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SYNONYMS  
OF  
THE NEW TESTAMENT.

BY  
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*SECOND PART.*

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## P R E F A C E .

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IN publishing a preceding volume on *Synonyms of the New Testament*, I took occasion to observe, that the synonyms dealt with in it might easily have been doubled or trebled, and that many of the most interesting had been left altogether untouched. The subject proves so inexhaustible that, after another considerable number dealt with here, the assertion seems to me just as true now as it was then. That it is a subject of interest to the student of theology, and that the little volume did, however partially and imperfectly, supply a want, I feel assured by the several editions through which it has past,

and the requests which I have received to add a second part to that first. This I have at length done, and hope at some future day to fuse the two parts into a single volume. The book, though small in bulk, has been sufficiently laborious. It is my earnest prayer that, by God's blessing, the labour may not have been altogether in vain.

WESTMINSTER, *July 27, 1863.*

# SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

## PART II,

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§ i.—*εὐχή, προσευχή, δέησις, ἔντευξις, εὐχαριστία, αἴτημα, ἰκετηρία.*

FOUR of these words occur together at 1 Tim. ii. 1; on which Flacius Illyricus (*Clavis*, s. v. *Oratio*) justly observes, ‘Quem vocum acervum procul dubio Paulus non temere congegessit.’ It will be advisable to consider not these only, but the larger group of which they form a portion.

*Εὐχή* occurs only once in the N. T. in the sense of a prayer (Jam. v. 15). On the distinction between it and *προσευχή*, between *εὐχεσθαι* and *προσεύχεσθαι*, there is a long discussion in Origen (*De Orat.* § 2, 3, 4), but not of any great value, nor bringing out more than the obvious fact that in *εὐχή* and *εὐχεσθαι* the notion of the vow, of the dedicated thing, is more commonly found than that of prayer. The two other occasions on which the

word is found in the N. T. (Acts xviii. 18; xxi. 23), bear out this remark.

*Προσευχή* and *δέησις* often in the N. T. occur together (Phil. iv. 6; Ephes. vi. 18; 1 Tim. ii. 1; v. 5), and not unfrequently in the Septuagint (Ps. vi. 10; Dan. ix. 21, 23; 1 Macc. vii. 37). There have been a great many, but for the most part not very successful, attempts to distinguish between them. Grotius, for instance, affirms that they are severally ‘precatio’ and ‘deprecatio;’ that the first seeks to obtain good, the second to avert evil. Augustine, I may observe by the way, in his treatment of the more important of this group of words (*Ep.* 149, § 12—16), which, though interesting, does not yield any definite results of value, observes that in his time this distinction between ‘precatio’ and ‘deprecatio’ had practically quite disappeared. Theodoret in like manner, who has anticipated Grotius here, explains *προσευχή* as *αἴτησις ἀγαθῶν*, and *δέησις* as *ὑπὲρ ἀπαλλαγῆς τινῶν λυπηρῶν ἰκετεία προφερομένη*: cf. Gregory of Nazianzum;

*δεήσιν οἴου, τὴν αἴτησιν ἐνδεῶν.*

This distinction is arbitrary; neither lies in the words, nor is it borne out by usage. Better Calvin, who makes one (*προσευχή* = ‘precatio’) prayer in general, the other (*δέησις* = ‘rogatio’) prayer for particular benefits: ‘*προσευχή* omne genus orationis,

*δέησις* ubi certum aliquid petitur; genus et species.' Bengel's distinction amounts very nearly to the same thing: '*δέησις* (α δει) est *imploratio* gratiæ in necessitate quâdam speciali; *προσευχή*, *oratio*, exercetur quâlibet oblatione voluntatum et desideriorum erga Deum.'

All these passages, however, while they have brought out one important point of distinction, have failed to bring out another—namely, that *προσευχή* is '*res sacra*,' a word restricted to sacred uses; it is always prayer to God; *δέησις* has no such restriction. Fritzsche (on Rom. x. 1) has not failed to urge this: '*ἡ προσευχή* et *ἡ δέησις* differunt ut *precatio* et *rogatio*. *Προσεύχασθαι* et *ἡ προσευχή* verba sacra sunt; *precamur* enim Deum; *δεῖσθαι*, τὸ δέημα (Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 1059) et *ἡ δέησις* tum in sacrâ tum in profanâ re usurpantur. Nam et Deum rogare possumus et homines.' It is the same distinction as in our 'prayer' (though that has been too much brought down to mundane uses) and 'petition,' in the German 'Gebet' and 'Bitte.'

*Ἐντευξις* occurs only at 1 Tim. ii. 1; iv. 5, in the N. T. (but *ἐντυγχάνειν* four or five times) and once in the Septuagint (2 Macc. iv. 8). 'Intercession,' by which the E. V. renders it, is not, as we now understand 'intercession,' a satisfactory rendering. For *ἔντευξις* does not necessarily mean what 'intercession' at present exclusively does

mean—namely, prayer in relation to others (at 1 Tim. iv. 5 such meaning is impossible); a pleading either for them or against them. Least of all does it mean exclusively the latter, a pleading against our enemies, as Theodoret, on Rom. xi. 2, missing the fact that the ‘against’ lay there in the *κατά*, would imply, when he says: *ἐντευξίς ἐστὶ κατηγορία τῶν ἀδικούντων*; cf. Hesychius: *δέησις εἰς ἐκδίκησιν ὑπὲρ τινος* (Rom. viii. 34) *κατά τινος* (Rom. ii. 2); but, as its connexion with *ἐντυγχάνειν*, to fall in with a person, to draw close to him so as to enter into familiar speech and communion with him,<sup>1</sup> implies, free familiar prayer, such as boldly draws near to God (Gen. xviii. 23; Wisd. viii. 21; cf. Philo, *Quod Det. Pot.* 25; *ἐντεύξεις καὶ ἐκβοήσεις*). In justice, however, to our Translators it must be observed that ‘intercession’ had by no means once that limited meaning of prayer *for others* which we now ascribe to it; see Jer. xxvii. 18; xxxvi. 25. The Vulgate has ‘postulationes;’ but Augustine, in a discussion on this group of words referred to already (*Ep.* 149. § 12—16), prefers ‘interpellationes,’ as better bringing out the *παρρησία*, the freedom and boldness of access which is involved in, and constitutes the fundamental idea

<sup>1</sup> The rendering of *δι’ ἐντεύξεως*, 2 Macc. iv. 8, ‘by intercession,’ can scarcely be correct. It refers more probably to the fact of a confidential interview between Jason and Antiochus.

of, the ἔντευξις—‘interpellare’ being, as need hardly be observed, to interrupt another in speaking, and therefore ever implying forwardness and freedom. Origen (*De Orat.* 14) in like manner makes the boldness of access to God, asking it may be some great thing (he instances Josh. x. 12) the fundamental notion of the ἔντευξις.

*Εὐχαριστία* (‘thankfulness,’ Acts xxiv. 3; ‘giving of thanks,’ 1 Cor. xiv. 16; ‘thanks,’ Rev. iv. 9; ‘thanksgiving,’ Phil. iv. 6, E. V.), a somewhat rare word elsewhere, is frequent in sacred Greek. It would be out of place to dwell here on the special meaning which *εὐχαριστία* and ‘eucharist’ have acquired from the fact that in the Holy Communion the Church embodies its highest act of thanksgiving for the highest benefits which it has received of God. Regarding it as one manner of prayer, it is manifest that it expresses that which ought never to be absent from any of our devotions (Phil. iv. 6), namely, the grateful acknowledgment of past mercies, as distinguished from the earnest seeking of future. As such it may, and will subsist in heaven (Rev. iv. 9; vii. 12); will indeed be larger, deeper, fuller there than here; for only there will the redeemed know how much they owe to their Lord; and this, while all other forms of prayer in the very nature of things will have ceased in the entire fruition of the things prayed for.

*Αἴτημα* occurs twice in the N. T. in the sense of petitions of men *to God*, both times in the plural (Phil. iv. 6; 1 John v. 15); it is, however, by no means restricted to this meaning (Luke xxiii. 24; Esth. v. 7; Dan. vi. 7). In a *προσευχή* of any length there will probably be many *αἰτήματα*, being indeed the several requests of which it is composed. For instance, in the Lord's Prayer it is generally reckoned that there are seven *αἰτήματα*, though some have regarded the three first as *εὐχαί*, and only the last four as *αἰτήματα*. Witsius: '*Petitio pars orationis; ut si totam Orationem Dominicam voces orationem aut precessionem, singulas vero illius partes aut septem postulata petitiones.*'

*Ἰκετηρία*, with *ράβδος* or *ἐλαία*, or some such word understood, like *ἰλαστήριον*, *θυσιαστήριον*, and other words of the same termination (see Lobeck, *Pathol. Serm. Græc.* p. 281), was originally an adjective, but gradually obtained a substantive power and learned to go alone. It is explained by Plutarch (*Thes.* 18): *κλάδος ἀπὸ τῆς ἱερᾶς ἐλαίας ἐρίῳ λευκῷ κατεστεμμένος* (cf. Wyttenbach's *Plutarch*, vol. xiii. p. 89), the olive-branch bound round with wool, held forth by the suppliant in token of the character which he bore (*Æschylus, Eumenides*, 43, 44). A deprecatory letter, which Antiochus Epiphanes is said on his death-bed to have written to the Jews, is described in 2 Macc. ix. 18 as *ἰκετηρίας*



τάξιν ἔχουσαν, and Agrippa styles one addressed to Caligula: γραφή ἦν ἀνθ' ἱκετηρίας προτείνω (Philo, *Leg. ad Cai.* 36). It is easy to trace the steps by which this, the symbol of supplication, came to signify the supplication itself. It does so on the only occasion of the word's occurrence in the N. T. (Heb. v. 7), being there joined to δέησις, as often elsewhere (Job xl. 3; Polybius, iii. 112. 8).

Thus much on the distinction between these words; although, when all has been said, it will still to a great extent remain true that they will often set forth, not different kinds of prayer, but prayer contemplated from different sides and in different aspects. Witsius (*De Orat. Dom.* § 4): 'Mihi sic videtur, unam eandemque rem diversis nominibus designari pro diversis quos habet aspectibus. Preces nostræ δέησεις vocantur, quatenus iis nostram apud Deum testamur *egestatem*, nam δέεσθαι indigere est; προσευχαί, quatenus *vota* nostra continent; αἰτήματα, quatenus exponunt *petitiones* et desideria; ἐντεύξεις, quatenus non timide et diffidenter, sed *familiariter* Deus se a nobis adiri patitur; ἐντεύξις enim est *colloquium et congressus familiaris*; ἐνχαριστίαν *gratiarum actionem* esse pro acceptis jam beneficiis, notius est quam ut moneri oportuit.'—On the Hebrew correlatives to the several words just considered, see Vitrिंगa, *De Synagogá*, iii. 2. 13.

## § ii.—ἀσύνθετος, ἄσπονδος.

Ἀσύνθετος occurs only once in the N. T., namely at Rom. i. 31; cf. Jer. iii. 8—11, where it is found several times, but not elsewhere in the Septuagint.

Ἀσπονδος occurs twice, Rom. i. 31; 2 Tim. iii. 3; but in the former of these passages its right to a place in the text is contested, as many important authorities omit it. It is nowhere found in the Septuagint.

The distinction between the two words, as used in the Scripture, is not hard to draw;—I say, as used in the Scripture; because there may be a question whether ἀσύνθετος has anywhere else exactly the meaning which it has there. Elsewhere often united with ἀπλοῦς, it has the sense of the Latin ‘incompositus.’ But the ἀσύνθετοι of St. Paul are they who, being in covenant and treaty with others, refuse to abide by these covenants and treaties; μὴ ἐμμένοντες ταῖς συνθήκαις (Hesychius); ‘pactorum haudquaquam tenaces’ (Erasmus), ‘bundbrüchig’ (not ‘unverträglich,’ as Tittmann maintains); ‘covenant-breakers,’ E. V. It is associated with ἀσπάθμητος, Demosthenes, *De Fals. Leg.* 383. The ἄσπονδοι (the word is joined with ἀσύμβατος and ἀκοινώνητος, Philo, *De Merc. Mer.* 4),

worse than the *δυσδιάλυτοι* (Aristotle, *Ethic. Nic.* iv. 5. 10), who are only hard to be reconciled, are the absolutely irreconcilable (*ἄσπονδοι καὶ ἀκατάλλακτοι*, Philo, *Quis Rer. Div. Hær.* 50); those who will not be *atoned* (using this word in its earlier sense), who being at war refuse to lay aside their enmity, or to hear of terms of accommodation; ‘implacabiles, qui semel offensi reconciliationem non admittunt’ (Estius); ‘unversöhnlich,’ ‘implacable,’ E. V. The phrase, *ἄσπονδος καὶ ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος* is frequent, indeed proverbial, in Greek (Demosthenes, *De Coron.* 79; Philo, *De Præm. et Pæn.* 15; Lucian, *Pisc.* 36); in this connexion *ἀκήρυκτος* does not mean, which was not duly announced by the fecial; but these epithets describe the war as one in which no herald, no flag of truce, as we should say, is allowed to pass between the parties, no terms of reconcilement listened to; such a war as that of the Carthaginians with their revolted mercenaries. In the same sense we have elsewhere *ἄσπονδος μάχη καὶ ἀδιάλλακτος ἔρις* (Aristænetus, 2. 14); cf. *ἄσπειςτος κότος* (Nicander, *Ther.* 367); these two quotations are from Blomfield’s *Agamemnon*, p. 285; *ἄσπονδος ἔχθρα* (Plutarch, *Pericles*, 30); *ἄσπονδος Θεός* (Euripides, *Alcestis*, 431).

Where *ἀσύνθετος* is employed, a peace is presumed, which the *ἀσύνθετοι* refuse to continue, but

unrighteously interrupt; while ἄσπονδος presumes a state of war, which the ἄσπονδοι refuse to bring to a righteous close. It will be seen then that Calvin, who renders ἄσπονδοι 'foedifragi,' and ἀσύνθετοι 'insociabiles,' has exactly missed the force of both; it is the same with Theodoret, who on Rom. i. 31 writes: ἀσυνθέτους, τοὺς ἀκοινώνητον καὶ πονηρὸν βίον ἀσπαζομένους · ἀσπόνδους τοὺς ἀδεῶς τὰ συγκείμενα παραβαίνοντας. Only by giving to each word that meaning which they have given to the other, will the right equivalents be obtained.

In agreement with what has been just said, and in confirmation of it, is the distinction which Ammonius draws between συνθήκη and σπονδή. Συνθήκη assumes peace; being a further agreement, it may be a treaty of alliance, between those already on general terms of amity. Thus there was a συνθήκη between the several states that were gathered round Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, that with whatever territory they began the war, with the same they should close it (Thucydides, v. 31). But σπονδή, or more commonly in the plural, assumes war, of which it is the cessation; it may be only the temporary cessation, being often used of an armistice (Homer, *Il.* ii. 341). It is true that a συνθήκη may be attached to a σπονδή, terms of alliance consequent on terms of peace; thus σπονδή and συνθήκη occur together in Thucydides, iv. 18:

but they are different things; in the *σπονδή* there is a cessation of the state of war; there is peace, or at all events truce; in the *συνθήκη* there is, superinduced on this, a further agreement or alliance.—*Εὐσύνθετος*, I may observe, which would be the exact opposite of *ἀσύνθετος*, does not occur in Greek; but *εὐσυνθεσία*, Philo, *De Merc. Mer.* 3.

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§ iii.—*μακροθυμία, ὑπομονή, ἀνοχή.*

*Μακροθυμία* and *ὑπομονή* occur together at Col. i. 11, where Chrysostom draws this distinction between them; that a man *μακροθυμεί*, who having power to avenge himself, yet refrains from the exercise of this power; while he *ὑπομένει*, who having no choice but to bear, and only the alternative of a patient or impatient bearing, has grace to choose the former. Thus the faithful, he implies, would commonly be called to exercise the former grace among themselves (1 Cor. vi. 7), the latter in respect of those that were without: *μακροθυμίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὑπομονήν πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω· μακροθυμεί γάρ τις πρὸς ἐκείνους οὗς δυνατὸν καὶ ἀμύνασθαι ὑπομένει δὲ οὗς οὐ δύναται ἀμύνασθαι.* This, however, will not endure a closer examination; for see decisively against it Heb. xii. 2, 3. He, to whom *ὑπομονή* is

there ascribed, bore, not certainly because He could not help bearing; for He might have summoned to his aid twelve legions of angels, if so He had willed (Matt. xxvi. 53). It may be well, therefore, to consider the words apart, and then to bring them into comparison, and try whether some more satisfactory distinction between them cannot be drawn.

*Μακροθυμία* is a word of the later periods of the Greek language. It occurs in the Septuagint (Jer. xv. 15), and in Plutarch (*Luc.* 32), although not in Plutarch exactly with the sense which in Scripture it bears. The long-suffering *of men* he prefers to express by *ἀνεξικακία* (*De Cap. ex In. Util.* 9), while for the grand long-suffering *of God* he has a noble word, of his own coining I believe, *μεγαλοπάθεια* (*De Ser. Num. Vind.* 5). The Church Latin rendered it by ‘longanimitas,’ which the Rheims Version sought to introduce into English in the shape of ‘longanimity,’ but without success; and this though Jeremy Taylor allowed and employed the word. We have preferred ‘long-suffering,’ and understand by it a long holding out of the mind before it gives room to action or passion—generally to passion. Anger usually, but not universally, is the passion thus long held aloof; the *μακρόθυμος* being one *βραδύς εἰς ὀργήν*, and the word exchanged for *κρατῶν ὀργῆς*, Prov. xvi. 32, and set over against *θυμώδης*,

Prov. xv. 18. At the same time it need not necessarily be wrath, which is thus excluded or set at a distance; for when the historian of the Maccabees describes how the Romans had won the world "by their policy and their *patience*" (1 Macc. viii. 4), *μακροθυμία* is that Roman persistency which would never make peace under defeat; cf. Plutarch, *Luc.* 32, 33; Isai. lvii. 15. The true antithesis to *μακροθυμία* in that sense is *ὄξυθυμία*, a word belonging to the best times of the language, and employed by Euripides (*Androm.* 729), as *ὄξύθυμος* by Aristotle (*Rhet.* ii. 12).

But *ὑπομονή*,—*βασιλις τῶν ἀρετῶν* Chrysostom calls it,—is that virtue which in heathen Ethics would be called more often by the name of *καρτερία* (the words are joined together, Plutarch, *Apoth. Lac. Ages.* 2), and which Clement of Alexandria, following in the track of some heathen moralists, describes as the knowledge of what things are to be borne and what are not (*ἐπιστήμη ἐμμενετέων καὶ οὐκ ἐμμενετέων*, *Strom.* ii. 18; cf. Plutarch, *De Plac. Phil.* iv. 23), being the Latin 'perseverantia' and 'patientia'<sup>1</sup> both in one, or more accurately still

<sup>1</sup> These two Cícero (*De Inven.* ii. 54) thus defines: '*Patientia* est honestatis aut utilitatis causâ rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpressio; *perseverantia* est in ratione bene consideratâ stabilis et perpetua permansio.' Cf. Augustine, *Quæst.* LXXXIII. qu. 31.

‘tolerantia.’ ‘In this noble word *ὑπομονή* there always appears (in the N. T.) a background of *ἀνδρεία* (cf. Plato, *Theæt.* 177 *b*, where *ἀνδρικῶς ὑπομεῖναι* is opposed to *ἀνάνδρως φευγείν*); it does not mark merely the *endurance*, the ‘sustinentiam’ (Vulg.), or even the ‘patientiam’ (Clarom), but the ‘perseverantiam,’ the *brave* patience with which the Christian contends against the various hindrances, persecutions, and temptations that befall him in his conflict with the inward and outward world.’ (Elliott, on 1 Thess. i. 3.) Cocceius, too, (on Jam. i. 12) has described it well: ‘*Ἐπομονή* versatur in contemptu bonorum hujus mundi, et in forti susceptione afflictionum cum gratiarum actione; imprimis autem in constantiâ fidei et caritatis ut neutro modo quassari aut labefactari se patiat, aut impediri quominus opus suum et laborem suum efficiat.’

We may proceed now to draw a distinction between them; and this distinction, I believe, will hold good in all places where the words occur: *μακροθυμία* will be found to express patience in respect of persons, *ὑπομονή* in respect of things. The man *μακροθυμεῖ*, who, having to do with injurious persons, does not suffer himself easily to be provoked by them, or to blaze up into anger (2 Tim. iv. 2). The man *ὑπομένει*, who under a great siege of trials, bears up, and does not lose heart or courage (Rom. v. 3; 2 Cor. i. 6; cf. Clemens Rom. 1 *Ep.* 5).



We should speak, therefore, of the *μακροθυμία* of David (2 Sam. xvi. 10—13), the *ὑπομονή* of Job (Jam. v. 11). Thus, while both graces are ascribed to the saints, only *μακροθυμία* is an attribute of God; and there is a beautiful account of his *μακροθυμία*, though the word itself does not occur, at Wisd. xii. 20. Men may tempt and provoke Him, and He may and does display *μακροθυμία* in regard of them (Exod. xxxiv. 6; Rom. ii. 4; 1 Pet. iii. 20); there may be a resistance to God in *men*, because He respects the wills with which He has created them, even when those wills are fighting against Him. But there can be no resistance to God, nor burden upon Him, the Almighty, from *things*; therefore *ὑπομονή* cannot find place in Him, nor is it, as Chrysostom rightly observes, ever ascribed to Him; for it need hardly be observed that when God is called *Θεὸς τῆς ὑπομονῆς* (Rom. xv. 5), this does not mean, God whose own attribute *ὑπομονή* is, but God who gives *ὑπομονή* to his servants and saints, in the same way as *Θεὸς χάριτος* (1 Pet. v. 10) is God, who is the author of grace; *Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης* (Heb. xiii. 20) God, who is the author of peace. So Tittmann (p. 194): ‘*Θεὸς τῆς ὑπομονῆς, Deus qui largitur ὑπομονήν.*’

*Ἄνοχή*, used commonly in the plural in classical Greek, signifies, for the most part, ‘a truce or suspension of arms,’ the Latin ‘*indutiæ.*’ It is excel-

lently rendered 'forbearance' on the two occasions of its occurrence in the N. T. (Rom. ii. 4; iii. 26). Between it and *μακροθυμία* Origen draws the following distinction in his *Commentary on the Romans* (ii. 4)—the original, as is well known, is lost:—'*Sustentatio* [*ἀνοχή*] a *patientiâ* [*μακροθυμία*] hoc videtur differre, quod qui infirmitate magis quam proposito delinquant *sustentari* dicuntur; qui vero pertinaci mente velut exsultant in delictis suis, *ferrî patienter* dicendi sunt.' This does not hit off very successfully the difference. Rather the *ἀνοχή* is temporary, transient: we may say that, like the word 'truce,' it asserts its own temporary, transient character; that after a certain lapse of time, and unless other conditions intervene, it will pass away. This, it may be urged, is true of *μακροθυμία* no less; above all, of the divine *μακροθυμία*. But as much does not lie in the word; we may conceive of a *μακροθυμία*, though it would be worthy of little honour, which should never be exhausted; while *ἀνοχή* implies its own merely provisional character. Fritzsche (on Rom. ii. 4) distinguishes the words: '*ἡ ἀνοχή indulgentiam* notat quâ jus tuum non continuo exequutus, ei qui te læserit spatium des ad resipiscendum; *ἡ μακροθυμία clementiam* significat quâ iræ temperans delictum non statim vindices, sed ei qui peccaverit pœnitendi locum relinquas;' and see

p. 198, on Rom. iii. 26, where he draws the matter still better to a point: ‘*Indulgentia* (ἡ ἀνοχή) eo valet, ut in aliorum peccatis conniveas, non ut alicui peccata condones, quod *clementiæ* est;’ it is therefore fitly used at this last place in relation to the πάρεσις ἀμαρτίων which found place before the atoning death of Christ, as contrasted with the ἄφεσις ἀμαρτίων, which was the result of that death. It is that forbearance or suspense of wrath, that truce with the sinner, which by no means implies that the wrath will not be executed at the last; nay, involves that it certainly will, unless he be found under new conditions of repentance and obedience (Luke xiii. 9; Rom. ii. 13). The words are also distinguished, but the difference between them not very sharply drawn out, by Jeremy Taylor, in his first Sermon ‘*On the Mercy of the divine Judgments,*’ *in init.*

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§ iv.—Στρηνιάω, τρυφάω, σπαταλάω.

IN all these words lies the notion of excess, of wanton, dissolute, self-indulgent, prodigal living, but with a difference.

Στρηνιάω occurs only twice in the N. T. (Rev. xviii. 7, 9), στρηῆνος once (Rev. xviii. 3; cf. 2 Kin.

xix. 28), and the compound *καταστρηγιᾶν* as often (1 Tim. v. 11). It is a word of the New or Middle Comedy, and is used by Lycophron, as quoted in Athenæus (x. 420 b); by Sophilus (*ib.* iii. 100 a); and Antiphanes (*ib.* iii. 127 d); but rejected by the Greek purists—Phrynichus, indeed, affirming that none but one out of his senses would employ it, having *τρυφᾶν* at his command (Lobeck, *Phrynichus*, p. 381). They do however different work, and oftentimes one would be no substitute for the other, as will presently appear. *Τρυφᾶν*, which is thus so greatly preferred, is of solitary occurrence in the N. T. (Jam. v. 5), *ἐντρυφᾶν* (2 Pet. ii. 13) of the same; but belongs with *τρυφή* (Luke vii. 25; 1 Tim. v. 11; 2 Pet. ii. 13), to the best age and most classical writers in the language.

In *στρηγιᾶν* (= *ἀτακτεῖν*, Suidas; or *διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ὑβρίζειν*, Hesychius) is properly the insolence of wealth, the wantonness and petulance from fulness of bread; something of the Latin ‘lascivire.’ There is nothing of sybaritic effeminacy in it; so far from this that Pape connects *στρήγος* with ‘strenuus;’ and whether he does this correctly or no, there is at any rate always the notion of force, vigour, the German ‘Uebermuth,’ such as that displayed by the inhabitants of Sodom (Gen. xix. 4—9), implied in the word. On the other hand this of effeminacy, brokenness of spirit through self-in-

dulgence, is exactly the point from which *τρυφή* and *τρυφᾶν* (connected with *θρύπτειν* and *θρύψις*) start; thus *τρυφή καὶ χλιδή* (Philo, *De Merc. Meret.* § 2); *τρυφή καὶ πολυτέλεια* (Plutarch, *Marcus*, 3); cf. Suicer, *Thes.* s. v.; note too the company in which *τρυφή* is found (Plato, *Alcib.* i. 122 *b*); these words only running into the notion of the insolent as a secondary and rarer meaning. It is thus we find united *τρυφή* and *ὑβρις* (Strabo, vi. 1); *τρυφᾶν* and *ὑβρίζειν* (Plutarch, *Præc. Ger. Rep.* 3); and compare the line of Menander—

*ὑπερήφανόν που γίνεθ' ἢ λίαν τρυφή.*

It occasionally from thence passes forward into a good sense, and expresses the triumph and exultation of the saints of God (Chrysostom, *In Matt. Hom.* 67. 668; Isai. lxvi. 11; Ps. xxxv. 9).

*Σπαταλᾶν* (occurring only 1 Tim. v. 6; Jam. v. 5; cf. Ecclus. xxi. 17; Ezek. xvi. 49; Amos vi. 4, the last two being instructive passages), is more nearly allied to *τρυφᾶν*, with which at Jam. v. 5 it is associated, than with *στρηνιάν*, but it brings in the further notion of wastefulness (= *ἀναλίσκειν*, Hesychius), which, consistently with its derivation from *σπάω*, *σπαθᾶω*, is inherent in the word. Thus Hottinger: '*τρυφᾶν* deliciarum est, et exquisitæ voluptatis, *σπαταλᾶν* luxuriæ atque prodigalitatatis.' Tittmann: '*τρυφᾶν* potius mollitiam vitæ luxu-

riosæ, *σπαταλᾶν* petulantiam et prodigalitatem denotat.' Theile, who takes them in the reverse order, 'Componuntur tanquam antecedens et consequens; diffluere et dilapidare, luxuriare et lascivire.'

It will thus be seen that the *σπαταλᾶν* might properly be laid to the charge of the Prodigal, scattering his substance in riotous living (*ζῶν ἀσώτως*, Luke xv. 13); the *τρυφᾶν* to the rich man faring sumptuously every day (*εὐφραϊνόμενος καθ' ἡμέραν λαμπρῶς*, Luke xvi. 19); the *στρηγιᾶν* to Jeshurun when, waxing fat, he kicked (Deut. xxxii. 15).

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§ v.—*θλίψις, στενοχωρία.*

THESE words are often joined together. Thus *στενοχωρία*, occurring only four times in the N. T., occurs thrice in association with *θλίψις* (Rom. ii. 9; viii. 5; 2 Cor. vi. 4; cf. Isai. viii. 22; xxx. 6). So too the verbs *θλίβειν* and *στενοχωρεῖν*, 2 Cor. iv. 8; cf. Lucian, *Nigrin.* 13; Artemidorus, i. 79; ii. 37). From the antithesis of the last-mentioned scriptural passage, *θλιβόμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐ στενοχωρούμενοι*, and from the fact that wherever in the N. T. the two words occur together, *στενοχωρία* always occurs last, we may conclude that, whatever is the difference of meaning, *στενοχωρία* is the stronger word.

They indeed express very nearly the same thing, but under changed images. *Θλίψις*, which we find joined with *βάσανος*, Ezek. xii. 18, is properly pressure, ‘*pressura*,’ ‘*tribulatio*,’—which last in Church Latin had a metaphorical sense, and indeed belongs to Church Latin alone,—that which presses upon, or burdens the spirit—I should have said ‘angor,’ the more that Cicero (*Tusc.* iv. 8) explains this ‘*ægritudo premens*,’ but that the connexion of ‘angor’ with ‘Angst,’ ‘enge’ (see Grimm, *Wörterbuch*, s. v. Angst) makes it better to reserve this for *στενοχωρία*.

The proper meaning of this latter word is narrowness of room, confined space, ‘*angustiæ*,’ and then the painfulness of which this is the occasion: *ἀπορία στενή* and *στενοχωρία* occur together, Isai. viii. 22. It is used literally by Thucydides, vii. 70; being sometimes exchanged for *δυσχωρία*; by Plutarch (*Symp.* v. 6) set over against *ἀνεσις*: and in the Septuagint expresses the straitness of a siege (Deut. xxviii. 53, 57). It is once employed in a secondary and metaphorical sense in the O. T. (*στενοχωρία πνεύματος*, Wisd. v. 3), this being the only sense in which it is employed in the New. The fitness of this image is attested by the frequency with which on the other hand a state of joy is expressed in the Psalms and elsewhere as a bringing into a large room (*εὐρυχωρία*, Marcus Antoninus,

ix. 32), I do not know whether Aquinas intended an etymology, but he certainly uttered a truth, when he said, 'lætitia est quasi latitia;' compare the use of *πλατυσμός* by the Greek Fathers; as by Origen, *De Orat.* 30.

When, according to the ancient law of England, those who wilfully refused to plead, had heavy weights placed on their breasts, and were so pressed and crushed to death, this was literally *θλίψις*. When Bajazet, having been vanquished by Tamerlane, was carried about by him in an iron cage, this was *στενοχωρία*: or, as we do not know that any suffering there ensued from actual narrowness of room, we may more fitly adduce the *oubliettes* in which Louis the Eleventh shut up his victims; or the 'little-ease' by which, according to Lingard, the Roman Catholics in Queen Elizabeth's reign were tortured: 'it was of so small dimensions and so constructed, that the prisoners could neither stand, walk, sit, nor lie in it at full length.' The word 'little-ease' is not in our dictionaries, but grew in our early English to a common-place to express any condition of extreme discomfort.—For some considerations on the awful sense in which *θλίψις* and *στενοχωρία* shall be, according to St. Paul's words (Rom. ii. 9), alike the portion of the lost, see Gerhard, *Loc. Theoll.* xxxi. 6. 52.



§ vi.—ἀπλοῦς, ἀκέραιος, ἄκακος, ἄδολος.

IN this group of words we have some of the rarest and most excellent graces of the Christian character set forth; or perhaps, as it will rather prove, the same grace by aid of different images, and with only slightest shades of real difference.

‘*Ἀπλοῦς*’ occurs only twice in the N. T. (Matt. vi. 22; Luke xi. 34); but *ἀπλότης* seven times, or perhaps eight, always in St. Paul’s Epistles, and *ἀπλῶς* once (Jam. i. 5). It would be quite impossible to improve on ‘single’<sup>1</sup> by which our Translators have rendered it, being as it is from *ἀπλώω*, ‘expando,’ ‘explico,’ that which is *spread out*, and thus without folds or wrinkles; exactly opposed to the *πολύπλοκος* of Job v. 13; cf. ‘simplex’ (not ‘sine plicis’ ‘without folds;’ but ‘one-folded,’ ‘einfaltig,’ see Donaldson, *Varronianus*, p. 390), which is its exact representative in Latin, and a word, like it, in honourable use. This notion of singleness, simplicity, absence of folds, which thus lies according to its etymology in *ἀπλοῦς*, is also the prominent one in its use—‘animus alienus a ver-

<sup>1</sup> See the learned note in Fritzsche’s *Commentary on the Romans*, vol. iii. p. 64, denying that *ἀπλότης* has ever the meaning of liberality, which our Translators have so often given it.

sutiâ, fraude, simulatione, dolo malo, et studio nocendi aliis' (Suicer).

That all this lies in the word is manifest from those with which we find it connected, as ἀπόνηρος (Theophrastus); γενναῖος (Plato, *Rep.* 361 *b*); ἄκρατος (Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 48); ἀσύνθετος, 'incompositus,' not put together (id. *ib.*; Basil, *Adv. Eunom.* i. 23); μονότροπος (id. *Hom. in Prin. Prov.* § 7); σαφής (Alexis, in Meineke's *Frag. Com.* p. 750). But it is still more apparent from the words to which it is opposed, as ποικίλος (Plato, *Theæt.* 146 *d*); πολυειδής (*Phædrus*, 270 *d*); πολύτροπος (*Hipp. Min.* 364 *e*); πεπλεγμένος (Aristotle, *Poët.* 13); διπλοῦς (*ib.*); παντοδαπός (Plutarch, *Quom. Ad. ab Am.* 7). Ἀπλότης (see 1 Macc. i. 37) is in like manner associated with εἰλικρίνεια (2 Cor. i. 12), with ἀκακία (Philo, *Opif.* § 41); the two words being used indiscriminately in the Septuagint to render the Hebrew, which we translate now 'integrity' (Ps. vii. 8; Prov. xix. 1); now 'simplicity' (2 Sam. xv. 11); again with μεγαλοψυχία (Josephus, *Antt.* vii. 13. 4), with ἀγαθότης (Wisd. i. 1); is opposed to ποικιλία (Plato, *Rep.* 404 *e*), to πολυτροπία, to κακουργία (Theophylact), to κακοθήθεια (Theodoret), to δόλος (Aristophanes, *Plut.* 1158). It may further be observed that ⲙⲛ (Gen xxv. 17) which the Septuagint renders ἄπλαστος, Aquila has rendered ἀπλοῦς. As is the case with

at least one other word of the group, and with multitudes of others expressive of the same ethical qualities, *ἀπλοῦς* comes often to be used of a foolish simplicity, unworthy of the Christian, who with all his simplicity should be *φρόνιμος* as well. It is so used by Basil the Great, *Ep.* 58.

