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ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES

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ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES

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ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES.

This is the critical part of Theism. In it we consider (1) the forms of the anti-theistic theories and (2) the practical effects upon life of a theistic or anti-theistic view.

Two things are posited in Theism: (1) The phenomenal world of plurality is resolvable into a unity—there is one ultimate ground of all existence. (2) All existence is made up of three fundamental data (a) a personal God, (b) a totality of phenomena, (c) a finite self. All anti-theistic theories grow out of a denial of one or the other of these categories.

Anti-theistic theories are unphilosophical or philosophical. To the former class belong Atheism and Polytheism. The philosophical theories are of three classes. Those which explain all existence in terms of God are pantheistic; those which explain it in terms of the world are pan-cosmic; those in terms of self are pan-egotistic.

I. UNPHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES.

A. ATHEISM.

(1) Dogmatic Atheism is the affirmation that God does not exist. This is absurd, for to prove that God does not exist one must be God. (2) Others hold that although there may be a God, yet we can not know that he exists. These are the Agnostics. (3) To believe in God we must have reasons and the theistic arguments are not strong enough. Holders of this view simply maintain a negative position. (4) There are men who have no idea whatever of God, and no belief in him. Now is this statement true? It is to be noted (a) that the affirmation that a-theistic or godless tribes exist is made in the interests of evolution theories as to the genesis of the idea of God. (b) Though it should be proved that such tribes exist it would not reduce the force of the

argument *e consensu gentium*. There may have been a degeneration. (c) But the question is answered by the fact that the tribes which have been claimed to be atheistic are not so. No tribe or nation has yet been met with destitute of belief in God.

B. POLYTHEISM.

Polytheism takes many forms. (1) Nature Worship, typically represented in the Vedic literature. Max Muller says that the Hindoo faith had an anthropomorphic development. Before there was a personal God there was worship of the bright powers of nature. But it has been shown that one supreme being was always a power in early Hindoo religion. This worship of the bright powers of nature is the corruption of the worship of one true and supreme being. (2) Anthropomorphic Polytheism. Nature worship passed into this by humanizing the gods and making them assume definite shapes. The best examples of this are seen in the religions of Greece and Rome. Many think this is the completion of the development from nature worship. (3) Zoolatry. While some nations worship the bright objects of nature others worship animals. We can not establish a genetic relation between all the forms of polytheism. The worship of sacred animals has the same foundation as mythology. (4) Idolatry. A man to be an idolator may be a worshipper of one or many idols. (5) Fetichism. This is supposed by some to be the earliest form of religion. It implies a belief in God or supernatural agency. (6) Shamanism. This is the worship of spirits who have passed into the world, and prevails among the Japanese, Chinese, etc.

PHILOSOPHY OF POLYTHEISM.

Why do men worship? What is the basis of religion? Many think that the basis is fear or wonder. Sir John Lubbock maintains that a crude animism is the only foundation for religion. But the feeling of a dog toward his master is

of the same character; religion however, keeps its hold upon men after their animistic conception has been dispelled. The first type of religion was not worship of spirits; what then was it? (1) There is no ground for the belief that Henotheism and Monotheism are a development from Fetichism. (2) There is much reason to believe that these low types of religion are corruptions of Monotheism. (3) The worship of the powers of nature is most likely a corruption of a most pure belief in one God.

(1) Is it possible to relate all the forms of polytheism to nature worship? There is no genetic relation between them. We can not show that all nature worship is transformed Jehovah worship. (2) Are the anthropomorphic religions of Greece and Rome a corruption of Monotheism? We must answer no. The Greeks and Romans had a religious nature and they gave expression to it. Polytheism has the good in it that it makes way for belief in a true and living God. (3) Given universal polytheism have men been able to reach Monotheism? We have seen that there was a downward tendency, was there not also a tendency upward? In the minds of some, yes. This was the case with a cultivated few in Greece. They show the possible trend of development. Has a race ever come out of Polytheism into Monotheism? Yes, the Jews. Did they come out suddenly or gradually by appreciating the philosophical aspects of the matter? The Higher Criticism of to-day says that it was gradual. But if Moses wrote the books ascribed to him, Monotheism was a revelation. Now if it was a development and the Jews were an exception other nations might be.

II. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES.

