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SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.



SYNONYMS

OF

THE NEW TESTAMENT;


BEING

THE SUBSTANCE OF A COURSE OF
LECTURES ADDRESSED TO THE THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS,
KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.

BY

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P R E F A C E.

THIS little volume has grown out of a short course of lectures on the synonyms of the New Testament, which, in the fulfilment of my duties as Professor of Divinity at King's College, I have more than once addressed to the theological students there. It seemed to me that lectures on such a subject might help, in however partial a measure, to supply a want, of which many of the students themselves are probably conscious, of which those who have to do with their training cannot help being aware. The long, patient and exact studies in philology of our great schools and universities, which form so invaluable a portion of their mental, and, I will add, of their moral discipline also, can find no place during the two years or two years and a half of the theological course at King's College. The time itself is too short to allow this, and it is

in great part claimed by other and more pressing studies. Some, indeed, we rejoice to find, come to us possessing this knowledge in a very respectable degree already; while of others much more than this can be said. Yet where it does not already exist, it is quite impossible that it can be more than in part supplied. At the same time we feel the loss and the deficiency; we are sometimes conscious of it even in those who go forth from us with general theological acquirements, which would bear a favourable comparison with the acquirements of those trained in older institutions. It is a matter of regret, when in papers admirable in all other respects, errors of inexact scholarship are to be found, which seem quite out of keeping with the amount of intelligence, and the standard of knowledge, which every where else they display.

Feeling the immense value of these studies, and how unwise it would be, because we cannot have all which we would desire, to forego what is possible and within our reach, I have two or three times dedicated a brief course of lectures to the comparative value of words in the New Testament—and these, with some subsequent additions and some defalcations, have supplied the materials of the present volume. I have never doubted that, setting aside those higher and more solemn lessons, which in a great measure are out of our reach to

impart, being to be taught rather by God than men, there are few things which we should have more at heart than to awaken in our scholars an enthusiasm for the grammar and the lexicon. We shall have done much, very much for those who come to us for theological training and generally for mental guidance, if we can persuade them to have these continually in their hands; if we can make them believe that with these, and out of these, they may be learning more, obtaining more real and lasting acquisitions, such as will stay by them, such as will form a part of the texture of their own minds for ever, that they shall from these be more effectually accomplishing themselves for their future work, than from many a volume of divinity, studied before its time, even if it were worth studying at all, crudely digested, and therefore turning to no true nourishment of the inner man.

But having now ventured to challenge for these lectures a somewhat wider audience than at first they had, it may be permitted to me to add here a very few observations on the value of the study of synonyms, not any longer considered in reference to our peculiar needs, but generally; and on that of the synonyms of the New Testament in particular; as also on the helps to this study which are at present in existence.

The value of this study as a discipline for

training the mind into close and accurate habits of thought, the amount of instruction which may be drawn from it, the increase of intellectual wealth which it may yield, all this has been implicitly recognized by well-nigh all great writers—for well-nigh all from time to time have paused, themselves to play the dividers and discerners of words—explicitly by not a few who have proclaimed the value which this study had in their eyes. And instructive as in any language it must be, it must be eminently so in the Greek—a language spoken by a people of the finest and subtlest intellect; who saw distinctions where others saw none; who divided out to different words what others often were content to huddle under a common term; who were themselves singularly alive to its value, diligently cultivating the art of synonymous distinction,¹ and sometimes even to an extravagant excess;² who have bequeathed a multitude of fine and delicate observations on the right distinguishing of their own words to the after world.

And while thus, with reference to all Greek, the investigation of the likenesses and differences of words appears especially invited by the characteristic excellences of the language, in respect to

¹ The *ὀνόματα διαίρειν*, Plato, *Laches*, 197 *d*.

² Id. *Protag.* 377 *a b c*.

the Greek of the New Testament, plainly there are reasons additional inviting us to this study. If by it we become aware of delicate variations in an author's meaning, which otherwise we might have missed, where is it so desirable that we should not miss anything, that we should lose no finer intention of the writer, than in those words which are the vehicles of the very mind of God? If it increases the intellectual riches of the student, can this anywhere be of so great importance as there, where the intellectual may, if rightly used, prove spiritual riches as well? If it encourage thoughtful meditation on the exact forces of words, both as they are in themselves, and in their relation to other words, or in any way unveil to us their marvel and their mystery, this can nowhere else have a worth in the least approaching that which it acquires when the words with which we have to do are, to those who receive them aright, words of eternal life; while out of the dead carcasses of the same, if men suffer the spirit of life to depart from them, all manner of corruptions and heresies may be, as they have been, bred.

The *words* of the New Testament are eminently the *στοιχεῖα* of Christian theology, and he who will not begin with a patient study of these, shall never make any considerable, least of all any secure, advances in this: for here, as everywhere else, disap-

pointment awaits him who thinks to possess the whole without first possessing the parts, of which that whole is composed. Now it is the very nature and necessity of the investigation of synonyms to compel such patient investigation of the forces of words, such accurate weighing of their precise value, absolute and relative, and in this its merits as a mental discipline, consist.

Yet neither in respect of Greek synonyms in general, nor specially in respect of those of the New Testament, can it be affirmed that we are even tolerably furnished with books. Whatever there may be to provoke occasional dissent in Döderlein's *Lateinische Synonyme und Etymologien*, yet there is no book on Greek synonyms which for compass and completeness can bear comparison with it; and almost all the more important modern languages of Europe have better books devoted to their synonyms than any which has been devoted to the Greek. The works of the early grammarians, as of Ammonius and others, supply a certain amount of important material, but cannot be said even remotely to meet the needs of the student at the present day. Vönel's *Synonymisches Wörterbuch*, Frankfurt, 1822, an admirable little volume as far as it goes, but at the same time a school-book and no more, and Pillon's *Synonymes Grecs*, of which a translation into English was edited by the late

T. K. Arnold, London, 1850, are the only modern attempts to supply the deficiency; at least I am not aware of any other. But neither of these writers has allowed himself space to enter on his subject with any fulness and completeness; while the references to the synonyms of the New Testament are exceedingly rare in Vömel; and though somewhat more frequent in Pillon's work, are capricious and accidental there, and in general of a meagre and unsatisfactory description.

The only book dedicated expressly and exclusively to these is one written in Latin by J. A. H. Tittman, *De Synonymis in Novo Testamento*, Leipzig, 1829, 1832. It would ill become me, and I have certainly no intention to speak slightly of the work of a most estimable man, and of a good scholar—above all, when that work is one from which I have occasionally derived assistance, such as I most willingly acknowledge. Yet the fact that we are offering a book on the same subject as a preceding author; and may thus lie under, or seem to others to lie under, the temptation of unduly claiming for the ground which we would occupy, that it is not occupied already; this must not wholly shut our mouths in respect of what appear to us deficiencies or shortcomings on his part. And this work of Tittmann's seems to me still to leave room for another on the subject of the synonyms of the

New Testament. It sometimes travels very slowly over its ground; the synonyms which he selects for discrimination cannot be esteemed always the most interesting, nor, which is one of the most important things of all, are they always felicitously grouped for investigation; he often fails to bring out in sharp and clear antithesis the differences between them; while now and then the investigations of later scholars have quite broken down the distinctions which he has sought to establish. Indeed the fact that this book of Tittmann's, despite the interest of its subject, and its standing alone upon it, not to speak of its republication in England and in English,¹ has never obtained any considerable circulation among students of theology here, is itself an evidence that it has not been felt to meet our wants on the matter.

The work which is now offered, is, I am perfectly aware, but a slight contribution to the subject—small in respect of the number of synonyms considered,² which might easily have been doubled or

¹ *Biblical Cabinet*, vols. iii. xxxvii. Edinburgh, 1833, 1837. It must at the same time be owned that Tittmann has hardly had a fair chance. Nothing can well be imagined more incorrect and more slovenly than this translation. It is often unintelligible, where the original is perfectly clear.

² I have not thought it worth while to dispose these synonyms in alphabetical order. The fact that only one in each pair or group,

trebled; many of the most interesting having remained untouched by me; and also, as I am painfully aware, with manifold deficiencies, most probably with some mistakes, even in the treatment of these. The conclusions at which I have arrived may rest sometimes on too narrow an induction: it is possible that a larger knowledge would have compelled me to modify or forego them altogether. I can only say that I have not consciously passed over any passages which would have made against my distinction; and that on this and any other subject in the volume I shall most gladly receive instruction and correction; while yet, in conclusion, I will not fear to add that, with all this, the book is the result of enough of honest labour, of notices not to be found ready to hand in Wetstein, or Grotius, or Suicer, in German commentaries, or in lexicons (though I have availed myself of all these), but gathered one by one during many years, to make me feel confident that any who shall hereafter give a better and completer book on the subject, will yet acknowledge a certain amount of assistance derived from these preparatory labours.

Let me only add how deeply thankful I shall

can be arranged according to such law, renders the disposition nearly, if not altogether, useless. On the other hand, I have sought, by sufficient indexes, to assist the reader's references to the book.

be to Him who can alone prosper the work of our hands, if my book, notwithstanding its deficiencies and imperfections, shall be of any service to any in leading them into a closer and more accurate investigation of His Word, and of the riches of wisdom and knowledge which are therein contained.

ITCHENSTOKE, *May*, 1854.

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SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.



§ i.—*Ἐκκλησία, συναγωγή, πανήγυρις.*

Ἐκκλησία is one of those words whose history it is peculiarly interesting to watch, as they obtain a deeper meaning, and receive a new consecration in the Christian Church; which, even while it did not invent, has yet assumed them into its service, and employed them in a far loftier sense than any to which the world had ever put them before. The very word by which the Church is named is itself an example—a more illustrious one could scarcely be found—of this gradual ennobling of a word. For we have *ἐκκλησία* in three distinct stages of meaning—the heathen, the Jewish, and the Christian. In respect of the first, *ἐκκλησία*, as all know, was the lawful assembly in a free Greek city of all those possessed of the rights of

citizenship, for the transaction of public affairs. That they were *summoned* is expressed in the latter part of the word; that they were summoned *out of* the whole population, a select portion of it, including neither the populace, nor yet strangers, nor those who had forfeited their civic rights, this is expressed in the first. Both the *calling*, and the *calling out*, are moments to be remembered, when the word is assumed into a higher Christian sense, for in them the chief part of its peculiar adaptation to its auguster uses lies.¹ It is interesting to observe how, on one occasion in the New Testament, the word returns to this its earlier significance (Acts xix. 32, 39, 40).

Ἐκκλησία did not, like some other words, pass immediately and at a single step from the heathen world to the Christian Church: but here, as so

¹ Both these points are well made by Flacius Illyricus, in his *Clavis Scripturæ*, s. v. Ecclesia: Quia Ecclesia a verbo *καλεῖν* venit, hoc observetur primum; ideo conversionem hominum vocationem vocari, non tantum quia Deus eos per se suumque Verbum, quasi clamore, vocat; sed etiam quia sicut herus ex turbâ famulorum certos aliquos ad aliqua singularia munia evocat, sic Deus quoque tum totum populum suum vocat ad cultum suum (Hos. xi. 1) tum etiam singulos homines ad certas singularesque functiones. (Act. xiii. 2.) Quoniam autem non tantum vocatur Populus Dei ad cultum Dei, sed etiam vocatur ex reliquâ turbâ aut confusione generis humani, ideo dicitur Ecclesia, quasi dicas, Evocata divinitus ex reliquâ impiorum colluvie, ad cultum celebrationemque Dei, et æternam felicitatem.

often, the Septuagint supplies the link of connexion, the point of transition, the word being there prepared for its highest meaning of all. When the Alexandrian translators undertook the rendering of the Hebrew Scriptures, they found in them two constantly recurring words, namely *קָהָל* and *עֵבֶרֶת*. For these they employed generally, and as their most adequate Greek equivalents, *συναγωγή* and *ἐκκλησία*. The rule which they seem to have prescribed to themselves is as follows—to render *קָהָל* for the most part by *συναγωγή* (Exod. xii. 3; Lev. iv. 13; Numb. i. 2, and altogether more than an hundred times), and whatever other renderings of the word they may adopt, in no single case to render it by *ἐκκλησία*. It were to be wished that they had shown the same consistency in respect of *עֵבֶרֶת*; but they have not; for while *ἐκκλησία* is their standing word for it (Deut. xviii. 16; Judg. xx. 2; 1 Kings viii. 14, and in all some seventy times), they too often render this also by *συναγωγή* (Lev. iv. 13; Numb. x. 4; Deut. v. 22, and in all some five and twenty times), thus breaking down for the Greek reader the distinction which undoubtedly exists between the words. Our English translation has the same lack of a consistent rendering. Its two words are ‘congregation’ and ‘assembly;’ but instead of constantly assigning one to one, and one to the other, it renders *קָהָל* now by ‘congregation’ (Lev.

x. 17; Numb. i. 16; Josh. ix. 27), and now by ‘assembly’ (Lev. iv. 13); and on the other hand, **קהל** only sometimes by ‘assembly’ (Judg. xxi. 8; 2 Chron. xxx. 23), but much oftener by ‘congregation’ (Judg. xxi. 5; Josh. viii. 35). There is an interesting discussion by Vitranga (*De Synag. Vet.* pp. 77—89) on the distinction between these two Hebrew synonyms; the result of which is summed up in the following statements: Notat proprie **קהל** universam alicujus populi multitudinem, vinculis societatis unitam et rempublicam sive civitatem quandam constituentem, cum vocabulum **עדה** ex indole et vi significationis suæ tantum dicat quemcunque hominum cœtum et conventum, sive minorem sive majorem (p. 80). And again: *Συναγωγὴ*, ut et **עדה**, semper significat cœtum conjunctum et congregatum, etiamsi nullo forte vinculo ligatum, sed ἡ ἐκκλησία [= **קהל**] designat multitudinem aliquam, quæ populum constituit, per leges et vincula inter se junctam, etsi sæpe fiat ut non sit coacta vel cogi possit (p. 88).

Accepting this as a true distinction, remembering too the probable etymological connexion between **קהל** and the Greek *καλεῖν*, and thus its relationship, once removed, with *ἐκκλησία*, as indeed also with the old Latin ‘calare,’ and our own ‘call,’ we shall see that it was not without due reason that our Lord (Matt. xvi. 18; xviii. 17) and His

Apostles claimed this, as the nobler word, to designate the new society of which He was the Founder, being, as it was, a society knit together by the closest spiritual bonds, and altogether independent of space.

Yet for all this we do not find the title *ἐκκλησία* altogether withdrawn from the Jewish congregation; that too was “the *Church* in the wilderness” (Acts vii. 38); for Christian and Jewish differed only in degree, and not in kind. Nor yet do we find *συναγωγή* wholly renounced by the Church; the latest honourable use of it in the New Testament, indeed the only Christian use of it there, is by that Apostle, to whom it was especially given to maintain unbroken to the latest possible moment the outward bonds connecting the Synagogue and the Church (Jam. ii. 2). Occasionally also by the early Fathers, by Ignatius for instance (*Ep. ad Polyc.* 4), we find *συναγωγή* still employed as an honourable designation of the Church, or of her places of assembly. Still there were causes at work, which could not but induce the faithful to have less and less pleasure in the application of this name to themselves; which led them in the end to leave it altogether to those, whom in the latest book of the canon the Lord had characterized for their fierce opposition to the truth even as “the *synagogue* of Satan” (Rev. iii. 9). Thus the greater

fitness and nobleness of the title *ἐκκλησία* has been already noted. Add to this that the Church was ever rooting itself more predominantly in the soil of heathendom, breaking off more entirely from its Jewish stock and stem. This of itself would have led the faithful to the letting fall of *συναγωγή*, a word at once of unfrequent use in classical Greek, and permanently associated with Jewish worship, and to the ever more exclusive appropriation to themselves of *ἐκκλησία*, so familiar already, and of so honourable a significance, in Greek ears.

It will be perceived from what has been said, that Augustine, by a piece of good fortune which he had scarcely a right to expect, was only half in the wrong, when transferring his Latin etymologies to the Greek and Hebrew, and not pausing to ask himself whether they would hold good there, as was beforehand improbable enough, he finds the reason for attributing *συναγωγή* to the Jewish, and *ἐκκλησία* to the Christian Church, in the fact that 'convocatio' (= *ἐκκλησία*) is a nobler term than 'congregatio' (= *συναγωγή*), the first being properly the *calling* together of *men*, the second the *gathering* together (*congregatio*, from *congrego*, and that from *grex*) of *cattle*.¹

¹ *Enarr. in Ps. lxxx. 1.* In synagogâ populum Israël accipimus, quia et ipsorum proprie synagoga dici solet, quamvis et Ecclesia dicta sit. Nostri vero Ecclesiam nunquam synagogam dixe-

The *πανήγυρις* differs from the *ἐκκλησία* in this, that in the *ἐκκλησία*, as has been noted already, there lay ever the sense of an assembly that had come together for the transaction of business. The *πανήγυρις*, on the other hand, was a great assembly for purposes of festal rejoicing; and on this account it is found joined continually with *έορτή*, as by Philo, *Vit. Mos.* ii. 7; Ezek. xlvi. 11; cf. Hos. ii. 11; ix. 5; the word having given us 'panegyric,' which is properly a speech made on such an occasion. Business might grow out of the fact that such multitudes were assembled, since many, and for various reasons, would be glad to avail themselves of the circumstance; but only in the same way as a 'fair' grew out of a 'feria,' or holy-day. Strabo (x. 5) notices the business-like aspect which the *πανηγύρεις* commonly assumed: *ἢ τε πανήγυρις ἐμπορικόν τι πρᾶγμα*: cf. Pausanias, x. 32. 9; and this was to such an extent the prominent character of them, that the Romans translated *πανήγυρις* by the Latin 'mercatus,' and this even when the

runt, sed semper Ecclesiam: sive discernendi caussâ, sive quod inter congregationem, unde synagoga, et convocationem, unde Ecclesia nomen accepit, distet aliquid; quod scilicet *congregari* et pecora solent, atque ipsa proprie, quorum et *greges* proprie dicimus; *convocari* autem magis est utentium ratione, sicut sunt homines. So also the author of a Commentary on the Book of Proverbs formerly ascribed to Jerome (*Opp.* vol. v. p. 533).

Olympic games were intended (Cicero, *Tusc.* v. 3; Justin, xiii. 5). These with the other games were eminently, though not exclusively, the *πανηγύρεις* of the Greek nation (Thucyd. i. 25). If we keep this festal character of the *πανήγυρις* in mind, we shall find a peculiar fitness in the employment of this word at Heb. xii. 23; where only in the New Testament it occurs. The Apostle is there setting forth the communion of the Church militant on earth with the Church triumphant in heaven,—with that Church from which all labour and toil have for ever passed away (Rev. xxi. 4); and how could he better describe this last than as a *πανήγυρις*, than as the festal assembly of heaven?

§ ii.—*θειότης, θεότης.*

NEITHER of these words occurs more than once in the New Testament: *θειότης* only at Rom. i. 20; *θεότης* at Col. ii. 9. We have rendered both by ‘Godhead;’ yet they must not be regarded as identical in meaning, nor even as two different forms of the same word, which in process of time have separated off from one another, and acquired different shades of significance. On the contrary, there is a real distinction between them, and one which

grounds itself on their different derivations; *θεότης* being from *Θεός*, and *θειότης*, not from *τὸ θεῖον*, which might be said to be the same thing as *Θεός*, but from the adjective *θεῖος*. Comparing the two passages where they severally occur, we shall at once perceive the fitness of the employment of one word in one, of the other in the other. In the first (Rom. i. 20), St. Paul is declaring how much of God may be known from the revelation of Himself which He has made in nature, from those vestiges of Himself which men may everywhere trace in the world around them. Yet it is not the personal God whom any man may learn to know by these aids; He can be known only by the revelation of Himself in His Son; but only His divine attributes, His majesty and glory. This Theophylact feels, who gives *μεγαλειότης* as equivalent to *θειότης* here; and it is not to be doubted that St. Paul uses this vaguer, more abstract, and less personal word, just because he would affirm that men may know God's power and majesty from His works; but would *not* imply that they may know Himself from these or from anything short of the revelation of His Eternal Word.¹ But in the second passage (Col. ii. 9), St. Paul is declaring that in the Son there dwells all the fulness of absolute Godhead; they were no

¹ Cicero (*Tusc.* i. 13): Multi de Diis prava sentiunt; omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur.

mere rays of divine glory which gilded Him, lighting up His person for a season and with a splendour not His own; but He was, and is, absolute and perfect God; and the Apostle uses *θεότης* to express this essential and personal Godhead of the Son. Thus Beza rightly: Non dicit: *τὴν θεióτητα*, i. e. divinitatem, sed *τὴν θεióτητα*, i. e. deitatem, ut magis etiam expresse loquatur; . . . ἡ *θεióτης* attributa videtur potius quam naturam ipsam declarare. And Bengel: Non modo divinæ virtutes, sed ipsa divina natura. De Wette has sought to express the distinction in his German translation, rendering *θεióτης* by ‘Gottlichkeit,’ and *θεότης* by ‘Gottheit.’

There have not been wanting those who have denied that any such distinction was intended by St. Paul; and they rest this denial on the assumption that no such difference between the forces of the two words can be satisfactorily made out. But even supposing that it did not appear in classic Greek, this of itself would be in no way decisive on the matter. The Gospel of Christ might for all this put into words, and again draw out from them, new forces, latent distinctions which those who hitherto employed the words may not have required, but which were necessary for it. And that this distinction between ‘deity’ and ‘divinity,’ if I may use these words to represent severally *θεότης* and *θεióτης*, is one which would be strongly felt, and

which therefore would seek its utterance in Christian theology; of this we have signal proof in the fact that the Latin Christian writers were not content with 'divinitas,' which they found ready to their hand in the writings of Cicero and of others; but themselves coined 'deitas' as the only adequate Latin representative of the Greek *θεότης*. We have Augustine's express testimony to the fact (*De Civ. Dei*, vii. 1): *Hanc divinitatem, vel ut sic dixerim deitatem; nam et hoc verbo uti jam nostros non piget, ut de Græco expressius transferant id quod illi θεύτητα appellant, &c.* Cf. x. 1, 2. But not to urge this nor yet the several etymologies of the words, which so clearly point to this difference in their meanings, examples, so far as they extend, go to support the same. Both *θεότης* and *θειότης*, as in general the abstract words in every language, are of late formation; and one of them, *θεότης* is extremely rare; indeed only a single example of it from classical Greek has yet been brought forward (Lucian, *Icarom.* 9); where, however, it expresses, in agreement with the view here affirmed, Godhead in the absolute sense, or at least in as absolute a sense as the heathen could conceive it. *Θειότης* is a very much commoner word; and all the instances of its employment with which I am acquainted also bear out the distinction which has been here drawn. There is ever a manifestation of the divine, there

are divine attributes, in that to which *θειότης* is attributed, but never absolute personal Deity. Thus Lucian, (*De Calum.* 17), attributes *θειότης* to Hephæstion, when after his death Alexander would have raised him to the rank of a god; and Plutarch speaks of the *θειότης τῆς ψυχῆς* (*De Plac. Phil.* v. 1; cf. *De Isid. et Osir.* 2; *Sull.* 6), with various other passages to the like effect. In conclusion, it may be observed, that whether this distinction was intended, as I am fully persuaded it was, by St. Paul or not, it established itself firmly in the later theological language of the Church—the Greek Fathers using never *θειότης*, but always *θεότης*, as alone adequately expressing the essential Godhead of each of the Three Persons in the Trinity.

§ iii.—*ἱερόν, ναός.*

WE have only in our Version the one word ‘temple,’ with which we render both of these; nor is it very easy to perceive in what manner we could have indicated the distinction between them; which is yet a very real one, and one the marking of which would often add much to the clearness and precision of the sacred narrative. *Ἱερόν* is the whole compass of the sacred enclosure, the *τέμενος*, in-

cluding the outer courts, the porches, porticoes, and other buildings subordinated to the temple itself. *Naós*, on the other hand, from *ναίω*, 'habito,' the proper habitation of God, is the temple itself, that properly and by especial right so called, being the kernel and centre of the whole; the Holy and the Holy of Holies. This distinction, one that existed and was recognized in profane Greek and with reference to heathen temples, quite as much as in sacred Greek and with relation to the temple of the true God (see Herodotus, i. 181, 183), is one, I believe, always assumed in all passages relating to the temple at Jerusalem, alike by Josephus, by Philo, by the Septuagint translators, and in the New Testament. Often indeed it is explicitly recognized, as by Josephus, (*Antt.* viii. 3. 9), who, having described the building of the *ναός* by Solomon, goes on to say; *Ναοῦ δ' ἔξωθεν ἱερὸν ᾠκοδόμησεν ἐν τετραγώνῳ σχήματι*. In another passage (*Antt.* xi. 4. 3), he describes the Samaritans as seeking permission of the Jews to be allowed to share in the rebuilding of God's house (*συγκατασκευάσαι τὸν ναόν*). This is refused them (cf. Ezra iv. 2); but, according to his account, it was permitted to them *ἀφικνουμένοις εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν σέβειν τὸν Θεόν*—a privilege denied to mere Gentiles, who might not, under penalty of death, pass beyond their own Court (Acts xxi. 29, 30).

The distinction may be brought to bear with advantage on several passages in the New Testament. When Zacharias entered into “the *temple* of the Lord” to burn incense, the people who waited his return, and who are described as standing “without” (Luke i. 10), were in one sense in the temple too, that is the *ἱερόν*, while he alone entered into the *ναός*, the ‘temple’ in its more limited and anguster sense. We read continually of Christ teaching ‘in the temple’ (Matt. xxvi. 55; Luke xxi. 57; John viii. 20); and perhaps are at a loss to understand how this could have been so; or how long conversations could there have been maintained, without interrupting the service of God. But this is ever the *ἱερόν*, the porches and porticoes of which were eminently adapted to such purposes, as they were intended for them. So too the money changers, the buyers and sellers, with the sheep and oxen whom the Lord drives out, He repels them from the *ἱερόν*, and not from the *ναός*. Irreverent as was their intrusion, they yet had not dared to establish themselves in the temple properly so called (Matt. xxi. 23; John ii. 14). On the other hand, when we read of another Zacharias slain “between the temple and the altar” (Matt. xxiii. 35), we have only to remember that ‘temple’ is *ναός* here, at once to get rid of a difficulty, which may perhaps have presented itself to many—this,

namely, Was not the altar *in* the temple? how then could any locality be described as *between* these two? In the *ἱερόν*, doubtless, the brazen altar to which allusion is here made was, but not in the *ναός*, “in the court of the house of the Lord” (cf. Josephus, *Antt.* viii. 4. 1), where the sacred historian (2 Chron. xxiv. 21) lays the scene of this murder, but not in the house of the Lord, or *ναός* itself. Again, how vividly does it set forth to us the despair and defiance of Judas, that he presses even into the *ναός* (Matt. xxvii. 5), into that which was set apart for the priests alone, and there casts down before them the accursed price of blood! Those expositors who affirm that here *ναός* stands for *ἱερόν*, should adduce some other passage in which the one is put for the other.

§ iv.—ἐπιτιμάω, ἐλέγχω. (αἰτία, ἔλεγχος.)

ONE may ‘rebuke’ another without bringing the rebuked to a conviction of any fault on his part; and this, either because there was none, and the rebuke was therefore unneeded or unjust; or else because, though there was such fault, the rebuke was ineffectual to bring the offender to own it; and in this possibility of ‘rebuking’ for sin,

without 'convincing' of sin, lies the distinction between these two words. In *ἐπιτιμᾶν* lies simply the notion of rebuking; which word can therefore be used of one unjustly checking or blaming another; in this sense Peter 'rebuked' Jesus (*ἤρξατο ἐπιτιμᾶν*, Matt. xvi. 22; cf. xix. 13; Luke xviii. 39):—or ineffectually and without any profit to the person rebuked, who is not therefore made to see his sin; as when the penitent-thief 'rebuked' (*ἐπετίμα*) his fellow malefactor (Luke xxiii. 40; cf. Mark ix. 25). But *ἐλέγχειν* is a much more pregnant word; it is so to rebuke another, with such effectual wielding of the victorious arms of the truth, as to bring him, I do not say to a confession, but to a conviction, of his sin; just as in juristic Greek, it is not merely to reply to, but to refute, an opponent.

When we keep this distinction well in mind, what a light does it throw on a multitude of passages in the New Testament; and how much deeper a meaning does it give them. Thus our Lord could demand, "Which of you *convinceth* (*ἐλέγχει*) Me of sin?" (John viii. 46.) Numbers rebuked Him; numbers laid sin to His charge (Matt. ix. 3; John ix. 16); but none brought sin home to His conscience. Other passages which will gain from realizing the fulness of the meaning of *ἐλέγχειν*, are John iii. 20; viii. 9; 1 Cor. xiv. 24, 25; but above

all, the great passage, John xvi. 8: "When He [the Comforter] is come, He will *reprove* the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment;" so we have rendered the words, following in our 'reprove' the Latin 'arguet;' although few, I think, that have in any degree sought to sound the depth of our Lord's words, but will admit that 'convince,' which unfortunately our translators have relegated to the margin, would have been the preferable rendering, giving a depth and fulness of meaning to this work of the Holy Ghost, which 'reprove' in some part fails to express.¹ "He who shall come in my room, shall so bring home to the world its own 'sin,' my perfect 'righteousness,' God's coming 'judgment,' shall so 'convince' it of these, that it shall be obliged itself to acknowledge them; and in this acknowledgment may find, shall be in the right way to find, its own blessedness and salvation."

Between *αἰτία* and *ἔλεγχος* a difference of a similar character exists. *Αἰτία* is an accusation, but whether false or true the word does not attempt to

¹ Lampe gives excellently well the force of this *ἐλέγξει*: *Opus Doctoris, qui veritatem quæ hactenus non est agnita ita ad conscientiam etiam renitentis demonstrat, ut victas dare manus cogatur.* See an admirable discussion on the word, especially as here used, in Archdeacon Hare's *Mission of the Comforter*, 1st edit. pp. 528—544.

anticipate; and thus it could be applied, indeed it was applied to the accusation made against the Lord of Glory Himself (Matt. xxvii. 37); but ἔλεγχος implies not merely the charge, but the truth of the charge, and the manifestation of the truth; nay more than this, very often also the acknowledgment, if not outward, yet inward, of the truth of the charge on the side of the party accused; it being the glorious prerogative of the truth in its highest operation not merely to assert itself; and to silence the adversary, but to silence him by convincing him of his error. Demosthenes, *Con. Androt.* p. 600: Πάμπολυ λοιδορία τε καὶ αἰτία κεχωρισμένον ἐστὶν ἐλέγχου. αἰτία μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, ὅταν τις ψιλῶ χρησάμενος λόγῳ μὴ παράσχηται πίστιν, ὧν λέγει ἔλεγχος δέ, ὅταν ὧν ἂν εἶπη τις, καὶ τὰληθὲς ὁμοῦ δείξῃ. Compare Aristotle, *Rhet. ad Alex.* 13: Ἐλεγχος ἔστι μὲν ὃ μὴ δυνατὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν ἄλλ' οὕτως, ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν. By our serviceable distinction between 'convict' and 'convince' we maintain a difference between the judicial and the moral ἔλεγχος. Both will meet together in the last day, when every condemned sinner will be at once 'convicted' and 'convinced;' all which is implied in that "he was speechless" of the guest who was found by the king without a marriage garment (Matt. xxii. 12; cf. Rom. iii. 4).

§ v.—*ἀνάθημα, ἀνάθεμα.*

MANY would deny that there is any room for synonymous discrimination in respect of these two words, affirming them to be merely different spellings of the same word, and promiscuously used; which if it were the fact, their fitness for a place in a book of synonyms would of course disappear; difference as well as likeness being necessary for this. This much, indeed, of what they affirm is perfectly true—namely, that *ἀνάθημα* and *ἀνάθεμα*, like *εὔρημα* and *εὔρεμα*, *ἐπίθημα* and *ἐπίθεμα*, must severally be regarded as having been at first only different pronunciations, which issued in different spellings, of one and the same word. But it is certain that nothing is more common than for slightly different orthographies of the same word finally to settle and resolve themselves into different words, with different provinces of meaning which they have severally appropriated to themselves; and which henceforth they maintain in perfect independence one of the other. I have elsewhere given a considerable number of examples of the kind; and a very few may here suffice: *θράσος* and *θάρσος*, ‘Thrax’ and ‘Threx,’ ‘rechtlich’ and ‘redlich,’ ‘harnais’ and ‘harnois,’ ‘allay’ and ‘alloy.’ That

which may be affirmed of all these, may also, I am persuaded, be affirmed in respect of *ἀνάθημα* and *ἀνάθεμα*. Whether this were so or not was a question debated with no little heat by some of the great early Hellenists, and names of weight and importance are ranged on either side; Salmasius being the greatest name among those who maintained the existence of a distinction, at least in Hellenistic Greek; Beza among those who denied it. Perhaps here, as in so many cases, the truth did not absolutely lie with the combatants on either part, but lay rather between them, though much nearer to one part than the other; the most reasonable conclusion, after weighing all the evidence on either side, being this—that such a distinction did exist, and was allowed by many, but was by no means recognized or observed by all.

In classical Greek *ἀνάθημα* is quite the predominant form, and that which alone Attic writers allow (Lobeck, *Phrynichus*, pp. 249, 445). It is there the technical word by which all such costly offerings as were presented to the gods, and then suspended or otherwise exposed to view in their temples, all by the Romans termed ‘donaria,’ as tripods, crowns, silver and golden vases, and the like, were called; which were in this way separated for ever from all common and profane uses, and openly dedicated to the honour of that deity to whom they were present-

ed at the first (Xenophon, *Anab.* v. 3. 5 ; Pausanias, x. 9).

But with the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek, a new thought demanded to find utterance. Those Scriptures spoke of *two* ways in which things and persons might be holy, set apart for God, devoted to Him. The children of Israel were devoted to Him ; God was glorified *in* them : the wicked Canaanites were devoted to Him ; God was glorified *on* them. This awful fact, that things and persons might be devoted to Him for good, and for evil ; that there was such a thing as being “ accursed *to the Lord* ” (Josh. vi. 17 ; cf. Deut. xiii. 16 ; Numb. xxi. 1—3) ; that of the spoil of the same city, a part might be consecrated to the Lord in His treasury, and a part utterly destroyed, and yet this part and that be alike dedicated to Him (Josh. vi. 19, 21) ; that in more ways than one a thing might be holy to Him (Lev. xvii. 28),—claimed its expression and utterance now, and found it in the two uses of one word ; which, while it remained the same, just differenced itself enough to indicate in which of the two senses it was employed. And here let it be observed, that those who find separation *from* God as the central idea of *ἀνάθεμα*, are quite unable to trace a common bond of meaning between it and *ἀνάθημα*, which last is plainly separation *to* God ; or to show the point at which they

diverge from one another. Rather is it separation to God in both cases.¹

Already in the Septuagint we begin to find *ἀνάθημα* and *ἀνάθεμα* disengaging themselves from one another, and from a confused and promiscuous use. How far, indeed, the distinction is observed there, and whether universally, it is hard to determine, from the variety of readings in various editions; but in one of the later critical editions (that of Tischendorf, 1850), many passages (such for instance as Judith xvi. 19; Lev. xxvii. 28, 29), which appear in some earlier editions negligent of the distinction, are observant of it. In the New Testament the distinction that *ἀνάθημα* is used to express the 'sacrum' in a better sense, *ἀνάθεμα* in a worse, is invariably maintained. It must be allowed, indeed, that the passages there are not numerous enough to convince a gainsayer; he may attribute to hazard the fact that they fall in with this distinc-

¹ Flacius Illyricus (*Clavis Scripturæ*, s. v. Anathema), excellently explains the manner in which the two apparently opposed meanings unfold themselves from a single root: Anathema igitur est res aut persona Deo obligata aut addicta; sive quia Ei ab hominibus est pietatis causâ oblata: sive quia justitia Dei tales, ob singularia aliqua piacula veluti in suos carceres pœnasque abripuit, comprobante et declarante id etiam hominum sententiâ. . . . Duplici enim de causâ Deus vult aliquid habere; vel tanquam gratum acceptumque ac sibi oblatum; vel tanquam sibi exosum, suæque iræ ac castigationi subjectum ac debitum.

tion; *ἀνάθημα* occurring only once: "Some spake of the temple, how it was adorned with goodly stones and *gifts*" (*ἀναθήμασι*, Luke xxi. 5); and *ἀνάθεμα* no more than six times (Acts xxiii. 14; Rom. ix. 3; 1 Cor. xii. 3; xvi. 22; Gal. i. 8, 9). Still none can deny that so far as these uses reach, they confirm this view of the matter; while if we turn to the Greek Fathers, we shall find some of them indeed neglecting the distinction; but others, and these of the greatest among them, not merely implicitly allowing it, as does Clemens of Alexandria (*Coh. ad Gen.* 4), *ἀνάθημα γεγόναμεν τῷ Θεῷ ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ*: where the context plainly shows the meaning to be, we have become *a costly offering* to God; but explicitly recognising and drawing out the difference with accuracy and precision. See, for instance, Chrysostom, *Hom.* xvi. *in Rom.*, as quoted in Suicer's *Thesaurus*, s. v. *ἀνάθεμα*.

