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A
S Y N O P S I S
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O F T H E
W O R K S
O F
P L A T O

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

JOHN EARL GRANVILLE,

PRESIDENT

OF HIS *MAJESTY'S* PRIVY COUNCIL:

THIS ESSAY ON

THE WORKS OF PLATO,

ONE OF THE GREATEST MASTERS

OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN ANCIENT TIMES,

Is,

With the HIGHEST RESPECT and VENERATION,

DULY inscribed,

by his LORDSHIP'S

most obedient Humble Servant

Floyer Sydenham.

A
 GENERAL VIEW
 OF THE
 WORKS
 OF
 PLATO

THE Dialogues of *Plato* are of various Kinds; not only with regard to those different *Matters*, which are the *Subjects* of them; but in respect of the *Manner* also, in which they are *composed* or *framed*, and of the *Form*, under which they make their *Appearance* to the Reader. It will therefore, as I imagine, be not improper, in Pursuance of the Admonition given us by *Plato* himself

himself in his Dialogue named ¹ *Phædrus*, and in Imitation of the Example set us by the ² ancient *Platonists*, to *distinguish* the several *Kinds*; by dividing them, first, into the *most General*; and then, subdividing into the *Subordinate*; till we come to those *lower Species*, that particularly and precisely denote the Nature of the several Dialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective Denominations.

The most General Division of the Writings of *Plato*, is into those of the SCEPTICAL Kind, and those of the DOGMATICAL. In the former Sort, nothing is expressly either proved or asserted: Some Philosophical Question only is *considered* and *examined*; and the Reader is left to Himself, to draw such Conclusions, and discover such Truths, as the Philosopher means to *insinuate*. This is done, either in the Way of INQUIRY, or in the Way of CONTROVERSY and DISPUTE. In the Way of *Controversy* are carried on all such Dialogues, as tend to eradicate *false* Opinions; and that,


¹ Εὰν μή τις κατ' εἶδη διαίρειναι τὰ ὄντα, καὶ μὴ ἰδέειν δυνατὸς ἢ κατ' ἐν ἑκάστῳ περιλαμβάνειν, ἔποτ' εἶναι τεχνικὸς λόγων πέρι, κατ' ὅσον δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ. Whoever is unable to divide and distinguish Things into their several Sorts or Species; and on the other hand, referring Every Particular to its proper Species, to comprehend them All in One General Idea; will never understand any Writings, of which those Things are the Subject, like a true Critick, upon those high Principles of Art, to which the Human Understanding reaches. Πλατ. Φαιδρ. We have thought proper, here, to paraphrase this Passage, for the Sake of giving to every Part of so important a Sentence its full Force, agreeably to the Tenor of *Plato's* Doctrine; and in order to initiate our Readers into a Way of Thinking, that probably Many of them are as yet unacquainted with.

² See Διεγ. Λαεργ. βιβ. 2.


either indirectly, by involving them in Difficulties, and EMBARRASSING the Maintainers of them; or directly, by CONFUTING them. In the Way of *Inquiry* proceed Those, whose Tendency is to raise in the Mind *right* Opinions; and that, either by EXCITING to the Pursuit of some Part of Wisdom, and shewing in what Manner to investigate it; or by leading the Way, and HELPING the Mind forward in the Search.

The Dialogues of the Other Kind, the *Dogmatical* or Didactic, *teach explicitly* some Point of Doctrine: And this they do, either by laying it down in the AUTHORITATIVE Way, or by proving it in the Way of Reason and ARGUMENT. In the *Authoritative* Way the Doctrine is delivered, sometimes by the Speaker himself MAGISTERIALLY, at other times as derived to Him by TRADITION from Wise Men. The *Argumentative* or *Demonstrative* Method of Teaching, used by *Plato*, proceeds either through ANALYTICAL Reasoning, *resolving* Things into their Principles, and from known or allowed Truths tracing out the Unknown; or through INDUCTION, from a Multitude of Particulars, *inferring* some General Thing, in which they all agree.

According to this Division is framed the following Scheme, or Table: which having been already explained, our Readers, it is hoped, will pardon any *new Term* there made Use of, or any *new Meaning* given to Words already authorized.