A. PANTHEISM.

Origin and meaning of the word. It is said that Leibnitz and other theologians never used the word pantheism. It was first used about 1705. Various definitions of it have been given and the name pantheism has been given to widely

different systems of belief. Some have said that it is a refined theism. (1) If there is any significance in the term there must be a theistic basis in it. It admits intelligence. (2) Those who hold pantheism destroy the distinction between God and nature, including man. *Pantheism says that God is one and the one is God.*

We can reach a conception of Pantheism by exclusion. Some beliefs have been called pantheistic which are not so. (1) Ritter's view that existence is a totality of material atoms. This is materialism and materialism is not pantheism. (2) The dynamic theory of matter. Suppose that the world *were* a manifestation of God, this would not be pantheism; for the world would be simply a phenomenal manifestation of God and not God. (3) Idealism in all its forms has been said to be pantheism, but this is not true. The Idealism of Berkeley is not necessarily pantheism. (4) It is common to hold that the Stoic doctrine of *anima mundi* is pantheism. This however, depends on the way it is held. If we conceive of God as outside of the world it is deism. The Stoics had a crude conception of the fact that God is immanent in nature. (5) The doctrine of continuous creation. The "Theory of Providence" taught by Jonathan Edwards is that of continuous creation but surely this is not pantheism. (6) Denial of personality of God. To think of God as a person is to think of him as an individual like one of us and God is therefore not a person. Those who take this view are not pantheists, for supra-personality as referred to God is not synonymous with pantheism. (7) The Scholastic doctrine of Realism. It does not lead to pantheism but on the other hand is far from it. The worst that could be said is that Realism makes no difference between individuals, but even then the difference would be marked between man and animals and animals and God. Realism might be shown to have trouble with immortality and other doctrines, but it is not pantheistic. (8) The co-eternity of God and creation. There are good reasons for believing that matter is not eternal, but passages of Scripture are not overwhelmingly in favor of creation *ex nihilo*. Suppose that matter were eternal, it would not be God. Were we to

hold eternal creation we would not be pantheists. Matter is not mind: we believe in a duality while pantheism is monism. (9) Immanent Theism is not pantheism for rightly understood this is what Christian theists believe. (10) Religious Mystics have been called pantheists. This would make our most cherished hymns open to the charge and our roll of ministers would be a roll of pantheists. (11) Poetical conceptions of nature are not pantheistic. (12) Nor does a definition of pantheism turn upon a theory of the will. All pantheism is determinism but all determinism is not pantheism.

It is easier to say what pantheism is not than it is to say what it is. The following are the main theories of the universe: (1) All that is is matter. This is pan-cosmism or materialism. (2) All that is is matter and mind, and mind is both finite and infinite. This is dualistic, and is the ordinary view of theism. (3) All that is is mind. This is monistic in terms of mind and does not believe in matter. It is Idealism. It is hard here to keep in view the distinction between finite and infinite mind. If *esse est percipi* the idealist falls into solipsism unless he posits an eternal perceiver to keep the solid world in existence. He does this and calls the eternal perceiver God. (4) Theory positing mind and matter but having only one category for mind and making matter animated by a universal spirit. The great spirit sleeps in the vegetable, dreams in the animal and wakes in man. The theory is known by many as pantheism and is held by men like Emerson and others believing in the "Over soul." It is really only half pantheism. It is not theism either. (5) *All that is is mind and that mind is God.* This view posits only one substance; mind is the only entity in the universe. It is pure pantheism, and is found in India. Spinoza and Hegel. (6) All this is is my mind. This is Solipsism. It says: I am the only entity, I the only universe. (7) There is neither mind nor matter but a *tertium quid*. These seven are the main theories of the universe. The only purely pantheistic one is that in which the totality of things is looked upon as mind, and this is spoken of as God.

HISTORY OF PANTHEISM.

All ancient pantheism is found in India, Persia, Egypt, Greece and Rome.

The religions of India may be considered under five heads. (1) In the Vedas we find the bright powers of nature worshipped. Whether this is pantheistic or a corruption of primitive monotheism has not been decided. (2) Brahminism. In this caste originates, and the religious cult becomes minute and burdensome. (3) Sankhya—very much like our materialism. (4) Buddhism is a protest against Brahminism, and is called the Protestantism of the East. There are two kinds of religion; one deals particularly with God and the other with the soul. The latter is true of Buddhism. To the Brahmin God is everything, to the Buddhist he is nothing. Buddhism is parallel to Schopenhauer's pessimism; it pities misery and promises annihilation. (5) Vedanta is the orthodox religion of India. Max Mueller says: "The highest aim of the Brahmin is to recognize his self as a reflection of the 'highest self,' the only thing which could be said to be true and real. All finite selves are modes of this infinite self. This is pantheism in its most unequivocal form.