And thus, putting all which has been urged together,—the *à priori* probability, drawn from similar phenomena in all languages, that the two forms of a word would gradually have two different meanings attached to them; the wondrous way in which the two aspects of dedication to God are thus set out by slightly different forms of the same word; the fact that every place in the New Testament, where the words occur, falls in with this scheme; the usage, though not perfectly consistent, of later

ecclesiastical books,—I cannot but conclude that *ἀνάθημα* and *ἀνάθεμα* are employed not accidentally by the sacred writers of the New Covenant in different senses; but that St. Luke uses *ἀνάθημα*, because he intends to express that which is dedicated to God for its own honour as well as for God's glory; St. Paul uses *ἀνάθεμα*, because he intends that which is devoted to God, but devoted, as were the Canaanites of old, to his honour indeed, but its own utter loss; even as in the end every intelligent being, capable of knowing and loving God, must be either *ἀνάθημα* or *ἀνάθεμα* to Him. (See Witsius, *Misc. Sac.* vol. ii. p. 54, sqq.; Deyling, *Obs. Sac.* vol. ii. p. 495, sqq.)

§ vi.—*προφητεύω, μαντεύομαι.*

Προφητεύω is a word of constant occurrence in the New Testament; *μαντεύομαι* occurs but once, namely at Acts xvi. 16; where of the girl possessed with the “spirit of divination,” or spirit of Apollo, it is said that she “brought her masters much gain *by soothsaying*” (*μαντευομένη*). The abstinence from the use of this word on all other occasions, and the use of it on this one, is very observable, furnishing as it does a very notable example of that instinctive

wisdom wherewith the inspired writers keep aloof from all words, the employment of which would have tended to break down the distinction between heathenism and revealed religion. Thus *εὐδαιμονία*, although from a heathen point of view a religious word, for it ascribes happiness to the favour of the deity, is yet never employed to express Christian blessedness; nor could it fitly have been so, *δαίμων*, which supplies its base, involving polytheistic error. In like manner *ἀρετή*, the standing word in heathen ethics for 'virtue,' is of very rarest occurrence in the New Testament; it is found but once in all the writings of St. Paul (Phil. iv. 8); and where else (which is only in the Epistles of St. Peter), in quite different uses from those in which Aristotle employs it.¹ In the same way *ἠθῆ*, which gives us 'ethics,' occurs only on a single occasion, and, which indicates that its absence elsewhere is not accidental, this once is in a quotation from a heathen poet (1 Cor. xv. 33). The same precision in maintaining these lines of demarcation is again strikingly manifested in the fact of the constant use of *θυσιαστήριον* for the altar of the true God, occurring as it does more than twenty times in the books of the New Covenant, while on the one occasion when an hea-

¹ Verbum nimium humile,—as Beza, accounting for its absence, says,—si cum donis S. S. comparetur.

then altar has need to be named, the word is changed, and instead of *θυσιαστήριον* ('altare'), *βωμός* ('ara') is used (Acts xvii. 23); the feeling which dictated the exclusion of *βωμός* long surviving in the Church, so that, as altogether profane, it was quite shut out from Christian terminology (Augusti, *Handbuch der Christlicher Archäologie*, vol. i. p. 412).

In conformity with this same law of moral fitness in the selection of words, we meet with *προφητεύειν* as the constant word in the New Testament to express the prophesying by the Spirit of God; while directly a sacred writer has need to make mention of the lying art of heathen divination, he employs this word no longer, but *μαντεύεσθαι* in preference (cf. 1 Sam. xxviii. 8; Deut. xviii. 10). What the essential difference between the two things, prophesying and soothsaying, the 'weissagen' and the 'wahrsagen' is, and why it was necessary to keep them distinct and apart by different terms used to designate the one and the other, we shall best perceive and understand, when we have considered the etymology of one, at least, of the words. *Μαντεύομαι* being from *μάντις*, is through it connected, as Plato has taught us, with *μανία* and *μαίνομαι*. It will follow from this, that the word has reference to the tumult of the mind, the fury, the temporary madness under which those were,

who were supposed to be possessed by the god, during the time that they delivered their oracles; this mantic fury of theirs displaying itself in the eyes rolling, the lips foaming, the hair flying, with all other tokens of a more than natural agitation.¹ It is quite possible that these symptoms were sometimes produced, as no doubt they were often heightened, in the seers, Pythonesses, Sibyls and the like, by the use of drugs, or by other artificial means. Yet no one who believes that real spiritual forces underlie all forms of idolatry, but will also believe that there was often much more in these manifestations than mere trickery of this kind; no one with any insight into the awful mystery of the false worships of the world, but will believe that these symptoms were the evidence and expression of an actual connexion in which these persons stood to a spiritual world—a spiritual world, indeed, which was not above them, but beneath.

¹ Cicero, who loves to bring out, where he can, superiorities of the Latin language over the Greek, claims, and I think with reason, such a superiority here, in that the Latin has 'divinatio,' a word embodying the divine character of prophecy, and the fact that it was a gift of the gods, where the Greek had only *μαντική*, which, seizing not the thing itself at any central point, did no more than set forth one of the external signs which accompanied its giving. (*De Divin.* i. 1): Ut alia nos melius multa quam Græci, sic huic præstantissimæ rei nomen nostri a *divis*; Græci, ut Plato interpretatur, a *furore* duxerunt.

Revelation, on the other hand, knows nothing of this mantic fury, except to condemn it. "The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets" (1 Cor. xiv. 32). The true prophet is, indeed, rapt out of himself; he is "in the Spirit" (Rev. i. 10); he is "in an ecstasy" (Acts xi. 5); he is *ὑπὸ Πνεύματος Ἁγίου φερόμενος* (2 Pet. i. 21), which is very much more than 'moved,' as we have rendered it; rather 'getrieben,' as De Wette; and we must not go so far in our opposition to heathen and Montanist error as to deny this, which some, especially of those engaged in controversy with the Montanists, have done. But then he is not *beside* himself; he is *lifted above*, not thus *set beside*, his every-day self. It is not discord and disorder, but a higher harmony, a diviner order, that is introduced into his soul; so that he is not as one overborne in the region of his lower life by forces stronger than his own, by an insurrection from beneath; but his spirit is lifted out of that region into a clearer atmosphere, a diviner day, than any in which at other times it is permitted him to breathe. All that he before had still remains his, only purged, exalted, quickened, by a power higher than his own, but yet not alien to his own; for man is most truly man, when he is most filled with the fulness of God.¹ Even within

¹ See John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, *On Prophecy*: ch. 4.

the sphere of heathenism itself, the superior dignity of the *προφήτης* to the *μάντις* was recognised; and recognised on these very grounds. Thus there is a well known and often cited passage in the *Timæus* of Plato (71 *e*, 72 *a, b*), where exactly for this reason, that the *μάντις* is one in whom the powers of the understanding are suspended, who, according to the derivation of the word, more or less *rages*, the line is drawn broadly and distinctly between him and the *προφήτης*, the former is subordinated to the latter, and his utterances only allowed to pass after they have received the seal and approbation of the other. The truth which the best heathen philosophy had a glimpse of here, was permanently embodied in the Christian Church in the fact that, while it assumed the *προφητεύειν* to itself, it ascribed the *μαντεύεσθαι* to that heathenism which it was about to displace and overthrow.

The difference of the true prophetic Spirit from an enthusiastical Imposture.

§ vii.—τιμωρία, κόλασις.

OF these words the former occurs but once in the New Testament (Heb. x. 29), and the latter only twice (Matt. xxv. 46; 1 John iv. 18). In *τιμωρία*, according to its classical use, the *vindictive* character of the punishment is the predominant thought; it is the Latin ‘ultio;’ punishment as satisfying the inflicter’s sense of outraged justice, as defending his own honour, or that of the violated law; herein its meaning agrees with its etymology, being from *τιμή*, and *οὔρος*, *όράω*, the guardianship or protectorate of honour. In *κόλασις*, on the other hand, is more the notion of punishment as it has reference to the correction and bettering of him that endures it; it is ‘castigatio,’ and has naturally for the most part a milder use than *τιμωρία*. Thus we find Plato (*Protag.* 323 *e*), joining *κολάσεις* and *νουθετήσεις* together: and the whole passage to the end of the chapter is eminently instructive as to the distinction between the words: *οὐδεὶς κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται, . . . ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὐθις ἀδικήσῃ*: the same change of the words which he employs, occurring again twice or thrice in the sentence. Compare an instructive chapter in Cle-

mens of Alexandria, *Strom.* iv. 24. And this is Aristotle's distinction (*Rhet.* i. 10): διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ τιμωρία, τοῦ ποιούντος, ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῇ: cf. *Ethic. Nic.* iv. 5: τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.

It would be a very serious error, however, to attempt to transfer this distinction in its entirety to the words as employed in the New Testament. The *κόλασις αἰώνιος* of Matt. xxv. 46, as it plainly itself declares, is no corrective and therefore temporary discipline; it can be no other than the *ἀθάνατος τιμωρία* (Josephus, *B. J.* ii. 8. 11), the *αἰδίοι τιμωρίαι* (Plato, *Aw.* 372 a), with which the Lord elsewhere threatens finally impenitent men (Mark ix. 43—48); for in proof that *κόλασις* had acquired in Hellenistic Greek this severer sense, and was used simply as punishment or torment, with no necessary underthought of the bettering through it of him who endured it, we have only to refer to such passages as the following: Josephus, *Antt.* xv. 2. 2; Philo, *De Agricul.* 9; *Mart. Polycar.* 2; 2 Macc. iv. 38; *Wisd. of Sol.* xix. 4. This much, indeed, of Aristotle's distinction still remains, and may be recognised in the sacred usage of the words, that in *κόλασις* the relation of the punishment to the punished, in *τιμωρία* to the punisher, is predominant.

§ viii.—*ἀληθής, ἀληθινός.*

IN the Latin ‘*verax*’ and ‘*verus*’ would severally represent these two words, and in the main reproduce the distinctions existing between them; indeed the Vulgate does commonly by their aid indicate whether *ἀληθής* or *ἀληθινός* stands in the original: but the English language has only the one word ‘true’ by which to render them both; so that of necessity, and by no fault of the translators, the difference between them disappears in our version. And yet this difference is a most real one. What exactly the nature of it is, a single example will at once make evident. God is *Θεὸς ἀληθής*, and He is *Θεὸς ἀληθινός*: but very different attributes and prerogatives are ascribed to Him by the one epithet, and by the other. God is *ἀληθής* (John iii. 33; Rom. iii. 4; = *verax*), inasmuch as He cannot lie, as He is *ἀψευδής* (Tit. i. 2), the truth-speaking, and the truth-loving God (cf. Euripides, *Ion*, 1554). But He is *ἀληθινός* (1 Thess. i. 9; John xvii. 3; = *verus*), very God, as distinguished from idols, and all other false gods, the dreams of the diseased fancy of man, having no substantial existence in the actual world of realities. “The adjectives in *-ινός* express the material out of which anything is

made, or rather they imply a mixed relation, of quality and origin, to the object denoted by the substantive from which they are derived. Thus ξύλ-ι-νος means ‘of wood,’ ‘wooden;’ [ὄστράκ-ι-νος, ‘of earth,’ ‘earthen;’ ὑάλ-ι-νος, ‘of glass,’ ‘glassy;’] and ἀληθ-ι-νός signifies ‘genuine,’ made up of that which is true [that which in chemical language has truth for its stuff and base]. This last adjective is particularly applied to express that which is all that it pretends to be; for instance pure gold as opposed to adulterated metal.” (Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, p. 426.)

It will be seen from this last remark that it does not of necessity follow, that whatever may be contrasted with the ἀληθινός, should thereby be concluded to have no substantial existence, to be altogether false and fraudulent. Inferior and subordinate realizations, partial and imperfect anticipations, of the truth, may be set over against the truth in its highest form, in its ripest and completest development; and then to this last alone the title ἀληθινός will be vouchsafed. Thus Xenophon affirms of Cyrus (*Anab.* i. 9. 17), that he commanded ἀληθινὸν στράτευμα, an army indeed, an army deserving the name; but would not have altogether refused this name of ‘army’ to inferior hosts; and Plato (*Tim.* 25 a), calling the sea beyond the Straits of Hercules, πέλαγος ὄντως, ἀληθινὸς πόντος, would say that

it alone realized *to the full* the idea of the great ocean deep; cf. *Pol.* i. 347 *d*: ὁ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων. We should frequently miss the exact force of the word, we should, indeed, find ourselves entangled in many and serious embarrassments, if we understood it *necessarily* as the true opposed to the false. Rather it is very often the substantial as opposed to the shadowy and outlinear; as Origen (*in Joan.* tom. ii. § 4) has well expressed it: ἀληθινὸς, πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολήν σκιᾶς καὶ τύπου καὶ εἰκότος. Thus, at *Heb.* viii. 2, mention is made of the σκηνὴ ἀληθινή into which our great High Priest entered; which, of course, does not imply that the tabernacle in the wilderness was not also most truly pitched at God's bidding, and according to the pattern which he had shown; but only that it, and all things in it, were weak earthly copies of things which had a real and glorious existence in heaven (ἀντίτυπα τῶν ἀληθινῶν); the passing of the Jewish High Priest into the Holy of Holies, with all else pertaining to the worldly sanctuary, being but the σκιὰ τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν, while the σῶμα, the filling up of these outlines, was of and by Christ (*Col.* ii. 17).¹

¹ This F. Spanheim (*Dub. Evang.* 106) has well put: Ἀλήθεια in Scripturâ Sacrâ interdum sumitur ethice, et opponitur falsitati et mendacio; interdum mystice, et opponitur typis et umbris, ut εἰκῶν illis respondens, quæ veritas alio modo etiam σῶμα vocatur a

When in like manner it is said, "The law was given by Moses, but grace and *truth* came by Jesus Christ" (John i. 17), it is plain that the antithesis cannot lie between the false and the true, but only between the imperfect and the perfect, the shadowy and the substantial. So too the Eternal Word is declared to be τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν (John i. 9), not denying thereby that the Baptist was also "a burning and a shining light" (John v. 35), or that the faithful are "lights in the world" (Phil. ii. 15; Matt. v. 14), but only claiming for a Greater than all to be "the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."¹ Christ declares Himself ὁ ἄρτος ὁ ἀληθινός (John vi. 32), not that the bread which Moses gave was not also "bread of heaven" (Ps. cv. 40), but it was such only in a secondary inferior degree; it was not food in the highest sense,

Spiritu S. opposita τῇ σκιᾷ. Cf. Deyling, *Obs. Sac.* vol. iii. p. 317; vol. iv. p. 548.

¹ Lampe (*in loc.*): Innuitur ergo hic oppositio tum luminarium naturalium, qualia fuere lux creationis, lux Israëliitarum in Ægypto, lux columnæ in deserto, lux gemmarum in pectorali, quæ non nisi umbræ fuere hujus veræ lucis; tum eorum, qui falso se esse lumen hominum gloriantur, quales sigillatim fuere Sol et Luna Ecclesiæ Judaicæ, qui cum ortu hujus Lucis obscurandi, Joel, ii. 31; tum denique verorum quoque luminarium, sed in minore gradu, quæque omne suum lumen ab hoc Lumine mutuuntur, qualia sunt omnes Sancti, Doctores, Angeli lucis, ipse denique Joannes Baptista.

inasmuch as it did not nourish up unto eternal life those that ate it (John vi. 49). He was ἡ ἀμπελος ἡ ἀληθινή (John xv. 1), not thereby denying that Israel also was God's vine, which we know it was (Ps. lxxx. 8; Jer. ii. 21), but only affirming that none but He realized this name, and all that it implied, to the full (Hos. x. 1; Deut. xxxii. 32).¹ It would be easy to follow this up further; but these examples, which the thoughtful student will observe are drawn chiefly from St. John, may suffice. The fact that in his writings the word ἀληθινός is used two and twenty times as against five times in all the rest of the New Testament, is one which he will scarcely dismiss without a thought.

To sum up then, as briefly as possible, the differences between the two words, we may affirm of the ἀληθής, that he fulfils the promise of his lips, but the ἀληθινός the wider promise of his name. Whatever that name imports, taken in its highest, deepest, widest sense, that he realizes to the full.

¹ Lampe: Christus est Vitis vera, . . . et quâ talis præponi, quin et opponi, potest omnibus aliis qui etiam sub hoc symbolo in scriptis prophetiis pinguntur.

§ ix.—*θεράπων, δούλος, διάκονος, ὑπηρέτης.*

THE only passage in the New Testament in which *θεράπων* occurs is Heb. iii. 5: "And Moses verily was faithful in all his house, *as a servant*" (*ὡς θεράπων*). The allusion here to Numb. xii. 7 is manifest; at which place the Septuagint has given *θεράπων* as its rendering of אָמֵן ; which yet is not its constant rule; for it has very frequently rendered it not by *θεράπων*, but by *δούλος*. Out of this latter rendering, no doubt, we have, at Rev. xv. 3, the phrase, *Μωϋσῆς ὁ δούλος τοῦ Θεοῦ*. From the fact that the Septuagint translates the same Hebrew word, now by *δούλος*, now by *θεράπων*, it will not follow that there is no difference between the words; nor yet that there may not be occasions when the one would be far more appropriately employed than the other; but only that there are other occasions which do not require the bringing out into prominence of that which constitutes the difference between them. And such real difference there is. (The *δούλος* (opposed to *ἐλεύθερος*, Rev. xiii. 16; xix. 18; Plato, *Gorg.* 502 *d*) is one in a permanent relation of servitude to another, and that, altogether apart from any ministration to that other at the present moment rendered; but the *θεράπων* is the

performer of present services without respect to the fact whether as a freeman or a slave he renders them ; and thus, as will naturally follow, there goes constantly with the word the sense of one whose services are tenderer, nobler, freer than those of the δούλος. In the verb *θεραπεύειν* ('curare'), as distinguished from *δουλεύειν*, and connected with 'faveo,' 'foveo,' *θάλπω*, the nobler and more careful character of the service comes still more strongly out. It may be used of the physician's watchful tendance of the sick, man's service of God, and is beautifully applied by Xenophon (*Mem.* iv. 3. 9) to the care which the gods have of men. Thus Achilles, in Homer, styles Patroclus his *θεράπων* (*Il.* xvi. 244), one whose service was not constrained, but the officious ministration of love. Merioneus is *θεράπων* to Idomeneus (xxiii. 113), and all the Greeks are *θεράποντες* "Αρηος (ii. 110 and often). So too in Plato (*Symp.* 203 c) Eros is styled the *ἀκόλουθος καὶ θεράπων* of Aphrodite. With all which agrees the definition of Hesychius: *οἱ ἐν δευτέρᾳ τάξει φίλοι*; of Ammonius: *οἱ ὑποτεταγμένοι φίλοι*; and of Eustathius: *τῶν φίλων οἱ δραστηκώτεροι*.

It will be seen then that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, calling Moses a *θεράπων* in the house of God (iii. 5), implies that he occupied a more confidential position, that a freer service, a

higher dignity was his, than that merely of a δούλος, approaching more closely to that of an οἰκονόμος in God's house; and referring to Numb. xii. 6—8, we find, confirming this view, that a special dignity is there ascribed to Moses, lifting him above other δούλοι of God. It would have been well if in our Version it had been in some way sought to indicate the exceptional and more honourable title here given to him who "was faithful in all God's house." The Vulgate has very well rendered *θεράπων* by 'famulus,' (so Cicero, 'famulæ Idææ matris'); Tyn-dal and Cranmer by 'minister,' which perhaps is as good a word as in English could have been found.

Neither ought the distinction between *διάκονος* and *δούλος* to be lost sight of and let go in the rendering of the New Testament. There is no difficulty in preserving it. *Διάκονος*, not from *δία* and *κόνις*, one who in his speed runs through the dust—a mere fanciful derivation, and forbidden by the quantity of *διᾶκονος*—is probably from the same root as has given us *διώκω*, 'to hasten,' or 'pursue.' The difference between *διάκονος* on one side, and *δούλος* and *θεράπων* on the other, is that *διάκονος* represents the servant in his activity *for the work* (*διακονεῖν τι*, Eph. iii. 7; Col. i. 23; 2 Cor. iii. 6), not in his relation either servile, as that of the *δούλος*, or more voluntary, as in the case of the *θερά-*

πων, to a person. The attendants at a feast, and these with no respect to their condition as one of freedom or servitude, are as such *διάκονοι* (John ii. 5; Matt. xxii. 13). What has just been said of the importance of maintaining the distinction between *δοῦλος* and *διάκονος* may be illustrated from the parable of the Marriage Supper (Matt. xxii. 2—14). With us the king's "servants" bring in the invited guests (ver. 3, 4, 8, 10), and his "servants" are bidden to cast out him that had not on a wedding garment (ver. 13): but in the Greek, those, the bringers-in of the guests are *δοῦλοι*; these, the fulfillers of the king's sentence, are *διάκονοι*—this distinction being a most real one, and belonging to the essentials of the parable; the *δοῦλοι* being men, the ambassadors of Christ who invite their brethren into His kingdom now, the *διάκονοι* the angels, who in all the judgment acts at the end of the world evermore appear as the executors of the Lord's will. However the point of the parable may not turn on the distinction between them, yet they may no more be confounded than the *δοῦλοι* and *θερισταί* of Matt. xiii. 27, 30; cf. Luke xix. 24.

Ἱππηρέτης, which only remains to be considered, is a word drawn originally from military matters; he is the rower (from *ἐρέσσω*, 'remigo'), as distinguished from the soldier on board a war-galley; then the performer of any strong and hard labour;

then the subordinate official that waits to accomplish the commands of his superior, as the orderly that attends a commander in war (Xenophon, *Cyrop.* vi. 2. 13). In this sense, as a minister to perform certain defined functions for Paul and Barnabas, Mark was their *ὑπηρέτης* (Acts xiii. 5); and in this official sense of lictor, apparitor, and the like, we find the word constantly, indeed predominantly used in the New Testament (Matt. v. 25; Luke iv. 20; John vii. 32; xviii. 18; Acts v. 22). The mention of *both* *δοῦλοι* and *ὑπηρέται* together (John xviii. 18) would be alone sufficient to indicate that a difference is there observed between them; and from this difference it will follow that he who struck the Lord on the face (John xviii. 32) could not be, as some have supposed, the same whose ear He had but just healed (Luke xxii. 51), seeing that this last was a *δοῦλος*, that profane striker an *ὑπηρέτης* of the High Priest. The meanings of *διάκονος* and *ὑπηρέτης* are much more nearly allied; they do in fact continually run into one another, and there are a multitude of occasions on which they might be promiscuously used; the more *official* character of the *ὑπηρέτης* is the point in which the distinction between them resides.

§ x.—δειλία, φόβος, εὐλάβεια.

OF these three words, the first is used always in a bad sense; the second is a middle term, capable of a good interpretation, capable of an evil, and lying pretty evenly between the two; the third is quite predominantly used in a good sense, though it too has not altogether escaped being employed in an evil.

Δειλία, the Latin ‘timor,’ having *θρασύτης*, or ‘temerity,’ for its opposite (Plato, *Tim.* 87 *a*), is our ‘cowardice.’ It occurs only once in the New Testament, 2 Tim. i. 7; but *δειλιάω*, John xiv. 27; and *δειλός*, Matt. viii. 26; Mark iv. 40; Rev. xxi. 8. In this last passage the *δειλοί* beyond doubt are those who in time of persecution have, out of fear of what they should suffer, denied the faith. It is joined to *ἀνανδρεία* (Plato, *Phædr.* 254 *c*; *Legg.* 859 *b*); to *ψυχρότης* (Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 17); to *ἔκλυσις* (2 Macc. iii. 24); is ascribed by Josephus to the spies who brought an ill report of the Promised Land (*Antt.* iii. 15. 1); being constantly set over against *ἀνδρεία*, as *δειλός* over against *ἀνδρείος*: as for example, in the long discussion on valour and cowardice in Plato’s *Protagoras*, 360 *d*; and see the lively description of the *δειλός* in the *Characters* (29) of

Theophrastus. *Δειλία* does not of course itself allow that it is such, but would shelter itself under the more honourable title of *εὐλάβεια* (Philo, *De Fortit.* 739); pleads for itself that it is *ἀσφάλεια* (Plutarch, *Anim. an Corp. App. Pej.* 3; Philo, *Quod Det. Pot. Insid.* 11).

Φόβος, answering to the Latin term ‘metus,’ is a middle term, and as such it is used in the New Testament sometimes in a bad sense, but oftener in a good. Thus in a bad sense, Rom. viii. 15; 1 John iv. 18; cf. Wisd. of Sol. xvii. 11; but in a good, Acts ix. 31; Rom. iii. 18; Eph. vi. 5; 1 Pet. i. 17. *Φόβος* being thus *μέσον*, Plato, in the passage from the *Protagoras* referred to above, adds *αἰσχρὸς* to it, as often as he would indicate the timidity which misbecomes a man.

Εὐλάβεια, which only occurs twice in the New Testament (Heb. v. 7; xii. 28), and on each occasion signifies piety contemplated on the side in which it is a *fear* of God, is of course from *εὐ λαμβάνεσθαι*, the image underlying the word being that of the careful taking hold, the cautious handling, of some precious yet delicate vessel, which with ruder or less anxious handling might easily be broken. But such a carefulness and cautiousness in the conducting of affairs, springing as no doubt in part it does from a fear of miscarriage, easily lies open to the charge of timidity. Thus Demosthenes claims

for himself that he was only *εὐλαβής*, where his enemies charged him with being *δειλός* and *ἄτολμος*. It is not wonderful then that fear should have come to be regarded as an essential element of *εὐλάβεια*, though for the most part no dishonourable fear, but such as a wise and good man might not be ashamed to entertain. Cicero, *Tusc.* iv. 6: *Declinatio* [a malis] si cum ratione fiet, *cautio* appelletur, eaque intelligatur in solo esse sapiente; quæ autem sine ratione et cum examinatione humili atque fractâ, nominetur *metus*. He has probably the definition of the Stoics in his eyes. These, while they disallowed *φόβος* as a *πάθος*, admitted *εὐλάβεια* into the circle of virtues. Diogenes Laertius, vii. 1. 116: τὴν δὲ εὐλάβειαν [ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι] τῷ φόβῳ, οὐσαν εὐλογον ἔκκλισιν φοβηθήσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν οὐδαμῶς, εὐλαβηθήσεσθαι δέ. It is joined to *πρόνοια* by Plutarch, *Marc.* 9; and set over against *θράσος* by Demosthenes, 517.

§ xi.—*κακία, πονηρία, κακοήθεια.*

WE are probably at first inclined to regard *κακία* in the New Testament as expressing the whole complex of moral evil, as vice in general; and in this latitude no doubt it is often used. Thus, *ἀρεταὶ*

καὶ κακίαι are 'virtues and vices' (Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 12; Plutarch, *Conj. Præc.* 25, and continually); while Cicero (*Tusc.* iv. 15) refuses to translate *κακία* by 'malitia,' choosing rather to coin 'vitiositas' for the occasion, giving this as his reason: *Nam malitia certi cujusdam vitii nomen est, vitiositas omnium*; showing plainly that in *his* eye *κακία* was the name not of one vice, but of all. Yet a little consideration of the passages in which it occurs in the New Testament, must make evident that it is not there so used; for then we should not find it as one in a long catalogue of sins (Rom. i. 29; Col. iii. 8); seeing that in it alone the others would all have been contained. We must therefore seek for it a more special meaning, and bringing it into comparison with *πονηρία*, we shall not err in saying that *κακία* is more the evil habit of mind, *πονηρία* rather the outcoming of the same. Thus Calvin says of *κακία* (Eph. iv. 32): *Significat hoc verbo [Apostolus] animi pravitatem quæ humanitati et æquitati est opposita, et malignitas vulgo nuncupatur.* Our English translators, rendering *κακία* so often by 'malice' (Eph. iv. 32; 1 Cor. v. 8; xiv. 20; 1 Pet. ii. 1), show that they regarded it in the same light.

But the *πονηρός* is, as Hesychius calls him, *ὁ δραστικὸς τοῦ κακοῦ*, the active worker out of evil; the German 'Bösewicht,' or as Beza (*Annott. in*

Matt. v. 37) has drawn the distinction: Significat *πονηρός* aliquid amplius quam *κακός*, nempe eum qui sit in omni scelere exercitatus, et ad injuriam cuivis inferendam totus comparatus. He is, according to the derivation of the word, *ὁ παρέχων πόνους*, or one that, as we say, "puts others to trouble;" and *πονηρία* is the cupiditas nocendi; or as Jeremy Taylor explains it: "aptness to do shrewd turns, to delight in mischiefs and tragedies; a loving to trouble our neighbour and to do him ill offices; crossness, perverseness, and peevishness of action in our intercourse" (*Doctrine and Practice of Repentance*, iv. 1). If the *κακός* is opposed to the *ἀγαθός*, and the *φαῦλος* to the *καλοκάγαθός*, the *πονηρός* would find his exact contrast in the *χρηστός*.

While these words, *κακία* and *πονηρία*, occur several times in the New Testament, *κακοήθεια* occurs there but once, namely, in St. Paul's long and fearful enumeration of the wickednesses with which the Gentile world was filled (*Rom.* i. 29), and never in the Septuagint. We have translated it 'malignity.' When, however, we take it in this wider meaning, it is very difficult to assign to it any district which has not been already preoccupied either by *κακία* or *πονηρία*. Even supposing the exact limits which separate these two words have not been perfectly traced, yet between them they

will have left little or no room unappropriated for ‘malignity’ to occupy as peculiarly its own. It would therefore seem preferable to understand *κακοήθεια* here in the more restricted meaning which it sometimes possesses. The Geneva version has done so, which has rendered it by a periphrasis, “taking all things in the evil part;” which is exactly the definition that Aristotle, of whose ethical terminology the word forms a part, gives (*Rhet.* ii. 13): *ἔστι γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβάνειν ἅπαντα*, or, as Jeremy Taylor calls it, “a baseness of nature by which we take things by the wrong handle, and expound things always in the worst sense;” the ‘malignitas interpretantium’ (Pliny, *Ep.* v. 7);¹ being exactly opposed to what Seneca (*De Irâ*, ii. 24) has so beautifully called the ‘benigna rerum æstimatio.’ For precisely this use of *κακοήθως* see Josephus, *Antt.* vii. 6. 1; cf. 2 Sam. x. 3. This giving to all words and actions of others their most unfavourable interpretation Aristotle marks as one of the vices of the old, in that mournful, yet for the Christian most instructive, passage, which has been referred to just now; they are *κακοήθεις* and *καχύποπτοι*. We shall scarcely err then, taking *κακοήθεια*, at Rom. i. 29, in this nar-

¹ How striking, by the way, this use of ‘interpretor,’ as ‘to interpret *awry*,’ in Tacitus (himself probably not wholly untouched with the vice), Pliny, and the other writers of their age.

rower meaning; the position which it occupies in St. Paul's list of sins entirely justifies us in regarding it as that peculiar form of evil which manifests itself in a malignant interpretation of the actions of others, an attributing of them all to the worst motive.

Nor should we take leave of the word without noticing the deep psychological truth attested in this its secondary employment—this truth, I mean; that the evil which we find in ourselves causes us to suspect and believe evil in others. The *κακοήθης*, according to the original constitution of the word, is he that is himself of an evil *ἦθος* or moral habit: but such an one projects himself, and the motives which actuate him, into others, sees himself in them; and as Love on the one side, in those glorious words of Schiller,

“delightedly believes
Divinities, *being itself divine*,”

so that which is itself thoroughly evil, finds it almost impossible to believe anything but evil in others. The reader of the *Republic* of Plato will remember that remarkable passage (iii. 409 *a, b*), in which Socrates, showing how it is good for physicians to have had chiefly to do with the sick, but not for teachers and rulers with bad men, accounts for the fact that the yet uncorrupted young men

are εὐήθεις, as over against the κακότηεις, on this ground, namely, ἄτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παραδείγματα ὁμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς.

§ xii.—ἀγαπάω, φιλέω.

WE have not, I believe, in any case attempted to discriminate between these two words in our English Version. It would not have been easy, perhaps not possible to have done it; and yet there is often a difference between them, one very well worthy to have been noted, if this had lain within the compass of our language; and which makes the two words to stand very much in the same relation to one another as ‘diligō’ and ‘amo’ in the Latin. It may be worth our while to realize to ourselves the exact distinction between these two Latin words, as it will help us much to understand that which exists between those which are the more immediate object of our inquiry. We have here abundant help from Cicero, who often sets the words in a certain instructive antithesis one to the other. Thus, writing to one friend of the affection in which he holds another (*Ep. Fam.* xiii. 47): Ut scires illum a me non *diligī* solum, verum etiam *amari*; and again (*Ad Brut.* 1): L. Clodius valde

me *diligit*, vel, ut ἐμφατικώτερον dicam, valde me *amat*. From these and various other passages to the same effect (there is an ample collection of them in Döderlein's *Latein. Synonyme*, vol. iv. p. 98 sq.), we might conclude that 'amare,' which corresponds to φιλεῖν, is stronger than 'diligere,' which, as we shall see, corresponds to ἀγαπᾶν: and this in a certain sense is most true; yet it is not a greater strength and intensity in the first word than in the second which accounts for these and for a multitude of similar employments of them. Ernesti has successfully seized the law of their several uses, when he says: *Diligere magis ad iudicium, amare vero ad intimum animi sensum pertinet*. So that, in fact, Cicero in the passage first quoted is saying,—“I do not *esteem* the man merely, but I *love* him; there is something of the passionate warmth of affection in the feeling with which I regard him.”

But from this it will follow, that while friend may desire rather 'amari' than 'diligi' by his friend, yet there are aspects in which the 'diligi' is a higher thing than the 'amari,' the ἀγαπᾶσθαι than the φιλεῖσθαι. The first expresses a more reasoning attachment, of choice and selection (*diligere* = *deligere*), from seeing in the object upon whom it is bestowed that which is worthy of regard; or else from a sense that such was fit and due toward the person so regarded, as being a benefactor, or

the like; while the second, without being necessarily an unreasoning attachment, does yet oftentimes give less account of itself to itself; is more instinctive, is more of the feelings, implies more passion; thus Dion Cass. 44: *ἐφιλήσατε αὐτὸν ὡς πατέρα, καὶ ἠγαπήσατε ὡς εὐεργέτην*. From this last fact it follows, that when the *φιλεῖν* is attributed to a person of one sex in regard to one of another, it generally implies the passion of love, and is seldom employed, but rather *ἀγαπᾶν*, where such is not intended. Take as an example of this the use of the two words in John xi. The sisters of Bethany send to Jesus to announce that His friend Lazarus is sick (ver. 3): no misunderstanding is here possible, and the words therefore run thus: *ὃν φιλεῖς ἀσθενεῖ*: cf. ver. 36. But where the Saviour's affection to the sisters themselves is recorded, St. John at once changes the word, which, to unchaste ears at least, might not have sounded so well, and instead of *φιλεῖν*, expresses himself thus: *ἠγάπα δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς τὴν Μάρθαν, κ. τ. λ.* (ver. 5). We have an instructive example of the like variation between the two words, and out of the same motives, at Wisd. viii. 2, 3. At the same time the *φιλεῖν* is not unusual to express the affection between persons of different sexes, and this where no passion, no *ἔρως*, honourable or dishonourable, is intended, if the case be one where nearness of blood at once and of itself

precludes the supposition of such, as that of a brother to a sister. See, for instance, Xenophon, *Mem.* ii. 7, 9, 11, a very useful passage in respect of the relation in which the two words stand to one another, and which shows us how the notions of respect and reverence are continually implied in the ἀγαπᾶν, which, though of course not excluded by, are still not involved in, the φιλεῖν. Out of this which has been said it may be explained, that while men are continually bidden ἀγαπᾶν τὸν Θεόν (Matt. xxii. 37; Luke x. 27; 1 Cor. viii. 3), and good men declared to do so (Rom. viii. 28; 1 Pet. i. 8; 1 John iv. 21), the φιλεῖν τὸν Θεόν is commanded to them never. The Father, indeed, both ἀγαπᾷ τὸν Υἱόν (John iii. 35), and also φιλεῖ τὸν Υἱόν (John v. 20); with the first of which statements such passages as Matt. iii. 17, with the second, as John i. 18; Prov. viii. 22, 30, may be brought into connexion.

In almost all these passages of the New Testament, the Vulgate, by the help of ‘diligō’ and ‘amo,’ has preserved and marked the distinction, which in each case we have been compelled to let go. It is especially to be regretted that at John xxi. 15—17 we have not been able to retain it, for the alternations there are singularly instructive, and if we would draw the whole meaning of the passage forth, must not escape us unnoticed. On occa-

sion of that threefold "Lovest thou Me?" which the risen Lord addresses to Peter, He asks him first, ἀγαπᾷς με; At this moment, when all the pulses in the heart of the now penitent Apostle are beating with an earnest affection toward his Lord, this word on that Lord's lips sounds too cold; not sufficiently expressing the warmth of his personal affection toward Him. Besides the question itself, which grieves and hurts Peter (ver. 17), there is an additional pang in the form which the question takes, sounding as though it were intended to put him at a comparative distance from his Lord, and to keep him there; or at least as not permitting him to approach so near to Him as fain he would. He therefore in his answer substitutes for it the word of a more *personal* love, φιλῶ σε (ver. 15). When Christ repeats the question in the same words as at the first, Peter in his reply again substitutes his φιλῶ for the ἀγαπᾷς of his Lord (ver. 16). And now at length he has conquered; for when the third time his Master puts the question to him, He does it with the word which Peter feels will alone express all that is in his heart, and instead of the twice repeated ἀγαπᾷς, his word is φιλεῖς now (ver. 17). The question, grievous in itself to Peter, as seeming to imply a doubt in his love, is not any longer made more grievous still, by the peculiar shape which it as-

sumes.¹ All this subtle and delicate play of feeling disappears perforce, where the variation in the words used is incapable of being reproduced.

