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
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A. VON JOCHMUS'
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN

I.

DIESES WERK WURDE IN DREIHUNDERT EXEMPLAREN ABGEZOGEN.

AKADEMISCHE BUCHDRUCKEREI VON F. STRAUB IN MÜNCHEN.





AUGUST VON JOCHMUS'
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN

HERAUSGEGEBEN

VON

DR GEORG MARTIN THOMAS.

ERSTER BAND

THE SYRIAN WAR AND THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

1840—1848.

BERLIN:
ALBERT COHN
32, MOHRENSTRASSE
1883.

THE SYRIAN WAR
AND THE
DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE //

1840--1848

IN OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS, DOCUMENTS, AND CORRESPONDENCES WITH LORD PALMERSTON, LORD PONSONBY, AND THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES

BY

BARON AUGUSTUS JOCHMUS

LATE GERMAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FIELD MARSHAL-LIEUTENANT
IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.


TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I. //

BERLIN:
ALBERT COHN
59, MOHRENSTRASSE.

1883. //

~~Ott 588.4~~
Ott 581.10



L. C. Santilaw

VORERINNERUNG DES HERAUSGEBERS.

Bei der Herausgabe dieses meist handschriftlichen und nur theilweise gedruckten Nachlasses des Feldmarschalls Herrn August von Jochmus war mir eine zweifache Pflicht auferlegt. Erstlich war es geboten, jenen Anweisungen vollständig und unbedingt Folge zu leisten, welche der Verlebte theils früher in besonderen Bemerkungen zu seinem wohlgeregelten Manuscript theils später in seinem letzten Willen niedergelegt hatte, betreffs der Art und Weise wie seine ansehnliche Sammlung historischer Schriftstücke sollte veröffentlicht werden, Bemerkungen, welche der Zeit nach allerdings bis nahe auf ein Menschenalter zurückgehen, wie solches die eigene Vorrede desselben beurkundet, welche aber dadurch keineswegs an Gültigkeit oder Zweckmässigkeit verlieren. Zweitens aber musste ich strenge und unverdrossen den Anforderungen nachkommen, welche die Wissenschaft heutzutage an den Herausgeber geschichtlicher Urkunden oder officieller Berichte und Briefe zu stellen berechtigt ist. Nach beiden Seiten glaube ich meine Schuldigkeit gethan zu haben.

Hinsichtlich des ersten Punctes mag es nur bemerkt sein, dass die wesentlich, wie es sich gehört, in chronologischer Folge gegebene Anordnung der einzelnen Stücke

VIII

dabei so gelassen worden ist, wie sie sich mit kleinen Abweichungen davon vorfand; diese wird der Kundige leicht sich erklären und auch billigen, so, wenn Brief und Gegenbrief sich unmittelbar aneinander reihen, oder wenn gewisse Stücke als Zugabe, andere zu begründen, zu erörtern geeignet sind. Eine Liste sämmtlicher Schriften wird diese Uebersicht noch erleichtern.

Die Orthographie der nicht selten mühsam lesbaren Originalbriefe wurde als 'Manus propria' selbst mit gewissen Versehen im Schreiben unverändert beibehalten, "der historischen Wahrheit halber", wie im Testament ausgesprochen ist.

Für die zweite Aufgabe musste ich als alt- und strengeschulter Philolog und als Diplomatiker — und letzteres ist nur recht wer ersteres wirklich ist — wissen und können was mir oblag. Schwierig dabei war es allerdings und oftmals in gewissen abgelegenen, man könnte sagen vertraulichen Verhältnissen sich den richtigen Einblick zu verschaffen, oder Namen von Orten und Personen sicher zu stellen, welche an sich und heute nach Decennien um so mehr unbekannt erscheinen, zumal auch die zur Arbeit dienenden Hilfsmittel selbst an so reichen Büchereien wie an der Münchener Bibliothek nicht alle sich vorfanden. Unerlässlich galt es, die in der 'Correspondence relative to the Affairs of the Levant' — presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1841, Part I—III — für den ersten Theil des Jochmus'schen Werkes niedergelegten Acten zu vergleichen; es gelang mir, dieselben aus England beizuschaffen. Man wird ebendieselben mit dem kurzen Lemma 'Levant Papers', was schon der Verstorbene gewählt hatte, häufig angezogen finden. Auch andere Hinweise im Buche selbst fehlen nicht am gehörigen Orte.

So wird man denn, hoffe ich, meiner Arbeit jene Anerkennung nicht versagen, welche redlichem Fleiss und gewissenhafter Sorgfalt gezollt wird. Irrungen oder Versehen haften jedem menschlichen Werke an. Mein Streben und Mühen war, ein schönes Wort zu erfüllen:

“An editor, or translator, collects the merits of different writers, and, forming all into a wreath, bestows it on his author’s tomb.”

Als Einführung in den Inhalt der Sammlung überhaupt und des ersten Theiles insbesondere, wie als biographische Skizze möge der Bericht dienen, welchen ich vor einigen Monaten über diese Angelegenheit in der “Augsburger Allgemeinen Zeitung” — Beilage Nr. 232 vom 20 August — veröffentlicht habe. Ich wüsste nichts anderes oder besseres dafür einzusetzen, und habe an demselben nur wenig geändert, nur einiges hinzugefügt, wie es hierorts statthaft und nach dem, was inzwischen auf dem Theater der östlichen Welt sich bedeutsames ereignet hat, geeignet und erforderlich schien.

August Freiherr Jochmus von Cotignola, kaiserlich österreichischer Feldmarschall-Lieutenant und Reichsminister unter Erzherzog Johann, welcher am 14. September des Jahres 1881 zu Bamberg entschlafen ist, wo er ein merkwürdig bewegtes, echt soldatisches Leben, von ritterlicher Art und von stolzem Thatendrang zuletzt mit einem mehr als stillen, abgeschlossenen, fast einsiedlerischen Dasein vertauscht hatte, dachte wohl schon vor Decennien daran, aus seinen Erlebnissen, aus seiner militärischen, politischen, höfischen Laufbahn, welche ihn in West und Ost mit distinguirten Männern des Friedens und des Krieges in persönliche und unmittelbare Berührung oder Beziehung gebracht hatte, eine Reihe von Schriftstücken zur Geschichte jener

Epochen, gleichsam Memorabilien zu veröffentlichen: Zeuge dessen ist die frühere Druckschrift "Der Syrische Krieg und der Verfall des Osmanen-Reiches seit 1840", welche 1856 in wiederholter Auflage in Frankfurt am Main erschienen ist.

Bestimmte Rücksichten des Gentleman, dann aber insbesondere die Entwicklung, der Umschwung der Dinge in Europa seit 1866, stellten den Plan zurück, und so kam es zuletzt, dass der Marschall nach 1870 auf dem Entschluss stehen blieb, dass seine hinterlassenen Schriften erst nach seinem Ableben in bestimmter Weise und Folge sollten herausgegeben werden.

August Jochmus war am 27. Februar 1808 in Hamburg als der Sohn einer wohlgestellten und wohlangesehenen Familie geboren; er erhielt, wie es dort belobte Sitte ist, von Haus und Schule eine sehr sorgfältige Erziehung. In dem begabten, aufgeweckten Knaben gab sich bald eine vorherrschende Neigung zum Soldatenstande kund: ebendesswegen bildeten Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft die Gegenstände seines besonderen Fleisses. Gleichwohl folgte er, nachdem er den Vater im 14. Jahre verloren hatte, der Zusprache der Mutter und trat in den Handelsstand; er kam als Lehrling in ein bedeutendes Kaufhaus, die noch heute bestehende Firma Lutterot und Comp. Aber der angeborne Drang liess ihn hier nicht ruhen; man erkannte die getroffene Berufswahl als verfehlt, und Jochmus durfte nun mit Zustimmung der Familie nach Paris ziehen, um sich dort den militärischen Studien und der damit zusammenhängenden Ausbildung voll und frei zu ergeben.

Ohne Zweifel erwarb er sich in dieser damals und noch lange nachher tonangebenden Weltstadt neben ausgezeichneten Fachkenntnissen auch jene Fertigkeit in den Sprachen, jene Gewandtheit und Feinheit im Umgang und jene Haltung, welche den hochgewachsenen stattlichen Mann

später in erlesener Stellung und in aristokratischer Gesellschaft eine feste und bedeutsame, eine geschichtliche Rolle spielen liessen.

Den Anfang seiner kriegerischen Thaten machte er 1827 im Befreiungskampfe der Neo-Hellenen bis 1829, in dieser Zeit zum Hauptmann und Adjutanten des Generals Sir Richard Church berufen. Als Hellas in Otto von Baiern seinen ersten König erhalten hatte, trat er als Hauptmann des Generalstabs in das griechische Kriegsministerium, und leistete als solcher sowohl im Frieden als im Felde, wie gegen die aufständischen Moreoten, besondere Dienste.

Im Jahre 1835 bestimmte ihn der damalige brittische Gesandte in Athen, Sir Edmund Lyons, der Anglo-Spanischen Legion sich anzuschliessen, welche General-Lieutenant Sir de Lacy Evans commandirte, und zwar als Hauptmann im achten Bergschotten-Regiment und Brigade-Adjutant. Seine hervorleuchtende Tüchtigkeit bei Arlaban, bei der Erstürmung von S. Sebastian, bei der Einnahme von Irun — 1836, 1837 — hob ihn rasch von Stufe zu Stufe, bis zum Brigade-General; im Juni 1837 ernannte ihn Espartero zum Chef des Generalstabs des spanischen Armeecorps für Cantabrien. Glänzend ausgezeichnet verliess Jochmus 1838 Spanien und begab sich nach England.

Nicht lange und er sollte auf einen Kriegsschauplatz entsendet werden, welcher ihm Gelegenheit zu selbständiger Leitung und Leistung und damit zu seltener Anerkennung gewährte, hin nach dem Küstenstrich zwischen dem Libanon und dem Mittelmeer, — im Zusammenhang mit dem libyschen Erdtheil eine vieltausendjährige Arena ziehender Völker und erobernder Könige, seitdem aber dort die Kraft des Islams zur Herrschaft gelangt ist, — die Hunderttausende von Männern verschlingende Walstatt im furchtbaren, un-
ausgefochtenen Conflict von Orient und Occident.

Die ägyptisch-orientalische Frage, welche eben wieder die Mächtigen der Erde nicht ruhen lässt, war damals durch den Rebellen, den despotischen Mehemed Ali, nicht nur für die Hohe Pforte, sondern auch für deren sogenannte Schutzmächte, für England insonderheit, zur hohen Gefahr umgestaltet: nach dem Tage von Nisib (24. Juni 1839) stand ein entscheidender Krieg in Syrien am Thor der Ereignisse.

Jochmus hatte schon vorher von Lord Palmerston die Mission nach Constantinopel erhalten, um daselbst mit dem brittischen Botschafter Lord Ponsonby einen Feldzugsplan zu entwerfen. Eben dieser wurde alsdann von der Quadrupelallianz, welche England, Oesterreich, Preussen und Russland in Folge der Convention zu London am 15. Juli 1840 zu Gunsten der Hohen Pforte eingegangen hatten, genehmigt, und Jochmus vom Commandanten der englischen Mittelmeerflotte, Sir Robert Stopford, zum Chef des Generalstabs der vereinigten englisch-österreichisch-türkischen Operationsarmee im Libanon berufen, indem er zugleich von Seite der türkischen Regierung zum Divisionsgeneral und Ferik Pascha (Pascha von zwei Rosschweiften) ernannt wurde. Nach mehreren glücklichen, aber heissen Gefechten, besonders bei Calat Meidan (10. October 1840), und nach der Beschiessung und Eroberung von Acre (3 November), an welcher er theilgenommen hatte, erhielt er den Oberbefehl der Landarmee, verdrängte durch kühne und rasche Operationen Ibrahim Pascha aus Syrien und beendete so factisch den syrischen Feldzug (Februar 1841). Welche Intriguen damals, vorher und nachher, von Frankreich aus zu Gunsten des Rebellen angezettelt wurden, welche Fehler, gelinde gesagt, man in England beging, welche persönlichen Leidenschaften hereinspielten, das ist zwar nicht unbekannt, wird aber durch die Papiere von Jochmus vielfach erhärtet und deutlicher ans Licht gebracht werden.

Eine ausgiebige Thätigkeit entwickelte Jochmus nachherhand als Mitglied des türkischen Kriegsministeriums in Constantinopel bis zum Jahre 1848; in dieser erschloss sich ihm, wie nicht gerade vielen, das Wesen und die Natur des sinkenden Osmanenthums, aber auch die Einsicht in die echte und falsche Politik des Westens gegen den Osten.

Im Bewegungsjahr 1848 war Jochmus nach Deutschland zurückgekehrt; die Wendung der Dinge im Frankfurter Parlament hob ihn als Reichsminister für das Aeussere und die Marine zu einer kurzen aber gewichtigen Stellung im Dienste des Vaterlands. Mit dem Rücktritt des Erzherzogs Johann vom Amte schloss sich jener ab, nicht aber die Intimität zu diesem Fürsten. Ueberhaupt war der General Jochmus schon im Orient und in Constantinopel mit dem österreichischen Kaiserhaus und seinen Vertretern in innige Beziehung getreten; auch hegte er für jenes eine entschiedene, eine mächtige Vorliebe, welche ihn aber mit nichten verhinderte, freimüthig der hohen Aufgabe der Habsburger Dynastie im Osten das Wort zu leihen und die gleich wichtige von "Austro-Germanien" in einem politisch-mercantilen Bündniss nach 1849 zur Geltung zu bringen. Der armseligen deutschen Kleinwirthschaft mit ihren 'little tyrants', wie man damals in England sich auszudrücken pflegte, dem alten Bundestagsunwesen, den Bamberger Conferenzen und dergleichen war ein Mann wie Jochmus von Natur aus und obwohl von sogenannter conservativer Gesinnung abhold und entgegen, wie jeder Freund des Vaterlandes, welcher das Mass des öffentlichen Credits, mit welchem das gute deutsche Volk so lange abgeschätzt worden war, im Ausland und auf Posten, wie die von Jochmus, hatte erfahren müssen.

Ebensowenig liess er es später bemessenen Ortes an ernsthaften Mahnungen gebrechen wegen der argen und

auffösenden Missgriffe, welche man im System der Regierung Oesterreichs beging, indem man den germanischen Grundstock des Kaiserreichs, den eigentlichen Kern und Halt desselben, übertriebenen Ansprüchen nationaler Begehrlichkeiten mehr und mehr zum Raube gab: so würde und müsste man bald "mit seinem Latein am Ende sein".

Es war für einen Mann von der Denkart und dem Eigenwillen unseres Jochmus ein Glück, dass er durchaus nicht an äussere Umstände gebunden war oder fremdem Belieben hörig sein musste. Bei voller Unabhängigkeit und im Besitz ausreichenden Vermögens verfügte er denn selbständig und frei über Zeit und Mittel und gewann so immer einen Boden fruchtbarer, ihn selbst befriedigender Thätigkeit.

Die Kenntniss der Völker, ihrer Geschichte und ihrer Wohnsitze war ihm eine Lieblingssache. Er besuchte deshalb, und wiederholt, die verschiedenen Länder Europa's, dann den Orient, und schloss daran in den Jahren 1853 bis 1855 von Aegypten aus eine Reise um die Welt. Mit welcher Neigung und Sorgfalt er bei diesen grossen Privatexpeditionen zu Werke ging, davon zeugen auch mehrere historische und geographische Studien, welche in den Mittheilungen der "Royal Geographical Society" in London veröffentlicht sind.

Als es im Jahre 1859 zum Kriege Oesterreichs gegen Italien-Gallien kam, sollte Jochmus als Feldmarschall-Lieutenant in der österreichischen Armee für die geplanten Operationen am Rhein eine Stellung erhalten, dieselben traten aber nicht ins Leben, und der Friede von Villafranca schloss jenen Feldzug, ehe seine förmliche Ernennung stattgehabt hatte. Der Kaiser von Oesterreich jedoch erhob ihn zum erblichen Baron mit dem Titel "von Cotignola" und dem Wappemotto "victoriosus in Syria".

Im Jahre 1866 wollte Feldzeugmeister von Hess, welcher bereits 1859 mit Jochmus vertrauliche militärische Besprechungen angeknüpft hatte, neuerdings dessen Ernennung zum Feldmarschall-Lieutenant in der Armee Oesterreichs durchsetzen; gewisse Präcedenzscrupel gegen den Ausländer verzögerten die Bewilligung abermals, obgleich man höchsten Ortes dazu geneigt war. Als dieselbe erfolgte, und zwar insbesondere durch den entscheidenden Einfluss des Erzherzogs Albrecht, war die Entscheidungsschlacht von Königgrätz bereits geschlagen und der Präliminarfriede von Nicolsburg machte allen weiteren strategischen Plänen ein rasches Ende.

Man kann sagen, mit diesem Jahr, mit 1866, schloss die Action des Generals ab, nicht aber die Thätigkeit des politischen militärischen Beobachters, des aristokratischen Weltmannes, des fleissigen Correspondenten, des emsigen Lesers, und noch ein zweites Mal 1870—71 wurde die Welt umsegelt, diessmal von England aus. Als er heim kam, war das Deutsche Reich geschaffen, und das hohe, stolze Gefühl, ein Deutscher zu sein, trat nun auch bei Jochmus voll in seine Rechte ein. Ein tief liegendes, körperliches Leiden, welches er verleugnend und klagelos ertrug, erzeugte nicht eine Schwäche des Willens des soldatischen Charakters, aber mehr und mehr eine düstere, trübselige, seine Umgebung härmende Verstimmung der Seele. Er hatte zuletzt Bamberg zum Aufenthalt gewählt, wo ihn seine dort lebende Schwester in ausharrender Treue bis ans schwere Ende wartete und pflegte.

Auch während dieser allerletzten Jahre der Entsagung und des Leidgeföhls hielt Jochmus, wie an der gewohnten strengen Ordnung und der selbstthätigen Führung seiner Geschäfte, so an den alten hohen Verbindungen fest: seine Stellung und Würdigung als eines tapferen und ehrenfesten,

hochstrebenden und hochsinnigen Mannes, als eines wahren Aristokraten wird allgemein zur Anerkennung kommen, wenn sein gesammelter schriftlicher Nachlass zu Tage getreten sein wird. Die Auswahl, Zusammenstellung, Ordnung und erneuerte Sichtung eben dieser Papiere, war sicherlich eine stete und erinnerungsstolze Beschäftigung der letzten Decennien seines Lebens. Ein ganz klarer Artikel seines Testaments bestimmt genau die Art der Veröffentlichung und weist hiefür behufs voller Unabhängigkeit des Unternehmens erkleckliche Mittel an.

Wie aber ich dazu komme, von dem Verstorbenen mit der Herausgabe seiner Schriften betraut zu werden? Einmal führe ich dieses zurück auf die sichere Freundschaft, welche mich mit dessen hochverehrtem Bruder, Herrn Thomas Jochmus (früher in München, nun in Florenz), seit langem verbindet; dann aber mochte der General in mir auch einige Kenntnisse voraussetzen von Dingen und Ereignissen, welche nunmehr in Zeit und Ort ziemlich ferne liegen, an denen ich aber, wie an der deutschen nationalen Bewegung von 1848 lebhaft und persönlich Antheil genommen hatte, oder für welche mir das innige Verhältniss zu Fallmerayer Auge und Sinn erschlossen haben konnte; und mit dem Fragmentisten war ja der Ferik Pascha nicht nur in Constantinopel in jenen vierziger Jahren zusammengewesen, er hielt auch auf diesen ersten Kenner der orientalischen Dinge, auf diesen untrüglichen Verkünder des Fatums von Byzanz zeitlebens, was man sagt ein grosses Stück.

Ich hatte vor beiläufig zehn Jahren, ohne den Umfang und die Bedeutung der Arbeit zu kennen, meine Bereitschaft zur Uebernahme derselben erklärt, und halte es nunmehr, soviel an Zeit dazwischen liegt, soviel von jenen "anni recedentes" — für Ehrenpflicht, dem Vertrauen des

Verstorbenen, der Erwartung der Hinterbliebenen pro viribus zu entsprechen.

Jochmus selbst hat seinen schriftlichen Nachlass in drei Gruppen getheilt:

die erste umfasst den Syrischen Krieg und den Verfall des Osmanischen Reiches von 1840 bis 1848;

die zweite enthält die Acten aus der Zeit des Reichsministeriums, die Correspondenz mit dem Reichsverweser Erzherzog Johann und Anderen von 1849 bis 1859;

die dritte die beiden Reisen um die Welt, die geographischen Abhandlungen, und allgemeine Correspondenzen und Aufzeichnungen zur Zeitgeschichte von 1859 bis 1866.

Aus den militärischen Schriftstücken der ersten Gruppe schöpfte der Oberst im k. k. Genie-Stabe, Heinrich Freiherr v. Scholl, zu seinem "Abriss der Geschichte des Krieges 1840—41 in Syrien", welcher 1866 in Wien erschienen ist. Jede der drei Gruppen zerfällt in zwei Theile; die Veröffentlichung soll successive geschehen. Alle gesammelte Schriften bilden nicht etwa historisch durchgearbeitete Werke, als vielmehr in Briefen, Berichten, Documenten u. dgl. geschicktes und werthvolles Material zur Geschichte der besagten Epochen, oder selbständige und schätzbare Beiträge zur Kunde der Erde und ihrer Völker.

Die beiden Bände der ersten Gruppe — welche fast nur englisch geschriebene Beweisstücke enthalten und desshalb auch sonst von Jochmus in diese Sprache eingekleidet sind — werden nun zuerst hiemit durch den Druck bekannt gemacht. Sie kommen, denke ich, wie vor einigen Jahren die zweite Auflage der "Fragmente aus dem Orient", gleichsam a tempo¹. Oder schaut nicht alle Welt gegen-

¹ Fragmente aus dem Orient von Dr. Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer. Zweite mit einem Anhang vermehrte Auflage. Durchgesehen und eingeleitet von Dr. Georg Martin Thomas. Stuttgart 1877.

wärtig hin nach dem Lande der Pyramiden? "Aegypten in seiner Vergangenheit und in seiner Gegenwart ist ein noch ungelöstes Räthsel, und wie das Land am Nil einst die Gigantomachie der alten Götter getragen hat, so soll es auch heute, wie es scheint, die Walstatt liefern, auf welcher die neuen Erdengötter den lang verschobenen und doch unvermeidlichen Kampf um Sein und Geltung auszufechten haben. So wollen es die Erinnyen und ihr Diener Palmerston" — schien diese Voraussagung Fallmerayers von 1851¹ nicht nahezu in der Zeit erfüllt?

Wenn die Töchter der Nacht, die hehren schwer versöhnbaren

*σεμναὶ
καὶ δυσπαρήγοροι βροτοῖς —*

den ehernen Schritt nochmals gehemmt, wenn die drohenden Geschicke sich wiederum gewendet, sich gemildert haben, welcher Geist hat dieses vermocht? welcher Macht dankt der Welttheil offenkundig die Dauer seines Friedens?

Wie im Jahre 1876, so 1882: der klaren, klugen und ehrlichen, der entschlossenen und zuverlässigen Politik des Deutschen Reiches, dem Ernst, dem Ansehen, der Wachsamkeit seines vorschauenden, alles bemessenden, alles überlegenden Kanzlers. Von lauterer Liebe zum Vaterland durchglüht, und emporgehoben über den unselig getrübten Luftkreis unseres parlamentarischen Treibens — lassen es doch die immer mehr zerklüfteten Parteien, in eigensinniger Selbstsucht und unverzeihlicher Verkennung der geschichtlichen Grundlagen des neuen Reiches, sich wahrhaft sauer werden, um jenes alte Reichstags-Dictum frisch in Schwang zu bringen "semper conveniunt Germani et nunquam con-

¹ Vgl. Gesammelte Werke, herausgegeben von G. M. Thomas. Leipzig 1861. I. Band. Neue Fragmente aus dem Orient. Seite 41.

veniunt" — unerschütterlich in der Seele und gleich Heinrich Dandolo jegliches Hinderniss überwindend, trägt der Deutsche Kanzler neben der Würde, der Hoheit, dem Heile von Kaiser und Reich nichts inniger am Herzen, verfolgt nichts standhafter im Sinne als den gemeinsamen Frieden Europa's. Hat derselbe doch schon lange, lange — dieses bezeugen zu allgemeinem Erstaunen die neuesten Veröffentlichungen aus seiner staatsmännischen Thätigkeit in Frankfurt am Main — neben seiner Herzenssache, der guten Zukunft des allein durch Preussens freie Kraft und stolze Führung aufzurichtenden, in wirklich nationalem Bund zu einigenden Vaterlands, die Blicke scharf auch nach dem Morgenland gerichtet, tief eingesenkt in die grösste erschütterungsschwangere Angelegenheit des Jahrhunderts, in die Orientalische Frage.

Wer vermag, vielmehr wer erdreistet sich gleichsam in Zahlen auszudrücken, welche Summa von allen denkbaren Erdengütern die vom Himmel gekrönte Friedenspolitik des Deutschen Reiches unserem Vaterland und Europa und der ganzen Welt erhalten, gemehret und gewonnen hat? —

Wenn, um auf den früheren Gedankengang zurückzukommen, im Jahre 1841 der ernste Tahir Pascha summarisch den Rath gab: "das eigentliche Anadoli von der Nazarener Pest gänzlich zu säubern und künftig allen Christen bei Todesstrafe den Aufenthalt in diesem irdischen Paradies der Gläubigen zu untersagen" — dröhnt dieses grausame Recept wider alle Christianer nicht auch jetzo herüber aus dem Stammlande des Propheten? Und hat nicht der Deutsche Kanzler auch eben darauf hin seine Weisungen gerichtet? seine Rathschläge ertheilt? Die Mission des Islam, man kann es nicht oft genug wiederholen, ist noch nicht vollendet.

¹ s. Fallmerayer, Gesammelte Werke I, 395.

“Der Islam ist weder todt noch sterbend, noch auch unerrettbarem Verfall entgegeneilend, wie man in Europa gern glauben möchte. Der Islam hat noch frische Kraft, und Afrika ist das Feld, auf dem sich Blüthentrieb und Glaubensmuth der Einheitsbekenner erproben, stärken und entfalten kann. Alle Sorge und alles Streben von Seiten der Christenheit, den Islam abzuschwächen und aufzusaugen, wird und muss in der Hauptsache vergeblich sein.”¹

Wie die Menschen ihrer Natur nach Menschen bleiben, so wiederholt sich auch *κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπιον* das Gleiche oder Aehnliche in der Geschichte, aber nirgends so sehr und, so zu sagen, typisch-starr, wie im Orient. Sein Wesen ist das stetige, stabile, beharrliche, in Jahrtausenden unveränderliche. Eben desswegen wird diese Zusammenstellung orientalischer Acta von Jochmus für diejenigen, welche aus dem Gestern das Heute verstehen wollen, von entschiedenem Werthe sein. Ganz vorzüglich erscheint mir die vertrauliche Correspondenz von Jochmus mit Lord Ponsonby; das war ein echter englischer Staatsmann und des hohen Postens, welchen er einnahm, vollkommen würdig. Seine Briefe sind klar, scharf, freimüthig, seine politischen Maximen aus der Kenntniss der Dinge abgezogen und desshalb noch heute von gleicher Gültigkeit.

Neben der drastischen “byzantinischen Correspondenz”, mit welcher damals — in den Jahren 1839, 1840, 1841 — Fallmerayer vom Bosphorus her prächtig und staatsmässig in der “Augsburger Allgemeinen Zeitung” hervortrat — (diese eminenten Briefe aus Constantinopel wurden wohl in jener Zeit vom “verzagten” Occident gar wenig beachtet oder verstanden, fanden übrigens auch nicht alle oder manchmal nur censurgemäss zugeschnitten am besagten Orte Aufnahme; einige davon hat der Fragmentist

¹ s. Fallmerayer, Gesammelte Werke I, 51.

eben unter obiger Bezeichnung "byzantinische Correspondenz" dem ersten Band seiner "Gesammelten Werke" eingereiht, wo sie unverkürzt zu lesen sind; zur Sache gehören noch die unter "Aegypten und Syrien" daselbst S. 37—95 gestellten Aufsätze, namentlich jener gewaltige "Gross-Kairo und die Mission des Islam") — also neben Fallmerayer und neben Moltke's berühmten Aufzeichnungen wird diese Sammlung von Papieren, wie sie Jochmus in den ersten Theilen geordnet hat, stets eine nie zu übersehende Quelle historischer Wahrheit sein: es bleibt dieselbe zugleich ein wirkliches Denkmal, welches sich der Mann hat selber setzen können, als Zeugniß eines starken und unternehmenden Geistes, hochachtbarer Gesinnung und manneswerther Wirksamkeit.

München. November 1882.

GEORG MARTIN THOMAS.



PREFACE.

PART I.

Diplomatic considerations and regard for eminent men have induced me to delay for many years the publication of the following notes and documents.

Their production is now deemed proper in general from political reasons, especially since death has taken from this world many of the acting statesmen and commanders, such as Lord Ponsonby, Admiral Stopford, the Austrian Admiral Bandiera, General Michell, the Spanish Envoy Don Antonio Lopez de Cordoba, and the Turkish dignitaries Chosrew Pasha and Izzet Mehemet Pasha, late Grand Visirs; Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt; Ibrahim Pasha and Achmed Zacharias Pasha, both Commanders-in-Chief.

Most of the documents remain in their original language and redaction, the Turkish and Arabic papers are translated or abbreviated by my Dragomans and Secretaries.

Correction of language and orthography would often have diminished the value of the documents in the eyes of the historian, of the learned, and of the statesman or soldier, whilst the general public will scarcely understand or feel a deep interest in these negotiations and proceedings.

The present work is divided into two parts, somewhat in imitation of the "English Blue-Books."

The *first* volume contains the Syrian war of 1840-1841.

The secret Memorandum dated 26 March 1846 — written for Lord Ponsonby, late British Ambassador at Vienna — de-

scribes that campaign, referring to the additional documents — official or secret.

The *second* volume furnishes historical materials to the description of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, especially in Europe.

The secret Memorandum dated 14 February 1850, drawn up by me when I was Germanic Minister of Foreign Affairs (under the Archduke John of Austria) and subsequently transmitted to the late Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, Prime Minister of Austria, represents, together with the Preface to the *second* volume of these Memoirs, a succinct abstract of the historical events and of the fundamental causes — which explain the interior and exterior decline of Turkey — especially since 1840.

The confidential letters and authentic documents¹ prepare the reader for the great crisis of 1853.

The present work is incomplete from its very nature, it furnishes only materials for a future historian.

May it contribute to a correct judgment and an impartial consideration of the interest and position of Germany and Austria — *viribus unitis* — in the present time, when a process of decomposition and of new formations occurs in the Levant.

Frankfort o. Main, end of November 1855.

A. JOCHIMUS.

¹ The publication of these papers was postponed from 1855 to the present time, 1866, and a great many have been eliminated, others much curtailed.

SECRET MEMORANDUM
ON THE
S Y R I A N W A R

1840—1841

DRAWN UP FOR

VISCOUNT PONSONBY

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT CONSTANTINOPLE
AND VIENNA

BY

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS.



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD
PONSONBY.

SECRET MEMORANDUM ON THE SYRIAN WAR OF 1840—1841.

Constantinople 26 March 1846.

It is now a remarkable historical fact and as such a proper matter of comment and of enquiry, that and how, a disciplined army of 85,000 men, under a leader of established renown, in the entire possession of an extensive country, rich in resources, should have been totally ruined and dispersed, by the nearly exclusively strategical combinations of an enemy very inferior in numbers and means.

For the forces opposed to this great army, which was constrained in the short space of five months, to evacuate all its conquests of many previous years, consisted in the first instance only of 3000 troops of disembarkation and ultimately amounted to no more than 33,000 men, supported, in truth, *generally*, yet not *permanently* by a powerful naval armament, which could only, however, operate on a coast without harbours, and in a season which rendered the mere cruising and stationing of that fleet in those waters, an operation of considerable danger to its heavy ships.

Those, who from experience are acquainted with the difficulties commonly inherent to all operations of combined sea and land forces, even if those forces belong to a single nation, will regard the complete and speedy success obtained by the Allies in Syria, during the memorable year of 1840/41 as well deserving a considerate exposition, the more so as the complications of that rapid campaign were certainly not diminished

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by the circumstance that the naval and military forces, engaged in those operations, acted under the banners of several powerful empires, and under the orders of Commanders of various nations and creeds.

It is beyond the limits of a military Memorandum to expound the general political situation of Europe at the time of the signature of the celebrated treaty of 15 July 1840.

Yet it is necessary to advert to the strange fact that, in our days, the four most powerful Christian Monarchies Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia should have coalesced in order to reduce to feudal obedience a petty Mohamedan tyrant, the vassal of the Ottoman Empire, and to remark the still stranger circumstance, that many people should have admitted at the time the possibility, that a fifth great European Government — France — in order to protect a Pasha, the subject of the Sublime Porte, or with the view of furthering some *negative* interests of its own, should seriously have meditated a war with the other four powers, several of whom *singly* are the equals or the superiors of France in military and naval resources.

Still the imaginary contingency of a conflict with the French fleet in the Mediterranean, was nearly influencing the active operations of the Allies on the Syrian coast, for this prevision, which heightened the natural irresolution of the aged Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, caused wavering and fluctuations in the early enterprises of the campaign, frequent countermandates to given orders and thereby serious misunderstandings amongst the principal Chiefs of the whole expedition.

But the clear practical sight of Lord Palmerston and his foreign colleagues united in London had never been obstructed by the vision of imaginary danger, or if the occurrence of a collision with France had been seriously contemplated, preparatory dispositions had been made of a magnitude far beyond the extent of the opposition to be apprehended, for Russian fleets in the Black Sea and in the Baltic and a fine army at Sebastopol were ready for immediate action and cooperation with the naval squadrons of England.

The British Ambassador at Constantinople could say with entire security :

"I wholly disbelieve in war In fact France "has not more than 230,000 men of *disposable* troops, while "there are ready, within a short distance of the Rhine "500,000 Prussian and German Confederation troops . . . " . . . and money also ready to defray the expense. "Austria and Russia and others are in the rear."

The instructions therefore given by Lord Palmerston to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, who by common consent of the Allies, had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the united sea- and land forces, were precise and uncompromising.

The expulsion of Ibrahim Pasha from Syria and the complete submission of Mehemet Ali Pasha to his lawful sovereign, in conformity with the stipulations of the treaty of July, were the *sine qua non* conditions of a pacification of the Levant.

Under Sir Robert Stopford were designated to act Commodore Napier, second in command of the British fleet, Rear Admirals Bandiera and Walker with the Austrian and Turkish squadrons, General Sir Charles Smith, by Admiral Stopford's delegated authority to direct the operations by land, General Selim Pasha to command the Ottoman troops of debarkation and General Jochmus to act as Chief of the Staff.

At Constantinople especially Lord Ponsonby in common with his colleagues of Austria, Prussia, and Russia had insisted on the necessity of absolute unity of Command in the Syrian expedition.

Although considering Admiral Stopford as little qualified for an arduous task, the British Ambassador had maintained the principle against the person, and Izzet Mehmet Pasha (late Grand Visir) a man, not deficient in great qualities, but of uncontrollable passions and strong prejudices, had been instructed, as newly appointed Governor General and Serasker of Syria, to act in strict conformity with these views.

The material means of the Allies for a war by *land*, exclusively of the great Russian reserve at Sebastopol, were certainly very limited.

¹ Lord Ponsonby to General Jochmus, 17 December 1840. Confidential Dispatch; vide No. 90.

They consisted in the beginning of 20,000 Ottoman troops, dispirited by the events of 1839: — the battle of Nizib and the treason of Ahmed Fevzi, the late Capudan Pasha; but even of that force 15,000 men were destined to remain in the first instance to cover Constantinople, and eventually to co-operate for that purpose with the Russian troops, in case Ibrahim Pasha should seriously menace the Capital from his positions in Mount Taurus.

To this effect the Russian Colonel — now General — Baron L'even, had made some necessary reconnaissances, and Lord Ponsonby had instructed General Jochmus on his departure for Syria, to return to Constantinople with the utmost possible speed, if he should learn with certainty that Ibrahim Pasha had actually undertaken an expedition against the Capital.¹ —

“I have no belief” — adds his Lordship — “in the probability of such an attempt, I do not believe it could be carried into effect, but I think it right to take precautions.”

The actual number of Ottoman troops of debarkation for Syria could thus only be of 5000 men, and to this force might be added eventually, for temporary operations on the coast, detachments of English and Austrian marines numbering about 1800 men.

Small as was this amount of land forces, when compared to the Egyptian army in Syria, there existed every chance that — supported by the powerful naval armaments, it could obtain advantages on the coast, and it was calculated that, if the reputation of Ibrahim Pasha for constant success against the Turks were once weakened or destroyed, and he himself obliged to act defensively in Syria, the 15000 men covering Constantinople would become disposable as reinforcements for the Allies in Syria.

The moral force also of the whole expedition would then be very great and throw a decisive weight into the balance of events.

¹ Conversation of Lord Ponsonby with General Jochmus 1. September 1840.

"It is impossible for the present" — said Lord Ponsonby¹ — to obtain good information as to the exact amount of force at the disposal of Ibrahim Pasha; people both at Constantinople and in Alexandria will tell falsehoods for their own purposes, but I do not care to ascertain the precise numbers of his soldiers. — I stand upon broader ground and more important facts. — I know that the Egyptian army in Syria is composed one third of native Syrians, who eighter won't fight at all, or who will fight for us. — I know that all the troops are eighteen months in arrears of pay, and I conclude thence that they are much dissatisfied. General Chranowsky, who has been closely watching Ibrahim Pasha's operations these last two years, tells me, and I have full confidence in his judgment, that both Ibrahim and Soliman Pashas are only third rate Generals, whose reputation has been made up by the french newspapers."

"I hear also that the latter (Soliman) is ready to sell himself, but I question if it is worth while buying him."

"I further know that the Sultan's name is still a tower of strength, and that Ibrahim's abominable system of oppression has been such that, although the Syrian Christians are ready to join us in arms, yet the Mussulmans will not support Ibrahim. On the contrary, Damascus is disposed to declare for its legitimate Sovereign."

"With such means of moral strenght at our disposal" — added his Lordship — "we must strike at once rapidly and well, and we are then sure to obtain great success by arms, and to show the frailty of Mehemet Ali's power in Syria and in Egypt. The whole tottering fabric of what is ridiculously called the Arab Nationality will tumble to pieces."

"True, I have no great confidence in our Admiral, he is too old and moreover he has no head, but orders and the force of circumstances will oblige him to act."

"The great thing — urged the Ambassador — "is to avoid jealousies and squabbles, our principal object must be unity of Command."

¹ Conversation of Lord Ponsonby with General Jochmus 1 September 1840.

The judgement of General Chranowsky on the military qualifications of Ibrahim and Soliman Pashas was soon verified.

The Egyptian army in Syria at the outbreak of the war was 85,000 men strong, whereof 75,000 effectives viz. 65,000 regulars and 10,000 irregulars.

Of this force, according to the Emir Beshir's statements¹ about 35,000 men were in northern Syria and in Mesopotamia, 24,000 in the Lebanon, and the rest distributed in various districts and garrisons.

On the other side the Allied Fleet protected on the 10 September at Djounie north of Beyrout (on the spot, where are the monuments of Sesostris²) the landing of the Allied troops, consisting of 5000 Ottomans with 12 fieldpieces, supported by 1500 British and 200 Austrians.

These forces were allowed to establish themselves without resistance on shore, in a strong mountain position, notwithstanding the presence in their immediate front of 14,700 men with 20 fieldpieces, commanded by Ibrahim and Soliman Pashas in person, and forming part of the Egyptian corps of the Lebanon, amounting to 24,000 men, disposed in a semicircle round Beyrout from Saïda to Merouba and Djebel.

On the 19 September already General Jochmus, keeping in view these facts and dispositions, could write to Lord Ponsonby³ (after enumerating the distribution in Syria proper of about 70,000 Egyptians):

"For the present Ibrahim Pasha cannot think of moving
"on towards Asia Minor and Constantinople, and this march
"will become the less possible, as the season advances, when
"the Taurus will be covered with snow. The troops of the
"Sultan which hitherto covered Constantinople against such
"a movement, become therefore disposable, and ought to
"reinforce us here."

"There is no possibility of conquering Syria with 5000
"Turks."

¹ The Austrian Consul General Laurin to Baron Stürmer, 16 October 1840. Levant Papers III, p. 43.

² Recent discoveries make it nearly certain that these monuments are of Assyrian and not of Egyptian origin.

³ vide No. 9.

The Ottoman Government without loss of time made arrangements for the transport of these reinforcements, and dispatched them by sea in successive detachments.

Events in Syria soon took a more decisive turn.

Before the middle of October the whole coast of Syria, north of Acre up to Latakia, was in the possession of the Allies, or of the insurged mountaineers.

Of the 24,000 men lately opposed to the allied camp at Djounie, there had fled only 4000 discomfited troops to Zachlé on the 12 October, and with them was Ibrahim Pasha in person.

20 fieldpieces, besides the guns and ammunition stores at Saïda and Beyrout, had been taken; 9500 men were prisoners or deserters to the Sultan's standards, 1500 Egyptians were killed, and wounded, chiefly in detail by the exasperated peasantry, and the rest of the 24,000 men, composed of Syrians and Druses, had dispersed to their homes.

Moreover, the old Emir Beshir of the Lebanon, after an attempt at treacherous negotiation with Mr. Wood, the special Agent in Syria of England and of the Porte, had constituted himself a prisoner on board of an English man-of-war, and his nephew the Emir Beshir Cassim had been invested with the Government of the Lebanon, by virtue of an Imperial Firman, till then in the secret keeping of Mr. Wood.

The inimical party of the Druses in the Lebanon was now crushed and even a few of them, animated by rancour and family feuds, had joined the standard of the new Prince, who had collected and organized a body of 2500 Christian Maronites, whilst about 22,000 British and Turkish muskets had been distributed for national defence to the mountaineers between Tyre, Saïda, and Tripolis.

Able negotiations with the mountain tribes, the brilliant exploit at Saïda, under Commodore Napier, gallantly supported by Admiral Walker and His Imperial Highness the Archduke Frederik of Austria, together with a succession of safe, well concerted, and rapid operations of the land forces, then augmented to 6500 Turks and 1660 British and Austrian Marines, supported by 2500 Maronites, had accomplished — in the short term of one month — the utter discomfiture of the Egyptian forces in a large, and the most important section of Syria.

XXXIV

Ibrahim Pasha, instead of securing his moral and material hold on the Lebanon, and thereby on Syria, by driving the enemy under the guns of their ships, after having crowned the heights of Mar Elias (which commanded completely in the inland portion of the enemy's position) with 15,000 men and 20 field pieces, had acted most unskilfully.

He tried to cover every vulnerable point of a menaced mountain territory by dividing his forces into six or seven isolated bodies of troops, and was therefore by his own fault' inferior in number in every single action; for his adversaries had taken up an entrenched *central* position, and as they commanded moreover the passage of the Kilb River, they could and did choose their time and place for each engagement.

The most correct local information, the sympathies of the country, and unsurpassed means of steam transport on the coast facilitated to the Allies a series of advantageous combats which — though in European warfare they would scarcely deserve the denomination of actions, yet produced results of great and permanent importance.

The severest of these blows fell on Ibrahim Pasha's power and reputation on the 10 October at Calat Meidan.

These heights, at a few hundred yards south-south west from Bekfaya, had been occupied ever since the 4 October by a force of about 1500 men under Hassan Bey and Emir Mas-soud², who had a skirmish with the allied troops under General Jochmus at day break on the 9.

Ibrahim Pasha, now intent on correcting his mistakes, tried to concentrate superior forces at Calat Meidan, but on the 10 October he was frustrated in this attempt by an unexpected combined attack in his rear and flanks, made by all the disposable Ottoman forces (nine battalions), commanded by Commodore Napier.

Ibrahim's troops dispersed or were made prisoners, he himself was nearly taken in person by Selim Pasha³, and the panic

¹ General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby, 7 and 12 October 1840. *Levant Papers* III, p. 11.

² General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby, 7 October 1840; vide No. 15.

³ Sir R. Stopford to the same. *Levant Papers* III, p. 14.

extended to the camp of Soliman Pasha, five hours from Calat Meidan, between Jamuhr and Beyrout.

This Pasha fled in the night from his camp with a few hundred horsemen, abandoning ignominiously four battalions without orders, and leaving them and their 20 field pieces to the capture of the enemy.

Great as were the enumerated advantages, and inconsiderable as had been proportionally the losses of the allied army, serious injuries had arisen in the coalesced camp from those very achievements.

Although the principle of unity in Command had been maintained in outward appearance, a scission had taken place between Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Charles Smith on the one side, and Commodore Napier and General Jochmus on the other.

The former two, in complete opposition to the judgment of the latter officers, had not only considered the means at the disposal of the Allies ever since the debarkation as entirely inadequate to the projected enterprise, but they were of opinion that the Syrian expedition was to return temporarily to Cyprus, in order to improve, by constant drill, the military instruction of the Ottoman troops, and to await a better season for the ships. Not only preparatory orders to this effect had already been given by the Admiral, but even, after the capture of Saïda, Sir Robert had declared to the Governor General of Syria that the fleet and the British Marines were soon to quit entirely the coast, whereupon Izzet Mehmed Pasha had protested that he alone could and would not stand a siege in Saïda.¹

Not only was the Admiral continually wavering and undecided,² but it was not without great and repeated efforts that Commodore Napier (who exercised during a temporary absence of Sir Charles Smith the delegated Command of the allied forces on shore) had obtained the appointment of General Jochmus to be Chief of the Staff, as a condition sine qua non, and with it the permission to operate offensively.

¹ Secret dispatch. General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby, 12 October 1840; *vide* No. 19.

² Commodore Napier to General Jochmus, 19 September 1840. (Private.)

XXXVI

Not only was it very reluctantly and conditionally that the Admiral gave his consent to the expedition against Saïda, for Commodore Napier said

“Sir Robert has given me the permission to *look* at “Saïda, however, if I *look* at it, I wil! also take it”. but the decisive action of the 10 October had been fought on the Commodore's responsibility, against the positive and written order of the Admiral¹

“You will be beat on shore” — had repeatedly said Sir Robert to General Jochmus — “but that is not my affair, it is yours.”

In the mean time had returned to Beyrout Sir Charles Smith, who — on the plea of conferring with Lord Ponsonby, had been gone to Constantinople in order to restore his impaired health.

After the successful engagements of the 24 September near Ardali, of the 4 October near Merouba, on the same day at Ainetta, on the 10 October at Calat Meidan; after the capture by the fleet of Caiffa, of Tyre, of Saïda, of Djebel, and of Beyrout, he found confidence and great buoyancy of spirits, restored to the camp of Djounie, which only on the 20 September he had left agitated and desponding.

However, the Admiral as well as General Smith soon again gave way to their former preoccupations, and declared all *past* and future operations by land and by sea intempestive or embarrassing² with the present amount of forces.

They prevented Tripolis from being regularly attacked, though it capitulated to the mountaineers alone as early as the 16 October, and Ibrahim Pasha from being driven out of Zachlé, though in the first instance — he had only been able to collect there 6000 discomfited troops and 7 field pieces.

Sir Robert Stopford, at times under the impression that he might still have to fight the French fleet, at other moments strangely extolling in concert with Sir Charles Smith the wisdom and efficiency of Ibrahim Pasha's dispositions³, or believing

¹ Secret dispatch. General Jochmus to Lord Ponsonby, 12 October 1840: vide No. 19.

² Sir C. Smith to Viscount Palmerston, 22 October 1840.

³ The same to the same, 22 October 1840.

him even yet capable of advancing on Constantinople¹, refused equally to support the much discontented Emir Beshir, by safely detaching some Ottoman troops into the Lebanon, and to attack Acre, according to the proposals of Admiral Walker, supported by the weighty information of Admiral Bandiera and of Mr. Laurin, the Austrian Consul General, regarding the utter inefficiency of the Egyptian garrison of that celebrated fortress, consisting of 4000 men.

Sir Robert Stopford always maintained that the fleet could no longer remain with safety on the Syrian coast.

"I regret extremely" — writes Lord Ponsonby — "that I could not get means to forward before yesterday (31 October) to the Admiral his instructions about St. Jean d'Acre. I fear he may have left the coast, to take refuge in Mar-marizza Bay before they reach him."²

Yet at the moment when the Admiral, off Beyrout, had already ordered to embark 2,400 Ottoman troops for a "*northward*" expedition of detail to Latakia, the stringent order arrived, directly from Lord Palmerston, to attack St Jean d'Acre.

In a council of war, held on the 30 October, Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Charles Smith declared on separate grounds against the enterprise, but the majority decided for the attack, amongst them Admirals Bandiera and Walker, Commodore Napier, and His Imperial Highness, the Archduke Frederik.

After the taking of Acre, Admiral Bandiera, alluding to the opposition of General Smith, said: „Eh bien, nous avons pris Acre malgré les règles."

The Ottoman troops ready for embarkation were reinforced to 3000 men under Selim Pasha, and in unison with British and Austrian Marines, this force was destined to assault, under the direction of General Jochmus, eventually the Castle of Acre, whenever the fire of the ships should have rendered practicable a breach.

But the fortress fell in the night preceding the 4 November, after four hours bombardment by the combined fleets of England, Austria, and Turkey; and after the explosion of the prin-

¹ Report to Baron Stürmer, 21 October 1840. Levant Papers III, p. 46.

² Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. Levant Papers III, p. 33.

cipal powder magazine, which destroyed between 900 or 1000 Egyptians.¹

Admiral Walker landed the first troops² that occupied Acre, and the Archduke Frederik in person, on the name's day of his illustrious and heroic father, planted the colours of the Allies on the highest battlement of Acre.³

The British and allied fleets had fought with the greatest gallantry, and had only opened their fire when anchored at 500 yards under the very walls of Acre, but the brilliant exploit had become a new cause of division between Admiral Stopford and his second in command, Commodore Napier, whom he accused of not having obeyed his orders in action.

The fact is that, late at night on the 2 November, the Admiral had assembled the commanding officers of ships and Generals Smith and Jochmus, and there Sir Robert had instructed his officers that the signal for attack was to be given at day light next morning.

During the dead calm expected to be prevalent at that hour, the heavy ships were to be towed successively into position by the steamers of the fleet.

Now Commodore Napier had objected to this order of combat, as uselessly dividing and exposing the forces, and he had suggested a general attack to be made at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when a breeze should have sprung up enabling all ships — great and small — to weigh anchor at once, and to bear down simultaneously upon Acre.

The Admiral, whatever may have been his opinion, did not make the signal for weighing till about midday when the breeze had sprung up, and thus acted according to the Commodore's plan, but the latter again changed an order of detail.

¹ Colonel Schultz (Egyptian Engineers) to Count E. Zichy.

² Before Acre were engaged 8 line-of-battle ships, 5 frigates, 2 corvettes, 1 brig, and 5 war-steamers. The whole British Mediterranean Fleet, however, in 1840/41 consisted of 17 line-of-battle ships, besides frigates, war-steamers &c. &c.

³ Admiral Walker was made a Ferik or Pasha of two tails for his distinguished services. — The Archduke Frederik landed on the very spot and mole where his ancestor Duke Leopold of Austria had so highly distinguished himself by the bold attack of "la Tour des Mouches" during the siege of Acre in 1190 (Crusade).

by leading into action from "the North" instead of going "by South", as prescribed to him by the Admiral.

Hence an altercation arose between the two commanders after the action, and Commodore Napier was on the point of applying for a court martial.

Thus a great victory had become a new source of dissension, and soon afterwards led to Commodore Napier's removal from Syria and to his mission to Alexandria, which — originating in a fortuitous complication arising from the inherent weakness and jealousy of human nature, led unexpectedly to the hasty convention of the 27 November 1840, between Mehemet Ali and Commodore Napier, who had no other instructions, than to blockade Egypt. — Hence the convention was deemed unauthorized in the first instance, was formally rejected in the sequel, but was finally essentially modified and then accepted as the basis of the Egyptian Pasha's submission.

The capture of Acre was beyond the previsions of Ibrahim Pasha and of Mehemet Ali.

"The Consuls (french) have let me 'know' — wrote the former to his father on the 4 Ramazan¹ — "that it is "intended to bombard Acre. To bombard it *perhaps*, but "to capture it at present, *no*."

The news of its fall and of the subsequent immediate insurrection of the Naplousians and of the inhabitants of Palestine, who took possession of Jerusalem and of Jaffa, after massacring part of the garrisons and capturing the rest, had completely confounded Mehemet Ali.²

He feared that all communication would be cut off between his Syrian army and Egypt, and sent or *pretended* to send orders to Ibrahim Pasha, directing him to evacuate Syria, the Egyptians being ready to surrender at discretion to the Sultan³ on the first demonstration of the Turks.

In Syria itself the capture in four hours' time of Acre, considered a first rate fortress since the failure of Buonaparte under

¹ Intercepted letter of Ibrahim Pasha.

² Mr. Laurin to Baron Stürmer, 24 November 1840. Levant Papers III, p. 101.

³ Consul Larking to Sir R. Stopford. Levant Papers III, p. 130.

its walls, added vastly to the renown and to the material strength of the Allies.

In the South, Naplous and the whole of Palestine on both sides of the Jordan, with the Bedoween tribes near Belka, declared for their legitimate Sovereign.

In the North, the evacuation already commenced, ever since the discomfiture of Ibrahim in the Lebanon, by a first concentric movement of the Egyptians on Aleppo, towards the end of October, was now hastened by fresh orders from Ibrahim Pasha.

On the 13 November Ahmed Menikli Pasha abandoned Aleppo with all the forces of Northern Syria, very much weakened by the desertion of most of the native Syrian soldiers, and after an unmolested retreat, he arrived on the 27 November in Damascus, where he joined Ibrahim who a few days before had retired in person from Zachlé.

The whole of Syria with the exception of its capital, still occupied by a numerous inimical army, had recognized the Sultan's authority in the first days of December, but the Egyptian army of 40,000 men and 150 field pieces was still menacing, and under a skilful leader it might yet have had a fair chance of continuing the struggle, at least for the possession of Southern Syria; for at that period the allied land forces — regulars and irregulars — consisted of not more than 20,000 men, with only 12 horsed field pieces — whilst the Admiral with the fleets had gone to a winter station in Marmarizza Bay opposite Rhodes.

At any rate the concentration of so numerous a force in the capital of Syria, was a fact much to be regretted, and Commodore Napier as well as General Jochmus had frequently urged the necessity of preventing this accumulation of forces on a vital point.

If ten thousand men, including 2500 mountaineers — declared these officers — have been able to defeat and disperse 24,000 Egyptians under Ibrahim Pasha in person, till then considered invincible by the Syrians, is it next to certain that 20,000 allied troops and mountaineers, of whom 16,000 men with 30 guns could have been made disposable, would have driven the defeated General from Zachlé.

Yet he was allowed to remain there — in an isolated position — till the end of November with only ten thousand

dispirited troops and 12 field pieces, even this force itself being chiefly the successively collected remains of his vanquished and demoralized corps, which had retreated from the neighbourhood of Beyrout and of Tripolis.

Damascus during this time was under the influence of an orthodox clergy, inimical to Ibrahim whom they considered from his profane habits as an infidel, and the Ulema were devoted to the Sultan whom they revere as their Calif.

Even within the walls of that capital — itself ripe for revolt — the very Egyptian Governor General, Sheriff Pasha, was believed ready to join the Sultan's standard, so much so, that some intercepted letters written to him by General Jochmus caused his arrest, and his detention as a prisoner during the retreat to Egypt; where since he has succeeded in proving his innocence, or in obtaining his pardon.

Had Ibrahim Pasha been once more beaten at Zachlé, Damascus would have taken up arms for the Sultan, the Syrian light troops of that neighbourhood in Ibrahim's pay would have passed over to and fought for the Allies, just as they did to the amount of several thousands at the very moment of the Egyptian retreat on the 29 December, and the chances were all that the army of Ahmed Menikli Pasha coming from Aleppo would have been obliged to capitulate, or to surrender.

There was no dangerous temerity in this plan of operations, on the contrary, it presented every fair chance of success; for Ibrahim Pasha's position in the centre of an insurrectional movement was beset with obstacles, difficulties, and dangers, and he had no staunch and faithful army to depend on.

However Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Charles Smith did not correctly appreciate the resources of mountain warfare on a large scale.

They had taken "ab initio" quite a different view of the question, and remained strictly defensive on the coast; and subdividing their troops into seven isolated corps at Tripolis, Beyrout, Saïda, Tyre, Acre, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, they were more than ever for delay since St. Jean d'Acre had fallen, and trusting, according to the news received from Egypt and Damascus that the Egyptian army would be withdrawn from Syria, they resolved Ibrahim Pasha should retire unmolested.

But "*delay*" and an "unmolested retreat" of the Egyptian forces never suited the policy and the plans of the authorities in Constantinople and in London.

"It is madness" — writes Lord Ponsonby — "to delay "because of the season of the year, it is not to be tolerated, "that Mehemet Ali and the French should be allowed the "time they so earnestly desire to have for the organization "of their force, and the working of their intrigues."

"Take my word for it, that delay will be most severely "criticized at home, and that better reasons must be given "for it to escape censure than the plea of bad weather ". . . . Take care not to lose the laurels you have "won."¹

"I hear Sir Charles Smith was occupied in pursuing "robbers, it is much better to pursue Ibrahim "I think it better to be a conqueror than a police con- "stable."²

Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, though authorizing eventual negotiations, instructed the British Admiral, as late as the 14 November:

"to push on with vigour his operations, for the purpose of "expelling the Egyptians from *the whole of Syria*, and "not to slacken in his exertions till he learned from *Con- "stantinople* that an arrangement had been made with Me- "hemet Ali, based upon his immediate submission to the "Sultan."

During all this conflict of opinions and of orders, great changes in the Syrian commands had been resolved upon in London and in Constantinople.

Commodore Napier in letters to Lord Minto and General Jochnus in communication to Viscount Palmerston and to Lord Ponsonby had exposed their views and plans, regarding the Syrian war, which were in direct opposition to the ideas and opinions of Admiral Stopford and of Sir C. Smith.

But facts and events had already borne out and verified the provisions of the first named officers: the retreat of the

¹ Lord Ponsonby to General Jochnus, 22 October 1840. vide No. 29.

² The same to the same, 11 December 1840. vide No. 89, p. 90.

XLIII

Egyptian army from the Taurus, instead of its advance on Constantinople; the destruction of Ibrahim's forces in the Lebanon, instead of the return to Cyprus of the allied troops; the capture finally of Acre, instead of the failure of that attack.

In a Memorandum read to Commodore Napier, and transmitted on the 12 October to Viscount Palmerston and to Lord Ponsonby, General Jochmus had described the operations in Syria up to the action of Calat Meidan, their probable consequences, the nature of the warfare, and the general outlines of a future plan of campaign, proposed by him. The General demanded that the regular Ottoman troops in Syria should be reinforced up to the number of 20,000 men, that another corps of about 10,000 men, or as strong as conveniently possible, should advance in a single body from Asia Minor towards the North of Syria, there to be placed at the disposal of the Syrian Commander-in-chief; that further the mountaineers of Syria should be made to co-operate efficiently with the main army, and the system of the war by land should be a mountain warfare on a large scale, supported by operations on the coast.

Above all, according to the aforesaid Memorandum, a general action in the plains was to be avoided, for there the efficiency and superiority of Ibrahim Pasha's Cavalry and Artillery would at any time have secured to him a second victory of Nizib.

At these conditions, General Jochmus believed that he could safely guarantee the end of the war "*early next spring*",¹ but he demanded the co-operation on the coast of Commodore Napier, whose high qualities as a naval and military Commander had conspicuously shone forth in the late Portuguese war by sea and land.

The General also recommended for various reasons the recall of Sir Charles Smith²

The proud spirit of Izzet Mehmed Pasha could not brook the idea of a somewhat dependent situation as far, at least, as it regarded the conduct of the war.

Notwithstanding the conciliatory efforts of Mr. Wood and others, continual differences arose between Sir C. Smith and

¹ Confidential Memorandum, 12 October 1840.

² Secret dispatch to Viscount Ponsonby, 23 October 1840; vide No. 26.

the Serasker, backed by the subordinate Pashas, and moreover violent scenes had taken place between Izzet Mehmed Pasha and Commodore Napier, who did not intend being thwarted in his operations.

General Jochmus as well as Mr. Wood saw also that, on account of Izzet Mehmed Pasha's administration, discontent had already arisen amongst the Syrian tribes, and especially amongst the christian mountaineers, and that it was continually and rapidly encreasing.

From unequivocal symptoms they perceived serious danger, on various grounds, to the Sultan's cause, and they made therefore early and pressing representations on the subject at Constantinople.

Their general views of Syrian affairs were borne out by the Consuls General of the Four Powers, then at Beyrout, on their return from Alexandria to Constantinople.

Under these circumstances the Ambassador of Great Britain, supported by his colleagues and especially by the Austrian Internuncio, had recommended and obtained the recall of Izzet Mehmed Pasha, and at the same time Lord Ponsonby, duly instructed by Lord Palmerston, had taken measures, in concert with the Sublime Porte, to supersede in Syria General Sir Charles Smith by General Jochmus.¹

The latter's authority was even considerably more extended for all practical purposes, than that of his predecessor, for Sir Charles, though armed with a special Imperial Firman, held no actual rank in the Turkish army, and exercised on shore only the delegated authority of the Admiral Commander-in-chief, whereas General Jochmus had been promoted to the rank of Ferik (Pasha of two tails) in the Ottoman armies.

"You must remember" — says Lord Ponsonby to General Jochmus in a confidential dispatch of the 11 December — "that you are in the service of the Sultan, and "that you are *not* to sacrifice your views of his interest to "the military opinion of General Michell or any other "General or Admiral."²

¹ Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston, 18 November 1840. Levant Papers III, p. 65. cfr. No. 49.

² vide No. 89, p. 90.

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General Michell had been appointed to the special command of the British troops in Syria.

A man of high and deserved reputation he had brought out with him for the general purposes of the war a number of excellent Staff Officers, both of the British army and of the late Anglo-Spanish legion, many of whom had already served with or under General Jochmus during the late war in Spain.

All this changes had been confidentially communicated to Admiral Stopford and to General Jochmus¹ at Beyrout, but the former took upon himself to order the Turkish authorities under pain of his leaving the coast with the fleet,² that the Imperial Firman, appointing General Jochmus, should be kept secret pro tempore.

Having done this with a view of maintaining Sir Charles Smith, or perhaps of preventing of what he deemed "perilous military enterprises", he rejected with a singular inconsistency the convention of Commodore Napier, made on the 27 November, which was tantamount to a suspension of hostilities, and then quitted the Syrian coasts for Marmarizza Bay in Asia Minor, where he laid up the fleets for the winter.

A steamer, however, purposely dispatched from London with General Michell on board, and another steamer from Constantinople brought to the Head-Quarters at Beyrout fresh and peremptory orders to carry into execution the new arrangements.

Sir Charles Smith was directed forthwith to quit, and he left Beyrout on the 15 December, without however communicating to General Jochmus any orders or instructions from the Admiral commanding in chief, and thus singularly embarrassing his successor, for Izzet Mehmed, not yet knowing that he himself was on the eve of being recalled also on the plea of ill health³, pretended to direct the war in person, after Sir Charles Smith's departure.

¹ Lord Ponsonby to General Jochmus, 15 November 1840; vide No. 43.

² General Jochmus to Lord Palmerston. Secret Memorandum, 12 May 1841, cfr. No. 136.

³ Secret dispatch. Lord Ponsonby to General Jochmus, 15 November 1840. vide No. 43.

It required a marked degree of firmness, on the part of the new General, his menace to embark for Constantinople, and the persuasive efforts of Mr. Wood, to convince of his error Izzet Pasha, who received his orders of recall only on the 24 December.

In his lieu was appointed Serasker and Governor General of Syria Ahmed Zacharias Pasha, a valiant, good, but illiterate soldier, who was still in the North of Syria, with the troops come from Asia Minor.

He arrived to late on the theatre of the great operations to take any share in the active command, but his high rank was always duly and respectfully acknowledged by all.

He was addressed as General in chief of the two armies in *Northern* and *Southern* Syria, whilst General Jochmus acted as commanding the army of *operations*.

Selim and Hassan Pashas, Lieutenant Generals, the senior officers at the head of the two Infantry divisions of the army of operations, notwithstanding the habitual *mussulman* intolerance of the East, commanded readily under a *christian* General, and in the memorable Syrian campaign there is not since this time a single instance on record of disobedience on the part of the Turks, or even of slackness or of the slightest delay in the execution of orders.

In the mean time had been received at the Imperial Headquarters of Beyrout, on the 14 December, the official news that the Sublime Porte, in unison with the representatives of the Quadruple Alliance, had rejected 'ab initio' the convention of the 27 November between Mehemet Ali and Commodore Napier.¹

"I admire and like Napier" - - said at that time Lord Ponsonby - "and I am sorry for all this affair, but the "absurdity of his propositions is obvious when they are "considered with regard to the settlement of the eastern "question, and as means intended by him to *thwart* the "French."

"Why what Napier proposed to do and tried to do, "is exactly that the French would fall on their knees and "worship him for obtaining.

¹ Commodore Napier to Lord Ponsonby, 14 December 1840, and to Lord Palmerston, 26 November 1840. Levant Papers III, p. 71.

“Their object always has been, to maintain Mehemet Ali in Syria if possible, if not, in Egypt; and how could he be now maintained so well as by sending back his army safe and sound?”¹

The subsequent speeches made by Mr. Guizot and by Mr. Thiers at the opening of the French chambers in 1841, fully justify the early previsions of the British Ambassador, for not only did Mr. Guizot recommend submission to Mehemet Ali, on the conditions laid down in the protocol of the 14 November 1840, but those speeches prove also that France would unquestionably have tried — though probably in vain² — to obtain for Mehemet Ali better conditions, than even the hereditary tenure of Egypt, if his army had not been utterly defeated and “ruined” in Syria.

It is known that the convention of Alexandria gave rise to a long and difficult negotiation, which led to a thorough modification of its most essential stipulations, for in its first shape, the convention promised to Mehemet Ali, as a *concession*, the simple hereditary tenure of Egypt, *guaranteed* by the Four European Powers, whereas the Porte demanded and obtained the complete *surrender* of Mehemet Ali, and then only could and did grant him as an act of sovereign authority and grace, the hereditary government of Egypt, in his quality of a subject Pasha, revocable on the infringement of certain conditions.

Moreover, the Allied Powers refused any guarantee whatever, as incompatible with the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

Hereditary vassalage is not a new principle in the Ottoman Administration.

Hammer gives a long list of ancient hereditary dynasties in Asia Minor, subject to the Porte; the Pashas of Bagdad and of Trebisonde were at times hereditary vassals, and the Pashas of Tunis, of Tripolis, and of Scutary in Albania have been so for many centuries.³

¹ Lord Ponsonby to General Jochmus, 11 December. Confidential; cfr. No. 89.

² Lord Palmerston to Mr. Bloomfield, 26 November 1840. Levant Papers Vol. III, p. 35.

³ In the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire the great families of the Mikalogli, Ewrenos and Timurtash held hereditarily the highest military commands

Historical precedents in favour of Mehemet Ali might therefore have been invoked, and the principle of *conditional* heredity was considered as admissible by the Allied Powers, yet the Porte was disinclined, after the open rebellion of the Pasha, to grant him either hereditary tenure, or even to reinstall him as simple Governor of Egypt "pro tempore." Reshid Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that it was necessary to annihilate Mehemet Ali,¹ and some of the most influential foreign representatives at Constantinople hoped to see his power ruined "de fond en comble."²

At any rate, the orders to continue hostilities in Syria were rigorous and stringent. The instructions of the Grand Visir to the Serasker and to General Jochmus, those of the Porte to Mr. Wood and to Mazloun Bey, the Sultan's Commissioner extraordinary "en route" for Egypt, neither admitted of leniency nor of half measures.

Moreover, Hussein Pasha, the President of the great Council of War at Constantinople, had been dispatched to the Syrian Head-Quarters with a secret mission to come to an understanding with General Jochmus, on no less an object than an eventual expedition into Egypt itself.³

Lord Ponsonby finally wrote on the 8 December to General Jochmus:

"I write to put you on your guard against permitting
"a man of Ibrahim's army to embark for Egypt; no matter
"what orders the Admiral or any body else may give to
"that effect. You must disobey them and refuse to permit
"them to be carried into effect. Depend upon me."

" The Porte has declared the convention
"null and void 'ab initio', and the representatives of the

of the army, and even the dignity of Grand Visir was hereditary in the family of Khalil Tshendéréli (the founder of the Janizaries) created Grand Visir in 1371.— His family remained in hereditary possession of that office up to the capture of Constantinople 1453 (vide Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* I, p. 91, 567).

¹ Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston, 15 December 1840. *Levant Papers* III, p. 134.

² Baron Stürmer to Viscount Ponsonby, 7 January 1841. *Levant Papers* Vol. III p. 184.

³ General Jochmus to Hussein Pasha, secret dispatch, 22 Zilhidge 1256 (14 February 1841).

"Four Powers concur with the Sublime Porte"
 "You will push on hostilities as well as your means and
 "your *prudence* will admit. I have written to the Naval
 "people to desire they will seize upon any of Ibrahim's
 "troops, that may *have been already* embarked, and to have
 "them reconducted to such places *in Syria*, as they may
 "have come from."¹

And again on the 11 December:

"The Admiral Sir Robert Stopford takes especial care
 "that I shall have no means of communication with Syria.
 "He will never forgive me for having proved him to be
 "a fool, and hindered him from losing Syria, and ruining
 "the English Government by the total failure, through his
 "means, of all that enterprise which has now been crowned
 "with success, by the skill and valour of yourself and of
 "your comrades."²

At last the Ambassador opines on the 17 December:

"I am full of apprehension lest it should turn out that
 "Ibrahim has escaped with a large part of his army, which
 "will be a most serious calamity"³

Unacquainted with the above facts and orders, Commodore Napier has maintained, at a later period, in the House of Commons (11 February 1842), that General Jochmus had destroyed *uselessly* 20,000 to 30,000 Egyptians *after* Mehemet Ali had submitted.

The loss of *dead* is here unwarrantably exaggerated, and it is equally erroneous that useless losses should have been inflicted on Mehemet Ali's forces *after* his surrender, for the original convention of the 27 November was rejected both by Admiral Stopford at Beyrout, and by all parties in Constantinople, and therefore it did not exist legally for either of the belligerents in Syria, until the *modified* arrangements were ultimately made known at the Imperial Head-Quarters on the 17 January 1841.

¹ vide No. 48.

² vide No. 89.

³ vide No. 90.

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By this date, however, Ibrahim Pasha had already lost in the Desert one half of his retiring army, in a great measure from desertion, partly also by capture and by death.¹

Hence the convention of Alexandria has had no *immediate* influence on the march of military events in Syria, since General Jochmus had assumed his command and the direction of the war, except in so far, as it made Ibrahim Pasha irresolute as to the nature and line of his operations.

As early as the 2 December² and again as late as the 27 December³ Ibrahim Pasha, informed by the French Consular Agents on the Syrian coast of the progress, but not of the final conclusion of the negotiations with Mehemet Ali, was decidedly inclined to maintain himself as long as possible in Damascus, at all other times, ever since his return to that capital, he had made active preparations for a retreat by the Bridge of Madjuma on the Jordan, through Palestine on Gaza.⁴

The Mufti of Jerusalem and other Ulemas, then at Damascus, had procured for the Allies minute details regarding this projected line of retreat; and an intercepted correspondence, relating to bribes offered by Ibrahim Pasha to some of the principal Naplousian Sheiks, connected with a plot to blow up the powder magazines at Acre, could not leave any doubts, as to Ibrahim's plans of retreat, in case he should be forced to evacuate Damascus.

If deductions be made from facts that have subsequently become public, such as the letter (relating to the eventual grant of Acre) written by Mehemet Ali to the King of the French; then the admission of this Pasha, that up to the 23 December⁵ his orders and news about the evacuation of Syria had been precarious and uncertain, and finally the assertions favourable to the Egyptian cause, made by MM. Thiers and Guizot in the

¹ General Jochmus to Sir Stratford Canning, 31 March 1841.

² Sir C. Smith to Lord Palmerston, 6 December 1840. *Levant Papers* Vol. III p. 119.

³ Lieutenant-General Jochmus to Brigadier-General Michell, 29 December 1840, vide No. 67.

⁴ Secret report of the Mufti of Jerusalem, 17 December 1840.

⁵ Consul Larking to Viscount Palmerston, 23 December 1840. *Levant Papers* III, p. 133.

session 1841/42, coupled with the continual efforts of the French Agents in Egypt and in Syria, to encourage Mehemet Ali's party, there can remain little or no doubt, that Ibrahim Pasha's intentions, on evacuating Damascus, were not merely to cross the Jordan and to march *through* Palestine, but also to maintain himself eventually *in* Palestine, with a view of enabling his father to negotiate on more favourable terms.

In fact, the report of the above quoted Mufti (dated 17 December) contains a phrase which was considered obscure at the time, but which has now a clearer meaning, for after the analysis of the Egyptian plan of retreat, it is said that "Ibrahim Pasha is going *to remain* at Gaza."

The Egyptian forces at Damascus in the latter days of December have been variously estimated.

According to official documents they have been computed:

at 54,713 men by the British Consul in Damascus;

at 40,000 men and 20,000 camp followers by the French Consul there;¹

at 40,000 men, of whom 35,000 effectives, by General Jochmus, whose estimate is the lowest, but the most correct one.

Compared to these numbers the disposable means of the Allies in Syria appeared but limited.

In the first week of December the fleets had sailed for Marmarizza Bay, leaving on the coast only two steamers, which subsequently were reinforced, at the demand of Generals Jochmus and Michell, by one Line-of-battle ship and by a corvette, but the season rendered naval assistance of little or no avail, and there remained on shore only 300 British and 200 Austrian Marines for garrison duty.

The Ottoman Government, however, had acted up to the plans, delineated in the secret Memorandum of General Jochmus, dated 12 October; and accordingly the Turkish army in Syria had been reinforced to 20,000 men, whilst an additional corps of 8000 men was advancing, as demanded, from Asia Minor; had entered Aleppo and was cautiously connecting itself by

¹ Consul Larking to Viscount Palmerston, 23 December 1840. Levant Papers III, p. 133.

Tripolis with the Syrian main army, according to instructions sent to Hadji Ali Pasha, who had already occupied Hamah.¹

Although still too distant to take an immediate share in the subsequent operations, the appearance of these strong reinforcements, the preparatory movements of the Syrian main army, with Head-Quarters at Hasbeya since the 22 December, and the levée-en-masse ordered by General Jochmus of the armed population south of Tripolis, Beyrout, Baalbek, and Damascus, seriously alarmed Ibrahim Pasha,² and these dispositions together with the obliged retreat of an Egyptian force from El Mezerib, (26 December) and the occupation of this important post by inimical partisans, who showed themselves in strong bodies on Ibrahim's last line of communication with Egypt, induced that General to renounce definitively his hopes of maintaining himself in Damascus till the pacification.

Justly alarmed at the imminent danger of his military position, in the centre of a general insurrectionary movement, with an army in utter destitution and deserting in all directions, blocked up within the walls of a large and disaffected town, ready for revolt and with the enemy at its very gates, unable at the same time to depend on his own troops, the major part of whom might join the armed inhabitants against their own General, Ibrahim Pasha, at last, gave way to the force of unlucky circumstances and fatal combinations.³

Not hearing of the final conclusion of any convention or armistice, the Pasha on the 29 December in the afternoon began his retreat from Damascus on El Mezerib by Kessoue.

When the Egyptian General quitted the Syrian capital, his forces were, in the first instance, still such that unquestionably he would have defeated the Ottoman army, if his adversary had accepted any *general* action in the *plains*, for though the Egyptian Infantry, reduced to about 20,000 men, was demoralized and in very bad order, yet supported by 9000 good

¹ General Jochmus to Hadji Ali Pasha, 24 December 1840; vide No. 64. These forces consisted of 5000 regular Infantry and 3000 regular Cavalry, besides some Albanian irregular foot.

² Soliman Pasha to Count E. Zichy, 10 October 1842.

³ General Jochmus to Sir Robert Stopford, 13 January 1841; *Levant Papers* III, p. 288; cfr. No. 82.

Cavalry and 150 field pieces and some excellent irregular Infantry, the whole force, in open *plains*, was much more than a match for 15,000 Turkish Infantry, with only 600 Cavalry and 30 field pieces, had the latter army even been supported by several thousand irregular mountaineers, of little use in an open field.

But the invariable purpose of General Jochmus had been *to avoid* a second battle of Nizib,¹ and only to meet the Egyptians, if necessary, on mountainous ground and in defiles, where their superior Cavalry and Artillery constituted a very limited advantage.

Notwithstanding then, that since the 16 December the concentric movements of the Turkish main army and of the *levée en masse* of the Mountaineers had assumed an offensive character (in opposition to the extended and purely defensive system of Sir Charles Smith), yet the great object of the Ottoman General had constantly been to defeat the intentions of the Egyptian Commander, first by obliging him to quit Damascus, and secondly by depriving him of his projected line of retreat through Palestine.

One of these points was now obtained: Ibrahim had quitted Damascus; the other was still contested, for the Pasha operated with a view to cross the Jordan and to enter Palestine, whilst his adversary manoeuvred to foil this intention.

The plan of General Jochmus, preconcerted in detail with Selim Pasha,² was simply and efficient.

Every disposable man and corps of the Turkish army were rapidly concentrating; the regular forces at Acre, the irregulars in Tabariah, Djenin &c., ready, to occupy the defiles formed by Mount Carmel and the mountains of Naplous.

Ibrahim Pasha would either be obliged to fight a general action, after forcing the passage of the Jordan, in the mountain defiles between Djenin and Kakoun, or he would be constrained to take the route of the Desert.

In both cases the Egyptian army was *sure* to suffer very severely, and *possibly* might be nearly or entirely destroyed.

¹ Secret Memorandum of 12 October 1840.

² Secret dispatch to Selim Pasha, 25 December, annexed to letter to Sir R. Stopford, 13 January 1841; vide No. 82b Inclosure No. I.

For in the first instance, if Ibrahim were attacked in the mountain defiles, his Cavalry was of no use, and his superior Artillery of limited advantage.

His demoralized Infantry would have been discomfited without doubt by 25 battalions of Turks with 30 guns and a mountaineer force of 10 to 12,000 men under the command of the Emir Beshir Cassim (including the Naplousians).

In the second alternative, Ibrahim Pasha would be forced to take the road through the Desert, but here he could only postpone, yet not escape disaster.

It was well ascertained that his troops carried with them rations for merely fifteen days,¹ whilst his army would have to perform a march of a month, through a desert and barren mountain track, without any resources, and nearly without water and inhabitants.

Fifteen days' provisions were sufficient for an unmolested march from Damascus to Gaza by Djenin and Kakoun, and besides there existed upwards of 3,000,000 of rations in the public stores of Palestine, rich itself in supplies of many kinds, but Ibrahim had not foreseen and calculated on the concentric movements of the enemy, towards the defiles of Djenin and Kakoun.

The Egyptian forces were collected at El Mezerib on the 2 January, and Ibrahim had reconnoitered Feik and the Jordan.

At this decisive moment, General Jochmus, though too weak in Cavalry to make large reconnaissances, had excellent means of intelligence. Every Syrian was a spy, and Ibrahim Bey, with a small corps of Turko-Albanians, together with the Druse partisans of Chebli Arrian, beyond the Jordan, collected every desirable information.

The *Egyptian* General declined the battle which was offered him at Djenin,² and the *Turkish* Commander pertinaciously stuck to his vantage ground, prudently avoiding to cross himself in force the Jordan, and to meet beyond Ibrahim on his own terms.

¹ Report of the Mufti of Jerusalem, 17 December 1840, also: General Jochmus to Sir R. Stopford, 13 January 1841, vide No. 82.

² General Jochmus to Sir R. Stopford, 2 February 1841, vide No. 110; cfr. *Levant Papers* III, p. 300.

At last, after several days of observation and indecision Ibrahim Pasha bent before the combinations of his adversary, and on the 4 January he indicated by a movement on Remtha, that he had given up his projected retreat through Palestine.

On the 6 January his rear-guards had quitted Remtha, and his army now marched by the great Caravan road into the Desert.

Henceforth the doom of the Egyptian forces was sealed.

The current of military events was now rapidly setting to the Southward.

The Turkish army followed parallelly through the well stocked country of western Palestine the Egyptian movement of retreat through the Desert, and already on the 9 January it was in line between Jerusalem, Ramleh, and Jaffa, with its Head-Quarters, according to circumstances, alternately at the first or at the last of these places.

On the other side Ibrahim Pasha's army had its rear-guard attacked on the 6 January at Remtha, by the irregular Cavalry of Chebli Arrian, who from Tabariah had effected his junction with the mountaineers of the Hauran.

On the 7 a slight skirmish had taken place near Djerash with partisans under Count Széchényi, and subsequently some foraging parties had been repulsed by the mountaineers.

In the Desert, however, the Egyptian army had been broken up into single columns, which soon after moved usually at hazard, conducted mostly by faithless guides, themselves generally in secret understanding with numerous swarms of mountaineers and Bedouins, intent on plunder, treasure, and slaves.

With the exception of the fierce Hauranee, the roving inhabitant of the mountains and deserts, east of the Dead Sea, will not even attempt an attack in broad day light on any corps militarily organized, but collected as these people were, on the enemy's line of retreat, by instructions and information sent to them from the Imperial Head-Quarters, ever since the beginning of the late operations, they completely fulfilled the object for which an appeal had been made to their interests and passions.

They surrounded each separate column of the Egyptian army, cutt off all communications and all stragglers, or small

detachments, gave frequent alarms at night, and carried off every animal of burden within their reach, or destroyed all means of transport and subsistence, when they could not secure them for themselves.

Under the guidance of some of these men, Baron Du Mont, dispatched from the Head-Quarters at Jerusalem, with some hundreds of light Cavalry of Hebron, succeeded in taking Maan, the central depôt of the Government tithes, situated deep in the Desert on the Egyptian line of retreat.

The Baron had gallantly thrown himself between the first and second column of Soliman Pasha's Division, which escorted all the Artillery.

He surprised on the 14 January Maan, which Soliman Pasha had neglected to order to be properly occupied by some troops of his *first* column, and which — being thought quite safe, was only guarded by 20 men and four bad guns.

The provisions at Maan, collected by order of Mehemet Ali, were thus destroyed or burnt, and a serious blow was inflicted on the already worn out army. Only a part of those stores had served to supply the first column, which had come to Maan a day before Baron Du Mont's attack.

Count Edmund Zichy, Count Pourtalès, and other distinguished travellers, who have passed the Desert two and three years later, affirm that the loss of the retreating Egyptians, in men, animals of burthen, and material of war, between Maan and Akaba was, at that time still, attested by the wreck of the army, strewed over the boundless wilderness. Soliman Pasha himself said to the former that the withering bones of camels, horses, and mules would indicate to him at once the road and the line of retreat.

"From the Wadi Leitrum to the valley of Ganna" — observed Count Zichy¹ — "we saw at least 10 to 15 large "heaps of stones, which were described by our Bedoweens "to be as many great tombs of troops."

Ibrahim Pasha's own column, originally consisting of 7 to 8000 men with 8 guns, seems to have been especially tracked

¹ Count Zichy to General Jochmus, 10 October 1842.

d harassed by the Arabs of the Desert, probably because they suspected it to convoy treasure.

General Jochmus had moreover promised a recompense of one hundred thousand piasters¹ to any Arab Chief who should make Ibrahim Pasha a prisoner.

The Egyptian Commander-in-Chief was cut off completely from his own main army, for whilst with or without orders his artillery was on the 15 January at Maan, his Infantry still kept in the Desert, and his principal force of Cavalry under Ahmed Menikli Pasha on the same day near Tafila (all "South" of the Dead Sea), Ibrahim himself after an useless expedition for taking provisions at Es-Salt,² had crossed the Jordan, with a part of his guardes, and was on this very 15 January at Jericho, "North" of the Dead Sea, evidently in a desperate attempt to march by any way on Gaza, or El Arish.³

The Turkish General Hassan Pasha, however, observed the Jordan with 12 battalions and 12 field pieces, his Head-Quarters being at Jerusalem, where Osman Aga, the tried Governor, commanded excellent means of information from the districts north and south of the Dead Sea.

Ibrahim, apprised of the presence and movements of Hassan Pasha, recrossed the Jordan immediately (15 January), experienced considerable losses, was shut up in Kerek, and then completely sequestered in the Desert by the Arabs, and finally entered Gaza on the 31 January, with the shattered remains of his guards, who had lost their eight guns.

"Two hundred determined Cavalry might have swept away with great ease" — says Colonel Rose to Lord Ponsonby⁴ — "all that part of this column which I saw, I entered it at about two thirds of its length."

Ibrahim's own Generals had already given up all hopes of communicating with him at Gaza, where they had arrived

¹ Circular to the Arab Chieftains 3 Zilcade 1256 (26 December 1840).

² Intercepted letter of Ibrahim Pasha to the inhabitants of Es Salt.

³ General Jochmus to Sir R. Stopford, 28 January 1841, vide No. 107; Levant Papers III, p. 295.

⁴ Colonel Rose to Lord Ponsonby, 20 February 1841, Levant Papers III, p. 329.

long before him, from the 21 to the 25 January. Even the Commissioners of England, Turkey, and Egypt, sent to the hostile armies with orders to proclaim the complete submission and surrender of Mehemet Ali, had ineffectually tried to communicate with him by either end of the Dead Sea, and concluding that he had marched by Maan on Suez, they prepared for returning from Gaza to Alexandria.

On the same day, when the Commissioners of peace arrived at Jaffa (17 January) the last offensive movement in this campaign, on the part of the Ottoman army, had been suspended, and the division of Selim Pasha had returned to its cantonments.

This division had been destined to drive from near Gaza a corps of Cavalry, lately arrived from El Arish in Egypt, in order to establish a communication with Syria.

The Egyptian force consisting of 1200 regular and 2000 irregular horse had a flying camp at three quarters of an hour south of Gaza, which town contained considerable stores of provisions.

The object of the Turkish expedition was not to occupy permanently Gaza, but to burn those provisions, and to retire without delay again on Jaffa,¹ provided that the whole operation could be accomplished in three days, or latest in three days and a half, counting from the 14 January.

Later than the 16 January this movement with a division of young Turkish Infantry, in open plains, became already unsafe, for it was calculated that Ahmed Menikli's whole Cavalry could approach and reinforce Gaza towards that time, by the south of the Dead Sea.

The division of Selim Pasha composed of 10 battalions and 14 pieces of Artillery had moved with the Head-Quarters of

¹ Selim Pasha, soon after the capture of Acre, had urged in vain Sir C. Smith to be allowed to drive from Gaza Ismael Bey, then occupying it with only 500 men and 8 guns.

General Jochmus, conjecturing the eventual importance of Gaza, had afterwards dispatched as early as the 18 December Omer Pasha for this purpose. His instructions were to collect three battalions and some irregular Cavalry, to capture, or to destroy all provisions in Gaza, and then to retire on Jaffa, but Omer Pasha whilst preparing his expedition found that Ismael Bey had been reinforced by three thousand men of Cavalry from El Arish, and consequently he suspended his enterprise.

the Serasker and of General Jochmus on the 14 January from Ramleh on Ashdud.

The British Commodore of Jaffa refused his active co-operation on the plea of special orders, and embarked only fifty marines in two steamers, — which were to show themselves off the coast.

The troops of Selim Pasha continued their movement notwithstanding the attempt of Ibrahim Pasha on Jericho, which was at once judged to be the march of a forlorn column, and they arrived on the 15 at El Maïshdal, three hours from Gaza. Here and in the next villages further on, the division found 150 regular and 1800 irregular Cavalry,¹ who drove in a reconnoitring party of the enemy — but early on the 16 after 72 hours of incessant rain, General Jochmus directed the Infantry and Artillery to countermarch on Jaffa. — He intended to reassume the operation on a much larger scale, when his approaching 3000 regular Cavalry should have joined from the north, and whenever the movements of the retiring Egyptian army should be definitively indicated, for the first and limited operation became henceforward unsafe, as instead of three days it would have required at least five days to accomplish it.²

The Cavalry at and near El Maïshdal was on the contrary advanced on the 16 January to within two hours of Gaza, along the river of Escalon, and there soon afterwards they received intelligence of the approach of Ahmed Menikli Pasha, who on the same day had already encamped west of Tafila.

Hassan Pasha, commanding the Turkish left division at El Chalil (Hebron), on the demand of the joint Commissioners of peace acquainted Ahmed Menikli Pasha with the orders he had received, to cease hostilities, and the Egyptian General now approached Gaza by slow marches, under the safe conduct³ of two Ottoman officers dispatched to him by Hassan Pasha.

¹ El Maïshdal and several villages nearer to Gaza were occupied by detachments of light Cavalry since the 8 January (report of Omer Pasha 11 January 1841).

² Memorandum of 12 May 1841; vide No. 136.

³ General Jochmus to the Serasker Ahmed Zacharias Pasha, 22 January 1841; vide No. 97.

He entered Gaza on the 21 January, and was followed there successively up to the 25 January by the remaining Infantry and Cavalry of the Egyptian army, who had been in the Desert during the last seven days nearly without any food,¹ and full three days without any water,² whilst Ibrahim Pasha himself arrived only on the 31 January.

The whole Artillery, however, even with the reserve parks of the Infantry ammunition, had marched to the Arabian Gulf by Maan and Akaba.

The orders of Ibrahim and the causes which influenced the movements of the Egyptian army in the Desert, since its departure from El Mezerib, are in a great measure still the subject of conjecture and of mystery, and may possibly remain so.

Ibrahim did certainly *not* leave Damascus in consequence of any public and acknowledged convention; he never tried even to negotiate, neither while in El Mezerib at the head of his army, or yet at Jericho, in his desperate position there.

On the contrary, he sacked and burnt the country, cut off wherever he went the heads of Sheiks who furnished no provisions, and of guides who found no roads, his hand was raised against all, and the hands of all were raised against him,³ and yet he allowed his shattered and exhausted forces, without Artillery, ammunition, and military array,³ in isolated weak columns, to arrive at the very out-posts of the strong and concentrated inimical army.

It was thought at the time, and may yet be found quite true that the destruction of the provisions at Maan caused Ahmed Menikli Pasha, and those that followed his track, to countermarch on Gaza, but it has since become doubtful, if Ahmed Menikli Pasha — surrounded like the rest by Bedoweens and Arabs — had really the means of communicating with Maan.

At any rate, the successive arrival at Gaza of the isolated Egyptian columns of mere Infantry and Cavalry, without Artillery and reserve ammunition, placed these forces at the mercy of the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, whose Cavalry had finally

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson to Colonel Bridgeman, Report to Sir R. Stopford, 2 February 1841. Levant Papers III, p. 298.

² Colonel Rose to Lord Ponsonby, 20 February 1841.

³ The same to the same, do. do. Levant Papers III, 329. Mr. Wood to the Serasker Pasha, 21 January 1841. Levant Papers III, 275.

come into line from the North, and who might have collected at any hour a force of refreshed troops, full of confidence, amounting to 18,000 Infantry, 3500 regular and 3000 irregular horse and 30 pieces of Artillery, whereas — even after the ultimate junction of Ibrahim's own corps, there never were at Gaza more than 22,500 worn out and demoralized troops¹ with eight field pieces; (originally retired from Acre.)

Immediately after the pacification, published at Jaffa 17 January, and whilst the Egyptian forces were still arriving in succession from the Desert, a conflict of opinions arose at the Allied Head-Quarters in consequence of special instructions, sent by Admiral Stopford to the commanding officer of the small naval station on the Syrian coast.

The Admiral — without communicating directly with General Jochmus — had ordered Captain Stewart to "*facilitate*" the retreat of Ibrahim Pasha by all means, and the British Commodore had construed this order into an authorization of allowing Ibrahim Pasha's columns to retreat from the Desert unmolested, not only by any road "*South*" of the Dead Sea, but also by route "*North*" of that lake, that is to *return* into Syria, after having once *abandoned* it.

Commodore Napier, sent by the Admiral with a special mission to Alexandria, was of the same opinion. He had been misled by erroneous reports² to entertain an exaggerated idea of the strength and efficiency of Ibrahim's army, and was therefore inclined to consider his convention as the only provision of security, not merely for the Egyptians, but — strange to say — also for the victorious Turkish army.³

However, neither the general instructions of Viscount Palmerston and of Lord Ponsonby, nor the quite recent secret dispatches from Mazloum Bey authorized any such proceedings, and General Jochmus therefore enforced his view of the case that no obstacle should be offered to any Egyptian force "*South*"

¹ General Jochmus to Commodore Napier, 8 February 1841 (private); vide No. 117.

² General Jochmus to Mr. Mellish, Foreign Office 10 February 1841 (confidential).

³ Correspondence between Admiral Stopford, Commodore Napier, and General Jochmus.

of the Dead Sea, but that any march "*North*" of that lake must be preceded by the surrender of guns and arms.

In order to impart the due consistency to this resolution 2000 Cavalry were sent to El Chalil, and 21 battalions and 18 field pieces were concentrated at Jerusalem, whither General Jochmus transferred his Head-Quarters on the 22 January.¹

Reserves were stationed at Ramleh

Ibrahim Pasha's army, in the mean time, continued its retreat by the "*South*" of the Dead Sea, yet Commodore Napier and some of his colleagues, after an unsuccessful attempt at underrating the results of the latter part of the Syrian campaign, have in the end assailed the principles and the "*policy*" which guided the Ottoman Arms, since the retreat of Ibrahim Pasha from Damascus.

All, however, were and are still unacquainted with, or only partly cognizant of the superior orders given to General Jochmus, and none were in the secret of his own general plan of campaign,² except Lord Ponsonby and Lord Palmerston, and neither of these statesmen have hesitated to incur the responsibility of an approval of the General's operations.

Lord Ponsonby writes to the latter on the 26 January:

"I have received from Lord Palmerston the expression "of his fullest approbation of your having been placed in "authority;"³

and of the 25 February:

"I have proposed to the Porte to give you the rank "of Mushir (or Pasha of three tails), you desire to have."

The Ambassador finally, in an official dispatch to Lord Palmerston, says on the 23 February⁴:

"Had it not been for the perseverance of General "Jochmus in taking measures against Ibrahim Pasha, it "would have been easy for Ibrahim Pasha, to remain with "his army in Damascus, until the arrangements with Me- "hemet Ali having been completed, he might have retreated

¹ General Jochmus to Sir R. Stopford, 30 January 1841; vide No. 109. Levant Papers III, p. 298.

² The same to Captain H. Stewart R. N., 25 January 1841; vide No. 105.

³ vide No. 122.

⁴ Levant Papers III, 331.

"with a great unbroken force to Egypt, instead of having
 "his army defeated, and nearly destroyed and wholly de-
 "moralized."

"Had Ibrahim remained at Damascus, the military
 "question would have been undecided, and it would have
 "been easy to assert that victory might still have been
 "on the side of the Pasha, had Mehemet Ali thought it
 "politic to continue the war."

"If Ibrahim had taken back to Egypt his large army
 "unharmed, Mehemet Ali would possess a force that might
 "encourage him to resist, and might possibly make him
 "stronger than ever."

"The energy of General Jochmus has rendered all doubt
 "and delusion on the subject of the military question im-
 "possible, and has shown that, under able command, the
 "Turkish troops are more than a match for the Egyptian
 "army and General; his energy has also taken from Me-
 "hemet Ali the best means he could have to support re-
 "sistance, and therefore has afforded the best grounds for
 "hoping he will submit."

On the 16 February every Egyptian force had evacuated
 Syria.

Soliman Pasha told Count Ed. Zichy¹ in 1842 that the
 loss during the retreat from Damascus amounted to 20,000 men
 of Egyptians alone, without counting the Syrians, and by con-
 fronting the returns of the British Consul at Damascus with
 those of the English officers, made out at Gaza, the losses of
 Ibrahim would have been 21,713² men, exclusively of the sub-
 sequent losses experienced on the marches from Maan and
 Gaza into Egypt.

According to the official reports of the Austrian Consul
 General in Egypt, there returned only 17,300 men and 82 guns
 from Syria out of the 40,000 men and 150 guns which had left
 Damascus at the *lowest* estimate,³ constituting a loss of 22,700
 men and 68 guns.

¹ Count Zichy to General Jochmus, 10 October 1842.

² General Jochmus to Sir R. Stopford, 10 March 1841: vide No. 124.

³ vide "l'Égypte sous Mehemet Ali par P. N. Hamont. Paris."

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Of these troops 5500 men were killed, or perished, the rest were deserters and prisoners, or were made slaves by the Bedoweens,¹ whilst the Ottoman army had not more than one hundred men "hors de combat", in the series of strategical operations since the 29 December.²

The 68 guns lost between Damascus and Akaba did not fall into the hands of the Turkish army.

They must have been buried in the Desert, in proportion as the means of transport diminished.

"I found" — says Count E. Zichy — "in the valley of Wali Aleitum (still in 1842) an enormous quantity of gun and grape shot, many parts of ammunition waggons, and half burnt remains of wheels."

"During several days I pursued the roads, indicated as the line of retreat of the routed army by the bones of their animals of burthen, by the tombs of their dead, and by the remains of their ammunition."³

Another traveller in Syria, Mr. Samuel, states on information collected from Abu-Saab, the conductor of the caravans from Damascus to Mecca, that

"many guns were left at various places during the retreat, as from want of provisions the troops were obliged to kill the horses, camels &c. &c.. and to use the gun-carriages for fuel"⁴

Great as the losses of the Egyptians were during the retreat, they appear moderate, when compared to the extent of ruin which had befallen the whole military establishment of Mehemet Ali in Syria, since the beginning of hostilities in September 1840.

The official returns of the Egyptian war department, published in 1841 *after* the close of the campaign, rate the

¹ Count E. Zichy to General Jochmus, 10 October 1842, and General Jochmus to Sir Stratford Canning, 2 February 1841.

² General Jochmus to Sir R. Stopford, 10 March 1841; vide No. 124.

³ Count Zichy to General Jochmus, 10 October 1842.

⁴ Mr. Samuel to the same, 27 October 1842; cfr. No. 152.

forces of Ibrahim Pasha in Syria at the outbreak of the war at	127,344 men
and those returned from Syria, exclusively of the 3000 men of the El Arish division, at	30,352 „
leaving a total loss of	96,992 men

It is probable from the known corruption and inefficiency of his military administration¹ that Mehemet Ali paid, or was supposed to pay these exaggerated estimates, but those troops never existed, except on the *paylists*.

According to the evaluation of the Emir Beshir, the Egyptian army nearly in September did not amount to more than 90,000 men,² and General Jochmus estimated it only at 85,000, whereof 75,000 effectives with originally 619 guns in fortified towns and 270 fieldpieces.

Of all these forces only 17,300 men and 82 fieldpieces returned to Egypt, leaving a loss for Mehemet Ali of 67,700 men, 619 garrison guns, and 188 fieldpieces, including the 104 guns which Mehmed Hafiz Pasha had lost at the battle of Nizib.

The ruin of Mehemet Ali's policy originated in his rebellion against his lawful Sovereign, in his abominable misrule and oppression of Syria, and in his perseverance to trust in an impossible support from France, the immediate causes however of his great military disasters were the three principal strategical errors of his son: for Ibrahim *subdivided* the army of the Lebanon, without a stringent necessity, he retreated untimely from Damascus, without the safe conduct of the convention, and finally he entered the Desert without a sufficient supply of provisions.

Ibrahim Pasha in person left Syria with an undermined constitution and in broken spirits.

He arrived at Gaza suffering from the jaundice, and was treated there by an English physician, sent to him from the Allied Head-Quarters, but his immoderate habits left little hope for a radical cure.

¹ Report of the Austrian Consul General, 20 Mai 1841.

² Report of the same to Baron Stürmer, 16 October 1840. Levant Papers Vol. III, p. 43.

The Pasha himself told Captain Arbuthnot¹ R. N. :

“that from the age of fifteen his life had been passed in “the camp, but now that Syria, the object of his loftiest aspirations, was lost, his most earnest wish was to retire “from public life, and to pass the remainder of his days in “the bosom of retirement.”

Indeed Syria was conquered for the Sultan; Adana, Marash, Orfa, Arabia with the holy cities, and the Island of Candia were restored to the Sublime Porte.

The treaty of the fifteenth July 1840 was executed to its fullest extent, without any concession, and notwithstanding all opposition.

The rival power on the banks of the Nile was broken. Mehemet Ali Pasha was reduced to the state of a subject Vassal, and his children will consider themselves fortunate on inheriting the Government of Egypt *proper*, only granted conditionally and after a prolonged negotiation.

Hence Prince Metternich says to Marshal Marmont:²

“If Mehemet Ali desires what the Porte assents to, “and what the Powers have equally assented to, if he “wishes that his family should be invested with the hereditary succession in the Government of a “*Turkish*” province, he may say that he has attained his object.”

“If he desires an independent position, if he aims at “establishing Sovereignty in his family, then he is in a “state of opposition not only to the Porte, but to the whole “of Europe, and he and his succession will perish in the “enterprise.”

A. Jochmus,
General-Lieutenant.

¹ Memoir of a staff officer on the Syrian campaign, p. 4.

² 27 April 1841. Levant Papers III. 431.

(Translation.)

P R O T O C O L

of a Conference held at the Foreign Office, 10 July 1841.

Present :

The Plenipotentiaries
of Austria,
of Great Britain,
of Prussia,
of Russia, and
of Turkey.

The difficulties in which His Highness the Sultan was placed, and which decided him to apply for the support and the assistance of the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, being now removed, and Mehemet Ali having made towards His Highness the Sultan the act of submission which the Convention of the 15 July was designed to bring about, the Representatives of the Courts parties to the said Convention have considered that, independently of the execution of the temporary measures resulting from that Convention, it is of essential importance to record, in the most formal manner, the respect which is due to the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of war of foreign powers to enter into the straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.

This principle being from its nature one of general and permanent application, the respective Plenipotentiaries, provided with the orders of their Courts to this effect, have been of opinion that, in order to manifest the agreement and union which regulate the intentions of all the Courts in what concerns the maintenance of the peace of Europe, it would be proper to record the respect which is due to the above-mentioned principle, by means of an arrangement in which France should be invited to concur, at the invitation, and agreeably to the wish of the Sultan.

This arrangement being calculated to afford to Europe a pledge of the union of the Five Powers, Her Britannic Majesty's

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Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. agreeably to an understanding with the Plenipotentiaries or the Four Powers, undertook to bring this matter to the knowledge of the French Government, requesting it to take part in an arrangement by which, on the one hand, the Sultan should declare his firm resolution to maintain for the future the above-mentioned principle; the Five Powers, on the other hand, should announce their unanimous determination to respect that principle and to conform themselves thereto.

(signed) Esterhazy. Neumann.
Palmerston.
Bulow.
Brunnow.
Chekib.

THE SYRIAN WAR
AND THE
DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

1840--1848.

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1.

LORD PALMERSTON TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Extract.

Foreign Office 29 July 1840.

I have to instruct you to proceed to Constantinople with all convenient speed, and on your arrival there to place yourself under the directions of Viscount Ponsonby,¹ Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, to be employed by him in any way in which His Excellency may consider your services most likely to be useful to the Sultan . . .

You will report to me direct as well as to Lord Ponsonby any matters which may come under your observation which may be likely to prove interesting to Her Majesty's Government.

(signed) Palmerston.

2.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Extract.

Therapia 2 September 1840.

I delivered on the 25 ultimo to His Excellency the Viscount Ponsonby Your Lordship's despatches of the 3 August.

By order of His Excellency I am leaving Constantinople this evening in the Hydra steamer for the Syrian coast, Viscount Ponsonby having communicated on the subject with Admiral Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Charles Smith.*

* Cfr. Levant Papers II, p. 24, No. 27.

¹ General Jochmus had lately returned from Spain, where he had been Quarter Master General of the British Legion.

3.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Extract.

Therapia 2 September 1840.

I have acquainted the Admiral Sir Robert Stopford that by orders from Lord Palmerston I have desired you to proceed to Syria I have most particularly to request you will return here with the utmost speed, if you should learn with certainty that Ibrahim Pasha has actually undertaken an expedition against the capital.

I have no belief in the probability of such an attempt, I do not believe it could be carried into effect, but I think it proper to take precautions etc. etc.

4.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received Hamburg 22 December 1839.)

Therapia 19 November 1839.

My dear Sir,

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter and I should be glad to say many things to you which I think it not right to do, till I know of your arrival in London. Therefore hoping you *may* be there now I will mention the fact of my opinion respecting the weakness of Mehemet Ali, having been fortified by later information, and that I do not believe it would require the exertion of much force to reduce him to the necessity for unconditional submission.

I will write to you very soon, and you will allow me to say that it will be a great satisfaction to me to hear from you.

Believe me to be very faithfully yours

Ponsonby.

5.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Hamburg 31 December 1839.)

Therapia 30 November 1839.

My dear General,

I thank you for your letter from London. It gave me great pleasure to learn, how you are going on. I shall always be happy to have it in my power to be of any use to you, and I should rejoice upon

every account if something could be done about raising a force of Albanians. If this country shall be saved from the ruin that threatens it through the insane protection given to Mehemet Ali by France, and the incredible misunderstanding of those, who believe in the power of that Chief to maintain himself by force against the most moderate exertion of the strength of any of those, whose interest it is to put him down, there will then arise a state of things most propitious for the creation of an Albanian Corps which being regularly paid and fed and officered by fit men, will be the best defence of the Empire. I have ground for believing, 30,000 men could be found without much difficulty willing to enter the service. I will take measures to forward some such establishment, *if things go on*. But if the Empire is to be partitioned by granting to Mehemet Ali that or any part of which he asks beyond Egypt, I shall consider Turkey as the property of Russia. — If you see the official reports respecting the state of things in Syria sent by the Austrian Consul,* you will know to what a low ebb the power of Ibrahim is in reality reduced. He only holds the country by the sword, and revolts are ready in every part of it. I am tempted to believe, that the mere sight of the Fleet of England in conjunction with that of the Sultan would suffice to take from Ibrahim his whole force, and possibly from Mehemet Ali also.

You are already intimately acquainted with these affairs, and I am not committing any indiscretion in writing to you as I have now done.

You will see a strange story about the defection of the Ottoman Fleet or rather of its Commander, for he deceived but did not seduce the Sultans sailor. The story I allude to is a bad one, and inculcates others *not* Turks — (i. e. the French).

I hope I shall have the satisfaction of hearing often from you, though I fear, I can only be a very bad correspondent on my side.

Believe me to be always very faithfully yours

* Levant Papers I p. 486.

Ponsonby.

6.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Extract.

Smyrna 4 September 1840.

Mehemet Ali's partisans in this neighbourhood, whose number is not inconsiderable according to Mr. Brant's opinion, continue their intrigues and manœuvres, representing him as the defender of the Musulman faith, and the Sultan as being in the hands of the Ghiaurs. Hassan Pasha the Governor of Smyrna is even said to entertain favourable feelings for Mehemet Ali and to be very anti-frank — but this of course may be spread by his personal enemies.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO R. C. MELLISH.

(Care of Lord Beauvale H. B. M. Ambassador at Vienna.)

Extract. Private.

On board the Hydra Steamer
off Samos 5 September 1840.

By order of Lord Ponsonby I am going to the Coast of Syria, there to act according to circumstances.

I wrote to Lord Palmerston from Constantinople and shall continue my reports as prescribed in his Instructions.

I am happy to add that this time Lord Ponsonby thinks, that the object of my mission will be completely attained — but he desired me first to go to the Syrian Coast and has communicated on the subject with the Admiral and Sir Charles Smith

The effect of Commodore Napier's capture of an Egyptian transport with 11 guns and military stores has been very favourable in Smyrna. The European trading population of that place approves very much of all immediate and energetic measures against Mehemet Ali, for two reasons:

1 — because a protracted warfare interferes generally with their commerce;

2 — because they know, that if the principles of the late commercial treaties of the Porte with England, Austria, France &c. &c. are also applied to Egypt, the monopolies which, in that country, concentrate trade in the hands of the Pasha and of some of his friends, must necessarily cease and open new resources to the Smyrna commerce...

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Extract.

Heights of Djounie 19 September 1840.

Mehemet Pasha has just arrived and will take the command. Sir Charles Smith has been unwell and goes to Constantinople.

I have read to Commodore Napier and Mr. Wood the letter I write to you to-day, and they fully agree with me in every point; we want money, more men, provisions, and plenty of ammunition.

P.S. — 6 o'clock, p.m. Caiffa is taken by some of the ships. Let the Turkish Government send us ample means, and the Commodore says he will do as he did in Portugal, and I am sure he will.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private.

Camp of the Heights of Djounie
19 September 1840.

I have the honour to inform you, that the fleet of Admiral Stopford and the forces of Rear-Admiral Walker, together with the troops under Selim Pasha, began hostilities before Beyrout on the 9 instant by firing some shells on the troops near the town.

On the 10 September at 1 o'clock p.m. the Turkish troops and the British marines effected a landing at the Kilbsu (10 miles) and at the village of Djounie (13 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles) north of Beyrout.

On the 11 September a position was taken up on difficult heights, the right on the Kilbsu, and the left at Djounie, the whole of the troops being 8 battalions of Turks (total 5000 men rank and file), and 1500 marines being disposed in a semi-circle, offering three excellent and very strong positions.

Soliman Pasha had made his dispositions against an attack on the south side of Beyrout, and the troops landed consequently without opposition at Kilbsu and Djounie. A communication was immediately established with some of the Mountain Chiefs, and up to this day 5000 to 6000 muskets have been distributed, principally through the means of Sheik Francis, and Abdallah Emir, a nephew of the Emir Beshir.

Two small forts north of this camp also surrendered, and according to Admiral Walker's returns he is now rationing 400 Egyptians or Albanian deserters, and troops surrendered.

Ever since the 10 September Ibrahim Pasha has been manoeuvring against this corps. On that day he was near Zachlé 15 hours ESE from Beyrout. On 12 September he was at Hannes, 4 hours from our extreme right, but having reconnoitred it, he marched 8 hours by his own right to Gatagos (on the 14 and 15 instant) 4 hours from our left, but having reconnoitred it also and found it equally unattackable from the new position taken up by this force, in consequence of his movements, Ibrahim Pasha withdrew to Merouba, 2 hours from Gatagos due east, being thus to-day 6 hours from our position. Some skirmishes have taken place between the newly armed mountaineers, and the advanced guard of Ibrahim, in which the latter always fought to disadvantage. Sheik Francis was on two occasions supported by a battalion of regular Turkish Infantry, who advanced several hours into the interior of the country.

The forces with Ibrahim Pasha in person are reported to consist of about

4000 Egyptian Infantry

1200 Albanians

2500 Egyptians under Othman Pasha come from Baalbek

7700

Besides there are about 7000 men under Soliman Pasha at and near Beyrout.

From all information that I can collect, Ibrahim Pasha seems for the present to have abandoned all idea of marching on Constantinople. Himself and his principal officers are all in this neighbourhood, and several corps from the northern parts of Syria have been moved in a southerly direction.

All reports agree, that the following distribution may be considered as tolerably correct: 19 September

with Ibrahim Pasha at Merouba	7700
with Soliman Pasha at Beyrout	7000
at Baalbek, a regiment of Turks forced into the service . . .	3000
at Acre, Saida and Palestine	12000
at Tripoli	4000
in small forts on the coast about	1300
	<u>35000</u>

If the whole effective army in Syria of Ibrahim Pasha, from the Egyptian frontiers to Adana, is estimated at 60,000 effectives, I believe that the mark is tolerably correct, my estimate from various sources being:

25 regiments of Infantry (regular and irregular) at 2000 effectives each	50,000
11 regiments of Cavalry at 600 each	6600
as many irregular Cavalry	<u>6600</u>
Albanians and Artillery	6,800
	<u>70,000¹</u>
Deduct non-combatants, sick &c.	<u>10,000</u>
	60,000

Taking from this amount of 60,000, the above 35,000, there remain 25,000, from which garrisons must be furnished to a great many places not in the above list, besides the garrisons of the lines in the Taurus.

For the present, Ibrahim therefore cannot think of moving on towards Asia Minor and Constantinople, and this march becomes the less possible, as the season is advancing, and the Taurus will be covered with snow.

The troops of the Sultan, which hitherto covered Constantinople against such a movement, become therefore disposeable, and ought to reinforce us here. — There is no possibility of conquering Syria with 5000 Turks, and in order to render the insurrection against Mehemet Ali more general and formidable, we must be able to advance deeper into the mountains, as the Emir Beshir and Ibrahim by occupying the passes in a semi-circle round us, prevent the peasants in many parts from joining us.

¹ These 70,000 men do not include the Egyptian corps at Orfa and neighbourhood, beyond the frontiers of Syria.

But I must observe to Your Lordship, that some essential improvement must be made in the direction of the Turkish division of troops. The greatest confusion prevails in every department — there is no staff, no commissariat, no arrangement of any kind, nor can there be any, because there is not a single officer who understands to prepare, and to execute a movement of any consequence on a large scale. By the desire of Commodore Napier I have taken, with Selim Pasha's consent, the command of the 7 battalions in the positions C and B, but I can assure Your Lordship, that if I had been attacked during the first 2 or 3 days, the troops could not have held their positions merely for want of proper arrangement, as I remained without ammunition, without intrenching tools, and yet we had every thing required only want of management, and this *want of management will continue, except* there is a *Chief of the Staff appointed*, who understands military operations on a large scale, because the best *chronometer* won't go, if by neglect, a only *one little screw* is wanting.

Levant Papers II, p. 309.

(signed) Jochmus.

10.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Extract.

Camp of Djounie 20 September 1840
10 o'clock a.m.

One of the mountaineer chiefs Abuzambra is just come over with 300 men to receive arms, and we are sending 2000 stands of arms more to Damour this moment (three miles south of Beyrout). The Cyclops is to protect the operation and the mountaineers who come to receive them. From my advanced posts I am in communication with the Albanian chief in front of the lines C. He has with him 200 Albanians and 300 Egyptians, and I am in hopes in getting him over to us. He promised me a decisive answer at 12 o'clock to-day. The public spirit is much in our favour in this part of the country. We have excellent information of all the movements of the enemy, and our armed mountaineers begin to hover on his flanks and rear, attacking small parties, convoys etc., whilst we send ammunition, provisions etc. with escorts of 4 or 5 men two or three hours into the country.

We must organize a Guerilla warfare, which will destroy Ibrahim's corps, *if he once suffers a defeat* in these mountains, which I hope he will, if he attacks us, but he as well as his troops appear to be cowed, for altho' we know him to have with him 7,700 men, and that 7000 are in Beyrout, yet with this superiority of forces he has not ventured to attack us.

He also begins to lose his hold on the mind of the country people, they had been forced under pain of death to leave the villages

occupied by us, but they now begin to return in great numbers, men and women, and a regular fair is opened in one of the villages. Our soldiers behave very well, and do not rob or annoy the peasantry, but our wants for success are strong reinforcements of troops and plenty of money, provisions, and ammunition.

Commodore Napier, who read my letters of to-day and yesterday, begs to say, that the expressed opinions are also his own, but that he has no time to write to Your Lordship to-day.

There is no desertion amongst our troops.

Levant Papers II, p. 310.

11.

COMMODORE NAPIER TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Head-Quarters of the Army of Lebanon,
Djounie 26 September 1840.

Agreeably to orders from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces by land and sea, on the Coast of Syria, General Jochmus is appointed Chief of the Staff of the Army of Lebanon.

(signed) Charles Napier.
Commodore.

Levant Papers II, p. 325.

12.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Extract.

Camp of Djounie 26 September 1840.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency, that on the 23 at night 5 battalions of Turkish Infantry, one battalion of Royal Marines, and two companies of Austrian troops were left to cover the camp of Djounie.

The remaining forces of this small army, consisting of 4 battalions Turkish Infantry of Selim Pasha's division, 1 battalion of R. Marines and 2 detachments of Austrian Rocketeers, the whole under the orders of Commodore Napier, were formed in the upper position of this camp, with a view to attack at daybreak of the 24 the advanced guard of Ibrahim Pasha of 1000 men under Emir Massoud, entrenched at Ardali in a very strong mountain position, in order to maintain the Pasha's communication from his Head-Quarters of Merouba with Beyrout.

After a fatiguing march of 5 hours over very precipitous ground, and having forded the Kilbsu River, Commodore Napier menaced the front of the enemy's position with the R. Marines and a battalion of

turks, whilst he ordered me with the remaining 3 battalion to turn the enemy's right flank, which movement I executed without delay, succeeding by the rapidity of my march to cut off the enemy's retreat to the Pasha's Head-Quarters, and thus to make 400 prisoners, and to disperse the remaining force by 11 o'clock a.m.

Our troops bivouacked on the field of battle, and in the neighbouring villages, on the 24 and 25 September.

At night-fall of the latter day the troops had returned into our camp with the exception of one battalion, which remained on the left bank of the Kilbsu, in order to maintain the now open communication Djounie with the mountaineers of the province of Kata . . .

Levant Papers II, p. 324.

13.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private.

Camp of Djounie 2 October 1840.

I hope Your Excellency will be pleased with what we have done. On the 10 September we disembarked, on the 23 we had distributed 20,000 stands of arms, entrenched our lines, formed a corps of about 2000 mountaineers in a body under Sheik Francis (the remaining armed Syrians occupying their own fastnesses and villages) and taken Gjebail, Beitrun and Caiffa. On the 24 we began operations in earnest, against a force of 18,000 Egyptians, Albanians and Druses, under Ibrahim Pasha, Soliman Pasha and Osman Pasha, all within a day's march of us, each of them. On the 28 in consequence of the successful affair at Ardali and the glorious victory of Commodore Napier at Sidon, 26 September, we had 4500 prisoners and deserters, and the enemy was completely baffled¹ on these victories and advantages obtained against forces, three times our number, and commanded by Generals, who since 10 years had continually beaten the Turks.

I must say to the honour of the latter, that they behaved very well, there being now identity of orders and purpose, as all the orders given by the Commodore to the troops on shore are implicitly obeyed, altho' I must confess, that the details of the service, and the want of assistance of good Officers in my department together with the confusion of 5 or 6 different languages present often the greatest difficulties, which, however, as yet have been fortunately overcome, and I hope they will diminish, if Your Excellency will send me out Captain Köpke (Bachri Bey)

¹ The Emir Beshir Cassim came over to the Sultan's cause openly on the 30 September, and waited on the Admiral and on Izzet Mehmed Pasha. He was a few days afterwards proclaimed governing Prince of the Lebanon, in lieu of his uncle the old Emir Beshir.

and Captain Boville, or instead of the latter an Officer who speaks well Turkish.

If we get out 10,000 more men from Constantinople, plenty of ammunition, shoes, clothing, arms for distribution, of which we have none left, and above all money, *and if Commodore Napier* is allowed to go on as he did in Portugal, I promise Your Lordship, that ere the season ends, we shall be master of all the country and sea-coast from Saïda to Tripolis, and perhaps more, but we can do little more at present without reinforcement, stores, and money.

Ibrahim Pasha has made a new fault by scattering his forces, and I hope that ere long Your Lordship will receive good facts of ours, either from Beyrout or from Osman Pasha's camp.

The public spirit is dayly improving, and the enthusiasm for the Sultans cause very great. Women and children receive us with cries of joy, and bring water to our soldiers even during the fight.

