




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THE
SYNONYMES
OF THE
LATIN LANGUAGE.

THE
SYNONYMES
OF THE
LATIN LANGUAGE,
ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED;

WITH
CRITICAL DISSERTATIONS
UPON THE FORCE
OF ITS
PREPOSITIONS,
BOTH
IN A SIMPLE AND A COMPOUNDED STATE:

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P R E F A C E.

Two great objections against the study of the dead languages arise, from the time supposed necessary to learn them, and from the uncertainty of success, when this time has been expended. The labour of the acquisition has been compared with its value, and, because the prize has not always seemed adequate to the exertion, literary eminence has fallen in the estimation of men. Before admitting the justness of this conclusion, however, it is but fair to examine the principles on which it rests. If the pursuit of ancient literature be really an abuse of the human powers, the error of the learned should be exploded; and our regard to the interest of the species should not be made to yield to our respect for a few.

They, who depreciate literary pursuits as being tedious, reflect not on the advantages, with which they are attended. The study of language they erroneously suppose to be but the acquisition of words, in which the memory alone receives strength from exercise. They observe not, that a thorough apprehension of the principles of one tongue presupposes advancement in the philosophy of grammar; and that, while the student imbibes those valuable sentiments with which the classics abound, he is multiplying his ideas, and cultivating his understanding.

Were the intimate connection between science and literature distinctly seen, and were the understanding more, and the memory less, exercised in the acquisition of languages, the success of the philologist would rest upon himself. The supposed instability of literary principles would form no apology for not tracing their source, and those failures, that are complained of in the scholar's pursuits, would be ascribed to their true cause. In spite of that liberty in the

choice of signs, of which every speaker is conscious, a standard would be discovered, to correct those irregularities that lead to confusion. The great purposes of speech would appear to be defended by a barrier, which it is impossible to surmount. In its mechanism a subtle and profound logic would be developed, resting upon principles, which, with due attention, it is possible to explore.

When the study of languages is first begun, no more should be required of the learner than he can easily perform. The school-boy's task is sufficiently hard for his years. In every stage of teaching, more failures arise from the indiscretion of the teacher, than from the dulness of the student. The first shoots of genius must be delicately managed, as they perish under the culture that is injudiciously applied to them.

As the young philologist advances in his progress, other powers must be exerted, beside that of memory. It is not enough, that he can repeat the few rules, by which he connects the few terms, with which he may be acquainted. When the eye of reason opens, it must have something to contemplate; and the objects, soliciting its notice, must be multiplied in proportion to its strength. The task, that is too easy, is as hurtful to the advanced student, as that, which is too hard, would have been at his outset. In the theory of universal grammar, he must look for the law, which he may have falsely understood to depend upon arbitrary usage. He must view the vocabulary of the language he studies, as an imperfect register of its terms. To each of these, that is susceptible of definition, he must apply it; and limit the authority of use with that scrupulous precision, which can render the laws of language immutable, like those of thought.

In hopes of confirming the truth of these observations, I mean, now, to shew the utility of defining synonymous terms, and to enquire into a branch of the study of language, that is alike difficult and important. That I may render my views the more intelligible upon a subject, to which few grammarians have, as yet, paid the attention it deserves, I shall treat it in the following order. I shall, first, state precisely, what I mean by synonymous terms; and then shew the causes of the ambiguity they sometimes occasion, together with the means by which this may be removed.

The word *synonymous* is often supposed applicable to such terms, only, as denote precisely the same conception. Though this use of it be legitimate, and consistent with its etymology, yet it must not be understood to be its sole one. Some words, indeed, occur in the different languages, so strictly equivalent, that their meaning is not to be distinguished. The multiplicity of such terms increases the harmony of speech, and gives the poet and the orator an advantage in the practice of their respective arts.

But, although this copiousness may, when in a certain degree, be an article of superiority, yet it is possible for it to degenerate into a hurtful redundancy. The steadiness of men's conceptions may be shaken by a superfluous variety in their signs, and obscurities created by the abuse of a number of these, as well as by a scarcity. Were a redundancy of this kind to pervade a language completely, the same people might be said to speak, at least, two languages at once. Though the established syntax might apply equally to every set of terms, yet the unmeaning multiplicity would only prove the folly of those who formed it. Each overcharged vocabulary would be cumbersome to natives and to foreigners. It would but increase the labour of the learner, and burden the speaker's memory.

Some languages, then, that are imperfect, may yet have a false appearance of copiousness. They may be deficient in that best kind of synonymous words, which not only give pleasure to the ear, by forming a variety of sound, but give instruction to the understanding, by imparting a variety of matter. Such terms take their character, not from the identity of the conceptions they denote, but from the analogy by which those conceptions are allied. They present differences, which, like shades of the same colour, bear a common relation to one generic idea. When the point of general coincidence, and the ground of particular diversity, in terms so discriminated, are ascertained, it is in the power of the writer to use them with propriety. He may then know which to adopt, and which to reject; and can reconcile embellishment with accuracy and precision. For the most delicate variety in thought, he is furnished with a corresponding variety in expression. He arranges terms upon precisely the same principles that apply to things; so that the language, in

which he conveys his idea, becomes a complete picture of the idea itself. If the vulgar had not a confused apprehension of differences, which the learned only can define, they would be almost debarred from the use of speech. The points, at the same time, that are specific, and involve the definition of terms, escape their notice, as if they had no existence.

Those synonymous terms, then, about which we are about to enquire, are not superfluities in language, but originate from certain delicate analogies, that subsist among things. An improper application of any one of them is an unequivocal proof of the speaker's ignorance of the tongue he employs. The conception, excited in his mind by that term, differs from what is established and assigned to it by the purest use. He may apprehend too little, or too much; but every deviation from a severe standard is, in the eye of the grammarian, culpable, according to its extent. He may consider that quality of an object as characteristic, which is only accidental, and misapply the term, purely from his ignorance of the nature of the thing.

When a language has come to its state of highest improvement, the number of words, justly synonymous, will be found to be greatest. Real copiousness is the immediate effect of that accurate discernment, which, in the rude ages of society, can have no existence. This copiousness, at the same time, is not to be measured by the absolute number of terms that compose a vocabulary, but by the nice precision of its component parts. A numerical superiority of words, which, from their promiscuous application to one object, are expletive, or, from their confused application to a number, are undefined, constitutes defect. Human language is then in its most improved state, when the stock of words is so precisely adjusted to that of ideas, that every sign has its own conception, and every conception its own sign. As the objects of knowledge, which are the materials of arrangement, multiply, the capacity of arranging them increases, and the power of expression is the exact measure of this capacity, both in men and in nations*.

* Per quæ colligitur, eandem esse rationem et percipiendi quæ proferas, et proferendi quæ perceperis.—*Dialog. de caus. corrupt. eloq. Cap. 33.*

Till a high degree of accuracy is acquired in a living language, the exact power of terms, that are synonymous, is never determined. Before the use of delicate signs, men think not of stating the coarse discriminations in those they have. Had the French language been less refined, the ability of M. L'Abbé Girard, in tracing its synonymes, would have been less conspicuous. In spite of the censure of M. D'Alembert, his work must ever stand high in the estimation of the learned, and be regarded as a pattern, by all other grammarians, which it is scarcely possible to improve*.

In the attempts, as yet made, to define synonymous words in the dead languages, distinctions are often stated, with more subtlety than judgment. The attention, directed, perhaps, to a single instance, from which little can be drawn, is harrassed with unnecessary minuteness. Though the standard, furnished by the classics, is unalterably fixed, and secured against those innovations to which living tongues are subject, yet, in some cases, it is by no means easy to apply it. Investigations, besides, that are the most profitable, are generally the most difficult; and grammatical science suffers, from those being neglected by many as useless, which are, really, too hard for a few.

Synonymous terms, it should seem, originate from changes, that take place as necessarily in the language, as in the reason, of men. The speaker is led instinctively to form them, from perceiving new relations established by nature among the objects of his thoughts. Before language has become refined, the authority of use is never inviolable, and whatever anomalies present themselves may be with ease corrected. The leaders of the tribe assume that weight, in respect to expression, in a rude tongue, which is allowed to the most learned in a polished. Innovations, not dictated by caprice, are adopted without reluctance; and the progressive nature of speech supposes a liberty to

* On voit, par ce détail, que la nouvelle édition des *synonymes* projetée par M. L'Abbé Girard, demandoit un long travail pour être digne de la première, et pour l'être aussi de l'académie et de l'auteur. Il eût, sans doute, exposé d'abord à la tête de chaque article, comme il l'a fait dans quelquesuns, le sens général commun à tous les mots qui paroissent synonymes, et qu'il est assez difficile de bien fixer. Sa mort, arrivée trois ans après son entrée dans cette compagnie, l'empêcha d'exécuter un projet si utile.—*Hist. des Membres de l'Academie Française.* Tom. V. p. 352.

overturn the authority of use, while it is possible to establish it upon the basis of reason.

The ambiguities, occasioned by the unskilful application of synonymous terms, are more numerous than those who attend not to such subjects can easily suppose. No difference is at some times perceived, where it really exists, and, at others, a difference apprehended is grossly mistaken. Because the range of the generic necessarily comprehends the specific term, the two are rashly held to be equivalent. Two or more words often differ, in respect to the simplicity of the conceptions they announce, and the force of each is tried by its relation to one more general than them all. Such a field of observation is alike trying to the ingenuity and the perseverance of the enquirer; because Substance, Quality, and Relation, on which the arrangement of words depends, may be modified to an extent, which it is impossible to limit. By those, who have hitherto examined the exact power of synonymous words, similar parts of speech have been generally collated. Though this is by no means necessary, yet it is convenient for the observer. By preserving the same general difference in the terms analyzed, their special difference becomes more easily manifest. When the exact power of a radical verb, for instance, is ascertained, that of every adjective, substantive, and adverb, connected with it, is so likewise. A reference can be always made to the root, in which the circumstance, forming the specific difference, resides, and all the ramifications, however various, may be explained, by attending to those general characters, which distinguish them only as parts of speech.

When Cicero stated the power of *audacia*, and added, “quod tamen vitium est,” he disclosed a fact, that respected, not that substantive merely, but the verb *audere*, the adjective *audax*, and the adverb *audacter*. In each, it appears upon the first authority, there is implied a culpable boldness. When the participle, *audens*, is converted into an adjective, the time, inherent in the verb, seems not extinguished. The filial piety of Euryalus, consigning his mother to the care of Iulus, is heightened by the use of this term :

Hanc sine me spem ferre tui : *audentior* ibo,
In casus omnes.—VIRG. *Æn.* lib. 9. v. 291.

Upon that constitutional courage, which is the gift of nature, and is implied in *audax*, he looked for no change ; but he affirms, that to those occasional exertions, then apparently before him, and in which he saw no excess, the success of his request would be ever adding new strength.

The most abstract terms which men employ, such as *Existence*, *Extension*, and *Duration*, can be held synonymous, in the sense explained, with none in the same language. Being themselves the signs of those ultimate genera, to which all other things are referred, distinctions, predicable of other terms, do not apply to them. They are, in fact, too much, and not too little, known, to be happily illustrated. From the simplicity of the conceptions they denote, nothing is gained by the substitution of a new sign. They are incapable of being analyzed, and any circumstance added would give them a complexness that is repugnant to their nature. When Aristotle, accordingly, attempted to define *motion*, he exposed himself to the ridicule of his inferiors in science. The most general terms in speech may indeed be confounded with those they comprehend, as their first species ; but, as there are none wider in their import than themselves, they furnish no relation upon which a definition can rest.

Thus, from what is afterwards said of *Esse*, *Existere*, and *Fieri*, it will appear, that the substantive verb, in all languages, admits approximations, but has nothing like, to itself. All other verbs denote a super-addition, greater or less, to that existence, which this suggests alone ; and the varieties in those verbs, if duly traced, will be found to spring from nothing, but the extent of their deviation from this simplest of their species.

The approximations, then, that take place between the most abstract terms in language, and those which they comprehend as their first species, form a class of synonymes, which, from the simplicity of their nature, should take place of the rest. The next class comprehends terms, denoting substances, invested with a variety of permanent qualities, and is regulated by other laws. This extensive set furnishes an ample field for the grammarian's subtlety. As the great end of words is the rapid suggestion of thought, so their meaning is never made to depend on such a number of qualities, as to render them nearly descriptive of the objects they denote. A definition, strictly logical, would be

an improper appellation of its subject. A single predominant quality, accordingly, is often made to characterize the rest. Other qualities, that would complete the definition, if wanted, because they are ingredients in the composition formed by nature, are banished from the speaker's, and, of course, from the hearer's, apprehension. The grammarian, then, in order to explain all synonymous words successfully, should have learned the properties, upon which the proficients in every science, and every art, found the appellations of those substances that belong to it. His application of the name to the object is vague, in proportion to the number of its qualities which others have explored, but of which he is ignorant. Of all enquirers he should be the least arrogant; because, from the extent of his subject, which refers to every thing known and named, he allows a task to be imposed upon him, that he can but imperfectly execute. He has a right to suppose, that the combination, in respect to each mass of matter, to whatever use it is turned, has been duly ascertained. To the most correct use of the term he requires a rigid adherence, and he pardons neither the inaccuracies that spring from dulness, nor the innovations that spring from conceit.

When the old name is still applied to any metal, of which a new quality is discovered, the chemist makes an innovation, but, at the same time, an improvement, in language. He gives that word a power, which before it had not, by widening the range of thought, which men are able to express by it, and by announcing a combination of qualities, never before known to exist. The artificial destruction of a quality, in any substance, creates also the necessity of giving it a new name. In every stage of society, the state of speech depends on that of science, and is the most accurate measure of the knowledge and the discernment of those who use it.

Each substance, therefore, presents a pattern, which, however imperfectly understood, yet, in as far as it is so, is in itself immutable. Though the number of its qualities must appear to increase, as the science to which it belongs improves, yet the substance undergoes no change, and still remains the subject of observation to future enquirers. Upon the steady application of the term to the pattern, the accurate signification of a numerous tribe of nouns depends.

By means of this, the nominal essence of substances, which can alone be laid hold of, may be completely defined, and grammar may have all the stability of a science, when carried to those great principles in the nature of things, on which it ultimately depends.

But, in the vocabulary of languages, many terms are found to denote combinations, formed only to suit the views of the speaker, which never had, and never can have, any archetype in nature. A new, and a very numerous, class of synonymes rests upon these. The simple conceptions, involved in the complex terms *parricidium* and *peculatus*, for example, were put together by the will of those who formed the language. Those parts, which form the composition, are not more allied in nature than others, banished by that authority which united them. The first of the terms mentioned might have extended to the crime of killing a father only, without also implying that of killing any relation, or of a citizen plotting against his country. The last might have been limited to the crime of theft, which it implies, without superadding, that the subject stolen belonged to the public; or it might have extended to the violation of a public trust in the robber, and thus have been equivalent with the word *repetundarum*.

What is said of nouns holds equally as to verbs. It will be seen, that the idea of fear, suggested by *timere*, has no regard to the nature of the object exciting it; while that, by *vereri*, implies respect, from its supposed excellence; and that, by *metuere*, dread, from its supposed malignity. Such arbitrary combinations, whether announced by nouns or verbs, cannot be verified by any pattern, like the substance, whose nature is determined by the qualities that are already, or may be afterwards, discovered. They are first fabricated by the mind for its own convenience, and the union of their parts, however prone to separation, is upheld by distinct appellations. In giving names to substances, men fix the power of nouns, as they discover qualities, none of which, that are disjoined in nature, are ever made to coalesce in words. The sole standard for words, denoting arbitrary combinations, on the contrary, is formed by the practice of the purest speakers, and is registered in the apprehension of critics. Classical authority, less stable than the archetype held forth by nature, assumes its place, and rests upon the nice discernment, and the patient

collection, of those simple notions, that have been allowed to enter into the complex.

From the nature of the conceptions last mentioned, it must appear no easy matter to ascertain, and to preserve, the just application of words expressing them. The ordinary purposes of language are served, without any very accurate knowledge of the force of its component parts; and, fortunately for human society, the practice of the most useful of all arts can take place among those, who know nothing of its theory. While each individual gratifies his propensity to speak, all those, who employ the same language, maintain their privilege of adopting such signs only as they chuse. Augustus perceived a jealousy among his subjects, in respect to the right of speech, not to be reconciled with that submission with which they relinquished others. In spite of the emperor's authority, they spurned at the obtrusion of new terms, such as *vacerosus* and *betissare*; so that he felt his inability to form one Latin word*.

But although no superiority, in respect to power, or to talents, entitles a person, wantonly, to give existence to new words, yet it is the grammarian's province to fix, and to preserve, the precise import of the old. Were he to allow the irregularities of speech to multiply, a rapid course of innovations would soon defeat its purposes. Each term must maintain the place which use has assigned it, and the least tendency to what is impure must be checked in the beginning. Though the difficulty of marking the boundary between two must rise with the nearness of their approach, yet the merit of success in the enquiry is always proportioned to the subtlety needful to conduct it. No conjecture, however probable, must be allowed to take the place of an authentic fact. An acute distinction, not supported by due authority, must be deemed a mis-application of talents, that might have been useful. While it proves the ingenuity, it arraigns the indolence, or the rashness, of its author. Had he formed an induction of facts, by steadily observing the uses of each term, in the same and in different classics, he might have given a value to his remarks, of which they are destitute. He might have improved the

* SUTTON. *in vit. Cas. Aug.* c. 87.

understanding of others, though he assumed the merit only of improving their speech.

Were the conceptions of all men equally distinct, the list of synonymous words, requiring explanation, would be much abridged. He, who undertakes to explain these, must not always court the admiration of the discerning, by a display of his ingenuity, but must submit to the task of giving instruction where it is needed. A similarity in point of meaning may be falsely ascribed to two words, that have a common root, and too much confidence reposed in etymology, though, in unskilful hands, the most dangerous of all guides. Many adverbs, such as *humane*, and *humanitus*, *continuo*, and *continenter*, have been thus confounded. An attempt to explain these, to the illiterate, may often prove irksome to the learned. It is better, however, that the latter should be at times offended, than that the former should be for ever ignorant.

The list of synonymous words would be by no means improperly swelled, by giving a place in it to such as are very generally, though not always, contra-distinguished by the classics. It becomes a scholar to know their most common, as well as their constant, practice. In the glow of composition, the purest writers may have forgotten the standard they had established, and sneered at those fetters, with which severe critics would bind them. A real philologist, though marking irregularity in the use of terms, will still see room for a scientific discussion. What seemed, at first, a fault, may be afterwards found a beauty. The distinctive character of a term may appear never to have been lost sight of, and a seemingly anomalous application may be reconciled with that which is really primary.

The observations, already made, may, perhaps, illustrate both the characteristics of synonymous words, the causes of the ambiguity they often occasion, and the general means by which this is to be prevented. Though the list of these, which it is afterwards attempted to explain, be numerous, it is still susceptible of addition. If the plan adopted is approved of, it may be pursued by others more successfully, and to a greater extent. It is understood, however, that by far the greatest number of Latin terms, that can be justly opposed to each other, will be found in this collection. In executing a plan, both new

and difficult, much time and labour have been expended, and upon the candour of those, who are the best entitled to judge of the effects of these, the author throws himself with most confidence. He knows, that to catch the circumstance, on which minute differences rest, must try the ingenuity of the discerning, and may often leave room for diversity of opinion. He presumes only to assist the philosophic enquirer upon points of deep research; and, as he is far from supposing himself superior to errors, so he shall be ever ready to avow and to correct them. In stating the power of the different terms brought together, he had adopted, of himself, the plan of Monsieur D'Alembert, and has been uniformly guided by an expression of the point, in which they all agree. Reversing afterwards the synthetic method, by which this point was at first apprehended, he has tried to shew, by a variety of examples of classical authority, how each of the terms, collated, holds of that general definition, to which they all refer as a standard.

The truth of every thing advanced is to be tried by its consistency with the instances produced. Those instances may, to some, appear more numerous than needful. They who think so should consider, that the full force of terms, in a sentence separated from the passage to which it belongs, is not equally clear to every reader, and that mere skill in the language does not always unfold it. To a real philologist, besides, repeated proofs of what is true can never be disagreeable. What, to the eye of some readers, was obscure in the first instance, may be luminous in the second; and assertions, which, in respect to one combination, appeared doubtful, may, in another, prove themselves to be solid, and force conviction.

To fix the original force of each term, and then to trace the intermediate links, which unite this with its most remote, is an operation, often difficult, and sometimes impracticable. In the age, in which the radical idea was laid hold of, no series had perhaps begun. From the simple train, seen imperfectly, and only at its commencement, involuntary deviations may have taken place. Shades of meaning, originally distinct, thus elude the sight; and the issue of a chase becomes unsatisfactory, in which the pursuer has exhibited both perseverance and skill.

With this, which may be regarded as an unavoidable cause of difficulty, in the definition of terms, another, seemingly accidental, unites its force. Between their literal and their metaphorical senses there may have existed a struggle, in which the former has been destroyed. The metaphor, in such cases, must be driven from the place it has preposterously assumed, and the effects of that blunder extinguished; which has been sanctioned by the authority of use.

Along with the synonymes of the Latin language, an attempt has been made to explain its PREPOSITIONS, in the order in which they occur in the arrangement. If these, the most subtle of the parts of speech, require deep attention in a simple state, much more do they require it, when compounded. In this last capacity, they modify the term, to which they are prefixed, with all the variety of power belonging to each of them when apart. Their primary relations holding as to matter in space, must be made by analogy to explain relations, from which the idea of space is excluded. Without analyzing prepositions, synonymes can never be understood; as the force of the contrasted term often rests upon that, given or withheld by what is made to coalesce with it.

Though the author is convinced, that it is impossible either to abridge those discussions, by which the force of contrasted synonymes is unfolded, or to render them intelligible to boys, yet he apprehends, that no teacher of Latin can perform his duty with skill, to whom such discussions are new. If his knowledge be superficial, in vain will his pupils expect to become learned. He can neither dispel the obscurities that arise from dulness, nor feed the cravings of genius. "Qui pythia cantat prius didicit," says Horace; and, as the case is in music, so is it in literature. The most accomplished proficient, in each, once hung upon their teachers, and, according to the extent of their information, such were the chances of failure or of success, upon the part of their pupils. Though the mind of the boy cannot cope with that of the man, yet no incorrect conception should be allowed to enter it. With a view to assist the learners of the first principles of that language, which is the general repository of knowledge, the author proposes, soon, to reduce into the form of a vocabulary the general results of what may be here established.

In that work, no subtle disquisition, respecting the comparative force of terms, or the philosophy of prepositions, will find a place. What is there

doubtful, from being just stated to the apprehension of the learned, may be here explained and supported; and the numerous authorities, which the Roman classics have furnished, will be found to form the best, nay the only, criterion, for judging of those classics themselves.

To the success of the present undertaking, in which subjects so intricate are discussed, more time may have been requisite than the author could always spare. The severity of his professional labours, during the greater part of the year, is known to many. Even when these were suspended, much of his leisure, that should have been devoted to the pursuit of letters, was long bestowed upon objects, to which few literary men were ever forced to attend.

Under every discouragement, however, he was animated with a sense of the importance of his subject. The Latin language has long been the vehicle, for transmitting the discoveries of every country to its neighbours, and of every race to its posterity. While the Roman classics are preserved, its purity may be so likewise; but were this standard to be either lost, or not critically understood, the barriers which avert its corruption would be removed, and its delicate beauties would be robbed of the admiration they have enjoyed for ages. In spite of the very able assistance given by certain Dutch and German critics, such as Popma, Noltenius, Gesner, and Schellerus, the extent of those nice discriminations, that are to be found in its synonymes, is still but imperfectly seen. In the discharge of his duty, the author has long tried to remedy this defect, and humbly flatters himself, that, if what is now offered meets with the approbation of the public, his labours may contribute to render the knowledge of Latin more scientific and precise. As the language is generally taught, the student, after a severe and a tedious course of study, stops at a stage near his journey's end. Were he to exercise his reason by such discussions as those that are here exemplified, that small stock of learning, which feeds the vanity of the pedant, would sink into the contempt it deserves. The ablest metaphysician would then take the rank, to which he is entitled as a critic; and many a passage in the Roman classics would be found luminous and instructive, that now lies neglected, because it is not understood.

THE
SYNONYMES
OF
THE LATIN LANGUAGE.

A. AB. ABS.

THE primary notion, suggested by these three prepositions, is the same ; that of the continually increasing distance of a body in motion, in respect to a point from which that motion commenced. They regard not the cause of this state, and are equally applicable to a body, that has the power of moving itself, and to one, that is impelled by something external. Till a change of place exists, they suggest nothing, and, regarding the moving body only in respect to the point of outset, they announce one of its relations, by governing the term which expresses that point.

——— *a Troja ventosa per æquora vectos.*—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 335.

— *Argiva phalanx instructis navibus ibat*

A Tenedo, tacitæ per amica silentia Lunæ,

Littora nota petens.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 254.

In the first of these examples, the city of Troy, and, in the second, the island of Tenedos, are the points, from which the motion of the adventurers commenced. In both a relation is suggested, which began and will end with the motion, and which does not depend on the extent of the interval between those

moving in the vessels, and the points of their departure, governed by the preposition.

In some cases, there is no reference whatever to the point at which the motion terminates, and, in others, there is an obscure one; as in the words "Litora nota petens." It often happens, however, that the point of departure, governed by *a*, and the correlative point governed by "ad," are distinctly mentioned. Thus, Horace, speaking of the range through which the industrious merchant carries on his traffic, says :

Hic mutat merces surgente *a* sole, ad eum quo
Vespertina tepet regio.—SAT. 1. 4. 29.

But the points, at which the voyage of the merchant began and ended, may be regarded as fixed in space, and thus become the measure of distance between bodies that are quiescent, the one of which lies in the east, and the other in the west.

Omnibus in terris quæ sunt *a* Gadibus usque
Auroram et Gangem.—JUVEN. 10. 1.

The poet here mentions a space, extending from the west of Europe to the eastern parts of Asia. Though he uses the preposition *a*, which originally denotes motion, he does not say that this space has been travelled over. He merely suggests an interval between the island, on the coast of Spain, and the river in India.

The prepositions, then, which first refer only to the point left, while the motion of the body continues, regard this point, afterwards, in relation to that at which this motion ceases. They thus depart from their primary power, and, by a natural association, are made to connote interval between bodies that have been always quiescent. "Passus sexcentos *ab* his castris idoneum locum delegit."—CÆS. *Bell. Gall.* 1. 49.

Though the prepositions suggest nothing as to the interval, or measured distance, between any two points, yet they may be so modified by the adverb "prope," as to signify nearness. The progress of the moving body is supposed to be soon stopped; and this gives existence to proximity, in respect to the

point of departure. “Tam prope *a* domo detineri.”—CIC. in VER. 110. a.
 “Proximus *a* postremo.—CIC. *Orat.* 218. a. In translating the above passages, we say, “near *to* the house,” and “next *to* the last ;” and thus the direction of the career is, in English, reversed, in respect to what it is in Latin. It is so, also, in the following example from Pliny. “Proximum est caprarum stercus *ab* hoc avium.—*Lib.* 17. *cap.* 9.

But the prepositions denote nearness, not only when connected with “prope,” or the superlative “proximus,” to which it is allied, but also when the characteristic idea of those terms is got by implication. Thus, in the ordinal numerals, as “secundus” comes immediately after “primus,” so the former term, united with *a*, signifies proximity in general. “Secundus *a* rege,” next *to* the king.—HIRT. *Bell. Alex. cap.* 66.

Exemplum vitæ fuit *a* cornice secundæ.—JUV. Sat. 10. 247.

The longevity of Nestor is said to be more than human, and to be next to that of the crow, which was supposed to live three centuries.

Even without any auxiliary word, these prepositions have, in themselves, the power of denoting nearness.

————— hæc cistella
 Numnam hinc *ab* nobis domo est ?
 Nam hinc *ab* ostio jacentem sustuli.—PLAUT. *Cist.* 4. 1. 7.

In the first part of this sentence, which is interrogative, *ab* is taken in its ordinary sense, and signifies interval between the house, from which the casket is supposed to have come, and the spot on which it was found. In the last part, however, in which Lampadiscus suggests the ground of his supposition, he limits this interval, and infers, that this casket had been in the house, purely because the spot, on which it had been found lying, was near to the door.—“Pleræque epistolæ mihi nuntiabant ubi esses, quod erant *abs* te.”—CIC. *Ep. Attic.* 4. 16. If we abstract the notion of vicinity from the preposition, the above sentence would be void of meaning.

From the general power of the prepositions, in marking vicinity between the point implied in the word governed by them, and that occupied by the corre-

lative object, the place, at which a person is generally to be found, is expressed, either by the name of that person, or by a pronoun referring to it :

Pam. Unde est ? dic clare. *Mys. a vobis.*—*TER. And. 4. 4. 15.*

The reply of Mysis is to be translated “from your house ;” though this definition of place is couched in the notion of nearness to the spot where the person generally is. Under the idea of residence is suggested every point at which the inhabitant may be, and the whole of the points are understood to be near one another :

Ch. Ab Andria est Ancilla hæc quantum intelligo.—*TER. And. 4. 4. 17.*

Mysis is here said to have come “from the house of her mistress,” who took her appellation from the island in which she was born.

The departments of servants are announced and fixed by their being near those places at which their services are performed, so that they can promptly afford the assistance that is wanted. Thus, Ganymede, the cup-bearer of Jupiter, was supposed not only to be in the God’s presence, but near to the cup which he occasionally handed to him. He was said, accordingly, “*A cyathis Jovis esse.*” A lacquey, or footman, was said to be “*a pedibus ;*” that is, near to the feet of the master, before whom he humbled himself, and from whom he received his commands. “*Servum a pedibus Romam misi.*”—*CIC. Ep. Att. 8. 5.* “*Libertorum præcipue suspexit Posidem & Harpocram, & super hos Polybium a studiis, sed ante omnes Narcissum ab Epistolis, & Pallantem a rationibus.*”—*SUETON. in Vita Claud. 28.* By means of these prepositions, the historian here mentions the director of the Emperor’s studies ; the secretary, who received and wrote his letters ; and the keeper of his accounts.

This idea of vicinity, involved in the prepositions, will also explain their being applied to the communication of support, or assistance, from the circumstance of being at hand, so as to afford it. “*Commune est quod nihilo magis ab adversariis, quam a nobis facit.*”—*CIC. de In. 59. a.* “*Critolaus erat ab Aristotele.*”—*CIC. de In. 1. 3.*

Omnia isthæc ego facile patior dum hic hinc a me sentiat :
Atqui nunc *abs* te stat.—PLAUT. *Rud.* 4. 4. 56.

When the idea of support is not so clear as in the instances quoted, the prepositions are translated “upon the side of.” In such cases, something favourable is understood, by implication, to those suggested in the governed word, arising from the vicinity of a person, always willing, and supposed able, to repel any evil. “Principes utrinque pugnam ciébant ; *ab* Sabinis Metius Curtius, *ab* Romanis Hostus Tullius.”—LIV. I. 12. As “*utrinque*” signifies “upon both sides,” so *ab* signifies “upon each side respectively.” The Generals of the contending parties could not have been both successful ; but each supported those whom he headed and was near, by employing the means seemingly the most conducive to victory.

In some cases, the idea of support is thrown out of the import of the prepositions, and they are thus translated, “upon the quarter of,” or “towards.”—“Portus *ab* Africo tegebatur, *ab* Austro non erat tutus.”—CÆS. *Bell. Civ.* 3. 26. “Aquilone maxime gaudent, densiores *ab* afflatu ejus lætioresque, et materiæ firmioris.”—PLIN. 17. 2. The naturalist here speaks of a certain species of trees, to which the north wind was as beneficial as to others it is noxious. That quarter of the wood, which lay towards the north, was nearest the point from which the blast came, and the growth and quality of the timber was improved by being exposed to it. “Ita ex omnibus partibus, a fronte, a latere, a tergo trucidantur Hispani.”—LIV. 27. 49. Each of the quarters, upon which this havoc was committed upon the Spaniards, is announced by the preposition, though it might not have been upon the whole, and upon less than the three.

The relation of cause and effect is understood to result from the nearness of bodies, one of which can, from this circumstance, produce a change upon the other. Hence, these prepositions denote cause, as referring both to the efficient means, and to the motive which influences a voluntary agent ;

Occidit a forti (sic Dii voluistis) Achille.—OVID. *Met.* 13. 597.

Had the rencounter never taken place, Achilles would not have been the ef-

ficient cause of his antagonist's death. "Gallinæ pullos cum excluserint ita tuentur, ut si calor est a sole, se opponant."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 52. b. The hens instinctively do what is equal to removing the heat, by getting between their chicks and the sun, which emits it. "Ibi eum incomposito agmine negligentius *ab* re bene gesta euntem adorti Æqui.—LIV. V. 28. The power of the *ab*, in this sentence, is equal to that of "propter." It was "on account of" the former success of Posthumius, that he was thrown off his guard, and a notion formed as to the weakness of the Æqui, was the cause of his ill-founded security. "Sanus filium a prima offensa non exhæredat."—SEN. *de Clem.* I. 14. The first offence is not, with a wise father, "the cause on account of" which he disinherits his son.

As the vicinity of one body to another, from which it is distinct, is understood, in certain circumstances, to be favourable to its best state, so the removal of the adjunct from its principal is supposed to have a contrary effect. In order to explain this power, the prepositions must be regarded as suggesting distance, or extent of interval. The principal is, in this use, expressed by "res," which represents a substance supporting certain qualities, one of which is supposed away from it, and thereby injuring the whole.

Quidvis, dum *ab* re nequid ores, faciam.—PLAUT. *Capt.* 2. 2. 8.

Hegio promises to do every thing desired, provided Tyndarus asked nothing injurious to a plan, the nature of which was understood. The fulfilment of the promise was to imply the separation of no circumstance, by the absence of which its success might be blasted. "Non *ab* re fuerit subtexere quæ ei, priusquam nasceretur et ipso natali die ac deinceps evenerint."—SÆTON. *in vita August.* 98. The "res," here, was the history of the emperor's life, and the events, immediately preceding and following his birth, are supposed to be of such consequence as to make part of it. A disjunction of these from the historian's narrative, it is understood, would have been injurious to it.

The primary notion of the prepositions, which we have found to refer to the existing motion of a body, that has left a point, at which it was before quiescent, is transferred to process in time. In this application they refer to a

defined point, subsequent to which an interval has elapsed ; and this interval is measured by such divisions of time as best correspond with its length. Successive periods, whether longer or shorter, are supposed to have taken their departure from a point, strictly defined ; and an analogy is established between the motion of a body, in space, and the flux of fixed times, in duration. As miles, furlongs, and yards, are the adopted measures of the former, so are years, months, and days, the adopted measures of the latter. “Cujus a morte hic tertius & tricesimus annus est.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 80. 6. The interval here is measured by years, thirty-two of which had elapsed, and the thirty-third was current.

Usque ab Aurora ad hoc quod est diei.—PLAUT. *Pæn.* 1. 2. 6.

As the interval, in the former example, was measured by years, and by months, which are the largest fraction of years, so, in this, it is measured by the hours, and their divisions, that had elapsed from sun-rising to the time of the day that then was. “Ab ovo usque ad mala.”—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 3. 6. The length of the interval, in the last example, depended on the accidental continuance of the entertainment, and this might have been longer or shorter, as those who were at it found themselves disposed. “Scipionis classis quadragésimo die a securi navigavit.”—PLIN. 16. 39. The interval between the application of the hatchet to the green wood, and the sailing of the fleet built of it, is, as in the last example, measured by days. In all the instances, the time, strictly ascertained, at which the calculation commences, is held analogous to the point actually left by the body, which in space moves from it.

If the foregoing reasoning be well founded, the three prepositions *A*, *Ab*, and *Abs*, have ten different applications, to one or other of which every possible use of them may be referred.

I.

FROM ; as expressing the continually increasing distance of a body in motion, from the point it had left when its state changed.

II.

FROM ; as denoting interval, either between bodies, one, or both of which, have been previously in motion, or between two that have been always quiescent.

III.

NEAR TO. This use rests upon an idea, that the motion of the body had soon stopped, after its departure from a point, at which it had been before quiescent.

IV.

IN THE HOUSE OF. This depends upon the meaning immediately preceding. It suggests the idea of habitation, from the supposed nearness of a person to the place at which he dwells.

V.

IN THE SERVICE OF; as being near the place at which the duties of a department, specified by the governed word, can be fulfilled.

VI.

BEING ON THE SIDE OF, OR FAVOURABLE TO. This meaning is also founded upon that nearness, first suggested in the third. A person, disposed to give voluntary assistance, is enabled to do so by being near those requiring it.

VII.

TOWARDS; ON THE QUARTER OF; IN RESPECT TO. This use, also, arises from the idea of diminished distance, or of the comparative nearness of one side of a space to the governed point, as opposed to the centre of this space, or to any of its other sides.

VIII.

BY MEANS OF; OR ON ACCOUNT OF. This idea of causation is understood to arise from the vicinity of the body, producing the effect, to that upon which it is produced.

IX.

CONTRARY TO THE INTEREST OF. The subject, in this case, is not expressed, but clearly implied in the general term "res." In this application, the preposition reverts to that separation, or interval, which is held forth in its primary power. It denotes more than the opposite of vicinity, in the estrangement of an essential quality from a subject, which naturally and necessarily supports it.

X.

AFTER; SINCE A DEFINED TIME. In this use there is also a reference to

the primary idea ; and, as the motion of a body between two points, effecting interval, is the measure of space, so the lapse of time between two periods is, by analogy, made the measure of duration.

The prepositions *A*, *Ab*, and *Abs*, retain, in composition, the idea of separation from a point, at which motion commenced, which is stated as the radical one in their simple state. They then denote, either that a whole changes its place, or that a part does so, by being lopped off, or separated from, the mass.

This power of the three prepositions appears in such compounded verbs as “*avolare*,” to fly from ; “*abigere*,” to drive from ; “*abscondere*,” to hide from. In each of them, the force of the different prepositions, in the concrete form, is precisely equal to that in the simple. “*Columbæ ex consuetudine avolare et revolare solent.*”—*CAIUS. in L. Nat. de acquir. Dom. lib. 41. Tit. 1.* “*Puer, abige muscas.*”—*CIC. de Orat. 131. b.* “*Erant fortasse gladii sed absconditi.*”—*CIC. in Anton. 180. b.* The swords, here mentioned, were removed from the places, in which they might have been seen, and carefully put out of the way.

In the view already taken of the prepositions as compounded, they undergo nothing more than a change of place, and no alteration in their meaning, in consequence of being prefixed to words, with which they are not originally connected. But, in another view, we shall find their original import seemingly lost sight of, and a change superinduced upon the term with which they are conjoined. This power of the preposition the Greeks styled its *Δυναμις σερητικη* and the Latins its *vis privativa*. In the exercise of this power, we shall find, in the first example that follows, that the term, to which the preposition is prefixed, presents a correlative object, opposed to another one, implied but not expressed, and upon which the government of the preposition would naturally throw itself.

The two first prepositions, *A* and *Ab*, which are by much the most frequently used, both in the simple and the compounded state, signify, in the latter, the privation of a quality involved in the annexed term, whether it is capable of motion or otherwise. This power appears in such words as “*Amens*,” “*Absimilis*.” The first denotes the privation of reason, which is

essential to mind in a sound state. This meaning holds of the radical one, by imputing, from analogy, motion, and consequent interval, to subjects that are susceptible of neither. Varro suggests this idea in the definition of a person to whom "Amens" is applicable; "Is qui *a* mente sua discessit."—*De L. L. V. VI.* We should have agreed with the critic entirely, had he said, "*a* quo mens sua discessit," and made the influence of the preposition act upon the object correlative to that, to which it is made an appendage. It is the departure of intellect, which is the quality, from the person, which is the substance, that is suggested; not that of the person from intellect. That the general assertion is true, may be more apparent in other compounded words, than in that under discussion. "Impeditus" and "Expeditus" are both compounds of "pes;" but the "in," attached to the former, and the "ex" to the latter, do not make the one refer to any thing "in," and the other to any thing "out of," the feet. In both compounds, the preposition respects the implied object, "in" which the first supposes the feet entangled, and "from" which the last supposes them disentangled.

"Absimilis" denotes the absence of likeness, under the idea that this quality has separated from a certain substance, in which, if it had continued, a precise similitude would have taken place between it and another. "Non *absimilis* Tiberio principi fuit."—*SUETON. in Othone. i.* The resemblance between Tiberius and Otho was so great, that many believed they stood in the relation of father and son. It is asserted that there was not one remove of that quality in Otho, as a copy, which formed his resemblance to Tiberius, as a pattern, and from this their mutual likeness is inferred. As the prepositions, in a simple state, fix nothing as to the interval between the two objects they present as related, so, in their compounded, they fix nothing as to the diversity of the qualities which are defined in the radical term, and then variously modified by a class of words, with which it is found to be blended. The quality of unlikeness, for example, denoted by "absimilis," may find many a place in the range between "similis," and the totally opposite quality expressed by "dissimilis."

As *A* and *Ab*, in composition, have a privative power, so *Ab* and *Abs* possess an opposite one, which the Greeks style a *Δυναμὶς Ἐπιτατικῆς*. By means

of this intensive power, they confirm the original meaning of the term with which they are associated. They have this power, however, only when united with verbs; as in the case of “abnegare,” and “abstergere.” The simple verb, “negare,” signifies “to deny,” or to “say no.”

Negat quis? Nego. Ait? Aio.—TER. *Eun.* 2. 2. 19.

The sycophant is here well represented as saying no and yes, as denying and affirming, just as it suits his interest. But the compounded verb, “abnegare,” suggests more than simple denial, by superadding the positive keenness of the person who denies:

Rex tibi conjugium et quæsitæ sanguine dotes
Abnegat; externusque in regnum quæritur hæres.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 423.

The Fury here gives Turnus the most express assurance of the king's positive denial, and, by means of the compounded verb, discourages every hope as to his relenting, and adopting him as his son-in-law.

The simple verb, “tergere,” signifies to “rub or clean,” but its compound, “abstergere,” signifies to do so by every possible method, and with the utmost care:

— manuque simul veluti lacrymantia *tersit*
Lumina.—OVID. *Met.* 13. 135.

As the grief of Ulysses was feigned, and as he was much engaged with his speech, it cannot be supposed that he was attentive to the manner in which he rubbed his eyes. It was otherwise with the young man, mentioned by Catullus, from whom the kiss was stolen; and such was the keenness with which he wiped his mouth, that the compounded verb only could do it justice in the expression.

Nam simul id factum est, multis diluta labella
Guttis *abstersisti* omnibus articulis,
Ne quicquam nostro contractum ex ore maneret.—CATULL. 97. 7.

There is a keenness, then, in the act of the person, “abnegans,” and “abstergens,” not to be found in the person to whom the simple participles only are applied. The involved distance, by means of the prepositions, between the agent and the correlative object which they affect, supposes a super-added energy in the radical operation, proportioned to the difficulty with which it can

then be performed. The cold denial of an interested sycophant, in the first example, is very different from the peremptory refusal of a king, whose resolution was fixed, in the second; and the affected grimace, with which the artful Ulysses wiped his eyes, is very different from the violent animation, with which the boy wiped his mouth, when he thought himself affronted.

ABDERE, CONDERE, ABSCONDERE, OCCULERE, CELARE,

agree in denoting the act of hiding, but differ, either as to the motives, which lead to this act, or as to the means, by which it is accomplished. ABDERE, compounded of "ab" and "dare," signifies, literally, "to give from;" and suggests the voluntary deed of concealing an object, by removing it from the eye, which would otherwise observe it. "Vestilia in insulam Seriphon *abdita est.*"—TAC. *Ann.* 2. 85.

E conspectu heri sui servi se *abdiderunt.*—PLAUT. *Pseud.* 4. 7. 5.

— nam senex

Rus *abdedit* se; huc raro in urbem com meat.—TER. *Hec.* 1. 2. 100.

When the place, occupied by the object concealed, is specified, as in the last and the following example, the term, denoting it, may be put in the accusative, in consequence of the motion implied in the preposition, and necessary to give existence to that species of hiding, which the verb suggests. "*Abdidit* se in intimam Macedoniam, quo potuit longissime a castris."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 13. 28.

When a dative case comes in place of the governed accusative, the idea of giving, which is specific in respect to the simple verb, "dare," overbalances that of removal, which distinguishes the compound. "*Qui ita se literis abdiderrunt.*"—CIC. *pro Arch. Poet.* 188. a. The conception is here given, not by the people moving from a point, before occupied, towards learning, but by their giving themselves up to it.

The concealment, denoted by *abdere*, does not always depend on the absolute distance of the object from the person. It may be effected by the darkness of the place, in which it is deposited, though every thing within it, if illuminated, would be within the sphere of his vision. "*Cum se ille fugiens in scalarum tenebris abdidisset.*"—CIC. *pro MIL.* 109. b. As the verb, in this example, has

no reference to motion, the preposition, "in," does not govern the accusative. By governing the ablative, it denotes the quiescence of the person, enjoying that security by lurking in darkness, which might have been attained by going out of the way.

Abdere deviates most from its primitive power, when it signifies "to hide by covering." An intervening object is, in this use, supposed to do what is effected by darkness in the last mentioned, and by removal in the radical. "Cultrum quem sub veste *abditum* habebat, eum in corde defigit."—LIV. 1. 48.

CONDERE signifies to hide, by the intervention of certain objects, with which that, which is concealed, is not necessarily connected. "Arcam esse factam, eaque *conditas* sortes, quæ hodie Fortunæ monitu tolluntur."—CIC. *de Div.* 126. a.

Quam multa in sylvis avium se millia *condunt*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 475.

The stimulating motive in the being, "qui condit," is the love of security for that which is concealed. Festus, accordingly, says of this verb, "proprie est in unum et interiorem locum dare ad custodiam faciliorem."

The safety of that, which is *abditum*, depends on the ignorance of the person from whom it is hidden, as to the particular place it occupies. This, however, is not always the case with that which is *conditum*. A thief may know that there is money in a strong box, which he cannot touch; and, though a fowler may know that there are birds upon trees, yet the foliage prevents him from seeing the spot they occupy.

From an apprehended analogy between the manner in which a writer and a builder collect and arrange their materials, and the selection and application of those things, which are fittest for hiding a particular object, the verb *condere* is transferred to productions, both in learning and architecture. Thus, Quintilian, treating of books upon rhetorick, says, "Romanorum primus *condidit* aliqua in hac materia Marcus Cato."—3. 1. 19.

————— si carmina *condas*.—HOR. *de Art. Poet.* 436.

————— Pallas quas *condidit* arces
Ipsa colat.—VIRG. *Ec.* 2. 61.

As, in the primitive use of *condere*, the concealment is not effected, till the body is completely covered, so, in its figurative uses, it supposes a consummation of the work defined by it. It would be improperly applied to a poem, or a house, that had been left imperfect. When it is applied to the divisions of time, the period, whether fixed by nature or convention, is always exhausted:

————— *vivendo condere sæcla.*—LUCRET. 3. 1104.

————— *sæpe ego longos*

Cantando puerum memini me condere soles.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 9. 51.

Condit quisque diem collibus in suis.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 5. 29.

The expression, “*lustrum condere*,” implies, that the survey of the Roman people was complete, and that this was finished, like the days, in the two last examples, said to have been spent. When the completion, implied in *condere*, is referred to animal life, it suggests the end or extinction of it. Thus, Seneca tells us, that Alexander fell a sacrifice to his intemperance: “*Alexandrum intemperantia bibendi, et ille Herculanæus scyphus condidit.*” *Ep.* 83. ad fin.

Both *condere* and *abdere* are compounds of “*dare*,” and, as “*ab*,” in the latter, regards the removal of an object, as the cause of its concealment, so “*con*,” in the former, regards the assemblage of objects, as the means of producing the same effect upon another, with which they are brought into connection.

ABSCONDERE unites in itself the powers of the verbs *abdere* and *condere*, and signifies to hide, by all possible means. The radical power of “*a*,” “*ab*,” and “*abs*,” has, in treating of these prepositions, been shewn to be the same. In *abscondere*; both “*ab*” and “*con*” operate upon the common root, and produce a more powerful effect than either can do separately. “*Tanquam scelera ostendi oporteat, dum puniuntur, flagitia abscondi.*”—TAC. *De Mor. Ger.* 12. The first species of crimes was brought to light, to deter those, who beheld their punishment, from committing them, while the last, because shocking and unnatural, was industriously concealed. “*Est quiddam, quod quo studiosius opprimitur et absconditur, eo magis eminent et apparet.*”—CIC. *pro Sex. Rosc.* 38. b.

In latebras *abscondas* pectore penitissimo stultitiam tuam.—PLAUT. *Cist.* 1. 1. 65.

By a figurative, but a natural and elegant, use of *abscondere*, it is made to denote the losing sight of an object at sea:

Protinus aërias Phæacum *abscondimus* arces.—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 291.

The constant increase of distance, necessarily taking place, is involved in the verb *abdere*; and the casual intervention of thick air, or clouds, or the convexity of the earth's surface, each of which may form a covering, is involved in the verb *condere*. Seneca has also an elegant application of *abscondere*, analogous to that now stated, and presents human life by it, under the notion of a race. “In hoc cursu rapidissimi temporis primum pueritiam *abscondimus*, deinde adolescentiam.”—SEN. *Ep.* 70.

OCCULERE signifies to hide, for the sake of that which is hidden. It is a compound of *colere*, the most general power of which is, that of making the most of any object, by duly attending to it. This general power of the simple verb is modified by the conjoined preposition, which, as appears in the discussion upon “ob,” suggests, that an intermediate object prevents the approach of one to another, whether injurious to it, or otherwise. Its effect in *occulere* is like its effect in “obsidere,” which signifies, to beset a place in all directions; so as to prevent communication, either in one line or another:

—————quæcunque premes virgulta per agros
Sparge fimo pingui, et multa memor *occulere* terra.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 346.

Without paying such attentions as those here recommended, the improver may lose his labour, from the severity of the season. “Puncta argumentorum plerumque *occulas*, ne quis ea numerare possit; ut re distinguantur, verbis confusa esse videantur.”—CIC. *De Or.* 124. b. The concealment, here recommended, is clearly to render the arguments of the speaker more effective, by depriving his antagonist of an advantage. “At Alcibiades, victis Atheniensibus, non satis tuta eadem loca sibi arbitrans, penitus in Thraciam se supra Propontidem *abdedit*, sperans ibi facillime suam fortunam *occuli* posse.”—NEP. *in Alcib.* 9. This commander, dreading the jealousy of his countrymen, retired far from their view, according to the native power of the verb *abdere*. The preservation of his fortune, which was the object hidden, and the cause of his retreat, is afterwards announced by the verb *occulere*.

CELARE signifies to hide, for the sake of the person who does so. His interest, in the success of the concealment, may vary according to circumstances, and be either greater or less than he supposes. The purity with which terms are used, at the same time, rests entirely on the conceptions of the speaker. A just conception, accordingly, may be inaccurately expressed, and a false one the contrary. “Satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid profecimus, persuasum esse debet, si omnes Deos hominesque *celare* possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil injuste, nihil libidinosè, nihil incontinentè esse faciendum.”—CIC. *De Off.* 59. 6.

“Stultorum incurata pudor malus ulcera *celat*.”—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 16. 24.

The *mauvaise honte*, here condemned by the poet, is the cause of a wrong judgment. Fools consider that concealment to be for their interest, which is really the contrary.

But Cicero has favoured us with a definition of *celare*, which will make it needless to produce any other examples. “Neque enim id est *celare*, quicquid reticeas: sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire.”—CIC. *De Off.* 63. a. In the definition given by this great master of Roman eloquence, it appears, that not only the concealer has an interest in the success of his deception, but those, also, whom he tries to blind, in escaping its effects.

As the advantage of the concealer, and that of the object concealed, are often mutual, a promiscuous use of *occulere* and *celare* is perfectly consistent with the definition given of each. In the following sentence, in which Mithridates is said to have been both the hider and the object hidden, either verb might have been used, with equal propriety. The increased energy of the agent, expressed in the frequentative *occultare*, it must be observed, does not affect the motive, suggested in the root, as being that from which his conduct proceeds. “Et ita regnat, ut se non Ponto neque Cappadociæ latebris *occultare* velit, sed emergere e patrio regno, atque in vestris vectigalibus, hoc est, in Asiæ luce versari.”—CIC. *Pro Leg. Man.* 5. a.

When inanimate objects form a nominative to *celare*, the condition specified cannot be duely complied with. From the good done to those suscep-

tible of it, the mind believes, at the time, that the objects it personifies have an interest in the concealment by which that good is effected.

Hic quos durus amor crudeli tabe peredit,
Secreti celant calles.—VIRG. *Æn.* vi. 442.

The view taken of these five verbs, separately, seems to lead to the following conclusion: that the ground of difference between *abdere*, *condere*, and *abscondere*, rests on the manner in which the concealment is effected, whether by removal, by covering, or by both jointly; and that that between *occulere* and *celare* rests on the motive by which the agent is actuated, whether proceeding from regard to that which he conceals, or to himself.

ABJURARE, EJURARE,

agree, in denoting “to deny upon oath,” but differ, in respect to the reason for which the denial is made. The first verb supposes the swearer guilty of perjury, in denying, with an oath, the trust that had been committed to him. “Tulliola deliciolæ nostræ tuum munusculum flagitat, et me ut sponsorem appellat. Mihi autem *abjurare* certius est, quam dependere.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 5. a.

Nec metuo quibus credidi hodie,
Ne quis mihi in jure *abjurassit*.—PLAUT. *Pers.* 4. 3. 9.

In the above examples, there is implied, in *abjurare*, a solemn denial of a known fact; namely, that the person swearing had been ever entrusted with what was really committed to him.

EJURARE differs from *abjurare*, in having no reference to perjury, in respect to a trust that had been committed to the swearer; but to his declaring, upon oath, that he will break off a connection with another, either from the disadvantage, or the impossibility, of maintaining it. “Negociatores putant esse turpe id forum sibi iniquum *ejurare* ubi negocientur: Prætor provinciam suam totam sibi iniquam *ejurat*.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 178. b. Both the traders and the prætor acted in the same way, by swearing that the connection, found to be disadvantageous, must be abandoned. “Prævenerat rumor *ejurari* ab eo imperium.”—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 60. The fixed determination of Vitellius to give

up the reins of government, as requiring a greater exertion than he was either able or willing to make, is well expressed by *ejurari*. "Tu autem quod mihi bonam copiam *ejures* nihil est."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 136. b. The expression, "ejurare bonam copiam," signifies to claim the privilege of a "cessio bonorum," and of an insolvent act. By the oath given in this case, it was meant to prove, that the connection which subsisted between the debtor and creditor must be dissolved, as it was impossible that the obligation incurred by the former could ever be fulfilled. The definition of "ejuratio," by Festus, corresponds with this last use of the verb. "Significat id quod desideretur non posse præstari."

By the expression, "jurare bonam copiam," the lawyers mean the reverse of what is intended by the verb *ejurare*, so placed. By the simple verb, the debtor swears that he has substance enough to satisfy his creditors, and is willing to do them justice. In the compounded verbs, all the difference rests upon the effect of the prepositions "Ab," and "E," on the common root. By the first, a declaration is made, that the trust was away from, that is, was never committed to, the swearer; and by the second, that this trust, which he had had in charge, was afterwards disclaimed, or formally put out of it.

ABNORMIS, ENORMIS,

agree in denoting a deviation from some standard, but differ according to its extent. The radical word "norma," suggests a standard of any kind, but one that is supposed to regulate the nature of the object to which it is applied. The two, however, are always understood not to accord. Thus, when Horace tells us that Ofellus was,

Rusticus, *abnormis* sapiens, crassaque Minerva.—SAT. 2. 2. 3.

he affirms that he was a wise man, but somewhat eccentric, that is, not formed precisely according to the standard held forth by philosophers. A deviation from a certain rule, then, did exist; but we are, in the case of *abnormis*, to understand that it was only a slight one.

ENORMIS, again, signifies something monstrous, in which the standard is nearly lost sight of, in respect to size, shape, or some other distinguishing cir-

cumstance. The preposition, "E," discovers a strong privative power, founded on its original notion of departure, without regard to any point at which the motion may stop. Had *enormis* been employed by Horace in the above-mentioned passage, it would have destroyed the quality of wisdom by the extent of the implied deviation from the rule established. "Sed acri judicandum intentione est, immodicum sit an grande, altum an *enorme*."—PLIN. *Ep.* 9. 27. The terms, "immodicum" and "*enorme*," are respectively opposed to "grande" and "altum." The former denote something extravagant, and beyond bounds, which is a great deal more than what is implied in the latter. "Impetu pervagatum incendium anteit remedia velocitate mali, et obnoxia urbe arctis itinibus, hucque et illuc flexis, atque *enormibus* vicis qualis vetus Roma fuit."—TAC. *Ann.* 15. 38. The streets of Rome are said to have been out of all shape, and to have assisted the progress of the fire from their irregularity. "Genus pugnae hostibus inhabile parva scuta et *enormes* gladios gerentibus."—TAC. *Agric.* 36. The Scots here had the disadvantage, from the unwieldy size of their swords, which, compared with those of the Romans and Batavians, were enormous.

ABNUERE—*vide* NEGARE.

ABOLERE—*vide* DELERE.

ABOMINARI—*vide* EXECRARI.

ABORSUS, ABORTUS,

agree, in denoting an untimely birth, but differ in respect to the immaturity of that which is brought forth. The first is a compound of the verb "Ordiri," and refers to the beginning of a state, which must end unsuccessfully, if it end soon. The distinction rests upon the authority of Nonius Marcellus, and there is no use of *abortus*, the more common term, that is not consistent with that stated as peculiar to *aborsus*.

As the latter respects the embryo, so the former, derived from "Oriri," respects the fœtus properly formed. In the fœtus, too, animation is understood to have taken place, and to have ceased before the untimely birth. "Tertullæ

nollem *abortum*: tam enim Cassii sunt jam, quam Bruti serendi.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 237. a. “Audies neptem tuam *abortum* fecisse.”—PLIN. *L. 8. Ep.* 10.

From a figurative use of *Abortus* in Pliny the elder, we may infer what was, in his apprehension, the pure and literal one. “Audio et Epicureos quoque parturire adversus libellos quos de grammatica edidi, et subinde *abortus* facere.”—PLIN. *In proem. hist. nat.* Those crude compositions had got the form of books, but, from being hastily published, did not deserve the name.

ABSCONDERE—*vide* ABDERE.

ABSQUE,

differs from the preposition of which it is a compound, in having no reference to the departure of any object correlative to that, whose sign it governs. It implies the absence of what is looked for as inherent in the object, but which, from not having existed, can never have been removed. That which “Sine” governs is in the state of an accidental concomitant, not found at the time; but that which *Absque* governs never could be the attendant of the correlative object, else its nature would have been different from what it is.

The “que,” combined with the “Abs” as an enclitick adjection, without altering the part of speech, destroys the notion of departure which marks the simple preposition. An effect somewhat similar is produced by “que,” when affixed to other terms. It strips “quando,” which, by itself, is an interrogative adverb, of its interrogative power, and converts the meaning “when” into that of “sometimes.” In like manner the “Abs,” which signifies “From,” is made by the “que” to signify something like “without,” that is, “with the exception of” what is implied in the governed word. “Nulam a me epistolam ad te sino *absque* argumento ac sententia pervenire.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 1. 19. Cicero here announces his respect for his correspondent by his attention to the letters he sent him. He was anxious that they should be none of those silly compositions, which, though they get the name of letters, yet, by being void of matter, are in fact not worth reading. “Postera parte purpureus *absque* cauda, in qua roseis pennis cœruleus inscribitur nitor.”—SOLIN. *c. 46. de phœnice.* Though the authority of Solinus is not

always to be trusted, yet this use of *Absque* seems not to be impure. It denotes an unexpected breach of uniformity, in respect to colour, upon a part of the bird. Had "sine" been used in place of *absque*, the meaning would have been different. It would have been affirmed that the bird had no tail, not that this, as an adjunct, only differed in point of colour from the principal object. *Absque* again allows the co-existence of both, but expresses exception in one circumstance, as by the words "all but," "were it not for."

Quam fortunatus cæteris sum rebus *absque* una hac foret.—TER. *Hec.* 4. 2. 25.

Had the one thing here excepted been removed, or, rather, had it never existed, the happiness of Pamphilus would have been complete. It, however, as an ingredient essential to the composition, and not to be extracted from it, made the temper of his mind, and the sense of his situation, very different from what they would otherwise have been.

The Greeks use the particle "χωρίς" in a way analogous to this exceptive application of *absque*. "Χωρίς" αν μη Γαλατικός η πολεμος, νομον εθεντο της ιερεις αφεισθαι της στρατιας.—PLUTARCH. *in Camillo*. This exemption of the priests from military service would have been complete, had it not been for the provision made for the occurrence of a war with the Gauls. Θαυμασια δ, η χωρη εκ χει "χωρίς" η οτι ποταμους, &c.—HEROD. *Lib.* 4. With the exception of the rivers, the country is said to have exhibited no curiosities.

ABUNDANTIA—*vide* COPIA.

ACCIPERE—*vide* CAPERE.

ACCLIVIS, DECLIVIS, PRÆCEPS,

agree, in denoting that the surface to which each is applicable is not horizontal, but differ in respect to the line in which the deviation is regarded, or to the degree in which it takes place. *Acclivis*, from "ad" and "clivus," refers to the ground, as rising, or presenting an ascent to those at the foot of it. This may be so gentle as to be surmounted with ease, or so steep as to try the strength of those who climb it. "Ab eo flumine pari *acclivitate* collis nascatur."—CÆS. *B. G.* 2. 18.

Sin tumulis *acclive* solum.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2.

Carpitur *acclivis* per multa silentia trames
 Arduus, obscurus, caligine densus opaca.—OVID. *Met.* 10. 53.

“In arando observandum, ut transversus mons sulcetur, nam hac ratione difficultas *acclivitat*is infringitur et labor minuitur.”—COLUM. *l.* 2. *c.* 4.

Declivis, which is, like the former word, sometimes found in the first and second declension, differs from *Acclivis* in regarding the ground as sloping, and presenting a descent to those at the top of it. In it too there seems to be no measure of the deviation, either from the level or the perpendicular, to determine its pure use. As the “Ad,” in the former term, refers to the point to which the walker directs his course upwards, so the “De,” in the latter, refers to that from which he moves in a contrary direction. “De locis superioribus hæc *declivia* et devexa cernebantur.”—CÆS. *B. G.* 7. 88.—“Collis a summo æqualiter *declivis*”—*Ibid.* 2. 18.

Non habeant amnes *declivum* ad littora cursum.—LUCAN. 4. 114.

Præceps, from “præ” and “caput,” properly signifies that motion of an animal, in which the head moves first, and danger is incurred from the rapidity of a descent, which it is impossible to stop. It agrees with *Declivis*, in supposing the motion, by which the surface is measured, to be downwards; and it differs both from it and *acclivis*, in supposing the superficial inequality to be at all times so great, that a line, passing from the extreme point of the interval, forms either a perpendicular, or a descent so steep as to be impassable with safety. “Quem posthac fore tam amentem putatis, qui non illam vitam vitæ, quam ante *præcipitem* et lubricam esse ducebat, huic planæ et stabili præponendam esse arbitretur.”—CIC. *pro Flac.* 166. 2.

Præcipitem sese scopulorum e vertice jecit.—CATULL. *Car.* 63. 244.

Quem mors manebat sæva *præcipitem* datum

E turre.—SENEC. *Troad.* 621.

The same place may be stiled both *præceps* and *declivis*, in which case the former will denote the descent as nearly or entirely perpendicular, and the latter will state it as making not so great an approach to the perpendicular, which it never reaches. “In *declivi* ac *præcipiti* loco equos sustinere.—CÆS. *B. G.*

Et modo summa petunt, modo per *decliva*, viasque
Præcipites spatio terræ propiore feruntur.—OVID. *Met.* 2. 206.

ACCOLA, INCOLA, CIVIS,

agree, in distinguishing those to whom they are respectively applied by the place of their habitation, but differ as to the manner in which they are related to that place. *Accola*, from “ad” and “colere,” marks the inhabitants from the circumstance of their vicinity to the place governed; “Pastor *accola* ejus loci Cacus,” LIV. 1. 7.

————— amnisque vadosi
Accola Vulturni.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 728.

Those, who knew the situation of this river in Italy, could be at no loss to distinguish the people, whose territory was bounded by it.

Incola, again, marks the inhabitants, from the place within which they reside. Every person is an *incola* in respect to a certain territory, whose domicil is within its precincts. “Cum accessisset Lemnum et *incolas* ejus insulæ sub potestatem redigere vellet Atheniensium.”—NEP. *in Milt.* 1. “Sunt enim in terra, non ut *incolæ* atque habitatores, sed quasi spectatores rerum cælestium.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 54. a. “Audiebam Pythagoram Pythagoreosque *incolas* pœne nostros, qui essent Italici philosophi quondam nominati nunquam dubitasse.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 93. a. These Italian philosophers dwelt so very near the Roman territory, that they might have been said to be almost within it. In place of *Accolæ*, then, which they really were, they might have got the name of *Incolæ*.

In the just application of *Incola*, the inhabited space is not understood to be the property of those who reside upon it. Horace, accordingly, with great elegance and purity, styles Umbrenus, the new possessor of that territory which had lately belonged to Ofellus, only an *incola*, marking thereby the general uncertainty of all such tenures.

————— quanto aut ego parcius aut vos
 O pueri nituistis ut huc novus *incola* venit.—HOR. *S.* 2. 2. 127.

Civis marks the inhabitants of one place from this circumstance, that all of them enjoy the same rights, and each of them is a member of the same community. The *incola*, whom the Greeks styled *παροικος*, takes his appellation from the place in which he holds his "domicilium" at the time, while the *Civis* takes his from the place in which he holds certain privileges, either from the right of birth, or from that of legal admission. The former was understood to be a stranger in comparison of the latter, and different duties arose from the different relations in which they stood to the place of their abode. "Repertum esse neminem, neque liberum neque servum, neque *civem* neque peregrinum, qui illud signum auderet attingere."—CIC. *in Ver.* 217. 6. "Peregrini et *incolæ* officium est, nihil præter suum negotium agere, minimeque in aliena esse republica curiosum."—CIC. *de Offi.* 1. 34. "*Incola* et his magistratibus parere debet apud quos *incola* est, et illis apud quos *civis* est."—CAJUS. *L. 50. Tit. 1. Leg. 50.* "Socrates totius mundi se *incolam* et *civem* arbitrabatur."—CIC. *Tusc.* 249. a. In the last example, Socrates is said to perceive his connection with the whole world in two capacities, and to recognize duties incumbent upon him in each. Plautus has presented all the three terms in one line.

Optati *cives*, populares, *incolæ*, *accolæ*, advenæ omnes,

Date viam qua fugere liceat, facite totæ plateæ pateant.—AUL. 3. 1. 1.

Congrio calls, first, upon the citizens in general to assist his escape; then, upon those who inhabited the same territory with himself; and, lastly, upon those who dwelt near it.

Civis sometimes denotes what we mean by "fellow-citizen." In this case, one community is ultimately the correlative object in respect to more than one person, but *Civis* refers immediately to each subject living under the same laws, and suggests the circumstance of general similarity. "Quibus quid aliud quam admonemus *cives* nos eorum esse."—LIV. 4. 3.

○

ACCUSARE—*vide* CRIMINARI.

ACERVUS—*vide* CUMULUS.

ACQUIRERE—*vide* PARARE.

AD.

The Preposition *Ad* is the correlate of A, Ab, and Abs ; and, in its primary meaning, refers to the continually decreasing distance of a moving body from a point, to which it tends, and at which its motion is to terminate. This correlation is often manifest by the two prepositions appearing in one sentence, and bearing the part in it to be expected from the definition given of each. "Nec vero velim quasi decurso spatio "a" calce *ad* carceres revocari."—CIC. *de Sen.* 94. b. The motion, which, in its natural course, had been from the starting post to the goal, was to be reversed. While the motion continued in either way, the distance between the body and the point left increased, as its distance from the point to which it tended diminished.

Ad, as referring to the existing motion of the body, is translated "To," and as referring to its state of rest, when this motion terminates, it is translated "At."

Before the commencement of the motion, *Ad* can suggest its future direction, and even suggests the aspect of a body that cannot of itself move towards the point to which it is made to look. "Simulacrum victoriæ quod *ad* simulacrum Minervæ, spectabat, *ad* valvas se templi limenque convertisse constabat."—CÆS. *B. C.* 3. 105.

————— duplices tendens *ad* sidera palmas.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 95.

In the above examples, in the latter of which the body can move in a certain line, and in the former it cannot, the preposition is translated "Towards."

But the motion of a body does not always terminate "at" or "by the side of" another, but sometimes at a point bounded by limits more or less extensive. When this happens, *Ad* is translated "in," or "within." "Pecunia utinam *ad* ædem Opis maneret."—CIC. *in Ver.* 155. a. It is here wished that the money, that had been deposited, had remained within the walls of this temple. "Cum senatus habitus esset *ad* Apollinis."—CIC. *Epist.* 114. a. The senate was held "within," not "at the side of," the temple of Apollo.

When the object moving is animated, and arrives at a point occupied by another of the same description, the former is said to be "before," or "in the presence of," the latter. "Milo reus *ad* populum accusante Publio Clodio."—CIC. *pro Mil.* 109. a. "Patrum superbiam *ad* plebem criminari.—LIV. 3. 9. In both cases, the pleaders had come to the judges, and sisted themselves in their presence at a point, from which their voices could be heard, and the grievances to be redressed known.

When a person faces danger, and moves up to the object from whence it proceeds, *Ad* signifies "against." The courage or dexterity possessed by him who makes the approach, is opposed to the hostility or noxious nature of the object which tries it. "Mirari licet quæ sint animadversa a medicis herbarum genera, quæ radicum, *ad* morsus bestiarum, *ad* oculorum morbos, *ad* vulnera."—CIC. *Div.* 82. b.

—————Lernæas pugnat *ad* hydras.—PROP. 2. 19. 9.
 —————clypeosque *ad* tela sinistris
 Protecti objiciunt.—————VIRG. *Æn.* 243.

In all the above examples the noxious object is approached as such, and that which is to overcome its effects is said to act "against" it. A combatant coming up to his antagonist is able to "act against," or to "be at" him, and it is by the due application of the medicine to the part affected that the physician "acts against" and cures the disease.

It may be observed, that the object approached may be either animate or inanimate, but that that which approaches must either have life itself, or be directed by a being that has it.

The departments of servants are marked by *ad*, as suggesting their going to and keeping at the place, at which their services are wanted. The cupbearer was near the cup of his master, and the amanuensis near the hand, the functions of which he performed, by writing as he was desired. Though this relation is most commonly expressed by the prepositions "A" and "Ab," yet, upon equal authority, we find it expressed by means of *Ad*. "Quod potes audire ex Erycino cliente tuo, literato homine, quem servum sibi ille habuit *ad* manum."—CIC. *de Orat.* 164. a.

Lygdamus *ad* cyathos vitrique æstiva suppellex.—PROPERT. 3. 9. 11.
 Nec puer Iliacus, formosa nec Herculis uxor
Ad cyathos.—JUV. 13. 43.

In order to ascertain the difference between two objects, in respect to some common quality which cannot be ascertained when they are at a distance, the one is brought to the other, and the preposition is, in this case, translated, “In comparison of.”

Estne ut fertur forma? *P. Sane. Ch. At nihil ad* nostram hanc.—TER. *Eun.* 2. 3. 69.

The beauty of the first-mentioned woman, it is said, was not exaggerated by report, and, taking her by herself, she deserved to be reckoned beautiful. It is added, however, that were she brought near to, so as to be compared with, the last, her good looks would disappear and be as nothing. “*Persuadent enim mathematici terram in medio mundo sitam ad universi cæli complexum quasi puncti instar obtinere, quod κεντρον illi vocant.*”—CIC. *Tusc.* 156. b. Though no change of place can be realized between the earth and the universe, in the centre of which it was formerly understood to lie, yet language supposes that a change is possible, and that when the earth and the universe are brought together, the former appears but as a point in comparison of the latter.

As the object to be regulated must come near to its standard, or the standard come near to it, this vicinity, however effected, is expressed in such applications by *Ad*, which is then translated “according to.” “*Longitudines ad regulam et lineam, altitudines ad perpendicularum, anguli ad normam respondententes exiguntur.*”—VITRUV. 7. 3. This quotation from the architect seems to be completely in point. The different standards are brought near to different parts of the building, and the strength and symmetry of the whole depend upon its being executed “according to” them. In intellectual subjects, the figurative application of *ad* in this sense is strictly consonant with the literal. “*Aliæ enim sunt legati partes atque Imperatoris. Alter omnia ad præscriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet.*”—CÆS. *Bell. Civ.* 3. 51.

When any accession is made to objects, that previously occupied a certain point, *Ad* is translated "beside."

——— *ad hæc mala hoc mihi accidit.*—TER. *And.* 1. 3. 10.

The evils, here mentioned, are supposed to occupy a certain point, by centering in the person who speaks, and a new one is said to come "additionally," or "beside," to encrease the aggregate. "Si *ad* cætera vulnera hanc quoque mortiferam plagam inflixisses."—CIC. *in Vatin. cap.* 8.

When the circumstance in which any quality shews itself is specified, the object invested with that quality is understood to point towards the circumstance, as occupying a fixed place, and the preposition *Ad* is then translated "in respect to." "Vir *ad* usum ac disciplinam peritus, *ad* casum fortunamque felix."—CIC. *pro Font.* 15. The same man, as possessing skill, pointed towards practice and discipline; and, as eminently successful, pointed towards chance and fortune. He was experienced "in respect to" things that are practical, and fortunate "in respect to" those that are casual. "Vidi simul cum populo Romano forum comitiumque adornatum *ad* speciem magnifico ornatu, *ad* sensum cogitationemque acerbo et lugubri."—CIC. *in Ver.* 87. 6. The Roman forum, invested with a pompous dress, pointed towards external appearance, and, invested with a dismal one, it pointed at the sense and reflection of the spectators. "In respect to" the former, it was splendid, and "in respect to" the latter, gloomy.

As the efficacy of means is held to be dependent on their vicinity to the subject upon which they are to operate, so *Ad* intimates the relation between cause and effect, and is translated "on account," or "by means of."

Panditur *ad* nullas janua dira preces.—PROPERT. 4. 11. 2.

It is here insinuated, that, from the inexorable disposition of the keeper of the infernal doors, the supplicants, who approached them, and offered prayers, which from their nearness might be distinctly heard, intreated in vain. "Ingenium *ad* preces tam placabile."—LIV. 4. 41.

Under this use of the preposition is comprehended the end or purpose in view, the attainment of which prompts the agent to undertake what he does.

In this last sense, it denotes "for the sake of," or "for the purpose of." "Id non tam *ad* honorem ejus factum quam *ad* Consulum ignominiam.—LIV. *Lib. 2. Cap. 17.*

————— aut equos
Alere, aut canes *ad* venandum.—TER. *And. 1. 1. 29.*

When *Ad* is applied to numbers, it suggests, that they are not strictly defined, and is translated "about," that is, more or less than that specified in the numeral. This indefinite power of *Ad* supposes the number suggested to occupy a fixed point, and the moving body to be carried either a little "short of," or "beyond" it. Still the idea of vicinity is maintained, which has no reference to any particular quarter of a fixed point, in respect to which it holds.

As the mass is understood to move "in cumulo," and the relation of the whole of it is judged of by the place at which it comes to a state of rest, so *Ad*, in this case, refers only to integrals, and not to fractional parts. The amount of the integral, which cannot be less than one, may rise indefinitely, according to the nature of the sums in question. "Quasi *ad* talenta quindecim coegi."—TER. *Heaut. 1. 1. 94.* Had the "quindecim" appeared singly in this sentence, that is, without the "quasi" and the *ad*, it would not have been viewed in respect to motion and space, and would have suggested neither more nor less than fifteen. As it stands, however, the speaker professes he does not know the precise number of talents, which may be one or two less, or one or two more, than fifteen. The preposition intimates degrees of proximity to a point, which, according as the impelling power has been stronger or weaker than it should have been, the moving body has either passed or has not reached. "*Ad* octingenti homines cæsi sunt." LIV. 28. 36. As, in the first example, the specification referred to units, so in this it refers to hundreds. The number of men slain may have been either between seven and eight, or between eight and nine hundred, and the chance of its being the one or the other is equal. It is to be observed, that, in this use of *Ad*, it always quits its original character, as a preposition, and becomes an adverb. Its due meaning is "thereabout" in respect to the number specified. In the example last given, no substantive is near it but "homines" in the nominative case;

and in the first, "talenta," in the accusative, is governed not by it, but by the verb "coegi."

In the application of *Ad* to the number one, it loses entirely the power it has when applied to all the numbers above it. Unity presents the primary point from which that space commences, within which the different numbers lie, in a series not to be altered. Every individual number has a number less than itself, except unity, which may be regarded as the root of an infinite series. "De amicitia omnes *ad unum idem sentiunt.*"—*Cic. de Am.* 112. a.

Luculli miles collecta viatica multis
Ærumnis, lassus dum noctu stertit, *ad assem*
Perdiderat.—*HOR. Ep.* 2. 2. 26.

In the first of the above examples, it must not be understood that one individual, implied in "unum," thought differently from the rest of the human race; nor, in the last, that one single penny of the soldier's fortune escaped the hands of the thief. The aggregate of human beings in the one case, and of pence in the other, is specified by no numeral. From the point occupied by this aggregate, however, there is supposed to be a progress, not, as usual, from the less to the greater number, but terminating "ad unum," which is the first in the enumerated class. The same fact, which is affirmed of the whole, holds as to every intermediate part, and the radical unit, involved in "unum" and "assem," marks only the termination of a progress in which that one is taken inclusively, and as an integral part.

When *Ad* is applied to the divisions of quantity, either solid or fluid, whether we proceed from the mass to the parts, or from the parts to the mass, it is completely definite. The wholes and the fractions, in this case, are supposed to be entire, and to subsist distinctly, and of themselves. The numerals employed to express fractions regard them as independent of the rest of the parts, though all appear indissolubly connected in nature, and the preposition scrupulously limits the precise magnitude expressed in the word it governs, by fixing the point in the series of numbers, upon which no latitude is allowed to the hearer's apprehension. "Ea pars hæreditatis est *ad triginta sestertia.*"—*Cic. Ep.* 217. Nothing is here said of the number of "sestertia," of which the whole inheritance consisted, but there is a precise specification of the num-

ber that formed the part mentioned. A progress is admitted by *Ad* to a point at thirty, which could not be arrested before, and cannot be continued after it. "Mustum quam dulcissimum decoquitur *ad* tertiam."—COLUMELL. 12. 21. "Amurca *ad* tertiam partem decocta."—CELS. 5. 28. Both the wine and the oil were boiled down to one-third of the original quantity. The remaining part bears a strict proportion to the whole, which must have been ascertained before the destruction of double the remainder. The preposition limits the point to which the reduction must be carried, and at which it must cease.

When *Ad* is transferred from motion in space to process in time, it ascertains both the period at which events occur, and their duration when they do. The former is ascertained, by a point in space being made to represent an instant in duration, and by the lapse of time from the latter being held forth by the motion of a body in the former. As the moving body rests at a fixed point, when the impelling force is spent, so is the time understood to cease at a future period, specified by the numeral. "Quid interest utrum illuc nunc veniam, an *ad* decem annos."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 12. In this sentence, there are two instants specified, at either of which an event might take place. The one of these is present, and the other is to exist at the expiration of ten years: By "nunc" is suggested, the moment prior to the currency of the ten years; and, by *ad*, that to which this process tends, and at which it terminates. Both specify the "time when," with equal precision, as being the extremities of a period, from which nothing can be taken, and to which nothing can be added.

In this use of *Ad*, the time of the present event is expressed by "nunc," or "now," but that of the future is translated "after." In English, there is an anticipation, during the present instant, of that which is future, at which the speaker, who had limited the interval once before him, is to take a retrospect of it as past, that is, as "after."

Ad, however, is usually translated "at," as marking the time when, and this time may be specified with sufficient accuracy, without any numeral. "Frumentum *ad* diem non dedit."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 1. 3. The *ad* here signifies the time, with all necessary minuteness, to those who knew that a day

was appointed for the delivery of the corn, and that a contract had been violated. “*Ad tempus aptæ simulationes.*”—CIC. *Pro. Mil.* 114. *b.* The time here is not limited by any division of duration, such as a day. The politician is supposed capable of judging as to the time at which his system of dissimulation is, with propriety, to begin, and as to that also at which it is to end. In reference to “the time when,” *Ad* suggests nothing as to the length of the period, within which the event can be accomplished. An instant, and an age, are, in this view, upon a level.

Ad is employed to denote the duration of an event, as well as the time of its occurrence; and it is only by attending to the general sense of the passage, that the reader can determine in which of the uses it is to be taken. The time, “how long,” is specified by the interval between two points in duration, within which time is current. “Sophocles *ad summam senectutem tragædias fecit.*”—CIC. *de Sen.* 81. *b.* The literary labours of this poet, we are to suppose, began as soon as he was able to engage in them, and we are told that they ended at an extreme old age. He did, at the last period of his life, what he had done at many preceding ones. “*Bestiæ quæ ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus.*”—CIC. *de Am.* 101. *a.* This *εογγη* lasted, by the command of nature, as long as it could be of service to those protected by it. It commenced immediately after the birth, and its duration depended on the keenness of the instinct, in animals of a particular species, and on the helplessness of the young in any one.

In some cases, the limits of the interval, during which the event takes place, are accurately stated by terms, expressing the divisions of time. “*Ex calendis Januariis ad hanc horam vigilavi.*”—CIC. *in Anton.* 262. *a.* The Consul’s watchfulness had suffered no interruption, from the first day of the year, to the very hour of that day upon which he delivered his speech.

The preposition *Ad*, then, it should seem, may be translated in a variety of ways, in each of which the radical meaning can be traced.

I.

To; as denoting the existing motion of a body approaching to a certain point.

II.

AT ; as denoting the state of rest, which is the immediate consequence of the motion of the body being over.

III.

TOWARDS ; as denoting the direction of a body possessing the power, though not in a state of motion ; and also the state of a body which is necessarily quiescent.

IV.

WITHIN. This supposes a certain latitude given to the point where the motion terminates, which implies its capacity or power of containing the body arriving.

V.

IN THE PRESENCE OF. It is understood, that the moving object is animated, and arrives near the spot occupied by one or more of a similar description.

VI.

AGAINST. In this use, the end proposed by the object approaching is, to counteract the noxious effect apprehended in that which it approaches.

VII.

IN THE SERVICE OF. The motion, implied in the preposition, is supposed to stop at that point, where the mover can render the services that are required of him.

VIII.

IN COMPARISON OF. The compared objects can be best judged of, when the one is made to move to the other, and the two are in a state of opposition.

IX.

ACCORDING TO. The congruity, or incongruity, between one object and another, is best seen, when the standard is made to move to the object regulated, or the object to the standard.

X.

BESIDE. The aggregate of objects, of a particular description, is increased by another moving to, and stopping "beside" them.

XI.

IN RESPECT TO. This rests on the third use, and supposes that an object, invested with a certain quality, points, or has respect to, a certain circumstance, involved in the governed word.

XII.

BY MEANS OF. FOR THE SAKE OF. The effect is produced, by the object, operating as a cause, coming to that on which it operates, and the motive, stimulating the agent, leads him to the point at which he can effect his purpose.

XIII.

ABOUT; that is, more or less than a specified number, supposed to occupy a fixed point. The moving body, in this train, is supposed to rest only at a point beyond, or at one on this side of, that expressed by the numeral, and these two are said to be "about" it.

XIV.

AMOUNTING TO. DOWN TO. In the first use, the sum of the integral parts, belonging to an aggregate, larger than what the numbered parts form, is specified by a numeral, which limits their amount; and, in the last, the aggregate, or mass, is reduced to a part, bearing a strict proportion to its original magnitude. In both directions, the radical motion cannot be arrested before, nor continued after, a certain point is reached, which the numeral fixes with severe precision.

XV.

AT. AFTER. In both uses, there is a specification of the time when an event takes place. In the former, there is, by the lapse of time, an arrival at a point in duration, analogous to one in space; and, in the last, a future point is anticipated, at which the speaker is to look back on the interval as past, or coming after.

XVI.

DURING. The continuance of an event is measured by the lapse of time between two assumed points in duration, analogous to the points of outset and arrival, which limit the motion of a body in space.

The preposition *Ad*, when compounded, retains its primary power entire, in respect both to the object as moving towards, and also as having arrived at a specified point. No change takes place in the meaning of the terms reduced from three to two, though the compounded verb does not always govern the same case as the preposition does in its simple state. “*Esse ad senatum,*” and “*adesse senatui,*” are expressions precisely equivalent. “*Is accurrisse Romam dicitur*”—*Cic. de Offi.* 74. b. amounts just to “*Is ad Romam accurrisse dicitur.*” The preposition, besides, is often found acting in a double capacity, that is, both in and out of composition at the same time. No remarkable effect, however, is to be seen arising from this pleonasm, which is justified by the authority of the purest classics. “*Nos accurrimus ad te.*”—*Cic. Ep.* 128. a.

Ad, in composition, has clearly an intensive power, and heightens every quality in the term with which it is united. It does so upon principles, that vary according to the nature of the parts of speech with which the preposition is combined, and the circumstances of the objects related. The verb “*Amare*” signifies to love, according to the apprehended excellence of the object; but the verb, *Adamare*, implies a higher sense of excellence, and, of course, a stronger sentiment of affection passing from the lover to the amiable object. The circumstance of transition, characteristic of *Ad*, is that by which the increase of attachment is announced. Though the verb itself is transitive, yet this quality is heightened in the speaker’s apprehension, by connecting it with a particle, whose primary power is transition alone.

Non foret Eumedes orbus, si filius ejus

Stultus Achilleos non *adamasset* equos.—*OVID. Trist.* 3. 4. 27.

The inordinate ambition of Dolon is here well expressed by *adamare*. A slighter attachment towards those horses would never have impelled him to make the attempt, which, in the end, proved fatal. “*Si virtutem adamaveris,*” “*amare*” enim parum est.—*SEN. Ep.* 71. The philosopher here suggests, that the extent of affection, implied in “*amare*” simply, is by no means adequate to the excellence of virtue. To suit it, the affection must rise to that degree which is expressed by its compound.

As *adamare* signifies to love ardently, so does *adbibere* signify to drink heartily, and with a keen appetite.

Quando *adbibero* alludiabo : tum sum ridiculissimus.—PLAUT. *Stich.* 2. 2. 69.

As it was the professed intention of Gelasimus to make himself merry, he would, in this way, drink in the liquor with more than usual avidity. In pursuing the frolic, he would discover all the keenness of one gratifying the most urgent thirst.

—————nunc *adbibe* puro

Pectore verba puer : nunc te melioribus offer.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 69.

The same keenness is perceptible in the figurative, as in the literal, application of this compound. The young man is desired to drink deep at that spring, whose waters are salutary at his time of life, and which will improve his character in proportion to the quantity imbibed. *Ad* has the same effect, when combined with adjectives, that it has when combined with verbs.

Quos super atra silex jamjam lapsura cadentique
Imminet *assimilis*———VIRG. *Æn.* VI. 602.

This black rock, though only about to fall, deceived the eye, and appeared actually falling. The “*silex cadens*” is understood to occupy the point to which the “*silex lapsura*” had approached, and the difference between the archetype and the copy would only be in proportion to the distance, which, it is to be supposed, was very small. “*Pari modo artifices apprime boni.*”——NEPOS. 25. 13.

—————nam id arbitror

Adprime in vita esse utile, ut ne quid nimis.—TER. *And.* 1. 1. 33.

In both instances, the adverb denotes a degree of excellence that, in the different ways stated, is above what is ordinary, and next to what is first. The artists may be supposed to be brought to, and set by, the best in their line, and to exhibit but a trifling inferiority. The moral precept, too, involved in the “*Aurea mediocritas*” of Horace, and here in the simple expression of Terence, is supposed to be collated, in point of utility, with the first of the kind, and then to shew and to maintain its value.

ADEPS—*vide* SEBUM.

ADIPISCI—*vide* PARARE.

ADIRE HÆREDITATEM—*vide* CERNERE.

ADOPTARE, ADSCISCERE.

agree, in denoting, that an agent establishes a connection between himself and some object, but differ in respect to the principle whence this action proceeds. *Adoptare* differs in so far from "Optare," its root, as to imply, that what is but a matter of contingency in the application of the latter verb, is always accomplished in that of the former. He, to whom the compounded verb is applied, gratifies his inclination by associating with himself an object that has excited his desire. "Ego autem quem potius *adoptem* atque invocem quam illum, quo defendente vincere didici."—CIC. *Ep.* 65. b. This deed of Vatinius in calling upon Cicero as his protector, was certainly as agreeable as it was unconstrained. It, besides, implies the actual completion of a desire, which it was in the power of the agent to gratify.

——sociam te mihi *adopto* ad meam salutem.—PLAUT. *Cist.* 4. 2. 78.

In the act of adopting children, which this verb often denotes, the parent was stimulated by a desire, which could be gratified only by undertaking duties not easily discharged.

ADSCISCERE, from "Ad," and "Sciscere," an inceptive from "Scire," differs from *Adoptare* in supposing that the agent is not necessarily actuated by a previous desire of the object assumed, but by his knowing its nature, and believing that it is fitted for his purpose at the time. He is not understood to act from the influence of attachment, but from a sense of expediency.

Multaque se incusat qui non acceperit ante
Dardanum Ænean, generumque *adsciverit* ultro.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 612.

Æneas could not possibly have stood in the relation to Latinus which the verb *Adoptare* is capable of denoting. By means of *Adsciscere*, the old king blames himself for a miscalculation in respect to the interest of himself and his family. Had he seen the advantages of an alliance with Æneas, upon his arriv-

ing at his court, he might have formed it; but the time was now over for acting that part, which he saw to have been the most expedient. "Nemo non modo Romæ sed ne ullo in angulo totius Italiæ oppressus ære alieno fuit; quem non ad hoc incredibile sceleris fœdus *adsciverit*."—CIC. *in Cat.* 106. a. Whatever demerit there was in Catiline, as a subject, he discovered judgment in the choice of those who were to be his tools. It was from no attachment to this vile band, but purely from his knowledge of them as fit for his purpose, that he took them as his associates.

ADVENA, CONVENÆ, HOSPES, PEREGRINUS,

agree, in denoting, that the present inhabitants are not the natives of a particular country, but differ, in respect either to the number of strangers changing their residence, to the place from which they have come, or to the proposed duration of their abode at that to which they have resorted.

ADVENA applies to a person who has come to take up his abode in a foreign country, of which he wishes to become a subject. The *Advenæ* stand opposed to the "Indigenæ," whom the Latins styled sometimes "Aborigines," and the Greeks *Αυτοχθόνες*. The definition given by Isidorus of *Advena*, will assist us in forming a proper idea of the term. "*Advenæ*, incolæ adventitii perhibentur, sed permanentes."—ORIG. 9. 4.

Est e Corintho hic *advena* anus pauperula.—TER. *Heaut.* 1. 1. 44.

Advena is applied to other animals beside man, and even to inanimate substances undergoing a complete change in their situation. "Volucres partim *advenæ* ut hirundines et grues: partim vernaculæ, ut gallinæ ac columbæ."—VARR. *R. R.* 3. 5. "Grues hiemis, ciconiæ æstatis *advenæ*."—PLIN. 10. 23. In the following example, *Advena* is applied to an ingrafted shoot, as taken from one tree and made part of another. "*Advenam* surculum qui alteri arbori per insitionem immittitur."—PLIN. 17. 14.

The Romans applied the term *Advena* to certain gods, supposed to be introduced into their country chiefly by that "evocatio Deorum," which took place before the surrender of a besieged city. "Separatim nemo habessit Deos; neve novos, sive *advenas*, nisi publice advectos privatim colunto."—CIC. *de Legg.* 173. a.

CONVENÆ differs from *Advena* in being always applicable to a number only, and in supposing that the emigrants came from many different points. The latter may be applied to a single emigrant, and supposes that even a number may or may not have come from the same place. "Romulus pastores et *convenas* congregavit."—CIC. *de Or.* 1. 9. The first inhabitants of Rome came from no particular quarter, but from every one that could furnish a supply. "Eodem *convenæ* complures in agro accessitavere."—CATO. *apud Gell.* 18. 12.

HOSPES differs from the two former terms in implying, that the abode of the stranger is to be but of short continuance, and that he is received with kindness by those with whom he resides. In the ordinary use of this term, it signifies a guest; and, by denoting both the person entertained, and the entertainer, the same word is both a relative and correlative term to itself.

—————non *hospes* ab *hospite* tutus.—OVID. *Met.* 1. 144.

As opposed to *Advena*, however, *Hospes* denotes a foreigner residing abroad, and having no intention to claim the protection of a citizen where he then is. "Adeone *hospes* hujusce urbis, adeone ignarus es disciplinæ, ut hæc nescias?"—CIC. *pro Rabir.* 96. 6.

Quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus *hospes*?—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 10.

The Trojan had no intention to tarry long at Carthage, though the reception he met with from the queen was abundantly kind. "Habuisse enim non *hospitem* sed contubernalem."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 138. b. In both capacities Cicero supposes that his company would have been agreeable to his friend. In the former, however, he would have enjoyed it for a short, and, in the latter, for a considerable time.

PEREGRINUS differs from the words already stated, in referring merely to the absence of the stranger from his native country, without regard to the proposed time of his residence, or to the nature of his reception. The term, *peregrinus*, stands opposed to "civis." It supposes that the traveller has no intention to settle abroad, and that he has left his home for a while for the purpose of business, of information, or of amusement. "Nos autem hinc Roma

qui veneramus jam non *hospites* sed *peregrini* atque *advenae* nominabamur.”—CIC. *contra Rull.* 85. a. The Capuans, it is here said, were too insolent to be hospitable. Far from treating the Romans as *hospites*, that is, as entitled to kindness, they treated them with the indifference usually shown to *peregrini* and *advenae*, the former of whom would soon be independent of their civilities, though to the latter they might continue desirable.

——te esse oportet et nequam et malum

Hominem *peregrinum* atque *advenam* qui irrideas.—PLAUT. *Pæn.* 5. 2. 71.

From this passage it appears, that even the *peregrinus* and the *advena*, though without the claims of the *hospes*, could not, in decency, be abused or insulted.

ADVENIRE, ADVENTARE,

agree in denoting the tendency of a moving body towards the point at which it is to stop; but the former can be applied to it only when the motion is nearly, or just ended, and the latter can be applied to it during the prior periods of its progress. Valla has observed the distinction; which, by the most general, and the purest use of the terms in the classics, seems to be supported. In confirmation of it, he says, “*Uxor adveniēti* marito occurrit ad limen; *adventanti* non occurrit nisi id fiat in ipso itinere.”—*Lib. 5. C. 10.* *Advenire*, according to this remark, is applicable to the person who is just at hand, or who has already arrived; and the frequentative *Adventare*, to him who is in the act of performing, but who has not nearly completed, his journey. The former verb is generic, and regards the traveller, both before and after his arrival; the latter is specific, and has no reference to the motion that is past. “*Advenire* literæ fusas Vitellii copias nuntiantes.”—SÜETON. *in Vespas. Cap. 7.*

——cuperim haud tali vos tempore tectis

Advenisse meis.———VAL. FLAC. 5. 535.

Advenis modo? Pam. admodum.—TER. *Hec. 3. 5. 8.*

In all the applications of *Advenire*, in the above examples, the motion is over, and the arrival completed. *Adventare*, again, never supposes this to

be the case. "Aut jam urgens, aut certe *adventans* senectus."—CIC. *de Sen. Cap. 1.* Cicero appears, in this sentence, to give authority to Valla's distinction. In the orator's conception, "urgere" seems to suggest a greater proximity than *adventare*, and the one is changed for the other, so as to express his idea more precisely. The following passage, in his epistles to Atticus, leads us to the same conclusion. "Tu *adventare* ac prope adesse jam debes."—*Lib. 4. Ep. 17.* The duty of his friend was not simply to be on the road, at an undefined distance, as expressed by *adventare*, but to be just at hand, as expressed by "prope adesse."

ADVERSARIUS—*vide* HOSTIS.

ADVERSUS, *vel* ADVERSUM,

compounded of "Ad" and "Versus," both distinct prepositions, agrees with the former in denoting the direction of motion, and also the position of one body as looking towards another, though it does not, and even cannot, move. The path in which the moving body performs its course, and the aspect of the quiescent body, are understood to be more direct in the case of *Ad*, than of *Adversus*. Thus, in the following example, *Adversus* could not be put in place of "Ad," because the path of the runners is of necessity as straight as possible. "Nunc video calcem "ad" quam decursum est."—CIC. *Tusc. 151. a.*

In all the uses of *Adversus*, accordingly, the related objects are never found to be what the French call *vis a vis*. The inequality of their magnitude, or the nature of their figure, fits them for being the subjects of an undetermined opposition. Thus, *adversum* marks the situation of the combined fleet of Greece, lying off Athens, the number of which amounted to three hundred sail, and the whole of which could bear upon the town in lines of direction far from parallel.

Adversus, itself a compound, is never found compounded with any other word. Its primary senses, which refer to the motion and position of bodies, have been explained. It is taken figuratively, but with little variety, and is never applied to time. When it denotes the progress of any thing intellectual towards its proper object, it is translated "towards," and when of any thing hostile, "against." In the former use, it is equivalent to "Erga," or "Versus;" and in

the latter, to "Contra." "Officia *adversus* eos servanda, a quibus injuriam acceperis."—CIC. *de Off.* 7. b. "Si duriorem te præbes, non contendam ego *adversus* te."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 228. b.

There appears a very extraordinary opposition in the writings of Ulpian, between "Contra" and *adversus*, in which the latter takes the power of "Secundum," and is to be translated "According to." "Bonorum possessio datur, aut *contra* tabulas testamenti, aut *adversus* tabulas."—*In frag. tit. pænult.* The *tabulæ*, governed by "Contra," suggest something hostile to, and opposing, the mode in which possession is acquired; and those *tabulæ*, governed by *adversus*, suggest something friendly, and presenting the rule by which the procedure is to be guided.

ADULARI, BLANDIRI, ASSENTARI,

agree, in denoting the act of flattering, but differ as to the manner in which this act is performed. The first, from the Greek word *δολος*, refers to the servility of that flatterer, who considers nothing beneath him, by which he can effect his purpose, and who, from mean obsequiousness, forgets what is due to himself. The definition, given by Noltenius, of this verb, is worthy of his high ability as a critic: "Adulor," says he, "quando inservio quoquo modo, vel voce, vel gestu, ut favorem emerear." That a distinction existed, in the opinion of Cicero, between the first verb and the last, is clear, from his use of the abstract nouns connected with each. "In amicitiiis nullam pestem esse majorem quam *adulationem*, *blanditias*, *assentationem*."—CIC. *de Am.* 113. a.

The means employed by the person, to whom *adulari* is applicable, are not only degrading, but of undefined variety. "Animus ejus ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem sed etiam nutum atque vultum convertitur."—CIC. *de Am.* 113. a. He waits not for the ordinary expressions of him whom he means to dupe, but watches and interprets his looks, and, both in words and actions, he is constantly assuming a character very different from his own. "Nolo esse laudator ne videar *adulator*."—AUCT. *ad Heren.* 31. a. The character of the speaker, in the sentence now quoted, is the very reverse of

that described. He is unwilling even to do justice to merit, lest he should be supposed guilty of the meanness of exaggerating it.

BLANDIRI differs from *Adulari* in referring, not to the meanness and the variety of the stratagems adopted by the flatterer, but to his constantly taking advantage of the person he means to cozen. Nepos says of Alcibiades, cap. 1. that he was “*Blandus et temporibus callidissime inserviens*,” and the one part of the character is explanatory of the other. He, “*qui blanditur*,” rests the success of his attempt upon soothing accommodations, suited to the time, and to the circumstances of the person to be preyed upon. “*Cur matri blanditur? cur epistolis et sororis et matris imbecillitatem aucupatur?*—CIC. *Pro. Flac.* 163. b. The words, “*imbecillitatem aucupari*,” in the last member of the sentence, explain forcibly the import of the verb *Blandiri* in the first. The person, *blandiens*, takes advantage of the unsuspectingness of his dupe in every way, as the fowler does of the bird he ensnares.

ASSENTARI differs from the verbs already mentioned, in limiting the mode, by which the flatterer effects his purpose, to the act of seemingly surrendering the exercise of his own judgment, and agreeing implicitly with his dupe. It is a frequentative from the verb “*Assentiri*,” which denotes, simply, that coincidence of opinion which takes place between those who see the same subject in the same point of view. The *assentator*, again, does not feel as he says, but, in the words of Cicero, “*semper auget id quod is, cujus ad voluntatem loquitur, vult esse magnum*.”—CIC. *de Am.* 114. b. The parasite, when describing himself, in the following sentence, gives a complete definition of *Assentari*.

Negat quis? nego. Ait? aio. Postremo imperavi egomet mihi
Omnia assentari.———TER. *Eun.* 2. 2. 19.

In the case of *Blandiri* and *Assentari*, it is supposed, that the flatterer, by being blind to his own weakness, and partial to his own opinions, might, in some degree, impose upon himself. “*Mihi ipsi assentor fortasse, cum ea esse in me fingo*.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 3. 11.

Omnia pro veris credam, sint ficta licebit:
Cur ego non votis blandiar ipse meis?—OVID. *Amor. Eleg.* 11. *ad fin.*

A similar deception, in the use of *Adulari*, seems to have been held impossible. The same mind, it has been understood by the Romans, that is conscious of the mean condescensions of the *Adulator*, could neither be misled nor pleased by any artifice he could practise.

ÆGER, ÆGROTUS,

agree, in denoting the unsound state of the objects to which they are applied, but differ in respect to the nature of those objects. The first, as a generic term, extends both to mind and to body, while the latter expresses the diseases of the body alone. Servius has stated the distinction, in his remarks upon Virgil, *Ecc.* 1. 13. The word "Sanus," as expressing the prayer of the stoic, "sit mens sana in corpore sano," can be applied to the same state of both body and mind, and *Æger*, in the same way, may be applied to the contrary state of each. In all probability *Æger* had, at first, the power of expressing only bodily diseases, and was afterwards transferred, by a very natural figure, to the disorders of mind. Such figurative uses of words are frequent in language, and often pass, improperly, for the extension of terms, from particular to general applications. "Antonius pedibus *ager* prælio adesse nequibat."—SALL. *Cat.* 59. "Ita graviter *agram* fuisse ut omnes medici diffident."—CIC. *de Divin.* 91. b. In the above examples, *Æger* extends to bodily disorders alone, and, in the two following, we shall find it applied to those of both body and mind. "Pro hoc ego amico, pro hoc ingenio non minus *ager* animo, quam corpore ille."—PLIN. *Ep.* 9. 22. "Mulierem *agram*, et corpore et animo confectam."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 235. a.

ÆGROTUS, again, is properly confined to diseases of the body. "Cum ad Lucium Cæsarem *ægrotum* Neapolim venissem, quanquam erat oppressus totius corporis doloribus, tamen," &c.—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 133. a.

Non domus et fundus, non æris acervus et auri

Ægrote domini deduxit corpore febres.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 47.

In some editions of Cicero, the expression "*ægrotus animus*" is found. *Tusc.* Q. 3. 4. This reading, however, is suspicious, and not generally supported.

His usual practice establishes a distinction between *Æger* and *Ægrotus*, similar to that which he has laid down between “*Ægritudo*” and “*Ægrotatio*,” the former of which he applies, exclusively, to mental, and the latter to bodily disorders.

Such an application of *Ægrotus* as the following, which appears two or three times in Terence, is understood by some critics to be against the distinction made by Servius between it and *Æger*.

Priusquam harum scelera et lacrymæ confictæ dolis
 Reducunt animum *ægrotum* ad misericordiam
 Uxorem demus.———TEREN. *And.* 3. 3. 26.

This uncommon use of *Ægrotus*, however, may be considered as figurative, and as expressing a temporary indisposition of mind. It may be regarded as equivalent to the English expression “love-sick.” During the young man’s convalescence, Simo is anxious to give effect to his purpose of having him married, before his compassion was excited to that degree which might render the disease incurable.

ÆGRITUDO et ÆGROTATIO—*vide* MORBUS.

ÆQUALIS, PAR, SIMILIS,

agree, in denoting certain distinct relations, by which separate substances may be allied. *Æqualis* and *Par* respect their quantity as existing in the same or a proportionate degree, and differ from *Similis*, which may extend to all their qualities, that will bear a comparison, and may exist in greater and in smaller degrees.

ÆQUALIS denotes, that the same quantity resides in the wholes, or in certain parts, of two or more subjects. By quantity is understood whatever can be measured, and its equality is ascertained by the absolute agreement between the subjects measured, and one standard to which they are all applied. “*Captivum agrum plebi quam maxime æqualiter darent.*” LIV. 2. “*Fruentum civitatibus æqualiter distributum.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 184. b. The land and the corn, in the above instances, were distributed with the utmost precision, so that the portion given to each, if tried by a true standard, would be found equal to that given to all the rest individually. “*Quod metiri possumus æqualibus*

intervallis.”—CIC. *de Or.* 160. a. *Æqualis* refers not to matter and space only, but also to time. “Livius Ennio *æqualis* fuit.”—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 171. a. “Demosthenes successit magnis et maximos oratores habuit *æquales*.”—CIC. *Orat.* 206. a. In these examples there is a suppression of the time, which is the only thing meant. The different authors are said to have been contemporaries of the orator, not to have been his equals in merit or any other respect.

PAR differs from “*Æqualis*” in denoting the proportion of quantity, in two subjects, and in supposing that that in each is measured, either by a common standard, or by one peculiar to each. When each quantity is measured by its own standard, the proportion between the two is regularly stated, and more distinctly preserved. When the standard of both again is common, the relation of proportion approaches to that of equality, and is apt to be confounded with it. Thus, they who are said to be “*pares ætate*,” may have been born about, or even in the same year, so that what is past in the life of each bears the same proportion to the ordinary life of man; but unless the events of their birth had been simultaneous, a mathematical, which is the only real equality, could not have existed in respect to their age. The latter is ascertained by the number of years, and their divisions, that have expired since the birth; the former, by the proportion borne by that interval to the usual extent of life. “*Par est quod in omnes “æquale” est.*”—CIC. *de Inv.* 68. This definition is strictly logical, and announces that the equality of the relation between each of the subjects and its standard, forms that of parity, or defined proportion, among the whole. “*Verbum latinum par græco et idem valens.*”—CIC. *de fin.* 66. b. If the word *par* denoted absolute equality, the last member of this sentence would form a complete tautology, and have no meaning. *Par* denotes the relation borne by each word in the two languages to the respective vocabulary of which it was a part, and “*idem valens*,” that the quantity of conception, transmitted by each, was not an approximation to equality, but precisely the same.

The attributes denoted by *Æqualis* and *Par* are by no means incompatible, though they do not always exist in the same subjects. “*Oratio par et æqualis*

rebus ipsis.”—CIC. *Orat.* 208. a. The words “Oratio *par* rebus” imply, that the expression is, in the subject referred to, as adequate to the subject of the speaker, as it can be in any other; and the words “Oratio *æqualis* rebus,” go further, and assert, that the subject and expression are so consonant as to form an entire coincidence or equality, and that, of course, the intention of the speaker is completely fulfilled. The same holds in the following and many other examples. “Suntque *pares* in amore et *æquales*.”—CIC. *in Læl.* 102. 9. “Ut nostra in amicos benevolentia, illorum erga nos benevolentia *pariter æqualiterque* respondeat.” CIC. *de Am.* 106. b. In all the examples it may be observed, that *par* goes before *æqualis*, for a reason that may be inferred from the one, before the two last, that was fully analyzed.

Among the poets, the distinction between *Par* and *Æqualis* is sometimes disregarded. Thus, Virgil and Lucan, speaking of the equinox, say,

Libra diei somnique *pares* ubi fecerat horas.—*Georg.* I. 208.

Tempus erat quo Libra *pares* examinat horas.—*Phars.* 8. 46.

In both these instances *Par* must denote the strictest equality, as day and night consist, at the time specified, of precisely twelve hours each, and every hour, in every season, was of the same length. Purity, in this use, has been sacrificed by both poets to conveniency, and it has been left to the judgment of the reader to interpret the term more extensively than its due import will bear.

When writers in prose use the liberty mentioned, it may be owing to this, that the subjects, which happen to be stated, though bearing comparison, yet do not admit of being ascertained as precisely equal. “Gracchus si vixisset, eloquentia nescio an habuisset *parem* neminem.”—CIC. *de Cl. Orat.* 175. a. Even though Gracchus had been alive, his rhetorical merit, and that of others, would not have admitted of that accurate measurement by which equality is determined. *Parem*, then, in the above sentence, only denotes, that his merit might have borne a comparison with that of the most distinguished, and the word *æqualem* would have denoted something more.

PAR, applied to number, denotes, that the number specified is an even, not an odd one; or, that it is capable of a division which will exhaust the whole, without leaving a fraction. “Stellarum numerus *par* an *impar* sit nescitur.”—

CIC. *Acad. Q.* 9. b. The expression “*æqualis numerus*” would have had an immediate reference to other things numbered, and said to be equal to the stars.

PAR denotes propriety, or consistency of conduct with some rule, which *Æqualis* never does. In the conduct of men, it may signify either particular or reciprocal duty. The first appears in the former, and the last in the latter, of the following examples. “*Itaque mihi dubitanti quid me facere par sit.*”—CIC. *Ep. F.* 143. a.

Scribere te nobis, tibi nos accredere *par* est.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 15. 25.

The same analogy is to be traced, then, in the application of *Par*, both in moral and in natural subjects. The standard in the former is always higher than the conduct tried by it; and, of course, this conduct can only approach it in the way of proportion, but it can never reach it in the way of equality.

SIMILIS differs from both *Æqualis* and *Par*, in having no reference to quantity, but to the closest approximation of qualities really different, though nearly the same in appearance. It refers to such as try the acuteness of the observer’s discernment, from the slightness of those differences by which they are distinguished. Pliny, then, is guilty of an inaccuracy, in thought as well as expression, when speaking of the cry of pigeons. “*Cantus similis atque idem.*”—*Lib.* 10. *cap.* 31. If these cries were like, they could not be the same, and if they were the same, they could not be like. Likeness admits of degrees, which neither proportion nor equality does. The first, that is likeness, commences at the point next to that involving qualities in the relation of identity, and does not terminate till it becomes so feeble, as to escape the sense which happens to recognize it.

———Pro Dii immortales! *similiorem* mulierem
Magisque eandem, *uptote* quæ non sit eadem, non reor
Deos facere posse.———PLAUT. *Mil. G.* 2. b, 48.

The progress and termination of similitude are here marked by the poet as by a philosopher. “*Phidias sui similem formam inclusit in clypeo.*”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 155. a. The ability of the artist shewed itself in the exactness of the quality of shape in his statue, when compared with its archetype, not in the equality of the quantity of matter in each.

Par and *Similis* are often found qualifying one subject, which is never the case with *Æqualis* and *Similis*. Such a coalescence, indeed, in respect to the same attribute, cannot exist in nature. *Par* and *Similis* are allied, as denoting progress in their respective categories of quantity and quality, while *Similis* and *Æqualis* differ, in as far as the former has a reference to progress terminating in identity, and the latter to a fixed relation, resting on the quantity in two or more objects being rigorously adjusted, so as to exclude the idea of either deficiency or excess in any one.

We find an expression approved of by one of the ablest critics of antiquity, in which the difference between *Par* and *Similis* has got his sanction, and is very clearly and happily couched. Speaking of Sallust and Livy he says, “*Mihi egregie dixisse videtur Servilius Novianus, pares eos magis quam similes.*”—QUINTIL. 10. 1. Their merit, as historians, he insinuates, might bear a comparison, as coming near the same standard, but the particular talents that constituted that merit were by no means like. Livy also supports the distinction stated, in the following sentence. “*Hærente adhuc memoria Macedonici triumphi Lucius Anicius triumphavit de rege Gentio. Similia omnia magis visa hominibus quam paria.*”—LIV. 45. 43. The circumstances in which Anicius and Æmilius were placed were by no means the same, and, from the superior advantages enjoyed by the latter, his conquests were proportionably more important, and his triumph more splendid. Still, however, men compared the exploits and the reward of the conquerors, which, it appeared, were similar in kind, but were not to be measured by one rule.

There is a passage in Cicero, in which he applies the abstract nouns, *Similitudo* and *Æqualitas*, to the words of the same sentence, which appears, at first sight, to contradict what is said as to the incompatibility of the adjectives themselves. He requires that discourse should be “*circumscrip̄ta non longo anfractu, sed ad spiritum vocis apto, habeatque similitudinem æqualitatemque verborum.*”—PART. Or. 231. *b*. Here, it must be observed, that the orator does not require that the component words should be like, and equal, in the same respects. Their likeness could refer only to their sound, arising from the manner in which they are pronounced, in which a certain latitude must take place,

so as to give room for greater and less resemblances. Their equality, again, would refer to the number of letters that compose them, or to the duration of the sound while they are expressed, which, though not susceptible of mathematical precision, in such subjects, yet can bear it in a degree which bare similitude necessarily excludes. If these subtle observations, then, be solid, Cicero does not, in the above passage, contradict the fact asserted as to *Similis* and *Æqualis*, nor his own general practice in using them.

AEQUOR, CAMPUS,

agree in denoting an even surface, but differ in respect to its extent, or to the direction in which it lies. *Aequor* is properly applied to the whole that is presented, if the boundaries of the surface be seen, and to all that the eye can comprehend, if they are not. The surface, besides, denoted by *Aequor*, may lie in any direction, and is not confined to one that is horizontal. “*Quid tam planum quam mare? ex quo etiam æquor illud poetæ vocant.*”—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 2. “*Æquor mare appellatum, quod æquatum, commotum vento non est.*”—VAR. *LL.* 6. 2. *P.* 69. In these two instances, that which is termed *Æquor*, lies parallel to the horizon, and a surface may be viewed, that is either limited, or so extended, as not to be all visible at once. In the two that follow, again, which refer to polished glass, and to a part of the human body, the case is reversed. “*Ventris æquor ne irrugetur.*”—AUL. GELL. 12. 1.

————— *quæ reddunt speculorum ex æquore visum.*—LUCRET. 4. 291.

The use to which the glass is put, and the posture of the body at the time, fixes the direction of the surface of each, which may vary with circumstances. *Aequor*, besides, admits considerable latitude in respect to the smoothness of the surface it denotes. This latitude extends from the finest polish that can be brought on glass or marble, to the inequalities upon the sea in a storm, to the surface of a river gliding gently down its channel, or to that of a country not so smooth as either, and that appears level only when compared with what is mountainous.

Disjecitque rates, evertitque æquora ventis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 47.

Viridesque secant placido æquore silvas.—IBID. 8. 96.

CAMPUS differs from *Aequor*, in referring to level fields of moderate extent, subservient to the purposes of agriculture. "Segetes *campis* melius, quam præcipitibus locis proveniunt."—COLUMELL. I. 2. "*Campi* quos non nisi ingentes boves, et fortissima aratra perfringunt."—PLIN. 5. 6.

Though the plain, denoted by *Campus*, is of undefined extent, yet it is always circumscribed, and it lies in a direction that is horizontal, or nearly so. A breach of the continuity of the level destroys the *Aequor* that is extensive, and may reduce it into such a number of *Campi*, of equal or unequal dimensions, as will exhaust it. *Aequor*, then, is a generic term, in respect to *Campus*, and we, accordingly, often meet with the expression "*Æquor Campi*," but never "*Campus Æquoris*." "Babylonii in *camporum* patentium *æquoribus* habitantes, cum ex terra nihil emineret quod contemplationi coeli officere posset, omnem curam in siderum cognitione posuerunt."—CIC. *de Div.* I. 42.

Atque illi ut vacuo patuerunt "*æquore*" *campi*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 710.

"Adde huc fontium perennitates gelidas, speluncarum concavas altitudines, impendentium montium altitudines, immensitatesque *camporum*."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 45. *b.* The word "immensitates," here, may be applied to *Campi*, whose extremities are seen, and denotes only their comparative greatness.

Campus often denotes the "*Campus Martius*," in which candidates for offices exerted their influence.

————— hic generosior
Descendat in *campum* petitor.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 1. 10.

It denoted, also, any field, in which they who excelled in particular arts might display their ability. "Nullum enim vobis sors *campum* dedit, in quo excurrere virtus, cognoscique possit."—CIC. *Pro Muræn.* 128. *a.*

Illo quærat conjux Lavinia *campo*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 80.

An use, similar to that now mentioned, is made also of *Aequor*. Thus, when Pallas and Turnus were about to engage in single combat, their friends made way for them.

————— socii cesserunt *æquore* jussi.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 444.

As *Æquor* is applied to the surface of the earth, so is *Campus* occasionally to that of the sea.

— *campus salis ære secabant.*—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 214.

AER, AETHER,

agree in the general relation of being circumambient, in respect to the earth. They differ in as far as the fluid, denoted by *Aer*, is essential to the existence of animal life, and is more dense in its nature than the *Æther* which lies beyond it, and with which it can never incorporate. The notions of the ancients, as to the nature and the height of the atmosphere, were indistinct. Still it seems to have been understood, that where the *Aer* ended, the *Aether* began, and Cicero has given definitions of each term, on the justness of which we may rely. “Terra sita in media parte mundi, circumfusa undique est hac animabili spirabilique natura, cui nomen est *Aer*.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 44. a. “*Aer* fertur ille quidem levitate sublime, sed tamen in omnes partes se ipse fundit, et natura fertur ad cœlum : cujus tenuitate et calore temperatus vitalem et salutarem spiritum præbet animantibus.”—CIC. *Ibid.* The ancients appear to have been less distinct in their notions of *Aether* than *Aer*. The former term sometimes denotes fire itself, and at other times that pure space in which the stars perform their fixed courses. “Cœlum ipsum stellæque cæligenæ omnisque siderea compago *Aether* vocatur ; elementum non unum ex quatuor quæ nota sunt cunctis, sed longe aliud, numero quintum, ordine primum, genere divinum et inviolabile.”—APUL. *de Mundo.* p. 57.

Aether is made clearly different from space, because it is held forth as contained by it. Its essence was understood to be subtilized air, as that of air was to be subtilized water. “Ex terra, aqua ; ex aqua, oritur *aer* ; ex *aere*, *Aether* : deinde retrorsum vicissim ex *Æthere*, *Aer* ; ex *aere*, aqua ; ex aqua, terra infima.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 2. 33. From the above passage, it should seem that a series of condensations of the thinner was understood to form the grosser substance. According to the philosophy inculcated in Cicero, the remotest extremity of the *Æther* formed the termination of the universe ; according

to that inculcated in Lucretius, no such extremity existed; because the “*Ignifer Aether*,” as he calls it, was supposed to keep pace with the immensity of space. “*Restat ultimus omnia cingens, et coercens cœli complexus, qui idem æther vocatur; extrema ora, et determinatio mundi: in quo cum admirabilitate maxima, igneæ formæ cursus ordinatos definiunt.*”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 2. 101.

Fiet uti nusquam possit consistere finis
Effugiumque fugæ prolatet copia semper.—LUCRET. 1. 981.

Though *Aer* and *Æther* are so completely distinguished among the prose writers, yet the poets sometimes chuse to confound them. Thus, Horace and Virgil speak of birds and insects flying in *æther*, in which they could not be supported, nor even exist.

Non usitata nec tenui ferar
Penna biformis per liquidum *Æthera*
Vates.—HOR. *Car.* 2. *Ult.*
— apes liquidum trans *æthera* vectæ.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 65.

AERUMNA—*vide* CURA.

AFFECTARE, AMBIRE,

agree as to the keenness with which some supposed good is desired, but differ in respect to the means employed for obtaining it. Both verbs imply, that this good is known to be of difficult acquisition, and not the proper object of a languid wish; and that it, of course, excites the activity of the person who perceives it. The force of *Affectare* rests upon the vigorous exertion of the agent, and upon his employing every species of means that promise success. “*Jugurtha civitates quæ ab se defecerant, formidine, aut ostentando præmia affectare.*”—SAL. *Jug.* 66.

This verb, signifying literally “to make keenly at,” carries in it all the zeal ordinarily involved in a frequentative, and, besides, intimates, by means of “*ad*,” that this zeal is exerted for behoof of the person possessing it. Jugurtha, accordingly, to whom it was applied, exercised a daring ambition, in pursuit of an object, not otherwise to be obtained. The degree of boldness displayed, at the same time, is always in proportion to the difficulty of the situation, and the arduous nature of the attempt. “*Nuntio affectati a Vespasiano imperii.*”—TAC.

Ag. 7. "Neque ea res Tarquinio spem *affectandi* regni minuit: immo eo impensius sibi occasionem datam ratus est."—LIV. 1. 46.

————— Cæsar dum magnus ad altum
Fulminat Euphratem bello, victorque volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamque *affectat* Olympo.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 560.

The power of the verb, *affectare*, may be discerned in its application to men in the humbler, as well as the higher spheres of life. "Elegans, non magnificus; splendidus, non sumptuosus; omni diligentia munditiam non affluentem *affectabat*."—NEP. *in vit. Att.* 13. The biographer tells us, that Atticus was as anxious to moderate the splendour of his fortune, as most men are to increase that of theirs. Even here, too, there was an object of ambition; for, what he gave up in shew, he expected to do more than gain in reputation.

In establishing a moral precept, Phædrus makes a happy application of this verb. He discourages inordinate ambition thus.

Noli *affectare* quod tibi non est datum.—FAB. 3. 18.

AMBIRE differs from *Affectare*, in implying that the agent makes an exertion, of which address is the characteristic, and that he employs gentle means only in the acquisition of his object. Thus, in the passage last quoted from Sallust, in as far as Jugurtha "ostentabat præmia," he might have been said, "ambire civitates;" but, in as far as he employed fear as the instrument of his ambition, the verb *affectare* only could be properly applied to his conduct. *Ambire*, from "Am" and "Eo," signifies, in the sense in which it is opposed to *Affectare*, to go round in quest of avenues for successful insinuation. In this way, candidates for offices at Rome neglected none of those upon whose support their success rested. The verb, *Ambire*, supposes an avowal of the purpose of the agent, as much as *Affectare* does. Nay, the former implies, that his success depends on the good-will of those to whom he communicates his intention, and the latter, that it depends upon himself. "Clodius vicatim *ambire*, servis aperte spem libertatis ostendere."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 56. a. "Maxima ope niti, *ambire*, fatigare vos singulos."—SAL. *Jug.* 14.

————— non connubiis *ambire* Latinum
Æneadæ possint.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 333.

Non ego nobilium scriptorum auditor et ultor
Grammaticas *ambire* tribus et pulpita dignor.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 19. 39.

Horace declares himself to be too proud to court the favour of those critics, by means of the soothing flattery, which was its certain price. He could have obtained it only by submissions which he reckoned beneath him; that is, by extenuating blemishes which he perceived to be glaring, and by praising trifling beauties beyond their desert.

Though *Ambire*, in its primary use, referred properly to canvassing, or going round a number of persons, yet many instances appear of its being applied to one. To the power of insinuation, which is characteristic of the person *ambiens*, there may be conjoined that of anxious entreaty, as in Horace's beautiful description of the peasant courting and imploring the favour of Fortune.

Te pauper *ambit* sollicita prece
Ruris colonus.—CAR. 1. 35. 5.

AFFINES—*vide* AGNATI.

AFFIRMARE, ASSEVERARE,

agree in denoting the act of asserting, but differ in respect to the strength with which the assertion is made. This variety in strength must depend upon the degree of evidence upon which the speaker either believes, or represents it, to be founded. The person, *Affirmans*, may or may not believe the proposition he announces, but he for certain wishes to impress those whom he addresses with a belief of its truth. “Nemo scire et omnes *affirmare*, donec inopia veri et consensu errantium victus Galba.”—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 35. The facts, here suggested, seem to rest upon no evidence at all, and to have been suggested by fear. The old emperor, however, was duped by the ignorance of his informers, and his own credulity. “Quid opus est de Dionysio tam valde *affirmare*? an mihi nutus tuus non facerét fidem?”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 7. 8. It appears, that even a nod may be regarded as a species of affirmation, and that, between the lowest and the highest degrees of it, there is a wide interval. “Dicendum est mihi igitur ad ea quæ sunt a te dicta, sed ita nihil ut *affirmem*, quæram omnia dubitans.”—CIC. *de Div.* 110. a.

AFFIRMARE frequently denotes confirmations drawn from the events which befall men, or from the actions which they perform, and not from their expressions, as in the instances above quoted. “Secuta anceps valetudo iram Deum *affirmavit*.”—TAC. *Ann.* 14. 22. “Eam opinionem ipse *affirmavit* petendo, ut summotis aliis, cum ipso imperatore Romano liceret sibi colloqui.”—LIV. 32. 35. The person, here mentioned, did not confirm this opinion by any verbal assertion, but by an action that was interpreted by those who were about him.

ASSEVERARE differs from “Affirmare,” in supposing, that he who asserts is not only convinced of the truth of his proposition, but that his conviction of this is as great as possible. It comes from “ad” and “severus.” This last, again, compounded of “secus” and “verus,” implies, keeping near, or adhering to, the truth. In the first example of *Affirmare*, relating to Galba, this verb could not have been substituted in its place. It could not have been expressed thus, “Nemo scire et omnes *asseverare*.” The ignorance, announced in the first member of the sentence, would have been incompatible with the rigid conformity to truth implied in the verb appearing in the last. In the following sentence, Cicero gives a definition of *Asseverare*, that supports what is said of it. “Nemo de ulla re potest *asseverare*, sine aliqua ejus rei propria et certa nota.”—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 10. a. “Omni tibi *asseveratione* *affirmo* quod mihi credas velim.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 13. 23. By means of the abstract from *Asseverare*, the verb “Affirmare” has here a force greatly superior to its own. An assertion, as to the certainty of any fact, could not be made more forcibly by any other terms in the Latin language. “Habes meum de oratore Brute judicium: quod aut sequere si probaveris; aut tuo stabis, si aliud quoddam est tuum. In quo neque pugnabo tecum, neque hoc meum, de quo tantopere hoc libro *asseveravi*, unquam *affirmabo* esse verius quam tuum.”—CIC. *Orat.* 220. b. The orator, by *asseverare*, declares he had done more in this book, with a view to support his own opinion, formed upon evidence collected and examined by himself, than he would try to do in the refutation of that of Brutus, in examining which, he would venture only *affirmare*.

ASSEVERARE is more rarely applied to confirmations drawn from events and circumstances, than *Affirmare*. When it is, it in so far retains its original power as to denote, that the proof given is unquestionable, and the fact asserted to be relied on. "Namque rutilæ Caledoniam habitantium comæ, magni artus, Germanicam originem *asseverant*."—TAC. *in Vit. Agric.* 11.

AGER—*vide* RUS.

AGGER—*vide* STRUES.

AGERE, FACERE, GERERE,

agree in denoting, that a being, which might have been quiescent, is in a state of active exertion: but the first has an immediate reference to the object upon which he acts; the second, to the means that are subservient to the end he has in view; and the third, to the continued effort necessary to produce the intended effect. They agree, also, in referring to every species of action, of which mind or matter is susceptible. Martial exhibits his wit in playing upon several different uses of the verb *Agere*.

Semper *agis* causas et res *agis*, Attale, semper

Est, non est quod *agas*, Attale, semper *agis*.

Si res et causæ desunt, *agis*, Attale, mulas:

Attale, ne quod *agas* desit, *agas* animam.—LIB. 1. *Ep.* 80.

In the above epigram, *Agere* denotes the pleading of causes, the general conduct of business, the driving of mules, and the act of dying. In all the different senses of the verb, it implies, that Attalus was exerting certain powers, but that nothing was consummated. Each object was still before him, and his activity continued to be called forth, as having as yet terminated in nothing. "Cicero eo tendit, id *agit*, ad eum exitum properat, ut sit illi Octavius propitius."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 288. a. The place which *Agere* holds in this climax, serves to unfold its nature. "Tendere," literally suggesting the direction in which a body is about to move, denotes the purpose of the agent; *Agere*, the exertion of powers which might not have been employed; and "Properare," the keenness and haste, with which such means are used as lead to a designed effect.

FACERE differs from *Agere* in representing the agent, not merely as employed, but as adopting means that have a direct tendency to the accomplishment of some end. “*Modo scribe aliquando ad nos quid agas, et a nobis quid fieri et curari velis.*”—*Cic. Ep. Fam. 7. 12.* Cicero first begs to be informed by Trebatius what objects engaged his attention, and then, if there were any to the accomplishment of which his exertions could minister. In the preceding epistle, Cicero says, “*Sed heus tu! quid agis? Ecquid fit?*” Varro explains these interrogations, in a way that supports the distinction laid down. “*Quid agis? id est, cogitas, studes, moliris?*” and then, “*Ecquid fit?*” i. e. “*Ecquid illo motu tuo, agitatione tua efficitur?*”—*De L. L. 5, 6.*

By means of these two verbs, Cicero offers his services against Antony, in every way possible. “*Quod agendum atque faciendum, id modo non recusem sed appetam etiam atque deprecem.*”—*Cic. Philip. 190. a.* The orator declares, that he would grudge no exertion, however laborious or disagreeable, as implied in the first verb; nor that unwearied attention, which would cease only when a successful issue was obtained, as implied in the other. *Facere* clearly denotes the consummation of the action implied in *Agere*; and when the person, *Faciens*, ceases to operate, something remains that has been produced by him, which is not the case with the person *Agens*. “*Itaque facio me alias res agere, ne convicium Platonis audiam.*”—*Cic. Ep. Fam. 15. 18.* The verbs, here, could not change places and preserve any meaning. The expression, “*Ago me alias res facere,*” could never suggest that coercive power which a man has over his mind, in effectually fixing the objects, that are to engage his attention.

In the application of the two verbs to the term “*Fabula,*” their distinctive meaning is clearly preserved. *Facere* has a reference to the work of the author, as brought to a conclusion, and fit to be presented to the world: *Agere*, again, to the motions of the actor upon the stage, without regard to the termination of any thing begun.

Poeta quum primum animum ad scribendum appulit

Id sibi negotii credidit solum dari

Populo ut placerent quas fecisset fabulas.—*TER. And. Prol. ad init.*

“ Quomodo fabula sic vita: non quam diu sed quam bene *acta sit*, refert.”—SENEC. *Ep.* 77. *ad fin.* The power of *Agere* is so extensive, and action, of one kind or other, so essential to the existence of man, that it sometimes denotes his being, or his abode simply. “ Apud illos homines qui tunc *agebant*.”—TAC. *Ann.* 3. 19. The last three words of this example refer to men who were then alive. “ Plerique copias trans Padum *agentes* acciri postulabant.”—TAC. *Hist.* 2. 39. The forces are here meant that dwelt, or were stationed, beyond the Po. Of the power of denoting existence, or habitation, *Facere* is destitute. So is it, also, of denoting the steady continuance in a state with which action is inconsistent, as in the enjoyment of rest, or the preservation of silence.

Ipsi in defossis specubus secreta sub alta
 Otia *agunt* terra—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 376.
 —————quem postquam vidit inanem
 Et desolatas *agere* alta silentia terras
 Deucalion.—————OVID. *Met.* I. 348.

GERERE differs from the two former verbs, in referring to the unremitting attention necessary, upon the part of the agent, in order to give effect to what he feels incumbent upon him. In its original meaning, it signifies to carry, and though the weight is not understood to be heavy, yet it requires unremitting support. The connection between the literal and the figurative meaning of *Gerere*, is expressed by Cicero in the following sentence. “ Ut “susceptum” negotium pro tua fide et diligentia, ex voluntate Cæsaris, qui tibi rem magnam difficilemque commisit *gerere* possis.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 13. 5. The commentary, which Varro gives on the three verbs, appears fully to justify all that is said of them. “ Potest quis aliquid *facere* et non *agere*, ut poeta *facit* fabulam et non *agit*: Contra actor *agit* et non *facit*: Contra Imperator, qui dicitur res *gerere*, in eo neque *agit* neque *facit*, sed *gerit*, id est sustinet; translatum ab his qui onera *gerunt*, quod sustinent.”—L. L. 5. 8. The commander delegated whatever was executive, and couched in the two first verbs, to those who acted under him; and, by a steady superintendance only, saw the fulfilment of one great plan, so devised as to lead to ultimate success.

Meo remigio rem *gero*.—PLAUT. *Mil.* 2. 1. 149.

Neither *Agere* nor *Facere* could be here substituted for *Gerere*, because in the expression there is a reference, not to a single act, but to a train of actions that are consecutive, each of which is connected with that preceding, and with that following, itself.

As the conduct of the train is necessarily prior to the consummation of affairs, so *Gerere* and *Facere* may go together in their natural order, as parts of one sentence. “Ita facta demonstras, ut mores ejus de quo narres, ut sermo, ut vultus omnes exprimentur, ut iis qui audiunt tum *geri* illa *ferique* videantur.”—CIC. *de Or.* 131. a.

GERERE refers to what is effected by mind, and not to operations upon bodily, or material substances. “*Facere gladium*” would suggest the act of the person forging the sword, but “*Gerere gladium*,” the act and intention of the person who carries it. Virgil applies this verb to the train of circumstances, in killing the calf as necessary to renew the stock of bees.

Hoc *geritur*, zephyris primum impellentibus undas.—*Georg.* 4. 305.

A single act is not held forth here as performed, but the extraordinary event is the effect of a series, in which each must be conducted in its proper place.

AGNATI, COGNATI, AFFINES,

agree, in denoting relation among persons connected with one family, but differ in respect to the line in which the connection is traced. The first signifies kinsmen by the father's side, and refers to the regular line of his descendants, as *Avus*, *Proavus*, *Abavus*, and *Atavus*, do to that of his progenitors. “*Agnati* sunt qui per virilis sexus personas cognatione junguntur, et ejusdem nominis sunt, quasi familiæ adnati, velut frater ex eodem patre natus, filius, neposve ex eo; item patruus, patruus filius, qui frater patruelis dicitur et nepos ex eo.”—*Inst. de Legit. Agnat. Tut.* § 1.

The relation of *Agnati*, then, flowed from the father as its source, and descended through the male line of all the brothers of a family. It is to be observed, that the word “*nepos*,” though differently translated, at different times,

signifies but one remove from the “pater.” It implies only the intervention of the “natus,” or son, when translated a grandson, and only that of the “patruus,” or uncle, by the father’s side, when translated a nephew. A corresponding double relation is observed in its compounds, “pronepos” and “abnepos,” to which some writers, of doubtful authority, have added “adnepos,” as answering with that relation in the line of descent, which is expressed by “atavus,” in that of ancestry.

COGNATUS agrees with *Agnatus*, in denoting relation by blood, but differs from it in implying, that the connection is traced by the female, not by the male line. “*Cognati sunt qui per fœminas conjunguntur, quasi simul nati, vel commune nascendi initium habentes.*”—*Inst. de Legit. Agnat. Tut.* § 1.

AGNATUS, however, is a general term in respect to *Cognatus*; that is, those denoted by the former term, may be also, in the relation, denoted by the latter; the reverse of which does not follow. The “patruus,” for example, is both *Agnatus* and *Cognatus*, but the “avunculus,” or uncle, by the mother’s side, is only the last of the two. An “avunculus” was said to be “sanguine non genere conjunctus.” His sister was understood to have left the family of her father, and to have passed into that of her husband. The “patruus,” accordingly, as an *Agnatus*, was, upon the death of the father, and during the minority of the nephew, invested, by the Roman law, with a power never given to the “avunculus.” From the frequent abuses of this power, probably came the phrase,

——ne sis “patruus” mihi.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 88.

“Qui in reliqua vita mitis esset, fuit in hac causa pertristis quidam “patruus,” censor, magister.”—CIC. *pro Læl.* 25. Though the natural affection, from consanguinity, should not have been greater upon the part of the one uncle than of the other, yet we never find the phrase “Ne sis mihi *avunculus.*”

AFFINIS differs from the two former words, in denoting relation by marriage, and in having no reference to the line, whether male or female, in which the connection is traced. A relation of this kind was said by the Greeks to be ὁ κατ’ ἐπιγαμίαν συγγένης. “*Affines sunt viri et uxoris cognati;*

dicti ab eo, quod duæ cognationes, quæ diversæ inter se sunt, per nuptias copulantur, et altera ad alterius cognationis finem accedit, ut cognati uxoris sunt adfines viri, ac viri cognati uxoris adfines: quorum nomina fere hæc sunt, Socer, Socrus; Gener, Nurus; Noverca, Vitricus; Privignus, Privigna; et alii ulteriores.”—MODESTIN. *de grad. et Affin.* 38. 10. 4. In the original import of *Affinis*, it has nearly the same power with “Vicinus.” Thus, Sallust says, “Interea parentes aut parvi liberi militum, ut quisque potentiore *affinis* erat, sedibus pellebantur.”—*Jug.* 41. 8. In the passage last quoted from Modestinus, we are not only indebted to his authority, as a lawyer, in stating the force of the word, but must be pleased also with his ingenuity, as a grammarian, in tracing the connection between its original and its acquired meaning.

ALAPA, COLAPHUS,

agree, in denoting a blow, but differ in respect to the manner in which the blow is given. The former comes from “Ala,” and refers to the stroke given by birds with their wing extended. The derivative signifies a slap with the hand open, which was seemingly held more expressive of the contempt, than the anger, of the person giving it, and intended often to make the spectators laugh. It was, besides, given upon the cheek, or upon the head shaven, that the noise might be the greater, and the person receiving it the more ridiculous.

—— ridere potest qui
Mamercorum *alapas*?—JUVEN. 8. 191.

The poet here refers to the blows received by the descendants of illustrious men, who dishonoured their ancestors by acting the part of slaves upon the stage. So also Martial.

O quam dignus eras *alapis* Mariane Latini!
Te successurum credo ego Panniculo. 5. 61.

The slap, mentioned in the fable of Æsop, as sufficient to destroy the fly that bit the old man’s head, was contrary to the ordinary use of the term, considered as both an insult and an injury to the person receiving it. The striker, besides, had no intention to entertain the people present, though he actually did so.

Calvi momordit musca nudatum caput,
 Quam opprimere captans *alapam* sibi duxit gravem ;
 Tunc illa irridens : punctum volucris parvulæ
 Voluisti morte ulcisci : quid facies tibi
 Injurix qui addideris contumeliam?—PHÆD. *Fab.* 5. 3.

COLAPHUS, which comes from the Greek verb, Κολαπτειν, “Tundere,” differs from *Alapa*, in denoting a blow with the fist, expressive of the wrath of the person who gives it, and intended only to gratify the resentment of the striker, without regard to those who see him. The stroke denoted by *Colaphus*, too, is not, like that by *Alapa*, confined to some part of the head.

— defigere aliquem *colaphis* in terram.—PLAUT. *Pers.* 2. 4. 22.

A well-aimed box, upon the trunk of the body, often produces the effect here mentioned, as well as one upon the head.

Homini misero plus quingentos *colaphos* infregit mihi !
 —omnes dentes labefecit mihi !

Præterea *colaphis* tuber est totum caput.—TER. *Adelph.* 2. 2. 36.

No such violent effects, as those here ascribed to the *Colaphus*, could ever have arisen from the *Alapa*. Tertullian seems to have used *Colaphus* impurely, by supposing that the person inflicting it meant only to be witty, and not to hurt him whom he struck. “Calces et *Colaphos* et omnem petulantiam manus.”—*De Spectac. Cap.* 18.

In the commentary of Willichius, upon the first part of the passage quoted from Terence, the two terms are well distinguished. “*Colaphum* infringere,” says the critic, “est compressa in pugnum manu cædere, sicut *alapam* infligere est diducta manu verberare.”

ALBUS—*vide* CANDIDUS.

ALERE—*vide* NUTRIRE.

ALES—*vide* VOLUCRIS.

ALGA, ULVA,

agree, in denoting herbs of the same species, as being both aquatic ; but differ, in respect to the water in which they are generated. The former is a produc-

tion of the sea, and the latter of lochs, rivers and marshes. The nature of each is defined in the following line.

Alga venit pelago, sed nascitur ulva palude.

Virgil talks of *Alga* as dashed upon the side of a rock by the fury of the sea.

——laterique illisa refunditur *alga*.—*Æn.* 7. 590.

——cras foliis nemus

Multis et *alga* littus inutili

Demissa tempestas ab Euro

Sternet.—*HOR. Car.* 3. 17. 9.

The Roman poets proclaim the ignorance of their countrymen by often talking of the useless nature of the *Alga*. This shews how far they were behind in agriculture and other arts.

Et genus et virtus nisi cum re vilior *alga* est.—*HOR. Sat.* 2. 5. 8.

——projecta vilior *alga*.—*VIRG. Ecl.* 7. 42.

ULVA again, as has been said, uniformly signifies the herbs that are the production of fresh water, whether stagnating or otherwise.

Limosaque lacu per noctem obscurus in *ulva*,

Delitui—————*VIRG. Æn.* 2. 135.

Tandem trans fluvium incolumes vatemque virumque

Informi limo, glaucaque exponit in *ulva*.—*VIRG. Æn.* 6.

——lupus *ulvis* palustribus exit.—*OVID. Met.* 11. 3. 366.

ALIBI, ALICUBI ; ALIO, ALIQUO ; ALIUNDE, ALICUNDE ;

agree in denoting points in space, different from others, whether specified by their relation to other points, or not, but differ, either as they admit or reject the idea of motion, or according to the direction of the motion when they do. They are all derivatives from *Alius*, the proper power of which is to be seen in its own place. The two first differ from the last four, in having no reference to motion at all.

Alibi is properly translated, “Elsewhere,” and *Alicubi*, “Anywhere.” Both come from “Ubi,” with the interrogative power of the root, expelled by the

“*Alius*,” in the former, and the “*Aliquis*,” in the latter. The first bears a part in the affirmation, that an object is not at a certain point, however defined, and leaves it to be inferred, that it is at some other. The second suggests, that this object may be in any point of space, without excepting one other, from which, by *alibi*, it is excluded. “*Sæva ac deformis urbe tota facies. Alibi prælia et vulnera: alibi balineæ popinæque: prorsus ut eandem civitatem et furere crederes et lascivire.*”—TAC. *Ann.* I. 77. The scenes of cruelty and debauchery were exhibited up and down the town; but the place of each, in both kinds, is no otherwise discriminated, than by not being the same with one excepted. “*Exercitus trifariam dissipatus: alibi primum, alibi postremum agmen; alibi impedimenta, inter vepres delituit.*”—LIV. 38. 46. The space, containing the whole army, may have been that occupied by the bramble bushes, but those forming the van and the rear, being separated, were elsewhere, in respect to each other, as well as to the baggage. “*Duas omnino clades nec alibi quam in Germania accepit.*”—SÆTON. *Aug.* 23.

By *Alicubi*, it has been said, no specification of one point in space is made by opposing it to another, and in the conception of the speaker, every point is regarded as indifferent.

Utinam hic prope adesset *alicubi* atque audiret hæc.—TER. *Adelph.* 3. 4. 7.

The only limitation of space, here given, is by “*prope*” and “*adesset*.” *Alicubi* intimates, that if the person were within hearing, it did not signify on what spot he was.

ALIO and ALIQUO differ from *Alibi* and *Alicubi*, in denoting motion towards, instead of quiescence in, a place. Their general ground of difference is precisely the same; as *Alio* denotes motion to any point in space but one that is specified, and *Aliquo* denotes motion to that, and to any other point alike.

Detineo te fortasse: tu profecturus *alio* fueras.—TER. *Eun.* 2. 2. 49.

The point occupied by Gnatho and Parmeno, when their conversation took place, was the only one to which the latter could not have been going. “*Si*

quando Romam *aliove* quo mitterent legatos.”—LIV. 38. 30. Rome here stands opposed to every other place, to which ambassadors might have been sent.

In the case of *Aliquo*, again, this generality, which is characteristic of *Alio*, is limited. There is, in the former, no exclusion of any one point in space, in respect to another; but the specified, and the unspecified point, may be equally those to which the motion tends. “Dandus est locus fortunæ: cendum ex Italia: migrandum Rhodum aut *aliquo* terrarum.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 11. 1. Rhodes is by no means excepted from the points to which this migration might have been directed. A full power is, at the same time, given to Brutus and Cassius, to select the spot to which their retreat is to be directed. In the respect mentioned, the *Aliquo* and the *Alicubi* coincide; and both are compounds of “quis,” with “alius” prefixed. As *Alicubi*, which would originally be written “Aliquibi,” signifies “at any point,” or, “any where,” so *aliquo* signifies “to some point,” as the spot upon which the implied motion is to terminate.

ALIUNDE and ALICUNDE differ from the two first terms, and agree with the two last, in having reference to motion. The ground of difference between the last and the first, in each set, is the same, and in consequence of the association of “ubi” and “quis,” with “alius” in the first; of “quis” with “alius” in the second; and of “alius” and “aliquis” with “unde” in the last. Though motion is suggested by the two last sets, yet its direction is reversed, *alio* and *aliquo* supposing it to proceed from an interior to circumjacent points, and *aliunde* and *alicunde* from the circumjacent to the interior. These last, accordingly, signify “from any other point,” and “from some other point.” “Cinnabaris neutro ex loco vehitur nec fere *aliunde*, quam ex Hispania.”—PLIN. 33. 7. This stuff, used by painters, was imported to Rome only from Spain. “Quum id neque per te scires neque *aliunde* audire potuisses.”—CIC. *Pro. Lig.* 137. a. The point, excepted here, is represented by the personal knowledge of him who is addressed, in opposition to any other quarter from which information could have been had. “*Aliunde* assumto bono uti non proprio nec suo.”—CIC. *de Or.* 112. a. Livy, in the following sentence, seems

to have used *Aliunde* irregularly, by putting it for *Alibi*, and excluding from the former the idea of motion. “*Qui aliunde stat semper, aliunde sentiat.*”—LIV. 24. 45.

In *aliunde*, then, there is always one point excepted, from which the motion cannot commence; but in *Alicunde*, it will be found, there is none. The former requires, that the point be different from that specified, while the latter requires only that it be some point, and capable of containing the body understood to depart from it.

Venit meditatus *alicunde* ex solo loco.—TER. *And.* 2. 2. 3.

When Davus said this to Pamphilus, he did not know from what quarter Simo had come, and only suspected he had been in a solitary place. “*Omnis enim vis est, quæ aut decedere nos alicunde cogit, aut prohibet accedere.*”—CIC. *Pro Cæc.* 293. *b.* The point of departure, here, is only required to be some undefined point, and stands opposed to no other upon the surface of the globe.

ALIUS, CÆTERA, RELIQUUS,

agree in denoting the exception of a part from a specified subject, but differ in respect to the proportion borne by the one to the other. *Alius*, in its simplest meaning, intimates diversity among objects supposed to be of the same general nature. “*Tantum dico aliud esse illud atque hoc.*”—CIC. *de Legg.* 105. *a.* “*Longe alia mihi mens est.*”—SAL. *Cat.* 52. It next excepts each of the individuals of a species from one before specified, and thereby puts all the last mentioned on a level.

Non enim posthac *alia* calebo
Fœmina—————HOR. *Car.* 4. 6. 33.

The poet obliges himself to set all the beauties of even the finest women at defiance, if Phyllis would comply with his request.

But the most ordinary power of *alius*, and that in which it approaches the nature of the other two words, is that of excepting an undefined part from many others, agreeing with it in their general nature, but differing in some one particular respect. “*Virtus per se ipsa laudabilis habet plures partes.*

Sunt enim *aliæ* virtutes quæ videntur in moribus hominum, *aliæ* in ingenii aliqua facultate.”—CIC. *de Or.* 140. *a.*

The first *aliæ*, which must be translated “some,” is the instrument of general specification, whereby those mental affections, styled “Virtutes,” are separated from vices, or any thing else with which they might be confounded. The second, as would have been the case with any possible number that followed, excepts an undefined set from those first specified. It gives no hint as to the extent of each remaining class, but only suggests that it is less than the whole. The same things may be applied to the two following examples. “In minimis tenuissimisque rebus ita labi, ut *aliis* miserandus, *aliis* irridendus esse videatur.”—CIC. *de Orat.* 98. *b.*

Vivite felices quibus est fortuna peracta
Jam sua : nos *alia* ex *aliis* in fata vocamur.—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 493.

CÆTERA differs from *Alius* in denoting, that the part, which is not excepted, contains all that remains, and that the excepted subject, or subjects, first specified, bear but a small proportion to the residue. “Quod satis in usum fuit sublato, *cæterum* omne incensum est.”—LIV. 22. 20. “Omnis homines qui sese student præstare *cæteris* animalibus.”—SAL. *Cat.* 1. The animal, Man, is here excepted from all other animals upon the face of the earth.

————— quod adest memento
Componere æquus. *Cætera* fluminis
Ritu feruntur.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 29. 32.

The poet here affirms, that the present event only can be called our own, and that all others are carried, as by the course of a river, which we can neither stop nor direct.

————— hac in re silicet una
Multum dissimiles, ad *cætera* pæne gemelli.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 10. 2.
Excepto quod non simul esses, *cætera* lætus.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 10. 50.

The absence of his friend, which is the only circumstance excepted, is opposed to all the others in Horace’s situation at the time, which were of a fortunate nature.

—— dira illuvies, immissaque barba,
 Consortum tegmen spinis, at *cætera* Graius.—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 593.

Here there is a plurality of circumstances excepted, and all the rest are classed from their connection with Greece.

RELIQUUS agrees with *Cætera* in denoting, that the part, not excepted, contains all that remains, but has no reference to the proportion subsisting between the part first specified, and that which is wanting to complete the aggregate.—The difference between *Alius* and *Reliquus* is well unfolded by a respectable critic, in his notes upon Terence.

Tu, Simalio, in sinistrum cornu, tu, Syrisce, in dexterum,
 Cedo *alios* : Ubi Centurio est Sanga?—EUN. 4. 7. b.

Donatus has well observed, “ Non *reliquos* dixit : sed *alios*, quasi multos.” A little below, Thraso again cries, “ Ubi *alii* ?” to which Sanga replies, “ —— qui malum *alii*? solus Sannio servat domi.” The irony of the poet shews itself, by his putting *alius* twice into the mouth of Thraso. Had this blustering soldier called out, “ Ubi *reliqui* ?” he would have shewn his strength at once, by calling forth all who accompanied him in the expedition against Thais’s house. The smallest plural number possible might have been all that the term happened then to denote.

RELIQUUS, like *cætera*, may be employed, when one only of a number is excepted. “ Unum in civitate esse magistratum cui *reliqui* magistratus parent.”—CIC. *de Legg.* 187. a. It may, at the same time, be employed, when those excepted are more numerous than the remainder, in which case *cætera* could not be used at all. “ Sunt enim multi, qui omnino græcas non ament literas : plures qui philosophiam : *reliqui* etiamsi hæc non improbent, tamen earum rerum disputationem principibus non ita decoram putent.”—CIC. *Q. Ac.* 2. a. The number, expressed by “ multi” and “ plures,” may be supposed not only to equal, but even to surpass, that implied in *reliqui*.

The place of *reliquus* is sometimes, though rarely, supplied by “ *alius*,” as in the two following examples from Livy. “ Terunti quinquaginta octo delecti, qui Romam mitterentur : vulgus *aliud* trucidatum.”—*Lib.* 7. *cap.* 19. “ Primo se agro paterno exuisse, deinde fortunis *aliis*.”—*Lib.* 2. *cap.* 23. In both

these instances, *Alius* signifies, not an undefined part, distinct merely from that excepted in “delecti” and “paterno,” but the complete residue, independently of the aggregate, of which it is stated as a part. “Cum *aliis* Quintus frater, *aliis* Caius Pomtimus, *reliquis* Marcus Anucius præessent.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 15. 4. The distribution of the troops among the lieutenants is here very distinctly marked, and might have been different from what the commander appointed. His brother Quintus commanded one undefined part, Caius Pomtimus another, and the whole remainder, which might have been more or less than either or both of those stated, was under the direction of Anucius. “Quintus frater Argilletani ædificii *reliquum* dodrantem emit.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 10. a. In this example it appears that *Reliquus* admits a definite specification of the excepted part, which neither *Alius* nor *Cætera* could have done. “*Alium* dodrantem” would have signified another part, containing three-fourths of one whole, which is absurd; and “*cæterum* dodrantem,” from the general comprehensiveness of the adjective, on the one hand, and the strictly limited speciality of the substantive, on the other, would have suggested a complex conception, whose parts, being heterogeneous, it would have been impossible to unite.

In the following passage from Cicero, the whole three adjectives are found exhibiting the distinctive character of each. “*Alia* enim et bona et mala videntur Stoicis, et *cæteris* civibus, vel potius gentibus; *alia* vis honoris ignominia, præmii, supplicii. *Reliqui* sunt Peripatetici et Academici: quanquam Academicorum nomen est unum, sententiæ duæ. Nam Speusippus, Platonis sororis filius, et Xenocrates, qui Platonem audierat, et qui Xenocratem, Polemo, et Crantor, nihil ab Aristotele, qui una audierat Platonem, magnopere dissensit: copia fortasse, et varietate dicendi pares non fuerunt.”—CIC. *de Or.* 149. a. By means of *Alia*, in both parts of this sentence, there is an undefined specification of certain points, in which the stoics and the rest of the sects either agree or differ. By means of *Cæteris*, the stoics are exempted from all the other sects; so that the numerous specified, and the single excepted parts, together, comprehend all the sects that existed, of whom it is said that they agreed in one point. By means of *Reliqui*, the enumeration

is completed, by specifying the remaining sects, which might have been either more or less than those excepted. The number of these is said by the philosopher to have been less than was commonly supposed, as the tenets of the Academicians, from their being divided into two classes, were extensive, and those of the Platonists and Peripatetics were nearly the same.

ALLEGARE—*vide* LEGARE.

ALLICERE—*vide* TRAHERE.

ALTUS, ARDUUS,

agree, in denoting both the height of such objects as are above the spectator, and the depth of such as are beneath him. They differ, in as far as the former regards nothing but the qualities of either height or depth, while the latter, besides, regards the act of overcoming the difficulty of getting to the top of what is elevated, or to the bottom of what is deep. The term, *Altitudo*, expresses a quality of an object, which may be measured by the application of a perpendicular line. The term, *Arduitas* again, used by Varro, denotes a quality of an object, measured by a deviation, greater or less, from the perpendicular applied to it. From the top to the bottom of what is *Altus*, a ball might drop, without striking its side. The descent of the same ball, on the other hand, would be effected by rolling along the side of what is *Arduus*. “Ultimus et a domiciliis nostris *altissimus*, omnia cingens et coercens cœli complexus, aether.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 2. 101. This “æther” is said to be the highest substance in nature, as comprehending the zenith or remotest vertical point of every being on the surface of the earth. “*Altissima* flumina minimo sono labi.”—CURT. 7. 4. 13. The rivers, which, in respect to the fish lying at their bottom, are high; are deep, in respect to the terrestrial animal that is above their surface. “Oppidum erat difficili ascensu atque *arduo*.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 211. b.

Ex alio puteo sursum ad summum ascendere.—PLAUT. *Mil. Glor.* 4. 4. 14.

Tu cum parentis regna per *arduum*

Cohors gigantum scanderet impia.—HOR. *Car.* 2. 19. 21.

—— per quem descenditis, inquit

Arduus in valles per fora clivus erat.—OVID. *Fast.* 1. 265.

Here *Arduus* has a reference to descent, and the danger of moving downwards rises, as the line of motion approaches the perpendicular, in which a body would fall. In the two following lines Ovid gives a very beautiful exemplification of the power of the two adjectives.

Ardua prima via est, et qua vix mane recentes
Enituntur equi; medio est *altissima* cœlo.—OVID. *Met.* 2. 64.

The former term refers to the steepness of the ascent, which tried the unexhausted strength of the horses; the latter refers to the perpendicular height of the point at the meridian, from which there was reason to apprehend that Phaeton would fall. The poets sometimes confound the distinction established, by applying *arduus* to objects, which there is no intention, and often no possibility, of climbing, from their being either nearly, or entirely, perpendicular.

————etiam *ardua* palma
Nascitur, et casus abies visura marinos.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 67.

Both terms admit of figurative applications. “Te natura *altum* et humana despicientem genuit.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 2. 11.

Virtutisque viam deserit *ardua*.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 24. 44.

ALUTA—*vide* CORIUM.

AMARE, DILIGERE,

agree, in denoting the act of loving, but differ in respect to the circumstances of the object, by which the sentiment of love is excited. The first verb implies, that the object is of itself amiable, and raises in the observer a sentiment proportioned to the degree of the quality that attracts. The other, from “*Legere*,” to choose or gather, implies, that the object is possessed of a comparative excellence, and selected from a number, among which it is held to be the most deserving. The emotions, expressed by *Amare*, differ according to the absolute amiableness of the person loved; those by *Diligere*, according to his relative superiority to those with whom he is compared. In the Greek verbs *Στεργειν*, *φιλειν*, and *Αγαπᾶν*, there is a gradation in the strength of the sentiment

expressed by each, but in none of them is the object contrasted and preferred to others capable of exciting it.

Were there a single pair of the human species upon a desert island, the sentiment expressed by *Amare* might be gratified by each in respect to the other, but that by *Diligere* could not. He, who is *Amatus*, has an intrinsic claim to the sentiment of which he is the object, independently of all around him: while he, who is *Dilectus*, is regarded only as superior to those with whom he is compared, and may be but the best of a number that are not very amiable. “Clodius valde me *diligit*, vel ut Εμφρατιστωτερον dicam, valde me *amat*.”—CIC. *ad Brut. Ep.* 1. “Eum a me non *diligi* solum, verum etiam *amari*.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 13. 47. “Quis putaret ad eum amorem posse aliquid accedere? tantum tamen accessit ut mihi denique nunc *amare* videar antea *dilexisse*.”

In all the above instances, it is clear that the verb *Amare* is employed to denote something more than *Diligere*. The former implies that intrinsic excellence, which, of itself, commands the love of those who perceive it; the latter, again, implies, that the attachment to the object arises from its having been preferred to others, with which it has undergone a comparison.

Some critics of most respectable authority, such as Noltenius and Forcellinus, have understood that the distinction, we have now tried to establish, does not always hold, and is in some cases actually reversed. They have adopted this opinion, chiefly, from the place held by *Diligere*, as coming after *Amare* in the same sentence. Upon this, however, much stress is not to be laid. It often happens, that the same object, as intrinsically good, is *Amatus*, and, as comparatively better than another, is *Dilectus*; and, if a variety of objects are suggested, some of them may accord with the sentiment couched in the former, and others with that in the latter verb.

—quo quenquam plus *amem* aut plus *diligam*
Eo feci. ————— TER. *Eun.* 1. 2. 16.

The person, implied in “quenquam” here, will apply equally to either verb, and in this way Thais certainly meant the expression to be taken. Her conduct was according to the heart’s love she bore to some, and the preference she

gave to others. As all are not alike amiable, so, among the former, there might have been room for the comparison involved in *Diligere*, and even the best of the latter might hardly have been entitled to the love involved in *Amare*. "Archagatus, homo nobilis, qui a suis et *amari* et *diligi* vellet."—CIC. *in Ver.* 6. 23. "Te semper *amavi dilexique*."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 15. 7. It does not appear that the person, mentioned in the former instance, was both *amatus* and *dilectus*, though it is possible that, as in the last, he might have been both. There is, besides, no reason to infer, from the place of the latter verb, that the sentiment implied in it is stronger than that in the former, though it is clearly different.

Where an anticlimax takes place, the feeblest verb necessarily comes last, and, to a discerning critic, its position carries in it a proof of the just extent of its power. This may be seen in the case of the verbs "Recusare" and "Abnuere."

AMATOR, AMICUS,

agree, in denoting a person possessed of the sentiment of love, but differ, as this sentiment is more or less honourable and permanent. The former, being more nearly connected with "Amare," denoting verbal state, implies a feeling more apt to change. It is, at the same time, occasionally found applied to the stable attachment of a friend, as well as to the transient affection of a lover, which often ceases with the gratification. The caprice of the *Amator* is well expressed by Horace, when his appetite is cloyed, and cold indifference returns. Thus, speaking of the book he was about to send into the world, he says,

In breve te cogi cum plenus languet *amator*.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 20. 8.

He elsewhere expresses the variable and dishonourable nature of the attachment peculiar to the *Amator*.

—————*amatorem* quod *amicæ*
Turpia decipiunt cæcum vitia, aut etiam ipsa hæc
Delectant.—————HOR. *Sal.* 1. 3. 38.

Ἐρωτι πολλάκις τὰ μὴ καλὰ καλὰ πεφάνται.—THEOCRIT. *Idyl.* 6.

The poet elsewhere uses *Amator* in a sense in which nothing culpable is to be seen.

Urbis *amatorem* Fuscum salvere jubemus
Ruris *amatores*.——HOR. *Ep.* 1. 10. 1.

“Papirius Pætus vir bonus, *amatorque* noster.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 1. ult.
“Vivamque tecum multum et cum communibus nostris *amatoribus*.”—
CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 7. 33. Unless the attachments referred to in the two last instances were entirely political, those professing them could be considered as neither fickle nor dishonourable.

AMICUS differs from *Amator* in denoting a sentiment that is always honourable, and generally more permanent than that implied in the latter. It rests upon good qualities understood to exist in the object, varying with their degree, and having no reference to any advantage or gratification arising to the person possessing it.

Summum bonum esse heræ putavi hunc Pamphilum,
Amicum, amatorem, virum in quovis loco
Paratum——TER. *And.* 4. 3. 2.

Mysis here ascribes to Pamphilus the double character both of a friend and a gallant to his mistress. In the former, he exhibited that steady friendship, the object of which is the good of the person loved; in the latter, he was the slave of a passion that would terminate only in its own gratification. Catullus gives the idea here stated, with elegant precision.

——injuria talis
Cogit “amare” magis, sed bene velle minus.—CAR. 72. 8.

Donatus, when commenting upon a passage in Terence, in which the word *Amicus* appears, makes observations that are worthy of him as a critic. “Aliud,” says he, “est *amator*, aliud *amicus*. *Amator* qui ad tempus, *amicus* qui perpetuo amat.”

In the antithesis made by Cicero, between *Amator* and “Amans,” we see clearly his idea as to the power of the former, and may guess at his idea of the power of *Amicus*. “Ut inter ebrietatem et ebriositatem interest, aliudque est *amatorem* esse, aliud “amantem.”—CIC. *Tusc.* 214. b. The abstract from “Ebrius” denotes that accidental state of drunkenness, which may

have appeared but once; while the abstract from "Ebriosus" denotes the state as having grown into a habit, and not to be relinquished. "Poteritne te, Alba, tuus antiquissimus non solum *amicus* verum etiam *amator* absolvere?"—CIC. *in Ver.* 181. a.

AMBIGUUS—*vide* DUBIUS.

AMBIRE—*vide* AFFECTARE.

AMBITIO, AMBITUS,

agree, in denoting the existence of the desire of honour, but differ, in respect to the manner in which this desire becomes manifest. The former expresses the internal sentiment, and may be often innocent, both from the nature of its object, and the degree of its strength: the latter expresses the overt-act by which the other shews itself, and, among those who used the term, was always held culpable. Both substantives come from the verb *Ambire*, but the abstract denotes the general train of sentiment that may lie concealed, and at length break forth in a variety of actions. The ordinary derivative, again, denotes the manifestation of what may have been but a momentary impulse, by a single act, which it may never be in the power of the agent to repeat. To the sentiment, while it lurked in the breast of the ambitious, human laws could not, and, while it was innocent, they were never made to extend. It was otherwise with the "crimen ambitus" at Rome, where, with great political wisdom, it was rigorously punished. This crime was understood to strike at the very vitals of the state. It robbed it of its best supporters, by forming an avenue for men into offices, which, from the defect of talents, they were rarely able, and from that of virtue, never entitled to fill.

Trudis avaritiam, cujus fœdissima nutrix

Ambitio, quæ vestibulis foribusque potentum

Excubat, et pretiis commercia pascit honorum.—CLAUD. *de laud. Stil.* 2. 114.

"Cedo, si fuerim in honoribus petendis nimis ambitiosus, non hanc dico popularem *ambitionem*, cujus me principem confiteor: sed illam perniciosam contra leges, cujus primos ordines ducit Sallustius."—CIC. *Declam. in Sal.* 6.

AMBITUS properly signifies what Cicero in this last example styles “perniciosa ambitio,” and so eagerly disclaims. Lucan describes it well in the following passage.

———letalisque *ambitus* urbi
Annua venali referens certamina campo.—Luc. 1. 179.

“Effusæ *ambitibus* largitiones.”—NEP. *in Vit. Att.* 6. “Raro illud datur ut possis liberalitatem ac benignitatem ab *ambitu* atque largitione sejungere.”—CIC. *de Orat.* 118. a.

AMBO—*vide* DUO.

AMBULARE—*vide* IRE.

AMITTERE—*vide* PERDERE.

AMOENUS—*vide* JUCUNDUS.

AMPLUS—*vide* MAGNUS.

AMPUTARE—*vide* CIRCUMCIDERE.

AN, AUT, VEL, SIVE,

agree, in denoting the ignorance of the speaker, as to the suitability of an affirmation to one of two or more alternatives ; but differ, as to the extent or the ground of that ignorance. The primary power of the particle *An*, is that of interrogation upon the part of some person who wishes to be informed. Thus, in Terence, Pythias asks “*An* abiit jam a milite?” To which Chremes answers, “Jamdudum, ætatem.”—*Eun.* 4. 5. 7. *An* is sometimes employed, not for the purpose of gaining information, but for that of expressing contempt of the person interrogated. A pretended submission is made upon the part of the enquirer, in order to bring the person interrogated to the necessity either of condemning himself, or of being silent. Thus Ovid says,

An nescis longas regibus esse manus?—*Ep.* 17. 166.

An sometimes does not operate as an interrogative particle at all, but only expresses doubt or ignorance upon the part of the speaker. Thus, Sallust says of Sylla, “Multique dubitavere fortior *an* felicior esset.”—*Bell. Jug. cap.* 95. Upon the best authority, then, it should appear, *An* deviates from its original

power, which is purely interrogative. It, in the first place, states a question, to which no answer is expected; and, in the next, it presents the mind of the speaker as wavering between different judgments, that are, in appearance, equally well supported, but, though unable to satisfy itself, requiring no information from others.

In the ordinary and pure use of *An*, when expressing doubt or hesitation, there is always a verb preceding it, that announces this circumstance. In this way “dubitavere” was used in the last, and “quæsitum est” in the following example. “Quæsitum est, in totone circuitu orationis, *an* in principiis solum, *an* in extremis, *an* in utraque parte numerus tenendus sit.”—CIC. *Orat.* 217. a. Tacitus uses *An* irregularly, by omitting the verb. “Archelaus finem vitæ sponte *an* fato implevit.”—*Ann.* 2. 42. He records the fact that this king did die; and the particle *An*, besides suggesting two ways, in either of which he might have died, is, without the aid of a “dubito” or a “nescio,” made to intimate also his ignorance whether he perished by a voluntary or by a natural death. When the writer’s hesitation, as to the opinion to be adopted, is but an inconsiderable circumstance, the verb is omitted even by the purest authors. “Summa senectute Cato orationem suam in origines suas retulit paucis antequam mortuus est *an* diebus *an* mensibus.”—CIC. *in Brut.* 172. b. The orator knew not whether Cato transcribed his oration a few days, or a few months, before his death; but, feeling that either alternative did not affect the leading circumstance, which was his great age, he states the undecided point in the slightest terms possible.

Aut differs from *An*, in supposing that the ignorance of the speaker arises, not from the equality of the circumstances judged of, in none of which he can discern a preponderance, but from the uncertainty of the thing itself. In the case of “*An*,” a slight additional information might remove his suspence, while in that of *Aut* the nature of the thing must alter, and be no longer casual. The translation given by Cicero of the law established by the masters of feasts in Greece, ἢ πιθι ἢ ἀπιθι, “*aut* bibat *aut* abeat,” shews the force of this conjunction. The speaker only put it in the power of the guest to choose one of two alternatives, without ever thinking of the probability of his accept-

ing the one more readily than the other. "Audendum est aliquid universis, *aut* omnia singulis patienda."—LIV. 6. 18. It was perfectly uncertain which of the two alternatives was to be accepted, that is, whether the whole were to make a certain exertion, or the individuals forming it were to suffer every extremity.

Aut prodesse volunt *aut* delectare Poetæ,
Aut simul et jucunda et idonea dicere vitæ.—HOR. *de Art. Poet.*

Different poets are here said to have three different objects, varying with the taste and the talents of each; and the last of the three is formed by a combination of the two first.

VEL differs from *An*, which implies doubt upon the part of the speaker, as to the superior probability of any one of the alternatives, and from *Aut*, which suggests the casual nature of them all. It states a number of alternatives, to one of which it suggests that the affirmation is necessarily applicable, to the exclusion of the rest, but without fixing which of the whole it is. "Allobrogibus se *vel* persuasuros existimabant, *vel* vi coacturos."—CÆS. *B. G.* 1. 6. It is here understood that the Allobroges were to be managed in one of two ways. If persuasion, which was to be first tried, would not do, force certainly would. "Dii immortales! cur ego non adsum, *vel* spectator laudum tuarum, *vel* particeps, *vel* socius, *vel* minister consiliorum?"—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 2. 7. The first *Vel*, in this sentence, refers only to the second, and states the witness of the praises of Curio, in opposition to the partaker in his counsels. The second, again, begins a new relation to the two that follow. It states Cicero's disposition to serve his friend in any one way possible; either as taking a share in his counsels as a fellow-labourer; as an associate running the same risks; or as a servant acting a subordinate part. Cicero might have served Curio in any one of those capacities, but not in any two, nor in all of them. The unrewarded labour of the "particeps" would not have accorded with the claim of the "socius," if the concern prospered, nor with the loss, if it did not. The humiliation of a "minister," too, could never have been reconciled with the generosity of the former relation, nor with the claims and perils of the latter.

Sallust knew the strict rules of purity in the Latin tongue too well to have said “fortior *vel* felicius esset.” The hesitation expressed by “dubitavere” would have jarred with the necessity couched in one or other of the comparatives, and it would have been affirmed, universally, that a man must be either brave or happy. Even Tacitus, in his days, would not have said of Archelaus that he died “sponte *vel* fato.” He would then have reduced all the possible modes of death to two, and set the marked volition, implied in “sponte,” at variance with the insuperable necessity implied in *vel*, extending here to one of the alternatives.

Had the expression used by the “Rex convivii,” been “*vel* bibit *vel* abeat,” there would have been a change in the conception, which, however consistent with the authority, would not have been so with the civility, of the speaker. Instead of the decision being left to the choice of the guest, and its being considered as a matter of contingency which of the alternatives he adopted, he would have been rudely threatened with being driven from the company. The power of the master of the feast might have been equally well maintained with either conjunction, but, in the use of *Aut*, the striking circumstance is the liberty of the guest's choice, and in that of *Vel*, the necessity of his departure if he refused to drink.

But there is an use of *Vel* in the form of an adverb, when it is translated “even” that, duly analysed, seems to justify the account given of it as a conjunction, which it originally is. The conjunctive power must, of necessity, cease, when there are not two objects to couple. “Hoc ascensu *vel* tres armati quamlibet multitudinem arcuerint.”—LIV. 9. 24. The adverbial power in this, and such instances, rests upon the conjunctive. Had any number been opposed to “tres,” it would have been more than three; and none being opposed to it, there is as positive an assertion, by means of the adverb, that a certain fact is true, as there would have been, by the conjunction, that an affirmation holds in respect to some one of a number of alternatives, to the exclusion of all the rest. If three armed men, as we are told by the historian, could have defended that ascent against any possible number, we are led, “a fortiori,” to infer, that four, or any greater number, would have done it with more ease.

——— infanda per orbem
 Supplicia, et scelerum poenas expendimus omnes,
Vel Priamo miseranda manus.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 257.

A strong assertion is here made, that the disasters of the Greeks had been so numerous and complicated, as to melt the heart even of Priam, whose kingdom they had overturned.

SIVE differs from all the words mentioned, in supposing not only, as they do, that the speaker cannot fix the alternative to which the assertion is applicable, but also, that, from the nature of the thing, it is impossible to do so. *An* supposes that something, though not enough, is known with regard to each of the whole. Thus, those who doubted whether Sylla owed most to his valour or his good fortune, possessed facts that tended to establish both opinions, though neither side preponderated. The mind is thus exhibited as balancing circumstances, and terminating in doubt from the scantiness of that information, which *An*, as an interrogative, serves originally to furnish. *Sive*, again, supposes complete ignorance as to all the alternatives stated, so as to preclude that doubt, of which the act of balancing probabilities is the sign. In the case of *An*, we have found, something is known with respect to all of them: In the case of *Sive*, nothing is known in respect to any one; and the whole subject is held forth as either in its nature inscrutable, or as industriously and effectually concealed. Thus, Tibullus says,

Vivite felices, memores et vivite nostri
Sive erimus, seu nos fata fuisse velint. 3. 5. 31.

Here there is a beautiful sentiment of resignation upon a subject into which no human eye could penetrate. Ignorance, and incapacity to remove it, are both announced by the conjunction. Had *Aut* or *Vel* been put in place of *Sive*, the beauty of the passage would have never existed. Those taking leave would have talked of a chance, or of a certainty, of their being either dead or alive; and, in place of a tender sentiment of pious submission, would have uttered a remark, in which there is nothing but what is unmeaning and trite.

The influence of *Sive*, it is said, is the same, whether the matter is in its nature inscrutable, as in the last instance, in which Heaven only knew which of the alternatives was to take place, or is rendered impenetrable from design.

——— Hæc Andria,

Sive ista uxor, *seu* amica est, grävida e Pamphilo est.—TER. *And.* 1. 3. 11.

Davus, here, virtually acknowledges, that he was not so much in the young man's confidence as to know whether he was married or not; and, of course, that matter, though perhaps known to others, was effectually concealed from him.

Though Tacitus did not live in times in which the Latin language was pure, yet his practice, as a writer, is entitled to uncommon attention. That mind, which was the first in moral and political science, might have been the first also in that of grammar. In the first of the following passages, he quits *Sive* for *An*, and, in the last, for *Vel*. He is telling us that no solicitations of Plautus's friends could prevail upon him to fly from the destruction threatened by Nero. "Sed Plautum ea non movere. *Sive* nullam opem providebat inermis atque exul: *seu* tædio ambiguxæ spei; *an* amore conjugis et liberorum, quibus placabiliorem fore principem rebatur, nulla solitudine turbatum."—*Ann.* 14. 59. Upon the two first of the alternatives, in which *Sive* is concerned, the historian does not offer a conjecture. The hopeless state of an unarmed exile, and the irksome, because uncertain expectation of relief, were circumstances which might have weighed with Plautus, though he had no reason for saying that they actually did. There was a third, however, more honourable for Plautus, as a husband and a father, in which Tacitus, by using *An*, insinuates that probability existed, and which stood differently related to the two first, from what they did to each other.

In another passage, Tacitus, after employing *Sive* twice, quits it for a similar purpose, and lays hold of the conjunction *Vel*. "Agitasse Laco, ignaro Galba, de occidendo Tito Vinio dicitur, *sive* ut pæna ejus animos militum mulceret, *seu* conscium Othonis credebat, ad postremum *vel* odio."—*Hist.* 1. 39. Laco's purpose is here represented as arising from one of three motives; but the two first are not to each other, as both are to the third. The historian knew not

whether it sprang from wishing to do what was agreeable to the soldiers, or from jealousy of Vinius's undue attachment to Otho; but he affirms, that if from neither of them, it certainly sprang from hatred.

ANCEPS—*vide* DUBIUS.

ANGOR—*vide* CURA.

ANGUSTUS, ARCTUS,

agree, in denoting the confinement of an object, by means of one or more external objects that touch it. *Angustus*, from “Angere,” properly refers to the pain given to any sensitive being forcing his way through straits, by which he can pass with difficulty, if he can pass at all. A certain proportion is always understood to exist between the size of the body passing, and the distance of the opposite objects between which it is squeezed. “Pontes enim lex Maria fecit *angustos*.”—CIC. *de Legg.* 191. b.

Ita hac re in *angustum* oppido nunc meæ coguntur copix.—TER. *Heaut.* 4. 1. 2.

From the original application of *Angustus* to sensitive beings, it has been afterwards transferred to material substances, and then denotes their narrowness. This quality consists in the nearness of those of their extremities, whose distance is measured by the shortest line. In this, which is the ordinary use of *Angustus*, it is precisely opposite to “*latus*.” The two words, accordingly, are made the subjects of an antithesis by Cicero. “Nulla omnino in re minutatim interrogati: Dives, pauper: Clarus, obscurus sit: Multa, pauca: Magna, parva: Longa, brevia: *Lata, angusta*: quanto aut addito aut dempto, certum respondeamus non habemus.”—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 4. 29. The robe, worn by the knights, had a narrow border, from whence they were called *angusticlavii*, and distinguished from the senators, who wore the *latus clavus*. “Patrem suum tribunum *angusticlavium* fuisse Othoniano bello.”—SÜETON. *in Oth.* 10.

Curia restabat: clavi mensura coacta est,

Majus erat nostris viribus istud onus.—OVID. *Trist.* 4. 10. 35.

ARCTUS differs from *Angustus*, in implying a greater degree of straitness, and in suggesting that the intermediate object is confined on more than two,

if not on all of its sides. It seems to have been originally a contracted participle from the verb "Arcere," which signifies to prevent a person, who is disposed to move, from doing so in any direction, and possesses the joint power of "continere" and "prohibere." *Arctus* is often written "Artus," and may be understood to come from the substantive "Artus," from *Ἀρθρον*, signifying a joint. The bones, forming a joint, are so exquisitely well adapted, that divided matter cannot be united by closer contact. *Arctus*, then, as an adjective, may have come to denote that closeness on all sides, which is formed in the joint where the apposition takes place. *Arctus* stands opposed, not to "latus," but to "laxus" or "solutus."

— diræ ferro et compagibus *arctis*
Claudentur belli portæ—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 297.

The joinings of those doors were as close as it was possible for iron to bind them.

— laxis laterum compagibus omnes
Accipiunt inimicum imbrem, rimisque fatiscunt.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 126.

The joinings of these ships were the reverse of what is denoted by *Arctus*, and thus admitted such a quantity of water as made them dangerous for the sailors. "Nec tamen hæc ita sunt *arcta* et astricta, ut ea, cum velim, laxare nequeam."—CIC. *Orat.* 218. b. "*Arctioribus* apud populum Romanum laqueis tenebitur."—CIC. *in Ver.* 78. b.

Vinclaque sopitas addit in *arcta* manus.—OVID. *Fast.* 3. 306.

Were *Angustus* applied to "laqueus" and "vinculum," in the two last sentences, in place of *Arctus*, a different meaning would be produced. *Angustus* would suggest the narrowness of the cord and chain, not the power of binding those close, to whom they were applied.

Sed nimis *arcta* premunt olida convivia capræ.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 5. 29.
— *arcto* stipata theatro.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 60.

The squeeze at these crowded entertainments, which rendered them disagreeable, was in all directions.

Arcta decet sanum comitem toga.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 18. 29.

Though it appears that both *Angustus* and “*latus*” were applied to the “*clavus*,” or border of a robe, yet *Arctus* is applicable only to the whole, and not a part of it. This last term denotes, not the comparative narrowness of any “*toga*”, which might have been discerned when it does not cover the wearer, but its power of binding and confining him, when it is actually worn.

Angustus and *Arctus* agree in admitting of figurative applications, and in having the same meaning, when so transferred. They then signify a state of distress.

Rebus *angustis* animosus atque
Fortis appare.--HOR. *Car.* 2. 10. 21.

“Circumsideri ipsos, et ni subveniretur, *artas* res nuntiaret.”—TACIT. *Hist.* 3. 69.

Haud facile emergunt quorum virtutibus obstat
Res *angusta* domi.-----JUV. *Sat.* 3. 164.

ANIMA, ANIMUS, MENS,

agree in referring to the soul, or living principle, but differ in respect to the powers ascribed to the being to which each of them is properly applied. *Anima* signifies nothing more than that principle of life, by which animate are distinguished from inanimate substances. By the presence of this is formed the being, styled animal; distinct, on the one hand, from pure spirit, and, on the other, from mere matter. The term comes from the Greek *Ανεμος*, signifying air in motion. Before the Romans began to speculate on the subjects of pneumatology, *Anima* would in all probability signify nothing but the element of air, which it sometimes did afterwards. Thus, Virgil applies it to the blast of Vulcan's furnace:

Quantum ignes *animæque* valent.—ÆN. 8. 403.

And Cicero says, “Inter ignem et terram, aquam Deus *animamque* posuit.” *De Un.* 197. b. It was also employed to signify breath, or air used in respiration. “Sub corde pulmo est, spirandique officina attrahens ac reddens *animam*.”—PLIN. II. 37.

From denoting the thinnest of material substances, which is the fluid called air, *Anima* has been transferred to spirit, to which this fluid is understood to bear the nearest resemblance. In the first and rudest conceptions which men form of mind, it is always held to be subtilized matter. In the eye of reason, however, it must be as unlike to the thinnest vapour that infests the mine, as to its grossest metals. No change of which matter is susceptible can produce in it an approximation to a substance, from which it is essentially different. “*Ægroto dum anima est, spes esse dicitur.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 145. a. “*Animantia quemadmodum divido? ut dicam quædam animum habent, quædam tantum animam.*”—SENEC. *Ep.* 58.

Summum crede nefas animam præferre pudori,
Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.—JUVEN. 8. 83.

Juvenal, speaking of the brute creation, says,

———mundi
Principio indulsit communis conditor illis
Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque.—SAT. 15. 147.

ANIMUS, then, differs from *Anima*, in suggesting, that to the principle of life, denoted by the latter, there are superadded those powers of feeling and reason, which constitute the rational soul, and raise man above the lower animals. This may be inferred from the power of the adverb “quoque”, in the last example, as well as from many others that might be produced. Desire and aversion, with many of the modifications of feeling, exist among the brutes in no inconsiderable degree. It is, however, the combination of sentiment and reason that forms the *Animus* which distinguishes man, and gives him his superiority in the creation of God. “*Animus hominis, si nihil haberet nisi ut appeteret aut refugeret, id ei esset commune cum bestiis.*”—CIC. *Tusc. Q. Lib.* 1. “*Animus est qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui prævidet, et moderatur et movet id corpus cui præpositus est.*”—CIC. *Som. Scip.* 130. b. “*Difficile est animum perducere ad contemptum animæ.*”—SENEC. *ad Lucil.*

Though in the brute creation the *Anima* exists without the *Animus*, yet in the rational the contrary does not take place. The classics, accordingly, have been guilty of no inaccuracy, in thought or expression, in sometimes

substituting the former for the latter term. “Causa in *anima* sensuque meo penitus affixa atque insita est.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 5. 139. “Mortales indocti incultique vitam sicuti peregrinantes transegere: quibus profecto contra naturam corpus voluptati, *anima* oneri fuit.”—SALL. *Cat.* 2. 8. As there can be no possible abstraction of the rational from the living principle in man, so there is no looseness in the application of any term, which, from the nature of the subject stated, cannot be misunderstood.

Nunc *animum* atque *animam* duo conjuncta teneri
Inter se, atque unam naturam conficere ex se.—LUCRET. 3. 135.

MENS differs from *Animus*, in being confined to the intellectual part of mind alone, and in having the controul of every appetite, which would otherwise be ungovernable. It denotes that principle which perceives the truth or the falsehood of propositions stated; which judges as to the propriety of conduct, and the expediency, as well as the efficacy, of means. “*Mens* cui regnum totius animi a natura tributum est.”—CIC. *Tusc.* 192.a.

———aliquid jamdudum invadere magnum
Mens agitat mihi; nec placida contenta quiete est.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 186.

In other examples it signifies the resolution formed, as well as the power that dictates it.

Quid tibi *mentis* erat, cum sic male sana lateres.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 713.

Aristotle makes the “*Mens*,” or understanding, subservient to the mind, as the eye is to the body. Ὡς ἐν σωματι ὀφθαλμῶς, ἔτω νῦς ἐν ψυχῇ.

Mens seems often taken as a branch of the *Animus*, or rational soul. The *Anima*, we have found, exists, in the case of the lower animals, without the *Animus*; but the latter would be incomplete without that essential part of it, styled *Mens*. Several passages in the classics justify this account of the terms, and shew that it is consistent with the doctrine of mind inculcated in the schools.

———ita nubilam *mentem*

Animi habeo: ubi sum ibi non sum: ubi non sum, ibi est *animus*.—PLAUT. *Cist.* 2. 1. 5.

Nec potis est dulces musarum expromere foetus,

Mens animi tantis fluctuat ipsa malis.—CATULL. 63. 3.

—cum somnus membra profudit,
Mens animi vigilat.—LUCRET. 4. 761.

In the three last examples, a generic power in the term *Animus* is apparent. *Mens* denotes the intellectual energy of *Animus*, but *Animus* can also denote a modification of *Mens*. “*Animos* qui nostræ *mentis* sunt eosdem in omni fortuna gessimus, gerimusque: neque eas secundæ res extulerunt aut minuerunt.”—LIV. 37. 45. The historian says here, that those sentiments and affections, coming under that division of mind called *Animus*, and which are regulated by those intellectual powers styled *Mens*, continue unaltered.

Mala mens, malus animus.—TER. *And.* 1. 1. 137.

When the understanding is perverted and incapable of discerning, the heart and affections are proportionally depraved. Neither term here is taken as generic, and both express the distinct constituent of a whole.

From the following figurative use of *Anima* and *Mens* the pure literal use of each may be clearly inferred. “*Corpus imperii* haud unquam coire et consentire potuisset, nisi unius præsidis metu quasi *anima* et *mente* regeretur: *anima* imperii est ejus vita, *mens* ratio et consilium quo gubernatur.”—FLOR. 4. 3.

ANIMADVERTERE, OBSERVARE,

agree in denoting the act of giving attention to a particular object, but differ in respect to the degree of attention given. The first, at the same time, may occasionally carry the power of the other, as in some degree generic, but the last is strictly limited to what is said to be its own.

Animadvertere, as may appear from its etymology, as coming from “*Ani-*mus,” “*ad*,” and “*verto*,” signifies the power of intention, or of directing the mind towards an object meant to be examined. It refers, however, to every thing that does not escape notice, even when it does not retain it. The existence of an event is thus announced by the sense that recognizes it, and the sensitive being is passive in respect to the object that solicits his attention.

“In quo prælio Alexandrum ut *animadvertit*.”—NEPOS, 16. 5. 4. “Expectata nutrix *animadvertit* puerum dormientem circumplicatum serpentis amplexu.”—CIC. *Divin.* 1. 79. In these instances the power of *Animadvertere* extends no farther than to denote that a certain object was seen, or did not escape unnoticed. In other instances, however, it does more, and implies that, by an effort of mind, its attention is summoned and directed in a particular way. “Dignitas tua facit ut *animadvertatur* quicquid facias.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 182. a. “Deinde me obsecras, amantissime, ne obliviscar vigilare, et ut *animadvertam* quæ fiant.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 6. 1. “Notatio naturæ atque *animaversio* peperit artem.”—CIC. *Orat.* 215. a. In the three last instances, there is evidently an act of volition upon the part of the person noticing, who, from some cause or another, chooses to have his attention engrossed with what then engages it.

The verb *Animadvertere* sometimes denotes to punish by authority, and then refers to the vigilance of the magistrate, in marking offences committed. In this case there is often an application of the preposition “In” before the name of the culprits, intimating more strongly the steady attention directed towards the conduct found to be reprehensible. “Prout quæque res erit *animadvertam*.”—ULPIAN. *Dig.* 47. 10. 15. “*Animadvertere*” in “aliquem causa indicta.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 5. 2.