*Ἀκέραιος* (not in the Septuagint) occurs only three times in the N. T. (Matt. x. 16; Rom. xvi. 19; Phil. ii. 15). A mistaken etymology, namely, that it was = *ἀκέρατος*, and derived from *ἀ* and *κέρας* (cf. *κεραΐζειν*, 'lædere'), without horn to push or hurt,—one into which even Bengel falls, who at Matt. x. 16 has this note: '*ἀκέραιοι*: sine cornu, unguâ, dente, aculeo,'—has caused our Translators on two of these occasions to render it 'harmless.' In each case, however, they have put a more correct rendering, 'simple' in St. Matthew, 'sincere' in Philippians, in the margin. At Rom. xvi. 19 all is reversed, and 'simple' stands in the text, with 'harmless' in the margin. The fundamental notion of *ἀκέραιος*, as of *ἀκήρατος*, which has the same derivation from *ἀ* and *κεράννυμι*, is the absence of foreign admixture: *ὁ μὴ κεκραμένος κακοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀπλοῦς καὶ ἀποίκιλος* (Etym. Mag.). Thus Philo, speaking of a boon which Caligula granted to the Jews, but with harsh conditions annexed, styles it a *χάρις οὐκ ἀκέραιος*, with manifest reference to this its etymology (*De Leg. ad Cai.*, 42); '*ὅμως, μέντοι*'

καὶ τὴν χάριν διδοὺς, ἔδωκεν οὐκ ἀκέραιον, ἀλλ' ἀναμίξας αὐτῇ δέος ἀργαλεώτερον.' It is joined by Plato with ἀβλαβής (*Rep.* i. 342 b), and with ὀρθός (*Polit.* 268 b); by Plutarch with ὑγιής (*Adv. Stoic.* 31); by Clemens Romanus (1 Cor. ii.) with εἰλικρινής. That, we may say, is ἀκέραιος, which is in its true and natural condition (Josephus, *Antt.* i. 2. 2) 'integer;' in this bordering on ὀλόκληρος, although completeness in all the parts is there the predominant idea, and not, as here, immunity from disturbing elements.

The word which we have next to consider, ἄκακος, is to be found only twice in the N. T. (*Heb.* vii. 26; *Rom.* xvi. 18). There are three stages in its history, two of which are sufficiently marked by its use in these two places; for the third we must seek elsewhere. It is used in its very highest sense, predicating in Him to whom it is there applied that absence of all evil which implies the presence of all good, at *Heb.* vii. 26, being associated there with other noblest epithets, and employed of the Son of God Himself. The Septuagint, which knows all uses of ἄκακος, employs it sometimes in this nobler sense: thus at *Job* viii. 20, the ἄκακος is opposed to the ἀσεβής; and at *Ps.* xxiv. 21 is joined to the εὐθής, as by Plutarch (*Quom. in Virt. Prof.* 7) to the σώφρων. The word at its next stage expresses the same

absence of all harm, but now contemplated more negatively than positively: thus ἀρνίον ἄκακον (Jer. xi. 19); παιδίσκη νέα καὶ ἄκακος (Plutarch, *Virt. Mul.* 23). The N. T. does not supply an example of the word at this its second stage. The process by which it comes to signify easily deceived, and then *too* easily deceived, and ἀκακία, simplicity running into an excess (Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 12), is not difficult to trace. He who himself means no evil to others, oftentimes fears no evil from others; conscious of truth in his own heart, he believes truth in the hearts of all; a noble quality, yet in a world such as ours capable of being pushed too far, where, if in malice we are to be children, yet in understanding to be men (1 Cor. xiv. 20; cf. Matt. x. 16); if "simple concerning evil," yet "wise unto that which is good" (Rom. xvi. 19). The word, as employed Rom. xvi. 18, already indicates this confidence beginning to degenerate into a credulous openness to the being deceived and led away from the truth (θαυμαστικοὶ καὶ ἄκακοι, Plutarch, *De Rect. Rat. Aud.* 7; cf. Wisd. iv. 12; Prov. i. 4; xiv. 15; ἄκακος πιστεύει παντὶ λόγῳ). For a somewhat contemptuous use of ἄκακος, see Plato, *Timæus*, 91 *d*, and Stallbaum's note; but above all, the words which the author of the *Second Alcibiades* puts into Socrates' mouth (140 *c*): τοὺς μὲν πλείστον αὐτῆς [ἀφροσύνης] μέρος ἔχοντας μαινομένους καλοῦμεν, τοὺς

δ' ὀλίγον ἔλαττον ἡλιθίους καὶ ἐμβροντήτους· οἱ δὲ ἐν εὐφημοτάτοις ὀνόμασι βουλόμενοι κατονομάζειν οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους, οἱ δὲ εὐήθεις, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀκάκους καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ ἐνεούς.

The second and third of these meanings of ἄκακος run so much into one another, are divided by so slight and vanishing a line, that it is not wonderful if some find rather two stages in the word's use than three; Basil the Great, for example, whose words are worth quoting (*Hom. in Princ. Prov.* § 11): Διττῶς νοοῦμεν τὴν ἀκακίαν. Ἡ γὰρ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἀλλοτρίωσιν λογισμῷ κατορθουμένην, καὶ διὰ μακρᾶς προσοχῆς καὶ μελέτης τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἶόν τινα ρίζαν τῆς κακίας ἐκτεμόντες, κατὰ στέρησιν αὐτῆς παντελῆ, τὴν τοῦ ἀκάκου προσηγορίαν δεχόμεθα· ἡ ἀκακία ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ πω τοῦ κακοῦ ἐμπειρία διὰ νεότητα πολλάκις ἢ βίου τινὸς ἐπιτήδευσιν, ἀπείρων τινῶν πρὸς τινὰς κακίας διακειμένων. Οἶον εἰσὶ τινες τῶν τὴν ἀγροικίαν οἰκοῦντων, οὐκ εἰδότες τὰς ἐμπορικὰς κακουργίας οὐδὲ τὰς ἐν δικαστηρίῳ διαπλοκάς. Τοὺς τοιούτους ἀκάκους λέγομεν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκ προαιρέσεως τῆς κακίας κεχωρισμένους, ἀλλ' ὡς μὴ πω εἰς πείραν τῆς πονηρᾶς ἕξεως ἀφυγμένους. From all this it will be seen that ἄκακος has in fact run the same course, and has the same history as ἀπλοῦς, εὐήθης, with which it is often joined (as by Diodorus Siculus, v 66), 'bon' (Jean le Bon = l'étourdi), 'bonhomme,' 'silly,' 'simple,' 'einfaltig,' and many more.

The last word of this beautiful group, *ἄδολος*, occurs only once in the N. T. (1 Pet. ii. 2), and is there beautifully translated ‘sincere,’—“the *sincere* milk of the word;” see the early English use of ‘sincere’ as unmixed, unadulterated; and compare, for that milk of the word which would *not* be sincere, 2 Cor. iv. 2. It does not appear in the Septuagint, but *ἀδόλως* once (Wisd. vii. 13). Plato joins it with *ὑγιής* (*Ep.* viii. 355 *e*); Philemo (Meineke, *Fragm. Com.* p. 843) with *γνήσιος*. It is difficult to indicate an ethical province for this word, on which the others of the group have not encroached, or, more truly, which they have not occupied already. It is indeed impossible. We can only regard it as setting forth the same excellent grace under another image, or on another side. Thus if the *ἄκακος* has nothing of the serpent’s *tooth*, the *ἄδολος* has nothing of the serpent’s *guile*; if the absence of willingness to hurt, the malice of our fallen nature, is predicated of the *ἄκακος*, the absence of its fraud and deceit is predicated of the *ἄδολος*, the Nathanael “in whom is no guile” (John i. 47). And finally, to sum up all, we may say, that as the *ἄκακος* (= ‘innocens’) has no harmfulness in him, and the *ἄδολος* (= ‘sincerus’) no guile, so the *ἀκέραιος* (= ‘integer’) no admixture, and the *ἁπλοῦς* (= ‘simplex’) no folds.

§ vii.—*χρόνος, καιρός.*

THESE words occur together in several places of the N. T., but always in the plural, *χρόνοι καὶ καιροί* (Acts i. 7; 1 Thess. v. 1); and not unfrequently in the Septuagint, Wisd. vii. 18; viii. 8 (both instructive passages); Dan. ii. 21; and in the singular, Eccles. iii. 1; Dan. vii. 12 (but in this last passage the reading is doubtful). Grotius (on Acts i. 7) conceives the difference between them to consist merely in the greater length of the *χρόνοι* as compared with the *καιροί*, and writes: ‘*χρόνοι* sunt majora temporum spatia ut anni: *καιροί* minora ut menses et dies.’ Compare Bengel: ‘*χρόνων* partes *καιροί*.’ This, if not inaccurate, is insufficient, and altogether fails to reach the heart of the matter.

*Χρόνος* is time, simply contemplated as such; the succession of moments (Matt. xxv. 19; Rev. x. 6; Heb. iv. 7); *αἰῶνος εἰκὼν κινήτη*, Plato calls it (*Timæus*, 37 d); *διάστημα τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κινήσεως*, Philo (*De Mund. Op.* 7); the German ‘*Zeitraum*,’ as distinguished from ‘*Zeitpunkt*.’ Thus Severianus (Suicer, *Thes.* s. v.): *χρόνος μῆκός ἐστι, καιρός εὐκαιρία. Καιρός*, derived from *κείρω*, as ‘*tempus*’ from ‘*temno*,’ is time as it brings forth its several births; thus *καιρὸς θερισμοῦ* (Matt. xiii. 30); *καιρὸς σύκων* (Mark xi. 13); Christ died *κατὰ καιρόν* (Rom.



v. 6); and, above all, compare Eccles. iii. 1—8. *Χρόνος*, it will be seen from this, embraces all possible *καιροί*, and being the larger, more inclusive word, may be often used where *καιρός* would have been equally suitable, though not *vice versâ*; thus *χρόνος τοῦ τεκεῖν*, the time of bringing forth (Luke i. 37); *πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου* (Gal. iv. 4), the fulness, or the ripeness, of the time for the manifestation of the Son of God, when we should before have rather expected *τοῦ καιροῦ*, or *τῶν καιρῶν*, which last phrase does actually occur Ephes. i. 10. So, too, there is every reason to think that the *χρόνοι ἀποκαταστάσεως* of Acts iii. 21 are identical with the *καιροὶ ἀναψύξεως* of the verse preceding. Thus it is possible to speak of the *καιρὸς χρόνου*, and Sophocles (*Elect.* 1292) does so:

*χρόνου γὰρ ἂν σοι καιρὸν ἐξείργῃς λόγος,*

but not of the *χρόνος καιροῦ*; cf. Olympiodorus (Suicer, *Thes.* s. v. *χρόνος*): *χρόνος μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ διάστημα καθ' ὃ πράττεται τι· καιρὸς δὲ ὁ ἐπιτήδειος τῆς ἐργασίας χρόνος· ὥστε ὁ μὲν χρόνος καὶ καιρὸς εἶναι δύναται· ὁ δὲ καιρὸς οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλ' εὐκαιρία τοῦ πραττομένου ἐν χρόνῳ γινομένη. Ammonius: ὁ μὲν καιρὸς δηλοῖ ποιότητα χρόνου, χρόνος δὲ ποσότητα.*

From what has been said, it will be seen that when the Apostles ask the Lord, 'Wilt Thou at this

time restore again the kingdom to Israel?" and He makes answer, "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons" (*χρόνους ἢ καιρούς*, Acts i. 6, 7), 'the times' (*χρόνοι*) are, in Augustine's words, 'ipsa spatia temporum,' the spaces of time, contemplated merely under the aspect of its duration, over which the Church's history should extend; but 'the seasons' (*καιροί*) are the joints, the articulations, in this time, the critical epoch-making periods fore-ordained of God (*καιροὶ προτεταγμένοι*, Acts vii. 26), when all which has been slowly, and often unmarkedly, ripening through long ages, is mature and comes to the birth in grand decisive events, which constitute at once the close of one period and the commencement of another; such, for example, was the recognition of Christianity as the religion of the Roman Empire; such the conversion of the Germanic tribes settled within the limits of the Empire; such the great revival which went along with the first institution of the Mendicant Orders; such, by still better right, the Reformation; such, above all, the second coming of the Lord (Dan. vii. 22).

It would seem as if the Latin had no word by which exactly to render *καιροί*. Augustine complains of this (*Ep.* excvii. 2): 'Græce legitur *χρόνους ἢ καιρούς*. Nostri autem utrumque hoc verbum tempora appellant, sive *χρόνους*, sive

*καιρούς*, cum habeant hæc duo inter se non neglegendam differentiam; *καιρούς* quippe appellant Græce tempora quædam, non tamen quæ in spatiis voluminibus transeunt, sed quæ in rebus ad aliquid opportunis vel importunis sentiuntur, sicut messis, vindemia, calor, frigus, pax, bellum, et si qua similia: *χρόνους* autem ipsa spatia temporum vocant.' Bearing out this complaint of his, we find in the Vulgate the most various renderings of *καιροί*, as often as it occurs in combination with *χρόνοι*, and cannot therefore be rendered by 'tempora,' which *χρόνοι* has generally preoccupied.<sup>1</sup> Thus 'tempora et momenta' (Acts i. 7; 1 Thess. v. 1), 'tempora et ætates' (Dan. ii. 21), 'tempora et sæcula' (Wisd. viii. 8); while a modern Latin commentator on the N. T. has 'tempora et articuli;' Bengel, 'intervalla et tempora.' It might be urged that 'tempora et opportunitates' would fulfil all conditions. This, however, is not so. Augustine has anticipated this suggestion, but only to acknowledge its insufficiency, on the ground that 'opportunitas' (= 'opportunum tempus') is a *convenient*, favourable season, *εὐκαιρία*; while the *καιρός* may be the most inconvenient, most unfavourable of all, the essential notion of it being that it is the critical

<sup>1</sup> Yet not perhaps very correctly, for in the common Latin phrase 'dies tempusque,' it is *dies* which answers to *χρόνος*, and *tempus* to *καιρός*; see Döderlein, *Lat. Syn.* iv. 267.

nick of time ; but whether, as such, to make or to mar, effectually to help or effectually to hinder, the word determines not at all ('sive opportuna, sive importuna sint tempora, καιροί dicuntur').

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§ viii.—φέρω, φορέω.

ON the distinction between these words Lobeck (*Phrynichus*, p. 585) has the following remarks : 'Inter φέρω et φορέω hoc interesse constat, quod illud actionem simplicem et transitoriam, hoc autem actionis ejusdem continuationem significat; verbi causâ ἀγγελίην φέρειν, est alicujus rei nuncium afferre, Herod. iii. 53 et 122; v. 14; ἀγγελίην φορέειν, iii. 34, nuncii munere apud aliquem fungi. Hinc et φορεῖν dicimur ea quæ nobiscum circumferimus, quibus amicti indutique sumus, ut ἱμάτιον, τριβώνιον, δακτύλιον φορεῖν, tum quæ ad habitum corporis pertinent.' He proceeds, however, to acknowledge that this is a rule by no means constantly observed even by the best Greek authors. It is, therefore, the more noticeable, as an example of the accuracy which so often takes us by surprise in the use of words by the writers of the N. T., that this rule is there exactly observed. The only places where φορεῖν occurs are the following, Matt. xi. 8;

John xix. 5; Rom. xiii. 4; 1 Cor. xv. 49, *bis*; Jam. ii. 3; and in all these it expresses, not an accidental and temporary, but a regular and continuous bearing. ‘Sic enim differt φορεῖν a φέρειν ut hoc sit *ferre*, illud *ferre solere*’ (Fritzsche on Matt. xi. 8). Cf. Prov. iii. 16, where of the heavenly Wisdom it is said, νόμον δὲ καὶ ἔλεον ἐπὶ γλώσσης φορεῖ—she bears these on her tongue, and bears them evermore.

A sentence in Plutarch (*Apoth. Reg.*), in which both words occur, illustrates very well their different uses: of Xerxes he records, ὀργισθεὶς δὲ Βαβυλωνίοις ἀποστᾶσι, καὶ κρατήσας, προσέταξεν ὄπλα μὴ φέρειν, ἀλλὰ ψάλλειν καὶ αὐλεῖν καὶ πορνοβοσκεῖν καὶ καπηλεύειν, καὶ φορεῖν κολπωτοὺς χιτῶνας. Arms would only be borne at intervals, therefore φέρειν; but garments are habitually worn, therefore this is in the second clause exchanged for φορεῖν.

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§ ix.—κοσμός, αἰών.

THE first of these words our Translators have, I believe, always rendered ‘world;’ and the second often, though by no means exclusively, so; thus (not to speak of εἰς αἰῶνα) see Ephes. ii. 2, 7; Col. i. 26. It is certainly a question whether we might

not have made more use of 'age' in our Version : we have employed it but rarely,—only, indeed, in the two places which I have cited last. 'Age' may sound to us inadequate now ; but it is quite possible that, so used, it would little by little have expanded and acquired a larger, deeper meaning than it now possesses. One cannot but regret that by this or some other like device, our Translators did not mark the difference between words conveying, to a considerable extent, different ideas; *κόσμος* being the world contemplated under aspects of space, *αἰών* under aspects of time,—*κόσμος* 'mundus,' and *αἰών* 'seculum;' for the Latin, like the Greek, has two words, where we have, or have acted as though we had, but one. In all those passages, such as Matt. xiii. 39; 1 Cor. x. 11, which speak of the end or consummation of the *αἰών* (there are none which speak of the end of the *κόσμος*), as in others which speak of "the wisdom of this world" (1 Cor. ii. 6), "the god of this world" (*ib.* iv. 4), "the children of this world" (Luke xvi. 8), it must be admitted that we are losers by the course which we have adopted.

*Κόσμος*, connected with *κόμειν*, 'comere,' 'compus,' is a word with a history of very great interest in more aspects than one. Suidas traces four successive significations through which the word passed: *σημαίνει δὲ ὁ κόσμος τέσσαρα, εὐπρέπειαν, τόδε*

τὸ πᾶν, τὴν τάξιν, τὸ πλῆθος παρὰ τῇ Γραφῇ. Having originally the meaning of ‘ornament,’ obtaining this meaning once in the N. T. (1 Pet. iii. 3; cf. Ecclus. xliii. 9), from this it passed to that of ‘order,’ ‘arrangement,’ (‘lucidus ordo’) ‘beauty,’ as springing out of these; εὐπρέπεια and τάξις, as Suidas gives it above, or as Hesychius, καλλωπισμός, κατασκευή, τάξις, κατάστασις, κάλλος. Pythagoras is said to have been the first who transferred and applied the word to the sum total of the material universe, desiring thereby to express his sense of the beauty and order which everywhere reigned in it; see Plutarch, *De Plac. Phil.* i. 5; and for a history of this transfer, a note in Humboldt’s *Cosmos*. ‘Mundus’ in Latin,—‘digestio et ordinatio singularum quarumque rerum formatarum et distinctarum,’ Augustine (*De Gen. ad Lit.* c. 3) calls it,—followed, as is familiar to all, in the same track; giving occasion to plays of words, such as ‘O munde immunde,’ in which the same great Church teacher delights. Thus Pliny (*H. N.* ii. 3): ‘Quem κόσμον Græci nomine ornamenti appellaverunt, cum nos a perfectâ absolutâque elegantîâ mundum;’ cf. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 22. From this signification of κόσμος as the material world, which is not uncommon in Scripture (Matt. xiii. 35; John xxi. 25; Rom. i. 20), followed that of κόσμος as the sum total of the men living in the world (John i. 29 ·

iv. 42; 2 Cor. v. 19), and then upon this, and ethically, those not of the ἐκκλησία,<sup>1</sup> the alienated from the life of God (John i. 10; 1 Cor. i. 20, 21; Jam. iv. 4; 1 John iii. 13). On this threefold use of κόσμος, and the serious confusions which, if not carefully watched against, may arise therefrom, see Augustine, *Con. Jul. Pel.* vi. § 3, 4.

But αἰών, connected with αἰεί, though scarcely αἰὲν ὄν (Aristotle), has in like manner a primary, and then, superinduced on this, a secondary and ethical, sense. In its primary, it signifies time, short or long, in its unbroken duration; oftentimes in classical Greek the duration of a human life (= βίος, for which it is exchanged, Xenophon, *Cyrop.* iii. 3. 24); but essentially time as the condition under which all created things exist, and the measure of their existence. Thus Theodoret: ὁ αἰὼν οὐκ οὐσία τις ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀνυπόστατον χρῆμα, συμπαρομαρτοῦν τοῖς γεννητῆν ἔχουσι φύσιν. καλεῖται γὰρ αἰὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου συστάσεως μέχρι τῆς συντελείας διάστημα.—αἰὼν τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ τῇ κτιστῇ φύσει παρεξυγμένον διάστημα. But thus signifying time, it comes presently to signify all which exists in the world under conditions of time; 'die Totalität desjenigen, was sich in der Dauer der

<sup>1</sup> Origen indeed (*in Joan.* vi. 38) mentions some one in his day who interpreted κόσμος as the Church, being as it is the ornament of the world (κόσμος οὐσα τοῦ κόσμου).



Zeit äusserlich darstellt, die Welt, so fern sie sich in der Zeit bewegt' (Bleek); and then, more ethically, the course and current of this world's affairs. This course and current being full of sin, it is nothing wonderful that *αἰὼν οὗτος*, like *κόσμος*, acquires presently in Scripture an evil significance; the *βασιλείαι τοῦ κόσμου* of Matt. iv. 8 are *βασιλείαι τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου* in Ignatius (*Ep. ad Rom.* 6); God has delivered us by his Son *ἐξ ἐνεστῶτος αἰῶνος πονηροῦ* (Gal. i. 4); Satan is *θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου* (2 Cor. iv. 4); cf. Ignatius, *Ep. ad Magn.* 1: *ὁ ἀρχῶν τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*); sinners walk *κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, too weakly translated in our Version, as in all preceding, "*the course of this world*" (Ephes. ii. 2). The last is a specially instructive passage, seeing that in it both the words which we are discriminating occur together; Bengel excellently remarking, '*αἰὼν et κόσμος differunt. Ille hunc regit et quasi informat: κόσμος est quidam exterius, αἰὼν subtilius. Tempus [= αἰὼν] dicitur non solum physice, sed etiam moraliter, connotatâ qualitate hominum in eo viventium; et sic αἰὼν dicit longam temporum seriem, ubi ætas mala malam ætatem excipit.*' Compare Windischmann (on Gal. i. 4): '*αἰὼν darf aber durchaus nicht bloss als Zeit gefasst werden, sondern begreift alles in der Zeit befangene; die Welt und ihre Herrlichkeit, die Menschen und ihr natürliches unerlöstes Thun und*

Treiben in sich, im Contraste zu dem hier nur beginnenden, seiner Sehnsucht und Vollendung nach aber jenseitigen und ewigen, Reiche des Messias.' We speak of 'the times,' attaching to the word an ethical signification; or, still more to the point, 'the age,' 'the spirit or genius of the age,' 'der Zeitgeist.' All that floating mass of thoughts, opinions, maxims, speculations, hopes, impulses, aims, at any time current in the world, which it is impossible to seize and accurately define, but which constitute a most real and effective power, being the moral, or immoral, atmosphere which at every moment of our lives we inhale, again inevitably to exhale,—all this is included in the *αἰών*, which is, as Bengel expressed it, the subtle, informing spirit of the *κόσμος*, or world of men who are living alienated and apart from God. 'Seculum,' in Latin, has acquired the same sense, as in that well-known phrase of Tacitus (*Germ.* 19), 'Corrumpere et corrumpi seculum vocatur.'

While it is thus with *αἰών* in all the other passages where it occurs in the N. T., it must be freely admitted that there are two in the Epistle to the Hebrews which constitute exceptions to the explanation here given, and to the distinction here drawn between it and *κοσμός*, namely i. 2 and xi. 8. In both of these *αἰῶνες* are the worlds contemplated, if not entirely, yet beyond question mainly, under

other aspects than those of time. Some, indeed, especially modern Socinian expositors, though not without forerunners who had no such motives as theirs, have attempted to explain *αἰῶνες* in the first of these passages, as the successive dispensations, the *χρόνοι καὶ καιροί* of the divine economy. But whatever doubt might have existed, had this verse stood alone, the parallel xi. 3 is decisive, that the *αἰῶνες* can only be, as we have rendered the word, 'the worlds,' and not 'the ages.' I have said these two are the only exceptions, for I cannot accept 1 Tim. i. 17 as a third; where *αἰῶνες* seems to denote, not 'the worlds' in the usual concrete meaning of the term, but, according to the more usual *temporal* meaning of *αἰών* in the N. T., 'the ages,' the temporal periods whose sum and aggregation adumbrate the conception of eternity. The *βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων* will thus be the sovereign dispenser and disposer of the ages of the world (see Ellicott, *in loco*).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Our English 'world,' as far as the etymology goes, more nearly represents *αἰών* than *κόσμος*. The old 'weralt,' or 'weralti' (in modern German 'welt'), is composed of two words, 'wer,' man, and 'alti, age or generation. The ground-meaning, therefore, of 'weralt' is generation of men. Out of this expression of time unfolds itself that of space, as *αἰών* passed into the meaning of *κόσμος* (Grimm, *Deutsche Myth.* p. 752); but in the earliest German records it is used, first as an expression of time, and only derivatively as one of space. See Rudolf von Raumer, *Die Einwirkung des Christenthums auf die Alt hochdeutsche Sprache*, 1845, p. 375.

§ X.—*νέος, καινός.*

WE translate both these words by the one English word 'new,' and there are those who deny that any difference can in the New Testament be traced between them. They derive a certain plausible support for this assertion from the fact that manifestly *νέος* and *καινός* oftentimes are interchangeably used; thus *νέος ἄνθρωπος* (Col. iii. 10), 'the new man,' and *καινός ἄνθρωπος* (Eph. ii. 15), 'the new man' also; *νέα διαθήκη* (Heb. xii. 24) and *καινή διαθήκη* (Heb. ix. 15), both 'a new covenant;' *νέος οἶνος* (Matt. ix. 17) and *καινός οἶνος* (Matt. xxvi. 29). The words, it is urged, are evidently of the same force and significance. But this does not follow, and in fact is not so. The same covenant may be qualified as *νέα* or *καινή*, but it is contemplated from a different point of view, according as it has one epithet applied to it or the other. It is the same in the other instances adduced: the same man, or the same wine, may be *νέος* or *καινός*; but a different notion is predominant according as the one epithet is applied or the other, and it will not be hard presently to demonstrate as much.

Contemplate the new under the aspects of *time*, as that which has more recently come into exist-

ence, and this is νέος (see Pott, *Etymol. Forsch.* 2d ed. vol. i. p. 290—292). Thus the young are continually οἱ νέοι, or οἱ νεώτεροι, the generation which has lately sprung up; so, too, νέοι θεοί, the younger race of gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and other Olympians (*Æschylus, Prom. Vinc.* 991, 996), as set over against Saturn, Ops, and the dynasty of elder deities whom they had dethroned. But contemplate the new, not under the aspect of *time*, but of *quality*, the new, as set over against that which has seen service, the outworn, the exhausted or marred through age, and this is καινός: thus καινὸν ἱμάτιον (Luke v. 36), ‘a new garment,’ as contrasted with one threadbare and outworn; καινοὶ ἀσκοί, ‘new wine-skins’ (Matt. ix. 17; John ix. 19); and in this sense, καινὸς οὐρανός (2 Pet. iii. 13), ‘a new heaven,’ as set over against that which has waxen old, and shows signs of decay and dissolution (Heb. i. 11, 12). In like manner, καινὰ γλῶσσαι (Mark xvi. 17) does not express the recent commencement of this miraculous speaking with tongues, but the unlikeness of these tongues to any that went before, therefore called also ἕτεραι γλῶσσαι (Acts ii. 4), tongues different from any hitherto known. Thus also, that καινὸν μνημεῖον, in which Joseph of Arimathea laid the body of our Lord (Matt. xxvii. 60), is not one lately hewn from the rock, but one which had never yet been used, in which no other

dead had ever lain, making the place ceremonially unclean (Matt. xxiii. 27). It might have been hewn out a hundred years before, and would thus have forfeited its right to the epithet *νέος*, but if never turned to use before it would be *καινός* still. That it should be so was part of that divine decorum which ever attended the Lord in the midst of the humiliations of His earthly life (cf. Luke xix. 30; 1 Sam. vi. 7; 2 Kin. ii. 20).

It will be seen from what has been said that *καινός* will often, as a secondary notion, imply praise, for the new is commonly better than the old; thus, everything is new in heaven, "the new Jerusalem" (Rev. iii. 12); "a new song" (v. 9); "a new heaven and new earth" (xxi. 1, cf. 2 Pet. iii. 13); "all things new" (xxi. 5). But this not of necessity; for it is not always, and in everything, that the new is better, but sometimes the old; thus, the old friend (Ecclus. ix. 10), and the old wine (Luke v. 39), are better than the new. And in many other cases *καινός* may express only the novel and strange, as contrasted, and that unfavourably, with the known and the familiar. Thus I observed just now that *νέοι θεοί* was a title given to the younger generation of gods; but when it was brought as a charge against Socrates that he had sought to introduce *καινούς θεούς*, or *καινὰ δαιμόνια* into Athens (Plato, *Apol.* 26 b, cf. *ξένα δαι-*

μόνια, Acts xvii. 18), something quite different from this was meant—a novel pantheon, such gods as Athens had not hitherto been accustomed to worship. So, too, they who exclaim of Christ's teaching, "What new doctrine [καινὴ διδαχὴ] is this?" mean anything but praise (Mark i. 27).

Follow up these words into their derivatives and compounds, and it will be found that the same distinction comes yet more clearly out: thus, νεότης (1 Tim. iv. 12) is youth; καινότης (Rom. vi. 4) is newness; νεοειδής, of youthful appearance; καινοειδής, of novel unusual appearance; νεολογία (if there had existed such a word) would have been, a younger growth of words as contrasted with the old stock of the language, or, as we say, 'neologies;' καινολογία, which does exist in the later Greek, a novel anomalous invention of words, constructed on different principles from those which the language had recognized hitherto; φιλόνεος, a lover of youth (Lucian, *Amor.* 24); φιλόκαινος, a lover of novelty (Plutarch, *De Mus.* 12).

There is a passage in Polybius (v. 75, 4), as there are many elsewhere (Clement of Alexandria, *Pædag.* i. 5, will supply one), in which the words occur together; but neither in this are they employed as a mere rhetorical accumulation: each has its own special significance. Relating a stratagem by which the town of Selge was very nearly sur-

prised and taken, Polybius makes this observation, that, notwithstanding the many cities which have evidently been lost through the same device, we are, some way or other, still *new and young* in regard of similar deceits (*καινοί τινες αἰεὶ καὶ νέοι πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀπάτας πεφύκαμεν*), and ready to be deceived by them over again. Here *καινοί* is an epithet applied to men in respect to their rawness and inexperience, *νέοι* in respect to their youth. It is true that these two, inexperience and youth, go often together; thus *νέος* and *ἄπειρος* are joined by Plutarch (*De Rect. Rat. And.* 17); but this is not of necessity. An old man may be raw and unpractised in the affairs of the world, therefore *καινός*: there have been many young men, *νέοι* as regarded age, who were well skilled and exercised in these.

Apply the distinction here drawn, and it will be manifest that the same wine, or the same man, may be at once *νέος* and *καινός*, and yet different meanings may be, and may have been intended to be, conveyed, as the one word was used, or the other. Take for example the *νέος ἄνθρωπος* of Col. iii. 10, and the *καινὸς ἄνθρωπος* of Ephes. ii. 15. Contemplate under the aspect of time that mighty change which has found and is finding place in the man who has become obedient to the truth, and you will call him subsequently to this



change, *νέος ἄνθρωπος*: the old man in him, and it well deserves this name, for it dates as far back as Adam, has died; a new man has been born, who therefore is fitly called *νέος*. But, on the other hand, contemplate, not now under aspects of time, but of quality and condition, this same mighty transformation; behold the man who, through long contact with the world, inveterate habits of sinning, had grown outworn and old, casting off the old conversation, as the snake its shrivelled skin, coming forth again a new creation (*καινὴ κτίσις*), from his heavenly Maker's hands, with a *πνεῦμα καινόν* given to him (Ezek. xi. 18), and you have here the *καινὸς ἄνθρωπος*, one prepared to walk in newness of life (*ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς*, Rom. vi. 4) through the *ἀνακαινώσις* of the Spirit (Tit. iii. 5); compare the Epistle of Barnabas, 16, *ἐγενόμεθα καινοὶ, πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κτιζόμενοι*. Often as the words in this application would be interchangeable, yet there are also times when they would not be so. Take for instance the saying of Clement of Alexandria (*Pæd.* i. 6), *χρὴ γὰρ εἶναι καινὸς Λόγου καίνου μετεिल्ηφώτας*. How impossible it would be to substitute *νέος* or *νέου* here. Take, again, the verbs *ἀνανεοῦν* (Ephes. iv. 23), and *ἀνακαινοῦν* (Col. iv. 10). We have need *ἀνανεοῦσθαι*, and we have need *ἀνακαινοῦσθαι*. It is indeed the same mysterious process, to be brought about by the same almighty Agent;

but it is the same regarded from different points of view; *ἀνανεοῦσθαι*, to be made *young* again, *ἀνακαινοῦσθαι*, to be made *new* again.

Apply this in the other instances quoted above. New wine may be characterized as *νέος* or *καινός*, but from different points of view. As it is *νέος*, it is tacitly contrasted with the vintage of past years; as it is *καινός*, we may assume it austere and strong, in contrast with that which is *χρηστός*, sweet and mellow through age (Luke v. 39). So too, the Covenant of which Christ is the Mediator is a *διαθήκη νέα*, as compared with the Mosaic covenant, given nearly two thousand years before; it is a *διαθήκη καινή* as compared with the same, effete with age, and from which all vigour, energy, and strength had departed (Heb. viii. 13).

A Latin grammarian, drawing the distinction between ‘recens’ and ‘novus,’ has said, ‘Recens ad *tempus*, novum ad *rem* refertur.’ Substituting *νέος* and *καινός*, we might say, ‘*νέος* ad *tempus*, *καινός* ad *rem* refertur,’ and should thus grasp in a few words, easily remembered, the distinction between them at its central point.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lafage (*Dict. des Synonymes*, p. 798) claims the same distinction for ‘nouveau’ (= *νέος*), and ‘neuf’ (= *καινός*). ‘Ce qui est *nouveau* vient de paraître pour la première fois: ce qui est *neuf* vient d’être fait et n’a pas encore servi. Une invention est *nouvelle*, une expression *neuve*.’

§ xi.—μέθη, πότος, οἶνοφλυγία, κῶμος, κραιπάλη.

*Μέθη*, occurring in the N. T. at Luke xxi. 34; Rom. xiii. 13; Gal. v. 21; and *πότος*, found only at 1 Pet. iv. 3, are distinguishable as an abstract and a concrete. *Μέθη*, defined by Clement of Alexandria, ἀκράτου χρήσις σφοδροτέρα, is drunkenness (Joel i. 5; Ezek. xxxix. 19); *πότος* (= εὐωχία Hesychius, cf. Polybius, ii. 4. 6), the drinking bout, the symposium, not of necessity excessive (Gen. xix. 3; 2 Sam. iii. 20), which gives opportunity for this (1 Sam. xxv. 36; Xenophon, *Anab.* vii. 3, 13; ἐπεὶ προυχῶρει ὁ πότος). *Μέθη* is stronger and expresses a worse excess than *οἶνωσις*, from which it is distinguished by Plutarch, *De Garr.* 4; *Symp.* iii. 1.

The next word in this group, *οἶνοφλυγία*, occurs only 1 Pet. iv. 3, where we translate it "excess of wine," and never in the Septuagint; but *οἶνοφλυγῆν*, Deut. xxi. 20; Isai. lvi. 12. It is certainly a step in advance of *μέθη*, see Philo *De Ebriet.* 8; and *De Merc. Mer.* 1, where he names *οἶνοφλυγία* among the ὑβρεῖς ἔσχαται, and compare Xenophon (*Æcon.* i. 22); δούλοι λιχνειῶν, λαγνειῶν, οἶνοφλυγιῶν. In strict definition it is ἐπιθυμία οἴνου ἀπληστος (Andronicus of Rhodes), ἀπλήρωτος ἐπιθυμία,

as Philo (*Vit. Mos.* iii. 22) calls it; the German 'Trinksucht;' but we find it commonly used for a debauch. I know no single word which would better render it, being as it is an extravagant indulgence in potations long drawn out (see Basil, *Hom. in Ebriosos*, 7), such as may induce permanent mischiefs on the body (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* iii. 5. 15); as did for instance that fatal one to which Arrian, according to one report current in antiquity, inclines to ascribe the death of Alexander the Great (vii. 24. 25).

