

PATTON


SYLLABUS ON

ETHICS

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PROF. PATTON'S LECTURES  
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# SYLLABUS OF PROFESSOR PATTON'S LECTURES ON ETHICS.

## INTRODUCTORY.

§ 1. Concerning Definition. Importance of correct definition: (a) as determining what topics are or are not ethical; thus, if we say that "ethics is the science which deals with the conduct of associated human beings" (Malcolm Guthrie) we give no place in Ethics to the relation of the individual to God or to the lower animals: (b) as determining the method of Ethics; thus Sidgwick regards Ethics as the science that "imparts or seeks to impart the most perfect knowledge possible of the rightness or goodness of voluntary actions or their results." Assuming that actions are governed by their end Sidgwick classifies ethical methods accordingly: the leading systems being those which consider Personal Happiness, General Happiness, and Moral Excellence, respectively, as the end of action.

Faulty definitions: Sidgwick's, because it does not make obligation enter essentially into the science. Calderwood's: very comprehensive and carefully considered; provides room for the discussion of all the psychological and metaphysical problems belonging to Ethics; but practically it amounts to saying that moral science is an explanation of moral phenomena—without telling us what moral phenomena are. Birks regards Ethics as "the

science of ideal humanity"; but his definition does not say whether the "ought to be" implied in an Ideal is an Hypothetical or a Categorical Imperative.

Three essential ideas to be embodied in definition of Ethics: (a) Conduct (including character) is viewed with reference to an Ideal. (b) Realization of this Ideal is rationally conceivable, i. e., if man ought he can (no Pelagianism implied in this). (c) The Imperative implied in the word 'ought' is Categorical.

Statement embodying these ideas:—

Ethics is the Science that offers a rational explanation of the ideas of Rightness and Oughtness; and that deals with the Life of free personal beings under these conceptions, considering it as related to an Ideal or norm of excellence, conformity to which is obligatory.

Or, more briefly:—

Ethics is the Science which deals with the character and conduct of a Free Agent in relation to an Obligatory Ideal.

§ 2. Relation of Ethics to kindred sciences.

To Psychology: as in discussion of Motive, Will, Desires, Affections. The ideas of Right and of Moral Obligation are mental facts to be psychologically considered.—To Metaphysics. Fundamental ethical ideas will receive various interpretations according to the different theories of the universe which men hold. Hence discussions regarding moral obligation involve inquiries concerning Theism and Pantheism, and in fact concerning the theory of knowledge itself.—To Political Economy. Politics (including Political Economy and Jurisprudence) differs from Ethics in that the former deals with the community, the latter with the Individual. Political Economy, like Ethics, is concerned with regulating conduct, but with a different end in view. Political Economy aims at the best, Ethics what is right.

Political Economy considers the individual in his relation to society as affecting the well-being of society. Ethics considers the individual, in relation to society as affecting his duties. The two sciences deal with the same topics to a great extent. They may agree or conflict, though it will generally happen that what is ethically commanded as right is also economically commended as wise.—To Jurisprudence. If the regulation of human conduct have for its end the greatest happiness of the greatest number, Ethics may have two departments, private Ethics and Legislation. Jurisprudence thus becomes a branch of Ethics (Bentham). If, however, the regulation of conduct be conceived under the idea of conformity to a code, the word Law will become the genus of which Ethics is a species: and so moral science will be a branch of Jurisprudence (Austin). Neither view is correct. Holland correctly regards Jurisprudence or Nology and Ethics as cöordinate moral sciences; but does not give the true account of the difference between the two. Ethics does not differ from Jurisprudence because it considers character as well as conduct while Jurisprudence considers conduct alone. Ethics as a science contemplating the regulation of human conduct, regards the individual as controlling his own conduct with reference to a moral Ideal and having in view the realization of his chief End or Good. Jurisprudence on the other hand as a science also contemplating the regulation of human conduct, regards the conduct of the individual as subject to the control of sovereign authority exercised through the instrumentality of law and sanctions and in order to the well-being of society. Therefore, Ethics considers disposition as well as external act; Jurisprudence considers only or rather mainly the external act. Hence in Ethics the question is, What are the duties which I ought to perform? In Jurisprudence the question is, What are

the Rights that I must not infringe upon? Different as these sciences are they are closely related. Pollock's statement that "a Jurist is not bound to be a moral philosopher" must be rejected if it imply that human Law may not be criticised by reference to Ideal Morality.

### § 3. Distribution of Material.

Some divide the science of Ethics into Theoretical and Practical. Dr. Calderwood's divisions are: Psychology of Ethics; Metaphysics of Ethics; Applied Ethics.

The following discussion will start with the word *Ought* as expressing the dominant idea in moral science.

What ought to be may be considered under two aspects:

1. As the end which I ought to realize: The Good.

2. As the norm to which my actions must conform: The Right.

The Right may be considered in two aspects also: (a) Subjectively, as embodied in conduct: Virtue; (b) Objectively, as expressed in a code: Moral Law.

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## I.

### § 4. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE.

There is manifest reason for founding moral science upon the word 'Ought.' It implies that human action is the subject of command. This is on the supposition that the idea of Oughtness is intuitive. If it be not it will be difficult to defend obligatory morality. And in the absence of obligation moral science could only give advices, and speak in hypothetical imperatives. We do not build ethical science upon the idea of Right; for right is a quality of actions, not of agents; and there is a prior question, Why ought I to do Right? which shows that



Rightness and Oughtness are distinct and that Oughtness takes precedence. Nor upon the Good, for the Good may mean either what I desire or what I ought to desire. If by Good I mean the desirable in the first sense the result would be a science of Ethics ignoring obligation; if in the latter sense the result will be a science of Ethics that takes the idea of obligation for granted. The cornerstone of Ethics is not the Right nor the Good, but the Categorical Imperative.

§ 5. Ethics deals with conduct under the idea of the Categorical Imperative. There is moral conduct and there is non-moral conduct. What is moral conduct? It is conduct obligatory in the terms of the Categorical Imperative. This implies (1.) a norm, or rule of universal application; (2) a rational expectation that the thing commanded shall be done; in short, Free Will. There are some acts of which it is as irrelevant to ask whether they are right or wrong as to ask whether they are round or square. Of acts having moral quality some are the subjects of moral approval. What actions are included in this category? Acts that (1) conform to the Ideal or norm of conduct, and (2) are not done with non-moral motives, e. g., we do not give moral approval to honest acts, done only from selfish motives. But must every act be done solely out of respect for the law to be entitled to moral approval? Kant says, Yes. Three men are honest. A says: It pays to be honest. B: It is Right to be honest. C says: My whole nature is repugnant to dishonesty. With Kant only B would be regarded as acting morally. A's act would be infra-moral, C's supra-moral. The being whose nature it is to act invariably in accordance with the Right transcends morality. We do not agree with Kant here; though it is quite clear that an act done with a non-moral motive is not a subject of moral approval.