OBSERVARE differs from *Animadvertere* in being confined to closer exertions of attention, and to such as are spontaneous, upon the part of him who makes them. It comes from “ob” and “servare,” which signifies, to watch so as to observe any change upon the subject of attention. Thus, Virgil advises the husbandman to mark every change of the weather, at every different season.

Hoc metuens cœli menses et sidera *serva*.—*Georg.* 1. 335.

—————dum sidera *servat*

Exciderat puppi.—————*Æn.* 6. 338.

All the power inherent in the root is heightened in the compound, *Observare*, where the preposition intimates, that the spectator turns to the object examined, and puts it in the line of his vision. Valla defines *Observare* thus. “Custodire aliquid oculis animoque in modum speculatoris, ne nos

silentio tacitoque prætereat." "Face ut se abs te custodiri et observari sciat."

CIC. *De pet.* 213. 6.

——— *observes* filium

Quid agat, quid cum illo consilii captet.—TER. *And.* 1. 1. 142.

Virgil has made an elegant and a forcible use of it, as denoting the submissive attention with which the bees regard their supposed king.

——— regem non sic Ægyptus et ingens

Lydia, nec populi Parthorum; aut Medus Hydaspes

Observant.———VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 210.

When *Animadvertere* appears in the same sentence with *Observare*, it always assumes its strongest power, and either adds to the force of the latter verb, or accords with those subjects, in the state of nominatives, to which it is best suited. "Etsi causæ non reperiuntur istarum rerum, res tamen ipsæ *observari animadvertique* possunt."—CIC. *de Div.* 118. a.

ANNUUS, ANNIVERSARIUS, SOLENNIS,

agree in denoting the yearly occurrence of certain events, but differ, either in respect to their continuance, or according as the times, at which they present themselves, recur necessarily within a limited period, or do so by arbitrary appointment. All of them come from "Annus," as their root. *Annuus* differs from the other two, in denoting, not only that certain events return yearly, but that, at some times, their duration is from the beginning to the end of a year. In respect to the regularity of the period of recurrence, all the three are upon a level; but the former only can occasionally denote that the duration of the events is precisely commensurate to that of a year. The first power of *Annuus* appears in the following examples. "Quadrupedibus pilum cadere atque subnasci *annuum* est."—PLIN. 1. 1. 39. "Idem *annuas* frigorum atque calorum facit varietates."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 46. a.

Deponit flavas *annua* terra comas.—TIBULL. 2. 1. 48.

The changes upon the animals mentioned, as well as upon the face of nature, though annual, are not constantly taking place, and recur at nearly the same

intervals in each. "Nos *annuum* tempus prope jam emeritum habebamus, dies enim triginta et tres erant reliqui."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 95. a. There is here a reference to the completion of a year, not to any event, as taking place during the course of it.

Nec somni faciles, et nox erat *annua* nobis.—OVID. *Heroid.* 11. 29.

Those sleeps were disturbed, and that night is held forth as being actually as long as a whole year.

ANNIVERSARIUS differs from *Annuus* in denoting only the regular return of an event in the course of every succeeding year, which, for certain, does not last the whole of it, and may be of much shorter duration. As it comes from "Annus" and "vertere," it implies, that the repeated occurrence of some one event is as certain as that of the seasons. "*Anniversariæ* valetudines ac tempore certo recurrentes."—SUTTON. in *August.* 81. The last member of this sentence defines the adjective that appears in the first. "Impetum cæli admirabili cum celeritate moveri vertique videamus, constantissime conficientem vicissitudines *anniversarias*."—CIC. *de Nat. D.* 95. b. In this last example, *anniversarius* does not imply that the aggregate of seasons occupies the whole year, but that the completion of each forms a separate event, and that the whole comes in regular rotation.

SOLENNIS agrees with *Anniversarius* in implying, that the events it specifies recur regularly in the course of a year, but differs from it, in suggesting, that the time, at which the events present themselves, is in consequence of an arbitrary appointment, not of a fixed rotation, that must necessarily take place in the process of time. *Solennis* is compounded of "solus" and "annus;" and though, from its component parts, nothing more than the single appearance of a certain event in the course of a year is to be inferred, yet to this there is, by the "usus dicendi," annexed an idea, that it is the effect of human appointment, and not of a necessary rotation. "Statas *solennesque* ceremonias pontificatu contineri."—CIC. *de Harusp. Respons.* 147. b. These stated and yearly ceremonies are opposed to the "Conceptivæ" and

“Imperativæ,” which were of no fixed appointment. “Legiones *solenni* calendarum Januariarum sacramento adactæ.”—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 55. This military oath was taken regularly upon New-year’s day. “Interim cum sciret Clodius (neque enim erat difficile scire) iter *solenne*, legitimum, necessarium, ante diem xiii. Cal. Feb. Miloni esse Lanuvium, ad Flaminem prodendum, quod erat dictator Lanuvii.”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 106. b. This journey of Milo is said to have been *solenne*, because it was a matter of civil appointment, to which he, as dictator, was bound to attend at a particular season.

The definition given by Festus of the “Sacra Solennia” is a good one. “Quæ certis temporibus annisque fieri solent.” From this it appears, that *Solennis* may be applied to a period that goes beyond the length of a year. While the measure of time is abandoned, the radical circumstance, that is, the regularity of the observance, is retained. The “Ludi Sæculares,” which happened but once in a century, were styled Ludi *Solennes*, as well as those that recurred in the course of a year. Those emperors, then, who, through a childish vanity and impatience, repeated the “Ludi Sæculares” at the end of sixty years from their former celebration, destroyed what Gellius and Solinus barbarously called their *Solennitas*. This was not owing to their being repeated every year, but to their being prematurely repeated before the hundred years expired.

It sometimes happens, that, when *Anniversarius* is applied to sacred institutions, it quits its proper meaning, founded on a fixed and necessary rotation of events, and assumes that of *Solennis*. No confusion is thus created, as the mind modifies the power of the adjective so as to suit the known nature of the subject to which it is applied. “Mercurius sacris *anniversariis* apud Tyndaritanos summa religione colebatur.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 219. b.

Beside the meaning now explained, in respect to which *Solennis* is synonymous with *Annuus* and *Anniversarius*, it has another, in which it is unconnected with either. In this acceptation it expresses what is ordinarily meant by “Solemn,” in English, that is, grave, awful. “Si tribunus plebis verbis priscis et pæne *solennibus* bona civis cujuspiam consecrarit.”—CIC. *pro*

Dom. 238. a. "Nullum est officium tam sanctum atque *solemne*."—*Cic. pro Quin.* 4. c. Though this last signification of *Solemnis* be frequent, it does not seem to be its radical one. The Romans had supposed, that the solemnity of all observances would be impaired, if too frequently repeated. On this account an annual celebration of many of them had been established, so that, while they were respected for their rarity, they were prevented from falling into disuse or oblivion by being too long discontinued.

ANTE

denotes the relation borne by one object to another, before or in the front of which it lies. It applies equally to objects, both animate and inanimate, and it may be transferred to time. In the relation expressed by *Ante*, one or both the objects must be animate, and the relation may exist equally well whether they be in a state of rest or of motion. In a state of motion, if the velocity of the posterior be greater than that of the anterior object, the relative must become the correlative. At the instant when they are together, they are in the relation denoted by "Ad," and that of opposition gives place to that of vicinity.

Et multo in primis hilarans convivium Baccho,
Ante focum, si frigus erit; si messis, in umbra.—*VIRG. Eccl.* 5. 70.
 Isthuc est sapere, non quod *ante* pedes modo est
 Videre, sed etiam illa quæ futura sunt
 Prospicere.———*TER. Adelp.* 3. 3. 32.

It appears, in those two last examples, that in one of the objects, at least, connected with *Ante*, there must be animation, and a consciousness of the opposition. This also appears in the two that follow, though in them the animation is in the governed, not in the correlative objects. "*Ante* hosce Deos erant arulæ."—*Cic. in Ver.* 6. 3. "*Ante* pedes vestros, *ante* oculos, judices, cædes futuræ sunt."—*Cic. pro S. Rosc.* 20. b. In the example following, it is clear that the animation may exist in both objects. Nepos, speaking of Chabrias, says, "Non enim libenter erat *ante* oculos civium suorum, quod

et vivebat laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut invidiam vulgi posset effugere.”—NEP. *in Cbab.* 3.

As the conditions specified appear indispensably requisite, upon the best authority, Columella is guilty of an impurity, when he states, by it, an opposition between two inanimate objects. “*Ante* stabulum nullæ angustiae sint.”—COL. 6. 6. 2.

When *Ante* is referred to persons, it often denotes comparison, and superiority, upon the part of the correlative, in respect to the governed object. “*Virgo una ante alias specie ac pulchritudine insignis.*”—LIV. 34. 14.

———— scelere *ante* alios immanior omnes.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 347.

In this use of *Ante*, there is a reference to objects in motion, as no pre-eminence is supposed to be attached to any one, from its being before, or opposed to, another, when both are in a state of rest. As in a race, the swiftest surpasses the rest, and in a procession, the same order is preserved, which fixed the merit of each of the runners; so the relative superiority of persons, compared in any way, is expressed by *Ante*, which originally marks it in those only above mentioned.

This power of comparison in *Ante*, at the same time, with the consequent discovery of superiority in one of the objects, extends occasionally, though rarely, to such as are inanimate, and have no power of moving themselves. “*Eo ante omnia insignis, quia matronæ annum luxerunt.*”—LIV. 2. 7. “*Ante omnia ne sit vitiosus sermo nutricibus.*”—QUINT. 1. 1. 3.

Ante is likewise applied to time, and denotes, that one event happened prior to another. In this, as well as the use just mentioned, there is an implied reference to motion. Time is supposed current, and, in its stream, two events are suggested; the one as preceding, and the other as following. The distance between material bodies, moving equally, leads to the idea of an interval, which commences with the arrival of the first, and ends with that of the last, at a given point in the course. Thus, in the following passage, two events are represented as consecutive; the first of which is, that of

the death of parents, and the second, that of the punishment of their son.

Felices ambo, tempestiveque sepulti,
Ante diem pœnæ quod periere meæ.—OVID. *Trist.* 4. 9. 72.

The time may be expressed, either by a word like “diem,” signifying a particular division of it, or by one of another kind, suggesting the commencement of an event of known and limited duration. Thus, Cicero tells us, that the death of one man was an event that preceded that of the prætorship of another, without mentioning the time at which this prætorship commenced. “Minutius mortuus est *ante eum prætorem.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 99. b.

Though *Ante* is compounded, yet, in this state, it preserves its meaning, as when by itself. Thus, “*anteire aliquem*” is just equal to “*ire ante aliquem.*”

ANTEA, SUPRA,

agree, in denoting the prior existence of one event, in respect to another suggested; but differ, in regard to the connection and interval between the two. *Antea* is an adverb of time, and supposes events to be the reverse of “simultaneous,” without fixing the interval that took place between them. “*Nactusque tempus hoc magis idoneum quam unquam antea, ita sum cum illo locutus.*”—CIC. *Ep.* 5. 6. The present time is here stated, in opposition to several prior times, differing in point of remoteness, but all of which are equally unconnected with the future, more convenient than any one of the past. “*Oppidum Poneropolis antea, mox Philippopolis, nunc Trimontium dicta.*”—PLIN. 4. 11. In respect to the time here implied in *Antea*, there is no limitation whatever; in that implied in “*mox,*” there is a limitation, founded upon the circumstance of its being immediately subsequent to what was *Antea*; and the “*nunc*” limits the time to the present, without defining the interval between it and the two former periods. It appears, from Cicero, that *Antea* and “*prius*” were precisely equivalent. In one of his letters, he laughs at Atticus, in a good natured way, for supposing any difference to subsist betwixt them. “*Quod ad te antea, atque ideo ‘prius’ scripsi.*”—*Ep. ad Att.* 15. 13.

SUPRA, again, though it implies diversity in the events, yet supposes both more nearly connected, and forming a part of one transaction.

Id quod jam *supra* tibi paulo ostendimus ante.—LUCRET. 1. 429.

The fact here referred to was explained, not only in the same poem, and in the same book, but a few lines before that quoted. “Sed quoniam eodem tempore, eademque de causa nostrum uterque cecidit, tibi et illa polliceor quæ *supra* scripsi, quæ sunt adhuc mea, et ea quæ præterea videor mihi ex aliqua parte retinere, tanquam ex reliquiis pristinae dignitatis.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 87. b. The good offices, here promised by Cicero to Trebianus, are both stated in the same letter, though they were to be performed at different times. The “*supra scripta*” were offered unconditionally, and the future services with all the confidence that could be applied to matters that were contingent. Had Cicero said, “quæ *antea*,” in place of “quæ *supra* scripsi,” the good offices would be understood to have been mentioned in a former letter, not in that in which they are for the first time promised.

ANXIETAS—*vide* CURA.

APERIRE, PANDERE, RECLUDERE,

agree, in denoting the act of laying open something shut, or concealed, but differ, in respect to the manner in which this act is performed, and to the nature of the subject opened. *Aperire*, at the same time, signifies, as the generic term, to remove any possible obstruction, in a way that suits the nature of what is obstructed. It comes from the preposition “a,” signifying removal, and the verb “parere,” signifying to exert successfully, in whatever operation the agent is engaged. This verb, accordingly, is employed to express the act of breaking the seal of a letter, of uncovering the head, of opening a door, and, in general, of rendering those objects visible to the eye, or accessible, which before were the contrary. “Accepi epistolam Pilæ: *aperui*, legi: valde scripta est *συμπαθως*.”—CIC. *Ep ad Att.* 74 a. “Quibus de causis Sullam in victoria dictatorem equo descendere, sibi uni adsurgere de sella, caput *aperire* solitum.”—SALL. *Frag. L.* 5. “*Aperto* ostio dormien-

tes eos repertos esse.”—CIC. *pro Sex. Rosc.* 29. a. “Sic exhausta nocte, novam aciem dies *aperuit.*”—TAC. *Hist.* 4. 29. In this last example, it appears, that the break of day exposed the new army to view, which the night had concealed, as with a covering.

Aperire is figuratively applied to immaterial objects, which come not under the apprehension of any of the senses. “*Involutæ rei notitia definiendo aperienda est; siquidem definitio est oratio, quæ quid sit id de quo agitur, ostendit quam brevissime.*”—CIC. *Orat.* 116. b. “Sed tamen in omnibus novis conjunctionibus interest, qualis primus aditus sit, et qua commendatione quasi amicitix fores *aperiantur.*”—CIC. *Fam. Ep.* 13. 10.

PANDERE, which is of very uncertain etymology, differs from “*Aperire,*” in being limited to such objects, as are opened by the mutual recess of parts that have been together, but may be occasionally separated. It is alike applicable to the subject which opens, and to that which is shut up. Thus, Virgil says, both “*panduntur portæ,*” and “*panditur domus.*” That which is opened sometimes shews only itself, and is, of course, the same with what is concealed. “*Rosa paulatim dehiscit ac sese pandit.*”—PLIN. *L.* 21. 4. “*Manibus passis et velis passis dicimus, quod significat diductis atque distentis.*”—AUL. GELL. 15. 15. The power of *Pandere* is beautifully exemplified in Virgil’s description of Cerberus, gaping for the soporific cake given him by the Sibyl.

———— fame rabida tria guttura *pandens.*—ÆN. 6. 420.

So also by Horace, in respect to the peacock.

———— picta *pandat* spectacula cauda.—S. 2. 2. 26.

Pandere often signifies the state of hair that is dishevelled, and it then supposes those hairs, that were contiguous, to be separated, and the whole to be spread out, so as either to shew some that were concealed, or the head, upon which they all grow.

Capillus *passus*, prolixus circum caput
Rejectus negligenter.—TER. *Heaut.* 2. 2. 49.

The verb “*Aperire,*” as the generic term, is often applied in the same

way as *Pandere*. Thus, both Virgil and Ovid apply it to gates with two leaves, that open by moving from each other.

Jamque adeo exierat portis equitatus *apertis*.—*Æn.* 8. 585.

——— dextra lævaque deorum

Atria nobilium valvis celebrantur *apertis*——— *Mct.* 1. 171.

Plautus has, in one instance, applied both verbs to the same subject.

Pandite atque *aperite* propere hanc januam orci.—*Bach.* 3. 1. 1.

Such substitutions of *Aperire* for *Pandere*, however, are not to be found in all the uses of the latter verb. Thus, we never see “*Crinibus apertis*,” instead of “*Crinibus passis*.” Such an expression as the former would imply, that the whole hair was uncovered, not that particular hairs were disposed in an unusual way.

Pandere agrees with “*Aperire*,” in being figuratively applied to immaterial objects. “*Quærebam igitur, utrum panderem vela orationis statim, an eam paululum dialecticorum remis propellerem.*”—*Cic. Tus. Q.* 4. 9. c. 5.

Sit mihi fas audita loqui; sit numine vestro

Pandere res alta terra et caligine metas.—*VIRG. Æn.* 6. 266.

RECLUDERE differs from “*Aperire*,” in not being applicable to the removal of every kind of obstruction; and from “*Pandere*,” in not being confined to that species of opening which is effected by the separation of contiguous parts. It is compounded of the inseparable preposition “*re*” and the verb “*cludere*,” and properly signifies, the act of opening what is occasionally opened and shut, without exertion upon the part of the agent. The place of keeping is understood to be of easy access to the proprietor, and to be subservient more to his convenience, than to the security of what is deposited.

Cellas refregit omnes intus, *reclūsitque* armarium.—*PLAUT. Capt.* 4. 4. 10.

The housebreaker, here mentioned, had used different means of getting into the places of security, according to the difficulties he met with. He forced his way into the cellars, containing wine, oil, and other articles, not in immediate use, by breaking the doors; but he had only to open the buttery, in

which the ordinary provisions of the family were kept, as in a place of convenience, rather than of defence.

Romæ dulce diu fuit et solenne *reclusa*
Mane domo vigilare, clienti promere jura.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 103.

The poet here informs us, that, in the virtuous days of Rome, the attention of patrons to their clients was almost without remission; and that the doors of their houses were open, when those of others were shut. He represents them as voluntarily submitting to grievances, of which he elsewhere makes the lawyer complain.

Sub galli cantum consultor ubi ostia pulsat.—*Sat.* 1. 1. 10.
Virtus *recludens* immeritis mori
Cœlum negata tentat iter via.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 2. 21.

The ease with which the doors of heaven, from the use of *Recludere*, are understood to be opened by Virtue, suggests her right to do so, and enforces the elegant sentiment which the lines contain.

Recludere may be applied, like “*Pandere*,” to the opening of gates, especially when the operation is performed with little exertion upon the part of the agent.

Nise, tuas portas fraude *reclusit* amor.—PROPERT. 3. 19. 24.

It is also, figuratively, applied to subjects incapable of being opened and shut. “*Ego iram omnem recludam repagulis.*”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 3. 66.

Quid non ebrietas designat? operta *recludit*,
Spes jubet esse ratas; ad prælia trudit inermem.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 5. 16.

The difficulty of the exertion must be estimated by the way in which the effect is produced, and not by the unfitness of ordinary causes to produce it. In the case of convulsions of the earth, and other great operations of nature, the means are completely adequate to the magnificent effect, which is of course accomplished with ease.

Non secus ac si qua penitus vi terra dehiscens
Infernas reseret sedes, et regna *recludat*
Pallida, Diis invisâ; superque immane barathrum
Cernatur, trepidentque immisso lumine manes.—VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 243.

Justin and Statius exhibit a barbarous use of *Recludere*, in giving the preposition an intensive power, so as to confirm that of "claudere." "Omnibus rebus expoliatae in carcerem *recluduntur*."—JUSTIN. 26. 1.

Sic ait, et speculum *reclisit*, imagine rapta.—STAT. *Sylv.* 4. 98.

APPETERE, EXPETERE,

agree, in denoting the act of desiring keenly, but differ, in respect to the motive influencing the person who does so. The keenness, implied in the radical verb "petere," is increased by the preposition prefixed to each; but the "ad" supposes the desire to terminate in the supposed good of the person feeling it, and the "ex," that it arises from any motive whatever. Those instinctive appetites, that tend directly to the support of animal nature, announce the force of the verb from which they take their name. "Puer lactens cum Junone, Fortunae in gremio mammam *appetens*."—CIC. *de Div.* 126. a. "Nullum potest esse animal in quo non et *appetitio* sit et *declinatio* naturalis."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 66. a. "Cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci Παθη nominant; *appetitionesque* quas illi ὀρμας obedientes efficere rationi."—CIC. *de Off.* 36. a.

Appetere, at the same time, is not confined to desires that are merely instinctive, but extends to those that operate after reason exerts itself. In the case of the first propensities, by which animals are guided, they are unconscious of the end served by each, and gratify it only because it is agreeable to do so. "Omne animal simul atque natum est voluptatem *appetit*."—CIC. *de Fin.* 55. a. Objects afterwards present themselves as desirable, which at one time were not understood to exist. The ambitious man sees, with sagacity, a remote good, and exerts all the energy, peculiar to *Appetere*, in making it his own. "Quoniam semper *appetentes* gloriae praeter caeteras gentes atque avidi laudis fuistis."—CIC. *pro Pomp.* 5. a. "Spurii Maelii regnum *appetentis* domus est complanata."—CIC. *pro Dom.* 233. a. "Deinde requirunt atque *appetunt* ad quas ejusdem generis se applicent animantes."—CIC. *de Am.* 111. a. The first verb, in the last example, denotes the patience discovered in the

previous search for the object wanted, and the second, the vigour of the exertion by which it may be attained, when discovered.

In some uses of *Appetere*, the object sought for has the appearance of not being desirable. "Ego inimicitias potentium pro te *appetivi*."—CIC. *pro Mil.* 99. a. However formidable those enmities may have been, of themselves, yet they were courted by Cicero, from the strength of his affection to Milo. "*Appetere* mortem timore."—SÆTON. *in Neron.* 2. Fear was, in this case, a stronger principle than the love of life. In all such applications of *Appetere*, man is regarded as a necessary agent. Yielding to the stronger influence, when flying from the greater evil, the lesser assumes the appearance and the effect of a positive good, and acts as a cogent motive in directing his choice.

EXPETERE differs from *Appetere*, in denoting keenness in general, without any necessary regard to the good of the person cherishing it. While the "ad" gives a specific direction to the desire, involved in the root, the "ex," with its generally confirming power, strengthens the desire, in whatever way it is directed. "Quod optabile est, id esse *expetendum*."—CIC. *de Fin.* 117. b. Good, wherever it is apprehended to exist, appears here to be the object of the verb *Expetere*, which, of course, has a generic power, comprehending that also in which the good of the individual desiring is alone concerned. The degree of the desire in "petere," and all its compounds, rises with that of the good understood, whether justly or otherwise, to reside in the object. "Si pecunia tantopere *expetitur*, quanto gloria magis est *expetenda*."—CIC. *de Or.* 124. a. In the following sentence *Appetere* could not be substituted for *Expetere*. "Deos pœnas ab aliquo ob aliquod delictum *expetere*."—CIC. *pro Marcell.* 133. b. Punishment, being of itself an evil, cannot be an object of desire to the petitioner, where there is no reason to suppose, that he can, by undergoing it in one instance, avoid something worse. Besides, by being here to be inflicted upon another, the direction of the desire cannot, as in *Appetere*, terminate in the person cherishing it.

APTUS—*vide* IDONEUS.

APUD,

in its original application, refers to bodies in their nature fixed, whose relative position it marks, by suggesting their vicinity to others in the same state. "Agri in Hispania *apud* Carthaginem novam."—CIC. *Contra Rull.* 62. a. The surface forming the fields, and that containing the city, are said to be in the relation of mutual vicinity, but neither could ever alter its site.

Apud differs from "Ad," in denoting only quiescence in the object at a particular point, without regard to the motion by which it previously arrived at its vicinity. "Cæsar *apud* Corfinium castra posuit."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 131. a. Though they, who formed the camp, might have pitched it where they pleased, yet no reference is made to the march, by which the soldiers arrived at the spot actually fortified. Still the radical purpose of the preposition is served, by its marking the place of encampment, from its being near to Corfinium.

When the point, occupied by a person, is stated to be a part of the space around it, *Apud* is translated "In."

Apud forum modo e Davo audivi.—TER. *And.* 2. 1. 2.

It is to be understood, that Byrrhia, who got, and Davus, who gave, this intelligence, were both in the forum, and not at the edge of the place so called. "Eupolemus qui nunc *apud* exercitum cum Lucio Lucullo est."—CIC. *in Ver.* 211. a. The spot, occupied by Lucullus, is fixed by the position of the army around him. The specification, given by *Apud*, extends no farther than the import of the word it governs. Little would, in the above instances, be communicated by it to the person who knew not, that the forum was a part of a certain city, and that the army of Lucullus was in Greece.

When the name of a person is expressed by a noun, or suggested by a pronoun, and either of these is governed by *Apud*, the point, at which this person generally is, is held forth as that at which he then is. "Eo die *apud* Pompeium cænavi."—CIC. *Ep.* 3. a. "Si me amas, *apud* me cum tuis maneat."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.*

In the first of these examples, the term "Pompeium" marks the place at which the person, implied in the understood pronoun, "Ego," did sup, and states it as being at Pompey's house. In the second, Cicero expresses his wish, that Atticus and his friends would take up their abode at his house.

The actual presence of the landlord at his own house, however, is not always necessary, in the just application of *Apud*, as now explained. The house is occasionally regarded as the place of general residence, and not as containing its master at the time.

——— *apud me domi.*—TER. *Heaut.* 3. 1. 21.

When Chremes uttered these words, he was on the street, and not in his own house. "Brutum *apud me fuisse gaudeo: modo et libenter fuerit, et sat diu.*"—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 15. 3. The landlord, here, is happy in the visit paid in his absence, and only wishes the guest might have found himself comfortable while in his house, and continued long at it.

It appears, in the following passages, that, when the parties meet, their intercourse takes place at the house of the person, whose name is governed by the preposition, and that *Apud* is more specific than "Cum," which refers to intercourse everywhere but at that house. "Pomponius a me petierat, ut "secum" et *apud se essem quotidie.*"—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 71. a. "Ego cum triduum "cum" Pompeio et *apud Pompeium* fuisset, proficiscebar Brundisium."—CIC. *Ibid.* 71. b. When two persons are in the same house, and *Apud* is applied to either, the governed term does not necessarily refer to a landlord, but to one who is near to, or by, another. "Cum in lecto Crassus esset, et *apud eum Sulpitius sederet.*"—CIC. *de Or.* 2. 3.

Apud denotes also the relation of presence, by means of which one person communicates to another, what, it is supposed, he will either approve or disapprove of. In this use the related objects are always animated, and mind is supposed to judge of mind. This is done, when the point, occupied by the person judged of, is defined by that of the person judging. "Causam *apud regem dicere.*"—NEP. 19. 3. 3. It behoved Phocion first to get admittance

to the king's presence, or to that of his minister Polyperchon, in order that his defence might be distinctly heard, and fairly examined.

It is sometimes understood, that the declared opinion of the speaker is to influence that of the hearer, whose approbation only is courted, and on whose judgment, thus expressed, there is nothing dependant. "Cum aliquem *apud* te laudâro tuorum familiarium."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 39. b. "Ut non anquirat aliquem *apud* quem evomat virus acerbitatis suæ."—CIC. *in Læl.* 122. b. In this last sentence it appears, that even the lonely misanthrope looks about at times for a friend, whose malignant sympathy may add to his gratification.

It sometimes happens, that this judging or inspecting power is understood, by the preposition, to be practised by the agent on himself. The correlative and the governed object are, in this case, the same.

—— proin tu fac *apud* te ut sies.—TER. *And.* 2. 4. 5.

Vix sum *apud* me: ita animus commotu 'st metu.—TER. *Ibid.* 5. 4. 34.

The phrase "*apud* se esse," in Latin, is precisely equivalent to that in Greek, Ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι. Both suppose that the agent has all his wits about him, and that, though alone, he exercises that controuling power over himself, by which he would be guarded in the presence of a respected superior.

When there is a specification of the point occupied by the book, which is understood to supply the place of the writer, that of the reader is fixed, by his vicinity to the source of his information. *Apud* is then translated, "in the writings of" the author, whose name it governs. "*Apud* Agathoclem scriptum in historia est."—CIC. *pro Dom.* 90. b. It is not, however, necessary that the implied work should be a literary publication, in which the author intends to instruct mankind. The preposition is applied to the code of laws promulgated to the Athenians, and meant solely for their regulation. "De sepulchris nihil est *apud* Solonem amplius."—CIC. *de Legg.* 2. 26.

Another singular use we find made of *Apud*, when no particular author is specified. "Inveni *apud* auctores."—PLIN. *L.* 20. *C.* 20. A special source of intelligence is here opposed to that by conversation, personal experience, or any other; but the name of no writer suggests the idea of his book.

When a fact is said to be applicable to one or many, it is figuratively held forth by *Apud*, as being in the vicinity of the persons named, and governed by the preposition. It is then translated, "in the case of," not "at," which suggests a more definite relation.

Quum *apud* te exemplum experiundi habeas.—PLAUT. *Mil. Glor.* 3. 4. 43.

"Sic enim existimo juris civilis magnum usum, et *apud* Scævola et *apud* multos fuisse, artem in hoc uno."—CIC. *in Brut.* 178. a. In this last example it is insinuated, that the practice of the civil law existed in the case of Scævola and others, by being within their reach, but that Servius alone understood the art upon principle. The "usus," in respect to Scævola and the rest, being an extrinsic quality, depending upon opportunities not in their power, is expressed by the intervention of *Apud*, while the "Ars," resting upon the exercise of a natural talent, is deemed inherent in the possessor, and is expressed by that of "In."

As applied to time, *Apud* is highly aoristical, and specifies the time when an event occurred, by governing a term, which suggests a wide and undefined extent of it. It fixes time much less precisely than "Ad." The determined tendency of the correlative object, leading, or that did lead, to the point suggested by the word governed by "Ad," makes the affirmation of rest, or fixed position, by means of it, much more express than it ever is made by *Apud*. "Quæsitum est *apud* majores nostros."—CIC. *de Orat.* 100. a. The preposition here denotes all past time, in opposition to what was present and future. The succession of generations renders the former necessarily undetermined, as the fact may be true of all, or only of one race. For the same reason, the time, which is future in the following passage, is necessarily undetermined also. "Ut *apud* posteros nostros conjurationis auctor fuisse videatur."—CIC. *pro Dom.* 233. b. In that which follows, the specification is somewhat stronger, but by no means precise.

Olim isti fuit generi quondam quæstus *apud* sæclum prius.—TER. *Eun.* 2. 2. 15.

Gnatho here refers to an age, certainly prior to that in which he lived;

but, as to the place it held in the succession of past ages, he says nothing.

It should seem, then, from the practice of the Latin authors, that *Apud* may be resolved into the following meanings.

I.

AT: as suggesting a point, which an object had always occupied, and from which it can never depart.

II.

AT: as suggesting a space, at which a body is supposed to be quiescent, without regard to any previous motion, but to which it is known to have come, and from which it is possible for it to remove.

III.

IN: when the space, in which a person is, is more than sufficient to contain him.

IV.

AT THE HOUSE OF. This holds, when the noun or pronoun, governed, suggests the place at which the person, meant by either, generally is.

V.

IN THE WRITINGS OF. This supposes the reader being near to the book or record, in which the author announces what he means to communicate.

VI.

IN THE CASE OF. The affirmed fact is presented, as being in the vicinity of those, in the case of whom it takes place.

VII.

IN THE TIME OF. The period at which a certain event occurred is stated, with a vague reference to the present, from which it may have been more or less remote, whether past or future.

The preposition, *Apud*, acts always by itself, and never is found in composition.

AQUA, UNDA.

agree, in denoting water, but differ, in respect to the quantity and state of the

fluid. The first is generic, and signifies one of the four elements, as opposed to the other three. “Ignis in *aquam* coniectus continuo restinguitur.”—CIC. *pro Quint.* 47. b. This fact, in respect to water, holds with any quantity, in any state. So it is in the next example. “*Aqua* neque congelaret frigidibus, neque nive prunaque concreceret.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 31. a.

When *Aqua* is not used as a general term, it denotes a small quantity in an undisturbed state. “Poscere *aquam* ad manus.”—PETRON. *C.* 27.

Ferte *aquam* pedibus.—PLAUT. *Pers.* 5. 2. 14.

UNDA differs from *Aqua*, in referring to water in a great quantity, and in a disturbed state. It denotes, either a wave, which is a “cumulus aquæ,” or a less regular, and more forcible, agitation. “Nihil est tam violentum et incontines sui, tam contumax infestumque renitentibus quam magna vis *undæ*.”—SEN. *Nat. Q. L.* 3. *sub finem*. It denotes also, the waves that come in regular succession.

——— velut *unda* supervenit *undam*.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 176.

Defluit saxis agitated humor

Concidunt venti fugiuntque nubes,

Et minax (quod sic voluere) ponto

Unda recumbit.———HOR. *Car.* 12. 29.

“Quid mare? nonne cæruleum? at ejus *unda* cum est pulsa remis purpurascit.”—CIC. *Frag. ap. Non.* Water gets the appellation of *Unda*, even when exposed to the gentlest motion.

Fons sonat a dextra tenui pellucidus *unda*.—OVID. *Met.* 3. 161.

Unda, when taken figuratively, always has a reference to the greatest possible agitation. “*Illæ undæ comitorum sic effervescunt quodam quasi æstu, ut ad alios accedant, ab aliis recidant.*”—CIC. *pro Planc.* 262. a.

Si non ingentem foribus domus alta superbis

Mane salutantem totis vomit ædibus *undam*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 461.

By a synecdoche, *Unda* is sometimes put, by the poets, for *Aqua*, and made to signify water in general.

Quos faciunt justos ignis et *unda* viros.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 598.

Massiliæ fumos miscere nivalibus *undis*
 Parce puer, constet ne tibi pluris *aqua*.—MART. 14. 118.

The wine from Marseilles, which was ripened too fast by being near a smoky fire, is here said to be less valuable than the water from melted snow, with which it was mixed.

ARBITER—*vide* JUDEX.

ARCANUS, OCCULTUS,

agree, in denoting the obscurity of the subjects they specify, but differ, in respect to the manner in which the concealment is effected, and the end proposed by its success. *Arcanus*, from “Arca,” is properly the attribute of those objects, which, from standing high in the estimation of those connected with them, are deposited in a strong box, and thus rendered inaccessible. It may be known that they exist, and that they occupy a certain space, but the knowledge of neither of these things furnishes any means that can lead to the possession of them. Cicero admits, that a distinction subsists between the two terms. “At quicum joca, seria, ut dicitur, quicum *arcana*, quicum *occulta* omnia?”—*De Fin.* 82. b. “Vidit impiæ gentis *arcantum* patens, sub aureo vitem cælo.”—*Flor.* 3. 5. 30. When the conqueror entered Jerusalem, he visited the temple, and beheld, in the inner part of it, the golden rod, that was kept in the ark. Whatever profane notions he formed of this vine, yet, among the Jews, it was preserved from ordinary view, with that religious reverence by which it might well be denominated *Arcanus*. “*Arcanus* hinc terror, sanctaque ignorantia quid sit illud, quod tantum perituri vident.”—TAC. *de Mor. Ger.* 40.

From material objects, *Arcanus* is transferred to intellectual, and refers to such as are rendered inscrutable from design. The same conditions are rigorously observed in the one as in the other, and the concealer, still having a supposed personal interest in his secrets not being divulged, dreads the prying disposition of the curious, as much as he would have done the rapacity of the thief. Both these enemies may undergo a greater or a less deception. They may be either ignorant that any thing is concealed at all, or, possessing this

advantage, may be unable to make it their own. None, or many, may be privy to the secrets; and the same act, which implies a violation of the honour of the confidants, is injurious to the interests of him who trusted them. "*Arcana* regum mira celantes fide Persæ."—QUINT. CUR. 4. 6. 5.

Arcanum neque tu scrutaberis ullius unquam

Commissumque teges et vino tortus et ira —HOR. *Ep.* 2. 18. 37.

Ille velut fidis *arcana* sodalibus olim

Credebat libris. ————— HOR. *Sat.* 1. 2. 30.

— quis enim bonus et face dignus

Arcana qualem Cereris vult esse sacerdos

Ulla aliena sibi credat mala? ————— JUV. 15. 20.

From what is before said of "Occulere," under "Abdere," the precise power of *Occultus*, as an adjective, may be easily gathered. It is properly the attribute of an object which is hid for its own sake, though the pains bestowed in doing so may be ultimately subservient to the good of the concealer. It differs from *Arcanus*, in implying, that that, which is hid, is not always the object of curiosity; so that, on the one hand, there may be often no desire to disguise what is *Occultum*, and none, on the other, to discover it. That, which is *Occultum*, changes its character, by being understood whenever it is known; while that, which is *Arcanum*, must, besides, be suited to the capacity of the being which recognizes; as whatever is beyond it can excite no curiosity. "Nullæ sunt *occultiores* insidiæ quam hæ, quæ latent in simulatione officii."—CIC. *in Ver.* 3. 15. As the success of the deception is the first object with those who lay snares, so their occult nature is necessary to their existence, and to their serving their purpose. The person entrapped suffers, either because he possessed too little penetration, or did not avail himself of that which he had. "Interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem: altera *occulta* quædam et quasi involuta aperiri: altera prompta et aperta judicari."—CIC. *de Fin.* 55. a. Were all things, it appears, alike plain to all men, every improvement in knowledge, and every exercise of reason, would cease. The characteristic of qualities, denominated *Occulta*, rests on their being not too obvious. They are, at the same time, not inscrutable, as being designedly

concealed by nature, but are meant only to solicit enquiry, and to reward it, when conducted as the laws of science direct.

——— hic ubi sæpe

Occultum visus decurrere piscis ad hamum.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 7. 74.

If the fish, caught by the hook, had had more sagacity, it would not have swallowed the bait. The hook is concealed by the angler, that it may be the instrument of deceiving the fish, and because, without being concealed in a certain degree, it would be of no use. “*Occultus* ac subditus fingendis virtutibus.”—TAC. *Ann.* 6. *sub fin.* The historian here states the stratagem of the dissembler, held needful to give effect to his purposes. *Occultus*, it appears, is applicable to persons, which *Arcanus* is not.

ARCESSERE—*vide* INVITARE.

ARDERE, FLAGRARE, URERE, CREMARE,

agree, in denoting the state of being on fire, but differ, in respect either to the immediate effects of the object burning upon others, or to the manner in which it is consumed. *Ardere*, as a neuter verb, supposes that the substance burned is itself the fuel, and that, while the fuel lasts, and the fire is not extinguished, this substance is itself conspicuous, and illuminates the space that is around it. “*Caput arsisse Servio Tullio dormienti, quæ historia non prodidit?*—CIC. *de Div.* 105. b.

——— Deus immortalis haberi

Dum cupit Empedocles *ardentem* frigidus *Ætnam*

Insiluit.——— HOR. *de Art. Poet.* 464.

——— jam proximus *ardet*

Ucalegon: Sigea igni freta lata relucet.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 311.

Ardere is often taken to denote the bright reflection of light, from a body not luminous, “*per se.*”

——— *campique armis cælestibus ardent.*—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 602.

FLAGRARE differs from *Ardere*, in respect to the degree of the state denoted by it, not in respect to its kind. It supposes the fuel to be more highly combustible, and the light emitted to be brighter, than is understood

to hold in the application of *Ardere*. This seems to be the case, from an opposition, made by Cicero, between the two verbs figuratively used. “Non vidit bello *flagrantem* Italiam, non *ardentem* invidia senatum.”—CIC. *de Orat.* 143. a. The raging of war throughout a country is expressed by *Flagrare*, and the prevalence of envy sufficiently conspicuous, though less glaring in a body of men, by *Ardere*. “Fœx vini siccata recipit ignes, ac sine alimento per se *flagrat*.”—PLIN. 14. 20. The power of generating fire, which is characteristic of the phosphorus mentioned, is expressed by the words, “recipit ignes.” Those qualities, again, that it had, in common with some other substances, of emitting a bright light, and of furnishing its own fuel, are expressed by the last clause, in which *Flagrare* bears a principal part.

—— crinemque *flagrantem*

Excudere et sanctos restinguere fontibus ignes.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 685.

Flagrare agrees with *Ardere*, in being figuratively applied to the reflection of light from a clear body, though it may suppose the brightness of the gleam to be greater.

Sidereo *flagrans* clypeo et cælestibus armis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 167.

In the case of the two verbs already examined, the primary circumstance is the light emitted by the burning substance, and the effect of this upon objects around it. In that of the two following, again, this is but a secondary and a casual circumstance, and the chief one is the destruction of any substance upon which fire can operate. *URERE*, accordingly, as an active verb, denotes a change produced upon that which is acted upon. It has no immediate reference to the light, but to the heat, of the burning substance; it admits this substance to be any thing which fire will consume; and it supposes that the continuance of the burning leads to the destruction of that burned, with a rapidity proportioned to its violence. In the case of *Ardere* and *Flagrare*, the burning substance is always luminous. This does not necessarily hold with *Urere*, unless light and heat are required at the same time, and by the same means; as from the firewood used in the cave of Circe.

Urit odoratam nocturna in lumina cedrum,
Arguto tenues percurrens pectine telas.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 12.

Though the destruction of the fewel is the circumstance that is properly characteristic of the verb *Urere*, yet the light and heat, that necessarily attended this, were subservient to the successful performance of the nightly labours of the sorceress. "*Uritur ebenus odore jucundo.*"—PLIN. 12. 4. Ovid, in his address to the sun, furnishes an instance, in which *Urere* refers both to the consumption of the substance furnishing the fewel, and also to that of extraneous substances suffering from their vicinity to that burning.

Nempe tuis omnes qui terras ignibus *uris*

Ureris igne novo: quique omnia cernere debes

Leucothoen spectas, et virgine figis in una

Quos mundo debes oculos.———OVID. *Met.* 4. 194.

In the two last examples, the thing burned is understood to be of such a nature as to feed the fire. This, however, is by no means the case always. "Hominem mortuum inquit lex in xii. tabulis, in urbe ne sepelito neve *urito.*"—CIC. *Legg.* 2. 58. The carcase, so far from furnishing the fewel, would diminish the susceptibility of fire, naturally inherent in the materials which consumed it. In all the examples already given, except that from Ovid, the consuming power, involved in the verb *Urere*, has been supposed to act upon subjects that either are, or have been, in contact with the fire. This power, however, may act on things which stand in none of these relations, as being destroyed by nearness to the body emitting the heat, without being set on fire by it. Thus, Cicero opposes the Torrid to the two Frigid Zones. "Cæteras partes incultas, quod aut frigore rigeant, aut *urantur* calore."—CIC. *Tusc.* 1. 69.

——— cum Sol gravis *ureret* arva.—OVID. *Met.* 6. 339.

Calidum hoc est: etsi procul abest, male *urit.*—PLAUT. *Most.* 3. 1. 81.

Urere differs from all the other verbs, in admitting that the state, denoted by it, may be superinduced by the extremity of cold as well as of heat. This effect, however, is always understood to be produced on animal substances alone. "Pernoctant venatores in nive, in montibus *uri* se patiuntur."—CIC. *Tusc.* 2. 40. The sharpness of pain, besides, in whatever way it is produced, may be expressed by this verb. Thus, Horace employs it to announce the

pain produced by the severe application of a whip, and that also by the pinching of too small a shoe.

—— habes pretium, non loris *ureris* aio.—*Ep.* 1. 16. 47.

18 Si pede major erit subvertet, si minor *uret*.——*Ep.* 1. 10. 43.

Bodily pain is sometimes, though rarely, expressed by the verb “*Ardere*.” “*Arcesilas cum podagræ doloribus arderet*.”—*Cic. de Fin.* 127. a.

CREMARE stands in a relation to “*Urere*,” similar to that between “*Flagrare*” and “*Ardere*.” It denotes, to reduce to ashes, and implies, that the destruction is consummated, which “*Urere*” supposes to be approaching, while the substance burned is exposed to the fire.

Gens quæ cremato fortis ab Ilio.——*HOR. Car.* 4. 4. 53.

—— *confusæque ingentem cædis acervum*

Nec numero nec honore cremant.——*VIRG. Æn.* 11. 207.

Des tua succensæ membra cremanda pyræ—*OVID. in Ibin.* 518.

ARDUUS—*vide ALTUS*.

ARENA, SABULUM vel SABULO, SABURRA,

agree, in denoting sand; but differ, as the particles composing it are more or less fine. *Arena* is generic, in respect to “*Sabulum*,” and is applied to what is found on the banks of rivers, and to what the sea-beach generally presents. It is put also for the coast itself.

—— ac magno telluris amore

Egressi, optata potiuntur Troes arena.——*VIRG. Æn.* 1. 176.

Arena comes from “*Arere*,” and denotes a substance that is naturally dry and unfruitful, the particles of which are of no great size, and do not cohere, unless they are much wetted. He, who lost his labour, was proverbially said among the Romans, “to sow in sand;” as, from the natural sterility of the soil, no return could be expected.

Quid facis Ænone? quid arena semina mandas?

Non profecturis littora bubus aras.——*OVID. Heroid. Ep.* 5. 115.

Horace talks of the “*vaga arena*,” referring to the lightness of the particles, as driven about by the wind.

At tu Nauta vagæ ne parçe malignus *arena* . . .
Ossibus et capiti inhumato

Particulam dare. — HOR. *Car.* 1. 28. 23.

Tentabo et arentes *arenas*

Littoris Assyrii viator. — HOR. *Car.* 3. 4. 31.

Discere quam multæ zephyro turbentur *arena*. — VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 106.

SABULUM differs from "Arena," in supposing that the sand, denoted by the former, has such a mixture of earth as to give it tenacity, and to render it fit, as a soil, for the purposes of vegetation. "Luctandum est cum tenacissimo *sabulo*, quod præaltum et vestigio cedens ægre moliantur pedes." — QUINT. CURT. 4. 7. "In terra quæ est mixta, cum sint dissimili vi ac potestate partes permultæ, in queis lapis marmor, rudus, *arena*, *sabulo*, argilla," &c. — Varro. *de R. R.* 1. 9.

As *Sabulum* can nourish plants, so there is no phrase similar to that founded on the sterility of the "Arena." The two last words are so opposed in the following sentence, that from the barrenness of the one we may infer the fertility of the other. "Magnam partem terræ steriles *arenæ* tenent, cum vero venti spirant quicquid *sabuli* in campis jacet, converrunt." — QUINT. CURT. 7. 4. In the sentences which follow, we find moisture and fertility ascribed to *Sabulum*. Thus, Columella, speaking of the soil fittest for the chesnut tree, says, "Pullam terram et resolutam desiderat; *sabulonem* humidum vel refractum tophum non respuit." — COL. 4. *Cap. ult.*

Vitruvius gives the gradations in the different kinds of sand, when talking of the clay that is fittest for tiles. He mentions the "lutum arenosum," denoting that mixed with sand most minutely granulated; the "Sabulosum," that which is mixed with grosser and earthy particles; and the "Calculosum," that mixed with pebbles or gravel. "Lateres non de *arenoso*, neque *calculoso*, neque *sabuloso* luto, ducendi sunt." — VITRUV. 2. 3.

SABURRA differs from the two words stated, in taking its distinctive character from the use to which it is subservient, as much as from the nature of the thing itself. It supposes such an inequality in the parts of the sand as to form gravel; and it besides requires, that this substance shall be used as ballast for ships, or for giving weight to birds that are exposed to blasts

in the course of long flights. “Onerarias ducere multa *saburra* gravatas.”—LIV. 37. 14.

—— et sæpe lapillos

Ut cymbæ instabiles, fluctu jactante, *saburram*

Tollunt : his sese per inania nubila librant.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 194.

“Qua nave nihil admirabilius visum in mari certum est : centum viginti millia modiûm lentis pro *saburra* ei fuere.”—PLIN. 16. 40. The same author, speaking of cranes, says, “Certum est pontum transvolaturas *saburra* stabiliri: cum medium transierint, abjici lapillos e pedibus; cum attigerint continentem, e gutture arenam.”—10. 23. It appears that small stones and sand are both understood to have been component parts of the *Saburra*. The former were thrown from the feet of the fowls, when the flight was half finished, and the other discharged from their stomachs, when they reached the land.

ARGUERE—*vide* CRIMINARI.

ARIDUS, SICCUS,

agree, in denoting that the object, to which they are applied, is dry, but differ, in the degree in which this quality exists. The first, from “Arere,” signifies a total privation of moisture. The fruit, or vegetable, to which *Aridus* is applied, has lost its succulent quality completely. The former quits both the natural tenacity of its parts, and the flavour which distinguished it. When the juice is removed by an intended evaporation, it is removed only in part. Such a quantity of it is retained, as is consistent with the preservation of the fruit, and as will emit its flavour. The substance is then in the state denoted by the adjective *Siccus*, which implies no tendency towards mouldering or decay. “Ne sint fragilia et *arida* potius quam *sicca* folia.”—PLIN. 12. 12. 26. “*Myrtus siccata* usque in *ariditatem* in umbra.”—PLIN. 15. 29. In this last example it appears clearly, that a continued increase of the quality involved in *Siccus*, leads to, and terminates in, that in *Aridus*.

The same difference exists between *Κεαυρος* and *Ξηρος*, in Greek, that exists

between *Aridus* and *Siccus*, in Latin. Κραυρον γαρ το τελεως ζηρον, ωσει η πεπηγεναι δι ελλειψιν υγρατητος. Αριστοτ. περι γενεσεως η φθορας. κεφ. ε.

The abstract noun, *Siccitas*, is occasionally taken to denote the firmness of the flesh of an animal, and, of course, its wholesomeness and strength. This quality stands opposed to morbid fatness. It implies the reverse of what is meant by flaccid, or being without due tension, and supposes this quality to arise from the natural juices being neither in a superabundant nor a deficient state. To the superabundance there is a reference in the following example. "Persæ propter exercitationes pueriles modicas, eam sunt consecuti corporis *siccitatem*, ut neque spuerent, neque emungerentur, sufflatove corpore essent."—*VAR. apud Non* 4. 426. To the deficiency, which might have been expected, there is a reference in the following passage from Cicero, when talking of the wonderful strength of Massinissa at the age of ninety years. "Nullo imbre, nullo frigore adduci, ut capite operto sit: summam in eo esse corporis *siccitatem*."—*Cic. de Sen.* 83. b. In the case of the Persians, *Siccitas* denotes the absence of laxness, produced by moderate exercise diminishing the quantity of the bodily fluids; and, in Massinissa, the absence of that rigid stiffness, when the extent of the ordinary secretions is diminished by old age.

ARMENTUM—*vide* GREX.

ARRIDERE, IRRIDERE,

agree, in denoting to laugh, so as to be seen by another, but differ, in respect to the sentiment upon which this expression of mirth proceeds. The verb "ridere," which is their common root, will appear to be generic, and to express laughter, on any account, and in any degree. By means of "Ad," the laugh is directed towards its object, with a purpose that is entirely innocent; by that of the "In," denoting motion, and making the verb it affects govern the accusative, the purpose is different. *Arridere*, then, implies goodwill towards the person laughed to, and a disposition either to excite mirth, or to support that, of which another has given signs. It agrees with "Subridere,"

in denoting an expression of benevolence, but differs from it, in being applicable to more than a smile, and as always denoting intention to raise, or to continue, the mirth of others.

— ut ridentibus *arrident*, ita flentibus adsunt
Humani vultus. — HOR. *Art. Poet.* 101.

Here the natural sympathies, of which man is susceptible, are beautifully and forcibly painted. The “Ad” affects the “Flere,” precisely as it does the “Ridere;” and he who rejoices, and he who weeps, wishes to bring the objects of their respective attention to the same state of mind with themselves. Ovid makes the same use of the verb *Adridere*, in directing the lover how to conduct his intrigues.

Riserit, *aride* : si flebit, flere memento :
Imponat leges vultibus illa tuis. — OVID. *Ars. Am.* 1. 201.

In the instances already given, *Arridere* signifies to support the laugh which another had begun. At some times it refers to the person wishing to excite mirth among others, who may, or may not, be disposed to enter into the feelings of the laugher. “Adolescentulo quem amabat tradidisse gladium dicitur. Hic quum quidam familiaris jocans dixisset, ‘Huic quidem certe vitam tuam committis,’ *arrisissetque* adolescens, utrumque jussit interfici : alterum quia viam demonstravisset interimendi sui ; alterum quia dictum id risu approbavisset.” — CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 240. a. The joke of Dionysius’s friend, which was intended to please the tyrant, had a contrary effect, and was fatal both to the joker and to the keeper of the sword, who unfortunately laughed at it.

Oportet lænam probam *arridere* quisquis veniat
Blandeque alloqui — PLAUT. *Truc.* 2. 1. 14.
Clemens, blandus, nulli lædere os, *arridere* omnibus. — TER. *Adelph.* 5. 4. 10.

The people, referred to in the last sentences, were disposed to meet every person with a smile, and, by an affected kindness, to promote their own purposes. Seneca exhibits this character, in the following sentence, with his usual affectation. “Stultorum divitum *arrosor*, et, quod sequitur, *arrior*.” —

Ep. 27. Though the attempt of the *Arrisor* fails sometimes, yet it was so generally successful, that the verb metonymically signifies to please.

— quibus hæc sint qualiacunque
Arridere velim : doliturus si placeant spe
 Deterius nostra. — HOR. *Sat.* 1. 10. 88.

“ Inhibere illud tuum quod valde mihi *arriserat* vehementer displicet.” — CIC. *Ep. ad Att.*

IRRIDERE differs from “ Arridere,” in implying that the laughter has no intention to excite mirth in others, but to give pain to the person whom he treats with contempt. The verb takes after it an accusative, governed by the compounding preposition, intimating, that the gibe is thrown at its object with a view to hurt him, and that, between the scorner and the person ridiculed, there exists an antipathy.

— venis ultro *irrisum* dominum. — PLAUT. *Amph.* 2. 1. 40.

“ Deforme etiam est de se ipso prædicare falsa præsertim, et cum *irrisione* audientium imitari militem gloriosum.” — CIC. *de Off.* 28. a. “ Illi *irridentes* responderunt tum id se facturos quum,” &c. — NEP. 1. 1.

Irridere, besides, differs from “ Arridere,” in being applied, occasionally, to inanimate objects. The latter verb supposes animation in its object, so as to return the smile, which is intended to please; while the former supposes this object either incapable of feeling any thing, or remotely, as in the last example, connected with some sensitive being. “ Apollonius *irrisit* philosophiam.” — CIC. *de Or.* 91. a. “ Romam præ sua Capua *irridebunt* atque contemnent.” — CIC. *Cont. Rull.* 85. b.

Bonis tuis rebus meas res *irrides* malas. — PLAUT. *Trin.* 2. 4. 45.

ARROGANTIA—*vide* SUPERBIA.

ARVUM—*vide* RUS.

ASSENTARI—*vide* ADULARI.

ASSEVERARE—*vide* AFFIRMARE.

ASSUESCERE—*vide* SOLERE.

ASTUTUS, VAFER, CALLIDUS, RECOCTUS,

agree, in denoting cunning, but differ, in respect to the manner in which this talent for deception is either acquired or directed. The first term comes from *Ἀστύ*, "Urbs," and denotes that habitual regard to the extent and preservation of a person's rights, which he acquires by living in cities, in which the sharpness of one man calls for and improves the sharpness of another. Festus supports the same etymology upon the same principles. "Quia qui in urbibus versantur assidue, cautiores et acutiores esse videntur quam qui in agris et pagis degunt." Though the Greek word *Ἀστύ*, and the Latin "Urbs," have precisely the same import, yet "Urbanus," derived from the latter, has a very different meaning from *Astutus*. When "Urbanus" quits its literal power, which is simply "belonging to a city," it suggests refinement of manner, and not artificial duplicity of character. It then denotes what we call polite, derived from *Πολίς*, which also signifies a city.

Astutus always implies, directly or indirectly, a sneaking regard to interest, such as is never consistent with strict morality.

—— pro bene sano

Ac non incauto fictum *astutumque* vocamus.—HOR. *Sat.* 3. 61.

"Labores per quos præmia ceperis, cum adeptus sis, deponere, esset hominis et *astuti* et ingrati."—CIC. *pro Mur.* 125. b.

VAFER differs from "Astutus," in supposing the person, to whom it is applied, to perceive the artifices intended to deceive him, and to adopt the best means for punishing the tricks of the deceiver. While he, who is "Astutus," questions the penetration of his supposed dupe, he, who is *Vafer*, conceals his consciousness of the stratagem, in hopes of making the biter bite himself. Some etymologists have, whether whimsically or otherwise, derived *Vafer* from the intensive particle "Ve" and "afer," and have supposed the adjective to denote all the refined dissimulation, in personal character, which the Romans expressed by the words "Punica fides," and ascribed to their African rivals.

——— captes *astutus* ubique
 Testamenta senum: neu si *vafer* unus et alter
 Insidiatorem præroso fugerit hamo
 Aut spem deponas, aut artem illusus omittas.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 5. 23.

In the above passage, “*Astutus*” and *Vafer* are used with all the classical purity to be expected in so great a poet. The “*Captator*” is desired, at the beginning of it, never to drop those selfish and insidious views which form the essence of the first word. Each of those, whom he in vain tries to overreach, is styled *Vafer*. Under the metaphorical image of a fish nibbling at the bait, without touching the hook, they are made to disappoint the expectations of the “*Insidiator*,” and to impair the means by which he may afterwards ensnare the unwary.

Illum aut nequities, aut *vafri* inscitia juris
 Postremo expellat certe vivacior hæres.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 131.

The law is here personified, and said to be *Vafer*, as first encouraging the credulous to engage in it, and, in the end, punishing them for rashness and ignorance.

Omne *vafer* vitium ridenti Flaccus amico
 Tangit, et admissus circum præcordia ludit,
Callidus excusso populum suspendere naso.—PERS. 1. 116.

The compliment paid to Horace here is both handsome and happily expressed. His delicate irony, it is said, can deceive even his friend, and furnish him with entertainment, till he feels that it is applicable to himself.

CALLIDUS differs from the preceding terms, in not directly referring to the intention of the person to whom it is applied, but to his increased skill, in consequence of having long performed the deception. It comes from “*Callus*,” and refers to the hand of the workman that has been hardened with long and severe labour. Cicero himself gives us this account of its origin. “*Proprie enim sic appellatur is, cujus, tanquam manus opere, sic animus usu concalluit.*”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.*

In the last line of the compliment paid by Persius to Horace, *Callidus* suggests a very different quality from “*Vafer*” in the first. It refers merely

to the acquired dexterity of the satyrist, from having long sneered at the people with success. The merit of Hannibal is raised by his biographer, when he suggests the advantages possessed by Fabius arising from long experience. "Hannibal Fabio *callidissimo* imperatori dedit verba."—NEP. in *Han. cap.* 3.

——— *callida* dona
Graiorumque doli.———STAT. *Achill.* 2. 171.

The dexterity with which the gifts were presented might give them a false appearance of generosity, and impose upon the unsuspecting Trojans.

——— timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 49.

Tacitus opposes "Astutus" to *Callidus* in such a way as to point out the meaning of each. Speaking of the wild Germans he says, "Gens non *astuta* nec *callida* aperit adhuc secreta pectoris licentia joci."—*De Mor. Ger.* 22. This openness of character is ascribed to the absence of two qualities, which the philosophic historian did not apprehend to be necessarily united in the same person. As a rude nation, who had but imperfect notions of property, they knew nothing of those selfish devices by which it is often acquired. On that account they were a "gens non *astuta*." Having had no opportunities of practising the mean arts of the interested, they could never become dextrous by that experience, to which they were of necessity strangers. In the character, of which "Astutia" forms a part, there is always something morally deformed, and, happily for human society, this quality is not uniformly combined with *Calliditas*. This last term infers nothing necessarily bad, and may apply to the dextrous and successful exertion of talents, which have the good of mankind for their object.

The use made by Ovid of *Callidus*, in one instance, is not to be easily reconciled with what is above said of it, nor with the practice of the other classics.

Non ego natura, nec sum tam *callidus* usu,
Solertem tu me sola (puella) facis.———*Heroid. Ep.* 9. v. 27.

Previous and long practice cannot surely be the foundation of any quality that

is the gift of nature, to which one species of *Calliditas* is here referred. The expression, "*Callidus* natura," must suggest something bordering upon "*Astutia*;" that is, a refined slyness, against the effects of which the most acute penetration will render no man proof.

RECOCTUS differs from "*Callidus*," in supposing that the dexterity denoted by it is the effect, not of long practice, but of study and discipline, upon the part of the deceiver. The latter term suggests a sort of slight-of-hand, with which mind may be little concerned; while the former supposes all the pains and attention, implied in the radical verb "*Coquere*," turned to the acquisition of those talents which give success in intrigue.

——— *displicere vellem*

Tibi et Fuffilio seni *recocto*.———CAT. *Car.* 54. 5.

This old man had long applied his mind to the study of men and manners. His address, in conduct, was the effect, not merely of practice, but of study and reflection.

——— *plerumque recoctus*

Scriba ex quinqueviro corvum deludet hiantem.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 5. 55.

The first time those scribes returned from attending the proconsul in any province, each of the five, styled *Quinqueviri*, was said to be "*coctus*." By this term it was suggested, that means, to a certain extent, had been employed to improve his talent in the duty required of him. If any of them went out, and returned a second time, he was then said to be "*Recoctus*." It was understood that his docility, too, had been sufficiently tried, and that every opportunity had been afforded him of becoming accomplished in his line.

ATER, NIGER, FUSCUS,

agree, in denoting a dark colour, but differ, in respect to the degree of darkness ascribed by each to the subject it specifies. In their literal acceptation they express an attribute of natural substances. *Ater* may be held the generic term, as signifying the deepest black in nature, such as that of coal.

Tam excoctam atque *atram* reddam quam carbo est.—TER. *Adelph.* 4. 1. 63.

Unlucky days among the Romans were styled "dies atri," because marked with a substance of the darkest hue.

—— dies *atro* signanda lapillo.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 1. 418.

"Risi nivem *atram* : teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad jocandum valde me juvat."—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 314. a. The wit here mentioned must certainly rest on the incongruity of conceptions suggested by "Ater" and "Nivis," thus made the subject of a grammatical concord. "Anaxagoras nivem *nigram* dixit esse. Ferres me si idem dicerem?"—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 18. b. It is the strangeness, not the wit, of the position of Anaxagoras, that is meant to solicit attention. Though the opposition between the colour, denoted by "Niger," and that peculiar to snow, be not the greatest possible in nature, yet it is sufficient to shew the absurdity of the assertion, and to enable Anaxagoras to be ranked among those sophists, who, as Cicero subjoins, "ostentationis aut quæstûs causa philosophantur."

Total darkness, formed by a thorough privation of light, is expressed by *Ater*, which is originally applicable to the colour reflecting least of the light which actually exists.

—— caligine turbidus *atra*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 876.

The feeble light, supposed to make the darkness of the infernal regions just visible, was styled *Atra lux*.

Donator *atra* lucis, Alcide, tuum

Diti remitte munus.———SEN. *Hippol.* 1217.

Ater is not found in the comparative degree, but in Plautus, who, besides indulging in those licences that are common in other poets, wrote before the Latin had reached its highest purity. The correlative term "Candidus," indeed, signifying the brightest possible white, is compared, because, besides the circumstance of colour, it denotes resplendence, which may exist among white substances in various degrees. *Ater*, again, refers to colour alone. Any intension of the deepest black is impossible, and a remission would reduce it to some of those shades that are expressed by another term.

NIGER differs from “*Ater*,” as denoting certain shades of that deepest black expressed by the latter.

— horrentique *atrum* nemus imminet umbra.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 169.

In the comment of Servius upon this passage he acknowledges, that, in the above use of “*Atrum*,” the poet had employed the term in a more confined signification than its natural one. “*Tropus est, per atrum, nigrum ostendit: per nigrum umbrosum: umbrosum, densum; id est frondibus plenum.*”

Niger admits comparison, in its fullest extent, on account of the many possible approximations to a darker colour, on the one hand, and to a lighter, on the other. Thus, Pliny styles those leaves, in which the green was darker than ordinary, “*Folia nigriora.*” 24. 15. Catullus also styles the ripest grapes “*Uvæ nigerrimæ.*”

Ut puella tenellulo delicatior hædo,
Asservanda *nigerrimis* diligentius uvis.—18. 15.

Et Lycum *nigris* oculis, *nigroque*

Crine decorum.—HOR. *Car.* 1. 32. 11.

Though the Romans admired black eyes and black hair, yet we must not suppose their admiration to have been confined to the deepest black that ever appears in either. “*Ater*” is, in fact, never applied to the one or the other. *Ισπλοκαμος*, applied by Pindar to the hair of the muses, and *Ελιζωπις*, by Homer to the eyes of Venus, must be interpreted with the same latitude that belongs to the Latin *Niger*.

Fuscus differs from “*Niger*,” in denoting a colour some shades farther removed from that expressed by “*Ater*.” It commences when those shades styled “*Subnigri*,” or blackish, become so faint as to be lost sight of. The diminishing power of “*Sub*,” in composition, is not found acting upon “*Ater*,” except in Plautus, who uses “*Subater*.” This he does, probably, according to the unphilosophic practice of those low characters whom he usually holds forth. *Fuscus* has its diminutive in “*Sub*,” but its degrees of comparison are not in use, probably owing to the extent of the range allowed by the purest practice to “*Niger*.”

The two following passages shew the precise force both of *Fuscus* and "Niger."

Nominibus mollire licet mala : *fusca* vocetur
Nigrior illyrica cui pice sanguis erit.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 657.
 Quam potes, in pejus dotes deflecte puellæ,
 Turgida si plena est, si *fusca* est *nigra* vocetur.—OVID. *Rem. Am.* 327.

AUDACIA, AUDENTIA, FORTITUDO, TEMERITAS,

agree, in denoting that quality of mind which consists in the contempt of danger, but differ, in respect to the degree in which this quality is under the controul of reason. *AUDACIA* denotes a constitutional boldness, which the agent is happy in gratifying, without any regard to the value of the object for which it is exerted. *AUDENTIA* differs from it only in respect to the unsteadiness of the sentiment in such men as feel bold but at particular times. The former term, being an abstract from "Audax," denotes that habitual quality, which marks an adjective: but the latter, being an abstract from "Audens," retains so much of its participial character, even after it has become an adjective, as to give a faint suggestion of the time at which the quality is ascribed to its subject. "Tum jacentem et impeditum, tribuni et centuriones et cæterorum ut quisque *audentiæ* habuisset, accurrerent trucidarentque."—TAC. *An.* 14. 53. Though a general plan had been laid down for slaying the emperor, yet, in all its parts, it was by no means fixed. Lateranus, approaching as a beggar seeking his alms, was to throw him down; but the tribunes, centurions, and others concerned in the plot, were to act according to circumstances, and just as they felt bold. *FORTITUDO* differs from both the terms mentioned, in supposing that the agent exerts his judgment, and his boldness, at one time; and that he acts from a deliberative principle, not from an instinctive ferocity. "Audacia" signifies a defect in the human mind, while *Fortitudo* denotes one of its cardinal virtues. "Jampridem equidem nos vera rerum vocabula amisimus; quia bona aliena largiri liberalitas; malarum rerum *audacia* "fortitudo" vocatur."—SAL. *Cat.* 52. "Pro virtute *audacia*; pro avaritia largitio vigeant."—SAL. *B. C.* 3.

Quod si deficiant vires, *audacia* certe
 Laus erit, in magnis et voluisse sat est.—PROPERT. 2. 10. 5.

“Animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate non utilitate communi impellitur, *audaciæ* potius nomen habet quam *fortitudinis*.”—CIC. *Off.* 1. 63.
 “*Audacia* non contrarium est *fidentia*, sed appositum et propinquum: et tamen vitium est.”—CIC. *pro Cecin.* 285. a. “*Fortitudo* est considerata periculorum susceptio, et laborum perpessio.”—CIC. *de Invent.* 82. b.

TEMERITAS can hardly be said to agree with the other terms, in the general circumstance of despising danger, because it implies that the danger is scarcely perceived. It denotes a quality opposed, not to cowardice, but to prudence, and supposes the understanding blind, in respect to consequences. “Nunquam enim *temeritas* cum *sapientia* commiscetur, nec ad consilium casus admittitur.”—CIC. *pro Marcell.* 7. “*Temeritas* est videlicet *florentis ætatis*, *sapientia senescentis*.”—CIC. *de Sen.* b. “Ac sane, quod *difficillimum* in primis est, et *prælio strenuus* erat, et *bonus consilio*, quorum alterum ex *providentia* *timorem*, alterum ex *audacia* *temeritatem* adferre plerumque solet.”—SALL. *Jug.* 7.

A few instances occur, in which “*Audacia*” expresses what is clearly given as an article of praise. “*Majores nostri P. C. neque consilii neque audaciæ unquam eguere*.”—SAL. *Cat.* 52. “*Non enim frangere audaciam vestram, sed differre in majorem gloriam et opportunitatem volui*.”—LIV. 25. 38.

AUDIRE, OBEDIRE, OBTEMPERARE, PARERE, SERVIRE,

agree, in denoting the act of complying with the will of another, but differ, in respect to the sentiment from which that act proceeds, or the zeal with which it is performed. *Audire*, in its primitive meaning, signifies to receive information by the ear. “*Sæpe audivi a majoribus natu, qui se porro pueros a senibus audisse dicebant*.”—CIC. *de Sen. cap.* 14. From the act of hearing, which may be either voluntary or involuntary, it has come to denote hearing favourably, or assenting to what is said. “*Hæc precatus, veluti sensisset preces auditas*.”—LIV. 1. 12. There was here more than a communication of the desire. He, who prayed, is supposed conscious, that the God was willing to grant it.

— precantem placidus audi.—OVID. *Met.* 8. 597.

Audit, et cœli genitor de parte serena
Intonuit.———VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 630.

When *Audire* is compounded with “Ex,” the radical power is increased, whether it refer simply to hearing, or extend to the act of compliance with what is heard. “Dic, oro te, clarius: vix enim mihi *exaudisse* videor.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 4. 8. “Capitoline Jupiter, *audisti* quæ malo principi precabamur; *exaudi* quæ pro dissimillimo optamus.”—PLIN. *in Pan. cap. pænult.* The prayer, offered in behalf of Trajan, was more sincere than that for his predecessor, and the god is entreated to lend to the former a still more favourable ear.

OBEDIRE, as compounded of “Ob” and “Audire,” signifies a stronger disposition to obey than the simple verb. By means of the preposition, the hearer is understood to put his ear in the way of the speaker, so as to catch every word that he utters, and to receive the whole as a command. Upon the part of the Being, said “Audire,” there is an amiable benignity, that encourages the petitioner, and excites his gratitude; upon that of the person, *Obediens*, there is a disposition to comply with the request, from feeling the claim of the petitioner, whether enforced or otherwise. The expression heard, then, may, in some cases, be the admonition of a friend, and, in others, the command of a superior. “Animus mansuete *obediens* imperio meliori.”—LIV. 3. 29. “Quibus rex maxime *obediat* eos habere inimicissimos.”—NEP. *in Dat.* 5. The king, in this last example, accepted of the counsel of these his greatest enemies, but was under no obligation to obey them. “Enixe *obeditum* dictatori est.”—LIV. 4. 26. Here the thing heard was an imperious command, and compliance with the dictator’s will could not be more zealous than necessary.

OBTEMPERARE differs from “Obedire,” in denoting the spirit of obedience, even though the will of a superior, who has a right to enforce it, has never been heard. It comes from “Ob” and “Temperare,” and implies acting under restraint, from regard to those who are near us, or in our way, and to whom our conduct is, or may be, an object of notice. The hearer is understood to interpret the will of his superior from circumstances, and to be ever ready to perform the duty, which he feels himself called upon to antici-

pate. "Imperium domesticum nullum erit, si servulis hoc nostris concesserimus, ut ad verba nobis *obediant*, non ad id quod ex verbis intelligi possit, *obtemperent*."—CIC. *pro Cæcin.* 296. a. "Ejus semper voluntatibus non modo cives "assenserint," socii *obtemperarint*, hostes *obedierint*; sed etiam venti tempestatesque obsecundarint."—CIC. *pro Leg. Man.* 13. a. In this climax the force of the three first verbs is most beautifully expressed. Pompey is said, by his panegyrist, to have possessed every quality needful in a great leader. The citizens of Rome had such confidence in his wisdom, and in the rectitude of his intentions, that they agreed to whatever he proposed; the allies had such respect for his will, that they interpreted it in articles in which it had never been declared; and the enemies of the state were the willing subjects of his power, and yielded that submission, as voluntary, which they durst not have refused.

Quando nec gnatus, neque hic mihi quidquam *obtemperant*.

Quæ dico parvi pendunt.—TER. *Hec.* 3. 5. 62.

Laches here complains of a double offence; first, by a violation of that respect, for what might have been understood to be his will, which was due him, as a father; and next, by positively disobeying and neglecting what he said. Donatus says, with great judgment, in his note upon the last line of this passage, "*Quia obtemperamus etiam tacitæ voluntati*."

"Audire" and *Obtemperare* may throw their power upon the agent, which "Obedire" cannot. "*Te audi, tibi obtempera*."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 2. 7. Cicero advises his friend to follow his own direction, and to adopt no counsellor but himself. The first verb suggests the confidence that was due to a friend, and the last the respect, which, as a good man, he must feel for himself. The expression, "*Obedi tibi*," could not have been used. From the constant influence of self-love no sense of claim could exist, in respect to a man's self, and the same person could not act as superior and inferior, so as both to give and receive the command.

"Obedire" and *Obtemperare*, however, may be coupled together in the same sentence, and each may, at the same time, retain its own meaning. "*Nec vero solum ut obtemperent obedientque magistratibus, sed ut eos etiam*

colant diligentque.”—CIC. *de Legg.* 185. a. In this sentence *Obtemperare* signifies that obedience, which is consistent with the spirit of the law, when all has not been said by the magistrate that is required; and “Obedire,” what is consistent with the letter of the law, which the subject willingly receives, and follows as his guide.

PARERE denotes the readiness of those who yield obedience, as appearing, from their being constantly at hand, to learn their superior’s will. It is derived from *Παρεῖναι*, “adesse,” and, in some few instances, has the meaning of its compound “Apparere.” “Immolanti omnium victimarum jecinora replicata *paruerunt*.”—SÜETON. *in Aug.* 95. It implies a higher degree of submission than “Obedire,” though it also supposes a disposition to hear the order, and to adopt it as a rule. *Parere*, however, suggests resignation, where force and complaint could have little effect. “De imperfectis hominibus loquor, quorum affectus sæpe contumaciter *parent*.”—SEN. *Ben.* 2. 18. The notion of contumacy is incompatible with that involved in “Obedire,” as no man would willingly hear what he had any desire to resist. This notion, however, is perfectly reconcileable with that in *Parere*. “Necessitati *parere* cogimur.”—CIC. *Orat.* 216. b. The irresistible power of necessity could not be expressed by “Obedire,” which would involve a disposition to know what cannot be concealed, and to assent to what is imposed as cogent and irresistible.

These two verbs, notwithstanding their difference, may be used in the same sentence, and applied to the same things. “Quemadmodum autem *obedire* et *parere* voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 5. 6. Both verbs imply a personification of those tools in the hand of nature; but the first refers to a voluntary, and the last to a forced obedience.

“Obtemperare” and *Parere* can act as correlatives to “Imperare,” which expresses the most absolute command. “Neque solum magistratibus præscribendus est “imperandi,” sed etiam civibus *obtemperandi* modus. Nam et qui bene “imperat” *paruerit* aliquando necesse est: et qui modeste *parent*, videtur qui aliquando “imperet” dignus esse.”—CIC. *de Legg.* 184. b.

“Obedire” is never seen in the relation of a correlative to “Imperare,” as the spontaneous submission, implied in the former verb, is not to be reconciled with the irresistible authority implied in the latter.

SERVIRE differs from “Parere,” in being applicable only to a slave, who has extinguished every feeling of what is due to himself. Though the latter verb denotes the act of yielding to necessity, and complying with reluctance, yet it does not extend so far as to imply servile subjection, or the sacrifice of every natural right. The person, “Parens,” acts from a sense of duty, and will state and resist his grievances; while the person, *Serviens*, hugs the chain that binds him, and feels no disposition to throw it off. The character given to the British, by the greatest historian of antiquity, will, it is hoped, belong to them while the world endures. “Ipsi Britanni delectum ac tributa et injuncta imperii munera impigre obeunt, si injuriæ absunt: has ægre tolerant, jam domiti ut “parent,” nondum ut *serviant*.”—TAC. *in Vit. Agric. cap. 13.*

AVIS—*vide* VOLUCRIS.

AVIUS, INVIUS, DEVIUS,

agree, in having a reference to roads, but differ, as they respect their actual, or their possible, existence, or as they fix the place of objects, by their remoteness from them. They are all compounds of “Via,” which signifies a channel of communication presented by nature, or formed by art, for rendering places mutually accessible. The preposition “A” exerts that *δυναμις σερητικη*, upon the noun “Via,” which is before explained, and the compounded adjective signifies “pathless.” It is applicable to places that are impervious, from not being rendered otherwise, and to others that may be with difficulty, but have seldom or never been, passed.

Avia Pieridum peragro loca, nullius ante
Trita solo: juvat integros accedere fontes
Atque haurire.———LUCRET. 1. 925.

Those pathless abodes of the muses had before been trodden by no human foot.

Avia tum resonant avibus virgulta canoris.—VIRG. *Georg. 2. 338.*

Though the music of the birds was heard in these places, yet, from the state

of the surface at the time, the spot where they were was inaccessible. It was otherwise in the following passage, in which Cicero exhibits a misplaced kind of wit. "Hunc avium dulcedo ducit ad *avium*."—CIC. *ad Her.* 30. b. The music of the birds led this person to a place that was trackless, but through which it was possible to pass.

Vitas hinnuleo me similis Chloe,
Quærenti pavidam montibus *avibus*
Matrem. ————— HOR. *Car.* 1. 23. 1.

The young fawn found a way for itself through the wild and pathless mountains.

INVIUS differs from "Avius," in implying, that, upon the place marked by it, a road cannot be formed. In the case of the latter, the spot may be impervious at the time, but the obstacles, it is understood, may be removed, and are not like those, in that specified by *Invius*, in their nature insurmountable.

Sic demum lucos stygios regna *invia* vivis
Aspicias. ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 154.
Et circumfusus *invia* fluminibus. ————— OVID. *Fast.* 5. 582.

The figurative uses of *Invius* correspond entirely with the literal one. Thus, Tacitus tells us of the confidence which Agricola's soldiers had in the valour of their leader, to which no effectual barrier could be presented. "Nihil virtuti suæ *inviuum* : penetrandam Caledoniam, inveniendumque tandem Britannia terminum continuo præliorum cursu fremebant."—TAC. *Ag.* 27. So, also, Ovid.

Invia virtuti nulla est via. ——— MET. 14. 113.

DEVIUS differs from "Avius," in always supposing the actual existence of a road, though at a distance from some fixed correlative point, and from "Invius," in allowing the possibility of that which has been really done.

Ergo ubi Narcissum per *devia* lustra vagantem
Vidit et incaluit : sequitur vestigia furtim. ——— OVID. *Met.* 3. 370.
————— serpente ciconia pullos
Nutrit, et inventa per *devia* rura lacerta. ——— JUV. 14. 74.

Devius does not always directly refer to the distance of persons or places from any road, but to the act, which may be deemed troublesome, by obliging the traveller to lengthen his journey, and to go out of his way. “Tu, si in Formiano non simus, si nos amas, in Pompeianum venito: id et nobis erit perjucundum, et tibi non sane *devium*.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 25. 1.

The figurative meanings of *Devius* correspond with the account now given of it. Thus, it is applied to things rarely seen, or not easily come at; as when Ovid styles an owl “avis *devia*.”

Et cecinit mæstum *devia* carmen avis.—*Ep.* 2. 118.

Horace applies it, in the same way, to a courtesan, not entirely abandoned, and, as it were, “non in via prostans.”

Quis *devium* scortum eliciet domo
Lyden? ————— *Car.* 2. 11. 21.

Propertius, though a writer of high authority, seems, in one instance, to have used *Devius* irregularly, and as equal to “*Invius*.”

— nullis sacra relecta viris.
Devia puniceæ velabant limina vittæ.—4. 10. 27.

This threshold was inaccessible, or not to be entered.

AURA, FLATUS, VENTUS, PROCELLA, TURBO,

agree, in denoting agitations of the air, but differ, in respect either to their degree, to their continuance, or to their lines of motion.

AURA supposes the air moving with a force that is never the most violent; that its motion is always of considerable duration; and that, during its continuance, it maintains the same direction. It denotes the slightest agitation of which the fluid is susceptible, but, at the same time, extends to such as rise several degrees above this. “Accipit ab hoc *auras* quamlibet sereno et placido die, non tamen acres et immodicas, sed spatio ipso lassas et infractas.”—PLIN. *Ep.* 5. 6.

Lenis alit flammas, grandior *aura* necat.—OVID. *Rem. Am.* 808.

That, which is styled *Aura*, when moderate, was supposed, by the Latins, to aid the sense of smell.

Dulcis compositis spiravit crinibus *aura*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 417.

The apprehension of this fact led to a figurative use of *Aura*, in which it denotes suspicion. “Sperat sibi *auram* aliquam posse afflari in hoc crimine.”—CIC. *Ver.* I. 13. From the fallibility of this sense of smell, even though assisted by a breeze, *Aura* is taken to express confused perception, in whatever way it is acquired.

Discolor unde auri per ramos *aura* refulsit.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 204.

It may seem presumptuous to question the interpretation of Servius, who explains *Aura* by splendour. A due regard, however, to the analogy of the term, and to the nature of the passage, appears to justify an opposite opinion. No radiance could be emitted by any metal shaded by boughs, and imperfectly seen through them, and, of course, we must suppose, that the poet meant to represent the colour as dim, which is the reverse of splendid. The interpretation given of this passage from Virgil, appears to be justified by another from Horace, in which some critics have taken *Aura* as signifying “glare,” and others “artificial perfume.”

Te suis matres metuunt juvencis,
Te senes parci, miseraeque nuper
Virgines nuptae, tua ne retardet
Aura maritos.—Car. 2. 8. 21.

The anxious mothers, the niggardly old men, and the jealous wives, were all afraid on one account; lest the slightest acquaintance formed with Barine might lead their young men to improve it into the most intimate possible. The general circumstance, then, involved in the two last applications of *Aura*, is that of the obscurity of a notice, without any necessary reference, either to the cause producing this, or to the possibility of removing it.

Aura is sometimes taken in the same sense with “Aer,” because a slight

agitation of the air does not render it unfit for the purpose of respiration. It is, therefore, beautifully held forth by Virgil as the food of life.

Quid puer Ascanius? superatne et vescitur *aura*?—ÆN. 3. 339.

FLATUS may be translated a blast, as “*Aura*” may be a breeze. It denotes an agitation of the air, generally more violent than that last defined; that is of shorter duration, and of greater uncertainty, in respect to the times at which it begins and ceases.

Ipsa sui *flatus* ne sonet *aura*, cavet.—OVID. *Fast.* 1. 428.

The moving air, in the case of *Flatus*, is always supposed to be heard, however feeble the noise. In the above instance the lover is desirous to suppress his breathing, as much as possible, not to disturb the slumbers of his mistress. The “*Aura*” refers to the gentle motion of his breath, and the *Flatus* to the sound which, with all his care, it must necessarily emit. “*Unde aliquis flatus ostenditur, vela do.*”—CIC. *de Orat.* 2. 187.

— omnisque repente resedit

Flatus, et in lento luctantur marmore tonsæ.—VIRG. ÆN. 7. 27.

Flatus refers to the eruption of air artificially confined, and from this acceptance it has probably been transferred to those motions in the atmosphere which resemble it. The force of the eruption corresponds with the proportion existing between the aperture, through which the air escapes, and the force which impells it. “*Æstiferos validis erumpit flatibus ignes.*”—CIC. *in Arat.* 3. Upon this correspondence, also, rest the applications of *Flatus* to the different tones emitted by wind-instruments, according to the impelling force employed by those who blow them. Thus, Horace tells us that the “*tibia*,” employed in the early ages of Rome, was sufficiently audible in its small theatres.

Nondum spissa viris complere sedilia *flatu*.—ART. *Poet.* 205.

VENTUS denotes agitations of the air, that may be either moderate, or as violent as possible. The intermediate degree of its force is higher than that

of "Aura" and "Flatus." It is somewhat like the former, in respect to continuance, and the latter, in respect to unsteadiness, though it differs from both, in supposing that the lines of its direction may often cut each other at the point occupied by the observer. *Ventus* may be considered either as a generic term, in regard to the other four compared, or as expressing the widest possible species, in regard to the abstract conception couched in the words "Aer agitated." "Semper aer spiritu aliquo movetur: frequentius tamen "auras" quam *ventos* habet."—PLIN. 5. 6. "Aer effluens huc et illuc *ventos* efficit."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 46. a.

Ventus enim fit, ubi est agitando percitus aer.—LUCRET. 6. 684.

PROCELLA stands in a relation to "Ventus," similar to that of "Flatus" to "Aura," in respect to duration. It expresses a short continuance of the most violent agitation of which the air is susceptible. It may be translated a squall, and implies a violence, while it lasts, which admits of no abatement less than that which would put an end to itself. *Procella* comes from the old verb "Procellere," and seems to take its name from its effects, in driving every thing forward in its own direction. In the definition given by Pliny of this term, he refers it to "Flatus," as a genus comprehending it. "*Flatus* vagi et ruentes torrentium modo tonitrua et fulgura edunt; majore vero illati pondere incursuque, si late siccam ruperint nubem, *procellam* gignunt, quæ vocatur a Græcis 'Ενεφιας.'"—PLIN. 2. 48.

Non est meum, si mugiat Africis
Malus *procellis*, ad miseras preces
Decurrere, et votis pacisci. — HOR. *Car.* 3. 29 56.

The inequality often ascribed by the classics to what are called *Procellæ*, refers not to any diminution of the absolute violence of each, while it lasts, or to the comparative violence of a number that take place in succession, but to the interval, by which distinct squalls are separated, and, of course, to the uncertainty of the return of each.

— creberque *procellis* Africanus.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 89.
— aut mare Caspium
Vexant inæquales *procelle* ———— HOR. *Car.* 2. 9. 2.

TURBO differs from all the words already defined, in respect to the direction of the air affected by it. It supposes that the line of its motion is circular, though the body of air, moving in this direction, be continually changing its place. The effects of a *Turbo* may be violent, though they are of short duration; and the extent of its influence is limited, when compared with that of the other agitations of the atmosphere. "Ventus circumactus et eundem ambiens locum, et se ipsa vertigine concitans, *turbo* est."—SENEC. *Q. N.* 13.

— rapidoque rotantia *turbine* portant.—LUCRET. I. 295.

The ancients seem to have understood, that the cause of what they called a *Turbo* was a conflict among the winds, breaking forth from all quarters, and meeting in one point. "Erumpunt undique omnes venti, sævi existunt *turbines*."—CIC. *Orat.* 3. 155. *C.* 39.

Turbo is transferred from the rotary motion of air to that of a solid body. Thus, it is made by Virgil to signify a top, when driven by the lash.

Tum vero infelix, ingentibus excita monstribus,
Immensam sine more furit lymphata per urbem :
Ceum quondam torto volitans sub verberibus *turbo*,
Quem pueri magno in gyro vacua atria circum
Intenti ludo exercent. Ille actus habena
Curvatis fertur spatibus : stupet inscia turba
Impubesque manus, mirata volubile "buxum."—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 376.

The comparison between "Amata" and the top, it is to be observed, holds only when it is in its whirling state; because this state, expressed by *Turbo*, is the efficient cause of those winding motions upon which the justness of the simile rests. As the admiration of the spectators respects the cause of the motion, which they cannot explain, the term "buxum," which is the name of the wood, is made to express the object of this admiration. The matter, however, as qualified by "volubilis," that is, only involving the capacity, and not being in the actual state, of this motion, could not have been expressed by the word *Turbo*.

AUSPICIUM, DUCTUS,

agree, in denoting military direction, but differ, in respect to the circumstances of the person giving it. The first, from "Avis" and "Specio," originally signified the act of consulting the gods, by means of birds or otherwise, and the drawing conjectures of good or ill fortune from the appearances exhibited. As the submission paid by the Romans to such intimations was unreserved, so *Auspicium* came to signify absolute authority in the person said to possess it, and such as he might exercise either personally or by deputation. The followers of Alexander expressed, by the use of this word, a disposition to obey, stronger than could be enforced by military command, as expressed by "Imperium," which follows it. "Eo pervenimus, *auspicium* atque imperium secuti tuum, unde, nisi te reduce, nulli ad penates suos iter est."—QUINT. CURT. 9. 6. Æneas, with great delicacy, tells Queen Dido, that he had not the complete direction of himself, but was guided by that of one higher, and which he could not oppose.

Me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam
Auspiciis et sponte mea componere curas,
 Urbem Trojanam primum dulcesque meorum
 Reliquias colerem, Priami tecta alta manerent.
 Sed nunc Italiam magnam Grynæus Apollo,
 Italiam Lyciæ jussere capessere sortes :
 Hic amor, hæc patria est.———VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 340.

As the power implied in *Auspicium* rejected equality, and was paramount to that of any person, in other respects, in the same situation, so the two Roman consuls, possessing military command, enjoyed this power alternately. "Quoniam in provincia Livii res gesta esset, et eo forte die quo pugnatum esset, *auspicium* ejus fuisset."—LIV. 28: 9.

DUCTUS differs from "Auspicium," in implying that the person invested with the direction holds it from another, and is answerable for the use he makes of it. He, who had the "Auspicium," had it also in his power to enjoy the *Ductus*, and to execute those schemes, which he alone was entitled to devise; but he, who had the *Ductus*, was allowed only to fulfil the orders of his superior. "Eam esse consuetudinem regum, ut casus adversos hominibus

tribuant, secundos fortunæ suæ. Quo facile fieri, ut impellantur ad eorum perniciem, quorum *ductu* res male gestæ nuncientur.”—NEP. 14. 5. The kings, who had the “Auspicia,” left the *Ductus*, in their absence, to commanders, who were answerable for the use they made of it, and for the success of their expeditions. “Ob recepta signa cum Varo amissa, *ductu* Germanici, *auspiciis* Tiberii.”—TAC. *Ann.* 2. 41.

Kings and consuls, who possessed the powers implied in both the terms, employed them separately or together, as they had a mind. “Quorum alia *ductu* meo, alia imperio *auspicioque* perdomui.”—QUINT. CURT. 6. 3. “Ob res *ductu auspicioque* Tib. Sempronii prospere gestas.”—LIV. 41. 17.

Plautus appears to have confounded the meaning of the two words in the following examples.

Ut gesserit rempublicam *ductu*, imperio, “auspicio,” suo.—*Amphit.* 1. 1. 41:
Eos “auspicio” meo atque *ductu*, primo cætu vicimus.—*Ibid.* 2. 2. 25.

As Amphitruo acted under Creon, king of Thebes, the “Auspicia” could not, with propriety, be said to belong to him. Still, however, if, in the first example, we make allowance for the partiality of Sosia to his master, and, in the last, for the vanity of the General himself, the seeming impurity may have been intended.

AUXILIUM, SUPPETIÆ, OPIS,

agree, in denoting assistance, but differ, as to the circumstances of those who require it. The first term seems originally to have been a military one, and, coming from “Augere,” to refer to those auxiliaries who increased the strength of the Roman armies. Thus, Varro says, “Auxilium ab “auctu,” quum accesserant qui adjumento essent alienigenæ.”—*De L. L.* 4. 16. It had become afterwards general in its signification, and denoted every accession of strength that might become occasionally needful to any requiring it. “*Auxilium* se putat sibi adjunxisse, qui rem cum altero communicavit.”—CIC. *pro Rosc. Am.* 37. b. Any person, in whatever circumstances, might have thought and said as Cicero does here. *Auxilium*, therefore, expresses accession of power, whether held requisite or not.

Mittitur et magni Venulus Diomedis ad urbem
Qui petat *auxilium* ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 10.

When Turnus sent this message, he meant to strengthen his party, by increasing his alliances. He had, at that time, no reason to despair of success, nor to suppose that he would be overmatched by the Trojans.

Multa poetarum veniet manus, *auxilio* quæ
Sit mihi. ————— HOR. *Sat.* 1. 4. 141.

This band of poets was to assist Horace only, if the infirmity, which he acknowledges, was not forgiven. He might or he might not, therefore, have had occasion for the aid which *Auxilium* denotes.

SUPPETIÆ differs from “*Auxilium*,” in supposing that the assistance denoted by it is given to those only, who are in the extremity of distress. The aid, implied in “*Auxilium*,” may enable the party to whom it is communicated to overcome its antagonists; that, implied in *Suppetiæ*, is understood only to save it from destruction. This last is derived from “*Suppetere*.” The simple verb denotes keenness to get at the object to be relieved, and the “*sub*,” in its second power, suggests the nearness necessary to give the aid required.

Aedepol, here, *næ tibi suppetias* tempore adveni modo.—PLAUT. *Menach.* 5. 7. 31.

The master immediately gives his slave credit for what he had done.

Nam absque ted' esset hodie, nunquam ad solem occasum viverem.—*Ibid.* 33.

“Et nunciabatur “*auxilia*” magna equitatus oppidanis *suppetias* venire.”—AUL. HIRT. *Bell. Afric.* 5. “*Auxilia*” here, as a military term, signifies any accession of strength. Considius, the governor of Adrumetum, who, though besieged, had rejected Cæsar’s propositions, might wish to have it supposed, that this term expressed all the aid he stood in need of. The word *Suppetias*, again, states the situation of the besieged more fairly, and refers to the danger to which their friends, hastening to their relief, might understand them to be exposed. “*Ex acie instructa equitatus sui prope totum dextrum cornu avertit, atque suis fugientibus suppetias ire contendit.*”—AUL. HIRT. *Bell. Afric.*

39. Nothing but a sense of the extreme distress of his friends, already put to flight, would have made Labienus dismember his army, that was in battle array, and about to engage.

Duodecim Deis plus quam in cœlo est Deorum immortalium!

Mihi nunc "auxilio" adjutores sunt, et mecum militant.

Quicquid ego male feci, "auxilia" mihi et *suppetiæ* sunt domi.—PLAUT. *Epid.* 5. 2. 10.

"Auxilium" may, in this passage, be taken to denote a resource, or "corps de reserve," in case of unforeseen exigencies; and *Suppetiæ* a "Subsidium," or body of men just ready to avert the existing danger.

OPIS is in so far generic, in respect to the other two terms, that it is not limited to the particular state of those to whom the aid is imparted, but differs from them, in denoting power that is inherent, as well as that which is communicated. "Omnes homines qui sese student præstare cæteris animalibus, summa *ope* niti decet, ne vitam silentio transeant."—SALL. *Bell. Cat. ad init.*

— grates persolvere dignas

Non *opis* est nostræ, Dido.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 604.

In the above examples, *Opis* refers entirely to what men can do of themselves. The power here meant is intrinsic, and has no regard to any thing adventitious. "Hæc nec institui nec effici possunt sine *ope* tua."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 16. 13.

— quid illum porro credis facturum Chreme

Nisi eum, quantum tibi *opis* Dii dant, servas, castigas, mones?—TER. *Heaut.* 3. 3. 30.

Vi propria nituntur, opisque haud indiga nostræ.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 428.

In the three last examples, the power is all extraneous and communicated. Some of them, likewise, shew *Opis* as suggesting aid, like that in "Auxilium," which may be but occasionally needful, and others suggest an accession of strength, of immediate and indispensable necessity.

AVUNCULUS, PATRUS,

agree, in denoting the brother of a parent, but the former relates to that of a mother, and the latter to that of a father. *Avunculus* is a diminutive from "Avus," and is said, by some critics, to be a "Minor Avus;" because this

uncle has less authority over the sons of a sister, than a grandfather has over his grandsons. Paulus, *De Gradibus*, again, Lib. 10. Sect. 14. gives another reason for this derivation. "*Avunculus* traxit appellationem ab eo quod æque tertius a me ut "Avus" est, sed non ejusdem juris est." According to this, the word should have been equally applicable to every connection, in the third degree. "Publius Tubero Africanum *avunculum* laudavit.—CIC. *de Or.* 140. a.

The *Avunculus* was only a "Cognatus," as it was understood that his sister had left her father's house, and passed into that of her husband. The "*Avunculus magnus*" denotes the brother of the grandfather, or the "Aviæ frater." "Drusum "tuum magnum *avunculum*" gravem oratorem."—CIC. *in Brut.* 194. b. The "*Avunculus major*," again, was the "Proaviæ pater," that is, the brother of the great-grandmother. The classics, however, do not adhere rigorously to those uses of the terms, and apply them also to other remote relations.

PATRUUS differs from "Avunculus," in being applied only to the brother of the father. Paulus gives the reason: "*Patruus* a patre quia patris loco est eo mortuo."—*Dig.* 28. 10. *Leg.* 10. Upon the death of the father, then, the *Patruus* was the legal guardian of the nephew, till he came to be of age. He was in the line of the "Agnati," or descendants by the male side, and was always numbered among them. Thus, Horace says,

Quæstor avus, pater atque meus, *patruusque* fuisset.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 6. *in fin.*

From the frequent abuse of that power, which the Roman law bestowed upon *Patruus*, the term has been applied to all those who wish to exercise a rigid discipline, without being entitled to do so. "Et qui in reliqua vita mitis esset, fuit in hac causa pertristis quidam *patruus*, censor, magister: objurgavit Marium Cœlium sicut neminem unquam parens."—CIC. *pro Cæl.* 42. b.

— sive ego prave

Seu recte hoc volui: ne sis *patruus* mihi.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 87.

— et nucibus facimus quæcunque relictis
 Quum sapimus *patruus* ————— PERS. 1. 10.

Cicero, in the next example, complains that his brother, Quintus, was not so severe a monitor to his own son as he wished, and that the good effects of his admonitions, as a *Patruus*, were by that means blasted. “Vellem suscipisses juvenem regendum: pater enim nimis indulgens, quicquid ego astrinxi relaxat.”—*Ep. ad Att.* 10. 5.

BALBUS, BLÆSUS,

agree, in denoting defective articulation, but differ, in respect to the extent of the defect. The first expresses what is called lispings, and supposes the person, denominated by it, to be incapable of pronouncing certain letters distinctly. The defect arises from too frequent appulses of the tongue to the teeth, or palate, and is not discernible but in the case of words of a particular structure. Demosthenes, we are told, could not at one time pronounce the “R,” styled, by the Romans, the “Litera Canina,” and had either omitted it entirely, or substituted an “L” in its place. “Demosthenes, cum ita *balbus* esset, ut ejus ipsius artis cui studeret, primam literam non posset dicere, perfecit meditando, ut nemo planius eo locutus putaretur.”—*Cic. de Or.* 109. a.

The defect implied in *Balbus*, though cured by the obstinate perseverance of the Grecian orator, often remains through life. Children and old people have it from the imperfect state of the organs of speech.

Os tenerum pueri *balbumque* poeta figurat.—*Hor. Ep.* 2. 1. 126.

The poet here gets the merit of teaching children to articulate properly, as being led by the ear to employ the untried organs as they should be. It appears, from Quintilian, that this was an object of no small consequence. “Ab his ætatibus exigendum, ut nomina quædam versusque affectatæ diffi-

cultatis ex pluribus asperrime coeuntibus inter se syllabis catenatos, et velut confragosos, quam citatissime volvant: quo fit absolutius os, et expressior sermo."—QUINT. *L. 2. cap. 3.*

Nec tædebit avum parvo advigilare nepoti,

Balbaque cum puero dicere verba senem.—TIBULL. 2. 5. 94.

The same defect is here applied to old as to young people, though arising from different causes. In the case of the former, the dental consonants must be imperfectly pronounced, from the want of teeth, especially when this want is combined with that relaxation in the muscles of the lips, which must hurt the articulation of the labial. Horace foretells to his book, that it was doomed to be in the hands of some old lispng schoolmaster.

Hoc quoque te manet ut pueros elementa docentem

Occupet extremis in vicis *balba* senectus.—Ep. 1. 20. 17.

Juvenal talks of Virgil having undergone the same fate.

— cum totus decolor esset

Flaccus, et hæreret nigro fuligo Maroni.—Sat. 7. 226.

BLÆSUS differs from "Balbus," in denoting "stammering," which is a general defect in speech, not perceptible in the utterance of particular letters.

Os *blasum* tibi, debilisque lingua est.—MART. 10. 65.

The mouth and tongue, as the organs of speech in general, are here said to be defective. If Demosthenes had had the misfortune to be *Blæsus*, in place of "Balbus," the cure would have been more difficult, if at all practicable.

A defect similar to that, which is natural and constant, may be superinduced by intoxication; and in this state, also, no one letter is articulated with less distinctness than another, as in the case of a person who is "Balbus."

Adde quod et facilis victoria de madidis, et

Blasis atque mero titubantibus.—JUV. Sat. 15. 48.

Ebrietas ut vera nocet, sic ficta juvabit.

Fac titubet *blaso* subdola lingua sono.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 1. 598.

The verb "Titubare" is here figuratively transferred from the feet to the tongue, and he, who staggers from drunkenness, is, at every step, equally apt

to fall. Cicero transfers it from the feet to the mind, and to the tongue of a young man, unsteady in his judgments, and rash in his speech. "Nedum valeat id, quod imperitus adolescens, mente ac lingua titubante, fecisse dicatur."

—CIC. *pro Dom.* 241. b.

The Roman ladies, it should appear, displayed affectation, by seeming to have the defect implied in *Blæsus*.

Quid cum legitima fraudatur litera voce,
Blæsaque fit jusso lingua coacta sono?—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 2. 294.

She stammers; oh what grace in lispings lies!
If she says nothing, to be sure she's wise.—DRYDEN.

BEATUS—*vide* FELIX.

BELLICUS, BELLICOSUS,

agree, in denoting objects that refer to war, but the former marks any thing that is considered as the means, or as the effect of conducting it; and the latter suggests the disposition which leads to prosecuting, and, of course, excelling in it. The derivative adjective *Bellicus*, being immediately connected with "Bellum," as its root, signifies whatever is the necessary concomitant and consequence of war. The amplificative, again, being more remotely connected with it, suggests only the disposition which may at some times exist, without being gratified, and, at other times, might be exerted, if it really did exist. "Ut exerceamur in venando ad similitudinem *bellicæ* disciplinæ."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 58. b.

Non ferrum crudele esset, neque *bellica* navis.—PROPERT. 2. 15. 43.

Bellicus ex illo fonte bibebat equus.—*Ibid.* 4. 4. 14.

Bellica non dextræ convenit hasta tuæ.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 3. 8.

In the above examples, *Bellicus* refers solely to the means and instruments by which war is carried on. In those that follow, it refers solely to its consequences. "Tiberius *bellica* quoque Germanici gloria angebatur."—TAC. *Ann.* 1. 52. "Virtutis *bellicæ* annulus insigne."—PLIN. 31. 1. "Excipit *bellicam* peregrinamque mortem."—CIC. *de Legg.* 185. a.

Though *Bellicus* is not applied to men, yet the Romans have applied it to

deities. Thus, Ovid styles Minerva, "*Bellica Dea*," and Romulus and Mars, "*Bellici Dii*."

Ensibus exsertis *bellica* læta Dea est.—*Fast.* 3. 814.

Bellicus a telo venit in astra Deus.—*Ibid.* 2. 478.

Bellice, depositis clypeo paulisper et hasta

Mars, ades; et nitidas casside solve comas.—*Ibid.* 3. 1.

It is difficult to discover upon what principle the Romans held the application of "*Bellicosus*" to be degrading to their deities, when they supposed that they not only took part in the battles of mortals, but also received wounds in them.

BELlicosus refers to the disposition of the warrior, and not to the subject, the instruments, or the effects of his art. There is, accordingly, no instance of such an expression as "*Res, hasta, vel laus bellicosa*." "*Libyes quam Gætuli minus bellicosi erant*."—*SALL. Jug.* 18.

Quid *bellicosus* Cantaber et Scythes.—*HOR. Car.* 2. 11. 1.

In some instances the Latin amplificative applies equally to persons and things, while the derivative, in English, applies only to one of these. The adjective "*Calamitosus*," for example, may characterize both the unfortunate man, and the misfortunes under which he labours. "*Homines miseri et fortuna magis quam culpa calamitosi*."—*CIC. Ep. Fam.* 9. 13. "*O rem miseram et calamitosam!*"—*CIC. pro Rosc. Am.* 28. In English we talk of "*calamitous circumstances*," but not of "*a calamitous man*." The authority of use, in both languages, is not to be contravened, and the right of the English, who adopted the word, must be held as good to limit, as that of the Latins, who invented it, was to extend it.

Livy has employed *Bellicosus* in a way that is rather singular, by making it suggest the conduct and the time in which a military spirit could best shew itself. "*Differendi sibi consulatus in bellicosiore annu*."—*LIV.* 10. 9. "*Cepisse eos non Romam sicut ante Gallos, sed quod multo bellicosius fuerit*."—*LIV.* 9. b. Whether this is to be regarded as a slight deviation from the high purity of the Latin language, and such as Quintilian styled a "*Patavi-*

nitās," in Livy, it is impossible for any scholar in modern times to determine.

BELLUM, PRÆLIUM, PUGNA, CERTAMEN,

agree, in referring to a state of hostility, but differ in respect either to the time of its continuance; to the number in each party occasionally engaged in it; to the manner in which it is conducted; or to the nature of the subject in dispute.

BELLUM denotes war, and implies, that a disposition to fight exists between nations, whether that disposition be gratified or not. The continuance of this hostile state depends jointly upon the extent of national spirit and resource in each, and upon the balance of both between the two. Many conflicts may take place, while hostilities endure; and the number at variance, on each side, forms the whole nation. "Tullus Sabinis *bellum* intulit."—LIV. 1. 30. Every Roman, and every Sabine, was concerned in this national struggle, the former to give effect to the attack, and the latter to repel it.

Nam cum Telebois est *bellum* Thebano populo.—PLAUT. *Amph.* 1. 1. 35.

Bellum is sometimes applied to animosities among individuals, and to the political struggles between parties in the same state. It supposes, however, that such dissensions have some continuance, and that proper opportunities, only, are seized for gratifying the hostile disposition. "Hoc bello perfecto, tribunicium domi *bellum* patres territat."—LIV. 3. 24.

In amore hæc omnia insunt vitia : injuriæ,

Suspiciones, inimicitæ, induciæ,

Bellum, pax rursus.—TER. *Eun.* 1. 1. 14.

PRÆLIUM differs from "Bellum," in being applicable only to one of those conflicts, each of which is a step towards the crisis of war. Each, too, lasts while the courage and strength of the combatants allow them to support it. Parties, engaged in war, watch an opportunity of harassing and destroying one another; those, engaged in battle, are making the most of the opportunity which they have actually got. In the following examples it will appear, that a "Bellum" may terminate by the issue of one, of two, or of many *Prælia*.

“*Prælio* uno debellatum est.”—LIV. 2. 26. “Bellum Philippense duplici *prælio* transegit.”—SÜETON. in *August.* 13. “Populus Romanus etsi nullo bello,” multis tamen *præliis* victus. —LIV. 9. 18.

Tacitus tells us, that, while the other German nations went forth to decide their contest by the event of a single battle, the Catti, with more circumspection, were duly aware of, and prepared for, the contingencies of war. “Alios ad *prælium* ire videas, Cattos ad “bellum.”—TAC. *de Mor. Ger.* 30.

Instances occur in some of the poets, and of the prose writers, who lived after the Augustan age, in which “Bellum,” the genus, is put for *Prælium*, of which it may comprehend many.

Hic vero ingentem pugnam, ceu cætera nusquam
“Bella” forent. —VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 438.

“Actum erat, nisi elephantum conversi in spectaculum “belli” procurrissent: quorum cum magnitudine, tum deformitate, et novo odore, equi consternati fugam stragemque late dederunt.”—FLOR. 1. 18. We sometimes find *Prælium* put for “Bellum,” that is, the species for the genus. Thus, Petronius calls the Trojan war a “Decenne *prælium*.”—*Sat.* 89. Livy, too, calls the war with the Boii, in which there were several engagements, a *Prælium*. “Consultatio de Macedonico bello integra ad consules, qui in *prælio* cum Boiis erant, rejecta est.”—LIV. 31. 2.

PUGNA differs from “*Prælium*,” in being applicable to combats between individuals, originating from a private concern, as well as to battles between nations, originating from a public one. It is derived from “Pugnis,” and had got its meaning in those rude periods of society, in which war was conducted with the fist. “Veteres enim, (says Donatus,) ante usum ferri et armorum, *Pugnis*, et calcibus, et morsibus, corporumque luctatione certabant.” PROL. *Hecyr.* 25. Horace gives the same account of the species, in its rude state.

Unguis et *pugnis*, dein fustibus, atque ita porro
“Pugnabant” armis, quæ post fabricaverat usus.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 3, 101.

The challenge, given by the son of Aunus to Camilla, was to try their strength in that single combat, which may be expressed by *Pugna*.

— dimitte fugam, et te cominus æquo
Mecum crede solo, *pugnaque* accinge pedestri.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 706.

Along with the general principle of hostility, that made the male and the female warrior bear a part in the “*Prælium*,” upon which the fate of Italy rested, they were influenced by a sentiment of private animosity, that led to that single combat termed *Pugna*.

When *Pugna* is opposed to “*Prælium*,” in the same sentence, the former suggests the personal exertion of each individual, and the latter the general conflict maintained by the same party, though not by the same persons. Upon this point the authority of Cæsar himself is decisive. “*Sed hoc superare, quod diuturnitate pugnae hostes defessi “prælio” excedebant, alii integris viribus succedebant.*”—CÆS. *Bell. Gall.* 3. 4.

Pugna is applicable, not only to a single combat, and to the exertions of individuals in a pitched battle, but to squabbles and riots, in which any number may be concerned. Thus, Cicero, speaking of a disorderly company, says, “*Nonnunquam etiam res ad manus atque ad pugnam veniebat. Itaque erant exitus ejusmodi, ut alius inter manus e convivio tanquam e “prælio” auferretur, ut quivis, cum adspexisset, non se prætoris convivium, sed ut Cannensem pugnam nequitiae videre arbitraretur.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 241. b. The *Pugna*, at the end of this sentence, and the “*Prælium*,” in the middle, are precisely equivalent; but this last term is very different from the *Pugna* at the beginning.

CERTAMEN differs from the former terms, in being applicable to any contest, upon whatever it may be founded, and in whatever way it may be carried on. It does not, like them, necessarily suppose, that those, contending, are enemies, or even rivals, and it may denote the struggle of those actuated by that honest emulation, which is superior to envy. Like “*Pugna*,” it admits of the contest subsisting between two, and any greater number. It comes from “*Certare*,” the radical power of which is that of an active verb, signifying to fix or make sure; and it supposes the struggle to be decisive, as to a

point, that was before uncertain. "Cum altero *certamen* honoris et dignitatis est, cum altero capitis et famæ."—CIC. *de Offic.* 8. b. The contest, with the first and the last of these, was on opposite grounds, and required to be conducted in very different ways.

Those engaged in a *Certamen* may begin it without any hostile intention, however it may end.

Ludus enim genuit trepidum *certamen* et iram,
Ira, truces inimicitias, et funebre bellum.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 19. 48.

To all the different stages of this contest, *Certamen* is equally applicable. The race between Atalanta and her lovers is, by Ovid, emphatically called a *Certamen*.

Præmia veloci conjux thalamicæ dabuntur,
Mors pretium tardis, ea lex *certaminis* esto.—OVID. *Met.* 10. 572.

Certamen sometimes denotes the ardour and energy by which the combatants maintain the "Prælium" and the "Pugna."

Qua tibi militia cujus *certamine* "pugnæ"
Cognitus? ————— OVID. *Met.* 12. 180.

"Fit "prælium" acri *certamine*."—HIRT. *de Bell. Gall.* 8. 28.

It is applied to a contest founded upon a matter of speculative opinion, and which may subsist between a great part of the human race. "Diu magnum inter mortales *certamen* fuit, vi ne corporis an virtute animi, res militaris magis procederet."—SALL. *Cat.* 1.

It is not easy to say what precise meaning Lucretius affixed to the three terms in the following lines. Neither was it easy to cloath a metaphysical subject in pure language: and some allowance should be also made for the time in which he wrote.

Et velut a terno *certamine* "prælia" "pugnasque"
Edege turmatim certantia. ————— LUCRET. 2. 117.

By *Certamen*, perhaps, he meant the general ardour with which the struggle was conducted; and, by "Prælium" and "Pugna," the repulsion among the atoms, shewing itself in numbers of very different extent.

BENIGNUS, BENEFICUS,

agree, in suggesting the existence of kind affections, but the former supposes those affections to appear in the dispositions, and the latter, in the conduct of men. The quality, denoted by *Benignus*, often exists without that denoted by "Beneficus;" but, as the goodness of an action depends upon the intention of the agent, that denoted by the latter can never be disjoined from the former. *Benignus*, according to Festus, is a contraction of "Bene genitus." It is, accordingly, equivalent to what the Greeks mean by *Ευγενής*, which may be translated "Generosus," or "Natura bonus." "*Benignus* qui dicitur, officium non fructum sequitur."—Cic. *de Legg.* 165. b. Though he, who is *Benignus*, must be thus disinterested, yet his benevolence must not exceed his ability, so as to degenerate into an indiscreet profusion. "Qui *benigniores* volunt esse quam res patitur, in eo peccant."—Cic. *de Off.* 9. b.

—— vellet bonus atque *benignus*

Esse, daret quantum satis esset, nec sibi damno

Dedecorique foret. ————— Hor. *Sat.* 1. 2. 49.

As the quality, denoted by "Benignus," consists in the disposition to do good, so that, denoted by BENEFICUS, consists in actually doing it. The same disinterestedness must take place in the one as in the other. "*Beneficus* est qui non sui, sed alterius causa, benigne facit."—Cic. *de Legg.* 166. a. A person truly beneficent, too, must accommodate his good offices to the exigencies, and not to the unjustifiable humours, of those to whom they are done. "Nam et qui gratificantur cuiquam quod obsit illi, cui prodesse velle videantur, non *benefici* neque liberales, sed perniciosi assentatores judicandi sunt."—Cic. *de Off.* 9. b.

It is fortunate for the human race, that the qualities, denoted by the two adjectives, are sometimes united in the same character. The Romans seem to have held it a kind of impiety to suppose that they were disjoined in the gods; or that those beings, who had it in their power to give effect to their purposes, should harbour any thing that was not benevolent. "Ut enim omittam vim et naturam Deorum: ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros *beneficos*, et "benignos" fuisse?"—Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* 25. a.

BESTIA, BELLUA, FERA,

agree, in denoting animals of a lower order than man, but differ, in respect to the number of circumstances peculiar to the species denominated by each. Nothing can be drawn from the doubtful etymology of each term; so that their meaning can be deduced only from an attentive observation of the manner in which they are applied. *BESTIA* appears to be generic, and, like the English word "brute," applies, not only to the beasts of the field, but to fowls and fishes. Thus, Cicero says, "Natura alias *bestias* nantes, aquarum incolas esse voluit; alias volucres cœlo frui libero; serpentes quasdam, quasdam esse gradientes, earum ipsarum partim solivagas, partim congregatas; immanes alias, quasdam autem cicures; nonnullas abditas, terraque tectas."—*Cic. Tusc.* 235. b. In another passage he opposes man to the animals called *Bestiæ*, in all of which there are gradations of strength, and, in many, a degree of it superior to what is human. "Cum homo imbecillus a valentissima *bestia* laniatur."—*Cic. Ep.* 7. 1.

BELLUA is less general than "*Bestia*," in being applied to beasts and fishes, exclusively of birds, and to particular species of the former only. Its distinctive character seems to rest upon the magnitude of the animal to which it is applied. The wit of Thraso's remark to the keeper of the elephants, in the *Eunuchus* of Terence, depends upon this.

Eone es ferox, quia habes imperium in *belluas*?—*Eun.* 3. 1. 25.

The ferocity of Strato's manners is supposed to arise from the habit of commanding animals of such strength and magnitude.

The calf, which the frog wished to equal in size, was well named by one of her young that had seen it.

Unus ubi effugit, matri denarrat ut ingens
Bellua cognatos eliserit.—Hor. *Sat.* 2. 3. 315.

Though *Bellua* is most frequently applied to large animals, yet there does not seem to have been any precise limit, in respect to their size, within which it would have been used improperly. The goat as well as the wolf, the bull and the lion, has got the appellation of *Bellua*. "*Belluarum* nomine appellare

singulas stellas, ut capram, ut lupam, ut taurum, ut leonem.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 3. 40.

In the use of *Bellua* regard seems to have been had to the relative magnitude of individuals in a species, or to those held forth as remarkable for strength or ferocity. Thus, to increase our admiration of the courage of Hercules, and of the poetic ability of Sappho and Alcæus, *Bellua* is applied to the snake overcome by the first, and to the dog charmed by the two last.

— ac *bellua* Lernæ

Horrendum stridens. — VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 287.

Quid mirum? ubi illis carminibus stupens

Demittit atras *bellua* centiceps

Aures. — HOR. *Car.* 2. 13. 32.

Bellua is also applied to fishes of an enormous size, as to those of the whale species.

— et ingens *bellua* immensam trahit

Squamosa partem — SEN. *Hippol.* 1087.

— *belluosus* qui remotis

Obstrepiit oceanus Britannis. — HOR. *Car.* 4. 14. 47.

The circumstance of size, though generally, is not always, adopted as the rule for the just application of *Bellua* to sea more than to land animals. “In mari quot genera quamque disparia partim submersarum, partim fluitantium et innantium *belluarum*, partim ad saxa nativis testis inhærentium.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 46. a.

FERA differs from “Bestia,” in being less general, and applicable only to particular species of beasts, without comprehending fishes. It suggests, that the animal, denoted by it, lives on its prey, and is of a fierce, untractable, and solitary disposition. “Incolæ ritu *ferarum* virgulta subire soliti.”—QUINT. CURT. 6. 7.

Ipse Deus velox discurrere gaudet in altis

Montibus, et subitas concitat ille *feras*. — OVID. *Fast.* 2. 285.

Non licuit thalami expertem sine crimine vitam

Degere more *feræ*? — VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 550

A man, of a savage disposition, is said to be a descendant of wild beasts, and a reproach to his species.

— te sævæ progenuere *feræ*. — OVID. *Heroid.* 2. 38.

The application of *Fera* to an ant, by Martial, seems to be altogether singular, and supported by no other authority.

Dum phaethontea formica vagatur in umbra,
Implicuit tenuem succina gutta *feram*.—MARTIAL. 6. 15.

BINI—*vide* DUO.

BLANDIRI—*vide* ADULARI.

BONUS, PROBUS;

agree, in denoting goodness; but the former supposes this goodness capable of being so modified as to suit the nature of the subject to which it is applied, and the latter supposes it to be such only as appears in the moral character of men. Those mental endowments, however; that belong to the intellect, and that discover judgment and vigour in conduct, may be occasionally expressed by *Bonus*, while “*Probus*” suggests those amiable qualities, which, though less splendid in appearance, prove themselves to be real.

Oderunt peccare *boni* virtutis amore—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 16. 52.

Those who love virtue, for its own sake, are said to be fit for every duty in life, and to deserve respect. Had “*Probi*” been here put for *Boni*, the poet would have been guilty of a tautology, as, wherever “*Probitas*” exists, the “*Amor virtutis*” must of necessity be its foundation.

“*Consules duos, bonos quidem, sed duntaxat bonos, amisimus.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Brut.* 3. Here *Bonus* signifies well-meaning, or having such dispositions as became their office. It is clear, however, from the expression, “*duntaxat bonos,*” that there was some defect. In point of that general goodness, expressed by *Bonus*, they did not fail; but they had failed in that energetic and vigorous conduct, by which alone it was understood, by Cicero, that the state in those times could be saved.

Cur non, Mopse, *boni* quoniam convenimus ambo
Tu calamos inflare leves, ego dicere versus. ——VIRG. *Buc.* 5. 1.

Menalcas allows to Mopsus merit in one way, and takes it to himself in another; and the adjective applies equally well to that of both.

Quæ *bonus* Eurytion multo calaverat auro.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 499.

If “*Probus*” had been here put for *Bonus*, Eurytion would have got the character of an amiable man, not of an eminent artist.

Hic jaculo *bonus*, hic longe fallente sagitta.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 572.

Both these warriors were excellent marksmen ; but the art of the one lay in throwing the javelin, and of the other in shooting the arrow.

Cicero styles the person, to whom he applies the epithet *Bonus*, “*Virum*,” and, when he applies to him the epithet “*Probus*,” he styles him “*Hominem*.” This last term signifies one of human kind, and invested, by the law of nature, with all the qualities that are seen in his species. Trebatius is spoken of, by Cicero, in terms of the highest affection and respect, when he recommends him to Cæsar in the following words. “*De quo tibi homine hæc spondeo “probiorem” hominem, meliorem “virum” prudentiorem esse neminem.*”—*Ep. Fam.* 7. 5. The goodness of his moral qualities is said to appear in him, as denominated “*homo* ;” that is, as possessed of feelings and affections born with mankind, and which always attract their love. His general excellence, in all other respects, is referred to him as a “*Vir* ;” that is, as possessing talents that are not so much the gift of nature ; that may be improved by art ; and which excite the admiration or the hatred of men, just as they are employed.

PROBUS is not always applied to mind, but frequently to matter. In such applications, however, material qualities are understood in so far to resemble those moral ones, constituting probity, as not to be at once apprehended. Thus, Livy applies it to silver, the goodness of which could be tried only by its being assayed. “*Quin argentum probum non esse quæstores renunciaverant, experientibusque pars quarta decocta erat.*”—LIV. 32. 2. Columella calls that a “*Color probus*,” which, unless we attend rigorously to the standard, might be confounded with lighter or darker shades of itself. Money, that is free from alloy, is called *Probus*. “*Nec voles quod debeo, nisi in aspero et probò accipere.*”—SENEC. *Ep.* 19.

The amiableness implied in *Probitas* may, though it does not always, exist in conjunction with the respectability implied in “*Bonitas*,” and the character approaches to perfection, in the degree in which they are found to be combined. “*Probitatis commendatione “boni” viri speciem tueri*”—*CIC. de Orat.* 128. a.

BRACTEA—*vide* LAMINA.

CABALLUS, MANNUS,

agree, in denoting horses not of the highest value, but differ as to the points in which this inferiority consists. The former properly signifies those horses that were styled “*Dossuarii*,” and were fit only to be beasts of burden. They were employed, also, for the turning of mills, and for other vile purposes. The term *Caballus* is hardly used by any prose writer, and appears in the writings of satyrists, when they wish to vilify the horse, and the person carried by it.

Thrax erit, aut olitoris aget mercede caballum.—*HOR. Ep.* 1. 18. 36.

A more humble or unprofitable employment can hardly be conceived, than that of driving the nag of this raiser of pot-herbs. “*Mollis, debilis, tanquam caballus in clivo.*”—*PETRON. C.* 134. The last part of this sentence is applied to a person worn out, and compared to a sorry animal struggling under his burden.

It should seem that, when Horace and Juvenal apply *Caballus* to a fine horse, they do so ironically.

— plures calones atque *caballi*

Pascendi.—*HOR.* 1. 6. 103.

Præda caballorum prætor sedet.—*JUV. Sat.* 11. 193. —

MANNUS differs from “*Caballus*,” in denoting a small horse or palfrey, employed in any kind of work to which his strength was adequate. His

inferiority to other horses seems to depend upon his being of a smaller size. Those etymologists, who employ their fancy more than their reason, tell us they were called *Manni*, “*Quia ob mansuetudinem manum sequantur.*” Those *Manni* were used by the Romans for drawing their carriages, as well as for riding, and considered as articles of convenience, as well as of luxury.

Arat falerni mille fundi jugera

Et Appiam *mannis* terit.——HOR. *Epod.* 4. 13.

Rumpat et serpens iter institutum,

Si per obliquum similis sagittæ

Terruit *mannos.*——HOR. *Car.* 3. 27. 5.

Impositus *mannis* arvum cælumque sabinum

Non cessat laudare.——HOR. *Ep.* 7. 76.

Habebat puer *mannulos* multos et junctos et solutos.—PLAUT. *Epid.* 4. 2. 3.

CACHINNARI—*vide* RIDERE.

CADERE, RUERE, LABI, LABARE,

agree, in denoting the influence of gravity upon material substances, but differ in respect to the line and rapidity of the motion, or to the cause of the fall that is taking, or about to take, place. They suppose that masses of matter are either entirely unsupported, or are supported imperfectly; and that those descending move with unequal velocities. The verb *Cadere* stands opposed to “*Stare*” or “*Consistere.*” It denotes the state of falling in a perpendicular line, when the motion downwards is retarded by no intervening substance, and stops only when the body is fully supported. The fall of Phaeton, compared by Ovid to that of a star, is properly expressed by this verb.

—— ut interdum de cœlo stella serena

Etsi non *cecidit*, potuit *cecidisse* videri.—OVID. *Mét.* 2. 221.

Gemma vel a digito, vel *cadit* aure lapis.—MART. 11. 50.

“*Si quando minus succedet, magnum tamen periculum non adibit: alte enim cadere non potest.*”—CIC. *Orat.* 105. b.

Summum ad gradum cum claritatis veneris

Consistes ægre, et quum descendes, decides.

Cecidi ego. *Cadet* qui sequitur.—LABERIUS *ap.* MACROB. *Sat.* 2. 7.

But the meaning of *Cadere* is not confined to the fall of a body entirely unsupported, the whole of which drops from an undeterminate height. The verb is also applied to those objects which, resting on the ground at one extremity, quit their perpendicular posture, and fall at their length.

Qui *cadit* in plano, vix hoc tamen evenit ipsum,
Sic *cadit* ut tacta surgere possit humo.—OVID. *Trist.* 3. 4. 17.
Securus *cadat*, an recto “stet” fabula talo.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 172.

In the following sentence there is an instance of both the kinds of falling mentioned.

— *cecidissetne* ebrius, aut de equo uspiam?—PLAUT. *Mil. Gl.* 3. 1. 124.

The drunk person falls at his length, because unable to stand or to walk; and the rider, though sober, falls perpendicular, through a space determined by the height of his horse.

As the fall of a body is a matter of contingency, so *Cadere* is taken to denote accident in general, whether good or bad. “Nihil mihi optatius *cadere* potest.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 3. 1. “Nihil ipsis jure incommodi *cadere* potest.”—CIC. *pro P. Quin. cap.* 16.

— quibus ad portas *cecidit* custodia sorti.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 165.

RUERE differs from “*Cadere*,” in supposing that the falling bodies do not move in a perpendicular line, and that they are all such parts of a mass as separate from want of due tenacity, and thereby superinduce ruin upon the whole. When the kind of falling, peculiar to *Ruere*, is referred to buildings, it may arise from their age, from their insufficiency, or from their being voluntarily demolished.

— stat putris tectis avitis
In nullos *ruitura* domus—LUCAN. 7 403.
Suis et ipsa Roma viribus *ruit*—HOR. *Epod.* 16. 2.
Hostis habet muros, *ruit* alto a culmine Troja—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 290.

Ovid applies the verb *Ruere* to the single stone, which Sisyphus in vain tried to bring to the top of the mountain. A failure in his strength is supposed to have the same effect as a failure in a mass of building.

Aut petis, aut urges *ruiturum*, Sisyphæ, saxum.—OVID. *Met.* 4. 459.

Though *Ruere* never denotes a fall in a perpendicular direction, like “*Cadere*,” yet it occasionally denotes the fall of a body from an erect to a lying posture.

— fratremque *ruentem*
Sustentat dextra. ———— VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 338.

As the fall of bodies, in the state denoted by *Ruere*, has been understood not to be a casual event, so it was never taken to denote contingency in general. When applied, figuratively, to the conduct of men, it supposes them suspending the exercise of their reason, and driven by the impulse of the moment.

Quo moriture *ruis*? majoraque viribus audes?
Fallit te incautum pietas tua. ———— VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 811.

LABI differs from “*Cadere*,” in supposing that the line, in which the falling body moves, is not perpendicular to the horizon. It differs, also, from “*Ruere*,” in supposing that the mass drops entire, and that its fall is owing to the want of general support, and not to the want of tenacity among its parts. It refers to bodies moving upon an inclined plane, more or less oblique, the motion of which, though susceptible of acceleration, is slower than that of those, upon which gravity operates without interruption. “*Serpit enim deinde res: quæ proclivius ad perniciem, cum semel cæpit, labitur.*”—CIC. *de Am.* 104. a. “*Sunt in lubrico, incitataque semel proclive labuntur.*”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 218. a.

Labitur occulte, fallitque volatilis ætas.—OVID. *Am.* 1. 8. 49.

Labi agrees with the two verbs already defined, in sometimes denoting the fall of a body, from an erect to a lying posture.

— nec te tua plurima, Pantheu,
Labentem pietas, nec Apollinis infula texit.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 429.

When “*Cadere*” and *Labi* are taken figuratively, the superior rapidity of the destruction, implied in the former, is visible. “*Nam cum vos labentem et prope “cadentem” rempublicam fulcire cuperetis.*”—CIC. *Philip.* 2. 170. a.

As the "a" in the former is long, and in the latter short, the poets often use either, as it is found most convenient.

Sæpe etiam stellas, vento impendente videbis
Præcipites cælo labi.———VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 365.

In the case of leaves, which, from their lightness, do not, though unsupported, fall perpendicular, Virgil, with great elegance, applies both verbs.

Quam multa in foliis autumnæ frigore primo
Lapsa "cadunt" folia.———VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 309.

LABARE differs from all the verbs mentioned, in supposing that the fall of the body is only threatened, from its general unsoundness or instability. It agrees with "Ruere," in sometimes implying weakness in the mass; but, in the use of "Ruere," the destruction, which *Labare* only anticipates, is understood to have actually taken place.

——— *labat* ariete crebro
Janua; et emoti procumbunt cardine postes.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 492.

The first verb in this sentence denotes a motion, indicating failure in the gate, in consequence of repeated blows; the last, the actual fall of it, when separated from its hinges. "Hora amplius jam in demoliendo signo permulti homines moliebantur, illud interea nulla *lababat* ex parte."—CIC. *in Ver.* 222. b.

Genua *labant*, gelidus concrevit frigore sanguis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 905.

The feebleness of the knee of Turnus, expressed by *Labare*, only forebodes the fall, which did not take place at the time referred to.

Labare properly denotes, that the stability of the mass is affected by a breach of the necessary dependance, which should subsist among its parts. "Quod non sic ex alio nectitur, ut non si ullam literam moveris, *labent* omnia."—CIC. *de Fin.* 105. b.

Labare does not always suppose any existing defect in the mass which threatens to fall, but refers, at times, to the insecurity, or voluble nature, of that on which it rests. Thus, Ovid applies it to ships tossed about, from not having a sufficient quantity of ballast.

Utque *labant* curva: justo sine pondere naves,
Perque mare instabiles nimia levitate feruntur.—OVID. *Met.* 2. 163.

In the following sentence three of the verbs under consideration find a place; the first in a simple, and the two last in a compounded, form. "Ruere" illa non possunt, ut hæc non eodem *labefactata* motu "conci-
dant."—CIC. *pro Leg. Man.* 7. b. Upon the wealth of Rome, it is here said, that of Asia depends. If the wealth of the former go to ruin, that of the latter first receives a shock, as expressed by the participle of the derivative from *Labare*, and then comes to the ground, as expressed by the compound of "Cadere."

Labare has an inceptive verb, *Labascere*, which no one of the rest has. This properly denotes the gradual increase of the shake, which, it is supposed, will terminate in the fall of the object. The radical verb admits the idea of progress, which the others reject.

Nam leviter quamvis, quod crebro tunditur ictu
Vincitur in longo spatio tamen, atque *labascit*.—LUCRET. 4. 1279.

This inceptive is frequently taken in a figurative sense, and then intimates hesitation, leading gradually to a change of opinion.

Labascit. Victus uno verbo quam cito!—TER. *Eun.* 1. 2. 98.

The critics upon this passage have given a very accurate account of the verb, and seem to support, by their authority, what is just said. "Estque in verbo *labascit* metaphora, desumpta ab ædificiis tenui tibicine fultis; aut ab arbore multis ferri ictibus succisa, adeoque ruinam minitante."

CÆDERE—*vide* SCINDERE.

CALAMITAS, CLADES,

agree, in denoting misfortune, but differ, in respect to its degree, and to the extent in which it is felt. The former, a derivative from "Calamus," has a reference to the storm, which breaks the stalk, and, of course, destroys the crop. From the misfortune peculiar to the farmer, it has been transferred to all other kinds, and denotes such only as are severely felt, and threaten the destruction of the persons who sustain them.

Sed eccia ipsa egreditur, nostri fundi *calamitas*.—TER. *Eun.* 1. 1. 34.

“Agri campani vectigal, neque bellis infestum, nec fructibus varium, nec cœlo ac loco *calamitosum* esse solet.”—CIC. *pro Leg. Agr.* 2. 80.

— non fuit quidquam olerum :

Nisi quicquid erat, *calamitas* profecto nunquam attigerat.—PLAUT. *Cas.* 5. 2. 33.

In the above examples the radical meaning of *Calamitas* is preserved, and traces of the severity of the evil may be discerned in all that can be produced.

“Videbam perniciem meam cum magna *calamitate* reipublicæ esse conjunctam.”—CIC. *in Cat.* 1. 5. “*Quam calamitatem* ita moderate tulit.”—NEP. 20. 1. 4. “Importare *calamitatem* conservatoribus suis, incidit amori nostro *calamitas*.”—CIC. *pro P. Sext.* 28. b.

CLADES differs from “*Calamitas*,” in denoting that the misfortune is less grievous, from being partial, and though inconsistent with the sound state of that affected by it, yet does not naturally lead to its destruction. It comes from Κλάδος, “*ramus*,” and refers to the accidental rubbing off of a branch, which may injure, though it does not kill, the tree. Both “*Calamitas*” and *Clades*, then, are originally applicable to the vegetable kingdom; and, when transferred from that to other subjects, express disasters proportioned to those implied in the primitive use of each. “*Mucium dimissum, cui postea Scævola a clade dextræ manus cognomentum inditum.*”—LIV. 2. 13. “*Qui risus classe devicta, magnam populo Romano cladem attulit.*”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 27. b.

Nunc victa, nunc captiva, nunc cunctis mihi

Obsessa videor *cladibus*.—————SEN. *Troad.* 989.

Plautus has brought both words into one sentence, and, by connecting them with “*Intemperies*,” maintains the reference both have to the vegetable kingdom. *Clades*, applied to the family, will denote the wound affecting a part, as the loss of a branch does a tree; and “*Calamitas*” will denote a general disaster, affecting the whole, as a storm does the crop.

Clades “*calamitasque*” *intemperies* modo in nostram advenit domum.

PLAUT. *Capt.* 4. 4. 3.

CALERE, TEPERE, FERVERE,

agree, in denoting a state of heat, but differ, in respect to the degree of that

quality, supposed to reside in the subject heated. *Calere*, as a generic term, expresses the existence of heat, in all the degrees of intension and remission of which it is susceptible. “Negat Epicurus opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentiri hoc putat, ut *calere* ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 1. 30. As fire is an element which affects every substance near it, and wastes whatever it touches, *Calere* is capable of expressing the greatest possible degree of heat. “*Calescere* vel apricatione vel igni.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 16.

—— epulasque foci misere *calentes*.—OVID. *Met.* 8. 674.

The viands, here mentioned, retained, in part, the heat of the fire, at which they had been dressed, and stand opposed to the feast of fruits that would appear at the “*mensæ secundæ*.”

Aqua calet : eamus jam intro, ut laves.—PLAUT. *Bach.* 1. 1. 77.

Quamvis non modico caleant spectacula sole.—MARTIAL. 12. 29.

The heat felt from the sun, at these spectacles, must have been less than some of those degrees of it already mentioned.

TEPERE differs from “*Calere*,” in being limited to a low degree of heat, such as that of the blood, and other fluids, in the bodies of animals. “*Dolium calfacito minus quam si picare velis, tepeat, lenibus lignis facito “calescat.” Ubi temperate tepabit, tum cummin indito.*”—CAT. *R. R.* 69.

Inferimus tepido spumantia pocula lacte.—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 66.

The milk, when foaming, would be just in the state in which it came from the cow.

Est ubi plus *tepeant* hiemes?—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 10. 15.

Hic mutat merces surgente a sole, ad eum quo

Vespertina tepet regio.———HOR. *Sat.* 1. 4. 29.

In both these last examples, the poet could mean nothing but a moderate degree of heat, such as is produced by the sun, either at mid-day, in winter, or just after his setting, even at the warmest season of the year. “*Uva maturata dulcescit, vestitaque pampinis, nec modico tepore caret et*

nimios solis defendit ardores.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 88. a. The term “Modicus,” here, may perhaps be understood as defining the absolute state of heat denoted by *Tepor*, not any gradation of which that state is susceptible. The degree of heat, at any rate, implied in it, which is fit only to ripen, is opposed to that sultriness by which the grapes, if unprotected, would be injured.

Nec tenerum Lycidam mirabere quo “calet” juvenus
Nunc omnis, et mox virgines *tepebunt*.——HOR. *Car.* 1. 4. 19.

In this figurative application of the two verbs, their difference is beautifully pointed out by the poet. The admiration, of which Lycidas was the object, when a boy, was understood to be stronger than that, which he would meet with afterwards, when grown up.

Sæpe *tepent* alii juvenes : ego semper amavi.—OVID. *de Rem. Am.* 7.

FERVERE, which is found both in the second and third conjugations, differs from “Calere,” in being limited to the expression of the greatest possible heat, and in denoting an extreme, opposite to that implied in “Tepere.” “Loca inhabitabilia *fervere* quanquam hiberno tempore.”—PLIN. 5. 1.

Incipit et sicco *fervere* terra cane.—PROPERT. 2. 28. 4.

Quasi aquam *ferventem* frigidam esse, ita vos putatis leges.—PLAUT. *Curc.* 4. 2. 25.

—— torret nimis *fervoribus* ætherius sol.—LUCRET. 5. 2. 6.

It should seem, then, that, in the scale of heat, there is no degree to which “Calere,” as a generic term, cannot be applied; that “Tepere” is applicable to those degrees only that are temperate, and correspond with what is called animal heat; and that *Fervere* is applicable to such degrees only as are violent, and tend to consume certain substances, if exposed to their influence.

CALIGO—*vide* TENEBRÆ.

CALLERE—*vide* POSSE.

CALLIDUS—*vide* ASTUTUS.

CALLIS—*vide* VIA.

CAMPUS—*vide* AEQUOR.

CANDIDUS, ALBUS,

agree, in denoting one colour, but differ, in as far as the former expresses the brightest white possible, as well as certain shades of it, and is applicable to the subjects both of nature and art; while the latter expresses but a shade, and is applicable to the subjects of nature alone. *Candidus*, then, is, in every view, generic, when compared with "Albus." It is applied to the brightness of the sun, and denotes its luminousness, abstractedly from its heat. "Nam solis calor et *candor* illustrior est quam ullus ignis."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 33. b. Even the borrowed lustre of the moon is expressed by *Candidus*.

———— nec *candida* cursum

Luna negat: splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 8.

It is applied, also, to the purest white, in substances which we can approach and examine.

Vides ut alta stet nive *candidum*

Soracte.—————Hor. *Car.* 1. 9. 1.

Pectora puris nivibus et lacte *candidiora*.—OVID. *Heroid. Ep.* 16. 250.

Beside the applications of *Candidus* to those substances which exhibit the brightest whiteness in nature, we find another to the whitest or fairest of their respective species.

Candidus, et talos a vertice pulcher ad imos.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2 4.

Præbenda est gladio pulcra hæc et *candida* cervix.—JUV. 10. 345.

———— quamvis aries sit *candidus* ipse.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 387.

In all these three instances, *Candidus* denotes a high comparative whiteness, in respect to other substances of the same kind with each.

Candidus is not confined to the whiteness of natural substances, but extends also to that of artificial.

Quæque gerit similes *candida* turris aves.—MART. 12. 31.

———— victimaque

Libetur tibi *candidas* ad aras.—————*Idem.* 11. 92.

Whether we suppose the pigeon-house in the former, or the altars in the latter, example, to have been formed of substances naturally white, or to have

been whitened after they were reared, *Candidus* is in both applied to artificial whiteness. However much varied the colour of the materials might be, it was the business of the builder to select such only as were white, or to render them so, when put together. Plautus styles a person clothed in white, "*Candide vestitus.*"—*Cas.* 4. 1. 19. "Scipio Nasica in toga *candida* bis repulsa notatus a populo."—*PLIN.* 7. 34. The "toga" here mentioned was undoubtedly of an artificial white, and we learn, from Persius, that this was effected by means of chalk.

— quem ducit hiantem

Cretata ambitio.—————*Sat.* 5. 176.

Candidaque imposui longæ velamina virgæ,

Scilicet oblitos admonitura mei.———*OVID.* *Ep.* 10. 41.

ALBUS differs from "*Candidus*," as it expresses a smaller degree of whiteness, and as it extends to the subjects of nature alone. When applied to "toga," it expressed no more than the natural colour of the wool.

"*Candidior*" *cycnis, hedera formosior alba.*—*VIRG.* *Ecl.* 7. 38.

Though both the swans and the ivy are said to be of one colour, yet, in point of brightness, there must have been a vast difference.

Virgil seems to have taken *Album* in an uncommon sense in the following line.

Strymoniamque gruem, aut *album* dejecit olorem.—*Æn.* 11. 580.

The whiteness of the swan is one of the brightest among natural substances, and, of course, is properly, and almost always, expressed by "*Candidus*." According to the use which the poet makes of *Albus*, as applied to "olor," it has no defined meaning, and serves only to eke out a line, into which a more proper word could not be conveniently introduced.

They who were *Albati*, that is, clothed in white on birth-days, or other joyous occasions, testified their mirth by a garment different in colour from that, by which the "*Pullati*" expressed their grief. It had not the brightness of that of the "*Candidati*," and served its purpose, by means of the natural colour of the wool, without any artificial whitening.

Ille repotia, natales, aliosve dierum
Festos *albatu*s celebret.———HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 60.

If the observations already made be well founded, the account ordinarily given, and believed, as to the difference between *Albus* and “Candidus,” cannot be so likewise. “*Illud natura hoc cura fit.*”—AUSON. *POP. L.* 1. *p.* 23. This may be true, in respect to the “*toga*,” but it is not universally true, in respect to every subject to which the words may be applied. “Candidus,” we have found, is applied to many natural substances, and no definition, really distinctive of the two terms, can be obtained, without regarding the last mentioned as extending to every material subject of a certain hue, and as denoting, not only the brightest white possible, but the highest degree of it, also, that is ever exhibited in the different classes of things.

CANTUS, CANTICUM, CANTILENA,

agree, in denoting a song, but differ, in respect to the nature, or the effect, of the performance. The first has all the generality of the verb “*Canere*,” from which it comes, and expresses music, either vocal or instrumental, and the natural cry of fowls, whether musical or otherwise. “*Animi et aurium causa tot homines habet, ut quotidiano cantu vocum, et nervorum, et tiliarum, nocturnisque conviviis tota vicinitas personet.*”—CIC. *pro S. Rosc.* 41. a. “*Oculi pictura tenentur, aures cantibus.*”—CIC. *Acad.* 6. b. In the first of the above examples, *Cantus* denotes music, vocal as well as instrumental, of different kinds.

—— non avium citharæque *cantus*
Somnum reducent.———HOR. *Car.* 3. 1. 20.

This term is also applied to the crowing of cocks, the croaking of frogs, and the cries of the owl and the cicada, known in Italy, and erroneously called a grasshopper. “*Te gallorum, illum buccinarum cantus, exsuscitat.*”—CIC. *pro Mur.* 128. b.

Et veterem in limo ranæ cecinere querelam.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 378.
Nequicquam seros exercet noctua *cantus* —*Ibid.* 403.
Et *cantu* querulæ rumpunt arbusta cicadæ.—*Ibid.* 3. 328.

CANTICUM differs from "Cantus," in denoting a song in which there is always much art, and in which it is the object of the performer to please, by exciting emotions not of the purest kind. The lascivious songs, called "Attellanæ," exhibited on the stage, were properly *Cantica*, which term is more applicable to the impurity of the subject of the song, than to the natural sweetness of the air. "Omne convivium obscenis *canticis* strepit."—QUINT. 1. 2. The adjective here only suggests, that the songs were of the worst kind, without implying that the best were undeserving of censure. "In Demiurgio (forte nosti *canticum*) totus est sermo verbis tectus, re impudentior."—CIC. *Ep.* 140. a. "Est autem in dicendo etiam quidam "cantus" obscurior, non hic ex Phrygia et Caria rhetorum epilogus, pæne *canticum*: sed ille quem significat Demosthenes et Æschines, cum alter alteri objicit vocis flexiones."—CIC. *Orat.* 202. a. By "Cantus" is here meant that natural sweetness of voice, which may be improved by industry and attention, and can never fail to please; and, by *Canticum*, an elaborate affectation of softness, which must excite a degree of disgust, proportioned to the correctness of the critic's taste.

CANTILENA differs from the two former words, in denoting a song, which disgusts from the frequent repetition of what is in itself trifling, or known to every body. It has none of the sweetness that renders the "Cantus" agreeable, nor of the impurity which renders the "Canticum" nauseous; but displeases merely from the vain repetition of a common subject. "Atque ita amem, si iis novis amicitiiis implicati sumus, ut crebro mihi vafer ille siculus insurret Epicharmus *cantilenam* illam suam, Νηφε, καὶ μέμνης' ἀπισειν."—CIC. *de Or.* 1. 105. The maxim, in Greek, is but a common one, and the verb, "Insurret," has a beautiful reference to the incessant humming of bees, which strike but the same note.

Cantilenam eandem canis.—TER. *Phor.* 3. 2. 10:

This proverb may be translated, "You harp too much upon one string."

CAPERE, SUMERE, ACCIPERE, EXCIPERE, RECIPERE, agree, in denoting the act of taking, but differ, in respect to the right of the

person who does so, or to the motives from which he acts. *CAPERERE* supposes, that the agent, of his own will, lays hold of an object, over which he has a certain power.

— *cape saxa manu, cape robora, pastor.*—*VIRG. Georg.* 3. 420.

The shepherd might, or might not, take the poet's advice for defending himself from the snake, and the stones and sticks are understood to be at his command. The general idea, suggested by this verb, is founded upon a necessity, which, at some times, operates upon that which is taken, and, at others, upon the person who takes.

Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit.—*HOR. Ep.* 2. 1. 156.

In both these applications of the verb *Capere*, the necessity operates upon the subject taken. Greece was first forced to submit to the arms of the Romans, and Rome was afterwards forced to abandon her ferocity, and to yield to the charms of the literature of Greece. The right of both the captors was equally good, and the necessity of submission upon the part of each, when vanquished, equally strong.

Hic jaculo pisces, illic capiuntur ab hamis.—*OID. Art. Am.* 1. 765.

In this example it also appears, that whatever instrument of destruction is used by the sportsman, his right to seize his prey, and the necessity, by which it yields to his art, are the same. “*Laertes leniens desiderium quod capiebat ex filio.*”—*CIC. de Sen.* 88. b. “*Decrevit senatus ut consules viderent, ne quid respublica detrimenti caperet.*”—*CIC. in Cat.* 98. a. In the two last examples, the necessity operates, not upon the subject taken, but upon the persons, who are supposed to be obliged to take. Unless the parental feelings of Laertes had been extinguished, he must have felt the loss of his son; and it is understood, that the republic must have unavoidably sustained a loss, unless the decree of the senate was obeyed. When the subject taken, then, is a good, the person taking exerts a power over it that is uncontrollable; and, when it is the contrary, it obtrudes itself upon him, and forces his acceptance.

The irresistible power of the "Pontifex Maximus," in naming a successor for any of the vestal virgins, was well and invariably expressed by the verb *Capere*. "Defuncta virgo vestalis Lætia, in cujus locum Cornelia ex familia Cossorum *capta* est."—TAC. *Ann.* 15. 22.

The radical power of *Capere* seems to be that of capacity, by which a certain quantity is said to be contained within a certain space. "Sunt ita multi, ut eos *capere* carcer non possit."—CIC. *in Cat.* 109. a. "Vix jam videtur locus esse, qui tantos acervos pecuniæ *capiat*."—CIC. *cont. Rull.* 77. b. The boundaries of a space may be supposed to have a power over that within it, which tallies with the power of a *Captor*, and the necessary dependance of that which he has taken.

When instances of reciprocation occur between the person taking and the object taken, the meaning is the same either way. As "Laertes qui *cepit* desiderium" was distressed, so was Philotis, in Terence.

Quem desiderium Athenarum *cepit*.—*Hec.* 1. 2. 13.

The loathing was the same, too, of the person, "Quem *cepit* satietas alicujus rei."—LIV. 27. 49. and of him,

Qui *cepit* satietatem alicujus rei.—PLAUT. *Amph.* 1. 2. 10.

SUMERE differs from "Capere," in denoting the act of taking the use of that, which may or may not be the property of the person who does so, and of employing it in such a way, as is most convenient for him. The necessity, which is characteristic of "Capere," is totally excluded from *Sumere*. The act of the person "qui *sumit*," may depend upon himself, or upon permission from others, and it involves nothing coercive, in respect to that which is acted upon. "Imitamini virtutem, et enitimini ne ego meliores liberos *sumsisse* videar, quam genuisse."—SALL. *Jug.* 10. The king had here no doubt of his own right to adopt Jugurtha, whatever might be the opinion of the other sons whom he addressed; but there was no coercive obligation upon Jugurtha to fulfil his father's intentions, similar to that upon the "virgo *capta*." "Quis Antonio permisit, ut et partes faceret, et utram vellet, prior ipse *sumeret*?"—CIC. *de Or.* 142. b.

Quis sibi res gestas Augusti scribere *sumit*?—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 8. 7.

Those exploits are held forth as a subject, upon which all the men of letters at Rome might display their genius; and it was in the power of each, at the same time, either to adopt them as such, or to let them alone.

— postremo argentum, quanti est, *sumito*.—TER. *Adelph.* 5. 9. 20.

Here the subject taken was not common, and it was not the property of the person taking it. Still, however, no violence was committed, as the leave of the proprietor to use it was given.

— distat *sumasne* pudenter
An *rapias*.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 17. 44.

“Tu qui a Nævio vel *sumpsisti* multa, si fateris: vel si negas, *surripuisti*.”—CIC. *Cl. Or.* 171. a. When the leave of the proprietor is obtained by him who takes, or when this last is pardoned if it is not, the act is denominated by the verb *Sumere*; but when neither of these circumstances takes place, this act is considered as a theft.

In mala uxore atque inimico si quid *sumas*, *sumtus* est;
In bono hospite atque amico, *quæstus* est quod *sumitur*;
Et quod in divinis rebus *sumas*, sapienti lucro est.—PLAUT. *Mil. Gl.* 3. 1. 78.

What, in each of these three lines, is said to be taken, is the property of him who takes, and employed according to his pleasure, in the different relations ascribed to him. “Duo denique illa, quæ facillima videntur, mihi pro meo jure *sumo*.”—CIC. *de Or.* 2. The speaker here insinuates a right to assume two things, and to turn them to what purpose he pleased. This right, however, is not absolute, as in the case of “*Capere*,” but ascertained, as explained in the fourth power ascribed to “*Pro*,” in which it signifies “according to.”

Apuleius seems to have used *Sumere* impurely, instead of “*Capere*.”

Venustate juvenis *sumitur*, Pamphile.—MET. 1. p. 116. 40.

The expression may be pardoned in an author who lived in the times of the Antonines, and was by birth an African. A purer classic would have expressed himself, as Ovid did in a similar case.

Me tua forma “*capit*,” “*capta*” parente soror.—OVID. *Ep.* 4. 64.

ACCIPERE differs from "Capere," in implying, that the act denoted by it depends, in every instance, upon the will of the agent; and from "Sumere," in implying, that the subject accepted did in no instance belong to the person who accepts. The deed of the person "accipiens," takes place only upon condition that another is ready to give, though he still possesses the power both of rejection and acceptance. *Accipere*, therefore, is correlative to "Dare," and is opposed to "Rejicere." The two former verbs are often put, by Cicero, into the same sentence. "Quod "dat" accipimus."—*Ep. Fam.* 1. 1. "*Accipienda* aliqua est et "danda" æstimatio."—*Ep. ad Att.* 12. 21. "Ita eloquentia coalescere nequit, nisi sociata "tradentis" accipientisque concordia." QUINCT. 2. 9.

The figurative uses of *Accipere* are consistent with the literal one. By whatever sense an object is recognised, the will of the person, who perceives it, is, or has been, concerned in bestowing upon it a necessary degree of attention. "Sed quem *accepi* ipse oculis atque animo sensum, hunc vere apud vos, et ut potero, planissime exponam."—CIC. *in Ver.* 157. a.

Accipite ergo animis, atque hæc mea figite dicta.—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 250.

Flavius Caper, *Orthog.* p. 2243, supports the distinction made between "Sumere" and *Accipere*. "Sumimus" ipsi; *accipimus* ab alio. Sic, cum "dabimus," dicendum est, *accipe*: cum permittimus ipsi tollere, dicendum, "Sume."

EXCIPERE differs from "Capere" and "Sumere," in having no reference to the will of the person who takes; and from "Accipere," in supposing that the object taken was not offered to the receiver, but came accidentally in his way. Those, to whom the two first verbs are applicable, pursue their object, and are gratified when they obtain it: those, again, said to be *Excipientes* only, cannot refuse to take what does not solicit their acceptance, and what is not, in every instance, held to be a good. "Genus divinandi naturale, quod animos arriperet, aut *exciperet* extrinsecus ex divinitate."—CIC. *de Div.* 112. b. The power of divination was either violently laid hold of, when

the gods had no wish to bestow it, or not rejected, when it came in the receiver's way.

——— nulla decempedis

Metata privatis opacum

Porticus *excipiebat* Arcton—HOR. *Car.* 2. 15. 14.

This private portico was meant to receive the north wind, when it chanced to blow. "O terram illam beatam, quæ hunc virum *exceperit*: hanc ingrattam si ejecerit: miseram si amiserit."—CIC. *pro Tit. An. Mil.* 122. a. Milo had, in the opinion of Cicero, no need to offer himself as a citizen of any foreign land. That land was deemed happy in which he chanced to find the refuge, which none would deny him. "Quemcunque mortalium arcere tecto, nefas habetur: pro fortuna quisque apparatus epulis *excipit*."—TAC. *de Mor. Ger.* 21. "Inter familiam et penates et jura successionum equi traduntur: *excipit* filius non ut cætera maximus natu, sed prout ferox bello et melior."—TAC. *Ibid.* 32. Those guests, and those inheritances, were not courted; but the persons, to whom they came, were not disposed, and did not feel themselves by the laws of hospitality and succession entitled, to reject them.

Both *Excipere* and "Accipere" are applied to wounds received. "Tanquam fortis in pugna vir, "acceptis" a forti adversario vulneribus adversis, cadere videatur."—CIC. *de Arusp. resp.* 253, a. "Subeunda pro patria pericula, vulnera *excipienda*."—CIC. *pro Sext.* 7. b. Though the general meaning of the two compounds of "Capere" be the same in those sentences, yet each has a shade peculiar to itself. "Accipere" refers directly to the courage of the soldier, ready to accept, from a sense of duty, what his enemy is disposed to give. *Excipere*, again, refers to the danger of his situation, in being necessarily exposed to wounds, that may every moment come in his way.

The verb *Excipere* signifies to succeed, which no one of the rest does. "Nox diem *excipit*."—LIV. 5. 42. "*Excipit* Pompilium Numam Tullus Hostilius."—FLOR. 1. 3. The receiving object is, in this sense, always the

nominate, and the governed is understood to be taken, as necessarily coming in its way.

RECIPERE differs from "Accipere," and agrees with "Excipere," in supposing that the deed of the agent does not necessarily depend on the offer of another; and it denotes, besides, that the subject taken was either previously possessed, or adopted into the possession of the recipient, as agreeable to him, or best suiting its nature. It has nothing in it of the accidental occurrence that is found in "Excipere," and supposes the receiver to be acting spontaneously and pursuing his object. "Mea opera, Q. Fabi, Tarentum *recepisti* : certe inquit ridens; nam nisi tu amisisses, nunquam *recepissem*."—CIC. *de Sen.* 79. a. "Omnia pro infecto sint; *recipiant* arma quæ per pactionem amiserunt."—LIV. 9. 11. In both those examples *Recipere* denotes the act of resuming a property that had been lost, though, in the one case, it is resumed by force, and, in the other, with the consent of the proprietor.

When the notion of previous possession is not found in *Recipere*, it implies that the deed of the agent is agreeable to himself, or suitable to the nature of that which is taken. "Laborem quæstus *recepit*? quæstum laboris rejecit."—CIC. *pro Rosc. Com.* 8. The toil was agreeable to Fannius, but not the gain. "Meminero me non "sumsisse" quem accusarem, sed *recepisse* quos defenderem."—CIC. *in Ver.* 144. b. Cicero here declares, that he had not, according to the power of the verb "Sumere," gratified his humour, in pitching upon a person whom he was to accuse; but that he had exercised his benevolence, by taking those under his protection, to whom it was most needful. "Cunctationem non *recepit* hæc res."—LIV. 29. 24. "Delay does not suit the nature of this affair."

Nos in custodiam tuam ut *recipias* et tutere.—PLAUT. *Rud.* 3. 3. 34.

Romulus, et Liber pater, et cum Castore Pollux

Post ingentia facta, Deorum in templa *recepti*.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 5.

Those characters, which had become illustrious upon earth, were afterwards received into the temples, which, by their virtues, they were fitted to inhabit. "Peneus "accipit" amnem Orcon, nec *recepit*."—PLIN. 9. 8. Facciolati explains "nec *recepit*" "ei non admiscetur." In this figurative use of

the terms, the literal may be discerned. The current of the "Pencus" was increased by the addition of the "Orcus," but their streams did not incorporate. Those of the latter were received into a place, that did not accord with their nature.

CAPER, HIRCUS,

agree, in denoting a he-goat, but the former is applicable to him either in a natural state or otherwise, while the latter is applicable only when he is mutilated.

Vir gregis ipse *caper* deerraverat.—VIRG. *Ecc* 7. 7.
 Sic modo qui Tuscus fueras, nunc Gallus Haruspex,
 Dum jugulas *hircum*, factus es ipse *caper*.—MARTIAL. 3. 24. 13.

In the first example the *Caper* is among the *Capræ* what the *Taurus* is among the *Vaccæ*; in the last, he is what the Greeks call an *Ἐκτρομίας*.

CARBO, PRUNA,

agree, in denoting a substance, which, though it has been exposed to the action of fire, is still capable of supporting it; but the former applies to it in a state of ignition, or otherwise; while the latter applies to it in that of ignition only. *CARBO* most commonly denotes charcoal, and supposes, that though the nature of the substance, whether fossil or animal, is immutably altered, yet it is still capable of supporting fire. Though this mass, styled *Carbo*, has furnished fuel to an extinguished fire, yet it has not been reduced to a residuum of ashes. Thus, the fuel that supported the unseen fire, mentioned by Horace, might have been expressed by either term mentioned, but the "Cineres" could be expressed by neither.

— et incedis per ignes
 Suppositos "cineri" doloso.—HOR. *Car*. 2. 1. 7.
 Tam excoctam reddam atque atram quam *carbo* est.—TER. *Adelph*. 5. 3. 63.

The word "excoctam" literally signifies, thoroughly changed by means of fire; and "atram," a blackness, not natural, but superinduced by it.

Quæque sequenda forent, et quæ vitanda vicissim,
 Illa prius creta, mox hæc *carbone* notasti.—PERS. *Sat*. 5. 108.

In both these examples *Carbo* signifies "charcoal." A mass has been exposed to the action of fire, which, being quenched, leaves a cinder. In the two examples that follow, this mass is still ignited, and in that form also gets the name of *Carbo*, till it is reduced to ashes. "Qui cultros metuens tonsorios, candente *carbone* sibi adurebat capillum."—CIC. *de Off.* 37. b.

Protinus inclusum lentis *carbonibus* ure.—OVID. *Trist.* 3. 11. 47.

The difference stated by Servius to exist between "Carbo" and PRUNA, does not seem to be well founded. When commenting on the following passage,

— et medium freti pietate per ignem
Cultores multa premimus vestigia *pruna*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 788.

he says, "Carbo" et *pruna* differunt, quod *pruna* dicatur quamdiu ardet, "carbo" quum extincta est." The first part of this remark is true, which the last is not; as there is many an instance of "Carbo" being applied to a substance upon which fire still acts.

Subjiciunt verubus *prunas*, et viscera torrent.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 103.

The *Pruna*, as fit for roasting any thing upon spits, would be in a state of red heat, and would emit no flame. That this was constantly the state of a substance so denominated, appears from a passage in the great Roman physician, whose authority may be always trusted. "Nunquam ad flammam ungi oportet, interdum ad *prunam*."—CELS.

CARERE, EGERE, DESIDERARE,

agree, in denoting the absence of that which is held desirable, but differ, as to the degree in which it is needed, or of the regret felt for the want of it. CARERE may be regarded as generic, because it refers to the absence of what is both good and evil. The want, besides, suggested by it, may or may not be felt by those in whom it exists.

Ergo animi indociles, et adhuc ratione *carentes*.—OVID. *Fast.* 3. 119.

Minds in this rude state would be conscious of no defect.

Per quem tot juvenes patrio *caruere* sepulcro.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 196.

The survivors of those young men, only, could know what had befallen them.

At cantu commotæ Erebi de sedibus imis

Umbrae ibant tenues, simulacraque luce *carantum*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 471.

In the following sentence, *Carere* signifies the simple absence or privation of an object, in opposition to the possession and enjoyment of it. “Amicitia, consuetudines, vicinitates quid haberent voluptatis, *carendo* magis intellexi quam fruendo.”—CIC. *Post. Red.* 198. b.

We learn, however, upon the authority of Cicero himself, that though *Carere* often denotes the want only, without any concomitant circumstance, yet it at times carries, by implication, a slight sense of the utility or needfulness of the object wanted. In the very beautiful analysis given of this word, accordingly, we find the orator saying, “*Carere* igitur hoc significat, “egere” eo quod habere velis. Inest enim “velle” in *carendo*, nisi cum sic tanquam in febris dicatur, alia quadam notione verbi.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 167. a. Nepos says, in this way, “facile *carere* aliqua re.”—19. 1. and means more than the simple absence of an object, by suggesting, that the want is felt, though not in a high degree. In the use of *Carere*, an inanimate object may be personified, and the deficient object not always a good.

Quæ caret ora cruore nostro?—HOR. *Car.* 2. 1. 36.

—— tutus caret obsoleti

Sordibus tecti.———*Ibid.* 2. 10. 6.

By a metonymy, the accessory is sometimes put for the principal, and is held forth as feeling the defect. “*Caruit* foro postea Pompeius, *caruit* senatu, *caruit* publico.”—CIC. *in Mil.* 105. a.

Caruitne febris te heri vel nudiustertius?—PLAUT. *Curc.* 1. 2. 46.

In spite of the expression, every person must understand that it was the person diseased that had got quit of the fever, and the public places, in which Pompey used to appear, that felt his absence.

From the definition given by Cicero of this verb, the expression, in respect to the vocative of “Ego,” by means of *Caret*, may be held improper, as it

cannot be applied where there is a physical rejection of that said to be wanting. "Deest casus" would better intimate the non-existence, which is true, than "*Caret casu*," when it is in the nature of things impossible to supply the defect. The verb *Carere* may be applied with propriety to all the deficient cases of such a substantive as "Noctu" in the ablative, because they might all have existed, were it not for the invincible authority of use, as well as the corresponding cases in "Nox."

EGERE differs from "Carere," in referring only to the absence of a supposed good, and in always denoting a deficiency, strongly perceived by a sensitive being. "Sapiens eget nulla re: *egere* enim necessitatis est."—SEN. *Ep.* 9. "Egebat? imo locuples erat."—CIC. *pro Rosc. Com.* 48. b.

Protinus ut moneam, si quid monitoris *eges* tu.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 18. 67.

As "Carere" gives, at times, an insinuation of the need of that which is wanting, so *Egere*, among the poets, is occasionally made to go no farther than "Carere," by expressing simply the defect.

—mæstamque Evandri primus ad urbem,
Mittatur Pallas, quem non virtutis *egentem*,
Abstulit ara dies et funere mersit acerbo.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 26.

It is the defect, not the need, of courage, that the poet here says did not belong to Pallas.

Sensum a cœlesti demissum traximus arce,
Cujus *egent* prona et terram spectantia.—JUV. *Sat.* 15. 146.

Among the lower animals there is no perception of any need of that sense, by which men are said to be distinguished. Any portion of it would raise them in the scale of being. It would, for certain, alter their nature, but would form no improvement of it, considering the place they hold.

Livy has taken *Egere* in this acceptance, which is most commonly met with among the poets. "Censoribus quoque *eguit* annus."—LIB. 6. 27. Here the historian meant only to say, that there were no censors that year, not that the year felt the want of them. The predominant circumstance in *Egere*

is the need, which necessarily implies the absence. This last verb, then, is generic, in respect to "Carere," though, according to the will of those using it, its power may be retrenched, and brought down to that of the latter.

DESIDERARE carries along with it all that is implied in "Egere," with this circumstance superadded, that the absence of what is perceived to be needful it sincerely regretted. "*Desiderare*," says Festus, "a sideribus dici certum est, et est quasi desiderio siderum teneri." The anxiety, then, with which the augur looked out for the constellation, from the observing of which he was to give information to those who consulted him, is the source of that regret, which is characteristic of the verb, however applied. "Eo ipso carus omnibus ac *desiderandus*, quod prospexerat ne *desidaretur*."—PLIN. *Pan.* 10. 6. "Non curia vires meas *desiderat*, non rostra, non amici, non clientes."—CIC. *de Sen.* 32. In both these examples the object is understood to have been first actually wanting, then to have been found needful, and, last of all, as such, to have been sincerely regretted.

In the use of *Desiderare* the circumstance of want must always exist, while that of need may at times be so feeble as hardly to be perceived. "Neque nunc vires *desidero* adolescentis, non plus quam adolescens tauri vires *desiderabam*."—CIC. *de Sen.* 82. b. Had Lælius possessed the strength supposed, at either period of life, there could have been no *Desiderium*. Though it did not exist, as in the former case, and never could, as in the latter, yet he was conscious of no perception of need, any more than of regret. His powers were always adequate to the duties required of him.

CARPENTUM—*vide* CURRUS. CASTIGARE—*vide* PUNIRE.

CARPERE—*vide* LEGERE. CASTITAS—*vide* PUDOR.

CASSUS—*vide* INANIS.

CASUS, EVENTUS, EXITUS,

agree, in denoting occurrences in their nature uncertain, but differ, in respect to the degree of uncertainty with which those, denoted by each, are accompanied. They all suppose, that the event, which does take place, might either

not have occurred at all, or have been different from what it is. *CASUS*, from “*Cadere*,” literally signifies a fall.

— *excelsæ graviore casu*

Decidunt turre.———*HOR. Car. 2. 2. 10.*

It had afterwards signified any contingency, whether good or bad, which, it is understood, no human sagacity could foresee. “*Quid enim aliud est casus nisi cum sic aliquid cecidit, ut vel non cadere, vel aliter cadere potuerit?*”—*CIC. de Div. 111. b.* “*Quomodo ergo id quod temere fit, cæco casu, et volubilitate fortunæ, præsentiri et prædici potest.*”—*CIC. Ibid.* Even the omniscience of the gods was taxed by the philosophers at Rome, who supposed a *Casus* to be concealed from them. “*Ne in Deum quidem cadere videtur, ut sciat quid casu et fortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet. Sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est. Est autem fortuna. Rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla est præsensio.*”—*CIC. de Div. 112. a.* Those events, styled *Casus*, take the epithets of good or bad equally well, and may be understood to be either, without any epithet applied to them at all. “*Reges hominibus casus adversos tribuunt, secundos fortunæ suæ.*”—*NEP. in Dat. 5.*

EVENTUS differs from “*Casus*,” in supposing the fact denoted by it not to be independent of others that went before, and, of course, that though its nature be unknown, yet its occurrence is less unexpected. In using this term, facts are understood to occur in a train, and that signified appears a consequence, though human sagacity could not always have foreseen it, or might have misinterpreted the causes, from which it proceeds. The possibility of existing or not existing, and of being either what they are, or what they are not, is common to the facts denominated both by “*Casus*” and *Eventus*. “*Quid est enim aliud fors, quid fortuna, quid “casus,” quid eventus?*”—*CIC. de Div. 111. b.* “*Sceleris est pæna tristis, et præter eos eventus “qui sequuntur,” per se ipsa maxima est.*”—*CIC. de Legg. 178. b.* That the idea of consequence is involved in *Eventus*, is here clearly marked. “*Consilia primum, deinde acta, postea eventus.*”—*CIC. de Or. 114. a.* In all the above examples it should seem, that the fact styled *Eventus*, though unknown, is not insulated, but comes in sequence, and is the last in a series.

Though no single fact can be considered both as a "Casus" and an *Eventus*, yet each may be interpreted, as it is, in regard to the same object. This appears in the very extravagant compliment paid by Cicero to Pompey. "Etiam ipsi "casus" *eventusque* rerum non duces sed comites ejus consiliorum fuerunt. In quo uno, ita summa Fortuna cum summa virtute certavit, ut omnium judicio plus homini quam Deæ tribueretur."—CIC. *pro Corn. Balbo*. 56. b.

EXITUS, from "Exire," differs from "Casus," in supposing the occurrence still less unexpected than "Eventus," and suggests the end of a transaction effected by one or by a train of incidents, all leading to one point. It denotes, too, what may or may not exist, as not necessarily of a determined nature. It implies, not merely general issue, or that termination which is as inseparable from every train of events as their beginning, but the kind of that termination, as prosperous or adverse, to those whom it concerns. "Responsa aruspicum, quæ aut nullos habuerunt *exitus*, aut contrarios."—CIC. *Div.* 119. b. "Cum ea quæ consulebantur ad *exitum* non pervenirent."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 156. b. In such examples a fact has been misinterpreted as a mean of information, or a rule of conduct, and has been supposed to hold a place in a train, which it really does not.

Cicero says, "Eventus est alicujus *exitus* negotii."—*De Inv.* 51. b. It is evident, that *Exitus* is a more general term than "Eventus," else it would not be employed to define it. Human sagacity may be more easily deceived in the interpretation of causes upon which "Eventus" rest, than of those means which in some degree lead to their own end. As there was less chance, then, in what the Romans styled "Eventus" than in "Casus," so there was still less in what they styled *Exitus* than "Eventus." "Ut non modo "casus" *eventusque* rerum, qui plerumque fortuiti sunt, sed ratio etiam causæque noscantur."—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 4.

CATENA—*vide* VINCULUM.

CELARE—*vide* ABDERE.

CATULUS—*vide* FOETUS.

CERNERE—*vide* VIDERE.

CAUPONA—*vide* DIVERSORIUM.

CERNERE HÆREDITATEM, ADIRE HÆREDITATEM,

agree, in denoting succession to an inheritance; but the former supposes the heir judging whether or not he should avail himself of his claim, and the latter supposes him accepting and enjoying what is left him. The original power of *Cernere*, which is "to sift," is visible in this particular application of it. It implies that the heir is, as it were, weighing circumstances, and fixing the expediency of accepting an addition to his fortune. A change in the situation of an individual at Rome was held a matter of public concern, and the tax on the heir was proportioned to his connection with the person, by whom the legacy was made. "Cretio est certorum dierum spatium, quod datur instituto hæredi ad deliberandum, utrum expediat ei "adire hæreditatem," necne?"—ULP. *Tit. 22. 27.* "*Cernere* est verba "Cretionis" dicere ad hunc modum, cum me Mevius hæredem instituerit eam hæreditatem adeo cernoque."—*Ibid. 28.* From the above passages it is evident that *Cernere* and *Adire* denote different acts, the former preparatory and antecedent to the latter. Other writers, beside lawyers, acknowledge the distinction stated. "Rogavit testamento, ut hereditatem suam *adirem cerneremque*."—PLIN. *Ep. 10. 79.* The "Auctor ad Herennium" displays his wit by opposing the terms. "De eo, qui multas hæreditates *adierit*, prospice tu qui plurimum *cernis*."—4. 67. Though the act involved in *Cernere* is prior to that in *Adire*, yet, from the "usus dicendi," the order of the words is the reverse of what we should, from this circumstance, suppose it to be.

CERTAMEN—*vide* BELLUM.

CERTUS, QUIDAM,

agree, in particularising the objects they specify, but differ as to the manner in which they do so. The former gives the strictest possible specification of the object, while the latter presents it only as one of a certain class, and marks it by properties that are common to a number. CERTUS is taken both in an active and a passive sense; that is, it either denotes a person as sure of something, in consequence of the proof by which it is supported, or it denotes an object as being fixed or stable, in consequence of its being thoroughly known

and accurately defined. In this last sense only it is to be held synonymous with "Quidam." The two first of the following passages are instances of its active signification, and the two last of its passive.

— lubet scire ex hoc me, ut sim *certior*.—PLAUT. *Mer.* 1. 2. 19.

"Id erat *certi* accusatoris officium, qui tanti sceleris argueret, explicare omnia."
—CIC. *Sext. Ros.* 26. b.

Amicus certus in re "incerta" cernitur.—ENN. *apud LÆL.* 64.

Arboribus primum certis gravis umbra tributa 'st.—LUCR. 6. 783.

The "*Amicus certus*," here, is not any friend whatever, but one whose fidelity and attachment had been long tried, and the "*Certæ arbores*" are trees of a specified and very particular nature.

QUIDAM, it is observed, differs from "Certus," in specifying an individual, by only referring it to its supposed class. "*Quidam ex advocatis, homo summa virtute præditus*."—CIC. *pro Cl.* 55. a. The person, here meant, was one of the *Advocati*, but nothing further is given as a characteristic of him.

Neque pugnas narrat, neque cicatrices suas

Ostentat: neque tibi obstat, quod *quidam* facit.—TER. *Eun.* 3. 2. 29.

The specification, here given, is designedly vague, though abundantly intelligible to Thraso, whose weaknesses are attacked.

— ut *quidam* memoratur Athenis

Sordidus ac dives, populi contemnere voces

Sic solitus.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 1. 64.

In all probability Horace had no particular person in view, and only told a story that might have been true, and from which the truth of his argument received support.

"Certus" and *Quidam* may qualify the same object, without any inconsistency. "*Certis quibusdam* verbis fieri divortium."—CIC. *de Or.* 100. a. Had the Romans been acquainted with no formula but one, "Certus" would have expressed their rigid adherence to it, and *Quibusdam* would have been inapplicable. As they knew many, however, the latter term gives a vague

specification out of a number, to no one of which they were bound to adhere, but from all of which they could not depart.

CERVIX—*vide* COLLUM.

CESSARE, REQUIESCERE,

agree, in denoting the intermission of business, but differ as to the reason for which this intermission takes place. The first, a frequentative from “*Cedere*,” generally imputes indolence to the person in the state denoted by it, while the last always supposes that he is recruiting his strength, by taking necessary repose. Donatus, in his commentary upon Terence, says, “*Cessat* desidiosus, “*requiescit*” defessus.” “Gorgias centum et septem complevit annos, neque unquam in suo studio atque opere *cessavit*.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 79. b. Here the activity of Gorgias is praised, and a quality the very reverse of that indolence, which is the reproach of men, is ascribed to him. Pliny, speaking of bees, says, “*Cessantium* inertiam notant, castigant mox.”—*Lib.* 11. 10. and Columella, speaking of husbandmen, “Dici vix potest, quid navus operarius ignavo et *cessatore* præstet.”—*Lib.* 11. 1.

In such instances as the following, again, the intermission arises, not from indolence, but from the fear of consequences in the one, and a sense of propriety in the other. “Nec ex quo castra castris collata sunt, *cessatum* a levibus præliis est.”—LIV. 4. 27.

Sed quid *cessas* hominem blande alloqui?—TER. *Phor.* 2. 1. 22.

The verb *Cessare* can be applied to beings, only, that do nothing, not to such as are indolent, and do but little. Thus, Cicero speaks of the divine mind. “Cur tam multos Deos *cessare* et “*nihil agere*” patitur? cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos Deos præficit?”—*De Nat. Deor.* 79. a.

REQUIESCERE differs from “*Cessare*,” in supposing the suspension of labour to arise from the necessity of taking rest after fatigue, and not from idleness. “Puella defatigata petiit a matertera, ut sibi concederet paulisper, ut in ejus sella *requiesceret*.”—CIC. *de Div.* 101. b.

— satis est *requiescere* lecto

Si licet, et solo membra levare thoro.—TIBULL. 1. 1. 38.

In the following lines Daphnis requests Melibœus to come near, and lie down with him in the shade, if he could spare as much time.

Huc ades O Melibœe, caper tibi salvus et hædi;
Et si quid "cessare" potes, *requiesce* sub umbra.—VIRG. *Buc.* 7. 8.

The gratification of indolence does not here enter into the conception denoted by "Cessare," which, in this instance, extends no farther than to that of suspending labour. *Requiescere*, too, does not suppose that the strength of Melibœus was quite exhausted, but that the acceptance of Daphnis's offer might refresh him after such fatigues, as he had undergone, and prepare him for others.

CÆTERA—*vide* ALIUS.

CHIROGRAPHUS—*vide* SYNGRAPHA.

CIRCA, CIRCUM,

denote the relation borne by surrounding objects to one or more, which they either partly or entirely enclose. As applicable to the relative position of bodies in space, the two prepositions are equivalent. It will appear, however, that *Circa* is the generic one.

Victori chlamydem auratam, quam plurima *circum*
Purpura.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 250.

The purple hem is stated but as one object, though occupying many points; and the whole cloak forms the inclosed space, within which a centre may be found.

As "Inter" requires more than one governed, so *Circa* and *Circum* require more than one correlative; object. Any number of governed, more than one, suits the former. When that number is but two, "Inter" is translated "Between;" and when it is any one above it, it is translated "Among." If three bodies lie in a straight line, the extreme ones are not in the relation of *Circa* or *Circum*, in respect to the middle one, whether they be equidistant from it or not. In order to give existence to this relation, it is understood that more than two points, equidistant from one in the midst of them, must be occupied, and there is no possible limitation of their number, till,

by their junction, they form one unbroken circumference. But a number of objects may be surrounded, as well as a single one; and this plurality only forms an extension of the central point, and requires the same conditions, in respect to the situation of the exterior objects, as a single one.

Circa and *Circum*, it is to be observed, admit either contiguity or undefined distance, in respect to the object suggested by the term which they govern, and those which surround it. In the case of "Ad" and "Apud," the idea of contiguity is excluded. Nearness to an assigned point, only, is required, from which a certain distance, likewise, would destroy the relation. But as *Circa* and *Circum* admit of actual contact, upon the one hand, so the orbit of the newly discovered planet, the remotest, as far as we know, from the centre of our system, is as much, in the relation denoted by them, to the sun, as the circumference of the smallest circle is to its centre.

Circa and *Circum*, then, in their primitive meaning, refer to objects, which, in a quiescent state, surround one or more in the midst of them. "Tabernæ autem erant *circa* forum."—QUINT. 6. 3. 39. "Nunc omnes urbes quæ *circum* Capuam sunt, a colonis occupabuntur."—CIC. *cont. Rull.* 65. b.

They next refer to objects which go round others, or encircle them by motion. One moving object gives existence to this revolution, as well as a number, for which all that is required is, that it, or they, pass through circumjacent points. "Ex consilio patrum, Romulus legatos *circa* vicinas gentes misit."—LIV. 1. 9.

Hectoris hic magni fuerat comes : Hectora *circum*

Et lituo pugnas insignis obibat et hasta.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 166.

When both the governed and the correlative objects are animated, the circular position of the latter sometimes leads to the idea of their being in the service of the former, and so placed as to be ready to execute their will, and to ensure their safety. The prepositions, in this use, denote the end served by the relative situation, not the situation simply. "Nec sine causa et eos qui *circum* illum sunt, times."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 9. 9.

Et *circa* regem, atque ipsa ad prætoria densæ
Miscentur. ————— VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 75.

In all the instances, illustrating the different meanings of *Circa* and *Circum*, given above, either of the prepositions may be applied indiscriminately. This arises from their being alike capable of expressing the relation of circumjacent bodies to their common centre. The "usus dicendi," however, has limited the power of *Circum*, and restricted it to the applications already stated. Besides these, *Circa* has other meanings.

As the English preposition "About" is transferred from its original sense to that of "Concerning," or "in respect to," so, likewise, is the Latin one *Circa*. In the case of objects that have no local existence, a relation is suggested between them and their correlatives, analogous to that between a circumference and its centre. "Publica *circa* bonas artes socordia."—TAC. *Ann.* 11. 15. "Animus meus perspectus *circa* curam valetudinis tuæ."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 9. 15. "Varia *circa* hæc opinio."—PLIN. *Ep.* 8. 16. In this last example, each opinion, forming the variety, is understood to have a general reference to their common subjects, in the same manner as the place of every surrounding object is determined by its relative situation, in respect to that, which is in the midst of the whole.

As the English preposition "About," too, is taken to signify more or less than an assigned quantity, so also is *Circa*. When the precise extent of neither can be ascertained, this uncertainty is held forth by the undefined distance between the surrounding objects from their centre, which, when no contiguity takes place, may be as great or as small as possible. It is insinuated, by means of *Circa*, that the approximations to the real extent of the mass, or the number, may not only exceed or come short of either, but be modified by all the variety which their minutest fractions can form. "Panis *circa* selibram."—CÆLS. 4. 17. A modification is here given of the quantity of bread, as being ounces, or some fractions of an ounce, more or less than a half-pound. "*Circa* quingentos Romanorum cæciderunt."—LIV. 27. 23. No intimation is here given whether there was a deficiency or an excess, in respect to the five hundred

stated; but one or other did exist, and the historian does not wish it to be understood that precisely five hundred were slain. It may appear that it is not the objects governed, themselves, that are affected by *Circa* in this use, but their accidents of quantity and number.

Modifications of time, likewise, analogous to those of quantity and number, are effected by the preposition *Circa*. Each stated division furnishes a defined quantity, and these divisions are again divided into their respective fractions. In the first of the two following examples the day is divided into hours, and the length of a person's life is, in the second, divided into periods of five years, both of which are again divisible into periods less than each. "Postero die *circa* eandem horam copias admovit."—LIV. 42. 57.

— desine dulcium

Mater sæva cupidinum

Circa lustra decem flectere mollibus

Jam durum imperiis. ————— HOR. *Car.* 4. 1. 6.

CIRCITER differs from "*Circa*" and "*Circum*," in not denoting the position of bodies in respect to one or more in the midst of them. Both it and "*Circum*" hold of "*Circa*," as the generic preposition, extending alike to the points occupied by bodies in space, and to approximations to defined numbers and times, to which last only *Circiter* is applicable. "Cum decem *circiter* millia ab hoste abessent."—LIV. 28. 1. The historian does not say here that the distance from the enemy amounted to precisely ten thousand paces, but to a number either more or less, which he cannot determine.

Circiter applies in the same way to time, whether it be that at which an occurrence takes place, or the duration of an event. "Nos *circiter* calendas aut in Formiano erimus, aut in Pompeiano."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 2. 4. "Dies *circiter* quindecim iter fecerunt."—CÆS. *Bell. G.* 1. 15.

A singular instance occurs in Plautus, the purity of which may be doubted, in which *Circiter* is applied to an object in space.

Loca hæc *circiter* mihi excidit. ————— PLAUT. *Cistell.* 4. 2. 8.

Halisca here limits the spot in which she had dropped the casket, which could

form no part of a circle, by its surrounding the many places mentioned. Nothing is, or could be, said, as to the side on which it probably lay; but it is suggested, that, whatever its position was, its distance from some of the points implied in "loca," like the fractions of number and time ordinarily denoted by *Circiter*, would be but small.

Of the three prepositions, in some degree connected, "Circum" is the only one found in composition. In this situation, however, it exhibits no new appearance, and only superadds the notion, peculiar to itself, to the verb or adjective with which it is connected.

— utrumque latus *circumfluit* æquoris unda.—OVID. *Met.* 18. 779.

Nos manet oceanus *circumvagus* arva beata.—HOR. *Epod.* 16. 41.

CIRCUMCIDERE, AMPUTARE,

agree, in denoting the act of cutting in a round direction, but differ, in respect to the effects of the cut, and the purpose for which it is given. Both agree in regard to the sharpness of the instrument, and to the operation being performed by the human hand. CIRCUMCIDERE denotes the act of separating the parts, whether flat or prominent, of any substance, as they lie round that which they encircle. In this operation the separated parts may either remain in a state of adherence to the body on which it is performed, or may be cut off from it. "*Circumcisas* quoque ad medullam alii non inutiliter relinquunt, ut omnis humor defluat."—PLIN. 16. 40. "Ejusdem spatii corticem *circumcidito*."—COLUMELL. 3.

Circumcide nos ut Judæi videamur.—PETRON. 102.

Dummodo ne totum corrumpas luminis orbem

Sed *circumcidas* aciem solamque relinquo —LUCRET. 3. 411.

AMPUTARE differs from "Circumcidere," in denoting that the same operation, which separates the parts, also cuts them off from the substance to which they belonged, and that that, which was lopt off, was prominent. Like the verb "Putare," it had originally been applied only to operations in gardening, and afterwards, figuratively, to those in surgery. "Vitem serpentem ferro *amputans* coercet ars Agricolæ."—CIC. *de Sen.* 88. a.

“Quæ sit scientia atque ars Agricoliarum quæ “circumcidat” *amputet*, erigat, extollat.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 5. 39. The simplest operation is here put first, as in its proper place. That, implied in *Amputare*, involves the other, as, in the act of lopping, the surrounding parts must necessarily have been cut.

Inutilesque falce ramos *amputans*
 Feliciores inserit ————— HOR. *Epod.* 2. 11.
 — ipse divisum secat
 In membra corpus; *amputat* trunco tenuis
 Humeros patentes et lacertorum moras.—SEN. *Thyest.* 760.

Both verbs agree in being figuratively used to denote the complete removal of something, that was before, either always or occasionally, connected with a specified object. “Delectationis causa quantum juvat ambulare, *circumcisa* omni negotiosa cogitatione vel actione.”—CELS. 4. *ad Fin.* “Ut medici abalienata morbis membra præcidunt, ita turpes et perniciosos, etiam si nobis sanguine cohærent, *amputandos*.”—QUINTIL. 8. 3. “Sapiens solus *amputata* “circumcisaque” inanitate omni et errore, naturæ finibus contentus sine ægritudine possit et sine metu vivere.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 58. a.

In this figurative use of the verbs, *Amputare*, which involves the idea expressed by “Circumcidere,” goes first, but in the following, this order, that appears the least natural, is reversed. From this circumstance it is evident, that very little, as to the true force of synonymous terms, is to be inferred from the place they hold in the same sentence. “Testatur Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias quæ defendi possint: “circumcidit” et *amputat* multitudinem.”—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 35. a.

CIS, CITRA,

denote the relation which one object bears to another, as being on that side of a third, which is nearer the observer, or the thing mentioned. Both stand opposed to “Trans” and “Ultra,” which have the same reference to the farthest which they have to the nearest side. “Prius *cis* Apenninum; postea trans Apenninum, *cis* Padum ultraque.”—LIV. 5. 33. and 35. “Ut exercitum *citra* flumen Rubiconem educeret.”—CIC. *in Anton.* 206. b.

