Q. XI., A. 3 ; Q. XXI., A. 1). Hence it must be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms.

Reply Obj. 1. This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (*Metaph.* xii.) the unity of God governing all ; and Plato, from the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.

Reply Obj. 2. No agent intends material plurality as the end ; forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of the Divine Agent ; forasmuch as for the same reason it might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if He had made three ; and so on to infinity.

Reply Obj. 3. The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the world.

QUESTION XLVIII.

THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the distinction of things in particular ; and firstly of the distinction of good and evil ; and then of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures.

Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.

Concerning evil, six points are to be considered : (1) Whether evil is a nature ? (2) Whether evil is found in things ? (3) Whether good is the subject of evil ? (4) Whether evil totally corrupts good ? (5) The division of evil into pain and fault. (6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVIL IS A NATURE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus ; for the Philosopher says (*De Prædicamentis*) that *good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things*. Therefore evil is a nature.

Obj. 2. Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality ; for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.

Obj. 3. Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit,

but as contraries, as the Philosopher shows (*De Prædicationis*), by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.

Obj. 4. Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.

Obj. 5. Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (*Enchiridion*) that *The admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good.* Therefore evil is a nature.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.), *Evil is neither a being nor a good.*

I answer that, One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible, and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that *evil is neither a being nor a good.* For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.

Reply Obj. 1. Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* x.), *the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation, as being necessarily seen in all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation*

to white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not absolutely, but in regard to contraries; because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.

Reply Obj. 2. Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Still neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed.

Reply Obj. 3. This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks, in the objection cited, of good and evil in morality. For in that respect, between good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says that a *prodigal man is foolish, but not bad*. And from this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of evil; for from blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil.

Reply Obj. 4. A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that sense evil even in the idea of privation itself is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final

cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause. But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.): evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: *while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention.*

Reply Obj. 5. As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by reason of some good joined to it.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVIL IS FOUND IN THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that evil is not found in things. For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of something, that is a *not-being*. But Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from non-existence. Therefore evil is not at all found in things.

Obj. 2. Further, *being* and *thing* are convertible. If, therefore, evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is contrary to the preceding article.

Obj. 3. Further, *the white unmixed with black is the most white*, as the Philosopher says (*Topic.* iii.). Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is no evil.

On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.

I answer that, As was said above, the perfection of the

universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be filled up. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness ; and this grade is to be found in existence itself ; for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.

As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings ; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found ; for corruption is itself an evil.

Reply Obj. 1. Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple *not being*, because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a privation.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says (*Metaph. v.*), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten *predicaments* ; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word *is* ; and in this sense being is what answers to the question, *Does it exist?* and thus blindness is said to be in the eye ; or any other privation [in anything else]. And in this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.

Reply Obj. 3. God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the whole, as was said above. And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can

fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because *it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature*, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says (*Enchir.*), *God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil*. Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVIL IS IN GOOD AS IN ITS SUBJECT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says that *evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists*. Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.

Obj. 2. Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But *not-being* does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as its subject.

Obj. 3. One contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its subject.

Obj. 4. Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore, also, the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said (Isa. v. 20): *Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!*

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Enchir.*) that *Evil exists only in good*.

I answer that, As was said above, evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. And absence of good, taken negatively, is not

evil ; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else ; for instance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil ; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.

Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same—viz., being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form ; or whether it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good ; and thus every actual being is a good ; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.

Reply Obj. 2. *Not-being*, understood negatively, does not require a subject ; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. iv.*), and such *not-being* is an evil.

Reply Obj. 3. Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not *sight*, but *animal*. Yet, it appears, as Augustine says, that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus ; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good.

Reply Obj. 4. The prophet imprecates woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is clear from the explanation given.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVIL CORRUPTS THE WHOLE GOOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Enchir.*) that evil hurts inasmuch as it *takes away good*. But good is like to itself and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.

Obj. 3. Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Enchir.*) that evil cannot wholly consume good.

I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the good opposed to the evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil ; for by darkness the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away ; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality.

The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitude is to be

taken as contrary to its intensity. For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject, the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions, which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.

Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; but, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and God, according to the words (Isa. lix. 2): *Our sins have divided between us and God.* Still, the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its very nature.

Reply Obj. 1. The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.

Reply Obj. 2. The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet,

on account of its relation to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.

Reply Obj. 3. Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either equally or more.

Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not directly (*in se*), but accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely, as explained above.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVIL IS ADEQUATELY DIVIDED INTO PAIN*
AND FAULT?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.

Obj. 2. Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.

Obj. 3. Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for *temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion for the exercise of virtue*, as is said in the Gloss

* Pain here means *penalty*: such was its original signification, being derived from *pœna*. In this sense we say *Pain of death*, *Pain of loss*, *Pain of sense*.—Ed.

on 2 Cor. xii. ; nor is it a pain ; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows afterwards: Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault.

Obj. 4. On the contrary, This division is superfluous ; for, as Augustine says (*Enchir.*), evil is so called *because it hurts*. But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain.

I answer that, Evil, as was said above, is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act however is twofold ; the first, and the second. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing ; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it does not exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a pain ; and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject to Divine Providence and Justice, as was shown above (Q. XXII., A. 2) ; for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault ; for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.

Reply Obj. 1. Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere negation, as was said above (A. 3), therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal ; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself,

because existence and conservation come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature.

Reply Obj. 2. Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.

Reply Obj. 3. Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not, properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault.

Reply Obj. 4. In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as including the idea of injury.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PAIN HAS THE NATURE OF EVIL MORE THAN
FAULT HAS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more of good than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.

Obj. 2. Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above (A. 5), is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it seems that pain is worse than fault.

Obj. 3. Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.

On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the

whole body. But Divine wisdom brings in pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain.

I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to include privation of grace or glory.

There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.): *To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment.* And this because, since good absolutely considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it than pain has.

The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because the evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good: for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the Divine will, and to Divine love, whereby the Divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that fault has more evil in it than pain has.

Reply Obj. 1. Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.

Reply Obj. 2. The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection, than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.

Reply Obj. 3. Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way, both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end.

QUESTION XLIX.

THE CAUSE OF EVIL.

(In Three Articles.)

WE next inquire into the cause of evil. There are three points of inquiry : (1) Whether good can be the cause of evil ? (2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil ? (3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOOD CAN BE THE CAUSE OF EVIL ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said (Matt. vii. 18) : *A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit.*

Obj. 2. Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.

Obj. 3. Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil.

Obj. 4. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Julian.*) : *There is no possible source of evil except good.*

I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which

is natural and due to a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition, this can only come from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good.

And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above (Q. XLVIII., A. 3). For it was shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; for not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.

In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action, otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; as the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more

perfectly does it impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the fire : but this is accidental ; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire—as, for instance, that it fails to heat—this comes either by defect of the action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the action of fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause ; and thus is good the cause of evil.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*Contra Julian.*) : *The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree.* Now, a good will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. But, nevertheless, the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good ; and thus good is the cause of evil.

Reply Obj. 2. Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil : just as the goodness of the fire causes evil to the water, so man, good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as explained above, this is by accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident : for instance, the cold surrounding (a body) heats (the body) through the concentration of the (bodily) heat.

Reply Obj. 3. Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing ; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient,

inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.

Reply Obj. 4. Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SUPREME GOOD, GOD, IS THE CAUSE OF EVIL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (Isa. xlv. 5, 7) : *I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil.* And (Amos iii. 6), *Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done ?*

Obj. 2. Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above. Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (Q. II., A. 3 ; Q. VI., AA. 1, 4), it follows that also every evil is from God.

Obj. 3. Further, as is said by the Philosopher (*Phys.* ii.), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Lib. 83 *qqu.*) that, *God is not the author of evil, because He is not the cause of tending to not-being.*

I answer that, As appears from what was said (in the preceding article), the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above (Q. IV., A. 1). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said (in the preceding article) that some agent inasmuch

as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above (Q. XXII., A. 2 ad 2 ; Q. XLVIII., A. 2), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to what is said (1 Kings ii. 6) : *The Lord killeth and maketh alive*. But when we read that *God hath not made death* (Wisd. i. 13), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe ; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

Reply Obj. 1. These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.

Reply Obj. 2. The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect ; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause ; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.

Reply Obj. 3. The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires ; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE BE ONE SUPREME EVIL WHICH IS THE
CAUSE OF EVERY EVIL ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things, according to the text : *Good is set against evil, and life against death ; so also is the sinner against a just man* (Ecclus. xxxiii. 15). Therefore there are contrary principles, one of good, the other of evil.

Obj. 2. Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was shown above (Q. II., A. 3 ; Q. VI., AA. 2, 4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.

Obj. 3. Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil.

Obj. 4. Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.

Obj. 5. Further, every accidental cause is reduced to a direct cause. But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some supreme evil which is the direct cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause ; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in the few.

Obj. 6. Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause ; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause, as was said above (AA. 1, 2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil.

On the contrary, The Supreme Good is the cause of every being, as was shown above (Q. II., A. 3 ; Q. VI., A. 4). Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.

I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.

Firstly, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good, as was shown above (Q. VI., AA. 3, 4). But nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good (Q. V., A. 3) ; and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject (Q. XLVIII., A. 3).

Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above (Q. VI., A. 2). But there cannot be a supreme evil ; because, as was shown above (Q. XLVIII., A. 4), although evil always lessens good, still, it never wholly consumes it ; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (*Ethic* iv.) that *if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself* ; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good.

Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle ; both because every evil is caused from good, as was shown above (A. 1), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause.

Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the ancients ; namely, because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being, but considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil ; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature

of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above (Q. XLVII., A. 2 ad 1).

Likewise, also, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and also above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above (Q. II., A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular causes, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was said above (Q. XLVIII., A. 3). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above, it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the Supreme Good, Who is pure act.

Reply Obj. 3. Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.

Reply Obj. 4. No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil.

Reply Obj. 5. Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above (A. 1). Hence reduction to any direct cause of evil is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply, as it stands, false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number ; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man—that is, in regard to reason ; and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason.

Reply Obj. 6. In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows indirectly.



TREATISE ON THE ANGELS

QUESTION L.

OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED.

(*In Five Articles.*)

NEXT we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.

Their substance we consider absolutely, and in relation to corporeal things.

Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal? (2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form? (3) We ask concerning their number? (4) Of their difference from each other? (5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL IS ALTOGETHER INCORPOREAL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely incorporeal.

But Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.) that *an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us ; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal.*

Obj. 2. Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* vi.). But Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.) that *an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance.* Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.

Obj. 3. Further, Ambrose says (*De Spir. Sanct.*) : *Every creature is limited within its own nature.* But to be limited belongs to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's creatures, as appears in the Psalm (cxlviii.) : *Praise the Lord, all His angels ; and, farther on, For He spoke, and they were made ; He commanded, and they were created.* Therefore angels are corporeal.

On the contrary, It is said, *Who makes His angels spirits* (Ps. ciii. 4).

I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect ; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and will (Q. XIV., A. 8 ; Q. XIX., A. 4). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty ; for every body is limited to *here* and *now*. Hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.

The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (*Phys.* iv.). Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts xxiii. 8).

But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect alone.

Reply Obj. 1. Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and thus it is said that the angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.

Reply Obj. 2. Motion is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.

Reply Obj. 3. To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (*De Spir. Sanct.*) that *although some things are not contained in corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel is composed of matter and form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the form (*Metaph.* viii.). Therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 2. Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive

and to substand ; whence Boëthius says (*De Trin.*) that a *simple form cannot be a subject*: and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an angel is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 3. Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.

Obj. 4. Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an angel is in matter.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*): *The first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal.*

I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form ; which opinion Avicbron endeavoured to establish in his book of the *Fount of Life*. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts, the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same ; so that it must be understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things.

But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form,

and another receives the spiritual form. Matter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity ; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (*Phys.* i.). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quantity ; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same matter.

It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality ; because forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it must be that every intellectual substance is altogether immaterial.

But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality ; because the intellect does not apprehend things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other hand, are above our intellect ; and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own mode, according as it apprehends composite things ; and in this way also it apprehends God (Q. III.).

Reply Obj. 1. It is difference which constitutes the species. Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being ; because *the species of things are like numbers*, which differ by the addition and subtraction of unity, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* viii.). But in material things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is the form ; and another thing which is determined, and this is the matter ; and hence from the latter the *genus* is derived, and from the former the *difference*. Whereas in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined ; each thing

by its own self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them *genus* and *difference* are not derived from different things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea of their *genus*; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their difference.

Reply Obj. 2. This reason is given in the book on the *Fount of Life*, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles would be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.

Reply Obj. 3. Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things, which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence; but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, *whereby he is*, and *what is*, or *existence*, and *what is*, as Boëthius says. For *what is*, is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God *existence* and *what is* are not different, as was explained above (Q. III., A. 4). Hence God alone is pure act.

Reply Obj. 4. Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while its *being* is finite as determined to some one special nature.

Whence it is said (*De Causis*) that *intelligence is finite from above*, as receiving its being from above itself, and is *infinite from below*, as not received in any matter.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS EXIST IN ANY GREAT NUMBER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels are not in great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown above. Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number.

Obj. 2. Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible number in the angelic nature.

Obj. 3. Further, the proper effect of the separated substances seems to be the motions of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements of the heavenly bodies.

Obj. 4. Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *all intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the Divine goodness.* But a ray is only multiplied according to the different things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above. Therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the requirements of the first bodies—that is, of the heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding forth of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence, the same conclusion is to be drawn as before.

On the contrary, It is said, *Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him* (Dan. vii. 10).

I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separated substances. Plato contended that the separated substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number of the separated substances is the number of the species of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (*Metaph.* i.) because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things. Consequently the separated substances cannot be the exemplar species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held (*Metaph.* xi.) that those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separated substances according to the number of the first motions.

But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (in the passage just quoted); while he con-

tended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a Divine message are styled angels ; and again, even the powers of natural things, which manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels.

Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier. xiv.*): *There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences, surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers.* The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, which are the most perfect of bodies, exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably according to magnitude ; for the entire sphere of things active and passive is something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude.

Reply Obj. 1. In the angels number is not that of discrete quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that which is caused by distinction of forms ; according as multitude is reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above (Q. XXX., A. 3 ; Q. XI.).

Reply Obj. 2. From the angelic nature being highest unto God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not so as to be found in few subjects.

Reply Obj. 3. This is Aristotle's argument (*Metaph. xii.*), and it would conclude necessarily if the separated substances were made for corporeal substances. For so the immaterial substances would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in corporeal

things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says, in the same place, that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones.

Reply Obj. 4. This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this was refuted above (Q. XLVII., A. 1). Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to (heavenly) bodies, but according to the Divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS DIFFER IN SPECIES ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :

Objection 1. It seems that the angels do not differ in species. For since the *difference* is nobler than the *genus*, all things which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species. But all the angels agree in what is noblest in them—that is to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species.

Obj. 2. Further, more and less do not change a species. But the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and less—namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.

Obj. 3. Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are the angels.

Obj. 4. Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of one species.

On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as *first* and *second* (prius et posterius), as the philosopher says (*Metaph.* iii.). But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (*Ang. Hier.* x.). Therefore the angels are not of the same species.

I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.

But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said above, it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. Even if the angels had matter, not even so could there be several angels of one species. For so it would be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers: and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but of genus.

Reply Obj. 1. *Difference* is nobler than *genus*, as the determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul. Therefore the irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature.

Reply Obj. 2. More and less, according as they are caused

by the intensity or remissness of one form, do not change the species ; but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees, they do change the species ; for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air ; and in this way the angels are diversified according to more and less.

Reply Obj. 3. The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species.

Reply Obj. 4. Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific multiplication, as was said above (Q. XLVII., A. 3). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS ARE INCORRUPTIBLE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels are not incorruptible ; for Damascene says, speaking of the angel, that he is *an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favour, and not by nature.*

Obj. 2. Further, Plato says in the *Timæus* : *O gods of gods, whose maker and father am I : You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it.* But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by their nature.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Gregory (*Moral. xvi.*), *all things would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them.* But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are corruptible of their own nature.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*) that the intellectual substances *have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death, matter, and generation.*

I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above (A. 2), it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it ; but what belongs to a thing, considered in relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself ; but a bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to exist belongs to the form considered in itself ; for everything actually exists according to its form : whereas matter is actually existent by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases actually to exist when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the angels, as was said above (A. 2), it cannot lose its existence. Therefore, the Angel's immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature.

A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation ; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of existence. Now the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.

Reply Obj. 1. Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability ; since *every change is a kind of death*, as Augustine says (*Contra Maxim. ii.*). The angels obtain perfect immutability only by grace, as will appear later (Q. LXII.).

Reply Obj. 2. By the expression *gods* Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore dissoluble of their own nature ; yet they are always preserved in existence by the Divine will.

Reply Obj. 3. As was observed above (Q. XLIV., A. 1) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary, or to an incorruptible, being to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but because it has some principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter.

QUESTION LI.

OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES.

(In Three Articles.)

WE next deal with the angels in comparison with corporeal things ; and in the first place with their comparison with bodies ; secondly, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places ; and, thirdly, of their comparison with local motion.

Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry : (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them ? (2) Whether they assume bodies ? (3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS HAVE BODIES NATURALLY UNITED TO THEM ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that angels have bodies naturally united to them. Origen says (*Peri Archon* i.) : *It is God's attribute alone—that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition.* Bernard likewise says (*Homil. vi. super Cant.*) : *Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal organs.* Augustine also says (*Gen. ad lit. iii.*) : *The demons are called animals of the atmosphere*

because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies. But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 3. Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *the angels are understood to be incorporeal.*

I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature, as, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Q. LXXV., A. 2), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else; just as it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the class of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be explained later on (Q. LXXXIV., A. 6; Q. LXXXIX., A. 1). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any *genus* we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore there are some perfectly intellectual substances in the intellectual nature, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels.

Reply Obj. 1. As was said above (Q. L., A. 1) it was the opinion of some that every being was a body; and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no

incorporeal substances existing except as united to bodies ; so much so that some even laid it down that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (*Civ. Dei* vii.). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according to that expression of Psalm viii. 2: *Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens*; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances ; being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained (in the following article). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there were some aerial animals, which they termed demons.

Reply Obj. 2. Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.

Reply Obj. 3. To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking ; hence it belongs to God, as is said—*The Lord killeth, and maketh alive* (1 Kings ii. 6). But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a body.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGELS ASSUME BODIES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that angels do not assume bodies. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of the kind in a work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his own power

exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a body.

Obj. 2. Further, every assumption is terminated in some union; because to assume implies a taking to oneself (*ad se sumere*). But a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as was said (in the previous article); while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels would be assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

Obj. 3. Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because air is without shape or colour. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Civ. Dei* xvi.) that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision—that is, according to imagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination, and consequently it is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said (in the preceding article, Q. L., A. 1) it follows that they sometimes assume bodies.

Reply Obj. 1. Angels have no need of an assumed body for themselves, but on our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared in the flesh.

Reply Obj. 2. The body assumed is not united to the angel as to a form, nor merely as to its mover, but as to its mover represented by the assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body.

Reply Obj. 3. Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape, nor colour, yet when condensed it can both be shaped and coloured as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by Divine power in so far as is needful for forming the assumed body.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS EXERCISE FUNCTIONS OF LIFE IN THE BODIES ASSUMED ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. Pretence is unbecoming in angels (messengers) of truth. But it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions. Therefore the angels do exercise functions of life in the assumed body.

Obj. 2. Further, in the works of the angels there is

nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life.

Obj. 3. Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.). But the angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it is said Gen. xviii. 16, that *Abraham walked with the angels*, who had appeared to him, bringing them on the way; and when Tobias said to the angel (Tob. v. 7, 8): *Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of the Medes?* he answered: *I know it; and I have often walked through all the ways thereof.* Therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.

Obj. 4. Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.

Obj. 5. Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having resumed life (Luke xxiv.). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored them as God (Gen. xviii.). Therefore the angels do exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.

Obj. 6. Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: *After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown* (Gen. vi. 4). Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies.

On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore

they cannot exercise functions of life through assumed bodies.

I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations ; just as speech, which is the function of a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is sound ; and walking agrees with other motions, in so far as it is motion. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such operations ; but not as to that which is special to living subjects ; because, according to the Philosopher (*De Somn. et Vig. i.*), *that has the action which has the faculty.* Hence nothing can have a function of life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such action.

Reply Obj. 1. As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through sensible figures ; in the same way, it is not contrary to the truth of the holy Angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they really are not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men ; because the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels.

Reply Obj. 2. Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain ; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest ; just as by the eye the power of the angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other members, as Dionysius teaches (*Cæl. Hier. ult. cap.*).

Reply Obj. 3. Motion coming from a united mover is a proper function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the motion of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the motion of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the movers in the things moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but according to a fixed quarter; because *the moving energy is always in the east*, as the Philosopher says (*Phys. viii.*).

Reply Obj. 4. Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.

Reply Obj. 5. Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance of the eater. Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter; nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the angel said to Tobias: *When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink* (Tob. xii. 19). Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom, nevertheless,

he worshipped God ; as God is wont to be in the prophets, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xvi.).

Reply Obj. 6. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xv.) : *Many persons affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny it. But God's holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth, who were good ; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor it is to be wondered at that giants should be born of them ; nor were they all giants, but there were many more before than after the deluge. Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from seed of such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men taken for the purpose ; as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man ; just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.), so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of the man.*

QUESTION LII.

OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE.

(In Three Articles.)

We now inquire into the place of the angels, touching which there are three subjects of investigation : (1) Is the angel in a place ? (2) Can he be in several places at once ? (3) Can several angels be in the same place ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL BE IN A PLACE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel is not in a place. Boëthius says (*De Hebdom.*) : *The common notion of the learned is that things incorporeal are not in a place.* And again, Aristotle observes (*Phys. iv.*) that *it is not everything existing which is in a place, but only a movable body.* But an angel is not a body, as was shown above (Q. L.). Therefore an angel is not in a place.