³ We have, given us by *Diogenes Laertius*, another Division of the Characters, as he calls them, of *Plato's* Writings, different from That exhibited in the Scheme above. This we have thought proper to subjoin, on Account of its Antiquity, and General Reception: neither are we fond of obtruding our Own upon the Reader, without leaving him his Choice of an Alternative; but are desirous, that he may judge for Himself, upon a Comparison of Both together, and make Use of That, to which he pleases to give the Preference.



The Philosopher, in thus varying his Manner, and diversifying his Writings into these several Kinds, means not merely to entertain with their Variety; nor to teach, on different Occasions, with more or less Plainness and Perspicuity; nor yet to insinuate different Degrees of Certainty in

The Learned Reader will observe the latter Half of the Dialogues, according to this Scheme, to be described by Metaphors taken from the *Gymnastic Art*: The Dialogues, here termed GYMNASTIC, being imagined to bear a Similitude to the *Exercise*; the AGONISTIC, to the Combat. In the lowest Sub-division, indeed, the Word *Maieutic* is a Metaphor of another Kind, fully explained in *Plato's Theætetus*: the MAIEUTIC Dialogues, however, were supposed to resemble Giving the *Rudiments* of the Art; as the PEIRASTIC were, to represent a *Skirmish*, or Trial of Proficiency: the ENDEICTIC were, it seems, likened to the Exhibiting a *Specimen* of Skill; and the ANATREPTIC, to Presenting the Spectacle of a thorough *Defeat*, or sound Drubbing.

The Principal Reason, why we contented not ourselves with this Account of the Difference between the Dialogues of *Plato*, was the Capital Error there committed in the *First* Sub-division, of Course extending itself through the *Latter*. This Error consists in dividing the *Didactic* Dialogues with Regard to their *Subject-Matter*; while Those of the *Inquisitive* Sort are divided with Respect to the *Manner* of their *Composition*. So that the Sub-divisions fall not, with any Propriety, under One and the Same *General Head*. Besides, a Novice in the Works of *Plato* might hence be led naturally to suppose, that the Dogmatical or *Didactic* Dialogues are, All of them, written in the *Same Manner*; and that the Others, those of the *Inquisitive* Kind, by Us termed Sceptical, have *no Particular Subjects* at all; or, if they have, that Their Subjects are *different* from Those of the *Didactic* Dialogues, and are consequently *unphilosophical*; there being no *Topick* in Philosophy, which is not reducible, according to the Doctrine of the *Platonists*, to One or Other of *These*, PHYSICKS, LOGICK, ETHICKS, or POLITICKS. Now Every One of the Suppositions, here mentioned, is far from being True.

the Doctrines themselves: But he takes this Method, as a consummate Master of the Art of *Composition* in the Dialogue-Way of Writing; from the different Characters of the Speakers, as from different Elements in the Frame of these Dramatic Dialogues, or different Ingredients in their Mixture, producing some peculiar *Genius*, and Turn of Temper, as it were, in Each.

Socrates indeed is in almost All of them the *Principal Speaker*: but when he falls into the Company of some arrogant *Sophist*; when the modest Wisdom, and clear Science of the One, are contrasted with the confident Ignorance, and blind Opinionativeness of the Other; DISPUTE and Controversy must of Course arise: where the false Pretender cannot fail of being either *puzzled*, or *confuted*. To PUZZLE him only is sufficient, if there be *no Other Persons present*; because Such a Man can never be confuted in his own Opinion: but when there is an *Audience* round them, in Danger of being misled by Sophistry into Error, then is the true Philosopher to exert his Utmost, and the vain Sophist to be CONVICTED and exposed.

In Some Dialogues *Plato* represents his Great Master mixing in Conversation with *Young Men* of the best Families in the Commonwealth. When These happen to have *docile* Dispositions and *fair* Minds, then is Occasion given to the Philosopher to call forth the latent Seeds of Wisdom, and to cultivate the noble Plants with True Doctrine, in the affable and familiar Way of *Joint Inquiry*. To This is owing the INQUISITIVE Genius of such Dialogues: where, by a seeming Equality

Equality in the Conversation, the Curiosity or Zeal of the mere *Stranger* is EXCITED; That of the *Disciple* is encouraged; and by proper Questions, the Mind is AIDED and forwarded in the Search of Truth.