— sunt certi denique fines
Quos ultra *citraque* nequit consistere rectum.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 1. 107.

In all the above examples the strict meaning of the prepositions is, "On this side of."

The preposition *Cis* does not appear, upon any great authority, to be applicable in any other way than the above, which is the radical meaning both of it and *Citra*. This last, however, exhibits a variety of meanings, all of which may be traced to the original one.

Under the notion of the progress of a moving body being stopped, without having reached the point to which it was seemingly tending, *Citra* is translated "not the length of" or "less than."

— peccavi *citra* scelus.—OVID. *Trist.* 8. 23.

The term "Scelus" suggests a point, in the course of that transgression expressed by "Peccare," which the speaker had not attained. Though he allows that he had trespassed, yet he declares himself not to have reached a certain degree of guilt. "Exercitationis plerumque finis debet esse sudor, aut certe lassitudo, quæ *citra* fatigationem sit."—CELS. 1. 2. The physician here mentions three points in the course of exercise: that at which a person sweats; that at which he feels weary; and that at which he feels fatigued. The two first of these he is allowed to reach, but not the third. That lassitude or weariness, which is wholesome, should not come the length of, or should be without, fatigue. "Creat abortus capris glans, cum *citra* satietatem data est. Itaque nisi potest affatim præberi, non est gregi permit-tenda."—COLUM. 7. 6. 5. If the quantity of acorns, that can be furnished, does not come the length of glutting the goats, none should be given them at all.

Citra is also applied to time, upon better authority than *Cis*, and then denotes "before." A particular period is fixed by the governed term for the occurrence of a certain event, and its happening before this is said to be *Citra*, that is, on this side of it. "*Citra* calendæ Octobris seminare convenit."—COL. 2. 8.

— *citraque* juventam

Actatis breve ver et primos carpere flores.—OVID. *Met.* 10. 84.

Between this and the last explained use of *Citra*, in which it denotes “not the length of,” there is a strict analogy. At the point to which *Citra* is applicable in space, the body, in order to give existence to the relation, must be quiescent, when it arrives; and the current time must also be arrested at a point prior to that governed, towards which its progress continues.

Of the two prepositions, *Cis*, only, is ever found compounded, and in this state retains its own meaning, without affecting that of the term associated. By “*Germani cisrhenani*” Cæsar means those Germans who lived on that side of the Rhine next Italy. The only compounded verb with *Cis* is *Cispello*.

Atque illuc sursum ascendero: inde optime sic *cispellam* virum.

PLAUT. *Amph.* 3. 4. 17.

CIVIS—*vide* ACCOLA.

CIVITAS, URBS,

agree, in denoting associations of mankind, but differ as those associations are formed, either by the subjects of one state, or by the inhabitants of one city. CIVITAS is sometimes put for “*Urbs*,” either metonymically, or because a small state may, in its infancy, consist of but one city. The distinction laid down, however, holds very generally. “*Nulla est civitas quæ non improbos cives aliquando et imperitam multitudinem semper habeat.*”—LIV. 43. 23. “*Concilia cætusque hominum jure sociati, quæ civitates appellantur.*”—CIC. *Som. Sc.* 127. b. “*Quam quum locis manuque sepsissent, ejusmodi junctionem tectorum, “oppidum” vel “urbem” appellarunt, delubris distinctam, spatiisque communibus.*”—CIC. *de Rep. apud Non.* 5. 27. “*Xenocrates non dubitavisset quin et prætor ille esset, et Roma “urbs,” et eam civitas incoleret.*”—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 34. b. “The “*Urbs*” here denotes a collection of edifices, and *Civitas*, the community that inhabited them. This appears also in the following passage. “*Tum conventicula hominum, quæ postea civitates nominatæ sunt; tum domicilia conjuncta quæ “urbes” dicimus.*”—CIC. *pro Sest.* 222. b.

The Latins made the same use of *URBS*, though a general term, that the Greeks did of *Αἶψα*. Both applied it, by way of eminence, to their respective capitals. "Oppidum" appears to differ from *Urbs* in nothing but its never being applied, so as to specify a town that is not named. Cicero uses them as precisely equivalent. "Endemum iter in Macedoniam facientem Pheras venisse, quæ erat *urbs* in Thessalia; in eo igitur "oppido," &c.—*De Div.* 91. b.

CLIENTELA, TUTELA,

agree, in denoting guardianship, but differ, in respect to the nature of the protection given, and the circumstances of those who require it. *CLIENTELA* refers to those, who, feeling that they are unable to defend themselves, court the defence of others. The needy and the vanquished are of this description, and they are understood to be always ready to acknowledge the patronage of their superiors. "Amplissimas *clientelas*, acceptas a majoribus, confirmare poterit, et beneficiis suis obligare."—*Cic. Ep. Fam.* 227. a. "Ut quisque opibus, domo, paratu speciosus, per nomen et *clientelas* illustrior habebatur.—*Tac. Ann.* 3. 55.

Thais patri se commendavit in *clientelam* et fidem.—*Ter. Eun.* 5. 8. 9.

TUTELA differs from "Clientela," in referring to those, who are unable to defend themselves, from their being under age, and in supposing that a power is given the guardian to exercise certain rights, for the security of his wards. In the relation denoted by *Tutela*, there are no reciprocal obligations, such as those between a patron and his clients. "*Tutela* est vis ac potestas in capite libero constituta ad tuendum eum, qui per ætatem sua sponte se defendere nequit, jure civili data ac permissa."—*PAUL. L. I. D. de Tutelis*. "Ut enim *tutela*, sic procuratio reipublicæ ad eorum utilitatem qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum quibus commissa est, gerenda est."—*Cic. de Off.* 17. b. "Nihil potest de *tutela* legitima, sine omnium tutorum auctoritate diminui."—*Cic. pro Flac.* 162. a.

COCLES—*vide* LIPPUS.

CŒLEBS, INNUPTA,

agree, in denoting the state of not being married, but differ, in respect to the sex to which each is applicable, and to the state itself having been always what it is at the time. CŒLEBS refers only to a male, whether he has never been married, or is a widower. "*Cælibes esse prohibento.*"—CIC. *de Legg.* 3. 7. The mandate of the censors is here given to the males, who had it in their power to alter their state, and against them only the penalties of the "*Lex papia poppæa*" were directed.

Sed utrum nunc tu, *cælibem* esse te mavis liberum,
An maritum servum ætatem degere?—PLAUT. *Cas.* 2. 4. 11.
Livia sic tecum sociales impleat annos,
Quæ, nisi te, nullo conjuge digna fuit.
Quæ si non esset, *cælebs* te vita deceret:
Nullaque, cui posses esse maritus, erat.—OVID. *Trist.* 2. 1. 160.

"Amissa uxore Lepida remansit in *cælibatu* neque sollicitari ulla conditione amplius potuit, ne Agrippinæ quidem viduatæ morte Domitii, quæ maritum adhuc, nec dum *cælibem* Galbam sollicitaverat."—SÜETON. *Galb.* 5.

In all the above instances, it is clear that the term *Cælebs* applies only to a male, and, in some of them, that it applies to a person who never had been married, and, in others, to one that had.

INNUPTA differs from "*Cœlebs*," in being applicable to a female, and to one, only, who never had been married.

— pueri circum *innuptaque* puellæ
Sacra canunt, funemque manu contingere gaudent.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 238.
Electos juvenes simul et decus *innuptarum*
Cecropiam solitam esse dapem dare Minotauro.—CATULL. 62. 78.

CŒNUM—*vide* LUTUM.

CŒPISSE, ORDIRI, INCHOARE,

agree, in denoting the act of beginning, but differ, as this act is considered as a change of state simply, as the first event in a series that may or may not have been continued, or as the first in a series that necessarily must, as leading to the termination with which it is inseparably connected. CŒPISSE

denotes nothing but a change of state, or the act of passing from a state either of action or inaction, and performing the first deed in a new engagement.

Dimidium facti, qui *cæpit*, habet, sapere aude.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 40.

The poet here tells us, that the great difficulty of attaining wisdom lies in the act of passing from folly, which is opposed to it; and that they, who have courage to do this, are farther advanced in their progress than could be expected from a single step. “Nihil autem erat illo blandius, nihil hoc benignius: ut magis peniteret *cæpisse*, quam liceret desistere.”—CIC. *pro Rabir.* 123. b.

A te principium; tibi desinet: accipe jussis
Carmina *cæpta* tuis.——————*Eclog.* 8. 11.

It was at the command of Pollio, the patron of Virgil, that he relinquished his ease, and began the pursuit of literary fame.

Cur ego id non perpetrem quod *cæpi*?—PLAUT. *Casin.* 3. 5. 57.

ORDIRI differs from “*Cœpisse*,” in denoting more than a change of state in the agent, and referring to an event, as the first in a series, which may or may not have been continued. “Hortensius igitur cum admodum adolescens *orsus esset* in foro dicere, celeriter ad majores causas adhiberi “*cœptus est*.”—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 193. a. The verb *Orsus esset* here refers to the first event in the life of Hortensius as an orator, as to the beginning of a career that commenced early, and happened to continue during his life. The verb “*Cœptus est*,” again, has no reference to the beginning of a train, but suggests only a change of state, in respect to the importance of the causes he was employed to plead.

Nec gemino bellum Trojanum *orditur* ab ovo.—HOR. *Art. Poet.* 147.

A good poet, we are told, does not make the first event in the series too remote, so as to render his detail tedious and uninteresting. “A *facillimis ordiamur*.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 1. 13. “Let us make the simplest facts the first in the train, that those more complex may, by this arrangement, become

more perspicuous." "Telam *ordiri*."—PLIN. II. 24. "To begin the web, by putting the threads in order." "Unde *est orsa*, in eodem terminetur oratio."—CIC. *pro Marcell. cap. ult.*

Celsaque Romanis decerpta palatia tauris
Ordinar, et "cæso" mænia firma Remo —PROPERT. 3. 9. 49.

Here the poet refers to what happened to be the first event in the Roman history, and upon which he was to found his detail.

INCHOARE differs from "Ordiri," in denoting the first event in a series, that necessarily goes on, and has a reference to every step, as subservient to the completion of it. The latter often implies a retrospect of the first event in any transaction, and the former always a prospect of the last, as the keystone upon which the fabric is to stand. It, accordingly, often marks the commencement of objects that undergo periodical revolutions, each part of which bears a necessary relation to all the rest. "Coeunt certis diebus cum aut *inchoatur* luna, aut impletur."—TAC. *Ger.* II. Neither "Cœpit" nor "Orditur" could be substituted here for *Inchoatur*. In men's notions respecting the lunar revolutions, they do not conceive any change of state, as of a permanent object, but the destruction of something that did exist, and the commencement of something about to do so. The verb "Cœpisse," then, would be improperly used to denote an object that had no prior existence, and of course cannot change its state. As men know nothing more uniform in nature than those revolutions, and as there is no visible agency giving a beginning to the existence of each moon, so "Ordiri" would be inapplicable to a progress which cannot be interrupted, and to a commencement of which there appeared to be no extrinsic cause. The passive of the verb *Inchoare* does what neither of the other verbs could have done. It ascribes no activity to an object that is not self-created, and implies a necessary and uninterrupted progress, from the first to the last point in its existence. *Inchoare* is taken, for the same reason, to express the commencement of seasons, and other periodical revolutions that occur regularly, and come, of necessity, to an end. "Favonius ver *inchoans*."—PLIN. 16. 25. "*Inchoandæ* vindemiæ dies."—*Ibid.* II. 14.

Te sine nil altum mens *inchoat*.—*Georg.* 3. 42.

Without the patronage of Mæcenas, the poet would despair of bringing any arduous work to a conclusion. “Natura hominem *inchoavit*, sapientia perficit.”—*Cic. de Fin.* 114. a. It falls to the share of wisdom to complete the train, to which nature has given a beginning. *Inchoare* sometimes denotes the act of finishing what a person has begun.

Tum stygio regi nocturnas *inchoat* aras.—*Æn.* 6. 252.

The figurative use, made of *Inchoare* by Horace, is perfectly consistent with its purest meaning.

Vitæ summa brevis spem nos vetat *inchoare* longam.—*Hor. Car.* 1. 4. 15.

Ennius has brought the first and the last verb together, with a derivative from “*Ordiri*,” into a single sentence; but it is not very easy to catch the ideas he affixed to each. In the classical times which succeeded, when the limits of each were fixed and understood, such a combination of heterogeneous terms would probably not have been made.

Utinam ne navis *inchoanda* “*exordium*”

“*Cœpisset*,” quæ nunc nominatur nomine

Argo.———*Cic. Auct. ad Her.* 12. b.

COGITARE, MEDITARI, PUTARE,

agree, in denoting the exercise of thought, but differ as to the degree in which it is voluntary or otherwise; as to the length of its continuance; or as to the judgment formed upon its subject. All the verbs imply that there is a consciousness of the perception existing in the mind, and an examination of that which excites it. *COGITARE* properly denotes that state of mind in which its powers are not dormant, whether they be considered as active or passive, in respect to the objects that engage them. According to the account given by Varro of the etymology of *Cogitare*, it should seem to regard mind as always in an active state. “*Cogitare* a “*cogendo*” dictum: mens plura in unum cogit, unde deligere possit.”—*De L. L.* 5. 6. 52.

It should seem, however, from certain passages in Cicero, that some philosophers of old considered thought to be as essential to mind, as extension is

to matter. They must, of course, have understood, that no thinking being could, by any voluntary effort, create a suspension of its own thoughts, and that the mind is in a state of necessary passivity, in regard to the train of ideas passing through it. "Agitatio mentis quæ nunquam acquiescit potest nos in studiis *cogitationis* etiam sine opera nostra continere."—CIC. *de Off.* 5. a. "Quoties in eam *cogitationem* necesse est et tu veneris, et nos sæpe incidimus."—CIC. *Ep. F.* 50. a.

According to the ideas of the Romans, then, *Cogitare* denotes that state of the mind, in which it directs its thoughts at will.

Proin tu, dum est tempus, etiam atque etiam *cogita*.—TER. *Eun.* 1. 1. 11.

Were it not in the power of any person to direct the train of his thoughts at pleasure, the command in this last example would have been absurd. It was understood, that a certain judgment, however slight, was sometimes formed upon those objects that engaged the mind. "Docto et erudito homini vivere est *cogitare*."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 349. b. The very essence of learning is here said to consist in thought; that is, in the investigation of those objects that engage the mind's attention.

MEDITARI differs from "Cogitare," in implying, that the subject considered is viewed more attentively, and that the person, exercising his attention, is disposed to prolong the effort. "Ut si quis quum causam sit acturus, in itinere aut ambulatione secum ipse *meditetur*, aut si quid aliud "attentius cogitet," non reprehendatur."—CIC. *de Off.* 29. a. The words "Attentius cogitet" appear to contain the best possible definition of *Meditari*. "Ipse an in senatum ire deceret *meditationi* suæ reliquit."—TAC. *Ann.* 16. 26. 8. Considering the sentiments with which Nero was animated, the part to be taken by Thræsea could not be a matter of slight or hasty discussion.

Meditari often denotes a kind of reverie, which the mind prosecutes with pleasure.

Nescio quid *meditans* nugarum et totus in illis.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 9. 2.

Silvestrem tenui musam *meditantis* avena.——VIRG. *Ecl.* 1. 2.

Tityrus was delighted while prosecuting that train of emotions, which the air he then played was fitted to excite.

In proportion as the attention bestowed on the subjects of what the Latins styled *Meditatio*, is higher than on those of "Cogitatio," the power of stating distinctly the perception, that has passed through the mind, increases. *Meditatio* expresses what the French call "une attention suivie," which is the great constituent of philosophical genius. In a mind possessing this power, the links forming the association of ideas are stronger than in others, and each in the train becomes the subject of patient attention, both by itself, and as connected with the rest.

Though *Meditari* contains every thing that "Cogitare" can denote, yet both terms are employed by Cicero in the same sentence. We may suppose, indeed, that the objects, to which the latter verb is applicable, are held distinct, and viewed "per se;" and that those, to which the former is applicable, being mutually connected, must be examined in respect to their relations with others, that go both before and behind them in the train. "Ea para, *meditare*, "cogita," quæ esse in eo viro debent, qui sit rempublicam in veterem dignitatem vindicaturus."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 2. 5.

PUTARE likewise denotes, that there has been an exercise of thought, and an attention to the subject of it; but differs from the two former verbs, in supposing that this attention has been much closer, and leads to the formation of a decided opinion. This verb, it appears, was originally applied to the pruning of trees, and the lopping off of whatever tended to prevent the growth of fruit. "*Putare* veteres dixerunt, vacantia ex quaque re ac non necessaria aut etiam obstantia et aliena auferre et excidere, et quod esse utile ac sine vitio videretur, relinquere. Sic arbores et vites et sic etiam rationes *putari* dictum."—AUL. GELL. 6. 5.

Persequitur vitem attondens, fingitque *putando*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 407.

From natural objects, *Putare* has been transferred to intellectual, and made to denote a conception, which, like the tree that is dressed, is freed from whatever encumbers and renders it obscure. In the two examples that follow, this verb denotes little, if any thing, more than the exercise of thought, and in so far corresponds with those defined.

Dum hæc *puto*, præterii imprudens villam.—TER. *Eun.* 4. 2. 4.

Multaque dura suo tristi cum corde *putabant*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 522.

In the two, again, subjoined, this power goes beyond that of “*Cogitare*” and “*Meditari*,” and it suggests, that a point has been investigated, and a judgment formed. “*Etiā videtis, iudices, ut omnes despiciat, ut hominem præ se nullum putet, ut se solum beatum, solum potentem putet.*”—CIC. *pro Rosc.* 41. a.

— aliquis forsā me *putet*
Non *putare* hoc verum.———TER. *And.* 5. 5. 1.

Seneca gives us an instance of *Putare* in both acceptations, in the same sentence. “*Turpissimam aiebat Fabius imperatori. excusationem esse non putavi: ego turpissimam homini puto.*”—SEN. *de Ira.* 2. 32. The words “*Non putavi*,” said to be reproachful to a commander, suppose him to have been off his guard, and not exercising his thoughts upon their proper object; while the word “*Puto*” involves a judgment of the philosopher, as to what Fabius said. In this last sense *Putare* falls in with “*Existimare*,” “*Reri*,” “*Opinari*,” “*Censere*,” all of which are separated by boundaries so very delicate, that little ambiguity can take place by not observing them.

COGNATI—*vide* AGNATI.

COLAPHUS—*vide* ALAPA.

COLERE, VENERARI,

agree, in denoting to regard an object as worthy of notice, but differ, in respect to the reason upon which this opinion is founded. *COLERE* is generic, and might be opposed to “*Vereri*,” and other verbs, elsewhere considered, as well as to “*Venerari*.” It applies to a great variety of different objects, but in every instance supposes, that the attention bestowed arises from a sense of the value of the object, and of the benefit to be derived from duly regarding it. It is from the expectation of a good crop that the farmer labours his ground. “*Majores nostri suos agros studiose colebant, non alienos cupide appetebant.*”—CIC. *pro Sext. Rosc.* 16. b.

— laudato ingentia rura,
Exiguū colito.———VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 412.

The spot that is inhabited, however small, is said *Coli*, for the conveniency of those who dwell in it. Hence individuals are said “*Colere urbem*,” and “*Colere domum*.” Thus, Cicero says of Syracuse, “*Coliturque ea pars, et habitatur frequentissime*.”—*In Ver.* 4. 119.

— hanc domum

Jam multos annos est cum possideo et *colo*.—PLAUT. *Aul. Præ.* 3.

— Pallas quas condidit arces

Ipsa colat.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 61.

It is from feeling the excellency of the divine perfections, and perceiving the advantages of piety, that the devotee is said “*Colere Deum*.” Worship, arising from such sentiments, accords with the purest use of this verb. “*Aris colebantur Dii, pulvinaribus, flamine*.”—PLIN. *Paneg.* 11. 3. “*Deum maxime Mercurium colunt*.”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 6. 16.

Attention paid even to a human being, from the same cause, is expressed by the same verb as that to a divine one. Thus, Tacitus, speaking of the insatiable arrogance of Livia, expresses himself as follows. “*Nihil Deorum honoribus relictum, quum se templis et effigie numinum per Flamines et Sacerdotes coli vellet*.”—*Ann.* 1. 10. “*Neque doctissimorum quos semper coluisti, præcepta te fugiunt*.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 4. 1.

Dulcis inexpertis *cultura* potentis amici,

Expertus metuit.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 18. 86.

This respect, paid to living beings, is transferred to inanimate, when they are understood to be the cause of good to those who shew it.

Aurum omnes victa jam pietate colunt.—PROPERT. 3. 13. 48.

VENERARI differs from “*Colere*,” in implying, that the attention paid arises purely from respect to the object, and not from any selfish view upon the part of the person who pays it. It comes from “*Venus*,” and denominates the worship paid to every deity, by that which is addressed to one. “*Deos auguste omnes sancteque veneramur*.”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* c. 20. Sometimes *Venerari* denotes, to entreat, by means of those expressions of respect paid to beings of a superior nature. In this case, the style of the request is

understood to tally with the purity of those, to whom it is presented, whether they be required to punish vice or to reward virtue. “*Quid irascitur ei qui aliquid scripsit contra suam voluntatem, cum ignorit omnibus, qui multa Deos venerati sint contra ejus salutem?*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 85. a. It is here said, that all the deities were addressed, in order to excite their ill will against Cæsar.

Venerans me ut id servarem tibi.—PLAUT. *Aul. Prol.* 8.

Even when the respect paid to a human being is expressed by *Venerari*, that being is held forth as a god. “*Ejusque inventori et principi gratias exultantes agunt, eumque venerantur ut Deum.*”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 173. a. The kings of Persia were worshipped as gods, and Conon was told by the Chiliarchus what would be expected of him, if he came into the king’s presence. “*Necesse est enim si in conspectum veneris, venerari te regem, quod προσκύνειν illi vocant.*”—NEP. 9. 3.

Plautus seems to shew the etymology of *Venerari* in the following example.

— Venus,

Veneror te, ut omnes miseri lenones sient.—RUD. 5. 2. 61.

The worship implied in *Venerari* is transferred from “Venus,” and applied to particular deities, as well as to the gods in general.

Ac *venerata* Ceres, ut culmo surgeret alto

Explicuit vino contractæ seria frontis.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 124.

The same object may excite the different sentiments expressed by the two verbs. Thus, the devotee may at one time pay his vows, from feeling his need of the divine mercy or protection, and at another, may express his admiration of that being, to whom he owes much, but from whom he supplicates nothing. “*Hos Deos et venerari et “colere” debemus.*”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 2. 28.

COLLUM, CERVIX, GULA, JUGULUM, GUTTUR.

agree, in denoting that part of the body of animals which separates the trunk from the head, but differ, as they signify the whole, or certain parts of this. COLLUM differs from the rest, in signifying the whole, without regard to

any thing, either external or internal. “Cameli adjuvantur proceritate *collorum*.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 50. b.

— *collum* obstringe, abduce istum in malam crucem.—PLAUT. *Curc.* 5 3. 15.

Et vix labante sustinet *collo* caput.—SEN. *Hip.* 368.

CERVIX differs from “Collum,” in denoting only the back part of the neck, consisting of the vertebræ, through which the spinal marrow descends from the brain. “*Cervix* e multis, vertebratisque orbiculatim ossibus, flexilis ad circumspectum, articulorum nodis jungitur.”—PLIN. II. 3. 37. “Boum terga non sunt ad onus accipiendum figurata, *cervices* autem natæ ad jugum.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 58. a.

Ad terramque fluit devexo pondere *cervix*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 524.

Cervix sometimes stands for “Collum,” when understood to try the strength of the executioner, or to shew that of the person to whom it belongs. “Offerre *cervicem* percussoribus.”—TAC. *Hist.* I. 53.

— pulcra hæc et candida *cervix*.—JUV. 10. 345.

Dum flagrantia detorquet ad oscula

Cervicem.—HOR. *Car.* 2. 12. 25.

When Cicero brings both “Collum” and *Cervix* into one sentence, he seems to use the figure “Endiadys,” more common among the poets. “Sustinere aliquid “collo” ac *cervicibus* suis.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 257. b. This he does upon other occasions. “Hunc “sertis” redimiri jubebis et “rosa.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 199. b.

GULA agrees with “Cervix,” in denoting only a part of the “Collum,” and differs from it, in signifying that channel through which the food passes into the stomach. Whatever force, then, destroys this part, necessarily extinguishes the life of the animal receiving the injury. “Laqueo *gulam* fregere.”—SALL. *Cat.* 55.

— demisisti gladium in *gulam*, jam cadam.—PLAUT. *Merc.* 3. 4. 28.

Gula nervo et “carne” constat.—PLAUT. 1. 1. 37.

Gula is taken to signify both a nice palate and a voracious appetite. “Numidæ plerumque lacte et ferina carne vescebantur, et neque salem neque alia *gulæ* irritamenta quærebant.”—SAL. *Jug.* 89.

— servire palato,
Namque coquus domini debet habere *gulam*.—MART. 14. 220.

— quanta est *gula* quæ sibi totos
Ponet apros ? animal propter convivia natum.—JUV. 1. 140.

JUGULUS, vel JUGULUM, signifies the forepart of the throat, at the hollow formed by the junction of the “*Ossa jugula*.” As the windpipe lies immediately below this, a cut or a thrust there is attended with hazard, if not with instant death. “*Quod si ita putasset, certe optabilius Miloni fuisset, dare jugulum P. Clodio, non semel ab illo, neque tum primum petitem, quam jugulari a vobis, quia se illi non jugulandum tradidisset.*”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 31. “*Socrates jugula concava non habebat.*”—CIC. *de Fat.* 142. a.

Da *jugulum* cultris, hostia dira, meis.—OVID. *in Ib.* 105.

“*Ut aliquo præsidio, caput, “cervices,” jugulum, latera tutetur.*”—CIC. *pro Sext.* 22. a. In this example “*Cervices*” refers to the act of beheading, and *Jugulum* to that of cutting the throat. All the four substantives, indeed, suggest death in different forms. “*Caput*” has a reference to the blow, and “*Latera*” to the stab, that might be fatal.

GUTTUR is more general than “*Jugulum*,” and denotes both the outside and the inside of the throat, from the jaws to the “*Jugulum*,” properly so called. It is said to come from “*Gutta*,” because whatever liquor is drunk passes through it, drop by drop. “*Guttur homini tantum et suibus intumescit, aquarum quæ potantur plerumque vitio.*”—PLIN. 11. 37.

Quis tumidum *guttur* miratur in alpibus ?—JUV. 13. 162.

Haud modicos tremulo fundens e *gulture* cantus.—CIC. *de Div.* 83. a.

Is mihi, dum resto, juvenili *guttura* pugno

Rupit.—OVID. *Met.* 3. 626.

— liquido cum plasmate *guttur*

Mobile collueris.—PERS. 1. 17.

Juvenal has used *Guttur* like “*Gula*,” to denote voracity.

— rarum ac memorabile magni
Gutturis exemplum.—2. 114.

COLONUS, VILLICUS, INQUILINUS,

agree, in denoting one who lives upon the property of another, but differ, in respect either to the nature of the property, or the terms upon which it is occupied. *Colonus*, from “Colere,” signifies a tenant, who cultivates the ground, and pays a rent to the landlord. He was a freedman, independent of the proprietor, to whom he was only bound to pay a definite sum for what he possessed. “Qui *Colonus* habuit conductum de Cæsennia fundum.”—CIC. *pro Cec.* 303. a. “Ratio ac scientia *Coloni* est, ut ea quæ in Agricultura nascantur, e terra fructum faciant.—VARR. *de R. R. in præm.* “Dare *colono* remissionem ob sterilitatem.—ULP. *Leg.* 15.

— videas metato in agello

Cum pecore et natis fortem mercede *colonum*.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 114.

VILICUS differs from “Colonus,” in referring to a servant, appointed by his master to take charge of his affairs in the country, for the due management of which this servant was answerable. “*Villicus* agri colendi causa constitutus atque appellatus a “villa,” quod ab eo in eam convehuntur fructus, et evehuntur cum veneunt.”—VARRO, *de R. R.* 1. 2. “Illud vetus est, et Catonis, agrum pessime multari, cujus dominus, quid in eo faciendum sit non docet, sed audivit *villicum*.”—COLUM. 1. 2. “Habiti *villici* rem Domini privatamque possessionem defenderent.”—CIC. *pro A. C.* 52. a. It appears, from Columella, that the “Coloni” were freedmen, and the *Villici* slaves. “Quum omne genus agri tolerabilius sit, sub “liberis colonis,” quam sub *villicis servis* habere.”—COLUM. 1. 7.

The use, made by Juvenal of *Villicus*, shews the servility of all in this capacity. He supposes the “Præfectus urbi” to be as dependant upon the emperor, as any steward could be upon the most tyrannical master.

Pegasus attonitæ positus modo *villicus* urbi,

Anne aliud tunc præfecti?—Juv. 4. 77.

INQUILINUS agrees with “Colonus,” in implying the independence of the person occupying what belongs to another, but differs both from it and “Villicus,” in suggesting that the property possessed is a building, and that this may be either in the town or in the country. *Inquilinus* is said to be

a corruption of "Incolinus," quasi "incolens aliena." "Ut is qui hypothecam dedit, pro "colono" in agro, in ædibus pro *inquilino* sit."—MARCELL. *Digest.* 41. 2. 37. "Tabernæ mihi duæ corruerunt, reliquæ rimas agunt: itaque non solum *inquilini* sed mures etiam migraverunt."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 225. b. "Hunc relegavit quod in ædilitate *inquilinos* prædiorum suorum, contra vetitum cocta vendentes multasset, "villicumque" intervenientem flagellasset."—SUET. *Tib. Claud.* 3. The emperor, here, had been offended with the abuse of a landlord's power, who had fined his tenants for selling their ripe fruits, contrary to his orders, and had scourged the steward, who had interfered in their behalf. The former had only exercised what they understood to be their right, and the latter only wished to protect those, over whom he had no controul, and no inspection. It must be observed, that the Romans had their "Prædia urbana," as well as "Rustica," and that the former comprehended, not only buildings, but gardens, and other appendages of a comfortable habitation. Unless the territory annexed to the edifice was of a considerable extent, the whole went under the appellation of "Prædium urbanum." "Proinde hortos quoque, si qui sunt in ædificiis constituti, dicendum in urbanorum appellatione contineri. Plane si plurium horti in reditu sunt (vinearii forte vel etiam olitorii) magis hæc non sunt urbana."—ULP. *L.* 198. *D. de Verb. signif.*

COMES, SATELLES, SOCIUS, SODALIS,

agree, in denoting a connection that subsists between one person and either one or a number, but differ as to the end for which this connection is formed, and the conditions upon which it is maintained. COMES is properly applied to one, who voluntarily gives his attendance to another, as to his superior. That parity, which subsists between a number of *Comites*, does by no means take place between them and their patron. Reciprocal obligations are understood to subsist between the parties, but the duties vary according to the respective situations of each. The attendance of the *Comites* is supposed to be given at all times, but especially when the superior is moving from one place to another, and the attachment of his followers is roused by a sense of his danger.

— tibi parvula res est

Arcta decet sanum *comitem* toga.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 18. 29.

“Creusa matre, Ilio incolumi, natus, *comesque* inde paternæ fugæ.”—LIV. 1. 3. “Quanta illi in oratione majestas? Ut facile Ducem populi Romani non *comitem* diceres.”—CIC. *Amicit.* 113. b. “Non enim paruit ille Tiberii Grachii temeritati, sed præfuit: nec se *comitem* illius furoris, sed ducem præbuit.”—CIC. *Ibid.* 103. b.

SATELLES differs from “Comes,” in implying, that the difference of rank is greater between the superior and his attendants; that the latter do not necessarily act from affection; and give their attendance as the instruments of protection or pageantry, or of both.

Aurum per medios ire *satellites*

Amat ————— HOR. *Car.* 3. 16. 9.

“Janitores ducentos in annos singulos stipatores corporis constituit, eosdem ministros et *satellites* potestatis.”—CIC. *Rull.* 72. b.

SOCIUS differs from the two former words in implying, that parity of rank subsists between the parties, and that each has an equal right to enjoy the good that belongs to their common concern, and is under an equal obligation to take a share of its evils. The *Socius* is actuated, not by respect to a superior, but by love to a party, in the success of which he feels that he has an interest. “Nam *socii* putandi, quos inter res communicata est.”—CIC. *Ver.* 3. 50. “Sed me movet unus vir, cujus fugientis “comes,” rempublicam recuperantis *socius* videor esse debere.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 132. a. The sentiment of respectful affection, expressed towards the fugitive in adverse times, is held the foundation of a claim to become his ally in times that were prosperous.

It is to be observed, that the personal attendance necessary to preserve the relation between “Comites” and “Satellites,” and those, with whom they are respectively connected, may be dispensed with in the case of *Socii*. When the terms of the alliance are defined, any mode of communication is sufficient to maintain it. The same persons, too, may, at the same time, be considered both as *Socii* and “Comites.” In the one case, they are regarded as

having a common fate with their leader, and, in the other, as associating with their friend in a common adventure. Thus, Teucer is made to address his "Comites," or followers, by the endearing appellation of *Socii* also.

Quo nos cunque feret melior fortuna parente
Ibimus, O *socii*, "comitesque."———HOR. *Car.* 1. 7. 25.

SODALIS agrees with "Socius," in supposing those connected to be upon an equal footing, but differs from it, in respect to the principle leading to the association, and to the purpose of maintaining it. Men become *Sodales*, not to promote their interest, but to enjoy society. Their alliance is formed and preserved for their mutual entertainment; it is never understood to lead to any thing disagreeable, and it may at any time be abandoned, without the violation of compact. "Et tempestiva convivia, et pervigiles ludos, advocata *sodalium* turba, solutus atque affluens agerem."—QUINCT. *Decl.* 9. 10.

Pompei meorum prime *sodalium*,
Cum quo morantem sæpe diem mero
Fregi.———HOR. *Car.* 2. 7. 5.

"Primum habui semper *sodales*. Epulabar cum *sodalibus* omnino modice."
—CIC. *Sen.* 86. a.

COMIS, CLEMENS, MANSUETUS,

agree, in denoting kindness of disposition, but differ, either as this quality is natural or acquired, or according to the circumstances of those who feel its effects. COMIS expresses that gentleness, by which we are led to consider mankind, in general, as entitled to our notice, and to shun that superciliousness, which gives undeserved pain. It implies a virtue, which they, who are any how distinguished, may constantly practice towards those beneath them; to the exercise of which, all but the undeserving have a claim. "Erat in illo viro *comitate* gravitas condita."—CIC. *de Sen.* 19. "Apud quosdam acerbior in conviciis narrabatur, ut bonis *comis*, ita adversus malos injucundus." TAC. *Vit. Agr.* 22. "Scævola multa in severitate non deerat *comitas*."—CIC. *de Cl. Orat.* 177. b. "*Comitas* affabilitasque sermonis maxime conciliat animos hominum."—CIC. *de Off.* 42. b.

CLEMENS differs from "Comis," in denoting a quality of mind that cannot be exercised towards mankind in general, but to those, only, who have given offence, and are in the power of those that are offended. It differs from "Comis," as the word "Merciful" does from the word "Gentle." "*Clementia* nisi post crimen supervacua est, et sola hæc virtus inter innocentes cessat."—SEN. *de Clem. in Pr.* "*Clementia* est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi."—SEN. *Ibid.* 2. 3. "Quid ergo opponitur *clementiæ*? Crudelitas, quæ nihil aliud est quam atrocitas animi in exigendis pænis."—SEN. *Ibid.* 4. "Si *clementes* esse voluerimus, nunquam deerunt civilia bella."—CIC. *Ep. Att.* 274. a.

It should seem, however, that the object of *Clementia* is not always, in the highest degree, at the mercy of another exercising the virtue. "Præest huic quæstioni vir et contra audaciam fortissimus, et ab innocentia *clementissimus*." CIC. *pro Rosc. Am.* 32. b. The power of "Ab," here, is equal to that of "Erga," and the clemency is shewn towards the person, who is innocent.

The offence, requiring the exercise of the virtue expressed by *Clemens*, may be very slight, but still it has an existence. He who contradicts another, in the way of maintaining his argument, is understood to stand in need of it. "Etsi satis *clemens* sum in disputando, tamen interdum soleo subirasci."—CIC. *de Fin.* 66. b.

MANSUETUS differs from "Clemens," in the capacity of becoming manifest to men, in any situation; and differs from "Comis," in denoting a quality that is less the gift of nature, than the effect of art and discipline. It comes from "Mansuescere," "to grow tame," which again comes from "Manus" and "Suescere." It implies a change from a fierce to a mild disposition, and this change may be superinduced, either by the person upon whom it is effected, or by another. The change, at the same time, must be a real one, and, by not being confined to external manners, gets the appellation of *Mansuetus*, instead of "Urbanus." "Quæro cur tam subito *mansuetus* in senatu fuerit, cum in edictis tam fuisset ferox."—CIC. *Phil.* 188. a. The inconsistency of conduct, here remarked, shews clearly the idea of change in disposition, which is characteristic of *Mansuetus*. "Illam "clementiam"

mansuetudinemque nostri imperii, in tantam crudelitatem inhumanitatemque esse conversam?"—CIC. *in Ver.* 5. 115. In this sentence "Clementia" is opposed to "Crudelitas," and *Mansuetudo* to "Inhumanitas," which should seem to justify what is said of both. Clemency is needed to correct that cruelty, which is formidable when the offender is obliged to call for mercy; and the gentleness, which belongs to a well regulated mind, to correct that savage disposition, which appears in the general intercourse of life.

Nesciaque humanis precibus *mansuescere* corda.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 470.

"Nam per hæc blandimenta triduo fere *mansuescunt*."—COLUMELL. 6. 2. The oxen in this way soon become tractable, and allow themselves to be handled.

COMITARI, STIPARE,

agree, in denoting the act of giving attendance to a superior, but differ, in respect to the numbers of those who do so. COMITARI may express this act when performed by a single person, or by several. STIPARE only denotes it when performed by a number, and when the space occupied by the attendants is too narrow to contain them with ease. "Herilem filium dum *comitatur* in scholas, literas didicit."—SUET. *Cl. Gr.* 23.

Omnis quam chorus et socii *comitentur* ovantes.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 346.

STIPARE, from Στελεειν, denotes, originally, to pack or cram.

— aut quum fragrantia mella

Stipant, et dulci distendunt nectare cellas.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 432.

Quorsum pertinuit *stipare* Platona Menandro?—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 11.

From the notion of squeezing objects into a narrow space, it has been transferred to that of a number of living beings pressing upon one, in order to shew their attachment to him.

Ille operum custos: illum admirantur et omnes

Circumstant fremitu denso, *stipantque* frequentes.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 216.

Regina ad templum forma pulcherrima Dido

Incessit, magna juvenum *stipante* caterva.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 500.

At sua magnanimum contra Pagasea juvenus
Prosequitur, *stipatque* ducem.—VAL. FLAC. 7. 556.

COMMODARE, MUTUO DARE,

agree, in denoting to lend, but differ as to the manner in which the loan is to be returned. The first verb signifies, originally, to favour by accommodation, without regard to any thing being restored. “*Quibus tu quæcunque commodaris erunt mihi gratissima.*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 13. 48. It then signifies to suit the thing, given, to the circumstances of the person who receives it. “*Parvis peccatis veniam, magnis severitatem commodare.*”—TAC. *Agric. C.* 19.

When *Commodare* signifies to lend, it supposes the subject restored as it was given, and, in this respect, stands opposed to *Mutuo dare*, which supposes the value in kind restored, but not the “*ipsum corpus.*” “*Ait se ædes cuidam ad nuptias commodasse.*”—CIC. *Auct. ad Her.* 40. a. When the marriage was over, the proprietor would resume the use of his house. In like manner, when a person lends a book or a horse, when no other book or horse is looked for, or would be accepted in return, the verb *Commodare* properly expresses the nature of the loan.

The adjective “*Mutuus*” comes from “*Mutare,*” and implies that there is a change of the thing lent, and that the return is made by an equivalent. He, who lends money, then, is said, non “*commodare pecuniam,*” sed “*pecuniam mutuo dare.*” The pieces lent are understood not to have been deposited in the coffers of the borrower for a certain time, but to have been used by him, and he pays his debt in others, amounting to the value he had received.

Miser fio “*quærendo*” argento *mutuo.*—PLAUT. *Pers.* 1. 1. 5.

Ut nummos sexcentos mihi *dares* utendos *mutuo.*—PLAUT. *Ibid.* 1. 3. 37.

Passages have been brought from Cicero, by critics of note, to prove that *Commodare* is applied to money, to corn, and to subjects immediately used. Nay, Cicero himself has been accused of abusing the term, and the great standard of purity in the Latin language has been thus called in question. Such passages, however, have been either misquoted or misunderstood. One of them is the following. “*Se aurum Cœlio commodasse.*”—CIC. *pro Cœl.* 43. b.

It should have been observed, however, that the gold, here spoken of, was in bullion, forming certain images for temple worship, lent by Clodia to Cœlius, and not money in coin. The other passage consists of these words: "At publice *commodas*."—CIC. *in Ver.* 204. a. In all good editions, the three words form a complete sentence, and are not connected with the bushels of wheat mentioned. With all due respect, then, for the authority of Popma, it must be asserted, that the verb, in this passage, has no extraordinary meaning. It exhibits the second power ascribed to it, that of expressing the idea of general accommodation, not of a particular loan.

COMMODUS, OPPORTUNUS, TEMPESTIVUS,

agree, in denoting the suitableness of objects or events to those interested in their nature, but differ, in respect to the circumstances upon which that quality is founded. The first comes from "Con" and "Modus," and denotes, that the thing specified is neither more nor less than it should be, and possesses an inherent aptitude for some purpose, to which it is just adequate. In the original application of *Commodus*, it denotes the agreement of things, as being adjusted by one common standard. Thus, when Horace says,

Miscetur cyathis pocula *commodis*.—*Car.* 3. 19. 12.

he means, that those "Cyathi" were neither more nor less than they should be. In consequence of this equality, each guest got that share of the wine which was, on the one hand, sufficient to excite his vivacity, without producing, on the other, too quick an intoxication. When Plautus also says,

Viginti argenti *commodas* minas.—*Asin.* 3. 3. 135.

he means, that the pieces were of a regulated weight.

When *Commodus* is applied to persons, it denotes their agreeableness as companions. It implies a mental temperament, which is mild from the restraint of sentiments, that always give disgust when extravagant. It accordingly signifies that pliancy of character, which, without servility, endears a

person to those with whom he lives. "Nemo Catone proavo tuo *commodior*, comior, moderatior fuit ad omnem rationem humanitatis."—CIC. *pro Muræn.* 66. "Qui antea *commodis* fuerunt moribus, eos prosperis rebus immutari."—CIC. *Am.* 106. b.

When *Commodus* is applied to events, it denotes, that they are agreeable, as being commensurate to the wishes of those concerned in their occurrence. It regards that medium, the happiness of which would be destroyed, either by defect or excess. "Nihil potest fieri nec *commodius* nec aptius, quam ut scribis. Ex literis tuis, ea quæ in agro Piceno gesta sunt cognovi *commodiora* esse multo, quam ut erat nobis nunciatum."—CIC. *Ep. Att.* 13. 37. & 126. a.

OPPORTUNUS differs from *Commodus*, in having no natural reference to the adjusted quantity of that which is specified, and in regarding the suitability, as founded on the exigency or pressing necessities of those to whom the objects or events present themselves. It comes from "Ob" and "Portus," and its force rests on the agreeableness of any harbour to a mariner, when contending with a storm. The suitability, implied in *Opportunus*, may be discerned either between objects and objects, or between events and the time and place of their occurrence.

Nihil homini amico est *opportuno* amicus.—PLAUT. *Epid.* 3. 3. 44.

"Ceteræ res quæ expetuntur *opportunæ* sunt singulæ rebus fere singulis: divitiæ ut utare: opes ut colare: honores ut laudare: voluptates ut gaudeas."—CIC. *de Am.* 100. a. In the first of the above examples, the friend may present himself either accidentally, or in consequence of being sought for; in the last, the different things mentioned are all the objects of an intended and a keen search. Both examples imply, that the occurrence or the attainments are highly seasonable, from the circumstances of the persons concerned. "Ad hosce proferendos, et tempus et locum *opportunissimum* elegi."—PLIN. *Lib.* 8. In this last example, we see the suitability between the event and both the time and the place of its occurrence.

TEMPESTIVUS denotes the suitability of objects and events, from neither

of the circumstances already mentioned, but from the former being in their state of full maturity, and the latter occurring at their proper season. As applied to objects, *Tempestivus* supposes them belonging either to the animal or the vegetable kingdom, and, of course, having a progress towards perfection, and afterwards a decline. “*Vindemia tempeſtiva.*”—*COLUM. II. 12.*

Aut *tempeſtivam* ſylvis evertere pinum.—*VIRG. Georg. 1. 256.*

Tandem deſine matrem,

Tempeſtiva ſequi viro.—*HOR. Car. 1. 23. 11.*

When *Tempeſtivus* is applied to events, it ſuppoſes them either as returning in a regular viciffitude, or as happening at their proper period, and of course being well-timed. “*Quam tempeſtivos* autem dedit, quam ſalutares non modo hominum, ſed etiam pecudum generi, iis denique omnibus quæ oriuntur ex terra, ventos eteſios? Quorum flatu nimii temperantur calores.”—*CIC. Nat. Deor. 52. b.* “*Ego* vero propter ſermonis delectationem *tempeſtivis* quoque conviviis delector.”—*CIC. de Sen. 14.*

Et *tempeſtivum* pueris concedere ludum.—*HOR. Ep. 2. 2. 142.*

COMMUNICARE, PARTIRI,

agree, in denoting the deed of a ſuperior, whereby he grants a ſhare to others of what belongs to himſelf. Both verbs bear a reference to the generoſity of a donor, but they differ as to the method by which this generoſity becomes manifeſt. *Communicare* ſuppoſes, that he diveſts himſelf only of the excluſive right to the whole of a ſubject, and makes the claim of one or more, to this whole, equal to his own. *Partiri*, again, ſuppoſes, that the property is divided into parts, either equal or unequal, and that the right of each receiver to his ſhare, is as valid as that of the proprietor was, before the diſtribution took place.

When Fabius, the Dictator, wanted to ſtop the encroachments of Minucius, his “magiſter equitum,” whoſe power had been made equal to his own, he tells him, “*Sibi communicatum* cum illo, non ademptum imperium.”—*LIV. 22. 27.* The Dictator acknowledges the power of the Roman people to

destroy the exclusive nature of his right, as at first granted, though no precedent of such an act existed in the annals of his country; but he gives Minucius to understand, that the rights of each were still equal. The command was made common to both, but there was no assignment of certain parts of it to each of the two.

Juvenal, lashing the selfishness of a Greek parasite, says of him,

Qui gentis vitio nunquam *partitur* amicum,
Solutus habet.-----Sat. 5.

The parasite could never bring himself to diminish the advantage, by giving away part of it to another. He retained his right to the whole of that property, which the blindness of avarice made him suppose would suffer in value by being divided.

When *Communicare* and *Partiri* denote the sharing of an evil, in place of a good, the general distinction stated still holds. Though the giver is, in this case, the gainer, yet they agree in supposing the confidence of the former in the good-will of those, upon whose sympathy he relies. "Nam et secundas res splendiores facit amicitia, et adversas *partiens communicansque* leviores."—Cic. *de Amicit. c. 6.* Friendship, thus personified, knows exactly her proper circle, and seeks relief under distress, by sharing the burden with those who are ready to bear it.

— fida ante alias quæ sola Camillæ
Quicum *partiri* curas.-----VIRG. *Æn. L. 11. v. 821.*

The last commission given by Camilla, when expiring, to her attendant, is expressive of those habits of confidence in which she had lived with her. Former cares had been alleviated by Acca being made to bear a part of them.

COMMUNITER—*vide* VULGO.

COMPERIRE—*vide* INVENIRE.

CONARI, MOLIRI, NITI,

agree, in denoting the application of means for the production of some effect, but differ, in respect to the extent of the exertion, that is either understood

or found to be needful. The verbs agree in implying, that the end proposed is practicable; but *CONARI* suggests the use of means of any kind; while the other two refer to such only as are difficult. “Videsne profecto Demosthenem multa perficere, nos multa *conari*: illum posse, nos velle.”—*Cic. de Or.* 266. a. The success of Demosthenes shewed the means to be practicable, and the failure of his rivals shewed that they were difficult. “Sibi cum viro forti ac strenuo negotium esse, qui quum cogitasset, facere auderet, et prius cogitare quam *conari* consuesset.”—*NEP.* 14. 7. In this example the means might, upon consideration, be found either easy or difficult. The courage of Datames was tempered with prudence, so as never to degenerate into fool-hardiness, and to make him suit the exertion to the effect intended.

— tum autem hoc timet,

Ne deseras se. *Pa*: hem, egone istuc *conari* queam?—*TER. And.* 1. 5. 34.

Pamphilus might easily have abandoned his mistress, if he had had the inclination necessary for the success of such an attempt. “*Conantur* nihil, dum omnia timent.”—*QUINTIL.* 2. 4. 10. It is the apprehended, not the absolute difficulty of means, that, at all times, prevents exertion. In certain attempts, to which *Conari* is applicable, a sense of their practicability may be extremely feeble. In despair there is a variety of degrees, and it is in the highest of these only in which there is a total failure of hope. “Desperant, se id quod *conantur*, consequi posse.”—*Cic. in Cat.* 108. a.

MOLIRI differs from “*Conari*,” in implying, that the attempt is always known to be arduous, and such as can be accomplished only with exertion. It comes from “*Moles*,” and has originally referred to the difficulty of either forming or removing the mound, from its magnitude. Its genuine power appears in the following passage from Livy. “Num montes *moliri* sua sede paramus?”—9. 3. “Sed videtis ut senectus non modo languida, atque iners non sit, verum etiam sit operosa, et semper agens aliquid atque *molians*.”—*Cic. de Sen.* 82. a. “Hora amplius jam in demoliendo signo permulti homines *moliebantur*.”—*Cic. in Ver.* 222. b. The radical meaning, of expected difficulty in the application of means, implied in *Moliri*, is increased, occa-

sionally, by certain words appearing as adjuncts, as in the following sentence. "Non cessans Deus, nec quæ agit *molians* cum labore operoso et molesto."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 37. b. The ancients seem to have forgotten the omnipotence of their deities, by applying the term *Moliri* to the operations in which they were concerned. "Mundum efficere *molians* Deus."—CIC. *de Univ.* 4. *ad fin.* At other times they suppose the word of their power to be sufficient to effect their purposes. "Dii nec cessantes, nec ea quæ agunt *molientes* cum labore operoso et molesto."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 37. b.

Illa volans, humeris surgunt qua tegmina summa,
Incidit: atque viam clypei *molita* per oras,
Tandem etiam magno strinxit de corpore Turni.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10.

Servius, in his commentary upon this passage, shews clearly his notion of the meaning of *Moliri*. "Viam *molita*, hoc est cum difficultate quæsivit: per quod et soliditas clypei, et minus firmus hastæ jactus ostenditur."

NITI differs from "*Moliri*" in having no reference to the presupposed extent of the exertion, but to that, only, which is actually made. The effort, implied in "*Moliri*," is always gradual, and just what is held sufficient to command the intended effect. *Niti* originally denotes pressing upon something stable, with all the weight of that which is supported. "Partes terræ, undique medium locum capessentes, *nituntur* æqualiter."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 49. a.

Alternos longa *nitentem* cuspidem gressus.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 386.

It afterwards came to signify exertion of any kind, whether bodily or mental; but in either case it implies, that the exertion, like the pressure, is the greatest that can be made. "Omniaque *nitor*, non ad animum sed ad vultum ipsum, si queam, reficiendum."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 189. b. "Cum uterque pari jugo non pro se sed pro causa *niteretur*."—PLIN. *Ep.* 3. 9. 8.

Saxum sudans *nitendo*, neque proficit hilum.—CIC. *Tusc.* 150. a.
Nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negata.—OVID. *Am.* 3. 4. 17.

Gesner's able commentary upon this passage supports what is said of *Niti*.

“Omnia *nitor*, i. e. omnia tento. Sed verbum *nitor* energiam habet: *nitimur* enim cum labore et difficultate.”

CONCILIARE—*vide* PARARE.

CONCINNUS—*vide* ELEGANS.

CONCUBINA, PELLEX, MERETRIX,

agree, in denoting a woman having unlawful connection with a man, but differ, in respect to the circumstances of those, between whom the connection subsists. The first properly signifies a kept mistress, who lives with a male, either married or otherwise.

Me germanam meam sororem in *concupinatu* tibi

Sic sine dote dedisse, magis quam in matrimonium.—PLAUT. *Trin.* 3. 2. 64.

“Quid quod usu, memoria patrum, venit, ut paterfamilias, qui ex Hispania Romam venisset, cum uxorem prægnantem in provincia reliquisset, Romæque alteram duxisset, neque nunciam priori remisisset, mortuusque esset intestato, et ex utraque filius natus esset: quum quæreretur de puero qui ex posteriori natus erat et de ejus matre; quæ si judicaretur certis quibusdam verbis, non novis nuptiis, fieri cum superiore divortium, in *concupinæ* locum duceretur.”—CIC. *de Or.* 100. a.

In the first of the above examples the *Concupina* is understood to have been connected with a bachelor; in the last, with one who was a husband.

PELLEX, from the verb “Pellicere,” differs from “Concupina,” in almost always denoting a woman who withdraws the affections of a husband from his wife. It is, accordingly, less general than the former term, which applies to a mistress, whatever the situation may be of the person who keeps her. The word *Pellex*, besides, has a reference in its government, as a noun, to the injured female, not to the male, with whom the *Pellex* is connected. Thus, Sallust, in his declamation against Cicero, cap. 2. says, “Filia “matris *pellex*,” tibi jucundior atque obsequentior, quam parenti par est.”

— nisi herile mavis

carpere pensum,

Regius sanguis dominæque tradi

Barbaræ *pellex*.——HOR. *Car.* 3. 27. 63.

Though the fact last stated, as to the government of this term, does not in every case appear, yet, it should seem, it may be always supposed.

Ante meos oculos adducitur advena *pellex*
 Nec mihi quæ patior dissimulare licet.
 Forsitan et pulsa Ætolide Dejanira
 Nomine deposito *pellicis*, uxor erit.—OVID. *Ep. Her.* 9. 121. & 131.

This female stranger, that excited so much jealousy, was to be a *Pellex* in respect to Dejanira, and an "Uxor" to Hercules.

— et matris *pellex* et adultera patris.—OVID. *Met.* 10. 347.

Justinian seems guilty of an impurity in applying *Pellex* to the male, and not the female. "Occiso Cyro, Aspasiâ *pellicem* ejus Artaxerxes in matrimonium receperat."—*Lib.* 10. 2. No such irregularity is found in other writers; who are entitled to the appellation of classics.

MERETRIX differs from the two former words, in having no reference to the condition of the paramour, and in supposing the female to be void of attachment to any individual, and ready to prostitute her favours to all disposed to purchase them. Valla says the term comes a "Merendo: nam mercede suam exercet militiam."

Stat *meretrix* certo cuivis mercabilis ære,
 Et miseras jusso corpore quærit opes.—OVID. *Amor.* 1. 10. 21.
Meretricem ego item esse reor mare ut est; quod des devorat, nec unquam
 Abundat.—PLAUT. *Truc.* 2. 7. 16.

CONDERE—*vide* ABDERE.

CONFICERE, PERFICERE,

agree, in denoting the act of finishing whatever is the subject of operation; but the former occasionally implies the destruction of this subject, while the latter always implies, that it has either terminated according to the wish of the agent, or has been brought by him to its most improved state. They are both compounds of "Facere," and, as such, have a reference to the means,

as not terminating in the exertion of the agent, but in the accomplishment of some end.

The simplest power of *CONFICERE* seems to be that of effecting some purpose by the application of proper means. “*Pacem maritimam summa virtute atque incredibili celeritate confecit.*”—*CIC. pro Flac.* 29. “*Suavitas vocis, et lenis appellatio literarum bene loquendi famam confecerat.*”—*CIC. de Cl. Or.* 259. In the above instances the object is understood to be attained, and no reference is made to any termination, except that formed by its accomplishment. No change could take place upon this object, which received its existence by the operation suggested in each instance.

When *Conficere* is applied to a subject, the materials of which previously existed, it implies, that these are so put together as to effect the purpose of the agent. It then denotes, to form or make, and supposes such a change superinduced upon the subject as was originally intended by him who effected it. “*Hippias gloriatus est annulum quem haberet, pallium quo amictus, soccos quibus indutus est, se sua manu confecisse.*”—*CIC. de Or.* 154. b. When the purpose of the agent is thus effected, the work is supposed to be done, and, of course, *Conficere* implies the act of finishing or completing that which was undertaken.

The work may end, not only by the fulfilment of the intention of the agent, but also by the destruction of the subject, either partially or totally effected. In this view *Conficere* denotes, to finish or put an end to. “*Gladiorum vulneribus et ætate confectus.*”—*CIC. Ep. ad Oct.* 331. a. Though these wounds, and that age, had not extinguished the life of the gladiator, yet they had in so far destroyed his strength, as to make him unfit for his profession.

At other times *Conficere* denotes the total destruction of the object, of whatever nature it may be, as when wood is reduced to ashes by fire, or animal life extinguished by a sword. “*Sica Clodii nuper quidem, ut scitis, me ad regiam pæne confecit.*”—*CIC. Mil.* 109. b. “*Quem ignarum inermumque, quamvis firmatus animo centurio, ægre confecit.*”—*TAC. Ann.* 1. 6.

Non possent ullum tempus celarier ignes,

Conficerent vulgo sylvas, arbusta cremarent.—*LUCRET.* 1. 904.

PERFICERE differs from "Conficere," in being confined to the fulfilment of the agent's intention, in consequence of the subject being brought to its completest state. It does not denote the act of attaining or effecting simply, as in the expressions, "Conficere pacem, famam, exercitum;" neither does it imply the destruction of the subject operated upon. It supposes, that successful labour has been bestowed on this subject, which is thereby brought to its most improved state. "Demosthenes multa *perfecit*, nos multa conamur: ille potest, nos volumus."—CIC. *de Clar.* 206. a. "In omni natura, necesse est absolvi aliquid ac *perfici*."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 2. 35. "Manus extrema non accessit operibus ejus, præclare inchoata multa, *perfecta* non plane."—CIC. *de Clar.* 187. b.

When *Perficere* is applied to a period of time, it denotes that that period has completely elapsed. "Conficere" is incapable of any such application. When it refers to time, the space is held forth as an instrument of the destruction of some other subject, but not as the subject operated upon. Thus, a person, who is "annis confectus," could not be said "Confecisse annos."

Est vetus atque probus centum qui *perficit* annos.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 39.

CONFINIS—*vide* VICINUS.

CONFITERI—*vide* FATERI.

CONGIARIUM, DONATIVUM, DONARIUM,

agree, in denoting a gift, but differ, in respect to the situation of the persons to whom the gift is made. The first comes from "Congius," and expresses, from its etymology, the distribution of whatever is given to a number, in a measure of liquids, that each might have neither more nor less than his share. It properly refers to the munificence of some great person, either courting popularity, or wishing to conciliate the affection of one, and supposes his fellow-citizens, in general, to be the objects of this person's liberality. "Lucullus millia cadum in *congiarium* divisit amplius centum."—LIV. 14. 14. "In Acilium Glabrimonem maxime, quod multa *congiaria* habuerat, quibus magnam partem hominum obligarat, favor populi se inclinabat."—LIV. 37. 57. "Cæsar *congiariis* multitudinem imperitam lenierat."—CIC. *in Ant.*

182. b. “*Congiararia* frequenter populo dedit, sed diversæ fere summæ, modo quadringenos, modo tricenos, nonnunquam ducenos, quinquagenosque nummos.”—Suet. *in Aug.* 41. In all the above examples, the beneficence of the giver is directed to a multitude indiscriminately. In that which follows, it is directed to a single person. “Plancus magno *congiario* donatus est a Cæsare.”—Cic. *Ep. Fam.* 8. 3.

DONATIVUM agrees with “*Congiarium*,” in regard to the respectability of the giver, but differs from it in implying, that a single person is never the object of his generosity, and that those, who are so, are not the multitude in general, but such of them, only, as are soldiers. “Additum nomine ejus *donativum* militi, “*congiarium*” plebi.”—Tac. *An.* 12. 41. “Datum “*congiarium*” populo, cum *donativi* partem milites accepissent.”—Plin. 35.

No exception, against the definition given of *Donativum*, appears in the Latin classics. “*Congiarium*,” however, is by Curtius, and, in one instance, by Cicero, made to denote a military gift. “Sex et viginti millia talentum proxima præda redacta erant, e quibus duodecim millia in “*congiarium*” militum absumta sunt.”—Quint. Curt. 6. 2. “Legiones Macedonicæ “*congiarium*” ab Antonio accipere noluerunt.”—Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* 16. 8.

DONARIUM, used only in the plural number, differs from the former words, in having no reference to the giver, and in implying, that the gift is offered to the gods, and deposited in a temple. “Ornamenta vero sunt clypei, coronæ et hujusmodi *donaria*.”—Macrob. *Sat.* “*Donaria* sunt ea quæ ad ministeria dei dedicata sunt.”—Justin. *Inst. sect.* 8. *de rer. divis.*

Si tua contigimus manibus *donaria* puris,

Hoc quoque, quod petitur, si pia lingua rogat.—Ovid. *Fast.* 3. 335.

In the last example, *Donaria* expresses the altars on which the gifts were laid, but both, as well as the temples themselves, were dedicated to the gods.

— ductos alta ad *donaria* currus.—Virg. *Georg.* 3. 533.

The following use of *Donarium*, by Tacitus, is so singular, that it may be regarded as an impurity. “Citatus ab Imperatore nomen, patriam, numerum stipendiorum, et cui erant *donaria* militaria, edebat.”—Tac. *Ann.* 1. 44.

. CONJECTOR—vide INTERPRES.

CONJECTURA, SUSPICIO,

agree, in denoting an opinion formed upon slight grounds, but differ, as this opinion respects either an ordinary matter of fact, or something evil in the apprehension of the person forming it. Both imply an exercise of judgment, resting upon probability, without full proof of the fact, or knowledge of the thing. "*Conjectura* dicitur a "conjectu," id est, directione quadam rationis ad veritatem."—QUINCT. 3. 6. 30. Where there is full scope for argument or investigation, or where a subject is thoroughly known, what is called *Conjectura* finds no place. "Etiam in tam perspicuis rebus argumentatio quærenda, aut *conjectura* capienda sit?"—CIC. *pro Rosc. Amer.* 35. a. "Non scientia comprehendere, sed *conjectura* prosequi."—CELS. *Præf. post Med.*

— multa concurrunt simul,

Quî *conjecturam* hanc nunc facio.—TER. *And.* 3. 2. 31.

Davus was here reasoning from a number of circumstances, as to the probability of one fact. This he considered as a matter of indifference to his master, whom he was then addressing. "*Conjectura* quæ in varias partes duci potest, nonnunquam etiam in contrarias, nihil incertius."—CIC. *de Div.* 139. a. *Conjectura* refers to the light to be drawn from human reason alone, without supernatural aid. "Jam hæc divinatio est: sed vide ne mea *conjectura* multo verior sit."—CIC. *pro Clu.* 37. b. *Conjectura*, then, refers to the simple probability of a fact, but has no regard to that fact, as injurious to the reputation of the person, against whom it is alleged. The first of the two terms is clearly the generic one. This may be inferred, both from its own nature, and from observing in what way Cicero has opposed it to the gerund of the verb "Suspiciari." "*Conjectura* duci ad "suspiciandum."—*in Brut.* 14.

SUSPICIO differs from "*Conjectura*," in referring, not to the probability of any matter of ordinary investigation, but to the apprehension of some evil, in that which is the subject of enquiry. It comes from "Suspiciere," to look up, and respects the jealousy entertained by an inferior of the advantages possessed by one above him, of which he is likely to avail himself. "Improbora facta primo *suspicio* insequitur, deinde sermo atque fama, tum accusator,

tum iudex.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 16. “Carendum non solum crimine turpitudinis, verum etiam *suspicione*.”—QUINCT. I. I. The evil is involved in “Turpitude,” which is the object of *Suspicio*, and the latter stands opposed to “Crimen,” of which the proof is, or may be, established. “Atque utinam ut culpam sic *suspicionem* vitare potuisses.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 159. a.

Not only may the evil, which is the object of *Suspicio*, be greater and less at different times, but also the grounds upon which it is apprehended. “Judex bonus esse nemo potest, qui *suspicionem* certa non movetur.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 248. b. “Canutius qui quodam odore *suspicionis* Stalenum corruptum esse sensisset.”—CIC. *pro Clu.* 32. b. Canutius is here said to be quick-scented, in discerning what might have escaped the penetration of another. Cicero has made use of both terms in one sentence, in the heat of his argument. “Atque hæc a me *suspicionibus* et “conjectura” coarguuntur.”—CIC. *contra Rull.* 64. a. The orator cannot mean, that the introduction of the Agrarian law both was, and was not, an evil, in his apprehension. By the first, he announces his dread of this democratical system; and by the last, that the fact, respecting the tribune’s intentions, was so palpable, as to be almost manifest to him, and to others, upon the coolest and most dispassionate investigation.

The “Auctor ad Herennium” and Quintilian seem to have used *Suspicio* impurely, by applying it to a matter of ordinary opinion. “Cum ad te literas misissem, *suspicionem* nullam habebamus te reipublicæ causa mare transiturum.”—37. a. “Fit ei spes aliqua clementiæ, non palam ne paciscamur, sed per quandam credibilem *suspicionem*.”—QUINCT. 9. 2.

Though the difference, above stated, holds almost universally, yet there are instances in which *Suspicio* comes very near to “Conjectura,” and denotes the slight knowledge of a fact, which is in itself not evil. “Multas esse gentes sic immanitate efferatas, ut apud illas nulla *suspicio* deorum sit.”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 23.

CONSTANTIA, PERSEVERANTIA, PERTINACIA,

agree, in denoting steady adherence to some adopted system, but differ, in respect to the causes by which one might be led to desert it. The first term

stands opposed to levity or fickleness, upon the one hand, and to uncomplying rigour upon the other. "Pravus, et cui placebat pro *constantia* rigor."—SEN. *de Ira*. 1. 16. But *Constantia* is more frequently found opposed to the other extreme than to that, of which an instance is now given. It is then the reverse of a disposition to change, either from no reason that is perceptible to others, which is styled capriciousness, or from a reason that, in the circumstances of the agent, is held so trivial, that yielding to it is styled weakness. "Tanto consensu rogabaris, ut negare non *constans* sed durum videretur."—PLIN. *Ep.* 6. Had the request, here mentioned, been much less general, there would have been positive weakness in yielding to it, and a defect of the virtue, denoted by *Constantia*, in doing so. Stubborn inflexibility, at the same time, appears, from the passage quoted, to be equally contrary to the spirit of this virtue. "Cato gravitatem suam perpetua *constantia* roboravit, semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansit."—CIC. *Off.* 23. a. "Fortis animus sine *constantia* et æquabilitate nullus est."—CIC. *Att.* 286. b. "Vitellianus miles neque astu neque *constantia* inter dubia indigebat."—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 73.

PERSEVERANTIA differs from "Constantia," in denoting a quality that is never opposed to capriciousness, and implies a steady adherence to a system of opinion or conduct, that has been adopted after mature consideration. By possessing too little of this virtue, men forsake the opinion they had formed, from feeling too strongly the evil attending the support of it: and, by possessing it in an excessive degree, they fall into unparadonable dogmatism. "*Perseverantia* est in ratione bene considerata, stabilis et perpetua permansio."—CIC. *de Inv.* 82. b. The merit of *Perseverantia* continues only while the agent is convinced of the propriety of the object of pursuit, or of the justness of the opinion formed. "Cujusvis hominis est errare: nullius nisi insipientis *perseverare* in errore."—CIC. *in Ant.* 240. a. That *Perseverantia* may exist in a degree so high as to degenerate into a weakness, appears from the following passage. "Primum dico senatoris esse boni, semper in senatum venire: nec cum his sentio, qui statuunt minus bonis temporibus in senatum ipsi non venire; non intelligentes, hanc suam nimium *perseverantiam*

vehementer iis, quorum animum offendere voluerunt, gratam et jucundam fuisse.”—CIC. *pro Dom.* 214. a. By the “*Nimia perseverantia*,” here condemned, those senators are said to have been too much attached to their own opinion, and to have blindly obliged those, whom they meant to mortify.

PERTINACIA differs from “*Perseverantia*,” in denoting an obstinate adherence to a purpose, any how formed, and implies a determination to maintain it, whether it can be justified or not. They, who are guided by this principle, act not from caprice, as in the case of that opposed to “*Constantia*,” but resolutely in opposition to others, who are disposed to make them change their intention. “*In quo non debet pertendi et pertendit pertinacia est: in quo oportet manere, si in eo perstet, “perseverantia” est.*”—VARR. *L. L.* 4. *sub init.* Cicero allows, that the three words under discussion are frequently confounded, though, at the same time, he marks their difference with the strictest precision. “*Ingratus est injustusque civis, qui armorum periculo liberatus animum tamen retinet armatum; ut etiam ille sit melior, qui in acie cecidit, qui in causa animam profudit. Quæ enim pertinacia quibusdam, eadem aliis “constantia” videri potest.*”—CIC. *pro Marcell.* 136. a. “*Unicuique virtuti finitimum vitium reperietur, ut audacia quæ fidentia, pertinacia quæ “perseverantia” finitima est; superstitio quæ religioni propinqua est.*”—CIC. *de Inv.* 83. a. Though “*Perseverantia*” and *Pertinacia* are thus beautifully distinguished by Cicero, yet he elsewhere allows, that, from the thinness of the difference, they are apt to be confounded. “*Duo sunt genera: quorum in altero disputandum est, aliud an idem sit, ut pertinacia et “perseverantia.*”—CIC. *part. Or.* 235. b. In the following sentence, from the orator, we have a beautiful account of the manner in which philosophic disputations should be conducted. “*Et refellere sine pertinacia, et refelli sine iracundia parati sumus.*”—CIC. *Tusc.* 176. a. The refutation of a false argument is here to take place, consistently with candour and an openness to conviction, upon the one hand, and with civility and good temper on the other.

Though, in the instances already given, *Pertinacia* evidently denotes a quality that is condemned, yet upon some occasions it expresses steadiness in

what is laudable, and thus borders on the meaning of "Perseverantia." "Ne patientia et *pertinacia* hostis, animi suorum frangerentur."—SÜETON. *in Cæs.* 68. The obstinate courage of any enemy, however disagreeable to their opponents, is certainly meritorious upon their own part. "Vicit omnia *pertinax* virtus."—LIV. 25. 14.

CONSÜETUDO—*vide* Mos.

CONTEMNERE, SPÉRNERE, DESPICERE,

agree, in denoting the low estimation in which an object is held; but *Contemnere* denotes the absolute vileness of this object, while *Spernere* and *Despicere* denote its relative inferiority, in respect to something else. When the first of these is applied to a person, it suggests a quality more opprobrious than those suggested by the other two. It implies, that the object is held to be of no value, while the two last suppose the objects to be only of less value than something else, with which the speaker expressly or tacitly compares them. In the scale of estimation, there is no point lower than that occupied by the object we are said *Contemnere*; but there must be always some, and there may be often many, lower than that occupied by the objects, which we are said *Spernere* and *Despicere*.

When the idea of comparison is expressed in any sentence, in which *Contemnere* is used, this idea is brought forth by means of the preposition "Præ."

Hic ego illum *contempsi* præ me.—TER. *Eunuch.* 2. 2. 8.

The interval between the speaker and the person, with whom he compares himself, is here made as great as possible. Had the former used *Spernere* or *Despicere*, which, involving comparison, would have rejected the use of "Præ," the point, occupied by the person despised, would have been undefined; but, by his thus using *Contemnere*, this point is fixed to be the lowest that can be.

Livy furnishes us with a sentence, in which we may discern the difference, established by the classics, between the two verbs, *Contemnere* and *Spernere*. The leaders of the common people are there said, "Querí, se à plebe adeo

spretos, ut quum per tot annos tribuni militum consulari potestate creentur, nulli unquam plebeio ad eum honorem aditus fuerit. Multum providisse suos majores, qui caverint, ne cui patricio plebeii magistratus paterent; aut patricios habendos fuisse tribunos plebei. Adco se suis etiam sordere, nec a plebe minus quam a patribus *contemni*.”—LIV. L. 4. c. 25. These leaders first complained, that they were *Spreti*, that is, slighted by their equals in rank, because none of their order had ever been promoted to the military tribuneship, which was open both to them and the patricians. They understood, that, after a comparison of the claims of each party, they were always disgraced, by the preference being given to their rivals. When they reflected, farther, on the zeal, with which their forefathers had defended the rights of their order, by excluding patricians from plebeian offices, the injury done them rose in their estimation. Every mark of respect was now withheld, which the commons of old paid to their leaders. The pretensions of the plebeians to offices held promiscuously, were uniformly disregarded, and never so far honoured, by their equals, as to be even compared with those of their superiors.

The verbs *Spernere* and *Despicere* agree, as to the ground of difference between each and *Contemnere*; but, in another respect, they differ from one another. The correlative object to that, which is *Spretum*, may be either the person who slights, or any object whatever; whereas the correlative object to that, which is *Despectum*, is always the person who looks down. Thus, Ovid says, “*Spernentem sperne*,” *Met.* 14. 35. and he advises the person, “*qui spernit*,” to proportion his disregard to another, to that which is shewed to himself. In the judgment of Paris, again, complained of by Juno in these noted words,

Judicium Paridis, *spretæque* injuria formæ.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 27.

the correlative objects were Juno and Verus. The opinion of the judge was regulated by nothing that related to himself. By the goddess not using *Contemtæ*, he had tacitly allowed, that she possessed such a degree of beauty, as would bear a comparison with that of Venus. His declared sense of its

inferiority, however, had inflamed the jealousy of Juno, and made her indignation implacable against the whole Trojan race.

In the use of *Despicere*, on the other hand, the agent always states himself in opposition to somebody else. “Hiempsal ignobilitatem Jugurthæ *despicens*.”—SALL. *Jug. c. 11*. This youngest son of Micipsa, having compared the rank of Jugurtha with his own, and found it inferior, refused him the most honourable place, which was that between himself and his brother Adherbal.

Fastus inest pulchris, sequiturque superbia formam,
Irrisum vultu *despicit* illa suo.—OVID. *Fast. 1. 418*.

The fair one, here referred to, contrasts the merits of her suitor with her own beauty, and sneers at him, from the disparity which she apprehends to subsist between them.

CONTINUO, CONTINENTER,

agree, in denoting the possibility that certain events may take place between two specified periods, which really do not. But CONTINUO supposes the shortness of the interval the cause why no event takes place, and, from the unbroken connection, the mind infers the rapid succession of one thing, not co-existent with another.

Haud mora : *continuo* matris præcepta facessit.—VIRG. *Georg. 4. 548*.

His mother's directions were no sooner known to Aristæus, than they were executed. To shew his readiness to follow them, he religiously abstained from the performance of every other act. “Ignis in aquam coniectus *continuo* extinguitur.”—CIC. *pro Q. R. 47*. More than the connection between a cause and its effects is here suggested, as the former might have acted slowly, though surely. The application of the water, and the extinction of the fire, being nearly simultaneous, the possibility of an intermediate event was almost destroyed.

In opposition to what is said of “Continuo,” CONTINENTER supposes, that between the periods specified or implied, some event has actually taken

place, but that there has been no change of event. That, which had begun at the former, is understood to have continued uninterruptedly, till it ended at the latter.

As "Continuo" supposes, that, from the shortness of the interval between two specified events, no third can well intervene, so *Continenter* supposes, that, between two periods considerably distant from each other, there is no cessation in the occurrence of a number of similar ones. "Cum esset pugnatum *continenter* horas quinque."—CÆS. *Bel. C.* i. 46. "Biduum *continenter*, lapidibus pluit."—LIV. 25. 7. The strokes of the warriors, and the fall of the stones, took place at no longer intervals than were sufficient to discriminate each as a separate event.

There is an use of "Continuo," seemingly anomalous, that may perhaps be explained by what is said of it above. It is taken to question, or to deny, the direct tendency of premises to lead to a certain conclusion. "Non "continuo" si me in gregem sicariorum contuli, sum sicarius."—CIC. *pro Rosc. Am.* 33.

Quisnam igitur sanus? qui non stultus. Quid avarus?

Stultus et insanus. Quid? si quis non sit avarus:

Continuo sanus? minime.———HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 158.

As, in its primary signification, "Continuo" denotes the quick succession of events, so, in this now mentioned, it denotes the necessary and immediate connection between one fact already affirmed, and another inferred from it as a consequence. It bears its part in expressions amounting to, "Does it follow?" or, "It does not follow." When the whole chain of an argument is seen, with an almost intuitive rapidity, the notion of succession, however quick, is never applied to it. When "Continuo" is applied in this way, a short time is allowed the mind to form its conclusion. If, on the contrary, the dependence of the conclusion is to be traced, through a variety of links, to its first premises, however rapidly the mind may run over the train, the use of *Continuo* is inadmissible.

CONVENÆ—*vide* ADVENA.

CONVICIUM—*vide* MALEDICTUM.

CONVIVA, CONVICTOR, CONVIVATOR,

agree, in denoting a person at table, with one or more associates, but differ as to the relation between the former and the latter. The first term signifies a guest invited by another to be entertained by him, and who considers himself as receiving expressions of his landlord's good-will. "Hunc tu lege *convivis* tuis: sed si me amas, hilaris et bene acceptis."—CIC. *Ep. Att.* 252. b.

Tum me *convivam* solum abducebat sibi.—TER. *Eun* 3. 1. 17.

Ille cubans gaudet mutata sorte, bonisque

Rebus agit lætum *convivam*.——HOR. *Sat.* 2. 6. 111.

CONVICTOR differs from "Conviva," in denoting a companion at table, without suggesting any such connection as that of landlord and guest. The person, styled *Convictor*, is associated, either from accident or convenience, with one or more, who are in the habit of taking their food along with him. The term applies, properly, to each of the boarders at the same table, who might change their companions, if they became disagreeable. "Utor familiaribus et quotidianis *convictoribus*, quos secum Cratippus adduxit, hominibus et doctis et illi probatissimis."—CIC. *Ep.* 265. a.

Me Capitolinus *convictore* usus amicoque

A puero est.——HOR. *Sat.* 1. 4. 95.

Ille ego *convictor*, densoque domesticus usu.—OVID. *Pont.* 4. 3. 15.

CONVIVATOR agrees with "Conviva," in supposing the existence of that relation which subsists between the landlord and his guest, but differs from it, in being applicable to the former. It belongs to that person, who calls together his friends, and entertains them at his table. "Est autem res simillima cænæ Chalcidiensis hospitis mei, hominis et boni et sciti *convivatoris*."—LIV. 35. 49.

Sed *convivatoris*, uti ducis, ingenium res

Adversæ nudare solent, celare secundæ.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 8. 72.

COPIA, ABUNDANTIA, UBERTAS,

agree, in denoting plenty, but differ, according as this refers to the removal

of every want, to what is more than sufficient for this purpose, or to the regular supply of a necessary waste. *COPIA*, which seems to be compounded of "Con" and "Opis," denotes an assemblage of the means fit for effecting any purpose. It stands opposed to "Inopia," which denotes the absence of such means, and which is also derived from the same root. "Nec in summa inopia levis esse senectus potest ne sapienti quidem, nec in summa copia insipienti non gravis."—CIC. *de Sen.* 78. b. "Rerum copia verborum copiam gignit."—CIC. *Or.* 3. 123.

— obnoxii ambo

Vobis sumus propter hanc rem, cum quæ volumus nos

Copia est, ea facitis nos compotes.—PLAUT. *cap.* 2. 1. 21.

The obligation, mentioned in this last example, rests upon the complete supply afforded in respect to the object desired. It must not, at the same time, be understood, that the supply, denoted by *Copia*, is always much more than adequate to the exigency. The term cannot be applied where there is any want, but it occupies all the interval between the mere absence of this and that exuberance, which suggests a quantity more than adequate to any possible demand. "Minimam copiam poetarum egregiorum exitisse."—CIC. *de Or.* 85. b. Though there was no want of distinguished poets at the period referred to, yet there was the smallest number to which *Copia* could be applied. "Ex majore copia nobis quam illi fuit eligendi potestas."—CIC. *de Inv.* 62. b. The "major copia" is here opposed to the "minor," and the existence of that latitude clearly proved, in which it has been said that the substantive is taken. In the one case, *Copia* denotes what ministers to the gratification of the caprice, and, in the other, to the full supply of the wants of mankind.

ABUNDANTIA differs from *Copia*, in denoting greater plenty, and in implying, that the object, to which it is ascribed, possesses more than sufficient means for satisfying any want. It comes from "Ab" and "Unda," and has at first referred to a river, when overflowing its banks.

Præsertim incertis si mensibus, amnis abundans

Exit, et obducto late tenet omnia limo.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 115.

“Circumfluere omnibus “copiis” atque in omnium rerum *abundantia* vivere.”—CIC. *de Am.* 52. In the climax formed in this sentence, the last substantive denotes something beyond the satisfaction of want. It expresses somewhat to spare, which would be lost if not used. “Non erat *abundans*, non inops tamen.”—CIC. *in Brut.* 238. Cicero here suggests the existence of that interval, in all the different points of which *Copia* finds a place. There is said to be, on the one hand, nothing superfluous, and, on the other, nothing deficient.

While *Abundantia* denotes a greater plenty than “Copia,” yet that implied even in it, may be occasionally carried to excess, and to what in English is styled “Superabundance,” when the quantity is so great, as to be cumbersome and useless. “Ludos et inania honoris modo rationis atque *abundantiæ* duxit, uti longe a luxuria ita famæ propior.”—TAC. *Agric.* 6. In the conduct of Agricola, there was, on the one hand, no blamable economy, and, on the other, no needless waste, that might be termed extravagance. “Non illa quidem luxuriosi sed *abundantis*.”—CIC. *Phil.* 2. 66.

UBERTAS differs from the two former words, in referring, not to the absolute quantity alone existing at a specified time, but to the regular supply of a necessary waste, and in supposing the plenty, denoted by all the terms, uniformly continued. The adjective “Uber,” of which it is an abstract, takes its power from the substantive “Uber,” signifying that which contains the milk of an animal giving suck. “Nuper nati mammas appetunt, earumque *ubertate* saturantur.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 52. a. From denoting the regular supply of this juice, designed for supporting the young of animals, it has been transferred to another operation of nature, visible in the fertility of fields and trees. “*Ubertatem* frugum et fructuum a diis se habere.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 77. b. “Facile est remedium *ubertatis*; sterilia nullo labore vincuntur.”—QUINCT. 2. 4.

Last of all, *Ubertas* has been figuratively applied to that inexhaustible store of sentiment and expression which forms a distinguished orator; and, in the example subjoined, the metaphor, begun in the first member of the sentence, is happily supported in some of the words that follow. “Omnis

enim *ubertas*, et quasi *sylva dicendi ducta ab academicis est.*—CIC. *Orat.* 198. a.

CORAM, PALAM,

agree, in serving to denote, that a certain event did not take place in private, but differ, in respect to the degree of its notoriety. The first supposes, that there is a specified number, whether great or small, before whom, either as eye or ear witnesses, or as both, some event occurs. The latter not only supposes all that is said of *Coram* to be true, but comprehends every possible channel of information, and can admit of this being extended to the world at large.

Coram rege suo de paupertate tacentes.—HOR. *Ep.* I. 17. 43.
Nec pueros coram populo Medæa trucidet—HOR. *Art. Poet.* 185.

In the first of the above examples, there is but one person hearing what is said; and, in the last, there is a number seeing what is transacted.

Coram is taken as an adverb, as well as a preposition, and in both capacities exhibits the same power. “*Mihi promiserunt coram, et absentî scripserunt.*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 12. 14.

Palam, again, denotes, that the transaction may be so notorious, as to be open to the inspection of the whole world. “*Cum arma in templum Castoris, luce ac palam comportarentur.*”—CIC. *in Pison.* 84. a. “*Quæ in foro palam Syracusis in ore atque oculis omnium gesta sunt.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 115. a. In these two instances, it is clear, that it is not the circumstance of accidental presence, as in the case of “*Coram,*” that creates the relation expressed by *Palam*. There is in them, upon the part of the agent, a clear purpose to publish what he does, and a desire that it should be known to every body.

Though that, above stated, be the general power of *Palam*, it has, at the same time, a limited meaning, that is not commonly attended to, and which some critics, of respectable name, have denied it. The notoriety of the fact, which it is concerned in announcing, may be confined to a certain number, or it may be known even to a single individual, and it is thus occasionally

converted into a preposition, and brought down to the power of "Coram."
 "Inde rem creditori *palam* populo solvit."—LIV. 6. 14.

Meque *palam* de me tuto sæpe mala loquuntur.—OVID. *Trist.* 5. 10. 39.

CORIUM, ALUTA, PELLIS, CUTIS,

agree, in denoting that external covering, with which the fleshy parts of animals are covered, but differ, in respect to the nature or the state of that covering. CORIUM properly signifies a hide, which, in its natural state, being thick and hard, diminishes the sensibility of the parts, which it covers. The back of the camel, and of other beasts of burden, is, by the wisdom of the Author of nature, furnished with such a protection. *Corium*, it must be observed, is equally applicable to the hide, when on the living animal, and, when separated from the flesh of it, after it is dead. "Animantium aliæ *coriis* tectæ sunt, aliæ villis vestitæ, aliæ spinis hirsutæ."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 50. a.

Herus meus elephanti *corio* circumtectus est, non suo.—PLAUT. *Mil.* 2. 2. 80.

The slave here taxes his master's acuteness, and charges him with dulness, or diminished sensibility. The word *Corium* is extended to the coverings both of natural and artificial substances. "Putamine clauduntur nuces, *corio* castaneæ."—PLIN. 15. 28. The shell of the nut is here distinguished from the skin of the chesnut. "Piscium *corium*."—*Idem.* 6. 24. "*Coriis* alternis in crassitudinem instruentes."—VITRUV. 7. 3. "Calce arenato semipedem unumquodque *corium* struito."—CATO, 18. 7.

ALUTA differs from "Corium" in three respects. It denotes a hide, that is not necessarily thick; that must have been taken from the animal it covered; and that has undergone the operation of tanning. It comes from "Alumen," which substance served the same purpose in antient times, that bark does in modern. *Aluta* properly signifies leather, such as was used by the Gauls for sails, and by the Romans for shoes and purses. "Pro velis *alutæ* tenuiter confectæ."—CÆS. *Bell. Gall.* 3. 13.

Appositam nigræ lunam subtexit *alutæ*.—JUV. 7. 192.

—tumidaque superbus *aluta*.—*Idem.* 14. 282.

PELLIS differs from "Corium," as being a more general term; that is, in referring, not only to the thickest hides, such as those of elephants and oxen, but to those of smaller animals, such as goats, sheep, and dogs. It differs from *Aluta*, in supposing the hide to be either raw or otherwise; and, in its purest acceptation among prose writers, it refers to it, when separated from the flesh of the animal it covered. "Sospita quam tu, nunquam, ne in somnis quidem vides, nisi cum *pelle* caprina."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 1. 83. "Retentus omnis exercitus sub *pellibus*, quamvis hieme sæva."—TAC. *An.* 13. 35.

Nam ut quisque insanus nigris medium impediit crus
Pellibus. ————— Hor. *Sat.* 1. 6. 27.

The shoes of the senator must be supposed to have been made of tanned leather, not of a rough hide.

Nil vetitum fecisse volet, quem non pudet alto
Per glaciem perone tegi, qui summovet euros
Pellibus inversis. Peregrina ignotaque nobis
Ad scelus, atque nefas, quodcunque est, purpura ducit.—Juv. 14. 185.

In the following quotation from Virgil, the *Pellis* is spoken of as covering the living animal.

Labitur infelix studiorum atque immemor herbæ
Victor equus. ————— aret
Pellis, et ad tactum tractanti dura resistit.—Georg. 3. 499.

CUTIS differs from all the words mentioned, in referring to the human skin, and not to that of any other animal. It admits of its being either rough or smooth, and supposes it always in the state of covering the body. There may be some variety in respect to its thickness at particular parts, according to the sensibility required in such parts, as the organs of sense. "Finditur *cutis*."—CELS. 5. 27. "Tonsus ad *cutem*."—*Idem.* 1. 4. In the description of an old man by Juvenal, he ascribes to him,

———— deformem pro cute "pellem."—*Sat.* 10. 192.

The effeminacy of the Roman youth is reproved by Horace, as unworthy of the character they should acquire and maintain.

In *cute* curanda plus æquo operata juvenus.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 29.

Non missura *cutem* nisi plena cruoris hirudo.—HOR. *Art. Poet.* 476.

Cutis is, by a very natural figure, applied to the skins of certain fruits, which resemble the human skin in point of thinness. “*Uvæ et cerasi cutis.*” —PLIN. 15. 28. “*Cute* clauduntur uvæ, “corio” et membrana punica.” —*Ibid.* 29. The skin of the grape was so thin, as to be called *Cutis*; that of the pomegranate so thick and hard, as to be called “*Corium.*”

CORONA, DIADEMA,

agree, in denoting a crown, but differ, in respect to the rank of the persons who wear it. CORONA is a generic term, and denotes an ornament for the head, that may be worn either by a sovereign or a subject. “*Certamini præsedet, capite gestans coronam auream, cum effigie Jovis, ac Junonis, Mineræque.*”—SÜET. *in Dom.* 4.

—— duplicem gemmis auroque coronam.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 659.

The last of the *Coronæ*, in the above examples, was destined for the queen of Carthage, and the first worn by the emperor Domitian. “*Comites et participes victoriæ novo genere et nomine coronarum donavit, quas distinctas solis ac lunæ siderumque specie, exploratorias appellavit.*”—SÜET. *in Calig.* 43. Here an emperor distributes certain crowns, to be worn by his subjects.

DIADEMA, from *Διάδω*, “*Circumligo,*” differs from “*Corona,*” in being the badge of regal dignity only, and never worn by a subject. “*Diadema regum insigne primus invenit Liber pater.*”—PLIN. 7. 56. “*Quidam e turba statuæ ejus “coronam” imposuit; quem in vincula duci jussit: pro rostris a consule Antonio admotum sæpius capiti suo diadema repulit, atque in capitolium Jovi optimo maximo misit.*”—SÜET. *in Jul.* 79. The “*Corona*” and the *Diadema* were here both meant as signs of regal dignity, and, as such, rejected by the emperor; but the former term suits that put upon his statue, and the latter, that intended for his head.

— propriis sub regibus omnis
Terra : premit felix regum *diademata* Roma.—STAT. *Sylv.* 3. 3. 50.

CRASSUS, DENSUS,

agree, in denoting thickness, but differ, as to the manner in which this is effected. The former refers to the grossness of single masses, and regards that dimension of solids, which is called the third, as coming after their length and breadth. *Densus*, again, refers to the thickness, which arises from the vicinity of particles in fluids, or of the component parts of solids, which, taken together, form one whole. “*Arbores crassiores quinque digitis.*”—PLIN. 17. 11. The trees here were measured by the diameter of their trunks, and found to be five inches thicker than some others.

Et subitus *crasse* decidit imber aquæ.—MART. 12. 26.

By the “*Crassa aqua*” is here meant the money that fell out of the purse, which formed solid drops.

— toga quæ defendere frigus
Quamvis *crassa* queat.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 3. 14.

The coarseness of the cloth is here measured by its thickness, which made it so much fitter to protect the wearer from the cold.

The radical power of *DENSUS* appears, when it is applied to fluids that are thicker than when in their ordinary state.

Sed me per hostes Mercurius celer
Denso paventem sustulit aere.—HOR. *Car.* 2. 7. 13.

It was by means of a thick cloud that the god, who patronized learned men, saved Horace from the danger that beset him.

Densus is applied to fluids perfectly pure, when the thickness arises from the vicinity of the drops forming the shower.

— ingeminant austri, et *densissimus* imber.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 333.

Densus may be applied to material bodies, when standing close to one another. The expression “*Crassa sylva*” would be improper, which

“*Densa sylvæ*” is not. The *Densitas*, in the whole wood, arises from the nearness of tree to tree; while *Crassitudo* would mark each tree composing it, in respect to the quantity of timber lying in a particular direction. *Crassus*, then, properly expresses the quantity of matter in a single mass, measured by its diameter, without suggesting the boundaries of a space containing a number. But though *Crassus* and *Densus* are thus radically distinct, yet they run into one another, in point of meaning, in a way that may be accounted for. When the fluid is uncommonly thick, it is regarded and spoken of as a solid. The air at Athens, we are told, was as thin as that at Thebes was thick, which last is characterized by *Crassus*. “*Athenis tenue cœlum, ex quo etiam acutiores putantur Attici: crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani et valentes.*”—CIC. *de Fat.* 141. a. “*Ut ergo illis aqua, sic nobis aer crassus offunditur.*”—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 20. b.

When *Densus* is applied to solids, it always announces a quality arising from the nearness of particles forming their contents. “*Liquidius audiunt talpæ obrutæ terra, tam denso, atque surdo naturæ elemento.*”—PLIN. 10. 69. Virgil, speaking of the different kinds of earth, says,

Densa magis Cereri: rarissima quæque Lyæo.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 229.

CREBER—*vide* FREQUENS.

CREMARE—*vide* ARDERE.

CREPITUS—*vide* SONUS.

CRIMINARI, INSIMULARE, ACCUSARE, ARGUERE,

agree, in denoting the act of stating some person as guilty, in the eye of such as have a right to judge of his conduct; but differ, either in respect to the charge being unsupported by any proof; to the nature of the evidence actually produced; or to the effect of this evidence upon the mind of those, before whom it is laid.

CRIMINARI denotes nothing more than to state a person, before supposed innocent, as guilty; and to require that his conduct, in respect to certain articles, should undergo an investigation. The accuser is, in this case, an

enemy to the person represented as culpable; but he carries his malice no farther than discovering certain facts, which might have remained concealed, or exciting certain suspicions, which might never have existed. “Sed amici accendendis offensionibus callidi, intendere vera, adgerere falsa, ipsumque et Plancinam et filios variis modis *criminari*.”—TAC. *Ann.* 2. 57. The friends of Piso were little concerned as to the means by which they traduced Germanicus, and had no intention to offer any proof of their charge. Their sole object was, to render him and his family the objects of Tiberius’s suspicion. “Jam enim non libet omnia *criminari*.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 213. a. Cicero here declares, that he had, at that time, no inclination to bring forth all the articles of the charge against Verres, though he had undertaken to prove certain articles, which he had already produced.

Hanc metui, ne me *criminetur* tibi.—TER. *Eun.* 5. 2. 16.

INSIMULARE differs from “Criminari,” in having a reference to the accuser’s consciousness that the charge is false. The definition, given of this verb by Festus, supports what is now said of it. “*Insimulare*, crimen in aliquem confingere.”

Criminibus falsis *insimulare* virum.—OVID. *Heroid.* Ep. 6. 21.

“Dicit rem incredibilem, Verrem *insimulat* avaritiæ et audaciæ.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 128. C. 49. The irony contained in this sentence shews the power of the verb. It supposes the accuser conscious of the injustice of a charge, which he well knew to be highly applicable. “Non mirum si quid severius in eam statuisset, a qua veneficii *insimularetur*.”—TAC. *Ann.* 4. 54. The indignation which Tiberius is here said to have felt against his mother, Agrippina, for refusing the fruit, with which she understood he meant to poison her, is forcibly expressed by means of this verb. Whatever reason she might have had to suspect her son, he reproaches her with acting against her conscience, in bringing any insinuation against him. When Cicero uses the expression, “aperte *insimulare*,” *pro Cluent.* 56. a. the power of the adverb modifies the power of the verb, without destroying it. The charge, though not fabricated, was suspicious, and after investigation, only, was found to be true.

It seems to be by a catachresis, or abuse of the term, that *Insimulare* is ever applied to a charge known or believed to be true. Its etymology, from "Similis," from which it signifies likeness where there is no reality, goes against the propriety of this application. Still, however, the authority of some of the best writers justifies the seeming abuse. "Me adjuvant viri boni, cum id jurati dicunt, quod ego injuratus *insimulo*."—CIC. *pro Cael.* 285. b. Cicero was certainly satisfied as to the truth of the charge, to which good men gave oath, and which he, without doing so, was active in leading.

ACCUSARE differs from the other two verbs, in having a reference to the means of proving the charge, and in supposing, that no part of it will be admitted, that is not supported by proof, and by arguments duly deduced from it. "Aliud est maledicere, aliud *accusare*. *Accusatio* crimen desiderat, rem ut definiat, hominem ut notet, argumento probet, teste confirmet."—CIC. *pro Cael.* 6. This verb, then, has a necessary reference to those formalities of a law-suit, that were supposed indispensable. In the case of "Criminari" and "Insimulare," the accuser, the person accused, and the judge, are always different persons; but this does not constantly hold with *Accusare*. This last may denote, that a man's own conscience both suggests and proves the guilt, and also inflicts the punishment. "Non solum a sapientissimis hominibus qui tum erant, verum etiam a seipso sæpe *accusatus*."—CIC. *Frag. pro Caio. Corn. p.* 430. Valla says, with great justice, of this verb, "Est autem *accusare* vel apud iudices, vel apud alium quemvis, vel etiam apud illum ipsum quem "accuses," significare atque ostendere aliquem peccasse."

In the use of the verbs "Criminari" and "Insimulare," the accuser is understood to gratify his malice, by looking on the worst side, only, of the character he traduces. In that of *Accusare*, though he alleges what is bad, yet he at least professes that he is open to conviction, and will willingly acquiesce in such a decision as shall be warranted by the proof. "Sed est iniqua in omni re *accusanda*, prætermisissis bonis, malorum enumeratio, vitiorumque selectio."—CIC. *de Legg.* 3. 22.

ARGUERE differs from "Accusare," in supposing, that the proof is

convincing, and that the charge is, of course, made good. It supposes a fair inference from an unequivocal testimony, so that the evidence presented is the nearest possible to that given by the sense, under which the object naturally falls.

Quin ego cum peribat vidi, non ex audito *arguo*.—PLAUT. *Bach.* 3. 3. 65.

Though a fair inference from a well attested report might have been convincing, yet Lydus asserts, that he had still higher authority to go by, which was the testimony of his eyes.

— amantem et languor et silentium

Arguit et latere

Petitus imo spiritus ————— HOR. *Epod.* 11. 13.

— humor et in genas

Furtim labitur *arguens*

Quam lentis penitus macerer ignibus.—HOR. *Car.* 1. 13. 6.

From the involuntary tears of Horace, the reality of his sufferings, as a lover, might be certainly inferred. The manner in which *Arguere* is applied, as a law term, supports what is now said of its original force. “Indicasse reum est detulisse: *arguisse* est accusasse et convicisse.”—ULP. *L.* 192. *de V. S.* Upon the part of the person, who is *Argutus*, the intention of the accuser is often unperceived, and his own confession, therefore, involuntary. “Ut sua confessione *argueretur*, unum esse reipublicæ corpus, atque unius animo regendum.”—TAC. *Ann.* 1. 12. 4. From the pretended modesty of Tiberius, this confession had the appearance of being extorted, without his perceiving the art of Gallus, who drew it from him. The verb *Arguere*, then, differs from all the other verbs, in this respect, that it does not necessarily imply, that the accuser is an enemy to the person accused, but is consistent with sentiments of friendship subsisting between them.

CRUOR—*vide* SANGUIS.

CULPA, PECCATUM,

agree, in denoting an act subjecting the agent to the imputation of blame, but differ, in respect to its degree, as apprehended in the nature of the action.

Besides suggesting something amiss, they agree, also, as each admits of gradations in its own class, by which the demerit of the agent is tried.

CULPA denotes an offence, that is most nearly venial, and implies a deviation from duty, in consequence of an ignorance or carelessness, which might have been prevented, rather than of a disposition, either to do what is known to be wrong, or to omit what is known to be right. The definition given of *Culpa* by the lawyers corresponds with the use made of the term by the purest classics. "Quod quum a diligente provideri poterat, non est provisum."—L. 31. D. ad L. Aquil. The acute criticism of Donatus upon the following passage in Terence, supports the account given of *Culpa*.

Non mea opera, neque pol *culpa* evenit.—*Hecyr.* 2. 1. 31.

"Bene additum "neque pol *culpa*;" potuit enim fieri ut non fecerit ipsa injuriam: sed tamen permiserit fieri. Videtur unum dixisse "opera" et *culpa*, et tamen non est idem. "Opera" enim est si scientes læserimus: *Culpa* si nescientes. Quorum alterum sceleris, alterum stultitiæ est." "Et si aliqua *culpa* tenemur erroris humani, a scelere certe liberati sumus."—CIC. *pro Marc.* 133. b.

A *culpa* facinus scitis abesse mea.—OVID. *Trist.* 1. 2. 98.

Mihi ignoscas, si quid imprudens *culpa* peccavi mea.—PLAUT. *Epid.* 5. 2. 74.

Corasius, in his note upon this passage in Plautus, approves, upon principle, of the expression. "Recte imprudens; nam *culpæ* finitio est: Imprudentia qua homines circa res alienas vel negligunt quod fieri oportet, vel faciunt quod omitti debet."

Culpa does not always refer to the act of the person who has done amiss, but often, metonymically, to the blame or sentiment of disapprobation expressed by others.

— vitavi denique *culpam*,

Non laudem merui.—HOR. *Art. Poet.* 267.

In spite of what is said by the best critics, and supported by the purest writers, instances do occur in which *Culpa* appears generic, and comprehends crimes of a deep dye. "In hoc genere omnes inesse *culpas* istius maximas, avaritiæ, majestatis, dementiæ, libidinis, crudelitatis."—CIC. *in Ver.* 244. a.

PECCATUM differs from "Culpa," in referring more frequently to positive transgression, than to offences of omission. In *Peccatum*, too, there is often implied a purpose of doing evil, and a thorough knowledge of the nature of that which is done. This term, also, is applicable to the slightest trespass, as well as to the greatest enormity, and is modified by the adjective that accompanies it. "Parvis peccatis veniam, magnis severitatem commodare."—TAC. *Agric.* 19. "Peccavit vero nihilominus: siquidem est peccare tanquam transire lineas."—CIC. in *Paradox.* 3. In the two instances that follow, *Peccatum* is nearly the same with "Culpa," and implies only a defect in attention, where it ought to have been bestowed. "Oratoris peccatum si quod est animadversum, stultitiæ peccatum videtur."—CIC. *de Or.* 95. a.

Si id est peccatum, peccatum imprudentia est.—TER. *Eun. Prolog.* 27.

Cum librum legeres, si unam peccavisses syllabam.—PLAUT. *Bacch.* 3. 3. 31.

In the instances that follow, *Peccatum* signifies trespasses, in which the agent knows that he is offending, and in which there are very different degrees of demerit. "Impetratum est a consuetudine, ut peccare suavitatis causa liceret."—CIC. *Orat.* 212. a. "Peccatum est prodere patriam."—CIC. *de Fin.* 97. a. "Recte facta sola in bonis actionibus ponens, prava id est peccata, in malis."—CIC. *Acad.* 45. b.

Præteritisque admissa annis peccata remordent.—LUCRET. 3. 839.

Seditione, dolis, scelere atque libidine et ira,

Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 16.

Peccatum and "Culpa" must have been understood to be different, as they are sometimes found connected in the same sentence. In this case, the former is to be interpreted the higher offence of the two. "Præter "culpam" et peccatum, quo semper caruisti, homini accidere nihil potest, quod sit horribile et pertimescendum."—CIC. *Ep.* 77. b.

CUM,

exhibits an object, as not single, but in conjunction with another, with which it is not necessarily connected. The relation expressed by it rests simply upon accidental concomitancy, and it is said, with apparent reason, that the

word "Comes" springs from this preposition, as its root. "Vagamur egentes *cum* conjugibus et liberis."—CIC. *Ep. Att.* 8. 2. Those needy vagabonds might, or might not, have been attended by their wives and children.

Haud convenit una *cum* amica ire imperatorem in via.—TE *Eun.* 3. 2. 42.

It was not necessary that the "Imperator" should appear publicly with his mistress, and all that is affirmed is, that it is not decent that he should.

The instrument, with which any thing is effected, is not considered as an accidental concomitant, because it is held necessary for executing a purpose deliberately formed, and in which the agent must have failed, had he not been duly prepared. A sword is the necessary instrument of the assassin. Death may be effected without it; but the mode of effecting it, and, of course, the affirmation stating the event, would have been completely different. "Nullum modum esse hominis occidendi, quo ille non aliquot occiderit: multos "ferro," multos "veneno."—CIC. *pro Sext. Rosc.* 35. a.

Suo sibi gladio hunc jugulo.—TER. *Adelph.* 5. 8. 35.

In these instances the poison and the sword are means equally necessary for accomplishing the purpose of the murderer, in the way in which he chose to give it effect. Neither, accordingly, is reckoned a casual concomitant of the person using it, which relation would have been expressed by *Cum*. The poets, however, sometimes prefix a preposition to the ablative of the noun, expressing an instrument.

Hic jaculo pisces, illic capiuntur *ab* hamis.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 1. 765.

If the sword is not actually employed as the instrument of death, but is either used to excite fear in the person attacked, or regarded as a ground of suspicion against the wearer, the word denoting it may be governed by this preposition. "Imperasse ut in Cæcinam advenientem *cum* ferro invaderet."—CIC. *pro Cæcin.* 289. b. The attacker here only meant to excite fear, and did not actually put Cæcina to death. "Si et ferro interfectus ille, et tu inimicus ejus *cum* gladio cruento comprehensus es in illo ipso loco."—CIC. *de*

Orat. 124. a. The term "Ferro," here, expresses the instrument with which the death of one person was effected, and, as such, is governed by no preposition. Another is said to be "comprehensus *cum* gladio," in which expression the governed word suggests a simple concomitant, leading only to a suspicion against the wearer, that might be well or ill founded.

Cum is translated differently, according to the sentiments of those, whom it represents as being together. A friend, who accompanies a friend, is said to be "for," or "in favour of" him. As soon as the connection is suggested by *Cum*, in any instance, the mind is left to gather, from circumstances, in what way it takes place, and upon what sentiment it is founded. Thus, "Stare *cum* aliquo," *Cic. Ep.* 74. a. would be improperly translated, were it understood to suggest, merely, that one man stood by another. His station is but a secondary circumstance, and the import of the preposition depends upon the sentiment which leads him to act in his friend's defence. "Quod Chabrias adversum regem bellum gereret *cum* Egyptiis."—*NEP.* 12. 3. The sentiments of Chabrias were hostile towards the king, but friendly towards the Egyptians, as expressed by *Cum*.

As enemies come together to accomplish their mutual destruction, as well as friends do so for their mutual support, so, in certain instances, *Cum* suggests a sentiment of hostility, and denotes "against." The malignity of the one, and the benevolence of the other, might have existed, without being manifest, did not that contingency, which marks the preposition in its radical power, bring them together. In the case of both, *Cum* states directly the sentiment leading to the situation, whether amicable or hostile. "Qui *cum* hoste nostro cominus in acie dimicaret."—*Cic. pro Corn. Balb.* 59. a.

When a part is, in idea, separated from the whole, and again associated with it, by means of *Cum*, the preposition is translated "in." "Sic habeo statutum *cum* animo ac deliberatum."—*Cic. in Ver.* 168. a. "Si *cum* animis vestris recordari illius vitam volueritis."—*Cic. pro Cluent.* 32. a. In the first of the above examples, it appears, that the Romans separated the power of thought, and, in the second, the power of memory, from mind, the seat of both. They said, to think and remember "with" the mind, as if this might,

or might not, accompany either operation, while we suppose each to be an intrinsic energy, inseparable from that which gives it existence, and therefore "in" or "within it." When it was said in Latin, "Adeste animis," that is, "have all your wits about you," men were desired to be present with that, from which they could not be absent. So, in the above use of *Cum*, they are desired to have their minds along with them, in order to avoid the consequences of a premature judgment, or a hasty recollection.

CUM, then, may be translated in four different ways.

I.

WITH; as denoting the accidental connection of objects not necessarily together.

II.

FOR, OR, IN FAVOUR OF; when the sentiments of those, who happen to come together, are mutually amicable.

III.

AGAINST, OR, IN OPPOSITION TO; when the sentiments of those, who come together, are mutually hostile.

IV.

IN; when the mental power exerted is supposed to be distinct from the mind, in which it resides, but to be taken along with it, when its presence is held needful.

In composition, *Cum* is converted into "Con," and often signifies that species of connection which is characteristic of it, in its primitive sense. Thus, in such words as "Consentire," "Conclamare," "Concors," it denotes the unanimity of friends, all whose sentiments or expressions go together, without variance. In such words, again, as "Configere" and "Contendere," though parties are together, they are so, purely to gratify resentment, and to engage as enemies.

"Con," in composition," discovers a general intensive influence, affecting the simple term, according to its nature. The intrinsic power possessed by the person, to whom "Compos" is applied, is higher than that involved in the simple "Potis," representing the old nominative. The first implies a

complete mastery, so as to be able to use and to direct something at will; the latter only a power adequate to the production of a given effect, and no more. "Corpore atque animo vix præ gaudio "compotes."—LIV. 4. 40. A complete command, both of body and mind, is essential to one in a sound state.

— nec tendere contra,

Ille quidem hoc cupiens "potis" est per tela virosque.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 795.

All Turnus wanted was to effect his escape, which he was unable to accomplish; but the term "Compos" could not have been employed to express his situation.

The same is the case with the words "Scius" and "Conscius," the former of which denotes knowledge simply, as opposed to ignorance. The latter, again, denotes the completest knowledge possible, being that which mind has of itself, and implying the fullest conviction of its truth.

The influence of "Con" upon verbs is the same with that upon adjectives. "Edere" signifies to eat, without any reference to the keenness of the eater, or to the quantity eaten, while "Comedere" constantly refers to one or both. "Usque eo non fuit popularis, ut bona solus "comesset."—CIC. *pro Sest.* 24. b.

Tam facile vinces, quam vulpes pyrum "comedit."—PLAUT. *Most.* 3. 1. 32.

In these instances the mind is led directly to the voracity of the eater, or to the extent of the consumption, or to both together.

In the verb "Compellere," when applied to a number of separate objects brought together, "Con" seems to put forth its radical power, and, when applied to a single one, to exert this intensive one.

"Compulerantque" gregem Corydon et Thyrsis in unum.—VIRG. *Eccl.* 7. 2.

"Compulerant" regem jussa nefanda pati.—OVID *Fast.* 3. 860.

CUMULUS, ACERVUS, STRAGES,

agree, in denoting a multiplicity of objects of the same nature, that have been either accidentally or intentionally brought together.

CUMULUS, which may come from *Κυμα*, "fluctus," differs from the other

two, in being applicable to fluids, as well as solids. It also refers to a measure of capacity, and to such a superabundance of parts, which compose the heap, as will cause an overflowing of that measure. Hence it signifies that which renders either happiness or misery complete. "Consulis corpus eo die, quia obrutum superstratis Gallorum *cumulis* erat, inveniri non potuit."—LIV. 10. 29.

Cum mare surrexit, *cumulusque* immensus aquarum

In montis speciem curvari et crescere visus.—OVID. *Met.* 15. 508.

"Mille equites *cumulus* prosperis aut subsidium laborantibus ducebantur."—TAC. *Hist.* 2. 24.

— et addit

Perfidiae *cumulum* falsis perjuriam verbis.—OVID. *Met.* 11. 205.

Malorum maximus *cumulus*.—SEN. *Hippol.* 1119.

Such instances as the two last, in which *cumulus* denotes an addition to what is evil, are rarely to be found among the poets, and never among the pure prose-writers.

ACERVUS differs from "Cumulus," in always referring to the intention of the person who forms it; in being applicable only to solids; and in having no regard to any measure, whether overflowing or filled in part. The constituents of an *Acervus* are supposed to be piled up one above another, and to be held together by nothing containing them. When the term is applied to corn, it must be understood as necessarily referring to grains of the same species, else it would be confounded with "Farrago." "Ut *acervus* ex sui generis granis, sic vita beata ex sui similibus partibus effici debeat."—CIC. *Tusc.* 5. 45.

At ni id fit, quid habet pulcri constructus *acervus*?—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 1. 44.

The term "Cumulus" is clearly of greater extent than *Acervus*, and may be made to comprehend it. This appears in the following instance. "Immensus aliarum super alias *acervatarum* legum "cumulus."—LIV. 3. 34. In this figurative use of the terms, the *Acervi* are made the component parts of the "Cumulus," as the "Leges" were of the *Acervi*. It is difficult to

discover upon what authority the great Buchanan has, in his Psalms, used the expression "*Acervus aquæ*."

STRAGES, like "*Acervus*," can never be applied to fluids, and has no reference to the filling of any measure. It may occasionally denote similar objects lying above one another. This position, however, must be the effect of accident, and not of intention, upon the part of the person acting. The intention of the agent goes no farther than to the act of levelling or laying flat a number of similar objects, in effecting which he is successful. No one position is more natural to the component parts of a "*Cumulus*" and an "*Acervus*" than another: but the specific power of *Strages* arises from such objects being made to change their natural, which is an erect posture, and to take a horizontal one, and from these objects, both before and after their fall, being in a state either of contact or of close vicinity. "*Per vicos late stragem dedere*."—LIV. 8. 30.

Qualis ubi ad terras abrupto sidere nimbus,

— dabit ille ruinas,

Arboribus *stragemque* satis, ruet omnia late.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 451.

Procubuisse super confusæ *stragis* acervum.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 504.

From the expression "*Confusæ stragis*," in the last example, some critics have understood, that the same strict similarity in the component objects, necessary to form a "*Cumulus*" and an "*Acervus*," may be dispensed with in that which is styled a *Strages*. This conclusion seems to be ill-founded. The subjects, on which Deiphobus was supposed to have lain, were all human carcasses, though he was ignorant as to the names and characters of those Greeks who fell by his sword, and whose dead bodies, on that account, formed the "*Confusa strages*."

Tacitus appears to use *Strages* not very regularly, when he applies it to the overturn of a solid mass. In this case, one body, only, falls, and the vicinity, that before subsisted between its component particles, is but slightly disturbed. "*Tiberis strage obstantis molis refusus*."—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 86.

CUNCTARI, MORARI,

agree, in denoting the act of delaying the execution of some transaction, but differ, as to the cause for which the delay takes place. The first verb refers to the designed slowness of the process, with a view to its success; the second, to the prolonged interval between the period at which it should, and that at which it does actually, commence, originating from the indolence of the agent. Grammarians derive CUNCTARI from "Cunctus." They talk of the difficulty and consequent delay, in moving all the constituents of a whole at once; and upon this, perhaps, as upon some other occasions, present their readers with a play of fancy, in place of a fact in their science.

The compliment paid by Ennius to Fabius, styled *Cunctator*, could not have been expressed by any derivative from "Morari."

Unus homo nobis *cunctando* restituit rem,
Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem,
Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret.

The intention of Fabius was to watch the motions of Hannibal, and not to fight him. He was, in the mean time, always upon his guard, and designedly putting off the crisis, for which his antagonist wished. It was no wonder, then, that when the Carthaginian saw the Roman troops hovering upon the mountains around him, he exclaimed, that he was afraid that cloud would end in a storm.

"*Cunctatorem* ex acerrimo bellatore factum."—LIV. 6. 23. "Sed assequar omnia si propero: si *cunctor*; amitto."—CIC. *Ep. Att.* 160. b. The verbs "Properare" and *Cunctari* are here stated in direct opposition. The first signifies hurrying through the business in any way, and the other, performing it at leisure. From the following very elegant sentence in Livy, it is clear, that the slowness implied in *Cunctari* proceeds from no constitutional laziness, but from considerations of prudence. "Dein propalam in vulgus pro *cunctatore* segnem, pro cauto timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat."—LIV. 22. 12. "An etiam tunc quiesceretis, *cunctaremini*, timeretis, cum rempublicam a facinorosissimis sicariis et a servis esse oppressam atque occupatam videretis."—CIC. *pro P. Sex.* 20. b. By means of

Cunctaremini, here, the orator upbraids his hearers, not with the want of activity, as implied in “*Quiesceretis*,” but with the want of judgment, in not seeing and seizing the critical time, in which exertion might still save the state, bad as its situation was. *Cunctari*, then, denotes to hesitate, or to deliberate; as to the opinion to be formed, or the action to be done. During the time of this suspense, the mind is understood to be engaged, and the adopted delay is considered as subservient to the success of an event that is not casual.

The figurative uses of *Cunctari* are strictly consonant with what is said as to its literal one. “*Quam ob causam non est cunctandum profiteri, hunc mundum animal esse.*”—*CIC. de Un.* 169. b. “*Inter cunctationem ingrediendi flumen, ab hostibus oppressi.*”—*LIV.* 21. 56.

MORARI differs from “*Cunctari*,” in implying, that the delay, proceeding from indolence upon the part of the agent, is by no means conducive to the success of the transaction. “*Deinde alius existet, qui reliquas impediatur; sic multum ac diu ludetur, atque ita diu, ut plus biennium in his tricis moretur.*” *CIC. Ep. Fam.* 8. 5.

*Æneæ subiit mucronem, ipsumque morando
Sustinuit* ————— *VIRG. Æn.* 10.

In the above examples *Morari* denotes the delay of an event, which might have commenced sooner, and marks the interval between its possible and its actual occurrence. It presents the agent as being either dilatory in the execution of his own designs, or as impeding those of others. “*Cunctari*,” again, only regards the slow manner in which a person, either intending to act or already engaged, chuses to execute the transaction, in order to give it effect. “*Quatuor tribunorum, adversus unum moratorem publici commodi, auxilio, delectum consules habent.*”—*LIV.* 2. 4.

*Jam mare turbari trabibus, sævasque videbis
Collucere faces; jam fervere littora flammis,
Sī te his attigerit terris Aurora morantem.
Eia age, rumpe moras.* ————— *VIRG. Æn.* 4. 566.

When the agent is successful, in consequence of not hurrying the transaction

in which he happens to be engaged, the verb “Cunctari,” only, can be properly applied to his conduct. If he fails, however, *Morari*, which generally charges the agent with indolence, may refer to the want of judgment, and state it as the cause of failure. “Luceius narravit Brutum valde *morari*, non tergiversantem, sed expectantem, si qui forte casus,” &c.—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 16. 5.

CUPERE—*vide* VELLE.

CURA, SOLLICITUDO, ANGOR, ANXIETAS, ÆRUMNA, agree, in denoting a state of mind that is disagreeable to those who labour under it, and that attracts their attention to its supposed cause, as long as it lasts; but differ, as the distress is more or less grievous, or according to the circumstances with which it is attended. CURA differs from the other words, in implying, that its cause is not always disagreeable, and that, when this is the case, it may at times cease to solicit attention. “Ægyptii omnem *curam* in siderum cognitione posuerunt.”—CIC. *de Div.* 99. b. The pursuit of those astronomical studies, being voluntary upon the part of the Egyptians, was certainly not disagreeable; and the most zealous inquirers into truth must occasionally quit their investigations, for the purpose of amusement, or of attending to ordinary business.

Annus et inversas duxerit ante vices,

Quam tua sub nostro mutetur pectore *cura*.—PROPERT. 1. 15. 29.

Cyrene soror; ipse tibi, tua maxima *cura*

Tristis Aristæus.———VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 354.

“Omnes meas *curas* in rempublicam confero.”—CIC. *de Offic.* 33. a. Cicero’s zeal, as a patriot, would certainly make the state an agreeable object of his attention; but, however agreeable, we cannot suppose it to have been his only one.

In the above examples, *Cura* signifies an object of attention, that gives no pain to the person who pursues it, and that may occasionally give place to others. In those that follow, we find it denoting objects that are highly disagreeable, and that rarely, if ever, cease to engage the sufferer’s attention. “Vos vero et præsentem me *cura* levatis, et absentem magna solatia dedistis.”—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 165. b.

O fortes pejoraque passi

Mecum sæpe viri, nunc vino pellite *curas*.—HOR. *Car.* 1. 7. 30.

Among those disagreeable states of mind, styled *Curæ*, there has been an immense variety. “Loquuntur leves *curæ*, ingentes stupent.”—SENEC. *Hippol.* 607. Besides the intermediate species, which must have been numerous, it would not be easy to recount those in the extremes, which, on the one hand, prompt the sufferer to seek relief by expression, or, on the other, overwhelm and put him to silence.

SOLLICITUDO differs from “Cura,” in implying, that its object is never agreeable, and that it attracts the attention of the sufferer without remission. Nothing can be drawn from the etymology of *Sollicitus*, in tracing of which the critics have indulged themselves in a variety of conjectures. The following distinction between “Cura” and *Sollicitudo*, made by Donatus, may, in some few instances, but does not always, hold. “Cura” est in spe bonorum: *sollicitudo* in metu malorum.”

Cicero’s definition is, “*Sollicitudo* est ægritudo cum cogitatione.”—*Tusc.* 213. a. In this he expresses both distress of mind and the direction of the sufferer’s attention. “*Sollicitudo* conscientiæ vexat impios.”—*Cic. de Legg.* 164. a. “Easque ipsas *sollicitudines*, quibus eorum animi noctes diesque exeduntur, Diis immortalibus supplicii causa importari putant.”—*Cic. de Fin.* 1. 51. “Cæsar mihi tantum studium, tantam etiam “curam:” nimium est enim dicere, *sollicitudinem* præstitit.”—*PLIN. Lib. 2. Ep.* 11. “Curam” ergo verborum, rerum volo esse *sollicitudinem*.”—*QUINCT. in Proæm. Lib.* 8. The critic’s expression here is happy, and worthy of that high taste in composition, for which he is justly distinguished. He insinuates, by the “Curam verborum,” that an incorrect expression, though a blemish, is venial; and, by the “*Rerum sollicitudinem*,” that an inaccurate thought is not entitled to the same indulgence. The writer’s attention, then, may at times flag in respect to his words, without giving much offence; but if there be the least remission of it in regard to his matter, he has no right to expect his reader’s forgiveness.

ANGOR, from the verb "Angere," differs from the words already defined, in respect to the acuteness of the pain denoted by it, and to this pain extending both to mind and body. The pain, too, is not only intense, but unceasing, "*Angor est animi vel corporis cruciatus, proprie a Græco συναγχνη i. e. strangulatione dictus.*"—FESTUS. "*Angor est ægritudo premens.*"—CIC. *Tusc.* 213. a. Cicero's definition extends only to the mental pain denoted by *Angor*, but clearly intimates its severity. "Nec me *angoribus* dedidi quibus essem confectus, nisi restitsem, nec rursus indignis homine docto voluptatibus."—CIC. *de Offic.* 33. a.

ANXIETAS, connected with "Angor," as coming from the same root, differs from it, in referring, not to the actual state of pain, but to the propensity to that state. The intermissions of uneasiness, denoted by *Anxietas*, are necessary, and not incidental, like those by "Cura." The paroxysms of pain, however, are more violent while they last, and equal to what is expressed by "Angor." "In aliis *Anxietas*, in aliis iracundia efficitur, quæ ab ira differt: estque aliud iracundum esse, aliud iratum: ut differt *anxietas* ab "angore." Neque enim omnes anxii qui anguntur aliquando, nec qui anxii semper anguntur: ut inter ebrietatem et ebriositatem interest: aliudque est amatorem esse, aliud amantem."—CIC. *Tusc.* 4. 27.

ÆRUMNA signifies a state of pain, to which the sufferer is necessarily subjected; and from which he feels there is a possibility of his extricating himself. It supposes him exercising his fortitude in the midst of evils, under which he scorns to succumb. In the case of the other words, the arrival and the removal of the distress, denoted by each, are understood to be casual events. He, who is afflicted with *Ærumnæ*, may be unconscious of any fatality, by which he is doomed to a state of distress; but he must feel that state to be the trial of certain talents, which it is certainly in his power, and will, in all probability, be for his interest to exert. "Vel Herculis perpeti *ærumnas* (sic enim majores nostri labores non fugiendos, tristissimo tamen verbo, *ærumnas* etiam in Deo nominaverunt) exigerem ex te."—CIC. *de Fin.* 147. b. "*Ærumna* est ægritudo laboriosa."—CIC. *Tusc.* 213. a. In the first of these

examples, Cicero states the inevitability of the distress denoted by *Ærumna*, and in the last, the exertion needful to combat this distress successfully.

Animus æquus optimum *ærumne* condimentum.—PLAUT. *Rud.* 2. 3. 71.

This composure of mind may alleviate the distress of the sufferer, but it must not go too far, so as to repress his activity. Like the sauce, it only heightens what is naturally good, but does not extinguish its flavour.

Luculli miles collecta viatica multis
Ærumnis.———HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 26.

The opportunities, by which this soldier shewed his prowess, occurred in the way of his duty, and the courage, with which he improved them, entitled him to the provision with which he was to perform his journey through life.

——, et potiores
Herculis *ærumnas* putat, sævosque labores,
Et Venere, et cœnis, et plumis Sardanapali.—JUV. *Sat.* 10. 362.

By a metonymical use of *Ærumna*, it here denotes the exertion, in place of the state of mind, which leads to the making it. As there is a necessary aptitude between the two, the justness of the definition is not in this way affected. Had Hercules and Sardanapalus exchanged situations, the dispositions of each would have been dormant. The former could not have displayed his active courage, nor the latter indulged in his unmanly pleasures.

CURRUS, ESSEDUM, RHEDA, CARPENTUM, PILENTUM, PLAUSTRUM, agree, in denoting a vehicle, but differ, in respect to the purpose to which that, denoted by each, is applied. The first, from “Currere,” seems to have been named from the expedition, with which it is possible to move in it. The chariot of the sun was understood to maintain a rapid and unceasing motion.

Ausus æternos agitare *currus*,
Immemor metæ juvenis paternæ,
Quos polo sparsit, furiosus ignes
Ipse recepit———SEN. *Med.* 599.

The Romans employed their *Currus*, not only for the purpose of easy and expeditious conveyance, but also as an instrument in their wars.

Falciferos memorant *currus* abscindere membra.—LUCRET. 3. 642.

The ancients employed it also at their races and triumphs.

Illum non labor Isthmius
 Clarabit pugilem ; non equus impiger
Curru ducet Achaico
 Victorem ; neque res bellica Delis
 Ornatum foliis ducem,
 Quod regnum tumidas contuderit minas,
 Ostendit Capitolio. ————— HOR. *Car.* 3. 3. 3.

ESSEDUM differs from “*Currus*,” in being originally limited to a chariot used in war, and still more calculated for rapid motion. It is said to have been first used by the Belgæ, and afterwards by the Gauls and Britons. The *Essedum* had but two wheels, and the horses which drove it were, on that account, said, “*Ferre, non trahere.*” Thus, Virgil, speaking of a young fleet horse, says,

Belgica vel molli melius feret *esseda* collo.—*Georg.* 3. 204.
Esseda caelatis siste Britanna jugis.—PROP. 2. 1. 78.

“Terrore equorum et strepitu rotarum ordines plerumque perturbant, et quum se inter equitum turmas insinuaverint, ex *essedis* desiliunt, et pedibus præliantur.”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 4. 33. Cicero advises his friend Trebatius, then in Gaul, to take an *Essedum*, and return home as fast as possible. “*Essedum* aliquod suadeo capias, et ad nos quam primam recurras.”—*Ep. Fam.* 7. 7. Afterwards the *Essedum* was used by the Romans as a travelling machine, especially by those of higher rank. “Quum per omne iter dextra sinistraque oppidatim victimæ cæderentur, taurus securis ictu consternatus, rupto vinculo *essedum* ejus invasit.”—SÜET. *in Vit. Galb.* 18.

RHEDA differs from “*Essedum*,” in denoting a curricle, or light chaise, in which the luxurious drove about for their amusement. It was the machine in which they could travel with most expedition and ease, and, having four wheels, it was capable of transporting great weights. “Longissimas vias incredibili celeritate confecit, expeditus, meritoria *rheda.*”—SÜET. *Cæs.* 57.

“Statuimus *rbeda* mille pondo tantummodo superponi, birotæ ducenta.”—COD. THEODOS. Tit. 5. Leg. 8. In this the Romans usually travelled, when going to and from their villas, and enjoying the pleasures of the country. “Clodius expeditus in equo, nulla *rbeda*; Milo cum uxore, in *rbeda* penulatus.”—CIC. pro Mil. 196. b. “Hanc epistolam dictavi sedens in *rbeda*.”—CIC. Ep. Att. 5. 17. It was in a carriage of this sort that Horace had the honour of attending Mæcenas.

Ex quo Mæcenas me cœpit habere suorum.
In numero; duntaxat ad hoc, quem tollere *rbeda*
Vellet, iter faciens.———HOR. Sat. 2. 6. 41.

“Hic Vedius venit mihi obviam cum duobus “essedis” et *rbeda* equis juncta, et lectica et familia magna. Erat præter ea cynephalus in “essedo.”—CIC. Ep. Att. 89. a. For transporting this large family, a variety of carriages were needed. As the *Rbeda* is said to be “equis juncta,” it was probably drawn, for the most part, by but one horse. The baboon was in one of the “Esseda,” as being most roomy.

CARPENTUM and PILENTUM differ from the former words, in denoting carriages employed only upon ceremonious occasions, and with a view to distinguish those who rode in them. Both seem designed, originally, for the use of the Roman matrons, and the only difference to be seen between them is, that the former appears sometimes to have been used by men, and the latter always by women. To reward the public spirit of the Roman ladies, who unanimously gave their trinkets into the treasury to supply the deficiency of gold, the senate voted them the privilege of being carried in such machines. “Grata ea res ut quæ maxime senatui fuit: honoremque ob eam munificentiam ferunt matronis habitum, ut *pilento* ad sacra ludosque, *carpentis* festo profestoque uterentur.”—LIV. 5. 25.

—— castæ ducebant sacra per urbem
● *Pilentis* matres in mollibus.———VIRG. Æn. 8. 665.

Florus and Juvenal furnish instances of *Carpentum* being applied to a vehicle carrying males; but such will hardly be found elsewhere. “Rex Bituitus discoloribus in armis argenteoque *carpento*.”—FLOR. 3. 2.

Præter majorum cineres, atque ossa volucris
Carpento rapitur pinguis Damasippus—JUV. 8. 147.

PLAUSTRUM differs from all the words before mentioned, in being applied to such carriages, only, as are fit for transporting great weights. Antiquaries are not agreed as to the number of its wheels, some making it two, and others four. They all agree, however, that it was employed only in carrying stones, beams of wood, and such heavy substances.

Contenta cervice trahunt stridentia *plaustra*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 536.

— fertur *plastro*

Præda gementi—SEN. *Hippol.* 76.

CURVARE, FLECTERE, Plicare,

agree, in denoting the act of altering the form of some substance, but differ, in respect either to the force requisite for that purpose, or to the natural elasticity of the substance, by which it recovers its original shape. The first is generic, in having a reference to every alteration of shape, whether effected with ease or with difficulty, and to every substance, whether elastic or not.

Arbor curvata est pondere serpentis.—OVID. *Met.* 3. 93.

Here the alteration of shape is easily effected, and the tree retains a disposition to recover its original shape.

Umber et iligna nutritus glande rotundas,

Curvet aper lances carnem vitantis inertem.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 4. 40.

Ingentemque manu *curvaret* Delius, arcum.—STAT. *Achill.* 1. 4. 487.

Here, again, the alteration of shape is effected by a great weight, or a great force. The plate, too, may, or may not, be understood to continue in its bended state. “*Corpuscula curvata* et quasi adunca.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 24. b.

— *Ityræos taxi curvantur* in arcus.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 448.

The shape of what is formed by the hand of nature, is also expressed by this verb. “*Ora Bosphori utrinque ex Asia atque Europa curvatur* in Mæotim.”—PLIN. 6. 6.

FLECTERE differs from "Curvare," in supposing, that a considerable exertion is always requisite to change the form of the substance bent, and that the substance has a tendency to return to its original shape. "Omne animal, membra quo vult *flectit* et contorquet."—CIC. *pro Cæ.* 40. a. Both verbs imply exertion, though the opposite force may be for a while overcome.

Flectitur obsequio "curvatus" ab arbore ramus.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 179.

Here the means, though gentle, are steady, and the bough is understood to retain its elasticity. Upon the resisting force, implied in the literal meaning of *Flectere*, is founded that figurative one, to "prevail upon," in spite of the action of opposite motives.

Flectere si superos nequeo, Acheronta movebo.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 312.

Flectitur assiduis certa puella minis.—PROP. 1. 19. 24.

Flectere also denotes the winding path observed by a body in motion, though no vestige or tract remains. "Claustrum transitu fluminis, ad oceanum *flexit*."—LIV. 28. 16. "Leucaten *flectere* molestum videbatur."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 5. 9.

PLICARE differs from the other verbs, in supposing, that the substance assumes any form with ease, and retains that given it without resistance. "Ut oræ lori, quod *plicabatur*, coirent."—AUL. GELL. 17. 9.

— tibi charta *plicetur*.—MART. 4. 82.

— seque in sua membra *plicantem*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 279.

CURVUS, UNCUS,

agree, in denoting crooked; but the former supposes the curvature affecting the whole body, and the latter, only the extremity of it.

Et *curva* rigidum falces conflantur in ensem.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 58.

The general form of the pruning knife was crooked, as being the fittest for the purpose of him who used it.

— *curvos* trans ripam miserat arcus.—OVID. *Met.* 9. 114.

Jam veniet tacito *curva* senecta pede.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 670.

Tempora quæ messor, quæ *curvus* arator haberet.—VIRG. *Ec.* 3. 42.

In the last three examples, the general fact laid down, respecting *Curvus*, is

fully supported. A bow, that is thoroughly elastic, yields at every part of it, and old age produces that general inclination downward, which the ploughman exhibits while performing his art.

UNCUS differs from "Curvus," in denoting hooked, and supposing the body to be crooked at the extremity. "Dextra manu baculum sine nodo *aduncum* tenens, quem lituum appellaverunt."—LIV. 1. 18. The augur's rod was straight so far, and crooked only at the end. Though the preposition "Ad" at some times specifies the direction as being inwards, as in the following examples, yet it ordinarily only heightens the radical power. "Cornua aliis *adunca*, aliis *redunca*. Rupicapris in dorsum *adunca*, damis in adversum."—PLIN. 11. 37.

Nec celate cibis *uncos* fallacibus hamos.—OVID. *Met.* 15. 485.

— *uncisque* timendæ

Unguibus Arcadiæ volucres ———— LUCRET. 5. 31.

— *avis unca* Minervæ.—STAT. *Theb.* 3. 371.

There is nothing in the nature of the two qualities, denoted by "Curvus and *Uncus*, to prevent their being attributes of the same substance. The same body may be both crooked and hooked, as the Epicureans say was the case with those particles, of which all things were formed. "Esse corpuscula quædam lævia, alia aspera, rotunda alia, partim autem angulata, curvata quædam et quasi *adunca*."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 14. b.

The meaning of the substantive, *Uncus*, corresponds entirely with what is said to be the meaning of the adjective.

— Sejanus ducitur *unco*.—JUV. 10. 66.

"Nemo punitorum non et in Gemonias abjectus, *uncoque* tractus."—SÜETON. *Tiber.* 61.

CUTIS—*vide* CORIUM.

CYMBA—*vide* NAVIS.

DAMNUM, DETRIMENTUM, JACTURA,

agree, in denoting the diminution of value in a person's property, compared with the state in which it was, or might have been, possessed. They differ, however, in respect to the manner in which this diminution is effected.

DAMNUM expresses that species of loss which affects the whole of a stock, from the destruction, or the abstraction, of a part.

Nam de mille fabæ modiis cum surripis unum
Damnum est. ————— HOR. *Ep.* 1. 16.
 Verum ubi oves furto, morbo periere capellæ,
 Spem mentita seges, bos est enectus arando,
 Offensus *damnis*. ————— HOR. *Ep.* 1. 7.

From the first of these instances, it is evident, that a *Damnum* is constituted by the loss of one, even in a thousand parts; and by the last, that each of the successive losses, which, independently of its comparative extent, contributed to render the farmer desperate, formed a new *Damnum*.

Varro gives us the etymology of *Damnum* in the following words: "*Damnum* a demtione, cum minus re factum quam quanti constat."—*L. L.* 4. 36. The opinion of the philologist is supported by the authority of the lawyers, in their chapter *De Damnīs Infectis*. "*Damnum* et *damnatio* a demtione et quasi diminutione patrimonii dicta sunt."

"*Lucrum*" is the converse term in respect to *Damnum*, and, of course, denotes the augmentation of value in the whole subject, by means of an acquired addition. "In maximis "*lucris*" parum aliquid *damni*."—*CIC. de Fin.* 5. 91.

Næ ille haud scit, paulum "*lucris*" quantum ei *damni* adportet.—*TER. Heaut.* 4. 4. 25.

The possible value of the whole stock is sometimes judged of before it is attained, and he who does not acquire the addition, which was within his reach, is understood to have suffered a positive loss.

Nisi eo ad mercatum venio, *damnum* maximum est.—*TER. Adolph.* 2. 2. 23.

DETRIMENTUM denotes a loss, arising from the whole being made worse, though no part was destroyed or abstracted. The mandate of the Roman senate to the consuls, "Cavere ne quid respublica *detrimenti* caperet," referred to some unknown general misfortune, which might befall the state, and not to the destruction of any of its parts. We find the words "Emolumentum" and "Adjumentum" opposed to the word under discussion, by Cicero, the former of which signifies a general advantage, and the latter, a general support. "Plura *detrimenta* publicis rebus quam adjumenta per homines eloquentissimos importata."—CIC. *de Orat.* 88. "Emolumenta et *detrimenta* quæ ἀφέληματα et βλάμματα appellant, communia esse voluerunt; quorum altera prosunt, nocent altera."—CIC. *de Fin.* 104. b.

In the works of Cicero and Cæsar, who wrote Latin with a degree of purity that was never surpassed, we often find the expression, "Sarcire *detrimentum*." In the literal meaning of the verb "Sarcio," it supposes a general weakness in the garment to be patched, and, in the figurative, we may presume, that there is a similar generality in the evil needing reparation. The "Vestis sarcienda" must have been previously "Detrita," worn by use; that is, it must have suffered a *Detrimentum*, by which the whole is affected.

In support of what is now advanced, it is to be observed, that, when "Sarcio" and *Detrimentum* are found connected, the noun is never in the plural. The complexness of the conception, denoted by *Detrimentum*, excludes that of parts, in each of which a "Damnum" might take place. In the case of every individual junction of the terms mentioned, one general evil is supposed to be cured, though a number of *Detrimenta* may successively exist in one subject, as long as its value is not completely extinguished. He, "qui sarcit *detrimentum*," only restores the subject injured to a state better than that in which he found it.

As *Detrimentum*, then, when in the plural number, is never found connected with "Sarcio," so neither is "Damnum," in the singular, ever found connected with it among the purest writers of Latin. In Pacuvius, who wrote before, and in Suetonius, who wrote after, the age of high classical purity, we find "Sarcire et resarcire damnum;" but no such expression is to

be found in Cicero and Cæsar, whom we are to regard as standards. The noun denotes an imperfection in respect to a part, not consonant with that state of the whole subject, which fits it for the operation expressed by the verb. A plurality of co-existing "Damna," again, affecting the same subject, approaches to a *Detrimentum*, and the Roman classics, observing this nice approximation, suited their expression to it, with the most elegant accuracy.

JACTURA denotes a loss sustained, by either the whole or a part of a subject being thrown away, from the imprudence or the necessity of the possessor. Sallust talks of the "supervacua onera magnæ navis," which are chiefly thrown over-board, in the event of a storm. "De illis potissimum *jactura* fit, quia pretii minimi sunt."—SALL. *Orat. ad Cæs.* 2. 14.

In the instance now given, it is clear, that the loss arises from the necessity of the possessor; but, in the two following, it arises from his folly. "Si non modo utilitatem tibi nullam afferet, sed *jacturæ* rei familiaris erunt faciundæ."—CIC. *de Fin.* 2. 24. "Provincia sumptibus et *jacturis* exhausta."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 5. 1.

Jactura is sometimes substituted for "Largitio" by the best writers of Latin, and this use supports the general account given of its true power. "Qua cupiditate homines in provincias, quibus *jacturis* proficiscantur."—CIC. *pro Leg. Man.* 23. "Ariovistum ad se magnis *jacturis* pollicitationibusque perduxerant."—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* b. From the etymology of the term "Largitio," the politician, to whom it was applied, was held regardless of the largeness of the bribe, provided he accomplished his end. The "Largitio," too, may have been deemed a *Jactura* in more cases than one. There must have been a total loss of the subject given, if the party corrupted broke faith, and a partial loss of it, if, from the unexpected venality of this party, the bribe was more than adequate to the end to be accomplished.

"Damnum" and "Detrimentum," then, differ, in respect to the extent of the loss incurred, as affecting either a whole or some of its parts. *Jactura* differs from both, in referring indifferently, either to the whole, or to any number of its parts, without limitation. It differs, also, from "Damnum," in supposing, that the person, who is the sufferer, is always the author

of the evil; which he, who has sustained a "Damnum," may or may not be.

It may be observed, that the verb "Sarcio" is never applied to the noun *Jactura*. When the whole subject is thrown away, there is a physical impossibility of the same ever being repaired, and any number of its parts, thrown away at once, would form but one "Damnum," to which we have found the verb is inelegantly applied.

DARE, TRIBUERE, DONARE, LARGIRI,

agree, in denoting the act of giving, but differ, in respect either to the dispositions of the giver, or to the circumstances of the recipient. Of all the terms, the first is the most general. It supposes, that the giver may act either from a sense of justice, from generosity, or from purposes ultimately selfish. All it requires is, that the person, to whom the offer is made, do not reject it, and thereby prevent the transfer from taking place. The definition of *Dare*, given by the lawyers, is perfectly consistent with the use of it among the purest classics. "*Dare est transfundere in alium, dominium rei.*" "*Hoc etsi multis modis reprehendi potest, tamen accipio quod dat.*"—CIC. *de Fin.* 82. a. Here the acceptance is notified upon the part of the receiver, which is the only condition necessary for the just application of *Dare*. "*Si rationem hominibus Dii dederunt, et malitiam dederunt.*"—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 75. a. When the gods gave reason to men, they acted from generosity; when they gave them malice, it is insinuated by the philosophers, that they acted from a contrary principle.

In the use of *Dare*, the nature of the thing given is often got by implication. Thus, it is clearly information that Melibœus requires of Tityrus in the following line.

Sed tamen ille Deus qui sit, *da*, Tityre, nobis.—VIRG. *Ec.* 1. 19.

None of the other verbs are taken in this acceptance, but are always made to govern the noun expressing the subject given or required.

TRIBUERE differs from "Dare," in always implying, that the recipient has a claim to that, which is given him, or that the giver discovers his

judgment, in bestowing as he does. The generosity, occasionally expressed by "Dare," is incompatible with that sense of right, implied in *Tribuere*. This last verb applies equally to the imputation of what is blamable, and to the acknowledgment of what is good, and, in fixing both, the agent is understood to act from a sense of justice. "Quod ille *tribuebatur* ignavia, de nobis id existimari posse non arbitror."—CIC. *Ep.* 27. a.

Nec tamen hoc *tribuens*, "dederim" quoque caetera.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 10. 5.

That poignancy, which is allowed by Horace to belong to the satires of Lucilius, is not understood by him to balance every defect of his. He does not injuriously withhold from him the credit due to the quality, implied in "hoc," but he refuses to give him the praise in other respects, to which, in his estimation, he had no right.

The claim of the recipient is ascertained by the opinion of the giver, and not by his own. "Tu autem qui tantum mihi *tribuis*, quantum ego nec agnosco, nec postulo, facis amice."—CIC. *de Am.* 97. b. "Quid restat? nisi ut orem obtesterque vos, judices, ut eam misericordiam *tribuatis* fortissimo viro quam ipse non implorat."—CIC. *Mil.* 93.

Ego primam tollo, nominor quia leo :

Secundam, quia sum fortis, *tribuatis* mihi.—PHÆD. 1. 5. 7.

In this division of booty, the lion carried off the first, as belonging to the animal bearing his name. The second, he left it to the other beasts to bestow upon him as a matter of right, and trusted to their sense of justice.

Di tibi "dent," nostro quod non *tribuere* parenti,

Molliter in patria vivere posse sua.—OVID. *Trist.* 3. 1. 23.

The poet here prays for a blessing to the book, which had been denied its author, though understood to be deserving.

In some of the applications of *Tribuere*, the notion of claim is somewhat obscure, and almost imperceptible. "Generi animantium omnium a natura *tributum* est, ut se, vitam, corpusque tueatur."—CIC. *Off.* 1. 11. In the above instance, *Tribuere* carries in it the notion of division or distribution, as in the expression, "*Tribuere* rem universam in partes."—CIC. *Orat.* 198. a. The

original power of *Tribuere*, in such instances as the last but one, can only be made apparent by considering the necessary wisdom of Nature, in bestowing upon every animal the principle of self-preservation, and the seeming right of each to such a principle, in order to complete its structure, and to furnish it with the means of fulfilling the ends of its existence.

DONARE differs from "Tribuere," in referring, not to the right of the receiver, but to the generosity of the giver. As the latter verb, at the same time, does not always necessarily imply a want of benevolence in the person who acts justly, so neither does the former imply, that the generous do not discriminate the most deserving objects of their good-will. In performing the act, denoted by "Tribuere," the agent expresses his opinion of the object by the nature of that which is given; in performing that, denoted by *Donare*, he always gives what is acceptable, though the receiver could not blame him, had he withheld what he gives. "Qui Rubrium corona et phaleris et torque *donasti*."—CIC. *in Ver.* 190. "Auxit hoc beneficiis alia quoque liberalitate: nam universos frumento *donavit*."—NEP. *Att.* 2. When the receiver has demerit in the eyes of the giver, the act of the person, "qui *donat*," rises higher than usual, and becomes forgiveness. "Multa *donanda* ingeniis puto: sed *donanda* vitia, non portenta sunt."—SEN. *Controv.* 5. However great the generosity of the person, *Donans*, may, in any instance, be, it may be increased by the addition of adverbs. "Non pauca suis adiutoribus large effuseque *donabat*."—CIC. *pro Rosc. Am.* 22. a.

LARGIRI differs from "Donare," in referring to the quantity of that given, without regard to the sentiments of the giver, which may be either generous or selfish. The person, "qui *donat*," besides, can give only what belongs to himself; while he, "qui *largitur*," can give what belongs to others also. "Quod sine modo, sine iudicio "donarit" sua, *largiretur* aliena."—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 69. "Quidam eripiunt aliis, quod aliis *largiantur*."—CIC. *Off.* 9. b.

Præsentī tibi maturos *largimur* honores.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 15.

In the two former instances, the things given do not belong to those who gave them; in the latter, they clearly do. The quantity given, and not the

disposition of the giver, is the circumstance that is, in all cases, characteristic of this verb.

The power of *Largiri* is particularly apparent in the abstract noun "Largitio," derived from it, which often signifies a bribe. "Præclare in epistola quadam Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat, quod largitione benevolentiam Macedonum consecetur."—Cic. *Off.* 2. 53. "Largitio quæ ex re familiari fit, fontem ipsum liberalitatis exhaurit."—Cic. *Off.* 53. b.

DE,

unites the power of "A" and "E," and denotes the separation of one body from another, to which it had been contiguous, or by which it had been contained, or of which it had formed a part. It is, of course, opposed to "Ad" and "In," and its radical meanings are "from" and "out of." "Saxum de terra tollere."—Cic. *pro Cæcin.* 206. b. Here, the stone was in contact with the earth, that supported it. "Hæc agebantur palam in conventu, de sella."—Cic. *in Ver.* 220. a. Here, the chair contained the person, by whom those things were transacted.

— de duro est ultima ferro.—OVID. *Met.* 1. 127.

Here, the last age is said to have been part of the hard mass, out of which it was formed.

When *De* and "A" refer to different persons, mentioned in the same sentence, the former denotes the subject of discourse, and the latter, the person, from whom the intelligence comes. "Credas non de puero scriptum, sed a puero."—PLIN. 4. 7. The writer is more nearly connected with the person addressed, than spoken of, when these are different. Besides, the means of information, in respect to the latter, come only from the former; and the preposition, expressing separation most readily effected, is naturally made to specify its immediate force: In the case of the preposition "A," it will be found, that the body, which parts, is extraneous, with respect to the subject, from which the motion commences; while, in that of *De*, it may be contained in it. Of course, the separation, suggested by the latter, is held more difficult, as a barrier is to be overcome, or the general coherence of a mass conquered.

When, in Latin, the subject of thought is presented as coming from a particular point, as its cause, the same relation is, in English, presented by surrounding bodies pointing towards that subject, as the centre of a circumference, of which each is a part. This relation, accordingly, is translated by the words "about," or "in respect to." "Quid *de* Publio Clodio fiat, rescribe."—Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* 2. 5. In Latin, Clodius is the supposed point, from which that conduct, which was the cause of Cicero's curiosity, proceeds; and, in English, he is one of the many points bearing upon that conduct as a centre.

In the following example, *De* appears in both the acceptations already stated. "Messala *de* Pompeio quæsit, quid *de* religione sentire."—Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* 1. 14. Pompey is the object, containing the information wanted, and from which it proceeds; and religion is the point, to which the sentiments of Messala, enquired into, relate, as to a common centre.

When a similitude between a rule of conduct, and the object formed after it, is suggested, the preposition *De* is translated "according to." The former is, in Latin, held as the cause from which the copy proceeds, as an effect; and between the two an analogy is expected. "Minos leges *de* Jovis sententia sanxit."—Cic. *pro Cæl.* 52. a. The wisdom of Jupiter, from whom the laws proceeded, is expected to be seen in the laws themselves.

Si quid erit quod illi placeat, *de* exemplo meo
Ipse ædificato.———PLAUT. *Most.* 3. 2. 86.

Between the pattern, here offered, and the building to be constructed after it, a resemblance is expected.

When the idea of a source, and that which flows from it, is made to exhibit the necessary connection between cause and effect, *De* suggests the means, by which the latter is accomplished, and is translated "on account of." As certainly as the fountain supplies the stream, so does the cause give existence to the effect. "Flebat uterque non *de* suo supplicio, sed pater *de* filii morte, *de* patris filius."—Cic. *in Ver.* 91. b.

—— lætus est
De amica.———TER. *Adelph.* 2. 2. 45.

Though the emotions in the above examples are as opposite as possible, yet,

in both, *De* points at the cause, on account of which they respectively arose from their different sources.

When *De* is transferred to time, a point is fixed, during, or after, which, a certain space commences, within which a specified event occurs.

Ut jugulent homines surgunt *de nocte* latrones.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 32.

It is during, that is, after the commencement, and before the expiration, of night, that robbers rise to give effect to their foul purposes. “*Fac, si me amas, ut considerate diligenterque naviges de mense Decembri.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Q. Frat.* 2. 1. The point, at which December begins, and that, at which the weather usually improves, form the boundaries of that space, during which it is said not to be safe to sail.

When *De* is translated “after,” there is no expressed limitation of the interval between the point fixed, and that, at which the event takes place. “*De tertia vigilia silentio exercitum reducit.*”—CÆS. *Bell. Civ.* 2. 35.

— non bonus somnus est *de prandio.*—PLAUT. *Most.* 3. 2. 8.

Though the preposition, in this last instance, limits the time to “after dinner,” yet nothing is said as to the extent of the interval, within which sleep is not salutary. It must be fixed by some general notion of the time, within which the process of digestion is more oppressive to a person asleep than awake.

DE, then, by itself, is taken in the five following acceptations.

I.

FROM, OUT OF; denoting the separation of one body from another, with which it may have been, in different ways, connected.

II.

ABOUT, OR, IN RESPECT TO. In this use, there is, in English, a substitution of the relation, borne by surrounding bodies, looking to their central point, in place of that, in Latin, borne by the body moving, to the point from which it had moved.

III.

ACCORDING TO. The object, proceeding from another, is held to be modelled, or influenced, by the nature of that, with which it had before been connected.

IV.

ON ACCOUNT OF. The effect is, in Latin, understood to spring from the cause, as naturally as the stream does from its source, the point of its departure.

V.

AFTER, DURING. The point of departure, in space, is, in Latin, made by analogy to present both the point, in time, at which a certain event occurs, and the length of its continuance.

The power, most frequently discovered by *De* in composition, is its original one, that is, "separation," when a mass, or its part, is made to change its place. This appears in such verbs as *Detrabere*, *Depellere*, and *Dejicere*. "Multæque res sunt, in quibus *de* suis commodis viri boni *detrabunt*, *detrabique* patiuntur, ut his amici potius quam ipsi fruuntur."—CIC. *De Am.* 107. a. "*Demoveri* enim et *depelli de loco*, necesse est, eum qui *dejiciatur*."—CIC. *pro Cæc.* 294. a.

— quum exponendam do illi, *de digito annulum*
Detraho.—————TER. *Heaut.* 4. 1. 37.

This general power is so much diversified, as not to be always so obvious as in the above instances. To it may be referred the tendency of unsupported bodies downwards, by the influence of gravity. "Poma ex arboribus, si cruda sunt, vi avelluntur, si matura et cocta, *decidunt*."—CIC. *De Sen.* 92. a.

Pondera quantum in se'est, cum *deorsum* cuncta ferantur.—LUCRET. 2. 190.

This tendency, downwards, is expressed by *de*, not merely in respect to unsupported bodies that fall, but also in respect to those, that glide upon an inclined plane. This appears in such verbs as *delabi*, *defluere*, *descendere*. "*De manibus audacissimorum civium delapsa* arma ipsa ceciderunt."—CIC. *De Off.* 16. a. "Tantumque ab illo *defluabant*, quantum ille ab antiquis *descenderat*."—QUINT. 10. 1.

In the case of the verb "deprecari," this radical power, taken figuratively, produces different meanings, according as the separation, involved in the preposition, affects the person entreating, or the person entreated. When it affects the former, it signifies, "to pray hard against;" and, when it affects

the latter, "to pray hard for." "Legati, quos senatus non ad pacem *deprecandam*, sed ad denunciandum bellum miserat."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 12. 24. Here the entreaty of the ambassadors is not understood to be earnest in the hope of peace.

Sæpe "precor" mortem, mortem sæpe *deprecor* idem.—OVID. *ex Pont.* 2. 59.

The prayer, denoted by the simple verb, and by the compound, was addressed to the same being; but, by the first, death was implored as a blessing, and, by the last, it was deprecated as an evil. The blessing was asked from the Being, who could bestow it; and it was requested, that the evil might be removed from the Being, to whom it appeared such.

That privative power, which *De* often discovers in composition, may be also referred to this of separation, suggesting the actual removal of bodies, or their parts. The former is an abstraction of certain qualities from a subject, in which they, in conjunction with others, are constantly inherent, and a quality, the reverse of what exists in the concrete, is ascribed to the subject when analysed. Thus, *Debilis*, from *De* and "Habilis," expresses the absence of that fitness, involved in the root, and intimates positive weakness; and *Delumbis*, expressing the want of loins, upon which bodily strength depends, intimates the same, with respect to an animal. "Duo corpora esse reipublicæ, unum *debile*, alterum firmum."—CIC. *pro Muræ.* 236. b. "Perdix prægravem aut *delumbem* sese simulans."—PLIN. 10. 33.

Upon the same principle, that use of *De* in composition is to be explained, when it denotes the undoing the operation, implied in the simple verb, and, by intimating the absence of its native power, suggests a positive act of an opposite kind. Thus, the person, *Dedocens*, undoes what the person, "Docens," had done; and the person, *Detegens*, what the person, "Tegens," had done. "Et quidem *dedocendi* onus gravius, ac prius quam docendi est."—QUINT. 2. 3.

—modestiam omnem

Detexit, tectus qua fui.—PLAUT. *Most.* 1. 3. 6.

The same effect is produced by *De* on neuter verbs, expressing state, simply, and having no reference to any act. Cicero, in the following sentence, gives

us a powerful assistance: "Decere" declarat quasi aptum esse consentaneum-que tempori et personæ, quod cum in factis sæpissime, tum in dictis valet; contraque item *dedecere*."—*De Or.* 293. 6.

Beside the privative power, that operates so extensively, *De* has an intensive one, acting upon every component term, according to its native force. It then supposes the whole of a certain energy passing from an agent, and producing some powerful effect upon that, to which it is directed. The principle, upon which *De* suggests this increase, is analogous to that, upon which it may be seen that "Ad" does. In *De* there is an implied transition towards some point, as there is in "Ad" a direct one; and, in that way, both *Deamare* and "Adamare" denote stronger attachment than "Amare."

Næ ego fortunatus homo sum. *Deamo* te, Syre.—*TER. Heaut.* 4. 5. 21.

The verb "Certare" signifies to contend, and, as coming from "Certus," to fix the superiority. If *De* is joined to it, however, the keenness of the combatants is increased, and an issue to the struggle, that is completely decisive, is the consequence of high exertion upon the part of each. "Cum multis consularibus, tanta contentione *decertavi*, quantum nunquam antea."—*CIC. Ep.* 64. a.

Pace tamen sisti bellum, nec in ultima ferro

Decertare placet.—OVID. *Met.* 14. 803.

The verb "Bellare," in the same way, signifies to wage war, or to be in a state of hostility. But the verb *Debellare* signifies such an increase of every hostile sentiment, upon the part of the powers contending, as to bring the matter to an issue, by the destruction of one of them. "*Debellatum* foret, nisi de Mithridate triumphare cito, quam vere maluisset."—*FLOR.* 3. 5. "Sæpe ex eo audivi legione una et modicis auxiliis *debellari* obtinerique Hiberniam potuisse."—*TAC. In Vit. Agric.* 24.

— lectos juvenes, fortissima corda

Defer in Italiam; gens dura atque aspera cultu

Debellanda tibi Latio est.—*VIRG. Æn.* 5. 729.

Æneas is here warned, in a dream, by his father, of the exertion needful in a contest with the Latins, which, if not ending in their destruction, had

better never have been begun. The “De” in “Defer,” in the above passage, produces an effect upon its root, different, in respect both to kind and to principle, from that produced in the case of *Debellare*. Being connected with “Ferre,” a verb denoting motion, it fixes the direction of that motion, as tending downwards. From the implied ease in transporting the chosen troops into Italy, the mandate of Anchises is the more forcibly pressed upon the attention of his son.

DEBELLARE—*vide* VINCERE.

DECEDERE, DISCEDERE,

agree, in denoting the act of quitting the place which a person occupies; but the former respects the point, only, that is left, while the latter has a reference, also, to that gone to. As the conceptions expressed in the words “Departure” and “Arrival” are correlative, so the event, implied in either, cannot take place, without supposing the existence of the other. The first verb calls the mind to attend to the “motion from,” constituting the former, while the second fixes it upon the “motion to,” tending to constitute the latter, and, in the use of both, the correlative is suggested by implication. “Ut ex Cypro equites ante certum diem *decederent*.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 91. b. The circumstance of quitting the island is here the only one to which the mind is directed, not the place to which the cavalry was to go. So, in the next instance;

Nescio qui turbat, qui huc it: *decedamus*, soror.—PLAUT. *Bacch.* 1. 1.

The preposition often acts, in the way mentioned, in a double capacity; that is, both in a simple, and in a compounded state. “*De parte tertia agri Sequanos decedere jubet*.”—CÆS. *Bell. Gall.* 1. 31. But, while the place left is the leading circumstance in the sentence, that gone to may be at the same time expressed. “*Romam ad destinatum triumphum discessere*.”—LIV. 8. 13. This predominant circumstance may at times be so intelligible, as not to be expressed at all. “*Miseras cognoscite Siculorum, Heraclius ille et Epicrates mihi venienti Syracusas egerunt gratias flentes: Romam decedere mecum cupierunt*.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 2. 65. The point, to which these men

wished to go, is here specified ; but the object of their strongest desire was their leaving Sicily, which is couched in the verb.

From signifying to quit the space occupied, *Decedere* is made to denote expressions both of respect and disgust, by the act of giving place. “Hæc enim ipsa sunt honorabilia, quæ videntur levia atque communia, salutari, appeti, *decedi*, assurgi, deduci, reduci, consuli.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 90. a. “A Druidibus omnes *decedunt*, aditum sermonemque defugiunt.”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 6. 13. *Decedere* also signifies to die, intimating, that the deceased quits the present scene of things, without regard to the place to which he is supposed to go. “Puer Sositheus *decesserat*, meque plus quam servi mors debere videbatur, commoverat.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 1. 12.

DISCEDERE differs from “Decedere,” in always referring to an interval specified, or implied, between the place that was occupied and that which is gone to. It never signifies to give way to any person, or, figuratively, to shew respect to him ; neither does it signify to die. In the notion suggested by *Discedere*, there is a correlation between two points in space, which may occasionally be more or less apparent, but never can be destroyed. The original power of *Discedere* appears when it denotes the division of a mass, by the mutual separation of parts, that had been contiguous; and the extent of this is measured by the interval between two points, when the motion has ceased. The notion of a chasm can be suggested by the compound of “Cedere” with “Dis,” but not by that with “De.” “Cum terra *discessisset* magnis quibusdam imbribus, in illum hiatus descendit.”—CIC. *de Off.* 59. b.

— medium video *discedere* cœlum.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 20.

Though the leading circumstance in the use of *Discedere* is motion towards a certain point, yet the correlative point, only, is sometimes suggested. At other times, again, there is a reference to both. “Iisdem e cubilibus *discedunt* in partes, ingerunt tela.”—TAC. *Ann.* 1. 49.

The following figurative application of *Discedere* is a singular one, but strictly consonant with its literal. “Is magnitudine timoris a constantia, atque a mente, atque a seipso *discessit*.”—CIC. *de Div.* 132. A separation is

here said to have taken place between a person and himself. By this we are to understand, that his conduct was totally different from what it had been, and that the present and the past were separated by a wide interval.

The figurative use of *Discedere*, in announcing the opinion of the “Senatores pedarii” in the Roman state, seems to support what is said of its original power. “Si in eam sententiam *discedatur*.”—LIV. 28. 45. The opinion of these senators was known, not from the circumstance of their leaving the place they had occupied, but from that of their moving towards some other particular place, and there taking their station. When there was no unanimity, though the point of departure was fixed, as in the former case, yet that, to which they came, was contingent, so that nothing could be inferred from it. “Frequens eum senatus reliquit, et in alia omnia *discessit*.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 151. a.

DECET, OPORTET, NECESSE EST,

agree, in denoting obligation, but differ, in respect to the degree in which it is cogent. DECET refers to that obligation which binds every man to attend to propriety, and to maintain a conduct suited to his character and circumstances. He, who is duly attentive to this tie, enjoys the approbation of men, though he, who violates it, is exposed to no punishment but their disapprobation. “Ita fere officia reperientur, quum quæretur quid *deceat*, et quid aptum sit personis, temporibus, ætatibus.”—CIC. *de Off.* 25. b. The latter clause of this sentence is given as a definition of the former, and denotes nothing as an accessory to what had been first stated.

Id facere laus est quod *deceat*, non quod licet.—SEN. *Octav.* 44.

“Oratorem vero irasci minime *deceat* : simulare non “*dedecet*.”—CIC. *Tusc.* 221. a. When an orator is really angry, he forgets the obligation he lies under to support the dignity of his character ; but when he counterfeits, he does not.

OPORTET differs from “Decet,” in referring to a stronger obligation, founded, not upon a sense of decency, or regard to the opinion of others, but

upon what is felt to be fit in itself. It regards moral duty, and supposes the existence of a standard, by which the conduct of a free agent is to be regulated. "Aliud totum est utrum "decere" an oportere dicas: oportere enim perfectionem declarat officii quo et semper utendum est, et omnibus: "decere," quasi aptum esse, consentaneumque tempori et personæ."—CIC. *Orat.* 203. b. "Oportere est consentaneum esse officio, "licere" egibus et juri, "decere" temporibus et personis."—CIC. *pro Cor. Balb.* 56. b.

Though the primary meaning of *Oportere* seems to be that now stated, yet it is sometimes applied to matters, in which moral duty is not concerned. It then denotes the necessity of certain means for producing a particular effect, and falls in with "Necesse est."

—— valeat possessor oportet,
Si comportatis bene rebus cogitat uti.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 49.

NECESSE EST differs from both terms, in referring to an obligation too cogent to be resisted, and from the latter, in suggesting a physical, which is higher than a moral necessity. He, who acts in the way in which it is said "Oportet," may do otherwise, because it is in his power to do wrong; but he, who acts in the way to which *Necesse est* is applicable, cannot do the contrary of what he does; because he is under the influence of laws, which he is unable to controul. "Corpus mortale aliquo tempore interire necesse est."—CIC. *de Inv.* 83. b. "Dicitur necesse (says Gesner) quod vi aliqua cogente fieri opus est." That the "vis cogens" is essential to the above definition, and by being inherent in *Necesse est*, renders it superior to "Oportet," appears from the following passages: "Tanquam ita fieri non solum "oporteret," sed etiam necesse esset."—CIC. *in Ver.* 6. 39. "Ut hæc ipsa ædilitas, non quia necesse fuerit alicui candidato data, sed quia sic "oportuerit," recte collocata esse videatur."—CIC. *de Inv.* 7. 14.

DECIPERE—*vide* FALLERE. DECLIVIS—*vide* ACCLIVIS.

DECOLOR, DISCOLOR,

agree, in denoting a deviation from some standard colour, but differ, according to the extent of this deviation. DECOLOR signifies a slight difference in

the hue, such as is consistent with the preservation of the original colour. “*Decolor species æris argentive.*”—PLIN. 31. 6. The yellowness of the brass, and the whiteness of the silver, still shewed to what genus of metals each belonged, though neither of the species was pure. “*Jam decolorem sanguinem omnem exsorbuīt.*”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 179. a. The redness of the blood still shewed its nature, though the colour was altered by the poison in the garment.

Aurea quæ perhibent illo sub rege fuerunt
 Sæcula : sic placida populos in pace regebat.
 Deterior donec paulatim, ac *decolor* ætas,
 Et belli rabies et amor sceleratus habendi.—VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 324.

From this figurative use of *Decolor* we may infer its primitive. Every age was supposed to grow worse than another, by slight gradations; and this silver one, styled “Deterior” and *Decolor*, though less desirable than the preceding, had still something in it that was positively good, as well as better than those, styled brazen and iron, that succeeded it.

DISCOLOR differs from “Decolor,” in having no reference to shades of the same colour, but to colours that are completely distinct.

Jamque patent iterum reserato carcere postes,
 Evolat admissis *discolor* agmen equis.—OVID. *Am.* 3. 2. 77.

The racers in the Roman circus were dressed in four different colours, each of which was the subject of bets, and could be clearly distinguished.

Calculi hic gemino *discolor* hoste perit.—MARTIAL. 14. 17. 2.

The “Calculi,” used at play, were made of glass of different colours. Those of particular colours, only, could make certain movements, and some of them were styled “Grassatores,” and others “Insidiatores.”

Ut matrona meretrici dispar erit atque
Discolor, infido scurræ distabit amicus—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 19. 3.

Discolor, here figuratively taken, signifies direct opposition in point of appearance.

DECUS, DECOR,

agree, in denoting beauty; but the former regards this as an inherent quality of the object, and the latter, as a quality resulting from its connection with things around it. Every person may judge of the *Decus*, who has taste to discern it; but the *Decor* is visible to those, only, who know the circumstances, in which the object is placed. The one, then, may be said to denote absolute, and the other relative, beauty. “Ut homini *decus* est ingenium, sic ingenii lumen est eloquentia.”—CIC. *de Cl. Orat.* 169. b. Genius is here said to be the ornament of man, and is held forth as an intrinsic quality, visible to every person who has penetration to see it. “Ad *decus* et ornamentum senectutis, juris interpretationem ab adolescentia comparare.”—CIC. *de Or.* 101. b.

Signa *decus* belli, Parthus Romana tenebat.—OVID. *Fast.* 5. 585.

Valla seems to have given a very just definition of *Decor*, and to support that above laid down. “*Decor* quædam decentia rerum personarumque in locis et temporibus.” His definition of *Decus* appears to be too limited, as confining the beauty, denoted by it, to actions alone. “*Decus* est honestas quæ ex bene gestis oritur.”—*Lib. 4. C. 15.*

— divini signa *decoris*,

Ardentesque notate oculos: qui spiritus illi,

Qui vultus, vocisve sonus, vel gressus eunti.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 647.

Five circumstances are mentioned, in the two last lines, as signs of the “Divinus *decor*,” ascribed to Pyrgo. There is the lustre of her eye, the sweetness of her breath, the expression of her countenance, the sound of her voice, and the dignity of her gait. The word “Signum” would be utterly inapplicable to *Decus*; as the beauty expressed by it shews itself, and is not to be interpreted by any signs. In order to have a conception of the *Decor*, certain circumstances respecting the object, to which it is ascribed, must be known, and a judgment formed as to what becomes it.

Ipse *decor* recte facti si præmia desint,

Non movet, et gratis pœnitet esse probum.—OVID. *ex Pont.* 2. 3. 13.

The words “*Decor* recte facti,” here, mean the moral fitness of virtue. Any

sense of this species of beauty arises from a judgment formed upon the propriety of certain conduct, and not from an immediate apprehension, such as that which recognises what is styled *Decus*.

Cicero's definition of "Decorum," the neuter of an adjective exemplified like a substantive, explains the nature of *Decor*, from which it comes. "Ut in vita, sic in oratione, nihil est difficilius quam quod deceat, Περσερον Græci appellant, nos dicamus sane decorum."—CIC. *de Orat.* 203. a.

Ætatis cujusque notandi sunt tibi mores,
Mobilibusque *decor* maturis dandus et annis.—HOR. *Sat.* 155.

The term *Decor* could hardly be put in a situation, in which it shews its power more decisively than it is here put by the poet. Years, themselves, being constantly on the change, this necessary fluctuation forms a necessary variety in duty, resulting from circumstances that are new.

DEESSE, DEFICERE,

agree, in denoting the absence of some desirable object; but the former supposes only the possibility of its past or its future existence, while the latter supposes its certain existence at a past time, and its possible existence at a future one. That the circumstance of desirableness is characteristic of *Deesse*, appears from the following passage of Cicero, in which he contrasts it with "Abesse." "Hoc unum ille, si nihil utilitatis habebat, "abfuit:" si opus erat, *defuit*."—CIC. *in Brut.* 276. 80.

Non ratio sed argentum *deerat*.—TER. *Phor.* 2. 1. 69.

Both the plan and the money were desirable objects; but Geta allows the present existence of the one, and denies it of the other. This last, however, may have been possessed at some former and future period, but the verb carries no insinuation respecting either.

DEFICERE, again, always implies the past existence of the thing desired, and supposes its future to be a matter of contingency. "Quod mihi consuevit esse adjumento, id quoque in hac causa *deficit*."—CIC. *pro Quint.* 1. a. The past existence of this good is positively asserted, though its failure,

at the time, is regretted. The present non-existence of the good, however, furnished no argument that it might not be enjoyed again. “Res eos jampridem, fides *deficere* nuper cœpit.”—CIC. *in Cat.* 106. a. The prior existence of both objects is here announced, though the times of their failure were different. “Olim *deficere* sol hominibus extinguique visus est.”—CIC. *Som.* 130. In the apprehension of the first race of men, the sun was destroyed by an eclipse, though their senses had convinced them of its prior existence. “Ea me solatia *deficiunt*, quæ cæteris, quorum mihi exempla propono simili in fortuna, non *defecerunt*.”—CIC. *Ep.* 51. b. By means of the verb *Deficiunt*, Cicero evidently refers to the past existence of those comforts, which he tells Sulpitius he had lost. By means of *Defecerunt*, accompanied with “non,” there is an affirmation of the actual existence of those blessings which Maximus, Paulus, Gallus, and Cato enjoyed, without any insinuation whatever as to their past or their future existence. “Vereor, ne mihi crimina non suppeterent, ne oratio “deesset,” ne vox viresque *deficerent*.”—CIC. *Ver.* 3. 11. Supposing that the ground of discourse were wanting, as suggested by the verb “Deesset,” there is no reason to think that the case had ever been otherwise. But supposing that the voice and the strength were so, the verb *Deficerent* suggests, that, at the beginning of the orator’s exertions, both had been entire, and admits that both may be recovered.

DEFUNGI, PERFUNGI,

agree, in denoting the discharge of duty, but differ, according as the circumstances of the person discharging it are agreeable, or the contrary. The verb “Fungi” is the common root of both, and both prepositions exert upon it an intensive power, manifesting itself in different ways. The “De” supposes some energy having passed from an agent, so as to influence that, to which it is directed, and supposes, also, the state completed which the root denotes. The “Per,” again, supposes the transition, though effected, to be slower, and fixes the mind on the continuance of the state denoted by the root, whether agreeable or the contrary.

DEFUNGI properly signifies to get quit of a state that is troublesome, while, at the same time, its duties are performed.

O tandem magnis pelagi *defuncte* periclis!
Sed terra graviora manent.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 83.

The verb is here well applied to Æneas, who had before braved all the destined dangers of the deep, though the Sibyll tells him of others, more terrible, that awaited him by land.

Defunctumque laboribus,
Æquali recreat sorte vicarius.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 24. 15.

The word *Defunctus*, whether followed by “vita” or not, is often applied to the dead, as having finished their course, and performed the duties of life.

—— *defunctaque* corpora vita
Magnanimûm heroum.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 475.
Ut mea *defunctæ* molliter ossa cubent.—OVID. *Amor.* 1. 8. 108.

PERFUNGI differs from “Defungi,” in supposing, that the state, from which the agent is delivered, may be either agreeable or the contrary. In general, however, it should seem, that this state is troublesome, and that the circumstances, which palliate its evils, are but casual concomitants. “Dum sumus in his inclusi compagibus corporis, munere quodam necessitatis, et gravi opere *perfungimur*.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 93. a. “Cum et honoribus amplissimis et laboribus maximis *perfuncti* essemus.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 1. 8. In the duty here referred to, if the honours were gratifying, the labours would be oppressive. “Quo tempore ætas nostra *perfuncta* rebus amplissimis, tanquam in portum confugere deberet.”—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 2. Whatever splendour there might have been in the affairs said to have been managed, still the agent is compared to a mariner in a storm, who takes refuge in a port.

DELERE, OBLITERARE, ABOLERE,

agree, in denoting the act of destroying, but differ as to the manner in which the destruction is effected. DELERE, from “De,” and the obsolete verb “Leo,” from which comes “Levi,” the præterite of “Lino,” signifies to efface, by smoothing the surface, on which an impression had been made.

The impression is understood to be thereby destroyed, and the surface fitted to receive any other. When the Romans were said “*Vertere stylum,*” and so to correct, by smoothing the waxen tablet on which they had made their inscription, they were then properly engaged in the act implied in *Delere*. “*Quum tabulasprehendisset Oppianicus, digito legata delevit: et quum id multis locis fecisset, post mortem ejus, ne lituris coargui posset, testamentum in alias tabulas transcriptum, signis adulterinis obsignavit.*”—*CIC. pro Cluent. 41. C. 14.*

Delebis quoties scripta novare voles.—*MART. 14. 7.*

In the above instances, *Delere* is taken in its primitive sense, and signifies to smooth the surface of wax, or to erase from paper, so as to render both fit for the use to which they had been before applied. *Delere* has been carried to whatever destroys, and implies a diversity in the means, suited to the nature of the subject. “*Accepi tres epistolas quas ego lacrymis prope delevi.*”—*CIC. Ep. Fam. 14. 3.* The tears of Cicero had nearly rendered the letters illegible, as if the writings had been erased from the “*Charta deletitia.*” The destruction might, in this case, have extended to the paper, as well as to what was inserted on it, which is not involved in the original notion of *Delere*. In the following examples, it signifies destruction in general. “*Quæ unquam vetustas obruet? aut quæ tanta delebit oblivio?*”—*CIC. pro Dejot. 13.*

Nec si quid olim lusit Anacreon

Delevit ætas.———*HOR. Car. 4. 9. 9.*

OBLITERARE, from “*Ob*” and “*Litera*,” signifies to destroy the writing, by scratching and rasing the surface, on which it is inscribed. The letters are thus understood, by part of the surface being in the relation of “*Ob*” to the eye. The intention of the person, “*qui delet*,” in its primitive sense, is to efface a former, with a view to the superinducing a new inscription; that of him, “*qui obliterat*,” is only to destroy, effectually, the inscription already made. “*Quantoque major in Xenodoro præstantia fuit, tanto magis deprehendi æris obliteratio potest.*”—*PLIN. 34. 7.* The effect of the scratching, which concealed the art of the statuary, is said to have been visible in proportion to the delicacy of the work. From the particular mode of effacing now

stated, *Obliterare* is applied to destruction in general. “Bona juventæ senectus flagitiosa *obliteravit*.”—TAC. *An.* 6. 32. “Se rem vetustate *obliteratam*, cæterum suæ memoriæ infixam afferre.”—LIV. 3. 71.

Hæc vigeant mandata, nec ulla *obliteret* ætas.—CAT. 65. 232.

ABOLERE is a stronger term than any of the former, and has no reference to the effacing of any impression, in whatever way, or for whatever purpose, it was effected. Though it does not imply the annihilation, yet it implies so complete a change of the essence of some substance, that not even the smell of it remains. “Crebro postea coquitur, donec omnis odor *aboleatur*.”—PLIN. 28. 38. From denoting the destruction of the smell of any substance, this verb has been employed to express its complete dissolution, however that is effected. “Corpus non igne *abolitum*, ut Romanus mos est.”—TAC. *Ann.* 16. 6. “Deûm ædes vetustate aut igni *abolitas*.”—*Ibid.* 2. 49.

Da pater hoc nostris *aboleri* dedecus armis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 789.

DELIRARE, DESIPERE, INSANIRE, FURERE,

agree, in denoting unsoundness of mind, but differ as to the extent in which it is understood to exist. The first verb is compounded of “De” and “Lira,” and supposes a deviation from the straight line, in which the furrow should be formed. It is figuratively used to imply such a failure of the intellectual powers as is often produced by old age. Mental imbecillity, to a certain degree, at any time of life, may be denoted by this term. “Ista senilis stultitia, quæ *deliratio* appellari solet, senum levium est, non omnium.”—CIC. *de Sen. C.* 2. Seneca calls the false argument of the sophists, “*Deliratio acuta*.”—*Ep.* 49. “Multos ac *deliros* senes sæpe vidisse, sed qui magis quam Phormio *deliraret*, vidisse neminem.”—CIC. *de Or.* 2. 75.

Quicquid *delirant* reges, plectuntur Achivi.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 14.

The poet here insinuates, that the slightest deviation from sound judgment, upon the part of kings, is the cause of the most serious distress to their subjects.

DESIPERE, from “De” and “Sapere,” agrees with “Delirare,” in supposing no great deviation from right reason, but differs from it, in occasionally implying a consciousness in the person, “qui *desipit*,” that such a deviation takes place. In the two first of the following examples there is no intimation of such consciousness, but in the two last there evidently is. “Quum offenderissem populum Atheniensem prope jam *desipientem* senectute.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 1. 9. “Ægros *desipere* et aliena loqui.”—CELS. 3. 18. “In quo cum objurgarer, quod nimio gaudio pæne *desiperem*.”—CIC. *Ep.* 22. b. Reproof could not have been administered to a person not conscious of his error, by indulging excessive joy.

Misce stultitiam consiliis brevem.

Dulce est *desipere* in loco.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 12. 28.

By “brevis stultitia” the poet gives a happy definition of *Desipere*, and unless he had supposed that there was no extinction of moral agency, when this slight madness existed, he could never have recommended it as agreeable.

INSANIRE implies, that there is, in the persons modified by it, a greater defect of reason than that expressed by the two former verbs, and that this defect is often noxious to those who labour under it.

Quem mala stultitia et quæcunque inscitia veri
Cæcum agit, *insanum* Chrysiippi porticus et grex

Autumat.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 43.

— male rem gerere *insani* est; contra, bene sani.—*Ibid.* 74.

Hic homines prorsus ex stultis *insanos* facit.—TER. *Eun.*

People, in the state denoted by “Delirare” and “Desipere,” are guilty of false judgments in certain articles, which are an indication of folly, and make them the objects of ridicule rather than of compassion. Those, in the state denoted by *Insanire*, again, are out of their wits, and may occasionally be the cause of very serious evils to themselves and others. The words *Insania* and “Dementia” are made equipollent by Cicero. “Quæ est *insania* eademque “dementia.” Plato says, in his *Timæus*, Δυο δ’ ἀνοίας γενη ἡ μὲν μανία ἡ δ’ ἀραθία. The term *Μανία* corresponds with what the Romans styled *Insania*, and *Αραθία* with what they would have styled “Inepta stultitia,” implied in “Delirare” and “Desipere.”

FURERE denotes a higher degree of madness than "Insanire," and supposes the person, marked by it, to be hurried along by his rage, and blind to its consequences. "Insanire" denotes the absence of reason, and the delusions necessarily undergone by those who labour under it; while *Furere* supposes that they are incapable of governing themselves, and may commit actions prejudicial to others. The two verbs may be applied to one person, as containing steps in a progress, visible at different times. "Usque eo commotus est, ut "insanire" omnibus ac *furere* videretur."—CIC. *in Ver.* 108. b. "Hanc "insaniam" quæ junctæ stultitiæ latius patet, a *furore* distinguimus. Qui *furore* affectus sit, eum dominum esse rerum suarum vetant duodecim tabulæ. Itaque non est scriptum si "insanus," sed si *furiosus* esse incipit. "Insaniam" enim censuerunt (id est inconstantiam sanitate vacantem) posse tamen tueri mediocritatem officiorum et vitæ communem cultum, atque usitatum: *furorem* autem esse rati sunt, mentis ad omnia cæcitatem."—CIC. *Tusc.* 192. b.

— hunc, oro, sine me *furere* ante *furorem*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 680.

When Horace says,

— recepto
Dulce mihi *furere* est amico.—*Car.* 2. 7. 27.

he had not before styled this a "brevis stultitia," but had declared, that all the revelry of the Thracians should not exceed that in which he was about to indulge.

— non ego sanius
Bacchabor Edonis, &c.—*Ibid.*

DENSUS—*vide* CRASSUS.

DETERIOR—*vide* PEJOR.

DEPECULARI—*vide* PRIVARE.

DETESTARI—*vide* EXECRARI.

DEPORTATUS—*vide* EXUL.

DETRIMENTUM—*vide* DAMNUM.

DESERERE—*vide* RELINQUERE.

DEVIUS—*vide* AVIUS.

DESIDERARE—*vide* CARERE.

DIADEMA—*vide* CORONA.

DESIPERE—*vide* DELIRARE.

DICERE—*vide* FARI.

DESPICERE—*vide* CONTEMNERE.

DIFFERENTIA, DISSIMILITUDO, DISCRIMEN, DISCREPANTIA, agree, in denoting the disagreement of objects in certain points, but differ, in respect either to the points themselves, or to the extent of the disagreement. DIFFERENTIA, from "Differre," implies, that one object is carried apart from another, on account of an apprehended opposition in their natures. It is alike applicable to the essences and qualities of objects, and always expresses a denial of the identity, or sameness, of nature, in the things to which it is applied. "Qualis autem *differentia* sit honesti et decori, facilius intelligi quam explanari potest."—CIC. *de Off.* 19. a. In the eye of the moralist, the difference between the "Decorum" and the "Honestum" is so delicate, as not to be easily explained. Such difference, however, does exist, and, lying in the essence of things, is in its nature immutable. "Ita odor colorque duplex, et alius calycis, alius staminis *differentia* angusta."—PLIN. 21. 5. The difference here is also small, like that before mentioned, but is alike real, though resting on the quality, not on the essence, of its object. "Deinde quid res cum re *differat*, demonstrabitur, ut non idem videatur de utraque existimari oportere."—CIC. *de Inv.* 81. a.

DISSIMILITUDO differs from "Differentia," in referring, not to the opposition that exists in the essence of things, whether perceived or not, but to the apprehension which men have of that opposition, by means of the sense that properly recognises it. Objects, opposite in their nature, but alike in their appearance, are "Differentes," but not *Dissimiles*. Difference is measured by the supposed interval between things compared, which, when heterogeneous, form the greatest possible, that is, direct opposition. Unlikeness, again, is formed by such an absence of one quality in two or more objects, that they do not present themselves as subjects of comparison. "At enim quoniam in naturis hominum *dissimilitudines* sunt, ut alios subamara delectant, quoniam tantum natura a natura distat, quid mirum est, has *dissimilitudines* ex "differentibus" causis esse factas."—C. C. *de Fet.* 141. b. The unlikeness here, in the conduct of men, is such as to strike every beholder; the differences in the causes, again, are occult, and have their existence, whether they are explored or not. "Ita fit, ut quanta "differentia" est in principiis naturalibus,

tanta sit in finibus bonorum malorumque *dissimilitudo*.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 128. b. The philosopher asserts, that dissimilar appearances, in the tendencies of good and evil actions, correspond with the absolute difference in the natural principles he had established.

DISCRIMEN differs from the other words, in referring to the nicety of the difference, by which objects are distinguished. The “Differentia” and “Dissimilitudo” may be great or small; but *Discrimen*, from “Dis” and “Cernere,” supposes, that it tries the delicacy of the observer’s powers to catch the circumstance, on which the slight opposition depends. That, which is styled *Discrimen*, besides, must always lie in the essence, not in the appearance, of things. “Nox clara et extrema Britanniae parte brevis, ut finem atque initium lucis exiguo *discrimine* internoscas.”—TAC. *Agric.* 22. “Duo maria pertenui *discrimine* separata.”—CIC. *contra Rul.* 83. b. In both the above instances, the respective adjectives only confirm the power that is peculiar to *Discrimen*. “Hetruriam *discriminat* Cassia.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 243. b. This nice separation was made only by the breadth of the Cassian way.

Tros Tyriusve fuat nullo *discrimine* habebō.—VIRG. 10. 108.

By the use of *Discrimine*, Jupiter declares the strictness of his impartiality. Even the slight difference which this term denotes, he declares, should not be observed in his conduct towards the Trojans and Tyrians.

DISCREPANTIA differs from the other words, in denoting a natural and violent disagreement in the objects to which it is applied. It comes from “Dis” and “Crepare,” and, originally, denotes the jarring of discordant sounds. It therefore implies a general repugnance in objects, by which they refuse to unite. “Ut in fidibus aut tibiis, quamvis paululum *discrepent*, tamen id a sciente animadverti solet.”—CIC. *Off.* 29. a. “Majorem multo habere Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum omnino *discrepantiam* quam verborum.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 99. a. The tenets of those sects are said to have been less reconcileable in regard to things than words.

DIFFERRE, PROFERRE,

agree, in denoting the delay of a transaction that might have been sooner

finished ; but the former supposes, that no day had been before fixed for completing it, while the latter supposes that it had, and that another is appointed. The inseparable preposition “Dis,” forming a part of the first verb, suggests an interval, of any extent, that is never ascertained, in respect to the point at which it commences, and may, or may not, be so, in respect to that which is future. “Pro,” again, suggesting a short interval in space, necessarily suggests a similar one in time. This interval, besides, is strictly limited, as lying between the point, which is present, and had been before fixed, and that, which, though future, is precisely ascertained.

DIFFERRE signifies a general disposition to procrastinate, or leave that undone till some future period, which might, with at least equal propriety, be done at present. “Ac primo rem *differre* quotidie, ac procrastinare cœperunt.” —CIC. *pro S. R. Amer.* 22. b.

Sed propera : nec te venturas *differ* in horas.—OVID. *Rem. Am.* 93.

Differ : habent parvæ commoda magna moræ.—OVID. *Fast.* 3. 394.

Gaudia tu *differ*s, at non et stamina *differt*

Atropos.—MARTIAL. 10. 44.