The atrocities of Ibrahim Pasha of this last week have made matters worse for him, and the coming over of the Emir Beshir Cassim strenghtens much our cause.

We have just organized a battalion of 800 Egyptian deserters as volunteers; they have entered our division.

* Cfr. Levant Papers II, p. 200 No. 150; p. 232 No. 176.

14.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Head-Quarters Djourie 3 October 1840.

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship two Notes, which I have addressed to H. H. Izzet Mehmet Pasha, they are the indubitable proofs of Ibrahim Pasha's barbarities in the province of Kata, and of his system of intimidation (altho' unsuccessful), to prevent the people from getting arms. — He ordered many women and children to be shot and mutilated — alone in the village of Betzibab 42 of those unfortunate beings were thus murdered after having seen their houses and villages burnt and destroyed. Several wounded women were brought into our hospitals here.

I must also observe to Your Excellency, that from positive reports I know, that the country swarms with French Agents, who do everything in their power to harm the Sultan's cause.

The most active amongst them are a Mr. Perretié and a Mr. Baudin, both Consular Agents. — They have been with all the influential clerical men, telling them, that the English, being *protestants*, wish to exterminate the catholic religion in Mount Lebanon, and hundred other absurdities, such as that 100,000 Frenchmen, 80 Steamers and 40 Line-of-Battle ships are coming out to assist Mehemet Ali.

(Inclosure I in No. 14.)

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A MONSIEUR AVENDIKI
1^{er} DRAGOMAN.

Djounie 3 Octobre 1840.

Je vous envoie un état exact des malheureux, qui on perdu tous leurs biens et qui demandent des rations. Ils sont au nombre de 2820.

L'humanité demande que nous les secourions, et le Commodore Napier espère que S. A. Mehmet Izzet Pasha accède à leurs sollicitations.

Le porteur Elias Elbitar est un honnête homme, qui s'est offert de faire la distribution des rations.

Habitans de Betzibab, hommes	500	
femmes et enfans	2200	
		2720
habitans de Inain el Alak, hommes	30	
femmes et enfans	70	100
		total 2820.

(Inclosure II in No. 14.)

REPORT OF COLONEL OMER BEY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Translation.

Extract.

Der Assad 29 September 1840.

According to the news received the day before yesterday, Ibrahim Pasha and the Emir Massoud with about 3000 to 4000 men, marched from Marush to Bekfaya, and from thence he advanced to burn the villages of Betzibab, Ainlak, Ainar, Kornadischehvan, Kornetshamra, Habus, Knaitar and others

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Extract.

Camp of Djounie 5 October 1840.

In my letter of the 2 instant I had the honour to inform Your Lordship, that in my opinion Ibrahim and Soliman Pashas had committed a new fault in *dividing* their forces, with the view of covering the different provinces, and preventing the peasants from taking arms.

The position of the enemy was in consequence as follows:

Ibrahim Pasha with about 4000 men distributed between Besteddin and Sidon;

Soliman Pasha with about 5000 men in and near Beyrout;
Hassan Bey and Emir Massoud with about 2000 men in the neighbourhood of Bekfaya in the district of Kata;

Osman Pasha with 2500 to 3000 at Misouba in the Kessrouan.

The latter, thus entirely separated from the remaining part of the Egyptian Army by the rapid tho' shallow stream of Kilbsu, but whose banks are precipitous, and form a continuous steep gorge of several hundred feet deep.

Commodore Napier on his return from a reconaissance to Acre in a steamer, being informed of the circumstance, ordered the Emir Beshir Cassim¹ to collect 3000 mountaineers in front of Osman Pasha's position between Merouba and Kaifun, and supported this force by two battalions of Turks and 2 pieces of light Artillery.

During the night of the 3 and 4, Osman Pasha informed of the approach of these Corps decamped, but at daybreak his rearguard was vigorously attacked by the mountaineers, who soon gained ground by rapid marches.

At night-fall the whole of Osman Pascha's forces was outflanked, and turned, and his troops in complete dispersion, 100 men killed, and wounded, 400 to 500 prisoners, the sick, ammunition &c. &c. fell into the hands of Emir Beshir Cassim. The prisoners are now arrived here, 500 to 600 Syrians in the rout dispersed, and went to their homes, abandoning the Egyptian colours, and from *certain* intelligence Osman Pasha himself wounded, reached Zachlé on the Baalbek road with scarcely 1400 men. The whole province of Kessrouan is thus freed from the Egyptians, and there is not a single company of theirs remaining between Djounie and Tripolis, except the garrison of the latter place. This affair is the more important as it is the first victory, obtained by the mountaineers in a body acting *offensively*.

16.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Extract.

Camp of Djounie 7 October 1840.

His Highness Izzet Pasha communicated to me an official letter which he received from Constantinople, announcing to him that the Sublime Porte had appointed me a General of Division.

I hope in the course of this war to prove that this appointment has not been entirely useless: it will be the best mode of expressing my sincere thanks.

¹ The Emir Beshir Cassim, whilst the negotiations with his uncle (the old Emir Beshir) were still going on, acted as a volunteer in the Sultan's cause, but when Mr. Wood and Commodore Napier found out, that the old Emir was playing false, and wanted only to gain time, the Emir Cassim was appointed on the 8 October Governor of the Lebanon, by virtue of an Imperial firman in the keeping of Mr. Wood.

Selim Pasha, also a Ferik, or General of Division, will now command all the troops here, Izzet Pasha having declared that he will only occupy himself with his affairs as Governor General. Our difficulties are diminishing, and if Commodore Napier is allowed to go on as he began, you may expect good news from this quarter, the more so, as by the arrival of Captain Ford we received a new reinforcement of a battalion, and the news of another brigade coming immediately, and more troops later.

We can expect thus to see here soon from 15,000 to 18,000 men, and with that force, if they are tolerable troops, we may hope to do something decisive.

There are no Turkish nor English arms left for distribution; 20,000 have been given out.

If you send us down 10,000 stands more, they will immediately be disposed of.

Levant Papers III, 11.

17.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Head-Quarters Beyrout 12 October 1840.

I had the honour to inform Your Lordship of the causes and the event of the dispersion of Osman Pasha's corps.

Ibrahim Pasha having continued since, notwithstanding that reverse, his system of dividing his forces, in order to cover more ground against the projected armament of the mountaineers, we have persisted on our side, to take advantage of his errors.

On the 8 of October in the afternoon, I occupied the heights of Ardali, where the action of the 24 September had been fought, and the village of Ornachajuen without opposition, with a force of 4 battalions.

During the following night, about 300 armed peasants joined, and I made at daylight on the 9 a reconnoissance on my left, to ascertain the nature of the ground. A skirmish ensued, and the enemy showed about 1500 men under Hassan Bey and Emir Massoud, on the opposite heights of Calat Meidan.

Commodore Napier and Selim Pasha coming to the heights of Ardali on the 9, resolved to drive the enemy from his position, in order to facilitate the operations of the Emir Beshir Cassim, who had been proclaimed governing Prince in lieu of the old Emir Beshir, and directed to cross the Kilbsu and to enter the provinces above Beyrout. For this purpose he had collected a force of mountaineers, and had been provided with 1100 muskets for distribution (the last remaining). Our ultimate object was the attacking and taking of Beyrout, whither Admiral Stopford had gone with part of the squadron. —

The position of the enemy at Calat Meidan however was of prodigious natural strength, being covered by a deep ravine, and presenting three successive lines of entrenchments, the elevation of the position from the depth of the ravine to the highest redoubt, being perhaps 1000 yards, and in many parts the rocks were nearly perpendicular.

Commodore Napier, with the double view of saving a great loss of life on our part, and of obtaining a greater result in victory, directed me to order Omer Bey,¹ who with 5 battalions had been left in our position, above Djourie, to march with 2 of them to Ageltun, there to cross the Dogriver, and to fall on the enemy in his flank and rear. — The Emir Beshir received similar orders.

Shortly afterwards, and during the evening of the 9, we ascertained that Ibrahim Pasha in person had arrived at Calat Meidan, with 2000 of his best troops, viz.: 1200 Albanian body guards, and 800 of what is called his regular guard.

Perceiving finally his fault, this General had ordered also 4 battalions of Soliman Pasha's to join him, and 2000 more men marched from Zachlé, in order to be concentrated in our front.

Not a moment was to be lost, without compromising the column of Omer Bey, and the mountaineers of the Emir Beshir. —

The Commodore ordered up to the heights of Ardali the 3 remaining battalions from Djourie, together with 2 Turkish field-pieces.

At 2 o'clock on the 10 October, we had 7 battalions at Ardali, when the fire of Omer Bey approaching by the road of Bekfaya, was distinctly heard in the enemy's rear.

The following dispositions were then taken for an immediate attack:

One battalion (A.) and the mountaineers (B.) were directed to cross the ravine, which separated us from the enemy, and to arrive on his line of retreat by the road of Brumana (C.).

4 battalions stormed the heights of Calat Meidan (D.D.), two en tirailleurs, two supporting them in closer order, moving by the road.

2 battalions (E.E.) reserves on the heights of Ardali.

After two hours fighting and the display of the most daring gallantry on the part of the Turks, for the élite troops of the hitherto unvanquished Ibrahim stood also manfully to their fortified posts (I.I.I.), facing both attacks, we joined Omer Bey on the heights of Calat Meidan.²

The enemy's three lines of retreat being occupied by our respective corps, viz.: the road to Brumana by our column A.B., and the roads

¹ Omer Bey (now Omer Pasha), in consequence of his successful execution of the prescribed manoeuvre, was recommended by Commodore Napier and by myself for promotion to the rank of Major General. This Officer however was subsequently tried by a court martial (vide letter to Lord Ponsonby [No. 42] 18 November 1840), and I withdrew my recommendation, but it was too late, for Omer Bey had already been promoted to the rank of Major General or Emir Liwa Pasha.

² The heights of Calat Meidan and the village of Bekfaya remained occupied during the night by the mountaineers, who at twelve o'clock had already established a safe communication with the Emir Beshir.

to Bekfaya and Corneil by Omer Bey in F, Ibrahim Pasha's forces were thrown into the gorge G., not 25 men of any of his corps remaining formed and together at sunset, and he himself escaping with difficulty, accompanied by a few horsemen. —

800 prisoners, all his stores and ammunition, and his own standard fell into our hands, a great many more troops will disperse to their homes, or be persecuted by the Emir Beshir, who arrived at three hours' distance from the field of battle at sunset, and communicated to the Commodore, that he was then observing the 2000 men approaching to Ibrahim Pasha's support from Zachlé.¹

In consequence of having been weakened by 4 battalions, by order of Ibrahim, Soliman Pasha withdrew altogether from Beyrout in the night of the 9 October, and concentrated his forces in a camp 1½ hours east from the town, leaving the river between him and the place.

The town was consequently occupied by the English and a battalion of Turks on the 10 October — but the news of Ibrahim Pasha's entire defeat having reached Soliman Pasha's camp, his forces were seized by a panic. He himself, abandoned by his troops, fled in the direction of Damascus with a few squadrons of horse, many of his soldiers dispersed, and a regiment of 2000 men laid down their arms early on

¹ There existed many military and political reasons which made it necessary to operate against Beyrout and its neighbourhood:

1° the general military situation and the chance that considerable forces still might menace the allied camp, notwithstanding the repeated faults of Soliman and Ibrahim Pashas. The first of these Generals might have either disputed our landing, or have attacked us in the following night, and the second ought to have subsequently occupied Mar Elias with 15000 men and 20 guns. — Commodore Napier had given orders eventually to evacuate in this case all the upper positions, leaving it to the choice of General Jochmus to retire towards Djounie and the ships either by his left or by his right. — After the action of the 10 October, when in reference to this state of things General Jochmus asked the Commodore "Well, what do you think *now* of the military capacity of Soliman Pasha?" Napier answered: "I *now* don't care a d—n about him." —

2° The Emir Beshir Cassim, by entering the districts south of the Kilb River, where Druses and Christians live intermixed, would paralyse the inimical dispositions of the former, and enable the latter, to take up arms for the Sultan. —

3° In order to facilitate however this march of the Emir, who arrived from the districts beyond Bekfaya, it was necessary to drive from the neighbourhood of Bekfaya the inimical corps of 1500—2000 men, stationed there under Hassan Bey and the Emir Massoud, a grandson of the old Emir Beshir. —

4° The position taken up by the Ottoman troops at Ardali and Ornachajouen, was well calculated for attaining all these points, and more over it menaced by the road of Brumana the camp of Soliman Pasha at Jamulir, which in fact dispersed instantly after the victory of Calat Meidan.

5° It was desirable that about six hundred families, who were rationed as refugees in the allied camp, should be enabled to return to their homes, whence they had been driven by the barbarities of Ibrahim Pasha. —

This General after the affair of the 24 September had ordered the villages in the neighbourhood of Ornachajouen and Ardali to be sacked and burnt. His soldiers had horribly illtreated the inhabitants, had mutilated little children, and cut off the breasts of women. —

the 11 at Beyrout, and gave up the entrenched camp with 19 pieces of Artillery, ammunition, stores &c. &c.

Our success has been complete. The Turkish troops fought like they did in the times of Soliman the Great.

Levant Papers III, 11.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Head-Quarters Beyrout 12 October 1840.

My Lord,

Commodore Napier having given up his command of the forces landed in Syria, since the arrival of Sir Charles Smith, I have the honour of transmitting to Your Lordship a return of the respective forces and results of the operations in Mount Lebanon from the 10 September to the 10 October 1840, whilst the combined forces were under the command of Commodore Napier.

I have &c.

(signed) A. Jochmus.

His Highness Izzet Mehmet Pasha, Vice-Roy of Syria and Egypt.

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief. Commodore Napier, commanding a squadron and the forces of operation.

Selim Ferik Pasha (Lieutenant-General), commanding a division. Jochmus Ferik Pasha (Lieutenant-General), Chief of the General-Staff.

Prince Emir Beshir Cassim, commanding the Mountaineers of Lebanon.

Turkish forces:

1st Brigade } 1st regiment 4 battalions
 Major-General } 4500 men
 Chalid Bey } 2d regiment 4 battalions
 2d brigade Turkish 3 battalions }
 Deserters as Volunteers 1 battalion } 2000 "

6500 men

Armed Mountaineers acting in corps
 2500 men.

British forces:

Royal Marines Lieutenant-Colonel Walker
 2 battalions disembarked 1500 men
 Austrian Rocketeers 160 "

1660 men

Besides 22,000 muskets have been distributed to the Mountaineers between Tripolis and Saïda, who remain in their villages but act as Guerillas Bands.

Egyptian Army in the Lebanon, from the 10 September till 10 October 1840.

His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, Commander-in-Chief.

Osman Pasha, commanding a division, Lieutenant-General. Soliman Pasha, Lieutenant-General, Chief of the Staff.

Hassan Pasha, Major-General, commanding a brigade. Emir Massoud and Emir Chalil, commanding the Druses.

The Emir Beshir, commanding the Egyptian Partisans in the Lebanon.

Distribution of the regular troops and Albanians.

At Saïda	3000 men	} under Ibrahim and Soliman Pashas.
" Beyrout and neighbourhood	7000 "	
" Beteddin, Cornicil &c.	6000 "	} under Hassan Bey.
" Beckfaya &c.	1500 "	
" Merouba &c.	2500 "	} under Osman Pasha.
Armed Druses	20000 men	
	4000 "	
	total 24000 men	

Remains of this army after the Battle of Calat Meidan 10 October 1840.

Under Ibrahim, Soliman, Osman, Hassan Pashas retreated to Zachlé	4000 men
Prisoners made and deserters mostly sent to the coast, Cyprus &c.	9500 "
Killed and wounded	1500 "
Syrians deserted to their homes	5000 "
	20000 men

The above 4000 armed Druses are either gone to their homes or are now fighting under the new Emir Beshir Cassim, Prince of Lebanon, against the Egyptians.

This total force of 24,000 men does not comprise the garrison of Tripolis and neighbourhood, comprising a division of 6000 regular troops and a mixed force of 2500 men under Emir Mechid at Ainetta, between Tripolis and Baalbek. —

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Confidential.

Djounie near Head-Quarters of Beyrout
12 October 1840.

If the Egyptian army in Syria has been tolerably correctly evaluated at an *effective* force of 60,000 men
and if the losses of Ibrahim Pasha from the 10 September to the 10 October have diminished it by 16,000 „
there remain still regular forces 44,000 men¹
distributed from Palestine to the Taurus.

Of those we know to be

Acre and that part of Syria about	10,000 men ²
between Tripolis and Djebel Akkar	7,000 „
Ainetta &c. &c.	2,000 „
Zachlé, the remains of Ibrahim's defeated army of the Lebanon	4,000 „
the same place reinforcement arrived	1,500 „
	<hr/>
	24,500 men
aving for the forces in the lines of the Taurus, in Aleppo, Baalbek, Homs &c. &c.	19,500 „
	<hr/>
	Total 44,000 men

It is therefore evident, that *for the present* Ibrahim Pasha is reduced entirely to a defensive system in Syria, and the views which I proposed to Your Lordship in my first dispatches on the probabilities of not passing the Taurus have thus proved correct.

The system of the war being therefore tolerably well ascertained, the means of action also become more clear.

1. The most formidable part of Ibrahim Pasha's forces is his Cavalry, it is still intact, whilst his Infantry is completely demoralized.

The war in the mountains and the taking of the places on the coast, where Cavalry cannot act in bodies, are therefore still the most favourable operations for the Sultan's forces. — We must still avoid the plains, and in fact our troops, Turkish as well as English, are not accustomed to meet Cavalry in a plain.

2. The Lebanon must become our principal basis of operation — about 25,000 allied mountaineers will soon receive something like a guerrilla organisation under the new Emir Beshir, and altho' large bodies

¹ Exclusively of the corps beyond the Syrian frontiers at Orfa &c. &c. &c. estimated by the Emir Beshir at 12 to 15,000 men; whereof many irregulars.

² Later and correcter information gives the force in Acre and Palestine at about 5000 men in and near Acre and 2000 men in Jaffa, Jerusalem &c. &c. and about 7000 men.

of them will not act together, because it is impossible to make them leave their homes and respective provinces and districts, yet they will form a strong first barrier for any Egyptian enterprize against the sea-towns now occupied by the regular forces of this army, but in order to complete this basis of operation Tripolis ought to be taken without loss of time.

3. The Lebanon from Saïda to Tripolis will form an extensive and safe receptacle for all the Syrians and Turkish soldiers forcibly serving in Ibrahim's army. His losses in this desertion will tell twofold, for many of the deserters will fight against him.

4. It becomes necessary to prevent Ibrahim Pasha from collecting again a large force in a compact body. He must already keep a strong garrison in Acre and his fortified lines of the Taurus must be guarded, if he will not run the risk of losing all his guns, ammunition, stores &c. &c. in that part of Syria, Aleppo &c. &c. — In order then to obtain the result of his keeping strong garrisons in those lines, the Turkish forces in Asia minor ought to menace them in the direction of Diarbekir, Bir &c. &c., collecting that army in *one large Corps*, as the defiles of the Taurus will soon be impassable, but the Pasha commanding ought to have *positive orders only to menace those points*, as we must not compromise our victories *here*. No second battle of Nezib must be fought, nor the Turkish troops exposed "*in plain*".

In fact Ibrahim would be delighted to fall on a Turkish Pasha to take his revenge in the North for his defeat in the South, and in my opinion he also will succeed in gaining a victory over any *Turkish Pasha* if they manage things as usual. Your Lordship knows, that my first and important duty is to tell exactly what my convictions are, and I must say, tho' I should be convicted of vanity, that had it not been for Commodore Napier and myself establishing something like order and real military combinations in our operations of the last months, the Turkish forces would have been obliged long ago to embark for Cyprus!! and Your Lordship can not doubt of it, if I tell you that the preparatory orders were given to a similar purpose, because from the Admiral (Sir R. Stopford) downwards every one despaired of success, and Izzet Pasha even after the taking of Saïda, when the Admiral had announced to him officially that the ships could not remain on the coast, declared to me openly, that he would not stand alone a siege in Saïda, but would embark for Cyprus. — In the same way we should have *lost* 3000 prisoners on the 10 October instead of *making* them at Calat Meidan, had Commodore Napier not taken upon himself to fight the action *after he had received written orders* from the Admiral and Sir Charles Smith, who had just arrived, *to return* to Djounie on the 10 October in the morning, informing Omer Bey and the Emir Beshir Cassim, who *were then just coming into the enemy's rear* of his retreat towards our old camp, which trouble very likely would have been *safed us*, by Ibrahim himself, marching upon them, and making them all prisoners, for they could not have got back over the Kilbsu or Dogriver in presence of his superior forces. —

Altho' Selim Pasha is a better soldier than Izzet Pasha, yet even he if left to himself, would do nothing, as all of them are too fond of smoking their pipes and sipping coffee, whilst Commodore Napier and myself are 16 hours on horseback out of 24, reconnoitring and preparing our movements.

5. Whilst the lines of the Taurus and Aleppo will be thus only menaced by the troops at present in Asia minor and the neighbouring provinces, the principal forces now collected near Constantinople ought to be sent to this coast, so as to enable us to operate with 20,000 men. If 3000 or 4000 Austrians, troops seasoned to a hot mountainous climate, such as Dalmatia, were to join us, we would be "sure" of taking Acre, and the war would be finished early next spring, for there remains scarcely any doubt, that the districts of Damascus, Naplous &c. are only waiting for the opportunity to connect themselves with us in order to rise en masse like the Lebanon. Perhaps the whole thing will be done without the Austrians, if we know how to follow up our victories, cautiously but steadily, altho' with boldness and decision, but the *arrival of the Germans* would make the business more prompt and certain.

I have &c.

(signed) A. Jochmus.

I shall return only to-morrow or next day to Beyrout, where I shall see Sir Charles Smith, with whose views on the further campaign I am as yet unacquainted, only having seen him for a moment and being sent here to evacuate this camp.

20.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Confidential.

Djounie near Head-Quarters of Beyrout
13 October 1840.

I have already reported to Your Excellency the serious consequences which I apprehended from the system, adopted by Izzet Pasha, in not paying regularly the muleteers who carry our stores and ammunition. A great deal of discontent has thus been created, for abuses in war, if not instantly punished, engender new abuses of various kinds, and the people of this neighbourhood begin to send in numerous complaints of ill treatment, and say openly that the Turks treat them worse than the Egyptians, but the Pasha takes no steps for remedies, and his Mudir Effendi and other employés continue to take by force means of transport, tho' they find a thousand excuses if Commodore Napier or myself discover their avarice.

I am afraid that Izzet Mehmet Pasha is a bad choice. Personally I manage to get on tolerably well with him, because I treat him with

great deference, and all my demands on him are put in the shape of orders received from my superiors, but Commodore Napier has been obliged several times to take strong steps, and the Admiral himself I understand is not all pleased with him. The fact is, that he is a man, who will descend to the lowest frauds and lies in order to gain his personal purposes and objects, tho' they be in exact opposition to certain success and victory. I shall give some instances which I can vouchsafe to Your Excellency.

On the 2 October Emir Beshir Cassim had been most positively ordered by Commodore Napier that *one* battalion and no more should support him in his expedition against Osman Pasha, because Soliman and Ibrahim were still menacing our front. I sent away consequently one battalion to Ageltun and went to sleep at the out-posts. During the night Izzet Pasha, who knew nothing of the nature of the operation, or even the names of the places occupied, took it into his head to send 2 battalions more under Omer Bey, and in the morning I found my whole left wing gone. Commodore Napier getting very angry, the Pasha ordered Omer Bey back 3 hours afterwards, and directed him to deny openly that he had been at *Ageltun* at all!!!

In the same way he insisted upon Saïda being evacuated, because as he should be obliged to pass the winter there, he would not run the risk of a siege! —

Early on the 11 October after our victory at Calat Meidan, Commodore Napier not yet informed of the complete dispersion and surrender of Soliman Pasha's camp, ordered the troops to move on Beyrout with a view of getting hold of the enemy's Artillery &c. &c., but Izzet Pasha who had come up after the action was afraid of returning to Djounie, where his household *was not yet embarked*, with one battalion alone, and insisted upon having four.

He then took refuge to the following inventions in the course of half an hour of discussion:

answer:

1. The troops have no provisions and cannot march without their knapsacks left at Djounie . .

2. The troops are sick from fatigue, and *it will rain*.

3. I received this moment news (a false message) that Ibrahim is returning with a great force to his position of Calat Meidan.

4. I now receive a messenger telling that Ibrahim is come to

1. All the battalions have bread for two days, and there is more in the church depot, the knapsacks shall be embarked.

2. The troops can march very well, and in war there is no rain nor sunshine.

3. We have positive news, that he flies in the direction of Zachlé.

4. We have on the contrary this very moment received news,

Soliman Pasha's camp (another false message), and our troops are not sufficient to attack both together, we must all return to Djounie together.

that Soliman has fled and that his men lay down their arms.

The Commodore then declared, that if the troops did not instantly march, he would return on board his ship, and they consequently were ordered to move.

Your Lordship is now acquainted with the difficulties to overcome in this campaign. I could add a hundred other examples, false messages, lies &c. &c., and all for personal purposes. — Your Excellency will also see how absolutely necessary it is, that we should have special funds of our own espionage — hitherto the Admiral pays this sort of contingent account, but this cannot continue for ever.

21.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received at Beyrout 13 October 1840.)

Private.

30 September 1840.

My dear General,

I have written an official letter, notifying to you your appointment as Ferik. You will receive the Formal Paper and the Nisham. — You will observe the condition stated in my letter, upon which this rank is given, and you will settle with Sir Charles Smith the best mode of carrying that condition into effect without giving dissatisfaction to Izzet Pasha, the Chief of whose staff you are to be. — It is very important to avoid shewing more than necessity may absolutely require, the existence of the real authority held by Sir Charles Smith over the Pasha. This is the opinion of Sir Charles, but he will not fail to exert that authority with which he is invested by the Sultan, if it should be necessary so to do. — Izzet Pasha has been ordered by the S. Porte to act in conformity with the views of Sir C. Smith, but he might take it into his head to disregard his instructions, and therefore I have procured from the Sultan a more direct, full and positive command, that the Pasha shall follow implicitly the military orders given by Sir Charles Smith, and this supreme command will be produced by Sir Charles Smith *if necessary* but *not* unless there shall be a real and pressing necessity of which Sir Charles Smith will be the *sole judge*. — I hope, that if you should see or discover any appearance or intention in Izzet Pasha to neglect or to counteract any of Sir Charles Smith's military orders, you will be able to make the Pasha feel, that he will expose himself to very serious evils by so doing, and will find, that the Sultan

is too much attached to the British Government not to inflict exemplary punishment upon the Pasha, if he should venture to be guilty of such an act of disobedience to the orders of his Sovereign. I *know* Izzet Pasha, and that he is capable of any thing, but I believe he is a clever man and will comprehend, that he is not as strong as the British Government — and he may know that other men who have been Grand Visiers as well as himself, have fallen before much less influence than the British Government can exercise — and that the influence of Russia and Austria will also be exerted to chastize whoever shall venture to throw obstacles in the way of success &c. &c.

I commit these things to your prudence and ability, my dear General, and I have entire confidence in your secrecy and delicacy and zeal for the cause. —

I had an ulterior view in getting you the Military Rank, namely that of facilitating our plan of placing you at the head of the Albanians in the Ottoman service, when this Syrian affair shall be over — and that view I think will be attained. — You will have with you Ibrahim Bey, who has undertaken to *bring over* the Albanians in the service of Ibrahim, he is a clever fellow and expects large rewards if he is successful, but you had best never let him out of your reach unnecessarily, and keep a watch upon him, for he may be and is a slippery fellow. — You must however *show* him great confidence. — I have asked Sir Charles Smith to allow Captain Edmonds *who you knew here*, to be a volunteer. Pray be kind to him. He is a clever man. There will be a Baron Dumont also in the Cavalry volunteer. He is connected with some of the first and highest officers in the Austrian army and has been recommended by the Austrian General to the Internuncio — you may be useful to him! Sir Charles Smith seems to like having him in the capacity of volunteer.

I cannot tell you more that will be useful than you will learn from the acts of the Porte.

Believe me to be yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

Cfr. Levant Papers II, p. 327 No. 242 and inclosure in No. 242.

22.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Djounie 13 October 1840.

I have had the honour of receiving Your Lordship's letter of the 30 September informing me, that His Majesty the Sultan has been pleased to appoint me a Ferik in the Ottoman army at Your Lordship's solicitation. It will be my duty to show myself worthy of such eminent

a mark of confidence, and Your Excellency may rest persuaded, that in all I shall exactly and rigidly conform to the directions of Sir Charles Smith, persuaded as I am from experience, that unity of combination is the main spring of success in war.

23.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received at Beyrout 13 October 1840.)

5 October 1840.

My dear General,

Count Nugent desires me to recommend him to you. He has been sent here by Lord Palmerston, and his own earnest desire goes to Syria. His object is to be useful in any way. I cannot pretend to suggest what should be done — and I only tell you the facts.

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

24.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Beyrout 14 October 1840.

In the night of the 11 and 12 October the old Emir Beshir being apprised of the results of the battle at Calat Meidan, quitted his residence of Beteddin and surrendered to the Anglo-Turkish forces of Saïda. He is accompanied by nearly the whole of his family.

Ibrahim Pasha having been joined by the 2000 men, arriving from Aleppo and Zachlé to his support during the night of the 11 October, was then marching on Beteddin, but informed of the Emir's flight and defection he turned into the road of Zachlé, destroying during his retreat several of the villages and properties belonging to the old Emir Beshir or his friends.

3000 mountaineers between Beteddin Deir el Kammar and Saïda descended to the latter port for arms, and the 3000 stands of arms taken from the Egyptian prisoners and deserters of the 10 and 11 October have been sent up to them. We have not a single musket left, and there are thousand still to be armed. There is not a single Egyptian soldier left between Saïda and Tripolis¹ on the coast or in the mountains.

Commodore Napier has several times proposed during these last days to embark a force to take this latter place, which is certain to

¹ Tripolis alone continues to be garrisoned by Egyptians.

make only a feeble resistance, or none at all, but he has not been listened to.

I hope Beyrout will not become a second Capua.

After victory rapidity is required in *following it up*, before the enemy has *time to recover*.

25.

VISCOUNT PONSONBY TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

(Received 7 November 1840.)

Therapia 19 October 1840.

My Lord,

I have the honour to inclose dispatches I received yesterday from Syria, brought by Colonel Hodges.

I beg to call your attention to Mr. Wood's dispatches. In the dispatch from General Jochmus will be found most satisfactory proof of the sagacity with which Commodore Napier adapts his measures to the circumstances under which he acts, and the felicitous audacity with which he carries them into execution.

What has been done in Syria by Commodore Napier, by General Jochmus, and by Captain Walker,¹ and the brave men under their command, has destroyed the spell of Mehemet Ali's fortune, and shows that Ibrahim's boasted skill and valour are nothing when met by such men as those above named. The Turkish soldiers, heretofore cowed by defeats, due to the ignorance of their Generals, are now said to be elated with a just confidence in themselves under able commanders, and have shown that valour for which their nation has been formerly so highly celebrated.

It will not be the fault of the soldiers hereafter, if Syria and Egypt be not restored to the possession of their legitimate Sovereign.

I have &c.

(signed) Ponsonby.

Levant Papers III, p. 6.

26.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Confidential.

Beyrout 23 October 1840.

My Lord,

I have had the honour to write to Your Lordship on the 20 instant.

¹ Royal Navy.

It has been my system to tell to Your Lordship without reserve my opinion on the state of matters here, and if I peruse my correspondence I find, that events generally speaking have justified my previsions. I have great obligations to Your Lordship, and I know how much you have at heart the success of our cause, which I ought to call yours, for without Your Excellency there would have been no campaign of Syria. It would therefore be ungrateful on my part on one side, it would be a want of honourable frankness on the other, if I did not acquaint Your Lordship with the exact situation of affairs.

We are going on as badly as possibly can be imagined after the immense success of our campaign up to the battle of Calat Meidan on the 10 October.

We ought to have embarked a division of troops on the 12 or 13 October latest, for the attack of Tripolis, which was surrounded by the mountaineers, begging our assistance, yet we allowed 4400 men of the garrison to escape on the 16, who would have laid down their arms, without firing a shot. No entreaties of Commodore Napier could induce the Admiral to send a single man.

The Emir Beshir Cassim had 5000 men at Hamona, observing Ibrahim Pasha this fortnight, begging of us to send him a couple of field-pieces and two battalions, *not to fight*, but only to give confidence to the mountaineers, who would swell immediately to 8 or 10,000 armed men, cutting off all communications of Ibrahim's, if they would not prepare him the fate of Osman Pasha at Merouba.

We have done nothing, not a single man has moved, and we had 11 battalions doing nothing in Beyrout, and the Emir Beshir has actually written to Mr. Wood and the Pasha, that he would resign altogether his command, if the thing went still on as of late, his troops from 5000 men having dwindled away to 1000, not one oke of biscuit nor corn having been sent to him. — Two days ago therefore some provisions were dispatched, but in the meanwhile Ibrahim has been allowed to have his communication open, and he has again collected a force of 12,000 troops with 2 regiments of Cavalry and a good Artillery, which is one of the events pointed out in my memorial on this war, dated 12 October, as likely to occur, if not prevented by following up our success, as might be done *without* in the least exposing us or extending ourselves too much, only by harassing the enemy. —

The provinces near St. Jean d'Acre send deputations after deputations, all being ready to rise, and some having risen partially and even defeated the Egyptians under Brigadier Omer Bey; demanding some arms and a demonstration in their favour — all reports agreeing since 10 or 12 days, that the garrison under the then commanding officers was ready to give in (as Your Excellency will perceive from the enclosed report), if some ships and steamboats with troops presented themselves, but nothing having been done. Sheriff Pasha, one of the staunchest supporters of Mehemet Ali, has got into the place, the Governor has been superseded, and we may expect resistance, if the

troops do not openly revolt. — It is my opinion, that we have not forces enough here to make a regular prolonged attack on St. Jean d'Acre, but nothing could be endangered by our sending down 5 line-of-battle ships with troops to try the garrison.

Add to this, that all the Pashas here are furious, and that they have taken a dislike to Sir Charles Smith, whom they accuse to treat them personally „*cavalierement*”, and Your Lordship must be prepared to hear of some reverse in this quarter, such as Ibrahim having again entered the mountains, and blockading us “on large” in Saïda and Beyrout, disarming the peasantry and burning the houses of those who have taken up arms. If such a misfortune happens, Your Lordship must calculate, that the armament given to the mountaineers is lost, it will be given to the old Emir Beshir's party, and the Lebanon will *not rise again* in our favour.

The magnificent beginning of our campaign will all go for nothing. If Commodore Napier and myself had been allowed to go on for one month longer, the enemy would have received two or three blows more, which would have proved deadly, and very likely we might have obtained a capitulation for the evacuation of Syria, if not more.

I tell Your Lordship very frankly that the arrival of Sir Charles Smith has completely changed the face of things here. — His health is so broken down, that he himself says that every hour he stays in the sun endangers his life. He has not been able to go even as yet a step beyond the city walls.

I do not know if it comes from illness and years, but I confess I never saw a person less qualified for his present station from irascibility, indolence, and as it appears to me *decidedly narrow scope of mind* than the man now unfortunately charged with directing the movements of war. — He seems entirely incapable of comprehending the description of people he has to deal with, and the nature and the genius of this mountain warfare, and what is worse from fear of showing that he does not, he will not consult others, who do or who are capable to act. — He has shown the most unwarrantable jealousies of Commodore Napier, for no other earthly reason, than that this latter had been fortunate enough to “have success” on shore.

As for myself I am personally on very good terms with him, and Your Lordship may be persuaded, that bad as I conceive his system to be, I shall straine every nerve to assist him in order at least to prevent disasters. — My only hope is the demoralization of the enemy, so much so, that I do not even now despair of all success, if we show ourselves along the coast, but all is mere chance, and I only can trust to our good star in this campaign. — If Your Excellency wants to establish some probability of victory, the Admiral must go before Alexandria or into a winter port, where he can *waver* without injury to the cause, Sir Charles Smith recalled to Constantinople to be consulted on the general plan of the campaign and remain there or go to England, and Commodore Napier and myself left *to fight in Syria*.

The duty of telling my sincere conviction is fulfilled, but Your Lordship knows me enough to be persuaded, that nothing of this comes over my lips. It is told in confidence as I am bound to do in duty and honour, whilst Your Excellency may rely upon my acting as a good soldier according to Sir Charles Smith's directions, as long as he remains here.

I am very sorry to hear, that Mr. Wood is entirely adrift not knowing what to do since he is placed under Sir Charles Smith's directions. Mr. Wood who has done so much and who has the cause so much at heart, is tied down here, scarcely employed as a Dragoman and prevented from acting according to his own mode, which has been so successful. I can assure Your Excellency that he is in despair and has the most sinister forebodings.

I receive various and certain reports of the French trying to form an inimical party to us, and to create a civil war in the Lebanon. They promise to their partisans clandestinely to land 10,000 muskets, and some intrigue is also on foot about delivering up St. Jean d'Acre to the French. The Austrian Consul-General Mr. de Laurin who goes to Constantinople, will tell all about it.

—
27.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO THE EMIR HANDJAR AT BAALBEK.

Extract.

Quartier Général Beyrout
26 Octobre 1840.

Nous avons ici la nouvelle que vous avez battu une partie des troupes égyptiennes. Je vous félicite de cette victoire, et le Pacha Gouverneur Général et le Commandant Général des troupes européennes l'ont appris avec plaisir.

Les Emirs de Hasbeya et de Rasheya ainsi que le Sheik Hamed el Bey et le Sheik Hussein Sulman sont nos amis.

Ils ont occupé toutes les routes d'Acre à Zachlé, et il ne peut arriver à Ibrahim Pacha ni vivres ni munitions ni lettres de St. Jean d'Acre.

(signed) A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-General.

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28.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Confidential.

Head-Quarters Beyrout 27 October 1840.

I had the honour to write to Your Lordship on the 23 instant. — We have since received several steamers and transports with reinforcements from Constantinople, and we have actually under arms 6000 men

at Beyrout and 4000 men at Saïda, besides 60 men in the castle of Tripolis. —

The news that Ibrahim Pasha has concentrated again 12,000 men in and near Zachlé is confirmed, but since the Emir Beshir writes, that one of his regiments mutinied and disbanded on the road to Aleppo, so that actually there remain with Ibrahim 10,000. — The *Syrian* soldiers of Ibrahim desert in shoals from all places. He is master of the plains of Baalbek, and as we unfortunately continue to remain doing nothing here, instead of supporting the forces of Emir Beshir, with a good corps of Infantry in the mountains (which might be done without a *shadow* of danger, for their retreat on Saïda and Beyrout would always be open), he sends out moveable columns of 2000 men and more, drives back the small detachments of mountaineers, and scours all the declivities of the hills. — From the sole neighbourhood of Rasheya he carried off 7000 head of cattle and large quantities of grain. This has the double disadvantage of exhausting the resources of our friends, and of procuring him supplies without which he would be starved, for he can receive nothing from St. Jean d'Acree, the Sheiks Hussein Sulman, Hamed el Bey, Said Abdul Ali and the Emir of Hasbeya and Rasheya having declared for the Sultan, and occupied all the mountain passes from Acree to the neighbourhood of Damascus, defeating the forces who made a sortie from St. Jean d'Acree under Omer Bey, Brigade General, and driving them back actually into the fortress.

The Houran also begins to move, and 200 horsemen under one of Ibrahim Pasha's former Lieutenant Colonel passed over to us, and presented themselves here with horses and complete equipment of irregular cavalry at Head-Quarters. They return to-morrow to the Houran and neighbourhood of Damascus with orders to intercept as much as possible the road from Damascus to Zachlé, which is the only road still left open to Ibrahim.

The effect of the battle of Calat Meidan is now felt "par contre-coup" thro' the whole country. If we were to operate as we ought in the Lebanon, the effect on the country people would be such, that Ibrahim would be completely surrounded and much annoyed.

We hear, *but this requires still confirmation*, that the Egyptian troops near Tarsus and Adana surrendered to the Sultan, and that some Cavalry from the eastern lines of the Taurus presented themselves at Malatia.

The Mustechar Selami Effendi is the only man of business amongst the Turkish Pashas, and has done more good in 8 days, than Izzet and Selim Pasha in 6 weeks. Selim however is a good and loyal man, and I should say exactly the reverse of Izzet Mehmet. Fortunately he shot himself with a pistol thro' the foot, and is laid up, which prevents much mischief.

I am sorry to say, that the Turkish Pashas and Sir Charles Smith are on the worst terms possible.

29.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received at Beyrout 29 October 1840.)

Therapia 22 October 1840.

My dear General,

You will, I am confident, be assured of the very great joy with which I have heard of your great services and brilliant conduct. I am sorry, that my applause can be of no value to you, as I am no soldier, were it otherwise, I would heap it on you.

I have sent in to the Porte a list of the things you desired should be sent to you. I believe I have done every thing you wished. I have taken such ships as seemed to me best to get Captain Boville sent out to you. — I do not yet know how they will turn out.

I entreat you to exert every nerve to prevent delay in the operations of the campaign! It is *madness* to delay because of the season of the year. — It is not to be tolerated, that Mehemet Ali and the French should be allowed the time they so earnestly desire to have for the organization of their force, and the working of their intrigues. — I am certain, that at *home* the capture of St. Jean d'Acre will be a subject of the greatest joy. — I believe it to be easy to those who are resolute, and I have little doubt of its leading to the fall of Alexandria, if only a few shots be fired into the palace of the Pasha. Take my word for it, that delay will be most severely be criticized at home, and that better reasons must be given for it to escape censure than the plea of bad weather! — If you *stop* now, you will allow time for intrigues of *those around you* to sow discord, and to excite distrust and jealousy in your army. — It will abate the ardour and confidence inspired by victory — it will diminish the panick of the enemy, and if you wait till spring, you will find that to be difficult, nay perhaps impossible, what may now be easy. — Take care not to lose the laurels you have won. — Do not let timid counsels do that what *french intrigue* has failed to perform against you.

Adieu

yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

30.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Extract. Confidential.

Beyrout 30 October 1840.

I have received Your Excellency's kind letter of the 22 instant . . .

By the date of this letter Your Excellency will perceive that unfortunately we have allowed three of the finest weeks by sea and by land

to elapse without doing any thing, but circumstances and the vibration of the victory of Calat Meidan which broke the spell of Ibrahim Pasha over his troops and army, have done more than we deserve. I have already told you, that the communication between Acre and Ibrahim is completely cut off. Between the Mustechar, Selim Pasha and myself (Izzet being unwell) we have taken measures to surround him completely by the appointment of Sheik Abdul Cader to command the mountaineers between Tripolis and Homs &c. &c., Emir Handjar those of Baalbek and of the Anti-Lebanon, and Ali Aga Kurdli for the neighbourhood of Ageltun and Connetra, so that the semicircle from the Houran by Damascus, Baalbek, Homs to Tripolis will be occupied by our light troops, cutting off all supplies for the enemy's camp by the only roads of Homs and Damascus as yet left open to him. This operation would have been carried into execution much more vigorously with more men and confidence on the part of the mountaineers, if we had been able to induce Sir Charles Smith to send even temporarily a few battalions to the Emir Beshir, who has again collected 3500 men since they have finally sent him some provisions to keep them from starvation in the barren hills he must occupy. Sir Charles however could not be brought to move, and it is with the greatest difficulty that he even speaks to men like the Mustechar and Selim Pasha, except at *office hours*, of which office hours the Turks know nothing. It was by the greatest exertions, that I prevented Selim Pasha from taking his troops and marching up to the Emir Beshir *without* asking Sir Charles. He was furious on account of our unnecessary delays. — Mr. Wood and myself have even succeeded in more, and induced the Pashas to make a promise to Sir Charles, allowing him even to interfere in the smallest details of their service, to which he has no right by his Firman which he has produced, expressing however *his doubts*, that it gave him all necessary authority, so that between these untimely expressed doubts, the pedantry of Sir Charles Smith, his illtreatment of the Turks, and the wounded pride of their principal men, I can assure Your Lordship, that Mr. Wood and myself had no easy course to steer, but setting all personal feelings aside, and looking only to the good of the cause we have reestablished at least an apparent reconciliation, but I am afraid that undue interference in details and little acts of unnecessary show of authority will spoil all again.

A French man-of-war steamer runs between Alexandria and all the places on the coast of Syria, communicating Mehemet Ali's orders, landing agents, and bringing back to Egypt news, intelligence &c., they landed this trip four¹ french engineers at Acre.

¹ There were not *four* french engineers, but a polish Officer Captain Pursesky and a french non-commissioned Officer were landed at Acre *sent by Count Waleasky* from Egypt.

31.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A MUSTAPHA NOURY PACHA,

Ministre de la Guerre à Constantinople.

Beyroul 1 Novembre 1840.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir par l'entremise de Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de la Grande Bretagne le Diplome de la Sublime Porte, la Décoration et le Sabre, que le Gouvernement Impérial a bien voulu m'envoyer, lors de ma nomination à l'emploi de Ferik Pacha dans l'Armée Ottomane.

Sensible à l'honneur et à la haute marque de confiance qui me sont dévolus, j'espère dans le courant de cette campagne de m'en rendre digne en contribuant autant que me le permettront mes faibles moyens au succès et à la gloire des armes de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan Abdul Mechid notre auguste maître.

J'ai l'honneur &c.

A. Jochmus.

32.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Head-Quarters St. Jean d'Acre
4 November 1840 9 o'clock a.m.

St. Jean d'Acre was occupied this morning an hour before daylight. My Aid-de-Camp, Count Nugent, and the Archduke of Austria were the first¹ to land at that hour and beating the charge, attacked the citadel, where however they found no resistance, the garrison surrendering.

The fire began yesterday afternoon at 3 o'clock and lasted till sunset. All the ships of the British, Austrian and Turkish force anchored at $\frac{1}{4}$ range of gunshot, and opened nearly simultaneously on the place. There were 8 ships of the line, 8 frigates and smaller vessels and 4 steamers, battering the two sea-faces of St. Jean d'Acre, and never was a fire so murderous and destructive kept up with more coolness and precision. At 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ o'clock p.m. a shell blew up the principal powder magazine. 2 battalions were thereby entirely annihilated, many of their mangled bodies falling into the sea.² — No resistance was offered after this, an immense breach being made in the centre

¹ These officers commanded the first *European* troops that landed, during the night, but Admiral Walker had already sent before them 300 men of a Turkish battalion from his ship to occupy a couple of the land gates of the fortress.

² Colonel Schultz (egyptian engineer) stated to Count Zichy, that 900 men were blown up. (Count Zichy 10 October 1842.)

wall of the land-face, and the Artillery of the castles was entirely silenced.¹

During the night several deserters were coming off, informing Admiral Walker that the greater part of the garrison was leaving the place, which was consequently occupied early in the morning, but except 600 Cavalry and a mounted battery² of 8 pieces, all the garrison was thrown back on the town by the mountaineers of the neighbourhood, and nearly 3000 are as yet made prisoners, amongst them Colonel Schultz, the principal engineer of Syria, a Pole, under *french* protection. I sent him a prisoner on board the *Edinburgh*, he is badly wounded.

We have as yet not found out the traces of the other *french* engineer officers, who defended the place.

The stores taken are immense, amongst them all the guns lost at the battle of Nisib.

There is now remaining only one regiment between this and *Egypt*, about two thousand men at and near Jaffa and Jerusalem. I am trying to persuade the Admiral to send off immediately 2 line-of-battle ships and a steamer to catch them, I am sure they would surrender, and with some vigilance and activity and supporting the mountaineers, Ibrahim Pasha must be our prisoner ere long. The blow at St. Jean d'Acre will tell well in Europe and *Egypt*.

33.

COUNT NUGENT A.D.C. TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Beyrout 15 November 1840.

Sir,

In consequence of your directions I here have the honour of submitting some details of what came under my personal observation during the attack upon St. Jean d'Acre.

On the 3 instant at one o'clock, and after you had left the *Princess Charlotte* and gone aboard of the *Edinburgh*, I received the following orders from Sir C. Smith:

"A detachment of Royal sappers and miners with powderbags, 20 British, and as many Austrian and Turkish Marines, are to be put under your orders. — You form the advanced guard of General Joch-

¹ Only a couple of guns on the north-west face of Acre continued to fire till half an hour after sunset against the "*Revenge*", "*Powerful*" and "*Princess Charlotte*".

² These Cavalry and Artillery were stationed 15 minutes ride N.N.E. from Acre near the garden of Abdullah Pasha.

³ A polish officer and a french non-commissioned officer sent by Count Walewski from *Egypt*.

mus's colonne d'attaque for the assault, you are to facilitate the advance of this column by blowing and removing any impediment in its way, further orders you'll receive from General Jochmus himself." — I then went on board the Edinburgh.

About midnight I was walking the quarterdeck with the officer of the watch, when a rocket rose from the Turkish flag-ship. Admiral Walker, on its being reported to Captain Henderson, he sent a boat to enquire the cause, I went in this boat. —

Admiral Walker had received intelligence, that the Commander, on part of the garrison, had abandoned the place, — and that he had sent a boat to report this to Sir R. Stopford, he then directed me to return on board the Edinburgh, communicate this intelligence to you, observing that a "coup de main" could succeed.

Your answer thereto was that you could not take the responsibility upon yourself without Sir R. Stopford's orders. On returning to Admiral Walker with your answer, I observed the Turkish troops on board this ship getting into boats, and shoving off, so I offered myself to go with them, he assented, I got into one of the boats and landed at the seagate of Acre fortress. —

The gate was closed, but we got in thro' an embrasure close by; — I had with me a Bimbashi of the name of Mehemet Aga, and 100 to 150 men, the night was very dark, so that we had good deal of difficulty in finding our way through the narrow streets to the Catholic Convent, — we found it occupied by some of the enemy, but they offered no resistance; I left 50 men here, and advanced to the citadel — it was not occupied — I left the Bimbashi and the rest of the men in possession of it, and returned to the seagate. —

It was just begining to dawn, I took a boat and shoved off (intending to pull aboard of the Edinburgh, and make me report to you), but, observing two Austrian man-of-war boats approaching, I waited for them. His Imperial Highness the Archduke Frederic was in the first, I made a short report to him of the state of things, upon which he determined to enter the fortress, at this moment Captain Collier of the Castor frigate landed, I acquainted him with what had happened in the night. — He than shoved off and pull'd aboard his frigate for his marines. — I led the Archduke and his men thro' the embrasure into the town and up to the citadel. — A few minutes after you joined us on the top of the citadel.

I have the honour to remain Your Excellency

most obedient

A. Count Nugent,
Aid-de-Camp.

34.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Syre 9 November 1840.

My Lord,

I think it is in conformity with the usages of Europe and late with those of Turkey, that actions of great military results like that of Acre, should be recompensed by medals given to all the officers and soldiers who were present at the action.

The Turkish Government would therefore do well to have a medal made for the taking of Acre on the 3/4 of November 1840, and I send Your Lordship drawings of two, for a choice.

Similar measures, to have a good effect, *must be taken at once.*

I have the honour &c.

A. Jochmus.

35.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Confidential.

Beyrout 13 November 1840.

I had the honour to inform Your Excellency on the 4 instant of our successful attack of St. Jean d'Acre.

If Your Lordship will be pleased to refer to my letter of the 23 October it will be seen, that this attack proved exactly of the character of the main nature which I suggested a month ago, which time has been most unfruitfully lost, and very likely we should not even have attempted¹ Acre since, had not the views of Commodore Napier, the Austrian Admiral and the Archduke decided in favour of the attack, the council of war, held on the 30 October, when Sir Charles Smyth decidedly declared against any attack, except backed by a sufficient land force, to make a siege *en règle*.²

Notwithstanding my urgent entreaties on the 4 November, it has not been possible to induce the Admiral to send a steamer and a line-of-battle ship or two frigates, to take off the garrison of Jaffa and its neighbourhood, amounting to one regiment of Infantry 2000 men

¹ Admiral Stopford was not of the opinion of one of his sailors, who made the following verse:

“The Frenchman’s ships are twenty one,
But then — they shun the sea;
Our seventeen sail would make them run,
For Britain rules the free.”

² After the taking of Acre Admiral Bandiera addressed Sir Charles Smyth with the following words: “Eh bien, nous avons pris Acre malgré les règles.”

strong. I was fully persuaded that they would offer no resistance to the ships, but the Admiral said, he did not want any more prisoners for the present. — As however I was of a different opinion, and seeing that nothing could be done by sea, I induced the former Governor of Jerusalem, whom we delivered from the jails of Acre, to write instantly to his partisans in that neighbourhood to attack without loss of time the detached garrisons of the Egyptians, and to drive them all into Jaffa, which was done very successfully. 200 Egyptians were killed, 200 wounded and sick remain at Jaffa, about 600, being Syrians, dispersed to their homes, and 800 to 1000 were marched prisoners to St. Jean d'Acre, where they arrived on the 11 and 12 November, and whither the Admiral has now sent a steamer to bring them to Beyrout.

In the meantime however a French steamer went to Jaffa, took off for Egypt 11 mule loads of gold, saved by Ismael Bey, the fugitive Governor of Acre, from the military chest (of which 5000 £ fell into our hands in the fortress), and many valuable stores, also Chosrew Effendi, a confidential messenger of Ibrahim's to Mehmet Ali. Ismael Bey, accompanied by the regiment of Cavalry stationed outside of Acre, and 8 pieces of Horse-Artillery tried to make his way by land to Egypt, but his troops revolted, and the Cavalry dispersed on hearing of the defeat of the Infantry at Jaffa. The 8 pieces of Artillery were left at Tantoura,¹ and Ismael with his household and a few faithful horsemen escaped towards Ramlé, but it is questionable, if he will arrive without being plundered and made prisoner. There are thus no Egyptian forces of any kind between Acre and Egypt, and the chiefs of Naplous and the neighbourhood have sent in their submission to the Sultan's authorities.

Ibrahim Pasha's own forces are now reduced to scarcely 20,000 demoralized men, distributed between Zachlé (where he is in person with 10 to 12,000), Zebdeni, Damascus and that neighbourhood. We never ought to have allowed him to collect as many, but deprived as he is of the lines of the Taurus of Antioch, and the whole seacoast and his communication with Egypt by land and by sea, he must be irretrievably lost, if we only would move against him, but I see no preparations for an *immediate and resolute* attack of his forces. There are besides some strong forces under Achmet Menikli Pasha in Aleppo. —

I think it my duty to inform Your Excellency exactly tho' confidentially of all that has happened, for I think it highly important, Your Lordship should know every thing that occurs here, and nothing will make me swerve from that line of conduct, because gratitude imposes upon me the obligation of informing Your Excellency correctly to the best of my knowledge, and I further will exculpate myself from any later reproach of inactivity. — A new explosion of the destroyed powder

¹ Beyrout 20 November. About 300 horsemen (regulars) and 8 field-pieces as above mentioned succeeded in getting to Gaza, where they remain for the present.

magazine at Acre killed and wounded about 80 of our men on the 6 instant.

On a former occasion I informed Your Lordship, that Sheriff Pasha had taken the command of Acre, this proved a mistake. Ibrahim sent there Ismael Bey, a connection of Ibrahim Pasha's.

36.

SIR EDMUND LYONS TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Beyrout 14 November 1840.)

Athens 6 Antm. 30 (October) 1840.

My dear Jochmus,

Few, if any, rejoice in your success more than your friends at Athens, and amongst them not one more sincerely than

Yours faithfully

E. Lyons.

I suit you to write to me of your proceedings and prospects.

37.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Beyrout 14 November 1840.

I have the honour to enclose a list of Turkish officers, whom I shall get proposed by Izzet Pasha for promotion on the occasion of the taking of Acre, but as I do not know if or not, or when Izzet Pasha will recommend them, I beg Your Excellency will induce the Minister of War to *promote them at once*, and *notify* it to the army here, for the *only mode* of making good officers is to promote those who really distinguish themselves on the field-of-battle or by particularly good management of their men in garrison, especially after the taking of places, where it is always very difficult to maintain order. — The officers who I now propose for promotion, are in one of the two cases, and the Turkish Government may be persuaded, that they render *themselves* the best service, if they promote them, and generally they may be certain, that in no instance will they *find me* recommend an undeserving officer. On the contrary, I shall point out to them those who *are good* and those who *are not*, for without good officers there is no good army, and as a General in the Turkish service, it naturally must be a sacred duty for me to point out conscientiously who are *effective* or who are *useless* men. — My own interest and glory is to command

or to take into action *safe* troops, and these do not exist, where *justice* is not the source of promotion. — Hitherto it has been unfortunately *only* favour, with the few exceptions of the recommendations made by Commodore Napier and myself for the actions up to the 10 October.

I have the honour &c.

38.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Beyrout 14 November 1840.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of my letter to His Excellency Lord Ponsonby of this date. —

I have requested the Ambassador to send to Your Lordship such copies or extracts of my letters as are deemed of any interest, it being sometimes utterly impossible for me to make these copies myself, as I can not confide this correspondence to a third person, and my communications to the Ambassador contain often details, which altho' of momentary use at Constantinople lose their value, if transmitted to London for want of immediate solution on account of the distances. I hope Your Lordship will approve of this arrangement the more so as most of my letters have to go to Constantinople, direct occasions for London or Malta being scarce. In important cases, and if a direct opportunity offers, I shall of course submit my observations by the shortest means of conveyance.

39.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Beyrout 14 November 1840.

I am concerned to say, that our accounts from the mountains are far from favourable. Izzet Pasha, during our short absence from this place to Acre, has done very serious injury, and has principally committed two great faults, if his actions deserve this lenient term. First he appointed a man named Jussuf Ahmet, one of the greatest scoundrels in Syria, a known agent of Ibrahim Pasha's and the creature of the old Emir Beshir, to command the districts round Damascus, and ordered an issue of 5000 muskets to this fellow, who had probably bribed his Kihaya.

Secondly he said openly before all his servants, that he would disarm all the Syrians, the moment the war was over. — This news, which ran like wildfire thro' the mountains, produced the worst possible

effect and created a general distrust, the more so as it was known, that Izzet Pasha favoured openly the grand-son of the old Emir Beshir, named Emir Mechid, to whom he had entrusted an independant command, notwithstanding the urgent entreaties of the new Emir Beshir to the contrary. —

I heard great uneasiness expressed about these measures during my journey by land from Acre to this place, where I arrived 48 hours ago, and found that Mr. Wood and the Mustechar Selami Effendi had had similar information. We therefore represented immediately the matter to Sir Charles Smith and the Admiral, and the necessary steps have been taken to render Jussuf Ahmet impotent for evil by not issuing the 5000 stands of arms, and Emir Mechid by resolving to send him to join his family at Malta.

Mr. Wood, who is full of zeal and activity, has left for the mountains to counteract the effect of Izzet Pasha's mischievous conduct, and I hope matters may still be mended, altho' I have certain information that the Druses are listening to Ibrahim Pasha's promises of reward and plunder of the christian properties, as soon as the English fleet be gone, if they succeed in effecting a counter-revolution, assisting Emir Effendi of Rasheya, to whom he is promising the appointment of Emir Beshir, if he fights against the Sultan. If we had issued the 5000 muskets to Jussuf Ahmet, and left Emir Mechid in an independant command of 800 Cavalry, as ordered by Izzet Pasha, I should not have been astonished to see both join Emir Effendi and the Druses, and act for Ibrahim Pasha, but I think we have crushed the plan, before its maturity.

As I can not confide this correspondence to any person, I must again beg of Your Lordship to send to Lord Palmerston such copies or extracts of my letters as Your Excellency deems of interest, it being utterly impossible for me to make myself copies for the Secretary of State, my time being so taken up, that actually I have often not 3 hours sleep in 24.

Besides direct occasions for London are very scarce here, and my letters therefore would mostly have to go via Constantinople.

I beg Your Lordship will explain this to Lord Palmerston.

Return of Forces present in Syria on the 16 November 1840

with their distribution in the different towns.

Brigades	Regiments	Bat- talions	Field Officers	Officers including Staff	Non com- missioned Officers	Rank and file	Music and Drum- mers	Total	Remarks.
Ali Pasha's Brigade . . .	1 Regiment . . . 2 " . . .	4	15	106	162	1714	130	2127	
		4	10	108	188	1617	140	2063	
Chalil Pasha's Brigade	1 Regiment . . . 2 " . . .	4	14	104	148	1645	62	1973	
		4	12	102	150	1712	83	2059	
Guards	4 Regiment . . . Smyrna Regmt. Mehmed Bey's	2	6	64	105	907	48	1130	
		1	1	21	34	308	43	407	
Not brigaded	Regiment . . . Erzroom Regt. Mehmed Bey Tumili	4	13	114	151	2136	69	2483	
		2	3	32	83	797	30	945	
		3	4	60	100	1329	28	1521	
		—	8	56	113	660	20	857	
Artillery	1 Regiment . . .	—	—	—	—	200	—	200	
Sappers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
		28	86	767	1234	13,025	653	15,765	(signed) J. Boville, A.D.C.

41.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A L'EMIR SAEDDIN DE HASBEYA

Beyrout 16 Novembre 1840.

Un nouveau protocole vient d'être signé par les 4 puissances l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, la Russie et la Prusse que d'aucune manière la Syrie ne peut rester à Mehmet Ali. Les Ministres amis de Mehmet Ali en France ont perdu leurs places et la Flotte française est retournée en France. Les Syriens qui combattraient donc pour Ibrahim, seraient des fous, parcequ'ils ne peuvent pas resister à la puissance du Sultan Abdul Mechid dont Dieu augmente la gloire, et à ses amis les 4 puissances. Je vous previens de ceci et vous pouvez me le croire sur mon honneur. Faites le connaître à tous vos amis, afin qu'ils ne se perdent pas. —

Tous les Egyptiens retourneront dans leur pays après la paix.

La même lettre envoyée

à l'Emir Fendi de Rasheja,
au Sheich Hussein Selman à Nakhura,
à Sheriff Pacha, Gouverneur Egyptien de Damas,
„ Asmsan Mohamed Hafour Bey Mutsellim de Damas,
„ l'Emir Hanjar de Baalbek,
au Gouverneur de Tripolis,
„ „ de Latakia,
„ „ d'Antioche,
„ Sheich Seid Abdali à Safed,
à Ali Aga el Kurdi, Konetra,
„ Abdallah Bey, Sasa Kurdli, Kaimacan dans le Hauran,
au Mutsellim d'Aleppo, Jussuf Bey,
„ „ de Homs,
„ „ de Hamah,
„ „ de Jérusalem,
„ „ de Naplouse,
à l'Emir Bechir.

42.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Beyrout 18 November 1840.

My Lord,

Colonel Omer Bey¹ who commanded the two battalions, which turned the enemy's rear in the battle of Calat Meidan on the 10 October, had been deservedly praised for his conduct on that occasion,

¹ See annex to No. 42.

and His Highness Izzet Mehmet Pasha had recommended him for promotion. He was sent during the operations against Acre to occupy the passes of the white mountain between Tyre and Acre with 4 battalions of Chalil Pasha's brigade, in order to secure that important defile against any possible, tho' not probable, attempt of Ibrahim Pasha's to succour the place. As numberless complaints have come in against Omer Bey from all parts of the country, for having allowed his troops to rob the inhabitants and such Syrians, as had made booty by attacking Ismael Bey's retreating troops, giving "*personally*" a very bad example.¹ — His Highness Izzet Mehmet Pasha has very properly ordered Omer Bey, to be tried by a court martial, of which circumstances I beg to inform Your Lordship, as I consider it my duty for the best of the Government to make known such Officers, as behave well, and such as do not, and in the overwhelming occupations of the Governor General of Syria it might be overlooked, to send to Constantinople details of apparently small importance, yet highly important in the formation of an army, as one bad superior Officer, who allows pilfering and pillage, may spoil 4 or 5000 good soldiers.

I leave it entirely to Your Lordship to make such use of this communication, as Your Excellency thinks proper.

I have &c.

A. Jochmus.

Annex to No. 42.

Note on the life of Omer Pasha 1853.

Lattas, now Omer Pasha, born in 1801, deserted as Austrian corporal from the Frontier Regiment of Ogulina, having embezzled one hundred and eighty florins from the military chest. There can be no doubt about this fact, after the declaration of General Count Schlick.

Omer Pasha was tried in December 1840 for misconduct and robbery of three valuable horses. —

In 1849 Kossuth and Szemere are related to have bribed Omer Pasha with one hundred thousand florins worth of diamonds, in order to secure for the flying Hungarians a passage to Belgrade.

These diamonds were the property of the late Count Eugene Zichy, and his brother Count Edmond Zichy, — in stating the above facts, — often shows to those of his friends, who visit his valuable collection of eastern relics, — the box which contained those diamonds, and which still bears the broken seals of G6rgey, Szemere and Kossuth.

¹ Omer Bey was subsequently tried by a court martial for having himself robbed some Druse Emirs of three valuable horses &c. (1841). — Omer Bey was going to be cashiered, when Izzet Mehmet Pasha took a liking to these three fine arab horses, kept them for himself, squashed the proceedings of the court martial, and sent to Omer Pasha the brevet of his new rank of Major General.

In 1842/3 Omer Pasha had the intention of leaving again Turkey and of abjuring the Mohamedan Faith, and stating his views on these points, he addressed several times enquiries to General Jochmus and to Count Edmond Zichy, about the laws regarding renegades in Austria. A Prussian of rank also took an interest in this affair. —

These latter circumstances are known to, or suspected by several Turks, and it is therefore not astonishing, that Omer Pasha has dangerous enemies amongst the "True Believers" of the old stamp.

I find the following Memorandum amongst my papers :

Constantinople 2 September 1842.

Count Edmond Zichy maintains with regard to Omer Pasha, that although *French* renegades do not lose for apostacy their innate quality of Frenchmen (for instance Soliman Pasha, who at Navarino even fought against his own country), yet according to Austrian law Omer Pasha — as an Austrian deserter and renegade — is legally liable to the penalty of death and confiscation of property, not only if he comes to Austria, but if he goes to any country which has treaties with Austria for mutual extradition of deserters and malefactors.

43.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received Beyrout 24 November 1840.)

Therapia 15 November 1840.

My dear General,

I have notified to Sir Charles Smith what has passed. You will, I presume, receive your Firman from the Sultan by this conveyance, if you do I recommend you to communicate the fact to Sir Charles Smith in writing and without comment, but with all possible civility in expression. — I cannot tell you what will be the line of conduct finally acted upon. There are the greatest pains taken to get Egypt granted to Mehemet Ali — I know how mischievous this will be and so forth. We ought to have gone before Alexandria and that place would surrender to half a dozen shots — but I have nothing more to say now, except to beg you will write to me, and that Izzet Pasha is recalled on *account of his health*, and that we are done all in our power to obtain for Selim Pasha the government of Acre &c. &c., but are opposed by intrigues in —

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private.

Beyrout 28 November 1840.

I only heard *this moment* that the Firman appointing me to command the Sultan's troops in Syria, has arrived here, and that Izzet Pasha has communicated it to Sir Robert Stopford, but that the Admiral ordered it not to be published, as he was to write about it to London or to Your Excellency, because no-where but in London could a change-ment be made. All this "*I hear*", as I am suffering and in bed, but certain it is, that the Firman is here and *not* published.

As Your Lordship only says a few words in your note of the 15, I am quite in the dark and wait your instructions, but I can not see what right any English Admiral or General has to dispute the Sultan's authority to give the command of *his* troops in Syria, to any *Turkish* General he pleases, and I am a Turkish General as well as any Pasha in the Turkish army.

The only man who could complain, could be Izzet Pasha, but I hear nothing of this latter, doing so at least openly.

Sir Charles Smith never could imagine that he had the *actual* command of the Turkish forces, because he *had not the actual Turkish rank*.

Izzet and the other Pashas never would have acknowledged his authority to that extent, but I am afraid that he has some flatterers about his person, who indulge him in this illusion.

I only write to Your Lordship to inform you of the cause of the non-publication of the Firman.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS AU SERASKIER ET GOUVERNEUR
GÉNÉRAL IZZET MEHMET PACHA.

Quartier Général de Beyrout 3 Décembre 1840.

J'ai l'honneur de transmettre à Votre Excellence les 2 traductions des lettres de mon Dragoman Mr. G. Gervis dont les originaux se trouvent en possession du Colonel Omer Bey, et j'y joins un document signé par le Colonel Tahir Bey et le Capitain Boville, relatif à un cheval appartenant au Lieutenant-Colonel Abdallah Bey.

Je resulte de ces papiers plusieurs charges graves contre Mr. George Gervis.

1. Il a reçu *des cadeaux* étant à mon service, contre mes défenses mille fois répétées.

2. Il a trompé ceux qui donnaient des cadeaux, car il savait très bien qu'il ne lui aurait servi de rien de me parler en leur faveur connaissant ma résolution de ne pas me mêler des affaires civiles.

3. Il paraît qu'il a gardé pour lui même le cheval d'Abdallah Bey qui par ignorance l'avait envoyé *pour moi*, et comme le Dragoman savait que moi je ne l'accepterais pas, il l'a fait mettre *néanmoins* dans ma maison et l'a gardé pour lui même.

Je prie donc Votre Excellence de faire juger ce Dragoman d'après les lois militaires.

46.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private. Extract.

Beyrout 8 December 1840.

Since the taking of St. Jean d'Acre on the 3/4 November we have done nothing of any importance in Syria, the only movement having been to send on the 26 November 4 battalions of the Guards to Jerusalem and 1 battalion of the Line to Jaffa, the whole country south of Acre having recognized the Sultan's authority. I understand, that a small force of Egyptians under Ismael and Mahmoud Beys, who escaped from Acre, are still shut up in Gaza by the mountaineers, and that these are kept at bay by a few guns of the Egyptians. These latter however are treating with Selim Pasha of Acre for a safe conduct.

Our troops are distributed as follows:

6 battalions at Acre,
2 battalions at Tyre,
8 battalions at Sidon,
10 battalions at Beyrout.

The armed mountaineers occupy the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon.¹

The Admiral and the Austrians left us last week for Marmorice after having rode out a heavy gale of 4 or 5 days, in which several ships lost their anchor, and some of the small crafts experienced serious damage. The Austrian Corvette Lipsia lost a mast here, the Zebra Brig went on shore near Acre, and the Pique Frigate at Acre was obliged to cut away all her masts. There remain however three steamers on the coast for our communications.

Ibrahim Pasha has on the other hand collected all his forces at Damascus, having withdrawn every man, horse and gun at his disposal in Syria to that place. At the period of the taking of Acre his forces were still divided between Aleppo, Hamah, Homs, Baalbek, Zachlé and Damascus.

The result, that Ibrahim has lost every spot in Syria except Damascus, is very likely much beyond the general expectations in England, Europe and Constantinople, considering the short period of the present campaign, and that the whole of our losses in men is scarcely 200 in

¹ 5000 muskets have been given to the mountaineers of Naplous, Jerusalem &c. &c.

five actions. From our latest information Ibrahim continues to collect means of transport preparatory to his retreat by el Mezarib on Suez and Egypt. This at least is the general opinion of the Emirs of Hasbeya and Rasheya, and of the Emir Beshir — none of them suppose, that his intentions are offensive. From various other indications I am inclined to the same belief, and his delay arises from the great difficulties he must find in collecting a sufficient number of animals of burthen and of draught for his guns, which he does not seem inclined to abandon, altho' the severe winter and the state of the roads together with the inimical disposition of the inhabitants, may present also great difficulties for his retreat.

There is no certain calculating on the resolutions of a man in the desperate situation, to which Ibrahim is reduced, the more so as in a violent fit of passion or drunkenness, to which he is now more subject than ever, he may undertake any desperate coup de main.

There has been on the 24 and 26 November some fighting between the men of Jussuf Ahmet (whom Izzet Pasha has by the most disloyal means and notwithstanding his positive promises to the contrary maintained in his command), and some of the troops of Ibrahim Pasha near Zahsa *six* hours from Damascus. On the first day Zahsa was taken by our partisans, who were driven out again on the last, when a strong reinforcement arrived from Damascus. The most alarming reports were spread here immediately, but the whole turns out to have been a skirmish. — We have had 11 men killed, and our light troops fell back on the mountains of Hasbeya, whilst 100 Kurdish horsemen deserted from Ibrahim to our side. The Emir of Hasbeya writes to me on the 4 December, that the whole business is nothing, and that his brother and Jussuf Ahmet had left again the mountains, and followed up the Egyptians on their falling back on Damascus, after leaving a garrison in Zahsa, and burning some villages on their road. I hope in conformity with Your Excellency's letter of the 15 November, that Izzet Pasha will soon receive his order of recall. The Porte may be certain that her greatest enemy in Syria at present is not Ibrahim, but certainly Izzet Pasha.

I have &c.

A. Jochmus.

P.S. The agreement made on the 27 November between Mehemet Ali and Commodore Napier of a cessation of hostilities in Egypt and Syria on the understanding, that Ibrahim was to evacuate Syria, and Mehemet Ali to be hereditary Pasha of Egypt, restoring the fleet, was known here on the 30 November, but Admiral Stopford *refused his sanction*, and will of course have informed Your Excellency of his reasons.

The intrigues of the French in this country go on in the usual way, but it is extremely difficult to catch them so, as to subject them to a court martial. The other day some of the catholic mountaineers hesitated to take *english* muskets, tho' they were very desirous to have

turkish, some months ago it was exactly the reverse, and we had great disputes in not furnishing english to all, the latter being much superior in quality. The reason for not receiving them in the present instance was, that the people were afraid of using them, it being known, that they were made by *Freemasons*, and that they consequently might kill a *true catholic*, who fired them off.

The health of the Turkish troops here is excellent, there being only 600 men on the sick list out of 30 battalions — the English however suffer a great deal from fever. The reason lies principally in the different composition of the nations.¹

47.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Private.

Bevrou 11 December 1840.

I have the honour to inclose to Your Lordship a copy of my letter to His Excellency Lord Ponsonby, dated 8 December.

The latest reports from our advanced light troops on the road to Damascus are, that the Egyptians ravage the country of that neighbourhood, burning the villages and killing the inhabitants and collecting by force animals of burthen and provisions, in which operations they experience the greatest difficulties. — These circumstances together with very heavy rains, which render the roads nearly impracticable, retard any retrograde movements of Ibrahim, whose position becomes very bad, provisions growing extremely scarce in Damascus. It is therefore possible, that he may suspend his projected movement altogether, if he hears, as it very likely he will do, of the pacific arrangements, which it is reported here yesterday are in progress in Alexandria, and authorized by the Powers.

48.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received Bevrou 14 December 1840.)

Therapia 5 December 1840.

Dear General,

The S. Porte has declared null and void ab initio the Convention, which is pleased Commadore Napier to make with Mehemet Ali.

¹ The returns of sick in hospital were on an average in the warm season:

Turks	4 per cent,
Austrians on shore	14 to 15 per cent,
English do.	22 to 25 per cent.

You will receive orders from the S. Porte on the subject, but I write to put you on your guard against permitting a man of Ibrahim's army to embark for Egypt. *No matter*, that orders the Admiral or any body else may give to that effect, you must disobey them and refuse to permit them to be carried into effect! Depend upon me. —

Sir Charles Smith is ordered back to Gibraltar for Health; you have before this received your authority to *act*. I hope to hear of your activity and your prudence. —

Napier, if he insisted upon assuming authority that does not belong to him, might better have placed Alexandria in our power than have attempted to destroy the Ottoman Empire by Partition of it, and giving to Mehemet Ali the Sovereignty *de facto* of Egypt, then he is actually at the last gasp. Such folly I have never before heard of.

Yours sincerely

Ponsonby.

You will communicate to every body the fact that the Porte has declared the Convention *null* — and that the R. R. of the Four Powers concur with the S. Porte. — You will push on hostilities as well as your means and your *prudence* will admit. — I have written to the *Naval* People to desire they will seize upon any of Ibrahim's troops, that may have *been already* embarked, and to have them reconducted to such place in Syria as they may have come from, *steamer* can always catch transports, and I beg you will inform me, if there be the least delay or slackness in this work. — We have unwilling toils to work with. —

P.

My best regards to Wood, and tell him I have not time to write to him being obliged to dispatch these letters at a railroad pane. —

LORD PONSONBY TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Extract.

Therapia 18 November 1840.

The Porte has recalled Izzet Pasha

The Porte has given powers to General Jochmus, in conformity with Your Lordship's instructions.

I have notified the fact to Sir Charles Smith, and sent him an extract from the instructions.

Levant Papers III, p. 65.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Extract.

Beyrout 15 December 1840.

I have had the honour to receive Your Excellency's letter of the 8 December this day, and as the Austrian steamer which brought it, goes back again to-day, I have only a few hours notice and cannot answer it as fully as I wished, being obliged to see the Mustechar and some other people before the ship starts. —

The Sultan's Firman has not been delivered to me as yet, but I understand that I shall receive it to-morrow.

There has been a delay of nearly a fortnight in its delivery, as after all I have found out that it arrived by Captain Ford, but was not given to me.

It is a great story of little intrigues too tedious to detail to Your Lordship, but I only regret the loss of *precious time*, for a fortnight in this season is a great loss, the more so, as we begin to feel the effects of the bad weather, some of our small merchant vessels with provisions from Tripolis and Latakia having been lost and others driven back into those ports by stress of weather.

General Sir Charles Smith embarks to night for Malta . . .

THE GRAND VISIR RAOUF PASHA TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received at Beyrout 15 December 1840.)

Per steamer, express.

Translation.

Constantinople $\frac{13 \text{ Sheval } 1256.}{7 \text{ December } 1840.}$

After the usual compliment, the Convention which has been lately concluded between Commodore Napier of Her Majesty's Navy and Mehemet Ali at Alexandria being disapproved of by His Highness the Sultan, and as it appears from the letters received by the Tairi Bahri from the camp, that the same has been thought improper by the superior officers of Beyrout, you have made no alterations in your proceeding on the arrival of the above news. This is agreeable with our wishes and opinion, and has met with our approbations. Be careful not to allow Ibrahim (who may embrace this opportunity) to send to Alexandria his warlike stores, cannons &c. &c. &c.

The inclosed is a copy of the note presented to the Ambassadors of the four allied Powers, residing at Constantinople.

Have the goodness to make this known to their Excellencies Generals Jochmus and Sir Charles Smith.

Raouf Pasha, the Grand Visir.

Annexed a communication to the Allied Powers.

(Inclosure in No. 51.)

A copy of the communication made by the Pasha to the ambassadors of the four allied Powers residing at Constantinople.

His Highness the Sultan has been informed of the late Convention concluded between Méhemet Ali and Commodore Napier of Her Majesty's Navy, and finding it quite contrary to the treaty which was drawn up and signed by the four Powers in London, and to his own wishes as well as to the prosperity of His Empire, disapproves of it. After so many military and naval preparations, the negotiation concluded between Commodore Napier and Mehemet Ali will be looked upon by the said four Powers as very unjust and accidental occurrence rather, than a treaty. After the Convention of London was signed, the Porte has received no communications from any of the European Powers, conveying their intention, begging His Highness the Sultan to confer Egypt upon Mehemet Ali, more particularly to his Heirs. If it had been the case, His Highness the Sultan would have applied to the said four Powers to support his just pretentions, and not have certainly been refused by them.

52.

THE GRAND VISIR RAOUF PASHA TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Translation of a letter from the Grand Visir to General Jochmus dated Constantinople 25 Sheval 1256 (19 December).

In consequence of an Imperial resolution, the noble commandement has been dispatched that, in consideration of the circumstances which require that the employment of Sir Charles Smith should cease, this employment should be conferred to Your Excellency.

We, Minister of the Sublime Porte, hope and expect, that you will serve faithfully and show the desirable zeal in the affairs confided unto you.

By means of your personal capacity and your peculiar discernment you will certainly do with the utmost zeal, in unison with the other servants of the Sublime Porte, every thing that is required by the circumstances, wherever are concerned the execution and the order of the affairs unto you confided, and the important matters of the present moment. — Under this persuasion we have addressed unto you this friendly dispatch, and we hope that, when with the help of God it will have reached Your Excellency, — you will proceed with zeal in the said manner.

Ali Pasha's Brigade	1	4	3	30	662	—	695	—	2	1	—	698	—	16	—	16	714	
"	2	2	30	593	33	658	2	2	3	2	—	667	—	40	—	40	707	
Unbrigaded	9	2	31	612	32	677	1	1	1	—	—	680	—	1	—	1	681	
Rhodes Battalion		2	26	621	29	678	1	1	4	—	—	684	—	57	—	57	741	
Cyprus		2	8	153	31	194	1	1	—	1	—	197	—	24	—	24	221	
Arab		2	25	644	25	696	1	—	1	—	—	698	—	34	—	34	732	
Artillery		2	17	264	3	286	1	1	3	8	—	299	—	1	—	1	300	
	15	167	3549	153	3884	7	8	13	11	3923	—	—	173	—	173	4096	At Acre.	
Haji Fettahagas Battalion	1	1	32	543	40	616	1	1	1	—	—	619	—	8	—	8	627	At Jaffa.
Guards	1	3	22	322	26	373	2	2	4	4	—	385	—	2	—	2	387	
	2	2	23	322	23	370	1	1	1	—	—	373	—	—	—	—	373	
	3	1	9	135	24	169	1	—	1	—	—	171	—	4	—	4	175	
	4	2	23	341	29	395	1	1	1	—	—	398	—	—	—	—	398	
	8	77	1120	102	1307	5	4	7	4	1327	—	—	6	—	—	6	1333	At Jerusalem.
16 Regiment	2	3	24	392	34	453	3	4	3	2	—	465	—	—	—	55	520	
	4	2	25	397	31	455	—	—	—	—	—	455	—	—	25	25	480	
One Company		5	49	789	65	908	3	4	3	2	—	920	—	—	80	80	1000	At Sour or Tyre.
Total of Troops in all Syria		—	3	77	3	83	—	1	—	—	—	84	—	—	—	—	84	At Tripolis.
	104	797	15208	917	17026	42	40	52	44	17204	195	274	190	80	42	781	17985	

Beyrou: 17 December 1840.

J. Boville,
Captain A.D.C.

54.

GENERAL SIR DUNCAN MAC DOUGALL TO BRIGADIER
GENERAL MICHELL.

. 27 November 1840.

My Dear Mitchell,

I congratulate you sincerely on your appointment in Syria.

You will find my friend Jochmus to be a fine, noble, gallant, and *straight forward* fellow.

You may *depend* upon him in *all respects*.

In honor and integrity he cannot be exceeded, — and I consider him to possess the highest order of military talent.

I am assured that you and he will harmonize in all respects.

Give me kindest regards to Colquhoun, and tell him that I know I need not write to him about the merits of our friend Jochmus.

May all success attend you.

Your ever truly sincere

D. M. Dougall.

55.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHELL TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered 17 December 1840.)

Beyrout 17 December 1840.

Several officers of Infantry and Cavalry having arrived from England, with the appointment of Assistant Adjutant General, and my instructions being to make their zeal and talents available, more particularly in organizing the Turkish troops — I am anxious to know your opinions and wishes as to attaching any of them to the forces under your command; and I shall be very glad to receive your suggestions as to rendering their services in any other mode conclusive to the objects we have in view.

Yours very sincerely

Edward Michell,
Brigadier General.

Brigadier General Michell succeeded General Sir Charles Smith, recalled 17 December 1840.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO GENERAL E. MICHELL.

Beyrout 17 December 1840.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of this day, and in reply to it I beg to state, that I shall be most happy to meet your desire of employing usefully in Syria the officers you mention.

If amongst them you will direct Major Churchill and Captain Edmunds to be attached to the General Staff of this army, it will be very agreeable to me, being personally acquainted with their military qualification.

With reference to any organisation of the Turkish forces, and the assistance to be derived from some of the other officers under your command, I have to make the following observations.

The Turkish forces here, altho' now divided into divisions, brigades and regiments, are composed most of single battalions taken from different corps of the whole Turkish army. For instance, what is called here the first regiment, is in reality mixed up of two battalions of the 17, one battalion of the 21, and one battalion of the 5 regiment. Where there is no unity of arrangement, any improvement made here would be lost immediately, if these battalions return to their respective corps in Albania, Asia Minor, or Macedonia.

Before any improvements, *which are certainly required*, can be made, the general principles of the administration, organisation or drilling must be invariably fixed upon one determined basis for the whole army, and this can be only done at Constantinople.

Another point must also be determined with regards to personal position and Turkish rank of the officers. They can not, and I am sure, they would not serve as mere instructors of Cavalry and Infantry, because it is well known that such employment affords neither credit nor satisfaction.

This second observation can also find its solution only at Constantinople.

It is finally well known, that this present campaign is a very arduous and fatiguing one, I should not consider it politic or military to enforce *new regulations* and changes at a moment, when privations of all descriptions are the lot of the soldier. — I believe it would *not* be right to try to teach him in the course of a few months of campaign, *theoretical* improvements which he did or could not learn in the 20 years of peace since the creation of the regular army. —

Under similar circumstances I believe it best to employ for the moment the officers you mention, on *Staff* duties. — If you were to send some to the most important points now occupied by the allied troops, with orders to report to you all military and other occurrences of interest, whilst some were directed to levy plans and sketches of

the most important roads and positions likely to be within the limits of our operations, their informations and reports would be highly valuable, the more so, as our maps are so extremely deficient, that no trust can be put in their details. During actual operations some officers might also be attached to the Turkish Generals commanding divisions and brigades, but then they must have good dragomans.

The Austrian officers sent out here will also be employed according to the views I have now had the honour of exposing to your consideration.

57.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO MAJOR GENERAL OMER PASHA.

(Instructionen für den General-Major Omer Pascha.)

Beyrut 18 December 1840.

Der General Omer Pascha wird sich ohne Zeitverlust nach St. Jean d'Acre begeben und sich dort bei Seiner Excellenz dem General-Lieutenant Selim Pascha melden.

Dem General Omer Pascha ist hiermit das Commando von Jaffa, Loud und Ramleh übertragen.

Letzteren Ort hat er unverzüglich zu recognosciren und denselben mit den Bataillonen von Cypern und Rhodes zu besetzen.

Diese beiden Bataillone wird ein starkes Bataillon der Brigade von Ali Pascha in Acre selbst remplaciren.

Der unverzügliche Marsch der Bataillone von Cypern und Rhodes auf Ramleh wird dazu dienen, einen Convoy von 400 Kisten Gewehrmunition und 5000 Gewehrsteinen für Jerusalem und 100 Kisten Gewehrmunitionen nach Jaffa zu geleiten. Von Ramleh nach Jerusalem hat ein oder nach Umständen mehrere Bataillone der Garnison von Jerusalem den Convoy zu decken; — in dieser Hinsicht haben sich die Generale Omer Pascha und Emin Pascha zu verständigen.

In Loud und Ramleh sind bedeutende Vorräthe von Gerste, Korn und sonstigen Provisionen für Rechnung des Gouvernements, nach der Angabe Seiner Excellenz des Mustéchars.

Hievon ist der grössere Theil nach Jerusalem zu schaffen und dasselbst in die Festung zu bringen. Sollte der andere Theil für Jaffa nöthig sein, so kann er dorthin gebracht werden.

In Jaffa sollen andere Vorräthe sein.

In Ramleh und Loud sind nur für den augenblicklichen Gebrauch der Truppen Vorräthe zu lassen, und dabei sind folgende Berücksichtigungen zu nehmen.

Die Besetzung von Ramleh ist für jetzt nicht permanent, sondern geschieht aus zwei Ursachen, einer offensiven und einer defensiven.

a) *Offensiv* gegen Gaza, wo sich Ismael und Mahmout Bey befinden, verstärkt durch 500—600 Mann Cavallerie aus dem Lager von

El-Arisch. Ueber die Details ihrer Stellung, die von den Gebirgsvölkern stark bedroht, aber von 8 leichten Geschützen vertheidigt wird, und über die Ausführbarkeit eines Angriffes auf Gaza haben sich der General Omer Pascha mit Seiner Excellenz dem General-Lieutenant Selim Pascha zu verständigen, der bereits hierüber mit dem englischen Obersten Colquhoun sich berathen.

Die Cooperation englischer Truppen und Dampfboote ist allerdings sehr wichtig und wünschenswerth, wenn dadurch ein nicht zu *bedeuten-der Zeitverlust* in der Unternehmung entstehen sollte. — Nur wenn dem General-Lieutenant Selim Pascha und dem General Omer Pascha die Expedition gegen Gaza als unbedingt erfolgreich erschiene mit den Mitteln in Artillerie und Truppen, worüber Selim Pascha *allein* verfügen kann, *und* die englischen Hülfsmittel gar zu lange ausblieben, könnte der Angriff mit türkischen Truppen allein gemacht werden. — Alsdann wäre aber Emin Pascha wie Seine Excellenz Selim Pascha gehörig zur Mitwirkung zu instruiren.

Genauere Erkundigungen sind indess vorher über die etwaige Annäherung der Armee von Ibrahim Pascha von Damascus her einzuziehen, so dass Jerusalem nie die geringste Gefahr durch etwaige augenblickliche Verwendung der Garnison liefe, und diese stets vor Ankunft irgend eines Feindes in Jerusalem complet zurück wäre.

Gaza ist nicht durch regelmässige Truppen, sondern nur mit Gebirgstruppen, mit Reservemunition versehen, zu besetzen. Alle Geschütze und sämtliche Vorräthe, die sehr bedeutend sind, in spätestens 3 Tagen auf Jaffa zu räumen, entweder mit Schiffen oder Lastthieren. Später setzt man sich einem Angriff von El-Arisch aus. Die Expedition kann daher gar nicht unternommen werden, wenn nicht zahlreiche Lastthiere vorher gemiethet sind. Man muss diese entweder baar bezahlen oder als Zahlung einen Theil des Getreides überlassen.

Können nicht alle Vorräthe fortgeschafft werden, so muss der Rest *unbedingt verbrannt werden*.

b) In *defensiver* Hinsicht beschränkt sich die Occupation von Loud und Ramleh auf Räumung sämtlicher Vorräthe.

Man hat nämlich in ziemlich sichere Erfahrung gebracht, dass Ibrahim Pascha, gezwungen seinen beabsichtigten Rückzug über Suez aufzugeben, den Entschluss gefasst hat, sich über den Jordan, Djenin Kakun, Ras-el-Ain und Ramleh einen Weg *nach Gaza* zu bahnen.

Diese Indication bedingt die Natur des defensiven Theils der Operationen, die hiermit dem anerkannten Eifer des Generals Omer Pascha übertragen sind. In Räumung der Vorräthe ist nur auf Schnelligkeit zu sehen. Alle Transportkosten sind baar von Seiner Excellenz dem Mustéchar zu bezahlen, und bei Annäherung des Feindes sind sämtliche *bleibende Vorräthe unbedingt zu verbrennen*.

Ueber die zu projectirenden Flankenbewegungen gegen den Feind, sollte er seinen Rückzug mit bedeutenden Massen bis nach Ramleh und Gaza bewerkstelligen wollen, sowie über andere offensive und defensive Dispositionen, dann über die Ausführbarkeit eines eventuellen Rückzuges

unserer eigenen Truppen auf Jaffa oder Jerusalem, je nach Umständen, ist genau und durch häufige Expreſſe *per Triplicat* an mich zu berichten.

Auch Terrainaufnahme mit Angabe der Defilés und Defensiv- und Offensiv-Positionen wird der General mir baldmöglichst zukommen lassen.

Ueber sämtliche Courierspesen und sonstige Unkosten ist eine genaue Rechnung zu führen.

Der Commandirende
General-Lieutenant
A. Jochmus.

58.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO THE MUSTECHAR MEHEMED
SELAMI EFFENDI.

Beyrout 19 December 1840.

I request Your Excellency will order the sum of forty thousand piasters to be put to-day at the immediate disposal of Major General Omer Pasha, who is charged to evacuate the stores of Ramleh and Lood, and eventually those of Gaza. Your Excellency will be pleased to send a Commissary with this money to keep an exact account of all the expenses, particularly of those required for means of transport. This operation being very important, I beg Your Excellency to order the Commissary to leave with Omer Pascha without a moment's delay.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant General.

To the same:

I request Your Excellency will be pleased to order ten of the best Artillery horses to be given over to the Austrian Colonel Philippovich for the service of the officers under him. These horses will be returned to the Artillery after the campaign is over.

A. Jochmus.

59.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO THE MUSTECHAR MEHEMED
SELAMI EFFENDI.

Beyrout 19 December 1840.

I have the honour to request Your Excellency, that all the biscuits now here be sent without a moment's loss of time to Saïda, and that

in general there may remain here in Beyrout only provisions for two battalions always complete for two months, and that the rest of the provisions be sent for the present to Saïda. As most of the troops will be in Saïda, and it will be the Head-Quarters of the army at present, it is also requisite that Your Excellency should go without delay to that place. — I beg Your Excellency will also appoint a Commissary to each of the four brigades of the army viz.: to that of Chalid Pasha, that of Ismael Pasha, both now at Saïda, that of Ali Pasha at Acre, and that of Emin Pasha at Jerusalem.

These four commissariat officers must always have at least 50,000 piasters in cash with them, and this sum must continually be kept up in order to meet the expenses for accidental means of transport by land and sea, repairs of hospitals, purchase of small quantities of stores, as butter, oil, salt &c. &c., as I shall give the most positive orders to the respective Generals, never to take anything from the country- and townpeople without cash payments by the commissariat officers to the sellers, or to those who furnish means of transport. By following up a system contrary to this, as has frequently the case up to the present moment, we render disaffectionate the inhabitants to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and fall again into those errors and injustices of the Egyptian administration which have rendered unanimous the hatred and the armed opposition of Syria to Mehemet Ali. —

I shall send a copy of this letter to Constantinople.

60.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO GENERAL E. MICHELL.

Extract.

Head-Quarters of Beyrout
19 December 1840.

Our reports are, that Ibrahim Pasha has given up his intention of retiring by Suez in consequence of a meeting of his officers, who declared that they would not go by the desert. — He now intends retiring by el Kessue, the Jordan, Djenin, Kakoun, Ramleh and Gaza, the latter place being still occupied by Egyptian troops, and there are great magazines of corn and barley in it. I have therefore directed Omer Pasha to proceed to Ramleh and to evacuate the stores in that place on Jaffa or Jerusalem, and to combine with Selim Pasha of Acre a movement on Gaza, in order to take that place and the stores, and to evacuate the latter, or to burn them, as it is of the utmost importance not to let them fall into the hands of Ibrahim's army. Omer Pasha will have 2 battalions at Ramleh, 1 at Jaffa, and he may combine operations with Emin Pasha, who commands 4 battalions of the Guard at Jerusalem, but he has strict instructions always to be well informed of the army of Ibrahim approaching from Damascus, in order that neither Jerusalem nor Jaffa may run any risk from that quarter,

and that the respective garrisons may be always back in due time from any expedition on Gaza, which however is only 12 and 14 hours distant from those places . . .

As for myself I shall move to-morrow for the valley of the Jordan and the adjoining mountains in order to watch closely the operations of the enemy. — We are too inferior in numbers, but particularly in Artillery and Cavalry, to engage in a battle *in the plain* . . .

In the mean time our regular troops will follow nearly parallel the enemy's route, marching close by the sea side, Saïda, Tyre, Acre &c. &c. towards mount Karmel, and if circumstances become favourable we may hope to operate more seriously in the direction of Djenin. I am sorry to say, that no preparations having been made for any enterprise of this description before I received my Firman, *only 4 days ago*, we have as yet neither means of transport nor properly distributed depôts for operations on this scale, which therefore require the greatest caution.

61.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL SELIM PASHA.

Extract.

Head-Quarters of Hasbeya
22 December 1840.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I arrived here this afternoon, and that I hear that the Kaftan Agassi has gone from el Mezerib to Feik with 1,400 irregular Cavalry, which is only eight hours from Tabariah. This movement shows that Ibrahim has given up his intention of going to Egypt by Suez, and that he now hopes to go by Gaza . . .

62.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO THE MUSTECHAR MEHEMED
SELAMI EFFENDI.

Head-Quarters Hasbeya 25 December 1840
5 o'clock p.m.

I have had the honour to write to Your Excellency on the 21 December from Saïda, and to the Excellency Izzet Mehmed Pasha on the same day, and also on the 22 December from this place. It is reported to me from all sides that the troops at Saïda are in a very bad want of provisions, and that Your Excellency has not made any arrangement to supply the Mudir in the fonds for the purchase of such articles as are daily required. The consequence is that the soldiers are very badly off, and the horses starving for the want of proper rations. The straw is notwithstanding very easily got, and costs only

8 paras (eight) an okc, but Chalid Pasha and the Mutsellin tell me that they cannot bring into true sufficient quantities of forage, because the mules for the transport have never been paid, and always taken by force. The consequences of this system, if continued, will be that the Cavalry and the officers will be left without horses, who all will die from disease, if fed only in barley, and the losses to the Government will be immense, besides the serious evil of indisposing the inhabitants by open injustice, and violation of property.

A great many shops in Saïda have been shut up, because articles were taken without payment, giving only receipts in writing, and such is the want, that officers even cannot get bread for ready money, because naturally the tradespeople get frightened. This cannot be otherwise, because the Mudir himself told me that he was since three weeks without any money, and 40,000 piasters in debt. I hope that Your Excellency on the receipt of my last letters has taken immediate steps to send provisions and ammunitions and all the other articles to Saïda and Acre *by land*, as we cannot depend on ships and winds in this season, and the success of our operations depends on the prompt execution of my demands in this respect. In war, believe me, never lose time, never spare money, and never disclose the secret of operations. The troops are now distributed as follows:

- 2 battalions at Beyrout,
- 12 battalions at Saïda — Chalid Pasha,
- 5 battalions at Acre — Ali Pasha,
- 6 battalions at Sour — Ismael Pasha,
- 4 battalions at Jerusalem — Emin Pasha,
- 3 battalions at Ramleh and Jaffa,

which I communicate again to Your Excellency in order that a Commissary with 50,000 piasters may be sent to each General commanding a brigade, as it is the regulation in all the armies of Europe.

I have &c.

Jochmus.

63.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL SELIM PASHA
GOVERNOR OF ACRE.

Hasbeya $\frac{1 \text{ Silkade } 1256.}{24 \text{ December } 1840.}$

With reference to the attack of Gaza, about which Your Excellency writes to me on the 27 Sheval, it is very important, as Ibrahim Pasha will go there and provision his troops. I see that Your Excellency and Colquhoun think, that 6 battalions and 6 guns are required for this enterprise, and that all should be sent on steamers to a place near Gaza. I doubt that there are steamers enough just now, but if

there are, this mode would do very well. However no troops can be taken for it from Saïda, but I find that three battalions might be taken from Acre viz.:

the Cyprian battalion,
the Rhodes battalion,
the Arab battalion of Mehmud Aga,

and the two battalions of Agroom from Sour. The battalion of Jaffa might follow the coast and go by land. If the Cyprus and Rhodes battalions are already gone to Ramleh, they might also come to Jaffa and go by the same road — but all these troops must be sent back to their garrisons the moment Gaza is taken, according to the instructions which I have already given to Omer Pasha, and which he will have submitted to Your Excellency. The above is for the case, that the expedition can be made by steamers. As however very likely there will be difficulties in this respect, the operation ought notwithstanding not to be given up. — Therefore if you operate principally by land, the following forces become disposable:

The Cyprus and Rhodes battalions from Ramleh, and the battalion now at Jaffa, and two battalions of the Guards, from Jerusalem, appear to me sufficient for the operation — but perhaps one battalion more might be embarked from Acre, where there would still remain 4 battalions and the English — and if Ibrahim moves to the South, I will send plenty more troops from Sour and Saïda.

If this operation is made, Your Excellency will be pleased to order Emin Pasha at Jerusalem to march two battalions from Jerusalem towards Gaza, leaving one battalion and a half in the castle of that town.

But the moment Gaza is taken, the troops must return to Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Ramleh, burning such provisions as cannot be brought away. At all events the two battalions of Jerusalem must return to that place *one* hour after Gaza is taken, because we must be extremely cautious on account of the movements of Ibrahim towards Gaza.

I shall however inform Your Excellency of his march, the moment he leaves Damascus. I find that the troops from Jerusalem can come to Gaza, — take it — and return in five days. — Ibrahim requires nine or ten days to go from Damascus to Jerusalem, if not 11 or 12 with his Artillery.

Besides we will harass and attack him as much as possible on the whole road, with the mountaineers and light Cavalry. I shall always write to Your Excellency.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO HADJI ALI PASHA.

Hasbeya $\frac{1 \text{ Silkade } 1256.}{24 \text{ December } 1840.}$

His Excellency Zacharias Pasha wrote to the Seraskier Izzet Mehmed Pasha, some time ago, that he intended to send his troops to Damascus from Aleppo, where he had then arrived. After General Sir Charles Smith and myself had been consulted on this movement, we considered it extremely dangerous, and His Excellency Izzet Mehmed then agreed, that he would write immediately to His Excellency Zacharias Pasha, desiring him not to move on Damascus, but to march by Antiochia, or Latakia on Tripolis and Beyrout, and there to join the army on the coast.

It is therefore with great concern that I hear of Your Excellency's arrival at Hamah with 8000 men, whilst Ibrahim Pasha has still a force of 20,000 men at least, regular Infantry and 5000 regular Cavalry with 160 guns, besides his irregular troops in Damascus. I therefore most earnestly address Your Excellency to explain to you the danger of your position, which is against all military rules, as this army which is now concentrated between Acre and Saïda cannot support your corps, whilst Ibrahim Pasha may march upon you with nearly the whole of his forces, which are three times superior to your own.

If such should be the case, it is absolutely necessary that Your Excellency should not accept the battle, but march immediately into the *mountains* of Lebanon, to Latakia, Antiochia, or Tripolis, as the roads or the snow may permit, but all events to avoid *the plains* and march by the mountains.

My decided opinion is, that Your Excellency should come with all your troops immediately to Tripolis, either by Latakia, or on the road through the mountains, but if Your Excellency hears and *positively knows*, that Ibrahim Pasha has retired from Damascus and gone to El Mezerib, or Djenin Jakub, then I consider it best for His Majesty the Sultan's service, that your Infantry alone should enter Damascus, and all your Cavalry go in a straight line to Tabariah by the road of Homs, Baalbek, Zachlé, Merly, Ajun and Safed, in order that they may assist in pursuing Ibrahim Pasha, who intends to retire by the province of Safed towards Gaza and Egypt.

I have also ordered the Emir Handjar, Ahmet Aga, Jussuf and the other chiefs of the Emir Beshir, *not* to enter Damascus, but to follow up Ibrahim Pasha, for in this way alone we may hope to injure, or even, if God permits it, to destroy his army.

A. Jochmus.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO BRIGADIER GENERAL E. MICHELL

Hasbeya 3 Silkade 1256.
26 December 1840.

You will have received the different letters I sent you, with copies of my letters to Selim Pasha at Acre (about the *very important* operation against Gaza), which I wrote to Captain Boville to transmit to you from Saïda. From the annexed report of Captain De L'or, who is with my advanced posts towards Damascus, you will see how much Ibrahim Pasha depends on the provisions at Gaza, and how important it is therefore to deprive him of this resource. All reports in this respect agree, and I hope you will have enabled Omer Pasha to take the place.

I have the *most positive instructions* from Constantinople to continue hostilities, and we cannot halt. I have written to Zacharias Pasha, or rather to Hadji Ali Pasha, who commands the division at Hamah. — The demoralization amongst the Egyptians at Damascus seems to be great. An officer and 15 dragoons of the Guards came over to Captain De L'or, with horses, armes and baggage, and are now doing service with him. Captain De L'or, with 700 light Cavalry and several Emirs, is within two hours march of Damascus.

The Emir Beshir sends me a report that 1 Colonel, 20 Captains, 1 Adjutant and 10 Sergeants, all of the regular troops, deserted to our outposts in a body. He has sent them on to me at Hasbeya.

I have directed De L'or to drive in the Egyptian outposts, and to alarm Damascus by a night attack, in order to favour the desertion; but to do it with prudence — as a very safe and excellent point has been indicated to me for that purpose by the Emir of Hasbeya.

Ibrahim has positively expected to leave Damascus on the 1, 2 and 3 Silkade, or 24, 25, 26 December for Mezerib, Djenin, Madjuma and Gaza.

Six different reports say the same thing, but I have no news as yet, that he has actually left, he could not therefore have left on the 1. He had put Reuff Pasha in prison, who refused to march. Under these circumstances I recommand again the operation on Gaza, as of the greatest importance, and hope you are gone, or will soon go to Acre. I send daily information to Selim Pasha, and Ibrahim shall not make a step without you or him knowing it.

If the Egyptians move to the South, my Head-Quarters will go to the castle of Safed, 4 hours SE from the bridge of Jakub, and thence to Acre, to direct the operations of the regular troops. I have fully written to Selim Pasha on the subject.

I have this moment received your two letters of the 23 and 24 December, and I am delighted to hear of the arrival of the ships and steamers.

There is, I hope, now no difficulty about the operation against Gaza. Notwithstanding the respect I have for the Admiral's opinions, my instructions are *so positive*, that we cannot allow Ibrahim Pasha to move at his pleasure, and carry off the property of hundreds of plundered Syrian villages, and several thousands of the *Sultan's subjects, natives of Syria*, into slavery.

66.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHELL TO LIEUTENANT-
GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Hasbeya 29 December 1840.)

Beyrout 26 December 1840 10 p.m.

My dear General,

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of 22 and 24. The position you hold appears to be advantageous in many respects, and your presence will, I doubt not, have a highly beneficial effect upon the mountain tribes and upon the country in general. Major Napier's last letter is from Nazareth of 21, and he was going on the next day to Naplous. He has not yet sent me his sketches, but he writes that the roads from Acre to Nazareth are quite practicable for Artillery. He had heard of the reconnoissance made by an Egyptian party of Cavalry on Feik. The fact you mention of their having declared for the Sultan's cause is most important. We are still delayed here by the weather, but the sea to-day was less rough, and we have done something. Captain Houston Stewart of the Benbow and Honorable Captain Elliot of the Hazard have been on shore and offered every aid, but the Admiral has cautioned Captain Stewart against any hazardous operations on the coast at this season of the year. Our Artillery could not be embarked — but we have sent the Vesuvius to Sidon with the provision Brig, which takes flints also and some Artillery men, and she is to return before daylight to take Colquhoun and his men and stores on board for Acre, if the weather should admit of it.

I have desired him to communicate with the Pashas there and to report as to Ascalon and Gaza.

Yours very truly

Edward Michell.

07.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHELL

Hasbeya 6 Silkkade 1256 8 o'clock a.m.
29 December 1840

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 26 this moment. I hope and believe, that Colonel Colquhoun will be in time for Gaza — Omer Pasha left Acre only on the 27, being detained several days in collecting camels, the Captain of the steamer, as Omer Pasha reports, having declined to take to Jaffa the reserve ammunition for 8 field-pieces.

I have pushed my advanced posts, composed of the light Cavalry of the Anti-Lebanon, commanded by the Emir Handjar, Chebel el Harrian and Ahmed Aga, from Zebdeni to within one and a half hour's march of Damascus, which has very much augmented and facilitated the desertion.

I have sent yesterday 40 soldiers and officers deserters to Saïda, amongst them 4 of the staff of Sheriff Pasha.

The latter all agree that Ibrahim leaves Damascus either Monday or Tuesday. The only thing that may stop him is the hope of an immediate convention or arrangement, which idea is infused into him by the reports of the French from Beyrout since a few days.

Captain Edmunds with the Albanians and some light troops is in Tabariah and near Djeser Madjuma.

Baron Du Mont with the corps of Seid Abd'Ali of Safed is at the castle of Safed, with troops at the Bridge of Jacob.

I have sent Count Széchényi to command the Beduin partisans of Kura, Adjelun &c. &c. beyond the Jordan, and to threaten El Mezerib and make night attacks if possible. Sheik Mahmud of the Hauran has also orders to approach El Mezerib for the same purpose. His people are famous for these night attacks, and always practised them during the last insurrection of the Hauran. If they succeed in destroying and carrying off many mules and camels, Ibrahim's means of transport will much diminish, and his embarrassment for a retreat increase in proportion.

I have arranged with Selim Pasha, that in due time the mountaineers of his Pashalic as far south as Djebel Chalil carry on the same sort of warfare.

The Emir Beshir will move south with 3000 men, the moment Ibrahim Pasha leaves Damascus, and all these light troops will concentrate on the latter's line of march. At each day's journey he will find fresh enemies, and old ones follow him.

I hope he may remain in Damascus and leave us time for some more days to finish all arrangements. After 8 or 9 days march he may be so much reduced, that we may hope to attack him with some

fair chances of success, with the regular troops, provided it be in a ground where *his Cavalry* can not act.

An A.D.C. of Osman Pasha is just come here, and about 100 deserters gone to Zachlé.

68.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private.

Hasbeya 29 December 1840.

I had the honour to write to Your Excellency eight days ago by an Austrian steamer the Crescent. — I left Beyrout on the 20, and arrived on the 22 instant. I have not lost a moment's time to reassume the offensive against Ibrahim Pasha, but as since the 4 November we had been entirely passive, or on the defensive, the labour of this last week has been very great. However our regular troops are now ready to move at a moment's notice, provided as I certainly trust the Mustechar has collected a sufficient number of transport mules.

The army is in three divisions "en échelon" between Saïda and Acre. As for the light troops Your Lordship will see, what dispositions have been taken by my letter to General Michell. Omer Pasha is going to attack Gaza in order to destroy the Egyptian magazines there, on which Ibrahim depends very much, since his army refused to march by the desert. — There are 7 battalions between Jerusalem and Jaffa, with 5 Omer Pasha is to operate against Gaza. — We might have taken Gaza *long ago*, when there were 200 or 300 refugees under Mahmoud Bey from Acre, but Sir Charles Smith would not allow Selim Pasha to attack it, when he asked to do it — three or four days ago. — Now strong reinforcements are arrived from El Arish, and our men-of-war have orders not to interfere with steamers of Mehmet Ali, going to take off sick and wounded from Gaza to Egypt.

I shall notwithstanding continue hostilities as well as our means and prudence permit, wherever the enemy is to be met, in accordance with Your Excellency's directions and opinions.

69.

RECHID PACHA AU LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered 18 January 1841.)

Constantinople le 20 Décembre 1840.

Général,

J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 1 Novembre pour m'informer de la réception du Diplome, de la décoration et du Sabre qui vous ont été adressés par la Sublime Porte.

Je me suis empressé de déposer aux pieds du trône Impérial l'hommage des sentimens que vous exprimez en cette occasion, et j'ai l'ordre de vous assurer, Général, que le Sultan, notre Auguste Maître, y a été sensible; qu'il apprécie les services que vous avez déjà rendus à Son Empire et qu'il compte avec confiance pour l'avenir sur votre zèle éclairé et sur votre dévouement.

Je dois vous prévenir aussi que l'on s'occupe, par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale, des distinctions à accorder aux militaires méritans de l'Armée de Syrie et qu'en attendant des médailles ont été frappées en mémoire de cette Campagne mémorable pour être distribuées à tous ceux qui y ont pris part.

Signé
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la S. P.
Rechid.

70.

THE MUSTECHAR MEHEMED SELAMI EFFENDI TO HIS
EXCELLENCY JOCHMUS PASHA

at Hasbeya.

Extract.

Saïda 29 December 1840.

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of all your former letters as well as that of yesterday, which I have received this morning. I cannot compliment you too much on the zeal and activity you have shown for our service.

I have complied with all your instructions with regard to the provisions.

There is now at Saïda the quantity of biscuit you demanded, and the same at Acre.

With regard to your intended movements against the enemy, you are the General, and it is not my business to interfere.

71.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHELL TO LIEUTENANT
GENERAL JOCHMUS

at Safed.

(Received Safed 1 January 1841.)

Acre Sunday 29 December 1840 7 p.m.

My dear General,

I wrote to you last night from Beyrout, telling you of my intentions. This morning I came away in the Hecate Steamer and Captain

Stewart accompanied me, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Colquhoun and **Aldersons**. We arrived at 5 p.m. The Hazard Sloop sailed with us, but met with a foul wind and will not come probably till to-morrow. My wish was to have watched and assisted in any operation which **Omer Pasha** might undertake at Gaza. We find that **Omer Pasha** marched this morning for Ramleh — that he will arrive there on the 31. But he took 2 battalions and 6 light guns on camels — also 80 Cavalry.

As far as I can learn, his instruction was to take up a position in advance of Ramleh — a strong one, he said, upon a torrent — to cover the removal of provisions to Jaffa and Jerusalem, and then to reconnoitre Gaza with a view to the execution of your orders there.

The *Vesuvius* went last night to Jaffa with the gun ammunition and ball cartridges for **Osman Pasha's** corps — and was to bring back 22,000 okes of biscuit to Acre. It is expected he will be back here to-morrow morning. Having 1200 or 1300 muskets on board the *Hecate*, Captain Stewart will go to Jaffa with them to-morrow, as he understands to be your wish. I will go with him and endeavor to gain better information as to Gaza — but it is my decided opinion, that this operation with **Omer Pasha's** present force is very hazardous — that it will take too much time, even if success were possible — in case of **Ibrahim** having moved on the 28 from Damascus — and might endanger Jerusalem, if **Omer Pasha** should borrow 2 battalions from that place — and on the other hand could not be done with his present force. — I see more than ever the impossibility of combined operations in this country where letters are sometimes delayed for 2 or 3 days, and where a sudden change of wind renders embarkations and debar-kations for days together impossible. I shall send Colonel Rose to warn **Omer Pasha** as *to time* and *superior force*. He cannot be at Gaza till Saturday and by that time the 2 steamers will have no coals, so that all attempt of naval cooperation will be out of the question. I beg you to write to me here. If I know where you are on my return from Jaffa, I will endeavor to go and see you.

In haste, my dear General, Yours very sincerely

Edward Michell.

72.

LE SÉRASKIER AHMED ZEKERIA PACHA AU GÉNÉRAL
D'ARMÉE JOCHMUS PACHA.

Saïda Jeudi le $\frac{8 \text{ Dgumazilevvel } 1256.}{31 \text{ Décembre } 1840.}$

Monsieur le Général,

Aujourd'hui je suis arrivé à Saïda où j'ai appris par votre lettre au Moustéchar Effendi qu'**Ibrahim Pacha** est parti de Damas.

Vraiment de cette nouvelle joyeuse je suis bien charmé, et j'espère qu'avec votre zèle et talent vous parviendrez encore à rendre d'autres services importants au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse.

Moi j'attends ici vos avis et j'inclus une lettre à Kérim Pacha qui se trouve à Hamah avec trois Régiments de Cavalerie, par laquelle je lui ordonne de se conformer aux dispositions qui lui seront données de votre part.

Par conséquent ce que vous trouverez à propos, vous aurez la bonté de lui faire connaître en lui envoyant la lettre ci-incluse.

Monsieur le Général, quoique je n'aie pas l'honneur de vous connaître personnellement, les rapports favorables que j'ai eus sur votre mérite excitent mon plus vif penchant de vous voir le plus tôt possible, c'est à dire quand les affaires vous le permettront.

En attendant &c. &c. &c.

Ahmed Zékéria.
Séraskier de la Syrie.

73.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO KERIM PASHA

commanding the Cavalry at Hamah.

Safed 10 Silcade 1256.
2 January 1841.

As soon as Your Excellency has learnt the actual departure of Ibrahim Pasha from Damascus I request, that you will be pleased in conformity with the enclosed letter from His Excellency the Seraskier Ahmet Zacharia Pasha to order the three regiments of Cavalry under Your command to march without loss of time by Homs, Baalbek, Zachlé, Merdj Adjun and Safed to Tabariah. — There are Government stores of barley and corn on this road in Shekiff, Jebada, Safed and Tabariah. —

The troops of Kerim Pasha belonged to the corps of Hadji Ali Pasha coming from Asia Minor.

74.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A MUSTAPHA NOURI PACHA, SÉRASKIER ET MINISTRE DE LA GUERRE, ET A RECHID PACHA, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

à Constantinople.

Safed 10 Zilcade 1256.
2 Janvier 1841.

Immédiatement après la réception du très haut Férman de la Sublime Porte daté de la fin de Ramadan qui m'a été remis le 22 Sche-

wal ou 16 Décembre j'ai fait les dispositions nécessaires pour reprendre l'offensive contre l'armée rebelle d'Ibrahim Pacha, et j'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-jointe à votre Excellence une copie de ma lettre d'aujourd'hui à Son Excellence Achmet Zacharia Pacha par la quelle Elle connaîtra l'état actuel des affaires militaires de la Syrie.

Le temps ne me permettant pas d'entrer dans le détail de nos opérations, je me réserve l'honneur d'adresser à Votre Excellence une plus ample relation d'ici à quelques jours. En attendant &c. &c.

75.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS AU SÉRASKIER AHMET ZACHARIA
PACHA, GOUVERNEUR GÉNÉRAL DE LA SYRIE.

Safed le $\frac{10}{2}$ Zilcade 1256.
2 Janvier 1841.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que Votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 8 de ce mois et je suis bien obligé des flatteuses expressions dont elle est remplie, d'autant plus si je considère qu'elles me sont adressées de la part d'un général dont la réputation est également haute dans l'Orient et en Europe.

Dès que les opérations militaires le permettent, j'aurai l'honneur de présenter personnellement mes hommages à Votre Excellence. En attendant, je ne manquerai pas de l'informer des évènements.

J'écrirai à Hamah pour déterminer la marche des trois régiments de Cavalerie qui s'y trouvent et que Votre Excellence place sous mes ordres.

Ibrahim Pacha était le 7 Zilcade encore à El Kissoué à $3\frac{1}{2}$ de marche au sud de Damas pour organiser sa marche et ses convois.

El Mézérîb est évacué par Caftan Agassi qui s'est replié sur El Kissoué, et les vivres y sont tombés entre les mains de nos troupes légères qui aussi aujourd'hui vont occuper la position de Feik.

76.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHELL.

Djeser Madjuma 4 January 1841
2 o'clock p.m.

I receive this moment a letter from Zacharia Pasha, who wishes to see me at Acre, I answer him that I shall come the moment.

I see that Palestine is no longer exposed to Ibrahim's army, but that I request you to assist any council in my name.

See, my dear General, that the 20 battalions under Hassan Pasha, Chalid Pasha and Ismael Pasha march immediately on *Jaffa*, with all the Artillery, *6 mule loads* of ammunition *per battalion*, and all the rest of the mules with biscuit, rice, butter and some barley for the officers' horses. It is also very necessary, that immediately 2000 ardebs of barley be towed by a steamer from Acre to Jaffa for the Cavalry.

We must cover the south of Palestine.

77.

MAJOR GENERAL OMER PASHA TO GENERAL JOCHMUS PASHA.

(Received Safed 7 January 1841.)

Translation. Extract.

Ramleh $\frac{12 \text{ Silkade.}}{4 \text{ January 1841.}}$

In Ramleh there are collected six battalions of Infantry with 6 guns and complete ammunition and the necessary means of transport . . .

According to the latest news the Egyptians have in Gaza 700 to 800 men regular and above 2000 men irregular Cavalry and eleven guns — but they are nearly without gun ammunition

78.

COUNT SZECHENYI TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received at Jerusalem 8 January 1841.)

Extract. Translation.

Suf near Djerash 6 January 1841.

I have now collected about 450 to 500 men. The Mutsellim is with me, and I have given orders through him that all shall take provisions with them, as nothing is to be found near El Szerka. —

According to news which I will not warrant, there remained yesterday still some troops in El Mezerib, which they were to leave only to-day.