At Other Times, the *Philosophic Hero* of these Dialogues is introduced in a *higher* Character, engaged in Discourse with Men of more *improved* Understandings, and *enlightened* Minds. At Such Seasons he has an Opportunity of *teaching* in a more *explicit* Manner, and of discovering the *Reasons* of Things. For to Such an Audience Truth is due, and all ⁺ *Demonstration* possible in the teaching it. Hence, in the Dialogues composed of these Persons, naturally arises the justly Argumentative or DEMONSTRATIVE Genius; of the ANALYTICAL Kind, when the *Principles* of Mind or *Science*, the *Leading Truths*, are to be unfolded; of the INDUCTIONAL Kind, when any *Subsequent Truth*, of the same Rank with Others, any *Part of Science*, is meant to be displayed.

But when the Doctrine to be taught admits not of Demonstration; of which Kind is the Doctrine of *Outward Nature*, being only *Hypothetical*, and a Matter of *Opinion*; the Doctrine of *Antiquities*, being only *Traditional*, and a Matter of *Belief*; and the Doctrine of *Laws*, being *Injunctive*, and the Matter of *Obedience*; the Air of AUTHORITY

⁺ The *Platonists* rightly observe, that *Socrates*, in these Cases, makes Use of *Demonstrative* and just Reasoning; (ἀποδεικτικῶς;) whereas to the Novice he is contented with Arguments only *Probable*, (πιθανοῖς;) and against the litigious Sophist often employs Such, as are (ἐγχεῖται) *Puzzling*, and *Contentious*. See Ἀλκιβ. Εἰσαγωγή. Κεφ. 5'.

is then assumed: in the former Cases, the Doctrine is TRADITIONALLY handed down to Others from the Authority of *ancient Sages*; in the latter, is MAGISTERIALLY pronounced with the Authority of a *Legislator*. That this Turn may be given to *such* Dialogues with Propriety, and Justice to the Character of the Speakers, the reasoning *Socrates* is laid aside, or only sustains some *lower* and *obscure* Part; while That, which is the *Principal*, or *Shining*, is allotted to some *Other Philosopher*, to whom may properly be attributed a more *Authoritative* Manner; to Such an *Antiquarian*, as may be *credited*, or deemed to have received the best *Information*; to Such a *Statesman* or *Politician*, as may fairly be presumed best qualified for the *making Laws*.

THUS much for the *Manner*, in which the Dialogues of *Plato* are severally composed, and the Cast of *Genius* given them in their Composition. The *Form*, under which they *appear*, or the external *Character* that marks them, is of *Three* Sorts; either purely *Dramatic*, like the Dialogue of Tragedy or Comedy; or purely *Narrative*, where a former Conversation is supposed to be committed to Writing, and communicated to some absent Friend; or of the *Mixed* Kind, like a Narration in Dramatic Poems, where is recited to some Person present the Story of Things past.

HAVING thus divided the Dialogues of *Plato*, in respect of that inward Form or Composition, which creates their Genius; and again, with Reference to that outward Form,
which,

which marks them, like Flowers and other Vegetables, with a certain Character; we are farther to make a Division of them, with regard to their ^s *Subject*, and their *Design*; beginning with their Design, or End, because for the Sake of This are all the Subjects chosen. The End of all the Writings of *Plato* is That, which is the END of all true PHILOSOPHY or Wisdom, the Perfection and the HAPPINESS of MAN. MAN therefore is the General Subject: And the *first* Business of PHILOSOPHY must be to inquire, What is that Being, called MAN, who is to be made Happy; and what is his NATURE, in the Perfection of which is placed his Happiness.

The Philosopher considers Man, as a Compound Being, consisting of *Body* and of SOUL: the *superior* Part of which *Soul* is MIND; by which he is intimately connected with, and of near Kindred to, the *Divine Nature*; the *inferior* Part is made up of *Passions* and *Affections*, reducible All to *Two* Kinds, having All of them either *Pain* or *Pleasure* for their Object; by Means of which, and also of his *Body*, he is outwardly related to, and connected with, the Fellows of *his own Species*, and with all *Outward Nature*. He is moved by some commanding Power within him, the Principle of Action, commonly called *Will*; and when the *Motion*, given by it, is *Right*, and in *Right Direction*, moves him for his *real Good*. The Motion and Direction Both are right, when the One is