Let me observe in conclusion that *ἔρως*, *ἐράν*, *ἐραστής*, never occur in the New Testament, but the two latter occasionally in the Old; *ἐραστής* generally in a dishonourable sense (Ezek. xvi. 33; Hos. ii. 5); yet once or twice (as Wisd. viii. 2; Prov. iv. 6) in a more honourable meaning, not as 'amasius,' but 'amator.' A word or two on the causes of this their significant absence may here find place. In part, no doubt, the explanation of this absence is, that these words by the corrupt use of the world had become so steeped in earthly sensual passion, carried such an atmosphere of this about them, that the truth of God abstained from the defiling contact with them; yea, found out a new word for itself rather than betake itself to one of these. For it should never be forgotten that the substantive *ἀγάπη* is purely a Christian word, no example of its use occurring in any heathen writer whatever; the utmost they attained to here was *φιλανθρωπία* and *φιλαδελφία*, and the last indeed never in any sense but as the love between brethren in blood. This is Origen's explanation in an inter-

¹ Bengel generally has the honour *rem acu tetigisse*: here he has singularly missed it, and is wholly astray: *ἀγαπᾶν*, *amare*, *est necessitudinis et affectus*; *φιλεῖν*, *diligere*, *judicii*.

esting discussion on the subject, *Prol. in Cant.* vol. iii. pp. 28—30. But the reason may lie deeper than this. "Ἔρως, like so many other words, might have been assumed into nobler uses, might have been consecrated anew, despite of the deep degradation of its past history;¹ and there were beginnings already of this, in the Platonist use of the word, as the longing and yearning love after that unseen but eternal Beauty, the faint vestiges of which may here be everywhere traced.² But in the very fact that ἔρως did express this yearning love (in Plato's exquisite mythus, *Symp.* 203 b, "Ἔρως is the child of Πενία), lay the real unfitness of the word to set forth that Christian love, which is not merely the sense of need, of emptiness, of poverty, with the

¹ On the attempt which some Christian writers have made to distinguish between 'amor' and 'dilectio' or 'caritas,' see Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xiv. 7: Nonnulli arbitrantur aliud esse dilectionem sive caritatem, aliud amorem. Dicunt enim dilectionem accipiendam esse in bono, amorem in malo. He shows, by many examples of 'dilectio' and 'diligo' used in an ill sense in the Latin Scriptures, of 'amor' and 'amo' in a good, the impossibility of maintaining any such distinction.

² I cannot regard as a step in this direction the celebrated words of Ignatius, *Ad Rom.* 7: ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως ἐσταύρωται. It is far more consistent with the genius of these Ignatian Epistles to take ἔρως *subjectively* here; "My love of the world is crucified," i. e. with Christ, rather than *objectively*: "Christ, the object of my love, is crucified."

longing after fulness, not the yearning after an invisible Beauty; but a love to God and to man, which is the consequence of a love from God, already shed abroad in the hearts of His people. The mere longing and yearning, which ἔρως at the best would imply, has given place since the Incarnation to the love which is not in desire only, but also in possession.

§ xiii.—θάλασσα, πέλαγος.

Θάλασσα, like the Latin 'mare,' is the sea as contrasted with the land (Gen. i. 10; Matt. xxiii. 15; Acts iv. 24). Πέλαγος, closely allied with πλάξ, πλατύς, 'flat,' is the level uninterrupted expanse of open water, the 'altum mare,' as distinguished from those portions of it broken by islands, shut in by coasts and headlands.¹ Hippias, in Plato's *Gorgias* (338 a), charges the eloquent sophist, Prodicus, with a *φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν*

¹ It need not be observed that, adopted into Latin, it has the same meaning:

*Ut pelagus tenuere rates, nec jam amplius ulla
Occurrit tellus, maria undique et undique cœlum.*

Virgil, *Æn.* v. 8, 9.

λόγων, ἀποκρύφαντα γῆν.¹ Breadth, and not depth, save as quite an accessory notion, and as that which will probably find place in this open sea, lies in the word. Thus the murmuring Isarelites, in Philo (*Vit. Mos.* 35), liken to a πέλαγος the illimitable sand-flats of the desert; and in Herodotus (ii. 92), the Nile overflowing Egypt is said πελαγίζειν τὰ πεδία, which yet it does not cover beyond the depth of a few feet. A passage which illustrates well the distinction between the words, occurs in the *Timæus* of Plato (25 *a, b*), where the title of πέλαγος is refused to the Mediterranean sea; that is but a harbour, with the narrow entrance between the Pillars of Hercules for its mouth; only the great Atlantic Ocean beyond can be acknowledged as ἀληθινὸς πόντος, πέλαγος ὄντως. And compare Aristotle, *De Mun.* 3; and again, *Meteorol.* ii. 1: ρέουσα δ' ἡ θάλαττα φαίνεται κατὰ τὰς στενότητας [the Straits of Gibraltar], εἴπου διὰ περιέχουσιν γῆν εἰς μικρὸν ἐκ μεγάλου συνάγεται πέλαγος.

It might seem, at first sight, as if this distinction did not hold good in one of the only two passages where the word occurs in the New Testament, namely Matt. xviii. 6: "It were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea" (καὶ κατα-

¹ This last idiom reminds us of the French 'noyer la terre,' applied to a ship sailing out of sight of land.

ποντισθῆ ἐν τῷ πελάγει τῆς θαλάσσης). But the sense of depth, which undoubtedly the passage requires, is here to be looked for in the *καταποντισθῆ* :—*πόντος*, which indeed does not itself occur in the New Testament, being connected with *βάθος*, *βένθος*, perhaps the same word as this last, and implying the sea in its *perpendicular* depth, as *πέλαγος* (*aquor maris*), the same in its *horizontal* dimensions and extent.

§ xiv.—*σκληρός, αὔστηρός.*

IN the parable of the Talents (Matt. xxv.), the slothful servant charges his master with being *σκληρός*, “an *hard* man” (ver. 24); while in the corresponding parable of St. Luke it is *αὔστηρός*, “an *austere* man” (xix. 21), which he accuses him of being. It follows that the words are to a certain degree interchangeable; but not that their meanings run exactly parallel throughout. They will be found, on the contrary, very capable of discrimination and distinction, however the distinction may not affect the interpretation of these parables.

Σκληρός, derived from *σκέλλω, σκλήναι*, ‘arefacio,’ is properly an epithet expressing that which through lack of moisture is hard and dry, and thus

rough and disagreeable to the touch; nay more, warped and intractable. It is then transferred to the region of ethics, in which is by far its most frequent use; and where it expresses the roughness, harshness, and intractability in the moral nature of a man. Thus it is an epithet applied to Nabal (1 Sam. xxv. 3), and no other could better express the evil condition of the churl. Looking to the company which *σκληρός* keeps, we find it commonly associated with such words as the following: *ἀνχμηρός* (Plato, *Symp.* 195 d); *ἀντίτυπος* (*Theæt.* 155 a); *ἄγριος* (Aristotle, *Ethic.* iv. 8); Plutarch (*Cons. ad Apoll.* 3); *ἄτρεπτος* (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 1. 64, 117); *πονηρός* (1 Sam. xxv. 3). It is set over against *εὐηθικός* (Plato, *Charm.* 175 d); *μαλακός* (*Protag.* 331 d); *μαλθακός* (*Symp.* 195 d).

Ἀυστηρός, which in the New Testament only appears in the single passage already referred to, and never in the Old, is in its primary meaning applied to such things as draw together and contract the tongue, which are, as we say, harsh and *stringent* to the palate, as new wine, not yet mellowed by age, unripe fruit, and the like. Thus, when the poet Cowper describes himself, when a boy, as gathering from the hedgerows "sloes *austere*," he uses the word with exactest propriety. But just as we have transferred 'strict' (from 'stringo'), to the region of ethics, so the Greeks transferred *αυστηρός*,

the image here being borrowed from the taste, as in *σκληρός* it is borrowed from the touch. Neither does this word set out anything amiable or attractive in him to whom it is applied. We find it in such company as the following; joined with *ἀηδής* (Plato, *Pol.* 398 a); *ἄκρατος* and *ἀνήδυντος* (Plutarch, *Conj. Præc.* 29); *ἀνήδυστος* (*Phoc.* 5); *αὐθέκαστος*¹ (*De Adul. et Am.* 14). We find, further, Aristotle (*Ethic. Eudem.* vii. 5), contrasting the *αὐστηρός* with the *εὐτράπελος*, which last word he uses in a good sense.

At the same time it will be observed that in none of the epithets with which we have thus found *αὐστηρός* associated, is there that deep moral perversity which lies in those with which *σκληρός* is linked; and, moreover, it is met not seldom in more honourable company; thus it is joined with *σώφρων* continually (Plutarch, *Conj. Præc.* vii. 29; *Quæst. Gr.* 40); while the Stoics were wont to affirm all good men to be *αὐστηροί* (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 1. 64, 117): *καὶ αὐστηροὺς δὲ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὀμιλεῖν, μήτε παρ' ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν προσδέχεσθαι.* In Latin 'austerus' is predominantly an epithet of

¹ In Plutarch this word is used in an ill sense, as self-willed, 'eigensinnig;' being one of the many, in all languages, which, beginning with a good sense (Aristotle, *Ethic. Nic.* iv. 7), ended with a bad.

honour (Döderlein, *Lat. Synon.* vol. iii. p. 232). The 'austerus' is one of an earnest, severe character, opposed to all levity; needing, it may very well be, to watch against harshness, rigour, or moroseness, into which his character might easily degenerate (*non austeritas ejus tristis, non dissoluta sit comitas*, Quintilian, ii. 2. 5), but as yet not charged with these.

We may distinguish, then, between *σκληρός* and *αύστηρός* thus: *σκληρός*, applied to any, conveys always a reproach and a severe one, indicates a character harsh, inhuman, and (in the earlier use of the word) uncivil; *αύστηρός*, on the contrary, does not always convey a reproach at all, any more than the German 'streng,' which is very different from 'hart;' and even where it does, yet one of comparatively a milder and less opprobrious description.

§ xv.—*εἰκόν, ὁμοίωσις, ὁμοίωμα.*

THERE is a double theological interest attending the distinction between *εἰκόν* and the two words which are here brought into comparison with it; the first belonging to the Arian controversy, and turning on the fitness or unfitness of the words before us to set forth the relation of the Son to the

Father; while the other is an interest that might seem at first sight remote from any controversy, which yet has contrived to insinuate itself into more than one, namely, whether there be a distinction, and if so what it is, between the image (εἰκών) of God, *in which*, and the likeness (ὁμοίωσις) of God, *after which* man at the first is declared to have been created (Gen. i. 26).

And first, for the distinction drawn between the words during the course of the long Arian debate. It is evident that εἰκών (from ἔοικα) and ὁμοίωμα might often be used as equivalent, and in many positions it would be indifferent whether of the two were employed. Thus they are convertibly used by Plato (*Phædr.* 250 *b*), ὁμοιώματα and εἰκόνες alike, to set forth the earthly patterns and resemblances of the archetypal things in the heavens. When, however, the Church found it necessary to raise up bulwarks against Arian error and Arian equivocation, it drew a strong distinction between these words, one not arbitrary, but having essential difference for its ground. Εἰκών (= imago, imitago) always supposes a prototype, that which it not merely resembles, but from which it is drawn. It is the German 'Abbild,' which invariably presumes a 'Vorbild;' Gregory Nazianzene, *Orat.* 36: αὕτη γὰρ εἰκόνοσ φύσις, μίμημα εἶναι τοῦ ἀρχετύπου. (Petravius, *De Trin.* vi. 5, 6.) Thus, the monarch's

head on the coin is εἰκών (Matt. xxii. 20); the reflection of the sun in the water is its εἰκών (Plato, *Phædo*, 99 d); the statue in stone or other material is εἰκών (Rev. xiii. 14); the child is ἔμφυτος εἰκών of his parents. But in the ὁμοίωμα or ὁμοίωσις, while there is resemblance, it by no means follows that it has been gotten in this way, that it is derived: it may be accidental, as one egg is like another, as there may exist a resemblance between two men who are not in any way akin to one another. Thus, as Augustine in an instructive passage brings out (*Quæst.* lxxxiii. 74), the ‘imago’ (= εἰκών) includes and involves the ‘similitudo,’ but the ‘similitudo’ (= ὁμοίωσις) does not involve the ‘imago.’ The reason will at once be manifest why εἰκών is applied to the Son, as the expression of his relation to the Father (1 Cor. xi. 7; Col. i. 15; cf. *Wisd. of Sol.* vii. 26); while among all the words of the family of ὁμοιος, not merely none are so employed in the Scripture, but they have all been expressly forbidden and condemned by the Church; that is, so soon as ever it has had reason to suspect foul play, and that they are not used in good faith. Thus Hilary, addressing an Arian, says, “I may use them, to exclude Sabellian error; but I will not allow you to do so, whose intention is altogether different” (*Con. Constant. Imp.* 17—21).

Εἰκών, when employed of the Son, like χαρακ-

τήρ and ἀπαύγασμα (Heb. i. 3), with which theologically it is nearly related, is indeed *inadequate*, but, at the same time, it is true as far as it goes; and in human language, employed for the setting forth of truths which transcend human thought, we must be content with approximative assertions, seeking for the complement of their inadequacy, that which shall redress their insufficiency, from some other quarter. Each has its weak side, which must be supported by strength derived from elsewhere. *Εἰκών* is not without its weakness; for what image is of equal worth and dignity with the prototype from which it is imaged? But it has also its strong side; it at any rate expresses *derivation*; while *ὁμοιότης*, *ὁμοίωσις*, or any other words of this family, expressing mere similarity, if they did not actually imply, might yet suggest, and if they suggested, would seem to justify, error, and that with no compensating advantage. Exactly the same considerations were at work here, which, in respect of the verbs *γεννᾶν* and *κτίζειν*, did in this same controversy cause the Church to allow the one, and to condemn the other.

The second interest in the discrimination of these words lies in the question which has often been discussed, whether in that great fiat announcing man's original constitution, "Let us make man in our

image (εἰκών LXX., עִבְרָה Heb.), after our *likeness*” (ὁμοίωσις LXX., חֲמוּדָה Heb.), anything different was intended by the second than by the first, or whether the second is merely to be regarded as consequent upon the first, “in our image” and therefore “after our likeness.” Both are claimed for man in the New Testament: the εἰκών, 1 Cor. xi. 7; the ὁμοίωσις, Jam. iii. 9.

Many of the early Fathers, as also of the Schoolmen, maintained that there was a real distinction. Thus, the Alexandrians taught that the εἰκών was something *in* which men were created, being common to all, and continuing to man after the fall as before (Gen. ix. 6), while the ὁμοίωσις was something *toward* which man was created, that he might strive after and attain it; Origen, *Princ.* iii. 6: Imaginis dignitatem in primâ conditione percepit, similitudinis vero perfectio in consummatione servata est; cf. *in Joan.* tom. xx. 20. It can hardly be doubted that the Platonist studies and predilections of the Christian theologians of Alexandria had some influence upon them here, and on this distinction which they drew. It is well known that Plato presented the ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*Theæt.* 176 a) as the highest scope of man's life; and indeed Clement (*Strom.* ii. 22) brings the great passage of Plato to bear upon this very discussion. The Schoolmen, in like manner, drew a distinction,

although it was not this one, between “these two divine stamps upon man.” Lombard, *Sent.* ii. *dist.* 16; H. de S. Victore, *De Animá*, ii. 25; *De Sac.* i. 6. 2: Imago secundum cognitionem veritatis, similitudo secundum amorem virtutis; the first declaring the intellectual, as the second the moral pre-eminence, in which man was created. Many, however, have refused to acknowledge these, or any other distinctions between the two declarations; as Baxter, for instance, who, in his interesting reply to Elliott’s, the Indian Missionary’s, inquiries on the subject, rejects them all as groundless conceits, though himself in general only too anxious for distinction and division (*Life*, vol. ii. p. 296).

It is hard to think that they were justified in this rejection; for myself I should rather believe that the Alexandrians were very near the truth, if they did not grasp it altogether. There are eminently significant parts of Scripture, where the words of Jerome, originally applied to the Apocalypse, ‘quot verba tot sacramenta,’ can hardly be said to contain an exaggeration. Such a part is the history of man’s creation and his fall, in the first three chapters of Genesis. We may expect to find mysteries there; prophetic intimations of truths which it might require ages and ages to develop. And, without attempting to draw any very strict line between εἰκὼν and ὁμολώσις, or their Hebrew

originals, I think we may be bold to say that the *whole* history of man, not only in his original creation, but also in his after restoration and reconstitution in the Son, is significantly wrapped up in this double statement; which is double for this very cause, that the Divine Mind did not stop at the contemplation of his first creation, but looked on to him as “*renewed* in knowledge after the image of Him that created him” (Col. iii. 10); because it knew that only as partaker of this double benefit would he attain the true end for which he was made.

§ xvi.—*ἄσωτία, ἀσέλγεια.*

THE man who is *ἄσωτος*, it is little likely that he will not be *ἀσελγής* also; and yet *ἄσωτία* and *ἀσέλγεια* are not identical in meaning; they will express different aspects of his sin, or at any rate contemplate it from different points of view.

And first *ἄσωτία*, a word in which heathen ethics said much more than they intended or knew. It occurs thrice in the New Testament (Eph. v. 18; Tit. i. 6; 1 Pet. iv. 4); once only in the Septuagint (Prov. xxviii. 7). Besides this we have the adverb *ἄσώτως*, Luke xiv. 13; and *ἄσωτος* once in the Septuagint, Prov. vii. 11. At Eph. v. 18 we translate

it 'excess;' in the other two places, 'riot,' as the ζῶν ἀσώτως, 'in riotous living;' the Vulgate always by 'luxuria' and 'luxuriose,' words which, it is hardly needful to observe, imply in Latin much more of loose and profligate living than our 'luxury' and 'luxuriously' do *now*. The word is sometimes taken in a passive sense, as though it were ἄσωστος, one who cannot be saved, σώζεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενος, as Clement of Alexandria (*Pædag.* ii. 1) expressly explains it, = 'perditus,' 'heillos,' or as we used to say, a 'loسل.' Grotius: Genus hominum ita immersorum vitiis, ut eorum salus deplorata sit; the word being, so to speak, prophetic of their doom to whom it was applied.¹ This, however, was quite its rarer use; more commonly the ἄσωτος is not one who cannot be saved, but who cannot himself save, or spare; = 'prodigus,' or, again to use a good old English word which we have now let go, a 'scatterling.' Aristotle notes that this, a too great prodigality in the use of money, is the ear-

¹ Thus, in the *Adelphi* of Terence (iv. 7), one^h having spoken of a youth 'luxu perditum,' proceeds:

Ipsa si cupiat *Salus*,
Servare prorsus non potest hanc familiam.

No doubt in the Greek original from which Terence translated this comedy, there was a play here on the word ἄσωτος, which the absence of the verb 'salvare' from the Latin language has hindered Terence from preserving.

liest meaning of *ἄσωτία*, giving this as its definition (*Ethic. Nic.* iv. 1. 3); *ἄσωτία ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ περὶ χρήματα*. The word forms part of his ethical terminology; the *ἐλευθέριος*, or the truly liberal man, is with him one who keeps the golden mean between the two *ἄκρα*, namely, *ἄσωτία* on one side, and *ἀνελευθερία* or stinginess, on the other. And it is in this view of *ἄσωτία* that Plato (*Pol.* viii. 560 e), when he names the various catachrestic terms, according to which men call their vices by the names of the virtues which they caricature, makes them style these *ἄσωτία, μεγαλοπρέπεια*.¹ It is with the word at this stage of its meaning that Plutarch joins *πολυτέλεια* (*De Apotheg. Cat.* 1).

But it is easy to see, and Aristotle does not fail to note, that one who is *ἄσωτος* in this sense of spending too much, of laying out his expenditure on a more magnificent scheme than his means will warrant, slides too easily under the fatal influence of flatterers, and of all those temptations with which he has surrounded himself, into a spending on his own lusts and appetites of that with which he parts so easily, laying it out for the gratification of his own sensual desires; and that thus a new thought finds its way into the word, so that it indicates not only one of a too expensive, but also and chiefly,

¹ Quintilian (*Inst.* viii. 36): Pro luxuriā liberalitas dicitur.

of a dissolute, debauched, profligate manner of living; the German 'lüderlich.' These are his words (*Ethic. Nic.* iv. 1. 36): διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν [τῶν ἀσώτων] εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροὶ εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν, πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. Here he gives the reason of what he has stated before: τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν.

In this sense *ἀσωτία* is used in the New Testament; as we find *ἀσωταί* and *κραιπάλαι* (Herodian, ii. 5) joined elsewhere together. It will of course at once be felt that the two meanings will often run into one another, and that it will be hardly possible to keep them strictly asunder. Thus see the various examples of the *ἄσωτος*, and of *ἀσωτία*, which Athenæus (iv. 59—67) gives; they are sometimes rather of one kind, sometimes of the other. The waster of his goods will be very often a waster of everything besides, will lay waste himself—his time, his faculties, his powers; and, we may add, uniting the active and passive meanings of the word, will be himself laid waste; he loses himself, and is lost.

There is a difference in *ἀσέλγεια*, a word the derivation of which is wrapped in much obscurity; some going so far to look for it as to Selge, a city of Pisidia, whose inhabitants were infamous for

their vices; while others derive it from *θέλγειν*, probably the same word as the German 'schwelgen.' Of more frequent use than *ἀσωτία* in the New Testament, it is by us generally rendered 'lasciviousness' (Mark vii. 22; 2 Cor. xii. 21; Gal. v. 19; Eph. iv. 19; 1 Pet. iv. 3; Jude 4); though sometimes 'wantonness' (Rom. xiii. 13; 2 Pet. ii. 18); as in the Vulgate either by 'impudicitia' or 'luxuria.' If our translators or the Latin intended by these renderings to express exclusively impurities and lusts of the flesh, they have certainly given to the word too narrow a meaning. The *ἀσέλγεια*, which it will be observed is not grouped with fleshly lusts, in the catalogue of sins at Mark vii. 21, 22, is best described as petulance, or wanton insolence; being somewhat stronger than the Latin 'protervitas,' though of the same nature, more nearly 'petulantia.' The *ἀσελγής*, as Passow observes, is very closely allied to the *ὑβριστικός* and *ἀκόλαστος*, being one who acknowledges no restraints, who dares whatsoever his caprice and wanton insolence suggest.¹ None, of course, would deny that *ἀσέλγεια* may display itself in acts of what we call 'lasciviousness;' for there are no worse dis-

¹ Thus Witsius (*Melet. Leid.* p. 465) observes: *ἀσέλγειαν* dici posse *omnem* tam ingenii, quam morum proterviam, petulantiam, lasciviam, quæ ab Æschine opponitur *τῇ μετριότητι καὶ σωφροσύνῃ*.

plays of ὕβρις than in these; but still it is their petulance, their insolence, which causes them to deserve this name; and of the two renderings of the word which we have made, 'wantonness' seems to me the preferable, standing as it does, by the double meaning which it has, in a remarkable ethical connexion with the word which we now are considering.

In a multitude of passages the notion of lasciviousness is altogether absent from the word. Thus Demosthenes, making mention of the blow which Meidias had given him, characterises it as in keeping with the known ἀσέλγεια of the man (*Con. Meid.* 514). Elsewhere he joins δεσποτικῶς and ἀσελγῶς, ἀσελγῶς and προπετῶς. As ἀσέλγεια Plutarch characterises a like outrage on the part of Alcibiades, committed against an honourable citizen of Athens (*Alcib.* 8); indeed, the whole picture which he draws of Alcibiades is the full-length portrait of an ἀσελγής. Josephus ascribes ἀσέλγεια and μανία to Jezebel, daring, as she did, to build a temple of Baal in the Holy City itself (*Antt.* viii. 13. 1); and the same to a Roman soldier, who, being on guard at the Temple during the Passover, provoked by an act of grossest indecency a tumult, in which great multitudes of lives were lost (*Antt.* xx. 5. 3). And for other passages, helpful to a fixing of the true meaning of ἀσέλγεια, see 3 Macc. ii. 26;

Polybius, viii. 14. 1; Eusebius, *H. E.* v. 1. 26; and the quotations given in Wetstein's *New Testament*, vol. i. p. 588. It, then, and *ἄσωτία* are clearly distinguishable; the fundamental notion of *ἄσωτία* being wastefulness and riotous excess; of *ἄσέλγεια*, lawless insolence and wanton caprice.

§ xvii.—*θιγγάνω, ἔπτομαι, ψηλαφάω.*

WE are sometimes enabled, by the help of an accurate synonymous distinction, at once to reject as untenable some interpretation of a passage of Scripture, which might, but for this, have maintained itself as at least a possible explanation of it. Thus is it with Heb. xii. 18: "For ye are not come unto the mount *that might be touched*" (*ψηλαφωμένῳ ὄρει*). Many interpreters have seen allusion in these words to Ps. civ. 32: "He *toucheth* the hills and they smoke;" and to the fact that, at the giving of the Law, God did descend upon mount Sinai, which "was altogether on a smoke, because the Lord descended upon it" (Exod. xix. 18). But, not to say that in such case we should expect a perfect, as in the following *κεκαυμένῳ*, still more decisively against this is the fact that *ψηλαφάω* is never used in the sense of so handling an object as

to exercise a moulding, modifying influence upon it, but only to indicate a feeling of its surface (Luke xxiv. 39; 1 John i. 1); often such a feeling as is made with the intention of learning its composition (Gen. xxvii. 12, 21, 22); while not seldom the word signifies no more than a feeling *for* or *after* an object, without any actual coming in contact with it at all. It is used continually to express a groping in the dark (Job v. 14), or of the blind (Isa. lix. 10; Gen. xxvii. 12; Deut. xxviii. 29; Judg. xvi. 26); and tropically, Acts xvii. 27; with which we may compare Plato, *Phæd.* 99 b: ψηλαφῶντες ὡσπερ ἐν σκότει. The ψηλαφώμενον ὄρος, in this passage, is beyond a doubt the ‘mons *palpabilis*.’ “Ye are not come,” the Apostle would say, “to any *material* mountain, like Sinai, capable, as such, of being touched and handled; not in this sense, to the mountain that may be *felt*, but to the heavenly Jerusalem,” to a νοητὸν ὄρος, and not to an αἰσθητόν.

The so handling of any object as to exert a modifying influence upon it, the French ‘manier,’ as distinguished from ‘toucher,’ the German ‘betasten,’ as distinguished from ‘berühren,’ would be either ἀπτεσθαι¹ or θιγγάνειν. Of these the first is stronger than the second; ἀπτεσθαι (= ‘con-

¹ In the passage alluded to already, Ps. civ. 32, the words of the Septuagint are, δ ἀπτόμενος τῶν ὀρέων, καὶ καπνίζονται.

trectare'), than *θιγγάνειν* (Ps. civ. 15; 1 John v. 18), as appears plainly in a passage of Xenophon (*Cyrop.* i. 3. 5), where the child Cyrus, rebuking his grandfather's delicacies, says: ὅτι σε ὀρώ, ὅταν μὲν τοῦ ἄρτου ἄψη, εἰς οὐδὲν τὴν χεῖρα ἀποψώμενον, ὅταν δὲ τούτων τινὸς θιγγῆς, εὐθὺς ἀποκαθαίρη τὴν χεῖρα εἰς τὰ χειρόμακτρα, ὡς πάνυ ἀχθόμενος. Our Version, then, has just reversed the true order of the words, when, at Col. ii. 21, it translates *μὴ ἄψη, μηδὲ γεύση, μηδὲ θίγγῆς*, "*Touch* not, taste not, *handle* not." The first and last prohibitions should, in our English, just have changed their places, and the passage should stand, "*Handle* not, taste not, *touch* not." How much more strongly will then come out the ever ascending scale of superstitious prohibition among the false teachers at Colosse. 'Handle not' is not sufficient; they forbid to 'taste' and, lastly, even to touch those things from which, according to their notions, uncleanness might be derived. Beza well: Verbum *θίγειν* a verbo *ἄπτεσθαι* sic est distinguendum, ut decrescente semper oratione intelligatur crescere superstitio.

§ xviii.—παλιγγενεσία, ἀνακαίνωσις.

'Αναγέννησις, a word frequent enough in the Greek Fathers (see Suicer, *Thes.* s. v.), no where occurs in the New Testament; although the verb ἀναγεννάω twice (1 Pet. i. 13, 23). Did we meet ἀναγέννησις there, it would furnish a still closer synonym to παλιγγενεσία than the ἀνακαίνωσις, which I propose to bring into comparison with it: yet that also is sufficiently close to justify the attempt at once to compare and distinguish them. It will be no small gain to the practical theologian, to the minister of God's word, to be clear in his own mind in respect of the relation between the two.

Παλιγγενεσία naturally demands first to be considered. This is one of the many words which the Gospel found, and, so to speak, glorified; enlarged the borders of its meaning; lifted it up into a higher sphere; made it the expression of far deeper thoughts, of far greater truths, than any of which it had been the vehicle before. It was, indeed, already in use; but, as the Christian new-birth was not till after Christ's birth; as men were not new-born, till Christ was born (John i. 12); as their regeneration did not go before, but only followed his generation; so the word could not be used in this

its highest, most mysterious sense, till that great mystery of the birth of the Son of God into our world had actually found place. And yet it is exceedingly interesting to trace these its subordinate, and, as they proved, preparatory uses. Thus, by the Pythagoreans, as is well known, the word was employed to express the transmigration of souls; their reappearance in new bodies being called *παλιγγενεσία*: Plutarch, *De Esu Car.* i. 7; ii. 6; *De Isid. et Osir.* c. 35: Ὀσίριδος αἱ ἀναβιώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσιαί: *De Ei ap. Delph.* 9: ἀποβιώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσιαί. Among the Stoics the word set forth the periodic renovation of the earth, when, budding and blossoming in the spring-time, it woke up from its winter sleep, nay, might be said even to have *revived* from its winter death: *Marc. Anton.* ii. 1: τὴν περιοδικὴν παλιγγενεσίαν τῶν ὄλων. Cicero (*Ad Attic.* vi. 6) calls his restoration to his dignities and honours, after his return from exile, ‘hanc παλιγγενεσίαν nostram;’ with which compare Philo, *Leg. ad Cai.* 41. Josephus (*Antt.* xi. 3. 9) characterises the restoration of the Jewish nation after the Captivity, as τὴν ἀνάκτησιν καὶ παλιγγενεσίαν τῆς πατρίδος. And, to cite one passage more, Olympiodorus, a later Platonist, styles memory a revival or παλιγγενεσία of knowledge (*Journal des Savans*, 1834, p. 488): παλιγγενεσία τῆς γνώσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ἀνάμνησις.

No one who has carefully watched and weighed the uses of *παλιγγενεσία* just adduced, and similar ones which might be added, but will note that while it has in them all the meaning of a recovery, a change for the better, a revival, yet it never reaches, or even approaches, the depth of meaning which it has acquired in Christian language, and which will now claim a little to be considered. The word occurs never in the Old Testament (*πάλιν γίνεσθαι* at Job xiv. 14), and only twice in the New (Matt xix. 28; Tit. iii. 5), but there (which is most remarkable) apparently in different meanings. In St. Matthew it seems plainly to refer to the new-birth of the whole creation, the *ἀποκατάστασις πάντων* (Acts iii. 21), which shall be when the Son of Man hereafter comes in his glory; while in St. Paul's use of the word the allusion is plainly to the new-birth of the single soul, which is now evermore finding place in the waters of baptism. Shall we then acquiesce in the conclusion that it is used in diverse meanings; that there is no common bond which binds the two uses of it together? By no means; all laws of language are violated by any such supposition. The fact is, rather, that the word by our Lord is used in a wider, by his Apostle in a narrower meaning. They are two circles of meaning, one more comprehensive than the other, but their centre is the same. The *παλιγγενεσία* of which

Scripture speaks, begins with the *μικρόκοσμος* of single souls; but it does not end there; it does not cease its effectual working till it has embraced the whole *μακρόκοσμος* of the universe. The first seat of the *παλιγγενεσία* is the soul of man; but, beginning there, and establishing its centre there, it extends in ever widening circles. And, first, to his body; the day of resurrection will be the day of *παλιγγενεσία* for it; so that those Fathers had a certain, though only a partial, right, as many as interpreted the word at Matt. xix. 28, as though it had been equivalent, and only equivalent, to *ἀνάστασις*, and who, as a consequence, themselves continually used it as a synonym for ‘resurrection’ (Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* v. 1. 58; Suicer, *Thes.* s. v.). Doubtless the word there includes, or presupposes, the resurrection, but it also embraces much more. Beyond the day of resurrection, or it may be contemporaneous with it, a day will come, when all nature shall put off its soiled work-day garments, and clothe itself in its holy-day attire, the day of the “restitution of all things” (Acts iii. 21); of the new heaven and the new earth (Rev. xxi. 1); the day of which Paul speaks, as one in expectation of which all creation is groaning and travailing until now (Rom. viii. 21—23). Man is the present subject of the *παλιγγενεσία*, and of the wondrous transformation which it implies; but in that day it will have in-

cluded within its limits the whole world, of which man is the central figure : and here is the reconciliation of the two passages, in one of which it is spoken of as pertaining to the single soul, in the other to the whole redeemed creation. They allude both to the same fact, but in different epochs and stages of its development.

But now to consider *ἀνακαίνωσις*, the relation in which it stands to *παλιγγενεσία*, and the exact limits of the meaning of each. This word, which is peculiar to the Greek of the New Testament, occurs there also only twice—once in connexion with *παλιγγενεσία* (Tit. iii. 5), and again Rom. xii. 2 ; but we have the verb *ἀνακαινόω*, which also is an exclusively New Testament form, at 2 Cor. iv. 16 ; Col. iii. 10 ; and the more classical *ἀνακαινίζω*, Heb. vi. 6, from which the nouns, frequent in the Greek Fathers, *ἀνακαινισμός* and *ἀνακαίνισις*, are more immediately drawn ; we have also *ἀνανεόω* (Eph. iv. 23) ; all in the same uses. It would be impossible better to express the relation in which the two stand to each other, than has been already done in our Collect for Christmas day, in which we pray “that we being regenerate,” in other words, having been already made the subjects of the *παλιγγενεσία*, “may daily be renewed by the Holy Spirit,”—may continually know the *ἀνακαίνωσις Πνεύματος Ἁγίου*. In this Collect, uttering, as so many others of them

do, profound theological truth in its most accurate forms, the 'regeneration' is spoken of as past, as having found place once for all, while the 'renewal' or 'renovation' is that which ought now to be daily proceeding—this *ἀνακαίνωσις* being that gradual restoration of the Divine image, which is going forward in him who, through the new birth, has come under the transforming¹ powers of the world to come. It is called "*the renewal of the Holy Ghost,*" inasmuch as He is the 'causa efficiens' by whom alone this renewal, this putting on of the new man, is carried forward.

We see then, of the two, that they are indissolubly bound together—that the second is the following up, the consequence, the completion of the first; yet, for all this, that they are not to be confounded. The *παλιγγενεσία* is that great free act of God's mercy and power, whereby He causes the sinner to pass out of the kingdom of darkness into that of light, out of death into life; it is the *ἄνωθεν γεννηθῆναι* of John iii. 3; the *γεννηθῆναι ἐκ Θεοῦ* of 1 John v. 4, sometimes called, therefore, *θεογενεσία*

¹ *Μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός*, Rom. xii. 2. The striking words of Seneca, *Ep.* 6, *Intelligo me emendari non tantum, sed transfigurari*, are far too big to express any benefits which he could have gotten from his books of philosophy; they reach out after blessings to be obtained, not in the schools of men, but only in the Church of the living God.

by Greek theologians ; the *γεννηθῆναι ἐκ σπορας ἀφθάρτου* of 1 Pet. i. 23. In it,—not in the preparations for it, but in the act itself,—the subject of it is passive, even as the child has nothing to do with its own birth. But it is very different as respects the *ἀνακαίνωσις*. This is the gradual conforming of the man more and more to that new spiritual world into which he has been introduced, and in which he now lives and moves ; the restitution of the Divine image ; and in all this, so far from being passive, he must be a fellow-worker with God. That was ‘regeneratio,’ this is ‘renovatio.’ They must not be separated, but neither may they be confounded.¹ What infinite confusions, conflicts, scandals, obscurations of God’s truth on this side and on that, have arisen from the one course as from the other.

§ xix.—*αἰσχύνη, αἰδώς.*

THERE was a time when the Greek language possessed only the word *αἰδώς* ; which then occupied the two regions of meaning afterward divided be-

¹ Gerhard (*Loc. Theoll.* xxi. 7. 113) : Renovatio, licet a regeneratione proprie et specialiter acceptâ distinguatur, individuo tamen et perpetuo nexu cum eâ est conjuncta.

tween it and *αἰσχύνη*. *Αἰδώς* had at that time the same duplicity of meaning as is latent in the Latin ‘pudor,’ in our own ‘shame.’ Thus in Homer *αἰσχύνη* never occurs, while sometimes, as *Il.* v. 787, *αἰδώς* is used on occasions when *αἰσχύνη* would, in later Greek, have necessarily been employed: elsewhere Homer employs *αἰδώς* in that sense which, at a later period, it vindicated as exclusively its own. And even Thucydides (i. 84), in a difficult and doubtful passage where both words occur, is by many considered to have employed them as equipollent and convertible. Generally, however, in the Attic period of the language, the words were not accounted synonymous. Ammonius formally distinguishes them in a philological, as the Stoics in an ethical, interest; and almost every passage in which either word occurs is an evidence of the real difference existing between them. Yet the distinction has not always been quite successfully seized.