Obj. 2. Further, place is a quantity having position. But everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a position cannot befit an angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position. Therefore an angel is not in a place.

Obj. 3. Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (*Phys. iv.*). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place, because the container is more formal than the contained ; as air with regard to water, as is said in *Physics iv.* Therefore an angel is not in a place.

On the contrary, It is said in the Collect : *Let Thy holy angels dwell herein, who may keep us in peace.*

I answer that, It is befitting to an angel to be in a place ; yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity ; but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place.

Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the continuous ; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place ; because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not contained by it : for the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it.

And hereby we have the answers to the objections.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN BE IN SEVERAL PLACES AT ONCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel can be in several places at once. An angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.). Therefore an angel can be in several places at once.

Obj. 2. Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes ; and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is in every part thereof. But according to its various parts there are various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* i.) that *where the angel operates, there he is.* But occasionally he operates in several places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gen. xix. 25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*ibid.* ii.) that *while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth.*

I answer that, An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things, is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. But since the angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in only one place.

Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. Some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point. But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as of his own free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one place to him.

Neither, if any angel moves the heavens above, is it necessary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his power is only applied to what is first moved by him. Now there

is one part of the heavens in which there is motion first of all, namely, the part to the east : hence the Philosopher (*Phys.* viii.) attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.

So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in one place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.

From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections : because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied, is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER SEVERAL ANGELS CAN BE AT THE SAME TIME IN THE SAME PLACE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that several angels can be at the same time in the same place. Several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place, because they fill the place. But angels do not fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as appears from the Philosopher (*Phys.* iv.). Therefore several angels can be in the one place.

Obj. 2. Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at the one time in the one place : because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in *Physics* iv. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.

Obj. 3. Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* vi.). But demons, although

they do not obsess souls, yet do obsess bodies occasionally ; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place : and consequently for the same reason all other spiritual substances.

On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place.

I answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason whereof is this, because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every class of causes : for there is one proximate form of one thing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several individuals may draw a boat after them, since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat ; while the whole party takes the place of a mover, in so far as their united strengths are all put forth in producing the one motion. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said (in the first article), there can therefore be but one angel in one place.

Reply Obj. 1. Several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place ; but for another reason, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2. An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way ; hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3. Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality ; since the soul is its form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.

QUESTION LIII.

OF THE LOCAL MOTION OF THE ANGELS.

(In Three Articles.)

IT now remains for us to consider the local motion of the angels ; under which heading there are three things to be sought : (1) Whether an angel can be moved locally ? (2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space ? (3) Whether the angel's motion is in time or instantaneous ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN BE MOVED LOCALLY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :

Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* vi.), *nothing which is devoid of parts is moved* ; because, while it is in the term *whence* (*a quo*), it is not moved ; nor while it is in the term *whither* (*ad quem*), for it is then already moved ; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term *whence* and partly in the term *whither*. But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally.

Obj. 2. Further, motion is *the act of an imperfect being*, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* iii.). But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.

Obj. 3. Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.

On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved locally.

I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise does local motion. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is necessary for local motion of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the continuity of motion is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority in magnitude is the priority and posteriority of local motion, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* iv.). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local motion of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous motion. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above (Q. LII., A. 1), it follows necessarily that the motion of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above (Q. LII., A. 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above (*ibid.*), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local motion; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his motion will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the

whole of another place, and thus his motion will not be continuous.

Reply Obj. 1. Such an argument fails of purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with motion which is continuous. For if the motion were not continuous, it might be said that a thing is moved while it is in the term *whence*, and while it is in the term *whither*: because the very succession of *wheres*, regarding the same thing; would be called motion: hence, in whichever of those *wheres* the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of motion prevents this; because nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel's motion is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's motion is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in motion, he is partly in the term *whence*, and partly in the term *whither* (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the Angel's substance, but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous motion the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in motion, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to something which is divisible.

Reply Obj. 2. The motion of that which is in potentiality

is the act of an imperfect agent. But the motion which is by application of energy is the act of one in act : because energy implies actuality.

Reply Obj. 3. The motion of that which is in potentiality is on account of its own need : but the motion of what is in act is not for any need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to the text, *Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation ?* (Heb. i. 14).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL PASSES THROUGH INTERMEDIATE SPACE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel does not pass through intermediate space. Everything which passes through a middle space first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his motion : which is not possible.

Obj. 2. Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle : for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle.

On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then, when he is in the term *whither*, he is no longer in motion, but is changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change : consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he was not moved so long as he was in the term *whence*. Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space : and so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening space.

I answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the local motion of an angel can be continuous,

and non-continuous. If it be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another, without passing through the mid space; because, as is said by the Philosopher (*Phys. v.*), *The middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved first comes, before arriving at the last into which it is transferred*; because the order of first and last in continuous motion, is according to the order of first and last in magnitude, as he says (*Phys. iv.*).

But if an angel's motion be not continuous, it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle, which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which are indivisible; because between every two points there are infinite intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a middle, as the Philosopher proves (*Phys. vi.*). And the same must of necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the continuous motion of a body. For a body is only moved from place to place in time. But in the whole time which measures the motion of a body, there are not two *nows* in which the body moved is not in one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same place in two *nows*, it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and previously. Therefore, since there are infinite *nows* between the first and the last *now* of the time which measures the motion, there must be infinite places between the first from which the movement begins, and the last where the motion ceases. This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm's length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first place from which the motion starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the motion ends is of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate

places multiplied ; because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible, and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places.

Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places by the continuity of its motion ; because, as the intermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes in motion which is continuous. Consequently, if the motion be not continuous, then all the parts of the motion will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by continuous motion, it follows, either that it does not pass through all the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite places : which is not possible. Accordingly, then, as the angel's motion is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate places.

Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature ; but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained under a place ; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its motion. But an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained thereby, but is above it as containing it : hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or without the intervening place.

Reply Obj. 1. The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power : and so the angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above : but they are consumed by the continuity of the motion, as is evident from the foregoing remarks.

Reply Obj. 2. While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to various places : but the soul's essence is not applied to the things thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3. In continuous motion the actual change is not a part of the motion, but its conclusion : hence motion must precede change. Accordingly such motion is through the mid-space. But in motion which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is a part of number : hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such motion.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MOTION OF AN ANGEL BE INSTANTANEOUS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel's motion is instantaneous. The greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist the mover, the more rapid is the motion. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body be moved in time, an angel is moved in an instant.

Obj. 2. Further, the angel's motion is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as illumination ; both because the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot successively ; and because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel's motion instantaneous.

Obj. 3. Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term *whither* : but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term *whence* ; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other. But if he be partly in the one and partly in the other, it follows that he is divisible ; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term *whence*. Therefore he

rests there : since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said (in the preceding article). So it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time.

On the contrary, In every change there is a before and after. Now the before and after of motion is reckoned by time. Consequently every motion, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after in it.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the local motion of an angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term *whence* ; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term *whither*. Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But there is a mid-time between two *nows* of time : hence they say that a last *now* cannot be assigned in which it was in the term *wherewith*, just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire : but a last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous motions.

But this does not hold good in the present case ; and it is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before : and therefore in every *now* of time which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the same (disposition) in the first, in the middle, and in the last *now*. On the other hand, it is of the very nature of motion for the subject moved to be otherwise now than it was before : and therefore in every *now* of time which measures motion, the movable subject is in various dispositions ; hence in the last *now* it must have a different form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time.

Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible in motion : because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous motion : just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local motion of the illuminating body. Now the local motion of an angel is not the term of any other continuous motion, but is of itself, depending upon no other motion. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last *now* he is in another place : but some *now* must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many *nows* succeeding one another, there is necessarily time ; since time is nothing else than the numeration of before and after in motion. It remains, then, that the motion of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his motion be continuous, and in non-continuous time if his motion be non-continuous ; for, as was said (in the first article) his motion can be of either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of motion, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* iv.).

But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the time which measures the motion of the heavens, and whereby all corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the motion of the heavens ; because the angel's motion does not depend upon the motion of the heavens.

Reply Obj. 1. If the time of the angel's motion be not continuous, but a kind of succession of *nows*, it will have no proportion to the time which measures the motion of corporeal things, which is continuous ; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the motion exists. Besides, the

swiftness of the angel's motion is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will.

Reply Obj. 2. Illumination is the term of a motion ; and is an alteration, not a local motion, as though the light were understood to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But the angel's motion is local, and, besides, it is not the term of motion ; hence there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection is based on continuous time. But the time of an angel's motion can be non-continuous. So an angel can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel's motion be continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes the last *now* ; as was already shown (in the preceding article). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above (in the first article).

QUESTION LIV.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS.

(*In Five Articles.*)

AFTER considering all that belongs to the angel's substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation is fourfold. In the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge : secondly, into his medium of knowledge : thirdly, into the objects known : and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them.

Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry : (1) Is the angel's understanding his substance ? (2) Is his being his understanding ? (3) Is his substance his power of intelligence ? (4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect ? (5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL'S ACT OF UNDERSTANDING IS HIS
SUBSTANCE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angel's act of understanding is his substance. The angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action ; as is evident from Aristotle (*De Anima* iii.) and from his Commentator. Therefore much more is the angel's substance his action,—that is his act of understanding.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* xii.) that *the action of the intellect is life.* But *since in living things to*

live is to be, as he says (*De Anima* ii.), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an intelligent angel.

Obj. 3. Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them ; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who understands.

On the contrary, the action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above (Q. III., A. 4). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance.

I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any other creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality of a power ; just as existence is the actuality of a substance, or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality : because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His existence and His action.

Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one ; just as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance of another angel.

Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly ; for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding .

Reply Obj. 1. When the active intellect is said to be its

own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it : which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.

Reply Obj. 2. The relation between *life* and *to live* is not the same as that between *essence* and *to exist* ; but rather as that between *a race* and *to run*, one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if *to live* be *to exist*, that *life* is *essence*. Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* x.), *Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life* : yet it is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that *the act of the intellect is life*.

Reply Obj. 3. The action which is transitive, passing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according to the manner of expression ; for it really follows the union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an effect which differs from both.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE ANGEL TO UNDERSTAND IS TO EXIST ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in living things to live is to exist, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.). But *to understand is in a sense to live* (*ibid.*). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.

Obj. 2. Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.

On the contrary, The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.). But

to exist is not movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.

I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. As is said by the Philosopher (*Metaph.* ix.), there is a twofold class of action ; one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting ; and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent ; as to feel, to understand, to will : by such actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very existence : because the agent's existence is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act *to understand*, of which the object is *the true* ; and the act *to will*, of which the object is *the good* ; each of which is convertible with being ; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things ; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species ; God's being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* v.). Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will.

Reply Obj. 1. Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject : sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live : for there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life.

Reply Obj. 2. The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own specific nature as such an

essence, it is compared to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow that in the angel *to be* is the same as *to understand*.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL'S POWER OF INTELLIGENCE IS HIS ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence. For, *mind* and *intellect* express the power of understanding. But in many passages of his writings, Dionysius styles angels *intellects* and *minds*. Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.

Obj. 2. Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident ; for that which is besides the essence of anything, we call its accident. But *a simple form cannot be a subject*, as Boëthius states (*De Trin.* i.). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said (Q. L., A. 2).

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine (*Confess.* xii.) says, that God made the angelic nature *nigh unto Himself*, while He made primary matter *nigh unto nothing* ; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier.* xi.) that *the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation*. Therefore substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.

I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence :

which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said (Q. XLIV., A. 1). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.

Reply Obj. 1. An angel is called *intellect* and *mind*, because all his knowledge is intellectual. But the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.

Reply Obj. 2. A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boëthius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the form;—whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.

Reply Obj. 3. The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS AN ACTIVE AND A PASSIVE INTELLECT
IN AN ANGEL?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (*De*

Anima iii.) that, *In the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can do all things,* But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel.

Obj. 2. Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive ; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active intellect, as is made clear in *De Anima* iii. But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.

On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive intellect as colours to the sight ; but to the active intellect as colours to the light, as is clear from *De Anima* iii. This is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel.

I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this,—that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible : and this power in us is called the active intellect.

But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend ; nor, again, are their intelligible objects intelligible

in potentiality, but they are actually such ; for they first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear later (QQ. LXXXIV., A. 7, and LXXXV., A. 1). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally.

Reply Obj. 1. As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is no need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.

Reply Obj. 2. It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect : neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally ; and it is not about names that we need trouble.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* viii.) that in the angels there is *life which understands and feels*. Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well.

Obj. 2. Further, Isidore says (*De Summo Bono*) that the angels have learnt many things by experience. But

experience comes of many remembrances, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* i.). Consequently they have likewise a power of memory.

Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that there is a sort of *perverted phantasy* in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of the same nature.

On the contrary, Gregory says, in a homily on the Ascension, that *man feels in common with the brutes, and understands with the Angels.*

I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through the bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (Q. LI., A. 1). Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them.

The Commentator (*Metaph.* xii.) says the same thing, namely, that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For this reason the angels are called *intellects* and *minds*, as was said above (A. 3 ad 1).

A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. Firstly, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united with them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (*De Civ. Dei* xxi.) that *such an inquiry does not call for much labour.* Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood as by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension

of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage of speech, when we understand something for certain to, say that we *feel* it. And hence it is that we use the word *sentence*. *Experience* can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know single objects through the senses : the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show (Q. LVII., A. 2), yet not through the senses. But *memory* can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (*De Trin.* x.) puts it in the mind ; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion *a perverted phantasy* is attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good ; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.

QUESTION LV.

OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE.

(*In Three Articles.*)

NEXT in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some species? (2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as they have derived from things? (3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower angels?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW ALL THINGS BY THEIR SUBSTANCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels know all things by their substance. Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.) that *the angels, according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth.* But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore the angel knows things by his essence.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* xii. and *De Anima* iii.), *in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same as the object understood.* But the object understood is the same as the one who understands it, by reason of that whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very substance of the one understanding it.

Obj. 3. Further, everything which is contained in another is there according to the manner of the container. But an angel has an intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible manner. But all things are in him : because the lower orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower participatively : and therefore Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that God *gathers all in all*. Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*ibid.*) that *the angels are illumined by the forms of things*. Therefore they know by the forms of things, and not by their own substance.

I reply that, The medium through which the intellect understands, is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter : because the potentiality of the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding all things : because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth. The angel's essence, however, does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence ; his intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.

Reply Obj. 1. When it is said that the angel knows things according to his own nature, the words *according to* do not determine the medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing known ; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the angel of his own nature.

Reply Obj. 2. As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as

the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.), not so that the sensitive power is the sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality : so likewise the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act ; not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is precisely the same thing to say *in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object understood*, as to say that *the intellect in act is the thing understood in act* ; for a thing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.

Reply Obj. 3. The things which are beneath the angel, and those which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality ; because the angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality from other things ; but according to some common formality. But all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence : and this the angel has not, but only a common knowledge.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS UNDERSTAND BY SPECIES DRAWN FROM THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels do understand by species drawn from things. Everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that that likeness is the cause of the thing ; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things ; that belongs

to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things.

Obj. 2. Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands through species drawn from things.

Obj. 3. Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and distant ; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.) that the angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible.

I answer that, The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form ; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual substances—that is to say, human souls—have a power of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual substances—that is, the angels—the power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to understand all things which they can know naturally.

The same is evident from the manner of existence of such

substances. The lower spiritual substances—that is, souls—have a nature akin to a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies : and consequently from their very mode of existence it behoves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies ; otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand, the higher substances—that is, the angels—are utterly free from bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature ; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature. Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*) : *The other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature.*

Reply Obj. 1. There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not, indeed, derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence Augustine says (*ibid.*) that, *As the idea, according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same idea exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature.*

Reply Obj. 2. To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination, which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined forms ; which is impossible, since the angel has no imagination, as was said above (Q. LIV., A. 5). Even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he would not do so ; because he would not need them, for he has connatural intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 3. The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local motion is not purposeless on that account : for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HIGHER ANGELS UNDERSTAND BY MORE
UNIVERSAL SPECIES THAN THE LOWER ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the higher angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower angels. The universal seems to be what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than what is known generically ; because to know anything generically is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower ; which is not befitting.

Obj. 3. Further, the same cannot be the proper idea of many. But if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things. Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each ; which seems unbecoming.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier. xii.*) that the higher Angels have their knowledge more in the universal than have the lower. And in the *Book of Causes* it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.

I answer that, For this reason are some things of a more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which is God. Now in God the whole plenitude

of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God knows by one, and by so many the more according as the intellect is lower.

Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his forms must be more universal ; each one of them, as it were, extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth, except it be explained to them bit by bit ; this comes of their weakness of intellect. There are others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.

Reply Obj. 1. It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them ; either according to the order of causality, as the universal ideas of things are in the Word of God ; or at least in the order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.

Reply Obj. 2. To know anything universally can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less perfect : for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal ; for the intellect, which by one universal medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot.

Reply Obj. 3. The same cannot be the proper and adequate idea of several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the proper idea and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues ; which can be taken as the proper idea and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of wariness ; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence is in like fashion taken as the proper idea of individual things, because of its eminence : for it contains within it something according to which others are likened to it in their own proper formalities. It can similarly be said of the universal form which is in the mind of the angel, that, on account of its excellence, many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge.

QUESTION LVI.

OF THE ANGELS' KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, firstly, of immaterial things; and then of things material. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Does an angel know himself? (2) Does one angel know another? (3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL KNOWS HIMSELF?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel does not know himself. For Dionysius says that *the angels do not know their own powers* (*Ang. Hier. vi.*). But, when the substance is known, the power is known. Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.

Obj. 2. Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would not act, since acts belong to single substances. But nothing single is intelligible. And so, since the angel possesses only knowledge which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object: because, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima iii.*), to understand is partly passive. But nothing is moved by or suffers from itself; as appears in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*) that *the angel in his formation knew himself, that is, by the illustration of truth.*

I answer that, As is evident from what has been previously said (QQ. XIV., A. 2 ; LIV., A. 2), the relation of the object (to the agent) is different in an immanent, from what it is in a transient, action. In a transient action the object or matter into which the action passes is something separate from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and the building from the builder ; whereas in an immanent action, for the action to proceed, the object must be united with the agent ; just as the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that sense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the form which is the principle of action in other agents : for, as heat is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.

It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty ; and then there is only knowledge in potentiality ; and in order that there may be actual knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the species, it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something else, or self-subsisting ; because heat would give forth heat none the less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something else. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since an angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form ; and, consequently, he is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by his form, which is his substance.

Reply Obj. 1. That is the text of the old translation, which

is amended in the new one, and runs thus : *furthermore they*, that is to say the angels, *knew their own powers* : instead of which the old translation read—*and furthermore they do not know their own powers*. Although even the letter of the old translation might be kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own power perfectly ; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine Wisdom, Which to the angels is incomprehensible.

Reply Obj. 2. We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to the intellect, in so far as it is in potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that he understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes out into some other matter.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE ANGEL KNOWS ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one angel does not know another. For the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.), that if the human intellect were to have in itself any one of the natures of sensible things, then such a nature existing within it would exclude other things which are outside of it : as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were coloured with some particular colour, it could not see every colour. But as the human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is the angelic mind for understanding immaterial ones. Therefore, since the angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature from the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot understand (those) other natures.

Obj. 2. Further, it is stated in the *Book of Causes* that every intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is beneath it, in so far as it is its cause. But one angel is not the cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another.

Obj. 3. Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way of a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what has been said before (QQ. L., A. 4; and LV., A. 1 ad 3). Hence, it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of another, but only a general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known; because that whereby the intellect understands is something within the intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species; because that species would not differ from the angel understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can understand another.

Obj. 4. Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God were now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the existing angels; or else he would have to be known by a species drawn from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could not know the lower, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel knows another.

On the contrary, We read in the *Book of Causes* that every intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*), such things as pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him in two ways: firstly, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to subsist in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in such a way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images

of the things which He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word of God from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal things, but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so that in every angel there was impressed the form of his own species according to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that he should subsist in the nature of his species, and understand himself by it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual creatures.

Reply Obj. 1. The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another in a certain order, as was already observed (Q. L., A. 4 ad 1, 2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being according to their various degrees of perfection.

Reply Obj. 2. The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another.

Reply Obj. 3. One angel knows another by the species of such angel existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the intellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only an intelligible existence. As the form of colour on the wall has a natural existence; but, in the medium that conveys it (to the eye), it has only intentional existence.

Reply Obj. 4. God made every creature proportionate to the universe which He determined to make. Therefore

had God resolved to make more angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible species in the angelic minds ; as a builder who, if he had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the universe, means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL KNOWS GOD BY HIS OWN NATURAL PRINCIPLES ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels cannot know God by their natural principles. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* i.) that God *by His incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds.* Afterwards he adds that, *since He is above all substances, He is remote from all knowledge.*

Obj. 2. Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written, *We see now through a glass in a dark manner ; but then face to face* (I Cor. xiii. 12). From this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge of God ; the one, whereby He is seen in His Essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face ; the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already shown (Q. XII., A. 4), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (*Div. Nom.* vii.). Therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers.

On the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet men can know God through their natural principles ; as it is written, *what is known of God is manifest in them* (Rom. i. 19). Therefore much more so can the angels.

I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own natural principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing is known in three ways : firstly, by the presence of its essence in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye ; and so we have said that an angel knows himself ;—secondly, by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye from its image being in the eye ;—thirdly, when the image of the object known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from something else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.

To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He is seen through His Essence ; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above (Q. XII., A. 4). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in creatures ; as it is written : *The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made* (Rom. i. 20). Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to his natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway between these two ; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold God's Essence ; because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the Divine Essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind ; because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the Divine image.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not known by any created intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him ; nor can he see God's Essence through his own

nature. Yet it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all : because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has of Him.

Reply Obj. 3. The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway between these two kinds of knowledge ; nevertheless it approaches more to one of them, as was said above.

QUESTION LVII.