*Κῶμος* (used in the plural on the three occasions when it is found in the N. T.) rendered once 'rioting' (Rom. xiii. 13), and twice 'revelling' (Gal. v. 21; 1 Pet. iv. 3), may be said to unite in itself both these notions, namely, of riot, and of revelry. It is the Latin 'comissatio,' which, as is well known, is connected with *κωμάζειν*, not with 'comedo.' Thus, *κῶμος καὶ ἀσωτία* (2 Macc. vi. 4); *πότοι καὶ κῶμοι καὶ θαλῖαι ἄκαιροι* (Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 16; *ἐμμανεῖς κῶμοι* (Wisdom. xiv. 23); cf. Philo, *De Cher.* 27, where we have a striking description of the company which it and *μέθη* keep, of the other vices with which these are associated the most nearly. At the same time *κῶμος* is often in a more special sense the troop of drunken revellers ('comissantium agmen,' Blomfield, *Agamemnon* 1160, where the troop of Furies, as *drunk* with blood, obtain this

name), who at the late close of a revel, with garlands on their heads, and torches in their hands,<sup>1</sup> with shout and song<sup>2</sup> (*κῶμος καὶ βοά*, Plutarch, *Alexander*, 38), pass to the harlots' houses, or otherwise wander through the streets, with insult and wanton outrage for any whom they meet; cf. Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Græc.* p. 617. It is evident that Milton had the *κῶμος* in his eye in those lines of his—

‘when night

Darkens the streets, then wander forth the sons  
Of Belial, *flown with insolence and wine.*’

Plutarch (*Alex.* 37) characterized as a *κῶμος* the mad drunken march of Alexander and his army through Carmania, returning from their Indian expedition.

*Κραιπάλη*, the Latin ‘crapula,’ though with a more limited signification (*ἡ χθρσεινὴ μέθη*, Ammonius), is a word concerning the derivation of which nothing certain has been arrived at. We have rendered it ‘surfeiting’ at Luke xxi. 34, being the single occasion on which it occurs in the N. T. In

<sup>1</sup> εἶοικε ἐπὶ κῶμον βαιδίζειν.

*φαίνεται.*

*στεφανόν γέ τοι καὶ δᾶδ' ἔχων πορεύεται.*

Aristoph. *Plut.* 1040.

<sup>2</sup> Theophylact makes these songs themselves the *κῶμοι*, defining the word thus : τὰ μετὰ μέθης καὶ ὕβρεως ἄσματα.

the Septuagint it is never found, but the verb *κραιπαλάω* twice (Ps. lxxvii. 65; Isai. xxix. 9). ‘Fulsomeness,’ in the early sense of that word (see my *Select Glossary of English Words*, s. v. ‘fulsome’), would express it very well, with only the drawback that by ‘fulsomeness’ might be indicated the disgust and loathing from overfulness of meat as well as of wine, while *κραιπάλη* expresses only the latter; thus Plutarch, *Præc. San.* 11: *πλησμονὴ ἢ κραιπάλη*. It is, as Clement of Alexandria (*Pæd.* ii. 2) defines it, *ἡ ἐπὶ τῇ μέθῃ δυσαρέστησις καὶ ἀηδία*: and with it this series of words may fitly close.

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§ xii.—*καπηλεύω, δολόω.*

IN two passages, standing very near to one another in St. Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians, he avouches of himself that he is not “as many *who corrupt* (*καπηλεύοντες*) the word of God” (ii. 17); and presently again he disclaims being of them who can be accused of “*handling* the word of God *deceitfully*” (*δολοῦντες*, iv. 2); these being the only occasions on which either of these words is employed in the N. T. It is evident, not less from the context than from the character of the

words themselves, that the notions which they express must lie very near to one another; oftentimes it is said or assumed that they are absolutely identical, as by all translators who render the two Greek words in the same way; by the Vulgate, for instance, which has 'adulterantes' in both places; by Chrysostom, who explains *καπηλεύειν* as = *νοθεύειν*. But I am persuaded that, on nearer inspection, it will be found that while *καπηλεύοντες* covers all that *δολοῦντες* does, it also covers something more, and this, whether in the literal sense, or transferred figurative in which it is used by the Apostle; even as it is quite plain that our own Translators, whether with any very clear insight into the distinction between the words or not, certainly did not acquiesce in the obliteration of all distinction between them.

The history of *καπηλεύειν* is not difficult to trace. The *κάπηλος* is properly the huckster or petty trader, as set over against the *ἔμπορος* who sells his wares not in retail but in the gross. But while the word may be applied to *any* such pedlar, the *κάπηλος* is predominantly the vendor in retail of wine (Plato, *Gorg.* 518; Lucian, *Hermot.* 58). Exposed to many and strong temptations, into which it was easy for them to fall (Ecclus. xxvi. 29), as to mix their wine with water (Isai. i. 22), or otherwise to tamper with it, to sell it in short measure, these men so generally yielded to these

temptations, that *κάπηλος* and *καπηλεύειν*, like ‘caupo’ and ‘cauponari,’ became words of contempt; *καπηλεύειν* being the making of any shameful traffic and gain as the *κάπηλος* does (see Becker, *Charikles*, Leipzig, 1840, p. 256). But it will at once be evident that the *δολοῦν* is only one part of the *καπηλεύειν*, namely, the tampering with or sophisticating the wine by the admixture of alien matter, and does not suggest the fact that this is done with the purpose of making a disgraceful gain thereby. Nay, it might be urged that it only expresses partially the tampering itself, as the following extract from Lucian (*Hermotimus*, 59) would seem to say: οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀποδίδονται τὰ μαθήματα ὡσπερ οἱ κάπηλοι, κερασάμενοί γε οἱ πολλοὶ, καὶ δολώσαντες, καὶ κακομετροῦντες: for here the *δολοῦν* is only one part of the deceitful handling by the *κάπηλος* of the wares which he sells.

But whether this be worth urging or not, it is quite certain that, while in the one word there is only the simple falsifying, there is in the other the doing of this with the intention of obtaining shameful gain thereby. Surely here is a *moment* in the sin of the false teachers, which St. Paul, in disclaiming the *καπηλεύειν*, intended to disclaim for himself. He does in as many words most earnestly disclaim it in this same Epistle (xii. 14; cf. Acts xx. 33), and this the more earnestly, seeing that it



is continually noted in Scripture as a mark of false prophets and false apostles (for so does the meanest cleave to the highest, and untruthfulness in highest things expose to lowest temptations), that they, through covetousness, make merchandise of souls ; thus by St. Paul himself, Tit. i. 11 ; Phil. iii. 19 ; cf. 2 Pet. ii. 3, 14, 15 ; Jude 11, 16 ; Ezek. xiii. 19 ; and see Ignatius (the larger recension), where, no doubt with a reference to this passage, and showing how the writer understood it, the false teachers are denounced as *χρηματολαίλαπες*, as *χριστέμποροι*, *τὸν Ἰησοῦν πωλοῦντες, καὶ καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*. Surely we have here a difference which it is quite worth our while not to pass by unobserved. The Galatian false teachers were such as undoubtedly might have been charged as *δολοῦντες τὸν λόγον*, mingling, as they did, vain human traditions with the pure word of the Gospel ; building in hay, straw, and stubble with its silver, gold, and precious stones ; but there is nothing which would lead us to charge them as *καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, working this mischief which they did work for filthy lucre's sake (see Deyling, *Obs. Sac.* vol. iv. p. 636).

I cannot forbear quoting here a remarkable extract from Bentley's *Sermon on Popery* (*Works*, vol. iii. p. 242), in which he strongly maintains the distinction which I have endeavoured to trace :

‘Our English Translators have not been very happy in their version of this passage [2 Cor. ii. 17]. We are not, says the Apostle, *καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, which our Translators have rendered, “we do not corrupt” or (as in the margin) deal deceitfully with “the word of God.” They were led to this by the parallel place, c. iv. of this Epistle, ver. 2, “not walking in craftiness,” *μηδὲ δολοῦντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, “nor handling the word of God deceitfully;” they took *καπηλεύοντες* and *δολοῦντες* in the same adequate notion, as the vulgar Latin had done before them, which expresses both by the same word, *adulterantes* verbum Dei; and so, likewise, Hesychius makes them synonyms, *ἐκκαπηλεύειν, δολοῦν*. *Δολοῦν*, indeed, is fitly rendered ‘adulterare;’ so *δολοῦν τὸν χρυσὸν, τὸν οἶνον*, to adulterate gold or wine, by mixing worse ingredients with the metal or liquor. And our Translators had done well if they had rendered the latter passage, not adulterating, not sophisticating the word. But *καπηλεύοντες* in our text has a complex idea and a wider signification; *καπηλεύειν* always comprehends *δολοῦν*; but *δολοῦν* never extends to *καπηλεύειν*, which, besides the sense of adulterating, has an additional notion of unjust lucre, gain, profit, advantage. This is plain from the word *κάπηλος*, a calling always infamous for avarice and knavery: “perfidus hic caupo,” says the poet, as a general

character. Thence *καπηλεύειν*, by an easy and natural metaphor, was diverted to other expressions where cheating and lucre were signified: *καπηλεύειν τὸν λόγον*, says the Apostle here, and the ancient Greeks, *καπηλεύειν τὰς δίκας, τὴν εἰρήνην, τὴν σοφίαν, τὰ μαθήματα*, to corrupt and sell justice, to barter a negociation of peace, to prostitute learning and philosophy for gain. Cheating, we see, and adulterating is part of the notion of *καπηλεύειν*, but the principal essential of it is sordid lucre. So ‘cauponari’ in the famous passage of Ennius, where Pyrrhus refuses the offer of a ransom for his captives, and restores them gratis :

‘ Non mi aurum posco, nec mi pretium dederitis,  
Non cauponanti bellum, sed belligeranti.’

And so the Fathers expound this place. . . . So that, in short, what St. Paul says, *καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον*, might be expressed in one classic word—*λογέμποροι*, or *λογοπρᾶται*,<sup>1</sup> where the idea of gain and profit is the chief part of the signification. Wherefore, to do justice to our text, we must not stop lamely with our Translators, “corrupters of the word of God;” but add to it as its plenary notion, “corrupters of the word of God *for filthy lucre.*”

If what has been just said is correct, it will

<sup>1</sup> So *λογοπῶλοι* in Philo, *Cong. Erud. Grat.* 10.

follow that 'deceitfully handling' would be a more accurate, though itself not a perfectly adequate, rendering of *καπηλεύοντες*, and 'who corrupt' of *δολοῦντες*, than the converse of this which our Version actually offers.

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§ xiii.—*ἀγαθωσύνη, χρηστότης.*

'*Αγαθωσύνη* is one of the words with which revealed religion has enriched the Greek language. It occurs no where else but in the Greek translations of the O. T. (Nehem. ix. 25; 2 Chron. xiv. 16), in the N. T., and in those writings which are directly dependent upon these. The grammarians, indeed, at no time acknowledged, or gave to it or to *ἀγαθότης* the stamp of allowance, demanding that *χρηστότης*, which yet we shall see is not absolutely identical with it, should be always employed in its stead (Lobeck, *Pathol. Serm. Græc.* p. 237). In the N. T. we meet with it four times, always in the writings of St. Paul (Rom. xv. 14; Gal. v. 22; Ephes. v. 9; 2 Thess. i. 11); and it is invariably rendered 'goodness' in our Version. We feel the want of some word more special and definite at such passages as Gal. v. 22, where *ἀγαθωσύνη* makes one of a long list of Christian virtues or

graces, and must mean some single and separate grace, while 'goodness' seems to embrace all. To explain it there, as Phavorinus explains it, ἡ ἀπηρτισμένη ἀρετή, is little satisfactory. It is quite true that in such passages as Ps. lii. 5, it is set over against κακία, and has this general meaning, but not there. At the same time it is hard to suggest any other rendering; even as, no doubt, it is harder to seize the central force of this word than it is of χρηστότης, this difficulty mainly arising from the fact that we have no helping passages in other literature; for, however these can never be admitted to give the absolute law to the meaning of words in Scripture, we feel much at a loss when such are wanting altogether. It may be well, therefore, to consider χρηστότης first, and when it is seen what domain of meaning is occupied by it, we may then better judge what remains for ἀγαθωσύνη.

That other, a beautiful word, as it is the expression of a beautiful grace, (cf. χρηστοθήθεια, Eccclus. xxxvii. 13), like ἀγαθωσύνη, occurs in the N. T. only in the writings of St. Paul, being by him joined to φιλανθρωπία (Tit. iii. 4); to μακροθυμία and ἀνοχή (Rom. ii. 4); and opposed to ἀποτομία (Rom. xi. 22). The E. V. renders it 'good' (Rom. iii. 12); 'kindness' (2 Cor. vi. 6; Ephes. ii. 7; Col. iii. 12; Tit. iii. 4); 'gentleness' (Gal. v. 22).

The Rheims, which has for it ‘benignity’ (Gal. v. 22), ‘sweetness’ (2 Cor. vi. 6), has perhaps seized more successfully the central notion of the word. It is explained in the *Definitions* which go under Plato’s name (412 e), ἤθους ἀπλαστία μετ’ εὐλογιστίας; by Phavorinus, εὐσπλαγχνία, ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας συνδιάθεσις, τὰ αὐτοῦ ὡς οἰκεία ἰδιοποιουμένη. It is joined by Clemens Romanus with ἔλεος (1 Ep. i. 9); by Plutarch with φιλανθρωπία (*Demet.* 50); with εὐμένεια (*De Cap. ex In. Util.* 9); with γλυκυθυμία (*Terr. an Aquat.* 32); with ἀπλότης and μεγαλοφροσύνη: grouped by Philo with εὐθυμία, ἡμερότης, ἡπιότης (*De Mer. Merc.* 3). So too, when Josephus speaks of the χρηστότης of Isaac (*Antt.* i. 18. 3), the word marks upon his part a very true insight into the character of the patriarch; see Gen. xxvi. 20—22.

Calvin has quite too superficial a view of χρηστότης, when, commenting on Col. iii. 12, he writes: ‘Comitatem—sic enim vertere libuit χρηστότητα, quâ nos reddimus amabiles. *Mansuetudo* [πραΰτης], quæ sequitur, latius patet quam *comitas*, nam illa præcipue est in vultu ac sermone, hæc etiam in affectu interiore.’ So far from being this mere grace of word and countenance, it is one pervading and penetrating the whole nature, mellowing there all which would have been harsh and austere; thus wine is χρηστός, which has been mellowed with

age (Luke v. 39); Christ's yoke is *χρηστός*, as having nothing harsh or galling about it (Matt. xi. 30). On the distinction between it and *ἀγαθωσύνη* Cocceius (on Gal. v. 22), quoting Tit. iii. 4, where *χρηστότης* occurs, goes on to say: 'Ex quo exemplo patet per hanc vocem significari quandam liberalitatem et studium benefaciendi. Per alteram autem [*ἀγαθωσύνη*] possumus intelligere comitatem, suavitatem morum, concinnitatem, gravitatem morum, et omnem amabilitatem cum decoro et dignitate conjunctam.' This does not seem to me perfectly successful as a distinction. If the words are at all set over against one another the 'suavitas' belongs to the *χρηστότης* rather than to the *ἀγαθωσύνη*. I like much better what Jerome has said on the difference between the words. Indeed, I do not know anything so well said on this matter elsewhere (*Com. in Ep. ad Gal. v. 22*): '*Benignitas* sive suavitas, quia apud Græcos *χρηστότης* utrumque sonat, virtus est lenis, blanda, tranquilla, et omnium bonorum apta consortio; invitans ad familiaritatem sui, dulcis alloquio, moribus temperata. Denique et hanc Stoici ita definiunt: *Benignitas* est virtus sponte ad benefaciendum exposita. Non multum *bonitas* [*ἀγαθωσύνη*] a benignitate diversa est; quia et ipsa ad benefaciendum videtur exposita. Sed in eo differt; quia potest bonitas esse tristior, et fronte severis moribus irrugatâ,

bene quidem facere et præstare quod poseitur ; non tamen suavis esse consortio, et suâ cunctos invitare dulcedine. Hanc quoque sectatores Zenonis ita definiunt : Bonitas est virtus quæ prodest, sive, virtus ex quâ oritur utilitas ; aut, virtus propter semetipsam ; aut, affectus qui fons sit utilitatum.' With this agrees in the main the distinction which Basil draws between the words (*Reg. Brev. Tract.* 214) : πλατυτέραν οἶμαι εἶναι τὴν χρηστότητα, εἰς εὐεργεσίαν τῶν ὅπως δηποτοῦν ἐπιδεδωμένων ταύτης· συνηγμένην δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ἀγαθωσύνην, καὶ τοῖς τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγοις ἐν ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις συγχρωμένην.

A man might display his ἀγαθωσύνη, his zeal for goodness and truth, in rebuking, correcting, chastising. Christ was working in the spirit of this grace when He drove the buyers and sellers out of the temple (Matt. xxi. 13) ; when He uttered all those terrible words against the Scribes and Pharisees recorded in the 23d chapter of St. Matthew ; but we could not say that his χρηστότης was shown in these acts of a righteous indignation. This was rather displayed in his reception of the penitent woman (Luke vii. 37—50 ; cf. Ps. xxiv. 7, 8) ; in all his gracious dealings with the children of men. Thus we might speak,—the *Apostolic Constitutions* (ii. 22) do speak,—of the χρηστότης τῆς ἀγαθωσύνης of God, but scarcely of the converse. This χρηστότης was predominantly the character of



Christ's ministry, so much so that it is nothing wonderful to learn from Tertullian (*Apol.* 3), how 'Christus' became 'Chrestus,' and 'Christiani' 'Chrestiani' on the lips of the heathen—with that undertone, it is true, of contempt,<sup>1</sup> which the world feels, and soon learns to express in words, for a goodness which to it seems to have only the harmlessness of the dove, and nothing of the wisdom of the serpent; a contempt which it is justified in feeling for a goodness which has no edge, no sharpness in it, no righteous indignation against sin, nor willingness to punish it. That what was called *χρηστότης*, still retaining this honourable name, did yet sometimes degenerate into this, and end with being no goodness at all, we have evidence in a striking fragment of Menander (Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Græc.* p. 982):—

ἡ νῦν ὑπό τινων χρηστότης καλουμένη  
 μεθῆκε τὸν ἕλον εἰς πονηρίαν βίον·  
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀδικῶν τυγχάνει τιμωρίας.

<sup>1</sup> The *χρηστός* was called *ἡλίθιος* by those who would fain take every thing by its wrong handle (Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 9. 3; cf. Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* v. 5. 5).

§ xiv.—*δίκτυον, ἀμφίβληστρον, σαγήνη.*

OUR English word 'net' will, in a general way, cover all these three, which yet are capable of a more accurate discrimination one from the other.

*Δίκτυον* (= 'rete,' 'retia'), from the old *δικεῖν*, to cast, which appears again in *δίσκος*, a quoit, is the more general name for all nets, and would include the hunting net as well as the fishing, although used only of the latter in the N. T. (Matt. iv. 20; John xxi. 6).

*Ἀμφίβληστρον* and *σαγήνη* are different kinds of fishing nets; they occur together, Hab. i. 15; and in Plutarch (*De Sol. Anim.* 26), who joins *γρίπος* with *σαγήνη*, *ὑποχή* with *ἀμφίβληστρον*. *Ἀμφίβληστρον*, found only in the N. T. at Matt. iv. 18, and Mark i. 16; cf. Eccl. ix. 12; Ps. cxl. 10; (*ἀμφιβολή*, Oppian), is the casting net, 'jaculum,' *i. e.* 'rete jaculum' (Ovid, *Ar. Am.* i. 763), or 'funda' (Virgil, *Georg.* i. 141), which, when skilfully cast from over the shoulder by one standing on the shore, or in a boat, spreads out into a circle (*ἀμφιβάλλεται*) as it falls upon the water, and then sinking swiftly by the weight of the leads attached to it, encloses whatever is below it. Its circular, bell-like shape adapted it to the office of a mosquito

net, to which, as Herodotus (ii. 95) tells us, the Egyptian fishermen turned it; but see Blakesley's *Herodotus, in loc.*

*Σαγήνη*, found only at Matt. xiii. 47: cf. Eccl. vii. 28; Isai. xix. 8 (from *σάπτω*, 'onero,' perf. *σέσαγα*), is the long draw-net, or sweep-net, 'vasta sagena' Manilius calls it, the ends of which being carried out in boats so as to enclose a large space of open sea, are then drawn together, and all which they contain, enclosed and taken. It is rendered 'sagena' in the Vulgate, whence 'seine,' or 'sean,' the name which this net has in Cornwall, on whose coasts it is much in use. In classical Latin it is called 'everriculum' (see Cicero's pun upon Verres' name, 'everriculum in provinciâ'), from its sweeping the bottom of the sea. From the fact that it was thus a *πάναγρον* or take-all (Homer, *Il.* v. 487), the Greeks gave the name of *σαγήνευειν* to a device by which the Persians were reported to have cleared a conquered island of its inhabitants (Herodotus, iii. 149; vi. 31; Plato, *Legg.* iii. 698 *d*). Virgil in two lines describes the fishing by aid of the *ἀμφίβληστρον* and the *σαγήνη*, every word in each line having its precise fitness for its own kind (*Georg.* i. 141):—

'Atque alius latum fundâ jam verberat amnem  
Alta petens, pelâgoque alius trahit humida lina.'

It will be seen that there is an evident fitness in

our Lord's use of *σαγήνη* in a parable (Matt. xiii. 47) wherein He is setting forth the wide reach, and all-embracing character, of his future kingdom. Neither *ἀμφίβληστρον*, nor yet *δίκτυον* which *might not* have meant more than *ἀμφίβληστρον*, would have suited at all so well.

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§ xv.—*λυπέομαι, πενθέω, θρηνέω, κόπτω*.

IN all these words there is the *sense* of grief, or the *utterance* of grief; but the sense of grief in different degrees of intensity, the utterance of it in different ways of manifestation.

*Λυπέσθαι* (Matt. xiv. 9; Ephes. iv. 30; 1 Pet. i. 6) is the most general word, to be sorrowful, 'dolere,' being opposed to *χαίρειν* (Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 2), as *λύπη* to *χαρά* (Xenophon, *Hell.* vii. 1, 22). This *λύπη*, unlike the grief of the three following words, a man may so entertain in the deep of his heart, that there shall not be any outward manifestation of it, unless he himself be pleased to reveal it (Rom. ix. 2; Phil. ii. 7).

Not so the *πενθεῖν*, which is stronger, being not merely 'dolere' or 'angi,' but 'lugere,' and like this last, properly and primarily (Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 13; iv. 8: 'luctus, ægritudo ex ejus, qui carus

fuerit, interitu acerbo ') to lament for the dead; *πενθεῖν νέκυν* (Homer, *Il.* xix. 225); *τοὺς ἀπολωλότας* (Xenophon, *Hell.* ii. 2, 3); then any other passionate lamenting (Sophocles, *Æd. Tyr.* 1296; Gen. xxxvii. 34); *πένθος* being in fact a form of *πάθος* (see Plutarch, *Cons. ad Apoll.* 22); to grieve with a grief which so takes possession of the whole being that it cannot be hid; cf. Spanheim (*Dub. Evang.* 81): 'πενθεῖν enim apud Hellenistas respondit verbis כבב κλαίειν, θρηνέιν, et לללללל לללללל, adeoque non tantum denotat luctum conceptum intus, sed et expressum foris.' According to Chrysostom (*in loco*) the *πενθοῦντες* of Matt. v. 4 are *οἱ μετ' ἐπιτάσεως λυπουμενοι*, those who so grieve that their grief manifests itself externally. Thus we find *πενθεῖν* often joined with *κλαίειν* (2 Kin. xix. 1; Mark xvi. 10; Jam. iv. 9; Rev. xviii. 13); so *πενθῶν καὶ σκυθρωπάζων*, Ps. xxxiv. 14. Gregory of Nyssa (Suicer, *Thes.* s. v. *πένθος*), gives it more generally, *πένθος ἐστὶ σκυθρωπή διάθεσις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπὶ στερήσει τινὸς τῶν καταθυμίων συνισταμένη*: but he was not distinguishing synonyms, and in nothing therefore induced to draw out finer distinctions.

*Θρηνέιν*, joined with *ὀδύρεσθαι* (Plutarch, *Quom. Virt. Prof.* 5), with *κατοικτείρειν* (*Cons. ad Apoll.* 11), is to bewail, to make a *θρήνος*, a 'nenia' or dirge over the dead, which may be mere wailing or lamentation (*θρήνος καὶ κλαυθμός*, Matt. ii. 18),

breaking out in unstudied words, the Irish wake is such a *θρήνος*, or it may take the more artificial form of a poem. That beautiful lamentation which David composed over Saul and Jonathan, is introduced in the Septuagint with these words, *ἐθρήνησε Δαβὶδ τὸν θρήνον τοῦτον, κ. τ. λ.* (2 Sam. i. 17), and the sublime dirge over Tyre is called a *θρήνος* (Ezek. xxvi. 17; cf. Rev. xviii. 11; 2 Chron. xxxv. 25; Amos viii. 10).

We have last to deal with *κόπτειν* (Matt. xxiv. 30; Luke xxiii. 27; Rev. i. 7). This being first to strike, is then that act which most commonly went along with the *θρηνεῖν*, to strike the bosom, or beat the breast, as an outward sign of inward grief (Nah. ii. 7; Luke xviii. 13); so *κοπετός* (Acts viii. 2) is *θρήνος μετὰ ψοφοῦ χειρῶν* (Hesychius), and, as *πενθεῖν*, oftenest in token of grief for the dead (Gen. xxiii. 2; 2 Kin. iii. 31). It is the Latin ‘*plangere*’ (‘*laniataque pectora plangens*’: Ovid, *Metam.* vi. 248), which is connected with ‘*plaga*’ and *πλήσσω*. Plutarch (*Cons. ad Ux.* 4) joins *ὀλοφύρσεις* and *κοπετοί* (cf. *Fab. Max.* 17: *κοπετοὶ γυναικέιοι*) as two of the more violent manifestations of grief, and such as he esteems faulty in their excess.

§ xvi.—*ἄμαρτία, ἀμάρτημα, παρακοή, ἀνομία, παρανομία, παράβασις, παράπτωμα, ἀγνοήμα, ἥττημα.*

A MOURNFULLY numerous group of words, which it would be only too easy to make much larger than it is. Nor is it hard to see why. For sin, which we may define in the language of St. Augustine, as ‘factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra æternam legem’ (*Con. Faust.* xxii. 27; cf. the Stoic definition, *ἀμάρτημα, νόμου ἀπαγόρευμα*, Plutarch, *De Rep. Stoic.* 11); or again, ‘voluntas admittendi vel retinendi quod justitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere’ (*Con. Jul.* i. 47), may be regarded under an infinite number of aspects, and in all languages has been so regarded; and as the diagnosis of it belongs above all to the Scriptures, nowhere else are we likely to find it contemplated on so many sides, set forth under such various images. It may be contemplated as the missing of a mark or aim; it is then *ἄμαρτία* or *ἀμάρτημα*: the overpassing or transgressing of a line; it is then *παράβασις*: the disobedience to a voice; in which case it is *παρακοή*: the falling where one should have stood upright; this will be *παράπτωμα*: ignorance of what one ought to have known;

this will be *ἀγνοήμα*: diminishing of that which should have been rendered in full measure, which is *ἡττημα*: non-observance of a law, which is *ἀνομία* or *παρανομία*: a discord, and then it is *πλημμέλεια*: and in other ways almost out of number.

In seeking accurately to define *ἁμαρτία*, and so better to distinguish it from the other words of this group, there is no help to be derived from its etymology, seeing that is quite uncertain. Suidas, as is well known, derives it from *μάρπτω*, ‘*ἁμαρτία* quasi *ἁμαρπτία*,’ a failing to grasp. Buttmann’s conjecture (*Lexilogus*, p. 85, English edition), that it belongs to the root *μέρος*, *μείρειν*, on which a negative intransitive verb, to be without one’s share of, to miss, was formed, has found more favour (see Fritzsche on Rom. v. 12, a long note, with excellent philology and execrable theology). Only this much is plain, that when sin is contemplated as *ἁμαρτία*, it is regarded as a failing and missing the true end and scope of our lives, which is God; *ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπόπτωσις*, as Ecumenius; *ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποτυχία*, and *ἁμαρτάνειν* an *ἄσκοπα τοξεύειν*, as Suidas; *ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐκτροπή*, *εἴτε τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν*, *εἴτε τοῦ κατὰ νόμον*, as another.

It is a matter of course that with slighter apprehensions of sin, and of the evil of sin, there must go hand in hand a slighter ethical significance in the words used to express sin. It is therefore nothing



wonderful that *ἁμαρτία* and *ἁμαρτάνειν* should nowhere in classical Greek obtain that depth of meaning which in revealed religion they acquired. The words run through the same course, through which all words ultimately taken up into ethical terminology, seem inevitably to run. Employed first about things natural, they are then transferred to things spiritual, according to that analogy between those and these, which the soul delights to trace. Thus *ἁμαρτάνειν* signifies, when we meet it first, to miss a mark; thus a hundred times in Homer the warrior *ἁμαρτεῖ*, who hurls his spear, but misses his adversary (*Il.* iv. 491). The next advance in the use of the words is to things intellectual. The poet *ἁμαρτάνει*, who selects a subject which it is impossible to treat poetically, or who seeks to attain results which are beyond the limits of his art (Aristotle, *Poët.* 8 and 25); so we have *δόξης ἁμαρτία* (Thucydides, i. 33); *γνώμης ἀμάρτημα* (ii. 65). It is constantly set over against *ὀρθότης* (Plato, *Legg.* i. 627 *d*; *ib.* ii. 668 *c*; Aristotle, *Poët.* 25). So far from having any ethical significance of necessity attaching to it, Aristotle sometimes withdraws it, almost, if not altogether, from the region of right and wrong (*Eth. Nic.* v. 8, 7); it is a mistake, a fearful one it may be, like that of *Œdipus*, but nothing more (*Poët.* 13; cf. Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 1407). Elsewhere, however, it has as much of the

meaning of our 'sin,' as any word, employed in heathen ethics, could possess.

'*Ἀμάρτημα* differs from *ἁμαρτία*, in that *ἁμαρτία* is sin in the abstract as well as the concrete; or again, the act of sinning no less than the sin sinned, 'peccatio' (A. Gellius, xiii. 20, 17) no less than 'peccatum'; while *ἁμάρτημα* (it only occurs Mark iii. 28; iv. 12; Rom. iii. 25; 1 Cor. vi. 18) is never sin regarded as sinfulness, or as the act of sinning, but only sin contemplated in its separate outcomings and deeds of disobedience to a divine law. There is the same difference between *ἀνομία* and *ἀνόμημα* (not in the N. T.; but Ezek. xvi. 49), *ἀσέβεια* and *ἀσέβημα* (not in the N. T.; but Lev. xviii. 17), *ἀδικία* and *ἀδίκημα* (Acts xviii. 14). This is brought out by Aristotle (*Ethic. Nic.* v. 7), who sets over against one another *ἄδικον* (= *ἀδικία*) and *ἀδίκημα* in these words: *διαφέρει τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. Ἄδικον μὲν γὰρ ἔστι τῇ φύσει, ἢ τάξει· τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῆ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι*; cf. a good passage in Xenophon (*Mem.* ii. 2. 3): *αἱ πόλεις ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀδικήμασι ζημίαν θάνατον πεποιήκασιν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν μειζόνος κακοῦ φόβῳ τῆν ἀδικίαν παύσουντες*. On the distinction between *ἁμαρτία* and *ἁμάρτημα*, *ἀδικία* and *ἀδίκημα*, and other words of this group, there is a discussion at length by Clemens of Alexandria (*Strom.* ii. 15), but which does not yield much profit.

*Παρακοή* is found only at Rom. v. 19 (where it is opposed to *ὑπακοή*), 2 Cor. x. 6; Heb. ii. 2. It is not in the Septuagint, but *παρακούειν* (once in the N. T., Matt. xviii. 17) occurs several times there in the sense of to disobey, Esth. iii. 3, 8; Isai. lxxv. 12. *Παρακοή* is in its strictest sense a failing to hear, or a hearing amiss—the active disobedience, which follows on this inattentive or careless hearing, being tacitly implied; or, it may be, the sin being contemplated as already committed in the failing to listen when God is speaking. Bengel (on Rom. v. 19) has a good note: ‘*παρά* in *παρακοή* perquam apposite declarat rationem initii in lapsu Adami. Quæritur quomodo hominis recti intellectus aut voluntas potuit detrimentum capere aut noxam admittere? Resp. Intellectus et voluntas simul labavit per *ἀμέλειαν*· neque quicumque potest prius concipi, quam *ἀμέλεια*, incuria, sicut initium capiendæ urbis est vigiliarum remissio. Hanc incuriam significat *παρακοή*, inobedientia.’ It need hardly be observed how continually in the O. T. disobedience is described as a refusing to hear (Jer. xi. 10; xxxv. 17); and it appears literally as such at Acts vii. 57. Joined with, and following *παράβασις* at Heb. ii. 2, it would there imply, in the intention of the writer, that not merely every actual transgression, embodying itself in an outward act of disobedience, was punished, but every

refusal to hear, even though it might not have asserted itself in such overt acts of disobedience.

We have generally translated *ἀνομία* 'iniquity' (Matt. vii. 23; Rom. vi. 19; Heb. x. 17); but once 'unrighteousness' (2 Cor. vi. 14), and once 'transgression of the law' (1 John iii. 4). *Ἄνομος* is once at least in Scripture used negatively of a person without law, or to whom a law has not been given (1 Cor. ix. 21); though elsewhere of the greatest enemy of all law, the Man of Sin, the lawless one (2 Thess. ii. 8); *ἀνομία*, however, is never in Scripture the condition of one living without law, but always the condition or deed of one who acts contrary to law: and so, of course, *παρὰνομία*, which occurs however only once (2 Pet. ii. 16). It will follow that where there is no law (Rom. v. 12), there may be *ἁμαρτία*, *ἀδικία*, but certainly not *ἀνομία*: being, as Œcumenius defines it, *ἡ περὶ τὸν θετὸν νόμον πλημμέλεια*: as Fritzsche: 'legis contemptio aut morum licentia quâ lex violatur.' Thus the Gentiles, not having a law (Rom. ii. 14), might sin, but they, sinning without law (*ἀνόμως* = *χωρὶς νόμου*, Rom. ii. 12; iii. 21), could not be charged with *ἀνομία*. It is true, indeed, that behind that law of Moses, which they never had, there is another law, the original law and revelation of the righteousness of God, written on the hearts of all (Rom. ii. 14, 15); and as this in no

human heart is obliterated quite, all sin, even that of the darkest and most ignorant savage, must still in a secondary sense remain as *ἀνομία*, a violation of this older, though partially obscured law. Thus Origen (*in Rom.* iv. 5): ‘Iniquitas sane a peccato hanc habet differentiam, quod iniquitas in his dicitur quæ contra legem committuntur, unde et Græcus sermo *ἀνομίαν* appellat. Peccatum vero etiam illud dici potest, si contra quam natura docet, et conscientia arguit, delinquatur.’ Cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* iv. 4. 18, 19.

It is the same with *παράβασις*. There must be something to transgress, before there can be a transgression. There was sin between Adam and Moses, as was witnessed by the fact that there was death; but those between the law given in Paradise (*Gen.* ii. 16, 17) and the law given from Sinai, sinning indeed, yet did not sin “after the similitude of Adam’s transgression” (*παραβάσεως*, *Rom.* v. 14). With law came first the possibility of the transgression of the law; and exactly this transgression, or trespass, is *παράβασις*, from *παραβαίνειν*, ‘transilire lineam,’ the French, ‘forfait,’ ‘faire fors’ or ‘hors,’ some act which is excessive, enormous. Cicero (*Parad.* 3): ‘Peccare est tanquam transilire lineas;’ compare the Homeric *ὑπερβασίη*, *Il.* iii. 107 and often. In the constant language of St. Paul this *παράβασις*, as the transgression of a commandment

distinctly given, is more serious than *ἁμαρτία* (Rom. ii. 23; 1 Tim. ii. 14; cf. Heb. ii. 2; ix. 14). It is in this point of view, and indeed with reference to the very word with which we have to do, that Augustine draws often the distinction between the 'peccator' and the 'prævaricator,' between 'peccatum' (*ἁμαρτία*) and 'prævaricatio' (*παράβασις*).<sup>1</sup> It will be seen that his Latin word introduces a new image, not of overpassing a line, but of halting on unequal feet. The image, however, had faded from the word when he used it, and his motive to employ it lies in the fact that the 'prævaricator,' or collusive prosecutor, dealt unjustly *with a law*. He who, having no express law, sins, is in Augustine's language, 'peccator;' he who, having a law, sins, is 'prævaricator' (= *παραβάτης*, Rom. ii. 25). Before the law came men might be the first; after the law they could only be the second. In the first there is *implicit*, in the second *explicit*, disobedience.