Thus it has been sometimes said that *αἰδώς* is the *shame* which hinders one from doing a dishonourable thing; *αἰσχύνη* is the *disgrace*, outward or inward, which follows on having done it (Luke xiv. 9). This distinction, while it has its truth, is yet not an exhaustive one; and if we were thereupon to assume that *αἰσχύνη* was thus only retrospective, the consequence of things unworthily done, it would

be an erroneous one;¹ for it would be abundantly easy to show that *αἰσχύνη* is continually used to express that feeling which leads to shun what is unworthy out of a prospective anticipation of dishonour. Thus one definition (Plat. *Def.* 416) makes it *φόβος ἐπὶ προσδοκίᾳ ἀδοξίας*: and Aristotle includes the future in his comprehensive definition (*Rhet.* ii. 6): ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη, λύπη τις καὶ παραχῆ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων, ἢ γεγονότων, ἢ μελλόντων. In this sense as ‘fuga dedecoris’ it is used *Ecclus.* iv. 21; by Plato, *Gorg.* 492 *a*; by Xenophon, *Anab.* iii. 1. 10. In this last passage, which runs thus, φοβούμενοι δὲ τὸν ὄδον καὶ ἄκοντες ὅμως οἱ πολλοὶ δι’ αἰσχύνην καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ Κύρου συνηκολούθησαν, Xenophon implies that while he and others, for more reasons than one, disapproved the going forward with Cyrus to assail his brother’s throne, they yet were now ashamed to draw back.

This much of truth the distinction drawn above possesses, that *αἰδώς* (= ‘verecundia,’ see Cicero, *Rep.* v. 4) is the nobler word and implies the nobler motive: in it is implied an innate moral repugnance

¹ There is the same onesidedness, though exactly on the other side, in Cicero’s definition of ‘pudor,’ which he makes merely prospective: Pudor metus rerum turpium, et ingenua quædam timiditas, dedecus fugiens, laudemque consectans; but Ovid writes,

Irruit, et nostrum vulgat clamore pudorem.

to the doing of the dishonourable act, which moral repugnance scarcely or at all exists in the *αἰσχύνη*. Insure the man restrained only by *αἰσχύνη* against the outward disgrace which he fears may accompany or follow his act, and he will refrain from it no longer. It is only, as Aristotle teaches, *περὶ ἄδοξίας φαντασία*: its seat, therefore, as he goes on to show, is not properly in the moral sense of him that entertains it, in his consciousness of a right which has been, or would be, violated by his act, but only in his apprehension of other persons who are, or might be, privy to its violation. Let this apprehension be removed, and the *αἰσχύνη* ceases; while *αἰδώς* finds its motive in its own moral being, and not in any other; it implies reverence for the good as good, and not merely as that to which honour and reputation are attached. Thus it is often connected with *εὐλάβεια* (Heb. xii. 28), the reverence before God, before His majesty, His holiness, which will induce a carefulness not to offend, the German ‘Scheu;’ so Plutarch, *Cæs.* 14; *Conj. Præc.* 47; Philo, *Leg. ad Cai.* 44; often also with *δέος*, as Plato, *Euth.* 126 c; with *εὐκοσμία*, Xenophon, *Cyrop.* viii. 1. 33; with *εὐταξία* and *κοσμιότης*, Plutarch, *Cæs.* 4; with *σεμνότης*, *Conj. Præc.* 26. To sum up all, we may say that *αἰδώς* would always restrain a good man from an unworthy act, while *αἰσχύνη* would sometimes restrain a bad one.

§ XX.—*αἰδώς, σωφροσύνη.*

THESE words occur together at 1 Tim. ii. 9; the only other places where *σωφροσύνη* occurs being Acts xxvi. 25; and 1 Tim. ii. 15, where *αἰδώς* and *σωφροσύνη* are urged by the Apostle as together constituting the truest adornment of a Christian woman. If the distinction drawn in § 19 be correct, this one, which Xenophon, (*Cyrop.* viii. 1. 31) ascribes to Cyrus, between the words now under consideration, can hardly be allowed to stand: *διήρει δὲ αἰδῶ καὶ σωφροσύνην τῆδε, ὡς τοὺς μὲν αἰδομένους τὰ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ αἰσχρὰ φεύγοντας, τοὺς δὲ σόφρονας καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεί.* On neither side is it successful, for as on the one hand the *αἰδώς* does not shun merely open and manifest basenesses, however the *αἰσχύνη* may do this, so, on the other side, the point of the *σωφροσύνη* is altogether different from that here made, which, though true, is yet a mere accident of it. The opposite of *ἀκολασία* (Thucydides, iii. 37), it is properly the state of an entire command over our passions and desires, so that they receive no further allowance than that which the law and right reason admit and approve; Plato, *Symp.* 196 c: *εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν:* and in the

Charmides he has dedicated a whole dialogue to the investigation of the exact force of the word. Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 9 : ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει : cf. Plutarch, *De Curios.* 14 ; *De Virt. Mor.* 2 ; *Gryll.* 6 : ἡ μὲν οὖν σωφροσύνη βραχύτης τις ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τάξις, ἀναιροῦσα μὲν τὰς ἐπεισάκτους καὶ περιπτώας, καιρῶ δὲ καὶ μετριότητι κοσμοῦσα τὰς ἀναγκαίας : and Diogenes Laertius, iii. 57. 91. No single Latin word exactly represents it. Cicero, as he avows himself (*Tusc.* iii. 5 ; cf. v. 14), renders it now by 'temperantia,' now by 'moderatio,' now by 'modestia.' Σωφροσύνη was a virtue which assumed more marked prominence in heathen ethics than it does in Christian ; not because more value was attached to it there than with us ; but partly because it was there one of a much smaller company of virtues, each of which therefore would singly attract more attention ; but also in part because for as many as are "led by the Spirit," this condition of self-command is taken up and transformed into a condition yet higher still, in which a man does not command himself, which is well, but, which is far better still, is commanded by God.

In the passage already referred to (1 Tim. ii. 9), where it and αἰδώς occur together, we shall best distinguish them thus, and the distinction will be capable of further application. If αἰδώς is the

'shamefastness,'¹ or pudency, which shrinks from overpassing the limits of womanly reserve and modesty, as well as from the dishonour which would justly attach thereto, σωφροσύνη is that habitual inner self-government, with its constant rein on all the passions and desires, which would hinder the temptation to this from arising, or at all events from arising in such strength as should overbear the checks and hindrances which αἰδώς opposed to it.

¹ It is a pity that 'shamefast' and 'shamefastness,' by which last word our translators rendered σωφροσύνη here, should have been corrupted in modern use to 'shamefaced' and 'shamefacedness.' The words are properly of the same formation as 'steadfast,' 'steadfastness,' 'soothfast,' 'soothfastness,' and those good old English words, now lost to us, 'rootfast,' and 'rootfastness.' As by 'rootfast' our fathers understood that which was firm and *fast* by its *root*, so by 'shamefast' in like manner, that which was established and made *fast* by (an honourable) *shame*. To change this into 'shamefaced' is to allow all the meaning and force of the word to run to the surface, to leave us ethically a far inferior word. It is very inexcusable that all modern reprints of the Authorized Version should have given in to this corruption. So long as merely the spelling of a word is concerned, this may very well be allowed to fall in with modern use; we do not want them to print 'sonne' or 'marveile,' when every body now spells 'son' and 'marvel.' But when the true form, indeed the life, of a word is affected by the alterations which it has undergone, then I cannot but consider that subsequent editors were bound to adhere to the first edition of 1611, which should have been considered authoritative and exemplary for all that followed.

§ XXI.—σύρω, ἐλκύω.

THESE words differ, and with differences not theologically unimportant. We best represent these their differences in English when we render σύρειν, 'to drag,' ἐλκύειν, 'to draw.' In σύρειν, as in our 'drag,' there lies *always* the notion of force, as when Plutarch (*De Lib. Ed.* 8) speaks of the headlong course of a river, πάντα σύρων καὶ πάντα παραφέρων: and it will follow, that where persons, and not merely things, are in question, it will involve the notion of violence (Acts viii. 3; xiv. 19; xvii. 6). But in ἐλκύειν this notion of force or violence does not of necessity lie. That, indeed, such is often implied in it, is plain enough (Acts xvi. 19; xxi. 30; Jam. ii. 6; and cf. *Il.* xi. 258; xxiv. 52, 417; Aristophanes, *Equit.* 710; Euripides, *Troad.* 70: Αἰὼς εἴλκε Κασάνδραν βία); but not always, any more than in our 'draw,' which we use of a mental and moral attraction, or in the Latin 'traho,' as witness the language of the poet, Trahit sua quemque voluptas. Thus Plato, *Pol.* vi. 494 e: ἐὰν ἔλκεται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν.

Only by keeping in mind this difference which there is between ἐλκύειν and σύρειν, can we vindicate from erroneous interpretation two doctrinally

important passages in the Gospel of St. John. The first is xii. 32; "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, *will draw* all men unto me" (πάντας ἐλκύσω). But how does a crucified, and thus an exalted, Saviour draw all men unto Him? Not by force, for the will is incapable of force, but by the divine attractions of His love. Again He declares (vi. 44): "No man can come to Me, except the Father which hath sent Me *draw* him" (ἐλκύσῃ αὐτόν). Now as many as feel bound to deny any 'gratia irresistibilis,' which turns man into a mere machine, and by which, *nolens volens*, he is dragged to God, must at once allow that this ἐλκύσῃ can mean no more than the potent allurements of love, the attracting of men by the Father to the Son; as at Jeremiah xxxi. 3, "With loving-kindness have I drawn thee" (ἐἴλκυσά σε), with which compare Cant. i. 3. 4. Did we find σύρειν on either of these occasions (not that I believe this would have been possible), the assertors of a 'gratia irresistibilis'¹ might then urge the

¹ The excellent words of Augustine on this last passage, himself sometimes adduced as an upholder of this, may be here quoted (*In Ev. Joh. Tract. xxvi. 4*): Nemo venit ad me, nisi quem Pater adtraxerit. Noli te cogitare invitum trahi; trahitur animus et amore. Nec timere debemus ne ab hominibus qui verba perpendunt, et a rebus maxime divinis intelligendis longe remoti sunt, in hoc Scripturarum sanctarum evangelico verbo forsitan reprehendamus, et dicatur nobis, Quomodo voluntate, credo, si trahor? Ego dico: Parum est voluntate, etiam voluptate traheris. Porro si

passages as leaving no room for any other meaning but theirs ; but not as they now stand.

In agreement with this which has been said, in *ἐλκύειν* is much more predominantly the sense of a drawing to a certain point, in *σύρειν* merely of dragging after one ; thus Lucian (*De Merc. Cond.* 3), likening a man to a fish already hooked and dragged through the water, describes him as *συρόμενον καὶ πρὸς ἀνάγκην ἀγόμενον*. Not seldom there will lie in *σύρειν* the notion of this dragging being upon the ground, inasmuch as that will trail upon the ground (*σύρμα, σύρδην*) which is forcibly dragged along with no will of its own. A comparison of the uses of the two words at John xxi. 6, 8, 11, will be found entirely to bear out the distinction which has been here traced. In the first and last of these verses *ἐλκύειν* is used ; for they both express a *drawing* of the net to a certain point ; by the disciples to themselves in the ship, by Peter to himself upon the shore. But at ver. 8 *σύρειν* is employed ; for nothing is there intended but the *dragging* of the net which had been fastened to the ship, after it through the water. Our Ver-

poetæ dicere licuit, Trahit sua quemque voluptas ; non necessitas, sed voluptas ; non obligatio, sed delectatio ; quanto fortius nos dicere debemus, trahi hominem ad Christum, qui delectatur veritate, delectatur beatitudine, delectatur justitiâ, delectatur sempiternâ vitâ, quod totum Christus est ?

sion, it will be seen, has maintained the distinction; so too the German of De Wette, by aid of ‘ziehen’ (= ἐλκύνειν), and ‘nachschieben’ (= σύρειν), but neither the Vulgate, nor Beza, which both have forms of ‘traho’ throughout.

§ xxii.—ὀλόκληρος, τέλειος.

THESE words occur together, though their order is reversed, at Jam. i. 4, —“perfect and entire;” ὀλόκληρος only once besides (1 Thess. v. 23), and the substantive ὀλοκληρία, used however not in an ethical but a physical sense, also once, Acts iii. 16; cf. Isa. i. 6. ὀλόκληρος signifies first, as its derivation implies, that which retains all which was allotted to it at the first, which thus is whole and entire in all its parts, to which nothing necessary for its completeness is wanting. Thus unhewn stones, inasmuch as they have lost nothing in the process of shaping and polishing, are ὀλόκληροι (Deut. xxvii. 6; 1 Macc. iv. 47); so too perfect weeks are ἑβδομάδες ὀλόκληροι (Deut. xvi. 9); and in Lucian, *Philops.* 8, ἐν ὀλοκλήρῳ δέρματι, ‘in a whole skin.’ At the next step in the word’s use we find it employed to express that integrity of body, with nothing redundant, nothing deficient (Lev. xxi. 17—23), which

was required of the Levitical priests as a condition of their ministering at the altar, which was needful also in the sacrifices they offered. In both these senses Josephus uses it, *Antt.* iii. 12. 2; as continually Philo, with whom it is the standing word for this integrity of the priests and of the sacrifice, to the necessity of which he often recurs, seeing in it, and rightly, a mystical significance, and that these are *όλόκληροι θυσίαι όλοκλήρω Θεώ*: thus *De Vict.* 2; *De Vict. Off.* 1: *όλόκληρον και παντελώς μώμων άμέτοχον*: *De Agricult.* 29; *De Cherub.* 28; cf. Plato, *Legg.* 759 c. The word in the next step of its history resembles very much the 'integer' and 'integritas' of the Latins. Like these words, it was transferred from bodily to mental and moral entireness. The only approach to this use of *όλόκληρος* in the Septuagint is *Wisd.* xv. 3, *όλόκληρος δικαιοσύνη*; but in an interesting and important passage in the *Phædrus* of Plato (250 c), it is twice used to express the perfection of man before the fall; I mean, of course, the fall as Plato contemplated it; when men were as yet *όλόκληροι και άπαθείς κακών*, and to whom as such *όλόκληρα φάσματα* were vouchsafed, as contrasted with those weak partial glimpses of the Eternal Beauty, which is all whereof the greater part of men ever now catch sight; cf. his *Timæus*, 44 c. 'Όλόκληρος, then, is an epithet applied to a person or a thing that is 'omnibus nu-

meris absolutus;’ and the ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι, which at Jam. i. 4 follows it, must be taken as the epexegetis of the word.

Τέλειος is a word of various applications, but all of them referable to the τέλος, which is its ground. They in a natural sense are τέλειοι, who are adult, having reached the full limit of stature, strength, and mental power appointed to them, who have in these respects attained their τέλος, as distinguished from the νέοι or παῖδες, young men or boys; so Plato, *Legg.* 929 c. St. Paul, when he employs the word in an ethical sense, does it continually with this image of full completed growth, as contrasted with infancy and childhood, underlying his use, the τέλειοι being by him set over against the νήπιοι ἐν Χριστῷ (1 Cor. ii. 6; xiv. 20; Eph. iv. 13, 14; Phil. iii. 15; Heb. v. 14), being in fact the πατέρες of 1 John ii. 13, 14, as distinct from the νεανίσκοι and παιδιά. Nor is this application of the word to mark the religious growth and progress of men, confined to the Scripture. The Stoics opposed the τέλειος in philosophy to the προκόπτων, with which we may compare 1 Chron. xxv. 8, where the τέλειοι are set over against the μανθάνοντες. With the heathen, those also were called τέλειοι who had been initiated into the mysteries; the same thought being at work here as in the giving of the title τὸ τέλειον to the Lord’s Supper. This was so called,

because in it was the fulness of Christian privilege, because there was nothing beyond it; and the *τέλειοι* of heathen initiation had their name in like manner, because those mysteries into which they were now introduced were the latest and crowning mysteries of all.

It will be seen that there is a certain ambiguity in our word 'perfect,' which, indeed, it shares with *τέλειος* itself; this, namely, that they are both employed now in a relative, now in an absolute sense; for only out of this ambiguity could our Lord have said, "Be ye therefore *perfect* (*τέλειοι*), as your Heavenly Father is *perfect* (*τέλειος*), Matt. v. 48; cf. xix. 21. The Christian shall be 'perfect,' yet not in the sense in which some of the sects preach the doctrine of perfection, who, preaching it, either mean nothing which they could not have expressed by a word less liable to misunderstanding; or mean something which no man in this life shall attain, and which he who affirms he has attained is deceiving himself, or others, or both. He shall be 'perfect,' that is, seeking by the grace of God to be fully furnished and firmly established in the knowledge and practice of the things of God (Jam. iii. 2); not a babe in Christ to the end, "not always employed in the elements, and infant propositions and practices of religion, but doing noble actions, well skilled in the deepest mysteries of faith and holi-

ness.”¹ In this sense Paul claimed to be *τέλειος*, even while almost in the same breath he disclaimed the being *τετελειωμένος* (Phil. iii. 12, 15).

The distinction then is plain; the *τέλειος* has reached his moral *end*, that for which he was intended; namely, to be a man in Christ; (it is true indeed that, having reached this, other and higher ends open out before him, to have Christ formed in him more and more;) the *όλόκληρος* has preserved, or, having lost, has regained, his *completeness*. In the *όλόκληρος* no grace which ought to be in a Christian man is wanting; in the *τέλειος* no grace is merely in its weak imperfect beginnings, but all have reached a certain ripeness and maturity. *Όλοτελής*, which occurs once in the New Testament (1 Thess. v. 23; cf. Plutarch, *Plac. Phil.* v. 21), forms a certain connecting link between the two, holding on to *όλόκληρος* by its first half, to *τέλειος* by its second.

§ xxiii.—*στέφανος, διάδημα.*

THE fact that our English word ‘crown’ covers the meanings of both these words, must not lead us

¹ On the sense in which ‘perfection’ is demanded of the Christian, there is a discussion at large by J. Taylor, *Doctrine and Practice of Repentance*, i. 3. 40—56, from which these words in inverted commas are drawn.

to confound them. In German the first would often be translated 'Kranz,' and only the second 'Krone.' I indeed very much doubt whether anywhere in classical literature *στέφανος* is used of the kingly, or imperial crown. It is the crown of victory in the games, of civic worth, of military valour, of nuptial joy, of festal gladness—woven of oak, of ivy, of parsley, of myrtle, of olive,—or imitating in gold these leaves or others—of flowers, as of violets or roses (see Athenæus, xv. 9—33), but never, any more than 'corona' in Latin, the emblem and sign of royalty. The *διάδημα* was this (Xenophon, *Cyrop.* viii. 3. 13; Plutarch, *De Frat. Am.* 18), being properly a linen band or fillet, 'tænia' or 'fascia' (Curtius, iii. 3), encircling the brow; so that no language is more common than *περιτιθέναι διάδημα* to signify the assumption of royal dignity (Polybius, v. 57. 4; Josephus, *Antt.* xii. 10. 1), even as in Latin in like manner the 'diadema' is alone the 'insigne regium' (Tacitus, *Annal.* xv. 29).

A passage bringing out very clearly the distinction between the two words occurs in Plutarch, *Cæs.* 61. It is the well known occasion on which Antonius offers Cæsar the kingly crown, which is described as *διάδημα στεφάνῳ δάφνης περιπεπλεγμένον*: here the *στέφανος* is only the garland or laureate wreath, with which the true diadem was enwoven. Indeed, according to Cicero (*Phil.* ii. 34), Cæsar

was already 'coronatus' = ἑστεφανωμένος (this he would have been as consul), when the offer was made. Plutarch at the same place describes the statues of Cæsar to have been, by those who would have suggested his assumption of royalty, διαδήμασιν ἀναδεδεμένοι βασιλικοῖς. And it is out of the observance of this distinction that the passage in Suetonius (*Cæs.* 79), containing another version of the same incident, is to be explained. One places on his statue 'coronam lauream candidâ fasciâ præligatam;' on which the tribunes of the people command to be removed, not the 'corona,' but the 'fascia;' this being the diadem, and that in which alone the traitorous suggestion that he should be proclaimed king, was contained.

How accurately the words are discriminated in the Septuagint may be seen by comparing in the First Book of Maccabees, in which only *διάδημα* occurs with any frequency, the passages in which this word is employed (such as i. 9; vi. 15; viii. 14; xi. 13, 54; xii. 39; xiii. 32), and those where *στέφανος* appears (iv. 57; x. 29; xi. 35; xiii. 39: cf. 2 Macc. xiv. 4).

In respect of the New Testament, there can be, of course, no doubt that whenever St. Paul speaks of crowning, and of the crown, it is always the crown of the conqueror, and not of the king, which he has in his eye. The two passages, 1 Cor. ix. 24—

26; 2 Tim. ii. 5, place this beyond question; while the epithet *ἀμαράντινος* applied to the *στέφανος τῆς δόξης* (1 Pet. v. 4), leaves no doubt about St. Peter's allusion. If this is not so directly to the Greek games, yet still the contrast which he tacitly draws, is one between the wreaths of heaven which never fade, and the garlands of earth which lose their brightness and freshness so soon. At Jam. i. 12; Rev. ii. 10; iii. 11; iv. 4, it is more probable that a reference is not intended to these Greek games; the alienation from which as idolatrous and profane was so deep on the part of the Jews (Josephus, *Antt.* xv. 8. 1—4), and no doubt also of the Jewish members of the Church, that an image drawn from the rewards of these games would have been to them rather repulsive than attractive. Yet there also the *στέφανος*, or the *στέφανος τῆς ζωῆς*, is the emblem, not of royalty, but of highest joy and gladness, of glory and immortality.

We may feel the more confident that in these last passages from the Apocalypse St. John did not intend *kingly* crowns, from the circumstance that on three occasions, where beyond a doubt he does mean such, *διάδημα* is the word which he employs (Rev. xii. 3; xiii. 1 [cf. xvii. 9, 10, *αἱ ἑπτὰ κεφαλαὶ . . . βασιλεῖς ἑπτὰ εἰσιν*]; xix. 12). In this last verse it is fitly said of Him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, that “on His head were *many crowns*”

(*διαδήματα πολλά*); an expression which, with all its grandeur, we find it hard to realize, so long as we picture to our mind's eye such crowns as at the present monarchs wear, but intelligible at once when we contemplate them as diadems, that is, narrow fillets bound about the brow, such as *διαδήματα* will imply. These "many diadems" will then be the tokens of the many royalties—of earth, of heaven, and of hell (Phil. ii. 10)—which are his; royalties once usurped or assailed by the Great Red Dragon, the usurper of Christ's dignity and honour, described therefore with *his* seven diadems as well (xiii. 1), but now openly and for ever assumed by Him to whom they rightfully belong; just as, to compare earthly things with heavenly, we are told that when Ptolemy, king of Egypt, entered Antioch in triumph, he set two crowns (*διαδήματα*) on his head, the crown of Asia, and the crown of Egypt (1 Macc. xi. 13).

The only place where *στέφανος* might seem to be used of a kingly crown is Matt. xxvii. 29, with its parallels in the other Gospels, where the weaving of the crown of thorns (*στέφανος ἀκάνθινος*), and placing it on the Saviour's head, is evidently a part of that blasphemous caricature of royalty which the Roman soldiers enact. But woven of such materials as it was, probably of the *juncus marinus*, or of the *lycium spinosum*, it is evident

that *διάδημα* could not be applied to it; and the word, therefore, which was fittest in respect of the material whereof it was composed, takes place of that which would have been the fittest in respect of the purpose for which it was intended.

§ xxiv.—*πλεονεξία, φιλαργυρία.*

BETWEEN these two words the same distinction exists as between our ‘covetousness’ and ‘avarice,’ or as between the German ‘Habsucht’ and ‘Geiz.’ *Πλεονεξία* is the more active sin, *φιλαργυρία* the more passive: the first seeks rather to grasp what it has not, and in this way *to have more*; the second, to retain, and, by accumulating, to multiply that which it already has. The first, in its methods of acquiring, will be often bold and aggressive; even as it may, and often will be as free in scattering and squandering, as it was eager and unscrupulous in getting; ‘*rapti largitor*,’ as is well imagined in the *Sir Giles Overreach* of Massinger. Consistently with this we find *πλεονέκτης* joined with *ἄρπαξ* (1 Cor. v. 10); *πλεονεξία* with *βαρύτης* (Plutarch, *Arist.* 3); and in the plural, with *κλοπαί* (Mark vii. 22); with *ἀδικίαι* (Strabo, vii. 4. 6); with *φιλονεικίαι* (Plato, *Legg.* iii. 677 *b*); and the sin defined by

Theodoret: ἡ τοῦ πλείονος ἔφεσις, καὶ ἡ τῶν ου προσ-
ηκόντων ἀρπαγή. But, while it is thus with πλεο-
νεξία, φιλαργυρία on the other hand will be often
cautious and timid, and will not necessarily have
cast off the outward appearances of righteousness.
Thus, the Pharisees were φιλάργυροι (Luke xvi. 14);
this was not irreconcilable with the maintenance
of the outward shows of holiness, which the πλεο-
νεξία would evidently have been.

Cowley, in the delightful prose which he has
mixed up with his verse, draws this distinction
strongly and well (*Essay 7, Of Avarice*), though
Chaucer had done the same before him in his *Per-
sones Tale*: "There are," says Cowley, "two sorts
of avarice; the one is but of a bastard kind, and
that is the rapacious appetite for gain; not for its own
sake, but for the pleasure of refunding it immedi-
ately through all the channels of pride and luxury;
the other is the true kind, and properly so called,
which is a restless and unsatiable desire of riches,
not for any farther end or use, but only to hoard and
preserve, and perpetually increase them. The cov-
etous man of the first kind is like a greedy ostrich,
which devours any metal, but it is with an intent
to feed upon it, and, in effect, it makes a shift to
digest and excern it. The second is like the foolish
chough, which loves to steal money only to hide it."

There is another and more important point of

view, from which *πλεονεξία* may be regarded as the wider, larger term, the genus, of which *φιλαργυρία* is the species; this last being the love of money, while *πλεονεξία* is the drawing and snatching to himself, on the sinner's part, of the creature in every form and kind, as it lies out of and beyond himself; the 'indigentia' of Cicero: (*Indigentia est libido inexplibilis: Tusc. iv. 9. 21*). For this distinction between the words compare Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps. cxviii. 35, 36*; and Bengel's profound explanation of the fact, that, in the enumeration of sins, St. Paul so often unites *πλεονεξία* with sins of the flesh; as at 1 Cor. v. 11; Eph. v. 3, 5; Col. iii. 5: *Solet autem jungere cum impuritate πλεονεξίαν, nam homo extra Deum quærit pabulum in creaturâ materiali, vel per voluptatem, vel per avaritiam; bonum alienum ad se redigit. But, expressing much, Bengel has not expressed all. The connexion between these two provinces of sin is deeper, is more intimate still; and this is witnessed in the fact, that not merely is πλεονεξία, as covetousness, joined to sins of impurity, but the word is sometimes in Scripture, continually by the Greek Fathers (see Suicer, *Thes. s. v.*), employed to designate these sins themselves; even as the root out of which they alike grow, namely, the fierce and ever fiercer longing of the creature which has turned from God, to fill itself with the inferior objects of sense, is one*

and the same. Regarded thus, *πλεονεξία* has a much wider and deeper sense than *φιλαργυρία*. Take the sublime commentary on the word which Plato (*Gorg.* 493) supplies, where he likens the desire of man to the sieve or pierced vessel of the Danaids, which they were ever filling, but might never fill;¹ and it is not too much to say, that the whole longing of the creature, as it has itself abandoned God, and by a just retribution is abandoned by Him, to stay its hunger with the swines' husks, instead of the children's bread which it has left, is contained in this word.

§ XXV.—*βόσκω, ποιμαίνω.*

WHILE both these words are often employed in a figurative and spiritual sense in the Old Testament, as at 1 Chron. xii. 16; Ezek. xxxiv. 3; Ps. lxxvii. 72; Jer. xxiii. 2; and *ποιμαίνειν* often in the New; the only occasions in the latter, where *βόσκειν*

¹ It is evident that the same comparison had occurred to Shakespeare:

“The cloyed will,
That satiate yet unsatisfied desire,
That tub both fill'd and running.”

Cymbeline, Act i. Sc. 7.

is so used, are John xxi. 15, 17. There our Lord, giving to St. Peter his thrice repeated commission to feed his "lambs" (ver. 15), his "sheep" (ver. 16), and again his "sheep" (ver. 17), uses, on the first occasion, *βόσκει*, on the second, *ποιμαίνε*, and returns again to *βόσκει* on the third. This return, on the third and last repetition of the charge, to the word employed on the first, has been a strong argument with some for the indifference of the words. They have urged, and with a certain show of reason, that Christ could not have had *progressive aspects* of the pastoral work in His intention, nor have purposed to indicate them here, else He would not have come back in the end to *βόσκει*, the same word with which He began. Yet I cannot believe the variation of the words to have been without a motive, any more than the changes, in the same verses, from *ἀγαπᾶν* to *φιλεῖν*, from *ἀρνία* to *πρόβατα*. It is true that our Version, rendering *βόσκει* and *ποιμαίνε* alike by "Feed," has not attempted to reproduce the variation, any more than the Vulgate, which, on each occasion, has 'Pasce;' nor do I perceive any resources of language by which either the Latin Version or our own could have helped themselves here. It might be more possible in German, by aid of 'weiden' (= *βόσκειν*), and 'hüten' (= *ποιμαίνειν*); De Wette, however, has 'weiden' throughout.

The distinction, although thus not capable of being easily reproduced in all languages, is very far from fanciful, is indeed a most real one. *βόσκω*, the same word as the Latin ‘*pasco*,’ is simply ‘to feed:’ but *ποιμαίνω* involves much more; the whole office of the shepherd, the entire leading, guiding, guarding, folding of the flock, as well as the finding of nourishment for it; thus Lampe: Hoc symbolum totum regimen ecclesiasticum comprehendit; and Bengel: *βόσκειν* est pars τοῦ ποιμαίνειν. Out of a sense continually felt, of a shadowing forth in the shepherd’s work of the highest ministries of men for the weal of their fellows, and of the peculiar fitness which this image has to set forth the same, it has been often transferred to *their* office, who are, or should be, the faithful guides and guardians of the people committed to their charge. Kings, in Homer, are *ποιμένες λαῶν*: cf. 2 Sam. v. 2; vii. 7. Nay more, in Scripture God Himself is a Shepherd (Isa. xl. 11); and David can use no words which shall so well express his sense of the Divine protection as these: *Κύριος ποιμαίνει με* (Ps. xxiii. 1); nor does the Lord take anywhere a higher title than *ὁ ποιμὴν ὁ καλός* (John x. 11; cf. 1 Pet. v. 4, *ὁ ἀρχιποιμὴν*: Heb. xiii. 20, *ὁ μέγας ποιμὴν τῶν προβάτων*; nor give a higher than that implied in this word to his ministers. Compare the sublime passage in Philo, *De Agricul.* 12, beginning: *οὕτω*

μέντοι τὸ ποιμαίνειν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν, ὥστε οὐ βασιλεύσει μόνον καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι, καὶ ψυχαῖς τέλεια κεκαθαρμέναις, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεῷ τῷ πανηγερόνι δικαίως ἀνατίθεται: and also the three sections preceding.

Still, it may be asked, if ποιμαίνειν be thus the higher word, and if ποιμαίνε was therefore superadded upon βόσκει, because it was so, and implied so many further ministries of care and tendance, why does it not appear in the last, which must be also the most solemn, commission given by the Lord to Peter? how are we to account, if this be true, for his returning to βόσκει again? I cannot doubt that in Stanley's *Sermons and Essays on the Apostolical Age*, p. 138, the right answer is given. The lesson, in fact, which we learn from this His coming back to the βόσκει with which He had begun, is a most important one, and one which the Church, and all that bear rule in the Church, have need diligently to lay to heart; this namely, that whatever else of discipline and rule may be superadded thereto, still, the feeding of the flock, the finding for them of spiritual nourishment, is the first and last; nothing else will supply the room of this, nor may be allowed to put this out of its foremost and most important place. How often, in a false ecclesiastical system, the preaching of the word loses its pre-eminence; the βόσκειν falls into the background, is swallowed

up in the *ποιμαίνειν*, which presently becomes no true *ποιμαίνειν*, because it is not a *βόσκειν* as well, but such a 'shepherding' rather as God's Word, by the prophet Ezekiel, has denounced (xxxiv. 2, 3, 8, 10; cf. Zech. xiii. 15—17; Matt. xxiii.).

§ XXVI.—*ζήλος, φθόνος.*

THESE words are often joined together; they are so by St. Paul, Gal. v. 20, 21; by Clemens Romanus, 1 *Ep. ad Cor.* 3, 4, 5; and by classical writers as well; as, for instance, by Plato, *Phil.* 47 e; *Legg.* 679 c; *Mencæ.* 242 a. Still, there are differences between them; and this first, that *ζήλος* is a *μέσον*, being used sometimes in a good (as John ii. 17; Rom. x. 2; 2 Cor. ix. 2), sometimes, and in Scripture oftener, in an evil sense (as Acts v. 17; Rom. xiii. 13; Gal. v. 20; Jam. iii. 14); while *φθόνος* is not capable of a good, but is used always and only in an evil signification. When *ζήλος* is taken in good part, it signifies the honourable emulation, with the consequent imitation, of that which presents itself to the mind as excellent; *ζήλος τῶν ἀρίστων*, Lucian, *Adv. Indoct.* 17; *ζήλος καὶ μίμησις*, Herodian, ii. 4; *ζηλωτῆς καὶ μιμητῆς*, vi. 8. It is the Latin 'æmulation,' in which nothing of envy is of necessity in-

cluded, however it is possible that such may find place; the German 'Nacheiferung,' as distinguished from 'Eifersucht.' The verb 'æmulor,' as is well known, finely expresses the distinction of worthy and unworthy emulation, governing an accusative in cases where the first, a dative where the second, is intended.

By Aristotle (*Rhet.* ii. 11) ζήλος is employed exclusively in this nobler sense, to signify the active emulation which grieves, not that another has the good, but that itself has it not; and which, not stopping here, seeks to make the wanting its own, and in this respect is contrasted by him with envy: ἔστι ζήλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένη παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων, . . . οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλω, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῷ ἔστι· διὸ καὶ ἐπεικές ἐστὶν ὁ ζήλος, καὶ ἐπεικῶν· τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν, φαῦλον, καὶ φαύλων. Cf. Jerome, *Exp. in Gal.* v. 20: ζήλος et in bonam partem accipi potest, quum quis nititur ea quæ bona sunt æmulari. Invidia vero alienâ felicitate torquetur; and again, *In Gal.* iv. 17: Æmulantur bene, qui cum videant in aliquibus esse gratias, dona, virtutes, ipsi tales esse desiderant. Cæcumenius: ἔστι ζήλος κίνησις ψυχῆς ἐνθουσιώδης ἐπὶ τι, μετὰ τινος ἀφομοιώσεως τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἡ σπουδὴ ἔστι.

But it is only too easy for this zeal and honourable rivalry to degenerate into a meaner passion, a fact which is strikingly attested in the Latin word

‘simultas,’ connected, as Döderlein (*Lat. Synon.* vol. iii. p. 72) shows, not with ‘simulare,’ but with ‘simul;’ those who *together* aim at the same object being in danger not merely of being competitors, but enemies; just as ἄμιλλα, which however has kept its more honourable use (Plutarch, *Anim. an corp. app. p. 3*), is connected with ἄμα. These degeneracies which wait so near upon emulation, may assume two shapes; either that of a desire to make war upon the good which it beholds in another, and thus to trouble that good, and make it less; therefore we find ζήλος and ἔρις continually joined together (Rom. xiii. 13; 2 Cor. xii. 20; Gal. v. 20; Clem. Rom. 1 *Ep.* 3, 6); or, where there is not vigour and energy enough to attempt the *making* of it less, there may be at least the *wishing* of it less. And here is the point of contact which ζήλος has with φθόνος: thus Plato, *Menex.* 242 a: πρῶτον μὲν ζήλος, ἀπὸ ζήλου δὲ φθόνος: the latter being essentially passive, as the former is active and energetic. We do not find φθόνος in the comprehensive catalogue of sins at Mark vii. 21, 22; its place being there supplied by a circumlocution, ὀφθαλμὸς πονηρός, but one putting itself in connexion with the Latin ‘invidia,’ which is derived, as Cicero observes, ‘a nimis *intuendo* fortunam alterius;’ cf. Matt. xx. 15; and 1 Sam. xviii. 9: “Saul *eyed*,” *i. e.* envied “David.” Θθόνος is the meaner sin,

being merely displeasure at another's goods¹ (λύπη ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, as the Stoics defined it, Diogenes Laertius, vii. 63. 111), with the desire that these may be less; and this, quite apart from any hope that thereby its own will be more (Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 10). He that feels it, does not feel with it any impulse or longing to raise himself to the level of him whom he envies, but only to depress the other to his own.² When the victories of Miltiades would not suffer the youthful Themistocles to sleep (Plutarch, *Them.* 3), here was ζήλος, that is, in its nobler form, for it was such as prompted him to worthy actions, and would not let him rest till he had set a Salamis of his own against the Marathon of his great predecessor. But it was φθόνος which made that Athenian citizen to be weary of hearing Aristides evermore styled "The Just" (Plutarch, *Arist.* 7); and this his φθόνος contained no impulses moving him to strive for himself after the justice which he envied in another. See on this

¹ Augustine's definition of φθόνος (*Exp. in Gal.* v. 21) is not quite satisfactory: Invidia vero dolor animi est, cum indignus videtur aliquis assequi etiam quod non appetebas. This would rather be νέμεσις and νεμεσᾶν in the ethical terminology of Aristotle (*Ethic. Nic.* ii. 7. 15; *Rhet.* 2. 9).