Remtha was burnt this morning, a proof that troops passed there.¹ . . .

¹ Remtha was taken that morning by the Sultan's partisan Chebli-el-Arrian, who had connected himself with the Hauranees, having passed the Jordan (from Tabariah) at Djeser Madjuma.

A LETTER TO THE ARAB TRIBES.

Literal Translation from the Arabic.

This is the letter from His Excellency Jochmus Pasha, General &c. &c. &c., and the Mutsellim of Jerusalem El Sydi Osman to Sheik Kourchan-el-Sekour and to the twelve Arab Tribes of the Desert.

Jerusalem 8 January 1841.

Know ye that we are arrived at Jerusalem for the dispatch of the business of war, and that we have entertained ourselves with El Sydi Osman Aga Mutsellim of this town on the actual state of affairs, and it has happened that we have learnt, that you live under the Imperial shade in the neighbourhood of the forts and castles, where are the stores and provisions, such as Maan and others.

Now whereas we have become cognizant of your good reputation and that you walk in the path of faithfulness and probity, in the service of our master the Sultan — whose power is always in the ascendant —, we have deemed proper and expedient to dispatch unto your distant tents our Sons, the Baron Du Mont and Hadji Haziz Bey and the Sheik Abdurrahman Omar, that they may consult with you on the necessary measures to raise your lances against Ibrahim Pasha — and be it understood, that as soon as they arrive at your dwellings, you will be of the number of our friends, and consequently you will follow exactly all their instructions.

Persuaded of your good faith in the service of His Imperial Majesty, and certain of the existence of great stores and provisions in the forts and castles, we hereby authorise you to possess yourselves of all the grain, barley and ammunition of war, and to carry away all with the utmost dispatch, so that the enemy of the Sultan finds nothing in his flight. —

And this our Burjurdi will be your security and authority that you may take away every thing out of the path of retreat; burn the rest; and whenever you shall have executed this order in the mode we have prescribed, you may come with our Envoys to receive the Kalha (the honourable presents), and they shall be worthy of you, according to the execution of this important enterprise, for they are the favours of the Imperial Majesty, whose name you glorify, and you will have deserved them (the presents) by the effects of your fidelity and activity in his service.

This is written at the Head-Quarter of the victorious troops at Jerusalem on the 16 of Silkade of the year 1256.

(signed) Jochmus,
Ferik, General of the army.

(signed) Osman, Capidchi Bashi.

80.

MAJOR GENERAL OMER PASHA TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOCHMUS PASHA.

Translation. Extract.

Ramleh 11 January 1841.

Riza Pasha arrived here yesterday at 9 o'clock (turkish) with the number of Cavalry, known to Your Excellency.

At two o'clock at night arrived His Excellency Hassan Pasha with seven battalions of Infantry, who continued their march (to Jerusalem) at eight o'clock.

The undersigned has detached the 180 additional irregular Cavalry to the villages near Gaza, in order to protect them against plundering parties.

An Egyptian Colonel, a Captain and a Lieutenant deserted from Gaza and presented themselves at the quarters of our irregular Cavalry

81.

MEMORANDUM.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 12 January 1841.

Orders have been sent to the Governor of Jerusalem and to the Governor of Chalil to send light troops and spies to the north and south of the dead Sea, to bring news about the enemy. — Amongst the troops to be sent south of the dead Sea, are to be some men on Dromedaries, if possible, for rapid information. —

A. Jochmus.

82.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD
at Marmarissa.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 13 January 1841.

Sir,

Intrusted by the Imperial Firman of the end of Ramazan with the operations of this army since the 10 December, I immediately resolved to reassume the offensive against Ibrahim Pasha, who had concentrated his forces at Damascus, since the end of November, reduced however to 20--24,000 regular Infantry, 5 to 6000 regular Cavalry, 150 pieces or more of partly disorganized Artillery, besides 4000 irregular Kurdish and Hennedy horses, and as many Albanians and other irregular Infantry.

The Turkish and Allied forces consisted at that period of 15,000 Infantry and 150 regular Cavalry with 30 pieces of Artillery, exclusive of the garrison of Acre, which, reduced to 4 battalions and a detachment of British Marines, was destined to remain at that point.

The Emir Beshir maintained still in pay a corps of 3000 mountaineer Infantry and 500 (irregular) Cavalry. —

Such was the comparative strength of the forces when, after the necessary preliminary arrangements, I transferred my Head-Quarters from Beyrout to Hasbeya, where I arrived on the 22 December, and without loss of time, ordered the "levée en masse" of the population of the Lebanon and of Syria, south of the line of Beyrout, Baalbek and Damascus, including the warlike tribes of the Hauran. I had sent my Aid-de-Camp Captain De L'or to direct the operations against Damascus, and Count Széchényi of the Austrian service, to command the Beduin tribes on the left bank of the Jordan, south of the lake of Tiberias. Both those officers have executed their arduous and perilous tasks with brilliant courage and devotion.

From the best and most authentic information that could be obtained, it was evident that Ibrahim Pasha, towards the latter part of the month of December, had resolved to maintain himself as long as possible in Damascus, in hopes of a speedy settlement of the Egyptian Question, and a pacific arrangement, that might enable him to withdraw his shattered forces from Syria.

The fact of the "Carysfort" Frigate being in the harbour of Alexandria, and the nature of the news from Europe which Ibrahim Pasha obtained from friendly agents in Beyrout, Saïda¹ and the other sea ports, afforded him unquestionably strong reasons to hold out to the last.

On the other hand, should circumstances force him to retire (since violent remonstrances, visited on their authors in some instances by capital punishment, had been addressed to him by many or most of his officers, against the retreat through *the Desert*), the Pasha had resolved to march by El Mezerib, the bridge of Madjuma on the Jordan, Djenin, Ramleh, and Gaza to El Arish.

The most positive and well-corroborated news had been obtained on this head from Damascus, and the fact was put beyond a doubt, when Mehemet Ali had obtained not only the authority from the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, to embark the sick, wounded, and women (who amount to upwards of 10,000), at or near Gaza, but had actually sent from El Arish a Cavalry division of 3000 men, who encamped on the borders of the Desert, $\frac{3}{4}$ hours south of Gaza. —

Under such circumstances I considered it a most positive duty on my part to defeat the intention of the Egyptian Commander, first by obliging him to quit Damascus, and secondly by forcing him to take the route of the Desert; for if a convention had actually been signed

¹ *Sidon Levant Papers.*

whilst Ibrahim Pasha remained at Damascus, the military question remained undecided, and the complete conquest of Syria by the allied arms could be denied upon the ground of our supposed inability of driving a much superior force from its capital, whilst, if the Egyptian army made forcibly its way thro' Palestine on El Arish, its losses and sufferings would be small, the country being rich in all resources and large Government stores existing still at Safed, Tabariah, Ramleh and Gaza.

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency annexed the plan of operations as contained in my secret dispatch to Lieutenant General Selim Pasha, Governor of St. Jean d'Acre, then Kaïmakam of Syria, in absence of His Excellency the Serasker Ahmet Zacharias Pasha, who was still in the north of Syria. —

Your Excellency will perceive that the general outline of this plan was to concentrate the whole of the regular forces towards the defiles formed by Mount Carmel and the mountains of Naplous by a march along the coast, whilst all the irregular forces from the Lebanon &c. &c. moving parallel to the Egyptian army along the right bank of the Jordan and the Lakes of Houlé and Tabariah, not only covered the magazins of Safed and Tabariah, but were constantly in a position of close observation, covering Syria against large foraging detachments, and remaining at the same time disposable for a concentric movement on the defiles of Djenin, where I calculated to unite 25 battalions with 30 pieces of Artillery, and a mountaineer force of 10 to 12,000 men, and to fight a general action in a ground quite impracticable to the enemy's Cavalry. — It was at the time, and it remains still my firm conviction, that victory would have crowned the Sultan's arms in a few hours, and that the whole of Ibrahim Pasha's army would have been annihilated or obliged to surrender, the only force of his, still in some state like organisation, being his Cavalry, and this arm would have been of no use to him in the rocky grounds of Djenin.

The appeal to arms in the Sultan's name was cheerfully followed by the mountaineer population of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, obeying Prince Cassim Emir Beshir, by the men of Bellad-Bescharra and Safed under their Mutsellims Hamed-el-Bey, Hussein Selman and Seid Abdal Ali, by the Emirs of Rasheya¹ and Hasbeya, and the Cavalry of Baalbek under the Emirs Handjar, Ahmet and Chebli Arrian. —

The powerful house of Abdel-Al, Governors of Naplous, called under their standards the Musulman population of their districts and of Djebel Kuds, and the Beduin tribes of Kura, Adjelun, and Es Salt, prepared for booty when the hour of pursuing the enemy should have come, for the latter will not face an armed force, but are terrible to a flying foe.

On the 27 December the Hauran population appeared already in masses round El Mezerib and Caftan Agassi, the Egyptian Commander of the Hennedy Cavalry and Moghrehins, who had occupied that important post to protect the stores, collected there since 2 months, was

¹ *Rasbeya* Levant Papers.

obliged to fall back near to Damascus, leaving all the provisions and forage in the hands of our partisans, who appeared in strong bodies on Ibrahim's last line of communication with Egypt.

Since the 24 December the Cavalry of Baalbek had thrown back the outposts of Ibrahim Pasha into the very gardens of Damascus, maintaining themselves afterwards at 1 or 2 hours from the gates of the town, and thus facilitating the desertion of the enemy. Upwards of 100 officers and 800 men of the regular troops had presented themselves at our outposts up to the 28 December, many bringing with them both horses and arms, and offering themselves for immediate service in the Imperial army. —

Justly alarmed at the eminent danger of his military position in the centre of a general insurrectionary movement, with an army in utter destitution and deserting in all directions, blocked up also in the walls of a large and disaffected town, ready for revolt, and with the enemy at its gates, unable at the same time to depend on his troops, the major part of which might join the inhabitants against their General, — Ibrahim Pasha at last gave way to unlucky circumstances, and selling the stores which he could not carry away, and destroying a great part of his ammunition, he began his retreat on the 29 December in the afternoon, encamping that day in the gardens of Damascus, and continuing his march on the 30 as far as El Kessoue,¹ 3 hours from the latter city.

On the 31 December an advanced guard of 1000 Druses and 2000 Baalbek Cavalry entered the town of Damascus to establish the authority of the Sultan, but the Cavalry, according to my precise orders to Captain De L'or, started soon after, to pursue the Egyptians in their route towards El Mezerib where Ibrahim's army arrived on the 2 and 3 January 1841 after a loss by desertion, killed, and dead from cold, of upwards of 10,000 men and 20 guns.²

The icy rain and an intense cold caused numerous deaths amongst the nearly naked soldiery in summer clothing, and the sword of the fierce and revengeful Hauranees, the victims of Ibrahim's abominable oppression, was unmerciful to any small detachments or straggling deserters. —

The bivouacks of the Egyptian army and the whole line of march resemble a wide field of battle from the dead bodies of men and animals, such of the latter as could not keep up, being immediately shot by orders of the Pasha.

Ibrahim Pasha's march was in parallel direction followed by the forces of Emir Beshir, to whom I had given the Command-in-Chief of

¹ *Ressone* Levant Papers.

² The loss of these guns, tho' mentioned by the deserters and in the reports of the Arab chieftains, is doubtful *in so far*, as they have been lost between Damascus and el Mezerib, they have never been found or dug up, certain it is however that of 150 guns marched out of Damascus, only 82 arrived in Egypt, vide reports of Mr. Laurin to the Internuncio.

all the light troops, and who parting from Al Elias and Zachlé marched by Merdje Adjun and Safed on Tabariah, reinforced at each station to the south by the different detachments of volunteers who had been directed to assemble along the banks of the Jordan.

The Baalbek Cavalry having also come to Tabariah from its pursuit of the enemy in the direction of El Mezerib, the Emir Beshir found himself on the 4 and 6 January¹ at the head of 7000 Infantry and 1500 horse in and near Tabariah, whilst the defile of Djenin was occupied by a body of Albanians and Naplousians, supported by a strong force of the latter at 6 hours' distance at Naplous, ready to move at a moment's notice. —

19 battalions of the regular army having been concentrated at Acre since the 5 January, marched on that day and on the 6 from Acre in the direction of Jaffa, and with the 8 battalions already in Palestine at Jerusalem and Ramleh, were in position to arrive at Djenin long before the enemy. —

My own Head-Quarters had been transferred successively on the 31 December from Hasbeya to Safed, thence on the 3 January to Djeser Madjuma, and on the 4 to Djenin, on the 5 to Naplous, and on the 6 to Jerusalem.

Ibrahim remained 3 days irresolute at El Mezerib, reconnoitring Feik and the Jordan; but, informed of, or concluding the certainty of a general action, if he insisted in his intended movement on Djenin, he pushed his advanced guard on the 4 on Remtha, he was followed thither on the 5 and 6 by all his forces and trains, thus evincing that he had changed his plans.

On this latter day his rear-guard was attacked in Remtha² by the Cavalry of Chebli Arrian, who had again gone over the Jordan from Tabariah on the 5 January. On the 7 a skirmish took place near Djerash with the partisans of Count Széchényi. On the 11 the rear-guard of Ibrahim³ sending out a foraging party with some Artillery towards Es Salt, this corps was repulsed in the defiles of Es Salt.

The Egyptian army since fairly launched into the Desert has not been authentically heard of. When last seen, between El Mezerib and Kalaat Mefrek, its Infantry was reduced to 15,000 disorderly men, its Artillery tho' still numerous was utterly disorganized, principally by desertion, Infantry soldiers serving the guns, the Cavalry alone was in something like discipline.

After four months' campaign a powerful army of 65,000 *regular* troops has thus been reduced to scarcely two incomplete divisions. The valour of the Imperial and Allied troops has done much in the con-

¹ This advanced guard arrived on the 4 himself during the night of the 6 January. (Mr. Wood's report.)

² Count Széchényi reports that Remtha was burnt, but he does not say by whom, Turks or Egyptians.

³ Report of Mr. Gaillardot, from Reyha and from the Sheik of Es Salt, see Ibrahim Pasha's proclamation to the people of Es Salt.

quest of a vast country like Syria in a short period of glory and success, but Providence has evidently visited the sins of tyranny and unparalleled oppression on the heads of Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pashas, and has given a new and terrible lesson, that if revolt and armed rebellion against the legitimate sovereign are events unfortunately frequent in history, they lead finally, but thro' heavy misfortunes, to the wiser order of things, which entrusts the direction of empires to those in whose hands command has been vested from their birth.

The God of battle may lead Ibrahim and his shattered forces thro' the Desert, and bring some troops back to the banks of the Nile.

I have taken, as in duty bound, such measures as may as much as possible delay his march, or diminish his chances of escape.

On the 6 January I ordered from Jerusalem by 12 Firmans the general insurrection of the Beduin tribes of the Desert, and giving them as reward all the Miri or Government tithes of produce, yearly collected at Maan, the great central depôt of the Desert, provided they would remove them and others out of the way of Ibrahim Pasha's line of march. —

I entrusted the command of this expedition to the Sheik Abdurrahman, the renowned Chief of Djebel Chalil, since ten years the personal and unvanquished enemy of Ibrahim. This expedition of 200 Beduin horse, was accompanied by my Aid-de-Camp Baron Du Mont of the Austrian service, an officer of talent and resolution, and by Hadji Haziz' Bey, the son of the Governor of Jerusalem, Osman Aga.

My next report will inform Your Excellency of the issue of this enterprise.

It is to me an agreeable duty to state to Your Excellency the perfect unanimity which has actuated all, officers and men, of the Turkish and Allied forces during these last and extensive operations, which by mere strategic combinations and movements, and with very little loss of life, have given those great and important results: the clear proof of Ibrahim's having lost Syria by mere force of arms and without negotiations, the salvation of Palestine from pillage and destruction, and finally the enormous loss of the Egyptian General, only as far as El Mezerib, since he left Damascus, without calculating the new losses reserved for himself by the sufferings of the Desert.

To Brigadier General Michell and Commodore Houston Stewart of Her British Majesty's service, I have to offer my most grateful acknowledgements for their zealous and active co-operation. To their Excellencies, the Lieutenant Generals Selim and Hassan Pashas, to His Excellency the Mustéchar Mohammed Selami Effendi, to Omer Pasha and to the other General and Field officers of this army, as well as to their gallant and hardy troops, I have to express my sincerest thanks. My Aid-de-Camp Captain Boville has with great activity and intelligence performed the duties of the Quarter-Master-General's department of two

divisions. Lieutenant Colonel Tahir Bey and Major Herman, of Her British Majesty's service (attached to my staff), have in the execution of my orders displayed distinguished zeal and ability; but no services could be more essential than those rendered by Mr. Wood, who with unabating zeal and activity and with an admirable degree of management has obtained the prompt execution of my orders to the mountain chiefs, who accustomed hitherto to the mere surveillance and defence of their special districts, have for the first time in modern Syrian history been brought to act in perfect accordance for one general and great object, and who have, for this purpose, without pay and often without regular rations, gone for many days' marches beyond the frontiers of their proper command, a remarkable and isolated fact due to the personal influence of Mr. Wood, and as much to the devotion displayed by these chiefs to their legitimate Master.

I have the honour &c.

A. Jochmus.

Levant Papers III. p. 288.

82 b.

THE SAME TO THE SERASKER AHMET ZACHARIA PASHA
with the following addition:

I now have finally to express to Your Excellency my sincere gratefulness for the generous and effective support of my operations since Your Excellency's arrival in the south of Syria.

(Inclosure I in No. 82.)

COPY OF A SECRET DISPATCH FROM LIEUTENANT GENERAL
JOCHMUS TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL SELIM PASHA.

Most secret.

Hasbeya $\frac{2 \text{ Silkade } 1256.}{25 \text{ December } 1840.}$

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have directed the Emir Beshir Cassim, Emir Handjar of Baalbek, Achmed Aga-el-Jussuf, and the Emir of Rasheya and Hasbeya to follow Ibrahim Pasha with their Cavalry and Infantry the moment he leaves Damascus.

I have also written this order to Sheik Mahmoud of the Hauran, and to the Beduin Sheiks of Kura, Adjelun, Es Salt and others. These latter will come to El Mezerib and Feik the moment Ibrahim tries to pass Djeser Madjuma. All these light troops will continually attack and harass the Egyptian army by day and by night, and in this way they will create great disorder, and give occasion to the soldiers to desert,

and to the muleteers to escape with their mules and camels, and leave Ibrahim without means to transport his guns and provisions.

I beg now that Your Excellency will give similar orders immediately in your Pashalik to the same effect, and order Seid Abd' Ali to collect all his people at Djeser Jakub, the castle of Safed, and Djeser Madjuma.

Your Excellency will hereby see how necessary it is to send to Safed the four guns of Seid Abd' Ali, and the 100 boxes of ammunition, and 2500 flints, and 2000 okes of rice from Acre, together with 10,000 okes of biscuit, *if the 20,000 okes are arrived from Beyroul.*

It is also very important that Your Excellency orders immediately the people of Belled Harthé and those of Djebel Naplous to be ready to fall upon Ibrahim Pasha, when he passes by the road from Djeser Madjuma to Djenin and Kakim: as Your Excellency has received many muskets, these may all or partly be distributed to the people of Djebel Naplous, and other warlike tribes near them, together with ammunition and flints; but I think it best, only to do this when Ibrahim has actually left Damascus, and not before.

With all these people following and harassing Ibrahim, we may hope to do him great injury; and in the mean time, we shall assemble all the regular troops near Acre, and march by Mount Carmel towards Djenin, and defeat the enemy in a general action in the defiles, where his cavalry is of no use, and where we shall have all the mountaineers besides our regular Infantry and Artillery.

But before this, I shall come to Acre and concert everything with Your Excellency, and we shall go together and fight another action like that of Calat Meidan, and, please God, the Sultan's standards shall be victorious.

I have written this to Your Excellency in the greatest confidence.

I have &c.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant General.

Levant Papers III, p. 293.

(Inclosure II in No. 82.)

Army of Southern Syria.

His Excellency Ahmet Zacharias Pasha, His Excellency Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B.,
Serasker of Syria, Governor General &c. Commander-in-Chief of the forces by sea and land.

His Excellency Lieutenant General Jochmus Pasha,
commanding the army of operations.

His Excellency Lieutenant General Mehmet Reshid Pasha,
Chief of the General Staff.

His Excellency Lieutenant Selim Pasha, His Excellency Lieutenant General Hassan Pasha,
commanding 1st division.

1st Brigade Chalid Pasha.

2nd Brigade Ali Pasha.

Omer Pasha,

General of Brigade on the Staff.

His Excellency Prince Cassim, Emir Beshir,
commanding the irregular forces.

1st Brigade (Guards) Emin Pasha.

2nd Brigade Ismael Pasha.

Riza Pasha,

commanding the regular and irregular Cavalry.

Regular forces:

Corps of operations	15,000 men
Garrison of Acre	3,000 "
Garrison of Saïda and Beyrout	1,000 "
Cavalry	150 lancers
Tartars, 1 regiment	450 horses
Field-Artillery, 30 pieces	500 men
	<hr/>
	20,100 men

British Artillery and Marines at Acre

and Jaffa 300 men

Levant Papers III. p. 202.

Troops of the Emir Beshir, irregular forces and levies.

Emirs of Hasbeya	3000	Infantry
and Rasheya	1000	Cavalry
other Chieftains including Naplous	6000	500
	<hr/>	200
	10,000	1500
		<hr/>
		2200

Austrian Marines at Beyrout 200 men.

Egyptian Army of Syria.

His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha,
Commander-in-Chief.

His Excellency Soliman Pasha, Lieutenant General,
Chief of the General Staff.
His Excellency Churchid Pasha, Lieutenant General,
commanding a division.
Ahmed Pasha Deramanli, Major General,
commanding the Cavalry.
His Excellency Ahmed Menikli Pasha, Lieutenant
General, commanding a division.
His Excellency Osman Pasha, Lieutenant General,
commanding a division.
Hasan Pasha, Major General,
commanding a brigade of light troops.

Effective combattants.

Return of forces on the 29 December 1840 on leaving Damascus.

	Infantry	Artillery	Cavalry	Albanians Infantry	Irregular Kurdish	Cavalry Hennedy and others
	22,000 men	2000 men	5000 men	2000 men	2000 men	2000 men
Loss from 29 December to 3 January 1841	7000 "	1000 "	few	none	2000 "	none
Forces at Mezerib 4 January 1841	15,000 "	1000 "	5000 men	2000 men	none	2000 men

Levant Papers III, p. 292.

Djenin 5 January 1841.

*

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 17 January 1841.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency, that on the 14 instant I directed a division of 10 battalions of Infantry, 1800 irregular and Tartar horse, 150 regular Cavalry, and 14 pieces of Artillery to march from Ramleh towards Gaza.

This latter village is abandoned by the enemy, who has a flying camp of Cavalry of 1200 regular and 1800 irregular horse with 8 pieces of horse-artillery at $\frac{3}{4}$ hours south of Gaza, whence he draws his forage and provisions — but ravages at the same time the country, carrying off cattle and mules to a great extent from most of the villages south of Ramleh.

The object of my movement was the protection of these villages, but principally the destruction of the enemy's provisions at Gaza, in case Ibrahim Pasha, distressed in the Desert, should have struck off south of the dead Sea towards Gaza.

On the 14 January the division encamped at Esdud, on the 15 it could only make 3 hours' march to El Mesden, on account of the incessant heavy rains, which poured down ever since it left Ramleh. Towards the afternoon a reconnoitring party of the enemy of 500 horse approached the camp, but the commanding officer, making a very silly manoeuvre, was taken in flank and rear by about 400 or 500 of our Cavalry, who pursued him for two hours, taking between 40 and 50 prisoners, and killing and wounding as many. Our loss was 4 killed and about 12 wounded.

Hearing nothing positive about Ibrahim's immediate approach, and the low country towards Gaza having become a complete marsh by the continual floods of rain up to the 16 in the morning, and the troops having been completely drenched day and night in the bivouacks, I suspended the movement, and sent the Infantry and guns to Jaffa, advancing at the same time the Cavalry detachments to the neighbourhood of Ascalon and some villages towards the river of that name, with their Head-Quarters at El Mesden, intending to resume the operation the moment the ground had become practicable; but on my arrival here informed officially of the complete submission of Mehemet Ali Pasha, and the consequent cessation of the state of rebellion of his army, our troops have been ordered to cease offensive hostilities. His Excellency the Serasker Ahmet Zacharias Pasha commanded in person since we left Ramleh.

P.S. At El Mesden on the 16 the Serasker received still a letter from Ismael Bey commanding the camp at Gaza, informing him of the above fact of Mehemet Ali Pasha having been pardoned by his imperial master, which was an additional reason to get the Infantry under

cover, until the fact was ascertained, as in all events it was impossible for us to advance for the next 4 or 5 days.

The same officially transmitted to Sir Robert Stopford; Levant Papers III, p. 293.

84.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A L'AMIRAL BANDIERA.

Quartier Général de Jaffa
17 Janvier 1841.

J'ai reçu la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser de Marmarice en date du 19 Décembre qu'à mon Quartier Général de Jérusalem il y a 8 jours. Je m'empresse d'y répondre par la première occasion de bateau à vapeur qui s'offre, pour remercier Votre Excellence de la promptitude avec laquelle Elle a accordé à l'Armée Ottomane l'assistance importante des forces sous ses ordres.

La fin des opérations étant pourtant à présent arrivée, Votre Excellence tout en acceptant mes sincères remerciements pour ses services empressés, aura su avant la réception de cette lettre, que le choix du point des côtes Syriennes ou autres dépend entièrement de son propre désir, et je serai toujours heureux de lui être agréable en tout selon mon pouvoir.

J'adresse aujourd'hui à Son Excellence l'Amiral Stopford le rapport officiel des opérations du dernier mois.

Dix mille déserteurs, morts, prisonniers &c. &c. sont le résultat de la retraite forcée d'Ibrahim Pacha de Damas sur El Mézérîb. Ses pertes probables depuis dans le désert ne peuvent pas encore être fixées, mais en quittant El Mézérîb son armée était déjà dans une désorganisation complète.

La Palestine qui aurait été mise à feu et à sang si les Egyptiens y avaient pénétrés par la route de Djeser Madjuma, Djenin et Ramleh, pour marcher sur Gaza et El Arish selon le projet d'Ibrahim, a été sauvée de cette incursion barbare et nous avons, en outre, obtenu le grand résultat d'avoir vidé la question par les armes sans recourir à une évacuation de convention. La conquête de la Syrie est donc un fait militaire tout pur, et il n'y a plus moyen de dire que sa capitale était à la fin de la campagne occupée par une armée supérieure en nombre à la nôtre et qui, sans convention, n'aurait pu être obligée d'abandonner le pays.

Il m'est bien agréable de pouvoir informer Votre Excellence des services éminens que plusieurs des officiers Impériales et Royales attachés à mon État-Major ont été à même de rendre, et de vous annoncer que j'ai proposé au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale pour la décoration du Nishan Ifitihar Messieurs les Comtes Nugent et Széchényi et le Baron Du Mont.

Veillez, Monsieur l'Amiral, vous charger d'exprimer à Son Altesse Impériale et Royale l'Archiduc Frédéric tout le respect et l'admiration que m'inspirent ses vertus militaires, et agréer l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être &c.

85.

ADMIRAL BANDIERA TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Jaffa 17 January 1841.)

Baja di Marmarizza li 19 Decembre 1840.
Dalla Fregata "Medea".

Eccellenza,

Pochi momenti sono ho avuto l'onore di ricevere il riverito di Lei dispaccio dei 16 andante. Spedisco sull'istante costì la Corvetta Clemenza per tutti que' bisogni di servizio che potessero presentarsi in codeste parti.

Attendo di giorno in giorno delle risposte ed istruzioni da Constantinopoli, e se le circostanze lo esigessero, io sono pronto per ritornar subito a Beruti.

Do tutte le disposizioni necessarie perchè, subito che giungerà costì la nostra compagnia d'Infanteria Marina, forte di 284 uomini, se Vostra Eccellenza lo giudicasse necessario, sia sbarcata a terra, ove lo crederà V. E. più opportuna.

Io amerei però che rimanesse, se fosse possibile, di guarnigione a Beruti per farla sorvegliare dai nostri bastimenti che saranno in codesta rada.

Devo pregare l'E. V. di non far sbarcare a terra le nostre truppe d'Infanteria Marina che nel solo caso ne avesse un assoluto bisogno. Se non le accorressero e che Ibrahim Pascia avesse intieramente evacuata tutta la Siria, in allora me le rimanderà a Marmarizza.

L'E. V. decida su questo punto a norma delle circostanze.

Anco gl' Uffiziali, Chirurghi, e Sott' Uffiziali dei differenti Corpi dell' Armata Austriaca, la batteria di racchette, i fucili e fisecche saranno subito sbarcati costì, qualora V. E. li credesse necessari.

Se le truppe di Marina dovessero sbarcare a terra, io devo interessarla, Eccellenza, di far provvedere al loro mantenimento, poichè certamente non avrebbero le nostre truppe il modo di provvedersi di pane e carne.

Da varj giorni sono giunti costì 5 Uffiziali Austriaci, cioè il Signore Tenente Colonello Philippovich ed un Maggiore dello Stato maggiore, un Maggiore ed un Capitano del Genio, ed un Capitano di Cavalleria. Questi Signori Uffiziali sono molto distinti pei loro talenti e meriti; quindi io devo pregare l'E. V. di volerli disporre nei servigj più adattati alle molte loro qualità ed alla Nazione che rappresentano.

Sono certo che V. E. destinerà gl' Uffiziali Austriaci negl' eguali servigj, di cui vengono incaricati gl' Uffiziali Inglesi di un grado corrispondente.

Ho presentato i di Lei ommaggi a Sua Altezza Imperiale Reale il Serenissimo Arciduca Federico, che m'incaricò di ringraziare l' Eccellenza Vostra.

Aggradisca, Eccellenza, gl' ommaggi della distinta mia stima.

Bandiera.

86.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A SON ALTESSE LE GRAND VISIR
RAOUF PACHA.

Jaffa $\frac{25 \text{ Zilcade } 1256.}{17 \text{ Janvier } 1841.}$

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que Votre Altesse a daigné m'adresser le 25 du mois passé et dans laquelle Elle veut bien m'assurer de sa bienveillance.

Mon absence des côtes de la Syrie et le manque d'une occasion par bateau à vapeur m'ont empêché de répondre plutôt selon mon devoir pour exprimer à Votre Altesse, combien je suis sensible à ses bontés.

Je suis heureux de pouvoir annoncer à Votre Altesse la satisfaisante termination de cette campagne mémorable qui a rendu en quatre mois à la Sublime Porte une de ses plus belles provinces. La valeur des troupes Ottomanes et alliées a certainement beaucoup fait dans ces succès extraordinaires, le dévouement montré par les habitans de la Syrie pour le Gouvernement paternel de Sa Majesté Impériale en a fait pour le moins autant, car ces populations savent à présent distinguer entre l'oppression inouïe de Mehmed Ali Pacha et l'indulgence de leur Maître légitime.

87.

COMMODORE NAPIER TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received Jaffa 17 January 1841.)

Her Majesty's Ship "Carysfort", Alexandria
10 January 1841.

Sir,

The bearer of this letter is charged by me (agreeable to the orders of Sir Robert Stopford in consequence of directions from Lord Palmerston to carry my convention into effect) to proceed with Hamid Bey to the Head-Quarters of Ibrahim Pasha and deliver to him the order of Mehemet Ali, for the immediate evacuation of Syria.

It is Sir Robert Stopford's direction, that every facility is to be given for the embarkation of the sick, the wounded, the women and children, and others of the Egyptian army at Caiffa.

But it appears to me (if there is no objection of which I cannot be a judge here) they may be permitted to embark at any other place if more convenient.

The officer charged with dispatches to Ibrahim Pasha will necessarily consult with him and with you on this point, as well as the officer, who is charged to see the evacuation carried into effect. —

It is needless to observe, that as Mehemet Ali has made his submission to the Porte and is reinstated in the Pashalik of Egypt it is of the utmost importance, that he should not only not be disturbed in his evacuation, but that he should be protected and assisted in every manner so as to cause as little loss of life as possible. —

I have the honour &c.

(signed) Charles Napier,
Commodore.

88.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A SON EXCELLENCE RECHID PACHA,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Constantinople.

Jaffa 18 Janvier 1841.

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser la réception de la lettre dont Votre Excellence a bien voulu m'honorer en date du 20 Décembre.¹

Son Excellence le Séraskier Ahmed Zacharias Pacha transmettra aujourd'hui au Gouvernement Impérial les rapports de l'heureuse terminaison de la campagne de Syrie.

Il est pour moi un sentiment bien satisfaisant de répondre par de si bonnes nouvelles à l'espérance que Votre Excellence exprime dans sa lettre de la continuation satisfaisante des opérations de la campagne actuelle.

Je suis bien heureux de voir que sa Majesté Impériale dans sa sollicitude paternelle pour l'armée a daigné accorder à celle de Syrie une médaille en mémoire des faits militaires qu'elle a été appelée à exécuter. Jamais certainement les souffrances, les privations et les dangers du soldat ont eu plus de titres à la bienveillance du Souverain. —

¹ vide No. 69.

89.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Jaffa 18 January 1841.)

Therapia 11 December 1840.

My dear General,

It is unnecessary that I should enter into the history of the detention of the Firman, it is enough that I have put an end to the evil and that you will receive it — I ought to say you have received it — I have now other matter and I am obliged to write post haste, lest I should miss the occasion to send any letter.

It is the ardent desire of the Porte to destroy the army of Ibrahim, and it is hoped that you may be able to do it, aided by the season, and other difficulties that press upon him. If he can get back to Egypt, then will be a fearful encrease of the obstacles in the way of *perfect* success, and the French will obtain a great advantage.

His mere personal *wight* in Egypt will be a disadvantage to us all — If he be beaten, I wish you to consider of a *march* at the proper moment upon Cairo! I believe a plan was given for this by Love^t the Prussian Officer. — You must not speak of this notice. It will be proper to execute it if feasible, but it must not be spoken of, before it is actually undertaken.

The Admiral Sir Robert Stopford takes especial care that I shall have no means of communicating with Syria — He will never forgive me for having proved him to be a fool, and hindered him in losing Syria, and ruining the English Government by the total failure through his means of all that enterprise which has now been crowned with success by the skill and valour of yourself and your comrades.

I was mortified and astonished by the absurd conduct of Napier — It was the foolishhest act I ever yet know done by a clever brave man.

It was *impossible* it could succeed, and it is almost incredible that a man should assume authority and power, to which he had not a shadow of right, and expose himself to all the censure and ridicule of such doings, to attempt a thing in itself obviously impracticable. I admire and like Napier and I am sorry for all this, but only I measure the absurdity of his propositions when they are considered with regard to the *settlement* of the Eastern Question and as means intended by *him* to thwart the French! Why what Napier proposed to do and tried to do, is exactly that the French would fall on their knees and worship him for obtaining their object always has been, to maintain Mehemet Ali in Syria if possible, if not, in Egypt; and how could he be now maintained so well as by sending him back his army safe and sound? How could he be so well enabled to assert again his claims to Syria?

¹ i. e. *Laue*.

How else can he be enabled again to disturb the Ottoman empire so certainly and so well as by Napier's plan to thwart the French? Truly one would have supposed the plan was the plan of Walewski, only he would not have hoped for success for such a barefaced attempt to set up french power —

You will see that I have likely known that the Pasha of Candia has joined the Sublime Porte and given up that island to the Sultan. So there is an end of one source of advantage to french schemes. If we are steady France is defeated, *the Porte is steady and will not give Egypt to Mehemet Ali.*

I have said enough to you in this letter to put an end for the time to your desire to leave Syria — Do your business well there! You will find however in proper time that your position will be as good as you desire, or I am much mistaken — The thing to be done, is to make the Porte victorious and to *destroy* Mehemet Ali.

Make for me all manners of compliments to Selim Pasha and tell him *I will work for him* and hope to succeed. The present arrangements are not likely to be *permanent* — I have only one word to add, you must remember that you are in the service of the Sultan, and that you are not to sacrifice your views of his interest to the military opinion of Colonel Mitchel or any other Colonel or Admiral —

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

General Jochmus,

I have not time to write much that I wish to say that I must again renew my recommandations of Wood to you and beg, you will second him in his exertions to keep the Mountaineers in good humour —

I hear Sir Charles Smith was occupied in pursuing Robbers, it is much better to pursue Ibrahim, put him down, and then you may look after police duties. I think it better to be a Conqueror than a Police Constable.

P.

90.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Jaffa 18 January 1841.)

Therapia 17 December 1840.

My dear General,

The steamer that takes you this will carry out to Syria Hassein Pasha, President of the Council of the Seraskerlik, who is sent to restore

order in the army and to see that the authority of the Sublime Porte be not abused, and the orders of the Porte should be carried into execution with exactness and punctuality.

Reshid Pasha has desired me to introduce this Pasha to you. Reshid is well acquainted with him and says, he is a very honest man and has a good capacity.

I lament more than I can say the accidents that have occurred to prevent the execution of the designs and wishes of the Porte — I am full of apprehension lest it should turn out that Ibrahim has escaped with a large part of his army, which will be a much serious calamity — I do not know what letters of mine have reached you and what not, and I am too busy now with matters of the most pressing notices to say more to you than that I am sure, there will be nothing wanting on your part to certify the confidence the Porte has placed in you.

I wholly disbelieve in war with France, the french steamer has brought us accounts of the debates in the french chambers which I think clearly shew that France has been attempting to bully and will not fight — besides which I heard some weeks ago from the best authors, that *in fact* France has not more than 230,000 men of disposable troops. — While there are *ready* within a short distance of the Rhine 500,000 Prussian and German Confederation troops — to be commanded by the King of Virtembergh and money also ready to defray the expense — This is only the force actually on the spot, Austria and Russia and others are in the rear —

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

91.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Jaffa 18 January 1841.)

Therapia 21 December 1840.

My dear General,

I had yesterday a conversation with Reshid Pasha who expressed his sorrow that accidents had prevented the *opportune* delivery to you the Sultan's Firman, and orders (the mostfull) are gone to the Mustechar Selami to deliver it to you, and also orders to you for your government — The Pasha said he hoped you would *continue in the Sultan's service*. I replied that I hoped you would and thought you would.

I have reasons for saying that the Porte expects, you will consider yourself as the Officer of the Sultan, and that you are to obey the orders of the Porte. I do not think it necessary for me to make known to

you what my raisons are for making this statement to you, but you will bear in mind that I have made it, and I have only to add that the Pasha is confident, you will continue to cultivate the best understanding and feelings between yourself and the British and Austrian Officers. —

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

92.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Confidential.

Jaffa 18 January 1841.

I have had the honour to receive Your Lordship's kind letters of the 11, 17 and 21 December, but absent from the coast on account of the operations, I have not been able to answer them before this — I beg to enclose the copy of the official reports, which I address to Sir Robert Stopford, and I address one exactly similar to the Serasker Ahmet Zacharias Pasha, who will forward it to the War-Office at Constantinople. — I think it will flatter his amour propre that this report be sent thro' him, and I have made the military and propre distinction styling myself commanding the *army of operations only*, whilst he is Commander-in-Chief of the forces. He is a good straight forward soldier, but not much of a General — we get on extremely well together.

I hope Your Excellency will be satisfied with our operations, the losses of Ibrahim are certainly *under* and not *over* rated and if the expedition on Maan in the desert succeeds, he is completely lost. — As it is and in case even of good luck for him, he will only bring back a wreck and his moral authority being much impaired, the desertion will increase as he approaches Egypt. — The irregular Hennedy Cavalry are certain to be all off to their homes, for it is known that on an average each private of those robbers has cleared 20,000 piasters, and they will thus not continue the service. Yesterday the Commissioners of peace, Hamid Bey and an English officer, arrived with an official letter from Sir Charles Napier, dated Alexandria 10 January, and copies of the visirial letter to Mehemet Ali reinstating him to the Pashalik of Egypt, but as Ibrahim Pasha is deep in the desert, the convention is of no earthly use to him as far as it regards the army. — The matter would have been different if I had allowed him to stay in Damascus, as I was most earnestly advised and entreated to do, but having Your Lordship's directions, I followed exactly the line Your Excellency traced, and the result has been certainly above my expectations. It was also after vanquishing the greatest difficulties and by obstinately refusing to give way, that I succeeded in marching on Gaza. Commodore Stewart

declined in writing to co-operate in consequence of the Admiral's orders to *facilitate* Ibrahim's retreat. — Unfortunately the rain was so incessant and heavy that the guns and camels could not get beyond El Mesden and we had the greatest difficulty to bring them back the 7 or 8 hours' march to Jaffa even by the *sands* of the sea shore, whilst the ground towards Gaza is marshy.

The information of the pacification which the Serasker received at El Mesden from Ismael Bey would not have stopped me, altho' I suspected its hourly confirmation via Jaffa, had the ground permitted the operations, but I did not like and did not consider it prudent to drive 3000 Cavalry with 8 guns from their camp, attacking them with young Infantry and 1800 Cavalry alone, without Artillery, as I did not wish to expose myself even to the "soupçon", of a check. The Cavalry affair at El Mesden has been very creditable indeed to the Turks, who had inferior horses to the Egyptians and got beat them completely upon equal terms and numbers.

I do not think, my Lord, that my presence in Syria will now be for the future of any real use. Organisations can only be made in Constantinople, because one uniform basis must be given to the whole army, and this has to be discussed and fixed.

I have received very flattering letters from the Grand Visir, from Reshid Pasha and Hussein Pasha, and I am happy to answer them by the news of our successful operations.

Perhaps it may induce them to give me the rank of a full General or Mushir, which I consider very desirable not so much as a recompense but in order to put me in a position to carry thro' any future organisation with vigour, and without clashing with senior Lieutenant Generals, as most are now in the Turkish service, but I believe from all what I hear here, that generally speaking promotions in Turkey must be obtained whilst still on actual service. Once arrived in Constantinople and out of the field, the thing will be much more difficult. — I put all this however entirely in Your Lordship's hands, as also the fixing of my stay in Syria.

Omer Pasha has been completely acquitted by the Court-Martial and has shown a good deal of talent in the last operations.

I mention these circumstances as on a former occasion I reported his being placed under arrest and being tried.

Perhaps Zacharias Pasha will not have time to get my report translated for this steamer, in which case Your Excellency might think it proper to allow Reshid Pasha to take a copy of my official report. —

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private.

Jaffa 20 January 1841.

I have this instant received from my Aid-de-Camp Baron Du Mont the important news, that the expedition of a corps of our light troops under his command which left Jerusalem on the 9 instant for Maan, has completely succeeded. Ibrahim Pasha thinking his depôt deep in the desert completely safe, neglected to keep a sufficient garrison in the castle, which was only defended by 4 guns and few men. — Baron Du Mont after 5 forced marches arrived at 10 o'clock p.m. on the 13 January near the place and surprised it the next morning, just after the first column of Ibrahim's troops had left it for Suez, and after inducing the people to evacuate the town, burnt the 5 magazines which contained Ibrahim Pasha's stores.

The column which left Maan for Suez is chiefly composed of all the women, servants &c. &c., with some troops of escort. The army itself, of which the 2d column was to sleep at Maan on the 14, seeing its provisions burnt, has been obliged to countermarch, is now wandering in the desert, harassed on all sides by the Beduin tribes, and all over the country thro' which Baron Du Mont came back to Kerek, he saw the dead bodies of small detachments which has been cut off by the Beduins.

The same officially sent to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford. Levant Papers III, p. 294.

(Inclosure in No. 93.)

Extract from Baron Du Mont's report of the operation against Maan.

(Translated from German.)

Bivouac-Mountains between Kerek el Schoback
and Maan 16 January 1841 8 o'clock a.m.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that according to your orders I left Jerusalem in the 9 instant, accompanied by Sheik Abdul Rahman of Halil Cherif and Hadji Hazis Bey, the son of the Governor of Jerusalem, with an escort of 15 Arab horsemen.

By five forced marches of 15 to 18 hours per diem I arrived near Maan on the 13 instant at 10 o'clock p.m., our detachment being then increased by the Sheik's followers to 220 horsemen. —

I approached an Egyptian bivouac near Maan to within 150 paces, there being no piquets, guards, or military precaution, and I found that I had before me the first column of the Egyptian forces escorting the women, harems &c. &c. The escort consisted only of Henedy irregular Cavalry.

My force not being sufficient to attack, I watched the column till daylight, when it continued its march by the Suez caravan road, and I entered Maan two hours afterwards. It is a place consisting of about 50 houses with a chemise of masonry. The magazines were in an old castle, defended by four old iron guns, and 20 Egyptian soldiers. These were killed by my horsemen before I could prevent it, as they were endeavouring to escape.

After ordering the town's people to quit, and communicating Your Excellency's orders and instructions to their Sheik, I saw the town evacuated in the space of twelve hours, surmounting the difficulties by money, and promises of presents.

The magazines, 5 in number, I found to contain on inspection :

150	camel	loads	of	barley,
50	id.	id.	of	prepared wheat,
135	id.	id.	of	rice.

They were burned at 3 o'clock in the night of the 14/15 January, the private property and stores of the inhabitants having been by that time removed to the mountains, and nothing left in Maan.

I took the direction of Aneizez with Sheik Abdul Rahman, and on the 15 at 7 o'clock after sunrise, I perceived the second column of the Egyptian army, consisting only of about 1200 camels, and a greater number of mules and other animals of burthen, and an irregular Cavalry escort, altho' I had received positive news that it was conducted by Soliman Pasha, and had with it the Artillery.

My Arab horsemen had seized 44 camels that belonged to the first column during the preceding night, and I found 40 more dead on the road, or in the bivouac, constituting a loss of 84 camels in one single night by my party alone.

The whole of the Arabs of this desert are pursuing the Egyptian forces.

(True extract.)

(signed) A. Du Mont.

Levant Papers III, p. 295.

94.

LE SÉRASKIER MUSTAPHA NOURI PACHA AU
GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Jaffa 20 January 1841.)

Constantinople le 20 Décembre 1840.

Général,

J'accomplis une tâche bien agréable en vous informant que le Sultan, notre Auguste Maître, m'a ordonné de vous faire savoir qu'il est

satisfait de vos services, et que votre conduite jusqu'ici dans les fonctions qui vous étaient confiées a mérité sa pleine approbation.

Recevez en même temps, Général, mes félicitations particulières sur l'heureuse issue de vos efforts pour le succès de notre cause, et croyez que vous me trouverez toujours prêt à les seconder, et à faire valoir vos titres à la bienveillance de notre Souverain, qui vous est déjà acquise par vos zélés services.

Je profite de cette occasion pour vous offrir, Général, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Le Séraskier Pacha,
Mustafa Nouri.

95.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS AU SÉRASKIER AHMET ZACHARIAS
PACHA ET A HUSSEIN PACHA, PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL.

Secret.

Jaffa 21 Janvier 1841.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer vos Excellences, que d'après des nouvelles officielles de mon Aid-de-Camp le Baron Du Mont, les magasins d'Ibrahim Pacha à Maan ont été brûlés le 15 Janvier, que l'armée d'Ibrahim est coupée en deux, et en complète déroute, rebroussant chemin, qu'en conséquence ses 150 canons sont déjà véritablement en notre pouvoir, et que sous ces circonstances, et d'après les ordres officiels et secrets lus au Conseil d'hier, on ne peut permettre à Ibrahim Pacha que le choix des conditions suivantes :

1. De marcher sur El Arish par le Sud de la Mer Morte, ou bien sur Such¹ avec les hommes, armes et moyens de transport qu'il possède à présent. —

2. De venir (par le Nord de la Mer Morte) en détachements de 3000 hommes par Gaza sur El Arish, en laissant en nos mains ses canons, en considérant la grâce qui lui est accordée de poursuivre ce chemin, pourvu qu'il laisse tous les Syriens dans leur pays. —

Il est de la plus urgente nécessité de couvrir toute la Palestine, sans un moment de délai, par toutes nos troupes, pour empêcher qu'on ne saccage et brûle le pays par des partis en désespoir, comme Ibrahim en a donné le funeste exemple, il y a peu de jours, à Jéricho; et s'il veut pénétrer *après nos sommations* par force en Palestine, ce qui n'est nullement probable, il faut repousser l'attaque par les armes, car dans ce cas c'est Ibrahim qui rompt la convention.

Mr. Wood fera à Votre Excellence une déclaration pareille en écrit

¹ *Suez Levant Papers.*

Je ne saurais prendre la responsabilité personnelle d'aucune autre mesure, car elle compromettrait les intérêts les plus chers de Sa Majesté Impériale Notre August Maître, et l'honneur de nos belles victoires. —

Jochmus.

Levant Papers III, 274.

96.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS AU SÉRASKIER AHMET
ZACHARIAS PACHA.

Jaffa le 20 Janvier 1841.

Le mouvement de cavalerie sur El Chalil étant de la plus haute importance, et pouvant décider, si Ibrahim Pacha pourra trouver moyen, ou non de transporter ses 150 pièces de canon, je le considère de la plus urgente nécessité, et contraire à toute règle militaire et aux intérêts les plus essentiels de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan de suspendre d'un seul instant l'ordre de faire marcher demain matin la cavalerie du Murchardar de Mesdén sur El Chalil, et celle à Jérusalem sur le même point, et je prends la liberté d'envoyer à Votre Excellence cette opinion en écrit afin que je ne sois pas responsable de tout malheur ou deshonneur militaire qui pourraient avenir.

97.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS AU SÉRASKIER AHMET
ZACHARIAS PACHA.

Quartier Général Jérusalem 30 Zilcade 1256.
22 Janvier 1841.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que je suis arrivé ici hier au soir. Le Lieutenant Général Hassan Pacha y était retourné également hier de Chalil-Rachman, et Selim Pacha avec la Brigade de Chalid Pacha y sera aujourd'hui de manière que se trouvera ce soir réunie à Jérusalem une force de 21 bataillons et 10 pièces d'artillerie. La cavalerie de Riza Pacha se réunira aujourd'hui au soir ou demain matin à celle du Murchardar qui doit être arrivée hier au soir à el Chalil. — Ces forces, aux points centraux où elles se trouvent, auraient été plus que suffisantes pour appuyer nos négociations avec Ibrahim si elles avaient eu lieu, mais comme celui-ci doit se trouver d'après les dépositions de tous les déserteurs au sud de la Mer Morte, il n'y a plus rien à négocier. Son armée est en complète déroute faute de vivres par la prise de Maan, et les déserteurs déposent tous que même avant d'arriver à ces ma-

gasins (à présent brûlés) toute l'infanterie vivait pendant 4—6 jours de la chair de chameaux. J'ai trouvé ici le Baron Du Mont qui me confirme la complète dérouté des Egyptiens. Comme il a vu passer les trois premières colonnes à portée de fusil et que dans la deuxième où devait se trouver d'après toutes les informations l'artillerie, il n'a vu qu'un grand nombre de chameaux et de mulets, on croit ici généralement qu'Ibrahim a enterré ses canons dans le désert.¹ — De son infanterie on n'a vu que la 3^{me} colonne, réduite à 5000 hommes, un corps isolé à Tafila de 2000 hommes, et à peu près 2000 hommes qui il y a quelques 4 jours étaient avec Ibrahim vers Kerek, tout ce monde était à moitié mort de faim. — Les pertes d'Ibrahim en hommes et en chevaux et bêtes, de somme, en repassant le Jourdain, ont été très fortes, enfin son armée est à la dernière extrémité. —

Son Excellence Hassan Pacha sur la nouvelle de la paix a envoyé de Chalil un sauf conduit à Ahmet Menikli Pacha, commandant la cavalerie égyptienne, et lui a fait savoir qu'il ne l'attaquerait pas dans sa retraite, pourvu qu'il ne vint pas fourrager nos villages près de el Chalil. Ahmet Menikli Pacha conduit par un officier de Hassan Pacha a alors choisi la route vers Gaza dans sa retraite sur l'Egypte. Sa cavalerie réduite à 2500 chevaux et à 5 ou 700 cavaliers démontés était dans le plus misérable état, et sans la Convention 2 bataillons dans les passes presque impraticables du Wadi el Ghor à une forte journée de el Chalil auraient été suffisantes pour arrêter cette colonne.

Je prie Votre Excellence de communiquer cette lettre à Monsieur le Général Michell.

A. Jochmus.

P.S. Il me paraît très nécessaire de signifier immédiatement aux troupes ennemies à Gaza de se retirer, afin qu'il ne soit jamais plus de 3000 hommes à la fois dans cet endroit.

Il y a beaucoup d'orge à El Chalil et on y trouve aussi d'autres provisions, mais il faut y envoyer du riz et du beurre. —

Levant Papers III, 279.

¹ 12 Juillet. D'après les meilleurs renseignemens obtenus jusqu'à présent l'artillerie avait brûlé la plupart des caissons et affûts, soit faute de moyens de transport, soit faute de bois pour cuire les vivres.

Distribution of Forces on the 22 January 1841.

Brigade of Ali Pasha.	4 battalions of Infantry 350 men of Artillery	} at <i>Acre</i> , besides 150 British Marines.
Brigade of Chalid Pasha.	2 battalions of Infantry at <i>Ramlieh</i> . 8 battalions of Infantry 6 guns	} at <i>Jerusalem</i> . ¹
Brigade of Ismael Pasha	8 battalions of Infantry 6 guns	} at <i>Jerusalem</i> .
Cavalry.	2 Squadrons of Lancers	} under Riza Pasha at <i>Challi</i> . ²
	Irregulars of the Murchadar	

¹ 1 battalion of Rediff and the Austrian Marines are at Beyrout. Detachment of British Artillery 1 battalion of Rediff at Saïda.
² Besides there are en route between Acre and Ramlieh 3 regiments of regular Cavalry under Kerim Pasha.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A L'AMIRAL DE BANDIERA.

Quartier Général Jérusalem $\frac{1 \text{ Silhidgé } 1256.}{23 \text{ Janvier } 1841.}$

Le Baron Du Mont, parti par mes ordres le 9 Janvier de Jérusalem avec le fils du Gouverneur de cette ville, Hadji Haziz Bey, et le Shek Abdurahmen de Chalil, avait pour mission de brûler les magasins de vivres d'Ibrahim à Maan dans le désert qui separe la Syrie de l'Arabie. Par 5 marches forcées de 16 à 18 heures par jour, suivi de 220 Cavaliers Bedouins, les seuls dont les chevaux eussent pu soutenir ces fatigues, le Baron Du Mont avec la plus brillante audace s'est jeté sur la grande ligne de communication de l'ennemi et a complètement détruit le dépôt égyptien, qui avec une inconcevable négligence n'était gardé que par quatre mauvais canons et une faible garnison d'une 20 d'hommes qui ont été passés au fil de l'épée dans la surprise de Maan le 14 Janvier au matin. C'est un des évènements décisifs de la campagne de Syrie, dans le courant de laquelle j'avais déjà recommandé le Baron Du Mont pour la décoration du Nishan Istihar.

Cet officier ne se trouvant pas au service Ottoman et servant comme mon Aide de Camp en volontaire, je crois que la seule récompense que je puisse lui offrir pour la prise de Maan est une recommandation bien chaude auprès de Votre Excellence afin qu'elle veuille bien appeler l'attention du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal sur la conduite du Baron Du Mont, dans le but de faire valoir ses services dans les rangs mêmes de l'Armée Autrichienne par une promotion en grade certainement bien méritée.¹

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS AU SÉRASKIER AHMET ZACHARIAS PACHA.

Quartier Général de Jérusalem $\frac{2 \text{ Silhidgé } 1256.}{24 \text{ Janvier } 1841.}$
5 heures p.m.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que les Commissaires de paix partis de Jaffa le 17 Janvier après avoir été à El Chalil le 19, en étaient partis pour Jéricho le même jour, mais n'ayant pu obtenir aucune nouvelle certaine sur Ibrahim Pacha, étaient retournés à El Chalil le 22 Janvier.

Il y a ici la nouvelle qu'Ibrahim Pacha après son passage rétrograde forcé du Jourdain le 15 Janvier a abandonné une partie de son

¹ Baron Du Mont was promoted to the rank of Captain and appointed orderly Officer to His Imperial Highness the Archduke Frederik of Austria.

artillerie dans les environs de Es Salt. Hadji Haziz Bey, fils du Mutsellim de Jérusalem, part demain matin pour Es Salt, afin de s'assurer de ce fait et j'ai écrit aux differents chefs des environs de la Mer Morte pour leur offrir 1000 piastres par pièce de canon qu'ils ameneraient à Jaffa.

D'après les rapports du Baron Du Mont qui a bien de près observé les colonnes de l'ennemi les 14, 15 et 16 Janvier entre Kerek et Maan, il paraît certain que l'artillerie n'était plus trainée par des chevaux et mulets comme elle l'était à sa sortie de Damas et de El Mézérîb. Elle est donc à présent portée à dos de chameaux bien que la route des pèlerins soit plus favorable au roulage, ou bien elle a été enterrée dans le désert. Dans l'un et l'autre cas il est probable qu'une grande partie des affûts et voitures ou tous ont été brûlés. —

101.

REAR-ADMIRAL BANDIERA TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received at Jerusalem 25 January 1841. Answered by last letter, vide No. 99.)

Marmarizza 15 Gennaro 1841.

Eccellenza,

Coll'ultimo vapore Inglese la Gorgona, che lasciò il quartiere di Vostra Eccellenza in Jaffa il 10 andante, abbiamo saputo la felice posizione che occupava l'E. V. colla sua armata diretta ad impedire la ritirata d'Ibraim Pascia pella Palestina, e costringerlo a prender la via del deserto.

Vostra Eccellenza già conoscerà che il Commodore Napier ha ottenuto in Alessandria da Mehemet Ali l'immediata restituzione della squadra Ottomana, e l'ordine ad Ibraim Pascia d'evacuare sul momento tutta la Siria, e luoghi santi.

Javer Pascia (Walker Bey) aveva già inalberata la sua bandiera a bordo di un vascello Ottomano, e fu salutato da tutti li bastimenti da guerra Ottomani ed Egiziani.

Javer Pascia si occupava a preparare tutti li bastimenti della sua squadra per ponerli in stato di eseguire il viaggio per Costantinopoli.

Un vascello Ottomano dev'essere sortito dal porto di Alessandria sino da jeri e proseguirà subito per Costantinopoli passando per Marmarizza.

Ho l'onore di prevenirla, Eccellenza, che mi giunse da Venezia una compagnia d'Infanteria Marina forte di 284 uomini per porla a disposizione di V. E. al caso n'avesse bisogno.

Vista la citata sommissione di Mehemet Ali, la pronta restituzione, ch'Egli fa della squadra Ottomana, e l'ordine dell'immediata ritirata d'Ibraim Pascia dalla Siria, ne deriva con tutta probabilità il pieno accommodamento di tutte le vertenze fra S. M. il Gran Signore ed il ribello vassallo Mehemet Ali.

L'Ammiraglio Stopford ed io supponiamo, che nel pacifico aspetto che prendono gl'affari, si renderebbero inutili le poche truppe d'Infanteria Marina che mi sono testè giunte, quindi abbiamo giudicato di trattenerle a Marmarizza fino a che V. E. si compiacerà di farmi conoscere se ne ha di bisogno o no'.

Io prego V. E. di voler approfittare del ritorno del Ciclope che Le porterà la presente per farmi positivamente sapere, s' Ella desidera che Le spedisca in Syria le suddette truppe d'Infanteria Marina, o se, come sembra, non ne avesse più di bisogno, io possa rimandarle nei nostri stati.

Io mi regolerò pienamente secondo la Sua decisione.

Devo pregare la compiacenza dell'Eccellenza Vostra di voler far attenere la qui inclusa lettera al Signor Conte Széchényi, Capitano dei Dragoni Austriaco, che credo si trovi presso l'Eccellenza Vostra.

Mi sarà ben grato se vorrà l'E. V. farmi conoscere la posizione della di Lei armata, anche quella d'Ibraim Pascia, e delle truppe Egiziane che si trovavano a Gaza.

Noi speriamo che Ibraim Pascia e Muhamed Bey, ch'era in Gaza, saranno di già rientrati in Egitto.

Aggradisca l'Eccellenza Vostra gl'omaggi della più distinta stima ed alta mia considerazione.

Bandiera.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHELL.

Private.

Jerusalem 25 January 1841.

I have to-day sent an answer to Captain Stewart's official letter of the 12 instant.

I regret infinitely that this correspondence should have taken place, but I certainly did not open it, and I believe that you as well as Captain Stewart have not had reason to complain about any punctilio on my part in our conversations.

I always have received your opinion with candour and frankness, and if any sin has been committed on either side, it has certainly not been that of concealing our opinion or mincing the matter. — Nevertheless as I have always found the most cordial feeling on your part, even when there were points on which we did not entirely agree, and as you have done me the honour of accompanying the troops as far as El Ma'ishdal, I am persuaded that our official and private relations will be as satisfactory and friendly as hitherto, and having had your verbal assurance to this effect on the day when I started for Jerusalem, I have not even alluded to your name in my official answer to Captain Stewart, the more as he alone signed the letter to me.

103.

COMMODORE HOUSTON STEWART TO LIEUTENANT
GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Private.

Jaffa 17 January 1841.

My dear Sir,

Immediately after leaving you on the 12 instant I came home and wrote the accompanying letter — which I read at the moment to General Michell — to Colonel Bridgeman and to Colonel Alderson — but when finished and about to send it — we learnt that you had already left Jaffa for Ramleh.

I had therefore no means of sending it to you — nor was it of consequence I should — seeing that you had taken the step I depreciated — nor would I send it you now, were it not for the circumstance of its being absolutely necessary to place upon record and beyond the possibility of mistake — the *reasons* which could induce and justify me (even in my own eyes) in taking so strong a step as to decline naval co-operation. — And even after declining it — I could not reconcile it to my conscience to remain idle here — and made every effort to be on the coast opposite Gaza at the time you intended being there. — But the elements were sadly against us and made communication with the shore impracticable.

I have the honour to be

My dear General

Yours sincerely

Houston Stewart.

104.

COMMODORE HOUSTON STEWART TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Jerusalem 25 January 1841.)

British Head-Quarters Jaffa 12 January 1841.

3 p.m.

Sir,

In order that there may be no misapprehensions on the subject of our conferences yesterday and to-day, I think it right to put the particulars into writing.

When Reshid Pasha came to General Michell and myself yesterday morning — he stated that Ibrahim Pasha's army being now fairly entered on the desert — there could be no reason for the 3000 Egyptian men quartered at Gaza, being permitted to remain there, and asked us if

we would concur in an advance which should have the effect of ridding the Syrian country of these plunderers. General Michell and I both said that our instructions being to facilitate the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians — there could be no *political* reason to prevent our co-operation, and that, provided the forces advanced were so great as to make resistance hopeless — and *certain information* received of Ibrahim Pasha having advanced *South* of any road by which he could march upon Gaza — there appeared, to be none of a *military* nature. —

Very shortly after this, Reshid Pasha returned with Your Excellency, when the same points were distinctly stated, and you expressed your conviction of the impossibility of Ibrahim's coming upon Gaza — that we should advance close to it, and you would then send notice to the Egyptian troops that they might have 24 hours to retreat, after which you would attack and occupy Gaza. —

Reshid Pasha said he should go immediately to Jerusalem, from whence he would write positive information upon which we might safely rely — and that "*we should not move* from this place until we received his communication." —

After his departure General Michell and I paid Your Excellency two visits, in which we found out, on examination of maps and Egyptian officers who had deserted from Gaza, that it was not only *possible* but very probable that Ibrahim might come upon Gaza by the end of the Dead Sea, and that he might reach it *within two days* of the time in which your troops could — You then, to our utter astonishment, avowed that your aim was *not* to facilitate his retreat, but to *annihilate* his army, and prevent a single Egyptian getting back to his own country. —

The Serasker Zacharias Pasha, Your Excellency, General Michell, and myself had a meeting this forenoon, at which you stated it to be your determination to advance, that you had sent orders for the troops at Jerusalem to make a combined movement on Gaza with those from Ramleh, and that 6000 men and 1400 cavalry (900 of them being irregular) with 24 guns would attack Gaza, destroy the provisions, and immediately retire, leaving two battalions in the place — that if Ibrahim Pasha appeared you would retire, and that, if he pressed you, you would retreat on the mountains near Jerusalem.

There appears to General Michell and to me such an evident and imminent hazard in this operation, and so inadequate an object to be gained — so much evil would result from a retrograde movement — such disaster from defeat — that I declared I could be no party to it — and that so long as it was not *ascertained beyond doubt* — that Ibrahim Pasha was *not* coming on Gaza, I would not afford any naval co-operation. —

It is with sincere pain that I have come to this resolution; Your Excellency has no reason to doubt the hearty co-operation hitherto of Her Britannic Majesty's Naval Forces in promoting the Sultan's cause, but I should be betraying my trust, and acting in direct opposition to

my orders, if I concurred in any operations which had for their object the prevention or suspension of Ibrahim Pasha's evacuation of Syria.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

your most obedient servant

Houston Stewart,

Captain of H. B. M. S. Benbow and Senior Naval officer on the coast of Syria.

Levant Papers III, 267.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COMMODORE HOUSTON STEWART.

Head-Quarters Jerusalem 25 January 1841.

Sir,

I had the honour to receive your letter of the 13 January only on the 17, and active operations have prevented my answering it before this. It would be superfluous to enter now into any details on its varied contents, since fortune and victory declared on all sides for me, by the total rout of the Egyptians, thus consoling me in a certain degree for that want of confidence in my judgement, which, it is evident, you entertain with respect to my operations in the field. Unskilful as I may be deemed as a military commander, it must at least be confessed, from the recent march of events, that I am certainly a very fortunate one! —

I must however most distinctly advert to and refute two points upon which a great part of the critical acumen contained in the letter in question appears to be erroneously based, by stating first:

That I am not aware of any person in Syria being in the secret of my operations, and cognizant of all my plans until after their execution, since I consider secrecy the main spring of success, and secondly:

That I do not admit the right of any naval officer on a special station to attempt to control those operations, in the way you have thought proper to assume — upon the same principal as I suppose would guide you, were I to presume to give you a lesson on the best mode of manoeuvring your ship, at the same time I am and have always been most happy to receive any opinion or explanation, provided they be given with the courtesy and respect due to the General entrusted with the operations of the army. —

It is to me a matter of regret, after the transcendent services rendered by the British Fleet, that in the very last operation you should have thought proper to decline any naval co-operation in the projected movement on Gaza, but it is certainly to me much more a cause of

surprise, that you should have thought proper to write an official letter on an occasion, where naval co-operation could not even make any serious impression *on the inland* position of the enemy, and when the sole column of Ramleh was more than doubly sufficient to attain any object. As it is well known, that since after the defeat of part of the Egyptian cavalry at El Maïshdal on the 15 instant the enemy never ventured again to meet our troops beyond the river of Ascalon, altho' I advanced our cavalry on the following day, which was not half his in number, and left it encamped ever since within 1½ hours of Gaza, whilst at the same time I sent the infantry and artillery into Jaffa on account of the impracticable state of the roads. — Under these circumstances it would in my opinion have been perfectly consistant with your responsibility not to have given any naval assistance in this operation, but without officially declining *it after my return to Jaffa*, the more so as I fully agreed with you on the impossibility of the steamers being of any immediate use; but it seems to have been your particular desire to have made the whole transaction a matter of official correspondence, which, altho' I do not decline, I fain would hope is now brought to a close. —

I have etc.

A. Jochmus.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private.

Head-Quarters Jerusalem 25 January 1841.

After my return to Jaffa I received on the 17 instant an official letter from Captain Stewart, commanding the naval station of Jaffa, to which I replied on the 25 in the same way. I transmit to Your Lordship copies of this correspondence, and I must add that Captain Stewart has certainly done every thing in his power, to render as difficult as possible my position here, in the execution of my plans of campaign *in conformity with Your Lordship's instructions, and those of the Turkish Government*. Your Excellency may depend upon it, that I have shown a great deal of patience and indulgence in conversation, for policy's sake, and for the good of the cause, but since Captain Stewart has chosen to address me officially I have been obliged to answer. The only real reason that I can discover for this correspondence is, that I have had the misfortune of superseding General Sir Charles Smith, who was a personal friend of Captain Stewart, but I do not think that such petty considerations should weigh in public life.

In a general council held on the 20 January in the morning Captain Stewart stated, that he interpreted the instructions of Admiral Stopford and Commodore Napier to *facilitate* the *evacuation* of Syria to

to the extent of permitting Ibrahim Pasha, who already had actually evacuated it, to reenter with his troops into Palestine in his retreat on Arish, if he choose to take that line, altho' the Egyptian army was there nearly since a fortnight wandering in the desert between El Mezerib and Maan, having been prevented by my operations to take any road thro' Palestine north of the Dead Sea. — By holding forth the most extraordinary arguments on the necessity and policy of treating Ibrahim Pasha with kindness, and according him an honorable retreat, and hinting at a rupture with France and the withdrawal of his own ships from Jaffa, if we persisted in any other conduct towards Ibrahim Pasha, Captain Stewart in the absence of General Michell who was unwell and in bed, had succeeded in frightening the Serasker Ahmet Zacharias Pasha, the taking of Maan not being known till the night of the 20 January, and I was obliged to write the enclosed letter No. 3 and 4 (= No. 96, 97) to the Serasker. Mr. Wood took a similar step, which put a stop to all attempts of procuring an honorable retreat for Ibrahim, for it was distinctly laid down, that any possible, tho' not probable march of detachments by any road north of the Dead Sea must be preceded by a surrender of arms and guns on the part of the Egyptians, and I concentrated on the 22 January 21 battalions (supported by a reserve at Ramleh) and 18 field-guns at Jerusalem and all our cavalry at El Chalil, leaving 300 Tartars at El Maishdal, in order to give weight to this resolution in case if any negotiations should take place with Ibrahim Pasha. —

P.S. General Michell is a most excellent man and I get on perfectly well with him. — There is nobody who has the cause more at heart, than he has, but until the taking of Maan was known he always considered the Egyptian army as a most redoubtable force, going sometimes upon the most absurd stories of the Egyptian partisans of this country, where lying and inventing stories are innate qualities, and where I often have been obliged to confront 50 verbal and written reports, before I could come to the truth. —

Now he agrees fully with me, who considered the Egyptian army as in complete dissolution, ever since it left El Mezerib, and based my operations accordingly. —

107.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD.

Head-Quarters Jerusalem 28 January 1841.

Sir,

I had the honour to inform Your Excellency in my report of the 17 instant that in consequence of the official news of the submission of

Mehemet Ali, hostilities had ceased on our part from that day, after the arrival of Hamid Bey, the latter having written to the same purpose to the Egyptian General at Gaza, who received and answered his communication on the 18. —

No hostilities however had been committed since the defeat of the Egyptian cavalry corps on the 15 instant at El Maïshdal, and our cavalry had ever since maintained the positions which it occupied on the 16, when I advanced it along the course of the Ascalon river. —

By my directions a corps of 8 battalions of infantry and 12 pieces of artillery under Lieutenant General Hassan Pasha flanked from Jerusalem our movement towards El Maïshdal, observing by light cavalry the roads north and south of the Dead Sea, by which any Egyptian forces might arrive on Gaza.

On the 14 a corps was reported to have crossed the Jordan and bivouacked (near Jericho) at Reyha. —

Hassan Pasha encamped at Abugosh, 3 hours SW. of Jerusalem, marched towards the enemy on the 15 instant, but the Egyptian division on hearing of his approach immediately recrossed the Jordan, with a heavy loss of drowned, and killed, the waters of the Jordan having risen more than a foot during the incessant rains of the 14 and 15 January, and the Arabs falling upon the troops during the passage and in the nearly impracticable marshes of the valley at the head of the Dead Sea. —

The enemy's column above mentioned proved to be the shattered remains of the corps called by Mehemet Ali the Guards, amounting to about 4 or 5000 men and 2 cavalry regiments, forming the rear-guard of the army under the personal command of Ibrahim Pasha, together with a battery of artillery.

The artillery and one of the regiments (Cuirassiers) had remained at some distance on the left bank of the river, and the movement was evidently a desperate attempt to march by any way on Gaza, or El Arish. —

The forlorn situation of this corps will be seen by the enclosed two reports of Mehmet Reshid Pasha, Chief of the Staff, and Riza Pasha, commanding the cavalry. —

I do not estimate the loss of the enemy so great as the latter, but certainly after comparing all the reports it amounts to a 1000 or more men, 8 pieces of artillery, which latter, altho' still with the column at Es Salt, were unquestionably not at Kerek on the 19 instant, whither Ibrahim Pasha had retired after continual skirmishes with the Arabs. The Governor of Jerusalem has sent his son Hadji Haziz Bey to ascertain if this artillery has been buried in the desert mountains, or not. —

Such was the isolated position of this last corps of the Egyptian army, that its Commander-in-Chief had lost all means of communication with his remaining forces and that, altho' Hamid Bey and the

ther Commissioners from Egypt were from the 19 to the 22 at El Chalil, trying by all means to establish a communication with Ibrahim either by the north or the south of the Dead Sea, it proved a vain attempt, notwithstanding that during the same days the above column under the Pasha was at Kerek, but completely surrounded by the Arabs of the country, who had been reinforced by the tribes of Beni Sackr and Beni Hennedy, arrived from the depth of the desert in consequence of the orders I sent them from Jerusalem on the 8 January thro' Baron Du Mont.

The distance from El Mezerib to Kerek is at the utmost five days' march. Ibrahim Pasha left the former place on the 6 or 7 January and after 15 days was still at Kerek, having continually marched and countermarched in the desert mountains in search of food, or from having been stopped in the mountain defiles. According to the statement of the son of the Chieftain of Abugosh, (a Captain in the Guards who deserted on the 21 from Kerek and had been with the column ever since it quitted Damascus and El Mezerib), Ibrahim marched from the latter place to Belka, thence back north to Es Salt, again south to Kerek and back to Jericho. Obligated to recross the Jordan, he for a second time returned to Kerek, having lost his guns, ammunition and stores during the continual and very harassing attacks day and night of the Arab bands, intent on plunder.

My last reports from Chalil of the 28 January (22 days after Ibrahim's leaving El Mezerib and 31 after his retreat from Damascus) state that Hamid Bey despairing of communicating with Ibrahim Pasha, had resolved to return to Gaza, and thence to Egypt. —

I have the honour &c.

(signed) A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant General,
commanding the army of operations.

Annexed 1 a report from Mehemet Reshid Pasha,

„ 2 a report from Riza Pasha.

Levant Papers III, p. 295.

(Inclosure I in No. 107.)

LE GÉNÉRAL DE DIVISION MEHEMED RECHID PACHA AU
GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS PACHA.

Jérusalem $\frac{25 \text{ Zilkade } 1256.}{17 \text{ Janvier } 1841.}$

6 heures du soir à la Turque.

Mon Général!

J'arrive à l'instant de Reyha où j'étais pour m'assurer moi-même de ce qui s'y passait.

En effet Ibrahim Pacha y était hier au soir et il y était arrivé jeudi, il est parti vendredi à midi. J'ai vu à Reyha les bivouacs de l'ennemi. Tout le village a été brûlé entièrement. J'ai vu plusieurs déserteurs qui disent qu'Ibrahim avait sous ses ordres le 1 et 2 Régiment de sa Garde, un peu de Cavalerie et les Gardes du Corps. Les troupes ennemies n'ont ni des canons, ni des munitions de guerre, ni des provisions de bouche.

Je ne peux pas me rendre compte de ces mouvements de l'ennemi. J'ai réuni les officiers supérieurs chez Hassan Pacha.

Nous avons fait venir quelques gens du pays, qui connaissent les routes.

Ibrahim Pacha ne peut prendre que la route de la Mecque, de Halil, de Gaza, de Maan. Alors tant pour protéger Gaza que Halil où se trouvent beaucoup de provisions, nous nous sommes décidés de nous rendre à Halil de bon matin avec huit bataillons et douze pièces. Si l'ennemi veut montrer sa figure, nous tâcherons de lui apprendre de ne pas perdre une seconde fois la route.

(signé) Mehemet Rechid Pacha.

(Inclosure II in No. 107.)

This is the report of Riza Pasha (commanding the Cavalry) at Jericho to His Excellency Lieutenant General Hassan Pasha at Jerusalem.

Translation.

On Thursday 22 Silkade (14 January 1841) Ibrahim Pasha arrived at Reyha (Jericho) and called the old Sheik Soliman and requested him to provide him with barley, telling him, that if he supplied his wants he would be safe, but if not he would cut off his head. For this reason the Sheik showed him one or two wells full of barley, which Ibrahim took and distributed amongst his troops.

After this he set the town on fire, and took the sheep and other animals from the town and neighbourhood. — Ibrahim remained there that night, and sent towards Jerusalem about 100 horsemen, but on the road these were informed that there were 4 or 5 Pashas with a large body of troops at Jerusalem.

Upon hearing this news the horsemen went back and informed Ibrahim that it was impossible to advance, and that if he did all would be cut to pieces.

There upon he ordered all his troops to recross the river (Jordan), but whilst the forces were passing the Arabs fell upon them, and fired, and many men were killed and drowned in the river, and most of the troops who passed the river, dispersed in the direction of the road of Damascus, and Ibrahim Pasha with the remaining part of the troops

went to Kerek, but on the road he lost all his infantry and arrived at Kerek with only cavalry. Ibrahim Pasha left some guns at Es Salt.

Jericho $\frac{30 \text{ Silcade } 1256.}{22 \text{ January } 1841.}$

Transmitted by His Excellency Lieutenant General Hassan Pasha to His Excellency Lieutenant General Jochmus at Jerusalem.

(A true Translation.)

(signed) M. Tahir Bey.

Levant Papers III, p. 297.

108.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL
SIR DE LACY EVANS M.P.

at London.

Private.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 30 January 1841.

My dear General,

I had a very great satisfaction in receiving through Captain Arbutnoth your kind letter of 10 December, and I shall be most happy, if in any way I can be useful to him, and promote his views.

The war of Syria is now at an end. You will see by my official reports that the latter part of the campaign has been as satisfactory in results as the beginning. The loss of Ibrahim Pasha has been *at least* 15,000 *effective* men, out of 35,000 *combattants*, with which he left Damascus. The operation on our side has been a mere strategic one, for I frustrated Ibrahim's plan of passing through Palestine on Gaza, and El Arish, by offering him a general action in the defiles of Djenin, where I could oppose him with 26 battalions, 30 pieces of artillery and 10 to 12,000 mountaineers, on a ground where his cavalry was of no use. He then was obliged instead of going through a country, where he would have found of Government stores alone all collected about 3 millions of rations for troops, and 300,000 of forage, to take to the Desert by the Caravan road of Suez, and I again obliged him, or rather his army, to change its route by my expedition into the Desert, where a couple of hundred horses destroyed the magazines of Maan, thus routing completely his army, for 2 columns with the women, baggage, and the remains of his disorganized artillery went on to Suez under the escort of some irregular infantry and cavalry. The main body of cavalry and infantry after wandering in the mountains, I suppose, away from the ordered line of march by Maan and Suez, came back to Gaza, after being according to Colonel Alderson's report, for

seven days without food and *three* without *water*, but I believe that they must still have had some camels to live upon, else it is impossible that they could have marched for previous to the taking of Maan, most of them had eaten for 4 or 5 days nothing but camels, mules und horse flesh.

Ibrahim Pasha himself according to our latest accounts was completely surrounded by Arabs with a body of 3000 men, the shattered remains of his Guards. He has been without communication with any of his columns, since a fortnight, and is supposed here and at Gaza to have gone by Maan, not knowing that his main force "rebroussait chemin" to Gaza. The Commissioners of peace, English and Egyptian, have been in search of him ever since the 17 January (to-day a fortnight) using all efforts to communicate with him, by letters or in person, but in vain, since they penetrated three times into the Desert beyond the Dead Sea, without ever being able to hear of him, altho' they must have been on those occasions within one day's march of him, they being on the 19 and 21 instant at Chalil, and Ibrahim on the same days at Kerek, the one west, the other east of the Dead Sea.

This situation seems to be desperate. I hope, my dear General, you will not be displeased to hear of this success of one of your élèves — it would have been more complete still without the Convention: 2 battalions could have stopped any force at the pass of Beseyra between Tafia and Gaza, in the Wadi-Ghor, and it was my intention to take El Arish. Either of these operations (and both were easy and certain) would have left to the enemy no other choise than to surrender, or to starve in the Desert. As it was, Ahmet Menikli Pasha only ventured to continue his march from Tafia on Gaza under the safe guard of two Turkish officers, sent to him by Hassan Pasha from Chalil.

I am fully persuaded that the loss of Ibrahim exceeds 15,000 men. but I am very careful in my estimates, as there is here a party who cannot forgive me to have superseded Sir Charles Smith. I must therefore be rather *under* than above the true loss of the enemy. However I believe that it is not rendering a service to the Allied Powers and to Turkey, to represent the Egyptian army still as an organized force, when it is a mere armed mass, keeping together in the Desert from fear of having their heads taken off by the Arabs, who kill every straggler and small detachment, but who can make no impression upon any force in the plain, although they caused them great losses in the mountain passes — particularly to the rear-guard under Ibrahim personally, who has countermarched three or four times since he left El Mezerib in search of food, or on account of opposition in the defiles east of the Dead Sea.

Believe me &c, &c.

109.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 30 January 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose to Your Excellency the terms granted by the Ottoman authorities for the entire evacuation of Syria.

Since the arrival of Hamid Bey and the English Commissioner Lieutenant Loring R. N. on the 17 instant it has been deemed advisable, after a general council held at these Headquarters, to come to the resolution on the part of the Imperial authorities, that no obstacle should be offered to the retreat of any Egyptian Force, *South* of the Dead Sea, but that any march *North* of that lake must be preceded by the surrender of guns and arms, leaving it optional to embark any wounded, sick, and women, at Caïffa and Gaza.

In order to impart the due consistency to this resolution, 21 battalions of Infantry and 18 pieces of Artillery were concentrated at Jerusalem, and 2000 Cavalry at El Chalil with reserves at Ramleh.

I had transferred my own Head-Quarters to Jerusalem, whence I returned yesterday, Ibrahim Pasha having left Kerek and being beyond the Dead Sea, but as the Arabs of the Desert swarm round him on all sides, I have not as yet been able to ascertain his present situation. Hamid Bey, Major Wilbraham, and Selim Bey (the Turkish Commissioners) after fruitless attempts to communicate with the Pasha have returned to Gaza. —

(Annexed a declaration.)

Levant Papers III, p. 298.

(Inclosure I in No. 109.)

Guarantee by Menikli Pasha, and the other Chief Officers of the Egyptian Army, at present encamped near Gaza.

Gaza 28 January 1841.

We, the Undersigned, being assembled in council with Commodore Houston Stewart, Royal British Navy, and Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson, Royal Engineers, after the discussion which has taken place, have pledged ourselves, that His Highness Ibrahim Pasha will, on his arrival at Gaza, execute the orders of his Highness Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, for the evacuation of Syria, and that he will not make any movement

whatever against those orders, for all of which we give our signatures and affix our seals.

(Signed) Ahmed Menikli, General of Division.
Churchid, General of Division.
Selim, General of Division.
Ahmed Deramanli, General of Division.
Ismael, General of Brigade.
Ibrahim, General of Brigade.
Mahmoud Bey, Captain of the Navy.

Levant Papers III, 283.

(Inclosure II in No. 109.)

Guarantee by the Serasker, the Mustechar Effendi, and Lieutenant-General Jochmus.

We, the Undersigned, upon the received declaration of His Excellency Menikli Ahmed Pasha and the other Egyptian Generals and Officers, to carry forthwith into execution the entire evacuation of Syria and the Desert, consent and promise faithfully to abstain from any hostile movement, according to the promise given by Commodore Stewart and Colonel Alderson, with the proviso that the forces at present near and at Gaza march on El-Arish within seven days from this, embarking such men in transports as are sick, unfit for campaign, and unable to march according to Colonel Alderson's judgment, and provided that no movement is made by any Egyptian force at Gaza, east or northward.

Given under our hand and seal at the Imperial Head-Quarters of Jaffa, January 30, 1841. (7 Silhidge 1256.)

(signed) Ahmed Zacharias,
Serasker.

(signed) A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant General.

(signed) Mohamed Selami,
Mustechar.

Levant Papers III, 284.

(Inclosure III in No. 109.)

To His Excellency Menikli Ahmed Pasha and the other Chief Officers of the Egyptian army, at present encamped near Gaza.

A true copy.

Gaza 28 January 1841.

In consequence of the written guarantee which you have now given us — making yourselves responsible that His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, as well as yourselves, will implicitly obey, and forthwith carry into effect with perfect good faith, the orders of His Excellency Mehemet Ali Pasha for the evacuation of Syria by the whole Egyptian army:

We, Houston Stewart, Captain of Her Britannic Majesty's ship "Benbow" and Senior Naval Officer on the coast of Syria, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Carr Alderson, Royal Engineers, representing here the united forces of Great Britain, do pledge ourselves that no molestation shall take place, nor any obstacle be put in the way of such evacuation, and that you are perfectly safe in diminishing your forces here as fast as possible, and further, that provided you continue to make that diminution to the satisfaction of the said Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson, we promise to insist with His Excellency the Serasker Zacharias Pasha, commanding in chief the Ottoman forces — that no advance shall be made by the Turkish troops, nor any augmentation be made to the troops now at Medjdul, nor any Governor be sent to Gaza, until Colonel Alderson shall have reported the evacuation complete; and we promise, that if the Turkish authorities refuse to ratify and accept one of these conditions, we will *immediately* and in perfect honourable faith give you notice thereof.

R. C. Alderson.

Houston Stewart.

Levant Papers III, 283.

110.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 2 February 1841.

Sir,

I had the honour to inform Your Excellency in my dispatch of the 30 January, that the Commissioners of England, Turkey, and Egypt, not being able up to that day to communicate with Ibrahim Pasha, had returned to Gaza. Omer Pasha and Captain Arbuthnot, Royal Navy, sent on a similar mission, had been equally unsuccessful.

At last, on the 30 January, intelligence was received at Gaza, that the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief was within a day's march of that

place, still pursued by the Arabs, who had not left him a moment's quiet ever since his defeat near Jericho on the 15 ultimo. On the 31 he entered Gaza, with the remains of the Guards and some irregular troops to the following amount:

3 regiments of Guards. Infantry	3500
1 regiment of Cuirassiers, 1 regiment Lancers	600 horse
irregular Infantry	500
Hennedy irregular horse	40

This force was in a most deplorable state, having wandered in the mountains of the Desert in search of food for the last 17 days since their recrossing the Jordan, Ibrahim being away from Damascus 34 days. Colonel Rose (British service) who went to meet Ibrahim, told me that an oke or 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ pounds of camel or mule's flesh was sold at 30 to 40 piasters, or 8 shillings English, and that the Pasha's own horses were without barley the last two days.

The 3 regiments of Guards on their starting from Damascus were 8000 men strong, and the 2 regiments of Cavalry 1200, constituting a loss of these corps alone, who were the elite of the army, of 4500 Infantry and 600 Cavalry.

The different columns which since the 21 to the 25 January had preceded the arrival of Ibrahim at Gaza were as follows:

Under Ahmed Menikli Pasha regular Cavalry 2400, irregular Cavalry 300; under Churchid Pasha, Ahmed Deramanli and others 11,000 Infantry and Irregulars and 600 irregular Cavalry, — which with the 4640 men arrived under Ibrahim Pasha and about 3000 Artillery and irregular troops, gone under Soliman and Ismael Pashas to Cairo, escorting the two convoys of Artillery and women, civil Employés and others, forms a total of 22,000 men, constituting in conformity with my preceding reports a loss of 18,000 men and 44 guns since Ibrahim Pasha left Damascus with 40000 men and 150 guns¹.

The enclosed general return will give to Your Excellency a complete tableau of the enormous losses of the Egyptian army in Syria under Ibrahim Pasha since the opening of the campaign, amounting to 63,000 men, 610 garrison guns, and 148 field pieces.

The forces of Mehemet Ali in Syria have always been very much and purposely overrated, I have never estimated his actual army above 75,000 effectives² and 10,000 non-effectives, and the losses on the same scale. — Were it otherwise, the glory of the Sultan's and Allied arms would only be enhanced, for at the opening of the campaign there were in the field about 9000 men of regular forces, at the period of the taking of Acre about 16,000, and the active army at present in Southern Syria amounts to 18,000 Infantry, 3500 regular Cavalry, 3000 irregular horse, and 30 pieces of Field-Artillery. The enthusiasm of the gallant Syrian population for their legitimate Sovereign has done the rest.

¹ besides leaving 12 guns at Damascus and 4 at Maan.

² viz. 65,000 regulars and 10,000 irregulars.

In the above estimates are not included the 3200 Egyptian horse and 600 Infantry and Artillery forming the division of El Arish, come to and encamped near Gaza during the month of December last.

The sufferings of the remains of Ibrahim Pasha's own army have been dreadful. Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson in his reports from Gaza to Colonel Bridgeman states that the Infantry arriving from the Desert had been 7 days nearly without any food, and 3 full days without water; and the 2 Turkish staff officers who served for 3 days as safeguard to the Cavalry column of Ahmed Menikli Pasha, represent his force as in the most exhausted state.

The loss of Cavalry and other horses since Damascus has been at least 2000. — Baron Du Mont's prisoners made before the 17 January had then already been living respective for 4 and 6 days upon camel's flesh.

The number of those which will be embarked at Gaza as "hors de combat" will be very great, and the whole material of the army being completely ruined, it cannot be in its present state considered any thing but an armed mass, the only force in any thing approaching order being the Cavalry.

The Artillery, when last seen by Baron Du Mont after the taking of Maan, was not any longer transported by draught as it was when it left Damascus; but as many guns had been drawn by oxen, cows and buffaloes, this column found means of subsistence by killing those animals, and was enabled to continue its march by the route of Maan, whilst the other columns of the army after the magazines of Maan had been emptied by the Bedouins and the remains burnt, were obliged to countermarch, and come back upon Gaza by isolated tracts, and completely destitute of all military array.¹

The straight road from Maan to Cairo is about 11 days, every station having water for the usual wants of the large pilgrim caravans, the circuit by Gaza and El Arish is for troops 23 days through deserts, *one half* of which is destitute of water. — Without the convention and the arrival of the Commissioners of peace, the fate of the isolated columns of Ibrahim's army could not have been doubted, arriving as they did at long intervals in isolated columns, distant from each other, and without connexion at the very Head-Quarters nearly of the Imperial army, ready to move at a moment's notice.

The final operations of this campaign were marked by two distinct features:

after a forced retreat from Damascus the Egyptian General was compelled at El Mezerib to abandon his original intention of passing thro' Palestine to El Arish, on which line according to the enclosed return he would have found:

2,797,775 rations for troops and
271,980 rations of forage.

¹ They were without *any* ammunition. See Mr. Laurin's report in the dispatch to Sir R. Stopford 21 April 1841.

He was offered battle at Djenin and declined it, preferring the risk of a march thro' the Desert.

The general insurrection of the Bedouins and the destruction of the stores at Maan obliged him a second time to change his route, falling from the caravan road into the heart of the wilderness.

His Artillery and convoys having gone on by the prescribed line-of-march, the remains of his army, henceforth routed and isolated columns, without array, ammunition, and guns, without reciprocal military communications, could have offered no effectual resistance against a general movement of the Turkish army, whose Cavalry had come into line from the North, and its choice would have been surrender or starvation in the Desert.

Such are the advantages of strategical combinations over mere fighting, that the effective loss of 18,000 men and the complete disorganization of the Egyptian army has not cost one hundred men "hors de combat" to their antagonists.

I have the honour &c.

(signed) A. Jochmus.

The general return of the Egyptian forces will be sent by the next steamer.

(Annexed a Return of stores.)

Levant Papers III, 298.

(Enclosure I in No. 110.)

Return of Stores on the projected Egyptian Line of March thro' Palestine.

Magazines of	Wheat per ardeb	Barley per ardeb	Prepd. Wheat per ardeb	Maize per ardeb	Butter per oke	Oil per oke	Olives per oke	Biscuit per oke
Tabariah and Safed	2400	3900	700	182	280	—	—	—
Jaffa and Loud.	848	2633	—	1737	400	1249	1246	22,000
Ramleh	3509	533	—	1162	—	176	—	—
Total	6817	7066	700	3081	680	1425	1246	22,000

NB. — One ardeb is 105 okes. One oke is 23/4 pounds English weight.

Calculation of Provisions and Forage.

Wheat at 1/2 an oke per ration	6817 ardebs	=	2,113,270 rations	} besides oil, butter, and olives.
Maize at 1 oke per ration	3081 " "	=	323,505 " "	
Wheat (prepared for ready use)	700 " "	=	217,000 " "	
Biscuit at 1/2 an oke per ration	22,000 " "	=	44,000 " "	
				2,697,775 rations for troops.
Barley at 3 1/2 okes per ration	7066 ardebs	=	211,980	
Barley, at Djenin, at 3 1/2 okes per ration	2000 " "	=	60,000	
				271,980 rations of forage.

Jaffa 20 January 1841.

(signed) Mohamed Selami,
Mustechar.

Levant Papers III, 300.

(Inclosure II)

General Return of the Losses

under His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, since the landing of the Allied Forces at 31 January 1841, being the day

Periods	Effective combattants			
	Regular army		Irregular forces	
	Infantry and Artillery	Cavalry	Infantry	Cavalry
	Effective Officers and rank and file	Effective Officers and Lancers and swords	Effective Officers and Muskets	Effective Officers and Lancers and swords
10 September 1840. Forces in Syria under Ibrahim Pasha.	58,000	7000	5000	5000
Loss of Troops and Guns up to the concentration of the Forces at Damascus, end of December 1840.	34,000	2000	3000	1000
Idem from the evacuation of Damascus to the evacuation of Syria, 31 January 1841.	12,000	2000	100	2100
Total loss of the Army.	46,000	4000	3100	3100
Returning to Egypt by Maan and Gaza.	12,000	3000	1900	1900

Recapitulation.

	Men	Garrison guns	Field pieces
Total Egyptian Force at the opening of the campaign, 10 September 1840	85,000	619	270
Total Loss up to the 31 January 1841	63,500	619	148
Returning to Egypt by Maan and Gaza	21,500	—	122
subject to further losses by fatigue and desertion. ^o			

This return does not include the fresh division come from El Arish to the south of Gaza in December last, composed of 1000 - 1200 Cavalry, 2200 irregular Cavalry, and 600 Infantry and Artillery.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 2 February 1841.

(signed) A. Jochmus.
Lieutenant-General.

Remarks.

¹ These 85,000 men do not include the muleteers, cameldrivers, employes of the Civil Administration of Syria, their servants and the women of the army, harems &c. It may be calculated, that between 15 to 16,000 individuals of these classes have left Damascus at the retreat.

in No. 110.)

of the Egyptian Army in Syria

Djounie 10 September 1840 up to the evacuation of Syria via Maan and Gaza of arrival of Ibrahim Pasha at Gaza.

Total of Effective Com- battants	Non-com- battants Military Ad- ministration, Musicians, Military Ser- vants, Sick in Hospital &c. &c.	General Total			Totals of Army
		Army	Number of Guns		
			Garrison Guns	Field Pieces	
75,000	10,000	85,000 ¹	619 ²	270 ²	
40,000	5000	45,000 ³	603	120	Loss to 30 Dec. 1840.
16,200	2300	18,500	16 ⁴	28 ⁴	Loss since the retreat from Damascus.
56,200	7300	63,500	619	148	Total loss.
18,800	2700	21,500	—	122 ⁵	Remaining.

Distribution of Guns.

	Garrison	Field		Garrison	Field
Saida	20		Field Artillery concen- trated at Damascus		150*
Beyrout	30	20	Jerusalem	20	
North of Syria and lines of the Taurus	200		Jaffa	33	
Acre	300	100	Maan	4	
Castle of Damascus	12			619	270

* It has been said that the Field Artillery at Damascus was 250, but this being exaggerated, as in general the Egyptian Force always has been.

³ Distribution of loss up to the end of December 1840:

Sent prisoners to Cyprus and Constantinople	16,000 men
Killed and died in the field	4,000 "
Turks and Syrians deserted to their homes in Syria and Asia minor	25,000 "
	<u>45,000 men</u>

⁴ Loss of Guns since Damascus:

Castle of Damascus	12 Garrison
Castle of Maan	4
From Damascus till El Mezerib	20 Field pieces
From Mezerib to Kerek	8
	<u>16</u> <u>28</u>

⁵ In case there were concentrated at Damascus 250 Field pieces, there remain 222 Field guns, but this is highly improbable. — The 100 taken at Acre were those lost of in the battle Nezib.

⁶ Of this latter force only 12,000 Infantry, 3000 horse, and 122 guns are of the regular army.

NOTE.

Constantinople 27 April 1841.

According to the above return passed through Maan and Gaza . . . 21,500 men and 122 Field pieces
 Arrived in Egypt up to the 25 February 1841, according to the return
 of the Austrian Embassy here 17,300 men and 82 Field pieces
 Loss from 31 January to 25 February 1841 4,200 men and 40 Field pieces
 which with the above loss 18,500 men and 28 Field pieces
 makes since the retreat of Damascus a total loss of 22,700 men and 68 Field pieces

122

Levant Papers III, 301.

A. Jochmus.

His Excellency Ahmet Zacharias Pasha,
 Serasker of Syria and Governor General.

His Excellency Lieutenant General Jochmus Pasha, commanding the army of operations.
 His Excellency Lt. General Mehmet Reshid Pasha,
 Chief of the General Staff.

His Excellency Lieutenant General Selim Pasha,
 commanding the 1 division.

1 brigade of Infantry Chalid Pasha,
 2 id. Ali Pasha.
 Kerim Pasha, Major General,
 commanding the 1 division of Cavalry.

His Excellency Prince Cassim Emir Beshir, commanding the irregular Infantry.

Regular Army.

	Infantry	Cavalry	Artillery		Infantry	Cavalry
Corps of operations	15,000			Troops of the Emir Beshir	3,000	500
Garrison of Acre	3,000			Emirs of Hasbeyra and Rasheya . .	1,000	200
id. Beyrout and Seida	1,000			other Chieftains, including Naplous and El Chali	6,000	1500
Cavalry 1 division		3000		Irregular Cavalry	10,000	800
id. regular of the 2 division .		500				
Artillery 30 Field pieces . . .			500			3000
		19,000	3500			
			500			

British Marines and Artillery at Jaffa and Acre 300 men. — Austrian Marines at Beyrout 200 men.
 3000 more regular and irregular Cavalry are approaching Palestine.

Jaffa 2 February 1841.

III.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS PACHA A SON EXCELLENCE
IBRAHIM PACHA,

Général en Chef de l'Armée Egyptienne.

Quartier Général de Jaffa $\frac{10 \text{ Silhidgé } 1256.}{1 \text{ Fevrier } 1841.}$

Monsieur le Général,

Après l'heureuse terminaison de la guerre en Syrie, je regrette d'apprendre que quelques Arabes du désert continuent de harceler vos troupes, c'est au moins un on-dit, car je n'ai pas de nouvelles officielles.

Il y a quinze jours et immédiatement après l'arrivée de Hamid Bey que, tant Son Excellence le Seraskier Ahmed Zacharias Pacha que moi, ont donné partout des ordres précis de cesser les hostilités, et Hassan Pacha, Commandant du côté du Djebel Chalil et du Désert, a non seulement agi d'après ces ordres, mais il a donné une saufe conduite aux troupes sous le Général Ahmed Menikli Pacha pour les conduire à Gaza, en empêchant les Sheiks voisins de guerroyer.

Toutefois, pour persuader Votre Excellence de notre entière bonne foi et notre désir sincère de faire cesser cette malheureuse guerre, j'envoie au Quartier-Général de Votre Excellence deux officiers Autrichiens Messieurs le Comte Széchényi et le Baron Du Mont, munis d'ordres sévères pour les Sheiks Arabes.

Son Excellence le Seraskier écrira dans le même sens à Votre Excellence ce soir ou demain —

En attendant, je me permets de recommander à l'accueil bienveillant de Votre Excellence, Monsieur le Comte Széchényi, parent de Son Altesse le Prince de Metternich, et Monsieur le Baron Du Mont, qui tous les deux se proposent sur peu de visiter l'Égypte, et qui pour cela m'ont demandé comme une faveur d'être choisis pour être porteurs de cette lettre, afin d'avoir l'honneur d'être présentés à Votre Excellence.

Heureux, si les affaires me le permettaient d'avoir moi-même l'avantage de voir Votre Excellence, je n'ai pour le présent cas que la prier d'agréer l'expression des hommages avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur &c.

pour copie conforme
G. F. Herman,
Assistant Adjudant-Général.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-Général,
commandant l'armée d'opérations.

112.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD
at *Marmarissa Bay*.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 6 February 1841.

Sir,

The Chief of the Staff of this army, Mehmet Reshid Pasha, now at Gaza, having reported to me, that the Egyptian authorities maintain (verbally) that the Arabs of the Desert, who have pursued Ibrahim Pasha as far as Gaza, have *secret* orders still to harass him notwithstanding the convention, I beg to enclose to Your Excellency a copy of my letter to His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha¹ on this subject, by which it will be perceived that orders to cease hostilities have been given on our part ever since the arrival of Hamid Bey and the other Commissioners of peace.

Levant Papers III, 302.

113.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 7 February 1841.

My Lord,

As some of the Egyptian authorities at Gaza maintained (verbally) that the Arab tribes, who continued to harass Ibrahim Pasha as far as Gaza, had *secret* orders to act thus, I beg to transmit to Your Lordship a copy of my dispatch to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford on this subject, containing a copy of my letter to His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha.

I have &c. &c.

A. Jochmus.

114.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 7 February 1841.

I have the honour to enclose to Your Lordship the copy of a letter which his Excellency Hussein Pasha, President of the Aulic Council, wrote to me on the 4 instant, together with my answer to the same, dated February the 5.

Your Excellency may rely upon it, that there are no reasonable grounds to complain in any way against the conduct of the Turkish

¹ vide No. 111.

troops since their arrival in Syria. I know perfectly well that the persons alluded to in Hussein Pasha's letter, are the French and American Consuls at Beyrout. They tried every means in their power to have the houses of their protégés exempted from military lodgements, but neither the Admiral Sir Charles Smith nor myself listened to their repeated demands, for if we had done it in one instance, all the house-owners would have declared their houses to be French or American property. As it was, there were 13 American flags hoisted indicating consular dwellings — only I took no notice of them, and lodged the troops in the *military* positions.

I think it very essential, that the indemnities for the trees and the few houses destroyed near Beyrout and Saïda should be paid as soon as possible, and that the Mustechar should receive positive orders to liquidate the accounts due for mule hire &c. &c., to be fixed by a commission of which Mr. Wood is to be President. I shall give to Your Lordship an instance of what is to be done here in these abuses.

They took latterly 10 camels from the American Consul at Rameh for the transport of guns — 2 of these animals died within the course of a fortnight, whilst not a single para had been paid as indemnity to the owner, nor even the hire due for the 8 remaining ones, until I found it out, and ordered the account to be settled forthwith.

Now there arises a double inconvenience from this abominable system: first, the evident injustice, and its consequences on the minds of the people, and secondly, the quarrels with, and the complaints of the consular agents; for although these latter had usually neither camels nor mules, a great number make it a sort of revenue to declare them theirs, and to receive some money from the owners, altho' in the end they find out that their soi-disant protection is of no use.

I have been, as another consequence, in the most serious difficulties for want of sufficient means of transport, and our operations have been highly endangered by this deficiency, altho' General Michell and myself had made it the "sine qua non" condition of any military movements, for telling the Mustechar all that would happen if he did not procure proper and abundant means of transport — but as I was away from the Head-Quarters of the regular forces, during the greater part of time of our late operations, I could not by my presence enforce the necessary supply, and the consequence is, that now our troops and horses are starving, altho' we have plenty of stores in other parts of the country. Some of Hassan Pasha's troops have been living on camel's flesh, because no money was sent them to buy other, and it is with the greatest difficulty that Mr. Wood suppressed a seditious movement amongst the irregular Cavalry, the horses having been left for several days without barley.¹

¹ One of the causes of these seditions was the projected appointment of Sheik Mahmoud Abdul Al by Zacharias Pasha to be Commandant of this Cavalry, who accused him of having secretly treated with Ibrahim Pasha for the latter's passage thro' Palestine.

I am really sorry to see the Mustechar so little efficient *in the field*. He was well disposed enough at Beyrout, when we were in quarters, but he got evidently frightened at the greater amount of expense in the field, and it seems to be his idea, that he will be considered a very clever man in Constantinople, by presenting a comparatively small account, not knowing in the mean time, that this illjudged parsimony costs in reality ten times as much to the Government by the loss of Cavalry horses, and the irregularities, introduced into the Infantry, besides the dissatisfaction which it creates, both in the country and in the troops, who both suffer from this foolish system.

I think the Imperial Government should be at least *just* in the payment of the claims of the Syrians — but it would be *wise* to be *liberal*.

115.

COMMODORE NAPIER TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Jaffa 8 February 1841.)

Duplicate.

Her Majesty's Ship "Carysfort" Alexandria
2 February 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour of enclosing a copy of a convention entered into by myself and the Egyptian Government, which has been approved of by the Allies, and I have been directed¹ to see it carried into execution.

I send you this convention, because I understand the Turkish authorities (notwithstanding my letter to you of the 11 of January sent by Lieutenant Loring) have put difficulties in the way of carrying it into execution, and have even meditated an attack on the Egyptian army.

I have authorized Mehemet Ali to send Frigates and Transports to Gaza, to embark any portion of the Egyptian army he sees fit, and I have directed Captain Stewart to give them every facility, and I call upon Your Excellency in the name of the Allied Powers to desist from any hostile measures.

Relative to the question of the Syrians, I have directed Captain Stewart not to embark them against their will.

Should the Turkish authorities (at the head of which, I believe, you are) impede in any way the retreat² of the Egyptian army, I have directed Captain Stewart to protest against it in the most solemn manner, as contrary to the existing treaties, contrary to the custom of civilized nations, contrary to the laws of humanity, and contrary even to the interests of the Porte.

I have &c.

Charles Napier.

Levant Papers III, 286.

¹ sent Levant Papers.² return Levant Papers.

116.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COMMODORE SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

Imperial Head-Quarters 8 February 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2 February, by which you inform me that several Frigates and Transports have been sent to embark the remains of the Egyptian army at Gaza.

There exists neither on the part of His Excellency Ahmed Zacharias Pasha, Serasker of Syria, nor on my own any objections to this measure, as it hastens the evacuation of Syria, there existed however a very serious one before the *actual* arrival of these transports, because we could not have sanctioned any delay under the possibly vain pretext that the Egyptians were *waiting* for transports, and consequently would not have moved by land in the mean time.

I am not aware that any difficulties have been raised by the Turkish authorities in the way of the execution of the convention or arrangement, sanctioned by the Allied Powers and the Sublime Porte, but Ibrahim Pasha having de facto evacuated Syria, and being thrown into the Desert ever since the 6 January, when he quitted El Mezerib, it certainly could not be contemplated by any convention stipulating the *evacuation* of Syria, that it embraced also the eventuality of his *returning* into the country, particularly in the mode he attempted at Jericho, on the 14 and 15 January, putting to fire and sword all the neighbourhood. It is to me a matter of real concern, that false reports, intentional or not, should have made you erroneously suppose that this army was destined to make any hostile movements on the remains of the Egyptian troops. — If such had been my intention I should not have waited for a concentration of troops at Gaza, but should have attacked them as they arrived at long intervals in isolated columns from the Desert, in the most helpless state.

If the Turkish authorities had really contemplated hostilities, an easy and valid excuse would have been found in the fact, that Ibrahim Pasha has already by two days exceeded the term of evacuation, granted on the 30 January for only seven days. — After acquainting you, Sir, with these circumstances I cannot any further be responsible for reports arising from the visions of frightened imaginations at Gaza.

The Turkish authorities, consulting the British officers at these Head-Quarters, have duly considered, in a general council, your letter of the 11 January, and such instructions as they possess from other official sources on the present state of affairs in the Levant. — Their proceedings have been made known both to His Excellency Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and to the Sublime Porte; they accept without hesitation the consequences of their former resolution, and of that taken to-day to permit the embarkation of a corps of Infantry at Gaza, notwith-

standing that neither Sir Robert Stopford's orders, nor those of His Excellency Maslum Bey, specify anything about the embarkation of *armed* bodies on any part of the Syrian coast, granting only this favour to women, children, and sick and wounded men.

The brilliant services which you have rendered, Sir, in this memorable war, have not been bestowed on a worthless cause, and the proceedings of the Ottoman Commanders and authorities are not so extravagant as they may be deemed in Alexandria.

They are, withstanding a momentary impression to the contrary (founded on illusion), in conformity with the existing treaties, in conformity with the customs of civilized nations, in conformity with the laws of humanity, in conformity with the interests of the Sublime Porte, and, ranging higher than all this considerations, in conformity with the military point of honour.

I have &c.

(signed) A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-General
commanding the army of operations.

Levant Papers III, 303.

117.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COMMODORE NAPIER.

Private. Extract.

Jaffa 8 February 1841.

My dear Commodore,

I was much more frightened at your awful official letter of the 2 instant, than I was at the fire of the Albanians, when you ordered me to storm the heights of Calat Meidan. Who has told you the cock and a bull story of our putting difficulties in the way of the retreat of Ibrahim Pasha, and of our meditating an attack upon him? Why all the Commissioners of peace sent after him from the 17 January to the 30 (and they were more than half a dozen) could not find him for a fortnight? At last he made up his mind to find them, but it was only at 12 hours from Gaza. If the Egyptians are frightened out of their senses at Gaza because I sent 1000 irregular horse from El Chalil (where there was no forage left) back to Jaffa, it is not my fault. At the latter place they were farther away from them than at El Chalil. This only proves their complete disorganization, and utter want of the means of resistance. There is not the slightest objection on my part, now that the transports *are* arrived, to embark any number of Infantry at Gaza. The only real reason why about nine days ago the Serasker and myself agreed in the presence of Colonel Bridgeman that only sick

and wounded should be embarked, was that there were no transports for *more*, and with the uncertainty of the weather we could not authorize any delay in the evacuation of Syria, under pretense of waiting for transports.

In a military point of view it is much more agreeable to me that part of the troops should go to Alexandria, and part to El Arisch, because according to the rules we can put our own troops in more comfortable quarters — altho' I am sure we are safe enough, were all the forces that remain with Ibrahim concentrated at El Arisch. — They are completely demoralized, and in utter destitution of every thing like military array.

Omer Pasha, who saw them, tells me that 20 drummers beating the charge in a dark night, would have put the whole to flight. The only troops in military order are the 4000 men of the El Arisch division, encamped since about 2 months $\frac{1}{4}$ hour south of Gaza.

Ibrahim Pasha, in conversation with Omer Pasha and Captain Arbuthnot, admitted himself that since the beginning of this campaign he had lost 70,000, and that he had only 30,000 men left.

Jochmus.

118.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 9 February 1841.

I have the honour to enclose two open letters for His Excellency Mustapha Noury Pasha, Minister of war, the one relative to the Syrians not delivered up before the evacuation of Syria, and the other referring to the indemnity which ought to be paid by the Pasha of Egypt for the destruction of olive trees near Gaza. — I send this two dispatches direct to the Minister through Your Excellency, leaving the Serasker to report officially the latter part of the operations in Southern Syria from the reasons stated to Your Lordship in a former letter, but as I suppose it will be done in a very confused manner, I should suggest that "*officiusement*" copies of my official communications, to Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-chief by sea and by land, should be given by Your Excellency to Reshid Pasha.

The number of Syrians with the Egyptian army is not considerable, and from the dispatches I have seen of Maslum Bey, we have not sufficient authority to take them here by force.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Private.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 10 February 1841.

I have the honour to transmit for Your Lordship's private information the annexed estimates of the Egyptian Forces returning home. They were made separately and in different stations by the English, Austrian, Prussian, and Turkish officers who observed the enemy, and all agree perfectly, except in the irregular Infantry, and here the *Turkish estimate* must be adopted, because it is founded on the habit of seeing irregular troops more. — Besides only 2000 irregular Infantry (*real soldiers*) left Damascus, and as about 500 went via Maan, the remainder of 1400 is the utmost which could possibly have arrived at Gaza. — The notes on the return explain the rest.

I also beg to annex a distribution of the Ottoman army as it will be dislocated in a few days. — The principal forces in southern and central Syria can at any time be reunited at a few days' notice.

(Inclosure I in No. 119.)

COLONEL ROSE TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOCHMUS.

My dear Jochmus,

The following is a simple calculation of Ibrahim Pasha's force which marched into Gaza.

1 Division which marched into Gaza.

Ahmed Dramali ¹	
Selim Pasha	
Churchid Pasha	
	Men
Infantry of the Line	10,000
Irregular Troops called <i>Hintz</i> ²	3,000
600 Irregular Cavalry	600
	13,600

2 Division.

Ahmed Menikli Pasha	
8 Regiments of Cavalry	2,400
Irregular Cavalry	300
Dismounted Cavalry	600
	3,300

¹ alias *Deramanli*.² This is a mistake and must mean "train" or armed muleteers &c. &c.

3 Division.

	Men
Ibrahim Pasha	
1 Regiment of Guards	1,500
2 Regiment „ „	1,500
3 Regiment „ „	500
Rifles	250
Albanians	260
Arabs of El Hennedy	40
	<hr/>
	4,050
	<hr/>
Lancers and Cuirassiers	600

I hope you will be able to read this "griffonage".

Yours

sincerely

Hugh Rose.

(Inclosure II in No. 119.)

*Rapport sur l'état des troupes ennemies qui sont parties de Gaza, et qui
séjournent encore dans cette ville.*

Gaza le 5 Février 1841.

I. Parties avant mon arrivée à Gaza.

	hommes	chevaux
2 Bataillons Infanterie irrégulière	800	-
1 Détachement d'Infanterie composé de plusieurs Régiments	2000	-
6 Régiments de Cavalerie régulière et de quelques cohortes irrégulières	—	25

II. Parties pendant mon séjour à Gaza.

le 2 Février 2 Régiments de Cavalerie ré- gulière que j'ai été empêché de voir	—	600 à 8
le 4 et 11 Régiment d'Infanterie que j'ai vus partir	1500	-
le 3 Février 1 Colonne de	600 à 800	-
puis l'Infanterie arrivée la veille, que l'on a prétendu être les Régiments Nr. 12 & 17	1800 à 2000	-
le 4 Février Infanterie irrégulière	1200 à 1500	-
le 5 Février 2 Régiments d'Infanterie ré- gulière	2700 à 3000	-

III. J'ai évalué le camp restant à Gaza

	hommes	chevaux
1 une masse d'Infanterie dans les jardins, 9 à 11 Bataillons	3500 à 4000	—
2 un bivouac dans la plaine de cinq Ba- taillons formés	1800 à 2000	—
3 cinq Régiments de Cavalerie régulière et plusieurs cohortes de Cavalerie ir- régulière (cette dernière de 1200 à 1500 chevaux)	—	3300
4 huit pièces d'Artillerie avec 150 artilleurs	—	—
Somme	150	15,900 à 17,600
Artillerie	Infanterie	Cavalerie

Laue.

Note of Totals.

	Medium
Total amount at Gaza	22,800 men
deduct 3300 Cavalry	}
700 or 600 Infantry and Artillery	} come from
	ElArish
Arrived of Ibrahim Pasha's Army	4,000 "
	18,800 men

(Inclosure III in No. 119).

Troupes ennemies parties de Gaza pour El Arish et séjournantes encore à Gaza.

Gaza le 4 Février 1841.

I. Avant mon arrivée à Gaza.

	Infanterie	Cavalerie
2 Bataillons d'Infanterie irrégulière	800	—
6 Régiments de Cavalerie	—	1,900
Un détachement	2,000	—

II. Pendant mon séjour à Gaza.

le 2 Février 2 Bataillons de Cavalerie que je n'ai pas pu voir (irrégulière)	—	700
4 & 11 Régiment d'Infanterie que j'ai vus	1,500	—
le 3 Février. Une Colonne de	600 à 800	—
l'Infanterie arrivée la veille. On m'a nommé les Régiments Nr. 12 & 17	1,800	—
le 4 Février. Infanterie irrégulière	1,200 à 1,500	—

III. J'ai évalué le camp restant à Gaza

	Infanterie	Cavalerie
1 Infanterie dans les jardins 9 à 11 Bataillons	3,500 à 4,000	—
2 Un Bivouac formé de 5 Bataillons . .	1,800 à 2,000	—
3 Un " " " 5 Bataillons . .	1,500	—
4 Un " " " 4 Bataillons . .	1,200	—
5 Cinq Régiments de Cavalerie et plusieurs Cohortes de Chevaux irréguliers (cette der- nière de 1600 hommes)	—	3,900
6 Huit pièces de canons et 150 artilleurs .	—	—
Total	15,900 à 17,100	6,500

Transport 15,900 à 17,100 homme d'Infanterie régulière et irrégulière et 6500 hommes de Cavalerie régulière et irrégulière.

Terme moyen

Grand-Total, Soldats et Officiers 22,500

A Gaza Garnison antérieure 3,300 hommes de Cavalerie régulière et irrégulière et 600 à 700 hommes d'Artillerie et Infanterie irrégulière.

	Total	4,000 hommes
Arrivés de l'armée d'Ibrahim	18,500	
	Total	22,500 hommes

C^{te}. Széchényi.

A. Du Mont

(Inclosure IV in No. 119.)

Estimates of Egyptian Forces returning home.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 10 February 1841.

From actual observation in the field	Grand Totals		
	Regular Infantry	Regular and irregular Cavalry	Irregular Infantry
Return of Colonel Rose (Brit. service) from Gaza			
1 division under Ahmed Dramali, Selim, and Churchid Pashas	10,000	600	3,000 ¹
2 division under Ahmed Menikli Pasha (600 dismounted Cavalry)	—	2,700	—
3 division under Ibrahim and Osman Pashas (inclosure I)	3,500	640	510
	<u>13,500</u>	<u>3,940</u>	<u>3,510 ²</u>
Return of Colonel von Laue (Prussian service) from Gaza (inclosure II)	13,700	3,300	2,300
Return of Count Széchényi and Baron Du Mont (Austrian service) from Gaza (inclosure III)	13,900	3,200	2,000
Returns of Omer Pasha, Hassan Pasha, Riza Pasha from the line-of-march	12,500	3,800	1,400
General Return of the Egyptian Army in Syria made at the Head-Quarters of Jaffa (average)	13,200	3,900	1,400
	or Total 18,500. ³		

¹ The civil Employés of the Government and Administration, the mule-teers, camel drivers, servants, and followers of harems, are all *armed* according to the Oriental custom, and the greater proportion mounted. In this way 6 or 7000 *armed individus* have left Damascus, but they are *no soldiers*. Hence the high evaluation of the irregular forces by those who are not accustomed to estimate eastern armies. Of *actual* irregular Infantry never more than 2000 men left Damascus.

² The 3300 Cavalry and 700 Artillery and irregular Infantry come from *El Arish* to *Gaza* are not comprised in Ibrahim Pasha's *Syrian* army.

³ Besides these 18,500 men, there are 3000 men escorting the great Convoy via *Maan*. Total 21,500 men.

(Inclosure V in No. 119.)

Distribution of Troops (now taking place).

Head-Quarters Jaffa 10 February 1841.