We now arrive at *παράπτωμα*. 'Si originem verbi spectemus, significat ea facta præ quibus quis cadit et prostratus jacet, ut stare coram Deo et surgere non potest' (Cocceius). At Ephes. ii. 1, where

<sup>1</sup> *Enarr. in Ps. cxviii.*; *Serm.* 25: 'Omnis quidem prævaricator peccator est, quia peccat in lege, sed non omnis peccator prævaricator est, quia peccant aliqui sine lege. Ubi autem non est lex, nec prævaricatio.'

*παραπτώματα* and *ἁμαρτίαι* are found together, Jerome quotes with apparent assent a distinction between them; that the former are sins conceived in the mind, and the latter the same embodied in actual deeds: ‘*Aiunt quod παραπτώματα quasi initia peccatorum sint, quum cogitatio tacita subrepat, et ex aliquâ parte conniventibus nobis; necdum tamen nos impulit ad ruinam. Peccatum vero esse, quum quid opere consummatum pervenit ad finem.*’ This, however, cannot be allowed to pass. Only this much truth it may be admitted to have; that, as sins of thought partake more of the nature of infirmity, and have less aggravation than the same sins embodied in act, so it cannot be denied that there is sometimes a disposition to employ *πάρπτωση* when it is intended to designate sins not of the deepest dye and the worst enormity. One may trace this very clearly at Gal. vi. 1, where, doubtless, our Translators meant to indicate as much when they rendered it by ‘fault,’ and not obscurely, as it seems to me, at Rom. v. 15, 17, 18. It is used in the same sense as an error, a mistake in judgment, a blunder, by Polybius (ix. 10. 6; cf. Ps. xviii. 13). To a certain feeling of this we may ascribe another inadequate distinction,—that, namely, of Augustine (*Qu. ad Lev.* 20), who will have *πάρπτωση* to be the negative omission of good (‘*desertio boni,*’ or ‘*delictum*’), as contrasted with

*ἀμαρτία*, the positive doing of evil ('perpetratio mali'), though of course this cannot be accepted as otherwise having any right in it.

But this mitigated sense is very far from belonging always to the word. There is nothing of it at Ephes. ii. 1, "dead in *trespasses* (*παραπτώμασι*) and sins;" *πράπτωμα* is mortal sin, Ezek. xviii. 26; and the *παραπεσεῖν* of Heb. vi. 6 is equivalent to the *ἐκουσίως ἀμαρτάνειν* of x. 26, the *ἀποστήναι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ ζώντος* of iii. 12; and any such extenuation of the force of the word is expressly excluded in a passage of Philo (ii. 648), resembling these two in the Hebrews, in which he distinctly calls it *πράπτωμα*, when a man, having reached an acknowledged pitch of godliness and virtue, falls back from, and out of this; 'he was lifted up to the height of heaven, and is fallen down to the deep of hell.'

*Ἄγνομα* in the N. T. occurs only at Heb. ix. 7 (see Tholuck, *On the Hebrews, Beit.* p. 92), but also at 1 Macc. xiii. 39; and *ἄγνοια* in the same sense of sin, Ps. xxv. 7 and often; and *ἀγνοεῖν*, to sin, at Hos. iv. 15; Eccclus. v. 15; Heb. v. 2. Sin is designated by this word when it is desired to make excuses for it, so far as this may be possible, to regard it in the mildest possible light (see Acts iii. 17). There is indeed always a certain element of ignorance in every human transgression, which constitutes it human and not devilish, and which, while



it does not take away, yet so far mitigates the sinfulness of it, as to render its forgiveness not indeed necessary, but possible. Thus compare the words of the Lord, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Luke xxiii. 34), with those of St. Paul, "I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly, in unbelief" (1 Tim. i. 13). No sin of man, except perhaps the sin against the Holy Ghost, which for this reason is irremissible (Matt. xii. 32), is committed with a full and perfect recognition of the evil which is chosen as evil, and the good which is abandoned as good. Compare the numerous passages in the *Dialogues* of Plato, which identify vice with ignorance, and even pronounce that no man is voluntarily evil; οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός, and what is said qualifying or guarding this statement in Archer Butler's *Lectures on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 285. Whatever exaggeration there may be in his statement, it still remains true that sin is always, more or less, an ἀγνόημα; and the more the ἀγνοεῖν, as opposed to the ἐκουσίως ἀμαρτάνειν (Heb. x. 26), predominates, the greater the extenuation of the sinfulness of the sin. There is therefore an eminent fitness in the employment of the word on the one occasion, referred to already, where it is used in the N. T. The ἀγνοήματα, or 'errors' of the people, for which the High Priest offered sacrifice on the great day of atonement, were not wilful

transgressions, "presumptuous sins" (Ps. xix. 13), 'peccata proæretica,' committed against conscience and with a high hand against God; those who committed such would be cut off from the congregation; there was no provision made in the Levitical constitution for the forgiveness of such (Num. xv. 30, 31); but sins growing out of the weakness of the flesh, out of an imperfect insight into God's law, out of heedlessness and lack of due circumspection (Lev. v. 15—19; Num. xv. 22—29), and afterwards looked back on with shame and regret. The same difference exists between *ἄγνοια* and *ἀγνόημα* which has been already traced between *ἁμαρτία* and *ἁμάρτημα*, *ἀδικία* and *ἀδίκημα*: that one, namely the first, is often the more abstract, the other is always the concrete.

"*Ἡττημα* does not appear in classical Greek, but *ἦττα*, being opposed to *νίκη*, as discomfiture or worsting to victory, and has passed very much through the same stages as the Latin 'clades.' In the final *μα* which it has acquired we have an illustration of the tendency of so many words to obtain an additional syllable in the later periods of a language. "*Ἡττημα* appears once in the Septuagint (Isai. xxxi. 8), and twice in the N. T., namely at Rom. xi. 12; 1 Cor. vi. 7; but only in the latter instance having an ethical sense, as a coming short of duty, a fault, the German 'Fehler,' the Latin

‘delictum.’ Gerhard (*Loc. Theoll.* xi.): ‘*ἥττημα* diminutio, defectus, ab *ἥττᾶσθαι* victum esse, quia peccatores succumbunt carnis et Satanæ tentationibus.’

*Πλημμέλεια*, a very frequent word in the Old Testament (Lev. v. 15; Num. xviii. 9, and often), does not occur in the New. It is derived, as need hardly be said, from *πλημμελής*, one who sings out of tune (*πλήν* and *μέλος*),—as *ἐμμελής* is one who is in tune, and *ἐμμέλεια*, the right modulation of the voice to the music;—so that Augustine’s Greek is at fault when he finds in it *μέλει*, ‘curæ est’ (*Qu. in Lev.* l. iii. qu. 20), and makes *πλημμέλεια* = *ἀμέλεια*. Rather it is sin regarded as a discord or disharmony (*πλημμέλειαὶ καὶ ἀμετρίαι*, Plutarch, *Symp.* ix. 14. 7), according to those sublime words of Milton:

‘Disproportioned sin  
Jarred against nature’s chime, and with harsh din  
Broke the fair music that all creatures made  
To their great Lord.’

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§ xvii.—*ἀρχαῖος, παλαιός.*

WE should go astray if we contemplated these words as expressing one a higher antiquity than the

other, and should at all seek in this the distinction between them. On the contrary, this remoter antiquity will be expressed now by one, now by the other. Ἀρχαῖος, expressing that which was *from the beginning* (ἀπ' ἀρχῆς), if we accept this as the *first* beginning of all, must be older than any person or thing that is merely παλαιός, existing a long time ago (πάλαι); while on the other hand there may be so many later beginnings, that it is quite possible to conceive the παλαιός as older than the ἀρχαῖος. In Donaldson's *New Cratylus*, p. 19, the following passage occurs: 'As the word *archæology* is already appropriated to the discussion of those subjects of which the antiquity is only comparative, it would be consistent with the usual distinction between ἀρχαῖος and παλαιός to give the name of *palæology* to those sciences which aim at reproducing an absolutely primeval state or condition.' I confess I fail to find in the uses of παλαιός so strong a sense, or at least at all so constant a sense, of a more primeval state or condition, as this statement would seem to imply. Thus compare Thucydides, ii. 15: Ἐμβέβηκε τοῦτο ἀπὸ τοῦ πάνυ ἀρχαίου, that is, from the pre-historic time of Cecrops, with i. 18: Λακεδαίμων ἐκ παλαιτάτου εὐνομήθη, from very early times, but still within the historic period; where the words are used in senses exactly reversed.

The distinction between them is not to be looked for here, and on many occasions it is not to be looked for at all. Often they occur together as merely cumulative synonyms, or at any rate with no higher antiquity predicated by the one than by the other (Plato, *Legg.* 865 *d*; Plutarch, *Cons. ad Apoll.* 27; Justin Martyr, *Coh. ad Græc.* 5). It lies in the etymology of the words that in cases out of number they may be quite indifferently used; that which was from the beginning will have been generally from a long while since; and that which was from a long while since will have been often from the beginning. Thus the *ἀρχαία φωνή* of one passage in Plato (*Crat.* 418 *e*) is exactly equivalent to the *παλαιά φωνή* of another (*Ib.* 398 *b*); *οἱ παλαιοί* and *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι* alike mean the ancients (Plutarch, *Cons. ad Apoll.* 14 and 33); there cannot be much difference between *παλαιοὶ χρόνοι* (2 Macc. vi. 21) and *ἀρχαῖαι ἡμέραι* (Ps. xliii. 2).

At the same time it is evident that whenever an emphasis is desired to be laid on the reaching back to a beginning, whatever that beginning may be, *ἀρχαῖος* will be preferred. Thus Satan is *ὁ ὄφης ὁ ἀρχαῖος* (Rev. xii. 9; xx. 2), his mischievous counterworkings of God reaching back to the earliest epoch of the history of man. The world before the flood, that therefore which was indeed from the first, is *ὁ ἀρχαῖος κόσμος* (2 Pet. ii. 5). Mnason

was ἀρχαῖος μαθητής (Acts xxi. 16), “an old disciple,” not in the sense in which most English readers inevitably take the words, namely, an *aged* disciple, but one who had been such from the commencement of the faith, from Pentecost or before it. The original founders of the Jewish Commonwealth, who, as such, gave with authority the law, are οἱ ἀρχαῖοι (Matt. v. 21, 27, 33; cf. 1 Sam. xxiv. 14; Isai. xxv. 1); πίστις ἀρχαία (Eusebius, *H. E.* v. 28, 9), is the faith which was from the beginning, “once delivered to the saints.” The *Timæus* of Plato, 22 *b*, offers an instructive passage in which both words occur, where it is not hard to trace the finer instincts of language which have determined their several use; another occurs in the *Trachiniæ*, 546, where Deianira speaks of the poisoned shirt, the gift to her of Nessus :

ἦν μοι παλαιὸν δῶρον ἀρχαίου ποτὲ  
θηρὸς, λέβητι χαλκίῳ κεκρυμμένον.

Compare the *Eumenides*, 727, 728, which furnishes another.

Ἀρχαῖος, like the Latin ‘*priscus*,’ will often designate the ancient as the venerable as well, as that to which the honour due to antiquity belongs; thus Κῦρος ὁ ἀρχαῖος, Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 9. 1; and it is here that we reach a point of decided divergence between it and παλαιός, each going off into a secondary meaning of its own, which it does

not share with the other, but possesses exclusively as its own domain. I have just observed that the honour of antiquity is sometimes expressed by ἀρχαῖος, nor indeed is it altogether strange to παλαιός: but there are other qualities that cleave to the ancient; it is often old-fashioned, seems to be unsuitable to the present, and to belong to a world which has past away. We have a witness for this fact in our own language, where ‘antique’ and ‘antic’ are but two different spellings of one and the same word. There lies often in ἀρχαῖος this sense superadded of old-world fashion; now not merely antique, but antiquated and out of date (Æschylus, *Prom. V.* 325; Aristophanes, *Plut.* 323); and still more strongly in ἀρχαιότης, which has no other meaning but this (Plato, *Legg.* ii. 657 *b*).

But while ἀρχαῖος goes off in this direction (we have, indeed, no instance in the N. T.), παλαιός diverges in another, of which the N. T. usage will supply a large number of examples. That which has existed long has been exposed to, and in many cases will have suffered from, the wrongs and injuries of time; it will be old in the sense of more or less worn out; and it is always παλαιός, never ἀρχαῖος, which is employed to express old in such a sense as this.<sup>1</sup> Thus ἱμάτιον παλαιόν (Matt.

<sup>1</sup> The same lies, or may lie, in ‘vetus,’ as witnesses Tertullian’s

ix. 16); *ἄσκοι παλαιοί* (Matt. ix. 17); so *ἄσκοὺς παλαιούς καὶ κατερρώγους* (Josh. ix. 10); *παλαιὰ ῥάκη* (Jer. xlv. 11). In the same way, while *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι* could never express the old men of a living generation as compared with the young of the same, *οἱ παλαιοί* continually bears this sense; thus *νέος ἢ παλαιός* (Homer, *Il.* xiv. 108, and often); *πολυτεῖς καὶ παλαιοί* (Philo, *De Vit. Cont.* 8; cf. Job xv. 10). It is the same with the words formed on *παλαιός*: thus Heb. viii. 13: *τὸ δὲ παλαιούμενον καὶ γηράσκον, ἐγγὺς ἀφανισμοῦ*; cf. Heb. i. 11; Luke xii. 33; Ecclus. xiv. 17; while Plato joins *παλαιότης* and *σαπρότης* together (*Rep.* x. 609 *e*; cf. Aristophanes, *Plut.* 1086: *τρὺξ παλαία καὶ σαπρά*). As often as *παλαιός* is employed to connote this worn out, or wearing out, by age, it will absolutely demand *καινός* as its opposite (Mark ii. 21; Heb. viii. 13), as it will also sometimes have it on other occasions (Herod. ix. 26, *bis*); when this does not lie in the word, there is nothing to prevent *νέος* being set over against it (Lev. xxvi. 10; Homer, *Od.* ii. 293; Plato, *Cratylus*, 418 *b*; Æschylus, *Eumenides*, 778, 808); and *καινός* against *ἀρχαῖος* (2 Cor. v. 17; Philo, *De Vit. Con.* 10).

pregnant antithesis (*Adv. Marc.* i. 8): ‘Deus si est vetus, non erit; si est novus, non fuit.’



## § xviii.—βωμός, θυσιαστήριον.

I HAVE noticed elsewhere, in dealing with the words *προφητεύω* and *μαντεύομαι* (*Synonyms of the N. T.*, part I. § vi.), the accuracy with which in several instances the lines of demarcation between the sacred and profane, between the true religion and the false, are maintained in the words which are severally appropriated to each, and not permitted to be promiscuously used for the one and for the other alike. We have another example of this same precision here, in the fact of the constant use in the N. T. of *θυσιαστήριον*, occurring as it does more than twenty times, for the altar of the true God, while on the one occasion when a heathen altar has need to be named (Acts xvii. 23) the word is changed, and *βωμός* in the place of *θυσιαστήριον* is employed.

But indeed this distinction is common to all sacred and ecclesiastical Greek, both to that which goes before, and that which follows, the writings of the New Covenant. Thus so resolute were the Septuagint Translators to mark the distinction between the altars of the true God and those on which abominable things were offered, that there is every reason to think they invented the word

*θυσιαστήριον* for the purpose of maintaining this distinction; being indeed herein more nice than the inspired Hebrew Scriptures themselves, in which *פֶּזֶז* does duty for the one and for the other (Lev. i. 9; Isai. xvii. 8). I need hardly observe that *θυσιαστήριον*, properly the neuter of *θυσιαστήριος*, as *ἱλαστήριον* (Exod. xxv. 17; Heb. ix. 5) of *ἱλαστήριος*, nowhere occurs in classical Greek; and it is this fact of its having been coined by the Septuagint Translators one must suppose that Philo has in mind when he affirms that Moses invented the word (*De Vit. Mos.* iii. 10). At the same time the writers of the Septuagint do not themselves invariably observe this distinction. Thus there are four occasions, two in the Second Book of Maccabees (ii. 20; xiii. 8), and two in Ecclesiasticus (i. 13, 16), where *βωμός* is used of the altar of the true God; these two Books however, it must be remembered, hellenize very much; it is employed in like manner occasionally by Philo, thus *De Vit. Mos.* iii. 29: and *θυσιαστήριον* is sometimes used of an idol altar; thus Judg. ii. 2; vi. 25; 2 Kin. xvi. 10, and in other places. Still these are quite the rare exceptions, and sometimes the antagonism between the words comes out with the most marked emphasis. It does so, for example, at 1 Macc. i. 59, where the historian recounts how the servants of Antiochus offered sacrifices to Olympian

Jove on the altar which had been built over the altar of the God of Israel:· *θυσιάζοντες ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν, ὃς ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου.* Our Translators here are put to their shifts, and are obliged to render *βωμός* ‘*idol* altar,’ and *θυσιαστήριον* ‘altar.’ In the Latin, of course, there is no such difficulty; for at a very early day the Church adopted ‘*altare*’ as the word expressive of her altar, and assigned ‘*ara*’ exclusively to heathen uses. Thus Cyprian (*Ep.* 63) expresses his wonder at the profane boldness of one of the ‘*thurificati*,’ or those who in time of persecution had consented to save their lives by burning incense before a heathen idol,—that he should afterwards have dared, without having obtained the Church’s forgiveness, to continue his ministry—‘*quasi post aras diaboli accedere ad altare Dei fas sit.*’ I said the distinction between *βωμός* and *θυσιαστήριον*, first established in the Septuagint, and recognized in the N. T., was afterwards observed in ecclesiastical Greek; for the Church has still her *θυσία αἰνέσεως* (Heb. xiii. 15) and her *θυσία ἀναμνήσεως*, or rather her *ἀνάμνησις θυσίας*, and therefore her *θυσιαστήριον* still. This may be seen in the following passage of Chrysostom (*In 1 Ep. ad Cor. Hom.* 24), in which Christ is assumed to be speaking: ὥστε εἰ αἵματος ἐπιθυμεῖς, μὴ τὸν τῶν εἰδώλων βωμὸν τῷ τῶν ἀλόγων φόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ θυσιαστήριον τὸ ἐμὸν

τῷ ἐμῷ φοίνισσε αἷματι. Compare Mede, *Works*, 1672, p. 391; and Augusti, *Handbuch d. Christl. Archæol.* vol. i. p. 412.

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§ XIX.—μετανοέω, μεταμέλομαι.

It is a frequent statement of our early theologians that *μετάνοια* and *μεταμέλεια*, with their several verbs, *μετανοεῖν* and *μεταμέλεσθαι*, are used with this distinction, that where it is intended to express the mere desire that the done might be undone, accompanied with regrets or even with remorse, but with no effective change of heart, there the latter words are employed; but where a true change of heart toward God, there the former. It was Beza, I think, who first strongly urged this difference between the words. He was followed by many; thus see Spanheim, *Dub. Evang.* vol. iii. dub. 9; and Chillingworth (*Sermons before Charles I.* p. 11): ‘To this purpose it is worth the observing, that when the Scripture speaks of that kind of repentance, which is only sorrow for something done, and wishing it undone, it constantly useth the word *μεταμέλεια*, to which forgiveness of sins is nowhere promised. So it is written of Judas the son of perdition, Matt. xxvii. 3, *μεταμεληθεὶς ἀπέτρεψε*, he repented and went and hanged him-

self, and so constantly in other places. But that repentance to which remission of sins and salvation is promised, is perpetually expressed by the word *μετάνοια*, which signifieth a thorough change of the heart and soul, of the life and actions.’

Let me, before proceeding further, correct a slight inaccuracy in this statement. *Μεταμέλεια* nowhere occurs in the N. T.; only once, if we may trust Trommius, in the Old (Hos. xi. 8). So far as we deal with New Testament synonyms, it is properly between the verbs alone that the comparison can be instituted and a distinction sought to be drawn; though, indeed, what is good of them will be good of their substantives as well. The statement will need also a certain qualification, as will presently appear. Jeremy Taylor allows this. His words—they occur in his great treatise, *On the Doctrine and Practice of Repentance*, ch. ii. § 1, 2—are as follows: ‘The Greeks use two words to express this duty, *μεταμέλεια* and *μετάνοια*. *Μεταμέλεια* is from *μεταμελείσθαι*, post factum angi et cruciari, to be afflicted in mind, to be troubled for our former folly; it is *δυσαρέστησις ἐπὶ πεπραγμένοις*, saith Phavorinus, a being displeased for what we have done, and it is generally used for all sorts of repentance; but more properly to signify either the beginning of a good, or the whole state of an ineffective, repentance. In the first sense we

find it in St. Matthew, *ὕμεις δὲ ἰδόντες οὐ μετεμελήθητε ὕστερον τοῦ πιστεῦσαι αὐτῷ*, and ye, seeing, did not repent that ye might believe Him. Of the second sense we have an example in Judas, *μεταμελήθεις ἀπέστρεψε*, he “repented” too, but the end of it was he died with anguish and despair. . . . There is in this repentance a sorrow for what is done, a disliking of the thing with its consequents and effect, and so far also it is a change of mind. But it goes no further than so far to change the mind that it brings trouble and sorrow, and such things as are the natural events of it. . . . When there was a difference made, *μετάνοια* was the better word, which does not properly signify the sorrow for having done amiss, but something that is nobler than it, but brought in at the gate of sorrow. For *ἡ κατὰ Θεὸν λύπη*, a godly sorrow, that is *μεταμέλεια*, or the first beginning of repentance, *μετάνοιαν κατεργάζεται*, worketh this better repentance, *μετάνοιαν ἀμεταμέλητον* and *εἰς σωτηρίαν.* Presently, however, he admits that ‘however the grammarians may distinguish them, yet the words are used promiscuously,’ and that it is impossible to draw so rigid a line of distinction between them as some have attempted to do. This to a considerable extent is true, yet not so true but that a predominant use of one and of the other can very clearly be traced.

*Μετανοεῖν* is properly known *after*, as *προνοεῖν* to know *before*, and *μετάνοια* after or later knowledge, as *πρόνοια* foreknowledge; which is well brought out by Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* ii. 6): εἰ ἐφ' οἷς ἡμαρτεν μετενόησεν, εἰ σύνεσιν ἔλαβεν ἐφ' οἷς ἔπταισεν, καὶ μετέγνω, ὅπερ ἐστὶ, μετὰ ταῦτα ἔγνω· βραδεῖα γὰρ γνώσις, μετάνοια. At its next step *μετάνοια* signifies the change of mind consequent on this after-knowledge. At its third, regret for the course pursued, resulting from the change of mind consequent on this after-knowledge; 'passio quædam animi quæ veniat de offensâ sententiæ prioris,' as Tertullian (*De Pœnit.* 1) affirms, was all that the heathen understood by it. At this stage of its meaning it is found connected with *δηγμός* (Plutarch, *Quom. Am. ab Adul.* 12). Last of all it signifies change of conduct for the future, springing from all this. There is not of necessity any ethical meaning in the word in any of these stages of meaning—the change of mind, and of action upon this following, may be for the worse as well as for the better; thus Plutarch (*Sept. Sap. Conv.* 21) tells us of two murderers, who, having spared a child, afterwards 'repented' (*μετενόησαν*) and sought to slay it; *μεταμέλεια* is used by him in the same sense of a repenting of good (*De Ser. Num. Vin.* 11); so that here also Tertullian had right in his complaints (*De Pœnit.*

1): 'Quam autem in pœnitentiæ actu irrationaliter deversentur [ethnici], vel uno isto satis erit expedire, cum illam etiam in bonis actis suis adhibent. Pœnitet fidei, amoris, simplicitatis, patientiæ, misericordiæ, prout quid in ingratiam cecidit.' The regret may be, and often is, quite unconnected with the sense of any wrong done, of the violation of any moral law, may be simply what our fathers were wont to call 'hadiwist' (*had-I-wist* better, I should have acted otherwise); thus see Plutarch, *De Lib. Ed.* 14; *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 12; *De Soler. Anim.* 3: *λύπη δι' ἀλγηδόνας, ἣν μετάνοιαν ὀνομάζομεν*, 'displeasure with oneself, proceeding from pain, which we call repentance' (Holland). That it had sometimes, though rarely, an ethical meaning, none would of course deny, in which sense Plutarch (*De Ser. Num. Vin.* 6) has a passage in wonderful harmony with Rom. ii. 4.

It is only after *μετάνοια* has been taken up into the uses of Scripture, or of writers dependent on Scripture, that it comes predominantly to mean a change of mind, taking a *wiser* view of the past, *συναίσθησις ψυχῆς ἐφ' οἷς ἔπραξεν ἀτόποις* (Phavorinus), a regret for the ill done in that past, and out of all this a change of life for the better. This is all imported into, does not etymologically nor yet by primary usage lie in, the word. Not very frequent in the Septuagint (yet see *Ecclus.* xliv. 15;



Wisd. xi. 24 ; xii. 10, 19 ; and for the verb, Jer. viii. 6), it is frequent in Philo, who joins *μετάνοια* with *βελτίωσις* (*De Abrah.* 3), explaining it as *πρός τὸ βέλτιον ἢ μεταβολή* (*ibid.* and *De Pœn.* 2) ; while in the N. T. *μετανοεῖν* and *μετάνοια* are never used in other than an ethical sense. It is singular how seldom they occur in the writings of St. Paul, *μετανοεῖν* only once, and *μετάνοια* not more than four times.

But while thus *μετανοεῖν* and *μετάνοια* gradually advanced in depth and fulness of meaning, till they became the fixed and recognized words to express that mighty change in mind, heart and life wrought by the Spirit of God ; ‘such a virtuous alteration of the mind and purpose as begets a like virtuous change in the life and practice’ (Kettlewell) as we call repentance ; the like honour was very partially vouchsafed to *μεταμέλεια* and *μεταμέλεσθαι*. The first, explained by Plutarch as *ἡ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, ὄσαι παράνομοι καὶ ἀκρατεῖς, αἰσχύνη* (*De Gen. Soc.* 22), associated by him with *βαρυθυμία* (*An Vit. ad Inf.* 2), by Plato with *παραχή* (*Rep.* ix. 577 e), has been noted as never occurring in the N. T. ; the second only five times ; and on one of these to designate the sorrow of this world which worketh death, of Judas Iscariot (Matt. xxvii. 3), and on another expressing not the repentance of men, but of God (Heb. vii. 21) ; and this while *μετάνοια* oc-

curs some five and twenty, and *μετανοεῖν* some five and thirty times. Those who deny that either in profane or sacred Greek any traceable difference existed between the words are able in the former to point to passages where *μεταμέλεια* is used in all those senses which have been here claimed for *μετάνοια*, to others where the two are employed as convertible terms, and both to express remorse (Plutarch, *De Tranq. Anim.* 19); in the latter to passages in the N. T. where *μεταμέλεσθαι* implies all that *μετανοεῖν* would have implied (Matt. xxi. 29, 32). But all this freely admitted, there does remain, both in sacred and profane use, a very distinct preference for *μετάνοια* as the expression of the nobler repentance. This we might, indeed, have expected beforehand, from the relative etymological value of the words. He who has *changed his mind* about the past is in the way to change everything; he who has an *after care* may have nothing but a selfish dread of the consequences of what he has done; so that the long debate on the relation of these words with one another may be summed up in the words of Bengel, which seem to me to express the exact truth of the matter; allowing a difference, but not urging it too far (*Gnomon N. T.*; 2 *Cor.* vii. 10): ‘*Vi etymī μετάνοια proprie est mentis, μεταμέλεια voluntatis; quod illa sententiam, hæc solitudinem*

vel potius studium mutatum dicat. . . . Utrumque ergo dicitur de eo, quem facti consiliive pœnitet, sive pœnitentia bona sit sive mala, sive malæ rei sive bonæ, sive cum mutatione actionum in posterum, sive citra eam. Veruntamen si usum spectes, μεταμέλεια plerunque est μέσον vocabulum, et refertur potissimum ad actiones singulares: μετάνοια vero, in N. T. præsertim, in bonam partem sunitur, quo notatur pœnitentia totius vitæ ipsorumque nostri quodammodo: sive tota illa beata mentis post errorem et peccata reminiscencia, cum omnibus affectibus eam ingredientibus, quam fructus digni sequuntur. Hinc fit ut μετανοεῖν sæpe in imperativo ponatur, μεταμελείσθαι nunquam: ceteris autem locis, ubicunque μετάνοια legitur, μεταμέλειαν possis substituere: sed non contra.'

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§ xx.—μορφή, σχῆμα, ἰδέα.

Μορφή is 'form,' 'forma,' 'gestalt;,' σχῆμα is 'fashion,' 'habitus,' 'figur;,' ἰδέα, 'appearance,' 'species.' The first two, which occur not unfrequently together (Plutarch, *Symp.* viii. 2, 3), are objective; for the form and fashion of a thing would exist, were it alone in the universe, and whether there were any to behold it or no. The other is subjective, the appearance of a thing im-

plying some to whom this appearance is made; there must needs be a seer before there can be a seen.

To consider in the first place the distinction between *μορφή* and *σχῆμα*. The passage in which we may best study this distinction, and at the same time appreciate its importance, is that great doctrinal passage in the Philippians (ii. 6—8), where St. Paul speaks of the Son of God before his Incarnation as subsisting “in the *form* of God” (*ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*), as assuming at his Incarnation “the *form* of a servant” (*μορφήν δούλου λαβών*), and after his Incarnation and during his walk upon earth as “being found in *fashion* as a man” (*σχῆματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος*). It was the custom of the Fathers to urge the first phrase, *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*, against the Arians, and the Lutherans did the same against the Socinians, as a ‘dictum probans’ of the absolute divinity of the Son of God; that is, they affirmed *μορφή* here to be equivalent to *οὐσία* or *φύσις*. This asserted equivalence cannot, however, as is now generally acknowledged, be maintained. Doubtless there does lie in the words a proof of the divinity of Christ, but implicitly and not explicitly. *Μορφή* is not = *οὐσία*: at the same time none could be *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ* who was not God, as is well put by Bengel: ‘*Forma Dei non est natura divina, sed tamen is qui in formâ*

Dei extabat, Deus est;’ and this because *μορφή*, like the Latin ‘forma,’ the German ‘gestalt,’ signifies the form as it is the utterance of the inner life; not being, but manner of being, or better still, manner of existence; and only God could have the manner of existence of God. But He who had thus been from eternity *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ*, took at his Incarnation *μορφὴν δούλου*. The verity of his taking of our flesh is herein implied; there was nothing docetic, nothing imaginary about it. His manner of existence was now that of a *δούλος*, that is, of a *δούλος τοῦ Θεοῦ*: for with all our Lord’s humiliations He was never a *δούλος ἀνθρώπων*; their *διάκονος* He may have been, and from time to time eminently was (John xiii. 4, 5; Matt. xx. 28), this is part of his *ταπείνωσις* mentioned in the next verse; but their *δούλος* never. It was with respect of God He so emptied Himself of his glory, that, from that manner of existence in which He thought it not robbery to be equal with God, He became his servant.

The next clause, “and being found in fashion (*σχήματι*) as a man,” is very instructive for the distinguishing of *σχῆμα* from *μορφή*. The verity of the Son’s Incarnation was expressed in the *μορφὴν δούλου λαβών*. These words which follow do but express the outward facts which came under the knowledge of his fellow-men, with therefore an em-

phasis on *εὔρεθείς*: He was by men found in fashion as a man, the *σχῆμα* here signifying his whole outward presentation, as Bengel puts it well: ‘*Σχῆμα, habitus, cultus, vestitus, victus, gestus, sermones et actiones.*’ In none of these did there appear any difference between Him and the other children of men. *Σχῆμα* is the outline, as Plutarch (*De Plac. Phil.* 14) describes it: *ἐστὶν ἐπιφάνεια καὶ περιγραφὴ καὶ πέρας σώματος.*

The distinction between the words comes out very clearly in the compound verbs *μετασχηματίζειν* and *μεταμορφοῦν*. Thus if I were to change a Dutch garden into an Italian, this would be *μετασχηματισμός*: but if I were to transform a garden into something wholly different, say a garden into a city, this would be *μεταμόρφωσις*. It is possible for Satan *μετασχηματίζειν* himself into an angel of light (2 Cor. xi. 14); he can take all the outward semblance of such; the *μεταμορφοῦσθαι* would be impossible; it would involve an inwardness of change, a change not external but internal, not of accidents but of essence, which lies quite beyond his power. How fine and subtle is the variation of words at Rom. xii. 2; though ‘*conformed*’ and ‘*transformed*’<sup>1</sup> in our Translation

<sup>1</sup> The Authorized Version is the first which uses ‘transformed’ here. Wiclif and the Rheims, both following closely the Vulgate, ‘transfigured,’ and the intermediate Reformed Versions, ‘changed

have failed adequately to represent it. 'Do not fall in,' says the Apostle, 'with the fleeting fashions of this world, nor be yourselves fashioned to them (*μὴ συσχηματίζεσθε*), but undergo a deep abiding change (*ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε*) by the renewing of your mind, such as the Spirit of God alone can work in you (2 Cor. iii. 18).' Theodoret, commenting on these words, calls particular attention to this variation of the word used, a variation which it would task the highest skill of the English scholar adequately to reproduce in his own language. Among much else which is interesting, he says: 'Ἐδίδασκεν ὅσον πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ διάφορον· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκάλεσε σχῆμα, τὴν ἀρετὴν δὲ μορφήν· ἡ μορφή δὲ ἀληθῶν πραγμάτων σημαντικὴ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα εὐδιάλυτον χρῆμα. Meyer perversely enough, 'Beide Worte stehen im Gegensatze nur durch die Präpositionen, ohne differenz des Stamm-Verba; ' and compare Fritzsche, *in loc.* One can understand a commentator overlooking, but scarcely one denying, the significance of this change. For the very different uses of the words, see Plutarch, *Quom. Adul. ab Amic.* 7, in which chapter both occur.

At the resurrection Christ *μετασχηματίσει* the into the fashion of.' If the distinctions I am here seeking to draw are correct, and if they stand good in English as well as Greek, 'transformed' is not the word.

bodies of his saints (Phil. iii. 21; cf. 1 Cor. xv. 53), on which saying Calov remarks, ‘Ille μετασχηματισμός non *substantialem* mutationem, sed *accidentalem*, non ratione *quidditatis* corporis nostri, sed ratione *qualitatum*, salvâ quidditate, importat:’ but the changes of heathen deities into wholly other shapes are μεταμορφώσεις. In the μετασχηματισμός there is transition, but no absolute solution of continuity. The butterfly, prophetic image of our resurrection, is immeasurably more beautiful than the grub, yet has been duly unfolded from it; but when Proteus changes himself into a flame, a wild beast, a running stream (Virgil, *Georg.* iv. 442), each of these disconnected with all that went before, there is then not a change merely of the σχῆμα, but of the μορφή. All the conditions of our Lord’s own body underwent so wonderful an alteration at the Resurrection that we must not wonder to hear that after this He appeared to his disciples ἐν ἑτέρᾳ μορφῇ (Mark xvi. 12), though that phrase seems at first to express more even than that change would have involved. It is only, however, in keeping with the μετεμορφώθη of Matt. xvii. 2; Mark ix. 2; this change upon the Mount being a prophetic anticipation of that which should be.