² On the likenesses and differences between μῖσος and φθόνος, see Plutarch's graceful little essay, full of subtle analysis of the human heart, *De Invidiâ et Odio*.

subject further the beautiful remarks of Plutarch, *De Prof. Virt.* 14.

§ xxvii.—ζωή, βίος.

THE Latin language and the English are alike poorer than the Greek, in having but one word, the Latin ‘vita,’ the English ‘life,’ to express these two Greek. There would, indeed, be no comparative poverty here, if ζωή and βίος were merely duplicates; but, covering as they do very different spaces of meaning, it is certain that we, having but one word for them both, must use this one in very diverse senses; it is possible that by this equivocation we may, without being aware of it, conceal very real and important differences from ourselves; for, indeed, there is nothing so potent to do this as the equivocal use of a word.

The true antithesis of ζωή is θάνατος (Rom. viii. 38; 2 Cor. v. 4; cf. Jer. viii. 3; Sirac. xxx. 17; Plato, *Legg.* xii. 944 c), as of the verb ζῆν, ἀποθνήσκειν (Matt. xx. 38; 1 Tim. v. 6; Rev. i. 18; cf. *Il.* xxiii. 70; Herodotus, i. 31; Plato, *Phædo*, 71 d: οὐκ ἐναντίον φῆς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι); ζωή, in fact, being very nearly connected with ἄω, ἄημι, to breathe the breath of life, which is the necessary

condition of living, and, as such, is involved in like manner in *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*.

But, while *ζωή* is thus life *intensive* ('vita quâ vivimus'), *βίος* is life *extensive* ('vita quam vivimus'), the *period* or duration of life; and then, in a secondary sense, the *means* by which that life is sustained; and thirdly, the *manner* in which that life is spent. Examples of the use of *βίος* in all these senses the New Testament supplies. Thus it is used as —

α, the period or duration of life; 1 Pet. iv. 3, *χρόνος τοῦ βίου*: cf. Job. x. 20, *βίος τοῦ χρόνου*: Plutarch, *De Lib. Ed.* 17: *στιγμὴ χρόνου πᾶς ὁ βίος ἐστι*.

β, the means of life, or 'living,' *E. V.*; Mark xii. 44; Luke viii. 43; xv. 12; 1 John iii. 17, *τὸν βίον τοῦ κόσμου*: cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 486 *d*; *Legg.* 936 *c*; Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* ix. 23. 2; and often, but not always, these means of life, with an under sense of largeness and abundance.

γ, the manner of life; 1 Tim. ii. 2; so Plato, *Pol.* 344 *e*: *βίου διαγωγή*: and Plutarch very nobly (*De Is. et Os.* 1): *τοῦ δὲ γνώσκειν τὰ ὄντα, καὶ φρονεῖν ἀφαιρεθέντος, οὐ βίου ἀλλὰ χρόνον [οἶμαι] εἶναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν*: and *De Lib. Ed.* 7: *τεταγμένος βίος*: Josephus, *Antt.* v. 10. 1; with which compare Augustine (*De Trin.* xii. 11): *Cujus vitæ sit quisque; id est, quomodo agat hæc temporalia, quam vitam Græci non ζώην sed βίον vocant.*

From this last use of *βίος*, as the manner of life, there is often an ethical sense inhering in it, which, in classical Greek at least, *ζωή* does not possess. Thus Aristotle, according to Ammonius, could draw the following distinction between the words; *βίος ἐστὶ λογικὴ ζωή*: Ammonius himself affirming *βίος* to be never, except incorrectly, applied to the *existence* of plants or animals, but only to the *lives* of men.¹ I know not how he can reconcile this statement with such passages as these from Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* i. 1. 15; ix. 8. 1; unless, indeed, he would include him in his censure. Still, the distinction which he is here somewhat too absolutely asserting, must be acknowledged as a real one; it displays itself with great clearness in our words ‘zoology’ and ‘biography.’ We speak, on the one hand, of ‘zoology,’ for animals have the vital principle; they live, as well as men; and they are capable of being classed and described in relation to the different workings of this natural life of theirs; but, on the other hand, we speak of ‘biography;’ for men not merely *live*, but they *lead lives*, lives in which there is that moral distinction between one and another which may make them well worthy to be recorded. Out of this it will fol-

¹ See on this point, and generally on these two synonyms, Vömel, *Synon. Wörterbuch*, p. 168 sq.

low, that, while *θάνατος* and *ζωή* constitute, as was observed above, the true antithesis, yet they do so only so long as both are *physically* contemplated. So soon as a *moral* idea is introduced, the antithesis is not between *θάνατος* and *ζωή*, but *θάνατος* and *βίος*: thus Xenophon (*Resp. Laced.* 9. 1): τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ βίου. The two great chapters with which the *Gorgias* of Plato concludes (82, 83), are alone sufficient to bring plainly before the consciousness the full distinction between the words themselves, as also between those derived from them.

But this being the case, *βίος*, and not *ζωή*, being thus shown to be the ethical word in classical antiquity, a thoughtful reader of Scripture might very well inquire with something of perplexity, how it is to be explained that there all is reversed—*ζωή* being certainly in it the nobler word, belonging to the innermost circle of those terms whereby are expressed the highest gifts of God to his creatures; so that, while *βίος* has there no such noble use, but rather the contrary—for we find it in such associations as these, *ἡδοναὶ τοῦ βίου* (Luke viii. 14), *πραγματεῖαι τοῦ βίου* (2 Tim. ii. 4), *ἀλαζονεῖα τοῦ βίου* (1 John ii. 16)—*ζωή*, on the other hand, is continually used in the very noblest connexion; *στέφανος τῆς ζωῆς* (Rev. ii. 10), *βίβλος τῆς ζωῆς* (iii. 5), *ζωὴ καὶ εὐσέβεια* (2 Pet. 1. 3), *ζωὴ καὶ ἀφθαρσία* (2 Tim.

i. 10), *ζωὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Eph. iv. 18), *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* (Matt. xix. 16);¹ or it may be simply *ζωή* (Matt. vii. 14, and often), to express the highest blessedness of the creature.

A little reflection will supply the answer. Revealed religion, and it alone, puts death and sin in closest connexion, declares them the necessary correlatives one of the other (Gen. i.—iii.; Rom. v. 12), and, as an involved consequence, in like manner, life and holiness. It alone proclaims that, wherever there is death, it is there because sin was there first; wherever there is no death, that is, life, it is there because sin has never been there, or, having been once, is now cast out and expelled. In revealed religion, which thus makes death to have come into the world through sin, and only through sin, life is the correlative of holiness. Whatever truly lives, does so because sin has never found place in it, or, having found, has been expelled from it. So soon as ever this is felt and understood, *ζωή* at once assumes the profoundest moral significance; it becomes the fittest expression for the very highest blessedness. Of that whereof you predicate absolute *ζωή*, you predicate of the same absolute holiness. Christ affirming of Himself, *ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ ζωή*,

¹ *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* occurs once in the Septuagint (Dan. xii. 2; cf. *ζωὴ ἀένναος*, 2 Macc. vii. 36), and in Plutarch, *De Isid. et Os.* 1.

implicitly affirmed of Himself that He was absolute holiness ; and in the creature, in like manner, that only *lives*, or triumphs over death, death at once physical and spiritual, which has first triumphed over sin. No wonder, then, that Scripture should know of no higher word than ζωή to set forth either the blessedness of God, or the blessedness of the creature in communion with God.

From what has been said it will at once be perceived how erroneous is that exposition of Eph. iv. 18, which understands ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ, as “alienated from a *divine* life,” or, from a life lived according to the will and commandments of God (remoti a vitâ illâ quæ secundum Deum est: Grotius), ζωή having never, certainly never with St. Paul, this signification. The fact of such alienation was only too true ; but it is not what the Apostle is affirming. Rather he is there describing the miserable condition of the heathen, as of men estranged from God, the one fountain of life (παρὰ Σοὶ πηγὴ ζωῆς, Ps. xxxv. 10) ; as not having life, because separated from Him who alone absolutely lives (John v. 26), and in connexion with whom alone any creature has life. Gal. v. 22 is another passage, which we shall never rightly understand, which will always seem to contain a tautology, until we give to ζωή (and to the verb ζῆν as well), the force which has been claimed for it here.

§ xxviii.—κύριος, δεσπότης.

THE distinction which the later Greek grammarians sought to trace between these words was this; a man would be δεσπότης, as respects his slaves (Plato, *Legg.* 756 *e*), and therefore οἰκοδεσπότης, but κύριος in respect of his wife and children, who, in speaking either to him or of him, would use this title of honour; “as Sara obeyed Abraham, calling him *lord*” (κύριον αὐτὸν καλοῦσα, 1 Pet. iii. 6; cf. 1 Sam. i. 8; and Plutarch, *De Virt. Mul.* s. vv. Μίκα καὶ Μεγιστώ). There is a certain truth in this distinction. Undoubtedly there does lie in κύριος the sense of an authority owning limitations, — moral limitations it may be — and the word implies that the user will not exclude, in its use, their good over whom it is exercised; while in δεσπότης is implied a more unrestricted power and absolute domination, confessing no such limitations or restraints. He who addresses another as δέσποτα, puts a far greater emphasis of submission into his speech than if he had addressed him as κύριε. It was out of a feeling of this that the free Greeks refused this title of δεσπότης to any but the gods (Euripides, *Hippol.* 88: ἄναξ, θεοὺς γὰρ δεσπότας καλεῖν χρεών); and the sense of this distinction of theirs we have

retained in our use of 'despot,' 'despotic,' 'despotism,' as set over against our use of 'lord,' 'lordship,' and the like; the 'despot' is one who exercises not only dominion, but domination.

Still, there were influences at work, whose tendency was to break down any such distinction as this. Slavery, however legalized, is so abhorrent to men's inborn sense of right, that they seek to mitigate, in word at least, if not in fact, the atrocity of it; and thus, as no southern Planter at the present day willingly speaks of his "slaves," but prefers some other term, so in antiquity, as far as any gentler or more humane view of slavery obtained, and it was not merely contemplated in the aspect of one man's unlimited power over another, the antithesis of δεσπότης and δοῦλος would continually give place to that of κύριος and δοῦλος. The harsher antagonism would still survive, but the milder would prevail side by side with it. So practically we find it; one language is used as freely as the other; and often in the same sentence both terms are employed (Philo, *Quod Omn. Prob. Lib.* 6). We need not look further than to the writings of St. Paul, to see how little, in popular speech, the distinction of the Greek synonymists was observed. Masters are now κύριοι (Eph. vi. 9; Col. iv. 1), and now δεσπότηται (1 Tim. vi. 1, 2; Tit. ii. 9; cf. 1 Pet. ii. 18), with him.

But, while all experience shows how little sinful man can be trusted with absolute unrestricted power over his fellow, how certain he is to abuse it—a moral fact attested in our use of ‘despot’ as equivalent with ‘tyrant,’ as well as in the history of the word ‘tyrant’ itself—it can only be a blessedness for man to think of God as the absolute Lord, Ruler, and Disposer of his life; since with Him power is never disconnected from wisdom and from love: and, as we saw that the Greeks, not without a certain sense of this, were well pleased to style the gods *δεσπόται*, however they might refuse this title to any other; so, within the limits of Revelation, we find *δεσπότης*, no less than *κύριος*, applied to the true God. In the Old Testament, ‘Adonai’ is occasionally rendered by the two words joined together; as at Gen. xv. 2, 8; Jer. i. 6; iv. 10. No doubt *δεσπότης* realized to their minds who used it, even more than *κύριος*, the sense of God’s absolute disposal of His creatures, His autocratic power; and that when He worked, none could let Him. That it did so present itself to Greek ears is plain from a passage in Philo (*Quis Rer. Div. Hær.* 6), where he finds an evidence of Abraham’s *εὐλάβεια*, of his tempering, on one great occasion, boldness with reverence and godly fear, in the fact that in his approaches to God he leaves the more usual *κύριε*, and instead of it adopts the *δεσπότα*, in which there was

implied a more entire prostration of self, an ampler recognition of the omnipotence of God. The passages in the New Testament where God is styled *δεσπότης* are these which follow: Luke ii. 29; Acts iv. 24; Rev. vi. 10; 2 Pet. ii. 1; Jude 5. In the two last it is to Christ, but to Christ as God, that the title is ascribed. Erasmus, indeed, with that latent Arianism, of which, perhaps, he was scarcely conscious to himself, denies that in the words of Jude *δεσπότην* is to be referred to Christ; giving only *κύριον* to Him, and *δεσπότην* to the Father. The fact that in the Greek text, as he read it, *Θεόν* followed and was joined to *δεσπότην*, no doubt really lay at the root of his reluctance to ascribe the title of *δεσπότης* to Christ. It was with him not a philological, but a theological difficulty, however he may have sought to persuade himself otherwise.

§ XXIX.—*ἀλαζών, ὑπερήφανος, ὑβριστής.*

THESE words, which occur all three of them together at Rom. i. 30, and the first two at 2 Tim. iii. 2, offer an interesting subject for synonymous discrimination. We shall find them, I think, not to speak of other differences, constituting a regular sequence in this respect, that the *ἀλαζών* is boastful

in *words*, the *ὑπερήφανος* proud in *thoughts*, the *ὑβριστής* insolent and injurious in *acts*.

And first, as respects *ἀλαζών*. This word occurs in the New Testament only at the two places already referred to; *ἀλαζονεία* also twice, Jam. iv. 16; 1 John ii. 16. Derived from *ἄλλη*, ‘a wandering about,’ it was applied first to vagabond mountebanks, conjurers, and exorcists (Acts xix. 13; 1 Tim. v. 13), who were full of empty and boastful professions of feats which they could accomplish; being from them transferred to any braggart or boaster, vaunting himself to be in possession of skill, or knowledge, or courage, or virtue, or riches, or whatever else it might be, which had no existence in fact. Thus Plato defines *ἀλαζονεία* to be *ἕξις προσποιητικὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων*: and Xenophon (*Cyrop.* ii. 2. 12) describes the *ἀλαζών* thus: *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζῶν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κείσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἢ εἰσι, καὶ ἀνδρειοτέροις, καὶ ποιήσειν, ἃ μὴ ἱκανοὶ εἰσι, ὑπισχνουμένοις· καὶ ταῦτα, φανεροῖς γιγνομένοις, ὅτι τοῦ λαβεῖν τι ἔνεκα καὶ κερδᾶναι ποιούσιν*: and Aristotle (*Ethic. Nic.* iv. 7. 2): *δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζῶν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει*.

It is not an accident, but of the essence of the *ἀλαζών*, that in his boastings he overpasses the limits of the truth (Wisd. ii. 16,) as appears plainly from

that whole passage in Aristotle, who nowhere describes him as merely making unseemly display of things which he actually possesses, but as vaunting of those which he does not possess; cf. *Rhet.* ii. 6: τὸ τὰ ἀλλότρια αὐτοῦ φάσκειν, ἀλαζονείας σημεῖον: and Xenophon, *Memor.* i. 7. Thus, too, Plato (*Pol.* 560 c) joins ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι; and we have a lively description of the ἀλαζών in the *Characters* (23) of Theophrastus; and still better, of the shifts and evasions to which he has recourse, in the work, *Ad Herenn.* iv. 50, 51. While, therefore, ‘braggart’ or ‘boaster’ fairly represents ἀλαζών, ‘ostentation’ does not well give back ἀλαζονεία, seeing that a man can only be ostentatious in that which he really has to show; we have, in fact, no word which renders it at all so adequately as the German ‘Prahlerci.’ Thus, Falstaff and Parolles are both excellent, though infinitely diverse, examples of the ἀλαζών: while, on the contrary, Marlowe’s Tamburlaine, despite of all the big vaunting words which he utters, is no such, inasmuch as there are fearful realities of power with which these his μεγάλης γλώσσης κόμπου are sustained and borne out. This dealing in braggadocia is a vice sometimes ascribed to whole nations; thus, an ἔμφυτος ἀλαζονεία was charged on the Ætolians of old, and, in modern times, on the Gascons, who out of this have given us the word ‘gasconade.’ The Vulgate, which

translates ἀλαζόνες, 'elati,' and which the Rhemish follows, 'haughty,' has not seized the middle point of the word as successfully as Beza, who has rendered it 'gloriosi.'¹

A distinction has been sometimes drawn between the ἀλαζών and the πέρπερος [ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ περπερεύεται, 1 Cor. xiii. 4], that the first vaunts of things which he does not possess, the second, of things which,—however little this his boasting and bravery about them may become him,—he actually has. The distinction, however, is not one that can be maintained (Polybius, xxxii. 6. 5; xl. 6. 2); both are liars alike.

But this habitual boasting of one's own, will hardly fail to be accompanied with a contempt for that of others. If it did not find, it would rapidly generate, such a feeling; and thus ἀλαζονεία is nearly allied to ὑπεροψία: we find them not seldom used as almost convertible terms; thus see Philo, *De Carit.* 22—24. But from ὑπεροψία to ὑπερηφανία the step is very near; and thus we need not wonder

¹ We formerly used 'glorious' in this sense. Thus, in North's *Plutarch*, p. 183: "Some took this for a *glorious* brag; others thought he [Alcibiades] was like enough to have done it." And Milton (*The Reason of Church Government*, i. 5): "He [Anselm] little dreamt then that the weeding hook of Reformation would, after two ages, pluck up his *glorious* poppy [prelacy] from insulting over the good corn [presbytery]."

to meet *ὑπερήφανος* joined with *ἀλαζών*. This word occurs three times, besides the two occasions noted already; at Luke i. 51; Jam. iv. 6; 1 Pet. v. 5; *ὑπερηφάνια* once, Mark vii. 22. A picturesque image serves for its basis, being, of course, derived from *ὑπέρ*, and *φαίνομαι*, one who *shows himself above* his fellows, exactly as the Latin ‘superbus’ is from ‘super;’ as our ‘stilts’ is connected with ‘Stolz,’ and with ‘stout’ in its earlier sense of ‘proud,’ or ‘lifted up.’ Deyling, *Obs. Sac.* vol. v. p. 219: Quæ vox proprie notat hominem capite super alios eminentem, ita ut quemadmodum Saul, præ ceteris, sit conspicuus, 1 Sam. ix. 2. Figurata est is qui ubique eminere, et aliis præferri cupit.

A man can be actually *ἀλαζών* only when he is in company with his fellow men; but the seat of the *ὑπερηφάνια* is the mind. He that is sick of this sin, compares himself secretly *with* others, and lifts himself *above* others, in honour preferring himself. His sin, as Theophrastus (*Charact.* 34) describes it, is the *καταφρόνησις τις πλὴν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων*. His conduct to others is not of the essence of his sin, it is only the consequence. His ‘arrogance,’ as we say, his claiming to himself of honour and observance, his indignation, and, it may be, his cruelty and revenge, if these are withheld, are only the result of this false estimate of himself. In this way *ὑπερήφανοι καὶ βαρεῖς* (Plutarch, *Qu. Rom.* 63) are joined

together. In the *ὑπερήφανος* we have the perversion of a much nobler character than in the *ἀλαζών*, the melancholic, as the *ἀλαζών* is the sanguine, the *ὑβριστής* the choleric, temperament; but because nobler, therefore one which, if it falls, falls more deeply, sins more fearfully. He is one, in the striking language of Scripture, “whose heart is lifted up,” *ὑψηλοκάρδιος* (Prov. xvi. 5); he is one of those *τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονοῦντες* (Rom. xii. 16), as opposed to the *ταπεινοὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ*; and this lifting up of his heart may be not merely against man, but against God; he may assail the very prerogatives of Deity itself (1 Macc. i. 21, 24; Wisd. xiv. 6: *ὑπερήφανοι γιγάντες*). Therefore are we thrice told, in the very same words, that “God resisteth the proud” (*ὑπερηφάνοις ἀντιπάσσειται*: Jam. iv. 6; 1 Pet. v. 5; Prov. iii. 34); sets Himself in battle array against them, as they against Him.

We have now to speak of *ὑβριστής*, which, by its derivation from *ὑβρις*, (which is, again, from *ὑπερ*, as we should say, ‘uppishness,’) stands in a certain etymological relation with *ὑπερήφανος* (see Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, pp. 517—519). The word occurs only twice; Rom. i. 30, where we have translated it, ‘despiteful;’ and 1 Tim. i. 13, where we have rendered it, ‘injurious.’ In the Septuagint often; and at Job xl. 6, 7; Isa. ii. 12, in connexion with *ὑπερήφανος*: as the two, in like manner, are cou-

nected by Aristotle (*Rhet.* ii. 16). Other words with which it is associated, are ἄγριος (Homer, *Od.* vi. 120); ἀτάσθαλος (*Ib.* xxiv. 282); ἄδικος (Plato, *Legg.* i. 630 *b*); ὑπερόπτης (Aristotle, *Ethic. Nic.* vi. 3. 21). The ὑβριστής is contumelious; his insolence and contempt of others break forth in *acts* of wantonness and outrage. Thus, when Hanun, king of Ammon, cut short the garments of king David's ambassadors, and shaved off half their beards, and so sent them back (2 Sam. x.), this was ὑβρις. St. Paul declares that, in the time when he persecuted the Church, he was ὑβριστής (1 Tim. i. 13; cf. Acts viii. 3), but that he was himself ὑβρισθεὶς (1 Thess. ii. 2) at Philippi (Acts xvi. 22, 23). Our blessed Lord, when He is prophesying the order of His Passion, declares that the Son of Man ὑβρισθήσεται (Luke xviii. 32), as we have later the account of the ὑβρις which He actually underwent at the hands of the Roman soldiery (Matt. xxvii. 27—30). The whole blasphemous masquerade of royalty, in which it was sought that He should sustain the chief part, was such. Tacitus, describing the deaths of the Christians in Nero's persecution, adds (*Annal.* xv. 44): Pereuntibus addita ludibria; they died, he would say, μεθ' ὑβρεως: the same applies to York, when, in Shakspeare's *Henry VI.*, the paper crown is set upon his head, before Margaret and Clifford stab him.

Cruelty and lust are the two great spheres in which ὕβρις will display itself; or rather not two; —for they are one and the same sin, and when Milton wrote, “lust hard by hate,” saying much, he yet did not say all; —but the two forms in which it will mainly display itself; and, out of a sense that the latter belongs to it quite as much as the former, Josephus (*Antt.* i. 11. 1) characterizes the men of Sodom as being ὕβρισται to men, no less than ἀσεβεῖς to God. He applies exactly the same phrase on a later occasion (*Antt.* v. 10. 1) to the sons of Eli; indicating on each occasion presently after, that by this ὕβρις which he charged on those and these, he intended an assault on the chastity of others; cf. Plutarch, *Demet.* 24; Lucian, *Dial. Deor.* vi. 1; and the article “Ἵβρεως δίκη in Pauly’s *Encyclopädie*. The true antithesis to ὕβριστής is σῶφρων (Xenophon, *Apol. Soc.* 19; *Ages.* x. 2).

The three words, then, are very broadly distinguishable from one another, have very different provinces of meaning severally belonging to each, and present to us an ascending scale of guilt, such as I sought to seize at the first, when I observed, that the three severally expressed a sin in word, in thought, and in deed.

§ XXX.—ἀντίχριστος, ψευδόχριστος.

THE word ἀντίχριστος is peculiar to the Epistles of St. John, occurring five times in them; 1 Ep. ii. 18, bis; ii. 22; iv. 3; 2 Ep. 7; and no where besides. But, although St. John only has the word, St. Paul has, in common with him, a designation of the person of this great adversary, and of the marks by which he shall be recognized; for there can be no doubt that the ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἁμαρτίας, the υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας, the ἄνομος of 2 Thess. ii. 3, 8, are all of them other designations of the same person (see Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xx. 19. 2); and, indeed, to St. Paul and to that passage in his writings we are indebted for our fullest instruction concerning this great enemy of Christ and of God. Passing by, as not relevant to our purpose, many of the discussions to which the mysterious announcement of such a coming foe has naturally given rise, as, for instance, whether we are to understand by the Antichrist a single person or a line of persons, a person or a system, there is only one of these questions which has a right to occupy us here; namely, what the force is of ἀντί in this composition; does ἀντίχριστος imply one who sets himself up *against* Christ, or one who sets himself up *in the*

stead of Christ? Is he an open foe, who seeks violently to usurp his seat; or a false friend, that professes to hold it in his name?

There is no settling this matter off-hand, as some are in so great a hurry to do; seeing that *ἀντί*, in composition, has both these forces. It is used often in the sense of *substitution*; thus, *ἀντιβασιλεύς*, he who is instead of the king, ‘prorex,’ ‘viceroy;’ *ἀνθύπατος*, he who is instead of the consul, ‘proconsul;’ *ἀντίδειπνος*, he who fills the place at a feast of an absent guest; *ἀντίλυτρον*, the ransom paid instead of a person. Then, secondly, there is in *ἀντί* often the sense of *opposition*, as in *ἀντίθεσις*, *ἀντιλογία*, *ἀντικείμενος*: and still more to the point, more exact parallels to *ἀντίχριστος*, as expressing not merely the fact of opposition, but, in the latter half of the word, the very object against which the opposition is directed, *ἀντινομία* (see Suicer, *Thes.* s. v.), opposition to law; *ἀντίχειρ*, the thumb, as set over against the hand; *ἀντήλιος*, lying over against, and so exposed to, the sun; *Ἀντικάτων*, the title which Cæsar gave to a book which he wrote against Cato; *ἀντίθεος*,—not indeed in Homer, where it is applied to Polyphemus (*Od.* i. 70), and to the suitors (xiv. 18), and must mean ‘godlike,’ that is, in strength and power;—but yet, in later use, as in Philo; with whom *ἀντίθεος νοῦς* (*De Conf. Ling.* 19) can be no other than the ‘*adversa Deo mens*;

and so in the Christian Fathers. And the jests about an 'Antipater' who sought to murder his father, to the effect that he was *φερόνυμος*, would be utterly pointless, if *ἀντί* in composition did not bear this meaning. I will not cite *Ἀντέρως*, where the force of *ἀντί* is more questionable; and examples in sufficient number have been quoted already to prove that in words compounded with *ἀντί*, some imply substitution, some opposition; which being so, they have equally erred, who, holding one view of Antichrist or the other, have affirmed that the word itself decided the matter in their favour. It does not so; but leaves the question to be settled by other considerations. (See on this word *ἀντίχριστος* a masterly discussion by Lücke, *Comm. iib. die Briefe des Johannes*, pp. 190—194.)

For myself, St. John's words seem to me decisive on the matter, that resistance to, and defiance of, Christ, not the false assumption of his character and offices, is the essential mark of Antichrist; that which, therefore, we should expect to find embodied in his name; thus see 1 John ii. 22; 2 John 7; and in the parallel passage, 2 Thess. ii. 4, he is *ὁ ἀντικείμενος*, where none will deny that the force of *ἀντι* is that of opposition: and in this sense, if not all, yet many of the Fathers have understood the word. Thus Tertullian (*De Præsc. Hæc.* 4): *Qui Antichristi, nisi Christi rebelles?* He is, in Theophy-

lact's language, *ἐναντίος τῷ Χριστῷ*, 'Widerchrist,' as the Germans have rightly rendered it; one who shall not pay so much homage to God's word as to assert its fulfilment in himself, for he shall deny that word altogether; hating even erroneous worship, because it is worship at all, hating much more the Church's worship in spirit and in truth; who, on the destruction of every religion, every acknowledgment that man is submitted to higher powers than himself, shall seek to establish his own throne; and, for God's great truth, 'God is man,' to substitute his own lie, 'Man is God.'

The term *ψευδόχριστος*, with which we proceed to compare it, occurs only twice in the New Testament; or, if we count, not how often it has been written, but how often it was spoken, only once; for the two passages (Matt. xxiv. 24; Mark xiii. 22) are records of the same discourse. In form the word resembles so many others which appear to have been combined of *ψεῦδος* and almost any other substantive at will. Thus, *ψευδαπόστολος*, *ψευδάδελφος*, *ψευδοδιδάσκαλος*, *ψευδοπροφήτης*, *ψευδομάρτυρ*, all in the New Testament; the last also in Plato. So, too, in ecclesiastical Greek, *ψευδοποιμήν*, *ψευδολατρία*, and in classical, *ψευδάγγελος* (Homer), *ψευδομαντις* (Herodotus), and a hundred more. The *ψευδόχριστος* is not one who denies the being of a Christ; on the contrary, he builds on the world's

expectations of such a person ; only he appropriates these to himself, blasphemously affirms that he is the Foretold One, in whom God's promises and men's expectations are fulfilled. Thus Barchochab, or "the son of the Star,"—as claiming the prophecy at Numb. xxiv. 17 he called himself,—who, in Adrian's reign, stirred up again the smouldering embers of Jewish insurrection into a flame so fierce that it consumed himself with more than a million of his fellow-countrymen,—he was a *ψευδόχριστος*: and such have been that long series of blasphemous pretenders and impostors, the false Messiahs, who, since the rejection of the true, have, in almost every age, flattered and betrayed the expectation of the Jews.

The distinction, then, is plain. The *ἀντίχριστος* denies that there is a Christ; the *ψευδόχριστος* affirms himself to be the Christ. Both alike make war against the Christ of God, and would set themselves, though under different pretences, on the throne of his glory. And yet, while the words have this broad distinction between them, while they represent two different manifestations of the kingdom of wickedness, we ought not to forget that there is a sense in which the final Antichrist will be a Pseudochrist as well; even as it will be the very character of that last revelation of hell to absorb into itself, and to reconcile for one last assault

against the truth, all anterior and subordinate forms of evil. He will not, it is true, call himself Christ, for he will be filled with deadliest hate both against the name and offices, as against the whole spirit and temper, of Jesus of Nazareth, now the exalted King of Glory. But, inasmuch as no one can resist the truth by a mere negation, he must offer and oppose something positive in the room of that faith which he will assail and endeavour utterly to abolish. And thus we may certainly conclude, that the final Antichrist will present himself to the world as, in a sense, its Messiah; not, indeed, as the Messiah of prophecy, the Messiah of God, but still as the world's saviour; as one, who, if men will follow him, will make their blessedness, giving to them the full enjoyment of a present material earth, instead of a distant and shadowy heaven; abolishing those troublesome distinctions, now the fruitful sources of so much disquietude and pain; those, namely, between the Church and the world, between the spirit and the flesh, between holiness and sin, between good and evil. It will follow, therefore, that however he will not assume the name of Christ, and so will not, in the letter, be a *ψευδόχριστος*, yet, usurping to himself Christ's offices, presenting himself to the world as the true centre of its hopes, as the satisfier of its needs and healer of its hurts, he will in fact take up into himself all names and

forms of blasphemy, will be the *ψευδόχριστος* and the *ἀντίχριστος* at once.

§ xxxi.—*μολύνω, μιάινω.*

WE have translated both these words, as often as they occur (the first, at 1 Cor. viii. 7; Rev. iii. 4; xiv. 4; the second, at John xviii. 28; Tit. i. 15; Heb. xii. 15; Jude 8), invariably by the one English word, 'defile,' a word which doubtless covers them both. At the same time there exists a certain difference between them, or at least between the images on which they repose—this namely, that *μολύνειν* is properly 'to besmear' or 'besmirch,' as with mud or filth, 'to defoul;' which, indeed, is only another form of the word 'defile;' thus Aristotle (*Hist. An.* vi. 17. 1) speaks of swine, τῷ πηλῷ μολύνοντες ἑαυτούς: cf. Plato, *Pol.* vii. 535 e; Cant. v. 3; while *μιάίνειν*, in its primary sense and usage, is not 'to smear,' as with matter, but 'to stain,' as with colour. The first corresponds with the Latin 'inquinare' (Horace, *Sat.* i. 8. 37), 'spurcare,' (itself probably from 'porcus'), and is thus exactly equivalent to the German 'besudeln;' the second with the Latin 'maculare,' and the German 'beflecken.'

It will follow from what has been said, that while,

in a secondary and ethical sense, both words have an equally dishonorable signification, the *μολυσμὸς σαρκός* (2 Cor. vii. 1) being no other than the *μιάσματα τοῦ κόσμου* (2 Pet. ii. 20), this will only hold good so long as the words are figuratively and ethically taken; so taken, *μιαίνειν* is the standing word in classical Greek to express the profaning or unhallowing of aught (Plato, *Legg.* ix. 868 *a*; *Tim.* 69 *d*; Sophocles, *Antig.* 1031). In a literal sense, on the contrary, *μιαίνειν* may be used in good part, just as, in English, we speak of the *staining* of glass, the *staining* of ivory (see an example of this, *Il.* iv. 141), and as, in Latin, the ‘*macula*’ need not of necessity be also a ‘*labes*’; *μολύνειν*, on the other hand, admitting of such better use as little in a literal as in a figurative sense.

§ xxxii.—*παιδεία, νουθεσία.*

THE chief inducement to attempt a discrimination of these synonyms lies in the fact of their occurring together at Eph. vi. 4, and being often there not distinguished at all, or erroneously distinguished.

Παιδεία is one of those many words, into which the more earnest spirit of revealed religion has put

a deeper meaning than it knew of, till that took possession of it; the new wine by a wondrous process making new even the old vessel into which it was poured. For the Greeks, παιδεία was simply 'education;' nor, in all the many definitions of παιδεία, which are to be found in Plato, is there so much as the slightest prophetic anticipation of the new force which the word should obtain. But the deeper apprehension of those who had learned that "foolishness is bound in the heart" alike "of a child" and of a man, while yet "the rod of correction may drive it far from him" (Prov. xxii. 15), led them, in assuming the word, to bring into it a further thought; they felt and understood that all effectual instruction for the sinful children of men, includes and implies chastening, or, as we are accustomed to say, out of a sense of the same truth, 'correction.'¹

Two definitions of παιδεία,—the one by a great heathen philosopher, the other by a great Christian theologian,—may be fruitfully compared. This is Plato's definition (*Legg.* 659 *d*): παιδεία μὲν ἐστ' ἡ παίδων ὀλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγή πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον: and this is that of Basil the Great (*In Prov.* 1): ἔστιν ἡ παιδεία ἀγωγή τις ὠφέ-

¹ The Greek, indeed, acknowledged, to a certain extent, the same, in his secondary use of ἀκόλαστος, which, in its primary, meant simply 'the unchastised.'

λιμος τῆ ψυχῆ, ἐπιπόνως πολλάκις τῶν ἀπὸ κακίας κηλίδων αὐτὴν ἐκκαθαίρουσα. For those who felt and acknowledged that which is asserted in the second clause of this last definition, the word came to signify, not simply ‘eruditio,’ but, as Augustine expresses it, who has noticed the change (*Enarr. in Ps. cxviii. 66*), ‘*per molestias eruditio.*’ And this is quite the predominant use of παιδεία and παιδεύειν both in the Septuagint and in the New Testament (Lev. xxvi. 18; Ps. vi. 1; Isa. liii. 5; Sirac. xxii. 6; μάστιγες καὶ παιδεία: Luke xxiii. 16; Heb. xii. 5, 7, 8; Rev. iii. 19, and often). The only occasion in the New Testament upon which παιδεύειν occurs in the old Greek sense, is Acts vii. 22. Instead of “nurture” at Eph. vi. 4, which is hardly strong enough a word, ‘discipline,’ I am persuaded, would have been preferable—the laws and ordinances of the Christian household, the transgression of which will induce correction, being indicated by παιδεία.

Νουθεσία, for which the more Attic Greek would have had *νουθετία* or *νουθέτησις* (Lobeck, *Phrynichus*, pp. 513, 520), is more successfully rendered, ‘admonition;’ which, however, as we must not forget, has been defined by Cicero thus: *Admonitio est quasi lenior objurgatio.* Exactly so much is intended by *νουθεσία* here; the training by word—by the word of encouragement, when no more than this is wanted, but also by the word of remonstrance,

of reproof, of blame, where these may be required; as set over against the training by act and by discipline, which is *παιδεία*. It seems to me, therefore, that Bengel, who so seldom misses, has yet missed here the distinction, who, on the words, *ἐν παιδείᾳ καὶ νοουθεσίᾳ*, has this note: *Harum altera occurrit ruditati; altera oblivioni et levitati. Utraque et sermonem et reliquam disciplinam includit. In support of that which has been urged above, and in evidence that νοουθεσία is the training by word of mouth, such combinations as the following, παραινήσεις καὶ νοουθεσίαι (Plutarch, *De Coh. Græc.*, 2); νοουθετικοὶ λόγοι (Xenophon, *Mem.* i. 2. 21); διδαχὴ καὶ νοουθέτησις (Plato, *Pol.* 399 *b*); νοουθετεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν (*Prot.* 323 *d*), may be adduced.*

Relatively, then, and as by comparison with *παιδεία*, *νοουθεσία* is the milder term; while yet its mention, associated with that other, teaches us that this too is a most needful element of Christian education; that the *παιδεία* without it would be very incomplete; even as, when years advance, and there is no longer a child to deal with, it must give place to, or rather be swallowed up in, the *νοουθεσία* altogether. And yet the *νοουθεσία* itself, where need is, may be earnest and severe enough. The word indicates much more than a mere Eli-remonstrance: "Nay, my sons, for it is no good report that I hear" (1 Sam. ii. 24); indeed, of Eli it is expressly re-

corded, in respect of those sons: οὐκ ἐνοουθέτει αὐτούς (iii. 12). In Plutarch alone we find the word united with μέμψις (*Conj. Præc.* 13); with ψόγος (*De Adul. et Am.* 17); and νοουθετεῖν to have continually, if not always, the sense of admonishing *with blame* (*Ib.* 37; *De Prof. in Virt.* 11; *Conj. Præc.* 22). Jerome, then, is only partially in the right, when he desires to get rid, at Eph. vi. 4, of 'correctione,' which he found in the Vulgate, and which still keeps its place there. This he did, on the ground that in νοουθεσία no rebuke nor austerity is implied, as in 'correctio' there certainly is: *Quam correctionem nos legimus, melius in Græco dicitur νοουθεσία, quæ admonitionem magis et eruditionem quam austeritatem sonat.* Undoubtedly, in νοουθεσία such is not *of necessity* implied, and therefore 'correctio' is not its happiest rendering; but the word does not exclude, nay implies this, whenever it may be required; the derivation, from νοῦς and τίθημι, involves as much; whatever is needed to cause the monition to be taken home, is implied in the word.