In the above instances there is no limitation of the future point ; but in those that follow there is. “Antonius diem edicti ante diem quartum Calend : Decemb : *distulit*.” —CIC. *in Ant.* 187. a. “Quum is diem de die *differret*.” —LIV. 25. 25.

PROFERRE differs from “Differre,” in denoting a prorogation, by means of which the day, previously appointed for transacting some business, is altered, and the interval prolonged.

— saltem aliquot dies

Profer, dum proficiscor aliquo.—TER. *And.* 2. 2. 28.

The day for the marriage had been fixed, and Charinus was anxious that Pamphilus should consent to a delay for a limited time, hoping to avail himself of some intermediate occurrence, as he says above.

Interea fiet aliquid, spero.—*Ibid.* 14.

Ille ut depositi *proferret* fata parentis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 395.

The filial piety of Japis appeared in his wish to put off the day that was to

prove fatal to his father, then in the last extremity. For this purpose he studied the science of botany, and the practice of medicine, as appears in the next line.

Scire potestates herbarum, artemque medendi,
Maluit.

Though the latitude allowed in the limitation of the future period, by means of *Proferre*, be optional, yet a certain interval is always understood to be fixed. “*Quod si laxius volent proferre diem, poterunt vel biduum, vel triduum, vel ut videbitur; nihil enim interest.*”—*Cic. Ep. ad Att. 13. 14.*

DILIGENTIA—*vide* INDUSTRIA. DISERTUS—*vide* ELOQUENS.

DILIGERE—*vide* AMARE. DISSERERE—*vide* FARI.

DISCEDERE *vide* DECEDERE. DISSIMULARE—*vide* SIMULARE.

DIU, DUDUM, PRIDEM;

agree, in denoting an undefined space; but the first gives the time during which a single event continues, and the two last, the unequal intervals between two. Though *DIU* signifies a long time, yet the absolute length of it varies, according to the nature of the thing signified. “*Quanquam, O Dii boni! quid est in hominis vita diu?*”—*Cic. de Sen. 91. b.* Here the adverb comprehends the whole span of life, compared to something greater. Between this, however, and the ordinary length of a speech, which is suggested in the example, there is a wide difference.

Nimis diu et longum loquor.—*PLAUT. Pseud. 2. 3. 21.*

In the following example *Diu* refers to a period much shorter than the first, which is a life-time, and much longer than the last, which could extend but to a few hours.

Neque enim diu huc commigrarunt.—*TER. Adelpb. 4. 5. 15.*

A few weeks, months, or years, would probably measure the period, during which these women had taken up their abode where they then were.

When “*Jam*” is prefixed to *Diu*, the time measured is understood to be longer than upon other occasions of the same kind. If the verb happens to

be in the præterite, there is a retrospect upon the past, and the attention is called to the time that has elapsed, from the moment of commencement to that, then present.

Nunquam, Ædepol, quidquam *jamdiu*, quod magis vellem evenire
Mihi evenit, quam quod modo senex intro ad nos venit errans.—TER. *Eun.* 5. 6. 1.

Pithias had met with nothing, for a very long time, more acceptable to her, than the unexpected arrival of the old man, which had just taken place.

When the verb, again, appears in the present time, it is influenced by the “*Jam*” referring to the moment, then existing, and as in continuity with the space that is past. It is suggested by the moment thus arrested, that even then, and without further addition, this space is long. “*Jamdiu* ignoro quid agas.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 99. b. The writer here says, “I am ignorant what you, my correspondent, are doing;” and he says, by implication, “I have been so for some time past.”

Agite pugni, *jamdiu* est quod ventri victum non datis.—PLAUT. *Amph.* 1. 1. 146.

DUDUM differs from “*Diu*,” in referring, not to the continuation of a single event, but to the interval, which separates two. The general character of this interval is shortness, though the length varies with the nature of the subject to which it is applied.

Ipsa egomet *dudum* Beroen digressa reliqui.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 650.

Here it is to be understood, that Iris had just left Beroe, and that the interval between her doing so, and telling that she did so, was as short as possible.

To. E Persia ad me allatae sunt “modo” istae. Do. Quando?

To. Haud *dudum*.—PLAUT. *Pers.* 4. 3. 28.

The length of time, implied in *Dudum*, is greater than that in “*Modo*.” The latter adverb signifies “just now,” or “very lately,” while the former may refer to any period, within which the correspondence with Persia may be supposed to have stopped.

Pi. Anne abiit jam a milite?

Ch. *Jamdudum*: ætatem.—TER. *Eun.* 4. 5. 7.

Chremes, in his reply, not satisfied with *Jamdudum*, signifying long ago, adopts another term, and says, “a whole age ago.”

When "Jam" is prefixed to *Dudum*, it lengthens the time in the same way, and upon the same principle, as in the case of "Diu." The time of the verb may also vary. "Vides sudare me *jamdudum*."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 44. b. This sweating, seen at the time, involved in "Jam," had begun before, and had continued a considerable while.

Jamdudum syrio madefactus tempora nardo.—TIBULL. 3. 6. 63.

The perfume, that had been for some time on the young man's temples, still continued to emit its fragrance.

PRIDEM agrees with "Dudum," in denoting a space as the measure of an interval, but differs from it, in supposing that the interval is longer. Valla says of it; "De longiori tempore dicitur: decem aut viginti dierum, aut mensis, mensium, et nonnunquam annorum pro conditione materiæ." As in "Dudum," then, the time varies with the subject spoken of. "Ego tua gratulatione commotus, quod ad me *pridem* scripseras."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 5. 6. This congratulation, upon the purchase of a house, could not refer to an event that happened very long before the date of Cicero's letter. "Fuit enim Themistocles, regnante jam Græcia, nostra autem civitate non ita *pridem* dominatu regio liberata."—CIC. *in Brut.* 168. a. The interval between the two periods in history referred to, though comparatively short, in respect to others that might have been named, was very different from that implied in the preceding example.

The same effect is produced by "Jam," prefixed to *Pridem*, as to "Diu" and "Dudum;" that is, it lengthens the time in the root. "Cum ille *jampridem* gloriæ suæ, reipublicæ nondum satisfecerit."—CIC. *de Prov. Cons.* 76. a.

Jampridem equidem audivi, cepisse odium tui Philumenam.—TER. *Hec.* 2. 1. 22.

Laches means here, not to flatter Sostrata, but to tell her, that the hatred mentioned was of considerable standing.

DIVERSORIUM, HOSPITIUM, CAUPONA,

agree, in denoting places of entertainment, but differ, in respect either to the

time at which the entertainment is taken, or the conditions upon which it is to be had. The first term, from "Divertere," properly denotes a resting place, where the attention is turned from the fatigues of a journey. This place of refreshment may belong either to the person who enjoys it, or to his friend; but, in this last sense, the possessor is at all times disposed to accommodate his guest, without any reward. The guest, besides, uses the *Diversorium* chiefly for his own conveniency, and with a view to shew his respect to the landlord whom he visits. "Tandem Crotonam intravimus, ubi quidem parvo *diversorio* refecti, postero die amplioris fortunæ domum quærentes," &c. —PETRON. ARB. C. 126. The travellers, in the above instance, quitted the place of their entertainment only to look out for a more wealthy landlord.

Mutandus locus est, et *diversoria* nota

Præterendus equus. —HOR. Ep. 1. 15. 10.

"Næ ego multo libentius emerim *diversorium* Tarracinæ, ne semper hospiti molestus sim." —CIC. Ep. 106. a. In this last example, Cicero speaks of purchasing a *Diversorium* for himself, that he might no longer be troublesome to his landlord at Tarracina.

HOSPITIUM differs from "Diversorium," in being a place of entertainment that is always furnished by another to the person who enjoys it. The guest, besides, does not use the *Hospitium* for his own conveniency, and generally takes up his abode in it for a longer time than in the "Diversorium." The latter is commodious for the passenger, the former is the place to which the traveller directs his journey. "Ex vita ista discedo tanquam ex *hospitio*, non tanquam ex domo: commorandi enim natura "diversorium" nobis, non habitandi dedit." —CIC. de Sen. 94. b. *Hospitium* is here opposed to "Domus," as being a place of temporary use, and not of ordinary habitation. "Diversorium" carries in it still less of the idea of a permanent abode than *Hospitium*, and means only occasional accommodation while the journey lasts.

Nil me pœnitet jam quanto sumtui fuerim tibi.

Nam hospes nullus tam in amici *hospitium* divertit potest,

Qui ubi triduum continuum fuerit, jam odiosus siet. —PL. Mil. Gl. 3. 1. 145.

The figurative application of "Diversorium" and *Hospitium*, in the

following sentence, explains the literal force of each. "Defessus jam labore atque itinere disputationis, requiescam in Cæsaris sermone quasi in aliquo peropportuno "diversorio." Atqui, inquit Julius, non nimis liberale *hospitium* meum dices. Nam te in viam, simulac perpaululum gustaris, extrudam et ejiciam."—CIC. *de Orat.* 130. b.

CAUPONA differs from the two former nouns, in denoting an inn, or place of entertainment, in which the guest purchases what the landlord, in the "Diversorium" and "Hospitium," gives gratuitously.

Si te grata quies et primam somnus in horam
Delectat : si te pulvis, strepitusque rotarum,
Si lædit *caupona* ; Ferentinum ire jubebo.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 17. 6.

The noise of a public house is here well described ; and they, to whom this is disagreeable, are desired to retire to an obscure town of the Hernici, where no such bustle takes place. "Cum duo quidam Arcades iter una facerent, alter ad *cauponem* diverterit, alter ad "hospitem."—CIC. *de Div.* 92. b. The one of those travellers went to the house of a friend, and the other to that of an innkeeper, whom he would pay for his entertainment.

DIVORTIUM—*vide* RĒPUDIUM.

DOCERE, ERUDIRE, INSTITUERE, IMBUERE,

agree, in denoting a change produced upon the mind by communication from others, but differ, in respect either to the state of that mind, to which the communication is made, or to the means employed in making it. DOCERE, which, according to Varro, comes from "Do," signifies to give information to those who need it, without reference to their previous knowledge, and is a correlative term in respect to "Discere." Thus, Seneca says, "Homines dum *docent*, "discunt."—*Epist.* 7. "Itaque non facile est invenire qui quod sciat ipse, alteri non tradat. Ita non solum ad "discendum" propensi sumus, verum etiam ad *docendum*."—CIC. *de Fin.* 104. a. That *Docere* is applicable to all who receive instruction, whether ignorant, or, in a certain degree, previously instructed, appears from the following passages. "Quid nunc te, Asine, literas *doceam* ? Non opus est verbis sed fustibus."—CIC. *in Pis.* 95. a.

Hoc quoque te manet, ut pueros elementa *docentem*,
Occupet extremis in vicis balba senectus.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 20. 17.

In the passages now quoted, *Docere* supposes the minds receiving the information to be completely ignorant; but, in the three that follow, they appear to be in a state directly contrary. “Et *docebo* sus (ut aiunt) oratorem eum, quem quum Catulus nuper audisset, fœnum alios aiebat esse oportere.”—CIC. *de Or.* 2. 233.

Plura recognoscēs, pauca *docendus* eris.—OVID. *Fast.* 4. 418.

“Quid est enim aut tam arrogans, quam, de religione, de rebus divinis, ceremoniis sacris pontificum collegium *docere* conari.”—CIC. *pro Dom.* 219. b.

Docere is almost the only one of the verbs mentioned, that is employed to denote information given as to an event, as well as the acquisition of a new conception. “Cum interea ne literas quidem ullas accepi, quæ me *docerent* quid ageres.”—*Ep.* 34. a.

ERUDIRE, from “E” and “Rudis,” differs from “Docere,” in referring always to the rude state of the person instructed, and to the gradual progress by which he becomes learned. No such expression as “sus *erudio* oratorem” can exist; because, when “Docere” is thus used, it vilifies the ability of the teacher, and heightens the information of the scholar. When the Romans used the phrase “sus Minervam,” the construction was to be completed by “Docere,” not by *Erudire*. They only admitted, in idea, the possibility of adding one or a few facts to the stock of knowledge, possessed by the goddess of learning.

The instances that follow shew clearly, that *Erudire* constantly implies the absence of information upon the part of the person to be instructed.

— qui mollibus annis

In patrias artes *erudiendus* erat.—OVID. *Ep.* 1. 112:

“Inde puerum liberum loco cœptum haberi, *erudirique* artibus quibus ingenia ad magnæ fortunæ cultum excitantur.”—LIV. 1. 39. “Philosophia omnium mater artium nihil aliud est quam donum inventum deorum. Hæc nos primum ad illorum cultum, deinde ad jus hominum, quod situm est in generis humani societate, tum ad modestiam magnitudinemque animi *erudivit*.”—CIC.

Tusc. Q. 161. b. In this last example, the progress of man, as the pupil of philosophy, is beautifully painted by *Erudire*, in its purest sense.

There is no inconsistency in “*Docere*” and *Erudire* appearing in one sentence, and being applied to the different degrees of proficiency made by those acquiring knowledge. “*Neque solum vivi atque præsentis studiosos discendi erudiunt atque “docent,” sed hoc idem etiam post mortem monumentis literarum assequuntur.*”—*Cic. de Off.* 31. b. Sallust says of Sylla, that he was “*Literis Græcis, atque Latinis juxta, atque “doctissime” eruditus.*”—*Jug.* 95. Upon the principles laid down, this compounded expression will bear to be analysed. The participle, it should seem, denotes, that he had been regularly instructed in Greek and Roman literature; and the adverb, that the stock of his knowledge was such, that few, if any, were able to add to it.

One instance occurs in Cicero, in which *Erudire* signifies to inform as to an event, which “*Docere*” does often. “*Obviæ mihi velim sint literæ tuæ, quæ me erudiunt de omni republica, ne hospes plane veniam.*”—*Cic. Ep.* 24. b. This uncommon use of *Erudire* seems to justify the definition given of it. Cicero modestly confesses that ignorance of the affairs of the state, in consequence of his absence, which is perfectly consistent with the pure use of *Erudire*, and which, when duly represented, his correspondent was able to remove.

INSTITUERE differs from the preceding verbs, in denoting the first step of a progress in teaching, and the communication of the elements of whatever is the ground of instruction. The simple verb “*Statuere*,” in a figurative sense, denotes the determination to act, while the compound denotes the commencement of the action that had been resolved upon. It is only, however, as applied to teaching, that this verb can be held synonymous with the rest of the set. “*Socrates jam senex institui lyra non erubescibat.*”—*QUINCT.* 1. 27. The verb here evidently refers to the first lesson in an art, of which the philosopher was before utterly ignorant. “*Susceperas enim liberos non solum tibi, sed etiam patriæ. Eos instituere, atque “erudire” ad majorum instituta atque civitatis disciplinam, non ad tuas turpitudines debuisti.*”—*Cic. in Ver.* 184. a. “*Instituere* here refers to the first step in a process, which “*Erudire*” supposes to be carried on in the education of children. The arrangement of the verbs,

however, may be reversed, and each respectively applied to that particular state of certain pupils with which it best accords. "Senectus adolescentes "docet," *instituit*, ad omne officii munus instruit."—CIC. *de Sen.* 82. b.

IMBUERE differs from "Instituere," in denoting the instilment of sentiments that fit the pupil for making progress in a particular line. It implies intention upon the part of the agent, like the former verbs, and supposes the means of instruction to operate, without the consciousness of him who receives it. In its original application to material objects, it had denoted an affection of them in respect to colour, taste, or smell, communicated by means of a fluid; and has been afterwards applied to the production of a mental disposition or aptitude, not easily to be destroyed. "Appium Claudium præfectum urbis relinquunt, jam inde ab incunabulis *imbutum* odio tribunorum plebisque."—LIV. 4. 36. "Ad hanc legem non "docti" sed facii, non "instituti" sed *imbuti* sumus."—CIC. *pro Mil.* 103. a. "Facti" here suggests the purpose of the Creator, in opposition to that of a teacher, at whatever time he might communicate his instructions, and *Imbuti* the instilment of preparatory sentiments, before any lesson was given, as involved in the verb "Instituere."

Imbuere does not always imply the complete absence of information on any subject, but it uniformly implies an effect produced, as the means tending to future improvement. "Sin sit is qui et doctrina mihi liberaliter "institutus," et aliquo jam *imbutus* usu."—CIC. *de Or.* 123. b. "Institutus" here denotes, that a good foundation had been laid, upon which the scholar's progress rests; and *Imbutus*, that by habit he had acquired such predispositions, as fit him to advance in that line of study which the orator chalks out.

When Horace states the good qualities of a slave exposed to sale, he says he was

Literulis Græcis *imbutus*, idoneus arti
Cuilibet; argillâ quidvis imitaberis uda.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 7.

Though the power of the diminutive, in the noun, falls properly on the participle, yet no ambiguity is produced in respect to the meaning of *Imbutus*. From the words that follow, it evidently implies, that the smattering of Greek literature acquired by the slave, fitted him for making further proficiency.

DOLOR, MÆROR, LUCTUS,

agree, in denoting distress, but differ, in respect either to the cause, the extent, or the expression of that distress. The first, as the most general term, applies to distress both of body and mind. In its original use, it had been applied to corporal pain, and thus tallies with the definition given of it by Cicero. "*Dolor* autem motus asper in corpore a sensibus alienus."—CIC. *Tusc.* 182. a. From the necessary influence of body upon mind, *Dolor* has been made to denote mental pain also, and that regret of any evil, which is styled grief, and is the attribute of mind only. "Nec eum *dolorem* quem a republica capio, domus jam consolari potest."—CIC. *Fam.* 4. 6. "Summus *dolor* quem in rebus tuis capio."—CIC. *Ep.* 5. 6.

Nec laterum *dolor*, aut tussis, nec tarda podagra.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 9. 32.

— felix quicumque *dolore*

Alterius discis posse carere tuo.—TIB. 3. 6. 43.

Dolor, then, not only signifies bodily and mental pain, but regards both the cause and the effect, that is, the evil itself, and the perception of it in a sensitive being.

MÆROR differs from "*Dolor*," in being confined to mental pain, in denoting deeper distress, and in never expressing the cause which excites it. "Magno in "*dolore*" sum vel potius *mærore* quem accepimus ex crudeli morte Trebonii."—CIC. *in Ant.* 130. b. There is here no reference to bodily distress in either of the terms, and the latter evidently implies a higher degree of mental than the former.

It is, besides, characteristic of *Mæror*, that the grief it denotes arises, not from the personal distress of him who grieves, but from his sympathy with others. "Nemo enim *mæret* suo incommodo. "*Dolent*" fortasse et anguntur: sed illa lugubris lamentatio, fletusque *mærens*, ex eo est, quod eum quem dileximus, vitæ commodis privatum arbitramur, idque sentire."—CIC. *Tusc.* 154. b. "Amici qui tuo "*dolore*" *mærent*."—CIC. *Ep.* 51. a. "Fuit meum quidem jam pridem rempublicam "*lugere*;" quod faciebam, sed initius. Erat enim ubi acquiescerem. Nunc plane nec ego victum, nec vitam illam colere possum. *Mærorem* minui: "*dolorem*" nec potui, nec si possem,

vellem.”—CIC. *Ep. Att.* 195. b. By *Mærorem*; here, Cicero means his deep affliction on account of the state, which he tells his correspondent he had tempered. By “*Dolorem*,” again, he means that pain, arising from sensibility to the public interest, which rendered him easily vulnerable, but which, as a good citizen, he wished to remain in all its vigour.

LUCTUS differs from “*Dolor*” and “*Mæror*,” in supposing that the distress which it denotes is always made visible by external signs. It implies, at the same time, that the grief is not counterfeited, and that it is occasioned by some disaster that has befallen others. Cicero’s definition is, “*Luctus est ægritudo ex ejus qui charus fuit interitu acerbo.*”—CIC. *Tusc.* 213. a. “*Erat in luctu senatus, squalebat civitas.*”—CIC. *pro Sext.* 9. b.

Lentius *luctus*, lacrymæque mordent
Turba quas fletu simili frequentat.—SEN. *Troad.* 1011.

The order of the Roman senate, after the defeat at Cannæ, shews the precise force of *Luctus*. “*Censuerunt patres conscripti ne feminæ ultra triginta dies in luctu essent.*”—LIV. 22. 56. Neither “*Dolor*” nor “*Mæror*” could be substituted for *Luctus*, as the senators could have no command over the sentiment of grief, but in as far as it was expressed by external signs.

Tacitus introduces the three terms in one sentence of that edict, in which the emperor Tiberius reproves his subjects for their excessive grief upon the death of Germanicus. “*Convenisse recenti “dolore” luctum, et ex “mærore” solatia: sed referendum jam ad firmitudinem animum.*”—TAC. *Ann.* 3. 6. By “*Dolore*” is meant the natural and pardonable distress, in consequence of the recent death of Germanicus, whose memory the emperor pretended to respect; by *Luctum*, the expression of that distress by external signs; and by “*Mærore*” that deep regret which, in his opinion, the honours done to the memory of the deceased might have assuaged.

DOMINATUS—*vide* REGNUM.

DONARIUM, DONATIVUM—*vide*

DONARE—*vide* DARE.

CONGIARIUM.

DUBIUS, ANCEPS, AMBIGUUS,

agree, in denoting some quality of an object, which embarrasses the observer,

and prevents him from rightly apprehending its nature. In the original application of *DUBIUS*, it refers to that state of mind, in which the truth is not clearly seen, and a choice of alternatives cannot be decisively made. “*Quum equites procul visi non sine terrore ab dubiis quinam essent, mox cogniti.*—*LIV. 4. 40.*

Dum in dubio est animus, paulo momento huc illuc impellitur.—*TER. And. 1. 5. 3.*

Though the original application of *Dubius* be, properly, to the mind that hesitates, yet it is very frequently applied to the subject of hesitation.

Cæna dubia apponitur. *Get. Quid istuc verbi est?*

Ph. Ubi tu dubites, quid sumas potissimum.—*TER. Phorm. 2. 2. 28.*

From this definition, of unquestionable authority, it is clear, that though *Dubia* seems to express a quality of the entertainment, yet its meaning rests upon the distraction of the guest, owing to the variety of dishes that form it.

ANCEPS denotes that quality of an object, by which it may be applied, or interpreted, in two different ways, according to the inclination of the person who uses or contemplates it. Thus, the “*Gladius anceps*” was an instrument of death, with whichsoever of the sides the warrior chose to employ it.

Jus anceps novi: causas defendere possum.—*HOR. Sat. 2. 5. 34.*

Knowing the quirks of the law, says the speaker, which may be variously applied, I can turn them to the advantage of the cause I support.

Anceps forma bonum mortalibus.—*SEN. Hippol. 761.*

Beauty, it is here said, from what has been seen of its consequences, may be interpreted either a blessing or a curse to its possessors.

Anceps is more rarely transferred from its original meaning than “*Dubius*.” It is among the poets, chiefly, that this term is taken from the subject, which may mislead from its nature, and applied to the person in the dark.

At matres primò ancipites.—*VIRG. Æn. 5. 654.*

Sic tum diversis hinc atque hinc molibus anceps,

Pectora dux crebro gemitu quatit.—*VAL. FLAC. 5. 310.*

AMBIGUUS denotes the quality of an expression, which may be interpreted in one of two different ways, according to the apprehension of the person to

whom it is addressed. “Si quando aliud in sententia videtur esse, aliud in verbis; genus est quoddam *ambigui*, quod ex præterito verbo fieri solet, in quo quod est *ambiguorum* proprium, res duas significari videmus.”—CIC. *Orat.* 208. “Scriptum *ambiguum* est, cum duæ differentes sententiæ accipi possunt.”—*Idem. in Top.* 96.

In this original application of *Ambiguus*, a person is misled without being conscious of it, or perceiving that any alternative exists, to which it is possible for him to have recourse, in order to avoid mistake. He is, in fact, the dupe of the ambiguity in the expression he misinterprets. In the case of “Dubius” and “Anceps,” the matter is very different. The person, to whom the former in its primary, and the latter in its secondary use, is applied, feels himself to be a free agent, and at perfect liberty to do as he has a mind.

There is an use of *Ambiguus* in Horace, that does equal honour to his accuracy, as a philosopher, and his elegance, as a poet:

— certus enim promisit Apollo

Ambiguam tellure nova Salamina futuram.—HOR. *Car.* 1. 7. 28.

The God is here said to have promised, that the name Salamis should be equally applicable to the city which Teucer was to found at Cyprus, and to that in Attica, from which he and his followers were then driven. By substituting “Dubiam” or “Ancipitem” in place of *Ambiguam*, the consolation would have been destroyed. The power of the two former must have necessarily fallen upon the place, and thus have diminished the probability of arriving at it. But *Ambiguus*, by throwing its power upon the appellation, and rendering it equivocal, beautifully insinuates, that the refugees would soon forget that Telamon had banished them, and that any other Salamis existed but their own.

From expression, to which *Ambiguus* is originally applicable, it has been afterwards turned to persons and things.

— oculisque malignis

Ambiguæ spectare rates.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 654.

“Rem *ambiguam* distinguere.”—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 178. a. “Tiberius cuncta per consules incipiebat, tanquam vetere republica, et *ambiguus* imperandi.”—

TAC. *An.* 1. 7. In such applications it is understood, that the duplicity of a character, or the obscurity of any subject, may be the cause of a mistake, analogous to that arising from the misapprehension of terms that have a double meaning. It is to be observed, too, that when *Ambiguus* is taken as equivalent to "Dubius" and "Anceps," it in so far forsakes its native power as to imply, that the person, to whom it is applied, sees the alternatives, of which he is unable to make a choice.

DUCERE—*vide* TRAHERE.

DUDUM—*vide* DIU.

DUCTUS—*vide* AUSPICIUM.

DUO, AMBO, BINI,

agree, in referring to the same number, but differ, in respect to the connection that subsists between the units composing it. The first denotes that number which is formed by adding unity to itself, and which is more than one and less than three. It is the first symbol which marks quantity as divided, and not as one continuous mass; and the plurality, which it announces as commencing, may be continued without end. In the units composing this number, no bond of connection is visible whatever. Each is understood to be an individual substance existing, "per se," and occupying the attention of the observer, along with another of a similar description.

Si *duo* præterea tales *Idæa* tulisset

Terra viros.———VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 285.

The connection between the heroes composing the number, expressed by *Duo*, is inferred from their common resemblance to *Æneas*. *Venus* states the precise number of such, which, in his estimation, would have turned the scales, and given Troy the superiority of which Greece could boast. One might have been insufficient, but three would have been more than needful.

At longe patria est, longe est carissima conjux,

Quicquid et hæc nobis post *duo* dulce fuit. — OVID. *Trist.* 3. 4. 53.

The objects, here styled *Duo*, were very opposite in their nature, the one being the object of public, and the other of private, affection. The absence of his country and his wife excites the complainer's regret. These two are

associated by being dearest to him, but he insinuates, that other objects, beside these, engaged his affections, and might have increased the group.

AMBO differs from "Duo," in supposing a certain connection to subsist between the individual substances that form it, so as to constitute a pair. The first unit, forming "Duo," is, in Latin, styled "Unus," and the second "Alter." In the case of *Ambo*, again, neither has any particular appellation, but "Uterque" is alike applicable to each, when there is no reference to the choice of the hearer. If this exists, "Utervis" takes the place of "Uterque."

Menander fecit Andriam et Perinthiam

Qui "utramvis" recte norit, *ambas* noverit.—TER. *Prol. And.* 9.

These two dramatic works are coupled together in a general way, as being the productions of one author. "Duo" would have suggested, that Menander had composed neither more nor less than two comedies, which is not true. *Ambo*, however, has no reference whatever to the absolute number of his works, but only classes two of them, from the circumstance of their being like; and this likeness is so great, that the knowledge of either of the two infers that of both. "Est autem quidam interjectus, inter hos medius et ut cinnus *amborum*, in neutro excellens, utriusque particeps."—CIC. *Orat.* 198. b. The two modes of speaking, that had been opposed, are classed by the word *Ambo*, and a "tertium quid" is introduced, carrying in it the excellence of neither, though partaking of the nature of both.

The poets sometimes use *Ambo* and "Duo" promiscuously, as when Virgil says,

— partes se via findit in *ambas*—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 640.

The two roads, here mentioned by the Sybill, are mentioned for the first time. There might have been more of them; but *Ambo* fixes the number as exactly as "Duo" would have done, had the line, as it now stands, admitted of it.

BINI differs from "Ambo," in supposing the connection between the units forming it to be more intimate, and the two together, as the constituent parts of what the speakers consider as one whole. It is the first of what are called

distributive numerals, in each of which the respective cardinal fixes the number of units entering into the composition of an aggregate, regarded as single, and susceptible of any addition. "Et unicuique vestrûm ubi consistat, vix *bini* pedes assignentur."—CIC. *contra Rull.* 83. a. The plurality, involved in *Bini*, is lost in the unity of those spaces assigned to each of the individuals mentioned. The piece, given to each, in the division of a surface, consisted of two feet; and if the number of feet was just double that of the individuals, an allotment to that extent a-piece would exhaust the subject, without any overplus. "Nonne cernimus vix singulis ætatibus, *binos* oratores laudabiles extitisse."—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 196. b. It is here said, that scarcely, in the course of each of the ages that had elapsed, could one pair of accomplished orators be found.

Bini, in some instances, shews the power of "Ambo," and states the units as associated, not for the purpose of distribution, or for forming a compounded integral. "Itaque illi veteres, cum circuitum et quasi orbem verborum conficere non possent, "terna," aut *bina* verba dicebant."—CIC. *de Or.* 161. b. These adjectives, which are usually distributives, here state the words as uttered, in two's and three's, for the convenience merely of the speaker. Every such set of words, at the same time, would not have suited his purpose. "Ambo" might do the duty, in respect to any two selected words, here done by *Bina*, but there is no corresponding term to do that of "Terna." "Tres" would have suggested three distinct individual terms; but "Terna" states them as in a relation analogous to that, here expressed by *Bina*, in regard to the number two, but really descriptive of them, as marked by "Ambo."

There are instances, however, in which *Bini* does precisely the duty of the cardinal numeral "Duo."

Frænaque *bina*, meus quæ nunc habet aurea Pallas.—VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 168.

When *Bini* is joined to nouns that want the singular number, it then has the same import with "Duo." The expressions "*Binæ literæ*," and "*Duæ literæ*," are very different in their meaning. The first, in which the substantive wants the singular, signifies two letters or epistles, and the last, two

alphabetical characters. “Credo te *binas* meas literas accepisse, unam a Pen-
denisso, alteram a Laodicea.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 6. 1. “Pompeius cum duce
Marsorum inter *bina* castra collocutus est.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 12. 11. Cicero,
we are told by Appian, in his commentary upon Virgil’s *Æneid*, 8. 168.
found fault with his son for saying, “Direxi “duas literas” pro “*binas*.”
The word “Duo” supposes the existence of separate units, for the expression
of each of which “Literæ” and “Castra” are provided with no singular num-
ber. While the plural form in *Bini*, then, accords with the nouns mentioned,
as destitute of any other, which “Duo” might have done, it suggests, in
respect to such terms, the impossibility of a resolution into those units, which
the singular number only can announce.

DUPLEX, DUPLUS,

agree, in denoting “double;” but the former respects the object, as being either
void of simplicity, or more than one; while the latter respects its relative
quantity, as being twice the magnitude of something else. The first is com-
pounded of “Duo” and “Plica,” and properly signifies twofold; the latter
signifies more by another, or double in size or number. As “Simplex” de-
notes a substance open or exposed to view, so *Duplex*, “Triplex,” and
“Quadruplex” denote the contrary, by means of the number of folds respec-
tively announced by each adjective prefixed. The precise power of “Sim-
plex” and *Duplex* may be gathered from Terence.

— integram comœdiam

Hodie sum acturus, Heautontimorumenon,

Duplex quæ ex argumento facta est “simplici.”—TER. *Prolog. in Heaut.* 5.

When this play came first from the pen of the Greek poet Menander, it was
“Simplex;” but now, when transferred by Terence into another language, it
is said to be *Duplex*. He means by this, that there are not two different
plays bearing one name, but that there is such a diversity between them, as
that effected by two folds in the same piece of cloth.

Duplex signifies “two,” when the units, by being closely united, form

a pair, so that an apparent unity is preserved in the aggregate, consisting of two parts.

— et *duplices* tendens ad sidera palmas.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 93.

“Socrates ita disseruit duas esse vias, *duplicesque* cursus animorum a corpore excedentium.”—CIC. *Tusc.* 103. b. The first adjective shews, that there were more than one and less than three roads; and the last, that the roads agreed, as leading from this world; though they differed in respect to the place to which each of them pointed.

DUPLUS differs from “Duplex,” in referring, not to the general nature of objects, as void of simplicity or unity, but to their relative quantity, as being twice as large as some other, with which they are compared.

Duplum pro furto mihi opus est.—PLAUT. *Pæn.* 5. 6. 14.

Agorastocles here requires double the quantity to his dinner that was given to the rest, on account of his theft. “Secundam autem primæ partis *duplam*, deinde tertiam quæ esset secundæ sesquialtera, deinde quartam quæ secundæ *dupla* esset.”—CIC. *de Un.* 199. a. In the above example, the second part is said to be double the first in magnitude, and the fourth the second. This meaning holds equally in regard to the subjects of discrete and of concrete quantity. “Majores enim nostri sic habuere, et ita in legibus posuere, furem *dupli* condemnari, fœneratorem “quadrupli.”—CATO, *de R. R. in Præf.* The thief, by this law, would pay double the number of pieces he stole, and the usurer four times the number of those, that he had acquired by injustice in his line.

E, EX,

are precisely equivalent, and refer to the departure of one object from another, within which it is contained. Their original meaning, then, is "out of;" and they suppose either that a part is taken from the mass, or that a distinct body is made to quit certain limits, within which it had lain.

E flamma petere te cibum posse arbitror.—TER. *Eun.* 3. 2. 38.

"Duo genera causarum sunt: unum *ex* eo loco in quo esset; alterum si ab eo loco quo veniret, vi dejectus esset."—CIC. *pro Cæc.* 301. b. In this last passage *Ex* is opposed to "In," as "Ab" is to "Apud," or to "Ad," when it denotes quiescence.

In the use of these prepositions, it is not always needful, that the part, understood to be separated, should be a distinct portion of the mass. They are used purely when, by the art of the statuary or sculptor, the object formed comes from the solid body, cut by the chissel. "Pocula *ex* auro gemmis distincta. Erat etiam vas vinarium *ex* una gemma pergrandi."—CIC. *in Ver.* 214. a. In such instances, it is understood, that the artist's skill can as certainly produce the preconceived form out of the mass of matter, upon which he operates, as if the subject with that form actually existed, and were inclosed within it.

The two prepositions denote, "for the interest of" the object, whose appellation they govern. "Senatus existimat atque *e* republica censet."—CIC. *in Ant.* 224. a. "Statues ut *ex* fide, fama, reque mea videbitur."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 5. 8. This power of *E* and *Ex* is the reverse of one already explained, and belonging to "Ab." "Id quoque notasse non "ab" re est."—PLIN. 34. 9. The observation of Scaurus de Orthog. upon this use of these different prepositions, appears ingenious and solid. "*E* re" vel "*ex* re" nostra est, quod intime cum illa conjunctum est; "ab re," quod sejunctum et adversum adeo."

E and *Ex* have the power of expressing causation, or the reason “on account of” which any event takes place. They have then a reference to the effect, springing from its cause, as the stream does from its source. “Nos hic te ad mensem Januarium expectamus, *ex* quodam rumore, an *ex* literis tuis ad alios missis?”—CIC. *Ep. Att.* 2. a. “*Ex* lassitudine arctius dormire.”—CIC. *pro Rab. P. C.* 9.

Ex amore hic admodum quam sævus est!—PLAUT. *Amph.* 1. 3. 43.

The Latins consider the words governed by the prepositions as denoting inclosed points, from which the events stated proceed; while the English consider them as distinct causes, on account of which those events take place.

These prepositions also denote “according to,” or “consistently with.” This use of *E* and *Ex* is precisely similar to that of “De,” already explained, and is founded upon the supposed similarity between the object proceeding, and that from which it proceeds. “Facis *ex* tua dignitate et “e” republica.”—CIC. *Fp. ad Att.* 273. b. The conduct, expressed by the verb, is here said to tally with the dignity of the person acting, and is understood to be an effect strictly consonant with the cause that gives birth to it. The Latins judge of the conduct from the personal dignity of the agent, which they consider as its source: the English apply the conduct to the dignity, as to a standard with which they find it consistent. The import of the *E*, in the last example, is very different from that of the *Ex*. The *E* is in the third power assigned to the præpositions, and denotes that this agent’s conduct is for the interest of the state. “Decedere *ex* provincia, *ex* senatus consulto.”—CIC. *Fp. Fam.* 2. 13. The first of the two prepositions, in the above sentence, exhibits the radical power, which is “out of,” and the last, that now explained “according to,” “in compliance with.”

E and *Ex* are frequently to be translated “in respect to.” In this use the Latins regard the object, denoted by the governed word, as the origin of the correlative state; while the English regard the person in this state as pointing to the object governed by an expression equal to “quod attinet ad.” “Laborare e renibus.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 188. a. So, also, “*ex* pedibus, *ex* oculis, *ex*

capite," &c. The preposition is applied also to mind and its affections. "Si ipsi *ex* invidia minus laborarent."—CIC. *pro Sex. Ros.* 43. b. This use of *E* and *Ex* is analogous to one of "A" and "Ab;" as, "Ab" animo æger."—PLAUT. The "Ægritudo," in Latin, is supposed to proceed from a certain part, and thereby to affect the bodily or the mental system, as it belongs to either. In English it is supposed to be extraneous, but to affect the part in respect to which the complaint is made.

From a natural analogy, *E* and *Ex* denote process in time, and that from any given period, whether past, present, or future. "*Ex* calendis Januariis ad hanc horam vigilavi."—CIC. *in Ant.* 262. a. "*Ex* hoc tempore miretur potius."—CIC. *pro Sext.* 3. a. "Tribuni militum *ex* calendis Januariis non judicabunt."—CIC. *in Ver.* 71. b.

The prepositions *E* and *Ex* exhibit seven different powers.

I.

OUT OF; as implying the departure of an object from what contained it.

II.

OUT OF; as formed from the mass.

III.

FOR THE INTEREST OF; as coming naturally from the object, and, of course, being the reverse of injurious.

IV.

ON ACCOUNT OF; as giving out the cause which produces the effect on that, upon which it operates.

V.

ACCORDING TO; founded on the supposed similarity between the thing producing and that produced.

VI.

IN RESPECT TO; the event spoken of being regarded, in Latin, as proceeding from a cause expressed in the governed word, and this, in English, being supposed to refer to a cause that is extraneous.

VII.

AFTER. A point in time, past, present, or future, analogous to one in space,

is assumed, and, as a body moves from the latter with a force proportioned to the power that impels it, so unequal portions of duration succeed the former, according to the extent of the interval implied.

E and *Ex* discover, in composition, the same power of departure from a containing object, that is essential to them in their simple state. In some cases they govern in composition, and in others they do not. “An tu egressus porta Capena?”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 51. a. “*Fgressi tecta, consistimus.*” PLIN. *Ep.* 6. 20. “*Terminos ætatis egrediens.*”—TAC. *Hist.* 4. 5. In the last examples we find “*Gradior,*” which, in its simple state, is a neuter verb, converted into an active one by being compounded. So it sometimes happens with the verb “*Exire.*”

Corpore tela modo atque oculis vigilantibus *exit.*—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 438.
Sustinet a jugulo dextram, et vim viribus *exit.*—*Ibid.* 11. 750.

As a separation between bodies inclosed is always effected with more difficulty than between those that are simply contiguous, so, from the necessary effort needful to accomplish the former, *E* and *Ex* are made to denote, that the motion, implied in the simple verb, is upwards, and that the influence of gravity is counteracted. This appears in such verbs as “*Erigere*” and “*Escendere.*” The motion, implied in “*Regere,*” the root of the former, may be in any direction but downwards, and, of course, there is no such compound as “*Dërigere.*” The root of the former, “*Scandere,*” again, admits of being compounded with “*De,*” as in “*Descendere,*” because the motion downward is retarded, and may not be perpendicular, so as to be consistent with the safety of the animal descending. “*Natura quum cæteras animantes abjecisset ad pastum, solum hominem erexit, ad cœlique conspectum excitavit.*”—CIC. *de Legg.* 161. a.

Non tu scis, cum *ex* alto puteo sursum ad summum “*escenderis,*”
Maximum periculum inde esse, a summo ne sursum cadas?

PLAUT. *Mil. G.* 4. 4. 14.

“*Escendere*” and “*Descendere*” are directly opposite in their meaning. As “*De*” unites the power of “*A*” and “*E,*” so it can announce the diminished influence of gravity upon bodies, which, though they do not fall from those

to which they have been contiguous only, yet descend gradually, and without acceleration.

E and *Ex* possess a strong privative power, by suggesting the departure, and, of course, the absence, of a circumstance essential to a particular object, the want of which alters its general nature. Thus, the adjective “Elinguis” supposes the privation of a tongue, or of the power of using it, and, of course, the mutilated state of man, to whom speech is natural. “Præsertim cum Fannius nunquam est habitus *elinguis*.”—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 173. b. “Egelidus,” in like manner, intimates the privation of cold, or the absence of that degree of it, at which water is just at the freezing point. “Ulcus si hiems est, *egelida*, si aliud tempus, “frigida” aqua fovendum.”—CELS. 6. 18.

Nunc ver *egelidum*, nunc est mollissimus annus.—COLUM. 10. 282.

As “Armare” signifies to arm, so does *Exarmare* signify to disarm. “Longinum manibus coercent *exarmantque*.”—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 31.

E and *Ex* discover a power that is strongly intensive, and the very reverse of that now explained. This is founded, like that in “Ad” and “De,” upon the idea of a quality, that abounds in one object, passing towards and affecting another, in a way consistent with its nature. The verbs “Docere” and “Discere” are correlatives; the one signifying to communicate, and the other to receive, instruction. “Natura impellimur ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis docendo; ita non solum ad “discendum” propensi sumus, sed ad “docendum.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 104. a. Though the simple verbs denote nothing more than the acts of communicating and receiving instruction, yet the compounds go farther. “Qui meam causam prudentibus commendarit, imperitos *edocuerit*.”—CIC. *post Red.* 210. b. To those, who are styled “Prudentes,” and would easily understand the cause, it needed only a “Commendatio;” but to the “Imperiti,” it would require an accurate and a laboured statement, such as the skilful in the art of communicating could alone give. “Poetæ ita sunt dulces, ut non legantur modo, sed etiam *ediscantur*.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 180. b. The first verb signifies a superficial reading, so as to perceive the general meaning, in as far as the reader can unfold this by himself. But the last verb

denotes an accurate perusal, and every assistance given the student, so that he may discern those latent beauties that escape an ordinary eye.

Nec levis ingenuas pectus coluisse per artes
Cura sit; et linguas "edidicisse" duas.
Non formosus erat, sed erat facundus Ulysses.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 121.

It is not to be supposed that a slight exertion would procure those accomplishments, or that skill in the two languages mentioned, or would lead to the fame enjoyed by Ulysses.

The verb "Elevare" is singular in one respect, that the same intensive power acts differently, according to the nature of the subject to which the term is applied. When applied to material bodies, "Elevare" signifies to raise from the surface that supports, or, as we say, to elevate. "Contignationem storeasque *elevabant*."—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 2. 9. Applied to intellectual objects, it signifies to weaken, or to impair the effect of. "Nihil est quod tam obtundat *elevetque* ægritudinem."—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 198. a. "Suspiciones tum evitare, tum *elevare*, tum ferre sapientis est."—CIC. *de Am.* 112. b.

This double meaning may be explained upon the same principle, by referring it to the intensive power of the prepositions. The simple verb "Levare" signifies to lighten; and "Elevare," applied to bodies, supposes such an increase in this way, as to render the mass almost buoyant. Gravity is made negative in respect to lightness; so that when the first fails, the last operates. The latter, besides, from being a quality of the subject raised, is transferred to the energy of the agent, who raises it. The same thing holds with the intellectual objects, to which "Elevare" is applied. In the first of the two last examples, Cicero gives the best possible prescription for one who wishes "elevare prementem ægritudinem," that is, to diminish the weight of what he feels oppressive; and, in the second, he tells us, that if a wise man cannot, in the first place, avoid, he will, in the next, extenuate, or lighten, grounds of suspicion, before he is forced, in the last, to exercise his patience in bearing them.

EBRIUS, EBRIOSUS,

agree, in referring to a state of drunkenness, but differ, according as that state

is accidental or habitual. The person, to whom the first term is applied, is always in a state of intoxication at the time; while he, to whom the last is applied, may happen to be sober, but is generally otherwise. The former means one that is drunk, the other one that is a drunkard. “Zeno ait, *ebrium* duobus modis dici, altero, cum aliquis vino gravis est, et impos sui: altero, si solet *ebrius* fieri, et huic obnoxius vitio est: plurimum interesse concedes inter *ebrium* et *ebriosum*. Potest et qui *ebrius* est, tunc primum esse, nec habere hoc vitium; et qui *ebriosus* est, sæpe extra *ebrietatem* esse.”—SEN. *l'p.* 85. “In aliis iracundia dicitur, quæ ab ira differt: estque aliud iracundum esse, aliud iratum, ut inter *ebrietatem* et *ebriositatem* interest.”—CIC. *Tusc.* 214. b.

When a person is not in full possession of reason, from the undue prevalence of any sentiment, this state is figuratively expressed by *Ebrius*. Thus, Horace elegantly says of Cleopatra, when intoxicated with her good fortune,

— quidlibet impotens
Sperare, fortunaque dulci
Ebria. ————— *Car.* 1. 37. 10.

EDERE—*vide* VESCI.

EGESTAS—*vide* PAUPERTAS.

EFFIGIES—*vide* IMAGO.

EJULARE—*vide* FLERE.

EGELIDUS—*vide* GELIDUS.

EJURARE—*vide* ABJURARE.

EGERE—*vide* CARERE.

ELEGANS, CONCINNUS, MUNDUS, LAUTUS,

agree, in denoting the elegance or beauty of the object to which each is applied, but differ, as they refer to the taste of him who composes it; to the mutual fitness of the parts; or to the costliness of the whole. Upon the authority of Cicero, *Elegans* comes from “*Eligere*.” “*Elegantes ex eligendo, tanquam a diligendo diligentes.*”—*De Nat. Deor. C.* 28.

In old Latin, *Elegans* was written “*Eligans*,” shewing, thus, its derivation from “*Eligere*.” In early times, too, the quality denoted by it was held a disparagement to the person to whom it was ascribed. Even after the days of Cato, it implied a quality that entitled its possessor to no praise. As taste improved, however, it began to denote a quick and just apprehension of the

constituents of beauty. The productions of the person, to whom it was then applicable, were supposed equally removed from that coarseness which prevails in rude times, and from those spurious ornaments that spring from the abuse of refinement.

This term, then, has a reference to that power, by which a man of genius adopts the fittest means for the completion of his work, and to that power, also, by which a man of taste discerns at once its beauties and its defects. “Vide ne ille non solum temperantia sed etiam intelligentia te atque istos, qui se *elegantes* dici volunt, vicerit.”—CIC. *Ver.* 4. 98. “Si etiam *elegantem* videri volet; “eliget” quibus utatur.”—CIC. *Or.* 204. b. “*Elegantes* hi sunt (says Gesner) qui iudicium rerum pulcrarum habent, quid pulcrum sit intelligunt.”

Elegans refers to the taste of the spectator, as well as to the genius of the artist.

Cum ipsum me noris, quam *elegans* formarum spectator siem. TER. *Eun.* 3. 5. 18.

“*Elegans* spectator est (says Donatus) qui sit cunctantis et fastidiosi iudicii, cui non quid placet facile.”

Eia quam *elegans* est!—TER. *Eun.* 5. 5. 19.

Gesner translates this “*Quam fastidiosus in eligendo.*” The quality denoted by *Elegans*, though bestowed by nature; is susceptible of high improvement. “*Erudito-luxu, Neroni assumptus est elegantiaæ arbiter.*”—TAC. *Ann.* 16. 18.

CONCINNUS differs from “*Elegans*,” in referring, not to the delicate apprehension of what is beautiful, both in the composer and in the critic, but to the nice consonance of those parts that form the composition. It comes from “*Con*” and “*Cinnus*,” which denotes a kind of drink formed by an artificial mixture of various liquors. It is well defined by Facciolati, “*Aptitudo et convenientia plurium rerum intra re apte compositarum.*”

At magnum fecit, quod verbis Græca Latinis
Miscuit. At sermo lingua *concinnus* utraque
Suavior: ut chio nota si commista falerni est.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 10: 23.

“*Illam autem concinnitatem, quæ verborum collocationem illuminat his luminibus, quæ Græci, quasi aliquos gestus orationis, σχήματα appellant.*”—CIC.

Or. 284. b. *Concinnitas*, here, denotes an artful collocation of terms, so that the place of each ministers to the perfection of the composition. “Ab re longa digressio; in qua cum fuerit delectatio, tum reditus ad rem aptus et *concinnus* esse debet.”—CIC. *Orat.* 161. a.

Auceps quando *concinnavit* arcam, effundit cibum.—PLAUT. *Asin.* 1. 3. 64.

Concinnare, here, denotes the act of removing inequalities on the ground, and rendering it fit for practising the fowler's art. This is one step in a process, tending to success. “*Concinnare* lutum,” to mix mortar.—PL. *Rud.* 1. 2. 8. “*Concinnare* vinum,” to medicate wine.—PLIN. 14. 20. As the Romans understood, that the excess of that quality, styled “*Elegantia*,” degenerated into affectation, so they understood, also, that there might be an abuse of *Concinnitas*, when sense was sacrificed to sound, and quaintness came in place of simplicity. “Sunt enim *concinne* distributa, sed tamen non perite.”—CIC. *de Or.* 116. a. “Non est ornamentum virile *concinnitas*.”—SEN. *Fp.* 115.

MUNDUS differs from the former terms, in denoting a lower degree of beauty, and such as originates chiefly from the absence of what is offensive. “*Elegans*” and “*Concinnus*” denote intrinsic excellence in the work, from the judgment of the artist, and the just arrangement of its parts. *Mundus*, again, denotes a negative excellence in it, from the want of whatever would disgust, as unclean or slovenly. “Ob id crebrius vasa *mundanda*.”—PLIN. 15. 6.

Quæ dum foris sunt, nihil videtur *mundius*

Nec magis compositum quidquam, nec magis “*elegans*.”—TER. *Eun.* 6. 4. 12.

In this description of courtezans, the poet rises in his expression, and marks the power of this and the two last nouns. The first in order denotes cleanliness; the second, the reverse of that tawdriness of dress which arises from inconsistency in its parts; and the third, that refinement which arises from the taste and delicate selection of the wearer.

Munda, sed e medio consuetaque verba, puellæ,

Scribite. ————— OVID. *Art. Am.* 3. 479.

The poet, here, means neat and chaste expression, opposed to what is flowery, and to what the French call “*recherché*.”

Plerumque gratæ divitibus vices,
Mundæque parvo sub lare pauperum,
 Cænæ sine aulæis et ostro,
 Sollicitam explicuere frontem.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 29. 13.
Mundus erit qui non offendet sordibus, atque
 In neutram partem cultûs miser.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 65.

Mundus is not confined to cleanliness in dress, but is sometimes made to denote a culpable gaudiness. “Minucia Vestalis primo suspecta propter *mundiorem* justo cultum.”—LIV. 8. 15. “*Munditias* mulieribus, viris laborem convenire.”—SAL. *Jug.* 85. “Adhibenda præterea *munditia* est, non odiosa neque exquisita nimis: tantum quæ fugiat agrestem et inhumanam negligentiam.”—CIC. *de Off.* 265.

LAUTUS, in its original acceptation, as a participle, agrees in so far with “Mundus,” as to denote cleanliness. This state is understood, in the case of *Lautus*, to be acquired by a past act of washing. The account given by Festus of the abstract noun *Lautitia* will explain the nature of *Lautus*, as an adjective. “Epularum magnificentia, a “lavatione” dicta: quia apud antiquos hæ elegantia, quæ nunc sunt, non erant, et raro aliquis lavabat.”

From the costliness of baths, which were once so rare, *Lautus* would, in all probability, come to denote magnificence, or expensive elegance in general. The entertainer is called by Horace, “eum qui præbet aquam.” From this circumstance the wealth of the landlord was inferred, as well as from his furnishing perfumes, expressed in the phrase, “scit ponere unctum.” “Nec tamen eas cænas quæro, ut magnæ reliquiæ fiant: quod erit, magnificum sit et *lautum*. Ante meum adventum fama ad te de mea nova *lautitia* veniet.”—CIC. *Ep.* 136. b.

LAUTUS is employed to denote both the good and the bad qualities for which the wealthy are often remarkable. It is applied to their good breeding and to their pride. “Homo *lautus* et urbanus.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 79. b. “Valde jam *lautus* es, qui gravêre ad me literas dare, homini præsertim prope domestico.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 7. 14. It expresses, also, the extent of a sum of money, which either did enrich, or might have enriched, the possessor. “Patrimonium satis *lautum* dissipare.”—CIC. *pro Flac.* 163. b.

ELOQUENS, DISERTUS,

agree, in denoting the power of uttering animated conceptions, by means of speech, but differ, in respect to the degree in which that power is possessed. The first term, from "Eloqui," implies the perfection of that art, by which human thought is communicated. It supposes, that the idea is accurately formed, and that the expression is so precise, as to state it exactly as it is. Mr Pope's definition of a person to whom *Eloquens* is applicable, is a happy one.

Fit words attended on his weighty sense.

"Is erit *eloquens*, qui ad id quodcunque docebit, poterit accommodare orationem; qui parva submisse, modica temperate, magna graviter dicere potest."—CIC. *Orat.* 208. a. "Nihil aliud est *eloquentia* quam copiose loquens sapientia."—CIC. *Part. Or.* 236. b.

DISERTUS comes from "Disserere," which, properly, denotes the act of separating different seeds, and sowing each in its proper place. "Ut olitor "disserit" in areas suas cujusque generis res, sic in oratione qui facit, *disertus*."—VAR. *L. L.* 5. 7. The native power of this verb appears in such a sentence as the following, from Columella. "Baccas lauri et myrti, cæterorumque viridium semina in areolas "disserere."—II. 2. 30. This derivative adjective, *Disertus*, denotes a degree of ability, in the use of speech, superior to what is generally met with, but inferior to that suggested by "Eloquens." The following definition, from Cicero, is decisive as to both terms. "Celer tuus *disertus* est magis quam sapiens. *Disertos* me cognosse nonnullos scripsi, "eloquentem" adhuc neminem: quod eum statuebam *disertum*, qui posset satis acute atque dilucide apud mediocres homines ex communi quadam hominum opinione dicere: "eloquentem" vero qui mirabilius et magnificentius augere posset, atque ornare quæ vellet, omnesque omnium rerum, quæ ad dicendum pertinerent fontes, animo ac memoria contineret."—*Ep. ad Att.* 10. 1. "*Disertis* satis putat, dicere quæ oporteat; ornate autem dicere proprium est "eloquentissimi."—QUINT. *in Proæm.* 8.

In causa facili cuivis licet esse *diserto*.—OVID. *Trist.* 11. 21.

EMPLASTRUM, MALAGMA, PASTILLUS,

agree, in denoting medicinal applications, but differ, in respect either to the nature of the ingredients, or to the manner in which they are used. The first signifies a plaster, to be applied to wounds where the skin is necessarily broken, and which is chiefly composed of metallic substances. It forms a cataplasm that is laid upon the sore, with a view to assist nature in the progress towards a cure.

MALAGMA, again, consisting chiefly of vegetable substances, is laid upon the unbroken skin, with a view to remove inflammations, or to discuss what may require to be fomented or brought to suppuration. The *Pastillus* and the *Emplastrum* agree, in respect to their component parts; those of both being chiefly metallic substances. They differ, as the former is prepared by reducing dry materials to a powder. This, when made to cohere, by the application of a liquid not of an oleaginous nature, is allowed to dry, and is again softened before it is applied to wounds, upon which it is spread, and not laid like the *Emplastrum*.

The great Roman physician, who lived in the time of Tiberius, and knew the language of his country thoroughly, has given an account of the three terms, upon which the apprehensions of all modern philologists may safely rest. “*Malagmata* maxime ex floribus eorumque etiam surculis, *emplastra pastillique* magis ex quibusdam metallis fiunt. Deinde *malagmata* contusa abunde mollescunt; nam super integram cutem injicientur: laboriose vero conteruntur ea ex quibus *emplastra pastillique* fiunt, ne lædant vulnera cum imposita sunt. Inter *emplastrum* autem et *pastillum* hoc interest, quod *emplastrum* utique liquati aliquid accipit: in *pastillo* tantum arida medicamenta per se teruntur: deinde mistis his instillatur aut acetum, aut si quis alius non pinguis humor accessurus est, et ea rursus ex eo teruntur. Tum *emplastrum* imponitur, *pastillus* illinitur, aut alicui molliori aut cerato miscetur.”—CELS. 5. 17.

EN, ECCE;

agree, in denoting that the attention of the hearer is called to something unexpected, but differ, as the former has the power of exciting different

emotions, beside that of surprise, to which the latter is confined. “*En* ibi tu quicquam nasci putas posse, aut coli natum?”—VARRO, *de R. R.* 1. 2. Here surprise is expressed that it should be supposed possible for any thing to grow, or be cultivated, in such circumstances. “Sed *ecce* nuntii scribente me, *ecce* literæ, Cæsarem ad Corfinium esse.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 8. 3. This intelligence, which came suddenly upon Cicero himself, would do so upon his friend Atticus also.

But though the interjections agree in the respect mentioned, yet *En* can, besides, express other sentiments also, such as indignation and derision. “*En* crimen, *en* causa, cur regem fugitivus, dominum servus accuset.”—CIC. *pro Reg. Dej.* 146. b. When the orator uttered this, he was in no small wrath at the accuser of his client, and the predominant feeling in his mind was, not the novelty of the deed, which *Ecce* might have suggested, but its atrocity, which *En* only could express. “Hæc est istius præclara tutela. *En* cui tu liberos committas: *en* memoria mortui sodalis: *en* metus vivorum existimationis.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 97. a. This object of the orator’s contempt is first marked by the epithet “*Istius*,” and he is then exposed to the most pointed derision, by having the interjection applied to three different circumstances, of all of which he had reason to be ashamed. In the following sentence the two interjections are equivalent.

—*en* quatuor aras:

Ecce duas tibi, Daphni, duoque altaria Phœbo.—VIRG. *Ec.* v. 65.

By the first, the attention of Daphnis is summoned to the whole number of altars then before him, and by the last, to the two that were intended for himself, and the two for Apollo.

The original power of the two is increased by their being joined together in one sentence. As the Greek said *Ἐν ἰδέε*, so the Latins said

En ecce rapido sæva prosiluit gradu.—SEN. *in Œdip.* 1004.

Ovid does the same thing, the power of *Ecce* being involved in the imperative of the verb “*Aspicere*.”

—tostos *en* “aspice” crines.—MET. 3. 283.

ENORMIS—*vide* ABNORMIS.

EPULÆ, EPULUM,

agree, in denoting a splendid entertainment, but differ as to the reason for which this entertainment is given. Both are understood by certain etymologists, who give play to their fancy, to come from "Edere," and to be contractions, the one from "Edipulæ," and the other from "Edipulum." The first denotes a banquet, either public or private, at which the landlord shews his wealth and hospitality to those whom he has invited. "Carmina cantitata in *epulis* a singulis convivis de clarorum virorum laudibus."—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 171. a. "*Epulis* et viscerationibus pecunias profundere."—CIC. *de Off.* 44. b. At those entertainments the invitations were general, and the expence of the landlord, particularly in that distribution of flesh styled "Visceratio," immense.

In other instances, again, the invitations have been necessarily limited, and the company select.

Vir tuus est *epulas* nobis aditurus easdem.

Ultima cœna tuo sit precor illa virô.—OVID. *Amor.* 1. 4.

—— sic Jovis interest

Optatis *epulis* impiger Hercules.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 8. 29.

Had the admission to this celestial entertainment been easy, the value of the hero's reward would have fallen.

EPULUM differs from "Epulæ," in referring to a religious entertainment, in which either the favour of the gods is implored, or their wrath deprecated. It was given, besides, in behalf either of the living or of the dead. "Ludi plebeii per biduum instaurati, et Jovis *epulum* fuit ludorum causa."—LIV. 27. 36. "Ludi funebres per triduum facti: post ludos *epulum*, in quo cum toto foro strata triclinia essent."—LIV. 39. 46.

Suetonius and Juvenal have used *Epulum* impurely, as may be expected from the times in which they lived, by putting it for "Epulæ," and thus applying it to banquets, in which religion was not concerned. "Ephebis exercentibus *epulum* in conspectu suo præbuit, permissa diripiendi licentia."—SÜETON. *in August.* 98.

—— culti villicus horti,

Unde *epulum* possis centum dare Pythagoreis.—JUV. *Sat.* 3. 228.

ERGA

denotes the direction and tendency of gentle affection, from one person to another, and has no reference to the motion of material substances. It suggests the progress of something mild and salutary towards the object governed, as "Contra" does that of something fierce and destructive. "Id non sine divina bonitate *erga* homines fieri arbitrantur."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 37. b. "Tua voluntas *erga* me, mea que *erga* te par atque mutua."—CIC. *Ep. Att.* 16. 16. "Animos eorum, apud quos agitur, conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam, cum *erga* oratorem, tum *erga* illum pro quo dicit orator."—CIC. *de Or.* 125. a.

Nepos seems, in a few instances, to have deviated from the rule observed in the pure use of *Erga*, by applying it to the transmission of a sentiment of hatred. "Odio quod *erga* regem susceperant."—NEP. *in Dat.* 10. "Velut hæreditate relictum odium paternum *erga* Romanos."—NEP. *in Han.* 1.

Plautus has used *Erga* as equal to "Contra," that is, as denoting situation, from opposition to some known object in space. This single instance, from a comedian not remarkable for purity, should not be regarded as an authority of any weight.

— tonstricem Syram

Novisti nostram, quæ modo *erga* ædes habet.—PLAUT. *Truc.* 2. 4. 52.

ERRARE, VAGARI, PALARI,

agree, in denoting the uncertainty of those, who have moved, as to the point at which their motion is to terminate, but differ, in respect either to the ground of the uncertainty, or to the number of those involved in it. ERRARE, properly, signifies to wander, or to deviate from the path leading to a certain point, which it is proposed to reach. It supposes, that, both before and during the act of moving, an intention existed of coming to a certain place, but that this intention is frustrated from ignorance of the road that leads to it. "Quæ tot vestigiis impressa, ut in his *errare* non possit."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 5. 20.

Passibus ambiguis fortuna volubilis *errat*,

Et manet in nullo certa tenaxque loco.—OVID. *Met.* 3. 175.

— procul avius *erras*.—LUCRET. 2. 739,

“Maxime vero mirabiles sunt motus earum quinque stellarum, quæ falso vocantur *errantes*.”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 36. a. It is in this last example said, that there is both design, and the power of fulfilling design, in the author of that seemingly irregular motion observed by the planets. *Errare* is applied to animals grazing. They direct their motion not in a straight line, and may often miss the best of the pasture they are in quest of.

Mille meæ Siculis *errant* in montibus agnæ.—VIRG. *Ec.* 2. 21.

— armento teneras *errante* per herbas.—OVID. *Met.* 15. 14.

VAGARI differs from “Errare,” in implying, that the wanderer means only to quit the spot he occupies, and has no intention to direct his course to any particular place. The person “Errans” commits a mistake, which the person *Vagans* never can; because he has formed no plan that can be frustrated. “Non sumus ii quorum *vagetur* animus errore, nec habeat unquam quid sequatur.”—CIC. *Off.* 34. a. “Curandum est ne *vagum* villicum, ne aversum contubernio suo habeamus.”—COLUM. 12. 1. “Nam fuit quoddam tempus quum in agris homines passim bestiarum morè *vagabantur*.”—CIC. *de Inv.* 1. 2. Men, at the period referred to, were vagabonds, who, knowing no place more desirable than another, continually changed their abode.

The following figurative acceptance of “Errans” and *Vagus* seems to confirm what has been said of the verbs with which they are respectively connected. “Est enim et philosophi, et pontificis, et Cottæ, de diis immortalibus habere non “errantem” et *Vagam*, ut academici, sed ut nostri, stabilem certamque sententiam.”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 26. a. In the antithesis, “Errans” is opposed to “Stabilis,” and suggests, that the philosopher occupies a point at which he is disposed to rest, without making any attempt to go to another, in which he might fail. *Vagus*, again, is opposed to “Certus,” and implies, that he is free from that want of determination, as to the point he is to arrive at, which is peculiar to vagabonds.

PALARI agrees with “Vagari,” in implying the act of roving without any settled direction; but differs both from it and “Errare,” in suggesting the dispersion of a multitude, and the straggling of scattered parties. The two former verbs apply either to one or a number, and have no reference to any

party with which they were previously connected. It is otherwise with *Palari*; which supposes more than one separated from a company that has been broken.

Fœmina *palantes* agit, atque hæc agmina vertit.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 736.

“Teucrorum auxilia, fœda fugâ dispersa, totis campis *palantur*.”—TAC. *Hist.* 4. 18.

The purity of the following expression in Lucretius, in which “Errare” and *Palari* are found in the same sentence, may be questioned.

Despicere unde alios queas, passimque videre
“Errare,” atque viam *palantes* quærere vitæ.—LUCRET. 2. 9.

The same wanderers cannot be both with and without an object at the same time. While *Palari*, then, marks only their number and their dispersion, the terms, “viam quærere vitæ,” annexed to it, shew, that it is not to be understood in its full extent.

ERUDIRE—*vide* DOCERE.

ESSE, EXISTERE, FIERI,

agree, in denoting existence; but the first denotes existence simply, and the two last present it as modified in a slight degree. ESSE, which is styled the substantive verb, may be regarded as the most abstract in the Latin language. All other verbs, it has been said, denote a super-addition, greater or less, to that existence, which this suggests alone; and their varieties, as active and neuter, spring from nothing but the extent of their deviation from this simplest of their species.

The approximations, that take place between *Esse* and such verbs as those now opposed to it, are so exceedingly close, that they have escaped the eye of some grammarians. These have unguardedly called all such, substantive verbs. *Esse* in Latin, at the same time, *Εἶναι* in Greek, “Etre” in French, and “To be” in English, though they admit approximations in the respective languages, yet have nothing like to themselves. The four would form a group, each one of which is, with mathematical precision, equal to each of

the rest. To suppose, that, in these languages, there can exist a class of verbs to which the term "substantive" is applicable, implies a looseness of conception, of which grammarians should be ashamed.

Esse has got the appellation of a substantive verb, because it subsists "per se," and without dependence upon other verbs, all of which hold of it in a greater or a less degree. As the substance in natural subjects upholds its modes, so does this verb enter into the conception of every other one. Existence is the essential attribute of an object in every verbal state, and nothing can be predicated of that, which is not understood to be. To attempt giving any definition of *Esse* would be absurd, because no conception is more general than that denoted by it. For "existence," we might say "being," or "essence;" but the term adopted explains nothing, and stands in the same need of a definition with any of those for which it is substituted.

Esse denotes existence that is either absolute, or that involves the relation between the object said to be, and some quality ascribed to it. Thus, we say, "*Deus est*," God is; or "*Deus est bonus*," God is good. In the first instance, simple existence is predicated of God; and in the last, this existence is only implied, and the attribute of goodness becomes the subject of the predication. In the two following passages from Cicero, what is now said of *Esse* is manifest. "*Deum igitur scito esse: siquidem Deus est, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui prævidet, qui regit et moderatur id corpus, cui præpositus est.*"—*Som. Scip.* 8. "*Plato sine corpore Deum vult esse, ut Græci dicunt, ἀσώματον.*"—*De Nat. Deor.* 1. 8. a.

EXISTERE agrees with "Esse," in denoting absolute existence, but differs from it, in suggesting, that the object said to have existence either had it not before the time involved in the verb, or was not known to have it. The circumstance in which it agrees with "Esse" appears in such instances as the two following. "*Hoc malum non modo non existit.*"—*Cic. in Ver.* 84. a. "*Ni Ilias extitisset illa.*"—*Cic. pro Arch.* 190. a.

But the distinctive power of *Existere*, from "Ex" and "Sistere," appears best when it is applied to objects that spring forward unexpectedly, and arrest the observer's notice. "*Qui signo dato, simul omnes e latebris existerent.*"—

LIV. 25. 21. Here, those who come from the lurking places certainly had a prior existence, but were not known to have it by those upon whom they came. “*Existat* ille vir parumper in cogitatione vestra, quoniam re non potest.”—CIC. *pro Cor. Bal.* 64. b. Here, the person mentioned not only did not, but never could, exist. In the case of the verb *Existere*, it may be observed, the radical power of “Ex,” as referring to motion, remains with it, and the simple verb “Sistere” supposes that motion stopped. In that of “Extare,” again, the idea of motion, as inherent in the preposition, is extinguished by that of rest in the verb “Stare.” The first verb, then, signifies, literally, to come forward into view, and the last, to stand forward, or to be prominent.

When “Esse” and *Existere* appear in one sentence, the meaning of each may be traced and kept separate. “Talem vero *existere* eloquentiam, qualis fuerit” in Crasso, non potuisse confirmo.”—CIC. *de Or.* 190. a. That degree of eloquence, to which “Fuerit” is applied, and which Crassus exhibited, had actually existed; but a similar degree of it, to which *Existere* is applied, could not, in the speaker’s apprehension, be again called forth. The figurative applications of *Existere* justify what is said of the literal. “*Existit* autem hoc loco quæstio subdificilis.”—CIC. *de Am.* 109. a. Till the argument respecting friendship had advanced a certain length, the question, said to be somewhat difficult, could not present itself. When the train, however, had been so far continued, it summoned the reasoner’s attention.

FIERI differs from the two verbs just mentioned, in suggesting a change of state, superinduced upon an object by the use of means fitted to effect it. Like every other verb, it implies the simple existence which, and which only, “Esse” expresses. As the latter signifies to “be,” so this irregular passive of the verb “Facere” signifies to “become;” intimating, by the annexed “come,” the act of passing from one condition to another, by whatever means the transition is effected. “Obvius *fit* ei Clodius expeditus in equo.”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 106. b. This rencounter was by no means an accidental one: Clodius knew when and where to meet Milo, with a view to give effect to his foul purpose. Knowing the hazard to which he was exposed, and of what consequence it

was to him that he should succeed, he had made his arrangements deliberately.

— brevis "esse" laboro ;

Obscurus *fiō*. — HOR. *Art. Poet.* 25.

The brevity, which the poet wished to "be," led him imperceptibly to "become" obscure. The actual existence of the first quality of his diction, though the terms refer it to himself, is announced by the verb "Esse;" while the consequent production of the last quality, of which the poet was not aware, is announced by the verb *Fio*. He says, elsewhere, of a slave offered to sale,

Fiet "eritque" tuus nummorum millibus octo.—*Ep.* 2. 2. 5.

The first of these two verbs has a reference to the observance of all those forms, that were customary in the transfer of a slave, from one master to another. These forms were so many steps in a progress, necessary to give validity to the sale. By means of "Erit," again, nothing more is suggested than the state in which the slave was afterwards to be. When the vender made the offer, he was his. He tells the supposed purchaser, that when the price specified was paid, and the necessary forms observed, that which was his property at the time would change its master, and be at the disposal of him who had acquired it.

Other verbs, such as "Evadere," "Evenire," "Contingere," that have been rashly styled substantive verbs, might be opposed to "Esse," which comprehends them as its first species. The opposition, however, after what is said of "Existere" and "Fieri," may be manifest to every one who is at pains to analyze the verbs themselves.

ESSEDUM—*vide* CURRUS.

EVENTUS—*vide* CASUS.

EXCELLERE, PRÆSTARE,

agree, in denoting the act of surpassing others; but the former refers to the exertion by which the superiority is acquired, and the latter to the eminence that is the consequence of acquiring it. EXCELLERE, compounded of "Ex" and the obsolete verb "Cellere," signifies, to strike so powerfully as to overcome

resistance, and to force the body upwards. "Procellere," from the same root, signifies to drive forward with impetuosity. "Scio solere plerisque hominibus, rebus secundis, atque prolixis, atque prosperis, animum excellere, superbiam atque ferociam augescere atque crescere."—CATO, *apud Gell.* 7. 3. The verb afterwards has come to denote that influence which is earned by personal exertion, while the exertion is making, and the agent is asserting his superiority. "Non enim tu possis quantumvis licet aliis excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere."—CIC. *de Am.* 75. a. The effort, it is said, which brings the vigorous agent to the station he is entitled to fill, will have no effect in raising others, in consequence of their connection with him.

PRÆSTARE, when it governs the dative, and sometimes when it governs the accusative, signifies to excel. It signifies, also, to perform; and, coming from "Præ" and "Stare," refers to the agent, as standing forward to do an arduous duty. Under the idea of excelling, again, this agent is supposed to have done manfully, and to stand before others, who had struggled with less success. "Omnes homines qui sese student præstare cæteris animalibus."—SAL. *ad Init. B. I.* "Excellere" could not, consistently with the high purity of the writer, have been put for *Præstare*. The former verb would have denoted the exertion by which one man is successful in the act of raising himself above others. The latter, again, refers to that state of eminence which is the reward of virtue, when seen and approved. "Etenim in virtute multi ascensus: ut is gloria maxime "excellat," qui virtute plurimum præstet."—CIC. *pro Plan.* 271. b. Though *Præstare*, here, signifies to perform, and not to excel, yet the antithesis seems to support what is said of the verbs. "Excellere," connected with "Gloria," regards that state of elevation which the agent attains, as the reward of virtuous exertion. "Quorum vero patres aut majores aliqua gloria præstiterunt, ii student plerumque eodem in genere laudis "excellere."—CIC. *de Off.* 23. b. The first verb denotes the actual possession of well-earned fame, and is contrasted with "Excellere," which refers to the actual exertion, implied in "Student" in the present tense, in order to raise the descendants mentioned to that state of eminence which their forefathers enjoyed.

EXCUBIÆ, VIGILIÆ,

agree, in referring to the act of watching for the security of those who are off their guard, and whose safety is a matter of concern, but differ, in respect to the time during which the watch is kept. The first term comes from "Excubare," and properly signifies, to lie out of doors, to protect those within from a supposed danger. This danger, however, is understood to be such, as to demand the protector's attention day and night. "Cognitum id Neroni, *excubiasque* militares, quæ ut conjugi imperatoris olim, tum et ut matri servabantur, et Germanos super eundem honorem custodes additos digredi jubet."—TAC. *Ann.* 13. 18. The watchers, here mentioned, were kept day and night for the security of a lady, who had been the consort, and was then the mother, of an emperor. "Horret animus tanti flagitii imagine. Tutori Trevero agentur *excubiæ*? Signum belli Batavus dabit?"—TAC. *Hist.* 4. 58. This foreigner, it is understood, was to be employed and treated like a Roman in all the most important military affairs.

Excubiæ is applied, also, to other animals, beside man, who keep watch. "Grues *excubias* habent nocturnis temporibus, lapillum pede sustinentes."—PLIN. *IO.* 23.

—et "vigilum" canum

Tristes *excubiæ* munierant satis

Nocturnis ab adulteris.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 16. 2.

VIGILIÆ differs from "Excubiæ," in being confined to watches that are kept by night. It comes from "Vigil," and refers to the wakefulness that is required of those, upon whose attention the security of others, who are at rest, depends. "Præcipitur ædilibus, ut noctu *vigilias* agerent ad ædes sacras."—CIC. *in Ver.* 222. a. "O "excubias" tuas, Cn. Planci, miseras, O flebiles *vigilias*, O noctes acerbas, O custodiam etiam mei capitis infelicem!"—CIC. *pro Plan.* 280. b.

Both terms agree in denoting the persons who keep the watches, as well as the act and the time of keeping them. "Si Capitolinæ cohortes, si "excubiæ" si *vigiliæ*, si delecta juventus, quæ tuum corpus domumque custodit, contra Milonis impetum armata est."—CIC. *pro Mil.* 114. b.

EXECRARI, DETESTARI, ABOMINARI,

agree, in denoting aversion upon the part of a rational being, but differ, in respect to the circumstances upon which this aversion is founded, or the manner in which it is expressed. The first verb, from "Ex" and "Sacrare," signifies, properly, to exclude from participation in matters that are sacred. The character of a person *Execratus* was so odious, that it was held profane to admit him to join in the common acts of devotion, and men dreaded the effects of that divine wrath towards societies, which they knew to be due to him alone. "Tibi proficiscenti evenit ut omnes *execrarentur*, male *precarentur*."—CIC. *in Pis.* 86. b. "Inter hunc tumultum Tullia domo profugit, *execrantibus* quacunque incedebat, invocantibus parentum furias viris mulieribusque."—LIV. 1. 59. "Odise aliquem, ei pestem optare, et eum *execrari*."—CIC. *in Pis.* 101. a. "Te oderunt, tibi pestem exoptant, te *execrantur*."—CIC. *in Pis.* 40. In the three members of this sentence, there is an evident climax. Piso was, in the first, the object of hatred; in the second, of a curse; and, in the third, of excommunication from every thing sacred.

From the above instances, it should seem, that *Execrari* often signifies more than to curse or wish evil to. In some cases, indeed, its meaning extends no farther, as in the following. "*Execratus* deinde in caput regnumque Prusiæ, poculum exhausit."—LIV. 39. 51.

DETESTARI, from "De" and "Testari," differs from "Execrari," in supposing that the aversion is founded, not upon a religious principle, but upon a sense of the immorality of some deed, and that the sentiment of aversion shews itself by an unwillingness to witness it, or to see its author. "Mater vero post id factum neque domum ad se filium admisit, neque aspexit, quin eum fratricidam impiumque *detestans* compellaret."—NEP. 20. 1. The aversion of Timoleon's mother, in respect to this deed, made her unwilling to admit the author of it into her presence; and the son, who perpetrated it, was the object of her abhorrence, in spite of natural affection, operating to the contrary. "Non te "execrandum" populo Romano non *detestabilem*, non omnes tibi Deos, omnes homines, et esse inimicos, et futuros scias."—CIC. *Philip.* 2. 65. The odiousness of Antony's character is here strongly drawn.

His countrymen would neither join with him in acts of devotion, nor witness those atrocious acts he habitually committed.

The act implied in "Execrari" is always that of men; that of *Detestari* may be that of gods also, refusing to witness the deeds which they disapprove of. The latter verb, also, is more general in its meaning, and, besides its radical power, implies, calling vehemently to witness, and pouring out imprecations on those supposed to deserve them.

Summum Jovem deosque *detestor*, me neque isti male fecisse.—PLAUT. *Men.* 5. 2. 61.

"In caput eorum *detestari* minas periculaque, qui id suasissent."—LIV. 39. 10.

ABOMINARI, from "Ab" and "Omen," agrees so far with "Execrari" as to suppose the aversion to be founded on a religious principle. In the case of "Execrari," however, this sentiment rests on the profaneness of the deed, without regard to its consequences. In that of *Abominari*, again, the aversion rests, not on the profaneness of a certain act, but on that act being interpreted as the presage of some future evil. "Quod igitur nos maxime *abominaremur*, vos ante omnia optaretis."—LIV. 20. 30. "Cum dixisset, sepulchrum dirutum proram spectare, *abominatus*, prætervehi jussu gubernatore, ad Leptim appulit classem."—LIV. 30. 25.

Si mea mors redimenda tua (quod *abominor*) esset.—OVID. *de Ponto.* 1. 104.

Parentibusque *abominatus* Hannibal—HOR. *Epod.* 116. 8.

In this last example, the poet takes the verb in its purest sense. The very name of Hannibal was understood to be a presage of evil, and, as such, struck terror into parents.

EXILIS, MACER,

agree, in denoting the slenderness of the bodies of animals, but differ, in respect either to the cause of that slenderness, or to the manner in which it is estimated. Grammarians differ as to the etymology of EXILIS. It most probably comes from "Ex" and "Ile," intimating the smallness of the flank, and, of course, the comparative thinness of the animal to which it is applied. *Exilis* denotes slenderness, as characteristic of the natural make of a species,

and as consistent with the sound state of each individual belonging to it. It is, besides, alike applicable to the whole, and to parts of the body. “Hic aprum glans emptitia facit pinguem; illic gratuita *exilem*.”—VAR. *R. R.* 3. 2. The body of the animal is here said to be slender, or thick, according as he is fed; and either state is consistent with his being in sound health. “Sed si eadem hora aliæ pecudis jecur nitidum atque plenum est, aliæ horridum et *exile*: quid est quod declarari possit habitu extorum et colore?”—CIC. *de Div.* 114. b. As the words “Pinguis” and “Plenus” are opposed to *Exilis* in the two last examples, it is clear what idea was affixed to the latter term. In the first instance, *Exilis* specifies the whole, and in the last, only a part, of the animal’s body; but, in both, supposes it to be in health. An unsound animal could not, without profanity, have been offered. Besides, from one of this description no conclusion could fairly be drawn, though any part had been diseased.

From animals, *Exilis* has been transferred to vegetable substances. “Ne oneretur *exilitas* vitis.”—COLUM. 5. 5. Here the abstract refers to the slenderness of the vine, as bearing fruit not of any particular stem. *Exilis* is also applied to the earth. “Propter *exilitatem* soli quæ littori vicina est.”—COL. 8. 16.

— nimium glebis *exilis* Arisbe.—LUCAN. 3. 204.

It is applied, also, to things that are immaterial and intellectual. Thus, Horace, like Homer in the expression νεκρων ἀμενηνα κρηνα, applies it to the ghosts that inhabit the infernal regions.

Et domus *exilis* Plutonia—HOR. *Car.* 1. 4. 17.

The application of *Exilis* to “Domus,” here, must be regarded as metonymical. It would be absurd to refer it to the smallness of Pluto’s abode, owing to the number of its inhabitants. These, being immaterial, cannot occupy space, and, of course, there can be no want of capacity in the mansion that receives them. “Genus orationis *exile*, aridum, concisum.”—CIC. *de Or.* 122. a.

Exilis domus est ubi non et multa supersunt,
Et dominum fallunt, et prosunt furibus—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 6. 45.

MACER differs from "Exilis," in implying, that the slenderness does not arise from the natural make of the animal, but from the want of due nourishment, or from the influence of disease. It expresses extenuation, any how produced; that is, either by famine, by the want of appetite, or by the organs of digestion being unable to turn the food swallowed into a nutritive state. The degree of that state, denoted by *Macer*, is estimated by comparing the body of the individual with the rest of the species; the degree of that, again, denoted by "Exilis," is discovered by comparing individuals of one species with those of another. Thus, a greyhound has more "Exilitas" than any other species of dog, and a weasel more than any other animal. Individuals in each class, however, may be in the state denoted by *Macer*, in consequence of their being ill-fed or diseased.

Eheu quam pingui *macer* est mihi taurus in arvo!
Idem amor exitium pecori est, pecorisque magistro.—*VIRG. Ecc.* 3. 100.

Both the bull and his keeper were affected by the same disease, under which they pined.

Ossa atque pellis sum misera *macritudine*.—*PLAUT. Cap.* 1. 2. 32.
Nocte boves *macri*, lassoque famelica collo,
Armenta ad virides hujus mittuntur aristas.—*JUV.* 14. 146.

In the last two examples, hunger reduced the animal to the state denoted by *Macer*. In the former, it was produced by a mental affection, which had destroyed appetite.

Macer, besides, differs from "Exilis," in never being applied to vegetable, immaterial, and intellectual substances. It is applied to the earth, however, and denotes its infertility, not as arising from the nature of the soil at any place, but from some defect in him who cultivates it.

Propter *macritatem* ager semen aliud ferre non valet.—*PALLAD.* 11. 1.
— qui *macro* pauper agello
Noluit in Flavi ludum me mittere.—*HOR. Sat.* 1. 6. 71.

The application of *Macer* to the farm possessed by Horace's father, is a corroboration of his poverty, as expressed by "Pauper." The former term insinuates, that he was so poor as to be destitute of the means of improving

his farm ; and the unfruitfulness of it is ascribed to the want of due cultivation. From the account given of "Exilis" and *Macer*, it should seem, that there is no incompatibility in the application of both to one object. Cicero, accordingly, says, "Quod solum tam "exile" et *macrum* est, quod aratro perstringi non possit?"—CIC. *cont. Rull.* 79. b. By "solum exile" is meant natural sterility, and by "solum *macrum*," that which is superinduced either by the poverty or the carelessness of the husbandman. "In "exili" terra cultoris diligentia *maciem* soli vincere potest."—COLUM. 1. 4. The subject, here, to work upon, had been none of the best ; but the farmer's diligence might have remedied defects, and brought it to that productive state of which it is susceptible, under due management.

EXITUS—*vide* CASUS.

EXPECTARE, SPERARE, OPPERIRI, PRÆSTOLARI, agree, in denoting the expectation of some future event, but differ, either in respect to the nature of that event, or to the state of preparation for its occurrence, in which the expectant puts himself.

EXPECTARE, from "Ex" and "Spectare," signifies to look out for the occurrence of any event, whether good or evil, and supposes, that though this may be more or less probable, yet the time at which it is to take place is unknown, and may be either immediate or remote. "Hanc rem avidissime civitas *expectat*."—CIC. *in Ant.* 258. b.

— seu me tranquilla senectus

Expectat, seu mors atris circumvolat alis—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 1. 58.

— nescio quod magnum hoc nuntio *expecto* malum.—TER. *Phorm.* 1. 4. 16.

In the above instances, some of the events are good and some evil ; but the time of the occurrence of all is undefined, and may be either at hand or at a distance.

SPERARE differs from "Expectare," in supposing, that the expected event is desirable. It agrees with it, in implying the ignorance of the expectant, as to the period at which the event may take place. "Ut agroto dum anima est, "spes" esse dicitur : sic ego quoad in Italia Pompeius fuit, *sperare* non

destiti.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 145. a. In this example, we see clearly both the desirableness and the contingency of the event; and nothing is insinuated as to the probability of its taking place sooner or later. “Attica nostra quid agat scire cupio. Etsi tuæ literæ (sed jam nimis veteres sunt) recte *sperare* jubent. Tamen “*expecto*” recens aliquid.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 208. a. The verb *Sperare* intimates the expectation of something agreeable, in respect to Attica. From the time that had elapsed between and the last accounts of her, Cicero’s hopes had ceased, and a general anxiety, in respect to what concerned her, succeeded.

Quid mihi affers, quamobrem “*expectem*” aut *sperem* porro non fore?

TER. *Phorm.* 5. 8. 36.

“Profectus cum exercitu ab urbe “*expectatione*” hominum majore quam *spe*.”—LIV. 5. 19. The first noun, here, expresses the general anxiety, as to the event of Camillus’s expedition, which was stronger than the hopes of its success.

Sperare, among the poets, has been employed to denote the expectation of evil. This, however, appears to be a licence bordering upon an impurity, and is scarcely justified by the practice of prose writers in the Augustan age.

Hunc ego si potui tantum *sperare* dolorem.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 419.

Autumno, jam quartanam *sperantibus* ægris.—JUV. 4. 57.

Upon the medical authority of Celsus, there is nothing impure in this last application of *Sperare*. “Quartanam neminem jugulare, ægros intelligunt in eam optare verti quotidianam febrem, quia extra periculum erunt.”—3. 15. Instances occur also in Cicero, where, with a negative particle, *Sperare* denotes hope, in respect to what is undesirable. “Sin a vobis, id quod non spero, deserar, tamen animo non deficiam.”—CIC. *pro Rosc. Am.* 20. a. When there is a negation of the existence of the hope, the mind is not understood to examine the nature of the object which might have excited it.

OPPERIRI agrees with “*Expectare*,” in supposing, that the expected event may be either agreeable or disagreeable, and that it may be either certain or probable; but differs from both verbs, in implying, that it is near at hand, and that the expectant is determined to keep his station, or place of abode, till it actually take place. “Nihil puto tibi esse utilius, quam ibidem *opperiri*,

quoad scire possis, quid tibi agendum sit.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 92. b. It was doubtful whether Toranius would obtain information agreeable to him or not; from the state of public affairs he could not be long in suspence, and he is advised to remain where he was and wait the intelligence.

Opperiar hominem hic, ut salutem, et conloquar.—TER. *Adelph.* 3. 3. 92.

Demia saw Hegio at a distance, coming his way. He accordingly determines to continue where he was, that he might shew him civilities, and converse with him. “Ad ea Vologeses nihil pro causa, sed *opperiendos* sibi fratres Pacorum ac Tiridatem rescripsit; illum locum tempusque consilio destinatum quid de Armenia cernerent.”—TAC. *Ann.* 15. 14. “Constantia *opperiendæ* mortis.”—*Ibid.* 14. 59.

— manet imperterritus ille
Hostem magnanimum *opperiens*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 770.

PRÆSTOLARI differs from “Opperiri,” in supposing the time at which the event is expected to be more immediate, and the expectant to be in a state of greater preparation for its occurrence. It comes from the adverb “Præsto,” signifying “at hand.” “*Præstolari* is dicitur (says Festus) qui ante stando ibi, quo venturum excipere vult, moratur.”

Quem *præstolare* Parmeno hic ante ostium?—TER. *Eun.* 5. 5. 5.

From the appearance of Parmeno standing at the door, the old man supposes he was in the immediate expectation of somebody arriving, and he desires to know who this was. “Qui tibi ad forum Aurelium *præstolantur* armati.”—CIC. *in Cat.* 102. a. By means of *Præstolari*, Cicero brings home upon Catiline the exactness of his information in respect to all his movements. Those armed men were in a state of the greatest possible preparation, in order to execute the traitor’s purposes at a moment’s warning. It may be remarked, that Cicero is the only Latin author that connects *Præstolari* with a dative case.

EXPERIRI—*vide* TENTARE.

EXPERS, EXSORS, IMMUNIS,
agree, in denoting the want of share in what may be possessed or performed

in common, but differ, in as far as the first relates to the want simply; the second to the cause of the want; and the third to the consequences with which that want is attended. *EXPERTS*, from “*Ex*” and “*Pars*,” denotes, only, being no sharer, or having no part, and stands opposed to “*Particeps*,” as in the following passage. “*Solum enim est ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis, “particeps” cogitationis et rationis: quum cætera sint expertia.*”—*CIC. de Legg.* 160. a. “*Ratione utentia anteponuntur rationis expertibus.*”—*CIC. Top.* 226. b. “*Consederant utrinque pro castris duo exercitus, periculi magis quam curæ expertes.*”—*LIV.* 1. 25. In all the above instances, nothing more is insinuated, than the “being void of,” or “having no share in.”

EXSORTS differs from “*Experts*,” in referring to the cause of the want, and ascribing it to accident. The latter term regards the want barely as existing, and as a fact, for which a cause may or may not be discovered.

Infantùmque animæ flentes in limine primo,
Quos dulcis vitæ *exsortes*, et ab ubere raptos,
Abstulit atra dies, et funere mersit acerbo.—*VIRG. Æn.* 6. 427.

By means of *Exsortes*, those infants are not said merely to have died, but a reference is made to their unexpected misfortune, in having died so early. “*Se omnis culpæ exsortem, omnis tamen eventus “participem” fore dicebat.*”—*LIV.* 22. 44. The expression, here, in which Paulus disclaims all blame, but announces his willingness to share in every consequence attending the battle of Cannæ, is highly elegant and happy. As becomes a man, who had acted upon the best suggestion of his understanding, he considers himself as entitled to escape the censure to which Varro would be exposed, by rashly engaging with Hannibal; but, as a soldier, he refuses an exemption from any event, however disastrous, to which the fate of war might subject him.

Exsorts is occasionally applied to the object, the chance of obtaining which is taken from others, as well as to the person whose lot it is to lose it.

Sume, pater, nam te voluit rex magnus Olympi,
Talibus auspiciis *exsortem* ducere honorem.—*VIRG. Æn.* 5. 533.

Those gifts of Æneas to Acestes were excepted from the stock to be distributed to others, and in the state of those promised by Ascanius to Nisus:

— clypeum cristasque rubentes
Excipiam sorti, jam nunc tua præmia, Nise.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 271.

IMMUNIS differs from “Expers” and “Exsors,” in having no reference to the bare existence, or to the accidental cause, of a want, but in implying its consequences, in freeing a person from the performance of some troublesome duty. It comes from “In” and “Munus,” and, according to Festus, is applied to one, “Qui nullo fungitur officio, liber ab onere publico: qui vel ætate, vel alio privilegio præstare munia non tenetur.” “Retineri sub vexillo, cæterorum *immunes*, nisi propulsandi hostis.”—TAC. *Ann.* 1. 36. “Prædia *immunia* conditione commodiore sunt, quam illa quæ pensitant.”—CIC. *cont. Rull.* 89. a.

Ad quæ si properas gaudia, cum tua
Velox merce veni. Non ego te meis
Immunem meditor tingere poculis,
Plena dives ut in domo.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 12. 21.
Nullum passa jugum, curvique *immunis* aratri.—OVID. *Met.* 3. 11.

Immunis is, among the poets, sometimes taken as equal to “Expers,” and made to denote the bare want, without regard to its consequences.

Immunis tanti nec sinit esse boni.—OVID. *Trist.* 4. 2. 62.
— aspicit urbem
Immunem tanti belli, atque impune quietam.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 558.

EXPETERE—*vide* APPETERE.

EXPILARE—*vide* PRIVARE.

EXTINGUERE, OPPRIMERE,

agréé, in denoting to destroy, or put an end to, but differ, in respect to the manner in which the destruction is effected. EXTINGUERE is originally applied to the quenching of fire. Facciolati supposes it to come from “Ex” and “Tingo,” and adds, “Proprie dicitur de igne qui aqua tinctus opprimitur; qua ratione sine S scribi oportebit.”

Da illi cantharum, *extingue* ignem, si cor uritur.—PLAUT. *Pers.* 5. 2. 22.

It has afterwards come to denote the destruction of the fire, by withholding the fuel. "Animus et mens, nisi tanquam lumini oleum instilles, *extinguuntur* senectute."—CIC. *de Sen.* 84. a. Even in the figurative uses of *Extinguere*, its radical one is to be traced. "Omnes cives sic existimant, quasi lumen aliquod, *extinctis* cæteris, elucere sanctitatem, et prudentiam, et dignitatem tuam."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 4. 3. "Animorum motus inflammare vel *extinguere*."—CIC. *de Or.* 90. a. Afterwards this verb denoted the destruction of any object, by such means as are suited to that end. "Mors *extinguit* invidiam."—CIC. *pro Cor. Balb.* 58. a.

OPPRIMERE differs from "Extinguere," in having no reference to the destruction, as effected by withholding the necessary means of support, but to that effected by the application of violence. "*Opprimere* senem injectu multæ vestis."—TAC. *Ann.* 6. 50. "Quamobrem primum danda opera est, ne qua amicorum dissidia fiant: sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut "extinctæ" potius amicitix quam *oppressæ* videantur."—CIC. *de Am.* 110. b. Nonius, from this passage, argues, that *Opprimere* signifies more than "Extinguere;" "Quasi quod "extinguitur" possit reflammari; quod *opprimitur* non queat." The soundness of this criticism has been very justly questioned by Gesner: and indeed the reason, upon which it is founded, is the very reverse of what is true; as in the case of "Extinguere" the fuel may be wasted, but in that of *Opprimere* it never can. An intermission of the habits of intimacy between friends is like withdrawing the fuel, and is said "Extinguere amicitiam;" while an open violation of former sentiments, by mutual injuries, is said forcibly to stifle, "Vel *opprimere* amicitiam."

The orator shews clearly the sense in which he takes the verbs in the above passage, by his application of them in another. "Itaque adolescentes mori sic videntur, ut cum aquæ multitudine vis flammæ *opprimitur*: senes autem sic, ut sua sponte nulla adhibita vi, consumptus ignis "extinguitur."—CIC. *de Off.* 92. a.

EXTRA

signifies without, and stands opposed to "In," "Intra," and "Intus." It

supposes, that one object is not contained by another, which is understood to be capable of containing it. "Et "in" corpore et *extra* sunt quædam bona."—Cic. *de Fin.* 79. a.

Extra differs from "Ex," which always implies, that the correlative object has been actually within that governed by it, but that it has changed its place, and come out of it. *Extra*, besides, is more general than "Ex," as it is equally applicable to objects that have, and to those that have not, been enclosed within that denoted by the word it governs. "*Extra* portam collinam ædes Honoris est."—Cic. *de Legg.* 182. a. This temple might have been within this gate, and it could never change its place. "Certos mihi fines terminosque constituam, *extra* quos egredi non possim."—Cic. *pro Quint.* 6. a. The orator here refers to limits, within which he had the power of placing himself, and out of which, if he had chosen, he had the power of coming.

In the primary meaning of *Extra*, then, it refers to the absence of limitation, in all directions round the enclosed objects, and is translated "without." It is, besides, translated "beyond," and in this use the limitation could have taken place in one direction only. *Extra*, then, assumes the power of "Ultra," but is taken figuratively, and refers to objects that do not occupy space. The line which, in the literal and primary sense, is the means of interruption in all directions, is regarded as a boundary in one, and as separating that, which is more remote, from that, which is nearer. "Cavendum est etiam si ipse ædifices, ne *extra* modum sumptu et magnificentia prodeas."—Cic. *de Off.* 28. b. The word "Modum," in this sentence, represents a point, or boundary, on the nearest side of which the builder may keep with propriety. This propriety, however, he of necessity violates, if he trespass or go beyond it.

Extra, when taken in a figurative sense, has the power of denoting "not concerned in." In this use it generally refers to persons, though not exclusively. "Si Syllam *extra* conjurationem esse se scire dixisset."—Cic. *pro Syll.* 174. b. Sylla is here the correlative object, in respect to a certain space, suggested by "Conjuratio," in respect to which he is said to be *Extra*. Having never been within this space, it is inferred that he was not concerned in the conspiracy. "Et id, tametsi *extra* causam est, brevi percurram."—Cic.

pro Cæcin. 303. a. The point, to be here slightly run over, was *Extra*, in respect to the topics that belonged to the cause. That point, therefore, thus separated, was foreign to these topics.

When *Extra* denotes "except," "saving," it is also taken figuratively; but is, in this sense, confined to persons alone. As denoting "not concerned in," it refers to a space, within which certain persons are supposed never to have been; but, when denoting "except," it refers to a space, out of which such persons are supposed never to have gone. "Civis est nemo in tanto populo *extra*. contaminatam illam manum."—CIC. *pro Dom.* 235. a. The persons, implied in the word "Manum," are supposed to be insulated from all the other citizens. No Roman, it is insinuated, ever went upon the spot occupied by this unhallowed band; and, of course, that band is excepted from all the rest of the nation.

The same explanation may also be given of the two following examples; in which *Extra* signifies "except." "Ipsos et conjuges vendendas, *extra* filias, quæ," &c.—LIV. 26. 34.

— neque illi benevolens,

Neque notus, neque cognatus, *extra* unam aniculum,

Quisquam aderat, quæ adjutaret funus.—TER. *Phorm.* 1. 2. 47.

Extra does not appear much in composition. When it does, however, it produces an effect upon the word with which it is associated, perfectly consistent with its original meaning.

EXUL, EXTORRIS, DEPORTATUS, RELEGATUS.

agree, in denoting the state of being absent from one's native country, but differ, in respect to this state being voluntary or involuntary, to the power allowed the absentee to chuse the place of his residence, and to his rights, as a citizen, being maintained or forfeited. EXUL, from "Ex" and "Solum," refers to one that is banished, in consequence of a deed of his country, or to avoid a punishment, for having violated its laws. It supposes the exile suffering, from the natural attachment to the place of his nativity being thwarted, and from all the inconveniences of not being at home. Even when

he goes into a voluntary banishment, he only exchanges a greater for a less evil. His rights, too, as a citizen, are, for the time, understood to be destroyed, and every claim to his country's protection forfeited. The place of his habitation may, or may not, be fixed; and the only circumstance in his lot, that can lessen its misery, is the possibility of his being recalled. "*Exilium* triplex est, aut certorum locorum interdictio; aut lata fuga, ut omnium locorum præter certum locum; aut relegatio in insulam."—MARTIAN. *Dig.* 48. 22. 5. "*Exules* dicuntur loco patriæ suæ pulsi."—FESTUS. "Cum vagus et *exul* erraret atque undique excluderetur Oppianicus."—CIC. *pro Clu.* 54. b. "Egredere ex urbe, Catilina; atque in *exilium* proficiscere."—CIC. *in Cat.* 101. b. "Ab illo patriæ proditores de *exilio* reductos esse."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 151. b. "*Exilium* terribile est illis quibus circumscriptus est habitandi locus."—CIC. *Part. Or.* 119. a. In the above five instances, all the circumstances mentioned in the definition of *Exul* seem to be justified. We are not to suppose, that the following passage from Cicero, highly honourable to his moral feelings, and uttered in the glow of eloquence, is at all inconsistent with the definition given of *Exul*. "Omnes scelerati atque impii, quos leges *exilio* affici volunt *exules* sunt, etiamsi solum non mutârunt."—CIC. *in Paradox.* 121. b.

EXTORRIS agrees with "*Exul*," in implying, that all the evils attending banishment are aggravated; but differs, in supposing, that the fugitive is always driven from home by violence; that the place of his habitation is never fixed by those who expel him; and that he is without hope of ever revisiting his native country. "Nursinos grandi pecunia et quam pendere nequirent, multatos, *extorres* egit oppido."—SÜET. *Aug.* 12. "Me *extorrem* patria, domo, inopem et co-opertum miseriis effecit, ut ubivis tutius, quam in meo regno essem."—SALL. *Jug.* 14. Adherbal, here, represents himself as driven from Numidia by the actual violence of Jugurtha; as a wanderer on the face of the earth; and without any hope, or even desire, of ever resuming his kingdom. "Suis quisque sedibus *extorres*, quibus neque boni intellectus, neque mali cura, sed mercede aluntur, ministri sceleribus."—TAC. *Ann.* 6. 36. These people are exhibited as outcasts from society; as deserted by mankind; and as seeking refuge wherever they could find it. "Ne "*exsulem*," *extorrem* populum

Romanum ab solo patrio ac Diis penetibus in hostium urbem agerent.”—LIV. 5. 30. The arrangement of the terms seems to shew, that the historian conceived the evils of banishment to be more strongly held forth by the latter, and that abandoning Rome, and going to Veii, would be attended with endless misery.

DEPORTATUS differs from the former words, in supposing the place of banishment, to which the culprit is transported, to be always fixed. It implies, also, the complete forfeiture of his rights, as a citizen, and the impossibility of his ever recovering them. “*Deportatos* autem eos accipere debemus quibus princeps insulas adnotavit, vel de quibus *deportandis* scripsit: quæ pœna civitatem adimit, et testamenti factionem et reversionis spem.”—ULP. *Dig.* 48. 22. 7.

RELEGATUS differs from all the former words, in implying, that the evils of banishment are the slightest possible. It supposes certain rights of the culprit, as a citizen, suspended, and himself prohibited from appearing within certain territories, under fixed penalties. He retained, however, some of the rights of a Roman citizen, and his property, during his absence, remained secure and entire.

The *Relegatio* was a state preferable to the “*Deportatio*,” from the restraints and punishments being less severe, even when the former was “in perpetuum.” A person “*Deportatus*” could not cherish the hope of revisiting his native country; while some, who were *Relegati*, might entertain this hope, and all felt the benefit of having once been Roman citizens. “*Hæc est differentia inter “deportatos” et relegatos: quod in insulam relegari, et ad tempus et in perpetuum quis potest. Sive ad tempus, sive in perpetuum quis fuerit relegatus, et civitatem Romanam retinet, et testamenti factionem non amittit.*”—ULP. *L.* 7. “*Lucium Lamiam in concione relegavit: edixitque ut ab urbe abesset millia passuum ducenta.*”—CIC. *pro Sext. Rosc.* 9. a.

Quippe *relegatus* non “*exul*” dicor in illo,
Parcaque fortunæ sunt data verba meæ.—OVID. *Trist.* 2. 137.

EXULTARE—*vide* SALIRE.

EXUVIÆ—*vide* PRÆDA.

FACERE—*vide* AGERE.

FACETUS, URBANUS,

agree, in denoting the agreeableness of a person as a companion; but the former refers to the liveliness of the wit, both in words and sentiment, and the latter to its elegance, as appearing in expression alone.

The wit implied in FACETUS may appear both in words and in things. “*Quod facete dicatur, id alias in re, alias in verbo habere facetias.*”—CIC. *de Or.* 131. b.

Facetus is generic, in being applicable to wit that is both coarse and elegant, according to the genius of those who exhibit it:

— conviva joco mordente *facetus*,

Et salibus vehemens intra pomœria notis.—JUV. *Sat.* 9. 11.

The wit here meant, though painful to its butt, is, at the same time, not the grossest, as partaking of the refinement of the city. Plautus uses the term in this way also:

Vel cavillator *facetus*, vel conviva commodus

Item ero: neque ego unquam oblocutor sum alteri in convivio.—MIL. *Glor.* 3. 1. 47.

It should seem, however, that the purer writers always ascribe a certain politeness to the wit implied in *Facetus*. “In altercando, cum aculeo et maledicto, *facetus.*”—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 180. a. The addition of the adjective, here, softens the severity implied in “Aculeus” and “Maledictum.” “Genus jocandi non profusum nec immodestum, sed ingenuum et *facetum.*”—CIC. *de Off.* 1. 29.

Quintilian, whose authority as a critic is unquestionable, gives a commentary upon this term that supports the last remarks. “*Facetum* quoque non tantum circa ridicula opinor consistere. Neque enim diceret Horatius *facetum* carminis genus natura concessum esse Virgilio. De-

coris hanc magis et excultæ cujusdam elegantiaë appellationem puto.”—QUINTIL. 4. 20. The passage referred to in Horace is as follows :

— Molle atque *facetum*

Virgilio annuerant gaudentes rure Camenæ.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 10. 44.

URBANUS differs from “Facetus,” in referring entirely to the elegance, as appearing in the use of speech, and in implying a greater degree of that quality, than the latter term ever expresses. It comes from “Urbs,” and suggests that refinement of expression, in as far as it can be disjoined from sentiment, which is to be got in towns, and which stands opposed to that coarseness that prevails in the country. It implies a certain elegance of wit, and corresponds with what the Greeks styled, *χαριτες ἐν ἀνθρώποις*. “Nec vero hoc in te unum convenit, moribus domesticis ac nostrorum hominum *urbanitate* limatum.”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 41. a. It should seem that *Urbanus* originally denoted persons living in the town, in opposition to those in the country; and that this radical meaning was abandoned in the days of Cicero. “Quos non solum alieni, sed etiam sui vicini, tribules, *urbani*, “rustici” repulerunt.”—CIC. *de Arusp.* 257. a. “Hominem non solum sapientem, verum etiam, ut nunc loquimur, *urbanum*.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 37. a.

In the following example it appears, that that styled a “Maledictio” changes its nature according to the manner in which it is thrown out. “Maledictio autem si petulantius jactatur, convicium : si “*facetius*,” *urbanitas* nominatur.”—CIC. *pro Cæl.* 38. b. Pertness in the speaker’s manner gives that the appellation of a reproach to the person addressed, which, when accompanied with pleasantry, bespeaks politeness in the person who utters it.

FACINUS, SCELUS, FLAGITIUM,

agree, in denoting a wicked action, but differ in respect to the degree of immorality peculiar to that denoted by each.

Though FACINUS, from “Facere,” when by itself, always denotes an immoral deed, yet it is often connected with adjectives that alter the nature of that deed, and shew it to be laudable. “Cui nihil unquam nefas fuit, nec in *facinore*, nec in libidine.”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 27.

Nondum justitiam *facinus* mortale fugarat.—OVID. *Fast.* 1. 249.

In the above examples, the actions are reproachful; but, in those that follow, the adjectives with which *Facinus* is connected, shew them to be the contrary. “Qui judicaverunt hostem Dolabellam ob rectissimum *facinus*.”—CIC. *Phil.* 13. 17. “Ingenii egregia *facinora*, sicut anima, immortalia sunt.—SALL. *Bel. Jug.* 2.

Non fit, sine periculo, magnum *facinus* et memorabile.—TER. *Heaut.* 2. 3. 73.
— ad omne clarum *facinus* audaces manus.—SEN. *Herc. Fur.* 247.

When *facinus* is connected with adjectives that shew the deed to be evil, there are gradations in the evil itself. “At Agrippina ne tantum malis *facinoribus* notesceret.”—TAC. *Ann.* 12. 8. “*Facinus* foedum ac ferum.”—LIV. 28. 22.

— ubi illum “scelerosum” quæram?
Hocine tam audax *facinus* “facere” esse ausum?—TER. *Eun.* 4. 3. 1.
— non *facinus* mihi pacto lenius isto.—HOR. 1. 16. 56.

SCELUS differs from “*Facinus*,” in denoting an action in which there is a higher degree of immorality, the general nature of which cannot be changed by the application of any adjective whatever. The same epithets, applied to the two substantives, produce a meaning, in the aggregate, corresponding with the original force of each. Thus, “*Foedum scelus*” supposes a greater degree of turpitude in the act than “*foedum facinus* ;” though, in both, it is less than if the epithets “*infandum*” or “*detestabile*” were applied to each. The following expression, in which virtue is ascribed to *scelus*, is irregular, and implies a confusion in speech, as well as in the ideas of right and wrong.

Prosperum ac felix *scelus*, virtus vocatur.—SEN. *Herc. Fur.* 251.

“Nullum *scelus* impunitum est, quoniam *sceleris* in *scelere* supplicium est.”—SEN. *Ep.* 97. Here, the evil nature of what is styled *Scelus*, is manifest from the certainty and severity of the punishment, without any epithet being affixed to it. “*Facinus*” est vinciri civem Romanum: *scelus* verberari: prope “*parricidium*” necari: quid dicam in crucem tolli? verbo satis digno tam nefaria res appellari nullo modo potest.”—CIC. *in Verr.* 271. a. “*Facinus*” and

Scelus evidently bear a part in this climax ; and the act of lashing a Roman citizen is said to be a greater crime than that of binding him.

FLAGITIUM differs from "Scelus," in denoting an action, in which there is a still higher degree of immorality, and such as cannot be surpassed. When it appears in the same sentence; accordingly, with any of the other terms now compared with it, it naturally finishes the climax. "Stupra vero, et adulteria, et omne tale *flagitium* voluptatis illecebris excitari."—CIC. *de Sen.* 85. a. "Quæ libido ab oculis, quod "facinus" a manibus tuis unquam, quod *flagitium* a toto corpore unquam abfuit?"—CIC. *in Cat.* 100. a. "Cum omnes in omni genere "scelerum" et *flagitiorum* voluntentur."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 9. 3. "Distinctio pœnarum ex delicto. Proditores et transfugas arboribus suspendunt. Ignavos, et imbelles, et corpore infames, cœno ac palude, injecta insuper crate, mergunt. Diversitas supplicii illic respicit, tanquam "scelera" ostendi oporteat, dum puniuntur, *flagitia* abscondi."—TAC. *Ger.* 12. The opposition between "Scelus" and *Flagitium* is here very strongly marked. Crimes of a slighter, though not of a venial nature, were punished openly by the Germans, in order to deter those, who witnessed the punishments, from committing the crimes which led to them. Those, again, which they held to be of a deeper dye, they treated in a manner that would have done credit to proficients in the theory of penal law. Supposing that even the knowledge of gross crimes might corrupt the mind that was a stranger to them, they punished them in secret ; and, by that means, prevented impure conceptions from becoming familiar to those, in the rigour of whose virtue the state was concerned.

FACULTAS—*vide* POTENTIA.

FÆCES—*vide* SORDES.

FALLERE, DECIPERE,

agree, in denoting the act of deceiving ; but the former has a reference to the weakness of the person duped, and the latter, to the dexterity of him who practices the deception. Little or no art may be necessary upon the part of him "qui *fallit*," as he is often understood to be engaged with an easy prey. In the case of the person "qui *decipit*," again, the success of the stratagem depends only on the dexterity of him who executes it.

— itane tandem idoneus

Tibi videor esse, quem tam aperte *fallere* incipias dolis?—TER. *And.* 3. 2. 12.

The indignation of Simo is here manifest, chiefly by means of *Fallere*, which implies, that he is easily duped. He desires his slave to practise his tricks upon those who were blind enough not to see them.

Nunc referam gratiam; atque eas itidem *fallam*, ut ab illis *fallimur*.

TER. *Eun.* 2. 3. 93.

Panphilus, here, proposes to return the compliment, and to befool those who had befooled him. “Multi *fallere* docuerunt, dum timent *falli*.”—SEN. *Ep.* 3. The weakness of suspicion is no security against deception, but, on the contrary, by betraying a foible, often suggests the means of it.

In performing the act denoted by *Fallere*, the person, who suffers the delusion, may be himself the cause of it. This verb has no reference to the intention of any agent, and extends only to the success of means, which may operate without his knowing that they exist.

Fallit te incautum pietas tua.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 812.

It was a quality in the mind of Lausus that operated, without his consciousness, and was reprov'd by Æneas, as likely to lead to destructive effects.

Nam dominum sterilis sæpe *fefellit* ager.—OVID. *de Art. Am.* 450.

The field could form no plan to deceive the landlord; but he had deceived himself, by forming unreasonable expectations.

DECIPERE differs from “*Fallere*,” in constantly referring to the ability of the deceiver, and to the consequent success of the means by which the cheat is practised. As it comes from “*De*” and “*Capere*,” so it signifies “to become complete master of the subject wrought upon.” The verb “*Fallere*” may be applied to a person who deceives himself, which *Decipere* cannot, as it supposes concealed art.

Ultimus est aliqua *decipere* arte labor.—OVID. *Ep.* 12. 50.

The act, denoted by *Decipere*, is not performed without a degree of care and circumspection, proportioned to the discernment of the person misled. “Jam illis promissis standum non esse quis non videt, quæ coactus quis metu, quæ

deceptus dolo promiserit.”—CIC. *Off.* I. 10. “Nam illa amphibolia quæ Cræsum *decepit*, vel Chrysippum potuisset “fallere.”—CIC. *de Div.* 132. b. The ambiguity mentioned was intended to deceive Cræsus, and actually did so. It was so embarrassing, that it might have deceived even Chrysippus, upon whom it was not meant to impose, and whose powers of discernment were acute, even to a proverb.

Postquam primus amor *deceptam* morte “fefellit.”—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 17.

The verb “Fallere,” here, is immediately connected with the words “Primus amor,” and suggests, that a sentiment, originating in the mind of Dido, misled her. The verb *Decipere*, again, is connected with “Morte,” and suggests, that death, acting as an extrinsic cause, had formed and executed a plan, in respect to Sichæus, of which she could not be conscious, and which she was unable to frustrate.

The following use of *Decipere*, as applied to the person who deceives himself, though resting on high authority, is uncommon. “Nisi forte me communis *φιλαυτία* *decipit*.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 13. 13. The force of self-love is supposed to be such, as to blind the observer, and to make him forget that he is both judge and party.

FAMA, RUMOR,

agree, in denoting report, or the propagation of events held credible, whether favourable to those hearing them, or the contrary, but differ, in respect either to their date, as recent or remote, or to the number and respectability of those, by whom the report is maintained. FAMA is generic, as being applicable to events, that have just taken place, as well as to those of high antiquity. “Si quid ipsi audistis communi *fama* et sermone.”—CIC. *pro Flac.* 13. “Centesima lux est hæc ab interitu Publii Clodii, qua fines imperii populi Romani sunt, ea non solum *fama* jam de illo, sed etiam lætitia peragravit.”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 120. b. In both these instances, the report, denoted by *Fama*, is understood to be recent, and that, which pervaded the whole Roman

empire in a hundred days, must have passed with wonderful rapidity in the neighbourhood of Rome, where the communication was unbroken.

Non ita contemno volucris præconia *fama*,
Ut probris terras impleat illa meis.—OVID. *Ep.* 16. 207.

At other times *Fama* denotes a report that has been long prevalent, and that is entitled to gain ground from the authority that supports it.

— tum uno ore omnes omnia
Bona dicere, et laudare fortunas meas,
Qui gnatum haberem tali ingenio præditum.
Quid verbis opus est? hac *fama* impulsus Chremes
Ultro ad me venit.—TER. *And.* 1. 1. 69.
Sylvano *fama* est veteres sacrasse pelagos.—VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 600.
Dædalus, ut *fama* est, fugiens Minoa regna.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 14.

RUMOR differs from “*Fama*,” in relating to a report that has not been of long standing, and that is neither so generally prevalent, nor so well supported, as that denoted by “*Fama*.” Popma defines it thus; “*Rumor* est sermo, sine ullo certo auctore dispersus; cui malignitas initium, credulitas incrementum dedit.” “Sed adhuc sine capite, sine auctore, *rumore* nuntio.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 12. 10. “Ex Asia nihil prefertur ad nos præter *rumores* de oppresso Dolabella, satis illos quidem constantes, sed adhuc sine auctore.”—CIC. *Ep.* 127. a. “Calamitatem quæ facta fuit; ut eam ad aures L. Luculli non ex prælio nunciis, sed ex *rumore rumor* afferret.”—CIC. *pro Leg. Manil.* 8. b. In both instances, the event reported was recent; it does not appear to have been in the mouth of every body; and the authority upon which it rested was not capable of being assigned.

“*Fama*,” besides, may denote “character,” that is, the estimation in which a person is held, considered as a quality of himself, while *Rumor* has no such meaning. The last noun, too, is often seen in the plural among the best authors; but the first is so used by no prose writer whatever, and by Seneca and Plautus alone, even supposing that the ordinary reading can be regarded as genuine.

FAMES, INEDIA, JEJUNIUM,

agree, in denoting hunger, but differ, either in respect to its extent, or to its being voluntary, or the contrary. *FAMES* expresses the pressure of hunger, as affecting either the individual from poverty, or a country at large from a scarcity of provisions. It is, in every case, considered as an evil, and is borne with reluctance. If not satisfied in a certain time, it terminates in the death of the animal.

— et pallida semper

Ora fame. ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 217.

Here, *Fames* denotes a scarcity of victuals among a race of animals, which scarcity appears in the meagre aspect of the species, though it is not so great as to extirpate it. “*Avis fame enecta, in offam pultis invadit.*”—CIC. *de Div.* 123. b. Here, *Fames* expresses the craving of hunger upon a single animal, satisfied in a particular way. “*Etiam fames qua nihil miserius est, quæ tum erat in hac mea Asia, mihi optanda fuit.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 82. a. “*Quis esset qui plebem fame necaret?*”—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 308. a. “*Senatores quinque fame necati sunt.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 85. b. In the two last examples, *Fames* denotes hunger terminating in death; and in all it implies, that it is borne with reluctance.

Celsus employs *Fames* to denote that abstinence which promotes recovery from disease. “*Paucis diebus fames : deinde liberalius alimentum.*”—L. 8. C. 10. The authority of the physician is here held absolute; and, whatever desire the patient may have for food, it is no more to be gratified than if he wanted the necessaries of life.

INEDIA agrees with “*Fames,*” in implying, that the hunger may be voluntary or not, and that, if continued, it will superinduce death. It differs from it in supposing, that the *Inedia* affects individuals only, and not nations, and that it may, or may not, be accompanied with those cravings of appetite which always attend “*Fames.*” “*Cum milites tecum inediam, tecum ferrent sitim.*”—PLIN. *Pan.* 13. “*Minturnenses Caium Marium fessum inedia fluctibusque recrearunt.*”—CIC. *pro Plau.* 264. a. Here, the hunger was involuntary, and accompanied with the desire of the food, that was at last

furnished. "*Inedia*, et purgationibus, et vi ipsius morbi consumtus es."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 13. 10. In this case, there was no desire for food, and it was part of the disease to reject necessary support. "Mori *inedia* destinanti per vim ore diducto, infulciri cibum jussit."—SÜETON. *Tib.* 54. Here, the hunger was voluntary, and the cravings of appetite were extinguished by the fixed determination, which Agrippina fulfilled. Such determination may, or may not, be fulfilled by *Inedia*. "A vita quidam per *inediam* discedens, revocatur ab amicis."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 166. a. "Silius Italicus *inedia* vitam finit."—PLIN. *Ep.* 3. 7. "Homini non utique septimo letalis *inedia*."—PLIN. II. 54.

JEJUNIUM differs from the two former nouns, in implying, that the hunger, which may affect one or many, is but temporary, and never extinguishes animal life. It supposes, that the craving of the appetite is proportioned to the time of the abstinence, which may, or may not, be voluntary. When the abstinence is voluntary, it forms what is called a fast, which is intended as a temporary penance, but not as the means of extinguishing life. "Eorum prodigiorum causa libros Sibyllinos ex senatusconsulto Duumviri quum adissent, renuntiarunt, *jejunium* instituendum Cereri esse, et id quinto quoque anno servandum."—LIV. 36. 37. Here the penance was for a time only, and the response of the priests might have been either regarded or not. So, also, in Horace :

Mane die, quo tu indicis *jejunia*, nudus
In Tiberi stabit.———Sat. 2. 3. 291.

In the two following passages, again, the hunger was owing to a deficiency of food, which those suffering it could not remedy.

—— placare voracis *jejunia* ventris.—OVID. *Met.* 15. 95.
Domant longa illos inopi *jejunia* victu.—OVID. *Met.* 1. 312.

In the example that follows, the hunger is undergone by an individual, who had the command of food, but would not use it. "Ne judæus quidem tam diligenter sabbatis *jejunium* servat, quam ego hodie servavi."—SÜETON. *in Aug.* 76.

FARI, LOQUI, DICERE, DISSERERE, NARRARE, agree, in denoting the exercise of the faculty of speech, but differ, in respect to the intention of the speaker, and the means by which he fulfils it. FARI has the power of announcing the rudest species of oral expression, and such as is barely intelligible. Thus, Varro says, “*Fatur* is, qui primus significabilem vocem ore emittit, nullo verborum ordine servato. Unde pueri antequam id faciunt, “*infantes*,” dicuntur.”—*De L. L.* 5. 7. 54.

Nescios *fari* pueros Achivis

Ureret flammis, etiam latentes

Matris in alvo.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 6. 18.

Tu meum ingenium *fans* non edidicisti, atque *infans*.—PLAUT. *Pers.* 2. 1. 7.

“Epicuræi nostri Græce *fari* nesciunt, nec Græci Latine.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 250. b. The Epicureans and Greeks are here said to be completely ignorant of the different languages mentioned, and to be unable to express themselves in them.

Quid voveat dulci nutricula majus alumno

Quam sapere, et *fari* ut possit quæ sentiat?—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 4. 8.

If, from some accidental cause, people find difficulty in employing a particular tongue, which they actually understand, they cannot be said *Fari*. Thus, the awe with which the presence of Mæcenas struck Horace, when he was first introduced into it, almost robbed him of the power of uttering his native tongue, of which he was a thorough master.

Ut veni coram, singultim pauca locutus,

“*Infans*” namque pudor prohibebat plura “*profari*.”—SAT. 1. 6. 56.

From this effect of fear, or of modesty, *Fari* is often applied to those who make a formal harangue, and suggests the notion of dignity in the speaker, as conscious of ability to instruct his audience. When Sinon, the Greek traitor, was brought before Priam, and surrounded by the Trojan youth, he acted his part skilfully, and counterfeited an aversion to speak before such an assembly.

— hortamur *fari*, quo sanguine cretus,

Quidve ferat, memoret; quæ sit fiducia capto.

Ille hæc, deposita tandem formidine, *fatur*:

Cuncta equidem tibi, rex, fuerint quæcunque fatebor.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 74.

The sense of dignity, arising from the supposed importance of that communicated, is to be found in *Fari*, when the idea of fear is excluded from it. It thus denotes the response of an oracle, or a speech in a council of the gods. "Tum enim ferunt ex oraculo hæc *fatam esse* Pythiam."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 94. b. "Tum ad eos is Deus qui omnia genuit, *fatur*."—CIC. *de Un.* 202. b.

LOQUI differs from "*Fari*," in supposing the oral expression to be more accurate; and more strictly adapted to the meaning of the speaker. "*Loqui* ab "*loco*" dictum: quod qui primo dicitur, "*fari*," et vocabula et reliqua verba dicit, antequam suo quisque loco ea dicere potest. Igitur is *loquitur*, qui suo loco quodque verbum sciens ponit. Pueros enim, corvos, cornices quæ id facere nesciunt, non *loqui*, sed "*fari*."—VAR. *de L. L.* 5. 7. p. 55. 10. "Mihî non invenuste dici videtur, aliud esse Latine, aliud grammaticè *loqui*."—QUINCT. 1. 6. It appeared in a former instance from Cicero, that the expression "*Fari Latine*" can be employed in contradistinction to "*Fari Græce*." When Quintilian, however, opposes that expression, which is consistent with the purest Latin idiom, to that which is barely grammatical in the same language, he takes *Loqui* in place of "*Fari*." A delicate selection and position of terms are then requisite, that the speaker may communicate his meaning in language that is more than intelligible, and classically precise. Cicero says, in the same way, "*Latine me scitote, non accusatorie loqui*."—*In Ver.* 200. a.

It should seem, then, that, when accurate execution in any language is suggested, the term for announcing this is not "*Fari*," but *Loqui*. "Is perbene Latine *loqui* putabatur, literatiusque quam cæteri."—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 174. a. "*Loqui* primum pure et Latine, deinde plane et dilucide, tum ad rerum dignitatem apte et quasi decore."—CIC. *de Or.* 96. b.

Loqui is also properly applied to conversation, when the conceptions of those engaged in it can be rendered just, in respect to the subject, by mutual intercourse of speech. "Sæpiusque ista *loquemur* inter nos, communiterque agemus."—CIC. *de Fin.* 3. 9.

Certe nescio quid secreto velle *loqui* te

Aiebas mecum.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 9. 67.

This verb may also be employed to denote a soliloquy, or even reasoning not announced by speech, which "Fari" could not. "Ne hæc quidem tecum loquutus es."—CIC. *pro Quin.* 53.

Quocirca mecum loquor hæc, tacitusque recordor.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 145

DICERE differs from "Loqui," in supposing, that still higher attentions are paid to the perfection of speech, and that the only means of promoting this depend upon a successful application of the speaker's skill in his language. It refers to the consonance between the thoughts of men and their expressions, more than to the absolute justness of the thoughts themselves. It accordingly does not express conversation, by which errors in sentiment may be corrected. *Dicere*, is understood to come from Δεινω, and signifies to shew, or explain, by terms that are the fittest for the purpose. A speaker, in the Roman senate, was said "*Dicere* sententiam;" and when he had done, he intimated this by saying *Dixi*. When the pleaders on both sides in the Roman courts had finished, and the judges were about to form and deliver their opinion, a crier exclaimed *Dixerunt*. "Jam censendi tempus; *dicit* Domitius consul designatus, *dicit* Fabricius, Fabius Vectius," &c.—PLIN. 9. 13. "*Dicere* causam" signifies to plead a cause, that is, to state it as it is, and to present it to the judge, unembarrassed with extraneous circumstances, and clothed in its native dress. "Fari causam" and "Loqui causam" are expressions never to be met with. *Dicere* is properly applicable to exertions of oratory, and, in this view, Cicero gives us the following definition of it. "Nec aliud quidquam est *dicere* nisi omnes, aut certe plerasque aliqua specie illuminare sententias."—CIC. *Orat.* 209. b. "Nec idem "loqui" est quod *dicere*: attamen utrumque in "disserendo" est. Disputandi ratio et "loquendi" dialecticorum sit: oratorum autem *dicendi* et ornandi."—CIC. *Ibid.* 207. a. It is here manifest, that, in the expression of the most acute sophists, there was a looseness, not to be found in that of the best orators. The former often regarded the terms as suited to disguise the conception; the latter always regarded them as the tools, by which their own thoughts were to be transmitted with most perspicuity and force.

DISSERERE, from "Dis" and "Serere," appears, from the passage in Cicero just quoted, to be generic in respect to "Loqui" and "Dicere," that is, to be capable of doing the duty of both. This last term, then, is alike applicable to that artful arrangement of matter, by which subtle reasoners formed their arguments, and to that judicious selection of words, upon which skilful speakers rest the chief merit of their harangues. *Disserere*, in its primitive meaning, signifies to plant at proper distances, so that each seed may be duly nourished, without interfering with those that are next to it. "Panax utroque tempore levi et subacta terra rarissime *disseritur*."—COLUM. II. 3. 29. Others, again, give a different account of the etymology of this verb, by bringing it from "Dis" and "Serere," to plait. The meaning of the compound, then, will be to unplait, to unravel what is intricate, and, in general, to explain what is abstruse. "Serere" to sow, and "Serere" to plait, are undoubtedly different verbs, and the difference existing in the roots may be traced in their derivatives.

NARRARE differs from all the verbs before defined, in denoting, that that which is spoken is complete, and is all that is meant to be said upon the subject. It has, at the same time, no reference to the absolute length of the detail, but to its being, in the estimation of the speaker, as much as it is needful for him to communicate. "*Narratio est rerum explicatio, et quædam quasi sedes ac fundamentum constituendæ fidei*."—CIC. *Part. Or.* 31.

Tu isti *narrato* omnem rem ordine ut factum siet.—TER. *Eun.* 5. 5. 28.

Iliacosque iterum demens audire labores

Exposcit, pendetque iterum *narrantis* ab ore.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 78.

Navita de ventis, de tauris *narrat* arator.—PROPERT. 2. 1. 43.

When *Narrare* is applied to a single fact, its power appears to fall in with that of "Dicere." Still, however, the speaker rests upon its importance, and regards it as of itself deserving the hearer's attention. "*Narro tibi Quintus exultat lætitia*."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 246. a. "*Narro tibi hæc loca venusta sunt*."—*Ibid.* 146. a.

Non opinor, Dave. *Da. Opinor narras?* non recte accipis,

Certa res est. ————— TER. *And.* 2. 2. 30.

FAS, JUS,

agree, in denoting right, but differ, as the former regards duty in respect to God, and the latter regards it in respect to man. Gesner defines *Fas* thus; "Quod pium est, et religiosum, et "fari" dignum, et ad Deos refertur, sicut "justum" ad homines." "Socrus contra quam *fas* erat, generi sui amore capta." —CIC. *pro Cluen.* 20. a. This attachment is held a violation of the law of God.

Jampridem nobis cœli te regia, Cæsar,
Invidet, atque hominum queritur curare triumphos.
Quippe ubi *fas* versum atque nefas, tot bella per orbem,
Tam multæ scelerum facies. ————— VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 503.

This act, of confounding what was *Fas* and "Nefas," is held sacrilegious, and the cause why the gods wished that Cæsar should forsake the pollutions of men, and become an inhabitant of heaven.

The glowing imagination of Tacitus has probably led him to be guilty of an impurity in the use of *Fas*. He talks of the "*Fas* gentium," "*Fas* armorum," and "*Fas* patriæ," supposing that the rights peculiar to each were constantly recognized by the gods, who would hereafter punish every violation of them.

Fas is, among the poets, found to denote possibility, considering the strength that can be applied to the object.

Quam neque *fas* igni cuiquam, nec sternere ferro.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 692.

JUS differs from "Fas," in referring to right as existing between man and man, and as the foundation of civil society. It relates either to systems of written laws, by which particular communities are governed, or to certain innate apprehensions of justice, which all men entertain, and feel to be binding on the species. "Atque inter hanc vitam perpolitam humanitate, et illam immanem nihil tam interest, quam *jus* atque vis. Horum utro uti nolimus, altero est utendum. Vini volumus extinguere? *jus* valeat necesse est, id est judicia, quibus omne *jus* continetur." —CIC. *pro Sext.* 22. b.

Jus anceps novi, causas defendere possum.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 5. 34.

In both the last examples, *Jus* denotes the code of statutes, or enactments, by which civil society is maintained in particular countries. “*Naturæ jus est, quod non opinio genuit, sed quædam innata vis inseruit.*”—CIC. *de Inv.* 82. a. “*Hieme omnia bella jure gentium conquiescunt.*”—CIC. *pro Rab. Post.* 129. b. Here, *Jus* regards all those natural impressions of justice of which mankind are conscious, but which have been reduced to no system. “*Clodium nihil delectat, quod aut per naturam “fas” sit, aut per leges liceat.*”—CIC. *pro T. Ann. Mil.* 110. a. “*Fas*” is here applied to the will of the Author of nature, appearing through his works; and *Jus* is involved in the notion of what the laws, or positive enactments, permit to be.

FAS EST—*vide* LICET.

FASTUS—*vide* SUPERBIA.

FATERI, CONFITERI, PROFITERI, PRÆ SE FERRE,

agree, in denoting the act of declaring to others something of which they are understood to be ignorant, but differ, in respect either to the zeal with which the declaration is made, or to its intended notoriety. FATERI, as a generic word, denotes the act of confessing, either voluntarily or by compulsion. In general, however, the person *Fatens* utters what he would more willingly conceal. Spontaneous confession, such as appears in the two following instances, is most rarely expressed by it. “*Laterensis nostri in rempublicam animum singularem semper fatebor.*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 157. b. “*Fatendum est, summum bonum esse jucunde vivere.*”—CIC. *de Fin.* 1. 12.

Ego me amare hanc *fateor*: si id peccare est, *fateor* id quoque.—TER. *And.* 5. 3. 25.

“*Traditusque Andranodoro torquendus, de se ipse haud cunctanter fassus, conscios celabat.*”—LIV. 24. 5. The informer had, here, an interest in concealing his own guilt, which did not weigh with him. All the tortures, however, with which he was threatened and tried, did not bring him to make any confession respecting his associates.

Even when the sign is involuntary, and such as to require nice interpretation, *Fateri* denotes confession.

—*oculos oculis spectare fatentibus ignem.*—OVID. *Art. Am.* 1. 573.

CONFITERI differs from its root, in respect to the full and unreserved confession denoted by it. The declaration, implied in this compound, is not understood to be extorted by compulsion, but given with the good will of him who makes it. The confession, denoted by this verb, may, or may not, relate to something which he, who makes it, reckons disgraceful; and, in either way, it may be meritorious.

Ignosce, orat, *confitetur*, purgat: quid vis amplius?—TER. *Phor.* 5. 9. 46.

“Devinctum me esse tuis officiis, *confiteor* non solum, sed etiam gaudeo.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 1. 9. The verb *Confiteri*, in this last sentence, as opposed to “Gaudere,” manifestly denotes a spontaneous and unreserved declaration. The last verb suggests the joy of the confessor in doing that, which had been a matter of choice and free-will.

Non est *confessi* causa tuenda rei.—OVID. *de Pont.* 2. 2. 56.

When a culprit takes, of his own accord, with the guilt that is imputed to him, no defence can be offered tending either to palliate or to conceal it.

The circumstance of full and spontaneous declaration is to be found in *Confiteri*, even when natural signs are interpreted which cannot be disguised. To a penetrating eye, the confession is then held to be as convincing as if it were actually made in words. “*Confiteri* inotum animi sui lacrymis.”—QUINCT. 6. 1. 23.

Navita *confessus* gelidum pallore timorem.—OVID. *Trist.* 1. 3. 113.

PROFITERI agrees with the last verb, in implying a full and voluntary confession, but differs from it in respect to the desire of the person making it, that it should be notorious, as being such as he has no reason to be ashamed of. Noltenius’s account of the radical verb, and this compound, is what might be expected from his eminence as a critic. “*Fateor*” significat qualemcumque confessionem, etiam coactam: *profiteor*, liberam, publicam ac solennem.” “Atque ita libenter “*confitetur*,” ut non solum “*fateri*,” sed etiam *profiteri* videatur.”—CIC. *pro Cæc.* 290. a. “Omnes enim istiusmodi artes in iis reprehenduntur, qui cum *professi* “*fuerint*,” satisfacere non possunt: non in iis, qui abfuisse ab

istis studiis “confitentur.”—CIC. *pro Plan.* 272. a. The first of those compounds refers to such vain boasters as publicly arrogate to themselves more merit than they possess; and the second, to those people who are, at all times, ready to confess their ignorance in matters to which they have not devoted their attention.

PRÆ SE FERRE is an expression that differs from what is implied in “Profiti,” only in regard to the superior strength of the desire to have the confession notorious. The agent, *Præ se ferens*, acts from a kind of ostentation, and puts it in the power of every observer to interpret his sentiments, from circumstances that are continually held forth to his view. “Fateor” atque etiam “Profitior,” et *præ me fero*, perduellionis iudicium a me fuisse sublatum.”—CIC. *pro Rab.* 93. b. “Fiduciam igitur *præ se ferat* semper orator, semperque ita dicat, tanquam de causa optime sentiat.”—QUINCT. 5. 13. “Cruentis manibus scelus et facinus *præ se ferens*, et “confitens.”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 109. b. In this last example, the generic substantive, and the generic verb, come last, and form a double anti-climax. The “Scelus” is a crime of a deeper dye than the “Facinus,” and the person *Præ se ferens* does more than the person “Confitens.” “Sampsicerano negat, cæteris *præ se fert*, et ostentat.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 2. 23. Between the verb “Negare,” in the first member, and the words, *Præ se ferre* and “Ostentare,” in the second, there is more than an ordinary antithesis. “Fateri,” simply, might have been opposed to “Negare;” but the other expressions shew a keenness, and even a vanity, in the confession, which the root, contrasted with them, could not have announced. “Cujus rei tantæ facultatem “consecutum” esse me, non “profitior:” “secutum” me esse, *præ me fero*.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. C. 5. The speaker was not anxious that the circumstance, connected in the first member of the sentence, should be publicly known, but was very much the contrary, in respect to that in the second.

FATUUS—*vide* STULTUS.

FAVILLA, SCINTILLA,

agree, in denoting fire, which, from the want of fuel, must be of short

duration. The first term, supposed to have been originally "Fovilla," from "Fovere," refers to ashes not extinguished, and preserving the fire while any remains of the fuel lasts. Its generic power is such, as to make it imply, not embers always, but ashes in a cold state.

Atque ibi *favilla* plena, fumi, ac pollinis
Coquendo sit faxo, et molendo.——TER. *Adelpb.* 5. 3. 60.

"Sabulo, calce ac *favilla* mixtis."—PLIN. 36. 25. In both these instances the *Favilla* is cold, and does not nourish the fire; and, in the former, it is understood to deform, without injuring, the person covered by it.

Favilla, besides, is applicable to the finer particles of the ashes, that fly off, and form a thick smoke, that dirties what it comes near. It is then nearly equal to "Fuligo."

Atra *favilla* volat, glomerataque corpus in unum
Densatur.——OVID. *Met.* 13. 604.

Favilla often denotes hot ashes, or embers, and, in that view, properly, is synonymous with "Scintilla." The fire existing is then supposed to be in a decaying state, owing to a defect in the fuel, which nourishes it.

Postquam collapsi cineres et flamma quievit,
Reliquias vino et bibulam lavere *favillam*.——VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 226.

The ashes, here styled "*bibula favilla*," must have been red hot, and the quality, implied in the adjective, must have arisen from the quick evaporation occasioned by the heat, more than from any absorbing power in themselves.

—— ibi tu calentem,
Debita sparges lacryma *favillam*
Vatis amici.——HOR. *Car.* 2. 6. 22.

SCINTILLA differs from "Favilla," in having no reference to ashes; in often supposing, that the fire is generated by the collision of hard substances, and that that, which supports the momentary fire, is always in motion. It comes from "Scindere," and supposes the ignited particle cut off from a body, the whole mass of which it before served to compose. Gesner defines it thus; "*Scintilla* proprie est ignita et candens particula, quæ e silice, quum is cæditur, exsilire solet."

Pars quoque quum saxis pastores saxa feribant,
Scintillam subito prosiluisse ferunt.—OVID. *Fast.* 4. 795.
 Ac primum silice *scintillam* excudit Achates,
 Suscepitque ignem foliis, atque arida circum
 Nutrimenta dedit.————VIRG. *Æn.* 1; 178.

In the two following examples, we find “Favilla” and *Scintilla* appearing together, and, in both, the distinctive meaning may be collected, if allowance is made for the generic power of “Favilla.”

Ut solet a ventis alimenta resumere, quæque
 Parva sub inducta latuit *scintilla* “favilla”
 Crescere, et in veteres agitata resurgere vires.—OVID. *Met.* 7. 79.

The “Favilla inducta,” here, suggests the ashes drawn together that maintained the fire in a dormant state; the *Scintilla*, again, that lurked under these, was the spark which, from acquiring motion by being blown upon, rekindled the fire, that had been nearly extinguished. “Cum contactus ignis ex se “favillam” discutit, *scintillamve* emittit.”—PLIN. *sub Fin.* 18. L. The “Favilla,” here, signifies an ember, and is part of the mass, within which the shake takes place; the *Scintilla* flies from it, and exists in a separate state, though of instantaneous duration.

FELIX, BEATUS,

agree, in denoting the happiness of some sensitive being, but differ in respect to the circumstances from which that happiness is inferred. The former intimates the superiority of the percipient, as compared with the generality of his species; the latter intimates, that his present enjoyments are superior to his former. He, who is *Felix*, is understood to be fortunate, as being rich in the goods of fortune, which many have been denied; he, who is “Beatus,” again, is understood to have attained the completion of his wishes, and to possess higher happiness than he before enjoyed. “Sapienter hæc reliquisti, si consilio; *feliciter*, si casu.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 7. 28. Curius is said, by Cicero, to have been wiser than others, in leaving Rome, if, in so doing, he exercised his judgment; and to have been luckier, if he did not.

Felix et nato, *felix* et conjuge Peleus,
 Et cui, si demas jugulati crimina Phoci,
 Omnia contigerant.———OVID. *Met.* 11. 266.

Peleus is here said to have been born under lucky stars, and, with the exception of one event only, to have had uninterrupted happiness. “*Illi fortuna felicitatem dedit, huic industria virtutem comparavit.*”—CIC. *Auct. ad Her.* 30. b.

When Æneas took leave of Andromache and the other inhabitants of Crete, he makes a beautiful and tender comparison between the happiness of their lot, and that of himself and his followers, to which the purest use of *Felix* is strikingly subservient.

Vivite *felices* ! quibus est fortuna peracta
 Jam sua : nos alia ex aliis in fata vocamur.
 Vobis parta quies : nullum maris æquor arandum.—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 493.

BEATUS differs from “*Felix*,” in supposing, that the attained happiness is estimated by a comparison between the past and the present enjoyment of the percipient. It is originally a participle of the verb “*Beare*,” which signifies, to bless, or render happy. The notion of time is necessarily excluded from this word, when in the form of an adjective ; and it signifies a superinduced, in place of an accidental, state of happiness. A person, said to be *Beatus*, was understood to enjoy a degree of happiness, unsusceptible of addition. “*Qui beatus est, non intelligo quid requirat, ut sit beatior. Si est enim quod desit, ne beatus quidem est.*”—CIC. *Tusc.* 5. 8. Though *Beatus* admits of a comparative and a superlative degree, it may be inferred, from the above passage, that these do not refer to different states of the same person. They suppose, that different portions of happiness are suited to the capacity of different men, and that the interval between the point quitted and that attained is not the same to all. One man may be “*Beatior altero*,” but this comparative is not applicable to those states of happiness in which the same person has found himself. If there was any deficiency in a former state, he was not *Beatus* ; and it is, of course, impossible, that in any future one he can be *Beatior*. “*Nec ulla alia huic verbo, cum beatum dicimus, subjecta notio est, nisi secretis malis omnibus, cummulata bonorum complexio.*”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 234. a.

Non possidentem multa vocaveris
 Recte *beatum* : rectius occupat
 Nomen *beati* qui Deorum
 Muneribus sapienter uti,
 Duramque callet pauperiem pati,
 Pejusque letho flagitium timet.
 Non ille, pro caris amicis
 Aut patria, timidus perire. —HOR. *Car.* 4. 9. 45.

He, who is fortunate in possessing the constituents of wealth, may be “Felix;” but he, to whom *Beatus* is properly applicable, must have reached that state, by acquiring virtues of which he was at one time destitute.

The term *Beatus* is applied to the dead, who, though they were not all understood to be deified, yet were often held to be in a better state than formerly, and to be completely happy in heaven. “Omnibus qui patriam conservarint, auxerint, certum esse in cœlo ac definitum locum, ubi *beati* sempiterno ævo fruuntur.”—CIC. *Som. Scip.* 4. 3. When *Beatus* is thus applied, the existence of man in this, and in another world, is taken as forming one train; and his happiness, in the posterior state, is compared and preferred to any thing he enjoyed before.

The term “Felix,” however, we find also applied to the dead, as well as *Beatus*; and this application, if the ground of it is properly distinguished, is perfectly consistent with the definition given of both. The state of the dead, when styled “Felices,” is not compared with what it before was, but with that of those they have left behind them. Andromache, accordingly, envies the fate of Polyxena, as more fortunate than her own, when she exclaims,

O “felix” una ante alias Priamœia virgo,
 Hostilem ad tumulum Trojæ sub mœnibus altis,
 Jussa mori! ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 321.

The same use is beautifully made of “Felix,” in the Troades of Seneca, when Hecuba and the Trojan ladies were lamenting their captivity.

————— “Felix” Priamus
 Dicimus omnes. Nunc Elysii
 Nemoris tutus errat in umbris;
 Interque pias “felix” animas
 Hectora quærit. “Felix” Priamus!

“Felix,” quisquis bello moriens,
Omnia secum consumpta videt!—SEN. *Troad.* 156.

In this pathetic exclamation, no reference is made to the state, in which the deceased king was supposed to be. His surviving friends only declare him to be happy, in having escaped the distresses, to which they were themselves exposed.

If this account of the real import of “Felix,” when applied to the dead, be true, we must refuse our assent to what Gesner and Facciolatti say of the word, as being applicable to the dead, in the same sense with *Beatus*, and as equal to *Μακαριος* and *Μακαριτης* with the Greeks. This we do with diffidence, and with all due respect for the discernment of such able critics. The former brings the passage, last quoted from Virgil, in support of his opinion; and both refer to the following, which, from an error in the punctuation, appears to be misinterpreted.

———— est tibi mater
Cognati, quis te salvo est opus? Haud mihi quisquam.
Omnes composui “felices:” nunc ego resto.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 9. 26.

The colon should have been put after “composui,” and Horace should have been understood to utter, though not audibly, the rest of the line. As the words are usually taken, the impertinent fellow is absurdly made to say, that he buried all his friends after they were in a state of bliss. He did not mean to say, that they were either fortunate in having died, or were afterwards *Beati*, that is, admitted into the mansions above. All he intended was, to answer the question put to him, and to declare, that not one of them was alive. Upon this, Horace, humourously appearing to envy their state, compared to his own, while exposed to such a nuisance, says, “Felices!” By this he means, that those connections were well out of the way, while he underwent a penance, from which they were luckily freed.

FERA—*vide* BESTIA.

FERRE, GERERE, PORTARE, VEHERE,

agree, in denoting the act of carrying, but differ, in respect to the weight of

that which is supported. FERRE is generic, and may be applied to the act of bearing what is either light or heavy, whether it be only supported, or carried from one place to another. “*Lectica per oppidum ferri.*”—CIC. *Phil.* 2. 106.

Habendum et *ferendum* est hoc onus cum labore.—PLAUT. *Amph.* 1. 1. 21.

In the instances now given, the weight carried is said to be oppressive, or at least considerable. In those that follow, the weight cannot be understood to try the strength of those who support it. “*Octonis mensibus ferunt partus, et interdum gemellos.*”—PLIN. 8. 32.

Olera et pisciculos minutos *ferre* obolo in cœnam seni.—TER. *And.* 2. 2. 32.

Pater nos *ferre* hoc jussit argentum ad te.—PLAUT. *Asin.* 3. 3. 42.

GERERE differs from “*Ferre*,” in implying, that the weight of that, which is always transported, is either inconsiderable, or borne so habitually as to become less oppressive. “*Cæteris animantibus statum et pariendi et partus gerendi tempus est: homo toto anno et incerto gignitur spatio.*”—PLIN. 7. 5. “*Optima veste contexit quam Satrapæ regii gerere consueverant. Galeam in capite gerere, dextra manu clavam, sinistra copulam.*”—NEP. *in Dat.* 3.

Invicta *gerit* tela Cupido.—SEN. *Octav.* 807.

Quodque aliena capella *gerat* distentius uber.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 1. 110.

In the above examples, the weight carried cannot be supposed burdensome. *Gerere*, however, is sometimes applied to such weights; but they are always understood to be so habitually borne, that they must be considered as the less oppressive. Thus, Seneca applies it to the stone of Sisyphus;

Quis iste saxum immane detritis *gerit*

Jam senior humeris? ecce, jam “*vectus*” lapis

Quærit relabi.—HERC. *Oct.* 1009.

PORTARE differs from “*Gerere*,” in having a constant reference to the weight of the body carried from one place to another, and in supposing it transported, either by human strength, by that of the lower animals, or by water. “*Omnia mea mecum porto.*”—CIC. *Parad.* 117. a.

Callidus ut soleat humeris *portare* viator.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 5. 90.

— curru servus *portatur* eodem.—JUV. 10. 42.

“Quinque naves, quæ Macedonum atque Pænorum captos legatos Romam portabant.”—LIV. 23. 38.

Sed puerum est ausus Romam portare docendum
Artes, quas doceat quivis eques, atque senator
Semet prognatos.——HOR. Sat. 1. 6. 76.

The merit of Horace's father is increased, by the figurative application of this term. Had the load been light, he would have done no more than his duty; but when, from his poverty, he was just able to support it, he shewed equally his love of learning, and the strength of his paternal attachment.

VEHERE differs from “Portare,” in supposing the transported weight to be generally greater, and such as human strength could not support.

Nam muliones mulos clitellarios
Habent, ego habeo homines clitellarios.
Magni sunt oneris : quicquid imponas *vehunt*.—PLAUT. *Most.* 3. 2. 93.
Vehit ista Danaos classis?—SEN. *Agam.* 526.

“*Vectus* jumentis junctis, atque ita de vehiculo, quæ videbantur, dicebat.”—NEP. in *Timol.* 4.

When *Vehere* is applied to man, or to any animal that is not a beast of burden, it always supposes them to be overloaded, and doing more than could be expected from their strength.

Ut redit itque frequens, longum formica per agmen,
Granifero solitum cum *vehit* ore cibum.——OVID. *Art. Am.* 1. 93.

—— ut si

Reticulum panis venales inter onusto
Forte *vehas* humero, nihilo plus accipias, quam
Qui nil “Portarit.”——HOR. *Sat.* 1. 1. 47.

By changing the verb *Vehere* for “Portare,” the poet, with much art, strengthens the idea he wishes to enforce. A negation of what is expressed by *Vehere* would only have implied, not sweating under the load, with which the slave, carrying the bag of bread, was oppressed. But, by a negation of what “Portare” expresses, there is a greater exemption from burden; and, of course, he, who groaned with his loaded shoulder, had the more reason to complain.

In the last example under "Gerere," respecting the stone of Sisyphus, we see a participle of the verb *Vehere* introduced at the end of it. Huge as the stone was, and oppressive to the old man, who bore it, at the bottom of the mountain, it became more so when he approached its top. The struggle, just before his strength failed, which no habit could alleviate, could only be expressed by the verb *Vehere*. Though the effort, then, in combatting this "non exsuperabile saxum" was endless, yet the fatiguing exertion was not always the same. At one time, the effort might be expressed by the verb "Gerere," which, at another, would be totally inapplicable.

Optat supremo collocare Sisyphus
In monte saxum : sed vetant leges Jovis.—HOR. *Epod.* 17. 16.

FERRE, PATI, TOLERARE,

agree, in denoting the state of one who suffers what is disagreeable ; but the first refers to the exertion, as greater or less, upon the part of the sufferer, in bearing what is burdensome ; the second, to his resisting propensities inconsistent with his duty, and allowing himself to be acted upon by the motive, that ought to be cogent ; and the third, to his patience, in brooking what is most repugnant to his nature. FERRE has already been found generic in respect to "Gerere," "Portare," and "Vehere," with which it may be compared in its literal meaning ; and it will perhaps be found so, in respect to "Pati," and "Tolerare," in its figurative. The three are synonymous, only in as far as they denote voluntary submission to that, which the agent has a power of rejecting ; and they differ in respect to the extent of the grievance, to which the mind is reconciled. "Id et modeste et sapienter, sicut omnia et *ferre* et *laturum esse* certo scio."—CIC. *de Sen.* 77. a. "Qui potentissimorum hominum potentiam nunquam *tulerim, ferrem* hujus, *asseclæ* ?"—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 93. b.

Totque *tuli* terra casus, pelagoque, quot inter
Occultum stellæ, conspicuumque polum.—OVID. *Trist.* 10. 107.

From the above examples, it should seem, that *Ferre* is a generic word, comprehending various degrees of that patience, which is necessary for bearing

what is disagreeable. It applies to every ground of refusal, from the slightest inconvenience, to that which is insufferable, as being beyond the agent's strength.

Quid faciam Syre mi? Gaudeo: *fer* me.—TER. *Heaut.* 4. 3. 14.

In this last example, the patience requisite to bear with a man intoxicated with joy must be but inconsiderable.

PATI differs from "Ferre," in denoting a struggle in counteracting strong propensities, that has been successful from a sense of duty. It refers, originally, to material objects, and denotes their physical fitness to be acted upon by external agency. When transferred from such as are material to intellectual, it denotes the overcoming a reluctance, founded upon a determination not to comply with what is naturally agreeable. The physical passivity, implied in this verb, appears in the following sentence. "Mundus per se, et a se, et *patitur*, et facit omnia."—CIC. *de Un.* 198. a. Here are held forth two physical capacities, the one of acting, and the other of being acted upon; both of which are ascribed to the world. The passivity, now stated, is applicable to matter only, which mind is understood to resemble, when strong propensities are subdued, in consequence of the effort of a moral agent exerting a controuling power. By such power, mind operates an effect upon itself, by producing obedience, which otherwise would not exist. Such self-command is matter of discipline, and what the mind is able, and is required, to produce, by regulating its internal system. Thus, Lucan prescribes it as a lesson;

— et disce sine armis

Posse *pati*.—————5. 313.

"Et facere et *pati* fortia, Romanum est."—LIV. 2. 12. The character of the Romans is said to be alike distinguished for activity and patience; in both of which fortitude has room to display itself.

Magnum pauperies opprobrium jubet,

Quidvis et facere et *pati*.————HOR. *Car.* 3. 24. 42.

"Nobiscum versari jam diutius non potes: non "*feram*," non *patiar*, non.

sinam.”—CIC. *in Cat.* 99. b. The orator, here, clearly allows, that a distinction exists; and, in his climax, he rises from the general to the particular word. By “non feram,” he insinuates, that the presence of Catiline is burdensome to him, and that he will not bear it; and by “non *patiar*,” that he has formed a determination to resist importunity, in respect to that subject, as being a point which he ought on no account to give up.

Pateretur : nam quem “ferret” si parentem non “ferret” suum.

TER. *Heaut.* 1. 1. 28.

By *Pateretur* is denoted, the dutiful submission to the will of a parent, in spite of every temptation to withhold it. By “Ferret,” again, is denoted, not merely such submission as becomes a son, but every species of it, the obligations to which may be supposed more or less cogent.

TOLERARE agrees with “Pati,” in so far as to imply the subduing a disposition to do the contrary of what should be done, but differs from it, in supposing the reluctance, and, of course, the merit of overcoming it, to be stronger. Festus says, “*Tolerare* est patienter “ferre,” estque verbum mala patientis.” “Dicunt illi asperum esse dolorem, molestum, odiosum, contra naturam, difficilem *toleratu*.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 118. a. In this example, there is a combination of circumstances, all tending to form the strong reluctance which is characteristic of *Tolerare*. “Qui in oppida compulsi, ac simili inopia subacti, eorum corporibus, qui ætate inutiles ad bellum videbantur vitam *toleraverunt*.”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 7. 77. “Tristis enim res et sine dubio, aspera, amara, inimica naturæ, ad “patiendum” *tolerandumque* difficilis.”—CIC. *Tusc.* 178. b. As, in the second example from Cicero respecting “Pati,” “Ferre” was the first in the climax, so, in this last, “Pati” is made to take place of *Tolerare*. In the case of “Pati,” the sufferer may only act contrary to some determination, or some feeling of moderate impulse; but, in that of *Tolerare*, he thwarts principles, that are deeply implanted, and of powerful influence, in his nature. “Quæ tamen si *tolerabiles* erunt, “ferendæ” sunt.” CIC. *de Am.* 111. a. The generic power of “Ferre” is here evident, and no commutation of the terms can take place. The philosopher advises us to bear

the weaknesses of friends, if they are such as it is possible to brook, and to sacrifice much, though not every thing, to old connections.

FERVERE—*vide* CALERE.

FERUS, FEROX, FERINUS,

agree, in referring to the wildness of certain animals, but differ, as the quality denoted is characteristic of a species or an individual. FERUS always implies, that the animal, marked by it, enjoys his liberty uncontrouled, and shews a disposition to prey upon others. This disposition is not the universal concomitant of the quality expressed by *Ferus*, as some animals, even in their wild state, are timid and harmless, and, being tamed, only become more familiar with man, whom they naturally distrust. “*Varia genera bestiarum, vel cicurum, vel ferarum.*”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 46. a. Tame animals are here opposed to wild, and the radical power of the adjective is unfolded. “*Jam vero immanes et feras belluas nanciscimur venando.*”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 58. b. *Ferus* is figuratively applied to those of the human race that are uncivilized. “*Gentes feras armatas in Italiam adducere.*”—CIC. *Tusc.* 154. b.

Nemo adeo ferus est, qui non mitescere possit.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 1. 39.

Ferus, besides, is applicable to inanimate objects.

— *montesque feri sylvæque loquuntur.*—VIRG. *Ecl.* v. 28.

“*O fera tempora, quum dubitet Curtius consulatum petere.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 12. 49.

Nec mihi sunt vires, nec ferus ensis adest.—OVID. *Ep.* 8. 54.

FEROX differs from “*Ferus*,” in denoting a quality that marks the individual, and not a number of a species, and in ascribing to a single animal boldness and contempt of danger. It is, besides, never applied to inanimate objects. “*Ferox genus, nullam vitam rati sine armis esse.*”—LIV. 34. 17. “*Victoria reddidit hominem ferociorem impotentioremq.*”—CIC. *Ep.* 54. b. In the above instances, the epithet is opprobrious; in the two that follow, it

is the contrary. "Ille animo *feroce* negat se fusam toties Numidiam pertimescere."—SALL. *Jug.* 106.

O præstans animi juvenis, quantum ipse *feroci*
Virtute exsuperas.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 19.

FERINUS, though agreeing with "Ferus" in regarding the general character of a species, differs from it in having no reference to the disposition of the being characterized by it, but to some quality of its animal nature. The disposition, at the same time, is inherent in this creature, though it is not the intention of the speaker to suggest it to the hearer's mind. *Ferinus* denotes such qualities of wild beasts as relate to their mode of living, their flesh, their milk, and their cries. "Nam fuit quoddam tempus quum in agris homines passim bestiarum more vagabantur, et sibi victu *ferino* vitam propagabant."—CIC. *de Inv.* 42. a. "Getulis cibus erat caro *ferina*."—SALL. *Jug.* 18.

Armentalis equæ mammis et lacte *ferino*
Nutribat, teneris immulgens ubera labris.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 571.
Omnia barbariæ loca sunt, vocisque *ferina*.—OVID. *Trist.* 5. 13. 55.

FESTINARE, PROPERARE, MATURARE,

agree, in denoting the expedition with which business is transacted, but differ, in respect either to the multiplicity of affairs which distract the agent's attention; to the vigour and success with which he prosecutes a single object; or to the judicious exertion by which he executes his purpose at the most favourable time. Aulus Gellius has preserved a definition, given by Cato, of the two first terms. "Aliud est "properare," aliud *festinare*. Qui unum quid mature transigit, is "properat:" qui multa simul incipit, neque perficit, is *festinat*."—NOC. *Att.* 16. 14. *Festinare*, then, should seem to denote a pother, or ineffectual effort to accomplish different ends at once. The reason of the person hastening is thus suspended, and, from a vain attempt to accomplish too many ends, he is apt to fail in all. Popma says, "*Festinare* est temeraria et præcipiti celeritate aliquo contendere."

Cuncta *festinat* domus: huc et illuc
Curstant mistæ pueris puellæ.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 11 9.
Remigio veloce quantum poteris, *festina* et fuge.—PLAUT. *Asin.* 1. 3. 6.

The Greek proverb, *Σπευδε Ἐραδεως*, and “*Festina lente*,” which we are told, by Suetonius, was often in the mouth of Augustus, accord very much in meaning. The verb *Festina* refers to the multiplicity and progressive stages in the transaction, which, if unduly accelerated, cannot be completed; while the adverb “*Lente*” retards the process, and prevents the failure, which must arise from misjudged impetuosity.

PROPERARE differs from “*Festinare*,” in supposing that the agent is not encumbered with a multitude of objects, which he leaves unfinished, but is vigorous and successful in his attempt to execute one. The following definition, by Popma, justifies this account of *Properare*, as well as that already given by Cato. “*Properare est cito et strenue progredi, ut eo quo velis peruenias.*” It comes from “*Prope*,” and signifies to bring that event near, which otherwise would have been distant.

Hoc opus, hoc studium parvi *properemus*, et ampli.—HOR. 1. 3. 28.

Here is one great object, which the poet tells us must be steadily pursued,

Si patriæ volumus, si nobis vivere cari.

“Hoc magis *properare* Varro, ut cum legionibus quamprimum Gades contenderet.”—CÆS. B. C. 2. 20.

— quem regia conjux

Adjungi generum miro *properabat* amore.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 57.

Properare propere domum.—PLAUT. *Aul.* 2. 2. 4.

“Atque inde ventis, remis, in patriam, omni “*festinatione*,” *properavi*.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 198. b. By combining the abstract noun from “*festinare*,” with *Properare*, in this sentence, the greatest possible hurry is expressed. The great object of getting home, and profiting by the winds, that favoured him, was accomplished by Cicero; and sails and oars were used, with more keenness than judgment, as the means of effecting this rapid conveyance. “At ille *properans*, “*festinans*,” *mandata nostra conficere cupiens, in hac constantia, morbo adversante, perseveravit.*”—CIC. *in Ant.* 222. a. The merit of Sul-

picius, in hastening to execute his commission, as implied in *Properare*, was impaired by that bustle and distraction which, in the end, made him lose his life. After all, though the general distinction stated, often holds between "Festinare" and *Properare*, yet there are instances in which it can hardly be discerned.

MATURARE differs from the former two verbs, in referring to the judicious acceleration of the event, lest the best time for giving effect to it should not be seized, either by a culpable prematureness, or slowness, in the conduct of the agent. It denotes a well-timed haste; and, according to the definition preserved by Aulus Gellius, *Lib. 10. Cap. xi.* "Est quod neque citius neque serius est: sed medium quiddam et temperatum." This author has given a very ingenious and just discussion upon the adverb "Mature," in the place now quoted.

"Successor tuus non potest ita *maturare* ullo modo, ut tu me in Asia possis convenire."—CIC. *Ep. Fam. 28. a.* *Maturare*, here, insinuates that the prudent acceleration mentioned, while consistent with due attention to business, might also make the times, at which Cicero and Sallustius could be in Asia, accord. "Quæ causa, consuli cunctandi, eadem Gallis rei *maturandæ* erat."—LIV. 34. 46. The two verbs, in this sentence, are beautifully opposed. There might, on the one hand, be an excess in that slowness, which is characteristic of the first, and, on the other, of that expedition in business, which marks the second.

Frigidus agricolam si quando continet imber,
 Multa forent quæ mox cœlo *properanda* sereno,
 "Maturare" datur.———VIRG. *Georg. 1. 259.*

Gellius's note upon the poet's art in this passage needs no commentary, and must recommend itself. "Duo ista verba, "properare" et *maturare*, tanquam plane contraria, scitissime separavit, in hisce versibus. Namque in præparatu rei rusticæ, per tempestates, pluvias, quoniam otium est, *maturari* potest; per serenas, quoniam tempus instat, "properari" necesse est."—AUL. GELL. 10. 11.

FIGURA, FORMA,

agree, in referring to the manner, in which the surfaces of bodies, tangible and visible, terminate, and to the relation which their different extremities bear to each other. FIGURA, however, relates to the arbitrary termination of surfaces, without regard to any genus to which the bodies presenting them are understood to belong. "Forma," again, always supposes a defined shape, by which, as a pattern, certain individuals, though deviating slightly from each other, are held together as a genus. The varieties of which *Figura* is susceptible, from the possible combinations of bounding lines, differing in length and in curvature, are infinite; those of "Forma," on the other hand, are limited by necessary approximations to a standard.

That the Romans understood there was intention in the agent, who imparted both qualities to matter, is evident from what Varro says of the terms. "Fictor, cum dicit, Fingo, *figuram* imponit; cum dicit, Informo, "formam."—VARRO *de Ling. Lat. L. 5.*

He "qui fingit," or "dat *figuram*," then, is supposed to act from intention, and follows a pattern existing only in his own imagination. The rudest mass, accordingly, to which *figura* is applied, is not understood to have taken its shape fortuitously. Its surface is supposed to terminate according to the will of the Creator, though it terminates in a way peculiar to itself.

FORMA is a less general term than "Figura." The latter is the inseparable concomitant of matter, which the former is not, because it suggests extension, limited by fixed boundaries. Were there but one object in nature, it would possess "Figura," but not *Forma*. If we suppose no plurality of masses, the idea of standard and copy is necessarily destroyed; and, of course, that attribute of divided matter, denoted by *Forma*, must perish along with it.

The definition which Cicero gives of *Forma*, in a figurative sense, is justly applicable to it in its literal. "*Forma est notio cujus differentia ad caput generis, et quasi fontem referri potest.*"—CIC. *Top.* 223. a. Again, he says, "Cum quæritur quæ *forma* et quasi naturalis nota cujusque sit."—*de Orat.* 153. b.

Forma is taken to denote a stamp, among the different impressions of which

the strictest possible similarity must exist. "Omnia facta dictaque tua inter se congruant, et respondeant sibi, ut una *forma* percussa sint."—SENEC. *Ep.* 34. It is also made to express a shoemaker's last, which may differ from others of the same kind, both in size and shape, but still exhibits a pattern, from which there can be no deviation.

Si scalpra et *formas* non sutor, nautica vela
Aversus mercaturis, delirus et amens
Undique dicatur merito.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 106.

There are several passages in Cicero, in which "Figura" and *Forma* are very happily opposed, so as to aid our researches in discovering the power of each. As when he says, "Omnium animantium *formam* vincit hominis "figura."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 11. a. In the interpretation of this sentence, it is to be observed, that the term *Formam* refers to that defined shape, by which every different species of animals, except man, is discriminated. The term "figura," has, indeed, a reference to the shape of the human body; not, however, as exhibiting a standard for a species, but as contradistinguished to the bodies of all other animals, beside man. It refers to no pattern ever exhibited, but to one that pre-existed in the divine mind, before man had any being; and into this were incorporated certain mental powers, which might have been united with a mass of matter differently modelled. Had the place of the two terms compared been reversed, thus, "Omnium animantium "figuram" vincit hominum *forma*," the meaning of the expression would have been altered, and its general precision impaired. The term "Figura" might, with sufficient distinctness, have been applied to the abstract shape which marks any one particular species of animals, opposed to the rest, but not to all the species except that one. In the use made, by Cicero, of *Forma*, it preserves the distinction of the classes, and holds forth the shape, which is characteristic of each, as the subject of comparison with that of man.

Cicero, elsewhere, has the following remarkable sentence. "Hoc dico, non ab hominibus *formæ* "figuram" venisse ad Deos. Non, ergo, illorum humana *forma*, sed nostra divina dicenda est."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 90. The abstract shape, denoted by "Figura," is here very clearly made to characterize

the particular one adopted to mark the species, either of gods or men. The words, "*formam figuræ*," would have involved an absurdity. They would have presented a circumstance, as descriptive of a general term, by means of one more particular than itself.

FILII, FILIÆ— <i>vide</i> LIBERI.	FLAGRARE— <i>vide</i> ARDERE.
FLAGITARE— <i>vide</i> ROGARE.	FLATUS— <i>vide</i> AURA.
FLAGITIUM— <i>vide</i> FACINUS.	FLECTERE— <i>vide</i> CURVARE.

FLERE, VAGIRE, PLORARE, EJULARE, ULULARE, PLANGERE, agree, in denoting the expression of grief, or mental distress, by natural signs, but differ in respect, either to the nature of the sign itself, to the age or sex of the person using it, or to the degree in which it is manifest. FLERE, which seems equivalent to "*lacrymari*," denotes to weep, or to express sorrow, by the shedding of tears.

Ut flerent oculos erudiere suos.—OVID. *Rem. Am.* 690.

Flendo turgiduli rubent ocelli.—CAT. *Car. 3. ad finem.*

Uxor amans flentem, flens acrius ipsa tenebat.—OVID. *Trist.* 1. 3. 17.

Flere has no reference to the age of the person who weeps, and suggests nothing but the fact, that water comes from the eyes, as the natural sign of grief. "*Pedibus manibusque devinctis jacet flens animal, cæteris imperaturum.*" PLIN. *de Hom. Lib. 57. Præf.* In the above passage, the helplessness of the infant, as contrasted with the power he is afterwards to assume, is very beautifully painted.

VAGIRE differs from *Flere*, in referring to expressions of distress given by infants, whether they shed tears when they cry, or not. "*Et si quis Deus mihi largiatur, ut ex hac ætate reperuiscam, et in cunis vagiam.*"—CIC. *de Sen.* 94. a. "*Natura hominem nudum, et in nuda humo, natali die abjicit ad vagitus statim et "ploratum," et sic a suppliciis homo vitam auspicatur.*"—PLIN. *Lib. 7. Præf.*

Tutus ut infanti vagiat ore puer.—OVID. *Fast.* 4. 207.

PLORARE agrees with "*Vagire*," in denoting an expression of grief, by

means of cries, accompanied with tears, but differs from it, in not being confined to infants. The act implied in this verb was understood to be unmanly, and such as was pardonable only in women and children.

Heu virginelem me ore *ploratum* edere,
Quem vidit nemo ulli ingemiscentem malo.—CIC. *Tusc.* 179. b.

“Date puero panem, ne *ploret.*”—QUINCT. 6. I. 46. “Omnia passim mulierum puerorumque *plorantibus* sonant.”—LIV. 29. 17. “Nec sicci sint oculi amisso amico, nec fluant: lacrymandum est, non *plorandum.*”—SEN. *Epist.* 64.

EJULARE differs from “Plorare,” only in denoting a degree of lamentation more extravagant, and such as shews itself in women during the depth of distress.

— Hercules toto jacet
Mundo gemendus: fata ne, mater, tua
Privata credas: jam genus totum obstrepit.
Hunc, *ejulatu* quem gemis, cuncti gemunt.
Commune terris omnibus pateris malum.—SEN. *Herc. Œteus.* 758.

“Ipsum enim Herculem viderat in Œta magnitudine dolorum *ejulantem.*”—CIC. *Tusc.* 178. b. The fancy of poets is here said to be devising what could never be seen, a hero sinking under his distress, the extravagance of which is overpowering his reason. From a passage in Cicero, it appears, that the *Ejulatus* was held reproachful, even to women, and, of course, pardonable only in children. “In dolore maxime est providendum, ne quid abjecte, ne quid timide, ne quid serviliter, muliebriterve faciamus. “Ingemiscere” nonnunquam viro concessum est, idque raro: *ejulatus* ne mulieri quidem.”—CIC. *Tusc.* 187. a.

ULULARE, from the Greek verb Ολολυζω, and signifying to howl, differs from the former verbs, in supposing the cries adopted as the signs of grief, though adopted by the human species, to resemble those of certain brutes, such as dogs and wolves.

— visæque canes *ululare* per umbram,
Adventante Dea.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 257.
Per noctem resonare lupis *ululantibus* urbes.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 486.

From originally denoting the cries of wild animals, *Ululare* has been transferred to those of human beings, that are also natural signs of distress. “*Inclinata ululantiq̄ue voce, more Asiatico, canere.*—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 199. a.

The *Ululatus* used by the human species was not always expressive of distress in those who raised it, but often intended to excite terror in others. “*Cantus ineuntium prælium et ululatus.*”—LIV. 31. 17. “*Terribili Marte ulularent.*”—PLIN. 26. 4. It was sometimes intended to express joy, and to raise it in others by sympathy.

— *lætis ululare triumphis.*—LUCAN. 6. 261.

Liber adest, festisque fremunt ululatibus agri.—OVID. *Met.* 3. 528.

PLANGERE differs from all the verbs mentioned, in having no reference to sounds emitted, or tears shed, as the signs of grief, but to blows given the body. In its original meaning, it expressed blows, by whatever given or received, and was afterwards applied to a natural sign of intemperate grief.

Plangens moribundo vertice terram.—OVID. *Met.* 12. 118.

— *quanto planguntur littora fluctu.*—OVID. *Her.* 19. 121.

Aut ubi suspensam vestem, chartasve volantes,

Verberibus venti versant, planguntque per auras.—LUCRET. 6. 113.

In the above instances, *Plangere* denotes a general beating, any how given: in those that follow, again, it denotes strokes given one's self during violent grief. “*Funus sparsis prosequi crinibus, et nudatum pectus in conspectu frequentiæ plangere.*”—PETRON. *A.* 3.

Parce precor lacrymis, sævo nec concute planctu

Pectora.—STAT. *Silv.* 5. 1. 179.

Lamentis, gemituque, et fœmineo ululatu

Tecta fremunt, resonat magnis plangoribus æther.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 667.

— *Planxitque suos furibunda lacertos.*—OVID. *Met.* 9. 635.

FLUERE, MANARE,

agree, in denoting the natural motion of fluids downwards, but differ as that motion may be violent or gentle, broken or continued. FLUERE denotes a motion in water, analogous to that denoted by “Flare” in air, though

the causes of the motion in each are different. "Flumina in contrarias partes fluxerunt: atque in annes mare influxit."—CIC. *de Div.* 96. b. Here the motion of the different waters was violent and broken, during the earthquake. "Chrysas est amnis, qui per Assorinorum agros fluit."—CIC. *in Ver.* 222. b. Here, nothing more is suggested by *Fluere*, than the calm and unbroken course of a river, not more agitated than common. *Fluere* may, besides, be applied, figuratively, to solid bodies falling, because unsupported. "Excident gladii, fluent arma de manibus."—CIC. *pro Mur.* 240. b. It also denotes, figuratively, the destruction of that which it is applied to. "Fluit igitur voluptas corporis, et prima quoque avolat, sæpiusque relinquit causas poenitendi quam recordandi."—CIC. *Fin.* 17.

Ex illo fluere, ac retro sublapsa referri
Spes Danaüm. ———— VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 169.

MANARE differs from "Fluere," in denoting a motion that is never violent, nor subject to sudden interruptions. It supposes the current to be moderate and gradual, like the supply, and rejects certain figurative applications, attached to "Fluere." The latter verb never refers to a fluid thinner than water, while *Manare* may be applied to air. "Qui aer per maria manat, is est Neptunus."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 10. a. "Tum ea quæ natura "fluerent" atque manarent, ut et aquam, et terram, et aera."—CIC. *Ibid.* The motion of "aqua" alone is common to both verbs, and "terra" is peculiar to "Fluere," and "aer" to *Manare*. "Multa a luna manant et "fluunt" quibus animantes alantur augescantque."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 2. 19. That a distinction exists between the verbs, is clear from Cicero's use of them. It may be supposed, that this effluence from the moon, being not all of the same nature, proceeded from its source in different ways.

The slowness of the motion denoted by *Manare*, appears strongly in the four following examples. "Arborum succo manantium picem resinamve, aliæ ortæ in oriente, aliæ in Europa feruntur."—PLIN. 14. 20.

Mella cava manant ex ilice. ———— HOR. *Epod.* 16. 47.
—— tepidæ manant ex arbore guttæ. ———— OVID. *Met.* 10. 500,
De nive manantis more liquescit aquæ. ———— OVID. *Pont.* 1. 1. 68.

Any interruption of the current is inconsistent with the pure use of the verb. "Homines qui terram incolunt interruptos ita esse, ut nihil inter ipsos ab aliis ad alios *manare* possit."—CIC. *Som. Scip.* 129. b. "*Manavit* hoc malum non solum per Italiam, sed etiam transcendit Alpes."—CIC. *in Cat.* 119. b. The figurative application of each of the terms justifies what is said of their primitive power. A report is said, by Cicero, *Manare*, and an intemperate person, "Fluere mollitia." The former spreads itself, without being opposed, or even perceived; the latter breaks through every restraint, in pursuing his selfish indulgences. "Quum tristis a Mutina fama *manaret*."—CIC. *in Ant.* 261. a. "Cum voluptate molles liquescimus, "fluimusque" mollitia."—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 186. a.

FÆNUS—*vide* USURA.

FÆTUS, PULLUS, CATULUS, HINNULUS,

agree, in denoting the young of animals, but differ, in respect to the nature of the animals to which each is applicable. FÆTUS, which comes from Φωω, is generic, and applicable to all animal and vegetable productions, as they come into existence. "Hæc omnia sunt opera providæ solertisque naturæ; quæ multiplices *fætus* procreant, ut sues, ut canes, his mammarum data est multitudo."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 52. a. The term *Fætus*, thus applicable to the young of animals of one description, is applicable to that of every other. It applies equally to oviparous as viviparous animals. "Ova piscium facile aqua et sustinentur, et *fætum* fundunt."—CIC. *Ibid.*

— alix, spem gentis, adultos
Educunt *fætus*. ————— VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 162.

Though the ancients were mistaken as to many facts respecting bees, yet they seem to have understood that they were generated by means of eggs.

Fætus is equally applicable to vegetable productions. "Nec solum ea quæ frugibus atque baccis terræ *fætu* profunduntur, sed etiam pecudes."—CIC. *de Legg.* 161. a.

Arborei *fætus* alibi, atque injussa virescunt
Gramina. ————— VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 55.

“Ager novatus et iteratus, quò meliores *fætus* possit et grandiores edere.”—CIC. *de Orat.* 120. b. It is figuratively applied to the productions of mind. “Ex quo triplex ille animi *fætus* existet.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 241. b. “Nec ulla ætate uberior oratorum *fætus* erat.”—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 181. a.

PULLUS agrees with “Fœtus,” in being applicable to the young of every animal, but differs from it, in expressing vegetable productions only of a certain kind, and in not being taken, figuratively, to express the productions of mind. It appears, however, to have been originally applied to chicks, or the young of fowls.

Quatenus in *pullos* animaleis vertier ova.—LUCRET. 2. 926.
Nos viles *pulli* nati infelicibus ovis.—JUV. 13. 142.

From the affection with which the hen protects her young, it is figuratively applied to a child that requires more than usual attention upon the part of a parent.

—— strabonem
Appellat pætum pater, et *pullum* male parvus
Si cui est filius.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 3. 44.

It has afterwards come to denote the young of all animals indiscriminately.

Nec tam doctus equæ *pullus*, quam fortis equi vis.—LUCRET. 3. 763.
Absentis ranæ *pullis* vituli pede pressis.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 314.

Pullus, it has been observed, never denotes the fruits of the earth, whether growing upon a tree or a stalk. The only vegetable production, to which it is ever applied, is the sucker, which hurts the tree from whose root it springs. “Ab arbore, abs terra *pulli* qui nascentur eos in terram deprimito.”—CATO, 51.

Pullulat ab radice aliis densissima sylva:
Ut cerasis ulmisque.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 17.

CATULUS differs from the two former terms, in being more generally confined to the young of a particular species of animals, and in expressing

vegetable productions of no kind whatever. It, besides, like "Pullus," is never taken, figuratively, to express the productions of mind.

Catulus is said, by Varro, to be a corruption of "Canis," and properly signifies a "puppy."

Sic canibus *catulos* similes, sic matribus hædos.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 1. 23.

"Chrysippus docet omnia in perfectis et maturis esse meliora, ut in equo quam in equulo, in cane quam in *catulo*."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 33. b.

Though *Catulus* is very frequently applied to the young of the canine race, yet it is also applied to the young of many other animals. Phædrus uses it in respect to kittens; Virgil, to the cubs of lions and to young serpents; and Pliny, to the spawn and young of fishes.

Felique et *catulis* largam præbuerunt dapem.—PHÆD. 2. 4. 24,

Tempore non alio *catulorum* oblita læena

Sævior erravit campis.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 245.

— aut *catulos* tectis, aut ova relinquens

Arduus ad solem, et linguis micat ore trisulcis—*Ibid.* 438.

"Delphini agunt fere conjugia, pariunt *catulos* decimo mense, æstivo tempore."—PLIN. 10. 72.

HINNULUS differs from all the above terms, in being limited in its application to the young of one species of animals only; that is, the Stag. It is sometimes written *Hinnuleus*, and is so used by Horace;

Vitas *hinnuleo* me similis, Chloe,

Quærenti pavidam montibus aviis

Matrem, non sine vano

Aurarum et sylvæ metu.—*Car.* 1. 23. 1.

The ancients also applied it to a mule, the progeny of a horse, and a she ass. "Qui ex equo et asina concepti generantur, quamvis a patre nomen traxerint, quod *hinni* vel *hinnuli* vocantur, matri per omnia magis similes sunt."—COLUM. 6. 37.

FORMA—*vide* FIGURA.

FORTE, FORTASSE,

agree, in denoting contingency in some event; but the former refers to one that is known, as being past or present, while the latter suggests what may or may not be, as being entirely future. Both come from "Fors," as their common root; the first being the ablative of that substantive, and the last a compound of it with the verb "Esse." "*Forte* evenit ut in Privernati essemus."—CIC. *de Or.* 129.

Ibam *forte* via sacra, sicut meus est mos.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 9. 1.

Forte sub arguta consererat ilice Daphnis.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 7. 1.

All the events, in the above three examples, might, or might not, have been; but all were past, and had actually taken place.

— interea inter mulieres

Quæ ibi aderant, *forte* unam aspicio adoluscentulam.—TER. *And.* 1. 1. 90.

Simo states an event which took place during the funeral, but which, at the same time, was altogether contingent.

Forte, then, is an adverb equal to "Casu," and signifying "by chance." It supposes the reality of the event, as having been, or as being; but, at the same time, implies, that it is contingent or accidental.

When *Forte* comes before a verb in the subjunctive mood, this mood is adopted in consequence of a preceding conjunction; and the casual nature of the event is neither influenced nor announced by the adverb.

Si quis *forte* velit puerum tibi vendere natum.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 2.

Ne quis *forte* internuncius clam a milite ad istam curset.—TER. *Eun.* 2. 2. 56.

There are times, however, when, after a conjunction, the indicative is more properly adopted than the subjunctive, when the reality of the fact, only supposed, is insinuated. "Si quis vestrûm *forte* miratur."—CIC. *in Ver.* 55. a.

FORTASSE differs from "Forte," in implying, that the event is future, and that, as such, the speaker is uncertain as to its nature.

Si curant igitur cunctos punire nocentes,

Quando ad me venient, sed et exorabile numen

Fortasse experiar. — JUV. 13. 101.

The event is here future, and it is the chance only of forgiveness hereafter that can cheer the culprit. “*Quæ res tamen fortasse aliquem reciperet casum.*”
CÆS. Bel. Civ. 3. 51.

In the passage before quoted from Terence, Simo says,

— interea inter mulieres
Quæ ibi aderant, “forte” unam aspicio adolescentulam
 Forma.

and Sosia goes on,

— *fortasse bona.*—*TER. And. 1. 1. 90.*

The event stated by Simo was present; but the fact, respecting the beauty of this young woman, might, or might not, be. Sosia supposes her beautiful; but her looks might have been indifferent, and even bad. The real contingency, then, is expressed by “Forte,” and the possible by *Fortasse*.

Fortasse is sometimes joined with an indicative mood, and has a seeming reference to an actual contingency, like that expressed by “Forte.” This, however, when analysed, will appear to be only a possible event; and the possibility will be found to exist in the adverb itself, and to respect a matter which the speaker cannot determine.

— *tu fortasse quæ facta hic sint, nescis.*—*TER. Eun. 5. 8. 31.*

This may be resolved, “Forte esset ut” *tu nescias quæ facta sint hic.* “It may be that you are ignorant,” &c. Had the expression been “*tu forte nescis,*” the meaning would have been different, and equal to “you by chance are ignorant.” “*Raras tuas quidem, fortasse non perferuntur, sed suaves accipio literas.*”—*CIC. Ep. Fam. 2. 5.* “Forte” esset ut non perferantur:” “They are perhaps not brought forward.” Had it been “Forte non perferuntur,” an unlucky event would have been positively announced, namely, that the letters had been lost on the way. “Fortasse,” “Forsit,” “Forsitan,” and “Forsan,” are not synonymous, but equivalent, terms.

FORTITUDO—*vide* AUDACIA.

FRAGOR—*vide* SONUS.

FRANGERE, RUMPERE,

agree, in denoting the destruction of continuity in the parts of a substance, but differ, in respect to the manner in which the violence, which destroys it, is applied. The first supposes, that the body, receiving the blow, yields to it from its friability, and goes to pieces. It matters not, likewise, whether the body fractured gives or receives the impulse by which it is broken.

— si patinam pede lapsus *frangat* agaso.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 8. 72.

This vessel might have been broken by a rash stroke from the servant, as well as by his falling and dashing it upon the floor. “*Milvo est quoddam bellum quasi naturale cum corvo. Ergo alter alterius, ubicunque nactus est, ova frangit.*”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 51. a. This mutual antipathy, between the kite and the raven, led each to do the same mischief to the other, when an opportunity occurred. “*Adamas in parvas frangitur crustas.*”—PLIN. 37. 4. In all the instances now produced, the fracture, whether from intention or otherwise, is the only circumstance to which the notice of the person spoken to is called. The body, receiving the impulse, undergoes a change by the dissolution of its parts; but that, which gives it, continues as it was.

Frangere is applied to masses of water, the parts of which are separated, as well as to solids. “*Fluctus a saxo frangitur.*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 9. 16.

— cum se tollentibus Euris

Frangentem fluctus scopulum ferit.—LUCAN. 6. 265.

The fracture in fluids arises from the momentary separation of their component parts, though these parts naturally form a mass as complete as if they had never been asunder.

RUMPERE differs from “*Frangere*,” in suggesting, not merely a fracture, but some purpose effected, or change produced, in consequence of it. It refers to one power acting against another with success, and is properly translated “to burst.”

— aqua tendit *rumpere* plumbum.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 10. 20.

The contending powers, here, are the tenacity of the lead, and the pressure

of the water. If the latter preponderated, the leaden pipe must of necessity burst.

Progenies stimulantē fame festinat ad illam,
Quam primum *rupto* prædam gustaverat ovo.—JUV. *Sat.* 14. 84.

The animal, just hatching, breaks the shell with a view to relieve itself. The operation by which the raven and the kite, mentioned in a former instance, broke each others eggs, is the same with that here ascribed to the chicken; but the intention is different. When the enmity of the former animals is gratified by the fracture, the power of the verb “Frangere” ceases. But *Rumpere* goes farther, and suggests the change, produced by the fracture, to the being effecting it.

This last verb refers equally to efficient force directed inwardly and outwardly.

— viribus ensis adactus,
Transadigit costas et candida pectora *rupit*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 431

It is not needful, likewise, in the pure use of *Rumpere*, that there should be a completely inclosed space, “into,” or “out of,” which a person breaks. It refers to confinement anyhow effected; as, by the rope which moors the ship, or the chain by which the felon is tied to a post. “Cæsar adjungit gravem pœnam municipibus, si quis eorum vincula *ruperit*.”—CIC. *in Cat.* 119. b.

Rupimus invitæ tua vincula, teque per æquor
Quærimus. ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 233.

— quæ bellua *ruptis*
Cum semel effugit, reddit se prava catenis?—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 7. 70.