The μορφή then, it may be assumed, is of the



essence of a thing;<sup>1</sup> we cannot conceive of the thing as apart from this its formality, to use 'formality' in its old logical sense; the σχῆμα is of its accident, having to do not with the 'quidditas,' but the 'qualitas,' and, however it may change, leaving the 'quidditas' untouched, the thing itself essentially or formally the same as it was before; as one has said, μορφή φύσεως, σχῆμα ἕξεως: thus σχῆμα βασιλικόν (Lucian, *Pisc.* 35) is the whole outward array and adornment of a monarch—diadem, tiara, sceptre, robe (cf. his *Hermot.* 86)—all which he might lay aside and remain king notwithstanding. It in no sort belongs or adheres to the man as a part of himself. He may put it on, and again put it off. Thus Menander (Meineke, *Frag. Com.* p. 985):

πρᾶον κακοῦργος σχῆμ' ὑπεισελθὼν ἀνὴρ  
κεκρυμμένη κείται παγὶς τοῖς πλησίον.

Thus, too, the σχῆμα τοῦ κοσμοῦ passes away (1 Cor. vii. 31), the image being here probably drawn from the shifting scenes of a theatre, but the κόσμος itself abides; there is no τέλος τοῦ κοσμοῦ, but only τοῦ αἰῶνος.

<sup>1</sup> 'La forme est nécessairement en rapport avec la matière ou avec le fond. La figure au contraire est plus indépendante des objets; se conçoit à part' (Lafaye, *Syn. Franc.* p. 617).

There is so far a corresponding use in Latin of the words 'forma' and 'figura,' that while 'figura formæ' occurs not rarely ('veterem formæ servare figuram;') and cf. Cicero, *Nat. Deor.* i. 32), 'forma figuræ' not at all (see Döderlein, *Latein. Syn.* vol. iii. p. 87). Contrast too in English 'deformed' and 'disfigured.' A hunchback is 'deformed,' a man that has been beaten about the face is 'disfigured;'; one is for life, the other may be only for a few days. In 'transformed' and 'transfigured' it is easy to recognize the same distinction. There are some valuable remarks on the distinction between *μορφή* and *σχῆμα* in *The Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, No. 7, pp. 113, 116, 121.

'*Ἰδέα* occurs only once in the N. T. (Matt. xxviii. 3). Our Translators have there rendered it 'countenance,' as at 2 Macc. iii. 16 'face.' It is not a happy translation; 'appearance' would have been much better; for *ιδέα* is exactly this, 'species sub oculos cadens,' not the thing itself, but the thing as beholden; thus Plato (*Rep.* ix. 588 c), *πλάττε ιδέαν θηρίου ποικίλου*, fashion to thyself the image of a manifold beast; so *ιδέα τοῦ προσώπου*, the look of the countenance (Plutarch, *Pyrr.* 3, and often), *ιδέα καλός*, fair to look on (Pindar, *Olymp.* xi. 122), *χιόνος ιδέα*, the appearance of snow (Philo, *Quod Det. Pot. Ins.* 48); but *ιδέα* never bears the mean-

ing which our Translators have given it; rather that which Plutarch ascribes to it in a definition, of which all the earlier parts may be past by, as belonging to the word in its philosophic use, and of which the last clause alone concerns us here (*De Plac. Phil.* i. 9): *ἰδέα ἐστὶν οὐσία ἀσώματος, αὐτὴ μὲν μὴ ὑφεστῶσα καθ' αὐτήν, εἰκονίζουσα δὲ τὰς ἀμόρφους ὕλας, καὶ αἰτία γινομένη τῆς τούτων δείξεω*. The word in all its uses is constant to the definition of this last clause, and to the *ιδεῖν* lying at its own base; oftentimes it is manifestly so, as in the following quotation from Philo, which is further curious as showing how widely his doctrine of the Logos differed from St. John's, was in fact a denial of it on its most important side: *ὁ δὲ ὑπεράνω τούτων [τῶν χειρουβίμ] Λόγος θεῖος εἰς ὄρατὴν οὐκ ἦλθεν ιδέαν* (*De Prof.* 19). On the distinction between *εἶδος* and *ιδέα*, and how far in the Platonic philosophy there is a distinction between them at all, see Stallbaum's note on Plato's *Republic*, x. 596 *b*; Donaldson's *Cratylus*, 3d ed. p. 105; and Professor Thompson's note on Archer Butler's *Lectures*, vol. ii. p. 127.

§ XXI.—*ψυχικός, σαρκικός.*

*Ψυχικός* occurs six times in the N. T. ; on three of these it has no distinctly *ethical* meaning attached to it ; but the meanness of the *σῶμα ψυχικόν* which the believer now bears about with him is contrasted with the glory of the spiritual which he shall bear (1 Cor. xv. 44 *bis*, 45). On the other three occasions a moral emphasis rests on the word, and always a *most* depreciatory. Thus St. Paul declares the *ψυχικός* receives not the things of the Spirit of God (1 Cor. ii. 14) ; St. James characterizes the wisdom which is *ψυχική*, as also *ἐπίγειος* and *δαιμονιώδης* (iii. 15) ; St. Jude explains the *ψυχικοί* as *πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες* (ver. 19). The word nowhere appears in the Septuagint, but *ψυχικῶς* in the sense of ‘heartily’ twice (2 Macc. iv. 37 ; xiv. 24).

It is at first with something of surprise that we find *ψυχικός* employed in these senses, and keeping this company ; and the modern fashion of talking about the soul, as though it were the highest part of man, does not make this surprise the less ; for it would rather lead us to expect to find it grouped with *πνευματικός*, as though there were only light shades of difference between them. But indeed

this is characteristic of the inner differences between Christian and heathen, and indicative of those better gifts and graces which the Dispensation of the Spirit has brought into the world. *Ψυχικός*, continually used as the highest in later classical Greek literature—I do not think the word is older than Aristotle—being there opposed to *σαρκικός*, or rather, where there was no *ethical* antithesis, to *σωματικός* (Plutarch, *De Plac. Phil.* i. 9; Aristotle, *Ethic. Nic.* iii. 10. 2), and constantly employed in praise as the noblest part of man (Plutarch, *Ne Suav. Vivi sec. Epic.* 9 and 14), must come down from its high estate, another so much greater than it being installed in the chiefest place of all; for indeed that old philosophy knew of nothing higher than the soul of man; but Revelation of the Spirit of God, and of that, indwelling and making his habitation with men, and calling out an answering spirit in them. According to it the *ψυχή*, no less than the *σάρξ*, belongs to the lower region of man's being; and if a double use of *ψυχή* in Scripture (as at Matt. xvi. 26; Mark viii. 35) requires a certain caution in this statement, it is at any rate plain that *ψυχικός* is not a word of honour<sup>1</sup> any more than

<sup>1</sup> Hilary has not *quite*, however nearly, extricated himself from this notion, and in the following passage certainly ascribes more to the *ψυχικός* than the Scriptures do, however plainly he sets him in opposition to the *πνευματικός* (*Tract. in Ps.* xiv. 3): 'Apostolus et

*σαρκικός*, and is an epithet quite as freely applied to this lower. The *ψυχικός* of Scripture is one for whom the *ψυχή* is the highest motive power of life and action; in whom the *πνεῦμα*, as the organ of the divine *Πνεῦμα*, is suppressed, dormant, for the time as good as extinct; whom the operation of this divine *Πνεῦμα* has never lifted into the region of spiritual things (Rom. vii. 14; viii. 1; Jude 19). For a good collection of passages from the Greek Fathers in which the word is employed in this sense, see Suicer, *Thes.* s. v.

It may be said that the *σαρκικός* and the *ψυχικός* alike, in the language of Scripture, stand in opposition to the *πνευματικός*. Both epithets ascribe to him concerning whom they are predicated a ruling principle antagonistic to the *πνεῦμα*, though they do not ascribe the same antagonism. When St. Paul describes the Ephesians as “fulfilling the carnalem [*σαρκικόν*] hominem posuit, et animale[m] [*ψυχικόν*], et spiritalem [*πνευματικόν*]; carnalem, belluæ modo divina et humana negligentem, cujus vita corporis famula sit, negotiosa cibo, somno, libidine. Animalis autem, qui ex judicio sensûs humani quid decens honestumque sit, sentiat, atque ab omnibus vitiis animo suo auctore se referat, suo proprio sensu utilia et honesta dijudicans; ut pecuniam spernat, ut jejuniis parcus sit, ut ambitione careat, ut voluptatibus resistat. Spiritalis autem est, cui superiora illa ad Dominum studia sint, et hoc quod agit, per scientiam Dei agat, intelligens et cognoscens quæ sit voluntas Ejus, et sciens quæ ratio sit a Deo carnis assumptæ, qui crucis triumphus, quæ mortis potestas, quæ in virtute resurrectionis operatio.” Compare Irenæus, v. 6.

desires of the flesh and of the mind" (Ephes. ii. 3), in the first he describes them as *σαρκικοί*, in the second as *ψυχικοί*. For, indeed, in men unregenerate there are two forms of the life lived apart from God; and, though every unregenerate man partakes of both, yet in some one is more predominant, and in some the other. There are *σαρκικοί*, in whom the *σάρξ* is more the ruling principle, and *ψυχικοί*, in whom the *ψυχή*. It is quite true that *σάρξ* is often used in Scripture as covering the entire domain in which sin springs up and in which it moves; thus the *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός* (Gal. iv. 19—21) are not merely those sinful works that are wrought in and through the body, but those which move in the sphere and region of the mind as well; more than one half of them belong to the latter class. Still the word, covering at times the whole region of that in man which is alienated from God and from the life in God, must accept its limitation when the *ψυχή* is brought in to claim that which is peculiarly its own.

There is an admirable discussion on the difference between the words, in Bishop Reynolds' Latin sermon preached at Oxford, with the title *Animalis Homo*. I quote the most important paragraph bearing on the matter in hand: 'Verum cum homo ex carne et animâ constet, sitque anima pars hominis præstantior, quamvis sæpius irrogenitos, propter

appetitum in vitia pronum, atque præcipites concupiscentiæ motus, *σάρκα* et *σαρκικούς* Apostolus noster appellet; hic tamen hujusmodi homines a præstantiore parte denominat, ut eos se intelligere ostendat, non qui libidinis mancipia sunt, et crassis concupiscentiis vel nativum lumen obruunt, (hujusmodi enim homines *ἄλογα ζῶα* vocat Apostolus, 2 Pet. ii. 12), sed homines sapientiæ studio deditos, et qui ea sola, quæ stulta et absurda sunt, rejicere solent. Hic itaque *ψυχικοί* sunt quotquot *τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ἔχουσι* (Jud. 10), utcumque alias exquisitissimis naturæ dotibus præfulgeant, utcumque potissimam partem, nempe animam, omnigenâ eruditione excolant, et rectissime ad præscriptum rationis vitam dirigant. Denique eos hic *ψυχικούς* vocat, quos supra Sapientes, Scribas, Disquisitores, et istius seculi principes appellaverat, ut excludatur quidquid est nativæ aut acquisitæ perfectionis, quo naturæ viribus assurgere possit ratio humana. *Ψυχικός, ὁ τὸ πᾶν τοῖς λογισμοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς διδούς, καὶ μὴ νομίζων ἄνωθεν δεῖσθαι βοηθείας*, ut recte Chrysostomus: qui denique nihil in se eximium habet, præter animam rationalem, cujus solius lucem ductumque sequitur.’ I add a few words of Grotius to the same effect (*Annott. in N. T.*; 1 Cor. ii. 14): ‘Non idem est *ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος* et *σαρκικός*. *Ψυχικός* est qui humanæ tantum rationis luce ducitur, *σαρκικός* qui corporis affectibus gubernatur: sed plerumque *ψυ-*



χικοί aliquâ in parte sunt σαρκικοί, ut Græcorum philosophi scortatores, puerorum corruptores, gloriæ aucupes, maledici, invidi. Verum hic [1 Cor. ii. 14] nihil aliud designatur quam homo humanâ tantum ratione nitens, quales erant Judæorum plerique et philosophi Græcorum.'

The question, how to deal with ψυχικός in translation, is certainly one not very easy to answer. 'Soulish,' which some have proposed, would have the advantage of standing in the same relation to 'soul' that ψυχικός does to ψυχή and 'animalis' to 'anima;' but the word is hardly English, and would certainly convey no meaning at all to English readers. Wiclif rendered it 'beastly,' which, it need hardly be said, had nothing for him of the meaning of θηριώδης, but was simply = 'animal' (he found 'animalis' in his Vulgate). The Rheims renders it 'sensual,' which, at Jam. iii. 15; Jude 19, our Translators have adopted, substituting this for 'fleshly,' which was in Cranmer's and the Geneva Version. On the other three occasions of the word's occurrence they have rendered it 'natural.' These are both unsatisfactory renderings, and 'sensual' more so now than it was at the time when our Version was made, 'sensual' and 'sensuality' having considerably modified their meaning since that time.

## § xxii.—σαρκικός, σάρκινος.

A DISCUSSION on the relations between ψυχικός and σαρκικός easily draws after it one on the relations between the latter of these words and another form of the same, σάρκινος, which occurs three, or perhaps four, times in the N. T.; only once indeed in the received text (2 Cor. iii. 3); but the evidence is overwhelming for its further right to a place at Rom. vii. 14; Heb. vii. 16; while a preponderance of evidence is in favour of allowing σάρκινος to stand also at 1 Cor. iii. 1.

Words with the termination in *ινος*, *μετουσιαστικά* as they are called, designating, as they most frequently do, the substance of which anything is made (see Donaldson, *Cratylus*, p. 458; Winer, *Gramm.* § xvi. 3), are common in the N. T.; thus θύϊνος, of thyine wood (Rev. xviii. 12), ὑάλινος, of glass, glassen (Rev. iv. 6), ὑακίνθινος (Rev. ix. 7), ἀκάνθινος (Mark xv. 17). One of these is σάρκινος, the only form of the word which classical antiquity recognized (σαρκικός, like the Latin ‘carnalis,’ having been called out by the ethical necessities of the Church), and at 2 Cor. iii. 3 well rendered ‘fleshy;’ that is, having flesh for the substance and material of which it is made. I am not aware whether the word ‘fleshen’ ever existed in the English language.

If it had done so, and still survived, it would be better still; for 'fleshy' may be 'carnosus,' as undoubtedly may *σάρκινος* as well (Plato, *Legg.* x. 906 c; Aristotle, *Ethic. Nic.* iii. 9. 3), while 'fleshen' must be what *σάρκινος* means here, namely 'carneus,' or made of flesh. Such a word may very probably have once existed in the language, a vast number of a like form having once been current, which have now passed away; as, for example, 'stonen,' 'hornen,' 'clayen' (all in Wiclif's Bible), 'threaden' (Shakespeare), 'tinnen' (Sylvester), 'milken,' 'broaden,' 'reeden,' with many more (see my *English Past and Present*, 5th edit. p. 165 sqq.). Their perishing is to be regretted, for they were often by no means superfluous. Thus we have given up 'stonen' and kept only 'stony,' while the Germans retain both 'steinig' and 'steinern,' and find use for both; as the Latin does for 'lapidosus' and 'lapideus,' 'saxosus' and 'saxeus.' We might do the same for 'stony' and 'stonen;' a 'stony' field is a field in which stones are many, a 'stonen' vessel would be a vessel made of stone. As again, a 'glassy' sea is a sea resembling glass, a 'glassen' sea is a sea made of glass. And thus too 'fleshy,' 'fleshy,' and 'fleshen,' would have been none too many, any more than are 'earthly,' 'earthly,' and 'earthen,' for all of which we are able to find their own proper employment.

‘Fleshly’ lusts (‘carnal’ is the word oftener employed in our Translation, but in fixing the relations between *σαρκικός* and *σάρκινος*, it will be more convenient to employ ‘fleshly’ and ‘fleshy’) are lusts which move and stir in the ethical domain of the flesh, which have in that rebellious region of man’s corrupt and fallen nature their source and spring. Such are the *σαρκικὰ ἐπιθυμίαι* (1 Pet. ii. 11), and the man who is *σαρκικός* is the man allowing an undue preponderance of the *σάρξ*; which is in its place so long as it is under the dominion of the *πνεῦμα*, but which becomes the source of all sin and all opposition to God so soon as the true positions of these two are reversed, and that rules which should have been ruled. But when St. Paul says of the Corinthians (1 Cor. iii. 1) that they were *σάρκινοι*, he finds fault indeed with them; but the accusation is far less grave than if he had written *σαρκικοί* instead. He does not intend hereby to charge them with positive active opposition to the Spirit of God—this is evident from the *ὡς νήπιοι* with which he proceeds to explain it—but only that they were intellectually as well as spiritually tarrying at the threshold of the faith; making no progress, and content to remain where they were, when they might have been carried far onward by the mighty transforming powers of that Spirit which was freely given to them of God. He does not charge them in this word

with being *antispiritual*, but only with being *unspiritual*, with being flesh and little more, when they might have been much more. He goes on indeed, at verses 3, 4, to charge them with the graver guilt of allowing the *σάρξ* to work actively, as a ruling principle in them; and he consequently changes his word. They were not *σάρκινοι* alone, for no man and no Church can long tarry at this point, but *σαρκικοί* as well, and, as such, full of “envying and strife and divisions” (ver. 3).

In what manner our Translators should have marked the distinction between *σάρκινος* and *σαρκικός* here it is not so easy to suggest. It is most likely, indeed, that the difficulty did not so much as present itself to them, who probably accepted the received text, in which there was no variation of words. At 2 Cor. iii. 3 all was plain before them; the *σάρκιναι πλάκες* are, as they have given it well, the “fleshy tables of the heart;” where Erasmus observes to the point that *σάρκιμος*, not *σαρκικός*, is used, ‘ut materiam intelligas, non qualitatem.’ St. Paul is drawing a contrast between the tables of stone on which the law of Moses was written and the tables of flesh on which Christ’s law is written, and exalting the last over the first; and so far from ‘fleshy’ there being a dishonourable epithet, it is a most honourable, serving as it does to set forth the superiority of the new Law over the

old—the one graven on dead tables of stone, the other on the hearts of living men (cf. Ezek. xi. 19; xxxvi. 26; Jer. xxxi. 33).

§ xxiii.—*πνοή, πνεῦμα, ἄνεμος.*

FROM the association into which *πνεῦμα* is here brought, it will at once be evident that it is only proposed to deal with it in its natural and earthly, not at all in its supernatural and heavenly, meaning. It may be permitted, however, to observe, by the way, that on the relations between *πνοή* and *πνεῦμα* in this its higher sense there is a discussion in Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xiii. 22; cf. *De Anim. et Huj. Orig.* i. 14. 19. The three words, as designating not things heavenly but things earthly, differ from one another exactly as, according to Seneca, do in the Latin ‘*aër*,’ ‘*spiritus*,’ ‘*ventus*’ (*Nat. Qu.* v. 13): ‘*Spiritum a vento motus*’ *separat*; *vehementior enim spiritus ventus est*; *invicem spiritus leviter fluens aër.*’

*Πνοή* conveys the impression of a lighter, gentler, breath of air than *πνεῦμα*, as ‘*aura*’ than ‘*ventus*’

<sup>1</sup> So quoted in Döderlein; but the edition of Seneca before me reads ‘*modus*.’

(Pliny, *Ep.* v. 6: ‘Semper aër spiritu aliquo movetur; frequentius tamen *auras* quam *ventos* habet’); this is evident from the following words of Philo (*Leg. Alleg.* i. 14): *πνοὴν δέ, ἀλλ’ οὐ πνεῦμα εἴρηκεν, ὡς διαφορᾶς οὔσης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πνεῦμα νερόηται κατὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ εὐτονίαν καὶ δύναμιν· ἡ δὲ πνοὴ ὡς ἂν αὐρά τις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀναθυμίασις ἡρεμαία καὶ πραεῖα.* It may be urged as against this, that in one of the only two places where *πνοή* occurs in the N. T., namely Acts ii. 2, the epithet *βιαία* is attached to it, and it plainly is used of a strong and vehement wind (cf. Job xxxvii. 9). But, as De Wette has observed, this may be sufficiently accounted for by the fact that it was necessary to reserve *πνεῦμα* for the higher gift of which this *πνοή* was the sign and symbol; and it would have introduced, if not confusion, yet certainly a repetition, for many reasons to have been avoided, to have employed that word here.

*Πνεῦμα* is seldom used in the N. T., indeed only twice, namely at John iii. 8; Heb. i. 7 (in this last place not certainly), for wind; but in the Septuagint often, as at Gen. viii. 1; Ezek. xxxvii. 9; Eccles. xi. 5. The rendering of *רוּחַ* in this last passage by ‘spirit,’ and not, as so often, by ‘wind’ (Job i. 19; Ps. cxlviii. 8), in our English Version, is to be regretted, obscuring as it does the remarkable connexion between these words of the Preacher

and our Lord's words at John iii. 8. He, who ever moves in the sphere and region of the O. T., in those words of his, "The wind bloweth where it listeth," takes up the words of the Preacher, "Thou knowest not what is the way of the wind;" who had thus already indicated of what higher mysteries these courses of the winds, not to be traced by man, were the symbol. Πνεῦμα is found often in the Septuagint in connexion with πνοή, but this generally in a figurative sense: Job xxxiii. 3; Isai. xlii. 5; lvii. 16; 2 Sam. xxii. 16 (πνοή πνεύματος).

"*Άνεμος*, etymologically identical with 'ventus' and 'wind,' is the strong, oftentimes the tempestuous, wind (1 Kin. xix. 11; Job i. 19; Matt. vii. 25; John vi. 18; Acts xxvii. 14; Jam. iii. 4; Plutarch, *Præ. Conj.* 12). It is interesting and instructive to observe that our Lord, or rather the inspired reporter of his conversation with Nicodemus, which itself no doubt took place in Aramaic, uses not *άνεμος*, but *πνεῦμα*, as has been noted already, when he would seek analogies in the natural world for the mysterious movements, not to be traced by human eye, of the Holy Spirit; and this, doubtless, because there is nothing fierce or violent, but all measured in his operation; while on the other hand, when St. Paul would describe men violently blown about and tempested in a sea of error, it is *κλυδωνιζόμενοι καὶ περιφερόμενοι παντὶ ἀνέμῳ*



τῆς διδασκαλίας (Ephes. iv. 14; cf. Jude 12 with 2 Pet. ii. 17).

§ xxiv.—δοκιμάζω, πειράζω.

THESE words occur not seldom together, as at 2 Cor. xiii. 5; Ps. xxv. ii; xciv. 10 (at Heb. iii. 9 the better reading is ἐν δοκιμασίᾳ); but though both in our English Version are rendered ‘prove’ (John vi. 6; Luke xiv. 19), both ‘try’ (Rev. ii. 2; 1 Cor. iii. 13), both ‘examine’ (1 Cor. xi. 28; 2 Cor. xiii. 5), they are not therefore perfectly synonymous. In δοκιμάζειν, which has four other renderings in our Version,—namely, ‘discern’ (Luke xii. 56); ‘like’ (Rom. i. 28); ‘approve’ (Rom. ii. 18); ‘allow’ (Rom. xiv. 22),—lies ever the notion of proving a thing whether it be worthy *to be received* or not, being, as it is, nearly connected with δέχεσθαι. In classical Greek it is the technical word for putting money to the δοκιμή or proof, by aid of the δοκίμιον or test (Plato, *Timæus*, 65 c; Plutarch, *Def. Orac.* 21); that which endures this proof being δόκιμος, that which fails ἀδόκιμος, which words it will be well to recollect are not, at least immediately, connected with δοκιμάζειν, but with δέχεσθαι. Resting on the fact that this proving is through fire

(1 Cor. iii. 13), *δοκιμάζειν* and *πυροῦν* are often found together (Ps. xcvi. 9; Jer. ix. 4). As employed in the N. T., the word will in almost every case imply that the proof is victoriously surmounted, the proved is also approved (2 Cor. viii. 8; 1 Thess. ii. 4; 1 Tim. iii. 10), just as in English we speak of *tried* men (= *δεδοκιμασμένοι*), meaning not merely those who have been tested, but who have stood the test. It is then very nearly equivalent to *ἀξιῶν* (1 Thess. ii. 4; cf. Plutarch, *Theseus*, 12). Sometimes the word will advance even a step further, and signify not merely to approve the proved, but to select or choose the approved (Xenophon, *Anab.* iii. 3. 12; cf. Rom. i. 18).

But on *δοκιμάζειν* there not merely for the most part follows a coming victoriously out of the trial, but also it is implied that the trial was itself made in the expectation and hope that so it would be; at all events, with no contrary hope or expectation. The ore is not thrown into the fining pot—and this is the image which continually underlies the use of the word in the Old Testament (Zech. xiii. 9; Prov. viii. 10; xvii. 3; xxvii. 21; Ps. lxxv. 10; Jer. ix. 7; Sirac. ii. 5; Wisd. iii. 6; cf. 1 Pet. i. 7)—except in the expectation and belief that, whatever of dross may be found mingled with it, yet it is not *all* dross, but that some good metal, and better now than before, will come forth from the fiery trial

(Heb. xii. 5—11; 2 Macc. vi. 12—16). It is ever so with the proofs to which He who sits as a Refiner in his Church submits his own; his intention in these being ever, not indeed to find his saints pure gold (for that He knows they are not), but to make them such; to purge out their dross, never to show that they are all dross. As such, He is *δοκιμαστής τῶν καρδιῶν* (1 Thess. ii. 4; Jer. xi. 20; Ps. xvi. 4); as such, Job could say of Him, using another equivalent word, *διέκρινέ με ὡσπερ τὸ χρυσίον*. To Him as such his people pray, in words like those of Abelard, expounding the sixth petition of the Lord's Prayer, 'Da ut per tentationem probemur, non reprobemur.' And here is the point of divergence between the use of *δοκιμάζειν* and *πειράζειν*, as will be plain when the second of these words has been a little considered.

This putting to the proof *may* have quite another intention, as it may have quite another issue and end, than those which have been just described; nay, it certainly will have such in the case of the false-hearted, and those who, seemingly belonging to God, had yet no root of the matter in themselves. Being proved or tempted, they will appear to be what they have always been; and this fact, though it does not overrule all the uses of *πειράζειν*, does yet predominantly affect the use of the word. It lies not of necessity in it that it should oftenest pos-

sess an evil signification, and imply a making trial with the intention and hope of entangling the person so tried in sin. *Πειράζειν*, connected with ‘perior,’ ‘experior,’ *πείρω*, means properly no more than to make an experience of (*πείραν λαμβάνειν*, Heb. xi. 29, 36), to pierce or search into (thus of the wicked it is said, *πειράζουσι θάνατον*, Wisd. ii. 25; cf. xii. 26; Ecclus. xxxix. 4); or to attempt (Acts xvi. 7; xxiv. 6). But the word came next to signify the trying intentionally and with the purpose of discovering what of good or evil, of power or weakness, was in a person or thing (Matt. xvi. 1; xix. 3; xxii. 18; 1 Kin. x. 1); or, where this was already known to the trier, discovering the same to the tried themselves; as when St. Paul addresses the Corinthians, *ἐαυτοὺς πειράζετε*, “try,” or as we have it, “examine yourselves” (2 Cor. xiii. 5). It is thus that sinners are said to tempt God (Matt. iv. 7 [*ἐκπειράζειν*]; Acts v. 9; 1 Cor. x. 9; Wisd. i. 2), putting Him to the proof, refusing to believe Him on his own word or till He has shown his power. At this stage, too, of the word’s history and successive usages we must arrest it, when we affirm of God that He tempts (Heb. xi. 17; cf. Gen. xxii. 1; Exod. xv. 25; Deut. xiii. 3). In no other sense or intention can He try or tempt men (Jam. i. 13); but because He does tempt in this sense (*γυμνασίας χάριν καὶ ἀναρρήσεως*, Ecumenius), and because of

the self-knowledge which may be won through these temptations,—so that men may, and often do, come out of them holier, humbler, stronger than they were when they entered in,<sup>1</sup>—St. James is able to say, “Count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations” (i. 2; cf. ver. 12). The word itself, however, does not stop here. The melancholy fact that men so often break down under temptation gives to *πειράζειν* a predominant sense of putting to the proof with the intention and the hope that they may break down; and thus the word is constantly applied to the temptations of Satan (Matt. iv. 1; 1 Cor. vii. 5; Rev. ii. 10), which are always made with such intention, he himself bearing the name of The Tempter (Matt. iv. 3; 1 Thess. iii. 5), and evermore approving himself as such (Gen. iii. 1, 4, 5; 1 Chron. xxi. 1).

We may say then in conclusion, that while *πειράζειν* may be used, but exceptionally, of God, *δοκι-*

<sup>1</sup> Augustine (*Serm.* lxxi. c. 10): ‘In eo quod dictum est, Deus neminem tentat, non omni sed quodam tentationis modo Deus neminem tentare intelligendus est: ne falsum sit illud quod scriptum est, Tentat vos Dominus Deus vester [Deut. xiii. 3]; et ne Christum negemus Deum, vel dicamus falsum Evangelium, ubi legimus quia interrogabat discipulum, tentans eum [Joh. vi. 5]. Est enim tentatio adducens peccatum, quâ Deus neminem tentat; et est tentatio probans fidem, quâ et Deus tentare dignatur.’ Cf. *Serm.* ii. c. 3: ‘Deus tentat ut doceat; diabolus tentat, ut decipiat.’ Cf. *Serm.* lviii. c. 9.

μάζειν could not be used of Satan, seeing that he never proves that he may approve, or tests that he may accept.

§ xxv.—Σοφία, φρόνησις, γνῶσις, ἐπίγνωσις.

Σοφία, φρόνησις, γνῶσις all occur together, Dan. i. 4, 17. They are all ascribed to God (φρόνησις not in the N. T., for Ephes. i. 8 is not in point); σοφία and γνῶσις, Rom. xi. 33; φρόνησις and σοφία, Prov. iii. 19; Jer. x. 12. There have been various efforts to draw the exact lines of distinction between them. These, however they may vary in detail, have this in common, that σοφία is always recognized as expressing the highest and noblest, as indeed it must, being, as it is commonly declared, the knowledge of things divine and human. Θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη, Clemens of Alexandria defines it (*Pædag.* ii. 2), but adds elsewhere, καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων (*Strom.* i. 5), following herein the Stoic definition.<sup>1</sup> Augustine distinguishes between it and γνῶσις as follows (*De Div. Quæst.* ii. qu. 2), ‘Hæc ita discerni solent, ut sapientia [σοφία] pertineat ad intellectum æternorum, scientia [γνῶσις]

<sup>1</sup> On the relation of φιλοσοφία (ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας, Philo, *De Cong. Erud. Grat.* xiv.) to σοφία see Clemens, *Strom.* i. 5.

vero ad ea quæ sensibus corporis experimur;’ and for a much fuller discussion see *De Trin.* xii. 22—24; xiv. 3. Very much the same is said in regard of the relation between σοφία and φρόνησις. Thus Philo; who defines φρόνησις as the mean between cunning and folly, μέση πανουργίας καὶ μωρίας φρόνησις (*Quod Deus. Imm.* 35), gives elsewhere the distinction between it and σοφία (*De Præm. et Pæn.* 14): Σοφία μὲν γὰρ πρὸς θεραπείαν Θεοῦ, φρόνησις δὲ πρὸς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου διοίκησιν. This was the familiar and recognized distinction, as witness the words of Cicero (*De Off.* ii. 43): ‘Principes omnium virtutum est illa sapientia quam σοφίαν Græci vocant. Prudentiam enim, quam Græci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus, quæ est rerum expetendarum, fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia:’ cf. *Tusc.* iv. 26. In all this he is following in the steps of Aristotle, who thus defines φρόνησις (*Ethic. Nic.* vi. 5. 4): ἕξις ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. It will be seen from these references and quotations, that the Christian Fathers have drawn their distinction between these words from the schools of heathen philosophy, with only such deepening of their meaning as must necessarily follow when the ethical terms of a lower are assumed into the service of a higher.

We may say boldly that *σοφία* is never in Scripture ascribed to other than God or good men, except in an ironical sense, with the express addition, or subaudition, of *τοῦ κόσμου τούτου* (1 Cor. i. 20), *τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου* (1 Cor. ii. 6), or some such words (2 Cor. i. 12); nor are any of the children of this world called *σοφοί* except with this tacit or expressed addition (Luke x. 21); they are in fact the *φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοί* of Rom. i. 22. For, indeed, if *σοφία* includes the striving after the best ends as well the using of the best means (cf. Aristotle, *Ethic. Nic.* vi. 7. 3), there can be no wisdom disjoined from goodness, even as Plato had said long ago (*Menex.* 19): *πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς, πανουργία οὐ σοφία φαίνεται* · cf. Ecclus. xix. 20, 22, a fine parallel. The true antithesis to *σοφός* is *ἀνόητος* (Rom. i. 14). The *ἀσύνετος* need not be more than intellectually deficient, but in the *ἀνόητος* there is always a moral fault which lies at the root of the intellectual, the *νοῦς*, the highest knowing power in man, the organ by which divine things are known and apprehended, being the ultimate seat of the error. Thus compare Luke xxiv. 25 (*ὧ ἀνόητοι καὶ βραδεῖς τῇ καρδίᾳ*); Gal. v. 1, 3; 1 Tim. vi. 9; Tit. iii. 3; in every one of which places the word has a moral tinge: it is the foolishness which is akin to and is



derived from wickedness, even as *σοφία* is the wisdom which is akin to goodness.

But *φρόνησις*, being a right use and application of the *φρήν*, is a *μέσων*. It may be akin to *σοφία* (Prov. x. 23),—they are interchangeably used by Plato, *Conv.* 202 *a*,—but it may also be akin to *πανουργία* (Job v. 13; Wisd. xvii. 7). It skilfully adapts its means to the attainment of the desired ends, but whether the ends themselves are good, of this the word affirms nothing. On the different kinds of *φρόνησις*, and the very different senses in which it is employed, see Basil the Great, *Hom. in Princ. Prov.* § 6; cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 9. It is true that on the only two occasions when *φρόνησις* occurs in the N. T. (*ἐν φρονήσει δικαίων*, Luke i. 17; *σοφία καὶ φρονήσει*, Ephes. i. 8), it is used of a laudable prudence, but for all this *φρόνησις* is not wisdom, nor *φρόνιμος* wise; so that Augustine (*De Gen. ad Lit.* xi. 2) has right when he objects to the ‘sapiientissimus’ with which some Latin Version had rendered the *φρονιμώτατος* applied to the serpent at Gen. iii. 1, saying, ‘Abusione nominis sapientia dicitur in malo;’ cf. *Con. Gaud.* i. 5. And the same objection, as has been often urged, holds good against the “*wise*<sup>1</sup> as serpents” (Matt. x. 16),

<sup>1</sup> The Old Italic runs perhaps into the opposite extreme, rendering *φρόνιμοι* here by ‘astuti;’ which, however, it must be remembered,

“*wiser* than the children of light” (Luke xvi. 8), of our Version.

On the distinction between σοφία and γνῶσις Bengel has the following note (*Gnomon, in 1 Cor.* 12): ‘Illud certum, quod, ubi Deo ascribuntur, in solis objectis differunt; vid. Rom. xi. 33. Ubi fidelibus tribuuntur, sapientia [σοφία] magis in longum, latum, profundum et altum penetrat, quam cognitio [γνῶσις]. Cognitio est quasi visus; sapientia visus cum sapore; cognitio, rerum agenda-rum, sapientia, rerum æternarum; quare etiam sapientia non dicitur abroganda, 1 Cor. xiii. 8.’