In claiming for νοουθεσία, as compared with and discriminated from παιδεία, that it is predominantly the admonition *by word*, which is also plainly the view that our translators have taken of it, I would not at all deny that both it and the verb νοουθετεῖν are used to express correction *by deed*, but only af-

firm of the other—the appeal to the reasonable faculties—that it is the prevailing use of both; so that in such phrases as these of Plato: *ράβδου νοουθέτησις* (*Legg.* 700 *c*); *πληγαῖς νοουθετεῖν* (*Legg.* 879 *d*), the word is used in a secondary and *improper*, and therefore more emphatic, sense. Such passages are exactly parallel to that in Judges, where it is said of Gideon, that “he took thorns of the wilderness and briers, and with them he *taught* the men of Succoth” (*Judg.* viii. 16); on the strength of which language, or of any number of similar uses, no one would seek to deprive the verb ‘to teach’ of having, as its primary meaning, to communicate orally knowledge from one to another.

§ xxxiii.—*ἄφεσις, πάρεσις.*

Ἄφεσις is the usual word by which forgiveness, or remission of sins, is expressed in the New Testament. Derived from *ἀφήμι*, the image which underlies it is, of course, that of a releasing or letting go; probably the year of jubilee, called constantly *ἔτος*, or *ἐνιαυτός, τῆς ἀφέσεως*, or simply *ἄφεσις* (*Lev.* xxv. 31, 40; xxvii. 24), and in which all debts were to be forgiven, suggested the higher application of the word. It occurs with considerable frequency,

though oftener in St. Luke than in all the other books of the New Covenant put together. On a single occasion, however, the term *πάρεσις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων* occurs (Rom. iii. 25). Our translators have not noticed, or at least have not marked in their Version, the variation in the Apostle's phrase, but render *πάρεσις* here as they have rendered *ἄφεσις* elsewhere; and many have since justified them in this, having, after consideration of the subject, denied that any difference was intended by him. Others again, and as I believe more rightly, are persuaded that St. Paul changed his word not without a reason, but of intention, and because he wished to say something which *πάρεσις* does express adequately and accurately, and which *ἄφεσις* would not.

It is known to many, that Cocceius with those of his school made much of the variation of words here, finding herein a great support for a favourite assertion of theirs, that there was no remission of sins, in the fullest sense of the words, under the Old Covenant, no *τελείωσις* (Heb. x. 1—4), no entire abolition of sin even for the faithful themselves, but only a present prætermission (*πάρεσις*), or dissimulation, upon God's part, in consideration of the sacrifice which was one day to be. On this matter a violent controversy raged among the theologians of Holland, at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of

the following century, which was carried on with an unaccountable acrimony; and for a brief history of which the reader may turn to Deyling, *Obss. Sac.* vol. v. p. 209; Vitringa, *Obss. Sac.* vol. iv. p. 3; Venema, *Diss. Sac.* p. 72; while the fullest statement of what Cocceius did mean, and in his own words, may be found in his treatise, *Utilitas Distinctionis duorum Vocabulorum Scripturæ, παρέσεως et ἀφέσεως*, *Opp.* vol. ix. p. 121. Those who at that time opposed the Cocceian scheme, denied that there was any distinction between ἀφεις and πάρεσις. But in this they erred: the Cocceians were undoubtedly wrong, in saying that *for the faithful* there was only a πάρεσις, and no ἀφεις, ἀμαρτημάτων, in applying to them what was asserted in respect of the world under the Old Covenant; but they were right in maintaining that πάρεσις was not purely and entirely equivalent with ἀφεις. Beza, indeed, had already drawn attention to the distinction. Having in his Latin Version, as first published, taken no notice of it, he acknowledges at a later period his error, saying, *Hæc duo plurimum inter se differunt*; and now rendering πάρεσις by ‘dissimulatio.’

In the first place, the derivation would *à priori* suggest a difference of meaning; if ἀφεις is *remission*, πάρεσις, from *παρήμι*, will be naturally ‘*prætermission*’—the πάρεσις ἀμαρτημάτων, the

prætermision or *passing by* of sins for the present, leaving it open in the future either entirely to *remit*, or else to punish them, as may seem good. And the classical usage both of *παριέναι* and of *πάρεσις* bears out this distinction. Thus Xenophon (*Hipp.* vii. 10): *ἀμαρτήματα οὐ χρὴ παριέναι ἀκόλαστα*. Of Herod Josephus tells us, that being desirous to punish a certain offence, yet for other considerations he passed it by (*Antt.* xv. 3. 2): *παρήκε τὴν ἀμαρτίαν*. When the Son of Sirach (*Ecclus.* xxiii. 2) prays to God that He *would not* “*pass by*” his sins, he assuredly does not use *οὐ μὴ παρή* as = *οὐ μὴ ἀφῆ*, but only asks that he may not be without a wholesome chastisement following close on his transgressions. So, too, on the contrary, when in proof that *πάρεσις* is equivalent to *ἄφεσις*, the following passage, from Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Antt. Rom.* vii. 37) is adduced: *τὴν μὲν ὀλοσχερῆν πάρεσιν οὐχ εὕροντο, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρόνον ὅσον ἠξίου ἀναβολὴν ἔλαβον*, it is not *πάρεσις*, but *ὀλοσχερῆς πάρεσις*, which is equal to *ἄφεσις*, and no doubt the historian added the epithet out of a feeling that *πάρεσις* would have insufficiently expressed his meaning without it.

Having seen, then, that there is a great *primâ facie* probability, that St. Paul intends something different by the *πάρεσις ἀμαρτημάτων*, in the only place where he thinks good to use this phrase, from

that which he intends in the many where he employs ἄφεσις, that passage itself, namely Rom. iii. 25, may now be considered more closely. It appears in our Version: "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness *for the remission* of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God." I would venture to render it thus: "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, for a manifestation of his righteousness, *because of the prætermission* [διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν, not διὰ τῆς παρέσεως], in the forbearance of God, of the sins that went before;" and the exact meaning which I should attach to the words is this—"There needed," St. Paul would say, "a signal manifestation of the righteousness of God, on account of the long prætermission or passing over of sins, in his infinite forbearance, without any adequate expression of his wrath against them, during all those long years which preceded the coming of Christ; which manifestation of God's righteousness found place, when He set forth no other and no less than his own Son to be the propitiatory sacrifice for sin." There had been a long period during which God's extreme indignation against sin and sinners was not pronounced; the time, that is, previous to the Incarnation. Of course, this connivance of God, this his holding his peace, was only partial; for St. Paul has

himself just before declared, that the wrath of God was revealed from heaven against all unrighteousness of men (Rom. i. 18); and has traced in a few fearful lines some of the ways in which this revelation of his wrath displayed itself (i. 24—32). Yet still, it was the time during which He suffered the nations to walk in their own ways (Acts xiv. 16); they were the times of ignorance which God winked at (Acts xvii. 30), in other words, of the *ἀνοχή τοῦ Θεοῦ*. But this position in regard of sin could, in the very nature of things, be only transient and provisional. With a man, the prætermission, or 'præterition,' as Hammond would render it, of sins will very often be identical with the remission, the *πάρεσις* will be one with the *ἄφεσις*. He forgets; he has not power to bring the long past into judgment, even if he would; or he has not righteous energy enough to will it. But with an absolutely righteous God, the *πάρεσις* can only be temporary, and must always find place with a looking on to a final decision; every sin must at last either be absolutely forgiven, or adequately avenged. In the meanwhile, the very *πάρεσις* might seem to call in question the absolute righteousness of Him, who was thus content to pass by and to connive. God held his peace, and it was only too near to the evil thought of man to think wickedly that He was such an one as himself, morally indifferent to good and

to evil; but now (ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ) God, by the sacrifice of his Son, has rendered such a perverse misunderstanding of his meaning in the past dissimulation of sin for ever impossible. Bengel expresses well this same view, which I cannot doubt is the correct one, of the passage: Objectum prætermissionis [πάρεσεως], peccata; tolerantia [ἀνοχῆς], peccatores, contra quos non est persecutus Deus jus suum. Et hæc et illa quam diu fuit, non ita apparuit justitia Dei: non enim tam vehementer visus est irasci peccato, sed peccatorem sibi relinquere, ἀμελεῖν, negligere, Heb. viii. 9. At in sanguine Christi et morte propitiatoriâ ostensa est Dei justitia, cum vindictâ adversus peccatum ipsum, ut esset ipse justus, et cum zelo pro peccatoris liberatione, ut esset ipse justificans. Compare Hammond (*in loc.*), who has seized excellently well the true distinction between the two words.

He, then, that is partaker of the ἀφεσις, has his sins forgiven, so that, unless he bring them back upon himself by new and further disobedience (Matt. xviii. 32, 34; 2 Pet. i. 9; ii. 20), they shall not be imputed to him, or mentioned against him any more; while the πάρεσις is indeed a benefit, but a very subordinate one; it is the present passing by of sin, the suspension of its punishment, the not shutting up of all ways of mercy against the sinner, the giving to him of space and helps for repentance,

as it is said at Wisd. xi. 24: *παρορᾶς ἀμαρτήματα ἀνθρώπων εἰς μετάνοιαν*. If this repentance follow, then the *πάρεσις* will be swallowed up in the *ἄφεσις*, but if not, then the punishment, suspended but not averted, in its due time will arrive (Luke xiii. 9).

§ xxxiv.—*μωρολογία, αἰσχρολογία, εὐτραπελία*.

Μωρολογία, a word employed by Aristotle, but not of frequent use till the later Greek, is rendered well in the Vulgate, on the one occasion of its occurrence in Scripture, Eph. iv. 5, by ‘stultiloquium,’ a compound word, it may be first coined by Plautus (*Mil. Glor.* ii. 3. 25); although one which did not find more favour and currency in the after language of Rome, than the ‘stultiloquy’ with which Jeremy Taylor sought to reproduce it, with us. It will include not merely the *πᾶν ῥῆμα ἀργόν* of our Lord, (Matt. xii. 36), but in good part also the *πᾶς λόγος σαπρός* of his Apostle (Eph. iv. 29); discourse, as everything else about the Christian, needing to be seasoned with the salt of grace, and being in danger of growing first insipid, and then corrupt, without it.

It seems to me, that those who stop short with the *ἀργὰ ῥήματα*, as if those alone were included in

the word, fail to exhaust the fulness of its meaning. Thus Calvin too weakly: *Sermones inepti ac inanes, nulliusque frugis*; and even Jeremy Taylor, in his sermons *On the Good and Evil Tongue* (Serm. xxxii. pt. 2), hardly comes up to the full force of the word. The remarkable passage in which he unfolds the meaning of the *μωρολογία* begins thus: "That which is here meant by stultiloquy or foolish speaking is the 'lubricum verbi,' as St. Ambrose calls it, the 'slipping with the tongue' which prating people often suffer, whose discourses betray the vanity of their spirit, and discover 'the hidden man of the heart.'" In heathen writings, *μωρολογία* may very well be used as little more than equivalent to *ἀδολεσχία*, 'random talk,' and *μωρολογεῖν* as equivalent to *ληρεῖν* (Plutarch, *De Garr.* 4); but words obtain a new earnestness when they are assumed into the ethical terminology of Christ's school. Nor in seeking to enter fully into this word's meaning, ought we to leave out of sight the greater emphasis which the words 'fool,' 'foolish,' 'folly,' obtain in the language of Scripture, than elsewhere they have, or can have. There is the positive of folly as well as the negative to be taken account of, when we are weighing the force of *μωρολογία*: it is that 'talk of fools,' which is folly and sin together.

Αἰσχρολογία also occurs only once in the New Testament (Col. iii. 8), and is not to be confounded

with *αἰσχροτύτης*, Eph. v. 4. By it the Greek Fathers (see Suicer, *Thes.* s. v.), and most expositors after them, have understood obscene discourse, ‘turpiloquium,’ such communication as ministers to wantonness, ὄχημα πορνείας, as Chrysostom calls it. Thus Clemens of Alexandria has a chapter in his *Pædagogus* (ii. 6), *Περὶ αἰσχρολογίας*, in which he recognises no other meaning but this. Nor is it otherwise with our own Version, which has rendered the word by ‘filthy communication.’ Now, beyond a doubt, *αἰσχρολογία* has sometimes this sense predominantly, or even exclusively; thus Xenophon, *De Lac. Rep.* v. 6; Aristotle, *De Rep.* vii. 15; Epicetetus, *Man.* xxxiii. 16; and see Becker’s *Charikles*, 1st ed. vol. ii. p. 264. But very often, indeed more generally, by *αἰσχρολογία* is indicated all foul-mouthed abusiveness of every kind, not excluding this, one of the most obvious kinds, most ready to hand, and most offensive, but still not intending by the *αἰσχρά* of the word, to point at such alone. Thus Polybius, viii. 13. 8; xxxi. 10. 4: *αἰσχρολογία καὶ λοιδορία κατὰ τοῦ βασιλείως*: and compare the phrase *αἰσχρολογία ἐφ’ ἱεροῖς*. Plutarch also (*De Lib. Educ.* 14), denouncing all *αἰσχρολογία* as unbecoming to youth ingenuously brought up, includes in it every license of the ungoverned tongue, employing itself in the abuse of others; and I am persuaded that St. Paul, using the word, is forbid-

ding the same. The context or company in which the word is found goes far to prove this; for all the other things which he is here prohibiting, are the outbreaks of a *loveless* spirit toward our neighbour; and so, I cannot but believe, is this.

But by far the most interesting word in this group remains still to be considered. *Εὐτραπελία*, a finely selected word of the world's use, which however St. Paul uses not in the world's sense, like its synonyms just considered, is only met with once in the New Testament (Eph. v. 4). Derived from *εὖ* and *τρέπεσθαι*, that which easily turns, and in this way adapts itself to the shifting circumstances of the moment, to the moods and conditions of those with whom at the moment it may deal;¹ it has not of necessity, nor indeed had it more than slightly and occasionally in classical use, that evil signification which, in the use of St. Paul, and of the ethical writers of the Church, it exclusively acquired. On the contrary, Thucydides, in that panegyric of the Athenians which he puts into the mouth of Pericles, employs *εὐτραπέλωσ* (ii. 41) as = *εὐκινήτως*, to characterize the versatility, the 'versatile ingenium,' of his countrymen. Aristotle also, as is well known, gives praise to the *εὐτράπε-*

¹ That St. Paul himself could be *εὐτράπελος* in this, the better sense of the word, he has given the most illustrious proofs, Acts xxvi. 29.

λος or ἐπιδέξιος (*Ethic. Nic.* iv. 8), as one who keeps the due mean between the βωμολόχος and ἄγροικος in whatever pleasantry or banter he may allow himself. He is no mere γελωτοποιός or buffoon; never exceeds the limits of becoming mirth, nor ceases to be the gentleman; and we find in Plato (*Pol.* viii. 563 a), εὐτραπελία joined with χαριεντισμός: as it is in Plutarch (*De Adul. et Am.* 7), in Josephus (*Antt.* xii. 4. 3), and in Philo (*Leg. ad Cai.* 45), with χάρις.

At the same time, there were not wanting even in classical usage, anticipations of that more unfavourable signification which St. Paul should stamp upon the word, though they appear most plainly in the adjective εὐτράπελος: thus, see Isocrates, vii. 49; and Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 93, where Dissen traces well the downward progress of the word: Primum est de facilitate in motu, tum ad mores transfertur, et indicat hominem temporibus inservientem, diciturque tum de sermone urbano, lepido, faceto, imprimis cum levitatis et assentationis, simulationis notatione. In respect of only gradually acquiring an unfavourable significance, εὐτραπελία has a history closely resembling that of the Latin ‘urbanitas,’ which would be the happiest equivalent by which to render it, as indeed Erasmus has done; ‘scurrilitas,’ which the Vulgate has, is altogether at fault. There needs only to quote in proof the

words of Cicero, *Pro Cæl.* 3: Contumelia, si petulantius jactatur, convicium; si facetius, urbanitas nominatur; which agrees with the striking phrase of Aristotle, that the εὐτραπελία is πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις: cf. Plutarch, *Cic.* 50. Already in Cicero's time (see *Rhet.* ii. 12) 'urbanitas' had begun to obtain that questionable significance, which, in the usage of Tacitus (*Hist.* ii. 88) and Seneca (*De Irâ,* i. 28), it far more distinctly acquired.

But the fineness of the form in which evil might array itself could not make a Paul tolerant of the evil itself; he did not consider that sin, by losing all its coarseness, lost half, or any part of, its mischief; on the contrary, that it might so become far more dangerous than it was before. In the finer talk of the world, its 'persiflage,' its 'badinage,' there is that which would attract many, whom scurrile buffoonery would only revolt and repel; who would in like manner be in no danger of lending their tongue or ear to foul-mouthed abuse. A far subtler sin is noted here than in either of the other words, and not a few would be now touched, whom the preceding monition had failed to find out. Thus, Bengel (*in loc.*) has well observed: Hæc subtilior quam turpitude aut stultiloquium; *nam ingenio nititur*; and Jerome: De prudenti mente descendit, et consulto appetit quædam vel urbana verba, vel rustica, vel turpia, vel faceta. I should only object

to the ‘rustica vel turpia,’ which belong rather to the other forms in which men offend with the tongue than to this. It always belongs to the εὐτράπελος, as Chrysostom notes, ἀστεῖα λέγειν. He keeps ever in mind the observation of Cicero (*De Orat.* ii. 58): Hæc ridentur vel maxime, quæ notant et designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter. There would need polish, refinement, knowledge of the world, wit, to be an εὐτράπελος even in this worsèr sense of the word;—although these, of course, enlisted in the service of sin, and not in that of the truth. The very profligate old man in the *Miles Gloriosus* of Plautus, iii. 1. 42—52, who at the same time prides himself, and with reason, on his wit, his elegance and refinement (cavillator lepidus, facetus) is exactly the εὐτράπελος: and remarkably enough, when we remember that εὐτραπελία being only expressly forbidden once in Scripture, is forbidden to Ephesians, we find him bringing out that all this was to be expected from him, being that he was an Ephesian: Post Ephesi sum natus; non enim in Apulis, non Animulæ.

While then by all these words are indicated sins of the tongue, it is yet with a difference. In μωρολογία the foolishness, in αἰσχρολογία the foulness, in εὐτραπελία the false refinement, of discourse which is not seasoned with the salt of grace, are especially noted.

§ XXXV.—*λατρεύω, λειτουργέω.*

IN both these words lies the notion of service, but of service under certain special limitations in the second, as compared with the first. *Λατρεύειν*, as indicated by the words with which it is allied, *λάτρης*, ‘an hired servant,’ *λάτρον*, ‘hire,’ is properly, ‘to serve for hire.’ Already, however, in classical Greek both it and *λατρεία* are occasionally transferred from the service of men to the service of the higher powers; as by Plato, *Apol.* 23 c: *ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ λατρεία*: cf. *Phædr.* 244 e; and the meaning, which in Scripture is the only one which the words know, is anticipated in part. In the Septuagint *λατρεύειν* is never used to express any other service but either that of the true God, or of the false gods of heathenism. The single seeming exception, Deut. xxviii. 48, is not such in fact; so that Augustine has perfect right when he says (*De Civ. Dei*, x. 1, 2): *Λατρεία* secundum consuetudinem quâ locuti sunt qui nobis divina eloquia condiderunt, aut semper, aut tam frequenter ut pæne semper, ea dicitur servitus quæ pertinet ad colendum Deum.

Λειτουργεῖν is a word boasting of a somewhat nobler beginning; it signified, at first, to serve the state in a public office or function; from *λεῖτος*

(= *δημόσιος*), and *ἔργον*. It resembled *λατρεύειν* in this, that it was occasionally transferred to the highest ministry of all, the ministry of the gods (Diodorus Siculus, i. 21). When the Christian Church was forming its terminology, which it did partly by shaping new words, but partly also by elevating old ones to higher than their previous uses, it more readily, as regarded the latter, adopted those which had before been employed in the civil and political life of the Greeks, than such as had played their part in religious matters; and this, even when it was seeking for the expression of religious truth. The reasons which induced this were the same which caused it more willingly to turn basilicas,—buildings, that is, which had been used in civil life,—than temples, into churches; namely, because they were less haunted with the clinging associations of heathenism. Of the fact itself we have a notable example in the words *λειτουργός*, *λειτουργία*, *λειτουργεῖν*. It is probably well known to all how prominent a place in ecclesiastical language these words assumed. At the same time, in this case also the transition had been made more easy, the way for it had been prepared, by the Septuagint; and by Philo (*De Prof.* 464). Neither by these, however, nor yet by the Christian writers who followed, were the words of this group so entirely alienated from their primary uses as *λατρεία*

and *λατρεύειν* had been; being still occasionally used for the ministry *unto men* (2 Sam. xiii. 18; 1 Kings x. 5; 2 Kings iv. 43; Rom. xv. 27; Phil. ii. 25, 30).

From the distinction already existing between *λατρεύειν* and *λειτουργεῖν*, before the Church had anything to do with them, namely that *λατρεύειν* was 'to serve,' *λειτουργεῖν*, 'to serve in an office and ministry,' are to be explained the different uses to which they are severally turned in the New Testament, as, indeed, previously also in the Septuagint. To serve God is the duty of all men; the *λατρεύειν*, therefore, and the *λατρεία* are demanded of the whole people (Exod. iv. 23; Deut. x. 12; Josh. xxiv. 31; Matt. iv. 10; Acts vii. 7; Rom. ix. 4); but to serve Him in special offices and ministries is the duty and privilege only of a few, who are set apart to the same; and thus in the Old Testament the *λειτουργεῖν* and the *λειτουργία* are ascribed only to the priests and Levites who were separated to minister in holy things; they only are *λειτουργοι* (Numb. iv. 24; 1 Sam. ii. 11; Nehem. x. 39; Ezek. xliv. 27); which language, *mutatis mutandis*, reappears in the New; where not merely is that old priesthood and ministry designated by this language (Luke i. 23; Heb. ix. 21; x. 11), but that of apostles, prophets, and teachers in the Church (Acts xiii. 2; Rom. xv. 16; Phil. ii. 17), as well as that

of the Great High Priest of our profession, who is τῶν ἁγίων λειτουργός (Heb. viii. 2).¹

It may be urged against the distinction here drawn that λατρεύειν and λατρεία are sometimes applied to *official* ministries, as at Heb. ix. 1, 6. This is, of course, true; just as where two circles have the same centre, the greater will necessarily include the less. The notion of service is such a centre here; in λειτουργεῖν this service finds a certain limitation, in that it is service *in an office*: it follows that every λειτουργία will of necessity be a λατρεία, but not, vice versâ, every λατρεία a λειτουργία. I know no passage which better brings out the distinction between these two words which I have sought to trace, than Ecclus. iv. 14, where both occur: οἱ λατρεύοντες αὐτῇ [*i. e.* τῇ Σοφίᾳ] λειτουργήσουσιν Ἁγίῳ. "They that *serve* her, shall *minister* to the Holy One."

¹ In later ecclesiastical use there has been sometimes the attempt to push the special application of λειτουργία still further, and to limit its use to those prayers and offices which stand in more immediate relation to the Holy Eucharist.

§ XXXVI.—*πένης, πτωχός.*

IN both these words the sense of poverty, and of poverty in this world's goods, is involved; yet have they severally meanings which are exclusively their own. It is true that *πένης* and *πτωχός* continually occur together in the Septuagint, in the Psalms especially, with no rigid demarcation of their meanings (as at Ps. xxxix. 18; lxxiii. 22; lxxx. 4; cf. Ezek. xviii. 12; xxii. 29); very much as our "poor and needy;" and whatever distinction may exist in the Hebrew between *יָדָוִן* and *עָנִי*, the Alexandrian translators have either considered it not reproducible by the help of these words, or have not cared to reproduce it; for they have no fixed rule in regard of them, translating the one and the other by *πτωχός* and *πένης* alike. Still there are passages which show that they were perfectly aware of the distinction, and would, where it seemed to them needful, maintain it; occasions upon which they employ *πένης* (as Deut. xxiv. 16, 17; 2 Sam. xii. 1, 3, 4), and where, as will presently be evident, *πτωχός* would have been manifestly unfit.

Πένης occurs only once in the New Testament (1 Cor. ix. 9), while *πτωχός* some thirty or forty times. Derived from *πένομαι*, and connected with *πόνος*,

πονέομαι, and the Latin ‘penuria,’ it properly signifies one so poor that he earns his daily bread by his labour; Hesychius calls him well *αὐτοδιάκονος*, as one who by his own hands ministers to his own necessities. The word does not indicate extreme want, or anything approaching to it, any more than the ‘pauper’ and ‘paupertas’ of the Latin; but only the ‘res angusta’ of one to whom *πλούσιος* would be an inappropriate epithet. What was the popular definition of a *πένης* we learn from Xenophon (*Mem.* iv. 2. 37: *τοὺς μὲν οἶμαι μὴ ἰκανὰ ἔχοντας εἰς ἃ δεῖ τελεῖν, πένητας· τοὺς δὲ πλείω τῶν ἰκανῶν πλουσίους.* *Πένης* was an epithet commonly applied to Socrates (Xenophon, *Econ.* ii. 3); and *πενία* he claims more than once for himself (Plato, *Apol.* 23, c; 31 c). What his *πενία* was, he explains in the passage from Xenophon referred to; namely, that all which he had, if sold, would not bring five Attic minæ. So, too, the *Πενέσται* in Thessaly, (if, indeed, the derivation of the name from *πένεσθαι* is to stand,) were a subject population, but not reduced to abject want; on the contrary, retaining partial rights as boors or cultivators of the soil.

But while the *πένης* is ‘pauper,’ the *πτωχός* is ‘mendicus;’ he is the ‘beggar,’ and lives not by his own labour or industry, but on other men’s alms (Luke xvi. 20, 21); one therefore whom Plato would not endure in his ideal State (*Legg.* xi. 936 c).

If indeed we fall back on etymologies, *προσαίτης* (a word which ought to be replaced in the text at John ix. 8), or *ἐπαίτης*, would be the more exactly equivalent to our 'beggar.' Tertullian long ago noted the distinction between *πτωχός* and *πένης* (*Adv. Marc.* iv. 14), for having to do with our Lord's words, *μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί* (Luke vi. 20), he changes the 'Beati *pauperes*,' which still retains its place in the Vulgate, into 'Beati *mendicī*,' and justifies the change, observing, Sic enim exigit interpretatio vocabuli quod in Græco est.

The words then are markedly distinct; the *πένης* is so poor that he earns his bread by daily labour, the *πτωχός* is so poor that he only obtains his living by begging. The *πτωχός* has nothing, the *πένης* has nothing superfluous. (See Döderlein, *Lat. Synon.* vol. iii. p. 117.) The two, *πενία* (= paupertas) and *πτωχεία* (= egestas), may be sisters, as one in Aristophanes will have them (*Plut.* 549); but if such, yet the latter very far more destitute of the world's goods than the former, and indeed *Πενία* in that passage seems inclined to disallow wholly any such near relationship as this. The words of Aristophanes, in which he plays the synonymist between them, have been often quoted:

πτωχοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίος, ὃν σὺ λέγεις, ζῆν ἔστιν μηδὲν ἔχοντα· τοῦ δὲ πένητος, ζῆν φειδόμενον, καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχοντα, περιγίγνεσθαι δ' αὐτῷ μηδὲν, μὴ μέντοι μηδ' ἐπιλείπειν.

§ xxxvii.—*θυμός, ὀργή, παροργισμός.*

Θυμός and *ὀργή* are found several times together in the New Testament, as at Rom. ii. 8; Eph. iv. 3; Col. iii. 8; Rev. xix. 15; often also in the Septuagint, 2 Chron. xxix. 10; Mic. v. 15; and often also in other Greek (Isocrates, xii. 81; Polybius, vi. 56. 11; Josephus, *Antt.* xx. 5. 3; Plutarch, *De Coh. Irá*, 2); nor are they found only in the connexion of juxtaposition, but one of them made dependent on the other; thus *θυμὸς τῆς ὀργῆς* (Rev. xvi. 9; cf. Job iii. 17; Josh. vii. 26); while *ὀργὴ θυμοῦ*, not occurring in the New Testament, is of constant recurrence in the Old (Ps. lxxvii. 49; Lam. i. 12; Isa. xxx. 27; Hos. xi. 9).

When these words, after a considerable anterior history, came to settle down on the passion of anger, as the strongest of all passions, impulses and desires, and to be used predominantly as expressions of it (see Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, pp. 675—679), the distinguishing of them one from another, a good deal occupied grammarians and philologists. They felt, and rightly, that the existence of a multitude of passages in which the words were perfectly indifferently used (as Plato, *Legg.* 867), made nothing against the fact of such a distinction; all which, in

seeking to desynonymize the two, they assumed was, that the words could not be indifferently used in *all* cases. The general result of their disquisitions is, that in *θυμός*¹ (connected with *θύω*, and derived, according to Plato, ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως, *Crat.* 419 *e*), is more of the turbulent commotion, the boiling agitation of the feelings, either presently to subside and disappear,—like the Latin ‘*excandescencia*,’ which Cicero defines (*Tusc.* iv. 9), *Ira nascens et modo desistens*,—or else to settle down into *ὀργή*, wherein is more of an abiding and settled habit of the mind (‘*ira inveterata*’), with the purpose of revenge; the German ‘*Zorn*.’

This the more passionate, and at the same time more temporary, character of *θυμός* (*θυμοί* according to Jeremy Taylor, are “great but transient angers”), may explain a distinction of Xenophon, namely that *θυμός* in a horse is what *ὀργή* is in a man (*De Re Equest.* ix. 2; cf. Plutarch, *Gryll.* 4, in fine). Thus the Stoics, who dealt much in definitions and distinctions, defined *θυμός* as *ὀργὴ ἀρχομένη* (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 1. 63. 114); and Ammonius: *θυμός μὲν ἐστι πρόσκαιρος· ὀργὴ δὲ πολυχρόνιος μνησικακία*. Aristotle too, in his won-

¹ It is commonly translated ‘*furor*’ in the Vulgate. Augustine (*Enarr. in Ps.* lxxxvii. 8) is dissatisfied with the application of this word to God, ‘*furor*’ being commonly attributed to those out of a sound mind, and proposes ‘*indignatio*’ in its room.

derful comparison of old age and youth, characterizes the angers of old men (*Rhet.* ii. 11): *καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ, ὄξεις μὲν εἰσιν, ἀσθενεῖς δέ*—like fire in straw, quickly blazing up, and as quickly extinguished. Origen (*in Ps.* ii. 5, *Opp.* vol. ii. p. 541) has a discussion on the words, and arrives at the same results: *διαφέρει δὲ θυμὸς ὀργῆς, τῷ θυμὸν μὲν εἶναι ὀργὴν ἀναθυμιωμένην καὶ ἔτι ἐκκαιομένην· ὀργὴν δὲ ὄρεξι ἀντιτιμωρήσεως.* This agrees with the Stoic definition of *ὀργή*, that it is *ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας.*

The *παροργισμός* of Eph. iv. 26,—a word which does not occur in classical Greek, but several times in the Septuagint, as at 1 Kin. xv. 30; 2 Kin. xix. 3,—is not = *ὀργή*, however we may translate it ‘wrath.’ This it cannot be; for the *παροργισμός* there is absolutely forbidden; the sun shall not go down upon it; whereas under certain conditions *ὀργή* is a righteous passion to entertain. The Scripture has nothing in common with the Stoics’ absolute condemnation of anger; it takes no such loveless view of other men’s sins as his who said, *σεαυτὸν μὴ τάρασσε· ἀμαρτάνει τις; ἑαυτῷ ἀμαρτάνει* (Marc. Ant. iv. 46). It inculcates no *ἀπάθεια*, but only a *μετριπάθεια*: and even as Aristotle (*Ethic. Nic.* vii. 7), in agreement with all deeper ethical writers, had affirmed before, that when guided by reason anger is a right affection, so the Scripture permits, and not only permits, but when the right occasion for it has arrived,

demands it. This all the profounder teachers of the Church have allowed ; thus Gregory of Nyssa : ἀγαθὸν κτηνός ἐστὶν ὁ θυμὸς, ὅταν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ὑποζύγιον γένηται : Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, ix. 5) : In disciplinâ nostrâ non tam quæritur utrum pius animus irascatur, sed quare irascatur. There is a “wrath of God,” a wrath also of the merciful Son of Man (Mark iii. 5), and a wrath which righteous men not merely may, but as they are righteous, must feel ; nor can there be a surer and sadder token of an utterly prostrate moral condition than the not being able to be angry with sin — and sinners ; see the words of Plato (*Legg.* 731 *b*) : θυμοειδῆ μὲν χρῆ πάντα ἄνδρα εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.¹ St. Paul is not therefore, as so many understand him, condescending here to human infirmity, and saying, “Your anger shall not be imputed to you as a sin, if you put it away before nightfall” (see Suicer, *Thes.* s. v. ὀργή) ; but rather, “Be ye angry, yet in this anger of yours suffer no sinful element to mingle ;” there is that which may cleave even to a righteous anger, the παροργισμός, the irritation, the exasperation (‘exacerbatio’), which must be dismissed at once ; that so, being defecated of this impurer element which

¹ “Anger,” says Fuller (*Holy State*, iii. 8), “is one of the sinews of the soul ; he that wants it hath a maimed mind, and with Jacob sinew-shrunk in the hollow of his thigh, must needs halt. Nor is it good to converse with such as cannot be angry.”

mingled with it, that only which ought to remain, may remain.

§ xxxviii.—*ἔλαιον, μύρον* (*χρίω, ἀλείφω*).

It has been sometimes denied that in the Old Testament there is any distinction between these words; and that on the very insufficient grounds that the Septuagint renders מָשֶׁחַ sometimes by *μύρον* (Prov. xxvii. 9; Cant. i. 3; Isa. xxxix. 2; Am. vi. 6); though much more frequently, indeed times out of number, by *ἔλαιον*. But how often in a single word of one language are latent two words of another; especially, when that other abounds, as does the Greek compared with the Hebrew, in finer distinctions, in a more subtle notation of meanings; for example, *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* in the Hebrew מִשְׁלָּה , and this duplicity of meaning it is the part of a well-skilled translator to evoke. Nay the thing itself, the *μύρον* (= ‘unguentum’) so naturally grew out of the *ἔλαιον* (= ‘oleum’), having oil for its base, with only the superaddition of spice or scent or other aromatic ingredients,—Clement of Alexandria (*Pædag.* ii. 8) calls it “adulterated oil” (*δεδολωμένον ἔλαιον*¹),—that it would be long in any

¹ Compare what Plutarch says of Lycurgus (*Apoth. Lac.* 18):
τὸ μὲν μύρον ἐξέλασεν, ὡς τοῦ ἐλαίου φθορὰν καὶ ὕλεθρον.

language before the necessity of differencing words would be felt. Thus in the Greek itself *μύρον* is not found earlier than Archilochus, who was the first to employ it (Athenæus, xv. 37). Doubtless there were ointments in Homer's time; he is satisfied however with 'sweet-smelling oil,' 'roseate oil' (*εὐώδες ἔλαιον*, *Od.* ii. 339; *ῥοδόεν ἔλαιον*, *Il.* xxiii. 186), wherewith to express them.

But that in later times there was a clear distinction between the two, and a distinction which uttered itself in language, is abundantly evident. I would only refer in proof to a passage in Xenophon (*Conv.* ii. 3, 4), which turns altogether on the greater suitableness of *ἔλαιον* for men; and *μύρον* for women; these last consequently being better pleased that the men should savour of the manly oil than of the effeminate ointment (*ἐλαίου δὲ τοῦ ἐν γυμνασίοις ὀσμὴ καὶ παροῦσα ἡδίων ἢ μύρου γυναιξί, καὶ ἀπούσα ποθεινοτέρα*). And in like manner our Lord's rebuke to the discourteous Pharisee, "My head with *oil* thou didst not anoint, but this woman hath anointed my feet with *ointment*" (Luke vii. 46), would lose all or nearly all its point on any other supposition: "Thou withheldest from me," He would say, "cheap and ordinary civilities; while she bestowed upon me costly and rare homages;" where Grotius remarks well: *Est enim perpetua ἀντιστοιχία*. *Mulier illa lacrimas impendit pedibus*

Christi proluendis : Simon ne aquam quidem. Illa assidua est in pedibus Christi osculandis : Simon ne uno quidem oris osculo Christum accepit. Illa pretioso unguento non caput tantum sed et pedes perfundit : ille ne caput quidem mero oleo : quod perfunctoriæ amicitiae fuerat.