- I Military Division of southern Syria under His Excellency Lieutenant General Hassan Pasha.
- Cavalry* under Major General Kerim Pasha,
 3 Regiments under Murad Bey, of Guards, and under Ali Bey at Gaza &c. &c. &c.
Artillery 8 field pieces at Jerusalem, 4 field pieces at Gaza,
Infantry Brigade of Ismael Pasha = 8 Battalions, Ramleh and Jaffa,
 Brigade of Emin Pasha = $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 4 \text{ id. Jerusalem,} \\ 1 \text{ id. Gaza,} \end{array} \right.$
 Irregular Albanians = 1000 men at Naplous.
- II Military Division of central Syria under His Excellency Lieutenant General Selim Pasha.
- Cavalry* under Major General Riza Pasha,
 3 Regiments under Ali Bey, Noury Bey and Arab Ahmed Bey at Damascus,
 Irregulars under Chebli Arrian, 300 men at Damascus,
 id. under Murchardar Bey and others 2500 men at Tabariah,
Artillery 12 field pieces at Damascus, 12 field pieces at Saïda, grand parc in Acre,
Infantry Brigade of Chalid Pasha = 8 Battalions at Damascus,
 Brigade of Ali Pasha = 9 " at Acre and Saïda.
- III Military Division of northern Syria under Major General Eyub Pasha.
- Cavalry* 4 Regiments (Diarbehr, Arzroum and Aleppo), 1 Regiment at Adana, 1 Regiment Shaky Bey at Antioch,
Artillery 8 guns at Aleppo,
Infantry 2 Battalions under Mehmet Bey at Aleppo,
 1600 irregular Albanians at Tripolis.
- A. Jochmus.

¹ The troops of the Military Division of northern Syria are not comprised in the present army of the operations, which acted in the field against Ibrahim Pasha.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD
at *Marmarissa Bay*.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 15 February 1841.

Sir,

From the dispatches and returns which I had the honour to address to Your Excellency on the 2 and 3 instant, it will have been perceived that the amount of the remains of Ibrahim Pasha's retiring army, was 18,800 combatants and 2,700 non-combatants, making a grand total of 21,500 men of all arms, including regulars and irregulars. —

From all the reports and returns which I have since received from my Turkish and European Staff-Officers, most of whom were sent to ascertain these numbers, I find that this estimate requires no alteration, and is perfectly correct.

The remains of the Egyptian Cavalry preserve some military order, the rest of the troops returned from Syria are utterly disorganized, and the losses from disease in consequence of excessive fatigue amounted daily to 50 or 60 men between the camps of Gaza and El Arish. —

It is extraordinary that the casualties should not be more numerous, considering the sufferings in the Desert, and the fact that whole regiments have been actually living for some days on the grass and herbs of the wilderness.

For more than 10 days the only rations issued to most columns, were two or three camels for each regiment on the march.

Ibrahim Pasha himself is very ill, and has sent for an English Physician to these Head-Quarters. Dr. Robertson is gone to attend His Excellency.

I do not suppose, according to the annexed estimate, that out of the whole of the remaining 21,500 men, more than one half or about 11,000 will ever be again on the strength of the Egyptian army.

I have calculated the probable loss on the march from Maan and Gaza into Egypt, and the amount of desertion when arrived in Egypt, only at 4000 men. If it is considered that a great proportion of the now remaining troops are married men and consequently the worst soldiers, who did not desert in Syria because their wives and children went via Maan, but who will desert on the very first occasion that offers in Egypt, the above estimated reduction will be found very moderate, the more so as there are about 2000 Henedy irregular horse, who have pillaged Syria during 10 years, and are averaged to carry each from 15 to 20,000 piasters' worth in horses, arms, and money back into Egypt, all of whom will go to their homes.

In all there were embarked up to the 13 instant about 3000 sick, wounded, and others hors de combat, with some women and the skeletons of some Infantry regiments. About 3000 men waited up to to-day

to embark, and were prevented by the heavy surf.¹ The rest went by land to Egypt via El Arish.

It may be calculated, that out of the "débris" of the former Syrian army and the *regular* troops still in Egypt, Mehemet Ali, or any future Pasha of Egypt, may reform a peace establishment of 20 to 25,000 effective soldiers, such a force may also be maintained in the long run without too heavy charges, out of a population amounting at present to 1,800,000 to 2,000,000, of which the permanent soldiery would form $\frac{1}{4}\%$ and would eventually afford an accession of strenght to the Turkish Empire.

The larger *rival* military power on the banks of the Nile, now fortunately broken in its most essential elements, would have only been a seed of destruction in the Ottoman dominions.

I have &c.

(signed) A. Jochmus.

Levant Papers III, 305.

¹ Part of the Infantry of the Guards, originally destined to march by land, embarked also. Vide report of Colonel Bridgeman and Alderson.

(Inclosure in No. 120.)

Estimate

of the effective force of Ibrahim Pasha's army returned to Egypt,
and fit for further service.

Head-Quarters Jaffa 10 February 1841.

Distribution.	Total of Forces according to the General Return of the 2 February. Regular and irregular Troops		Grand Total
	Effective combatants	Non-Combatants	
Returning to Egypt by Gaza and Maan . . .	18,800	2,700	21,500
Embarked at Gaza or sent for embarkation to El Arish on mules and camels as hors de combat 3000			
Died of disease in Gaza and El Arish during the last 20 days, in consequence of excessive fatigue, at the rate of 50 men per diem 1000			
Deserted during that time 500			
Turks and Syrians to be sent back to Syria and Constantinople 2000			
Probable loss on the march by the Desert to Cairo, and estimated desertion when arrived in Egypt 4000			
	10,500		10,500
Remain fit for further service	10,200	800	11,000

(signed) A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-General.

J. Freestun,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Levant Papers III, 307.

food to some hundred of famished Europeans, and some dozens of barbers of France and Italy, styling themselves doctors, and has moreover given the facility to the French consuls and agents to ascertain the nature of foreign and internal correspondence by letters.

I suppose Mr. Robert could do nothing more for the Ottoman Government.

After cases of plague have taken place in the Hospital of Jaffa — we have immediately surrounded it by a company of troops, but at the same time positive orders have been given that no steamer, or troops coming from Jaffa, should be put in Quarantine.

I shall to-morrow leave for Damascus, where the neighbourhood is infected by deserters. — One of my objects is also to make arrangements with Hadji Ali Pasha to reestablish and secure the caravans between Damascus, Bagdad, and the Euphrates.

122.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Beyrout 10 March 1841.)

Private.

Therapia 26 January 1841.

My dear General,

I have waited with infinite impatience an opportunity for sending a few lines to you, and none was to be had till this moment, where I hear of the sudden and immediate departure of a steamer for Beyrout. I can only write a few lines and say next to nothing as I do not know, that my letter will reach you in safety, or at all I presume you will receive orders from the Sublime Porte. — I have received from Lord Palmerston the expression of his fullest approbation of your having been placed in authority, and *he* does not desire that you should be in *any degree whatever under the least control* of General Mitchell or of any body. You are therefore without obligation to consult any body. — It seems to me from General Mitchells letters that he has great modesty, and I augur therefore that he has much merit. — You of course know *who* the men are who wished to deprive you of the command, but you need not *mind* them. You depend only upon the Sultan, and he and his ministers have confidence to you in all ways.

I beg of you to be kind to Wood, I will not write more.

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

NOTE.

Damascus 5 March 1841.

On my arrival here I found several Arab Chiefs and Sheiks in prison for having plundered Mezerib and some neighbouring villages *after* the Egyptian retreat.

They pleaded, without denying the fact, that they had done so only in strict obedience of my written orders: "*to destroy or carry off all provisions on the line of march of the enemy.*"

They added that they had done so to the best of their power, but finding that there were left still some trifling remains, they had thought themselves entitled to take also those away *after* the enemy had fled.

One of the Chieftains quoted even the orders of Sultan Saleddin, who when he has been preparing to attack the Franks at Jerusalem, had invited to join his standards all the Arabs who desired to have "gold, silver, goods, male and female slaves."

The learned Sheik and his companions were put in liberty, on the express condition of considering at least henceforth their military duty as scrupulously fulfilled.

A. J.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO ADMIRAL SIR R. STOPFORD.

Beirut 10 March 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose to Your Excellency the return of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, Mr. Werry, detailing the amount of the Egyptian forces which left Damascus on the 29 December 1840 for Egypt. According to this document the retreat

was begun with	54,713 men
Colonel Bridgeman informs me that according to Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson's return, the following numbers of the army left Syria:	
by Gaza	29,000
by Maan	4,000
	<u>33,000</u>
Loss during the retreat	21,713 men

The above estimates, however, are made up from Egyptian sources of information, and I know from other and well authenticated returns, such as the enclosed from Austrian and Prussian officers as well as Turkish, compared by me with numerous reports from the local Syrian

authorities, most of whom had relations or friends in high confidential situations in the Egyptian army, that the above forces, particularly those enumerated by Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson, are very much overrated. — This arises particularly from the circumstance that the trains of Attendants, Muleteers, Cameldrivers &c. &c., who are all armed after the eastern fashion and many in the dress of regular, others in that of irregular soldiers, are put down in the above returns as part of the army, whilst in reality they are no soldiers at all.

This number may amount to 8000 men, as Your Excellency will perceive from the enclosed comparative statement of the Egyptian forces leaving Damascus.

According to my best conviction the amount of actual troops retiring was never above	40,000 men
and of those marched home by Maan and Gaza	21,500 "
	making the loss 18,500 "
	instead of the above loss of 21,713 "

Any further details may be found in the marginal remarks on the return. — It has come to my certain knowledge, that the loose organization of the Egyptian army has never permitted Ibrahim Pasha, even in time of peace, to ascertain the actual forces under his command, much less can it be expected that Egyptian written or verbal estimates can be considered as exact, and as not overrated at the periods of the retreat, and of the camp near Gaza.

The vicious mode of military administration, copied and half understood from the complicated French system, gave the greatest facility to all sorts of frauds, and where all found certain profits in misrule, it was impossible to obtain correct estimates of pay and rations, nor to elicit from the Chiefs the actual forces under their command. — These defects already too obvious before the beginning of the last campaign, were only mitigated by Ibrahim Pasha's well known character of severity, and by the dread of his name, the only one which, founded on a victorious career, effectually kept in respect and awe a raw and half disciplined soldiery.

The moment the current of military success was checked on the heights of Calat Meidan by the personal defeat of the hitherto always successful General, disorganization in the army began with the decline of the individual fame of the leader. Hence and *not* from the numbers engaged or lost, the relative importance of that action, and the rapid demoralization of the Egyptian army, which rendered it unable to resist henceforth the Allied troops, though still on the spot nearly triple in numerical strength. — The fate of the army was identified with that of its Commander, no other General having any effective sway over the troops.

From the best information which I have been able to collect, I make the composition of the Syrian army under Ibrahim Pasha at the beginning of the campaign as follows:

Effective combatants regulars and irregulars . . . 75,000 men
 sick in Hospitals, military servants, Administration &c. . 10,000 „

viz. Total 85,000 „

Egyptians of all arms 47,000
 Hennedy irregular Horse 2,200
 Albanian Infantry, irregular 2,800
 Kurdish Cavalry, irregular 2,800
 Turks from the Fleet and others 5,200
 Syrians of all arms 25,000

Total 85,000 men

Loss of all arms up to the retreat *from Damascus*
 29 December 45,000 men

Loss since the retreat.

Turks, Kurds, and Syrians deserted to their homes,
 or serving now in the Ottoman army 7,800
 Drowned at Jericho, and other losses in action 1,500
 Died from cold and disease (chiefly the 3,697 men
 who left Damascus already as invalids) 4,000
 Egyptians deserted 5,200

18,500

Returned by Maan and Gaza.

Egyptians of all arms 16,200
 Hennedy irregular Horse 1,900
 Albanian irregular Foot 1,900
 Syrians and Turks 1,500

21,500 40,000 „
 Total 85,000 men

I have already stated to Your Excellency my opinion, that out
 of the last 21,500 men, there never will appear again more than about
 11 or 12,000 men on the effective strength of the actual regular army.

I have &c.

(signed) A. Jochmus,
 Lieutenant-General,
 commanding the army of operation.

Enclosed copies of the returns of Colonel Rose, Colonel Laue, Count
 Széchényi, Baron Du Mont, Omer Pasha, as transmitted to Lord Palmerston on
 the 10 February 1841 from Jaffa (vide No. 119 inclosures 1—5).

(Inclosure I in No. 124.)

*Traduction d'une Note en arabe sur la force de l'armée d'Ibrahim Pa.
et des personnes qui s'y trouvaient attachées, lors de l'évacuation de Dab
le 29 Décembre 1840.*

Nombre des Pachas.

Ibrahim Pacha, Général en Chef	I
Soliman Pacha, Chef de l'État-Major, Général de l'armée	I
Ahmed Pacha, Emir miran	I
Osman Pacha, Emir miran	I
Ahmed Pacha, Emir miran des Cuirassiers	I
Selim Pacha, Emir miran	I
Kourchid Pacha, Emir miran	I
Houssein Pacha, Emir miran	I
Cherif Pacha, Emir miran	I

Infanterie.

Généraux	4
Colonels	11
Lieutenants-Colonels	13
Chefs de Bataillons	60
Adjudants-Majors	68
Capitaines	438
Lieutenants et Sous-Lieutenants	823
Attachés aux Régiments (Médecins, Pharmaciens, Mu- sique &c. &c.)	<u>275</u>
Sousofficiers et Soldats	27,9

Cavalerie.

Généraux	3
Colonels	3
Lieutenants-Colonels	6
Chefs d'Escadrons	16
Capitaines	93
Lieutenants et Sous-Lieutenants	171
Adjudants-Majors	34
Attachés aux Régiments (Médecins, Pharmaciens, Mu- sique &c. &c.)	<u>176</u>
Sousofficiers et Cavaliers	3,6
	<u>Latus 33,8</u>

Transport 33,858

Infanterie légère.

Chasseurs tirailleurs 520

Artillerie.

Généraux	2	
Colonels	3	
Lieutenants-Colonels	3	
Chefs de Bataillons	10	
Adjudants-Majors	21	
Capitaines	73	
Lieutenants et Souslieutenants	92	
Attachés aux Régiments (Médecins, Pharmaciens, Mu- sique &c. &c.)	190	394
Sousofficiers et Artilleurs		4,628

Soldats irréguliers.

Bachibouzouk } Cavalerie	4000	
Hanadi }	2500	
Cavas	280	
Arnaout (Infanterie)	4860	11,640

Invalides.

de toutes armes 3,673

Femmes et enfans de l'armée, excepté les femmes des Chefs.

Femmes	3697	
Enfans sevrés	1752	} 2089
Enfans laitants	337	
		5,786

Total de l'armée en hommes 54,713

Grand Total de toute l'Évacuation 60,499

Pour traduction conforme à l'original en arabe, en possession de Mr. Werry, Consul d'Angleterre.

Damas 27 Février 1841.

Louis de L'Or,
Capitaine d'État Major.

(Inclosure II

General Return of

beginning the retreat from Damascus

Periods.	Effective Combatants			
	Regular Army		Irregular Forces	
Vide General Return, dated at Jaffa 2 February 1841 (Inclosure II in No. 110.)	Infantry and Artillery. Effective Officers and Rank and File	Cavalry. Effective Officers and Lances and Sabres	Infantry Effective Officers and Firelocks	Cavalry. Effective Officers and Lances and Sabres
10 September 1840				
Forces in Syria under Ibrahim Pasha	58,000	7000	5000	5000
Loss of troops up to the the beginning of the retreat	34,000	2000	3000	1000
A. Forces retreating from Damascus	24,000	5000	2000	4000
B. Same Forces according to Mr. Werry's return made at Damascus	Infantry 29,382 Artillery 4832 ⁴	4201 ⁵	Albanians 2000	Hennedy 2500 ³ Others 1500
	34,214	4201	2000 ⁷	4000 ⁷

Remarks.

¹ Vide General Return of 2 February 1841, note 2, where these classes are estimated at 8000 men, who *altho' armed* on foot and on horseback, do not constitute any effective irregular force; Mr. Werry has included them in the irregular troops under the denomination of Bashibuzuk horse and Arnouts. According to the same note 2 the number of women and children is about 8000. — Mr. Werry makes it:

wives of soldiers and non-commissioned officers with children	5786
add wives and female attendants on the harems of the general and field officers	1600
	<u>Total 7386</u>

² The difference of 1840 men must be deducted from the amount of Mr. Werry's regular Infantry, as many former soldiers were employed as muleteers and camel drivers, the animals not having been hired, but driven away by force from the neighbouring devastated villages, from whence the peasantry had fled.

³ The effective number of *Hennedy* irregular horse was not above 2000.

⁴ Upwards of one half of these 4832 men were lately drafted Infantry soldiers, the old Artillery having deserted in large proportions.

in No. 124.)

the Egyptian Forces

on the 29 December 1840.

Damascus 27 February 1841.

Total Effective Combatants	Non-combatants Military Administration, Musicians, military Servants, Invalides and Hospitals	Grand Total of the Army in Syria	Muleteers, Camel-Drivers, Civil employés of Syria, their servants and attendants on Harems, all armed and hence included by Mr. Werry in the irregular Forces	Total of male Individuals leaving Damascus at the retreat 29 December 1840
75,000	10,000	85,000	—	—
40,000	5000	45,000	—	—
35,000	5000	40,000	8000 ¹	48,000
—	4138 not including military servants	—	6160 ²	—
44,415	4138	48,553	6160 ⁷	54,713 ⁶

⁵ 700 dismounted Cavalry arrived at Gaza, it is only likely that a similar number of dismounted men left already Damascus, where barley had become extremely scarce. Hence also a great many guns were drawn by bullocks and cows.

⁶ Difference of rations issued 6713.

The difference of 6713 men will not appear extraordinary, if it is considered that Mr. Werry's return is made up from the ration returns, paylists, and other similar documents of the last days of December, found in Damascus. — The already then only half-organized Infantry and Artillery naturally overdraw rations and such small portions of pay as was issued. The general return A is therefore much approaching the real strength.

⁷ Distribution of irregular forces:

Total of Mr. Werry	11,640
Riflemen	520
	<hr/> 12,160

Returned above:

Albanians	2000
Hennedy and Bashibuzuk Cavalry	4000
Armed men on horse and foot accompanying the army and harems as in note 1, not actual soldiers	6160
	<hr/> 12,160

IL CONTR' AMMIRAGLIO BANDIERA AL GENERALE JOCHMUS.

Presidiale.

Marmorice 8 Febbrajo 1841.

Eccellenza,

Ho avuto l'onore di ricevere li riveriti suoi Dispacj dei 17 e 23 Gennaro, come pure la pregiatissima sua lettera dei 25 dello stesso mese.

Permetta Eccellenza ch'io le faccia le mie felicitazioni sopra li belli successi dell' Armata da lei comandata, che ha saputo portar tanti danni ad Ibraïm Pascia, e forzarlo ad evacuare tutta la Siria e la Palestina.

Ora che l'accomodamento diffinitivo con il Vice-Re d'Egitto è stato pienamente convenuto, e che ha di già restituito tutta la squadra Ottomana, inutili si rendono costì li nostri uffiziali, truppe di Marina e racchette che rispedisco nei Stati Austriaci.

Sono ben felice che il signor Primo Tenente Du Mont abbia potuto ben disimpegnare tutte le commissioni che Vostra Eccellenza ha affidate, e meritarsi la di Lei approvazione. Ho soddisfatto al grato dovere di far conoscere alle mie superiorità quanto Vostra Eccellenza sia stato contento di lui, ed ho ricercato una meritata ricompensa per questo distinto uffiziale.

Ho pure rappresentato al Ministerio della Guerra la soddisfazione esternatami da Vostra Eccellenza per li servizj prestati dal Signor Capitano Conte Széchényi.

La squadra Ottomana è giunta da Alessandria a Marmorice li 24 Gennaro.

Essa non attende che il favore del vento per sortire da questo porto e ridursi a Costantinopoli.

L'ammiraglio Javer Pascia è da varj giorni partito con il Vascello Mahmoudié remurchiato fuori del porto da un mio vapore.

L'ammiraglio Stopford si trova da varj giorni a Malta.

Abbiamo a Marmorice il Contr' Ammiraglio Omaney con 9 vascelli Inglesi.

Ovunque io possa servirla La prego, Eccellenza, di onorarmi di suoi Comandi &c. &c.

Bandiera, C. A.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Beyrout 18 March 1841.)

Therapia 25 February 1841.

My dear General,

I have received your letters by Lieutenant-Colonel Rose. — I need not tell you with how much pleasure — I have sent copy of your

Despatch to the Admiral (dated the 13 February) home, that Lord Palmerston may see, to whom it is due that Ibrahim has been unable to carry his army safe and sound to Egypt, but has been defeated and deprived of moral and physical power. I have shown that, had Ibrahim been left in Damascus, and permitted to take his departure from thence as the foolish convention made by Napier intended, Ibrahim would have still been supposed by many *or most* people to have had force enough, to contest the victory, and by his return to Egypt with an unbroken army he would have given Mehemet Ali the means to resist the terms imposed on him by the Sultan, and by giving him the means he very probably would have *induced* him to do so. — These toils have been prevented by your energy in not yielding to bad and foolish counsels, and your skill and vigour in your acts. — All the world *must* now admit that Ibrahim has been beaten, and Mehemet Ali will find that his army is nearly good for nothing. — Tell Wood, how glad I am to see that he has in the case I allude to acted with the same good judgment and resolution which he has displayed on every occasion from first to last in this eventful campaign, and I am delighted to see you, my dear General, giving *him* the praise he so justly merits.

I have proposed to the Porte to give you the *rank* you desire to have. — I have proposed to it also to call you here, and to give you the job of forming the Ottoman army.

Yours sincerely

Ponsonby.

I must call your attention to the horrid reports of the vile conduct of the Albanians in the service of the Porte, and tell you that I have urged the Porte to order them all out of Syria without loss of time. — I am sorry to hear very bad accounts too of the conduct of some of the Turkish troops.

I have said much in praise of your Serasker Zacharias Pasha. I will support him well, if he will be the *friend of the soldier*, his own soldiers I mean, and will continue to be a brave and honest servant to the Sultan. — *I can do him service.*

We are not certain that Mehemet Ali will submit to the terms imposed on him — I think he will submit in words and take his chance for not performing any thing. — I hear the Ibrahim is dying. — If Mehemet Ali should refuse to submit, I hope the Porte will be permitted by the Allies to attack him, and I suppose you could easily march to Cairo and the Ottoman fleet attack Alexandria. — Let me hear what you think of the march.

P.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private.

Beyrout 18 March 1841.

I have received by Colonel Rose Your Excellency's letter of the 25 February, and it is with the greatest satisfaction that I perceive, that Your Lordship approves of what has been done in the latter part of the Syrian campaign. — I see by the debates in both houses of Parliament that great satisfaction has also been there expressed at the success of the operations here, and that the rewards bestowed have been on a liberal scale.

I informed the Serasker Zacharias Pasha that Your Lordship was well disposed towards him, and he seemed highly flattered by what I told him. He is a very good man and personally a gallant soldier, but I do not perceive that he has any of the higher qualifications of the Administrator or of the General.

He is personally liked by the soldier, particularly by the Albanians under his orders. — I believe that the reports made on the pretended disorders by the Albanians are highly coloured and exaggerated. The only real complaint that I could trace was a row between an Albanian and an apothecary of the name of Crollo, who is at the same time Spanish consul.

Consuls in general in this part of the world and I believe in many others too, have an idea of their dignity exactly in the inverse ratio of the importance of their Consulships, and I think that the principal reason of the late complaint was a desire to get rid of the Albanians in order not to quarter them *in houses*. — Since they have been put *in tents*, I don't hear of a single complaint.

As for the regular troops I never saw in my life a better behaved set of men, and I have stated this already to Hussein Pasha, in an official dispatch of which I have sent a copy to Your Excellency.

I understand by a late arrival from Alexandria, that Mehemet Ali, altho' accepting the Sultan's investiture objects to some of the conditions imposed on him. It strikes me, that after his defeat and the conviction he must have of his inability of further effective resistance, that it can only be by hopes that are held out to him at Alexandria by foreign Agents, or by news and advices which he has of late received from Europa, that he trusts in some more favourable decision from the Allied Powers, and I hold that he will abide by their resolution as soon as it becomes definitively known to him.

From the last news received here from Egypt the demoralization amongst the remains of the army come home is very great. Ibrahim Pasha by an overland Courier from Gaza admitted, that he had only 23,600 men left and no regular troops are gone by Maan except the Artillery. From these circumstances and from all the other information which I have been able to collect, I am induced to believe, that my

former estimates transmitted to Your Excellency by Captain Boville and Colonel Rose are quite correct, and Your Lordship receives further details in my official dispatch of this day. — The return of Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson is *nonsense*, made out with a desire to disparage the advantages obtained *by me*. Colonel Bridgeman himself showed me on his arrival from Gaza a return made out *by himself* and Colonel Alderson of the forces *gone* and *present*, amounting to 25,000 men regulars and irregulars, but in order to augment the numbers come from Damascus they estimated the original garrison of Gaza at 3000 men, but since they have been obliged by referring to former dispatches, that the garrison was 4000 men, and hence the troops *arrived* only 21,000, which was still 2500 overrated. — This happened about the 15 of February. On the 19 Colonel Bridgeman sends me an information that 33,000 men had left Gaza, of which 29,000 had arrived from Damascus.

Unfortunately, however, for this unexpected amelioration of the army, Ibrahim Pasha himself reported to Alexandria, that he had only 23,000 men at Gaza.

From all that I see in the papers confronted with old and late reports and informations, I continue to believe, that the moral and physical power of this army is completely broken, and the resistance to be expected in Egypt against the Allied forces of *no weight*, against the Turkish *alone not very formidable*, but I must admit that I have not been able to obtain here in Syria any correct information as to the means of defense possessed by Mehemet Ali *independent* of his former Syrian army.

At first sight, however, I should be let to believe that the moral effect of the Sultan's forces would have been very great, and hence it might suffice to attack Alexandria, Damietta, or any other point in order to obtain results similar to those gained by the landing at Djouni in September last.

A march on Cairo thro' the Desert *in summer* is a very serious operation, and requires enormous means of transport and expenses. — If the troops that are still in Egypt *will fight*, this march without well prepared and adequate means would be very hazardous, if they will *not* fight, or fight *badly*, operations on the coast will lead to equally great results, without great expenses and considerable risk.

I hope to hear by the next steamer, my Lord, if I am to come to Constantinople.

128.

MR. BACKHOUSE TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Extract.

Foreign Office 11 February 1841.

I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to request, that you will report to him your opinion whether British officers will be wanted to

assist in organizing the Turkish army, as if they should be so, there are several officers well spoken of by the General commanding in chief, who would be desirous of taking service under the Turkish Government

129.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Beyrout 18 March 1841.

My Lord,

I have had the honour to receive Your Lordship's letter of the 11 February, and in answer beg to state, that in my opinion it would be essentially useful to have the assistance of British officers in the organization of the Turkish army.

His Excellency Lord Ponsonby in a letter of the 25 February informs me that he has been pleased to propose to the Imperial Government, that the formation of the Ottoman army should be confided to me, but whoever may be charged with this arduous duty, he will find it necessary to reduce to one uniform system the present chaos of European tactics, introduced into the Turkish service. — It may be admitted that our exclusively English-Austrian or French system cannot be adopted in Turkey. — Natural habits — religious customs, and climatic observances prescribe certain alterations. — But it must be laid down as a rule, that the *Basis* of the instruction should be uniform, and worked out in the Turkish war-office for all branches of the service after one *steady* combination.

If this Basis be the English military system, the presence of a certain number of British officers will not only be desirable but necessary. — They will particularly be required for the organization of the General Staff, of the Commissariat and medical Departments. In the battalion-school and manual exercise the Turkish troops are tolerably advanced, and the required uniformity can be obtained without great difficulty. — Cavalry and Artillery require more care and amelioration.

The principal condition of success, however, will depend on the readiness of the Turkish Government to give actual rank to foreign officers.

As it is very likely that I shall proceed to Constantinople ere long by order of the Government, I shall be able to complete this report, as soon as I shall have had interviews with the Turkish authorities and with Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador.

I have &c.

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL GORDON HIGGINS TO LIEUTENANT
GENERAL JOCHMUS.**

A Return of Ordnance Stores taken at Acre.

*Return of Ordnance, Ammunition, Small Arms, Camp Equipage, Provisions &c. &c.
taken from the enemy in the Fortress of St. Jean d'Acre on the morning of the
4 November 1840.*

Iron Guns	{	32 pounder	9	
		24 "	66	
		18 "	20	
		12 "	31	
Grenades	{	10 inch	7	
		8 "	7	
Iron Howitzers		24 pounder	2	
Brass Guns	{	18 "	1	
		9 "	23	
		6 "	75	in store
		3 "	1	
Carronades		68 "	1	
Brass Howitzers	{	24 "	13	
		12 "	18	
		5 ¹ / ₂ inch — heavy	12	
Brass Mortars	{	13 "	7	
		10 "	4	
		8 "	4	
		5 ¹ / ₂ "	1	
Iron Mortars	{	18 "	9	in store
		15 "	1	
		13 "	1	
Total			313	

Portfires, common 3000
 Fuzees 2000
 Camp Equipage, complete for 1000 men
 total 22,000,000

Cartridges	{	32 pounder, 8 pounds each	1800
		24 " 6 " "	950
		12 " 3 " "	180
		9 " 3 " "	250
		6 " 1 pound 8 gr. each	1200

Common Case	{	32 pounder	900
		24 "	550
		18 "	770
		12 "	2000
		6 "	550
		} with cartridges fixed	450
Round Shot	{	32 "	1500
		24 "	1900
		18 "	5000
		12 "	3350
		9 "	9330
		6 "	1200
Double-headed Shot	{	24 "	1600
		18 "	800
		12 "	1600
Shells fixed	{	32 "	550
		24 "	900
		18 "	950
		12 "	3000
		9 "	1500
		6 "	2900
Shells unfixed	{	32 "	6500
		24 "	2500
		18 "	3950
		6 "	8500
		3 "	1500
Shells unfixed	{	18 inch mortars	1500
		15 " "	2050
		13 " "	2000
		10 " "	1300

Stores.

Glue, bags	100
Charcoal, tons	1
Oil, gallons	2000
Clothing for soldiers, suits	50
Stocks for muskets	3000
Haircloths	100
Anvils for smiths	14
Bellows for smiths	14
Lathes, turning	2
Lime, bushels	3000
Spades, common	1600
Felling axes	1300
Shovels	1000

Axes, pick	2000
Mill-stones, hand	50
Cavalry boots, pairs	200
Canvass bags	12
White thread, pounds	20
Sheepskins dressed	212
Three-eight-inch rope, tons	1
Flat iron, tons	6
Bolt iron, tons	9
Iron straps	300
Hammers for masons	200
Plates screw	7
Taps screw	60
Vices for smiths	10
Old iron, tons	64
Iron axletrees for guns	190
Wire hanks	28
Horseshoes	5000
Miners' scrapers	40
Hinges, iron	300
Masons' malls, iron	300
Masons' picks, iron	260
Cocks, brass	100
Paint brushes	50
Tongs for smiths, pairs	40
Miners' borers	40
Crowbars	30
Handcuffs with chains, pairs	200
Screws, stocks, and dies, pairs	9
Steelyards, pairs	3
Steel, square, tons	2
Files of sorts, tons	400
Well-boring tools	200
Grapnells for boats	15
Sheet-lead, tons	6
Pig-lead, tons	4
Brass bushes	100
Sheet-iron, tons	1
Marble slabs, pounds	7
Baskets, sand	7000
Wire-screens	30
Carts with wheels	200
Barrows, hand	100
Door-frames	40
Cured hides	500
Tar, jars	100
Sulphur, boxes	40

Nails, of sorts, tons	2
Bales of cloth	200
Skins, of sorts	200
Buckets, small	4000
Gins for mounting guns	14
Slowmatch, tons	2

Provisions.

Wheat, bushels	10,900
Salt, "	1600
Rice, "	8500
Indian corn, bushels	8000
Olives, barrels and baskets	1300
Barley, bushels	13,000
Bread, tons	2500
Butter, jars	110

Return of Ordnance mounted on the Walls of the Fortress of St. Jean d'Acc pointing seaward on the 3 November 1841.

Iron Guns	{	68 pounder carronade	1
		24 " long	60
		18 " "	20
Iron Howitzers	24 "	2	
Grenades	{	10 inch	7
		8 "	7
Brass Howitzers	5 ¹ / ₂ "	3	
Brass Gun	18 pounder, long	1	
" Howitzers	24 "	2	
Brass Mortars	{	13 inch	7
		10 "	4
		8 "	4
		5 ¹ / ₂ "	1
Iron Mortars	{	15 "	1
		13 "	1
Pointing seaward		127	
" in land		102	
In park and store		84	
Grand total			313

Return of Ordnance, Small Arms, Ammunition, Provisions &c. &c. seized in town of Beyrout on the morning of the 10 October 1840.

Iron Guns of different calibres	31
Carronades 24 pounder	4

all arms: 2000 stand taken from the mountaineers on the 1 insurrection
 ammunition: Small Arm Ball Cartridge 1260 cases, each containing
 2000 rounds = 2,522,000.

Common case	{	24 pounder filled with iron balls	932
		18 " " " " " "	48
		6 " " " " " "	587
Round shot	{	68 "	8
		24 "	105
		12 "	90
Fuzees, common	200	
Portfires	224	
Slowmatch, pounds	200	
Paper blue, cartridge, reams	2	
Flints, Muskets	2200	
Bread, Rice, Wheat, Oil, Olives, Onions &c. &c.			

*Return of Ordnance, Ammunition, Stores, Small Arms, Camp Equipage &c. &c.
 seized from the enemy in their camp before Beyrout 11 October 1840.*

Iron Guns	{	4 pounder, long	7 serviceable
		4 " " "	1 unserviceable
		6 " short	9 serviceable
		6 " " "	1 unserviceable
		12 " " "	2 serviceable

provisions for 3000 men for 3 or 4 days.
 powder, barrels, large grain 1220, each containing 112 pounds, total
 136,640 pounds.
 Small Arms complete 1000 stand.
 Small Arms 1500 stand, delivered up by the enemy at the gates of the
 11 October 1840.
 All tents, complete 130.
 Missions, filled with cartridges, shot, and shells 300.

Beyrout 31 March 1841.

T. Gordon Higgins,
 Lieutenant-Colonel,
 commanding Royal Artillery.

131.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received Beyrout 31 March 1841.)

Therapia 20 March 1841.

My dear General,

At last an opportunity offers for sending you my letter, and I shall limit it to saying that I have spoken to the Ottoman Minister and you are expected here. I recommend you to come as soon as you can. — Pray present my compliments to the Serasker for whom I feel a high respect, because I know he is a good Osmanli, an honest man, and the *friend* of the poor soldier, as well as a gallant general &c. &c. &c.

I beg you will also make my best compliments to Selim Pasha for whose merits I entertain the highest respect.

Mehemet Ali in a letter to the Grand Visir written in his usual style of assumed humility — such as he practiced even when in arms against his Sovereign, has refused the conditions annexed by the Sultan to the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt as specified in the Sultan's Firman. The Porte will not listen to him, but will communicate with the Allies *before any measures whatever be taken*. — It is, I believe, out of Mehemet Ali's power to attempt at present any hostile act, but I think every body should be put well on guard against surprise.

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

I hope you will come here immediately. I write to Mr. Wood to come also, you might come together.

P.

132.

SON ALTESSE LE PRINCE DE METTERNICH AU LIEUTENANT
GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS.

Vienne le 6 Avril 1841.

Monsieur,

C'est avec le sentiment d'une vive peine que j'ai appris par la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le 10 Mars, le décès du Comte de Széchényi.

Intimement lié avec sa famille et ayant protégé le voeu de ce jeune officier d'aller faire ses premières armes sous vos ordres, j'éprouve toutes les douleurs de ses parents.

Le Comte Széchényi, père, vous exprime, Monsieur le Général, les sentimens de reconnaissance qu'il vous porte pour les bontés que vous avez eues pour son fils et dont celui-ci n'a pas manqué une occasion, pour lui en rendre compte.

L'homme n'échappe pas à sa destinée. Sauvé miraculeusement d'un naufrage, quand il est allé vous rejoindre en Syrie, peiné d'y être arrivé trop tard pour assister aux premières opérations de la guerre, accueilli par vous avec bonté et employé dans les occasions qui se sont encore présentées, ce n'est pas sur le champ d'honneur qu'il lui a été réservé de terminer une courte carrière, que ses excellentes qualités militaires lui eussent, sans doute, fait parcourir avec succès!

La reconnaissance de la famille du Comte Széchényi vous est acquise, Monsieur le Général, et j'y joins l'expression de la mienne, ainsi que celle de ma considération très distinguée.

Metternich.

133.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO SIR ROBERT STOPFORD.

Constantinople 21 April 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency the enclosed extract of the official dispatches received from Egypt by the Austrian Embassy here, stating the numbers of the Syro-Egyptian forces returned into Egypt to amount only to 17,300¹ men and 82 pieces of Artillery, constituting since the retreat from Damascus on the 29 December 1840 to the 25 February 1841, when the utterly disorganized remains had reentered Egypt, a total loss of 22,700 men and 68 field-pieces, according to the *lowest* estimate of Ibrahim Pasha's army at 40,000 men and 150 pieces of Artillery, whilst Mr. Werry's return amounts to 54,713 men leaving Damascus.

It will also be observed that more than one half of the two Divisions, returned via Gaza, went into hospital on their arrival in Egypt, which corroborates exactly the anticipated result reported to Your Excellency in several of my dispatches of the last two months, that not more than 11 or 12,000 men of the Syro-Egyptian army would ever be fit again for the actual regular service.

Hence out of an effective force of 75,000 combatants only 11,000 men or about $\frac{1}{7}$ has been brought back to Egypt, a proportion of losses more frightfull, than the destruction during the French campaign of Moscow.

¹ According to my returns of the 2 February 21,500 men passed thro' Maan and Gaza, the loss since has been consequently 4200 men besides those gone into hospital on arrival.

I am perfectly aware that petty machinations have not been wanting to underrate the results obtained against Ibrahim Pasha, since the command of the Turkish forces and the general direction of the operations have been confided to myself. — I have, in the security of success, not condescended to enter officially into any details on this subject, leaving it to time to dissipate the haze of idle clamour, and knowing that one day or another foreign and authentic documents, of the nature of the enclosed report, would confirm the results of the campaign.

But lest my intentional silence be construed into acquiescence, nor lest it be supposed that I could be overawed by vague and jealous declamation, when I have not shrunk from the responsibility of deeds, nor finally, that it be imagined that I do not properly estimate or assert the military value of the latter operations in Syria, tho' my own, I must *now* be allowed shortly to recapitulate the march of events.

On the 16 December, when after an undue detention of three weeks of the Imperial Firman, I was entrusted with the command in Syria, I found the Turkish army of 15,000 men of Infantry, 150 Horse and 30 field-pieces scattered in four principal Divisions over 150 miles of ground, without means of transport, nor any preparations for offensive movements. — The Emir Beshir, in the worst personal disposition, had only 3,500 irregular troops — whilst Ibrahim Pasha had been allowed to concentrate 30,000¹ foot and Artillerie and 10,000¹ Cavalry with 150 field pieces at Damascus.

On the 27 December I had organized the levée en masse of the populations south of Damascus and Beyrout inclusive the Hauran.

On the 6 January, the whole of the disposable forces, regulars and irregulars, were ready to be concentrated for a general action at the one point of Djenin, and by this single manoeuvre Ibrahim Pasha was obliged to abandon his original plan of marching thro' Palestine by roads full of resources of every kind, which would have brought his army without great losses to Gaza.

Three weeks afterwards the Egyptian forces thrown into the Desert had ceased to be an army, and were utterly discomfited.

Your Excellency will undoubtedly have perceived from the tenor of my dispatches that I never pretended to have beaten an army of 40,000 men with 15,000 half organized troops, the only merit which I claim, is to have known and duly appreciated the military chances of the fact that the Egyptian army *would not fight*, and had *no capable Generals*, a fact which others would or could not see, except his Excellency Lord Ponsonby, who told me so before I left Therapia in September last.

To Your Excellency as Commander-in-Chief by sea and by land of the *Allied* forces, I have reported the details of these operations, which led to the ultimate result of Ibrahim Pasha's loosing 22,700 men

¹ Regulars and irregulars.

and 68 pieces of Artillery since I took the command in Syria, and it must therefore be to me a matter of surprise, not to have been honoured with an acknowledgement even of the receipt of my dispatches, from the 13 January to the 10 of March, — a circumstance certainly new in the annals of military history.

An Officer must be equally prepared for the blame or the approval of his actions by his superiors, but he has a *right* to suppose that either one or the other be made *known* to him.

It has been *told* me that Your Excellency had prescribed the *facilitation* of Ibrahim Pasha's retreat, but I never have been honoured with any positive order in this respect, nor in fact have I ever received any instructions whatever from Your Excellency. — In the doubt, I have preferred to destroy the Egyptian army on my own responsibility.

I have the honour &c.

A. Jochmus.

134.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Private.

Constantinople 11 May 1841.

My Lord,

With reference to the letter which I had the honour to address to Your Lordship on the 18 March¹ in answer to your dispatch of the 11 February ultimo I now beg to state, that some Ministerial changes which have taken place here, or are likely still to occur, have momentarily prevented as speedy an arrangement with respect to the projected new organization of the Ottoman army, under my care, as might have been at first sight thought probable.

From the annexed documents, however, Your Lordship will perceive, that the Sultan personally recognizes the necessity of and is anxious for the improvement of his army, and that he expressed his desire to see me undertake this task.

His Excellency Lord Ponsonby told me, that from political reasons there exist some difficulties for officers in the *actual* British service to enter the Turkish army with effective rank.

I am happy, however, to see that Dr. Davy, Captain Williams, and the officers under their command have been employed, remaining in the English pay.

It has struck me and I have communicated to His Excellency Lord Ponsonby, that the officers of the late British Legion might be useful here, as the political difficulty alluded to, does not exist with respect to them, and the Turkish authorities appear also more favourable to this idea, altho' the point of actual rank, as granted to myself, pre-

¹ No. 129.

sents always, I apprehend, some obstacle, and even if surmounted, there would exist another, that of the expense of their passage to this country. — I must beg, however, to observe to Your Lordship, that if I am to a degree becoming responsible for the remodelling of the Ottoman army, it would be desirable and perhaps necessary for me to be allowed to point out myself such officers as might be destined, for *special* purposes, in a service of a particular and very difficult nature.

I have &c.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-General.

(Inclosure in No. 134.)

Discours de présentation au Sultan, le 7 May 1841, prononcé par le Général Jochmus, traduit par Safet Effendi, Dragoman de la Sublime Porte.

Que Votre Majesté veuille être persuadée, combien je suis heureux d'être admis à l'honneur de lui être présenté après une campagne aussi rapide que glorieuse, pour les armes de Votre Majesté et de ses Augustes Alliés.

Que Votre Majesté veuille croire que c'est encore un plus grand sujet de félicitation pour moi, de pouvoir lui assurer que l'ancienne valeur des troupes Ottomanes a brillé d'un nouvel éclat dans de nombreuses actions où souvent elles ont combattu à elles seules.

Les glorieuses institutions militaires de l'illustre Sultan Mahmoud sous le sage gouvernement de Votre Majesté ont commencé à porter des fruits.

Le développement lent mais systématique de la science militaire dans les rangs de votre armée, fondée sur des institutions turques, lui assignera sans doute, par la volonté de Votre Majesté un bel et grand avenir.

Réponse du Sultan traduite par Safet Effendi.

Sa Majesté est très contente de vous voir, Général, de retour à Constantinople et de pouvoir vous témoigner toute sa satisfaction de votre conduite en Syrie. Les services que vous avez rendus sont tels que Sa Majesté ne les oubliera jamais.

Sa Majesté sait que ses troupes se sont bien battues sous vos ordres, mais elle n'attribue véritablement leurs grands succès qu'au Général qui les a si bien dirigées.

Sa Majesté n'ignore pas combien il sera utile de travailler encore à l'amélioration de son armée et combien les connaissances militaires sont surtout nécessaires à ses officiers.

Elle espère qu'en donnant dorénavant vos soins à cet important objet, vous continuez, Général, à lui rendre des services aussi grands que ceux, qui vous ont distingué par le passé. —

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Private.

Constantinople 12 May 1841.

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose to Your Excellency the annexed two Memoranda¹ on the late campaign in Syria.

Political views, or personal considerations, or in some instances both together have led to the circulation of the most absurd statements on the results of the war, particularly of its latter period when I was entrusted with the command, and a wild field has certainly been left to vague speculation since nobody in Syria had the key to those operations, from the simple circumstance that I never communicated my plans to any one: not *before* the operations, because I consider secrecy as the main spring of success, and not *afterwards*, because I am not in the habit, when commanding, to discuss military enterprises.

The fact of my official dispatches to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford not having been published, has thrown additional darkness on these events, a circumstance which, besides the advantages derived from it by all open or secret adversaries of the Syrian cause, has placed me in a painful position towards several distinguished officers under my orders, some of whom (of high family connexions) are serving in the Austrian and other armies, and who, altho' deservedly praised and commended for their actions, have now no public document authenticating their just and great claims to distinctions and recompenses in their respective countries.

In the annexed two Memoranda I have drawn what impartially will be considered a fair outline of the whole campaign, which cannot be judged in its details without a full knowledge of the real causes and effects of our action. The *secret* Memorandum is especially destined for Your Excellency's and Lord Palmerston's information, to whom I beg Your Lordship will be pleased to transmit a duplicate with a copy of this letter. Of the second Memorandum (in french) being of a public nature I have given privately copies to the Ministers here of Austria and Russia as due to the character, position, and prospects in life of the officers engaged in the operations which it describes.

When Mazlum Bey left Constantinople towards the end of the Syrian campaign, he had been correctly informed of the precarious state of the Egyptian army at Damascus, but on his arrival in Marmarizza he was distinctly told and it was repeated to him in Alexandria, that Ibrahim Pasha was on the contrary still at the head of a most formidable force, and that my offensive movements were sure to end in the utter defeat of the Turkish forces. — Your Lordship must be aware, how much the conduct of the Sultan's Envoy to Alexandria was in-

¹ vide No. 136 and Inclosure in No. 136.

fluenced by these contradictory reports, so much so that he sent to the Imperial Head-Quarters at Jaffa ostensible directions to allow Ibrahim Pasha to evacuate Syria, and secret instructions to make him depose his arms. — Both communications were read by the Mustechar Mohamed Selami Effendi and by Mr. Wood in the council of war held at Jaffa on the 20 January ultimo.

It, however, so happened that against all the above preventions Ibrahim Pasha was completely routed, and by way of amendment it was then maintained for some weeks that his losses had been exceedingly overrated. Now, however, that these are well authenticated to consist of about 23,000 and 68 guns it seems to have been agreed, as an ultimo ratio, to consider the operations which caused them as contrary to the laws of war and humanity. It has not been difficult to reduce, in the enclosed documents, these various benevolent assertions to their proper standard.

I have &c.

A. Jochmus.

136.

SECRET MEMORANDUM ON THE LATE WAR IN SYRIA.

Constantinople 12 May 1841.

The Syrian campaign, in which Admiral Sir Robert Stopford was Commander-in-chief by sea and by land, presents three distinct periods: the first from the 10 September to the 10 October, when Commodore Sir Charles Napier directed the operations by land, the second from the 11 October to the 15 December 1840, during which time General Sir Charles Smith was charged with this direction, and finally the third epoch from the 16 December to the 17 January 1841, whilst the command was entrusted to General Jochmus.

There exist as yet many very imperfect and frequently very erroneous notions respecting the facts and achievements of this memorable campaign — and the undersigned thinks that this observation applies more directly to the events of the latter of the above three periods.

Hence it may be deemed proper for the information of the competent authorities to embody in a brief narrative the principal features of the campaign, and since it is impossible to form a correct judgment of its general course and more especially of the war by land, without weighing the peculiar circumstances in which each of the three commanding General Officers have been successively placed by the operations of the enemy, the original state of the country, or by the acts of their predecessors — it becomes requisite to trace the march of events from the beginning of the war.

Generally speaking it will then be perceived that the principle of the land war has been offensive, and essentially decisive in its effects,

during the time of Sir Charles Napier's and General Jochmus' commands, and that it was defensive under Sir Charles Smith's direction, since the attack on Acre was exceptional and ordered by Lord Palmerston, and undertaken against all former opinions and plans of Admiral Stopford and General Smith, the latter expressing himself in terms next to a protest against the enterprise in the council of the 30 October, held on board the Princess Charlotte, at which the Austrian Admiral Baron de Baudiera was present.

The original force of the Egyptian army in all Syria at the outbreak of the war was 65,000 regulars, 10,000 irregulars, and about 10,000 men effectives, sick in hospital &c. &c. The command of Commodore Napier begins with the landing at Djouni on the 10 September, and is characterized by his opposing firmly Sir Robert Stopford's¹ resolution (taken in the second week after the landing) of reembarking the troops within a specified term of four days, further by the successive victorious actions of the 24 September at Ardali, of the 26 September at Saïda, of the 4 October near Merouba, and on the 10 October at Calat Meidan.

In the short period of 30 days the result has been, that an inimical corps in the immediate front of the Allies of 18 to 20,000 men² — (injudiciously distributed —) was defeated by a force of about 5,500 Turks, 1,800 British marines and 200 Austrians (supported, it is true, by a powerful fleet,) — that 10,000 Egyptians (prisoners or deserters) were sent to Constantinople, that 4 or 5000 more escaped to their homes, and finally that Ibrahim Pasha having lost his moral supremacy in Syria, a great part of the coast and his artillery at Beyrout and Saïda returned in perfect confusion to Zachlé with 4 or 5000 men, the insurrection of the mountaineers, — in consequence of our victorious career — having spread by this time over most of the provinces of Central Syria.

Commodore Napier offered still on the 11 October to embark a corps in steamers, to profit by the dismay of the Egyptians, and to attack immediately Tripolis; but he was refused to act by Admiral Stopford, who gave over the direction of the operations by land to Sir Charles Smith, just then returned from Constantinople.

1500 men, however, of the troops at Tripolis soon after deserted, *even without being attacked*, and about 4,500 retired to Ibrahim's camp at Zachlé.

It may be added that one of the great consequences of these first rapid successes of the Allies was the evacuation of the whole of Northern Syria, the loss of the enemy's artillery, which he abandoned in the lines of the Taurus, and an immense desertion amongst his columns, when ordered from the north of Syria to concentrate on Damascus.

The undersigned estimates that the losses of Ibrahim Pasha's army in the operations up to the 10 October, or in the subsequent retreats

¹ In a similar spirit Admiral Walker declared to Sir Robert Stopford that, *happen what might*, the Turkish naval forces should not leave Djounie nor the coast.

² exclusively of inimical Druses.

which must be considered as their immediate effects, may be taken to be as follows:

Troops of all arms		35,000 men
Guns at Saïda	20	
Guns at Beyrout	50	
In the lines and places of the North	200	total 270 guns.

These then are the trophies of Commodore Napier's command, and his glory is still enhanced if it be considered, that he has twice rescued the whole Syrian expedition (*in its existing shape and strength*) from a perhaps temporary but certainly very decided failure, notwithstanding all the elements and chances of success so lucidly indicated beforehand by Lord Ponsonby.

Sir Charles Napier prevented this mishap: first by dissuading Admiral Stopford from reembarking the troops at Djouni in September last, and secondly by gaining the victory of Calat Meidan against the repeated and written orders of Admiral Stopford and General Smith, both of whom, *without having even reconnoitred the ground*, pronounced the operations over-hazardous, and ordered the Commodore to retire.

Now the retreat on the 10 October was tantamount to the surrender or destruction of the corps of Omer Bey and the Emir Beshir Cassim, who since the 9 at night were manoeuvring in the rear of the enemy.

Nothing could have saved them, and the result of the operation of Calat Meidan, instead of 3000 Egyptian prisoners, would have been 3000 Turkish troops and partisans taken prisoners, the reestablishment of Ibrahim Pasha's *moral* force (for till then he never had been beaten *in person*) and again as a necessary and unavoidable consequence, the temporary failure of the campaign.

It has already been observed that the period of Sir Charles Smith's command has been, with the exception of the attack on Acre¹ (prescribed in Downing-Street) of an essentially defensive character, and since opinions on probable consequences of supposed military movements can only lead to useless controversies, it is quite superfluous to enter into any calculations if or if not, between the 10 or 12 and the 30 November (taking into consideration the scale of our former victories) Ibrahim Pasha with about 10,000 men and 12 guns, might or might not have been driven from or beaten at Zachlé.

There were for this purpose disposable within 2 days' march from Zachlé 12,000 Turks and 30 guns with 4 to 5000 mountaineers ready to act with them, and if the operation succeeded, it might have led to the insurrection of Damascus and to the successive destruction or surrender of the retreating columns of the Egyptian army coming from the Taurus and Aleppo under Ahmed Menikli Pasha.

¹ One half of the Turkish troops sent to Acre were originally destined up to the 30 October to be embarked for Latakia and Scanderoon, and had actually been ordered to be ready for embarkation on that day for those places.

But a certainly remarkable fact, as characteristic of the plans of that whole period, and which might be qualified as defensive "par excellence" occurred on the morning of the 4 November after the occupation of Acre, when General Jochmus proposed to Sir Charles Smith, to induce the British Admiral to send two ships or frigates and a steamer on Jaffa, in order to receive the apparently certain submission of that small fortress and of an Egyptian regiment in Palestina.

Sir Robert Stopford refused to accede to this proposition on the extraordinary plea that "he did not want any more prisoners."

The undersigned reported this circumstance at the time to Lord Ponsonby (in a dispatch of the 13 November) and it is necessary to record it here, because, altho' Jaffa and the regiment of Infantry surrendered soon afterwards, (*without any force* being sent down) yet part of a regiment of Cavalry from Acre could make good its retreat with 8 field pieces by the Jaffa road on Gaza, where they were more than a month afterwards reinforced by about 2,800 Cavalry, and some irregular foot sent from El Arish.

The presence of this forces prevented the stores of the Egyptians at Gaza from falling into the hands of the mountaineers in the course of November last, and since the later operations of Ibrahim Pasha, when retreating from Syria, and the arrangement of Captain Fanshawe R. N. with Mehemet Ali to allow steamers to go to Gaza, were in a certain measure based upon the existence of those magazines, it is as well to bear in mind by whose resolution these stores were allowed to remain in possession of the Egyptians.

It will then be understood, that the successor to Sir Charles Smith's command found existing on his accession a hostile and not unimportant element, which might have been destroyed long before.

Selim Pasha, Governor of Acre, offered several times in the course of November to drive the few Cavalry (not yet reinforced by the El Arish division) from Gaza, and to take the magazines, but Sir Charles Smith refused him the demanded permission to act.

Soon after this denial information was received at Beyrout on the 25 November from Constantinople, that in consideration of illhealth Sir Charles Smith was to give up the direction of the operations in Syria to General Jochmus, and an Imperial Firman to this purport was sent by the Ottoman Government to the Mustechar, Mohamed Selami Effendi, who reported the circumstance to Sir Robert Stopford.

The Admiral, desirous of maintaining Sir Charles Smith, declared, however, to the great amazement of the Mustechar that this change was inadmissible, and hinted or declared, in presence of the Austrian Admiral, that he would take the fleet away from the coast, if the appointment took place.

Mohamed Selami, very much frightened, declined all responsibility, kept the Firman secret, and referred the matter to Constantinople.

A loss of 22 days occurred until second and explicit orders transferred the command to General Jochmus on the 16 December.

In the mean time the British fleet had gone off to Alexandria and Marmarizza, leaving some steamers on the Syrian coast, which were subsequently reinforced again by a line-of-battle ship, and some light vessels under Captain Houston Stewart R. N.

Ibrahim Pasha had been allowed to concentrate 40,000 men and 150 guns at Damascus, whilst the Turkish army had been placed entirely on the defensive

viz. at Tripoli	84 men
„ Beyrout	5,896 „
„ Saïda	4,949 „
„ Sour (Tyrus)	1,000 „
„ Acre	4,096 „
„ Jaffa	627 „
„ Jerusalem	1,333 „
	<hr/>
	Total 17,985 men,

including artillery and sick.

So much so was this defensive absolute, that not a single mule was collected by the Commissariat, nor more than 10 guns ready to take the field for want of transport.

It was, however, evident, that in the uncertain state of the negotiations pending since the originally rejected convention of Commodore Napier, that Ibrahim Pasha would try to do one of two things: either remain at Damascus, or march on Gaza where provisions were allowed to be sent in conformity with Captain Fanshawe's permission granted to Mehemet Ali.

In the first case 40,000 men and 150 guns would have returned to Egypt, had the late convention of London received its execution with Ibrahim Pasha's forces intact at Damascus, — and it may be deducted from the attitude which Mehemet Ali assumes *now*, that a crippled corps of 17,300 men has returned to Egypt, what would have been his pretensions and the consequent difficulties of the Allies, if instead of these poor remains, an intact corps of 40,000 men had come home.

In the second case Ibrahim Pasha would have penetrated into Palestine, ruining the country and bringing likewise away his army without great and material losses. Neither case could possibly have been avoided, had General Jochmus left the Turkish army distributed as he found it. — It was moreover known by an intercepted letter in possession of Mr. Wood that Ibrahim Pasha had gained over Mahmoud Bey, the Governor of Naplous, and other influential men of that place, and that he could at any time on his leaving Damascus establish himself in Palestine, make prisoners the completely isolated corps of 2000 Turks at Jerusalem and Jaffa, and support the negotiations of Mehemet Ali by a military attitude in Southern Syria quite safe for himself, since his retreat was secure, and alarming even offensively for his enemy.

To prevent the success of either of these two plans was the military and political obligation of General Jochmus.

However to effect his two objects he had only disposable 14 to 15,000 Turks in seven separate detachments, and 3500 light troops under the Emir Beshir Cassim, but if this latter had not become a secret adversary, he was certainly very far from being a warm friend and active partisan. He violently resented the neglect with which he had been treated by Sir Charles Smith, who had scarcely answered, or paid the slightest attention to his suggestions, quite in opposition to the judicious conduct in this respect of Commodore Napier.

If there could be the slightest doubt on the matter it would be dissipated by his violent language to Colonel Rose on or about the 24 December, reproaching the English with having abandoned him to his own resources in the most eminent danger in front of a very superior enemy at Zachlé.

To reconcile the Emir Beshir, to create instantly the means of transport for his troops and for at least 30 pieces of Artillery, to concentrate his army, passing from the defensive to the offensive system, augmenting its means of action by a "levée en masse" of the mountaineers and the Bedouin tribes — finally to repair or to mitigate the effects of the fault committed in November last, by leaving the magazines at Gaza in the hands of the Egyptians, were for General Jochmus the conditions of victory in this unequal contest.

They were felt on the 19 December, they were accomplished on the 6 January, and their execution led to Ibrahim Pasha's complete ruin by a loss of 22,700 men and 68 guns, when on the 17 January further operations became impossible in consequence of the convention of London.

Admiral Stopford had sent no instructions to General Jochmus, but in some communications to Captain Stewart, he directed the latter to *facilitate* the evacuation of Syria. — General Jochmus in conformity with his previous orders could only continue hostilities, and consider the return to Egypt of a large force as a most untoward event. — Hence occurred to pronounced a difference of opinion, that the General could not execute his plans (from the want of steamers, tho' they were on the coast) of attacking El Arish, and of occupying the pass of Beseyra south of the Dead Sea, both previous to the 17 January, which operation would have annihilated even the remains of the Egyptian army, and that was still further refused naval co-operation against Gaza.

The annexed Memorandum (*in french*) will show the details of this third and closing period of the Syrian war.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-General.

(Inclosure in No. 136.)

Mémoire sur les Opérations contre l'Armée d'Ibrahim Pacha à Damas.

Le commandement de l'armée Turque et la direction générale des opérations en Syrie ont été confiés au Général Jochmus le 16 Décembre 1840.

Les forces alliées alors sur une pure défensive ont repris l'offensive le 19 Décembre.

L'armée Turque était forte de

15,000 hommes d'Infanterie,
150 Lanciers,
3,500 hommes de troupes irrégulières,

18,650 hommes en total, ayant 30 pièces d'Artillerie, outre
300 Marins Anglais à Acre et 200 Marins Autrichiens en la rade de Beyrout.

La levée en masse ordonnée dès le 22 Décembre avait créé vers le 5 Janvier 1841 à peu près encore 5000 Fantassins et 2000 Cavaliers tous irréguliers.

L'armée Égyptienne comptait au moins 40,000 hommes dont 10,000 Cavaliers et 150 pièces d'Artillerie.

Les opérations actives ont duré 30 jours du 19 Décembre au 17 Janvier 1841, jour où la convention d'Alexandrie, modifiée à Londres, fut officiellement connue à Jaffa.

Dans cet espace de temps Ibrahim Pacha, malgré sa grande supériorité numérique, a été obligé de quitter Damas et ensuite forcé de changer deux fois sa ligne de retraite, d'abord à El Mézérib et ensuite dans les environs de Maan.

Ces trois opérations lui ont coûté en définitive 22,700 hommes et 68 pièces d'Artillerie.¹

Encore faut-il considérer qu'après le second changement de route près Maan, les débris de son armée, coupés de leur Artillerie et de leur Convois de munitions, revinrent à Gaza, à la débandade et sans moyens de résistance (excepté la Cavalerie qui, vu la force et la beauté de ses chevaux, avait moins souffert).

Arrivant à différentes reprises du 20 au 31 Janvier ces 3 ou 4 divisions, séparées par plusieurs journées de marche, complètement isolées et sans leur Général-en-Chef, qui ne parut à Gaza que le 31 Janvier, eussent été obligées de se rendre à l'armée Turque (renforcée vers le 22 Janvier de 3500 hommes de Cavalerie régulière, arrivés du Nord), réunie en *un seul corps* à une journée de marche de Gaza, si dès le 17 Janvier on n'avait suspendu les hostilités en vertu de la Convention de Londres.

¹ D'après les états du Général Jochmus il est passé par Maan et Gaza le 31 Janvier 21,500 hommes, mais d'après les Rapports de l'Ambassade d'Autriche il n'en est arrivé en Égypte que 17,300 hommes et 82 canons.

Parmis les causes et les effets du désastre des forces Égyptiennes on fera ressortir les détails suivants :

La résolution d'Ibrahim Pacha d'abandonner Damas le 29 Décembre sera toujours considérée comme la cause principale de ses malheurs, — car s'il y était resté jusqu'au 17 Janvier, son armée était sauvée.

Dans l'état incertain des négociations les ordres de son père n'étaient pas absolus et ne pouvaient l'être ; au demeurant Ibrahim lui avait déjà disobéi une fois, et la preuve indubitable qu'il n'a pas considéré lui-même l'évacuation de Damas comme l'effet d'une convention ou d'une capitulation, est qu'il n'a entamé aucune négociation pacifique avec le Général ennemi et qu'il a préféré marcher de Mézérib par le Désert, — malgré les pertes certaines qu'il devait prévoir, plutôt que d'essayer même de s'ouvrir, en négociant, la route de la Palestine.

Sous le rapport politique rien n'aurait justifié, dans la position du Général Jochmus, la cessation des hostilités en Syrie, attendu que *les premières* instructions de la Porte, basées sur les négociations d'Alexandrie, ne lui sont arrivées que le 17 Janvier, et ce jour même tout mouvement offensif a cessé.

Considérant la question sous ce point de vue le Général turque devait tâcher d'abord de manoeuvrer de manière à forcer l'armée Égyptienne de quitter Damas, en second lieu le devoir militaire voulait qu'il rendît sa retraite aussi désastreuse que possible.

Les mouvemens de l'armée et la levée en masse des populations de la Syrie méridionale et centrale, du Hauran et des tribus du Désert ont été dirigés vers ce double but.

Ibrahim Pacha sorti de Damas avait distribué 15 jours de vivres à ses troupes dans l'intention de marcher par la Palestine sur Gaza, en suivant la route de Djenin et de Ramleh longue de 13 à 14 journées.

Prévenu dans les défilés de Djenin, où toutes les forces de son adversaire, au nombre de 15,000 hommes d'Infanterie avec 9 à 10,000 irréguliers et 30 pièces d'Artillerie, auraient pu lui offrir une action générale, il a été obligé d'abandonner son projet à El Mézérib, où se bifourquent les routes du Désert et de Djenin en Palestine.

Le mouvement du Général Égyptien étant bien prononcé vers le 6 Janvier dans la direction de Maan dans le Désert, où il y avait un dépôt de vivres considérables, établi par les ordres de Mehemet Ali à l'époque de la prise d'Acre, la principale chance d'une retraite, qui ne fût pas une déroute complète, reposait sur l'existence de ces vivres à Maan.

C'est là exactement la raison qui engagea le Général Jochmus à envoyer de Jérusalem le 9 Janvier son Aide-de-Camp le Baron Du Mont pour détruire ces magasins.

L'expédition réussit par la rapidité extraordinaire de la marche et grâce à l'imprévoyance des Égyptiens.

Dès-lors l'Artillerie et les munitions d'Ibrahim Pacha marchant vers l'Égypte, furent coupées du reste de l'Armée qui, entourée et harcelée sans cesse par les tribus Arabes du Désert, rebroussait chemin vers Gaza,

où elle arriva, — réduite de moitié, — complètement désorganisée et sans munitions, — à différentes époques du 20 au 31 Janvier 1841.

La cessation des hostilités dès le 17 Janvier empêcha que ses débris ne fussent faits prisonniers de guerre.

Tels sont les traits caractéristiques d'une campagne plus décisive encore que rapide; son tableau général sera plus complet, lorsqu'on y aura compris les deux actions partielles de El Maïshdal (à trois heures au nord de Gaza) et de Reyha près l'ancienne Jéricho.

Dépuis le 7 Janvier l'armée Égyptienne marchait par le Désert dans la direction de Maan. Elle pouvait donc prendre trois partis :

- 1 arriver par Jéricho et le nord de la Mer Morte sur Gaza;
- 2 marcher sur le même point par le sud de la Mer Morte;
- 3 marcher droit sur l'Égypte par Maan et Suez.

Les dispositions de l'armée Turque furent prises en conséquence dès le 11 et 12 Janvier — 13 bataillons sous Hassan Pacha à Jérusalem observèrent le Jourdain pour le 1^{er} cas, 10 bataillons et 2000 chevaux sous Selim Pacha à Jaffa et Ramleh observèrent Gaza pour le 2nd cas et tandis que le reste des troupes arriva successivement en ligne, l'expédition du Baron Du Mont marchait sur Maan pour le 3^{ème} cas.

Cette disposition avait l'avantage de permettre, en cas de besoin, de réunir toutes les troupes par une seule marche, éventuellement de 6 ou de 12 heures.

Jusqu'au 13 Janvier on se trouvait, au Quartier Général de Jaffa, — sans nouvelles positives sur la direction de marche d'Ibrahim, mais s'il prenait la route du nord ou du sud de la Mer Morte, il pouvait arriver vers le 18 Janvier sur Gaza, où il y avait déjà un corps venu de El Arish de 3200 hommes de Cavalerie avec 600 Fantassins et 18 pièces d'Artillerie.

Sous ces circonstances il était avantageux de chasser ce corps isolé de Gaza, de brûler les vivres qui s'y trouvaient, et de retourner à Jaffa pourvu que l'opération put se faire dans 3 jours ou 3 jours et demi, c'est à dire jusqu'au 16 ou 17 Janvier, par la division de Selim Pacha, couvert sur sa gauche par Hassan Pacha, qui resterait en observation du Jourdain.

L'opération toutefois eût été très dangereuse plus tard du 18 au 22 Janvier attendu que l'armée Égyptienne ou du moins toute sa Cavalerie eût pu arriver à cette époque à Gaza, ce que eut lieu effectivement.

Or il avait été de principe dans cette campagne de n'exposer, *en pleine*, la jeune Infanterie Turque à une action générale avec la bonne Cavalerie Égyptienne.

La division de Selim Pacha se mit en mouvement le 14 Janvier et campa le 15 à El Maïshdal ayant cependant mis deux journées pour faire 9 heures de route, vu l'état affreux des chemins, rendus impraticables par les pluies incessantes de 72 heures.

Une reconnaissance de l'ennemi fut repoussée avec perte.

L'opération ne devenant plus praticable dans le *terme voulu de 3 jours*, Selim Pacha reçut ordre le 16 Janvier de laisser sa Cavalerie à El Maïshdal et de retourner avec l'Infanterie et l'Artillerie à Jaffa. — Le Quartier Général s'y rendit également le 16 Janvier et le 17 au matin y arriva la nouvelle de la paix.

En attendant Ibrahim Pacha en personne, à la tête de sa garde, avait passé le Jourdain vers Jéricho le 14 Janvier pour marcher par Reyha et El Chalil sur Gaza.

Hassan Pacha se porta à sa rencontre le 15, mais aussitôt les Égyptiens repassèrent le fleuve en grande hâte et désordre, perdant 1000 hommes, toutes leurs munitions et beaucoup de bagages.

Ibrahim s'enfonça de nouveau dans le Désert et ne parut à Gaza que le 31 Janvier, 11 jours après l'arrivée de sa première colonne composée de la Cavalerie sous Ahmet Menikli Pacha, et 15 jours après la pacification.

Constantinople 12 Mai 1841.

A. Jochmus.

Extracted in the Levant Papers III, 166.

137.

NOTE.

Constantinople 12 Mai 1841.

Le Mémoire inclus démontre les résultats de la dernière partie de la guerre Syrienne, depuis que la direction en a été confiée au soussigné.

Ibrahim Pacha dans le courant du mois de Décembre passé, devait se décider à faire de deux choses l'une: ou rester à Damas et y attendre le résultat des négociations, ou bien marcher sur Gaza par la Palestine.

D'après des informations certaines et des lettres interrompées, il paraissait s'être décidé pour cette dernière alternative, mais l'exécution de chacun des deux projets aurait été très nuisible aux intérêts de la Porte et des Alliés.

Dans le premier cas Ibrahim Pacha, d'après la Convention connue depuis à Jaffa le 17 Janvier 1841, aurait pu ramener intactes les forces qui lui restaient encore à Damas: savoir 40,000 hommes et 150 pièces d'Artillerie.

Dans le second cas, il aurait conduit son armée en Palestine pour l'y établir et aurait pu soutenir par une bonne attitude militaire les négociations de Mehemet Ali; dans l'un et l'autre cas enfin le retour en son pays d'une armée considérable aurait infiniment haussé les prétensions du Pacha d'Égypte, si l'on juge d'après celles, qu'il établit depuis bien qu'il n'y ait que des débris qui soient revenus en Égypte.

Au demeurant l'évacuation conventionnelle de la Syrie eut été un acte diplomatique, tandis que c'est aujourd'hui un fait purement militaire,

circonstance bien décisive sous le rapport moral et matériel de la campagne.

(signé) A. Jochmus,

Lieutenant-General.

Note pour

l'Internonce d'Autriche 12 May,

le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie 29 May.

138.

COMMODORE NAPIER TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received Constantinople 23 May 1841)

Her Majesty's Ship "Powerful", Malta
29 March 1841.

Sir,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8 February, and in reply beg to observe that Captain Stewart and the British officers give a very different account of the state of the Egyptian army to what you do, and also of the facilities given to Ibrahim Pasha to evacuate Syria by the Turkish authorities.

In Captain Stewart's letter to you dated the 12 January¹ he distinctly says that you avowed, in the presence of General Michell, your intention to annihilate Ibrahim's army, and if possible, prevent a single Egyptian getting back to his country, and in fact you did advance on Gaza in face of a protest from General Michell and Captain Stewart, and then retired contrary to the opinion of General Michell.

In your letter to the Serasker of the 21 January² you inform him that Ibrahim's magazines had been destroyed at Maan, that his army was cut in two, and that 150 guns are *véritablement* in your power, and that in consequence of official and secret orders, read at a Council, Ibrahim could only be permitted the choice of two conditions, viz.:

1st "De marcher sur El Arish par le Sud de la Mer Morte, ou bien sur Suez avec les hommes, armes et moyens de transport qu'il possède à présent."

2nd "De venir en détachements de 3000 hommes par Gaza sur El Arish, en laissant en nos mains ses canons, en considérant la grâce qui lui est accordée de poursuivre ce chemin, pourvu qu'il laisse tous les Syriens dans leur pays."

Mr. Wood also writes that in obedience to secret orders from the Porte, if he is weak, these conditions ought to be imposed upon him, by what authority he gave any opinion at all, I am at a loss to guess

¹ vide No. 104.

² vide No. 95.

— he was simply the Vice-Consul at Beyrout. There is nothing either in the Convention, or in Sir Robert Stopford's orders authorizing the imposing of such conditions, on the contrary he was permitted to embark if he thought proper. Had Ibrahim Pasha been allowed to retire quietly from Syria, which was the intention of the Allies, the misery and loss of life both to the Syrians and Egyptians would have been spared, and I am sorry to be obliged to observe that the sole object of the Turkish authorities appears to have been not to facilitate Ibrahim's retreat, but on the contrary to destroy his army. Reshid Pasha acknowledged to Captain Stewart and Colonel Bridgeman that he had sent orders to you to demand his guns, and in case of a refusal to attack him, but after seeing the efficient state of the Egyptian army, particularly the Cavalry, he went himself with an escort and fortunately arrived in time to contradict his orders. I say fortunately, because from all I have heard from the British officers who were there, had the Egyptian army been attacked, so far from dispersing at the sound of a few drums as you observe, they were in a condition supported by their numerous Cavalry to have annihilated the Turkish army, but even had the contrary been the case, I cannot understand that destroying the Sultan's subjects whether Turkish or Egyptian would tend to strengthen the Turkish Empire, fortunately for Turkey, as will be seen ere long, notwithstanding the impediments thrown in the way of Ibrahim's retreat, it was effected with great judgment, and the 150 guns which were reported to have fallen into the hands of the Turks, arrived safe at Cairo.

I have the honour to be, Sir, &c.

Charles Napier,
Commodore.

139.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COMMODORE SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

Constantinople 24 May 1841.

Sir,

I only received yesterday your letter dated Malta the 29 March. On my part it would perhaps be more graceful to cease altogether a correspondence that can lead to no practical utility, events having placed most of the questions alluded to beyond the reach of controversy.

Neither does my position admit of an elucidation of some of their details, but lest my silence may be construed into acquiescence, I have considered that without indiscretion I may venture to offer some observations of a nature to correct conclusions deduced from erroneous reports or supposed facts.

A campaign is the best judged by its results, and I have been enabled to transmit to Sir Robert Stopford reports that have long ago determined the value of the exertions on the supposed strength and efficiency of Ibrahim Pasha's army returning or returned into Egypt.

The annexed copy of a statement of the Austrian Embassy is one of the documents that have been communicated to the Admiral commanding-in-chief.

To Captain Stewart's R.N. military dissertations the enclosed answer to that officer dated Jerusalem 25 January may be deemed a correct reply.

The two objects which I had and must have had in view from the moment that His Imperial Highness the Sultan entrusted to me the direction of the operations in Syria, were first to oblige Ibrahim Pasha to abandon Damascus, and afterwards to render his retreat as disastrous as possible.

They were in fact the necessary consequences of any system which had not for its basis the actual capitulation of the Egyptian forces at Damascus, or a cessation of hostilities, and as Ibrahim Pasha did not leave Damascus in consequence of a convention, or in fact of any known and definite pacific arrangement, he had no right to expect, nor did he anticipate from his dispositions in the field, and from the depredations committed during his march any thing short of a continuation of hostilities.

Of conventions all that was or could be known to Ibrahim Pasha, and to myself, was limited to the fact that yours of November last had been rejected, and consequently up to the 17 January, when the first pacific instructions from the Porte were received at Jaffa, there could be no question of ceasing operations. At that time, however, Ibrahim Pasha had already lost 18,500 men, and his army was totally disorganized.

The movement upon Gaza was made to complete the destruction of the Egyptian stores on the enemy's line of retreat.

But it is perfectly unnecessary to dwell here upon my operations at Maishdal, the commander-in-chief is alone responsible for his plans and their execution, as from the varied and numerous means of information that he possesses, he alone can correctly estimate from time and circumstances how *far* and how *long* an enterprise is prudent, and in conformity with the fundamental principles of war. Thus officers not in that situation, whatever may be the degree of their capacity, can only take partial and imperfect views on the general combination of a campaign; but the history of the Syrian war or the discussion of its plans is foreign to the subject of the present communication.

Speculations on the march of future events open a wide and extended field for conjecture, and to the hallucinatory action of distempered imagination, for under the latter category I must certainly be permitted to rank the imaginary orders you state to have been sent me by Reshid Mehmet Pasha to attack Ibrahim Pasha's army, since I never

did receive any instructions of the kind from any military authority in Syria at the period you allude to, and much less from Reshid Pasha who, as one of my subordinate officers, you must be aware could in no possible manner have issued orders to me.

I have already observed to you on a former occasion that after the 17 January no hostilities took place between the Imperial and Egyptian troops, but I also beg most distinctly to repeat that in conformity with my letter to Zacharias and Hussein Pashas dated Jaffa the 21 January 1841, Ibrahim Pasha would unquestionably *not* have been permitted to march by the north of the Dead Sea upon Gaza, that is he would not have been allowed to *return* into Syria *after* having once evacuated it without laying down his arms.

Whether the Turkish army were in a state to enforce these conditions, may be a matter of opinion. I have already observed that hypothetical discussions are singularly ill-timed, and perhaps in equally bad taste on either side after a victorious campaign, in which an army of 40,000 men and 150 guns at the lowest estimate experienced a loss of 22,700 men and 68 pieces of Artillery, inflicted by a force of scarcely 18,000 men and 30 guns, and at a moment too when the conduct of its commander has received the unqualified approbation of the sovereign, certainly the most interested party in the contest, and probably the best or at any rate the only responsible judge of whether the Egyptian army of Mehemet Ali were to be considered as the loyal subjects of the Sultan, and as an element of strength, or as a cause of division and weakness of his Empire.

I have the honour to be, Sir, &c.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-General.

140.

ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD TO GENERAL
JOCHMUS PASHA.

"Princess Charlotte" at Malta
1 March 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters as per margin with the various documents therein referred to, detailing your proceedings in the command of the Ottoman forces in the late operations in Syria and the happy termination of the campaign by the entire evacuation of the Egyptian troops, in the number of which there appears however a discrepancy between Your Excellency's account, stating them to be 21,500, and that of Colonel Bridgeman by Lieutenant Alderson's estimate which makes them 30,000, a difference which

I am not able to reconcile, but which perhaps may not be difficult to explain.

I have great reason to be satisfied with this fortunate termination of the warfare in Syria and I have to inform you, that I have transmitted copies of all your communications to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have the honour &c.

Robert Stopford,
Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief.

141.

ADMIRAL SIR R. STOPFORD TO GENERAL JOCHMUS PASHA.

(Received Constantinople 25 May 1841.)

"Princess Charlotte" at Malta
16 May 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21 of April with its inclosures — containing the Austrian statement of the Syro-Egyptian forces, and if, as you say, you consider me as Commander-in-chief by land as well as sea after I left the coast, the tone and manner of your reproof is in my opinion anything but becoming an officer under my orders, and a little patience might perhaps have put you in possession of my general acknowledgement of the 1 March, by the "Wasp", of your letters from the 13 January (to the 15 February) acquainting you I had forwarded copies of the whole to the Admiralty for the information of the Government.

It is not for me to praise or blame transactions of which I cannot judge, *that* I left to a higher power, the Government, from whom you will no doubt receive the due meed of approbation according to your merit. Your letter of the 20 March I afterwards received and forwarded its contents as I do the present, to the Admiralty; and the reason you had not a direct acknowledgement for that, was my not knowing where to address you.

For all this details I am very much obliged to you; — a misunderstanding seems to have arisen from your having had secret orders, of which those acting with you were for some time ignorant, and such a circumstance was of itself enough to destroy confidence and all good understanding.

I have the honour to be

Your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant

Robert Stopford, Admiral.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD
at Malta.

Constantinople 28 May 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 16 May, and of another dated Malta 1 March.

The latter arrived here only on the 24 instant, and I am therefore at a loss to know how it could have been sent by the "Wasp" since *that vessel* arrived at Beyrout, several days *before* my departure on the 4 April, from that port; after I had made particular inquiries for any letters by her.

Your Excellency had received my dispatches up to the 2 February on the 16 of the same month at Malta, those up to the 15 February before the 1 March, and my final report dated Beyrout 10 March (not 20), in which I am not aware to have mentioned to Your Excellency, that I was to leave Syria, will have reached you about the 18 March, since it left *direct* for Malta by Captain Stopford, in a British steamer.

I found that the "Wasp" had returned without an answer, I found at Marmarizza on the 6 April two mails from Malta, with letters up to the latter days of March, and it was only after having waited in Constantinople for the return of the Austrian steamer from Beyrout, which left that place on the 12 April, subsequently to the arrival there of the *above two* mails, that I took the liberty to address to your Excellency my letter of the 21 of April, being by that time 9 weeks without a reply to the first series of my dispatches. and nearly 5 to the last.

I enter into these details with the view of assuring Your Excellency, how much more agreeable it would have been to me, not to be obliged to write at all on this subject.

With reference to the discrepancy in the numbers of the Egyptian forces returned home Your Excellency observes in your letter of the 1 March that it is

"a difference which you are not able to reconcile, but which
 "perhaps may not be difficult to explain".

I must regret that the expression of a doubt in a public letter should have been deemed necessary, when it is considered that a commanding General has numerous and various sources of corroboration and information, whilst the means of observation of detached officers, particularly where they depend chiefly on Dragomans, must naturally be very limited and imperfect.

The documents which I have since had the honour of transmitting to Your Excellency will have cleared up all dubious points.

I beg still to enclose a second report to the Austrian Embassy on the Egyptian forces communicated to me this day. — I have reason to consider it as derived from very authentic sources, and if it confirms the statements on past events, it is not less interesting at the present moment, as it enumerates the actual military forces of the Pasha of Egypt.

I have the honour &c.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-General.

(Annexed a copy of the Austrian report.)

(Inclosure in No. 142.)

AUSTRIAN REPORT.

*Reçu à Constantinople 31 May par Mr. Laurin, Consul Général
d'Autriche.*

Situation de l'armée avant les hostilités.

36 Régiments d'Infanterie complets	118,080
3 " de Garde	9,840
15 " de Cavalerie	11,880
5 " d'Artillerie de 12 Bataillons	12,000
2 Bataillons du Génie	1,600
2 Régiments d'Invalides	6,500

Troupes Turques irrégulières:

Cavalerie, Infanterie, Mogrebins	31,050
Artillerie Turque	9,850
Bedouins du Hedgias et Syrie	8,000
Marine	12,000
Total	221,460

Division de l'armée

en Égypte :

2 Régiments d'Infanterie	6,500
1 " d'Artillerie	2,400
3 " de Cavalerie	2,376
2 " d'Invalides	6,500
Artillerie Turque irrégulière	1,600
Cavalerie et Infanterie irrégulière	8,400
1 Bataillon du Génie	800
Total	28,696

au Hedgias :

0 Régiments d'Infanterie	32,800
1 Compagnie Chasseurs	84
1 Compagnie Vétérans	102
3 Batteries d'Artillerie	600
Artillerie Turque irrégulière	400
Cavalerie et Infanterie irrégulière	9,650
Bedouins du Hedgias	1,000
<hr/>	
Total	44,636

au Sennar :

3 Régiments d'Infanterie	9,840
Cavalerie Turque irrégulière	800
<hr/>	
Total	10,640

en Candie :

1 Régiment d'Infanterie	3,280
Artillerie Turque irrégulière	400
Cavalerie et Infanterie irrégulière	350
<hr/>	
Total	4,030

en Syrie :

23 Régiments d'Infanterie	75,440
12 " de Cavalerie	9,504
4 " d'Artillerie	9,600
Cavalerie et Infanterie irrégulière	21,000
Artillerie irrégulière	4,800
Bedouins de Syrie	7,000
<hr/>	
Total	127,344

Après l'évacuation de Syrie et du Hedgias :

Rentrés du Hedgias

10 Régiments d'Infanterie incomplets	15,000
1 Compagnie de Chasseurs	46
3 Batteries d'Artillerie	320
<hr/>	
Total	15,366

de la Syrie

5 Régiments d'Infanterie	16,400
2 Bataillons d'Infanterie	1,600
6 Régiments de Cavalerie	4,752
2 " d'Artillerie	4,800
Cavalerie et Infanterie irrégulière	5,200
Artillerie Turque	600
<hr/>	
Total	33,352

Troupes qui existent en Égypte après la nouvelle réorganisation du 15 Mars 1841:

12 Régiments d'Infanterie compris les 2 de Garde	39,360
2 Bataillons de Garde	1,600
2 Régiments de Vétérans	6,560
9 „ de Cavalerie	7,128
3 „ d'Artillerie	7,200
Troupes irrégulières Turques, Cavalerie et Infanterie . . .	12,600
Artillerie Turques	2,200
Marine	10,800
	Total 87,448

Les troupes qui étaient au Sennar et en Candie restent les mêmes.

Caire le 22 Avril 1841.

Le Vice-Consul d'Autriche:
(signé) J. Champion.

Levant Papers III, 467, 468.

143.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received Constantinople 24 July 1841.)

London 2 July 1841.

Sir,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24 of May enclosing one to Captain Stewart and a copy of a statement from the Austrian Consul at Alexandria.

As I have long ceased to have anything to do with the affairs of the East, it is unnecessary that I should now enter into its contents, I am, however, happy that fortune and victory declared for you, though I never knew that any action had been fought, and I have only to regret that the Sultan should have been so ill-advised as to have given directions to his officers to destroy 22,700 human beings (if the Consul's report is true, which I hope and believe is not correct) his subjects, without the least necessity, as under the convention they would have retired, had you never moved from your quarters.

I have the honour &c.

Charles Napier.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COMMODORE SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

Constantinople 31 July 1841.

Sir,

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 2 instant I have to observe to you, that the study of military history would have shown you that campaigns or periods of campaigns, without general actions, have often been more destructive by strategic combinations to one of the contending armies, than a series of battles without decisive results, and I ought to add that your quotation of a phrase in my letter to Captain Stewart (*not to you*) is at least ill timed, since you will be pleased to consider that my answer to that officer was necessarily written in a spirit in keeping with the unbecoming tone of his letter to me, for it is not my habit to extol my own actions, but much less could it be at any time my intention to put up with a want of proper courtesy.

I am further perfectly aware that *under the convention* Ibrahim Pasha would have retired from Syria, without my ever moving from my quarters, also that he would have brought back 40,000 men and 150 guns to Egypt, instead of 17,300 men and 82 guns — but as he happened to retire *before the convention*, my operations could only be shaped according to my instructions, and these instructions were not changed in consequence of your diplomatic victory at Alexandria, whatever you might have thought of the human and transcendant effects of *your* convention, which was not, however, at the time appreciated and acknowledged by any authority, British or Turkish, in the Levant.

Altho' contrary to your opinion Mr. Laurin's statement of the Egyptian force of 17,300 men returned home from Syria has been found correct and is corroborated from all sides, yet it is neither military nor just to infer from hence,

“that the Sultan has been so ill-advised as to give directions to “his officers to destroy 22,700 human beings, his subjects,”

because, according to my official returns, the loss of life is as follows:

Drowned at Jericho and other losses in action with the	
Mountaineers and Bedouins	1,500
Died from cold and disease (chiefly the 3,697 men who	
left Damascus already as invalids)	4,000
Total of troops	5,500

If Ibrahim Pasha like every human General would have done, had left those unfortunate 3,697 sick in their hospitals at Damascus, they would not have perished miserably on the road.

Of the remaining 17,200 men, who constitute the loss of Ibrahim Pasha since he retired from Damascus, the greater number are Syrians, Turks, and Kurds, who deserted his standards, as did also a great many

Egyptians, besides the prisoners made by the Hauranees and Bedouins of the Desert.

I have &c. &c.

A. JOCHMUS,
Lieutenant-General.

145.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Therapia 17 September 1841.

My Lord,

With reference to my letter of this date and my former communications to Your Lordship on the Syrian campaign, I must beg leave to call Your Excellency's attention to a dispatch of Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, dated Malta 19 February 1841, in which the Admiral reports my proceedings in Syria in the following terms:

"It appears, that the plan laid down by General Jochmus, in command of the Turkish army, was to drive Ibrahim Pasha from Damascus and to force him to retreat by the Desert in place of marching on Gaza, notwithstanding which Ibrahim Pasha reached Gaza on the 31 ultimo, by a détour to the southward of the Dead Sea, on which some skirmishing has taken place."

From the wording of this dispatch published in the III part of the Levant Papers (Inclosure in Nr. 166) laid before Parliament, the impression of every reader must be that my operation to force Ibrahim Pasha, to quit Damascus and to march by the Desert, has completely failed, whilst the fact is that it completely succeeded, because not only was Ibrahim Pasha obliged to abandon his projected line of retreat thro' Palestine on Gaza, on which line he would have found 3 millions of rations for his troops, but he remained 24 days in the Desert, lost half his army and Artillery by desertion or in the Desert, and his scattered columns arrived at Gaza at great intervals, partly with *our safe conduct*, in consequence of the convention which precluded all further operations.

These details were perfectly known to Admiral Stopford when he wrote the above dispatch, because the Admiral was then in possession of my dispatches describing the operations, yet His Excellency prefers making on the 19 February a statement the meaning of which no one can misunderstand, and my dispatches, tho' arrived at Malta on the 15 or 16 February, are kept back up to the 1 of March.

Also my closing dispatch, giving full details about the numbers lost of the Egyptian army, has not been transmitted to the Admiralty, or at least not in a manner that has led to its publication, and the returns of Mr. Laurin, the Austrian Consul General, to his own Embassy, giving

the details of the Syro-Egyptian forces, returned to Egypt, fully confirmatory in every point of my dispatches, have been equally suppressed, altho' I transmitted them officially to Admiral Stopford on the 20 April and 28 May.

From the suppression of the above documents, the opinion of every military man who reads the "Levant Papers, laid before Parliament" must be that my operation has been a failure, whilst the fact is that its success had been complete, that it has cost the enemy 22,700 men and 68 field pieces, a loss inflicted too by a force itself not above 20,000 men and 30 guns, without the assistance of the British fleet, because Captain Stewart was directed by the Admiral to *facilitate* the Egyptian retreat, although Your Lordship prescribed to me the continuation of hostilities as rigorously as possible, and although I see from the Levant Papers (Part. III Nr. 24 Foreign Office, 14 November 1840) that Lord Palmerston equally directs that

"Admiral Stopford should be informed that he is not in any degree to suspend his operations, or to relax his efforts, on account of the communication which he is instructed to make to Mehemet Ali, but on the contrary he should continue to push on with vigour his operations for the purpose of expelling the Egyptians from the whole of Syria, and he should not slacken in his exertions, till he learns from Constantinople that an arrangement has been made with Mehemet Ali."

Under these circumstances and finding that I had entirely acted up to the spirit of these prescriptions, seeing also that my operations have been misrepresented, I take once more the liberty of adverting to the obligation which the care of my military reputation imposes on me, of asking from the British Government a *public* acknowledgement of approval of my operations in Syria.

I have the honour &c. &c.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-Geueal.

146.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 6 November 1841.)

Lazzaretto Malta 24 October 1841.

My dear General,

I have the moment received your letter of the 12 enclosed in that of the 17 instant. — The last has given me unmixed pleasure in so far as it states the line of conduct you have reached to pursue, and shews me also that already there are evidences of probable success in

ending it. Your manners are calculated so to afford to your talents and acquirements the opportunity to display themselves, you will, I believe, be able to *win* the Turks over to the adoption of a system necessary to their own existence. I am certain that they cannot be *forced* to do any thing that it is right to be done in such matters as you have to deal with. It might be easy to force them to yield up a Province, or to disband an army, but it exceeds the power of all Christendom united to oblige them to bring a good system fully or at all into execution. *That must be done* voluntarily by them, or not at all. I admit that a man of your merit and who has already rendered them such great services, may naturally feel that his opinions ought be *sought for*, and when made known, treated with respect; but reason has little to do with the conduct of men so ignorant as the Turks are, and so presumptuous and such Turks as the Serasker and others, who have obtained the highest places and greatest authority in the Empire without the aid even of the smallest possible of the qualities that entitle men to be high placed.

If you had a cudgel, and could apply it to the head and feet of the fools and rogues, it might be the best instrument, but you have nothing of the sort. You will obtain one probably, if you succeed in effecting the amelioration for which you are willing to labour, and as the Sultan advances in years, he will see more and more clearly that his own best interests are intimately connected with your success. The end crowns the work. Success in every thing. Merit goes for little, till it has produced success so evident that it cannot be denied by the enviers of its author.

You will I think *gain* the men you have to deal with by your attention to them, and your care never to expose their ignorance, never to wound their selflove. The common rules of politeness direct every man to act so towards every body. I am sorry to hear things of that valuable and estimable man Walker, which indicate that he has allowed punctilios and feelings, mistaken for personal dignity, to operate upon his temper so as to have placed him in a false position with his Commander-in-Chief. — It never was intended that he should be Commander-in-Chief, it was intended that he should aid the Turks in amending their navy, not that he should have supreme power to direct the work. In all things a man should assure himself of his *real* position, and act accordingly. Vagueness in such things leads to failure, and of all counsellors selflove is the worst to advise a man in delicate affairs.

You have given me equal confidence and pleasure by the truly manly view you have taken of your position. The temple of honour is a mountain top and the ascent to it is rugged and fatiguing, and above all things demands patience. You may be beaten by the horrible duplicity and the intrigues you will have to encounter, but I anticipate really for you now that I feel assured of your perseverance. — Genius triumphs when it submits to do that which is *necessary*.

I am going to Naples direct. I shall remain there some considerable time, because Lady Ponsonby's health seems to me to require it. She has been again ill of fever, but thank God seems quite free from it now. You will direct to me there any letters you may do me the favor to write, and the more the better of them. I think they had best be under cover to Mister Rothschild. — Charles de Rothschild, the chief of the house there, is my old acquaintance, and he will I am sure take care of all letters for me.

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

If things should contrary to my expectation go ill, you will of course acquaint me with it, and then I will take the best means in my power to aid in applying remedies.

P.

147.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DE LACY EVANS TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 18 March 1842.)

Private. Extract.

London 12 February 1842.

My dear Jochmus,

I perceive by the papers that Sir Charles Napier said last night in the House of Commons that you had destroyed some thousands of Ibrahim's army in conformity with instructions to you from Lord Ponsonby, and in opposition to those of Lord Palmerston, which directed that Ibrahim should be allowed to retreat unmolested. — You are not amenable to English popular opinion or to opinions expressed in the English House of Commons, and in my opinion you need not be in the least displeased with this remark having been made — which, if it could have any little effect, must be that of being much more likely to be advantageous to you than the reverse. — The supposed business of a General is to destroy as many of his supposed enemies as possible — and if you have destroyed 20,000 of Ibrahim's people you will only be generally thought the better of, for having done so — and even if you had swerved a little from obedience to orders in doing so — and I do not hear that Napier is himself very celebrated for obeying orders.

It is not very improbable that I may reenter the House on a future opportunity — I doubt the present party being able to hold power so much as two years. — They will be compelled to add to taxation, and this will inevitably lead to their overthrow. — I am afraid your position

in Turkey must particularly at present be very precarious. — It is most highly honorable to you. — But I conclude you will see the necessity of the most watchful prudence, temperance, and forbearance with regard to your personal deportment. — So as to avoid, if possible (even if occasion require a sacrifice of feeling) giving umbrage to jealousy, either on the part of those under your direction, or of any of the national authorities, civil or military.

I shall be delighted to hear from you, and believe me, my dear Jochmus, very sincerely yours

D. L. EVANS.

148.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SIR DE LACY EVANS

at London.

Pera 18 March 1842.

My dear General,

I have not had the pleasure to write to you since the 31 January 1841, supposing that my letter had miscarried, or that from other reasons I had not been favoured with an answer, but I am very glad to hear that it reached you, and it is equally agreeable to me that you have found an occasion to write to me on the 12 February by the departure of Count Pisani. I beg to transmit the answer of Colonel Herman relative to your enclosure with reference to Captain Arbuthnot.

The object of Sir Charles Napier's motion in the House of Commons on the 11 February for the production of the correspondence on the Syrian War between Sir Robert Stopford, myself &c. &c., and relative to the instructions given to me and to Mr. Wood by Lord Ponsonby, can have only been brought on with a view to elucidate a *supposed* difference of instructions during the war of Lords Ponsonby and Palmerston to the commanding officers in Syria. — In all other respects that correspondence is only calculated seriously to injure Sir Robert Stopford, and I think that Sir Robert Peel acted with great discretion not to grant the production of those papers, for as a *Minister of the British Crown* he cannot wish to attack the Commander of the Allied forces during the Syrian war.

As for myself, I could desire no better than to see this correspondence published, for it would clear up many important points and the fact that my official dispatches were *suppressed* for more or less time, and that this *suppression* has thrown *temporarily* an erroneous light on Syrian affairs. It has strangely mixed spurious laurels with real glory, but it has gone to deprive me (tho' I dare say only temporarily) of

that just share of rewards which is and remains due to me, and the claim of which I shall never abandon, for reason is stronger than error, and truth in the end must conquer fallacy. Sir Charles Napier says that my troops have *destroyed* 20,000 or 30,000 of the Egyptian forces *after* the convention with Mehemet Ali.

If he really stated this in the House, as reported, I have only to observe that I wrote to him myself, on the 31 January 1841, that the Egyptian loss since the retreat from Damascus had been ascertained (by confronting all reports and especially those of the Austrian Embassy, with the data collected in Syria) to amount to 22,700 men and 68 guns, but that of those 22,700 men only 5,500 might be estimated to have *perished*, nearly 4000 of which were Invalids, forced by Ibrahim Pasha to quit the Hospitals of Damascus, merely that it might not be said that they had been made prisoners. I accounted for the loss of 17,200 men by desertion to the Sultan's standard, by dispersion to their homes, of the Syrians, Kurds, and Turks in Ibrahim Pasha's army, and by all those other causes (such as capture in the field &c. &c.) which reduce a retreating force *without provisions*.

The dispatches published in the Impartial (Smyrna newspaper) give all further details, and Sir Charles Napier must have known those details when he made his motion. The gallant Commodore certainly does not mean to blame me as a General for having caused these losses to an army of at least 40,000 men and 150 guns, whilst my own forces amounted to scarcely 20,000 men and 30 guns. But these identical losses have been *denied* till now, both by Sir Robert Stopford and Commodore Napier, for (at least in their self complimentary speeches) there is no allusion made that any such person as General Jochmus ever existed during the campaign of which Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Charles Napier were hitherto the sole heroes! —

It is true that the demanded correspondence would prove something beyond this mere fault of memory, it would prove that my dispatches have been suppressed, or that garbled extracts have been made of them.

Remains then to be seen if I have acted *contrary* to orders, or if Lord Ponsonby has given orders in discordance with those of Lord Palmerston, or finally if 20,000 or 30,000 lives have been uselessly sacrificed *after* the convention.

Hostilities have ceased in Syria from the hour that it was notified at the Turkish Head-Quarters of Jaffa that a convention had been concluded. This notification took place on the 17 January 1841. But it was *not* Sir Charles Napier's original convention, signed in Alexandria on the 27 November 1840. It was the changed and modified convention agreed to in London, and notified on the 17 January thro' the *Ottoman* Envoy at Alexandria to the *Ottoman* Authorities in Syria.

Sir Charles Napier's convention of the 27 November had been rejected *ab initio*, first by Sir Robert Stopford, and then by the Porte and the ministers of the four Allied Powers in Constantinople, and this

rejection had been officially notified to all concerned by the Porte and by Lord Ponsonby with orders to *continue hostilities*. Neither Ibrahim Pasha nor myself nor any other Commander did know or could know that a *valid* convention existed, and hostilities were continued both by the Egyptians and the Turks, until they were suspended on the 17 January in consequence of the *only then* notified and *alone* legal and official convention.

Between the 27 November and 17 January there existed (for the inimical Syrian armies) *no* convention whatever, and during that interval I executed in spirit and letter the profound, wise, and energetic instructions of Lord Ponsonby, and those instructions and their execution prevented that Ibrahim Pasha remained master of Damascus, and that he returned to Egypt with a powerful and unbroken army, or that (at his choice) he might have taken up a formidable position in the mountains of Palestine, with his rear and retreat secure.

The consequences of either of these three contingencies may be deduced from the reasoning in that hypotheses in the speeches of Mr. Thiers and Mr. Guizot at the opening of the French chambers now sitting.

Lord Ponsonby therefore judged the military question with sagacity and correctness, nor is his view impaired by the positive directions of Lord Palmerston, who with equal firmness signifies to the Lords of the Admiralty as late as the 14 November 1840 (Levant Papers Part III Nr. 24)

“that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be informed that he
“is not in any degree to suspend his operations, or to relax his efforts,
“on account of the communication which he is instructed to make to
“Mehemet Ali, but on the *contrary* he should continue to push on
“with vigour his operations for the purpose of expelling the Egyptians
“from the whole of Syria, and he should not slacken in his exertions
“till he learns *from Constantinople* that an arrangement has been
“made with Mehemet Ali.”

The instructions from Lords Palmerston and Ponsonby are therefore not in dissidence, on the contrary they are *identically* the same.

I have never received from Sir Robert Stopford *any* instructions *nor* orders, but, in the face of the precited instructions, the Admiral wrote to Captain Stewart to induce me to “*facilitate*” the retreat of the Egyptian forces, which I could not and would not do. — I therefore acted up to Lord Ponsonby’s instructions, on my sole responsibility, and in conformity with the Sultan’s Firman, and this responsibility was the heavier as Admiral Stopford was away in Marmarizza, with all the naval forces, except a couple of light vessels under Captain Stewart, who finished by refusing to co-operate with me. This resolution of Captain Stewart has been sent home and published in the Levant Papers, but my *answer not*. If I had been beaten, all the blame would have fallen on me, and with justice, but having obtained a great and glorious result, a proportionate reward from the Allied Powers is and from some (including

England) remains due to me, by the pure laws of equity, were it not by the military rule, which demands that the reward be given to the officer who takes the troops victoriously out of the field.

I am and uniformly have been the first to proclaim that the credit of gloriously opening the campaign belongs to Commodore Napier, all that I demand is, that he shall admit that I have well closed it, and he must and will do so whenever his anger will be over about my not having considered his original convention of Alexandria as the Mosaic tables of the law.

I see that I have written more pages than I intended, but I suppose that you take some interest in Oriental affairs, and I therefore do not apologize for the length of this letter in answer to your just observations about Sir Charles Napier's motion.

Believe me &c.

A. Jochmus.

149.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO R. C. MELLISH.

Private. Extract.

Pera 24 March 1842.

If the correspondence between Sir Robert Stopford, myself &c. &c. and the instructions from Lord Ponsonby, for which Sir Charles Napier moved in the House of Commons, on the 11 February had been produced, it would have seriously injured Sir Robert Stopford, for it would have proved the fact that my dispatches have been for a longer or shorter time *suppressed*, or that *garbled* extracts have been made from them, calculated to underrate the result attending my military operations by *unfair* means.

It is easy to calculate the military consequences of this undeniable fact for Sir Robert Stopford! —

But it is exactly because I can appreciate these consequences, that I am deprived of the means to urge directly my claims at Berlin and at Vienna, altho' my family connexions in the former and military friends in the latter place afford me every facility.

I do not like to attack before *third* parties the character of the British Commander-in-chief, but again I cannot honourably bend under open injustice.

You know too well yourself the real events of the Syrian campaign, as that it is necessary for me, seriously and at length, to refute the absurd statement of Sir Charles Napier that my troops have *destroyed* 20,000 or 30,000 Egyptians *after* the convention with Mehemet Ali.

To be sure, Napier does not mean to blame me for having caused these losses to Ibrahim Pasha, who had 40,000 men and 150 guns, whilst I had 20,000 men and 30 guns.

The Egyptian loss amounted to 22,700 men and 68 guns, but of those only 5500 men *perished*, and this loss was inflicted *before* the 17 January 1841; that is to say *before* anything was officially and legally known of any convention whatever, Napier's first convention had been *rejected*.

But the most curious feature in the whole transaction is, that these *identical* losses had hitherto been *denied* altogether for from Sir Robert Stopford's and from Commodore Napier's speeches and commentaries, it would fain appear that no such person as General Jochmus existed during the Syrian campaign. — How is it then that, after such an extraordinary lapse of memory, this poor man is all at once made responsible for the souls of 20,000 or 30,000 innocently sacrificed Egyptians?

A General may have acted right or wrong, according or against the instructions from a British Ambassador, or from a Turkish Minister, but at any rate he must have done *something*, in order to cause to his enemy a loss of 20,000 or 30,000 men, and hereafter it will not be thought neither noble nor fair to have (temporarily I dare say) tried to conceal his actions.

I have fully stated and proved in many dispatches to Sir Robert Stopford and Lord Ponsonby (vide those of the 17 September 1841 to the latter) that I have acted in entire accordance with Lord Ponsonby's directions (approved by Lord Palmerston), that I have acted on my own responsibility, and that this responsibility has been superior to any other General officer, that of Sir Robert Stopford excepted.

J.

150.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Private. Extract.

Pera 16 May 1842.

I have just had the honour to receive your two letters from Naples dated 24 April and 3 May. From the latter I learn that by this time you are en route for England. . . .

Captain Arbuthnot writes to me on the 20 April from England, with reference to the Syrian campaign:

"I have great pleasure and satisfaction in telling you, that your "valuable services in Syria are beginning to 'ooze out', and that all "impartial military men now give you full credit for having been the "means of causing an additional loss of 30,000 men to Ibrahim "Pasha, and thereby rendering Mehemet Ali almost powerless. Napier's "speech in the House of Commons has done you much good, public "attention has been called to General Jochmus."

I will take this occasion to call your attention, my Lord, to an article in the Westminster Review (April 1842) entitled "Fruits of the Syrian Campaign" and said to be written by Dr. Bowring.

The political part is a violent diatribe against yourself and Lord Palmerston, by an exultation of the fair, just, and statesmanlike proceedings of the French Ministers, the military part of the said article is "tout bonnement" nonsense, based upon an erroneous intermixture of facts and reports *previous* and *subsequent* to the decisive date of the 17 January 1841. — However, I am quite prepared to load myself with any blame for having executed Your Lordship's directions during that campaign, all that I fairly demand is, that the results of that campaign be *not concealed nor denied*. — I have been often abused during the Spanish wars, principally because I never took the trouble of enlightening what is called the public, but what in reality is a set of persons called reporters, who imagine that they must dine and drink at a General's table *gratis*, sub poena to abuse him if they do not.

All the abuse I earned in Spain did not prevent me from rising during the Syrian war, nor is it likely that the abuse of learned or ignorant scribblers will prevent me from rising higher, should a new war break out. — Much as I value the art of governing men by ideas in social relations, and powerful, and useful as the press becomes in this respect, I cannot find its utility in military matters, except in scientific discussions by competent persons on accomplished and well-ascertained facts. — The French papers had puffed up the military skill of Ibrahim Pasha and some of his Generals. — Mehemet Ali and France believed in their skill, but they paid dearly in the days of trial for having rated their Generals by the evaluations of the Marseilles and Paris newspaper correspondents.

Colonel Hodges writes to me that Sir C. Napier is about to publish a book on Syria.

I hope he will not ruin his reputation by indiscretions, but I do not see how he can state *facts* and *truths* without compromising living statesmen, and consequently his own future prospects and position, for what Minister of State could employ an Admiral or a General who afterwards goes and publishes his instructions, or his motives of action. — Napier's book will therefore be only a superficial "ex parte" statement, or it will ruin him in the eyes of every reflecting man. I hope and trust that it may be superficial, for after all the old Commodore is a gallant sailor, and a man of great resource and of genius. He has proved it in Portugal and Syria.

I have to say much to Your Lordship about the state of affairs here and in Syria, but I shall write it by Major Herman, whom I beg to recommend to Your Lordship's kind protection, he is a clever officer. . . .

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private. Extract.

Buyukdéré 8 September 1842.

I have read the book which Commodore Napier has lately published under the title of the "War in Syria", and I confess that the impression it has produced on me, is a regret that a man who has such unquestionably good and great qualities as a Commander, should have so little delicacy as to publish a similar work. It is evident that the *vulgar* praise of the *mob* and that *notoriety* of the day are estimated by Napier higher than the judgment of posterity and the true glory of history.

There is not the slightest doubt that every thing which the Commodore says about the conduct of Sir Robert Stopford, is intirely correct. I have not read the work with very great attention, as it contains nothing which is new to me, but I will warrant that every thing which occurred before Beyrout, at Saïda, and at Acre up to the beginning of the blockade of Alexandria, is exactly as stated by the Commodore, and a perfect idea of the Admiral's imbecility it must give to any person at all conversant with the Syrian war.

I was present at the scene when Captain Boxer's plan was being discussed to tow in succession before Acre the line-of-battle ships by steamers, and it finished by the Admiral's peremptorily declairing, on the night "which preceeded the attack, that the question was settled, and that he (Sir Robert Stopford) had adopted Captain Boxer's¹ view, and would hear of *no change*", notwithstanding which he acted the next day (tho' imperfectly and without giving clear instructions to his Captains) according to Napier's ideas, which were unquestionably the only safe and practicable ones.

I think Napier has treated the Admiral with *extreme leniency*, but I nevertheless should say, that he has acted very wrong to publish *already now* a work which discloses so many things compromising persons who have been and who are in high and responsible situations, and compromising the interests, and even to a certain degree the military honour of his own country, merely with a view to satisfy his own vanity. He should have borne in mind the just tho' not classic observation of Napoleon's "il faut laver son linge sale en famille" — but Napier like all radicals, his fit companions, is a slave to the *daily press*, and "*the press one day will destroy the discipline of the British Army and Navy*", if proper measures are not adopted to prohibit the present system, which tolerates the public criticism of campaigns and expeditions by subordinate officers, and even non-commissioned officers, whilst the operations are still going on, or immediately after their close.

¹ The late Admiral Boxer. 1855.

As far as a rapid perusal has allowed me to form a judgement, I am inclined to say that Commodore Napier describes every thing that occurred on the coast of Syria *up to his leaving* for Alexandria, with correctness, altho' he certainly is not very backward in allowing credit "*to himself*", but from the moment he has concluded the famous convention of the 27 November, his judgement is overruled by passion, and his book becomes full of recriminations, accusations, false inferences, and contradictions. He makes extracts of dispatches, cites reports "*in tribus*", and as he has no longer the responsibility of describing *himself* what he sees and observes with his own eyes, he may find an excuse for his own conscience by saying "I have only repeated what others have stated, or reported to me", knowing or concluding all the while what was wrong or correct, but *not wishing* to come himself impartially to the just evaluation of the facts.

He therefore throws a doubt upon every thing which does not fit *his* views, and lets it *rest* there, without proving or disproving what he cannot bring to throw the proper light on his own line of reasoning.

These literary tactics are not new, but they are not very creditable. They are exhibited daily in the newspapers.

Your Lordship will easily have perceived, if you have had the patience to read thro' Napier's work, that he wishes principally to prove two things:

1 that the military question was as good as settled, when Napier left the coast of Syria and concluded the Convention;

2 that Your Lordship committed a great fault in not inducing your colleagues, and in union with them the Ottoman Government, to ratify the Convention, which ratification would have saved the lives of ten thousand people, besides women &c. &c., uselessly and barbarously sacrificed thro' my instrumentality at Your Lordship's bidding, Your Lordship being only actuated by personal feelings against Mehemet Ali.

The best answer to this straine of reasoning are the speeches of M. Guizot and Thiers in the late French Chambers, who based *both* their hopes of obtaining favourable conditions for Mehemet Ali, and perhaps a part of Syria, on the presence in Syria of Ibrahim, with an efficient force, *only even* for the time that negotiations were going on.

Moreover fully as conclusive an argument against Napier's proceedings may be drawn from the fact that Mehemet Ali assumed *after* the ultimate arrangement on Captain Fanshaw's mission such a position, which might nigh well again have led to new coercitive measures, and hence perhaps to a serious misunderstanding with France, for who in common senses can admit that France might have made war against *four* powers, each of which individually is a match for her?

Now if Mehemet Ali had had an efficient army instead of one that was demoralized, broken up, and "*hors de combat*", would this circumstance not have augmented the chances of new collisions with

Mehemet Ali, and above all with France, collisions which the sapient Commodore pretends he has prevented?

But the most extraordinary part of Napier's reasoning is that, whilst he stoutly maintains on one side that in consequence of Your Lordship's orders, barbarously and inhumanly executed by me, 10,000 and more human beings (or 20,000 to 30,000 as he said for cant's sake in Parliament) have been uselessly sacrificed, yet in order not to allow *me* any *military* credit he pretends on the other side that the Turkish army has done no harm to Ibrahim Pasha, who has made (it is asserted) his retreat in a most masterly manner.

The Commodore therefore makes a very ingenuous but not quite correct distinction between the *Turkish* army and the *irregular* forces, which latter are to be understood as not to have belonged to the Sultan's forces, altho' they were all engaged in the *same* cause, and acted under *one* and the same Commander.

I confess that — as this Commander — I have hitherto been of the (what would appear erroneous) opinion that the Sultan's army, regular and irregular, had only operated against (and caused great losses to) a force, certainly in numbers much superior, but already demoralized, and conducted by Generals of very indifferent talents. Your Lordship may recollect what you told me in Therapia, before I left for Syria, that General Chranowsky, from his personal observation of Ibrahim Pasha's former operations, had formed also but a very low estimate of the military abilities both of Ibrahim and Soliman Pashas (Sèves), and I remember that Your Lordship pointed out this low estimate as one of the chances of success for the Allies in Syria.

I must therefore be very much flattered, indeed, to learn from Napier's book that the Egyptian army was in excellent order, and altogether efficient when it left Damascus, and that Ibrahim Pasha showed himself a great Commander during the retreat.

The Commodore, however, confesses a widely different opinion of Ibrahim's talents when this General was opposed to himself, and he points out, in the earlier part of the campaign, a number of palpable and great faults committed by his adversary, to which faults he might have added a good many more, than those enumerated. The contradictions of the Commodore are thus so evident, and they often approach so near to nonsense, both in a political and military point of view, that I must beg Your Lordship's pardon to have said as much as I did on the subject.

I have seen of late a good deal of Count Zichy, cousin to Princess Metternich. He has been this spring for several months in Egypt, and arrived here via Suez, Akaba, Jerusalem, Damascus by land to Smyrna.

He has promised me some details in writing on the retreat of the Egyptians from Syria, having followed himself some parts of their route, and having frequently conversed with Soliman Pasha and Sheriff Pasha, late Governor-General of Damascus and Syria.

The chief reproach which both these Pashas make to the Allies, is the distribution of fire arms to the Syrians. They maintain that in

consequence of this measure the Porte will never be able to restore tranquillity in Syria. Soliman Pasha stated to Count Zichy that the loss of Ibrahim's army retreating from Damascus by Gaza and Maan was of *Egyptian* troops *alone* twenty thousand men,¹ besides the Syrians who died or deserted.

This is much above my own estimate, but I knew at the time that I underrated the loss, as I often told Your Lordship; yet I think Soliman's numbers too high. — He admits also the loss of all his ammunition, and Count Zichy saw large quantities of Artillery ammunition still lying in heaps in different parts of the Desert. Soliman Pasha, however, pretends that he lost no guns, but I showed to Count Zichy the report of Mr. Laurin, and the Count admitted the usual correctness of Mr. Laurin's information, and more so in this case, considering that it would have been impossible for camels to *carry twelve* pounders, many of which were with the Artillery, and the rocky defiles of many parts of the road not admitting of the possibility of transporting Artillery by *draught*.

Napier must have known all these circumstances, as his son saw frequently Soliman Pasha and other people who could give him information, and I myself had sent Mr. Laurin's report to the Commodore. Yet he "*scarcely doubts*" that the Egyptian Artillery had arrived, and pretty clearly insinuates that it came all home safe and in good condition.

Of the loss of ammunition not a word! Soliman Pasha told Count Zichy that the sufferings of the army retreating from Damascus had been greater, than those of the French army driven back from Moscow, and he added:

"if you come upon my track you do not require to ask the road,
"you will find it by following the line of dead bodies."

Count Zichy told me that he actually found this description not overcharged, for during one day's march on the road to Akaba and two days' march from Akaba northward in the direction of Maan, he saw the roads and bivouacs of the Egyptian forces strewed with bleaching bones. —

I heard similar descriptions have been made by Lord Butler, and some reverend Gentlemen who had seen parts of the lines of retreat of other columns towards Gaza.

Mr. Samuel, who has also been in Egypt and Syria, and whom Your Lordship will soon see in London, corroborates the great losses of the Egyptians, tho' not to the extent of Soliman Pasha's evaluation, and the miserable plight of the force on its arrival at Gaza, contrary to the nonsense published by Napier on the state of efficiency of these troops at Gaza. — Soliman Pasha has told a great many people in Egypt that he had the offer of the Pashalic of Cyprus for life time, when he commanded the Division at Beyrout in September 1840, pro-

¹ dead, deserted, prisoners &c. &c. — in fact missing.

vided he would come over to the Sultan's cause. — All what I know about the matter is, that I recollect Your Lordship telling me on the 2 or 3 September in Therapia, that Soliman Pasha was quite ready to sell himself, and Napier said to me, alluding to this business, on the 10 September, that if he had had the disposal of ten thousand pounds, he might have finished the whole affair (meaning the Syrian war) without many blows. I observed to him that I very much questioned the influence of Soliman Pasha, and that his ability to bring over his Division appeared very doubtful to me.

On the 11 of October, after the battle of Calat Meidan, and after the many blunders committed by Soliman Pasha during the last month. I again adverted to the subject, and asked the Commadore what he then held of the value and talents of Soliman Pasha, and he answered "that he did not now care a d— for him". . . .

152.

MR. GEORGE SAMUEL¹ TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Extract.

Pera 27 October 1842.

I have no notes about the retreat of Ibrahim Pasha from Damascus to Cairo, but as far as my memory serves me, the results of the various conversations I had with many official persons, connected with both the Syrian and Egyptian armies, is the following:

Ibrahim Pasha, when he heard of the advance of General Jochmus and of his Head-Quarters being at Hasbeya, resolved after some hesitation on evacuating Damascus, as he feared disaffection on the part of his Syrian troops, and knew that the Egyptians had no stomach for further fighting.

Ibrahim's army consisting of about 60,000 men was formed into several Divisions —

At the end it was decided that the troops under Soliman Pasha and Ismael Bey (having with him Sheriff Pasha) should retreat across the Desert by Maan and Akaba, and from thence to Cairo.

They were put under the guidance of Abu-Saab, the conductor of the caravans from Damascus to Mecca.

Ismael Bey's Division (with Sheriff Pasha) conducting the women and children arrived at Maan two or three days before that of Soliman Pasha, and took from thence most of the stores which were in the magazines.

They left some portion behind them for want of means of transport, and these stores were burnt by Captain Du Mont at Maan.

Soliman Pasha's Division did not arrive at Maan until after Captain Du Mont had left that place.

¹ later Private Secretary to Lord Ponsonby.

Both Divisions left their guns at various places during the retreat, as from want of provisions they were obliged to kill the horses, camels &c., and to use the gun-carriages for fuel.