^s It is by no Means intended here to present our Readers with an Epitome or Abstract of *Plato's* Doctrine, any farther than may serve for the present, in some Measure, to shew the *Connection* of his *Writings*, and the *Relation* which the several *Subjects* of them have One to Another.

measured

measured and the Other *dictated* by *Right Reason*. 'The Motion is thus measured, and the Direction thus dictated; or, in other Words, the *Measure* and the *Rule* of a Man's Actions are agreeable to *Right Reason*, when the *Governing Power* within him, the Reason of his *own Mind*, harmonises with Reason *Universal*: And This it does, when his Mind *sees* Things as they *are*, and *partakes* of *Truth*: because Truth is the *Standard* of Right Reason, and is the *Same* in *Every*, and in *All* Mind; of Mind the *Perfection* and the *End*. By Means of *Truth* therefore, or the *Knowledge* of it, (for the Mind is in *Possession* of Truth by *knowing* it) is a Man's *Reason* empowered to *govern* him, and his *Will* to *move* him, for his *Good*. Now the Power of so governing and so moving is Man's *Virtue*: the *Virtue* of Every Thing being its *Power* to produce or procure some certain *Good*. Thus the Two great Objects of the *Platonic* Philosophy are TRUTH and VIRTUE; Truth, the Good of *all Mind*; and Virtue, the Good of the *Whole Man*.

TRUTH, that is, the *Reality* of Things, being Eternal, Absolute, and Independant upon any Particular Mind; the *real Essences* of Things not only always *are*, but always have the *same Manner* also of Being, that is, Uniform and Invariable, not subject to the Differences or Changes of any Thoughts concerning them, and indeed seated above the Comprehension or the Reach of any Particular Minds. Our *Ideas*, when true, are the exact *Copies* or perfect *Images* of These: and when we *know* them so to be, and can resolve them

them into their *Principles*, then have we true *Science*. It is the Nature of the *Human Soul* to have these *Ideas generated* in her, and to *partake* of MIND Eternal and Immutable. Hence She is the *Offspring*, and the *Image*, of the *Divine Nature*: and hence by *Participation* of That, which is *Eternal*, and whose Principle is UNITY, She is Herself *Indissoluble* and *Immortal*.

The *Resemblances* of those *real Essences* are also in *Outward Things*, serving first to *excite* in the Soul those true *Ideas*. But because of the ever-changing and transient Nature of such Things, those *Resemblances* being uncertain; they are no less apt to raise false *Fancies*, and to give Birth to erroneous *Opinions*.

But besides these *Natural Representations* of Things, Others there are which are *Arbitrary*; invented by Men, in order to express or signify to Each Other whatever they perceive or fancy, know or think. These are *Words*, framed into *Propositions* and *Discourses*; in which we give an Account of what we take to be the Nature of Things. They are delivered in *Three Ways*; either in the Way of *Reason*, applying themselves to the *Understanding*, with Pretensions to *prove*; in the Way of *Oratory*, addressing the *Passions*, in order to *persuade*; or in the Way of *Poetry*, engaging the *Imagination*, with a View to *please*. The Mind therefore is in Danger of being seduced into Error by Words, in *Four different Ways*: either, by *WRONG NAMES* attributed to Things, disguising thus their real Nature; by *SOPHISTICAL ARTS of REASONING*, thus exhibiting Falshood in the Dress of Truth;

Truth; by the adulterated Colours of RHETORICK, deluding us; or the fantastick Figuring of POETRY, enchanting us. In this Manner does *Plato* warn his *Readers* against the Ways, that lead aside into Error; while he conducts his *Followers* along the Road of Truth.

As to the Other Object of *Platonic* Wisdom, VIRTUE, or the settled Power in the Soul of governing Man rightly; considered as *adhering* to its Divine Principle, *Truth*, it takes the Form of SANCTITY; considered as *presiding* over every *Word* and *Action*, it has the Nature of PRUDENCE; in controlling and ordering the *Concupiscible* Part of the Soul, or the Affections and Passions that regard *Pleasure*, it is called TEMPERANCE; in composing and directing the *Iracible* Part of the Soul, or the Affections and Passions relative to *Pain*, it assumes the Name of FORTITUDE. And thus far it respects *Private* Good *immediately*, yet extending its *Influence* to the Good of *Others*, through the Connections of Kindred Nature and of Social Life.