Some have drawn a distinction between the verbs *ἀλείφειν* and *χρίειν*, which, as they make it dependent on this between *μύρον* and *ἔλαιον*, may deserve to be mentioned here. The *ἀλείφειν*, they say, is commonly the luxurious, or at any rate, the superfluous, anointing with ointment, *χρίειν* the sanitary anointing with oil. Thus Casaubon (*ad Athenæum*, xv. 18) : *ἀλείφεσθαι* dicebantur potissimum homines *voluptatibus dediti*, qui pretiosis unguentis caput et manus illinebant ; *χρίεσθαι* de hominibus ponebatur *oleo* corpus, *sanitatis causâ*, inunguentibus. No traces of the observation of any such distinction appear in the New Testament ; thus compare Mark vi. 13 ; Jam. v. 4, with Mark xvi. 1 ; John xi. 2.

A distinction between the words *is* maintained there, but it is wholly different from this ; namely, that *ἀλείφειν* is the common and mundane, *χρίειν* the sacred and heavenly, word : *ἀλείφειν* is used in-

discriminately of all actual anointings, whether with oil or ointment; while *χρίειν*, no doubt in its connexion with *χριστός*, is absolutely restricted to the anointing of the Son, by the Father, with the Holy Ghost, for the accomplishment of His great office, being wholly separated from all secular and common uses. Thus, see Luke iv. 18; Acts iv. 27; x. 38; 2 Cor. i. 21; Heb. i. 9; the only occasions on which *χρίειν* occurs. The same holds good in the Septuagint, where *χρίσις*, *χρίσμα* (cf. 1 John ii. 20, 27), and *χρίειν*, are the constant and ever recurring words in respect of all religious and symbolical anointings; *ἀλείφειν* hardly occurring in this sense, not oftener, I believe, than at Exod. xl. 13, and Numb. iii. 3.



§ xxxix.—*Ἑβραῖος, Ἰουδαῖος, Ἰσραηλῆτης.*

ALL these titles are used to designate members of the elect family, the chosen race; yet they are very capable, as they are very well worthy, of being discriminated.

And first, *Ἑβραῖος*—a name which dates back from a period before one, and very long before the other, of those brought into comparison with it, were, or could have been, in existence (Josephus,

Antt. i. 6. 4). It is best derived from עֲבָרָה, the same word as ὑπέρ, 'super;'—in this title allusion being contained to Abraham's immigration into the land from the other side of Euphrates; who was, therefore, in the language of the Phœnician tribes among whom he came, "Abram *the Hebrew*," or ὁ περάτης, as it is well given in the Septuagint, *Gen.* xiv. 13, being from *beyond* (πέραν) the river. Thus Origen, *In Matt.* tom. xi. 5: 'Εβραῖοι, οἵτινες ἐρμηνεύονται περατικοί. The name is not one by which the chosen people know themselves, but by which others know them; not one which they have taken, but which others have imposed on them; and we find the word's use through all the Old Testament entirely consistent with this explanation of its rise. In every case 'Εβραῖος is either a title by which foreigners designate the people of God (*Gen.* xxxix. 14, 17; xli. 12; *Exod.* i. 16, 19; 1 *Sam.* iv. 6; xiii. 19; xxix. 3; *Judith* xii. 11); or by which they designate themselves to foreigners (*Gen.* xl. 15; *Exod.* ii. 7; iii. 18; v. 3; ix. 1; *Jon.* i. 19); or by which they speak of themselves in tacit opposition to other nations (*Gen.* xliii. 32; *Deut.* xv. 12; 1 *Sam.* xiii. 3; *Jer.* xxxiv. 9, 14); never, that is, being used without such an antagonism, either latent or expressed.

When, however, the name 'Ιουδαῖος arose, as it did in the later periods of Jewish history (the pre-

cise time will be presently considered), *Ἑβραῖος* was no longer used exactly as hitherto it had been. Nothing is more frequent with words than to retire into narrower limits, occupying a part only of that meaning whereof once they occupied the whole; when, through the coming up of some new term, they are no longer needed in all their former extent; and at the same time, through the unfolding of some new relation, it is no longer desirable that they should retain it. It was exactly thus with *Ἑβραῖος*. According to the usage of the word in the New Testament, the point of view external to the nation, which it once always implied, exists no longer; neither is every Jew an *Ἑβραῖος* now; but only those who, whether dwelling in Palestine or otherwise, have retained the sacred Hebrew tongue as their native language; the true complement and antithesis to *Ἑβραῖος* being *Ἑλληνιστής*, a word first occurring in the New Testament, and used to designate the Jew who has unlearned his own language, and now speaks Greek, and reads the Scriptures in the Septuagint version.

This distinction first appears at Acts vi. 1; and is probably intended in the two other passages, though these are not without their difficulties, where *Ἑβραῖος* occurs (2 Cor. xi. 22; Phil. iii. 15); as well as in the superscription, on whosoever authority it rests, of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is important to

keep in mind that in language, not in place of habitation, lay the point of difference between the 'Hebrew' and the 'Hellenist.' He was a 'Hebrew,' wherever domiciled, who retained the use of the language of his fathers. Thus Paul, though settled in Tarsus, a Greek city in Asia Minor, can affirm of himself that he was a 'Hebrew,' and of 'Hebrew' parents (Phil. iii. 15), though it is certainly possible that he may mean by these assertions no more than in a general way to set an emphasis on his Judaism. Doubtless the greater number of the 'Hebrews' in this sense were resident in Palestine; yet still it was not this fact, but their language which constituted them such.

At the same time it will be good to keep in mind, that this distinction and opposition of *Ἑβραῖος* to *Ἑλληνιστής*, as a distinction within the nation, and not of that nation with other nations, which is clear at Acts vi. 1, and probably is intended at Phil. iii. 15; 2 Cor. xi. 22, is hardly, if at all, recognized by later Christian writers, not at all by Jewish and heathen. With them *Ἑβραῖος* is simply equivalent to *Ἰουδαῖος*: thus see Plutarch, *Symp.* iv. 6; Pausanias, v. 7. 3; x. 12. 5; while Eusebius, speaking of Philo, an Alexandrian Jew, who had been but once in his life at Jerusalem, and who wrote exclusively in Greek, expresses himself in this language (*Hist. Eccl.* ii. 4): τὸ μὲν οὖν γένος ἀνέκαθεν Ἑβραῖος

ἥν: and Clement of Alexandria, as quoted by Eusebius (vi. 14), makes continually the antithesis to 'Εβραῖοι, not 'Ελληνισταί, but 'Ελληνες and ἔθνη. Theodoret (*Opp.* vol. ii. p. 1246) styles the Greek-writing historian, Josephus, συγγραφεὺς 'Εβραῖος: cf. Origen, *Ep. ad Afric.* 5. As little in Josephus himself, or in Philo, do any traces exist of the New Testament distinction between 'Ελληνιστής and 'Εβραῖος. Only this much of it is recognised, that 'Εβραῖος, though otherwise a much rarer word than 'Ιουδαῖος, is always employed when it is intended to designate the people on the side of their language; a rule which Jewish, heathen, and Christian writers alike consent to observe, and which still survives in the fact, that we speak to the present day of the *Jewish* nation, but of the *Hebrew* tongue.

This name 'Ιουδαῖος is of much later origin. It does not carry us back to the very cradle of the nation, and to the day when the father of the faithful passed over the river, and entered on the promised land; but keeps rather a lasting record of the period of national disruption and decline. It arose, and could only have arisen, with the separation of the tribes. Then, inasmuch as the ten tribes, though with the worst right, assumed Israel as a title to themselves, the two drew their designation from the chiefest of them, and of Judah came the name יְהוּדָיִם, or 'Ιουδαῖοι. Josephus, as far as I have ob-

served, never employs it in telling the earlier history of his people. The first occasion of its use by him is, I believe, at *Antt.* x. 10. 1, and in reference to Daniel and his young companions. Here, however, if his own account of the upcoming of the name were correct, he must have used it by anticipation—his statement being that it first arose *after* the return from Babylon, and out of the fact that the earliest colony of those who returned were of that tribe (*Antt.* xi. 5. 7): ἐκλήθησαν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα ἐξ ἧς ἡμέρας ἀνέβησαν ἐκ Βαβυλῶνος, ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰούδα φυλῆς, ἧς πρῶτης ἐλθούσης εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους, αὐτοί τε καὶ ἡ χώρα τῆς προσηγορίας αὐτῆς μετέλαβον. But in this he is clearly in error. We meet Ἰουδαῖοι in books anterior to the Captivity, used in them as a designation of those who pertained to the smaller section of the tribes, the kingdom of Judah (2 Kin. xvi. 6; Jer. xxxii. 12; xxxiv. 9; xxxviii. 19); and not first in Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther; however in these, and especially in the last, it may be of far more frequent occurrence.

It is not hard to perceive how the name extended to the whole nation. When the ten tribes were carried into Assyria, and disappeared from the world's stage, that smaller section which remained henceforth represented the whole nation; and thus it was only natural that Ἰουδαῖος should express, as it now came to do, not one of the kingdom of Judah

as distinguished from that of Israel, but any member of the nation, a Jew in this wider sense, as opposed to a Gentile. In fact, the word *Ἰουδαῖος* underwent a process exactly the reverse of that which *Ἑβραῖος* had undergone. For *Ἑβραῖος*, belonging first to the whole nation, came afterwards to belong only to a part; while *Ἰουδαῖος*, designating at first only the member of a part, ended by designating the whole. It now, in its later, like *Ἑβραῖος* in its earlier, stage of meaning, was a title with which the descendant of Abraham designated himself, when he would bring out the national distinction between himself and other people (Rom. ii. 9, 10); thus 'Jew and Gentile;' never 'Israelite and Gentile:' or which others used about him, when they had in view this same fact; for example, the Eastern Wise Men inquire, "Where is He that is born King of the Jews?" (Matt. ii. 2), testifying by the form of this question, that they were themselves Gentiles, for they would certainly have asked for the King of Israel, could they have claimed any nearer part or share in Him; as, again, the Roman soldiers and the Roman governor give to Jesus the mocking title, "King of the Jews" (Matt. xxvii. 29, 37), but his own countrymen, the high priests, challenge Him to prove by coming down from the cross that He is "King of Israel" (Matt. xxvii. 42).

For indeed the absolute name, that which ex-

pressed the whole dignity and glory of a member of the theocratic nation, of the people in peculiar covenant with God, was *Ἰσραηλίτης*. It is a title of unfrequent occurrence in the Septuagint, but often used by Josephus in his earlier history, as convertible with *Ἐβραῖος* (*Antt.* i. 9. 1, 2); in the middle period of it to designate a member of the ten tribes (viii. 8. 3; ix. 14. 1); and toward the end as equivalent to *Ἰουδαῖος* (xi. v. 4). It is only in its relation of likeness and difference to this last that we have to consider it here. It was the Jews' badge and title of honour. To be descendants of Abraham, this honour they must share with Ishmaelite, and Edomite; but none except themselves were the seed of Jacob, such as in this name of Israelite they were declared to be: nor this only, but more honourably still, their descent was herein traced up to him, not as he was Jacob, but as he was Israel, who as a Prince had had power with God and with men, and had prevailed (Gen. xxxii. 28). That this title was accounted the noblest, we have ample proof. Thus, when the ten tribes threw off their allegiance to the house of David, they claimed in their pride and pretension the name of "the kingdom of *Israel*" for the new kingdom which they set up—the kingdom, as the name was intended to imply, in which the line of the promises, the true succession of the early patriarchs, ran. So, too,

there is no nobler title with which our Lord can adorn Nathanael than that of “an *Israelite* indeed” (John i. 47), one in whom all which that name involved, might be indeed found. And when Peter, and again when Paul, would obtain a hearing from the men of their nation, when therefore they address them with the name most welcome to their ears, it is still *ἄνδρες Ἰσραηλῖται* (Acts ii. 22; iii. 12; xiii. 16; cf. Rom. ix. 4; Phil. iii. 5; 2 Cor. xii. 29); with which they seek to acquire their good-will.

When, then, we limit ourselves to the employment in the New Testament of these three words, we may say that *Ἑβραῖος* is a Hebrew-speaking, as contrasted with Greek-speaking, or Hellenizing, Jew; what in our Version we have well called a ‘Grecian,’ as distinguished from *Ἕλληγν*, a veritable ‘Greek’ or other Gentile; *Ἰουδαῖος* is a Jew in his national distinction from a Gentile; while *Ἰσραηλίτης*, the augustest title of all, is a Jew as he is a member of the theocracy, and thus an heir of the promises. In the first is predominantly noted his language, in the second his nationality (*Ἰουδαϊσμός*, Josephus, *De Macc.* 4; Gal. i. 13; *Ἰουδαίξειν*, Gal. ii. 14), in the third his religious privileges, and glorious vocation.

§ xl.—*αἰτέω, ἐρωτάω.*

THESE words are often rendered by the authors of our Version, as though there was no difference between them; nor can any fault be found with their rendering, in numerous instances, *αἰτεῖν* and *ἐρωτᾶν* alike by our English ‘to ask.’ Still it must be admitted that there are occasions on which they have a little marred the perspicuity of the original by not varying *their* word, where the original has varied its own. Thus it is, for example, at John xvi. 23, where the obliteration of the distinction between *αἰτεῖν* and *ἐρωτᾶν* suggests very often a wrong interpretation of the verse,—as though its two clauses were in nearer connexion, and more direct antithesis, than in fact they are,—being indeed in none. The words as they stand in our Version are as follows: “In that day *ye shall ask* me nothing [*ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐρωτήσετε οὐδέν*]. Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever *ye shall ask* [*ὅσα ἂν αἰτήσητε*] the Father in my name, He will give it you.” Now any attentive student of the original will acknowledge, that “*ye shall ask*” of the first half of the verse has nothing to do with “*ye shall ask*” of the second; that in the first Christ is referring back to the *ἤθελον αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν*

of ver. 19; to the questions which they would fain have asked Him, but did not venture: "In that day," He would say, "the day of my seeing you again, I will by the Spirit so teach you all things, that ye shall be no longer perplexed, no longer wishing to ask Me questions, which yet you dare not put." Thus Lampe well: *Nova est promissio de plenissimâ cognitionis luce, quâ convenienter œconomix Novi Testamenti collustrandi essent. Nam sicut quæstio supponit inscitiam, ita qui nihil amplius quærit abunde se edoctum existimat, et in doctrinâ plene expositâ ac intellectâ acquiescit.* There is not in the verse a contrast drawn between asking the Son, which shall cease, and asking the Father, which shall begin; but the first half of the verse closes the declaration of one blessing, that they shall be so taught by the Spirit as to have nothing further to *inquire*; the second half of the verse begins the declaration of altogether a new blessing, that whatever they ask from the Father in the Son's name, He will give it them. Yet who will affirm that this is the impression which the English text conveys to his mind?

The distinction between the words is this: *αἰτέω*, the Latin 'peto,' is more submissive and suppliant, indeed the constant word by which is expressed the seeking of the inferior from the superior (Acts xii. 20); of the beggar from him that

should give alms (Acts iii. 2); of the child from the parent (Matt. vii. 9; Luke xi. 11; Lam. iv. 4); of the subject from the ruler (Ezra viii. 22); of man from God (1 Kin. iii. 11; Matt. vii. 7; Jam. i. 5; 1 John iii. 22; cf. Plato, *Euthyph.* 14: εὐχέσθαι [ἔστω] αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς). Ἐρωτάω, on the other hand, is the Latin ‘rogo;’ or sometimes (as John xvi. 23; cf. Gen. xliv. 19) ‘interrogo,’ which indeed is the only meaning that in classical Greek it has; never there meaning ‘to ask,’ but only ‘to interrogate,’ or ‘to inquire.’ Like the Latin ‘rogo,’¹ it implies on the part of the asker a certain equality, as of king with king (Luke xiv. 32), or, if not equality, familiarity with him from whom the gift or favour is sought, which lends authority to the request.

Thus it is very noticeable, and witnesses for the remarkable accuracy in the employment of words, and in the record of that employment, which prevails throughout the New Testament, that our Lord never uses αἰτεῖν or αἰτεῖσθαι of Himself, in respect of that which He seeks from God; his is not the *petition* of the creature to the Creator, but the *request* of the Son to the Father. The consciousness of his equal dignity speaks out in this, that often as

¹ Thus Cicero (*Planc.* x. 25): Neque enim ego sic *rogabam*, ut *petere* viderer, quia familiaris esset meus.

He asks, or declares that He will ask, anything of the Father, it is always *ἔρωτῶ*, *ἔρωτήσω*, an asking, that is, as upon equal terms (John xiv. 16; xvi. 26; xvii. 9, 15, 20), never *αἰτῶ* or *αἰτήσω*. Martha, on the contrary, plainly reveals her poor unworthy notions of his person, and in fact declares that she sees in Him no more than a prophet, ascribing the *αἰτεῖσθαι* to Him, which He never ascribes to Himself: *ὅσα ἂν αἰτήσῃ τὸν Θεὸν, δώσει σοι ὁ Θεός* (John xi. 22): on which verse Bengel has these observations: *Jesus, de se rogante loquens ἐδείθην dicit (Luc. xxii. 32), et ἔρωτήσω, et nunquam αἰτοῦμαι. Non Græce locuta est Martha, sed tamen Johannes exprimit improprium ejus sermonem, quem Dominus benigne tulit: nam αἰτεῖσθαι videtur verbum esse minus dignum; cf. his note on 1 John v. 16.*

It will follow from what has been said that the *ἔρωτᾶν*, being thus proper for Christ, inasmuch as it has authority in it, is not proper for us; and in no single instance is it used in the New Testament to express the prayer of man to God, of the creature to the Creator. The only passage where it might seem to be so used, which therefore might be adduced as contradicting this assertion, is 1 John v. 16; which yet constitutes no true exception to the rule, but rather in its change from *αἰτήσῃ* of the earlier clause of the verse, a strong confirmation of

it. "If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, *he shall ask* [αἰτήσῃ], and He shall give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death. I do not say *that he shall pray* [ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ] for it;" the Christian intercessor for his brethren, St. John declares, shall not assume the authority which would be implied in making request for a sinner who had sinned the sin unto death (cf. Mark iii. 29; 1 Sam. xv. 35; xvi. 1), whatever this may be, that it might be forgiven to him.



§ xli.—ἀνάπαυσις, ἄνεσις.

OUR Version renders both these words by 'rest;' ἀνάπαυσις at Matt. xi. 28; xii. 45; and ἄνεσις at 2 Cor. ii. 13; vii. 5; 2 Thess. i. 7. No one can object to this; while yet on examination we at once perceive that the words repose on different images, and contemplate this 'rest' from different points of view. Ἀνάπαυσις (from ἀναπαύω) implies the pause or cessation from labour; it is the constant word in the Septuagint for the rest of the Sabbath; thus Exod. xvi. 23; xxxi. 15; xxxv. 2, and often: ἄνεσις (from ἀνίημι) implies the relaxing or letting down of chords or strings which have before

been strained or drawn tight, the exact and literal antithesis to it being ἐπίτασις (from ἐπιτείνω): thus Plato (*Pol.* i. 349 e): ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν: and Plutarch (*De Lib. Ed.* 13): τὰ τόξα καὶ τὰς λύρας ἀνίεμεν, ἵνα ἐπιτεῖναι δυνηθῶμεν: and again (*Lyc.* 29): οὐκ ἄνεσις ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐπίτασις τῆς πολιτείας. Other quotations illustrative of the word are the following; this from Josephus (*Antt.* iii. 12. 3), where he says of Moses that in the jubilee year he gave ἄνεσιν τῇ γῆ ἀπό τε ἀρότρου καὶ φυτείας: but the most instructive of all is in Plutarch's treatise, *De Lib. Ed.* 13: δοτέον οὖν τοῖς παισὶν ἀναπνοὴν τῶν συνεχῶν πόνων, ἐνθυμουμένους, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σπουδὴν διήρηται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μόνον ἐγρήγορσις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕπνος εὐρέθη· οὐδὲ πόλεμος, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰρήνη· οὐδὲ χειμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐδία· οὐδὲ ἐνεργοὶ πράξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑορταί. . . . καθόλου δὲ σώζεται, σῶμα μὲν, ἐνδεία καὶ πληρώσει· ψυχὴ δὲ, ἀνέσει καὶ πόνω. The opposition between ἄνεσις and σπουδὴ which occurs in this quotation, is found also in Plato (*Legg.* iv. 724 a); while elsewhere in Plutarch (*Symp.* v. 6), ἄνεσις is set over against στενοχωρία, as a dwelling at large, instead of in a narrow and strait room.

When thus we present to ourselves the precise significance of ἄνεσις, we cannot fail to note how excellently chosen the word is at Acts xxiv. 23;

where ἔχειν τε ἄνεσιν, we translate, “and let him have *liberty*.” It would be difficult to find a better word, yet ‘liberty’ does not exactly express St. Luke’s intention: Felix, taking now a more favourable view of Paul’s case, commands the centurion who had him in charge, as the context abundantly shows, to relax for the future the strictness of his imprisonment, and it is this exactly which ἄνεσις implies.

The distinction, then, between it and ἀνάπαυσις is obvious. When our Lord promises ἀνάπαυσις to as many as labour and are heavy laden, if only they will come to Him (Matt. xi. 28, 29), the promise is, that they shall *cease* from their toils; that they shall no longer weary themselves for very vanity; when his Apostle expresses his confidence that the Thessalonians, troubled now, should yet find ἄνεσις in the day of Christ (2 Thess. i. 7), that which he anticipates for them is not so much rest from labour, as a *relaxing* of the strings of endurance, now so tightly drawn, and, as it were, strained to the uttermost. It is true that this promise and that are not at their centre two, but one; yet for all this they present the blessedness which Christ will impart to his own under different aspects, and by help of different images; and each word has its own peculiar fitness in the place where it is employed.

§ xlii.—ταπεινοφροσύνη, πραότης.

THE very work for which Christ's Gospel came into the world was no other than to cast down the mighty from their seat, and to exalt the humble and meek; it was then only in accordance with this its task and mission that it should dethrone the heathen virtue *μεγαλοψυχία*, and set up the despised *ταπεινοφροσύνη* in its room, stripping that of the honour which hitherto it had unjustly assumed, delivering this from the dishonour which as unjustly had hitherto been its portion. Indeed the very word *ταπεινοφροσύνη* is, I believe, itself a birth of the Gospel; I am not aware of any Greek writer who employed it before the Christian æra, or, apart from the influence of Christian writings, after. Plutarch has got as far as *ταπεινόςφρων* (*De Alex. Virt.* ii. 4), which however he employs in an ill sense; and the use which heathen writers make of *ταπεινός*, *ταπεινότης*, and other words of this family, shows plainly in what sense they would have employed *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, had they thought it good to allow the word. For indeed the instances in which *ταπεινός* is used in any other than an evil sense, and to signify aught else than that which is low, slavish, and mean-spirited, are few and altogether excep-

tional. Thus it is joined with *ἀνελεύθερος* (Plato, *Legg.* iv. 744 c); with *ἀγεννής* (Lucian, *De Calum.* 24); with *δουλικός*, and with other words of this stamp.

Still these exceptional cases are more numerous than some will allow. Such may be found in Plato, *Legg.* iv. 716 a, where *ταπεινός* is linked with *κεκοσμημένος*, as in Demosthenes we have *λόγοι μέτριοι καὶ ταπεινοί*: and see for its worthier use a very grand passage in Plutarch, *De Prof. in Virt.* 10. Combined with these prophetic intimations of the honour which should one day be rendered even to the very words which have to do with humility, it is very interesting to note that Aristotle himself has a vindication, and it only needs to receive its due extension to be a complete one, of the Christian *ταπεινοφροσύνη* (*Ethic. Nic.* iv. 3). Having confessed how hard it is for a man *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι*—for he will allow no *μεγαλοψυχία* which does not rest on corresponding realities of goodness, and his *μεγαλόψυχος* is one *μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν, ἄξιος ὧν*—he goes on to observe, though merely by the way and little conscious how far his words reached, that to think humbly of oneself, *where that humble estimate is the true one*, cannot be imputed to any as a culpable littleness of spirit; it is rather the true *σωφροσύνη* (*ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος, καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν, σώφρων*). But if this be so

(and who will deny it?) then, seeing that for every man the humble estimate of himself is the true one, he has herein unconsciously vindicated the ταπεινοφροσύνη as a grace which should be every man's; for that which Aristotle, even by the light of ethical philosophy, confessed to be a χαλεπόν, namely τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι, the Christian, convinced by the Spirit of God, knows to be an ἀδύνατον. Such is the Christian ταπεινοφροσύνη, no self-made grace, and Chrysostom is in fact bringing in pride again under the disguise of humility, when he characterises it as a making of ourselves small, *when we are great* (ταπεινοφροσύνη τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅταν τις μέγας ὢν, ἑαυτὸν ταπεινοῖ: and he repeats this often; see Suicer, *Theo. s. v.*); it is rather the esteeming of ourselves small, inasmuch as we are so; the thinking truly, and because truly, therefore lowly, of ourselves.

But it may be objected, if this be the Christian ταπεινοφροσύνη, if it springs out of and rests on the sense and the confession of sin, how does this agree with the fact that our Lord could lay claim to this grace and say, "I am meek and *lowly in heart*" (ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ, Matt. xi. 29)? The answer is, that *for the sinner* ταπεινοφροσύνη involves the confession of sin, for it involves the confession of his true condition; while yet for the unfallen creature the grace itself as truly exists, involving for

such the acknowledgment not of sinfulness, which would be untrue, but of creatureliness, of absolute dependence, of having nothing, but receiving all things of God. Thus this grace belongs to the highest angel before the throne, being as he is a creature, yea even to the Lord of Glory Himself. In his human nature He must be the pattern of all humility, of all creaturely dependence; nor is it otherwise than as a man that Christ thus claims to be *ταπεινός*; for it will be observed that He does not affirm Himself *ταπεινὸς τῷ πνεύματι* (contrite sinners are such, Ps. xxiii. 19), any more than He could speak of Himself as *πτωχὸς τῷ πνεύματι*, his *πνεῦμα* being divine; but He is *ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ*: his earthly life was a constant living on the fulness of His Father's love; He continually took the place which becoms the creature in the presence of its Creator.

Let us seek now to put this word in its relation with *πραότης*. The Gospel of Christ did not to so great an extent rehabilitate *πραότης* as it had done *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, and this, because the word did not need rehabilitation in the same degree. *Πραότης* did not require to be turned from a bad sense to a good, but only to be lifted up from a lower good to a higher. This indeed it did need; for no one can read Aristotle's account of the *πρᾶος* and of *πραότης* (*Ethic. Nic.* iv. 5), mentally comparing this

with the meaning which *we* attach to the words, and not feel that revelation has given to them a depth, a richness, a fulness of significance which they were very far from possessing before. The great moralist of Greece set the *πραότης* as the middle virtue between the *ὀργιλότης* and the *ἀοργησία*, with however so much leaning to this last that it might very easily run into this defect; and he finds the *πραότης* worthy of praise, more because by it a man retains his own equanimity and composure (the word is associated by Plutarch, *De Frat. Am.* 18, with *μετριοπάθεια*), than from any nobler reason. Neither does Plutarch's own pretty little essay, *Περὶ ἀοργησίας*, rise anywhere to a higher pitch than this, though we might perhaps have expected something higher from him. The word is opposed by Plato to *ἀγριότης* (*Symp.* 197 *d*); by Aristotle to *χαλεπότης* (*Hist. Anim.* ix. 1); by Plutarch to *ἀποτομία* (*De Lib. Ed.* 18); all indications of a somewhat superficial view of its meaning.

Those Christian expositors who will not allow for the new forces at work in sacred Greek, who would fain limit, for instance, the *πρᾶος* of the New Testament to such a sense as the word, when employed by the best classical writers, would have borne, will deprive themselves and those who accept their interpretation of very much of the deeper meaning in Scripture; on which subject, and with

reference to this very word, see some excellent observations by F. Spanheim, *Dubia Evangelica*, vol. iii. p. 398. The Scriptural *πραότης* is not in a man's outward behaviour only; nor yet in his relations to his fellow-men; as little in his mere natural disposition. Rather is it an inwrought grace of the soul; and the exercises of it are first and chiefly towards God (Matt. xi. 29; Jam. i. 21). It expresses that temper of spirit in which we accept his dealings with us without disputing and resisting; and it is closely linked with the *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, and follows close upon it (Eph. iv. 2; Col. iii. 12), because it is only the humble heart which is also the meek; and which, as such, does not fight against God, and more or less struggle and contend with Him.

This meekness however, which is first a meekness in respect of God, is also such in the face of men, even of evil men, out of the thought that these, with the insults and injuries which they may inflict, are permitted and used by Him for the chastening and purifying of his people. This was the root of David's *πραότης*, when on occasion of his flight from Absalom Shimei cursed and flung stones at him—the thought, namely, that the Lord had bidden him (2 Sam. xvi. 11), that it was just for him to suffer these things, however unjust it might be for the other to inflict them; and out of like convictions all true Christian *πραότης* must spring. He

that is meek indeed will know himself a sinner among sinners; or, if in one case He could not know Himself such, yet bearing a sinner's doom; and this will teach him to endure meekly the provocations with which they may provoke him, not to withdraw himself from the burdens which their sin may impose upon him (Gal. vi. 1; 2 Tim. ii. 25; Tit. iii. 2).

The *πραότης* then, if it is to be more than mere gentleness of manner, if it is to be the Christian grace of meekness of spirit, must rest on deeper foundations than its own, on those namely which the *ταπεινοφροσύνη* has laid for it, and it can only continue, while it continues to rest on these. It is a grace in advance of *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, not as being more precious than it, but as presupposing, and as unable to exist without it.

§ xliii.—*πραότης, ἐπιείκεια.*

Ταπεινοφροσύνη and *ἐπιείκεια* are in their meanings too far apart to be fit objects of synonymous discrimination; but *πραότης*, which stands between them, holds on to them both. Its points of contact with the former have just been considered; and for this purpose its own exact force was sought to be

seized. Without going over this ground anew, we may now consider its relation to the latter. Of *ἐπιείκεια*, it is not too much to say that the mere existence of such a word is itself a signal evidence of the high development of ethics among the Greeks.¹ Derived from *εἶκω*, *ἔοικα*, 'cedo,' it means properly that *yieldingness* which recognises the impossibility which formal law will be in, of anticipating and providing for all those cases that will emerge and present themselves to it for their decision; which, with this, recognises the danger that ever waits upon legal rights, lest they should be pushed into moral wrongs, lest the 'summun jus' should practically prove the 'summa injuria;' which therefore urges not its own rights to the uttermost, but going back in part or in the whole from these, rectifies and redresses the injustices of justice.² It is in this way more truly just than strict justice would have been; *δίκαιον καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου*, as Aristotle

¹ No Latin word exactly and adequately renders it; 'clementia' sets forth one side of it, 'æquitas' another, and perhaps 'modestia' (by which the Vulgate translates it, 2 Cor. x. 1) a third; but the word is wanting which should set forth all these excellences reconciled in a single and a higher one.

² This aspect of *ἐπιείκεια* must never be lost sight of. Seneca (*De Clem.* ii. 7) well brings it out: *Nihil ex his facit, tanquam justo minus fecerit, sed tanquam id quod constituit, justissimum sit*; and Aquinas: *Diminutiva est pœnarum, secundum rationem rectam; quando scilicet oportet, et in quibus oportet.*

expresses it (*Ethic. Nic.* v. 10. 6); being indeed, again to use his words, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου:¹ and he sets the ἀκριβοδίκαιος, the man who stands up for the utmost title of his rights, over against the ἐπιεικῆς. Plato defines it (*Def.* 412 b), δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων ἐλάττωσις.

The archetype and pattern of this grace is to be found in God. All his goings back from the strictness of his rights as against men; all his allowing of their imperfect righteousness, and giving of a value to that which, rigidly estimated, would have none; all his refusing to exact extreme penalties (*Wisd.* xii. 18; *2 Macc.* x. 4; *Ps.* lxxxv. 5: ὅτι σύ, Κύριε, χρηστὸς καὶ ἐπιεικῆς καὶ πολυέλεος: cf. *Plutarch, Coriol.* 24; *Pericles*, 39; *Cæsar*, 57); all his remembering whereof we are made, and measuring his dealing with us thereby; we may contemplate as ἐπιείκεια upon his part; as it demands the same, one toward another, upon ours. The greatly forgiven servant in the parable (*Matt.* xviii. 23) had known the ἐπιείκεια of his lord and

¹ Daniel, a considerable poet, but a far greater thinker, has in a poem addressed to Lord Chancellor Egerton a very noble passage, which may be regarded as an expansion of these words; indeed it would not be too much to say that the whole poem is written in honour of ἐπιείκεια or 'equity,' as being

"the soul of law,

The life of justice, and the spirit of right."

king; the same therefore was justly expected from him. The word is often joined with *φιλανθρωπία* (Polybius, v. 10. 1; Philo, *De Vit. Mos.* i. 36; 2 Macc. ix. 27); with *μακροθυμία* (Clemens Rom. 1 *Ep.* 13); and, besides the passage in the New Testament (2 Cor. x. 1), often with *πραότης*: as by Plutarch, *Pericles*, 39; *Cæsar*, 57; cf. *Pyrrh.* 23; *De Prof. Virt.* 9.

The distinction existing between these two, *ἐπιείκεια* and *πραότης*, Estius, on 2 Cor. x. 1, seizes in part, although he does not exhaust it, saying: Mansuetudo [*πραότης*] magis ad animum, *ἐπιείκεια* vero magis ad exteriorem conversationem pertinet; cf. Bengel: *πραότης* virtus magis absoluta, *ἐπιείκεια* magis refertur ad alios. Aquinas too has a fine and subtle discussion on the relations of likeness and difference between the graces which these words severally denote (*Summ. Theol.*, 2^a 2^e, qu. 157): Utrum Clementia et Mansuetudo sint penitus idem. Among other marks of difference he especially urges these two; the first that in *ἐπιείκεια* there is always the condescension of a superior to an inferior, while in *πραότης* nothing of the kind is necessarily implied: Clementia est lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem; mansuetudo non solum est superioris ad inferiorem, sed cujuslibet ad quemlibet; and the second, that which has been already brought forward, that the one grace is more pas-

sive, the other more active, or at least that the seat of the *πραότης* is in the inner spirit, while the *ἐπιείκεια* must needs embody itself in outward acts: Differunt ab invicem in quantum clementia est moderativa exterioris punitionis, mansuetudo proprie diminuit passionem iræ.

§ xliv.—κλέπτης, ληστής.

Κλέπτης and *ληστής* occur together John x. 1, 8;¹ cf. Obad. 5; Plato, *Pol.* i. 351 *c*; and their meanings coincide so far that the one and the other alike appropriate what is not theirs, but the *κλέπτης* by fraud and in secret (Matt. xxiv. 43; John xii. 6; cf. Exod. xxii. 2; Jer. ii. 26); the *ληστής* by violence and openly (2 Cor. xi. 26; cf. Ezek. xxii. 9; Jer. vii. 11; Plutarch, *De Super.* 3: οὐ φοβεῖται ληστὰς ὁ οἰκουρῶν); the one is the ‘thief’ and steals, the other the ‘robber’ and plunders, as his name, from *ληΐς* or *λεία* (as our own ‘robber,’ from ‘raub,’ booty), sufficiently declares. They are severally the ‘fur’ and ‘latro’ of the Latin. Our translators

¹ They do not constitute there a tautology or rhetorical amplification; but as Grotius well gives their several meanings: *Fur* [κλέπτης] quia venit ut rapiat alienum; *latro* [ληστής] quia ut occidat, ver. 10.

have always rendered κλέπτης by 'thief;' it would have been well, if they had with the same consistency rendered ληστής by 'robber;' but, while they have done so in some places, in more they have not, rendering it also by 'thief,' and thus effacing the distinction between the words.

We cannot indeed charge *them* with any oversight here, as we might those who at the present day should render ληστής by 'thief.' Passages out of number in our Elizabethian literature make it abundantly clear that there was in their day no such strong distinction between 'thief' and 'robber' as now exists. Thus Falstaff and his company, who with open violence rob the king's treasure on the king's highway, are 'thieves' throughout Shakespeare's *Henry IV*. Still there are several places in our Version, where one cannot but regret that we do not read 'robbers' rather than 'thieves.' Thus Matt. xxi. 13: "My house shall be called the house of prayer, but ye have made it a den of *thieves*;" so we read it; but it is 'robbers' and not 'thieves' that have dens or caves. Again, Matt. xxvi. 55: "Are ye come out as against a *thief* with swords and staves for to take me?"—but it would be against some bold and violent robber that a party armed with swords and clubs would issue forth, not against a lurking thief. The poor traveller in the parable (Luke x. 30) fell not among

‘thieves,’ but among ‘robbers;’ bloody and violent men, as by their treatment of him they plainly declared.

No passage however has suffered so seriously from this confounding of ‘thief’ and ‘robber’ as the history of him, whom we are used to call ‘the penitent thief;’ the anterior moral condition of whom is probably very much obscured for us, and set to a great extent in a wrong light, by the associations which naturally accompany this name. It is true that in St. Luke’s account of the two that are crucified with Jesus, the one obdurate, the other penitent, the word *ληστής* does not occur any more than *κλέπτης*: they are styled generally *κακούργοι*, ‘malefactors;’ and only from the earlier Evangelists their more special designation as *λησταιί* has been drawn. In all probability they both belonged to the band of Barabbas, who for murder and insurrection had been cast *with his fellow insurgents* into prison (Mark xv. 7). He too was a *ληστής* (John xviii. 40), and yet no common malefactor, on the contrary ‘a notable prisoner’ (*δέσμιος ἐπίσημος*, Matt. xxvii. 16). Now when we consider the enthusiasm of the Jewish populace on his behalf, and combine this with the fact that he had been cast into prison for an unsuccessful insurrection, keeping in mind too the condition of the Jews at this period, with false Christs, false deliverers, every

day starting up, we can hardly doubt that Barabbas was one of those stormy zealots, who were evermore raising anew the standard of resistance against the Roman domination ; flattering and feeding the insane hopes of their countrymen, that they should yet break the Roman yoke from off their necks. These men, when hard pressed, would betake themselves to the mountains, and there live by plunder, —if possible, by that of their enemies, if not, by that of any within their reach. The history of Dolcino's 'Apostolics,' of the Camisards in the Cevennes, makes sufficiently clear the downward progress by which they would not merely obtain, but deserve to obtain, the name of 'robbers.' By the Romans they would naturally be called and dealt with as such ; nay, in that great perversion of all moral sentiment which would find place at such a period as this was, the name, like 'klept' among the modern Greeks, would probably cease to be dishonorable, would scarcely be refused by themselves.