In Persia we find the religion of Zoroaster. It is an open question whether or not this is pantheism.

The Egyptians worship the objects of nature, which are the symbols of God. This is hardly pantheism, for we can not identify nature with God.

The Greeks were monotheists as well as polytheists. The popular religion was polytheism, which is a corruption of monotheism. But pantheism always runs along with polytheism. Pure pantheism never exists among the popular religions of the world; hence it is not found in Egypt or Persia. It is, however, found in India and in Greece because there philosophy flourished. Pantheism never exists without having a connection with philosophy. Parmenides and Heraclitus were the pantheists of Greece. Parmenides held that all multiplicity is due to the senses; all real existence is one.

The true first principle is the self-conscious idea. Parmenides 'saw through a glass darkly.' Heraclitus called the universe a process of incessant change. Nothing *is*, everything is *becoming*. All phenomena are but manifestations of one substance. Plato was a theist. Bain, however, says that he was moving in the direction of pantheism, but died before he got there. Aristotle has been called a pantheist, but the charge is untrue. Zeller says that he was the first to put theism on a scientific basis.

John Scotus Erigena was the most decided pantheist of the whole scholastic period. His principal work was his "De Divisione Naturae." By nature he means all being, and of it he makes a fourfold division. (1) That which creates and is not created. (2) That which creates and is created. (3) That which is created but does not create. (4) That which neither creates nor is created. The divisions are made simply to show that all is God, since the four natures are only revelations of God. The universe has no existence independent of God. It is therefore God, although not all of God. With God, being, thought, and creating are identical. God's being consists in thinking, and his thoughts are things. Consequently the world is eternal. God and the world are identical.

Sufism is the speculative side of Mohammedanism. It teaches that the great creator is diffused over all creation. It compares the divine emanations to rays of the sun. The soul of man and the principle of life in all nature are not only from God but are God. The phenomenal world is a mere illusion which seems to be something but is nothing. Sufism represents an endeavor to reconcile philosophy with religion.

In the period marking the transition to modern philosophy is Giordano Bruno. In him the Italian Renaissance finds expression on its philosophic side. He was a pantheist.

Modern pantheism is best treated by Saisset. This writer thinks—and rightly—that Descartes is a theist. He says, however, that some of Descartes theories are pantheistic in their tendency: (1) Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation. Saisset thinks that substance becomes a mere phan-

tom under this doctrine; but Descartes does not assert this. (2) Descartes was a determinist and Saisset says that this is a pantheistic tendency. Saisset's criticisms are at fault.

Malebranche. "Seeing all things in God" is the statement on which his pantheism is charged. He may be regarded as a typical representative of the better side of the Roman Catholic Church. He was a student of Descartes and started out with Descartes' dualism of thought and extension, mind and matter. He was pre-eminently a man of pious convictions and believed in the truths of Christianity. His was no system of mere naturalism. The Incarnation was the one event in this world which made it worthy of God. We need other reasons for calling him a pantheist than that he held the doctrine of continuous creation and denied second causes. The following are the points most worthy of notice in Malebranche's system: (1) His theory of perception. He did not believe in immediate perception. We do not see extended objects, but only ideas or copies of things. Whence do we get these ideas? (a) From the objects themselves, (b) from the mind, (c) from God, (d) from the mind in contemplating itself, (e) we see all things in God; in him are all ideas, our minds are in contact with him. This last view is Malebranche's own. He did not deny the external world but made it superfluous. (2) His doctrine of efficiency. I will and God produces the change. God is the only cause. He exercises his power immediately. This doctrine presupposes a prior doctrine of the duality of mind and matter. (3) His theory of matter. Martineau says that Malebranche does not have place for both finite creatures and an infinite creator. The question is, does Malebranche blot out finite creatures? He did not mean to identify God with extended bodies. His is only a theory like the Stoic doctrine of *anima mundi*, which is not pantheism. (4) His doctrine of personality. Does Malebranche identify God with human persons? Is it possible for finite spirits to exist with the infinite spirit? Martineau says that Malebranche identifies God with human persons in two ways: (a) By identifying God with the human