In their figurative meanings, the two verbs often agree; as when they signify to “destroy,” or “annul.” “Contumelia non “fregit” eum, sed erexit.”—NEP. *in Themist. C.* 1. “Constat agnoscendo *rumpi* testamentum.”—CIC. *de Or.* 107. a.

FREMITUS—*vide* SONUS.

FREQUENS, CREBER,

agree, in denoting the quick repetition of similar events. The former, how-

ever, occasionally supposes the succession to be so quick, that the events become simultaneous, while the latter, requiring the succession to be slower, supposes the individuality of each to be distinctly preserved. "Saltus castulonensis nunc *frequentioribus* latrociniiis infestior factus est."—CIC. *Ep.* 163. a. Events, that occurred often, are here said to occur oftener. Each, at the same time, was distinct; and the succession of robberies might have been expressed by *Creber*. "Iambum et trochæum *frequentem* segregat ab oratione Aristoteles."—CIC. *de Orat.* 159. a. Those feet, different in their nature, were kept distinct from each other, before the change said to be introduced by Aristotle. "Nos etiam in hoc genere *frequentes*, ut illa sunt in quarto accusationis."—CIC. *Orat.* 213. a. "Venis in senatum *frequens*."—CIC. *de Sen.* 84. b.

Though both *Frequens* and *Creber* imply, that the events they qualify recur at short intervals, yet it is understood, that the times which separate them are unequal, or at least unspecified. "Eo tempore Roscius erat Romæ *frequens*, atque in foro, et in ore omnium quotidie versabatur."—CIC. *pro S. R.* 21. a. "In levioribus peccatis quæ magis *crebra*, et prope quotidiana sunt."—CIC. *Ep.* 198. b.

In all the above instances, the events, qualified by *Frequens*, are held forth as distinct, and following in succession. In those that are subjoined, again, they are not consecutive, but simultaneous; and the term *Frequens* suggests the idea of multitude, from the number of similar events seen to take place at one time, and, of course, in one place.

— locus piceis ilicibusque *frequens*.—OVID. *Heroid.* 16. 54.

"Senatus continuo est convocatus, *frequensque* convenit."—CIC. *Epist.* 151. a. In this instance, the adjective denotes the number of senators assembled in the house. The perception of each, as present, is regarded as a distinct event, and, from the number of such simultaneous perceptions, is inferred the multitude of the assembled objects that excite them.

CREBER differs from "Frequens," in supposing the events to be always coming in succession; and, of course, it can never signify multitude. No

such expression as *Creber Senatus*, as denoting a throng house, is ever to be met with. The event denoted by *Creber* may recur at the shortest possible interval; but it is always insulated, and kept apart from that which is prior and posterior to it in the train. "*Crebri e cœlo cecidere lapides.*"—LIV. 1. 31. However rapid the succession in the fall of the different stones might be, that of each presented a separate event.

Percussa crebro saxa cavantur aquis.—OVID. *ex Pont.* 7. 40.

We find in Plautus the expression "*Crebro salicto oppletus lucus.*"—*Aulul.* 4. 6. 9. According to the account given of *Creber*, this appears impure, as the notion of fulness should seem better expressed by "*Frequens*," which takes the mind off from marking the individuality of single objects, and turns it to the group. Still, however, the compound of "*Pleo*," with "*ob*," originally refers to the interruption of a person moving, who feels retarded by each object forming the *Crebritas*. Thus, in Livy, we read of the effect of snow. "*Nives omnia "oppleverant,"* 10. 46. "*Videres referta tuta et laborantia, "oppletas" undique vias.*"—PLIN. *Pan.* 22. The nature of the verb, then, may in some degree save Plautus from the charge of impurity in his use of the adjective; and this use may be reconciled with the general distinction laid down, as to the contrasted terms.

"*Venæ crebræ, multæque toto corpore intextæ.*"—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 54. a. The opposition here made between *Crebræ* and "*Multæ*," seems to support the definition given of the former. When the veins occur in such numbers, as either not to be all seen at once, or not easily discriminated, they are styled "*Multæ*;" but when they appear in a discrete form, and within a surface such as the eye can comprehend, they are styled *Crebræ*. "*Thucydides omnes dicendi artificio meo iudicio facile vicit, qui ita creber est rerum "frequentia," ut verborum prope numerum sententiarum numero consequatur.*"—CIC. *de Orat.* 113. b. This talent of the historian, in the way of detail and of description, is happily described. *Creber* denotes the frequent recurrence of those strokes by which his genius shews itself, and "*Frequentia*" an assemblage of circumstances seen at once, and fraught with information to every intelligent

reader. By the former term, there is a reference to such a quick suggestion of consecutive events, as will furnish variety; and, by the latter, to the simultaneous existence of such as form the designed group, from which entertainment and instruction may be drawn.

FUGAX, FUGITIVUS,

agree, in denoting a runaway, but differ in respect to the principle upon which the person so called acts. Both come from "Fugere;" and the first supposes that the person flying is stimulated by fear, and flies from what he apprehends to be immediate danger.

Mors et *fugacem* persequitur virum.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 2. 14.

At juvenis vicisse dolo ratus, avolat ipse,

Haud mora conversisque *fugax* aufertur habenis,

Quadrupedemque citum ferrata calce fatigat.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 712.

In both the above instances, the flier acts under the immediate impression of strong fear.

FUGAX is figuratively applied to things that are inanimate, and in their nature transient. Though void of the sense of danger, they resemble animals under the immediate influence of it. "Res *fugax* ac lubrica tempus."—SEN. *Epist.* 1. "Hæc brevia, *fugacia*, et caduca existima."—CIC. *Epist.* 151. b.

—ventis, volucrique *fugacior* aura.—OVID. *Met.* 13. 807.

Eheu, *fugaces*, Posthume, Posthume,

Labuntur anni!—HOR. *Car.* 2. 14. 1.

FUGITIVUS differs from "Fugax," in supposing that the flier quits the place he occupied, in consequence of some deliberate purpose, and not from the impulse of fear. The latter acts from the press of the moment, the other from a conviction that it will be better for him to be elsewhere than where he is. Slaves were often disposed to run from their masters; and they did so, from various motives. The misery of their situation might be nearly the same anywhere; but still they expected relief from a change. To prevent their running off, they were often fettered, which practice Plautus condemns.

Homines captivos, qui catenis vinciunt,
 Et qui *fugitivis* servis induunt compedes,
 Nimis stulte faciunt, mea quidem sententia.—*Men.* 1. 1. 3.

“Neque tam *fugitivi* illi a dominis, quam tu a jure et legibus.”—*Cic. in Ver.* 226. b. In all cases, the beings quitting their station never mean to resume it. This appears, both in the literal and figurative uses of *Fugitivus*. “Apes fiunt *fugitivæ*.”—*Var. R. R.* 3. 16.

Gaudia non remeant, sed *fugitiva* volant.—*Mart.* 7. 46.

FURERE—*vide* DELIRARE.

FUSCUS—*vide* ATER.

FUROR—*vide* INSANIA.

GAUDIUM, LÆTITIA.

agree, in denoting joy, but differ in respect to the degree, and the cause of its excitement, and to the manner in which it shews itself. *GAUDIUM* refers to an emotion that is calm and steady, and that arises from a sense of something good to the mind that perceives it. *Lætitia*, again, refers to one less temperate, and that arises from some external cause, in which others may be concerned. “Nam cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud *gaudium* dicitur. *Lætitia* ut adepta jam aliquid concupitum, effertur et gestit. Cum autem inaniter et effuse animus exsultat, tum illa *lætitia* gestiens, vel nimia dici potest; quam ita definiunt, sine ratione animi elationem.”—*Cic. Q. Tusc.* 212. a. “Atque ut confidere decet, timere non decet, sic quidem *gaudere* decet, *lætari* non decet, quoniam docendi causa a *gaudio lætitiâ* distinguimus.”—*Cic. Ibid.* 224. a. “Quem tamen esse natum et nos *gaudemus*, et hæc civitas dum erit, *lætabitur*.”—*Cic. de Am.* 98. a. *Lælius* employs the two verbs here in a way strictly consonant, both with classical purity, and also with the dignity of himself, and those whom he addressed. From their connection with Africanus, their joy was personal, when they reflected on the merits of so distinguished a relation; and the old man also conceives, that it became their

feelings to be more temperate than those of the herd of citizens, who would rejoice in doing honour to his memory.

GELIDUS, EGELIDUS,

agree, in denoting objects as not in a state of heat, but differ, in respect to the distance of each from that state. The first term, from "Gelu," applies to water, that is either frozen, or just at the freezing point.

—— id venti curant, *gelidæque* pruinae,
Et labefacta movens robustus jugera fossor.——VIRG. *G.* 2. 263.

The adjective, here, specifies the dew actually congealed, and in the form of hoar-frost. "Fibrenus statim præcipitat in Lirem, eumque multo *gelidiorem* facit: nec enim ullum hoc frigidius flumen attingi, cum ad multa accesserim, ut vix pede tentare id possim."—CIC. *de Fin.* 170. b. "Ægri morbo gravi, si aquam *gelidam* biberint, primo relevari videntur."—CIC. *in Cat.* 103. b. In both the last instances, it is clear, that the cold water, specified by *Gelidus*, is in a fluid state.

The poets apply *Gelidus*, also, to solids, that are cold, and have taken the temperature of the frosty air around them.

Protinus Arcadiæ *gelidos* invisere fines.——VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 159.
—— atque rigere
Frigore, cum in summo *gelidi* cubat æquore saxi.——LUCRET. 3. 904.
—— et *gelida* monstrat sub rupe lupercal.——VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 343.

EGELIDUS differs from "Gelidus," in denoting a diminution of the cold implied in the latter, or a step in the progress towards heat. Servius has given it a contrary meaning, and made it to denote a higher degree of cold than "Gelidus," in his commentary on *Æn.* 8. 610. "Ut procul *egelido* secretum flumine vidit." Any thing beyond the cold implied in the simple adjective, would suppose a severity in the temperature of the water, that could not be supposed to exist while the interview between Venus and her son took place, and would necessarily imply, that the river was bound up in ice. Besides, other writers always take it in a contrary meaning, that is, as implying diminished cold, or that degree of heat that approaches to tepid.

Jam ver *egelidos* refert tepores.—CATULL. 46.

Nunc ver *egelidum*, nunc est mollissimus annus.—COLUMEL. 10. 282.

Quid tibi (me miserum !) Zephyros, Eurumque timebo,

Et “gelidum” Boream, *egelidumque* Notum.—OVID. *Am.* 2. 11. 10.

The temperature of these winds is in the proportion of water specified by the respective adjectives. “Unguebatur sæpius, sudabat ad flammam; deinde perfundebatur *egelida* aqua, vel sole multo tepefacta.”—SÆTON. *Aug. C.* 28. By the “aqua *egelida*” is probably meant water from a tepid spring, in opposition to that heated by being exposed to the sun. “Tum et vinum, si tussis non est, potui frigidum dandum: si vero est *egelidum*.”—CELS. 3. 22. In the absence of cough, the physician orders the wine, for his patient, to be in the state “Frigidum,” which is not so cold as “Gelidum.” If there is cough, however, it must be *Egelidum*; that is, of a warmer temperature than either.

GENA—*vide* MALA.

GENS, NATIO,

agree, in denoting a number of people derived from the same blood, born in the same country, and living under the same government, but differ, in respect to the number referred to by each. *Gens* is generic, and may comprehend many *Nationes*. “Nunc de Suevis dicendum est, quorum non una ut Cattorum Tencterorumque *gens*: majorem enim Germaniæ partem obtinent, propriis adhuc *nationibus* nominibusque discreti, quanquam in commune Suevi dicuntur.”—TAC. *Ger.* 38. 1. “Ita *nationis* nomen non *gentis* evaluisse paulatim, ut omnes primum a victore ob metum, mox a seipsis invento nomine Germani vocarentur.”—*Ibid.* 2. 7. “Propior est societas ejusdem *gentis*, *nationis*, linguæ, qua maxime conjunguntur.”—CIC. *de Off.* 1. 17.

Gens is sometimes made to denote the whole human race, and then stands opposed to higher and lower orders of beings. “Quin et *gens hominum* est huic belluæ adversa.”—PLIN. 8. 25.

Gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas.—HOR. *Car.* 2. 2. 6.

GERERE—*vide* AGERE ET FERRE. GLABER—*vide* LÆVIS.

GESTIRE—*vide* SALIRE. GLORIA—*vide* LAUS.

GRACILIS, TENUIS, TERES,

agree, in denoting the absence of thickness in substances, but differ, in respect to the manner in which their thinness is estimated. The first expresses slenderness, or the small proportion which the diameter of a body bears to its length. It seems to have been originally applied to the human form, though afterwards to other substances. Excessive leanness, however, is understood to be an article of dispraise.

In *gracili* macies crimen habere potest.—OVID. *de Rem. Am.* 327.

Haud similis virgo est virginum nostrarum : quas matres student

Demissis humeris esse, vincto pectore, ut *graciles* sient.—TER. *Eun.* 2. 3. 21.

Non mittent *gracilem* Cretes arundinem.—SEN. *Hippol.* 815.

“*Ilicis glans brevior et gracilior.*”—PLIN. 16. 6.

Gracilis is, figuratively, taken to denote what is scanty or feeble. “*Vindemiæ graciles, uberiores tamen quam expectaveram.*”—PLIN. *Ep.* 8. 15.

Si quid forte petam timido *gracilique* libello.—MART. 8. 24.

TENUIS differs from “*Gracilis*,” in not regarding the diameter of substances that approach to a round form, but in referring to the thinness of such as may be a covering to others. It stands opposed to that kind of “*toga*,” which Horace denominates “*Crassa*.”

— et *toga* quæ defendere frigus,

Quamvis *crassa*, queat.—Sat. 1. 3. 14.

It comes from ΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ, “*Tendere*,” and relates to cloth, to bark, and to plates of metal that is ductile or malleable, and suggests their comparative thinness. “*Quo tenue* linum proveniat.”—COL. 2. 10. 17. “*Tenuissimus* cortex.”—PLIN. 12. 14.

— dives quæ munere Dido

Fecerat, et *tenui* telas discreverat auro.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 264.

“*Natura primum oculos membranis tenuissimis* vestivit et sepsit: quas primum perlucidas fecit ut per eas cerni posset, firmas autem ut continerentur.”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 54. b.

The rusty spit, mentioned in Plautus, became thinner the more it was scoured.

Nam hoc quidem pol e robigine, non e ferro factum est ;
Ita quanto magis exterges, rutilum atque *tenuius* fit.—*Rud.* 5. 2. 13.

The thread of the spider is said to be *Tenuis*, from its want of extension in any direction but in that of length.

— nec aranei *tenuia* fila
Obvia sentimus, quando obretimur euntes.—*LUCRET.* 3. 384.

Tenuis is, figuratively, applied to air ; to quantity, when small ; to subtilty of understanding ; and to feebleness of mind, arising from want of courage. “ Athenis *tenuis* cœlum, ex quo etiam acutiores putantur Attici : crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani et valentes.”—*CIC.* *de Fat.* 7.

— *tenui* censu, sine crimine notum.—*HOR.* *Ep.* 1. 7. 56.
Sed tibi plus mentis, tibi cor limante Minerva
Acrius, et *tenuis* finxerunt pectus Athenæ.—*MART.* 6. 64. 16.

“ Animi *tenuis* et infirmi hæc videre esse.”—*CÆS.* *Bel. Civ.* 1. 32.

TERES differs from “*Tenuis*” in the same way that “*Gracilis*” does from it, but supposes, that the body it is applied to is of a round form, and that it is smooth and tapering from one end to the other.

— *teretem* versabat pollice fusum.—*OVID.* *Met.* 6. 22.
Incumbens *tereti* Damon sic cœpit oliva.—*VIRG.* *Ecc.* 8. 16.
Et *teretes* digitos, exiguumque pedem.—*OVID.* *Art. Am.* 1. 622.
— illam *tereti* cervice reflexam
Mulcere alternos, et corpora fingere lingua.—*VIRG.* *Æn.* 8. 633.

In all the above instances, except the first, there is a pliancy, as well as a smoothness, and tapering form in the substance, said to be *Teres* ; in others, again, this pliancy would be a defect, and the term refers only to the fineness of shape.

Brachia et vultum *teretesque* suras
Integer laudo.—*HOR.* *Car.* 2. 4. 21.
— et *tereti* subnectit fibula gemma.—*VIRG.* *Æn.* 5. 313.

Teres is, figuratively, applied to the ear, and then denotes, nice in point of judgment, like a substance smooth and delicately formed, which tries the shape of others to which it is applied. “*Qui teretes aures habent, intelligens-que judicium.*”—CIC. *de Opt. Gen.* 244. a.

— in seipso totus *teres* atque rotundus,
 Externi ne quid valeat per læve morari,
 In quem manca ruit semper fortuna.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 7. 86.

A wise man is encumbered by nothing, and, like a round body thoroughly polished, moves on in his course undisturbed.

GRADI—*vide* IRE.

GRAMMATICUS, GRAMMATISTA,

agree, in referring to persons supposed to be skilled in the science of grammar, but differ, in respect to the degree in which they are accomplished. The first term is applicable to those only who understand their science thoroughly, and whose luminous observations throw light upon the authors they interpret. They are styled, by Seneca, the guardians of the purity of their native tongue; “*Grammatici custodes Latini sermonis.*”—*Epist.* 95. “*Proprie dicti sunt viri eruditissimi atque elegantissimi, non qui grammaticam docerent, sed qui poetas, historicos, oratores interpretarentur ut Donatus, Festus, Nonius, Asconius, et alii qui tabularum Græciæ, antiquitatum Romanarum, legum, omnium denique rerum cognitione et scientia præstiterunt.*”—CORN. NEP. *ap Suet. de Illust. Gram.* 4.

GRAMMATISTA signifies “a smatterer in his science,” who adopts grimace to screen ignorance. “Grammaticum” “absolute,” *grammatistam* “mediocriter” doctum putant.”—SÜET. *de Ill. Gram. C.* 4.

GRATUS, GRATIOSUS—*vide* JUCUNDUS.

GREMIUM—*vide* SINUS.

GREG, ARMENTUM,

agree, in denoting an assemblage of animals that keep together from instinct, but differ, in respect to the kind of the animals associated. When the former

is opposed to the latter term in the classics, it is made to comprehend the whole of those animals expressed by "Pecus"; that is, such as are tamed and fed for the use of man. To the larger animals, the word *Armentum* is applied. Thus, Virgil, after he had treated of oxen and horses, says,

Hæc satis *armentis* : superat pars altera curæ
 Lanigeros agitare *greges*, hirtasque capellas.—*Georg.* 3. 286.
 Mille *greges* illi, totidemque *armenta* per herbas
 Pascebant.—OVID. *Met.* 4. 635.
 Non ego sum pastor : non hic *armenta gregesve*.—*Ibid.* 1. 513.

But though the words *Grex* and *Armentum* are often opposed, as now stated, so as to put them in the relation of synonymous words, yet they are not so always. The former, as a generic term, frequently comprehends the latter as its species, by which means their strict relation, as synonymes, is destroyed. "Quid ergo, inquis, acturus es? Idem quod pecudes quæ dispulsæ, sui generis sequuntur *greges* : ut bos *armenta*, sic ego bonos viros sequar."—*Cic. Ep. Att.* 7. 7. As the term "Pecudes" comprehends all animals of a certain description, both great and small, so *Grex* is here made to denote the respective assemblages of the whole, and *Armentum* those only of oxen. "Cædit *greges armentorum* reliquique pecoris quodcunque nactus est."—*Cic. Philip.* 3. 31. Were the one term substituted for the other, as in the expression "*Armenta gregum*," all meaning would be destroyed. The word *Grex* is, in the above instance, taken to signify assemblages of every kind of cattle, and *Armentum* limits them to those of cattle of the larger sort. But though the expression "*Armenta gregum*" is inadmissible, a commutation of terms, we find, is supported by Cicero's authority. The generic power of *Grex* makes it denote assemblages in general; that of "Pecus," in the neuter, extends to assemblages of cattle of all kinds; and from these, by the specific power of *Armentum*, are substracted those of the largest species. Columella says of the ass, "Tardius deficit quam ullum aliud *armentum*."—7. 1. 2. By this he means, that the ass surpasses, in one respect, every other gregarious animal belonging to the larger class of beasts employed in the work of husbandry. "Tauros in *gregem* redigo."—*VAR. de R. R.* 2. 5. Virgil says of a bullock,

Aut aliquam in magno sequitur grege.—*Ecc.* 6. 55.

Grex, besides, differs from *Armentum* in this respect, that it is applied to companies of every species of animals that have a propensity to associate. In the following instances, it is applied to those of men and of fowls. “In his *gregibus* omnes aleatores, omnes adulteri, omnes impuri, impudicique versantur.”—CIC. *in Cat.* 1. 23.

Scribe tui *gregis* hunc, et fortem crede bonumque.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 9. 13.

Ne si forte suas repetitum venerit olim

Grex avium plumas.—IBID. 1. 3. 19.

“*Grex* anatum et anserum.”—VAR. *R. R.* 3. 10. & 11.

GUBERNARE—*vide* IMPERARE. GULA—*vide* COLLUM.

GUSTARE, SAPERE,

agree, in denoting to taste; but the former has a reference to the palate, which perceives the taste, and the latter, to the substance, that emits it. Both apply equally to meat and to drink, and suppose, that the quantity taken of either may be but small, in order to fulfil the purpose of the person tasting. “*Gustatus*, qui sentire eorum quibus vescimur genera debet, habitat in ea parte oris, qua esculentis et poculentis iter natura patefecit.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 54. b. “*Capræ* dictamnum quærunt: quam cum *gustaverunt*, sagittæ quibus confixæ sunt, excidunt.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 51. a. “*Leporem*, et *gallinam*, et *anserem*, *gustare* fas non putant.”—CÆS. *Bell. Gall.* 5. 12. In the above instances, there is an evident exercise of the organ of taste, by the application of something to it, the nature of which it instantly discerns. The quantity taken may be great or small, and the verb may be, figuratively, applied to immaterial objects, whose nature we wish to explore. “*Qui primoribus labris* genus hoc vitæ *gustant*, et extremis, ut dicitur, *digitis attingunt*.”—CIC. *pro Cæl.* 43. a.

SAPERE differs from “*Gustare*,” in referring to the taste set forth by that, which is applied to the palate, and not to the act of exercising the sense. “*Fici ramulis* *glaciatus caseus* *jucundissime sapit*.”—COLUM. 7. 8.

Qui meminit calidæ sapiat *quid vulvæ popinæ*—JUV. 11. 81.

The substance emitting the taste is sometimes put after the verb in the accusative. “Mella herbam eam *sapiunt*.”—PLIN. II. 8. “Tantum in illis esse fastidium, ut nollent attingere nisi eo die captum piscem, qui, ut aiunt, *saperet* ipsum mare.”—SEN. *Quest. Nat.* 3. 18.

One seemingly irregular use of *Sapere* is produced from Cicero, in which it is made to have the power of *Gustare*, and to suggest the exercise of the sense, not the taste of the substance. “Nec enim sequitur, ut cui cor *sapiat*, ei non *sapiat* palatus.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 69. b. In all probability, the orator has taken the verb in this singular sense, for the sake of a species of wit, in which he chuses sometimes to indulge. When *Sapere* is applied to mind, which it frequently is, it signifies “to be wise.” It implies the exercise of that wisdom and prudence, in the conduct of life, which enables a man to judge correctly as to the nature of those objects that engage his attention at the time, and of those, also, that may do so afterwards.

Isthuc est *sapere*, non quod tibi ante pedes modo est
Videre, sed etiam illa quæ futura sunt
Prospicere. ————— TER. *Adelph.* 3. 3. 32.

This figurative use of *Sapere*, stated with all the simple elegance of Terence, rests upon a metonymy influencing the literal. It supposes, that the person *Sapiens*, like the person “*Gustans*,” exercises a power that discriminates good from evil. As the discovery implied in *Sapere*, literally taken, could never have been made without the act implied in “*Gustare*,” the two appear to be in the relation of cause and effect. The one, accordingly, may, by the figure now mentioned, be put for the other. The mental talent, which Terence defines, is held analogous to the sense of taste, which, when exquisite, catches the slightest differences subsisting among its objects. From this extraordinary use of *Sapere*, then, the truth of the established distinction does not appear to be shaken. The orator, it should seem, meant to be witty, in applying the same word to things so opposite as the heart and the palate. Both thus get a discriminating power, and are said to be equally acute in apprehending and scrutinizing their respective objects.

GUTTUR—*vide* COLLUM.

HABERE, TENERĒ, POSSIDERE,

agree, in denoting possession, but differ, as to the title upon which the possession is founded. The first verb is generic, and refers to every possible mode of tenure. He, who is invested as *Habere* denotes, may have the property either of himself, or of his neighbour; and he may hold it willingly or unwillingly, justly or unjustly. Though the classics have seldom occasion to state the terms in such pointed opposition as the lawyers, yet the practice of the latter is fully justified by that of the former, and the intrinsic power of each term shews clearly, that there has been no impure, or professional, application of it. "His de causis mirabiliter faveo dignitati tuæ, quam mihi tecum statuo *habere* communem."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 10. 3. This property, besides, being divided between Cicero and Plancus, could not, from its nature, as depending on the sentiments of others, be of the most stable kind.

His quoque non passim mundi fabricator *habendum*,
Aera permisit. ————— OVID. *Met.* 1. 57.

This element of air, again, was given by the great Architect, to be used and enjoyed as the absolute property of those, who received it. "Quæ prætor *habuit* sic accepimus, ut omnes res contineantur non solum quæ propriæ illius fuerunt, verum et si quæ apud eum depositæ sunt, vel ei commodatæ, vel pignoratæ, quarumque usum, vel usufructum, vel custodiam *haberet*, vel si ei quæ locatæ sunt; cum enim dicit prætor *habuit*, omnia hæc *habendi* verbo continentur."—ULPIAN. *de vi Arm. L.* 1. § 33.

TENERĒ differs from "Habere," in being limited to a particular mode of tenure, and in supposing, that the connection between the object held and the person holding it is stronger. It is more specific than "Habere," and coming, as we are told, from "Tendere," implies an intention, and a certain exertion,

with a view to retain that which the hand has laid hold of. “Cum pyxidem *teneret* in manu, conaretur tradere, nondum tradidisset.”—CIC. *pro M. Cæl.* 51. a.

Ille *tenens* dextra baculum, clavemque sinistra.—OVID. *Fast.* 1. 99.

“Propterea quod tam longo spatio multa hæreditatibus, multa emtionibus, multa dotibus *tenebantur*.”—CIC. *de Off.* 50. a. In the three passages now produced, those said *Tenere* were in the actual possession of their respective subjects. In the two first, however, the box, the staff, and the nail, may, or may not, have belonged to those who held them; but in the last, what had been acquired by inheritance, by purchase, and by dowry, was their absolute property. With all this latitude in the signification of *Tenere*, it could not, in every case, be substituted for “Habere,” which has still more. “Dionysii equus “habuit” apes in juba.”—CIC. *in Div.* 122. a. The fact, as to the bees being in the mane of the horse, is here distinctly affirmed by “Habere;” but, were *Tenere* put for it, an insinuation would have been made, that the horse had an intention, and tried, to retain the hive there, which certainly was not the case.

POSSIDERE differs from the two former verbs, in supposing, that the person holding has an exclusive right to that which he holds. It comes from “Pro” and “Sedere,” and suggests the possessor as sitting before his property, with a view to secure it. “Philosophi qui omnia sicut propria sua esse, atque a se *possideri* volunt.”—CIC. *de Or.* 103. b. The unbounded ambition of philosophers is here well represented. They are said to claim a sovereignty over every subject in nature, and to suppose, that every thing they are called to explain is, in fact, their own. “Quæque procurator “*tenuerit*,” pro domino *possederit*.”—LIV. 34. The privilege of the procurator went no farther than to the guardianship of the property; but was here extended to the disposal and enjoyment of it. “Bonorum possessio spectatur non in aliqua parte, sed in universis quæ “*teneri*” ac *possideri* possunt.”—CIC. *pro Quinct.* 17. a.

As the verb *Possidere* supposes exclusive right, it is applicable to a master alone, in whom such right can be inherent. The “Servus,” therefore, the “Commodatarius,” or debtor, who was bound to return what he had in loan,

and the "Usufructuarius," might all have been said "Habere" and "Tenere," but never *Possidere*. "Plane si "tenere" sibi licere stipulatus sit servus, utilem esse stipulationem convenit; licet enim *possidere* civiliter non possint, "tenere" tamen eos nemo dubitat."—ULP. *ad Edict.* 49. All the three kinds of possession are suggested in the following sentence. "Quodve tu meum habes," "tenes," *possides*."—FLORENT. *Institut.* 8.

HABITUS, VESTITUS,

agree, in denoting the appearance of a person as depending on circumstances that occasionally alter, but differ, in respect to the circumstances, upon which this diversity of appearance is founded. The power of the first term is so general, as to extend to every possible state of mind, as well as body, and to embrace all the circumstances that can produce changes in each. "*Habitus* in aliqua perfecta et constanti animi aut corporis absolute consistit, quo in genere virtus, scientia," &c.—CIC. *de Inv.* 65. b. "Isque *habitus* animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur."—TAC. *Hist.* I. 28.

Habitus, applied to the body, denotes the state of it, as affected by health, food, or any thing else. "Diversus est ascendentium *habitus* atque descendentium, qui per pronum eunt, resupinant corpora: qui in arduum, incumbunt."—SEN. *Ep.* 123. *ad fin.* "Obsita erat squalore vestis: fœdior corporis *habitus* pallore et macie perempti."—LIV. 2. 23. "Metus est ne in malum *habitus* corpus ejus recidat."—CELS. 2. 7.

As applied to dress, *Habitus* denotes it in the most general sense, without regard to any particular kind or part of it. It is in this view of the term that it is to be considered as synonymous with "Vestitus." The generality of *Habitus* never quits it, though it may be more or less limited in particular applications. "Cum sollenni *habitu* ante portam occurrunt."—LIV. 37. 9. It is to the attire in general, and to no particular part of it, that *Habitus* here refers.

VESTITUS differs from "Habitus," in denoting dress as susceptible of variety, and capable of being divided into different kinds, according to its use

in covering particular parts of the body, and its nature in particular countries. “*Vestitu* calceatuque et cætero “habitu” neque patrio neque civili, ac ne virili quidem ac denique humano semper usus est.”—SÜETON. *Calig.* 52. Those parts of dress, expressed by *Vestitus* and “Calceatus,” are evidently made species of the genus “Habitus,” which comprehends the whole. “Erant duo signa virginali “habitu” atque *vestitu*.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 201. a. The general dress, here mentioned, was such as young women usually wore, and every particular part of it suited its general character. “Is crudelitatem regis in togatos *vestitus* mutatione vitavit: nam soccos habuit et pallium.”—CIC. *pro Rab. Post.* 126. b. Rutilius, in order to avoid the cruelty of Mithridates, laid aside the use of the “Toga,” which was a Roman dress, and put on the “Socci” and “Pallium,” which were worn by the Greeks. In each there was that particularity which is characteristic of “Vestitus.” “In hoc legato vestro nec hominis quidquam est, præter figuram et speciem; neque Romani civis præter “habitu” *vestitumque*, et sonum linguæ Latinæ.”—LIV. 29. 17. By “Habitus” may be here understood the general aspect and appearance of a Roman, founded upon manners, and other circumstances beside dress; by *Vestitus*, again, may be understood the particular garb, such as the “Toga,” by which the subjects of Rome were distinguished from all mankind besides.

HOMO, VIR,

agree, in denoting a human being, but differ, as the former is applicable to both sexes, and the latter only to the male. “At quæ mater? cujus ea stultitia est, ut eam nemo *hominem*; ea vis, ut nemo *foeminam*; ea crudelitas, ut nemo matrem appellare possit.”—CIC. *pro A. Cl.* 59. b. “In unius mulierculæ animula si jactura facta est, tanto opere commoveris? quæ si hoc tempore non suum diem obiisset, paucis post annis tamen ei moriendum fuit: quoniam *homo* nata est.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 50. b.

Censen' *hominem* me esse? erravi.—TER. *Adelph.* 4. 2. 40.

VIR is never applied to the female sex, though “Homo” is to both.

Deque *viro* fias nec “*femina*,” nec *vir*, ut Attys.—OVID. *in Ib.* 457.

“*Viros* avidiores hujus hieme, “*foeminas*” æstate Hesiodus prodidit.”—PLIN. 10. 63.

Both *Vir* and “*Homo*” are sometimes applied to the same man, when different views are taken of his character. Thus, Cicero applies them to Marius, who, when he was about to have one of his legs cut off, refused to be tied. “*Et tamen fuisse acrem morsum doloris, idem Marius ostendit. Crus enim alterum non præbuit. Ita et tulit dolorem, ut vir, et ut “homo” majorem ferre sine causa necessaria noluit.*”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 186. b.

Though *Vir*, when opposed to “*Homo*,” often supposes a merit in the man spoken of, which the latter does not, yet, at times, “*Homo*” is used with propriety as an epithet expressive of respect. “*Ex hoc esse hunc numero quem patres nostri viderunt, divinum “hominem,” Africanum.*”—CIC. *pro Arch. P.* 188. b. Africanus is here opposed, not to those respectable men styled *Viri*, but, being considered as divine, is preferred to the whole human race. The same observations will hold, when the two terms are opposed in the same sentence. “*Ut te hortarer rogaremque, ut et “hominem” et virum esse meminisses, id est, ut et communem incertumque casum sapienter ferres, et dolori fortiter ac fortunæ resisteres.*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 5. 17. “*Probiorem “hominem,” meliorem virum, prudentiorem esse neminem.*”—CIC. *Ibid.* 7. 5. In “*Hominem*” are here comprehended those qualities that may be cultivated, and that characterize the species; and in *Virum*, those talents which distinguish certain individuals, but are not to be acquired.

Among the compounds of “*Homo*” and *Vir*, the same distinction is observed as in the roots. Thus, when Virgil speaks of the cave of the monster Cacus, he says,

“*Semihominis*” Caci facies quam dira tenebat
Solis inaccessam radiis.———*Æn.* 8. 194.

What is said of Cacus, here, refers to his animal nature, as but half human; what is said of those after mentioned, refers to the absence of that spirit which becomes them as men, and entitles them to the appellation. When certain effeminate persons styled, by Livy, “*Molles viri, qui joci causa convivio celebri interfuerant,*” were unjustly accused of having committed

a murder, their exculpation is given thus: "Errare ait qui tam atrocem cædem pertinere ad illos "semiviros" crederent."—LIV. 33. 28.

HORTARI, SUADERE, PERSUADERE, MONERE,

agree, in denoting the act of prompting a person to do something from which he is averse, but differ, in respect to the adopted means by which this aversion is to be removed, or to the effect they produce. The first verb implies, that he, who gives the advice, apprehends, that the person getting it either is ignorant of the value of some object before him, or suspects the danger, or difficulty, to be greater than it is. The intention of the *Hortator*, then, is to excite either courage or hope, or to do both.

— *hortari cæpit eundem*

Verbis, quæ timido quoque possent addere mentem.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 35.

As the courage of this soldier had been proved, the Prætor's chief aim was to satisfy him as to the value of the prize to be won. "*Hortatore non egetis: ipsi enim vestra sponte exarsistis ad libertatis recuperandæ cupiditatem.*"—CIC. *in Ant.* 235. a. Here, there was a sufficient apprehension of the value of liberty, and a degree of courage adequate to the recovery of it. "Iisdem igitur te rebus etiam atque etiam *hortor*, quibus superioribus literis *hortatus sum*: ut in ea republica, quæcunque est, quamprimum velis esse. Multa videbis fortasse, quæ nolis; non plura tamen quam audis."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 54. a. "Quare quid est quod ego te *horter*, ut dignitati et gloriæ servias? proponam tibi claros viros, quod facere solent qui *hortantur.*"—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 133. b.

Virginosque metus levat, *hortaturque* timentem.—OVID. *Met.* 10. 466.

SUADERE differs from "*Hortari*," in supposing, that the good suggested by the adviser is within the reach of the person advised, so that it may be attained without difficulty or danger. The *Suasor*, as well as the "*Hortator*," acts the part of a friend; but the former states his advice only as ministering to the advantage of another, while the latter both allows and extenuates the danger of following it.

Isne tibi melius *suadet*, qui ut rem facias, rem ;
 Si possis recte ; si non, quocunque modo, rem,
 Ut propius spectes lacrymosa poemata Puppi :
 An qui fortunæ te responsare superbæ
 Liberum et erectum præsens *hortatur*, et optat.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 1. 65.

The acquisition of opulence anyhow, is here held forth as both an easy and a safe operation ; but the acquisition of those sentiments, which qualify men for struggling with adverse fortune, is understood to call for bold and steady exertion. The first adviser had only to influence the will of the person addressed ; the last had, besides, to arm him with courage, so as to encounter difficulties that could neither be concealed nor evaded. “ Cum legem Voconianam magna voce et bonis lateribus *suasissem*.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 80. a. He, who was said “ *Suadere* legem,” had only to influence the will of those to whom it was proposed, and it was alike easy to reject and to adopt it.

PERSUADERE differs from “ *Suadere*,” in implying, that the advice given has been accepted, and that the benevolent intentions of the adviser have been completely successful. It has, at the same time, no regard, more than the root, to the opinion, whether sound or otherwise ; but suggests, that, such as it is, it has not been rejected. “ An ego Caio Trebonio *persuasi*, cui ne “ *suadere* ” quidem ausus essem ? ”—CIC. *in Ant.* 165. b. When Cicero could not even offer the advice, it were absurd to suppose that he could press it home, so as to influence the conduct of Trebonius. “ Duo tamen tempora inciderunt quibus aliquid contra Cæsarem Pompeio “ *suaserim*,”—quorum si utrumvis *persuaserim*, in has miseras nunquam incidissemus.”—CIC. *Ibid.* 165. a.

MONERE differs from the two former verbs, in not suggesting the attainment of a future good, but the avoiding a future evil. The *Monitor* is also a friend ; but he effects his purpose by exciting the fear, instead of the hope and the courage, of the person advised. “ *Moneo*, prædico, ante denuntio.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 73. a. “ Nam et *monendi* sæpe amici sunt et objurgandi : et hæc accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt.”—CIC. *Am.* 112. b.

Quid mihi Celsus agit ? *monitus* multumque *monendus*
 Privatas ut quærat opes.——————HOR. *Ep.* 1. 3. 15.

Here, the plagiary is put upon his guard, and the evil, to which he is exposed, is afterwards clearly stated.

The verb "Hortari" may be united in the same sentence with *Monere*, and also with "Suadere," consistently with the pure meaning of each.

— ergo propterea te sedulo

Et *moneo*, et "hortor" ne cujusquam misereat.—TER. *Hec.* 1. 1. 6.

The advice given by Syra to Philotis, is founded upon the experience the latter had had of the inconstancy of gallants. She, accordingly, warns her, by means of the first verb, of the evils that may arise from misjudged compassion, and, by means of the second, encourages her to encounter the danger of incurring their resentment. "Quod te vehementissime diligo, et *monerem* te et "hortarer," ut fortunis Volterranorum consuleres."—CIC. *Ep.* 13. 4. Cicero, here, gives the reason to Valerius why he was at pains *Monere* and "Hortari;" and that is, because he was much attached to him as a friend. He says afterwards, in the same epistle, "Quæ supra scripta sunt eo spectant ut te "horter" et "suadeam." His intention was, to recommend the Volterrani to Valerius. As a "Hortator," he meant to excite his hope of pleasing Cæsar, by serving a set of people to whom he had shewn himself attached, and to make him despise the danger with which doing so might be attended: as a "Suasor," he intimates to him a good, which he might attain without danger: and, as a *Monitor*, he warns him against the evil of not contributing to the comfort of those, whom so distinguished a character had shewn himself disposed to protect.

HORTUS, HORTI,

agree, in denoting a space cultivated for the production of fruit and vegetables, but differ, in respect to the kind to be found in each, and to the intention of the person who rears them. The first, in both numbers, refers to a garden cultivated for the sake of the roots and fruit that can be raised in it. He, who plants the spot, has more regard to its profitableness than to its amenity. "Hinc primum agricolæ æstimabantur prisci et sic statim faciebant judicium, ne quam esse in domo matremfamilias, etenim hæc cura fœminæ dicebatur, ubi indiligens esset *hortus*; quippe e carnario aut macello vivendum esse."—PLIN. 19. 4.

— *custos es pauperis horti.*—VIRG. *Ecc.* 7. 34.

“*Jam hortum ipsi agricolæ succidiam alteram appellant.*”—CIC. *de Sen.* 89. a.

All the above-mentioned gardens belonged to people who were forced to be economical, and could make no sacrifice to luxury. That in the last example belonged to husbandmen, whose appetite was vigorous through temperance, and needed nothing delicate to whet it.

HORTI, in the plural, differs from “Hortus,” in denoting, not a plurality of such gardens as have been mentioned, but a single one, maintained at greater expence, and producing a variety of fruits. Of the former we say, “Unum hortum,” duos, tres, “hortos;” of the latter, “Unos, binos, ternos, hortos.” The distributive numeral, applied to “castra,” “literæ,” and such other terms, implies a multiplicity of parts forming a single unit, but, at the same time, states each aggregate as a distinct existence. “Hortus,” however, may be so modified as to denote such a garden as that denoted by *Horti*.

Hortus odoratis suberat cultissimus herbis,
Sectus humum rivo lene sonantis aquæ.—OVID. *Fast.* 2. 703.

Horti, in its proper meaning, appears in such instances as the following.

“Nunc domus suppeditat mihi *hortorum* amœnitatem.”—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 320.

b. “Dictitabat se *hortos* aliquos velle emere, quo invitare amicos, et ubi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset.”—CIC. *de Off.* 63. b.

Forsitan et pingues *hortos* quæ cura colendi
Omaret canerem, biferique rosaria Pæsti—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 118.

“Amplissimos *hortos* eodem quo emerat die, instruxit plurimis et antiquissimis statuis.”—PLIN. 8. 18. Those gardens called “Mæcenatiani,” “Sallustiani,” “Serviliani,” “Cæsar’s ad Tiberim,” were all of the kind to which *Horti* was applicable, and were adorned with arbours, walks, statues, and furnished even with places for giving entertainments. “Hodie non descendit Antonius. Cur? dat natalitia in *hortis.*”—CIC. *Phil.* 2. 6.

HOSPES—*vide* ADVENA.

HOSPITIUM—*vide* DIVERSORIUM.

HOSTIS, INIMICUS, ADVERSARIUS,

agree, in denoting a person who is unfriendly to another, but differ, either as

the enmity is of a public or a private nature, or as it is permanent, or of short duration. *HOSTIS* signifies an avowed enemy, whose hatred is known to others, as well as to the object of it. Cicero gives us a history of the word in the following sentence. "Equidem illud etiam animadverto, quod qui proprio nomine perduellis esset, is *hostis* vocaretur, lenitate verbi tristitiam rei mitigante; *hostis* enim apud majores nostros is dicebatur, quem nunc peregrinum dicimus."—*Off.* 8. b. A traitor, then, being the known enemy of his country, got, by way of eminence, the name of *Hostis*.

INIMICUS, again, supposes, that the enmity is of a private nature, and, though known to the object of it, may be unknown to others. From the definition given by Cicero of the abstract founded upon *Inimicus*, taken as an adjective, we may collect his notion of the import of the substantive. "*Inimicitia*, ira ulciscendi tempus observans."—*Cic. Q. Tusc.* 213. b. Even the object of *Inimicitia* may, at times, be unconscious that he is so. "Tacitæ magis et occultæ *inimicitia* timendæ sunt quam indictæ, et apertæ."—*Cic. in Ver.* 273. a. Enmities of this kind may exist between nations, as well as individuals, and take their character from their not being declared. "Insitas *inimicitias* istæ gentes habent et gerunt cum populi Romani nomine."—*Cic. pro Font.* 289. b.

A person, who is a "Hostis," may, or may not, be an *Inimicus*. "Multi qui de castris visundi aut spoliandi gratia processerant, volventes "hostilia" cadavera, amicum alii, pars hospitem reperiebant: fuere item, qui *inimicos* suos cognoscerent."—*SAL. Cat. sub fin.* The dead, whose bodies were found upon the field, had all been "Hostes;" but some of them were recognized as private friends, and others as private enemies. "Sæpius cum "hoste" confligit, quam quisquam cum *inimico* concertavit."—*Cic. pro Leg. Man.* 9. a. "Tum rex, quæro itaque, inquit, an vivere velitis non *inimici* mihi, cujus beneficio victuri estis? Illi, nunquam se *inimicos* ei; sed bello lacesitos "hostes" fuisse respondent."—*Q. CURT.* 7. 10.

When the enmity borne by one person to another is notorious and avowed, "Hostis" is used to express this:

Nam nupta meretrici "hostis" est, a viro ubi segregata est.—*TER. Hec.* 5. 2. 23.

“Recusasse autem se, ne patris animum offenderet : ex eo sibi illum “hostem.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 248. a.

The terms “Hostis” and *Inimicus* may, without impropriety, be applied to the same person. “Aliquem insectari tanquam *inimicum* et “hostem.”—LIV. 39. 28. Personal animosity is the spur which prompts the persecutor of a private enemy ; while patriotism, and a sense of professional duty, form that which prompts the persecutor of a public.

ADVERSARIUS differs from the two former words, in supposing, that the enmity entertained is but casual, and may be soon removed. It applies, properly, to those who are antagonists in a law-suit, or in an argument ; who are reconciled when the matter in dispute is settled ; and who may be neither public nor private enemies. “Convincere *adversarium* auctoritatibus et testibus.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 1. 5. “Luctabitur Olympiis Milo ; sed sine *adversario* nulla luctatio est.”—CIC. *de Fat.* 146. a. In those instances, the enmity is slight, casual, and of short duration. So it is, also, in the mock sea-fight mentioned by Horace ;

Partitur lintres exercitus : Actia pugna

Te duce per pueros hostili more refertur.

Adversarius est frater : lacus Adria : donec

Alterutrum velox victoria fronde coronet.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 18. 61.

In Suetonius and Nepos, we find *Adversarius* put for “Hostis,” though this is seldom to be met with, and, were it not for the authority of the latter author, would be held impure. “Bello Vitelliano confugit in Capitolium ; sed irrupentibus *adversariis*,” &c.—SÜETON. *in Dom.* 1. “His locis castra ponit, ut neque circuii multitudine *adversariorum* posset.”—NEP. *in Dat.* 6. *Adversarius* is also applied to opponents at a sale. “Sed accedit cupiditas : in qua præter Othonem non puto nos ullum *adversarium* habituros.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 13. 31.

It occasionally happens, that the person styled *Adversarius* is also a “Hostis.” In this case, the first term is applied to one of the “Hostes,” with whom the person denoted by it has a casual rencounter during a general engagement. “Ut tanquam fortis in pugna vir, acceptis a forti *adversario*

vulneribus adversis et honestis cadere videatur.”—CIC. *de Arusp. resp.* 40. The sentiment animating “Hostes” being common on both sides, there remains the casual enmity, arising from the accident of the parties meeting, and the temporary enmity, arising from the necessary failure of the strength or the courage of either.

HUMANE *vel* HUMANITER, HUMANITUS,

agree, in denoting something that belongs to man ; but the former affects him as a matter of duty, and the latter, as a circumstance that is inseparable from his nature. The two first are, like “Dure” and “Duriter,” equivalent. All the three come from “Humanus,” as their common root, and express either what one and all of the human species ought to do, or must do from necessity.

HUMANE and HUMANITER, in one of their acceptations, have the same import with the Greek adverb, Φιλανθρωπως. As “Civiliter” suggests that civil behaviour which should take place between fellow citizens, so, the adverbs mentioned suggest those humane sentiments which man has a right to expect from man. “Hirtium aliquid ad te συμπαθως de me scripsisse facile patior : fecit enim humane.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 12. 44. “Sed fecit humaniter Licinius, qui ad me venit.”—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 306. b. In these two sentences, both adverbs have precisely the same power, and present kindness and humanity as the attributes of the persons said to act in each.

But the two equivalent adverbs, now treated of, refer to another species of duty besides that mentioned. They suggest that suppression of discontent, under circumstances that are disagreeable, which accords with the lot of man. “Morbo toleranter atque humane ferunt.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 184. a. The patience here stated becomes the situation of those exhibiting it, and no reference whatever is made to any sentiment of benevolence, as supporting the mind of the sufferers. The same use of *Humane* is found in Terence :

Tamen vix humane patitur.—*Adelph.* 1. 2. 65.

A power, similar to that now explained, is to be seen also in *Humaniter*. “Sin aliter acciderit, humaniter feremus.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 2. a. The

misfortune, here stated as contingent, is to be borne with the resignation that becomes men.

HUMANITUS differs from the adverbs stated, in having no reference to duty of any kind, but to a fact peculiar to human nature, and inseparable from its essence. "Si quid mihi *humanitus* accidisset; multa autem impendere videbantur præter naturam, præterque fatum."—CIC. *in Ant.* 154. b. Under the expression "*Humanitus* accidere" is comprehended every unavoidable distress in human life. Even the extinction of it is not excluded from the general list; for the preposition "præter" separates this only to make the former more conspicuous from their number. All the events stated and insinuated agree in the common character, of being inevitable, while man is what he is. "Humane" and "Humaniter," we find, apply to him, as a moral, an active, and a sentient being. *Humanitus*, again, applies to him in the latter capacity alone, and as a being necessarily submissive to the laws of his nature.

Ubi rem rescivi, capi non *humanitus*,
 Neque ut animum decuit ægrotum adolescentuli,
 Tractare: sed vi et via pervolgata patrum.—TER. *Heaut.* 1. 1. 47.

The poet, here, is not under any necessity to use *Humanitus* in preference to "Humaniter," for each would have suited his line equally well. By the former, however, he gives a conception, which the latter could not have excited. Had the father meant to express cruelty simply, the two adverbs, "non humaniter," would have done it. *Humanitus*, it must be observed, refers to his son, as a sensitive being, whose spirit, as a man, might have failed before the wrath of an incensed parent. The peculiarity of the son's circumstances, beautifully expressed in the line that follows the adverb, confirms the justice of the interpretation given of the adverb itself. If, in any circumstances, the treatment stated would have been too much for him, "a fortiori" it was so, when his mind was distressed with love. By the words "non humaniter," the attention would have been directly led to the idea of cruelty from man to man; while, by "non *humanitus*," this idea is got only by implication. The last two terms, though indirectly, state this cruelty to be more monstrous. They summon the mind's attention to the necessary proportion that must

subsist between the severity of the punishment and the strength of the sufferer, and suggest, that, by a law of his nature, this person must yield to what is beyond his strength.

Humanitus is the only derivative from the adjective "Humanus," in which there is no reference to the morality of conduct implied in the root. The abstract, *Humanitas*, involves it in a high degree, and suggests the claim to kindness, which man has upon man. "Si non hominis, at *humanitatis* rationem haberet."—Cic. *pro Quint.* 18. a. As that amiable sensibility to the rights of man, implied in *Humanitas*, was understood to be most improved by the pursuit of literature, so, the term itself was applied to those studies, which thus humanize the soul. What we style "philology," or "classical erudition," the Romans styled *Humanitas*. "Homo non hebes, neque inexercitatus, neque communium literarum, et politioris *humanitatis* expers."—Cic. *de Or.* 115. a. The French have taken their word "Humanité," derived directly from *Humanitas*, in the sense last explained; but, by always taking it, when so applied, in the plural, seem to intimate their just apprehension, that the study is complex, and embraces more sciences than one. Of a student in philology, they say, "Il apprend les humanités." The Scots have employed the word "Humanity" as the Romans did *Humanitas*, and have probably adopted this use from the French, with whom, before the Union, they were long and intimately connected. The person who, in Scotland, is styled a "student in humanity," the Romans would have said to be "*Humanitatis* vel literarum humaniorum studiosus."

HUMARE—*vide* SEPULIRE.

HUMIDUS, UVIDUS, MADIDUS,

agree, in denoting the quality of wetness, but differ, as to the manner in which it is generated and retained. HUMIDUS implies, that the object, which it specifies, not only contains moisture, but is fitted to supply the waste of it, whether by evaporation or otherwise. It comes from "Humor," and that from "Humus," and regards the ground, as furnishing a constant supply to those springs which break forth at different parts of its surface. "Præmisso

Cecina ut occulta saltuum scrutaretur, pontesque et aggeres, *humido* paludum, et fallacibus campis imponeret.”—TAC. *Ann.* 1. 61. *Humidus*, then, in its primitive sense, refers to a subject as formed by the hand of nature, and possessed of a quality which, when absent, cannot be imparted, and, when present, cannot be destroyed.

The definition given by Servius of *Humidus*, seems to have been very properly rejected by Ausonius Popma, whose remarks “de differentiis verborum,” are often both ingenious and solid. “*Humidum*,” says Servius, “quod extrinsecus habet aliquod humoris;”—In VIRG. *Ec.* 10. 20. To this Popma refuses to assent. “Cui non adsentior. *Humidum* enim proprie est quod in profundo continet humiditatem, ut terra.”—*Lib.* 2. 133.

Humidus is transferred from the subject to which, from its etymology, it appears to have been originally applied, to others that strongly resemble it. Thus, Virgil speaks of the “*Humida* nox,” and means, by it, that dampness which prevails in the air, next the surface of the earth, from the constant falling of the dew in the course of the night. It is transferred by Ovid to the clouds, and by Vitruvius to those winds which ordinarily produce rain.

— cadit Eurus, et *humida* surgunt

Nubila. ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 198.

“Auster et reliqui (venti) qui a solis cursu sunt *humidissimi*.”—VITRUV. 8. 21. In both those applications of the word, there is a reference to a supply of the waste, and, of course, to the long continuance of the fall expected.

Humidus is occasionally applied to bodies impregnated with moisture, which they receive from others that generated it. Cicero speaks thus of a bed bedewed with tears, “Qui jacet in lecto *humido*,

Ejulatu, questu, gemitu, fremitibus,

Resonando, multum flebiles voces refert.—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 9. 2. 33.

The wood of a tree, too, when vegetating, may be styled *Humidus*, on account of the communicated moisture which supports it. Nay, Cicero, in one instance, applies the term to wood that is green and newly cut. “Ignem ex lignis viridibus atque *humidis* in loco angusto fieri jussit.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 2. 45.

UVIDUS agrees with "Humidus," in supposing, that the substance, to which it is applied, contains moisture, but does not suggest the means of supplying the waste, from whatever cause it arises. The definition given by Servius of this term, is more accurate and satisfactory than that given of "Humidus." It were better, at the same time, not to derive "Uva" from *Uvidus*, but to consider the shortest of the two words as the root. "*Uvidum est*," says he, "quod intrinsecus habet aliquod humoris, unde "uvæ" dicuntur."—*In VIRG. Ec. 10. 20.*

Arboribus redeunt detonsæ frigore frondes,
Uvidaque in gravido palmite gemma tumet.—*OVID. Fast. 4. 235.*

The term *Uvidus* is applied to the earth as well as "Humidus," but the quality suggested by it is different. Thus, Columella says, "Nisi præpingui et *uvida* terra."—*Lib. 7. C. 3.* By *Uvida*, he does not mean the poor soil, that is swampy, and generates water, which it emits at its surface, but such as, though moist, is rich and loamy.

UVIDUS is transferred from those vegetable substances, to which it is originally applicable, to others which strongly resemble them, by imbibing and retaining a quantity of moisture.

— me tabula sacer
 Votiva paries indicat *uvida*,
 Suspendisse potenti
 Vestimenta maris deo.—*HOR. Car. 1. 5. 14.*

The mariner's clothes, hung up in the temple of Neptune, are, here, supposed to have been soaked in the sea, and, like the grape, to contain a quantity of moisture, which would either free itself by evaporation, or might be easily wrung from them.

Uvidus hiberna venit de glande Menalcas.—*VIRG. Ec. 10. 20.*
 Longas O utinam, Dux bone, ferias
 Præstes Hesperiaë, dicimus integro
 "Sicci" mane die : dicimus *uvidi*,
 Cum sol oceano subest. ———*HOR. Car. 4. 5. 37.*

In the last of the above examples, it appears, that *Uvidus* differs from "Humidus," in being applied to mind, as well as matter, and in suggesting the

notion of drunkenness. This application seems to be founded on the kind of drink which produces the intoxication. The amplificative adjective "Vinosus," denotes the quality of being a lover of wine; and *Uvidus*, as taken in the passage last quoted, denotes having drunk it plentifully, and feeling its effects.

MADIDUS differs from "Humidus" and "Uvidus," in expressing moisture that is not contained in the substance specified, but which is adventitious, and affects its surface. It agrees, also, with the last term, in supposing it void of the capacity of supplying the waste of moisture, in whatever way that waste may be effected. It applies to the extrinsic or superficial wetness of a substance, whether this is produced by a natural, or an artificial cause. In the primitive and literal applications of "Humidus" and "Uvidus," they denote subjects furnished by the hand of nature with the attributes they respectively denote. Thus, moisture is naturally inherent in humid ground and in a ripe grape. Dryness, again, is the natural state of that, which, being accidentally wet, is then said to be *Madidus*.

— nam dum se continet Auster,
Dum sedet, et siccat *madidas* in carcere pennas,
Contemnunt mediam temeraria lina Charybdin.—Juv. *Sat.* 5. 98.

"Sed ille scripsit ad Balbum, illum fasciculum epistolarum totum sibi aqua *madidum* redditum esse."—CIC. *ad Quint. Frat.* 2. 14. This packet was so much wetted, from an accidental cause, that Cicero tells us the letter addressed to him was not legible. A superficial wetting would produce this effect. It is not necessary to suppose, that the "fasciculus" would be drenched like the "vestis uvida" before-mentioned, which, from the porousness of the materials, had absorbed a quantity of water, and retained it as the skin of the grape does its juice.

Madidus agrees with "Uvidus, in being applied to persons as well as to things, and in suggesting the idea of drunkenness. He, who was said "*Maddere* vino," was understood to be "*Vino rigatus*;" that is, bedewed with wine.

Faciam ut sit *madidus* sobrius.—PLAUT. *Amph.* 3. 4. 18.

The wit of the comic poet, here, rests upon his apprehension, that *Madidus* refers to an external or superficial wetting in its primitive sense.

While *Madidus* agrees with “Uvidus,” in the respect just mentioned, it differs from it, in denoting proficiency in science and in letters.

Si quis Cecropiæ *madidus* Latæque Minervæ
 Artibus, et vera simplicitate bonus.———MART. 1. 40.
 Non ille quanquam Socraticis *madet*
 Sermonibus te negliget horridus.
 Narratur et prisci Catonis,
 Sæpe mero caluisse virtus.———HOR. *Car.* 3. 21. 9.

The critics have very properly explained *Madidus* and *Madere*, in the above and other such passages, by means of the term “Imbutus.” Both the adjective and the verb refer to a vessel tinctured in respect to colour, taste, or smell, by a fluid, with which it was wet when made to contain it.

JACTURA—*vide* DAMNUM. JANUA—*vide* OSTIUM.

IDONEUS, APTUS,

agree, in denoting the relation of fitness, but differ, according as that fitness is intrinsic, that is, naturally inherent in the subject specified, or artificially imparted to it. IDONEUS signifies “fitness of the first kind,” and implies, that a relation, previously existing, is apprehended between two objects, of which the observer avails himself.

—— itane tandem *idoneus*

Tibi videor esse, quem tam aperte fallere incipias dolis?—TER. *And.* 3. 2. 12.

The adjective, in this instance, must not be interpreted “formed by Nature” to be deceived, else it would be confounded with “Aptus;” as Nature evidently has her purposes, which she can accomplish better than any of her sons.

The force of the sentence is, "Do you make this use of a degree of folly," with which you suppose me to have been born, and to which you yourself could give no existence?" "Locus ad aciem instruendam opportunus atque *idoneus*." CÆs. *Bel. Gal.* 2. 5. This place, as appearing just when the army was about to engage, was "Opportunus;" as being naturally fit for drawing up the army, it was *Idoneus*, whether it had appeared then or not.

Non ego sum laudi, non natus *idoneus* armis—PROPERT. 1. 6. 29.

"Ad lacertas captandas tempestates non sunt *idoneæ*."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 26. a. "Aliæ res *idoneæ* sunt stomacho, aliæ alienæ."—CELS. "*Idonea* mihi Caii Lælii persona visa est quæ de amicitia loqueretur."—CIC. *de Amicit.* 96. a. From the use made, in the last instance, of *Idonea*, there is no reason to suppose, that Cicero meant to affix any meaning to it different from that laid down, or that there had been any artificial accommodation of the part to the character of Lælius. The train of thought, forming the dialogue, may have existed in the author's mind before he apprehended the fitness of the old man's character to bear a principal part in it. It is, indeed, a higher compliment to Lælius to suppose, that the most refined sentiments of friendship, which such a philosopher could conceive, naturally suggested him as their most probable author.

APTUS, from the verb "Apiscor," differs from "Idoneus," in implying, that the relation of fitness is not essential to two subjects, but imparted by a power that can alter the state of at least one of them. "Palpebræ *aptissimæ* factæ, et ad claudendas pupillas, et ad aperiendas."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 54. b. Nature is here said to have had an intention, and has not failed in the accomplishment of it. "Cossus notæ facundiæ, sed dicendi artem *apta* trepidatione occultans, atque eo validior."—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 69.

Verna ministeriis ad nutus *aptus* heriles,
Literulis Græcis imbutus, "idoneus" arti
Cui libet : argilla quidvis imitaberis uda.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 6.

In the first part of this example, the poet sets forth the acquired accomplishments of the slave; and in the last, his natural capacity. The purchaser, is first told, that he had been trained to service, so as to catch his master's nod,

and had, besides, got a smattering of Greek literature; and then, that his natural capacity was excellent, so as to fit him for becoming a proficient in whatever he was taught. “*Cibus aptus stomacho.*”—*CELS.* 2. 20. The application, here made by the physician, of *Aptus*, is by no means inconsistent with that made above, by him, of “*Idoneus.*” In the former case, he meant food found, from experience, to be easily digested in any state of the stomach; but in this last, he meant such as suits the stomach at a particular time, either from the nature of the food itself, or from the mode of its preparation. He, in the same way, says, “*Vinum frigidum aptissimum est potui.*”—4. 5. intimating, not that cold wine is found, in general, to be most salutary for the stomach, but that care should be taken to suit the temperature of the liquor to its morbid state.

The use, too, which Cicero makes of *Aptus*, in the following passage, is not inconsistent with his use of “*Idoneus,*” when applied to Lælius. “*Ca-tonem induxi senem disputantem: quia nulla videbatur aptior persona quæ de illa ætate loqueretur.*”—*CIC. in Læl.* 2. The meaning of the two adjectives, in the different passages, is not the same, though the latitude with which we are allowed to use the word “fit,” in English, is apt to make us suppose that it is. When the word “*Idoneus*” is used, we find, that Cicero is to be understood as laying hold of an apprehended fitness, to which, in the formation of his dialogue, he could have no view of giving existence. When *Aptus*, again, is used, he only avails himself of a relation, which Nature had created by giving the aptitude. This same power, which formed the character, formed also the fitness between it and the task of speaking upon the subject of old age, with advantage to every hearer.

Cicero frequently makes use of the expressions “*Idonei testes,*” and “*Calcei ad pedes apti.*” By the first, he means witnesses fitted to bear evidence, as having been present when a certain event took place. Had he said “*Apti,*” he would have meant fellows who were suborned, and who had not witnessed what they testify. In the expression “*Calcei ad pedes apti,*” there is a compliment paid to the art of the shoemaker. “*Idonei,*” here, would have been unintelligible, by suggesting a natural fitness, which does not exist.

JEJUNIUM—*vide* FAMES.IGNAVIA—*vide* PIGRITIA.

IGNOMINIA, INFAMIA,

agree, in denoting reproach; but the former supposes it affixed by one or a number, who are understood to be acquainted with the character censured; while the latter supposes it originating from the report of a number, who are incapable of vouching for its truth. The character of a person subject to *IGNOMINIA*, which comes from “In” and “Nomen,” suffers from being stigmatized by those who know it; that of him who is subject to “*Infamia*,” from the voice of mankind, who speak only as they hear. “*Ferre ignominiam et “infamiam” sine dolore.*”—*CIC. Q. Tusc.* 218. b. Both are here understood to be evils, whether the ground of the latter be just or not. “*Dedecore, macula, turpissimaque ignominia notetur.*”—*CIC. pro Quinct.* 64. “*In illo communi incommodo, nulla in quenquam propria ignominia nominatim cadebat.*”—*CIC. Ibid.* *Ignominia* may be imposed by a person who has a right to do so, both in civil and military affairs; while “*Infamia*” is the consequence of a report, well or ill founded. “*Censoris animadversio versatur tantummodo in nomine, et ignominia dicta est.*”—*CIC. in Frag. apud Non.* 1. 93. “*Mille milites, qui serum auxilium post prælium venerant, prope cum ignominia dimissi.*”—*LIV.* 3. 5.

INFAMIA, then, differs from “*Ignominia*,” in implying, that the bad report is propagated among a number, and may be not only improbable, but even false. “*Quomodo fama non est unius sermo, nec infamia unius mala existimatio.*”—*SEN. Ep.* 102. “*Qui istius facti non modo suspicione, sed ne infamia quidem est aspersus.*”—*CIC. pro Cæl.* 10. Here, the “*Suspicio*” is held more formidable than the *Infamia*. The former, it is understood, would not exist without some ground, which the latter might.

IMAGO, UMBRA, EFFIGIES, SIMULACRUM, STATUA,

agree, in denoting representations of objects that approach more or less to perfection, according to the means employed, or the art displayed, in the formation of them. *IMAGO*, in its radical sense, refers to the reflection, as naturally

expressive of the substance reflected. Of all representations, this is apt to be the least striking, as the surface of the fluid emitting it may not be always stable, nor that of the solid, either perfectly even, or equally well polished. The primary acceptation of *Imago* may be seen in such passages as the following :

Nec sum adeo informis : nuper me in littore vidi,
 Cum placidum ventis staret mare : non ego Daphnim
 Judice te metuam, si nunquam fallit *imago*.—VIRG. *Ec.* 2. 25.
 Non aliter quam cum puro nitidissimus orbe
 Opposita speculi referitur *imagine* Phœbus.—OVID. *Met.* 4. 349.

A natural, though often an incorrect, apprehension, by means of hearing, is compared to one furnished by means of the *Imago*, which respects the sense of sight. “Gloria virtuti resonat tanquam *Imago*.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 190. b.

— ubi concava pulsu
 Saxa sonant, vocisque offensa resultat *imago*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 49.

From the expression of imperfect resemblances, such as might be caught by the savage when he looked into the fountain, *Imago* has been extended to that of the most exquisite that are furnished by the hand of art. It is then applied to the productions both of the sculptor and the painter. In this acceptation of the word, the means by which the likeness is effected are lost sight of, and the common circumstance of resemblance to an archetype, is made to include representations of every kind, both good and bad, natural and artificial. “Agesilaus, qui neque pictam neque fictam *imaginem* suam, passus est esse.”—CIC. *Ep.* 68. a. “*Imaginum* pictura quam maxime similes in ævum propagabantur formæ.”—PLIN. 35. 2. Though the word *Imago* was applied indiscriminately to the works of the sculptor and the painter, yet the work of the latter was deemed the least expressive, and is therefore styled, by Cicero, “Muta *imago*.”

Imago is particularly applied to those representations of ancestors in wax, by which the Romans shewed the nobility of their families. The head of the family, as its visible representative, was thus called upon to emulate the virtues of those, whose images he preserved, and to make his connexion with

them manifest, by exhibiting a resemblance, in character, analogous to that between the substance and its reflection. "Obrepisti ad honores errore hominum, commendatione fumosarum *imaginum*, quarum nihil simile habes præter colorem."—CIC. *in Pison.* 79. b. "Appius Claudius vir honoratissimæ *imaginis* futurus apud posteros."—LIV. 3. 58. "Novi homines," who rose to distinction suddenly, were said "Subitas *imagines* relinquere."—PLIN. 8. 10.

As "Imago" denotes the natural reflection of objects from smooth surfaces, so UMBRA denotes the shadow of the substance so situate as to intercept the light.

Nam nihil esse potest aliud nisi lumine cassus
Aer, id quod nos *umbram* perhibere suemus.—LUCRET. 4. 369.

Umbra and "Imago" agree, in expressing likenesses that may be more or less striking, according to the manner in which they are obtained. The exactness of that, got by the former, will depend on the position and the distance of the body intercepting the light, in respect to the surface, upon which the shadow is thrown. *Umbra* appears, in its radical meaning, in the following sentence. "Nam me hæc tua platanus admonuit, quæ non minus ad opacandum hunc locum patulis est diffusa ramis, quam illa cujus *umbram* secutus est Socrates."—CIC. *de Orat.* 1. 28.

Fecerat exiguas jam sol altissimus *umbras*.—OVID. *Met.* 3. 50.
Et sol crescentes decedens duplicat *umbras*.—VIRG. *Ec.* 2. 67.

Umbra differs from "Imago" in so far, that it can be applied to no likeness but such as is obtained by a shadow. "Imago," again, besides being applicable to a natural reflection, has been found to extend to the works both of the painter and the sculptor.

That, denoted by "Imago," was not supposed to be so inseparably a concomitant of its substance as that denoted by *Umbra*; probably, because the former can hardly be obtained but when the spectator chuses, while the formation of the latter can frequently not be avoided. *Umbra*, accordingly, often denotes inseparable connexion, which "Imago," though we have found it denoting the similarity between the echo and the original sound, never does. "Gloria virtutem tanquam *umbra* sequitur."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 1. 109. "Decretum est mihi,

quasi *umbra*, quoquo ibis tute, persequi.”—PLAUT. *Cas.* 1. 4. Consistently with what is now laid down, the plural of *Umbra* is made, by Horace, to denote unexpected guests, who follow those who have been invited, like their shadows.

— cum Servilio Balatrone
Vibidius; quos Mæcenas adduxerat *umbras*—*Sat.* 2. 8. 22.
— locus est et pluribus *umbris*.—*Ep.* 1. 5. 28.

Umbra agrees with “*Imago*,” in being applied to those who are deceased. That denoted by the latter, however, was a solid substance, and remained with the living, whose virtue it was supposed to stimulate; while the *Umbra* was but a ghost, that had its abode in the infernal regions, and presented no subject of imitation to surviving friends. Every person, who died, necessarily had his *Umbra*, but the “*jus imaginum*” was peculiar to those only of a certain rank. “*Umbra est species incorporea quæ non potest tangi, sicut ventus.*”—SERV. in *Æn.* 4. 654, “*Quæ genitis quies unquam, si in sublimi sensus animæ maneat, inter inferos umbræ ?*”—PLIN. 7. 57.

Nox ubi decidimus
Quo pius *Æneas*, quo Tullus dives et Ancus,
Pulvis, et *umbra* sumus.——— HOR. *Car.* 4. 7. 14.

In the passage last referred to from Virgil, Dido is made to say of herself,

Vixi, et quem cursum dederat fortuna peregi,
Et nunc magna mei sub terras ibit “*imago*.”—*Æn.* 4. 654.

The word “*Imago*” is, here, put for *Umbra* by a poetical licence; but, in this instance, there can be no confusion in their different meanings. Though “*Imago*,” like *Umbra*, is made to refer to the queen when deceased, yet the possibility of misinterpreting it is prevented, from the place, “*sub terras*,” being fixed.

EFFIGIES differs from “*Imago*” and “*Umbra*,” in expressing a resemblance that is always artificial; that is effected by the mass, independently of its reflection or its shadow; and that, from its solidity, may be liker its archetype. *Effigies*, then, were properly formed by those artists, who, in the language of Virgil, were said, “*Excudere spirantia æra*” et “*vivos vultus*

ducere de marmore.” “Consecraturque nullam eminentem *effigiem* virtutis, sed adumbratam “*imaginem*” gloriæ.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 190. b. “Objectavitque Cassio, quod inter “*imagines*” majorum etiam Caii Cassii *effigiem* coluisset, ita inscriptam : Duci partium.”—TAC. *Ann.* 16. 7. The connexion between Cassius and the “*Imagines*” was but a general one, and the respect paid to them was but suited to his admiration of the virtues of his forefathers ; but his attachment to the *Effigies* of Caius Cassius was understood, by Nero, to have been more particular. This bust was valued as representing the destroyer of Cæsar, of whose political principles he approved, though he could not regard him as in the list of his ancestors.

SIMULACRUM is of more general import than either “*Imago*,” “*Umbra*,” or “*Effigies*.” It denotes any kind of representation of which the subject will admit, whether solid or not ; and admits of a likeness less striking than that which can be obtained between a substance and either its reflection or its shadow. The artist, who forms a *Simulacrum*, has the privilege of indulging his fancy to a certain degree. He may fabricate the likeness of those gods, who were never visible to mortal eye, and of those heroes, who had received an apotheosis, and had lived in periods of remote antiquity. “*Imagines*,” non animorum *simulacra* sunt, sed corporum.”—CIC. *pro Arch.* 19. b. It is here evident, that “*Imago*” is applicable only to material substances ; but that *Simulacrum* is so to both material and immaterial. “Zeuxis ut excellentem muliebris formæ pulchritudinem muta in se “*imago*” contineret, Helenæ se pingere *simulacrum* velle dixit.”—CIC. *de Invent.* 62. a. The painter, here, told, that he meant to form a fancy-piece ; and we find, that, in order to furnish him with the means of completing it, the inhabitants of Crotona allowed him to select five virgins, that the beauties peculiar to each might be combined and exhibited in his intended work. The term *Simulacrum* was applied, not only to man, but to other animals, and to inanimate objects also.

Vastarumque videt trepidus *simulacra* ferarum.—OVID. *Met.* 2. 195.

“Vecta spolia, captivi, *simulacra* montium, fluminum, præliorum.”—TAC. *Ann.* 2. 41. Tacitus, speaking of the Paphian goddess, says of her, “*Simu-*

lacrum Deæ non “effigie” humana continuus orbis latiore initio, tenuem in ambitum metæ modo exurgens. Et ratio in obscuro.”—*Hist.* 2. 3. The representation of this deity, which was fanciful, and not taken from any known archetype, is styled *Simulacrum*. The “Effigies humana,” again, though referring to no individual in the human species, was consistent with a general idea, to which every spectator could easily apply it. Though an extension is given the word *Simulacrum*, yet this is consistent with its purest use. In the present case, “Effigies” takes the usual place of the term to which it is opposed, as being applied to no particular human being; but *Simulacrum* gets beyond its ordinary station, as being applied to an animated form, altogether anomalous, and such as imagination can hardly conceive.

STATUA differs from “Imago,” “Effigies,” and “Simulacrum,” in supposing, that that, which it denotes, is made to stand in the place best fitted for preserving the memory of the person to whom it was decreed. The representation by *Statua*, besides, like that by the constant use of the two latter, was always artificial, and, like that by “Effigies,” was effected by a solid mass. “Illi autem *statuam* persimilem istius quam “stare” celeberrimo in loco voluerat, ne suavissimi hominis memoria moreretur, deturbant.”—*Cic. in Pis.* 93. “Senatus honore rarissimo, *statua* in palatio posita, prosecutus est eum.”—*SUET. in Oth.* 1.

We are told, by Tacitus, that an accusation was brought before Tiberius against one Falanius, for having sold a statue of Augustus. In the words of the accusation, and of the emperor’s reply together, we find the precise meaning affixed, by this very accurate historian, to the three words, “Statua,” “Effigies,” and “Simulacrum,” and his application seems to agree with the definition given of each. “Objiciebat accusator quod venditis hortis *statuam* Augusti simul mancipasset. Tiberius scripsit consulibus, nec contra religiones fieri, quod “effigies” Augusti, ut alia numinum “simulacra,” venditionibus hortorum et domuum accedant.”—*Ann.* 1. 73. In this passage, the same representation of Augustus has three different names, each of which, according to the view taken of it, has its own propriety. When defined by the place in which it stood, which was the gardens, it is called *Statua*: when defined by the

person whose bust it was, and whose exact resemblance it was understood to present, it is called "Effigies:" when defined by its connexion with those of the gods, the material forms of all of whom, except such as had lately received an apotheosis, could never have been seen, it is called "Simulacrum."

IMBER, NIMBUS, PLUVIA,

agree, in denoting rain, but differ either as to the continuance, or the violence of the fall. It should seem that *IMBER* is generic in both respects, and is applicable to showers, whether continued or transient, heavy or slight. "Quæ opera per *imbrem* fieri potuerunt."—CATO *de R. R.* cap. 2.

Sive operum vacuo gratus conviva per *imbrem*.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 119.

In both the above passages, the suspension of labour seems to have been considerable, and, of course, *Imber* is employed to denote a rainy season. "Maximo *imbri* Capuam veni pridie nonas."—CIC. *Ep. ad At.* 7. 20. Though this shower was heavy, yet there is no reason to suppose that it was of long continuance. "Qui tectum quo *imbris* vitandi causa succederet, nullum haberet."—CIC. *pro Dom.* c. 44. The roof here mentioned would have afforded protection from showers of all kinds. The poverty of Scato is better held forth, by supposing the orator to mean, that, even in his own country, he had it not in his power to shun the slightest.

NIMBUS differs from "Imber," in never referring to any continued rain, and in supposing that the rain, while it falls, is always violent.

— quam multa grandine *nimbi*

In vada præcipitant, cum Jupiter horridus austris

Torquet aquosam hiemem, et cava nubila rumpit.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 669.

Subito coorta tempestas, cum magno fragore tonitribusque, tam denso regem operuit *nimbo*, ut conspectum ejus concioni abstulerit."—LIV. 1. 16. In both these instances, there is a strong reference to the violence, but none to the continuance, of the shower, which in both cases could not last. There is, at the same time, no absolute measure, as to the duration of the *Nimbus*; and it appears, that it admits of considerable latitude. What, in the following pas-

sage, is said in a figurative, might have been also said in a literal, application of it. "Sed hunc quidem *nimbus* cito transiisse lætor."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 15. 9. It may here be inferred, that, though this *Nimbus* had lasted longer than it did, it would still have retained its name.

PLUVIA differs from "Nimbus," in referring to a gentle shower, and to one that is generally of longer continuance. "Equidem etiam *pluvias* metuo, si prognostica nostra vera sunt: ranæ enim *γηρορευσίν*."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 15. 16. Cicero did not, at this time, infer, from the croaking of the frogs, that he would be exposed to constant rain, but to frequent showers.

Aut si, nox *pluviam* ne colligat ante, veremur.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 9. 63.

The shower, here dreaded, could not, from its nature, be heavy, as it was supposed to arise from a temporary condensation of the night-air, which, by means of it, would clear itself.

— lassove papavera collo

Demisere caput, *pluvia* cum forte gravantur.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 436.

The shower, here spoken of, must not be supposed to have been so heavy, as to level the poppies with the ground. It was of a light nature, so as to fill the cavities of the flower, and thus to bend the top of the stalks.

IMBUERE—*vide* DOCERE.

IMMINERE, IMPENDERE—*vide*

IMMERENS—*vide* INDIGNUS.

INSTARE.

IMPERARE, JUBERE, REGERE, GUBERNARE,

agree, in denoting the act of ruling, but differ in respect either to the extent of the ruler's power, or to the end for which he is disposed to exert it. IMPERARE, from "In" and "Parare," implies the highest possible authority, and both a right and a disposition to employ it, in order to give effect to some purpose. It implies a peremptory intimation to an inferior to procure or to manage something given in charge.

Bonam atque justam rem oppido *imperas*, et factu facilem.—TER. *Heaut.* 4. 3. 25.

It is a word, therefore, that expresses the power of commanders, masters, and of all those that are entitled to direct. It, besides, implies, that the authority

may be exerted upon the person possessing, as well as upon others who are subject to it.

— postremo *imperavi* egomet mihi
 Omnia assentari.——TER. *Eun.* 2. 2. 21.
 Animo nunc jam otioso esse *impero*.——TER. *And.* 5. 2. 1.

Davus, here, assumes the consequence of one who was directing a party, and imposes a rule upon himself and all his associates.

Imperat aut “servit” collecta pecunia cuique.—HOR. *Ep.* 10. 47.

The term placed here, as correlative to *Imperare*, is a clear proof of the genuine import of this verb. As the one denotes the most abject submission, so the other must denote unlimited authority. “Appius tenebat non modo auctoritatem, sed etiam *imperium* in suos.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 84. b.

The *Imperator*, in a Roman army, was supreme in military command, and all the “Duces” were understood to be subordinate to him. “Præstate eandem nobis “ducibus” virtutem, quam sæpenumero *imperator* præstitistis: adesse eum, et hæc coram cernere, existimate.”—CÆS. *B. G.* 6. 8.

JUBERE differs from “Imperare,” in denoting an authority that can never be exerted upon the person possessing it, and that admits of a variety of degrees, corresponding with the manner in which he, who orders, either chuses, or reckons himself entitled, to announce his will.

Par. *Jubesne?* Ch. *Jubeo*, “cogo,” atque “impero.”
 Nunquam defugiam auctoritatem.——TER. *Eun.* 2. 3. 97.

Here, *Jubeo* intimates the determined will that Parmeno should do as Cherea desired him; “Cogo,” the force that a superior would employ with one beneath him; and “Impero,” the irresistible authority of a master with his slave.

Quod *jussi* ei dare bibere, et quantum “*imperavi*”
 Date.——TER. *And.* 3. 2. 4.

From the change of the verb in the different members of this sentence, it should seem, that Lesbia was more anxious in regard to the quantity than the quality of the drink she had prescribed for her patient. The orders of physi-

cians are held imperious, and are often expressed by the verb "Imperare."
 "Non idem "imperassem" omnibus per diversa ægrotantibus."—SENEC. *de Ira*, I. 16. "Medici, una artium, "imperatoribus" quoque "imperaverunt."
 PLIN. 24. 1.

But, beside denoting the order of a superior, and the advice of a physician, *Jubere* also expresses a certain good wish, either personally or by another, in as far as he, from whom it comes, commands, or give effect to it. "Illum salutavi, postea *jussi* valere."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 96. a. "Dionysium *jube* salvere."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 4. 14.

———— salvere Hegionem plurimum

Jubeo. ————— TER. *Adelph.* 3. 4. 14.

REGERE differs from "Imperare," in not suggesting the same unlimited authority, and from "Jubere," in not admitting of the same degrees. It implies an authority that is gentle, and exerted for the direction of others, who are unable to guide themselves.

Pacatumque *reget* patriis virtutibus orbem.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 4. 17.

Here, the gentleness of the means, by which the sovereign was to execute his purpose, is manifest, and the needfulness of the direction, for the benefit of the human race, is implied. "Summas, Domine, ago gratias, quod iis de quibus te consului, me quoque *regere* dignatus es."—PLIN. *Ep.* 10. 64. "Scipionem ea auctoritate esse, ut non solum libere quæ probasset exponere, sed etiam, ex magna parte, compellere, atque errantem *regere* posset."—CÆS. *B. C.* 3. 57.

Iter *rexit* lino Theseus. ————— *Prop.* 2. 14. 8.

When the goodness, and the sovereignty of the ruler are held forth, so as to make him at once the object of love and respectful submission to those whom he governs, the force of *regere* is tempered with that of "imperium."

Tu *regere* "imperio" populos, Romane, memento.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 851.

———— O qui res hominumque Deûmque

Æternis regis "imperiiis."—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 234.

GUBERNARE differs from "regere," in referring to a degree of authority

that must be considerable, and fully adequate to the purpose of the ruler, and in supposing that the subject governed would, without his direction, not only be useless, but would even go to destruction. It comes from the Greek verb κυβερναω, which signifies to steer a ship. “Ut si nautæ certarent; quis eorum potissimum gubernaret.”—CIC. *de Off.* 1. 25. “Si in ipso mundo Deus inest aliquis, qui “regat,” qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum, mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservet, terras et maria contemplans, hominum commoda vitasque tueatur.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 12. a. The “regat,” here, suggests the gentleness and the benevolence of the ruler; the *gubernet*, his power being equal to the execution of his purpose, and the necessity of his superintendence for the sake of those whom he governs. “Lucius Sulla, cum solus rempublicam “regeret,” orbemque terrarum gubernaret.”—CIC. *pro S. Rosc. Amerin.* 40. 6. By the first verb is expressed the Dictator’s attachment to that state, for the behoof of which he exerted his power; and by the last, the necessity of his directing the affairs of mankind in general, to which his influence only could be applied, but which were less dear to him. “Clodius contulit se ad Milonis competitores; sed ita totam ut petitionem ipse solus etiam invitis illis gubernaret, tota ut comitia suis, ut dictitabat, humeris sustineret.”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 10. a. b. “Hæc omnia, Deorum immortalium nutu atque consilio, et gesta et provisa esse videntur; et vix videtur humani consilii tantarum rerum gubernatio esse potuisse.”—CIC. *in Cat.* 115. a.

IN

denotes either the relation between the object contained, and that containing it, or the tendency of one object towards another, upon its arrival at which, its motion will cease. In the former use, it expresses rest in a place; in the latter, motion towards, and not terminating till the body be within it. Absolute rest, however, in the space occupied, is not required in the first use of *In* mentioned, provided the motion is performed within the limits of that space. Thus, in the first of the two following examples, “Adolescens *in* littore ambulans,”—CIC. *in Brut.* 182. a. the boundaries of the shore fix the space within which the young man walked, and no reference is made to any point

at which his motion might terminate. In the next, however, "*In jus ambulā,*"—TER. *Phorm.* 5. 7. 43. in which the word "*Jus*" suggests the place in which the law was expounded, the motion is towards, and not within, that space. A difference of case in the governed word announces this difference of meaning in Latin, the motion within limits being always in the ablative, and that towards a point in the accusative.

As every object is naturally quiescent, and is put in motion by the action of a cause that is extraneous, and does not necessarily exist, so, the primary signification of *In*, is rest in a place. Prior to the motion of any body, its situation is defined only by things in its own vicinity. As soon as the motion commences, and as long as it endures, new relations are taking place in respect to the surface over, or the medium through, which it is performed, and to the object to which the motion of the body is directed, and at which it is to cease. This last, which is the quiescent object, retains its relation to the spot it occupied, and, besides, furnishes a subject for a new relation with another, moving towards, and about to enter it.

The primary motion of *In*, then, is that of the same preposition in English. It refers to an object resting within some limited space. "*Non possum, præ fletu, diutius in hoc loco commorari.*"—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 175. a. "*Tibi in Sicilia, quoad vellemus, esse uti liceret.*"—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 6. 8.

But the idea of inclosure within a space, having fixed boundaries of its own, is extended to that of one, whose limits are determined by the number of objects occupying it. In this case, *In* becomes equal to "*Inter*," and is translated "*among*." In both cases, the separation of the correlative from all other objects is equally complete, as in both the line of division is sufficiently explicit. "*Byzantio expugnato, cepisset complures Persarum nobiles; atque, in his, nonnullos regis propinquos.*"—NEP. *in Paus.* 2. The relations of the king are excepted from the Persian nobility, who made up the aggregate of the captives; and this exception is founded upon the idea of a separation being made between a part, and the rest, composing the whole. So, also, in the following example: "*Hic in viris magnis non est habendus.*"—CIC. *de Off.*

When the preposition governs a noun in the singular number, it cannot denote the relation implied in "Inter" or "Among," which suppose a plurality of objects, connected in space with the correlative. It is then translated, "In the case of." "Sed *in hoc homine nullam accipio excusationem.*"—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 25. b. "Quod idem *in bono servo dici solet.*"—*Idem, de Or.* 131. b. The particularity of the case of such a slave as that now mentioned, is announced under the idea of his being kept apart from all others, in the same state as the object, within a certain boundary, is from all others without it.

When the preposition is applied to gerunds, it affects the states denoted by them, as the parts of verbs, precisely in the same way that it does the objects denoted by nouns. "Nobis autem, *in scribendo atque in dicendo, necessitatis excusatio non probatur.*"—CIC. *Orat.* 219. b.

When the power of the preposition *In* falls upon the person understood to superintend and direct, it properly affects that range within which his power has influence, and without which it has none, and is then translated, "In the power of."

— vivat an ille occidat, *in Diis est.*—OVID. *Met.* 7. 24.

The gods are here said to have an exclusive power to decide as to the life and death of the person suggested. "Juxta Deos *in tua manu positum est.*"—TAC. *Hist.* 2. 76. The hand, with which a person directs, is here put for his power, which, in this use of the preposition, is the implied attribute upon which its force depends. The expression "*in Diis*" is just equivalent to "*in potestate deorum,*" and that "*in tua manu,*" to "*in tua potestate.*"

When *In* is translated "out of," it is taken in a meaning of all others the most inconsistent with its primary one. When this is done, there is generally a reference to the substance of which the vessel containing a draught is composed. "*In ossibus humanorum caput bibere.*"—PLIN. 7. 2. The skulls, which served for cups, are regarded, by the Latins, as containing the liquor before it was drunk. In English, again, we refer to the act of drinking, when the liquor passes out of the cup into the mouth of the drinker. So,

Venenum *in auro bibitur* —SEN. *Thyest.* 453.

In the following passage of Virgil, it should seem, that *In* would be improperly translated "Out of."

Tutatur favor Euryalum, lacrymæque decoræ,
Gratior et pulcro veniens *in* corpore virtus.—*Æn.* 5. 343.

The verb "Venire," here, quits entirely the idea of motion, and denotes only simple existence. Virtue is not said to proceed "from," or "out of" a handsome body, but to be more alluring, when understood to reside in it. The same use of "Venire" is made in the *Georgicks*, when the poet is addressing Cæsar.

An Deus immensi "venias" maris, ac tua nautæ
Numina sola colant.—*Georg.* 1. 29.

In, as denoting motion to a place, is explained "Into," and then generally governs the accusative. "Ex Asia *in* Europam exercitum trajicere."—*NEP. in Milt.* 3. "Pergunt etiam *in* castra tribuni, si incipiens adhuc, et nondum adulta seditio, melioribus consiliis flecteretur."—*TAC. Hist.* 1. 31.

— an quo via ducit *in* urbem?—*VIRG. Ecc.* 9. 1.

But this preposition, though expressing motion, is, at times, translated as if it expressed rest; and it then denotes "In." When connected with verbs of rest, it governs the accusative, and with verbs of motion, the ablative. "Cum vestros portus *in* prædonum potestatem fuisse sciatis."—*CIC. pro Leg. Man.* cap. 12. The Latins regard the change of situation, in the correlative object, when in the act of going forward, to that denoted by the word governed. The English, again, regard the situation that is the consequence of the change, not the motion effecting it. There appears to be a Græcism in this Latin expression. The Greeks sometimes substituted *Εἰς* for *Εν*, and said *Εἰς τὸν κόσμον* for *Εν τῷ κόσμῳ*. The irregularity, now stated, is, in some cases, reversed; and verbs of motion are accompanied with the preposition *In*, governing the ablative.

In conspectu meo audet venire.—*PHÆD.* 5. 1. 15.
Introrumpam *in* ædibus.—*PLAUT. Amph.* 4. 3. 14.

When translating the above passages, we regard the agent spoken of, as

moving towards the presence, in the one case, and the house, in the other. But the Romans regarded the consequence of the motion, which is arrival "within," or "in" the space defined. The expressions may be analyzed thus. "Audet venire ut sit *in* conspectu meo:" He has the boldness to come, with a view to be within my sight or presence. "Introrumpam ut sim *in* ædibus:" I will break forcibly inwards, with a view to be within the house. No mistake can ever arise from the irregularities above stated, by making the hearer suppose, that there is not quiescence within the spot expressed by the word governed in the accusative, or that there is motion within that expressed by the word governed in the ablative. The determinate force of each verb prevents the possibility of the speaker's meaning ever being misapprehended.

This power of *In*, by which it denotes motion directly into a particular place, is occasionally taken more vaguely, and translated "Towards." It is then equal to "Erga," and signifies the secret communication of something good from one object to another. "Obsequia *in* homines, ceremoniæ religio-nesque *in* Deos."—CIC. *De Leg.* 164. b. *In*, however, is in this use more general than "Erga," being equally applicable to the transmission of what is desirable, and of the contrary. "Impietas *in* Deos, injuria *in* homines."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 77. a.

Iniqui sunt patres *in* adolescentes.—TER. *Heaut.* 2. 1. 1.

In has also the force of "Versus," and denotes the direction of an object necessarily quiescent. "Spectant *in* septentriones et orientem solem."—CÆS. *B. G.* I. I. As the verb "Spectare" has the power of governing the accusative, the preposition, here, may be taken adverbially, and understood to have the power of the adjection "wards." They look "northwards" and "eastwards."

By extending this power of *In*, as resembling "Erga," other applications of it may be explained. As denoting the communication of what is favourable, it may be translated "To the advantage of," and in this use it is always joined with "Res" among the purer writers.

Quod si idem faceres, magis *in* rem et nostram et vostram id esset.

TER. *Hec.* 2. 2. 7.

“ Si negotium tantulum *in* rem suam convertisset.”—CIC. *pro Rosc. Am.* 39. The purity of the following passage from Tacitus, who applies the *In* to “ Fama,” as well as “ Res,” may be questioned. “ Coloniam copiis validam auferre Vitellio, *in* rem famamque videbatur.”—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 8. Under this view of *In*, also, may be explained that use in which it is translated “ In support of,” “ *In* eam sententiam multa dixit.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 2. 22.

In is sometimes translated “ Before,” and in this use the English regard the range of vision as lying before the eyes of the spectator ; while the Latin’s regard this range as limited, and having the spectator in the midst of it. “ *In* ore ejus jugulatur.”—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 78. “ *In* ore atque oculis Antonianæ classis per Agrippam Læucas expugnata.”—VELL. PAT. 2. 84. In the above instances, the eyes and the face are put for the field of vision, in which, as being before them, the former can operate. In English, the prepositions “ In ” and “ Before ” are taken in this sense at pleasure. We say, with equal propriety, to do any thing “ in,” or “ before,” the face and the eyes of mankind.

As the direction of looks and words towards the person seen and addressed insinuates motion, there is sometimes a change of the case in Latin, and of the preposition in English. Thus, in the former, Terence says, “ *In* os aliquem laudare,”—*Adelph.* 2. 4. 5. and we say, “ To praise a man to his face.” “ Quod *in* cernendi sensum caderet.”—CIC. *de Univ.* 196. b. “ Which might fall within the sense of sight.”

In is transferred to time, and, when it governs the ablative in this application, it suggests the time when any event took place, and has no reference to its duration. A certain extension is implied in the occurrence of every event; but the preposition, governing the ablative, suggests only the relation borne by the period, more or less accurately defined, to that immediately before, and to that immediately after it. “ Spreta *in* tempore gloria interdum cumulatorum redit.”—LIV. 2. 47. The period for the under-rating of glory is here limited by no precise boundary ; but the skilful in the conduct of life are capable of seizing it. “ *In* hoc spatium, et *in* iis post ædilitatem annis Prætor factus sum.”—

CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 195. a. There is a limitation of the time at which Brutus became prætor, being within what is implied in the words "hoc spatio," and that immediately succeeding his ædileship. So, also, in the following passage:

Fere *in* diebus paucis quibus hæc acta sunt,
Chrysis hæc moritur.——TER. *And.* 1. 1. 78.

In is occasionally taken as equal to our preposition "Upon." The Latins, in this acceptation, regard the motion leading to the place of support, and the English, the pressure of the body on that which supports it. "Filius *in* humeros suos extulit."—VAR. 2. 12. "Se interfectum *in* plaustrum a caupone conjectum esse."—CIC. *de Div.* 92. b. The shoulders of the parent are, in the first example, the place of reception for the son laid "upon" them; and the waggon, that in the second, for the dead body thrown "upon" it. The conception, in Latin, extends no farther than the motion leading to the place of rest; that, in English, passes over this, as if it had never existed, and regards only the pressure of a body, which, having moved, has changed its state, though it is then quiescent.

This idea of incumbency, or pressure, is transferred, figuratively, to objects having no weight, and then suggests that of power, or being over. "Pater habet potestatem *in* filium."—CIC. *de Inven.* 68. b. In English, the superiority of the father is suggested by "Over," by which he is understood to have it in his power to keep down the son, were he to rise up against him. In Latin, again, the son is regarded as the object to which the power of the father was, by the Roman law, directed. The power of Jupiter is, in the same way, said to be superior to that of kings, as theirs is to that of subjects.

Regum timendorum *in* proprios greges,
Reges *in* ipsos imperium est Jovis.——HOR. *Car.* 3. 1. 5.

When the object, specified by the verb, is understood to be brought to the object expressed by the word governed by the preposition, and then directed by it, the preposition *In* is translated "According to." "Judicium quin acciperet *in* ea ipsa verba, quæ Nævius edebat, non recusasse."—CIC. *pro Quin.* 11. b.

Is homo exornetur graphice peregrinum *in* modum.—PLAUT. *Trin.* 3. 3. 38.

The Latins regard the transportation of the correlative object to that, by which it is regulated, while the English regard the actual application of the former to this adopted standard.

It may appear, perhaps, that, in such an instance as the last, the ablative of “Modus,” as expressive of manner, might have served the purpose of the accusative, governed by *In*. The latter construction, however, expresses the idea more forcibly than the former. By the ablative, “Modo,” a casual or an incomplete resemblance between the mode, that was foreign, and that, which was usual, might have been announced; but the expression “*In* modum” intimates a voluntary departure from what is ordinary, within the observation of the agent, and the closest possible adoption of what is new and uncommon. The same purpose seems to be served, by the application of “De” to “Modo,” in the ablative.

Mollius, et solito matrum *de* more locuta est.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 357.

By suggesting the notion of a body quitting its place, by means of “De,” a similar effect is produced, as by the notion of a body tending towards another, by the application of *In*. The language of Amata, in the last example, suited her situation. It came from that, which was usual among mothers, and, of course, was regulated by it as a pattern.

In is taken to denote the end, or purpose, for which any thing is done, and, in that way, approaches in meaning to “Propter.” As the end of motion is to reach the point to which the moving body is directed, so, every cause whatever is presented under the idea of a tendency towards the production of its particular effect. “Nullam pecuniam Gabinio, nisi *in* rem militarem datam.”—CIC. *pro Rab. Post. C.* 12. “*In* hoc omnis hyperbole extenditur, ut ad verum mendacio veniat.”—SEN. *de Ben.* 7. 23.

Under the idea of shares of a whole passing from a former possessor and going to another, *In* is often used to announce such distributions. The shares are understood to be either equal, or regulated according to an established proportion. “Illud vero omnes *in* Epiro facimus, ne minus habeamus *in*

centenas hirtas, singulos homines, *in* pellitas, binos.”—VARR. *R. R.* 2. 2. “Titurius quaternos denarios *in* singulas vini amphoras, portorii nomine exegit.”—CIC. *pro Fon.* 278. a. In each of the above examples there is an established rate, according to which the distribution is conducted. Every hundred of those sheep, whose fleeces were exposed to the weather, had one keeper; and the same number of those, whose fleeces were covered, had two. The tax-gatherer exacted four denarii, in the way of custom, for every amphora, or nine gallons, of wine imported.

In is transferred to time, and denotes, either “against” some future period, or “during” another, either present or future, the length of which is fixed by the term governed. In the first of these acceptations, it denotes the interval between one point in duration and another, at which a certain event is to take place; and, in the last, it denotes the duration of the event, at whatever time it takes place. “Qui *in* proximum annum consulatum peteres.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 175. a.

Sumas *in* hunc diem, abi quo lubet.—PLAUT. *Stich.* 3. 1. 23.

In the first example, the event is future, and said to take place against next year; in the second, it is present, and said to continue during the day.

In both applications of *In*, it appears, that process in time is understood to correspond with the motion of a body in space, which requires the accusative. When *In* is translated “Against,” this process commences with the point at which the speaker foretells, or announces, what is to be, and ends with that at which his declaration should take effect. When it is translated “For,” or “During,” the process commences and terminates with the space, expressed by the term which it governs. In this last use, it may be translated “Until.”

Hesterno factere mero qui credit Acerram
Fallitur, *in* lucem semper Acerra bibit.—MART. 1. 29.

The point at which the drinking, which occasioned the smell, commenced, was yesterday's supper, and its termination is said to be at day-light. Acerra's revels, therefore, which did not end the day they began, lasted “for” so long a time, or “until” next morning.

When considering the effect of *In* compounded, we must regard it in a double capacity ; as expressing rest, and as expressing motion, or the immediate effect of it. In the first capacity it denotes,

I.

IN ; by which is implied rest in, or within, some limited space.

II.

AMONG. The relative position of objects lying at different distances, and in different directions, in respect to one not at their extremity, supplies the place of a boundary, that can inclose, by being unbroken or continuous.

III.

IN THE CASE OF ONE. In this use, a person is supposed to be kept apart from all others ; so that the affirmation, which holds true with regard to them, does not do so as to him.

IV.

IN THE POWER OF. The thing to be managed is understood to pass into, and to continue within, the range, in which the superintendant is entitled to direct.

V.

OUT OF. The vessel is regarded by the Latins as containing the liquor, while the English regard this liquor as passing "from," or "out of," the vessel into the mouth of the drinker.

As expressing motion, *In* is translated,

I.

INTO. This supposes, that the motion has commenced, but has not yet terminated in the arrival of the body moving, at the point to which it tends.

II.

TOWARDS. In this sense, it carries the force of "Erga," "Contra," and "Versus," and supposes the line of motion to be less direct than in its primary application.

III.

BEFORE. In this use, *In* is found both with the accusative and the ablative.

When the first case is adopted, the English regard the range of vision as before the spectator, and his eyes as directed towards it; while the Latins regard it as limited, and lying around him.

IV.

UPON, OVER. The Latins regard the previous motion, which leads to the point of rest; while the English regard the pressure, or incumbency, which ensues upon its arriving at it.

V.

ACCORDING TO. The Latins suppose, that the object, said to accord, moves towards the regulating standard; while the English suggest only the conformity of the one with the other.

VI.

TO THE END THAT. Under the idea of a body in motion, is suggested the direct tendency of a cause towards the production of its proper effect.

VII.

SO MUCH TO EACH. In distributing a subject capable of division, a certain portion is understood to pass to those receiving shares, according to any established rate.

VIII.

AGAINST and DURING a limited time. In the first of these meanings, the period of affirmation is understood to be opposed to that, at which the future event is to take place, and the same idea is suggested, in Latin, by the motion of a body from one point in space to another. In the second, the duration of an event is held forth by the continued motion of a body, beginning at the commencement, and ceasing at the end, of the space involved in the governed word.

When we view the effect of this preposition compounded, it must be regarded both as governing the ablative and the accusative. In both cases, it discovers the power that is radical in respect to each. The verb "Inambulare" signifies to walk, and the verb "Impasci" to feed, "in," or "within," a certain space. "Ante lucem *inambulabam* domi."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 99. b. "*In viridi opacaque ripa inambulant.*"—CIC. *de Legg.* 159. a. "*In ea loca perducendi sunt, quibus nullum impascitur pecus.*"—COLUM. 6. 5.

It is more uncommon, however, to find *In*, compounded, retaining its radical meaning when governing the ablative than the accusative. In the last case, the power of the verb, and that of the preposition, remain clearly distinct. Thus, "Inire domum," and "Ire in domum," excite the same conception, and are to be explained in the same way.

In, compounded, discovers the fourth power ascribed to it, when accompanied with an accusative case, and denotes "Upon," or "Over."

— *in* te omnis domus "inclinata" recumbit.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 59.

Herculi totus æther pondus "incubuit" leve.—SEN. *Herc. Oct.* 1764.

Quos super atra silex jam jam lapsura cadentique

"Imminet" assimilis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 602.

But *In*, when compounded, often discovers both a privative and an intensive power, operating upon the same root, which changes its meaning according as the preposition is taken at the time. Thus, in the case of the adjective "Infectus," the power of *In* is privative, and there is a negation of that, to which it is applied, being done: while in that of the participle "Infectus," the power is intensive, and there is an affirmation, that that, to which it is applied, is wrought into, so as to undergo a change in its nature. "Vitia elici difficile est. Non enim inquinati sumus; sed *infecti*."—SEN. *Ep.* 59. From this example it appears, that this last participle refers to nothing superficial, but to something that pervades the whole, and alters the nature of the mass. The tawny colour, that is produced by a hot sun, is supposed to be indelible, and deeper than the skin. "*Infecti* sole populi."—PLIN. 6. 19.

Infectus, as an adjective, shews its power in such instances as the following, and signifies "not made," or "unaccomplished."

Ea, quæ sunt facta, *infecta* refert.—PLAUT. 3. 2. 3.

— pariter facta atque *infecta* canebat.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 190.

The term "Inscriptus" appears in the same situation with "Infectus;" that is, both as a participle and an adjective, and exhibiting, in the preposition, both an intensive and a privative power. In the participle is to be seen the former, and in the adjective the latter, power. "Ut, si quæ essent incisæ aut *inscriptæ* literæ, tollerentur."—CIC. *pro Dom.* 53.

Dic quibus in terris *inscripti* nomina regum
Nascantur flores.-----VIRG. *Ecc.* 3. 106.

In the above instances, "Inscriptus" signifies "inscribed," or "written upon;" in the two that follow, it signifies "unwritten," "not recorded." "Greges ovium longe abiguntur ex Apulia in Sannium æstivatum, atque ad publicanum profitentur, ne si *inscriptum* pecus paverint, lege censoria committant."—VAR. R. R. 2. 1. " *Inscriptum* ex portu exportant clanculum, ne portorium dent."—LUCIL. *apud Non.* 1. 169. There is the same difference between "Inscriptus," as an adjective and a participle, that there is between the Greek words *Ἐγγραφα* και *αγραφα*.

In the case of words which have different meanings, according to the supposed power of the preposition, the critics are not always agreed in which it ought to be taken at the time. Thus, at the beginning of the 12th book of the Æneid, Servius takes the participle "Infractus," signifying "broken," or "dispirited," as if it were an adjective, and signified "unbroken."

Turnus ut *infractus* adverso Marte Latinos,
Defecisse videt.

The ablest grammarians condemn this acceptation as unnatural, and inconsistent with the general meaning. "Infractus" is used as an adjective, and as equal to "non fractus," only by such writers as Symmachus and Hieronymus, whose authority is not to be trusted. But though this use were more justifiable, it could not, in the present case, be adopted by Turnus. The discouraged state of mind, expressed in the participle, is evidently the cause of that failure involved in "Defecisse," and both made him adhere to the resolution of continuing the struggle.

According as the preposition, in the word "Incensus," is intensive or privative, not only the meaning, but the etymology, of the term changes. The first power appears always in the participle, and the last in the adjective. *Incensus*, from "Incendere," signifies "burnt." The same word, in point of sound, when a compound of "In" and "Census," the participle of the verb "Censere," signifies "not rated;" that is, not being in the censor's roll. "Censu perfecto, quem maturaverat metu legis de *incensis*."—LIV. 1. 44.

INANIS, VACUUS, CASSUS,

agree, in denoting, that a space, which might have been occupied, is void, but differ, in supposing that the voidness which is the present, may be the constant quality of the space, or that it is only contingent. *INANIS* signifies the absence of a material substance, from a space capable of containing it, without any regard to the past or the future state of that which is void. “*Vas inane cum dicimus, non ita loquimur ut physici, quibus inane nihil placet, sed ita ut verbi gratia, sine aqua, sine vino, sine oleo, vas esse dicamus.*”—*CIC. de Fat.* 145. a. The vessel, here mentioned, was supposed to be in the state *Inanis*, when it contained no fluid, such as water, wine, or oil. Nothing could be inferred from its present, as to its past or its future state, with each of which fulness and emptiness are understood to be equally consistent. “*Tunc inane quicquam putas esse? cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movelitur corporum cedat, et qua quicquam cesserit, aliud illico subsequatur.*”—*CIC. Acad.* 31. b. In the former example, Cicero was speaking according to the ideas of ordinary men; but in this, he speaks according to those of certain philosophers who affirmed, that nature abhors a void.

Ego bajulabo : tu, ut decet dominum, ante me ito *inanis*.—*PLAUT. Asin.* 3. 3. 70.

The term *Inanis* denotes only the state of one carrying nothing, but does not infer any thing but what respects the time at which the slave made the offer, and the young gentleman may be understood to accept it. “*Quem posteaquam inanem locum offenderunt, et prætorem commovisse ex eo loco castra senserunt.*”—*CIC. in. Ver.* 5. 96. By means of the first member of the sentence, we are told that this place was void, and nothing is insinuated as to its having been before occupied : by means of the second, however, this defect is made up, and the fact respecting the removal of the prætor is formally told.

VACUUS differs from “*Inanis*,” in implying that the voidness, existing at the time, is but occasional, and that the object qualified has often been, and will often be, in a state totally different from its present one. The expression, “*Equus inanis*” denotes a horse upon which there is no rider, but has no reference to this horse, as having been before, or being afterwards to be, ridden.

Thus, Cicero says, "Eadem de causa equum "inanem" reliquerunt."—*In Ver.* 2. 160. The expression "Equus *vacuus*," again, denotes a spare horse, and refers to the animal, as occasionally unemployed. Like "Inanis," it implies, that the horse has no rider, but it suggests, that his present is not like his former state, which may be quickly resumed. "Et invicem prolapsorum equitum *vacuos* capientium ad pugnam equos."—*Liv.* 44. 26. The horses are supposed to be in the state *vacui*, only when their riders fell; but this state was soon to be changed, by means of others taking their place.

Paulo ante *vacua* turbam deficient loca.—*PHÆD.* 5. 5. 12.

Ut nec vela videt, *vacuum* petit anxia lectum,

Seque toro ponit: renovat lectusque locusque

Halcyonæ lacrymas: et quæ pars, admonet, absit.—*OVID. Met.* 11. 62.

The distress of Halcyone, when the ship which carried off her husband was no longer to be seen from the shore, is here beautifully painted. Her bed is said to be *Vacuus*, because Ceyx was not at home to take his part of it. He might return to occupy the vacant place, but still he was exposed to the dangers of the sea.

The figurative meanings of *Vacuus* all accord with the literal, in referring to an occasional state.

—— his verbis *vacuas* permulceat aures.—*HOR. Ep.* 16. 26.

Poscimus, si quid *vacui* sub umbra

Lusimus tecum.—*HOR. Od.* 32. *Lib.* 1.

The ears, thus to be soothed, were then engaged in hearing nothing else, and the people in the shade were, for the time, at perfect leisure, however much they had been, or might be, employed.

When "Inanis" and *Vacuus* are applied to the same object, they seem to denote different degrees of emptiness. "Inde navigia "inania" et *vacua*, hinc plena atque onusta mittantur."—*PLIN. Pan.* 31. The ships said to be "Inania" had no cargo at all, and are opposed to the "Plena," which had; those said to be *Vacua*, again, though not empty, might have space to spare, and are opposed to the "Onusta," which were deeply laden.

CASSUS agrees with "Vacuus," in implying, that the voidness expressed by

it did not always exist, but differs from it, in implying, that it will continue for ever. It denotes a deprivation that is not occasional, because, when once it occurs, it cannot be removed. It differs from "Inanis" in supposing, that what is void at the time has necessarily been occupied before.

Eripiet quisvis oculos citius mihi quam te,
Contentum *cassa* nuce pauperet.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 5. 35.

The nut, without the kernel, did not always want, but will, for certain, never acquire it. A voidness, superinduced by a corruption, or a disease of the fruit, can only be expressed by *Cassus*. It had not taken place during all past time, as "Inanis" might imply, and it is not occasional, as "Vacuus" necessarily does.

— nec autem
Cassum anima corpus durare et sensibus uti.—LUCRET. 3. 560.
— nunc *cassum* lumine lugent.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 85.

Ted amatorem inventum esse "inanem," quasi *cassam* nucem.
PLAUT. *Pseud.* 1. 3. 137.

In the last example "Inanis" is taken, figuratively, to denote insignificant. When Ballio compares Calidorus to a nut without a kernel, he suggests, that he was a person not to be trusted, and one who would disappoint the expectations formed with regard to him. When "Inanis" and *Cassus* specify the same object in their literal acceptations, which happens but seldom, the former can only intimate, that the object specified had never been full, and the latter, that it never will be so. "Retonsarum vero etiam semel, (segetum) omnino certum est, granum longius fieri, sed "inane" *cassumque*, ac satum non nasci."—PLIN. 18. 17. 545.

INCHOARE—*vide* CÆPISSE. INDICIUM—*vide* SIGNUM.
INCOLA—*vide* ACCOLA.

INDIGNUS, IMMERENS,

agree, in denoting unworthiness; but the former is applicable to good and to evil, the latter to evil alone. "Calamitates hominum *indignorum* sublevare."
—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 5. 45.

Indignis si male dicitur, maledictum id esse dico.—PLAUT. *Curc.* 4. 2. 27.
Cur eget indignus quisquam te divite?—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 103.

In the above examples, there is a reference to an undeserved evil. “Cæsar te omni honore *indignissimum* judicat.”—CIC. *in Vat.* 36. b.

Indignissimus tanto nato.—STAT. *Theb.* 11. 304.

In the two last, there is a reference to an undeserved good.

IMMERENS, again, refers to an evil, and never to a good. “Honestissimum credidi non premere *immerentem*.”—PLIN. *Ep.* 3. 9. “Multumque conquestus eripi sibi vitam *immerenti*.”—SUET. *Vesp.* 10.

Ut *immerentis* fluxit in terram Remi,
 Sacer nepotibus cruor.———HOR. *Epod.* 7. 19.
 Te, triste lignum, te caducum
 In domini caput *immerentis*.———HOR. *Car.* 2. 13. 11.

In the above, and all other applications of *Immerens*, it suggests only a misfortune undeserved. The preposition “In” affects the verb “Merere,” which respects both rewards and punishments, in such a way as to limit its power, in the compound, solely to the latter.

INDOLES, INGENIUM,

agree, in denoting an innate quality of mind, but differ, as the former regards the dispositions of the heart, as susceptible either of improvement or of corruption, and the latter, the powers of the understanding as they exist. The first noun is derived from “Inolesco,” and may refer to the discovery of the nature of a substance by the sense of smell. Servius defines *Indoles*, “Proprie imago quædam futuræ virtutis.”—*Ad Æn.* 10. 826. Had he defined it a quality, from which the existence of future vices, as well as virtues, might be inferred, he would have been supported by the following passage from Livy respecting Hannibal. “Cum hac *indole* virtutum ac vitiorum sub Asdrubale meruit.”—21. 4. “Idque primum nonnullius *indolis* dedi specimen.”—PLIN. *Ep.* 3. 11. “Ita sæpe magna *indoles* virtutis, priusquam reipublicæ prodesse potuisset, extincta fuit.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 203. b.

Lætitia juvenem, frons decet tristis senem.
 Quid te coerces, et necas rectam *indolem*?—SEN. *Hip.* 453.
 Sensere quid mens rite, quid *indoles*,
 Nutrita faustis sub penetralibus
 Posset, quid Augusti paternus
 In pueros animus Neronis.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 4. 25.

As *Indoles*, when applied to young men, presents a circumstance from which future worth, or depravity, is inferred, so, when applied to men in advanced life, it suggests the existence of such qualities not yet called forth. “Homines, in quibus est virtutis *indoles*, commoventur.”—CIC. *de Off.* 55. a.

INGENIUM differs from “*Indoles*,” in referring to a quality that is expressive of the absolute strength of intellectual power, and is to be regarded as no indication either of its probable increase or diminution. Coming from “*Ingenitus*,” it evidently suggests a quality that is innate. “Ut hominis decus est *ingenium*, sic *ingenii* lumen est eloquentia.”—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 169. b. Here, intellectual talent is said to be the ornament of man, and eloquence the instrument by which that talent becomes visible. “In eo *ingenium* ejus elucere videbatis: quod sæpe, etiam si industria non alitur, valet tamen ipsum suis viribus.”—CIC. *pro Cæl.* 47. a. Though the power, denoted by *Ingenium*, be influenced by that industry, which increases the capacity, and multiplies the opportunities of exerting it, yet it is not on that account to be regarded as a symptom of any talent not yet unfolded, such as that implied in “*Indoles*.” “*Alere*,” applied to mind, in the above instance, suggests the maintenance, not the increase, of its powers. “*Ingenii* celeres quidam motus esse debent, qui ad excogitandum acuti, et ad explicandum ornandumque sint uberes.”—CIC. *de Or.* 49. a.

Novi “*indolem*” nostri *ingenii*, cito erit parata navis.—PLAUT. *Mil.* 3. 3. 46.

A conjecture is here formed respecting a future event, and, from the knowledge possessed of the extent of the *Ingenium*, a certain consequence is deemed probable.

INDUSTRIA, DILIGENTIA, SOLERTIA,

agree, in denoting active exertion; but the first refers to patience under

labour, as agreeable to the person exerting ; the second, to attachment to the subject of it ; and the third, to skill in the work. *INDUSTRIA* expresses a talent for, and a delight in, drudgery, without regard to the pursuit ; while “*Diligentia*” expresses assiduous application to an object that is selected as according with the disposition of the person who pursues it. *Industrius*, with which the Greek word *Φιλοπονός* corresponds, is, by Festus, derived from “*In-dostruere*,” contracted into “*Instruere*,” and signifies a steady and considerate improvement of some talent, or advantage, given by nature. “*Ingenium sæpe, etiam si industria non alitur, valet tamen ipsum suis viribus : sed inerat ratio et bonis artibus instituta, et cura et vigiliis elaborata.*”—*CIC. pro Cæl. 19.* “*Tanta autem industria est, tantumque evigilat in studio, ut non maximo ingenio, quod in eo summum est, gratia habenda videatur.*”—*CIC. Ep. ad Brut. 15.* “*Nihil huc nisi perfectum ingenio, elaboratum industria afferri oportere.*”—*CIC. pro Leg. Manil. C. 1.*

Atque hæc celamus nos damna, *industria*,

Cum rem fidemque nosque nosmet perdimus.—*PLAUT. Truc. 1. 1. 37.*

In all the above instances, *Industria* denotes the unremitting pains taken to effect some purpose.

DILIGENTIA is clearly distinguished from “*Industria*,” by Cicero, in the following and in other examples. “*Demosthenes impedimenta naturæ diligentia “industriæque” superavit.*”—*CIC. de Or. 108. a.* The two qualities, it appears, may exist together as well as apart. By the use of “*Industria*,” Cicero suggests the absolute labour undergone by Demosthenes as the means for accomplishing his end ; by that of *Diligentia*, he suggests something new, namely, the alleviation of that labour, from attachment to the science, in which he became unrivalled.

Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem.—*HOR. Sat. 2. 2. 12.*

“*Enitar ne desideres aut “industriam” meam, aut diligentiam.*”—*CIC. Ep. ad Att. 15. 13.* “*Vos, pro mea summa et vobis cognita in rempublicam diligentia, moneo.*”—*CIC. pro Mur. 86.* The orator, here, values himself, not upon his industry, or patience under labour, but upon his attachment to the state,

on account of which his talent was exerted. The idea of selecting the object, upon which *Diligentia* is exerted, is manifest in the adverb, with which it is connected. “Et sæpe idoneis hominibus indigentibus de re familiari impertendum: sed *diligenter* et moderate.”—CIC. *de Off.* 44. a. By means of *Diligenter*, a due discrimination of the objects of charity is recommended. “Nam qui fortasse de alieno negligentes, de suo certe *diligentes* erunt.”—PLIN. *Ep.* 4. 13. As “Negligens” denotes neglect, from indifference as to the object, so *Diligens* denotes care, from regard to it. The definition given, by Popma, of the two terms, seems to be well founded. “*Diligentia* est in diligendo et discernendo: “*Industria*” versatur in agendo; alterum est ingenii et iudicii, alterum laboris atque operæ.”

SOLERTIA differs from the two former terms, in referring to the skill of the agent in the work which engages him. Like “Iners,” it comes from “Ars.” “Nulla ars imitari *solertiam* naturæ potest.”—CIC. *Divin.* 41. Nature is here said to be singular in her performances, and to baffle every attempt of art to rival them. It is compounded of “Solutus,” and supposes the workman to be unrivalled in his art. Such was Marcus Piso as a critic. “Marci Pisonis acumen in reprehendendis verbis versutum et *solers*.”—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 186. a. “Tum eum dixisse, mirari se non modo “*diligentiam*,” sed etiam *solertiam* ejus, a quo essent illa dimensa et descripta.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 89. b. The compliment of Lysander to Cyrus reaches farther than to a laudable attachment to an useful art. It implies, that he was deeply skilled in agriculture, and capable of doing in it what few, if any, could execute.

INEDIA—*vide* JEJUNIUM.

INFANDUS—*vide* NEFANDUS.

INERTIA—*vide* PIGRITIA.

INFANS—*vide* MUTUS.

INFAMIA—*vide* IGNOMINIA.

INFITIARI—*vide* NEGARE.

INFRA

denotes the relation which one object bears to another, as being beneath it, or lower in position. It is opposed to “Supra,” which denotes a contrary relation. “Supra” lunam sunt omnia æterna, *infra* autem nihil est nisi mortale.”

—CIC. *Som. Scip.* 128. b. “Stomachi partes quæ sunt *infra* id quod devoratur, dilatantur: quæ autem “supra,” contrahuntur.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 53. a.

The preposition has no reference to the incumbency of the superior body, but expresses the relation of the lower, by referring the correlative conceptions, expressed in “over” and “under,” to some standard, real or imaginary. In the first example, accordingly, it is by referring to the moon’s orbit, as intermediate, that the superiority of things above, and the inferiority of things beneath it, is estimated. The medium size of soldiers, in a regiment, presents the standard, which measures the excess of the tallest, expressed by “Supra,” and the deficiency of the lowest, in stature, which may, with equal propriety, be expressed by *Infra*.

— ipse catervis

Vertitur in mediis, et toto vertice “supra” est.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 603.

The inferiority, which *Infra* denotes, in respect to the position of material objects, is transferred to intellectual, and in these signifies something not so good as in those opposed to them. As he, who exerts his muscular strength, does so with most advantage if he stands higher than his antagonist, and as the contrary must take place if he stands lower, so this advantage, and disadvantage, is transferred, in idea, to objects, to which, in its literal sense, it is inapplicable.

— quamvis

Infra Lucili censum ingeniumque.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 1. 75.

Face tu, quem ego esse *infra* infimos omnes puto

Homines.—TER. *Eun.* 3. 2. 36.

Infra is taken to denote what is called “down,” upon a surface that is horizontal, and neither elevated nor depressed at particular parts. The Roman “Triclinium” was not raised at the top, nor lowered at the foot, and yet the person at the one end was said to be the “Summus conviva,” and he at the other “Imus.” It does not appear that the place at the supposed top was the most honourable. As the Romans reclined upon their left elbow, the “Conviva ad dextram” was *Infra*, in respect to the “Conviva summus,” and

yet occupied the place which was the most dignified, and, as such, given to the ladies. “*Infra* Eutrapelum Cytheris accubuit.”—CIC. *Fp. Fam.* 143. a.

Nomentanus erat super ipsum, Porcius *infra*.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 8. 20.

The number, governed by *Infra*, is, by Pliny, stated as an aggregate, of which the correlative number is an undefined, but necessarily a smaller, part. In this sense, *Infra* is translated “Fewer than.” “Ova incubari *infra* decem dies edita utilissimum est: vetera aut recentiora infecunda.”—PLIN. 10. 54. In respect to the “Ova vetera,” there is no limitation, and they may be any number of days older than ten. The “Recentiora” refer to those newly laid, which are declared to be less productive than those that have been kept a few days, though not so many as ten. The natural historian makes elsewhere the same use of the ordinal, that he does here of the cardinal, number. “Vulnera recentia conglutinant terreni; adeo ut nervos quoque abscissos illis solidari *infra* septimum diem persuasum sit.”—PLIN. 30. 13.

We find *Infra* transferred, by Cicero, to time, and signifying “After.” The period is involved in the name of a person, and supposed to be known by those to whom it is suggested. No specification of the time is given but this, that it was posterior to another, in which this person lived. “Homerus non *infra* superiorem Lycurgum fuit.”—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 168. a. The principle, upon which time is fixed by *Infra*, is exactly similar to that used in its application to number. The interval between the time, at which the affirmation was made by Cicero, and the days of the elder Lycurgus, was known; and it is asserted, that Homer did not live during any part of that intervening period.

INFRA, then, may be translated in the following ways:

I.

UNDER; expressing inferiority in one object, in respect to another above it in space.

II.

LESS CONSIDERABLE; expressing inferiority in respect to things not susceptible of local situation.

III.

BELOW; that is, being nearer one of the ends of a surface that is horizontal than another person is, whatever conventional notions may be affixed to the circumstance of being near either the one or the other.

IV.

FEWER THAN. The correlative number is in this use undefined, and always smaller than that implied in the numeral agreeing with the governed word.

V.

AFTER. The time at which the affirmation is made, and that at which a certain person lived, form the two extremities of a determined period, and to the latter of these the event is said to be posterior, though it is not said how much.

INGENUUM—*vide* INDOLES.

INOPIA—*vide* PAUPERAS.

INIMICUS—*vide* HOSTIS.

INQUILLINUS—*vide* COLONUS.

INNUPTA—*vide* CÆLIBS.

INSANIA, FUROR, RABIES,

agree, in denoting mental derangement, but differ, in respect to its extent. The first, from "Insania," denotes, properly, the absence of soundness of mind, but does not necessarily imply that state of it, in which a person is denominated mad. "*Insaniam enim censuerunt, id est inconstantiam sanitate vacantem, posse tamen tueri mediocritatem officiorum et vitæ communem cultum atque usitatum.*"—Cic. *Q. Tusc.* 191. b. *Insania* implies more than "Stultitia," which last is not inconsistent with soundness of mind.

Ille homines procerus ex "stultis" insanias facit.—Ter. *Ros.* 2. 2. 29.

Though the degree of derangement, implied in *Insania*, is strictly limited, yet it admits a latitude which allows comparison. "Nemo est inter eos, qui ipsi quoque insaniant, insanissimus."—Cic. *pro S. N. Ros.* 23. a.

FUROR differs from "Insania," in implying a greater mental derangement, and such as disqualifies a man from performing the ordinary duties of life.

“Hanc “insaniam,” quæ juncta stultitiæ patet latus, a *furore* distinguimus. Qui ita affectus sit, cum dominum esse rerum suarum vetant duodecim tabule. Itaque non est scriptum si “insanus,” sed si *furiosus* esse incipit. *Furorem* autem esse rati sunt, mentis ad omnia excitatem.”—Cic. *Q. Tusc.* 192. b. The *Furor*, we are told by Cicero in the same passage, may occasionally belong to a wise man; but the “Insania” cannot. He adds, “Quod cum majus esse videatur quam “insania,” tamen ejusmodi est, ut *furore* in sapientem cadere possit, non possit “insania:” quia *furore* intermittitur aliquando, “insania” perpetua est.”

RABIES differs from the two former nouns, in denoting a still higher derangement, and the operation of a rage that is ungovernable. In its original meaning, it has expressed the madness of dogs, from which it has been transferred to that state of mind, in which reason is extinguished. It supposes, that the rage admits of no paroxysm, but always exists in the greatest possible degree. Pliny, speaking of man, and comparing him with other animals, says, “Nulli rerum omnium libido major, nulli pavor confusior, nulli *rabies* acrior.”—PLIN. 5. *sub fin.* “Hecubam autem putant, propter animi acerbitatem quandam et *rabie*m, fingi in canem esse conversam.”—Cic. *Q. Tusc.* 204. a. “Ex dolore in *rabie*m effëratus, tollit clamorem.”—PETRON. *C.* 94.

— et *rabie* jecur incendente feruntur

Præcipites i ut saxa jugia abrupta, quibus mons

Subtrahitur, clivoque latus pendente recedit.—Juv. *Sat.* 6. 647.

INSANIRE—*vide* DELIRARE.

INSIMULARE—*vide* CRIMINARI.

INSOMNIS, VIGIL,

agree, in denoting wakefulness, but differ, in respect to the cause from which it proceeds. The first, from “In” and “Somnus,” denotes the want of sleep, from disease, or from fear, or any strong mental emotion. “Et explorato, jam profectos amicos, noctem quietam, utque affirmatur, non *insomnem* egit.”—TAC. *Hist.* 2. 49. Though, in the case of Otho, before he killed himself, there was a cause for want of sleep, yet the cause, it should seem, was too feeble, and he did enjoy it.

Collucent ignes : noctem custodia ducit
Insomnem ludo.———VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 166.

Here, the guards pass a sleepless night, not from disease or fear, but from excessive mirth.

—— ille notis actus ad Oricum
 Post insana Capræ sidera, frigidus
 Noctes non sine multis
Insomnis lacrymis agit.———HOR. *Car.* 3. 7. 5.

Such was the distress of Gyges, in the absence of Asteria, that it robbed him of his rest.

From *Insomnis* comes “*Insomnia*,” as an abstract, which signifies restlessness. “*Incitabatur insomnia maxime ; neque enim plus quam tribus nocturnis horis quiescebat.*”—SÜET. *Cal.* 50. “*Captivos insomnia cruciatos interiisse.*”—GELL. 4. 6. *Insomnium*, again, which appears generally in the plural number, only signifies the dream, which gives uneasiness during sleep, and thereby breaks it. “*Caret ergo etiam vinolentia, et cruditate, et insomniis.*”—CIC. *de Sen.* 86. a.

Dii meliora ferant, nec sint insomnia vera.—TIBULL. 3. 4. 1.

VIGIL differs from “*Insomnis*,” in implying, that the want of sleep proceeds from a sense of duty, leading to a disposition to watch.

Quaque *vigil* custos, præcriturus eram.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 3. 612.
 —— invenies, tu tantum providus astu
 Tende animum *vigilem.*———STAT. *Achill.* 1. 543.
 Monstrum horrendum, ingens : cui quot sunt corpore plumæ,
 Tot *vigiles* oculi subter,——
 Nocte volat, cœli medio terræque per umbram
 Stridens, nec dulci declinat luminat somno.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 181.

From this inimitable and picturesque description of Fame, the correctness of the definition of *Vigil*, on which term its merit rests, may be inferred. “*Nox per diversa iniquis : cum barbari festis epulis, lato cantu, aut truci sonore, subjecta vallium ac resultantis saltus complerent ; apud Romanos invalidi ignes, interruptæ voces, atque ipsi passim adjacerent vallo, oberrarent tentoriis, “insomnes” magis quam pervigiles, ducemque terruit dira quies.*”—TAC. *Ann.* 1. 65. The Germans were “*insomnes*” entirely, as they wanted sleep by

a voluntary indulgence in the joys of a feast. With the Romans, however, the case was not similar. They were restless from anxiety, though they did not observe the same regularity in their watches, for which they were in general remarkable.

INSTARE, IMPENDERE, IMMINERE,

agree, in denoting the nearness of one object to another, but differ, in respect to the manner in which that nearness is effected. *INSTARE* implies the greatest nearness, and such as is effected by the previous motion of the body said to be in the state denoted by it. "*Quæ venientia metuuntur, eadem efficiunt ægritudinem instantia.*"—*CIC. Q. Tusc.* 211. b. The termination of the approach, or the state of proximity effected by it, is the cause of that distress, which was preceded by fear. "*Marcellus ubi lux fugam aperuit, vestigiis institit sequi.*"—*LIV.* 27. 2. Here, the commander had resolved, by rapid motion, to get into that situation, in respect to his enemy, which is expressed by *Instare*.

Instare, in its original meaning, signifies "to stand upon;" and from this, nearness, in any direction, is inferred.

— *instare jugis et grandia volvere saxa.*—*VIRG. Æn.* 11. 529.

"*Instans in medio triclinio, adstante lictore, singulos valere dicentes appellavit.*"—*SUET. in Tiber.* 72. The original meaning is always to be seen in the figurative, more or less clearly. "*Quibus ego confido pœnas aut instare jam plane, aut certe appropinquare.*"—*CIC. in Cat.* 106. b. In this example it appears, that the degree of nearness, implied in *Instare*, is greater than that in "*Appropinquare.*" The former denotes the greatest possible, and suggests, that one step farther would bring the bodies into such a state, that the one would support the other. "*Galli instant atque urgent summo cum studio.*"—*CIC. pro Font.* 283. a. "*Instat enim et urget, et quocunque te verteris, persequitur.*"—*CIC. de Div.* 139. a.

IMPENDERE differs from "*Instare*," in implying, that the nearness between the two objects is not the greatest possible, and that this nearness is not effected

by previous motion, but by the one being hung over the other. Gesner says, "*Impendere* plus quam "instare" est; supra caput veluti casurum pendere." That the last part of the assertion is true, appears in the two following applications of the verb. "Gladium e lacunari, seta equina aptum, demitti jussit, ut *impenderet* illius beati cervicibus."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 5. 21. "Poetæ *impendere* apud inferos saxum Tantalò faciunt."—CIC. *de Fin.* 61. a. It may be supposed, too, that the person under the suspended body may have a strong sense of his danger, and that *Impendere* may, on that account, be deemed a more forcible word than "Instare." This seems to be the case in the anticlimax that follows, and before quoted in part. "Quibus ego confido *impendere* fatum aliquod, aut "instare" jam plane aut certe jam appropinquare."—CIC. *in Cat.* 2. 11. *Impendere* is taken to denote the inevitable approach of any future evil. "Tum vidi quanta reipublicæ procella *impenderet*."—CIC. *de Ar. Resp.* 4. 3.

Impendere sometimes signifies nearness simply, without regard to the danger arising from suspension in the object. "*Impendebat* mons altissimus, ut facile perpauci prohibere possent."—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 6.

IMMINERE differs from "*Impendere*," in supposing, that the body is not suspended over the person, whom it is understood to be near, but is supported from the ground, and inclines, like a cliff, from the perpendicular, so as to threaten a fall. It comes from "In" and the obsolete verb "Mineo," which Lucretius alone uses, and which has much the same meaning with itself.

Inclinata "minent," in eandem prodita partem.—Luc. 6. 562.

"Ad hoc stipatum tribunal, atque etiam ex superiore Basilicæ parte, qua fœminæ, qua viri, et audiendi quod difficile, et quod facile videndi studio, *imminebant*."—PLIN. *Ep.* 6. 33. The verb *Imminere*, in its figurative sense, carries in it the idea of danger, or of a threat, more than any of the other two. "Instabat" agmen Cæsaris, atque universum *imminebat*."—CÆS. *de Bel. Gal.* 80. The first verb expresses the exertion of Cæsar's army, and its success in getting near the enemy; and the latter, the inevitable danger to which the enemy was thereby exposed. "Qua ex re primum caritas nata est: deinde inopia.

“Impendebat” fames, incendia, cædes, direptio: *imminebat* tuus furor omnium fortunis et bonis.”—CIC. *pro Dom.* 218. a. The famine, the fires, the slaughter, the plundering, were all contingencies that were seen with uneasiness; but the madness of Clodius was more alarming, as it threatened immediate destruction to the property of every Roman citizen.

INSTITOR—*vide* MERCATOR. INSTITUERE—*vide* DOCERE.

INTER

holds of “In,” as its root, and being rendered indefinite, from being compounded, expresses imperfect inclosure. It expresses that relation which one or more objects bear to a number, that are on different sides of them. The difference between “Circa” and *Inter* has been explained at length. The former intimates, that the central body occupies a particular point in respect to those, by which it may be partly or entirely surrounded; the latter denotes, that the correlative body, or bodies, do not form the extremities of three, or of any greater number.

Inter, in its radical meaning, signifies “Between” and “Among.” It denotes the former, when the interjacent object lies in a line that is direct, or nearly so, between two, not necessarily equally distant from it. It denotes the latter, when the correlative object is not at the extremity of a group, the constituents of which may lie at different distances, and must lie in different directions, from itself.

As denoting “Between,” the interjacent object may occupy either the whole space between the extreme ones, or only a part of it. “Ager qui *inter* urbem et Tiberim est, consecratus Marti fuit.”—LIV. 2. 5. “Is queritur Brundisium me non venisse, cum *inter* me et Brundisium Cæsar est?”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 135. b.

Inter me et te est murus.—PLAUT. *Pæn.* 5. 4. 21.

In the first example, the intermediate object comprehends the whole space between the city and the Tyber; in the two that follow, it is no more than the breadth of a wall, or the size of a person.

When *Inter* signifies "Among," there is no limitation of the number of objects governed, after it has necessarily exceeded two, and there may be either one or many correlative ones. One person, or several persons, may be "among," or beset by, a number of others. "Furere apud sanos, et quasi *inter* sobrios bacchari, vinolentus videtur."—CIC. *Orat.* 205. b. "Lucium Ennium equitem Romanum, majestatis postulatum, recipi Cæsar *inter* reos vetuit."—TAC. *Ann.* 3. 70.

Inter, in this its radical sense, is frequently found repeated, and it is not easy to see the purpose served by the repetition. Did this practice subsist among the poets alone, it might be deemed one of their licences, and adopted, at times, to suit their versification; but the authority of Cicero often justifies the seeming liberty. "Ut nihil *inter* te atque *inter* quadrupedem aliquam putes interesse."—CIC. *Parad.* 1. "Quid intersit *inter* popularem, id est assentatorem et levem civem, et *inter* constantem, severum, gravem."—CIC. *de Am.* 113. b.

— Nestor componere lites

Inter Peliden festinat, et *inter* Atriden.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 11.

It does not appear that, in the above instances, any new meaning is super-added by the last *Inter*. The repetition of it may therefore be regarded as an authorized pleonasm in the Latin language.

As "In" is taken to denote "Among," so is *Inter* taken to denote "In." The imperfect boundary, suggested by *Inter*, and formed by the relative position of objects, lying at different distances, and in different directions, in respect to one, is put for a regular inclosure, and a thoroughly limited space. When thus taken, *Inter*, both in a literal and a figurative sense, is equal to "In." "Ut alius *inter* manus e convivio, tanquam e prælio, auferretur."—CIC. *in Ver.* 241. b. "Inter novam rem verbum usurpabo vetus."—PLAUT. *Cist.* 2. 1. 28. "Tibicines *inter* exercitum positi canere inceperant."—AUL. GELL. 1. 11.

Inter sometimes carries in it the force of "Ad," and is translated "To." In this use the Latins regard the relative situation of a person, in respect to a number of objects, after his arrival at a certain point, and the English regard

the motion that previously led to it. "Dico te, priori nocte venisse, *inter* falcarios in M. Leccæ domum."—CIC. *in Cat.* 99. b.

— nunc te mea dextera bello

Defensum dabit, et magna *inter* præmia ducet.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 436.

It is not to be understood, in the first instance, that Catiline came in the midst of those armed with falchions to the house of Lecca, but that he came to those people who were in this house.

Inter is transferred to time, and then signifies "During." When so used, the word governed by it involves in itself a period; more or less accurately specified; in the currency of which the event spoken of takes place. It carries no analogy to "Between," by denoting two distinct points in duration; but the existence of the event is said to continue from the commencement to the end of the space, expressed by the governed word.

Quot prandia *inter* continuum perdidit triennium?—PLAUT. *Stich.* 1. 3. 61.

The day before the commencement, and that after the termination, of the three years, limit precisely the space, within which the dinners were lost. "Hæc *inter* cœnam Tironi dictavi."—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 3. 1. As the time of a Roman "cœna" might be shortened, or prolonged, according to the inclination of those who partook in it, the absolute space here stated cannot be strictly defined.

Tityre, dum redéo, brevis est via, pasce capellas :

Et potum pastas age, Tityre, et *inter* agendum

Occursare capro, cornu ferit ille, caveto.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 9. 23.

It depended upon the distance between the pastures and the water, and upon the speed with which Tityrus drove those "olentis uxores mariti," whether the time, during which Mæris tells him he was exposed to danger from the he-goat, was long or short.

Inter, in composition, shews its radical power unaltered, in certain instances, as much as "In." "*Interjacebat* campus: colles imminebant nudi."—LIV. 27. 41. "A regione quæ duas syrtes *interjacet*."—PLIN. 5. 4. These expressions are just equal to "jacere *inter* colles et *inter* syrtes." The intervening

object, besides, may be either in motion or at rest. “Misimus tres principes civitatis qui *intercurrerent*.”—CIC. *in Anton.* 217. b. “Flumine medium oppidum *interfluente*.”—PLIN. 36. 14.

In the case of compounded substantives, one of the correlative terms is annexed to the preposition, and the other is implied. Thus, “Intervallum” originally denotes that surface, which lay between the rampart and the tents in a Roman camp, though afterwards taken to denote any interval, in respect either to space or time. The same conception might have been given by “Intercontubernia,” had the Romans chosen to compound the one in place of the other term. In some cases, the relative and the correlative terms are the same. Thus “Interlunium,” which is just equal to the expression “*Inter lunam et lunam*,” signifies the time between the new and the old moon, when none appears.

An intensive power, in composition, is ascribed, by Donatus, to *Inter*, which can hardly be inferred from the passage on which he comments.

— præterea tибicinam,
 Quæ mihi *interbibere* sola, si vino scatet,
 Corinthiensem fontem Pyrenen potest.—PLAUT. *Aul.* 3. 6. 29.

It may be doubted whether “Interbibere” presents this woman drinking up the whole fountain, or coming between it and Euclio, and preventing him from using it. The “mihi” certainly refers to the speaker, from whom the liquor was to be taken, and the use of the preposition is analogous to that in “Interdicere,” intimating privation, in respect to persons. “Fœminis duntaxat usum purpuræ *interdicimus*.”—LIV. 34. 7.

Neither is it by any means clear, that an intensive power of the preposition appears in “Interaresco.” “Nihil enim *interarescere*, nihil extingui, nihil cadere debet eorum, in quibus vita beata consistit.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 236. b. The effect of *Inter*, here, seems to regard, not the degree of the dryness, but its universality, as pervading the mass, and reaching between each of its extremities and that opposite to it. The root “Arere,” besides, denotes so complete an absence of moisture, as seems to exclude the possibility of an increase in any of its derivatives.

The privative force of *Inter* may be referred to its original. It rests on the idea of one possessed of power coming between parties, and enforcing his will, as in "Interdicere." This power extends also to the destruction of objects, by making such a separation between them and what is essential, as is incompatible with their existence. Thus, a person slain was said to be "Interfectus vita;" that is, cut off from life. In the purer ages, the "vita" was thrown out, but still its being found, both before and after the Augustan age, proves the effect of *Inter* compounded with "Facere."

Salve qui me *interfecisti* pene et "vita" et lumine.—PLAUT. *Truc.* 2. 6. 37.

"Eadem mulier, virum et filium eodem tempore, venenis clam datis, "vita" *interfecerat.*"—AUL. GELL. 12. 7.

The same effect of *Inter* is seen upon the verb "Emere," which, thus compounded, signifies also to kill, and may govern either the life, or the person losing it.

Interimam tuam vitam.—PLAUT. *Epid.* 4. 2. 24.

Cum laqueo uxorem *interimis*, matremque veneno.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 131.

INTER, then, is taken in the following acceptations:

I.

BETWEEN and AMONG; the two differing in respect to the position and number of objects with which the correlative is beset.

II.

IN. The inclosure, by means of objects in the relation suggested by "among," is, in this use, supposed more complete than it really is.

III.

TO. The English, in this use, regard the motion leading to a certain point, and the Latins, the situation of the object, that has become quiescent, in respect to a number.

IV.

DURING. The word governed involves the period, between the beginning and the end of which the event takes place.

INTEREA, INTERIM,

agree, in denoting a period strictly limited by two assigned points; but the former refers to an event that continues during the whole interval, and the latter, to one that only occurs while the interval lasts, however frequently it might have been repeated. The preposition "Inter" is common to both adverbs. Both, likewise, state the time when a thing happens; but *Interea*, compounded of the plural of "Is," gives a suggestion also in respect to the time of its continuance. It regards a number of events, all of which are alike connected with one that is correlative to the whole. As "Antea" signifies "Before," and "Postea," "After all these things were done," so *Interea* signifies "While all these things were doing," and amounts to what is meant by such an expression as "Dum hæc geruntur." "Interim," again, compounded of "Im," the old accusative, as Festus tells us, from "Is," and which, in the rude times of the language, stood for the masculine and the neuter, suggests no plurality, but one single event, longer in its duration than the correlative, which it measures. The proper power of *Interea* may be gathered from the following examples:

Ph. Quid *interea*? ibatne ad Bacchidem? *Pa.* Quotidie.—*TER. Hec. 1. 2. 82.*

Philotis, here, asks Parmeno if the young man was in the way of visiting his mistress, not if he saw her once during a certain time. The answer is, that he visited her every day, and, unless he had lived with her continually, he could not well be supposed to have been more in her company. "*Interea* quoad fides esset data, non intermissuros esse consules delectus."—*CÆS. Bel. Civ. 1. 10.* It is here promised, that, under a certain condition, there was to be no interruption in the way of raising supplies.

Panditur *interea* domus omnipotentis Olympi.—*VIRG. Æn. 10. 1.*

The poet does not here mean, that, at a certain point of time in a limited interval, the gates of heaven were thrown open; else he would have employed "Interim," to announce such an event. By *Interea* he represents, that, during a train of events just related; those gates stood open, and that the gods were

then assembling, at the command of Jupiter, and deciding the fate of the contending nations.

INTERIM differs from "Interea," in regarding the event as occurring within a limited space, while, at the same time, it suggests nothing as to its being repeated, nor as to its continuance being commensurate to that of the space. "*Interim* ad me venit Munatius noster."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 151. a. The arrival of this friend was a single event occurring within a defined space, but having no relation, and bearing no proportion, to its length.

— *interim*

Dum ante ostium sto, notus mihi quidam obviam

Venit. ————— TER. *Eun.* 5. 1. 3.

This event, of an acquaintance coming up to him, occurred while Chærea stood at the door. Though he made off immediately upon seeing him, yet such an event might have been often repeated while he was standing there.

Though the distinction mentioned between these two adverbs appears to be very generally maintained, by the practice of writers both in prose and poetry during the Augustan age, yet, even then, it should seem, comic writers often disregarded it.

Credo, impetrabo ut aliquot saltem nuptiis prodât dies.

Interea fiet aliquid spero. ————— TER. *And.* 2. 1. 13.

Here, undoubtedly, Charinus refers to a single possible contingency in the course of several days, not to an event that was to last during that time.

INTERPRES, CONJECTOR,

agree, in being applicable to one who has the power of illustrating what is not understood, but differ as to the subjects in which the obscurity resides. Both suppose, that the interpretation is required by those who have need of it. INTERPRES is generic, as referring to the act of explaining the will both of Gods and men, while "Conjector" supposes the intimation to come from the former alone. *Interpres* is said to come from "Inter" and "Præs," and is originally applied to one that mediates between parties that have differed. As the mediator explores the sentiments of each, and mutually unfolds them, so

this term comes to denote an interpreter in general. “Se pacis ejus *interpretem* fore pollicetur.”—LIV. 21. 12. Here, *Interpres* has its original power of mediation, or settling differences, among parties.

— ille hominum divumque *interpres* Asylas.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 175.

“*Interpretes* et internuncii Jovis, augures.”—CIC. *Phil.* 248. b. The augurs are said to intimate both the displeasure of the Gods, and the means of removing it. “Quod erant multa obscura, multa ambigua, explanationes adhibitæ sunt *interpretum*.”—CIC. *de Div.* 1. 16. Here, the notification of what is, and must be, unknown, is implied, and the Latin term approaches, in meaning, to the English term “Interpreter.”

CONJECTOR differs from “Interpres,” in having no reference to mediation, and, in implying, that the notice comes only from the Gods. Festus defines it “Somniorum *interpres*,” and makes it equivalent to the Greek word *Ὀνειροκριτής*. It appears, however, that it refers to intimations from above, by means of any omens. Thus, when snakes appeared in an unusual place, recourse was had to the *Conjector* for information how to appease the deity.

Ego Teresiam *conjectorem* advocabo, et consulam,
Quid faciendum censeat.—PLAUT. 5. 2. 76.

The definition of Quintilian, in which the generic power of “Interpres,” and the specific of *Conjector*, are apparent, is more to be trusted. “Somniorum atque ominum “*interpretes*,” *conjectores* vocantur.”—3. 6. 30.

INTRA

denotes the relation borne by an object to the space within which it is contained. It stands opposed to “Extra,” as in the following line.

Nil *intra* est oleam, nil “extra” est in nuce duri.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 31.

It refers to the boundaries of the containing space in all directions. In the instance just given, the stone must, in the reader’s conception, be abstracted from the olive, and the shell from the nut. What is soft in the one and hard in the other, lies in all directions from what is opposite in quality to each.

The distance between the bounding line, in respect to the object contained, may be as great or as small as possible in the case of *Intra*. That part of the olive, which can be turned to use, adheres to the stone in the closest contact, and the distance between the kernel and its shell is always trifling. "Locus *intra* oceanum jam nullus est, quo non nostrorum hominum libido iniquitasque pervaserit."—CIC. *in Ver.* 194. a. Here, the boundary is so wide as to embrace the whole surface of the earth, as surrounded by the ocean. "Nulla *intra* oceani ostium navis est."—CIC. *pro Leg. Man.* 10. b. Here, every point of the ocean is comprehended within the solid parts of the earth, understood to surround them.

Intra refers, not only to the boundary which contains the quiescent object, that never could be elsewhere, but also to that which contains an object, which has already, and may again, change its place. In this view, it agrees with "In," and differs from it only in governing the same case, whether it refers to motion or rest. "Compulso *intra* mœnia hoste."—LIV. 34. 3. "Ingrediens *intra* finem ejus loci."—CIC. *pro Cæc.* 289. a.

—sentio aperiri fores,

Quæ obsorbent quicquid venit *intra* pessulos.—PLAUT. *Truc.* 2. 3. 30.

Intra, in its original meaning, is applied, figuratively, to intellectual objects not capable of being inclosed, and is still translated "Within." It then denotes the existence of a state more moderate than is allowed or supposed. "Modice hoc faciam, aut etiam *intra* modum."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 4. 4. The adverb "Modice" intimates the existence of such intended moderation in the agent, that there can be no room for blame; but the words "*Intra* modum" intimate a still higher degree of this, keeping the agent from going near the boundaries, and making him avoid even the appearance of excess. "Epulamur una non modo non contra legem, sed *intra* legem."—CIC. *ibid.* 9. *Ep. Ult.* The word "Legem," here, suggests a bounded space, within which, so far from transgressing it, the persons were careful to keep.

Intra is sometimes taken as equal to "Citra," and translated "On this side of." "Antiochus *intra* montem Taurum regnare jussus est."—CIC. *pro Sest.* 16. a. The space occupied by this mountain, which is the object governed,

is understood to be part of a line, separating all that lies between it and the speaker, from another space more remote. The former, then, is to him in the relation of "Citra," and the latter in that of "Ultra."

Intra is transferred to time, and denotes, within a period limited by two extreme points involved in the word governed, at some times accompanied with an adjective, and at others not. "Quid invicti Germani qui *intra* annos quatuordecim tectum non subiissent, virtute possent."—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 1. 27. The event, here stated, has a retrospect from the time at which Ariovistus made the affirmation, and ends just fourteen years before it. "Quod Dii me *intra* juventam præmaturo exitu raperent."—TAC. *Ann.* 2. 71. In this last address, Germanicus measures his life, from the day of his birth to that in which he saw it was to end, which last was within the period called "Juventa," when he could have assisted his friends and his country.

INTRA, then, may be translated as follows:

I.

WITHIN; referring equally to objects that never could change their place, and to those that have actually done so.

II.

ON THIS SIDE OF. The word governed must, in this use, occupy a point in the line which separates the space, in which the speaker is, from one beyond it.

III.

AT A TIME; limited by two points ascertained by the word governed, either singly, or in conjunction with a numeral.

Intra appears very rarely in composition, and, when it does so, exhibits only its radical power as connected with motion. Thus, the verbs "Introire" and "Introducere" suggest nothing which their roots, accompanied with the preposition in its separate state, do not.

INVENIRE, REPERIRE, COMPERIRE,

agree, in denoting the act of finding, but differ, as the discovery is either accidental, or otherwise, or according to the certainty with which it is made.

INVENIRE is generic, as it implies that the object is found, either accidentally, or in consequence of searching. "Quod quæritabam, filium *inveni* meum."—PLAUT. *Cist.* 4. 2. 93. Here, *Invenire* denotes the recovery of a child that was lost and searched for. "Nihil est *inventum* simul et perfectum."—CIC. *in Brut. cap.* 18. Here, *Inventum* refers to the casual discovery of an object not previously known to exist. "Dum eam vitastis vituperationem, eam *invenistis*, ut timidi putaremini."—CIC. *Auct. ad Her.* 35. b. The thing found is, in this instance, the object neither of desire nor expectation.

REPERIRE, from "Re" and "Pario," differs from "Invenire," in denoting, that the object sought is always known to exist, and is found in consequence of a search.

Sed ubi Antiphonem *reperiam*? aut qua quæreere insistam via?

TER. *Phorm.* 1. 4. 15.

"Quum complector animo, quatuor causas *reperio*, cur senectus misera videatur."—CIC. *de Sen.* 15. In both examples a specified object is understood to be found, in quest of which some person had gone.

— tu non "inventa" *reperita*

Luctus eras levior. — OVID. *Met.* 1. 654.

Here no opposition is to be discerned between the two verbs; the former, by its generic, and the latter, by its specific power, applying to Io, who was lost, sought for, and found. "Inventa" might have been repeated, without making any change upon the sense, had the nature of the verse permitted its being so.

Perscrutabor fanum si "inveniam" uspiam aurum; sed si *reperero*, O fides!

PLAUT. *Aulul.* 4. 2. 13.

Here, also, the terms are equivalent, from the generic power of the former. "Hoc *reperire* difficilius, quam cum "inveneris," argumentis adjuvare."—QUINT. 5. 10. 116. There is here a seeming and singular antithesis between the verbs, though applying to the same thing. The former appears to suggest the labour of investigation, when the object is known to exist; the latter, the apparent easiness of the discovery, which had been the fruit of exertion, and not presented by chance.

COMPERIRE agrees with "Reperire," in supposing, that the object found

was understood to exist, but differs from it, in never referring to any thing material, but to the truth of a fact, and to the superior certainty of having discovered it. “Et inquireret qui tibi constares : cum idem negares quicquam certi posse “reperiri,” idem te *comperisse* dixisses.”—CIC. *Q. Acad.* 16. b. In the denial and the assertion here made by the same person, the force of the two verbs may be seen. The investigation had been declared needless, from the impossibility of discovering the truth, and yet the certainty of the information is maintained. “Ex multis audivi : nam *comperisse* me non audeo dicere.”—CIC. *Ep.* 62. a. A flying report, though supported by a number, is here said not to amount to that solid testimony implied in *Comperire*.

Ubi *comperi* ex iis qui ei fuere conscii.—TER. *Heaut.* 1. 1. 69.

Those, who were privy to the transaction, were best able to give that satisfactory information respecting it, which *Comperire* denotes.

INVIDIA, INVIDENTIA,

agree, in denoting the sentiment of envy ; but the former refers both to the feeling, as harboured in the breast of the malevolent, and to the hatred which belongs to the object ; while the latter implies only the first of the correlative conceptions, and respects the feeling alone.

Invidia Siculi non invenere tyranni

Majus tormentum.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 58.

Here, *Invidia* denotes the foul sentiment that tortures the mind which fosters it. “Sullanus ager maximam habet *invidiam*.”—CIC. *pro Rull.* 80. a.

— ita facillime

Sine *invidia* laudem invenias, et amicos pares.—TER. *And.* 1. 1. 39.

In the two last examples, that, which is denoted by *Invidia*, is the attribute of the object envied, not of the person envying.

INVIDENTIA differs from “*Invidia*,” in referring only to the sentiment entertained by the envious, and not to the hatred which falls upon the object. As an abstract from “*Invidens*,” it denotes an emotion existing, and acting at the present time, and not the odium, of which the object may be unconscious.

Cicero states this difference in the most precise terms. “Ægritudini subjicitur *invidentia*, utendum est enim docendi causa verbo minus usitato; quoniam “invidia” non in eo qui invidet solum dicitur, sed etiam in eo cui invidetur.”

—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 212. b. The philosopher subjoins a definition of *Invidentia*, that decides its import. *Invidentiam* esse dicunt ægritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quæ nihil noceant “invidenti.” Nam si quis doleat ejus rebus secundis a quo ipse lædatur, non recte dicitur “invidere;” ut si Hectora Agamemno. Qui autem cui alterius commoda nihil noceant, tamen eum doleat his frui, is “invidet” profecto.”—CIC. *ibid.*

Both substantives come from “Invidere,” in which verb the preposition has a confirming power, and makes the root express the earnest look at what excites, in the beholder, an unpleasant emotion. “Ab “invidendo” *invidentia* recte dici potest, ut effugiamus ambiguum nomen “invidiæ,” quod verbum ductum est a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 194. b.

INVITARE, ARCESSERE,

agree, in denoting desire upon the part of one person, that another, who is absent, should come to him, but differ in respect to the manner in which this desire is expressed, and to the means employed to effect it. INVITARE carries in it the expression of good-will towards the person invited, by intimating that his presence would be agreeable. It implies, that one, who possesses some good, calls upon another to come and take a share of it. “Benigne salutare, alloqui plebis homines, domum *invitare*.—LIV. 3. 14. “Ad quem fruendum non modo non retardat, verum etiam *invitat*, atque allecat senectus.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 57. “Tu *invita* mulieres, ego vero acciam pueros.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 68. a. It is here insinuated, that the company of the women would be got only by a civil invitation, but that that of the boys might be had whenever they were called upon.

ARCESSERE differs from “Invitare,” in implying, that the person who sends for another is not actuated by motives of kindness towards him, but feels that he has a right to command his attendance, and to make him recognise his authority. It is a derivative from “Arcere,” which implies the exertion of force,

upon the part of the superior, in effectually keeping another either within or without certain limits. *Arcessere* carries in it this notion of force, and suggests, that if the call is disregarded, compulsive means will be immediately used. “*Quum me arcesserent in senatum, non venirem?*”—*CIC. pro Dom.* 3. “*Siculos sane in eo non liberos fuisse, qui quamobrem arcesserentur, cum intelligerent, non venisse.*”—*CIC. in Ver.* 1. 25. The Sicilians are here said to have disclaimed the authority of Hortensius, and to have shown that they were conscious of their own freedom, by refusing the attendance which they knew he had no right to command. “*Laus est pulcherrima cum sequitur, non cum arcessitur.*”—*QUINT.* 10. 2. 27.

Arcessere is often employed to denote the exercise of the military command imparted by a state to a general, or of the civil authority imparted to a judge. In both cases, it implies that their message to those under their power cannot be disregarded with safety. “*Arcessendas plerique legiones admonebant.*”—*TAC. Agric.* 35. When *Arcessere* denotes the authority of a judge, it is translated to “accuse.” The appellant had a power “*vocare reum in jus,*” which summons could not pass unnoticed, without the respondent incurring the displeasure, and feeling the vengeance, of one superior to both. “*Cum magis invidioso crimine quam vero arcesseretur, ita a Cneio Pompeio absolutus est.*”—*CIC. in Ver.* 2. 113. “*Ne quem innocentem iudicio capitis arcessas.*”—*CIC. de Off.* 2. 14.

INVIUS—*vide* AVIUS.

JOCUS—*vide* FACETIÆ.

IRA, IRACUNDIA,

agree, in denoting wrath; but the former regards the emotion, as it exists, the latter the propensity to give way to it. That both may belong to one person, appears from a passage in Suetonius, respecting the Emperor Claudius. “*Ira atque iracundiæ*” *consciis sibi, utramque excusavit edicto, distinxitque, pollicitus alteram quidem brevem et innoxiam, alteram non injustam fore.*”—*SUETON. in Claud.* 38. The distinction laid down seems to be here maintained. The passion denoted by *Ira* is to be short and innocent, and the propensity denoted by “*Iracundia,*” is to be moderated, as far as the person subject to it can do so, from his sense of what is just. *Ira* is a part of the con-

stitution of man, which, though it requires to be moderated, is not to be extinguished, and is defined by Cicero, "Libido puniendi, ejus qui læsisse videatur, injuria."—*Tusc. Q.* 4. 21.

IRACUNDIA, again, which signifies irritability, is always culpable. Donatus says, "Ira" de causa est : *Iracundia* de vitio multum irascentis." Cicero, too, styles it a defect. "In tuis summis laudibus unam excipiunt *iracundiam* : quod vitium, cum in hac privata vita levis esse animi atque infirmi videtur; tum vero nihil est tam deforme, quam ad summum imperium etiam acerbiter naturæ adjungere."—*Ad Q. F.* 197. a. "Ira" quo distet ab *iracundia* apparet, quo "ebrius" ab "ebrioso," et "timens" a "timido."—*SEN. de Ira*, 1.

It has been supposed, that "Ira" and *Iracundia* are sometimes confounded, from the passages, in which the latter appears, not being duly understood.

— præ *iracundia*
Menedeme, non sum apud me?—*TER. Heaut.* 5. 1. 47.
— ita ardeo *iracundia*,
Nihil est quod malim quam illam totam familiam mihi dari obviam,
Ut ego "iram" hanc in eos evomam omnem : dum ægritudo hæc est recens.
TER. Adelp. 3. 2. 12.

The propensity to anger may be smothered, in which case "Ira" cannot exist. While the struggle lasts, however, and there is room for farther excitement, the higher is the merit of the person "Iracundus" not becoming "Iratus."

IRASCI, SUCCENSERE, STOMACHARI,

agree, in denoting that a person is angry, but differ in respect either to the nature of the cause, to the extent of the emotion, or to the manner in which it shews itself. IRASCI suggests the existence of anger, whether the cause that excites it be just or not. The person that takes the offence may be culpably irritable, or he may misapprehend the conduct of him who gives it. "Ne in me stomachum crumpant, cum sint tibi bene *irati*."—*CIC. Ep. ad Att.* 251. a.

— et sibi et hosti
Iratus pariter.—*HOR. Ep.* 2. 2. 28.

In both the above instances, the anger is supposed to be well founded. The

soldier referred to in the last, was angry with his enemy for having stolen his money, and with himself for his carelessness. “Peripatetici virum videri negant qui *irasci* nesciat, eamque quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lenitudinis nomine appellant.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 218. a. Nothing is here said as to the cause of the anger: and it may be understood to arise either from a good or a bad one. “Ne si *irascamur* aut intempestive accedentibus, aut impudenter rogantibus, in morositatem inutilem et odiosam incidamus.”—CIC. *de Off.* 1. 25.

De nihilo illi est *irasci*.—PLAUT. *Truc.* 4. 2. 58.

In the first of these examples, the cause of the anger is slight, and held inadequate to the ground of its excitement; in the other, there is said to be no cause at all.

SUCCENSERE differs from “*Irasci*,” in implying that the offence is always a real one, and that there is cause for the anger that is excited. It is a derivative from the verb “*Succendere*,” and supposes a trespass to be as needful to the existence of the wrath, as the application of fire is to the destruction of what is burnt. The definitions given by Donatus of the verb, correspond nearly with that now given. “*Succensere*, in re gravi et justa “*irasci*.” *Succensere* is dicitur, qui quum amare debeat læsus “*irascitur*.” “Nec vero ego iis, a quibus accusatus sum, aut a quibus condemnatus, habeo quod *succensem*, nisi quod mihi nocere se crediderunt.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 170. a. Whatever the intention of the enemies of Theramenes was, in respect to accusing and condemning him, this intention gave him no offence; but their belief that they hurt him was the cause of that just anger which *Succensere* denotes.

Nec tamen “*irascor*?” quis enim *succenset* amanti?—OVID. *Ep.* 17. 34.

The first verb, here, denotes a state of anger, without regard to its particular cause; the latter, again, implies the impossibility of taking offence when the lover is incapable of giving it. “Ex perfidia et malitia, per quam insidiæ tenduntur alicui, Dii immortales hominibus “*irasci*” et *succensere* consuerunt.”—CIC. *pro Q. Rosc.* 52. b. “*Irasci*” states the wrath of the Gods simply, even though the cause had been slight, and *Succensere* superadds the idea of

that wrath being well founded, considering the wickedness of mankind. It is announced by "Irasci," that the Gods are angry, on account of perfidy and malice, and, in the progress of the climax, it is added, by *Succensere*, that they are angry with justice.

STOMACHARI differs from the other two verbs, in implying that the person offended is irritable, that his anger is violent, and that he gives full vent to the emotion by which he is actuated. It comes from "Stomachus," which denotes the ventricle that receives and digests animal food, and which, when applied to mind, denotes a quick apprehension of what is either agreeable, or the contrary. "In hoc autem agello; si modo arriserit pretium, Tranquilli mei "stomachum" multa sollicitant, vicinitas urbis, opportunitas viæ, mediocritas villæ."—PLIN. I. *Ep. ult.* Here "Stomachus" suggests the apprehension and desire of something agreeable. "In quo tamen ille mihi risum magis quam "stomachum" movere solet."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 6. 3. Here, again, "Stomachus" denotes the apprehension of something disagreeable, and an aversion to it, proportioned to the degree in which it is so. It is in the view of rejecting what is loathsome, that "Stomachus" is to be regarded as the root of *Stomachari*. "Amariorem me senectus facit; *stomachor* omnia."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 236. a. Here the old man confesses his bad temper, the degree of his passion, and his want either of ability or desire to repress it. "Et homo, natura lenissimus (nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius), *stomachari* tamen cœpit."—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 4. 11. The general mildness of the character of Antiochus made the violence of his wrath, in this instance, the more remarkable. "Sæpe vidi "irascentem" et *stomachantem* Philippum."—CIC. *de Cl. Orat.* 196. a. *Stomachantem* denotes more than "Irascentem." It implies not only that anger existed, but that it was violent, and discovered itself by unequivocal signs.

— et prave sectum *stomacheris* ob unguem

De te pendentis, te respicientis amici.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 1. 134.

The slightness of the offence, and the violence of the wrath, are here happily contrasted, and mark strongly the interest which Mæcenias took in every thing that concerned his client.

IRE, VADERE, MEARE, GRADI, INCEDERE, AMBULARE, SPATIARI, agree, in denoting the exercise of the locomotive power in animals, but differ, in respect either to the manner, or the end, of exercising it. IRE, as a general term, signifies motion in any direction, and allows, that the animal that moves may either walk or be carried. It intimates merely a change of place, in whatever way that is effected. “*Celeriter isti et redisti.*”—CIC. *in Anton.* 175. b.

Anxius huc illuc dissimulanter *eo.*—OVID. *Ep.* 20. 130.

Et Capitolinas *itque* reditque *vias.*—MART. 6. 10.

In the above examples, the simple verb *Ire* signifies “to go;” that is, it implies passing to a place; and the compound “Redire,” signifying “to come,” implies passing from it. The motion, implied in *Ire*, however, may be either backwards or forwards. “*Qui sella aut lectica vehitur, ire non agere dicitur.*”—ULP. *L. 7. de Serv. Prod.* “*Navigio esse te iturum trans mare credere non possum.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 10.

—— nescio, Hercule, neque unde *eam*, neque quorsum *eam.*

TER. *Eun.* 2. 3. 13.

Quatuor in niveis aureus *ibis* equis—OVID. *de Art. Am.* 1. 214.

Seu pedibus terras, seu pontum carpere remis,

Ibis. ————— PROP. 1. 6.

In the four last examples, it appears, that *Ire* is applicable to persons that are carried, whether by sea or by land.

VADERE differs from “*Ire*,” in implying, that the motion is effected by an exertion of the animal that moves. It accordingly performs a part of the duty of “*Ire*,” but not the whole, as it is never applied to a person that is carried.

Perstat Echionides : nec jam jubet “*ire*,” sed ipse

Vadit. ————— OVID. *Met.* 3. 701.

The zeal of Pentheus was here so great, that he does not rest satisfied with ordering others to transport themselves anyhow, but undertakes the personal exertion of going to Cithæron himself.

Ardua per præcepta gloria *vadit* iter.—OVID. *Trist.* 4. 3. 74.

Here, also, the personal exertion, by which a steep path is to be overcome, is implied.

Vadere is often taken to denote the steady courage with which an animal rushes upon the danger, of which he is aware. “*Vadunt* igitur in prælium, momentoque non restituta modo pugna.”—LIV. 3. 63. “Cum feras bestias videamus alacres et erectas *vadere*, ut alteri bestię noceant.”—*Auct. ad Her.* 11. b.

MEARE differs from the former verbs, in referring to the power which the moving animal has to gratify his own will, as to the time and the direction of his motion.

Nimirum, quia terra locis ex ordine certis
Lumine privatur solis, quacunq̄ue *meantes*
Officimus.—LUCRET. 4. 371.

“Aves solæ vario *meatu* feruntur et in terra et in aere.”—PLIN. 10. 38.

Meare is also applied to inanimate objects, when the laws of their motions are either entirely unknown or imperfectly understood.

— quæve sit ollis
Reddita mobilitas magnum per inane *meandi*.—LUCRET. 2. 64.
Discursusque animæ diversa in membra *meantis*.—LUCAN. 3. 640.
— qua sidera lege *mearent*.—OVID. *Met.* 15. 71.

GRADI takes its character from the manner in which the progressive motion is effected, and supposes, that the animal moving steps, or moves with a regular pace. “Jam vero alia animalia *gradiendo*, alia serpendo, ad pastum accedunt, alia volando, alia nando.”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 50: a. The verb has no reference to the quickness or the length of the step, or to the number of feet which the animal has.

Induiturque aures lente *gradientis* aselli.—OVID. *Met.* 11. 179.

Of Polyphemus it is said,

— *gradiens* ingenti littora passu
Degravat.—OVID. *Met.* 13. 776.

When *Gradi* and "Ire" appear in one sentence, the former respects progress in the moving animal, and the latter its completion.

Si *graderere* quantum loquere, jam "isses" ad Forum.—PLAUT. *Pseud.* 4. 7.

INCEDERE agrees with "Ire" and "Vadere," in referring to the motion of animals on foot only, and signifies either to come or to go. "*Incedebas pedibus, incedis : lætabaris labore, lætaris.*"—PLIN. *Pan. C.* 24.

Virum bonum eecum Parmenomen *incedere* video.—TER. *Eun.* 5. 3. 9.

Incedere is distinguished from the other verbs in generally referring to the gait of the person walking. This gait is peculiar to an individual, to a species, or to an order of beings superior, or inferior, to the human. "*Incessus omnibus animalibus certus et uniusmodi, et in suo cuique genere.*"—PLIN. 10. 38.

— et gressu gaudens *incedit* Iuli.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 694.

Cupid is here said to have feigned the gait of Ascanius in order to give effect to his mother's intentions.

Ast ego quæ divum *incedo* regina.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 50.

Et vera *incessu* patuit Dea.—*Ibid.* 409.

AMBULARE has also a general power of expressing the exercise of the locomotive faculty in animals, but differs from the other verbs in supposing, that the animal steps at its slowest pace, and that generally for health or recreation. It comes nearer "Gradi" than any of the rest. "*Mures Ægyptii bipedes ambulat* ceu Alpini."—PLIN. 10. 65. "*Ambulant* aliquæ aves, ut cornices, saliant aliquæ ut passeret, merulæ."—*Ibid.* 38. "*Socratem ferunt, quum usque ad vesperum contentius ambularet, quæsitumque esset ex eo, quare id faceret, respondisse, se quo melius cænaret, obsonare ambulando famem.*"—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 247. a.

Though the exertion implied in the act denoted by *Ambulare* is not the severest, yet, by continuing it, the animal moving may be fatigued.

Defessus sum *ambulando*.—TER. *Adelph.* 4. 6. 1.

The step, too, of the person *Ambulans* may be slower or quicker, according to circumstances.

Ps. Ambula ergo "cito." Si. Immo "otiose" volo.—PLAUT. *Pseud.* 4. 1. 14.

SPATIARI differs from the other verbs in respect to the extent of the range over which the moving animal passes. He, "qui ambulat," may walk but a little way, but he, "qui *spatiatur*," roves at large. "Per totam *spatiatus* Ægyptum."—PLIN. 5. 9. "Ita negligens esse cœpit, ut cum in mentem veniret ei, resideret; deinde *spatiaretur*."—CIC. *pro Ros. Am.* 28. a.

Neve sit errandum lato *spatiantibus* arvo.—OVID. *Met.* 4. 87.

Jam diu lato *spatiata* campo

Fortis heroos, Erato, labores

Differ, atque ingens opus in minores

Contrahe gyros.———STAT. *Syl.* 4. 7.

IRRIDERE—*vide* ARRIDERE.

JUBERE—*vide* IMPERARE.

IRRITARE—*vide* PROVOCARE.

JUCUNDUS, GRATUS, GRATIOSUS, AMÆNUS,

agree, in denoting something agreeable to the percipient, but differ, in respect to the circumstances on which the agreeableness is founded. JUCUNDUS properly refers to those qualities in objects, which, by being fitted to please a particular sense, become the avenues to enjoyment. The agreeableness implied in this word depends on the mutual aptitude established by nature between the sense, which recognizes the object, and the object, which stimulates it. Facciolati's definition of this term, founded upon what is said by Cicero, seems correct and satisfactory. "Est enim id omne *jucundum* quod sensum aut animum movet et juvat: præsertim vero quod tristitiæ opponitur, et hilaritatem in eo ac lætitiâ gignit."—*De Fin.* 4. *ad fin.* "Nihil visum est eo pane *jucundius*."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 5. 43. "Uritur ebenus odore *jucundo*."—PLIN. 12. 4. We learn from Cicero, that *Jucundus* comes from "Juvare," as signifying to delight. "In corpore autem voluptas, omnium Latine loquentium more ponitur, cum percipitur ea, quæ sensum aliquem moveat, *jucunditas*. Hanc

quoque *jucunditatem*, si vis, transfer in animum : “juvare” enim in utroque dicitur, ex eoque *jucundum*.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 67. a. *Jucundus* denotes the agreeableness of persons, as well as of inanimate objects. “Atticus adolescens seni Syllæ fuit *jucundissimus*.”—NEP. *Vit. Att.* 16.

GRATUS differs from “*Jucundus*,” in implying, that the agreeableness of the object, which, in the view now taken of the word, is always inanimate, arises, not from any physical aptitude between it and the sense, but from the intention of some agent, whose conduct was meant to please, and is gratefully resented. Even in the particular use of *Gratus* here taken, its native power, which respects persons, is still visible. In the following and all such examples, we find the intention of the agent recognized, who introduced the object, or gave existence to the event, at a time that was convenient for another. Cicero, wishing to receive, from his friend Atticus, information upon a subject, that was interesting, though not agreeable, unfolds the difference between “*Jucundus*” and *Gratus* thus : “Hæc res quemadmodum ceciderit, et tota res quo loco sit, velim ad me scribas. Nam ista veritas etiamsi “*jucunda*” non est, mihi tamen *grata* est.”—*Ep. ad Att.* 52. a. The political events, that were here to be the subjects of intelligence, are said to be the contrary of what is denoted by “*Jucundus* ;” but the act of giving the intelligence was entreated by means of *Gratus*, as agreeable, and as deserving the grateful acknowledgments of Cicero to his friend. “*Cujus officia* “*jucundiora*” scilicet sæpe mihi fuerunt, nunquam tamen *gratiora*.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 51. b.

It is to be observed, that nothing can be said to be *Gratum* that is not in a certain degree “*Jucundum*,” as the perception of a good done is the only foundation for gratitude. “Tale tuum judicium non potest mihi non summe esse “*jucundum* :” quod cum ita sit, esse *gratum* necesse est.”—CIC. *Ep.* 13. 18. In the absence of intention upon the part of an agent, again, the “*Jucundum*” may exist without the *Gratum*. Though the notions implied in “*Jucundus*” and *Gratus* are different, yet they are by no means incompatible. “Balbum, quod ais, mature Romam bene comitatum esse venturum, mecumque assidere usque ad Id. Maias, futurum id mihi *pergratum* perque “*jucundum*” est.”—

CIC. *Ep. ad Q. F.* 320. a. Even though this visit of Balbus had been accidental, or a matter of convenience to himself, it would have been “Jucundus” to Cicero; but, as it was intentional, and a matter of civility, upon the part of the guest, it became also *Gratus*. “Amor tuus *gratus* et optatus: dicerem “jucundus,” nisi id verbum in omne tempus perdidissem.”—CIC. *Ep.* 5. 15. This love was agreeable to Cicero, as expressed by *Gratus*, because Luceius always acted from the best intention towards his friend; it would have been also “Jucundus,” had not Cicero’s misfortunes rendered his mind callous, and destroyed his susceptibility of happiness.

Though the difference between “Jucundus” and *Gratus* is thus apparent, when they are made the subjects of antithesis in the same sentence, yet *Gratus* is sometimes found by itself, in the writings of the poets, denoting only, that an object is agreeable, and without any reference to an agent, or to the manner in which his conduct is resented.

Gratior et pulcro veniens in corpore virtus.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 344.

Si te *grata* quies et primam somnus in horam.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 17. 6.

GRATIOSUS, as an amplificative from “Gratia,” denotes, that a person has obtained much favour in the eyes of those with whom he is connected. His agreeableness, however, is not like that implied in “Jucundus,” the physical effect of amiable qualities operating upon the observer, but the consequence of address skilfully exerted, either by the agent himself, or by another in his behalf. “Cicero erat *gratiosus* apud Cæsarem.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 340. a. “Is suo splendore *gratiosissimus* in provincia, vehementer confidit his meis literis se apud te *gratiosum* fore.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 4. a. It is, in fact, the personal qualities that deserve favour, that render a man *Gratiosus*, whether reported by those to whom they are known, or exhibited by himself. “*Gratiosum* esse tribulibus Plancium, quod multis benigne fecerit, pro multis sponderit, in operas, plurimos patris auctoritate et gratia miserit.”—CIC. *pro Plan.* 268. b.

Gratiosus sometimes signifies abounding in favour towards others, as well as possessing their favour. Both senses are exemplified in the following sentence. “Ego Plancium et ipsum *gratiosum* esse dico, et habuisse in

petitione multos cupidos sui et *gratiosos*.”—CIC. *pro Plan.* 268. b. The following use of *Gratiosus*, as applied, by Pliny, to the shade of a tree, is singular, and seemingly impure, both as the object is inanimate, and as the agreeableness arises from a physical cause. “*Odore violenta, ac ne umbra quidem gratiosa.*” —PLIN. 16. 33.

AMÆNUS agrees with “*Jucundus*,” in denoting the natural agreeableness of an object, but implies, that its agreeableness results from the place it occupies. As it is never applied to persons, so it is connected with “*Gratus*” and “*Gratiosus*” only in respect to the pleasantness of the sentiment excited. It properly denotes that rural beauty, which, in different parts of the country, is to be found in different degrees, whether these be improved by art or not. “*Amœnissimas villas prospicit.*”—PLIN. *Ep.* 2. 17. “*Quodque temporis in prædiolis nostris, et belle ædificatis, et satis amœnis consumi potuit.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 16. 3.

— fontem propter *amœnum*

Assidet. ————— LUCRET. 4. 1018.

Tu nidum servas : ego laudo ruris *amœni*

Rivos, et musco circumlita saxa nemusque.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 10. 6.

JUDEX, ARBITER,

agree, in denoting a person entitled to judge in particular matters ; but the first supposes, that the judge acts officially, and that his right to do so is equal in all matters of the same kind ; while the latter always supposes that he is appointed by the parties to settle some particular case. The first is sometimes taken as a generic term, and applied to the judges appointed by the parties, between whom the difference subsists.

— non ego Daphnim

Judice te metuam, si nunquam fallit imago.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 2. 26.

Corydon, here, gives his consent to Alexis, that he should himself decide as to the comparative beauty of him and Daphnis. Had the consent been mutual, the person, styled “*Judex*,” would have been a regular “*Arbiter*.”

That a difference between the two terms subsists, appears from several

passages in the Latin classics. “Utrum *judicem* an *arbitrum* dici oporteat.”—CIC. *pro Mur.* 130. b. Seneca states the difference between the terms most philosophically in the following sentence. “Ideo melior videtur conditio causæ si ad *judicem* quam ad *arbitrum* mittatur, quia illum formula includit, et certos quos non excedat terminos ponit: hunc libera et nullis adstricta legibus religio, et detrahere aliquid potest et adjicere, et sententiam suam, non prout lex et justitia suadet, sed prout humanitas et misericordia impulit, regere.”—*De Benef.* 1.

JUGULUM---*vide* COLLUM.

JURGIUM, RIXA, SIMULTAS, LIS,

agree, in denoting animosity that exists and appears, but differ in respect to its degree, and to the manner in which it shews itself. JURGIUM signifies nothing more than a slight difference among friends, that may be easily accommodated. “Si “jurgant,” inquit, benevolorum concertatio, non “lis” inimicorum *jurgium* vocatur.”—CIC. *de Rep. lib.* 4. “Inter benevolos aut propinquos dissensio vel concertatio *jurgium* dicitur.”—NON. 5. 34. *Jurgium* is said to be a compound of “Jus” and “Ago,” and supposes that the contest is accompanied with little animosity, and may exist among relations that are mutually attached. “Ira cujus impulsu existit etiam inter fratres tale *jurgium*.” CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 226. a. “Vixit cum uxore triginta et novem annis sine *jurgio*, sine offensa.”—PLIN. 8. 5.

Jurgia proludent: sed mox et pocula torques

Saucius, et rubra deterges vulnera mappa.—Juv. 5. 26.

“Omnia sunt alia, non crimina, sed maledicta *jurgii* petulantis, magis quam publicæ quæstionis.”—CIC. *pro Cæ.* 43. b.

Though *Jurgium* never supposes that there is high animosity among the contending parties, yet it supposes different degrees of it. Thus, Tacitus talks of “Acre *jurgium*,” “Notabile *jurgium*.”—*Hist.* 4. 6. and *Ibid.* 2. 53. The increased animosity, however, is announced, not by the word itself, but by the adjective made to go along with it.

RIXA differs from “*Jurgium*,” in supposing that there exists a higher de-

gree of animosity between the contending parties, and that it is always accompanied with bustle and noise. The verb "Rixari," besides denoting to quarrel, signifies often to make a disagreeable din. "Aridæ factæ herbæ "rixantur," et celerius rumpuntur quam sequuntur."—VAR. *de R. R.* 1. 47. "Rixantur" consonantes quoque, eæque præcipue, quæ sunt asperiores, in commissura verborum."—QUINT. 9. 4. 37.

In the following sentence, Tacitus shows clearly that *Rixa* implies something worse than "Jurgium." "Jurgia" primum, mox *rixæ*, inter Batavos et legionarios."—*Hist* 1. 2. 64. *Rixa* generally supposes the contention to exist only between two. If the number is greater, it becomes a "Turba," or mob. "Turba" est multitudinis hominum turbatio atque cætus: *rixæ* duorum."—ULP. *dig.* 47. *tit.* 3. *leg.* 4.

Though the term *Rixa* always implies noise and confusion, yet it does not always imply much injury to the parties between whom it takes place. "Consulium intercurso *rixæ* sedata est: in qua, tamen, sine lapide, sine telo, plus clamoris atque irarum quam injuria fuerat."—LIV. 2. 29. In other cases, *Rixa* supposes bloodshed and mischief taking place among those who squabble. "Crebræ ut inter vinolentos *rixæ*, raro conviciis, sæpe cæde et vulneribus transiguntur."—TAC. *de Mor. Ger.* 22.

——— verecundumque Bacchum

Sanguineis prohibete *rixis*.———HOR. *Car.* 1. 27. 3.

Nec tua nocturna frangetur janua *rixæ*.———OVID. *A. A.* 3. 71.

Rixa always supposes a struggle and spirit of opposition in each party. Were either to succumb, the term would be inapplicable.

——— miseræ cognosce proœmia *rixæ*,

Si *rixæ* est ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum.———JUV. 3. 288.

SIMULTAS differs from "Jurgium" and "Rixa," in implying, that the animosity has been, and is likely to be, of long continuance, and that the person who entertains is often disposed to conceal it. By attending to this last circumstance, its etymology may be traced to "Simulare," to counterfeit.

Sæpe *simultates* ira morata facit.———OVID. *Amor.* 1. 8. 82.

Inter finitimos vetus atque antiqua *simultas*,

Immortale odium, et nunquam sanabile vulnus

Ardet adhuc.———JUV. 15. 33.

“Qui enim poterat tum in gratiam redire cum Oppianico Cluentius? qui cum matre habebat *simultates*.”—CIC. *pro A. Clu.* 35. b. In this last example, the continuance of the grudge is strongly insinuated, as being handed down from parent to child. “Ut multas etiam *simultates* partim obscuras, partim apertas intelligam, mihi non necessarias, vobis non inutiles suscepisse.”—CIC. *pro L. Man.* 17. 6. Cicero here declares, that his attachment to Pompey had been the cause of his being exposed to grudges, partly open and partly concealed. Such a term as “Apertus,” applied to *Simultas*, destroys its usual character of being latent, but leaves unimpaired that of its not being likely to be soon removed.

That the grudge denoted by *Simultas* may be carried on more or less openly, appears from a passage in Tacitus, as well as from that in Cicero. “Nec fefellerent ea Mucianum: inde graves *simultates*; quas Antonius simplicius; Mucianus callide eoque implacabilius nutriebat.”—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 53. The philosophic historian, by explaining the sentiment, with his usual discernment, gives much information as to the word.

Lis differs from “Jurgium,” in denoting animosity among people that are not friends; from “Rixa,” in supposing that this exists without any noise; and from “Simultas,” in supposing, that it is never concealed, and may be soon determined. “Inter inimicos dissentio *lis* appellatur.”—NON. 5. 34. “Jurgare” igitur lex putat inter se vicinos, non “litigare.”—CIC. *de Rep.* 4. *Lis* denotes any ground of controversy in which men can be engaged, and that can be brought to an issue, whether judicially or otherwise. “Philosophi ætatem in *litibus* conterunt.”—CIC. *de Legg.* 166. 6. In the eye of those disputants, every speculative point might be determined, did their opponents fairly exercise their reason.

Saxum antiquum ingens campo qui forte jacebat,
Limes agro positus, *litem* ut discerneret arvis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 898.
Semper habet *lites*, alternaque “jurgia” lectus,
In quo nupta jacet.—JUV. 6. 267.
Lenit albescens animos capillus,
Litium et “rixæ” cupidos protervæ.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 14. 24.

Lis may be joined either with “Jurgium” or “Rixa,” as in the above two

examples. In its nature, however, it is incompatible with "Simultas," which implies a disposition to stifle and continue the enmity, which the other supposes to be avowed, that it may be brought to a conclusion.

JUS—*vide* FAS.

JUXTA,

from "Jungere," expresses nearness, without reaching to contact, and denotes the relation of vicinity borne by two objects that lie near to each other. It has no reference to the extent of the interval, but only suggests, that, in the speaker's apprehension, it is small. "Sepultus est *juxta* viam Appiam, ad quintum lapidem."—NEP. 25. 22. The distance between the sepulchre and the Appian way is more vaguely stated by means of *Juxta*, than that between the city and the milestone is by "Ad," though the former was by much the smallest. "Totos dies *juxta* focum atque ignem agunt."—TAC. *de Mor. Ger.* 17. The natural sluggishness of the Germans led them to keep nearer the fire, than men of a contrary disposition would have done; merely to counteract the effects of the cold. A certain nearness, however, would have been noxious to their animal frame.

When *Juxta* is applied, figuratively, to objects that do not occupy space, it signifies, that the one has the appearance of the other. The original nearness in material bodies is put for an approach to identity in things of a different description, which last are regarded not as they really are. "Velocitas *juxta* formidinem, cunctatio "propior" constantiæ est."—TAC. *de Mor. Ger.* 30. Rapid motion was here mistaken for an expression of fear, and slow, of steadiness. From the force of the terms in the two members of the sentence, the probability of error was greater in the former case than in the latter. The "Velocitas" was near the "Formido," but the "Cunctatio" was only nearer the "Constantia" than the "Formido," and not so much in the middle as to be confounded with either. "Tanti fuit in avum, et qui *juxta* erant, obsequii, ut," &c.—Suet. *in Calig.* 10. The latter were what the Greeks call *Οἱ περὶ αὐτον*, and had apparently a claim to respect, like the grandfather, whom they were near.