OF THE ANGELS' KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE now propose to investigate the material objects which are known by the angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry : (1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things ? (2) Whether they know single things ? (3) Whether they know the future ? (4) Whether they know secret thoughts ? (5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW MATERIAL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things.

Obj. 2. Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss upon 2 Corinthians xii. 2. But material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into the angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but

only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know material things.

Obj. 3. Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.

On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the mind of an angel.

I answer that, The established order of things is for higher beings to be more perfect than lower ; and for whatever is contained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. i.*). But among other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most ; hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier. iv.*). Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God.

Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the angels know them ; because they are in the angels by reason of their intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 1. The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. Sense does not apprehend the essences of

things, but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination ; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that the object of the intellect is *essence* (*quod quid est*), regarding which it does not err ; as neither does sense regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore, the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real natures. But some things are in the (angelic) intellect or in the soul according to both natures ; and in either case there is intellectual vision.

Reply Obj. 3. If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, he would require to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves ; he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, which [species] are connatural to him ; just as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL KNOWS SINGULARS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that angels do not know singulars. For the Philosopher says (*Phys.* i.): *The sense has for its object singulars, but the intellect, universals.* But in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power ; as is evident from what was said above (Q. LIV., A. 5). Consequently they do not know singulars.

Obj. 2. Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular ; because, as was observed above (Q. L., A. 2), an angel is immaterial,

while matter is the principle of singularity. Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.

Obj. 3. Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species; because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular things are not known in the universal except potentially. Therefore the angel does not know singulars.

On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to the Psalmist: *He has given His angels charge over Thee* (Ps. xc. 11). Consequently the angels know singulars.

I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith, which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels, according to the text: *They are all ministering spirits* (Heb. i. 14). Now, if they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals: and this is against the text: *Say not before the angel: There is no providence* (Eccles. v. 5). Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres; and to move them according to their knowledge and will.

Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not knowing it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing from computation of the heavenly motions that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it in the universal; but he does not know it as taking place now,

except by the senses. But administration, providence and movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.

Therefore it must be said differently, that, as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power unified and far-reaching : as in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no outer sense knows ; for example, the difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that an angel by his one faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know everything that a man knows by any one of his powers. Hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God ; as appears in *De Anima* i.

The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation ; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know ; for this knowledge is the cause of the thing, as was shown above (Q. XIV., A. 8). Therefore as by His Essence, by Which He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity ; so through the species imparted to

them do the angels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple Essence.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which apprehends things only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of the angels, as was said above (Q. LV., A. 2, A. 3 ad 1), and consequently there is not the same ground of argument.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to their matter.

Reply Obj. 3. Angels know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by the same species, has been already stated above (Q. LV., A. 3 ad 3).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGELS KNOW THE FUTURE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels do know future events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future events. Therefore much more do the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, the present and the future are differences

of time. But the angel's intellect is above time ; because, as is said in the *Book of Causes: An intelligence is made equal to eternity*, that is, to æviterernity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future are not different, but he knows each indifferently.

Obj. 3. Further, the angel does not understand by species derived from things ; but by universal innate species. But universal species refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future.

Obj. 4. Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant according to future time.

On the contrary, Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, according to the text : *Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods* (Isa. xli. 23). Therefore the angels do not know future events.

I answer that, The future can be known in two ways. Firstly, it can be known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily from their causes, are known with sure knowledge ; as that the sun will rise to-morrow. Events which proceed from their causes in the majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally ; as the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more perfectly ; as doctors who penetrate more deeply into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a better verdict on the future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown ; such as casual and chance events.

In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the future in this way belongs to God alone ; and

not merely to know those events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And therefore God's one glance is cast over all things which happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are in themselves, as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge (Q. XIV., A. 13). But the mind of an angel, and every created intellect as well, falls far short of God's eternity; hence the future as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. Men cannot know future things except in their causes, or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way, but much more distinctly.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the angel's intellect is above that time according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts; of which Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. viii.*) that *God moves the spiritual creature according to time.* And thus, since there is succession in the angel's intellect, not all things, that happen through all time, are present to the angelic mind.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in so far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future do not bear the same relations to the species. Present things have a nature according to which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such species: consequently, they cannot be known by those species.

Reply Obj. 4. Things distant according to place are already existing in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel; whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated. Consequently there is no comparison.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGELS KNOW SECRET THOUGHTS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels know secret thoughts. For Gregory (*Moral.* xviii.), explaining Job xxviii. 17 : *Gold or crystal cannot equal it*, says that *then*, namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, *one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and when once the mind of each is seen, the conscience will at the same time be penetrated.* But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is stated (Matt. xxii. 30). Therefore an angel can see what is in another's conscience.

Obj. 2. Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the thoughts of both.

Obj. 3. Further, the ideas in our intellect resemble the angels more than do the images in our imagination ; because the former are actually understood, while the latter are understood only potentially. But the images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things are known : because the imagination is a corporeal faculty. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the intellect.

On the contrary, What is proper to God does not belong to angels. But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts ; as Jeremiah says : *The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable ; who can know it ? I am the Lord, Who search the heart* (xvii. 9). Therefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts.

I answer that, A secret thought can be known in two ways : firstly, in its effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also by man ; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by outward

act, but also by change of countenance ; and doctors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate these occult bodily modifications. Hence Augustine says (*De Divin. Dæmon.*) that demons *sometimes with the greatest facility learn men's dispositions, not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body ;* although in the Second Book of Retractations he says it cannot be asserted how this is done.

In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and affections as they are in the will : and thus God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is, because the rational creature is subject to God only ; He alone can work in it Who is its principal object and last end : this will be developed later (Q. CV.). Consequently all that is in the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are known to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will for anyone actually to consider anything ; because a man who has a habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will. Hence the Apostle says, *For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him ?* (I Cor. ii. II).

Reply Obj. 1. In the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance ; namely, on account of the grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets. The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at all in the angels ; while the second will remain, and is in the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the quality of the soul ; as to both its amount of grace and of glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another.

Reply Obj. 2. Although one angel sees the intelligible species of another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual consideration.

Reply Obj. 3. The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause. Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the motions of the sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man, in so far as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the baser part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as is said by the Philosopher (*Ethics* i.). But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses of them.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW THE MYSTERIES OF GRACE?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels know mysteries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for, Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* v.) says: *This mystery was hidden in God through the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places.* And the Apostle says: *That great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels* (1 Tim. iii. 16). Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace.

Obj. 2. Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which is His Essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.

Obj. 3. Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (*Angel. Hier. iv.*). But the prophets knew mysteries of grace; for it is said: *For the Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets* (Amos iii. 7). Therefore angels know the mysteries of grace.

On the contrary, No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated (*Cæl. Hier. vii.*) that the Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly: as is evident in Isa. lxiii. 1, where, on the angels asking, *Who is he who cometh up from Edom?* Jesus answered, *It is I, Who speak justice.* Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace.

I answer that, There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle reasons in this fashion: *No one knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him. So, the things that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God* (I Cor. ii. 11).

There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries; nor do they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says: *But to us God hath revealed them through His Spirit* (I Cor. ii. 10); yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them.

Some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught afterwards, as befits their ministrations.

Reply Obj. 1. One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are ordered; as we read: *All are ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation* (Heb. i. 14); and this is brought about by the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning. We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to know everything hidden in it.

Reply Obj. 3. Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the Apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know. Thus we read (Eph. iii. 4, 5): *As you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles.* Among the prophets also, the later ones knew what the former did not know; according to the Psalm: *I have had understanding above ancients* (cxviii. 100), and Gregory says: *The knowledge of Divine things increased as time went on* (Homil. xvi. in Ezech.).

QUESTION LVIII.

OF THE MODE OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE.

(*In Seven Articles.*)

AFTER the foregoing subjects we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry : (1) Whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in act ? (2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time ? (3) Whether the angel's knowledge is discursive ? (4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing ? (5) Whether there can be error in the angel's intellect ? (6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening ? (7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they differ ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGEL'S INTELLECT IS SOMETIMES IN POTENTIALITY, AND SOMETIMES IN ACT ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For motion is the act of what is in potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (*Phys.* iii.). But the angels' minds are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.

Obj. 2. Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality thereto. But in Peter's First Epistle (i. 12)

it is said : *Upon Whom the Angels desire to look.* Therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality.

Obj. 3. Further, in the *Book of Causes* it is laid down that *an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance.* But the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes understands potentially.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*) : *Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout contemplation.* But a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (*De Anima iii.*), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways ; firstly, *as before learning or discovering,* that is, before it has the habit of knowledge ; secondly, it is said to be in potentiality as *when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but does not actually consider.* In the first way an angel's intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher bodies, namely, the heavenly ones, have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality : because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being illumined by the sun.

In the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge ; for he is not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things beheld in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality ; because he is always actually beholding the Word, and the things seen in the Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision ; and beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (*Ethics i.*).

Reply Obj. 1. Motion is taken there not as the act of something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding and feeling are termed motions, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.).

Reply Obj. 2. Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.

Reply Obj. 3. In the angel's substance there is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without act.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN UNDERSTAND MANY THINGS AT THE SAME TIME ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (*Topic. ii.*) that *it may happen that we know many things, but we understand only one.*

Obj. 2. Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be determined by an intelligible species ; just as the body is determined by shape. But one body cannot be fashioned into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things.

Obj. 3. Further, to understand is a kind of motion. But no motion is concluded by various terms. Therefore many things cannot be understood altogether.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. iv.*) : *The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all things that it wills.*

I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of motion, so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that several things may be taken as several, or as one ; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if

each of the parts be considered severally, they are many : consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole ; and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation ; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in *De Anima* iii. In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition ; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once ; but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible objects.

Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all things at once : just as in heaven *our thoughts will not be fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance*, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.). But by that knowledge where-with the angels know things by innate species, they can at the one time know all things which can be comprised under one species ; but not such as are under various species.

Reply Obj. 1. To understand many things as one, is, so to speak, to understand one thing.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many intelligible objects under one species ; as one body can by one shape be likened to many bodies.

To the third objection the answer is the same as to the first.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE IS DISCURSIVE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of an Angel is discursive. The discursive movement of the mind comes from one thing being known through another. But the angels know one thing through another ; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore the intellect of an angel learns by discursive method.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do. But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects ; all of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel, which is higher, in the order of nature, can with greater reason do this.

Obj. 3. Further, Isidore says that demons learn many things by experience. But experimental knowledge is discursive : for, *one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from many experiences*, as Aristotle observes (*Poster* ii., *Metaph.* i.). Therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.) that the angels do not acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they led to something particular from something common.

I answer that, As has often been stated, the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances : for Dionysius calls them *heavenly minds*. Now, the difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by change and motion : while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise, the lower intellects, namely, the human, obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of motion and discursive intellectual working ; that is to say, as they advance from one known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a recognized

principle they were straightway to perceive all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at all. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known by them.

Therefore they are called *intellectual* beings: because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to be understood (*intelligi*); hence the *intellect* is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called *rational*; and this comes of the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range, by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.

Reply Obj. 1. Discursion expresses motion of a kind. Now all motion is from something before to something after. Hence discursive knowledge comes about according as from something previously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards known, and which was previously unknown. But if in the thing perceived something else be seen at the same time, as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in this way the angels know things in the Word.

Reply Obj. 2. The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.

Reply Obj. 3. Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are present; yet there is no discursive process.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS UNDERSTAND BY COMPOSING AND DIVIDING ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels understand by composing and dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of intellectual concepts, there is composition of the same, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.). But there is a multitude of intellectual concepts in the angelic mind ; because angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at one time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's mind.

Obj. 2. Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than any two opposite natures are ; because the first of distinctions is that of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what was said in the second article. Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and dividing.

Obj. 3. Further, speech is a sign of intellect. But in speaking to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which are signs of composition and of division in the intellect ; as is manifest from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the angel understands by composing and dividing.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.), that *the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine concepts.* But a simple intelligence is without composition and division. Therefore the angel understands without composition or division.

I answer that, As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if the intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner, if the

intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to, or removed from the subject, it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion, by composing and dividing : namely, that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said (A. 3). Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.), it follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing.

All the same, he does understand the composition and the division of enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms : for he understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable immovably, and material things immaterially.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every multitude of intellectual concept causes composition, but a multitude of such concepts that one of them is attributed to, or else denied of, another. When an angel apprehends the nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by composing and dividing.

Reply Obj. 2. The various natures of things differ less as to their mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more in common ; because directly the truth of an affirmation is known, the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also.

Reply Obj. 3. The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of speech, shows that they know both composition and division : yet not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply the nature of a thing.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE FALSEHOOD IN THE INTELLECT
OF AN ANGEL ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there can be falsehood in the angel's intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.), there is a *perverted fancy* in the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But, as Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.* vi.), there can be nescience in the angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.

Obj. 3. Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom, and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its intellect. But Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* vii.) affirms this of the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that *the intelligence is always true*. Augustine likewise says (*Lib. 83 qqu.*) that *nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence*. Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel's knowledge.

I answer that, The truth of this question depends partly upon what has gone before. For it has been said that an angel understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding the essence of things. Now the intellect is always true as regards the essence, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in *De Anima* iii. But by accident, deception and falsehood are apt to creep in, when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another, or when the parts of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature, a *four-footed flying beast* (for there is no such animal). And this comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements, one of

which is as matter to the other. But there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is stated in *Metaph.* ix. ; for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know nothing respecting them ; or else they are known precisely as they exist.

So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in the mind of any angel ; yet it does so happen accidentally ; but very differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such is not the method of the angels ; but through the (knowledge of the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such thing, or excluded from it ; but not of what may be dependent on God's supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright will, from their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form no judgments as to the nature of qualities therein, save under the Divine ordinance ; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them. But since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things simply according to the natural conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of anything ; but they can be misled with regard to supernatural matters ; for example (a demon), on seeing a dead man, may suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ, he may judge Him not to be God.

From all this the answers to the objections on both sides of the question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes of their not being subject to the Divine wisdom ; while the lack of knowledge in the angels is not with regard to things natural, but supernatural. It is, furthermore, evident that the understanding of the essence of a thing is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an undue manner, referred to some composition or division.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS A 'MORNING' AND AN 'EVENING'
KNOWLEDGE IN THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is neither an evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels ; because evening and morning have an admixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel ; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes ; while noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, if there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference of the objects known : hence the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.), *The sciences are divided just as things are.* But there is a threefold existence of things : to wit, in the Word ; in their own natures ; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (*Gen. ad lit.* ii.). If, therefore, a morning and an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in the Word, and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a third class of knowledge, on account of the existence of things in the angelic mind.

On the contrary, Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* iv. and *Civ. Dei* xi.) separates the knowledge of the angels into two classes, as morning and evening knowledge.

I answer that, The expression "morning" and "evening" knowledge was devised by Augustine ; who interprets the six days wherein God made heaven and earth, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the sun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the ordinary day, morning is the beginning, and evening the close of day, so, their knowledge of

the primordial existence of things is called morning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their knowledge of the very existence of the thing created, as it stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the existence of things flows from the Word, as from a kind of primordial principle; and this flow is terminated in the existence which they have in themselves.

Reply Obj. 1. Evening and morning in the angelic knowledge are not taken as in similitude to the admixture of darkness, but after the similitude of principle and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine puts it (*Gen. ad lit.* iv.), that there is nothing to prevent us from calling something light in comparison with one thing, and darkness with respect to another. In the same way the life of the faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked, according to the text: *You were heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord* (Eph. v. 8): yet this very life of the faithful, when set in contrast to the life of glory, is termed darkness, as it is written: *You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place* (2 Pet. i. 19). So the angel's knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark in comparison with the vision of the Word.

Reply Obj. 2. The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things. Consequently after evening (knowledge) there is no night, but morning (knowledge); so that morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the angels refer to God's praise their knowledge of the preceding work. The noonday is comprised under the name of day, as the middle between the two extremes. Or else

the noon can be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither beginning nor end.

Reply Obj. 3. The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own nature.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MORNING AND EVENING KNOWLEDGE ARE ONE ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the morning and the evening knowledge are one. For it is said, *There was evening and morning, one day* (Gen. i. 5). But by the expression *day* the knowledge of the angels is to be understood, as Augustine says on that passage. Therefore the morning and the evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.

Obj. 2. Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their morning knowledge ; because they are always beholding God and things in God, as it is said Matt. xviii. 10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge was different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, again, the Apostle says, *When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away with* (1 Cor. xiii. 10). But, if the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. iv.*) : *There is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God, and as it is in its own nature ; so that the former belongs to the day, and the latter to the evening.*

I answer that, As was observed (in the preceding article), the evening knowledge is that by which the angels know things in the actual nature of such things. This cannot be

understood as if they drew their knowledge from the very nature of things, so that the preposition *in* denotes the form of a principle ; because, as has been already pointed out, the angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It remains, then, for us to interpret the expression *in their own nature* according to the form of the thing known in so far as it comes under our knowledge ; that is to say, that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they grasp the existence of things which the things themselves have in their own nature.

Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas, or else by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the Word, they know not merely the existence of things as existing in the Word, but the existence as possessed by the things themselves ; as God by contemplating Himself sees that nature which things possess in themselves. If, therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word, they know the real existence which things have in themselves, then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the things known. If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas they know the individual essences which things have in their own natures, then the morning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to understand it, when he assigns one as inferior to the other.

Reply Obj. 1. The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken as the six classes of things known by the angels ; so that the day's unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood ; which, nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it.

Reply Obj. 2. There can be two operations of the same faculty at the one time, one of which is referred to the other ; as is evident when the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end ; and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired knowledge. As Augustine says, the evening knowledge is referred to the morning

in the angels ; hence there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the angels.

Reply Obj. 3. On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite imperfect is put away : just as faith, which is of the things that are not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not opposite to knowing the same in its cause. Nor, again, is there any repugnance between knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other less perfect ; just as we can have a demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion. In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.

QUESTION LIX.

THE WILL OF THE ANGELS.

(In Four Articles.)

It now rests with us to deal with the will of the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself ; secondly, of its motion, which is love. Under the first heading there are four points of investigation : (1) Whether there is will in the angels ? (2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect ? (3) Is there free-will in the angels ? (4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS WILL IN THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems there is no will in the angels. For as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.), *The will is in the reason.* But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels. but something higher than the will.

Obj. 2. Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is evident from the Philosopher (*ibid.*). But, appetite argues something imperfect ; because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones ; it seems that there is no will in them.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*ibid.*), that the will is a mover which is moved ; for it is moved by the appetible object understood. Now the angels are immovable,

since they are incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* x.) that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding, and will. But God's image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels.

I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow from the Divine Will, all things in their own way are inclined towards good of their own natural tendency, but in different ways. Some things of their own natural tendency, without knowledge, are inclined to good, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called *a natural appetite*. Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge; not that they know the formality of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good; as the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called *a sensitive appetite*. Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the formality of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards good, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed *will*. Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the universal formality of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them.

Reply Obj. 1. Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which

appetite belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect learns by simple intuition, while reason learns by a process of discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal. Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are only intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the name of the appetitive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part reaches out not to these things only, but to many other things; as the name of a stone (*lapis*) is derived from injuring the foot (*læsione pedis*), though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger (*ira*); though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest.

Reply Obj. 3. The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to will and to understand are termed motions of a kind; and there is nothing to prevent motion of this kind from existing in the angels, since such motion is the act of a perfect agent, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE ANGELS THE WILL DIFFERS FROM THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that in the angels the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel inclines

towards the good through his own nature, and through an intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is the good. But there is no real difference between the good and the true, but merely one of reason. Therefore will and intellect are not really different.

Obj. 3. Further, the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives colour and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.

On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good things only, while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both. Therefore the will of the angels is different from their intellect.

I answer that, In the angels the will is a special faculty or power, which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes from the active qualities.

Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing beyond Himself

except on account of His goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.

In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is within the knower ; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it, according as what in its essence is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside itself. Now it belongs to one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.

Reply Obj. 1. A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form : while it is inclined to something outside by something additional, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2. Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of intellect from will.

Reply Obj. 3. Because the good and the true are really convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true ; while the true is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless the diversity of their formalities is sufficient for diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS FREE-WILL IN THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no free-will in the angels. The act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is *the desire of something after taking counsel*, while counsel is *a kind of search*, as the Philosopher states (*Ethics* iii.). But the angels' knowledge is not the result of searching, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference ; because, as was observed already (Q. LVIII., A. 5), their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will.

Obj. 3. Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less ; because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them.

On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.

I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others ; just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment ; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals ; for the sheep flies from the wolf by the instinctive judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself : such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the

common note of goodness ; from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need ; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth.

Reply Obj. 2. As was observed already (in the preceding article), knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him ; but it would argue imperfection in him, were he to be indeterminate to what is above him.

Reply Obj. 3. Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree ; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves ; but only by their cause, or through the addition of some qualification.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS AN IRASCIBLE AND A CONCUPIBIBLE
APPETITE IN THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*) that in the demons there is *unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence*. But demons are of the same nature as angels ; for sin has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible ; while anger, hope, and fear, are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible, as charity and temperance appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Anima iii.*) that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in the angels.

I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible and concupiscible ; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of sight be colour as such, then there are not

several powers of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white : whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black.

Now it is quite evident from what has been said (in the first article), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the will, is good according to the common form of goodness ; nor can there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its common formality, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided ; and it is called the will.

Reply Obj. 1. Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God ;—on account of the resemblance in the effect.

Reply Obj. 2. Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act of the will, they are in the intellective part : in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone ; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the angels, as by way of passions ; as Augustine says (*Civ. Dei ix.*).

Reply Obj. 3. Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the will ; because, the object of the concupiscible appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind. For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite ; because the object of the irascible appetite is something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of hope does not regard ; since the object of hope is

something arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible appetite.

QUESTION LX.

OF THE LOVE OF THE ANGELS.

(*In Five Articles.*)

THE next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is love ; because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of love.