soul, which is a complete surrender of individuality. But we might ask, does universal reason obliterate finite mind? (b) By affirming the unity of the thing apprehended. But it would surely not be plausible to say that two men are one man because they see the same thing. Man and God are not the same because they have the same objects of knowledge. Malebranche says, "Our mental modifications are possible only within certain limits. In an act of the will two things are involved, the muscular change and the volition. Both are produced by God." This is not an obliteration of the separate mind or make it identical with God. Having tried to show that on the cognitive side it is impossible for both of these to exist in Malebranche's system, Martineau turns to the practical side where he makes out a somewhat stronger case but fails to prove his point.

Spinoza was born at Amsterdam in 1632, his parents being Portuguese Jews. He was excommunicated at the age of 24 and thereafter found friends among the Mennonites principally. He led a quiet life and was very kind. A chair at the university of Heidelberg was offered him but he refused in order that he might not be trammelled in his views. For a living he ground lenses. He was indebted to Descartes and Bruno for inspiration and for some of his thoughts but the articulation of his thought into a system was his own. He was poor and consumptive. There is a mystery concerning his death.

His "Ethics," his most elaborate work, was published in 1675. Part I concerning God, II concerning the nature and origin of the mind, III concerning the nature and origin of the emotions, IV concerning human bondage and the strength of the emotions, V concerning the understanding and human freedom. The "Ethics" is made up of definitions, illustrations, etc. Definition three is "Substance is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself." Hence it follows that one substance can not produce another; existence belongs to the nature of substance; every substance is necessarily infinite; substance is indivisible; substance ex-

cept God is inconceivable. There is therefore but one substance; there may be many things but only one substance and this is infinite. There is one infinite, indivisible substance and that is God. The trouble is with the definition. If we agree to his definition of substance we can easily agree that there is but one substance and can call this God.

There are certain modes of conceiving God which Spinoza thinks are wrong, *e. g.*, the anthropomorphic way. But we say that Spinoza's deterministic way of conceiving God is pantheistic. He affirms that God is free, but makes free mean necessary. Therefore his determinism is objectionable," says Prof. Flint. But the human will is determined by the character. A man acts in accordance with his nature or character, and must do so if he is free. Determination according to character is of the essence of freedom in man, and therefore it is so in God. Prop. 17. "God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by any one. Therefore there can be no cause extrinsic to his own nature which compels him to act. There is nothing in Spinoza's determinism which is against his Theism, and we will therefore have to look further. "If intellect and will appertain to the essence of God we must take them in a different sense from our own; they are only the same in name. There is no more likeness between God's mind and man's mind than between the constellation dog and the animal dog." Spinoza says that God made man's intellect, and so the two intellects are necessarily different. We are accustomed to reason the other way: That which has nothing in common with another thing can not be its cause. Whatever has intelligence and will must have intelligence and will as its cause. Spinoza simply meant that intelligence in God is not the *same* as intelligence in man. As to the divine nature he may have been a sincere worshipper of the one true and living God, and his pantheism must be proved on other grounds.

Prop. 15. "Whatever is is in God and without God nothing can be conceived. Dependent beings are modes and not substance." Prop. 18. "He is the indwelling and

not the transient cause of all things." Prop. 24. "He is not only the cause of all things coming into existence but of their continuing in existence." God is efficient cause. All things are predetermined by him by his nature. So far Spinoza is all right. We must decide whether he is a pantheist by saying that dependent beings are modes of the one substance, God. The question is, does he make a distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*?

What does God mean in Spinoza's vocabulary? "*Natura naturans* is nature active, and *natura naturata* is nature passive or all that follows from the nature and attributes or modes of attributes of God. *Natura naturans* is that which is in itself and conceived through itself and those attributes of substance which express infinite essence—in other words, God." Now how do these two terms stand related? Are *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* two different things, or are they two aspects of one and the same thing? The question as to Spinoza's theism is involved in the same answer to this inquiry.

Spinoza says, "Substance and modes, or substance and its modes, make up the sum total of existence." Finite beings, such as men, are not substances, they may be modes. Spinoza might have used substance and mode as we use creator and creature and he would not then have been anti-theistic. We do not identify God and matter. We might say that the phenomenal world is a mode of God but we would not mean by this that God and the world are identical.