Yet of how different a stamp and character would many of these men, these last protesters against a foreign domination, be likely to be from the mean and cowardly purloiner, whom we call the thief. The bands of these *λησταιί*, while they would number in their ranks some of the worst, would probably include also some that were ori-

ginally of the noblest spirits, of the nation—even though they had miserably mistaken the moral necessities of their time, and had sought to work out by the wrath of man the righteousness of God. Such a one we may well imagine this penitent *ληστής* to have been. Should there be any truth in such a view of his former condition,—and certainly it would go far to explain his sudden conversion,—it is altogether kept out of sight by the name ‘thief’ which we have given him; and whether there be any truth in it or not, there can be no doubt that he would be more accurately called, ‘the penitent *robber*.’

§ xlv.—πλύνω, νίπτω, λούω.

WE have but the one English word, ‘to wash,’ with which to render these three Greek. We must needs confess here to a certain poverty, seeing that the three have severally a propriety of their own,—one which the writers of the New Testament always observe,—and could not be promiscuously and interchangeably used. Thus *πλύνειν* is always to wash inanimate *things*, as distinguished from living objects or persons; garments most frequently (*εἴματα*, Homer, *Il.* xxii. 155; *ιμάτιον*, Plato,

Charm. 161 *e*; and in the Septuagint continually; so *στολάς*, Rev. vii. 4); but not exclusively these, which some have erroneously asserted, as witness the only other occasion where the word occurs in the New Testament, being there employed to signify the washing or cleansing of *nets* (*δίκτυα*, Luke v. 2). When the Psalmist exclaims, *πλῦνὸν με ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνομίας* (Ps. l. [li.] 3; cf. ver. 9), these words must not be cited in disproof of this assertion that only of things, and not of persons, *πλύνειν* is used; for the allusion to the hyssop which follows presently after, shows plainly that David had the ceremonial aspersions of the Levitical law primarily in his eye, which aspersions would find place upon the *garments* of the unclean person (Lev. xiv. 19; Numb. xix. 6), however he may have looked through these to another and better sprinkling beyond.

Νίπτειν and *λούειν*, on the other hand, express the washing of living persons; although with this difference, that *νίπτειν* (which displaced in the later period of the language the Attic *νίζειν*) and *νίψασθαι* almost always express the washing *of a part* of the body,—the hands (Mark vii. 3), the feet (John xiii. 5; Plutarch, *Thes.* 10), the face (Matt. vi. 17), the eyes (John ix. 7), the back and shoulders (Homer, *Od.* vi. 224); while *λούειν*, which is not so much ‘to wash’ as ‘to bathe,’ and *λούσθαι*, or in

common Greek λούεσθαι, 'to bathe oneself,' imply always, not the bathing of a part of the body, but of the whole: λελουμένοι τὸ σῶμα, Heb. x. 23; cf. Acts ix. 37; 2 Pet. ii. 22; Rev. i. 5; Plato, *Phaed.* 115 *a*. This limitation of νίπτειν to persons as contradistinguished from things, which is always observed in the New Testament, is not without exceptions, although they are very unfrequent, elsewhere; thus, in Homer *Il.* xvi. 229, δέπας: *Od.* i. 112, τραπέζας: Lev. xv. 12, σκεῦος. A single verse in the Septuagint (Lev. xv. 11) gives us all the three words, and all used in their exact propriety of meaning: καὶ ὅσων ἐὰν ἄψηται ὁ γονορρυῆς καὶ τὰς χεῖρας οὐ νένιπται ὕδατι, πλυνεῖ τὰ ἰμάτια, καὶ λούσεται τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι.

The passage where it is most important to mark the distinction between the last considered words, the one signifying the washing of a part, and the other the washing of the whole, of the body, and where certainly our English version loses something in clearness from not possessing words which should note the change that finds place in the original, is John xiii. 10: "*He that is washed* [ὁ λελουμένος] needeth not save *to wash* [νίψασθαι] his feet, but is clean every whit."¹ The foot-washing

¹ The Latin labours under the same defect; thus in the Vulgate it stands: Qui lotus est, non indiget nisi ut pedes lavet. De Wette

was a symbolic act. St. Peter had not perceived this at the first, and, not perceiving it, had exclaimed, "Thou shalt never wash my feet." But so soon as ever the true meaning of what his Lord was doing flashed upon him, he who had before refused to suffer Him to wash even his feet, now asked to be washed altogether: "Lord, not my feet only, but also my hands and my head." Christ replies, that it needed not this; Peter had been already made partaker of the great washing, of that forgiveness which reached to the whole man; he was *λελουμένος*, and this great absolving act did not need to be repeated, as, indeed, it was not capable of repetition: "Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you" (John xv. 3). But while it was thus with him, he did need at the same time *to wash his feet* (*νίψασθαι τοὺς πόδας*), evermore to cleanse himself, which could only be through suffering his Lord to cleanse him from the defilements which even he, a justified, and in part also a sanctified man, should gather as he moved through a sinful world. The whole mystery of our justification, which is once for all, reaching to every need, embracing our whole being, and our sanctification, which must daily go forward, is wrapped

has sought to preserve the variation of word: Wer *gebadet* ist, der braucht sich nicht als an den Füßen zu *waschen*.

up in the antithesis between the two words. This Augustine has expressed clearly and well (*In Ev. Joh.* xiii. 10): Homo in sancto quidem baptismo totus abluitur, non præter pedes, sed totus omnino: veruntamen cum in rebus humanis postea vivitur, utique terra calcatur. Ipsi igitur humani affectus, sine quibus in hâc mortalitate non vivitur, quasi pedes sunt, ubi ex humanis rebus afficimur. . . . Quotidie ergo pedes lavat nobis, qui interpellat pro nobis: et quotidie nos opus habere ut pedes laveamus in ipsâ Oratione Dominicâ confitemur, cum dicimus, Dimitte nobis debita nostra.

§ xlvi.—*φῶς, φέγγος, φωστήρ, λύχνος, λαμπάς.*

ALL these words are rendered either occasionally or always, in our version, by 'light;' thus *φῶς*, Matt. iv. 16; Rom. xiii. 12; and often; *φέγγος*, Matt. xxiv. 29; Mark xiii. 24; Luke xi. 33, being the only three occasions upon which the word occurs; *φωστήρ*, Phil. ii. 15; Rev. xxi. 11, the only two occasions of its occurrence; *λύχνος*, Matt. vi. 22; John v. 33; 2 Pet. i. 19, and elsewhere; though also often by 'candle,' as at Matt. v. 15; Rev. xxii. 5; and *λαμπάς*, Acts xx. 8, but elsewhere by 'lamp,'

as at Matt. xxv. 1; Rev. viii. 10; and by 'torch,' as at John xviii. 3.

Hesychius and the old grammarians distinguish between $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ and $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ (which were originally one and the same word), that $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ is the light of the sun or of the day, $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ the light or lustre of the moon. Any such distinction is very far from being constantly maintained even by the Attic writers themselves, to whom it is said more peculiarly to belong; thus in Sophocles alone $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is three or four times applied to the sun (*Antig.* 800; *Ajax*, 654, 840; *Trachin.* 597); while in Plato we meet $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ *σελήνης* (*Pol.* vii. 516 *b*; cf. Isa. xiii. 10; Ezek. xxxii. 7). Still there is truth in that which the grammarians have observed, that $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is predominantly applied to the light of the moon or other luminaries of the night (Plato, *Pol.* vi. 508 *c*), $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ to that of the sun or of the day. Nor is it unworthy of note that this, like so many other finer distinctions of the Greek language, is thus far observed in the New Testament, that on the only occasions when the light of the moon is mentioned, $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is the word employed (Matt. xxiv. 29; Mark xiii. 24; cf. Joel ii. 10; iii. 15), as $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ where that of the sun (Rev. xxii. 5). From what has been said it will follow that $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ and not $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, is the true antithesis to $\sigma\acute{\kappa}\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma$ (Plato, *Pol.* vii. 518 *a*; Matt. vi. 23; 1 Pet. ii. 9); and generally that the former will be

the more absolute word; thus Hab. iii. 4, καὶ φέγγος αὐτοῦ [τοῦ Θεοῦ] ὡς φῶς ἔσται. (See Döderlein, *Lat. Synon.* vol. ii. p. 69).

Φωστήρ, it has been already observed, is rendered 'light' in our version, on the two occasions upon which it occurs. The first of these is Phil. ii. 15: "Among whom ye shine as *lights* in the world" (ὡς φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ). It would be difficult to improve on this rendering, while yet it fails to mark with all the precision which one would desire the exact similitude which the Apostle intends. The φωστῆρες here are undoubtedly the heavenly bodies, ('luminaria,' as the Vulgate has it well, 'Himmelslichter,' as De Wette), and mainly the sun and moon, the 'lights,' or 'great lights' (= 'lucēs,' Cicero, poet.), of which Moses speaks, Gen. i. 14, 16; at which place the Septuagint has φωστῆρες for the Hebrew נִרְסָרָ. Cf. Ecclus. xliiii. 7, where the moon is called φωστήρ: and Wisd. xiii. 2, where φωστῆρες οὐρανοῦ is exactly equivalent to φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ at Phil. ii. 15; which last is to be taken as one phrase, the κόσμος being the *material* world, the στερέωμα or firmament, not the *ethical* world, which has been already expressed by the γενεὰ σκολιὰ καὶ διεστραμμένη.

So also, on the second occasion of the word's appearing, Rev. xxi. 11, where we have translated, "*Her light* [ὁ φωστήρ αὐτῆς] was like unto a stone

most precious," it would not be easy to propose anything better; and the authors of our version certainly did well in going back to this, Wiclif's translation, and in displacing "*her shining*," which has found place in the intermediate versions, and which *must* have conveyed a wrong impression to the English reader. Still, "her light" is not quite satisfactory, being not wholly unambiguous. It, too, *may* present itself to the English reader as, the light which the Heavenly City diffused; when, indeed, *φωστήρ* means, that which diffused light to the Heavenly City, its luminary, or light-giver. What this light-giver was, we learn from ver. 23: "the Lamb is the light thereof;" *ὁ λύχνος αὐτῆς* there being = *ὁ φωστήρ αὐτῆς* here.

In respect of *λύχνος* and *λαμπάς*, it may very well be a question whether the actual disposition made by our translators of the words which they had at their command was the best which could have been adopted. If instead of translating *λαμπάς* 'torch' on a single occasion (John xviii. 3), they had always done so, this would have left 'lamp,' now appropriated by *λαμπάς*, disengaged. Altogether dismissing 'candle,' they might have rendered *λύχνος* by 'lamp,' in all, or certainly very nearly all, the passages where it occurs. At present there are so many occasions where 'candle' would manifestly be inappropriate, and where, therefore,

they are obliged to fall back on 'light,' that the distinction between φῶς and λύχνος nearly, if not quite, disappears in our version.

The advantages of such a re-arrangement of the words appear to me not inconsiderable. In the first place, the English words would more nearly represent the Greek originals: λύχνος is not a candle ('candela,' from 'candeo,' the *white* wax light, and then any kind of taper), but a hand-lamp fed with oil; while λαμπάς is not a lamp at all, but a torch, and this not merely in the purer times of the language, but also in the later Hellenistic Greek as well (Polybius, iii. 93. 4; Herodian, iv. 2; Judg. vii. 16, 20); and so, I believe, always in the New Testament. In proof that at Rev. viii. 10, λαμπάδες should be translated 'torch,' ('Fackel,' De Wette,) see Aristotle, *De Mund.* 4. And even in the parable of the Ten Virgins it would be better so. It may be urged, indeed, that there the λαμπάδες are nourished with oil, and must needs therefore be lamps. A quotation, however, from Elphinstone (*History of India*, vol. i. p. 333), will show that in the East the torch, as well as the lamp, is fed in this manner. He says: "The true Hindu way of lighting up is by torches held by men, who feed the flame with oil from a sort of bottle" [the ἀγγεῖον of Matt. xxv. 4] "constructed for the purpose."

It would not be difficult to indicate more passages than one, which would be gainers in perspicuity by such a rearrangement as has been proposed, especially by marking more clearly, wherever this were possible, the difference between *φῶς* and *λύχνος*. Thus 2 Pet. i. 19 is one of these; but still more so John v. 35. We there make our Lord to say of the Baptist, "He was a burning and a shining *light*"—the words of the original being, *ἐκεῖνος ἦν ὁ λύχνος ὁ καιόμενος καὶ φαίνων*. The Vulgate has rendered them better: *Ille erat lucerna ardens et lucens*; not obliterating, as we have done, the whole antithesis between Christ, the *φῶς ἀληθινόν* (John i. 8), the *φῶς ἐκ φωτός*, the *Eternal Light*, which, as it was never kindled, so should never be quenched, and the Baptist, a *lamp* kindled by the hands of Another, in whose light men might for a season rejoice, and which was then extinguished again. It is not too much to say, that in the use of *λύχνος* here and at 1 Pet. i. 19, being here tacitly contrasted with *φῶς*, and there openly with *φωσφόρος*, the same opposition is intended, only now transferred to the highest sphere of the spiritual world, which the poet had in his mind when he wrote,—

"Night's *candles* are burnt out, and jocund *Day*

Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain tops."

§ xlvii.—*χάρις*, *ἔλεος*.

OF *χάρις* we have the following definition (Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 7); ἔστω δὴ *χάρις* καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται *χάριν* ὑπουργεῖν τῷ δεομένῳ, μὴ ἀντὶ τινὸς, μηδ' ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐκείνῳ τι. The word is often found associated with *ἔλεος* (1 Tim. i. 2; 2 Tim. i. 2; Tit. i. 4; 2 John 3); it is in this association only, and as signifying the *Divine* compassion, that I wish to speak of it here. But though standing in closest inner as well as outer connexion, there is this difference between them, that *χάρις* has reference to the *sins* of men, *ἔλεος* to their *misery*. God's *χάρις*, his free grace and gift, is extended to men, as they are guilty, his *ἔλεος* is extended to them as they are miserable.¹ The lower creation may be, and is, the object of God's *ἔλεος*, inasmuch as the burden of man's curse has redounded also upon it (Job xxxviii. 41; Ps. clxvii. 9; Jonah iv. 11), but of his *χάρις* man alone; he only needs, he only is capable of receiving it. In

¹ It will be seen that the Stoic definition of *ἔλεος*, to wit, *λύπη ὡς ἐπὶ ἀναξίως κακόπαθούντι* (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 1. 63; cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 8), breaks down at two points when transferred to the *Divine* compassion, which has not grief in it, and is very far from being limited to those who suffer *unworthily*.

the Divine mind, and in the order of our salvation as conceived therein, the ἔλεος precedes the χάρις. God so *loved* the world with a pitying love (herein was the ἔλεος) that He *gave* his only-begotten Son (herein the χάρις) that the world through Him might be saved: cf. Eph. ii. 4; Luke i. 78, 79. But in the order of the manifestation of God's purposes of salvation the grace must go before the mercy, the χάρις must make way for the ἔλεος. It is true that the same persons are the subjects of both, being at once the guilty and the miserable; yet the righteousness of God, which it is just as necessary should be maintained as his love, demands that the guilt should be done away before the misery can be assuaged; only the forgiven can, or indeed may, be made happy; whom He has pardoned, He heals; men are justified before they are sanctified. Thus in each of the apostolic salutations it is first χάρις, and then ἔλεος, which the Apostle desires for the faithful (Rom. i. 7; 1 Cor. i. 3; 2 Cor. i. 2; Gal. i. 3; Eph. i. 2; Phil. i. 2, &c.); nor could the order of the words be reversed.

§ xlvi.iii.—*θεοσεβής, εὐσεβής, εὐλαβής, θρησκος, δεισιδαίμων.*

Θεοσεβής, an epithet three times applied to Job (i. 1, 8 ; ii. 3), occurs only once in the New Testament (John ix. 31); and *θεοσέβεια* no oftener (1 Tim. ii. 10). *Εὐσεβής*, with the words related to it, is of more frequent occurrence (1 Tim. ii. 2 ; Acts x. 2 ; 2 Pet. ii. 9, and often). Before we proceed to consider the relation of these to the other words of this group, a subordinate distinction between themselves, may fitly be noted ; this, namely, that in *θεοσεβής* is necessarily implied by its very derivation, piety *toward God*, or *toward the gods* ; while *εὐσεβής*, often as it means this, yet also may mean piety in the fulfilment of human relations, as toward parents or others (Euripides, *Elect.* 253, 254), the word according to its etymology only implying ‘worship’ (in our older use of the word) and reverence *well* and rightly directed. It has in fact the same double meaning as the Latin ‘*pietas*,’ which is not merely ‘*justitia adversum Deos*’ (Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* i. 41); a double meaning, which, deeply instructive as it is, yet proves occasionally embarrassing in respect of both one word and the other ; so that on several occasions Augustine, when he has

need of an accurate nomenclature, and is using 'pietas,' pauses to observe that he means by it what *εὐσέβεια* indeed may mean, but *θεοσέβεια* alone must mean, namely, piety *toward God* (*De Civ. Dei*, x. 1; *Enchir.* 1). At the same time *εὐσέβεια*, which the Stoics defined *ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπέιας* (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 1. 64, 119), and which was not every reverencing of the gods, but a reverencing of them *aright* (*εὖ*), is the standing word to express this piety, both in itself (Xenophon, *Ages.* iii. 5; xi. 1), and as it is the true mean between *ἀθεότης* and *δεισιδαιμονία* (Plutarch, *De Superst.* 14).

What might otherwise have required to be said on *εὐλαβής* has been already anticipated in part in considering the word *εὐλάβεια* (see p. 58); yet something further may be added here. It was there observed how the word passed over from signifying caution and carefulness in respect of human things to the same in respect of divine; the German 'Andacht' had very much the same history (see Grimm, *Wörterbuch*, s. v.). The only three places in the New Testament in which *εὐλαβής* occurs are these, Luke ii. 25; Acts ii. 5; viii. 2. We have uniformly translated it 'devout;' nor could any better equivalent be offered for it. It will be observed that on all these occasions it is used to express Jewish, and, as one might say, Old Testament piety. On the first it is applied to Simeon (*δίκαιος*

καὶ εὐλαβῆς); on the second, to those Jews who came from distant parts to keep the commanded feasts at Jerusalem; and on the third there can scarcely be a doubt that the ἄνδρες εὐλαβεῖς who carry Stephen to his burial, are not, as might at first sight appear, *Christian* brethren; but devout Jews, who showed by this courageous act of theirs, as by their great lamentation over the slaughtered saint, that they abhorred this deed of blood, that they separated themselves in spirit from it, and thus, if it might be, from all the judgments which it would bring down on the city of those murderers. Whether it was also further given them to believe on the Crucified, who had such witnesses as Stephen, we are not told; we may well presume that it was.

∴ If we keep in mind that in that mingled fear and love which together constitute the piety of man toward God, the Old Testament placed its emphasis on the fear, the New places it on the love, though there was love in the fear of God's saints then, and there must be fear in their love now, it will at once be evident how fitly εὐλαβῆς was chosen to set forth their piety under the Old Covenant, who like Zacharias and Elisabeth "were righteous before God, walking in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord blameless," (Luke i. 6), and leaving nothing willingly undone which pertained to the

circle of their prescribed duties. For this sense of accurately and scrupulously performing that which is prescribed, with the consciousness of the danger of slipping into a careless negligent performance of God's service, and of the need therefore of anxiously watching against the adding to or diminishing from, or in any other way altering, that which is commanded, lies ever in the words *εὐλαβής*, *εὐλάβεια*, when used in their religious significance.¹

Plutarch, in more than one very instructive passage, exalts the *εὐλάβεια* of the old Romans in divine matters as contrasted with the comparative carelessness of the Greeks. Thus in his *Coriolanus* (c. 25), after other instances in proof, he goes on to say: "Of late times also they did renew and begin a sacrifice thirty times one after another; because they thought still there fell out one fault or other in the same; so holy and devout were they to the gods" (*τοιαύτη μὲν εὐλάβεια πρὸς τὸ θεῖον Ῥωμαίων*).² Elsewhere, he portrays Æmilius Paulus (c. 3) as eminent for his *εὐλάβεια*. The passage is

¹ Cicero's well-known words deducing 'religio' from 'relegere' may be here fitly quoted (*De Nat. Deor.* ii. 28): Qui omnia quæ ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent, et tanquam *relegerent*, sunt dicti *religiosi*.

² North's *Plutarch*, p. 195. Cf. Aulus Gellius, ii. 28: Veteres Romani . . . in constituendis religionibus atque in diis immortalibus animadvertendis castissimi cautissimique.

long, and I will only quote a portion of it, availing myself again of old Sir Thomas North's translation, which, though somewhat loose, is in essentials correct: "When he did anything belonging to his office of priesthood, he did it with great experience, judgment and diligence; leaving all other thoughts, and without omitting any ancient ceremony, or adding to any new; contending oftentimes with his companions in things which seemed light and of small moment; declaring to them that though we do presume the gods are easy to be pacified, and that they readily pardon all faults and scapes committed by negligence, yet if it were no more but for respect of the commonwealth's sake they should not slightly or carelessly dissemble or pass over faults committed in those matters" (p. 206).

But if in *εὐλαβής* we have the anxious and the scrupulous worshipper, who makes a conscience of changing anything, of omitting anything, being above all things fearful to offend, we have in *θρησκος*, which still more nearly corresponds to the Latin 'religiosus,' the zealous and diligent performer of the divine offices, of the outward service of God. *Θρησκεία* (= 'cultus,' or perhaps more strictly, 'cultus exterior'), is predominantly the ceremonial service of religion, the external forms or body, of which *εὐσέβεια* is the informing soul. The suggestion that the word is derived from Orpheus the

Thracian, who brought in the celebration of religious mysteries, etymologically worthless, yet points, and no doubt truly, to the celebration of divine offices as the fundamental notion of the word.

How finely chosen then are these words by St. James (i. 26, 27), and how rich a meaning do they contain: "If any man," he would say, "seem to himself to be *θρησκος*, a diligent observer of the offices of religion, if any man would render a pure and undefiled *θρησκεία* to God, let him know that this consists not in outward lustrations or ceremonial observances; nay, that there is a better *θρησκεία* than thousands of rams and rivers of oil, namely to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with his God" (Mic. vi. 7, 8); or, in the Apostle's own language, "to visit the widows and orphans in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world" (cf. Matt. xxiii. 23). He is not herein affirming, as we sometimes hear, these offices to be the sum total, nor yet the great essentials, of true religion, but declares them to be the body, the *θρησκεία*, of which godliness, or the love of God, is the informing soul. His intention is somewhat obscured to the English reader from the fact that 'religious' and 'religion,' by which we have rendered *θρησκος* and *θρησκεία*, possessed a meaning once which they now possess no longer, and in that

meaning are here employed. St. James would, in fact, claim for the Christian faith a superiority over the old dispensation, in that its very *θηρησκεία* consists in acts of mercy, of love, of holiness, in that it has light *for its garment*, its very *robe* being righteousness; herein how much nobler than that old, whose *θηρησκεία* was merely ceremonial and formal, whatever inner truth it might embody. These observations are made by Coleridge (*Aids to Reflection*, 1825, p. 15), who at the same time complains of our rendering of *θρησκος* and *θηρησκεία* as erroneous. But it is not so much erroneous as obsolete; an alternative indeed which he has himself suggested as its possible justification, though he was not aware of any such use of 'religion' in the time that our version was made as would bear out the translators. Milton however will at once supply an example of a passage in which 'religion' is used to express an outward ceremonial service, and not the inner devotedness of heart and life to God. Some of the heathen idolatries he characterizes as being

"adorned

With gay *religions* full of pomp and gold."

Paradise Lost, b. i.

And our Homilies will supply many more: thus in that *Against Peril of Idolatry*: "Images used for no *religion*, or superstition rather, we mean of none

worshipped, nor in danger to be worshipped of any, may be suffered." A very instructive passage on the merely *external* character of *θρησκεία*, which also I am confident our translators intended to express by their 'religion,' occurs in Philo (*Quod Det. Pot. Insid.* 7); having repelled those who would fain be counted among the *εὐσεβεῖς* on the score of divers washings, or costly offerings to the temple, he proceeds : *πεπλάνηται γὰρ καὶ οὗτος τῆς πρὸς εὐσέβειαν ὁδοῦ, θρησκείαν ἀντὶ ὀσιότητος ἡγούμενος.* The readiness with which *θρησκεία* declined into the meaning of superstition, service of false gods (*Wisd.* xiv. 18, 27; xi. 16; *Col.* ii. 18), itself indicates that it had more to do with the form, than with the essence, of piety. Thus Gregory Nazianzene (*Iamb.* xv.):

*Θρησκείαν οἶδα καὶ τὸ δαιμόνων σέβας,
'Ἡ δ' εὐσέβεια προσκύνησις Τριάδος.*

To come now to the concluding word of this group. *Δεισιδαίμων*, and *δεισιδαιμονία* as well, had at first an honourable use; as perhaps also 'superstitio' and 'superstitiosus' had; at least there seems indication of such in the use of 'superstitiosus' by Plautus (*Curcul.* iii. 27; *Amphit.* i. 1. 169). The philosophers first gave an unfavourable significance to *δεισιδαιμονία*. So soon as they began to account fear a disturbing element in piety, which was to be

eliminated from the true idea of it (see Plutarch, *De Aud. Poet.* 12; and Wyttenbach, *Animadd. in Plut.* i. 997), it was natural, indeed almost inevitable, that they should lay hold of the word which by its very etymology implied and involved fear (*δεισιδαιμονία*, from *δεῖδω*), and should employ it to denote that which they disallowed and condemned, namely, the ‘timor inanis Deorum’ (Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* i. 41); in which phrase the emphasis must not be laid on ‘inanis’ but on ‘timor;’ cf. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, vi. 9: Varro religiosum a superstitioso eâ distinctione discernit, ut a superstitioso dicat timeri Deos; a religioso autem vereri ut parentes; non ut hostes timeri.

But even after they had thus turned *δεισιδαιμονία* to ignobler uses, to the being, as Theophrastus defines it, *δειλία περὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον*, it did not at once and altogether forfeit its higher significance. Indeed it remained to the last a *μέσον*. Thus we not only find *δεισιδαίμων* (Xenophon, *Ages.* xi. 8; *Cyrop.* iii. 3. 58), and *δεισιδαιμονία* (Polybius, vi. 56. 7; Josephus, *Antt.* x. 3. 2), in a good sense; but I am persuaded also employed in no ill meaning by St. Paul himself in his great discourse upon Mars’ Hill at Athens. He there addresses the Athenians, “I perceive that in all things ye are *ὡς δεισιδαιμονεστέρους*” (Acts xvii. 22), which is scarcely, “too superstitious,” as we have rendered it, or “allzu aber-

glaübisch,' as Luther; but rather 'religiosiores,' as Beza, 'sehr gottesfurchtig,' as De Wette, have given it.¹ For indeed it was not St. Paul's manner to affront his auditors, least of all at the outset of a discourse; not to say that a much deeper reason than a mere calculating prudence would have hindered him, I believe, from expressing himself thus, namely, that he would not, any more than his great Master, quench the smoking flax, or deny the religious element which was in heathenism. Many interpreters, ancient as well as modern, agree in this view of the intention of St. Paul; for example, Chrysostom, who makes *δεισιδαιμονεστέρους* = *εὐλαβεστέρους*, and takes the word altogether as praise. Yet neither must we run into an extreme on this side. St. Paul selects with finest tact and skill, and at the same time with most perfect truth, a word which shaded off from praise to blame; in which he gave to his Athenian hearers the honour which was confessedly their due as zealous worshippers of the superior powers, so far as their knowledge reached, being *εὐσεβεστάτους παντῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων*, as Josephus calls them; but at the same time he does not squander on them the words of very highest honour of all, reserving them for the

¹ Bengel (*in loc.*): *δεισιδαίμων*, verbum per se μέσον, ideoque ambiguitatem habet elementem, et exordio huic aptissimam.

true worshippers of the true and living God. And as it is thus in the one passage where *δεισιδαίμων* occurs, so also in the one where *δεισιδαιμονία* is to be found (Acts xxv. 19). Festus may speak there with a certain latent slight of the *δεισιδαιμονία*, or overstrained way of worshipping God ('Gottesverehrung' De Wette translates it), which he conceived to be common to St. Paul and his Jewish accusers, but he would scarcely have called it a 'superstition' in Agrippa's face, for it was the same which Agrippa himself also held (Acts xxvi. 3. 27), whom certainly he was very far from intending to insult.

§ xlix.—*κλήμα, κλάδος.*

THESE words are related to one another by descent from a common stock, derived as they both are from *κλάω*, 'frango;' the *fragile* character of the branch, the ease with which it may be broken off, to be planted or grafted anew, constituting the basis and leading conception in both words. At the same time there is a distinction between them, this namely, that *κλήμα* (= 'palme') is especially the branch of the vine (*ἀμπέλου κλήμα*, Plato, *Pol.* i. 353 a); while *κλάδος* (= 'ramus') is the branch, not the larger arm, of any tree; and this distinction

is always observed in the New Testament, where *κλήμα* only occurs in the allegory of the True Vine (John xv. 2, 4, 5, 6; cf. Num. xiii. 24; Ps. lxxix. 12; Ezek. xvii. 6); while we have mention of the *κλάδοι* of the mustard-tree (Matt. xiii. 32), of the fig-tree (Matt. xxiv. 32), of the olive-tree (Rom. xi. 16), and generally of any trees (Matt. xxi. 8; cf. Ezek. xxxi. 7; Jer. xi. 16; Dan. iv. 9).

§ 1.

[I have put together, and in a concluding article subjoined, as there are readers to whom they may be welcome, a few passages from different authors, intended to have illustrated some other synonyms of the New Testament, besides those which, after all, I have found room to introduce into this volume. I have also added to these one or two quotations, which would have found their fitter places earlier in the book.]

a. χρηστότης, ἀγαθωσύνη.—Jerome (*Comm. in Ep. ad Gal.* v. 22): *Benignitas* sive *suavitas*, quia apud Græcos *χρηστότης* utrumque sonat, virtus est lenis, blanda, tranquilla, et omnium bonorum apta consortio; invitans ad familiaritatem sui, dulcis alloquio, moribus temperata. Non multum *bonitas* [ἀγαθωσύνη] a benignitate diversa est; quia et ipsa ad benefaciendum videtur exposita. Sed in eo dif-

fert; quia potest bonitas esse tristior, et fronte severis moribus irrugatâ bene quidem facere et præstare quod poscitur; non tamen suavis esse consortio, et suâ cunctos invitare dulcedine.

β. ἐλπὶς, πίστις.—Augustine (*Enchirid.* 8): Est itaque *fides* et malarum rerum et bonarum: quia et bona creduntur et mala; et hoc fide bonâ, non malâ. Est etiam fides est præteritarum rerum, et præsentium, et futurarum. Credimus enim Christum mortuum; quod jam præteriit; credimus sedere ad dexteram Patris; quod nunc est: credimus venturum ad judicandum; quod futurum est. Item fides et suarum rerum est et alienarum. Nam et se quisque credit aliquando esse cœpisse, nec fuisse utique sempiternum; et alios, atque alia; nec solum de aliis hominibus multa, quæ ad religionem pertinent, verum etiam de angelis credimus. *Spes* autem non nisi bonarum rerum est, nec nisi futurarum, et ad eum pertinentium qui earum spem gerere perhibetur. Quæ cum ita sint, propter has causas distinguenda erit fides ab spe, sicut vocabulo, ita et rationabili differentiâ. Nam quod adtinet ad non videre sive quæ creduntur, sive quæ sperantur, fidei speique commune est.

γ. σχίσμα, αἵρεσις.—Augustine (*Con. Crescon. Don.* ii. 7): *Schisma* est recens congregationis ex

aliquâ sententiarum diversitate dissensio; *hæresis* autem schisma inveteratum.

δ. μακροθυμία, πραότης.—Theophylact (*In Gal.* v. 22): μακροθυμία πραότητος ἐν τούτῳ δοκεῖ παρὰ τῇ γραφῇ διαφέρειν, τῷ τὸν μὲν μακρόθυμον πολὺν ὄντα ἐν φρονήσει, μὴ ὀξέως ἀλλὰ σχολῇ ἐπιτιθέναι τὴν προσήκουσαν δίκην τῷ πταίοντι. τὸν δὲ πρᾶον ἀφιέναι παντάπασιν.

ε. λοιδορέω, βλασφημέω.—Calvin (*Comm. in N. T.*; 1 *Cor.* iv. 12): Notandum est discrimen inter hæc duo participia, λοιδορούμενοι καὶ βλασφημούμενοι. Quoniam λοιδορία est asperior dicacitas, quæ non tantum perstringit hominem, sed acriter etiã mordet, famamque apertâ contumeliâ sugillat, non dubium est quin λοιδορεῖν sit maledicto tanquam aculeo vulnerare hominem; proinde reddidi *maledictis lacessiti*. Βλασφημία est apertius probrum, quum quispiam graviter et atrociter proscinditur.

ζ. ψυχικός, σαρκικός.—Grotius (*Annot. in N. T.*; 1 *Cor.* ii. 14): Non idem est ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος et σαρκικός. Ψυχικός est qui humanæ tantum rationis luce ducitur, σαρκικός qui corporis affectibus gubernatur; sed plerunque ψυχικοί aliquâ in parte sunt σαρκικοί, ut Græcorum philosophi scortatores, puerorum corruptores, gloriæ aucupes, male-

dici, invidi. Verum hic (1 Cor. ii. 14) nihil aliud designatur quam homo humanâ tantum ratione nitens, quales erant Judæorum plerique et philosophi Græcorum.

η. μετανοέω, μεταμέλομαι.—Bengel (*Gnomon N. T.*; 2 Cor. vii. 10): Vi etymi *μετάνοια* proprie est mentis, *μεταμέλεια* voluntatis; quod illa sententiam, hæc solitudinem vel potius studium mutatum dicat. . . . Utrumque ergo dicitur de eo, quem facti consiliive pœnitet, sive pœnitentia bona sit sive mala, sive malæ rei sive bonæ, sive cum mutatione actionum in posterum, sive citra eam. Veruntamen si usum spectes, *μεταμέλεια* plerunque est μέσον vocabulum, et refertur potissimum ad actiones singulares: *μετάνοια* vero, in N. T. præsertim, in bonam partem sumitur, quo notatur pœnitentia totius vitæ ipsorumque nostri quodammodo: sive tota illa beata mentis post errorem et peccata reminiscentia, cum omnibus affectibus eam ingredientibus, quam fructus digni sequuntur. Hinc fit ut *μετανοεῖν* sæpe in imperativo ponatur, *μεταμελεῖσθαι* nunquam: ceteris autem locis, ubicunque *μετάνοια* legitur, *μεταμέλειαν* possis substituere: sed non contra.

θ. αἰών, κόσμος.—Bengel (*Ib. Eph. ii. 2*): αἰών et κόσμος differunt, 1 Cor. ii. 6, 12; iii. 18. Ille hunc regit, et quasi informat: κόσμος est quiddam

exterius; αἰών subtilius. And again (Eph. vi. 12): κόσμος mundus, in suâ extensione: αἰών seculum, præsens mundus in suâ indole, cursu et censu.

ι. πραῦς, ἡσύχιος.—Bengel (*Ib.* 1 *Pet.* iii. 4): *Mansuetus* [πραῦς], qui non turbat: *tranquillus* [ἡσύχιος], qui turbas aliorum, superiorum, inferiorum, æqualium, fert placide . . . Adde, mansuetus in affectibus: tranquillus in verbis, vultu, actu.

κ. θνήτος, νεκρός.—Olshausen (*Opusc. Theoll.* p. 195): Νέκρος vocatur subjectum, in quo se junctio corporis et animæ facta est: θνήτος, in quo fieri potest.

λ. κόλασις, τιμορία (see p. 47).—Aulus Gellius, vi. 14: Puniendis peccatis tres esse debere causas existimatum est. Una est quæ νουθεσία, vel κόλασις, vel παραίνεσις dicitur; cum pœna adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi gratiâ; ut is qui fortuito deliquit, attentior fiat, correctiorque. Altera est quam ii, qui vocabula ista curiosius diviserunt, τιμορίαν appellant. Ea causa animadvertendi est, cum dignitas auctoritasque ejus, in quem est peccatum, tuenda est, ne prætermissa animadversio contentum ejus pariat, et honorem levet: idcircoque id ei vocabulum a conservatione honoris factum putant.

μ. ἄφεσις, πάρεσις (see p. 163).—Fritzsche (*Ad Rom.* vol. i. p. 199): Conveniunt in hoc [ἄφεσις et πάρεσις] quod sive illa, sive hæc tibi obtigerit, nulla peccatorum tuorum ratio habetur; discrepant eo, quod, hâc datâ, facinorum tuorum pœnas *nunquam* pendes; illâ concessâ, non diutius nullas peccatorum tuorum pœnas lues, quam ei in iis connivere placuerit, cui in delicta tua animadvertendi jus sit.



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
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
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