Under this heading there are five points of inquiry : (1) Whether there is natural love in the angels ? (2) Whether there is in them love of choice ? (3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice ? (4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself ? (5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS NATURAL LOVE OR DILECTION IN AN ANGEL ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love ; this is manifest from the authority of Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.). But an angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.

Obj. 2. Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves ; for nothing has control over its own nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves ; because they possess free-will, as was shown above (Q. LIX., A. 3). Consequently there is no natural love in them.

Obj. 3. Further, every love is either well regulated or not. But well-regulated love belongs to charity; while ill-regulated love belongs to iniquity. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, while iniquity is against nature. Therefore there is no natural love in the angels.

On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* x.). But there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love.

I answer that, We must necessarily admit of natural love in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each after its own kind. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something else. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.

Reply Obj. 1. Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. All things in the world are moved to act by something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom, nature and will are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act of himself, because he has free-will.

Reply Obj. 3. As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love always well regulated ; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue : because the one rectitude perfects the other ; as the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS LOVE OF CHOICE IN THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love ; since choice follows counsel, which lies in investigation, as the Philosopher says (*Ethics* iii.). Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual (which is proper to angels) ; as is said, *Div. Nom.* iv. Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused : since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions. So they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, which it can know naturally. But love follows knowledge, as has been already stated. Consequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels : therefore there is no love of choice in them.

On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of choice in them.

I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice ; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle ; conse-

quently, since nature is first in everything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.

This is clearly evident in man, both with respect to his intellect, and to his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect, as is laid down by the Philosopher, *Phys.* ii. Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills happiness. All other desires are caused by this natural desire: since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.

There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will. Because, as was stated already (Q. LIX., A. 2), the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible on account of something else. Consequently it does not come of the imperfection of the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both natural love and love of choice.

In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards

things which are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later on (Q. LXII.).

Reply Obj. 1. Not all love of choice is rational love, according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (Q. LIX., A. 3), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.

The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGEL LOVES HIMSELF WITH BOTH NATURAL LOVE, AND LOVE OF CHOICE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the angel does not love himself both with a natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (in the preceding article), natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the same object.

Obj. 2. Further, as Dionysius observes (*Div. Nom.* iv.): *Love is a uniting and a binding power.* But uniting and binding imply various things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.

Obj. 3. Further, love is a kind of motion. But every motion tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural or elective love.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethics ix.*): *Love for others comes of love towards oneself.*

I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from *Ethics i.*, a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent

good. That is loved as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good; as knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it may be possessed. This class of love has been called by the name of *concupiscence*, while the first is called *friendship*.

Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self. But each loves self with the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will benefit himself.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not under the same but under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with elective love, as was observed above.

Reply Obj. 2. As to be one is better than to be united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in the love which unites to others. Dionysius used the terms *uniting* and *binding* in order to show the derivation of love from self to things outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.

Reply Obj. 3. As love is an action which remains within the agent, so also is it a motion which abides within the lover, but does not of necessity tend outwards towards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL LOVES ANOTHER WITH NATURAL LOVE
AS HE LOVES HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. For love follows know-

ledge. But an angel does not know another as he knows himself : because he knows himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as was said above (Q. LVI., A. 1). Therefore it seems that one angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.

Obj. 2. Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect ; and the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes of love for self ; as the Philosopher says (*Ethics ix.*). Therefore one angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.

Obj. 3. Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is inseparable (from anything). But no angel is the end of another ; and again, such love can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.

On the contrary, that seems to be a natural property which is found in all, even in such as are devoid of reason. But, as is said, *every beast loves its like* (Ecclus. xiii. 19). Therefore an angel naturally loves another as he does himself.

I answer that, As was observed (in the preceding article), both angel and man naturally love self. Now what is one with anything, is itself : consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if it be one with itself by natural union, it loves it with natural love ; but if it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. As a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.

Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with another, is one according to nature. And so everything loves another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things devoid of knowledge : for fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to something else, and this is its own good ; as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely to be borne upwards.

So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.

Reply Obj. 1. The expression *as himself* can in one way determine the knowledge and the love on the part of the thing known and loved: and thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other to be as he knows himself to be. In another way the expression can determine the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself, because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the other's essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love another by the other's will.

Reply Obj. 2. The expression *as* does not denote equality, but likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he loves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing well to him.

Reply Obj. 3. Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of the end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness and unrighteousness.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL BY NATURAL LOVE LOVES GOD MORE THAN HE LOVES HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angel does not love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated (in the preceding article), natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.

Obj. 2. Further, *that which is cause of anything having a certain quality, must possess that quality in a higher degree.* But every one loves another with natural love for his own personal sake : because he loves it as good for himself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than self with natural love.

Obj. 3. Further, nature is self-centred in its operation ; for we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But nature's operation would not be self-centred were it to tend towards anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than himself from natural love.

Obj. 4. Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels ; for *it is poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them*, as Augustine says (*Civ. Dei* xii.). Therefore the angels do not love God more than themselves by natural love.

Obj. 5. Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who sins ; for, as Augustine says (*Civ. Dei* xiv.), *Two loves have made two cities, namely, love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly city ; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city.* Therefore it is not natural to love God more than self.

On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God more than

self is a moral precept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself.

I answer that, There have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own good ; and in a fashion as to the love of friendship, in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself ; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.

The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider whither natural motion tends in the natural order of things ; because the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature. Now, in the natural order of things, everything which of its nature belongs to another, is principally and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural tendency is evidenced from things which are moved to act according to nature : because whatever is moved of its nature to act in a certain manner, has the inborn aptitude for such action, as the Philosopher says (*Phys. ii.*). For we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole ; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues ; for it behoves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state ; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him.

Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both man and angel and every creature is comprised, because every creature in regard to its entire being naturally

belongs to God ; it follows that from natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.

Reply Obj. 1. Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided, whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the other ; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other, such other is naturally more loved than self ; because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more than itself. And each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good of one species, but He is absolutely the universal good ; hence everything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.

Reply Obj. 2. When it is said that God is loved by an angel *in so far* as He is good to the angel, if the expression *in so far* denotes an end, then it is false ; for he does not naturally love God for his own good, but for God's own sake. If it denotes the nature of love on the lover's part, then it is true ; for it would not be in the nature of anyone to love God, except from this—that everything is dependent on that good which is God.

Reply Obj. 3. Nature's operation is self-centred not merely as to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common ; for everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.

Reply Obj. 4. God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude, He is loved with the love of charity.

Reply Obj. 5. Since God's substance and universal goodness are one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same motion of love moved towards the Divine Essence as it is distinct from other things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good; it is impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him. But such as do not behold His Essence, know Him by some particular effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.

QUESTION LXI.

OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING.

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will, it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence; secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly, how some of them became wicked.

Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence? (2) Whether he has existed from eternity? (3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures? (4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS HAVE A CAUSE OF THEIR EXISTENCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels have no cause of their existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not created by God.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Metaph. viii.*) that if any substance be a form without matter, *straightway it has being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity.* But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown

above (Q. L., A. 2). Therefore they have no cause of their being.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is produced by any agent from the very fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the angels have no active cause.

On the contrary, It is said, *Praise ye Him all His angels :* and further on, *For He spoke and they were made* (Ps. cxlviii. 2).

I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing, except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence ; while in everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown above (Q. III., A. 4). From this it is clear that God alone exists of His own Essence : while all other things have their existence by participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what exists essentially ; as everything ignited is caused by fire. Consequently the angels were of necessity made by God.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine says (*Civ. Dei* xi.) that the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things, but are designated by the name of *heavens*, or of *light*. And they were either passed over, or else designated by the names of corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature ; and if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard them.

Reply Obj. 2. Substances that are subsisting forms have no *formal* cause of their existence and unity, nor such *active* cause as produces its effect by way of changing the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality ; but they have a cause productive of their entire substance.

From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGEL WAS PRODUCED BY GOD FROM
ETERNITY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angel was produced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His Being : for He does not act through something besides His Essence. But His Being is eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.

Obj. 2. Further, everything which exists at one period and not at another, is subject to time. But the angel is *above time*, as is laid down in the *Book of Causes*. Therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine (*Soliloq.* ii.) proves the soul's incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but likewise eternal.

On the contrary, It is said, Proverbs viii. 22, in the person of begotten Wisdom : *The Lord possessed me from the beginning of His ways, before He yet made anything from the beginning*. But, as was shown above, the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.

I answer that, God alone, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is from eternity. Catholic Faith holds this without doubt ; and everything to the contrary must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He made them *from nothing* ; that is, after there had been nothing.

Reply Obj. 1. God's Being is His Will. So the fact that God produced the angels and other creatures by His Being does not exclude that He made them also by His Will. But, as was shown above (Q. XIX., A. 3 ; Q. XLVI., A. 1), God's Will does not act by necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when He willed.

Reply Obj. 2. An angel is above that time which is the measure of the motion of the heavens ; because he is above

every motion of a corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above the time which is the measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations. Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. viii.*), that *God moves the spiritual creature according to time.*

Reply Obj. 3. Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth. But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not follow that the angels existed from eternity.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS WERE CREATED BEFORE THE
CORPOREAL WORLD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For Jerome says (*on Ep. ad Tit. i. 2*): *Six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the other orders served God?* Damascene also says (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*): *Some say that the angels were begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, 'He first of all devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making thereof.'*

Obj. 2. Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.

Obj. 3. Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature.

On the contrary, It is said in Genesis i. : *In the beginning God made heaven and earth.* Now, this would not be true if anything had been created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before corporeal nature.

I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the universe ; they do not constitute a universe of themselves ; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature ; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, *Whose works are perfect,* as it is said Deut. xxxii. 4, should have created the angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous ; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine of Athanasius, as Jerome says.

Reply Obj. 1. Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek Fathers ; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.

Reply Obj. 2. God is not a part of but far above the whole universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the comparison does not hold.

Reply Obj. 3. All corporeal creatures are one in matter ; while the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all things ; but the creation of the angels does not involve creation of the universe.

If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Genesis i.

In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the words, *In the beginning*, must be rendered: *In the Son*, or *In the beginning of time*: but not *In the beginning, before which there was nothing*, unless it be expressed thus: *Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures*.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS WERE CREATED IN THE EMPYREAN HEAVEN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation. Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine remarks (*Gen. ad lit. iii.*), that the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the empyrean heaven.

Obj. 3. Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the sinning angel: *I will ascend into heaven* (Isa. xiv. 13).

On the contrary, Strabus says, on the text—*In the beginning God created heaven and earth*: *By heaven he does not mean the visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendour; and which was filled with angels directly it was made.*

I answer that, As was observed (in the previous article), the universe is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as

presiding over all corporeal nature ; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of Deuteronomy x. 14 : *Behold heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven.*

Reply Obj. 1. The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their being made ; because God could have created them before all corporeal creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that they are by their power in touch with bodies.

Reply Obj. 2. By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not speaking of all the angels ; but only of such as sinned, who, in the opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal things, were created in the highest place of the corporeal creature ; while the other angels, as having more restricted powers, were created among the inferior bodies.

Reply Obj. 3. Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity ; unto which the sinning angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner to God, as will appear later on (Q. LXIII., A. 3).

QUESTION LXII.

OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY.

(*In Nine Articles.*)

IT now remains for us to investigate as to how the angels were made in the order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Were the angels created in beatitude? (2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God? (3) Were they created in grace? (4) Did they merit their beatitude? (5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit? (6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural capacities? (7) After entering into glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain? (8) Could they have sinned afterwards? (9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS WERE CREATED IN BEATITUDE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels were created in beatitude. For it is stated (*De Eccl. Dogm. xxix.*) that *the angels who continue in the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess the excellence they have.* Therefore the angels were created in beatitude.

Obj. 2. Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation was made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. i.*). Therefore neither did

God create the angelic nature imperfect and incomplete. But its formation and perfection are derived from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was created in beatitude.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. iv.*), the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six days, were all made together at one time; and so all the six days must have existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according to his exposition, in those six days, *the morning* was the angelic knowledge, according to which they knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore straightway from their creation they knew the Word, and things in the Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from the very beginning of their creation.

On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in good is of the nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as soon as they were created; the fall of some of them shows this. Therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.

I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (*Ethics x.*) says that man's ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby *we shall see God as He is*. This is beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above (Q. XII., A. 4).

So, then, it remains to be said, that, so far as regards this first beatitude, which the angel could procure by his

natural power, he was created already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action, as man does, but, as was observed above (Q. LVIII., A. 3), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of nature ; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end ; and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning.

Reply Obj. 1. Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 2. The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation ; consequently, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* iv.), the growing of plants from the earth did not take place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection of its nature ; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation.

Reply Obj. 3. The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word ; the one which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude thereof shining in his nature ; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he knows the Word through His Essence. By both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in the Word ; imperfectly by his natural knowledge and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation ; but the second was not, but only when the angels became blessed by turning to good. And this is properly termed their morning knowledge.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL NEEDS GRACE IN ORDER TO TURN
TO GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God : because he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said already (Q. LX., A. 5). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.

Obj. 2. Further, we only seem to need help for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God ; simply because there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God.

Obj. 3. Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace ; hence it is said, *Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you* (Zach. i. 3). But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace : for this would involve an infinite (series of graces). Therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to God.

On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached to beatitude. If, then, he had had no need for grace in order to turn to God, it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle, *The grace of God is life everlasting* (Rom. vi. 23).

I answer that, The angels did stand in need of grace in order to turn to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above (Q. LX., A. 2), the natural motion of the will is the principle of all things which we wish. But the will's natural inclination is directed towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth

heat, and to generate fire ; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire : consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.

Now it was shown above (Q. XII., A. 4), when dealing with God's knowledge, that to see God in His Essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the motion of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1. The angel does naturally love God, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His Essence.

Reply Obj. 2. A thing is *difficult* which is beyond a power ; which happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the natural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be *difficult* ; but if it can in no way be attained, then it is *impossible* ; as it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening hindrance ; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul ; because the soul, of itself, can be moved in any direction : but the hindrance steps in owing to the gravity of the body ; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man, both because it is beyond his nature ; and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and the infection of sin. But it is difficult for an angel only because it is supernatural.

Reply Obj. 3. Every motion of the will towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The first is by the perfect love of God ;

this belongs to the creature enjoying the possession of God ; and for such conversion, consummate grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits beatitude ; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is the principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man disposes himself so that he may have grace ; for this no habitual grace is required, but the action of God, Who draws the soul towards Himself, according to that saying in the last chapter of Lamentations : *Convert us to Thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted.* Hence it is clear that there is no need for an infinite series of graces.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS WERE CREATED IN GRACE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels were not created in grace. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*) that the angelic nature was first made without form, and was called *heaven* : but afterwards it received its form, and was then called *light*. But such formation comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.

Obj. 2. Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God.

Obj. 3. Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that they were not created in grace : but that they were first created in nature only ; that then they received grace ; and that last of all they were beatified.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Civ. Dei xii.*), *Who wrought the good will of the angels ? Who, save He Who created them with His will, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him ; at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them ?*

I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on the point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state, while others maintain that they

were created in grace ; it seems more probable, however, and more in keeping with the sayings of the Saints, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in the process of time, were produced by the work of Divine Providence, the creature operating under the direction of God, were produced in the first fashioning of things according to seedling forms, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. viii.*), such as trees, and animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect ; hence in the First Epistle of John (iii. 9) grace is called the *seed* of God. As, then, in Augustine's opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally created, so, straightway from the beginning the angels were created in grace.

Reply Obj. 1. Such absence of form in the angels can be understood either by comparison with their formation in glory ; and so the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or else it can be understood of the formation according to grace : and so it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature ; as Augustine lays it down of the formation of corporeal things (*Gen. ad lit. i.*).

Reply Obj. 2. Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the motion of grace does not impose necessity ; but he who has grace can fail to make use of it, and can sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Although in the order of nature grace comes midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature ; because glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace does not stand as the end of operation, because it is not of works ; but as the principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for grace to be given straightway with nature.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL MERITS HIS BEATITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angel did not merit his beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous action was not a cause of meriting for him.

Obj. 2. Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not thereby merit beatitude.

Obj. 3. Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not before ; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards ; because so he would be meriting it now ; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent ; which is not admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.

On the contrary, It is stated that the *measure of the angel* in that heavenly Jerusalem is *the measure of a man* (Apoc. xxi. 17). But man can only reach beatitude by merit. Therefore the same is the case with the angel.

I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude, however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation leading to the end, either actually produces the end, when such end is not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing art brings about health ; or else it is deserving of the end, when such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it ; wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. As is evident from what has gone before,

ultimate beatitude exceeds angelic and human nature. It remains, then, that man and angel merited their beatitude.

And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude. In like manner, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory.

But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then have to be said that he procured beatitude without merit, as we do with regard to grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude ; which conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the Philosopher says (*Ethics* i.). Or else it will have to be said, as some others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary, again, to the notion of merit : since merit conveys the idea of a means to an end ; while what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking, be moved towards such end ; and so no one merits to procure what he already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said that one and the same act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is meritorious ; and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even this view will not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient cause of merit ; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming from free-will, except in so far as it is informed by grace ; but it cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the same time to merit it.

Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.

Reply Obj. 1. The angel's difficulty of working righteously does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers ; but because the good work is beyond his natural capacity.

Reply Obj. 2. An angel did not merit beatitude by natural motion towards God ; but by the motion of charity, which comes of grace.

The answer to the third objection is evident from what we have said in the article.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGEL OBTAINED BEATITUDE IMMEDIATELY AFTER ONE ACT OF MERIT ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angel did not possess beatitude instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man to do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.

Obj. 2. Further, an angel could act at once from the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to be moved in the very instant of their creation, and if the motion of a body could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, they would have motion in the first instant of their generation. Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will, then he merited it in the first instant of his creation ; and so, if their beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the first instant.

Obj. 3. Further, there must be many intervals between things which are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far remote from their natural condition : while merit comes midway between. Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in order to reach beatitude.

On the contrary, Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for beatitude : consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints. Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his

first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by only one meritorious act.

I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature ; as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to another ; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown already (Q. LVIII., A. 3). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. So instantly after merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act ; because man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one act of charity.

Reply Obj. 1. Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection at once, like the angel. So a longer way was assigned for man than for the angel for securing beatitude.

Reply Obj. 2. The angel is above the time of corporeal things ; hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of beatitude, which is fruition ; since the one belongs to imperfect grace and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains for different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel merited beatitude ; and in another was beatified.

Reply Obj. 3. It is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one meritorious act is required ; which act can so far be called a stage between (nature and glory) as by it the angel is brought to beatitude.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS RECEIVED GRACE AND GLORY ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE OF THEIR NATURAL GIFTS ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the angels did not receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is bestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts.

Obj. 2. Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with grace than is nature ; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. But grace does not come *of works*, as is said Rom. xi. 6. Therefore much less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural gifts.

Obj. 3. Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.

On the contrary, is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent. ii. 3), that *those angels who were created with more subtle natures and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with greater gifts of grace.*

I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His wisdom, assigned various degrees in the angelic nature. As the angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude, so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the various degrees of grace and glory ; just as when, for example, the builder chisels the stone for building a house, from the fact that he prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is clear

that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.

Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other ; as happens in man, in whom the motion of his intellective part is either hindered or thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy. So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature, were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing happens in men, that greater grace and glory are bestowed according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the more grace and glory.

Reply Obj. 1. As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise does the nature of the angel : and as God's will ordained nature for grace, so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace.

Reply Obj. 2. The acts of the rational creature are from the creature itself ; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it seems rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than according to works.

Reply Obj. 3. Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels, who are themselves different specifically ; and in quite another way in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on account of the end ; while numerical difference is because of the matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or impede the movement of his intellective nature ; but not in the angels. Consequently the argument is not the same for both.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER NATURAL KNOWLEDGE AND LOVE REMAIN IN THE
BEATIFIED ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that natural knowledge and love do not remain in the beatified angels. For it is said, *When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away* (1 Cor. xiii. 10). But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural knowledge and love cease.

Obj. 2. Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels. Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love to remain.

Obj. 3. Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts, as the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points. But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified knowledge and love ; for, as is observed by the Philosopher (*Ethics* i.), happiness does not consist in any habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge and love in the angels.

On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its operation remains. But beatitude does not destroy nature ; since it is its perfection. Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and love.

I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to second ; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved in beatitude : and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude.

Reply Obj. 1. The advent of a perfection removes the opposite imperfection. But the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude, but underlies

it ; as the imperfection of the power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the knowledge in glory ; for nothing hinders us from knowing a thing through various mediums, as anything may be known at the one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one. In like manner, an angel can know God by His Essence, and this appertains to his knowledge of glory ; and at the same time he can know God by his own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2. All things which make up beatitude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural gifts ; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beatitude.

Reply Obj. 3. There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory. Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A BEATIFIED ANGEL CAN SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a beatified angel can sin. For, as was said above, beatitude does not do away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified angel can sin.

Obj. 2. Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (*Metaph.* viii.). But the will of the angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good and evil.

Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of the will is not lessened in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xi.) that *there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin.* Therefore the holy angels cannot sin.

I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His Essence. God's essence is the very essence of goodness. Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Created good, considered in itself, can fail. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already alleged.

Reply Obj. 2. The rational powers are referred to opposites in the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good, formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have no tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards God, whatever choice they happen to make among opposite things.

Reply Obj. 3. Free-will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to proceed to some conclusion by

passing out of the order of the principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view ; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end ; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves who can sin.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BEATIFIED ANGELS ADVANCE IN BEATITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the beatified angels can advance in beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Doct. Christ. i.*) that *God makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness.* The same thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations ; since *they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation* (Heb. i. 14). This would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to advance in beatitude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beatitude.

Obj. 3. Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not in the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore, if unable to ascend higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them ; which is not admissible.

On the contrary, Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude, they are already in possession of

beatitude. Consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude.