The loss of live in both Divisions, but particularly in that of Soliman Pasha, was appalling, and had not Ismael Bey taken with him most of the stores which were in the magazines at Maan, hardly a soul of his column would have got to Akaba.

Ibrahim Pasha himself took another route. He kept on the left bank of the Jordan down to Om Keis with the intention of crossing the river at Djeser Madjuma, and often throwing himself into the mountains of Naplous. In this attempt he was frustrated, so he continued his march on the left bank of the Jordan until he crossed that river at Jericho; but his retreat from thence to Gaza would have been cut off.

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(signed) George Samuel.

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APPENDICES.



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APPENDIX I.

BATTLE OF NIZIB

24 JUNE 1839.

I.

MEMORANDUM ON THE EVENTUAL WAR IN SYRIA

to be presented to the Sublime Porte (presented 28 May 1839), transmitted on the 13 June 1839 by order of the Sultan to the Serasker Hafour Pasha thro' Mehemet Ali Bey, to serve as basis of instruction in the Campaign of Syria.

Constantinople 12 April 1839.

In the present situation of the Sultan against Mehemet Ali the following propositions may be considered as correct with reference to the operations *by land*:

1 That the forces of the Imperial army under Hafour Pasha are equal or superior in number, but inferior in point of military instruction, and in the number of efficient officers, to the Egyptian troops in Asia.

2 That the spirit of revolt is considerably excited in the Syrian territories occupied by Mehemet Ali, but that discontent also prevails to a great extent in the Sultan's dominions of Asia minor (with this remarkable difference that the Syrians seem to be ready to rise at the mere approach of the Sultan's forces, whilst Ibrahim Pasha must obtain a decisive victory before he can expect to find active partisans in Asia minor).

3 That hence, if Hafour Pasha enters Syria, the insurrection of the mountain tribes will seriously embarrass Ibrahim Pasha, but that if the latter makes any considerable progress in Asia minor, the disaffection there existing, will obnoxiously affect the operations of the Sultan's General.

It is therefore evident that if, on one hand, it becomes of great advantage to Hafour Pasha to put himself in direct communication with the disaffected tribes of Syria, the chances of a general action, — in order to ensure this result, — fought in a *plain*, upon equal terms of number and ground — may be considered, on the other side, as unfavourable to the Imperial Commander-in-Chief.

In mountain battles it is an absolute rule to consider a defensive action as presenting the probable chances of success.

The object of Hafour Pasha's general manoeuvres should therefore be to occupy a strong mountain position on the borders, or in Syria

"to entrench it strongly, and to defy in this situation the attack of the Egyptians".

The inferiority of discipline and tactics becomes much less sensible if his troops have only to repulse an attack in a *position*, and his irregular forces in a mountain action will be of infinitely more use than they could be in a battle, fought in a plain, which it certainly will be the desire of Ibrahim Pasha to bring on.

In such a position Hafour Pasha would obtain comparative advantages:

- 1 He prevents Ibrahim from entering Asia minor, because the latter cannot abandon his communications, and leave *an intact* army behind him.
- 2 He fights upon very advantageous terms if the Egyptian General attacks him, and the Turkish Serasker may be victorious.
- 3 He can make numerous detachments of small moveable columns, and send with them influential chiefs to the mountain tribes to make the insurrection general, and direct it to one common object.
- 4 These small detachments and the Mountaineers will appear on the Egyptian line of communication, and cut off the convoys of provisions, ammunition, reinforcements &c. &c., and menace the enemy's depôts of all sorts.

Thus straitened for supplies and room, Ibrahim Pasha will very likely have to make a choice from between three evils:

Either to attack Hafour Pasha, or to make a general retrograde movement towards his magazines, or to detach strong bodies of troops to maintain his communication.

In the first case he runs the risk of defeat, in the second, the moral victory (immense with reference to the Syrian insurrection) is for Hafour Pasha, in the third supposition the reduced forces of Ibrahim may be attacked with better chances of success.

A general action fought, on the contrary, at the very onset of the campaign seems to present only disadvantageous chances, and victory, even obtained at a great risk, could scarcely ensure those results which eventually may be ripened merely from a well-calculated defensive operation, if it can be made in such a manner, as to obtain originally a safe

communication with the Syrian population opposed to Mehemet Ali's tyranny.

(signed) A. Jochmus.

NOTE.

7 July 1839.

The battle of the 24 June was fought in complete contradiction to these orders, Hafour Pasha having left a strong position in order to fight an offensive *general action* in the *plain* at the onset of the campaign.

(signed) A. Jochmus.

NOTE.

21 August 1839.

From what Baron MOLTKE, who was present at the battle of Nizib, told me, Hafour Pasha was extremely eager to fight, and it is much doubted by him and Baron von Vincke (who was with the army of Koniah), if he gave orders to Izzet Mehmet Pasha early enough, to join him in due time, being anxious to fight a victorious action *alone*. The orders transmitted through Mehemet Ali Bey, who left Constantinople on the 14 June (Friday) in a steamer for Samsona, seem to have arrived only on the 22 or 23 June by a Tartar, — Ali Bey himself arrived after the battle of Nizib. It is evident, however, from what these officers say, that even the general sense of the Sultan's previous orders to Hafour is that he was not to be the *open* aggressor in this campaign.

(signed) A. Jochmus.

2.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered 25 June 1839, Dardanelles.)

Therapia 21 June 1839.

My dear General,

We are all in the greatest alarm about the Sultan's health. The reports are very sinister. God grant that he may not be lost to his poor country just at the moment when he is most necessary to it. — I cannot learn the exact truth on the subject, but there is no room to

doubt that he is in a very dangerous state. Do not say this to the Pasha in its *full force*, but I should be glad if you should be able to give him sound ideas as to what ought to be done, were the Sultan to die.

The first thing would be to save the crown to the new Sultan from Mehemet Ali, and to do that and at the same time to save the country from being overrun by the nations of Europe, it will be necessary to take steps to keep the army and fleet in obedience to the Government, and to prevent any *violences* being offered to the Franks, what might be one of the consequences of the subtraction by death of that hand which has kept *all in order*.

An attack upon the Franks would bring about immediately the destruction of the Ottoman power.

Ahmed at the head of his fleet will be able to do much indeed, everything if he succeeds in Syria: where, I presume, he is going to disembark troops, and to engage the Druses and Mountaineers of Lebanon to join in hostilities against the Egyptians. — You may tell him in confidence that Russia will not be *permitted* to interfere *alone* in the affairs of Turkey, but that if Russia pretends to take any part, the other great powers, England, France, and Austria will also interfere, and then Russia will lose all her influence, because she is not able to oppose them, nor perhaps able to oppose one of them viz. England, even were this country alone in her efforts.

His (the Pasha's) business is to be *Turkish*, to be a Turk, and nothing else — if he makes himself a partizan he will become nothing ere long except the object of the vengeance of the strongest, and Russia cannot be that.

Why is he waiting his time? Why is he not at sea making his sailors good for something? Send him off!

I hear good accounts from the Syria, at least so far good as concerns the supply of Hafiz Pasha with money and provisions, so that he may, if he *will*, follow the plan of campaign chalked out for him. — But I fear that he like all the other ignorant Pashas will think that everything consists in fighting a battle, it was such folly made the fortune of Ibrahim Pasha at Koniah, and such folly occasioned all the defeats of the Turkish armies from the days of Prince Eugene down to the last opportunity offered for playing the fool. — With respect to our plan, the opinion I have is, that it becomes more to be desired in proportion as the danger to the Ottoman monarchy encreases — and it may be the means (if executed) of keeping the throne for the legitimate successor of the Sultan.

I have letters from Samuel and from Captain Conelly, who have just left Broussa. They say that they find a strong impression made in the mind of the *Asiaticks* in favor of Mehemet Ali by the fact of his being the Guardian of the Holy City — (which he is in virtue of his being a rebel). These Asiaticks say that the Sultan ought not to attack the Guardian of the Holy City!!!

You may tell this to Ahmed Pasha, because it will shew him how necessary it is to put down Mehemet Ali, if it is desired to preserve the Sultan and the Ottoman family.

I hear the Prussian officers are about to leave the Head-Quarter of Hafiz Pasha, some say they are recalled by their own Government — others that they have quarreled one with the other, and that Hafiz to get rid of them has had them removed. I do not know if any credit be due to any of these reports.

We are in great uneasiness here, for it is an alarming crisis. — I have proposed a plan of action to be followed by England, Austria, and France in the case of the Sultan's death, which will, I am sure, effect all the purposes we any of us have a right to aim at, provided it be acted upon with the least vigour. — I, however, flatter myself that circumstances will *force* those Governments to act with energy.

The triumph of Russia in Servia has been complete, and Milosh has been in fact deposed by the new senate choosen and created by Russia. — This triumph is, I think, an illjudged thing on the part of Russia, it shews to the whole world that Servia now actually belongs to the Emperor Nicolas — and that fact is one that will be eloquent. — It is to be seen how Austria likes it!

The French Ambassador has been ordered to demand from the Sublime Porte, that order be sent to Hafiz Pasha to recross the Euphrate and retire beyond Malattia, the Porte is furious but do not know what reply it will make. It would be insane were it to consent.

The French Government have sent at the same time an officer to Alexandria with a message of the same sort — but adapted to the Egyptian troops — Mehemet Ali will laugh in his sleeve at this. — I am surprized people can be so misled, as the *Great Ministers* in Europe shew themselves to be.

I was threatened, by the French Ambassador, with the receipt of an order from my Government like that sent to him, but it is not come, and, I hope, will not come. — Pray, tell the Pasha that the Commissioner sent to the Levant by the French Government to inquire into the Quarantine, has reported to his Government that the plague is *endemic* in the East, that the Quarantine is useless, and that the East, that is Turkey and Egypt; can never be allowed to be in *pratique* with the Mediterranean, nor can the bills of health for those countries be *ever considered* of any authority at Marseilles, or Livourne, or Malta, or Ancona &c. &c., so that all the expence and all the popular discontent occasioned by the fine plans of the Doctors, will be incurred by the Porte for *nothing at all*.

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BATTLE OF NIZIB

24 JUNE 1839.

transmitted by Lord Ponsonby to the Foreign Office and to Lord Beaulieu at Vienna on the 12 August 1839.

Constantinople 11 August 1839.

There are several circumstances connected with the battle of Nizib, which deserve to fix attention, as indicating the real causes of the loss of this action by the Turks, and the subsequent comparatively small military advantages derived from the victory by Ibrahim Pasha. — The details of the event are now well known, and as the reports from the Turks and the Egyptians as well as from the Prussian officers and other Franks, present during the action, agree in all essential points little doubt can be entertained as to the resp. informations.

Hafour Pasha by all parties is represented as having fought with the greatest personal bravery, but nobody denies that he has acted without the least notion of military talent.

He fought the battle with 37,000 men (including 5000 irregulars) against 43,000 Egyptians, whilst he might have had 12 to 15,000 men more in action (viz. 52,000), if the corps of Izzet Mehemet Pasha had marched sooner from Koniah and been united to his force.

Notwithstanding this inferiority of number and the danger of an engagement, without having 2 bridges and a tête de pont on the Euphrates, he did not complete his entrenchments near Nizib, nor retreated in due time to Bir, putting the river between himself and Ibrahim, but accepted a general action in an open plain, his Infantry consisting of young soldiers and irregulars, and his adversary's most and only formidable portion of troops being an excellent Cavalry.

If it is considered that the Sultan's orders to this Serasker were to take up a strong position, to fortify it, and there to wait the progress of the Syrian insurrection, without fighting at the onset of the campaign and from his own seeking a general *offensive* action, *above all not in a plain*, it may be easily believed what the Prussian officers say of Hafour Pasha's having sought to die on the field of battle, by exposing himself to the greatest personal danger when he saw the day decided against him.

From all that can be collected from the different reports and informations, every chance of success seems to have been in favour of Hafour Pasha, except one, "*to fight a general action in the plain.*" — His sanguine hopes just induced him into this last error.

The country was against Ibrahim and the insurrection becoming more formidable every day, so much so, that there is no doubt that even now, after the victory of Ibrahim, several of the most warlike tribes in Syria continue in arms and are in open hostility against the Egyptians.

What would have been the result, if Ibrahim had been beat, or even the battle been a drawn action?

The Egyptians deserted by entire battalions (whilst the Turkish desertion, mostly to their own homes, in two months, did not exceed 3000 men) and 3500 to 5000 men went over to Hafour Pasha in two days and during the action, and what is more, fought against the standards of Mehemet Ali, and continue at this hour to form the most compact nucleus of the Turkish forces, who have collected again in the Sultan's camp to the number of 3,500 Cavalry and from 8 to 10,000 Infantry, with 80 pieces of Artillery.¹

A most extraordinary feature of this battle is, that altho' (after having behaved very well for a couple of hours) the Turkish Infantry soon fell into disorder by the flight of the irregulars, left the field in great confusion, they were not followed up by the Egyptians, nor in any way molested by them during their retreat. In fact, it is positively asserted by the Prussian officers that a great many men sat down and smoked their pipes, about a mile beyond the field.

Three causes may be assigned for these extraordinary facts:

1 that the Turkish Cavalry were intact, and altho' their Commander Sheriff Pasha had shown neither courage nor talent and quite the reverse during the action, yet these troops retired afterwards in good order, so long as they were in sight of the enemy;²

2 that a considerable portion of the Egyptian Infantry had fled from their ranks during the action, and that consequently their officers were occupied in reestablishing order;

3 that the Egyptian Chief Commanders from the actually alarming effect of great desertion and from the looseness of discipline, which necessarily must exist in any army being 18 months in arrears of pay, could not have any real confidence in their men, amongst whom an impression and scruples existed that it was unlawful to fight against the Sultan, and that all who fell in such an action would be punished according to the Koran, in the other world.

This spiritual bond, which strongly militates in favour of the Sultan, may also explain how after a complete dispersion many soldiers, without any forcible means being employed, have returned to their standards.

It may be added in this respect that during the present campaign Hafour Pasha has had a good deal of care for his men being regularly paid and provisioned. — Indeed, it is mentioned as a positive fact, perhaps hitherto in Turkey unequalled for many years, that his troops during the course of several months were left only three times without

¹ A curious news is existing, that 3000 of Ibrahim Pasha's men, who left their respective corps, are at Diarbekir independent of *Turkish* and *Egyptian* authorities. — These 3000 men are exclusive of the above mentioned deserters.

13 August 1839.

They left Ibrahim after the battle was over.

² They afterwards dispersed from want of provisions &c. &c.

their rations of *meat*, and that the value of these *three* rations v
to them in money.

On the contrary, much blame is thrown on Izzet Meheme
the Commander of the Koniah corps (formerly Grand Visir),
represented as having been very jealous of Hafour Pasha (a fe
ago his inferior, being then only a Colonel). — He seems to
treated his men, and to have starved them on the road from
to Hafour's camp, in order to retard their march and thus ne
obliged to join the forces under the Serasker's immediate co

As a consequence this portion of the army revolted, the m
dered the military chest, and went to their homes.

(signed) A. Joch

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APPENDIX II.
CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE RETURN OF A SWORD OF HONOUR TO HER
MAJESTY QUEEN VICTORIA BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS.

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I.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Therapia 17 September 1841.

My Lord,

I have had the honour of receiving Your Lordship's letter of the 14 August, informing me that Her Majesty the Queen had been graciously pleased to command that a sword should be prepared, and sent to me at Constantinople, as a mark of Her Majesty's satisfaction with my services in Syria.

It is with the most profound respect that I beg to express my grateful acknowledgements of Her Majesty's sovereign intentions in conferring upon me a distinction, the more valuable, as it is graciously bestowed for services as yet scarcely known to the world at large, for reasons which still remain to be explained.

Yet, My Lord, the distinction of a sword places me in an isolated position with regard to other General officers, who have been rewarded by the Order of the Bath for services which, however meritorious and distinguished, were not in any degree marked by the extensive command and the personal and heavy responsibility that fell to my share during the latter part of the campaign of the Allies, which was brought, as far as I am concerned, to a completely successful issue.

As His Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, thro' whom I beg to transmit this letter, is fully acquainted with the details of the Syrian campaign, I have taken the liberty of exposing to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador the reasons which lead me to hope, that Her Majesty's Govern-

ment will be pleased to reconsider a question which so nearly touches my military reputation.

I have the honour to be &c.

A. Jochmus.

2.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Therapia 17 September 1841.

My Lord,

Since I had the honour of addressing Your Excellency on the 28 ultimo, expressing my anxiety to know if Her Britannic Majesty's Government had approved, or not, of the line of conduct pursued by me in the Syrian campaign, I have received from His Excellency the Viscount Palmerston two letters on this subject dated Foreign Office 31 July and 14 August.

In the former Viscount Palmerston states :

"that the Orders conferred upon Admiral Walker and the Austrian Admiral were given because their ships cooperated with the British Fleet, in actions in which the British Fleet was the principal party concerned, but that as the British employed on shore were only acting in support of the Sultan's troops, no Orders have been given by Her Majesty's Government to any of the Turkish military officers, who, however meritorious and distinguished their services have been, were serving the Sultan, and who should therefore look to him for reward."

In his letter of the 14 August, however, Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acquainted me that it has graciously pleased the Queen to bestow on me a sword for my services in Syria, and I beg of Your Excellency to kindly transmit my enclosed acknowledgement of Her Majesty's gracious intentions.

The Royal gift of a sword is certainly highly honourable, so much so, that had it even been sent to the Serasker Ahmed Zacharias Pasha, tho' an officer of higher rank than myself, it would *for him* have been a reward of the proudest distinction, but it places *me* in an exceptionable position with regard to other European officers, for the fact of discrimination implies either superiority or inferiority, and as most likely it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to place me above its own officers and of foreign officers, I cannot on the other hand, request Her Majesty's Government to discontinue the sword as a mark of distinction.

The campaign of Syria, from beginning to end, consists of a series of close joint operations by sea and land, but even if an Order were given to Admiral Walker, and to the Austrian Admiral for actions in which the British Fleet was the principal party concerned, and consequently for the capture of Acre, which led more especially to the distribution afterwards, I must respectfully beg to state that in that identical attack on Acre I was the Chief of the Staff of the land forces, embarked for the taking of Acre.

Moreover, as late as the evening of the 3 November I was ordered to be prepared to direct and lead the storming of the town, and my Aid-de-Camp, Count Nugent, was to lead the forlorn posts to consist of British, Austrian, and Turkish troops, and a detachment of British sappers with powder bags to blow open the gates, were sent to me on board the *Edinburgh*, and placed under *Count Nugent's orders* for that purpose. — If then in the principal action of the British Fleet, an eventual post of honour and danger was singled out for me and my officers, I think it is also fair that those facts should have been reported by the Commander-in-Chief to Her Majesty's Government, and I feel quite persuaded that, had this been done, I should not have been under the necessity of addressing Your Lordship now on this subject.

But, as from motives which it is superfluous to qualify, it has been deemed proper by my superiors during the war to try to deprive me of my just share of honours and rewards, I am finally bound to assert, (tho' reluctantly) because it is a personal question, my good right not only for Acre, but also for other occasions.

In the action of the 24 September, the Marines under Commodore Napier were destined to attack in front the Egyptian forces entrenched at Ardali, while with about 1500 Turks I was to turn their right flank.

But at the moment of execution the Commodore sent me word thro' Lieutenant Bradley to manage the attack as I best could "*alone*", the Marines being dead beaten by the fatigue of the march thro' the hills.

The position was carried and between 3 and 400 prisoners made, and Commodore Napier half an hour afterwards accosted me with the words:

"I wish you joy, General, those Marines won't do for this "mountain work, I could not have got them to move an inch."

Again, my Lord, in the battle of Calat Meidan on the 10 October, I was occupied directing a movement on the right, when Commodore Napier sent for me to come to the left of our position, and requested me to lead the main attack against Ibrahim Pasha.

I carried the first position of the enemy¹, and the green standard of the Albanian guard about which there has been so long a corre-

¹ The first battalion I ordered to disband intirely "en Tirailleurs" on account of the difficulty of the ground, I attacked personally with the second battalion turning the enemy's first position by its left flank over a very broken ground on my right.

spondence, was taken in my presence by one of the officers next to me, consequently by the troops under my immediate command, and both standard and position were in my possession long before either Commodore Napier, Selim Pasha, or in fact any Staff officer made their appearance.

Even before they came up, my troops had already made a fresh attack on the second position, and fallen back on account of the heavy fire, before this second position was carried in an ultimate onset, but which last attack I had again to lead *personally* for the third time at Commodore Napier's request.

It is for me, my Lord, a most painful subject to enter into personal details, when, compared with my latter command, these details are rather actions of secondary importance, but I am finally forced to do so, because those whose duty it was to report them, have *studiously avoided* to make them known.

I have the conviction of having always done justice to those under or above me, and I have therefore a right also to claim, even upon secondary grounds, justice for myself — since the legitimately ambitious wish to live esteemed in the memory of man.

I must therefore beg to refer to my Memorandum of the 12 May and to my dispatches to Sir Robert Stopford dated 21 April and 28 May a.c.

I consider the practice of editing newspaper articles or of public speeches as unsoldierlike, but because I do not make use of such means, altho' they have always been at my entire disposal, yet I cannot submit to be wilfully deprived of my fame and military reputation, chiefly by the delay or temporary *suppression* of my public dispatches to Sir Robert Stopford, whence it happens that for Syrian affairs my name is better known on the wild borders of Kurdistan or Persia, and in the depth of the Desert, than in scientific Great Britain.

I have referred to the above facts, because it is evident from the contents of Viscount Palmerston's dispatch dated 31 July, that the details never have been reported to His Excellency. However, I should faintly hope that it is not alone for actions of detail, but principally for the results of my command during the latter part of the campaign, that I may trust to be honoured with a military Order from Great Britain.

Your Excellency is perfectly aware of the conditions of my employment in Syria, which placed me entirely under the British Commander-in-chief, for the time being, also that my latter instructions from the Porte were of a very vague nature, and that I have only acted on my responsibility in Syria, according to *Your Lordship's* directions to continue hostilities as vigorously as possible, after the convention of Commodore Napier had been rejected both by Sir Robert Stopford and the Ottoman Government.

I have successfully carried into execution Your Lordship's views, and consequently those of the British Government, and on the 26 January Your Excellency writes to me:

"I have received from Lord Palmerston the expression of his
"fullest approbation of your having been placed in authority, and he

"does not desire that you should in any degree whatever be under the control of General Michell or any body. — You are therefore without obligation to consult any body."¹

Again on the 25 February Your Lordship stated:

"I have sent copy of your dispatch (to the Admiral dated 13 January) home, that Lord Palmerston may see, to whom it is due that Ibrahim has been unable to carry his army safe and sound to Egypt, but has been defeated and deprived of moral and physical power."

"I have shown that, had Ibrahim been left in Damascus, and permitted to take his departure from thence, as the convention made by Napier intended, Ibrahim would still have been supposed by many or most people to have had force enough to contest the victory, and by his return to Egypt with an unbroken army he would have given Mehemet Ali the means to resist the terms imposed on him by the Sultan, and by giving him the means he very likely would have induced him to do so. These evils have been prevented by your energy in not yielding to unwise counsels, and the skill and vigour in your acts. — All the world must now admit that Ibrahim has been beaten, and Mehemet Ali will find that his army is nearly good for nothing."²

By these testimonials of flattering approval, highly prized as they are by me, considering the sources from whence they emanate, I trust to have secured also a *claim*, that a public token of Her Majesty's acknowledgement of my services in Syria, not of a *private* or special character, be graciously bestowed upon me, and that to further this, Your Lordship will kindly obtain, by a clear exposition of facts to Her Majesty's Government, a reconsideration of the question of my military reward for Syria.

Might I still beg to observe that my military responsibility has been undivided during the latter part of the campaign, that is to say during the whole time of my command, Sir Robert Stopford, the Commander-in-chief by sea and by land, being absent at Marmarizza, and having left me *without instructions*, notwithstanding that his Excellency had taken originally upon himself, to postpone during three weeks of the fast advancing season, the delivery of the Firman appointing me to direct the campaign by land, at the demand of Your Lordship and of the *British Government*.

I believe therefore that justice and equity, by which on one side, if unsuccessful, I should have borne all the blame, indicate on the other, that a proportional acknowledgement be accorded to heavy responsibility accompanied by decisive and favourable results.

I have the honour &c.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-General.

¹ cfr. No. 122.

² cfr. No. 126.

3.

MR. BANKHEAD H. B. M. MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY TO
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Pera 4 November 1841.

Sir,

I have the honour to send you herewith a Sabre of Honour together with a Case of Pistols, which the Queen has been graciously pleased to present to you, in token of Her Majesty's approbation of your conduct while in Command of the Turkish army in Syria.

I have great pleasure in being the medium by which this distinguished mark of Her Majesty's favour is conveyed to you.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

your most obedient humble servant

Charles Bankhead.

4.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS TO CHARLES BANKHEAD
H. B. M. MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY

at Constantinople.

Pera 14 November 1841.

Sir,

With reference to my letters addressed to Viscount Palmerston and Viscount Ponsonby, dated 17 September ultimo, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of two boxes, containing the Sabre and a Case of Pistols, which you have had the kindness to send to me on the 4 instant.

I have the honour to be &c.

A. Jochmus.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS TO SIR STRATFORD
CANNING,

Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Pera 31 March 1841.

Sir,

It has come to my knowledge that on the 11 February last Sir Charles Napier moved in the House of Commons for the production of certain instructions and correspondences between Lord Ponsonby, Sir Robert Stopford, myself, and some other officers, relative to the Syrian war, and that on his demand not being granted, Sir Charles Napier expressed his regret at the refusal of Sir Robert Peel to lay those papers before the House, the more so as the Commodore had understood that the officers under my command had *destroyed* between twenty and thirty thousand people *after* Mehemet Ali had submitted.

As this latter statement is in all parts erroneous, I consider it a duty to record, in the form of a letter to Your Excellency, the real march of events, since silence on such important points might otherwise be construed into acquiescence.

If the conversation in the House of Commons of the 11 February on Syrian affairs between Sir Robert Peel and Sir Charles Napier is correctly reported, I have only to observe for Your Excellency's and the Earl of Aberdeen's information, that as early as the 31 July 1841 I informed Sir Charles Napier, in a public letter, according to the statements from Mr. de Laurin to the Austrian Embassy here, confirmatory in all points of my former communications to Lord Ponsonby and of my reports to Admiral Stopford, that the Syro-Egyptian forces returned into Egypt did not exceed the numbers of 17,300 men and 82 guns, and that hence the loss of Ibrahim Pasha since his retreat from Damascus, at its lowest computation, must amount to 22,700 men and 68 guns.¹

However, I added in the letter to which I have alluded, that

“altho' this statement of Mr. de Laurin had been found correct, and “had been corroborated from all sides, yet it was neither military nor “just to infer from hence (in the words of Sir Charles Napier²),

““that the Sultan had been so ill-advised as to give direc-
“tions to his officers to *destroy* 22,700 human beings, his sub-
“jects””, because

“according to my official returns the loss of *life* was as follows:

¹ Reports to Admiral Stopford, Constantinople 21 April 1841 and 28 May 1841 (copies to Lords Palmerston and Ponsonby); vide No. 133, 142.

² Sir Charles Napier to General Jochmus, London 2 July 1841; vide No. 143.

Drowned at Jericho and other losses in action with the Mountaineers and Bedouins	1500
Died from cold and disease (chiefly the 3697 men who left Damascus already as invalids)	4000
Total of troops	5500. ¹

I said further that,

"if Ibrahim Pasha (like every human General would have done) had left those unfortunate 3697 sick in their hospitals at Damascus, they would not have perished miserably on the road."

"Of the remaining 17,200 men, who constituted the loss of Ibrahim Pasha since he retired from Damascus, the greater number were Syrians, Turks, or Kurds, who *deserted* from his standards, as did also great many Egyptians, besides the prisoners made by the Houranees and Bedouins of the Desert."

Similar causes had also mainly contributed to the demoralization of the Egyptian army and to the great losses of Ibrahim Pasha during the first¹ part of the Syrian campaign, under Sir Charles Napier's own direction, for the number actually killed in action is comparatively very small, yet I am not aware that any competent person ever denied the prevalence of desertion and the other causes of loss in the Egyptian ranks.

I always have maintained and I still proclaim that Sir Charles Napier gloriously *opened* the campaign, and that without his firmness the whole expedition would have been back in Cyprus early in autumn 1840, instead of planting victorious banners on the heights of Calat Meidan and on the walls of Acre²; but with equal justice I opine that Sir Charles Napier ought to admit that I have well *closed* that memorable campaign.

It is evident that on the 31 July 1841, and consequently long before the 11 February 1842, Sir Charles Napier knew that, altho' Ibrahim Pasha's *loss* during the retreat from Damascus to Egypt was 22,700 men, yet these 22,700 men had *not been destroyed*, but only 5500 had perished.

Even thus the Egyptian General had experienced this great *loss before*³ and not *after* the convention with Mehemet Ali, for the convention dated Alexandria 27 November 1840 had been rejected "*ab initio*" first by Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and then by the Sublime Porte, and the Representatives of the four Allied Powers at Constantinople.

¹ vide Memorandum on the Syrian campaign by General Jochmus, Constantinople 12 May 1841, transmitted by Lord Ponsonby to the Foreign Office; *cf.* No. 136.

² vide the same Memorandum 12 May 1841.

³ vide Memorandum of the 12 May 1841.

The subsequently modified arrangement with Mehemet Ali, accepted by the Sultan, was only notified at the Imperial Head-Quarters of Jaffa on the 17 January 1841, and hostilities ceased in consequence without delay.

Between the 27 November and the 17 January there existed for the contending armies in Syria no convention whatever, and hostilities were continued both by Egyptians¹ and by Turks, and the result of these hostilities was that by the 17 January Ibrahim Pasha had lost half his army in the *Desert east* of the Dead Sea, into which Desert he had been thrown by the strategic movements of the forces under my command, having been obliged to abandon his original plan, and his line of retreat thro' the fruitful and abundantly stored districts of Palestine *east* of the Dead Sea.²

It is however incumbent on me to call Your Excellency's attention to the peculiarly strange circumstance that, whilst in the House of Commons I am made all at once responsible for the lives of 20,000 to 30,000 Egyptians, — uselessly sacrificed, — those identical losses had been hitherto *denied*, or *concealed*.

At least, in the various speeches of Sir Robert Stopford and of Sir Charles Napier, there is no allusion made to the existence, during the Syrian campaign, of any such person as General Jochmus, yet it is only reasonable to conclude that, if a General has destroyed 20,000 or 30,000 people, he may certainly have acted right or wrong, but at any rate he must have *acted*.

And it further stands on official record, of which I have the honour to enclose the written proofs, that my actions were in perfect accordance with the directions from Lords Palmerston and Ponsonby and with the orders from the Sublime Porte, since the period that it had pleased the Sultan to confer on me the direction of the war by land, and to issue a Firman³ informing his army that

"in consequence of the illness of Sir Charles Smith it has been deemed expedient to appoint in his lieu General Jochmus, who already is in Syria with the army (having been named a Lieutenant-General of the regular troops), and be it understood that all the functions of the said officer (Sir Charles Smith) are completely transferred unto him, and that only in important matters and then merely for counsel and reciprocal support is he to confer⁴ with (the much distinguished in military affairs) Colonel Michell. The British

¹ Ibrahim Pasha burns Jericho, 15 January 1841; Report to Sir Robert Stopford 28 January 1841 (Inclosure of Riza Pasha); vide No. 107.

² Memorandum of 12 May 1841 (No. 136) and letter from General Jochmus to Lord Ponsonby, Therapia 17 September 1841, No. II; vide No. 145.

³ Dated Constantinople Ramazan 1256 (November 1840); vide also Levant Papers II, Firman, Inclosure in No. 240.

⁴ Captain Stewart to General Jochmus, Jaffa 12 and 17 January 1841; vide No. 103, 104.

"Government has already executed all that is necessary with reference to the employment of these officers."

Yet notwithstanding these arrangements, and particularly the last disposition, I have never received a single instruction from Sir Robert Stopford, and I have been obliged entirely to act on my own responsibility during the latter part of the Syrian war, which led to such decisive, but long disputed results, obtained ultimately by the half-disciplined Turkish army over the doubly strong Egyptian forces, altho' I had been refused, at the most decisive moment, co-operation from Captain Stewart, the commanding officer of the naval station, then off Syria.¹

I will not certainly at present repudiate the responsibility of my operations, and still less that of their results which have been long denied, disputed, or concealed by my superiors in command, but which finally too reluctantly have been admitted by Sir Charles Napier himself in the British House of Commons. — On the contrary, I trust to the honour and to the sense of justice of the British Government for taking finally into consideration my repeatedly exposed claims to be put in point of public rewards by Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia (as I have been by the Imperial court of Russia) at *least* on a par with the Austrian and Turkish Admirals, the responsibility under which I have obtained great military results, in the common cause of the High Allies, — having been heavier, than that of *any* officer engaged in the Syrian war, except Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir Charles Napier's motion on the 11 February has afforded me a legitimate occasion to submit this question again to the fair consideration of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

There is no doubt that the courts of Berlin and Vienna will follow in this case the example of England.

If Sir Robert Peel had granted the demand of Commodore Napier relative to the publication of the instructions asked for, and of the correspondence that has taken place between Lord Ponsonby, Sir Robert Stopford, myself &c., the palpable, tho' perhaps inconvenient fact would have been elucidated that Admiral Stopford has unduly detained², or temporarily suppressed³ my official dispatches, or made from them such partial or incomplete extracts,⁴ as entirely changed the original sense of my reports, converting victory into appearant defeat,⁵ or throwing

¹ General Jochmus to Captain Stewart, R. N., Jerusalem 25 January 1841; vide No. 105.

² General Jochmus to Admiral Stopford 21 April and 28 May 1841; vide No. 142. — Admiral Stopford to General Jochmus, Malta 16 May 1841; vide No. 141.

³ General Jochmus to Lord Ponsonby, Therapia 17 September 1841, No. I and II; vide No. 145.

⁴ *id. id. id.*

⁵ Admiral Stopford's extract of General Jochmus' dispatch of 10 March 1841; vide Levant Papers Part III, inclosure in No. 218.

a doubtful light on the henceforth undeniable military results of the final campaign.¹

Those results and their inherent advantages are not merely confined to Turkey. To the honour of the British name they have extended over a far wider field — to Persia and Central Asia, where the capture of Acre and the subsequent utter ruin of Ibrahim Pasha in his retreat from Damascus have made a profound impression.

The annals of Asiatic warfare offer but few or no examples of open capitulations in the field; when these have taken place they resulted from such a parity of forces on the part of the belligerents, which rendered tactical advantages on either side impossible. But much less were they ever the consequence of diplomatic negotiations. Hence arises the difference in honour and military reputation between the defeat of Ibrahim Pasha by purely military means and his evacuation of Syria, unmolested, by the virtue of a convention.

The wise, practical, and energetic directions from Lord Ponsonby to me, in perfect accordance with the equally clear and farsighted instructions from Lord Palmerston to Admiral Stopford, are the leading causes of the last victories in Syria, with this difference, that Lord Ponsonby's directions were promptly executed, whilst Lord Palmerston's were construed into an authorisation for granting an unmolested retreat to the Egyptian forces, contrary to the open and ostensible tenour of Lordship's despatch of the 14 November 1840.²

As early as the 23 February 1841 Lord Ponsonby³ foretold, what would have been the influence on the general politics in the Levant of the contingency allowing Ibrahim Pasha to remain master of Damascus, or of permitting that General to bring back a strong and unbroken army into Egypt. If any doubt could possibly have remained on the nature of these consequences, this doubt will have been cleared up by the speeches on the treaty of 15 July of Mr. Guizot and of Mr. Thiers in the present French chambers.

I have the honour to be &c.

A. Jochmus.
Lieutenant-General.

¹ Admiral Stopford to General Jochmus, Malta 1 March 1841. General Jochmus to Admiral Stopford, 28 May 1841; vide No. 140, 142. Admiral Stopford to the Admiralty; vide Levant Papers Part III, inclosure in No. 166.

² Levant Papers III, No. 24, also id. id. Part III, subinclosure No. 5 in No. 175 § 3. Brigadier-General Michell to Admiral Stopford.

³ Lord Ponsonby to Lord Palmerston, Levant Papers III, No. 192.

6.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Extract.

Naples 15 January 1842.

I.

You must be aware that you have done too well and too much not to be pursued by the envy of all those Europeans who did nothing, though they received the rewards due only to great deeds. Your successes have not been made known *generally* to the world, there must be time allowed for the knowledge of them to be spread more largely. You ought to hold your position where you are, even at the sacrifice of much and many things, because if you quit it, you must fall on disadvantageous ground for the pursuit of your just claim to the recognition in a proper way of the services you have rendered.

Your vexation and impatience are natural and just, but do not allow them to govern your acts, and thereby give additional power to your *enviers* to do you mischief. You may have an opportunity of adding brilliancy to your already most brilliant services and thereby give additional wings to your fame.

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Extract.

Naples 5 February 1842.

II.

. I feel confident that justice will at last be done to you. This Eastern question will be stirred in the French chambers often and often.

You will see what Thiers says of the state of Syria *after the capture of Acre &c.*

This statement of his ought to bring on an elucidation of that part of the business, and that being done, it cannot any longer be hidden from the world that the discomfiture and defeat of Ibrahim Pasha was *your* deed

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Extract.

Naples 4 March 1842.

III.

. There seems to have been a great deal of exertion used *to prevent* the circulation of the successes due to your skill and activity.

Your dispatches were kept back and I know *that, where they have been seen*, they have convinced every body of the merits and ability of your conduct.

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Extract.

Naples 27 March 1842.

IV.

. You allow me to make what use I think proper of the last mentioned extract, and I am pleased that you suggest the communication of it to Lord Beauvale.

I have already had some conversation with him, and I find him *ignorant of your dispatches*, so far as to make it very desirable that he should learn the main points from your calm and able exposition of them in the above mentioned extract, and I will endeavour to guide him to lay the whole before Prince Metternich, with whom he corresponds occasionally.

I am desirous to make known to the world the facts in the extract, because it defies by its lucidity all the artifices that can be resorted to by the two shabby fellows in question, for the purpose of keeping the public longer in ignorance of the brilliant success you obtained under such difficult circumstances.

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Extract.

Naples 24 April 1842.

V.

. I received by last steamer your letter of the 6 instant, and therein inclosed a copy of your letter to Sir Stratford Canning dated 31 March.

I think that letter most powerful in statement, indeed unanswerable, and I do not see how any British Government can avoid doing justice to your meritorious services.

I take it for granted that Sir Stratford will transmit it to the Secretary of State.

I wish that letter could be publicly known for men who, like Stopford and Napier have endeavoured, as it may be supposed, but who certainly have by their speeches and conduct prevented your brilliant services being known, and *assumed to themselves* the whole glory and applause due in fact *to another*, deserve that the whole truth should be published to the world, and that they should be shown in such colours as properly belong to them.

Ponsonby.

Lord Beauvale is absent on a tour to visit some remarkable parts of the country, and I have not therefore had it in my power to communicate the letter to him.

P.

7.

LORD PONSONBY TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Private.

London 2 September 1842.

My dear General,

I have delayed and delayed writing to you, because I could not tell you with clearness my opinion respecting the state of your affair here.

I mean of the public recognition by some honour of your merits as a soldier, when you commanded in Syria.

My opinion is now formed and although it may be erroneous, I think I am bound to acquaint you with it.

I will begin by stating that I spoke to Lord Aberdeen fully, I said that *you* had done *everything* after the first performance of Napier of the business and the attack upon Akka, in both of which, however, you had taken part, and particularly and with complete success and ability in the first mentioned affair. I shewed him (Lord A.) how it was due to *you alone*, militarily spoken, that Ibrahim was forced to leave Damascus — attempt a retreat — beaten into another track, and finally reduced to the deplorable state which left him no chance of escaping ruin, had your operations not been put an end to by the news of the acceptance by the British Government of Napier's convention. I stated the losses Ibrahim had actually to lament, and the effect his defeat had upon the situation of Mehemet Ali, both at the time and on his power to regain his former weight and his means for being mischievous; in a word, I set before Lord A. the magnitude of the effect you had produced, and I terminated by asking him, if he knew what reward had been conferred on you by Her Majesty's Government? — "*a Sword and a brace of Pistols!*"

Lord Aberdeen was, I think, fully and strongly convinced of your merits, not alone from what I reported to him, but from his own knowledge of facts also, and he did show as much surprise as a Minister in his situation could well show, of the *reward* you had obtained.

I particularly explained to him your feeling, that the withholding from you by the British Government of an honorary and distinguished mark of approbation of your military services, had in your view of it the effect of preventing the other Governments conferring upon you those marks of distinction which otherwise they would have conferred upon you, and I concluded by telling him that you had remained hitherto silent and inactive, because you expected that justice to your services would ultimately be done, when their value had been accurately con-

sidered, but that I did not think that you would long abstain from taking such steps as you thought fit to be taken, in order to assert your own just right &c. &c.

I must do Lord Aberdeen the justice he deserves, and say that he was sensible of your merit and evidently surprised that it had *not been properly recognised*, — I told him that you would probably *write* to claim what you considered to be due to you.

I have been waiting ever since the above interview with a hope that I should hear of something being done that would be agreeable to you, but now that Lord Aberdeen and the Queen have left London for Scotland, I think I should be wrong to defer any longer writing to you, and telling you what has passed, and offering you my advice (as I am bound to do by my friendship for you and my warm feelings of the vast services you rendered the cause in which we both laboured). — I recommend you then, *not to continue silent*, but to lay before Lord Aberdeen your claims upon *the British Government*, and to ask him to take them in consideration.

It is possible that Lord A. may be waiting for an application from you, which should authorize him to take some step, and you will observe that I acquainted him with your intention to write on the subject in some way or other. I will take the liberty of offering for your consideration some opinions of mine, respecting the nature of the communication you may make upon the above subject to Lord A.

I know how much he is acted upon by a feeling of delicacy towards his predecessor in the office he now holds. Lord A. would not hesitate to find fault with and attacking acts of his predecessor which are of a *purely* political nature, but every Minister in Lord A.'s position is very scrupulous about meddling with acts which are more connected with *personalities*. The present affair is likely to be one of the latter in Lord A.'s eyes, and I think it would be advisable and advantageous for you to write in such a way, as should not throw any blame whatever upon the conduct of any body, whilst you exhibit in the strongest colours your claims to the honours that ought to be the reward of merits and services like yours, — setting forth also the mischievous effect upon your fair and well-earned fame, which has been the result of the *delay* on the part of the British Government of the species of reward which such services ought to receive, a delay which has influenced other Governments, and also tended to decrease your power to do *good even in Turkey itself*.

If I have expressed my opinion in an intelligible form, you will see that my object is, that you should avoid exciting opposition to your claims, and making those *enemies* who have only been *lukewarm* friends, and who, it is possible, have been lukewarm more from some difficulties they had to encounter, than from want of disposition to do you justice, and I *believe* this to be the fact.

Your writing in this tone to Lord A. will not prevent your taking subsequently any other step you may think desirable, and it will be

preparative for any ulterior measure and will aid the effect of the publication of your dispatches, which I think ought to appear in the English papers in extenso, just at the meeting of Parliament, if you have not before that time seen reason to be satisfied with the state of affairs.

I *have* been able to make some men of mark in this country aware of the truth, and they do *you* justice, but the season at which I arrived here, necessarily deprived me of the means of communication that are dependent upon the presence in town of political personages.

I fear I have tired you, and I am obliged to add to this letter the expression of my thanks for your interesting and instructive communications to me. I will reserve the rest of what I have to say for another time, and being now free from the *particular* cause of my silence, I intend to write freely and fully upon every thing which I think can be interesting to you.

I hope you are well, and I take leave of you, begging you to believe me always, my dear General,

most truly yours

Ponsonby.

8.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO EARL OF ABERDEEN,

Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Constantinople 27 February 1843.

My Lord,

I had the honour to receive your letter of the 27 November, in which Your Lordship refers me to the dispatch of Viscount Palmerston dated 31 July 1841, regarding my claims to partake in the honours conferred on other officers for services in the Syrian campaign of 1840.

With all the profound respect which is due to your Lordship's opinion, it is impossible for me to see in the resolution, communicated to me on the 31 July 1841, any general rule, but merely an individual case, against which I took immediately the liberty to expostulate with an entire conviction that I was only defending my military reputation, for it does not appear at first sight upon what principle Austria, Prussia, and Russia acted in the distribution of honours, if the rule laid down by Viscount Palmerston is to be the leading principle, according to which rewards have been granted for the services in Syria, and it is therefore evident that either Austria, Prussia, and Russia have acted, in a common cause, exactly on *contrary* principles to *those* of Great Britain, or that I am the *only* individual against whom Her Britannic Majesty's Government made an exception.

Moreover, I must hazard respectfully to state to Your Lordship that there appears to exist a deviation even from the rule, laid down by the above dispatch of the 31 July, in the fact that I am therein exclusively referred to His Majesty the Sultan for any reward, and that in later letters from Viscount Palmerston, dated 14 and 23 August, and in a dispatch from Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary at Constantinople, dated 4 November 1841¹, a Sabre of Honour and a case of Pistols are presented to me by Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

Now, if on the 31 July it is laid down, *as a rule*, that my past services do not entitle me to certain honours which I humbly claimed from Her Britannic Majesty's Government, it does not seem clear to me upon what consideration other honours were granted to me on the 4 November, except the latter honours are considered inferior, and I am fully persuaded that Your Lordship's sense of justice will at once admit that after every exertion on my part to obtain what I consider fairly won in war, I might possibly (by force of circumstances) have acquiesced in a resolution which deprives me of what I (perhaps erroneously) believe due to me, but that no consideration can induce me to agree to a distribution of honours which establishes *inferiority*, where I have an undoubted claim to *superiority* of reward.

In Spain as well as in Turkey I owe my military career — I may say entirely — to the kind protection of British authorities — I have tried to prove, my Lord, that I was willing to deserve this protection. — At any rate, I never was ungrateful, but no gratitude imposes the sacrifice of honour.

If it is still in Your Lordship's power to obtain justice for me, I should fervently beg that you will exert your influence to this effect, and if thought proper, destroy even this letter, but if, in reference to my letter of the 25 October ultimo, all prospect to obtain what is due to me should be vain, I must with the deepest regret inform Your Lordship, that I consider it my painful duty to return to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople the reward which Her Britannic Majesty's Government has thought proper to offer me for my services in Syria.

I have the honour to be &c.

(signed) A. Jochmus.

9.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Private.

Pera 28 February 1843.

My Lord,

With reference to what I have stated in answer to Your Lordship's kind letter of the 2 September, I now beg leave to enclose an open

¹ supra No. 3.

letter for the Earl of Aberdeen, which I beg Your Lordship will read and then have it sealed and delivered.

I am obliged to act as I do, by the laws of military honour, for I cannot subject myself to the *expedients* of Lord Palmerston. If *at the time* His Lordship had, in a private letter, stated to me that (what I believe to be the case) it was *not* from any neglect, but from a desire to avoid jealousies in military quarters, that he could not get me the Order of the Bath, I should have known how to value such a mark of confidence, because it would have proved that he expected me to be *above* the usual distinction of an Order, and my breast is full enough of honourable marks, fairly won in battle, that one star more or less is a matter of no great importance to me, but Lord Palmerston had no right to offer me an *inferior* distinction, where by all military rules I have an undoubted claim to *superiority* even, in point of rewards, nor moreover to base this difference of retribution on a supposed rule of "*mauvaise chicane*."

I have already expressed in my letter to Lord Aberdeen, how much I regret the necessity of returning to Her Majesty's Government a token of the Queen's satisfaction with my services, but I am acting under the conventional laws of all armies. — If Your Lordship can think of any means which will allow me to withdraw my letter, I am ready to do so, because I know and feel under what obligations I am to the British Government, and I should not like to appear ungrateful, and Your Lordship must be already persuaded that ingratitude is not in my character.

I know also that the step which I am about to take may prove disadvantageous to me in respect to my present and future position, but this is a secondary consideration, which even cannot be weighed at all upon the same principle that you cannot refuse to fight a duel, because your antagonist is more skillful in the exercise of arms than yourself.

If Your Lordship *will* or *can* inform Lord Aberdeen of the contents of my letter to him without in the first instance delivering it, and if His Lordship can be brought to see justice done to me, you are at liberty to destroy the letter, but the only way of doing justice to me is to give me the Cross of the Commander of the Bath.

However, should it already have become a matter of inconvenience or even of amour propre not to do so — there may be perhaps a possibility of substituting for the riband of *Commander* of the Bath that of *Grand Cross* of St. Michael and St. George, both of which are held on a par in England, and it may perhaps be more convenient for Ministers to grant the second, and to take hereafter some step or other in order to explain the delay in rewarding my services at Berlin and Vienna.

Your Lordship will easily perceive that my reason for making all these suggestions is the strenuous desire *to exhaust* every means of representation and expostulation, before I take a step which is disobliging to the British Government, and I have merely to add how much I regret

to give so frequently trouble to Your Lordship in a matter in which, however, you are the only person on whom I can depend for justice, and I feel persuaded that this latter consideration is quite sufficient to excuse in Your Lordship's eyes the liberty I am taking in requesting your kind attention to the contents of this letter and some words of information, in order that I may know how Your Lordship has acted with reference to my enclosure to the Earl of Aberdeen.

I have the honour &c.

A. Jochmus.

10.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

London 30 March 1843.

My dear General,

I have had your letter of 28 February in my hands some days, and I delayed writing to you that I might well consider the matter of which I must speak to you in reply. — You will long ere this have heard from your friend Colonel Herman what passed in conversation between him and me, and of our conjoint feeling of apprehension that your *present position* might be seriously effected, should the British Minister consider what you talk of doing in the light of an offense to the Queen.

I have hesitated about consulting with the Colonel *since* I received your letter, because I have not felt quite safe, that I might consider myself at liberty to make known to him the step you have actually taken, — I mean that of sending to me your letter to Lord Aberdeen, — but I *now* think I ought to consult with him, and I will do so, and after hearing his opinion I will act upon the discretion you have authorized me to use, and either send your letter to Lord Aberdeen, or withhold it till I may receive from you further directions.

I think your letter to Lord Aberdeen is perfectly well worded, and that you could not take a better ground to justify your conduct than that of military honour; at the same time I will not say that I do think *it certain*, by any means, that our Ministers will consider it a sufficient reason for your return, to the Sovereign, of those marks of approbation which she thought proper to send to you. — It is true the Queen is not *your* Sovereign, and that fact may alter the nature of the case, but generally, any gift from a Sovereign is considered a high honour independent of its special nature, and though inadequate in its magnitude and consideration to the merits of the services performed, and of the person who rendered those services, still a thing to be prized most highly.

Your services have been unrequited to a degree that gives me great pain, but the neglect of the justice due to your merits cannot diminish the quality and magnitude of your services.

Those services are well known to all the European Governments, all my colleagues in Turkey agreed entirely with me in the estimate of their value. I do not *know* why the rewards, for that brilliant conduct, to which the British Government was so particularly indebted, were so inadequate, but I do *believe* that political embarrassments, arising, in part, out of the nature of the English Government, were the real causes.

I do not say that such causes are an excuse for the injustice, but I do think those causes afford reasons why you should not feel yourself undervalued in the *estimation* of the British Ministers. I would also hope that the fact of your having been so much neglected in the public manifestation of the applause of the British Government may induce the Ministers of that Government to afford you, at any need, a strong and efficacious support.

With relation of the Order of St. Michael and St. George I am pretty nearly certain that the statutes require, that the knights should be taken only from amongst men who have served under the Crown, the Protecting Sovereign in Malta, or the United Jonian States. I will, however, inform myself accurately on this point.

I think Lord Palmerston might have had official obstacles in the way of making to you the statement to which you allude, but I am very much of opinion that he would have been glad to do it.

The Syrian campaign has not excited any attention in Parliament or the public, in consequence of recent and more specially interesting events in China, and Afghanistan, and America, and no opportunity has offered for any body to express the proper sense of the services you performed. It never is advantageous to act when the time is not evidently *favorable* for action — more is lost by it, than can possibly be gained.

You will understand me to intend to consult your friend Colonel Herman, and after deliberation to determine, whether or not to send your letter to Lord Aberdeen, and that my *present* opinion is that you would find it more advantageous to withhold the letter, that if this, my present opinion should continue I will keep the letter and await your instructions respecting it.

I fear I shall not see Colonel Herman for some few days to come, and I therefore will keep back my letter for a short period.

Believe me to be, my dear General,

most faithfully yours

Ponsonby.

P.S. I have not seen Colonel Herman. I keep the letter till further orders from you, feeling convinced it had better not be sent.

11.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON,

Foreign Office.

112 Eaton Square 24 May 1850.

My Lord,

His Serene Highness the Prince of Leiningen has been pleased to transmit some months ago to His Royal Highness Prince Albert a Memorandum on the Syrian war of 1840, dated Constantinople 26 March 1846, together with the annexed correspondence lit. B No. 1 to 15, and the Prince of Leiningen has also allowed me the perusal of Your Lordship's reply to His Royal Highness on the subject.

After acknowledging the general correctness of my Memorandum, Your Lordship observes that my activity was limited to the organization of the Turkish troops, and to the strategical arrangements for the campaign, and that although those strategical arrangements had materially contributed to the general success of the war, yet it so happened that I had not been present and personally engaged in the decisive actions of the campaign, which were those of Djounie, the bombardment of Beyrout, the battle of Calat Meidan, the storming of Sidon, and the taking of Acre.

Your Lordship further says that the Order of the Bath has hitherto only been given "for brilliant exploits in actual battle", and you are pleased to add that, although success might have been anticipated from my known and acknowledged abilities, yet it had not been my lot to take into action the Sultan's forces, and it further seems to be Your Lordship's present impression that those troops acted especially as reserves, and that my command was exclusively limited to the Turkish portion of the combined forces.

Having thus correctly described, I believe, the substance of Your Lordship's reply to His Royal Highness Prince Albert, I must beg first to make a counterstatement, and then to offer some general observations.

After an interval of ten years, and under an unusual pressure of business it cannot be expected that Your Lordship should exactly remember all the details of the Syrian campaign, and I explain your present impression chiefly from the nature of Sir Robert Stopford's official and, to say the least, very incomplete reports, as well as from my own manner of arranging the contents of the Memorandum on Syria.

In that Memorandum, which is only *an abstract* of the operations, I have left upon military principle, and from motives of courtesy, and delicacy to Sir Robert Stopford and to Sir Charles Napier the responsibility, and of course the merits for the actions fought up to the 17 December 1840, assuming on the same principle the responsibility,

and of course the merits for my command from the 18 December to the end of the war.

Yet this circumstance does not preclude, and I must now beg distinctly to state that as chief of the staff and in command of the Turkish troops I was not only present and personally engaged in four out of the above quoted five decisive actions, but that "*I won*" by the troops under my personal command "*two*" out of those five actions (Ardali above Djounie and Calat Meidan).

I have still to add that at Acre I was ordered by Sir Robert Stopford eventually to command the combined troops that were to storm the fortress, and that the success of Jaffa and Jerusalem, after the capture of Acre, was exclusively due to my arrangements and dispositions.

With reference to the actions of Ardali above Djounie and Calat Meidan Lord Ponsonby writes to me:

"You will, I am confident, be assured of the very great joy
"with which I have heard of your great services and brilliant con-
"duct. I am sorry that my applause can be of no value to you,
"as I am no soldier, were it otherwise, I would heap it on you."

Brilliant conduct in actual battle has been laid down by Your Lordship, in the letter to His Royal Highness Prince Albert, as the test for the distinction of Bath.

The British Ambassador must be supposed to have been correctly informed of the occurrences in Syria.

Lord Ponsonby not only makes use of the expression with reference to the above two actions, but repeats it three times on other occasions.

As for myself, I had thought it more becoming to claim the Order of the Bath for my responsible command of the land forces, who were to act in conformity with, or eventually on the British Ambassador's responsibility even against the orders emanating from the superior authority of Sir Robert Stopford.

The result of this command, proclaimed though reluctantly and not in a friendly spirit by Sir Charles Napier in the British House of Commons, was the loss of 22,700 Egyptians and 68 guns out of an army still numbering 40,000 men and 150 guns, against which I operated with scarcely half that number of combined forces and 30 guns, whilst the British Fleet had left the Syrian coast, and gone to Marmarice.

That in the combined army the Sultan's forces "on shore" did not act "merely" as reserves results evidently from the proportion of forces in the field,¹ and was admitted by Your Lordship yourself in communications to Mr. Guizot and Prince Metternich.

¹ viz.:	Turks	British	Austrians
10 September	5000	1350	150
12 October	9000	1500	160
18 December	28,000	300	200
31 January	36,000	300	200

I do not claim, my Lord, the Order of Commander of the Bath or the Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George as a *favours*, I only **make** a renewed appeal to the *justice* of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

I do (what Lord Ponsonby repeatedly has recommended me to do) "assert my own just right, not remaining silent, but laying my claims before the British Government,

adding that, however valuable the Order of the Bath would have been to me in 1841, or even in 1848, I now merely revert to the claim, because, as a private individual, I remonstrate against "a neglect of justice", whilst I have entirely abstained from urging the question, as long as I was Minister for foreign affairs of Germany.

The grounds upon which the K. C. B. has been withheld from me hitherto have been differently stated at various periods.

On the 31 July 1841 the reason assigned was that

"at Acre the Orders conferred on the Turkish and Austrian Admirals were given, because their Ships cooperated with the British Fleet in actions in which the British Fleet was the principal party concerned, but that as the British employed "*on shore*" were only acting in support of the Sultan's troops, no Orders have been given by Her Majesty to any of the Turkish military officers, who, however meritorious and distinguished their services have been, were serving the Sultan, and should therefore look to him for rewards. On the 30 March 1843, however, Lord Ponsonby writes to me:

"Your services are well known to all European Governments, all my colleagues in Turkey agreed entirely with me in the estimate of their value. I do not know why the rewards, for that brilliant conduct, to which the British Government was so particularly indebted, were so inadequate, but I do believe that political embarrassments, arising, in part, out of the nature of the English Government, were the real causes."

Lord Ponsonby is led to give this explanation, because I had observed to the Ambassador that the operations "*on shore*" were *joint* operations of the *combined* army (Turkish, British, and Austrian), to which I had been appointed Chief of the Staff *not* by the Turkish Government, but by Sir *Robert Stopford*, and which I commanded subsequently agreeably to written arrangements between the *British* Ambassador, the *British* Government, and the Sublime Porte, according to which "the functions of General Sir Charles Smith¹ (a *British* not a *Turkish* officer) were completely transferred to me."

Moreover, the K. C. B. had been conferred on Sir Charles Smith for the Syrian campaign, and the C. B. on Colonel Leibeltern of the

¹ See also the annexed communications from the *Austrian* Admiral Banniera, the *Turkish* War-President Hussein Pasha, and the Commander of the *British* land force Colonel Bridgeman.

Austrian service, and on Colonel Rose, who was wounded at El Maishdal in an action commanded by me in person.

In 1849 again Your Lordship was pleased to state to the Baron Andrian, the German Envoy, that certain difficulties existed with regard to my obtaining the K. C. B.; but finally in 1850 it appears that the actual reason for which I am not entitled to that Order, is to be looked for in the fact, that I was not present and personally engaged in the decisive actions of the war: Djounie, Beyrout, Calat Meidan, Sidon, and Acre.

I trust having now succeeded in removing that last objection by an exact reference to facts and

I have the honour to be &c.

(signed) A. Jochmus

ad II.

a.

REAR ADMIRAL BANDIERA, COMMANDING THE AUSTRIAN NAVAL FORCES OF SYRIA, TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL JOCHMUS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE OTTOMAN ARMY IN SYRIA.

(Translation.)

Extract.

Marmarice 8 February 1841.

I have had the honour to receive your esteemed dispatches dated 17 and 23 January, as well as your favoured letter of the 25 ditto.

Will Your Excellency permit me to present you my felicitations on the fine success of the army under your command, which has caused such damage to Ibrahim Pasha, and forced him to evacuate the whole of Syria and Palestine.

Now that the definitive arrangement with the Vice-Roy of Egypt has been fully convened, and after his having restituted the whole Ottoman Fleet, it becomes useless to send you our Marine officers, troops, and rocket batteries, all of whom I send back to the Austrian dominions.

I am most happy that Lieutenant Baron Du Mont has been able well to execute all the commissions entrusted to him by Your Excellency, and that he has deserved your approbation.

It has been my agreeable duty to inform my superiors how much Your Excellency has been pleased with him, and I have asked for a well deserved recompense for that distinguished officer. I have also made known to the Minister of War the satisfaction which Your Excellency has expressed to me with regard to the services rendered by Captain Count Széchényi.

vide No. 125.

b.

CONFIDENTIAL DISPATCH OF HUSSEIN PASHA, PRESIDENT OF
THE GREAT COUNCIL OF WAR AT CONSTANTINOPLE, TO GENERAL
JOCHMUS PASHA AT JAFFA.

(Translation in the handwriting of Omer Pasha, the original
in German language.)

Extract.

Dated $\frac{13 \text{ Zilhidge } 1256.}{4 \text{ February } 1841.}$

Excellency,

Thanks be to God, the Almighty! with the assistance of the Allied powers, as well as by the infatigable zeal and the talents of Your Excellency, the prosperity of the Ottoman arms had led to a glorious result in this admirably victorious war, by which the just and mild Government of the Ottoman Porte has enabled to secure a firm footing in all Syria, delivering the Syrian people from the iniquitous and tyrannical Egyptian administration.

And the most important occupations and endeavours of our most just Emperor tend to make happy and content all his peoples, as Your Excellency is certainly convinced &c. &c.

c.

COLONEL BRIDGEMAN TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Copy.

British Head-Quarters Jaffa
10 February 1841.

Sir,

I have had the honour to receive your letter, dated 8 instant, in which you communicate to me that you have recommended Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins of the Royal Artillery and Lieutenant Aldrich of the Royal Engineers, for the decoration of the Nishan Iftihar, in consideration of their services during this campaign, and especially for those rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins at the camp of Djounie, and for the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Aldrich on several occasions.

Having communicated your kind intentions to these officers, they beg me to express their high sense of the honour which may thus be conferred upon them, and to assure you that this proof of your consideration of their services is particularly gratifying to them.

I have the honour to be &c.

H. Bridgeman, Colonel,
commanding British force in Syria.

SIR DUNCAN MAC DOUGALL TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
JOCHMUS.

Private.

United Service Club 8 July 1851.

My dear Jochmus,

I have just time to send you the enclosed, which I thought had come from Lord Grey, but it turns out to be from his brother, who is Equerry to Prince Albert.

I deeply regret the tenure of the communication, and lament it is not as my sanguine expectations led me to expect.

Sir de Lacy Evans desires his kindest regards to you, and fears there would be but little use, in your making any further move.

He, like me, feels the injustice that has been done you . . .

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO SIR DUNCAN MAC DOUGALL

Edinburgh 10 July 1851.

Many thanks for the enclosures from Colonel Grey and Lord Stanley, as well for the considerate expressions of your feelings and of those of Sir de Lacy Evans on the subject. I have sent to Lord Ponsonby the contents of those communications, and after the very strong letter he wrote lately to Baron Stockmar, and in which he gives *me* the whole credit of the success of the operations by land in Syria (*more indeed* than I deserve and ever claimed), His Lordship will be as surprised as I am at the cool denial of facts and justice on the part of Lord Palmerston. — To me the matter is perfectly clear. The real cause of the present conduct of Lord Palmerston is his resentment at my political action in favor of Austria 1849, and that Prince Albert is a little influenced by similar considerations is also evident, from what Prince Leiningen and Colonel Wylde said on the subject. However, you may rely on my not-compromising the latter in any way with regard to what he confided to you about these feelings — but so much is certain that similar considerations make the injustice still much more glaring, because I ought to have had the K. C. B. in 1841, and *not* in 1849 or 1850!!

I shall now await Lord Ponsonby's answer, who after his former statements and particularly after his last letter to Stockmar is nearly as much interested as myself in the question. As I have often told you, I care *very little* for the Order itself, but I will *not* submit to an injustice and to the arbitrary decision of Lord Palmerston, who does not dare

to confess, or at least to consign on paper the true causes of his conduct, and therefore prefers putting forward downright falsehood.

A. Jochmus.

14.

SIR DUNCAN MAC DOUGALL BRIGADIER-GENERAL TO
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Private. Extract.

United Service Club 18 September 1851.

In case I may not find you at home I enclose your two Memoranda.

That on the Syrian war is triumphantly conclusive in respect to your claims on the gratitude of the British Government.

In the hands of an uncautious man it would create such a "flare up" as was never known . . .

15.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
PRINCE ALBERT.

Arrow-Hall near Birkenhead
31 July 1851.

Sir,

By command of Your Royal Highness Colonel Grey has transmitted to me on the 7 instant a communication from the Foreign Office, referring to my claim to the Order of the Bath, and I beg leave to express to Your Royal Highness my respectful thanks for the kind and considerate manner in which Your Royal Highness has been pleased to forward my application.

With reference, however, to the question itself a feeling of honour and of duty to myself obliges me most respectfully to request Your Royal Highness' permission to say, that the opinion expressed by Lord Palmerston must necessarily be erroneous, because it is based on statements regarding the part I have taken in the Syrian war of 1840/41, which are not founded on fact.

Those statements are in direct contradiction with the official and private communications on the campaign from Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, with the printed documents laid before Parliament in 1841, and with the late conclusive letter which Lord Ponsonby wrote to Baron Stockmar, after having read my note of the 24 May 1850 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, containing a clear and very distinct refutation of the same arguments which Lord Palmer-

ston brings forward now again, just as if His Lordship never had received the said letter.

If additional proof of the justice of my claim were required I should humbly beg Your Royal Highness to read the annexed copy of a *confidential* Memorandum, drawn up some years ago in the Prussian Foreign Office, wherein the whole case is closely scrutinized, and then viewed very differently from the opinions which Lord Palmerston chooses to express.

It is the desire to show that I have not inconsiderately taken the liberty of troubling Your Royal Highness, which induces me to request as a last favor, the perusal of this document.

I have the honour to be Your Royal Highness'

most obedient humble servant

Jochmus.

ad 15.

PRO MEMORIA.

(Abschrift.)

General Jochmus hat zur Zeit des Syrischen Feldzuges 1840/41 das Commando der türkischen und combinirten Landtruppen geführt, welche in Gemeinschaft mit den Flotten Englands etc. gegen Mehemet Ali's Truppen unter Ibrahim Pascha erfolgreich fochten. Nach der vielfach ausgesprochenen Ansicht des Viscount Ponsonby, früheren britischen Botschafters bei der Pforte, ist es weit weniger Napier oder irgend ein anderer englischer oder türkischer Befehlshaber, als vielmehr General Jochmus gewesen, dessen Muth und Umsicht Ibrahim Pascha "on his last legs" gebracht hat.

Gleichwohl hatten Napier, (abgesehen von Admiral Stopford), der türkische Admiral Walker und der österreichische Admiral Bandiera sowohl von England (den Bath-Orden) als von Oesterreich, Preussen und Russland Orden erhalten, Jochmus aber nur vom Kaiser von Russland den Annen-Orden in Brillanten.

Er hat desshalb bereits im Jahre 1841 bei dem englischen Gouvernement reclamirt, ist jedoch von dem damaligen Whig-Ministerium aus dem Grunde zurückgewiesen worden, weil nur diejenigen fremden Militairs, welche die englische Flotte bei ihren Kriegs-Operationen unterstützt hätten, Decorationen erhalten hätten, die Militairs der Landtruppen aber nicht.

Kurz darauf ist dem General Jochmus jedoch Namens der Königin Victoria ein Ehrensäbel und ein Paar Pistolen zum Geschenk gemacht worden.

Vielfältige Reclamationen des Generals selbst und die angelegentlichen Bemühungen des Viscount Ponsonby haben kein günstigeres Re-

ultat herbeigeführt, und im Jahre 1842 hat auch Lord Aberdeen die abschlägige Antwort seines Whig-Vorgängers bestätigt.

General Jochmus, der übrigens — wenn der betreffende Passus richtig verstanden wird — mit Lord Ponsonby der Meinung zu sein scheint, dass eine Depeschen an Admiral Stopford während des Feldzuges *absichtlich* zurückgehalten und der Veröffentlichung entzogen worden sind, um ihn der Auszeichnung der fremden Mächte zu berauben, steht jetzt auf dem Punkte, den Degen und das Pistolen-Geschenk zurückzusenden, und hat nur auf Anrathen des Lord Ponsonby diese äusserste Massregel einstweilen noch aufgeschoben.

Von England glaubt er entweder das Commandeur-Kreuz des Bath-Ordens oder das Gross-Kreuz des Jonischen St. Michael- und Georgen-Ordens fordern zu können.

Sein Wunsch geht nunmehr darüber Rath zu erhalten, wie er es machen solle, dass ihm von Seiten Preussens Gerechtigkeit durch Verleihung eines Ordens widerfahre.

Hinsichtlich eines österreichischen Ordens gedenkt er sich an den Erzherzog Friedrich, dem er persönlich bekannt geworden, zu wenden. Er beabsichtigt des Königs Majestät, wenn ihm nicht abgerathen wird, seine Correspondenz mit der englischen Regierung vorzulegen, um das ihm von derselben widerfahrene Unrecht darzuthun.

Darf ich, nach näherer Durchsicht der fraglichen, mit Lord Palmerston, Lord Aberdeen, Viscount Ponsonby und Sir Stratford Canning geführten Correspondenz, eine ganz unmassgebliche Meinung sagen, so wäre es die, dass dieselbe sich zur Vorlage Allerhöchsten Ortes *nicht* eignet. Abgesehen davon, dass dieselbe etwas *weilläufig* ist, so möchte die beharrliche Weigerung *einer* Regierung, einen Orden zu verleihen, kaum für eine andere *befreundete* Regierung einen Grund abgeben, ihrerseits eine solche Gunst zu bezeugen, zumal da die Absicht des Generals Jochmus, das Geschenk der Königin Victoria zurückzuweisen, *jedenfalls* die Sache so auf die Spitze gestellt hat, dass daraus leicht ein für ihn ungünstiger Eindruck erwachsen möchte.

NOTE.

Diese vertrauliche Note wurde auf Ansuchen meines Onkels, des Königlich Preussischen Geheimen Rathes von Bernuth, im Jahre 1843 im Ministerium des Aeussern zu Berlin als Parere verfasst.

Sir Stratford Canning, Nachfolger des Lord Ponsonby als Botschafter in Constantinopel, machte mir den Antrag durch seine Intervention mir die betreffenden österreichischen und preussischen Orden zu verschaffen, *vorausgesetzt*, dass ich die bestehenden Differenzen mit der britischen Regierung wegen des *Ehren-Säbels* oder des *Bath-Ordens* auf sich beruhen lassen wolle.

Meiner Correspondenz mit Lord Ponsonby zufolge, schlug ich aber diesen vermittelnden Antrag ab und bestand unter Zustimmung Lord

Ponsonby's einfach in erster Instanz auf Verleihung *mindestens* des Commandeur-Kreuzes des Bath-Ordens, obgleich mir mit *vollem Rechte* das Gross-Kreuz gebührte.

Diese Correspondenz endete erst am 24 Januar 1852, als ich den Ehren-Säbel an den englischen Minister des Aeussern Lord Granville *surück* schickte.

Seine Kaiserliche Hoheit Erzherzog Friedrich aber war schon viel früher gestorben, ein grosser Verlust für Oesterreich.

Der Erzherzog Friedrich, Kaiserliche Hoheit, hatte mir schon im Juni 1841 schriftlich durch den Kaiserlichen Oberlieutenant von Du Mont wissen lassen, dass Seine Kaiserliche Hoheit mich für ein *Oesterreichische Gross-Kreuz* seiner Zeit in Vorschlag zu bringen geruhen würden.

Frankfurt am Main Ende Januar 1852.

A. Jochmus.

16.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT
PALMERSTON,

Her Britannic Majesty's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Francfort o. M. 24 December 1851.

My Lord,

It has not been in my power to acknowledge before this your letter of the 7 August, because I was absent from hence, and I desired to offer some remarks — drawn from official papers — on the note of 2 July last, which Lord Stanley wrote by your direction to Colonel Grey.

The statements therein contained for the information of His Royal Highness Prince Albert are in open contradiction not only with the facts substantiated in my letter of the 24 May 1850, which remain unrefuted, but your note is completely at variance with your own former communications to Lord Ponsonby, and with all the statements of the late Ambassador to the Foreign Office, and ultimately to Baron Stockmar.

Your letter of the 2 July, instead of refuting my very plain arguments of the 24 May 1850, insinuates a subtle controverse about claims to the Order of the Bath for 1840/41 of British or foreign officers.

I have always brought forward very distinctly *my* claim as a *foreign officer*, and all I asked for was to be placed *at least* on the same line with Admiral Bandiera and Admiral Walker, but the fact is, that my claims are *much stronger*, because I held a much higher and more responsible command than either, and besides there are some collateral circumstances, which strenghten my case very much.

I had been a General officer and Quarter Master General of the British Legion in Spain and the *only* General officer, of that force, who

did not receive some reward or acknowledgement from the *British* Government, because I was a *Foreigner*.¹ — I was subsequently sent to Syria, in pursuance of Your Lordship's instructions dated 29 July 1840.

I was appointed Chief of the Staff of the *combined* Syrian army (not merely the Turkish forces) first by Sir Robert Stopford and only later by order of the Sultan at the special demand of the *British* Ambassador, and I was finally appointed to the Chief Command of the British forces in Syria, again at the demand of Lord Ponsonby. Indeed so little did the Turkish Government understand the difference between a General officer of the British legion and of the British army that the Firman of the Porte, transmitted officially to me through the British Ambassador, ran thus:

On the 10 October 1840:

"Au très illustre parmi les hauts Personnages de la nation Chrétienne le meilleur des Grands du Peuple de Jésus le Général Jochmus, un des Généraux de la haute Cour de la Grande Bretagne, qui se trouve au camp Impérial en Syrie et à qui il vient d'être conféré le grade de Général de Division dans mes armées Impériales &c. (Translation of Mr. F. Pisani.)"

and on the 30 of Ramazan in a circular to all the Turkish General officers in Syria:

"In one of my former orders you have been directed to follow in all military operations the dispositions of the *British General officer* Sir Charles Smith, who on account of his tactical knowledge is in the Imperial camp of Syria, but in consideration of his recent illness it has been deemed necessary to appoint in his lieu General Jochmus &c."

and again on the 11 October 1841:

"To you the distinguished General Jochmus, upon whom the Sublime Porte has some time ago at the request of the illustrious *British Government* conferred the high rank of Ferik (General of Division) which has been graciously granted to you by His Imperial Majesty.

"Whereas in pursuance of the alliance, union, and friendship which exist between the everlasting Sublime Porte and the august Court of Great Britain, and which are more and more acquiring strength, the British Government, taking to heart the rights of the Sublime Porte in the solution and settlement of the Egyptian question, has adhered to our cause, interfered in it, and particularly sent your Excellency to the Imperial camp in Syria &c. . ."

Although from these quotations there can be no doubt that my position in 1840/41 was as closely connected as possible with the *British*

¹ In Spain I was *honourably* and fully rewarded by the *Spanish* Government, because I cumulated the functions of Quarter Master General of the *British* legion with those of Chief of the Staff of the *Spanish* army of Cantabria.

interest and service, yet I have merely claimed to be placed on a footing of equality with other *foreign* General officers, who held special commands in the Syrian campaign.

Your Lordship can impossibly pretend that the *British* Government can in fairness demand that at a most critical moment a *foreign* officer should be placed by the *British* Government in a position of high responsible command, that he should carry out the military and political plans of that Government with complete success, and that, whilst the *British* Government reaped the full advantage and benefit of those military measures, the *foreign* officer, to whom the success "*by land*" is due, should be left without an adequate honorary reward, under *pretences* which cannot stand a moment's serious scrutiny.

I have had the honour to state to Prince Leiningen, to Lord Ponsonby, and to others, that in my *present* situation I do not attach any great value to the K. C. B., however desirable it might have been for me to obtain that distinguished Order in 1840, but I must beg leave to repeat that I cannot submit to an open act of injustice, and that I must be considered to remain at liberty to take any further steps, in order to obtain redress for an *arbitrary denial of justice*.

(signed) A. Jochmus

17.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO THE VISCOUNT PONSONBY,
at London.

Francfort o. M. 24 January 1852.

Dear Lord Ponsonby,

In conformity with the contents of my last note to you from Eaton Square I have written after my return hither to Lord Palmerston on the 24 December.

My letter was such that it precluded all further correspondence with Lord Palmerston himself, but that it left open the question about the K. C. B.

After taking Prince Leiningen's opinion on the subject, it was my intention to lay presently the whole correspondence from 1841 to 1852 before Lord John Russell, because it was evident to me that from motives of delicacy Earl Granville could not well decide the pending question against his predecessor, whereas the Prime Minister might possibly take a different view of this affair.

I had communicated this resolution to Sir Duncan Mac Dougall requesting him to explain to you the details, when a few day's ago I received an official letter from Lord Granville acknowledging the receipt of my last letter to Viscount Palmerston, but adding that he could not reverse the decision about my claim.

This answer has modified my plan, and I have written to-day to Lord Granville, returning the Sword and the case of Pistols offered to me in 1841, and enclosing copies of my communication to Lord Aberdeen, dated 27 February 1843, and of your letters to me, dated 2 September 1842 and 23 March 1843, in which you advise me not *then* to return the Present, but strongly to insist on an appropriate reward for my services in Syria.

I have carried on patiently a correspondence and remonstrances against an arbitrary act of injustice for upwards of nine years, but at its close I have been obliged, now to return the Sword &c. It is impossible for me to submit to a marked slight, and whilst the reversion of a hasty decision of Lord Palmerston may be a matter of *delicacy* in the eyes of the British Government, it is a question of *honour* for me not to submit to a *differential* distribution of rewards for the Syrian campaign.

I have once more to thank you for all your kindness and for your repeated exertions to redress the wrong done to me

A. Jochmus.

18.

EXTRAIT DU VOYAGE EN ÉGYPTÉ PAR J. J. AMPÈRE DE
L'ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE, PARIS 1867.

Beyrouth, héroïquement défendu par le courage français de Soliman Pacha, fut bombardée et les Anglais, en prenant Saint Jean d'Acre "la difficile", comme disent les Arabes, enlevèrent à Ibrahim Pacha l'honneur d'avoir seul fait capituler une place qui avait résisté à Bonaparte.

L'armée Égyptienne se fonda comme par enchantement. Les manœuvres habiles et cruelles d'un Allemand au service de la Porte, le Général Jochmus, que j'ai eu occasion de connaître à Constantinople, en isolant des points de ravitaillement les débris de cette armée, en précipitèrent la destruction

Que serait-il advenu, si nous avions soutenu Méhémet Ali? Je ne sais; mais je suis certain que dans ce cas, les vainqueurs de Nezib n'auraient pas disparu devant le Général Jochmus

Cfr. Revue de deux mondes 1847, III, p. 304.

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AUTHORS OF THE LETTERS &c.

- ALDERSON, R. C. Inclosure in No. 109.
AMPÈRE, J. J. Appendix II No. 18.
- BACKHOUSE. No. 128.
BANDIERA. No. 85, 101, 125. Appendix II, ad 11a.
BANKHEAD. Appendix II No. 3.
BOVILLE, J. No. 40, 53.
BRIDGEMAN, H. Appendix II, ad 11c.
- CHAMPION, J. Inclosure in No. 142.
- DUMONT, A. Inclosure in No. 93. Inclosure III in No. 119.
- EVANS, DE LACY. No. 147.
- HIGGINS, GORDON. No. 130.
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- NAPIER, CHARLES. No. 11, 87, 115, 138, 143.
NOURI, Pasha. No. 94.
NUGENT, Count. No. 33.
- OMER BEY. Inclosure II in No. 14, 77, 80.
- PALMERSTON. No. 1.
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131, 146, Appendix I No. 2, Appendix II No. 6, I-V, 7, 1
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ROSE, HUGH. Inclosure I in No. 119.
- SAMUEL, GEORGE. No. 152.
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No. 110.
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SZECHENYI, Count. No. 78, Inclosure III in No. 119.
- TAHIR BEY. Inclosure II in No. 107.
- ZACHARIAS AHMED, Pasha. No. 72, Inclosure II in No. 109.

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- p. 11 No. 15 lin. 6 Beteddin.
p. 12 lin. 4 Merouba.
p. 41 col. 1 Chalid Pasha's Brigade.
p. 43 lin. 4 Chalid.
p. 48 No. 48 Therapia 8 December 1840.
p. 49 lin. 3 what orders . . .
p. 69 lin. 2 Alderson.
p. 81 § 3 lin. 4 Kakun.
p. 89 § 4 lin. 3 hindered him from losing . . .
p. 89 § 6 lin. 10 for obtaining. Their object . . .
p. 91 lin. 10 a most serious.
p. 91 lin. 20 230,000.
p. 111 No. 108 § 1 lin. 2 Captain Arbuthnot . . .
p. 151 lin. 1 (dated the 13 January).
p. 151 lin. 11 These evils . . .

to No 9 and 10.

one mile.



- A Position. { 1500 Marines
1 Battalion of Turks
- B. { 300 Australians
4 Battalions of Turks
- C. { 3 Battalions of Turks

L. of B. Ships

L. of B. Ships



BATTLE OF CALAT MEIDAN


OR
BEKFAYA

10. October 1940

to No 17.

one mile





A. VON JOCHMUS'
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN

II.



DIESES WERK WURDE IN DREIHUNDERT EXEMPLAREN ABGEZOGEN

AKADEMISCHE BUCHDRUCKEREI VON F. STRAUB IN MÜNCHEN.

AUGUST VON JOCHMUS'
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN

HERAUSGEGEBEN

VON

DR GEORG MARTIN THOMAS.

ZWEITER BAND

THE SYRIAN WAR AND THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

1840—1848.

BERLIN:
ALBERT COHN
53, MOHRENSTRASSE
1883.

THE SYRIAN WAR
AND THE
DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
1840—1848

IN OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS, DOCUMENTS, AND CORRESPONDENCES WITH LORD PALMERSTON, LORD PONSONBY, AND THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES

BY

BARON AUGUSTUS JOCHMUS

LATE GERMAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FIELD MARSHAL-LIEUTENANT
IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.

TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

BERLIN:
ALBERT COHN
58, MOHRENSTRASSE
1883.



VORWORT DES HERAUSGEBERS.

Bei dem innigen Zusammenhang des zweiten Bandes mit dem ersten und, nachdem in der Einleitung zu eben diesem das allgemeine und nöthige bestimmt und, wie ich glaube, hinreichend auseinandergesetzt ist, bleibt mir für die Einführung dieses Theiles des Jochmus'schen Werkes nur wenig zu bemerken. Uebrigens mag auch die eigene Vorrede des Verlebten zu diesem Bande nebst den "Addenda" an sich zum Geleite dienen.

Welche Rücksichten aber bei der Auswahl dieser Schriftstücke vorgewaltet haben, welche Grundsätze dabei leitend gewesen sind, das wird dem aufmerksamen und einsichtigen Leser nicht entgehen.

Die Stellung, welche der Mann — damals in der Kraft der Jahre — während eines längeren Zeitraumes, 1841 bis 1848, in Constantinopel einnahm (vgl. Band I p. XIII), und die feste Gesinnung welche er in sich trug, sowohl in Beurtheilung öffentlicher Dinge als in Abschätzung von Persönlichkeiten, bedingten neben dem Einfluss der bedeutenden Ereignisse der späteren Epoche naturgemäss und folgerecht die Wahl, Sichtung und Diaskeuase seiner ausgedehnten Correspondenz, wie die gelegentliche Beigabe von Noten und Erörterungen.

Es sind, um dieses Eine hervorzuheben, wesentlich vier grosse Gesichtspunkte welche dabei den Blick auf sich ziehn und die Aufmerksamkeit erregen:

die Verhältnisse Aegyptens nach Mehemed Ali's im Grunde nur scheinbarer Unterwerfung;

die Regierung in Stambul und die Verwaltung in den Provinzen des Osmanischen Reichs in Europa und Asien, als unveränderte Zustände, ja unveränderliche Dinge;

die eiteln, unberechneten Versuche oder Eingriffe von Seiten der Mächte und der Diplomatie, mit abendländischen Reformen am Bosphorus und bei den Musulmanen überhaupt etwas sicheres zu bewirken, etwas dauerndes herzustellen;

endlich die Absichten und Begehrlichkeiten der Griechen für Ausdehnung der ihnen von Europa zugestandenen Grenzen auf Kosten der Pforte und unter steter thätiger Mithilfe der revolutionären Propaganda.

Mit Rücksicht auf die griechische Angelegenheit wollte, wie ich glaube, der General jene ernsthafte Note des Fürsten Metternich an den Grafen Appony, österreichischen Gesandten in Paris, — d. d. 10 October 1844, — beigezogen sehen, welche als eine Art Corollar an den Schluss seiner die Vorrede begleitenden Schriften gestellt ist.

Ein Mann und Beobachter, wie Jochmus, vermochte diese tief eingreifenden Verhältnisse der grossen orientalischen Frage nicht bloss mit Aug' und Ohr unmittelbar zu erfassen und genau zu erforschen, sondern auch Hinweisungen und politische Aperçus mit einzufügen welche zur Klärung des historischen Urtheils, welchem die Wahrheit als letztes schweres Ziel gesteckt ist, unleugbar Halt und Licht gewähren.

“Vier politische Probleme hat die neueste Zeit
“zu eben so vielen Axiomen erhoben:

“1. Die in Folge der Siege Englands und Oesterreichs in Syrien dem Nilsatrapen auferlegten Bedingungen werden nur so lange vollzogen, als man ihm “mit aufgehobenem Stock zur Seite steht.”

“2. Die Wiederbelebung der Türkei durch Einführung christlicher Kriegszucht und Regierungsform “ist unmöglich, und folglich beim ersten Stoss von “ausen die Zerstücklung des Reichs nicht zu ver-
“hindern.”

“3. Von den nicht moslimischen Stämmen (Raja) “der Türkei ist keiner zur Uebernahme des Ganzen “oder auch nur eines überwiegenden Theiles politisch “befähigt. Folglich sind

“4. alle politischen Combinationen ausserhalb “dieser Schranke als abortiv und provisorische Phan-
“tasien zu betrachten.”

Diese vier politischen Axiome hat im Monat Juni 1841 und, wie man sofort erkennt, im Gleichklang der oben berührten Saiten, jener Historiker aufgestellt, welchem ob seiner Kenntniss der levantinischen Dinge und wegen des Scharfblicks in der Darlegung und Folgerung bestimmter, aber gerne anders gefärbter Verhältnisse seit jenen Tagen und in der Folge eine entschiedene Autorität, auch öffentlich, wie im brittischen Parlament während der gerade jetzt wieder lesenswerthen Verhandlungen vom Jahre 1861, zugestanden worden ist. Der beste Prüfstein derselben war die alles enthüllende Zeit —

*ἀμέραι δ' ἐπίλοιποι
μάρτυρες σοφάταιοι —*

die historischen Denksteine von vier Decennien bezeugen ihre Wesenheit, ihre Wahrheit. Man wird der Hinweisung auf diesen Gewährsmann im Werke selbst begegnen.

Es ist aber vorzugsweise die vertrauliche Correspondenz zwischen General Jochmus und Viscount Ponsonby, zuletzt britischem Gesandten in Wien, in welcher sich jene Wege und Wirren des Fatums abspiegeln. Dieselbe reicht beiden zur Ehre: es ist der Austausch von Männern, und von solchen welche die Zufälle des Augenblickes nicht zum Masstab nehmen für Staaten und Völker, noch auch die Stimmen des Tages als heilbringende Orakel moderner Glückseligkeitsapostel betrachten. Klugheit und Vorsicht wird jene immerhin in Rechnung bringen, und diese niemals überhören.

Die Briefe des Viscount, deren Sachgehalt schon zum ersten Band hervorgehoben wurde, vgl. I, p. XX, bleiben auf gleicher Höhe, ja einzelne derselben, wie No. 21, 22, 27, 30, 80 überragen noch durch die Schärfe des Urtheils, die Geradheit der Sprache, die Wucht der Worte: es sind wirkliche Staatsbriefe. Ich möchte auf ihn den besonnenen Staatsmann, antiken Charakters, jene Verse römischer Kraft anwenden:

civis erat qui libera posset
verba animi proferre et vitam impendere vero.

Wenn Jochmus selbst an einer Stelle schreibt — in dem Briefe vom 4. September 1846, welcher unter No. 77 im Auszug mitgetheilt ist:

“La nomination à Vienne de mon ancien ami Lord Ponsonby m’a fait le plus grand plaisir. Les nombreuses lettres que j’ai reçues de lui depuis son départ d’ici, prouvent par leur teneur et par leur style, que l’esprit et le caractère de Lord Ponsonby n’ont rien perdu de leur vigueur et de leur fraîcheur, malgré le grand âge de cet Ambassadeur qui est dans sa 77^{ème} année” — so wird jeder Leser diesem Ausspruch beipflichten.

Wenn, beispielsweise, Ponsonby sagt:

“Every country must be governed in very great accordance with the fundamental principles, upon which the society, called a people, is formed. The religion and the manners of that society are the most important of those principles” —

oder ein andermal:

“Every Government must stand upon its appropriate original fundamental principles, every Government that abandons them will be destroyed” —

und aus diesem Grund hinzufügt:

“What can be so absurd as to attempt to govern a Mahometan population upon the principles that rule Christians and vice versa, as if religion were nothing, instead of being as it is the foundation and support also of every human society. All religions sanctify justice and that is enough, until it may please God to give greater purity to the doctrines, established in the various parts of the world” —
oder anrath:

“An approach then, in Turkey, to a good administration of justice in all things, is the proper object, in my opinion, to which Turkish statesmen ought to direct their attention. Justice will establish an improved order, and that will increase wealth, and that will augment intelligence, and trade will follow and will liberate those who engage in it from many mischievous prejudices and habits, and the society will advance towards an amended station, by sure though slow degrees” —

so haben wir sozusagen einen Commentar zu mehreren der obigen politischen Axiome und fühlen zugleich den Geist und die edle Gesinnung eines Staatsmannes, in

XII

vielen unserem Wilhelm von Humboldt vergleichbar. Es liessen sich classische Apophthegmata aus dieser Correspondenz zusammenlesen.

Was Ponsonby, die Hauptfrage ausgenommen, gelegentlich über Fürst Metternich, über englische und irische Zustände, über Frankreich, über Peter den Grossen, über Presse und Revolution ausspricht, zeigt den unbefangenen und selbstdenkenden Politiker; auch er sieht einen Weltkampf um Constantinopel voraus —

“the World will have to fight for the possession of that City which by its position is naturally the very Heart of Europe and Asia.” —

Einmal und angesichts des bedenklich wachsenden religiösen Eifers und Hasses bei Christen und Moslims ruft derselbe aus:

“Bigotry has made immense progress in Europe!” — wie würde der aufgeklärte, aber jedem hohlen Gerede und allem eiteln Gebilde religiöser oder politischer “Schemer” abgewandte Menschenfreund erst heute staunen, sich sorgen, nachdem diese am Mark der Gesellschaft, der Staaten zehrende Geisteskrankheit fast alle Schichten der Bevölkerung unter verschiedenen Symptomen angesteckt und jenseits des Aermelcanals wie diesseits, bei Romanen und Germanen eine Ausdehnung gewonnen hat, welche mit dem Verfall der Zucht und bei der ausschweifenden Sucht zu blossen Genuss eine gefährliche Krisis fast unvermeidlich macht.

Statt der lichten Gestalten evangelischen Friedens und lauterer Herzensfrömmigkeit, welche in Demuth gegen “die in der Höhe waltende Macht” liebevoll einhergeht und die Würde der Menschheit in jedem Nächsten unverbrüch-

lich hochhält, zieht es wiederum dumpf und dunkel, feindselig und finster durch die Gemüther der Christenheit —

vexilla regis prodeunt inferni. —

Ob der Satz:

“If the Powers of Europe would attend to their own affairs and state-interests, and leave off meddling with the internal business of other kingdoms, there would be somewhat less mischief in the world” —

obwohl unbestreitbar richtig, je zu einem allgemein befolgten Princip der politischen Welt werden mag — wer weiss dieses?

Die militärische Skizze “Abriss der Geschichte des Krieges 1840—41 in Syrien” — vgl. Band I, p. XVII — ist nach dem ausdrücklichen Willen des Verstorbenen im Anhang wiedergegeben. Dieselbe, seiner Zeit wesentlich aus den Papieren des Generals und, wie man voraussetzen darf, mit dessen vollem Einverständniss ausgeführt und veröffentlicht, hat und behält als Fachstudie ihren eigenen Werth.

München, Februar 1883.

GEORG MARTIN THOMAS.

PREFACE.

PART II.

For the last thirty years, from the destruction of the Janizaries — that great act of despair on the part of Sultan Mahmoud — up to the year 1855 the Ottoman Empire has passed through a period of pretended reforms.

The year 1840/41 may be described as the culminating point of this epoch, for the Syrian war was a direct, arbitrary, armed intervention of the great European Powers with regard to the interior affairs of an independent country, and this act destroyed the self-reliance of the Turks. — The farsighted policy of Prince Metternich had early denounced the dangers of similar interventions during the Greek insurrection. — But the blind policy of France, which favored the rebellion of Mehemet Ali, rendered obligatory the untoward intervention in Syria.

Its results were the subjection of Mehemet Ali, the isolation and humiliation of France, but also the permanent diminution of the Sultan's authoritative power, for the year 1841 marks in modern history the commencement of the extremely rapid decline of Turkey.

Hopes in the success of the bold plans, entertained by the energetic Sultan Mahmoud, were not unjustifiable up to the end of the Syrian campaign, but this confidence ceases in 1841. Reforms become unhealthy under his mild and enervated son, and they assume the character of verbose emptiness, or of shallow outward imitation and caricature of European models.

The Western Powers have certainly done more for the dissolution and decomposition of Turkey, by means of their late open military intervention during the last short eighteen months, than Russia had done in the long twenty six years since the peace of Adrianople. Whatever may be the final issue of the war, "European" Turkey will remain annihilated in its character of "a Mohammedan" power.

An Arab legend tells us, how two tribes of Bedoweens began a quarrel about a camel, and how long they continued their hostilities. At last they patched up an arrangement, but none of the parties would confess to have been in the wrong at the beginning of the quarrel. Hereupon rose a venerable and wise Sheik of the Desert, and most solemnly delivered an undisputed judgment in this sense: "that in reality none of the litigants had been in the wrong, but that *'the camel'* was to be condemned, as being the *'fundamental cause'* of the war." The camel therefore, from the reason assigned, was led out into the open space between the tents of the opposing camps, and being unanimously condemned to death, the camel was first well thrashed, and then executed.

Future times will prove, if England and France acted wisely and prudently in declaring war against Russia; but at all events Austria and Germany have no interest "in precipitating" the decline of Turkey, nor is the German Confederation (including Austria and Russia) justified in offering any serious sacrifices for the purpose of maintaining, by force of arms Mussulman misgovernment in Christian countries, at the enormous expense especially of a war and a permanent rupture with Russia, who has been our staunch ally from the great times of Suwaroff to the memorable day of Vilagos.

Who guarantees Germany — under possible circumstances — against a treacherous attack from France,¹ whilst engaged in uncertain war with Russia?

Is it the present French „*regime*“, which prepared the second of December for its *own* country?

Be it here remembered that the English armaments of 1852 were in the first instance directed against France.

¹ See the complications and the war against Austria in 1859.

When I was German Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Imperial Regency, I deemed it proper to elucidate the strange controversies in the Francfort Parliament on the Eastern Question and on the importance of the mouths of the Danube, by drawing up a Memorandum on the subject for His Imperial Highness the Archduke John, and I transmitted the paper subsequently to Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, President of the Austrian Ministry.

The fundamental idea of this Memorandum, post-dated 14 February 1850, is the "*united*" action of the "*whole*" German Confederation, with reference to the affairs of the Levant, and Prince Schwarzenberg told me personally that he entirely agreed with this view of the case.¹

The late conferences of Bamberg, the Austro-Prussian "*special*" treaty, the "*separate*" convention of Austria with France must be considered as abnormities of a period of transition. Abnormities indeed, for what would be the strange position of Germany, in toto, and of the "*first*" German Power (Austria), now tied down by the treaty of the 2 December, if the "*second*" German Power (Prussia) were attacked by the Western Powers on the Rhine or in the Baltic, — whilst again Austria and Prussia — (in their quality of European Powers) — are bound to act together by the defensive and offensive treaty of the 20 April 1854?

These anomalies alone prove the absolute necessity of undertaking a reform of the German Confederation, even if the late Prince Felix Schwarzenberg had not pledged the word of his Imperial master with regard to this reform of the central organ of Germany.

According to the Memorandum of the 14 February 1850 the possible "*identity*" of interests, not the "*antagonism*" of the Austro-German Confederation and of Russia are deemed to be the basis of any solution with regard to the Turkish problem. Hence all causes of a war against Russia not only disappear, but the present object of the great Confederation will be to act as mediator or arbitrator.

¹ The old political anarchy of Hungary paralyzed the immediate influence of Austria at Constantinople, but since 1849 nothing of importance can be decided in Turkey without the full concurrence of Austria.

The word *identity* of Austrian and Russian interests has become of historical importance since the *confidential* conversation of the Emperor Nicholas with Sir Hamilton Seymour.

The great deceased said to the Envoy:

"You must understand that, when I speak of Russia, I also mean Austria, what suits one also suits the other; "our interests are identical."

Circumstances unfortunately seem to have prevented the Cabinet of St. Petersburg from coming, in the *first* instance, to a definitive and complete understanding with the Court of Vienna, regarding the Oriental Question, whilst Sir Hamilton Seymour in his secret reports supposes "*erroneously*" this understanding to be fully established.

An organized system of newspaper-lying has intentionally disfigured and misconstrued the above Imperial words, in order to turn them to account as an offensive valuation of the power, the position, and the grandeur of Austria.

But the late Emperor Nicholas always showed the greatest "*attachment*" to Austria, and the well known word of the chivalrous Field-Marshal Prince Windischgrätz certifies this truth.

It is impossible to overrate the fact that the Russian monarch pronounced a thoroughly justified and humane judgment, when His Majesty declared *ab initio* that the cordial understanding between Russia, Austria, and England was the absolutely necessary preliminary to a "*peaceable*" solution of the Oriental problem.

Late historical events have fully proved the deep wisdom of the Imperial views, whilst these latter are corroborated by the earlier British policy of Mr. Fox and the memorable quadruple treaty of 1840.

As soon as the successful mission of Baron de Brunnow had led to the quadruple alliance of the 15 July 1840, the peace of Europe, till then menaced by the eastern crisis, could be deemed as secured, from fundamental causes, and it was the late disregard of these very causes which has forcibly led to the present war, since England — in an evil hour — was

tempted to desert¹ from the camp of her allies of 1840 into the French position of 1853.

The Syrian War of 1840/41 was essentially a covert struggle between England and France. — Austria, Germany, and Russia had, by arbitration, given their votes in favor of England, and they all were prepared eventually to maintain them by force of arms.

Austria, Germany, and England together could have prevented war in a similar manner in 1853 by an armed "*mediation*", but the self-willed "*partisanship*" of England rendered war unavoidable. — Thus even at present an active co-operation of Austria and Germany might lead to *extend* the war, whereas "*mediation*" rising by degrees to "*arbitration*" may terminate the hostilities.

The four points of guarantee are as elastic as some of the "*Suras*" of the Coran, yet the true believers say that the Coran contains "*all knowledge*", provided you know "*how*" to read and explain it.

History shows the positive fact that an understanding between Austria, Russia, and England has been at various times conducive to arrangements of Turkish dilemmas *without* war, whilst the present Anglo-French one has *caused* war "*ab initio*". Simple logic then furnishes the conclusion that we ought to look for a "*future*" *definitive* solution of the Oriental problem by means of the first combination in as much as the present war must eventually lead to peace, yet only to a provisional mezzo-termo in the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the more so since the basis of the present alliances is false, and since war, after all, is but the execution of politics by force of arms.

The Austro-German Confederation may ultimately and in due time have the last word for the protection of its interests, whenever the Confederation chooses to act in full unity.

The alliance of the pretended organized democracy and of the, de facto, disorganized aristocracy, can only be temporary and precarious, from want of common principles.

¹ Count Ficquelmont ("zum künftigen Frieden") observes on British policy during the Turkish and Greek question: "It was a policy of mere *interest*, without principles or conscience".

France — from similar causes as Spain — lies for the present beyond the sphere of the usual calculations of probability, because she has still to accomplish another of her chronic revolutionary periods.

France herself is decidedly adverse to the Russian war, which can only be continued in the personal interest of her present ruler. Indeed, the principal cause of the whole complication must be looked for either in the inconsiderate deportment of M. de Lavalette or, still more probably, in the silly planned presumption of Louis Napoleon's Envoy towards the poor weak Turks, for already in 1849¹ Lord Palmerston and Louis Napoleon considered and discussed the chances of a war against Russia. "L'Empire c'est la paix."

War feeds the political, military, and financial imposition which is kept up at Paris.²

But is there no probability that the very foundations of the present Government will be rent on *that* day, when the nobler minds of the country will find insupportable the Byzantine servility and the corruption of the times, and when the nation will rise from its torpor, and regain the feelings of political honour and moral dignity?

England is usually in the habit of not *acting* before fully calculating her *interests*. Yet without insisting that the England of *our* days is more and more drifting into the current of a species of American Mobocracy and subject to a journalism, essentially venal and speculating on mere monetary gains, it must not be forgotten that her history shows various wars — begun in presumptuous levity — and terminated in irresolute weakness.

For instance, when the pretense of popular opinion,³ but

¹ See the annexed report to the German Foreign Office at Francfort a. M., dated Paris 13 October 1849.

² "The mad prodigality which prevails in the confusion of a shipwreck or a siege may serve to explain the progress of luxury amidst the misfortunes and terrors of a sinking nation," Gibbon.

³ 1856. Popular opinion can be good or bad, accordingly as it is directed either by the passions of those who misuse its power, or by being led into the path of right and prudence. Hence it is by no means admissible to consider popular opinion as being always morally correct. (Count Ficquelmont "The future peace".)

in reality parliamentary party strife had caused the unjust war against Spain, Sir Robert Walpole said to his country:

"You ring now the bells (for war), before long you
"will be wringing your hands (for peace)."

The course of events justified the clear-sighted Minister.

If therefore the English cannot always be called a *judicious* people, they still remain a deeply calculating nation.

Just in the same manner as the money-making London journalist augments the circulation and the profits of his own mercantile enterprise¹ by blowing the flame of war and by taking advantage of and befooling the English public, who, in foreign affairs, are as ignorant as the Chinese, even so the agriculturist, the tradesman, and the merchant only looks to the precise amount of loss or profit which peace or war are likely to yield to the *individual*,² whilst the mob shrinks from the military service, and whilst the militia — deaf to law and honour — deserts its ranks at the rate of fifty and in some cases of sixty six per cent, in order to avoid personally the chances of actual war.

From these reasons the so-called public opinion of England desires a participation of Germany and Austria in the war against Russia.

The British Government has *no* power to raise recruits, the British army has *no* well trained officers, but in case of extreme need, there would be *money* forthcoming for paying subsidies.

Little stress is laid under such circumstances on the pretended "*cause*" of civilization against barbarism, for the reasonable and well informed amongst the far travelling English know perfectly well that the Russians are "*the*" real and actual agents of civilization in the countries which they have conquered from the Turks and Persians, just as truly as the English civilize and humanize India.³

¹ See the statistical returns of the Peace Society. February 1856.

² The policy of such a nation finishes necessarily by being a mere calculation of *plus* and *minus*. (Count Ficquelmont "The future peace".)

³ The history of Europe has furnished at no period a more magnificent and splendidly striking fact than the civilization of those immense tracts of the Russian

England above all desires a rapid and advantageous peace, and naturally so because as a *mercantile* nation England is afraid of the competition in manufactures and in commerce on the part of the *neutral* Power, especially of Germany, in the great market of the world, and indeed, we all know on the continent that *since the beginning of the war* the manufacture and the trade of Germany have received an additional impetus.

However, in case that England should not be able soon terminate this war, she would like to see Germany and Austria take part in it, in order that in these latter countries, as in England and France, agriculture, manufacture, and trade might be burthened with the expenses, the damages, and the taxes dependent on war, thus diminishing the apprehended chances of competition, by equalizing the present extra charges.

This calculation is perfectly correct as far as *English* interests are concerned, but precisely for this reason it furnishes the opposite result with regard to *German* interests.

It is most difficult to prove even on principles of mere political economy, that if a short foreign war is not *detrimental* to us and a long one is essentially *profitable*. Englishmen would reason and also act on these principles.

The status quo of the present "*military*" *neutrality* is at all events the most advantageous combination of political economy for Austria and Germany, whilst from a purely political point of view we can remain satisfied to stand aloof from those fields of battle where our old national enemies the French, Italians, Poles, and Turks are acting in unison with our modern manufacturing and mercantile antagonists.

Germany must never disregard the fact that Austria is the guardian of our common interests in the South and East, but that is no logical reason why Germany should be induced by Austria to fight for *French* and *English* interests. The advantages and the disadvantages in the general balance of power and gain, such as they may arise from the present war, will be at least equalized as far as they regard Austria and Germany, if these latter remain in an expectative position

Empire, more or less populous, called into social existence by Peter the Great. (Count Ficquelmont "The future peace" 1856.)

I wrote on the 10 May 1854 from Singapore to His Imperial Highness the Archduke John of Austria:

"I dare not wrong the English statesmen in asserting that they really believe in the vitality of Turkey, for every clerk in the Foreign Office is convinced of her unavoidable decline and fall."

„Still less is it possible to assume their actual fear of a war against France for the valuable possession of Egypt, since England is prepared to begin hostilities with a much more formidable adversary than France, with Russia."

"Finally it is vain to suspect that the successors of Pitt, Castlereagh or Wellington are moved by abstract philanthropy, or by the kind wish of enforcing the blessings of ultra liberal institutions or of Mohammedan religious tolerance on certain portions of Europe, for they have become the allies precisely of that person who has just now re-established despotism in France in its most humiliating, most degrading, and most repulsive form."

"It becomes thus necessary to look for the solution of the above problem to the question of maritime supremacy."

"As soon as Russia becomes extended to the Mediterranean, her naval power will be relatively much greater than that of Spain, in past days."

"England once swept the seas, destroying the combined fleets of France and Spain — yet it would now require still greater victories than those of the Nile and of Trafalgar in order to annihilate the combined fleets of Russia and France, amounting together to 68 ships of the line, each of which may be transformed into a steam-liner or replaced by a heavy ship of that class."

"It may please France to call herself *on paper* the *second* naval power of Europe, in reality she is only the *third*, for France has only 22 line-of-battle ships, fit for sea, whereas there are afloat 46 Russian line-of-battle ships."

"When I was at Spithead in August last, twenty six war steamers of all classes weighed anchor there, led by Her Majesty Queen Victoria, but *each* ship required only "*three first class sailors*" in order to manage her, all the remainder of the sailors might have been just as well marines, artillery men &c."

"Nobody will assert that the Russian naval artillery men and their "équipes de ligne" have not fully as strong nerves as the English, although their *sailors proper* are not as skilful."

"France — in difficulties at home and abroad — may be afraid of the superior military force of Russia, but in case that the Russian fleets be destroyed during the present war, France will have nothing to fear from the then absolute naval supremacy of England?"

"Similar questions are fit objects for the consideration of the statesmen at Paris."

"Germany, however, since the commission of that great act of injustice and impolicy which destroyed the German fleet, must wait for more favorable times, in order to become a naval power. At all events it is not the interest nor the calling either of Austria nor of the other parts of the German Confederation to sacrifice a single drop of our blood for the purpose of establishing a complete British supremacy at sea. Cicero pro domo."

"It must be admitted that in an age, essentially commercial and manufacturing, our national wealth may be much more endangered by an uncontrollable maritime command on the part of England than by any *probable* extension of the Russian Empire."

The Russian fleet of the Black Sea *is now* destroyed.

After the great naval victory of Prince Don Juan of Austria at Lepanto, the Ottoman Grand Visir of those days is reported to have said:

"The Ghiaours have taken the trouble of shaving our beards, and of making our chins smooth, but the beard grows again."

Just so think the Russians. One of their ablest diplomatists told me lately:

"La flotte de la mer noire est le cadet de mes soucis.

"Nous avons une *vieille flotte à voile*, nous aurons, si c'est "nécessaire, une *flotte neuve à vapeur*."¹

People who are well acquainted with the local and strategical considerations which induced the late Emperor Nicholas

¹ See the new Russian steamfleet in the Black Sea. It is *called* a mercantile establishment, but it is semi-military and can be *armed* in a few days.

to create a powerful fleet of *sailing ships* in the Black Sea, *doubt* very much that it ever could be an object with the Emperor Alexander II to re-establish squadrons of "heavy" steam ships of the line in the Euxine.

Yet it is quite a different thing, if the Western Powers intend touching and limiting the inherent sovereign rights of a Russian Monarch in his own dominions, instead of evoking the fair principle of parity and reciprocity.

Bomarsund and Sebastopol have cost the allies about one hundred and fifty millions of Pounds Sterling up to this date.

I have thus given a repetition of the arithmetical thesis of the Dey of Algiers, who sneered at the French Envoy by saying:

"If you had given me the *third* part of the money, "which you have expended on a hostile expedition against "Algiers, I would have *burnt* the whole place, whereas you "have only destroyed *one half* of the town."

England has also been the decided antagonist of a German fleet.

Lord Palmerston was even pleased to describe the German fleet under Admiral Brommy as "*Pirates*." In an answer from Gastein to this frivolous and supercilious behaviour, I instructed Prince Wittgenstein, President of the German Ministry, by order of His Imperial Highness the Archduke John of Austria eventually to deliver his passports to the British Envoy, without taking the trouble of referring the matter again to Gastein.

This diplomatic rupture was only avoided by a satisfactory explanation, by the dignified demeanor of Prince Wittgenstein, and by the considerate conduct of Lord Cowley.¹

¹ *March 1856*. The clear views and the sharp logical deductions of M. de Detmold, the German Minister of Justice, contributed powerfully to the satisfactory settlement of this temporary *quaestio vexata*.

The following honourable testimony to the character of the late genial statesman was delivered at his early death by an impartial observer, if not by a former political opponent:

Frankfort 20 Mars. Le monde politique, le monde savant et le monde artistique viennent de faire une perte sensible dans la personne de M. le conseiller de légation Detmold, décédé récemment à Hanovre dans la force de l'âge. Qu'il nous soit permis de jeter quelques fleurs sur la tombe d'un homme qui a marqué

Can it hereafter be deemed wise that Austria and Germany should be asked to enter on a general war for the purpose, amongst others, of consolidating the naval supremacy of Great Britain?

The superficial phrase that an armed intervention would "abbreviate" the war, and "enforce" peace from Russia, would be just as true in the reversed sense, if it were at all admissible.

Is the Austro-German Confederation called upon to accelerate the conclusion of a war, which may strengthen the Western Powers at the expense of Russia, and thus enable England to foster a revolution in Italy against Austria,¹ and induce France to become the most obstinate antagonist of Germany on the banks of the Rhine?²

d'une manière si honorable dans des temps de trouble et de discorde, temps qui sont la pierre de touche des êtres supérieurs et font ressortir leurs brillantes qualités. Elles seraient peut-être, sans ces circonstances extraordinaires, restées ensevelies dans l'ombre de l'intimité. M. Detmold compte parmi les élus qui n'attendent que le moment propice pour apparaître sous leur véritable jour. Doué d'un esprit droit, fin, lucide, enclin à la raillerie, mais sans méchanceté, il possédait une perspicacité merveilleuse, un coup-d'œil sûr, et un courage à toute épreuve. Il a montré tout ce que peuvent ces rares présens du ciel quand ils sont unis à la plus parfaite probité, au sentiment de l'honneur le plus délicat. On l'a vu à l'œuvre à cette époque néfaste de l'agonie du Parlement de Francfort, lorsqu'il n'y avait plus ni loi, ni autorité reconnues, luttant avec une mâle énergie, tenant de l'audace, pendant qu'il était ministre de l'empire, contre toutes les mauvaises passions déchaînées, ainsi que contre les faiblesses cachées, plus dangereuses encore dans les crises populaires. *Vir probus et peritus* de l'antiquité, il savait dominer les partis, soutenir, encourager ses adhérens et commander l'estime de ses adversaires. Plein de ressources imprévues dans les cas difficiles, avec une âme inaccessible à la crainte, rien ne l'arrêtait quand il s'agissait du salut de l'Allemagne. Toujours modeste, il ne cherchait qu'à s'effacer sans pouvoir y parvenir, la sagesse de ses conseils le trahissait. Il vivra à jamais dans le souvenir de ceux qui ont eu occasion d'admirer sa conduite politique, dans celui de sa famille qui le chérissait pour ses vertus domestiques, dans le cœur de ses amis qui lui sont restés fidèles jusqu'à sa mort et ne cesseront d'honorer sa mémoire. Comment, en effet, oublier le type de l'homme de bien, le patriote ardent, guidé par le génie et la modération, créant pour ainsi dire la lumière autour de soi, et Detmold était tout cela.

¹ 1859. See the plans of Sardinia and of England in the conferences of Paris in 1856, and after the preliminaries of Villafranca in 1859.

² 1859. See France before and after the preliminaries of Villafranca.

These corollaries are as certain as the correctness of that symbol of ancient feud and rivalry, the statue of Arminius (Herman) in the Teutoburg forest, with the sword of Germany uplifted against the *Western* neighbour.

The linguistic line of demarcation has been changed to our disadvantage — however slightly — by the occupation of Alsace on the part of our hereditary enemy, whereas — on the contrary — *we* have germanized many millions of Slavic tribes in the territories between the Elbe, the Danube, and the Vistula.

The Russians therefore have a right to complain of our constant success in germanizing the Slavic element, but *we* have *no* cause reasonably to mention only a russification of the Germans.

The Russians on our eastern frontiers have neither asked nor coveted a single inch of German ground, for the last forty years, since the victorious entry of the Allies into Paris. On the contrary the *Slavic* republic of Cracovia has been incorporated by *German* Austria, not by *Slavic* Russia, whilst the heroes of the goosequill in France and in England have periodically been prating about our difficulties in the Rhenish provinces and in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom.

Admitted that this constant exhibition of hatred be but idle talk, admitted that the events of 1848 to 1850 have evidently proved the power and even the violence of the *German* feeling precisely in the Rhenish provinces, yet the periodical return of the very bombast shows the tendency and the animosity of our true adversaries.

The pretended *defensive* war of the Western Powers has long lost its *defensive* character, and therefore it is vain rhetoric to discuss still the unpractical question who was in the right and who in the wrong, at the beginning of the war.

The parties engaged have made an appeal to arms, precisely because the abstract question of right or wrong was insoluble.

Lord Raglan himself said to one of my military acquaintances that this *defensive* war would never lead to the firing of a gun "*in good earnest*," but it was changed all at once into

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an *aggressive* war against Russia since the Crimean adventure, and it will continue most probably in this character as long as a foreign enemy remains on the Russian soil. Russia has already suffered nearly all and any damages which it may be in the power of the Allies to inflict on her, at enormous and disproportionate expenses on their own part. Henceforward the chances are in favor of the Russian Commanders.¹

If the Western Powers really felt themselves victorious, they would not have subscribed their own *testimonium paupertatis* by courting alliances with third rate powers like Sardinia, Denmark, and Sweden.

Is it logical, if on one side the English and the French assume the tone of victors, and if on the other hand they invoke the assistance of the German and Austrian arms?

Russia is fighting for *positive* and inherent political interests, whereas the Western Powers continue war for *negative* interests, and for purposes of jealousy and envy.

Certain preparations may tend to indicate the intention of an attack on Bessarabia, beyond the Pruth &c. &c.

Party spirit and civic amateurs look to such an eventuality as to a *forcible* inducement for Austria and the remaining parts of the German Confederation to become *active belligerents*.

Yet the position of Austria is not endangered nor exposed by the execution of any similar plan of campaign, on the contrary the military position of Austria becomes — in such a case — still more weighty and decisive.

His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph, by showing parts of his armies in Transylvania, caused the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia by the Russians, from strategical reasons.

Just so the fate of the allied army, if it were to operate on the Pruth, would be actually placed in the hands of the Austrian Commander of the Imperial forces in Transylvania, since in each of the above cases and vice versa the Austrian General stands close to the lines of communication of the belligerents.

¹ 1857. I expressed this conviction to eminent Russian diplomatists early in 1856, before the conferences at Paris, and indeed the financial crisis in France, its calamities arising from the great inundation in 1856, the Persian war against England and the Sepoy rebellion in India would have turned out to be as many chances in favor of Russia, if she had continued hostilities.

Thus the newly projected campaign, as little as the Crimean episode, may possibly *force* the Austro-German Confederation to abandon their present *military* neutrality, whilst the pretended disadvantages of the so-called *political* isolation (of Prussia) are the effects of apprehensive imagination.

England was isolated, by her own will, at the time of the intervention in Spain on the part of Louis XVIII; — the Austro-German Confederation, during the Greek insurrectionary war; Russia, Austria, and Prussia resolved very wisely to stand aloof from the late disturbances in Spain during the disputed succession; France finally was isolated in 1840/41, but the actual rank and power of all those countries was never disregarded nor endangered by these temporary acts of policy.¹

Yet it is another question if the German Confederation (including Austria and Prussia) is in a position to allow any transformation of the Levant to occur without their own active participation.

This question may remain in suspense as long as those transformations continue to belong to the domain of conjecture and hypothesis.

Those changes, however, *are* approaching, for the decline of Turkey is rapid and unavoidable.

In this respect new proofs will be furnished by the documents² contained in the present work, if the reader has not already acquired the same conviction from other or better sources.

Frankfort o. Main, end of November 1855.

A. JOCHMUS.

¹ *March 1856.* See the late invitation addressed to Prussia, requesting her to join the Paris conferences.

² Those papers express no solely *personal* opinions; they usually reflect those entertained by high Turkish functionaries, or by European statesmen and agents residing in Turkey.

Postscriptum.

FRANCFURT O. M. 17 December 1855.

The conquest of Kars by the Russians is of the highest importance, politically, militarily, and commercially.

The power of Nadir Shah was broken against this bulwark, the Russians were forced to raise its siege in 1807, and Field-Marshal Paskewitch took this fortress in 1827 only favored by special circumstances.

The capture of Kars will efface¹ in the whole of Asia, and especially in Persia, the adverse effect produced by the fall of South-Sebastopol, the more so as North-Sebastopol remains unvanquished, and as semi-successes are little apt to produce any impression on the Asiatic mind.

The conquest of Kars completes the definitive possession of the whole Pashalik of Kars and of the Pashalik of Bayasid.

Thus the general result of the two campaigns undertaken by four allied Powers against Russia in Europe and Asia may be shortly described, as follows:

The combined armies and fleets have gained *in Europe* considerable advantages on the coasts, as far as they are within the reach of the naval guns, one half of the fortresses of Sebastopol is taken, and the minor places of Jenikaleh, Eupatoria, and Kinburn are occupied, whereas *in Asia* the Russians have taken the main fortress of Kars, and conquered the minor places of Ardagan, Bayasid, and Toprak Kaleh.

Again *in Europe* the allies are thrown on the *defensive* and are limited to the ground of their fortified positions, whereas *in Asia* the Russians can act *offensively*, since they hold the defiles of the Saganluk and all the highroads from Erzurum to Persia, and since they occupy two Pashaliks nearly equal in extent to the kingdoms of Bavaria and Wurtemberg.