But since every Man is a Member of some *Civil Community*, is linked with the Fellows of his *own Species*, is related to every Nature *Superior* and *Divine*, and is a Part also of *Universal* Nature; he must always of Necessity participate of the Good and Evil of every Whole, greater as well as less, to which he belongs; and has an Interest in the Well-being of every Species, with which he is connected. With *immediate* Reference therefore to the Good of *Others*, to the *Public* Good, to the *General* Good of Mankind, and to
Universal

Universal Good; yet *remotely*, and by Way of *Consequence* affecting *Private* Good; *Virtue*, as She regulates the Conduct of Man, in order to these Ends, has the Title given her of JUSTICE, *Universal*, or *Particular* in all its various Branches, FRIENDSHIP, PATRIOTISM, *Humanity*, *Equity* and PIETY, with every *subordinate* Duty springing out of These.

But since, in order to effect thoroughly, and fully to accomplish, the Good of any *Vital Whole*, there must be a *Conspiration* and *Co-operation* of all the Parts; there ought in Every Public to be ONE MIND OF LAW presiding over, disposing, and *directing All*; that through All may run *One Spirit*, and in All *One Virtue* operate. To illustrate This, the Idea is presented of a perfect COMMONWEALTH, and a just Model is framed of Public LAWS. And *in This* the Nature of *Virtue* is seen most Godlike, that is, of Her-self most diffusive, and of the most Good productive, in her making *All happy*, as She is POLITICAL and LEGISLATIVE.

Thus all *Virtue* is *Order* and *Proportion*; whether in the *Soul of Man*, or in a *Civil State*: and putting *Measure* into all the Manners, and into every Action, whether of Private or of Public Life, produces in them *Symmetry* and *Beauty*: for of These, *proportioned Measure* is the *Principle*. This She does, because the *Rule*, according to which the Mind by her Will then governs, is *Beauty Itself*; and the *Science*, through which She governs, is the Science of that *Beauty*. For TRUTH and BEAUTY concur in *One*; and where-ever They are, there is also GOOD. The LOVE of BEAUTY then

is nothing different from that First and Leading Motive in all Minds to the Pursuit of every Thing, That from whence the Philosopher sets out in his Inquiry after Wisdom, the DESIRE of GOOD. Thus the *Perfection* of Man consists in his *Similitude* to this SUPREME BEAUTY; and in his *Union* with it is found his SUPREME GOOD.

THE Dialogues of *Plato*, with respect to their *Subjects*, may be divided, conformably to this slight Sketch of their *Design*, into the *Speculative*, the *Practical*, and such as are of a *Mixed* Nature. The Subjects of these *last* are either *General*, comprehending Both the Others; or *Differential*, distinguishing them. The *General* Subjects are either *Fundamental*, or *Final*: Those of the Fundamental Kind are PHILOSOPHY, HUMAN NATURE, the SOUL OF MAN: of the Final Kind are LOVE, BEAUTY, GOOD. The *Differential* regard *Knowledge*, as it stands related to *Practice*: in which are considered two Questions; One of which is, whether *Virtue* is to be *taught*; the Other is, whether Error in the *Will* depends on Error in the *Judgment*. The Subjects of the *Speculative* Dialogues relate either to *Words*, or to *Things*. Of the former Sort are ETYMOLOGY, SOPHISTRY, RHETORICK, POETRY: of the latter Sort are SCIENCE, TRUE BEING, the PRINCIPLES OF MIND, OUTWARD NATURE. The *Practical* Subjects relate either to *Private* Conduct, and the Government of the Mind over the Whole *Man*; or to his Duty towards *Others* in his several *Relations*; or to the Government of a *Civil State*, and the *Public* Conduct of a Whole
People.

People. Under these Three Heads rank in Order the Particular Subjects Practical; VIRTUE in General, SANCTITY, TEMPERANCE, FORTITUDE; JUSTICE, FRIENDSHIP, PATRIOTISM, PIETY; the RULING MIND in a Civil GOVERNMENT, the FRAME AND ORDER of a *State*, LAW in General, and lastly, those *Rules* of Government and of Public Conduct, the CIVIL LAWS.