I answer that, In every motion the mover's intention is centred upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject ; because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. XII., A. 4), that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end.

Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist precisely in that which is seen ; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all the blessed in various degrees : but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension, for this belongs to God only ; as is evident from what was said above (Q. XII., A. 7 ; Q. XIV., A. 3). But since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only finite ; and since every finite thing is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite ; it comes to pass that the rational creature understands God more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as beatitude consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.

Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.

Reply Obj. 1. Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely passively, but also by working actively.

If the end is within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said to procure the end ; as man acquires knowledge by reflection : but if the end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the ultimate term (of motion) is not said to be moved, but to have been changed. Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life ; whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. As in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is productive of the habit ; but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward.

Reply Obj. 2. A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all, as being on the way to an end ; and so the merit of beatitude is useful. Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole ; as the wall for a house. In this way the angelic ministrings are useful for the beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude ; for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what is perfect, considered as perfect.

Reply Obj. 3. Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the highest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as are saved by their ministrations, as we read : *There is joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance* (Luke xv. 10). Such joy belongs to their accidental reward, which can be increased unto the judgment day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say that a beatified (soul) can in no wise merit, unless it be at the same time a sojourner upon earth and beholding the face of God ; like Christ, Who alone was such. For the blessed rather acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude, than merit it.

QUESTION LXIII.

THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN.

(*In Nine Articles.*)

IT now remains for us to consider how angels became evil : first of all with regard to the evil of fault ; and secondly, as to the evil of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for consideration : (1) Can there be evil of sin in the angels ? (2) What kind of sins can be in them ? (3) What did the angel seek in sinning ? (4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are any of them naturally evil ? (5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will ? (6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his creation and fall ? (7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the angels ? (8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning ? (9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EVIL OF FAULT CAN BE IN THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there can be no evil of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (*Metaph.* ix.), because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.

Obj. 2. Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies. Therefore neither can there be in the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, what is natural is always present. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by the motion of love towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.

Obj. 4. Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good. Now in the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good ; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what is truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.

On the contrary, It is said, *He found wickedness in His angels* (Job iv. 18).

I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature, can sin ; and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have ; whether sin be taken in natural, artificial, or moral acts. That act alone can never fall short of rectitude, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent. Were the carver's hand the rule itself of the act of carving, he could not carve the wood otherwise than rightly ; but if the rightness of carving be judged by another rule, then the carving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God's act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred : as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior ; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of his commander. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin ; whereas there can be

sin in the will of every creature ; considering the condition of its nature.

Reply Obj. 1. There is no potentiality in the angels to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellectual part, for them to be inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them.

Reply Obj. 2. The heavenly bodies have merely a natural operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature ; so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.

Reply Obj. 3. It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the motion of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.

Reply Obj. 4. Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will. Firstly, when something evil is chosen ; as man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error ; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the inclination of passion or of habit ; even though he does not err in his universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin in the angel ; because there are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above (Q. LIX., A. 4) ; nor, again, could any habit of sinning precede their first sin, as inclining them thereto. In another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule ; so that the defect which induces sin comes only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen ; as if one were to pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of con-

sideration of the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own free-will, insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONLY THE SIN OF PRIDE AND ENVY CAN EXIST IN AN ANGEL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there can be other sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can take delight in any kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons take delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins ; as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* ii.). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.

Obj. 2. Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth, avarice and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the angels ; but likewise sloth and avarice.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.), many vices spring from pride ; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.) that the devil is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort ; yet he is proud and envious.

I answer that, Sin can exist in a subject in two ways : first of all by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in the demons ; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection, only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with spiritual things ; because nothing is affected except with regard to something which is in some way

suited to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride,—not to be subject to a superior where subjection is due. Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride.

Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them, since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neighbour's good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the devil's will God makes use of man for the Divine glory.

Reply Obj. 1. The demons do not take delight in the obscenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures: but merely from envy they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to man's good.

Reply Obj. 2. Avarice, considered as a special class of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human life, and which can be estimated in value by money; to these demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to

the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons ; yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.

Reply Obj. 3. Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEVIL DESIRED TO BE AS GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the devil did not desire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire ; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual ; (and sin consists only in such desire). But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction ; for if the finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God.

Obj. 2. Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin.

Obj. 3. Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel, still less of God ; because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.

On the contrary, is the saying of Isaiah, speaking in the person of the devil, *I will ascend into heaven, and be like to the Most High* (xiv. 13). And Augustine (*De Qu. Vet. Test.* cxiii.) says that being inflated with *pride*, he wished to be called God.

I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God. This can be understood in two ways : firstly,

by equality ; secondly, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way ; because by natural knowledge he knew full well that this was impossible : and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some particular ; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire ; because there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature ; which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature ; just as an ass does not desire to be a horse : for were it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false ; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature ; and one angel, another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher ; and still more to covet equality with God.

To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin ; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like unto God in some respect which is not natural to one ; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is God's attribute ; in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely ; for so he

would be desiring his own *not-being* ; since no creature can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this respect,—by desiring, as his last end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God's grace. Or if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature ; and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says that he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast. These two views in a manner coincide ; because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to God alone.

Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have dominion over others ; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto God.

From this we have the answer to all the objections.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY OF THE DEMONS ARE NATURALLY WICKED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x.), *There is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead.* But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally wicked.

Obj. 2. Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said, *Their wickedness was natural to them* (*Wisd.* xii. 10). Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.

Obj. 3. Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature ; as the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious ; yet they are God's creatures.

Therefore, although the demons are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *the demons are not naturally wicked.*

I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, naturally tends towards something good ; as coming from a principle which is itself good ; because the effect always reflects the principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it, as fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things ; but with the universal good no evil can be connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good, it can naturally tend to evil ; not as evil, but accidentally, inasmuch as it is connected with something which is good. But if anything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever ; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful ; himself maintaining that they are not naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are animals with a sensitive nature. Now sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this way, then, they can have a natural inclination to evil ; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as the evil is connected with what is good.

Reply Obj. 2. The malice of some men can be called natural, either because of custom which is a second nature ; or else on account of the natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful ; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Mere brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils are connected; as the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes (*De Div. Nom.* iv.).

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEVIL WAS WICKED BY THE FAULT OF HIS OWN WILL IN THE FIRST INSTANT OF HIS CREATION?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of the devil, *He was a murderer from the beginning* (John viii. 44).

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* i.), the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time; but merely in order of nature. Now according to his interpretation given in the second book of his commentary, the *heaven*, which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said that God spoke the words, *Let there be light, and light was made*, we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the Word; consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from *darkness*, whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed; and some sinned.

Obj. 3. Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation.

Obj. 4. Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than any corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation ; as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either good or evil. If good, then, since he had grace, he merited beatitude by his good work. But with the angels the reward follows immediately upon merit ; as was said above (Q. LXII., A. 5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once ; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by not operating well in their first instant.

On the contrary, We read in Genesis i. 31 : *God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.* But among them were also the demons. Consequently the demons were at some time good.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the demons were wicked straightway in the first instant of their creation ; not by their nature, but by the sin of their own will ; because, *as soon as he was made, the devil refused righteousness.* To this opinion, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xi.), *if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil of itself.* Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the authority of Scripture (for it is said under the figure of the prince of Babylon, the devil, in Isaiah xiv. 12 : *How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning?* and in Ezechiel xxviii. 13, *Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God,*—which words were addressed to the devil in the person of the King of Tyre), consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous.

Hence others, again, have said that the angels could have sinned in the first instant of their creation ; but did not sin. This view also is repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to his

creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel's own nature ; while the term of the act of sinning is the being wicked. It seems, then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence.

This argument, however, does not satisfy. It holds good only in such movements as are measured by time, and take place successively ; for instance, if local motion follows a change, then the change and the local motion cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a term to the first and the second change ; as in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous ; so also is the motion of free-will in the angels ; for, as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning (Q. LVIII., A. 3). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant.

We must therefore come to the opposite conclusion—namely, that it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence, nevertheless, that operation which begins with the existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature ; just as upward motion in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause, which can be the cause of a defective action, then it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective operation ; just as the leg, which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin. Consequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the first instant of his creation.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xi.), when it is stated that 'the devil sins from the beginning,' *He is not to be thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was*

created, but from the beginning of sin : that is to say, because he never went back from his sin.

Reply Obj. 2. That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken as according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (*ibid.*), that *He alone could discern light and darkness, Who also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall.*

Reply Obj. 3. All that is in merit comes of God ; and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same reason does not hold good of sin ; as has been said.

Reply Obj. 4. God did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says (*ibid.*). Therefore, as all were created in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their preceding merit ; and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude which they had merited.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS ANY INTERVAL BETWEEN THE
CREATION AND THE FALL OF THE ANGEL ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there was some interval between the angel's creation and his fall. For, it is said, *Thou didst walk perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation, until iniquity was found in thee* (Ezech. xxviii. 15). But since walking is continuous motion, it requires interval. Therefore there was some interval between the devil's creation and his fall.

Obj. 2. Further, Origen says (*Hom. i. in Ezech.*) that *the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly ;* which refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his creation.

Obj. 3. Further, capability of sinning is common alike

to man and angel. But there was some delay between man's formation and his sin. Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the devil's formation and his sin.

Obj. 4. Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle time between every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his creation and his fall.

On the contrary, It is written of the devil: *He stood not in the truth* (John viii. 44). And as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xi.), *We must understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not remain in it.*

I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this matter ; and the more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the Saints, is this, that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation ; and that he was created in grace ; as we have said (in the preceding article). For since the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said above (Q. LXII., A. 5), then if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.

If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his creation and fall.

Reply Obj. 1. Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous motions are represented by corporeal motions which are measured by time. In this way by *walking* we are to understand the motion of free-will tending towards good.

Reply Obj. 2. Origen says, *The serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly*, because of the first instant in which he was not wicked.

Reply Obj. 3. An angel has an inflexible free-will after once choosing ; consequently, immediately after the first

instant, in which he had a natural tendency to good, unless he placed at once a barrier to beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man ; and therefore the argument does not hold good.

Reply Obj. 4. It is true to say that there is a middle time between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved *Phys. vi.* But in the angels, who are not subject to heavenly motion, which is primarily measured by continuous time, time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of their affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood to respond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge ; because on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in them all. From such operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word by their morning knowledge : while others, absorbed in themselves, became night, *swelling up with pride*, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. iv.*). So the first act was common to them all ; but in their second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in the first instant ; but in the second the good were set apart from the wicked.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HIGHEST ANGEL AMONG THOSE WHO SINNED
WAS THE HIGHEST OF ALL ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated in Ezechiel xxviii. 14 : *Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God.* Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (*Ang. Hier. vii.*). Therefore, he who was highest among them who sinned, was not the highest of all the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest

of the angels sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature ; which is unfitting.

Obj. 3. Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is, so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.*) says that the chief angel who sinned, *being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them.*

I answer that, Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the proneness to sin ; and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels we consider the proneness to sin, it seems less likely that the higher angels sinned than the lower. On this account Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*), that the highest of them who sinned was set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (*De Civ. Dei viii., x.*). For they said that all the gods were good ; whereas some of the demons were good, and some bad ; naming as gods the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of demons the intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith ; because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (*De Trin. iii.*). Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies ; the higher for the higher bodies ; and the highest to stand before God. And according to this distinction Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth. ii.*) that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels ; yet in that order some of them remained good.

But if the motive for sinning be considered, then we find that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said (A. 2), the demons' sin was pride ;

and the motive of pride is excellence ; which was greater in the higher spirits. So Gregory says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view. Because the angels' sin did not come of any proneness to sinning, but of free choice ; consequently that argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the other view ; because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels.

Reply Obj. 1. *Cherubim* is interpreted as *fulness of knowledge*, while *Seraphim* means *those who are on fire, or who set on fire*. Consequently *Cherubim* is derived from knowledge ; which is compatible with mortal sin ; but *Seraphim* is derived from the heat of charity, which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is not styled a Seraph, but a Cherub.

Reply Obj. 2. The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those who sin, or in those who are saved ; for God knows beforehand the end of both ; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted creature ; because the intellectual creature was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its end.

Reply Obj. 3. However great was the inclination towards good in the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him : consequently it was in his power not to follow it.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SIN OF THE HIGHEST ANGEL WAS THE CAUSE OF THE OTHERS SINNING ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the result. But, as Damascene observes

(*De Fid. Orth.* ii.), they all sinned at the one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others sinning.

Obj. 2. Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was shown above (A. 2). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior ; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. The sin of one angel would thus have been the cause of the others sinning, if he had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.

Obj. 3. Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another against God, than to wish to be over another against God ; because there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning in this way, that he induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one ; which is contrary to the gloss on Ps. ciii. 26 : *This dragon which Thou hast formed :— he who was the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice.* Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning.

On the contrary, It is said that the dragon drew with him *the third part of the stars of heaven* (Apoc. xii. 4).

I answer that, The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning ; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that highest one ; as is evident from our Lord's words, *Depart, ye accursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels* (Matt. xxv. 41). For the order of Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment ; according to the text : *By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave* (2 Pet. ii. 19).

Reply Obj. 1. Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest

sinning. For the angel has no need of any delay for choice, exhortation, or consent, as a man needs it ; for man requires deliberation in order to choose and consent ; and he needs vocal speech in order to exhort ; and these things are the work of time. It is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he takes thought ; and in the last instant of speech, another who catches his meaning can assent to what is said ; as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts, *which everyone accepts directly they are heard* (Boëthius, *De hebdom.*). Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is required in us ; in the same instant in which the highest angel expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to consent thereto.

Reply Obj. 2. Things being equal, the proud wills rather to be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior. Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior yielding to his rule ; for they wanted to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers ; especially because they were even then subject in the order of nature to the highest angel.

Reply Obj. 3. As was observed above (Q. LXII., A. 6), there is nothing to restrain an angel ; but with his whole might he is impelled to his object, be it good or bad. Consequently since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and so he became the greater in malice.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO SINNED WERE AS MANY AS THOSE WHO REMAINED FIRM ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that more angels sinned than stood firm. For, as the Philosopher says (*Topics ii.*): *Evil is in many, but good is in few.*

Obj. 2. Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than good ; according to the text : *The number of fools is infinite* (*Eccles. i. 15*). Therefore for a like reason it is so with the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it would appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders.

On the contrary, It is said, *There are more with us than with them* (*4 Kings vi. 16*) : which is taken to mean the good angels who are with us to aid us ; and the wicked spirits who are opposed to us.

I answer that, More angels stood firm than those who sinned. Because sin is contrary to the natural inclination ; while that which is against the natural order happens with less frequency ; for nature procures its effect either always, or more often than not.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are known to most men ; and from forsaking the good dictated by reason, which good appeals to fewer persons. In the angels there is only an intellectual nature ; hence the argument does not hold.

And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.

Reply Obj. 3. According to those who hold that the chief devil belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly affairs, it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but only those of the lowest order. According

to those who maintain that the chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some fell of every order ; just as men are taken up into every order to supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is more established ; which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of some orders, as of Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons ; since they are derived from the ardour of love and from God's indwelling, which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities, are attributed to them ; because these names are derived from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both good and bad.

QUESTION LXIV.

THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

IT now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons ; under which heading four things have to be inquired into : (1) Of their darkness of intellect. (2) Of their obstinacy of will. (3) Of their grief. (4) Of their place of punishment.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEMON'S INTELLECT IS DARKENED BY
PRIVATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL TRUTH ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the demon's intellect is darkened by being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For if they were to know any truth at all, they would most of all know themselves ; which is to know separated substances. This is not in keeping with their misery : for this seems to belong to great beatitude, insomuch that some writers have assigned as man's last beatitude the knowledge of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all knowledge of truth.

Obj. 2. Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same is not most manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms ; as it comes from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most

manifest of Himself, because He is the sovereign truth ; and this is because they are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can they know other things.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. iv.*), the proper knowledge of the angels is twofold ; namely, morning and evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do not see things in the Word ; nor have they the evening knowledge, because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the Creator's praise (hence, after *evening* comes *morning*, as is said in the first chapter of Genesis). Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things.

Obj. 4. Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. v., De Civ. Dei xi.*). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge : *for if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory*, as is said 1 Cor. ii. 8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of all other knowledge of truth.

Obj. 5. Further, whatever knowledge of truth is held is known either naturally, as we know first principles ; or by deriving it from someone else, as we know by learning : or by long experience, as the things we learn by discovery. The demons cannot know truth by their own nature, because, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xi.*), the good angels are separated from them as light is from darkness ; and every manifestation is made through light, as is said Eph. v. 13. In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from the good angels : because *there is no fellowship of light with darkness* (2 Cor. vi. 14). Nor can they learn by long experience : because experience comes of the senses. Consequently there is no knowledge of truth in them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*) that, *We declare that the angelic gifts bestowed upon the demons have not been changed at all, but remain untouched and unquenched.* Now, the knowledge of truth stands among those

natural gifts. Consequently there is some knowledge of truth in them.

I answer that, The knowledge of truth is twofold : one which comes of nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of grace is likewise twofold : the first is purely speculative, as when Divine secrets are imparted to an individual ; the other is affective, and produces love for God ; which knowledge properly belongs to the gift of wisdom.

Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind : for on account of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural powers ; as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or foot or of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (*loc. cit.*) that the natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however, which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been utterly taken away from them, but lessened ; because, of these Divine secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary ; and that is done either by means of the angels, or *through some temporal workings of Divine power*, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei ix.*) ; but not in the same way as to the holy angels, to whom many more things are revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived.

Reply Obj. 1. Happiness consists in self-application to something higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of nature ; hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one separate substance to know another ; as it is natural for us to know sensible natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not

consist in knowing sensible natures ; so neither does the angel's happiness consist in knowing separated substances.

Reply Obj. 2. What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect ; and not merely because our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although they do not possess the purity which comes with grace, nevertheless they have purity of nature ; and this suffices for the knowledge of God which belongs to them from their nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The creature is darkness in comparison with the excellence of the Divine light ; and therefore the creature's knowledge in its own nature is called *evening* knowledge. For the evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light : but when the light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of the Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine light, and can be called evening knowledge ; but if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but *nocturnal* knowledge. Accordingly we read in Gen. i. 5, that the darkness, which God separated from the light, *He called night*.

Reply Obj. 4. All the angels had some knowledge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its completion in Christ ; and most of all from the moment when they were beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never had. Yet all the angels did not fully nor equally apprehend it ; hence the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation, when Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (*De Civ. Dei ix.*), *It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy Angels, who enjoy a participated eternity of*

the Word ; but it was made known by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them. For had they fully and certainly known that He was the Son of God and the effect of His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory.

Reply Obj. 5. The demons know a truth in three ways : first of all by the subtlety of their nature ; for although they are darkened by privation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature : secondly, by revelation from the holy angels ; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will, they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by others : thirdly, they know by long experience ; not as deriving it from the senses ; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible species is completed in individual things, they know some things as present, which they previously did not know would come to pass, as was already said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels (*Q. LVII., A. 3 ad 3*).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF THE DEMONS IS OBSTINATE IN EVIL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual being, which nature remains in the demons as we said above (*A. 1*). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demon's will is not so obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.

Obj. 2. Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than the demon's malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy. Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice to the state of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in

evil, then their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they fell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer ; because the motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore the demon is not obstinate in malice.

Obj. 4. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* iv.) that man can be reinstated by another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed already (Q. LXIII., A. 8), the lower demons fell through the highest one. Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they are not obstinate in malice.

Obj. 5. Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any good work. But the demon performs some good works : for he confesses the truth, saying to Christ : *I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God* (Mark i. 24). *The demons also believe and tremble* (Jas. ii. 19). And Dionysius observes (*Div. Nom.* iv.), that *they desire what is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand*. Therefore they are not obstinate in malice.

On the contrary, It is said : *The pride of them that hate Thee, ascendeth continually* (Ps. lxxiii. 23) ; and this is understood of the demons. Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.

I answer that, It was Origen's opinion that every will of the creature can from freedom of will be inclined to good and evil ; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude ; hence it is termed *life everlasting*. It is also contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which pronounces that demons and wicked men shall be sent *into everlasting punishment* ; while the good shall be exalted *into everlasting life*. Consequently such an opinion must be considered erroneous ; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be held firmly that the will of the good angels is confirmed in good ; and the will of the demons is obstinate in evil.

We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in

the gravity of the sin, but in the natural condition of their state. As Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* ii.), *Death is to men, what the fall is to the angels.* Now it is quite clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are pardonable before death ; but after death they are without remission, and endure for ever.

To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the apprehensive, whereby it is moved ; as a thing movable is to its mover. For the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good ; while the will seeks the universal good, as was said above (Q. LIX., A. 1) ; as also the sense apprehends particular objects while the intellect considers universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the virtue of *intelligence* ; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one consideration to another ; and having the way open by which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite ; but the angel's will adheres fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely adhere to this or to its opposite (namely, in such things as he does not will naturally) ; but after he has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that man's free-will is flexible to the opposite *both before and after choice* ; but the angel's free-will is flexible to either opposite *before the choice, but not after.* So therefore the good angels who adhered to justice, were confirmed therein ; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who are damned. (*Suppl.*, Q. XCVIII., AA. 1, 2.)

Reply Obj. 1. The good and wicked angels have free-will, but according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2. God's mercy delivers from sin those who

repent. But such as are not capable of repenting, clinging immovably to sin, are not delivered by the Divine mercy.

Reply Obj. 3. The devil's first sin still remains in him according to desire ; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he desired. Just as if anyone were to believe that he can commit murder, and wants to commit it ; and afterwards the power is taken from him ; nevertheless, the desire of murdering can stay with him, so that he wishes he had done it, or still wishes to do it if he could.

Reply Obj. 4. The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion, is not the whole cause for man's sin being pardonable. Consequently the argument does not hold good.