§ 6. Fuller discussion of the idea of Oughtness will involve inquiry respecting its nature as ultimate or derived from experience; its meaning and metaphysical implications; and its relation to human Freedom. The study of the Categorical Imperative will therefore embrace three topics:

First. The Idea of Oughtness as a psychological fact.

Secondly. The metaphysical aspect of Oughtness.

Thirdly. The Idea of Oughtness in its relation to human freedom.

§ 7. I. *Oughtness as a psychological fact.*

The advocates of Intuitionist philosophy believe that the idea of moral obligation is simple and incapable of being reduced to lower terms. If, however, all knowledge is derived from experience, if the raw material of thought is a sensation, we may expect to find that the idea of Oughtness is capable of being resolved into simpler elements. Among the advocates of empirical philosophy large place is accordingly given to the genesis of moral ideas. The conflicting opinions in regard to the genesis of the idea and the unsatisfactory efforts that have been made to harmonize it with the requirements of empiricism only serve to strengthen the cause of Intuitionism. Among those who deny the *a priori* character of Oughtness we have:—

1. Those who say (Schopenhauer) that there is no place for Duty and Obligation in the science of Ethics. Sympathy, with Schopenhauer, takes the place of Obligation. But it issues no commands and gives no orders. This view of morals simply ignores the word ought. It neither explains it nor explains it away.

2. Obligation is held by some to be based upon Law. Hobbes held that before the State enunciated its will there was neither right nor wrong. The individual conscience

is according to this view an imitation within the individual of the government exercised by the State. Hobbes has been followed by Bain, who says: "I maintain that conscience is an imitation within ourselves of the government without us; and that even when differing in what it prescribes from the current morality the modes of its action are still parallel to its archetype." This theory of conscience is simple and easily understood. Certain relations of superior and inferior lay the foundation of commands and penalties. The child's susceptibility to pleasure and pain is made use of to secure obedience. A mental association is rapidly formed between disobedience and apprehended pain more or less magnified by fear. Hence by and by the "strong sense of ideal avoidance" which Bain identifies with conscience. To this view it may be objected: (1) That upon Bain's own showing conscience is not co-extensive with morality. Moral rules, says Bain, are the fruit (a) of Utility and (b) of Sentiment. Now those rules which are the fruit of Utility might be explained perhaps according to Bain's theory of conscience: We might suppose that honesty being found to be the best policy has in this way become part of the moral code, so that we now say we ought to be honest, the rule being treated as a law and the unhappiness resulting from its violation as a penalty; but moral rules which are the fruit of sympathy it would be hard to bring into harmony with Bain's theory. (2.) Besides, if this were the true idea of conscience there would be no obligation. This is the defect in Bain's theory. The question is not how certain conduct known as morality has been generated, but how the feeling of obligation regarding it has been generated. Bain's theory does not explain obligation.

3. The advocates of Utilitarianism. Advocated by Bentham, and in a later and more refined form by Mill. The Egoistic Hedonist says, 'That conduct is right which

makes me happy.' Clearly, there can be no obligation affirmed in regard to conduct viewed in this way. The Universalistic Hedonist makes the end of Conduct the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For an examination of Utilitarianism see Professor Grote. We are concerned only at this point with its relation to obligation. The advocates of this philosophy must either ignore obligation altogether, when they speak of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and then clearly they do not explain it; or else they must say that we ought to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number; and then they take it for granted. Mill's position comes very nearly to this second position; or rather the principle of Sympathy which underlies his Utilitarianism as Professor Grote remarks is not far removed from the "Intuitivism" which he repudiates. Utilitarianism needs the Categorical Imperative. To be efficient it should be able to say, 'You ought to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' But the idea of obligation is in no sense accounted for by the Utilitarian formula.

4. The late Professor Clifford advanced a theory of moral obligation in his essay on the "Scientific Basis of Morals." The peculiarity of the theory is the distinction between the Individual Self and the Tribal Self. The Tribal Self of course is simply a conception which I have of my tribe. The Individual Self is simply the Ego. And the Ego is, according to Clifford, only an abstraction. How one abstraction can be the subject of another abstraction is very hard to comprehend, and it is still harder to see how the jealousy of one of these abstractions of the other can explain the Categorical Imperative. Clifford however recognizes that the idea of Oughtness exists and must be accounted for; the weakness of this theory is only a concession to the strength of Intuitional Morality. Like all Evolutionists Clifford believes that morality is an affair of

the tribe. Briefly stated the theory is this: The tribe precedes the individual. Those tribes have survived among which ideas promotive of the tribe's vitality have been perpetuated. Morality is exclusively concerned with the well-being of the tribe. There is a Tribal Self whose jealousy of the Individual Self expresses itself in what is called the conscience. The sense of wrong doing is simply the Tribal Self saying "In the name of the tribe I hate myself for this treason that I have done."

Clifford's theory is a recognition of the importance of accounting for the Categorical Imperative; and his figment of a Tribal Self is simply an artificial effort to adjust the admitted facts of consciousness to the hypothesis of Evolution. As an explanation of conscience it is far-fetched and visionary.

5. The Evolution Ethics of Spencer and Stephen. Spencer is the master in the school, but Stephen has given the most elaborate exposition of the master's tenets. According to Leslie Stephen, Ethics is the science of what is, not of what ought to be. Morality is that set of rules in actual existence among a people, and is the result of a process by which an organism adjusts itself to its environment. Man's conduct is always in the terms of pleasure and pain. Character determines conduct. Right conduct is life-maintaining and pleasure-giving. Some conduct affects the individual specially; some the organism specially. Hence nature's command, "Be happy," means "Be prudent" and "Be virtuous." It is virtuous conduct—conduct promoting social well-being—that is treated of in Ethics. A man's character—his instincts—determine his conduct. Along with self-regarding, he has altruistic instincts. Morality, in short, is an instinct as much as hunger. The Evolutionist does not view conduct as related to a standard, or as obligatory. Moral conduct is simply the condition of social life. The race

has lived because it has evolved the conditions of regulated conduct necessary to life. The Evolution Ethics does not explain Oughtness. It ignores the idea. Hence as Schurman says the "Evolution hypothesis does not really affect because it never reaches the problems of ethical philosophy. These lie in the moral consciousness of humanity to which it simply gives the go-by." The Evolutionist does not preach and does not pretend to preach an authoritative morality. "If you care for the well-being of social tissue" he would say, "you must do so and so." But to one who would admit that he did not care a button for social tissue he would have nothing to say. Looking at the Evolution Ethic simply in relation to the idea of oughtness we may fairly ask its advocates these questions: (a) If morality concern only the organism and its sole recommendation be that it tends to the life of the organism, how does Stephen know but that a certain amount of immorality is also commendable. Morality is here and society is here. The inference is that morality is the condition of social life. But immorality is also here. How does Stephen know that this is not likewise one of the conditions of social life? (b) If morality exists only as a life-perpetuating agency why is it that we have the idea of obligation? According to the theory, morality has been evolved and the idea of moral obligation has been evolved. Now, why is it that while the actions of men have always been directed to secure the pleasurable and the healthful, the moral formulas which represent the healthful and pleasurable are expressed in categorical imperatives? Acting for pleasure man has evolved morality; and one of his maxims is that he must sacrifice pleasure for duty. How does Evolution explain this? The Evolution Ethic fails quite as much as the Utilitarian philosophy, or the philosophy of Hobbes and Bain to express the genesis of Obligation. These failures

may be taken as valuable contributions to the support of the position that the idea of obligation is intuitive; is an ultimate psychological fact; and that the word "Ought" represents the ethical Atom.