Juxta, also, is taken to denote, coming next to, or following in immediate

succession. "Neque enim convenit *juxta* inediam protinus satietatem esse."—CELS. 2. 16. The physician tells us, that it is improper to pass at once from fasting to gluttony. "*Juxta* Deos in tua manu positum est."—TAC. *Hist.* 2. 79. The person or beings, expressed by the governed word, go immediately before those, expressed in the correlative. The inferiority in respect to the former is admitted, yet superiority to all others in the same predicament is necessarily implied. Vespasian, in the last example, is put after the Gods, but takes place of every other being. "Nigidius Figulus *juxta* Marcum Varonem doctissimus."—GELL. 4. 9.

Tacitus makes *Juxta* signify "connected with," or "existing at the same time with." As the interval, in space, between the related objects, may be as small as possible, so that, in time, between two events, may be so short, that both are held simultaneous. "Periculosius sunt inimicitæ *juxta* libertatem." TAC. *de Mor. Ger.* 21. Enmities are here meant, "quæ geruntur inter eos qui liberi sunt." Varro also says, "Cum interea lucubrando faceret *juxta* ancillas lanam."—*Apud* NON. 4. 233. This was done at night, along with the maid servants. The relative position of the person so engaged would have been expressed by "Inter," as in Livy. "Inter" lucubrantes ancillas sedentem invenit."—LIV. 1. 57.

By writers not remarkable for their purity, *Juxta* is used as equal to "Secundum," and as denoting "according to." Though this application may be explained by the necessary nearness of the standard to the object regulated by it, yet it rests upon the authority of Justin, Solinus, Hieronymus, and such authors as are not to be trusted. "Iones *juxta* præceptum Themistoclis pugnae se paulatim subtrahere cœperunt."—JUST. 2. 12. "*Juxta* responsum dictum Deo."—SOLIN. 9. "*Juxta* illud poeticum."—HIERON. *Ep.* 4. *ad Rust. Mon.*

JUXTA, then, may be translated as follows :

I.

NEAR TO. The extent of the interval may vary ; but, in the case of objects standing in the relation denoted by it, contact or apposition is inadmissible.

II.

LIKE TO. In this use it is figuratively applied to immaterial objects, and supposes them to partake of the nature of those to which they are near.

III.

NEXT TO, or IMMEDIATELY AFTER. The governed word, in this use, gives the point from which the order of objects lying in succession is reckoned; and the first, being comparatively near to it, is said to be *Juxta*.

IV.

ALONG WITH, or EXISTING AT THE SAME TIME. In this use, events, really distinct, come so near each other, as to be held simultaneous.

LABARE, LABI—*vide* CADERE. LACESSERE—*vide* PROVOCARE.

LACUS, PALUS, STAGNUM,

agree, in denoting a space covered with seemingly confined water, but differ, as this water may or may not be occasionally exhausted, and according to the extent or depth to which it covers the surface. LACUS signifies a diffusion of water, by means of springs, that furnish a constant, though perhaps an unequal, supply. A *Lacus*, accordingly, may vary in size, but can never be destroyed, and may be the source of rivers, more or less rapid, as the quantity at the fountain happens to be great or small. “Cum *lacus* Albanus præter modum crevisset.”—CIC. *de Div.* 10. b. “Tertia, *lacu* Lemano et flumine Rhodano, qui provinciam nostram ab Helvetiis dividit.”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 1. 2. In the last example, mention is made of a river which enters the lake at one part, and leaves it at another, but in which the efflux is greater than the influx.

The water in lakes may have more or less motion, according to circumstances, but is always understood to be quiescent, when compared with that in rivers.

Multum, crede mihi, refert, a fonte bibatur
 Quæ fluit, an pigro quæ stupet unda lacu.—MART. 9. 100. 9.

In the following passage, Virgil, perhaps, refers to lakes in which the water is pure and wholesome, from being exposed to more than ordinary agitation.

———— at latis otia fundis
 Speluncæ, vivique lacus; at frigida Tempe,
 Mugitusque boum, mollesque sub arbore somni
 Non absunt.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 468.

From a proverbial use of the term, it seems to have been understood among the Romans, that when the lake was dry, it was of no use.

At dum demissis supplex cervicibus ibam,
 Dicebar sicco vilior esse lacu.—PROPERT. 3. 11.

PALUS differs from “Lacus,” in implying that the water, covering the surface, that is not furnished by springs, may be occasionally dried up. The wetness in the *Palus* arises from its being lower than the grounds around it, and its forming a receptacle for the water that naturally runs into it. In the *Palus*, besides, the water has no necessary motion of any kind, and neither receives nor delivers any regular stream. A marshy surface, not entirely covered with water, forms a *Palus*, as well as when the ground is not to be seen.

Limosoque palus obducat pascua junco.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 49.
 Postquam exhausta palus, terræque ardore dehiscunt.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 431.
 ——— sterilisve diu palus, aptaque remis,
 Vicinas urbes alit, et grave sentit aratrum.—HOR. *A. P.* 65.

“Is, quum animum advertisset perpetuam esse paludem quæ influeret in Sequanam, atque illum omnem locum magnopere impediret, hic consedit; nostrosque transitu prohibere instituit.”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 7. 57. The word “perpetuus,” here, denotes the unbroken extent of the marsh, not its continued supplies. This marsh would empty the surface-water that formed it, into the Sequana, in a time proportioned to the aperture and the declivity jointly. Had the surface been always covered, and the stream constant, it would have been a “Lacus,” and not a *Palus*.

STAGNUM, derived, by Festus, from *Στεγνος*, and that from *Στεγειν*, “quod continere, nec pati elabi ac defluere, significat,” agrees with “Palus,” in respect to the manner in which the water is collected, and to its being void of motion. It differs from it, in respect to the extent of the surface covered, and the general depth of the water. The *Stagnum* may be dried up as well as the “Palus,” but is dried up with greater difficulty, from the water being less diffused, and occupying a smaller surface.

Jam pauca aratro jugera regiae
 Moles relinquunt: undique latius
 Extenta visentur Lucrino
Stagna “lacu.”———HOR. *Car.* 2. 15. 1.

The progress of luxury is here represented to have been so great, that the *Stagna*, or fish-ponds, are said to have surpassed the Lucrine lake in extent.

Addit et fontes, immensaque *stagna*, “lacusque.”———OVID. *Met.* 1. 38.

There seems to be a gradation, in point of extent, here, between the “Fontes,” *Stagna*, and “Lacus.” “Levior piscis inter saxa editus quam in arena; levior in arena quam in limo. Quo fit, ut ex *stagno* vel “lacu,” vel flumine eadem genera graviora sunt. Leviorque qui in alto quam qui in vado vivit.” CELS. 2. 18. The nature of the fishes is here inferred, from the bottom of the water in which they are generated. As this bottom is more or less muddy, so are they more or less light. By the arrangement of the terms, an anti-climax is formed; the *Stagnum*, in which the water is motionless, being more muddy than the “Lacus,” in which it moves gently, and still more so than the “Flumen,” in which the motion is always greater, and proportioned to the declivity of its channel. The “Palus,” it is to be observed, can contain no fishes. It is not necessarily deep enough for sheltering them, and it is occasionally dried so quickly, as at once to deprive them of the element in which alone they can subsist.

LÆTITIA—*vide* GAUDIUM.

LÆVIS, GLABER,

agree, in denoting smoothness, but differ, according as that smoothness is natural to the substance to which it is referred, or arises from some external operation. LÆVIS is generic, and is taken in both acceptations. "Esse corpuscula quædam lævia, alia aspera, alia rotunda."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 14. b. In the formation of those small bodies, said to be smooth, the hand of Nature, or something like it, could alone be concerned. So, also, Lucretius:

Et quo mista putes magis aspera lævibus esse.—2. 470.

Lævior assiduo detritis æquore conchis.—OVID. *Met.* 13. 792.

In the two following instances, again, *Lævius* signifies "made bare by the hand of art," as when Persius ridicules the effeminacy of a Roman knight.

Trossulus exultat tibi per subsellia lævis.—1. 82.

Sed vitate viros cultum formamque professos,

Quique suas ponunt in statione comas,

Fœmina quid faciat, cum sit vir lævior ipsa?—OVID. *Art. Am.* 3. 437.

Juvenal makes *Lævius* denote baldness, as arising from old age.

— cum voce tremantia membra

Et jam læve caput, madidique infantia nasi.—SAT. 10. 199.

The baldness may also arise from disease, or its effects.

— canibus pigris, scabieque vetusta

Lævibus.—JUV. 8. 34.

GLABER differs from "Lævius," in implying, that the smoothness, denoted by it, is not natural, but effected by some external operation, such as that of plucking off feathers, or tearing out hairs.

— tu istum gallum, si sapiis,

Glabriorem reddes mihi, quam Volsus Ludius' t.—PLAUT. *Aul.* 2. 9. 5.

The cook, here, orders the cock to be so nicely plucked as to be smooth, like those players who, if they were "vesticipes," had the "dropax" applied to their skins. Martial repeatedly refers to this practice:

Et splendent vulso brachia trita pilo.—EPIG. 2. 29.

Lævius "dropax" tu quotidiano,

Hirsutis ego cruribus genisque.—10. 65. 8.

Crine nitens, niger unguento, perlucidus ostro,
Ore tener, latus pectore, crure *glaber*.—12. 38. 3.

LAMBERE, LINGERE, LIGURIRE,

agree, in denoting the act of taking nourishment, but differ, in respect to the nature of the food, and the manner in which it is taken. LAMBERE is properly applicable to those animals who lap with the tongue, and to such food as is fluid, and may be, in that way, received into the mouth. “Hi canes quos tribunal meum vides *lambere*.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 5. 11. “Pisces quia dentibus carent, aut *lambunt* cibos, aut integros hauriunt.”—COL. 8. 17. “Domitianus, immanissima bellua, nunc propinquorum sanguinem *lamberet*, nunc se ad clarissimorum civium strages cædesque proferret.”—PLIN. *in Pan.* 48.

Canibus et siccæ *lambentibus* ora lucernæ.—JUV. 8. 35.

Nothing can more strongly mark the starved state of these mangy dogs, than their licking the sides of the lamps, upon which little or none of the oil remained.

Lambere is, figuratively, taken to denote touching gently, even though harm might be expected.

Fundere lumen apex, tractuque innoxia molli
Lambere flamma comas, et circum tempora pasci—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 683.

Mr. Dryden translates this passage thus ;

—— from young Iulus' head
A *lambent* flame arose, which gently spread
Around his brows, and on his temples fed.

LINGERE differs from “*Lambere*,” in implying, that the food taken is not in a fluid state, and that the quantity received into the mouth depends either upon the degree in which any hard substance licked is soluble, or upon the quantity of one, in powder, that sticks to the tongue.

Ut quia te tango, mel mi videor *lingere*.—PLAUT. *Cas.* 2. 8. 21.

It is understood, that the honey is not taken up like water by the dog, but dissolved in the “*saliva*,” and that the person is licking it. “Datusque sal *lingendus*. Multi tussim veterem *linctu* salis discussere.”—PLIN. 31. 9.

Lingere is also applied to the act of keeping any thing in the mouth, and allowing it to melt. This accords with the former acceptation, in respect to the smallness of the quantity taken at one time, and the solubility of that, to which the tongue is applied. “*Sed lingentium calculos frangit pellitque.*”—*PLIN.* 37. 10.

LIGURIRE, from *Λιγυρος*, “*Suavis*,” differs from the two former verbs, in referring to no particularity in the way of taking the food, but to the degree in which it is relished, and the gratification of a liquorish appetite, by selecting what is best.

Meretrices dum foris sunt, nihil videtur mundius,
 Quæ cum amatore suo quum cœnant, *liguriunt.*—*TER. Eun.* 5. 4. 14.
 — seu puer unctis
 Tractavit calicem manibus, dum furta *ligurit.*—*HOR. Sat.* 2. 4. 78.

From the following figurative application of *Ligurire*, it should seem, that it refers to the epicurism, and not to the gluttony, of the eater. “*Non reperietis hominem timide, nec leniter hæc improbissima lucra ligurientem.* “*Devorare*” omnem pecuniam publicam non dubitavit.”—*CIC. in Ver.* 128. a.

LAMINA, BRACTEA,

agree, in denoting any substance that is rendered thin, whether malleable, like metal, or cut, like wood or stone; but differ, in respect to the thinness of that, to which each is applicable. “*Eo super tigna bipedalia injiciunt, eaque laminis clavisque religant.*”—*CÆS. Bel. Civ.* 2. 10. “*Cataphractorum tegmen ferreis laminis aut præduro corio consertum.*”—*TAC. Hist.* 1. 79. “*Tenuem nimium laminam ducere, et quam cœlatura altior rumpat.*”—*QUINCT.* 2. 4.

BRACTEA differs from “*Lamina*,” in denoting a substance that is still thinner, and which, from its pliancy, may be made to take the shape of that, which it is intended to cover. It will apply to the leaf, which, from its thinness and lightness, rustles in the wind.

Talis erat species auri frondentis opaca
 Illice; sic leni crepitabat *bractea* vento.—*VIRG. Æn.* 6. 208.

In the following expression, there is reason to believe, that the impurity of the author shews itself. Seneca styles this same leaf “*Lamina crepitans.*”—*Agam.* 85. According to the practice of writers in the Augustan age, little pliancy and no sonorousness could be looked for in any thing so thick as the “*Lamina.*”

Bractea is applied to the thinnest substances in nature, as to a leaf of gold, and it is classed even with the spider’s web.

Obvia cum veniunt, ut aranea, *bracteaque* auri,
Quippe etenim multo magis hæc sunt tenuia textu.—LUCRET. 4. 728.

It is applied to wood, when nicely cut, though without the tenacity in its parts, which would render it malleable and ductile, like gold. “*Ut una arbor sæpius veniret, excogitatae sunt et ligni bractea.*”—PLIN. 16. 23.

LARGIRI—*vide* DARE.

LATRO—*vide* PRÆDO.

LAUS, GLORIA,

agree, in denoting the approbation bestowed on meritorious actions, but differ, in respect to the extent to which that approbation is given. Both suppose, that the good discerned is not the subject of silent admiration, but is celebrated in a greater or a less degree.

LAUS may suggest the approbation of excellence as communicated only to the person, in whom it exists, or as increased by the consent of a number, who have seen and admired it. The love of this, by being immoderate, may degenerate into a weakness, but, when duly limited, is one of the natural rewards of virtue. “*Vera laus uni virtuti debetur.*”—CIC. *de Or.* 140. a. “*Ego dolori tuo non solum ignosco, sed summam etiam laudem tribuo.*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 61. b. Here, Cicero communicates to Metellus himself only, his sense of his merit, and he does so in the strongest terms. “*Quanquam ego illi tum verborum laudem tribui, eamque modicam.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Brut.* 283. a. Here, too, the praise seems communicated to Cæsar only, though but in a small degree.

But the sphere of what is called *Laus* may be considerably enlarged, by the consent of those who praise the merit they have witnessed. “*Ii quibus*

summa dicendi *laus* a nostris hominibus concessa est.”—CIC. *de Or.* 86. a. “Ea est profecto jucunda *laus* quæ ab iis proficiscitur qui ipsi in *laude* vixerunt.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 15. b.

— *laus* tibi erepta inclyta est,
Ingens triumphus. ————— SEN. *Here. OEt.* 882.

Here, *Laus* denotes a high general encomium upon civil and military virtues, resting on the testimony of numbers, who have witnessed their exertion.

GLORIA differs from “*Laus*,” in implying, that the approbation of virtuous conduct is as extensive as possible, and that all mankind are, in a particular instance, doing justice to distinguished merit. “*Gloria* est frequens de aliquo fama cum “*laude*.”—CIC. *de Inv.* 2. 55. “*Gloria* est illustris ac pervulgata multorum et magnorum, vel in suos cives, vel in patriam, vel in omne genus hominum fama meritorum.”—CIC. *pro Marcel.* 135. a. “*Gloria* est consentiens “*laus*” bonorum, incorrupta vox bene judicantium de eccellente virtute.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 190. b. The above definitions are so correct and decisive, that it is impossible to add to them in any way. Cicero repeatedly uses “*Laus*” and *Gloria* in the same sentence, where the pure meaning of each is preserved. “*Trahimur omnes “laudis” studio, et optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur.*”—CIC. *pro Arch.* 190. b. The desire of praise, which all may obtain, is common to every human being; but the best of the species, only, are impelled by the love of that distinguished renown, which is the reward of high public virtue. *Gloria* is distinguished, among the classics, in respect to extent, degree, and duration. “*Nescio quo pacto vel magis homines juvat gloria lata quam magna.*”—PLIN. *Ep.* 4. 12. “*In appetenda gloria duo sunt maxima, quæ præoptari possent, ut et quam latissime vegetur, et quam diutissime perseveret.*”—MACROB. *in Som. Sc.* 2. 10.

LAUTUS—*vide* ELEGANS.

LEGARE, ALLEGARE,

agree, in denoting the act of committing to others what a person has a right to do of himself, but differ, in respect to the nature of that, to which the deputation refers. LEGARE always implies, that the subject of the commis-

sion is a public concern, in which a number are interested. "Allegare," again, implies, that this subject concerns that person only, from whom the commission proceeds.

Legare differs from "Mittere," in implying, that the objects sending, sent, and receiving, are animated, and that the purpose of the agent is to promote some public interest. "*Legantur* tamen in Africam majores natu, nobiles amplis honoribus usi."—SALL. *Jug.* 25. The subject of the embassy, here mentioned, was a matter in which the whole Roman state was concerned. "Neque enim eram tam desipiens, ut privatæ rei causa *legari* putarem, qui et tibi non privato, et pro re non privata sua, sed publica; non in privato, sed in publico orbis terræ consilio, ut gratias agerent, mittebantur."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 37. b. The conduct, here supposed, was not more irregular than the application of the term *Legare* would have been in expressing it. "Cassium sibi *legavit*, Brutum Galliæ præfecit."—CIC. 6. 6. "Usumfructum omnium bonorum suorum Cesenniæ *legat*."—CIC. *pro Cæc.* 287. a.

ALLEGARE differs from "Legare," in implying, that the subject of the commission is particular, and concerns the person only who gives it. It agrees with it, however, in supposing animation in all the objects concerned in the act. As in the verb "Appetere," the preposition "Ad," here, renders the act, implied in the root, personal, in respect to the agent "Legans;" though, in "Appetere," the thing sought comes *to* the "Petitor," and in *Allegare*, the subject of the commission goes *from* the "Legator," if the word can be so used. "Ad" limits, not the persons receiving the deputation, more than the simple verb, but the things committed to their care.

Hoc modo te obsecro, ut ne credas a me *allegatum* hunc senem.

TER. *And.* 5. 4. 28.

Nothing can be supposed more particular than the business here understood to be committed, by Pamphilus, to Crito.

Pater *allegavit* villicum, qui posceret sibi istam uxorem.

PLAUT. *Prol. Casin.* 52.

"Nam statim Chrysogonus et ipse ad eos accedit, et homines nobiles *allegat* iis, qui peterent ne ad Sullam adirent, et omnia Chrysogonum, quæ vellent, esse

facturum pollicentur.”—CIC. *pro Sext. R. Am.* 22. b. This freedman of Sylla was deeply concerned in the subject of the commission which he gave these nobles to carry to the ambassadors.

LEGERE, CARPERE,

agree, in denoting the act of picking out what is most agreeable for the purpose of him who chuses, but differ, in respect to the nature of the objects selected. The former, as a generic term, implies, that the objects are either so permanent, as to admit of a deliberate choice, or so fleeting, that they must be seized quickly, if they are seized at all. “Ex quibus cum optimos viros legeret, non potuit *legere* non studiosos mei.”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 105. b. The elector had no need to be in any hurry, so as by accident to pass over the boasted merit of Cicero.

— non legit idonea, credo,

Tempora, nec petiit horamque animumque vacantem.—OVID. *Met.* 9. 610.

The person here mentioned is blamed for not making that deliberate choice which it was in his power to make, and which alone could ensure success.

Quod potui, puero sylvestri ex arbore “lecta”

Aurea mala decem misi, cras altera mittam.—VIRG. *Ec.* 3. 70.

In this last instance, the choice of the elector was more hastily made than in the two former. He had to catch the time when the apples were in their highest perfection, in respect to colour and maturity, and not in the state of the fig mentioned by Ovid.

— ficus non erat apta *legi*.—FAST. 2. 254.

“Quintus Fabius ducem Gallorum occidit, spoliaque ejus *legentem* Galli agnovere.”—LIV. 5. 36. The warrior had no time to act deliberately, while gathering the spoils of his slain foe, when the incensed Gauls then saw, and were ready to attack him. The phrase, “*legere sermonem alicujus*,” also signifies to be highly attentive, or to make the most of a person during the short time that he speaks.

— nam mihi videor cum ea fabularier,

Lego.-----PLAUT. *Pseud.* 1. 1. 60.

CARPERE differs from "Legere," in always implying, that the objects selected are of a fleeting nature, and that the quickness of the choice is the only condition upon which it can be made. It is, accordingly, with great propriety applied to the act of plucking the fruits of the earth, as the best of them are naturally selected, and as the time at which they are in greatest maturity is necessarily short.

Luciferi primo cum sidere, frigida rura
Carpamus ; dum mane novum, dum gramina canent,
 Et ros in tenera pecori gratissimus herba est. —VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 324.
 Primus vere rosam, atque autumno *carpere* poma.—*Ibid.* 4. 134.

The roses pulled by this Corycian old man are supposed to have been neither unblown nor faded, and his apples to have been neither green nor rotten.

Vive velut raptō, fugitivaque gaudia *carpe*.—MART. 7. 47. 11.

The rapidity necessary in this choice could not have been expressed by "Legere." This seems to hold also in the following beautiful passage from Persius.

Indulge genio : *carpamus* dulcia ; nostrum est
 Quod vivis : cinis, et manes, et fabula fiet.
 Vive memor lethi : fugit hora. ————— 5. 151.
 ——— dum loquimur, fugerit invida
 Ætas : *carpe* diem, quam minimum credula postero.—HOR. *Car.* 1. 11. 7.

In this elegant application of *Carpere*, its purest use is discernible. It suggests the necessity of seizing time while it is going, as nothing in nature is so transitory.

In that use of *Carpere*, in which it denotes to carve, the idea of selection is maintained. The person, who divides the meat, should certainly mean to cut out the best. "Vides illum qui obsonium *carpit* ? *Carpus* vocatur. Itaque quotiescunque dicit, *carpe*, eodem verbo et vocat et imperat."—PETRON. *ARB.* 36.

In all the figurative uses of *Carpere*, there is a reference to the proper time of performing what is meant, or to the absence of delay, upon the part of the agent. "Non sum tam insolens in dicendo, ut omni ex genere orationem aucuper, et omnes undique flosculos *carpam* ac delibem."—CIC. *pro Sest.*

— ibimus, ibimus,
 Utcunque præcedes, supremum
Carpere iter comites parati.—HOR. *Car.* 2. 17. 10.

In some few instances, the notion of limitation in respect to time, in the use of *Carpere*, is faint, and even not perceptible. This happens chiefly among the poets.

— unumquidquid quod quidem erit bellissimum
Carpam.————TER. *Adelph.* 4. 2. 51.

In the above use of *Carpere*, it should seem, that though the beauty of the object had attracted the choice of the agent, yet he was under no compulsion to determine, or to act, in haste.

LEPOS, JOCUS, SAL,

agree, in denoting the display of a lively imagination, but differ, either in respect to the manner in which this shews itself, or to its discovering elegance, or acrimony, upon the part of him who possesses it. LEPOS expresses a stronger reference to the elegance, than to the wit, of the person said to possess it, and supposes, that the quality thus tempered is chiefly seen in his expressions. It, besides, as often implies defect, as correctness, of taste. “Homo affluens omni *lepore* ac venustate.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 265. a. The character here stated is not held forth as respectable, because expressive of effeminate elegance, and of such as was sacrificed to the foulest purposes. “Genus orationis pictum et expoliturum, in quo omnes verborum, omnes sententiarum illigantur *lepores.*”—CIC. *Or.* 205. b. Here, also, *Lepos* denotes a finical elegance that disgusts a judicious eye. “*Lepos* quidam *facetiæque* et *eruditio* libero digna.”—CIC. *de Or.* 86.

Scimus inurbanum *lepido* seponere dicto.—HOR. *Art. Poet.* 273.

In both the last examples, *Lepos* suggests the *agrément* and good taste of the person possessing it.

JOCUS signifies, properly, an expression of merriment, without regard to the good or bad taste of the person shewing it, and stands opposed to a state

of mind characterized by "Serius." "Quicum *joca*, seria, ut dicitur, quicum arcana, quicum occulta omnia?"—CIC. *de Fin.* 82. b. "Lepos" fails to be agreeable only from a mental defect in the person exhibiting it; but *Jocus* does not necessarily imply that consonance between the feelings of the speaker and the hearers that can at all times render it acceptable. "Suavis est et vehementer sæpe utilis *jocus* et facetiæ, in quibus tu longe aliis mea sententia, Cæsar, excellis."—CIC. *de Or.* 128. a. "Ludo enim et *joco* uti illis quidem licet, sed sicut somno et quietibus cæteris."—CIC. *de Off.* 21. a.

Si quid per *jocum* dixi, nolito in "serium" convertere.—PLAUT. *Pan.* 5. 5. 41.
Difficile est tristi fingere mente *jocum*.—TIBULL. 3. 7. 2.

SAL differs from the words mentioned, in supposing, that the wit is intended to be sharp, and to expose the object of it to the ridicule of others. The French critics have properly defined *Sal*, "Ce qu'il y a de piquant dans les plaisanteries." It does not, however, always imply great severity upon the part of the person possessing it, and is, in a certain degree, compatible with good humour and good manners. "Ergo, Hercule, vita humanior sine *sale* nequit degere, adeoque necessarium elementum est, ut transierit intellectus ad voluptates animi quoque. Nam ita *sales* appellantur omnisque vitæ "lepos" et summa hilaritas, laborumque requies non alio magis vocabulo constat."—PLIN. 31. 7. "Accedunt non Attici, sed "salsiores" quam illi Atticorum, Romani veteres atque urbani *sales*."—CIC. *Ep.* 134. a. "*Salis* enim satis est, Sannionum parum."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 9. 16. Cicero here says, that the talent for satire was abundantly strong, but that those possessing it were afraid to exert it.

Candidus a *salibus* suffusis felle refugi :

Nulla venenato litera mista "joco" est.—OVID. *Trist.* 2. *sub fin.*

From the epithets here applied to *Sal* and "Jocus," it appears, that both can be made worse, and that the interval can, at the same time, be preserved that subsists between each, when placed by itself.

LIBELLA—*vide* NORMA.

LIBERI, FILII, FILIÆ,

agree, in denoting children, but differ, as the former signifies either one or more of either or both sexes, and the two latter more than one of each respectively. The first is the plural of the adjective "Liber," taken as a substantive, and probably served to distinguish those who were free, under the heads of each family, from those who were slaves. It may be translated "Issue," without regard either to the number or the sex. "Non est sine *liberis* cui vel unus filius, unave filia est."—CAIUS, *de Verb. Sig.*

Quod si pudica mulier in partem juvenis
Domum, atque dulces *liberos*.——HOR. *Epod.* 2. 39.

A single child, as well as a number of either sex, might have been the object of this woman's affection.

Ingenio te in *liberos* leni puto, et
Illum obsequentem.——TER. *Heaut.* 1. 1. 99.

Menedemus had but one son, referred to in the above sentence, both by *Liberos* and "Illum." "Si ad jucundissimos *liberos*, si ad clarissimum generum properaret."—CIC. *de Prov. Cons.* 76. a. Cicero means by "Jucundissimos *liberos*," only the single daughter of Cæsar. The privileges of those having the "Jus trium, quatuor, et quinque liberorum," were the same, whether they were boys or girls.

The two latter terms are stated only in contradistinction to "Liberi," and not with a view to shew any thing particular in themselves.

LINTER—*vide* NAVIS. LIGURIRE, LINGERE—*vide* LAMBERE.
LIGARE—*vide* VINCIRE. LIMUS—*vide* LUTUM.

LIPPUS, LUSCUS, LUSCIOSUS, COCLES, PÆTUS, STRABO,

agree, in denoting some defect in the organ of sight, but differ in respect to the nature or the cause of that defect. LIPPUS applies to one whose eyes emit water or humour, and whose sight is, in that way, less acute than otherwise.

Cum tua pervideas oculis mala *lippus* inunctis,
 Cur in amicorum vitiis tam cernis acutum,
 Quam aut aquila, aut serpens Epidaurius?—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 3. 25.
 Non tamen idcirco contemnas *lippus* inungi.—*Idem, Ep.* 1. 2. 28.

LUSCUS is applied to a person who has but a single eye, and is one whom the Greeks styled *ἑτεροφθαλμος*.

Solvere dodrantem nuper tibi, Quincte, volebat
 “Lippus” Hylas : *luscus* vult dare dimidium.
 Accipe quamprimum : brevis est occasio lucri.
 Si fuerit cæcus, nil tibi solvet Hylas.—MART. 8. 9.
 Perdidit ille oculos, et *luscis* invidet, ambos.—JUV. 10. 227.

LUSCIOSUS denotes a person who sees imperfectly in twilight, morning, and evening, and whose vision is clear only in broad day-light. “*Lusciosus* ad lucernam non videt : et “myopes” minus videntes vocantur a Græcis.”—NON. 2. 512. “Vesperis non videre quos *lusciosos* appellant.”—VAR. *ap. Non.* 1. c.

—— ædepol, tu quidem
 Cæcus, non *lusciosus*.——PLAUT. *Mil. Gl.* 2. 3. 51.

COCLES is not easily distinguished from “Luscus,” and seems to be often taken as equivalent to it. The Greek word, *Μονοφθαλμος*, stands for both, though *ἑτεροφθαλμος*, referring to one of two, is sometimes put for “Luscus.” Pliny seems to insinuate, that *Cocles* applies properly to those who had been born with one eye, in opposition to those who have had the misfortune to lose one. “Qui altero lumine orbi nascerentur, *Coclites* vocantur.”—II. 37. According to Scaliger, “Ocles,” from “Oculus,” has denoted “One-eyed,” and this has been changed into *Cocles*.

PÆTUS applies to one whose eyes squint in a small degree, or roll from one object to another, and who either has or has not the power of fixing them. Acron says, *Pæti* proprie dicuntur, quorum huc atque illuc oculi velociter vertuntur. From a passage in Horace, it evidently denotes a smaller defect than “Strabo,” though of the same kind. As Venus herself is said to be *Pæta*, the adjective certainly implies what is not inconsistent with beauty.

STRABO denotes being "Squint-eyed," that is, not having the power of looking straight.

At pater ut gnati, sic nos debemus amici,
Si quod sit vitium, non fastidire. *Strabonem*
Appellat "pætum" pater.———HOR. *Sat.* 1. 3. 45.

The same thing also appears from the testimony of Cicero, who uses a diminutive from "Pætus." "Redeo ad Deos; ecquos si non tam *strabones*, at "pætulos" esse arbitramur?"—*De Nat. Deor.* 17. a.

LIS—*vide* JURGIUM.

LUCRUM—*vide* QUÆSTUS.

LITARE—*vide* SACRIFICARE.

LUCTUS—*vide* DOLOR.

LOQUI—*vide* FARI.

LUCUS—*vide* SYLVA.

LUTUM, LIMUS, CÆNUM,

agree, in denoting earth in a moist state, but differ in respect to the manner in which the substance denoted by each is formed, and the effect produced on each when dried. LUTUM denotes clay, or that kind of earth which is unctuous and ductile, and found in beds, as formed by nature. It seems to differ from "Argilla," in respect to colour, the latter coming from *Agγos*, and referring to that which is white. Cicero intimates a distinction between the terms, though he does not explain it. "Hic homulus ex "argilla" et *luto* factus."—*In Pis.* 92. a. Juvenal says of the first of the human race formed by Prometheus:

Compositique *luto* nullos habuere parentes.——*Sat.* 6. 13.
Fictilia antiquus primum sibi fecit agrestis
Pocula, de facili composuitque *luto*.———TIBUL. 1. 1. 33.
Udum et molle *lutum* es, nunc nunc properandus, et acri
Fingendus sine fine rotâ.——PERS. 3. 23.

The clay that is soft, only, can be moulded into any shape: When hard, it retains the form it had before received, and loses its ductility.

LIMUS differs from "Lutum," as denoting mud, or the uliginous matter at the bottom either of still or of running water. This matter has nothing of the tenacity of clay. When dry, it is reduced either to sand, or to a hard substance that may be easily mouldered, and has the same name applied to it in both states. "India conferente fluminum suorum *limum*."—PLIN. 35. 7.

Informi *limo*, glaucaque exponit in ulva.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 416.

Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit

Uno eodemque igni.—*Idem*, *Ecc.* 8. 80.

Sive gravis veteri crateræ *limus* adhæsit.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 4. 80.

CÆNUM differs from the two former words, in having no reference either to a particular species of earth, or to the natural sediment of water, but in denoting a mixture which is putrid and dirty. The two former words, again, suggest a mixture of earth and water alone. “Stoici dicunt omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne *cænum*.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 220. b. “Si Apelles Venerem suam *cæno* oblitum videret.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 38. a. The dirtiness of the matter, styled *Cænum*, appears in the figurative application of it. “Orare, ut ex *cæno* plebeio consulatum extraheret.”—LIV. 10. 15.

MACER—*vide* EXILIS.

MADIDUS—*vide* HUMIDUS.

MAGNITUDO, MAJESTAS,

agree, in denoting greatness; but the one has a stronger reference to this greatness, as absolute, and the other to it, as comparative. The first is an abstract founded upon the positive degree of the adjective “Magnus,” and the last stands in the same relation to the comparative of that adjective, “Major.” Though all notions of magnitude must be in some degree relative, yet this circumstance is not so strongly perceptible in the abstract of the positive, as of the comparative degree. Seneca observes, with great justice, “*Magnitudo non habet certum modum; comparatio illum aut tollit aut deprimit.*”—SEN. *de Ira*, 1. As the standard is either greater or less than the subject compared, so, the idea of the magnitude of the latter varies. “*Etiam si dinumerare se stellas, aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitratur.*”—CIC. *de Off.* 31. b. Here, *Magnitudo* refers to the mass of the earth, without regard to its being larger than any thing it contains, or less than the universe, of which it forms

a part. "Ut enim obscuratur et offunditur luce solis lumen lucernæ, et ut interit *magnitudine* maris Ægei stilla muriæ."—CIC. *de Off.* 99. b. Here, the comparative greatness inherent in *Magnitudo* is apparent, that of the Ægean sea being compared to that of a drop of salt water, and the light of a lamp to that of the sun.

MAJESTAS differs from "Magnitudo," in stating more strongly the comparative greatness involved in the latter; and in denoting that some one object is greater than another, that is really great. In the use of both words, the objects must necessarily be of one nature, so that their qualities may admit the comparison they suggest. *Majestas* differs from "Magnitudo," in never being applied to material objects. No such expression as "Majestas mundi," or "maris," is to be met with; but the term is employed to announce the comparative greatness of living natures, either as individuals, or as forming states. Thus, Horace, speaking of Augustus, admits a subordination among those with whom he could possibly be compared; but asserts, that he was higher in rank than those who were most so around him.

Sed neque parvum carmen *majestas* recipit tua.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 258.

He uses the same term in respect to the Roman empire, to show its comparative superiority over every other empire upon earth.

Per quas Latinum nomen, et Italæ
Crevere vires, famaue et imperi
Porrecta *majestas*, ad ortum
Solis, ab Hesperio cubili.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 15. 13.

Majestas is employed to express the superior greatness of the Supreme Being, as well as of particular deities, and intimates, that what is held absolute greatness shrinks under the comparison, and is almost eclipsed. "Nec vero quisquam aliter arbitrari potest, nisi qui nullam *majestatem* esse ducit, numenve divinum."—CIC. *pro Mil.* 30. "Prorsus incertum est utrum munimentum loci, an *majestas* Apollinis plus hic admirationis habeat."—JUSTIN. 24. 6.

MAGNUS, INGENS, AMPLUS, PROCERUS,

agree, in denoting the magnitude of objects, but differ in respect either to its degree, or to the manner in which it is estimated. The notion of absolute magnitude, it must be observed, is inconceivable. Men have compared the object they denominate "Great" with others of the same kind with itself, and have given it its appellation from observing its relative greatness. "Thus, "*Magna balæna*" signifies either a whale that is larger than other animals of its own species, or that, compared with other sorts of fishes, exceeds them in size. As *Magnus* relates to every kind of greatness, and embraces every object within that predicament, so it may be regarded as the general term. "*Magna dii curant, parva negligunt.*"—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 51. b.

In the original application of *Magnus* to material objects, it signifies their greatness, in respect both to quantity and number.

Heu *magnum* alterius frustra spectabis acervum!——VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 150.

"*Magnum* numerum frumenti pollicentur."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 82. a. The mass, which, in both the above examples, is denominated *Magnus*, receives this appellation, both from the size of the whole, and from the number of its parts, considered separately.

Magnus is figuratively applied to immaterial objects, and denotes a superiority in some respect among them, analogous to that of the largest over the smallest material subjects of a species. "Si ut sapientibus placet, non cum corpore extinguuntur *magnæ* animæ."—TAC. *Ag.* 46.

Magnum pauperies opprobrium jubet."——HOR. *Car.* 3. 24. 42.

INGENS differs from "Magnus," in denoting a greatness that is preternatural, and is unexampled in the class of objects to which that specified belongs. It surpasses the power of "Maximus," the superlative from "Magnus," as the latter marks the greatest only among the objects of a species, in respect to a quality, which, though existing in different degrees in each, admits comparison in all. The superiority of that denominated *Ingens*, again, is so decided, as to eclipse the rest that participate in its nature.

Scilicet et fluvius qui non est "maximus," ei est,
 Qui non ante aliquem "majorem" vidit :——
 —— et omnia de genere omni,
 "Maxima" quæ vidit quisque hæc *ingentia* fingit.——LUCRET. 6. 674.
He. Quid jubeam? *Er.* Ignem *ingentem* fieri.
He. Ignem *ingentem*? *Er.* Ita dico "magnus"
 Ut sit.——PLAUT. 4. 2. 64.

Ingens agrees with "Magnus," in admitting an application to objects, of which quantity is not an attribute.

Thras. "Magnas" vero agere gratias Thais mihi?
Gnath. *Ingentes.*——TER. *Eun.* 3. 1. 1.

Cicero comments upon this passage, in a way that puts the precise difference between the terms in the clearest light possible. "Satis erat respondere "magnas:" *ingentes* inquit. Semper auget assentator id, quod is, cujus ad voluntatem dicitur, vult esse magnum."---CIC. *in Læl.* 26.

During the Augustan age, the prose writers never used degrees of comparison from *Ingens*. When Virgil styles Æneas "fama *ingens*, *ingentior* armis," his doing so must be considered as a poetical licence, such as that of Milton speaking of the leviathan.

Hugest of living creatures, in the deep
 Stretched like a promontory, sleeps or swims,
 And seems a moving land.

The superlative *Ingentissimus* is not found but in such writers as Symmachus and Vegetius, who lived late, and whose practice should not be regarded as a standard. The absurdity, at the same time, is equal, in giving *Ingens* either a comparative or a superlative degree; as the essence of hugeness depends on there being nothing in nature in which the quality, that it is made to denominate, is to be found in a superior degree.

AMPLUS differs from "Magnus" and "Ingens," in being limited to that kind of greatness, among material objects, which consists in superficial capacity. It properly denotes such an extension of a surface as fits it for receiving easily what it is designed to contain. "In qua *amplissima* curia, *amplissimum* gymna-

sium, et complures ædes sacrae : coliturque ea pars et habitatur frequentissime.”
—CIC. *in Ver.* 228. a.

Illos porticibus rex accipiebat in *amplis*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 353.

“Ad eam multitudinem urbs quoque *amplificanda* visa est.”—LIV. I. 44. In this last example, the compounded verb marks the power of the adjective very distinctly. It denotes the necessary extension of the precincts of the city, so as to afford commodious habitations for the growing multitude. “Loci præter modum *ampli* vagas imagines reddunt, et nimis angusti sæpe non videntur posse capere imaginum collocationem.”—*Auct. ad Her.* 22. a.

Amplus, like the two words defined, is often transferred from material to immaterial objects. “Suosque omnes per se esse *ampliores* volebat.”—CIC. *de Am.* 109. a.

PROCERUS differs from all the words stated, in never being transferred from material to immaterial objects, and in implying, that the magnitude is estimated, not from the extension of the object in all the directions that can take place on a surface, but in that of a straight line, that is either perpendicular or horizontal, according to the nature of the object specified. Applied to the human form and to trees, it denotes tallness; and to fishes and four-footed animals in their natural position, length. The general proportions in each, at the same time, are understood to subsist, according to the law observed in the rest of their kind. “Gallorum quisque *procerissimus* ad pompam triumphi lectus.”—SÜETON. *Calig.* 47. “Sues *procero* corpore, capitibus ut sint parvis.”—VAR. *de Re. R.* 2. 1.

Proceras manibus vertere fraxinos.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 25. 16.

—quo pertinet ergo

Proceros odisse lupos? quia scilicet illis

Majorem natura modum dedit, his breve pondus.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 35.

MALA, GENA, MAXILLA,

agree, in denoting the side of the face, but differ, as they refer to the bone and the flesh together, or to either by itself. MALA is generic, and expresses

the cheek and the cheek-bone. "Faciei pars ita dicta quod rotunda *mali* speciem præ se ferat."—ISID. 2. 1. "Infra oculos *malæ*, homini tantum, quas prisci "genas" vocabant, duodecim tabularum interdicto radi a fœminis eas vetantes. Pudoris hæc sedes: ibi maxime ostenditur rubor."—PLIN. 2. 37.

Signarat teneras dubia lanugine *malas*.—OVID. *Met.* 13. 754.

In both of the above instances, *Mala* signifies the external or fleshy part of the cheek; in the following, it signifies the bone, as connected with the flesh.

"Impius frater hortatur me, ut meos *malis* mandem natos."—CIC. *de Or.* 163. a.

Rhœcum retorsisti leonis

Unguibus, horribilique *mala*.—HOR. *Car.* 2. 19. 23.

Dein clamore pari concurritur, et vice teli

Sævit nuda manus: paucæ sine vulnere *malæ*.—JUV. 15. 53.

From the violent effect of the blows with the fist, in this last example, both the cheek and cheek-bone must have suffered.

It should seem that, in the singular number, *Mala* signifies the bone of the cheek below the eyes, and not the moveable bone forming the under part of the mouth; but that, in the plural, it signifies both. "Dentium pars "maxillæ," pars superiori ossi *malarum* hæret."—CELS. 8. 1.

GENA differs from "Mala," in referring only to the external part of the face, and is generally understood to denote that part which is under the eyes, and that extends from the nose to the ears. It should seem, however, that the old Romans made this term also comprehend the eyelids, as appears from Ennius:

Pandite, sultis, *genas*, et corde relinquite somnum,

Imprimitque *genam genæ*.

Among the purer writers, *Gena* appears in the plural only, and is confined to that part of the face which is below the eyes. "*Genæ* ab inferiore parte tutantur oculos, subjectæ, leviterque eminentes."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 55. a.

Tum mihi prima *genas* vestibat flore juvenus.—VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 160.

Siccis ipse *genis* flentes hortatus amicos.—MART. 1. 79.

— et hiantia ruptis

Ossa *genis*.—JUV. 15. 57.

In this last instance, the *Gena*, or fleshy part of the cheek, is clearly distinguished from the bone, which it covers. "Bucca" refers to the same part of the face with *Gena*, but regards it as capable of collapsing, and being inflated at different times.

Quid causæ est, merito quin illis Jupiter ambas
 Iratus *buccas* inflet? ————— HOR. Sat. 1. 1. 27.
 Orator vehemens, an Curtius an Matho? *buccæ*
 Noscenda est mensura tuæ. ————— JUV. 11. 34.

"Erant illi comiti capilli, et madentes cincinnorum fimbriæ, et fluentes cerussatæque *buccæ*, dignæ Capua, sed illa veterè."—CIC. *in Pis.* 84. b.

MAXILLA differs from "Gena," in denoting that bone only which the latter covers, and in which the jaw-teeth, or grinders, both above and below, are fixed. "*Maxillaresque* ita sanari dentes præcipue putant."—PLIN. 23. "Sub lentis *maxillis* esse."—SÜET. *Tib.* 21. By this phrase, the author means, that the person spoken of undergoes a prolonged torture. "*Maxillas* crocodilus tantum superiores movet."—PLIN. 11. 37. *Maxilla* seems to be figuratively employed to signify a comb, the teeth of a comb being so called from their resemblance to those of an animal.

Tu quum *maxillis* balanatum gausape pectas.—PERS. 4. 371.

MALAGMA—*vide* EMPLASTRUM.

MALEDICTUM, CONVICIUM, PROBRUM,

agree, in denoting words that are hurtful to those of whom they are spoken, but differ, in respect to the injuriousness of the intention of those who utter them. MALEDICTUM signifies a charge intended to bring reproach upon the object, who is thereby exposed to unjust disrepute, from the accusation being either false or insignificant. In the one case, the evil-speaker takes advantage of the credulity, and, in the other, of the folly, of mankind.

Indignis si "maledicatur," *maledictum* id esse dico.—PLAUT. *Curc.* 42. 27.

"In "maledicentissima" civitate, *maledictum* omne, non modo crimen

effugit.”—CIC. *pro Flac.* 147. b. “In *maledicto* plus inest injuriæ quam in manu.”—QUINCT. 6. 3. If the reproach, implied in *Maledictum*, be well founded, it appears, by the practice of Cicero, that terms may be annexed, by which its truth is made apparent. “Quem ego inustum verissimis *maledictorum* notis tradam hominum memoriæ sempiternæ.”—CIC. *Phil.* 13. 19.

The following passage explains the nature both of *Maledictum* and “Convicium,” and shews, that, in the former, the evil is the ground of suspicion only, and never of proof. “Aliud est accusare, aliud *maledicere*. Accusatio crimen desiderat, rem ut definiat, hominem ut notet, argumento probet, teste confirmet. *Maledictio* autem nihil habet propositi præter contumeliam: quæ si petulantius jactatur “convicium;” si facetius, “urbanitas” nominatur.”—CIC. *pro Cæl.* 38. b. “Quippiam in criminis, aut in *maledicti* loco objicere.”—CIC. *pro Cluent.* 30. b.

CONVICIUM holds of “*Maledictum*,” as a species of its genus. The author of either means always to affront; but, in applying the *Convicium*, his intentions are highly injurious, and he greedily lays hold of every opportunity to gratify them. The satirist, again, shews his “Urbanitas,” by indulging in raillery which, though disagreeable, is not hurtful to its butt. Both “*Maledictum*” and *Convicium* suggest an attack upon character, that may be well or ill founded. “Saltatorem appellat Lucium Murenam Cato. “*Maledictum*” est, si vere objicitur, vehementis accusatoris; sin falso, maledici *conviciatoris*.” It is insinuated, that an increased malevolence would appear in the attack, if the ground of disparagement were false, and it is the superior malevolence of the intention alone, on which the *Convicium* rests. The extent of the injury, implied in *Convicium*, is to be measured only by the opinion of him who receives it. Tiberius was reproached for favouring one side of an argument discussed in the schools of the sophists, and he punished the *Conviciator* as if he had done him an injury. “Repente cum apparitoribus prodiit, citatumque pro tribunali voce præconis *conviciatorem* rapi jussit in carcerem.”—SUEt. *in Tib.* 11. *Convicium*, from “Con” and “Vox,” signifies an outcry; that is, either the united cries of a number, or the repeated

cries of one, whatever sentiment is expressed. It suggests what the Greeks mean by *Καταλοησις*.

Clamorem ranæ sustulere ad sidera :

Convicio permotus quærit Jupiter

Causam querelæ. ————— PHÆD. 1. 6. 4.

As Jupiter only inquired into the distress of those animals, and could not be considered as the cause of it, he could not be exposed to their abuse. “*Epistolam hanc convicio efflagitarunt codicilli tui.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Q. F.* 2. 11. “*Efflagitasti quotidiano convicio.*”—QUINCT. *Ep. ad Tryph.* In both these examples, the *Convivium* comes from a single person, who expects to succeed in his demand, not by abusing, but by teasing those whom he attacks. It may be observed, that the cry, implied in *Convivium*, in its literal sense, whether uttered by one or by many voices, is always that of discontent. The abuse, accordingly, denoted by it, in its ordinary acceptation, is repeatedly thrown out by the malevolent, whether proceeding from malice in themselves, or demerit in others.

PROBRUM differs from the two former words, in implying a more injurious intention in the person who offers it, leading him, not only to affront, but to stigmatize, him whom he attacks. The charge, however, is not understood to be always true, but is pressed home with a keenness as if it were.

Neque me patiar *probri* falso insimulatum.—PLAUT. *Amph.* 3. 2. 6.

“*Probri* insimulasti pudicissimam fœminam.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 179. a. In both the above instances, the verb “*Insimulare*” intimates, that the charge was known to be false by him who brought it. “*In isto tuo “maledicto” probrum non modo mihi nullum objectas, sed etiam laudem illustras meam.*”—CIC. *pro Dom.* 128. b. The evil in the “*Maledictum*,” we have seen, may be either greater or less, according to the intention of the person who offers it. We find, however, in this last instance, that the person failed in the malicious purpose of fixing the stigma implied in *Probrum*, and gave eminence to the character he meant to disparage. “*Pulchorem rei tollet multitudo*

peccantium, et desinet esse *probri* loco commune “maledictum.”—SEN. *de Ben.* 3. 16. The subject of the “Maledictum” and the *Probrum* were here the same; but the latter, charged with more keenness, and likely to gain more belief, was more formidable than the other, in which many partook.

MANARE—*vide* FLUERE.

MANSUETUS—*vide* COMIS.

MANDERE—*vide* VESCI.

MANUBIÆ—*vide* PRÆDA.

MANNUS—*vide* CABALLUS.

MARINUS, MARITIMUS,

agree, in denoting the quality of being connected with the sea, but differ, as this connection is more or less remote. Both come from “Mare;” but the first, being a derivative more nearly allied to the root, supposes the object to which it is applied to be more intimately connected with the sea. It accordingly signifies whatever may be regarded as a part of it; its productions, whether animal or vegetable; and all the phenomena which it exhibits. “Astra quæ *marinis* terrenisque humoribus aluntur.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 34. a. “Lactuca *marina*.”—COL. 6. 15. “Quid de *marinis* æstibus plura dicam, quorum accessus et recessus lunæ motu gubernantur?”—CIC. *de Div.* 115.

Horret capillis, ut *marinus*, asperis,

Echinus.—HOR. *Epod.* 5. 27.

Ossa superstabunt volucres inhumata *marina*.—OVID. *Ep.* 10. 123.

— etiam ardua palma

Nascitur, et casus abies visura *marinos*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 68.

MARITIMUS differs from “Marinus,” in referring to objects less intimately connected with the sea. It does not apply to marine productions, nor to phenomena in which the sea is exclusively concerned. It expresses nearness to, in opposition to remoteness from, it, and implies, that objects belonging to the land are connected with it by a medium peculiar to themselves. “In locis autem et illa naturalia, *maritimi* an remoti a mari?”—CIC. *Or. Part.* 239. a. “Te in Arpinati videbimus, et hospitio agresti accipiemus, quoniam *maritimum* hoc contempsisti.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 32. b. In both the above instances, *Maritimus* denotes the circumstance of propinquity to the sea only.

“Enumerari non possunt fluminum opportunitates; æstus *maritimi* multum accedentes et recedentes.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 52. b. The tides, as arising in the sea, are styled “Marini,” and as, in conjunction with rivers, overflowing the land, *Maritimi*. *Maritimus*, however, sometimes, upon good authority, gets the power of “Marinus.” Cornelius Nepos has joined *Maritimus* with “Prædo” and “Fluctus.” *In Vita Them.* 2. & *Attici*, 6. The slightest reference to the sea, it may be observed, would limit the former term to the idea better expressed by “Pirata,” and the waves nearest the coast, which are the most formidable, may be styled “Fluctus *maritimi*.” In the expressions “*Maritimum bellum*,” and “*Res maritimæ*,” there is a reference to ships, as the medium by which alone the connection between men and the sea, as the scene of action, can possibly be carried on. “*Maritimo afflatu gaudent vites*.”—PLIN. 14. 2. The sea-breeze is denominated *Maritimus*, being felt only in the neighbourhood of the sea, and a breeze on the sea itself has no particular appellation.

MATURARE—*vide* FESTINARE.

MEARE—*vide* IRE.

MAXILLA—*vide* MALA.

MEDITARI—*vide* COGITARE.

MEMINISSE, REMINISCI, RECORDARI,

agree, in denoting the act of remembering, but differ in respect either to the manner in which the subjects of memory are furnished, or to the facility with which they are recalled. All the verbs agree in supposing that the exercise of memory is but temporary, and that one object, or one event only, engages the mind's attention at once. MEMINISSE implies, either that an object is recognised by its particular sense, as being before known to exist, or that, when an object, or an event before known, is mentioned, or suggested, each presents itself immediately, as having been the ground of a former perception. In this exercise of memory, the recurrence of its objects cannot be prevented till the causes of excitement are removed from without, the mind being as incapable of not remembering things duly suggested, as the eye is of not seeing what is fairly exposed to its view. “*Memini, enim, memini, neque unquam obliviscar illius noctis*.”—CIC. *pro Plan.* 280. b. This memorable night was sug-

gested to Cicero by the train of his pleading, and the situation of his client. He affirms, that the impression made by it was so strong, that, when suggested, the sufferings of Plancius would always strike him as events with which his mind had before been deeply affected.

—— numeros *memini*, si verba tenerem.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 9. 45.
Ego illam vidi : virginem forma bona
Memini videre.—TER. *And.* 2. 5. 17.

Here, the previous impression, when the young woman was seen, and the perception, that this impression was not new, are clearly stated.

Considering the inevitable recurrence of the objects of memory, in certain situations, and the necessity of an external cause of excitement, the use of the imperative of *Meminisse* may appear to be somewhat singular. It implies a command to do what does not depend upon the will of him who receives it. “Sed *memento*, præter Appium neminem esse,” &c.—CIC. *in Ant.* 133. a.

Ducere me auditum, perges quocunque, *memento*.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 4. 89.

It is understood, in the use of this imperative, that those things are best remembered which make the strongest impression. By a voluntary increase of attention, it is supposed, that the subject of it will, with more certainty, present itself, when suggested, than if that subject engaged the mind but slightly, when it came first under its notice.

REMINISCI differs from “*Meminisse*,” in implying, that the subjects of memory are not suggested directly by an external cause, but in consequence either of a train of ideas passing involuntarily through the mind, or of an association to which it had itself given existence.

Sternitur infelix alieno vulnere, cœlumque
Aspicit, et dulces moriens *reminiscitur* Argos.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 741.

The delicacy of the poet’s sentiment rests upon a just acceptance of *Reminisci*, for which “*Meminisse*” could not be substituted. In the last moments of Anthon, expiring upon the plains of Italy, the beauties of Argos, where he drew his first breath, obtrude themselves upon his mind, by a natural association, without being suggested by any thing without him. “In nostro eventu

aliorum *reminiscentes* casus.”—CIC. *antequam Red. in Sen.* 164. a. In this instance, also, the mind remembering suggests its own object, and is said to acquire wisdom, as it recals the ideas it has accumulated. “Declarare, se non tum illa discere, sed *reminiscendo* recognoscere: nec vero fieri ullo modo posse, ut a pueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas, et quasi consignatas in animis notiones, quas *ενοιας* vocant, haberemus, nisi animus antequam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 160. a. Those general conceptions, styled by the Greeks *ενοιαι*, and said to aid the docility of young men, are recognised as existing only in the mind, and occur by means of associations, which arise from nothing acquired from without.

RECORDARI differs from the two verbs already examined, in implying, that the subjects remembered are suggested, either by an external cause, or by what passes within the mind itself. It differs, besides, from “Meminisse,” in denoting, that the suggestion is not immediate, and from “Reminisci,” that it is the consequence of an effort, in directing the train of ideas, and marking their associations. “Homines scire pleraque antequam nati sint, quod jam pueri, cum artes difficiles discunt, ita celeriter res innumerabiles arripiunt, ut non tum primum accipere videantur, sed “reminisci” et *recordari*.—CIC. *de Sen.* 93. b. The things, to which “Reminisci” is applicable, present themselves naturally, in the train of conceptions passing through the mind; those, again, to which *Recordari* applies, to those only that are collected by a steady attention to each composing it. In the case of the last verb, the slightest ground of association must be accurately traced the moment it is apprehended. A definition of *Recordari* may be collected from the high authority of Horace.

Quod si intercideret tibi nunc aliquid, repetes mox;
Sive est naturæ hoc, sive artis; mirus utroque.—*Sat.* 2. 4. 6.
Quocirca mecum loquor hæc, tacitusque *recordor*.—*Ep.* 2. 2. 145.

Here, the maxims recollected occur to the mind itself.

Et vocem Anchisæ magni, vultumque *recordor*.—*VIRG. Æn.* 8. 156.

Here, again, things are recollected that are furnished by the senses of hearing

and seeing. "Tu, si meliore memoria es, velim scire ecquid de te *recordere*?" —CIC. *de Fin.* 150. b. Ovid has applied *Recordari* to an event that is future, and expressed a strong anticipation, as if it were a recollected fact.

Nunc ego non tantum quæ sum passura *recordor*,
Sed quæcunque potest ulla relicta pati.——OVID. *Her.* 10. 79.

"Sed parum est me hoc "meminisse:" spero etiam te, qui oblivisci nihil soles nisi injurias, quoniam hoc est animi, quoniam etiam ingenii tui, te aliquid de hujus illo quæstoris officio cogitantem, etiam de aliis quibusdam quæstoribus "reminiscentem" *recordari*."—CIC. *pro Lig.* 143. a. In the preceding sentence, Cicero states the circumstances that made him remember the quæstorship of Ligarius, and produced that state of mind styled "Meminisse." In this he expresses a hope, that when Cæsar was thinking of the circumstances that were meritorious upon the part of this quæstor, the merits of other people, acting in the same capacity, would obtrude themselves upon his memory, as expressed by "Reminisci," and that he would encourage the train of conceptions, so as to render it complete, as expressed by *Recordari*.

MEMORARE, NARRARE,

agree, in denoting the act of telling; but the former refers to the effect produced on the memory by doing so, and the latter to the number and the arrangement of the particulars that make up the tale. It has been said, that MEMORARE, at some times, signifies to recal to the memory of the hearer certain facts that have escaped him, and differs from "Recordari," in implying, that the means of recollection are without the mind that remembers. Gesner defines it, "In memoriam reducere," and supports his definition by the following passage from Plautus:

Ha. Dic mihi
Ecquid meministi tuum parentum nomina?
Ag. Patris atque matris memini. *Ha.* Memora dum mihi,
Si novi forte, aut si sunt cognati mihi.——PLAUT. *Pæn.* 5. 3. 101.

It does not appear, from Hanno's question, that he had ever known any thing whatever of the parents of Agorastocles, and, of course, there could at first be

no recollection. *Memorare* suggests a subject for "Meminisse," and its force depends upon the effect produced upon the memory of the person, to whom an important fact is related.

Musa, mihi causas *memora*.——VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 11.

Here, the causes are understood to be of such moment, as never to be forgotten, if once communicated.

Tacitus, speaking of Helvidius Priscus, styles him a "Vir sæpius *memorandus*," and thereby suggests the importance of every thing relating to him.—*Hist.* 4. 5.

Si qua fidem tanto est operi lata vetustas,
Non equidem, nec te, Juvenis *memorande*, silebo.——VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 792.

The poet, here, insinuates, that he would do injustice to the filial piety of Lausus, if he did not, as far as he could, consign it to the remembrance of posterity.

NARRARE differs from "Memorare," in having no reference to the anxiety of imprinting the facts related upon the memory of the person to whom they are communicated, but to the minuteness and regularity of the detail given.

Nec "memoranda" tamen vobis mea facta, Pelasgi,
Esse reor : vidistis enim ; sua *narret* Ulysses,
Quæ sine teste gerit, quorum nox conscia sola est.——OVID. *Met.* 13. 13.

Ajax declines recounting his own exploits, not from a conviction of their wanting intrinsic worth, but because his hearers knew them ; and he recommends it to his rival to give a minute detail of what, he affirms, nobody ever witnessed, and what none would be at pains to remember.

—— tu isti *narra* omnem rem ordine, ut factum siet.——TER. *Eun.* 5. 4. 48.

The terms that appear as adjuncts to the verb, do, in this example, explain its power.

Si tibi nulla sitim finiret copia lymphæ,
Narrares medicis.————HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 146.

The verb, in this instance, represents happily the minute enumeration of symptoms given by one labouring under a disease.

Iliacosque iterum demens audire labores
Exposcit, pendetque iterum *narrantis* ab ore.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 78.

The place of *Narrare*, in this beautiful description of Dido's fatal curiosity, could be supplied by no other verb in the Latin language.

The loquacity of people, upon subjects relating to their own trade, is well expressed by *Narrare*, which denotes a detail prolonged as much as possible, from whatever cause it is so.

Navita de ventis, de tauris *narrat* arator.—PROPERT. 2. 1. 43.

MENS—*vide* ANIMA.

MERCATOR, INSTITOR, NEGOTIATOR,

agree, in denoting a trader, but differ, as this person is either proprietor, or only manager, of the subjects of his merchandize, and according to the manner in which he acquires the articles in which he deals. The first signifies any merchant, who buys and sells commodities on his own account, and is answerable to nobody for his bargains, whether profitable or otherwise. “*Sordidi etiam putandi qui mercantur a mercatoribus, ut statim vendant.*”—CIC. *de Off.* 30. b. Here, the merchants, blamed, were stimulated by the hope of an immediate gain to themselves; and those, from whom they bought, may be understood to have been actuated by the same principle. The *Mercator*, besides, is understood not to be tied down to any particular spot, but to travel over the surface of the earth, conducting those exports and imports in which he is alone concerned. “*Multique ad eos mercatores ventitant.*”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 4. 3.

Mercator——mox reficit rates
Quassas, indocilis pauperiem pati.—HOR. *Car.* 1. 1. 16.
——Tu corycia, semper qui puppe moraris
Atque habitas, Coro semper tollendus et Austro,
Perditus, ac vilis sacci *mercator* olentis.
——parcat tunicis licet atque lacernis,
Curatoris eget, qui navem “*mercibus*” implet.
Ad summum latus, et tabula distinguitur unda.—JUV. 14. 267.

In both the last instances, the merchant is supposed to have a personal interest in the purchase and the sale of his wares, and to expose himself to the hazards of the sea, only for a premium that he is himself to enjoy.

INSTITOR differs from "Mercator," in supposing, that the trader is not buying and selling on his own account, but as the agent of another, who employs him. He is so called, "quia negotio gerendo instet;" and it should seem, that his employment was not limited to the superintendance of ordinary sales, but extended to that of different species of traffic, by which another might become a gainer. "Nec multum facit tabernæ sit præpositus, an cui-libet alii negotiationi. Cuicunque, igitur, negotio præpositus sit, *institor* recte appellabitur."—ULP. *L. 3. de Institoria Actione*. "Sed etiam eos *institores* dicendos placuit, quibus vestiarii vel lintearii dant vestem circumferendam et distrahendam, quos vulgo circuitores appellamus."—PLIN. 18. 23. "Si tabernarius servum suum peregre mitteret, ad merces comparandas et sibi mittendas, loco *institoris* habendum, Labeo scripsit."—PLIN. *ibid*.

The *Institor* is never represented by the poets, as running the same risks at sea as the "Mercator." As a factor, he cannot be understood to have the same zeal, and he may be more apt to cheapen the commodities he is employed to sell.

Et patere inde aliquid decrescere; non aliter quam
Institor hibernæ tegetis, niveique cadurci.—JUV. 7. 220.

In the classics, the *Institor* is represented as occasionally exposing the goods of his master at the door of the shop at which they are sold, and as running about in the performance of his duty with loose clothes.

Abstulerat totam temerarius *institor* urbem,
Inque suo nullum limine limen erat.—MART. 7. 61. 1.
Institor ad dominam veniet discinctus emacem:
Expedit merces, teque sedente, suas.—OVID. *A. Am.* 1. 421.
Mundus demissis *institor* in tunicis.—PROPERT. 4. 37.

NEGOTIATOR differs from "Institor," in being applicable to traders, who deal either on account of themselves, or their employers, and from the former, in supposing, that the subjects of merchandize are acquired and disposed of,

without the trader going abroad to do so. Labeo says of them, "*Negotiatores servi videntur, qui præpositi sunt negotii exercendi causa: veluti qui ad emendum, aut locandum aut conducendum præpositi sunt.*"—*De Legat. Serv.* 3.

That the employments of the *Negotiator* and the "Mercator" were not the same, is clear from a passage in Cicero. "Postulo mihi respondeat qui sit iste Verrutius: "Mercator" an *Negotiator.*"—*in Ver.* 4. 77.

Negotiatoribus comis, "Mercatoribus" justus, municipibus liberalis, sociis abstinens."—*Cic. pro Plan.* 272. b. Affability towards those dealers who speculated at home on the stock they had acquired, was the best quality of a quæstor; and justice towards merchants, in their transactions abroad, also suited the character which Cicero wishes to assume to himself. "Hominesque "negotia gerentes" judiciis iniquissimis irretires, "mercatores" e navi egredientes terreres, conscendentem morarere."—*Cic. in Vatin.* 5. There was, in this conduct, a want of that "Comitas" towards *Negotiatores*, necessary for the successful practice of their trade, in the place where they had settled; and "Mercatores" were impeded in their transactions, by being put in fear when they landed, and prevented from sailing when they chose.

MERETRIX—*vide* CONCUBINA.

METUERE—*vide* TIMERE.

MODO, RECENS, NUPER,

agree, in denoting time lately past, but differ, either as the point, from which the interval is reckoned, is present or past; or according to the extent of the interval itself. MODO, as an adverb of time, is generic, signifying the past, present, and future: it supposes the past, however, as just gone, and the future as instant, or just approaching. "Parietes urbis modo stant et manent: rempublicam penitus amisimus."—*Cic. de Off.* 2. 8.

Modo dolores, mea tu, occipiunt primulum.—*TER. Adelp.* 3. 1. 2.

Here, *modo* signifies "just now," or "at this very time."

Domum modo ibo: ut apparentur dicam.—*TER. And.* 3. 4. 15.

Here, the time is future. It is as denoting past time, however, that *Modo* is synonymous with the two other terms; and then it denotes a short interval

between the present point and some former one. There is no absolute measure, at the same time, for the extent of this interval. It may vary, even in subjects of the same nature, and has constantly a reference to a period shorter than another specified.

———— sæpe notatus,
 Cum tribus anellis, *modo* læva Priscus inani
 Vixit inæqualis, clavum ut mutaret in horas.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 7. 9.

The whim of this Priscus would probably shew itself by short intervals, between the times he wore, and did not wear, rings. “*Provinciae Galliae partim modo ab nostris imperatoribus subactæ, modo bello domitæ, modo triumphis ac monumentis notatæ, modo ab senatu agris urbibusque multatæ sunt.*”—CIC. *pro Font.* 276. b. The different past events, specified by *Modo*, may not all have happened within the memory of those living when Cicero recorded them; but the interval, between that period and the time of their occurrence, was short, in respect to many other events in the history of Rome.

RECENS differs from “*Modo*,” in supposing that the interval, which is but short, extends not from the present, but from a former period, at which some other event took place.

Puerum aut puellam alicunde ut reperirem sibi
Recens natum, eapse quod sibi supponeret.—PLAUT. *Cist.* 1. 2. 16.

The birth of this child was an event that took place a short time before it was exposed, which event was prior to the time in which the Lena gave this narration. It was not like the event of the young woman bearing her company, mentioned a few lines before, the time of which is fixed by its proximity to that present one, in which she gives her statement.

Is amore misere hanc deperit mulierculam,
 Quæ hinc “*modo*” flens abiit.——————*Ibid.* 12.

Suetonius, speaking of the Claudian family, as existing in the reign of Tiberius, says, “*Inde Romam recens conditam, cum magna clientum turba commigravit, auctore Tito Tatío, consorte Romuli.*”—SÜET. *in Vit. Tib.* 1. The event of this migration is fixed, in point of time, by its being near a

prior one of great notoriety ; but this last has no connection with the then present one when the historian recorded it.

—— armentaque pasces

Sole recens orto, aut noctem ducentibus astris.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 155.

In this precept of general use, there is no reference to the time at which it is given, but to the period at which either the sun should rise, or the stars should appear, and that at which it was proper to feed the herds.

NUPER differs from “Recens,” and agrees with “Modo,” in implying, that the present time forms one of the points containing the interval between two events. This interval, however, though undefined, is much longer in the case of *Nuper*, than of “Modo.” A single sentence in Cicero puts this beyond all doubt, when, upon finding the former did not suit the idea he meant to convey, he quits it, and employs the latter, which he explains. “*Nuper* homines nobiles ejusmodi judices ; et quid dico *nuper* ? immo vero “modo” ac plane “paulo ante” vidimus.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 6. 3.

The interval in particular cases, to which *Nuper* is applied, varies with the subject, and is more or less, according to circumstances. Thus, though ages had passed from the discovery of those sciences forming philosophy, yet, as these are few, when compared with what had before elapsed, the discovery is said to have been lately made. “Neque ante philosophiam patefactam quæ *nuper* inventa est.”—CIC. *de Divin.* 39. “Ea quæ *nuper*, id est, paucis ante sæculis, reperta sunt.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 50.

MÆROR—*vide* DOLOR.

MONERE—*vide* HORTARI.

MOLES—*vide* STRUES.

MORARI—*vide* CUNCTARI.

MOLIRI—*vide* CONARI.

MORBUS, ÆGROTATIO, ÆGRITUDO,

agree, in denoting the unsound state of that to which they are applied, but differ, in respect either to the symptoms or the seat of the disease. MORBUS signifies that state of the body, in which some of its members have for a while been unfit for performing either a part or the whole of their functions, and in which that, which is the seat of the disease, extends its influence over

the system. What is called a "Vitium" is permanent, while a *Morbus* yields often to the power of medicine. The *Morbus* may be more or less violent, according to circumstances; but both it and its effects are understood to cease, however gradually, when its cause is removed. Aulus Gellius furnishes us with the following definition of the term: "*Morbus* est habitus cujusque corporis contra naturam, qui usum ejus facit deteriore."—*Noct. Att.* 4. 2. "*Morbum* appellant totius corporis corruptionem."—*Cic. Q. Tusc.* 215. a. Seneca emphatically calls those diseases which are the effects, the punishments, also, of luxury. "*Morbi* supplicia luxuriæ."—*Ep.* 95.

ÆGROTATIO differs from "Morbus," in denoting a disease that is always chronic, and whose symptoms appear in the weakness and lassitude of the patient. Both terms, at the same time, agree in expressing a general derangement in the system, from whatever cause it proceeds. "*Ægrotationem* appellant "morbum" cum imbecillitate. Itaque illa duo "morbus" et *ægrotatio* ex totius valetudinis conquassatione et perturbatione gignuntur."—*Cic. Q. Tusc.* 215. a.

Ægrotatio exists, along with "Morbus," as its concomitant, and not as a separate disease. The latter term denotes the unsound state in general, and the former marks the symptoms which accompany, or the effects which follow, it. "Tulliæ meæ "morbus" et "imbecillitas corporis" me exanimat."—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.* 11. 6. Both terms, also, agree in being very frequently applied to the disorders of mind. "Quia nomen insanix significat mentis *ægrotationem* et "morbum."—*Cic. Q. Tusc.* 191. b.

ÆGRITUDO differs from both "Morbus" and "Ægrotatio," in being properly applied to the disorders of mind alone. "Sed proprie ut "ægrotatio" in corpore, sic *ægritudo* in animo nomen habet."—*Cic. Q. Tusc.* 195. a.

— aut illud falsum est, quod vulgo audio

Dici, diem adimere *ægritudinem* hominibus:

Nam mihi quidem quotidie augetur magis

De filio *ægritudo*. ————— *TER. Heaut.* 3. 1. 12.

"Neque enim omnis *ægritudo* una ratione sedatur: alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti, alia invidenti adhibenda medicina."—*Cic. Q. Tusc.* 222. a. "Ita-

que præclare nostri, ut alia multa, molestiam, solitudinem, angorem, propter similitudinem corporum ægrorum, *ægritudinem* nominaverunt.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 3. 22. From this last observation of Cicero, it should seem, that, in his apprehension, *Æger* had been originally applied only to bodily diseases. This adjective, however, which is a root, was afterwards used in a more extensive sense than its derivatives, *Ægre* and *Ægritudo* ever were, among pure writers. A person in bad health was never said *Ægre ferre*, but one who was discontented, or somehow troubled in mind.

After the corruption of the Latin language had commenced and become prevalent, the term *Ægritudo* was sometimes applied to bodily disease. Thus, Tacitus says of Piso, who was watching the motions, and planning the destruction of Germanicus, “*Tum Seleuciam digreditur, opperiens ægritudinem, quæ rursum Germanico acciderat.*”—*Ann.* 2. 69. But the practice of Tacitus is not to be set in opposition to that of Cicero, especially when explained and supported by a critical observation from himself. In Columella, too, as may be expected, we find this impure use of *Ægritudo*. “*Agnis quoque succurrendum est vel febricitantibus vel ægritudine alia affectis.*”—7. 5. 20.

MORITURUS, MORIBUNDUS,

agree, in denoting approaching death, but differ, in respect to the supposed nearness of the event. *MORITURUS* implies a general futurity, when the fulfilment of the event may be more or less distant from the period, at which it is announced as about to happen. The occurrence of the event, besides, is not certain, when depending on the resolution of the person proposing to terminate his existence, or on the hostile disposition of others understood to be ready to do so.

Ne quid inexpertum, frustra moritura, relinquat.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 415:

Before putting an end to her existence, the queen had resolved to exercise her address. This might require a shorter or a longer time, and if the plan was in the end successful, she would alter her purpose.

Illa petit Nilum cymba male nixa fugaci,
Hoc unum, jussu non *moritura* die.—PROP. 4. 6. 63.

By means of the flight here mentioned, Cleopatra had disappointed her enemies, and avoided her death, upon the day they had fixed for it.

Arma diu senior desueta trementibus ævo
Circundat nequicquam humeris, et inutile ferrum
Cingitur, ac densus fertur *moriturus* in hostes.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 509.

The intention of Priam to perish in battle was altered by Hecuba, and he afterwards patiently waited his fate, of which, though not distant, he had no knowledge.

MORIBUNDUS differs from “*Moriturus*,” in implying both an instant and an inevitable futurity in the event. The fate of the person dying is understood to be unalterable, by means either of his own resolution, or of any circumstances without him. In *Moribundus* there is implied an imaginary extension of a period, which it cannot in reality admit, and circumstances which lead to the event of death, are held to be part of the event itself. “*Tribunum plebis, plus viginti vulneribus acceptis, jacentem moribundumque vidistis.*”—CIC. *pro Sest.* 21. b. “*Moribundus Romanus, labentibus super corpus armis, ad terram defluxit.*”—LIV. 2. 20.

Inter cunctantes cecidit *moribunda* ministras.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 488.

From the seeming licence elsewhere assumed by Virgil, in applying both words to Dido in the same speech, no argument is to be drawn against the distinction stated. As he was under no necessity, as a poet, to prefer the one term to the other, a reason may be seen for the change, that does honour to his talents in the way of description. The queen first says of herself,

Nec *moritura* tenet crudeli funere Dido?—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 308.

and afterwards,

— cui me *moribundam* deseris hospes?—*Ibid.* 323.

By the first term, she begins to try the attachment of Æneas, and intimates a

purpose of dying, without fixing the time of fulfilling it; by the latter, she makes her last effort to move his compassion, and states the event as immediate, and such as it was hardly even in his power to prevent. She exclaims, accordingly, a little afterwards,

Quid móror ? an mea P'gmalion dum mœnia frater
 Destruat ?—————VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 325.

MORS, NEX,

agree, in denoting death, but differ, in respect to the manner in which it is effected. The former signifies an extinction of life, by disease or old age; the latter, such as is produced by violence committed upon the animal frame, with a view to destroy it. The causes of disease originate either from some disorder in the inward structure, or from some accidental blow from without. Such causes may superinduce death, either instantly, or some time after they begin to exist: “*Mors* propter incertos casus quotidie imminet, et propter vitæ brevitatem nunquam longe potest abesse.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 168. a.

NEX differs from “*Mors*,” in signifying a violent, in opposition to a natural, death. “*Insidiatori vero et latroni quæ potest afferri injusta nex?*”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 103. a. “*Viri in uxores, sicuti in liberos, vitæ necisque habent potestatem.*”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 6. 19.

Suetonius and Justin have not been correct in their application of *Nex*. The former says, “*Post necem consulis,*” in *Vita C. J. Cæs.* v. when Lepidus had died of a disease: and the latter says, “*Post necem Mithridatis,*” when, in a former chapter, he had told that he had died “*gloriosa senectute.*”—JUST. 42. 1.

A person guilty of suicide is, in one passage, said by Cicero, “*Consciscere mortem sibi,*” and in another, “*Consciscere necem sibi.*”—*In Ver.* 176. b. & *de Nat. Deor.* 27. b. Upon looking into the two passages, we shall find, that though the act of suicide was common to the perpetrators mentioned in each, yet, in the former, where “*Mors*” is used, death was courted by the sufferers as a relief, and a termination of a series of miseries, to which they had been unjustly subjected; while, in the latter, the profane conduct of Junius, who had

slighted the auspices, and lost the Roman fleet, exposed him to the just vengeance of his country, so that he became his own murderer to shun disgrace, and to escape from the hand of the executioner.

In some instances, "Mors" appears to have a generic power, by which it denotes the extinction of life, without regard to the means. Thus, Cicero says of a murderer, who had effected his purpose by two blows, one on the stomach, and the other near the ear; "Ita vir clarissimus ab homine deterrimo acerbissima "morte" est affectus."—*Fam. Ep.* 4. 12. If death is agreeable to the person condemned to suffer it, "Mors" is more properly adopted than *Nex*. When Socrates had received his sentence, Cicero makes him speak as follows: "Magna me spes tenet, iudices, bene mihi evenire, quod mittar ad "mortem."—*Q. Tusc.* 170. b.

MOS, CONSUETUDO,

agree, in denoting the voluntary repetition of certain acts, but differ, in respect to the origin of that, which is thus rendered customary. *Mos* denotes some observance that had been enacted with a design to its being afterwards attended to, and implies, that it has been actually sanctioned by use. Varro says, "*Morem* esse institutum animi, quod sequi debeat "consuetudo." Macrobius quotes from Varro and Festus as follows: "*Mos* est institutum patrium, sive ad sacra pertineat, ut ait Festus, sive ad alia quælibet, cujus usus seu cultus perseverans "consuetudinem" facit. Quare *mos* præcedit ut causa, "consuetudo" sequitur."—*Saturn.* 3. 8. The first part of this definition will appear to be justified by examples. The second will probably not have the same support, as *Mos* does not seem always needful to give existence to "Consuetudo."

Mos erat Hesperio in Latio, quem protinus urbes
Albanæ coluere sacrum, nunc maxima rerum
Roma colit, cum prima movent in prælia Martem.—*VIRG. Æn.* 7. 501.

There is here mentioned a positive institution, originating in Latium, and handed down, by those who made it, to succeeding generations. "Hic enim est *mos* patrius academiæ, adversari semper omnibus in disputando."—*Cic. de Or.* 91. b.

The sceptical and disputatious spirit here mentioned, was the established and continued characteristic of the sect of academicks. "Romanorum epulis fides ac tibias adhibere, *moris fuit.*"—QUINCT. I. 10.

CONSUETUDO differs from "Mos," in denoting the continued observance of something that had never been enacted, and which rests upon the tacit consent of those disposed to attend to it. "Suscepit autem vita hominum *consuetudoque* communis, ut beneficiis excellentes viros in cœlum tollerent." This determination was prior to human appointments, and is a necessary tribute which all men are impelled to pay to superior worth. That it may be violated, because it occasionally depends on the will of individuals, appears from the conduct of the most corrupt of mankind. "*Consuetudinis* jus est quod voluntate omnium sine lege vetustas comprobavit."—CIC. *de Inv.* 70. b. "Immo magnæ auctoritatis hoc jus habetur: quod in tantum probatum est, ut non fuerit necesse, scripto id comprehendere."—PAUL. 36. "Exercitatio ex qua *consuetudo* gignitur."—CIC. *de Or.* 141. b. "Quem "morem" cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias sæpe, et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam *consuetudinem* disputaremus."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 230. a. The Socratic method of reasoning, here alluded to, was invented and established by the philosopher who gave it its name. Because it was thoroughly understood by Carneades, those succeeding academicks, who were contemporaries of Cicero, gave it currency by only bringing it into use.

MULTIPLEX, VARIUS, MULTIFARIUS,

agree, in denoting the absence of simplicity in the objects they define, but differ, according as the parts, or attributes, of those objects are the same or different, and according to the extent of the diversity, when such diversity exists. In their original sense, they must be considered as applied to material and compounded substances, though afterwards applied to the qualities and relations of immaterial objects. It is to be observed, that the simplicity, to which the qualities denoted by the three adjectives are opposed, must not be taken so rigidly as to be inapplicable to substances that are uniform in their natures, though capable of being resolved, not only into elements, but into

distinct parts. Every herb, accordingly, and every metal, must be held simple in its respective kind. MULTIPLEX is originally applicable to a substance that has many folds, as "Simplex," from "Sine" and "Plica," is applicable to one that has none. "Cortex *multiplex* tunicis vitibus, tiliæ, abieti : quibusdam "simplex" ut fico, arundini."—PLIN. 16. 31.

Auri *multiplicis* thoraca tulit.—SIL. ITAL. 16. 583.

It is applied also to bodies that, from any cause, exhibit a greater number of similar parts than others of their kind. "Alvus est *multiplex* et tortuosa."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 53. b. "Vitem serpentem *multiplici* lapsu et erratico."—CIC. *de Sen.* 80. a.

Multiplex sometimes denotes numerous ; but, when it does so, supposes the individuals making up the group to be strictly similar. Thus, Cicero speaks of the young animals forming one litter. "Quæ *multiplices* foetus procreant, ut sues, ut canes, his mammarum data est multitudo."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 52. b.

Multiplex is figuratively applied to subjects that are immaterial, and can have no number of parts. There is always, however, a strict similarity in the qualities, or possible applications, of such subjects as are specified by this term. "Anceps et *multiplex* verborum potestas in ambiguis."—Auct. *ad Her.* 41. a. "Sed est magnum illud quidem, veruntamen *multiplex* pueri ingenium."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 90. a. "Neque enim fidum esse potest *multiplex* et tortuosum ingenium."—CIC. *de Am.* 18.

VARIUS differs from "Multiplex," in referring to the number neither of similar parts in material, nor of similar qualities, or possible applications of them, in immaterial, objects, but to an undefined diversity, either in one object, or in a number forming one class. "Principes qualitates sunt "uniusmodi," et "simplices:" ex his ortæ, *variæ* sunt, et quasi multiformes."—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 44. a. There is here given a most correct definition of simplicity, as opposed to the quality denoted by "Multiplex," and of that variety, also, which is opposed to both. Cicero gives a definition of the abstract term *Varietas*, so very much in point, as to supersede the necessity of any further discussion

respecting the adjective. “*Varietas* enim Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in disparibus coloribus dicitur: sed transfertur in multa disparia. *Varium* pœma, *varia* oratio, *varii* mores, *varia* fortuna. Voluptas enim *varia* dici solet, cum percipitur ex multis dissimilibus rebus, dissimiles efficientibus voluptates.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 66. a.

MULTIFARIUS differs from “Multiplex,” in denoting, that the multiplied parts are heterogeneous, and from “Varius,” in denoting, that the diversity exists in a number of points, of which the latter gives no notice. This adjective, it must be observed, is not much used, nor is it to be seen in the best writers. From the manner, however, in which the adverbs connected with it are applied, there can be no doubt of the precise power of the adjective itself. “*Militares coronæ multifariæ sunt.*”—GELL. 5. 6. A great variety of crowns are mentioned in the chapter which the above sentence begins, and they are said to be different, both in the figures represented, and the materials of which they were made. “*Panis multifarie et e milio fit, e panico rarius.*”—PLIN. 18. 7. A variety in the ways of making bread is here mentioned, whether of the common millet, or of the other species of it mentioned. The “*Milium*” and the “*Panicum*” may have been mixed, or either may have been combined with any other species of grain. Though any one of them had been used singly, yet the adverb “*Multifarie*” suggests the variety of different materials which might enter into the composition of what is styled bread. “*Legionariorum se firmare præsiidiis, qui multifariam diverseque tendebant.*”—SÆTON. *in Galba* 19. The last of these adverbs can only shew, that some of the paths, by which the legionary soldiers separated during the emperor’s extreme danger, were opposite. The multiplied diversity, that appeared in all the other intermediate directions, is, with sufficient clearness, announced by the first.

MUNDUS—*vide* ELEGANS.

MUNUS—*vide* OFFICIUM et DONUM.

MURUS, MÆNIA, PARIES,

agree, in denoting walls intended to give protection, but differ, in respect to

the kind of the protection, and the manner in which it is given. *MURUS* properly signifies a wall not easy to be got over, and that defends those who are within it, by its height. By means of it alone, nothing but inclosure is effected, the advantage of which may be destroyed by scaling ladders. The command of Æneas, upon leaving his little army, was to take all the protection their intrenchment afforded them, and to keep off the plain field, where they might be forced to fight against a superior number.

Neu struere auferent aciem, neu credere campo,
Castra modo, et tutos servarent aggere *muros*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 42.

“Magno me metu liberabis, dummodo inter me atque te *murus* intersit.”—*CIC. Cat.* 1. 5.

When those walls, styled *Muri*, were regularly fortified, so as to give protection to the besieged employing arms in their defence, they then got the appellation of *MÆNIA*. In consequence of this improvement, they ministered to the security of those within them by other means than by their height. The *Murus*, or unfortified wall, was sometimes used for the double purpose of keeping off the enemy from the fortified one, and of making their retreat the more difficult, in case they were unsuccessful, and met with a repulse. “*Zamæ mænia* rex Juba duplici “muro” sepsit.”—VITRUV. 8. 4. “*Hic mænia* “muro” amplexus est.”—FLOR. 1. 4. The imagination of Virgil has presented this practice as taking place in the infernal regions.

Mænia lata videt triplici circumdata “muro.”—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 549.

We find the same walls styled both *Muri* and *Mænia*, according to the different views taken of them, as comprehending the height of the one and the artificial fortification of the other. The former might have been subservient to other purposes beside military ones, which it is understood the latter could not. “Est mihi tecum pro aris et focus certamen, et pro Deorum templis atque delubris, proque urbis “muris” quos vos pontifices sanctos esse dicitis, diligentiusque urbem religione quam ipsis *mænibus* cingitis.”—*CIC. de Nat. Deor.* 3. 65. The fortifications have sometimes been considered apart from the walls that supported them, and of which they are ordinarily regarded

as a part. “Quum pæne ædificata in “muris” ab exercitu nostro *mœnia* viderentur.”—CÆS. *de Bel. Civ.* 2. 16.

PARIES differs from “Murus” and “Mœnia,” in denoting a wall which, being connected with a roof, gives protection against the severity of the weather, and forms a place of habitation. It is applicable to all the inner walls of a house, by which the different apartments are divided, and also to the side-walls, which form a contiguity with the neighbouring houses, by being under a continued roof. In the zeal of Nero to improve the city of Rome, after great part of it was burnt down, and to prevent an evil which had been augmented by the roofs being continuous, he gave orders that each house should be set by itself. “Nec communione *parietum* sed propriis quæque “muris” ambirentur.”—TAC. *Ann.* 15. 43. The buildings, then, which would otherwise have been named “Domus,” got the name of “Insulæ,” as being separated from each other, as islands are by the sea.

Paries, sometimes, is made to denote the whole house.

Nam tua res agitur, *paries* cum proximus ardet.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 18. 84.

It most frequently, however, denotes only the common side-wall of two houses. Through a chink of this, we are told, in the elegant fable of Ovid, that Pyramus and Thisbe first unfolded their love.

Fissus erat tenui rima, quam duxerat olim,
Cum fieret *paries* domui communis utrique.—OVID. *Met.* 4. 65.

MUTUO DARE—*vide* COMMODARE.

MUTUS, INFANS,

agree, in denoting the absence of the power of speech, but differ, in respect to the cause of that absence, and the time of its continuance. “*Mutus*,” says Nonius, 1. 29. “onomotopeia est incertæ vocis, quasi “mugitus.” Nam *mutus* sonus est proprie, qui intellectum non habet.” *Mutus*, then, signifies an incapacity, from the state of the organs, to emit articulate sounds. “Satius est *mutum* esse, quam quod nemo intelligat, dicere.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 186. b. “Est

etiam ejus qui servis, qui *mutis* pecudibus præsit, eorum quibus præsit, commodis utilitatique servire.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Q. F.* 294. b.

Mutus is sometimes applied so as to denote the voluntary silence of animals who do not emit articulate sounds. Thus, Pliny says of the blackbird, “*Merula canit æstate, hieme balbutit, circa solstitium muta.*”—10. 29. This silence is but temporary, and is not like the dumbness expressed in the original meaning of *Mutus*, which continues while no change takes place upon the organs.

INFANS differs from “*Mutus*,” in supposing, that the incapacity of speaking arises from the tender nonage of the animal, and that a power is dormant which will by and by be called into action. “*Fatur is qui primum homo significabilem ore emittit vocem: ab eo, antequam ita faciunt pueri, dicuntur infantes.*”—VARRO, *de L. L.* 5. 7. “*Iste infanti pupillæ fortunæ patrias ademit.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 1. 153. “*Si infantes pueri, “mutæ” etiam bestię pæne loquuntur.*”—CIC. *de Fin.* 63. b. The children, specified by *Infantes*, have the capacity that will grow into the power of speech; the beasts, again, are void of this capacity, and are destined to remain eternally mute.

Tutus ut *infanti* vagiat ore puer.—OVID. *Fast.* 4. 208.

It appears, that “*Mutus*” is never applied to the human species, when voluntarily silent, or unable to utter what they feel. *Infans* is then taken like “*Elinguis.*”

Infans namque pudor prohibebat plura profari.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 6. 57.

The truth of the above remark is not overturned by the following expression in Plautus:

Quin taces? *Eu.* “*Muto*” imperas.—*Merc.* 2. 4. 26.

The reply made to the question, as to voluntary silence, is a sufficient proof that the person making it was not “*Mutus.*” The power of speech existed; but it is wittily said, that, in the present instance, it was no more to be used than if it did not.

NANCISCI—*vide* PARARE.NARRARE—*vide* FARI.

NATIVUS, NATALIS,

agree, in suggesting the commencement of animal existence; but the one refers to the origin of the object, or its qualities, and the other to the times or places at which its origin took place. Both adjectives are derivatives from "Nasci," but they cannot be applied indiscriminately. NATIVUS refers to objects and their qualities, as the productions of nature, and not as being formed or affected by art. In the two examples that follow, there is a reference to the existence merely of the objects, without regard to their qualities. "Anaximandri autem opinio est, *nativos* esse Deos, longis intervallis orientes occidentesque."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 7. a. Here, the eternity of the divine nature is denied, and the existence of the Gods is, by means of *Nativus*, said to have a beginning.

Nunc age, *nativos* animantibus, et mortales

Esse animos, animasque leveis ut noscere possis.—LUCRET. 4. 418.

In the two examples that follow, *Nativus* refers to the existence of the attribute, and not of the object. "Tanta autem erat suavitas sermonis Latini, ut appareret in eo *nativum* quendam leporem esse, non adscitum."—NEP. *in Vit. Att.* 4. The "Lepor," in the speech of Atticus, might have existed, whether it was natural or not. "Nonne fuit eo major adhibenda medicina, quæ et illud *nativum*, et hoc delatum malum, sanare posset?"—CIC. *pro Dom.* 215. b. The "malum *nativum*" was the discontent excited by the famine, that originated with it: the "malum delatum" was the increase of that evil, superinduced by the interference of Clodius.

Nativus signifies what is natural, in opposition to what is artificial. Thus, by the expressions "*Nativæ* oves," and "*Nativi* coloris pannus," Pliny means

the natural colour of the wool that has not been dyed. By "*Nativa coma*," likewise, Ovid means the natural hair, with its original colour.

Postmodo *nativa* conspiciere coma.—OVID. *Amor.* 1. 14. 56.

NATALIS differs from "Nativus," in referring, not to the origin of the object, or to its qualities, but to the times and places at which this origin takes place. "Chaldæis in prædictione, et in notatione cujusque vitæ, ex *natali* die, minime est credendum."—CIC. *de Div.* 126. b. "O nonæ illæ Decembris, quæ me consule fuistis, quam ego diem vere *natalem* hujus urbis, aut certe salutarem appellare possum!"—CIC. *pro Flac.* 165. b. If this day was not that of the commencement of the existence, it was, for certain, that of the safety of the city.

Seu Libra, seu me Scorpius aspicit
Formidolosus, pars violentior
Natalis horæ.—HOR. 2. 17. 17.

The poets seem to apply *Natalis* only to the place of the origin of the object's existence.

———— funestaque funera nuper
Natales rapuere domos.—VALER. *Argon.* 3. 321.
Nescio qua *natale* solum dulcedine captos
Ducit, et immemores non sinit esse sui.—OVID. *Ep. ex Pon.* 1. 9. 35.

It is used as equivalent to "Nativus," and applied to inanimate objects, by prose writers, who lived after the Augustan age. "In auro non nisi excellentissimo *natalis*."—PLIN. 37. 4. "Sterilitas *natalis* et ingenita."—COLUM. 3. 7.

Natalis is applied to certain deities, and has a reference to the time at which their superintendance takes place.

At tu *natalis* quoniam Deus omnia sentis.—TIBUL. 4. 5. 19.

Juno, as presiding at the time of child-bearing, is also designed by *Natalis*.

Natalis Juno, sanctos cape thuris acervos,
Quos tibi dat tenera docta puella manu.—TIBUL. 4. 6. 1.

NATIO—*vide* GENS.

NAVIS, RATIS, CYMBA, SCAPHA, LINTER,

agree, in denoting a machine for conveying both persons and the subjects of trade, by water, from one place to another, but differ, in respect to the size or the construction of the species, to which each can be properly applied. The first, indeed, is a generic term, applicable to a vessel of any kind, of whatever dimensions, or however formed.

Navem agere ignarus navis timet.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 114.

The poet has, here, no intention to specify the kind of ship, as the danger from ignorance is the same in all kinds. “*Conficit optime cursum navis, quæ scientissimo gubernatore utitur.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 244. b.

The generality of the term *Navis* is often limited by the application of adjectives, which mark the use of particular species; as *Navis Longa, Marina, Fluviatilis, Piscatoria, Oneraria, Actuaria, &c.*

RATIS differs from “*Navis*,” in denoting the rudest vehicle to which a person can commit himself on water. The poets sometimes use *Ratis* as a general term, but the prose-writers never do. The term expresses a raft, formed by the junction of a few beams, which can be used with safety only in smooth water. It had at first been but a floating platform, and when improved a little, got the appellation of “*Cava*.”

Ipsa vides cælum pice nigrius, et freta ventis

Turbida, perque “cavas” vix adeunda rates.—OVID. *Ep.* 17. 7.

Both Festus and Isidorus support the account now given of *Ratis*. “*Rates vocantur tigna inter se colligata, quæ per aquas agantur.*” “*Rates primum et antiquissimum genus navigii, e rudibus tignis asseribusque consertum.*”

In the two following instances, Cicero and Livy seem to justify the distinction made between “*Navis*” and *Ratis*. “*Cum aut “navibus” aut ratibus conarentur accedere.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 236. b. “*Navibus ab Hannibale incensis, rates ad trajiciendum, in magna inopia materiæ, ægre comparabat.*”—LIV. *cap.* 36. When any reference is made to *Ratis*, as the subject of a simile, it is always regarded as denoting a rude vessel, capable of giving but very imperfect security. “*Tanquam ratis in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio.*”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 164. a.

CYMBA differs from "Ratis," in referring to a vessel fabricated with more art, and that is always of a small size. It denotes a boat, such as is used upon a ferry or lake, but so formed as to give all the security to be expected from its dimensions.

Non ideo debet pelago se credere, si qua
Audet in exiguo ludere *cymba* lacu.—OVID. *Trist.* 2. 329.

Cymba is often applied to the boat in which Charon wafted the souls of the dead across the Stygian lake.

Scandenda est torvi publica *cymba* senis.—PROPERT. 3. 18. 24.

This boat, we are told by Virgil, was so small, that it could hardly support the body of Æneas.

— gemuit sub pondere *cymba*.—ÆN. 6. 413.

SCAPHA differs from "Cymba," in denoting a yawl, that attends a ship for the convenience of those who belong to it. As coming from the Greek verb *σκαπτειν*, it seems originally to have signified a canoe, or boat formed out of the trunk of a tree; but the circumstance which distinguishes it, is that above mentioned. "Ut dominus "navis" cum idem gubernator esset, in *scapham* confugeret, et inde funiculo qui a puppi religatus *scapham* annexam trahebat, navim quoad posset moderaretur."—CIC. *de Inv.* 81. b. "Quum mersissent quassas "naves" in alto, exceptis in præparatas *scaphas* nautis."—LIV. 23. 3.

LINTER differs from "Scapha," in suggesting no connection between it and a larger vessel, and in denoting a "navis fluviatilis," or wherry, used only on fresh water, such as that of rivers and lakes. They agree as to the original mode of their formation, that is, as being *μονοξυλα*, or hollowed out of a solid piece of wood.

— durum proeudit arator
Vomeris obtusi dentem, cavat arbore *lintres*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 261.
Partitur *lintres* exercitus; Actia pugna
Te duce per pueros hostili more refertur,
Adversarius est frater, lacus Adria.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 18. 61.

“Qui cum non impetrasset, ut insulam in lacu Prelio venderet, repente *lintribus* in eam insulam, materiam, calcem, cæmenta atque arenam convexit.”—*Cic. pro Mil.* 27.

NECESSE EST—*vide* DECET.

NEFANDUS, INFANDUS,

agree, in denoting something not to be uttered, but differ, in respect to the reason for which it is so. They are both derivatives from the verb “Fari;” but the one regards the impropriety, and the other the impossibility, of saying what one may attempt to express.

— quippe illa *nefandi* Taurica sacri
Inventrix, homines, ut jam quæ carmina tradunt
Digna fide credas, tantum immolat; ulterius nil
Aut gravius cultro timet hostia.—*Juv.* 15. 116.

The poet avoids giving any particular description of this barbarous practice, styled *Nefandi*, lest he should shock the feelings of his reader.

— abolere *nefandi*
Cuncta viri monumenta jubet, monstratque sacerdos.—*VIRG. Æn.* 4. 497.
At sperate Deos memores “fandi” atque *nefandi*.—*Ibid.* 1. 547.

In this last example, there is a distinction strongly marked between right and wrong, between what ought and ought not to be mentioned. “Novum delubrum cum in urbis clarissimo loco, *nefando* quodam atque inaudito instituto, inchoares.”—*Cic. pro Dom.* 249. a. “*Nefandissima* quæque tyrannicæ crudelitatis exercuit.”—*JUSTIN.* 16. 4.

INFANDUS differs from “*Nefandus*,” in referring to the impossibility of saying upon a subject what might be needful to explain it.

Infandum, regina, jubes renovare dolorem.—*VIRG. Æn.* 2. 3.

Æneas seems unwilling to comply with the queen’s request, from the extent of the subject, and not from any thing respecting it, that it would have been improper to utter. He afterwards says to her,

O sola *infandos* Trojæ miserata labores!—*Ibid.* 1. 601.

that is, distresses which no human tongue could describe. The poet, elsewhere,

allows, that an attempt might be made to explain, imperfectly, what no person could explain fully. Thus, he says of Mezentius,

Quid memorem *infandas* cædes? quid facta tyranni
Efferæ?

and, after relating one shocking act of barbarity, he adds,

At fessi tandem cives, *infanda* furentem
Armati circumsistunt.———VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 489.

It must be allowed, however, that *Infandus* possesses a generic power, by which it may be occasionally interpreted, as “Nefandus” is always. The short *e* in “Nefandus” often suits the poets, when the long *i* in *Infandus* is inadmissible.

———*Do.* Tam *infandum* facinus ne audivi quidem.—TER. *Eun.* 4. 3. 22.

The deed was actually related; but the adjective implies, that its nature was so horrible, that it ought not to have been so. Cicero says, that the introduction to a pleading may be taken from the subject, “Ex re si crudelis, si *infanda*, si præter opinionem, si immerito, si misera, si ingrata, si indigna, si nova, si quæ restitui sanarique non possit.”—*De Or.* 138. a. *Infanda*, here, certainly denotes something that ought not to be fully developed, and not what it is impossible to utter; else the orator would labour in vain.

NEGARE, INFITIARI, ABNUERE, RECUSARE,

agree, in expressing the act of denying, but differ, in respect either to the ground of the denial, or to the manner in which it is made. NEGARE, in its primitive sense, denotes nothing more than the negation of a proposition, which, consistently with truth, cannot be affirmed. By means of it, the speaker denies the existence of a supposed fact, the contrary of which must necessarily exist, and he gives that information to the hearer, which is, in his apprehension consistent with truth, and must be agreeable to him, unless he wishes to be deceived. “Sunt etiam valde contraria quæ appellantur *negantia*, ea ἀποφατικά Græci, contraria aientibus: ut si hoc est, illud non est.”—CIC. *Topic. C.* 14.

Et hoc *negat* minacis Adriatici
Negare litus—————CATULL. 4. 6.

The “Phaselus” is here made to speak of itself, and to deny, that the shore of the Adriatic denies its excellence. By means of the double negation, there is a positive affirmation that the case is so and so.

Negat Quis? *Nego*. Ait? aïo : postremo imperavi egomet mihi
 Omnia assentari.—————TER. *Eun.* 2. 2. 21.

The parasite denies and affirms, just as doing either will please. *Negare* reaches only to the expression, not to the justice or the injustice, with which the thing is uttered.

When that which is denied happens to be mentioned, the primary power of *Negare* undergoes an extension. It then denotes more than simple negation, and implies the denial of something which may have been expected, or might have been enjoyed.

Si natura *negat*, facit indignatio versus.—JUV. 1. 79.
 Egregii forma, sed quis fortuna *negarat*
 In patriam reditus.—————VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 435.

INFITIARI, from “In” and “Fateor,” denotes a known violation of truth, when the speaker denies what his conscience tells him he ought to affirm. Its force shews itself, not in the negation simply, but in the moral deformity of the lie, with which “Negare” is unconnected. “Nam cum id posset *infitiari*, repente præter opinionem omnium confessus est.”—CIC. *in Cat.* 3. 11. C. 5. “Una et eadem est omnibus in locis fraudatorum et *infitiatorum* impudentia.”—CIC. *pro Flac.* 159. a.

Non erit hic nobis *infitiandus* amor.—OVID. *Am.* 2. 17. 265.
 In jus, O Fallax, atque *infitiator* eamus.—MART. 1. 98. 104.

“Multi mori maluerunt falsum fatendo, quam *infitiando* dolere.”—CIC. *Part. Orat.* 234. a. The use of the rack is here said to be an ineffectual way of discovering the truth. Many, to avoid the pain, have chosen rather to avow what was false, than, for the sake of maintaining the truth, to continue in agony.

The place of *Infitiari* may be supplied by “Negare,” when the verb

“Fateri” is put in the same sentence with it. The mutual opposition between the two intimates an extension of the primary power of the last verb, as in the following sentence. “Tu qui a Mævio vel sumpsisti multa, si “fateris,” vel si “negas” surripuisti.”—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 171. a.

ABNUERE, from “Ab” and “Nuo,” refers to the manner in which the denial is made, and supposes it expressed by a nod, or some bodily gesture. “Quum “adnuimus” et “abnuimus,” motus quidem ille capitis, a natura rei quam significat, non abhorret.”—AUL. GELL. 10. 4. Its force depends on the slightness of the intimation; and from this is inferred, either the dignity of the person who denies, or the quickness of the petitioner in interpreting his signs. It supposes the former acting in obedience to his own will, without explaining his motives, and differs from “Infitari,” in suggesting nothing dishonourable in the concealment of that, which ought to be confessed.

*Abnueram bello Italiam concurrere Teucris,
Quæ contra vetitum discordia?——VIRG. Æn.* 10. 8.

The verb *Abnuere* suits the majesty of Jupiter in a council of the Gods, and is finely expressive of a dignified reproof. “Neque Mario senatus quamquam infestus *abnuere* de ullo negotio audebat.”—SALL. *Jug.* 84. 3. The supremacy of the power of Marius is forcibly exhibited by the use of a verb, which extends only to the slightest possible expression of the senate’s disposition to refuse. “Neque Silius flagitii aut periculi nescius erat: sed certo si *abnueret* exitio, præsentibus frui pro solatio habebat.”—TAC. *Ann.* 11. 12. Silius was completely aware of Messalina’s power, and of the danger of rejecting her kindness, even by the slightest hint.

RECUSARE, from “Re” and “Causa,” signifies to deny upon principle, whether well or ill founded, and to remonstrate against that which is requested. He, “qui *recusat*,” gives no hints in respect to his will, and intimates his determination to stick by his purpose. “Populum Romanum disceptatorem non modo non *recuso*, sed etiam depono.”—CIC. *pro Fl.* 194. b. So far from there being a disposition to reject, or stand out against, there was a disposition to claim that mentioned, as a right. “Si quis Deus mihi largiatûr ut ex hac ætate reperascam, et in cunis vagiam, valde *recusem*.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 94. a. The speaker

would strongly remonstrate against this, as exposing him to distresses already undergone, from the repetition of which the rest of his species were exempted. "Non *recuso*, non *abnuo*."—CIC. *pro Mil. cap.* 36. So far from refusing upon any ground, good or bad, the orator would not even seem to decline the request.

— at pater ardens

Sævit, quod meretrice nepos insanit amica

Filius, uxorem grandi cum dote *recusat*.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 4. 48.

The rage of the father was founded on the son's fixed determination not to marry, in spite of the temptation mentioned.

NEGOTIATOR—*vide* MERCATOR. NIGER—*vide* ATER.

NEMUS—*vide* SYLVA.

NIMBUS—*vide* IMBER.

NEX—*vide* MORS.

NITI—*vide* CONARI.

NIDOR—*vidi* ODOR.

NORMA, REGULA, LIBELLA,

agree, in denoting a rule for the direction of an artist's work, but differ, in respect to the nature of the rule, or the manner in which it is applied. NORMA signifies an instrument by which workmen measure, or form their angles, so as to render them neither greater nor less than right ones. By means of the *Norma*, the artist measures the squareness of his work. Gesner, from a passage in Vitruvius, defines it thus, "Fabrorum instrumentum ex duabus regulis constans, ita conjunctis, ut angulum rectum efficiunt." *Norma* is figuratively applied to every rule by which any subject is rigorously tried. "Natura, quæ *norma* est legis."—CIC. *de Legg.* 182. b.

Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus et *norma* loquendi.—HOR. *de Art. Poet.* 72.

REGULA differs from "Norma," in denoting a rule for the formation of a straight line. "Longitudines ad *regulam* et lineam, altitudines ad perpendicularum, anguli ad "normam" respondententes."—VITRUV. 7. 3.

Both "Norma" and *Regula* are used figuratively, and applied to objects that are intellectual. "Demosthenes ipse, illa "norma" oratoris et *regula*, num se cohibet?"—PLIN. 9. 26.

LIBELLA differs from "Regula," in denoting a rule for trying à line, as parallel to the horizon. "Locus ad *libellam* æquus."—VAR. *de R. R.* 1. 6. In this place, no deviation from the level is found upon applying the rule. "Structuram ad "normam" et *libellam*, et ad perpendiculum respondere oportet."—PLIN. 36. 22.

Denique ut in fabrica, si prava est "regula" prima,
 "Normaque" si fallax rectis regionibus exit,
 Et *libella* aliqua si ex parte claudicat hilum,
 Omnia mendose fieri, atque obstipa necessum est.—LUCRET. 4. 518.

Every original error, whether in the straightness, the squareness, or the levelness of the work, is here said to increase as the work proceeds.

It does not appear that the Latins ever made any figurative application of *Libella*, as they did of "Norma" and "Regula."

NOSCERE—*vide* SCIRE.

NOTA—*vide* SIGNUM.

NOVUS, RECENS,

agree, in denoting what is new; but the former regards the novelty as an inherent attribute of the object specified, and the latter regards it as arising from the shortness of the time it has been in existence. The event, to which *Novus* is applicable, strikes the observer, as what he had never before seen. It may excite his surprise, if singular; but, at any rate, he states it as an object now capable of summoning his attention, which just before it was not. That event is *Novus*, which occurs for the first time; that, again, is "Recens," which has occurred lately, in respect to a specified time. The first quality is held intrinsic, and adhering to the object itself; the latter is held to be the contrary, and as resting merely on the length of the interval between two points, during which that object has existed. "Sed hoc scito, tuos veteres hostes, *novos* amicos, vehementer esse percultos."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 5. 7. Cicero,

here, tells Pompey, that there was an instantaneous change produced in the dispositions of certain people, in consequence of the news of his success. Old enemies then became new friends.

Novum attulerunt, quod fit nusquam gentium.—PLAUT. *Cas. Prol.* 70.

The poet, here, speaks of as great a novelty as possible, the like of which had never been seen or heard before.

RECENS differs from “Novus,” in regarding the object as having come lately, and not just into existence. Every thing, to which the first is applicable, must have been in that state in which the last once was. When specified by *Recens*, however, its “Novitas” is over, and as much removed from the hearer’s conception as if it had never existed. “Cum e provincia *recens* esset, invidiaque et infamia non *recenti* sed veteri et diuturna flagraret.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 2. 2. Though Verres had not just arrived from his province, yet he had done so but a short time before, and that odium and infamy, to which he was exposed, were so much the worse for having been of long standing. “Quocirca Segulium negligamus, qui res novas quærit: non quo veterem comederit: nullam enim habuit: sed hanc ipsam *recentem* “novam” devoravit.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 11. 21. This fortune of Segulius was *Recens*, because acquired but lately; and it was “Novus,” because he had enjoyed nothing of the kind before. By the first, the orator marks the rapid consumption of the spendthrift; and, by the last, the wretched poverty in which he had spent the whole of his former life.

NUPER—*vide* MODO.

NUTRIRE, ALERE,

agree, in denoting to nourish, but differ, in respect to the circumstances of those to whom the nourishment is given. The first suggests weakness upon the part of the animal fed, arising either from its being young, or in bad health. The last, again, is generic, and suggests the supporting of animal

life upon the part of the young and the old, the healthy and the diseased. “Balenæ, vitulique mammis *nutriunt* foetus.”—PLIN. II. 40.

— quos lupa *nutrit*,
 Prodere cognatæ sustinuere manus.
 Constitit, et cauda teneris blanditur alumnis,
 Et fingit lingua corpora bina sua. ———— OVID. *Fast.* 2. 415.

In the above examples, the young of the different animals required the care of a nurse, from not having as yet acquired strength sufficient for protecting and supporting themselves.

To the helpless animal, at any period of life, labouring under disease, from which he may, or may not, recover, the same verb is applied. The strength of the patient is understood to be increased, by certain attentions, so as to enable him to resist the effects of his malady. “Pestilentia cogitationes hominum ad curam corporum *nutriendorum* avertit.”—LIV. 4. 52. “Oculorum morbi, qui lenibus medicamentis *nutriuntur*.”—CELS. 6. 6. 16. The antecedent to the relative, here, is the eyes themselves, which, by the mild medicines mentioned, recover their proper tone.

ALERE differs from “Nutrire,” in having no reference to the age of the animal fed, or to the state of its health.

Bis venit ad mulctram, binos *alit* ubere foetus.—VIRG. *Ec.* 3. 30.

The young, here referred to, were but sucklings, and nourished by the milk of their mother. In the two examples that follow, the animals maintained were grown up, and could earn and employ their natural support. “Cum agellus eum non satis *aleret*.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 15. b. “Dejotarus antea majores copias *alere* poterat, nunc exiguas vix tueri potest.”—CIC. *pro Reg. Dej.* 147. b.

 OB

denotes the relation which one object bears to another, as moving directly towards it. It differs from "Ad," which suggests the point at which the motion of the body is certainly to terminate. In the case of *Ob*, though the correlative object must always move, yet the governed may, or may not. If it does, the motion of both may be destroyed, or that of the body, least forcibly impelled, must yield to that which is more so. If it does not, the motion of the correlative will either cease when it arrives at the governed, or be diminished, in proportion to the impulse given to the body it has displaced.

The radical meaning of *Ob*, then, is called forth when it denotes the motion of a body going straight upon another, which occupies a point in its path. This is rarely visible, when the preposition appears in a simple state, but is often so, when it is compounded. A few instances are to be found, however, which appear to justify the observations already made.

Cujus *ob* os Graii ora obvertebant sua.—*Vet. Poet. apud Cic. Q. Tusc. 18. 9.*

Ob Romam noctu legiones ducere cœpit.—*ENN. teste Festo.*

Ob Trojam duxit exercitum.—*Ibid.*

Ob sometimes is translated, like "Ante," "Before," or "Over against." In the use already mentioned, the idea of motion is more or less clearly expressed by the verb, with which the preposition is connected. In this second, though it is by no means extinguished, yet it is much more obscure. "Mors *ob* oculos mihi sæpe versata est."—*CIC. pro Rabir. 128. a.* The Latins suppose death lying in the direct line through which the sight of the spectator must pass, and that therefore the object must of necessity become visible.

Nunc demum exerior, prius *ob* oculos mihi caliginem obtigisse.

PLAUT. Mil. 2. 4. 51.

In this example, it is not the visible object, which the English say is "before" the eyes, and the Latins say is in the line of vision, but the darkness, which

infers the absence of that medium in which sight can operate. In all the cases in which *Ob* appears with the meaning stated, it governs the word "Oculos." In the formation of language, men use terms according to their original conceptions, and not according to those that are suggested, and justified, by science. Both in English and in Latin, the eye is said to meet the object seen. We say, "The eyes of all men are cast upon thee;" and the Latins said, "In te omnium coniecti sunt oculi."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 278. a. No notion was entertained, by the formers of either language, that light actually passes from the object to the eye. Had this been understood, the relative and the correlative objects would have changed places; and in the use of *Ob*, as translated by the English, the eyes would have been said to be before the object. According to its radical use in Latin, again, they would have been stated as directly in the path of that, which was passing from it. In the first example, accordingly, death is said to be directly in the way of the speaker's eyes, so as of necessity to be seen; and, in the second, darkness, as a positive quality, is said to be in the same state, as, by destroying that medium, in which the sense of sight operates, it renders an object invisible, which otherwise might have been seen.

Ob denotes cause, both final and efficient; and, in the one way, signifies "On account of," and, in the other, "By means of." As intention upon the part of the mover is that which creates change of place in bodies naturally quiescent, so, his purpose of regulating the motion of a body, so as to be performed in a particular line, is transferred to conduct in general.

In triviis fixum cum se demittit *ob* assem.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 16. 64.

The miser stoops for the purpose of lifting this coin, which he finds it impossible to move. The cause of action resides always in the governed word. It represents the point to which the moving body directly tends, whether it has a locomotive faculty of itself, or receives its impulse from a being that is capable of giving it. The final cause, which prompts to action, is so immediately followed by the efficient, which involves the means of producing a certain effect, that *Ob* is taken to express each.

Navibus, infandum, amissis, unius *ob* iram
 Prodimur, atque Italis longe disjungimur oris.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 255.

Venus, here, upbraids Jupiter with his partiality to Juno. Her anger is not held forth as the immediate cause, “on account of” which the Trojans were given up to destruction, but she employed it as the means of inflaming her husband, and of ultimately effecting the purpose she had in view.

When *Ob* is translated “In defence of,” this is but a special meaning, comprehended under the general one involved in the idea of final cause.

Hic manus, *ob* patriam pugnando vulnera passi.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 660.

Love to their native country was the impelling cause, which made this gallant band expose themselves to all the wounds their enemies could inflict. They did so “in defence of,” or “on account of,” what was dear to them.

Ob appears sometimes equal to “Pro,” and denotes “In lieu,” or “As the value of.” In this sense, a subject is opposed to its equivalent; and if that governed is removed, or destroyed, the correlative takes its place, and furnishes the means of indemnification.

— ager oppositus est pignori
Ob decem minas.—TER. *Phor.* 4. 3. 56.

The land is here in pawn for the money, and, like a body susceptible of motion, is ready to supply its place. “Talentum magnum *ob* unam fabulam datum.”—AUL. GELL. II. 10.

Ob has sometimes the force of “Circa,” and is translated “Around.”

Quin cum it dormitum, follem sibi obstringit *ob* gulam.
 Cur? ne quid animæ forte amittat dormiens.—PLAUT. *Aul.* 2. 4. 25.

This use rests on what is made the second, in which it is explained “Before,” as applying to the eye. Upon whatever side the throat of this miser was viewed, the purse met the eye, and, of course, it surrounded the whole.

In one instance, *Ob* is understood to be put for “Circa,” by two very able critics, Servius and Noltenius, without any apparent necessity for supposing it to be taken in this uncommon use.

— quibus tot funera passis
Cunctus *ob* Italiam terrarum clauditur orbis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 237.

Venus does not here complain, that all the world around Italy was shut up against the Trojans, but that they were doomed to suffer such misfortunes, “propter hoc,” because they obstinately pursued their fate, and were determined to settle in Italy.

It appears that *OB* may be translated as follows :

I.

STRAIGHT UPON, or DIRECTLY TOWARDS. The correlative object is, in this use, understood to be moving in a line, in which, if its motion continues, it must strike the governed.

II.

BEFORE, or OPPOSITE TO. This use appears chiefly when the preposition is connected with objects of sight. The eye and the thing seen are then said to be what the French call “*Vis-a-vis.*”

III.

ON ACCOUNT OF, and BY MEANS OF. The purpose formed, and the means used, to give regulated motion to a quiescent body, are transferred to the influence of cause, and the production of effect, in general.

IV.

IN LIEU, or AS THE PRICE OF. The correlative object is understood to move, and to come instead of the governed, if it quits its place.

V.

AROUND. The encircling object is understood to meet the eye upon every point of the substance it covers.

In composition, *Ob* discovers the first power ascribed to it but rarely, and that power, it appeared, is seldom seen in the simple preposition. Cicero, we found, quotes an old poet, who says, “*Obvertere sua ora ob os.*” Festus likewise quotes the following passage from Ennius :

Acheruntem obibo, ubi mortis thesauri objacent.

In the word "Obstetrix;" the preposition seems to carry the second power ascribed to it, and to signify "Before." By some critics, it is taken as equal to "Ad," but it more properly refers to the station of the *Accoucheur*, when assistance is necessary.

Peperit sine *obstetricis* opera, et sine doloribus.—PLAUT. *Cistell.* 1. 2. 22.

In the case of "Obstare," the root of "Obstetrix;" as in that of "Obesse" and "Officere," the preposition imparts to the roots the idea of being cumbersome and injurious. The object, governed by the verb, is then understood to be in the way of the correlative, and to stop its motion sooner than was intended. "Cur mihi te offers, ac meis commodis *officis et obstas?*"—CIC. *pro Rosc. Amer.* 37. a.

Hoc mihi quid prodest, si tibi lector *obest?*—OVID. *Trist.* 1. 66.

Eos metuo, mihi ne *obsint*, neve *obstent* uspiam.—PLAUT. *Mit.* 4. 2. 6.

In the figurative use of "Obligare," the preposition discovers the fourth power ascribed to it, which is "In lieu of." "Rediit nihilo opulentior, ut qui prope labefacta jam fide, omnia prædia fratri *obligarit.*"—SÆTON. *Vespar.* 4. "Rem suam pignori *obligare.*"—SCÆV. *Digest.* 20. 4. *Leg. Ult.* In those two examples, the simple verb shews the security of the pawn, as bound down for the behoof of the creditor, and the preposition states it as lying in his way. It does not appear that, in the literal sense of this verb, the preposition shews its last mentioned power, and it can then be always translated, either around what is circular, or before what would make its way through an aperture in a surface. In the case of a fractured limb, the bandage must encircle it; but, in the case of an ordinary wound, all that is needed is to stop the effusion of blood, by an application fixed in any way.

Medicus ait se *obligasse* crus fractum Æsculapio,

Apollini autem brachium.—PLAUT. *Men.* 5. 3. 9.

"Æsculapius, qui specillum invenisse, primusque vulnus dicitur *obligavisse.*"
CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 71. a. "Ut collocet in cubili, ut vulnus *obliget.*"—CIC.
Q. Tusc. 183. a.

OBEDIRE—*vide* AUDIRE.OBSERVARE—*vide* ANIMADVER-OBLITERARE—*vide* DELERE.

TERE.

OBSIDERE, OPPUGNARE,

agree, in denoting the act of surrounding some fortified place, with a view to reduce it, but differ, in respect to the means held necessary to do so. The preposition “Ob” is common, and is taken in the same acceptation in both. It supposes every point in a circumference occupied, so as to render the object surrounded inaccessible, or the means of communication, between that object and the adjacent country, cut off. *Obsidere*, from “Sedere,” implies, that the besiegers expect success without exertion, by exposing the besieged to the horrors of famine. *Oppugnare*, again, supposes the application of violence, as being either the surer or the easier means of accomplishing the warrior’s purpose. “Consiliis ab *oppugnanda* urbe ad *obsidendam* versis.”—LIV. 2. 11. “Quum spes major imperatoribus Romanis in *obsidione* quam in *oppugnatione* esset.”—LIV. 5. 2. “Publius ille Scipio natus mihi videtur ad interitum exitiumque Carthagini, qui illam a multis imperatoribus *obsessam*, *oppugnatam*, labefactatam, pæne captam aliquando, quasi fatali eventu, solus evertit.”—CIC. *de Arus. Resp.* 244. b. The two first participles express the different means by which Carthage had been attacked, by commanders, before the days of Scipio; and the two last, their effects. The blockade and the assault had proved equally ineffectual.

OBSTARE, OBSISTERE, OFFICERE,

agree, in denoting to be in the way of, but differ, in respect to the degree, or to the effects, of the obstacle. The preposition “Ob” being common to the three, the difference that subsists among the compounds must have its seat in the simple verbs. OBSTARE signifies to impede, by standing in the way of that, which is in motion, and which would otherwise effect its progress till it arrived at a certain point. The verb “Stare,” signifying to stand, suggests a posture of the body, that is opposed to those of sitting and lying, expressed by “Sedere” and “Jacere.”

Si rex *obstabit* obviam, regem ipsum prius pervertito.—PLAUT. *Stich.* 2. 1. 14.
Obstitit in media candida pompa via.—OVID. *Fast.* 4. 906.

In the above examples, the native power of the root, affected by “Ob,” is visible. The motion of a person going forward is stopped, by others standing in his way. It does not appear, however, that the latter always take their station intentionally, or wish to give opposition to the person moving.

OBSISTERE differs from “Obstare,” in suggesting, that the impediment, which, in the latter verb, may have been matter of accident, is, in the former, intentional. The verb “Sistere” signifies, to arrest the progress of a person moving, and to make him stationary at a certain point of his course. The “Ob” states the way in which this is effected, which is by the intervention of a body in a certain path, which he cannot remove.

“Siste” gradum, teque aspectu ne subtrahe nostro.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 465.

Here, the power of the root appears; and, in the instances that follow, that of the compound may appear also.

Hic *obsistam*, ne imprudenti huc ea se surrepsit mihi.—PLAUT. *Mil.* 2. 3. 62.

The speaker, here, takes his station with a professed design to keep it for a certain time, and to effect a certain purpose, which was to oppose the escape of one he was watching.

Impositaque manu vulnus fovet; oraque ad ora
 Admoveret; atque animæ fugienti *obsistere* tentat.—OVID. *Met.* 12. 425.

“Qui autem non defendit, nec *obsistit* injuriæ, in vitio est.”—CIC. *de Off.* 5. b. Here, *Obsistere* signifies more than steadiness upon the part of him who has put himself in the way. It suggests, also, active exertion, in order to repel that, which should not be obtruded upon him.

OFFICERE differs from the former verbs, in suggesting, that the object in the way never is an inactive obstacle, retarding merely by its weight and situation. It intimates the will and the exertion of an agent, with a view to thwart the intentions of another, and to impede his success. “Alexander Diogeni *offecerat* apricanti.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 246. 6. The churlish reply of the Cynic seems to intimate, that he understood the king intended to injure

him, by depriving him of the benefit of the sun. The force of terms is always to be measured by the conception of the speaker, whether it be well or ill founded. "Aciem, quo hostium itineri *officeret*, latius porrigit."—SALL. *in Jug.* 56. Here, there was a clear intention; upon the part of the commander, to blast the schemes of the enemy, by stopping their progress. "Cur te mihi offers, ac meis commodis, officio simulato *officis* et "obstas?"—CIC. *pro Sex. Rosc.* 37. a. The opposition here given was conducted in every way possible. By "Obstare," the person giving it threw himself in the way of another, as an incumbrance not easily removed; from its weight. By *Officere*, he is strenuous in his efforts to injure, and is not satisfied with an opposition in which he does not bear an active part.

OBTEMPERARE—*vide* AUDIRE.

OCCULERE—*vide* ABDERE.

OCCASIO—*vide* OPPORTUNITAS.

OCCULTUS—*vide* ARCANUS.

ODOR, NIDOR,

agree, in denoting something that affects the sense of smell, whether agreeably or the contrary; but they differ, in respect to the state of the substance that excites the sensation. That which emits what is styled *Odor*, whether it be a simple or a compounded substance, is in its natural state, and excites, by its own agency only, a determinate sensation, by means of the organ of smell. The substance, again, that emits what is styled *Nidor*, is not in its natural state, and excites in the percipient a sensation, which, without the action of fire upon it, would never have existed.

Disce et *odoratam* stabulis accendere cedrum,

Galbancoque agitare graves *nidore* chelydros.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 414.

"Cedri fumo convolutum *nidorem* verius quam *odorem*."—PLIN. 13. 1. From both the instances now given, it should seem, that the same substance which, in its natural state, emits the *Odor*, when acted upon by fire, emits the *Nidor*.

In the two first of the following quotations, we find *Odor* denoting smells that are both grateful and nauseous; and, in the two last, the same is to be seen in respect to *Nidor*. "Cum admiraretur Lysander suavitatem *odorum*

qui afflarentur ex floribus.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 17. 1. “Multæ etiam bestiæ insectantes *odoris* intolerabili fœditate depellunt.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 2. 127.

— non in caro *nidore* voluptas
Sed in teipso est. Tu pulmentaria quære
Sudando. ————— HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 19.
Nocturnumque recens extinctum lumen, ubi acri
Nidore offendit nareis, consopit ibidem. ————— LUCRET. 6. 791.

OFFENDERE—*vide* VIOLARE.

OFFICERE—*vide* OBSTARE.

OFFICINA, TABERNA,

agree, in denoting a place in which the subjects of manufacture are to be found; but the former refers to that in which they are made, and the latter, to that in which they are exposed to sale. “Destinantur validæ civitates exercendis armorum *officinis*.”—TAC. *Hist.* 2. 82. “Opifices omnes in sordida arte versantur: nec vero quicquam ingenuum potest habere *officina*.”—CIC. *Off.* 30. b.

— dum graves Cyclopum
Vulcanus ardens urit *officinas*. ————— HOR. *Car.* 1. 4. 7.

Officina comes from “Officere,” which, as a compound of “Facere,” had, at one time, the power of “Efficere,” to work so as to complete. The due force of prepositions, both simple and compounded, is never fixed early in the progress of any language.

TABERNA differs from “Officina,” in denoting the place in which commodities are sold, without regard to that in which they are manufactured. It most commonly signified what, from it, is, in English, called a “Tavern;” that is, a house in which wine is sold, and drinkers are entertained. Afterwards, it was made to express a wareroom, in which commodities of any kind may be viewed, and are exposed to sale.

According to Donatus, Ter. *Adelph.* 3. 3. 5., *Taberna* has been put “per metathesin,” for “Trabena,” from “Trabs,” and originally signified a superficial structure composed of boards. In this way, it has been applied to a mean cottage.

Pallida mors æquo pulsat pede pauperum *tabernās*,
Regumque turres—————HOR. *Car.* 1. 4. 13.

When the purity of the Latin declined, *Taberna* was sometimes put for “*Officina*.” Thus, Juvenal speaks of Vulcan as rubbing his dirty arms in the shop, where he acted as a blacksmith,

———— et jam siccato nectare tergens
Brachia Vulcanus liparæa nigra *taberna*.———JUV. *Sat.* 13. 44.

“Cum ambo in quandam *tabernam* divertissent, simul cœnare voluerunt.”——CIC. *de Inven.* 63. b. It is not to be supposed that the wines sold in the taverns at Rome were manufactured there. “Nisi ille se in scalas *tabernæ* librariæ conjecisset, hisque oppilatis impetum tuum compressisset.”——CIC. *in Ant.* 164. b. The stair, here mentioned, led to the shop of a “*Bibliopola*,” or bookseller, not to that either of a “*Typographus*” or “*Bibliopega*,” a printer or a bookbinder.

Nulla *taberna* meos habeat neque pila libellos.——HOR. *Sat.* 1. 4. 71.

The shops at Rome were marked by “*Pilæ*,” or pillars before them; and, upon these, specimens of the merchandize sold in each were probably laid, to attract the notice of passengers.

Salax *taberna*, vosque contubernales,
A pileatis nona fratribus pila.——CATULL. 37. 1.

OFFICIUM, MUNUS,

agree, in referring to what is incumbent on a rational being, but differ, in respect to the duty, as being general or particular. OFFICIUM, from “*Ob*” and “*Facio*,” denotes what we are bound to do to those with whom we have intercourse in life, and is applied also to what we owe to ourselves. It should seem, that the verb *Officere*, which afterwards signified to retard, or injure, originally meant the same with “*Efficere*,” to effect, or accomplish. *Officere* thus meant the energy of the agent doing what came in his way, and failing in the discharge of nothing that was assigned him. “Nulla enim vitæ pars, neque publicis neque privatis, neque forensibus, neque domesticis in rebus,

neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare *officio* potest; in eoque colendo sita vitæ est honestas omnis, et in negligendo turpitude.”—CIC. *de Off.* 1. 4. In the above example, *Officium* denotes the most general idea that can be formed of duty, and applies to whatever is incumbent upon man, in every possible relation.

Officium, as a generic term, may occasionally be applied to acts of particular duty. Still, however, *Munus* often discovers a power of specifying, of which *Officium* is destitute. “*Munus animi est ratione uti.*”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 139. b. *Officium* might be intelligible in the last example; but *Munus* intimates exclusive duty, or privilege, which the author wishes to suggest. “*Principum munus est, resistere levitati multitudinis.*”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 105. b. *Munus*, here, intimates the prerogative of princes, as being that which they alone have a right to exercise, as well as a duty incumbent on them only. “*Aliquem ad omne munus officii instruere.*”—CIC. *de Sen.* 82. b. The impossibility of commuting the terms in this last instance, tends to establish the distinction made between them. Such an expression as “*Officium muneris*” would be absurd, as making the whole subordinate to the part. As the words stand, they denote every branch of duty.

Munus et officium nil scribens ipse docebo.—HOR. *Art. Poet.* 306.

By the two terms in this line, Horace professes to teach both the general duties incumbent upon every poet, and the particular duties incumbent upon those poets, who have assumed particular departments in their art. The terms however, are applied to duty, as incumbent upon the same person, though capable of being viewed in two distinct lights. “*Non surdum iudicem huic muneri atque officio præesse.*”—CIC. *pro Font.* 279. b. The first term seems to refer to the discharge of that duty, which belonged exclusively to the judge then acting; and the latter, to that of what belonged to all judges, in whom the attention, implied in being “*non surdi,*” is considered as an essential quality.

ONUS—*vide* PONDUS.

OPACUS, UMBROSUS, UMBRATILIS,

agree, in denoting intercepted light; but the first refers to the power of forming a shadow; the second, to the extent of that which is actually formed; and the third, exclusively to the object requiring the protection of the shade, in which it is found. OPACUS, originally, denotes that quality of a body by which it does not permit the rays of light to pass through it, and which is the reverse of what forms transparency. A substance, thus pervious to light, is styled diaphonous, and is the contrary of one that is opaque.

— tanti tibi non sit *opaci*

. Omnis arena Tagi, quodque in mare volvitur aurum.—JUV. 3. 54.

The water of the Tagus, which would otherwise have been pure and pellucid, was rendered thick, by the particles of gold with which it was impregnated.

— nulla decempedis

. Metata privatis *opacam*

. Porticus excipiebat Arcton——HOR. *Car.* 2. 15. 14.

It is the coolness of the air that is denoted by *Opacus*, in consequence of the exclusion of the sun, from the manner in which the portico was built. The greatest heat, and the greatest light, was kept off by the same quality in the materials, of which the edifice was formed.

— latet arbore *opaca*

Aureus, et foliis et lento vimine ramus.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 136.

That closeness in the branches of the tree, which prevented the light from getting through, made it difficult to discover the bough sought for.

Stattius styles the moon, which is not like the sun, luminous “per se,” and which intercepts the light during an eclipse,

Solis *opaca* soror.—Thebaid. 6. 606.

The bushy beard of a young man, which prevents his cheek from being seen, is also marked by this adjective.

Egnati, *opaca* quem bonum facit barba.—CATULL. *Car.* 37.

From denoting a quality opposite to that meant by diaphonous, *Opacus* has come to denote shadowy, or darkened, by the exclusion of light in a greater or a less degree.

Adiitque *opaca* silvis redimita loca Deæ.—CATULL. 63. 3.

“Loci *opaci* an *aprici*?”—CIC. *Part. Or.* 233. a. “Densiore umbra *opacior* nigriorque.”—PLIN. *Ep.* 5. 6.

UMBROSUS differs from “Opacus,” in not originally referring to that quality of a substance which prevents the rays of light from passing through it, but to the effect of that quality, when a substance possessing it darkens a certain space, by intercepting the light. “Ego locum æstate *umbrosiorem* vidi nunquam.”—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 318. b.

—Herculeæque arbos *umbrosa* coronæ.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 66.

In both instances, *Umbrosus* intimates, that a shadow is actually formed, not that the substance specified has the power of forming it, whether shone upon, or not.

In the case of *Umbrosus*, however, there is a metonymy, as well as in “Opacus.” The latter, originally, suggests the cause of the darkness, from a body refusing to transmit the light; and, afterwards, the effect of this resisting quality. The former, again, originally, denotes the effect, which is that of a space being darkened; and, afterwards, the cause, which is that of excluding the light, by the intervention of a body, not transparent, between it and a space, that would otherwise have been illuminated. “Fico folium maximum *umbrosissimumque*.”—PLIN. 16. 26.

Tantum inter densas *umbrosa* cacumina fagos.—VIRG. *Ec.* 2. 3.

UMBRATILIS differs from the two former words, in having no reference to the formation of a shadow, but to the nature of a substance that requires to be under it. It has probably at first denoted the tender structure of those flowers, that must be protected from the heat of the sun, and been afterwards transferred to whatever is delicate, or easily injured. “Ad vitam *umbratilem*

et delicatam cum accesserunt, etiam poetæ, nervos omnis virtutis elidunt.”—Cic. *Q. Tusc.* 180. b. “Educenda deinde dictio est ex hac domestica exercitatione et *umbratili* medium in agmen, in pulverem, in clamorem, in castra, atque aciem forensem.”—Cic. *de Or.* 97. b. Those severe trials of eloquence, mentioned in this last example, seem to correspond with the effect of great heat upon plants that require to be nursed in the shade.

OPIS—*vide* AUXILIUM.

OPPRIMERE—*vide* EXTINGUERE.

OPORTET—*vide* DECET.

OPPORTUNUS—*vide* COMMODUS.

OPPERIRI—*vide* EXPECTARE.

OPPORTUNITAS, OCCASIO,

agree, in denoting the suitability of circumstances to some end, but differ as to the number of circumstances, in respect to which this suitability takes place. OPPORTUNITAS, an abstract from “Opportunus,” denotes a suitability founded upon the particular situation of the person concerned in what occurs. *Opportunus* itself is compounded of “Ob” and “Portus,” and suggests the seasonableness with which a harbour comes in the way of a mariner, when threatened, or contending, with a storm. It is generic in respect to “Occasio,” and implies a suitability in the occurrence, in regard both to time and place. “*Opportunitas*, sic enim appellamus *ευκαιριαν*, non fit major productione temporis, habent enim suum modum quæcumque “opportuna” dicuntur.”—Cic. *de Fin.* 99. a. Here, the suitability refers to time alone, and to a part of it that is strictly limited. So, also, in the example that follows, the consistency of the actions, with the times in which they are to be performed, is the circumstance held forth. “*Scientia est opportunitatis idoneorum ad agendum temporum.*”—Cic. *de Off.* 29. a.

Opportunitas, besides, suggests the suitability of the place to the action performed in it. “*Locus consideratur in quo res gesta sit ex opportunitate quam videatur habuisse ad negotium administrandum.*”—Cic. *de Inv.* 50. b.

OCCASIO differs from “Opportunitas,” in supposing the suitability to respect the circumstance of time only, and never to extend to place. It is originally an abstract from “Occidere,” and suggests something falling unex-

pectedly in the way. “Ex incommodo alieno suam *occasionem* petere.”—LIV. 4. 58. Cicero gives two different definitions of the term, that are decisive as to its real import. “Tempus actionis “opportunum,” Græce *ευκαιρία*, Latine appellatur *occasio*.”—CIC. *de Off.* 29. a. “*Occasio* est pars temporis, habens in se alicujus rei idoneam faciendi aut non faciendi “opportunitatem.”—CIC. *de Inv.* 51. In both sentences it is to be observed, that the word “Tempus” makes part of the definition, and that “Opportunus” and “Opportunitas,” as generic terms, are employed to explain *Occasio*, which is specific.

OPPUGNARE—*vide* OBSIDERE.

ORBARE—*vide* PRIVARE.

OPTARE—*vide* VELLE.

ORDIRI—*vide* CÆPISSE.

ORDO, SERIES,

agree, in denoting objects following each other in a certain train, but differ, as the arrangement is susceptible of change, without being completely dissolved. ORDO supposes a disposition of objects more or less intimately connected, that is established upon a principle, which he, who formed it, might, or might not, adopt. One order may be more regular than another, but the term is alike applicable to both. “Nam et *ordinem* sic definiunt compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis locis, *ευταξίαν*, in qua intelligitur *ordinis* conservatio.”—CIC. *de Off.* 29. a. “Sed ex ea materia particulas primum confusas, postea in *ordinem* adductas.”—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 29. b. In the two examples given, the precise power of *Ordo* may be seen. It supposes intention to reduce things, that are in a confused state, into one that is orderly; but the kind of the arrangement adopted depends also on the will of him who superinduces the change. The different ranks in Rome were styled *Ordines*, as the legislator might, if he chose, have assumed a different principle of subordination from that which he established. In the formation of military ranks, too, the will of the commanding officer is the sole circumstance that settles the arrangement at any given time; and what is adopted to-day, may, with propriety, be abandoned to-morrow.

SERIES differs from "Ordo," in implying, that no latitude is allowed the will of the person forming the arrangement, which must hang upon immutable principles, in which an undisturbed sequence is necessarily preserved. The chain of connection, forming a series, is indissoluble, and each object, or event, is fixed to the place and time it occupies, by an unalterable law. Such is the state of numbers in arithmetic, or geometric, progression, in either of which the established train is destroyed by the slightest change in the constituent parts. "Cætera series deinde sequitur, majora nectens, ut hæc, quæ quasi expletam rerum comprehensionem amplectuntur, si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis particeps."—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 6. b. "Videtisne, quanta series rerum sententiarumque sit, atque ut ex alio alia sequantur?"—CIC. *de Legg.* 166. b. It appears from the above examples, that, in every species of reasoning, whether tending to establish a principle, or deduced from one already fixed, the steps must hang upon each other in one train, and that any transposition of these would lead, either to no conclusion, or to a false one.

Those measures of duration that are fixed by immutable intervals of equal lengths, though of different kinds, are also said to form one series.

Quod non imber edax, non Aquilo impotens
Possit diruere, aut innumerabilis
Annorum series, et fuga temporum.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 30. 3.

That which binds together a chain of causes and effects is properly called a *Series*, not an "Ordo." From the analogy between these and material objects, it is understood, that any disturbance in the parts of either would destroy their nature. "At qui introducunt causarum *seriem* sempiternam, ii mentem hominis voluntate spoliata, necessitate fati devinciunt."—CIC. *de Fat.* 144. a.

An historian, forming his detail, may arrange his facts in what way he pleases. If he pays no regard to the succession of the times in which they occurred, he forms an "Ordo;" if he does, the necessary intervals, by which they are kept asunder, give existence to a *Series*.

Ingens argentum mensis, cœlataque in auro
Fortia facta patrum, series longissima rerum,
Per tot ducta viros antiquæ ab origine gentis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 644.

There was no selection of signal deeds in this engraving; but it was a regular calendar, extending from the very commencement of an old and an illustrious race. "Omissis quæ sine fructu erunt, ea omnia Pompeius divisa temporibus, et *serie* rerum digesta composuit."—JUST. *in Præf.* 3. The rejection of certain trivial facts, does not alter the nature of a *Series*, provided those that are selected be allowed to maintain their due place.

Series is made to denote the unbroken line of a family, in which any interruption would alter the succession.

Et *serie* fulcite genus.—PROP. 4. *Uk.* 69.

"Fatum autem id appello, quod Græci *επιμαρτυρον*, id est "ordinem" *seriemque* causarum, cum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat. Ex quo intelligitur, ut fatum sit non id quod superstitiose, sed id quod physice dicitur, causa æterna rerum, cur et ea quæ præterierunt facta sint, et quæ instant fiant, et quæ sequuntur futura sint."—CIC. *de Div.* 106. b. It is not easy to see why the philosopher has given the word "Ordo" any place in his definition of fate. The concatenation of causes and effects appears so intimate and indissoluble, that no room is left for spontaneous arrangement, and all things seem, in his opinion, to be guided by an irresistible physical necessity.

ORNARE, REDIMIRE,

agree, in denoting to adorn, but differ, in respect to the manner in which the ornament is applied, and the nature of the subject adorned. ORNARE is generic, and is applied to every adorned subject, in whatever manner it is so.

"Quamquam illa tua, legi enim libenter, horridula mihi atque incomta visa sunt: sed tamen erant *ornata* hoc ipso, quod ornamenta neglexerant; et ut mulieres, ideo bene olere, quia nihil olebant, videbantur."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.*

2. I. The ornaments applied by Atticus to his Greek commentaries, though not brilliant, had still, in the apprehension of Cicero, the merit of simplicity.

Pastores hedera crescentem *ornate* poetam. VIRG. *Ecc.* 7. 25.

Populus et longis *ornabat* frondibus ædem,

Multaque cantantes umbra tegebat aves.—PROP. 4. 10. 29.

Ornare, besides, denotes that species of beauty which results from an object being fitted to its particular end, such as a fleet being duly equipped, and a soldier accoutred. “Qui posteaquam maximas ædificasset, *ornassetque* classes.”—CIC. *pro Leg. Man.* 5. a. “Flavianus exercitus, ut ad prælium intentus *ornatusque*, densis circa viam ordinibus adstiterat.”—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 63.

REDIMIRE differs from “*Ornare*,” in being applicable to material subjects only, and in implying, that the body is always encircled with that, which adorns it. The generic power of “*Ornare*” appears in the example from Virgil already given. *Redimire*, however, is applicable to no ornament that does not go round the object.

— Phœbique sacerdos

Vittis, et sacra *redimitus* tempora lauro.—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 80.

Ausus es hirsutos mitra *redimire* capillos :

Aptior Herculeæ populus alba comæ.—OVID. *Heroid.* 9. 63.

“Cernis autem terram eandem, quasi quibusdam *redimitam* et “*circundatam*” cingulis.”—CIC. *Som. Sc.* 129. b. The first participle suggests the idea of an ornament, from the way in which it is applied ; the other, that of belts encompassing the earth, without regard to their beauty.

OSTIUM, JANUA, PORTA,

agree, in denoting that which, by opening, gives entrance to some habitable place, but differ, in respect to its situation, or its magnitude. OSTIUM, as a generic word, signifies either the outer door of a house, or those doors by which the different apartments within it are accessible. Cicero calls the tax that was laid on the doors of houses, from the number of which the wealth of the possessor was inferred, “*Acerbissima exactio ostiorum.*”—*Ep. Fam.* 37. b.

Sub galli cantum consultor ubi *ostia* pulsat.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 1. 10.

In this example, *Ostium* denotes the outer door of the house ; but in the following, the door of a chamber within.

Est mihi in ultimis conclave ædibus quoddam retro

— huc abiit Clitipho.

— Bacchis consecuta est illico.

— operueré *ostium.*—TER. *Heaut.* 5. 1. 29.

Ostium signifies a door of no more than a convenient size for the person who enters it. When Virgil expresses by it the hundred doors in the cave of the Sibyl, by which her voice was heard, when emitting her responses, he qualifies it with the adjective "Ingens."

Ostia jamque domus patuere "ingentia" centum
Sponte sua, vatisque ferunt responsa per auras.—*Æn.* 6. 81.

When he afterwards applies it to the gates of hell, by the use of "Pandere," he suggests their more than ordinary magnitude.

—doceas iter, et sacra *ostia* pandas.—*Ibid.* 6. 109.

JANUA differs from "Ostium," in always denoting a door of considerable size, at which more persons than one may enter at a time, and which, besides, is not within the house. That it signifies only an outer door, appears from the address of Catullus to that of a courtesan.

Dixerit hic aliquis; qui tu isthæc, *janua*, nosti?
Quoi nunquam domini limine abesse licet,
Nec populum auscultare; sed huic suffixa tigillo
Tantum operire soles, aut aperire domum.—CATULL. 66. 37.

Janua is applicable to the gate of private buildings, and of all public ones not set apart for the purposes of religion. "Foresque in liminibus profanarum ædium *januæ* nominantur."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 39. b. But the proper notion of *Janua* depends upon the magnitude, as well as the place, of that denoted by it. When the great Nasica meant to honour Ennius with a visit, Cicero tells us that he came to the "Ostium" of the poet's humble mansion: but, when the visit was returned, the term is changed, and *Janua* applied to the gate of the illustrious citizen. "Nasica, qui cum ad poetam Ennium venisset, eique ab "ostio" quærenti Ennium, ancilla dixisset, domi non esse; Nasica sensit illam domini jussu dixisse, et illum intus esse. Paucis post diebus cum ad Nasicam venisset Ennius, et eum a *janua* quæreret, exclamat Nasica, se domi non esse. Tum Ennius, *Quid? ego non cognosco vocem*, inquit, *tuam?* Hic Nasica, *Homo es impudens. Ego cum te quærerem,*

ancillæ tuæ credidi, te domi non esse, tu mihi non credis ipsi?—CIC. *de Orat.* 134. b.

It does not appear that any thing is to be inferred from a passage in Plautus, in which both “*Ostium*” and *Janua* appear together.

Ite foris hic volo ante “ostium” et januam, meos participes bene accipere.

PERS. 5. 1. 6.

Toxilus intends to give his entertainment out of doors to those who had promoted his success. “*Ostium*” and “*Janua*,” then, signify the same door leading into a house, to which either term might have been applied, though it was not large enough for entertaining so numerous a company.

PORTA differs from the other two nouns, in denoting the gate of some fortified place, as of a town, or a camp. In point of size, it should be understood to exceed the “*Janua*,” in order to answer its purpose, as subservient to the conveniency of numbers passing occasionally through it. It is said, by the critics, to come from “*Portare* ;” because, when the founder of a town marked out its precincts with a plough, drawn by a cow and a bull, he raised and carried the plough at the place where he meant that the entrance should be. “*Si Hannibal ad portas venisset, murumque jaculo trajecisset.*”—CIC. *de Fin.* 111. a. “*Capit arma a proximis, atque in porta consistit.*”—CÆS. *de Bel. Gal.* 6. 37.

— diffidit urbium

Portas vir Macedo.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 16. 13.

All the three nouns agree in admitting of figurative applications.

PÆDOR—*vide* SORDES.

PÆTUS—*vide* LIPPUS.

PAGUS—*vide* VILLA.

PALARI—*vide* ERRARE.

PALUS—*vide* LACUS.

PANDERE—*vide* APERIRE.

PAR—*vide* ÆQUALIS.

PARARE, PARERE, ACQUIRERE, CONCILIARE, ADIPISCI, NANCISCI,
SORTIRI,

agree, in denoting the acquisition of something not possessed, but differ, as to the manner in which the acquisition is made.

PARARE is, of all the verbs, the most general, and supposes the means of acquiring to be any that will produce the effect. “*Quid autem, stultius, quam ut plurimum copiis possint, cætera parare, quæ parantur, pecuniam, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa: amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitæ, ut ita dicam, suppellectilem.*” Many of those good things may be purchased by money; but money will not purchase such friends as are said to be the best furniture of life. The verb *Parare*, then, denotes, not only the act of buying what can be bought, but that of gaining money by industry, and friends by merit. “*Cupio aliquos amicos parare beneficio meo.*”—TER. *Eun.* 12. 69. The kindness, here mentioned, is but one way of gaining friends, as men may admire and befriend the merit by which they never profited.

— *divitias avidus sine fine parandi.*—OVID. *Trist.* 2. 75.

Parare, as signifying to prepare, that is, to take steps previous to the accomplishment of some end, is not to be treated as synonymous with the other verbs.

PARERE supposes the means of acquisition defined by the energy and successful exertion of the agent, and is, of course, more particular in its import than the preceding verb.

— egregias animas quæ sanguine nobis
Hanc patriam *peperere* suo, decorate supremis
Muneribus. — VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 25.

“Libertas plurimo sudore et sanguine majorum *parta* nobis, et tradita.” — CIC. *de Leg. Ag.* 2. 16. “*Paritur* pax bello.” — NEP. 15. 5. 4. In all these examples there is implied an effort, without which the different ends could not have been accomplished. “Majus dedecus est, *parta* amittere, quam omnino non “paravisse.” — SAL. *Bel. Jug.* 31. The loss of what has been earned by vigorous exertion is supposed to be more disgraceful than never to have acquired at all, whatever means were employed. The merit of the effort, implied in the participle, is evinced by its success. Had “Peperisse” stood in place of “Paravisse,” an enterprising agent would have been held forth as missing his reward. But “Paravisse” suggests greater demerit, as supposing the necessity of ordinary means only for producing an ordinary effect.

ACQUIRERE supposes the means of acquiring defined by their slow and gradual operation.

Mobilitate viget, viresque *acquirit* eundo. — VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 175.

The strength, here ascribed to Fame, was acquired, not “per saltum,” but by a steady motion, uniformly conducted. “Pigrum quinimmo et iners videtur sudore *acquirere* quod possis sanguine “parare.” — TAC. *de Mor. Germ.* 14. The Germans despised the slow profits of regular industry, when compared with those more rapid, though uncertain, advantages, that are occasionally gained in war. The last, being a generic verb, suits any mode of acquisition; but *Acquirere* could not express the quick and violent effort of the warrior during the heat of battle, and the shedding of blood.

CONCILIARE supposes the means of acquisition defined by their gentleness. It has no reference to the nature of the effect, but only supposes it accomplished by means that are not violent.

— male quæritur herbis,
Moribus et forma *conciliatur* amor.—OVID. *Ep.* 6. 94.

They, who seek to create love by herbs, lose their labour. Good manners and beauty are the gentle, but effectual, means of its excitement.

Animos conjugum *conciliat* partus.—SEN. *Herc. Œt.* 407.

The parental are here said to strengthen the conjugal affections; and they can produce this effect only by means of the gentlest feelings in the human breast. “Duo genera vini: unum quo somnus *concilietur*, alterum quo “*fugetur*.”—PLIN. 14. 18. By means of the first verb, the kind of wine, to which it refers, should be understood to produce a gradual drowsiness, and not to act like a violent soporific. The effect of the other kind, to which “*Fugare*” refers, is more forcible in banishing sleep. “*Intestina et fimum eorum, quum id animal nullo cibo vivat, cum simiarum urina illita inimicorum januæ, odium omnium hominum his conciliare.*”—PLIN. 28. 8. It is here evident, that the effect, denoted by *Conciliare*, is not always a good, in respect to those for whom it is produced.

ADIPISCI supposes the means of acquisition defined by their apprehended suitableness to the end proposed, so that the person, to whom this verb is properly applied, has the merit of having laid and pursued his plan with judgment. The force of “*Apiscor*,” the simple verb, shews clearly that of the compound. “*Non præciditur spes plebeio quoque apiscendi summi honoris.*”—LIV. 4. 3. The road to honour was open both to the high and the low, so that the means that were most judiciously applied would succeed, independently of the rank of those who employed them. The means employed to carry the point may be immoral, but the verb is purely applied if they are efficacious. “*Adipisci magistratum malis artibus.*”—SALL. *Orat. ad Cæs. de Rep. Ordin.* 2. “*Nos ea quæ “consecuti sumus,” his studiis et artibus adepti sumus.*”—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 295. b. “*Consequi*,” as denoting a successful termination of a pursuit, is, in so far, equivalent to *Adipisci*. The first, however, implies a successful exertion in one direct line, in which the object is clearly seen: the other, the successful application of a variety of means, as involved in “*Studia*” and “*Artes*,” suited to the circumstances of the case.

There may be some doubt as to the purity of Suetonius's application of the verb to things deemed evil in the eye of the world, though not in that of the person acting. "Nero in *adipiscenda* morte Epaphroditi manu adjutus existimabatur."—*In Domit.* 14.

NANCISCI supposes that the means operating in behalf of the acquirer are unknown to him, and that the acquisition itself, whether good or bad, is a matter of accident. "Illi *nacti* austrum naves solvunt."—*CÆs. Bel. Gal.* 3. 26. The change of the wind into the south could only be a matter of chance, and not the effect of any possible exertion upon the part of those about to sail. "Quoniam *nacti* te, inquit, sumus aliquando otiosum."—*Cic. de Fin.* I. 14. "Vitis ut se erigat, claviculis quasi manibus, quicquid *est nacta* complectitur."

This verb may be applied indiscriminately to any object got by accident, whether it be good or evil. "*Nactus est* morbum, quem initio et ipse et medici contempserunt."—*NEP. in Attic.* 21.

SORTIRI agrees with "Nancisci," in supposing the acquisition to be a matter of accident; but differs from it, in supposing the acquirer availing himself of a chance of which he is thoroughly aware. "Cum prætores designati *sortirentur*, Mario Metello obtigit, ut is de pecuniis repetundis quæreret."—*Cic. in Ver.* 70. a.

Nam si nihil impetrare potero, saltem *sortiar*.—*PLAUT. Cas.* 2. 4. 19.

———— felicem dicere non hoc

Me possum casu, quod te *sortitus* amicum—*HOR. Sat.* 1. 6. 52.

The poet, here, uses the verb *Sortiri* with the strictest purity; and, by means of it, pays a very handsome compliment to his patron, without losing sight of his own dignity. He allows, that it was an object of his ambition to become a favourite with Mæcenas, and that he practised those modes of insinuation, that would most probably give him a chance of becoming so. Considering the discernment of his patron, "Cautum dignos assumere," he is entitled to pique himself on his successful address.

In some instances, it is not easy to perceive any thing voluntary upon the part of the person *sortiens*; who must acquiesce in what is obtruded upon him by an irresistible fatality.

Tu si Mæonium vatem *sortita* fuisses,
 Penelopes esset fama secunda tuæ.—OVID. *Trist.* 6. 21.
 Quidam *sortiti* metuentem Sabbata patrem.—JUV. 14. 96.

The person immortalized could have no choice of her poet, nor the young Jew of his father.

PARERE—*vide* AUDIRE.

PARENTARE—*vide* SACRIFICARE.

PARIES—*vide* MURUS.

PARS, PORTIO,

agree, in denoting something less than a whole, but differ, as that which is so is either undefined, or bears a certain relation to the aggregate. *PARS* is well defined by Facciolati, “Unum aliquid ex iis in quæ totum dividitur.” It stands in the general relation of a component of the whole, but suggests no proportion borne by the former to the latter.

— ne expers *partis* esset de nostris bonis.—TER. *Heaut.* 4. 1. 39.

The ring put on the child's finger was a part of the goods of Sostrata; but from its value we can form no judgment of the extent of her possessions. “Quibus illi urbis suæ *partem* ademerunt, iis tu nostri imperii *partem* dedisti.” CIC. *in Ver.* 32. “Quis Antonio permisit ut *partes* faceret, et utram vellet, prior ipse sumeret?”—CIC. *de Or.* 142. b. There is, here, a reference to the division of an integer, and to the inequality of the fractions to which it is reduced. The divider attended to himself only, without regard to others. “Ut socius in societate habet *partem*, sic cohæres in hæreditate habet *partem*.”—CIC. *pro Q. R.* 54. a. No law of division is understood to be observed in the share of this concern, or this inheritance. If the parts specified do not exhaust the whole, the aggregate of these parts is still but a part itself, as well as that which remains. The whole of the “tres partes,” by which the Romans denoted “three-fourths,” form but one part, as well as the single fourth, which does not enter into the plural denomination.

Pars is, besides, applicable to the species of a genus, as they stand in relations more or less remote from that genus of which the whole are constituents.

The possible variety in the principle, upon which the classification proceeds, accords with the undefined nature of "*Partes*," properly so called. "*Partes sunt quæ generibus iis, e quibus emanant, subjiciuntur.*"—CIC. *de Or.* 100. b. "Genus est quod plures amplectitur *partes*, ut animal: *pars* quæ subest generi, ut equus. Sed sæpe eadem res alii genus, alii *pars* est."—CIC. *de Inv.* 49. b.

PORTIO differs from "*Pars*," in implying, that the less quantity bears a fixed relation to the whole, and that a line of division into parts, which exhaust the aggregate, is formed and followed by the person who directs the distribution. In all probability, the term has been "*Partio*," *per syncopen*, for "*Partitio*," and its proper meaning is an allotment, or dividend. "Nunquam in Sicilia frumentum publice emptum est, quin Mamertinis pro *portione* imperaretur."—CIC. *in Ver.* 246. b. Upon the part of the Roman state, a certain quantity of corn was found to be requisite, and the proportion called for from the Mamertines was suited to that furnished by the other Sicilian states; so that the demand of the public was satisfied. "Pulmo chamæleoni *portione* maximus."—PLIN. 11. 37. The proportion borne by the size of the lungs of the cameleon, to that of its whole body, is greater than in other animals.

PARTIRI—*vide* COMMUNICARE. PATI—*vide* FERRE.

PASCUUM—*vide* RUS. PATRUUS—*vide* AVUNCULUS.

PASTILLUS—*vide* EMPLASTRUM.

PAUPERTAS, INOPIA, EGESTAS,

agree, in denoting poverty, but differ, in respect to the degrees in which it is oppressive. The first supposes the possession of the necessaries, and the want only of the superfluities, of life. "*Paupertas* est non quæ pauca possidet, sed quæ multa non possidet."—SEN. *Ep.* 87.

Tu tamen affectas, Nestor, dici atque videri

Pauper, et in populo quæris habere locum.

Mentiris, vanoque tibi blandiris honore.

Non est *paupertas*, Nestor, habere nihil.—MART. 11. 33.

Me mea *paupertas* vitæ traducat inerti,

Dum meus assiduo luceat igne focus.

Nec spes destituat, sed frugum semper acervos
 Præbeat, et pleno pinguia musta lacu.—TIBUL. 1. 1. 3.
 Res urget me nulla: meo sum *pauper* in ære.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 12.

It appears from the above examples, that a person in the state denoted by *Paupertas* is neither oppressed with want, nor possessed of what is more than sufficient to answer the calls of nature.

INOPIA differs from “*Paupertas*,” in implying a positive deficiency of the necessaries of life, and the state of one that is destitute and friendless. “*Non erat abundans, non inops tamen.*”—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 186. b. The latter adjective denotes deficiency, as the former does excess. “*Nec in summa inopia levis esse senectus potest ne sapienti quidem, nec insipienti in summa copia non gravis.*”—CIC. *de Sen.* 78. b. “*Vixit in summa “paupertate,” ac pæne inopia.*”—SÜETON. *de Gram.* II.

Inopia differs from “*Paupertas*,” in referring to the want of other things, beside those that minister to the support of animal life. “*Aliis per inopiam occasionis titubantibus.*”—SÜET. *Calig.* 56. “*Sedulius, propter inopiam tecti, in foro pernoctans.*”—CIC. *pro Dom.* 229. a.

EGESTAS differs from “*Inopia*,” in implying, that, along with the absence of the necessaries of life, the need of them is felt so as to be oppressive. “*Egestas differt a “paupertate,” quod “paupertas” levior est, et honesta esse potest: Egestas gravior et turpis.*”—SERV. *ad Virg. Georg.* 1. 146. That the pressure of *Egestas* is greater than that of “*Paupertas*,” appears also in the following sentence. “*Non est quod “paupertas” nos a philosophia revocet, ne egestas quidem.*”—SEN. *Ep.* 17. That *Egestas* implies more than “*Inopia*,” is also evident. “*In deterius quidem accidit hoc: primum imbecillitate ingenii mei: deinde “inopia,” ac potius egestate patrii sermonis.*”—PLIN. *Ep.* 4. 17. Virgil defines *Egestas* in its severest form.

—— labor omnia vincit

Improbis, et duris urgens in rebus egestas.——*Georg.* 1. 146.

“*Si propter “inopiam” in egestate estis.*”—CIC. *de Inv.* 58. b. The total want of resources of every kind implied in “*Inopia*,” leads to the destitute state implied in *Egestas*.

PECCATUM—*vide* CULPA.

PEJOR, DETERIOR,

agree, in denoting, that the objects they respectively specify are not good, but differ in respect to the remoteness of each from what is supposed to be so. PEJOR implies an increased degree of what is positively bad, while "Deterior" implies only a diminution of what is positively good. "Malum id, quidem, sed alia *pejora*."—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 178. a. There is here mentioned a positive evil; but it is also said that greater evils existed. "Turpis fuga mortis omni est morte *pejor*."—CIC. *in Ant.* 219. b. Any mode of death is said, by implication, to be bad; but a shameful flying from it is affirmed to be still worse.

DETERIOR is understood to come from "Detero," which signifies to wear much, or to diminish in such a degree, that the value of the whole is impaired, though the nature of what remains is unchanged. Its proper notion, then, is a less good, in opposition to what is not positively bad. The account given by both Nonius and Servius of the words now stated is apparently just. "Pejus" a malo est, quod in usu est, et creberrime frequentatur: *deterius* vero a bono, ut minoris sit meriti quam id quod placet."—"Deteriores jugulare cupio, meliores vincere."—CIC. *in Ant.* 256. a. By *Deteriores*, here, it is not meant that a certain set were worse than bad, but that they were as much inferior to the positively good, as others, called "*Meliores*," were better.

———— subit argentea proles

Auro *deterior*, fulvo pretiosior ære.—OVID. *Met.* 1. 114.

Had it been affirmed that the silver age was worse than the golden, it would have followed, that the latter had been positively bad, which was not the case. All that is intended is to express a diminution of excellence in the former; and "Æs" is affirmed to stand in the same relation to "Argentum," that "Argentum" does to "Aurum."

———— video meliora proboque,

Deteriora sequor————OVID. *Met.* 7. 20,

The virgin does not take the demerit of pursuing what was positively bad,

far less what was worse. She only laments, that though she saw and approved what was excellent, yet she had not virtue enough to pursue it, but squared her conduct by a standard more remote from perfection.

PELLERE, TRUDERE, TUNDERE,

agree, in denoting to strike, so as to affect the mass, but differ, in respect to the severity of the stroke, or to the effect it is fitted to produce. PELLERE implies such an impulse upon the body struck, as is fit to give it motion, and to drive it from the point it occupied. The literal meaning of this verb may be well gathered from the following figurative use of it. “Neque hæc movere potest appetitum animi, nec ullum habet ictum, quo *pellat* animi status hic non dolendi.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 71. b. The stroke, here mentioned, was not adequate to the end; and that, which received it, continued in a state of rest, and in its former position. “Cum viri boni lapidibus e foro *pellerentur*.”—CIC. *in Pison.* 10.

Jam hoc aliud est quod gaudeamus: Miles *pellitur* foras.—TER. *Eun.* 5. 8. 11.
Nec mihi sunt vires inimicos *pellere* tectis.—OVID. *Ep.* 1. 109.

Penelope complains to her husband, that she had not force enough to drive those suitors out of her house, who had taken up their abode there in his absence.

TRUDERE differs from “Pellere,” in implying, that a greater impulse is requisite to drive the body receiving it, from the point it occupies, and that the line of direction, in which it moves, is limited. When applied to inanimate bodies, it supposes, that the impelling power is just able to overcome their weight; and, when applied to living beings, it supposes that they quit their station with reluctance, and make every effort to maintain it.

The simple verb gives no intimation as to the path, in which the motion is performed, in respect to points around it, which its compounds do. Thus, “Intrudere” signifies “to break in,” and “Extrudere” “to drive out,” where an opening is to be found. “Obtrudere,” also, signifies “to force upon,” by coming in the way of a body whose station is fixed.

Sed frustra oppositum *trudentes* pectore montem.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 373,

Though the stags, here mentioned, made an impression upon the snow, yet they were unable to save their lives by it. “Et cum pæne in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem *trudi*, verum in cœlum videretur ascendere.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 173. b. The calm dignity with which Socrates met death, gave his enemies no opportunity to use violent means, with a view to compel him. “*Trudebanturque* in paludem gnaram vincentibus, iniquam nesciis, ni Cæsar productas legiones instruxisset.”—TAC. *Ann.* 1. 63. The pursuing army would naturally exert all its force to drive the flying one into this marsh, which the latter would as naturally avoid, by every possible resistance. Those pressing had more in view than to make the foe quit his station. They wished to confine his motion to a line which led to inevitable destruction.

Aut *trudit* acres hinc et hinc multa cane
Apros in obstantes plagas.—HOR. *Epod.* 2. 30.

TUNDERE differs from the two former verbs, in implying, that the body, receiving the stroke, does not quit its place, whatever change may be produced upon it otherwise. It differs from the other verbs, also, in supposing, that the purpose of the agent cannot be served by a single blow, but by a repetition, greater or less.

Tundier, et crebro pulsariæ aeris ictu.—LUCRET. 4. 932.
Seque jacit vecors e summo culmine turris,
—— *tundit* humum moriens.—OVID. *Met.* 5. 291.

The single blow, that was the consequence of this voluntary fall, is not that expressed by *Tundere*. It denotes those repeated blows given by this person to the ground, while in the agonies of death.

In consequence of the impulse, the parts, whether great or small, of the body, if broken, remain where the mass was. The stroke, too, may or may not injure the substance receiving it, according to its nature; but the substance at all times retains its place. “*Tundere* allium.”—COLUM. 2. 21. “*Tunditur* in pila, deinde crebro tenui cernitur.”—PLIN. 33. 5.

Proderit et *tunsum* gallæ admiscere saporem.—VIRG. *Geo.* 4. 267.

In all the above instances, the substance beaten is reduced to small pieces, in order to answer the purpose for which it is employed.

Jamque iterum *tundens* mollissima pectora palmis.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 1. 535.

Here; the substance, from its tenderness, would, of necessity, be hurt by the strokes given it. In the two following, no effect of this sort is produced at all, upon that which receives the blow. “Ego autem, si quem nunc plane rudem institui ad dicendum velim, his potius tradam assiduis uno opere eandem incudem diem noctemque *tudentibus*.”—CIC. *de Or.* 123. b.

—— saliet, *tundet* pede terram.—HOR. *Ar. Poet.* 430.

PELLEX—*vide* CONCUBINA.

PELLIS—*vide* CORIUM.

PENES,

denotes the relation which an object bears to a person, as being in his possession, and under his direction. It differs from “Apud,” in referring only to persons, in having no regard to place, and in suggesting superiority in the person to the correlative object. Thus, “apud aliquem esse,” supposes the person expressed by the governed word to be a landlord; but “*penes* aliquem esse” supposes him to be a master. Vicinity is suggested by both, and an ideal sphere is supposed to exist in the case of *Penes*, within which a master’s dominion is acknowledged.

Me *penes* est unum vasti custodia mundi,

Et jus vertendi cardinis omne meum est.—OVID. *Fast.* 119.

Janus, by means of this preposition, assumes to himself the command of the universe, which he declares to be in his custody, and under his controul.

De. Quid isthæc jam *penes* vos psaltria est?

Sy. Ellam intus.—TER. *Adelph.* 3. 3. 34.

It is here asked, if this singing wench was at the disposal, or in the keeping, of Syrus. This he declares to be the case, by pointing to her, and telling she was within doors. “Eloquentia exornat eos *penes* quos est.”—CIC. *de Or.* 210. a. This ornamental talent is supposed to be as much under the command of its possessor, as the tool is in the hand of the artist.

Penes is frequently found denoting, that a person has the credit of what is praise-worthy, and the blame of what is the contrary. This meaning arises from an idea, that the correlative object is at the disposal of the persons implied in the governed word, who, accordingly, have merit or demerit, as that object is well or ill managed. "*Penes quos laus emendatæ et Latinæ locutionis adhuc fuit.*"—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 188. b. "Cæterum fides ejus rei *penes* auctores erit."—SAL. *Jug.* 17. The historian, here, reports upon the authority of others, for whom he does not hold himself answerable. The authors, he allows, will have a claim to praise, or be subject to blame, according as their narrative is found authentic, or otherwise.

Ego etiam "illorum" esse hanc culpam credidi, quæ te est *penes*.

TER. *Hec.* 4. 1. 21.

The blame implied in "Culpa," as referring to "illorum," was common to a number, and misplaced by Phidippus; that, again, implied in "Culpa," as connected with "Te," governed by the preposition, falls upon Myrrhina alone, and falls deservedly. The blame might then be said to "lie at her door," she being supposed to have the direction of what happened in or near her own house.

The use made by Tacitus of the preposition *Penes*, in the following passage, the meaning of which cannot be mistaken, is undoubtedly singular. He is telling us of Tiberius's intention of introducing a new law respecting the election of a "Flamen Dialis," and of his being displeased, that the practice of marrying by the "Confarreatio" was no longer in constant use among the Patricians. "Pluresque ejus rei causas afferebat; potissimam *penes* incuriam virorum foeminarumque." Here, the blame is not announced by "Culpa," as usual, but is got only by implication. The culpable circumstance is expressed by the word "Incuria," and this is governed by *Penes*, in place of standing as a correlative term to those expressing the persons blamed. "Incuria," besides, even though it had been legitimately placed, yet as denoting only carelessness, or the absence of thought, is too specific to act as a correlative to the terms denoting the persons. The preposition is thus made to relinquish its native power of marking blame, and, assuming that of expressing cause in general, must be translated,

“Owing to,” or “Arising from.” If, then, the expression “*Incuria penes viros foeminasque*” would be illegitimate, that adopted by the historian, “*Causa penes incuriam virorum foeminarumque,*” is certainly more so*.

PENNA, PLUMA,

agree, in denoting feathers, but differ as to the kinds, and the use to which each is applied. PENNA is applicable to the quills with which the wings are furnished for the purpose of flying. It refers also to those in the tail, which support the bird in its flight, though not moved like the other. “*Aves pullos ex ovis exclusos pennis fovēt, ne frigore lædantur.*”—CIC. *de Div.* 102. a. It is the wing and tail feathers alone that are understood to protect against the cold. Those on the breast only communicate the heat that is inherent in the body, and of themselves would form but an imperfect defence against the chillness of the external air.

Sine pennis volare haud facile est : meæ alæ pennas non habent.

PLAUT. *Pæn.* 4. 2. 46.

This is a proverbial expression, intimating the necessity of adequate means to effect a particular end.

Quo nunquam pennis appellunt corpore rauca

Cornices. — LUCRET. 6. 751.

PLUMA differs from “Penna,” in denoting those feathers only that form down, and protect the body of the fowl from cold.

Qui soleant levibus velari corpora plumis.—OVID *Met.* 15. 357.

“*Fusca plumæ, nigrisque pennis.*”—COL. 8. 2. “*Non avium plumæ in usum vestis conferuntur?*”—SEN. *Ep.* 90. “*Dixi te “pennam” tenere : mentitus sum ; plumam tantum tenebas.*”—SEN. *Ep.* 42. “*His rebus plumam “pennasquæ” emundant.*”—COL. 8. 4.

PER

denotes the relation which a moving object bears to the surface which sup-

* *Vide* Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Vol. 1. Part 2. page 205.

ports it; to the medium through which it passes; and to the obstacle which it overcomes. “*Per omnes vias cum clamore in forum curritur.*”—LIV. 2. 23. The roads were the supporting surface to those who ran in them.

Quippe ferant rapidi secum, verrantque per auras.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 63.

Here, the air was the medium through which the winds would hurl the sea, the earth, and the heaven, if Æolus did not controul them. The flight of Iphigenia may be understood to have been performed without any pressure upon the fluid, and merely by the force that impelled her.

*Sceptra tenente illo, liquidas fecisse per auras
Nescio quam dicunt Iphigenian iter;
Quam levibus ventis sub nube per æquora vectam,
Creditur his Phœbe deposuisse locis.*—OVID. *ex Pont.* 3. 2. 61.

In the two following examples, there is a reference to the barrier, or boundary, that must be broken through. “*Nec per castra eorum perrumpi ad Capuam posse.*”—LIV. 26. 7.

— *per obstantes catervas
Explicuit sua victor arma.*—HOR. *Car.* 4. 9. 43.

When Horace says of the merchant,

Per mare pauperiem fugiens; per saxa, per ignes.

he, by the two first substantives, suggests a surface rugged and dangerous; and by the last; an obstacle which nobody else would dare to combat.

— *veniet classis quocunque vocarit.
Spes lucri.*—JUV. 14. 277.

Per is sometimes taken like “*Inter*,” signifying “*Between*.” Surfaces, which, from being contiguous in appearance, are held to be but one, are divided by the correlative object. As being actually two, the English say that a body passes between them; and, as seeming to be but one, this body is said, by the Latins, to pierce, or pass, through them.

Has "inter," mediamque duæ mortalibus ægris,
 Munere concessæ divum, et via secta *per* ambas,
 Obliquus qua se signorum verteret ordo.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 237.

The temperate zones are here supposed to make their way between the Torrid Zone and the Frigid on each side of it, which three would otherwise have come together, and have occupied the whole surface of the earth.

Per is found to denote "Under the pretence," or "With the appearance of." "Qui *per* simulationem amicitiaë me prodiderunt."—CIC. *post Red.* 202. b. The circumstance of disguise is not always couched in such words as "Simulatio" or "Species." "Cato invisus quasi *per* beneficium Cyprum relegatur: alter ejicitur *per* honorem turpissimum: alter *per* honestissimam calamitatem."—CIC. *pro Dom.* 226. b. "*Per* fidem fallere aliquem."—CIC. *de Inv.* 56. a. In English, the deception is announced by an appearance covering a reality, and, in our idea, the latter is "under" the former. Thus, in translating the first example, we say, the treachery was "under the mask of" friendship, and, of course, was not discerned. So, also, in the second, we translate the banishment of Cato as being "under," or "with the appearance of," a favour, and, of course, the act, which sprung from disguised malice, was misapprehended for an act of benevolence. In Latin, again, the difficulty of passing through some intervening object represents the difficulty of reaching the one to be obtained, in order to discern the truth. In the two first examples, accordingly, the friendship and the favour, that were pretended, came between the observer and the hostile sentiment of the deceiver. The former was duped, because he had not penetration to see through the deception.

Per, denoting the agency of a cause in the production of its particular effect, is translated "By means of." "Quod *per* scelus adeptus est, *per* luxuriam effundit."—CIC. *pro Sex. Rosc.* 19. b. The preposition has precisely the same meaning in respect to "Scelus" and "Luxuria," and suggests the means, however opposite, by which the fortune was both acquired and dissipated. "*Per* me vel stertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas." CIC. *Acad. Q.* 23. b. There is, here, both an extension and a limitation of the energy, according to the degree in which it is intended to produce the

effect. Carneades declares, that he will not try to make Chrisippus break that silence, implied in the verb *ἠσυχάζειν*, and that, in as far as he is concerned, he may not only enjoy his ease, but even snore.

In this, as well as in the meanings before explained, there is a clear reference to the effort needful to carry a body through the obstacle that impedes its progress. As rest is the natural state of every object, so intention and exertion are necessary even to change this state, and far more to overcome a barrier, that is opposed to it. The person who, in the first of the above examples, is said to have attained his object "through" wickedness, broke down what lay between him, and that which he desired. The intention, prior to the commencement of the motion, suggests the final cause of the action, to which it leads. A body in the relation of "Inter" to a number, may, while it moves, interfere with none; but a body, in the relation of *Per*, makes its way through that which the word, governed by the preposition, denotes, and therefore implies determination upon the part of the agent, who communicates the force needed to give effect to his intention.

Qui *per* virtutem peritat, non interit.—PLAUT. *Capt.* 3. 5. 32.

He, who is said "*per* virtutem peritare," faces death with intrepidity, and courts the end, from his admiration of the means which lead to it. It is otherwise with one who could be only said "Interire." He dies an ordinary death, and, as one among many, fulfils his destiny, without knowing that it is at hand.

There is no need for reckoning that use of *Per*, in which it denotes the earnestness with which vows and entreaties are offered, a distinct power. It may be referred to the efficacy of means, in the production of their intended effect. "Quid est enim *per* Deos optabilius sapientia."—CIC. *de Off.* 33. b.

Supplex et oro regna *per* Proserpinæ,
Per et Dianæ non movenda numina,
Per atque libros carminum valentium,
 Refixo cælo devocare sidera.—HOR. *Epod.* 17. 2.

It appears, that the person, vowing and intreating, tries to gain his point by

the intervention of means, which, with the being implored, he apprehends will be most persuasive. He, also, who swears, supports his veracity by calling that being to witness, who stands highest in the estimation of those, by whom he wishes to be believed. The path of the motion is thus regulated, and the force of the impulse adjusted from intention, so as to encounter and surmount a known obstacle, and to come at the point for which the motion takes place.

Per is equally applicable to the efficient and to the final cause. Both are stated in the following sentence, and it is clear to which *Per* applies. “Naturalis illa amicitia *per* se et propter se expetenda.”—CIC. *de Am.* 111. a.

This preposition is at some times translated “In,” when the object is known to be generally in a moving state within a limited space, and only stationary at particular points.

Quid hoc negotii est, quod homines fabulantur *per* vias,
Mihi esse filiam inventam? — PLAUT. *Cist.* 5. 1.

“Si rex amicis tuis, qui *per* imperii tui provincias ei credidissent, fidem præstitissent.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 5. 7.

Per is transferred to time, and is employed to denote both “When” and “How long.” It denotes the former in the two following examples :

— O Chreme! *per* tempus advenis.—TER. *And.* 1. 4. 44.
Non potuisti magis *per* tempus mihi advenire, quam advenis.

PLAUT. *Men.* 1. 2. 30.

In both these passages, “Tempus” does not signify time in general, but a limited space, measured by the conveniency of the person speaking. The person then arriving, is understood to have passed through a difficulty in hitting that point in time which is most agreeable to his friend.

In the two passages that follow, *Per* denotes the duration of an event. “Tenuisti provinciam *per* decem annos.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 108. a. “Sociali exercitu *per* multa bella magnaue sæpe usi estis.”—LIV. 8. 13. In this use, the governed word always expresses the length of a given space, not the place it holds, in respect to periods prior and posterior. The preposition, then, serves to measure the effort by which the inferred passage is effected, and, of course, the continuance of a specified event.

PER, it appears, may be translated as follows :

I.

THROUGH ; referring to the continuation of motion in a given space, whether any obstacle is to be surmounted or otherwise.

II.

BETWEEN. Distinct surfaces, which, from their contiguity, appear to be but one, are said to be divided, in English, by the intervention of a third, and, in Latin, to be pierced, or forcibly severed.

III.

UNDER, or ON PRETENCE OF. The difficulty of coming at the truth is, in Latin, held forth by forcing a way through obstacles, and, in English, by removing that which covers it.

IV.

ON ACCOUNT OF. BY MEANS OF. FOR THE SAKE OF. The general agency of a cause is expressed by the act of him, who communicates such motion, in respect to its line and degree, as enables a body to resist a known obstacle, and to force its way.

V.

IN. The place, in which the correlative object then is, is understood to be such, that this body may be occasionally at rest, as well as moving within it.

VI.

TIME WHEN, and HOW LONG. In both uses, there is a defined period, represented by a space, to be gone through. In the former, the period is short, and the arrival of the object opportune, because within it. In the latter, the duration of an event, whether long or short, is measured by the continuance of the motion within the established boundaries.

Per, in composition with verbs that denote motion, retains its original meaning, which is "Through." "Citato equo Cales *percurrit*."—LIV. 26. 15. "Quædam animalis intelligentia *per* omnia *permeet* et transeat."—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 30. a.

Perrupit Acheronta Hercules labor.—HOR. *Car.* 1: 3. 43.

But the power which *Per* most frequently discovers in composition is intensive, in respect to the word to which it is prefixed. “Me *perfacilem* in audiendo, te *perpugnacem* in disputando esse visum.”—CIC. *de Or.* 92. b. By means of *Per*, there is an equal increase of the ease implied in the former adjective, and of the love of controversy in the latter. In the case of “Perdere,” the radical power of “Dare” is so heightened, as to denote a thorough abandonment of the object given. It is thus understood to be without the controul of its natural law, and thereby exposed to destruction. The person “Perdens,” withholds his care from that, which he knows must suffer from the want of it.

Sic ne *perdiderit*, non cessat *perdere* lusor.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 1. 451.

The gamester encounters the hazard with his eyes open, and, for the sake of an uncertain addition to his fortune, makes a conditional surrender of the whole.

Per, in composition, very often displays its power of expressing time, “How long.” The compounded word may be either an adjective or a verb; but then the preposition virtually affects the substantive, from which the last part of the word is derived, such as “Nox,” “Dies,” “Annus,” “Hiems.” “Hæc studia *pernoctant* nobiscum, *peregrinantur*, *rusticantur*.”—CIC. *pro Arch. P.* 180. a. “Stare solitus Socrates dicitur *pertinaci* statu, *perdius* atque *pernox* *inconnivens*.”—AUL. GELL. 2. 1. “Ideo puella nata non *perannavit*.”—SUET. *in Vespas.* 5. “Sub initium sulcos vacuos *perbiemare* patiemur.”—COLUM. 11. 3.

— effigies quo

Tot bellatorum, si luditur alea *pernox*.—JUV. *Sat.* 8. 9.

— arte *perennat* amor.—OVID. *de Art. Am.* 42.

PERAGRARE, PEREGRINARI, RUSTICARI;

agree, in denoting absence from a city, which is the ordinary place of abode, but differ, in respect to the manner in which the person absent is employed. PERAGRARE, from “Per” et “Ager,” signifies, “to traverse the fields,” or, as

Servius says, "Inquirendo circuire." The traveller is always understood to have some object, and to keep in motion, as constantly as possible. "Et ob eam causam urbe relicta, rura *peragrantes*, sæpe soli sumus."—CIC. 52. b. "Arabes autem, et Phryges, et Cilices, quod pastu pecudum maxime utuntur, campos et montes hieme et æstate *peragrantes*, propterea facilius cantus avium et volatus notaverunt."—CIC. *de Div.* 100. a.

PERAGRARE is applied to those who make voyages as well as journeys. "Ipse cum lectissima manu navibus conscensis oceani littora *peragrat*."—JUSTIN. 12. 10. "Maria *peragrarare* pedibus, classibus montes."—CIC. *de Fin.* 88. a. "Cum orbem terrarum non pedibus magis, quam laudibus *peragraret*."—PLIN. *Paneg.* 14.

PEREGRINARI differs from "Peragrarare," in implying, that the course of the journey is occasionally interrupted, for the purpose of observation, and that passing over the surface of a foreign country is not the chief object of the traveller. It signifies, properly, "to go abroad," or "to go upon a tour," and supposes such cessations in the general course, as make the journey agreeable and useful. "Exilium non multum a perpetua *peregrinatione* differt."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 249. a. In the case of "Exilium," however, there was a necessity not to be overcome; in that of *Peregrinatio*, the traveller had it in his power to return home, as soon as he found it disagreeable to be abroad. "Me Romæ tenuit omnino Tullia meæ partus: non tam sum *peregrinator* jam, quam solebam. Ædificia mea me delectant et otium."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 92. a.

The force of the two verbs appears remarkably in the following antithesis. "Nam ut semel e Piræo eloquentia evecta est, omnes "peragravit" insulas, atque ita *peregrinata* tota Asia est, ut se externis oblineret moribus, omnemque illam salubritatem Atticæ dictionis, et quasi sanitatem perderet, ac loqui pæne dediceret."—CIC. *de Cl. Or.* 169. a. The quickness with which Attic eloquence passed through the islands, was such as not to give time for tainting its purity. Its motion through Asia, however, was slower. Full time was by this means given for innovations to be made; and so general a corruption took place upon it, as almost to destroy the power.

RUSTICARI differs from the two former verbs, in implying, that the jour-

ney of the person absent from town is over, and that, in a rural retreat, he is enjoying the pleasures of the country. It does not apply to a constant inhabitant of the country, but to one who has retired for a while from the amusements or business of society. Horace felt strongly the desire of this relaxation, when he exclaimed,

Perditur hæc inter misero lux, non sine votis :
O rus, quando ego te aspiciam ? quandoque licebit
Ducere sollicitæ jucunda oblivia vitæ ?—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 6. 59.

“ Ut sciam quid garriat ; sin *rusticatur*, quid scribat ad te : eique interea aut scribe salutem, aut nuntia.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 12. 1. Cicero was desirous to know the prattle of Tullia, if in Rome, or the substance of her correspondence, if in the country. According as either was the case, his own good wishes were to be announced, by word of mouth, or by letter. “ Hæc studia delectant domi, non impediunt foris, “ peregrinantur,” *rusticantur*.—CIC. *pro Arch. P.* 189. a. Those studies are not cumbersome, during our excursions, and furnish the best subjects of study, in our rural retreats.

PERCONTARI, SCISCITARI,

agree, in denoting the act of seeking information by questions, but differ in respect to the sentiment which prompts the person who puts them. In the case of the first verb, he either gratifies his curiosity, by prying into matters with which he is little, if at all, concerned ; or he presents queries, the purpose of which is hidden from the person required to answer them. *Percontari* is said, by Festus and Donatus, to come à “ conto,” quo nautæ utuntur, ad inquirenda loca navibus opportuna.”

— quacunque libido est,

Incedo solus : *percontor* quanti olus ac far.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 6. 111.

The poet, certainly, had no intention to purchase any of the pot-herbs, or the corn. His asking the price of them, therefore, was only for amusement, or to gratify an idle curiosity.

Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 13. 69.

Tua quod nihil refert *percontari* desinas.—TER. *Hec.* 5. 3. 12.

In all the above instances, *Percontari* signifies the act of searching for information, which is of no importance to the enquirer, farther than as it gratifies curiosity.

There is an use made of *Percontari* by Horace, that does not seem to tally with the instances, and the definition, already given of it.

Inter cuncta leges et *percontabere* doctos,
Qua ratione queas traducere leniter ævum.—*Ep.* 18. 96.