These results of the war may serve normally as criterions of the past and future.

The chances are in favor of the coalition on all the coasts, the Russians are victorious in the interior of the country.

¹1856. See the diplomatic rupture between England and Persia on the conquest of Kars, also the Persian war against Herat and India.

It would be superfluous to mention the evacuation of Moldavia and Walachia, for every judicious soldier knows that the Russians withdrew from those provinces into their own country from strategical reasons, enforced by the military position of the Austrian army in Transylvania.

The number of the prisoners of war is decidedly in favor of the Russians, and may be in proportion of three to one since the surrender of Kars and its army.

The Kurdish population of the Pashaliks of Kars and Bayasid, as well as the Armenians there, are generally favorably disposed towards the Russians. Hence the easy success of their partisan expeditions and the safety of their detached squadrons of light horse in the far interior of the country, hence also the recent measures of the Russians against the English and French trade to Persia and to Asia Minor.

As soon as it shall be known in these latter countries that the Russians confiscate any goods not furnished with certificates showing their neutral origin and shipment in *neutral* vessels, the native and foreign merchant in Persia and Asia Minor will only deal in *neutral* articles. — Combined measures of the above character will paralyze the Asiatic trade of the belligerents, and favor the navigation, the commerce, and manufactures of Austria and Southern Germany, in a similar manner as the trade of Prussia and Northern Germany has been largely extended and benefited by the effects of the Baltic blockades since the beginning of the present war.

PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.¹

I am induced to publish a new edition with additional notes, as the first thousand copies are disposed of.

Time and circumstances have furnished, within a few weeks, some remarkable commentaries to the following four points:

- 1) to the Arab legend of the executed camel;
- 2) to the importance of the conquest of Kars;
- 3) to the pretended isolation of Prussia;
- 4) to the peace of 1856 or rather to the intermezzo in the decomposition of the Ottoman Empire.

1) The Legend of the Camel.

The integrity and independence of Turkey became naturally "*a mythe*" on the day when the first gun was fired there "*in good earnest*."

The Anglo-Turkish campaign in Asia -- totally unsuccessful -- is the fulfilment of Prince Menschikoff's "*dictum*" in 1853: "*Ce sera la dernière guerre de la Turquie.*"

It is the prognostic of the deadly weakness of the Ottoman Power "*abroad*", whilst the foreign military intervention and the forced admission of the 21 reform points furnish the undeniable proof of the "*interior*" decomposition and of the approaching dissolution of the Mussulman social organization in Europe.

2) Kars.

If the most determined Anti-Russian and the most enthusiastic German professor will kindly undertake an imaginary

¹ viz of the political pamphlet; vide Vol. I p. X.

trip down the Rhine, he may have in his mind's eye the vision of Coblenz: viz on the right Ehrenbreitstein and on the left the fortified *town* of Coblenz.

If the same cosmopolite, by force of his intellectual powers, will be pleased to run down the long bight of Sebastopol from Inkerman to the Black Sea, he may find, by analogy, on his right North Sebastopol with the great citadel of Siwernaja (the Russian Ehrenbreitstein) and on his left hand the *town* of Sebastopol "fortified" towards the sea shore, but "unfortified" at the *beginning* of the siege, on the land side.

The genius of Prince Menschikoff and of General von Todleben created the fortified camp of South Sebastopol under the very fire of the Allies.

Supposing that an enemy has taken the "town" of Coblenz, and that he remains on the left bank of the Rhine, instead of crossing the river and of besieging Ehrenbreitstein, it is impossible to say that the whole "fortress" of Coblenz is taken, particularly whilst a German army of 150,000 men remains encamped in and near Ehrenbreitstein.

Just the same reasoning applies to South- and North-Sebastopol.

Notwithstanding the appearance of a light war squadron in the sea of Azow and notwithstanding the significant letter of Louis Napoleon to General Pelissier which demonstrated that the Russians *ought properly* to have evacuated the Crimea long ago, since the elementary art of war teaches that roads and highways are usually bad in rainy seasons, but practicable during dry weather, and notwithstanding all renewed "*decisive*" victories of the Allies, yet the Russians remain steadily in and near North-Sebastopol, rooted to the soil.

The really "*decisive*" moment was the time when the ruins of South-Sebastopol had just been occupied by the English and French (second week of September) after the masterly passage of Prince Gortschakoff's troops from South-Sebastopol to North-Sebastopol.

If, at that time, the Allies had immediately attacked and taken — under the protection of their eight hundred guns — the Russian position of Inkerman, and if they had established themselves between Inkerman and the river Belbeck, in order

to repulse and separate the Russian main army from North-Sebastopol, and finally if they had succeeded in besieging and capturing this chief fortress, then indeed the operations in the Crimea might have been deemed victoriously terminated.

At present the result of the war is only a "mezzo termine" and a confession that the Western Powers were deficient in the skill or power requisite to strike a "decisive" blow.

The glory of the *defense* of Sebastopol will in history outshine the perseverance of the *attack*, in the same proportion as the annals of war raise the heroic resistance of Zaragoza far above the deeds of the assailants.

Looking from Europe to Asia, it must be confessed that the "mezzo termine" of Sebastopol has been completely erased from the mind of the Asiatic nations by the "complete" success of war, represented by the Russian conquest of Kars.

As a proof consider *immediately* after the fall of Kars: the diplomatic rupture between Persia and Great Britain, the declaration of war on the part of the Shah against Dost Mehemed Khan of Kabul (the ally of England), and the march of a Persian army on Herat, proclaiming all about the victories of Russia in Asia to the nations of Khiwa, Bokhara, and Kokand, to the far borders of China and India.¹

3) *The isolation of Prussia.*

When the time had arrived to consider the stipulations and the guarantees of a European peace, it became necessary to invite the great German Power "Prussia" to the Conferences of Paris — and indeed Austria as a member of the German Confederation had asked as much.

Great Britain — then inimical to Prussia — sounded the retreat, and a Prussian Prince is now married to the Princess Royal of England.

It was impossible more completely to justify the policy of German neutrality, and without the treaty of the second December the neutrality of the "*whole*" German Confederation would

¹ 1857. The fall of Kars was the signal of the Persian expedition against Herat. — This rupture caused the Anglo-Persian war, and the latter event had a decisive influence on the great Indian rebellion. The Nemesis of history!

have become ipso facto by its innate might and power, by its mere vis inertiae the "decisive" pacifying agency of Europe.

For, if a European peace without Prussia "alone" offers no proper guarantee, how could such a peace be concluded at all, and properly guaranteed, without the German Confederation, if the latter acted as a political unity?

The "action" of this political unity was eventually secured by the Austro-Prussian treaty of the twentieth April.

This unity against the Foreigner was rendered nugatory by the subsequent treaty of the second December, which was calculated to promote an alliance of the Germans with their natural enemy — France — and which might have led to a species of subdivision of Germany according to the so-called program of M. de Gagern, if the Austrian statesmen had not fortunately stopped short in their dangerous course.

At Vienna *two* means of solution must be considered with regard to the Oriental problem viz:

1) The policy of the Danube or of the temporary small advantages;¹

¹ The present observations are not intended to diminish the full rights of Austria and Germany in maintaining the free navigation of the Danube.

However it may be remarked here that the German Rhine has its mouths in Holland, and the Russian Vistula runs into the Sea through Germany.

At all events it is sufficient slightly to modify the present frontiers in order to secure the neutralisation of the island between the Kilia and Sulina branches of the Danube, and in order to liberate the Sulina course of the river from any Russian control whatever.

The Russians have no legal claim to the above island, nor to any quarantine there.

By the treaty of Adrianople and by the Russian maps the said island is supposed to remain "uninhabited", a stipulation the more appropriate as it is actually a swamp, more fit for frogs than for man.

Count Ficquelmont ("on the future peace") relates with some humour that it may be found out, how precisely English, French, and Sardinian corn-merchants in Odessa, competing with the traders of Galacz, have been inducing certain Russian maritime authorities, not to be too zealous in clearing and deepening the Sulina mouth of the Danube. — I am in a position to add that certain Greek vagabonds of Constantinople, who profited largely by lightened vessels, frequently directed the captains of merchantmen, to throw their ballast overboard on the very bar of the Danube. The bank rose, but the vessels' charges also.

The following statistical return may contribute to form a judgement on the Sulina question:

to repulse and separate the Russian main army from North-Sebastopol, and finally if they had succeeded in besieging and capturing this chief fortress, then indeed the operations in the Crimea might have been deemed victoriously terminated.

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2) the policy of the line Belgrade-Salonica or of the permanent great interests.

The *first* line leads to the Anti-German treaty of the second December, to a kind of subdivision of Germany and to a hostile position against Russia.

The question in this case is, if the *advantages* on the Danube are proportionate to the *difficulties* which Sardinia and England are preparing for the Imperial Government in Italy.¹

The *second* line leads to an understanding with Russia, to augment commercial connections with Great Britain, by favoring the Anglo-Indian trade via Suez, Salonica,² Belgrade, and Semlin, and finally to promote — in Germany — the commercial and political unity of the whole Austro-German Confederation.

Generally speaking, the Germans have no more direct interests in the ruins of Sebastopolis than in the remains of Persepolis.

Yet Germany ought steadily to support Austria, not merely from specific *German* interests, but on account of the undeniable important *Austrian* interests. Such is the "*sacred duty*" of the whole Confederation, excepting the *one* case, if Austria should attempt to impose on us an alliance with France under Louis Napoleon.

It is self-evident that Austria and Germany must maintain the principle of the free navigation of the Danube. — A rectification of the frontiers settles the question. — But what interest has Germany, or even Austria, in the cession of half Bessarabia?

Cession to *whom*? Not to Austria, but to Moldavia!

The Austrian and German Danube trade amounts to an aggregate of eighteen millions of florins *down* the river (or £ 1,800,000). The export *across* the bar is only six millions of florins. — If it is supposed that the premium of insurance rises by an additional half per cent, on account of the augmented risks at the bar, yet the actual surplus expense is only 30,000 florins or £ 3000 per annum.

The quatum of Germany proper is very trifling.

¹ But too correctly anticipated by the conduct of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell in 1859.

² Marseilles now competes with Trieste for the Indian overland route; but if Austrian Lloyd's steamers should run from Salonica to Alexandria, the line would be shortened by full forty eight hours, on an average passage of one hundred and twenty hours from port to port in the Mediterranean.

Was it the object of Anglo-French civilization, to undo the effects of historical development, by replacing a Christian country in the nineteenth century under the suzeranty of the Sultan, and by transferring to the corrupt Boyarocracy of Moldavia the flourishing German colonies of Bessarabia, the name of which recalls to the memory the German victories of Leipzig and Katzbach?

4) *The peace of 1856.*

Lord Clarendon has called *a* peace, but not *the* peace, what I have described as an intermezzo in the decline of the Ottoman Empire.

There are no victors and no vanquished in the peace of the 30 March.

The ways of Providence are hid. The prophets of the Greeks have been true. The power of the Osmanli was broken in Europe in 1853, precisely four hundred years after the conquest of Constantinople.

The blood of the Crusaders in Sebastopol is deemed by the Orthodox Greek to have been the price of Christian liberty in the Empire of the Infidel, and this blood is the mortgage of augmented Russian influence in the lands of the Eastern Greek.¹

Hence says the Emperor Alexander II — true to the tradition of history and of the Eastern church — that the object of the war has been carried out: "*the safety of the Christians in Turkey*" has been stipulated even to a degree superior to the original demands of Russia.

It is curious that Lord Palmerston should add: "The object of the Western Powers is also carried out, *Turkey is settled*," which is again true in this sense that the obsequies of the "dying" sick man may be performed in due time in a spirit of calm reconciliation.

Future days will show, if the testament can be executed or not, *sub beneficio inventarii*, by all the heirs.

One of the English coryphees of the war — now strangely converted — (Sir Charles Napier) told me for instance last

¹ Our great Orientalist Professor Fallmerayer justly observes that in orthodox regions of the Levant "*the creed*" secures political weight.

summer: "What damned fools we have been not to take Egypt."

At the ultimate solution of the Eastern question, the chances are ten to one that England will not again refuse the possession of Egypt, if offered, and that Great Britain will pay — in after times — the tribute of acknowledgement — once denied to the Emperor Nicholas — of immortal memory — for his wisdom and humanity. — England will thus return to the principles of the Alliance of 1840/41, which may eventually "*prevent*," as experience has shown, a new European war.

The policy of England is so thoroughly marked by bare egoism and mere utilitarian principles that any new change of front or the securing a strong position by facing to the rear, will not be deemed abnormal, particularly if that which proves *useful* happens also to be *pleasant*.

Events have proved that Great Britain alone is "impotent" to cope with Russia, whereas some serious reflection will lead to the conviction that she is still "omnipotent" with regard to France.

Why "*impotent*" against Russia? Because Russia cannot be "*effectually assailed*" anywhere.

The spirits of the slain and dead in the Crimea proclaimed it aloud to present and coming generations; an echo of the great year of 1812.

"*Four*" united armies — not to speak of the British alone — were found incapable, during two campaigns, to penetrate only ten German miles into Russia, and with regard to the damaging effects of the blockades, Russia proved herself enabled to substitute an extensive overland trade for the intercepted maritime commerce, to such a degree that the balance of trade was in favor of Russia, during the two years of war.

The irony of fate caused this balance to be paid, in English gold, by the British bank.

Why "*omnipotent*" against France? Because France can be "*effectually assailed*" everywhere: — in the few colonies which England allowed her to retain after the last war, in her diminutive Indian possessions, whereby the severe conditions, imposed by England in 1815, France is only permitted to maintain soldiers for the purposes of "*police*", in Algiers finally,

which can be blockaded and attacked, according to a detailed plan, which has lain in the Foreign Office since 1848.

England possesses 60 to 80 line-of-battle ships,¹ France only 22. Both maintain minor war craft in proportion.

England therefore can effectually blockade the coasts and annihilate the entire maritime commerce and export of France, whereas the repeated menace of a French invasion is — in the true sense of the word — “*a bad joke.*”

If the French ports of war are duly observed by superior British steamfleets, single vessels will scarcely escape from the cruisers, whereas a French fleet, carrying a large army of invasion or protecting its convoy, would be taken, sunk or annihilated before crossing half the channel.

It is necessary to consider these essential and original features of the balance of power in Europe — by land and by sea, and to mature the idea that there exist certain affinities of Anglo-Russian and Austro-German interests in the Levant, as proved by the quadruple treaty of the 15 July 1840 and by the earlier policy of M. Fox. The future solution of the great Eastern problem will thus be facilitated by equal or similar combinations, “*without*” the renewal of a European war.

The present genesis does not pretend to underrate the power of France as a member of the European Pentarchy, but it means to acknowledge the historical truth that the “*principle*” of stability and law has disappeared in France, that the ruling power there exists merely “*de facto*”, and that, in general, the various and periodical revolutionary changes in France, do not admit of any safe calculation, as to her future destiny.

Shortly after the time when the dynasty of Napoleon was deemed to be “*consolidated*” by the birth of the King of Rome, the notorious General Malet happened to escape from a Parisian prison, and the conspiracy of *two* individuals was very near upsetting Napoleon I, together with his King of Rome.

At this moment there is incarcerated somewhere in France by the correctional police a M. Albert, the late member of a French Government, a person of certain abilities.

¹ The *practical* difficulty lies in the manning of the fleet, as there exists no English maritime inscription of the sailors.

Let there a socialist wind blow, and who can guarantee that Albert Ouvrier I will not command in modern France, in the character of a democratic Emperor or Dictator, dissolved as the country now is into Gallic atoms?

See Rom and Byzantium!

The late General de Radowitz — a German statesman of genius — reported 48 hours before the crush of the 24 February that the throne of King Louis Philippe was most solidly established. — Louis Philippe also was commonly described by most newspapers to be wise, moderate, and farseeing, "*as long as*" he was enabled to "*pay*" French and foreign journalists.

Yet the historical school persisted in judging the power of the French King to be ephemeral and unstable, because it was *constantly* menaced by the Legitimists from above and by the Republicans from below.

But what must be said "*now*" of the "*public conscience of France*," of its "*sense of law*", since the coup d'état of the second December?

These are commentaries of the past.

Now a few words of the present:

Lord Palmerston announced the conclusion of the peace of the 30 March 1856 to the honourable House of Commons (laughter).

England, till then pretending to be extremely warlike, had become very quiet and conciliatory, since it was felt that France was ready to abandon her eventually.

A peace "*honourable for all*," a peace without victors and vanquished, has been the logical consequence of the double struggle in Europe and in Asia, its result being the complete balance or the neutralization of mutual advantages and defeats.

The course of the late campaigns had proved to evidence that it was impossible for the "*four*" allied Powers — in as much as Turkey and Sardinia may be deemed actual and virtual Powers in a great war — to secure a full and decisive result against Russia, without relying on the arms of Austria and Germany.

The continuation of the war had thus become nearly useless under existing circumstances.

On one side *Russia* was in a position to pursue her Asiatic victories by land, but on the other side her coasts in Europe were exposed and seriously menaced. In one word *Russia* — even in a fortunate case — could look to no eventually sufficient compensation against certain sacrifices.

On the other side the Western Powers were not sure of inflicting on the enemy any disadvantages and losses which could be in any proportion to their own enormous expenses, as already proved by experience.

The present *England* of Balaklava was no longer the glorious and victorious *England* of Waterloo. — The trite although trivial proverb "Brag is a good dog, but Holdfast is a better" had been sadly verified in the Baltic, after Sir C. Napier's boasting signals and after the bombast of toasts and the garulous straines of mob orators.

Parliament, it is true, continued to vote liberal supplies and heavy income taxes, but the old British army lay buried in the "sacred" soil of *Russia*, and along with it the military reputation of the "Peninsular Heroes."

There remained in the furthest corner of the *Crimea* fifty thousand "jolly" recruits under an untried Commander!

France was financially¹ exhausted, and hailed the end of an unpopular war with inconsiderate joy and haste.

The sword of Damocles, in the shape of a financial crisis, was suspended over the swindling "Bourse," and her "good Ally" across the channel was overanxious to prove by official and documentary evidence that the French² had suffered more in the *Crimea* than the English, that the reports of the *Moniteur* were falsified, that truth was suppressed or hid, and that finally the French army was worse off than the maligned English troops.

In short, the Western Powers were "*au but de leur Latin.*"

Thus peace had become a general necessity, and peace again furnished the negative proof that the Oriental problem cannot be solved on the basis of an Anglo-French Alliance.

¹ French credit is fifty per cent below English credit viz 100:150, since the French 4½ % are at 93, and the English 3% also at 93.

² M. Stafford M. P. produced returns to show that the French loss was 106,000 men dead and disabled only from July 1853 to July 1854.

For the treaty of the 30 March can only be considered as an *interim*: in the preliminary phase of the deadly struggle of European Turkey, and in this sense it is a provisional status, which leaves totally unresolved the main question or the *real* *liquidation* of the Levant: it is a circumscription of an *essential abstract form* of mere words: — *The Integrity and Independence of Turkey.*"

"*Ueân travailler pour le Roi de Prusse*" in both meanings of the words, for Prussia had shown the plain common sense to keep out of this war.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who is not overfriendly to France, said once:

"*Un tel dommage que nous soyons toujours à nous quereller avec la France: si nous agissions ensemble, nous pourrions dominer le monde.*"

The reply given to the Ambassador by an eminent Russian diplomatist was:

"*Dominer le monde non, le troubler, oui.*"

Who can deny that similar views partially provoked and directed the last Oriental war.

Under this constellation "*Turkey*" has shown herself to be *most shortsighted*: for, instead of accepting the moderate terms of Prince Menschikoff, she has had imposed on her the *mortal* twenty one points of reform: "*Sardinia*" has been *most dishonest* or unfaithful to existing treaties, she was baffled in anticipating an unjustifiable accession of territory: "*France*" or the "*Imperial Regime*" was *most selfish*, for the peaceful excitement of the country — since and even before the 30 March — proves the unpopularity of the war and its impossibility under a *free* Government: England finally has come off *worst*, for the country has suffered in its glory and splendour from the military events of the war, it has suffered in its political honour and in its moral dignity from the Queen's journey to Paris.

¹ Lord Aberdeen in the House of Peers said on the 5 May:

"I know enough of Turkey to say that without the *constant interference* of the Foreign Powers the Hattissherif would not be worth the paper "it is written on."

The old parliamentary and military organization of Great Britain was found to be corrupt in peace, powerless and valueless in war, and never did a nation sink so rapidly and so low in the estimation of the contemporary world, as did England by the abuse of its liberty of the press.

The selfsufficiency and boasting of the press in prosperity; its want of courage and its irresolution in the hour of danger; its calumny and reviling of a magnanimous enemy; its treason and disclosures of the plans and secrets of war; its hypocrisy and flattery — in the time of English mishaps — its cringing before "*a noble and great Ally*" (for years despised and maligned); its unworthy insults to the British army and its lying exaltation of the French; its silly menace and abuse of neutral Powers; its party spirit stronger than its love of country, in short, all that can be described as bad, vile, and low was the characteristic type of English journalism during the war.

The daily press, nearly without exception, offered the strongest antithesis to the well known feelings of the English *Gentleman* and *Officer*.

Yet it may be hoped that "*Great Britain*" will again rise from its present deep fall, whenever the voice of the good and the brave shall dominate anew in the country.

"*Russia*" finally will acknowledge that the conservative Alliance of forty years' duration between Austria, Prussia, and Russia requires an open understanding with reference to the definitive solution of the Oriental question, in the *first instance* between St Petersburg and Vienna (not in the *first instance* between St. Petersburg and London), the more so, as it may be assumed that — before the next year — the influence at Constantinople of the neighbouring Empires of Austria and Russia will be again paramount, since the Sultan and his "*wise*" Ministers must by this time at their *own* expense appreciate the benefit of European complications which cause the presence of Anglo-French armies in Turkey.

A safe judgment may be delivered that the deep sagacity and the discerning humanity of the Emperor Nicholas — in eternal glory — had indicated the political combination which would have saved Europe from the immense sacrifices and costs of a great war for the solution of the historical Oriental problem,



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and it may be added that the actual proofs are now furnished, showing that this definitive solution is *not* to be found by means of an Anglo-French Alliance, but that the power and the action of united Austria and Germany will determine the final issue.

The unity or the combined action of Austria and Germany has been promoted by the treaty of the twentieth April 1854, and disturbed by the treaty of the second December 1854.

The mere circumstance that this latter baneful treaty was signed on the nefast anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz, has deeply wounded the national pride of Germany.

Austria has now to fulfil a high moral obligation after having been instrumental in mediating and in concluding peace.

Austria must magnanimously reconcile the moral interests of her German Confederates suffering from the treaty of December, Austria must reconcile her gallant Northern neighbours, the stanch Allies of a hundred years, her comrades in arms on the victorious fields of Leipsic and Paris.

Francfort o. M., 8 April 1856.

A. Jochmus.

PREFACE

TO THE THIRD EDITION.

The complications in Moldavia and Walachia, the disturbances in Bosnia and in the Herzegowina, the catastrophe in Montenegro, the insurrection in Candia, and finally the sanguinary occurrences in Djedda are the unmistakeable indications of the steadily progressing interior decomposition of the Ottoman Empire, caused by the antagonism of the Christian and Mussulman elements in Europe and in Asia, from the confines of Austria to the far frontiers of India, where the Seapoy mutiny and the Mussulman insurrection appear as the last vibrations of the great Russian war, taking their course by Kars, Herat, and Delhi.

It was shown by these papers — already two years ago — from facts and historical reasons — how the last war in Turkey, the peace of 1856 — and especially the twenty one points of “*miscalled*” reforms, and the “*pretended*” equalification of the Mussulmans and the Rayahs must “*necessarily*” become the causes of *that* interior decomposition of Turkey which to prevent was deemed or pretended to be the reasons of the Western Powers for a war against Russia.

History, however, will have to inscribe in its annals no war more unjustifiable in its beginning, more mediocre in its execution, more unpractical in its results and ends than the untoward episode of the Crimea.

Some time ago an old and effete Gentleman, a Swedish Envoy at one of the principal European Courts, happened to hear that his recall had been discussed in council.

¹ vide note pag. XXXII.

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"Sire," — wrote the dying diplomatist to his Royal master — "if Your Majesty orders me to be recalled, you "commit murder; and if Your Majesty wants me to send "in my resignation, you ask me to commit suicide."

Thus lies the case also at Constantinople with regard to the *practical* execution of the *theoretically* correct twenty-one points of reform.

Francfort o. M., 5 August 1858.

A. Jochmus.

NOTE.

The Preface to the first Volume together with the secret Memorandum on Syria, dated Constantinople 18 March 1846, and the Prefaces to the second Volume with their Addenda, as far as the Memorandum to Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, dated Francfort o. M. 14 February 1850, were published (in German) in three editions from 1856 to 1858 in the shape of a political pamphlet.*

* vide Vol. I pag. X.

ADDENDA

TO THE PREFACE OF PART II.

THE BARON DE DRACHENFELS, GERMAN ENVOY TO HIS
EXCELLENCY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS, GERMAN
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris 13 October 1849.

I believe I was correct when in my report Nr. 61 I represented, as somewhat exaggerated, the apprehensions of some amongst the Paris diplomatists with regard to the complications, likely to arise from any refusal of the Porte to give up the Polish and Hungarian refugees.

From what I have learnt since on this point, I am, however, now inclined rather to take the same view of the case.

Long before the revolution of February, it was asserted, on various sides, and perhaps at first, most decidedly, on the part of the French Chargé d'affaires in London, Count Jancourt, that Lord Palmerston tried to create complications everywhere, from no other reason, than from his opinion, that he should secure for himself a great historical position by means of a European war.

A similar supposition might be confirmed by the action, which he has prescribed everywhere to the British diplomatists, especially for the last two years.

But very lately he tried to excite Sicily anew against King Ferdinand, by giving publicity to the fact, that he had caused certain recommendations to be made to the King in favor of the constitution of 1812.

If any doubt could have remained with me respecting the motives of Lord Palmerston's political proceedings, this doubt

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must cease when we consider the ways and means, by which Lord Normanby — in his own especially vivid spirit of intrigue seeks to secure, *not* indeed an understanding between England and France, in order that England by diplomatic demonstrations may keep the upper hand in Constantinople, but on the contrary seeks to force the French Cabinet to assume an attitude of provocation and to induce in fact the latter to lift the sword against Austria and Russia, if those two Powers should not humbly withdraw their late demands on the Porte.

It will be sufficient in this respect, that I reproduce a conversation which occurred some eight days ago, in presence of the President, between Lord Normanby and Monsieur Thiers. — These details have been confided to me, under the seal of official secrecy, by a person very intimate with M. Thiers.

I do not know if the latter went of his own accord to the Elysée, or if the meeting there with the British Ambassador was only accidental.

As soon as M. Thiers had entered the apartment of the President, Lord Normanby, who made his appearance there before him, entered on the question without any further preparation, by addressing M. Thiers, and saying: he (M. Thiers) whose patriotism was above doubt, could not decline to admit that England and France must come, regarding the question pending at Constantinople, to a prompt decision, which could be no other than the resolution to declare war: he (Normanby) relied on his (M. Thiers's) influence and on his support, in order to secure in this case to the French Cabinet the approbation of the Government party and of the National assembly.

M. Thiers on placidly hearing these words, which were uttered by Lord Normanby in great excitement, replied:

“Pendant les vingt années, que je prends une part active aux affaires de l'Europe, il ne m'est pas encore arrivé de voir un ambassadeur se conduire aussi légèrement que vous le faites. Milord, depuis quinze jours.” — “Légèrement?” retorted Lord Normanby, accentuating the word with much sensibility.

Here upon M. Thiers: “Oui! ou si vous l'aimez mieux, lestement; car depuis quinze jours vous cherchez à engager la France inconsidérément dans une guerre, sans qu'il soit le moins du monde constaté, que notre honneur national l'exige.

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j'en doute fortement, quant à moi, et en tout cas, je sais d'avance que, quand vous aurez bien brouillé les cartes, vous vous retirerez du jeu."

Lord Normanby: "La loyauté de l'Angleterre est trop bien reconnue par tout le monde, pour ne pas vous garantir de ce danger."

Monsieur Thiers: "Je regrette de ne pas pouvoir être entièrement de votre avis. Pour ma part, je suis loin de vouloir contester la loyauté de l'Angleterre; mais certes, elle n'est pas si généralement reconnue, que vous vous plaisez de le croire. Bien, au contraire elle est très controversée. Vous dites que le Cabinet Britannique, une fois engagé avec la France, ne l'abandonnerait pas, le cas échéant."

"Eh bien, je n'en suis pas sûr du tout. Au contraire. Je veux bien admettre que vous, Milord, et Lord Palmerston ne nous abandonnez pas, mais vous et lui, vous serez des-avoués et sacrifiés par votre pays, et la France n'en resterait pas moins seule."

"Pardonnez-moi, Milord, mais vous et votre Ministre, vous parlez et vous agissez comme des écoliers, quand le maître est absent."

"Attendez seulement que Sir Robert Peel apprenne ce que vous faites ici en ce moment, et vous verrez ce qui arrivera. L'Angleterre, pas plus que la France, ne veut la guerre sans nécessité absolue. Et pour la France je vous promets que vous ne l'y entraînerez pas, tant que l'Assemblée nationale actuelle existera": and turning towards the President, who had not ceased all the time "to support" the expositions of the Ambassador by signs and even by occasional words: "Je ne suis pas fâché de vous le dire, *mon Prince* (M. Thiers only calls him so, when rather irritated), en présence de Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, afin qu'il puisse l'écrire à son Gouvernement."

"Oui, la majorité de l'Assemblée législative veut la paix, elle saura la maintenir aussi longtemps qu'elle est compatible avec l'honneur de la France.¹ Pour nous précipiter sans raison légitime dans une guerre, il faudrait que vous fissiez d'abord un 18 Brumaire et que nous fussions tous jetés par la fenêtre."

¹ 1855. There can exist no doubt that the Anglo-French war never would have been undertaken by the consent of a parliamentary Government in France.

Lord Normanby: "Mais comment, ne pouvez-vous pas comprendre que, précisément en cette circonstance, il existe un motif légitime, une raison d'humanité, qui engage l'honneur de nos deux pays, à défendre, à sauver ces malheureux réfugiés du supplice qui les attend?"

M. Thiers: "Ah, oui, ces pauvres réfugiés, vous voudriez peut-être les conduire aux Iles Joniennes, pour les y faire assister à l'édifiant spectacle des exécutions qu'on y fait par ordre de votre Gouvernement."

M. Thiers related elsewhere the essential parts of his conversation with Lord Normanby, nearly in the above manner.

It is possible, even probable, that he, in order to raise his own importance, may have coloured some of his words, and understated or passed over some of Lord Normanby's statements. However, the violent zeal of the latter, not always directed by discreet judgment, is generally well known.

At all events, thus much may be gathered from the representation of M. Thiers that the Ambassador has employed of late all his influence on the President and on the French Government, in order to drag them into a more adventurous sphere, and that his efforts have not remained altogether unsuccessful, as far as "the President" is concerned.

With regard to the Ministers, M. Thiers did not as yet know himself how far Lord Normanby had been able to convince them.

When M. Thiers left the President, he tried to find out the feelings of M. de Tocqueville, to whom he paid a visit.

He communicated to the latter his conversation at the Elysée, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs observed great reserve towards him, and although the advice of M. Thiers was apparently well received, yet the Minister showed a certain embarrassment, which induced M. Thiers to apprehend that some inconsiderate proceeding on the part of Lord Palmerston might possibly have already led to some step or other in the above direction.

(signed) v. Drachenfels.

(Translation.)

THE BARON DE KÜBECK¹ TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
JOCHMUS.

Francfort o. M. 22 February 1850.

Sir,

I have the honour to return the documents² which you kindly communicated to me, with the most sincere thanks.

Their contents prove the profound knowledge and the genial conceptions of their author. They have interested me in the highest degree.

Be pleased, Sir, to receive the assurance &c. &c.

(signed) K ü b e c k.

¹ late President of the Council of the Empire.

² The annexed Memorandum, dated 14 February 1850, subsequently transmitted to Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, President of the Imperial Ministry.

SECRET MEMORANDUM

DRAWN UP FOR HIS IMPERIAL HIGHNESS THE ARCHDUKE JOHN
OF AUSTRIA, REGENT OF GERMANY, TRANSMITTED TO HIS HIGH-
NESS PRINCE FELIX SCHWARZENBERG, PRESIDENT OF THE
IMPERIAL MINISTRY.

Francfort o. M., 14 February 1850.

The maintenance of Turkey is more than ever a necessity of European policy since the revolutionary elements in Hungary, Poland, and Italy have been vanquished by means of the sword.

Internal reconstruction and centripetal organization is the present object of Austria; cultivation and support of the conservative elements in Europe is the great mission of Russia.

Neither of these two powerful Empires can now wish for an extension of territory at the expense of their weak neighbour in modern Byzantium,¹ but the general situation of South-Eastern Europe, after the eventful rise and annihilation of its revolutionists, must necessarily lead to an effective augmentation of Austrian and Russian influence in Turkey.

On the part of *Austria* this increased weight arises — both from the moral impression produced by her Hungarian and Italian victories, and from the national prosperity of her Illyrian subjects — (Croatians, Slavonians, and Servians) — who must exercise in future a nearly irresistible power of attraction on the wretched Rayahs of the same races, still under Ottoman oppression and deprived of all the guarantees enjoyed by free-

¹ "Under a Prince whose weakness is disguised by the external signs of majesty and discretion, the most worthless favorites may secretly dispute the Empire of the Palace and dictate to submissive provinces the commands of a Master whom they direct and despise." Gibbon.

men. This attraction will exercise its power in proportion and in time, as the Austrian Illyrians shall feel secured in their national tendencies, in as far as they are fully compatible with the unity of the Austrian Empire.

The additional augmentation of the preponderating religious and political influence of Russia — already firmly founded on an historical basis, especially since the treaty of Adrianople — is explained most evidently by her late enormous display of military power, and by her commanding position towards Moldavia and Walachia, where Turkey *alone* would be materially and morally impotent permanently to oppose the revolutionary machinations of a sunken and totally corrupt minority of Boyars, who are not afraid of an agrarian rising, because they are already financially ruined.

These machinations, notwithstanding all contrary appearances and protestations, are ultimately directed "*against*" the authority of the Sultan himself.¹

A clear appreciation of existing facts will immediately show that the status quo, nay the very existence of Turkey has depended for many years on the good will of her powerful neighbours.

If we consider that there are in European Turkey 11½ millions of Christian Rayahs, who are legally deprived of all the rights of citizens, nay of free men — for the Koran grants to the infidel only *protection never rights* — and who only await a signal or a command from St. Petersburg, in order to rise against merely three millions of Mussulmans; if we know that 20,000 Russians at the Dardanelles would more efficiently defend the South of their gigantic Empire than 100,000 men distributed along the shores of the Black Sea; if we look to the circumstances that 12 line-of-battle ships and a mixed fleet of minor vessels could carry those 20,000 men in four days from Sebastopol to the Dardanelles,² and that a Russian army could

¹ *March 1856.* See the present protests of the Boyars against the conferences at Constantinople and their demands for "Union and Independence."

² *1855.* The local and strategical conditions which favored the execution of a similar expedition have been modified since the day of Spithead (August 1853), which disclosed and founded the new naval tactics dependent on the system of screw war ships.

arrive at the Dardanelles in one short campaign; and that finally the Balkan, which has been carefully reconnoitred since 1829, can not be any longer deemed a sufficient bulwark for the protection of Constantinople, then indeed it will be found that the chances of maintaining the independence and integrity of Turkey must surely be looked for in the conservative interest of the Great Powers and in their inherent principles of public right, much more than in the intrinsic power of the Ottoman Empire itself.

When the question arose about the Hungarian refugees, much was heard of fantastic dreams about the excellence of the Turkish fleet, about a military organization of the Sultan's Christian Rayahs, and about His Turkish Majesty's well disciplined army, raised to 350,000 men.

The bare truth, however, is that — in point of naval skill — the Sultan's men-of-war are — in action more dangerous to each other, than to the enemy; that a military organization of the Rayahs would lead unquestionably to civil war in Turkey and nearly with certainty to an expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe, and that, finally, the pretended army of 350,000 men consists in reality of 130,000 men.

This latter number of soldiers is reluctantly raised from a total Mussulman population of about eight millions of souls, and only 70 to 80,000 effective men can actually take the field in Europe. In their present state of transition, when they have lost the good qualities of *irregular* troops, without having yet acquired the "tactical solidity" of *regular* bodies, the power of resistance, inherent in these forces, may be estimated from the certainty that forty thousand Austrians or Russians, would totally rout in the open field double the Ottoman numbers in the space of a few hours.

The Sultan *pays*, the administration and the commanding officers *steal*, the troops exist mostly *on paper*, and the reputation

The advantageous currents of water and wind from Sebastopol towards the Dardanelles do not secure any further to new Russian *steamfleets* that *local preponderance* which their *sailing* fleets enjoyed as long as *all* the European naval armaments consisted mainly of heavy sailing ships.

This important circumstance diminishes essentially the general bearing of the question about the eventual strength of the Russian fleet in the Euxine.

of their Generals and drill masters is the illusory fabrication of venal foreign journalists at Constantinople, and abroad.

The memorable Syrian campaign of 1840/41 is a good criterion.

In successful rebellion against his legitimate Sovereign since eight years. Mehemet Ali, "*on the ninth September*", mustered in Syria and in Egypt 127,344 men, *on paper*, forming effectively 85,000 men with 619 pieces of ordnance in fortified places and 270 field guns, supported by 18 line-of-battle ships in the harbour of Alexandria.

"*On the seventeenth January*" Syria was conquered, the fleet restored to the Sultan, and only 17,300 men and 82 field guns returned to Egypt, the wreck of a regular army routed and destroyed in *four months*.

Yet the Egyptian army of those days was tactically superior to the present Turkish forces, and its leaders, although no strategists in the European sense of the word, certainly surpassed the now acting Ottoman Commanders.

It is not therefore due to any intrinsic capacity of resistance on the part of the Divan, but it is to the moderation and to the longanimity of the two Imperial Courts that we owe the termination of the latest Oriental crisis, unfairly conjured up by means of the refugee question.

If the Envoys of Russia and Austria had left Constantinople, the whole of European Turkey — three months after their departure — would have been involved in the flames of an open rebellion sapping the throne and Empire, even without a single Russian or Austrian soldier crossing the frontiers.

In case, however, that the Czar's forces should have entered the Ottoman states, the shouts of the Greeks hailing Prince Radzivil might possibly have been verified: "Next year mass will be said in Santa Sophia"; for Russia united with Austria (or Austria *remaining neutral*) would easily penetrate in one campaign to the very Dardanelles, in absence or in presence of the Western fleets.¹

¹ 1853. Modified in point of immediate execution, since the changes in naval tactics, inaugurated by the great review of Spithead in August last.

The more impotent Turkey would thus remain eventually against the action of Austrian and Russian armies, the more elevated — in the true interest of all general conservative policy — appears the present mission of the two Imperial Courts, who must protect the Sultan in order to prevent new and heavy explosions and European complications; — but the duty also becomes most important clearly to examine the symptoms of the irremediable decay and the organic decline of the Ottoman Empire, since the true knowledge of a disease can alone lead to the choice and application of temporary palliatives.

If there exists no actual *external* danger for Turkey, if on the contrary still in 1840 the quadruple Alliance (of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia) has prevented her partition or dissolution, yet it cannot be denied that the *internal* process of decomposition makes the most lamentable and rapid progress.

The open and the covert failures of the Turkish domestic organization may be properly subdivided into "*general*" distempers, which enervate the whole Empire, and into "*special*" diseases, which affect certain individual localities.

Without being misled by the vain machinations of bribed journalists — scarcely worth the purchase money — and their hollow declamations calculated for the European market — we may include in the *general* class all those measures which are adopted much more as a means to edify or to deceive the distant liberalizing public of Europe, than in order truly to benefit Turkey herself, viz the remedial schemes of the pretended reformers, properly described by Prince Metternich as incapable innovators (*ineptes innovateurs*).

The symptoms of this era of impracticable theories of reform are: a permanent vacillating system of up and down between Ministries — (leading the weak Sultan) — of the old and new school; a mutual négation and evasion of regulations and ordinances of succeeding adverse administrations, occasioning constant oscillations of the whole governmental machinery; inconceivable corruption and intriguing machinations.

Rising demands of the Rayahs, never satisfied, determined resistance of the Mussulmans, irritation, mortal hatred, and strife amongst all classes, conflicts, arising from the contrasts of the Koran, and the reform regulations — and thus creating a dis-

harmony in the administration and embarrassments for the provincial Governors, are the lamentable consequences of indigested innovations or rather of hollow imitations of European "*external forms*".

The "*external form*" (nearly theatrically) is the law of the army and of the navy; whilst there is total absence of true military spirit, of martial discipline, and devoted confidence; the "*external form*" announces a financial reform, whereas the positive facts show a deficit of an amount equal to the whole general revenue of eighteen months, produced by former deteriorations of the coin, by present malversation, and by extravagance; the "*external form*" finally of ministerial decrees and Imperial Hattisherifs grants equal rights to all the subjects of the Sultan, whereas the hidden reserves, the dubious terms of the text itself, the positive prescriptions of the Koran, and the whole Mussulman law speak only of the *protection*, never of the *rights* of infidel Rayahs. Indeed, the bona fide change of these laws, the practical alteration of the centenarian custom would be tantamount to the dissolution of the Turkish Empire.¹ The Koran must first have given way to the Bible.

If we pass from the above *general* symptoms of the internal decay of Turkey to its *special* character in various parts of the Ottoman state, it must be acknowledged by all competent judges that in Asia and in Africa the faith of Islam will still for ages confront victoriously the attempts of Christianity, and that the Koran has created strong vital organizations in Damascus, Bagdad, and Cairo, whereas the unmistakable proofs of Mohammedan decrepitude become daily more menacing to the Sultan's authority in European Turkey itself, where 11½ millions of Christians, who find a support in modern civilization, are still

¹ 1856. The new 21 points of reform are equivalent in themselves alone to an annihilation of the "*old Ottoman state*", supposing that they be executed "*bona fide*", but in the case that they are eluded "*mala fide*", like the former Hattisherifs, their sure consequences must be permanent anarchy and revolution. At all events it is nefast and perilous to endanger the freedom and privileges of the Byzantine church, which have remained respected, and unchanged, and were lawfully confirmed even by the mighty conqueror Mahommed II. The moral constraint, now laid by the Western Powers on the soi-disant "*independent*" Sultan, can only tend again to augment the influence of Russia in future, both in the eyes of the Turks and of the Rayahs.

condemned to live under the pressure of 2,900,000 Mussulmans, who derive only corruption and enervation from that very same civilization.

Amongst the causes of this perilous decline must be enumerated — besides the above indications — chiefly that natural influence of Europe which acts by means of daily steam navigation, of trade, commerce, and of all those flourishing civil and military institutions of the neighbouring Empires, secured on the principle of equal rights granted to nationality and religion, that influence which is acquired by the education of many amongst the younger Rayah generation in Europe, by the daily contact — in one word — of high civilization with semi-barbarism.

Amongst the causes of internal decomposition may still be enlisted the open or covert struggle against the pretended late reforms, maintained by those great Illyrian families who became converts to the Islam after the battle of Kossowa, in order to secure their feudal privileges at the expense of their faith; further the latent consequences of the Servian and Greek wars of independence; the revolutionary doctrines of the neighbouring Greek press and of the French journals, favored by the foolish shortsightedness of Reshid Pasha's adherents; the machinations of the Italian, Polish, and Hungarian refugees, and last not least the cabals of the Moldavian and Wallachian revolutionists, who tend ultimately — abusing Turkish simplicity and ignorant credulity — to accelerate the fall¹ of an Empire — *absolute* par excellence — in whose interest they pretend to act in favor of *liberty*, against Russia and Austria.

The above facts and opinions lead to the logical conclusion that the more positively the great policy of Europe must be directed to maintain the status quo of the Levant, the more clearly its leading statesmen must have perceived the dangerous rapidity of the internal process of dissolution, which undermines the Ottoman Empire.

The status quo, however, can be maintained only by means of a sincere co-operation on the part of the great Powers —

¹ 1858. See the project of an "independent" Daco-Roumanic state under a foreign Prince, as proposed by France and the revolutionary party in Moldavia and Walachia.

and in the first line of Russia and Austria — and their chances of success rise in proportion as these two Empires agree on a common policy, in one instance for the maintenance of the status quo, in the other for the eventuality of an internal dissolution especially of European Turkey, which may possibly still occur in the portentous times of the present generation.

Amongst the misconceptions of the year 1848, which have found their expression partially in the German national Assembly, is to be included the current supposition, fostered by the Erfurt or Gotha party and by the Teutonic radicals, that Germany and Austria must oppose, at any price, the influence and the extension of Russia towards Constantinople and in the Black Sea.

They are pleased to describe this project as "the German mission of Austria in the East." The fullest indications of this scheme may be found on one part in a plan of General von Gagern — hawked about at Berlin in its time as coming from Francfort o. M. — based on the re-establishment of Poland and the diminution of Austria &c., on the other part in a pamphlet of M. William Schulze, member of the national Assembly, where the dissolution of Austria is still clearer pre-supposed by the projected reconstruction of Poland and by the scheme of an *Hungarian* (Magyar) federative state as far as the Sulina-Mouth of the *German* Danube, as well as by the concoction of a united Italy.

The skill to combine the German Eastern mission of Austria with its own projected diminution remains the diplomatic secret of the aforesaid parties.

The *German* patriotism of those schemes may remain unexplained.

Thus much, however, is certain that quite different combinations become possible on *that* day when Providence should decree the fall of the Ottoman dominion in Europe, and when Russia as well as Austria should be called upon to accept a rich inheritance in order to prevent a neighbouring chaos and anarchy.

The Unitarians in Germany, who purposely or unintentionally tend to undermine Austria, and who are subdivided in Prussian Imperialists (of a theoretical turn rather than of a mis-

chievous character) — and in Ultra-Liberals — at heart Republicans — have adopted a common cry: viz liberty of the *German*: Danube and of its *German* trade as far as Sulina, the means of execution being looked for in the scheme of a Federative State including Hungary proper, Transylvania, Walachia and Moldavia.

During the winter of 1848 agents and members of the revolutionary Moldo-Wallachian Government carried on some negotiations in this sense with the Gagern party and certain members of the central Ministry at Francfort o. M. The scheme was:

“to break ethnographically as well as politically the great chain of the Slavic nations by means of the Magyars and the Daco-Roumans: introducing a wedge between Russia and Constantinople.”

They forgot or disregarded various circumstances and conditions, for instance: that the practical result of the projected scheme might have closed the Danube — for the purpose of *German* trade — at Pressburg rather than at Sulina; they forgot that Sulina is not situated in *Turkish* Moldavia but in *Russian* Bessarabia; that Russia can blockade the mouths of the Danube by means of a single corvette, that a Russian fleet of twelve line-of-battle ships completely commands the Black Sea, that it is necessary to begin with digging a port for a *German* fleet — supposed that such a fleet could be “conjured up” in the Black Sea or “let down” ready from the skies — since there exists no war harbour from Kustendje to Trebizond; they overlooked that trade — German as well as general European commerce — *never* had been so flourishing in the Danubian principalities as it has been precisely since the peace of Adrianople,¹ they finally disregarded the fact that

¹ The Russian quarantine at Sulina was established subsequently to this treaty, and the pretended usurpation is de facto limited to this institution.

It is singly and alone due to the Russians that any European trade exists at all in the Black Sea, for this trade only sprung up since the treaty of Kainardje in 1774, and has received its great increase especially since the peace of Adrianople in 1829, which abolished the malpractices of the Turks, who claimed up to that period the right of stopping all corn-cargoes, of fixing their value and of paying them arbitrarily in debased coin.

the Black Sea trade just since 1829 has been permanently rising, that amongst other items the number of mercantile vessels passing through the Dardanelles was:

	in 1839	in 1847
Austrian	440	1450
Hanseatic	10	100

and that the ratio of nearly all Foreign shipping has risen in similar proportions. — The English trade at Trebizond has advanced during the last ten years at the rate of 100 to 300. It amounted in 1847 to about 3 millions Sterling.

In referring to the above data we explain the preponderant influence of Russia, her interest in maintaining the status quo, and the resolution of the Court of St. Petersburg:

“to expend the last cossack and the last ruble rather than
 “to tolerate the execution of the aforesaid plans and
 “schemes” —

such as they have been ascribed to the Gotha-Unitarians and to the German radicals.

Should the time of an internal decomposition of European Turkey really be so near as many people believe; should the expectative and mediating policy of the great Powers prove inefficient in supporting any longer the unstable throne of the Sultan; should the period of transition between *decline* and *fall* remain so poor indeed in the organic and political regeneration of the Rayahs, as many politicians argue from the miserable and anarchical condition of modern Greece; still there would be found definitively other ways and means fully to satisfy the Oriental interests of Austria and Germany than to follow a course which must involve the Austro-German Confederation in permanent enmity or even in war with Russia.

Those ways and means do not consist in hostility against Russia, nor in the exclusion of Austria from Germany, but on the contrary they pre-suppose a good understanding with Russia, and the closest union of Austria and Germany in the sphere of politics and of material interests. With reference to the latter point they lead to the formation of the Austro-German Custom's Union, to the German colonization of Hungary, and

to the junction of the Austrian railroads with those of South-Western Germany.

Annexed to this Memorandum is an ethnographical map. The population of European Turkey may be computed to be:

Moldo-Wallachians (north of the Danube)	4,000,000
Slavic races (south of the Danube)	6,000,000
Greek mixed races (in Thessaly and dispersed on the coasts)	900,000
Armenians and Jews	600,000
	<hr/>
Total of Rayahs	11,500,000.
Ottomans (of Asiatic extraction)	700,000
Mussulmans in general, including con- verts	2,200,000
	<hr/>
Total of Mohammedans	2,900,000
Total population	14,400,000.

The Moldo-Wallachians are already de facto separated from Turkey.

The principal groups of the 900,000 mixed Greeks live near the frontiers of modern Greece — excepting those who inhabit Constantinople

The natural lines of separation, indicated by the rivers and the mountain chains south of the Danube, nearly co-incide with the demarcations which subdivide according to language or nationality the powerful Illyrian and Bulgarian tribes, who count six compact millions of Slavic race.

The natural and historical power of attraction causes the gravitation of the Illyrians towards the tribes of their own kin in Austria, that of the Bulgarians towards their Russian progenitors.

Already the treaties of Carlowitz and Passarowitz had assigned in former days to Austria by the frontier line of the Aluta river the possession of the Banat of Crajowa, which is so indispensable to the manufactural and agricultural pursuits of Transylvania.

A similar fluvial frontier and a line from Widdin to the Gulf of Cavala, and further a demarcation from Salonica to a given point between Durazzo and Cape Linguetta, consequently a limitation including chiefly the Illyrian and the Catholic tribes, would circumscribe the natural territory which Austria

— and by her indirectly the Austro-German Confederation — ought to claim as the proper domain of their commercial and political sphere, in case of the decomposition of European Turkey, whereas those parts of the Sultan's dominions in Europe which are situated east of the above demarcation, could scarcely be withheld from an unavoidable annexation to Russia.

When these times of accomplishment are approaching, when the often predicted but seldom fairly examined "German mission of Austria in the Levant" shall have been directed into its true channels and limitations, then the proper means for obtaining and for securing the blessings of the moral resurrection and of the material prosperity of the Christian populations in the fairest portions of Europe — admitting the event of the great Oriental catastrophe — will be found to exist in the good understanding between the Austro-German Confederation and Russia — not in their mutual hostility — just as the maintenance of the present status quo depends on the latter contingency.

As soon as Servia and Macedonia shall be drawn within the sphere of the Austro-German civilization and general industry, the construction of a railroad from Belgrade to Salonica will prove to be the solution of the military and commercial difficulties which constitute the so-called Sulina-question.¹

Salonica after being connected with the Danube and the Hungarian railroads; Triest, after becoming the terminus of the railroads of Western Austria, would soon rise in our days to the relative importance of Venice and Genoa during the middle ages, the more certainly so, when the Indo-European intercourse (men and merchandise) shall pass again, via Suez, through the Mediterranean. No merchant will send his goods from a central point in the Archipelago (for instance from Syria) to Belgrade by way of Sulina (or vice versa), when he has at his disposal the railroad from Salonica to Belgrade, because larger vessels must lighten their cargoes at the bar of Sulina (9 feet of water) and they are compelled to discharge it altogether at Galacz. — Besides the steam navigation is in-

¹ There are less technical difficulties to contend with on a line from Belgrade to Salonica, than on the line from Vienna to Triest, which is already terminated. (Cfr. Fallmerayer Werke II, 491 "Ueber die Erbauung einer Eisenbahn von Belgrad nach Salonik".)

errupted between Constantinople and Galacz from November to April.

It is therefore a pure phantasmagory to speak of a *closure* of the German Danube by the *Russian* occupation of Sulina, for Russia has commanded the lower Danube since 1774, and trade in the Danubian principalities, in Bessarabia, and in the whole Black Sea has become permanently and progressively flourishing precisely since that period. — Hence, if the status quo of Turkey can be maintained, trade and commerce will continue to be fostered and protected, but if the Ottoman Empire in Turkey succumbs to its destiny, Sulina² will be turned by Belgrade and Salonica.

A compressed review of the above facts and opinions may be reduced to the following points:

1) The preponderant influence of Austria and of Russia in Turkey continues to be increased in consequence of their victorious suppression of the revolutionary party in South-Eastern Europe;

2) The conservative policy of those Empires, the same as the interests of the other great European Powers, require the maintenance of the status quo in Turkey, already once saved by the active policy of 1840/41;

3) Yet the Ottoman Empire, supported and protected — not harassed — by its powerful neighbours, seems notwithstanding doomed to undergo an irresistible process of internal dissolution;

4) In opposition to the theories and phantastical schemes of the German Ultra-Unitarians and Radicals, it is possible to conceive the accord and the mutual benefit of the political and material interests of Austria (or indirectly of the Austro-German Confederation) and of Russia, either in the sense and for the time of the above status quo, or with regard — sooner or later — to the eventuality of the predestined fall of the Ottoman dominion in Europe.

A. Jochmus.

² The Sulina question arises chiefly from a purely local competition between the commerchants at Odessa and those at Galacz, yet Austria has a full right to insist on the liberty of the Danubian navigation. (See Count Ficquelmont; The future peace 1856.)

COMMUNICATION DU PRINCE METTERNICH A M. LE COMTE
D'APPONY, AMBASSADEUR D'AUTRICHE A PARIS.

Vienne le 10 Octobre 1844.

Nous avons donné plusieurs fois aux cours de France, d'Angleterre et de Russie des preuves de notre sollicitude pour tout ce qui regarde le royaume de Grèce. Les raisons qui nous forcent d'avoir particulièrement les yeux fixés sur la Grèce sont claires. Ce n'est point l'étendue de la Grèce qui leur donne du poids, mais bien le lien de cette dernière avec les intérêts de la politique universelle, et ses relations immédiates avec l'Empire. Sous ce point de vue, l'importance de la Grèce est supérieure à celle que ses limites lui donnent. Quoique nous n'ayons eu aucune part à l'indépendance politique des parties dont le royaume actuel est formé, toutefois, dès que le Sultan a abandonné les droits qu'il avait sur la Grèce, nous avons mis cette oeuvre nouvelle sous l'égide de notre politique conservatrice. Chaque fois que nous élevons la voix pour les affaires grecques, nous ne le faisons pas avec le désir d'exercer sur elles une influence immédiate (tendance, en général, étrangère à notre politique), mais avec le sentiment qu'il s'agit des intérêts de politique générale ou que l'intérêt immédiat de notre Empire l'exige. Persuadés comme nous le sommes qu'en général on reconnaît et on approuve notre politique à cet égard, nous n'hésitons pas à remplir ce que nous regardons comme un devoir en expliquant aujourd'hui aux Puissances qui partagent avec nous la mission d'exercer une influence utile sur la Grèce, la manière dont nous devons juger la position de ce royaume et les besoins qui résultent de ce jugement.

Pour être mieux compris, j'établis les positions suivantes qui, à mon idée, sont les points de départ. Cela fait, il ne nous reste qu'à en tirer les conséquences,

Nous considérons donc comme points de départ les positions suivantes :

1 Le royaume de Grèce existe. Puisqu'il existe il doit être mis sous la garantie des principes conservateurs qui seuls peuvent en assurer l'existence.

2 Le royaume a pris position parmi les états qui ont la souveraineté et l'indépendance. Les bases sur lesquelles cet état a été établi à l'intérieur ne doivent pas tomber sous l'appréciation des autres Puissances, si ce n'est en tout ce qui pourrait attaquer les droits souverains des autres états et surtout la tranquillité de l'Empire Ottoman.

3 Le roi Othon n'occupe le trône de la Grèce qu'en vertu d'une décision des trois Puissances alliées et de la ratification expresse de cette décision par la nation grecque. Par conséquent le trône et l'ordre de succession sont fondés sur des conventions qui ont pour but de fixer et assurer la durée de cette décision.

4 Les Puissances alliées n'ont pas donné l'indépendance politique aux provinces qui forment aujourd'hui le royaume hellénique pour que le nouveau royaume serve de foyer de troubles ou pour qu'il s'augmente aux dépens de l'Empire Ottoman.

Après avoir posé ces points de départ, dont aucune puissance ne pensera sans doute à diminuer l'importance, à quoi nous arrêtons-nous, si ce n'est à simplifier les positions, et à comprendre clairement celle qui est propre au royaume grec, de même que celle des Puissances européennes envers ce royaume, et enfin les relations mutuelles qui doivent exister entre la Grèce et l'Empire Ottoman? Dans la série de nos idées nous ne trouvons aucune place pour des jalousies politiques entre les puissances, non plus qu'aucune cause d'inquiétude pour l'Empire Ottoman. En établissant ces positions sur les bases de la vérité, nous n'attaquons aucun droit. Le seul but que nous ayons en vue, c'est de détruire les folles illusions dont se nourrissent les factions turbulentes et qu'elles ne cessent de répandre en Grèce pour leur propre utilité et pour le malheur du pays et de la politique européenne.

Les termes sur lesquels le royaume grec a été fondé nous paraissent réclamer les deux mesures suivantes de la part des Puissances alliées :

1 Une déclaration qu'elles n'entendent pas d'admettre un jour un changement dans les garanties sur lesquelles le trône du roi Othon est fondé.

2 Une déclaration semblable pour tout ce qui concerne les frontières qui forment le royaume d'aujourd'hui.

De ces déclarations il ne résulte aucun changement dans les positions des Puissances vis-à-vis de la Grèce. Celles qui ont concouru à la formation du royaume restent dans l'intégrité de leurs droits. Les garanties pour la durée du trône gagnent une sûreté de plus, et, d'un autre côté, la politique et la paix morale entre la Grèce et la Porte s'établissent sur une base plus solide, les provinces de cette dernière cessant par là d'être exposées aux incursions de la nation qu'en définitive elle a concouru à former.

La Grèce est soumise et le sera pour long-temps encore à des influences contraires non seulement au développement de son propre bonheur, mais encore à la paix de l'Orient, par conséquent de toute l'Europe. Le plus grand service que les Puissances puissent rendre à la Grèce, c'est, d'après notre intime conviction, de prendre vis-à-vis d'elles la position que nous avons eu l'honneur de leur indiquer. Par une déclaration sincère de leur volonté à cet égard, les Puissances sauront prévenir les manoeuvres des factions ennemies du trône et de la paix politique de ce nouvel état, en déterminant un point de départ qu'il doit respecter comme immuable et en montrant au gouvernement et au peuple grec la direction qu'ils doivent tenir pour assurer l'avenir du royaume. Les nations s'éloignent facilement de l'utile, mais difficile est la route des améliorations que le temps amène, quand elles croient trouver une route plus courte, celle par laquelle elles s'agrandissent en s'emparant des terres étrangères.

Les manoeuvres des factions, en Grèce, ont un double but, celui de créer des troubles à l'intérieur et de faire des conquêtes sur l'Empire Ottoman, conquêtes qui, si elles étaient permises par la politique européenne, n'auraient d'autre effet que d'augmenter l'arène des malheurs de la Grèce, bien loin

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1841

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY FOR THE EARL
OF ABERDEEN.

Therapia 27 September 1841.

Memorandum.

The substance of a pamphlet published by Lieutenant-General Fabvier (*Revue Orientale*) is that the Sultan possesses no army nor fleet to defend himself as an independent Sovereign, and that as it is against the interest of Europe to see Russia in possession of Constantinople, the best practical measure to prevent such an occupation of Constantinople by Russia, is to drive the Turks from Europa. This is to be effected by means of the Christian populations of European Turkey and of the islands, who are to establish hereafter an independent Christian Empire at Constantinople.

Lieutenant-General Fabvier has long served in Greece during the war of independence, and is considered both at the Court of the Tuileries and in France as a great authority in affairs of the Levant.

At his age and considering his political connexions, he would not put himself forward, if he had not strong grounds to go upon; moreover it is known that personally he despises the Greeks, his ideas are therefore not the inspirations of a phantastic Philhellenism, but have profounder roots, they are more *French* than *Greek*.

Yet whatever may be the personal feelings of General Fabvier, circumstances prove that strong and determined parties are at work in France and in modern Greece aiming at the one common object, of overthrowing the Ottoman Power in Europe.

In the former country the symptoms are:

1. the re-establishment of the old philhellenic committees, including many of the leading men of France;
2. the collection of money for the active operation of these committees;
3. the violent language of the public press, inclusive of some of the Government papers.

In Greece on the other hand overt and secret acts prove a similar tendency :

1. the opinions of the Greek Journals ;
2. the expeditions into Candia, Thessaly, and the machinations fomented on the Albanian frontiers ;
3. the appointment of Mr. Christidis as Minister of the Interior, who is known to be at the head of a party in Greece who without disguise flatters King Otho with the possession of Constantinople.

With reference to the nomination of Mr. Christidis it ought to be considered that he is the intimate friend and former secretary of Mr. Coletti, now Greek Envoy at Paris, who calls himself the Chief of the French party in Greece . . . Mr. Christidis must still be considered the representative in Greece of Mr. Coletti, and it may be supposed that the latter is privy to what is going on in France, relative to the openly advocated movement against the Turks. It must further be borne in mind that the means of influence and the political and military connexions of Mr. Coletti do not lay in the Morea nor in the islands of the Archipelago, but in continental Greece, and that they extend their ramifications amongst the Christian Capitani of Thessaly, of Mount Olympus, and of Albania. — Mr. Coletti was formerly physician and political agent of Ali Pasha of Janina, and all his influence dates from that time.

The Chiefs who have figured in the late movements in Candia, Thessaly &c., namely Jani Costa, Valentza, and Caratasso, belong all to this party of Mr. Coletti now represented by Mr. Christidis.

The tendency of the political and eventually military movement against Turkey now schemed in France and Greece, is not difficult to penetrate: the action of the press in both countries, strengthened by the money of the philhellenic committees, goes to create disturbances amongst the Christian populations of continental Turkey, and if these disturbances once take place, the insurgents will be supplied with money, arms, and ammunition from or rather by way of continental Greece. This project is practical because Turkey has no army to operate vigorously in those provinces.

The progress, however, of the insurrection would place the European Cabinets in a position very analogous to that in which the principal Courts found themselves during the late Greek revolution.

The spirit of Christianity (tho' in a merely revolutionary cause) would be appealed to by the press of most countries, and public opinion would shake the free actions of the Governments in favour of Turkey against the revolutionary propaganda, in full activity in this country.

It cannot be denied that a similar state of things would soon become rife with general complications of the most serious nature. On one hand the Northern Courts, and especially Austria, and Russia, could not allow the direct and unlimited action of the revolutionary propaganda, and of an incendiary Greek press in provinces so near their

own frontier, and whilst a sectarian spirit in the British public might not leave the action of the Cabinet of St. James as free as it might be desirable for Turkey. -- France, in the opposite interest, would not be able to break off connexions and plans which she is now fomenting.

But what ever may be the result of the moral and political conflict, created under the circumstances which have been adverted to, the existence or the independence of the Ottoman Monarchy would be seriously menaced. — And this danger is not imaginary, the adversaries of Turkey know perfectly well, and Lieutenant-General Fabvier states distinctly that Turkey has no army nor other means of defence.

If an efficient military force were always ready to curb the outbreaks of the revolutionary spirit, fomented in Paris and Athens, the danger would be less real, because a repetition of rapid defeats would have the double effect of tranquilizing Turkey, and of convincing Europe of the fertility of the revolutionary plans of subverting the Ottoman Empire by the action of an incendiary press and an appeal of the democratic propaganda to Christianity, but as the matter stands, the insurrection, finding no military means arrayed against itself, would make such rapid progress as soon to be able to assume the mask of a national and of a pretended christian movement, against which the coercive means of the Porte, in its present state, are quite inadequate, and against which the mere moral action of the European Cabinets could be probably only very limited.

A. Jochmus.

2.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at *Malta*.

Private. Extract.

Therapia 17 October 1841.

Since I had the honour of writing to Your Lordship on the 12 instant I have seen Prince Voghorides, the Captain Pasha, and the Serasker. — I also paid a visit to Rifaat Pasha at the Serasker's desire, to thank him for a sword set in diamonds, given to me by the Sultan for the Syrian campaign.

In the course of conversation with Prince Voghorides I entered into some details about the present *disturbances in Syria* and the game of the *French* in that province. I hinted that I thought it not unlikely that these intrigues might be linked with what was going on in *France* and *Greece*, as indicating the working of a powerful party in France

We are now in the time of Turkish prayers and fasts.

Speaking of the Ramazan I should mention to Your Excellency that Wednesday last, when I saw Tahir Pasha,¹ the conversation fell

¹ The Capudan Pasha and Minister of the Navy.

on the serious inconvenience which the labouring classes experience from the fasting, whenever the Ramazan falls in the long summer days. To be sure, rejoined Tahir Pasha, it is an inconvenience, and I am old enough to remember it so, not only for the working classes, but also for gentlemen. In such cases and during the long days, however, I for my own part make *two* Ramazans instead of *one*, that is to say, I dine at noon and thus divide the Ramazan into *two*.

It strikes me that Tahir Pasha cannot be so fanatic¹ a Mussulman and retrogradist as his enemies would represent him to be . . .

3.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Naples.

Private. Extract.

Pera 6 November 1841.

I have had the honour of receiving your kind letter of the 24 October by the last French steamer . . .

Baron Stürmer² seems to be very desirous to support me; he called twice on me during the past week and I dined with him on Monday last. In the evening he gave me three reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Hauslab³ to Prince Metternich, on the present situation and future prospects of the Turkish military school at Vienna. Lieutenant-Colonel Hauslab is very much pleased with the progress of his pupils (about 11 in number), and he desires the number to be made up to about 50, in which case he proposes to buy a larger establishment and to connex to it a small Mosk, where the young Turks could attend the mussulman divine service.

I understood Baron Stürmer to say that Prince Metternich is favourable to this plan of education, upon the very sound principle that *Turkey* can only be regenerated by *Turks*.

Your Lordship will recollect that, some weeks before your departure, you approved of a similar plan also, and authorized me to mention to Baron Stürmer that you considered it a good thing to educate a certain additional number of young Turks in Vienna.

There can be no doubt that the young men brought up under careful inspection at Vienna have turned out infinitely better *élèves*, than the specimen of "jeune France atheist Turks" returned from France, after spending a few years amongst the "mauvais sujets" of a French regiment. The people brought up in England have given satisfaction, but the expenses of their education are too heavy.

¹ February 1842. Another proof that Tahir Pasha is not so fanatic as he is often represented, may be deduced from the fact that he allowed dead bodies from the Marine troops to be dissected in the Galata Serai Medical School for the instruction of the "élèves".

² The Imperial Internuncio at Constantinople.

³ 1870. Now the distinguished Austrian 'Feldzeugmeister' von Hauslab.

I shall as much as possible assist Baron Stürmer in his plan of getting more young men sent to Vienna, and I have broken the ground with the Serasker. — If a great number of young men are brought up in the same school, it will ultimately facilitate the *necessary* uniformity in the army, which cannot be the work of months but of years.

But I shall abstain from discussions on *general* points with the Serasker or any other Turkish authorities, keeping in view only the *general* plan.

A general plan of organization will only find greater obstacles because it must necessarily attack many abuses, and will have no supporters in men who are never sa'fe of retaining office beyond the present hour, whilst partial questions, carried for a given purpose, will each facilitate the general plan, and render the execution of the latter ultimately necessary.

The Greek question, comprising the residue of affairs pending since 1829 and 1830, and the late and present machinations at Athens, supported by French intrigue and animosity against Turkey, have seriously alarmed the Porte.

The Serasker told me three or four days ago :

“It is our intention to arm 300,000 men. I am now getting the project translated, so that you may understand it and we shall then consider it. You may write this to Lord Ponsonby, he is a friend of Turkey's.”

I answered that I reserved my opinion until I had seen the project.

I shall try to convince the Serasker of the absurdity and extravagance of the idea of arming 300,000 men, when most of the 80,000 or 100,000 men now under arms are in arrears of 8 or 9 months' pay in various provinces, and whilst the finances of the Empire are in a state of *complete dilapidation*.

In order to remedy this sad state of the finance department, I understand that projects are under consideration to return very nearly to the old system of perception and of imposts, doing away with the Mouhassils and the other fine frank importations of Reshid Pasha . . .

4.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Naples.

Private. Extract.

Pera 17 November 1841.

I had the honour to answer your letter of the 24 October¹ by mine of the 6 November.

¹ Letter dated Malta 24 October 1841 ; vide Vol. I, No. 146.

I communicated Your Lordship's letter to Mr. de Cordoba, who said that it not only applied perfectly to the present state of things in Turkey, but that it contained general remarks of such practical experience and wisdom that they might serve as general rules for public life. He requested me to allow him to copy some of these remarks, and I suppose I have not done wrong in acceding to his desire . . .

Zacharias Pasha is shortly expected here. Prince Voghorides continues to believe that he *will receive* a high employment. The Serasker has received authority to pay me on account £ 1000 of my arrears, amounting to £ 2200.

As the present state of the exchequer is very unsatisfactory, this payment is very extraordinary. Mr. de Cordoba considers it as indicating the desire of the Porte of employing me in Rumilia, and Prince Voghorides says that this proposition has been actually discussed in the Council of State.

I shall consider an appointment there probable, if the war party gains ascendancy in the Ministry . . .

There has also been some talk about Admiral Walker, but Tahir Pasha is against his active employment at sea . . .

I have suggested indirectly that, *if* the fleet were to go, it would be very likely best to send the heavy ships to winter at Volo, but that some frigates and light ships might go to Bucintro and to Mourtoux,¹ opposite Corfu. In this case the Capudan Pasha would of course be Commander-in-Chief, but the separate light squadron, on the Albanian coast, might be placed under Walker.

As the armaments by sea and by land are at present only to be demonstrations in order to see justice done, and in order to *prevent war*, I think it would have a good effect to see so able an officer as Walker in command of a squadron. His name would frighten the Greeks more, than those of half a dozen Turkish Admirals, except Tahir Pasha himself, who is admitted to be a good and gallant *practical* seaman.

I abstain, however, carefully from entering into any discussion for or against war, except with Prince Voghorides, and it is the opinion of both of us that firmness and resolution will *prevent war* without any concessions to Greece.

It is as yet uncertain whether the absurd proposition to cede Thessaly to Greece by way of making up the quarrel, has originated in Paris, *before* or *after* Mr. Piscatori's mission to Greece.

At any rate it has given a new shock to French policy at Constantinople, the more so as on the 14 very unfavourable accounts have been received from Salonica, dated 3 November, representing several parts of Macedonia and Thessaly as in a very unsettled state. Several small frays have taken place between Turks and Greeks, and in one of them 8 people had been killed . . .

¹ i. e. *Vuzindro* (*Butrinto*) — *Murtus* (*Murto*).

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Naples.

Extract.

Pera 10 December 1841.

I informed you of the appointment of Izzet Mehemet Pasha, the late Serasker of Syria, to the post of Grand Visir in lieu of old Rauf Pasha. I paid a visit of ceremony to the new Grand Visir, the day after his instalment to the Porte.

From what had happened in Syria, I concluded that he must receive me *very* coolly or *very* well. The latter was the case, but as I know his art of dissimulation I attach no meaning to his friendship, he said, however, to an Officer of mine, who was acting to as my Dragoman, when I assured him of my readiness to serve the Porte:

"You, my friend, are only a short time with the General, and you can't know him, I do, and I know what services he can render, it is superfluous that you should give me new assurances to this effect."

Speaking afterwards of Syrian affairs, the Grand Visir's opinion may be resumed in his own words:

"It is necessary that water should become muddy and troubled before it becomes clear"

After my visit to the Grand Visir I called on Tahir Pasha, whom I see, according to Your Lordship's advice, once or twice a week and with whom I usually have very long and often confidential conversations. This time I was alone with him for upwards of two hours, and my impression is that he is glad to see Rauf Pasha superseded by Izzet Pasha.

We had a long conversation on Greek affairs, and from the nature of his questions, such as the names and qualities of their Generals &c. saw that the possibility of an early or later conflict was strongly impressed on his mind.

Add to this the language of the Serasker to me some 15 or 16 days ago, when I was inspecting with him 20 battalions of Infantry, when he said: "If we cannot finish with the pen, we must take to the sword", and Your Lordship may infer that the concentration of troops here (now 40,000 men) and the fitting out of the greater part of the squadron are not without positive views, to put a stop to the continual machinations and provocations of the Greeks, and to make them change their conduct in the negotiations pending between Greece and Turkey, since the treaty of independence.

Prince Voghorides thinks that the present object of what is called the war party, goes no further than a strong demonstration. The Turks are not pleased with the idea of Sir Stratford's going to Athens, because they think that he has a decided preference for the Greeks.

I have had occasion to repeat to the Serasker that the presence of Sir Stratford Canning in Athens has nothing to do with his erroneously supposed Philhellenism, and I added that I would undertake to warrant to the Serasker, that in a few weeks we should learn from the official language which the Ambassador would hold in Athens, that the policy of the Tory Administration were as favourable to Turkey, as that of the Whig Government

The recall of the English Mission in Syria has given satisfaction to the Turkish Government.

The *evil* of distrust created by their presence in Syria was certainly much greater, than the *good* to be derived from their prolonged residence in that country

6.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Naples.

Private.

Constantinople 13 December 1841.

I have received the day before yesterday the news I expected from Syria. According to my letters which I find are confirmed by others received here, the civil war continues as violent as ever in the Lebanon. The Christians have been defeated, ransacked, and injured on all points by the Druses, inhabiting the provinces south of the Kilbsu, and it appears even that the Druses have received support by armed detachments sent by their co-religionaries of the Hauran. The Emir Beshir Cassim has taken refuge in Beyrout, after having seen most of his property pillaged and ransacked at Deir el Kammar as well as in other places.

Nedjib Pasha, who found out that he had been deceived by Chebli El Arrian, the Druse Chief of the Hauran, whom he employed against the Christian population of Hasbeya and Rasheya, ordered the Mutual Emir Handjar to attack Chebli El Arrian, who was encamped with other Druse Chiefs of the Lebanon near the village of Zachlé.

An action has been fought in consequence on the 14 November between the Druses on one side and the Christians united under the Emir Handjar on the other. — The latter have been victorious, and it is reported that between killed, wounded, and prisoners the Druses have lost 1000 men. This number, of course, is much exaggerated, as usual in oriental warfare, and I have no means here to ascertain the real amount

My letters go to the 27 November.

The Porte is much alarmed at this state of things, and in a council held on the 10 instant, it has been decided to send Mustapha Nouri Pasha as Governor General to Syria.

This business has been kept extremely secret, and yesterday night when I dined at Mr. Titoco's, neither Baron Stürmer nor any body of the diplomatic corps knew the arrangements made by the Grand Visir, and all believed that Jacob Pasha was going to Syria. The Serasker Mustapha Nouri Pasha had confidentially communicated to me his appointment early on the 11 instant, asking, however, my word not to divulge any thing, which I promised him. As he did not trust any dragoman, he sent every body out of the room, and told me in Turkish what had happened, requesting that, as I had been in Syria, I might draw up a Memorandum on the state of affairs there and on the best means of re-establishing tranquillity. He then called in the Dragoman, and asked me if I had understood what he meant, to which I replied that I should do what he had desired me to do.

It had so happened that during the Beyram visits I had a long conversation on Syrian affairs with Rifaat Pasha, who had begun by asking my opinion about the old Emir Beshir, who ever since his return here had been intriguing to be sent back to Syria. I spoke with Rifaat Pasha for upwards of an hour, during which time he was dining, and finished by asking me to put my observations on paper. I did so and recommended most particularly *not* to send back the Emir Beshir, enumerating all the reasons which militate for this opinion, and with which Your Lordship is better acquainted than myself, insisting particularly on the fact that division amongst the Chiefs of the mountains would give no danger to the Porte, *provided the Turkish* authorities were liberal and "*just*" enough to inspire confidence to the different parties, whilst uniting them all (which I admitted might be possible), the old Emir Beshir would very possibly assume a sort of half independence of himself.

I recommended also, what I had already told seven months ago to old Yusuf Pasha, to establish a good local police of Syrian irregular troops, who otherwise, for want of occupation, would infest the highroads, stop trade &c.

The maximum of concession to the Druses I considered to be their being authorized to have a Kapu Kiaya here, the same as the Emir Beshir Cassim, but the latter to remain Governor General of the Lebanon and to preside the general Council of Government, in which of course the principal Druse Sheiks have voices as already arranged.

As there is a leaning in the Turkish Ministry towards the Druses, because these latter pretend to approach more the Mussulman creed than the Christian religion, it required on my part some caution to draw up the document, but before delivering it, I read it to Prince Voghodes, who entirely approved of the contents.

It is a copy of this memorandum which I gave to Mustapha Pasha

The Serasker asked me a great many questions about the old Emir Beshir, which prove to me that the Emir is still moving heaven and earth to be sent to Syria, or to get as a "pis aller" and compromise his son Emir Emin appointed

The Serasker is to leave on the 10 instant.

There are also three battalions of reinforcements embarking in steamers Saturday next for Beyrout, under the orders of Brigadier General Omer Pasha, the same who was already in Syria during the war.

He has left a bad reputation for rapacity in the country, altho' he was acquitted by the court martial that was to judge him on complaints against him from several quarters.¹

Omer Pasha is a shrewd man of military capacity, but I have no opinion of *his honesty*.

He has been appointed by the Grand Visir himself, altho' he was on the worst possible terms with Izzet Pasha whilst in Syria, and it is curious fact that the latter has also sent for Mr. Avendiki, his late Dragoman in Syria, and offered him his former situation, altho' the Grand Visir knows that Mr. Avendiki was instrumental in his removal from the Syrian command.

These two acts show that Izzet Pasha's judgment has been above his passions

7.

GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A RIFAAT PACHA,

Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Mémoire confidentiel.

Constantinople 18 Novembre 1841.

Comme Son Excellence Rifaat Pasha m'a demandé une exposition de mes idées sur les affaires et l'état actuel de la Syrie, je me permets de lui donner par écrit les opinions que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui exposer ce matin :

Les causes des désordres en Syrie sont tant politiques qu'administratives.

Les causes politiques disparaîtront en grande partie dès qu'on aura remédié aux défauts de l'administration.

Quant à l'administration pratique du pays je dirai ainsi :

1. Ce qui contribuera le plus à tranquilliser le pays sera une distribution équitable des impôts de la Syrie.

Je crois que le meilleur moyen de lever ces impôts serait de faire payer un certain nombre de bourses à chaque district, comme on l'a déjà fait pour le pays gouverné par l'Émir Béchir; et de laisser aux

¹ Omer Pasha was acquitted on several minor charges for want of evidence, because the evidence of *christian* Rayahs was not taken against a *Mussulman*. He has been condemned on the charge of having taken by violence three valuable arab horses from certain Emirs of the Lebanon, but Izzet Mehmet Pasha, the Governor General, never executed the sentence, because he chose to keep for himself those fine horses. — cfr. Vol. I p. 43.

autorités locales le soin de la perception directe et celui de fixer le taux de chaque contribuable. — De cette manière les employés de la Sublime Porte seraient exempts de tout blâme de pressurer le peuple.

2. Pour la sûreté des propriétés et du commerce il est très nécessaire qu'on établisse une police des grands chemins et du pays en général.

La meilleure police qu'on puisse établir pour le présent sont les Baschibouzouk de la Syrie même, autrefois au service d'Ibrahim Pacha. Si ces gens là ne sont pas des employés sous de bons chefs et payés, ils feront les voleurs, comme cela arrive en Albanie &c.

Si on avait à peu près 2500 à 3000 Baschibouzouk *régulièrement payés*, je crois qu'on pourrait au bout de quelque temps retirer 8 à 10,000 hommes des 22,000 hommes de troupes régulières qui sont à présent en Syrie. Cela diminuera les dépenses de la Sublime Porte et les troupes deviennent disponibles pour d'autres services.

Il y a trois grandes lignes de commerce en Syrie qu'il faut surtout protéger, savoir :

1. la ligne de Scanderoun à Aleppo et Diarbekir;
2. la ligne de Beyrout à Damas et Bagdad;
3. la ligne de Jaffa et Jérusalem à Kerek.

Si ces lignes sont sûres et tranquilles, le commerce y prospérera et cela non seulement augmentera les revenus des douanes, mais cela sera aussi agréable aux puissances étrangères dont les sujets trafiquent en Syrie.

3. Quant aux troubles survenus dans le Liban et surtout à Deir el Kammar, ils ne deviendront effectivement dangereux que lorsqu'ils se prolongent, car dans ce cas les ennemis de la Sublime Porte diraient qu'il y a anarchie en Syrie et que la Sublime Porte ne peut pas maintenir l'ordre dans ces provinces — au contraire la désunion entre les Maronites et les Druses devrait fournir à un habil Gouverneur turc le moyen d'affermir l'autorité de Sa Hautesse dans la montagne du Liban.

La demande des Druses d'être gouvernés par un Emir Druse et non pas par l'Emir Béchir Cassim qui est Chrétien, serait très admissible, attendu que les Druses disent que leur religion s'approche plus de la loi musulmane, que de la foi chrétienne, mais la difficulté qui existe est que les propriétés et les habitations des Druses et des Maronites chrétiens sont complètement entremêlées, de manière que je ne vois pas comment pour le présent on pourrait tout à fait diviser le gouvernement des districts que ces nations habitent.

Ce que les Druses craignent aussi est que l'Emir Béchir, qui a un Capukiayassi à la Sublime Porte, ne représente pas bien à la Sublime Porte les intérêts des Druses.

Sous ces circonstances il serait probablement convenable de laisser le gouvernement général du Mont Liban à l'Emir Béchir "*Cassim*",

mais d'ordonner qu'un des principaux Scheiks Druses eût la seconde place dans le conseil général qui gouverne le Mont Liban et dont l'Emir Béchir est le Chef — et pour contenter plus encore les Druses, on pourrait autoriser aussi pour la forme que le principal Scheik eût un Capukiayassi à la Sublime Porte, attendu que cette faveur a été accordée à l'Emir Béchir.

Pour ce qui regarde la mesure *éventuelle* — dont il a été question — de remplacer l'Emir Cassim par l'ancien Emir Béchir, il est certain que le dernier est un homme bien plus habile que le premier, et que dans une position presque *indépendante*, telle qu'il l'occupait *autrefois* comme Prince de la Montagne du Liban, il pourrait probablement mieux gouverner les Maronites et les Druses *ensemble* que ne le fait l'Emir Cassim — c'est à dire, qu'il réussirait probablement à maintenir mieux la tranquillité pour les petites affaires, mais aussi l'autorité de la Sublime Porte dans la montagne diminuerait beaucoup pour les grands intérêts du pays.

Il se pourrait aussi que le vieil Emir Béchir tournât sa grande influence personnelle contre la Sublime Porte, comme il l'a déjà fait une fois du temps de Mehemet Ali, car le vieil Emir Béchir est très lié avec le Patriarche Maronite et avec tout le parti catholique, et ce parti catholique, qui travaille aussi *politiquement*, a toujours été le plus fort soutien de "*Mehemet Ali*" en Syrie; lors même que les populations musulmanes et beaucoup d'autres étaient en faveur de la Sublime Porte.

Le retour de l'ancien Emir Béchir ne devrait donc être qu'une mesure d'extrême nécessité, si tous les autres moyens qui ont été indiqués ne seraient pas suffisants pour rétablir la tranquillité de la Syrie — et plus spécialement du Mont Liban.

Supposé le cas de la réinstallation de ce Gouverneur du Liban, il serait certainement très nécessaire, de lui faire donner des garanties pour sa fidélité, et d'obtenir la sûreté qu'il ne reprît pas de leurs propriétaires actuels les biens autrefois confisqués par lui et rendus aux familles lésées, depuis la restoration de la Syrie cette année-ci.

Comme d'ailleurs l'ancien Emir Béchir a été destitué par la Sublime Porte et renvoyé de la Syrie par les Amiraux des Alliés, il est probable que la Sublime Porte veuille consulter amicalement les Cours Alliées (pour la restoration de la Syrie) sur une mesure aussi significative que la réinstallation du vieil Emir Béchir.

Les Cours Alliées certainement n'ont en vue que la tranquillité de la Sublime Porte, sans préférence personnelle pour tel ou tel Gouverneur d'une province ou d'un district de la Syrie.

Au commencement du mois de Schewal 1257.

A. Jochmus.

Communiqué ce mémoire le 12 Décembre 1841 au Séraskier Mustapha Nour Pacha.

Inclosure in No. 7.

GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A RIFAAT PACHA.

Population approximative de la Syrie.

mans		995,000
ens Grecs	345,000	
ites et Catholiques	260,000	
niens et Francs	10,000	
.	175,000	
ialis et Yezdis	40,000	
s	48,000	878,000
	Total	1,873,000

NOTE.

De ce total de 1,873,000 individus, il habite dans le Mont Liban près 200,000, dont 40,000 sont des Druses.

Des du Gouvernement Égyptien en Syrie dans l'année 1251 (1835|36).

à Sa Hautesse le Sultan Bourses	15,000
rnement Civil	4,800
.	970
ch transmis à Sa Hautesse le Sultan	1,726
ses de perception des revenus	1,250
ations des ponts et routes	240
ations des écoles publiques	360
tement de la Guerre	12,000
cations, Casernes &c. &c.	15,000
ses de recrutement de troupes	1,500
de l'Armée	24,000
	Total Bourses
	76,846

.423,000 piastres turcs.

Revenus du Gouvernement Égyptien de la Syrie, y compris Tarsous et Adana

pour l'année 1251 (1835/36).

Districts.	Ferdch	Douanes	Karatch	(Detroi et Accise	Miri et autres re- venus	Total en bourses
Acre, Caiffa, Jaffa	5200	1500	48	4098	3100	14666
Jérusalem	912	450	831	1455	780	4428
Sour et Saïda	788	975	81	1183	200	3317
Beyrout	340	1520	40	1351	420	3671
Damas	7845	380	308	3058	121	12372
Tripolis	240	431	47	908	758	2444
Latakia	550	370	51	4800	978	6749
Antioche	470	180	100	700	300	1750
Aleppo	5500	2008	160	3200	1470	12410
Tarsous	712	525	---	380	100	1717
Adana	400	371	---	200	87	1058
Anazaris	2500	-	---	4566	4750	11816
Naplouse	2980	-	---	3580	3500	10060
Emir Bechir	1300	-	---	---	---	1300
	29737	8842	1726	30730	10714	87758

or 43,870,000 piastres turcs.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Pera 17 December 1841.

Details of the nomination of the Grand Visir.

Izzet Mehemet Pasha had informed the Grand Seignior that he was much in want of money. — The Sultan gave him a rendezvous on Friday 3 December in the mosque of Eyub, where the Sultan went after the usual divine service from the mosque of Tophana.

Having repeated a short namaz on the tomb of Eyub, the Sultan entered a small cabinet on one of the sides of the mosque, and sent there for Izzet Pasha, who had arrived at Eyub.

The Sultan remained closeted with Izzet Pasha for an hour and half, and was quite alone with him, altho' Riza Pasha and Izzet Bey were at the time in the mosque.

Izzet Pasha having returned and mounted his horse for some minutes, the Sultan after some reflection ordered Izzet Bey to ride after him and to tell the Pasha, not to leave his house the next morning, Saturday, until he had heard from the Sultan.

On Saturday morning a Major of the Guards on duty at the Imperial Palace brought a closed letter to Izzet Pasha, and on opening it he read his appointment to the post of Grand Visir.

Rauf Pasha received his dismissal direct from the Sultan, and Rifaat Pasha was only aware of what had happened, when Rauf returned him some papers, sent for his signature, with the observation that he was no longer Grand Visir.

The Ministers of the Porte mutually asked each other, who was the new Grand Visir?

Communicated to Lord Ponsonby
and
to Lord Aberdeen thro' R. C. Mellish Esq.

NOTE.

2 June 1842. Mr. de Cordoba learnt for certain that one Omer Effendi, private Imam of the Sultan, placed as such by old Chosrew Pasha, insinuated the expediency of Izzet Pasha's appointment. — He was in this the "cheville ouvrière" of Chosrew Pasha, for the nomination of Izzet Pasha was a surprise to all the Ministers of the day, to Riza Pasha, Izzet Bey, and other people of influence.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

'Received and answered Constantinople 17 January 1842.'

Naples 18 November 1841.

My dear General,

I this day received your letter, dated 6 instant, but too late to reply to it as I wish, and therefore I limit myself to one point viz the question whether or not it would be expedient for you to serve *out* of Constantinople. — My opinion is that, having in view the success of your grand part, that is the organization of the Ottoman army, it is not only expedient but necessary that you should shew yourself to the Turks to be *their officer*, and consequently ready to serve any where. If war should be made, *you* will be able to shew the extreme value of your skill to the Turks at the same time that you prove your attachment to their cause. I cannot see how international can be contrary to your giving all your services to the Turks in any war in which they can be engaged for you are not the subject of any state with which the Porte can be engaged in war. — I believe, with you, that the Three Powers will prevent war, but that does not induce me to be less anxious that you should *accept* and execute any task committed to you as a soldier by the Porte.

Your letter has given me the greatest pleasure; it is full of the good feeling and sound views exhibited by you in all you say and do — I have much to write to you, and by the next steamer you shall hear from me. We remain here during the winter. Lady Ponsonby is well though weak, but is going strength fast.

Yours most faithfully

P.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

'Received and answered Constantinople 17 January 1842.'

Naples 23 November 1841.

My dear General,

There is apparently no little irregularity in our Post, I ought to have received one of your letters long before I did.

I am happy to learn that Baron de Stürmer is cordial in his support of you, it will be an important aid. — I continue to be entirely of my old opinion that *Vienna* is the best place for the education of young Turks. I think the Empire would be seriously injured, perhaps ruined, if Turks continued to be sent to *France*.

If I may take the liberty to say so, I think your mode of healing the Serasker is most wise. A man who is so ignorant as he is cannot comprehend generalities, though he may, by possibility, be brought to adopt every thing one by one that may be contained in the general proposition. — I am glad of the dismissal of the Instructor, but I regret the case of Captain Boville who *I thought* I had preserved. You know I spoke of him particularly to the Serasker, and also to others.

I think you are fairly entitled to endeavour to obtain the services of Mr. Redhouse, when it is considered that Tahir Pasha is clearly resolved to put an end to all the power and the employment also of Walker. I had no doubt of the fact before I left Therapia.

I hope there is no intention of sending an expedition to Tunis, it would place the Porte in inextricable difficulties, were it either successful or a failure, the *latter* would be the least mischievous result of the two.

The Porte has good cause to look sharp after everything the Greeks can do, and it is not to be forgotten what were the plans of the Philorthodox Society. There is no prudence in crediting the notion that the French will ever rest quiet, or desist from their views of reducing the Porte by distresses to become more dependent upon France. The selflove of that country is too deeply wounded to allow it to be friendly to the Porte unless it can command its counsels. I am far from sure that, what Tahir proposes to do now, may not soon become a thing prudent to be done, but I gave my opinion very strongly in favor of delay and of allowing the Greeks to fill the measure of their iniquities and folly, so as that the Porte should have a case so good that not even a Philosopher should be able to find fault with it. I have little doubt that the Greeks will act so as to bring about such a state of things.

The Turks would be very unwise were they to neglect the precautions you speak of. Turkey depends upon its army, that is to say its military force, and will immediately fall to pieces whenever that force fails — happily the Turks can go on with a very bad army.

I am never surprized at the success of the Porte in procuring pecuniary resources, for I have been accustomed many years to hear that they are absolutely paupers, and yet I have always seen them go on.

I repeat my earnest recommendation that you should accept any command in active service the Porte may wish to entrust you with. I continue convinced that the *general* organization is more likely to be advanced by your doing so than by your refusal, which latter I do think would be a death blow to it.

Sir Stratford Canning cannot be influenced by such motives as the Turks suppose, and I am sure you have judged rightly of him. Old Chosrew will soon embroil the Ottoman Ministry, and I doubt not turn out Tahir.

I have repeated much that I before said to you, and have to request you to excuse it — Lady Ponsonby has quite regained her health but not quite her strength — I have been unwell with a violent cold.

I hope I shall hear from you when you are at leysure. I take the strongest interest in your success.

Pray remember me to Captain Williams and Lieutenant Dickson. I have taken the best measures in my power to be of service to Mr. Redhouse.

I beg to be remembered to your brother.

Yours most faithfully

Ponsonby.

1842

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received and answered Pera 22 January 1842.)

Naples 2 January 1842.

My dear General,

I fear that some of my letters may not have reached you, for you say you have not heard from me during so long a period of time, and it is certain that I have written often and much, till within a late period when events in my family have caused an interruption of my habitual thoughts and occupations. I have received from you letters under date 8, 10, 13 December by the late steamer.

I before received your letters on the subjects of the Despatches to Sir R. Stopford and about the Decoration and Sword &c. &c. and upon the last mentioned subjects. I think it necessary to abstain from acting till I am in a situation that will enable me to act *directly* upon Lord Aberdeen, because I do not think that any other proceeding will be of use in England. You may be surprized to hear that Lord A. has not answered my letters written from Malta, nor even notified to me either publicly or privately my removal from the Post of Ambassador.

I much suppose that some accident has occasioned this neglect of what I conceive to be common civility. I believe Lord A. to be a gentleman too well bred to be guilty of an impertinence, which I think you would consider such a neglect to be, were it deliberate and designed. You will also agree with me that, whilst I am in the situation I have described, I cannot write to Lord A. — I hope this matter may be arranged, but should it not I shall take measures immediately on my return to England to perform what I consider a duty, that is to make known in a proper way the neglect with which *you* have been treated. The delays have already been so great that a little longer delay will not be of consequence, and *success is the end* we have in view. I intend to go home as soon as ever the weather will permit Lady Ponsonby to travel without danger to her health. I do *not* intend to wait for the opening of the passage of the Alps.

I am extremely obliged to you for the informations you give me: That relative to Isset Pasha's appointment is very curious; there certainly must be something behind the curtain, of which we are ignorant with respect to it. — I rejoice at the manner in which you have conducted yourself, it fully answers the expectations I entertained of your tact and judgement, and I augur complete success from it.

You are called upon to consider yourself *wholly* Turkish; you have no debt to any other Government, and assuredly you have little reason to expect any thing from that quarter. If you succeed (as I believe you will do) in making your party good with the Porte, you will obtain a vast addition of fame and be able to become the chief instrument in raising the Ottoman Government from all need of dependances upon the acts of any foreign state. —

I endeavoured to make both Rifaat and Tahir understand how little necessity there was for Turkey to deviate from the assertion of her own policy and independent administration of her affairs, and I pointed out, first the security the Porte enjoyed against the aggression of any one Government in consequence of the jealousy *all* other Governments must entertain, if any aggression should be made, and secondly the easy means the Porte possessed, by making a good army, of rendering any aggression a foreign Government could make, a work of great difficulty &c. &c.

I am extremely glad to see that the Porte seems to be aware of its *rights* and of its powers. I trust it will not do anything that is in violation of the *rights* of any of the Great Powers! The Porte is sure of success if it keeps within the letter and true spirit of its existing engagements to other Governments. The Porte will do well, and wisely, to reject the advice and disregard the eternal interference of those Governments, and so I told Tahir and Rifaat and others.

I am convinced that the worst thing for England is that the Porte should be always listening to counsels sent from Europe, including those from London and else where there has existed, and I believe does still exist the most gross ignorance of the Turkish country and the most absurde ideas of what the Ottoman Government ought to do.

If the affair with Greece be well managed, I am sure the Porte will triumph, and I do think it absolutely necessary that the Porte should break down the power the Greeks have (and which they seek to extend) of stabbing Turkey in the way an assassin uses his weapons. Let the Porte be calm, and avoid precipitation, and no doubt, the Greeks will give sufficient ground for the assertion, by the Turks in arms, of their just right to secure themselves against danger.

The Porte ought not now to yield any more to demands, made by Foreign Powers, for the concession of more power and greater advantages to Greece. It is not in the nature of things that the Greeks should abstain from using such power for the attainment of their object, namely the ruin of the Ottoman Government, and I think the European State that shall support Greek purposes, will prove to all

men of sense either that it seeks by such means to gratify some ambitious end of its own, or that its counsels are as foolish as need be.

It seems to be the opinion that Sir S. Canning may have a strong leaning to favor Greece. I do not know that gentleman, but I cannot believe any Englishman can *now* believe it to be the interest of England to foster the designs of Greece, and favor the plots and plans of the French.

You will see, if you read the "Constitutionnel", of the last Decade of December, how laboriously Thiers exerts himself to make the events in the East a strong arm to attack Guizot. Thiers uses those events to raise again a flame in french minds and to enrage them against England, and certainly the topic favors all his addresses to the vanity of some of his country men, and the ambition of others. If Thiers should succeed in displacing Guizot and placing himself, I do not see how war can be avoided, and I am told that Thiers has a chance of success. The Porte ought to prepare itself for such a possible state of things, and no preparation will be so little *costly* or so easy, as the proper organization of the Ottoman army — and no possible preparation unless that one be effected, can be of real and permanent efficacy for the security of the Porte *against attacks*, which may be very disagreeable to it.

I am extremely delighted to hear of conduct in Isset Pasha (the Grand Vizier) which shews a superior mind. I hope it may prove that he has the good sense to be directed by the wise principles of conduct, you think it possible that he may be actuated by. At all events, as he is a man of action, he probably will cease to allow the Porte to be influenced by that miserable spirit of subserviency to every body who spoke *in anger!* If he has sense, he must see that the Porte may be mistress of her own country, and he will see that he may call into action talents and knowledge for the creation of an army, such as you possess, without derogating from Turkish honor or pride.

I earnestly hope the Porte will not attack Tunis! I have already in an other letter expressed my opinion as to the issue of such a policy. The time is not yet come for the Porte to aim at the restoration of an authority over that country, which has been for centuries wrested from the Ottoman Government. Such an attempt would probably create a sort of common feeling amongst the Great Powers to put down an attempt to disturb peace, and Turkey, in that case, would be subjected to great humiliation and losses. — The Porte is safe so long as it acts upon real legitimate natural grounds, and nobody will be allowed to molest it, but if it takes to making attempts at conquest the case will be altered; no matter how much logic or rhetoric may be employed to give another color to the act.

I am ignorant of the exact state of affairs in England, but I am told that notwithstanding the great Majority in Parliament enjoyed by Ministry there are strong reasons to imagine the present Government may not last very long. — I feel assured that the late Ministry cannot

be re-established, but I do think it very possible that there may be great changes before long in the personal and in the policy of the Government.

I hope to hear from you as often as you have nothing more interesting to you to do than to write to me. Your letters give me not only great pleasure but very great satisfaction as evidences of the skill and firmness and prudence, with which you fight the great battle, which if gained will establish the Porte in security and immortalize you as the chief author and instrument of that victory.

I am about to write to le Chevalier de Cordoba. I have not had a letter from him dated 7 November, though Mr. Hardy (in a letter of 17 November) announced one as being ready to be sent by the Chevalier, so dated.

Pray remember me to the *Prince*.

“L’Impartial” is much esteemed here by men of sound sense to whom I have shewn it. Your Despatches have made a great sensation.

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

12.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(*Answered Pera 26 January 1842.*)

Naples 15 January 1842.

My dear General,

I heard with great uneasiness from Doyle that you had not received letters from me. I have written several and fully stated the opinions I entertain.

I hope those letters have been delayed, *not lost*, but I confess I do not like to write as I otherwise would do, *until* I hear that you have received them.

“L’Impartial” makes a great impression on all who see it. I think what it contains, I mean the Despatches, will prove the way better than any thing for the results you look for.

On the subject of your own situation I took the liberty *vivâ voce* in reply to you, to express my firm *conviction* — a conviction that shall last in full force: that your *continuation* in Turkey and your success there is the only *sure* way for you to *obtain justice*. If you effect the design hinted at in your letter to Doyle, I am afraid you will secure against yourself all that power and force of circumstances which you will command in your own favor by looking only to success, where you are, at present and disregarding the opinion of European Governments considered in the way you seem in that letter to consider it!

You must be aware that you have done too well and too much not to be pursued by the envy of all those Europeans *who did nothing*, though they received the rewards *due only to great deeds*. —

Your successes have not yet been made known *generally* to the world: there must be time allowed for the knowledge of them to be spread more largely. You ought to hold your position where you are, even at the *sacrifice* of much and many things, because if you *quit it*, you must fall on disadvantageous grounds for the pursuit of your just claim to the recognition in a proper way of the services you have rendered.

Your vexation and your impatience are natural and just, but do not allow them to govern your acts and thereby give additional power to your enviers to do you mischief. — I am unable at this distance from London to take that part I desire to take, and I have been unable to move from hence, but I shall be at home surely in the spring if I live so long, and then it will be in my power to give you some information that may be useful. You know how much I have your affair at heart.

You lose nothing either in credit or interest by what I entreated you to do. You may have the opportunity of adding brilliantly to your already most brilliant services, and thereby give additional wings to your fame. — Your services are as yet comparatively speaking *unknown*, and therefore it is I say all I have said. *Not* one man here of English birth or French knew what you had done in Syria. Nor do I believe there was any one of German or Italian blood more correctly informed.

“L’Impartial” has raised the question, and truth will now spread. There are good reasons for the counsel I give you.

Yours most faithfully

Ponsonby.

13.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received and answered Pera 17 February 1842.)

Naples 3 February 1842.

My dear General,

I got this morning your letter of the 17 January. I also received I believe in due course the letters of which you state the dates in your margin. I replied to them all, and therefore my answers must have been detained somewhere, or my letters of the 18 and 23 November¹ were — I suppose and hope they will appear some time or other.

¹ vide No. 9, 10.

I cannot account for this occurrence; my letters were forwarded by the favour of the French Embassy *here*. Your letters, I presume, were sent by the Post and came so from Malta. — The French steamer does not take letters from Naples, but surely my letters, having been sent by the French Embassy with its Despatches to the Embassy at Constantinople, ought to have gone at once as directed — where the *blot* is I know not, but I will no more take the same channel — you may safely write by Post: I will manage to find a safe conveyance to you — I do not like to write now till some channel is fixed.

I shall be grieved not to hear from you — I wonder if my letters have reached Cordoba. I hope so — pray ask him — I have seen Lord Beauvale only once at a great dinner, he has been confined with the gout.

I feel confident that justice will at last be done to you.

This Eastern Question will be strived in the French chamber often and often, you will see what Thiers says in his speech of the state of Syria *after the capture of Acre &c.*

This statement of his ought to bring on an elucidation of that part of the business, and that being done, it cannot any longer be hidden from the world that the discomfiture and defeat of Ibrahim Pasha was *your* deed.

"L'Impartial" ought to make that appear to the public eye, it will be useful to that Journal to do so. Your Despatches have produced a great change in the opinion of some men of weight and sense, and that the truth will make its way. The "L'Impartial" did good by the publication — I believe all my letters to de Jongh have been stopped.

It is hard to know what to say of English affairs, but many people think the present administration will not be able to go on long. Certainly it will have immense difficulties to surmount. — I doubt if it will be able to raise money by taxes, now that so many people are persuaded that the Corn Laws ought to be repealed.

Suppose that Manchester or Glasgow or Liverpool or any of the great trading cities should refuse to pay taxes, laid on to supply the public necessities which could be supplied by the repeal of the Corn Laws. No Ministry could coerce the City so acting, because it would have to face an opposition in the House of Commons consisting of 240 votes backed by all the clamour of the Anti-Corn-Law people &c.

This is a serious difficulty, but if we have a war with America or with any other country, I feel assured that *any* tax may be levied to support the honor and rights of the country, and that our Jacobines and Radicals will be scouted by the nation if they resist with vigorous measures as may be necessary

COLONEL CHURCHILL TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 19 February 1842.)

Extract.

Beyrout 28 January 1842.

I believe Bertrand has kept you pretty well au fait of all that has been going on here, and as we both have about the same means of getting information, it will be useless for me to enter at large in the question. The whole question has been one of money and power.

The Emir Beshir became by degrees the complete tool of the Patriarch, who wanted to get the ascendant in the Lebanon. The Druse Emirs found themselves in a degraded position, and a natural mistrust and hatred gradually grew up between the two parties, which wanted but some trifling cause of quarrel to blaze out into open civil war. And this is just what occurred. The utter defeat of the Maronites is greatly owing to the superior bravery and address of their adversaries, and partly owing to treason in their own camp.

The Emir Heider was well understood with the Druse Sheiks, and though in command of a greatly superior force, refused under some pretext or other to march to the relief of "Deir el Khamar", which consequently, after an investment of 3 or 4 weeks, surrendered at discretion to the Druses.

The Turkish policy was to connive at the proceedings of the Druses, and even to help them to a certain extent. Then Chebli Arrian had means of sending ammunition to them' from Damascus, while the real understanding between the Druses and Turks was cloaked over *here* by Selim Pasha, sending a few mule loads of ammunition to the *Christians*.

The Turkish Pashas knew that their only chance of having a footing in the mountain was to foment disunion, and they supported the Druses, because they knew they were the bravest party, inimical like themselves to the Christians, and hoping by shewing them countenance to detach them from a growing attachment to the English, what they were beginning to evince. However up to the present day, I believe no money has been got out of the mountaineers, but I am ignorant what arrangements may have been made lately.

Every thing is quiet now, and Omer Pasha has been named Governor General of the mountain. Still, whenever the authorities begin to levy contribution, the chances are that some disturbance will break out again. The Druses are friends of the Turks just so long as they will support them, and help to importance and ascendancy, and let them off easy, in money matters. Most of the functionaries of the Porte in Syria pay themselves, and thus the province is not a very great burden on the public treasury; and so, if the Porte will only let Syria exist quietly as it is — the sink of corruption and venality — without attempting to make it a source of public revenue, it may hang on yet

for some years, and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire be maintained as far as it is concerned.

It will be curious to see how the Turks will act, should the Druses attempt to commit outrages on the Christians. The Emir Handjar was sent against them, when they threatened to take Zachlé: for if they had taken that town, they might have done what they pleased in the Lebanon.

The Druses are still armed, and the Turks will be playing with edged tools when they begin to coerce them — the consequence of which will be probably to bring about an union between them and the Christians. In fact, the affairs of the mountain are only pacifically arranged for the moment — nor will they ever be finally settled until a power comes which is able to restrain *all parties*, without having necessity to put one against the other. The Turkish Pashas are no Mazarins, but at present they have contrived to get into the saddle — though I do not think they will keep them seat long

The fortifications at Acre are still unrepaired, and Symonds assured me, one entire bastion must fall down soon, and that it will cease to be a fortress. But what do the Turks care! Syria is only used to produce the Pashas presents and bribes. If it answers that purpose they care for nothing else. Justice is every where sold to the highest bidder, and this is the way the public functionaries from the highest to the lowest are paid. This is the *Revenue* of Syria!

Symonds has made a beautiful survey of Palestine, which I hope will be published. All have left. I am here like

"The last rose of summer left blooming alone,
"My lovely companions all faded and gone."

My affair at Damascus ended in an official report to Lord Aberdeen from Colonel Rose, that a vile conspiracy had been got up against me — and I have since received a great many letters thanking me for the way in which I defended the Jews and Christians against Nedjib Pasha

15.

CONSUL WOOD TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 1 March 1842.)

Damascus 9 February 1842.

My dear General,

I had much pleasure in receiving only the other day your kind note of the 14 of October. I shall be very happy to shew every civility in my power to your friend Mr. de Pohland, whenever he visits our City.

I am very happy to hear that you have received your Firman as Inspector General of the army, but I am afraid you will meet with many difficulties in the prosecution of the duties of your new office.

Lord Ponsonby I believe is still at Naples, and I do not think His Lordship will visit England before spring.

Your Serasker is still at Damascus, and I dare say you were surprised both to see your old friend at Constantinople and to hear of the good luck of Omer Pasha. I am afraid these are experiments that will teach the Turks a hard bought experience in Syrian affairs. The country is pretty quiet although there is a visible agitation throughout.

It is reported here that the old Emir is about to return with the consent of the Embassies. — His presence may serve to quiet matters a little for the time being — but what the ultimate consequences may be no one can tell.

I am very glad that the Sultan gave you a sword. I think you deserve two, but the Turks are, I suppose, tired of giving.

By the bye I see in one of the Smyrna Papers that the medals have been given, you will remember that we inserted in the list the names of the Misks and others. I must beg of you therefore, not to forget these individuals whom I recommend to you most strongly. The elder Misk has been most unfortunate. After serving most zealously and actively to the moment of the removal of the Emir, he has been thrown aside without receiving a single asper for all his very valuable and faithful services. He is consequently a ruined man, having neglected his own affairs for the last two years. It is shameful!

Do please write me occasionally and believe me, my dear General,

ever yours most faithfully

Richard Wood.

16.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Extract.

Pera 7 March 1842.

Many important things have happened here of late, especially in the interior administration, where the retrograde system is in full operation. The foreign questions bear principally on Syria and Greece, but as a few days more will make me see clearer on these subjects, I shall not enter upon those points at present.

I hear that in many late measures the Grand Visir has gone further than some of his colleagues and particularly Tahir Pasha wished him to do. Izzet Mehmet Pasha is supported in his retrograde system especially by Ariff Pasha, the President of the Council &c.

The Mushirs of the Provinces have been declared absolute in the interior administration and in the finances of their resp. districts. The latter are to be formed again as in olden times. The karatch or Christian capitation tax has also been taken out of the hands of the Patriarchs and their dependant clergy, and is to be under direct Turkish control. The perception is to be made through Turkish bureaux, and the ecclesiastical local authorities have only to fix the rate of each individual, as all Rayahs are to remain classed in three categories for the payment of the karatch.

It is generally said that the reason of this change is a considerable deficit in the annual revenue, but Prince Voghorides assures me that the deficit¹ is insignificant, and that security for this deficit had been offered by the Patriarch. He holds that the real reason of the measure is to be found in the desire of the present administration to re-establish as much as possible the outward superiority of the Mussulman conquerors over the Christian Rayahs. So much so is this the real tendency of the Government that an order was actually given and published in some quarters of Constantinople, to oblige the Rayahs to return to their old distinctive costume.

The representations of Tahir Pasha, however, (others say some observations made by Riza Pasha to the Sultan on the danger of this measure) caused the order to be rescinded — and Sarim Effendi denied even to some of the Dragomans that any order at all had been given, pretending that it was a mistake and that no change in the dress had been contemplated.

The re-establishment of the old costume is, however, simply the amplification of the new system of the perception of the karatch.

I very much doubt if the Porte will get *more* money² by the changed mode of collection

I have received a letter from Mr. Mellish, Foreign Office, dated 24 January. He tells me that he had delivered my Memorandum on Syrian Affairs to Lord Aberdeen, and that His Lordship had caused the communication to be *made official*.

I hear that the Porte has settled the question about the protestant Bishop of Jerusalem on a satisfactory basis.

It appears now very probable that the Porte will give way with reference to the affairs of the Lebanon.

It is a great pity that the Divan committed the mistake, against which it had been cautioned, to change the Government of the Emir Beshir, and thus to create spontaneously all the complications arising

¹ It amounted only to 200,000 piasters due by the Patriarch for Constantinople and the Bosphorus. — The Karatch in the provinces is levied by the Bishops and the remaining Clergy.

² The Armenian Patriarch was actually not able to collect the full amount of Karatch. He applied to the Porte to be relieved from the task of collecting it, but the Greek Patriarch did not.

from *foreign interference* in affairs of the *internal* administration of an independent state.

Mr. Mavrocordatos¹ arrived here on the 2 instant. He is an old friend of mine, and I have found him very little changed since I saw him last in London.

He brought me a letter from our common friend Sir Richard Church, who seems decidedly as great a Philhellen as ever

17.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RICHARD CHURCH TO
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 7 March 1842.)

Athens 11 February 1842.

My dear Jochmus,

You know me too well to judge of my friendship by the number of my letters, and think when we were here last, we came to an understanding on that head. It is disgraceful to a man, no doubt, to neglect writing to his friends; but as there are vices in the constitutions of individuals which sometimes cannot be conquered, so there are bad habits that in like manner cannot be overcome.

I *know* that you will excuse me, and therefore perhaps I have presumed on your patience and good nature. In the midst of your brilliant career I have never lost sight of you for an instant; and I have always accompanied you with my good wishes.

Your talents, activity, and bravery left no doubt of your distinguishing yourself, and also of finding a field for the display of these qualities which I believe I was one of the first to discover and to do justice to.

You may now be proud of your exploits, and of the laurels gained both in the East and West, and if the assurance of my anxious desire for the continuation of your prosperity will be any satisfaction to you, receive it herewith in the plenitude of the sincerest friendship.

Although you were obliged to have recourse to the sword to conquer my hitherto invincible silence, I am indeed much obliged to you for still remembering with kindness your first General, and it is no small boast on my part, that you first signalized yourself under my orders and belonging to my personal staff.

The sword I shall highly prize; I doubt not of its merits; but even were they disputable, the feelings, excited on receiving the gift of it, were and are of that nature to give it a very high price indeed. — Mr. du Rocher was kind enough to deliver it in *propria Persona*.

¹ Appointed Greek Envoy Extraordinary in Constantinople.

Our old friend Mavrocordatos will deliver you this letter, I believe he has not forgotten in the least his former friendship for you.

I hope you find Sir Canning quite friendly. I have not failed to talk to him of you and also with Mr. Anzon — they both know the friendly relationship existing for so many years between us. — Sir E. Lyons also often speaks of you with regard.

Go on, my dear Jochmus, and distinguish yourself on every possible occasion — but as (perhaps) I am oldest and sincerest friend and first military Patron, let me warmly advise you never to *mix yourself in the least degree in Greek affairs.*

That you will appreciate this counsel I am persuaded from the thousand reasons which point out to you as a man of delicacy and a high minded soldier that every field of action is open to you save one. In bringing myself to say what I do on this subject I prove the interest that I take on your reputation and welfare, and I think that I give you the greatest possible proof of the continuation of my friendship; at the same time I must assure you that I never even for a moment did you the injustice to believe that you ever had any such intentions.

I have only now to say, how truly I desire that you may continue to prosper and that your prosperity may be established on the most permanent basis possible, and so thanking you again for the Kara Kirk Merdivan.¹ —

I remain, my dear Jochmus,

your very sincere friend

R. Church.

P.S. When you write let me know your proper Turkish titles — are you Jochmus Pasha — or by what name are you known as Pasha?

18.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 16 March 1842.)

Naples 4 March 1842.

My dear General,

I have received your letter of the 10 and 17 February.

I regret much the appointment of Omer Pasha; the *man is excellent* but the selection of a Turk for that post is a serious *error*, and more serious because it has been the effect of Mustapha Nouri's bigotry adopted (to certain extent) by the Porte and therefore threatening to lead to more extensive mischief even than the evils it is likely to produce in Syria.

¹ "an excellent kind of Damascus steel sword-blade" *Redhouse.*

The state of Europe places the Porte in complete security against the hostile attacks of every separate Power, and I do not see any way by which the Porte could excite a general union against itself excepting by the adoption of hostile measures, in spirit and in fact, against Christians as Christians, and were the Porte to commit that folly, all Christendom would unite, and sweep the Ottomans from the seats of authority.

This is a serious affair and ought to be looked after. I agree in thinking that the *Sou* of the Old Emir may be the best person to be placed in command, as it seems to be determined that Cassim cannot administer the government with success. — At all events, it is necessary to put an end, without loss of time, to the *direct* government of the Turks in the Lebanon, or else all the evils you speak of will infallibly ensue. —

The Druses seem to have had the same success in making a fool of Nouri and the Turks, as they had in making a fool of Colonel Rose, and leading him to draw Lord Palmerston into the capital errors he committed, which are the source of all the existing difficulties.

I shall be glad of the influence of Tahir Pasha; he is a man of sense and courage. I do not regret the return towards the old regiment, for I think it necessary that Turks should be governed on Turkish principles, in accordance with the religion and manners of the people; all I desire is to see the government carried on with firmness, and the more justice the better.

It is folly to attempt to introduce the principles of french *centralization* into a country, where a loose system of feudality is the only one comprehended by any individual high or low.

It gives me great pleasure to hear of the Sultan's attention to Finances. I wish I could hear from you that he is equally alive to the other element of strength and security, the *Army*.

I think what you have heard of the proceedings of Mehemet Ali at El Arish, is most likely to be true. I have no doubt that the Old Pasha is still looking to the restoration of his power in Syria, and to the aid of France, and I as little doubt the *intentions* of the French to aid him, whenever it shall appear to them feasible so to act without too much danger to themselves. It is obvious the French are speculating upon the chances of a war between England and North America, perhaps such an event may take place, and may be considered by the French as a favorable opportunity for them to beat down their hated rivals the English. It is certainly fit that we should look after the Old Pasha, and it is more particularly incumbent on the Ottoman Ministers to do so; perhaps Tahir Pasha will see this in the same light as I do, and will be upon his guard.

I do hope the Porte is attentive to the situation of Thessaly and Albania! It is evident that there exist hopes as well as the intention of evil in the mind of many of the Greeks, and perhaps there may be a plan amongst the French for making *them* the instruments of french

purposes; I cannot imagine that Austria would seek to produce disorders in Turkey, because she could not obtain the spoils she might like well enough to get, without bringing forward France in a way which could not suit the policy so dear to her, of preventing to the utmost the spreading of democratic or constitutional ideas. — Metternich is (above all things) cunning, but as cunning is not wisdom, he may possibly imagine that he could again with success play the same sort of game he did play before. I think he would now fail; I think he would not now be again favored by *so many* circumstances, the pure result of causes he did not see. He was, indeed, so successful rather because of *the failure* of his own plans than in consequence of them, but as I have said above he may be tempted to seek aggrandizements.

I think Russia will not find it her interest to allow the Greeks to bring on a serious crisis: The present policy of Russia seems to be to maintain and extend her influence with the Greek Priesthood and so forth, as a basis on which to act whenever a proper opportunity may offer for the accomplishment of her old and natural designs of ambition, but as the present time is felt by Russia to be *inopportune*, I confide in her sagacity and prudence for her abstinence from the adoption of disturbing measures of a greater action than those calculated to produce the limited effect I have stated.