§§ 8, 9.—II. *The Metaphysical Aspect of Oughtness.*

Some teach that all knowledge grows out of sensations; the attempt which some make to reduce all knowledge to the method of science means simply the attempt to express all knowledge in the terms of sensation. This is impossible. We can apply mathematical calculations to material phenomena, but mathematical relations are not material, nor are they sensations. We can reduce phenomena to system but the ideas implied in classification are not sensations nor derived from sensations. We could not make a classification of material phenomena if we did not approach phenomena with the a priori elements of the science of classification. There are, in other words, certain elements in our knowledge that are not derived from experience but which condition experience. In a sense all knowledge is experiential, since it is not knowledge except as it is experienced; but in the sense in which the word experience is commonly used there are some factors in knowledge which do not grow out of experience. We have perceptions, and sensations; we can observe and collect physical facts and also psychological facts. These are all empirically known, but besides these sensations and perceptions there is first the Ego which is the subject of them; and there are certain necessary beliefs or judgments, certain a priori categories: Time, Space, Cause, Substance, etc. There is in all science an empirical and a metempirical element. But it is with the empirical that science as such has to deal. It is the province of metaphysic to deal with the metempirical. The first thing to be done in building the temple of knowledge, is to subject these a priori ideas to scrutiny. Some

task akin to Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* confronts the metaphysician. Whether there be any further scope for Metaphysic will depend upon the outcome of this scrutiny. If, however, we do not land, as so many have landed, in Agnosticism, the next outcome of Metaphysic will be Ontology.

Metaphysic in other words, which is the science of first principles, is a science first of Knowing, secondly of Being. As one of our a priori ideas Oughtness is to be considered under both aspects. By the metaphysical aspect of Oughtness is meant: first, the explanation of the nature, scope, and implications of Oughtness considered as an ultimate idea; secondly, the relation which the idea of Oughtness sustains to the leading theories of the universe. It will be convenient, however, to reverse this order and we accordingly consider

§ 10, 11. *Oughtness in relation to theories of the universe.* The three leading theories of the universe are: (1) Theism (Dualistic: mind and matter); (2) Materialism (A-theistic or Pan-cosmic); and (3) Spiritualism (Pan-theistic or A-cosmic). The first question is how far these theories are compatible or incompatible with the idea of moral obligation. Where there is no free will, *i. e.*, no power of self-determination, there can be no obligation. There can clearly be no authoritative morality under the system of Materialism or Pantheism. Theism is the only theory of the universe compatible with moral obligation. The consideration of the relation of Oughtness to theories of the universe is thus narrowed to this question touching its relation to Theism. Two points are to be noticed under this head: 1. How far the idea of Oughtness is corroborative of Theism; 2. How far the hypothesis of Theism is properly interpretative of Oughtness.

§ 12. The moral argument for Theism is a strong one. Briefly it is this: We feel ourselves under a law com-



manding us to do Right. Rational explanation of this feeling of obligation there is none, unless there is a moral Governor. Rational explanation of the word Right there is none, if it be not true that God's nature is the norm or standard of Right. The value of this argument depends of course, upon the intuitive character of the ideas represented by Ought and Right. It is a mistake to say that this argument is not affected by the current theories as to the genesis of conscience; for if we should accept any of the materialistic explanations of conscience the moral argument would be entirely changed and this form of it would fall to the ground. We should still have a theistic proof based upon moral phenomena; for we could not see the upward tendency of the race, the evolution of the idea of obligation, and the tendency of conduct in the direction of an ideal under the double influence of the idea of Duty and that of the Good, without seeking some explanation of this teleological trend. This would be a moral argument for theism, but it would not be the old moral argument.

§ 13. Theism however does not depend upon the moral argument alone for reasoned support. We may, therefore, ask the second question proposed above. Approaching Ethics under the assumption of the Divine existence, how far does Theism help us to explain the meaning of Oughtness? We do not reason in a circle here reaching Theism by Oughtness and then explaining Oughtness by Theism. But since Theism is supported by other lines of argument we naturally use our belief in God to interpret the ultimate conception of moral obligation. This brings us to the second question proposed in connection with the inquiry into the metaphysical aspect of Oughtness; namely—

§ 14. *The meaning of Oughtness.*

Oughtness being an ultimate idea: not capable of being resolved into simpler elements; what does it imply?

We naturally turn for help in answering this question to those who have recognized the intuitive character of this idea—for example, to Kant.

Kant says :—

1. “There is nothing good but a good will.” Of inclinations, apprehensions, desires, feelings, affections, Kant makes no appreciative mention. The core of manhood is will: nothing good but a good will is the foundation of Kantian Ethics.

2. “An action done from duty derives its moral worth not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but by the maxim by which it is determined and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire.” Kant does not mean simply that the moral quality of an action depends upon the motive, but that whatever the motive may be, an action done with reference to consequences has no moral worth. Moral action must be done at the bidding of an a priori maxim of the will.

3. “Duty is the necessity of acting from respect to the Law.” We all recognize the necessity of acting against inclination when law and inclination are in conflict. Kant means more than that. He means that if law and inclination are parallel, and in doing what I ought to do I do what I like to do, my action is deserving of no moral consideration. The law voices itself in the Categorical Imperative.

4. “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.” There is but “one Categorical Imperative” says Kant. This is it. But what actions come under this law? How are we to know what actions we would be willing to have made a universal law? The weakness of the Kantian Ethic comes out in the answer to this question. Why, for

example, may I not break my word, or neglect those who are in distress? "Because," says Kant, "cases might occur in which one would have the need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which by such a law of nature sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires." Kant surrenders absolutely to Utilitarianism at this point. The maxim is as to form a priori; as to content it is a posteriori.