On the difference between γνῶσις and ἐπίγνωσις, it will be sufficient to say that the ἐπί in the latter must be regarded as intensive, giving to the compound word a greater strength than the simple possessed; thus ἐπιμελέομαι, ἐπινοέω, ἐπαισθάνομαι: and, by the same rule, if γνῶσις is ‘cognitio,’ ‘kenntniss,’ ἐπίγνωσις is ‘major exactiorque cognitio’ (Grotius), ‘erkenntniss,’ a deeper and more intimate knowledge and acquaintance; not recognition, in the Platonic sense of knowledge; a reminiscence, as distinct from cognition, if we might use that word; which Jerome, on Ephes. iv. 13, and some moderns, have affirmed. St. Paul, it will be remembered, exchanges the γιγνώσκω, which ex-

had not in the later Latin at all so evil a subaudition as it had in the classical; so Augustine (*Ep.* 167. 6) assures us.

presses his present and fragmentary knowledge, for ἐπιγνώσομαι, when he would express his future intuitive and complete knowledge (1 Cor. xiii. 12). It is difficult to see how this should have been preserved in the English Version; our Translators have made no attempt to preserve it; Bengel does so by aid of 'nosco' and 'pernoscam,' and Culverwell (*Spiritual Optics*, p. 180) has the following note: 'Ἐπίγνωσις and γνώσις differ. Ἐπίγνωσις is ἡ μετὰ τὴν πρώτην γνώσιν τοῦ πράγματος παντελὴς κατὰ δύναμιν κατανόησις. It is bringing me better acquainted with a thing I knew before; a more exact viewing of an object that I saw before afar off. That little portion of knowledge which we had here shall be much improved, our eye shall be raised to see the same things more strongly and clearly.' All St. Paul's uses of ἐπίγνωσις justify and bear out this distinction (Rom. i. 28; iii. 20; x. 2; Eph. iv. 13; Phil. i. 9; 1 Tim. ii. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 25).

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§ xxvi.—λαλέω, λέγω (λαλιά, λόγος).

IN dealing with synonyms of the N. T. we ought plainly not to concern ourselves with such earlier, or even cotemporary, uses of the words which we are discriminating, as lie altogether outside of its

sphere, when these uses do not illustrate, and have not affected, the scriptural employment of the words. It will follow from this that all those contemptuous uses of *λαλεῖν* as to talk at random, as one with no door to his lips might do; of *λαλιά* as chatter (*ἀκρασία λόγου ἄλογος*, Plato, *Defin.* 416)—for I cannot believe that we are to find this at John iv. 42—may be dismissed and set aside. The antithesis of the line of Eupolis,

*λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν,*

does not help us, nor touch the distinction between the words which we seek to draw out. What that distinction is, may in this way be made clear. There are two leading aspects under which speech may be contemplated. It may, first, be contemplated as the articulate utterance of human language, in contrast with the absence of this, from whatever cause springing; whether from choice, as in those who hold their peace, when they might speak; or from the present undeveloped condition of the organs and faculties, as in the case of infants (*νήπιοι*); or from natural defects, as in the case of those born dumb; or from the fact of speech lying beyond the sphere of the powers with which as creatures they have been endowed, as in the lower animals. This is one aspect of speech, namely articulated words, as distinguished from silence, or from animal cries. But,

secondly, speech may be regarded as the orderly linking and knitting together in connected discourse of the inward thoughts and feelings of the mind, 'verba legere et lecta ac selecta apte conglutinare' (Valcknaer; cf. Donaldson, *Cratylus*, 453). The first is λαλεῖν = 𐤠𐤊𐤍, the German 'lallen,' 'loqui,' 'sprechen,' to speak; the second λέγειν = 𐤠𐤊𐤍𐤏, 'dicere,' 'reden,' to discourse.

Thus the dumb man, restored to human speech, ἐλάλησε (Matt. ix. 33; Luke xi. 14; cf. xii. 22), the Evangelists fitly employing this word, for they are not concerned with relating what the man said, but only with the fact that he who before was dumb, was now able to employ his organs of speech. So too, it is always λαλεῖν γλώσσαις (Mark xvi. 17; Acts ii. 4; 1 Cor. xii. 30), for it is not *what* those in an ecstatic condition utter, but the fact of this new utterance itself, and quite irrespective of the burden of it, to which the sacred narrators would call our attention; even as λαλεῖν may be ascribed to God Himself, (it is so more than once in the Epistle to the Hebrews, as at i. 1, 2,) where the point is rather His speaking to men than what it may have been that He spake.

But if in λαλεῖν the fact of uttering human words is the prominent notion, in λέγειν it is the words uttered, and that these are correlative to reasonable thoughts within the breast of the utterer. Thus

while the parrot or talking automaton (Rev. xiii. 15) may be said, though even they not without a certain impropriety, λαλεῖν, seeing they produce sounds imitative of human speech; yet seeing that there is nothing behind these sounds, they could never be said λέγειν; for in the λέγειν lies ever the ἔννοια, or thought of the mind, as the correlative and complement to the words on the lips. Of φράζειν in like manner (it only occurs twice in the N. T., Matt. xiii. 36; xv. 15), Plutarch affirms that *it* could not, but λαλεῖν could, be predicated of monkeys and dogs: λαλοῦσι γὰρ οὗτοι, οὐ φράζουσι δέ (*De Plac. Phil.* v. 20).

In the innumerable passages where the words occur together, I refer especially to such phrases as ἐλάλησε λέγων and the like (Matt. ix. 33; Luke xi. 14; cf. λαληθεῖς λόγος, Heb. ii. 2), each is true to its own meaning, as just asserted. Ἐλάλησε expresses the fact of opening the mouth to speak, as opposed to the remaining silent (Acts xviii. 9); λέγων proceeds to declare what the speaker actually said. Nor is there, I believe, any passage in the N. T. where the distinction between them has not been observed. Thus at Rom. xv. 18; 1 Cor. xi. 17; 1 Thess. i. 8, there is no difficulty in giving to λαλεῖν its proper meaning; indeed all these passages gain rather than lose when this is done. At Rom. iii. 19 there is an instructive exchange of the words.

*Λαλιά* and *λόγος* in the N. T. are true to the distinction here traced. How completely *λαλιά*, no less than *λαλεῖν*, has put off every slighting sense, is abundantly clear from the fact that on one occasion it, as well as *λόγος*, is claimed by the Lord Himself (John viii. 43 ; cf. Ps. xviii. 4). This passage in St. John deserves especial attention, as in it these two words occur in a certain opposition to one another, and in the seizing of the distinction intended between them must lie the right understanding of what the Lord here says. What He intended by varying *λαλιά* and *λόγος* has been very differently understood. Some, as Augustine, though commenting on the passage, have omitted to notice the variation. Others, like Olshausen, have noticed, only to deny that it had any significance. Others again, admitting the significance, have failed to draw it rightly out. It is clear that, as a failing to understand his speech (*λαλιά*) is traced up to a refusing to hear his word (*λόγος*), this last, as the root and ground of the mischief, must be the deeper, the anterior thing. To hear his word, must be to give room to his truth in the heart. They who will not do this must fail to understand his *λαλιά*, the outward utterance of his teaching. In other words, they that are of God hear God's words, his *ῥήματα*, = *λαλιά* here,<sup>1</sup> (John viii. 47 ; xviii. 37),

<sup>1</sup> Philo makes the distinction of the *λόγος* and the *ῥήμα* to be that

which they that are not of God do not and cannot hear. Melancthon: 'Qui veri sunt Dei filii et domestici non possunt paternæ domûs ignorare linguam.'

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§ xxvii.—ἀπολύτρωσις, καταλλαγή, ἱλασμός.

THERE are three grand circles of images, by aid of which it is sought in the Scriptures of the N. T. to set forth to us the inestimable benefits of Christ's death and passion. Transcending, as these benefits do, all human thought, and failing to find anywhere a perfectly adequate expression in human language, they must still be set forth by the help of language, and through the means of human relations. Here, as in other similar cases, what the Scripture does is to approach the central truth from different quarters; to seek to set it forth not on one side but on many, that so these may severally supply the deficiency of one another, and that moment of the truth which one does not express, another may. The words placed at the head of this article, ἀπολύτρωσις or redemption, καταλλαγή or reconciliation, ἱλασμός or propitiation, are the capital words sum- of the whole and the part, *Leg. Alleg.* iii. 61: τὸ δὲ ῥῆμα μέρος λόγου.



ming up three such families of images; to one or other of which almost every word directly bearing on this work of our salvation through Christ may be more or less remotely referred.

To speak first of ἀπολύτρωσις, which form, and not λύτρωσις, St. Paul invariably employs, λύτρωσις occurring only at Luke i. 68; ii. 38; Heb. ix. 12,—Chrysostom upon Rom. iii. 24, drawing attention to this, observes that by this ἀπὸ the Apostle would express the completeness of our redemption in Christ Jesus, which no later bondage should follow: καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς εἶπε, λυτρώσεως, ἀλλ' ἀπολυτρώσεως, ὡς μηκέτι ἡμᾶς ἐπανελθεῖν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν δουλείαν. In this no doubt he has right, and there is the same force in the ἀπὸ of ἀποκαταλλάσσειν (Ephes. ii. 16; Col. i. 20, 22), which is 'prorsus reconciliare;' see Fritzsche on Rom. v. 10. Both ἀπολύτρωσις (which nowhere occurs in the Septuagint, but ἀπολυτρώω twice, Exod. xxi. 8; Zeph. iii. 1), and λύτρωσις are late words in the Greek language. Rost and Palm (*Lex.*) give no earlier authority for them than Plutarch (*Pomp.* 24), while λυτρωτής seems to be peculiar to the Greek Scriptures (Ps. xviii. 15; Acts vii. 35), and such writings as are dependent upon them.

When Theophylact defines ἀπολύτρωσις as ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰχμαλωσίας ἐπανάκλησις, he omits one most important moment of the word, and one con-

stituting the central notion of it, as indeed of our word 'redemption' no less; for ἀπολύτρωσις is not recall from captivity merely, as he would imply, but recall from captivity *through a price paid*; cf. Origen on Rom. iii. 24. The idea of deliverance through a price paid, though in actual use it may sometimes fall away from words of this family (thus see Ps. cxxxiv. 24), is yet central to them. Let us keep this in mind, and we shall find connect themselves with ἀπολύτρωσις a whole group of most significant words; not only λύτρον (Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45); ἀντιλύτρον (1 Tim. ii. 6); λυτροῦν (Tit. ii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 18); λύτρωσις (Heb. ix. 12); but ἀγοράζειν (1 Cor. vi. 20) and ἐξαγοράζειν (1 Pet. i. 19; Luke i. 74): here indeed is a point of contact with the ἰλασμός, for the λύτρον paid in this ἀπολύτρωσις, is identical with the προσφορά or θυσία by which that ἰλασμός is effected. Not to say that there also link themselves with ἀπολύτρωσις all those passages which speak of sin as slavery, and of sinners as slaves (John vi. 17, 20; viii. 34; 2 Pet. ii. 19); of deliverance from sin as freedom, cessation of bondage (John viii. 33, 36; Rom. viii. 21; Gal. v. 1).

Καταλλαγῆ, occurring four times in the N. T. only occurs twice in the Septuagint. On one of these occasions, namely at Isai. ix. 5, it does not come into consideration, meaning simply exchange;

but at 2 Macc. v. 20 it is employed in the N. T. sense, being opposed to the ὀργή τοῦ Θεοῦ, and expressing the reconciliation, the εὐμένεια of God to his people. While διαλλαγή (Ecclus. xxii. 23; xxvii. 21), and διαλλάσσειν (in the N. T. only at Matt. v. 24; cf. Judg. xix. 3) are the more frequent words in the earlier and more classical periods of the language,<sup>1</sup> still the grammarians are wrong who denounce καταλλαγή and καταλλάσσειν as words avoided by those who wrote the language in its highest purity. None need be ashamed of words which found favour with Æschylus (*Sept. con. Theb.* 767); and Plato (*Phæd.* 69 a). Fritzsche (on Rom. v. 10) has a valuable note disposing of Tittman's fanciful distinction between καταλλάσσειν and διαλλάσσειν.

The Christian καταλλαγή has two sides. It is first a reconciliation, 'quâ Deus nos sibi reconciliavit,' laid aside his holy anger against our sins, and received us into favour, a reconciliation effected once for all for us by Christ upon his cross; so 2 Cor. v. 18, 19; Rom. v. 10; in which last passage καταλλάσσεσθαι is a pure passive, 'ab eo in gratiam recipi apud quem in odio fueris.' But καταλλαγή is secondly and subordinately the reconcilia-

<sup>1</sup> Christ according to Clement of Alexandria (*Coh. ad Gen.* 10), is διαλλακτής καὶ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν.

tion, 'quâ nos Deo reconciliamur,' the daily deposition, under the operation of the Holy Spirit, of the enmity of the old man toward God. In this passive middle sense *καταλλάσσεσθαι* is used, 2 Cor. v. 20; and cf. 1 Cor. vii. 11. All attempts to make this, the secondary meaning of the word, to be the primary, rest not on an unprejudiced exegesis, but on a foregone determination to get rid of the reality of God's anger against sin. With *καταλλαγή* connects itself all that language of Scripture which describes sin as a state of enmity (*ἔχθρα*) with God (Rom. viii. 7; Eph. ii. 15; Jam. iv. 4); and sinners as enemies to Him and alienated from Him (Rom. v. 10; Col. i. 21); Christ on the cross as the Peace, and maker of peace between God and man (Ephes. ii. 14; Col. i. 20); all such language as this, "Be ye reconciled with God" (2 Cor. v. 20).

Before leaving *καταλλαγή* it may be well to observe, that the exact relations between it and *ἵλασμός*, which will have to be considered next, are somewhat confused for the English reader, from the fact that the word 'atonement,' by which our Translators have rendered *καταλλαγή* on one of the four occasions upon which it occurs in the N. T., namely Rom. v. 11, has gradually shifted its meaning. It has done this so effectually, that if the translation were now for the first time to be made, and words to be employed in their present sense and

not in their past, it is plain that it would be a much fitter rendering of *ἰλασμός*, the notion of propitiation, which we shall find the central one of this word, always lying in our present use of 'atone-ment.' It was not so once; when our Translation was made, it signified, as innumerable examples prove, reconciliation, or the making up of a foregoing enmity; all its uses in our early literature justifying the etymology now sometimes called into question, that 'atone-ment' is 'at-one-ment,' and therefore = reconciliation: and consequently then, although not now, the proper rendering of *καταλλαγῆ* (see my *Select Glossary*, s.vv. 'atone,' 'atone-ment').

*Ἰλασμός* occurs only twice in the N. T., both times in the First Epistle of St. John (ii. 2; iv. 10). I am inclined to think that the excellent word 'propitiation,' by which our Translators have rendered it, did not exist in the language when the earlier Reformed Versions were made. Tyndale, the Geneva, and Cranmer have "to make *agreement*," instead of "to be the *propitiation*," at the first of these places; "He that obtaineth grace" at the second. In the same way *ἰλαστήριον*, which we, though I think wrongly, have also rendered 'propitiation' (Rom. iii. 25), is rendered in translations which share in what I conceive our error "the obtainer of mercy" (Cranmer), 'a pacification' (Ge-

neva); and first ‘propitiation’ in the Rheims—the Latin tendencies of this translation giving it boldness to transfer this word from the Vulgate. *Ἰλασμός* is of rare use also in the Septuagint, but in such passages as Num. v. 8; Ezek. xliv. 27; 2 Macc. iii. 33, it is being prepared for the higher employment which it shall obtain in the N. T. Connected with *ἴλεως*, ‘propitius,’ *ἰλάσκεσθαι*, ‘placare,’ ‘iram avertere,’ ‘ex irato mitem reddere,’ it is by Hesychius explained, not incorrectly indeed (for see Dan. ix. 9; Ps. cxxix. 4), but inadequately, by the following synonyms, *εὐμένεια*, *συγχώρησις*, *διαλλαγή*, *καταλλαγή*, *πραότης*—inadequately, because in none of these does there lie what is constant in *ἰλασμός*, namely that the *εὐμένεια* or goodwill has been gained by means of some offering or other, ‘placamen.’ The word is more comprehensive than *ἰλάστης*, which Grotius proposes as equivalent to it. Christ does not propitiate alone, as that word would say, but at once propitiates, and is Himself the propitiation; being, to speak in the language of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the offering of Himself both at once, *ἀρχιερέυς* and *θυσία* or *προσφορά*, for the two functions of priest and sacrifice, which were divided, and of necessity divided, in the typical sacrifices of the law, met and were united in Him, the sin-offering by and through whom the just anger of God against our sins was appeased, and God was render-

ed propitious to us once more. All this the word *ἵλασμός*, applied to Him, declares.

It will be seen that with *ἵλασμός* connect themselves a larger group of words and images than with either of the words preceding—all, namely, which set forth the benefits of Christ's death as a propitiation of God, even as all which speak of Him as a sacrifice, an offering (Ephes. v. 2 ; Heb. x. 14 ; 1 Cor. v. 7), as the Lamb of God (John i. 29, 36 ; 1 Pet. i. 19), as the Lamb slain (Rev. v. 6, 8), and a little more remotely, but still in a lineal consequence from these last, all which describe Him as washing us in his blood (Rev. i. 5). As compared with *καταλλαγή* (which is equivalent to the German *Versöhnung*), *ἵλασμός* (which is equivalent to *Ver-sühnung*) is the deeper word, goes more to the central heart of things. If we had only *καταλλαγή* and the group of words and images which cluster round it, to set forth the benefits of the death of Christ, these would indeed describe that we *were* enemies, and by that death were made friends ; but *how* made friends *καταλλαγή* would not describe at all. It would not of itself necessarily imply satisfaction, propitiation, the daysman, the Mediator, the High Priest ; all which in *ἵλασμός* are involved. I conclude this discussion with Bengel's excellent note on Rom. iii. 24 : '*ἵλασμός* (expiatio sive propitiatio) et *ἀπολύτρωσις* (redemptio) est in fundo rei

unicum beneficium, scilicet, restitutio peccatoris perditum. Ἀπολύτρωσις est respectu hostium, et καταλλαγή est respectu Dei. Atque hic voces ἰλασμός et καταλλαγή iterum differunt. Ἰλασμός (propitiatio) tollit offensam contra Deum; καταλλαγή (reconciliatio) est δίπλευρος et tollit (a) indignationem Dei adversum nos, 2 Cor. v. 19 (b) nostramque abalienationem a Deo, 2 Cor. v. 10.'

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§ xxviii.—ψαλμός, ὕμνος, ᾠδή.

ALL these words occur together at Ephes. v. 19, and again at Col. iii. 16; both times in the same order, and in passages which very nearly repeat one another; cf. Ps. lxvi. 1. When some refuse even to attempt to distinguish them from each other, urging that St. Paul had certainly no intention of giving a classification of Christian poetry, this may be, and no doubt is, quite true; but neither, on the other hand, would he have used, where there is evidently no temptation to rhetorical amplification, three words if one would have done equally well. It may reasonably be doubted whether we can draw very accurately the lines of demarcation between the "psalms and hymns and spiritual songs" of which the Apostle makes mention, or



whether he drew them for himself with a perfect accuracy; the words, even at the time when he wrote, may have been often promiscuously, confusedly used. Still each must have had a meaning which belonged to it more, and by a better right, than it belonged to either of the others; and this it may be possible to draw out, even while it is quite impossible with perfect strictness to distribute under these three heads Christian poetry as it existed in the Apostolic age.

The Psalms of the O. T. remarkably enough have no single, well recognized, universally accepted name by which they are designated in the Hebrew Scriptures. They first obtained such in the Septuagint. *Ψαλμός*, properly a touching, then a touching of the harp or other stringed instruments with the finger or with the plectrum; was next the instrument itself, and last of all the song sung with this musical accompaniment. It is in this latest stage of its meaning that we find the word adopted in the Septuagint; and to this agree the ecclesiastical definitions of it; thus in the *Lexicon* ascribed to Cyril of Alexandria: *λέγος μουσικός, ὅταν εὐρύθμως κατὰ τοὺς ἀρμονικοῦς λόγους τὸ ὄργανον κρούηται*; cf. Clement of Alexandria (*Παδ. ii. 4*): *ὁ ψαλμός, ἐμμελής ἐστὶν εὐλογία καὶ σώφρων*. It is certainly far the most probable that the *ψαλμοί* of Ephes. v. 19; Col. iii. 16, are the inspired Psalms

of the Hebrew Canon. The word *must* refer to these on every other occasion when it is met in the N. T., with only one exception, namely 1 Cor. xiv. 26; and even there it in all likelihood means nothing else; and I must needs believe that the Psalms which the Apostle would have the faithful to sing to one another, are the Psalms of David, and of the other sweet singers of Israel; above all, seeing that the word seems bounded and limited to its narrowest use by the nearly synonymous words with which it is grouped.

But while the psalm by the right of primogeniture, as at once the oldest and most venerable, thus occupies the foremost place, the Church of Christ does not restrict herself to such, but claims the freedom of bringing new things as well as old out of her treasure-house. She will produce "hymns and spiritual songs" of her own, as well as inherit psalms bequeathed to her by the Jewish Church; a new salvation demanding a new song, as Augustine delights so often to remind us.

It was of the essence of a Greek *ῥυμος* that it should be addressed to, or be otherwise in praise of, a god, or of a hero, that is, in the strictest sense of that word, of a deified man; as Callisthenes (Arrian, iv. 11) reminds Alexander; who, claiming hymns for himself, or suffering them to be addressed to him, implicitly accepted not human honours but

divine (ὕμνοι μὲν ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς ποιοῦνται, ἔπαινοι δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους). In the gradual breaking down of the distinction between human and divine, with the snatching on the part of men of divine honours, the ὕμνος came more and more to be applied to men; although this not without observation (Athenæus, vi. 62; xv. 21, 22). When the word was assumed into the language of the Church, this essential distinction clung to it still. A psalm might be a *De profundis*, the story of man's deliverance, or a commemoration of mercies which he had received; and of a "spiritual song" much the same could be said: a hymn must always be more or less of a *Magnificat*, a direct address of praise and glory to God. Thus Jerome (*In Ephes.* v. 19): 'Breviter hymnos esse dicendum, qui fortitudinem et majestatem prædicant Dei, et ejusdem semper vel beneficia, vel facta, mirantur.' Cf. Origen, *Con. Cels.* viii. 67; and a precious fragment, probably of the Presbyter Caius, preserved by Eusebius (*H. E.* v. 28): ψαλμοὶ δὲ ὅσοι καὶ ᾠδαὶ ἀδελφῶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πιστῶν γραφεῖσαι τὸν Λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν Χριστὸν ὕμνοῦσι θεολογοῦντες. Augustine in more places than one states the notes of what in his mind are the essentials of a hymn—which are three. It must be sung. It must be praise. It must be to God. Thus *Enarr. in Ps.* lxxii. 1: 'Hymni laudes sunt Dei cum cantico: hymni cantus sunt continentēs

laudes Dei. Si sit laus, et non sit Dei, non est hymnus: si sit laus, et Dei laus, et non cantetur, non est hymnus. Oportet ergo ut, si sit hymnus, habeat hæc tria, et laudem, et Dei, et canticum.' Cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* cxlviii. 14: 'Hymnus scitis quid est? Cantus est cum laude Dei. Si laudas Deum, et non cantas, non dicis hymnum; si cantas, et non laudas Deum, non dicis hymnum; si laudas aliud quod non pertinet ad laudem Dei, etsi cantando laudes, non dicis hymnum. Hymnus ergo tria ista habet, et cantum, et laudem, et Dei.'<sup>1</sup> Compare Gregory of Nazianzum:

ἔπαιός ἐστιν εὖ τι τῶν ἐμῶν φράσαι,  
 αἶνος δ' ἔπαινος εἰς Θεὸν σεβάσμιος,  
 ὁ δ' ὕμνος, αἶνος ἐμμελής, ὡς ὄσομαι.

But though, as appears from these quotations, ὕμνος in the fourth century was a word freely adopted in the Church, this was by no means the case at a somewhat earlier day. Notwithstanding the authority which St. Paul's employment of it in these two places which have been so often referred to might seem to give it, it nowhere occurs in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, nor in those of

<sup>1</sup> It is not very easy to follow Augustine in his distinction between a psalm and a canticle [canticum]. Indeed he acknowledges himself that he has not arrived at any clearness on this matter (*Enarr. in Ps.* lxxvii. 1; cf. *in Ps.* iv. 1; cf. Hilary, *Prol. in Lib. Psalm.* §§19-21).

Justin Martyr, nor in the *Apostolic Constitutions*; only once in Tertullian (*ad Uxor.* ii. 8). It is at least a plausible explanation of this that the word was so steeped in heathenism, so linked with profane associations, there were so many hymns to Zeus, to Hermes, to Aphrodite, and the rest, that the early Christians shrunk from and would not willingly employ it.

If we ask ourselves what probably the hymns, which St. Paul desired that the faithful should sing among themselves, were, we may, I think, confidently assume that these observed the law to which the heathen hymns were submitted, and were hymns *to God*. Inspired specimens of the ὕμνος we may find at Luke i. 46—55; 68—79; Acts iv. 24; such also probably was that which Paul and Silas made to be heard from the depth of their Philipian dungeon (ὕμνον τὸν Θεόν, Acts xvi. 25). How noble, how magnificent uninspired hymns could prove we have evidence in the *Te Deum*, in the *Veni Creator Spiritus*, and in many a later heritage for ever which the Church has acquired. That the Church, at the time when St. Paul wrote, brought into a new and marvellous world of realities, would be rich in these we might be sure, even if no evidence existed to this effect, of which however there is abundance, more than one fragment of a hymn being probably embedded in St. Paul's own Epistles

(Ephes. v. 14; 1 Tim. iii. 16). And as it was quite impossible that the Christian Church, mightily releasing itself, though not with any revolutionary violence, from the Jewish synagogue, should fall into that mistake into which some portions of the Reformed Church afterward ran, we may be sure that it adopted into liturgic use not psalms only, but also hymns, singing hymns to Christ as to God (Pliny, *Ep.* x. 96); though this, as we may well conclude, to a larger extent in Churches gathered out of the heathen world than in those where a strong Jewish element was found.

Ὠδή (= αἰοδή) is the only word of this group which the Apocalypse knows (v. 9; xiv. 3; xv. 3). St. Paul, on the two occasions when he employs it, adds *πνευματικῆ* to it; and this, no doubt, because ὠδή by itself might mean any kind of song, of battle, of harvest, or festal, or hymeneal, while *ψαλμός* from its Hebrew, and *ῥυθμός* from its Greek, use, did not require any such qualifying adjective. It will at once be evident that this epithet thus applied does not necessarily imply that these ὠδαί were divinely inspired, any more than the *ἀνὴρ πνευματικός* was an inspired man (1 Cor. iii. 1; Gal. vi. 1); but only that they were such as were composed by spiritual men, and had to do with spiritual things. How, it may be asked, are we to distinguish these “spiritual songs” from the “psalms”

and “hymns” with which they are associated by St. Paul? If the first word represents the heritage of sacred song which the Christian Church derived from the Jewish, the second and third will between them express what more of this sacred song it produced out of its bosom; but with a difference. What the *ὑμνοὶ* were, we have already seen; but Christian feeling will soon have expanded into a wider range of poetic utterances than those in which there is a direct address to the Deity. If we turn for instance to Keble’s *Christian Year*, or Herbert’s *Temple*, there are many poems in both which, as they certainly are not psalms, so as little do they possess the characteristics of hymns; but which would most justly be entitled “spiritual songs;” and in almost all our collections of so-called “hymns” at the present day, there are not a few which by much juster title would bear this name. Calvin: ‘Sub his tribus nominibus complexus est [Paulus] omne genus canticorum; quæ ita vulgo distinguuntur, ut Psalmus sit in quo concinendo adhibetur musicum aliquod instrumentum præter linguam; hymnus proprie sit laudis canticum, sive assâ voce, sive aliter canatur; oda non laudes tantum contineat, sed paræneses, et alia argumenta.’

§ XXIX.—*ἀγράμματος, ιδιώτης.*

THESE words occur together Acts iv. 13; *ἀγράμματος* nowhere else in the N. T., but *ιδιώτης* on four other occasions (1 Cor. xiv. 16, 23, 24; 2 Cor. xi. 6). In that first-named passage there can be little doubt that according to the natural rhetoric of human speech the second word is stronger than the first, adds something to it; thus our Translators have evidently understood them, rendering *ἀγράμματος* 'unlearned,' and *ιδιώτης* 'ignorant;' and so Bengel: '*ἀγράμματος* est rudis, *ιδιώτης* rudior.'

When we seek more accurately to distinguish them, and to detect the exact notion which each conveys, the second, as the word of more various and subtle uses, will mainly claim our attention. '*Ἀγράμματος* need not occupy us long; it is simply illiterate (John vii. 13; Acts xxvi. 24; 2 Tim. iii. 15); the *ἀγράμματος* being joined by Plato with *ὄρειος*, rugged as the mountaineer (*Crit.* 109 *d*), with *ἄμουσος* (*Tim.* 23 *b*); by Plutarch set over against the *μεμουσωμένος* (*Adv. Col.* 26).

But *ιδιώτης* is a far more complex word. Its primary idea, the point from which, so to speak, etymologically it starts, is that of the private man, occupying himself with *τὰ ἴδια*, as contrasted with



the political ; the man unclothed with office, as set over against and distinguished from him who bears some office in the state. But then as it lay very deep in the Greek mind, being one of the strongest convictions there, that in public life the true education of the man and the citizen consisted, a contemptuous use lay very near to *ιδιώτης*, which it did not fail presently to make its own. The *ιδιώτης*, unexercised in business, unaccustomed to deal with his fellow-men, is unpractical ; and thus the word is joined with *ἀπράγμων* by Plato (*Rep.* x. 620 c ; cf. Plutarch, *De Virt. et Vit.* 4), with *ἄπρακτος* by Plutarch (*Phil. esse cum Princ.* 1), who sets him over against the *πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς*. But more than this, he is boorish, and thus *ιδιώτης* is linked with *ἄγροικος* (Chrysostom, *In 1 Ep. Cor. Hom.* 3), with *ἀπαίδευτος* (Plutarch, *Arist. et Men. Comp.* 1).<sup>1</sup>

The history of the word by no means stops here, though we have followed it as far as is absolutely necessary to explain its association at Acts iv. 13 with *ἀγράμματος*, and the points of likeness and difference between them. But for the sake of the other passages where it occurs, and to explain why it should be used at 1 Cor. xiv. 16, 23, 24, and exactly in what sense, it may be well to pursue this his-

<sup>1</sup> There is, I may observe, an excellent discussion on the successive meanings of *ιδιώτης* in Bishop Horsley's *Tracts in Controversy with Dr. Priestly, Appendix, Disquisition Second*, pp. 475—485.

tory a little further. The circumstance is explained by a singular characteristic of the word, which is not easy to describe, but which a few examples at once make intelligible. There lies continually in it a negation of that particular skill, knowledge, profession, standing, over against which it is antithetically set, and not of any other except that alone. For example, is the *ιδιώτης* set over against the *δημιουργός* (as by Plato, *Theag.* 124 *c*), he is the unskilled man as set over against the skilled artificer; any other dexterity he may possess, but that of the *δημιουργός* is denied him. Is he set over against the *ιατρός*, he is one ignorant of the physician's art (Plato, *Rep.* iii. 389 *b*; Philo, *De Conf. Ling.* 7); against the *σοφιστής*, he is one unacquainted with the dialectic fence of the sophists (Xenophon, *De Venat.* 13; cf. *Hiero*, i. 2; Lucian, *Pisc.* 34; Plutarch, *Symp.* iv. 2. 3). Those unpractised in gymnastic exercises are *ιδιώται* as contrasted with the *ἀθληταί* (Xenophon, *Hiero*, iv. 6; Philo, *De Sept.* 6); subjects are *ιδιώται* as contrasted with their prince (Id. *De Abrah.* 33); the underlings in the harvest-field are *ιδιώται καὶ ὑπηρέται* as distinguished from the *ἡγεμόνες* (Id. *De Somn.* ii. 4); and lastly, the whole congregation of Israel are *ιδιώται* as contrasted with the priests (*De Vit. Mos.* iii. 29). With these uses of the word to assist us, it is impossible, I think, to come to any other conclusion

than that the *ιδιώται* of St. Paul (1 Cor. xiv. 16, 23, 24) are the plain believers, with no special spiritual gifts, as distinguished from those who were in the possession of these; even as elsewhere they are the lay members of the Church as contrasted with those who minister in the Word and Sacraments; for it is ever the word with which it is at once combined and contrasted which determines its use.

But to return to the matter immediately before us. For this it will be sufficient to say that when the Pharisees recognized Peter and James as men *ἀγράμματοι καὶ ιδιώται*, in the first word they expressed more the absence in them of book-learning, and, confining as they would have done this to the O. T., the *ἱερὰ γράμματα*, and to the glosses of the elders upon these, their lack of acquaintance with such lore as St. Paul had learned at the feet of Gamaliel; in the second the absence in them of that education which men insensibly acquire by mingling with those who have important affairs to transact, and by themselves sharing in the transaction of such. Setting aside that higher training of the heart and the intellect which comes from direct contact with God and his truth, no doubt books and public life, literature and politics, are the two most effectual organs of mental and moral training which the world has at its command—the second, as needs hardly be said, immeasurably more effec-

tual than the first. He is ἀγράμματος who has not shared in the first, ιδιώτης who has no part in the second.

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§ XXX.—δοκέω, φαίνομαι.

OUR Translators have not always observed the distinction which exists between δοκεῖν = ‘videri,’ and φαίνεσθαι = ‘apparere.’ Δοκεῖν expresses the subjective mental estimate or opinion about a matter which men form, their δόξα concerning it, which may be right (Acts xv. 28; 1 Cor. iv. 9; vii. 40; cf. Plato, *Tim.* 51 *d*, δόξα ἀληθής), but which may be wrong; involving, as it always does, the possibility of error (2 Macc. ix. 10; Matt. vi. 7; Mark vi. 49; John xvi. 2; Acts xxvii. 13; cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 458 *a*, δόξα ψευδής; Xenophon, *Cyr.* i. 6. 22; *Mem.* i. 7. 4; ἰσχυρὸν, μὴ ὄντα, δοκεῖν, to have a false reputation for strength); φαίνεσθαι on the contrary expresses how a matter phenomenally shows and presents itself, with no necessary assumption of any beholder at all; suggesting an opposition not to the ὄν, but to the νοούμενον. Thus, when Plato (*Rep.* 408 *a*) says of certain heroes in the Trojan war, ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐφάνησαν, he does not mean they *seemed* good for the war

and were not, but they *showed* good, with the tacit consequence that what they showed, they were as well. So too, when Xenophon writes ἐφαίνετο ἵχνια ἵππων (*Anab.* i. 6. 1), he would imply that horses had been actually there, and left their prints on the ground. He could only have used δοκεῖν, supposing him to have wished to say, that Cyrus and his company took for the tracks of horses what indeed might have been, but what also might not have been, such at all; cf. *Mem.* iii. 10. 2. Zeune: ‘δοκεῖν cernitur in opinione, quæ falsa esse potest et vana; sed φαίνεσθαι plerumque est in re extra mentem, quamvis nemo opinatur.’ Thus δοκεῖ φαίνεσθαι (Plato, *Phædr.* 269 *d*; *Legg.* xii. 960 *d*).

Even in passages where δοκεῖν may be exchanged with εἶναι, it does not lose the proper meaning which Zeune gives to it here. There is ever a predominant reference to the public opinion and estimate, rather than to the actual being; however the former may be the just echo of the latter (*Prov.* xxvii. 14). Thus, while there is no slightest touch of irony in St. Paul’s use of οἱ δοκοῦντες at *Gal.* ii. 2, οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναι τι (ii. 6), and manifestly could not be, seeing that he is so characterizing some of the chiefest of his fellow Apostles, the words at the same time express rather the reputation in which they were held in the Church than that which in themselves they were, however this reputation was

only the true measure of their worth (= ἐπίσημοι, Rom. xvi. 7); compare Euripides, *Hec.* 295, and Porphyry, *De Abst.* ii. 40, where οἱ δοκοῦντες in like manner is put absolutely, and set over against τὰ πλήθη. In the same way οἱ δοκοῦντες ἄρχειν τῶν ἐθνῶν (Mark x. 42) casts no doubt on the reality of the rule of these, for see Matt. xx. 25, but as little is it redundant. It means those who are *acknowledged as* rulers of the Gentiles; cf. Josephus, *Antt.* xix. 6. 3; Susan. 5; and Winer, *Gramm.* § lxxvii. 4.