The presumption and the folly of the Greek is aided by extreme activity, and the full possession of the sort of ability required for scattering reports amongst editors of Journals and others, so as to create, perhaps, a disposition in many to give encouragement to plans which have the air of probability of success. I am at the same time well aware that a conspiracy exists, supported by the strongest wishes and by the best (though feeble) means of a multitude of men of different sorts, and I feel certain that any conspiracy will meet with support, more or less, from such people as the Albanians, if there should be plunder or gain to be expected, and I am anxious to see the Porte take the proper measures to meet so probable a danger, and to put an end to it.

The Porte ought not to yield any thing to the exigence of the Foreign Powers; I think it ought to refuse to allow the Foreign Courts to bind it to administer its internal government after the mode suggested by them. I am of opinion, it ought to *refuse to answer affirmatively* the question that has been asked about Omer Pasha, and that it ought, as soon as possible, to remove *him* from his *Post* and place a Maronite there.

You know my opinion that the time is come when the Porte can and ought to assume openly and maintain steadily the independent administration of its own affairs; It was a great source of weakness and of misfortune to the Porte, the constant dependence upon foreign advice, for it not only lowwed the Porte in the eyes of its subjects, but led to an infinity of errors deriving from the ignorance of those who took upon themselves to give counsel, *being themselves ignorant of the*

truth and full of silly prejudices and of notions inapplicable to the country. Cassim has been ill-used by every body; had I remained I would have protected him, and could have done so provided *he* would have listened to me.

I would *not have remained* without forcing Palmerston to undo the follies he had committed in Syria. I could have forced him. It will be too late when I get home to be of service to Cassim, and as he is not a man of any ability it might be wrong to endeavour to replace him after a new arrangement of the administration of the Lebanon had been completed.

I shall be glad to learn something more of Hadil, I know all about the accomplished scoundrel Sheik Nuhrran, the protégé of our wise Colonel Rose, and of the pious Missionary American Thompson.

Napier, it is said, has made himself an object of ridicule in England. He is said to be disliked by his own profession, and also not well thought of by the Soldier. A man who will not allow any body but himself to deserve any praise cannot long preserve unfaded on his own brow laurels which ought to be placed on other heads.

There seems to have been a great deal of exertion used to prevent the circulation of the *successes* due to your skill and activity. Your Despatches were kept back, and I know that, *where they have been seen*, they have convinced every body of the merit and ability of your conduct. I cannot conceive what could have been Napier's object when he moved for their production.—Vanity blinds men, and he did not see, perhaps, the condemnation inherent in the facts, those details contain, of his own puerile and unauthorized Convention.

In a late *United Service Journal* the Editor expresses his wish that somebody or other at Naples would send to that paper "l'Impartial", which the Editor says is the only Journal that advocates the policy of England, and which is not in the pay of France. Now it might be in your power to send those numbers of the "Impartial", in which are your Despatches, to London and have them given to the Editor. He probably for his own ends would publish them and there cannot be a better channel by which to make them known, and thereby refute the lies and nonsense of military men who are jealous of your merits.

I am told that Peel is not in safety notwithstanding his vast majority in Parliament. I do, myself, think his position is a difficult one, and that it may become worse and worse. The Crown is adverse to him. If the *Towns* are so also, there is a great chance of his fall. I never know any Minister stand against the *Towns* of England: I do not believe it possible to restore the Old (the late) administration without fundamental changes in its composition and so forth; and it is possible the result of existing contests may be some coalition of men who may carry with them a really extended influence. *Who the men are I know not.*

I remain here for some time, and hope to hear from you often. Your letters come *safe to me* by the hands of Mr. Barber of Malta.

Mine to you also, I hope, go safe. If by any chance you have kept my letters, I wish you would continue to preserve them! I shall be glad, at some other time, to be able to get from them a record of the opinions I have entertained.

Yours faithfully

Poussonby.

19.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO R. C. MELLISH,

Foreign Office, London.

Private. Extract.

Pera 24 March 1842.

I have been prevented from answering your Note of the 24 January by the February messenger.

I am much obliged for your having delivered my Memorandum on Syrian affairs to Lord Aberdeen.

Events have since shown that the Porte would have done well not to follow up its own headstrong course of policy, with regard to the Lebanon, because Europe will not suffer open hostile measures against the Christians of the Lebanon as *Christians*.

If the Porte realizes its present plans of sending a force of five thousand Albanians from Thessaly into Syria, the affair will assume a very serious aspect indeed, for neither Druses nor Maronites will accept Albanians as pacificators, particularly of such men as Abbas Aga and Tafil Bey (formerly known as the robber chief Tafil Buzi, 1832 to 1835) are destined to lead them. I know that Mustapha Nouri Pasha himself pointed out these leaders soon *after* his arrival in Syria, and this proves that coercion entered into the plans of the Porte, when she appointed Mustapha Pasha to Syria, and his conduct there has shown that, altho' a moderate man in politics, as long as he stood under such a Sovereign as the late Sultan Mahmoud, yet his fanaticism and bigotry are too strong to allow him to remain moderate, in a question of civil and religious strife, when a tight hand is not kept over him, much less so if "reaction" is the order of the day.

Mustapha Pasha is a proud man, not likely to swerve from a course which he has chalked out for himself, except when *forced* to do change it. — I do not believe therefore in the protestations of the Porte that the Albanians are not to be actively employed against the mountaineers.

On the contrary, they will be the *first* to be employed, if any serious disturbances take place, and it is my opinion that the mere presence of the Albanians will lead to those disturbances, for of two things one must happen: either the Druses, under promises of all kinds of privileges from the Turks, will themselves create hostilities in order to assail, conjointly, with the Turks their rivals, the Maronites, and

this case the whole country will be ruined, or it may be that the Druses and Christians join, in order to escape being *both* plundered by the Albanians.

I am not on the spot so as to judge of the probability of either case, but I hold that, in the run of some months, this union between the Christians and Druses is more likely to take place, and the Porte will then have converted a party strife between mountaineers into an insurrection against the Sultan's authority.

It ought to be remembered that, had the Pashas of Saïda and Damascus supported the Emir Cassim, that is to say the authority *legally* installed, instead of fomenting discord and secretly supporting the factious Druses, neither event would have happened, I mean neither the civil war nor eventually an insurrection against the Sultan's dominion.

A. Jochmus.

20.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Naples.

Private. Extract.

Pera 26 March 1842.

Mr. Mavrocordatos has not as yet had an audience from the Sultan, he was only admitted to one at the Grand Visir (10 March).

I heard the other day a curious argument from a high Turkish Functionary relative to this delay of presentation.

That personage stated that Mavrocordatos could *not* be presented to the Sultan, because there *existed* no treaty between Turkey and Greece, whereas the fact is that Mavrocordatos is come to *conclude* a treaty.

According to ancient Ottoman Court etiquet certainly the formal presentation of a Foreign Envoy did not take place, whenever a treaty did not already exist between the two Courts. I believe that there exist, however, some exceptions to this rule, but at any rate Zographos and Christidis had been admitted to the Imperial presence notwithstanding the non-existence of a treaty.

It is the general opinion here amongst the Diplomatic Corps that Turkey cannot and will not consent to any essential modifications of the treaty, signed by Zographos.

The fact is that, if the Divan does give way on the question of the coasting trade and of the external jurisdiction, Turkey throws into its own dominions a seed of destruction, more vivid than any other cause of dissolution now existing or working. It must always be considered that the close neighbourhood and the former condition of Greece do not admit of the possibility of its being placed on the same footing as other countries, and it strikes me that Turkey, far from making *new* treaties consecrating the principal of *external* jurisdiction, ought

to work with all its might to modify those already in existence, bearing on this question. Those treaties were made and calculated for a time when the number of foreign subjects amounted to very little, but if Turkey by a wise course of policy should take rank amongst European Powers and *inspire confidence*, it must needs try to undo regulations which lower its moral authority, and which only embarrass its jurisdiction, and seriously injure its finances, by affording means of covering innumerable frauds and villanies.

It is supposed that upwards of 20,000 Greeks or people enjoying Greek protection are established in and near Constantinople and Smyrna. Many others live by the coasting trade.

A great number of the former exercise the retail trade of the country and live as artificers and by handicrafts, enjoying thus the privileges or means of livelihood of numerous corporations of this country. These corporations, as well as the Rayahs or Turks who live by the coasting trade, accept the advantages and disadvantages of the Turkish law and administration. If you create an exceptional and more advantageous position for foreign Greeks, you ruin your own subjects. The Turks are therefore perfectly right when they say to those foreigners "either abandon those trades and corporations, or submit to their disadvantages as well as to those advantages which make you desirous to live by them." I trust and hope that the Ottoman Ministers will not abandon, in the Greek question, the advantageous ground upon which they have taken their stand, the less so, as they have shown great deference to the friendly mediation of the Three Powers, parties to the Greek treaty of London.

Izzet Pasha and Tahir Pasha have no intention to quit this ground of legitimate self-defence. Sami Pasha (the Agent from Egypt) arrived here on the 11 instant. He is still in quarantine. His mission, it is supposed, embraces three principal points, that have *as yet* transpired:

1. The fortification of the shores of the Red Sea against *India*.
2. Desired support in Mehemet Ali's system of eluding the commercial treaty of 1838:
3. Regulation of the arrears due by Egypt to the Porte. The latter claims 400,000 purses or 200 millions of piasters. The Pasha makes out that he owes only 400,000 dollars or 10 millions of piasters, that is to say he offers to pay the twentieth part of the arrears claimed, and in order to make good his calculation, he deducts from the admitted demands of the Porte, the sums paid to the Ottoman Navy at Alexandria, and the amount of the losses, which he has experienced in *Material of War* during the Syrian War!!

21.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered 16 April 1842.)

Naples 23 March 1842.

My dear General,

The French steamer was some days after her time but at last arrived, and I had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 7 instant. You ought to have had letters from me and I will hope you have so before now. The time is approaching for my return to England. I intend to leave this as soon as the mountain passes are free, but that will be late this year owing to the great mass of snow that has fallen. It would be imprudent to expose a delicate woman to the chance of disaster for the gain of a few days, though I confess I am very anxious to get home.

I have heard much of the excessive ignorance in England concerning every thing that has taken place in Turkey, and I am told that Napier has not been wanting in coloring his own acts so as to give himself the air of being the *only man* who did *any thing*. I have not seen your Despatches in any of the English or German papers, notwithstanding the efforts made to get them published in them, perhaps the strong excitement in England upon internal questions has prevented all feeling of interest on subjects of any other nature. This feeling will subside now, and I trust by the time I reach home, people may not be exclusively occupied with Corn Laws &c.

I wish you could do something with the German papers about those Despatches, or with the *French!* They ought to be made public. — I am certain they would produce a great effect because I have seen them to do so on many men here.

Your letters directed to me if sent under cover to *Mr. Barber* at Malta will be sure to reach me, and I shall not leave this till the end of April; when I go they shall be forwarded to me by safe means.

I wait with much interest for your promised letter on the subject of Syria and Greece. — Tahir Pasha has too much sense to approve of violent and sudden retrograde measures — Ariff is a known rogue and a *bigot* though he may not be a *believer* . . .

The great thing to be attended to by the Turks is, as I have so often said already, to take care not to give *just* offence to *all the European Powers* by making attacks upon *Christians as Christians*, that is, proving by acts that religious feelings are to govern the conduct of the Porte to the detriment and injury of Christians! I know of no other cause which the Turks can give for the serious and formidable dissatisfaction of *all* the Courts, and I do not think the Turks need be afraid of any thing excepting such a common and general feeling of hostility.

If the Turks choose to uphold their own system of government contrary to the advice and the inclination of any one or of more than one foreign Government, the Turks have not only the right to do so, but they may be certain, no one Government nor any two Governments will be permitted by the *others* to do more than *complain*. — I cannot judge at this distance of the precise amount of bearing which the arrangement about the *Karatch*, now made or making, will have upon the question of *interference* by the Turks with the *question* of religion.

I am sure it would be safer for the Turks to leave the matter as it was. Time had given it a covering that secured it against all interference from abroad. Who can be certain that this new mode may not occasion a beginning of meddling that may lead from one thing to another, till a step shall be thus made towards the great and only danger, of which I have already spoken above?

What you say of the increase of burden upon the Rayahs in consequence of some of the new regulations seems to me too probable. It will be a cause for great outcry and will aid in disposing the Christian world to believe unfounded stories against the Turks upon the subject of religious toleration. As to every thing connected solely with the administration of the Turkish Government (*exclusive* of religious matter as above explained) I think light of it; I am not a bit surprized that Gul Khana should be thrown in the dirt, I never considered it but as a valuable *assertion* publicly made of sound principle of universal justice — most useful at the moment to the cause of the Turks, and a base upon which might be raised hereafter some valuable arrangements for the general good.

The measures taken by Reshid Pasha for carrying the *Hati Sherif* into execution have always appeared to me to be very foolish and jejune, and the offsprings of frippery, french philosophy, and ignorant vanity. Every country must be governed in very great accordance with the fundamental principles, upon which the society, called a people, is formed. The religion and the manners of that society are the most important of those principles, and Reshid's measures *alarmed* religion and often offended manners. — All men comprehend *justice*, and a theocratic Despot *may* administer justice as well as any other Government that has ever existed or been imagined by the mind of man. An approach then, in Turkey, to a good administration of justice in all things, is the proper object, in my opinion, to which Turkish statesmen ought to direct their attention. Justice will establish an improved order, and that will increase wealth, and that will augment intelligence, and trade will follow and will liberate those who engage in it from many mischievous prejudices and habits, and the Society will advance towards an amended station, by sure though slow degrees.

All sudden changes are likely to do mischief, they have seldom done any good. — The vast changes made by Peter in Russia may be said in many respects to have been like covering an image of yellow

clay with Plaster of Paris, the surface only was polished and white, and every scratch exposed the vile *substratum*.

Many many years have passed away since Peter's time, and all his successors have done more or less to civilize their country with little effect upon the mass, which seems only to have been acted upon with some force when the war with France had the effect of bringing large bodies of men into contact with foreigners, and to make them feel and see the different condition in which they stood from other men. *This*, it is true, has accelerated the progress of those opinions and of that advancement in knowledge which necessarily brings about at last, that is at the appointed time, the destruction of serfage and other relations of man to man, which then become unsuitable to existing circumstances of a people — Reshid was no Peter the Great — very much the contrary, and though a curious combination of events gave him the means of propounding and of apparently executing his plans, they had little more strength in them than was to be found in the feeble reed with which they were written.

If all I have said has any meaning, at all, it is that I think, Turkey must flounder on in the midst of errors and faults, which will be softened gradually by time, and which might be more speedily altered, if any man could administer the actual power of the state with a greater attention to justice. I have been most earnestly desirous of the establishment of a good system of military discipline and arrangement, not solely because the army is the great bulwark of the state and necessary for the establishment of national security, but because also by the creation of order in the army every other branch of the executive administration would be, to a certain degree, improved in a similar or more correctly speaking, in the same principle.

I hope the Sultan may feel the necessity for a good army! he has comprehended it, but if he has his eyes opened to such a state of things as you describe as likely to be seen in Albania and Bosnia and all those parts of Greece upon which His Majesty's enemies can too easily act, He could not long allow his Ministers to trifle with a matter of so great magnitude, but must force them to execute the plans of which he has himself approved. — Those plans, I hear, have been given to Sir Stratford Canning by Captain Williams. I hope *He* will urge their execution.

I intend to *speak to Aberdeen* as soon as I can. I am not at liberty to write — and I should only by any imprudent attempt *create* jealousies, which might excite opposition instead of procuring support for the measure so desirable to have executed. — Sir Stratford Canning seems to have learned from the Sultan also that I had communicated plans to him. I think Sir Stratford cannot but approve of them so far as the principle goes, and if he has a fancy to alter the details, he can do so.

Yours most faithfully

Ponsonby.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 16 April 1842.

Private.

Naples 27 March 1842.

My dear General,

The French steamer brought me this day your letters of the 12 and 16 instant and the copy of an Extract from Sir de Lacy Evans' letter to you, and an extract of a letter from yourself addressed to — incognito.

You allow me to make what use I think proper of the last mentioned Extract, and I am pleased that you suggest the communication of it to Lord Beauvale. I have already had some conversation with him, and I find him ignorant of your Despatches so far as to make it very desirable that he should learn the main points from your able and calm exposition of them in the above mentioned Extract.

I will let you know what he says after the communication, and I will endeavour to guide him to make some effort to lay the whole before Metternich with whom he corresponds occasionally.

I think of employing *The Extract* in another way also, but I must well consider whether or not it will be advantageous for you that it should appear with your signature — as at present advised I understand that you give me *Carte blanche* respecting the use to be made of that Extract. — I *am* desirous to make it known to the world because it defies, by its lucidity, all the artifices that can be resorted to by the two shabby fellows in question for the purpose of keeping the public longer in ignorance of the brilliant success you obtained under such difficult circumstances. — I could wish to add a note upon the Extract for the purpose of bringing out for general notice the fact that for such services English gratitude has given you a brace of pistols!!! but this must be done with caution and discretion.

My delay here has been disagreeable to me on account of the comparative inaction to what it has condemned me.

You alarm me about the Turks, and more particularly by what you say about Tahir Pasha. I hoped *he* would see more clearly — his error is, that he supposes in his argument *that what ought to be done will be done*. I will grant, if he chooses it, "that the good and just intentions of the Ottoman Government to maintain tranquillity in the disturbed provinces of the Lebanon ought to be a sufficient guarantee to the Christian powers that a fair administration will be established under a Turkish Pasha." — Your observations on this are just and conclusive, but (as I above said) I will *grant* him that all he (Tahir) says is true, and I will ask him: does he believe that the Christian powers will accept his proposition as a security? — Is it not certain, that they will not? and if they will not, of what avail to him, or to

the Porte is it, that such a security *ought* to be accepted by those powers?

Tahir is a practical man and has a strong understanding, *he* ought not to allow himself to confide the security of his country to the power of *the idea of such a duty incumbent upon the foreign powers even if he* could be sure, which he cannot be, that *they* will admit the existence of that duty. He ought not to risk giving to foreign powers a pretext if not a cause for an *armed* interference with the authority of the Porte, because if that interference should take place, he and his country cannot resist the force that may be employed, with the utmost facility, against the Porte.

You *agree* with me that the great danger to be avoided by the Turks is that of a *union* amongst Christian Powers for the purpose of coercing the Ottoman Government.

I say that the union so much to be dreaded, cannot be created except by the folly of the Ottoman Government in giving cause for a general opinion amongst Christians, that the Turks are acting against Christians as Christians. Now let it be supposed that the Turkish authorities in Syria, being animated by bigotry or any other motive, should continue to act as the present Governor of Damascus Nedjib Pasha has acted, or that they should act as some imagine Mustapha Nouri Pasha may have counseled the Porte to act, suppose that the Albanians under Tafil Bey should act as Albanians act wherever they are employed, what will be the result? Will the foreign powers say, we *ought* to take the good and just intentions of the Ottoman Government to maintain tranquillity &c. as a sufficient guarantee that a fair administration will be established under a Turkish authority?

The powers would say, we cannot accept such a guarantee, because the evil to be guarded against, *is actually* in being, it actually has fallen upon our co-religionists, and *we will* protect them by a force that shall defy the return of the mischief.

Will Tahir allow things to come to such a pass as that? He is brave as a lion, and a true patriot, but he knows *by experience* that Turkey, *at present*, could not resist the forces of one of the Great Powers, if allowed to act single; and how can he expect to make head for an hour against a combined act of them all?

Of what use is it then to Tahir, if his notion of what *ought* to be a sufficient guarantee *be a notion* founded in moral truth? For what end can he risk incurring that *only danger* to which the Turks can be exposed at the present *time*, of having their Government destroyed and themselves reduced to the state of national and individual distress and misery, which must attend upon their subjugation under the yoke of exasperated Christians, animated themselves by a bigotry like that by which the Turks will have drawn vengeance upon their own heads?

I am the more anxious to examine this point, and if possible, to convince Tahir Pasha, because I believe the fate of Turkey depends upon the conduct the Ottoman Government pursues in Syria; I see, as

you do, the symptoms of gathering storms, and I am sure that the elements are charged with one much more furious than that of the Greek revolution. There has been a great change in public feeling since that event; Bigotry has made *immense* progress in Europe; it is ready now to become an active principle, and Woe Woe to the Turks, if they do call it into action.

Nobody will be allowed to injure the Porte, if the Porte will oblige its officers to act with common sense, but let the Porte take care for, there is a mine prepared, and a spark thrown by the Porte thereon will ignite the combustible and scatter and destroy the Sultans and Pashas like withered leaves.

I fear I have been very tedious; I have been drawn on by the interest I have in the affair to say more than I ought to have imposed upon your patience to attend to. My argument is a simple one that might be stated in three words, but age is garrulous and I am old. — I will not now add to the trouble I have already given you, but will reserve for next Post what I have further to say, only expressing here my earnest hope (I wish I could say my expectation) that some good may arise out of the feeling, which Hafiz Pasha seems to have on the subject of the Army.

I am happy to hear that Sir Stratford Canning treats you with friendly confidence. It is what he ought to do. — I am entirely convinced with you, that no Ambassador would act in opposition to the policy of the Government that employs him, but an Ambassador may *form* the opinion of his Government, and he may give it an erroneous direction. I am far from supposing that to be the case with Sir Stratford Canning, for he has the reputation of being a clever man, and he has had every advantage to enable him to form a sound judgement of affairs

23.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Naples.

Extract.

Pera 16 April 1842.

I have had the honour to receive by the last steamer your two letters of the 23 and 27 March¹, and I am looking with great interest for the next, which your Lordship is kind enough to promise me, as a continuation of the views on Turkish affairs which you entertain at present. — These communications are to me always of the highest value, not only from the intrinsic weight of the reasoning, but because I often refer to them in conversation with Prince Voghorides, Tahir Pasha, and

¹ vide No. 21, 22.

other men of importance, and I feel quite persuaded that Turkey has in several cases been actually benefited by your Lordship's sound advice, tho' it comes from a distance.

Your Lordship will have perceived the violent language of the French, German, and English press relative to the state of Syria, the proceedings of the Porte in the affair of the Emir Beshir, and generally relative to the retrograde policy of the present Ottoman Ministry, *as far as* it affects or is likely to affect the condition of the Rayah population of the Empire. — The exaggerations of the press are evident to those who have followed the course of events here, but as the number of people in Europe able to form a correct opinion on the state of Turkey is extremely limited, all the absurdities said about this country will be generally believed, and public opinion will be vitiated and real danger may accrue to Turkey from imaginary or exaggerated wrongs inflicted on the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Porte.

The danger of Izzet Pasha's policy lies still more in the bad feeling created in *Europe*, than by *real* sufferings of the people *in the Empire*, but Your Lordship has so thoroughly entered into these considerations, that any feeble argumentation of my own is quite superfluous, yet I hope still that Izzet Pasha's administration may be maintained, for it is a *Turkish* Government and Turks alone can save Turkey.

I am not afraid that even retrograde measures can be carried out to their utmost extent, fore there is an inherent force in the attitude of Europe at large, which must bring every Turkish statesman to the conviction (except he be mad) that the Christian population cannot be dealt with as they were 100 or 200 years ago. — There may be vexations and partiality in the distribution of public imposts &c., but the Turks must feel and know that open violence and oppression would be resisted from within and from without.

The caravan between Damascus and Bagdad had been plundered by the Arabs of the Desert. — Incursions in the South of Syria by armed bands of Arabs had also become very frequent. — They carry off every thing they find.

A skirmish has taken place in the middle of March near Bekfeya, where five Albanians had been killed. — I believe that Mustapha Nouri Pasha and Omer Pasha do every thing in their power to prevent for the present an outbreak in Syria, or rather in the Lebanon. They of course will have made, for this momentary object, every promise imaginable, particularly to the Druses, of exemptions from public charges &c., but nobody here is mistaken on this head, and I have not heard *one* foreign diplomatist placing the slightest confidence in this state of things, because its base is injustice and ingratitude towards the populations who have most contributed to the success of the Sultan's arms in Syria

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LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 26 April 1842.)

Naples 14 April 1842

My dear General,

Many thanks for your letter of 26 March which came in due course by the last steamer. I have not time to answer it because I made a mistake and thought this was the 13 day of the month, and therefore imagined I had full time to write, whereas not late at night I find that my letters must be sent off or risk being kept back ten days. — I have a great deal to say to you in reply to your letter, but I do not know how to say *a little*.

I cannot understand what the Porte and Mehemet Ali can respectively intend, unless it be to cheat each other. Mehemet is still French and always will be so. He probably sees that there is a chance of a war between America and England, and knows that, if one do break out, the French will join the Americans, and then he feels he may be necessary to France and obtain her aid for the attainment of his ends.

Certainly the concession by the Porte to the Greek demand of jurisdiction and cabotage will ruin the Sultan — I should be surprized if the English Government took the part of the Greek.

I think your suggestion to put the Albanians into St. Jean d'Acre is the best thing that can be done — God help those who are exposed to the consequences of the foolish acts of Colonel Rose and Co. — Every bit of the present difficulties in Syria is due to that wiseacre who was him buzzed by his own vanity into giving credit to the American Missionary and two rascally *Sheiks*.

I have shewn your Despatches, as printed in "l'Impartial", to some British Officers, one of them having visited Syria where he had been told a very different story, and they all were astonished when they saw the statement of facts. — I hope those Despatches may be printed in the United Service Journal. They have been sent to that paper. It is astonishing to me how they have been kept back all this time from publication. What means can have been taken with success to prevent it?

I must not enter on this subject without saying more than I have now time for, so I close it.

They say Peel is in difficulties and ill in health. — Do you think America *will* go to war?

I want to hear more from Constantinople, I expect the fall of the present Ottoman Ministers, excepting Riza and those whom he chooses to support.

I stay here till the 2d week in May and then go without delay to London. I can hear from you again. I will write again by next steamer.

P.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Naples.

Extract.

Pera 26 April 1842.

. . . With reference to Indian affairs I told Tahir and Hafir Pashas that my opinion on the war in Afghanistan was that the British Government certainly would punish the traitors at Caboul, who ever they might be, Akbar Khan or Shah Shoojah or both, but that after having re-established the supremacy of British arms in Central Asia, the troops would very likely be ordered back across the Indus

I am, my Lord, at too great a distance from the theatre of war to judge correctly of what has occurred and of what is likely to take place, but it strikes me that, according to all military rules, British troops sought *not permanently* to occupy Afghanistan or any other large territories beyond Attock and the Indus. I have heard it stated that the Whig Government was of this opinion, and that they wanted only to introduce order into the Afghan tribes, by subjecting them all to *one* ruler and *then to retire*. I believe also that the Duke of Wellington recommended and still recommends that course. — The only possible danger for India is an attack by a large Russian army. I myself hold at present this aggression *to be chimerical*,¹ but arguing that it is possible, you only augment the chances of success of the enemy, by going to meet him half way, in a wild and barren country of small resources for military subsistence. In a war between Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia and on the borders of the Indus, victory will be on the side of the General who knows best *to subsist* his army. Positions to fight in, may be chosen any where, and the advantage of fighting in a strong mountainous country like Afghanistan, in positions of your own choice, is by no means balanced by the dangers you incur of having your convoys from India intercepted, detained, or plundered by the robber hordes, that are and will remain in possession of the passes and defiles of the country

The difficulties of an invasion rise nearly in a geometrical proportion with the distance which the invading army has to march from its natural and original base of operations.

Hence these difficulties are diminished in the same ratio by every step which the defensive army makes forward, and which thus diminishes the distance which the invading army has to move through until it reaches the decisive field of battle.

If these premises are correct, any advance of a British army across the Indus would diminish the most serious of all difficulties, "*distance*" — which a Russian army has to contend with for the invasion of India.

¹ The very reverse is true since the great mutiny of 1857.

Moreover, if the Afghans were your enemies, it would not be militarily correct to undertake at the *same* time *two* operations: one to fight the Russians in the centre of Afghanistan, and the other to detach strong forces to keep up your communications for convoys &c. with Attock and the Indus.

On the other hand, if the Afghans are your friends, the best service they can render you is to defend their passes and strongholds against the invading army.

I hope that the next mail from India will bring the news of the safety of Sir Robert Sale's forces

If Shah Shoojah proves to be a traitor I suppose it possible that the Indian Government may restore and increase the power of Dost Mahomed, who seems to be a much abler man than his competitor

All these latter observations are, however, only based on newspapers reports and opinions of the lying press of India, and they are therefore *worth nothing*. I cannot understand how the British Government tolerates the discussions *on military affairs* in the *local* papers of India. I cannot see one single advantage in allowing some vagabond scribes, or some commissariat-clerks, surgeon's-apprentices &c., to give their insipid opinions on military operations, of which they cannot have the slightest conception, and if *military* men write in those papers and reason correctly, which is scarcely ever the case, considering the class of men and their means of information, it can only tend to *loosen discipline* and to *destroy confidence*. I can see no advantage and only a thousand disadvantages in such a system as that of late allowed to grow up in the Indian press relative to *military affairs*. To be obliged to tolerate it in England is bad enough, but to permit it in *Colonial India*,¹ appears to me next to inexplicable. — Napoleon used to say that during the Peninsular war the best and often the only information he could obtain of the situation and of the plans of the Duke, was derived from the *English* newspapers. — The Afghans cannot read, but there are other natives in India and in Europe who can and who make use of *lies* as well as of *truth*. An illustration are the reports of the French papers on the Afghan war, all derived from the British and Indian gazettes

¹ The impunity of such insolence and calumny lowers the social and military consideration of the British army at home and in India it must ultimately overthrow the discipline of the native army and the impression of European superiority.*

* 1858. Corollaries are Crimean campaigns and Indian rebellions. "*The Fusillade. Georges Dandin.*"

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received and answered Pera 16 May 1842.)

Naples 24 April 1842.

My dear General,

I received by last steamer your letter of 6 instant, and therein enclosed your letter to Sir Stratford Canning dated 31 March.¹

I think that letter, most powerful in statement, indeed unanswerable, and I do not see how any British Government can avoid doing justice to your *meritorious services*.

I take it for granted that Sir S. Canning will transmit it to the Secretary of State, and I have a strong impression that Lord Aberdeen is very and well disposed to do justice. He cannot approve of the ungenerous and unfair conduct of Napier and his accomplice towards you, and having been put in possession of the *facts* by you in a formal and official manner, he cannot appear to be ignorant, even if he were disposed, which might be the case, to avoid taking any part whatever in the affair. It is *because* it is likely that a Minister in his position might have that inclination, that your letter was necessary.

I wish that letter could be publickly known, for men who, like Stopford and Napier, have endeavoured, as it may be supposed, but who certainly have by their speeches and conduct prevented your brilliant services being generally known, and assumed to themselves the whole glory and applause due in fact to another, deserve that the whole truth should be published to the world, and that they should be shewn in such colours as properly belong to them.

Lord Beauvale is absent on a tour to visit some remarkable parts of this country, and I have not therefore had it in my power to communicate the letter to him. He will return to Naples before I leave it, and I shall have an opportunity for acting as you wish.

All the news from Syria and relating to Syria are very disagreeable. Sheik Nahman is a regular villain, and is in the pay of Mehemet Ali. He duped Rose; he would betray Emin. *Confusion* is the object of Mehemet Ali. His own interest is the object of Nahman.

The Ottoman Ministers I fear are as headstrong as foolishness can make them, and if they continue their absurd policy they will ruin themselves and their country. You know my view and my opinions on this point, and I need not repeat what I have already written upon it. I am sorry but not at all surprized at what you say respecting Walker and Tahir Pasha. I have been in constant expectation of an open breach between them. The Turkish Ministers are not deserving of blame, I think, for refusing to concede to the Greeks privileges and advantages, which if obtained by the Greeks would prove the best and

¹ Vol. I p. 219. cfr. p. 225.

strongest instruments to be employed by them for the destruction of the Ottoman Government.

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

27.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 16 May 1842.)

Naples 3 May 1842.

My dear General,

I have had the pleasure to receive your letter of 16 April, and I am very much flattered by your giving any value to my views of Turkish affairs. I think them sound, or I would not state them, but every man is inclined to imagine that his peculiar opinions are sound. I am certain that I am honest, and that I have an interest in the prosperity of the Ottoman Government, and that I am uninfluenced by any passion that can lead me astray from the plain path which it appears to me, that common sense points out to be followed.

I have seen many violent articles in the french, german, and english Press, and I fear you are too well justified in supposing that those exaggerations may produce real danger to Turkey, and I will add to Europe also by the effects that may spring from that source.

People generally are as ignorant as it is possible to be of the truth respecting Turkey, and unfortunately they are led to imagine that they *do know* something of the matter, this may be infinitely mischievous to the Porte, and I think the Ottoman Ministers are much to blame for neglecting to avail themselves of the means they actually possess for opposing an effectual shield against the blows which fall upon them from the Press, and wound them. — The Ministers do not furnish "Impartial" with facts, nor do they encourage the writers thereof, nor even leave them free from apprehension of giving offence by vindicating the cause of the Porte as it might be vindicated.

The foolish Turks have not yet comprehended that the Press originates ideas in the european mind, and that every where Man is governed by ideas. The Turks will not believe how absolutely dependent they are upon the *ideas* that are formed of them by the nations of Europe, and that the real and true interests of those nations which, if known clearly, will preserve Turkey from harm and ruin, may be and are disguised by the Press, and that every degree of evil may be the result of such disguise, and fall with irresistible weight on Turkey.

As you say that Tahir Pasha and Voghorides and others do sometimes listen to what you tell them of my opinions, I should be glad if you could make them comprehend the truth of the observations I have

here made. I am sure that "L'Independant" may be made the instrument to produce the greatest good for the Porte, if the Writers be supplied with matter, and urged to make use of it by the Ottoman Ministers. The Reis Effendi ought to order copies of "L'Independant" to be sent to all the Turkish diplomatic and Consular Agents, employed in Europe by the S. Porte, with orders to those Agents to circulate through the Press, at their respective stations, the facts and reasonings and polemicks of the "Independant". The European world would by that means obtain a much better and much more advantageous knowledge and opinion of the Turkish affairs and, no doubt, controversies would arise between the Journals which could not fail to encrease the light of truth.

The cost of this is next to nothing, and the success of the measure which is hardly doubtful, would enable the Porte to save millions and millions, which otherwise it may have to expend in an unsuccessful struggle, created by universal prevalence of erroneous ideas all over Europe.

I am not afraid of the retrograde action of the Ottoman Government, so long as there shall be no attack made upon Christians as Christians. I think it necessary that the Porte should retire from the position in which it has been placed by the folly of pseudo-philosophy. Every government must stand upon its appropriate original fundamental principles, every government that abandons them will be destroyed. — What can be so absurd as to attempt to govern a Mahometan population upon the principles that rule Christians and vice versa, as if religion were nothing, instead of being as it is the foundation and support also of every human society. All religions sanctify justice and that is enough, until it may please God to give greater purity to the doctrines, established in the various parts of the world.

You see how entirely I agree with your opinions respecting the assumed retrograde movement, and also in my dislike to the return of such men to power as Halil and Ahmed Fethi Pasha, who are unfitted by their folly on the one side, and by a smelling of what is called philosophy on the other, for administering the affairs of Turkey. They are both miserable political cowards and will depend upon the counsels or rather orders of the French or Russians or Austrians without regard to the substantial indigenious interests of their own country. Of all things in Turkey a vigorous and severe administration is the most essentially necessary.

I despise the namby-pamby stuff contained in eloquent speeches and the inapplicable humanity of the Wilberforce-school.

Enough of mischief has been done and prepared in Europe by such things where, after all, they have a certain homogeneity with other existing modes of thought, and with manners, and above all religion, but, to apply them to Turkey, is insanity or imbecility.

I wish the Sultan would act upon his own personal feelings. I believe they would direct him naturally to the adoption of wiser

methods of government in his own country than the counsel of all the soi-disant philosophers or the best speakers and writers of Europe. The fashionable jargon in Europe is calculated to urge men to act so as to ruin Turkey. That country should be let alone and left to the natural and necessary operation of the intercourse between man and man, which must attend upon commerce, and *Our Treaty* has ensured the safety of our commercial intercourse and this of all other nations with the Turks. Let things alone appears to me to be the best rule to be applied to foreign governments acting with or upon the Ottoman Government. Advice I fear given by men who have not won and deserved the confidence of the Turks, will have little influence for good and may create *jealousy* that will do mischief. I think that the Turks ere long will naturally turn their attention to the improvement of their Army; they *do* already see the necessity for it, *if they propose* to themselves to be independent of the orders of the foreign powers, and they do appear to be strongly desirous of that independence. — The Porte must also see the inefficiency of troops like Albanians undisciplined, and it is to be hoped the lesson on that subject so lately given at or about Volo will have a good effect in more ways than one. I am glad of this event.

Nedjib Pasha has been allowed to do mischief enough. I hope his successor may have more sense than Nedjib. — What takes place through the impunity of the Arabs will prove the necessity for a good Army. — Mustafa Nouri is a poor creature, I fear.

The conduct pursued by the Porte with respect to the Druses is *less inexcusable* than the conduct we pursued in their case, at the instigation of Lieutenant-Colonel Rose, which was the original cause of all the evils in the Lebanon and of our disgrace as politicians and honest men. Colonel Rose was duped by his own vanity and the falsehood *called* piety of the American Missionary, and Palmerston was foolish enough to be duped by Rose.

The Druses had no claims upon us. The Maronites had vast and just claims. The Sheiks who directed the Druses when Rose acted, are known scoundrels in every sense of that epithet, and moreover are partizans of Mehemet Ali, folly is fruitful seed, but unfortunately many are forced to eat the produce who had nothing to do with the sowing of the noxious germ. —

I leave this on the 6 for England. I hope I shall hear from you. I have sent my address to Mr. Barber at Malta to whom you will be so good as to enclose your letters to me. — Do not *ever* direct to me at the F. O. — letters are lost there. — If at any time you have to write to me from any other place or you wish for a more direct channel, you can direct to me No. 13 Kings Road Grays Iron London, the Office of my Solicitor.

Yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at London

(by Major Herman).

Confidential. Extract.

Pera 18 May 1842.

In reference to my letter of the 16 instant . . . , I now shall take the liberty to give you some details of what is going on here in the general politics of the Empire. — Izzet Mehmet Pasha maintains still his post as Grand Visir, but he fights in his last entrenchments

Chosrew has received a visit from the Sultan and a monthly pension of 30,000 piasters. Halil and Achmet Fethi Pashas 50,000 piasters a month each. Saïd Pasha (the Sultan's brother in law) is expected from Adrianople. Chosrew has given to understand that he wishes to be President of the Council, leaving Izzet to be Grand Visir, but the latter seems little inclined to this compromise, which would be based on a division of power. — Izzet Pasha's character may be considered an obstacle to this arrangement. He will not divide his power with Chosrew, and this objection on his part may explain the progress of the Egyptian intrigues in this place.

Any concession to or any close connexion with Mehemet Ali must embarrass Chosrew's progress, and Izzet Pasha, who, I believe, some time back, was not very favourable to Mehemet Ali's views, becomes ready to enter into those plans (as far as they are explained by Sami Pasha) in proportion as he is hard pressed by Chosrew's advance or by the demands of Sir Stratford Canning and the other European diplomatists with reference to the Syrian question, upon which point he shews a fanatic resistance. Sami Pasha has the mission to bring the Divan to nominate Saïd Pasha (Mehemet Ali's son) to be Governor of Saïda, of the Lebanon &c.

I believe I mentioned to Your Lordship the old project of Saïd Pasha's marriage with an Imperial Princess.

Mr. de Wagner¹ read to me a letter from Mr. de Laurin, who says that Sami Pasha's mission comprises the proposition of appointing an Egyptian Governor for Saïda and the Lebanon. Your Lordship is therefore perfectly warranted in admitting as you do in your letters, *that confusion in Syria* is the object of Mehemet Ali, for the greater the confusion the more the Porte will find inefficient its own means of repressing it, and hence the better the chances for Mehemet Ali's offers and assistance being accepted. I always have been of opinion that the ultimate local danger in the Syrian question lies in the probability of the Druses and Christians uniting against the Turkish Pashas, and I now should not be astonished to see this union in the end accomplished by Mehemet Ali's agents or partisans.

¹ 1869. Mr. de Wagner, Chargé d'Affaires of Prussia at Constantinople, since then Prussian Minister in Mexico, and presently North German Envoy Extraordinary at Athens.

Sheiks Nahman and Jumblatt and several other Druse chieftains have already abandoned the Turks. They were conspiring secretly against the Turks and proposed to the Christian chiefs a hostile union for common defense. Some of the latter, from religious fanaticism or from feelings of revenge, however, betrayed the existing conspiracy, and Mustapha Nouri and Nedjib Pashas were in time to arrest some of the Druse leaders, and thus to crush temporarily the seed of insurrection. The Porte pretends that the Druse Sheiks were arrested, because they refused to pay certain sums, said to have been taken by them from the public chest of Emir Beshir Cassim (2000 purses) at the outbreak of the civil war of the Lebanon, and also because the Sheiks refused to pay their arrears of contributions &c. — It is my impression that the Turks gained over the Druses originally by promising them certain exemptions from taxes &c., and that the Druses now seeing that they have made a bad bargain, wish to get off it as best they can, and it is very likely that they consider joining the Christians and fighting the Turks the cheapest and least expensive process. — The Druses have not this time succeeded, and it will be very likely now the policy of Izzet Mehmet and Mustapha Nouri Pasha to pitch the Christians against the Druses, as they did in the first instance array the Druses against the Christians, but I am afraid that after playing this game over once or twice, they will find themselves abandoned by both parties, and it seems to be Mehemet Ali's object to bring about this latter state of things, or at least to make the Divan believe that it is likely to happen, as a reason for accepting his plan of the nomination of one of his children as Pasha of Saïda. Mehemet Ali is stated to keep up a lively correspondence with Mustapha Nouri, to whom he has sent by an Egyptian Frigate (arrived at Beyrout) a couple of fine Dougola horses. Sami Pasha's proposal is to send some Egyptian regiments to assist Mustapha Nouri in disarming both Druses and Christians, and Mr. Laurin writes in the letter which I have already alluded to, that Mehemet Ali told him personally that the Government of the Lebanon could not be confided alone to an Emir Beshir, the mountain chiefs being too unruly and coarse, and that the Emir Beshir, if reinstated, must be under the actual control of a Pasha. — Mehemet Ali even holds out, it is said, a vague prospect of sending most of his line-of-battle ships to Constantinople, to reinforce the Imperial squadron.

In the meantime he has ordered the naval uniform to be changed, and the Egyptian sailors and officers are now dressed after Constantinopolitan fashion, that is to say in a pseudo-frank frock and trowsers. If Mehemet Ali's plans are carried out, he may easily give the Sultan also the satisfaction of dressing his army "à la franca". Mr. Laurin says that the army actually does not muster above 18,000 men, and that the fleet is altogether neglected, and the greater part laid up in ordinary.

Mehemet Ali instead of carrying out his plans by force of arms, appears to have imagined a more practicable and much cheaper mode

of execution. He sends presents and bribes. — The “Nile” and Sami Pasha brought very valuable gifts to many influential people. The “Reshid Steamer”, which arrived some days ago with Sami Pasha’s son on board, has brought other presents. Those who remember what Your Lordship said when the finance question of Egypt was discussed, and what reasons you assigned for not allowing the surplus revenue of Egypt to remain in Mehemet Ali’s hands, without Ottoman control, will soon find that money in his hands is just as formidable a weapon as guns and muskets, and perhaps more so

Your Lordship may have noticed what Sir Robert Peel said in the House of Commons on the 18 April, with reference to the hoped for withdrawal of the Albanians from the Lebanon and of the removal of Omer Pasha from the Government of that district.

The Divan by creating these false expectations has in reality deceived nobody here, for I believe that none of the diplomatists to whom these promises were made, placed at the time any confidence in them, and I presume that they were only reported as Turkish promises, or to speak more correctly, as promises of Sarim Effendi, of whom even Mirza Djafer Khan said that he was the greatest liar, with whom he, though a Persian Ambassador, ever met with in his life

I spent about a fortnight ago a whole day with Tahir Pasha,¹ who took me in his caïk to visit the Fleet. We were for several hours alone on board the “Mahmoudieh”.

In the course of conversation I alluded to reports then prevalent in Pera of Tahir Pasha succeeding Izzet Mehmet Pasha as Grand Visir.

He pretended not to know anything about such reports, but he was evidently very glad to talk about them, altho’ he said that he was no diplomatist but a simple military man.

I have always expressed a very high opinion of Tahir Pasha’s talents to Sir Stratford Canning. A great many people, I suppose, do the reverse, but I hold that Tahir Pasha would make a much better Grand Visir, than any Turkish statesman I know, or have heard of.

He would be severe but just, and I should suppose that he knows to appreciate the position of Turkey towards Europe.

He has proved that he knows to administer a province, for I believe that Aidin during his time was the *only* pashalic which was governed and administered, when confusion and derision of public authority was the order of the day in most of the other provinces of the Empire, and if in Turkey a man knows to govern well a province, he may be said to be a fit candidate for more, until a better man turns up.

I am very glad to perceive a “rapprochement” between Sir Stratford and Tahir Pasha. They met the other day (9 May) on board the “Stromboli Steamer”. Captain Lewis was supposed to give a breakfast.

¹ The present Capudan Pasha and Minister of the Navy.

Hafir Pasha, who is an old woman, was present pro forma, and so I suppose was Mehemet Ali Pasha of Tophana, who behaves like a scoundrel to Captain Williams¹ and Dickson, by throwing every possible difficulty into their way. It has not been and it is not in my power to be of any use to those officers, because my name would be a new difficulty and barrier to their success, altho' I can assign no earthly reason for Mehemet Ali's enmity towards me, as we never exchanged a syllable in conversation, nor have come in contact on duty, the Artillery being, foolishly enough, entirely separate from the Seraskeriat.

One of the consequences of this system is that there does not exist anything like harmony in the attempts at organization of the different arms; — and as nobody understands anything about the combination of the three arms in the field, it may be asserted that even the *positive good* which should result from the ameliorations introduced into the Artillery by the Prussian officers, now employed here, may turn out to be a *relative evil*, in so far as it may and very likely will detrimentally influence the general out-line of any plan of campaign of an Ottoman army, if eventually opposed to any European army.

I mean to say that the ameliorations which have been introduced into the Artillery, and which render this arm comparatively superior to the Ottoman Cavalry and Infantry, will very probably induce a Turkish General to rely more on his Artillery than on his other forces. If he does so, and if the Cavalry and Infantry do not essentially improve before the Turkish army is called into the field, the general combinations of his plan of campaign must be erroneous, and will lead to certain defeat, because the proper ground for Artillery and its best field of action is in plain and flat countries, and a Turkish army operating in *plains* is sure to be defeated by any European force, even should this force be only half as strong as the Ottoman army, or less. The Turkish Infantry and the Turkish Cavalry are not efficient enough to protect their Artillery in the plains, for operations in flat countries and champaign battles require that an army should be perfectly well drilled and able to execute steadily the great manoeuvres of a line-of-battle.

It is for not having understood this necessity that Hafir Pasha lost the battle of Nizib and upwards of 100 guns, which his other troops could neither protect and support, nor bring away.

The proper ground of action for a Turkish army is for the present, and will be for some time to come, in fortresses, entrenched camps, or in the mountains, which are the natural defenses of Turkey. The Turkish Infantry in this respect is like the Spanish. — You may hope to wear out an enemy by continual marches and a harrassing system of warfare, the war of Sartorius against the Romans. Famine, the

¹ 1857. Now Major-General Sir W. J. Williams of Kars, in 1840/41 charged with assisting the Turks in the organization of their Artillery. He was afterwards for several years British Commissioner for the regulation of frontiers between Turkey and Persia, and distinguished himself during the Crimean war in the defense of Kars.

effect of climate, and diseases in the enemy's camp are the most powerful auxiliaries of an Ottoman army against an European enemy.

A General who would show impatience and meet his adversary "*in the plains*" at the opening of the campaign, even if he be superior in numbers, is sure to be utterly defeated and destroyed.

I am perfectly persuaded that, if the Turkish forces in Syria in 1840 and 1841 had been exposed *for half an hour* to the combined action of the three arms, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry of the Egyptian army, even after Ibrahim Pasha had left Damascus, the consequence would have been instantaneous and utter ruin.

It was because the army was placed in a position where it could be beforehand with Ibrahim Pasha in the *mountain defiles* (where the Egyptian Cavalry and Artillery could not have acted to full advantage) that the tables were turned upon the Egyptian General.

Your Lordship knows the Turks too well not to appreciate the difficulties which I have to encounter in overcoming the innumerable obstacles that must be cleared before even an approach can be made to act efficiently according to a general plan of organization, based upon the military principles of which I have developed just now some features. As neither Hafir Pasha nor any Serasker that I know of, has sufficient notions of the art of war to form a clear conception of these fundamental principles, according to which the progress of the *present* Turkish army should be directed, I believe to act correctly in keeping these views for myself

Riza Pasha's health is in a very declining state. Dr. M^cCarthy however hopes to prevent still the disorder from taking a decided character of consumption.

Ahmet Zacharias Pasha is rapidly approaching death. He may live for a short time longer. — He is a good and worthy man, a brave soldier, but an unskilful General. He has the good of his country at heart, and his conversation is sometimes very desponding when he takes a glance at what is going on here

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at London.

Extract.

Pera 6 June 1842.

Mehmet Pasha of Bolu (a rich man) has been appointed to Tripolis of Barbary in lieu of Asker Ali Pasha. Saib Mustapha Pasha (lately Governor of the Dardanelles) refused to go to Tripolis and was banished in consequence to Magnesia, not so much because he refused that special appointment, but on account of his declining to serve generally under the present administration.

Hafir Pasha (of Nizib) was originally destined for Tripolis, but the prolonged absence of Mustapha Nouri caused him to be kept as Kaimakan of the Serasker.

Under pretext that he is only Kaimakan, but in reality because he does not venture to speak to the Grand Visir — he does nothing for the army. — Except the Artillery, the army retrogrades, instead of advancing in organization. — I am astonished that Izzet Pasha does not act as vigorously for the army, as he has done for the Finance department. A priori one should conclude that his system of defiance to foreign intervention should have induced him to make a military show, but the first period of his administration was necessarily taken up with finance measures, and he now fights for his existence as Prime Minister, and I believe he is so hard beset that little time is left for any thing else.

I believe and it is admitted by people much better informed than I am, that his best strength with the Sultan continues to be derived from the fact of his having considerably ameliorated the finances of the Empire. But if I say that Izzet Pasha has ameliorated the finances, I beg Your Lordship will only consider this amelioration in so far real, as the Grand Visir has introduced more regularity in the receipts and diminished the expenses by cutting down or suppressing on one hand some palpable abuses, and by strengthening on the other the hands of those who were to collect the revenue which was "à l'abandon" under Reshid Pasha.

The revenue of the state is said to equal at least its expenses, but this favourable circumstance does not from the general vices of the administration exclude the fact that many branches of the current service are in exorbitant arrears. This evils, however, would be comparatively matters of detail and might be remedied, were the great canker of the deterioration of the currency cured. Unfortunately, however, nothing has been done in this respect, nor is it as yet anticipated that any thing will be done to put a stop to this evil, which will lead Turkey ultimately to a bankruptcy, unless remedied in time. The mint strikes nearly exclusively 20 para pieces or pieces of $2\frac{1}{2}$ and 5 piasters, the intrinsic value of most of which is only $\frac{2}{12}$ piasters to a Pound Sterling, and in some coins only $\frac{280}{1000}$!!

The necessary consequence is that all the better coins still in circulation are by degrees withdrawn and sent out of the country (the gold and the 6 piaster pieces are sent to Greece, to Wallachia, to Moldavia, to Servia &c.) and the clandestine mints in those provinces and in Greece melt down these coins and issue again 20 para pieces, $2\frac{1}{2}$ and 5 piaster pieces of the same value as those of the Constantinople mint, *and consequently of legal tender.*

Turkey thus continually loses its good money, and the clandestine mints gain on each issue from 60 to 80 per cent.

The exchange which in the beginning of 1841 was still between 100 and 105 piasters per Pound Sterling, is now approaching 120, and

An eminent banker told me that he was sure it would be 140 next year and would continue to rise, until it reached the intrinsic value of the currency, that is to say 212 or 280 per Pound Sterling. If Turkey hereafter continues still further its system of deterioration, it must eventually become bankrupt without means of redressing its finances, for there is nothing in the laws of political economy, that can in the long run maintain a deteriorated currency at a fictitious height.

I have received this information on the present state of the finance of this Empire from various and good authorities, none of the parties who gave me these statements were of opinion that the Turkish Government would understand and comprehend the necessity of adopting proper measures to remedy the evil of deterioration, and it was argued that, even should some influential persons be convinced of the absolute necessity of putting a stop to the downward course of the finance administration, yet it would be difficult to find a Finance Minister capable to execute the financial reform, because the system of deterioration, though absolutely ruinous to the state, had always proved and would still prove a source of *enormous, tho' illicit revenue* to the Finance Minister and the persons in a position to benefit by these speculations.

It may be adduced against this reasoning, which unfortunately is very evident, that Mehemet Ali, as the great monopolist of the Egyptian trade, has begun to feel and appreciate the inconvenience of a deteriorated currency, and that Turkish coins are only received of late in Egypt at their real and intrinsic value.

Mehemet Ali having set this example consequent upon his being the principal merchant of Egypt, there is some chance or hope of this example being in time understood and imitated here.

The great object of Mehemet Ali at present is to make money.

Being now nearly the sole proprietor of the soil and produce of Egypt, or having made his family and dependents so, he may without any great inconvenience adopt the commercial treaty as he has done, and Your Lordship may have observed that amongst other measures, calculated for his de facto monopoly, he has published an "ordonnance" denying all recourse to law and tribunals in cases of claims for non-fulfilment of contracts for merchandise sold on delivery against advances in cash, so that if a foreign or a native merchant advances one half the supposed value of 1000 bales of cotton or of any other merchandise to an Egyptian grower, who promises to deliver the goods in six or three months hence, the merchant can claim no redress if the grower keeps the money and yet refuses to deliver the merchandise.

A friend of mine who has just arrived from Egypt gives a lamentable account of the oppression of the Fellahs.

All the public works, such as canals, dikes &c., are still executed by forced labour. Parties of soldiers and police enter the villages and towns, lay their hands on all people they choose, and drive them to the place where they are to be employed. The poor wretches receive

neither pay nor food, and in nearly all cases must digg the sand with their hands, no remuneration nor instruments being given for the execution of their task of labour. —

30.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 6 June 1842.)

Rome 11 May 1842.

My dear General,

I received here yesterday your letter of 26 April — you ought to receive letters from me by the steamer of the 25 April and of the 5 May. I have left directives for forwarding from Naples to me any letters that may come there, and I have requested you to direct yours hereafter to Mr. Barber (as heretofore) and he will forward them from Malta to my Solicitor in London, so that they will reach me safe from all mischief.

I do not see any reason to alter my opinions respecting the policy which ought to be pursued in Turkey by the English Government.

Your account of the various views and plans stated to be entertained — (stated, I mean, by rumour) — is very interesting to me. — I think the restoration of the power of the Christian chiefs in Lebanon is necessary to save the Turks from serious dangers, and however much I may regret the manner in which the demand has been made, I would advise *submission*.

My notion was that the Porte might decline in positive terms to grant what was demanded, but that, having by denial asserted its freedom of action, the Porte should without delay remove the Turkish Governor and establish a Christian one. — I think it is mischievous that the Porte should continue to be *forced* by the Foreign Powers, and I am sorry that the Turkish Ministers do not know how to *resist* or to *yield*.

Such men as Izzet Pasha mistake cunning for wisdom, subterfuge is their favorite arm, and it must always fail when used against more enlightened persons.

As you must justly observe, the question is not touching the individual *who* shall be the Governor, but dwells in the *principle* on which the Lebanon shall be governed.

I am much grieved by what has happened to Frederik Pisani, and knowing his honesty and his skill in the language, I cannot but suspect that something has been with which we are not acquainted, which if known might alter color now borne by the affair. I do not mean to blame Sir S. Canning for what I hear he has done. I feel how necessary it was for him to vindicate himself.

The policy of the Divan (I mean the failing to remove the Turk and to establish the Christian Governor) will *unite*, not disunite the Great Powers, and that is one of the great mischiefs, it will inflict upon the Porte, it partakes in the nature of the great fault which if committed would *ruin* the Ottoman Empire, namely the persecution of the Christians as Christians, though it is not equal with it in *degree*.

I can easily believe the foolish, narrow-minded, shortsighted Turks capable of entertaining the project of gaining Mehemet Ali by such means as the marriage of his son with the sister of the Sultan, but I hope what I said to the Sultan on that subject will not lose the power it then had of making *Him* feel, that his crown and life might be seriously endangered by making the son of Mehemet Ali so *closely connected* with the Imperial family as to enjoy a sort of claim to the Throne, if that family should be destroyed. I trust in such considerations for working upon the selfish feelings of the Sultan, and those who are personally interested in his preservation. —

I never pretended to foresee the issue of the intrigues of the Seraglio, and at this distance it would be difficult for the most penetrating man to give a guess at their results. Things of this sort are determined generally by what is commonly called accident, that is they are not apparently regulated by general laws which may be seen governing and guiding the progress of great events.

The Sultan is right to look particularly to the finances. Money is power more emphatically in Turkey than any where else. The evils that attend the measures taken for the purpose may cease after a short lapse of time. — Reshid's measures would, as you say truly, have ruined the country immediately. — *Fear* is the principle upon which the Ottoman Government stands as its foundation. — The Sultan need not fear the personal influence of old Chosrew, but his roguery and falsehood may be mischievous. —

I myself know the Sultan despises Halil and dislikes him, nevertheless he *may* be weak enough to employ him and Fethi Pasha also, whom he despises as much.

I think *your* solution of the question, mooted by the Turkish Gentlemen and reported to you by Mr. Cordoba, is indisputable. — Such a government could not stand eight nor three years. — The mode of thinking of those Turks is a strong moral cause to produce that dissolution of the Empire which they predict. —

I shall hear with infinite pleasure of the establishment of some intimacy between Cordoba and the Ambassador. — I agree with you in thinking that it is not possible that Mehemet Ali can ever desire to give the Sultan real honest support. — *I* should not be so generous as you are in exempting Bourgueney from suspicion of having urged the Porte to refuse a passage to English troops through Egypt. I have no doubt he would have done it, *if* there had been any intention of making the demand.

There has been no such intention — whenever any such shall exist, it will be not only right but necessary to carry it into effect suddenly and without acting any question of the Porte, if consent be doubtful. I always imagined that the policy was to establish a strong united government in Afghanistan, and to leave it to itself.

Dost Mahomed Khan *could* not be, *at the time*, selected because he *insisted* upon Peshawar and *that* Rungiet Sing would never consent to allow him to have, and Rungiet Sing was absolutely necessary to us; we could not disregard *his* interests nor act without him. The Shah Soojah is a weak foolish man; Rungiet Sing is dead, and *that* may now be feasible which was before impossible. — The character or the acts of Akbar Khan are of little importance in considering the terms to be made with his father. — Akbar must be punished, but the English will lose nothing with Dost Mahomed by inflicting any punishment even death on Akbar, because they will never have the support of Dost unless it be his interest to give it, and if it be his interest, there will be no danger that his paternal love will move him to revenge his Son at the expence of loss to himself. Kings and Chiefs in the mass care but little about ties of blood, and Asiatic Princes not at all. — I am too ignorant on the subject of war to speak about it, but I have always been told that the difficulty of operations increased in proportion with the distance of the place of action from the source of supplies &c. &c.

It always appeared to me that the end our government had in view, was *ultimately*, and when the time and affairs were ripe, to fall back upon Sind and make that country the new limit of the Indian Empire, having previously established in Afghanistan a wholesome fear of British power and a government there which should be interested to look to the English for support. This would have been easily and firmly accomplished, had it not been for the incomparable stupidity and cowardice of those who had the direction of our Army. It may still be effected and I think it has now become *necessary*, having before only been highly advantageous in as much as it established a moral force in our favor in the general mind of Central Asia, which would have fully satisfied our want of security against the intrigues and demonstrations of hostility of the Russians. — I am national enough to feel confident that the English will succeed in beating down all opposition in Afghanistan and thereby restoring our late good character as soldiers &c. &c.

I hope to hear from you very often, and that I may be able to send you matter from England much less unworthy of your trouble in reading it, than has been the case in the many letters I have written to you. — Nothing will give me so much pleasure as to hear that the Porte has adopted some good plan for the improvement of the Turkish Army. I intend to urge Lord Aberdeen to instruct Sir S. Canning to press the measure upon the Porte. —

I remain my dear General yours faithfully

(Turn over.)

Ponsonby.

I communicated your Despatches (as they are printed in the "Impartial") to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederik Adam, and he read them with great intention and afterwards told me that he thought very highly of your conduct.

This is an additional instance of the effect produced by the statement of those events and facts which have been so improperly concealed from the public eye. Every body known to me who has read those Despatches, has been convinced in the same manner, and some of those persons had been most strongly prejudiced on the other side. I wish you could get them published in the "Augsburg Gazette", and in the "Francfort Gazette" also!

31.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY

at London.

Extract.

Pera 17 June 1842.

I had the honour to write to you by last steamer.

Sir John McNeill, accompanied by Mr. Todd, has since arrived, but as the day of their departure is not as yet fixed, I send this via Malta and Falmouth by the "Oriental Steamer".

The Protocol of the Conference held here on the 27 May was laid before the Sultan on the 2 June. Mr. Cordoba told me that on this as on former occasions great liberties were taken in *translating* into Turkish the opinions of the foreign diplomatists, and that Sarim Effendi was not overnice neither in having put down in the Turkish Protocol exactly what he said himself.

The object of presenting to the Sultan *ex parte* versions is to *conceal* from His Highness the irritated state of the question, but it appears that the Sultan has become acquainted with what really has happened. His Majesty has consequently expressed his uneasiness about the march of affairs in Syria. In a general council, held subsequent to the 2 of June, Izzet Pasha and Ariff Pasha tried to convert the Sultan to their views, but His Highness answered:

"All what you say is very well, but it does not convince me that the Great Powers are satisfied with your dealings, carry on the business, but be it understood that I do not want to satisfy the Foreign Powers."

Riza Pasha is again very influential in the Palace, also one Chalim Bey.[†]

[†] 25 June. Chalim Effendi, having become an object of jealousy, has been dismissed from the service, tho' the Sultan resisted a long time the demands of his adversaries.

The turn which Syrian affairs had taken previous to the Conference of the 27 May, and the address sent by the chiefs of the Lebanon to Mustapha Pasha, and represented to the Sultan as genuine documents, had assisted the Grand Visir to come well out of the late crisis, tho' his struggle has been a very hard one. The intrigues of Sami Pasha and of the other partisans of Mehemet Ali had vastly contributed to this result. Mehemet Ali strongly advises the Sultan *to resist*, and offers his assistance.

A memorial was even drawn up by the Porte and presented to the Sultan on the 15 May, recommending the appointment of Saïd Pasha as Governor of Saïda.

One of the Ministers of State, talking to Sami Pasha on the subject, observed to him that, even should the Sultan accede to the proposal, it struck him that Saïd Pasha was not a proper person to govern a disturbed country. "We know him," said the Turkish Minister, "and he has left us the impression that he is a man of less than even ordinary talents. Who will assist him in the government?" — Sami Pasha answered: "I am the Padisha's servant, send me and I will guide him." — "In that case it would be better to appoint you at once and leave Saïd Pasha where he is." — "Well," retorted Sami Pasha, "even that appoint me and I will undertake to settle the matter with Mehemet Ali Pasha."

This would prove that the Pasha of Egypt has more in view, to get again a footing in Syria, than to have any special relation of his nominated. It is a question of principle of dominion more still than of persons. — The Sultan has had the good sense to refuse Saïd Pasha's appointment, and the Porte afterwards denied to Baron Stürmer and the other Envoys that there had been any *intention whatever* (notwithstanding their own written exposition on the subject) to nominate Saïd Pasha.

They gave this formal denial on the 18 May.

The current report in Egypt has been of late that one of Mehemet Ali's sons would be named Pasha of Syria. At one time this was announced as next to certain.¹

Not long ago the Grand Visir and some other influential persons had presented to the Sultan a Memorandum in which they exposed that a certain post in the Administration was filled by a man very young in years, and the Memorandum, altho' containing the greatest eulogium on the sentiments of justice, on the capacity and the experience of the present occupant, demanded the employment for another person, because it had been the habit to give the post in question only to men of old age. The Sultan refused this demand and wrote his answer about as follows:

"If the occupant is just, capable, and experienced, he is fit for the employment, if his age is the sole objection, it might be observed that, altho' "Sultan, I am very young myself."

This answer, attributed to Chalim Effendi, is considered as one of the principal causes of his present disgrace.

¹ Baron Beeckman told me that he heard this report given as certain and next to official by the most confidential servants of Mehemet Ali Pasha.

The news arrived here on the 7 June by the Beyrout steamer is very different from the Ottoman reports. — Not only has it become known that the addresses of the chiefs of the Lebanon to Mustapha Nouri Pasha were compulsory, as it was supposed they would turn out, but most of the same chiefs together with others have signed a petition against the Government of a Turkish Pasha, and in favor of a member of the family of Shehab. Copies or similar documents had been sent to the agents of the European Powers.

The Hennedy Arabs had made incursions in the neighbourhood of Damascus and defeated a party of Turkish Irregular Cavalry under Chebli El Arrian. The Albanians had mostly arrived

32.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY

at London.

Extract.

Buyukdéré 16 July 1842.

I had the honour to write to Your Lordship on the 6 instant . . .

I can give some more details of the military movements that have taken place of late in this Empire with reference to the unsatisfactory news received from the European provinces.

The troops which marched from hence for Monastir are three regiments of Infantry, and from Adrianople four regiments of Infantry and one regiment of Artillery, in all perhaps 10 to 11,000 men of Infantry and 32 pieces of Artillery. — On the march of the Division from Adrianople, however, an order was sent from here to the General commanding, directing him to detach immediately six battalions (or two regiments) and 8 guns towards Nissa in Bulgaria, where new disorders have broken out, similar to those of last year, altho' not on so extensive a scale. Some of the leaders in those disturbances are the same who figured last year, and who escaped subsequently into Servia, and there can scarcely exist any doubt that these leaders are connected with the *Greek Propaganda*

The Turks are gradually reinforcing their garrisons of Larissa, Salonica &c. &c. This fact confirms me in the opinion that the concentration of forces in Monastir has not so much for object repulsion of the Montenegrines, as observation and, if necessary, repression of rebellions amongst the Rayahs.

I understand that the troops have been paid up at Adrianople, and I know that they are so also here.

The finance measures of Izzet Pasha, whatever may be their value in the eye of the political economist, have had for *present* result not only to bring up considerable arrears, but also to enable the Finance

department to withdraw from circulation most or all the "*paper*" money, emitted by Reshid Pasha.

The Porte has sent a considerable sum to the new Governor of Bagdad, Nedjib Pasha, who has left Aleppo with some troops for his new Pashalic, as it is not quite sure that Hadji Ali Riza Pasha is very much disposed to give up Bagdad for Damascus, to which Government he is appointed. Riza Pasha protests that the people of Bagdad love him so much, that they won't allow him to depart.

It is understood that he has accumulated great riches during his administration, which is more likely the reason of his disinclination to leave Bagdad.

In the meantime he has had to fight the Persians who surprised Sulimanieh. Sarim Effendi says that the Turks have driven the Persians out again from Sulimanieh with great slaughter. This news was known here since about 10 or 12 days, but only vaguely. More serious intelligence, however, has been received a week ago from Tabriz and Teheran via Trebizonde. It would appear that the court of Teheran is not unconnected with the proceedings of the Persian Commander who surprised Sulimanieh, but that on the contrary the Shah is prepared to declare war, if the Porte does not immediately settle the long pending questions about certain boundaries of the Pashalic of Bagdad towards Persia, and also about a reimbursement of about 3 millions of dollars, claimed by the court of Teheran as indemnity for damages, caused by incursions of Turks on Persian ground in the Southern provinces of that Empire.

Mirza Djafer Khan, the Persian Ambassador, having left Constantinople several months ago,² the Persian Consul informed the merchants of his nation some days ago that they had to liquidate their affairs, and to quit Turkey in the course of two months. He read to them an order from his Government to that effect, stating that it was a copy communicated to him via Trebizonde, but that he expected to receive the original without delay. As the Persians are traders to a considerable extent in this place, this news has produced great alarm at the exchange of Galata. The Persians owe from what Mr. Consul Sandisson of Brussa told me, about 16,000,000 piasters to Greek merchants alone.

The Porte has ordered Rustem Pasha of the Guards to leave Constantinople with 2 regiments of Infantry, 2 regiments of Cavalry and 1 battery of 12 pieces Artillery. His destination is said to be Diarbekir, Mossoul, or Bagdad, according to circumstances.

Whatever may be the results of all these military movements, and should even war in Asia and rebellion in Europe be prevented, one thing is certain: the finances of the Ottoman Government will be seriously embarrassed, for these marches from the centre of the Empire to its furthest limits cause enormous expenses, besides the minor evils, such

² (in March 1842.)

as desertions amongst the troops, pillaging on the road, and avanias of all descriptions to the towns and villages on the line of march.

In the case of a war with Persia the Porte will severely feel the impolicy of its proceedings in Syria

The Christians in Mount Lebanon still rely on the support and protection of the European Ambassadors here. They have sent a new deputation demanding a Prince of the family of Shehab, whilst Mustapha Nouri Pasha is collecting subscriptions that they are perfectly satisfied with a Turkish Governor

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY

at London.

Private. Extract.

Buyukdéré 16 August 1842.

I have received a letter from Major Herman, who says that he had the honour of delivering to you my letter of the 18 May.

Baron Behr¹ read to me on the 23 ultimo a dispatch, which he had addressed some days before to his Government on the hostile differences between Persia and Turkey.

The Baron, who told me that Baron Stürmer and other diplomatists here are of a similar opinion, comes to the conclusion that there exist strong grounds to admit that war may be avoided, thro' the mediation of Russia and Great Britain. He shows in his dispatch further that in all probability Russia will derive the principal credit from these negotiations, and augment thereby her powerful influence in Persia and Turkey.

Amongst other reasoning he says about thus:

“Je suppose que la Russie tachera de terminer cette négociation aussi vite que possible vue les circonstances favorables que présente pour sa diplomatie la face actuelle de cette affaire.

“L'Angleterre qui après les démarches de son Ambassadeur ici concourt avec la Russie dans *un but commun de pacification*, n'est pas proprement dit représentée diplomatiquement à la cour de Téhéran, et Sir Stratford Canning a arrangé les affaires à Constantinople d'une manière à faire perdre complètement à l'Angleterre dans le courant de six mois toute l'influence dont elle jouissait antérieurement.”

This extract is not verbal, but the sense is complete and exact. Tahir Pasha, whom I continue to frequent and who never sees me without asking news from Your Lordship, said to me about a week ago

¹ The Belgian Minister.

that Turkey wished to maintain peace, but that if war came over Turkey, force must be repelled by force. I understand that Tahir Pasha has voted for any reasonable arrangement in preference to war with Persia, but that several of his ministerial colleagues are of a less pacific disposition.

There has been some talk in Pera of the Grand Visir going to be appointed Serasker against Persia, but this idea seems again to be dropped for the present, nor have any more troops left Constantinople for the Persian frontier since I last wrote to Your Lordship.

The Shah, however, by the latest news from Trebizonde is still represented as very irritated against Turkey, but as yet there is no question of military preparations on a very extensive scale.

I believe that the two principal reasons which induce the Turkish Government not to break, if possible, with Persia, are the present situation of Syria and the necessary measure of precaution lately adopted to concentrate about 20,000 men in the neighbourhood of Monastir, with a view to check the secret manoeuvres of the *Gallo-Hellenic Propaganda*.

With reference to the first point — the state of Syria — the Turkish Government persist in their plan of governing the Lebanon by a Turkish Pasha. Prince Voghorides, indeed, told me about three weeks ago that there then existed a plan to appoint, if absolutely required, a Maronite Chief *and* a Druse Chief — but both to remain under a Turkish *Inspector General*.

I understand that many individuals, gained by *bribes* or *menaces*, have signed as well in favor of a Christian as a Turkish Governor, the scenes are stated sometimes to have been perfectly ludicrous. A great many seals are reported to be false, spurious signatures of both parties having been affixed by means of seals engraved for the purpose.

The French Consul appears to have been very active in favor of the Shehab family, and especially of the old Beshir. Baron Stürmer told me yesterday that he attributed some late steps taken by the French Government, or by their agents, announcing a new rapprochement towards Mehemet Ali, to the conduct of the Turkish Government in the Syrian question. The Baron did not say what steps had been taken, nor did I think it proper to ask him

Mr. Tecco, the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires, who has constituted himself one of the principal protectors of the Maronites, assured me himself that Sir Stratford had told him, that under present circumstances he (Sir Stratford) preferred not to act at all in the Syrian affairs, rather than to have recourse *only* to councils which were not followed

A person well able to judge of Turkish affairs made some days ago the following reasoning in favor of Izzet Pasha's administration:

“The present Grand Visir about 8 months ago found the “finances of the Empire in the worst state possible, they are to-day “if not flourishing, at least in a very satisfactory state: proofs are

“that the Echequer Bills (or Zaihms) were at 8% discount; they
“are now at par, the army was in arrears of 8, 10, 12, and even
“19 months, it is paid up to the day, the navy claimed 8 months
“of arrears, it is also paid up — 20,000 men are concentrating
“at Monastir, 4000 men at Nissa, where the threatened disorders
“are already suppressed, a Division has marched towards Persia
“— all these movements require money, and it was found ready.
“Besides a military school is finishing at the Seraskeriat, the burnt
“down Palace of the Porte is rebuilding, and a large Hospital com-
“menced near Pera, and above all four large War Steamers are
“ordered to be bought or built in England.¹ The finances of the
“Empire therefore must be in a good state, the more so, as most
“of the paper money has been withdrawn from circulation.

“If you look to the Interior it must be allowed that under
“Reshid Pasha’s and the succeeding administration public authority
“was nearly held in derision, to-day the Sultan’s name is *respected*,
“because the Grand Visir is *feared*, and generally speaking there
“is a good police kept up in most provinces, the revenue is col-
“lected without serious difficulties, and there are hopes of even
“enrolling some Albanian *regular* troops.

“Finally, if the exterior relations of Turkey are dispassionately
“viewed, the ultimate result must be granted to be that without a
“violent rupture or even ‘sans des secousses sérieuses’ the complete
“subserviency of the Porte to the will of Foreign Powers has been
“followed by what may be considered a nearly independent line
“of policy.

“It is perfectly true that great duplicity must be reproached
“to Izzet Pasha in his dealings with Foreign Powers about Syria,
“perhaps even want of acknowledgement to the Syrians themselves
“and absence of foresight as to ultimate results, but there finishes
“his register of sins, for it would be difficult to point out any fact
“of importance in his internal administration of the Empire, which
“might be taxed as cruel or openly unjust.”

I have heard of late a great many people of mark reason in a
similar straine, and generally speaking they found little contradiction on
solid grounds.

I confess I am glad to see the Turkish Government very much on
its guard against the manoeuvres of the *Gallo-Hellenic Propaganda*.

I had a long conversation with Rifaat Pasha and Ahmet Fethi
Pasha, and I convinced myself that the latter particularly is well in-
formed on this subject. His sojourn in France seems to have awakened
him to the dangers that are threatening Turkey from the combined
action of the French and Greek revolutionary Propaganda, and if it be
considered that the French Government seems to contemplate the

¹ Two large lines of battle-ships have been nearly finished at Heraclea and
at Samsonn.

appointment of Mr. Piscatori to the post of Minister in Greece it must be confessed that the danger to Turkey does not come from the Propaganda *alone*.

Rifaat Pasha is to leave this capital in a few days to commence his tour as Inspector General of Rumili, that is European Turkey.¹ — Rifaat Pasha proposed to me to accompany him on this occasion, and I told him that I should be most happy to do so, provided he would get me an order from the Grand Visir, as I could not leave Constantinople on my own authority and in a private capacity. He has since tried to execute this plan of his, but after several communications on the subject he informed me that, much as he had wished me to accompany him, particularly because his inspection had also reference to certain military concerns, he had found obstacles to his plan which he had not been able to remove.

Your Lordship may recollect that it was Rifaat Pasha to whom I gave my Memorandum (of November last) on Syrian affairs. He has always shown me much confidence since.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY

at London.

Private. Extract.

Buyukdéré 16 September 1842.

On the 30 August the Grand Visir Izzet Mehmet was superseded by our old acquaintance Mehmed Rauf Pasha. Izzet Pasha is not in disgrace, but Saïd Pasha, the Sultan's brother-in-law, has made place for him at Adrianople, being himself transferred to Angora.

I called yesterday on Izzet Pasha, and found him surrounded in his private summer residence by a number of Turks of distinction, which proves that he has not lost the favor of the Sultan.

There seems to have been a mortal strife between Izzet and Riza Pashas, but the latter has had the better of it, as Your Lordship foretold, several months ago, that such was likely to be the case, in a letter from Naples. Riza has been strongly supported by old Chosrew Pasha. I know for certain² that two months ago Chosrew stated distinctly that the time was not distant when Rauf Pasha would be made President of the Council of Justice, and some weeks after that

¹ 25 August. The appointments of Rifaat Pasha as Inspector General of European Turkey and of Hassib Pasha as Inspector General of Asiatic Turkey have been cancelled. They were considered a sort of honorary exile, invented by the Grand Visir Izzet, to get them away from Constantinople, and thus to weaken his opponents.

² from Mr. de Wagner, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires.

Grand Visir. Chosrew said then that, altho' the Sultan was gracious enough to consult him, yet he did not wish to become again Grand Visir, being too old.

From Chosrew Pasha's prevision having been so exactly realized, and from some other circumstances it may be supposed that his influence will be very commanding in the present administration. Halil Pasha, with whom he is reconciled, has succeeded Rauf Pasha as President of the same Council of Justice which three years ago condemned Halil Pasha as unworthy of any appointment of importance. — The representatives of the Five Great Powers, in conformity with the instructions they had received from the conference in London or from their Courts, transmitted simultaneously notes on the Syrian question to the Porte, I think dated 26 August.

It is thought that this step has brought about the crisis in the struggle between Riza and Izzet Pashas, but it would not appear that the notes caused the *fall* of the Grand Visir otherwise than by accelerating a decision of affairs; each in its own peculiar way.

I have seen of late a good many travellers from Syria, amongst them Count Zichy and Mr. Samuel

The object of the present lenient policy is to keep the Mountain quiet, and thus to get rid of foreign intervention.

Mr. Samuel¹ told me that he had written in this sense to Your Lordship some months ago from Syria, stating at that time his opinion that a less conciliatory conduct and above all the execution of the plan to disarm the mountaineers would unquestionably have brought about an union for mutual defense amongst the Druses and Maronites, which might have become very dangerous to the Ottoman Government.

Hadji Ali Riza Pasha is soon expected in Damascus; his successor for Bagdad, Nedjib Pasha, had been stopped near or in Orfa by the Kurds during the early part of August, but has since proceeded towards his destination.

This agitation amongst the Kurds in general may be chiefly attributed to the suspension of friendly relations between Persia and Turkey, altho' the Kurds near Orfa had some complaints of their own against their Pasha.

I hear, however, that a Persian Plenipotentiary may be expected ere long at Constantinople, and that some recent military preparations and demonstrations on the part of the Turks as well as of the Persians must be taken more as a show than as an earnest of fighting.

The reasoning of Baron Behr, which I communicated to Your Lordship, would therefore appear to have been correct.

The sequester on Persian merchandise at Constantinople has been raised on the 25 August, and the Persian residents here have placed themselves under the protection of Russia.²

¹ lately attached to the Embassy at Vienna (1847).

² In raising the sequester on Persian merchandise, the Porte informed the

Your Lordship will have heard ere this of Mehemet Ali's having been raised to the honorary rank of Grand Visir.

The fact is Sami Pasha was negotiating, backed by a loan of 150,000 £, to obtain for Mehemet Ali the title or rank of Khan, which like that of Serdar and others is *persian*, and was represented as a mere distinction, but as "Khan" is also a *hereditary* title of Royalty in the East, the Porte seems to have had its suspicions and conferred on Mehemet Ali a *personal* and honorary distinction. Some body wrote to Mr. de Cordoba¹ from Alexandria that Mehemet Ali talked of coming *in person* to Constantinople to thank the Sultan!

A Turk of high rank² told me that Mehemet Ali's old partisans are the principal friends of the Emir Beshir, and that he has not discontinued his intrigues in the Lebanon, principally amongst the Maronite clergy³

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private. Extract.

Buyukdéré 2 October 1842.

I had the honour to state, on the 16 August last, that it was not any longer the intention of the Ottoman Government to name a Christian Prince for the Government of the Lebanon, altho' the Porte had previously shown a disposition to appoint a Christian *and* a Druse Chief to govern those mountains under a Turkish Inspector General or Caïmakam.

I informed subsequently Your Excellency in my letter of the 16 September that a Conference had been held on the 15 September, in which the propositions of the Five Powers had been discussed, but that those discussions had not led to any practical result, with reference to the change recommended by the Five Powers in the form of government lately adopted in the Lebanon.

Persian merchants that the Ottoman Government could not be answerable, in the present disturbed state of the border provinces, if the Persian merchants experienced losses by plunder of their Caravans into Persia. This declaration was necessary, because the Persians being pro tempore under Russian protection, might have claimed the benefit of the treaties of Bucharest and Adrianople, which grant indemnities to be paid by the Porte for similar losses of Russian subjects. The merchants therefore have decided to send their goods (in lieu of the Trebizonde and Bayasid road) by the Russian provinces bordering on the Araxes and Black Sea. —

¹ The Spanish Minister.

² Ahmed Fethi Pasha.

³ Sami Pasha, the agent of Mehemet Ali, left Constantinople in the Reshid Steamer on the 15 September, taking the insignia of his new rank to the Pasha of Egypt.

Before I give to Your Lordship any further details on what passed in the Conference, it is essential to point out the difference which seems to exist with reference to the value of the term of *Emir*, or Prince of the Maronites.

The deputies and other defenders of the Maronites associate with this title of Emir governing the Maronites the idea of a sort of tributary sovereignty, as it was enjoyed by the old Emir Beshir Shehab, the Turks on the contrary say: Omer Pasha of the Lebanon is now assisted by two Kihayas, a Christian *Emir* and a Druse *Sheik*. We are ready to change the *name* and the *persons*, even that of the Pasha, but we *won't* change the *form* of government.

It is in this sense that Sarim Effendi's declaration to the Maronites must be taken as mentioned in my letter of the 16 August.

Between these two extremes of interpretation lies the proposal of the Five Powers, to nominate a Christian Governor (if possible of the family of Shehab) for the Maronites, and a Druse Chieftain to govern the Druses.

The Shehab family has had, since it succeeded that of Maan, authority both over the Maronites and over the Druses.¹ An *Emir of the Shehab* must therefore rank higher than a Sheik of the Druses, and this superiority is *absolutely* necessary for the efficient government of those districts of the Lebanon where the property of the Maronites and that of the Druses is so subdivided and intermixed, that a form of government which does not give *superiority* to either the Emir of the Christians or the Sheik of the Druses, would infallibly lead to continual quarrels and animosities, and hence ultimately to anarchy and civil war.

I pointed out this difficulty about the mixed property in my Memorandum to Rifaat Pasha, dated 18 November, of which Lord Aberdeen has a copy.

If the arrangement proposed by the Five Powers — contemplated (which I supposed it does not in my observations of the 16 September) a perfect equality between the Christian *Emir* and the Druse *Sheik*, I am afraid that it would create causes of disunion and uneasiness in the Lebanon, which it is evidently the object of the Five Powers to prevent, and the only means to prevent the eternal rivalry between two Governors *equal* in authority, but *divided* by religious fanaticism and hereditary

¹ The late Emir Beshir had principally annihilated the power of the great Druse-house of Djombelat and of its chief the Sheik Beshir, who was decapitated by the then Pasha of Acre. — The Druses, since the fall of their chief, remained governed by the Emir Beshir, until the war of 1840. In former times they were on the contrary the reigning and military portion of the community of the Lebanon, the Christians were the traders and agriculturists. In military qualifications the Druses still excel by far the Maronites. — The hatred between these nations continually influences their politics. When Ibrahim Pasha invaded Syria, the Maronites declared for the Egyptians, and consequently the Druses for the Ottoman Government. On the contrary in 1840 the Maronites fought for the Sultan, and hence the great majority of the Druses either were for Ibrahim Pasha, or remained neutral.

feuds, would best be found in the expedient of appointing an Ottoman Delegate, *resident on the spot*, to act as arbitrator between two parties who certainly would come to blows, but not to any understanding without him.

Now the presence of this arbitrator (be his title Pasha or Bey) is exactly what the Five Powers do not seem to want, and it therefore appears reasonable to admit that they should not demand neither the principle of *equality* between the governing *Emir* and the governing *Sheik*, which equality would render necessary the presence in the Lebanon of some person with authority enough to prevent quarrels, hostilities, and anarchy.

If the Turks had been wise, instead of having now a hornet's nest about their ears, they would have left the government of the Lebanon to the Emir Beshir Cassim, and would have supported him instead of mining his authority.

He was a man who from his want of talent and ambition would have been a harmless tool, never to be feared and yet representing that *unity* of authority, so essential for the government of the districts of the Lebanon south of Nahr el Kilb, in which the Druse and Christian property is so much intermixed.

As the matter stands now the whole question may be resumed as follows:

The appointment of a Christian Prince to govern the Lebanon with an authority similar to that of the old Emir Beshir Shehab is decidedly *refused* by the Porte.

The proposition of the Five Powers in its present shape, demanding the nomination of a Christian *Chief* for the Maronites and a Druse *Chief* for the Druses, and establishing the *non-residence* of a Turkish Governor in the Lebanon, is equally objected to, but the Porte offers to appoint a Christian Chief for the Maronites and a Druse Chief for the Druses, controlled *both* by Turkish Delegates or Caimakams (residing in the Lebanon), subject to the Pasha of Saïda and Tripoli. — This is Essad Pasha, late Governor of Aleppo, who was removed at the time when Izzet Pasha was deposed from the Grand Visiriat.

At the Conference of the 15 September the Ottoman Ministers began by proposing *two* Caimakams for the Lebanon, one to be placed above the Christian Emir, and the other above the Druse Sheik, but when this arrangement was pointed out by the Foreign Ministers as a very unpractical one, the Turks discussed the propriety of naming only *one* Caimakam. "Le fait est," observed a friend of mine who was present at the Conference, "la discussion a roulé sur des '*mots*' et en définitive les Turcs ne veulent rien changer de ce qui existe, quant '*aux choses*'."¹

¹ Chosrew Pasha said a few days ago to Baron Behr, that the ultimatum of the Porte would be to appoint a Christian and a Druse chief for the Lebanon, in the choice of whose persons these parties might respectively concur or have voice, but that both Governors would be subject to a Turkish Ferik Pasha, resident in the Lebanon, and himself dependent on the Mushir of Saïda &c. &c.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private. Extract.

Buyukdéré 16 October 1842.

By the Steamer of the day before yesterday I had the great pleasure to receive Your Lordship's letter of the 2 September.¹

I was afraid that my letters might have been intercepted, but I now perceive the reasons why you have delayed writing, and I feel much obliged and still more flattered by all what Your Lordship is kind enough to mention. Were I to remain without any reward from the British Government, I should still feel satisfied, since the denial of common justice would at least have been the cause of your having expressed opinions and given judgement on the Syrian campaign which, tho' perhaps too favorable for me, yet, I must confess, I am most proud to have heard pronounced by the person most qualified to pronounce judgment, from having been able to confront all reports, opinions, and facts. —

I shall follow in all exactly Your Lordship's directions, and send you a copy of the letter which I shall address to the Earl of Aberdeen.

I stated to Your Lordship on the 8 instant that the Porte would very likely recognize a member of the family of Czerny George as Prince of Servia. I have since heard that the Porte is going to do so without delay, and Alexis Simitch told a gentleman of my acquaintance on the 13 instant that a Tartar had been sent to Belgrade, in order to acquaint Kiamil Pasha with this resolution. Simitch expected to hear that the Berat or Hattisheriff appointing Alexander Petrowitch, second son of Czerny George² (born in 1806), to be Prince of Servia, would be signed immediately. — The explanations of Shekib Effendi seem to have induced the Porte to act as it has done.

Previous to his arrival there appeared to exist some doubt, as to the propriety of the proceedings of Kiamil Pasha and Shekib, in recognizing instantly the provisional Government of Thomas Wutchich and Abraham Petronowich (vide Proclamation of the latter two chiefs, dated Belgrade 8 September, and the Proclamation of the 9 September 4 Shaban 1258 of the Ottoman authorities in Belgrade).

Your Lordship will observe that in neither of these documents there is an allusion to the fights of the 3 and 4 September near Kragujewatch, but that Prince Michael is represented as having left Servia, whilst the nation was only coming to meet him in order to make certain remonstrances.

Old Chosrew Pasha said before Shekib's arrival to a friend of mine³ that Kiamil Pasha had acted like an ass (eshek), that he ought to have waited for answers from Constantinople &c. &c. &c.

¹ Vide Vol. I, Appendix II, No. 7, p. 226.

² elected by the Servians at Belgrade on the 14 September.

³ Baron Behr, the Belgian Minister.

Perhaps Chosrew thinks or thought at the time that the Imperial authorities had been overreached, or that they had played other people's game, but be this as it may, there can be no doubt that Wutchich and his partisans were strongly supported by what is called in Servia the *Turkish* party, and as it is also unquestionable that Turkish troops, even part of those lately sent to Monastir, had been marched towards the Servian frontiers, by orders from *Constantinople*, previous to the insurrection, it would appear that the Government of Izzet Mehmet Pasha knew what was going on in Servia, and favored the insurrectional projects against Michael.¹

Perhaps it was Izzet's secret project, to grant the recognition of the *new* Prince only against certain concessions favorable to the Porte and strengthening her authority in Servia, but this is only a supposition of mine, as Izzet would have been treading upon very dangerous ground, in so far as every thing, connected with the internal government of Servia in its relations to Turkey, is laid down in the Hattisheiff emanated from the Sultan (treating this question) subsequent to the treaty of Adrianople, and pronounced by that treaty as forming part of the treaty itself

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private. Extract.

Pera 16 December 1842.

The important events which have been so gloriously accomplished in China and Afghanistan, are producing a deep impression in this country. The Turks consider the Mantschou Tartars of China as springing from a common stock with themselves, and they know that the Afghan fought under Nadir Shah, who so often conquered the Ottoman armies in battle.

Tahir Pasha and Hafiz Pasha told me both that the war in Afghanistan might become to England what the war in Algiers is to France.

I told them long ago that I did not think this likely, and I based my opinion on the fact that the occupation of Afghanistan was not necessary to secure the northwest frontiers of British India, and that the difficulties which the Russians had found in their expedition to Khiva and those which the British experienced in Afghanistan, proper seemed to prove sufficiently the existence of nearly insurmountable natural obstacles between the present Russian and British possessions in Asia.

I can now refer to Lord Ellenborough's proclamation at the evacuation of Afghanistan for confirmation of these views. — Mr. Urquhart

¹ 10 December. Shekib Effendi told this day positively to Mr. Jean Argypoulos that he had decided orders from Izzet Pasha to bring about a change of government in Servia, by supporting the *insurgent* party.

must be wonderfully undeceived about the value of his predictions with reference to the affairs of Central Asia. It appears to me that the experience of late events in Khiva and Afghanistan must have a tendency to *diminish* the existing jealousy between Great Britain and Russia, regarding eastern policy, and thus enable both countries to counteract more firmly the effects in Europe of the antisocial doctrines "*of French democracy.*"

I find in the relations of the ancient traveller Marco Polo that, in describing Kathay and the province of Peking, he mentioned the curious circumstance of *coal* being in general use amongst the Tartars¹, and that this fuel existed in great abundance. This would be an immense thing for steamer navigation in the Pacific and Indian seas.

General de Lieven is expected here in a few days

After the delivery by Mr. de Boutenieff² of the Emperor's letter, which was presented to the Sultan on the 24 November, many people assumed from the severe tone of the letter that Russia would be content with nothing less than a reintegration of Prince Michael, and it was thought that Austria, always disinclined to recognize the workings of revolutionary principles, would join Russia to undo what armed rebellion had accomplished in Servia.

Well informed people tell me that Austria is far from being pleased with the election of Czerny George, and that the cabinet of Vienna considers his situation as very precarious.

On the other hand it is difficult to see how the Porte can be *obliged* to reinstall Prince Michael (against whom there exist, from what Prince Voghorides tells me, written proofs of his having fomented dissatisfaction and rebellion in Bulgaria) — without completely destroying all Ottoman authority and influence in Servia, and partially in other portions of the Turkish Empire.

The wording of some of the articles of the treaty of peace of Adrianople and of the *first* Hattisheriff, emanated in consequence of that treaty, is such that, without exactly binding Russia, it fetters Turkey, and again the wording of the latter Hattisheriff is such that, at choice, they may or they may not be considered as supplementary acts of the first Hattisheriff of 1829, an infraction of which could be considered as a rupture of the treaty itself. Even the Hattisheriff of Rebecowel 1246 (1830), which grants the hereditary sovereignty *of Servia* to Milosh, refers distinctly to the *existing Statutes* of that Province

With reference to the Ottoman army and fleet I have obtained the conviction that both decline rather than improve.

The ship which Your Lordship had obtained for Admiral Walker to be organized as a modelship, has been laid up in ordinary some weeks after you left and its crew broken up. Walker, after a rupture with Tahir Pasha, lives now altogether in Therapia.

¹ Coal was subsequently found in abundance in the Nanking River &c. &c.

The establishment for the engineers near Khasskoei under Captain Williams has also been broken up under pretense of some necessary reparations, and has not been restored to him since.

As for myself . . . I do not positive *good*, but nobody does me any *harm*. I go regularly to the War-Office and smoke pipes with the Serasker and the other Pashas, and as I am now able to speak sufficiently Turkish to converse without the assistance of a Dragoman, I study the men and means on which Turkey depends as a military power. The Turks think that they have nothing to learn. One of their principal men said some time ago to the Sultan, who was present at a parade:

"These troops are magnificent. It is true, we were obliged
"to learn from the Ghiaours how to drill them, but the troops
"are now in that state of perfection that we are sure to beat the
"Franks."

I am not so sanguine as the General who delivered those sentiments, because it is my conviction that there is no force and no leader in the Ottoman Empire able to impede the march of 30,000 European troops from the Danube to the Mediterranean, and I moreover believe that a force of 30,000 good troops, supported by the Russian fleet and the 20,000 men always ready at Sebastopol, could not only march, but maintain themselves against any forces which the Ottoman Government could bring to act against them in its European provinces.¹

I speak of a limited number of a land force of 30,000 men, because it is easier to subsist and to move 30,000 than 100 or 150,000 men, and the campaigns of the Duke of Wellington have shown what 30,000 *good troops* can do, whenever they are well provided with necessaries and food.²

The Porte promised on the 7 instant to leave to the mountaineers of the Lebanon the choice of a Christian Governor (to the exclusion, however, of the Shehab family) for the Maronites, and of a Druse Governor for the Druses, both to receive their investiture from the Pasha of Saïda. The Porte declares that she has acceded to this arrangement by way of *trial* at the recommendation of the Five Powers.

That the ultimate result of this trial will be beneficial, remains to me a matter of considerable doubt, because it would be a complete novelty if the hereditary feud amongst the Druses and Maronites should cease now that they are governed by *two* Chieftains, having different creeds and interests, whilst they could scarcely ever be quiet with *one* Chieftain, whose interest it was to see justice done to both parties, or who robbed both at least by equal shares.

¹ The danger for the Ottoman Empire of a similar combined operation by land and sea was pointed out to the Austrian Cabinet by its Minister at Constantinople Baron Thugut, as early as 1774, at the occasion of the peace of Kainardge; vide *Hammer's Ottoman History* (VIII, p. 578 sq.).

² Marshal Paskewitch showed similar skill in the late Persian war.

With reference to the exclusion of the family of Shehab I think it can only be considered as an open injustice, because during the war the Emir Cassim fought gallantly for the Sultan, and it was not his fault, if he could not after the campaign peaceably govern the country, as it appears now to be proved by official documents that the *Turkish authorities* themselves excited the *Druses* to begin the civil war of 1841, and that therefore it was not the assumed incapacity of Emir Cassim *alone* (though certainly he is not a very clever man) which brought about the disturbances. It is reported for certain from Beyrout that the Druses, at their last outbreak in November of the present year, delivered into the hands of the Maronite Chiefs old letters from Selim and Nedjib Pashas encouraging the Druses to attack the Christians. In consequence of this discovery the Maronites are said to have remained neutral, and to have promised even assistance to the Druses, in case the latter should not be sufficiently strong to cope alone with the Turks.

I believe that the representatives of the Five Powers have obtained the best conditions they were able to get from Turkish obstinacy, but I cannot persuade myself that division of power and authority is the proper means to keep quiet the unruly mountaineers, and I continue to be of opinion, as I expressed it in my Memorandum to Rifaat Pasha, that to change the Emir Cassim was a great fault.


The restauration of a provincial government was to be foreseen, for the Five Powers could never tolerate an open breach of fate, and this forced restauration must naturally lead to a humiliation of the authority of the Porte, in the eyes of its Syrian subjects. It was further certain that in proportion as the negotiations for a restauration were protracted, and the Porte pledged by its own deeds and open declarations that it never would give way, so its humiliation in Syria would be more keenly felt and appreciated by the whole Rayah population of this Empire.

Turkey never could have pursued a worse course than the silly line of policy followed in this Syrian question, first opposing the just demands of the Five Powers, than following up its resistance so as to create an European question, and finally giving way when the Lebanon is again in full insurrection, and when the concessions obtained will not be considered by those themselves in whose favor they were granted, as voluntary acts, or even as effects of consideration for the demands of the Five Powers, but as triumphs obtained by the dread of the Druses in arms and in open rebellion.

We are all accustomed to see the Turks shortsighted in their foreign policy, but it is lamentable that the Divan should feel its way so entirely in the dark

1843

6*



LE COMTE DE STÜRMER AU GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS.

Vienne 24 Janvier 1843.

Monsieur le Général,

Vous ne sauriez douter du plaisir que m'a fait votre obligeante lettre; recevez en, je vous prie, tous mes remercimens, ainsi que des félicitations que vous voulez bien m'adresser à propos de la faveur dont j'ai été l'objet. Cette faveur, qui a dépassée mes vœux et mes espérances, a gagné encore plus de prix à mes yeux par les témoignages d'intérêt et d'estime qu'elle m'a valu de toutes parts, et au nombre desquelles je me plais à compter avec une satisfaction particulière ceux que j'ai reçus de vous, Monsieur le Général.

Vous êtes bien bon de désirer mon retour à Constantinople. L'espoir de pouvoir y être encore de quelque utilité et d'avoir le plaisir de vous y retrouver devrait assurément m'engager à en reprendre le chemin; mais je me sens vieux et fatigué, et ce n'est pas sans crainte que je me chargerais de nouveau d'un fardeau qui désormais pourrait bien être au dessus de mes forces. Il n'y a toutefois absolument rien de décidé à cet égard. J'ai tout lieu de croire que cette question ne sera guères mise sur le tapis avant le retour de la belle saison, et j'aurai ainsi encore deux ou trois mois à y penser. Kommt Zeit, kommt Rath.

Nos pauvres Turcs paraissent plus mal conseillés que jamais. Ils n'ont fait que des bévues dans ces derniers temps, et semblent vouloir travailler eux-mêmes à la perte d'un pays qui offrirait encore bien des ressources et qu'un peu d'habileté suffirait pour retremper.

Je n'ai plus entendu de parler de Lord Ponsonby depuis un temps immémorial. Avez vous reçu de ses nouvelles?

Oserai-je vous prier de me rappeler au souvenir de Monsieur le Chevalier de Cordoba et lui dire que j'ai prendrai toujours une part sincère à tout ce qui le concerne.

Ma femme a été très sensible à tout ce que vous m'avez chargé de lui dire d'obligeant de votre part, elle vous en remercie de tout son cœur.

Recevez, Monsieur le Général, l'assurance réitérée de ma considération la plus distinguée.

Stürmer.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS AU COMTE MEDEM,

*Ministre Plénipotentiaire de S. M. Impériale de Russie, à Téhéran
en Perse.*

Extrait.

Pera 27 Janvier 1843.

Mon cher comte Medem,

Votre aimable lettre du 16/28 Novembre m'est parvenue en son temps et j'y vois avec satisfaction que vous ne voulez pas renoncer pour vous même ni surtout pour les personnes de votre suite au droit incontestable que tous ont sur la médaille de Syrie. Je n'ai rien fait dans cette affaire, depuis la démarche faite simultanément par Mr. de Titow et par moi auprès de Sarim Effendi qui sans nul doute a agi de mauvaise foi, mais je me propose de parler à Rechid Pacha à son retour de Paris, si sa position devient assez influente pour que sa parole puisse être de poids. — Qu'elle sera telle est l'opinion assez générale, bien que les nombreux adversaires de Rechid fassent le possible — pour empêcher sa nomination au poste de Reis Effendi, *qu'on dit* lui être destiné.

Vous pouvez être certain, cher Comte, que je n'oublierai pas cette affaire, car je conçois parfaitement le désir et même l'obligation qu'a un chef de faire rendre justice à ses subordonnés. Je vous félicite bien sincèrement du succès de vos négociations relativement à la question Turco-Persane.

Dans l'état de dépuisement des deux États Musulmans la guerre entre ces puissances aurait probablement dégénéré en brigandages des deux cotés, profitable seulement aux Kurdes des frontières Turco-Persanes et ruineux pour les provinces limitrophes.

Les bienfaits de la pacification seront donc palpables, mais ils ne deviendront permanents que lorsqu'il y aura impossibilité pour les Kurdes persans et turcs de guerroyer entr'eux, c'est à dire de piller réciproquement des caravanes ou des villages à la moindre apparence de més-intelligence entre les Cours de Téhéran et Constantinople.

Établir un obstacle à ces incursions mutuelles, c'est créer l'impossibilité ou une grande difficulté dans ces collisions limitrophes.

Or cet obstacle se trouverait créé en avançant la frontière russe jusqu'au lac de Wan qui n'est qu'à une très petite distance des limites actuelles de votre Empire. Un triangle d'une surface peu considérable, ayant sa base sur une partie de vos frontières actuelles vers Bayasid et sa pointe sur le lac de Wan serait tout ce qui est nécessaire. Une possession de côtes russes sur le littoral *nord* du lac de quelques miles de largeur suffirait pour empêcher toute collision entre les Kurdes de la Perse et de la Turquie depuis la pointe *sud* du lac jusqu'à la Mer Noire. et la Russie pourrait probablement sans inconvénient offrir en échange

de la cession du susdit triangle une étendue équivalente de territoire sur ses frontières actuelles en Asie soit à la Perse, soit à la Turquie selon que le terrain cédé appartient à l'une ou à l'autre de ces puissances ou à toutes les deux.

J'ignore si cette idée puisse être mise à exécution. Il paraîtrait au premier coup d'oeil qu'elle est avantageuse quant à la Turquie tant à la Perse, mais pour la développer entièrement, il faudrait l'envisager sous des points de vue généraux que les limites d'une lettre m'empêchent d'aborder.

Je laisse à votre sagacité de décider si elle est bonne ou mauvaise, praticable ou non — je ne me mêle pas de politique et je n'ai parlé absolument à *personne* de cette combinaison, qui s'est offerte à moi en jetant un coup d'oeil sur la carte.

Aussi crois-je pouvoir me flatter, mon cher Comte, que vous considérez cet ébauchement comme tout à fait amical et de confiance, comme un échange d'idées entre nous, et comme un témoignage sincère du plaisir que j'ai à m'entretenir avec vous et à vous être agréable ou utile.

Je désirerais pouvoir vous donner d'ici quelque chose de plus amusant en fait de nouvelles que la dissertation hypothétique que je viens de vous faire lire, mais nous sommes à Pera plus monotones qu'à l'ordinaire à cause de l'absence des *Stürmers* et des *Titows*.

Lady Canning nous a donné cependant une fête charmante Mardi dernier. C'était un bal costumé d'enfans et plusieurs petites demoiselles turques de l'âge de 8 à 11 ans y ont dansé et *walzé*. Imaginez vous que la loi du prophète permet la consommation du mariage à 9 ans et voyez les progrès de la civilisation Ottomane.

En revanche de cette concession on n'a pas voulu nous faire celle de nous laisser marcher dans Pera par des rues éclairées. Un entrepreneur avait pris les arrangements préliminaires et il y avait même commencement d'exécution. Cependant bientôt après Mehemet Ali Pacha de Tophana a fait déclarer aux intéressés que l'entreprise devait être abandonnée pour cause de *sûreté publique* attendu que la police turque, chargée de veiller au bien du pays, pourrait bien empêcher, par sa grande vigilance, une partie des infractions et vols nocturnes, tant que les rues seraient *obscur*, mais qu'elle ne pourrait plus être responsable, si Pera était éclairé, considérant que les voleurs ver- raient arriver les *Cavass* de trop loin, pour ne pas se sauver à l'instant.

40.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY

at London.

Confidential. Private. Extract.

Constantinople 16 April 1843.

My former letters will have prepared you to hear the solution of the Servian question, and I have now to state that the Ottoman Go-

vernment has been obliged to comply *fully* with the demands of the court of St. Petersburg.

Mr. de Boutenieff received his final instructions on the 31 March and communicated them officially to Sarim Effendi on the 2 April.

The alternative put to the Porte was compliance with the demands of Russia or a rupture.

An Austrian Estafette arrived on the 3 April, and Mr. de Klezl communicated the same day officially to the Porte that Austria advised Turkey in the most precise terms to prevent the most serious complications by complying with the demands of Russia. I hear that Prince Metternich pointed out war as the certain consequence of non-compliance.

An Austrian told me that one of the principal causes of this step taken by the Prince might be looked for in the circumstance that the language of Sir Stratford Canning at Constantinople induced the Turks to *procrastinate* in hopes of support from England and possibly from France, whilst the language of the British Ministers in London held out no such perspective.

The object of the Prince was therefore to bring the matter to a speedy close. — Sir Stratford Canning had been latterly instructed to take the same view of the Servian question as his Austrian colleague, but when Mr. de Klezl communicated to the Ambassador the final opinion of Prince Metternich, Sir Stratford was so disappointed that he crushed with his hands the paper presented by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires

The substance of the Sultan's message to Mr. de Bouteneff was that

"as it always had been the sincere wish of Her Majesty to maintain the strictest friendship with Russia, and as this personal desire was particularly strengthened by one of the last recommendations to this effect by the late Sultan Mahmoud, the choice of Her Majesty could not for a moment remain doubtful, since the alternative existed to decide between the maintainance of the status quo in Servia and the friendly relations with the Emperor of Russia."

The *immediate* compliance of Turkey with the demands of Russia seemed doubtful to many of the best informed people here, since it was known that as late as the 11 instant it had been decided by a very great majority in an extraordinary sitting of the Grand Conseil that the Porte should *resist* the concessions asked for, but since I know from two sources that already on *the 9* it had been secretly resolved to give way, the object of the assumed character of resistance on the 11 April must be only considered as a stratagem. Either Ministers were afraid that some public insult by a fanatic or Turkish patriot might be offered to the Sultan or to themselves during the procession on the Prophet's birthday (Mewlud) which took place on the 12, or Riza Pasha may have wished to claim the merit in the eyes of the Russians of having advised the Sultan to yield, notwithstanding the contrary reso-

tion of the Grand Conseil, and thus to propitiate the prepondering influence of the days to come.

Prince Voghorides has been ordered to communicate the resolutions of the Porte to Mr. Simich, the agent of Czerny George

It is scarcely possible that the present Ottoman Government can remain long in office. There either will be essential modifications or an entire change in the administration, for it cannot be denied that, tho' towards the end it was perhaps impossible to avoid the present humiliation, all serious complications might have been avoided, if in the beginning the Porte had left time for communications to be exchanged with St. Petersburg before it officially recognized Prince Czerny George, thereby giving into Russia's hands the arms from which it now suffers a severe defeat. A similar course was indeed since officially recommended. I know for *certain* by the representative of *one* of the Five Powers, if not by *two*.

Mr. de Foublanque also strongly recommended temporization, but his voice was overruled by the opinion of Sir Stratford.

I am, however, doubtful if temporization in the acknowledgement of Czerny George could have been obtained from the Turkish Government against the persuasive language of Wutchich and his party in the shape of a remittance of two hundred thousand Ducats, which according to a list in possession of Mr. de Cordoba were distributed as follows:

50,000 Sultan's Treasury,
40,000 Grand Visir,
35,000 Riza Pasha,

the rest to the Minister of finance, Sarim Effendi, Shekib Effendi &c.

The fact of the arrival of this money is also well known to the "Bourse" of Galata, and the names of the bankers are known thro' whose hands it passed. — It must therefore be admitted, however reluctantly by the friends of Turkey, that for the bribe of 200,000 Ducats the Ottoman Cabinet put knowingly in jeopardy the fate of one of its most important dependencies, for however low may be the character of some or nearly all the leading chieftains amongst the Servians, the nation sound, brave (tho' perhaps not in our sense of chivalrous devotion) and of uncorrupted morals, infinitely superior to the Greek population or instance of Turkey and of free Greece, where Primates and the populace belong equally to the "lowest of the low."

For the present there seems to exist no immediate apprehension of a rupture between Turkey and Persia, tho' the real dispositions of the latter power after the affair of Keerbelah appear doubtful.

If Turkey had come to a rupture with Russia, Persia certainly could have declared war, but the late arrangements about Servia will act on the relations between the two Mussulman Powers, and it is only that peace will be maintained.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO LORD PONSONBY.

Private. Extract.

Buyukdéré 16 July 1843.

The health of your old antagonist Mehemet Ali is far from being in the same satisfactory state. They say that his intellectual powers are rapidly diminishing, and that there is frequently much incoherency in his reasoning.

The sufferings of his mind must have been very great these last four years. — Destruction of all his political schemes of grandeur and power, and when he tried to console himself latterly by amassing wealth, — destruction of his property by the immense losses in cattle &c. &c. &c. He has employed nearly all the horses and mules of his military establishments for purposes of agriculture and cultivation, and has consequently been forced to disorganize the remains of his former army.

Mr. Basili, the Russian Consul at Beyrout (on leave), told me that there died in Egypt upwards of 250,000 oxen and cows which were in the country, and that most of those imported since had also perished.

The same gentleman assured me that upwards of 2000 Cavalry horses of those brought back from Syria in 1841 died in the spring of the same year from diseases arising out of fatigues during the retreat from Damascus.

The Egyptian fleet is also in a most pitiful state, so that the military means of the Pasha of Egypt are far from imposing at present.

This is the best explanation of his submissive conduct towards the Porte, for the Parliamentary Papers on the affairs of Syria of 1841 and 1842 and especially the correspondence of Colonel Rose prove clearly that even as late as then there was no want of *disposition* to do mischief on the part of Mehemet Ali, but only wants of means and opportunity.

The publication of the papers to which I have alluded must do a great deal of harm to the Ottoman Government. It is scarcely possible to conceive a policy on the part of the Divan more deeply died with a mixture of folly, injustice, and ingratitude, than is exhibited in the pages of those two volumes; — and I am sorry to say that from my local knowledge of Syria and from my personal acquaintance with nearly all the people who appear on that stage of disgrace, governors as well as governed, there remains no doubt in my mind that the picture drawn by Colonel Rose and Mr. Wood is by no means overcharged.

Mr. Wood at the time had a better opinion of Selim Pasha than myself, who always thought him a weak head,¹ tho' he behaved better than most other Pashas there as a soldier.

¹ The same Selim Pasha who was so thoroughly beat by the Russians in Asia in 1854.

I am afraid that most provinces of the Turkish Empire are not better governed than Syria, and some certainly much worse.

The only difference is that in Syria the Pashas were closely watched by the foreign agents, and consequently their misdeeds came into broad day-light, whilst in other districts they can act without being observed, or at least events have not occurred which call for a publication of reports similar to those on the administration of Syria.

Selim Pasha when he left Beyrout for his new Pashalic in the Caucasus, said "Thank God, there are no Consuls in Merash". — He went on, however, so lustily that he is now living in exile at Brussa.

A courier has arrived Monday last from St. Petersburg, bringing instructions to Mr. de Titow, which direct him to declare that Russia considers as inadmissible any election of a Prince of Servia, made by an assembly which acts still under the open influence of Wutchich and Petronowich, whose retirement from Servia was one of the special stipulations of the late Russian Ultimatum.¹

Mr. de Titow's note has created a great sensation in the Divan, and the Berat for Prince Alexander which was to be sent off to him, has consequently not been dispatched.

This is a most serious affair, and reopens the whole of the Servian question, and on very bad ground too for Turkey; — as Russia charges her with not having fulfilled one of the conditions of the Ultimatum, and Turkey must either plead guilty, or acknowledge that she had no power in her own province to execute a stipulation of comparatively minor importance; but I am much mistaken, *or Russia has proofs that the resistance of Wutchich and Petronowich was underhand instigated by the Divan.*

I am not *certain* that the Divan has done so, but I much fear it is the case

¹ Russian influence is now all powerful, for *fear* is the best teacher of this government.

This puts me in mind of a true anecdote which a friend of old Chosrew Pasha told me not long ago. Sultan Mustapha III. hated the Janizaries, and despised them much since their miserable conduct in the disastrous war which ended by the treaty of Kainardge. One day two regiments of Orta's quartered in Constantinople quarrelled and fought in the streets. A report was immediately made to the Sultan who answered "Olsun" — „let them fight". Half an hour later a new report was made of still greater disorders, and of complaints made by the inhabitants whose houses were burning in the midst of the fight. "Well," said the Sultan, „take a Russian hat and throw it amongst the rascals, and both parties will run away."

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO CHEVALIER DE WAGNER,
Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo.

Extract.

Buyukdéré 29 August 1843.

I have had great pleasure in receiving your kind letter of the 16 August

I saw yesterday Mr. de Titow, to whom I mentioned that I received a letter from you. He begs to be recalled to your memory as a sincere and attached friend.

His new and well deserved honours have not changed him, he is always the same unassuming worthy person. Baron Behr used to call him "la fleur de la diplomatie."

It is not certain yet, if Madame de Titow will be back here this autumn, or only next spring. I find a great resemblance in personal appearance between her and the Duquesa de la Victoria

The serious differences between Turkey and Russia on the Servian question being now settled entirely according to the interest of Russia, I suppose the Persians will look twice to it, before they begin hostilities.

The negotiations at Belgrade naturally must influence those at Arzroum, and I hear our friend General Lieven is now the *real* Governor of Servia.

. I understand he is extremely popular, and his open soldierlike manners and fine military bearing must powerfully act on a half barbarous people; brave but raw.

Wutchich and Petronowich I hold to be mercenary vagabonds, about on a par with most of the heroes of the Greek revolution, whose patriotism, after the natural struggle between Rayah and Mussulman, assumes a different hue of Austrian, Russian, English, or French tint, according as they are paid in florins, rubles, pounds Sterling, or francs.

Count Stürmer does not live this year at Buyukdéré, Madame having too much to do in town, her whole household going to be remodeled. They are as kind and hospitable as usual

I see a good deal of Sir Stratford and Lady Canning who reside again this year at Buyukdéré. Milady does every thing she can for society, and has given some charming Keff parties on the Bosphorus with good music and other improvements on our usual rural and innocent pleasures as you call them.

There is now a considerable military force concentrated at Constantinople and Adrianople for the purpose of augmenting and improving the army. With the exception, however, of the Artillery under the system of instruction of your Prussian officers, the progress of the troops is next to nothing; desertion in parties of 10 to 20 is a daily, I should say an every *night's* occurrence. The parties pick a leader amongst themselves, and rob on the highroads until they get to their respective homes.

The new recruits are the most pitiful refuse I ever saw. Among a corps of eighthundred men, lately come from Angora, there actually were not twohundred who would have been admitted into any European army.

Nothing can give a more decided proof of the rapid decline and deterioration of the genuine Ottoman population of Turkey, than the miserable appearance of the recruits of the late extensive enrolments for the army. It is true that the sound part of the Mussulman populations, that is to say the strong and more energetic mountaineers of Albania, Bosnia, of Kurdistan, and Syria refuse to submit to the conscription. Revolts broke out lately in Diarbekir, in Uskup, and in some districts of Upper Albania and Bosnia, where the Ottoman authorities insisted on levying recruits, and the Government possessing no sufficient means of coercion was obliged to come to a compromise.

Mr. de Cordoba told me that he has not yet given up his plan of visiting Syria and Egypt, but as he does not wish to make a long quarantine he intends to choose a period where there is no plague.

A propos de quarantine Sarim Effendi said some time ago, when he was still in office, that quarantines were not at all to his taste, because if now and then a few cases of plague were to take place in Constantinople it would go a good way to keep out troublesome Franks, travellers, and others.

About the same time a caravan of pilgrims coming from Syria broke by main force thro' the quarantine at Koniah, animated, I suppose, by as orthodox principles as His Excellency . . .

43.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO THOMAS JOCHMUS

at Hamburgh.

Extract.

Buyukdéré 31 August 1843.

The Berat for Prince Alexander Georgiowich has been this day sent off to Belgrade, the Porte having received about a week ago the official news that Petronowich and Wutchich had left Belgrade on the 19 instant for Widdin, whence they are stated to come to Constantinople. — Hussein Pasha of Widdin (the last Aga of the late Janizaries) now a monopolist à la "Mehemet Ali", is a protector of those two personages with whom he carries on occasionally a considerable trade.

The Ottoman Cabinet has been of late very much alarmed by the menacing tone of the Russian Government, who threatened to send 25,000 men into Servia in order to give full execution to the Ultimatum on the Servian question accepted by the Divan, and who moreover had declared that Russia would *not* recognize the legality of the second election of Prince Alexander, except the principal authors of the late revolutionary movements Wutchich and Petronowich were exiled from Servia.

In fact, the Emperor had signified that he would overlook the irregularities of the late election only from peculiar considerations for the Sultan, and from the fact that, altho' the above two agents of disorder had not actually quitted Servia at the time of the re-election of Prince Alexander, they at least had not been present at the electoral assembly, having gone to the distant town of Kragujewatz.

The decided tone of General Lieven in Belgrade and his somewhat dictatorial appearance amongst the Servian Senators had also much frightened the Divan of Constantinople, who saw how little notice the Russian General took of Hafir Pasha and the other agents of the Porte.

However desirous the Divan and some of the principal foreign Diplomats here were to shut their eyes to the fact, it could no longer be denied that the pretended *patriotic party* in Servia had either changed sides, or had waited only until it might suit their interest openly to declare for Russia, and I further believe that even Wutchich and Petronowich would have never continued their game till now, had they not been secretly instigated to resistance by agents of the Porte. — Rifat Pasha is not to blame, I believe, but others may fairly be suspected of double dealing, principally from fear that their pecuniary dabbling might be brought immediately to day-light.

Unless some untoward event happens, the late Servian question may be considered as closed, and closed in the most advantageous manner possible for Russia. — If all should not have been calculation and deep prevision on the part of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg (and it is too early to decide this point) circumstances must have wonderfully favored its combinations, for Russia has carried two main points:

1. the acknowledgement of its protectorate over Servia, which — deducted from the treaty of Adrianople — forms henceforth part of the international right of Europe; and
2. the abolition of the hereditary principle in the Government of Servia, granted by Sultan Mahmoud to Prince Milosh Obrenowich.