5. "The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties which conform to them; on the other hand heteronomy of the will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof and to the morality of the will." Kant means that my will must be self-legislative and not take its law from another. There is a sense in which this is true. Mere compliance with a command coming from without, for the sake of the consequence, be it reward or punishment, is not morality. It is prudence. And the duties of religion may be enforced in such a purely prudential and calculating way as to expose them to the full force of Kant's criticism. On the other hand what is the result of the autonomy of the will left to itself? I am to obey law but only such law as I make. I legislate honesty for myself. But suppose I legislate theft? What is to tell me that theft is unfit to be legislated? I must have a supreme norm of Right; or else I must take the empirical way of finding out whether honesty is right by asking whether an honest or a thievish community is the one I wish to live in. If I take the latter plan, I join the company of the empiricists. If the former, I surrender to Heteronomy. Again: I am to enact the law which I am to obey. Suppose my neighbor enacts for himself a conflicting law. Who then is to decide whether my maxim or my neighbor's is fit to be universal? Every man must settle it for himself. Do what you think is right is the sum and substance of Kant's doctrine.

6. "What makes Categorical Imperatives possible is this, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in consequence of which, if I knew nothing else, all my actions *would* always conform to the autonomy of the will; but as I at the same time intuit myself as a member of the world of sense, they *ought* so to conform; and this *categorical* ought implies, too, a sympathetic *a priori* proposition, inasmuch as besides my will as affected by sensible desire, there is added further the idea of the same will but as belonging to the world of the understanding, pure and practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according to Reason of the former will." According to Kant, man sustains a dual relation: a relation to Reason and a relation to Sense. In one sense man and man's actions are just parts of nature. Nature is simply an articulation of physical phenomena which are successively conditioning and conditioned. Physical phenomena are physically caused and so predictable. Why then are my actions not predictable? Kant says that as a *phenomenon*, man is part of nature. If man belonged only to the sensible world there could be no morality, no Categorical Imperative. But man besides being a part of nature is above nature. He belongs to the intelligible world. He is phenomenon—he is also noumenon. And in this super-sensible sphere man is free. If man belonged only to the intelligible world then all his actions would conform to the autonomy of the will. He would not only legislate but obey. Belonging to the sensible world as well as to the intelligible world he is both sovereign and subject. "Man as phenomenon receives the law, man as noumenon gives it" (Schurman). Self in the sphere of Reason, giving law to self in the sphere of Sense, encounters opposition. Opposition emphasizes command. The emphasized command is the feeling of Oughtness. Oughtness not only implies the

recognition of the Imperative, but the reluctant recognition of it. Without claiming ability to understand Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal will, it is not difficult to understand what is meant by saying that the feeling of Oughtness is evidence of opposition to law; that a nature in full sympathy with law would not realize Oughtness; that the more moral we become the less moral we are; that is, that perfection or holiness transcends morality and is supra-moral.

Hegel as we have said criticised Kant; yet the revived Hegelianism of England borrows much of its Ethics from Kant. For Kant's phenomenal and noumenal self substitute a finite and a universal self and we have the basis of Bradley's *Ethical Studies*. Bradley says: "Where there is no imperfection there is no ought. . . morality is the effort after non-morality, and it presses forward beyond itself to a super-moral sphere where it ceases to exist." For the universal Self which the finite Self is striving to realize and with which in a sense it is identical substitute the word "God;" say that man is seeking to be like God, or that God is seeking expression of himself in and through the organs of man's personality: and you have a religious but Hegelianized interpretation of Oughtness.

To neither of the views here presented do we assent. Kant is right in saying that unless my nature enunciate the moral law I have no other moral law than one of convenience and expediency. A moral law simply as a command from without, will not suffice. We agree with Kant in repudiating Heteronomy. On the other hand a law with no higher sanction than my individual will would not suffice. If on examining this feeling of obligation I found that it emanated from no source higher than my own will and looked to no moral system outside, I should probably feel that this subjective morality which claims to

be only regulative would not even be that. And so Autonomy, in and of itself, is also an unsatisfactory explanation of Oughtness. The true explanation is not found in Heteronomy or Autonomy but in both. There is truth in saying too that morality has self-realization for its end: the realization, that is to say, of a moral Ideal. But it is not to come about by any identity of God and man; though the recognition of God is a very important factor in a true ethical theory.

What then does Oughtness mean?

I feel that I ought. I also believe in God. If God exist, and I am a subject of his moral government, it is only natural that he should give me a moral nature and that moral law should issue from that nature, which after all is only the law of God. The moral Ideal is no other than the nature of God. The sense of obligation is witness to my subjection to moral law, which notwithstanding the autonomy of my will, has its abiding justification in the nature of God, and for this reason is fit for universal application.

§ 15. III. *Oughtness in relation to human Freedom.*

It is necessary in considering this subject to enter upon this vexed question of Free-will: Notice 1. History of the Free-will controversy; 2. Points in the Free-will controversy; 3. Special bearing of the Free-will controversy upon moral obligation.

1. *History of the Free-will controversy.*

At first this was altogether a theological question. Tertullian distinguishes between the will before and after the fall. So does Augustine. In denying free-will he affirms against Pelagius the doctrine of total depravity. This was what Luther meant by denying free-will in his controversy with Erasmus; so with Calvin vs. Pighius, and the Reformers at the Council of Trent. The theological doctrine of servitude of the will must be distinguished

from the doctrine of philosophical necessity taught in a later period by Hobbes, Collins, Priestly and Leibnitz; and repudiated by Price and Clarke. Jonathan Edwards stands out above all others in the discussion of this subject. The Edwardean doctrine besides meeting with opposition from Tappan, Hazard, Upham, Bledsoe and Whedon, has been strongly objected to by the Scottish philosophers Reid, Stuart and Sir William Hamilton. Empirical philosophers are naturally determinists; so are all who deny the separate existence of the individual Self. Determinism follows as naturally from the scheme of Hegel as from that of Comte. Sir William Hamilton following the suggestion of Kant's antinomies, found freedom and necessity to be both inconceivable, but believed in freedom. Many at the present day who do not follow Kant or Hamilton take an agnostic position believing that no answer can be given to the question, Why this rather than that volition? but believing nevertheless that they are free, are sure that the doctrine of physical determinism is incompatible with morality.

## 2. *Points in the Free-will controversy.*

If we were asked, What is meant by saying that a man is free? the reply would be that he can do as he wills. But what can be meant by saying that the Will is free? If it mean that I am self-determined, that I am the cause of my volition, there need be no debate. We all believe in the freedom of the man, whatever difference of opinion there may be about the freedom of the Will. In the question it is conceded that, in the volition, say, to walk East and not West, I am the agent; but the question is, Why did I choose to walk East rather than West? Two generic answers have been given to this question. Some hold that each volition is unconditioned by antecedents; others that each volition was antecedently determined and therefore certain. Indeterminism and Determinism are the two rival theories of the will.