THUS, for the Sake of giving the Reader a Scientific, that is, a *comprehensive* and at the same Time a *distinct*, View of *Plato's* Writings, we have attempted to exhibit to him their just and natural Distinctions; whether he chuses to consider them with regard to their *Inward Form* or *Essence*, their *Outward Form* or *Appearance*, their *Matter*, or their *End*: that is, in those more familiar Terms, we have used in this Synopsis, their GENIUS, their CHARACTER, their SUBJECT, and their DESIGN.



T H E

P R O L O G U E.

SOCRATES, *the Hero of these Dramatic Dialogues,* lived a private Life at Athens; quiet and studious, yet in the highest Degree social, deigning his Converse and communicating his Knowledge, in proper Measure, to all Sorts of People. In this City therefore must of Course lie the ordinary Scene of those Conversations, in which Socrates presides, or bath a Share. As that wise Man however used much Exercise, and died before his Days of Exercise were past, Probability admits the Scene to be now and then diversified, by being changed to the adjacent Country. Nor is it in these Cases either confined to One Spot of Ground, or in General only and at large Rural: sometimes opening into the Walks round the City-Walls; at other times lengthened along the Way to some appendant Sea-Port or Village: now widened into the Fields and Groves; now winding along the Banks of the Ilyssus. Of those Conversations, that pass within the City, the Particular
Spot

Spot is no less varied: here it is the open Street; there the private House of One of the Company; but ofteneft one or other Public Place of General Refort; as the Place of Exchange, or some Court of Judicature; the Place where the Gymnic Exercifes were used, or some School where they were taught: neither is the Banquet-Room, nor the Prison wanting, to compleat the Variety. But in every Dialogue the exacteft Care is taken to adapt the Scene, as much as poffible, to the Subject: even in the fame Dialogue the Scene is fhifted, if the Oeconomy of the Drama requires the different Parts of it to be difpofed in different Places. By all this Diverfification, Propriety is preferved, the Fancy fond of Change is entertained, and the Speculative Mind is prefented with a true, that is, a variegated Picture of Human Life. Our Readers, having thus received fome Sort of Information, concerning the Country whither they are going; may probably defire to have the like General Notice given them, concerning the Names and Titles of Thofe, to whose Acquaintance they are going to be introduced. Each of the Dialogues then of Plato bears Two Titles; One of which was in all Probability prefixed to it by Plato himfelf. This is ufually taken from the Name of the Perfon, with whom Socrates there is represented holding Difcourfe: or, if feveral Perfons are Parties in the Converfation, then Whoever makes the moft fhining Figure in it, next after Socrates, gives Name to the Dialogue. The Other Title feems to have been attributed

buted to it by Some of the ⁶ Platonic School, denoting the supposed Subject of that Conversation. That these Secondary Titles have not the Authority of PLATO, is evident ⁷ from the Disagreement and Uncertainty of Some of them, and the Impropriety of Others. We have thought it convenient to retain Both: for the Sake however of Distinction, calling the First, (and, we presume, not improperly,) the Name of the Dialogue; and the Other, the Title of it. But where the Title appeared improper, we have attempted to assign a Better; and where, in different Manuscripts of the Same Dialogue, were found different Titles, to prefer the Best.

⁶ This, we think, appears from *Diogenes Laertius*, who collected his Account of the Life and Writings of *Plato* from various Authors, Philosophers, Criticks, and Grammarians: and as he always fairly cites his Authorities for every Thing, which he advances; so upon this Head he informs us, that *Thrasylus* made Use of Double Inscriptions or Titles. *Διπλαῖς δὲ χρῆται [Θράσυλλος] ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς ἐκάστου τῶν βιβλίων. Διογ. Λαερτ. βιβ. γ.* From whence it is plain, that the Use of them was not General at least, till the Time of this *Thrasylus*.

⁷ Another Argument, to prove the After-Invention of these Secondary Titles, arises from this Observation; that among the numerous Works of the other Ancient Philosophers, of which there remain but the mere Titles, preserved to us by *Laertius*, scarce Any is found to bear more than One, till the Time of *Chrysippus* the Verbose; the Dialogues of the *Socratic* School being usually inscribed, after the Manner of *Plato*, with the Name of One of the Speakers; and the Treatises of the Other Philosophers taking their Title usually from their Subject, and sometimes, after the Manner of Epistles, inscribed only with the Name of the Person to whom they are addressed.



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