No question, doubtless, can be more important than that mentioned. The poet, at the same time, may have supposed, that Lælius was not sufficiently aware of its value; and he recommends that inquisitive disposition, which in other matters would be culpable, as highly meritorious in this. He says elsewhere,

Forte meum si quis te *percontabitur* ævum:—*Ep.* 1. 20. 26.

By using this verb, he modestly supposes, that the information called for could be of little consequence to the enquirer, though he puts it in the power of his friend to give it, if required.

Beside the use of *Percontari* already specified, it was said occasionally to imply, that the enquirer presents queries, the purpose of which is hidden from the person required to answer them. A philosopher, in this way, brings the person, with whom he reasons, to allow the justice of a principle which he may have been disposed to deny; or a judge investigates the truth, by cross-examining. Thus, Cicero says of the Socratic mode of reasoning; “*Is percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea quæ hi respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret.*”—*De Fin.* 2. 2. 1.

Aliquid insidiis hostilibus *percontari*. PLAUT. *Pseud.* 4. 4. 10.

SCISCITARI differs from “*Percontari*,” in having a constant reference to the advantage which the enquirer understands he is to derive from obtaining the information he asks. It is a frequentative from “*Sciscere*,” which is an inceptive from “*Scire*,” and denotes, of course, a growing eagerness to know. “*Scitari*,” which is a contraction of it, and used chiefly by the poets, has precisely the same meaning. “*Mathematicum sciscitatus est, quis eum maneret exitus.*”—SÆT.

Domit. 15. "Initio hujus belli *sciscitantibus* Delphis oracula."—JUSTIN. 2. 11. "Incidimus in turbam hæredipetarum *sciscitantium*, quod genus hominum, aut unde veniremus."—PETRON. 124. In none of the above examples could "Percontari" be put in place of *Sciscitari*. This last term is particularly applicable to those "Hæredipetæ," whose characters were grossly selfish, and whose queries were put only in the view of promoting their own interest. "Parendo potius, commilitones, quam imperia ducum *sciscitando*, res militares continentur."—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 84. The Roman general does not here reprove an impertinent curiosity upon the part of his soldiers, but an officious interference in matters, in which, though interested, they were not called to act, and the want of that confidence in their leaders, which is the basis of military subordination and success.

PERDERE, AMITTERE,

agree, in denoting the losing of something once possessed, but differ, in respect both to the circumstances of the loser, and the nature of the loss. The former verb supposes the agent culpable, either in not foreseeing the evil which, to others, was apparent, or in incurring a danger, where there was little hope of success, and in which the prize, if obtained, would be either an inadequate, or a dishonourable recompense. It supposes, also, that his rashness or demerit is punished by a loss that is irrecoverable. *Amittere*, again, implies, that all the abovementioned circumstances are reversed. The agent, though he has sustained a loss, yet is understood to have been guided by the dictates of prudence, and to have acted in consistence with his duty. If his loss is irreparable in kind, it always admits of alleviation in degree, and may often be more than balanced. "Decius, qui se devovisse dicitur, *amisit* vitam, at non *perdidit*. Re enim vilissimâ certam, et parvâ maximam redemit: dedit vitam, accepit patriam."—*Auct. ad-Heren.* 38. a. To the loss sustained by Decius, the verb *Amittere*, only, is applicable, for reasons that are clearly laid down. The patriot had estimated the value of the purchase, before he gave the price; and, by anticipating the compensation to which he had a right from posterity, he found himself a gainer, even upon the condition of losing his life. "Recu-

perata vero sua dignitate, se non commissurum, ut cum ea quæ *amiserat* sibi restituta essent, virtutem animi non haberet quam nunquam *perdidisset*.”—CIC. *post Red. in Sen.* 202. b. In this sentence the orator makes Marius discover equal dignity of sentiment, and elegance of expression. He considers the loss of his dignity, which was made up to him, as one of those to which all men concerned in the transactions, and dependent on the opinion of the public, are exposed. He disavows, at the same time, the loss of his virtue, for which he would have been blameable, and which, had it really taken place, could never have been recovered.

Luculli miles collecta viatica multis
Aerumnis, lassus dum noctu stertit, ad assem
Perdiderat.—————HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 26.

By means of the verb *Perdere*, there is, here, an insinuation of blame against the soldier, for his carelessness in not securing his property before he went to rest. It is indeed no wonder that he was, as the poet says,

Et sibi et hosti iratus pariter.

The sum lost, too, was deemed irrecoverable, though his misfortune was the cause of one splendid exertion of military prowess. “*Perdere oleum et operam*.”—CIC. *Ep.* 95. a. This phrase is applicable to those whose unsuccessful lucubrations meet with every discouragement. They pay for their error in over-rating their talents, by the complete loss, not only of labour, but of the very oil with which they trim their lamps. A person, who had lost his suit at law, was said “*Perdere litem*,” because the sentence of the judge was understood to be final, and his loss, of course, irretrievable. When Cicero, however, is stating the difference between a judgment and an arbitration, and speaking of the sentence in the former as future and unknown, he uses the verb *Amittere*. “*Ad iudicium hoc modo venimus, ut totam litem aut obtineamus aut amittamus: ad arbitrium hoc animo adimus, ut neque nihil, neque tantum quantum postulavimus, consequamur*.”—CIC. *Or. pro Q. R. Com.* 46. C. The persons who are here said *Amittere*, but not “*Perdere litem*,” have no injurious intentions towards their antagonists, but go to

the judge only to have their rights explained. Both parties are ignorant as to the issue of the process; and, as neither is culpable from ignorance or intention, the loss of the unsuccessful one may be deemed a misfortune, and admits of every alleviation. “*Minus miseri, qui liberos his temporibus amiserunt, quam si eosdem bona aut denique aliqua republica perdidissent.*”—*CIC. Ep. Fam.* 5. 16. Even in the bad times that then were, those parents were less to be pitied, who lost their children by ordinary misfortunes, than others, who, in better times, were in any degree culpable in exposing them to destruction.

PERDITUS—*vide* PROFLIGATUS. PERFICERE—*vide* CONFICERE.

PEREGRINUS—*vide* ADVENA.

PERFUGA, PROFUGUS,

agree, in denoting persons who have fled from those with whom they had been accustomed to live, but differ, in respect to their connection with those they quitted, and as they act with, or against, their own will. The former signifies a deserter, who, having broken faith with those whom he served, comes over to the enemy, and whose change of situation is altogether voluntary. Both come from one root, and the “*Per*” seems to refer to the difficulty with which the escape is made. “*Perfuga a Pyrrho venit in castra Fabricii.*”—*CIC. de Off.* 69. b. “*Pro perfuga jussus Tarentum transire.*”—*LIV.* 37. 15. Festus gives the definition, by Gallus Ælius, of this term, who says, “*Perfugam esse qui liber, aut servus, aut hostis, sua voluntate ad hostes transierit.*”

PROFUGUS differs from “*Perfuga*,” in denoting, that the person quitting those, with whom he had been connected, acts from constraint, and is obliged to fly contrary to his inclination. His act is voluntary, only in as far as he incurs a smaller, in order to avoid a greater, evil. “*Trojani qui, Ænea duce, profugi sedibus incertis vagabantur.*”—*SALL. Cat.* 6.

— Trojæ qui primus ab oris
 Italiam, fato profugus, Lavinaque venit
 Littora. ————— *VIRG. Æn.* 1. 1.

In the less pure use of *Profugus*, it should seem, that there is, upon the part of the refugee, no attachment to the situation quitted, but only a desire to be elsewhere, with a view to avoid some impending evil. "Bis ab Hannibal captus, bis vinculorum ejus *profugus*."—PLIN. 7. 28. In one use made of it by Horace, it is not clear that the *Profugi*, who were the wild Scythians, performed their migrations from either of the motives mentioned. Such wandering tribes may have been actuated by no principle but the love of change. The poet, in his address to Fortune, says, beautifully,

Te Dacus asper, te *profugi* Scythæ,
 Urbesque, gentesque, et Latium ferox,
 Regumque matres barbarorum, et
 Purpurei metuunt tyranni.—HOR. *Car.* 1. 35. 9.

PERFUNGĪ—*vide* DEFUNGI.

PERINDE, PROUT,

agree, in expressing the relation in which certain qualities of objects stand to each other, but differ as to the manner in which the relation is estimated. PERINDE denotes, that a certain quality in one subject measures the degree of a different quality in the same, or in a different one, and that the last stated of these qualities is precisely equal to the first. Thus, Cicero says, "Non possum dicere me hæc, *perinde* ut dicam discenda esse, didicisse."—CIC. *de Orat.* 149. b. There is, here, a negation of what might have been. The degree of proficiency, made by the orator, might have been precisely equal to that which he had inculcated. "Fusus Rufi clarissimi civis et *perinde* felicitis."—PLIN. *Ep.* 2. 1. The lustre and the happiness of Rufus, which were, as in the last instance, different qualities of the same person, are, here, said to have been alike.

Hæc *perinde* sunt, ut illius animus, qui ea possidet.—TER. *Heaut.* 1. 2. 21.

The value of the thing possessed, and the disposition of the possessor, which are different qualities in different subjects, are said to be in equal measure. "Non Philippum Atheniensibus, non Pyrrhum, aut Antiochum populo Ro-

mano, *perinde* metuendos fuisse.”—TAC. *Ann.* 2. 63. Though the powers of resistance, upon the part of the Athenians and the Romans, were very different, yet Philip is understood to have excited the same precise degree of fear in the former, that Pyrrhus and Antiochus did in the latter. By means of the negation, it is expressly said, however, that Maroboduus was more formidable than them all.

The etymology of *Perinde* seems to support the account now given of its power. The “*Inde*,” in which its force chiefly lies, has an immediate reference to the supposed origin of the latter from the former quality, and the “*Per*” to the thorough resemblance between them, which exists always in degree, but never in kind.

PROUT differs from “*Perinde*,” in suggesting, that a certain quality in one subject measures the degree of a different quality, not in the same, but in a different subject, and that the one is not equal, but proportioned, to the other. It is compounded of the adverb “*Ut*,” denoting similitude, the power of which is restricted by the preposition “*Pro*,” as taken to signify “*According*,” or “*In proportion to*.” “*Prout* tempus patiebatur instructa acies.”—LIV. 9. 43. The arrangement and the time are not said to have been precisely equal; but the exactness of the one, and the length of the other, are said to have been proportioned. It is thus insinuated, that the order, in which the army began the engagement, bore the same relation to the most complete arrangement of which it was susceptible, that the time taken to effect this order bore to that in which the best possible could be accomplished.

— *prout* cuique libido est

Siccat inequales calices conviva.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 6. 67.

It is not said, that the quantity drunk by every guest was precisely equal to his appetite, but that the size of his cup, and the quantity poured into it, were in proportion to his love of the liquor.

A complete member of a sentence, that is, one which contains a nominative and a verb, always follows *Prout*; but this is not the case with “*Perinde*.” In the use of *Prout*, those terms, which involve the assigned proportions, must

be always accurately stated ; but in that of "Perinde," where the relation of equality only is to be announced, such accuracy is not needful. A single word after, tallying with one before "Perinde," developes its power with sufficient distinctness. The relation of equality, which "Perinde" denotes, may be predicated of the attributes, either of the same, or of a different subject. That of proportion, again, is more complicated. The qualities thus connected rest either on a common relation to a third one, or on the particular relation which each of these bears to a certain one of other two qualities, whose connection is supposed to be known. Thus, in the passage last quoted from Livy, had an able general, who knows both the greatest possible order in which an army can be drawn up, and the time necessary for accomplishing this, seen the order in which the Roman army engaged, he could have, from thence, inferred the time taken to effect this ; and had he learned the time, he could have, with the same precision, inferred the degree of preparation which it was in that space possible to have attained. It therefore necessarily happens, that *Prout*, which announces proportion, must have, on each side of it, the expression of two distinct subjects ; of each of which it is said, that some one quality is unequal, in a certain respect, to its correspondent ; but, at the same time, it is affirmed that it is proportioned to it. There is a sentence in Quinctilian, respecting the disagreeableness of pronounciation, from the concourse of certain letters, in which both *Prout* and "Perinde" are used, and the account given of them apparently supported. "Perinde" asperiores erunt, *prout* oris hiatu simili aut diverso pronounciabuntur."—QUINCT. 9. 4. The author's intention, it must be observed, is to state the proportion between the increased harshness of two letters coming together, and the manner in which each of these is necessarily pronounced in its separate state. *Prout*, then, is the leading adverb in the sentence ; and, being employed to announce the proportion between the "Asperitas" and the "Hiatus," is in its natural and ordinary acceptation. The case is otherwise with "Perinde," because there is no annunciation of absolute equality between any two subjects whatever. *Prout* would have performed its duty in the absence of "Perinde ;" but, if *Prout* were driven out of the sentence, the whole would become unmeaning. "Perinde," at the same time, is by

no means expletive. By modifying "Asperiores," it gives a precision to one of the subjects of that proportion, involved in *Prout*, which could not otherwise have existed. The nicety with which the simple relation of equality is always capable of being ascertained, is thus communicated to that of proportion, which, as it was shewn to be more complicated, so it must, of course, be more vague. "*Prout* locus iniquus, æquusque his aut illis; *prout* animus pugnantium est, *prout* numerus, varia pugnæ fortuna est."—LIV. 38. 40. The fickleness of fortune is, here, said to be proportioned to three different circumstances, by which those engaged in battle may be affected; by the place, as level or otherwise; by the courage, and by the number, of the combatants.

PERSEVERANTIA, PERTINACIA— PETERE—*vide* ROGARE.
vide CONSTANTIA. PETULANS—*vide* PROCAX.

PIGET, TÆDET,

agree, in denoting uneasiness of mind, but differ, in respect to the cause from which this uneasiness proceeds. The first refers to an unpleasant feeling, arising from the necessity of undergoing what is disagreeable in its consequences; the last refers to a feeling of this kind, arising from the uniformity of a state continued, or the irksomeness of a task already begun. The pain, implied in the former, results from what is apprehended; that, in the latter, from what is actually felt. As *Piget* is the root of "Pigritia," we may judge of the force of this root from the definition given, by Cicero, of the branch. "*Pigritia* metus consequentis laboris est."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 213. a. Tacitus employs the verb in a way precisely consistent with this definition. "Insita mortalibus natura prope sequi, quæ *piget* inchoare."—*Hist.* 1. 55. The labour, involved in *Piget*, may be small or great; but there must always be some exertion, which may be magnified from complaisance, or from natural indolence.

Adolescens, quæso Hercle, loquere tuum mihi nomen, ni *piget*.

Non Ædepol ita promeruisti de me, ut *piget* quæ velis.—PLAUT. *Mæn.* 5. 9. 7.

The continuation of what had been begun, which necessarily implies future labour, is often expressed by *Piget*.

— *piget* incepti, lucisque : suosque
Mutatæ agnoscunt : excussaque pectore Juno est.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 678.

When the women came to their senses, they were unwilling to go on with what they had begun ; and this feeling may be construed into a regret of what was past, when they set fire to the ships. The radical meaning of *Piget* seems to be sometimes lost, and a regret for the past appears to be stronger than an aversion to the future. The latter circumstance, however, is preserved, in the idea of undoing what had been done.

Ne quid plus minusve faxit, quod nos post *pigeat*, Geta.—TER. *Phor.* 3. 3. 21.

The conduct, here to be observed, was delicate, and Antipho is afraid, that, by doing either too much, or too little, he and Geta might be brought to future trouble.

TÆDET differs from “*Piget*,” in implying aversion to something irksome, from continuance, whether naturally disagreeable or not.

— ut enim *tædet* jam audire eadem millies.—TER. *Phor.* 3. 2. 2.

The uneasiness arose, here, merely from the continued repetition. Those things that were indifferent, when spoken seldom, might have become disagreeable, when repeated a thousand times. So, also, in the following example :

Tædet quotidianarum harum formarum.—TER. *Eun.* 2. 3. 6.

The oppression of the *Tædium* necessarily rises, when the situation is, of itself, painful. “Prorsus vitæ *tædet*, ita sunt omnia omnium miseriarum plenissima.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 2. 24. “Dum me civitatis morum “*piget*” *tædetque*.”—SAL. *Jug.* 4. The historian, here, says, he was uneasy at seeing the consequences, as well as at perceiving the continuance, of this public corruption.

PIGRITIA, IGNAVIA, INERTIA,

agree, in denoting aversion to labour ; but differ, as they respect, either the dread of that which is future, the irksomeness of that which exists, or the

inability to perform any task, from habits of laziness. “*Pigritiam* definiunt metum consequentis laboris.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 213. a. “Nox et fugientes texit, et Romanis *pigritiam* ad sequendum ignotis locis fecit.”—LIV. 54. 42. “Insita mortalibus natura prope sequi, quæ *piget* inchoare.”—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 55.

Mane *piger* stertis; surge, inquit avaritia.—PERS. 5. 132.

The two last examples support the definition from Cicero, and show, that *Pigritia* denotes aversion to labour that is future, and begun with reluctance, “Noli putare *pigritia* me facere, quod non in ea manu scribam.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 16. 15. He, to whom *Pigritia* is applicable, calls constantly, as it is said in the Sacred Scriptures, for “yet a little sleep, yet a little slumber, yet a little folding of the hands.”

IGNAVIA differs from “*Pigritia*,” in referring, not to the dread of labour that is to come, but to the want of spirit and exertion for accomplishing that which is on hand. It implies that relaxed state of mind which prevents a person from accomplishing whatever he undertakes. When “*Pigritia*,” which prevents action, has complete influence, the existence of *Ignavia* cannot be ascertained. The philosophic historian last quoted states a principle in human nature, by which we are led to compensate, by a quality the reverse of *Ignavia*, the culpable delay implied in “*Pigritia*.” “*Utinam nihil detis, ut potius vestra injuria, quam ignavia mea cessem.*”—CIC. *Q. Fr.* 313. a. The distinctive meaning of “*Cessare*” is disposition to flinch from labour; and *Ignavia* denotes the principle from which such disposition proceeds. “An ego, quum omnes caleant, *ignaviter* aliquid faciam?”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 241. a. The heat of action, implied in “*Caleant*,” is well opposed to the *laceté*, or relaxed indolence, implied in *Ignaviter*. “*Utque alios “industria,” ita hunc ignavia ad famam protulerat.*”—TAC. *Ann.* 16. 18. Facciolati says, properly, that *Ignavia* applies to a man “*vilis et minuti animi, qui, cum possit strenue agere et fortiter, desidia, vanove metu periculi aut laboris, recusat.*”

INERTIA differs from the two former words, in referring to the incapacity of performing any thing well, superinduced by habits of indolence. It is an abstract from “*Iners*,” compounded of “*In*” and “*Ars*,” and supposes dimi-

nished dexterity in an art, that has been seldom, if at all practised. “Quod si, ut es, cessabis, laccessam: nec tua “ignavia” etiam *inertiam* afferet.”—Cic. *Ep. Fam.* 12. 20. *Inertia* is, here, said to be the direct consequence of “Ignavia” indulged. “Fuga laboris *inertiam* coarguit.”—Cic. *pro Mur.* 126. a. The indolence, which prompts men to fly from labour, is an infallible proof that their performance of any art will be awkward and lubberly.

Strenua nos exercet *inertia*, navibus atque

Quadrigis petimus bene vivere: quod petis hic est.—Hor. *Epod.* 1. 11. 28.

The poet by no means accuses men of inactivity; but he blames the “anile studium,” the unavailing pother, which comes short of the end, by either mistaking the means, or by the want of ability to employ them. Though the definition given of *Inertia* be its original and proper one, yet, upon some occasions, it is confounded with “Ignavia,” which, in strict propriety, leads to it as an effect. “Subit quippe etiam ipsius *inertiæ* dulcedo.”—Tac. *Ag.* 3.

Mollis *inertia* cur tantam diffuderit imis

Oblivionem sensibus.—Hor. *Epod.* 1. 14.

PILENTUM, PLAUSTRUM—*vide*

CURRUS.

PLANGERE—*vide* FLERE.

PLEBS—*vide* POPULUS.

PLECTI—*vide* PUNIRE.

PLICARE—*vide* CURVARE.

PLORARE—*vide* FLERE.

PLUMA—*vide* PENNA.

PLUVIA—*vide* IMBER.

PÆNA, SUPPLICIUM,

agree, in denoting a punishment inflicted upon some person, held to be a culprit, but differ, in respect to its severity. PÆNA denotes a penalty, which may be either the lightest or the heaviest possible, and comprehends, also, all the intermediate degrees. As the reward of good conduct was often undefined, so was the punishment of bad. Both must depend on opinion entirely, when arbitrary, and on the judgment of those who apply them, when established. “Contineri præmio et pæna rempublicam dixit Solon.”—Cic. *ad Brut.* 15.

Minor *pœna* merito, nocuit mala lingua duobus.—OVID. *Amor.* 2. 2. 49.

“Et sunt *pœnæ* quæ quidem aut vitam adimant, aut servitutem adjungant, aut civitatem auferant, aut exilium aut coercionem corporis contineant.”—ULP. *Dig.* 47. 15.

In a fragment of Cicero, it appears there were no less than eight different kinds of punishments; under the name of *Pœnæ*, all varying in degree. “Octo *pœnarum* genera in legibus continentur, damnum, vincula, verbera, talio, ignominia, exsilium, mors, servitus.”—AUGUSTIN. *de Civit. Dei*, 21. 11.

SUPPLICIUM differs from “*Pœna*,” in denoting, that the punishment is always severe, and that the rigour of the means is neglected, provided the end is obtained. In the use of *Supplicia*, intended and held necessary to effect a good purpose, there is no cruelty. This takes place only when harsh punishments are wantonly preferred to gentle, which might have been efficacious, and when they, who have the power of inflicting them, delight in the misery of those whom they oppress.

Supplicium originally denoted a supplication; and though this use was not very common, yet we find it supported by Sallust. “Non votis neque *suppliciiis* muliebribus deorum auxilia parantur; sed vigilando, agendo, bene consulendo prospera omnia cedunt.”—SAL. *Cat.* 52.

From denoting supplication, *Supplicium* has been transferred to punishment, probably from the person exposed to it begging for mercy, or bending under its severity. “*Supplicium* autem est “*pœna*” peccati.”—CIC. *in Pis.* 43. The definition here given of *Supplicium*, as a particular, could not be given of “*Pœna*,” which is a generic term. The latter may be either gentle or violent; the former can be violent alone, though it admits gradations.

“Auditisne ut “*pœna*” mea, et *supplicium* vestrum, simul postulentur? adeo manifestum est, neque perire nos, neque salvos esse, nisi una, posse.”—TAC. *Hist.* 1. 37. In the antithesis here stated between “*Pœna*” and *Supplicium*, the force of each term, and the art of the speaker, are alike apparent. Otho presents his personal sufferings as trivial, and matter of little concern, even to himself; but the prospect of those that might befall his followers, upon whose

attachment his very existence depended, and who were, certainly, not more culpable than himself, is held forth, by him, as an object of serious distress.

— jamjam, me præside, Roma

Supplicium “pœnamque” petat, neque enim ista vocari

Prælia justa decet, patriæ sed vindicis iram.—LUCAN. 2. 537.

Pompey is here said to be about to distribute punishments proportioned to the demerits of the supposed traitors. Some deserved the severest, as expressed by *Supplicium*; others slighter, and even the slightest, as may be expressed by “Pœna.”

POLLERE—*vide* POSSE.

POLLICERI—*vide* PROMITTERE.

PONDUS, ONUS, SARCINA,

agree, in denoting something weighty, but differ, in respect to the standard by which the weight is estimated. Gravity is the characteristic circumstance in each; but PONDUS denotes, either gravity in general, or a greater or less weight, in respect to a particular substance, measured by a common standard. “Onus” denotes weight, in respect to the strength of the animal that supports or carries it; and “Sarcina” denotes it, in respect to the strength of the person, who carries what it is necessary or convenient for him to have. “In terram feruntur omnia suo motu pondera.”—CIC. *de Somn.* 128. b. “Omne pondus, nulla re impediante, moveatur et feratur necesse est.”—CIC. *de Fat.* 150. a. The proposition, in each of the above examples, relates to every body having weight, whether that weight be great or small. Upon every substance the pressure of gravity is said to act, though with unequal effect, according to its magnitude, or its specific weight.

— gemuit sub *pondere* cymba.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 413.

The boat of Charon groaned under Æneas, in consequence of the difference in specific weight, between his body, and those spirits that were usually wafted in it.

Aspice convexo nutantem *pondere* mundum.—VIRG. *Ec.* 4. 50.

The specific gravity of the mass is here held forth by the term *Pondus*, and

its convex figure is given it by the equal pressure of every particle towards the centre.

ONUS differs from "Pondus," in having no reference to the absolute or specific weight of the heavy substance, but to the strength of the animal employed to support, or to carry it. It denotes burden, and implies a weight sufficient to try the strength of the living creature, on which it is imposed. One animal may be crushed by what another would not feel. "*Onus Ætna gravius mihi videor sustinere.*"—CIC. *de Sen.* 77. b.

Demitto auriculas, ut iniquæ mentis asellus,
Cum gravius dorso subiit *onus*.—HOR. *Sat.* 9. 21.
Aut *onera* accipiunt venientum.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 167.

In the above examples, burdens are mentioned, of very unequal weights, and suited to the strength of the animals who were to support and carry them. What fretted the ass would have destroyed the bee. In the first example, the *Onus* was only supported; in the two last, it was imposed, with a design to be conveyed from one place to another.

— consumptaque membra senecta
Ad minimum redigantur *onus*.—OVID. *Met.* 14. 148.

As the strength of the supporter fails, the burden must be proportionally diminished. "Examinare paucis manibus *oneris* maximi "pondus."—VIT. 10. 8. The word "Pondus" denotes the absolute weight of the body, as it lay; and *oneris* implies, that it was meant to be carried, though more hands might be required even to move it.

SARCINA, from "Sarcire," differs from "Onus," in referring to what is less burdensome, to what is borne always, with a view to its being transported, and to something carried for the conveniency of him who does so. From its etymology, it refers to a bag, containing what is occasionally useful, and fit to supply a necessary waste. "Cum prima legio in castra venisset, reliquæque legiones magnum spatium abessent, hanc sub *sarcinis* adoriri."—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 2. 17. Those articles which each soldier carried about with him, for his own use,

and which, collectively, formed part of the baggage of the army, are here called *Sarcinæ*. “Cæteri per varios casus elapsi, quidam servili habitu, alii fide clientium contecti, et inter *sarcinas* abditi.”—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 73. Here, *Sarcinæ* denotes the knapsacks deposited, which the soldiers carried while upon a march.

Sarcina is figuratively applied to mind, but in a way strictly consistent with its literal use.

Sarcinaque hæc animo non sedet apta meo.—OVID. *Heroid.* 4. 24.

Unde adveniēti *sarcinam* imponam seni.—PLAUT. *Mostell.* 2. 1. 83.

In this last example, the old man is befooled, and made to carry a burden he had nothing to do with. The phrase is shortened, when the verb “Impōnere,” by itself, signifies to deceive, or, as we say, “To impose upon.” “Catoni egregie imposuit Milo.”—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 2. b.

POPULUS, PLEBS,

agree, in denoting the members of one community, but differ, in respect to the rank which those expressed by each hold in it. The first is generic, and may occasionally comprehend the aggregate of subjects living under a regular government. “*Populum* non omnem cætum multitudinis, sed cætum juris consensu, et utilitatis communione sociatum esse determinat.”—AUGUST. *de Civ. Dei*, 2. 21. *ex* CIC. *de Rep.* “*Populus* Romanus, victor dominusque omnium gentium.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 207. b. *Populus* sometimes denotes the whole Roman people, except the senate, and then extends only to the knights and the commons. Thus, we read often, “*Senatus populusque Romanus.*” “*Et patres in populi fore potestate.*”—LIV. 2. 56. Among the poets, *Populus* is found equal to “Plebs,” and denoting the lowest order of the state. This, however, is uncommon, and rests chiefly upon the authority of Martial.

Dat *populus*, dat gratus “eques,” dat tura “senatus.”—LIB. 8. *Epig.* 15.

“Plebs” never was made to denote the best born of the subjects of Rome, nor the whole collectively.

— tamen ima *plebe* Quiritem
 Facundum invenies.—veniet de *plebe* togata
 Qui juris nodos, et legum ænigmata solvat.—Juv. 8. 47.

PLEBS differs from “Populus,” in never comprehending the highest order of any community, but in being applicable to the lowest of three, either by itself, or in conjunction with the intermediate one. “*Plebs* vero ea dicitur in qua gentes civium patriciæ non insunt.”—GELL. 10. 20.

Plebs pia, cumque pia lætatur *plebe* “senatus,”
 Parvaque cujus eram pars ego nuper, “eques.”—OVID. *Trist.* 4. 2. 15.

In the above two lines, all the orders of the Roman people are comprehended, and *Plebs* applies, exclusively, to the third and lowest. Though this term never extends to the highest, it does to the second, associated with the third. “In duas partes ego civitatem divisam arbitror, sicut a majoribus accepi, in “patres” et *plebem*.”—SALL. *Orat.* 2. *ad Cæs.* 5. “Huic actioni gratissimæ *plebi*, cum summa vi resisterent “patres.”—LIV. 2. 56.

PORTA—*vide* OSTIUM.

PORTIO—*vide* PARS.

PORTARE—*vide* FERRE.

POSCERE—*vide* ROGARE.

POSSE, VALERE, POLLERE, CALLERE,

agree, in denoting ability, but differ, in respect either to the degree in which it exists; to the standard by which it is estimated; or to the manner in which it is acquired. The first is a compound of “Potis” and “Sum,” and expresses that degree of power which is necessary for giving effect to the purpose in view. It may admit of degrees in the facility with which the cause operates, but it must suggest sufficient energy for the production of a certain effect. “Erit igitur hæc facultas in eo, ut definire rem *possit*.”—CIC. *Orat.* 207. b. It is asserted, that the person spoken of is not deficient in the power necessary for giving existence to the effect, and no insinuation is made, as to his being able to do more. “Hæc res tantum *potest* in dicendo, ut ad vincendum nulla plus *possit*.”—CIC. *de Or.* 124. b. The degrees of energy, existing in causes that lead to the same effects, are, here, insinuated, and one is said to have no superior, though each of the rest would accomplish the purpose.

As the efficiency of causes is never known till they are tried, so *Posse* is often made to express contingency, without regard to the efficacy of means. “*Fieri potest ut fallar.*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 13. 74. “*Dic mihi dormituro, potes non expergisci, dic experrecto, potes non dormire amplius.*”—SEN. *Ep.* 49.

VALERE differs from “*Posse*,” in suggesting, that the power possessed by the agent is more than sufficient for commanding the effect, and that he is capable of a greater effort. From that power in reserve, which is implied in *Valere*, there can be no chance of failure in the production of the effect, and, of course, it is never used, like “*Posse*,” to denote contingency. “*Fieri valet ut fallar*” would be an absurd expression. *Valere*, besides, denotes animal health, and the existence of force not exerted; in which view, it has no analogy with “*Posse*.” When this force, however, is called into action, it is understood to be highly efficacious. “*Fiet quodcunque volent qui valebunt; valebunt autem semper arma.*”—CIC. *de Fin.* 137. a.

Hæc amor et majora valet.—TIBULL. 3. 6. 17.

In all the applications of *Valere*, the distinguishing circumstance is, not the facility with which the effect is produced, but the superabundance of force unemployed. If the cause operates at all, its doing so may be expressed by “*Posse*,” as well as when it operates with ease; but the force must be more than adequate to the effect before *Valere* can be applied to it, and there is no limitation of that, which is superfluous. “*Quotiescunque filium tuum video, polliceor ei studium meum sine ulla exceptione: gratiam autem cum hac exceptione, quantum valeam, quantumque “possim.”*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 6. 5. This promise, made by Cicero to Cæcina, of zeal in the service of his son, is without all exception; while that of his influence is limited, in two ways, by verbs, which, in the orator’s conception, had different meanings. By means of the last verb, he promises more than by the first. The application of power, adequate and more to the fulfilment of his purpose, cost him but little, while that of power, just able to command the intended effect, required patient and vigorous exertion.

POLLERE differs from "Posse" and "Valere," in not referring to the power as adequate, or more than adequate, to the purpose intended, but to the superior degree in which it is possessed by the agent, when compared with others. "Tantoque magis ferito, quanto "magis potes, *pollesque*."—LIV. I. 24. Were there not a difference in the expressions "Magis potes" and *Polles*, there would be an unpardonable tautology in the sentence. By the first, while the priest supposes his own ability to kill the hog by his stroke, he confesses the superior ease with which the god might do so; and, by the last, that if the force both possessed were compared, that of the god would be found to be the greatest. "Filius *plus pollet* potiorque est patre."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 224. b. When the adverb "Plus" is joined with *Pollere*, there is both a specified and an implied comparison, referring to different persons. Though the father might have been said to excel in respect to some, yet the son is said to excel even him, and to take his pre-eminence from the number of those beneath him. The comparative superiority, expressed by *Pollere*, may be exhibited in different parts of the same subject. "Perorandi locum, ubi plurimum *pollet* oratio, semper tibi relinquebat."—CIC. *Brut.* 181. b. The "Locus perorandi" was but one part of a pleading, in which the eloquence of the speaker is said to have a higher effect than in any other, high as that might have been.

CALLERE differs from all the verbs mentioned, in implying, that the power exerted by the agent did not naturally belong to him, but had been acquired by practice. It comes from "Callus," as denoting any part of an animal's body which has grown hard by frequent use, as the sole of the foot by much walking, or the palm of the hand by hard labour.

Satin ea tenes? *So.* Magis *calleo* quam aprugnum *callum*.—PLAUT. *Pers.* 2. 5. 4.

In this reply, Sophoclidisca, by referring to brawn as a subject of the most highly diminished sensibility, or greatest callousness, in nature, gives the exact etymology of the verb. She, in that way, takes the merit of the most thorough experience in the business committed to her. "In illis rebus exercitatus animus *callere* jam debet."—CIC. *Ep.* 50. a.

Duramque *callet* pauperiem pati.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 9. 49.

By the use of *Callere*, the poet beautifully insinuates, that patience under poverty is a virtue to be acquired by those only who have been inured to distress, and that he, who possesses it, has been little indebted to the native strength of his mind, but has had the merit of subjecting it to a salutary discipline. He accordingly says elsewhere,

Angustam amici, pauperiem pati
Robustus acri militia puer
Condiscat.——————HOR. *Car.* 3. 2. 1.

POSSIDERE—*vide* HABERE.

POST

denotes the relation which one object bears to another, as being behind it. It stands opposed to “Ante,” and, like it, has no reference to the distance at which the one object is from the other. As one object may occupy an intermediate place between two, it may support the opposite relations of being “before” the one, and “behind” the other.

—— tu *post* carecta latebas.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 3. 20.

Damætas, conscious of his crime, skulked behind the sedges, that he might not be seen by Menalcas. “*Post* montem se occultavit, militesque ex nocturno labore sese reficere jussit.”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 7. 83. The commander practised a military stratagem, and took advantage of the ignorance of the enemy, with a view to refresh his soldiers.

It is not necessary for giving existence to the relation which *Post*, in its radical meaning, denotes, that the two objects should be stationary, like the mountain and the army, while it lay behind it. Both may move together, or the one may after the other.

Post equitem sedet atra cura.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 1. 40.

The same horse gives motion to the rider and to his ghastly attendant, who, in spite of the motion, maintains the relation of being behind.

Prætereo, atque aliis *post* me memoranda relinquo.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 148.

The poet passed certain points on which he might have dwelt, and left them to others, whose progress had not commenced, but who would certainly follow him.

Post, then, carries in it, not only the force of the English word “Behind,” but that of “After” also. In both senses it is opposed to “Before.”

What says Lord Warwick? shall we “after” them?

—“After” them! nay, “before” them, if we can.—SHAKESP. *Henry IV.*

Post is frequently applied to time, and signifies what is posterior in it. An order is thus established among events in duration, by supposing them to occur in sequence, as bodies pass in space. In this sense, *Post* stands opposed to “Præ” rather than to “Ante,” as it suggests a series, to all the parts of which motion is essential.

Post aliquot mea regna videns mirabor aristas!

Impius hæc tam culta novalia miles habebit?

Barbarus has segetes?—VIRG. *Ecc.* 1. 70.

The prior, which is the correlative event, took place when Melibœus foresaw the misfortunes that were to befall his country, in consequence of civil discord; and the future, or posterior one, was to take place when, after a few crops, he should see his property possessed by a rude conqueror. “Sexennio *post* Veios captos.”—CIC. *de Div.* 101. a. “Eo die pueri tui mihi a te literas reddiderunt: et alii pueri *post* diem tertium ejus diei, literas alias attulerunt.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 3. 7. By the words “Eo die,” which is the correlative period, is meant the day on which the letter was dated, which was the fourteenth of the Calends of May. Cicero tells Atticus, that, after an interval of three days, he received another letter from him, by the hands of other boys.

Post is often taken adverbially, and then is always expressive of time. “Ut initio mea sponte, *post* autem, invitatu tuo, mittendum duxerim.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 7. 5.

Quem nunc, et *post* semper, ob artem hanc Ardea laudat.

Vet. Poet. ap PLIN. 35. 10.

Quintilian tells us, that *Pone* was the old preposition, which, at one period, was used for *Post*. The former, however, never was applied to time, though applied to material objects, both quiescent and moving, and therefore translated "Behind" and "After." It stands opposed to "Ante," like *Post*, and is more frequently seen as an adverb, than a preposition. "Et *pone* quos aut "ante" labantur."—CIC. *de Un.* 201. b. "Moveri et "ante" et *pone*, et ad lævam, et ad dextram, et sursum et deorsum."—*Ibid.* 203. b.

As an adverb and a preposition, *Pone* is often found applied to objects both moving and at rest. "Vinctæ *pone* tergum manus."—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 85. "*Pone* castra utrique pabulatum et lignatum ibant."—LIV. 40. 30.

Pone sese locare.—PLAUT. *Pæn.* v. 35.

Pone subit conjux: ferimur per opaca locorum.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 725.

Post is found in composition, which *Pone* never is. In this state, however, it produces no effect that is not visible in its simple.

POSTULARE—*vide* ROGARE.

POTENTIA, POTESTAS, FACULTAS,

agree, in denoting power, but differ, according as this power is held to be general, or is measured by the particular effect, to which it is understood to be adequate. The first term, as an abstract from "Potens," signifies powerfulness, or the efficacy of any cause operating in the production of whatever the agent means to do. It implies a general command of means, which are infallibly effective in fulfilling every purpose which he forms. "*Potentia* est ad sua conservanda et alterius obtinenda idonearum rerum "facultas."—CIC. *de Inv.* 63. a. The power denoted by *Potentia*, which is properly the attribute of a sensitive being, is applied to things that are inanimate. Then, too, it denotes influence that is commanding, and not to be contravened.

Ne tenues pluvix, rapidive *potentia* solis.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 92.

Inque feris subiti deprehensa *potentia* morbi est.—OVID. *Met.* 7. 537.

POTESTAS, which is an abstract from "Potis," as "Potentia" is from "Potens," stands in the relation to the latter substantive of a species to a genus. It does not denote power in general, but such a degree of it as enables the

agent to produce a given effect. There is, then, a double limitation of the power; implied in *Potestas*, so as to render it precisely adequate to the end proposed in exercising it. If below what it should be, it fails in producing the effect; and it is not understood, as in "Potentia," that there should ever be any superfluous force, so as to create terror or admiration. Paulus, *De Verborum Significatione*, says, with great justice, "*Potestas* plura significat: in persona magistratum imperium: in persona liberorum patriam auctoritatem: in persona servorum dominium." In the above applications of *Potestas*, the degree of power is always relative; that is, proportioned to the intended effect. It will apply, accordingly, as in the first of the following examples, to efforts of the greatest might, as well as to matters of caprice and indifference, as in the two last. "Hanc urbem Deorum immortalium nutu atque *potestate* administrari."—CIC. *in Cat.* 3. 18. "An erit hæc optio et *potestas* tua?"—CIC. *in Vatin.* 37. a. "Num quis, cui quidem eligendi *potestas* esset, quenquam his anteponebat?"—CIC. *in Brut.* 181. b.

Though *Potestas* is applied to power of very different compass, yet the conception it suggests is uniformly accompanied with that of a limitation.

— an Fidenarum Gabiorumque esse *potestas*?

Et de mensura jus dicere? vasa minora

Frangere, pannosus vacuis ædilis Ulubris.—Juv. 10. 100.

In the two last lines of this example, there is a specification of the extent of the power of that petty magistrate, styled *Potestas*, joined to the circumstances of his ragged clothes, and the almost deserted place of his abode. The metonymy, too, by which the office is put for the office-bearer, has no effect whatever upon the intrinsic force of the word. In spite of the extensive power with which the tribunes were invested, and the high respectability involved in the term "Sacrosanctus," which was applied to them, their office, styled "Tribunicia *potestas*," had its limits. The term *Potestas* marks this limitation, in consequence of which the madness of democracy was prevented, and the arts of its pretended friends were rendered abortive.

FACULTAS differs from the two former words, in referring rather to the ease with which an effect is produced, than to the power exercised by the

agent. It comes from "Facilis," but implies a higher quality than "Facilitas," as it denotes superior skill in respect to the nature and just application of means. The quality implied in "Facilitas" is the attribute of the work; that in *Facultas* is the attribute of the mind of the agent giving existence to it. "Quia scilicet nimia assiduitate "facilitas" quam *facultas*; nec fiducia sed temeritas, paratur."—PLIN. *Ep.* 6. 29. By the former, is meant the ease and rapidity with which a work that is purely mechanical is performed; by the latter, a reference is made to skill, and the energies of mind. "Aut "potestas" aliis defuisse demonstranda est, aut *facultas*. "Potestas," si aut nescisse, aut non affuisse, aut conficere aliquid non potuisse, dicitur. *Facultas*, si ratio, adjutores, adjumenta et cætera, quæ ad rem pertinebunt, defuisse alicui demonstrabuntur."—CIC. *de Inv.* 64. b. "Potestas," here, refers to a physical impossibility to perform a certain act, arising from the agent's ignorance, absence, or inability. *Facultas*, again, suggests, that he may possess the means, without the skill to apply them, or the command of those auxiliary circumstances that render the application easy.

PRÆ

denotes the relation which one or more persons moving bear to others following them in the same path. It differs from "Pro" in two respects; both as it necessarily implies motion in the objects, expressed by the governed and the correlative terms, and as, in its original power, it necessarily supposes both to be animated. It comes from "Pro," though it differs from its root in the circumstances mentioned. It shews its connection with "Pro," in denoting that nearness in objects moving in succession, which is essential to the relation of a person said to be "before" an object, when both are quiescent.

There is no limitation of the number of persons that may be in the relation of "Pro" and *Præ*; that is, one, or many, may be "before," as expressed by both. In the case of the former, however, though the correlative objects may be numerous, yet the containing, which is the governed, can be but one; while, in that of the latter, both may be either one or many, if they follow in train.

— Sos. Eamus jam nunc intro. Sim. I *præ*, sequar.—TER. *And.* 1. 1. 144.

Though *Præ* is, here, used as an adverb, and not as a preposition, yet the spirit of the term is the same in either way. Sosia was to make the first in a procession, in which his master was immediately to follow. The motion of the two may not have been simultaneous; but that of the master came in such quick succession after that of the freedman, that, in language, it is regarded as such.

The objects denoted by the correlative term, though animated, may not be human beings, and may be compelled to move by the person denoted by the governed. “Prope Tyberim fluvium, qua *præ* se armentum agens nando trajecerat.”—LIV. 1. 7. In the same way, too, inanimate objects may be personified, and, as such, connected with *Præ*.

Continuo a nobis in id hæc, quæ fertur, imago
Pervenit, et nostros oculos rejecta revisit,
Atque alium *præ* se propellens aera volvit.—LUCRET. 4. 285.

The person, expressed by the governed term, may give motion to the object, whether animate or inanimate, expressed by the correlative, by carrying it before him. “Ille qui stillantem *præ* se pugionem tulit, is a te honoris causa nominatur?”—CIC. *in Ant.* 166. a.

Infantem fugiens — sustulit exilio comitem —
Ipse sinu *præ* se portans juga longa petebat
Solorum nemorum.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 541.

Præ is used to express pre-eminence, or superiority. This notion is founded upon an idea that the person, moving first in a procession, occupies the most dignified place. It is, accordingly, taken to denote the circumstance of superiority in persons that are quiescent, and in matters where motion cannot take place. “Qui et diutissime senex fuisset, et in ipsa senectute *præ* cæteris florisset.”—CIC. *de Sen.* 1.

The preposition is found also to denote in “In comparison of;” and, in this use, persons are compared, and judged of, when passing, as it were, in train before the observer. It is never understood that the governed and the corre-

lative objects are upon a level ; but the superiority lies always with the former. The spectator judges of their nature as they pass before him, when their difference can be best discerned. “ Gallis *præ* magnitudine corporum suorum, brevis nostræ contemptui est.”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 2. 30. “ Romanæ *præ* sua Capua, irridebunt atque contemnent.”—CIC. *contra Rull.* 85. b. “ Non tu quidem vacuus molestiis, sed *præ* nobis beatus.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 4. 4. Cicero, here, tells Sulpitius, that, though he, considered absolutely, and in himself, might be held not free from distresses, yet, when made to pass before an observer along with him and his party, those of Sulpitius would disappear, and he would be deemed absolutely happy. It appears, then, that the apprehended pre-eminence lies always in the circumstance, expressed by the term governed by the preposition ; as in the stature of the Gauls, the attachment to Capua, and the distresses of Cicero.

The person, expressed by the governed term, sometimes judges of the person, expressed by the correlative, and both are held forth as forming a train, and exposed to the observation of a third party. A fiction, then, takes place in the mind of the speaker, who supposes, that he himself follows another, and that both come under his own review.

Hic ego illum contempsi *præ* me.—TER. *Eun.* 2. 2. 8.

The imagination of Gnatho, here, suggests, that he is acting in a double capacity. Both he and the squanderer are understood to pass before himself, and, after the comparison made in this fictitious situation, he gives sentence in his own favour.

Præ is sometimes found equal to “ Propter,” and to signify “ On account of.” The cause and the effect are, in this use, understood to go in train, and the precedency of the former should naturally give existence to the latter. By a metonymy, however, the one is substituted for the other, and the object, expressed by the governed word, which is in reality the cause, is made subsequent to that, which in nature it precedes. “ Non, medijs fidijs, *præ* lacrymis possum reliqua nec cogitare, nec scribere.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 148. a. “ Cum

Perses dixisset glorians, solem *præ* jaculorum multitudine non videbitis. In umbra, inquit, igitur pugnabimus.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 170. b. In the first of these examples, the tears are stated as the cause why Cicero was unable to think and to write, and he, who might otherwise have done both, is said to be “*Præ* lacrymis;” that is, the first in the train. The metonymy, then, in this case, destroys the necessary antecedency of the cause, and substitutes the effect in its place.

In commenting upon this passage, and illustrating the principle upon which the preposition so used operates, the critical acuteness of Gesner seems to have forsaken him. The tears, he says, prevented Cicero from seeing, by being before his eyes, and thus making it impossible for him to write. To a philosophic grammarian of less ability it should have occurred, that the tears, by being the governed, necessarily form the posterior, object in the train, and that nothing in the smallest degree satisfactory can be inferred from their local situation, in respect to the eye, that emits them. It does not appear, either, as asserted, that the negative particle “Non” must always accompany the verb, when the preposition is taken in the sense now explained. Many proofs appear to the contrary, as in the following passage :

Credo, ut fit, misera *præ* amore exclusti hunc foras.—TER. *Eun.* 1. 2. 18.

Præ is sometimes to be translated “In,” when governing the word “Manus.”

— huic aliquid paululum *præ* manu
Dederis unde utatur : reddet tibi cito.—TER. *Adelpb.* 5. 9. 23.

“Si Cæsaris liber *præ* manibus est, promi jubeas.”—AUL. GELL. 19. 8. The hand, and the object to be laid hold of, are understood to be near each other in the train; and that which the correlative, which is always a person, can easily lay hold of, he is said, in English, to have in his hand. We, too, use “Before” as the Latins did *Præ*, and, by the money and the provision laid in “beforehand,” we mean that which is ready for use, and can be laid hold of upon any emergency.

It appears, then, that *PRÆ* may be translated,

I.

BEFORE ; that is, being the first of a set of objects moving in train.

II.

HAVING PRE-EMINENCE OF ANY KIND ; founded on an idea that the rank in the procession shews the merit of those who are first in it.

III.

IN COMPARISON OF ; supposing that the spectator judges of the objects while passing in review before him, so as that he may discern their difference.

IV.

ON ACCOUNT OF. In this use the cause and the effect are understood to follow, as objects do in a train.

V.

IN ; under an idea that what is before, and within reach of the hand, is actually in it.

Præ, in composition with verbs, often retains its radical power, as in "Præesse," to be the first, or to have the direction and leading of others. So, also, in the verb "Prævidere," which supposes a sagacity in the person to whom it is applied, enabling him to see future events, like objects moving before him in a train.

Applied to adjectives and adverbs, *Præ* has generally an intensive power, but never a privative. In "Prædives," "Præclarus," "Præaltus," the quality involved in the simple is heightened in the compounded word, and, in this way, the second power of general superiority, ascribed to *Præ*, operates. In the adjective "Præmaturus," however, the intensive power fails, as it does not denote very ripe, but ripe before the due time. It suggests an article of defect in vegetable substances, and supposes that the rapidity of their decay will correspond with that of their progress to perfection. Priority in space, which is the foundation of the literal meaning, is thus, figuratively, made to express priority in time, as creating this precocity, or hurried maturity.

PRÆTER

differs from "Præ," in supposing, that the object, expressed by the governed word, may or may not move; and that the correlative moves in a line, across its path, if moving, and the line of its aspect, if at rest.

Auspicio hodie optimo exivi foras,
Mustela murem abstulit *præter* pedes.—PLAUT. *Stich.* 3. 2. 6.

In this example, we are not to suppose, that the weasel and the mouse were at rest, but that both ran across the path in which Gelasimus was moving. "Erit ergo pergratum mihi, hanc effigiem ejus subinde intueri, subinde respicere, sub hac consistere, *præter* hanc commeare."—PLIN. *L.* 4. *Ep.* 7. The admirer of this representation was to cross the line of its aspect, that he might view it, in all lights, and to the greatest advantage.

"Præ" requires that both objects move, and move in the same direction. *Præter* requires motion only in one, though it may exist in both, and supposes the motion in the correlative to be transverse, in respect to the line of motion in the one case, and to the line of aspect in the other.

The specification, made by "Præ," is more definite than that by *Præter*, in the same way as we found that by "In" more so than by "Inter." "Præ" requires the correlative, and the governed object, to move in the same line, while *Præter* admits the correlative to move, or be quiescent, and only requires that it shall bear upon the path of the other, if moving, and on the line of its aspect, if at rest. This path may, besides, be cut in an infinite variety of directions, by the object that crosses it. While the motion of the correlative, then, in the case of "Præ," is confined to one path, from which it cannot deviate, the lines of its motion, in the case of *Præter*, are innumerable, and subject to no limitation, but that of crossing the lines of motion, or of aspect, in the other, so as to form any possible angle with them.

— tela volant hiberna grandine plura
Præter utrumque latus, *præterque* et lumen et aures.—OVID. *Met.* 5. 158.

As the distance between the two objects, connected by *Præter*, is never great, though incapable of being precisely defined, so the preposition, resting upon this circumstance, sometimes denotes "Near," or "Before." In this respect,

it resembles the fifth power of "Præ," its root, wherein it supposes the distance between two objects in train to be so small, that the person following can lay hold of that which is before him. "*Præter ripam euntibus Romanis Galli occurrere.*"—LIV. 38. 18. "*Servi ejus præter oculos Lollii hæc omnia ferebant.*"—CIC. *in Ver.* 191. a. "*Quo repente demisso præter ora suorum.*"—TAC. *Hist.* 4. 30.

Præter is frequently taken to denote "Contrary to," or "Against." It must be observed, that the coincidence which takes place in the lines of motion, between the two objects related by "Præ," is, in the case of *Præter*, broken, and that it may be broken in a greater or a less degree. The direction is completely transverse, when the correlative object crosses the line of motion, or of aspect, in the governed, at right angles. When the angle, formed by the object going athwart the line, in which the governed directs its motion, or its aspect, in one way, is as acute as possible, the lines of either become nearly opposite, and, in this view, *Præter* is made to denote "Against." When the motion is thus performed, there exists the nearest possible approach towards that relation between two objects, which is expressed by "Ob," or "Contra." "*Ut etiamsi præter consuetudinem acciderit aliquid, præter naturam tuam non possit existere.*"—CIC. *de Div.* 120. b.

——— *præter civium*

Morem atque legem.———TER. *And.* 5. 3. 8.

Præter is often to be translated "Except," or "Beside." In this use it is understood, that the general line of motion, maintained by the correlative, crosses that of one or a few of the governed objects, which last are thereby rendered singular, and are excepted from the general group. "*Omnibus sentiis, præter unam, quam suam Stalenus esse dicebat, Scamander condemnatus est.*"—CIC. *pro Cluent.* 28. b. The direct line, in which the single vote of Stalenus moved, was crossed by those of all the other counsellors, and the former, accordingly, is excepted from the rest, as tending a different way. "*Amicum tibi ex consularibus neminem esse video præter Lucullum.*"—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 5. b. Not one of those men, of consular dignity, crossed the line, in which Lucullus shewed his attachment to Lentulus. The sentiment

of Lucullus, accordingly, which was known to be amicable, is excepted from those of the rest, which, from having taken a direction different, and perhaps opposite, are understood to have been hostile.

This notion of exception may explain another power of *Præter*, when it is used to denote "Above," "More than."

— ille hinc abest quem ego amo *præter* omnes.—PLAUT. *Amph.* 2. 2. 10.

The object of the love is here excepted from all others, as enjoying a greater share of it. The attachment to this favourite, and to all mankind besides, flows in a different channel. If we transpose the preposition, thus, "*Præter* quem ego amo omnes," the excepting power predominates, and the meaning instantly changes. The person, implied in the relative, who before enjoyed almost all the love, becomes the only person who enjoys none of it. From the extent of the excepted part, it seems, the mind draws different conclusions. When this part consists of but one, or a few of those individuals that make up the aggregate, the preposition denotes "Beside," "Except;" and when it consists of a number, that amounts nearly to the whole, it denotes "Above," "More than." However opposite in appearance the two significations may be, yet the principle, by which the mind arrives at each, is evidently the same.

PRÆTER, then, discovers the following significations :

I.

ACROSS, ATHWART; supposing the correlative object to move transversely, in respect to the line of motion or of aspect in the governed, and not directly before it, as in the case of "Præ."

II.

BEFORE, NEAR; supposing the point, at which the line of motion or aspect is cut, not to be far from the governed object.

III.

CONTRARY TO, OR AGAINST. The coincidence, in the lines of motion, in two objects related by "Præ," is broken, in the case of *Præter*, which comes from it, and the angles formed by those which regard the latter, when they cross, may vary, till the motions become nearly opposite.

IV.

EXCEPT, BESIDE. The line in which the correlative objects move, crosses that of one or a few of the governed, which last thus form exceptions from a majority of the whole.

V.

ABOVE, MORE THAN. From the greatness of the excepted part, in respect to the remainder, the idea of exception is lost, and that of the discovered superiority only remains.

Præter appears in composition, without producing the smallest effect upon the term with which it is associated, which it does not produce in a simple state.

PRÆ SE FERRE—*vide* FATERI.

PRÆDA, SPOLIUM, EXUVIÆ, MANUBIÆ,

agree, in suggesting plunder, but differ, in respect either to the manner in which it is acquired, or to the use that is afterwards made of it. PRÆDA is, by Varro, derived à “Pariendo,” as referring to what the possessor has earned. It seems to come from the same root with “Prædem,” the accusative of “Præs,” and “Prædium,” as they all suggest the idea of property ascertained.

Præda, as a generic term, refers to whatever is unjustly taken from the former possessor, whether the possessor makes resistance or not. It relates to the “*ipsum corpus*” of the booty, whatever it is, and supposes the proprietor deprived of his possession, either by the superior force or cunning of his enemy. “*Præda est corpora rerum quæ capta sunt.*”—GEL. 13. 24.

Ad multas lupa tendit oves, “prædetur” ut unam.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 3. 419.
Cervi luporum *præda* rapacium.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 4. 50.

Here, the animal that preys can employ both force and stratagem. “Non me bonorum direptio, non capta crudelissime ex fortunis meis *præda* permovet.”—CIC. *pro Dom.* 243. a. Here, Cicero talks of violence, which he was unable to resist, however much disposed to do so.

Convectare juvat *prædas*, et vivere rapto.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 613.

SPOLIUM differs from "Præda," in referring only to that booty, which is got by violence. "Quodcunque hostibus detrahitur."—SERV. ÆN. 8. 201. The term implies an hostile attack, and refers to all that is got by being successful in it. "Si *spoliorum* causa vis hominem occidere."—CIC. *pro Sex. R.* 42. b. "Aliorum *spoliis* suas opes augere."—CIC. *Off.* 46. b.

Victores "præda" Rutuli *spoliisque* potiti.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 450.

In the last of those examples, the term "Præda" is to be applied to that part of the plunder that was most easily purchased, and fell to the conquerors, as the fruit of their victory. The term *Spoliis*, again, refers to that for which they had struggled, and overcome the resistance made by the former possessors.

In the same way, the precise meaning of the following passage from Cicero may be explained. "Quis pirata fuit tam barbarus, ut cum integram "prædam" sine sanguine habere posset, cruenta *spolia* detrahere mallet."—CIC. *pro Rosc. Amer.* c. 50. The verb "Habere" refers to the possession of the plunder, without regard to the means by which it was acquired, while the verb "Detrahere" refers emphatically to the violence of those means.

EXUVIÆ differs from "Spolium," in referring to that booty only, which the conqueror takes from the body of the person he has subdued. It holds, then, of "Spolium," as its generic term. "*Exuvia*," says Festus, "dicuntur "spolia hostibus detracta," ab exuendo quidem dictæ." The critic, here, makes "Spolium" the instrument of defining *Exuvia*, the last of which must, in his judgment, have been a more particular term.

Bellorum *exuvia*, truncis adfixa trophæis,
Lorica et fracta de casside buccula pendens.—JUV. 10. 133.

"Quum hunc locum vobis majores vestri *exuviis* nauticis et classium "spoliis" ornatum reliquissent."—CIC. *pro Leg. Man.* 14. b. By *Exuviis*, here, will be meant the spoils taken, by each mariner, from his vanquished foe, and, by "Spoliis," all those that naturally followed the destruction of an enemy's fleet.

Both terms agree in occasionally denoting the skins of animals, whether they are thrown off naturally, or taken off them when dead.

—— item cum lubrica serpens
 Exiit in spinis vestem : nam sæpe videmus
 Illorum “spoliis” vepreis volitantibus auctas.——LUCRET. 4. 60.
 —— anguis
 Cum positis novus *exuvias*, nitidusque juvena
 Vólvitur.——VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 337.
 —— horrentisque leonis
Exuvias.——VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 307.

MANUBIÆ, from “Manus,” differs from the other words in denoting the price of the booty when sold. The subjects constituting plunder cannot often be laid hold of, and turned to a particular account. But *Manubiæ* supposes their value ascertained and possessed, or, as it were, in the hand of the conqueror. Thus, Gellius, 13. 24. says, “Hæc facta comparataque esse ex *manubiis*, id est, ex pecunia prædatrix. *Manubiæ* enim sunt non “præda,” sed pecunia per quæstorem populi Romani vendita contracta.” The *Manubiæ*, besides, seem to agree with the “Opima spolia,” in referring to the share of the booty that fell to the general, or commanding officer. As this person, during an engagement, was more employed in directing the courage of others than exerting his own, his share must have been made up in value, and not by the “Ipsum corpus” of what those under him acquired. “Quibus ex hostium “spoliis?” qua ex “Præda” aut *manubiis* hæc abs te donatio constituta est?”—CIC. *in Ver.* 190. a. Cicero puts it strongly to Verres how he had come by the subject of that gift he presented to the Sicilians. Had he exerted himself in battle, and seized the “Spolia?” had he shared in the dangers of war, and the fruits of any victory? or, had he got an allotment, in value, as commander of any army that had been successful?

PRÆDO, LATRO, PIRATA,

agree, in denoting a robber, but differ, as he commits his crimes upon land or upon sea, or upon both. They all differ from “Fur,” which denotes, that the property of another is abstracted without violence, and by means that are clandestine. The first is generic, and refers to every species of robbery, wherever it is committed. “Si cui naviganti quem *prædones* insequantur, Deus dixerit, ejice te de navi.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 189. b. “Omnium templorum atque tec-

torum totiusque urbis *prædo*.”—CIC. *pro Dom.* 241. b. In the first of the above examples, *Prædo* denotes what we call a pirate; and, in the last, a robber by land. “*Maritimos prædones consecrando mare tutum reddidit.*”—NEP. *in Themist.* 2. The adjective “*Maritimus*” could not be applied to “*Latro*,” and would be expletive if applied to “*Pirata*,” as it refers to the sea of itself.

LATRO differs from “*Prædo*,” in being confined to robberies by land. These “*viarum obsessores*,” are said, by Festus, to have their name à “*Latendo*,” quod latenter insidientur.” *Latro* seems to correspond, according to this etymology, with the English word “*Highwayman*.” “*Non semper viator a latrone, nonnunquam etiam latro a viatore occiditur.*”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 21. “*Erat ei vivendum latronum ritu, ut tantum haberet, quantum rapere potuisset.*”—CIC. *in Ant.* 172. a.

Cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator.—JUV. 10. 22.

Latro rogat, res est imperiosa timor.—MART. 11. 58.

PIRATA differs from both terms, in referring to such robberies, only, as are committed at sea. It is, by some, derived from Πειρᾶν, “*Tentare*,” and, by others, from Πειρᾶν, “*Trajicere*.” It is clearly a specific term, in respect to “*Prædo*,” and stands opposed to “*Latro*.” “*Piratæ orbem classibus jam, non furtivis expeditionibus terrebant.*”—VELL. PAT. 2. 31.

Itque Cilix conjux, non jam *pirata*, carina.—LUCAN. 3. 225.

Cicero has, in the following sentence, applied both the generic and the specific name to pirates, without the possibility of its being supposed that he meant different persons. “*Si “prædonibus” pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris, nulla fraus est, ne si juratus quidem id non feceris: nam *pirata* non est ex perduellium numero definitus: sed communis hostis omnium.*”—CIC. *de Off.* 73. b. “*Quis unquam “prædo” fuit tam nefarius, quis *pirata* tam barbarus, ut cum integram prædam sine sanguine habere posset, cruenta spolia detrahere mallet.*”—CIC. *pro Sex. Rosc. Am.* 43. a. The term “*Prædo*” is, here, specified by the generic adjective, and *Pirata*, by one that corresponds with it. “*Nefarius*” denotes general villany, characteristic of the robber,

both by sea and land; and "Barbarus," that wanton cruelty which the pirate would be ashamed to exercise, on the high seas, upon those, there at his mercy, and incapable of retaliating afterwards any injury they might suffer.

PRIDEM—*vide* DIU.

PRINCIPATUS—*vide* REGNUM.

PRISCUS, PRISTINUS,

agree, in denoting something that existed in former times, but differ, as those times are more or less remote. The first supposes the remoteness to be beyond the memory of man, and the event to have existed in some of the ages of antiquity, no one of which is particularized by it. "Joves quidem plures in *priscis* Græcorum literis invenimus."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 67. b. "Itaque unum illud erat insitum *priscis* illis quos Cascos appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum, neque excessu vitæ sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 153. b.

Prisca juvenit alios: ego me nunc denique natum

Gratulor.———OVID. *de Art. Am.* 121.

Me chaos antiqui, nam res sum *prisca*, vocabant,

Adspice quam longi temporis acta canam.—OVID. *Fast.* 1. 103.

In all the above examples, there are references to very remote periods of antiquity. No one can be more so than that in the last, which existed before the elements, composing the universe, were arranged, and brought into order.

There are instances among the poets, however, in which *Priscus* denotes an event necessarily remembered, as happening within the period of an individual's life.

Quid si *prisca* redit Venus?———HOR. *Car.* 3. 9. 17.

———*priscum* pariter cum corpore nomen

Mutat.———OVID. *Met. in fin.*

In such cases, *Priscus* probably suggests a very remote period, and an interval that bears a great proportion to the whole life of the person mentioned.

PRISTINUS differs from "Priscus," in referring to a period much less remote, and within the memory of those who use it, or of those to whom it is applied. "Si illi labor meus *pristinus*, si sollicitudo, si officia, si operæ, si

vigiliæ deserviunt amicis, præsto sunt omnibus.”—CIC. *pro Syll.* 172. a. Both Cicero and his countrymen remembered well that toil which he underwent, and was offering again to undergo in their behalf. “Reminiscens *pristini* temporis.”—NEP. *in Alcib.* 6. “Animum *pristinum* erga aliquem conservare.”—LIV. 31. 2. The same person, remembered in the first example, and the same disposition, was to be preserved by the same person in the second, and, of course, the interval between the return of the appearance in each could not place the things, denominated by *Pristinus*, within the limits of very remote antiquity.

Jamque secuta manum, nullo cogente, sagitta

Excidit, atque novæ rediere in *pristina* vires.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 423.

The skill of Iapis, when seconded by the assistance of Venus, could not be tedious in its operation. It may be understood, too, that the restored strength of Æneas, after his cure, would be just equal to what he had lost by his wound.

Pristinus does not necessarily suggest one of the remotest events of one kind that happened during the life of an individual, but may denote the latest, in contradistinction to all former ones. “Consulatus, super *pristinum*, quatuor gessit.”—SÜETON. *in Claud.* 14.

PRIVARE, ORBARE, SPOLIARE, EXPILARE, DEPECULARI,

agree, in denoting the act of depriving, but differ, as they refer to the distress which the agent occasions; to the supposed right upon which he acts; or to the concealed injury done, either to individuals or societies.

The verb PRIVARE is, of all, the most general, and applicable to every act of depriving whatever. It implies simply the destruction of the state in which a certain object previously existed, by the removal of some of its qualities. *Privare*, then, is, in respect to things, what “Negare” is to propositions. “Sunt enim alia contraria, quæ *privantia* licet appellemus Latine, Græci appellant *στερητικα*. Prepositio enim “in” *privat* verbum ea vi quam haberet, si “in” præpositum non fuisset.”—CIC. *Top.* 224. b. “Omnis autem *privatione* doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 56. b.

“Dolori non voluptas contraria est, sed doloris *privatio*.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 70. b.

ORBARE differs from “Privare,” in referring to the grief occasioned to a sensitive being, by his being deprived of that which is dear to him. “Moveor enim tali amico *orbatus*, qualis, ut arbitror, nemo unquam erit : et ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit.”—CIC. *de Am.* 10. “Nec iis quidem verbis, quibus te consoler ut afflictum, et jam omni spe salutis *orbatum*.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 6. 6. “Nec patriam debes multis claris viris *orbata*m, “privare” etiam aspectu tuo.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 4. 9. The want of the sight of Marcellus, which was only the cancelment of a pleasure before enjoyed, is expressed by “Privare;” but the loss of so many illustrious characters as those mentioned, was more than a simple privation, and the subject of sincere regret.

SPOLIARE differs from the two former verbs, in referring to the violence and injuriousness of the means employed for depriving a possessor of what he enjoys. When the verb is applied to temples and to houses, it is understood, that the Gods, who are inhabitants of the former, and mankind of the latter, are injured, whatever may be the opinion of the conqueror while flushed with success. The means may be both violent and injurious at the same time, or they may be either ; but both or one of the two they must be.

Pars spoliat aras, frondem, ac virgulta, facesque

Conjunct : furit immissis Vulcanus habenis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 661.

Here, the means are both violent and injurious. “Dictator *spoliari* hominem, ac virgas et secures expediri jussit.”—LIV. 2. 55. Here, the means were violent ; but, proceeding from the dictator, they were not injurious, as leading to the infliction of a punishment that was deserved, and authorized by law. “Parcat juvenus pudicitiaæ suæ, ne *spoliet* alienam.”—CIC. *pro Cæ.* 46. b. Here, the means must be always injurious, but not always violent. “Eam philosophiam sequere, quæ confundit vera cum falsis, *spoliat* nos iudicio, “privat” approbatione, omnibus “orbat” sensibus?”—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 16. a. The first verb refers to the irresistible and injurious influence of philosophy, in wresting from men the power of judging ; the second, to its only withdrawing from them that approbation which they would otherwise enjoy ; and the

third, to the distress they must be exposed to, from being deprived of those senses which are the avenues of their pleasures.

EXPILARE differs from "Spoliare," in supposing, that the person, who deprives, has a constant sense of his acting injuriously, and without any right, such as even that of a conqueror. It supposes, also, that this person often does not employ violent, but clandestine, means for effecting his purpose. "Pecuniam Locris ex Proserpinæ thesauris nocte clam sublatam : senatui placere quæstionem de *expilatis* thesauris eodem exemplo haberi, quo M. Pomponius prætor triennio ante habuisset."—LIV. 31. 12. The act, here mentioned, was a theft, and the person, who committed it, did so in the nighttime, feeling that it was injurious, and wishing to escape the punishment due to it. "Tabernulas etiam effringere et *expilare*, quintana domi constituta."—SUET. in *Ner.* 26. Here, open violence was used, and a robbery committed, in place of a theft. "*Expilatores* atrociores fures sunt, quos Græci *λωποδυται* vocant."—ULP. *Dig.* 47. 18. "Quemadmodum regem ex provincia "spoliatum" *expilatamque* dimitteret."—CIC. in *Ver.* 214. a. Antiochus is, here, said to have been "Spoliatus" by Verres, in consequence of his power as the governor of Sicily, where the king was; and *Expilatus*, in consequence of the low stratagem adopted to deceive him, which was nothing better than a theft. "Si socios "spolias," ærarium *expilas*."—CIC. *Parad.* 6. 1. The allies might be spoiled under a false idea of a person having a right to do so; but the plundering the treasury was an atrocious robbery, which nothing could palliate, and the verb *Expilare* alone could express.

DEPECULARI agrees with "Expilare," in denoting an act of theft, but differs from it, in being generally applied to the stolen property of a state, or of a prince. It also denotes sacrilege, when the temples of the Gods were stripped of what they contained. "Verres in provincia omnia fana *depeculatus est*."—CIC. in *Ver.* 68. a. "Delubra omnia sanctissimis religionibus consecrata, *depeculatus est*."—*Ibid.* 69. a.

Depeculari is, however, sometimes applied to property stolen from individuals, especially if that of societies goes along with it. "Apollonium omni argento "spoliasti," et *depeculatus es*."—CIC. in *Ver.* 208. a. "Civitates,

regna, domos omnium *depeculatus es.*—*Auct. ad Her.* 32. b. This verb is clearly derived from “De” and “Pecus,” and refers to the original possessions of mankind, which consisted in cattle. It implies a complete pillaging, by driving off the herds, supposed the only articles of wealth before money was in use.

PRO

denotes the relation which a person bears to an object capable of containing him, as being before it. “Numidæ non castelli mænibus se tutabantur, sed *pro muro dies noctesque agitare.*”—*SALL. Jug.* 94. “*Sedens pro æde Castoris, dixit.*”—*CIC. in Ant.* 189. a. Apuleius, then, seems guilty of a barbarous expression when he says, “*Tabulas pro pedibus abjicere.*”—*In Apol. ad finem.* The person, here spoken of, could not be within the feet, as Antony might have been within the temple, before which he was sitting, or the Numidians within the walls of their fort.

It is not essential to the pure use of *Pro*, that the correlative object should be always a person. An inanimate object, the place of which is supposed to have been occupied from intention upon the part of an agent, may stand for the living being, in the relation of *Pro* to the object governed. “*Hasta posita pro æde Jovis Statoris, bona Cnei Pompei Magni voci acerbissimæ subiecta præconis.*”—*CIC. in Ant.* 172. b.

Pro and “*Ante*” agree in some circumstances, and differ in others. The latter refers to any two objects that stand in mutual opposition. It is more general than *Pro*, as applying equally to persons and to things. Thus, pure writers say, “*Ante templum,*” “*Ante judicem,*” but not “*Pro judice.*” *Pro*, then, governs an object that is not considered as opposed to any other, but that serves to define the situation of a person, as being before, and not behind, or beside, it. In the case of “*Ante,*” the object governed, and the correlative, define the situation of each other mutually; in that of *Pro*, the governed object defines the correlative, but the latter has no reciprocal influence. In the instance given, “*Pro æde Castoris sedens,*” the situation of the person sitting is directly fixed by his relation to the gate of the temple; but that of

the temple itself is fixed only by implication, from its relation to the person sitting.

Pro seems to carry in it a combination of the powers of "Ex," "Ad," and "Ante," modified in a certain degree. By it, as by "Ex," a person is described from his connection with an object, within which he might have been, and out of which he might have come. The quiescence of the person is denoted by a power similar to that in "Ad," which expresses the termination of motion in an object arriving at a certain place. The situation of the person is defined, as by "Ante," as being before an object of a particular description, though that object is not considered as being before him.

However inconsistent it may seem to be with the original meaning of *Pro*, yet it is sometimes translated "In." When this is the case, the English suppose an occupied point to be "in" a space, which the Latins regard as apart from, and "before" it. "*Pro tribunali cognoscit iudex.*"—ULPIAN. *L. 2. D. de re Judic.* "*Hac re pro suggestu pronunciata.*"—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 6. 3. In the above examples, the foremost part of the bench, denoted by "Tribunal" and "Suggestus," is made to define the place occupied by the judge within it. He is before a central point which may be ascertained, his anteriority to which, the natural power of *Pro* is fitted to express. "*Recitata pro concione epistolæ addidere fiduciam.*"—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 9. The Latins suppose the person, here said to read the letters, to be occupying a point "before" the space filled by the whole assembly; and the English suppose him to be one of a number occupying the same space, and, of course, being "in" it.

Pro, in the following example, appears to signify "In," or "During," and to have a reference to time. "*Ne suas quidem simultates pro magistratu exercere, boni exempli esse.*"—LIV. 39. 5.

That power of *Pro* in which it is taken as equal to "Coram," and made to signify "In the presence of," is nearly allied to the one now explained. As signifying "In," we have found it equally applicable to objects animate and inanimate; but, in the use now considered, it is applicable to living beings alone. In both, the distance between the object, expressed by the word

governed, and the correlative, must be small; but, when it signifies "In presence of," this distance is regulated by the same conditions which hold in the pure application of "Coram," to which it is equivalent. "Laudatum magnifice *pro* concione Jugurtham in prætorium abduxit."--SALL. *in Jug.* 8. Jugurtha is, here, supposed to have been in such a situation, that he himself might be distinctly seen, and his praises heard by all the assembly.

Pro is very often found to denote, that one object acts in place of another, and is then translated "For," or "Instead of." In this use, the idea of a substitution is suggested by a person, or thing, in the predicament of an accessory coming forward, and taking the place of a principal. What was originally the posterior, thus becomes the anterior, object, and does the duty of what was formerly before it.

— ego *pro* te molam.—TER. *And.* 1. 2. 29.

Simo, here, tells Davus, that he, though a slave, should, upon a certain condition, keep within a certain place, and that he, his master, should come forth and do his duty, by grinding in his stead. The absolute rank of the substitute is, in such cases, not to be regarded, and, in the operation of driving the mill, Davus must be considered as the principal person. "Tibi Marcelli statua *pro* patibulo fuit."—CIC. *in Ver.* 221. a. The statue is supposed to have been brought before the gibbet, and to have been used instead of it, as coming first to hand. Either person, or either object, in the above instances, might have done the duty of the other; but there is a transfer of it from the person, or the object, to which it properly belongs, to another, that acts occasionally, and is made to supply its place. Thus, the duty of grinding, though properly belonging to Davus, was to be undertaken by Simo; and the purpose of a gibbet was served by the statue of Marcellus, while Verres was wresting from an illustrious family the patronage of Sicily.

Upon this use of *Pro* is founded another analogous to it, in which it is held equal to "Tanquam," and translated "As if." In that explained, *Pro* implies a substitution of one thing in place of another; while the agent is completely aware of the diversity of their nature. In this, however, he may,

or may not, know the thing to be what it is ; but he encourages the delusion when he is conscious of it, and he is, of course, duped when he is not, by mistaking the nature of the object which engages him.

— hunc majorem adoptavi mihi:
 Eduxi a parvulo, habui, amavi *pro* meo :
 In eo me oblecto : solum id est carum nobis.—TER. *Adelph.* 1. 1. 22.

Mitio knew well that his adopted nephew was not his legitimate son, yet he treated him as if he had been so, and cherished the affection of a real father. Having no son of his own, there could be no substitution, properly so called; but he encouraged the delusion, which led him to believe his nephew to be what he was not. “*Volsci nocte pro victis Antium agmine trepido abierunt.*” —LIV. 8. 1. The Volsci, here, supposed themselves worsted, when they really were not. They were thus duped by their own misapprehension, and they treated an object, in consequence of their ill-founded alarm, as if it had been what it really was not.

That meaning of *Pro* in which it expresses value, or price, may be explained by what is now said of it. In the exchange of property, an equivalent is understood to be given “for,” or “instead of,” what is received.

Heri minas viginti *pro* ambobus dedi.—TER. *Eun.* 1. 2. 89.
 Illum Tydides alio *pro* talibus ausis,
 Affecit pretio.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 351.

Upon the principles now laid down, that use of *Pro* in which it denotes cause, and is translated “On account of,” “For the sake of,” may be also explained. “*Pro gloria atque imperio his, illis pro salute certantibus.*”—SALL. *Jug.* 94. “Gloria,” “Imperium,” “Salus,” are the rewards which the different combatants got in lieu of those exertions expressed in the word “Certantibus.” Each of these operated as a stimulus in the pursuit of what was desirable, and, on account of these, labours and dangers were encountered on both sides. *Pro*, in the same way, is often translated “For the sake,” or “The interest of.” The hero that first fights, and then dies, “*Pro patria,*” gets between it and its enemies, and states himself before that, which he is determined to defend. “*Juberem macte virtute esse, si pro patria mea ista*

virtus staret.”—LIV. 1. 12. Circumstances, generally favourable, are said, though not on the highest authority, to be *Pro*, in respect to the object governed. “Et cuncta *pro* hostibus erant.”—TAC. *Hist.* 4. 79. “Quod ego minime reor *pro* Agricola esse.”—COLUM. 3. 5. The good that is done by the person, who stands forward to protect what is attacked, is figuratively applied to advantage, that may be accidental, or acquired in any way.

Pro appears sometimes as equal to “Secundum,” and is translated “According to.” By means of the governed word, in this use of the preposition, a standard is assigned, by which something in the correlative is ascertained. In the literal application of *Pro*, it fixes the place of the last-mentioned term, as being before the governed, and, by analogy, qualities, unconnected with local situation in the correlative, are fixed, or measured, by those in the other, to which they necessarily refer. “Reliqua tu *pro* tua prudentia considerabis.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 4. 10. The degree of prudence, with which Cicero knew Marcellus to be endowed, is made the standard, or measure, of the degree of consideration he was expected to bestow. “Videndum est ut cuique *pro* dignitate tribuatur.”—CIC. *de Off.* 9. b. The worth, implied in “Dignitas,” furnishes the standard by which that respect, implied in “Tribuatur,” taken impersonally, and carrying in itself a nominative, is to be ascertained. Were this proportion not observed, one degree of merit might get less than the respect to which it is entitled, and another more.

That use of *Pro* in which it denotes “In comparison of,” is to be explained upon the same principle with that now mentioned. “Castra metatus latius quam *pro* copiis.”—LIV. 36. 10. There had been a mistake, here, upon the part of the person who measured, or laid out, the camp, by his not making the number of the forces the standard of its extent. The latter, compared with the former, was too great. So, in the following instance: “Major Romanis quam *pro* numero, jactura fuit.”—LIV. 59. *ad fin.*

PRO, it appears, has the following significations :

I.

BEFORE; supposing the correlative object to be animated, and the governed fit to contain it.

II.

IN. An occupied point that is prominent, in regard to others within the same space, is understood, by the English, to be "in," and, by the Latins, to be "apart from," and "before," it.

III.

FOR; as denoting "Instead of," "As if," "As the price of," "For the sake," or "On account of." In all these uses it is understood, that some object comes forward to supply the place, and to act, or be used, in the room of that, which is behind.

IV.

ACCORDING TO. The correlative object is, in this use, supposed to come before the governed, and the last presents a standard, by which the former is to be judged of.

V.

IN COMPARISON OF. The governed term, in this use, presents the subject of comparison, before which the correlative is brought, with a view to mark the difference between them.

In composition, the radical power of *Pro* is often visible. It suggests, that an object, whether moving or otherwise, is directly, and at a small distance, before another. This appears in such verbs as *Progredi*, *Procedere*, *Prodire*, by all of which, motion from one point to another, at no great distance, is suggested. "Ut "regredi" quam *progredi* mallent."—CIC. *de Off.* 7. b. The compounded preposition, it must be observed, denotes, either the production of motion, in a line leading from a fixed point to something without it, or the prevention of motion from a fixed extraneous point to one within it. The first power appears in such verbs as *Projicere*, and those already mentioned, all of which limit the path of motion from a defined point, in whatever manner, and with whatever velocity, it takes place. The last, again, appears in such words as *Prohibere* and *Profanus*, which arrest the object occupying some external point, and prevent its motion towards another within it. He, "qui *prohibet*," presents an obstacle that is not to be overcome, and, like a swordsman, keeps his antagonist at bay. "Equitem Romanum biduum cibo tectoque *prohibitum*."—CIC. *in Ver.* 160. b.

An *prohibere* aliquid censes, obstareque posse?—LUCRET. 1. 971.

Profanus, in the same way, refers to the person who was kept without the temple, as not having been initiated in the rites that were practised within it.

— procul O, procul este *profani*!

Conclamat vates.——————VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 258.

Quis Cereris ritus ausit vulgare *profanis*?—OVID. *de Art. Am.* 601.

In the words *Proconsul* and *Proprætor*, which denote magistrates who performed a vicarious duty in the Roman provinces, *Pro* discovers the third power ascribed to it, “For,” or “Instead of.” In the verbs *Promerere* and *Procurare*, it discovers an intensive power; and the same power is discovered in the case of the adjective *Procurvus*, signifying more than ordinarily crooked.

Contra non ulla est oleis cultura : neque illæ

Procurvam expectant falcem.——————VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 420.

The curvature, implied in the ordinary “Falx,” suggests a deviation from a straight blade, and *Procurvus* intimates, that this is increased by the crooked line being carried still farther from the right one.

PROBRUM—*vide* MALEDICTUM. PROBUS—*vide* BONUS.

PROCAX, PETULANS, PROTERVUS,

agree, in denoting presumption, but differ in respect to its degree, and the manner in which it shews itself. The first, according to Festus, comes from the old verb “*Procare*,” which was equal to “*Poscere* ;” “*Unde procaces meretrices, ab assidue poscendo, et proci uxorem poscentes in matrimonium.*” *PROCAX*, then, properly signifies that forwardness, which shows itself by improper requests, and by such as, probably, will not be granted. “*Non enim procacitate linguæ vitæ sordes eluuntur.*”—CIC. *in Sal.* 272. a. “*Desine bonos “petulantissima” consecrari lingua : desine morbo procacitatis isto uti.*” CIC. *ibid.* 275. b. In both the above instances, the forwardness implied in *Procax* shows itself in words, which, without containing any request, imply arrogance upon the part of the speaker. “*Si quæ non nupta mulier domum*

suam patefecerit omnium cupiditati, palamque sese in meretricia vita collocaret; si denique ita se gerit non flagrantia oculorum, non libertate sermonis, sed etiam complexu, osculatione, ut non solum meretrix, sed etiam *procax* videatur.”—CIC. *pro Cæl.* 47. b. The gradation in the signs of this woman’s profession shews clearly what is meant by *Procax*. She might have been known to be a “Meretrix,” by the wantonness of her looks, and the looseness of her general conversation; but the more enticing arts, implied in “Complexus” and “Osculatio,” indicate that pertness, which might have disgusted even in her, and is styled *Procacitas*.

Procax may denote that forwardness which is the effect of indulgence, and does not always give offence, especially if the superior has been more condescending than usual. Thus, the briskness of Horace’s home-bred slaves was agreeable to him, and formed a part of his happiness in the country.

————— *vernasque procaces*
Pasco libatis dapibus. ————— HOR. *Sat.* 2. 6. 66.

Virgil has figuratively applied *Procax* to the south wind, intimating its blustering and impetuous nature.

————— *penitusque procacibus austris,*
Perque undas, superante salo, perque in via saxa,
Dispulit. ————— ÆN. 1. 539.

PETULANS differs from “*Procax*,” in denoting a high degree of presumption, and one that is always disgusting, and never venial. It shows itself not merely by words, but often by actions, and supposes a person pressing directly towards a point, to which nothing but impudence can carry him. It comes from “*Petere*,” and intimates a selfish keenness, without regard to the injury done to another, by that conduct which is the means of acquisition. “*Petulantes et petulci etiam appellantur, qui “protervo” impetu et crebro petunt, lædendi alterius gratia.*”—FESTUS. “*Ex quo etiam illud assequor, ut si quis mihi maledicat, petulans aut plane insanus esse videatur.*”—CIC. *de Or.* 137. a. The orator, here, tells us, that by being guarded, and not wantonly uncivil to his adversary, he made abuse towards himself be construed into petulance, or, what was one, or a few degrees worse, into madness in him who discovered it.

When *Petulans* is applied to words, it always implies the most malevolent intention upon the part of the person who uses them. No indulgence, as in "Procax," upon the part of any superior, can justify the insolence of the speaker. "Maledictio nil habet propositi præter contumeliam: quæ si *petulantius* jactatur, convicium; si facetius, urbanitas nominatur."—CIC. *pro Cæl.* 38. b.

PROTERVUS differs from "Petulans," in denoting the impetuosity with which the presumptuous person aims at the object he is in quest of, and the violence of its effects, in bearing down every thing that opposes it. It comes from the verb "Proterere," and implies the agency of a force that overthrows every obstacle. This term is well said, by Donatus, to apply to one "qui, lasciviæ causa, neminem veretur. Includit itaque, in lascivia et "petulantia," superbiam, et contemptum aliorum." "Alii appetendo omnia "petulantes," alii audaces, *protervi*."—CIC. *de Fin.* 61. a. In this example, *Protervus* implies a degree of courage, impelling to action, and not to be daunted. From the antithesis, too, much may be gathered. The "Petulantes," though forward and grasping, had not the courage of the "Audaces;" and even the "Audaces," might chuse to come at their object by means less boisterous and distressing to those who opposed them, than those styled *Protervi*.

Quæ, velut latis equa trima campis,
Ludit exultim, metuitque tangi,
Nuptiarum expers, et adhuc *protervo*.
Cruda marito. —HOR. *Car.* 3. 11. 9.

Horace has, elsewhere, mollified entirely whatever is disagreeable in *Protervus*, by the use of the adjective "Gratus," and made the abstract denote the irresistible nature of his mistress's charms.

Urit grata *protervitas*,
Et vultus nimium lubricus aspici. —*Car.* 1. 19. 7.

PROCELLA—*vide* AURA.

PROFERRE—*vide* DIFFERRE.

PROCERUS—*vide* MAGNUS.

PROFITERI—*vide* FATERI.

PROFLIGATUS, PERDITUS,

agree, in having a reference to destruction ; but the former supposes the person tending, or on the road to it, while the latter supposes that he is actually destroyed. The former comes from the obsolete verb "Fligo," which, in all its other compounds, shows itself in the third conjugation, and properly signifies to drive forward to ruin, by an irresistible force. "Inimici nostri, atque uti nunc sunt, erunt, potius quam respublica *profligetur* et pereat."—NEP. *in Frag.* 12. 2. The first verb marks the progress of what the latter supposes completed. "Quam tandem illum mœrore afflictum esse, et *profligatum* putatis?"—CIC. *in Cat.* 104. b. This deep grief is understood to be the cause of affliction, which was leading to that destruction which it might never accomplish. "Qui *profligato* bello, ac pene sublato, renovatum bellum gerere conamur."—CIC. *Ep.* 201. a. The total termination of the war stands here for its destruction, and the first participle states the progress as begun. "Primo tempore commissum bellum, *profligatum* secundo, tertio vero confectum est."—FLOR. 2. 15. *Profligatus*, here, holds a middle place between the commencement and the termination of the war. It supposes, at the same time, that the career which had begun could not be arrested, till the body in motion came to its ultimate point.

PERDITUS differs from "Profligatus," in denoting the completion of that evil, which the latter supposes to be only on its way. What is said of "Perdere" is applicable to its participle. "Omnia denique in eo ad perniciem "profligata," atque *perdita*."—CIC. *pro Rosc. Amerin.* 24. b. The preposition "Ad," here, denoting motion towards a point, accords with the native force of "Profligare," and the consequence of the impulse is that destruction completed, which is implied in *Perdere*. "Hæc tu, omnium mortalium "profligatissime" ac *perditissime*."—CIC. *in Ver.* 162. b. Though little certain can be inferred from the place which different terms hold in any sentence, yet when what is understood to be the natural climax is generally observed, it affords a presumption that the terms are duly defined. This order, however, is occasionally reversed, as in the following sentence. It does not follow, however, as the critic mentioned says, that "Profligatus" denotes more than *Perditus*, which is impossible. "Senatoria judicia *perdita*, "profligataque"

esse arbitratur.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 2. 3. Asconius, in his commentary upon this sentence, says, “*Perditum* est quod inveniri non potest; “*profligatum*” quod potest: Ciceronem tamen velle hoc loco, pejus esse “*profligata*” quam *perdita*.” By the orator’s expression, as quoted, he must mean, that the subject, to which the former verb is applied, is extinguished or destroyed, and that that, to which the latter is, though still in existence, is on the road to similar destruction.

PROFUGUS—*vide* PERFUGA.

PROMITTERE, POLLICERI, RECIPERE, SPONDERE, agree, in denoting the act of exciting expectation, but differ in respect to the degree of obligation, which the person, doing so, incurs to fulfil it. PROMITTERE signifies the slightest possible engagement to fulfil that which is promised, and supposes the existence of certain contingencies, upon which it is understood to cease. In its original acceptation, it signifies to put forth, or to allow to grow; and its figurative power seems to rest on the supposition, that he who holds out, means to give. “*Quo tutior altitudine esset, hoc audacius longiusque tela promitteret.*”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 8. 9. “*Donec crinem barbamque promitteret.*”—TAC. *Ann.* 2. 39.

The slightness of the promise involved in *Promittere*, appears when it is taken as approaching to “*Profiteri*.”

— quod medicorum est,

Promittunt medici.—————HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 115.

Physicians tacitly encourage the expectations of their patients, but give no security that they will effect a cure.

Nec tacui demens: et me fors si qua tulisset,

Si patrios unquam remeassem victor ad Argos,

Promisi ultorem, et verbis odia aspera movi.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 94.

The contingencies upon which the promise would not be obligatory, are, here, carefully stated. “*Alimenta sanis corporibus agricultura, sanitatem ægris medicina promittit.*”—CELS. *in Præf.* The art of the husbandman, it is suggested, may fail, as well as that of the physician.

“POLLICERI differs from “*Promittere*,” in implying a stronger obligation to

fulfil the expectation, upon the part of the person who excites it. It comes from "Licere," and refers to the right of the vender to claim the price which the purchaser has offered.

— negabon' velle me, modo

Qui sum *pollicitus* ducere? qua fiducia id facere audeam.—TER. *And.* 3. 5. 6.

Pamphilus expresses strongly the consciousness of an obligation, which it would have been unbecoming to violate: and Donatus observes well, in his commentary on the passage, "Melius *pollicitus sum* dixit, quam si *promisi* diceret." "Contra facio quam professus *pollicitusque es*."—CIC. *de Legg.* 171. b. Suetonius uses the verb impurely, in applying it to the fulfilment of what physicians undertake. "Medicamenta hoc *pollicentur*."—*Ibid.* 217.

Cicero, in one passage, states "Promittere" in opposition to *polliceri*, and, by his antithesis, shows what his apprehension was of the due power of each. "Sin autem vitam mihi sors ademisset, aut vis aliqua major reditum peremisset, hos, hos omnia tibi illorum laborum præmia pro me persoluturos. Nihil tibi ego tum de meis opibus *pollicebar*, sed de horum erga me benevolentia." "promittebam."—CIC. *pro Plan.* 280. b. What was the subject of personal obligation upon the part of Cicero, and depended merely on himself, he was said *Polliceri*; what depended, again, on the steady attachment of his friends, in which he had all possible confidence, he was said "Promittere." The distinction mentioned is confirmed by another passage from the same author. "Neque minus ei prolixè de tua voluntate "promisi," quam eram solitus de mea *polliceri*."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 7. 5. Relying upon his own consciousness, the speaker could affirm with more confidence in respect to himself than to any body else.

RECIPERE differs from "Polliceri," in implying the readiness with which the obligation of a promise is incurred, from a conviction that it will certainly be fulfilled. "*Recipere* est quasi periculum et eventum rei suscipere in se."—GOCLEN. *Obs.* 254. It differs from "Polliceri," also, in denoting, that the person, who promises, may undertake for another, as well as for himself.

Cl. Pater, omnia faciam: impera.

Cl. Uxorem ut ducas. Cl. Pater. Cl. Nihil audio. Me. Ad me *recipio*.

Faciet.—TER. *Heaut.* 5. 5. 11.

Here, Menedemus warrants Clitipho's good behaviour, and assures his father, that he will marry according to his wish. "Sed tamen "promitto" in meque *recipio*, fore eum tibi et voluptati et usui."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 208. a. Cicero, here, not only promises, but becomes surety, that the person, recommended by him to Brutus, will be found both an agreeable and an useful friend. "Quoniam de æstate "polliceris" vel potius *recipis*."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 204. a. Atticus had not merely given Cicero a simple assurance, as to the events of the summer, but had become answerable for the truth of what he said. From the following passage it appears, that he, who did not see executed what he was said *Recipere*, was held guilty of a fraud. He had neglected the duty which he had voluntarily undertaken, not that which either had been assigned him, or which he could not decline. "Offensio vel negligentia, susceptis rebus: vel perfidia, *receptis*."—CIC. *de Or.* 118. a.

SPONDERE, from Σπενδω, "Libo," *i. e.* "Libando fœdus facio," differs from the former verbs, in implying, that he, who gives the promise, binds himself to answer for the consequences, if the promise is not fulfilled. If the contract was not observed, an "actio ex *sponsu*" might take place against the party failing. "Si post eas stipulationes uxor non dabatur, qui stipulabatur ex *sponsu* agebat, iudices cognoscebant."—GELL. 4. 4. The contract may relate either to the person "qui *spondet*," or to another; but in either case is equally binding. "Si quis, quod *sponpondit*, qua in re verbo se uno obligavit, id non facit, maturo iudicio, sine ulla religione iudicis condemnatur."—CIC. *pro Cæc.* 286. a. "Magis enim illum pro quo *sponpondi*, quam me obligavi."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 289. a.

Seneca, *ad Lucilium, Epist.* 19. says, "Jam non "promittunt" de te, sed *spondent*." Cicero uniformly puts *Spondere* the last in his climax. "Promitto," "recipio," *spondeo*, Caium Cæsarem talem semper fore."—CIC. *Phil.* 5. 18.

The lawyers seem sometimes to widen the signification of "Promittere," and to make it equal to that of *Spondere*. "Itaque si scriptum in instrumento fuerit, "promississe" aliquem, perinde haberi volunt atque si interrogatione præcedente responsum sit, *spondeo*."—JUSTIN. *Inst. de Inutil. Stipul.* § 16. This use, however, confirms the distinction established. It shews, that the

lawyers wished the slight promise involved in "Promittere," if recorded in an instrument, to be equivalent to the obligation in *Spondere*, when incurred by a person replying to the question put to him.

PROPERARE—*vide* FESTINARE.

PROPTER

denotes the relation of vicinity between two or more objects. It comes from "Pro," and, like it, supposes a small interval only to exist between the governed and the correlative object. It differs from it in having no reference to the situation of the latter, whether before, behind, or beside the former, and holds of "Pro," as "Inter" does of "In," and "Præter" of "Præ." "Vulcanus tenuit insulas *propter* Siciliam, quæ Vulcaniæ nominantur."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 70. b. "In pratulo *propter* Platonis statuam consedimus."—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 167. a.

Nimium isthoc abisti : hic *propter* hunc adsiste.—TER. *Adelph.* 2. 1. 15.

In the above examples, there is no reference to the direction in which the different objects lay in regard to those, with which they were respectively connected; and in this the derivative differs from the root. Both, however, agree in specifying by nearness, though this varies in degree, according to the nature of the case. Thus, the interval that formed nearness between Sicily and the Vulcanian islands, would have formed a very different relation between the company, said to sit down near the statue of Plato, and the statue itself. In the last example, too, Parmeno was within hearing of Æschinus, when desired by him to come near Sannio.

Propter is often made to denote the final cause of an action, and is then translated "For," "On account of." From the vicinity that always exists between the correlative and the governed object, the former is supposed to operate as a cause, like the tool applied by the mechanic to the subject of his manufacture. The idea of local situation is applied to intellectual objects, and, from an imaginary nearness between them, there is understood to exist a causation, or active energy, leading to some intended effect. "Susceptum

onus aut *propter* perfidiam abjicere, aut *propter* imbecillitatem animi deponere.” —CIC. *pro Sex. Ros.* 20. a. The burden being connected with perfidy in the agent, he was, on account of that, tempted to throw it off; or, being connected with weakness, he was, therefore, tempted to lay it down.

This preposition, when taken in the sense now explained, is, in some instances, made to govern the word that expresses cause. “Eamque suspicionem *propter* hanc causam credo fuisse, quod Fannius in mediocribus oratoribus habitus esset.” —CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 173. b. The last clause of this sentence would have stood in the predicament of a cause, whether “Causam” had been employed or not. By being employed, it forms a kind of tautology, like “Because of this cause” that Fannius, &c. Had “Causa” been employed as a correlative, in place of a governed, term, as in the following example, no such effect would have taken place.

Summum crede nefas animam præferre pudori,
Et *propter* vitam vivendi perdere “causas.” —Juv. *Sat.* 8. 83.

Life is not, here, sacrificed for the sake of the circumstances that render it worth having, but the circumstances for mere animal existence, which cowards only value.

Propter sometimes denotes also the efficient cause, by which any thing is performed, and is then translated “By means of,” “Owing to.” “Ut *propter* quos hanc suavissimam lucem adspexerit, eos indignissime luce privarit: cum etiam feras inter sese partus, atque educatio, et natura ipsa conciliet.” —CIC. *pro Sex. Rosc.* 28. b. “Quid enim præmium satis magnum est tam benevolis, tam bonis, tam fidelibus servis, *propter* quos vivit?” —CIC. *pro Tit. A. Mil.* 112. b. “Tu solus aperta non videbis, qui *propter* acumen occultissima perspicis?” —CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 70. b. In this use of *Propter*, the idea of a cause operating, in consequence of the vicinity of objects, is not lost sight of. The reference that, in the former use, is made to what stimulates to action, is, in this, made to the means, by which the cause produces its effect. It is said, in the first example, that, “by means of,” or “owing to,” parents, children have their existence; in the second, that, “by means of” faithful slaves, the life of Milo was preserved, when he was attacked by Clodius; and,

in the third, that, "by means of" the acuteness of Cicero, he saw clearly what escaped the discernment of others.

Propter, except in the case of "Propterea," never appears in a compounded state. It is, in this respect, unlike to other prepositions which have "Ter" annexed to their respective roots, such as "Inter," "Prater," "Subter."

PROVOCARE, LACESSERE, IRRITARE,

agree, in the act of voluntarily exciting an emotion of anger, but differ, in respect to the degree in which this emotion is raised. PROVOCARE, as may appear from its etymology, signifies, properly, to call one forth, and in this, its original sense, is not synonymous with the other two verbs.

— herus si tuus domi est; quin *provocas*.—PLAUT. *Pseud.* 2. 2. 43.

Here, nothing is said as to the purpose of the person, who wished the master to be called out of his house. When any insinuation is made, as to the end proposed by the person "qui *provocat*," this end may be very different at different times. He may mean to excite an expression of attachment, to correspond with one already made. "Amo te beneficio tuo *provocatus*."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 229. a. He may mean to excite a slight rivalry, without threatening his adversary. "Elegia Græcos quoque *provocamus*."—QUINCT. 10. 1. 93.

Age, age nunc experiamur contra hæc, quid ego possem
Blande dicere, aut benigne facere, quando ea *provocat*.—TER. *Adelph.* 5. 4. 23.

He may mean to excite fear or indignation, and to try the courage of him whom he offends. It is in this respect *Provocare* is synonymous with the two other verbs. "Gallus processit magnitudine atque armis insignis: quatiensque scutum hasta, quum silentium fecisset, *provocat* per interpretem unum ex Romanis, qui secum ferro decernat."—LIV. 7. 26. Last of all, he may mean to excite a sense of injustice done to himself, and a desire of that aid which it is understood that the person, or persons, to whom he appeals, can grant. "Quam recte decretum sit, tu judicabis: ne ad Catonem quidem *provocabo*."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 86. b. "Ut esset potestas populi ad quam *provocaretur*."—CIC. *de Legg.* 3. 27.

LACESSERE differs from "Provocare," in never denoting either to call forth simply, or to appeal to. It differs from "Provocare," also, in the art of the tempter, and in his not giving the same advantage to the person whom he attacks. It may be regarded as a frequentative from the obsolete verb "Lacio," signifying to allure, or draw in artfully. The evil consequences threatened by the person *Lacessens* are greater or less, according to the nature of the subject of the challenge given. The disgrace of being overcome may be the greatest possible.

• Efficiam posthac ne quenquam voce *lacessas*.—VIRG. *Eccl.* 3. 21.

As a stimulant to action, it appears to be more powerful than "Provocare," in the following sentence. "Sic igitur facies, meque amabis, et scripto aliquo *lacesses*. Ego enim respondere facilius possum quam "provocare." Quod si, ut es, cessabis, *lacessam*: nec tua ignavia etiam inertiam afferet."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 12. 20. In the two first sentences, Cicero takes more of the blame of being a bad correspondent, than he imputes to Cornificius. He allows, that he himself requires to be *Lacessitus*, and that, in general, his friend needed only to be "Provocatus." In the last sentence, however, he insinuates, that his correspondent was then culpable, and slightly threatens the use of those means which would secure regularity upon the part of himself.

—— doluere cruento

Dente *lacessiti*.———HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 150.

When *Lacessere* denotes, that an emotion of courage, or indignation, is excited, it supposes this emotion to be higher than "Provocare." "Arma quibus vel tectus ipse esse possis, vel "provocare" improbos, vel te ulcisci *lacessitus*."—CIC. *de Or.* 86. b. The sentiment of indignation against the wicked, expressed by "Provocare," is but a general one; that, by *Lacessere*, is personal, and leads immediately to revenge an injury that has been done to ourselves.

IRRITARE differs from both the verbs now treated of, in implying, that the emotion expressed by it admits of no degrees, but is the greatest possible which the cause can produce. "*Irritare* tractum a canibus, qui cum provo-

cantur, hirriunt.” The former verb is to be regarded as a frequentative from the latter, and both, we are told by Donatus, come from the letter “R.” “Hirrire,” proprie dicuntur canes, qui ante latrandum, restrictis dentibus, R literam sono asperiore imitantur.”—*Ad TER. Adelpb. 2. 4. 18. & And. 3. 4. 18.*

Ita sum *irritatus*, animum ut nequeam ad cogitandum instituere.

TER. *Phor. 2. 1. 10.*

Multa fero ut placem genus *irritabile* vatum.—HOR. *Ep. 2. 2. 103.*

The race of poets are, here, marked by the violence of that anger, of which they are susceptible. “Iracundus” implies the propensity to rage, but does not, like *Irritabilis*, refer to the length to which it may go, when uncontrolled.

Irritatque virum telis, et voce “laccessit.”—VIRG. *Æn. 10. 644.*

Different effects are, here, said to have been produced upon Turnus, by means of the weapons and the words. By the former, his life was endangered, and a keen sentiment of courage must have arisen to repel the attack. By the latter, he suffered only an insult, which might be greater or less according to circumstances; and there was no immediate necessity for any exertion in his defence. “Ut vi *irritare*, ferroque “laccessere” fortissimum virum auderet.”—CIC. *pro Mil. 118. a.* The emotion, expressed by the first verb, is excited by violence, and that, by the last, by the sword. In the one case, the person attacked, if he thinks at all, feels his safety to depend upon an instant and vigorous defence, such as passion dictates; in the other, he can take time to measure the insult, and to chuse the best means of repelling it.

PROUT—*vide* PERINDE.

PRUNA—*vide* CARBO.

PRUDENS—*vide* SAPIENS.

PUDOR, PUDICITIA, CASTITAS, VERECUNDIA, agree, in denoting that nice sensibility to what is decent, which produces purity of manners, and propriety of conduct. PUDOR expresses an instinctive dread of whatever is shameful, as leading to a degradation of the person guilty of it, in the eyes both of himself and of the world. Cicero has, with great acuteness and seeming propriety, considered the terms *Pudor* and “Terror”

as expressing modifications of fear, that discover themselves by opposite signs. “*Pudorem* et “*terrorem*,” metum concutientem, definiunt, ex quo fit ut *pudorem* rubor, “*terrorem*” pallor consequatur.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 213. a. By means of the sentiment styled *Pudor*, then, men are deterred from the commission of evil, by the prospect of their own and the world’s disapprobation; and they are punished in both ways for what they actually commit. “Homo in quo aliquis si non famæ *pudor*, at supplicii “timor” est.”—CIC. *de Prov.* 71. b. The definition given by Zeno of *Pudor* seems a happy one. He styles it Φοβος αδοξιας, *i. e.* “Metus ignominia.” Others have defined it Φοβος δικαιο ψογος, “Timor justæ reprehensionis.”—GELL. 19. 6.

Pudor denotes, not only the dread of what is absolutely evil, as tending to lessen the agent in his own and the world’s opinion, but also of what may erroneously be supposed to be so.

Quem tenet argenti sitis importuna famesque,
 Quem paupertatis *pudor* et fuga.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 13. 23.
 Stultorum incurata *pudor* malus ulcera celat.—*Ibid.* 1. 16. 24.

Pudor also denotes the virtue of modesty, by which a person is ready to decline what is due to him, and never arrogates what is not. “Ex hac enim parte *pudor* pugnat, illinc petulantia.”—CIC. *in Cat.* 2. 11. “*Pudore* a dicendo et timiditate ingenua quadam refugisti.”—CIC. *de Or.* 109. b.

PUDICITIA is more particular than “*Pudor*,” and denotes the same instinctive disposition to suppress all unchaste desires, that the other does to fly from what is shameful in general. “Hinc pugnat *pudicitia*, illinc stuprum.” CIC. *in Cat.* 2. 11.

— rara est adeo concordia formæ
 Atque *pudicitia*.—JUV. 10. 297.

“Parcat juvenus *pudicitia* suæ, ne spoliet alienam.”—CIC. *pro Cæli.* 46. b. “*Pudor*” and *Pudicitia* may appear in the same sentence, as the qualities of the same man. “An ex sororis cubiculo egressus, “*pudorem*” *pudicitiamque* defendat.”—CIC. *de Arusp.* 245. b. “Quem non “*pudor*” non *pudicitia* a cupiditate revocavit.”—CIC. *pro Cluent.* 20. a. In such examples, “*Pudor*” is to be translated sense of character in general, and *Pudicitia* confined to

the virtue of chastity, which is then all it denotes. The one regards the sentiment, by which a virtuous mind is influenced, and the other, the abstaining from every act inconsistent with it. “Pudor” vero in animo est, *pudicitia* in corpore.”—NON. 5. 73.

Non ego illam mihi dotem duco esse, quæ dos dicitur :
Sed *pudicitiam*, et “pudorem,” et sedatam cupidinem,
Deûm metum, parentum amorem, et cognatûm concordiam.

PLAUT. *Amph.* 2. 2. 209.

CASTITAS differs from “Pudicitia,” in being applicable only to females, and in referring, not to the restraining principle, by which chastity is maintained, but to the state itself. It denotes, that the person to whom it is applied is unspotted, without regard to any struggle she may have had in maintaining her purity, or temptation to forfeit it. The adjective, from which *Castitas* is taken, has a more extended signification than itself, and denotes integrity, or freedom from blemish in general, in either sex. “Vestæ colendæ virgines præsent, ut sentiant mulieres in natura foeminarum omnem *castitatem* peti.”—CIC. *de Legg.* 175. b.

—— et metuens alterius viri
Certo foedere *castitas*.———HOR. *Car.* 3. 24. 23.

“Pudicitia,” then, denotes the virtue of chastity, or continence, in either man or woman ; while *Castitas* denotes only the state of a female, who, if unmarried, has not been deflowered, and, if married, has not broken her conjugal vow.

VERECUNDIA differs from “Pudor,” in supposing, that the restraining principle is more limited, and that the agent acts from respect to those who observe his conduct, and from an immediate regard to the approbation of others. It suggests nothing like what the French call *Mauvaise Honte*, which “Pudor” does occasionally, and it supposes the persons influenced by it, to form a just estimate of the merit of those they respect. “Hoc solum animal natum est “pudoris” ac *verecundiæ* particeps, animadvertensque in omnibus rebus, quas ageret aut diceret, ne quid ab eo fieret, nisi honeste et decore.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 110. b. It differs from “Pudicitia,” in implying, that the actions subject to its con-

troul, are more numerous, and are all those of which the world can be witnesses and judges. It comes from "Vereri," and denotes the prevalence of that fear which arises from respect, and renders men unwilling to offend. "Justitiæ partes sunt non violare homines, *verecundiæ* non offendere."—CIC. *de Off.* 20. a. "*Verecundia* est custos omnium virtutum, dedecus fugiens, laudemque maxime consequens."—CIC. *Part.* 236. b. "*Verecundus* est, qui ut bene audiat, erubescit, et pudet impudica loqui."—CIC. *de Leg.* 166. a. *Verecundia* is opposed to "Impudentia," which implies a total disregard of the opinion of others. "*Verecundiæ* fines qui semel transiit, illum gnauiter "impudentem" esse oportet."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 5. 12. Quintilian seems impurely to take *Verecundia* in a bad sense, as equal to "Malus pudor." "*Verecundia* vitium quidem, sed amabile, et quod virtutes facillime generet."—QUINOT. 12. 5. pr.

PUGNA—*vide* BELLUM.

PULLUS—*vide* FÆTUS.

PUNGERE, STIMULARE,

agree, in denoting to excite pain in a sensitive being, by something sharp applied to it; but the former refers only to the pain produced in the part, the latter to its consequences, in whatever way they may show themselves. "Vulnus in latere quod acu *punctum* videretur, pro ictu gladiatoris putari."—CIC. *pro Mil.* 114. b. The pain of this wound was magnified, but it was entirely local, and inflicted to produce no effect but on the place affected. "Admota aspici quum *pupugerit*, si non occidat, sciat ex Psyllorum esse stirpe."—VAR. *apud Priscian.* 10. Against the sting of any serpent, it was understood the Psylli, a people of Lybia, possessed an antidote.

Pungere is figuratively applied to pain of mind. "*Pungunt* quasi aculeis, interrogatiunculis angustis."—CIC. *de Fin.* 107. b. "*Pungit* me rursus quod scribis."—CIC. *Epist.* 102. a.

STIMULARE differs from "Pungere," in supposing the pain to be the means of excitement, and not to terminate merely in the suffering of the animal exposed to it, or in the affection of the place touched.

Durius *stimulabat* in æquore currum.—SIL. ITAL. 16. 366.

Mox ubi se sævæ *stimulavit* verbere caudæ.—LUCAN. 1. 204

Both the person who drove the chariot, and the lion, who lashed himself, were disposed to quicken their motion, and not wantonly to create pain, for the sake of doing so. *Stimulare* is frequently applied to mind, and denotes the cogency of some motive, in compelling to a certain action. “*Avita quoque gloria animum stimulabat.*”—LIV. I. 22.

In the following sentence, Cicero employs both the verbs with great effect. “*Hunc sibi ex animo scrupulum qui se dies noctesque stimulet ac “pungat,” ut evellatis postulat, ut ad hanc suam prædam, tam nefariam, adjutores vos profiteamini.*”—CIC. *pro Sex. Ros. Am.* 19. b. By means of the two verbs, the misery of Chrysogonus, from the stings of a guilty conscience, is happily painted. The scruple mentioned had hitherto, as expressed by the last verb, been too feeble a stimulant, and had failed in the effect of making him abandon the foul purpose of robbing Roscius. Still, however, as expressed by the first, it gnawed incessantly, and, beside its own necessary pain, embittered every comfort, which his ill-gotten wealth could purchase.

PUNIRE, CASTIGARE, PLECTI,

agree, in denoting the infliction of something painful to the sufferer, in consequence of his supposed demerit, but differ in respect either to the severity of the punishment, or to the intention of the person who imposes it. PUNIRE, as a generic term, may suggest a punishment that is either just adequate, or more or less than adequate, to the offence, and which may lead either to the gratification of revenge, or to the correction of the person chastised. “*Est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus.*”—CIC. *de Off.* 7. b. “*Iracundia est cupiditas puniendi doloris.*”—CIC. *de Or.* 103. a. In those examples, the agent is evidently stimulated by revenge, and disposed to inflict a punishment that is more than adequate to the guilt. “*Postea levius demonstrando reum punitum, quam sit ille promeritus.*”—CIC. *de Inv.* 72. b. Here, again, the crime is understood to be more heinous than the penalty was severe; and the agent appears to have had no desire but that of correcting something wrong in the sufferer, without exposing him to needless pain. The kind of the punishment implied in *Punire* is often explained by the noun following it, expressing the

part of the body on which it is inflicted ; and, unless it be capital, it is always susceptible of degrees. “ Qui plebem sine Tribunis reliquisset, quique magistratum sine provocatione creasset, tergo ac capite *puniretur*.”—LIV. 3. 55.

CASTIGARE differs from “ Punire,” in implying, that the punishment is never the severest possible, that the infliction of it is not attended with the gratification of resentment, but is meant to produce reformation in the person corrected. It is derived from “ Cæstus,” and refers to the thong of which the cæstus was formed, and which might have been applied for the purposes either of binding or whipping. “ Pueros vero matres ac magistri *castigare* etiam solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 204. b. Both the chiding and the whipping may be more or less severe, according to the disposition of the person administering them. *Castigare* denotes more than simple admonition, or gentle reproof. “ Quo sæpius monuerit, eo rarius *castigabit*.”—QUINCT. 2. 2. 5. “ Omnis autem et animadversio et *castigatio* contumelia vacare debet : neque ad ejus qui “ punit ” aliquem, aut verbis *castigat*, sed ad reipublicæ utilitatem referri.”—CIC. *de Off.* 18. a. In the case both of “ Punire ” and *Castigare*, the philosopher’s intention is to suppress that degree of severity compatible with each, by which the punishment would fail in producing the intended effect. Contumely towards the object would make the act of the person “ puniens ” degenerate into harshness ; and it would imply a malignity, in the person *Castigans*, inconsistent with the supposed benevolence of his intentions, and destructive of attachment in the object of his reproof.

From the kindness of the intention, and the lenity of the punishment, implied in *Castigare*, a person may be said to inflict it voluntarily upon himself. “ In hoc me ipse *castigo*, quod ex aliorum et ex nostra fortasse mollitia, non ex ipsa virtute de virtutis robore existimo.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 228. b. Cicero elsewhere says, “ Quid ille Terentianus, *Εαυτὸν τιμωρὸν*, id est, “ ipse se puniens ? ”—*Tusc. Q.* 204. b. In this last instance, the self-tormentor was under the influence of a diseased fancy, and cannot be supposed to have acted like a free agent. His distress, though inflicted by himself, was as real as if it had come from another. The expression “ *castigare capite vel morte*,” is,

from the nature of things, inadmissible, and never to be met with. The humane intention of him, "qui castigat," is inconsistent with the extinction of the life of the person chastened. The former suffers from the pain of which he is the cause, and must wish the latter to live to profit by his afflictions.

PLECTI, which, in the passive voice, only refers to punishment, differs from the two former verbs, in supposing that the penalty is the severest of the kind, and that the person, who is the cause of the pain, is indifferent as to its being more than adequate to the offence. It is the passive of the verb "Plectere," to plait, or twist, and seems to insinuate, that the sufferer undergoes either as rigorous a punishment as his strength will permit him to bear, or one that is capital.

Quicquid delirant reges, *plectuntur* Achivi.—Hor. *Ep.* 1. 2. 14.

The slightest deviation from duty; upon the part of sovereigns, produces the greatest possible distress to their subjects.

———— tu jam lites audies,
Ego *plectar* pendens.—TER. *Phor.* 1. 4. 42.

The slave, here, declares, that whatever might become of the young man he was addressing, he himself would be hanged for his offence. "Cavendum est ne iisdem de causis, alii *plectantur*, alii ne appellentur quidem."—CIC. *de Off.* 18. a. The opposition between the two verbs, in this sentence, explains the force of *Plecti*. There can be no greater injustice than that of severely punishing some culprits for certain offences, and not even summoning others to answer for their conduct.

PUTARE—*vide* SCINDERE ET COGITARE.

QUANTUS, QUOT, QUOTUS,

agree, in denoting interrogation respecting quantity, but differ, either as that quantity is continuous or discrete, or as it is considered to be a whole, or a part. By means of *QUANTUS*, the same question is put in respect to the quality of magnitude, as by any other adjective, as to the extent of its quality, if susceptible of comparison, with "Quam" prefixed to it. As *Quantus* signifies "How much," so does "Quam præclarus" "How excellent," "Quam brevis," "How short." The quantity, besides, denoted by *Quantus*, is always held to be complete in itself, without reference to any greater whole, from which it was taken.

Quantam et quam veram laudem capiet Parmeno!—*TER. Eun.* 5. 4. 3.

The interrogation, here, is slight, and expressive only of admiration. "Parmeno, however, is unable to tell the extent and the reality of that praise, to which he might happen to be entitled. "*Quantas* audacias, quam incredibiles furores, *quantos* acervos facinorum reperietis?"—*CIC. pro Syll.* 181. b. To the question here strongly put, no answer is expected. "Ab eo provincias acciperent quas ipsi vellent: exercitum et pecuniam *quantam* vellent."—*CIC. pro Sext.* 8. a. Here, no interrogation exists, and the power of *Quantus* is indefinite, because expressing a quantity, in respect both to the army and the money, depending on the inclination of people who had not announced it. It refers, also, to the aggregate of number, and, in so far, is generic in respect to "Quot." The army mentioned consisted of a number of men, and the sum, of a number of pieces. This generic power of *Quantus*, however, is more apparent in the following examples. "Pecunia, numero ac summa, sua *quanta* sit, ostendit."—*CIC. pro Clu.* 36. a.

At tibi curarum millia *quanta* dabit?—*PROPERT.* 1. 5. 10.

QUOT differs from "*Quantus*," in being applicable to discrete quantity alone, and in signifying, when an interrogative, "How many?"

Quot adeo cœnæ, quas deflevi, mortuæ !

Quot potiones mulsi ! *quot* autem prandia !—PLAUT. *Stich.* 1. 3. 59.

“Is propagatione vitæ, *quot*, “quantas,” quam incredibiles hausit calamitates?”
CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 166. b.

Quot, like “*Quantus*,” is not always interrogative.

— verum ita est,

Quot homines, tot sententiæ.—TER. *Phor.* 2. 4. 13.

When *Quot* is added to itself, forming “*Quotquot*,” the interrogative power ceases, but the indefinite continues in full force. The imagination of the hearer is then required to suggest any number whatever; and it is insinuated, that, be that number what it may, what is said to hold of one or more, will hold of all. “*Si leges duæ, aut si plures, aut “quotquot” erunt, conservari non possint.*”—CIC. *de Inv.* 2. 49.

— Vertumnis “*quotquot*” sunt, natus iniquis.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 7. 14.

QUOTUS differs from the preceding adjectives, in being applicable to quantity of any kind, and in putting a question as to some one unit, or equal part, as being a fraction of a whole. It serves the purpose of an ordinal number to “*Quot*,” as a cardinal, and is properly translated, “What one?” “*Quotus* erit iste denarius, qui non sit ferendus, et in quo primum æstimationis iniquitas atque improbitas reprehendatur?”—CIC. *in Ver.* 197. b. Cicero is here asking where oppression is to begin, and what that particular piece is, in a number that may be extorted, which will justify complaint. When the ordinal unit is once stated, the absolute number, in a particular predicament, is fixed. If the person, to whom the invitation was given, in the following passage, was willing to accept it, the number of the company was ascertained, and he had a right to suppose, that without his consent, there would be no addition.

Tu *quotus* esse velis, rescribe.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 5. 30.

Horace, here, desires Torquatus to limit the number of the company, of which he was to make one. If the number was that only of the Graces, he would make a third “*sodalis* ;” if that of the Muses, a ninth.

Dic *quotus*, et "quanti" cupias cœnare : nec unum
Addideris verbum : cœna parata tibi est.—MART. 14. 217.

By the reply expected to *Quotus* and "Quanti," the number of the company, and the expence of the entertainment, are fixed.

—— hora *quota* est ?——HOR. Sat. 2. 6. 44.

The same power is discernible in *Quotus*, when applied to the divisions of time, as of any other species of quantity. In the above question it is asked, What hour in the twelve, which form either day or night, is passing at the time it is put ?

A question, as to the time of the day or the night, may be put by means of "Quot," as well as of *Quotus*.

—— clamore opus est ut sentiat auris,
Quem dicat venisse puer, *quot* nuntiet horas.—JUV. 10. 215.

By "Quot" it is asked how many hours have passed since the point at which mid-day or mid-night took place, and, by *Quotus*, what hour in the twelve is passing, when the question is put. The answer to that by *Quotus* must be made by "Primus," or by any ordinal belonging to one of the first twelve units ; that to the question by "Quot," by any of the cardinal numbers, after the first hour has expired, but not before. In whatever way time is divided, whether into hours, days, years, or centuries, the number "one" is physically inapplicable to the first, when current, and can act as a numeral only when the second has commenced. This holds equally in regard to space, divided by a fixed standard, and rendered the measure of distance, in a body moving over it. The ordinal number, besides specifying what is current in each, can never make part of the aggregate of those that are past, and have formed integrals, whatever place it may hold in the series.

The poets employ *Quotus*, as expressive of concrete quantity, in which sense it differs from "Quantus," in signifying "How great a part of a whole."

Qui *quota* terroris pars solet esse mei ?——OVID. ex Pont. 4. 10. 24.
Ista tuæ, Cæsar, *quota* pars spectatur arenæ ?——MART. 5. 65. 7.

When "Quisque" follows *Quotus*, either in composition or otherwise, it signifies "what one," among a great number, and suggests the fewness of

those, to whom the interrogation is applicable. "Quotusquisque" reliquus qui rempublicam vidisset?"—TAC. *Ann.* 1. 3.

Quis est enim, aut "quotusquisque," cui mors cum appropinquet,
Non refugiat timido sanguen, atque exalbescat metu?—CIC. *de Fin.* 131. b.

"Nam "quotocuique" eadem honestatis cura secreto, quæ palam?"—PLIN. 3. *Ep. penult.* The "Auctor ad Herennium" seems guilty of an impurity, in taking from "Quotusquisque" its interrogative, and giving it only an indefinite power. "Ut in quamlibet partem, "quotoquoque" loco libebit, possemus."—22. a.

When "Cunque" is added to *Quotus*, its meaning then shifts from discrete to concrete quantity, and its interrogative power is gone. It then denotes the smallest integral part.

Moverit e votis pars "quotacunque" Deos.—TIBULL. 2. 7.
Et sequitur regni pars "quotacunque" sui.—OVID. *Her.* 13. 60.

It is otherwise, we found, with "Quot," when added to itself, which keeps to the predicament of number in both ways.

QUÆRERE, SCRUTARI, RIMARI,

agree, in denoting the act of seeking something supposed desirable, but differ, in respect either to the anxiety which leads to the search, or to the nature of the means by which it is conducted. QUÆRERE, as a generic word, has a reference to every possible means by which that wanted can be acquired. It supposes the existence of a stimulus, which may be either strong or weak, but which, at the same time, prompts enquiry while the object is unattained.

Artibus ingenuis *quesita est gloria multis.*—OVID. *ex Pont.* 2. 7. 47.

In the means of acquiring glory by the different arts, every possible diversity must be exhibited, and the ardour of the pursuit, in each instance, proportioned to the zeal of the votary. The object of pursuit may be proper, or improper, according to the judgment of the person who adopts it. He pursues this object, however, with the same steadiness, whether he acts wisely or not.

“Frustra niti, neque aliud sese fatigando, nisi odium *quærere*, extremæ dementiæ est.”—SALL. *Jug.* 3.

Quæris, id quod habes, parentes : quod abest, non *quæris*, patri

Quomodo obsequare. ————— TER. *Heaut.* 5. 4. 16.

Nec minor est virtus quam *quærere*, parta tueri. — OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 13.

SCRUTARI differs from “*Quærere*,” in implying, that the search is always conducted with anxiety, and that he, who carries it on, supposes that he has an interest in its success. The calm patience with which an enquiry, as denoted by the latter verb, is occasionally conducted, may often exist, without the keenness implied in the former. “Non excutio te, si quid forte ferri habuisti : non *scrutor* : nihil ad me arbitror pertinere.”—CIC. *Q. F.* 1. 1.

Non se tam penitus, tam longe luce relicta,

Merserit Assyrii *scrutator* pallidus auri — LUCAN. 4. 297.

“Desinamus ea *scrutari* quæ sunt inania : “*Quæramus*” ubi maleficium est, et inveniri potest.”—CIC. *pro S. R.* 32. a. In this last instance, the orator reproves the keenness of that research, which had been wasted on trifles, and proposes to begin one, in which more steadiness would be requisite, and a surer and more important object was presented. “*Scrutari* loca abdita, clausa effringere.”—SALL. *in Jug.* 12.

Mentes Deùm *scrutantur* in extis.—OVID. *Met.* 15. 136.

The zeal, implied in *Scrutari*, and the steadiness, in “*Quærere*,” are by no means incompatible, and may often exist together in the same mind. “Imo vero *scrutabimur* et “*quæremus*.”—CIC. *Part. Or.* 230. b. “*Scrutatus sum* quæ potui, et “*quæsivi*” omnia.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 4. 74.

Scrutari implies an exertion upon the part of the enquirer, which is not always found in “*Quærere*.” The latter, accordingly, sometimes denotes nothing more than asking a question, which the former never does. “Non “*quæro*” abs te, quare patrem Sex. Roscius occiderit.”—CIC. *pro S. R.* 73.

RIMARI differs from “*Scrutari*,” in immediately referring, not to the eagerness of the person who makes the search, but to the minuteness with which it is conducted. It supposes a space to be thoroughly ransacked, and every

corner of it tried, as water does the "Rimæ," or chinks, of the vessel that contains it. As "Scrutari" refers to the keenness, so does *Rimari* to the activity of the searcher, who is understood to leave nothing unexplored. "Sed tamen id quoque *rimatur* quantum potest."—CIC. *Div.* 107. a.

— hic torre armatus obusto,
Stipitis hic gravidi nodis: quod cuique repertum
Rimanti, telum ira facit.—VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 506.

"Civitas *rimandis* offensis sagax."—TAC. *Hist.* 4. 11. In all those examples, the striking circumstance is the activity of the *Rimator*, who rummages to the utmost for the object of which he has gone in quest.

QUÆSTUS, LUCRUM,

agree, in denoting profit or gain; but the former can express both the profit, and the means of acquiring it; while the latter expresses the profit alone. "Cum maximos *quæstus* prædasque fecisset."—CIC. *in Ver.* 174. a. "Marcus Fabium quod mihi amicum tua commendatione das, nullum in eo facio *quæstum*."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 15. 14. "Pecuniam sine fœnore creditit, maximum existimans *quæstum*, memorem gratumque cognosci."—NEP. *in Attico*, *Cap.* 9. In the above instances, *Quæstus* signifies only the gain, without regard to the means of acquisition. "Decem his annis proximis H. S. sexagies honestissime consequi potuit: noluit. Laborem *quæstus* recepit? *Quæstum* laboris rejecit."—CIC. *pro Q. Rosc.* 48. b. Here, *Quæstus* appears in both the senses ascribed to it. It first denotes the labour of acquiring, and then the profit of the labour. "Improbantur ii *quæstus*, qui in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut fœneratorum. Illiberales autem et sordidi *quæstus*, mercenariorum, omniumque, quorum operæ non artes emuntur."—CIC. *de Off.* 30. a. In these last sentences, *Quæstus* signifies the trades, or means of acquisition, alone; and it differs from "Mercatura," in not being confined to the purchase and the sale of commodities, but extending to profit acquired by labour, or otherwise.

LUCRUM differs from "Quæstus," in being confined in its signification to profit, without regard to the mode of earning it.

Næ ille haud scit, paulum *lucri*, quantum ei "damni" apportet.

TER. *Heaut.* 4. 4. 25.

Quid sit futurum cras fuge quærere, et

Quem sors dierum cumque dabit, *lucro*

Appone. ————— HOR. *Car.* 1. 9. 14.

Dum licet amplectar : nunquam fortasse licebit

Amplius : in *lucro*, quæ datur hora, mihi est.—OVID. *Trist.* 1. 3. 67.

"Alii emendi, aut vendendi "quæstu" et *lucro* ducerentur."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 229. b. Those merchants were engaged in two ways, both with the means of practising their trade ; that is, with buying and selling to advantage, and with the profits of that labour, by which they were continually adding to their stock.

QUIDAM—*vide* CERTUS.

QUINQUENNIS, QUINQUENNALIS,

agree, in referring to the term of five years, but differ, as this period expresses the age of that to which it is applied, or the length either of the time during which it continues, or of the intervals at which it recurs. The first, which is equal to the Greek word Πενταετης, denotes age alone, according with the nature of the object.

— duæ fuere filix :

Altera *quinquennis*, altera quadrimula.—PLAUT. *Prol. in Pen.* 84.

Quinquennes oleas est, et silvestria corna.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2. 57.

QUINQUENNALIS, equal to Πενταετηριος among the Greeks, differs from "Quinquennis," in referring to the duration of an event, or to the intervals at which it recurs, according as it is applied. "*Quinquennali* exilio multari."—QUINCT 7. 4. In this instance, nothing is suggested but the length of the banishment, from the period of its commencement to that of its termination. "*Quinquennalis* magistratus qui quinque annis continuis geritur."—LIV. 4. 24. Here, though there was a succession of office-bearers, yet nothing is suggested but the time during which each held his appointment. "Eleas Hippias quum Olympiam venisset, maxima illa *quinquennali* celebritate ludorum gloriatus est."—CIC. *de Or.* 154. b. The regularity of the return of these games, at a stated interval, is here suggested, without regard to their continuance.

QUOT, QUOTUS—*vide* QUANTUS.

RABIES—*vide* INSANIA.

RATIS—*vide* NAVIS.

RECENS—*vide* NOVUS ET MODO.

RECIPERE—*vide* CAPERE ET PROMIT-
MITTERE.

RECLUDERE—*vide* APERIRE.

RECOCTUS—*vide* ASTUTUS.

RECORDARI—*vide* MEMINISSE.

RECUSARE—*vide* NEGARE.

REDIMIRE—*vide* ORNARE.

REGERE—*vide* IMPERARE.

REGNUM, PRINCIPATUS, DOMINATUS,

agree, in denoting the power of a sovereign, but differ, as that power is more or less limited. The first, as a generic term, denotes a monarchical form of government, more or less limited, as opposed to any other. “Nam ut adhuc quidem actum est, non *regno* sed *rege* liberati videmur. Interfecto enim rege, regios omnes nutus tuemur. Neque vero id solum sed etiam quæ ipse ille si viveret non faceret, ea nos, quasi cogitata ab illo, probamus.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 183. a. Here, Cicero speaks entirely as a republican. Any form of monarchy, in whatever degree limited, would have been disagreeable to him, though he refers particularly to that which once took place at Rome, and from which he considers the state as happy in being delivered.

Regnum, beside the meaning assigned to it, in respect to which it is synonymous with the two other terms, signifies also the territory within which a sovereign's power has influence. “Nullum *regnum* fuit unquam, quod non si minus jure aliquo, at regionibus tamen certis contineretur.”—CIC. *cont. Rull.* 73. a. In the following passage, *Regnum* may be taken in either acceptation. “Non exercitus neque thesauri præsidia *regni* sunt, verum amici.”—SALL. *Jug.* 10.

PRINCIPATUS differs from "Regnum," in supposing a limitation of that power of a sovereign, to which the latter suggests, that no particular bounds are set; but implies, that the limitation may be more or less extended. It comes from "Princeps," and that from "Primus" and "Capere," and refers to the first place, in respect to a quality held in estimation among a number of similar objects. Cicero gives the most general definition of it, in the following sentence. "*Principatum* id dico quod Græci *ηγερμονικον* vocant, quo nihil in quoque genere nec potest, nec debet, esse præstantius."—*Nat. Deor.* 31. b.

As opposed to "Regnum," however, we must take *Principatus* in a more limited sense, and confine it to a gradation in kingly authority. Suetonius seems to mark the difference between the terms with precision. "Nec multum a fuit, quin statim diadema sumeret, speciemque *principatus* in "regni" formam converteret. Verum admonitus et principum et regum se excessisse fastigium, divinam ex eo majestatem adserere cœpit."—*SUET. in Calig.* 22. The term *Principatus* defines the form of government as limited in a certain degree, even under Caligula. In his madness, however, and when he was exclaiming *Εἰς κοίρανος εἶμι, εἰς βασιλεὺς*, he wished his power to become extended to that degree which "Regnum," as a generic term, comprehends, but which is beyond the reach of *Principatus*. They who flattered him in his folly, too, are, by the climax, well made to observe, that though the power of "Reges" was higher than that of *Principes*, yet his was superior to both.

DOMINATUS differs from the two former words in denoting, that the power of the person ruling is uncontroled, and the submission of those yielding obedience, abject. "Principatus" differt a *dominatione*, quia hæc tyranni est, et vi metuque subjectos contextit. "Principatus" speciem libertatis admittit et amari magis curat quam metui. Differt a "regno" quia rex cum *dominatione* insignia quoque regis habet."—*FACCIOLATI, ad Voc.* "Ubi enim id quod intus est, atque nostrum, impune evolare potest, contraque nos pugnare: fit in *dominatu* servitus, in servitute *dominatus*."—*CIC. pro Reg. Dei.* 149. b. The two last words are strictly correlative, as, by such an overturn as that mentioned, tyrants become slaves, and slaves tyrants. By the expression "Servile imperium," Sallust means the arbitrary spirit of those who exercise the power, as

well as the slavish submission of those yielding to it. Pliny, in his Panegyric, furnishes us with a passage that makes the distinction between "Principatus" and *Dominatus* obvious. "Scis ut sint diversa natura *dominatio* et "principatus," ita non aliis esse "principem" gratiorem, quam qui maxime *dominum* graventur."—PLIN. *Pan.* 45. They who most value the lawful and limited authority of a "Princeps," do hate, in the same degree, the capricious tyranny of a *Dominus*. The emperor Tiberius gave himself out as the "*Dominus servorum*," the "Imperator militum," and the "Princeps cæterorum." Slaves, only, could, in his judgment, brook a *Dominus*; soldiers should submit to military command; and all the rest of his subjects should enjoy that liberty which sprung from a due limitation of his own power.

RELINQUERE, DESERERE,

agree, in denoting to leave what a person has been before connected with, but differ, in regard to the difficulty and the completeness of the separation. The first verb signifies to quit the object, merely by withdrawing from the spot where it is, and implies only a volition to depart gratified. Between "Linquere," the root, and this compound, there appears to be little difference.

En eget auxilio qui non tulit: utque *reliquit*

Sic "linquendus" erat. Legem sibi dixerat ipse.—OVID *Met.* 13. 71.

— nos dulcia "linquimus" arva.—VIRG. *Ecl.* 1. 3.

This migration was not the effect of a spontaneous volition. Seeing the impossibility of resistance, those concerned in it counteracted their inclination, and chose the least perilous alternative. "Quæ nunc ego omnia prætereo ac *relinquo*."—CIC. *in Ver.* 170. b. Cicero, here, supposes himself first moving towards a point, then passing, and afterwards leaving it, by continuing his motion. That the person *Relinquens* does not always act under compulsion, appears from the following example. "Non adimitur iis civitas, sed ab his *relinquitur* atque deponitur."—CIC. *pro Cæcin.* 304. b.

DESERERE differs from "Relinquere," in supposing, that the separation is effected with greater difficulty, in consequence of the connection having been more intimate. He, "qui *deserit*," does not merely recede from the point,

where the object of former connection is, but violently loosens the bonds, by which he was before tied to it. The verb is a compound of "De" and "Serere," to plait or twist, and denotes a breach of union between objects that had been interwoven.

— My. Tum autem hoc timet
 Ne *deseras* se. Pa. Hem ! egone istuc conari queam ?
 Non faciam. ————— TER. *And.* I. 5. 34.

By using the verb *Deserere*, Mysis supposes, that the separation, which Pamphilus afterwards declares to be impossible, would certainly cause a struggle. There would have been a feebleness in "Relinquere," not suited to the state of the lover's mind, and the purity of the author's style. "Omittendæ sunt omnes voluptates, "relinquenda" studia oblectationis, sermo familiarium *deserendus*." —CIC. *pro Cæ.* 47. a. Cicero, in here enumerating the sacrifices to be made in the study of oratory, forms a climax in his expression, by which the philologist may be instructed. Pleasures in general must not be indulged ; all refinement in luxury must be abandoned ; and, what is worst of all, the student must tear himself from the conversation of his friends.

— ubi ætate hoc caput colorem commutavit,
 "Reliquit," *deseruitque* me. ————— PLAUT. *Most.* 1. 3. 44.
 Quapropter nitar, faciam, experiar : denique
 Animam "relinquam," potius quam illas *deseram*. — TER. *Adelph.* 3. 4. 51.

The language of Hegio, as expressive of attachment, is as strong as possible. No exertion, however desperate, was to be declined ; and the loss of his life was to cause a struggle less disagreeable than that arising from deserting his friends.

RELIQUOUS—*vide* ALIUS. REPERIRE—*vide* INVENIRE.
 REMINISCI—*vide* MEMINISSE.

REPUDIUM, DIVORTIUM,

agree, in denoting the destruction of a matrimonial contract ; but the former is applicable to the parties, both when they are betrothed, and when they are actually married ; while the latter is applicable to them, while they are married

alone. REPUDIUM, from "Pudor," signifies a putting away for shame; "Dictum," according to Festus, "quod fit ob rem pudendam."

— illi *repudium* renunciat,

Hanc ducat.——TER. *Phorm.* 4. 3. 72.

Quum ego vestri honoris causa *repudium* alteri

Remiserim, quæ dotis tantundem dabat.——*Ibid.* 5. 7. 35.

In both the above instances, the *Repudium* refers to a woman that had been only affianced. "Quirinius post dictum *repudium* adhuc infensus, quamvis infami atque nocenti miserationem addiderat."—TAC. *An.* 3. 22. "Divus Hadrianus eum, qui alienam uxorem ex itinere domum suam reduxisset, et inde marito ejus *repudium* misisset, in triennium relegavit."—PAPIN. *L. 8. D. de Divort. et Repud.* In the two last examples, we find instances of a husband that had divorced his wife, and of a wife that had divorced her husband.

DIVORTIUM differs from "Repudium," in being applicable only to the divorce that takes place between parties that are married. "Non recte sponsa "divertisse" dicitur; quando *divortium* ex eo dictum est, quod in diversas partes eunt qui discedunt."—PAUL. *Lib. 50. Leg.* 191. The pre-existence of an union is here said to be necessary to the breach of it, and to that kind of separation which the radical word implies.

In its original meaning, *Divortium* expresses the separation of waters running different ways. "Amanus Syriam a Cilicia, aquarum *divortio*, dividit." CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 79. a. "Prope ipsis jugis, ad *divortia* aquarum, castra posuisse."—LIV. 38. 45.

From this radical meaning, *Divortium* has been taken, figuratively, to denote the legal putting asunder of a pair that had been married. "In defunctæ locum, Marciam Furnillam, splendidi generis, duxit uxorem; cum qua, sublata filia, *divortium* fecit."—SÜET. *Tit. Vesp.* 4. "*Divortium* inter virum et uxorem fieri dicitur, "repudium" vero sponsæ remitti videtur, quod et in uxoris personam non absurde cadit."—MODESTIN. *de Verb. Sig. L.* 101. § 1.

REVIVISCERE, RENASCI,

agree, in denoting the prolonged existence of animal or vegetable life ; but the former implies the re-animation of a substance that has been dead, and the latter the succession of another, that possesses the qualities of the one whose place it supplies. “Cujus vitam si putetis per vos restitui posse, nolitis : et de ejus necelata quæstio est, qui si eadem lege *reviviscere* posset, lata lex nunquam esset.”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 117. a. The supposition here is, that Clodius could be brought to life again ; and it is affirmed, that the judges would be as unwilling as unable to do so. “Gramina nisi manu eliguntur, et in summum rejiciuntur, *reviviscunt*.”—COL. 5. 4. Those very stalks that had withered for a while, spring again, unless they are taken care of in the way mentioned. The previous extinction of life is implied in the figurative meaning of *Reviviscere*. “Ut facilius *reviviscat* Pompeianorum causa toties jugulata.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 255. b.

RENASCI differs from “*Reviviscere*,” in implying the succession of an animal substance, in place of another that has perished. In the case of the latter verb, the identity of the substance continues ; in that of the former, there is only the strictest similitude between two. “Neu primi cujusque mali excidendi causa est, ut aliud *renascatur* illo pejus.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 275. a. One evil is here said to succeed another, the same in kind, but different in degree. “Ut *revixisse*, aut “renatum” sibi quisque Scipionem imperatorem dicat.”—LIV. 26. 41. The suppositions, here made, necessarily infer the distinction between the verbs, that is specified. It is understood, either that the Scipio, who was dead, should come to life again, or that another Scipio was to arise, who should be his equal in military skill. “Phoenix moritur, et *renascitur* ex seipsa.”—PLIN. 13. 4. The living bird is but a representative, not the bird that lived.

Renasci sometimes denotes a vegetable substance, springing afresh from a stem or root, and acquiring a renewed existence. “Iidem qui mihi pennas inciderant, nolunt easdem *renasci*.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 55. b. When the feathers, however, are torn out by the root, there is an apparent destruction of their vegetable nature ; and when new ones grow again, they are said

“reviviscere.” “Nullis eorum pennæ reviviscunt avulsæ.”—PLIN. 11. 18. This use of “Reviviscere,” by Pliny, is suspicious, and does not entirely tally with the practice in the purer ages.

REUS, SONS,

agree, in denoting the imputation of guilt, but differ, according as the ground of that imputation is understood to be real, or is only matter of proof. REUS, from “Res,” denotes the person whose cause is the subject of litigation, whether guilty or otherwise. “*Reus autem appello non eos modo qui arguuntur, sed omnes quorum de “re” disceptatur.*”—CIC. *de Or.* 125. a. It applies equally to one concerned in civil and in criminal processes, and, in the former, stands opposed to the “Petitor,” or “Prosecutor.” “Quis erat “petitor?” Fannius. Quis *reus*? Flavius.”—CIC. *pro Rosc. Com.* 52. a. The *Reus*, it may be seen in the following passage, may be either “nocens” or “innocens.” “*Reis tam innoxii, quam nocentibus absolutiones venditare.*”—SÜET. *in Vesp.* 16. Of one in the former state Horace speaks in the following passage:

Solventur risu tabulæ: tu missus abibis.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 1. 80.

SONS differs from “Reus,” in denoting the reality of the guilt, whether proven or otherwise. “Idque est viri magnanimi, rebus agitatis, punire *sontes*, multitudinem conservare.”—CIC. *de Off.* 16. b. “Qui antea aut obscuris hominibus, aut etiam *sontibus* opitulari poteram, nunc amicissimo ne benigne quidem polliceri possum.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 4. 13. Cicero, here, talks of the extent of his former influence, which could support the mean, and what he holds to be still more, could even screen the guilty.

Discitur innocuas, ut agat facundia, causas:

Protegit hæc *sontes*, immeritosque premit.—OVID. *Trist.* 2. 273.

The poet, here, talks of the perversion of eloquence, by which it protects the guilty, and oppresses the innocent.

Quid fiet *sonti*, cum “rea” laudis agar?—OVID. *Heroid.* 14. 120.

Hypermnestra, here, glories in the supposed criminality of being the only one

of fifty sisters that spared the life of her husband. She styles herself "Rea," because she was tried, and suffered for her virtue; but she affirms, that the punishment due to each of the rest, who were all undeniably guilty, and to whom the term *Sons* is applicable, could not be estimated.

RHEDA—*vide* CURRUS.

RIDERE, SUBRIDERE, CACHINNARI,

agree, in denoting the expression of mirth by laughter, but differ in respect to the violence with which the signs occasionally show themselves. RIDERE, as a generic term, allows more latitude, in the expression of mirth, than the other two, and is applicable to greater or less changes in the countenance, and involuntary motions in the body, while the fit continues. "Marcus Crassus, quem semel ait in vita *risisse* Lucilius, et ea re *αγελαστον* vocatum."—CIC. *de Fin.* 146. b. Nothing is said as to the violence of this single laugh of Crassus. Whatever may be inferred from the austerity of his character, the verb will apply to a laugh that was either moderate or otherwise. "Non puto esse, qui temporibus his *ridere* possit."—CIC. *Ep Fam.* 2. 4. If, in the times to which Cicero refers, there was an indecency in laughing, that indecency would increase or diminish, according as those times became more or less distressing.

Ut *ridentibus* "arrient," ita flentibus adsunt

Humani vultus. ————— HOR. *de Art. Poet.* 101.

The violence of the sympathetic laugh would be proportioned to that of the person who excited it. That of both, accordingly, is susceptible of the modifications of greater and less.

SUBRIDERE differs from "Ridere," in denoting to smile, or to express a moderate sentiment of mirth, with a corresponding change of the countenance. It supposes good-will in the person, who does so, towards those on whom he looks, and stands opposed to frowning. "*Subridet* Saturius Veterator, ut sibi videtur."—CIC. *pro Q. Rosc.* 48. b. The cunning purpose of Saturius would have been defeated, had he given any other kind of laugh but a smile.

Olli *subridens* hominum sator atque Deorum,

Vultu quo cœlum tempestatesque serenat,

Oscula libavit natæ. ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 258.

The smile of Jupiter was that of affection, and indicated every disposition to alleviate the uneasiness of Venus, in respect to the fate of Æneas and his followers. From the following passage in Martial, it should seem that there may be gradations even in the smile denoted by *Subridere*.

Subrisi modice : levique nutu

Me quem dixerat esse, non negavi.—MART. 6. 82.

Subridere signifies to sneer, as well as to smile. The agreeable sensation then expressed, arises not from good-will, but from a malicious satisfaction in seizing an opportunity to give pain.

Ad quem *subridens* mixta Mezentius ira.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 742.

CACHINNARI differs from the former verbs, in denoting to laugh violently, or to exhibit a convulsive expression of extravagant mirth, which affects the features, the lungs, and even the whole body.

Est quæ perverso distorqueat ora *cachinno*.——OVID. *Art. Am.* 3. 287.

—— Rides? majore *cachinno*

Concutitur : flet, si lacrymas aspexit amici :

Nec dolet———JUV. *Sat.* 3. 100.

—— et risu tremulo concussa *cachinnant*.——LUCRET. 2. 974.

“In iis ipsis potiundis, exultans gestiensque lætitia turpis est : ut si “ridere” concessum sit, vituperetur tamen *cachinnatio*.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 224. a.

RIMARI—*vide* SCRUTARI.

RIXA—*vide* JURGIUM.

RODERE—*vide* VESCI.

ROGARE, PETERE, POSTULARE, POSCERE, FLAGITARE, agree, in denoting the expression of a desire to obtain something not possessed, but differ in respect to the urgency with which this desire is announced. They are all distinguished from the verbs “Cupere” and “Optare,” which, though not equivalent, suppose, like them, the existence of desire, but not the expression of it, with a view to its being fulfilled.

The power of the verb ROGARE extends no farther than to the simple intimation of desire. By means of it, a want is suggested to the person addressed,

of which he was before ignorant ; and both he and his petitioner are supposed conscious, that compliance with the request must be voluntary, and the effect of good-will. “ Molestum verbum est, et onerosum, et demisso vultu dicendum, *rogo*.”—SEN. *Ben.* 22. ‘ “ Malo emere quam *rogare*.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 4. 12.

- He, who proposed a law in the Roman Comitia, and was then said “ *Rogare legem*,” presented his request respectfully, and left it to the assembly to judge as to the expediency of granting it.

PETERE differs from “ *Rogare*,” in supposing a certain difficulty in coming at the object desired, and a greater degree of keenness upon the part of the petitioner. “ Ad te confugimus, a te opem *petimus*.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 5. 5. “ Cum a me *peteret*, et summe contenderet, ut propinquum suum defenderem.”—CIC. *pro Quin.* 14. a. “ Id sibi ut donaret, “ *rogare* ” et vehementer *petere* cœpit.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 215. a. In the last example, the verbs “ *Rogare* ” and *Petere* are evidently contrasted. The latter denotes a degree of zeal upon the part of the person who asks, which the former does not.

The definition now given of *Petere* does not correspond with that given by Servius. “ *Peterè*,” says he, “ est cum aliquid humiliter, et cum precibus postulamus.”—*Æneid.* 9. 193. With all the respect due to so great a critic, it may be urged, that this power of *Petere* is not to be discerned in the verb, when taken by itself, though it may be expressed by words with which it is occasionally accompanied. Thus, Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, says, “ Suppliciterque locuti, flentes pacem *petissent*.”—1. 27. “ Pueri mulieresque, passis manibus, pacem ab Romanis *petierunt*.”—2. 13. Nothing in either of those instances serves to prove, that the keenness of the petitioner, which marks the verb, may not exist, independently of the manner in which the request is presented. The manner is, in fact, expressed by those terms that happen to be adjuncts to the verb.

Petere, from the Greek verb Πηρω, “ Ferri,” “ Volare,” shows its native force in such derivatives as “ Impetus ” and “ Præpes.” It seems to have originally expressed an effort to come at objects not within reach, and to have been transferred from material objects to intellectual conceptions. Its primi-

tive power appears in such instances as the two following: "Sciebam Catilinam non latus aut ventrem, sed caput et collum *petere* solere."—CIC. *pro Muræna* 136. b.

Malo me Galatea *petit*, lasciva puella.—VING. *Ecc.* 3. 64.

The power of *Petere*, thus limited, appears to have been afterwards extended, so as to express a desire, accompanied with an effort to obtain any object whatever; and thus the original idea of bodily exertion was lost in that of the eagerness of any pursuit. Candidates for offices at Rome were said "*Petere* magistratus;" and from a sense of the value, as well as of the difficulty of obtaining the object, they were keen in the pursuit of it.

From a passage in Horace, it should seem, that any means for the acquisition of an object, that are less than coercive, may be expressed by the verb *Petere*.

————— Cæsar, qui cogere posset,
Si *peteret* per amicitiam patris atque suam, non
Quidquam proficeret.——————HOR. *Sat.* 1. 3. 4.

Nothing more is suggested, here, by *Petere*, than Cæsar's keenness to hear this musician perform. It were absurd to suppose, that the emperor, who possessed the power of compulsion, would ever stoop to beg the favour, according to Servius, "humiliter, et cum precibus."

POSTULARE differs from "*Petere*," in as far as it suggests neither keenness nor difficulty, in the acquisition of the object. Beside the sentiment of desire, which is common to all the five verbs compared, the idea of claim, which is manifestly not inherent in either of the two former, is essential to *Postulare*. Upon a proper limitation of this claim, however, a due apprehension of the power of the verb depends.

The distinctive character of *Postulare* seems to rest on the acknowledged reasonableness of that which is demanded. "Geometræ solent non omnia docere, sed *postulare*, ut quædam sibi concedantur, quo facilius quæ velint explicent."—CIC. *de Off.* 58. b. When geometers require any concession of those they are about to instruct, they appeal to their reason, and tacitly bind themselves to allow the validity of that which they require. The axiom,

again, which is an undeniable principle, carrying with itself its own proof, is not to be confounded with the postulate, or entreated maxim. Other philosophers, as well as mathematicians, establish postulates, though often in terms less definite, and, of course, more readily mistaken. “*M. Dasne igitur hoc, Pomponi, Deorum immortalium vi, natura, ratione, naturam eam regi? A. Do, sane, si postulas.*”—CIC. *de Leg.* 1. 7.

Cicero uses the expression, “Impudenter “rogare,” impudentissime *postulare* :”—*de Off.* 1. 88. and thus intimates, that the indecency, which was culpable in the bare suggestion of a desire, as implied in the former verb, rose in a superlative degree, when to this was superadded the idea of a claim, as implied in the latter.

It appears from Quintus Curtius, that the insolence of Darius, after a severe defeat, provoked Alexander. He not only took to himself the appellation of king, without giving it to his conqueror, but presented his requests in terms that became not his situation. The historian of Alexander accordingly says, “*Postulabat autem magis quam “petebat.*”—QUIN. CUR. 4. 1.

POSCERE agrees with “Postulare,” in supposing, that the petitioner has a claim to have his request granted; but it besides denotes, that he himself is entitled to judge as to the validity of that claim, without regard to the opinion of the person requested, or to the acknowledged equity of the demand. Thus, Cicero says, “*Nemo tam audax qui posceret, nemo tam impudens qui “postularet.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 4. 44. The pointed opposition made here by the orator between the two verbs, shews clearly the meaning affixed by him to each. Impudence, he tells us in the last clause, or a contempt for the opinion of the world, who would judge as to the propriety of the demand, is all that would be needful for enabling the petitioner to present it in the form denoted by “Postulare.” With regard to *Poscere*, however, the case is different. A sentiment of courage is supposed needful, when a petition, implying the violation of some private right, was to be presented. A matter of favour would, with an unbecoming boldness, have been held forth as a matter of right, so that the person requested might reject the petition, as being an insult to himself.

The definition given by Varro of *Poscere* seems perfectly just, except only in as far as a compound is preposterously taken to state the power of the verb itself. "*Poscere*," says he, "est quoties aliquid pro merito nostro *deposcimus*."—SERV. *Æn.* 9. 193. Had the critic taken the trouble previously to define "*Deposcere*," we should have been at no loss to understand his account of the simple verb. His definition appears to be, in other respects, complete, as he supposes the petitioner possessed of the power of measuring the extent of what he styles "*Meritum*."

The different uses of the verb *Poscere* may be all reconciled with the definition now given, when it is applied to the intercourse that takes place between man and man. In its application, however, to those petitions that were presented by the ancients to their gods, its power becomes more mysterious. The idea of right is not easily reconciled with that of supplication; so that, according to the definition given of the verb, those, who were said "*Poscere deos veniam*," might well be accused of profaneness.

In order to obviate this seeming objection, it must be remembered, that a difference of opinion respecting the same act, in any two countries, may very naturally produce a difference in the interpretation of those words, that are expressive of this act in each. Undefined terms have, in this way, become a fruitful source of controversy in matters, both civil and religious; and even the science of grammar has suffered by those inaccuracies of expression, which it professes to remedy in all other subjects. The religious sentiments of the Romans were by no means refined. Vows were presented as bribes to their deities, into whose ear they whispered petitions, which they were ashamed to acknowledge in the face of the world. "*Turpissima vōta diis insusurrant; si quis admoverit aurem, conticescent, et quod scire hominem nolunt, Deo narant*."—SEN. *Ep.* 10. The prayer of such worshippers, then, was a matter of traffic, not an act of devotion. That disinterested benevolence, in reliance upon which more pious supplicants present their requests, was none of the attributes of a Roman deity. The humiliation of the devotee was, in his own eyes, an article of merit; and he left the altar, on which he had laid his offering, feeling the obligation imposed on that being to whom it was presented.

Many passages in the Latin classics confirm the truth of the observations now made.

— non tu prece *poscis* emaci,

Quæ nisi seductis nequeas committere divis.—PERS. Sat. 2. 3.

“Antequam limen Capitolii tangant, alius donum promittit, si propinquum divitem extulerit, alius si thesaurum effoderit. Ipse senatus recti bonique præceptor, mille pondo auri Capitolio promittit. Omnibus diis hominibusque formosior videtur massa auri, quam quicquid Apelles Phidiasve, Græculi delirantes fecerunt.”—PETRON. ARBIT. 88. 8. “Prisco instituto rebus divinis opera datur. Cum aliquid commendandum est, prece; cum solvendum, gratulatione; cum *exposcendum*, voto.”—VAL. MAX. I. I. I. The vow, then, among the Romans, was a bribe, the acceptance of which was deemed obligatory upon the party who took it. As means leading to an end, it necessarily preceded the claim, and was the foundation on which it was built.

The same notion respecting vows prevailed among the Greeks, as well as the Romans. In the prayer of the priest, who had been affronted by Agamemnon, the Grecian bard makes him state his claim to be heard in the most express terms.

— εἰ ποτε τοὶ χαριεντ' ἐπὶ νηὸν ἐρεψα,

Ἡ εἰ δὴ ποτε τοὶ κατα πionoα μηρὶ ἐκηα

Ταυρων ἠδ' αἰγων, τοδε μοι κρηνον εελδωρ.—Ιλιάδ. α. 39.

FLAGITARE differs from “Postulare,” and agrees with “Poscere,” in supposing the justness of the privilege assumed by the petitioner, of judging as to his own claim. Its power, however, is more extensive than that of “Poscere,” because, to the idea of being the judge of the validity of his right, it superadds that of effecting his purpose by such means as he reckons fit for doing so. In those means, at the same time, there may be a considerable variety. The petitioner may either distress the person requested with incessant importunity, or he may threaten vengeance, if the claim, which he feels himself entitled to enforce, is not fulfilled. That *Flagitare* has more power than “Rogare” and “Postulare,” appears from the two following sentences: “Metuo ne te forte

flagitent, ego autem mandavi ut “rogarent.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 98. “Tametsi causa “postulat,” tamen quia “postulat,” non *flagitat*, ego præteribo.”—CIC. *pro Quint.* 13.

In the oration of Cicero for Plancius, he calls upon Laterensis to specify his charge, and to mention any one tribe that his friend had corrupted in his competition for the ædileship. “Etiam atque etiam insto atque urgeo, insector, “posco,” atque adeò *flagito* crimen.”—CIC. *pro Plan.* 48. There is evidently a climax in the five verbs which compose this sentence, and the gradation is very happily supported. By means of “Poscere,” the orator makes a requisition in behalf of his client, of the justice of which he had a right to judge, and, by the public manner in which this requisition was made, he virtually threatens him with the penalties of law, if it was not complied with; which last conception is involved in the verb *Flagitare*.

Ausonius Popma defines this verb very properly, “Vehementer et plerumque cum strepitu et convicio “poscere.”—*De diff. Verb. Lib.* 2.

The gentlest power of *Flagitare*, which is that in which the petitioner proposes to effect his purpose only by teasing, appears in such examples as the two following: “Implorare et *flagitare* auxilium consulis.”—CIC. *pro Rab.* 9.

— nec potentem amicum

Largiora *flagito*,

Satis contentus unicus Sabinis.—HOR. *Car.* 2. 18. 12.

There are other instances, again, in which *Flagitare* implies, that the petitioner threatens the person requested, and excites fear, in order to effect his purpose.

Ejicite ex animo curam atque alienum æs,

Ne quis formidet *flagitatorem* suum.——PLAUT. *Præl. Cas.* 23.

“Petreius atque Afranius quum stipendium ab legionibus, pœne seditione facta, *flagitarentur*, cujus ille diem nondum venisse dicerent, Cæsar ut cognosceret “postulatum est.”—CÆS. *Bell. Civ.* 1. 87. The request made by the soldiers, in order to obtain their pay before it was due, was very different from that made to Cæsar, in order to have the matter settled.

There is a passage in Tacitus, in which the three last of the five verbs considered are so placed, that the meaning of each is very elegantly and decisively brought forth. The historian is describing the sentiments both of Otho and of the army at Bedriacum, which he had left just before the engagement that was to decide the contest between him and Vitellius. "Ibi de prælio dubitatum; Othone per literas *flagitante*, ut maturarent; militibus ut imperator pugnæ adesset "poscentibus;" plerique copias trans Padum agentes acciri "postulabant."—TAC. *Hist.* 2. 39. By forming this anticlimax, Tacitus gives information to the grammarian which is worthy of his attention. The terms of the emperor's message, in which *Flagitare* is used, are expressive of his authority, and intimate the danger of not complying with his request. Those which announce the sentiments of the soldiers, by means of "Poscere," are expressive of no unbecoming menace towards their commander, but make the fulfilment of their right to be led on to battle by him, the condition of their obedience. Many, again, whose request is announced by "Postulare," suggest a reasonable claim, in which there is not even the shadow of contumacy. They are willing to obey the orders of their commander with all prudent dispatch, and even in his absence; and they require a reinforcement, not as a right, but as the means of doing justice to their own courage, and to the cause which they had espoused. The delicacy exhibited by the historian in this description will please the more; the longer it is contemplated. He not only delights his reader by an elegant and masterly discrimination of the various sentiments then prevalent in the minds of Otho and his followers, but furnishes him also with some curious grammatical facts, which few other writers had ingenuity to perceive.

RUERE—*vide* CADERE.

RUMPERE—*vide* FRANGERE.

RUMOR—*vide* FAMA.

RUS, AGER, PASCUM, ARVUM,

agree, in denoting a territory without the precincts of any town, but differ, in respect either to its extent, or to its state of cultivation. RUS, in its most general sense, expresses the whole of a country, except that which is occupied

by cities, and has no reference to the state of the surface, whether champaign or mountainous, wild or cultivated. The limits of a kingdom alone circumscribe this territory; as no person that had gone abroad could be said to be "Rure," even though he inhabited no town. "Lælium semper fere cum Scipione solitum rusticari, cum *rus* ex urbe tanquam ex vinculis evolavissent." *Cic. de Orat.* 2. 6.

Romæ *rus* optas, absentem "rusticus" urbem.—*HOR. Sat.* 2. 7. 28.

Beside this general meaning, the term *Rus* is found to have a particular one, and is then made to denote the fields, which form a rural retreat. The extent of such fields depends on the accidental possession of the proprietor; but they are always understood to be in a state of improvement, and thereby to minister to his pleasure. When Horace exclaimed

O *rus*, quando ego te aspiciam?—*Sat.* 2. 6. 60.

he did not merely wish to be out of town, but to be at a particular place in the country.

Ergo alacris sylvas et cætera *rura* voluptas
Panaque pastoresque tenet———*VIRG. Eccl.* 5. 58.

Woods, and every thing else that promoted the amenity and improvement of the country, got the appellation of *Rura*. Many adjectives would be inapplicable to *Rus* in its most general acceptation, that are by no means so in this particular one.

——— laudato ingentia *rura*,
Exiguum colito.———*VIRG. Georg.* 2. 412.

AGER differs from "Rus," in denoting neither the country in general, nor any rural habitation in it. Like "Rus," it signifies a field of undefined extent; but it supposes it to possess the capacity of considerable improvement, and to furnish a subject for the industry, but not for the luxury, of the proprietor. Upon the "Rus," there was always a house or villa; upon the *Ager*, no such place of abode was expected. Ulpian, accordingly, says of it, "*Ager* est locus qui sine villa est."—*L. 27. de Verb. Sig.*

— *agrum* hunc mercatus sum : hic me exerceo.—TER. *Heaut.* 1. 1. 94.

“Ut *ager* quamvis fertilis, sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest ; sic sine doctrina animus.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 177. b.

Ager is sometimes used collectively, and then denotes an inhabited territory, without regard to any particular field. Thus, a person was currently said to be “in *Agro* campano,” “in *Agro* Sabino,” &c.

PASCUUM differs from “*Ager*,” in supposing the field to be in pasturage, whether it be so by the hand of Nature, or in consequence of the farmer’s art.

Hic ubi nunc Roma est, incædua sylva virebat,
Tantaque res paucis *pascua* bubus erat.—OVID. *Fast.* 1. 243.
Limosoque palus obducatur *pascua* junco.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 1. 49.

The pastures, overflown by the marsh, must have been originally natural ones. Those farmers, again, who burned their woods that they might extend their pasturage, employed their art.

Pascuum is found to denote that part of a farm, or rural retreat, that is kept for pasture. “Rus quod *pascuo* caret.”—COLUM. 7. 1.

— inducti terræ bonitate volebant,
Pandere agros pingues, et *pascua* reddere “rura.”—LUCRET. 5. 1247.

ARVUM, from “*Arare*,” differs from “*Pascuum*,” in supposing the land to be in a state of tillage, and put into such a situation as to justify the farmer’s expectation of a crop. The state denoted by “*Pascuum*” may be either natural or artificial ; that by *Arvum* can be artificial alone. “Numidæ “pabulo” pecoris magis quam *arvo* student.”—SALL. *Jug.* 90.

Arvo pascat herum, an baccis opulentet olivæ.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 16. 2.

“*Arva* per annos mutant, et superest “*ager*.”—TAC. *Germ.* 26. The Germans changed those fields that were in culture annually, and still they had an overplus of land, not actually in that state, but susceptible of improvement.

RUSTICARI—*vide* PERAGRARE.

SABULUM—*vide* ARENA.

SACRIFICARE, LITARE, PARENTARE,

agree, in denoting the act of sacrificing, but differ, in respect either to the supposed success with which the sacrifice is attended, or the nature of the beings to whom it is offered. SACRIFICARE signifies nothing more than to present the offering, and to implore a favour, which may, or may not, be obtained. Such was the act of Hamilcar, when he led his son, Hannibal, to the altar. “Apud quam *sacrificare* instituerat, eamque tenentem jurare jussit.”—NEP. 22. 2.

Admonet et forti *sacrificare* Deæ.—OVID. *Fast.* 3. 850.

LITARE differs from “Sacrificare,” in implying, that the offering has been accepted by the Gods, and the sacrifice attended with success. The verb has, in all probability, been originally “Lutare,” and a frequentative from “Luo.” The act has been understood to appease the Deity, and to free the person sacrificing from an obligation, similar to that of the debtor to his creditor. “Cum pluribus Diis immolatur, quî tandem evenit, ut *litetur* aliis, aliis *non litetur* ? quæ autem tanta inconstantia Deorum est, ut primis “minentur” extis, “bene promittant secundis ?”—CIC. *de Div.* 115. b. “Plurimis hostiis cæsis cum *litare* non posset, introiit curiam religione spreta.”—SÜETON. *in Cæs.* 81.

Si, hercle, istuc unquam factum est, tum me Jupiter

Faciat, ut semper “sacrificem” nec unquam *litem*.—PLAUT. *Pæn.* 2. 41.

“Tribus bubus *perlitasse* negavit. Senatus majoribus hostiis usque ad *litationem* “sacrificari” jussit.”—LIV. 41. 15.

PARENTARE differs from the two former verbs, in respect to the object of worship, when the offering is made. It supposes this object to be the

ghosts of departed parents, and the act to be expressive of filial piety. The act, which, from the etymology of the term, seems to have been applied to parents, was transferred to any benefactor. "Hostia autem maxima *parentare*, pietati esse adjunctum putabant."—CIC. *de Legg.* 181. a.

Et quocunque tamen miseri venere, *parentant*,
Et nigras macant pecudes, et Manibu' divis
Inferias mittunt. ————— LUCRET. 3. 51.

"Litemus" igitur Lentulo, *parentemus* Cethego, revocemus ejectos."—CIC. *pro Flac.* 164. a. The orator, here, speaking ironically, advises that such honours should be paid to Catiline's associates as ill became their character. The favour of Lentulus was to be courted by repeated sacrifices, till they were in the end successful; and rites were to be performed at the tomb of Cethegus, due only to parents, and the most respectable of men.

SAL—*vide* LEPOS.

SALIRE, EXULTARE, GESTIRE,

agree, in denoting the act of leaping, but differ, according as this act is, or is not, the sign of some inward sentiment, and according to the kind, or the degree, of the sentiment, when it is. SALIRE signifies to spring, either upwards or forward, by the use of that muscular power, with which certain animals are endowed. It generally supposes, that the animal exercises his natural agility, and employs no sign of any internal emotion whatever. "Aves vario meatu feruntur. Ambulant aliquæ ut cornices: *saliunt* aliquæ ut passer."—PLIN. 10. 38. Here, the verb denotes the hop of the sparrow, as different from the manner in which other animals use their feet.

Mollibus in pratis unctos *saliere* per utres.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 383.

The worshippers of Bacchus practised feats of agility in honour of the God, and wished to shew their contempt for goats as the enemies of vines, by leaping upon bottles made of their hides.

Ibi cursu, luctando, hasta, disco, pugillatu, pila,
Saliendo sese exercebant ————— PLAUT. *Bacch.* 3. 3. 24.

When *Salire*, like “Saltare,” signifies to dance, or to move with regular steps, according to a certain air, some word in the sentence refers directly to music.

— “tibicina,” cujus

Ad strepitum *salias* terræ gravis.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 14. 25.

EXULTARE differs from “Salire,” in implying, that the animal that leaps is stimulated by some inward affection, which the act of leaping makes manifest to others. It also differs from “Salire,” in never denoting the act of dancing in any possible combination of words in which it presents itself. The stimulating affection may be of different kinds; such as joy, fear, desire, vain-glory. “In ejus igitur copias cum se subito ingurgitavisset, *exultabat* gaudio.”—CIC. *Phil.* 2. 27. “Qui appetitus longius evagantur, et tanquam *exultantes* sive cupiendo, sive fugiendo, non satis a ratione retinentur.”—CIC. *Off.* 120. 29. “Verberibus cogebat equos *exultare*, et calces remittere.”—NEP. 18. 5. 5. “Nec Agricola unquam in suam famam gestis *exultavit*.”—TAC. *Ag.* 8. 4.

The shade, by which the figurative is distinguished from the literal meaning of words, is often extremely delicate, and, in order to understand the former, we must keep the latter constantly in view. It is certain, that a sentiment of joy often leads to the motions of dancing, though he, who is said “*Exultare* gaudio,” may really sit still.

GESTIRE differs from “Exultare,” in limiting the affection which stimulates the animal, to joy, and in admitting a greater variety of motions, by which this affection is expressed. Festus says of this verb, “*Gestit*, qui subita felicitate exhilaratus, nimio corporis motu præter consuetudinem “*exultat*.” It appears to have been originally applied to the brute creation, and afterwards to mankind. “Ut cum apricitate diei *gestiunt* aves.”—COLUM. 8. 15. “Lætitia, ut adepta jam aliquid concupitum, efferatur ac *gestiat*.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 211. b. “Quorum alter lætitia *gestiat*, alter dolore cruciatur.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 2. 14. The joy which leads to the act, implied in *Gestire*, stands opposed to the grief which forms the state denoted by “*Cruciari*.”—“Cum et inaniter et effuse animus “*exultat*,” tum illa lætitia *gestiens* vel nimia dici potest.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 212. a. In this figurative application of the verbs, a sentiment

of joy is made the cause of the act implied in the first, and the latter is made to comprehend the act of leaping, as a species within the range of its generic power.

SALTUS—*vide* SYLVA.

SALUBRIS, SALUTARIS,

agree, in denoting the quality of promoting the sound state of that to which they are respectively applied, but differ, according as this tendency is mediate or immediate. Both come from "Salus," and differ only as the causes, leading to certain effects, are primary or secondary.

Nutriant foetus et aquæ *salubres*.—HOR. *Car. Sæc.* 31.

———— et Jovis auræ

Lenibus impulsæ zephyris, auraque *salubri*.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 3. 693.

Nec potuit curas sanare *salubribus* herbis;

Quicquid erat medicæ vicerat artis amor.—TIBULL. 2. 3. 13.

In the two first examples, as soon as the waters were tasted, and the air breathed, their effects, in promoting health, were manifest: in the last, the medicinal herbs failed in producing their ordinary effects, only from the violence of the disease. "Leges, res *salubrior* meliorque inopi quam potenti."—LIV. 2. 3. "Dixi sententiam reipublicæ *saluberrimam* et necessariam."—CIC. *pro Dom.* 216. a. The laws had a direct tendency to the good of the poor, in the first passage, and the opinion to that of the state, in the second.

Salubris is sometimes used intransitively, and then denotes the sound state as an inherent quality, in place of the nature of those means which lead to it, as an effect. It then comes near to "Sanus," in meaning, but expresses more than soundness, or the mere absence of disease. It implies that wholesomeness, or general train of health, in animal bodies, which constitutes vigour, and that energy, in other subjects, which distinguishes them, as efficient in their own line. "Quicquid salsum aut *salubre* in oratione, id proprium Atticorum est."—CIC. *de Or.* 205. a. "Corpora hominum *salubria*, et ferentia laborum." TAC. *Hist.* 5. 6. "Defuncta morbis corpora *salubriora* esse incipere."—LIV. 3. 8.

SALUTARIS differs from "Salubris," in implying, that the specified effect is

produced not immediately, but by the agency of means operating between it and the first cause. "Cultura agrorum, hominum generi universo est *salutaris*."—CIC. *de Sen.* 89. a. The beneficial tendency of agriculture is not perceived in the very practice of the art, but shows itself in innumerable ways that exist as effects to which this practice leads. "*Salutaris* severitas vincit inanem speciem clementiæ."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 274. a. This severity does not produce its effect at once; and its ultimate tendency is very different from its apparent one. "Nec tam fuit hominum generi infensa natura, ut corporibus tot res *salutares*, animis nullam inveniret."—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 222. a. All medicines are not, like the waters, the air, and the herbs, styled "*Salubres*." Many of them operate only in consequence of the patient's submitting to a tedious regimen; and many an intermediate step must be taken from the first commencement, to the completion of the cure.

Those herbs which we found styled by Tibullus "*Salubres*," are, by Ovid, styled *Salutares*.

Terra *salutares* herbas, eademque nocentes
Nutrit. ————— OVID. *de Rem. Am.* 45.

The "*herbæ salutares*" stand opposed to those that are noxious; the "*herbæ salubres*" to those that are wholesome in a less degree, and produce their effect by a continued use, and, if they fail in this, are not pernicious.

SANGUIS, CRUOR, SANIES,

agree, in denoting blood, but differ in respect to the state in which that fluid is. The first refers to it, as circulating through the veins, and ministering to the existence of animal life. "Ventriculus cordis, in quem *sanguis* a jecore, per venam cavam influit; eoque modo ex his partibus, et *sanguis*, per venas, in omne corpus diffunditur."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 54. a. The word *Sanguis*, however, is not confined in its signification to blood, as contained in the veins, but is applied, also, to that which is allowed to flow from them, by a surgical operation. "*Sanguinem* mittere ex brachio, in temporibus."—PETRON: *Sat.* 90.

————— detracto *sanguine* venis. ————— LUCRET. 3. 443.

CRUOR differs from "Sanguis," in never denoting blood confined and circulating in the veins, but such as is shed, and no longer subservient to the support of animal life. The same fluid which, in the state of coming from the vein, gets the appellation of "Sanguis," gets afterwards that of *Cruor*.

— e nostro cum missis corpore "sanguis"
Emicat exultans alte, spargitque *cruorem*.—LUCRET. 2. 194.

The blood that is shed by violence, or an inflicted wound, is styled *Cruor*, even at the time it flows. "*Cruorem* inimici quam recentissimum ostendere."—CIC. *pro Sex. Rosc.* 21. b.

— sacrum jugulis demitte *cruorem*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 542.

This circumstance, however, is not discriminative between "Sanguis" and *Cruor*, as the first is applied when violence has been used in the effusion of blood. "Vos appello, fortissimi viri, qui multum pro republica "sanguinis" effudistis."—CIC. *pro Mil. cap. ult.* The word *Cruor* is applied to blood that is extravasated, and not in circulation at the time. "Si *cruore* suffunduntur oculi."—PLIN. 23. 1.

SANIES differs from "Sanguis," in supposing what it denotes not to be in circulation in the veins, and from both it and "*Cruor*," in supposing the blood to be, in a certain degree, corrupted. It signifies sanious matter, or what is called "gore," in which a serous fluid is separated from the blood, and the whole is left unequally thick. It suggests the first change produced upon that which issues from a wound, the appearance of which forms a stage in the progress towards a cure.

Vulnera et ad *saniam* nunc coiere mea.—PROP. 3. *ult.* 18.

Celsus tells us, that as the blood is succeeded by matter that is sanious, so this is succeeded by what is purulent. "Ex vulneribus ulceribusque exit "sanguis," *sanies*, "pus." "Sanguis" omnibus notus est. *Sanies* est tenuior hoc, varie crassa, et glutinosa, et colorata. "Pus" crassissimum, albidissimumque, glutinosius et "sanguine" et *sanie*. Exit autem "sanguis" e vulnere recenti, aut

jam sanescente: *sanies* est inter utrumque tempus: "pus" ex ulcere jam ad sanitatem spectante."—CELS. 5. 26.

SAPERE—*vide* GUSTARE.

SAPIENS, PRUDENS, SCIENS,

agree, in denoting the knowledge which constitutes wisdom, but differ, as that knowledge is either applied or acquired. The first is a generic term, and signifies the power of judging rightly in all subjects, from a strength of reason, that is born with the mind exercising it. It comes from "Sapere," as denoting that nice power of the palate, by which it discriminates tastes that are nearly allied, not as denoting the relish which the thing tasted emits, as in the following example: "Nec enim sequitur, ut cui cor "sapiat," ei non "sapiat" palatus."—CIC. *de Fin.* 69. b.

"Imprudens" harum rerum, "ignarusque omnium."—TER. *Eun.* 1. 2. 56.

The note of Donatus upon this last passage is so very satisfactory, that nothing need be added to it. "Prudentia" naturalis est: "Gnaritas" extrinsecus venit. "Imprudens" per se: "Ignarus" per alios. Hoc est qui nec suspicatus sit, neque ex aliquo audierit."

Donatus remarks on this passage, "Διασυστητικως "sapiencia" dixit; quia condimentum gustu et sapore temperant Coci." The dependence of the adjective *Sapiens*, upon the participle which is its root, is here clearly seen. The power of the latter is transfused through the former, by means of the abstract which comes immediately from it. In deducing the primary idea of "Sapere," however, the verb suffers a metonymy, as its radical notion refers to the taste emitted, not to the palate judging of it.

— Sy. O Demea,

Istuc est "sapere," non quod ante pedes modo est

Videre, sed etiam illa, quæ futura sunt,

Prospicere —————TER. *Adelph.* 3. 3. 31.

"*Sapientissimum* esse dicunt eum, cui quod opus sit, ipsi veniat in mentem."
—CIC. *pro Clu.* 35. a. "*Sapientia* est rerum divinarum et humanarum scien-

tia, cognitioque quæ causa cujusque rei sit.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 221. b. The three last examples seem to justify the definition given of *Sapientia*, by showing the extent and origin of the power, and the mode of its application. It should seem, however, that it was not always held generic, but stated in opposition to “*Prudentia*.”

PRUDENS differs from “*Sapiens*,” as *Φρονησις* does from *Σοφία*, and refers to a nice apprehension of the nature of circumstances that are present, and of that conduct which will lead to effects that are most beneficial to the agent. It supposes, also, that the natural talent is fortified by experience and practice in human affairs. “*Princeps omnium virtutum est illa “sapientia” quam Σοφίαν Græci vocant: “Prudentiam” enim, quam Græci Φρονησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus, quæ est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia. Illa autem “sapientia,” quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia.*”—CIC. *de Off.* 31. a. “*Sapientia*,” it should seem, regards those truths respecting the conduct of gods and men, that, having an eternal existence, are ever before the eye that chooses to contemplate them. “*Prudentia*,” again, regards those which enable a man to play his part successfully in life, and both to foresee what is likely to happen, and to be ready to meet it. “*Alii autem in republica exercitati, ut de Atheniensi Solone accepimus, orientem tyrannidem multo ante prospiciunt: quos prudentes possumus dicere, id est, “providentes.”*”—CIC. *de Div.* 103. b.

SCIENS differs from the two former words, in implying, that the wisdom displayed does not arise from the natural ability of the agent, but from the information of another. The distinction made by Calphurnius between *Sciens* and “*Prudens*,” supports what is now said of them. “*Ille est qui alterius indicio rem cognoscit: hic qui intelligentia sua aliquid sentit.*” A defect in “*Sapientia*,” or in “*Prudentia*,” constitutes folly; a defect in the quality denoted by *Sciens* constitutes ignorance, which infers folly, in as far as the agent is culpably unprepared for performing his part.

Id ego jam nunc tibi renuntio, Here, futurum, ut sis *sciens*.

TER. *And.* 3. 2. 28.

SARCINA—*vide* PONDUS.

SATELLES—*vide* COMES.

SATISFACERE, SATIARE, SATURARE,

agree, in denoting the supply of every demand, however constituted, but differ, as the supply equals, or exceeds, the demand, and according to the degree of the excess, when it takes place. *SATISFACERE* implies, that that which is done is just adequate to the claim, and no more. “Principio orationis hoc appono, me omnibus qui amici fuerint salutis et dignitati meæ, si minus referenda gratia *satisfacere* poterim, at prædicanda et habenda certe *satis esse facturum*.”—*CIC. pro Cor. Balb. 55. a.* In the first clause of this sentence, Cicero doubts if he would be able to fulfil the claims of his friends, by actual expressions of gratitude; and, in the last, he affirms, that, if he came short of fulfilling them in this way, he should certainly discharge every obligation, by publishing their good offices, and thus shewing that he resented them as they deserved. “Ubi officio *satisfactum*, nulla ultra potestatis persona.”—*TAC. Ag. 9.* When Agricola had done his duty as a judge, so that the public had no longer any claim upon him, he assumed more easy manners. “Seseque paratos esse demonstrant, omnibus rationibus de injuriis *satisfacere*.”—*CÆS. Bel. Gal. 5. 1.* “*Satisfacere* dicimur ei, cujus desiderium implemus.”—*CAIUS, Dig. 2. 8. 1.* By the addition of the adverbs, in the following sentences, the meaning of *Satisfacere* seems to be carried beyond its ordinary limits, as the demand is more than fulfilled. “Eique cumulatissime *satisfacturum* te certe scio, cum nullam partem belli contra eum suscipias, neque socius ejus adversariis fueris.”—*CIC. Ep. ad Att. 141. b.* “*Satis* superque abs te videtur istorum studiis *esse factum*.”—*CIC. de Or. 102. a.*

SATIARE differs from “*Satisfacere*, in implying, that the demand is completely fulfilled, and that a superabundant quantity exists, which is not the object of desire. Like “*Satisfacere*,” it applies equally to every sense, and to things, also, that are courted from caprice, and not from any direct appetite. “Veniebat ad cœnam ut animo quieto satiaret desideria naturæ.”—*CIC. de Fin. 70. a.* The feast, to which Lælius is here said to have come, though not consisting of fine meats, was fully adequate to satisfy all the calls of nature: plain as it was, there was a superabundance. “*Satiatque* semodius cibi, in diebus singulis vicanos et centenos turtures.”—*COL. 8. 9.* The quantity of

food mentioned was more than sufficient to maintain the number of animals spoken of. "Satisfacere" would have implied, that there was enough to satisfy the calls of nature; but *Satiare* intimates, that there was enough, and to spare. "Sed est earum rerum non *satietas* sed *modus*."—CIC. *Ep.* 52. b. The "Modus," here, denotes the quantity precisely adequate to the demand, and *Satietas*, a feeling of useless superabundance. "Mortalibus suarum rerum *satietas* est, alienarumque aviditas."—PLIN. 12. 17. The two substantives, in this sentence, are happily opposed; the one denoting the vigorous craving of an appetite not indulged, and the other, that fulness which almost resists further gratification.

SATURARE differs from "Satiare," in denoting a greater superabundant quantity, accompanied with a disgust and rejection of it, in consequence of its cloying the sense, which a smaller would have satisfied. An appetite, to which "Satiare" is applicable, may still be susceptible of indulgence, however small in degree; but that, to which *Saturare* applies, has come to the extreme point of satiety, and has not even those cravings that are really false. "Nuper nati mammas appetunt, earumque ubertate *saturantur*."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 52. a. The rich provision made by Nature for supporting the young of animals, is happily expressed by the last verb. In the case of the human race, the superfluous milk is thrown from the stomach of the child by an operation that is not painful, and at the same time involuntary.

Ecquis erit *modus*? inquit: amor non talia curat.

Nec lacrymis crudelis amor, nec gramina rivis,

Nec cytiso *saturantur* apes, nec fronde capellæ.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 10. 28.

The two last lines of the above passage contain a complete answer to the interrogation, by Pan, in the first. It is declared, that, so far from there being any boundary in the pains of love, it, like the grass with rivulets, the bees with cytissus, and the she-goats with leaves, increases its demands with the indulgence given to it.

— *saturabat* glebula talis

Patrem ipsum, turbamque casæ.—JUV. 14. 166.

The poet, in order to strengthen the contrast between the luxury of his own,

and the frugality of former times, employs the verb *Saturare*. The small spot defined was found sufficient, at one period, to glut the appetite of a numerous family, and to exceed all possible consumption.

Chemists use the word "Saturare" precisely in the spirit of the Latin word, from which it is derived. When a certain quantity of water has dissolved a certain quantity of salt, and will dissolve no more, the water is said to be "saturated." An acid and an alkali mixed, so that the one does not dissolve the other, are said to be at their point of "saturation."

SCAPHA—*vide* NAVIS.

SCIENS—*vide* SAPIENS.

SCELUS—*vide* FACINUS.

SCINDERE, CÆDERE, SECARE, PUTARE,

agree, in denoting the act of cutting, but differ, either as to the means, or the end, of accomplishing it. SCINDERE, properly, signifies the violent separation of the parts of a substance, either natural or artificial, by the use of any instrument that is fitted to effect it. In the operation, denoted by *Scindere*, the impelling force may, or may not, be exerted by human strength; and the instrument may, or may not, act by means of an edge. The act, too, is at some times intentional, and at others not. "Pecora majora demergunt ungulas, et atterunt *sciduntque* radices herbarum."—COLUM. 2. 18.

Tum ferri rigor, atque argutæ lamina serræ,
Nam primi cuneis *scindebant* fissile lignum,
Tum variæ venere artes———VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 142.

Wood is, here, said to have been originally cut by means of wedges, before the invention of hatchets and saws, which operate by the sharpness of their edge. The wedge does not act by its sharpness, but must have cut the timber used by those rude artists, by a pressure upon the sides of an aperture, that was probably accidental, in the trunk of the tree. Even when the edge of the instrument is not concerned, the verb *Scindere* may be applied to the fissile substance, whose parts undergo a separation.

Scindere is, figuratively, applied to the sailing of a ship, from its seeming to divide the sea, through which it passes.

Stringat tenuis littora puppis.
 Nec magna meas aura phaselos
 Jubeat medium *scindere* pontum.—SEN. *Herc. Œt.* 694.

This verb often denotes, that the act, expressed by it, is unintentional. The landlord, for example, who tore the cloak of his guest, in order to detain him, did not mean to do him this injury, in proof of his hospitality. "Venit enim ad me, et quidem id temporis ut retinendus esset: sed ego ita egi, ut non *scinderem* pænulam. Paulo post C. Capito cum T. Carrinate. Horum ego vix attigi pænulam, tamen remanserunt."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 13. 33. In like manner, they who tore their hair, and their clothes, under the pressure of violent grief, did not do so from any deliberate purpose.

Nec dubium de morte ratæ, Cadmeïda palmis
 Deplaxere domum, "scissæ" cum veste capillos.—OVID. *Met.* 4. 544.