(a) *Indeterminism.* Capable of being presented in two forms. It may mean: In every volition I not only do as I choose, but choose as I choose; or it may mean that the whole philosophy of will is expressed in the words 'I choose.' The one ends in the old difficulty of the infinite series; the other seems to sever single volitions from character. Indeterminism is supported (1) By appeals to consciousness; (2) By saying that the will can decide against the strongest motive; (3) By appealing to motiveless choices; and (4) By saying that the power of contrary choice is essential to moral responsibility.

(b.) *Determinism.* The two forms of this theory should be carefully distinguished. Physical determinism is simply the application of the law of physical causation to the facts of mind. This physical determinism now so prevalent, is something upon which every Theist must look with abhorrence. It blots out the soul. It makes man an automaton. The determinism taught by Edwards and others is simply the determinism of character. It is admitted by those who hold the view of which Edwards was such a distinguished representative, that in each volition the Ego is the agent or cause; but the question is, Why this rather than that volition? If the answer be, 'There is no reason,' it will be replied: (1) This is unconceivable; (2) This destroys responsibility. If volitions are simply 'projected' without reason it is hard to see what is to be the subject of responsibility; (3) It will be asked, Why do the volitions of the same man exhibit a general similarity; (4) We must choose between the theory that makes uniformities of conduct fortuitous and that which says that character determines conduct.

§18. 3. *Special bearing of the Free-will controversy upon Moral Obligation.*—To be moral I must be a free agent. I must be able to determine myself. I might cognize and recognize and enjoy and suffer without having will. But



I could not be a moral being without will. My actions are not forced upon me *ab extra*. I determine them. This power of self-determination is what is meant by freedom. This power of self-determination is what is meant by will. To be moral I must be free. To be moral I must have power of self-determination. To be moral I must have will. The wisdom of the inquiry whether the man be free is quite evident: but what is the wisdom of inquiry whether the will be free? We talk of the will as though the will were something separated from the man, and as though the will's freedom were something of more importance than the man's freedom. If I have power of self-determination it is not unreasonable to say that my self-determination should take this or that direction. There can be no doubt that the power of self-determination conditions the possibility of Ethics. The simple fact that we have power of self-determination, however, does not satisfy those who make Indeterminism essential to moral agency. We must therefore inquire further. A man takes \$10,000 out of the vaults of a Bank. He ought not to do it, but he does it. He has power of self-determination: abstracting the funds is his act. Power of self-determination is *prima facie* evidence of guilt, we say. No, it is said on the other hand, that depends upon your theory of the Will. We admit that the abstraction of the money was the cashier's act. What we want to know is whether there is any explanation of this self-determination. Thus we are drawn into the Free-will controversy. Notice, however, the ambiguity in the use of the word "cause," which it is so hard to avoid. A kleptomaniac steals a book. He is the cause of the act. He is the sole agent; in other words, is self-determined as to the particular action referred to. But why did his self-determination take this dishonest form? We cannot say that there is no reason. We impute his self-determination to a diseased brain. Then he was the cause; and

a diseased brain was the cause of this self-determination. There is no contradiction in saying that a maniac's acts are self-determined (that he is the cause of his acts) and that his self-determination would have been different had he been in a different state of body or mind. What is true in the case of disease holds good in the case of health. The nature of the man, his physical condition, and his mental idiosyncrasies, set limits to and determine what his self-determinations shall be. There is no contradiction in saying that a man is a self-determining agent, and that at the same time his self-determinations are certainly determined by character. Between self-determinism and motive-determinism there is no antithesis as Dr. Calderwood seems to think. Let us test this inquiry by some illustrations :

1. A case of indifference. I come to the place where two roads meet. I have no reason to choose one rather than the other. I go to the left. Why? I choose. Beyond that I know nothing. But it is quite possible that a being who knew me intimately could have predicted at the moment previous to choice, what choice I would make.

2. A case of desire followed by consent of the Will. I see a new book. I want it. I follow my inclination and buy it. Clearly, this is a case of self-determination: but the reason that I so determined was my desire of the book.

3. A case of contest with desire. Abraham loves Isaac, but is confronted by Duty. Abraham follows Duty. Will is in conflict with and triumphs over Desire. That is one way of looking at it. Another is, that when his act of self-determination took shape, he put before him as a thing to be desired, the obeying of God's will; and therefore that when he lifted the knife he was not so much acting against desire: rather had he deliberately and of choice put before himself another desire. Indeed, instead of saying that his will followed his desire we may say that desire is his Will.

4. A case of conflicting desire. A man loves money and he loves learning. Both equally, let us suppose. He cannot have both. He must decide which. Will he be found equally poised between motives unable to make a choice, or will he choose without regard to motive? Neither conclusion is necessary. If he settle down to the choice of learning it will be because he concludes that learning is on the whole more desirable. His will after all is as his desire.

It should be understood, however, that desire is a word that has more than one use. Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* has discussed this subject very acutely. In effect, Green says that the question is not whether the will is or is not ruled by motives, but what the nature of the motive is. If the motive is natural, i. e., is one of a series of physical events, then moral science is impossible. Green shows that the moral motives are not natural. For example: Esau is hungry, and sells his birth-right for a mess of pottage. What is his motive? Not the mess of pottage; motive, however considered, is subjective. Is it hunger? Then here is a sensation growing out of a condition of the physical system. If Esau acted blindly and in obedience to a physical craving he was not free; this act was like that of any animal that follows impulse. Esau could have controlled the action to which hunger tempted him. What he did was to present to himself the idea of himself as enjoying the mess of pottage, and so desiring it. The desire was not a blind natural craving; it was a deliberate and conscious realization of himself as in thought enjoying the pleasure afforded by the mess of pottage. In this sense we may say that his desire was his motive and his motive we may say determined his will. But it was a desire consciously put before the mind. We may say that the desire determined the will; but we may also say quite as truly that the desire was an act of will. And the desire was a moral motive only because allowed

by the mind in its own act to be so. Moreover, since desire is not a moral motive ruling a free will except when it is the word that represents the man as consciously putting before himself an idea to be realised, it is clear that desire and will cannot well be separated. Here Green differs from Locke, and virtually maintains the old Edwardian view as to the relation of Desire and Will. Green's discussion has not settled the free will controversy; but it has helped to show that it cannot be settled by putting the Will considered as one entity between conflicting desires considered as other entities and then as choosing between them or as swayed by the stronger. Esau put before him as a good to be realized the pleasure of gratifying his hunger. Looking at this on the inner side, that is in relation to Esau, you call it Esau's motive; looking at it on the outer side, that is, in relation to the subsequent transaction, you call it Esau's act of will. It was both. And since the same fact cannot be two different facts: since motive and will are only two aspects of the same thing, you come ultimately to say that Esau was self-determined. He was the author of the act of choice. If, however, you ask what is the explanation of the self-determination in this particular case, Green's discussion does not supply an answer. We probably cannot do better than say that it was Esau's character. Being what he was he made the decision he did.