Part II. Definition 1. "By body I mean the mode which expresses the essence of God so that we conceive of him as extended." Def. 2. "Essence is that which without the thing and without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived." "Attribute is that which the intellect perceives ^{of substance} as constituting the essence of substance." *E. g.* generic man; each man is a mode; mind and body are attributes. Spinoza says that attributes are infinite and are two in number—thought and extension. The human mind is part of the infinite mind of God. As body is identified with the essence

modes express the essence of ^{the} attributes as attributes express
essence of substance

of God in extension, so mind is identified with the essence of God in thought. *Natura naturans* and *natura naturata* are two aspects of the same thing. This is not theism or anything like it.

Spinoza says that the body is the embodiment of the idea constituting the human mind. He aims to keep up the parallelism between body and mind but makes statements which make body the source of mind. Man is both body and mind; they are two aspects of the same thing; viewed as extension he is body, but viewed as thought he is mind. A mode is that which expresses the essence of God. Here Spinoza is bringing in his dual view of causation. He distinguishes between essence and existence. As to essence he holds the doctrine of first causes but in mechanism—the controlling power of the world's order—he says there is room for second causes or causation as to particular existences. Spinoza is neither a materialist or an idealist but there is a stronger basis for the charge of idealism against him than of materialism.

Substance is and is one. All things which exist are modes. God has *cogitatio* though not mind such as man has. When man speaks and thinks God is speaking and thinking. Man is not a separate soul but God. Man is the highest existence form of God. This is Pantheism.

Spinoza's system: (1) Substance is and is one—God. (2) All things are modes of this one substance. (3) This does not mean that substance and mode are related as creator and creature. (4) There is a complete identification of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*.

Is Spinoza a theist? Some say yes (1) because of his use of the word God, (2) because he speaks strongly of intellectual love of God, (3) because he teaches a personal immortality. This last point is, however, very doubtful. Is he a materialist? He says that (1) body is not the source of mind but (2) is different from it. (3) Each has changes independent of the other and (4) the series of changes in each case goes back *ad infinitum*. He is, therefore, not a mater-

ialist or an idealist. Man is but a mode of God. Man's self-consciousness is God's self-consciousness. There is no separate and substantial self, he says, and his pantheism is proved.

Spinoza's system represents one of the greatest efforts ever made to rethink the universe. He used the process of deduction. It is a bad mode of reasoning. By it we can prove anything. We can discover the value of real estate in Utopia or the character of the people in the moon. Spinoza's ontology is pure dogmatism but he claimed it to be a rigid demonstration. It breaks down at several points. (1) After defining substance he invests it with infinite attributes of which thought and extension are only samples. He seizes only two but as he can not see why they are not infinite he says they are so. (2) How does he get by strict deduction from the eternal and necessary to the temporal and contingent? As essences things exist eternally, he says, but as existences things exist only temporarily. Now how do we get concrete expression of essence? Spinoza allows no creation, no fiat. (3) To show that God can not have intellect like man he avows dogmatically that the cause must be different from the thing caused. This is absurd and he himself contradicts it elsewhere. (4) He says that God is not like man but they differ as widely as possible. (5) He uses 'idea' in two senses,—as the conception which the mind forms, and as the mental state. (6) He starts out with a definition of God which would give him an indeterminate being. Then gives a definition of God which includes the deductions.

To accept his system we would have to believe: (1) Thought and extension are attributes not of two substances but of one. He legislated out dualism but it came back in parallelism. (2) There is no separate mind, no *ego*. He must speak of the mind's feeling yet denies that there is any mind; it is only a name. (3) *Natura naturans* has developed into *natura naturata*. Man's consciousness of God is simply God's consciousness of himself.

B. MATERIALISM.

Materialism is a type of pan-cosmism. Its position is "all that is is matter." It is as old as philosophy but not older. Ever since men have reasoned, some of them have been materialists. It is true that long before materialism was claimed as a fact it was held as a theory.

Chinese Materialism is represented by Mencius and Yangte. Most of the great Hindoos were pantheists but some of them were materialists. Greek and Roman materialism is more ample.