But as on one side the mental conception may have, but also may *not* have, a corresponding truth in the world of realities, so on the other the appearance may have a reality behind it, and φαίνεσθαι is often synonymous with εἶναι and γίνεσθαι (Matt. ii. 7; xiii. 26); but it may also have none; φαινόμενα for instance are set off against τὰ ὄντα τῆ ἀληθείᾳ by Plato (*Rep.* 596 e); being the reflections of things, as seen in a mirror: or it may be utterly false, as is the show of goodness which the hypocrite makes (Matt. xxiii. 28). It must not be assumed that in this latter case φαίνεσθαι runs into the meaning of δοκεῖν, and that the distinction is broken down between them. It still subsists in the objective character of the one, and the subjective character of the other. Thus, at Matt. xxiii. 27, 28, the contrast is not between what *other men took* the Pharisees to be, and what they really were,

but what *they showed themselves* to other men (*φαίνεσθε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δίκαιοι*), and what they were indeed.

*Δοκεῖν* signifying ever, as we have seen, that subjective estimate which may be formed of a thing, not the objective show and seeming which it actually possesses, it will follow that our Translation of Jam. i. 26 is not perfectly satisfactory: "If any man among you *seem to be religious* [*δοκεῖ θρησκος εἶναι*], and bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain." This verse, as it here stands, must before now have perplexed many. How, it will have been asked, can a man "seem to be religious," that is, present himself to others as such, when his religious pretensions are belied and refuted by the allowance of an unbridled tongue? But render the words, "If any man among you *think himself* religious" (cf. Gal. vi. 3, where *δοκεῖ* is rightly so translated; as is the Vulgate here, "se putat religiosum esse"), "and bridleth not his tongue, &c." and all will then be plain. It is the man's own subjective estimate of his spiritual condition which *δοκεῖ* expresses, an estimate which the following words declare to be altogether erroneous.<sup>1</sup> If the Vulgate in dealing here

<sup>1</sup> Compare Heb. iv. 1, where for *δοκῆ* the Vulgate has rightly 'existimetur.'

with one of these words is right, while our Translators are wrong, elsewhere in dealing with the other it is wrong, while they are right. At Matt. vi. 18 (“that thou appear not unto men to fast”), it has ‘ne videaris,’ although at ver. 16 it had rightly ‘ut appareant;’ but the disciples are here warned not against the hypocrisy of wishing to be supposed to fast when they did not, as these words might imply, but against the ostentation of wishing *to be known* to fast, when they did; as lies plainly in the ὄπως μὴ φανῆς of the original.

The force of φαίνεσθαι, attained here, is missed in another place of our Version; although not through any confusion between it and δοκεῖν, but rather between it and φαίνειν, there. We render ἐν οἷς φαίνεσθε ὡς φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ (Phil. ii. 15), “among whom *ye shine* as lights in the world.” To justify “ye shine” in this place, which is common to all the Versions of the English Hexapla, St. Paul should have written φαίνετε (John i. 5; 2 Pet. i. 19; Rev. i. 16), and not, as he has written, φαίνεσθε. It is worthy of note that, while the Vulgate, having ‘lucetis,’ shares and anticipates our error, an earlier Version was free from it, as is evident from the form in which the verse is quoted by Augustine (*Enarr. in Ps. cxlvi. 4*): ‘In quibus *apparetis* tanquam luminaria in cælo.’



## § xxxi.—Ζῶον, θηρίον.

THERE are passages out of number where one of these words might be employed quite as fitly as the other, even as there are many in which they are used interchangeably, as by Plutarch, *De Cap. ex In. Util.* 2. This is not however sufficient to prove that there is no distinction between them, if others occur, however few, where one would be fit and the other not; or where, though neither would be unfit, one would yet possess a greater fitness than would the other. The distinction, latent in the other cases, because there is nothing to evoke it, emerges in these.

The difference between ζῶον and θηρίον is the difference not between two terms in any respect coordinate; one, on the contrary—that is, the second—is wholly subordinate to the first, is a less included in a greater. All creatures that live on earth, including man himself, λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζῶον, as Plutarch (*De Am. Prol.* 3) so grandly describes him, are ζῶα (Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* i. 5. 1); nay, God Himself is ζῶον ἀθάνατον (Plato, *Def.*), being indeed the only one to whom life by absolute right belongs; φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον αἰδίου ἄριστον (Aristotle, *Metaph.* xii. 7). It is true

that there is no example of this employment of ζῶον to designate man in the N. T.; but see Plato, *Pol.* 271 e; Xenophon, *Cyr.* i. 1. 3; *Wisd.* xix. 20; still less to designate God; for whom, as not merely living, but as being absolute life, the one fountain of life, the αὐτοζῶον, the fitter and more reverent ζωή is retained (*John* i. 4; *1 John* i. 2). In its ordinary use ζῶον covers the same extent of meaning as our own word 'animal,' having generally, but by no means universally (*Plutarch*, *De Garr.* 22; *Heb.* xiii. 11), ἄλογον or some such epithet attached (*2 Pet.* ii. 12; *Jude* 10).

Θηρίον, a diminutive of θήρ, which in its Æolic form φήρ gives the Latin 'fera,' and appears in its more usual shape in the German 'Thier' and our own 'deer,' like χρυσίον, βιβλίον, φορτίον, ἀγγεῖον, and so many other words in the Greek language (see *Fischer*, *Prol. de Vit. Lex. N. T.* p. 256), has quite left behind its diminutive signification; how completely it is felt to have done so is remarkably attested in the modern compound 'megatherium;' and compare Xenophon, *Cyrop.* i. 4. 11, θηρία μεγάλα. Neither does θηρίον exclusively mean the mischievous and cruel beast, for see *Heb.* xii. 20; *Exod.* xix. 13; at the same time it has predominantly this meaning (*Mark* i. 13; *Acts* xxviii. 4, 5); θηρία at *Acts* xi. 6 being distinguished from τετράποδα. It is very noticeable that, numerous as

are the passages of the Septuagint where beasts for sacrifice are mentioned, it is never under this name; and the reason of this is evident, namely, that the brutal, bestial element is that which the word brings prominently forward, and not that wherein the lower animals are akin to man, not that therefore which gives them a fitness to be offered as substitutes for man. Here, too, we have an explanation of the frequent transfer of *θηρίον* and *θηριώδης*, as in Latin of ‘bestia’ and ‘bellua,’ to fierce and brutal men (Tit. i. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 32; Josephus, *Antt.* xvii. 5. 5; Arrian, *In Epict.* ii. 9).

All this makes the more to be regretted the breaking down for the English reader of the distinction between *ζῶον* and *θηρίον* in the Apocalypse, by the rendering of *ζῶα* as ‘beasts’ throughout that Book. As I could only say over again in other words what I had said before, I will make no apology for quoting on this matter some words of my own (*On the Authorized Version of the New Testament*, 2d edit. p. 102): ‘One must always regret, and the regret has been often expressed—it was so by Broughton almost as soon as our Version was published—that in the Apocalypse our Translators should have rendered *θηρίον* and *ζῶον* by the same word, ‘beast.’ Both play important parts in the book; both belong to its higher symbolism; but to portions the most different. The *ζῶα* or “living

creatures," which stand before the throne, in which dwells the fulness of all creaturely life, as it gives praise and glory to God (iv. 6—9; v. 6; vi. 1; and often) form part of the *heavenly* symbolism; the *θηρία*, the first beast and the second, which rise up, one from the bottomless pit (xi. 7), the other from the sea (xiii. 1), of which the one makes war upon the two Witnesses, the other opens his mouth in blasphemies, these form part of the *hellish* symbolism. To confound these and those under a common designation, to call those 'beasts' and these 'beasts,' would be an oversight, even granting the name to be suitable to both; it is a more serious one, when the word used, bringing out, as this must, the predominance of the lower animal life, is applied to glorious creatures in the very court and presence of Heaven. The error is common to all the translations. That the Rheims should not have escaped it is strange; for the Vulgate renders ζῶα by 'animalia' ('animantia' would have been still better), and only *θηρίον* by 'bestia.' If ζῶα had always been rendered "living creatures," this would have had the additional advantage of setting these symbols of the Apocalypse, even for the English reader, in an unmistakeable connexion with Ezek. i. 5, 13, 14, and often; where "living creature" is the rendering in our English Version of חַיָּוִת, as ζῶον is in the Septuagint.

## § xxxii.—ὕπέρ, ἀντί.

It has been often claimed, and in the interests of an all-important truth, namely the *vicarious* character of the sacrifice of Christ, that in such passages as Heb. ii. 9; Tit. ii. 14; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Gal. iii. 13; Luke xxii. 19, 20; 1 Pet. ii. 21; iii. 18; iv. 1; Rom. v. 8; John x. 15, in all of which Christ is said to have died ὑπὲρ πάντων, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων, and the like, ὑπὲρ shall be accepted as equipollent with ἀντί: it being further urged that, as ἀντί is the preposition first of equivalence (Homer, *Il.* ix. 116, 117) and then of exchange (1 Cor. xi. 15; Heb. xii. 16; Matt. v. 38), ὑπὲρ must in the passages referred to above be regarded as having the same force. Each of these, it is evident, would thus become a *dictum probans* for a truth, in itself most vital, namely that Christ suffered, not merely on our behalf and for our good, but also in our room, and bearing that penalty of our sins which we otherwise must have borne. Now, though some have denied, we must yet accept as certain that ὑπὲρ has sometimes this meaning. Thus in the *Gorgias* of Plato, 515 c, ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, I will answer in your stead; cf. Thucydides, i. 141; Euripides, *Alcestis*, 712; Poly-

buis, iii. 67. 7; Philem. 13; and perhaps 1 Cor. xv. 29; but it is not less certain, that in passages far more numerous *ὑπέρ* means no more than, on behalf of, for the good of; thus Matt. v. 44; John xiii. 37; 1 Tim. ii. 1, and continually. It must be admitted, I think, to follow from this, that had we in the Scripture only statements to the effect that Christ died *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, that He tasted death *ὑπὲρ παντός*, it would be impossible to found on these any irrefragable proof that the death of Christ was vicarious, He dying in our stead, and Himself bearing on his Cross our sins and the penalty of our sins; however we might find it, as no doubt we do, elsewhere (Isai. liii. 4—6). It is only as having other declarations to the effect that Christ died *ἀντὶ πολλῶν* (Matt. xx. 28), gave Himself as an *ἀντίλυτρον* (1 Tim. ii. 6), and bringing these others to the interpretation of those, that we feel we have a perfect right to claim such declarations of Christ's death *for us* as also declarations of his death *in our stead*. And in them beyond doubt the preposition *ὑπέρ* is the rather employed, that it may embrace both these meanings, and express how Christ died at once *for our sakes* (here it touches more nearly on the meaning of *περί*, Matt. xxvi. 28; Mark xiv. 24; 1 Pet. iii. 18; *διὰ* also once occurring in this connexion, 1 Cor. viii. 11), and *in our stead*; while *ἀντί* would only have expressed the latter.

Tischendorf, in his little treatise, *Doctrina Pauli de vi mortis Christi satisfactoriâ*, has some excellent remarks on this matter: 'Fuerunt, qui ex solâ naturâ et usu præpositionis ὑπέρ demonstrare conarentur, Paulum docuisse satisfactionem Christi vicariam; alii rursus negarunt, præpositionem ὑπέρ a N. Test. auctoribus recte positam esse pro ἀντί, inde probaturi contrarium. Peccatum utrimque est. Sola præpositio utramque pariter adjuvat sententiarum partem; pariter, inquam, utramque. Namque in promptu sunt, contra per plurimum opinionem, desumpta ex multis veterum Græcorum scriptoribus loca, quæ præpositioni ὑπέρ significatum, loco, vice, alicujus plane vindicant, atque ipsum Paulum eodem significato eam usurpasse, et quidem in locis, quæ ad nostram rem non pertinent, nemini potest esse dubium (cf. Philem. 13; 2 Cor. v. 20; 1 Cor. xv. 29). Si autem quæritur, cur hæc potissimum præpositione incerti et fluctuantis significatûs in re tam gravi usus sit Apostolus—inest in ipsâ præpositione quo sit aptior reliquis ad describendam Christi mortem pro nobis appetitam. Etenim in hoc versari rei summam, quod Christus mortuus sit in commodum hominum, nemo negat; atque id quidem factum est ita, ut moreretur hominum loco. Pro conjunctâ significatione et commodi et vicarii præclare ab Apostolo adhibita est præpositio ὑπέρ. Itaque rectissime, ut solet, contendit Winerus noster, non

licere nobis in gravibus locis, ubi de morte Christi agatur, præpositionem *ὑπέρ* simpliciter = *ἀντί* sumere. Est enim plane Latinorum *pro*, nostrum *für*. Quotiescunque Paulus Christum pro nobis mortuum esse docet, ab ipsâ notione vicarii non disjunctam esse voluit notionem commodi, neque umquam ab hâc, quamvis perquam aperta sit, excludi illam in istâ formulâ, jure meo dico.’

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§ xxxiii.—*φονεύς, ἀνθρωποκτόνος, σικάριος.*

OUR Translators have rendered all these words by ‘murderer,’ a word apt enough in the case of the first (Matt. xxii. 7; 1 Pet. iv. 15; Rev. xxi. 8), but at the same time so general that it keeps out of sight characteristic features which the other two possess.

’*Ἀνθρωποκτόνος*, exactly corresponding to our ‘manslayer,’ or ‘homicide,’ occurs in the N. T. only in the writings of St. John (viii. 44; 1 Ep. iii. 15 *bis*); it is found also in Euripides (*Iphig. in Taur.* 390). On our Lord’s lips the word has its special fitness; no other would have suited at all so well; for his reference (John viii. 44) is to the great, and in part only too successful, assault on the life natural and the life spiritual of all mankind which Satan



made, when planting sin, and through sin death, in them who should be the authors of being to all other men, he poisoned, as he hoped, the stream of human life at its fountain-head. Satan was thus *ὁ ἀνθρωποκτόνος* indeed; for he would have fain murdered not this man or that, but the whole race of mankind.

*Σικάριος*, which only occurs once in the N. T. and, noticeably enough, then on the lips of a Roman captain (Acts xxi. 38), is one of the many Latin words which we meet with there. Such in not inconsiderable numbers had followed the Roman domination even into those provinces of the empire that still retained their own language. The ‘siccarius,’ in the Roman use of the word, having his name from the ‘sica,’ a short sword, or rather poniard or stiletto, which he wore and was prompt to use, was the hired bravo or swordsman, of whom in the last days of the Republic, lawless men, the Antonies and the Clodiuses, kept troops in their pay and oftentimes about their person, to remove out of the way any who were obnoxious to them. The word had found its way into Palestine, and into the Greek, which was spoken there; Josephus in two instructive passages (*B. J.* ii. 13. 3; *Antt.* xx. 8. 6) giving us full details about those to whom the name of *σικάριοι* was applied. They were assassins who sprang up in the latter days of the Jew-

ish Commonwealth, when, in token of the approaching catastrophe, all ties of society were fast being dissolved. Concealing their short swords under their garments (it was from the likeness of this sword to the Roman 'sica' that, as Josephus tells us, they obtained their name), and mingling with the multitude, especially at the chief feasts, they stabbed whom of their enemies they would, and then, taking part with the bystanders in exclamations of horror, effectually averted suspicion from themselves.

It will appear from what has been said that *φονεύς* may be any murderer, the genus of which *σικάριος* is a species, this latter being an assassin, using a particular weapon, and following his trade of blood in a special manner. Again, *ἀνθρωποκτόνος* has a special stress and emphasis of its own. It bears on its front that he to whom this name is given is a murderer *of men*, a homicide; while *φονεύς* is capable of vaguer use, so that it would be possible to characterize a wicked man as *φονεὺς τῆς εὐσεβείας*, a destroyer of piety, though he made no direct attack on the lives of men, or a traitor as *φονεὺς τῆς πατρίδος* (Plutarch, *Præc. Ger. Reip.* 19); and such uses of the word are not unfrequent.

§ XXXIV.—*πονηρός, φαῦλος.*

THAT which is morally evil may be contemplated on two sides, from two points of view; either on the side of its positive malignity, its will and power to work mischief, or else on that of its negative worthlessness, and, so to speak, its good-for-nothingness. *Πονηρός* contemplates evil from the former point of view, and *φαῦλος* from the latter.

*Πονηρός*, connected with *πόνος* and *πονεῖν*, has sometimes, though very rarely, a good sense, as when Hercules on account of his twelve noble toils is termed in Hesiod *πονηρότατος καὶ ἄριστος*. It is then equal to *ἐπίπρονος*, by which Suidas explains it. Very much oftener, however, *πονηρός* is not one who himself labours, but who causes labours to others; and the point of difference between it and *φαῦλος*, and in a measure between it and *κακός*, is, that in it the positive activity of evil is more decidedly expressed than in either of those. Thus *ὄψον πονηρόν* (Plutarch, *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 2) is an unwholesome dish; *ἄσματα πονηρά* (id. *Quom. Adol. Poët.* 4), wanton songs, such as corrupt the minds of the young. Satan is emphatically *ὁ πονηρός*, as the first author of all the mischief in the world (Matt. vi. 13; Ephes. v. 16; cf. Luke vii.

21; Acts xix. 12); evil beasts are always *θηρία πονηρά* in the Septuagint (Gen. xxxvii. 33; Isai. xxxv. 9); *κακὰ θηρία* indeed once in the N. T. (Tit. i. 12), but the meaning to be expressed is not precisely the same; so too the evil eye is *ὄφθαλμὸς πονηρός* (Mark vii. 22); and compare John iii. 19; vii. 7; xvii. 15.

But while it is thus with *πονηρός*, there are words, I should suppose, in all languages, and *φᾶυλος* is one of them, which contemplate evil under another aspect, that namely of its good-for-nothingness, the impossibility of any good ever coming forth from it. Thus 'nequam' (in strictness opposed to 'frugi') and 'nequitia' in Latin; 'vaurien' in French; 'naughty' and 'naughtiness' in English; 'taugenichts,' 'schlecht,' 'schlechtigkeit' in German;<sup>1</sup> while on the other hand 'tugend' (= 'taugend') is virtue contemplated as usefulness. This notion of worthlessness is the central notion of *φᾶυλος* (by some recognized in 'faul,' 'foul'), which in Greek runs successively through the following meanings, light, unstable, blown about by every wind (see Donaldson, *Cratylus*, § 152; 'synonymum ex levitate permutatum:' Matthæi), small, slight ('schlecht' and 'schlicht' in German

<sup>1</sup> Graff, in his *Alt-hochdeutsche Sprachschatz*, p. 138, ascribes in like manner to 'bose' ('böse') an original sense of weak, small, nothing worth.

are only different spellings of one and the same word), mediocre, of no account, worthless, bad; but still bad predominantly in the sense of worthless; thus φαύλη αὐλητρὶς (Plato, *Conv.* 215 c); φαῦλος ζωγράφος (Plutarch, *De Adul. et Am.* 6). In agreement with this, the standing antithesis to φαῦλος is σπουδαῖος (Plato, *Legg.* vi. 757 a; vii. 814 e; Philo, *De Merc. Mer.* 1), and after this such words as χρηστός (Plutarch, *De Aud. Poët.* 4); καλός (id. *De Adul. et Am.* 9); ἐπιεικῆς (Aristotle, *Ethic. Nic.* iii. 5. 3); ἀστείος (Plutarch, *De Rep. Stoic.* 12); while those with which it is commonly associated are ἄχρηστος (Plato, *Lysias*, 204 b); εὐτελής (id. *Legg.* vii. 806 a); μοχθηρός (id. *Gorg.* 486 b); ἄτοπος (Plutarch, *De Aud. Poët.* 12; *Conj. Præc.* 48); κοινός (id. *Præc. San.* 14); ἀκρατής (id. *Gryll.* 8); ἀνόητος (id. *De Comm. not.* 11).

Φαῦλος, as used in the N. T., has reached this its latest meaning; and τὰ φαῦλα πράξαντες are set over against τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιήσαντες, being condemned to “the resurrection of damnation,” being as they are these doers of evil things (John v. 29). We have the same antithesis of φαῦλα and ἀγαθά, Phalaris, *Ep.* 144; Plutarch, *De Plac. Phil.* i. 8; and this severer meaning is involved in the word in all other places of the N. T. where it occurs (John iii. 20; Tit. ii. 8; Jam. iii. 16; cf. Aristotle, *Ethic. Nic.* ii. 6. 18; Philo, *De Abrah.* 3).

§ XXXV.—*εἰλικρινής, καθαρός.*

IT is hard to express, even while one may instinctively feel, the difference between *εἰλικρινής* and *καθαρός*. They occur continually together (Plato, *Phileb.* 52 *d*; Eusebius, *Præp. Ev.* xv. 15. 4), and the words associated with the one will be found constantly in association with the other.

*Εἰλικρινής* occurs only twice in the N. T. (Phil. i. 10; 2 Pet. iii. 1), once also in the Septuagint (Wisd. vii. 25), *εἰλικρίνεια* three times (1 Cor. v. 8; 2 Cor. i. 12; ii. 17). Its etymology, like that of 'sincere,' which is its best English rendering, is doubtful, uncertainty in this matter causing also uncertainty in the breathing. Some, as Stallbaum (Plato, *Phædo*, 66 *a*, note), connect with *ἴλος*, *ἴλη* (*εἴλειν*, *εἰλεῖν*), that which is cleansed by much *rolling* and shaking to and fro in the sieve; 'volubili agitatione secretum atque adeo cribro purgatum.' Another more familiar and more beautiful etymology, if only one could feel sufficient confidence in it, is that which Lösner indicates when he says, 'dicitur de iis rebus quarum puritas ad solis splendorem exigitur,' *ὁ ἐν τῇ εἴλῃ κεκριμένος*, held up to the sunlight and in that proved and approved. Certainly the uses of the word, so far as they afford an

argument, and there is an instinct and traditionary feeling which leads to a word's correct use, even when its derivation has been altogether lost sight of, are very much in favour of the former etymology. Not the clear, the transparent, but the purged, the winnowed, the unmingled, is the constant sense which the word possesses; as witness those with which it is continually found associated, such as ἀμιγής (Plato, *Menex.* 245 d; Plutarch, *Quæst. Rom.* 26); ἄμικτος (id. *De Def. Or.* 34; cf. *De Isid. et Os.* 61); ἄκρατος (id. *De An. Proc.* 27); ἀκέραιος (Clemens Romanus, 1 *Ep. ad Cor.* 2); and compare Philo, *De Opif. Mun.* 8; Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 5; *De Fac. in Orb.* 16; πάσχει τὸ μιγνύμενον· ἀποβάλλει γὰρ τὸ εἰλικρινές: in like manner the Etym. M.: εἰλικρινής σημαίνει τὸν καθαρὸν καὶ ἀμιγῆ ἑτέρου. I would not in the least deny that there are various passages in which the notion of clearness is the predominant, thus for example in Philo (*Quis Rer. Div. Hær.* 61) εἰλικρινές πῦρ is contrasted with the κλίβανος καπνιζόμενος, but they are quite the rarer, and may very well be secondary and superinduced.

The ethical use of εἰλικρινής and εἰλικρίνεια first appears in the N. T., being altogether strange to classical Greek; Theophylact defining εἰλικρίνεια well as καθαρῆς διανοίας καὶ ἀδολότης οὐδὲν ἔχουσαι συνεσκιασμένον καὶ ὑπουλον: and Basil the

Great (*in Reg. Brev. Int.*) εἰλικρινὲς εἶναι λογιζομαι τὸ ἀμιγές, καὶ ἄκρως κεκαθαρμένον ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐναντίου. It is true to this its central meaning as often as it is employed in the N. T. The Corinthians shall purge out the old leaven that they may keep the feast with the unleavened bread of sincerity (εἰλικρινείας) and truth (1 Cor. v. 8). St. Paul rejoices that in simplicity and in that sincerity which God gives (ἐν εἰλικρινείᾳ Θεοῦ), not in fleshly wisdom, he has his conversation in the world (2 Cor. i. 12); declares that he is not of those who tamper with and adulterate (καπηλεύοντες) the word of God, but that as of sincerity (ἐξ εἰλικρινείας) he speaks in Christ (2 Cor. ii. 17).

*Καθαρός* in its earliest use (Homer does not know it in any other, *Od.* vi. 61; xvii. 48) is clean, and this in a non-ethical sense, as opposed to *ῥυπαρός*. Thus *καθαρόν σῶμα* (Xenophon, *Æcon.* x. 7) is the body not smeared with paint or ointment, and in this sense it is often employed in the N. T. (Matt. xxvii. 59; Heb. x. 22; Rev. xv. 6). But already in the tragic poets it had obtained an ethical meaning, which is not uncommon in the Septuagint, where it often designates cleanness of heart (Job viii. 6; Ps. xxiii. 4), although far oftener a cleanness merely technical and ceremonial. That it frequently runs into the domain of meaning which it has been sought to claim for *εἰλικρινής* cannot be



denied. It also is found associated with ἀμιγής (Philo, *De Mund. Opif.* 8), with ἄκρατος (Xenophon, *Cyrop.* viii. 7. 20; Plutarch, *Æmil. Paul.* 34), with ἀκήρατος (Plato, *Crat.* 396 b); καθαρὸς σῖτος is wheat with the chaff winnowed away (Xenophon, *Æcon.* xviii. 8, 9); καθαρὸς στρατός, an army rid of its sick and ineffective (Herodotus, i. 211; cf. iv. 135), or, as the same phrase is used in Xenophon, an army made up of the best materials, not lowered by an admixture of mercenaries or cowards; the flower of the army, all ἄνδρες ἀχρεῖοι being set aside (Appian, viii. 117). And yet, notwithstanding all such associations and such uses of καθαρός, it still remains true that the purity expressed by it is mainly contemplated under the aspect of cleanness, freedom from soil or stain; thus θρησκεία καθαρὰ καὶ ἀμίαντος (Jam. i. 27), and the constant use of the phrase καθαρὸς φόνου, and the like.

It may then, I think, be said in conclusion, that as the Christian is εἰλικρινής, this grace in him will exclude all double-mindedness, the divided heart (Jam. i. 8; iv. 8), the eye not single (Matt. vi. 22), all hypocrisies; while, as he is καθαρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ, by this are excluded the μιάσματα (2 Pet. ii. 20; cf. Tit. i. 18), the μολυσμός (2 Cor. vii. 1), the ῥυπαρία (Jam. i. 21; 1 Pet. iii. 21; Rev. xxii. 11) of sin. In the one will be predicated his free-

dom from the falsehoods, in the other from the defilements, of the flesh and of the world. If absence of foreign admixture belongs to both, yet is it a more primary sense in *εἰλικρινής*, not improbably wrapt up in the etymology of the word, a more secondary and superinduced in *καθαρός*.

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§ xxxvi.—πόλεμος, μάχη.

*Πόλεμος* and *μάχη* occur often together (Homer, *Il.* i. 177; v. 891; Plato, *Tim.* 19 e; Job xxxviii. 23; Jam. v. 3); and in like manner *πολεμῆναι* and *μάχεσθαι*. There is the same difference between them as between our own 'war' and 'battle;' *ὁ πόλεμος Πελοποννησιακός*, the Peloponnesian War; *ἡ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχη*, the battle of Marathon. Dealing with the words in this antithesis, namely that *πόλεμος* embraces the whole course of hostilities, *μάχη* no more than the actual encounter in arms of hostile forces, Pericles, dissuading the Athenians from giving way to the demands of the Spartans, admits that the Peloponnesians were a match for all the other Greeks together in a single battle, but refuses to allow that they would possess the same superiority in a war, at least against such as had their preparations of another kind (*μάχη μὲν γὰρ*

μιᾷ πρὸς ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας δυνατοὶ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀντισχεῖν, πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι, Thucydides, i. 141).

But besides this, while πόλεμος and πολεμεῖν remain true to their primary meaning, and are not transferred to any secondary, it is altogether otherwise with μάχη and μάχεσθαι. Contentions which fall very short of the shock of arms are continually designated by these words. There are μάχαι of every kind: ἐρωτικάι (Xenophon, *Hiero*, i. 35); νομικάι (Tit. iii. 9; cf. 2 Tim. ii. 23); λογομαχίαί (1 Tim. vi. 4); σκιαμαχίαί: and compare John vi. 52; 2 Tit. ii. 24; Prov. xxvi. 20, 21.

Eustathius (on Homer, *Il.* i. 177) expresses these differences well: τὸ πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε, ἢ ἐκ παραλλήλου δηλοῖ τὸ αὐτό, ἢ καὶ διαφορά τις ἔστι ταῖς λέξεσιν, εἶγε μάχεται μὲν τις καὶ λόγοις, ὡς καὶ ἡ λογομαχία δηλοῖ. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ ποιητῆς μετ' ὀλίγα φησί, μαχεσσαμένω ἐπέεσσι (ver. 304). καὶ ἄλλως δὲ μάχη μὲν, αὐτὴ ἢ τῶν ἀνδρῶν συνεισβολή· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος καὶ ἐπὶ παρατάξεων καὶ μαχίμου καιροῦ λέγεται. Tittmann (*De Synon. in N. T.* p. 66): 'Conveniunt igitur in eo quod dimicationem, contentionem, pugnam denotant, sed πόλεμος et πολεμεῖν de pugna quæ manibus fit proprie dicuntur, μάχη autem et μάχεσθαι de quacunque contentione, etiam animorum, etiamsi non ad verbera et cædes

pervenerit. In illis igitur ipsa pugna cogitatur, in his sufficit cogitare de contentione, quam pugna plerumque sequitur.’

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§ XXXVII.—πάθος, ἐπιθυμία, ὄρμη, ὄρεξις.

*Πάθος* occurs three times in the N. T., once coordinated with *ἐπιθυμία* (Col. iii. 5; for *παθήματα* and *ἐπιθυμῖαι* in like manner joined together see Gal. v. 24); once with *ἐπιθυμία* subordinated to it (*πάθος ἐπιθυμίας*, 1 Thess. iv. 5); the only other occasion of its use being at Rom. i. 26, where the *πάθη ἀτιμίας* (“vile affections,” E. V.) are lusts that dishonour those who indulge in them.

The word belongs to the terminology of the Greek schools of ethical philosophy. Thus Cicero (*Tusc. Quæst.* iv. 5): ‘Quæ Græci πάθη vocant, nobis *perturbationes* appellari magis placet quam *morbos* ;’ on this preference see iii. 10; and presently after he adopts Zeno’s definition, ‘aversa a rectâ ratione, contra naturam, animi commotio ;’ and elsewhere (*Offic.* ii. 5), ‘motus animi turbatus.’ The exact definition of Zeno, as given by Diogenes Laërtius, is as follows (vii. 1. 63): ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος ἢ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, ἢ ὄρμη πλεονάζουσα. Clement of Alexandria has

this in his mind when, distinguishing between *ὄρμη* and *πάθος*, he writes thus (*Strom.* ii. 13): *ὄρμη μὲν οὖν φορὰ διανοίας ἐπὶ τι ἢ ἀπὸ του· πάθος δέ, πλεονάζουσα ὄρμη, ἢ ὑπερτείνουσα τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον μέτρα· ἢ ὄρμη ἐκφερομένη, καὶ ἀπειθῆς λόγῳ.*

At the same time *πάθος* in the N. T. nowhere obtains that wide sense which it thus obtained in the Greek schools; a sense so much wider than that ascribed to *ἐπιθυμία*, that this last was only regarded as one of the several *πάθη* of our nature (*Diogenes Laërtius*, vii. 1. 67). So far from this, *ἐπιθυμία* in Scripture is the larger word, including the whole world of active lusts and desires, all to which the *θυμός*, as the seat of desire and the natural appetites, impels; while the *πάθος* is rather the ‘*morosa delectatio*,’ not so much the soul’s disease in its more active operations, as the diseased condition out of which these spring, the ‘*morbis libidinis*,’ as Bengel has put it well, rather than the ‘*libido*,’ the ‘*lustfulness*’ as distinguished from the ‘*lust* ;’ cf. *Rom.* vii. 5 : *τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν.* Theophylact : *πάθος ἢ λύσσα τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ὥσπερ πυρετός, ἢ τραῦμα, ἢ ἀλλή νόσος.*

Ἐπιθυμία, or τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις, as Aristotle (*Rhet.* i. 10), ἄλογος ὄρεξις as the Stoics, ‘*immoderata appetitio opinat magni boni, rationi non obtemperans*’ as Cicero (*Tusc. Quæst.* iii. 11) defined it, is rendered for the most part in our translation

‘lust’ (Mark iv. 19, and often), but sometimes ‘concupiscence’ (Rom. vii. 8; Col. iii. 5), and sometimes ‘desire’ (Luke xxii. 15; Phil. i. 23). It appears now and then, though rarely, in the N. T. in a good sense (Luke xxii. 15; Phil. i. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 17; cf. Prov. x. 24; Ps. cii. 5), much oftener, however, in a bad; not as ‘concupiscentia’ merely, but as ‘*prava concupiscentia*,’ which Origen (*in Joan. tom. 10*) affirms is the only sense in which it was employed in the Greek Schools; (but see Aristotle, *Rhet. i. 11*); thus ἐπιθυμία κακή (Col. iii. 5); ἐπιθυμίας σαρκικαί (1 Pet. ii. 11); νεωτερικαί (2 Tim. ii. 22); ἀνοήτοι καὶ βλαβεραί (1 Tim. vi. 9); κοσμικαί (Tit. ii. 12); τῆς ἀπάτης (Eph. iv. 22); φθορᾶς (2 Pet. i. 4); μiasμοῦ (2 Pet. ii. 20); ἀνθρώπων (1 Pet. ii. 2); τῆς σαρκός (1 John ii. 16); and without a qualifying epithet (Rom. vii. 7; Jude 16, 18; Gen. xlix. 6; Ps. cv. 14). It is then, as Vitranga defines it, ‘vitiosa illa voluntatis affectio, quâ fertur ad appetendum quæ illicite usurpantur; aut quæ licite usurpantur, appetit ἀτάκτως;’ this same evil sense being ascribed to it in such definitions as that of Clement of Alexandria (*Strom. ii. 20*), ἔφεις καὶ ὄρεξις ἄλογος τοῦ κεχαρισμένου αὐτῆ. Our English word ‘lust,’ once harmless enough, has had very much the same history. For a long discussion seeking to trace why it should be constantly employed in malam partem,

see Vitrिंगa, *De Concupiscentiâ Vitiosâ et Damna-bili*, *Obs. Sac.* p. 598, sqq. The relation in which it stands to πάθος it has been already sought to trace.

Ὅρμη, occurring twice in the N. T. (Acts xiv. 5; Jam. iii. 4), and ὄρεξις occurring once (Rom. i. 27), are often found together; thus in Plutarch (*De Rect. Rat. Aud.* 18, on which see Wytttenbach's note); in Eusebius (*Præp. Evang.* xiv. 765 d). Of ὄρμη, 'appetitio,' as Cicero (*Off.* ii. 5) renders it, and again as 'appetitus animi' (*De Fin.* v. 7), we have the Stoic definition in Plutarch (*De Rep. Stoic.* 11), ἡ ὄρμη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος ἐστὶ προσ-τακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν. The Stoics explain it further as this 'motus animi,' which, if toward a thing is ὄρεξις, if from it ἔκκλισις. When our Translators at Acts xiv. 5 render ὄρμη 'assault,' they ascribe to the word more than it there contains. Manifestly there was no 'assault' actually made on the house where Paul and Barnabas abode; for in such a case it would have been very superfluous for St. Luke to tell us that they "were ware" of it. It was not an assault, but a purpose and intention of assault: 'Trieb,' 'Drang,' as Meyer gives it. And in the same way at Jam. iii. 4, the ὄρμη of the pilot is not the 'impetus brachiorum,' but the 'studium et conatus voluntatis.' Compare for this use of ὄρμη, Sophocles, *Philoct.* 237; Plu-

tarch, *De Rect. Rat. Aud.* 1; Prov. iii. 25; and the many passages in which it is joined with *προαίρεσις* (Josephus, *Antt.* xix. 6. 3).

But while the *ὄρμη* is thus oftentimes the *hostile* motion and spring toward an object, with a purpose of propelling and repelling it still further from itself, as for example the *ὄρμη* of the spear, of the assaulting host, the *ὄρεξις* (from *ὀρέγεσθαι*) is ever and always the reaching out after and toward an object, with a purpose of drawing that after which it reaches to itself, and making it its own. Very commonly the word is used to express the appetite for food (Plutarch, *De Frat. Am.* 2; *Symp.* vi. 2. 1); in the *Definitions* of Plato (414 b) philosophy is described as *τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμης ὄρεξις*. After what vile enjoyments the heathen, as judged by St. Paul, are regarded as reaching out, is sufficiently manifest from the context of the one passage in the N. T. where the word occurs (Rom. i. 27; cf. Plutarch, *Quæst. Nat.* 21).