Kant's distinction between a phenomenal Self whose states are physical and subject to the law of physical causation and a noumenal Self which is free and to which the law of causation does not apply is not needed and can serve no useful purpose. If you make my separate volitions phenomenally necessary you will not deliver from the jeopardy which such necessity involves me in by saying that they are phenomenally free. The phenomenal being the known and the noumenal the unknown, the end of

such speculation is, as Schurman shows, the abolition of the noumenal freedom and the acceptance of necessity. As little help is to be derived the recent discussion of the Will in the Bishop of Exeter's Bampton Lectures. For besides the gratuitous assertion that the will exercises its freedom only now and then, the discussion referred to still leaves us with the unanswered question: Why does self-determination take this rather than that direction?

## II.

### § 20. THE GOOD.

The Ethical systems of antiquity were generally based upon the idea of the Good. Men asked, What is the *summum bonum*?—wisely discerning that intelligently directed conduct must be determined by the end it is intended to realise. Modern systems have more generally built upon the idea of the Right, and in these systems the Good has very often been ignored. There is a tendency among more recent moralists to revert to the old idea of the Good. Schleiermacher considers Ethics under the three heads of Duty, the Good, and Virtue. Janet follows him. President Hopkins defines moral philosophy as “the Science which teaches man the end for which he was made, why he should attain that end, and how to attain it.” Dr. Hickok defines the *summum bonum* as “worthiness of spiritual approbation.” Professor Green shows in his *Prolegomena* that a large place must be given to the Good in the scientific treatment of morals. The double consideration of actions which the words Right and Good imply cannot well be avoided. We judge actions with reference to the end which they subserve but also with reference to their conformity to a norm or standard of behavior.

In dealing with the Good we shall consider:—

1. The relation of Oughtness to the Good and the Right;

2. The relation of the Good and the Right to each other ;
3. The idea of the Good in its relation to ethical theories.

§ 21. The idea of an end to be realised is a fundamental idea in Ethics: and as a man does not plan action with reference to a result unless the result be regarded by him as desirable, in other words as Good, the transition from the word 'end' to the word 'good' is easy. When, however, we say that the Good, the end, the thing aimed at is the Desirable we do not mean what men actually do desire but what they ought to desire. By the *summum bonum* is not meant the highest or most enduring pleasure, as is clear from the fact that some have answered the question, What is the *summum bonum*? by saying that Pleasure is; and others by denying that it is. If by the Desirable is meant an ideal Good, or what men ought to desire there is no difficulty in seeing how the Good can be subsumed under the word 'Ought,' and that the Ideal Good is a matter of moral obligation.

So far as the relation of Oughtness and Rightness is concerned there is very little room for discussion. If it is asked, Why ought I to do Right? no satisfactory answer can be given other than that the idea of Right carries with it that of moral obligation. If this answer is not accepted we shall have to say, 'I ought to do right because if I do wrong God will punish me.' To do this, however, would be to adopt Prof. Bain's theory that morality is utility made compulsory; it would be to resolve all matters of right and wrong into calculating expediency.

§ 22. In coming now to inquire respecting the relation of the ideas of the Good and the Right to each other, we ask (1) Whether Good is subordinate to Right or (2) Right is subordinate to Good or (3) Right and good are co-ordinate.

In answer to these questions it is held by some that the Good is subordinate to Right. This, however, is not the true view. We cannot say that the Desirable is simply doing Right. The end of life is not fully stated in saying doing right is its only desirable outcome. But can we say with any more propriety that the Right is subordinate to the Good; that, in other words, a thing is right because it contributes to the realisation of the Good? This is Janet's position which he calls "rational eudæmonism." The law, Janet thinks, must be based upon some reason. Janet will not accept as a reason the nature of God or the fitness of things. He wants to find that reason in us. Accordingly he says: "If, on the other hand, law is enforced by some reason, this reason which is anterior to the law itself can be nothing but the intrinsic goodness of the act required: it is then goodness which is the basis of duty, not duty which is the basis of goodness." The objection to Janet's subordination of the Right to the Good is neither more nor less than the objection to be urged against utilitarianism in general. Hedonists of all grades agree in making Happiness the end and in basing obligation upon it. The result of this is a calculating morality, a morality of expediency, a morality which speaks in hypothetical, not in categorical imperatives. We must hold that the words Good and Right stand for two independent and coördinate ideas in Ethics. Duty, or obligation to do right regardless of consequences—this is one part of life; Good, or an ideal to the realization of which we look forward—this is another part of life. What then does Reason teach us concerning the desirable outcome of life? What is the Good?

§ 23. Nothing is clearer than that our actions are subject to two kinds of measurement. They are related first to something that is to be accomplished; they are related

secondly to a norm or standard of Right that takes no account of consequences. Every man who has a purpose in life puts some end before him as that which he wishes to accomplish: the scholar, the politician, the business-man. It is hardly possible for a man to realize that there is something which he thinks is good for him without realizing that there is something good for all men. What ought every man put before him as the end to be realized in life? The answer to this question will be the Good. All the answers that have been given to this question are capable of being embraced under two heads: for all depends upon the question whether the Good or Ideal to be realized is an end outside of ourselves or in ourselves. Let us consider the Good under this two-fold division.

§ 24. I. *The Good considered as an End outside of Self.*

The classification here adopted brings into juxtaposition systems of thought that in their spirit and content are the poles apart. The Benthamite philosopher and some Christian theologians have this much in common, that they both say that the end which the individual should seek to realise and the realisation of which is the Good is outside of Self. According to the first the Good is the welfare of man; according to the other the Good is the glory of God.

1. *The Good considered as regard for the well-being of man.* The word 'well-being' is used because more comprehensive than the word 'happiness' or 'pleasure.' Fowler prefers it (See *Progressive Morality*). The general maxim of the Utilitarian philosophy is that the chief good is Happiness. And the question then arises, Whose happiness? The Utilitarians say, The happiness of the community. Hence the division of moral philosophers into Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonists, according as they teach that the happiness of the individual or of the organism is what each should strive to secure. The Util-



itarianism of John S. Mill really embraces two points : (1) that right actions are those which tend to promote happiness ; (2) that every man should seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number. These however are very different positions. Is it true that the reason for saying that an action is right is its tendency to promote general well-being ? Sidgwick tries to show that it is, and that this is seen in the different estimate which is placed upon the same action at different times and under different circumstances : e. g., the matter of truth-telling. Observe however, that though we do not accept the position taken by Sidgwick and others on this question, it is not to be denied that the felicific tendency of an act may be a test of its rightness. Fowler, however, does not distinguish between the *test* of rightness and the *ground* of rightness. To say that conduct which produces general happiness is right only means that if general happiness is what you want this is a way to seek it. Right in the sense of an immutable morality Utilitarianism knows nothing about. If Happiness is the desirable for society, why is it not the desirable for me ? And so we may ask : Is the desirable outcome of life alike for the individual and for society expressed in the phrase : Be Happy ? We answer, No.