Reply Obj. 5. A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will ; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's part is always wicked ; because, although he sometimes does something good, yet he does not do it well ; as when he tells the truth in order to deceive ; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. Another class of act is natural to the demon ; which can be good, and bears witness to the goodness of nature. Yet they abuse even such good acts to evil purpose.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS GRIEF IN THE DEMONS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no grief in the demons. For since grief and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same subject. But there is joy in the demons : for Augustine writing against the Manichees (*De Gen. contra Manich.* ii.) says, *The devil has power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this unhappy power.* Therefore there is no grief in the demons.

Obj. 2. Further, grief is the cause of fear ; for we fear those things before they happen, over which we grieve when they come to pass. But there is no fear in the demons ;

as is said, *He was made to fear no one* (Job xli. 24). Therefore there is no grief in the demons.

Obj. 3. Further, it is a good thing to grieve over evil. But the demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot grieve, at least over their evil of sin ; which applies to the worm of conscience.

On the contrary, The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man is punished with grief on account of the delight taken in sin, according to the text : *As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her* (Apoc. xviii. 7). Consequently much more is the devil punished with the sorrow of grief, because he especially glorified himself.

I answer that, Fear, grief, joy, and the rest, so far as they are passions, cannot exist in the demons ; for so they are proper to the sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According, however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the demons. And it must be said that there is grief in them ; because grief, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. It is evident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are ; and others to be, which are not : for, out of envy, they would wish others to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, grief must be said to exist in them : and especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. For they are deprived of happiness, which they desire naturally ; and their wicked will is restrained in many respects.

Reply Obj. 1. Joy and grief about the same thing are opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man from being sad over one thing, and glad over another ; and especially so far as grief and joy imply simple acts of the will ; because, not merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there can be something which we wish for, and something which we do not wish.

Reply Obj. 2. As there is grief in the demons over present

evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, *He was made to fear no one*, this is to be understood of the fear of God restraining from sin. For it is written elsewhere that *the devils believe and tremble* (Jas. ii. 19).

Reply Obj. 3. To grieve over the evil of sin on account of the sin bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin is opposed. But to grieve over the evil of punishment; or over the evil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix.), that *grief for good lost by punishment, is the witness to a good nature*. Consequently, since the demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he does not grieve over the evil of sin.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR ATMOSPHERE IS THE DEMONS' PLACE OF PUNISHMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this atmosphere is not the demon's place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of punishment for demons.

Obj. 2. Further, man's sin is not graver than the demon's. But man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the demon's place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome atmosphere.

Obj. 3. Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire. But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* iii.), that *the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment day*.

I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand midway between God and men. Now the order of Divine Providence so disposes, that it procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But man's welfare

is disposed by Divine Providence in two ways : first of all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil ; and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way, indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be of service in the natural order. Consequently a two-fold place of punishment is due to the demons : one, by reason of their sin ; and this is hell ; and another, in order that they may tempt men ; and thus the darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.

Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment day : consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons endures until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us here ; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial : although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they have led astray ; just as some of the good angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both man and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.

Reply Obj. 1. A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it : because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to its will.

Reply Obj. 2. One soul is not set over another in the order of nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature ; consequently there is no parallel.

Reply Obj. 3. Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day : and that the beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle : *If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have a house in heaven* (2 Cor. v. 1). Others, again, while not admitting the same of souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same judgment is passed upon wicked souls and

wicked angels ; just as there is the same on good souls and good angels.

Consequently, it must be said that, just as a heavenly place belongs to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own (in the same way as we say that the bishop's honour is not lessened while he is not actually sitting in his throne). In like manner it must be said, that although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment is none the less ; because they know that such confinement is in store for them. Hence it is said in the gloss upon Jas. iii. 6 : *They carry the fire of hell with them wherever they go.* Nor is this contrary to what is said in Luke viii. 31, that, *They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss ;* for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is recorded, *They (Vulg. He) besought Him that He would not expel them (Vulg. him) out of the country (Mark v. 10).*

TREATISE OF THE WORK OF
THE SIX DAYS



QUESTION LXV.

THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES.

(*In Four Articles.*)

FROM the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as given in the words, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*; the work of distinction as given in the words, *He divided the light from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament*; and the work of adornment expressed thus: *Let there be lights in the firmament.*

Firstly, then, is to be considered the work of creation; secondly, the work of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. About the first point four questions occur: (1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God? (2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness. (3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels? (4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from God.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CORPOREAL CREATURES ARE FROM GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that corporeal creatures are not from God. For it is said, *I have learnt that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever* (Eccles. iii. 14). But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for it is said, *The*

things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal (2 Cor. iv. 18). Therefore God did not make visible bodies.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said, *God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good* (Gen. i. 31). But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the sun's heat, and other like things. Now a thing is called evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

Obj. 3. Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the Apostle says, *While we look not at the things which are seen* (2 Cor. iv. 18). Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

On the contrary, It is said, *Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them* (Ps. cxlv. 6).

I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof of their error the words of the Apostle, *The god of this world has blinded the minds of unbelievers* (2 Cor. iv. 4). But this position is altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, *Whose god is their belly* (Phil. iii. 19).

Reply Obj. 1. All the creatures of God in some respects

continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, as are the heavenly bodies ; or the affections, as are spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's words, *The things which are seen are temporal*, though true even as regards the things themselves considered in themselves (in so far as every visible creature is subject to time, both as to being and motion), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal ; whilst those that are invisible endure for ever. Whence the Apostle's preceding words, *It worketh for us an eternal weight of glory* (2 Cor. iv. 17).

Reply Obj. 2. Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.

Reply Obj. 3. Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him ; for *the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made* (Rom. i. 20). If, then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it says in the Book of Wisdom, *Creatures are turned into a*

snare to the feet of the unwise (xiv. 11). And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good that they have from Him.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CORPOREAL THINGS WERE MADE ON ACCOUNT OF GOD'S GOODNESS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that corporeal creatures were not made on account of God's goodness. For it is said, *God created all things that they might be* (Wisd. i. 14). Therefore all things were created for their own being's sake, and not for God's goodness.

Obj. 2. Further, good has the nature of an end ; therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not to show God's goodness.

Obj. 3. Further, justice does not give inequalities, except to the unequal. But God is just ; therefore inequality not created by God must precede inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all inequality results from the different motions of free-will. But corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures : therefore the former were made on account of motions of free-will, and not on account of God's goodness.

On the contrary, It is said : *The Lord hath made all things for Himself* (Prov. xvi. 4).

I answer that, Origen laid down that corporeal creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature ; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the

measure of their conversion, were given a higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity ; whilst others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the first place, as contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of all kinds of corporeal creatures, subjoins, *God saw that it was good* (Gen. i.), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, corporeal creatures were made, not because it was good that they should be, but that the evil in others might be punished. It is erroneous, in the second place, because it would follow that the arrangement of the corporeal world, which now exists, would arise from mere chance. For if the sun's body was made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world ; and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts.

Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, firstly, that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing ; secondly, that less honourable parts exist for the more honourable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart ; and, thirdly, that all parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, for the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfec-

tion of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.

Reply Obj. 1. In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it represents the Divine Being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He created them for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 2. The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of God's goodness.

Reply Obj. 3. Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CORPOREAL CREATURES WERE PRODUCED BY
GOD THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELS.

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so by it were

all things made, according to the words of Ps. ciii. 24 : *Thou hast made all things in wisdom. But it belongs to wisdom to ordain* (as is said in *Metaph.* i.). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.

Obj. 2. Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since like always produces like. If then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God than another. But this is clearly false ; for the Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God (*De Gen. et Corrup.* ii.).

Obj. 3. Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures ; and therefore, too, it has been produced ; for in (spiritual) beings there is no distinction between what is possible and what is : especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.

On the contrary, It is said, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth* (Gen. i. 1) ; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.

I answer that, Some have laid down that creatures proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which matter itself is produced : for in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect. But it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.

In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now it is always the case that the underlying principle in things is more universal than that which informs and restricts it ; as being is more universal than living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said : *In the beginning God created heaven and earth.*

Reply Obj. 1. In the production of things an order exists, but not such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible ; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above (Q. XV., A. 2) ; so that by His wisdom He is the cause of diverse things, produced according to the diversity of things as known by Him, as an artificer, by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.

Reply Obj. 3. The amount of the power of an agent is not measured only by the thing made, but by the manner of making it ; for one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can belong to no creature.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FORMS OF BODIES ARE FROM THE ANGELS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the forms of bodies are from the angels. For Boëthius says (*De Trin.* ii.) : *From forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter.* But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances.

Obj. 2. Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances.

Obj. 3. Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from spiritual substances.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.) : *We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their pleasure, but rather that it obeys God thus.* But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not from the angels, but from God.

I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato laid down that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. For he held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these

separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or as he calls it, *participation* (*Phædo* xlix.). And, according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; the type of a horse, for example, being a single separate substance, which is the cause of all horses, whilst above this is the form of separate life, life in itself or *per se*, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that yet above this again is that form which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called *intelligences* by them, but *angels* by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of a work of art proceeds from the forms in the mind of the artist. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species.

But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being. Aristotle, however (*Metaph.* vii.), proves that what is, properly speaking, made, is the *composite*. But such are the forms of corruptible things that they exist at one time and cease to exist at another, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the *composite*; since even forms have not being, but composite things have being through forms: for, according to a thing's mode of being, is the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from mere potentiality into act by some composite agent. But since composite agents, such as bodies, are moved by created spiritual substances, as

Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.), it further results that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not as directly impressing the forms, but as motive powers towards their impression. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with the words, *God said, Let this thing be, or that*, to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom, according to Augustine, is *all form and fitness and concord of parts*.

Reply Obj. 1. Boëthius understands by immaterial forms the ideas of things in the mind of God, as the Apostle says : *By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God ; that from invisible things visible things might be made* (Heb. xi. 3). But if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.

Reply Obj. 2. Forms participated in by matter are to be referred, not to any self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but to intellectual forms, either of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by motion, or, still higher, to the ideas of the Divine intellect, by which forms are, so to say, implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought by motion into act.

Reply Obj. 3. The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by motion, not by emanation.

QUESTION LXVI.

ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must next consider the work of distinction ; first, the ordering of creation towards distinction ; secondly, the distinction itself. About the first four questions are asked : (1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation ? (2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same ? (3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with formless matter ? (4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORMLESSNESS OF CREATED MATTER PRECEDED IN
TIME ITS FORMATION ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said : *The earth was void and empty* (Gen. i. 2), or *invisible and without composition of parts*, according to another version ; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (*Conf.* xii.). Therefore matter was formless until it received its form.

Obj. 2. Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine working.

Obj. 3. Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist without form.

On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect, as is said of Him : *The works of God are perfect* (Deut. xxxii. 4). Therefore the work of His creation was at no time formless. Again, the formation of corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But to distinction is opposed confusion, as formlessness to form. If, therefore, formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the corporeal creation.

I answer that, On this point holy writers hold different opinions. Augustine, for instance (*Conf.* xii.), believes that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order of nature, whereas others, as Basil (*Hom. super Hexam.* ii.), Ambrose (*In Hexam.* i.), and Chrysostom (*Hom. in Gen.* ii.), hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little ; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to its formation or distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For if formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed ; for this is implied by duration ; since the end of creation is being in act. But act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate sub-

stance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but *this* actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be shown later (Q. LXIX., A. 1; and Q. LXXIV., A. 2).

And from the text of Genesis it may be gathered that to corporeal creatures a threefold beauty was wanting, for which reason they are said to be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body, which we call the heavens, whence it is said that *darkness was upon the face of the deep*. And the earth lacked beauty in two ways: firstly, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so we read that *the earth was void, or invisible*, inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view; secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants, for which reason it is called *empty*, or, according to another reading, *without composition*—that is, unadorned. Thus (the Book of Genesis) having already mentioned two created natures, the heaven

and the earth, expresses the formlessness of the heaven by the words, *darkness was upon the face of the deep*, since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of the earth, by the words, *the earth was void and empty*.

Reply Obj. 1. The word earth is taken differently in this passage by Augustine and other writers. Augustine holds that by the words *earth* and *water* in this passage primary matter itself is signified, on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said to be *void and empty*, or *invisible and incomposite*, that matter is apprehended by means of form (hence, considered in itself, it is called *invisible* or *void*), and its potentiality is completed by form (thus Plato says that matter is *place*). But other holy writers understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said (A. 1) how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form.

Reply Obj. 2. Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.

Reply Obj. 3. Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than for accident to be without subject.

In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if, according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part, but from His wisdom, and

from the design of preserving due order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.

In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient natural philosophers believed in an original chaos or confusion devoid of all distinction; indeed Anaxagoras taught that the intellect was the only thing that was distinct and without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction is expressed, as will be shown later (A. 3, and Q. LXVIII., A. 1). This is signified by the words, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*. The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of air and water to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato, nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words, *Spirit of God* (since spirit is another name for air), and considered that by the word heaven is meant fire (holding heaven to be composed of fire), as Augustine relates *De Civ. Dei* viii. But Rabbi Moses, though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold to what we stated above; because by the words *Spirit of God* Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to 'move over the waters,' not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the artist's will may be said to move over the material to be formed by his art. The third distinction is that of place, where the earth is said to be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, and the darkness therein, is described as being above the waters in the words: *Darkness was upon the face of the deep*. The remaining distinctions will appear from what follows.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FORMLESS MATTER OF ALL CORPOREAL THINGS IS THE SAME ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says (*Conf. xii.*) : *I find two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless,* and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and disordered, whereby he says the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the matter of all corporeal things is the same.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Metaph. v.*) : *Things that are one in genus are one in matter.* But all corporeal things are in the same genus, body. Therefore the matter of all of them is the same.

Obj. 3. Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.

Obj. 4. Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.

On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually interchangeable, and mutually active or passive, as is said (*De Gener. i.*). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.

I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Hence, because the four elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies :

By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that binds you together. But this theory Aristotle disproves by the movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural motion, different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elementary bodies have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicbron taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably, and so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be merely an accident of the disappearance of successive forms—that is to say, it would not be corruption pure and simple, but partial, since being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form.

Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, but in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards the particular form it receives, remaining in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than

others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form, and *vice versa*. Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter.

Neither can we say, as Averroes imagines, that the heavenly bodies themselves are the matter of the heaven—that is to say, that they are beings in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that their forms are a separate substance united to them as their motive force. For it is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside the consideration of the separate substance endowed with motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form—that is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form—it follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing is something actually intelligible, which the heavenly bodies are not, being sensible. It results, then, that the matter of the heavenly bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the question to inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle says (*Metaph.* xi.). So, then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the idea of potentiality.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato, who denies a fifth element, or essence. Or we may say, secondly, that formless matter is one with the unity

of order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. If genus is taken in a physical sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said *Metaph. x.* Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of bodies, since they are all included in the one idea of corporeity.

Reply Obj. 3. The form of corporeity is not one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are distinguished, as stated (in the article).

Reply Obj. 4. As potentiality is directed towards act, potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight is by colour, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, inasmuch as the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to elemental forms.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EMPYREAN HEAVEN WAS CREATED AT THE SAME TIME AS FORMLESS MATTER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the empyrean heaven was not created at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are mobile, and the empyrean heaven is not mobile. For if it were so, its motion would be ascertained by the motion of some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with formless matter.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin. iii.*) that *the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order.* If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without motion ; for one body cannot

move another unless itself also moves. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.

Obj. 3. Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv.): *In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world;* from which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation.

Obj. 4. Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.

On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth,* by the word heaven is meant, not the visible firmament, but the empyrean or igneous heaven.

I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authorities of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as created it was filled with the angels; and Basil says: *Just as the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward for works that deserve reward is laid up in the light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest.* But the reasons given by these authorities differ. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, was made on the second day. But the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert that He actually did, when they

call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained, according to Augustine, by supposing that formlessness (signified by darkness) preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, the creation from nothing of things at first imperfect, that from them the perfect might be produced, attests the Divine wisdom. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come a twofold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body glorified, but in the whole universe made new. But the spiritual glory begins with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, looks forward to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, not from its fiery heat, but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x.) says that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as the sidereal, to be igneous, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement (*De Cæl.* i.). This much has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.

Reply Obj. 1. Sensible corporeal things are mobile in the present state of the world, for by the motion of corporeal creatures is secured the multiplication of the elect. But

when glory is finally consummated, the motion of bodies will cease. And such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.

Reply Obj. 2. It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does not influence inferior bodies of another order—those, namely, that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that it does influence bodies that move, though itself motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who stand by (the throne of God), influence those of lower degree who act as messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (*Cæl. Hier.* xiii.). For this reason the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is in movement, may be held to be, not a passing to and fro by motion, but of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or causation, or other power of like dignity.

Reply Obj. 3. Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendour without may correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (*Hom. ii. in Hexam.*) says: *The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual dwelling in light and joy.*

Reply Obj. 4. As Basil says (*ibid.*): *It is certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region.* But since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see the stars through the intervening heaven), we may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TIME WAS CREATED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH
FORMLESS MATTER ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine says (*Conf. xii.*) : *I find two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and the angelic nature.* Therefore time was not created with formless matter.

Obj. 2. Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when *God divided the light from the darkness.* Therefore in the beginning time was not.

Obj. 3. Further, time is the measure of the firmament's motion ; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning time was not.

Obj. 4. Further, motion precedes time, and therefore motion should be reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.

Obj. 5. Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the things first created.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. i.*) : *Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time.*

I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were these four—the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (in the passage quoted above) lays down only two things as first created,—the angelic nature and corporeal matter—making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But he holds that these two—namely, the angelic nature and formless matter—precede the formation (of matter), by nature only, and not by duration ; and therefore that, as they precede formation, so do they precede motion and time.

Time, therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration : for otherwise there would be no such measure.

Reply Obj. 1. The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.

Reply Obj. 2. As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night.

Reply Obj. 3. If the motion of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was not the measure of the firmament's motion, but of the first motion of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's motion, in so far as this motion is the first motion. But if the first motion was another than this, time would be the measure of that motion, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. But it must be supposed that straight away from the beginning motion of some kind existed, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind. But motion without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than *the measure of priority and succession in movement*.

Reply Obj. 4. Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure ; but not motion, which is related only to the subject of motion.

Reply Obj. 5. Place is apprehended as existing in the empyrean heaven, that being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning : nor is time, in its actuality, ours except as regards the *now*.

QUESTION LXVII.

ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must consider next the work of distinction in itself. Firstly, the work of the first day ; secondly, the work of the second day ; thirdly, the work of the third day.

About the first, four questions are asked : (1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things ? (2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal ? (3) Whether light is a quality ? (4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WORD LIGHT IS USED IN ITS PROPER SENSE
IN SPEAKING OF SPIRITUAL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that light is used in its proper sense in spiritual things. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. iv.*) : *In spiritual things light is better and surer.* Also : *Christ is not called Light in the same sense as He is called a stone ; the former is to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically.*

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius (*Div. Nom. iv.*) includes Light among the intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiritual matters.

Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle says : *All that is made manifest is light* (*Eph. v. 13*). But to be made manifest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Fid.* ii.) that *Splendour* is among those things which are said of God metaphorically.

I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways—that is to say, either in its original application or in its more extended meaning. This is clearly shown in the word *sight*, originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses. Thus we speak of seeing how anything tastes, or smells, or burns. Further, sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: *Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God* (Matt. v. 8). And thus it is with the word *light*. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to the manifestation of anything, to cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (*loc. cit.*). But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things.

The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has been said.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIGHT IS A BODY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that light is a body. For Augustine says (*Lib. Arb.* iii.) that, *Light takes the first place among bodies*. Therefore light is a body.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Topics* v.) that light is a species of fire. But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.

Obj. 3. Further, the powers of motion, intersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and its rays. For different rays of light, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* ii.), are united and separated, which seems

impossible unless they are bodies. Therefore light is a body.

On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same space simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore light is not a body.

I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons. Firstly, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies, of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place; since contiguity requires distinction of place.

The second reason is from motion. For if light were a body, its diffusion would be the local motion of a body. Now no local motion of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place to another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be argued that the time required is too short to be perceived; for though this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in distances so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part of motion that whereas all bodies have their natural determinate motion, the motion of light is indifferent as regards direction, working equally in a circle as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local motion of a body.

The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the intervening space (between the sun and the earth). Also it would be absurd to say that a body of so great bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of

the luminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves round with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object that the whole room is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done, since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before.

Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act—in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.

Reply Obj. 2. Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is *flame*, or in earthy matter is *coal*. Nor must too much attention be paid to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers.

Reply Obj. 3. All these properties are assigned to light metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because motion from place to place is naturally first in the order of motion, as is proved *Phys.* viii., we use terms belonging to local motion in speaking of alteration and motion of all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said *Metaph.* x.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIGHT IS A QUALITY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that light is not a quality. For every quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality.

Obj. 2. Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light therefore is not a sensible quality.

Obj. 3. Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly bodies, and also gives to colours their immaterial being, by making them actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a substantial or spiritual form.

On the contrary, Damascene (*De Fid. Orth.* i.) says that light is a species of quality.

I answer that, Some writers have said that the light in the air has not a natural being such as the colour on a wall has, but only an intentional being, as a similitude of colour in the air. But this cannot be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But colour does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as coloured. Secondly, because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions of the mind. Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form, but this also seems impossible for two reasons. Firstly, because substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the essence of a being (*quod quid est*) is the object of the intellect, as is said *De Anima* iii. But light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.

We must, then, say that as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an

active quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse natures of bodies.

Reply Obj. 1. Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the form are firm and enduring ; as when, for instance, water is converted into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly, so as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than fully impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent ; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns in time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its active cause.

Reply Obj. 2. It is accidental to light not to have a contrary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of change, which is itself removed from contrariety.

Reply Obj. 3. As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does light act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards producing substantial forms ; and towards rendering colours visible, or actual, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRODUCTION OF LIGHT IS FITTINGLY
ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST DAY ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the production of light is not fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as proved

in the preceding article, is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.