It must be observed, that the hairs torn from the root during such frantic expressions of grief, are not the "Capilli scissi" above mentioned. A single hair, too, broken, could not be said to be "Scissus." The verb *Scindere* must refer to a number broken in a line, lying in the direction of the hand that tore them.

CÆDERE differs from "Scindere," in supposing, that the separation is always made by the edge of that which effects it, whether it be blunt or otherwise. The cut, at the same time, is understood to be made by the severity of the blow, rather than the sharpness of the instrument.

Cædit semianimis Rutulorum calcibus arva.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 404.

The verb implies, that the surface of the body, struck intentionally, and with human force, is broken, and that the parts within it are severed in one direction or another. It comprehends neither the blow, which produces a contusion merely, nor the puncture, which is effected by the sharpness of the instrument, with little exertion upon the part of the agent.

—— taceo, nec pugnis *cadere* pectus
 Te veto, nec plana faciem contundere palma.—JUV. 13. 127.
 —— populum si *cadere* saxis
 Incipias, servosque tuos quos ære parâris.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 3. 28.

Cædere often signifies to kill, when the force of the agent operates on the body of an animal, where it is unable to resist it. The instruments of death, in this way, may be very different, provided they are impelled with sufficient force. An extinction of life may be effected by severe scourging with the lash of a whip, or by the thrust or the cut of a sword, when impelled by the warrior's arm. "Cervicem gladio *cæsim* graviter percutere."—Suet. *Calig.* 58. "Hispano "punctim" magis quam *cæsim* assueto petere hostem."—LIV. 22. 46.

— ille flagellis

Ad mortem *cæsus*.——HOR. *Sat.* 1. 2. 41.

SECARE signifies the act of separating the parts of any substance, by means of the sharpness of the instrument applied to it. It differs from "*Cædere*," in not requiring a severe blow from the hand that gives it, in order to effect the cut, and from "*Scindere*," in supposing it effected by dint of sharpness alone. "In corpore si quid ejusmodi sit, quod reliquo corpori noceat, uri et *secari* patimur."—CIC. *de Un.* 217. a.

— cape cultrum, *seca*

Digitum vel aurem, vel tu nasum vel labrum.—PLAUT. *Merc.* 2. 2. 38.

"At vero C. Marius rusticanus vir, sed plane vir, cum *secaretur*, ut supra dixi, principio vetuit se alligari: nec quisquam ante Marium solutus dicitur esse *sectus*."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 186. b. "*Secare* venam."—CELS. 3. 5. In all the above examples, there is an evident reference to operations in surgery, the success of which must depend on the sharpness of the instrument, even though directed by the most skilful hand. "Eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum sed in suas partes, quæ infinite *secari* ac dividi possint."—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 44. a. The infinite divisibility of matter cannot be conceived, without ascribing to the instruments, understood to effect it, the highest possible sharpness, such as that denoted by *Secare*.

Tu *secanda* marmora,

Locas sub ipsum funus: et sepulcri

Immemor, struis domos.——HOR. *Car.* 2. 18. 17.

It appeared before, that the verb "*Cædere*" is applied, by Cicero, to the

operation of raising stones from the quarry, in which they are found. Those blocks of marble, mentioned by Horace, were thus raised, when in a rude state, and were presented to the workman, who was to undertake to cut them into pillars, and other figures expected in fine buildings.

PUTARE differs from all the verbs before defined, in being applicable only to vegetable and animal substances, and in implying, that the substance cut necessarily undergoes a diminution, by a part of it being lopt off. This last circumstance often holds with respect to "Scindere" and "Secare," but not always. The "pænula scissa" was not necessarily made less than when whole. When a surgeon was said "Secare venam," he, by means of his lancet, only separated the part which he touched, without directly impairing the quantity of matter in the body of his patient, as if he had cut off a limb. *Putare* agrees with "Secare," at the same time, in supposing the operation performed by the edge of a sharp instrument, such as that with which the husbandman prunes his trees.

Jam tum acer curas venientem extendit in annum
Rusticus, et curvo Saturni dente relictam
Persequitur vitem attendens, fingitque *putando*.—VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 405.

The reason given by Aulus Gellius, why *Putare* is transferred from its original meaning to that of thinking, is ingenious and solid. "Non significat profecto aliud quam id agere, ut nos in re dubia obscuraque, decisis amputatisquè falsis opinionibus, quod videatur esse verum, et integrum, et incorruptum retineamus."—*L. 6. C. 5.*

SCINTILLA—*vide* FAVILLA.

SCISCITARI—*vide* PERCONTARI.

SCIRE, NOSCERE,

agree, in denoting to know, but differ, in respect to the nature of that knowledge, which is acquired. The first verb refers to each object or event, as existing; the latter to each, in respect to its apprehended nature. The one goes the length only of regarding facts as accumulated; the other goes further, and regards them as the subjects of science, and as more or less accurately explored.

Ignorance stands opposed to what is meant by *Scire*, and indistinct perception of what is known, to what is meant by "Noscere." "Factum ambitum scitis, et hoc vos scire omnes sciunt."—SEN. *Ep.* 94. Two different facts are here stated, as the subjects of that kind of knowledge which is implied in *Scire*. The people addressed are said to know that bribery was committed, and all mankind are said to know that this fact was known to them.

Scire tuum nihil est, nisi te *scire* hoc *sciat* alter.—PERS. 1. 27.

Here, the number of facts forming the subject of knowledge, in respect to the first *Scire*, is indefinite, as it comprehends all that the person addressed knows. The subject, in respect to *Sciat*, again, is but a single fact. Still, however, the kind of knowledge is the same in each.

Scire refers to all the circumstances forming a single detail, and is equally applicable to each, and to the aggregate.

Omnem rem *scio*, ut sit gesta : adveniens audiivi omnia.—TER. *Hec.* 3. 5. 18.

Et is omnes linguas *scit* ; sed dissimulat *sciens*

Se *scire*. —————PLAUT. *Prol. in Pæn.* 112.

"Non enim tam præclarum est *scire* Latine, quam turpe "nescire."—CIC. *de Clar. Or.* 37. When *Scire* is applied to languages, it refers to the multitude of facts, which, when acquired, forms skill in each of them. The luminous discernment, which enables the grammarian to reduce the different terms to their respective species, is not included in the conception suggested by this verb.

NOSCERE differs from "*Scire*," in implying, that the nature of the facts, that are the subjects of knowledge, is more or less accurately understood, and that they are not accumulated merely to increase the stock. Every object, to which "*Noscere*" is applied, has either been particularly examined by the mind, or is referred to a class that has been previously formed by it. By a reflex act, the mind is, in this way, said to examine herself. "Cum igitur *nosce te* dicit, hoc dicit, *nosce* animum tuum."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 129. a. "Nihil esse, quod *nosci*, percipi, comprehendi possit."—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 21. a. The first, as well as the last, of those verbs denotes a just apprehension of the nature of whatever might have been known to exist.

— *Ch.* Phania ille frater meus fuit. *Si. Noram* et “scio.”

TER. *And.* 5. 4. 31.

The note of Donatus upon this passage is accurate and philosophical. It shews, that the critic had apprehended the precise force of the two verbs, when he refers the first to the acquaintance that subsisted between Simo and Phania, and the second to Simo's knowing that he was Chremes's brother. “*Noram Phanium,*” says he, “scio” fratrem fuisse. Ergo et ad personam et ad rem retulit.”

That intimate knowledge which Agricola had of his province, and which he put it in the power of his army to have of himself, is happily expressed, by Tacitus, by means of this verb, and could not have been so by any other. “*Noscere provinciam, nosci exercitui.*”—TAC. *de Vit. Agric.* 5. The historian says of the same commander elsewhere, “*Omnia “scire,” non omnia exsequi.*”—*Cap.* 19. Here, he compliments Agricola upon the extent of his information simply, not upon the accuracy of his knowledge of any particular facts. To the merit of knowing every thing that passed in the army he commanded, he joined that of prudently conniving at offences, from the commission of which less danger was to be apprehended than from any public attempt to restrain them.

— *nosco crines, incanaque menta*

Regis Romani.———VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 809.

Æneas must be held too well acquainted with the history of Rome, which had not then existed, not to recognize the hair and grey beard of the old king *Numa*. The anachronism committed by the poet has no effect upon the pure application of the verb, and the fact, though future, must be understood to have been previously known.

The poets sometimes employ *Noscere* in place of “*Scire,*” when the matter of fact, which is not easily discovered, has been thoroughly seen. Thus, *Catullus* describes the knowledge which *Juno* had of her husband's intrigues.

Noscens omnivoli plurima furta Jovis.—CAT. 69. 140.

SCRUTARI—*vide* QUERERE.

SEBUM *vel* SEVUM, ADEPS,

agree, in denoting fat, but differ in respect to the nature of the substance, and to the part of the animal's body in which it is found. The first is what is called suet; drier, harder, and more easily broken, than what is called "Adeps" in Latin, and grease, in English. The Greeks called the *Sevum* Στεας, and the *Adeps* Πιμελη. Though both are melted by heat, yet the former resists this effect of it longer than the latter. The *Adeps* is found in the "membrana adiposa," that lies immediately under the skin, and is diffused over almost the whole surface of the body, while the *Sevum* is found between the bones and the flesh, and in the inside of the body also, particularly about the kidneys. This last, when refined, forms what is called tallow, and is the material of candles. "Cornigera sevo pinguescunt, non cornigera adipe. Concretus hic et cum refrixit fragilis, semperque in fine"—PLIN. II. 37. Here, the natural historian opposes the *Sevum* and the *Adeps*, and tells us, that one species of animals fattens in respect to the one, and another in respect to the other. The *Adeps*, in this case, does not appear to be in its natural state, and to have grown to a harder consistency than ordinary. It is added, that it is always found at the end of the flesh, and not incorporated with it. The doctrine of modern anatomists is not the same, upon this subject, with that of the ancients. In strict classical purity, the term should be applied only as it was formerly; but a liberal philologist will forgive its being made to accord with what the moderns have discovered.

Varro speaks of the "*Adeps* suillus."—*de R. R. cap. ult.* By this he means what is called lard, which is the grease of swine, opposed to that of other animals. It does not appear that modern anatomists employ the terms with very great correctness. The purest classics use them but little, and not so as to mark the meaning of each; so that their practice can hardly be turned to advantage. Augustin, whose language is rarely exceptionable, seems to disregard the distinction which Pliny establishes, and to substitute *Adeps* for *Sevum*. "Quid de *adipe* respondebitis, qui prope omnes Italas lucernas illuminat?"—*de Mor. Manich.* 2. 16.

SECARE—*vide* SCINDERE.

SECUNDUM,

like "Propter," and "Juxta," denotes the relation of vicinity between two or more objects. The first, from "Prope," and that from "Pro," denotes vicinity simply; "Juxta," from "Jungere," vicinity approaching to union, though the union does not take place; *Secundum*, vicinity, together with the dependance of an accessory upon its principle, which determines its situation. "Aliud est proximum esse, aliud *secundum*."—QUINCT. 10. 1. Though, in the above example, both "Proximum" and *Secundum* are adjectives, yet from them the nature of the preposition may be determined. The first, from "Prope," denotes only being next to, and implies no farther connection than this, which is merely casual; the second from "Secundus," and that from "Secus," denotes coming next in train, and implies a relation founded upon an established arrangement, in which the correlative assumes a direct connection with the governed object, which follows it, and has an implied connection with that which necessarily precedes it, though not suggested to the hearer's conception. As each ordinal number fixes the place occupied by the term qualified by it, by stating it as coming after the anterior, and before the posterior number, without any thing intervening, so general vicinity is expressed by this preposition coming from the first ordinal in nature, that specifies an object, in respect to both its sides.

That which is now said with regard to *Secundum* seems supported, also, in the following example. "Proxime et *secundum* Deos, homines hominibus maxime utiles esse possunt."—CIC. *de Off.* 53. a. The adverb "Proxime" intimates the vicinity simply, but the preposition superadds something. It strengthens the idea of vicinity, by suggesting, that no intermediate object comes between the gods and men, and that, in the scale as going downwards, the latter hold the next place to the former.

This radical power of *Secundum*, which is "Next to, in point of place," appears in the following example. "Remotis omnibus, *secundum* invitentem consedi."—PETRON. ARB. 131. "Duo vulnera accepit: unum in stomacho, alterum in capite *secundum* aurem."—CIC. *Ep.* 56. a.

This preposition, it appears, fixes one point in space, that it may serve as a

guide to another. The governed word denotes the point which is to direct, as the principal, and the correlative that which, as an accessory, is defined only from its vicinity to this. In the last of the above examples, the head gives the part upon which one of the wounds was inflicted; the ear gives the place of the head; and a spot, as near the ear as possible, so as to be next to it, is the precise point, upon which the stroke took effect.

When the governed object is extended, and the correlative assumes its shape, in whatever line it is so, *Secundum* is translated "By the side of," or "Along." The vicinity, which is the radical circumstance, is maintained, in this case, through all the irregularities of figure that can appear in the object approached. "Legiones Macedonicæ, quæ iter *secundum* mare superum faciunt."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 257. b.

Saltibus in vacuis pascant, et plena *secundum*

Flumina—————VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 143.

It is not necessary, in this use of *Secundum*, that the correlative object should be in motion, like the cattle feeding along the banks of the rivers, or the troops marching along the coast. "*Secundum* flumen paucæ stationes equitum videbantur."—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 2. 18.

Secundum is often taken to signify "Next, in respect to value," and is thus used, to appreciate objects that are incapable of local situation. The idea of vicinity is in this use preserved, and the circumstance involved in the correlative term is stated as the next in the subordination to that in the governed. "In actione *secundum* vocem vultus valet."—CIC. *de Or.* 164. b. In delivery, it is here said the voice holds the first place, and the countenance the second, which is immediately next to it. It is possible, that the orator could have suggested another circumstance of inferior consequence. This new one would have been the next to the voice but one. It would have been one remove from the voice, and stood in the same relation to the countenance that it is said to bear to the voice.

When the governed word presents an object, which, by its vicinity to the correlative, serves as a standard by which it is to be directed or judged of, *Secundum* is translated "According to." In this use, the preposition is always

taken figuratively, but still the law of its application may be as clearly ascertained, as if it stated the relation of one material object to another. "Omnia quæ *secundum* naturam fiunt, sunt habenda in bonis. Quid est autem tam *secundum* naturam quam senibus emori?"—CIC. *de Sen.* 19. In both sentences nature is held forth as giving the standard, by which different subjects are to be judged of. In the first, she states the law by which things are to be reckoned good or bad, and, in the last, the law of mortality, as particularly cogent in respect to old men.

Sed ut *secundum* vota Parthorum, sua
Urbs hæc periret dextera.—HOR. *Epod.* 7. 9.

Secundum is often found to signify "For," that is, "In favour" or "In behalf of." In this use, the correlative object is understood to be "nearest," or "upon the side of" the governed. Both are supposed to be animated; and between the latter and some third object there is understood to be a competition of interest. "Nunciat jam populo pontifices *secundum* se decrevisse."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 4. 2. The judges and the successful litigant are the parties suggested, here, by the terms on each side of the preposition. Cicero was a third party, who denied that the sentence was such as his antagonist reported it to be. "Vulgata Victoria, post principia belli *secundum* Flavianos."—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 7. Victory is here personified, and said to declare in favour of Vespasian's party, in opposition to his enemies.

Secundum, when applied to the noun "Quies," seems to be transferred to time, and to denote "In," or "During." This use is so singular, that, were it not supported by Cicero, little attention would be paid to the authority of Suetonius and Petronius Arbiter. "Quæ, causa alia est, cur *secundum* quietem, aliquid videre, audire, agere videamur?"—CIC. *in Div.* 134. b. "Cujus imago *secundum* quietem sibi observata sit."—SUETON. *in Aug.* 94. In this use of *Secundum*, Rest, personified, seems to have approached the sleeper, and, in consequence of this vicinity, to have overpowered him. This act suggests the state of the person influenced, and the transitory continuance of the state is announced by the term which originally suggests the cause.

This preposition, however, is found much more frequently denoting the

time when an event took place, than that of its continuance. In the former sense, it always respects time as future. The governed word suggests a period which is the measure of that involved in the correlative, and which follows it immediately. *Secundum*, then, in this sense, denotes uninterrupted succession, and may be translated "Just after." The posterior event is said to be next to the prior in time, as one object is said to be next to another in space. "Facilius nobis expones ea, sed opinor *secundum* hunc diem. Satis enim multa a nobis hodie dicta sunt."—CIC. *de Or.* 108. b. The effect of *Secundum* is to mark not mere futurity, in this sentence, but the precise period at which the discussion, then left off, was to be resumed. This was to take place, without the intervention of a single day from the then present one. Accordingly, it appears that the conversation alluded to was begun again next morning, before Crassus was out of bed. "Fore uti *secundum* comitiâ aliquid de nobis in senatu ageretur. Qua de re, quoniam comitiâ habita sunt, tuque nihil ad me scribis, proinde habebô, ac si scripsisses nihil esse."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 3. 13. In however quick succession the "Dies comitiales" might come after one another, Cicero was assured by his friend, that immediately after the next, and certainly before that which followed it, something would be done with respect to him, in the senate.

The future point in time may be postponed at pleasure, and may come immediately after any number of stated periods that the speaker chuses. "Tua ratio est, ut *secundum* binos ludos mihi respondere incipias; mea, ut ante primos ludos comperendinem."—CIC. *in Ver.* 72. b. Cicero's object appears to have been, to bring on the cause before the first games, which were the "Ludi Votivi," and which were to be celebrated ten days after. He blames Hortensius for creating studied delays, and alleges, that he intended to postpone his answer till after the "Ludi Romani," and thus gain near forty days.

It appears that *Secundum* carries in it the idea of a train, both in space and in time. In the former, it marks a body from its position, as being next to the first; in the latter, it states the first possible repetition of a period, from its necessary revolution, either in the order established by nature, or in consequence of human appointment.

SECUNDUM, then, may be translated as follows :

I.

NEXT TO. The neuter of the adjective "Secundus," is in this use taken as a preposition, which, from its connection with the first ordinal number that can fix rank by a relation on each side of it, expresses vicinity in general.

II.

BY THE SIDE OF, or ALONG. The governed object is, in this use, understood to be extended, and the correlative to assume its shape, through all its irregularities.

III.

NEXT TO, IN POINT OF VALUE. Objects not capable of local situation are supposed to have it, and one of inferior consideration to come next to another immediately above it.

IV.

ACCORDING TO. In this figurative use, the governed word presents an object, which, from its vicinity to the correlative, serves as a standard for judging of it.

V.

IN FAVOUR, or IN BEHALF OF. Both objects are required to be animated, and the correlative is understood to be next to the governed, that is, to stand by it, for its protection.

VI.

IN, or DURING. This use appears only when the preposition is applied to the word "Quies." The supposed vicinity between Rest and the sleeper under its influence, being but temporary, *Secundum* quits its original power respecting place, and measures duration.

VII.

JUST AFTER. One object is said to be immediately posterior to another in time, as one object is said to be "next to" another in space.

SEMIANIMIS, SEMINEX,

agree, in denoting half-dead, but differ, in respect to the cause by which that

state is superinduced. The first, from "Semi" and "Anima," is generic, and implies, that animal life is in danger in any way; that is, either from disease, external violence, or any other cause. "Hic cum *semianimis* de templo elatus esset, confestim efflavit animam."—NEP. 4. 5. 2. The state in which Pausanias is said to have been, was owing to his having wanted food in the temple, to which he had fled as an asylum. This state, too, terminated in his death.

Illa dolore gravis, tenebris narratur obortis
Semianimis media procubuisse domo.—OVID. *Trist.* 1. 3. 91.

The adjective, here, denotes only that the wife had fainted from grief, on account of her husband's departure. "Ubi tollentes corpus *semianime* virginis."—LIV. 3. 57. "Ipse cum trecentis pugnantibus cecidit, et postea ab Attilio *semianimis* inventus et sanatus, magno postea terrore hostibus fuit."—AUR. VICT. 39. In the last two examples, the state, denoted by the adjective, was superinduced by external violence, which, in the former, was fatal, and, in the latter, not.

SEMINEX, which is hardly found in the nominative, differs from "Semi-animis," in denoting, that the state of being half dead is always superinduced by violence. It comes from "Necare," to kill, and implies, that the probability of recovery is but small, in consequence of the wound that had been received.

Cernat *semineci* sibi me rapere arma cruenta,
 Victoremque ferant morientia lumina Turni.—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 462.

Pallas prayed that Turnus might receive from him a blow that should terminate in death. "*Seminecem* eum ad Cannas in acervo cæсорum corporum inventum, curatumque benigne etiam cum donis Annibal domum remiserat."—LIV. 23. 15. In this instance, there was a recovery, in consequence of the care taken of the wound. "Integri cum sauciis, *semineces* cum expirantibus volvuntur, varia pereuntium forma, et omni imagine mortium."—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 28. Here, the half-killed are said to have been mingled with those "in articulo mortis," and the chance of recovery, upon the part of the former, must have depended upon the care taken of them.

SEMIHOMO ET SEMIVIR—*vide* HOMO.

SEMITA—*vide* VIA.

SEPELIRE, HUMARE,

agree, in denoting the act of hiding the carcasses of the dead, but differ, in respect to the manner in which this is performed. The first is generic, and is applied to a dead body, either interred, or deposited in a sepulchre. “*Sepultus* intelligitur quoquo modo conditus.”—PLIN. 17. 54. “*Formicæ sepe-liunt* inter se viventium solæ, præter hominem.”—PLIN. 11. 30.

Nec tumulum curo: *sepelit* natura relictos.—MÆCEN. *apud* PLIN. *Ep.* 92.

From all the above passages, it is evident, that *Sepelire* applies to every way in which carcasses can be disposed of, so as not to give offence.

HUMARE differs from “*Sepelire*,” in implying, that the dead body is interred, or covered with earth. “*Humatus* intelligitur “humo.” contectus.”—PLIN. 17. 54. “*Condiunt* Ægyptii mortuos, et eos domi servant: Persæ etiam cera circumlitos condunt, ut quam maxime permaneant diuturna corpora. Magorum mos est, non *humare* corpora suorum, nisi a feris sint ante laniata.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 172. a. “*Cum* ignotum quendam projectum mortuum vidisset, eumque *humavisset*.”—CIC. *de Div.* 92. a.

Though the verb *Humare*, as coming from “*Humus*,” should signify, properly, to inter, and though this meaning was at first maintained by constant practice, yet it came afterwards to have the generic power ascribed to “*Sepelire*.” “*Militari* honestoque funere *humaverunt*, ossaque ejus in Cappadociam deportanda curarunt.”—NEP. *in Vit. Eumen. ad fin.*

Hoc sub marmore Glaucus *humatus*,
Juncto flaminæ jacet sepulcro.—MART. 6. 28.

SERIES—*vide* ORDO.

SERVIRE—*vide* AUDIRE.

SERVUS, VERNA,

agree, in denoting a person who does not enjoy his freedom, but differ,

according as his state of slavery is more or less oppressive. *SERVUS*, according to Donatus, comes from "Servare." "*Servi*," he says, "qui servati sunt quum eos occidi oporteret jure belli: unde Virgilius sic inducit captivum rogantem."

Per patrios manes, per spes surgentis Iuli,
Te precor hanc " serves " animam natoque, patrique.—*VIRG. Æn.* 10. 524:

" *Servus* est qui est jure in servitute, aut ut antiqui dixerunt, qui servitatem servit. *Servus* cum manumittitur fit libertinus; addictus recepta libertate est ingenuus: invito domino libertatem non consequitur."—*QUINCT.* 7. 3.

— namque hominem *servum* suos
Domitos habere oportet oculos, et manus,
Orationemque.——————*PLAUT. Mil. Glor.* 2. 6. 80.

VERNA differs from " *Servus* " in implying, that the situation of the slave is more comfortable, from his being born in the house of his master, and descended of one or both parents that were in his service. The Greeks styled the " *Servus* " *Δεσλος*, and the *Verna* *Οιζοτραφης*.

Satius est me queri illo modo servitatem, hodie
Qui fuerim liber : —
— hic qui *verna* natus est, queritur.
PLAUT. Amph. 1. 1. 22.

In this passage it appears, that though the treatment of the *Vernæ* was generally milder than that of the " *Servi*," yet the situation of the former was held more ignoble. Having been born slaves, they were understood to be incapable of being cleared of their native meanness: whereas the " *Servi* " were understood to retain certain liberal sentiments, that could exist only in minds originally free. " Hic " *servus* " quem tibi vindicas, aut *verna* tuus est, aut emtus, aut donatus, aut testamento relictus, aut ex hoste captus, aut alienus." *QUINCT.* 5. 10. The last example shews both the generality of the term " *Servus*," and the different ways in which property in slaves might have been acquired.

SICUT—*vide* *UT*.

SICCUS—*vide* *ARIDUS*.

SIGNUM, NOTA, INDICIUM, PRÆSAGIUM,

agree, in denoting an indication of the existence, or the nature, of some object, but differ, as those attributes are understood to be past, present, or future. *SIGNUM* denotes the mark by which any thing is recognised, and it respects equally the past, the present, and the future existence of the object, or event, signified. “*Signum est quod sub sensum aliquem cadit et quiddam significat, quod ex ipso profectum videtur, quod aut ante fuerit, aut in ipso negotio, aut post sit consecutum, et tamen indiget testimonii et gravioris confirmationis.*”—*CIC. de Inv. 52. b.* From the conclusion of Cicero’s definition, it should seem, that the *Signum* is not so descriptive of the object as the “*Nomen.*” This appears also in the following passage :

— is qui sit, *signo* non nomine dicam.—*OVID Met. 15. 597.*
Sed silet, et læsi dat *signa* rubore pudoris.—*Ibid. 2. 451.*

Calisto, here, is said to betray, by involuntary signs, a fact, the existence of which was past. “*Signa doloris vultu ostendere.*”—*CIC. de Or. 125. b.* “*Legationis ultro missæ nomen signum esse timoris videbatur.*”—*CIC. in Aut. 199. b.* Here, again, the pain and the fear are to be understood as existing at the time of the intimation respecting each. “*Medici signa quædam habent ex venis, et ex spiritu ægroti, multisque ex aliis futura præsentiant.*”—*CIC. de Div. 138. b.* Here, the *Signa* are the ground of a prognostication, in respect to events that are to come.

NOTA differs from “*Signum,*” in supposing, that the indication refers to the present state of the object, and is more clearly intelligible than the “*Signum,*” which may be more or less obscure, even to the person who interprets it. Thus, Cicero says, “*Potest accidere ut aliquid “signum” dubie datum pro certo sit acceptum.*”—*De Div. 106. a.* The *Nota*, again, may be obscure, and even unintelligible to some; but to others carries convincing proof of the reality of that, which it marks. “*Quam scite per notas nos certiores facit Jupiter?*”—*CIC. de Div. 118. a.* The intimations here meant are unequivocal, and they state the disposition of the God at the present time. “*Pice liquida imponere notam pecori.*”—*COLUM. 7. 9. 12.* “*Ut enim si aurum cui, quod esset multifariam defossum commonstrare vellem, satis esse deberet,*

si “*signa*” et *notas* ostenderem locorum, quibus cognotis, ille sibi ipsi foderet, et id, quod vellet, parvulo labore, nullo errore inveniret: sic has ego argumentorum novi *notas*, quæ, illa mihi quærenti demonstrant ubi sint; reliqua cura et cogitatione eruuntur.”—CIC. *de Or.* 124. a. Had the term “*Signa*,” alone, appeared in this sentence, the certainty of the discovery of the gold would not have been so great. In the second member of it, where complete demonstration is talked of, the term *Nota* only is made use of.

The symptoms of the existing disease are expressed by the word *Nota*, which may be more or less clear, according to its nature, and to the penetration of the physician. “In acutis morbis fallaces magis *notas* esse et salutis et mortis.”—CELS. 2. 6. “Mihi quoque impendere idem exitium, certis quibusdam *notis* augurabar.”—PLIN. 3. 11.

INDICIUM differs from the two nouns before-mentioned, in implying, that the indication refers to an event that is past. “Omnia quæ solent esse *indicia* et vestigia veneni, in illius mortuæ corpore fuerunt.”—CIC. *pro Clu.* 23. b. All the marks of poison, visible on the body of Cluentia, were indications of an event that was past, and existed soon after it was administered. “Hoc nobis et scelerum *indicia* ostendit, et periculorum “*signa*” patefecit.”—CIC. *de Ar. Resp.* 249. a. The intimation respecting the “*Scelera*,” or crimes that were past, are styled *Indicia*; those respecting the dangers, which were necessarily future, are denominated by the generic term “*Signa*.” “Quas in his “*notas*” scelerum, quæ *indicia* parricidiorum reperietis?”—CIC. *pro P. Sulla.* 189. b. The “*Nota*,” here, suggest the marks of complicated wickedness then existing in the minds of Catiline and his associates; the *Indicia*, proofs of black crimes, which had been before devised, or executed.

PRÆSAGIUM; or, according to Cicero, PRÆSAGIO, differs from the former terms, in supposing the indication to refer to events that are future. “Is igitur, qui ante “*sagit*” quam oblata res est, dicitur res “*præsagire*.”—CIC. *de Div.* 94. a. “Utile contingit villico tempestatis futuræ *præsagium*.”—COL. 11. 1.

— perque omnia sæcula fama,

Si quid habent veri vatum *præsagia*, vivam.—OVID. *Met. Vers. Ult.*

Velleius Paterculus appears to have used “*Indicium*” impurely, when he

unites, in the same sentence, a term relating to a past event with this, which necessarily relates to a future one. “Cum quidem plurima *præsagia* atque “indicia” Dii immortales futuri obtulissent periculi.”—V. P. 2. 57.

SILERE, TACERE,

agree, in denoting a cessation of speech, but differ, in respect to the reason for which this cessation takes place. They are applicable to the human species only, in their literal sense; and are figuratively so, either to the brute creation, or to inanimate nature, as in the two following examples. “*Silent enim leges inter arma, nec se expectari jubent.*”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 103. a.

Et nunc omne tibi stratum *silet* æquor, et omnes,
Aspice, ventosi ceciderunt murmuris auræ.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 9. 57.

SILERE properly denotes the silence of those who either have nothing to say, or who are enjoined not to speak. “*Silent enim diutius Musæ Varronis quam solebant.*”—CIC. *Acad. Q.* 39. a. The silence of Varro was owing to his having nothing to publish.

The enjoined silence, implied in *Silere*, appears in such instances as the following.

In medium discenda dabat: cætumque *silentum*,
Dictaque mirantum, magni primordia mundi,
Et rerum causas, et quæ natura docebat.—OVID. *Met.* 15. 66.

The scholars of Pythagoras, during the time styled the *Ἐχεμυθία*, were not allowed to speak.

Lingua *sile*: non est ultra narrabile quidquam.—OVID. *ex Pont.* 2. 2. 61.

Here, the authority of the speaker is supposed to be exerted in controlling his tongue, not his prudence, in discerning the propriety of saying nothing.

TACERE differs from “*Silere*,” in implying, that the silence arises neither from want of subject for speech, nor from constraint; but is dictated by some motive, either of duty or prudence, upon the part of the person observing it. “Si cum cæteri de nobis “*silent*,” non etiam nos ipsi *taceamus*, grave.”—CIC. *pro Syll.* 182. b. When the world have nothing to say to our prejudice, it

becomes us to keep our own secret, as a matter of prudence. "Ut doceam Rullum posthac in his saltem *tacere* rebus, in quibus de se *taceri* velit."—CIC. *contra Rull.* 88. a. "Ac si quæritis plane quid sentiam, nuntiabo apud homines familiarissimos, quod adhuc semper *tacui*, et *tacendum* putavi."—CIC. *de Or.* 94. b. The speaker is here to bring out, among intimate friends, what he prudently concealed when he had an opportunity to declare it; and he approved of this taciturnity, when he had it not in his power to observe it.

Exigua est virtus, præstare silentia rebus :

At contra gravis est culpa, *tacenda* loqui.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 603.

The expression "Præstare silentia," denotes to perform the order of observing that silence, which was enjoined upon all who witnessed the rites sacred to Ceres: "*Tacenda* loqui," again, the violation of that duty which every person present felt to be binding.

In the following passage from Seneca, "Silere" seems to be impurely taken for *Tacere*.

Thes. Effare. Fido pectore arcana oculam.

Phed. Alium *silere* quod voles, primus *sile*.—SEN. *HIPP.* 876.

In spite of the express promise of Theseus to keep the secret with which he expected to be entrusted, Phædra refuses to tell it. By means of the imperative, she lays down a maxim of prudence which she and every body ought to follow; and, by means of the infinitive, she insinuates the probability, that a confidant may fail in duty, by disclosing what he undertook to conceal.

"Sileteque" et *tacete*, atque animum advertite;

Audire vos jubet imperator historicus.—PLAUT. *Prol. in Pen.* 4.

There is no inconsistency in the same person desiring another both "Silere" and *Tacere*; or, in Greek, Σιγαῖν and Σιωπᾶν. In the one case, he puts that authority to the test, by which he is entitled to command; in the other, he exerts that influence which his known wisdom should have on the will of him whom he advises. In the second line of the above quotation, the term "Imperator" accords with the authority necessary to command silence, and the term "Jubet," with that persuasive influence which inclines one to follow the advice of another held abler than himself.

SIMILIS—*vide* ÆQUALIS.SIMULACRUM—*vide* IMAGO.

SIMULARE, DISSIMULARE,
agree, in denoting an attempt to deceive, but differ, in respect to the means employed to fulfil it. In the use of SIMULARE, from "Similis," something like another is presented, in place of the thing itself, and the deceiver gives it to be understood, that that is, which is not. In the use of "Dissimulare," again, that which does or may appear to the observer to be the case, is denied, and the deceiver gives it to be understood, that that is not, which really is. "Solon, quo républicæ prodesset, furere se *simulavit*."—CIC. *de Off.* 22. a. The wise man, in order to execute his patriotic purpose, imposed upon his countrymen, and made them believe that to be the case which was not.

Tu, cum projectis insignibus, annulo equestri,
Romanoque habitu, prodis ex iudice Dama
Turpis, odoratum caput obscurante lacerna;
Non es quod *simulas*? ————— HOR. *Sat.* 2. 53.

The poet here asks the dissipated knight, who had put on the appearance of a mean slave, in order to conceal his guilt, if he was not, in fact, what he wished to appear. The cheat, accordingly, was practised upon himself, and not upon the world.

Deceptum risi, qui se *simulabat* amare;
In laqueos auceps decideratque suos.—OVID. *Rem. Am.* 501.

The pretended lover wanted a fact to be believed, which he knew did not exist, and therefore fell into the snare he had laid for another.

DISSIMULARE differs from "Simulare," in denoting, that the deceiver represents that as not existing, which, to his knowledge, actually does. When the primitive verb is employed, something like to another is held forth, in order to mislead the observer; and when the compound is so, something unlike to another is held forth, for the same purpose. As "Dissimilis" intimates what is totally unlike, in opposition to "Similis;" so *Dissimulare* intimates this diversity, by an immediate negation of that which "Simulare"

affirms. "*Dissimulatio* est cum alia dicuntur ac sentias."—CIC. *de Or.* 113. b.

Et is omnes linguas scit, sed *dissimulat* sciens
Se scire. ————— PLAUT. *Pan. Prol.* 112.

In both instances, that is represented as not being, which the dissembler knows to be.

Dr Johnson, in his Dictionary, mentions an impure use of the verb "to dissemble," by Shakespeare, when he employs it as denoting to pretend that to be which is not, which is the proper definition of "*Simulare*."

— Your son Lucentio
Doth love my daughter, and she loveth him,
Or both "dissemble" deeply their affections.

The dissembled sentiment, upon the part of both, was love, which should have been concealed, according to the spirit of the verb, but which was said to be obvious.

"Ita nunquam diffitebor, multa me, ut ad effectum horum consiliorum pervenirem, et "*simulasse*" invitum, et *dissimulasse* cum dolore."—CIC. *Ep.* 148. a. It appears, that Cicero practised the different frauds, implied in the verbs, with reluctance, but that in the latter, with most. In that denoted by "*Simulare*," as a politician, he availed himself of the weakness, or the inattention of others; in that by *Dissimulare*, he acted a more immoral part, by being at pains to support the cheat, and by continuing to exhibit appearances, the very reverse of what he knew to be the truth.

It should seem that Sallust, in the following passage, has employed "*Simulare*" in both senses, or has, at least, left it to his reader to determine in which he chooses to take it. "Ad "*simulanda*" negotia altitudo ingenii incredibilis."—*in Jug.* 100.

SIMULTAS—*vide* JURGIUM.

SINE

denotes the relation which one object bears to another, with which it is not,

but may be, or may have been, accompanied. It is opposed to "Cum," which denotes accidental concomitancy, existing at a given time. "Age jam "cum" fratre an *sine*. In utraque enim re summa difficultas erit."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 120. b. Either alternative might have existed, by the brother being present, or being absent. "Homo *sine* re, *sine* fide, *sine* spe, *sine* sede, *sine* fortunis."—CIC. *pro Cæl.* 54. a. The situation of this man was singular, who might have possessed all or some of those things of which he was destitute. "Homo iners, *sine* ingenio, cum infamia."—CIC. *de Pet.* 209. a. The character might have been reversed, and the person might have been "cum ingenio, et *sine* infamia."

Sine differs from "Absque," which denotes the breach of an union understood to have taken place, and to be essential to the nature of the subjects united. The former denotes casual disunion, not affecting the subjects separated. It does not suggest that any union had ever taken place, but only, that it is possible it might have done so.

SINUS, GREMIUM,

agree, in denoting a space formed by a certain position of the body, but differ, in respect to the manner in which that space is formed. SINUS properly signifies the bosom, and is defined by Valla, "Pars illa, quæ est intra pectoris brachiorumque complexum."—437. It denotes, therefore, all within the compass of the breast and arms.

Hic non amandus? hiccine non gestandus in *sinu* est?—TER. *Adelph.* 4. 5. 75.

Old Priam shows his affection to his young grandson, by the manner in which he held him, while he showed him his father storming in battle.

—— turre in hac blando *sinu*

Fovens nepotem, cum metu versos gravi

Danaos fugaret Hector et ferro et face,

Paterna puero bella monstrabat senex.—SEN. *Troad.* 1071.

Sinus is figuratively taken for a fold of cloth, and a bay of the sea, as both resemble the angle formed with the arms when stretched out.

GREMIUM differs from "Sinus," in denoting the lap, or the angle formed by the clothes covering the knees of a person sitting, and the trunk of the body. A child "in sinu," may be either only supported, or carried from one place to another; "in gremio," as he is always sitting, he can be supported alone. "Puer lactens in gremio matris sedens, mammam appetens."—CIC. *de Div.* 126. a.

Qui se in sui gremio positurum puerum dicebat patris.—TER. *Adelph.* 3. 2. 35.

Direptumque ab equo dextra complectitur hostem,

Et gremium ante suum multa vi concitus aufert.—VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 743.

Tarchon was on horseback, when he attacked and carried off Venulus; and, in this situation, his body formed a *Gremium*, as much as if he had been seated on a chair, and at rest. "Hoc jus terra humandi, ut "sinus" et *gremium* quasi matris mortuo tribueretur."—CIC. *de Legg.* 183. a.

Though "Sinus" and *Gremium* may be occasionally confounded among the poets, yet Cicero here shews that he apprehended a difference to subsist between them.

SIVE—*vide* AN.

SOCIUS ET SODALIS—*vide* COMES.

SOLERE, ASSUESCERE,

agree, in denoting the repetition of some act; but the former regards the repetition simply, while the latter regards it as generating habits. "Id quod optimo cuique Athenis accidere *solitum est*, in exilium pulsus esset."—CIC. *de Or.* 113. b. Though the act of banishing was frequently practised among the Athenians, yet no propensity to the performance of this act was by that means created. The frequency rested entirely upon the influence of a principle which their legislators had adopted as a sound one. "Si prius, quod maxime reprehendere Scipio *solitus sit* dixero, ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus."—CIC. *de Am.* 107. a. Scipio was not one bit more disposed to condemn the practice of loving friends, as if we were one day to hate them, in consequence of having often done it. He did so from a conviction that those, who acted in this manner, might discover their character to be as odious, as it was ungenerous.

Nugas garris. *Soleo*. Nam propter eas vivo facilius.—PLAUT. *Curc.* 6. 11. 6.

Curculio does not take the reproof of Planesium in the smallest degree amiss. He not only allows that he prattles, but tells that it was his custom to do so, for no other reason than that it made his life go on smoothly.

ASSUESCERE differs from “Solere,” in implying, that the repetition generates habit; and produces pleasure, or facility, in performing any act. “Puer *assuescat* a tenero non reformidare homines.”—QUINCT. 1. 2. “In hoc *assuescat*, hujus rei sibi naturam faciat.”—*Ibid.* 4. 2. 29. Here, the force of habit is strongly painted, and said to become a second nature.

— sub te tolerare magistro

Militiam, et grave Martis opus, tua cernere facta

Assuescat: primis et te miretur ab annis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 515.

Evander understood, that the habit of seeing would superinduce the love and the habit of performing illustrious deeds, and cherish the seeds of virtue in the young mind of Pallas.

Sera sub Ausoniis veniet provincia virgis;

Assuescent Latio Partha trophæa Jovi.—PROPERT. 3. 4. 5.

As *Assuescere*, here, refers to habits afterwards to be produced, there is no inconsistency in its appearing in the future tense. That conduct, which generates them, may be posterior to a present assertion, but, at the same time, prior to the period at which they are to exist. It were absurd, however, to use “Solere” in the future. Its force rests upon practice, past and present. The continuance of this practice, beyond the present, must be always uncertain, and the agent is understood to have no anticipation of what is to come.

Assuescere suggests that power in habit which can reconcile a person to what is at first disagreeable.

Nec cœlum patimur, nec aquis *assuevimus* istis;

Terraque, nescio quò, non placet ipsa modo.—OVID. *Trist.* 3. 9. 7.

Cicero states the two verbs, in one sentence, in a way that discovers the true import of each. “Ad fluctum, aiunt declamare *solitum* Demosthenem, ut fremitum *assuesceret* voce vincere.”—CIC. *de Fin.* 125. a. By “Solitum” is meant nothing more than the repeated act of the orator; but by *Assuesceret*

is meant the end he had in view by this repetition, namely, to superinduce the habit of bearing and overcoming noise.

SOLERTIA—*vide* INDUSTRIA.

SOLUS—*vide* UNUS.

SOLLICITUDO—*vide* CURA.

SOMNUS, SOPOR,

agree, in denoting sleep, but differ, as it is more or less profound, and according to the causes by which it is superinduced. SOMNUS signifies that state of rest in which the mental and bodily powers are generally suspended, and by which nature repairs the waste of animal strength, in consequence of ordinary fatigue. This state Seneca paints beautifully, and so as to exhibit a power of description not sufficiently known and admired.

— tuque O domitor
Somme malorum! requies animi,
 Frater duræ languide mortis,
 Veris miscens falsa, futuri
 Certus, et idem pessimus auctor.
 Qui par regi, famuloque venis,
 Placidus fessum lenisque fovens:
 Pavidum leti genus humanum
 Cogis longam discere mortem.—*Herc. Fur.* 1065.

Somnus denotes a state of sleep, that may be more or less broken, and more or less profound. “Si vero sub prima curatione febris intenditur: brevesque *somni*, et iidem per somnia tumultuosi sunt.”—*CELS.* 8. 4. “Deinde ut cubitum discessimus, me arctior quam solebat *somnus* complexus est.”—*CIC. Som. Scip.* 126. a.

Fontesque lymphis obstrepunt manantibus
Somnos quod invitet leves.——————*HOR. Epod.* 2. 27.

SOPOR differs from “*Somnus*,” in denoting a deeper sleep, but such as is superinduced either by extraordinary fatigue, by disease, by intemperance, or by the use of some medicine acting as a soporific.

Nox erat, et terras animalia fessa per omnes
 Alituum, pecudumque genus *sopor* altus habebat.—*VIRG. Æn.* 8. 26.

Here, all the animals on the face of the earth are held forth as wearied out, and immersed in that profound sleep, which is at once the consequence and the cure of fatigue. "Jubet bono animo esse: *sopitum fuisse* regem subito ictu, ferrum haud alte in corpus descendisse."—LIV. 1. 61. "Neque vero signum bonum est, "somno" ultra debitum urgeri: pejusque, quo magis *sopor* interdiu noctuque continuatur."—CELS. 2. 4. The uninterrupted "Somnus" forms that *Sopor*, which the physician declares to be an unfavourable symptom.

Addere merum, vinoque novos compeisce dolores,
Occupet ut fessi lumina victa *sopor*.——TIBULL. 1. 2.

"Profligatus temulento *sopore*, neque dormire excitatus, neque vigilare ebrius poterat: sed "semisomno" *sopore* inter manus centurionum concubinarumque jactabatur."—QUINCT. 4. 2. 24. Here, there is represented the disturbed sleep of drunkenness, by which nature tries to repair the voluntary injury that has been done to the animal frame. "Patri *soporem* medicos dare coegit. Hoc æger sumto, "somno sopitus," diem obiit supremum."—NEP. 10. 2. Here, the drug operated so powerfully, as to destroy life. "Hujus semine "somnum." allici: sed modum servandum ne *sopor* fiat."—PLIN. 21. 18. This seed of a kind of rush must have been given sparingly, in order to produce its proper effect. If given otherwise, it might have caused that deep sleep, which stupifies, without refreshing the patient, and which often terminates in death.

In the elegy addressed to Bacchus by Propertius, the God is supposed to assuage the cares of men, by allowing them the wine, over which he presided.

Atque hoc sollicitum vince *sopore* caput.—Eleg. 15. Lib. 15.

When a patient is wakeful, and suffers what Juvenal styles "vigili cum febre dolorem," sleep, to a certain degree, may be forced, by the use of medicines; and this degree of it may, without impurity, take the name of "Somnus." "Somnum" medicamentis arcessere."—CELS. 3. 18.

SONUS, SONITUS, CREPITUS, STREPITUS, FREMITUS, STRIDOR, FRAGOR, agree, in denoting something by which the organ of hearing is affected, but differ, in respect either to the nature of the sound, or to the manner in which

it is generated. The first is a generic term, and is well defined, by Gesner, "Quicquid auribus percipi potest." It denotes whatever acts upon the ear, through the medium of air, affected by the sonorous body, and refers to all sounds, whether loud or low, pleasant or otherwise. "Aures, cum *sonum* recipere debeant, qui natura in sublime fertur, recte in alta corporum parte collocatæ sunt."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 54. a. "Varietas *sonorum* in tiliarum nervorumque cantibus."—CIC. *Ibid.* 55. b.

Nam neque chorda *sonum* reddit, quem vult manus et mens,
Poscentique gravem perstepe remittit acutum.—HOR. *de Art. Poet.* 348.

SONITUS differs from "Sonus," in never denoting sound in general, but in being applicable to some modification of it. In this, however, there is a considerable latitude, and Gesner seems to be less fortunate in his definition of this than of the preceding word, when he styles it "Sonus vehementior."

Quis homo tam tumultuoso *sonitu* me excivit subito foras?—PLAUT. *Trin.* 5. 2. 52.
Quadrupedante putrem *sonitu* quatit ungula campum.—VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 596.

— et vox

Auditur fractos *sonitus* imitata tubarum.—VIRG. *Georg.* 4. 721.

— soporem

Nec *sonitus* placidæ ducere possit aquæ.—TIBULL. 1. 1. 66.

Nothing can be more different than the sounds produced by the voice of a man, the foot of a horse, the blast of a trumpet, and the purling of a stream, and yet we find *Sonitus* applied to them all. The definition, "Sonus vehementior," does not accord with it, as expressing the gentle murmuring of water.

CREPITUS differs from "Sonitus," in being applicable to a sharp sound only, and never to one that is soft and gentle. Those sounds, however, that are expressed by *Crepitus*, may be more or less loud or sharp, though they never resemble that of a stream inviting to sleep. They may arise from a vast variety of sounding bodies, as from the rattling of arms, the notes of musical instruments, the crackling of wood burning, and the rattling of rain among trees. "Quatentium scuta horrendus armorum *crepitus*."—LIV. 38. 17. "Tiliarum et scabellorum *crepitus*."—SÜETON. *in Calig.* 54. "*Crepi-*

tus viridis materiæ fragrantis.—LIV. 6. 2. “*Imbrium crepitus per folia.*”—PLIN. 12. 1.

In the following example, the latitude admitted in *Crepitus*, and the generic power of “*Sonus*,” are both evident. “*Audio crepitum illisæ manus humeris, quæ prout plana pervenit aut concava, ita “sonum” mutat.*”—SEN. *Ep.* 56.

STREPITUS differs from the former words, in denoting a confusion of sounds that are simultaneous, or nearly so, and prevent any one from being distinctly heard. That it denoted the noise of the feet of a single animal, as well as “*Sonitus*,” appears in the beautiful description of old age, by Ovid, in which it is represented as destroying beauty, and advancing by a silent step.

— formæ damnosâ senectus,

Quæ *strepitum* passu non faciente venit.—TRIST. 3. 7. 35.

Strepitus ordinarily suggests a number of co-existing and dissimilar sounds, that are generally disagreeable. “*Heri nescio quid in strepitu videor exaudisse, quum diceres te in Tusculanum venturum.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 13. 46. Gesner interprets *in strepitu*, “*inter plurium confusos sermones.*”

Those simultaneous sounds emitted by the human voice, that are nearly in unison, are said to form a “*Clamor*,” and those that are discordant, a *Strepitus*. “*Non strepitu sed maximo “clamore,” suam populus Romanus significavit voluntatem.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 74. b. A single object emitting a sound, varying in point of loudness, is understood to give something approaching to the *Strepitus*, which, in its original use, probably arose from a number. The roar of the sea, and of the forest, varies with the force of the blast, and thus resembles the confusion of voices more or less feeble and distant.

Garganum mugire putes nemus, aut mare Tuscum,

Tanto cum *strepitu* ludi spectantur.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 1. 202.

The *Strepitus*, it has been said, is not always disagreeable.

O testudinis aureæ

Dulcem quæ *strepitum*, Pieri, temperas!

O mutis quoque piscibus

Donatura cynci, si libeat, “sonum.”—HOR. *Car.* 4. 3. 17.

Ad *strepitum* citharæ cessatum ducere curam.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 31.

FREMITUS differs from "Strepitus," in denoting a sound, which, not being so violent, is less distinctly heard. It implies, also, that, when it is emitted by animals, it is expressive of keenness and discontent, and, when by inanimate objects, that it threatens unknown evil to those who hear it. "Qui *fremitus* hominum? Quam irati animi?"—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 2. "Si displicuit sententia, *fremitu* aspernantur."—TAC. *de Mor. Germ.* In both the above instances, the term denotes the murmuring of voices expressive of discontent. It applies also to the brute creation. Columella, talking of the formidable snarling of a dog that watches in the country, says, "Ut ne visus quidem, horribili *fremitu* suo fuget insidiantem."—7. 12. Cicero has employed "Strepitus" and *Fremitus* in the same sentence, without joining to either an adjective or a participle. "In agro latiniensi auditus est "strepitus" cum *fremitu*."—CIC. *de Har. Resp.* 248. a. The different modifications of sound, here suggested, could not have been emitted by the same objects at the same time, but must have come in succession. A little after he says, "Strepitus" quidam reconditus, et horribilis *fremitus* armorum." The participle "Reconditus" brings the first term nearer than usual to the meaning of the second, which always suggests a sound imperfectly heard. In the following instance, the sound, expressed by *Fremitus*, is emitted by an inanimate object, and portends evil to those who hear it. "Cum terræ sæpe *fremitus*, sæpe mugitus, sæpe motus, multa nostræ reipublicæ gravia et vera prædixerint."—CIC. *de Div.* 1. 18. In this use, inanimate objects are held sensitive. As the wrath of the latter is expressed by *Fremitus*, so, from a superstitious dread, men augur evil from objects that can neither harbour, nor express it.

STRIDOR differs from the other words, in denoting a grating, disagreeable sound, such as arises from the violent friction of bodies that are not smooth. "Ne *stridorem* quidem serræ audiunt, cum acuitur."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 250. b.

Januâ quæ verso *stridorem* cardine reddat.—OVID. *Met.* 11. 608.

It is not necessary, when *Stridor* is applied to animals, that the sound should be emitted by their voice. Thus, Pliny tells us, that the wing of the locust formed a *Stridor*. "Grandiores locustæ tanto volant pennarum *stridore*,

ut aliæ alites credantur.”—II. 51. Most commonly, however, this sound is raised by the animal’s voice. “Troglodytis *stridor* non vox.”—PLIN. 5. 8. The hedge-sparrow is said, by the naturalist, not to whistle like other birds, but to scream.

The *Stridor* may likewise be emitted by the human voice, whether of itself harsh, or uttering what is disagreeable to those who hear it. “Veri ac fortis tribuni plebis *stridorem* unum perferre non possit.”—CIC. *contra Rull.* 80. a.

From the diversity of those objects by which the *Stridor* is excited, it is clear, that it is not merely the physical disagreeableness of the sound to the ear that is the cause of it, but that it rests, at times, upon an association between what is heard, and danger apprehended. Thus, the rattling of cordage, and the howling of winds, creates terror on account of those who may be exposed to the fury of the storm.

— *stridorque* rudentum.—OVID. *Mét.* 11. 495.

— *stridorem* audire procellæ.—PROPERT. 3. 5. 61.

In the hissing of spears and stones, there is nothing physically disagreeable to the ear; but he, who hears, knows that many of them are the unerring messengers of death, and is ignorant how soon one of them may be the cause of destruction to himself. “Fundarum et lapidum *stridor*.”—HIRT. *de Bell. Af.* 83.

— it hasta Tago per tempus utrumque
Stridens.———VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 418.

FRAGOR differs from the rest of the words, in implying, that the body, emitting the sound, is broken when it does so. It comes from the verb “Frangere,” and is applicable to no substance that does not emit a sound when it undergoes a fracture, and to no one that is not broken when it emits a sound. It denotes a crash, such as that which arises from the breaking of a tree. “*Fragor* tectorum quæ diruebantur, ultimis urbis partibus audiebatur.”—LIV. 1. 29. The term is used, figuratively, to express loudness of voice, and the noise of the sea.

— vocis horrendæ *fragor*.—SEN. *Herc. Fur.* 795.

Sic cunctus pelagi cecidit *fragor*.——VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 158.

SOPOR—*vide* SOMNUS.

SORDES, PÆDOR, SQUALOR, FÆCES,

agree, in denoting something foul, but differ in respect to the manner in which the uncleanness is generated. *SORDES* properly denotes a collection of dirty matter, which prevents the organ of the body, that is oppressed with it, from performing its function. It supposes this matter to be in a fixed state, and not thrown out of the body, like any of the excrements.

Viden' tu, pleni oculi *sordium* qui erant, jam splendent mihi.

PLAUT. *Pæn.* 1. 2. 101.

Auriculas citharæ collecta *sorde* dolentes.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 53.

The humour in the eyes, and the wax in the ears, in the above instances, were in such quantities, as to impede the respective operations of each. It is not always to the superabundant quantity of this matter, however, that *Sordes* is applied, but sometimes to that which is really useful. “Provisum est etiam, ut si qua minima bestiola conaretur irrumpere, in *sordibus* aurium, tanquam in visco, adhæresceret.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 55. a. *Sordes* does not suppose, however, that the quantity of matter accumulated is offensive, only from its impeding the use of any organ, but often from its forming a disgusting uncleanness. Thus, the lover is desired by Ovid to pare and clean his nails, if he wishes to be successful in his intrigues.

Et nihil emineant, et sint sine *sordibus* ungues.—ART. *Am.* 1. 519.

Sordes is figuratively taken to denote the dirty habit of a person accused, and also meanness of character. “Non exuo, non depono *sordes* : et mihi quoque senex tanquam accusaturus occurrit.”—QUINCT. *Decl.* 17.

———— sepulchrum

Permissum arbitrio sine *sordibus* extruere, funus

Egregie factum laudet vicinia.—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 5. 104.

PÆDOR differs from “*Sordes*,” in referring to no natural dirtiness, in consequence of any diseased organ of the body, but to an uncleanness, arising from necessity, or from inattention upon the part of the person defiled. It is

said to come from Παις, and to suggest the dirtiness of children when not properly cared for.

———— barba *pædore* horrida,
Atque intonsa infuscat pectus illuvie scabrum.—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 196. a.
———— mox vincula ferri
Exedère senem, longusque in carcere *pædor*.—LUCAN. 2. 73.

In the above examples, the filth arises from the slovenliness of the person, who is at no pains to be clean, or has not the means of being so.

Pædor agrees with “Sordes,” in denoting the signs of mourning.

———— unde tam fœdo obsiti
Pædore nati? quæ domum clades gravat?—SEN. *Herc. Fur.* 627.

SQUALOR differs from “*Pædor*,” in implying, that the foulness constantly proceeds from slovenly habits encouraged, and is formed by slow and intended accumulations of what is loathsome. It comes from “*Squama*,” and supposes different masses, resembling the scales of fishes, creating the nuisance, and defiling the body. Gellius says, “In corporibus incultis, squamosisque alta congerie “sordium,” *squalor* appellatur.”—2. 6. “Obsita erat *squalore* vestis, fœdior corporis habitus pallore ac macie peremti.”—LIV. 2. 23.

Squalor, like the former words, is employed to denote the signs of grief, and the means of exciting pity. “Aspicite, iudices, *squalorem*, “sordesque” sociorum.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 261. b.

Plorare ergo jubet causam lugentis amici,
Squaloremque rei.—————JUV. 15. 134.

That the *Squalor* is always intended, appears strongly in the following passage, in which Laodamia declares her purpose of imitating Protesilaus.

Qua possum *squalore* tuos imitata labores
Dicar: et hæc belli tempora tristis agam.—OVID. *Heroid. Ep.* 13. 41.

FÆCES, and sometimes “*Fæx*,” differs from the former words, in denoting the refuse of a fluid that falls to the bottom as a sediment. It is not generated in the animal body, like “*Sordes*,” nor collected by contact with what may defile, like “*Pædor*” and “*Squalor*.”

————— diffugiunt cadis

Cum *face* siccatis amici. ————— HOR. *Car.* 1. 35. 26.

Qui canerent agerentque peruncti *facibus* ora. ————— HOR. *Art. Poet.* 276.

In both of the above instances, *Fæces* denotes the dregs, or lees of wine, as found at the bottom of the cask. “Quicquid *fæcis* subsederit, exagitet, et in summum reducat.”—COLUM. 12. 19. The lees, that have been deposited, may be again brought to the top of the vessel, and may, in part, be thrown off by fermentation.

Fæces agrees with “Sordes,” in sometimes denoting the vilest, or the off-scourings of men. “Perditissima atque infima *fæx* populi.”—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 311. b. “Apud “sordem” urbis, et *fæcem*.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 12. b.

Ovid has supposed *Fæx* to exist in a thinner fluid than either wine or water, and referred it to particles of earth subsiding in pure æther.

Hæc super imposuit liquidum, et gravitate carentem

Æthera, nec quidquam terrenæ *fæcis* habentem. ————— MET. 1. 67.

SORDIDUS, SORDIDATUS,

agree, in denoting something foul; but the former supposes the foulness to appear upon one's person, the latter supposes it to appear upon his clothes. The first in order, to shew its true meaning, must be taken *απλως*, that is, singly, or by itself. It may be applied to clothes, and then ekes out a compound conception, different from what it would express alone. Thus, Cicero says, “Sæpe est etiam sub palliolo *sordido* sapientia.”—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 202. b. The real meaning of *Sordidus* appears in such passages as the following :

Audire magnos jam videor duces,

Non indecoro pulvere *sordidos*. ————— HOR. *Car.* 2. 1. 21.

Sordidus is figuratively taken to denote meanness of character, and mental defilement. “Ut enim quisque *sordidissimus* videbitur, ita libentissime severitate judicandi “sordes” suas eluet, laborabitque, ut honestis decuriis potius dignus videatur, quam in turpem jure conjectus.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 156. b.

SORDIDATUS differs from “Sordidus,” in implying, that the foulness affects the clothes only. The uncleanness denoted by it, besides, may proceed

either from intention or necessity; that by “sordidus” is always accidental, and not forced.

——— *quanquam ego sum sordidatus,*
Frugi tamen sum, nec potest peculium enumerari.—PLAUT. *Asin.* 2. 4.

The meanness of Leonida’s dress was a matter of choice, upon his part, and might have been avoided, had he been at the expence of better.

——— *præterea una ancillula*
Erat, ea texebat una : pannis obsita,
Neglecta, immunda illuvie.
Cl. Scin’ hanc quam dicit *sordidatam* et “sordidam?”—TER. *Heaut.* 2. 3. 53.

This maid-servant was *sordidata*, and “pannis obsita,” from necessity and inevitable want; she was “sordida,” or “neglecta,” and “immunda illuvie,” from carelessness, or the want of time to bestow upon her person.

Persons standing trial at Rome, who wished to excite the judge’s compassion, by their bad dress, and uncouth appearance, were styled *Sordidati*. “Heraclæus et Epicrates *sordidati* maxima barba et capillo.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 121. a.

The habitual meanness in dress, that characterises the man, is, in the following passage, opposed to that temporary degradation, by which the compassion of judges was excited. “Nec minus lætabor, cum te semper “sordidum,” quam si paulisper *sordidatum*, videbo.”—CIC. *in Pis. in fin.* The distinction mentioned is not constantly observed, as “Sordidus” may sometimes, though rarely, refer to the dirty and tattered clothes of the person accused. “Nunc idem squalore “sordidus” vester est supplex, iudices.”—CIC. *pro Muren.* 40.

SORTIRI—*vide* PARARE.

SPATIARI—*vide* IRE.

SPERARE—*vide* EXPECTARE.

SPERNERE—*vide* DESPICERE.

SPOLIARE—*vide* PRIVARE.

SPOLIUM—*vide* PRÆDA.

SPONDERE—*vide* PROMITTERE.

STAGNUM—*vide* LACUS.

STATUA—*vide* IMAGO.

STIMULARE—*vide* PUNGERE.

STIPARI—*vide* COMITARI.

STRABO—*vide* LIPPUS.

STRAGES—*vide* CUMULUS.

STRENUUS, GNAVUS,

agree in denoting a disposition to be active, but differ, in respect to the manner in which this disposition shews itself. The first is the attribute of a person about to work, and supposes him conscious of his own powers, and not ready to shrink from any possible exertion; the latter is the attribute of a person already engaged, and implies that aversion from sloth which will make him improve every moment, and cling to his object till it is effected.

Tum Phormio, itidem in hac re, ut in aliis, *strenuum* hominem præbuit.

TER. *Phor.* 3. 1. 12.

The character of Phormio, as a parasite, accords exactly with the meaning given of *Strenuus*. Knowing his own activity, and confident, from past success, he was ready to embark in every enterprise.

Strenuus et fortis, causisque Philippus agendis

Clarus———HOR. *Ep.* 1. 7. 46.

“Ut cognosceret te si minus fortem, attamen *strenuum*.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 176. b. From the above examples, it appears, that the sentiment of courage, implied in “Fortis,” may exist, without the disposition to activity, implied in *Strenuus*. The brave may have no opportunity of shewing their powers; but the restlessness of the active must shew itself, even when it can be but imperfectly indulged.

Strenua nos exercet inertia, navibus atque

Quadrigis petimus bene vivere, quod petis hic est:

Est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit æquus.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 11. 28.

The activity of the *Strenui* was frustrated by the unskilfulness of the “Inertes.” By an unavailing pother; no progress can be made in the most important of all pursuits, and men vainly fatigue themselves, chasing a phantom abroad, when the reality is at home.

GNAVUS differs from “Strenuus,” in referring to the steadiness with which the labour begun is carried through, till the object is accomplished. “Strenuus” stands opposed to “Piger,” implying a disposition to fold the hands, and to shun work: *Gnavus* to “Ignavus,” which implies deficiency in the exertion necessary to accomplish what is on hand.

—— agendi *gnaviter* id quod
 Æque pauperibus prodest, locupletibus æque.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 1. 24.
 Verum si incipies, neque perficies *gnaviter*.—TER. *Eun.* 1. 1. 6.

Here, the work is begun, and the quality involved in the adverb is understood to show itself only in the course of a transaction. Donatus says, “*Naviter* a “navi” ductum, a qua in alto nullum diversorium. Qui semel verecundiæ finem transierit, eum bene et *naviter* oportet esse impudentem.”—CIC. *Epist.* 67. b. The character of impudence, once assumed, must be unremittingly supported, in order to conduct the begun business to a desired issue.

—— oderunt agilem *gnavumque* “remissi.”—HOR. *Epist.* 2. 18. 90.

“*Agilis*” and *Gnavus*, the one denoting agility, and the other, vigour and steadiness in action, are nearly allied, and both stand opposed to that *nonbalance* expressed in “*Remissus*,” which leads to disappointment, from the want of vigour, while the season for action continues. “In agresti negotio dici vix potest, quid *gnavus* operarius “*ignavo*” et cessatore præstet.”—COLUM. 2. 1. The opposition, here stated, between *Gnavus* and the words “*Ignavus*,” and “*Cessator*,” shews clearly the meaning affixed by the agriculturist to the former.

STREPITUS, STRIDOR—*vide* SONUS.

STRINGERE—*vide* VINCIRE.

STRUES, MOLES, AGGER,

agree, in denoting the accumulation of similar, or dissimilar objects, in order to effect some purpose, which the agent has in view. They differ, in respect either to the manner in which the mass is formed, or to its magnitude when finished.

STRUES supposes, that the mass, however rude, has the regularity of what is called a structure, in which each component part is understood to hold its proper place. The precise arrangement at first given to the whole materials, whether similar or otherwise, forms the essence of the term; so that any disturbance of this order would, of course, destroy it. “*Superque alia strue saxorum*

arborumque cumulata, velut quodam nexu continens opus junxerant.”—
 QUINT. CURT. 4. 3. “Virique, armaque congesta *strue* deplorata jace-
 bant.”—PETRON. 123.

Armaque cum telis in *strue* mixta suis.—OVID. *ex Pont.* 2. 1. 40.

MOLES refers to the labour necessary to accomplish the work, to its mag-
 nitude, and, of course, to its permanence when finished, but has no regard to
 any arrangement in the parts which compose it. “Erit igitur extracta *moles*
 opere magnifico, incisæ literæ divinæ virtutis testes sempiternæ.”—CIC. *in*
Anton. 264. a. “Fons munitione et *mole* lapidum a mari disjunctus.”—CIC.
in Ver. 228. a.

Jam pauca aratro jugera regiæ
Moles relinquent.—HOR. *Carm.* 2. 15.

The size and solidity of those piles, whether of stone, of wood, or of both,
 which displaced such quantities of water, must have been immense, before
 they could be trusted as foundations for any structure. “*Molibus* ex huma-
 norum corporum “*strue*” faciendis.”—LIV. 23. 5. The *Moles*, it appears
 by the above example, may have the “*Strues*” as a component part. The
 former differs from the latter in so far, that it is occasionally applied to a simple
 mass, as to the stone of Sisyphus, and the body of Polyphemus.

— Sisyphæ, *mole* vaces.—PROP. 4. 11. 23.

— vasta se *mole* moventem.

Pastorem Polyphemum.—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 656.

The confusion naturally existing in the parts of that, which is styled a
Moles, is not always stated as the effect of design in an agent, but as a subject
 for exerting his power in reducing them to order.

Prima fuit rerum confusa sine ordine *moles*.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 467.

AGGER agrees with “*Moles*,” in supposing no necessary arrangement in
 its parts, but differs from it, in respect to the degree of labour necessary for its
 formation, and to the magnitude and permanence of the work when finished.
 In forming the *Agger*, there was no art requisite, as in the case of the

“Strues.” The term comes from “Aggerere,” in which the radical verb has a reference to the ease with which the component parts have been carried, and consequently to the small proportion borne by each to the size of the general mass. The *Agger* formed about a Roman camp, to which the term seems to have been first applied, was not deemed of itself a sufficient barrier against the irruptions of an enemy, as a “Moles” was against the encroachments of the sea. Even with its greatest height, the vigilance of watchmen was supposed necessary to give security to those within it; and when the camp was styled “Mansiones,” and was soon to be abandoned, the *Agger* was quickly raised, and formed but a very slight defence. A funeral-pile, besides, which was speedily erected, and meant soon to be destroyed, had the appellation of *Agger*.

Flammas potius et vastum aggerem compone,
In altos ipsum me immittam rogos.—SEN. *Phœniss.* 110.

Agger is applicable to the materials of which the mound is formed, as well as to the mound itself. On the contrary, no portion of either the “Strues” or the “Moles” can be designed by the name of the mass. “Paulo longius, *aggeris* petendi causa processerant.”—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 2. 20.

— et fossas *aggere* complent.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 567.

From this last passage, it should appear, that an elevation above the general surface of the earth is not always intended by the person forming an *Agger*. That person makes it, who fills up a ditch, whether he does so completely or not.

STULTUS, STOLIDUS, FATUUS,

agree, in denoting folly, but differ, in respect either to the extent of the weakness in intellectual power, or to the manner in which that weakness shews itself. STULTUS is applicable to those persons, who, in the general conduct of their affairs, or in a single instance, have, from a defect of attention, or penetration, mistaken what it was expedient for them to do. As the wisest of men may occasionally err, so the term may, in some instances, have been justly applied to every individual in the human race.

Stultus quod stulto sæpe timore tremo.—PROPERT. 2. 34. 20.

The imputations of folly were just only when the paroxysms of fear returned, which, as such, were but occasional.

Stultorum incurata pudor malus ulcera celat.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 16. 24.

This false shame is peculiar to fools, who shew themselves to be such, by indulging it in the case stated.

Hic ego mendacem stultissimus usquepuellam.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 5. 82.

Horace, whose understanding was excellent in most things, confesses himself to have been extremely foolish in this.

In the degrees of folly, denoted by *Stultus*, there was a variety proportioned to the general inattention of the person to whom it is applicable, or his particular inattention in a single act.

Stultior stulto fuisti, qui iis tabellis crederes.—PLAUT. *Cerc.* 4. 3. 19.

The existence of folly, in the conduct of an agent, appears in the positive *Stulto*, and an increased degree of it in the comparative *Stultior*. “*Sed hujus istius facti stultitiam major jam superior stultitia defendit: quæ facit ut hoc stultissimum facinus sapienter factum esse videatur.*”—CIC. *pro Rab. Post.* 126. a. There were here gradations of folly, entitling the person exhibiting them to the appellation of *Stultus*. One act was so glaring, as to make another positively have the appearance of wisdom.

STOLIDUS differs from “*Stultus*,” in implying folly, arising either from a deficiency of some quality, for which the person holds himself distinguished, or of wisdom to make the most of a quality which he possesses in a great degree. “*Atesim flumen non ponte, nec navibus, sed quadam stoliditate barbarica primum corporibus aggressi, postquam retinere amnem manibus et clypeis frustra tentaverant, ingesta obrutum silva transiluire.*”—FLOR. 3. 3. The barbarians were foolish enough to over-rate their own strength, and to suppose themselves able to contend with the stream, which overpowered them. “*Consul armatos paulisper continuit, ut stolidam fiduciam hosti augetet.*”—LIV. 25. 19.

li se cum frustrantur, frustrari alios *stolidi* existimant.

PLAUT. *Bacch.* 3. 6. 19.

— *stolidum* genus *Æacidarum*

Bellipotentes sunt magi quam sapientipotentes.—CIC. *de Div.* 132. b.

“Erat in Caninefatibus *stolidæ* audaciæ Brinio, claritate natalium insigni.”—TAC. *Hist.* 4. 15. There is no reason to imagine that Brinio possessed less boldness than he supposed; but he wanted wisdom to discern its proper objects, and, in that way, got into situations in which it could not avail him.

FATUUS differs from the two former words, in denoting such a natural imbecillity of mind as disqualifies a person from judging right in any instance. He, who is “Stultus” or “Stolidus,” is, according to Isidorus, “Obtusus quidem sensibus, non tamen nullis.” He may fail in particular acts of judgment, but his general conduct discovers a certain portion of that reason, of which he, who is *Fatuus*, is destitute. The word *Fatuus* is understood to come from the Greek word Φωτης, signifying “Vates.” As the prophets were supposed to be out of their reason when they foretold future events, so *Fatuus* signifies a permanent derangement, similar to that, which was but temporary. “Ita non modo nequam, et improbus, sed *fatuus* et amens es.”—CIC. *pro Reg. Dej.* 147. b. As the two first adjectives denote different degrees of vice, or moral corruption, so the two last denote different degrees of intellectual derangement. *Fatuus* supposes the person, to whom it is applicable, to be an idiot, and “Amens” supposes him to be mad: “Si quando *fatuo* delectari volo, non est mihi longe quærendus: me rideo.”—SEN. *Ep.* 50. The philosopher, in the excess of his humility, is here vilifying his own powers, and supposing himself to be what he really was not. Plautus states the three terms as forming a climax, and makes folly the general characteristic of each.

“Stulti,” “stolidi,” *fatui* —

Solus ego omnes antedeo “stultitia.”—PLAUT. *Bacch.* 5. 1. 2.

SUADERE—*vide* HORTARI.

SUB

denotes the relation which one object bears to another that is immediately above it. If the inferior body serves as a support to a number above it, it is

in the relation of *Sub* to that only, with which it is in contact, and not to the rest, that are alike incumbent. The supported body, like an arch, is not necessarily in immediate contact with that under it, but may rest upon others, which transmit the weight, and are themselves also supported. Objects, also, are said to be under others that are not supported, and whether they be so or not, there is no limitation in respect to the interval. A person "*Sub* dio," that is, under the cope of heaven, is as much under it, as a person, who can just stand erect in a cave or a hut, is under its roof.

Sub cratim uti jubeas sese supponi, atque eo
Lapides imponi multos, ut sese neces.—PLAUT. *Pæn.* 5. 2. 65.
— gemuit *sub* pondere cymba.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 413.

In the above examples, the incumbent body is in contact with that which is under, and supports it. A column of water is in the same relation to a body immersed, and under it.

— quis te, Palinure, Deorum
Eripuit nobis, medioque *sub* æquore mersit.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 341.

In the two examples that follow, the supported body is not in contact with that said to be under it. Thus, Cicero calls men living in caverns, "*Homines sub* terra habitantes, qui nunquam existent supra terram."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 45. a. "*Negotiumque* transegisses, nisi se *sub* scalis tabernæ librariæ conjecisset."—CIC. *in Ant.* 64. a. In the following instance, the superior body is not incumbent, but has only the appearance of being so.

— manet *sub* Jove frigido
Venator, teneræ conjugis immemor.—HOR. *Car.* 1. 1. 25.

But the relation of nearness necessary to form that original one, in respect to the bodies "above" and "under," is transferred to objects lying on the same surface. The idea of "up" and "down" is then abandoned, and the circumstance, which is but an accessory in the radical meaning, becomes a principal in the use now explained.

— agelli est hic *sub* urbe paulum.—TER. *Adelph.* 5. 8. 26.

The ground, here mentioned, was not "under" the city, but "near" it. It

was what the Latins called the "Suburbium," and we the "Suburb." "Tanto *sub* oculis accepto detrimento."—CÆS. *Bel. Civ.* 1. 71. It was from the nearness of this misfortune, and its having been distinctly seen, that Cæsar expected the Afranii would be intimidated, and that his attack would prove successful.

This preposition is sometimes translated "In," or "Within." When this happens, the English regard both roof and walls as forming an edifice, within which the animated object is situate; while the Latins regard the covering of a roof merely. We say, accordingly, that Æneas was "in" the temple; while they said he was "under" it.

Namque *sub* ingenti lustrant dum singula templo,
Reginam opperiens.——VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 457.

In this use, *Sub* may be applied to an imaginary, and, apparently, more extensive inclosure than a temple. "Nam et idoneus *sub* dio sumendus est locus cochleariis."—VAR. *R. R.* 3. 14. The canopy of heaven is here said to be over the place where the shell-fish were kept, and the sleeper took his repose. The English, again, suppose this canopy to meet the surface of the earth at the sensible horizon, and to inclose a space, the extent of which is determined by the situation of the spectator, or of the object in the centre of it. They accordingly say "in" the open air, without minding the imaginary covering, and in opposition to that air which is inclosed by any building.

Sub is sometimes seen as equivalent to "Penes," and, like it, supposes animation in the object governed. In a trial of strength, the person above another in some degree fetters his antagonist, and bereaves him of his strength. This bodily oppression is understood to be the consequence of superior strength upon the side of the party creating it, and the preposition, accordingly, in this use, suggests, that the person, expressed, by the correlative term, is "in the power, or "at the disposal of" the person, expressed by the governed.

—— *sub* domina meretrice vixisset turpis et excors.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 2. 25.
Grammatici certant, et adhuc *sub* iudice lis est.—HOR. *de Art. Poet.* 78.

The parties, by bringing their cause to the cognizance of a judge, declare their disposition to submit to his decision. The relation is not between the judge

and the parties, but between him and the cause, so as to suggest his unlimited power of doing what he supposes consistent with justice.

Sometimes there is no animation in the thing governed; but still it is understood to contain a controuling influence, similar to that of a person in power. "Jussit præmium ei dari *sub* ea conditione, ne quid postea scriberet."—CIC. *pro Arch.* 190. b.

Sub is transferred to time, and then signifies "About;" that is, a little before, or a little after, a period, specified by the governed word. This use is taken from that which respects space, in which it denotes "Near." As one object may be near to another, either before or behind it, so the date of one event may be ascertained from its nearness to another, whether prior or posterior to it. *Sub* is, in this sense, equal to "Circiter." "*Sub* idem tempus legati ad res repetendas missi."—LIV. 25. 24. These ambassadors were not sent at the same time in which the correlative event took place; and it is uncertain whether it was a little before or a little after, though one of them it must have been. The time of the correlative event, however, is sometimes fixed by the nature of the thing. "*Sub* exitu vitæ."—SÆTON. *in Claud.* 43. As the event stated refers to the emperor's death, it must have taken place before it, though but a short time.

Sub likewise denotes the time during which any event takes place. It acquires this meaning, however, upon a principle different from that now stated, and, when so used, has no reference to the nearness of objects. In the use already explained, it may be joined either with an accusative or an ablative; but, in that now before us, it is joined with an ablative alone. "Cervi soli animalium omnibus annis, stato veris tempore, cornua amittunt: ideo *sub* ipsa die, quam maxime in via petunt."—PLIN. 8. 32. This retirement lasted only one day, as appears from Aristotle, from whom Pliny had probably taken the fact. Ὅταν δ' αποβαλλωσι, κρῦπτεσιν ἑαυτὲς τὴν ἡμέραν.—ΑΡΙΣΤ. ΠΕΡΙ ΖΩΩΝ Ι5. Ι. κεφ. ε.

— somno positæ *sub* nocte silenti,
Lenibant curas, et corda oblita laborum.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 525.

The word, employed to mark the time during which the event lasts, is not always the measure of a regular and defined period, as in the instances given.

“Ne *sub ipsa* profectioe milites oppidum irrumperent, portas obstruit.”—
CÆS. Bel. Civ. I. 27. The word “Profectio,” here, refers to the time during
 which Cæsar might be in pursuit of Pompey, which would be longer or
 shorter, according to the difficulties he encountered.

SUB, then, may be translated as follows :

I.

UNDER ; supposing the body getting and that giving the support to be in
 contact.

II.

NEAR. The nearness necessary to constitute the original relation is trans-
 ferred to bodies lying on the same surface.

III.

IN. The English regard the roof and walls of an edifice as forming one
 space, within which a person is ; while the Latins regarded only the roof
 above him.

IV.

IN THE POWER OF. The governed object, in this use, is almost always sup-
 posed to be animated, and the correlative to be controuled, as being under it.

V.

ABOUT ; that is, happening a little before, or a little after. This is founded
 on the second power, one event being supposed near to another, like two
 bodies in space.

VI.

DURING. This use is founded upon the third power. Events are under-
 stood to last till an expected and necessary change happen within the space in
 which they occur.

Sub, in composition, retains its primitive meaning of “Under,” as in “Subire
 tectum,” which literally signifies “To come under the roof.” Were “Tec-
 tum” regarded as the whole edifice, instead of its most essential part, the two
 terms would be equal to “Intrare domum,” and translated, like them, “To
 enter the house.” *Sub* is taken, figuratively, in this sense, in the verb “Sub-
 ornare,” signifying to fit underhand for any foul purpose, which otherwise

would not take effect. "Militem "subornant," ut Syracusas perferret nuntium convenientem iis quæ falso nuntiata erant."—LIV. 24. 31. It is so used, also, in the verb "Submittere." "Submissis" consularibus viris, qui libertan regio genere ortam dejerarent."—SÜET. *in Ner.* 28.

In the verb "Succedere," we find both the radical power of *Sub*, as in "Subire," and its second power, expressed by "Near." "Qui tectum, quo imbris vitandi causa "succederet," nullam haberet."—CIC. *pro Dom.* 236. b. In the second power, it takes either an accusative or a dative, and denotes to approach. "Succedens" murum parum proficeret."—LIV. 38. 9.

"Succedunt" tecto, flammisque ad culmina jactant.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 478.

The known purpose, for which the approach is made, sometimes fixes the meaning of the compounded verb, though the approach itself is lost sight of. "Rogo prætor, "subveni," "succurre."—AUL. GELL. 11. 7. Both these last verbs signify to give aid, with a zeal proportioned to the necessity. The primary idea in both, however, is that of approaching so as to give it.

The motion implied in *Sub*, in composition, may be, besides, either "up" or "down," according to circumstances. In the case of the verb "Subjicere," applied to mounting a horse, he, who does so, is lower than the animal, before he throws himself upon its back.

——— aut corpora saltu

Subjiciunt in equos.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 286.

As a person, looking up, is necessarily beneath the object he looks at, so *Sub*, compounded with the obsolete verb "Specio," suggests the low situation of the beholder. "Dum cælum "suspeximus," cœlestiaque contemplati sumus."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 26. b.

Pliny tells us, that the pheasant hen has ears, composed of feathers, which she can raise or depress at pleasure; and we find *Sub*, affecting the two verbs, employed very differently. "Phasianæ geminas ex pluma aures "submitunt" "subriguntque."—10. 48. Upon the literal meaning of the verb "Suspiciere," which is "to look up to," depend the two figurative, "to admire," and "to suspect." "Itaque eos viros "suspiciunt," maximisque efferunt

laudibus."—CIC. *de Off.* 2. 10. There is, here, an acknowledged superiority in the persons looked up to. In the exertions of bodily strength, the actual inferiority of one of the combatants implies disadvantage upon his side. If he is conscious of this, he is said "Suspicerè adversarium," which denotes, literally, "to look up to," and figuratively, "to suspect," or "be jealous of" his advantage. A sentiment of rivalry is thus excited, and the inferior dreads that he may be in the situation expressed by the fourth power of the simple preposition, that is "subject to," or "under the controul of" another. "Bomilcar "suspectus" regi, et ipse eum "suspiciens."—SAL. *in Jug.* 73.

From the inferiority, both literal and figurative, expressed by *Sub*, its figurative use has been extended, and made to denote something like inferiority in other matters, to which the idea of local situation is not applicable. In this use, though it is not privative, so as to extinguish the state or the quality involved in the simple word, yet it has a strong power of diminishing either. The wrath and the laughter of the person said "Subirasci," and "Subridere," are less than they would have been in one said "Irasci," and "Ridere." In the same way, the bitter, involved in "Subamarus," is not so strong, nor the green, in "Subviridis," so bright, as each would have been in their respective roots. "Etsi satis clemens sum in disputando, tamen interdum soleo "subirasci."—CIC. *de Fin.* 66. b. It would have been unworthy of the philosopher, and inconsistent with his character, as expressed in "Clemens," if his anger had gone the length of what is meant by the simple verb "Irasci."

— *subridens mixta Mezentius ira.*—VIRG. *Æn.* 10. 742.

A sentiment of indignation tempered the tyrant's laugh, and produced only a smile. "Alios dulcia, alios "subamara" delectant."—CIC. *de Fat.* 141. b. Things that are "Amara," that is, directly opposite to "Dulcia," might not have been agreeable, though things with a less degree of bitterness were. "Balanitæ duo genera habent, "subvirides," et Corinthii æris similitudine medias secante flamma vena."—PLIN. 37. 10. These gems were not of a bright green colour; but greenish; the enclitic "ish" producing the same

effect upon certain English adjectives, that the preposition *Sub* does when prefixed to certain Latin ones.

SUBRIDERE—*vide* RIDERE.

SUBTER

differs from "Sub," which is its root, in supposing that no contiguity takes place between the inferior and the superior body, and that the distance between the two may be greater or less, according to circumstances. As "Inter" differs from "In," so does *Subter* from "Sub." The enclosure, denoted by "In," is complete, in respect to the limits expressed by the governed word; that, implied in "Inter," is the contrary, as this last only suggests that the correlative object is not an extreme one of a number. "Sub," in the same way, expresses immediate vicinity, in the inferior object, in respect to the superior; while *Subter* supposes undefined interval between the correlative, which is the upper, and the governed, which is the lower object. "Deinde *subter* mediam fere regionem sol obtinet, dux, et princeps, et mens mundi."—CIC. *Som. Scip.*

4. By means of *Subter* we are made to understand, that the sun does not occupy that point which is next, or just under the centre of, this system, but one that is at some undefined distance from it. While *Subter* destroys the vicinity implied in "Sub," "Fere" limits the latitude to which the former might be carried in its greatest extent. "Qui omnia hæc quæ supra et *subter*, unum esse et una vi atque una consensione naturæ constricta esse dixerunt."—CIC. *de Or.* 144. b. Though the two prepositions are here taken adverbially, yet the power of each, in its natural state, is discernible. The remotest, as well as the nearest objects in the system mentioned, that are beneath an understood point, are subject to the government of *Subter*, the latter of which only would have been affected by "Sub."

Subter appears rarely in composition, and, when it does so, exhibits no power that is not visible in its simple state.

SUMERE—*vide* CAPERE.

SUPER

is the converse of "Sub," and denotes the relation which one object bears to another, that is immediately above it. It also supposes contiguity between the incumbent and supporting bodies, upon the conditions stated in respect to "Sub." Both allow that these bodies may occasionally be at a distance, and that there is no limitation of the interval, if it takes place at all. "Demetrius *super* terræ tumulum noluit quid nisi columellam."—CIC. *de Legg.* 183. b. In this example, the incumbent body is clearly in contact with that which supports it. "Tectum quod *super* conclavia non placuerat tibi esse multorum fastigiorum."—CIC. *ad Q. F.* 320. b. Here the roof was not in contact with the chambers which it covered.

— fama *super* æthera notus.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 383.

The heavens, to which Æneas's fame had reached, are not to be supposed in contact with the "Æther," beyond which it had gone. A long and undefined interval was understood to exist between that and the abode of the Gods, to which both Greeks and Romans believed that the reputation of illustrious men sometimes reached. Ulysses tells Alcinous in the same way,

— και με κλειος βρανον ηκει.—HOM. *Odys.* 9. 20.

It appears, however, that the instances in which *Super* denotes interval, in which there is no reference to intermediate support, are but rare. From this circumstance it might be understood that *Super* would more naturally have been employed to denote general vicinity than "Sub." In the use of language, however, caprice and principle have a joint influence. An inaccurate expression is often justified by general authority, to which the most enlightened philosopher must yield; and he must adopt the practice which the herd of speakers do not even see to be faulty.

Super is often applied to persons upon the same surface, and where there is no elevation. The one end of a seat or couch being held the most honourable, this opinion is expressed by the term which denotes superiority, where it actually exists.

Nomentanus erat *super* ipsum, Porcius "infra."—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 8. 20.

Polypercon, qui cubabat *super* regem."—Q. CURT. 8. 5. Degrees of superiority and inferiority were thus measured, upon the same level, by the guests being nearest either end of the triclinium, and the distance those in the middle were from each.

Super is taken as equal to "Ultra," and translated "Beyond." As the position of persons upon a level is made the sign of superiority in rank, so the extension of a territory, beyond its original limits, is made the sign of superiority in power. A force, similar to that which raises what is weighty, is supposed needful to remove the obstacle, which retards progress. An idea is suggested either of distress in the support, or of effort in the elevation, of an incumbent body. Adding to the surface is conceived to be adding to the height, and the difficulty of the former operation is suggested by the necessary counteraction of gravity in the latter.

— *super* et Garamantas et Indos
Proferet imperium. ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 794.

The irresistible power of Augustus was to extend the limits of his empire beyond the territory of the Garamantes, in the interior of Africa, and that of the Indians in Asia.

We find *Super* sometimes taken for "Præter," and, like it, translated "beside." An addition is understood to be made to the incumbent body, which, of course, is made proportionally heavier. The addition is expressed by the correlative, and the original weight by the governed term. "Obsessaque urbs foret, *super* bellum annona premente."—LIV. 2. 51. In this example, the verb "Premente" shews well the force of the preposition. The Romans had, first, the weight of war to support, and famine, being laid above it, added to the oppression.

The accession, however, is not always a disadvantage, as in the above cases, but often the contrary. The original, and the added weights, may be either good or evil, but are always homogeneous. "*Super* cæteros honores, locus in circo ipsi ad spectaculum datus."—LIV. 2. 31.

Super is often translated "about," or "concerning." This use corresponds

with that of "Circa," in which, when figuratively applied to objects having no local existence, it supposes a relation between them and their correlatives, analogous to that between a circumference and its centre. By means of the word "about," the concentration of bodies bearing upon one in the middle, is, in English, substituted for the superiority implied in *Super*, of the upper body over that which gives it support. "Hac *super* re scribam ad te Rhegio."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 16. b. In the above sentence, *Super* may be translated "about," or "upon," at pleasure. When the governed object is animated, however, we are limited to the former.

Multa *super* Priamo rogitans, *super* Hectore multa.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 754.

Hector and Priam are, in Latin, made the ground upon which those queries rested. The English speaker, again, when he substitutes "about" for "Super," concentrates his attention, in respect to his subject, as necessarily as the body above another is upheld by the support of what is beneath it.

Super is transferred to time, and then signifies "During." As expressive of duration, *Super* must refer to the temporary pressure of a body, while it continues in motion. A body, in a quiescent state, could never be made the measure of time, because it must remain for ever in that state, if no impulse is applied to change it. Time and motion thus measure each other reciprocally; and the time of the pressure will be as the velocity of the motion, and the extent of the surface, jointly.

——— ventos perpressus et imbres,

Nocte *super* media.————— VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 60.

There is no reason to suppose, that the wolf comes forth either "before" or "after" midnight, as denoted by "Sub," but a little "before" and "after;" that is, "during" it, while other animals are at rest. In the instance just explained, *Super* governs the ablative, but in others, in which it is connected with a word not of itself expressive of time, it governs the accusative. "*Super* coenam loqui."—PLIN. *Ep.* 4. 22. "*Super* vinum, mensam, epulas debellaturus Alexandrum."—CURT. 7. 4. Those entertainments, like motion in a limited surface, come to an end. The Latin *Super* makes the

pressure the principal circumstance, connoting also the motion of the body that is supported. The English "Over," again, coming near to the Latin "Trans," rests upon the motion effecting passage from one point to another, and also connotes the necessary pressure during the transition, whether rapid or otherwise.

SUPER, then, is translated as follows :

I.

ABOVE, UPON ; supposing the incumbent body to be either in contact with the supporting, or otherwise.

II.

ABOVE ; that is, being in the more honourable place on the same level ; from an idea that one end of a seat bestows an advantage similar to that of a person above another in space.

III.

BEYOND. A force similar to that which supports what is heavy, is understood to be exerted in removing what obstructs, in going forward.

IV.

BESIDE. An accession, either good or bad, is understood to be made, by adding to the body that was before incumbent.

V.

ABOUT. In English, a relation is supposed to exist between the governed word and its correlatives, surrounding it, similar to that which by *Super*, in Latin, is understood to exist between bodies, above and below.

VI.

DURING. The continuance of an event is measured by the temporary pressure of a moving body upon the surface that supports it.

Super appears in composition ; but, when in this state, seldom discovers any power but its radical one. The verb "Supervenire" discovers both this and the fourth, which rests upon the accession of somewhat to the body already incumbent.

— nam crura loquentis

Terra *supervenit*. — OVID. *Met.* 10. 489.

Grata *superveniet* quæ non sperabitur hora. — HOR. *Ep.* 1. 4. *sub. fin.*

SUPERBIA, ARROGANTIA, FASTUS,

agree, in denoting pride, but differ, in respect to the degree and the manner in which it shews itself. *SUPERBIA* is generic, as it denotes both that pride, which is disgusting to those who feel its effects, and that sense of dignity, which accompanies conscious merit, and offends nobody. “*Quod ego non *superbia* neque inhumanitate faciebam, sed mehercule, istius disputationis insolentia, et earum rerum inscitia.*”—*CIC. de Or.* 93. a.

Nec minus in vultu damnosa *superbia* vestro,
Comibus est oculis adliciendus amor.—*OVID. Art. Am.* 3. 509.

In the above instances, the pride, expressed by *Superbia*, is oppressive to those exposed to it. In those that follow, *Superbia* denotes what is laudable.

— sune *superbiam*

Quæsitam meritis.——*HOR. Car.* 3. 30. 14.

Magnanimi viri, freti virtute, et viribus *superbi*.—*PLAUT. Amph.* 1. 1. 59.

I, decus Ausoniæ, quo fas est ire *superbas*

Virtute et factis animas.——*SIL. ITAL.* 10. 513:

ARROGANTIA differs from “*Superbia*,” in the manner in which the pride shews itself, and as it is of a kind that is always unjustifiable. It expresses that species of pride which consists in exorbitant claims, and which, in order to satisfy these, prompts the possessor to disregard the right of others. The distinction established between “*Superbia*” and *Arrogantia*, by Facciolati, shews a high power of discrimination. They differ, he tells us, “*Quia “superbus” turgescit iis bonis quæ re vera habet; arrogans temere et impudenter bona sibi vindicat, quæ non habet.*” “*Et illud γνωθι σεαυτον, noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solum esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra norimus.*”—*CIC. ad Q. Frat.* 236. b. The ends served by this divine precept are here delicately pointed out. It checks the arrogance of the proud, and prevents the humble from becoming pusillanimous, and unconscious of their own rights. “*In “superbiam” et arrogantiam odium concitatur.*”—*CIC. de Invent.* 91. a. One species of “*Superbia*” excites hatred, to which *Arrogantia*, in all its forms, is exposed. Tacitus, in the following sentence, appears to have taken both *Arrogantia* and “*Avaritia*” in an impure sense. “*Ubi*

officio satisfactum, nulla ultra potestatis persona. Tristitiam et *arrogantiam* et "avaritiam" exuerat."—*Vit. Ag.* 9. The qualities, properly denoted by the two last terms, would certainly be no recommendation in a judge, in which capacity Agricola is represented. By the first, we must understand his jealousy of any infringement of his official dignity; and, by the last, his excessive zeal to make good every claim he was called to protect, and to maintain the public rights.

FASTUS differs from both terms, in denoting the extremity of that worst species of pride, implied in "Superbia." It implies an intolerable admiration of one's-self, and an insolent contempt of others. The ground of the apprehended superiority is undefined, and may be any thing understood to give eminence among men. "Accendebat dedignantēs et ipse diversus a majorum institutis, raro venatu, segni equorum cura; quoties per urbes incederet, lecticæ gestamine, *fastuque* erga patrias epulas."—*TAC. An.* 2. 2. The disgusting insolence of Vono towards the Parthians is happily expressed by *Fastus*. Every circumstance that could inflame their resentment, too, is finely selected by the historian.

Fastus inest pulchris, sequiturque "superbia" formam.—*OVID. Fast.* 1. 419.

The poet insinuates, that a supercilious insolence is an essential quality of the completely beautiful, and that a less intolerable degree of pride is in the train of those who come only near the standard, expressed by the word *Forma*. "In rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus, "superbiam," fastidium, "arrogantiamque" magnopere fugiamus."—*CIC. de Off.* 90. b. As "Fastidium" may be regarded as a modification of *Fastus*, its root, the two first words express different degrees of that senseless sauciness, which degrades the fool as much, in the eyes of the discerning, as he wishes to raise himself. The last term, again, represents him as injurious to others, by magnifying his own claims, and under-rating theirs.

SUPPETIÆ—*vide* AUXILIUM.

SUPPLICIUM—*vide* PÆNA.

SUPRA.

It does not appear that, in the radical meaning of this preposition, there is any difference between it and "Super." The incumbent body may be either in contact, or otherwise, with that which supports it, and, where an interval exists, there is no limitation of it. *Supra* is opposed, at different times, to "Sub," "Subter," and "Infra."

Tignumque *supra* petulans turba insilit.—PHÆD. 1. 2. 20.

The frogs were in contact with the log, upon which they leapt about.

— notasque paludes

Deserit, atque altam *supra* volat ardea nubem.—VIRG. *Georg.* 1. 363.

The range of the heron's flight was more distant from the earth than the cloud; but the interval between both it and the earth is not defined.

Supra, besides, seems to agree with "Super" in its second, third, and fourth meanings. "Accubueram hora nona: et quidem *supra* me Atticus, "infra" Verrius, familiares tui."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 9. 26. "Ratio recta constansque quæ *supra* hominem putanda est, Deoque tribuenda."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 32. b. "*Supra* belli Latini metum id quoque accesserat."—LIV. 2. 18.

Supra, as well as "Super," is transferred to time, but, when it is so, signifies "Before," not "During." The Romans had considered past times to be above, or up, in respect to the present, as we consider the present to be down, in respect to the past. "Apud Gallos paulo *supra* hanc memoriam servi et clientes una cremabantur."—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 6. 19.

Supra is not found in composition upon any authority that is at all to be trusted, and, in this state, has no effect upon the term to which it is prefixed, but that which it has by itself.

SUSPICIO—*vide* CONJECTURA.

SYLVA, NEMUS, SALTUS, LUCUS,

agree, in denoting a wood, but differ, in respect to the purposes to which a wood may be applied. SYLVA appears to be generic, in relation to the two

terms that follow it, and to denote any collection of trees, to whatever use they may be subservient, provided the wood is consecrated to no deity. In giving the etymology of *Sylva*, and bringing it from ὕλη, Servius has understood it to have originally expressed a wood reared and employed as timber. "Quam Græci ὕλην vocant, poetæ nominant *sylvam*, id est, elementorum congeriem, unde cuncta procreantur."—SERV. *ad Æn.* 1. 318. *Sylva* has afterwards been applied to all kinds of woods, whether "Cædua" or "Incædua." "*Sylva* cædua est, quæ in hoc habetur ut cæderetur."—PAUL. *de Verb. et re. Sig.*

Stat vetus et multos incædua *sylva* per annos.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 3. 1. 1.

Sylva is also applied to vineyards, valuable only for fruit.

Sylvarumque aliæ pressos propaginis arcus
Expectant. ————— VIRG. *Georg.* 2. 26.

NEMUS differs from "Sylva," in denoting a collection of trees, so disposed as to give beauty to the place where they are planted. The proprietor of the *Nemus* has no regard to the profit, but is desirous to enjoy the amenity of his possession. Servius says, "*Nemus* est composita multitudo arborum."—*Ad Æn.* 1. 314., and Festus, "*Nemora* significant "sylvas" amœnas." The generic power of "Sylva" appears in its being applied to the same collection with *Nemus*.

Interea videt Æneas in valle reducta
Seclusum *nemus*, et virgulta sonantia "sylvis."—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 703.

Ovid gives the following beautiful description of a *Nemus* :

Est prope purpureos colles florentis Hymetti
Fons sacer, et viridi cespite mollis humus.
"Sylva" *nemus* non alta facit ; tegit arbutus herbam,
Ros maris et lauri, nigraque myrtus olent.—*Art. Am.* 3. 687.

SALTUS differs from "Nemus," in referring to a collection of trees, in the disposition of which no regard has been paid to beauty, but to the convenience of cattle feeding among them. It supposes a thickness at some places, that affords protection, and an openness at others, that gives room to the

cattle to frisk and jump about. Varro derives *Saltus* from "Salire," and defines it "Pars vacua et expedita ab arboribus, ubi pecudes libere pascant et exiliant." The lawn, thus described, has a necessary reference to the neighbouring woods, within which shelter is to be found.

Saltibus in vacuis pascant, et plena secundum
Flumina.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 143.

The Dictæan nymphs are, by the junction of *Saltus* and "Nemus," said to inhabit woods, in which both beauty and the conveniency of pasturage were consulted.

— Claudite Nymphæ,
Dictææ Nymphæ, "nemorum" jam claudite *saltus*.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 6. 55.

From the general thickness of the wood surrounding the lawn, both of which form the *Saltus*, the term is, figuratively, taken to denote difficult access of any kind. "Ad Alpes posteaquam venit, quas nemo unquam cum exercitu ante eum præter Herculem Graium transierat, quo facto is hodie *saltus* Graius appellatur, loca patefecit."—NEP. *in Vit. Han.* 3.

LUCUS differs from all the preceding nouns, in referring to those woods that are consecrated, and in which certain deities are worshipped. It comes from "Lux," and refers to those fires that were lighted at the sacrifices offered in such woods. Servius says, "Ubicunque Virgilius *lucum* ponit, sequitur etiam consecratio." The ghosts of departed heroes were also supposed to reside in *Luci*, and to receive the homage due to them.

Nulli certa domus: *lucis* habitamus opacis.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 673.

"Vos enim Albani tumuli atque *luci*, vos inquam imploro atque obtestor, vosque Albanorum obrutæ aræ."—CIC. *pro Mil.* 118. a. The *Luci* were all "Incædui," and the trees preserved to maintain that gloom, which accorded with the sentiments of those who performed religious rites in them. Upon the top of the turrets of the houses of the opulent, "Nemora" were planted "amœnitatis causa," as appears in Tibullus and Horace.

Et "nemora" in domibus sacros imitantia *lucos*.—TIBULL. 3. 3. 15.

Audis quo strepitu janua, quo "nemus"
 Inter pulchra situm tecta remugiat
 Ventis.———HOR. *Car.* 3. 10.

These artificial groves sometimes got the name of "Sylvæ."

—— nulla culminibus meis
 Imposita nutat "sylvæ."———SEN. *in Thyest.* 464.

SYNGRAPHÆ, CHIROGRAPHUM,

agree, in denoting an obligation in writing, but differ, in regard to its extent. The Greek verb *Γραφειν* is common to both. The preposition *Συν*, in the first, intimates, that more are concerned in it than one; and the noun *Χειρ*, in the last, that it is the hand-writing of some particular person. *Syngrapha* denoted a deed that was equally obligatory upon each of the two parties who signed it, a copy of which was lodged with both. *Chirographum*, again, was obligatory upon that person only who wrote it, with whom no duplicate remained. "*Chirographa* ab una parte servari solent; *syngraphæ* signatæ utriusque manu, utrique parti servandæ traduntur."—ASCON. *in Ver.* 3. 36. "Ut ea *syngrapha* esset qua vi cæteræ."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 83. a. The senate, it appears, took cognizance of this obligation, in which Scaptius was one of the parties, and fixed it as to them appeared proper. "Cavere alicui jurejurando et *chirographo* de re aliqua."—SÆTON. *in Cæs.* 17.

Vana supervacui dicunt *chirographa* ligni,
 Arguit ipsorum quos littera.———JUV. *Sat.* 13. 137.

The corruption of Roman manners is here forcibly held forth by this eloquent poet. Nothing could surpass the daring iniquity of those, who, when their hand-writing condemned them, tried to overturn the validity of their own deed.

TABERNA—*vide* OFFICINA.

TEMERITAS—*vide* AUDACIA.

TACERE—*vide* SILERE.

TEMPESTIVUS—*vide* COMMODUS.

TÆDET—*vide* PIGET.

TENEBRÆ, CALIGO,

agree, in denoting such a deficiency of light, as prevents the eye from performing its function, but differ, in respect both to the cause of that deficiency, and the extent of its effect. TENEBRÆ properly denotes a total privation of light, or that state of darkness which takes place when there is no luminous body. *Caligo* again, while it implies the existence of a luminous body, supposes the transmission of light to be checked by means of thick air. Neither of the terms refers to any defect in the organ of sight; but the former suggests, that, from an abolition of its proper medium, it cannot operate at all, and the latter, that, from a deficiency in the medium, it operates but imperfectly.

Hic subitam nigro glomerari pulvere nubem
 Prospiciunt Teucri, ac tenebras insurgere campis.
 Primus ab adversa conclamat mole Cæicus,
 Quis globus, O cives, caligine volvitur atra?—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 33.

When the cloud first appeared, the *Tenebræ* are figuratively said to rise like the sun, and to threaten complete darkness. The light, however, was not so much diminished as to prevent Cæicus from seeing the approaching Rutuli, and perceiving the cause of that *Caligo* in which they were involved, and which was spreading over the country. “Quod videbam equidem, sed quasi per *caliginem* præstrinxerat aciem animi D. Bruti salus. Discussa est illa *caligo* : diluxit : patet.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 240. a. “Qui tanquam si offusa reipublicæ sempiterna nox esset, ita ruebant in *tenebris*, omnia miscebant.”—CIC. *pro S. R.* 33. a.

Premunt *tenebræ* lumina, et diræ Stygis
Inferna nox est.—SEN. *Agam.* 493.

When the obscuring cause is so strong, as not merely to diminish, but to destroy the light, *Tenebræ* may be put for *Caligo*. “Nos autem *tenebras* cogitemus tantas, quantæ quondam *Ætnæorum* ignium finitimas regiones obscuravisse dicuntur.”—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 2. 96.

———— me faciam pensilem :

Certum est mihi ante *tenebras*, *tenebras* persequi.—PLAUT. *Pseud.* 1. 1. 87.

In this passage, *Tenebras* is first taken to denote the night, in which there is no sun to illuminate a part of the earth's surface; and then, figuratively, to denote death, by suggesting the supposed darkness of the infernal regions.

In the two passages that follow, there is a marked reference to the substances, which, being thicker than the ordinary atmosphere, interrupt and diminish the light, as in the case of *Caligo*.

Nunc demum exerior, prius ob oculos mihi *caliginem* obstitisse.

PLAUT. *Mil. G.* 2. 4. 51.

Humidam a terra, aliâs vero, propter vapores fumidam exhalari *caliginem*.”—PLIN. 2. 42.

It matters not how the thick air, creating *Caligo*, is generated, if, by screening the luminous body, it obscures objects, that would otherwise be distinctly seen.

TENERE—*vide* HABERE.

TENTARE, EXPERIRI,

agree, in expressing the desire of information, upon some matter that is unknown, but they differ as to the manner in which this information is to be obtained. *Tentare* supposes a disposition, upon the part of the enquirer, to judge from circumstances, without putting the matter in question to a severe proof. *Experiri*, again, supposes him intent upon thorough information, and willing to adopt such means, only, as will afford it.

There is a sentence in Livy, in which the two verbs, now treated of, are happily opposed, so as to bring forth the specific power of each. In the

famous speech of Canuleius, he upbraids the patricians with cowardice, in only guessing at the sentiments of the plebeians, and with the want of that decisive courage, by which alone their strength could be brought to an unequivocal trial. “Nec nunc erit certamen, Quirites. Animos vestros illi *tentabunt* semper, vires non *experientur*.”

The applications, which Cicero makes of the verb *Experire*, confirm the account now given of its power. “Vim veneni aiunt Celium esse *expertum* in servo quodam ad rem ipsam comparato, cujus perceleri interitu esset ab hoc comprobatum venenum.” Celius seems, here, to have disregarded every consequence to which his experiment might lead. From the violence of the operation of this poison, he got speedy and complete information upon the matter in question.

When the equity of a cause was to be tried by the decision of a judge at Rome, we find the verb *Experiri* always used to express this inclination of one or both the parties. The verb *Tentare* would have insinuated the possibility of discovering his opinion before it was formally declared, so that either his caution or his integrity might have been questioned. But the sentence, which was to be final to the parties at law, was understood, by the Roman classics, to have been alike inscrutable to both. “Judicio gravi *experiri* nolebas.”—CIC. *pro Q. Rosc.* 49. a. “Qui ad constitutum *experiundi* juris gratia venisset.”—CIC. *pro Cæc.* 291. a.

TENUS,

denotes the termination of motion, any how directed, and is properly translated, “as far as.” The ordinary translation, “up to,” is incomplete, as the motion may be down, as well as up, and in every possible line, between the plane of the horizon, and a perpendicular passing above and below it. It governs both the genitive, the accusative, and the ablative, without undergoing any change in its meaning, as in the case of certain Greek prepositions, when they exhibit such a variety. Some have affirmed that it governs the genitive of nouns, in the plural, and the ablative of those in the singular. Though

this may be true in general, yet, that it is not always so, may appear in these two examples: "Corcyræ *tenus*."—LIV. 26. 26. 24.

—— pennis *tenus* acta sagitta.—OVID. *Met.* 6. 258.

From the passages subjoined, it will appear that *Tenus* may, with equal propriety, be translated, "up as far as," "down as far as," and "forward as far as." "Ut alibi umbilico *tenus* esset aqua, alibi genua vix superaret."—LIV. 26. 45. From the unequal depth of the water, it, at some places, moved up to one part of the body, and, at others, to another. When it came to the knees only, the preposition is not employed; but when it came to the "umbilicus," this extraordinary elevation is expressed by *Tenus*. The mind is not called to attend to the motion forward, of those wading through it; but the water itself is the moving object, and the direction is, in this instance, "upwards." "Demittere se inguibus *tenus* in aquam calidam." CELS. 1. 3. Here the motion is "downwards," and the moving object is the person going into the water, not the water itself. The bather, in this case, lets himself down, till the water, in consequence of his motion, reaches his groin, and, from this regulated depth, as well as temperature, expects to profit.

Nec poti vetulam fæce *tenus* cadi.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 15. 16.

Here, too, the motion is "downwards," but takes place in the fluid. The old woman is supposed to have drunk so very liberally, that the surface of the wine had descended from the top of the cask down to the very lees.

—— lateri capulo *tenus* abdidit ensem.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 553.

As Priam lay on the ground, when he received the fatal blow, the motion of the sword must have been "downwards." By means of the preposition, in this instance, however, the mind is not led to attend to its direction, in one way or another. The force of Pyrrhus, only, is held forth to the reader's imagination, without regard to that weapon being higher or lower in the hand that wielded it. That stab was more than sufficient to dispatch the

old king, when the progress of the sword was arrested by no obstacle before it, and only by its hilt.

Though *Tenus* very generally comes after the word it governs, yet it does not do so always.

— summo *tenus* attigit ore.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 741.

— media *tenus* eminent alvo.—OVID. *Fast.* 2. 145.

But *Tenus* as frequently denotes progress as either ascent or descent. In whatever direction the motion takes place, the point involved in the governed term forms its utmost boundary. “Antiochus a Scipione devictus Tauro *tenus* regnare jussus.”—CIC. *pro Dejot.* 150. b. The limits of that territory, over which the conquered monarch could exercise his sway, are here strictly defined. They extended as far as this mountain, but could not go beyond it.

Tenus is found in composition, and is always subjoined to the word with which it is associated. In this state its radical power remains entire; as in “Hactenus,” “up to this point,” and “Quadantenus,” “to a certain degree.” “Eatenus” and “Quatenus” are often opposed to each other, in different members of the same sentence. “Ex ulterioribus locis “eatenus” sanguis sequitur, “quatenus” emittitur.”—CELS. 2. 10.

TENUIS—*vide* GRACILIS.

TERES—*vide* GRACILIS.

TEPERE—*vide* CALERE.

TIMERE, METUERE, VERERI,

agree, in denoting the act of fearing, but differ in respect to the notions formed by those who are influenced by the fear, with regard to its cause. All agree in denoting a certain apprehension of danger, but differ, in respect to the degree of this apprehension, as corresponding with the nature of that which excites it. TIMERE is generic, and signifies to fear, without regard either to the nature of the being who is the object, or the extent of the evil apprehended. “*Timemus* Deos immortales.”—LIV. 39. 37. From the general character of goodness in the Gods, they would be the cause of a slavish fear in those, only, who were conscious of deserving their wrath.

Regum *timendorum* in proprios greges,
Reges in ipsos imperium est Jovis.—HOR. *Car.* 3. 1. 5.

Though neither the gods nor the kings, in the preceding examples, are understood to be bent upon the destruction of those who are subject to their power, yet, as the ancients believed in infernal, as well as celestial deities, and as all kings are not equally good, the sentiment of fear would vary with its object. “Ejus formam cognoscere studebant, quem tamdiu tamque valde *timuissent*.”—NEP. 18. 11.

Cum furem nemo *timeret*
Caulibus et pomis, sed aperto viveret horto.—JUV. 6. 17.
Quicquid id est, *timeo* Danaos et dona ferentes.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 49.

In the three last examples, a hostile disposition was dreaded in each of the objects of fear, for the gratifying of which there might be a want of power, but none of inclination. In the example that follows, the evil dreaded cannot be understood to be one of the most formidable, nor expressive of malice in him who is the author of it.

Si potes archaicis conviva recumbere lectis,
Nec modica cœnare *times* olus omne patella.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 5. 1.

METUERE differs from “Timere,” in implying, that a hostile disposition is always dreaded in the person exciting the fear, and that the evil apprehended is great. “Supplicia quæ a vobis pro maleficiis suis *metuere* atque horrere debent.”—CIC. *pro Sex. Rosc.* 20. a. “Omnium autem rerum nec aptius est quidquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligere: nec alienius quam “*timeri*.” Præclare enim Ennius: quem *metuunt* oderunt: quem quisque odit perisse expetit.”—CIC. *de Off.* 2. 7. As “Diligere,” in this last example, does not signify the greatest love, so neither does “*Timeri*” signify the greatest fear. In the quotation from Ennius, however, *Metuere* is opposed to “*Odisse*,” because, where the greatest possible injury only is to be apprehended, the object, exciting the fear, naturally excites hatred also.

In scalis latuit *metuens* pendentis habenæ.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 1.

The fear of the slave, conscious he had been in fault, is precisely that expressed

by *Metuere*. Some grammarians, however, have erred in supposing the fear, implied in *Metuere*, to be always servile and mean. It rests upon the extent of the evil, and does not constantly imply meanness upon the part of him who dreads it.

— intrepidus vultu, meruitque “timeri”
Non metuens. ————— LUCAN. 5. 326.

Cæsar is here described as entitled to awe his enemies, but as void of that excessive fear which constitutes cowardice.

The generic power of “Timere” is manifest in the following example. “In hujusmodi rerum perturbatione, quanquam omnia sunt *metuenda*, nihil magis quam perfidiam “timemus.”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 1. 5. All things are supposed so bad during such convulsions, that *Metuere* is applicable to each; but the particular fear naturally excited by “Perfidia,” as opposed to the others, is announced by the verb which can express the lowest and the highest degree of it, in every possible situation.

VERERI differs from “Metuere,” in implying, that the fear is tempered with respect for its object, and that the evil apprehended often originates from the demerit of the sufferer, and never from the malice of its author. “Timere” may be applied to objects of respect, as well as of horror; but *Vereri* to the former alone. “Quid veteranos non *veremur*? nam “timeri” se, ne ipsi quidem volunt.”—CIC. *in Ant.* 245. b. The veterans are here understood to be objects of respect, and to reject the power, rather than be held inclined, to do evil. “*Veremur* quidem vos, Romani: et si ita vultis, etiam “timemus:” sed plus *veremur* et “timemus” Deos immortales.”—LIV. 39. 37. Both the Gods and the Romans are held forth as objects of respect, and as susceptible of wrath, and capable of giving vent to it. The former, however, are supposed entitled to the highest reverence, and, as the authors of evil, are deemed the most formidable.

The qualities necessarily residing in the being who excites the different species of fear, expressed by *Vereri* and “Metuere,” are so heterogeneous, that they should be understood never to exist together in the same object. This, however, is not the case. “Licentia est cum apud eos quos aut *vereri*, aut

“metuere” debemus, tamen aliquid pro jure nostro dicimus, quod eos minime offendat.”—*Auct. ad Her.* 35. a. The hearers mentioned may be all the objects, either of respect or of terror; but none are here understood to be the objects of both. “Metuebant eum servi, *verebantur* liberi.”—*Cic. de Sen.* 48. b. In the prologue to the *Amphitruo* of Plautus, however, we find Mercury applying both verbs to his father, Jupiter.

———— quippe qui intellexerat
Vereri vos se et “metuere,” ita ut æquum est, Jovem.—*vers.* 22.

Those respectable qualities, which distinguished Jupiter, made him revered by his creatures, and the evils to which he could give existence, when he hurled his “*iracunda fulmina*,” excited their dread. The same author also applies both verbs to the goddess Juno.

Junonem quam me *vereri* et “metuere” par est maxime.—*Amph.* 2. 2. 201.

In the following passage from Cicero, the accident of primogeniture is said to entitle an elder to the respect of his younger brother. “*Quem meus Cicero et amabat ut fratrem, et jam ut majorem fratrem verebatur.*”—*Cic. ad Q. Frqat.* 303. b. Causes, leading to important effects of any kind, are also stated as deserving attention; and, as such, are connected with this verb. Thus, old Lælius speaking of Carthage, the rival of Rome, says, “*De qua vereri non desinam, quam illam excisam esse cognovero.*”—*Cic. de Sen. cap.* 6. Though Simo, in one part of the *Andria* of Terence, claims the respect due to him as a master, by the use of this verb, yet, in another, he allows his dependence, to a certain degree, upon his slave, and states him as more than an object of his notice.

———— *Si. Edixin' tibi*
 Interminatus sum ne faceres? num *veritus*?—3. 2. 15.
 ———— *Si. Audivin' tu illum?*
 Ego dudum nonnihil *veritus sum*, Dave, abs te, ne faceres idem,
 Quod vulgus servorum solet, dolis ut me deluderet.—3. 4. 2.

TRAHERE, DUCERE, ALLICERE,
 agree, in denoting to give motion, in a particular line, to what would other-

wise be at rest, but differ, in respect to the degree of force requisite to give existence to this motion. As "Agere" expresses the impelling power with which a person drives the heavy body that is before him, so *Trabere* expresses that power by which he drags such a body, when behind him. "Corpus tractum et laceratum in mare abjicit."—CIC. *in Ant.* 231. a. "Forte navem, haud procul castris frumento gravem cum per vada hæsisset, Germani in suam ripam *trabebant*."—TAC. *Hist.* 4. 27.

— hæc dicens altaria ad ipsa trementem
Traxit. ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 550.

Trabere is, figuratively, applied to immaterial objects, and refers to means, which though not always disagreeable, yet constantly command their proper effect.

— *trahit* sua quemque voluptas.—VIRG. *Ecc.* 2. 65.

DUCERE differs from "Trahere" in referring, not to the motion given to inanimate matter, but to a disposition produced in sensitive beings to follow where another leads.

Duc me ad eam, quando huc veni, ut videam.—TER. *And.* 4. 5. 23.

Crito, here, expresses his inclination to go wherever Mysis should lead him. "Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem" trahunt."—SEN. *Ep.* 107. The law of fate is alike peremptory in respect to those who are willing, and those who are unwilling, to obey it: but the former it leads to its fulfilment, and the latter it drags.

As "Trahere" does not imply that the means for commanding the effect are always disagreeable, so *Ducere* does not imply that they are always the contrary. "Illos *duci* in carcerem jubent."—CIC. *in Ver.* 251. b. The verb, here, implies the absence of resistance, upon the part of the criminal, from a sense of its inutility. He either reconciles himself to his fate, or, despairing of ever conquering it, forbears to contend with a superior force.

ALLICERE differs from "Ducere" in implying, that the means, producing the effect, are still gentler, and always agreeable, and that they operate without the consciousness of the person influenced. It comes from "Ad" and the

obsolete verb "Lacio," and suggests the physical operation of a principle which suspends the volition of him upon whom it acts. "Virtus *allicit* homines ad diligendum."—CIC. *de Am.* 101. a. This power of virtue is agreeable, effective, and yet unperceived by him who yields to its influence. "Cum in hunc sensum et alliciar beneficiis hominum, et compellar injuriis."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 16. a.

Rex sum, si ego illum hodie hominem ad me *allexero*.

PLAUT. *Pœn.* 3. 3. 58.

It was by the gentlest and most insinuating means only that the Advocati were to give effect to the wishes of Lycus. They were to entrap the stranger, like a pigeon, with corn thrown down to it.

Nos tibi palumbem ad aream usque adduximus.—*Ibid.* 63.

Adliciunt somnos tempus, motusque, merumque.—OVID. *Fast.* 6. 681.

The lateness of the time, the motion of the waggons, and the quantity of wine drunk, were all circumstances that made the unperceived influence of sleep irresistible.

In the following example, *Allicere* is transferred from immaterial objects to one that is material. "Magnes lapis est qui ferrum ad se *allicit* et "trahit."—CIC. *de Div.* 98. b. The gentle operation of the magnetic power, involved in *Allicere*, may have been visible when the body, affected by it, was at a distance. When the interval was diminished the power increased, and was expressed by "Trahere."

The "hæmatites," it should seem, was understood to be more powerful in its influence than the ordinary magnet, and affected silver, brass, and iron. "Hæmatites "trahit" in se argentum, æs, ferrum."—PLIN. 36. 20.

TRAMES—*vide VIA.*

TRANS

estimates the relation between the point at which a body begins to move, and that at which its motion terminates, by regarding the interval between them.

Cœlum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 11. 27.

The breadth of the sea, here, forms the interval between the ordinary residence, from which the voyager sets out, and that point at which he finds himself in a new climate; and by that interval his different situations are judged of.

*Illas ducit amor trans Gargara, transque sonantem
Ascanium: superant montes, et flumina tranant.*—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 269.

Though the rays of light pass from the object seen to the eye of the observer, yet *Trans* is used as if the direction of the motion were reversed. “*Domino trans ripam inspectante.*”—CIC. *pro Mil.* 115. b.

Trans does not always refer to the existing motion, as in the above instances. It often denotes the point at which a prior motion terminated, and at which the body is quiescent. “*Dicam hunc eo tempore quo homo occisus est, trans mare fuisse.*”—CIC. *de Inv.* 52. a. The person, in whose favour an “*Alibi*” is affirmed, might have been on the same side of the sea with the person killed, when the crime was committed, but may have afterwards gone across it, and taken up his abode there.

When *Trans* is applied to space, as the subject of property, or the place of habitation, it necessarily refers to the quiescence only of the correlative objects. “*Cogito interdum trans Tyberim hortos aliquos parare.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 12. 19.

Trans Tyberim cubat is prope Cæsaris hortos.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 9. 18.

Trans appears often in composition, and, in this state, refers also to objects in actual motion, to others that have moved, and to others that are incapable of doing so. “*Caucasum hunc transcendere potuit, vel Gangem tranare.*”—CIC. *in Som. Scip.* 129. b.

Ego transmarinus hospes sum Diapontius.—PLAUT. *Most.* 2. 2. 66.

“*Nunc vero etiam braccatis et transalpinis nationibus nullum veteris leporis vestigium apparet.*”—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 9. 15.

TRIBUERE—*vide* DARE.

TRUDERE—*vide* PELLERE.

TUMULTUOSUS, TUMULTUARIUS,

agree, in referring to dangerous sedition; but the former denotes those who are disposed to excite it, and the latter those who are suddenly called to put an end to it. "In otio *tumultuosi*, in bello *segnes*."—LIV. 4. 28. The most troublesome people in time of peace are, here, said to be slothful in time of war. "Ita *tumultuosæ* conciones, ita *molestæ* quinquatriis afferebantur."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 24. a.

Quis homo tam *tumultuoso* sonitu me excivit subito foras?

PLAUT. *Truc.* 5. 2. 52.

TUMULTUARIUS differs from "Tumultuosus," in denoting those who are suddenly called upon to quell an alarm that has actually taken place. "Syriam, ingruente Vologese, acriore in discrimine esse. Atque interim reliquas legiones pro ripa Euphratis locat: *tumultuariam* provincialium manum armat."—TAC. *Ann.* 15. 3. "Mens ea senatûs fuit, ut in Hispania *tumultuarii* milites legerentur."—LIV. 35. 2. In both the above examples, the troops raised were merely for the exigency, and when this was over, they would probably be disbanded.

TUNDERE—*vide* PELLERE;

TUTELA—*vide* CLIENTELA.

TURBA—*vide* AURA.

VACUUS—*vide* INANIS.

VAGIRE—*vide* FLERE.

VADERE—*vide* IRE.

VALERE—*vide* POSSE.

VAFER—*vide* ASTUTUS.

VARIUS—*vide* MULTIPLEX.

VAS, PRÆS,

agree, in being applicable to one who becomes bound for another, but differ, in respect to the circumstances of the person for whom the obligation is incurred. VAS supposes the person, for whom the security is given, to have been guilty of a capital crime.

Quis subit in pœnam capitali iudicio? *Var.*—*AUSON. Eidyll. 12. 100.*

“Quum is qui morti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causâ postulavisset, *vas* factus est alter sistendi ejus, ut si ille non revertisset, moriendum esset ipsi.”—*CIC. de Off. 61. a.* In both the above instances, it is evident, that the case of the person guilty was a criminal one, and, in the last, that he, who became surety for his appearance at a fixed time, became subject to his punishment, if he failed to appear.

PRÆS differs from “*Vas*,” in referring to the security given in a civil cause.

Quis subit in pœnam capitali iudicio? “*Vas*.”

Quis quum lis fuerit nummaria, quis dabitur?

Præs.—*AUSON. Eidyll. 12. 100.*

Præs is derived from “*Præstare*,” as the surety undertakes to perform what another may fail in. “*Præs est*,” says Varro, “qui a magistratu interrogatur in publicum ut “*præstet*,” a quo, quum responderit, dicitur *præs*.”—*De L. L. 5. 7.* “*Prædia*” sunt res ipsæ; *prædes* homines; id est fidejussores, quorum res “bona prædia” uno nomine dicuntur.”—*ASCON. in Cic. in Ver. 1. 142.*

UBERTAS—*vide COPIA.*

VEL—*vide AN.*

VEHERE—*vide FERRE.*

VELLE, CUPERE, OPTARE,

agree, in denoting desire, but differ, in respect to the circumstances of the person in whom this desire operates. *VELLE*, properly, signifies the inclination of one who judges between alternatives, and feels himself at liberty to adopt that which pleases him. It refers to that quality of mind which constitutes a free agent, and implies the power of rejection, which forms the essence of “*Nolle*.” “*Velit*, “*nolit*,” scire difficile est.”—*CIC. Ep. ad Q. F. 8.* In all the exercises of volition expressed by *Velle*, it is understood that there is an exercise of reason. “*Boni appetitionem*, *Stoici ἐπιθυμίαν* appellant, nos *voluntatem* appellamus.”—*CIC. Tusc. Q. 4. 12.* “*Ducunt volentem fata*, “*nolentem*” trahunt.”—*SEN. Ep. 107.* The conduct of those who possess, and of those who want, the virtue of resignation has the same appearance,

though the former are, after their decision, led, and the latter are forced, to submission. "Nolite" igitur *velle* quod fieri non potest.—CIC. *Phil.* 7. 9. The subject of the rejection, implied in the first verb, is the inclination, implied in the second. They, who desire an impossibility, cherish an absurd desire, and only court the pain of a disappointment.

*Vis ergo inter nos quid possit uterque vicissim,
Experiamur?*———VIRG. *Ecc.* 3. 28.

It was in the power of Menalcas to reject this challenge of Damon, who, by the interrogation, wanted only to know if he chose to accept it. The inclination, expressed by *Velle*, may be but faint, or it may be strong, and that in very different degrees. The poet Juvenal, when representing the mistress of a family ordering an innocent slave to be led to the rack, uses this verb, as expressive of inclination, which, from being slightly intimated, cannot be supposed to have been strong. To this, however, she understands it to have been the duty of her domestics to pay attention, and to yield obedience.

— nil fecerit esto ;

Hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas.—JUV. 6. 222.

The arrogance of the lady gives to *Volo*, here, a power which it hardly possesses. She supposes, that the slightest expression of her will should have been a law to her domestics.

In order to soften the apparent imperiousness in the indicative of *Velle*, the subjunctive is ordinarily adopted, which expresses being disposed to desire, and not actual desiring. "Tu, *velim*, ut consuesti, nos absentes diligas, et defendas."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 3. 15. The request is here presented as a matter of favour, and carries nothing of the insolent tone of "*Hoc volo, sic jubeo*," as above.

CUPERE differs from "*Velle*," in denoting the existence of a higher degree of inclination, the object of which has not, in every instance, been recommended to the pursuer as a preferable alternative. It implies, that some good, not possessed, is eagerly desired, and that an effort is made in order to obtain it. "*Animo cupienti nihil satis festinatur.*"—SALL. *Jug.* 64.

Mars videt hanc, visamque cupit, potiturque cupita.—OVID. *Fast.* 3. 21.

In those two instances, *Cupere* plainly denotes desire dictated by the impetuosity of passion, without any previous reflection as to the propriety of gratifying it. "Ego conservare coloniam Romanam *cupio*, tu expugnare studes."—CIC. *in Ant.* 217. b. Cicero, here, takes the credit of keenly pursuing an object, which he had considered and approved of as right. He must have perceived, that the fidelity with which he discharged the duty which he owed to his country, would be proportioned to the zeal with which he gratified his desire.

— et *cupio* omnia quæ "vis."—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 9. 5.

In these words, which are a form of compliment to be met with in several classics, there is the greatest possible expression of attachment. He, who uttered them, could not have formed a judgment as to the propriety of his own desire, because some of the inclinations of his friend must have been unknown to him. Were the phrase reversed thus, "Et "volo" omnia quæ *cupis*," it would have a very different meaning. It would imply, that though the parties had the same objects of desire in common, yet the person professing friendship was less anxious about the acquisition of them, and that he had formed a general resolution of gratifying the views of him, to whom his professions were made.

OPTARE agrees with the two former verbs, in supposing that the object is agreeable, but differs from them in having of itself no reference to the absolute degree of the desire, and in implying, that the acquisition of the object is a matter of chance, and not to be effected by any exertion upon the part of him who desires it.

Rursus in arma feror, mortemque miserrimus *opto*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 2. 655.

Though the Trojan hero was wretched, yet he resolved to sell his life dear, and wished for such a death only as became him; that is, to fall by the hand of an enemy.

Optat ephippia bos piger, *optat* arare caballus.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 14. 43.

They, who are thus discontented with their situation, naturally wish to change it, but feel the uncertainty, if not the impossibility, of accomplishing their

desire. "Bonitas vocis *optanda* est, non est enim in nobis, sed tractatio in nobis."—CIC. *Orat.* 202. a. As no art can supply the deficiency of natural talents, so the possession of them is the object of that desire which is expressed by *Optare*. "Tibi favemus, te tua frui virtute "cupimus:" tibi *optamus* eam rempublicam, in qua duorum generum amplissimorum renovare memoriam atque augere possis."—CIC. *de Cl. Orat.* 196. They, who pay this compliment to Brutus, intimate, by means of "Cupere," their strong desire that he should enjoy that reward of virtue, which naturally attends it. By means of *Optare*, again, they express their wish, that a seeming contingency should be accomplished, and that he might come to possess that power in the state, which it belonged not to them to bestow.

There is a passage in one of the Epistles of Ovid, addressed by the poet to his wife, during his banishment in Pontus, from which the power of each of the three verbs may be distinctly drawn.

Quid facias quæris? quæras hoc scilicet ipsum;

Invenies, vere si reperire "voles."

"Velle" parum est: "cupias," ut re potiaris, oportet;

Et faciat somnos hæc tibi cura breves.

"Velle" reor multos. Quis enim mihi tam sit iniquus

Optet ut exilium pace carere meum?

Pectore te toto cunctisque incumbere nervis,

Et nitii pro me nocte dieque decet.—OVID. *Ep. ex Ponto*, 3. 1. 33.

Ovid is here complaining that his wife did not sympathize with him under his misfortunes, in the degree to which he held himself entitled. He upbraids her, at first, with not even being desirous of an abatement of his distress, by means of "voles." He next tells her, that such inclination, as that involved in "Velle," was not enough; and that she ought to possess that keen desire for his relief, implied in "Cupere," which would disturb her sleep, and make her exert every nerve with a view to promote it. The cold wish, involved in "Velle," he insinuates, might be expected from many, but was unbecoming of the relation in which she stood to him. He gives the world credit for its general benevolence, and supposes nobody would be so hard-hearted as to rejoice in the probability, as expressed by *Optare*, that the woes of his banishment would be continued.

VELUT—*vide* UT.VERECUNDIA—*vide* PUDOR.VENERARI—*vide* COLERE.VERERI—*vide* TIMERE.VENTUS—*vide* AURA.VERNA—*vide* SERVUS.

VERSUS,

denotes the direction adopted by any person moving towards a definite point, in opposition to all others, in which this motion might have been performed. Like "Ad," it has no reference to the termination of motion. All it regards, is the limitation of the line, by its bearing upon a particular object, after the motion has commenced, and during the time of its continuance. "Et initio belli civilis, quum Brundisium *versus* ires "ad" Cæsarem, venisti "ad" me in Formianum."—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 179. b. The progress of the motion is announced by "Ire" and *Versus*, in as far as it led to the place where Cæsar was, though this place was not then reached; and the termination of the motion, by "Venire" and "Ad," which two suggest the arrival of the traveller at a point, to which he had no intention to go at his outset.

It may be observed, too; that *Versus* limits direction more vaguely than "Ad." The straight line, in which Matus should have moved, was "ad Cæsarem;" but he came at him, by taking a circuitous road to Brundisium, by Cicero's villa.

When *Versus* appears connected with a preposition, it changes its own nature, and becomes an adverb. It is then equal to the syllabic adjection "wards," in English, and renders the path of direction more vague than it would otherwise have been. "Deductus in arcem in lapide ad meridiem *versus* consedit."—LIV. I. 18. Were the preposition by itself, the aspect of the person looking would be understood to be due south; but, when modified by the adverb *Versus*, a certain deviation from this line, either one way or other, is understood to take place. The *Versus*, too; as an adverb, quits the necessary reference to motion, implied in it as a preposition; and possesses the third power of "Ad," signifying "Towards." The correlative object, in this case, either possesses the power of motion, without using it, or is, in its nature, always quiescent.

VESCİ, EDERĒ, MANDERE, VORARE, RODERE,

agree, in denoting the act of receiving nourishment by the mouth, but differ, in respect either to the nature of the nourishment, or to the manner in which it is prepared in the mouth, for the support of the animal that receives it. VESCİ, as the most general word, signifies to take in whatever ministers to the continuation of animal life. "Lacte, caseo, carne *vescor*."—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 246. a. The first of those substances is a fluid, and the two last solids; yet *Vesci* is applicable to them all. "Dii nec *escis*, nec *potionibus vescuntur*."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 73. b. The verb is here also applied both to meat and to drink.

The poets extend the meaning of *Vesci* to the air, which is used for respiration, as well as to the food for digestion.

Quid puer Ascanius? superatne, et *vescitur* aura?—VIRG. *Æn.* 3. 339.
Nam quæcunq; vides *vesci* vitalibus auris.—LUCRET. 5. 855.

EDERĒ differs from "*Vesci*," in always referring to the food that is solid, and in expressing the act of eating, in opposition to that of drinking. It is, besides, never applied to the act of respiration. "Mergi pullos in aqua jussit, ut biberent, quoniam *esse* nollent."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 27. b. "Numquam videlicet Darius sitiens biberat: nec esuriens Ptolemæus *ederat*."—CIC. *Tusc. Q.* 247. a. *EderĒ* is as uniformly applied to the act of eating, as "*Bibere*" is to that of drinking; and no opposition is ever found between the latter verb and "*Vesci*." No such expression as "*EderĒ* auris" is to be met with. This verb, at the same time, is figuratively taken to signify the act of wasting or consuming.

— *est mollis flamma medullas*

Interea, et tacitum vivit sub pectore vulnus.—VIRG. *Æn.* 4. 66.

MANDERE differs from the other verbs, in referring to the act of chewing, or preparing the solid food, by means of the teeth, in order to render it fit for being swallowed, and to facilitate digestion. "Dentibus *manditur*, extenuatur, et mollitur cibus."—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 53. a. "Cibos *mansos* ac prope liquefactos demittimus."—QUINCT. 10. 1.

Ponitur Ausoniis avis hæc rarissima, mensis
Hanc in lautorum *mandere* sæpe soles.—MART. 13. 65.

The food, that is *mansum*, is not always intended for the support of the animal that chews it, which is not the case with that to which the other verbs are applied. “Omnia minima *mansa*, ut aiunt, nutrices infantibus pueris in os inserere.”—CIC. *de Or.* 123. b.

VORARE stands opposed to “Mandere,” and implies swallowing solid food, with little or no mastication. Beasts, that ruminant, deposit a quantity of aliment in their stomach, which they afterwards chew; and birds have no comminution of the meat in their mouth at all. “Alia animalia sugunt, alia carpunt, alia *vorant*, alia “mandunt.”—CIC. *Nat. Deor.* 50. a.

Vorare is figuratively applied to whatever destroys or consumes quickly. “Nos hic *voramus* literas cum homine mirifico, ita mehercle sentio, Dionysio.”—CIC. *Ep.* 4. 15. “Vates cecinere, oriens Romanorum imperium vetus Græcorum ac Macedonum *voraturum*.”—JUST. 30. 4.

RODERE differs from the other verbs, in denoting the smallness of the quantity broken off at a time, from the mass that is eaten. It signifies to nibble or gnaw, as rats and mice do. “Quasi vero quidquam intersit, mures diem et noctem aliquid *rodentes*.”—CIC. *de Div.* 120. b.

Et divina Opici *rodebant* carmina mures.—JUV. 3. 207.

When *Rodere* is applied to the human species, it denotes that the food is hard and unpalatable, and therefore taken in small quantities at once.

Cum servis urbana diaria *rodere* mavis.—HOR. *Ép.* 1. 14. 40.

Rodere figuratively denotes to backbite, or injure in absence.

—— absentem qui *rodit* amicum.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 4. 81.

—— quid dentem dente *juvabit*

Rodere ? carne opus est, si satur esse velis.—MART. 13. 2.

VESTITUS—*vide* HABITUS.

VIA, TRAMES, SEMITA, CALLIS,

agree, in denoting paths of communication between places of mutual resort ;

but differ, in respect to the manner in which they are formed, and the frequency with which they are used. *Via* signifies a high road, upon which all have a right, and many are in use, to travel.

Strataque jam vulgi pedibus detrita *viarum*,

Saxea conspicimus.———LUCRET. 1. 316.

Quo te, Mœri, pedes? an, quo *via* ducit in urbem?——VIRG. *Eccl.* 9. 1.

——— haud convenit

Una ire cum amica imperatorem in *via*.——TER. *Eun.* 3. 2. 41.

The impropriety, here mentionéd, was equally great in every *via*, and from this the generality of the term may be inferred.

Via signifies the streets of a city, as well as the roads that lead to it. It regards the place, as fitted for communication only, whether the sides of it be inhabited or not.

Miratur portas, strepitumque, et strata *viarum*.——VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 426.

The generic nature of the term *Via* may be inferred from this circumstance, that it is applied to every part of the earth's surface that may be travelled over. He, who formed a road where there 'was none before, was said "Munire *viam*." The surface was, of course, a *Via*, before any thing was done to make it at all times fit to support heavy carriages.

TRAMES differs from "Via," in denoting a road that is less frequented, and formed with less care. It has generally been understood to signify a cross road, and to take its character from lying between two "Via." This opinion has been rashly formed; as a *Trames* may exist when there is but one great road, and implies only the small resort that takes place between the places it unites. Thus, Livy, speaking of the Volscan leader, with his whole army, says, "Inde Marcius in Latinam "*viam*" transversis *tramitibus* transgressus."—LIV. 2. 39. The adjective "Transversus" does not give the description of every *Trames*, but of those by which the passage was made into the Latin way. "Oppletas undique "*vias*," angustumque *tramitem* relictum sibi."—PLIN. *Pan.* 22. "Egressus non est "*viis*," sed *tramitibus*, paludatus." CIC. *Phil.* 2504.

Furta paro belli convexæ in *tramite* sylvæ.——VIRG. *Æn.* 11. 515.

Though a *Trames* was less frequented than a "Via," yet even the former may have been more or less so.

Dii faciant, mea ne terra locet ossa frequenti,
Qua facit assiduo *tramite* vulgus iter.
Non juvat in media nomen habere "via."—PROP. 3. 16. 25.

SEMITA differs from "Via" and "Trames," in being narrower than either, and unfit for the use of passengers who travel in crowds. It is said to come from "Semi" and "Iter," and to be equivalent to the Greek word *Ἡμιόδιον*.

Jussisti tenues, Germanice, crescere viros,
Et modo quæ fuerat *semita* facta "via" est.—MART. 7. 61. 2.
—— sciens.
De "via" in *semitam* degredere.—PLAUT. *Cas.* 3. 5. 39.

"You are giving up the better for the worse, by relinquishing the broad, and taking the narrow road."

Semita is used, figuratively, to denote quietness and solitude.

semita certe
Tranquillæ per virtutem patet unica vitæ.—JUV. 10. 363.
An secretum iter et fallentis *semita* vitæ.—HOR. 1. 18. 103.

CALLIS differs from "Semita," in supposing that the narrow road has been rendered hard by frequent treading, and that what has originally been formed by cattle, may or may not be used by man. It comes from "Callus," and originally refers to that hardness which is acquired by the foot of those animals who often press it, and which is then transferred to the road itself. The definition of Servius justifies what is now said of it. "*Callis* est "semita" tenuior, "callo" pecorum prædurata. "Pecorum modo per æstivos saltus, deviosque *calles*, exercitum ducimus."—LIV. 22. 14.

Rara per occultos ducebat "semita" *calles*.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 383.

Nothing can be supposed more cumbersome than the road through which Nisus and Euryalus are here said to have passed. A few narrow paths, through which it was just possible for men to pass, presented themselves, and the hidden goat and sheep-tracks retarded their progress, and made it almost impossible for them to escape.

VICINUS, CONFINIS,

agree, in denoting the relation of neighbourhood, but differ in as far as the former supposes the conterminous spaces to be the seat of habitation, which the latter does not. The boundaries of the one are formed by buildings, and of the other, by lines. "In prædiis urbanis proprie "Confines" non dici, quia plerumque communibus parietibus disterminantur, sed *Vicinos*: ideoque in iis non habere locum iudicium finium regundorum.—PAUL. *Dig.* 10. 1. 4.

Vicinus, from "Vicus," expresses, in its original meaning, an attribute of people, founded upon the circumstance of their inhabiting the same street. This, however, does not suppose a necessary contiguity in their property, as the extent of the separation may vary in proportion to the length of the quarter of the town inhabited. The power of *Vicinus* arises from the habits of intimacy that naturally take place among neighbours. Thus, Cicero says, "Caius Arrius proximus est *vicinus*, immo ille quidem jam "contubernalis." *Ep. ad Att.* 2. 14. Had a contiguity of property been necessary to form vicinity, the term "Proximus," here used, would have been expletive. That *Vicinus* also implies familiarity among those specified by it, appears from its forming a step in a climax, terminated by "Contubernalis," which denotes the closest possible.

From the notion of neighbourhood, as now described, *Vicinus* is extended to that of nearness of situation in general.

Mantua, væ miseræ nimium *vicina* Cremonæ!—VIRG. *Ecc.* 9. 28.

The term, here, expresses the vicinity of towns themselves, not of those houses which form streets or parts of them. It also supposes the intervention of uninhabited territory between the related objects, which, in its ordinary meaning, it does not.

Vicinumque pecus grandius uber habet.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 350.

In this last instance, the notion of the habitation of men is lost sight of, and that of fields, in which cattle are pastured, is substituted in its place.

One of the correlative objects may be unconnected with the abode of animals.

— “tecto” *vicinus* jugis aquæ “fons.”—HOR. *Sat.* 2. 2.
 — *avidos vicinum* “funus” ut “ægros”
 Exanimat. ————— HOR. *Sat.* 1. 4. 126.

Vicinus is also made to express the nearness of time, at which two events occur. “*Latona gravida, et jam ad pariendum vicina.*”—CIC. *in Ver.* 85. b. That stage of pregnancy, to which “*Gravida*” refers, and the state of actual labour, suggest times between which there is but a short interval. When used figuratively, it denotes general alliance, or connection among intellectual objects, to which the idea of motion is inapplicable. “*Vicina virtutibus vitia.*” QUINCT. 8. 3. 7.

CONFINIS discovers its literal meaning in such instances as the two following: “*Excursiones inde in confinem agrum Labicanum factæ erant.*”—LIV. 4. 49. “*Gens confinis Cappadociæ.*”—NEP. 14. 4. It is not used so extensively as “*Vicinus.*” Thus, it is not extended to nearness of situation in general, but confined to conterminous spaces. It is never applied to time, or to the nearness of events, one of which succeeds the other. Like “*Vicinus,*” however, it is taken figuratively, and has then much the same signification with it. “*Genus dicendi confine ejus quod appellamus fluctuans et dissolutum.*”—AUCT. *ad Heren.* 4. 17.

The lawyers have stated the difference between “*Vicinus*” and *Confinis* with great accuracy. “*Hoc judicium locum habet in “confinio” prædiorum rusticorum, urbanorum displicuit. Neque enim Confines hi, sed magis “vicini” dicuntur, et communibus parietibus plerumque disterminantur.*”—PAULUS *ad Edict.* 23. L. 4. *De fin. Reg. Hotom.*

VICUS—*vide* VILLA.

VIDERE, VISERE, CERNERE,

agree, in denoting the exercise of sight, but differ, in respect either to the keenness of the person seeing, or the acuteness with which the sense is exerted. VIDERE, as a generic term, signifies to perceive the existence of any object by the eye, when the organ is in a sound state, and the object is neither hidden, nor too far removed from it.

— hunc oculis suis

Nostrarum nunquam quisquam *vidit*, Phædria.—TER. *Eun.* 4. 4. 10.

It is here asserted by Pythias, that the person mentioned never had been an object of sight to any one of those with whom he was connected. “*Quæ vero miseranda sunt, ea et mihi ante oculos versantur, et vos videre ac perspicere potestis.*”—CIC. *pro Mur.* 145. a. The force of the expression, “ante oculos versari,” is nearly equivalent to that of the verb *Videre*. Both suppose, that an object is within the sphere of the beholder’s vision, and that its existence is announced by the sense of sight.

— læto complerant littora cætu,

Visuri Æneadas.—VIRG. *Æn.* 5. 107.

VISERE differs from “*Videre*,” from which it is a frequentative, in implying, that the object seen was not previously within the sphere of the beholder’s vision, but that he had gone with a design to bring it to be so. That which a person is said “*Videre*,” solicits his attention, as being before his eyes; that which he is said *Visere*, could not, as being either hidden, or beyond the distance at which the sense operates. The latter verb, accordingly, implies a keenness leading to an effort for its gratification. “*Eam rem populus Romanus non modo “vidit,” sed etiam studio omni visendam putavit.*”—CIC. *pro Leg. Man.* 61. The power of *Visere* is increased, and not altered, by the addition of the terms “*omni studio.*” The object mentioned had not only been before the eyes of the Romans, but had excited in them a strong curiosity to put it frequently into that situation, and to examine its nature.

Nunc huc ad Veneris fanum venio *visere*.—PLAUT. *Rud.* 1. 2. 7.

In this last example, the verb “*Venio*” does part of the ordinary duty of *Visere*. It announces the previous motion leading to the spot upon which the object was to be seen, and leaves it to the frequentative to express the keenness with which the sense of sight was exercised.

CERNERE differs from the verbs before defined, in denoting the nicest and most acute exercise of the sense of sight, so as to discriminate the object seen from every thing with which it might be confounded. It comes from the

verb *Κρίνω*, and signifies to separate, by judging of the nature of the objects presented. Hence, in its original acceptation, it has signified to sift, or to separate, the flour from the bran. “Per cribrum minutissime *cernere*.”—CAT. R. R. 107. 1. “Tunditur in pila, deinde cribro tenui *cernitur*.”—PLIN. 33. 5.

Hæc ubi contrieris, per densa foramina *cerne*.—OVID. *Medicam. Faciei*, 89.

From this nice separation of the greater from the smaller particles in the same substance, it has been transferred to the sense of sight, considered in respect to its finest exertions, and from thence to the penetration of mind.

Cur in amicorum vitiis tam *cernis* acutum,
 Quam aut aquila, aut serpens Epidaurius?—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 3. 26.
 Et quia tenuia sunt, nisi se contendit, acute
Cernere non potis est animus.—LUCRET. 4. 801.

“Nonne vobis videtur animus is, qui plus *cernat* et longius, “videre,” se ad meliora proficisci? ille autem cujus obtusior sit acies, non “videre?”—CIC. *de Sen.* 94. He, who is possessed of such penetration as is implied in *Cernere*, perceives that his destiny is higher than others are aware of. That mind, which has a more extensive range in all things, is said, in the last example, *Cernere*; and this mind only perceives the existence of those higher objects, which escape the notice of others, and which, by being seen obscurely even by the most acute, can have no other verb applied to them but “Videre.” “Nos enim, ne nunc quidem oculis *cernimus* ea, quæ “videmus.”—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 1. 20. The first verb in the above instance denotes that discriminating power which unfolds the nature of those objects, the existence of which the last verb only intimates.

VIGIL.—*vide* INSOMNIS.

VIGILIÆ.—*vide* EXCUBIÆ.

VILLA, VICUS, PAGUS,

agree, in denoting places of rural habitation, but differ, in respect to the number of families which each is supposed to accommodate. In all ages of the Roman state, the VILLA seems to have been destined for the residence of one family in the country. In early times, it was the constant abode of the

“*Villicus*” only, who had the management of the farm upon which it stood. “*Villicus*” appellatus a *villa*, quod ab eo in eam convehantur fructus et evehantur cum veneunt.”—VARR. *R. R.* 1. 2. 14. The proprietor of the farm, or one capable of conducting the business of it, appears also to have, in ancient times, resided constantly in the *Villa*. “Hoc ipso in loco cum anus viveret, et antiquo more parva esset *villa*, ut illa Curiana in Sabinis.”—CIC. *de Legg.* 2. 3. In the luxurious days of Rome, the *Villa* became a splendid edifice for the temporary residence of its proprietor, and a new distinction was made between the “*Villa rustica*” and that styled “*Urbana*.” From the number of servants attending opulent citizens when they retired to the country, the size of their *Villa* increased, and even different buildings became necessary for their accommodation. Still, however, there was but one family, and the strict meaning of the word *Villa*, which regards neither the unity of the building, nor the circumstance of the domestics being all under one roof, was preserved. When Horace, accordingly, says,

Hinc nos Cocceii recipit plenissima *villa*.—*Sat.* 1. 5. 50,

he means, not that it was populous, but stored with every thing that could minister to the conveniency of the guests.

VICUS differs from “*Villa*,” as it denotes a village, or the rural habitation of a number of inhabitants not belonging to one family. This number is as necessarily less than that which forms a town, as when *Vicus* is taken to signify a street, or part of one. The town, besides, may be surrounded with walls, which a village never is. “*Magna pars Judeæ vicis dispergitur. Habent et oppida. Hierosolyma genti caput.*”—TAC. *Hist.* 5. 8. “*Concursus fiunt ex agris, ex vicis, ex domibus omnibus.*”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 5. 16.

PAGUS denotes a territory containing a number of “*Vici*.” As “*Vicus*” always implies something less than a town, so *Pagus* refers to a division of some large territory. This part, however, must not be in the state of a desert, but must be the seat of villages, scattered over it, and mutually connected. The definition given of the term by Isidorus seems to be correct. “*Pagi sunt apta ædificiis loca inter agros habitantibus.*”—15. 2. Many passages, both in

Cæsar and Tacitus, accord with this definition. "Suevorum gens est longe maxima, et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium; ii centum *pagos* habere dicuntur; ex quibus quotannis singula millia armatorum bellandi causa suis ex finibus educunt."—CÆS. *Bel. Gal.* 4. 1. "Eliguntur iisdem in conciliis et principes qui jura per *pagos*, "vicosque" reddunt."—TAC. *de Mor. Ger.* 12.

VILLICUS—*vide* COLONUS.

VINCERE, DEBELLARE,

agree, in denoting to overthrow in war, but differ, as the defeat is more or less complete. The first respects any victory, and may be applied to such as a person obtains over himself. "Malo me cum Pompeio *vinci*, quam cum istis *vincere*."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 122. b. "Non est consentaneum qui "invictum" se a labore præstiterit, *vinci* a voluptate."—CIC. *de Off.* 14. a.

— solusque pudor non *vincere* bello.—LUCAN. 1. 140.

In none of the above examples is the victory obtained so very complete, that the enemy is held to be unable to rally, or recover his ground.

Vincere always implies superiority of force, though, from the weakness of his antagonist, the conqueror may have no reason to glory in his victory.

— quia miseram mulierem, et me servolum,
Qui referire non audebam, *vicit*. Hui! perfortiter.—TER. *Adelph.* 4. 2. 27.

It is taken to surpass in any way whatever, where the grounds of superiority are as opposite as can be. "Qui indignitate servos, temeritate fugitivos, scelere barbaros, crudelitate hostes *vicerit*."—CIC. *in Ver.* 6. 50.

DEBELLARE differs from "Vincere," in being applicable only to defeats in war, and in supposing, that the vanquished party is unable to contend any longer. "Vincere" is applied to the successful issue of a single battle, while *Debellare* suggests, not only the past success of the conqueror, but the inability of the conquered to continue the struggle.

— parcere subjectis, et *debellare* superbos.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 853.
— gens dura atque aspera cultu
Debellanda tibi Latio est.——————*Ibid.* 5. 730.

Anchises meant, and Æneas understood, that there must have been a complete reduction of the inhabitants, before the latter, and his followers, could settle in Latium. “Quod nisi paludes et sylvæ fugientes texissent, *debellatum* illa victoria foret.”—TAC. *Agric.* 26. The historian asserts, that, had the woods and marshes not protected the flying enemy, the last victory would have been decisive, and brought the war to an issue.

VINCIRE, LIGARE, STRINGERE,

agree, in denoting the act of binding, but differ, in respect either to the strictness of the confinement, or to the manner in which it is effected. *VINCIRE*, the most general of the terms, signifies to bind either the whole or a part of any substance, and either to prevent the motion entirely; to limit the sphere of it; or to leave it unimpaired. “Equites *vincti* Apronio traditi sunt.”—CIC. *in Ver.* 155. a. “Ei te *vinctum* astrictumque dedemus.”—*Ibid.* 222. b. In those two examples, the persons mentioned were completely bound, and their locomotive powers suspended. “*Vinctæ* pone tergum manus.”—TAC. *Hist.* 3. 85.

— homines captivos qui catenis *vinciunt*.—PLAUT. *Men.* 1. 1. 3.

— aspiciate religatum asperis,

Vinctumque saxis, navem ut horrisono freto

Noctem paventes timidi adnectunt navitæ.—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 180. a.

In the three last examples, the power of moving is only suspended in part, and the degree of liberty, enjoyed by those bound, greater than that of those first mentioned. The severity of the confinement of captives is diminished by the length of their chains, or the freedom with which they are indulged.

Purpureoque alte suras *vincire* cothurno.—VIRG. *Æn.* 1. 341.

Annule, formosæ digitum *vinciture* puellæ.—OVID. *Art. Am.* 2. 15.

Nec *vincire* novis tempora floribus.—HOR. *Car.* 4. 1. 32.

In those last instances, *Vincire* is equivalent to “Redimire,” and signifies to adorn by binding. It has no reference to any confinement, even of parts, or to the impairing the liberty of the person thus bound.

LIGARE differs from "Vincire," in denoting, that the binding is always so close, as either to prevent or to regulate the motion of that, which is bound, and to hinder any separation of the parts put together. It signifies to make fast by tying, and supposes, that the beauty of that, which binds, is but an accidental circumstance, and totally unconnected with the purpose of the act itself.

— scissaque a pectore veste

Vulnera sæva *ligo* : conorque inhibere cruorem. — OVID. *Met.* 7. 848.

"Cum filium ejus impuberem *ligatum*, a Prætore missum in carcerem necandum esse dixit." — CIC. *in Cal.* 121. a. In consequence of the Prætor's order, the tying would be as close, and the confinement as rigorous, as possible. The closeness of the binding, implied in *Ligare*, appears in its figurative, as well as its literal, significations.

Pacta *ligat*, pactis ipsa futura comes. — PROPERT. 4. 4. 82.

From the strength, needful in that styled *Ligamentum*, it is never subservient to ornament, as well as use. The substance, which adorns, may be added to that which is *Ligatum*, but is not that which preserves it in this state.

— quamvis non vitta *ligatos*

Impediat crines. — TIBULL. 1. 7: 73.

The locomotive powers of the "animal *ligatum*" are not always destroyed; but the line of his motion is regulated, and its extent is fixed.

— dum æs exigitur, dum mula *ligatur*. — HOR. *Sat.* 1. 5. 13.

STRINGERE implies, that the binding power is still stronger than that in "Ligare," so that there is a complete command of the thing laid hold off, and parts prone to separation are kept together.

— cras te quasi Dirceolim, ut memorant, duo

Gnati Jovis "devinxere" ad taurum, item hodie te *stringam* ad carnarium.

PLAUT. *Pseud.* 1. 2. 65.

Ecce latens herba coluber fugientis adunco,

Dente pedem *stringit* : virusque in corpore linquit. — OVID. *Met.* 11. 775.

"Magnæ sunt umbrarum catenæ, et quanquam volatilem vagamque imaginem,

morti *stringunt* atque alligant, tanquam reum corpus, animam.”—QUINCT. *Decl.* 10. 8. In all these instances, the binding force in *Stringere* is understood to be such, as to master that which is held. The binding power is not always extraneous, as in the case of “Vincire” and “Ligare,” but often inherent in the substance that is bound. The figurative uses of the verb also support this idea. “Nullum vinculum ad *stringendam* fidem, jurejurando, Majores arctius esse voluerunt.”—CIC. *de Off.* 3. 111.

Non talis niveos strinxit Lavinia vultus,
Cum, Turno spectante, rubet.—STAT. 1. 2. 244.

When *Stringere* suggests motion, it always supposes that the moving body is in a limited path, from which it cannot deviate. The regulating power acts upon the substance directed, both while it is grasped by the hand, and thrown by the arm, of him, who imparts it. Thus, he who drew his sword was said “*Stringere* gladium,” because, while it was firmly grasped, the path of its motion was limited by the scabbard. The path of the spear’s direction, if rubbing on a body that intervened, was also said *Stringere*, in respect to the substance on which it grazed. Had the impelling force ceased by the spear sticking in the body, *Stringere* could not have been used, which always denotes the continuance of energy that is communicated.

— hunc primum levis hasta Themillæ
Strinserat. ————— VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 577.

Stringere, applied figuratively to mind, signifies to affect it strongly. This originates from the idea of a well directed force acting upon, and, in some degree, overpowering it.

Atque animum patriæ *strinxit* pietatis imago.—VIRG. *Æn.* 9. 234.

VINCULUM, CATENA,

agree, in denoting what is used for the purpose of binding or confining, but differ in respect to the materials of which that denoted by each is made. **VINCULUM**, from “Vincire,” is of much more general import than “Catena,” and expresses the confining substance, in whatever way it is formed, and whether it be moveable or not. Columella, accordingly, applies it to inclo-

sures of willow, of broom, or of whins, all of which were used to protect the vineyards, and to keep the vine-shoots together. "Salix humida loca desiderat, genista etiam sicca, utræque tamen circa vineam scruntur, quum palmitibus idonea præbent *vincula*.—COLUM. *Arbor.* 29. 1. The *Vinculum* may be of rope, or of leather, or of any other substance capable of confining. "Si corpora capta sint armis, aut constricta *vinculis*."—CIC. *de Or.* 1. 226.

— et stupea *vincula* collo
Intendunt. — *Æn.* 2. 236.

Vincla duæ pedibus demunt. — OVID. *Met.* 3. 168.

— iræque leonum

Vincla recusantûm, et sera sub nocte rudentûm. — VIRG. *Æn.* 7. 15.

Even the wax, that fixed the wings to the body of Icarus, is called their *Vin-
cula*.

— rapidi vicinia solis

Mollit odoratas, pennarum *vincula*, ceras. — OVID. *Met.* 8. 225.

The wax, too, that sealed a letter, got the same appellation. "*Vincula* epistolæ laxare."—NEP. *in Pausan.* 4.

CATENA differs from "*Vinculum*," in implying, that the substance that binds is made of metal, and that it is not, like wire, formed by means of the ductility of the metal, but composed of a series of links.

— tum stridor ferri, tractæque *catena*. — VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 558.

"Caldius Cælius complexus *catenarum* quibus vinctus erat seriem, ita illis illisit capiti suo, ut protinus pariter sanguinis cerebrique effluvio expiraret."—VELL. PAT. 2. 120.

— extemplo graciles ex ære *catenas*. — *Met.* 4. 176.

It appears, from the following passage, that the *Catenæ* did not always bind down the culprit, so as to prevent his moving about.

His indito *catenas* singularias :

Istas majores, quibus sunt vincti, demito.

Sinito ambulare, si foris, si intus volent :

Sed uti asserventur magna diligentia. — PLAUT. *Capt.* 4. 2. 3.

VIOLARE, OFFENDERE,

agree, in denoting to injure, by denying to others what they suppose they have a claim to, but differ, in respect to the manner in which the injustice shews itself. VIOLARE, from "Vis," supposes that a person is forcibly deprived of what is his undoubted right. It applies equally to visible subjects of property, and to those claims, arising from the different relations in which men stand, both to the Deity, and to themselves. "Qui sacra bonæ Deæ, quæ viri oculis ne imprudentis quidem aspici fas est, non solum aspectu viri, sed etiam flagitio stuproque *violavit*."—CIC. *de Arusp.* 245. b. There was, here, a gross violation of the respect due to a deity, and such as was deemed sacrilegious. "Te neque Deorum neque hominum pudet, quos perfidia aut perjurio *violasti*."—SALL. *in Orat. Phil. in Lep. ad fnem.*

OFFENDERE differs from "Violare," in supposing that the injury arises from a breach of decency, and not of justice, and that the person offended has reason to complain of the respect being withheld from him, to which he is entitled. In the original acceptation of this verb, it signifies to strike, as one body does another, so as to injure the body impelled. "Quis est tam lynceus, qui tantis tenebris nihil *offendat*, nusquam incurrat?"—CIC. *Ep. Fam.* 9. 2.

In quibus *offendat* naufraga puppis, aquas.—OVID. *Ep. ex Ponto*, 14. 21.

From this literal meaning, *Offendere* has come to denote "to make angry," or, as we say, "to offend." "Justitiæ partes sunt non "violare" homines: verecundiæ, non *offendere*: in quo maxime perspicitur vis decori."—CIC. *de Off.* 20. a. The person "violans," it should seem, is guilty of a breach of justice, and the person *offendens*, of a breach of decorum. "Plura sæpe peccantur, dum demeremur, quam dum *offendimus*."—TAC. *Ann.* 15. 21. Such is the caprice of those, says the historian, with whom we are connected, that we more frequently trespass when we try to oblige them, than when we hurt their feelings, by withholding the attentions they deserve. "Apud quosdam acerbior in conviciis narrabitur, ut bonis comis, ita adversus malos injucundus. Cæterum ex iracundia nihil supererat. Secretum et silentium ejus non timeres. Honestius putabat *offendere* quam odisse." The confession

of this defect in Agricola's character is as candid, as the apology offered for it is delicate and manly. The historian allows the fault, by using the word *Offendere*, which implies injury, in a certain degree. Of the two evils, however, he holds this to be the least, and considers an honest indignation, wasting itself in coarse expressions, to be more venial than the latent malice which watches every opportunity of injuring its object.

The evil done to another, as expressed by the verb *Offendere*, is less than that expressed by the verb "Lædere." "Pleraque eorum propter quæ irascimur, *offendunt* nos magis quam "lædunt."—SEN. *de Ira*, 3. 28. The essence of an offence seems to lie in the carelessness of the person giving it, though he himself may suffer more than the person to whom it is given. This will, perhaps, be more apparent from a passage in Horace. The poet sets those at defiance who wished to detract from him, and says, that the same fate awaits them that befel the weasel who attempted to gnaw the file.

——— fragili quærens "illidere" dentem,
Offendet solido.———Hor. *Sat.* 2. 1. 77.

The biter expected that the file, from its brittleness, would yield to his tooth, and acted with an injurious intention. As he struck his tooth, however, upon what was harder than itself, he received the injury he meant to commit. The evil expressed by "Lædere" and its compounds, then, is always intended, while that by *Offendere* may not be so, and often recoils upon the person committing it.

VIR—*vide* HOMO.

VISERE—*vide* VIDERE.

ULCISCI, VINDICARE,

agree, in denoting to revenge, but differ, as the means refer only to the injury that is past, or partly to the prevention of a similar one in time to come. Both suppose that the agent has a sense of wrong done to him, and, in this respect, differ from "Punire," which admits the person, inflicting the punishment, to be either the party offended, or not. "Odi hominem et odero: utinam *ulcisci* possem: sed illum *ulciscentur* mores sui."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 148. a. "Deinde hoc si constitutum sit, ut peccata homines peccatis, et in-

jurias injuriis ulciscantur, quantum incommodorum consequatur?—CIC. *de Inv.* 72. b.

Androgeique necem justis *ulciscitur* armis.—OVID. *Met.* 7. 458.

Some of the offences stated cannot be repeated; and, in all, the punisher has a reference only to the past injury, to the degree of which, according to his apprehension, he is disposed to suit his chastisement.

VINDICARE differs from “Ulcisci,” in regarding the past injury only as a specimen of what may follow it, and in denoting, that the act of revenging the past, is meant as a protection against what may come. Popma says, “Vindicta factum punit, vel futurum prohibet atque propulsat; “ultio” persequitur contumeliam, vel injuriam factam, aut damnum datum.” This is strongly supported by Cicero, in the following passages. “Graviter olim ista *vindicabat* vetus illa Græcia, longe providens quam sensim pernicies illapsa civium animos, malis studiis, malisque doctrinis, repente totas civitates everteret.”—CIC. *de Legg.* 177. b. “*Vindicatio* est per quam vis et injuria et omnino quod obfuturum est, defendendo aut “ulciscendo” propulsatur.”—CIC. *de Inv.* 82. b. In this last example, *Vindicatio* is said to operate in two different ways. That implied in the first gerund denotes protection against future injury, and that in the second, a certain redress of what is past, as far as punishment can be considered as such.

Vindicare is in so far generic, that, at times, it signifies to punish the past injury, which it is impossible to repeat, upon the person who has suffered it. “Flebunt Germanicum, etiam ignoti, *vindicabitis* vos, si me potius quam fortunam meam fovebatis.”—TAC. *Ann.* 2. 71.

ULTRA,

denotes the relation which one object bears to another, as being on that side of an intermediate one, which is farthest from the observer, or person speaking of it. It stands opposed to “Cis” and “Citra,” which have the same reference to the nearest, which it has to the farthest, side. Both *Ultra* and “Trans” refer to objects in the different states of motion and rest; but as the original application of the latter appeared to be to moving bodies, so that of

the former appears to be to such as are at rest. "*Ultra* Silianam villam est villula sordida, et valde pusilla."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 95. a. The situation of the little dirty villa of Cotta is opposed to the place where Cicero then was, and is ascertained by its being beyond the "villa Siliana," which lay between them. The writer is thus enabled to fix the position of the former, in the apprehension of his correspondent, as far as it was necessary.

Ultra is applied, figuratively, to objects that have no local situation.

— pelagique minas cœlique ferebat
 Invalidus, vires *ultra* sortemque senectæ.—VIRG. *Æn.* 6. 113.
 — sunt certi denique fines
 Quos *ultra*, "citraque" nequit consistere rectum.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 1. 106.

Ultra differs from "Trans," in being applicable to time, to number, and to measure. "*Ultra* pueriles annos."—QUINCT. I. 11. "Hoc prælio desiderati sunt circiter quadringenti, et paulo *ultra* eum numerum classarii, et remiges."—HIRT. *de Bel. Alex.* 21. "Si res coegerit, non *ultra* heminam aquæ assumere."—CELS. 4. 2.

ULVA—*vide* ALGA.

UMBRATILIS, UMBROSUS—*vide* OPACUS.

ULULARE—*vide* FLERE.

UNCUS—*vide* CURVUS.

UMBRA—*vide* IMAGO.

UNDA—*vide* AQUA.

UNUS, UNICUS, SOLUS,

agree, in denoting that the object, which each specifies, is single; but the first supposes that there may be a plurality of objects of the same species; the second supposes that there is not; and the third, that though there is an actual plurality of objects, one only appears at the time. *Unus* expresses the radical integrè of divided quantity, which, being continually added to itself, can form any number. Every other number is a multiplication of this primary one, which is incapable of being reduced to any thing less than itself, and at the same time of preserving its nature. "Et si causa est in argumentis; firmissima quæque maxime tueor, sive plura sunt, sive aliquod *unum*."—CIC. *de Or.* 136. a. The cause is here understood to rest upon one or more good argu-

ments; and any number more than one forms a plurality, by an addition of those units, each of which is expressed by *Unus*. "Alterius animum cum suo commiscere, et efficere pæne *unum* ex duobus."—CIC. *de Am.* III. a. Such was the coalescence between distinct natures, here supposed, that one is said to be almost made out of two.

Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,
Quem dixere chaos.———OVID. *Met.* 1. 6.

Nature, at this period, put on but one aspect, though she might have put on a variety.

UNICUS differs from "Unus," in implying, that a plurality of objects, to each of which the latter would be applicable, does not exist, and that the one, denominated by *Unicus*, stands by itself, without any thing similar to it in nature. Ovid uses it in its purest sense, when speaking of the fabulous bird, styled the phoenix, one of which only existed at once.

Et vivax phoenix, *unica* semper avis.———OVID. *Am.* 2. 6. 54.

Livy considers the talents of Archimedes, as an astronomer, to have been so singular, that no other person deserved the appellation. "Archimedes is erat *unicus* spectator cœli, ac siderum."—24. 34.

——— seu pii ad rogum filii
Lugetur, orba quum flet *unicum* mater.—CATULL. 39. 4.

The mother, lamenting the death of an only son, is here beautifully described; and the pungency of her grief arises from the circumstance which *Unicus* only can suggest.

SOLUS differs from the two former words, in having no reference to the possible or impossible plurality of the single object, which each respectively specifies, but to the state of an object, that is, either intentionally or accidentally, by itself. "Cui quum visum esset utilius *solum* se quam cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit."—CIC. *de Off.* 60. a. There was, in the nature of things, no reason why there should be only one king at Rome, or more than one; but Romulus thought it expedient that he should reign alone. Gesner's definition of *Solus* appears an able and a happy one: "Nomen, quo excluditur

præsentia, vel auxilium, vel societas alterius.”—“Tiberius Gracchus *solus* ex illo collegio.”—CIC. *de Prov. Cons.* 72. b.

“Unus” and *Solus* can appear in the same sentence, and each preserve its own meaning.

Nil admirari prope res est “una,” Numici,
Solaque quæ possit facere, et servare beatum.—HOR. *Ep.* 1. 6.

It is said, by “Una,” that there is one thing in nature that can effect the composure of mind, implied in “Nil admirari;” and by *Sola*, that this can do what is assigned to it, “per se.” “Si tu *solus*, aut quivis “unus,” cum scuto, cum gladio impetum in me fecisset.”—CIC. *pro Cæcin.* 296. b. The orator here says, that if you, by yourself, or any other individual, in similar circumstances, made such an attack. As *Solus* specifies “Tu” as its substance, so does “Quivis” specify “Unus.” The two adjectives cannot be applied to one substantive, without giving existence to a gross tautology. Neither can “Unus” and “Unicus,” for the same reason. But *Solus* and “Unicus,” as well as “Unus,” may be attributes of one substance.

— nobilitas *sola* est, atque “unica” virtus.—JUV. 8. 20.

“Virtus *sola*,” that is, “per se,” constitutes nobility, without any thing adventitious: and “Virtus unica” denotes, that it is the only thing in nature that possesses this quality.

In some cases, “Unus” approaches near to the meaning of *Solus*. “Demosthenes “unus” eminent inter omnes in omni genere dicendi.”—CIC. *in Orat.* 29. There is no reference, here, to Demosthenes as solitary, and unassisted, but to his individuality; this one man having a prerogative, that was denied to any other number. The superiority would not have existed, had he not possessed it.

Lucretius gives all the three in two lines, in which the power of each may be discerned.

— res nulla sit “una”
“Unica” quæ gignatur, et “unica” *solaque* crescat.—LUCRET. 2. 1075.

By the words, "Res nulla sit una," the poet affirms, that so far from being a number, there is not one such existence, in nature, as that,

"Unica" quæ gignatur, et "unica," *solaque* crescat.

By being "Unica," this existence has nothing in nature like itself; and by being *Sola*, it is what it is, independently of every other object besides.

VOLUCRIS, AVIS, ALES,

agree, in denoting animals that fly, but differ, in respect to the species to which each is applicable. VOLUCRIS, from "Volare," is generic, and denotes every animal that uses a wing for supporting and moving itself in the air. It accordingly comprehends insects, as well as birds, of all the different species. "*Volucres* videmus procreationis et utilitatis suæ causa fingere, et construere nidos."—CIC. *de Or.* 110. b. This fact, in respect to the construction of nests, is equally true as to every animal that flies. Cicero, using *Volucris* as an adjective, applies it in the most general sense possible. "Natura bestias *volucrès* cælo frui libero voluit."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.* 235. b.

Et primo similis *volucris*, mox vera *volucris*,

Insonuit pennis.———OVID. *Met.* 13. 607.

Omne adeo genus in terris hominumque, ferarumque,

Et genus æquoreum, pecudes, pictæque *volucres*,

In furias, ignemque ruunt: amor omnibus idem.—VIRG. *Georg.* 3. 243.

AVIS differs from "Volucris," in being applicable only to the feathered tribe, and never to insects. It denotes birds of any size, from the largest to the smallest. Cicero, speaking of an eagle, says, "Ista enim *avis* insectans alias *aves*, et agitans, semper ipsa postrema est."—*De Div.* 138. a. The word *Avis*, then, comprehends the eagle, and all the birds, of whatever size, upon which he preys. "Quæ fundit frugem spici ordine structam, et contra *avium* minorum morsus munitur vallo aristarum."—CIC. *de Sen.* 88. a. The birds here meant are so small, as to be supported by the stalks of the corn upon which they feed. Pliny, in the following example, mentions the Ostrich as the largest of the species *Avis*. "Sequitur natura *avium*: quarum grandissimi et pæne bestiarum generis sunt struthiocameli."—*IO. I.*

ALES differs from "*Avis*," in being applicable to the largest only of the species denoted by the latter. Pliny, speaking of the "*Aves digitatæ*," in opposition to the "*Palmipides*," says, "Nunc de secundo genere dicamus, quod in duas dividitur species, oscines et *alites*. Illarum generi cantus oris, his magnitudo differentiam dedit."—10. 19. "Eademque efficit in "*avibus*" divina mens, ut tum huc tum illuc volent *alites*."—CIC. *de Div.* 105. a. The *Alites* are here evidently made a species of the genus "*Aves*," and are opposed to the "*Oscines*." The term *Ales* is applied to the eagle, as well as "*Avis*."

Namque volans rubra fulvus Jovis *ales* in æthra.—VIRG. *Æn.* 12. 247.

Martial applies it to a peacock, and Horace to a swan.

Alitis eximie cauda superba fuit.—MART. 14. 67.

Jamque residunt cruribus asperæ

Pelles, et album mutor in *alitem*

Supernè, nascunturque leves

Per digitos humerosque plumæ.—HOR. *Car.* 2. 20. 9.

VORARE—*vide* VESCI.

URBS—*vide* CIVITAS.

URBANUS—*vide* FACETUS.

URERE—*vide* ARDERE.

USURA, FÆNUS,

agree, in denoting the sum given for the use of money, but differ, as this sum is, or is not, regulated by some standard. *USURA*, coming from "*Uti*," as "*Cultura*" does from "*Colere*," is, at times, equal to "*Usus*," and signifies the power a person has of turning to his own advantage that which he has in his possession. "*Natura dedit usuram vitæ, tanquam pecuniæ, nullo præstituto die*."—CIC. *Q. Tusc.*

From signifying the use of any subject simply, *Usura* has been made to denote the reward given by the borrower for the money he has received in loan. In this sense, it is equal to the Greek word *Τόκος*, from *Τίσσειν*, and suggests the sum generated by the stock, styled, by the Romans, "*Sors*." It intimates, that the debtor makes a return for his accommodation, whether

great or small, without specifying what it is. The creditor may show either his generosity, by looking for one that is moderate, or his avarice, by taking advantage of the necessity of his dependant. "Legem promulgavit, ut sexies seni dies sine *usuris* pecuniæ creditæ solverentur."—CÆS. *Bel. Civ.* 3. 20. Here, by an order of the Prætor, there was a total extinction of interest, or use-money, for a limited time; nor is it said that the sum required was either moderate or oppressive. So it is, also, in the following line from Martial:

Debitor *usuram* pariter, "sortemque" negabit.—5.42. 3.

The generality of *Usura* is evident from the way in which it is specified in the following example: "Pecunias levioribus *usuris* mutuari."—SÆT. in *Aug. Cap.* 39.

This vagueness in the word *Usura* is completely corrected by associating it with such a term as "Centesimæ," or any of those that express divisions of the Roman "As." "Nam aut bono nomine, "centesimis" contentus erat, aut non bono, "quaternas centesimas" sperabat."—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 5. ult. The "*Usuræ centesimæ*" amounted to twelve per cent., and supposed, that one, for every hundred borrowed, was paid on the Calends of each month, so that the principal, styled the "Sors," would be equalled by the *Usura* at the end of a hundred months, or of eight years and four months. Interest of money borrowed, among the Romans, was paid, not once, but twelve times a-year. The "Centesimæ," referring to *Usuræ*, underwent divisions, analogous to those of the "As" into "Unciæ," which were its twelfths. The "Bes," which denoted eight ounces in weight, applied to *Usuræ*, as "Bes *usurarum*" denoted eight per cent. in value. "Centesima," which, in calculations of this kind, was the integral number, by being doubled, expressed a fraction that was precisely the half of its own amount. Thus, the tax imposed upon Cappadocia, at the rate of twelve per cent., was reduced to six by the emperor Tiberius. "Levare vectigal "centesimæ" et "ducentesimam" statuere."—TAC. *Ann.* 2. 42.

The same rate of interest, expressed by "Centesimæ," is expressed by "*Usura uncia vel unciaria*;" and as "Ducentesima" signified six per cent., so

“Semunciaria” signified the same. The “Centesima” referred to the “Sors,” or principal, as consisting of a hundred, and the “Uncia” to the “As,” as divided into twelve parts.

FÆNUS differs from “Usura,” in carrying in itself, without the addition of any term, a reference to a regulated interest. Though it possesses this intrinsic power, yet it does not reject such addition, in every instance, to express the different rates that may be allowed by law.

Dives agris, dives positis in *fænore* nummis.—HOR. *de Art. Poet.* 421.

This person, whose property was of different kinds, had laid his money out at interest, and, we are led to suppose, received, in return for it, neither more nor less than what was usually given. “Pecuniam sine *fænore*, sineque ulla stipulatione creditit, maximum existimans quæstum, memorem gratumque cognosci, simulque aperire, se non fortunæ, sed hominibus solere esse amicum.”—NEP. *in Attic.* 9. The generosity of Atticus towards Fulvia appears in his declining to accept what the law would have given him, and those stipulations, also, ordinarily entered into by those who borrowed. “Senatusconsultum factum est, ut centesimæ perpetuo *fænore* ducerentur.”—CIC. *Ep. ad Att.* 5. *ult.* Here, the senate sanctioned the twelve per cent., implied in “Centesimæ,” in all time coming, as the legal interest, implied in *Fænus*. This, then, may be understood to be the “Majus *fænus*,” or the greatest use-money allowed by law, in opposition to the “Minus,” which, at one time, the creditor was either disposed, or obliged to accept of.

When the creditor was ready to go as far as the law would permit him, and even to transgress the boundaries prescribed by it, this appeared by the term, with which *Fænus* was accompanied. Horace says,

Multis “occulto” crescit res *fænore*.—*Ep.* 1. 80.

Such money-dealers were afraid to expose their transactions to public view. By the application of an extraordinary frequentative verb to this noun, Tacitus also expresses the rapacity with which creditors oppressed their debtors. “Qui pecunias *fænore* “auctitabant.”—*Ann.* 6. 16. In this chapter, the historian

mentions different laws against usurious contracts, in all of which *Fænus* is used. “Nam primo duodecim *tabulis* sanctum, ne quis “*unciario fænore*” amplius exerceret, quum antea ex libidine locupletium agitaretur: deinde rogatione tribunicia ad semuncias redacta: postremo vetita versura.”

When “*Usura*” and *Fænus* appear in the same sentence, the former always suggests what is more oppressive to the debtor than the latter, and the generic term is thus confined to that one of its applications, in which a regulating standard is most needed. Thus, Lucan says,

Hinc “*usura*” vorax, avidumque in tempore *fænus*.—1. 181.

“*Fænus* agitare, et in “*usuras*” extendere ignotum est.”—TAC. *de Mor. Ger.* 26. The historian says, in the first member of this sentence, that the Germans lent no money upon terms that might have been equitable, and, in the second, that they were guilty of no oppression, when relieving the indigent, by affording them the use of their property.

But there is, in Cicero, a figurative application of the two words contrasted, that seems to support what is said as to their literal. “*Terra nunquam sine “usura” reddit quod accepit, sed alias minore, plerumque majore cum fænore.*” —*De Sen.* 87. a. “*Usura*,” here, signifies, as in its original sense, a return of any kind, whether great or small, and intimates, that the crop reaped is always greater than the seed that was sown. *Fænus*, again, refers to the average of what is produced by different fields, in proportion to their fertility, and to the state of their cultivation. This average in the crop accords with the regulation in the interest. The term *Fænus* supposes the possible existence of a certain latitude in both, but not in the degree in which it can exist in “*Usura*,” from which the idea of limitation upon either side of a standard is banished.

UT, SICUT, VELUT,

agree, in denoting resemblance, but differ, according as the resemblance is understood, by the speaker, to be more or less striking. The first can express

the lowest degree of it, in which it is just apprehended to exist, though it may be occasionally extended to others, that are somewhat higher.

— *ut tute es, ita censes omnes esse?*—PLAUT. *Rud.* 1. 4. 55.

The person addressed is made to understand, that he supposes there was a resemblance, whether general or otherwise, between himself and all mankind. As a diversity of character, to a certain degree, must exist among mankind, the likeness stated cannot be understood to be the strongest possible. “Indicant pueri: in quibus, *ut* in speculis, natura cernitur, quanta studia decertantium sunt?”—CIC. *de Fin.* 139. b. In this last instance, *Ut* may be supposed to express a more exact resemblance than in the former. The object, reflected by a mirror, is seen nearly as it is, and the conduct of boys is as nearly a representation of what takes place among men.

Sicut differs from “*Ut*,” in suggesting a resemblance that surpasses the slightest which the root can denote, and may be translated “Just as.”

Sicut aquæ tremulum labris ubi lumen ahenis,
Sole repercussum.———VIRG. *Æn.* 8. 21.

The wavering and undetermined state of Æneas’s mind is well represented, here, by an object exhibiting the most constant and rapid motion in different directions.

Ibam forte via sacra, *sicut* meus est mos.—HOR. *Sat.* 1. 9. 1.

By *Sicut*, the poet tells us that he was doing what was neither more nor less than common, and taking his walk “just as” usual. Had he never appeared in the “via sacra” at all, he could not have said even “*Ut* meus est mos.” The “*Sic*,” added to the “*Ut*,” suggests, that the event was by no means uncommon, and that what happened that day had frequently happened before, and would probably happen often again.

VELUT differs from the two former adverbs, in implying, that the resemblance between the two objects compared is, in the apprehension of the speaker, as strong as possible. It is compounded of “*Ut*” and the adverb “*Vel*,” signifying “Even,” and may be translated “Precisely as.” “*Vel*,”

which is originally a conjunction, suggests, in that capacity, as has been already shewn, the necessity of a fact holding, as to one of a number of alternatives connected by it; to the exclusion of all the rest. In the case of "Vel," as an adverb, the possibility of an exclusion is destroyed; but the assertion in the verb falls upon the only substantive, with which the adverb can be connected, with all the force with which it affects, as a conjunction, the alternative, which it actually suits.

— hæres

Hæredem alterius, *velut* unda supervenit undam.—HOR. *Ep.* 2. 2. 175.

The beauty of this, as of all comparisons, lies in its simplicity and justness. The succession of heirs, in human life, is as constant and regular, as that of waves upon the surface of the ocean. "Vitam silentio transire, *veluti* pecora." SAL. *Cat. ad init.* The historian, here, expresses his contempt for those who degrade the active nature of man, by not employing its powers. By so doing, he makes them strongly to resemble the brutes, who hold a lower place in the scale of being.

Had Horace said, "*Velut* meus est mos," in his satire, the term would have been too strong. A general allusion to his ordinary practice was all he meant, or could mean to suggest. The standard is not so precise, as to bear a rigorous comparison between it and a single act, which, with others, tends to establish it. Cicero's use of *Veluti*, in the following example, does not entirely accord with his own practice, and that of his contemporaries. "Bestiæ aquatiles, quæ gignuntur in terra, *veluti* crocodili."—CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* 50. b.

UVIDUS—*vide* HUMIDUS.

VULGO, COMMUNITER,

agree, in denoting the frequency with which any event occurs, but differ, in respect to the number of objects by which it is exhibited. The first implies, that there is no limitation of that number, and that the thing spoken of is the subject of ordinary, if not of constant, occurrence; the latter, again, implies, that this is circumscribed, and that objects of a certain class can exclusively exhibit what those of another cannot. There is the same difference between

Vulgo and “*Communiter*,” that there is between the English adverbs, “commonly” and “in common.” “*Ad prandium vocare nunc crimen est? minime: sed vulgo passim. Quid est vulgo? Universos.*”—*Cic. pro Mur.* 141. b. The event of receiving the invitation took place with respect to all, without exception. “*Ejusmodi tempus erat, inquit, ut homines vulgo impune occiderentur.*”—*Cic. pro S. R. Amer.* 80. The event of being put to death, with impunity, was not universal, but frequent, and might happen to any one indiscriminately.

COMMUNITER implies a limitation in the possibility of the occurrence of the event, so that it may be exhibited by a definite number of objects, all belonging to one class, to the exclusion of others. “*Alia epistola communiter commendavi tibi legatos Arpinatûm, hac separatim Quintum Suffidium.*”—*Cic. Ep.* 209. a. The recommendation, in a former epistle, respected the ambassadors of the Arpinates “in common;” so that no more was said of any one of them than of the rest. That, again, in the letter which Cicero was writing, was particular, and regarded Suffidius singly, to the exclusion of the rest. “*Dianæ Ephesiæ templum communiter a civitatibus Asiæ factum.*”—*LIV.* 10. 45. The building of this temple was a concern that belonged to the Asiatic states alone, and in which they all took the same part.

Forte quid expediat, *communiter*, aut melior pars
Malis carere quæritis laboribus.———*HOR. Epod.* 16. 15.

By *Communiter*, here, is meant the whole Romans; to a man, as distinguished from the rest of the human race. By “*Melior pars*,” there is a reduction of the number, composing this people, to somewhat more than a half. If the fact, involved in the verbs, of a desire to get free of evils, did not hold with regard to the whole, it is understood to have certainly held with regard to the greater part.

FINIS.

INDEX.

In order to increase the facility of consultation, and to render the above discussions as practically useful to his Readers, as, he flatters himself, they have long been to his Students, the Author subjoins an INDEX, leading to the page in which each particular term is defined. Those, that are in Italicks, form none of the numerous sets, the component words of which are compared and examined.

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