*a.* Because we can imagine a man or a society in a state of happiness, and at the same time in the lowest depths of degradation. The word ' Happiness ' does not provide for any valid distinction between the hog's heaven and the saint's heaven.

*b.* Because this criticism is invariably met by the statement that we must distinguish between different kinds of happiness. When, however, we distinguish between different kinds of happiness and find that only refined happiness, or holy happiness is contemplated, the very predicates ' refined ' and ' holy ' show that it is not happiness as such but happiness under certain conditions which is looked upon as desirable.

*e.* Because if happiness is the only end to be achieved and felicitic conduct is right conduct, there is no provision in this view for the sense of obligation that always attaches to right conduct.

It cannot be said that Mill taught that it is obligatory on every one to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number; though this was in his mind the Good: he finds for this principle, moreover, a natural basis as has been already seen in Sympathy. To the man, who should ask why he must seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number, Mill would have no adequate reply. Utilitarianism at best can only give advice. It cannot command.

§ 25. Yet we must recognize in the Utilitarian formula a statement closely akin to the teaching of Christianity. The Utilitarian emphasizes Benevolence. This is the good side of the system; and Benevolence is certainly a large part of Christianity. Christianity and Utilitarianism both emphasize Benevolence, but with this difference: the Utilitarian rejects all intuitional morality; rejects obligation: how then can we say that it is the duty of any man to seek the welfare of his neighbor? Utilitarianism preaches a lofty, an unselfish morality. But it has no sanctions, no promise, no motive, no voice of authority, and is inimical to the idea of obligation. The Christian position is vastly different from this. Christian moralists recognize the intuitive character of moral obligation; they recognize Right as something different from felicitic tendency; and they place the duty of living for the welfare of others upon the unassailable foundation of authority. Utilitarianism is confessedly weak compared with Christianity, even in regard to this cardinal point wherein the two agree. Turning from this comparison, however, let us ask whether the supreme end of the Individual's life is the well-being of society. Can I embody my idea of the Good in a Christian Altruism, or Christian Utilitarianism

and say that the one thing for which I am bound to live is the well-being of my fellow-men? To this question we answer, No. Omitting all reference to reasons derived from Revelation it is sufficient to say :

1. That one can not with any degree of wisdom plan for the well-being of others unless he have an idea of what welfare means in his own case. There can be no efficient Altruism which does not presuppose an intelligent Egoism. Mr. Sidgwick is right in saying that the Utilitarian is likely to be public-spirited and interested in social reforms; and he might have added that his public zeal will be directed very much in accordance with what he regards as desirable for himself. We can not ask a better test of Benevolence than that a man love his neighbor as he loves himself. If he have no personal expectation beyond the present life his public spirit will expend itself in the sphere of Political Economy and Sanitary Science. If he hold strong views, however, regarding a future state, and particularly if he hold Scriptural views, his Christian Utilitarianism will assume the form of missionary zeal. We are not to deny the great truth which Utilitarianism teaches: but we are to remember that Christianity taught it long before, taught it, too, in a more comprehensive form: and that its Altruism is always associated with a refined but palpable Egoism.

2. Again, if a man fulfilled his Duty when he entertained benevolent sentiments; if the sole aim in the life of the individual were the realization of general well-being, it would be very difficult to blame a man for any personal faults who lived for the good of others. Yet the union of great public spirit with grave personal defects is not uncommon; and we do not consider that this self-sacrificing life atones for personal faults.

§ 26. 2. *The Good considered as the Glory of God.*

All who regard the Scriptures as authoritative must hold that man's chief end is to glorify God. But this

belief does not prevent one from having an intelligent regard to his own well-being. Consider man as the product of Divine intelligence, and ask what particular purpose he was meant to serve. The answer must be, The glory of God. No substitute can be found for this answer. Let it be said, for example, that the individual exists for the sake of the organism of which he is a part, and that the end which the individual should seek to realise is the happiness of the social organism. Let the happiness or perfection of the individual and of society be conceived of as attained. Should we not still have to ask, What is it all for? And should we not be compelled to find the final cause of all in the glory of God? Kant is not influenced in his judgments by special reverence for the Bible; yet Kant was too profound a thinker not to see that the end of creation must be in God and that the glory of God is the purpose it is meant to serve.

This, however, is not all. The chief end of man is the glory of God. This is true of all created beings, whether they act with a motive or not, and even though they do not act at all.

But we are taught in Scripture that the glory of God must be the motive of our action. Whether therefore ye eat or drink or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God. Can this command be harmonized with the fact that we are also taught to seek our highest well-being and the well-being of our fellow-men?

These positions are not antagonistic. In the first place a generic choice may include subordinate choices. One may seek to glorify God in all he does and yet eat because he is hungry, and read poetry because he enjoys it. In the second place the motive of an action is not always the same as the result to be achieved. A man's motive may be devotion to his family; what he seeks to realise under the influence of this motive may be a fortune. Admit-

ting then that the glory of God should be the ruling motive of life, let us ask, Is the Good for which I am to strive simply the glory of God, irrespective of my personal well-being or the well-being of my fellow-men? We answer, No: for these reasons:—1. Though the glory of God be the highest motive, yet if a man had no other morality than this motive we should not know what he would do. ‘Do all for the glory of God;’ but do what? 2. Motive gives a formal Morality but the purest form may have very questionable content. Witness the persecutions which have had for their object the greater glory of God. 3. There is a third reason: Kant gives it. Man is an end in himself; he is not simply means to an end. Considered from one point of view he is means to an end; considered from another point of view he is something else. He cannot regard himself simply as a means to an end outside of self. Willingness to be damned for the glory of God is not a doctrine of true philosophy or sound theology. Man takes his place with all other creatures as having the glory of God for his final cause. But he also has for his aim the realization of an end in himself. He is to be something as well as to do something. In his case the Self of to-day stands related to the Self of to-morrow as means to end; the Self of to-day determining the Self of to-morrow. We cannot say therefore that the Good to be sought is exclusively outside of self. We can say that man’s chief end is the glory of God; we can also say that man’s chief end is Self-realization. These positions are not mutually exclusive or conflicting.

§ 27. II. *The Good considered as having Self-realisation for its object.*

This head embraces all those conceptions of the Good in which consider it as something that has to do with what we are to be. We are familiar by constant experience, with the idea for which the word ‘self-realisation’

stands. We look ahead, picture ourselves to ourselves as we would like to be, say ten or twenty years hence: we plan our life so that this picture of our Ideal Self may become real in our actual Self. These Ideals vary greatly: but they are really capable of being embraced under two heads. The Self to be realised will be sufficiently indicated by the word 'Happiness' or the word 'Perfection.' Let us consider these views separately.