Obj. 2. Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made on the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been on the first day.

Obj. 3. Further, night and day are brought about by the motion in a circle of a luminous body. But motion of this kind is an attribute of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, ought not to be assigned to the first day. —

Obj. 4. Again, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown (Q. LXIII., A. 5). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to the first day.

On the contrary, That without which there could not be day, must have been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light. Therefore light must have been made on the first day.

I answer that, There are two opinions as to the production of light. Augustine seems to say (*Gen. ad lit. i.*) that Moses could not have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and therefore when we read, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the word *heaven*, and formless corporeal matter by the word *earth*. And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of higher dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual nature is signified by the production of light, that is to say, of spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.

Other writers think that the production of spiritual

creatures was purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of time which belongs to sensible things ; but that the spiritual or angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand.

Chrysostom gives as a reason for the omission that Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things alone appealed, and whom he was endeavouring to withdraw from the service of idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal creatures ; for they would have paid them Divine worship ; since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and stars, as is shown by the prohibition in the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy.

But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness : of one where we read that *the earth was void and empty*, and of another where it is said that *darkness was upon the face of the deep*. Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of the primary corporeal motive force, as was stated (A. 3), and thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The second reason is because light is a common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before man, as is shown (*De Gener. Anim.*). It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of distinction the production of light should take first place, since light is a form of the primary body, and because it is more common quality.

Basil, indeed, adds a third reason : that all other things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth, already touched upon in the objections ; that day cannot be unless light exists, which was made therefore on the first day.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the opinion of those who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms, afterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which light holds the first place.

Reply Obj. 2. In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a kind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this returned to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot well be maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture records the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that time afterwards ceased to exist.

Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that it is superfluous, whereas none of God's works have been made in vain. On this account it is held by some that the sun's body was made out of this nebula. This, too, is impossible to those at least who believe that the sun is different in its nature from the four elements, and naturally incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on another form.

I answer, then, with Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.), that the light was the sun's light, formless as yet, being already the solar substance, and possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was afterwards added the special and determinative power required to produce determinate effects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a triple distinction was made between light and darkness. Firstly, as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we have the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of the earth the cause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for in one hemisphere there was light, in the other darkness. Thirdly, as to time; because there was light for one and darkness for another in the same hemisphere; and this is signified by the words *He calleth the light day, and the darkness night.*

Reply Obj. 3. Basil says (*Homil. ii. in Hexam.*) that day and night were then caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather than by motion (of the firmament). But Augustine objects to this (*Gen. ad lit. i.*), that there was no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction since there were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for whose service this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous body seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as the body is actually present; though this might be effected by miracle. As to this, however, Augustine remarks (*ibid.*) that in the first founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but for what is in accordance with nature. We hold, then, that the motion of the heavens is twofold. Of these motions, one is common to the entire heaven, and is the cause of day and night. This, as it seems, had its beginning on the first day. The other varies in proportion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations is the cause of the succession of days, months, and years. Thus it is, that in the account of the first day the distinction between day and night alone is mentioned; this distinction being brought about by the common motion of the heavens. The further distinction into successive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth day, in the words, *let them be for seasons, and for days, and years* is due to motions proper (to various bodies).

Reply Obj. 4. As Augustine teaches (*Conf. xii., Gen. ad lit. i.*), formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must understand the production of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures, not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in which they were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which they possessed from their creation as said above (Q. LXII., A. 3). Thus the division of light from darkness will denote the distinction of the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form. But if all created things received their form at the same time, the darkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked, not as existing from the beginning, but such as God foresaw would exist.

QUESTION LXVIII.

ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must next consider the work of the second day. About this four questions are asked : (1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day ? (2) Whether there are waters above the firmament ? (3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters ? (4) Whether there is more than one heaven ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRMAMENT WAS MADE ON THE SECOND DAY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the firmament was not made on the second day. For we read, *God called the firmament heaven* (Gen. i. 8). But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the words, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth.* Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

Obj. 2. Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to the order of Divine wisdom ; and this order would not be preserved, unless works precede, or follow each other, as the nature of each requires. But though the firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are mentioned as being made on the first day and before the formation of light. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

Obj. 3. Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of matter created before days began. But

the firmament cannot have been formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 6), *God said, let there be a firmament*, after which follow the words, *And the evening and the morning were the second day*.

I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to be observed, as Augustine teaches (*Gen. ad lit. i.*). The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing.

We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be understood, firstly, of the starry firmament, on which point it is necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution; because its parts are, so to say, in harmony, not in disunion. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle.

According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist.

But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on the second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation, since the first form received by matter is the elemental.

Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle, seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas the firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of matter existing antecedently in time.

Hence to produce the substance of the firmament is the work of creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.), the light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form.

If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (*Gen. ad lit.* iv.), and not succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of the opinions given above, that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day.

Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has received the name of firmament from the firmness and density of the air. *For a body is called firm, that is dense and solid, thereby differing from a mathematical body* as is remarked by Basil (*Hom.* iii. in *Hexam.*). If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (*Gen. ad lit.* ii.), recommends it thus: *I consider this view of the question worthy of all commendation,*

as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and believed.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Chrysostom, Moses prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in the words, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, and then proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as a man might write about the building of a house, saying first in general terms, that the house was constructed by a certain builder, and then describing in succession how the foundations were laid, the walls raised and the roof put on. In accepting this explanation we are, therefore, not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, and when we read that the firmament was made on the second day.

We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning is not the same as that made on the second day; and there are several senses in which this may be understood. Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* i.) that the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the formless spiritual nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the corporeal heaven. According to Bede (*Hexam.* i.) and Strabus, the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made on the second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene (*Fid. Orth.* ii.), that of the first day was spherical in form and without stars, the same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth sphere, and the primary movable body (*primum mobile*) that moves with a diurnal motion: and by the firmament made on the second day he understands the starry heaven. According to another theory, touched upon by Augustine, the heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven, and the firmament made on the second day was that region of the air where the clouds are collected, which is also called heaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an equivocal sense, it is expressly said that *God called the firmament heaven*: for the same reason in a preceding verse it is said

that *God called the light day* (since the word *day* is also used to denote a space of twenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as pointed out by Rabbi Moses.

The second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has been already said.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE WATERS ABOVE THE FIRMAMENT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not waters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.

Obj. 2. Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest on a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a sphere, there cannot be water above it.

Obj. 3. Further, water is an element, and appointed to the generation of composite bodies, according to the relation in which imperfect things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature have their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that water would be useless there. But none of God's works are useless. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 7) : *He divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament.*

I answer with Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*) that, *These words of Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect. Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there.* As to the nature of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (*Hom. i. in Gen.*) that the waters that are above the firmament are spiritual substances, and quotes in this sense the words of Ps. cxlviii. 4, *Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord*, also the words of Daniel (iii. 60) : *Ye waters that are above the heavens, bless the Lord.* To this Basil answers

(*Hexam.* iii.) that these words do not mean that these waters are rational creatures, but that *the thoughtful contemplation of them by those who understand fulfils the glory of the Creator*. Hence in the same context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are invoked in the same way, though no one would attribute reason to these.

We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact nature will be differently defined according as opinions on the firmament differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the elemental waters. But if by firmament we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four elements, then the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendour : so this other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its transparence ; and this heaven is above the starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the element but formless matter of bodies. Augustine, in fact, says (*Super Gen. cont. Manich.* i.) that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters.

If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament must rather be the vapours resolved from the waters which are raised above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to say, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* ii.), that waters resolved into vapour may be lifted above the starry heaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the intervening region of fire, wherein all vapour must be consumed, the tendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the moon, as well as the fact that vapours are perceived not to rise even to the tops

of the higher mountains, all go to show the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of this opinion, that bodies may be rarefied infinitely, since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain point only.

Reply Obj. 1. Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in its place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*), however, will not admit this solution, but says, *It is our business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His creatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way of miracle.* We leave this view, then, and answer that according to the last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears from what has been said in the body of the article. According to the first opinion, an order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven.

Or by the water, as stated in the article, we may understand corporeal matter to be signified, as we have explained.

Reply Obj. 2. The solution will appear from what has been said according to the last two opinions. As to the first opinion, Basil gives two replies (*Hexam. iii.*). He answers firstly, that a body seen as concave from beneath need not necessarily be convex, or rounded, above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.

Reply Obj. 3. The answer to the third objection is that, according to the third opinion given, the waters above the firmament have been raised in the form of vapours, and serve to give rain to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This, according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily revolution of the entire

heaven, whereby the continuance of generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the zodiacal motion, is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars, and their various influences. But according to the first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil supposes. And Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*) that some have explained the extreme cold of Saturn by its nearness to the waters that are above the firmament.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRMAMENT DIVIDES WATERS FROM WATERS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the firmament does not divide waters from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have naturally one and the same place. But Aristotle says (*Topics i.*): *All water is the same in species.* Water therefore cannot be distinct from water by place.

Obj. 2. Again, should it be said that the waters above the firmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be argued, on the contrary, that things distinct by species need nothing else to distinguish them. If, then, these waters differ in species, it is not the firmament that distinguishes them.

Obj. 3. Again, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from waters must be something which is in contact with them on either side, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore the firmament does not divide the waters from the waters.

On the contrary, It is written (*Gen. i. 6*): *Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters ; and let it divide the waters from the waters.*

I answer that, The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain philosophers of antiquity, who taught that water

was a body infinite in dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the words, *Darkness was upon the face of the deep*, the word *deep* might be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as the first principle of all bodies. These philosophers also taught that not all corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our senses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists above that heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide the waters without from those within, by taking the latter to denote all bodies under the heaven, of whatever kind, as water is the first principle of them all.

As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been philosophers who denied this, terming a space filled with air a vacuum.

Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words, *Darkness was upon the face of the deep*, the existence of air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is the air.

Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of transparent body. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region

divides that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are generated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water and included under that name.

Reply Obj. 1. If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven, the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But if by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both these waters are of the same species, and two places are assigned to them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of their begetting, the lower, the place of their repose.

Reply Obj. 2. If the waters are held to differ in species, the firmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of their distinction, but only as the boundary of each.

Reply Obj. 3. On account of the air and other similar bodies being invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water, and thus it is evident that on each side of the firmament waters are found, whatever may be the sense in which the word is used.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE HEAVEN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is only one heaven. For the heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth.* But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only one heaven.

Obj. 2. That which consists of the entire sum of its own matter, must be one ; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher proves (*De Cæl.* i.). Therefore there is but one heaven.

Obj. 3. Again, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there are more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then, they are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which each is

called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more than one heaven.

On the contrary, It is said in the Psalms, *Praise Him, ye heavens of heavens* (cxlviii. 4).

I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is only one heaven (*Hom. iv. in Gen.*), and that the words *heavens of heavens* are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand, Basil (*Hom. iii. in Hexam.*), whom Damascene follows (*Fid. Orth. ii.*), says that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason the birds that fly in the air are often called birds of heaven (*volucres cæli*). But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said that there are more heavens than one.

In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the other seven, called by some the seven heavens, are the spheres of the planets.

In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as luminosity, actual or potential, and sublimity. Thus Damascene (*ibid.*) holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon's orb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three heavens, the aerial, the

starry, and one higher than both these, of which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was *rapt to the third heaven*.

But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region, Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher region of fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian heaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three enumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus.

Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words, *I will ascend into heaven*; whereby the evil spirit is represented as seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual blessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so signified, according to Augustine, in the words, *Your reward is very great in heaven* (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*).

Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens. Augustine (*De Gen. ad lit. xii.*) speaks on this subject in reference to Paul's words quoted above.

Reply Obj. 1. The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one centre may have many circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be many heavens.

Reply Obj. 2. The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it is one.

Reply Obj. 3. All the heavens have the common characters of sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said (in the body of the article).

QUESTION LXIX.

ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY.

(In Two Articles.)

WE next consider the work of the third day. About this two questions are asked : (1) About the gathering together of the waters. (2) About the production of plants.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT THE GATHERING TOGETHER OF THE WATERS SHOULD TAKE PLACE, AS RECORDED, ON THE THIRD DAY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it was not fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been *made* in the words, *God said, let light be made, and Let the firmament be made.* But the third day is divided from the first and second days, as a distinct day. Therefore the work of the third day should have been described as a making, not as a gathering together.

Obj. 2. Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the waters, and was invisible for that reason. There was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be gathered together.

Obj. 3. Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact, and therefore all were not gathered together into one place.

Obj. 4. Further, a gathering together is a mode of local motion. But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea. In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary.

Obj. 5. Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by the words, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth.* Therefore the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity.

On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.

I answer that, Here it is necessary to explain this matter differently according to the different explanations given by Augustine and other holy writers. In all these works, according to Augustine, there is no order of duration, but of origin and nature only. He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all, and that the latter are signified by the words earth and water. This, however, he does not take to mean that formlessness preceded formation in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest or spiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it is said that light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the lower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the second place, by the words, *Let the firmament be made,* by which is to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only. But in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only. Therefore the words, *Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land appear,* mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the substantial form of water, so as to have such motion, and with the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.

According, however, to other holy writers an order of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is

meant that the formlessness of matter precedes its formation, and one form another, in order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the formlessness of matter implies the total absence of form, since the mention of heaven, earth, and water, indicates these things as already objects of the senses; rather they understand by formlessness the want of due distinction and of complete and perfect beauty, and in respect of these three Scripture mentions three kinds of formlessness. Heaven the highest of them, and the source of light, was without form so long as *darkness* filled it. The formlessness of water, which holds the middle place, is called the *deep*, because, as Augustine says (*Contr. Faust.*), this word signifies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly, the formless state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is said to be *invisible* or *void*, because it was covered by the waters. Thus, then, the formation of the highest body took place on the first day. And since time results from the motion of the heaven, and is the numerical measure of that motion; from the formation of heaven resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night and day. On the second day the intermediate body, water, was formed, receiving from the firmament a sort of distinction and order (and water is to be understood as including certain other things, as explained above, Q. LXVIII., A. 3). On the third day the earth, the lowest body, received its form by the withdrawal of the waters, and (from this formation) resulted the distinction in the lowest body, the distinction of land and sea. Hence Scripture, having clearly expressed the formless state of the earth, by speaking of it as void or invisible, expresses the manner in which it received its form by the equally suitable words, *Let the dry land appear*.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine, Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was made, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher and spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies, are perfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable. Hence the impression of such forms is signified by the gathering of the waters,

and the appearing of the land. *Water*, to use Augustine's words, *glides and flows away, the earth abides* (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*). Others, again, hold that the work of the third day was perfected on that day only as regards motion from place to place, and that for this reason Scripture does not speak of it as made.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument is easily solved, according to Augustine's opinion (*De Gen. contr. Manich. i.*), because we need not suppose that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that these were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced in this very gathering together. But according to the other writers there are three explanations which Augustine gives (*Gen. ad lit. i.*). The first supposes that the waters were heaped up to a greater height at the place where they were gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to the Red Sea that the sea is higher than the land, as Basil remarks (*Hom. iv. in Hexam.*). The second explains *the water that covered the earth as being a kind of cloud or vapour which was afterwards condensed*; and the third suggests *the existence of hollows in the earth, to receive the confluence of waters*. Of the above three explanations the first seems the most probable.

Reply Obj. 3. All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which they flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason why they are said to be gathered together into one place. Again the words *one place* are perhaps not used in a literal sense, but as contrasted with the place of the dry land, so that the sense would be, *Let the waters be gathered together in one place, that is, apart from the dry land*. That the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by the words that follow, *The gathering together of the waters He called seas*.

Reply Obj. 4. The Divine command gives bodies their natural motion; and by these natural motions they are said to *fulfil His word*. Or we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely to cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both water and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely, that

plants and animals might be on the earth, it was necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some philosophers attribute this uncovering of the earth's surface to the action of the sun lifting up the vapours and thus drying the land. Scripture, however, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book of Genesis, but in that of Job, where God speaking in person says, *I set My bounds around the sea* (Job xxxviii. 10), and in the prophecy of Jeremias, where it is written : *Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set the sand a bound for the sea* (v. 22).

Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine (*De Gen. contr. Manich. i.*), primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned, but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself. Again it may be said with Basil (*Hom. iv. in Hexam.*), that the earth is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, but here in respect of its principal property, namely, dryness. Wherefore it is written : *He called the dry land, Earth.* It may also be said with Rabbi Moses, that the expression, *He called*, denotes throughout an equivocal use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first that *He called the light day* : for the reason that later on a period of twenty-four hours is also called day, where it is said that *there was evening and morning, one day.* In like manner it is said that *the firmament*, that is, the air, *He called heaven* : for that which was first created was also called *heaven.* And here, again, it is said that *the dry land*, that is, the part from which the waters had withdrawn, *He called earth*, as distinct from the sea ; although the name earth is equally applied (to the whole globe), whether covered with waters or not. So by the expression *He called* we are to understand throughout that *He gave such a nature or property* (to these things) that *they could be called by the names which He bestowed on them.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT THE PRODUCTION OF PLANTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE THIRD DAY

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it was not fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded as taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of distinction.

Obj. 2. Again, a work by which the earth is accursed should have been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But the words of Gen. iii. 17, *Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee*, show that by the production of certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day, which is concerned with the work of formation.

Obj. 3. Again, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the third day.

On the contrary, It is said, *The earth brought forth the green herb* (Gen. i. 12), after which there follows, *The evening and the morning were the third day*.

I answer that, On the third day, as said (A. 1), the formless state of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold. On the one hand, the earth was *invisible* or *void*, being covered by the waters; on the other hand, it was *disordered* or *empty*, that is, without order of parts, that is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect this formless state ends on the third day: firstly when *the waters were gathered together*

into one place and the dry land appeared; secondly, when the earth brought forth the green herb. But concerning the production of plants, Augustine's opinion differs from that of other commentators. The latter, in accordance with the surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in their various species, on this third day. But Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. v.*) says that *the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees virtually, that is, it received then the power to produce them.* He supports this view by the authority of the following words of Scripture: *These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created; in the day that the Lord God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew* (*Gen. ii. 4*). Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface. Further, he argues thus in confirmation of this explanation. In these first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He subsequently rested. Yet *He worketh until now* (*John v. 17*), by watching over His creatures, in the work of propagation. Now the production of plants from out the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only. However it is the opinion of other writers that the first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days, but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the Divine direction of the universe. The proof of this from Scripture they find in the words, *before (the plant) sprung up from the earth, and before (the herb) germinated*, so as to produce others like itself by the natural way of reproduction from seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly, *Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed*, as indicating the production of perfect species, from the seed of which should arise others of similar kind. Nor does the question where the seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect the argument.

Reply Obj. 1. Life in plants is not readily discernible,

from their wanting sense and local motion, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is treated as a part of the earth's formation.

Reply Obj. 2. Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, either virtually or actually, but not in punishment of man. But when man began to till the earth to gain his food, these unfruitful and noxious plants were a part of his penalty, as is signified by the words, *Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth for thee.*

Reply Obj. 3. Moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we have said (Q. LXVIII., A. 3). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth, from which, moreover, they seem hardly specifically distinct. For this reason, therefore, Moses makes no particular mention of them.

QUESTION LXX.

OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by itself, secondly as to all six days in general.

In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day, secondly that of the fifth day, thirdly that of the sixth day, and fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.

On the work of the fourth day three questions are asked : (1) As to the production of the lights ? (2) As to the end of their production ? (3) Whether they are living beings ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE LIGHTS OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN PRODUCED ON
THE FOURTH DAY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the lights ought not to have been produced on the fourth day. For as the heavenly luminaries are by nature incorruptible bodies, their matter could not exist without their form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation, before time was, so therefore was their form. It follows, then, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day.

Obj. 2. Again, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light. But light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore, should have been made on the first day, not on the fourth.

Obj. 3. Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants are fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says, *He placed them in the firmament.* But plants are described as produced when the earth, to which they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore, should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is to say, on the second day.

Obj. 4. Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies ; but cause precedes effect in the order of nature. The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the third or before.

Obj. 5. Further, as astronomers say that there are many stars larger than the moon, the sun and the moon are not correctly described as the *two great lights.*

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says, *So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the furniture of them* (Gen. ii. 1), thereby indicating that the work was threefold. In the first work, that of creation, the heaven and the earth were produced, but as yet without form. In the second, or work of distinction, the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine holds (*Gen. ad lit.* ii.), or by giving them the order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers suppose. The third is the work of adornment, and is distinct from the work of perfecting. For the perfection of the heaven and the earth regards those things that belong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local motion, as separating one from another ; so the work of adornment is set forth by the production of such things as move freely in the heavens, and upon the earth. But it has been stated above (Q. LXIX., A. 1), that three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water,

and the earth ; and it has been shown how these received their form in the three days of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first day ; on the second day the waters were separated ; and on the third, the earth was divided into land and sea. So also is it in the work of adornment ; on the first day of this work, which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by their movements ; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one ; while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that Augustine's opinion (*Gen. ad lit. v.*) on the production of the lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that they were made on the fourth day actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say, *Let the firmament produce lights*, though it does say, *Let the earth bring forth the green herb*.

Reply Obj. 1. In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here ; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there was no need for the primary matter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another nature, and naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact that the lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but as made only on the fourth day, Chrysostom (*Hom. vi. in Gen.*) explains this by the need of guarding the people from the danger of idolatry :

since the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the beginning.

Reply Obj. 2. Here, again, no difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made on this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have been produced on that day merely as light in general, and to have had no determinate effects till the fourth, when the lights in the heaven were made. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have one effect, those of the moon another, and so forth. Speaking of such a determination of power, Dionysius (*De Div. Nom.* iv.) says that the sun's light which previously was without form, was formed on the fourth day.

Reply Obj. 3. According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not fixed in the spheres, but have their own motion distinct from the motion of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (*ibid.*) that when God is said to have placed them in the firmament it is not meant that He fixed them there immovably, *but that He bade them exist there*, even as He placed man in Paradise, to make his home there. In the opinion of Aristotle, however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres (*De Cæl.* ii.). But Moses describes what is obvious to sense, out of condescension to popular ignorance, as we have already said (Q. LXVIII., A. 3). The objection, however, falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day as having a natural distinction from that in which the stars are placed, even though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the testimony of which Moses follows. For although to the senses there appears but one firmament, if we admit a higher and a lower firmament, the lower will be that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the higher firmament.