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§ xxxviii.—*ἱερός, ὅσιος, ἄγιος, ἁγνός.*

*Ἱερός* never in the N. T., and very seldom anywhere else, expresses moral qualities. It is singular how seldom the word occurs there, indeed only



twice (1 Cor. ix. 13; 2 Tim. iii. 15); and, except in the Book of Maccabees, only once in the Septuagint (Josh. vi. 8); being in none of these cases employed of persons, who alone are moral agents, but only of things. To persons the word is of rarest application, as for instance when in Plutarch the Indian gymnosophists are *ἄνδρες ἱεροὶ καὶ ἀυτόνομοι* (*De Alex. Fort.* i. 10). *Ἱερὸς* (*τῷ θεῷ ἀνατεθειμένος*, Suidas) answers very closely to the Latin ‘sacer’ (‘quidquid destinatum est diis *sacrum* vocatur’), to our ‘sacred’; being that to which a certain inviolability is attached, thus *ἱερὸς καὶ ἄσυλος λόγος* in Plutarch (*De Gen. Soc.* 24), this inviolable character being derived from its relations nearer or remoter to God; *θεῖος* and *ἱερός* being often joined together, as by Plato, *Tim.* 45 *a*. Tittmann: ‘In voce *ἱερός* proprie nihil aliud cogitatur, quam quod res quædam aut persona Deo sacra sit, nullâ ingenii morumque ratione habitâ; imprimis quod sacris inservit.’ Thus the *ἱερεὺς* is a *sacred* person, as serving at God’s altar, the word not in the least implying that he is a *holy* one as well; he may be a Hophni, a Caiaphas, an Alexander Borgia. The true antithesis to *ἱερός* is *βέβηλος*, and, though not so perfectly antithetic, *μιαρός* (2 Macc. v. 19).

*Ὁσιος* is oftener grouped with *δίκαιος* for purposes of discrimination, than with the words here associated with it; and undoubtedly they are fre-

quently found together; thus in Plato often (*Theæt.* 176 *b*; *Rep.* x. 615 *b*), in Josephus (*Antt.* viii. 9. 1), and in the N. T. (Tit. i. 8); and so also the derivatives from these; ὀσιῶς and δικαίως (1 Thess. ii. 10); ὀσιότης and δικαιοσύνη (Plato, *Prot.* 329 *c*; Luke i. 75; Ephes. iv. 24; Wisd. ix. 3; Clemens Romanus, 1 *Cor.* 48). The distinction too is often urged that the ὀσιος is one careful of his duties toward God, the δίκαιος toward men; and in classical Greek no doubt we meet with many passages in which such a distinction is either openly asserted or implicitly involved; as, for example, in an often quoted passage from Plato (*Gorg.* 507 *b*): καὶ μὴν περὶ τοῦς ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων, δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοῦς ὀσια.<sup>1</sup> Of Socrates, Marcus Antoninus says (vii. 66), that he was δίκαιος τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, ὀσιος τὰ πρὸς θεοῦς: cf. Plutarch, *Demet.* 24; Charito, i. 10. 4; and see a large collection of passages in Rost and Palm's *Lexicon*, s. v. There is nothing however which warrants the transfer of this distinction to the N. T., nothing which

<sup>1</sup> Not altogether so in the *Euthyphro*, where he regards τὸ δίκαιον, or δικαιοσύνη, as the sum total of all virtue, of which ὀσιότης or piety is a part. In this *Dialogue*, which is throughout a discussion on the ὀσιον, Plato makes Euthyphro to say (12 *e*): τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὀσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος, which Socrates admits and allows; indeed, has himself forced him into it.

would restrict the application of *δίκαιος* to him who should fulfil accurately the precepts of the second table (thus see Luke i. 6 ; Rom. i. 17 ; 1 Joh. ii. 1) ; or the application of *ῥσιος* to him who should fulfil the demands of the first (thus see Acts ii. 27 ; Heb. vii. 26). Nor was it beforehand probable that such distinction should there find place. In fact the Scripture, which recognizes all righteousness as one, as growing out of a single root, and obedient to a single law, gives no room for such an anti-thesis as this. He who loves his brother, and fulfils his duties towards him, loves him in God and for God. The second great commandment is not coordinated with the first greatest, but subordinated to, and in fact included in it (Mark xii. 30, 31).

If *ιερός* is 'sacer,' *ῥσιος* is 'sanctus' (= 'sancitus'), as opposed to 'pollutus.' Some of the ancient grammarians derive it from *ἄζεσθαι*, the Homeric synonym for *σέβεσθαι*, rightly as regards sense, but wrongly as regards etymology. In classical Greek it is much more frequently used of things than of persons ; *όσία*, with *βουλή* or *δίκη* understood, expressing the everlasting ordinances of right, which no law or custom of men has constituted, for they are anterior to all law and custom, and rest on the divine constitution of the moral universe and man's relation to this. The *ῥσιος*, the German 'fromm,' is one who reverences these ever-

lasting sanctities, and owns their obligation; the word being joined with εὖροκος by Plato (*Pol.* 293 *d*), with θεῖος by Plutarch (*De Def. Orat.* 40), more than once set over against ἐπίορκος by Xenophon. Those things are ἀνοσία, which violate these everlasting ordinances; for instance, a Greek would regard the Egyptian custom of marriage between a brother and sister, still more the Persian between a mother and son, as ‘incestum’ (in-castum), μηδαμῶς ὄσια, as Plato (*Legg.* viii. 858 *b*) has it, unions which no human laws could ever render other than abominable. Such, too, would be the omission of burial rites, when it was possible to pay them; if Antigone, for instance, in obedience to Creon’s edict, had suffered the body of her brother to remain unburied (Sophocles, *Antig.* 74). What is the ὄσιον, and what are the obligations of it, has never been more nobly declared than in the words which the poet puts into her mouth :

οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσοῦτον φόβον τὰ σὰ  
 κηρύγμαθ', ὥστ' ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν  
 νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητὸν ὑνθ' ὑπερδραμεῖν (453—455).

This character of the ὄσιον as something anterior and superior to all human enactments, puts the same antithesis between ὄσια and νόμιμα as exist between the Latin ‘fas’ and ‘jus.’

When we follow ὄσιος to its uses in sacred

Greek, we of course find that it gains in depth and intensity of meaning; but otherwise it is true to the sense which it already had in the classical language. We have a very striking testimony for the distinction which, in the minds of the Septuagint translators at least, existed between it and ἅγιος, in the very noticeable fact, that while ὅσιος is used some thirty times as the rendering of יִיָּהּ (Deut. xxxiii. 8; 2 Sam. xxii. 26; Ps. iv. 4), and ἅγιος nearly a hundred times as the rendering of שִׁירָה (Exod. xix. 6; Num. vi. 5; Ps. xv. 3), in no single instance is ὅσιος used for the latter, or ἅγιος for the former of these words; and the same law holds good, I believe, universally in the conjugates of these; and, which is perhaps more remarkable still, of the other Greek words which are rarely and exceptionally employed to render these two, none which is used for the one is ever used for the other; thus καθαρός, used for the second of these Hebrew words (Num. v. 17), is never employed for the first; while, on the other hand, ἐλεήμων (Jer. iii. 12), πολυέλεος (Exod. xxxiv. 6), εὐλαβής (Mic. vii. 2), used for the former, are in no single instance employed for the latter.

"*Άγιος* and *άγνός* may very probably be different forms of one and the same word. At all events, they have in common that root 'ΑΓ, reappearing as the Latin 'sac' in 'sacer,' 'sancio,' and many other

words. It will thus be only natural that they should have much in common, even while yet they separate off, and occupy provinces of meaning which are clearly distinguishable one from the other.

The fundamental idea of ἅγιος is separation, and, so to speak, consecration and devotion to the service of Deity; it ever lying in the word, as in the Latin ‘sacer,’ that this consecration may be as ἀνάθημα or ἀνάθεμα (note in this point of view its connexion with ἀγής, ἅγιος). But the thought lies very near, that what is set apart from the world and to God, should separate itself from the world’s defilements, and should share in God’s purity; and in this way ἅγιος speedily acquires a moral significance. The Jews must be an ἔθνος ἅγιον, not merely in the sense of being God’s inheritance, but as separating themselves from the abominations of the nations round; God Himself, as the absolutely separate from evil, and as repelling from Himself every possibility of stain or defilement, having this title of ἅγιος by highest right of all (Lev. x. 13; Rev. iii. 7).

It is somewhat different with ἀγνός. ‘*Αγνεία* (1 Tim. iv. 12; v. 2), in the *Definitions* which go by Plato’s name too vaguely explained (414 a) εὐλάβεια τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀμαρτημάτων · τῆς θεοῦ τιμῆς κατὰ φύσιν θεραπεία: too vaguely also by Clement of Alexandria as τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἀποχή,

or again as *φρονεῖν ὅσια* (*Strom.* v. 1); is better defined as *ἐπίτασις σωφροσύνης* by Suidas, *ἐλευθερία πάντος μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος* by Phavorinus. *Ἄγνός* (joined with *ἀμίαντος*, Clemens Romanus, 1 *Cor.* 29) is the pure; sometimes only the externally or ceremonially pure, as in this line of Euripides, *ἀγνὸς γὰρ εἰμι χεῖρας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς φρένας* (*Orestes*, 1604); compare *Hippolytus*, 316, 317, and the use of *ἀγνίζειν* as 'expiare,' Sophocles, *Ajax*, 640; which last word in the Septuagint never rises higher than to signify a ceremonial purification (*Josh.* iii. 5; *2 Chron.* xxix. 5; *2 Macc.* i. 33), indeed in four out of the seven occasions on which it occurs in the N. T. it has the same lower signification (*John* xi. 55; *Acts* xxi. 24, 26; xxiv. 18; and compare *ἀγνίσμος*, *Acts* xxi. 26). *Ἄγνός* however signifies often the pure in the highest sense. It is an epithet frequently applied to heathen gods and goddesses, to Ceres, to Proserpine, to Jove (Sophocles, *Philoct.* 1273; Pindar, *Olymp.* vii. 60; and Dissen's, note), and to God Himself (1 *John* iii. 3). For these nobler uses of *ἀγνός* in the Septuagint, where the word however is excessively rare as compared to *ἅγιος*, see *Ps.* xi. 7; *Prov.* xx. 9. As there is no such impurity as fornication, being as it is defilement of the body and the spirit alike (1 *Cor.* vi. 18, 19) so *ἀγνός* is an epithet predominantly employed to express freedom from all impurity of this

nature (Plutarch, *Præ. Conj.* 44; *Quæst. Rom.* 20; cf. Tit. ii. 5); while sometimes in a still more restricted sense it expresses not chastity merely, but virginity; thus ἀκήρατος γάμων τε ἀγνός (Plato, *Legg.* viii. 840 *e*), and for the same use of ἀγνεία see Ignatius, *ad Polyc.* 5.

If what has been said is correct, Joseph, when he was tempted to sin by his Egyptian mistress (Gen. xxxix. 7—12), approved himself ὅσιος, in reverencing those everlasting sanctities of the marriage bond, which God had founded, and which he could not violate without sinning against God; “How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?” ἄγιος in that he separated himself from any unholy fellowship with his temptress, and ἀγνός in that he kept his body pure, and chaste, and undefiled.

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§ xxxix.—φωνή, λόγος.

ON these words, and on their relation to another, very much has been written by the Greek grammarians and natural philosophers (see Lersch, *Sprachphilosophie der Alten*, part iii. pp. 35, 45, and *passim*).

Φωνή, from φάω, ὡς φωτίζουσα τὸ νοούμενον (Plutarch, *De Plac. Phil.* 19), rendered in our



Version 'voice' (Matt. ii. 8), 'sound' (John iii. 8), 'noise' (Rev. vi. 1), is distinguished from ψόφος, in that it is the cry of a living creature (ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ψόφος τίς ἐστὶν ἐμψύχου, Aristotle), being sometimes ascribed to God (Matt. iii. 17), to men (Matt. iii. 3), to animals (Matt. xxvi. 34), and, though improperly, to inanimate objects as well (1 Cor. xiv. 7), as to the trumpet (Matt. xxiv. 31), the wind (John iii. 8), the thunder (Rev. vi. 1). But λόγος, a word, saying, or rational utterance of the νοῦς, whether spoken (προφορικός, and thus φωνὴ τῶν λόγων, Dan. vii. 11) or unspoken (ἐνδιάθετος), being, as it is, the correlative of reason, can only be predicated of men (λόγου κοινωνεῖ μόνον ἄνθρωπος, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα φωνῆς, Aristotle, *Probl.* ii. 55), of angels, or of God. The φωνή may be a mere inarticulate cry, and this whether proceeding from man or from any other animal; and therefore the Stoics' definition (Diogenes Laërtius, vii. § 55) is unsound: ζῶου μὲν ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἀπὸ ὀρμῆς πεπληγμένος, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἐστὶν ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη. They transfer here to the φωνή what can only be constantly affirmed of the λόγος; indeed, whenever it sought to set the two in sharp antithesis with another, this, that the φωνή is a πνεῦμα ἀδιάρθρωτον, is the point particularly made. It is otherwise with the λόγος, of which the Stoics themselves say, λόγος αἰὲν σημαντικός ἐστὶ (§ 57), and of the λέγειν

that it is τὸ τὴν νοουμένου πράγματος σημαντικὴν προφέρεσθαι φωνήν. Compare Plutarch (*De Anim. Proc.* 27): φωνή τις ἐστὶν ἄλογος καὶ ἀσήμαντος, λόγος δὲ λέξις ἐν φωνῇ σημαντικῇ διανοίας. In his treatise *De Genio Socratis*, there is much on the relation of φωνή and λόγος to one another, and on the higher functions of the latter. Such he affirms the Demon of Socrates to have been (*c* 20): τὸ δὲ προσπίπτον, οὐ φθόγγον, ἀλλὰ λόγον ἄν τις εἰκάσειε δαίμονος, ἄνευ φωνῆς ἐφαπτόμενον αὐτῷ τῷ δηλουμένῳ τοῦ νοοῦντος. Πληγῆ γὰρ ἡ φωνή προσέοικε τῆς ψυχῆς, δι' ὧτων βία τὸν λόγον εἰσδεχομένης, ὅταν ἀλλήλοις ἐντυγχάνωμεν. Ὁ δὲ τοῦ κρείττους νοῦς ἄγει τὴν εὐφῶα ψυχὴν, ἐπιθυγγάνων τῷ νοηθέντι, πληγῆς μὴ δεομένην. The whole chapter is one of deepest theological interest; the more so seeing that the great theologians of the early Church, above all Origen in the Greek (*in Joan. tom.* ii. § 26), and Augustine in the Latin, were very fond of transferring this antithesis of the φωνή and the λόγος to John the Baptist and his Lord, the first claiming for himself no more than to be “the voice of one crying in the wilderness” (John i. 23), the other emphatically declared to be the *Word* that was with God, and was God (John i. 1). In drawing out the relations between John and his Lord as expressed by these titles, the Voice and the Word, ‘Vox’ and ‘Verbum,’ φωνή and λόγος, Augustine

traces with a singular subtlety the manifold and profound fitnesses which lie in them for the setting forth of those relations. A word, he observes, is something even without a voice, for a word in the heart is as truly a word as after it is outspoken; while a voice is nothing, a mere unmeaning sound, an empty cry, unless it be also the vehicle of a word. But when they are thus united, the voice in a manner goes before the word, for the sound strikes the ear before the sense is conveyed to the mind: yet while it thus *goes* before it in this act of communication, it *is not* really before it, but the contrary. Thus, when we speak, the word in our hearts must precede the voice on our lips, which voice is yet the vehicle by which the word in us is transferred to and becomes also a word in another; but this being accomplished, or rather in the very accomplishment of this, the voice has passed away, exists no more; but the word which is planted now in the other's heart, as well as in ours, remains. All this Augustine transfers to the Lord and to his forerunner. John is nothing without Jesus: Jesus just what he was before without John; however to men the knowledge of Him may have come through John. John the first in time, and yet He who *came* after, most truly having *been* before, him. John, so soon as he had accomplished his mission, passing away, ceasing, having no continuous signi-

fiance for the Church of God ; but Jesus, of whom he had told, and to whom he witnessed, abiding for ever. (*Serm.* 293. § 3): ‘Johannes vox ad tempus, Christus verbum in principio æternum. Tolle verbum, quid est vox? Ubi nullus est intellectus, inanis est strepitus. Vox sine verbo aurem pulsat, cor non ædificat. Verumtamen in ipso corde nostro ædificando advertamus ordinem rerum. Si cogito quid dicam, jam verbum est in corde meo: sed loqui ad te volens, quæro quemadmodum sit etiam in corde tuo, quod jam est in meo. Hoc quærens quomodo ad te perveniat, et in corde tuo insideat verbum quod jam est in corde meo, assumo vocem, et assumtâ voce loquor tibi: sonus vocis ducit ad te intellectum verbi, et cum ad te duxit sonus vocis intellectum verbi, sonus quidem ipse pertransit, verbum autem quod ad te sonus perduxit, jam est in corde tuo, nec recessit a meo.’ Cf. *Serm.* 288. § 3 ; 289. § 3.

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§ xl.—λόγος, μῦθος.

Λόγος is quite as often ‘sermo’ as ‘verbum,’ a connected discourse as a single word. Indeed, as is familiar to many, there was once no little discussion whether Λόγος in its very highest applica-

tion of all (John i. 1) should not rather be rendered by the former word than by the latter. And, not to dwell on this exceptional and purely theological employment of *λόγος*, it is frequently in the N. T. used to express that word which by supereminent right deserves the name, being, as it is, "the word of God" (Acts iv. 31), "the word of the truth" (2 Tim. ii. 15); thus at Luke i. 2; Jam. i. 22; Acts vi. 4. As employed in this sense, it may be brought into relations of likeness and unlikeness with *μῦθος*, between which and *λόγος* there was at one time but a very slight difference indeed, one however which grew ever wider, until in the end a great gulf has separated them each from the other.

There are three distinctly marked stages through which *μῦθος* has past; although, as will often happen, in passing into later meanings it has not altogether renounced its earlier. At the first there is nothing of the fabulous, still less of the false, involved in it. It stands on the same footing with *ῥῆμα*, *ἔπος*, *λόγος*, and as its connexion with *μύω*, *μυέω*, *μύζω* sufficiently indicates, must have signified originally the word shut up in the mind, or muttered within the lips (see Creuzer, *Symbolik*, vol. iv. p. 517); although of this there is no trace in any actual use; for already in Homer it appears as the spoken word (*Il.* xviii. 253), the tragic poets and as many as form their diction on Homer con-

tinuing so to employ it (thus Æschylus, *Eumen.* 582; Euripides, *Phœn.* 455), at a time when in Attic prose it had nearly or altogether exchanged this meaning for another.

At the second stage of its progress *μῦθος* is already in a certain antithesis to *λόγος*, although still employed in a respectful, often in a very honourable sense. It is the mentally conceived as set over against the historically true. Not literal fact, it is often truer than the literal truth, involves a higher teaching; *λόγος ψευδής, εἰκονίζων τὴν ἀλήθειαν* (Suidas); though not *ἄληθης*, yet, as one has said, *ἀλήθειας ἔχων ἔμφασιν*. There is a *λόγος ἐν μύθῳ* ('veritas quæ in fabulæ involucro latet,' as Wyttenbach, *Plutarch*, vol. ii. pars 1, p. 406, gives it), which may have infinitely more value than much which is actual fact. *Μῦθος* had already obtained this significance in Herodotus (ii. 45) and in Pindar (*Olymp.* i. 29); and Attic prose, as has been observed, hardly knows of any other (Plato, *Gorg.* 523 a; *Phædo*, 61 a; *Legg.* 9. 872 d; Plutarch, *De Ser. Num. Vin.* 18; *Symp.* i. 1. 4).

But in a world like ours the fable easily degenerates into the falsehood; 'story,' 'tale,' and other words not a few, bear witness to the fact; and at its third stage *μῦθος* is the fable, not any more allowing itself to be such, and at the same time undertaking to be, and often being, the vehicle of

some higher truth; it is now the *lying* fable with all its falsehood and all its pretended claims to be what it is not; and this is the only sense of *μῦθος* which the N. T. knows (in the Septuagint it occurs but once, Ecclus. xx. 19); thus we have there *μύθοι βεβήλοι καὶ γραώδεις* (1 Tim. iv. 7); *Ἰουδαϊκοί* (Tit. i. 14); *σεσοφισμένοι* (2 Pet. i. 16); cf. *μύθοι πεπλασμένοι*, Diodorus Siculus, i. 93); the other two uses of the word (1 Tim. i. 4; 2 Tim. iv. 4) being equally slighting and contemptuous.

It will thus be seen that *λόγος* and *μῦθος*, which start on their journey together, or at all events separated by very slight spaces, gradually part company, the antagonism between them becoming ever stronger, till in the end they stand in open opposition to one another, as words no less than men must do, when they come to belong, one to the kingdom of light and truth, the other to that of darkness and lies.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'Legend,' a word of such honourable import at the beginning, meaning as it does, that worthy to be read, but which has ended in signifying 'a heap of frivolous and scandalous vanities' (Hooker), has had very much the same history as *μῦθος*; very similar influences having been at work to degrade the one and the other.

§ xli.—τέρας, σημεῖον, δύναμις, ἔνδοξον, παράδοξον, θαυμάσιον.

ALL these words have this in common, that they are every one applied to the supernatural works wrought by Christ in the days<sup>s</sup> of his flesh; thus σημεῖον, John ii. 11; Acts ii. 19; τέρας, Acts ii. 22; John iv. 48; δύναμις, Mark vi. 22; Acts ii. 22; ἔνδοξον, Luke xiii. 17; παράδοξον, Luke v. 26; θαυμάσιον, Matt. xxi. 15; while the first three, which are by far the most usual, are in like manner employed of the same supernatural works wrought in the power of Christ by his Apostles (2 Cor. xii. 12). It will be found, I think, on closer examination, that they do not so much represent different kinds of miracles, as miracles contemplated under different aspects and from different points of view.

The words τέρας and σημεῖον are often linked together in the N. T. (John iv. 48; Acts ii. 22; iv. 30; 2 Cor. xii. 12); and times out of number in the Septuagint (Exod. vii. 3, 9; Deut. iv. 34; Neh. ix. 10; Dan. vi. 27); the first = תְּרָאָה, and the second = נִיִּס; often also in profane Greek, in Josephus (*Antt.* xx. 8. 6); in Plutarch (*Sep. Sap. Con.* 3); in Polybius (iii. 112. 8); in Philo (*De Vit. Mos.* i. 16). The ancients were fond of drawing a



distinction between them which, as will presently appear, will not bear a moment's serious examination. It is sufficiently expressed in these words of Ammonius: *τέρας σημείου διαφέρει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέρας παρὰ φύσιν γίνεται, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον παρὰ συνήθειαν*; and again by Theophylact (*in Rom.* xv. 19): *διαφέρει δὲ σημεῖον καὶ τέρας τῷ τὸ μὲν σημεῖον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν λέγεσθαι, καινοπρεπῶς μέντοι γινομένοις, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ τὴν πενθερὰν Πέτρου πυρέττουσαν εὐθέως ἰαθῆναι* [Matt. viii. 15], *τὸ δὲ τέρας ἐν τοῖς μὴ κατὰ φύσιν, οἷον τὸ τὸν ἐκ γενέτης τυφλὸν ἰαθῆναι* [John ix. 7]; compare Suicer, *Thes.* s. v. *σημεῖον*. But in truth this distinction breaks down so entirely the instant it is examined—as Fritzsche, in a good note on Rom. xv. 19, has superabundantly shown—that it is difficult to understand how so many, by repeating, have accepted it for their own. An earthquake, however rare, cannot be esteemed *παρὰ φύσιν*, cannot therefore, according to the distinction traced above, be called a *τέρας*, while yet Herodotus (vi. 98) gives this name to the single earthquake which in his experience had visited Delos. As little can a serpent snatched up in an eagle's talons and dropped in the midst of the Trojan army be called beyond and beside nature, which yet Homer (*Il.* xii. 209) calls *Διὸς τέρας αἰγιόχοιο*.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, beyond

<sup>1</sup> On the Homeric idea of the *τέρας* there is a careful discussion in Nägelsbach, *Homeric Theologie*, p. 168, sqq.

and beside nature are the healing with a word of a man lame from his mother's womb, satisfying many thousand men with a few loaves, raising a man four days dead from the grave, which all in Scripture go by the name of *σημεῖα* (Acts iv. 16; John vi. 14; xi. 47); compare Plutarch, *Sept. Sap. Con.* 3, where a monstrous birth is styled both a *τέρας* and a *σημεῖον*. It is plain then that the distinction must be sought elsewhere. Origen has not seized it, who says (*in Rom.* xv. 19) 'Signa [*σημεῖα*] appellantur in quibus cum sit aliquid mirabile, indicatur quoque aliquid futurum. Prodigia [*τέρατα*] vero in quibus tantummodo aliquid mirabile ostenditur.' Rather the same miracle is upon one side a *τέρας*, on another a *σημεῖον*, and the words most often refer not to different classes of miracles, but to different qualities in the same miracles; in the words of Lampe (*Comm. in Joh.* vol. i. p. 513): 'Eadem enim miracula dici possunt *signa*, quatenus aliquid seu occultum seu futurum docent; et *prodigia* (*τέρατα*), quatenus aliquid extraordinarium, quod stuporem excitat, sistunt. Hinc sequitur signorum notionem latius patere, quam prodigiorum. Omnia prodigia sunt *signa*, quia in illum usum à Deo dispensata, ut arcanum indicent. Sed omnia signa non sunt prodigia, quia ad signandum res cœlestes aliquando etiam res communes adhibentur.'

*Tépas*, certainly not derived from *τρέω*, the ter-

rifying, but now put generally in connexion with *τηρέω*, as being that which for its extraordinary character is wont to be observed and *kept* in the memory, is always rendered "wonder" in our Version. It is the miracle regarded as a startling, imposing, amazement-wakening portent or prodigy; being elsewhere frequently used for strange appearances in the heavens, and perhaps more frequently still for monstrous births on the earth (Herodotus, vii. 57; Plato, *Crat.* 393 *b*). It is thus used very much with the same meaning as the Latin 'monstrum'<sup>1</sup> ('Nec dubiis ea signa dedit Tritonia monstris,' Virgil), or the Homeric *σῆμα* (*Il.* ii. 308: *ἐνθ' ἐφάνη μέγα σῆμα, δράκων*). Origen (*in Joh. tom.* xiii. § 60; *in Rom. lib.* x. § 12) long ago called attention to the fact that the name *τέρατα* is never in the N. T. applied to these works of wonder, except in connexion with some other name. They are often called *σημεῖα*, often *δυναμεις*, often *τέρατα καὶ σημεῖα*, more than once *τέρατα, σημεῖα, καὶ δυναμεις*, but never *τέρατα* alone. The observation was well worth the making; for the fact which we

<sup>1</sup> On the same similar group of synonymous words in the Latin, Augustine writes as follows (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 8): 'Monstra sane dicta perhibent a monstrando, quod aliquid significando demonstrant, et ostenta ad ostendendo, et portenta a portendendo, id est, præostendendo, et prodigia quod porro dicant, id est, futura prædicant.' Compare Cicero, *De Divin.* i. 42.

are thus bidden to note is indeed eminently characteristic of the miracles of the N. T. ; namely, that a title, by which more than any other these might seem to hold on to the prodigies and portents of the heathen world, and to have something akin to them, should thus never be permitted to appear, except in the company of some other, necessarily suggesting higher thoughts about them.

But the miracles are also *σημεῖα*. Of *σημείων* Basil the Great (*in Esai.* vii. § 198) furnishes us a good definition: *ἔστι σημεῖον πρᾶγμα φανερόν, κεκρυμμένου τινὸς καὶ ἀφανοῦς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν δήλωσιν ἔχον*: and presently after *ἡ μέντοι Γραφή τὰ παράδοξα, καὶ παραστατικά τινος μυστικοῦ λόγου σημεῖα καλεῖ*. Among all the names which the miracles bear, their ethical end and purpose comes out in *σημείων* with the most distinctness, as in *τέρας* with the least. It is involved and declared in the very word that the prime object and end of the miracle is to lead us to something out of and beyond itself; that, so to speak, it is a kind of finger-post of God (*διοσημεῖα*, signs from Zeus, is no unfrequent word in later Greek), pointing for us to this (*Isai.* vii. 11; xxxviii. 7); valuable not so much for what it is as for that which it indicates of the grace and power of the doer, or of the connexion with a higher world in which he stands (*Mark* xvi. 20; *Acts* xiv. 3; *Heb.* ii. 4; *Exod.*

vii. 9, 10; 1 Kings xiii. 3). Lampe has put this well: ‘Designat sane *σημείον* naturâ suâ rem non tantum extraordinariam, sensusque percellentem, sed etiam talem, quæ in rei alterius, absentis licet et futuræ, *significationem* atque *adumbrationem* adhibetur, unde et prognostica (Matt. xvi. 3) et typi (Matt. xii. 39; Luc. xi. 29) nec non *sacramenta*, quale est illud circumcisionis (Rom. iv. 11), eodem nomine in N. T. exprimi solent. Aptissime ergo hæc vox de miraculis usurpatur, ut indicet, quod non tantum admirabili modo fuerint perpetrata, sed etiam sapientissimo consilio Dei ita directa atque ordinata, ut fuerint simul *characteres* Messiæ, ex quibus cognoscendus erat, *sigilla* doctrinæ quam proferebat, et beneficiorum gratiæ per Messiam jam præstandæ, nec non *typi* viarum Dei, earumque circumstantiarum per quas talia beneficia erant applicanda.’ It is to be regretted that *σημείον* is not always rendered “sign” in our Version; but in the Gospel of St. John, where it is of very frequent recurrence, “sign” too often gives place to the vaguer “miracle;” and often not without loss to the force of the words: thus see iii. 2; vii. 31; x. 41; and above all, vi. 26.

But the miracles are also ‘powers’ (*δυναμεις* = ‘virtutes’), being as they are, outcomings of that great power of God, which was inherent in Christ, who was Himself that “great Power of

God" which Simon blasphemously allowed himself to be named (Acts viii. 8, 10); and was by Him lent to those who were his witnesses and ambassadors. It is only to be regretted that in our Version this word is translated now "wonderful works" (Matt. vii. 22); now "mighty works" (Matt. xi. 20; Luke x. 13); and still more frequently "miracles" (Acts ii. 22; 1 Cor. xii. 10; Gal. iii. 5); in this last case giving such tautologies as "miracles and wonders" (Acts ii. 22; Heb. ii. 4); and always causing something to be lost of the true energy of the word—pointing as it does to new *forces* which have entered and are working in this world of ours. With this is closely connected the term *μεγαλεία* = 'magnalia' (Luke i. 49), in which in like manner the miracles are contemplated as outcomings of the greatness of God's power.

The miracles are further styled *ἔνδοξα* (Luke xiii. 17), as being works in which the *δόξα* of God and of the Son of God shone manifestly forth (John ii. 11; xi. 40; Luke v. 25, 26; Acts iii. 13, 16). They are *παράδοξα*, as being "strange things" (Luke v. 26), "new things" (Num. xvi. 30), beside and beyond all expectation of men. The word, though occurring only this once in the N. T., is of very frequent occurrence in ecclesiastical Greek. They are *θανύμσια*, as provoking wonder (Matt. xxi. 15); *θαύματα* they are never called in the N. T.,

though this too is a name which they often bear in the writings of the Greek Fathers, and the *θαυμάζει* is often brought out as their consequence (Matt. viii. 27; ix. 8, 33; xv. 31).

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§ xlii.

[I add in a concluding article a few passages, bearing on some New Testament synonyms, which I have not undertaken to distinguish at length].

*a. φόρος, τέλος.*—Grotius: *φόροι* tributa sunt quæ ex agris solvebantur, atque in ipsis speciebus fere pendebantur, id est in tritico, ordeo, vino et similibus. Vectigalia vero sunt quæ Græce dicuntur *τέλη*, quæ a publicanis conducebantur et exigebantur, cum tributa a susceptoribus vel ab apparitoribus præsidum ac præfectorum exigi solebant.

*β. καλός* [Luke xxi. 5], *ώραίος*.—Basil the Great (*Hom. in Ps. xliiv.*): τὸ *ώραῖον* τοῦ καλοῦ διαφέρει ὅτι τὸ μὲν *ώραῖον* λέγεται τὸ συμπεπληρωμένον εἰς τὸν ἐπιτήδειον καιρὸν πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν ἀκμήν· ὡς *ώραίος* ὁ καρπὸς τῆς ἀμπέλου, ὁ τὴν οἰκίαν πέψιν εἰς τελείωσιν ἑαυτοῦ διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἔτους ὥρας ἀπολα-

βών, καὶ ἐπιτήδειος εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν· καλὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει τῶν μελῶν εὐάρμοστον, ἐπανθούσαν αὐτῷ τὴν χάρι ἔχον.

γ. πρεσβύτης, γέρων.—Augustine (*Enarr. in Ps.* lxx. 18): Senecta et senium discernuntur a Græcis. Gravitas enim post juventutem aliud nomen habet apud Græcos, et post ipsam gravitatem veniens ultima ætas aliud nomen habet; nam πρεσβύτης dicitur gravis, et γέρων senex. Quia autem in Latinâ linguâ duorum istorum nominum distinctio deficit, de senectute ambo sunt positæ, senecta et senium. Scitis autem esse duas ætates. Cf. *Quæst. in Gen.* i. 70.

δ. ὀφείλει, δεῖ.—Bengel (*Gnomon*, 1 Cor. xi. 10): ὀφείλει notat obligationem, δεῖ necessitatem; illud morale est, hoc quasi physicum; ut in vernaculâ, wir sollen und müssen.

ε. τεθεμελιωμένος, ἐδραῖος.—Bengel (*Ib.* Col. i. 23): τεθεμελιωμένοι, *affixi fundamento*; ἐδραῖοι, *stabiles*, firmi intus. Illud metaphoricum est, hoc magis proprium; illud importat majorem respectum ad *fundamentum* quo sustentantur fideles; sed ἐδραῖοι, *stabiles*, dicit internum robur, quod fideles ipsi habent; quemadmodum ædificium primo quidem fundamento recte solideque inniti, deinde vero



suâ etiam mole probe cohærere et firmiter consistere debet.

ζ. ψιθυριστής, καταλάλος.—Fritzsche (*in Rom.* i. 30): ψιθυρισταί sunt *susurriones*, h. e. clandestini delatores, qui ut invisio homini noceant quæ ei probro sint crimina tanquam in aurem alieni insurrant. Contra καταλάλοι omnes ii vocantur, qui quæ alicujus famæ obsint narrant, sermonibus celebrant, divulgant maloque rumore aliquem differunt, sive id malo animo faciant ut noceant, sive temere neque nisi garriendi libidine abrepti. Qui utrumque vocabulum ita discriminant, ut ψιθυριστάς *clandestinos* calumniatores, καταλάλους calumniatores qui *propalam* criminentur explicent, arctioribus quam fas est limitibus voc. καταλάλος circumscribunt, quum id voc. calumniatorem nocendi cupidum suâ vi non declaret.

η. ἄχρηστος, ἀχρεῖος.—Tittmann: Omnino in voce ἄχρηστος non inest tantum notio negativa quam vocant (οὐ χρήσιμον), sed adjecta ut plerumque contraria τοῦ πονηροῦ, quod non tantum nihil prodest, sed etiam damnum affert, molestum et damnosum est. Apud Xenophontem, *Hiero* i. 27, γάμος ἄχρηστος non est inutilis, sed molestissimus, et in *Œconom.* viii. 4. Sed in voce ἀχρεῖος per se nulla inest nota reprehensionis, tantum denotat rem aut

hominem quo non opus est, quo supersedere possumus, unnöthig, unentbehrlich [Thucydides, i. 84; ii. 6], quæ ipsa tamen raro sine vituperatione dicuntur.

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







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