1. *Happiness*. "There is only one way to found a moral science absolutely independent of all metaphysics: it is by proclaiming the doctrine of pleasure or utility." Janet is right. Egoistic Hedonism is the only doctrine that can be consistently commended by those who propose to dispense with metaphysics. It must be admitted, too, that one might make the end of life consist of Happiness without implying a view that leads to moral indifference. The Christian Hedonist would say: 'You want Happiness, eternal Happiness': but eternal Happiness is possible only by means of Holiness. In fact the Christian Hedonist can hold and teach and enforce the leading tenets of Christianity without compromising his Hedonism. Why then will it not do to say that Happiness is the end, the Good which each individual should seek to realise?

1. Because Happiness or Pleasure as such can be measured only by quantity: intensity and duration. Unlawful appetite gratified without abatement of pleasure though eternity is conceivable; but only in a way that awakens disgust.

2. Because Happiness does not seem to be a proper object of command.

3. Because as if to put a veto upon the idea that Happiness is our being's end and aim, it is notoriously true that the man who seeks happiness seldom finds it. The surest way to be happy is not make the attainment of it our business.

4. Because even in those systems which make Happiness the Good the distinction between quality and quantity is emphasized in a way that shows that Happiness as such is not thought of but a particular kind of Happiness : for example, holy Happiness.

5. Because we cannot think of Holiness as simply the means to the attainment of Happiness without feeling that the idea of Holiness has been degraded. Instead of saying with the Christian Hedonist, Be holy if you would be happy, we should prefer to say, Be holy and you will be happy.

§ 28. Personal Happiness is not the Good ; must we, however, disregard all idea of Happiness? This question may very readily be answered in the negative. Whatever the desirable outcome of life may be, it is not conceivable that an outcome resulting in personal misery could be recognized as the attainment of our end. Let us suppose for example, that the end of our life is to glorify God : suppose, moreover, that our eternal unhappiness promoted the glory of God. Should we feel that we had realised the Good for which we are seeking ? It is impossible to think that we should feel so. Accordingly when the Westminster divines framed their answer to the question, What is the chief end of man? they recognized the element of happiness which enters into it: "Man's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy him forever." Or suppose that the Good be defined as moral Perfection ; and that the price of moral perfection was unmitigated misery. Suppose that there was an unalterable relation between doing Right and reaping misery. Could we feel that a being who had attained to Perfection under the circumstances had attained the Good? We may say that it is not possible that Right-doing should be followed with suffering and that moral Perfection should prove the acme of misery. Of course it is not possible under the existing con-

stitution of things; but it is conceivable and the conception helps us to realise that it is impossible to separate the idea of Happiness from that of the Good. We of course must guard against the mistake which Mr. Green notices us, of "confusing the pleasure which attends the satisfaction of a desire with the object of the desire, and the anticipation of that pleasure with the desire itself." The Desirable is not Happiness; but neither is it something that is irrespective of Happiness.

§ 29. 2. *Perfection.* Passing by the discussion that might be raised at this point as to what is meant by Perfection we affirm that the perfection which man should seek after is moral Perfection or Holiness. The true Ideal of life, the Good, is given us in the command of our Savior: Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect. It will be easy to see the relation which this view of the good sustains to other theories regarding the *summum bonum* and also the elements of truth which these theories contain.

(1). Since the Good to be realised is perfection of character, a standard of excellence is pre-supposed. Those therefore who found Ethics upon the idea of Right will not have their views antagonized by anything here said concerning the Good. The realization of the Good will be the embodiment of the Moral Law in our nature and life.

(2). If we and all moral beings were perfect we should still ask, What are we for? What is our chief end? We should answer, To glorify God. What we should do if we were holy is then made the law of duty now.

(3). If we were perfect and other moral beings imperfect it would be our duty to seek their well-being. Let us imagine ourselves in a state of absolute moral perfection; and in that state witnessing the sinning, suffering multitudes constituting the brotherhood in which we are



born. What should we do? Of course we should sympathize with them and wish them well. Benevolence would find expression. If then this is what a perfect being would naturally do, it is clear that an imperfect being seeking to realise his perfection ought to act in this way. When therefore we are told that we ought to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number we are only having the nature of the perfect being made the law of the imperfect being. So that without accepting the Utilitarian maxim that the end of life is happiness, or conceding that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the great formula of Duty we are nevertheless shut up to Utilitarian conclusions as to our obligations to our fellow-men.

(4). We see the relation also subsisting between Mill's view of the Good here presented and that preached by Egoistic Hedonism. We do not say that Happiness is the Good; at the same time we do not accept a theory which gives no rational place to Happiness in the consideration of human destiny. The Bible does not teach Egoistic Hedonism nor Universalistic Hedonism; neither do the writers of the Bible hesitate to appeal to the motives of pleasure and pain in the enforcement of Duty. Paul was neither an inspired Paley nor a religious Bentham. We are told to seek God's glory; we are also told to strive after perfection; but we are not asked to seek the one or the other without regard to personal happiness. It is the Egoistic side of Christian Ethics which gives offence to writers like Mr. Frederic Harrison. Mr. Harrison, however, should learn that Altruism and Egoism imply each other. Altruism recognizes that he that loses his life shall save it. It must also recognize that this love which self-sacrifice implies derives all its significance from the worth of that something whether lost or saved which is implied in Personality. To sum up what has been said of the Good:

We find, (a) that as related to the Categorical Imperative the word 'Good' expresses not what we do desire but what we ought to desire; (b) that as related to Right a thing is not Right because Good nor Good because Right, but that these words represent coördinate ideas each of which is entitled to a place in Ethical Science; (c) that the Good has been defined as an end outside of Self and also as that which has self-realization as an end; (d) that self-realization is the Good we seek; not however in the form of a blind desire for happiness, nor yet in some ideal excellence from which the idea of Happiness has been eliminated, but in Perfection with its resulting Happiness; (e) that in the injunction 'Be ye perfect,' &c., we have the true ideal of human action; and (f) that moral perfection being the goal toward which we should strive, the knowledge of what a perfect being would do will give us the law of what an imperfect being should do.

The idea of the Good and the Right are thus brought into closest relation. The process by which the imperfect grows toward perfection is thus analogous to that by which all attainment is made. What is done at first by rule, by following directions, by copying example, is done by and by, by nature, by instinct. The Law at first put before us as an external rule by which we are to guide conduct eventually becomes the internal principle of life. In other words, we realise the Good by conforming to the Right.

### III.

#### § 30. THE RIGHT.

(The discussion of this subject was commenced but not completed).











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