Democritus was the chief exponent of Greek materialism. He was light hearted and was developed by Epicurus. Democritus held a materialistic explanation of the world; no place is left for supernatural agency. He did not believe in the gods but tried to explain the belief. He was an atomist. Atomism is not necessarily materialism but only so when given as an explanation of the universe. Democritus gave the soul an atomic existence. He held (1) *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. Nothing can be destroyed. (2) Nothing is by chance but all things are by cause or from necessity,—he believed in an infinite regress of mechanical causes. (3) There is nothing but atoms and empty space, (4) Atoms differ in number and are of endless variety. (5) Souls are fine smooth atoms.

Epicurus was the typical materialist among the post-Aristotelians. He did not seek truth for its own sake but wanted to be delivered from belief in service to the gods. He showed reverence for the gods but denied them any share in the world's affairs. He had foregone conclusions before entering the study of philosophy. He ascribed a limited instead of an infinite variety of combinations to atoms. They have free will. Our free will he accounts for by giving it to the soul atoms. He therefore unites materialism with the free will doctrine.

In his poem *De Rerum Natura* Lucretius places the doctrine *ex nihilo nihil fit* first. He says that if it is not true anything might arise. This he treats as an apriori truth and

supports it with *a posteriori* considerations. Nature works by means of atoms. They are the foundation stones of the universe. All order is merely the result of chance. How did the atoms form worlds? Falling with equal velocity they could not overtake one another. Therefore he had to ascribe a separate individual will to each atom. He denies anthropomorphic design to a maker but has to resort to it for each atom. Like other systems his atheism needs theism to make it work. Lucretius even tried to do away with the immortality of the soul.

Scholasticism at least was free from the taint of materialism. There developed however, a tendency toward it as a result of their physical investigations.

Bacon has been regarded by some as a materialist but there is not the least reason for calling him a materialist, or an atheist as a consistent materialist would have to be. Writers of the empirical school are fond of quoting Descartes as a materialist. This is because of his believing in the automatism of animals and the mechanism of the universe; but his distinction between *cogitatio* and *extensio* must defend him from the charge of materialism.

Gassendi and Hobbes have both been improperly charged with materialism. The former believed that it was possible to account for the world as a result of mechanical forces, but this is not materialism. He may be regarded as the forerunner of Locke. Nor was Hobbes a materialist. He did not hold atomism, and knew that the seen was not the ultimate reality. He might be called a Phenomenist or an Agnostic, but not a materialist.

It is sheer perversity to identify materialism with a true study of nature. Such students were Newton and Boyle, and they were called materialists. They did not believe that the universe was the result of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. If they did, they believed that God made the atoms. Hartley and Priestly said that the soul was material, but did not become materialists. In England there were no materialists in the 16th or 17th centuries. Some men were called so (1) because they were devoted to the study of nature, or (2) because they

advocated an empirical theory of knowledge. Some were semi-materialists, as they denied the spirituality of the soul. For genuine materialism we have to go to France.

In France there were two well-defined materialists. (1) La Mettrie was a shameless votary of lust. His "Natural History of the Soul" (1745) says that the soul does not exist. The soul partakes of the conditions of the body and dies with it. His "Man a Machine" was published in 1748. (2) The Bible of French materialism was the book "System of Nature" published by Paul Heinrich Deitrich Von Holbaeh. He was a rich man and a great entertainer. He said "there is no immortality, no free will, and no God." Materialism can never get beyond happiness as the end of life. If it is true, no fault can be found with a man for gratifying his lust.

There was no materialism in Germany until after the time of Kant. Kant was deeply interested in the teachings of science. There is some ground for making him the father of the Nebular Hypothesis and of Evolution. His doctrine of causation never rose above that of mere physical sequence. Strauss and Feuerbach, two of Hegel's disciples, were the first materialists in Germany. Modern materialism is therefore only a half century old. Strauss denied the need and existence of a creator. Feuerbach said that the true and divine is what needs no demonstration.

Czolve is the last representative. He said, "I must start with a hypothesis. My hypothesis is: nothing supra-sensuous exists." Here is one materialist who admits that his materialism is not the result of scientific investigation. He starts with a prejudice against the supernatural. His materialism is developed from ethical considerations: "Content thyself with the world that is given thee. Discontent is immoral. Therefore do away with discontent." He makes an ethic to suit his theory of the universe, and then defends his ethic by his theory. Czolve's failure is only an example showing that materialism is incapable of rational defence. It is hard to be a philosophic materialist. Atomism itself seems to cut away the ground from materialism.