Reply Obj. 4. In the words of Basil (*Hom. v. in Hexam.*) plants were recorded as produced before the sun and moon,

to prevent idolatry, since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom remarks (*Hom. vi. in Gen.*), the sun, moon, and stars co-operate in the work of production by their movements, as the husbandman co-operates by his labour.

Reply Obj. 5. As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great, not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent size is greater.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CAUSE ASSIGNED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
THE LIGHTS IS REASONABLE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the cause assigned for the production of the lights is not reasonable. For the Scripture says: *Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear* (Jer. x. 2). Therefore the heavenly lights were not made to be signs.

Obj. 2. Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore they are not signs.

Obj. 3. Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the first day. Therefore the lights were not made *for seasons, and days, and years*, that is, in order to distinguish them.

Obj. 4. Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is inferior to itself, *since the end is better than the means* (*Topics iii.*). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not made *to enlighten it*.

Obj. 5. Further, the new moon cannot be said *to rule the night*. But such it probably was when first made; for men begin to count from the new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made *to rule the night*.

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, As we have said above (Q. LXV., A. 2), corporeal creatures can be considered as made either for the sake of their proper functions, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the glory of God. Of these reasons only the second, which points out the usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon here by Moses, as being the most likely to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written, *Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations* (Deut. iv. 19). Now, the service rendered by the heavenly bodies to mankind is explained at the beginning of Genesis as three-fold. The first is indicated in the words, *Let them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth*; and refers to the use of sight, by which men are enabled to direct their actions, and recognize the objects with which they have to deal. Secondly, the lights preside over the changes of the seasons, thus relieving a monotony which would be wearisome, preserving mankind in health and providing for the necessities of the body. And as these things could not be secured if it were always summer or winter, Holy Scripture says that the lights were set for *times, and days, and years*. Thirdly, they are of service to man in the occupations of his daily life and business, having been placed in the heavens as signs, indicating fair or foul weather, which are conditions favourable or otherwise of daily business. And in this respect Scripture says *that they may be signs*.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, yet they have no influence on those changes which depend upon man's free-will.

Reply Obj. 2. We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But the word *sign* is here chosen, rather than *cause*, to guard against idolatry.

Reply Obj. 3. The general division of time into day and

night took place on the first day, in so far as it may be understood that the diurnal motion, in which the whole heaven participates began on that day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and years as marked by greater or less degrees of heat and cold, are due to certain particular movements of the stars : which movements may have had their beginning on the fourth day.

Reply Obj. 4. Light was given to the earth for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. Nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of the universe.

Reply Obj. 5. The moon at the full, by its rising in the evening and its setting in the morning, may truly be said *to rule the night*, and it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect may be developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must always exist in itself previous to the imperfect. Augustine, however (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*), does not say this, for he says that it is not impossible that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE LIGHTS OF HEAVEN ARE LIVING BEINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the lights of heaven are living beings. For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.

Obj. 2. Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the soul, as being

the first principle of life. Hence Augustine (*De Vera Relig.*) says: *Every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life.* The lights of heaven, therefore, are living beings.

Obj. 3. Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun, moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is seen in the case of living creatures generated from corruption, which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly bodies a living soul.

Obj. 4. Further, the movements of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural movements (*De Cæl. i.*), and such movements originate from within. Now it is proved in *Metaph. xii.* that the moving principle of the heavenly bodies is an intellectual substance which is moved as he who desires is moved by the object desired. The principle, then, that moves the heavenly bodies from within, is an intellectual principle. Therefore the heavenly bodies are living.

Obj. 5. Further, the first of moving bodies is the heaven. Now, of all things that are endowed with motion the first must move itself. This is proved (*Phys. viii.*) because, *what is essential is previous to that which is by participation.* But only beings that are living move themselves, as is shown in the same book. Therefore the heavenly bodies are living beings.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*Fid. Orth. ii.*), *Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living beings, for they have neither life nor sense.*

I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions (*De Civ. Dei xviii.*), *was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being.* On the other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. It was the belief of Origen (*Peri Archon i.*) and Jerome that these bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words of Ecclesiastes, *The spirit goeth forward,*

surveying all places round about (i. 6). But Basil (*Hom. iii., vi. in Hexæm.*) and Damascene (*loc. cit.*) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (*Gen. ad lit. ii. and Enchiridion lviii.*).

In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body; for the form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the form. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation, which is to a certain extent its end. Now for some of these operations, as sensation and nutrition, the body is a necessary instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. There are, however, operations of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far is dependent on the body, although capable of existing apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heavenly bodies, for such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are intelligence and motion, for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the intellect, which does not act

through the body, do not need a body as their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses. Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the motion of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (*Phys.* viii.), after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (*De Trin.* iii.).

From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words.

Reply Obj. 1. Certain things belong to the adornment of

the universe by reason of their proper movement ; and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they are moved by a living substance.

Reply Obj. 2. One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely, it must be conceded that they are superior to them with regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their matter entirely which is not in potentiality to other forms ; whereas a soul does not do this. Also the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind (than the animal soul).

Reply Obj. 3. Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent : and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent.

Reply Obj. 4. The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive principle ; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power.

Reply Obj. 5. The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved ; not by the union of the mover, as the form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect to that active principle ; just as we say that movement at will is natural to the animal as animal.

QUESTION LXXI.

ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY.

(In One Article.)

WE must next consider the work of the fifth day.

Objection 1. It seems that this work is not fittingly described. For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are generated from seed. Therefore the words, *Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth,* do not fittingly describe this work.

Obj. 2. Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly said that fishes and birds are produced from water.

Obj. 3. Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced from the air, and not from the waters.

Obj. 4. Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some, as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, *Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life.*

Obj. 5. Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes, which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and generation of a higher order. For they

bring forth living beings, whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, As said above (Q. LXX., A. 1), the order of the work of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction. Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of the distinction of water, which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the adornment of this intermediate body, by the production of birds and fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the first day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this fifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be observed that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially.

Reply Obj. 1. It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and, naturally, without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and, consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, the formative power is the influence of the heavenly bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either kind of animals,

is either some element, or something compounded of the elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars.

Reply Obj. 2. The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident that the earthly element must predominate, since the element that is least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move with certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity with the bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which their generation is described.

Reply Obj. 3. The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water, because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But birds move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly *beneath the firmament*, even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the water.

Reply Obj. 4. Nature passes from one extreme to another through the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type between the animals of the air, and those of the water, having something in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in common with that class, rather than with the other. But in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have

special characters like to theirs, the words, *Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life*, are followed by these: *God created great whales*, etc.

Reply Obj. 5. The order in which the production of these animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves. Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached through the less perfect.

QUESTION LXXII.

ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY.

(*In One Article.*)

WE must now consider the work of the sixth day.

Objection 1. It seems that this work is not fittingly described. For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals. But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words, *Let the earth bring forth the living creature*, should rather have been, *Let the earth bring forth the living fourfooted creatures*.

Obj. 2. Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.

Obj. 3. Further, as other animals belong to a determinate genus and species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is said *according to its genus* and *in its species*.

Obj. 4. Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more reason, of the other animals as well.

Obj. 5. Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been produced at that time.

Obj. 6. Further, certain animals are poisonous, and in-

jurious to man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at all, since He is the Author of good ; or at least not until man had sinned.

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely the water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day ; so the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.*, v.) that the production was potential, and other holy writers that it was actual.

Reply Obj. 1. The different grades of life which are found in different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which the Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (*Hom. viii. in Hexam.*). The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown later on (Q. LXXVIII., A. 2). But amongst animals, those that live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (*ibid.*) and Augustine rejects (*Gen. ad lit.* iii.), but because their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes *living creatures*, but *creeping creatures having life* ; whereas it does call land animals *living creatures* on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade,

is not said to be produced, like the life of other animals, by the earth or water, but immediately by God.

Reply Obj. 2. By *cattle*, domestic animals are signified, which in any way are of service to man : but by *beasts*, wild animals such as bears and lions are designated. By *creeping things* those animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to lift them far from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word *quadrupeds* is added. Or perhaps the word *quadruped* is used first as being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for even some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.

Reply Obj. 3. In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas man is said to be made *to the image and likeness of God*.

Reply Obj. 4. The blessing of God gives power to multiply by generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has a special relation to the number of the elect, *and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children*. As to plants, *since neither the affections nor the senses have any share in their propagation or generation, they are not judged worthy of a formal benediction* (August., *Gen. ad lit.* iii.).

Reply Obj. 5. Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, that from the corruption of the

less perfect the more perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But generation from animal corruption could have existed then only potentially.

Reply Obj. 6. In the words of Augustine (*Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i.*) : *If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful ; whereas the artist, knowing their use, laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe as a whole.* And we add that, since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have injured him.

QUESTION LXXIII.

ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. About these three questions are asked: (1) About the completion of the works. (2) About the resting of God. (3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE COMPLETION OF THE DIVINE WORKS OUGHT TO BE ASCRIBED TO THE SEVENTH DAY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the completion of the Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of the world will be at the end of the world, as the Gospel says (Matt. xiii. 39, 40). Moreover, the time of Christ's Incarnation is a time of completion, or as (Scripture) calls it, *the fulness of time* (Gal. iv. 4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, *It is consummated* (John xix. 30). Hence the completion of the Divine works does not belong to the seventh day.

Obj. 2. Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather that He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works does not belong to the seventh day.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things are added, unless they are merely superfluous,

for a thing is called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work of the Incarnation was a new work, as is said in the prophecy of Jeremias (xxx. 22) : *The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth.* Miracles also are new works, as we read in Ecclesiasticus (xxxvi. 6) : *Renew thy signs, and work new miracles.* Moreover, all things will be made new when the Saints are glorified, as is said in the Apocalypse (xxi. 5) : *And He that sat on the throne said : Behold I make all things new.* Therefore the completion of the Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day.

On the contrary, It is said, *On the seventh day God ended His work which He had made* (Gen. ii. 2).

I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first perfection and the second perfection. The *first* perfection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole ; which form results from the whole having its parts complete. But the *second* perfection is the end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the harp ; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation of the world ; and the first perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to the seventh day.

Reply Obj. 1. The first perfection is the cause of the second, as above said. Now, for the attaining of beatitude two things are required, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection of beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation existed previously

in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, *Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ* (John i. 17). So, then, on the seventh day was the consummation of nature, in Christ's Incarnation the consummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the consummation of glory.

Reply Obj. 2. God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the *second* perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version, however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its completion as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may also be added that in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is possible, motion cannot be called completed till it comes to rest, for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made many other creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and hence, by the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on that day to have consummated His work.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous existence materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causes, as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different

species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare ; but even these existed previously in their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read in Philippians ii., The Son of God *was made in the likeness of men*. And again, the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude ; and that of the body, in the heaven, especially the empyrean. Hence the words of Ecclesiastes (i. 10), *Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD RESTED ON THE SEVENTH DAY FROM ALL HIS WORK ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. For it is said (John v. 17), *My Father worketh until now, and I work*. God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all His works.

Obj. 2. Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labour, which movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and without labour, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from His work.

Obj. 3. Should it be said that God rested on the seventh day by causing man to rest ; against this it may be argued that rest is set down in contradistinction to His work ; now the words *God created* or *made* this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that He made man create or make these things. Therefore the resting of God cannot be explained as His making man to rest.

On the contrary, It is said, *God rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had done* (Gen. ii. 2).

I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and consequently to the labour that arises from movement. But although movement, strictly speak-

ing, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating itself to that object, as Dionysius says (*De Div. Nom.* ii.). On the other hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire. Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day. Firstly, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for, as said above (A. 1 ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously, in some degree, in the first works ; secondly, because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He is not said to have rested in His works, as though needing them for His own happiness, but to have rested from them, as in fact resting in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God's resting from His works on that day (*Gen. ad lit.* iv.).

Reply Obj. 1. God indeed *worketh until now* by preserving and providing for the creatures He had made, but not by the making of new ones.

Reply Obj. 2. Rest is here not opposed to labour or to movement, but to the production of new creatures and to the desire tending to an external object.

Reply Obj. 3. Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself both from His works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal explanation.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER BLESSING AND SANCTIFYING ARE DUE TO THE SEVENTH DAY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that blessing and sanctifying are not due to the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided. But whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is lost to Him. Therefore no special blessing nor sanctifying are due to the seventh day.

Obj. 2. Further, the Latin *benedictio* (blessing) is derived from *bonitas* (goodness). But it is the nature of good to spread and communicate itself, as Dionysius says (*De Div. Nom.* iv.). The days, therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather than the day on which He ceased producing them.

Obj. 3. Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as upon each work it was said, *God saw that it was good.* Therefore it was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day should be blessed.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 3), *God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work.*

I answer that, as said above, God's rest on the seventh day is understood in two ways. Firstly, in that He ceased from producing new works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself. According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh day, since (as we explained, Q. LXXII., ad 4) the blessing referred to the increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures which He blessed: *Increase and multiply.* Now, this increase is effected through God's Providence over His creatures, securing the generation of like from like. And according to the second

meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God. For this reason things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.

Reply Obj. 1. The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but from what is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God.

Reply Obj. 2. In the first six days creatures were produced in their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its fruition.

Reply Obj. 3. The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the seventh day, to its propagation.

QUESTION LXXIV.

ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE next consider all the seven days in common : about them three questions are asked : (1) As to the sufficiency of these days. (2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one ? (3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THESE DAYS ARE SUFFICIENTLY ENUMERATED ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that these days are not sufficiently enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the works of distinction and adornment, than these two works are from one another. But separate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.

Obj. 2. Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water and another to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought to be devoted to the distinction of fire and air.

Obj. 3. Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other animals than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day is devoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the beasts of the earth.

Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the production of birds, and another to that of man.

Obj. 4. Further, it seems, on the other hand, that some of the days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the luminaries in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is produced at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and the luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different days.

Obj. 5. Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting of the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that day ought not to be enumerated with the others.

I answer that, The system of distinction of these days is made clear by what has been said above (Q. LXX., A. 1), namely, that the parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or lowest part. Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then, is distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth. But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him, spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first of these two days, and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine the work of creation belongs to the production of formless matter, and

of the formless spiritual nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says (*Conf.* xii.). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there was any day. But it may also be said, following other holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas the work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore, every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place *in a day*, but creation *in the beginning* which means something indivisible.

Reply Obj. 2. Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the unlettered, are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the world, but reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially as regards the lowest part of the air, or with the heaven, to which the higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* ii.).

Reply Obj. 3. The production of animals is recorded with reference to their adorning the various parts of the world, and therefore the days of their production are separated or united according as the animals adorn the same parts of the world, or different parts.

Reply Obj. 4. The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they then received a form that they had not before, as said above (Q. LXX., A. 1 ad 2).

Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* iv.), after all has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something distinct is attributed to the seventh,—namely, that on it God rested in Himself from His works, and for this reason it was right that the seventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may also be said, with the other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to cessation from work.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THESE DAYS ARE ONE DAY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all these days are one day. For it is written (Gen. ii. 4, 5), *These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, before it sprung up in the earth.* Therefore the day in which God made *the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field*, is one and the same day. But He made the heaven and the earth on the first day, or rather before there was any day, but the plant of the field He made on the third day. Therefore the first and third days are but one day, and for a like reason all the rest.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said (Ecclus. xviii. 1), *He that liveth for ever, created all things together.* But this would not be the case if the days of these works were more than one. Therefore they are not many but one only.

Obj. 3. Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works. If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows that He did not make that day ; which is not admissible.

Obj. 4. Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in an instant, for with each work are the words, *God said, and it was done.* If, then, He had kept back His next work to another day, it would follow that for the remainder of a day He would have ceased from working and left it vacant, which would be superfluous. The day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with the day of the work that follows.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i.), *The evening and the morning were the second day . . . the third day,* and so on. But where there is second and third there are more than one. There was not, therefore, only one day.

I answer that, On this question Augustine differs from other expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are

called seven, are one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (*Gen. ad lit.* iv. ; *De Civ. Dei* xi. ; *Ad Orosium*) ; while others consider there were seven distinct days, and not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different. For Augustine understands by the word "day," the knowledge in the mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second day their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind ; which can know many things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced. Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately called *day*, since light, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (*Gen. ad lit.* iv.). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in the things produced.

If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown (Q. LXVII., A. 1), between Augustine and other writers is taken into account. Firstly, because Augustine takes the earth and the water, as first created, to signify matter totally without form ; but the making of the firmament ; the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter. But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing under their proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown (Q. LXIX., A. 2 ; Q. LXXI., Q. LXXII.). Secondly, some writers hold that plants and animals were produced

actually in the work of the six days ; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference as to four points ; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth difference, which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. In order, therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side.

Reply Obj. 1. In the day in which God created the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed, actually, but *before it sprung up in the earth*, that is, potentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to the first instituting of the world.

Reply Obj. 2. God created all things together so far as regards their substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in distinction and adornment. Hence the word *creation* is significant.

Reply Obj. 3. On the seventh day God ceased from making new beings, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it belongs, that the first day is succeeded by other days.

Reply Obj. 4. All things were not distinguished and adorned together, not from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in which to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfection.

Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the natural order of the works attributed to the days.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER SCRIPTURE USES SUITABLE WORDS TO EXPRESS THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Scripture does not use suitable words to express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament, and other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the heaven and the earth. For *all things were made by Him*, as is written John i. 3. Therefore in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, mention should have been made of the Word of God.

Obj. 2. Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently described.

Obj. 3. Further, it is said (Gen. i. 31) : *God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.* It ought, then, to have been said of each work, *God saw that it was good.* The omission, therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the second day, is not fitting.

Obj. 4. Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, *The Spirit of God moved over the waters*, are unbecoming.

Obj. 5. Further, what is already made is not made over again. Therefore to the words, *God said, Let the firmament be made, and it was so*, it is superfluous to add, *God made the firmament.* And the like is to be said of other works.

Obj. 6. Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, *The evening and morning were the second day or, the third day*, are not suitable.

Obj. 7. Further, *first*, not *one*, corresponds to *second* and *third*. It should therefore have been said that, *The*

evening and the morning were the first day, rather than one day.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. i.*), the person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place. For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called his intellectual word, so the giving form to every creature is by the Word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned as the beginning, by the words, *In the beginning God created*, since by creation is understood the production of formless matter. But according to those who hold that the elements were created from the first under their proper forms, another explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says (*Hom. ii. and iii. in Hexam.*) that the words, *God said*, signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it.

Reply Obj. 2. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. i.*), by the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth, the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted. But, according to Basil (*Hom. i. in Hexam.*), the heaven and the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the intervening things being left to be understood, since all these move heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that under the word, *earth*, Scripture is accustomed to include all the four elements, as in Ps. cxlviii. 7, 8, after the words, *Praise the Lord from the earth*, is added, *fire, hail, snow, and ice.*

Reply Obj. 3. In the account of the creation there is found something to correspond to the words, *God saw that it was good*, used in the work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, *there are two things*, says Augustine (*ibid.*),

which came from God's love of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. That they might then exist, and exist permanently, the Spirit of God, it is said, moved over the waters—that is to say, over that formless matter, signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over the materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And the words, *God saw that it was good*, signify that the things that He had made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction taken by God in His works, as of an artist in his art : not as though He knew the creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise, than before He made it. Thus in either work, of creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, the Person of the Son by the Word in Which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good. And if the words, *God saw that it was good*, are not said of the work of the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing the waters was only begun on that day, but perfected on the third. Hence these words, that are said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that Scripture does not use these words of approval of the second day's work, because this is concerned with the distinction of things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is not one of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by Rabbi Moses, and to these may be added a mystical one derived from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom the work of the second day is not marked with approval because the second number is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection of unity.

Reply Obj. 4. Rabbi Moses understands by the *Spirit*

of the Lord, the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says that it is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which these things are throughout attributed to God. But according to the holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said to *move over the water*—that is to say, over what Augustine holds to mean formless matter, *lest it should be supposed that God loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i.).* It is the opinion, however, of Basil (*Hom. ii. in Hexam.*) that the Spirit moved over the element of water, *fostering and quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen broods over her chickens.* For water has especially a life-giving power, since many animals are generated in water, and the seed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the soul is given by the water of baptism, according to John iii. 5: *Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.*

Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. ii.*), these three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures ; first, their being in the Word, denoted by the command *Let this be made* ; secondly, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, *It was made* ; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words, *He made*. And because the formation of the angels is recorded on the first day, it was not necessary there to add, *He made*. It may also be said, following other writers, that the words, *He said*, and, *Let this be made*, denote God's command, and the words, *It was made*, the fulfilment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in each work, after the words, *It was made*, some act of God

is expressed by some such words as, *He made*, or, *He divided*, or, *He called*.

Reply Obj. 6. According to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit. iv.*), by the *evening* and the *morning* are understood the evening and the morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained (Q. LVIII., A. 6, 7). But, according to Basil (*Hom. ii. in Hexam.*), the entire period takes its name, as is customary, from its more important part, the day. An instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, *The days of my pilgrimage*, where night is not mentioned at all. But the evening and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day begins with morning and ends with evening, or because evening denotes the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of day. It seems fitting, also, that where the first distinction of creatures is described, divisions of time should be denoted only by what marks their beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening first is that as the evening ends the day, which begins with the light, the termination of the light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness, which ends with the morning. But Chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it is intended to show that the natural day does not end with the evening, but with the morning (*Hom. v. in Gen.*).

Reply Obj. 7. The words *one day* are used when day is first instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours. Hence, by mentioning *one*, the measure of a natural day is fixed. Another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the return of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course. And yet another, because at the completion of a week of seven days, the first day returns, which is one with the eighth day. The three reasons assigned above are those given by Basil (*Hom. ii. in Hexam.*).



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