Now Russia began by demanding only the acknowledgement of the first point and it carried by dint of dexterity the second, perhaps not less important one for her policy, in the course of the negotiations.

I know for certain from Prince Voghorides that at the time Russia not only strenuously opposed the project of investing Milosh with a hereditary title of Sovereignty, but that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has never changed its views on this question since 1830.

To imagine that the Servians or *any Christian* population of Turkey should in good earnest cordially unite with the Turks *against* the Russians, is the height of absurdity as long as the Ottoman Government treat their Christian subjects as Rayahs.

Sir Stratford Canning is much disappointed and annoyed about the result of the Servian negotiations, principally because it has been proved that on this question there exists a complete dissidence between him and Lord Aberdeen

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO THOMAS JOCHMUS
at *Hamburgh*.

Extract.

Buyukdéré 28 September 1843.

A recent event has created a considerable sensation here, the execution of an unfortunate Armenian, who was beheaded on the 1st August in the Baluk Bazar or Fish Market at Constantinople.

About a year and a half ago a party of Armenians quarrelled in a drunken affray with a Turkish patrol. The Armenians, after a short struggle, were taken up and brought before the Serasker, who ordered them all to be instantly bastinadoed. Four had already suffered this punishment, when a fifth, the unfortunate wretch who has been lately executed, declared he would become a Mussulman.

It is scarcely possible at this distance of time to ascertain whether the young man (about 19 years of age) was still intoxicated when he made this declaration, or if he acted only from fear and in order to escape a severe bastinado. The fact is, he was taken to a Mekkemeh, where his abjuration was received and duly noted down.

But the Armenian immediately or very shortly afterwards made good his escape from Constantinople, returned to the Christian faith, and wandered for upwards of a year in different parts of the Levant, after which time he returned to Constantinople, having changed its national costume for the European dress, in order to escape observation.

Unfortunately not long ago he went over from Pera to Stamboul where his mother lived, and was recognized by the identical officer who had arrested him in his first affray with the public force.

The renegado was immediately imprisoned, and as the Mussulman law inflicts death as punishment for change of religion, his mother — a poor widow — threw herself at the feet of the British Ambassador, and claimed his intervention on the plea of humanity.

Sir Stratford Canning exerted himself to the utmost, but all he could obtain was a promise of suspension in favor of the culprit, in order that time might be left to him to return to the Mahomedan religion. All at once, however, the more merciful mood of the Government ceased, and the unfortunate Armenian was executed publicly on the 27 Regib, which, being a holyday, was chosen on purpose to please the fanatic appetite of the political party now in power.

A paragraph in a semi-official paper printed in Greek announced the execution, which took place with all the degrading formality observed when a *Rayah* is visited with capital punishment, in contradistinction with the public execution of a true believer, and in order that the meaning might not be misunderstood, it was added in the paper that the Armenian had been led to the place of execution in a "*Frank Dress*", thus insinuating that neither the dress nor the intervention of an Ambassador had had any influence on the decision of the court of justice nor of the Government.

The act was meant and has been taken by the public as a sort of defiance thrown out on legal ground to all Christian Powers, and it is generally considered the more unwise and reprehensible, as it is very questionable, indeed, if even the strict letter of the law warranted the execution :

1. because the conversion was not voluntary, for the Armenian acted either under the effect of intoxication, or from fear of the bastinado. The former is more probable, as later up to the hour of his death, he refused to abjure the Christian faith, tho' it was distinctly told him that he could thus save his life, and tho' he was subjected to barbarous torments. He died with the spirit of a Martyr :

2. because he did not receive the usual present which the law requires to be given to all renegadoes; and

3. because he did not fulfil certain other formalities prescribed in the case of change to the Mahomedan religion.

It was further very unwise to execute the man in an "*Europian*" dress, and to inflict upon this dress under the eyes of the foreign representatives the ignominious treatment to which a "*Rayah*" culprit is liable by custom since the barbarous ages of Turkish predominance.

But there prevails at this moment in the counsels of the Government a spirit of fanaticism and reaction against the ideas of reform of Sultan Mahmoud's reign, which makes them blind to the serious consequences of atrocious acts like this execution, which is meant as an act of hostility against Christianity.

I understand that the representatives of the Five Powers after a conference on the subject have demanded instructions from their courts, whether they are to remonstrate against the late proceedings, and how to act in case of a repetition of similar cases.

Sir Stratford Canning told me on this occasion that he had received an official report from the British Consul at Tripolis, detailing the execution of a culprit condemned to the stake. — The man lived three days in the most frightful tortures, and his mother lay all the times on her knees before him, entreating as an only favor to be allowed to give a drink of water to her son, which is known to procure instant death, but she was not permitted by the guards to approach the stake, and was condemned to see her child linger for nearly eighty hours.

If the Ottoman Government means in good earnest to return to and to sanction such acts of atrocious barbarity, and especially if they intend them as a means of coercion and of administration by intimidation of their Christian Rayahs, the reign of the Sultan may be considered as rapidly *approaching towards its end*, for Europe cannot tolerate such misdeeds by a Government which only exists by a common accord of the great Christian Powers. Lord Ponsonby pointed out this eventual danger to several of the most influential Ottoman Visirs.

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1844

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL CHURCHILL¹
at Beyrout, Syria.

Extract.

Pera 17 March 1844.

I had the pleasure to receive two letters from you by the February steamers. The second incloses an official dispatch from the late Mute-sellim of Jerusalem, to whom I return herewith an answer. He says nothing of his present imprisonment, but writes only about accounts which he ought not to present to me *now*, but which he ought to have submitted four years ago to the finance commissions then sitting at Jaffa and Beyrout.

I hear Namik Pasha, the new Commander-in-chief of the camp of Arabistan, whose Head-Quarters are to be at Damascus, has orders to raise a considerable regular force in Syria by conscription, and from what you tell me on this subject, as well as from the well known dispositions of the Syrians, I apprehend that this project will meet with considerable difficulties in Syria. The Porte experiences already serious resistance upon the same question in Albania.

My former Aide-de-camp Tahir Bey,² whom you will recollect, accompanies Namik Pasha. He has been appointed a Miriliva Pasha or Major-General.

I have already told you that I cannot partake of your enthusiastic views in favor of the Greeks. The idea of seeing them one day at Constantinople is preposterous,³ and there is nothing in the nation which warrants such a supposition.

¹ 1867. Colonel Churchill was one of my Aides-de-camp during the Syrian war. He bought later large property in Syria, and has written a valuable work on the Lebanon, also a remarkable "Life of Abdul Kadr, the celebrated Algerine Emir. Colonel Churchill had become his intimate friend, when both were living in Syria.

² Tahir Pasha married a daughter of Namik Pasha, and was later seriously implicated in the grave disturbances of the Lebanon. He was exiled after Lord Dufferin's mission to Syria. Tahir Bey was my Turkish military Secretary (1840/41) in Syria. He was steady and painstaking, but no brilliant officer.

³ Lord Ponsonby told me one day at Therapia: as British Ambassador and as a statesman I should prefer to see the Russians at Constantinople rather than the Greeks. The complications for England would be less in the former case.

The modern Greeks possess none of the qualities which make nations great. Their existence is due to the battle of Navarino, for in the autumn of 1827 Greece was unquestionably conquered by the arms of the Grand Visir Reshid Mehmed and by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt, and again the "untoward event" of Navarino could only occur at a time when Phil-hellenism was a sort of social disease, caused by hallucinations and by the illusion of finding in the present mongrel inhabitants of the Morea and Attica the descendants of the ancient Hellenes.

Subsequent contact of Greece with Europe has already considerably modified these ideas, and the modern Greek begins to pass for what he is: a semi-barbarian, a not yet cultivated citizen, and already a spoilt savage.

In ten years hence the opinions of Professor Fallmerayer on the Slavic and Albanian descent of the present inhabitants of Greece will be current and generally received in Europe

Our classical recollections will have been proved a fallacy,¹ and as the nation has no moral value nor a just claim to our sympathies, it would be an anomaly of history to see Europe make continual sacrifices in favor of semi-barbarians, *only because* they inhabit a soil where the Parthenon was built.

Upon the same principle Europe ought to insure a free constitution under an European Prince to the Mutualis or to the Bedoweens who live in the neighbourhood of the ancient temple of the Sun at Baalbek. The Bedoweens descend from the classical Arabs.

A Greek Minister (one of the pretended "coryphées" of liberalism and of extension of the kingdom) told lately a friend of mine: "les Grecs d'aujourd'hui sont des Turcs chrétiens et il faut les gouverner à la Turque". — There then is the veracity of liberal principles in the Greeks, but what can be expected of a nation whose deputies make it their special business to vote a decree which, contrary to all former laws of their national assemblies, deprives of equal social rights every Greek not born in the limits of the present kingdom, accompanying this decree by stipulations of retroactive effect for the space of *fifteen years*?

¹ As distinctly proved by Professor *Fallmerayer*, whose judgement is very correct. — The Greek of Byzantine and mixed descent is considered "fair prey" by the hardier races of Slavic blood the same as by the Albanian. — The latter, even when a Mussulman, respects and fears the Christian of pure Albanian blood, in fact the people of both creeds often intermarry and mostly live unmolested in each other's neighbourhood, but the Mussulman Albanian oppresses, insults, robs, and ill-treats the Christian Rayah of mixed descent living in the plains of Thessaly, Macedonia, Moesia &c. &c.

This feeling of supremacy of the Albanian is so general that I saw in Greece Grivas and other chieftains of Epirote descent treat the mixed Byzantines of the Morea with the utmost arrogance, calling them, even after the conclusion of the war, Rayahs and "Barbatches" (synonymous with "Fellahs") in contradistinction to the followers of the Capitani themselves, who are the "Rumeliote Pallicares" or "Albanian Soldiers". — Fallmerayer says (*Fragmente aus dem Orient*, 2. Auflage, p. 574): für "Griechen" haben die Albanesen durchweg die Benennung "Schklärisch" d. i. Sklave.

Does history show an example of greater ingratitude, narrow-mindedness, ignorance, and mean, anti-patriotic selfishness?

I say ingratitude, because the foreign Greeks thus excluded were ruined by the revolution of the Morea or by its consequences, and I say narrow-mindedness, because, I see in this act one of the surest proofs that no grandeur of political conception is compatible with the ideas of men capable of sacrificing any thing to the low venal interest of the moment.

There exists in the world at large a strange confusion about Greeks *by origin* and Greeks *by religion*.

The former, that is the Greeks of mixed Slavic and of modern Byzantine origin, are but in small numbers. — They may amount to 650—700,000 souls in the new kingdom (inclusive of the colonies of Albanians established in the country), and to about 900,000 in European Turkey, whereas the other Christian population of the *Greek church* in European Turkey amounts to upwards of nine millions of inhabitants, the majority of whom are of Slavic race, speaking Slavic tongues, and being the descendants or successors of those Slavic tribes who for centuries were the “*absolute masters*” of Greece.

46. 47.

EXTRACTS FROM TWO LETTERS

DATED CONSTANTINOPLE 12 FEBRUARY AND 20 MARCH 1844 FROM
GENERAL JOCHMUS TO PATRICK COLQUHOUN¹

at London.

I.

46.

Constantinople 12 February 1844.

Baron Behr, who was in Egypt after you, has the impression that Mehemet Ali, ruined and demoralized since the Syrian campaign, seems to have taken “à la lettre” the wise recommendation of Prince Metternich, to content himself, under *penalty of destruction*, with being a provincial Governor. The Baron says that he seems only intent on being a *rich* one, and that since he has turned merchant, he has become *English*, both from interest and from policy, his province being the continental bridge between Great Britain and her Indo-Chinese possessions.

Even Ibrahim Pasha is said secretly to partake of his father's views, and Colonel Barnett seems to be the most influential foreign agent in Egypt

¹ 1868. Now Sir Patrick Colquhoun, formerly Plenipotentiary of the Hanse-Towns in Turkey and Greece. — Subsequently a judge in the Jonian Islands.

Austria considers the demand of the abolition of the principle of capital punishment for the crime of apostasy as a direct attack on the religious and civil legislation of an independent state, and keeping in view the general policy of Europe to maintain the Turkish Empire, recommends any medium course, which would prevent a repetition of barbarous executions, without violently infringing the prescriptions of the Koran.

“Si l'on veut maintenir la Turquie, et l'Angleterre est la puissance la plus intéressée dans ce maintien, qui a toujours été la base de sa grande politique orientale, il faut aussi vouloir la Turquie avec ses propres conditions d'existence; or demander un empire Musulman sans Koran est vouloir l'impossible.”

The value of these ideas is incontestable, and a medium course must and will be found, tho' the question has become extremely arduous, since the Ottoman Cabinet in order to shelter its responsibility has converted the discussion into a religious question from a political one, which with more dexterity and good will it might perhaps have remained.

It would appear that a Jew renegade returning from the Mussulman faith to the Hebrew religion is also entitled to the benefit of the late modification of the law; for the law or the ancient usage upholds the fiction that a Jew becomes a *Christian*, before he is admitted as a follower of Mahomed.

The question in how far a renegade is protected would remain doubtful (as far as the letter of the late agreement goes), if the apostate returned from Islamism to the *Jewish* religion, — but I apprehend this latter case would never be allowed to happen¹ publicly, since Mussulmans would consider it as a great stain on their religion, holding as they do the Jews in the lowest estimation, the lowest except the opinion they entertain about *Shiites*, who are considered still more condemnable from their *heretic* tenets.

So much is this the case that, when the Shah of Persia sent to Sultan Suleyman the Great, by way of compliment, a present consisting of workmen, jewels, and money to be used in the erection and embellishment of the Suleymanié Mosque,² just then building, the Sultan thanked the Shah in the following manner:

¹ In the concessions made to Great Britain it is only said that *Death* shall not be inflicted on relapsing renegades, but they *may* be put into prison, into madhouses, impunity not being promised, or condemned to the galleys for life to apostates.

Moreover, the Sheik-ul-Islam having refused to change his original opinion, the corps of Ulemas is not deemed to have adhered to any concession, which latter is only the *political* act of the Porte.

December 1844. In a late conversation of Count Stürmer with Baron Behr, the first said that after a prolonged investigation of the question Austria admitted the principle: that an Austrian subject converting himself from the Christian religion to Mohamedism did by that act alone not lose his character of Austrian subject.

² Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches III, 290, 341.

„The workmen he sent back as superfluous, the diamonds he ordered to be mixed up with the common mortar, and the “money” he informed the king of Persia had been distributed amongst the Jews in order that they might be a little less unmerciful towards the heretic Shiites, whenever on the day of judgement the latter would serve for jackasses to the infidel Jews riding to hell on their backs.”

The late religious effervescence in Constantinople has given birth to all sorts of extravagant tales and suppositions. The Turks have raked up an old prediction about the present year of the Hedjra (1260) being predestined as fatal to their Empire. One of the Ulema gave to a friend of mine the warning “be careful how you behave, and show yourself our friend, for altho’ in the predestined year we are to be driven into Asia, yet it is also foretold that we shall return soon after with great glory into our old possession, and then beware our enemies”.¹

Whatever be the resolution of the Sublime Porte and its answer to the Foreign Powers, the negotiations have assumed a character which must act most detrimentally on the Turkish Empire.

The Greek free press at Athens will be the surest means to bring the matter before the Christian Rayahs of Turkey,² in particular in its most tangible form, under its most ominous aspect, and with every commentary that mendacity, subtlety, and calumny can invent.

England and France are professedly the friends of Turkey,³ yet they foster in Greece a constitution (the fruit of military treachery and revolt), which for that country itself can only become a source of anarchy, of military brigandage for the border provinces, and of demagogical mischief for the Christian populations of Turkey.

Ottoman indolence, pride, and apathy will and cannot prevent that a daily dose of social poison or of indigested anarchical opinions be distributed amongst those populations by the means of a number of

¹ A curious prediction of this kind has existed in Syria long before the year 1840; it being said that in the year 1256 (1840) the “Asker el garb” **عسكر الغرب** (the troops of the West) were to land and conquer the country. vide *J. Perrier*.

I find it also a curious fact that the verses 93 to 102 in the XVIII chapter of the Koran may be construed as if Gog and Magog, against whom Dhoul Karnain or Alexander the Great* has erected the Iron Gates, shall come to destroy the Ottoman Empire in the shape of the modern Russians advancing thro’ the Caucasus.

² Prince Callimachi told me that he went on purpose to a number of Turkish coffee-houses in Stamboul proper, and that he was astonished at the correct and public reasoning amongst most of the visitors on this religious question.

³ How sincere *France* is in her friendship for Turkey may be deduced amongst other proofs from a conversation between king Louis Philippe and the Baron de Behr (last year) when the former said: “Il faut que la Turquie soit toujours *malade*, mais qu’elle ne *meure pas*”. — (Confidential communication of Baron Behr.)

* cfr. *Wahl, der Koran* p. 251—254.

papers and of publications edited by men who write for their daily bread, and whose pens are at any one's service for a few sous a line.

A late Greek Minister of State² told me himself his opinion on a free press in Athens in the following words:

“Un nombre de vagabonds se feront journalistes comme dernier moyen d'existence pour eux et ils trouveront des abonnés en menaçant ceux qui ne voudraient pas souscrire à leurs journaux, de les calomnier dans leur vie publique et privée, dans leurs intérêts les plus chers de position ou de famille. Vous me direz qu'il existe des moyens de recours au Jury — mais moi, ancien Ministre, je vous réponds que les garanties du Jury sont illusoire, parceque le Jury en Grèce sera composé d'hommes sans conscience publique. — N'ai-je pas vu, moi, — le Jury absoudre des barateurs, lorsque les corps de délit étaient devant les yeux de tous?”

“Jugez là-dessus quelles seront les opinions des jurés sur les délits de la presse politique.”

II.

47.

Constantinople 20 March 1844.

The national assembly of Greece has forced the king to subscribe the constitution, after rejecting nearly all the king's modifications. — Grivas and Griziottis at the head of their Pallicaria and a numerous body of citizens have parodied the 3/15 September, and have been proclaimed the liberators or saviours of Greece, and his Majesty appearing on the *historical* balcony has vouchsafed to approve Grivas and Griziottis with their “*irregular émeutiers*”, just as he was graciously pleased to absolve Kalergi and his “*regular émeutiers*” on a former occasion.

Au reste, here are the clear results of all these maskeralikia: power has slipped thro' the hands of the constitutional *royal* party under Mavrocordatos &c.; it is for the present in those of the constitutional *national* party under Metaxas and Zographos, and it soon will pass to the constitutional *anarchical* party under the sway of the Capitani and their accolytes.

In the meantime there is not a sixpence to pay the interest of the guaranteed loan. What excuse will be made to Russia for the non-fulfilment of the pecuniary obligations it is difficult to say; England and France,

..... *Arcadians both* — will be sent “to the new Calends of another Session.”

² Mr. J. Rizo, ancien Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

48.

EXTRACTS OF THE CORRESPONDENCE

relating to the executions in Turkey for apostasy from Islamism.

a)

SIR S. CANNING TO MR. ADDINGTON.

Ruyukdéré 3 November 1843.

The Porte will probably seek to avoid replying ostensibly to the remonstrances of the several leading Courts, but means will, no doubt, be taken to prevent the necessity of practising such atrocities¹ in future. A success so important, though limited, might reasonably encourage the allied Courts to enter into a more complete understanding for the removal of other blots from the legal or political practice of the Turks in their intercourse with Christians.

b)

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN TO SIR STRATFORD CANNING.

Foreign Office 16 January 1844.

They (the Christian Powers) will not endure that the Porte should trample on their faith by treating as a criminal any person who embraces it.

Her Majesty's Government require the Porte to abandon, once for all, so revolting a principle.

c)

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Foreign Office 19 March 1844.

I have received Your Excellency's dispatch of the 10 February giving an account of the manner in which you executed the instruction of the 16 January.

Her Majesty's Government have not urged and do not propose to urge them to abrogate any law, divine or human, . . . , . . . , but to allow the law to remain practically dormant

3 Execution of the Armenian in Constantinople, vide No. 44.

d)

COUNT NESSELRODE TO MR. DE TITOW.

St. Petersburg le 15/27 Février 1844.

.
D'une part nous avons reconnu la difficulté pour ne pas dire l'impossibilité, de découvrir le moyen propre pour paralyser d'une manière définitive les effets de la loi de Coran qui concerne les apostasies, d'autre part nous ne saurions ne pas élever la voix lorsqu'il s'agit de l'application de la peine de mort à des individus qui, en embrassant le Christianisme, ou en retournant dans le sein de l'église invoquent notre protection, et nous imposent le devoir de les soustraire aux rigueurs d'une législation barbare.

Dans un tel état de choses, l'opinion que vous a communiquée le Comte de Stürmer nous a paru celle qui offre le plus de chances de succès

e)

SIR ROBERT GORDON TO THE EARL OF ABERDEEN.

Vienna 16 February 1844.

. and I have now to state that, although agreeing in the principle upon which have been founded the remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government, and seeking to arrive at the same result, the Austrian Minister has nevertheless a decided objection to the wording of Your Lordship's instructions, and the peremptory terms in which it is endeavoured by them to enforce the Sultan's compliance.

f)

OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF THE SUBLIME PORTE.

(Translation.)

It is the special and constant intention of His Highness the Sultan that his cordial relations with the High Powers be preserved, and that a perfect reciprocal friendship be maintained and increased.

The Sublime Porte engages to take effectual measures to prevent henceforward the execution and putting to death of the Christian who is an apostate.

21 March 1844.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL HERMAN¹
at London.

Extract.

Constantinople 30 April 1844.

The Divan has of late been sending considerable reinforcements of troops and Artillery into Albania, amongst others 3000 men of the Guards, but be it from want of capacity in the commanding Generals, or be it from want of confidence in the troops, who are continually deserting (especially the old Rediffs) to the Insurgents, nothing has been heard as yet of any decisive movement or action on the party of the Imperial forces.

There is no truth in the newspapers' reports about the efficiency of the army since the late reorganization under Riza Pasha.

Some of the regiments in Constantinople are a little *better clothed*, because Riza Pasha makes money by furnishing cloth and some other necessaries from the manufactories under *his own direction*,² and it may be supposed that the concentration of all military and administrative authority into *one hand* has been productive of some amelioration in the administration and in the comptabilité of the army;³ but as for the efficiency of the troops, these are not more capable of resisting an European force now, than they were two or three years ago, and I am firmly persuaded that 30,000 Austrian or Russian troops would completely defeat any Turkish regular army that could at present be brought to meet them in the open field, say to the amount of 60,000 regulars, that being the utmost force which could be collected for active operations out of the 100,000⁴ men now forming the regular army.

The desertions and the increase of mortality since the reorganization of the army have been such that, notwithstanding the considerable levies of last autumn and of this spring, the effective numbers — even

¹ 1866. Colonel Herman was my military Secretary during the Syrian war. He had highly distinguished himself in the same capacity under Lieutenant-General Sir de Lacy Evans, commanding the British Auxiliary Legion in Spain (1835 to 1837).

Colonel Herman has been since British Consul General in Tripolis (Africa).

² The contractors furnishing formerly the "fez" from *Tunis* (the head dress of the soldiers) fraudulently put in each parcel of "ten fezzes", one fez of very inferior quality and paid for passing the fraud. — The Imperial fez-chané or manufacture, established in Constantinople, continues to furnish parcels of the same description of 9 good and 1 bad fez.

³ Mr. de Testa, the Swedish Minister, told me that his smith having furnished for 1500 piasters work to one of the military establishments, demanded payment from one of the inferior employés of the Intendant General, who told him plainly that he (the employé) had added 3000 piasters to the original amount, but that the smith should have some hundred piasters above his due, whenever the whole 4500 piasters were paid.

⁴ Sir Stratford Canning estimated the army reduced to 80,000 men before the march-levies were made.

on paper — are much the same now as they were immediately after the incorporation of the Rediff last autumn, id est 100,000 men “grand total.”¹

The desertions are explained by the breach of faith committed at the occasion of the forced incorporation of the Rediff, and the increase of mortality² arises from the “replacement” of 17,000³ old soldiers (discharged to their homes) by much more than that number of recruits.

The quality of the army must hence be needs deteriorated, and in fact, I have seen a medical document,⁴ showing that out of 45,000 troops concentrated last autumn on the heights of Wely Pasha outside of Constantinople, 10,000 were children under fourteen years of age.

Amongst the levies which have made up the army again to 100,000 men, are comprised 9000 recruits picked up on the 28 March at Constantinople, a good many of them being old Rediff deserters.

They were entrapped by a proclamation directing all male inhabitants of Constantinople to present themselves at appointed places on the said day, in order that a general census of the capital might be made.

The result of the census, as far as the real number of the population goes, is not known as yet, but the statistical return is soon expected.

A curious fact, however, is that the number of soi-disant Greek subjects and protégés has all at once dwindled down from 15,000 to about 4,500 persons⁵, the first being the number hitherto protected by the Greek legation, and the latter that which the Turkish authorities have inscribed as free Greeks, a state of things at last reluctantly recognized and acknowledged by the Greek Mission.

The Greek Chancery, abating de prime abord something from the original number of 15,000 subjects, had sent in a list of 10 to 11,000 names, — but Mehemet Ali Pasha, charged with the revision of the list, had secured the valuable services of an individual who not long ago had been a “porter” at the Austrian Embassy, and having been

¹ Besides the above 100,000 regulars, there are 12,000 sailors and marines in the navy. — This number of 12,000 men is now making up by levies on the coasts of the Black Sea, especially in the Pashalik of Trebizonde.

² According to a return from Dr. Riegler (Austrian service), now employed in the hospital of Maldepé, the number of sick in that hospital were 13,628 men during the 6 months ending in March 1844, whereas there had been only 5452 sick from October 1842 to June 1843, viz in 8 months previous to the reorganization of the army.

Amongst the sick were a great many cases caused by Sodomy. It is an ascertained fact that this vice is more prevalent amongst the regular troops than amongst the irregulars. The same observation was made at Greek soldiers by Count J. Capodistrias. Vide: Bory de St. Vincent.

³ Number of discharges up to ultimo March 1844 from information of Rifaa Pasha to the Austrian Legation.

⁴ Statement of Dr. Riegler to the Austrian Legation.

⁵ According to former statements of Prince Mavrocordatos, late Envoy. there were 15,000 Greek subjects in Constantinople and 5000 subjects in Smyrna.

thence discharged for misconduct, this gentleman had secured a birth as a civil officer in the Greek Consulate, but being also dismissed from that situation, he had made a humble tender to Mehemet Ali Pasha, offering to point out to His Excellency such individuals under Greek protection as had obtained that protection by purchase, or by other fraudulent means.

At first the Greek Legation made a show of resistance, but Mehemet Ali Pasha resorted to a rather extraordinary measure, which took the Greek authorities by surprise on account of its ingenious simplicity.

The Pasha engaged two well known Rayahs *to buy* Greek protection, and as that commodity was just then rather dear — considering the circumstances — His Excellency had to advance himself the necessary funds, viz eight thousand piasters, and had the satisfaction of receiving after 48 hours the documents in due form, showing and proving how two Rayahs had become loyal Greek subjects by the simple and legal process of paying 8000 piasters into the hands of Mr. Majorani, the Greek Consul, or to the persons duly commissioned to receive the said sum for him.

Mehemet Ali Pasha¹ sent these documents to the Sublime Porte, with a procès verbal of what had happened, and such is reported to have been the generosity of the Greek Employés that they not only paid back the aforesaid 8000 piasters, but actually made no further objection to the reduction of the number of free Hellens from 11,000 to 4,500 — thus restoring by a stroke of the pen and by a chivalrous feeling of disinterestedness 6500 free hellenic subjects to the ancient and inveterate enemy of Greece, the Sublime Porte.

To explain the first discrepancy of 4000 Greeks, *id est*, the difference between 15,000 original protégés and 11,000 persons put down in the late return of the Legation, it must be borne in mind that a great number of inhabitants of Cyprus, Candia, Samos, and of many other islands of the Archipelago had left their homes about 10—12 years ago in consequence of some of the protocols signed in London by England, Russia, and France in the Greek question, but being sadly disappointed in their hopes, this poor people had returned long since, mostly ruined, to Turkey, and many have been living ever since in Constantinople, finding it convenient sometimes to be free Hellens, and at others to enjoy the privileges in retail trade and in the *esnafs* (*métiers*) of Turkish Rayahs.

If I said that many of these deluded people *returned* from Greece to Constantinople or to Turkey nearly ruined, I explained myself for many cases perhaps incorrectly, in as much as a great many of the emigrants were already ruined before they came from Turkey to Greece, since the little property which they possessed after ruinous sales of

¹ This Mehemet Ali Pasha, Governor of Tophana and Commander-in-chief of the Artillery, has been lately made a Mushir or Pasha of three tails, and is going to be married to the Sultan's sister, whose hand was long sought for Saïd Pasha, the grand-son of the Pasha of Egypt. — Mehemet Ali of Tophana is a man of low extraction, formerly a slave of Seraglio, and a very ignorant person.

houses, estates, and stocks in their native places, was in many instances shamfully taken from them by the extortions or by the open robbery of Greek Captains of merchant ships, engaged to take these poor people to Greece.

Baron Behr told me that he has incontrovertible proofs¹ of Greek Captains having thus embarked numerous families in Cyprus, and of their having disembarked them in other parts of the same island, or in Candia, and then having run off with all the property on board the ships.

50.

LORD NAPIER TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

Pera 1 May 1844.

My dear General,

I have been directed by the Ambassador to return you, with his thanks, your Memorandum¹, which His Excellency has perused with the attention it deserves, and he would be much obliged to you if you would have the kindness to point out to him in the laws of Solyman the passage to which you refer in speaking of the military pensions, conferred in his reign.

Believe me &c. &c. yours

Napier.

British Embassy, Pera,
Tuesday.

51.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO RICHARD WOOD,

H. B. M. Consul at Damascus.

Extract.

Buyukdéré 12 May 1844.

By the last Beyrout steamer I have received your kind letter from *Damascus*

I much fear that your opinion of Syria relapsing into still greater anarchy than that from which it suffers at present, is but too true. The districts of Jerusalem and Naplous are by all accounts in a sad state, and the authority of the Porte set at defiance or disregarded on every occasion.

¹ This Memorandum referred to the unjust treatment of Vice-Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker, who had been abruptly dismissed the Turkish service for having fairly stated — as was his duty — the iniquities and malpractices of the Capudan Pasha Halil in the administration and command of the Navy.

In the rest of Syria the respect of the Turkish Government is not greater, and in reality the power of its agents does not extend in most places beyond the rooms where they hold their divans. — As for the Lebanon, to whose inhabitants the Porte owed so much of the memorable success of 1840, its state seems to be very sad indeed. — I have always looked upon the settlement of the Druse-Maronite question of 1842 as a very precarious and unsatisfactory arrangement, and it now bears its natural fruits: anarchy and a renewal of the strife by arms, whenever the Druses and Christians disagree in good earnest — and to judge of the present by the past, there is every reason to suppose that the Turkish local authorities, instead of allaying these animosities, continue their old game of playing off the Christians against the Druses and vice versa.

With regard to the indemnity to be paid by the Druses to the Christians, — I hold that the Turks ought to pay it themselves, as the real abettors of the civil war. — Now it will remain a subject of long quarrels and rancour — tho' officially decided and closed — and as much may be said of the provision which divides the Lebanon into two geographical sections, one to be administered by a Druse Chieftain and the other by a Maronite Christian.

This is to all *appearance* a fair decision, but it is so only *on paper*, for it does not solve the most arduous of all questions, the "*de facto*" government of the districts where the Christian and Druse population and property are intermixed, and I am therefore not astonished that the interested parties on the spot have begun to fight again on the subject.

I believe the plan of Lord Ponsonby to have *one* Chieftain over the whole Lebanon, tho' it were a weak man like the Emir Cassim, is the real practical arrangement required, and in my humble opinion Emir Cassim was not much worse than another, provided the Turkish local authorities had chosen honestly to support and not clandestinely to thwart his administration.

According to all information which I have received from Beyrout and other places, the mission of Namik Pasha to introduce the conscription into Syria will meet with great difficulties, and the effects — it is feared — may become similar to those now experienced in Albania, where the combined causes of resistance to the conscription, lust of plunder, and newly kindled fanaticism have produced a most serious commotion and the more dangerous for Turkey, as it assumes a character of persecution against Christians, tho' the Rayah population, which are become the greatest sufferers, have nothing to do with the original quarrel of the Porte with its Mohamedan subjects.

The fanatic feeling nourished and kindled these last months in Constantinople has rapidly spread over the greatest part of the Empire.

The excesses perpetrated in Albania and Rumili to the very gates of Adrianople are dreadful, those committed in Syria and its neighbour-

hood you know better than I do, and the accounts from Asia Minor are very lamentable indeed.

Government has been obliged a fortnight ago to dispatch several thousand Infantry to Samsoun for Mosul, where a violent persecution is going on against the Christians.

In Koniah two Turks having been found killed, the Christians were "ab initio" accused of the murder, and several of them frightfully tortured. — In Kaiseriah a Christian woman washing the upper windows of a house spilt some water on a Turkish gentleman passing by, and this enormity was construed into an intentional general insult against the Mussulman population at large.

The Softas and other fanatics rose and demanded nothing less than a fetwa authorizing the massacre of the Christians "en masse."

Other disorders are reported to have taken place in Tarsus, Simope, Samsoun &c. &c.

These are ominous prognostics, and the Turks seem not to be aware, what danger they are incurring if they rouse the religious feeling of Europe by similar acts of persecution and savage cruelty . . .

52.

CONSUL WOOD TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered 26 June 1844.)

Privat and confidential. Extract.

Damascus 12 June 1844.

My dear General Jochmus,

I have received and have read with the liveliest interest your very kind letter of the 12 ultimo which portrays in such exact colours the real state of the provinces and of the Turkish Empire. There is not a word you say on this very interesting subject with which I do not fully concur.

At one time I did entertain the hope that an amelioration in the condition of the people and state of the country would follow its restoration to the Porte. That hope *has more than vanished now*, more particularly in proportion as the conviction forces itself upon me that, instead of the abandonment of a set of measures and arrangements which have been entered into, a determination has been manifested to persevere in them "coute qui coute."

The natural result of such a resolution in the actual temper of the people and weakness of the Turks can only be resistance, anarchy, and disorder and a consequent future complication of affairs and — the Turks, far from seeing such ruinous consequences to themselves from such a state of things, persevere unremittingly in their suicidal policy.

Indeed, a fatality appears to accompany all their measures, their plans and views, and their inmost thoughts — for all their determinations seem to carry ruin with them at the same time that they undermine their authority in their own country, and bereave them of the good opinion and sympathy of Europe and of Christendom.

The presence of the Serasker has been productive of no great good: on the contrary, the very idea of a conscription appears to have coalesced all sects and all parties, and to have drawn them closer together for purposes of resistance. With the miserable force at his disposal, I doubt much whether he will be able to execute his arduous task beyond the walls of a few cities and towns.

The country people will resist, and with arms in their hands, mountains to fly to, and deserts to retire to in case of need, it is not difficult to foresee the result. The attempt, without adequate means, may bring his authority and his scanty troops into danger, and he appears to see and to dread very much the attempt.

He has now visited almost the whole of the country, but the same abuses and disorders continue to exist everywhere. He menaced the Arabs of the North, but the only reply he received was the intelligence of their having attacked 4 or 500 irregulars, beaten them, and of having pillaged the villages they protected.

From Orfa to El-Arish, the Bedoweens are making repeated and successful irruptions — and only a few days ago a section of the Annazec attacked the auxiliary Arabs of the Government which were supported by a large corps of irregular Cavalry, and completely routed them, killing 100 of the Turks and wounding about 200. The forces engaged on both sides exceeded 6000 horse; and it is problematical whether the local Government does possess the means of compelling the innumerable hordes that are ruining the country to fall back.

Such engagements occur every day and within 10 or 15 leagues of the largest cities.

Indeed, the authority of the Turks, as you are pleased to say, does not extend beyond the apartments of their Divans.

Notwithstanding all their protestations, they are not the less bent on kindling fanaticism, and you will be surprised to hear that Namik gave in to the feeling here and actually did endeavour to assist it as much as it depended on him, which I opposed, on the other hand, with equal determination, which brought about personal explanations, and finally an understanding between us. He was weak enough to confess the cause of his conduct — you may therefore easily infer what we are to expect from him.

Rest assured, I will consider your kind and interesting letter to be strictly confidential, which I hope you will do with *the present*.

Like yourself, I am anxious to keep as much as possible aloof from what is going forward, and to avoid offering an opinion or intermeddling in matters with which I am unconnected. For the present, this appears to me to be the only prudent course to pursue . . .

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL HERMAN^{*}

at London.

Private. Extract.

Bu yukdéré 30 June 1844.

I have to answer your kind letter of the 20 April.

With reference to Major Jackson's desire to have Count Stürmer's signature to a document in vindication of Sir Hudson Lowe's military and diplomatic mission at St. Helena, I believe the best means to ascertain the Internuncio's intention on the subject would be to let me have privately a copy of the draught, so that I may show to him the exact wording of the document

It would be also proper to know the names of the civil and military authorities who have signed or are going to sign the said document.

I think it highly creditable to Sir Hudson Lowe never to have *himself published* a single line on the subject. It would have been *below his dignity* to act otherwise.

Major Jackson's project, however, can only be approved of by every impartial person, and I shall be most happy if I can be the means of obtaining Count Stürmer's signature for him, but I think it would be useless to mention to His Excellency any thing of this matter until I know the precise nature of the demand.

I heard by the last Courier via Malta from my brother, who said that General Lieven and Mr. Hay had spent some days with him in Hamburgh. Our Arab horses continue to do very well. My fine mare here, however, died not long ago, but the foal I have obtained out of her will be a very valuable horse, being now about 27 months of age.

The Albanians have demanded, or rather some chieftains have demanded a written engagement from the Porte, ratifying the late promises of the Rumili Valissy, of the Serasker commanding the Corps d'armée of Albania and of some other Mushirs of provinces &c., but the Porte refuses to grant any document of the kind, which would be in fact an open acknowledgement that it has been worsted in its Albanian expedition, for it must be understood that the original object of the Divan was *not* to put down the insurrection, caused by certain military and administrative measures of its own, but to introduce those measures and regulations notwithstanding the insurrection

You will have seen from the papers that the Emperor of Russia has conferred the title of Highness on the Prince of Servia, and that this title has been recognized by the Sublime Porte, whilst at the same time pensions to the annual amount of 300 ducats each have been granted by the Emperor to three of the Ex-Ministers of the late Prince Michael, so that Russia appearing bent on conciliating both parties. I

^{*} Now Her British Majesty's Consul General at Tripolis, 1853.

should not be surprised at seeing permission granted to Wutchich and Petronowich for returning ultimately to Servia, after having duly expiated in exile their "pas d'écolier"¹

In this part of the world and in the emancipated or half-emancipated Turkish provinces, like Greece, Servia and the transdanubian principalities, political faith is unknown, and personal motives are alone the leading principles of public actions, so that the antecedents of chieftains are by no means a criterion for their future conduct.

The reports from Albania have been of late very contradictory, especially as to the causes which induced the provinces of middle Albania and some Macedonian districts to submit again abruptly to the Ottoman authorities after a display of means of resistance which might have led to expect a much more serious and bloody struggle.

So much is certain that the pacification of the revolted districts has not been brought about by merely military operations, neither strategical nor simply tactical, on the contrary the instructions to the Turkish local authorities have been to employ every means of persuasion and to grant concessions rather than to run the risk of a serious campaign, and altho' the Divan of Constantinople met the very serious remonstrances of some of the leading European Courts with assurances, that orders to attack the rebels had been sent to Head-Quarters at Monastir with a view to obtain the *absolute submission* of the Albanians, yet it was well known that the Rumili Valissy and other chief authorities offered terms to the rebels, amounting to positive promises of impunity for the past and of "*exemption*" from the conscription &c. &c. for the future.

To these terms most of the rebel chieftains, at least of those who had taken up arms against the conscription, could and did agree with readiness and with advantage to themselves, — for in this manner the question remains as it was before the insurrection of last autumn.

Albania thus remains exempt for the present at least from the conscription

54.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO ADMIRAL SIR B. WALKER
at London.

Buyukdéré 30 June 1844.

My dear Walker,

The note which Lady Walker was good enough to write to me at your kind request on the day when you left this, made up to some

¹ 22 August 1844. These chieftains obtained permission to return to Servia and left Constantinople for Belgrade on the 20 August.

degree the disappointment which I felt at not-seeing you at your departure.

I am in hopes to learn soon that the British Government has taken up your cause with warmth and energy, and I have no doubt that in this case your just and fair claims will be *enforced* on the Divan.

I say enforced, because common equity has not induced this Government to act properly, and the spirit of the present administration remains the same as you have known it, nor is it likely to change as long as the Sultana Valideh and the Ulema keep the leading influence.

The apparent concessions made to the demands or representations of Great Britain and other Powers have not altered the character nor the policy of the influential men of the Divan.

The Reis Effendi may give certain assurances in the renegade question, but the Ulema said aloud that in reality no concession has been made, because an apostate will be thrown in future into the bagnio, and the proof that this statement remains the accredited opinion, is that fanaticism which was at its height in the provinces, whilst lasted the discussion with the foreign Powers, subsides — at least to the usual level — on the solution of the question, that is as soon as the correspondence of the Ulema can reach the provinces.

In the same spirit a promise is made about a month ago to the representatives of the leading European Courts announcing that torture, lately revived, — is entirely to be defended and abolished, and the people who have made use of it are to be called to severe account, whilst the last gazette contains the promotion to the rank of Mushir (Pasha of three tails) of Abdullah Pasha of Trebizonde, who is precisely the functionary against whom, together with the Kaimakam of Koniah, complaints have been made for employing torture as a means to extort confession of real or supposed crimes.

I have thought it right to call your attention to these facts, because they show more or as much as most late occurrences the spirit of reaction¹ and subterfuge, which animates the leading Ministers here, and because I believe that the only effectual proceeding in your own case is to get from the British Government the promise to obtain *official redress* for you, and to demand it in *clear* and *precise* terms . . .

A. Jochmus.

¹ According to precise information of Prince Handjery torture or rather infliction of severe corporeal pain was resorted to in Constantinople by order of the Porte, immediately after the communication to the different legations of the above Memorandum. — The reason of the infliction of bodily pain a priori was the intention to elicit confession of crimes, not yet proved.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL HERMAN
at London.

Extract.

Buyukdéré 30 September 1844.

I beg to express my sincere thanks for your kind and interesting letter of the 20 August.

I met not long ago a reverend gentleman of some notoriety at a dinner party at the Ambassador, I mean no less a person than the author of "The Bible in Spain", Mr. Borrow.

Mr. de Cordoba was also of the party, and we had a long conversation in Spanish.

After dinner I was alone with Mr. Borrow, and I referred to that strange story in his book about a certain number of Moorish families living in Spain at the present day, some occupying high stations, — even in the church, — and all being outward Christians, but practising secretly the Mohamedan religion.

Mr. Borrow said that those details were true, but that by a mistake of his publishers "Moors and Mohamedan" had been printed instead of "Jews" and "Hebrew".

Mr. de Cordoba told me subsequently that he had heard related something of the kind about certain *Jewish* families, but never about *Moorish* people.

I mentioned to Mr. Borrow that I knew on the best authority, that the exact counterpart of what he had stated about Spain was related about Constantinople.

One day old Prince Caradja (late Governor of Walachia) was at the Greek Patriarch in Constantinople, when a venerable white-bearded Turk entered the hall and seated himself on the divan. The Patriarch soon afterwards made a sign to Prince Caradja, who on this withdrew to an adjoining apartment. After half an hour he was requested to return, and the Patriarch, on his demand, told him under the promise of secrecy that the old Turk was the Chief of a Christian community who, forced to abjure their faith at the conquest of Constantinople, had adopted the outward forms of Islam, but were in all the rest as fervent Christians as at the moment of their forced conversion. "This old man who (added the Patriarch) "has assumed for more security the green turban of a descendant of the Prophet, comes to me on a fixed day every year, receives my benediction, and gives it in my name to his followers in their nocturnal meetings.

Prince Caradja never revealed the secret as long as he was in Turkey, and kept it till some years ago when he communicated it to his relative Mr. Argyropulo shortly before his death.

I have heard here myself of a vague story about Christian meetings in subterraneous vaults at Constantinople and of the ineffectual attempts of the Turks to discover these haunts.

Mr. Borrow — who seems to have a peculiar turn of mind for the odd or marvelous, said that he was delighted, but by no means astonished to hear this story, since there were more mysteries in this world than most people were inclined to admit in our days.

The conversation about conversions in general led us to the great apostasy of the majority of the Bosnian nobility after the celebrated battle of Kossova in 1389, which cost the Bosnians &c. their independence and their faith.

I observed that such was the vivid recollection amongst them of this event and its consequences and of their former national and religious independence¹, that I had frequently heard of Bosnian and Albanian Spahis, threatened in their feudal privileges by the measures of the Porte, having declared or menaced that, rather than give up those privileges, they would serve and live under the Austrians or the Russians. — The fact is, said I to Mr. Borrow, that, "le cas échéant", I should not at all be astonished at seeing the Bosnians and many of the northern Albanians — (tho' they be generally considered as the main strength of the European Mussulmans) return to the religion of their forefathers and do in our days², what their ancestors did at the decisive moment after the battle of Kossova, that is keep their property and renounce their faith, rather than lose their temporal goods and remain firm in their religious belief. — "Very likely they would", said Mr. Borrow "and" added the reverend gentleman with a quaint squint of the eye: "I tell you some thing more, dear General, most other people in this world would do the same." — In his opinion perhaps a practical truth, tho' by no means a certainty, but undoubtedly a strange admission for a holy missionary of that pious body, the London Bible Society.

Mr. Borrow is come by land from Rustchuk to Constantinople, where he has been already 21 years ago. — He told me that his principal reason for crossing the Balkan was to find out the remains of a place called, I believe, Zingarikeni or Borrough (village) of the Gipsies, a mountain hold occupied by some of the principal Zingari of the East, and considered as their capital, and according to Mr. Borrow taken and destroyed by the Russians in the late war only after a tremendous

¹ In Bosnia, in the Herzegovina, and in many other districts and islands where the Christian population or part of the inhabitants have been converted to Islamism, it is an usual occurrence for Turks and Mussulmans to send to the Christian monasteries for the Greek papas or priests in order to have read by them the holy scripture and other sacred writings over their sick children or parents as a remedy against disease.

Old Chosrew Pasha told a still stranger thing to Mr. Argyropulo: Sultan Selim's mother was a converted Georgian, and as once her son Selim was very unwell shortly before his ascension to the throne, the Sultana sent for the Greek Patriarch Anthymos, who was much frightened at the unusual message in the middle of the night. However, having put on his full sacerdotal, he obeyed the summons, and having been with much precaution and secrecy ushered into the presence of the Sultana, he was requested by her in most affectionate terms to give his blessings to her suffering son.

slaughter. I confess, however, that I never heard before of this combat *pro aris et focis* of the Zingari in the campaign of 1828/29.

As I am speaking of travellers I must also tell you that we have here Mr. Catacasi, the late Russian Envoy in Greece, who is likely to remain at Constantinople during the winter. The Emperor has conserved him his title of "Conseiller Privé", and has granted him a pension of 4000 silver rubles or about 15,000 francs per annum

56.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO PATRICK COLQUHOUN

at London.

Extract.

Pera 30 November 1844.

In reference to my preceeding letter¹ I subjoin some observations on the general trade of this country, which I dare say will interest you, since the time is approaching when the first English tariff made after the Commercial Treaty of 1838 will expire, and since England as well as the European Powers will be most anxious to renew or rather remodel their tariffs, upon principles calculated to place their traders on as favorable a footing as the Russian merchants.

The attention of the British Government has been called long ago to the critical situation of their traders whenever they come in this country in competition with the Russian merchant, and Austria has of late sent to Turkey a special Commissioner, the Baron Geringen, who has visited the Danube, Constantinople, Brussa, Salonica, Smyrna &c. &c., in order to draw up a report on the trade of this country in general and on the Austrian trade in the Levant in particular. Austria has equally of late directed Colonel Birago to make a report on the navigation of the Danube and on the long projected canal from the head of the Danubian Delta to Kustendje.

Russia in her turn is also negotiating, and it is understood will *now* come into nearly or altogether the same terms as regulate since 1838 the trade of Turkey with the remaining nations of Europe; probably because otherwise the Foreign Powers whose tariffs expire in 1845 would claim advantages equal to those enjoyed by Russia, which would be a demand tantamount to the abrogation of the treaties of 1838 and hence to the re-establishment of monopolies.

In the meanwhile Russia has derived during six years immense political and commercial profits from her exclusive regulations with the Porte, and trade once turned into certain channels is apt to flow in them for a long while, even if privileges cease or are extended to numerous competitors.

¹ cfr. No. 46, 47.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL HERMAN
at London.

Extract.

Pera 31 December 1844.

The Turkish Government continue to persist in the idea of raising their army to 150,000 men¹

The Ministry and the Divan have experienced several changes during the last month.

The most important are the appointment of Shekib Effendi to be Minister of Foreign Affairs vice Rifaat Pasha; and of Soliman Pasha to be President of the Council vice Ahmet Fethi Pasha (the Sultan's brother in law).

Shekib was Ambassador in London, and as such signed the treaties of 1840 and 1841. — Later he made the exploit at Belgrade, concurring in the overthrow of Prince Michael Obrenowich.

Ahmet Fethi Pasha it appears got tipsy one day when the Sultan dined with the Pasha's wife (His Majesty's sister) and said — what was deemed by Riza Pasha indiscreet — many things about the foreign and interior policy of the Empire, and His Highness has therefore been pensioned with 30,000 piasters a month.

Sarim Effendi — the great liar — who gave to Sir Stratford Canning "tant de fil à retordre" in the Syrian affairs, goes to London as Ambassador, because he was of opinion that the military and naval establishments,² such as they are and more still such as they are projected, will be too expensive for the finances of the Empire, to which observation the Maliyé Naziri is said to have retorted that, if there were

¹ It is nothing unusual to see recruits for the army brought "*in chains*" to the depôt and even to Constantinople. —

² March 1845. A violent scene of insubordination has just occurred at the Head-Quarters of the Artillery at Tophana. — A soldier of Artillery had presented a petition to the Sultan on Friday last, on His Majesty's passage to the Mosque. The petition stated that undue charges were made to the soldiers for necessaries, and that their nominal monthly pay of twenty piasters was thus frequently reduced to next to nothing. The petitioner was arrested on his return to the barracks, but his comrades to the number of several hundred (mostly Albanians) came to his rescue and attacked the Colonel of the regiment, who was severely wounded. Mehemet Ali Pasha was obliged to escape from the barracks.

² According to an official return of the beginning of this year the naval force of Turkey is computed at:

15 Line-of-battle Ships	} together 89,239 tons of shipping, 2832 guns, 918 officers, 26,500 marines and sailors,
16 Frigates	
8 Corvettes	
11 Brigs	
5 Sloops	
6 Steamers	
5 small Steamers	

but of the Line-of-battle Ships and Frigates only half the numbers quoted are seaworthy and could get out of harbour, and the whole number of sailors and marines does not exceed 12,000, instead of the 26,500 on paper. — There is only

a deficit, it could easily be made up by doubling the Karatch paid by the "Rayahs."

Sir Stratford Canning has successfully and with much moderation terminated the late affair of Trebizonde. — Abdullah Pasha¹ had ordered the British Dragoman of the Trebizonde Consulate to be thrown out of doors, and afterwards wanted the Consul "par force" to take pipes and coffee, as if nothing had happened. — This Pasha has been severely reprimanded and is to receive in state the Consul and his Dragoman and to return the visit to the Consul. — The Greek under British protection at Trebizonde who has been bastinadoed, "en est pour ses coups", because it appears that the Turkish authorities can prove that he is a Rayah born, who procured *false* papers from some Greek Consul or another. This, however, tho' it for the present has prevented the Ambassador from demanding more ample satisfaction, does not excuse the intention and action of Abdullah Pasha, who at the time thought that he was bastinadoing a British protégé from mere spite against the Consul.

But this affair involves a question of some magnitude, viz how far Russian, English, and French Agents can protect, under the transactions of 1832, bona fide subjects of King Otho, in places where there are no Greek Consuls; — and it is possible that the Trebizonde outrage may bring on a clear understanding on this head, when the case shall have been considered in the proper quarters.²

There are many other complaints against Abdullah Pasha, but as he is rich and has not spared his presents and bakshishes, he has weathered the storm.

His first dispatch about the affray with the Consul was addressed to Riza Pasha in the form of a fair Circassian, worth 40,000 piasters. — She arrived precisely in the same steamer that brought the Consular complaints, but the Pasha very wisely did not mention the quarrel and remained on the defensive.

Speaking of Circassians I will state in reply to your question about the Caucasian war, that I think you are quite right in considering the newspaper's reports about victories of Shamil Bey as extremely exaggerated. They do not spare with the recompenses bestowed by the Emperor on his army operating against the mountaineers — and the

one Man-of-war Steamer, the remaining are packets. — The whole of this naval force is in a most inefficient state for active service, and would certainly not be a match for 3 or 4 first rate British Line-of-battle Ships.

¹ Abdullah Pasha is a man of most ferocious character. — Not long ago two Mussulmans had murdered a Cadi, and being convicted of the crime, the Pasha instead of having them publicly executed gave them up to the family of the murdered Cadi, and some of the latter's relatives stabbed the two murderers to death by inflicting on them numberless wounds with small knives. This horrible scene took place in the Bazar of Trebizonde. — The Porte has given to this Pasha as a special regulation power over life and death.

² Sir Stratford Canning told me that in common with the Russian Minister and the French Chargé d'Affaires he had referred this special question to the decision of the respective Courts.

Emperor is not a man to bestow orders and swords of honour on beaten Generals, only with the view temporarily to deceive public opinion. I believe His Majesty rather would be prone to disregard than to court the venal opinions of the daily press.

The Russians *here* don't care nor speak about victories or defeats in the Caucasus, and as the mountaineers who occasionally arrive at Constantinople, only go by reports from the distant theatre of war, and are besides known to be nearly as great boasters and liars as the Russians themselves, it is extremely difficult to form an opinion of the result of this year's campaign.

From all that I can collect in the shape of information, I should be led to conclude that the Russian columns have entered rather deeply the mountains of Daghestan, destroying every thing which could not be removed or burnt by the mountaineers themselves, who retired before the Russians until they came to impenetrable fastnesses, whereupon the Imperial army, giving up an useless pursuit, began its retrograde movement, and the troops were of course as usual in an obstinate mountain warfare severely harrassed in their retreat towards their original basis of operations.

The amount of loss in men and field equipage is of course extremely difficult to ascertain, but no serious impression seems to have been made on the bulk of the Imperial troops.

In a general military point of view I should say that even in a drawn Caucasian campaign the advantage of forming practised officers and troops is greater than the disadvantage of losing a certain proportion of men, train, and field equipage.¹

What an army formed in the difficult war of the Caucasus *can* perform on an easier theater of action, Marshal Paskewich has shown in the Persian and Turkish campaigns which ended by the taking of Erivan, Kars, and Erzroum.

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¹ 17 January 1845. Prince Roman Sangusko, who served as a private soldier in the Russian armies of the Caucasus until he was pardoned by the Emperor and promoted to the rank of an officer, gave me his opinion that the mountain tribes of the Caucasus cannot resist the arms of Russia in the long run. "Ce n'est qu'une question de temps et de sacrifices plus ou moins considérables, mais l'issue de la lutte ne peut pas être douteuse." Such were that nobleman's words.

Prince Sangusko was implicated in the Polish insurrection of 1831 and cannot even now be considered as a friend of Russia, but hence his opinion is the more entitled to credit.

The estates of Prince Sangusko fell back to his family, when he was pardoned by the Emperor.

December 1845. According to Prince Wittgenstein, who accompanied the Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt in the expedition of Dargo, the loss of the Russians did not exceed 2500 men killed and wounded out of 11,000 men and 16 field-pieces under Count Woronzow. (Prince Wittgenstein [eldest son of the Prince August of Wittgenstein-Berleburg, late President of the Ministry under the Archduke John of Austria] is now a Colonel in the Russian service and distinguished himself at *Kars* 1855.)

1845



LORD PONSONBY TO PATRICK COLQUHOUN.

(Sent by the latter to General Jochmus.)

London 1 February 1845.

My dear Sir,

Peers have not the right to give orders for admission to the House of Lords when the Queen is there present. — The right is in the Lord Great Chamberlain, Lord Willoughby de Eresby — I regret to say that I have already applied for three tickets, and have only obtained a part of my demand, so that I am sure I have not the power to do what you wish.

I thank you for Jochmus' letter (which I enclose), I am much interested on his fortunes and I am sure that it would be a happy thing for those Syrians you mention, and advantageous for the Porte, that Jochmus should be employed to govern them.

Is Baron Behr certain of Stürmer's words? — The Count approved of the plan formerly agreed on with the Porte for the administration of Syria, and which was never carried into effect, but was defeated through the prevalence of personal interests, and jealousies of various persons; I fear the same sort of feelings would prevent the success of a plan for putting Jochmus in power, but I am inclined to think times are not unlikely to come, when the Porte, at least, will feel it to be its interest to employ the General *in great affairs*, and I hope he will remain in such a position in Turkey as will continue to make him available for such purpose.

Turkey will have something to pursue or to escape from, for Greece must occasion confusion. — If the Powers of Europe would attend to their own affairs and state interests, and leave off meddling with the internal business of other Kingdoms, there would be somewhat less mischief in the world.

Pray remember me to Jochmus, and also present Lady Ponsonby's compliments to him! — I will always do every thing I can, to be of use to the General *here*, but you know that in the present state of

affairs, and in the position I am, the probability is that I should do him harm by any thing I might attempt with the intention of being serviceable — I wish he would speak to Sir Stratford! I think his reason for *holding back* from the Ambassador is not good.

I have the honour to be, my dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully

Ponsonby.

59.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO PATRICK COLQUHOUN

at London.

Extract.

Pera 28 February 1845.

The Kurds and Arabs continue their depredations on the territories of the Pasha of Mossul.

In the Pashalik of Jerusalem the people of Naplous and the robber chieftains of Abugosh are the causes of continual petty disorders, and paralyse the action of the central Government.

Yet notwithstanding the insecurity of labour and industry, which naturally arises from such a state of things, the residence in the southern parts of Syria seems to be considered as a blessing and a paradise to the poor Egyptian Fellah, crushed under the taxation of Mehemet Ali Pasha.¹

Count Stürmer told me that according to the reports of his agents thousands of Fellahs have deserted again of late from Egypt into Syria to the great annoyance of the old Pasha, who is now too powerless to recommence a Syrian campaign like that against Abdullah Pasha of Acre for exactly the same cause, the desertion of the Egyptian Fellahs² into Syria.

The loss of his army and of the greatest part of his Artillery in 1840/41, the annihilation of his fleet by the dry rot, the scourge of pestilence amongst the cattle of Egypt, and finally the desertion of the Fellahs are, in my opinion, the true causes of the submissive behaviour of the old Pasha, much more than any real moderation of character.

Lord Ponsonby used to say: "if we leave to Mehemet Ali the *power* to do mischief, *he* will find the *means* to make it".

¹ Under the authority of their respective Kaimakams and not under the "direct" controul of the Pasha of Saïda.

² According to a dispatch of Colonel Barnett to Sir Stratford Canning the most violent means are employed to keep the Fellahs to their labour. Several thousand Fellahs who remaining in Egypt had fled from their villages, have been taken up again and sent back in chains, followed by their wives and children. The total number of persons thus forcibly restored of late to the work of the fields is estimated by the Consul General at twelve thousands souls.

Reduced to inanity the old man seems to have turned his mind to the making of money, and hence his inclination to favor the Anglo-Indian transit and general commercial policy and his forced preference of English to French interests, the one being commercial and the other merely political. Now Mehemet Ali is descended from the political stage and has ceased the representations of the "*Arab nationality*."

The Hattisheriff read at the Sublime Porte on the 12 January last has produced a considerable sensation in Europe, altho' at the time of its publication the Turks themselves did not seem inclined to attach any real importance to that remarkable document, and considered it rather as a show got up to prove that the Sultan himself governed the Empire and not this or that Minister.

Hence the composition or the wording of the Hat was contradictory attributed to Omer Effendi, the Sultan's Choja (and supposed to have been gained by Riza Pasha's secret or open *adversaries*), or to Soliman Pasha, the new President of the Council, a *protégé* of Riza Pasha.

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60.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL HERMAN

at London.

Extract.

Pera 30 March 1845.

The Sultan's late Hattisheriff has been followed up by three decrees: the first ordering two delegates, one a Mussulman and one a Rayah (at the choice of the governing Pasha) to be sent to Constantinople from each province in order to discuss the wants of the interior administration of the Empire; the second decree instituting a commission of public instruction composed of four Ulemas and of four other functionaries of the Empire, the whole under the presidency of Abdul Kadi Bey (a Sudur or Chief of the Ulemas); the third Imperial order appoints a general commission of police.

All three decrees are evidently the result of a system of policy less retrograde than the reactionary administration of the late years, and they seem principally calculated to conciliate, together with the Hattisheriff itself, the opinions of the European Cabinets. The severe language of England and the strong admonitions of Austria together with the general news from Europe seem to have induced the Divan to reconsider maturely the precarious position into which Turkey has been brought by the *antichristian* frenesia of some amongst the leading men and principal Ministers of the Empire.

It has been observed with some truth that the liberal influences gain ground in the Seraglio in exact proportion as the *exclusive* favor diminishes in which Riza Pasha was held by the Sultan.

There can be no doubt that since some months the Sultan must have listened to other opinions than to the exclusive advice of his formerly *sole* favorite, but I am inclined to think from what personally I have seen and known of Riza Pasha, that he is not a fanatic by persuasion.¹

If the present Ministry of which he is the centre has been till lately retrograde, I attribute this fact less to Riza's personal feelings than to the necessity of his following the strong impulse given to the administration of the last four years by the representatives of the ultra-conservative Mussulmans who had seen the whole fabric of Mahometan legislation and perhaps the existence — of the Empire menaced by the dissolving pseudo-liberal principles of Reshid Pasha's Ministry, which caused the Sultan's authority to be completely disregarded in nearly every part of his dominions. Such was the tottering state of things when in 1841 Izzet Mehmed Pasha, a man of ferocious, tho' not ungenerous mind and a Minister with an iron hand, restored obedience in most parts of the Empire.

His success — which hastened his own fall because he wanted perhaps to go to extremes, gave such strength to the ultra-orthodox and Mussulman influences that these have ever since domineered in the councils of the Porte, until a new reaction in the liberal sense caused the publication of the late Hattisheriff. As for Riza Pasha and his colleagues, they like the great number of Ottoman functionaries attach more value to favor and to place than to principles and systems of administration, if the term "system" can be at all applied to a government and delegates who live "au jour le jour", balloted between the fear of internal revolts and the apprehensions of external complications.

Whatever may be the *practical* results of the Hattisheriff and the subsequent decrees, the courtiers of the Seraglio will not appear any longer quite antichristian.

The Hekim Baschi dexterously got the lead and appeared one fine evening at the Opera. — Fancy one of the turbaned Ulemas in a box "aux Italiens de Péra."

Both Riza Pasha and Mehemet Ali of Tophana took the hint and renounced for a few hours the enjoyment of the pipe for a "Ghiam" spectacle!

The latter you know is the proclaimed bridegroom of the young Sultana Adliè

¹ Riza Pasha was brought up in the school of Sultan Mahmoud, and as late as 1839 was one of the confidential secretaries of Sultan Mahmoud.

Lord Ponsonby used to communicate frequently with the Sultan, through the medium of Riza Bey. His promotion to the rank of Pasha was one of the first acts of Sultan Abdul Meshid, who followed therein the will of his dying father. The latter had found Riza selling tobacco in a shop of the great Bazar of Constantinople, and was there struck by the handsome face and gentle appearance of the young boy.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL CHURCHILL

at Beyroul (Syria).

Private. Extract.

Pera 17 April 1845.

In your last letter you were kind enough to promise me some details on the recruiting operations of Namik Pasha, and also on the formation of some new Rediff corps in several towns of Syria.

I shall feel much obliged for any information of this kind, even if partial, as it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find out here what is going on really in Syria and in the other provinces.

The object of the secrecy and distrust of the Government is the desire to cause the military forces of the Empire to be overrated by foreign Powers.

The military mission in Turkey of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams¹ and of Lieutenant Dickson² is at an end. The former, however, remains for the present at Arzroum in his diplomatic capacity of Queen's Commissioner for the Persian negotiations, which are still open.

I have seen the famous Dr. Wolff at the English and at the Russian palaces here, but his sermons as well as what he calls his lectures have singularly fallen off since his last stay in Constantinople.

I do not know if — *for his interest* — I shall wish him or not a speedy recovery of his full intellect, for I verily believe that he is now just the man for the saints and mystics in England.

Never in my life have I heard greater nonsense than his absurdities about the Millenium, which is to begin in 1847 and to be in its full blossom — according to the calculations of scriptural prophecies — in the year of our Lord 1868.

He maintained that according to the scriptures Jerusalem ought to be levelled with the ground before the beginning of the Millenium, id est 1847, and that armies from the four cardinal points of the world would march to annihilate the sinful city.

Upon which I observed to him that, if such were really the holy prophecies, it might not be amiss to begin the leveling of the *walls* at least of Jerusalem already now, since they were the strongest and best built in Syria and in perfect repair, for it would certainly take 18 months to destroy them to the ground and, except an earthquake came to help the workmen, I even thought it difficult to accomplish the task at so short a notice.

As for armies from the four cardinal points, I ventured to express my opinion as a military man that instead of them a very moderate military force would be sufficient to take the town of Jerusalem, for the

¹ 1855. Now General Williams.

² 1855. Now Brigadier-General Dickson, commanding the Artillery of the Turkish contingent under General Vivian.

Pasha of the place was no engineer, skilful in defenses, nor did the garrison amount to more than a few hundred indifferent Nizam troops.

This conversation happened at Madame de Titow's *soirée*, and the next day the old Doctor told me at the English Embassy that I certainly had been hard upon him, but that after all I was not so great an unbeliever as the Baron Behr, the Belgian Minister, who I confess defeated the Doctor that same evening most dreadfully in a dogmatical controverse.

The Doctor was accompanied on his leaving Bokhara by a *soi-disant* Ambassador to England, to whom the Emir or Khan of Bokhara had given one hundred and fifty pounds Sterling for his expenses to London and home.

The Pasha of Trebizonde fired a salute when this personage arrived, but refused to pay his passage on board the steamer to Constantinople. — It was with great difficulty that the captain of the Austrian steamer could be induced to take His Excellency as a deck passenger, on account of the filth of his wardrobe, the only decent piece of dress he wore being a shawl, which he had taken actually by force from the head of poor Doctor Wolff, when the latter was at his mercy in the desert.

Mr. Sheil at Teheran and Sir Stratford Canning here have signified to this Ambassador that he won't be received in London on account of the murder of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly.

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62.

GENERAL JOCHIMUS TO COLONEL HERMAN

at London.

Extract.

Buyukdéré 1 May 1845.

I have to answer your letter of the 19 March

I have not neglected your demands about the communications between Kustendje and Czernavoda.

Count Stürmer has promised me to write without delay to Vienna in order to obtain all necessary information both in a scientific and political point of view, and I expect that I shall be able to write to you fully on the subject by the next courier.

If I am not mistaken the opinion of Colonel von Birago, the highest authority on engineering in Austria, is favorable to the enterprise, and he holds

"that the art of the engineer has overcome much greater obstacles than those which would be encountered on the line between Czernavoda and Kustendje in the operations of cutting and nourishing a canal."

Austria, I should expect, would facilitate by every means in her power an enterprise of this nature, but the financial and political conceptions of the Divan are sometimes so extravagant and absurd that I will not answer for the resolutions of the Turkish Government, altho' the undertaking would be at least as important and useful for Turkey as for Austria.

However, some thousand pounds as a pot de vin and some backshishes would smoothen down many difficulties.

Is it not ridiculous to be obliged to say that bribery must be probably resorted to in order to engage people to have good done to themselves and to their country;¹ — but you will recollect the negotiations of Lord Ponsonby regarding certain coal mines in Asia Minor, which were frustrated because some crafty Armenians desirous of monopolising the mines — tho' they had no sufficient means to work them — had insinuated to the Turks that the English wanted the mines — not for the extraction of coal but for building a *subterraneous* fortress.

Speaking of Armenians in Turkey there is perceptible a great religious movement amongst them, and many are going over to the Protestant church.

I believe they have in view by this change as much their *temporal* as their *eternal* welfare, for many of them imagine that by changing religion they also change their quality of Turkish Rayahs for quasi British protégés, and I strongly suspect that the American and other Protestant missionaries are not overanxious to destroy their illusion, tho' an aberration of this kind brought on ten thousand Armenians a most violent persecution in the time of Pertew Effendi, who had their property confiscated and themselves exiled into Asia Minor for their having gone over to the Roman Catholic religion and recognized the spiritual authority of "le porc qu'on appelle le pape", as the Reis Effendi said in an official proclamation of the times.

Catholic protection² not having served them much, the Armenians now make an appeal to sympathizing Protestants, which most probably will be of little more avail with regard to the security of their piasters and paras, altho' it may further their spiritual felicity.

How ever this may be, such is the present violence of party and religious feelings amongst the Armenians that their clergy refused bury-

¹ General Baron Lieven observed during his stay at Constantinople to a friend of mine: "Il n'y a qu'une manière de traiter avec les Turcs, il faut dans une main tenir l'argent et leur montrer de l'autre le bâton."

² In Tokat, Arzroum, Trebizonde, and other places the Armenians who have of late passed over to the Catholic creed are violently persecuted by the Turkish authorities at the instigation of their former coreligionists, even those whose conversion dates many years back. In several instances they have been forced to return to the Armenian church, in other exile and confiscation of property has been their lot. Strange to say the Turks themselves work thus for an extension of spiritual and temporal power of the Armenian Patriarch of Etschmiazin in Russia, but then they always find some pecuniary advantages in the persecution and spoliation of the Armenians accused of conversion.

ing an Armenian woman who died a short time ago at Trebizonde, because her husband and her friends had been occasionally "visiting" the Protestant missionaries. — The matter being referred to the Pasha, this grave functionary ordered the body to be buried in an old abandoned "Greek" churchyard, and this was going to be done when the Greek clergy remonstrated, until the Pasha directed — probably to his great inward satisfaction — that the relative of such refractory parents should be buried by the side of the highroad, near a precipice which was pointed out as a proper place of repose for the deceased heretic.

I hear that the Patriarch of Etschmiazin, appaled perhaps at the spirit of rebellion amongst his flock, is not unlikely to visit Asia Minor and probably also Constantinople,¹ a piece of intelligence which is by no means to the taste of the Divan, already jealous of the intimate relations between the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople and his spiritual chief residing at Etschmiazin (in the *Russian* province of Erivan).

¹ The Divan has some most likely unfounded apprehensions of a connexion between this visit of the Armenian Patriarch and the projected excursion of the Grand Duke Constantine to the Black Sea and to Constantinople. — Various changes prescribed by the Patriarch have of late taken place in the discipline of the Armenian churches in Turkey, such as permission to eat fish during the lent, defense on the contrary to eat eggs on the eve of Easter Sunday, further suppression of the Armenian Kalpack for the clergy and adoption of a headdress and an arrangement of the hair which bears a striking resemblance to the headdress of the Russian-Greek clergy. — All these changes are as many steps which approach the Armenian to the Greek church, and in the fanatic Christian communities of the East the importance of these innovations may be measured by the fact that a most violent animosity exists between the Greek and Catholic Christians of the Lebanon, on account of a pretended imitation, made by the Catholic priests of the Greek headdress. — The Porte has published an article in the "Moniteur" which, omitting the regulations about lent, denies the imitation of the Russian headdress by the Armenian priests, but the Porte must know perfectly well that the fact is true, for the Armenian priests in Turkey have not adopted, as is pretended to be contradicted, the headdress of the *Russian-Armenian* clergy, but the headdress and cut of the hair of the *Russian-Greek* clergy; a matter of more importance, since it is an approach to the unity of the eastern churches. — Mr. Vlachoutzis some three or four years ago had already been initiated in similar negotiations between the Armenian and Greek churches, but the Patriarch of Constantinople made at the time considerable difficulties in consequence of which the negotiations were suspended. Russia proceeds with great caution in her bona fide protection of the Armenians, and acts chiefly on their most wealthy and influential bankers who, besides being agents of the Pashas of Turkey, constitute the administrative council of the Armenian community. — This council is reproached since many years with acts of sordid iniquity, but as the Porte goes in this case on the principle of "laissez aller", the lower classes of the Armenians are at a loss to whom to appeal for redress. — It is thus that amongst the poorer classes the Protestant missionaries have succeeded in making numerous converts, but when the illusion about the temporal and substantial benefits of the conversion will be dissipated, it may happen at Constantinople that the Armenians do what their Greek brethren did from similar motives at Hasbeya in Syria: they may return to the belief of their fathers. — At Aleppo an union of the Armenian and the Greek church has since formally taken place under the auspices of the Russian Consul there.

What right have we to complain of Turkish barbarity and fanaticism, even of such odious scenes as those of Damietta, when Christian sectarians are as blind and bigotted as the most fanatic Mussulmans, and when want of power alone prevents them from following up their persecutions?

Pera has been alarmed not long ago by a report that the plague had made its appearance amongst its devoted inhabitants, but fortunately the medical men soon convinced themselves that the symptoms of the disease which caused there the death of a child, had not the characteristics of the much feared contagion.

The rumour, however, caused the more consternation, as the news had previously arrived that a caravan of Mekka pilgrims had forced the quarantine at Adana, notwithstanding an Imperial Firman ad hoc read to them by the Pasha of Adana, supported by a detachment of Nizam troops, who, however, doubted if it was lawful to stop, and much more to detain by force the "*holy men*" coming from the Prophet's shrine.

The Council of quarantine declared upon the reception of this intelligence that they could no longer deliver clean bills of health for Constantinople, and immediately orders were given by the Porte, as a show of authority, to dismiss the Pasha of Adana, and to submit all pilgrims to a forced quarantine of 15 days, and a refractory Mollah who had been their ringleader, to three times fifteen days by way of punishment.

The Constantinople and Smyrna newspapers were even ordered to announce that all pilgrims who had broken the quarantine laws, should be brought prisoners, and I believe, in chains to Constantinople.

To the amazement of the "*badauds*", however, but as it was expected by all who know the true bearing and value of visarial orders, the first badge of pilgrims arrived quietly on the 25 last from Smyrna in the French steamer, and went without the slightest molestation to pay a visit to their houses and harems.

Since the latter years of Sultan Mahmoud's reign the streets and public places in and near Constantinople are kept clean, and to this amelioration much more than to the quarantine regulations must be attributed the absence of the plague.

However, in and for the capital itself and in Smyrna the quarantine board may have done a great deal as unquestionably the plague has been kept confined several times in the lazarettos, but I am persuaded that generally speaking in the provinces the quarantine stations have done little or no good, being the refugium peccatorum of all nations.

The cordons kept by such people are a complete deception and unfortunately a very expensive one, both from the direct outlay and from the obnoxious disturbances caused to trade, industry, and agriculture.

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GENERAL JOCHMUS TO PATRICK COLQUHOUN

at London

Confidential. Extract.

Buyukdéré 23 May 1845.

The state of the Lebanon is worse than ever since 1841, — the Maronites plunder and destroy with fire and sword the Druse property, and vice versa the Druses pillage and sack the Maronite villages. — The worst feature in the affair is that the Maronites have not hesitated to attack a detachment of irregular Turkish troops, who made a mien to support the Druses.

The Turkish Government tries to conceal this latter fact, but it is not the less true for that.

Essad Pasha had been superseded by Vehidgi Pasha, late Governor General of Aleppo, before the civil war broke out in the Lebanon. Vehidgi has had immediately a violent altercation with Colonel Rose, who menaced to strike his Consular flag, and who had already written a letter to the Sardinian Consul, by which he placed the British subjects under Sardinian protection when the matter was temporarily made up and referred for decision to Constantinople.

The Divan has assigned no ostensible cause for the recall of Essad Pasha, but one of the reasons seems to be that he has been unable to recover the arrears due by the district of Tripoli, and most likely that he was too upright in his general dealing.

On the other hand the Ottoman Government has never paid the indemnity promised to the Maronites for the Druse war, nor have the Druses been obliged to pay their share of the indemnity.

Badfaith has been at the bottom of all the internal transactions in the Lebanon ever since 1841, and Turks, Druses, and Maronites have been and are striving to outdo and to deceive each other.

The policy of the Divan is to tire out the patience of the Foreign Powers, in order to make them acquiesce in the Government of the Lebanon by a Turkish Pasha.

If ever the Porte should agree to my nomination as Governor General of the Lebanon, it would be with a latent hope of coming thereby a step nearer to this its ultimate object.

I happened just to pay a visit to Count Stürmer soon after he received his last dispatches from Syria, and he told me at once:

“If now the Porte will appoint you Governor General of the Lebanon, I shall be the first to give my voice for this arrangement.”

From the circumstance that Mr. de Klezl, “*Conseiller de Legation*” was present when the Internuncio said this, and from what formerly occurred between Count Stürmer and Baron Behr in this question, I

conclude that the Internuncio has communicated on the subject with Prince Metternich, and that the arrangement would be eventually supported from Vienna, but I should conceive that Count Stürmer has hitherto received *no instructions* to "*propose*" it himself.

I do not believe that Russia would oppose *my* nomination in Syria, but I have heard that Mr. de Titow is adverse to the appointment of a *Turkish* Pasha.

The influence of France is not much to be considered, for the Turks are aware of the machinations of the Catholic party in the Lebanon, who have always been intriguing with France and the Pasha of Egypt.

If a proof were required of the hollowness of French influence, it might be found in the affair of Mossul, in which not one of the promises made to the French Ambassador by the Divan has been bona fide executed.

64.

COLONEL CHURCHILL TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received 8 June 1845.)

Extract.

Beyrout 2 June 1845.

The state of this province is about as deplorable as its worst enemy could desire. A civil war has broken out between the Druses and Maronites, which, after having lasted for about 3 weeks, has left the country inhabited by the mixed population of Druses and Maronites, a complete desert, with the exception of a very small part, to which the ravage of war has not extended.

It has been calculated that upwards of 150 villages have been entirely burnt, and that property to the amount of at least half a million of pounds has been destroyed. The greater portion of the silk crop has fallen a prey to the flames. The people say that so complete a calamity has never befallen Mount Lebanon since it became a part of the Ottoman Empire.

And I can well believe it. What the actual condition of the country is, he who runs may read — what its future fate may be, the wisest would hesitate to conjecture — the past alone is open to our contemplation and merits our scrutiny.

What then we may ask, have been the proximate causes of the present state of affairs. These have been two — the incapability, or as harsher judges boldly affirm, the wicked policy of the Turkish local authorities, and the restless ambition of the Maronite leaders, laic and clerical. The latter of these two causes I should have placed first.

The Maronite leaders have for many months past been avowedly organizing a system of resistance to the plan of Government which the European Powers had devised for the Mountain; and the customary alms subsidies sent to them by France and Austria have been by them unhesitatingly converted into the sinews of war. Open rebellion against the Porte they dared not declare — anarchy and misery in their own province, this it was in their power to create, and most effectually have they done so. Their object and their hope has been to conquer and subdue the Druses, imagining that by defeating them they would defeat the councils which admitted the Druse *Mokatajes* to a share of political power. Such was their policy, but how largely hatred and revenge entered into their plans of aggression against the Druses, so vastly inferior to them in point of numbers, so immeasurably their superiors in point of courage, prudence, and skill, both militarily and politically, I will not attempt to say.

I *could* write a chapter on the history of Syria beginning with the year 1841 and ending with the present period (or rather on the history of the affairs of the Lebanon) which, dealing in plain authenticated facts alone, would challenge the verdict of any *European*, putting an Englishman out of the question — but such is not my province, and I am writing you a letter, not a political chronicle.

Suffice it to say, at present, that the Maronite leaders have been completely discomfited in their hopes, and that their unfortunate dupes are now fugitives and vagabonds, depending, with their families, upon charity, to the amount of at least 20,000 souls, who have fled or emigrated from the southerly districts of the “Shoof” and the “Arkoob”.

I will not accuse the Turkish authorities of fomenting the elements of discord — they required no fomenting — but I do accuse them of *wilfully* neglecting to repress those disorders which, months ago, in the shape of murders and assassination of weekly and daily occurrence, gave sufficient demonstration that a calamity of dark and deadly hue was gathering foot over the country.

My own conviction is, that they could have repressed them, but they did not choose to do so. If they show themselves weak and incapable, it is because they choose to appear so, to compass about some latent plan of their own.

What an amount of misery has all this folly and wickedness brought upon this province — half a century will barely repair the mischief which has been done in 3 weeks! Every one has his theory and plan, and there are as many quack-statesmen as there are quack-doctors, and for fear of coming under the latter denomination, I will not trouble you with my opinion.

I do not venture to affirm that I take no interest in the affairs of Syria, or more, that I have no ambition to take a part in them. I confess that I have both these feelings, but whether the ebullition of these feelings will be, with the pen or the sword in my hand, time and circumstances can alone decide

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL HERMAN

at London.

Extract.

Buyukdéré 14 June 1845.

You will have received my letter of the 1 May¹ nearly immediately after you wrote to me on the 20 of the same month, and I have now to add to my communications about the subject of a railroad between Kustendje and Czernavoda, that the further information received from Vienna confirms completely my former views on the question, and these latter may be resumed as follows:

1. The technical obstacles according to the best authorities in Austria can be overcome by moderate exertions and expenses.

2. The political difficulties are perhaps of a more serious, at any rate of a more tedious character.

3. The nature and extent of those difficulties can be best ascertained at Vienna, and the diplomatic negotiations ought at *least to be begun* there under the auspices of Prince Metternich.

4. If it is your intention to come to Constantinople, you ought at any rate to pass thro' Vienna, there to be introduced to Prince Metternich, thro' the British Ambassador, or if it is your plan to come to this country accompanied by a civil engineer who is to report on local details of the ground between Kustendje and Czernavoda, then a special agent ought to treat the diplomatic part of the business simultaneously at Vienna, where the presence of the Turkish Ambassador might be turned to account, provided he can be brought to act *fairly* according to the advice of Prince Metternich

I consider the promises of Sarim Effendi as worth nothing. He is a person on whom no reliance can be placed, and I am *not alone* of this opinion. Depend on nothing what Sarim says or promises, all acts founded on his assurances are as many "coups d'épée dans l'eau."²

If you succeed in the whole enterprise, or if there is only a fair chance for success, you ought to press on Lord Aberdeen the demand of employment at Jassy.

Jassy would be excellent headquarters for you during the execution of the canal, for much of the material for the construction of the canal would be drawn from Moldavia and Walachia.

¹ vide No. 62.

² Words of Count Stürmer.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO PATRICK COLQUHOUN

at London.

Private. Extract.

Buyukdéré 30 June 1845.

I think now that it will be of some interest for you to read the enclosed extract of a letter from a friend of mine, who has been long a resident in Syria, and who is especially well acquainted with what has happened of late in the Lebanon.

The consequences which I have pointed out to you in my former letters, as likely to arise from the conflict of the different authorities in the Lebanon, have befallen that country even sooner than I expected, and I am afraid that also the present pause in the hostilities arise much more from partial exhaustion than from a return of good will and a spirit of reconciliation amongst the contending parties.

It will most likely remain a matter of dispute and of useless re- crimination to know who — if the Druses or if the Christians — have been the aggressors in the present civil war.¹ — The writer of the letter which I transcribe, opines that the Maronites have been the offenders, but many amongst the “Corps diplomatic” here maintain that the Druses made the first attack on a Maronite convent. So much seems certain, and all people here and in Syria appear to agree in the one point that the Turkish local authorities in the Lebanon have *not* done all that might have been tried to *prevent* the civil war, and the departure from Beyrout of Halil Pasha with the whole of the naval forces, at the very moment of the outbreak of hostilities, certainly authorizes a doubt whether himself and Vehidgi Pasha did not view with inward satisfaction or at least with indifference a renewal of the intestine war.²

The Naplousians and the robber chieftains of Abugosh set at defiance the authority of the Pashas of Acre and Jerusalem, and in Jaffa and in Saïda a rising of the Mussulmans against the Christians has been put down with the greatest difficulty. The Consuls General have protested against the conduct of Vehidgi Pasha.

The Porte has exiled the old Emir Beshir and the Christian member of his family from Constantinople to Viranshehr

¹ *September 1845.* The Parliamentary Papers on Syria 1843/1845 leave no doubt that the Maronites were the first to prepare for war — and to acknowledge their hostile intentions. The Patriarch distributed money for the purchase of arms and ammunition, and the clergy as well as the faction of the Shehabs and the intrigues of the Archbishop Murad kindled the civil war. — The occasions for the actual outbreak were as often quite accidental. In 1841 the occasion was a quarrel about a partridge, in 1845 a quarrel about some cockchaffers, but the very futility of the *cause* shows the intensity of the mutual *animosities*.

² Colonel Rose states that Vehidgi Pasha, like Selim Pasha in 1841, received from the Druses a large share of their booty and Christian spoils (Parliamentary Papers).

It has come to my certain knowledge that in the beginning of this month the Divan has discussed the propriety of the measure of sending me to Syria.

The discussion has been secret, but a preliminary order has been given by Riza Pasha to the Mustechar at the War-Office to transfer my name to the payroll of the Syrian army. When I had sent about 10 days ago for my monthly pay, my orderly sergeant, who of course could know nothing of the above discussion at the Porte, told me that there had been 24 hours' delay in the payment of my "check", because, instead of receiving the money at the usual office, he had been obliged to pass thro' four or five bureaux (new to him) in consequence of an order from the Mustechar, who had written on my monthly receipt "Arabistan urdussi ustende jazeshak, *to be borne on the strength of the army of Syria.*"

I have heard nothing officially of the whole affair, and I am inclined to believe that *only in an extreme case* will the Porte act up to these preliminary arrangements.

The extreme case may be: very bad news from Syria, especially from the Lebanon, or pressing demands of guarantee on the part of the European Powers, — after the reception of the reports on the late occurrences in Syria and on the conduct of Vehidgi Pasha.

The latent hope of the Divan will always be to establish the direct Government of the Mountain by a Turkish Governor or Pasha, and they will only look upon my eventual appointment as a "pis aller."

We have had a series of festivities in consequence of the arrival¹ of Grand Duke Constantin of Russia.

His presence has caused an immense impression amongst the Mussulman² as well as the Rayah population. I have seen here German, Prussian, French, and other Princes, but I am not aware that the people at large took the slightest notice of them; beyond usual curiosity the Orientals remained true to their principle of "nihil admirari."

The case has been very different this time. — The Greeks with their characteristic levity were the foremost in showing their admiration and partiality, and had the additional satisfaction of doing it with impunity at least "pro tempore" "à la barbe des Turcs".

¹ On the 18 June.

² There exists an ancient prediction amongst the Turks and the Rayahs that as Constantinople has been founded by one Constantine, and lost by another, so it is to be reconquered for the Christians by a third Constantine.

The Sultan showed great deference to the Prince, who on his reception at Court was the first person who passed en cérémonie thro' the "Golden Gate" of the Imperial palace, hitherto only reserved for the Sultan himself. — His Imperial Highness is also the first Christian who was allowed to visit the Mosque and Turbé* of Eyub, the Prophet's standard bearer.

* *cf.* Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs I, 523; II, 215.

Wherever the Prince showed himself, tho' in strict incognito, the enthusiasm went beyond the borders of common tact and prudence,¹ and the throng in Constantinople was such that several gentlemen of his suit lost their hats, and some of them were actually trampled down and escaped serious injury only by the greatest efforts of the attending cawasses.

I believe it had been originally contemplated to extend the Prince's excursion as far as Athens, but this part of the plan has been given up.

67.

MÉMOIRE DE JOCHMUS PACHA POUR S. E. RIZA PACHA,
Séraskier des Armées Ottomanes.

Constantinople 18 Mai 1845.

Le Gouvernement d'Athènes, ballotté entre les exigences des partis militaires, populaires et religieux, est tombé depuis les événemens du 3/15 Septembre 1843 dans un tel état de faiblesse que l'anarchie se fait sentir dans toutes ses relations intérieures et extérieures.

Le ministère actuel est surtout dominé par les chefs des milices pallicares lesquels ont presque partout usurpé les charges et les postes qui, dans des pays bien réglés, ne sont confiés qu'aux officiers des forces régulières ou même aux agens civils.

Or on sait que l'élément des pallicares c'est l'anarchie, et cette anarchie menace à la fois la Grèce elle même et les provinces Ottomanes limitrophes de ce pays.

La Sublime Porte ne peut manquer d'avoir des preuves incontestables des relations secrètes et des machinations qui se sont pratiquées entre les hommes de désordre en Grèce et un certain nombre de mécontents qui habitent surtout la Thessalie et une partie de l'Albanie méridionale.

Ces tendances sont dangereuses tant pour la Turquie et la Grèce que pour l'Europe monarchique entière qui désire la paix et la tranquillité, mais elles sont néanmoins appuyées ouvertement et presque unanimement par la presse grecque, par une partie des journaux de l'Europe, par des agens révolutionnaires de mainte espèce, par des discours enfin et par des propos inconsidérés qui se tiennent à Athènes et ailleurs.

¹ At Buyukdéré, at Bakschékoi, at Pyrgos, and in other places some Greeks cried out: Constantinople was lost under one Constantine, here is another who will reconquer it. — The Greek Patriarch prayed publicly for the Prince, and strange enough, he had been appointed to his spiritual command only a few months ago, because his predecessor was accused of being too great a partisan of Russia. — The true reason of the change, however, was that, as usual in the election of a new Patriarch, it afforded a boon of about one million piasters to be divided among some Turkish dignitaries and the Greek agents whom they had employed to discredit the late Patriarch.

L'influence et la faveur patente dont jouissent en Grèce des gens tels que Valenzas, Caratassos¹ et tant d'autres qui montrent, au grand jour, leur animosité contre l'Empire Ottoman, expliquent assez les motifs et le but des incursions à main armée² en Turquie, qui, à différentes époques et tout récemment encore, se sont faites sur les frontières entre les golfes de Volo et d'Arta, et qui presque toujours restent impunies.

La protection que la Sublime Porte doit à ses sujets dans leurs intérêts matériels et des considérations politiques du plus haut ordre imposent donc au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse l'obligation de prendre des mesures de précaution et de répression sur la ligne de frontière qui divise l'Empire du Sultan de l'état du Roi Othon.

L'armée grecque régulière ayant été réduite, par la désertion et par le manque de recrues³ et d'argent, de son faible état organique de 3797 hommes au nombre minime de 2447 hommes d'Infanterie, de 204 hommes de Cavalerie et 286 hommes d'Artillerie, la frontière grecque n'est gardée que par des pallicares sans discipline, probablement plus enclins à favoriser qu'à empêcher ou à réprimer les incursions et les brigandages.

Si à des gens pareils on opposait de la part de la Turquie des troupes irrégulières, il est probable que, tôt ou tard, quelque collision fâcheuse ne résulât d'un contact immédiat entre des soldats ordinairement enclins aux actes de violence.

Il sera donc préférable d'employer des troupes régulières pour la garde des *frontières mêmes*, ce qui n'empêche pas qu'on ne puisse avoir disponible quelques corps de troupes irrégulières pour poursuivre les brigands et les criminels partout où il s'en montrerait sur le territoire Ottoman proprement dit.

En d'autres termes il serait convenable d'avoir en première ligne sur les frontières mêmes ou près d'elles une chaîne de postes de troupes régulières, en second ligne quelques détachemens de troupes irrégulières et de soutenir cette disposition par des stations militaires relevant d'un centre commun où serait placé le quartier général et la principale réserve des troupes d'observation de la frontière.

Note confidentielle.

3 November 1845.

¹ Caratassos est beaufrère du Consul Grivas, Aide-de-camp du roi Othon.

² En 1841, lors de l'insurrection de Candie, le Roi de Grèce avait donné de sa caisse privée huit mille colonates (180,000 piastres) au Colonel Calergis pour les faire parvenir aux insurgés, mais les promptes mesures de la Sublime Porte ayant étouffé cette insurrection le Colonel Calergis restitua les 8000 colonates au Baron Stengel, trésorier du Roi. — S. M. frappée de ce qu'en Grèce on lui rendit de l'argent une fois déboursé, nomma le Colonel Calergis Gouverneur d'Athènes. La conduite de cet officier lors de l'insurrection militaire de la nuit du 3/15 Septembre fait juger du degré de perspicacité du Roi, dans le choix du Commandant de sa capitale.

Tandis qu'on préparait de pareils secours pour Candie, le Général Schmalz, Ministre de la guerre, discutait avec un diplomate étranger les moyens d'insurger la Thessalie et les environs d'Arta, Janina &c. &c. Ce Général, officier au reste d'un mérite très médiocre, est rentré depuis comme Colonel dans l'armée bavaroise, mais le diplomate précité est encore en Grèce.

³ Out of 1200 recruits to be levied in 1844, 940 men are defaulters.

Il paraît suffisant de porter de prime-abord la force du corps d'observation à 6 ou 7000 hommes avec 16 pièces d'Artillerie et un régiment de Cavalerie, le tout sous un chef éprouvé, spécialement chargé du commandement de la frontière entière depuis Prévésa jusqu'au golfe de Volo.

Dans ce golfe et dans celui d'Arta il serait nécessaire de faire croiser quelques bâtiments légers de guerre et deux bateaux à vapeur (ou au moins un bateau à vapeur dans le golfe de Volo).

Le point pour le quartier général serait Tricala.

Cette ville assez considérable, située près d'une plaine à fourages, est à égale distance à peu près de Volo et de Prévésa; elle offre une bonne position pour des dépôts de vivres et de munitions, dont les réserves seraient à Larisse et à Arta.

Entre Tricala et Volo d'un côté il y a Pharsale et entre Tricala et Prévésa de l'autre il y a Arta.

Prévésa, Arta, Tricala, Pharsale et Volo sont d'excellents points d'observation en face des principaux débouchés de la Grèce vers la Turquie méridionale.

Prévésa et Volo sont des stations de Marine, par Volo on peut communiquer, en cas de besoin, directement avec Constantinople.

Arta observe les défilés importants du Makrinoros, Pharsale les principaux passages du Mont Othryx, et Tricala est à une distance convenable des communications stratégiques de Rendina et du pont de Coraka, qui conduisent au point historique de Callium, célèbre dans les guerres de la Grèce depuis l'invasion des Gaulois, il y a 2000 ans, jusqu'à la campagne du Visir Mustafa, Pacha de Scodra, en 1823.

Il serait probablement nécessaire d'accorder des pouvoirs étendus au commandant-en-chef de la frontière, et dans le choix de ce général il serait avant tout urgent de ne pas perdre de vue qu'il s'agit d'éviter, pour le présent et pour le future, des complications politiques et militaires sur un terrain où se croisent à la fois les intérêts de la Turquie et de la Grèce et ceux des grandes puissances de l'Europe.

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM RIZA PASHA TO
GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Received Buyukdéré 9 July 1845.)

Après les compliments d'usage:

J'ai fait faire la traduction du Mémoire que vous m'avez communiqué concernant les frontières de la Grèce et dont le contenu a été porté à ma connaissance. Quoiqu'il soit déjà exécuté en partie d'après les réglemens militaires, cependant comme il y a certaines mesures accessoires qui se rapportent à l'administration générale et aux plans militaires

que l'on doit suivre dans les districts limitrophes des frontières grecques, et qu'il devient nécessaire de mettre par écrit une description de ces mesures avec les détails que l'on doit attendre de vos lumières et votre fidélité, ainsi dans l'espoir que vous voudrez bien rédiger une espèce de Mémoire concernant les mesures accessoires à mettre à l'exécution, je ne puis que me reposer entièrement sur votre intelligence et vos lumières, ainsi que sur les soins que vous voudrez bien employer à cet égard.

69.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS AU SÉRASKIER RIZA PACHA.

Buyukdéré 10 Juillet 1845.

Le soussigné, en réponse à la lettre d'hier¹ de Son Excellence le Séraskier Riza Pacha, a l'honneur de lui soumettre les observations incluses :

Les mesures à prendre aux frontières grecques ont un double caractère, car il s'agit des dispositions militaires et de la surveillance générale des provinces limitrophes.

Quant aux premières il est évident que le Roi Othon ne peut pas faire la guerre à la Sublime Porte, mais les émissaires grecs, soit qu'ils paraissent comme brigands armés, soit qu'ils agissent secrètement, peuvent porter le désordre et parvenir à semer la révolte parmi les populations Rayahs de la Thessalie et de l'Albanie. Un corps d'observation sur les frontières n'a donc pas pour mission de s'opposer à une armée grecque qui n'existe pas, mais son but principal est de montrer aux habitans des provinces limitrophes que la Sublime Porte est en mesure de réprimer une insurrection et de punir les auteurs de cette révolte, étrangers ou indigènes; tandis qu'elle protège ses sujets bien disposés contre le double fléau du brigandage et de la guerre civile.

Si l'on porte la force du corps d'observation à 6 ou 7000 hommes avec Cavalerie et Artillerie, il sera nécessaire de former des dépôts de vivres (de réserve) à Tricala ou ailleurs pour trois mois et d'approvisionner l'Artillerie à raison de cent coups par pièce.

Le quartier général du Ferik (Lieutenant-Général) commandant sera bien placé à Tricala, tandis qu'un Miriliva (Général de Brigade) sera établi à Pharsale et un autre Miriliva à Arta. Le détail de la distribution des forces militaires ne peut être déterminé que sur les lieux, car il dépend nécessairement de la conformation du terrain et de *l'esprit et des dispositions* de ses habitans.

Si des mesures purement militaires on passe à présent aux exigences de la surveillance générale des provinces limitrophes de la Grèce, il est clair que la police de sûreté y sera plus efficace en proportion

¹ vide No. 68.

de la concentration de tous ses fils entre les mains du Commandant général des frontières.

A cet effet non seulement les postes et les stations militaires doivent lui faire des rapports exacts, mais encore les Commandants des stations de Marine et toutes les autorités locales depuis Prévés jusqu'à Volo.

Le cercle de ces correspondances et la surveillance des personnes suspectes étrangères et indigènes doivent s'étendre jusqu'à Janina, Monastir, Larisse et Salonique, et aussi loin qu'il le juge nécessaire, car ce n'est qu'en confrontant soigneusement tous les rapports et tous les détails de personnes, temps et lieux qu'on peut apprécier la valeur des faits et des indications.

Les réglemens des quarantaines et des passeports, appliqués aux frontières rigoureusement (mais sans vexations ni exactions pécuniaires dans le sens européen, seront d'un secours marquant pour empêcher les communications clandestines entre la Grèce et les provinces limitrophes. On pourra en droit et sans inconvénient exiger le visa de tous les passeports par le Ministre de la Sublime Porte à Athènes ou d'un Consul.

Tout individu voyageant sans passeport dûment visé ou sans papiers en règle sera renvoyé à l'endroit d'où il est venu. En cas de récidive et trouvé en deçà des frontières il sera puni sévèrement.

Les émissaires sur lesquels on trouve des journaux défendus, ou des lettres suspectes, ou bien des écrits incendiaires, seront punis efficacement sur les lieux, sans référence ultérieure à Constantinople.

Pris en récidive sur le territoire Ottoman ils pourront être jugés par des conseils de guerre.

Le Commandant général des frontières doit être même éventuellement autorisé de déclarer l'état de siège, car s'il doit être responsable de la tranquillité publique, il doit aussi avoir une grande latitude d'action.

Le détail des mesures de précaution et de surveillance générale ne peut s'organiser que sur les lieux, car beaucoup dépend du zèle, de l'intelligence et de la résolution du Commandant-en-Chef. — On pourra tout au plus en thèse générale indiquer d'ici les causes du malaise et des désordres dans les provinces limitrophes de la Grèce, en les classant de la manière suivante :

1. Le simple brigandage des Kleftes grecs et rayah.
2. L'action ouverte ou secrète des sociétés et hétaires qui dominent souvent jusqu'aux agens publics mêmes du Gouvernement d'Athènes, en-dedans et au-dehors de la Grèce, et qui se servent d'instrumens tels que les Jani Costa et Valenzas, ou bien des Pharmakidés et Drossomansolas et d'autres personnes plus ou moins connues, mais qui ne se mettent pas en évidence.
3. L'influence des agens étrangers dont quelques uns, surtout depuis 1840, propagent le mécontentement et la dissatisfaction, soit comme résidens officiels ou semi-officiels dans le pays, soit comme

voyageurs ou chargés de missions scientifiques — les uns en dépassant par ambition ou par passion les instructions de leur Gouvernements, les autres en se constituant les partisans des doctrines de propagande révolutionnaire ou démocratique.

4. La résistance de quelques tribus Musulmans, d'Albanais ou de Bosniaques aux ordres de leur Gouverneurs ou à ceux de la Sublime Porte. Il suffit de rappeler ici, que, sans la révolte d'Ali Pacha de Janina, l'insurrection grecque de 1821 n'eût eu aucune chance de succès immédiat.

Le Commandant général des frontières donc doit avoir des soins particuliers à classer les faits et les évènements sociaux, qu'il est appelé à observer, et de ne leur accorder de l'importance qu'en les rattachant aux sources et causes qu'on vient d'énumérer.

A. Jochmus.

70.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO PATRICK COLQUHOUN

at London.

Private. Extract.

Buyukdéré 1 August 1845.

I had the pleasure of writing to you on the 17 July, and have now to state that on the 26 last the Divan has resolved to send the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shekib Effendi, to Syria with the special mission to settle the difficulties of the Lebanon question.

This resolution has been communicated in a long note to the representatives of the Five Great Powers at Constantinople, wherein is said amongst other things that in case of need Shekib Effendi is to concert with Namik Pasha, the commanding Serasker at Damascus, any military measures necessary for the tranquillity of the mountain.

The note explains further certain modifications in the local Government of the mixed districts, calculated to augment the political power of the Druses to the detriment of the Christians,¹ regulations which

¹ The question left in suspense as to the extent of authority belonging in the mixed districts to the Christian Wekil and to the Druse feudal lord of the district or Mokata is by this note decided in favor of the Mokatadgi. He is the chief magistrate and administrator, the Wekil only a subordinate judge. Vice versa in the Christian mixed Mokata's the Christian Mokatadgi has all real power and the Druse Wekil only a limited judicial authority. The Porte bases this decision on its assurance that it never meant to touch the feudal privileges of the Mokatadgis or feudal seigneurs (Christian and Druse) of the Lebanon. — Only an exception is made in respect to Deir El Kamar, which, tho' the chief lieu of a Druse Mokata, is inhabited by a great majority of Christians, and is therefore to be occupied by a Turkish garrison and pro tempore governed by the Ottoman Commander of the troops, in order to prevent continual disputes.

I hear are very little to the liking of MM. de Stürmer and de Bourqueneay as protectors of the specially catholic interests.

As for myself, I confess that in my opinion much less depends on the prescription of details of the *system* of administration in the Lebanon, than on the personal capacity and honesty of the Governor who is to carry it into execution.

Shekib Effendi is not to supersede Vehidgi Pasha, the present Governor of the Pashalik of Saïda. — His title is that of a Commissioner extraordinary of the Porte, so that properly speaking we are again at the old starting point of December 1841, when Mustapha Nour Pasha was sent to Beyrout in the same capacity, with this difference of circumstances that the Lebanon is now nearly ruined by three successive civil wars.

As I told you in former letters, I have not been mistaken in my suppositions that, if the Divan were induced to send me to Syria, it would be only from two main reasons: either *very bad* news from Syria and open revolts there, or pressing demands for guarantees from the European Powers.

Both the Porte and the Austrians here seem to have a temporary interest in keeping secret the events which have happened of late in Upper Albania and in Bosnia, but it is certain that a considerable force of Bosnian rebels not only expelled the Governors of Novi and Krupa, who fled into the Austrian territory, but that at Trawnick the Pasha has been² or may be still in a most precarious situation.

The Bosnians also have committed hostilities on the Austrian frontiers, in consequence of which an Imperial force has entered Bosnia, and has defeated a corps of rebels³, not without some sharp fighting and the loss of several Austrian officers.

The Porte, I believe, tacitly or avowedly submitted beforehand to the reprisals of the Austrians, but it is certainly as strange as marked a symptom of decay and decomposition to see a German force enter in time of peace the Turkish Empire, since the Porte has no power in Bosnia neither to maintain order nor to prevent the aggression of its subjects on a friendly neighbouring state.

By comparing the dates and places of the late events in Bosnia, and in North Albania, I am inclined to believe that a joint movement was originally projected between the rebels in both provinces, but that

¹ The present Governor General Vehidgi Pasha, who on one side supports the Druses against the Christians, offered on the other hand thro' a secret negotiator the head of Seid Djumblat or Abu Nached (Chiefs of the Druses) to the French Consul Mr. Poujade, provided he would pay him one hundred and forty thousand piasters. (Mr. Poujade to Mr. Dussault.)

² Banjaluka was also occupied and kept for some days by the rebels.

³ On the 9 July. The Austrians were about 2000 men and the Bosnian 3000 strong, the first had 40 men killed, the latter 60 men. — The Austrians after burning several farms &c. &c. by way of reprisals reentered their territory on the same day, their expedition lasting only five hours. — (Official report.)

the Albanians have acted prematurely, for they defeated and expelled the Governor of Jacova already on the 25 May, whereas the insurrections at and near Novi and Krupa broke out only on the 11 June.

71.

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE FOR SIR STRATFORD CANNING,

communicated by His Excellency to Shekib Effendi and Ali Effendi.

Buyukdéré 15 August 1845.

Generally speaking it may be said that in the affairs of the Lebanon much less rests on military dispositions than on the administration of that province, and again in the Government of the Mountain much more seems to depend on the personal capacity and honesty of the Governor than on the details of the local system, such as prescribed from Constantinople, since in Turkey nothing is easier nor more habitual than to elude or evade instructions, usually couched in vague and ambiguous terms.

If Shekib Effendi is to introduce certain modifications in the Government of the Lebanon and to uphold these measures if necessary, pro tempore, by military arrangements, calculated to maintain order and to prevent new conflicts in arms above all, the distribution of forces ought not to lead to a *scattering* of the troops.

With a limited force such as will be at the disposal of the Turkish authorities, it is impossible to guard *all* points, without being weak *everywhere*.

The number of positions therefore must be limited to the most important points, and these again should be occupied only by *small* detachments, which in case of need might be supported from a common central position, strongly guarded.

Such points seem to be at first view in the Christian and Druse districts south of the Nahr-el-Kilb :

1. Bekfaya or Ornachagouen ;
2. Hamana or Ain-el-Hajel ;
3. Djezzin

and finally

a central position at Deir-el-Kamar.

The nature of the ground, however, and the *dispositions* of the *inhabitants* may modify these general indications. — Each secondary point can be guarded by a detachment of 2 or 300 men. Intelligent Commanders of those isolated posts will find means to secure their positions against surprise, without the ostentation of military occupation and without erecting actual fortifications.

They may post and if necessary barricade their men in large strong built houses, where a fortnight's or a month's provision and a supply of water be deposited and kept up together with a store of ammunition.

A reserve of troops placed with the Head-Quarters and the necessary depôts at Deir-el-Kamar will be able to support each of the above named points in one day's march.

For a similar eventuality the commanding General at Deir-el-Kamar ought to have his forces divided into two detachments:

one corps to be kept as a permanent garrison at Head-Quarters and to consist of the *minimum* of what is actually necessary;

the other corps organized as a moveable column provided with Artillery and some Cavalry, baggage and ammunition train, and constantly ready to march at a moment's notice.

This column to be as strong and select as possible.

The above disposition, besides its efficiency as far as means and circumstances allow, has the advantage of presenting Deir-el-Kamar as the *only* place militarily occupied, whereas in reality each of the other points — held in the first instance as mere police stations — may be equally secured by a strong force at 24 hours' notice and converted, in its turn, into a temporary centre of operations.

A. Jochmus.

(Annex to No. 71.)

NOTE.

19 September 1845.

This Memorandum drawn up at the demand of Sir Stratford Canning was by him communicated to Shekib Effendi and to the Divan, after the formal assurance of Shekib Effendi that it was *not intended to disarm* the inhabitants of the Lebanon.

Subsequently, however, Shekib in concert with the military authorities in Syria acted on the military principles laid down in the Memorandum, and Shekib Effendi and Namik Pasha establishing their Head-Quarters at Deir-el-Kamar directed from thence their operations "*of the general disarmament*", having thus the advantage of operating from a central position towards the circumference — whereas Mustapha Nouri Pasha, who in 1842 wanted to reduce by force of arms parts only of the mountain districts, failed in his operation, chiefly because he acted from the circumference towards the centre. His Head-Quarters were at that time established at Beyrout, where hitherto all Turkish Commanders have continued to keep their Head-Quarters, until Shekib Effendi directed Namik Pasha to transfer his main force to Deir-el-Kamar.

30 November 1845.

The annexed Memorandum was communicated by Sir Stratford Canning to the Turkish authorities. I drew it up at his request. Ali Effendi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, told me at a dinner in the Jali of Rifaat Pasha that the Memorandum had been approved of by the Council of Ministers. — Shekib Effendi subsequently not only directed Namik Pasha to take his Head-Quarters at Deir-el-Kamar, but he himself directed the operation of the disarmament from this central position.

A. Jochmus.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL HERMAN

at London.

Extract.

Buyukdéré 16 August 1845.

I have delayed answering your letter of the 20 June
 Count Stürmer has written several times to Vienna with regard to your affair, and he has expressed an opinion that Prince Metternich might take an opportunity of speaking on the subject to Lord Aberdeen, when they shall meet on the Rhine during the visit of the Queen to the King of Prussia.

I trust that by that time your arrangements will have made considerable progress, and that you also may have had ere this an occasion of applying to Lord Aberdeen about Jassy.

Count Stürmer is the only person here to whom I have spoken about your projected enterprise.

I once was on the point of mentioning it to Riza Pasha, in order to propitiate him to your plans by showing him the possibility of making „une bonne affaire”, but knowing the instability of *things and men* here, I refrained from entertaining Riza Pasha on the project, and I now find that I have acted prudently, since the catastrophe of the 7 instant has completely prostrated the once powerful favorite and most of his adherents.

His partisans have already been turned out of office or are going to be so, except those who abandoned him in time to re-inforce the camp of his opponents, for instance Suleiman Pasha, whom he raised from the dust, Mehemet Ali of Tophana, and others.

The deplorable state of most of the European and Asiatic provinces of this Empire, where anarchy is raising its head like a Hydra, would have been more than an ample and legitimate cause for a change of administration, but the fall of Riza Pasha was simply occasioned by a prolonged Seraglio intrigue of his powerful enemies — who worked on the *personal* feelings of the Grand Seignior and the Sultana Valideh, altho' they neither may not have neglected the occasions of pointing out the bad condition of the Empire, representing its actual disturbed state as an effect of ministerial mismanagement.¹

In *Asia* the Pashalik of Van is in full insurrection, and the districts of Ardahan, Livana, and Ardanoud refuse to adopt the new Turkish system of administration, above all the conscription,² further south the Pasha of Bagdad fights with the Pasha of Sulimanieh, and having sent a Derwish to debauch the troops of the latter, the Pasha of Sulimanieh

¹ The Austrian reprisals on the Bosniak frontiers have been represented to the Sultan as one of the decisive proofs of ministerial mismanagement.

² Kiamil Pasha, late Minister at Berlin, has been ordered as special Commissioner for the Pashalik of Van and the revolted districts.

shoots the Derwish, upon which his troops and the Kurds revolt and drive him from his Government, because the dead Derwish is considered a saint.¹

Osman Pasha of Djedda² in Arabia has ten or twelve refractory Chieftains³ murdered, after having entertained them hospitably under his own tent, and in his turn he is poisoned or murdered by the Arabs, who revolt against the Sultan or rather continue their former insurrection.⁴

In the Lebanon the civil war between Druses and Maronites; in every other district of Syria the desert and the roving Bedoween gain on the cultivated soil and its settled inhabitants.

In *Europe* the Bosniaks refuse the financial reform system, or rather the small remnants of reform tried to be imposed on them of late in the shape of new taxations; they besiege their Governor General and commit hostilities on the Austrian frontiers, until the court of Vienna orders local reprisals, because the Porte has no power to give satisfaction.⁵

The Albanians of the North imitate the insurrectional movements of Bosnia, and in several partial actions defeat the partisans of the Government or annoy its troops.

Reshid Pasha, the Serasker of Rumili, altho' he pretends to have had the advantage in one or two engagements in the province of Javcova, demands reinforcements of regular troops, but so does the Governor General of Arzroum and the Pasha of Saïda; — which places the Government in a most serious predicament, because there are no considerable military forces in reserve at its disposal.

As long as Riza Pasha was at the head of the Seraskeriat, it was the fashion to admit that the army was vastly improving in numbers and instruction. — The Turks themselves say that the army has *not* improved neither in number⁶ nor in quality nor in instruction; for the

¹ The total decay of the national strength had annihilated even the last resource of a despotic government, and the revenue of exhausted provinces could no longer purchase the military service of a discontented and pusillanimous people. (*Gibbon*.)

² Kiamil Pasha (late Governor of Arzroum) has been appointed Pasha of Djedda, vice Osman Pasha deceased.

³ Or rather one influential Chief and his 10 or 12 principal followers.

⁴ The correspondence of the Armenian Sarafs in Constantinople state that Osman Pasha has been poisoned or murdered — the Turkish Government give out that he died —, the Austrian Consul General in Egypt writes that he died *suddenly*, and that in consequence of his death and the subsequent insurrection the yearly pilgrims from Egypt are afraid to go to Mekka. — According to Sir Stratford Canning's version the Arab Chieftains, murdered by order of Osman Pasha, were stabbed at random, the tent under which they had dined having fallen on them, the supporting cords being cut asunder by the assassins.

⁵ The reprisals took place in consequence of the unsuccessful attempt of the Austrian authorities to obtain redress for the murder of an Imperial employé, committed publicly by the Bosniaks on the Austrian territory.

⁶ The highest calculation (Sir Stratford Canning's estimates) of the army gives a grand total of one hundredthousand regular troops. Prince Handjery says

army "en masse" is not rendered more formidable nor more efficient because the hospitals and barracks in *Constantinople* are kept better and with much more cleanliness than they used to be, nor because some regiments of the Guards and of the Line doing duty in the capital are better dressed than they were two years ago. — Whatever some of the troops may have gained during their stay at *Constantinople* in point of appearance and in a few instances perhaps in point of instruction,¹ (as far as the battalion school), is lost again as soon as they get into the provinces, where the army is continually in heavy arrears of pay² and in want of necessaries. — It is superfluous to say that if without regular pay and regular supplies, if without staffs and administration no *European* army can be *maintained* in a state of efficiency, it is still less possible to imagine that a new *Turkish* army should be formed under such disadvantageous circumstances.

Riza Pasha had of late ordered the organization of a general Staff. I suppose, because he has been frequently told that an army must have a Staff, but neither the Chief of the department, one Abdi Pasha, has the necessary qualifications for such an important situation, nor has he under his orders any people of capacity and experience. Some of the young men, brought up in Vienna, might in time have become good Staff officers, but by a caprice of the Minister of Finance and of Riza himself they were ordered home abruptly from Vienna, without having finished their military education.

that his information only gives eighty thousand men, exclusive of the Rediff, to be formed out of the soldiers whose time of service has expired. — The Turkish Government pretend to have 150,000 men. — They *certainly pay* for a great many more men than the number *actually kept*.

¹ When the Grand Duke of Russia was invited to see a parade of the Guards, he found to his great astonishment only present *one* battalion of Infantry, *one* squadron of Cavalry and *one* battery of Artillery, altho' ten thousand men might have been paraded without inconvenience.

² The pay of the army officers has been considerably augmented on Riza Pasha's proposal.

1846

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO COLONEL HERMAN

at London.

Confidential. Extract.

Pera 31 January 1846.

I have not written to you for some time, expecting to see you here or perhaps to meet you en route. Since I have received your last letter of the 20 December, I will no longer delay a few lines from hence.

I am glad to learn that you still entertain hopes of organizing a company for the Kustendje-Czernavoda railroad, and I consider the attempt worth the while.

Reshid Pasha as Minister of Foreign Affairs here may be found disposed favorably towards entertaining a *serious* offer on the part of a substantial company, and I agree entirely with your resolution to act only on a *solid* basis of operation.

The late nomination, however, of Sarim Effendi to a seat in the cabinet is generally considered as calculated to weaken, if not eventually to endanger the position of Reshid Pasha.

The real power and the direction of the present Ministry belongs to the old Chosrew Pasha, who just now is as powerful "de prime abord" as ever was Riza Pasha when in the zenith of favor. — Chosrew Pasha has not forgotten 1839, but being a prudent politician and surnamed by many the Metternich of Turkey, he keeps at present on good terms with Reshid Pasha. "Qui vivra verra."

Chosrew Pasha professes to follow a moderate reform system, on essentially "*conservative*" principles, being a Turk "de l'ancienne roche." His present foreign bias is anglo-russian. — He says that the army must be reduced, or rather the expensive military scheme entertained by Riza Pasha, and that the provinces must be governed as much as possible by conciliatory measures.

With reference to the first point Riza was very near being exiled to Jokat and is now under surveillance in his house at Cadi Kevi, whither he was sent from his palace at Ichiragan, a controller of accounts having been appointed to examine into the charges brought against Riza Pasha for a deficiency of many millions in the late military administration.

With regard to the second point new concessions have been made to the province of Van, where the Kurds under their military chieftains won't submit neither to the Tanzimati haïrié, nor to the conscription, nor to the quarantine laws, — the Albanians on the other hand are soothed by the release from the bagno of the chiefs condemned for the late rebellion and by leniency in the application of the military conscription.

The name of Chosrew Pasha being in itself a tower of strength, these measures carried out by the old Visir himself are without danger.

In Syria Shekib Effendi has given general dissatisfaction, and altho' the Government have long ago officially admitted that he *had secret* instructions on leaving Constantinople for disarming the Mountaineers, yet the Ministers of the Porte themselves freely admitted that he had carried out their views in a very imprudent, violent, and untoward manner, which led to many recriminations between the Ottoman functionaries and foreign agents.

The fact, however, is that the very substantial advantage of disarming the Christian and Druse tribes of the Lebanon and thereby placing them nearly at the mercy of the local Ottoman authorities, which always was the latent hope of the Porte these last five years, has remained to the Divan here, whereas the most embittered of the Foreign Representatives, the French Ambassador, with the exception of an indemnity for parts of two ruined convents, has been "payé de paroles", and all that Count Stürmer could obtain were general assurances and the promise of a monthly allowance of ten thousand piasters for the exiled old Emir Beshir and his family at Viranshehr in Asia Minor.

Shekib Effendi in the mean time has been partially superseded by Emin Pasha, or rather they are to act as Joint-Commissioners extraordinary for the Lebanon, whereas Vehidgi Pasha of Saïda makes room for another Governor General, Kiamil Pasha, late Envoy at Berlin.

Altho' certain precautionary measures on the Greek frontiers have been adopted some time ago by Riza Pasha and have been of late followed up by his successors, I confess that I look with some apprehension to that quarter of the Turkish Empire, because I know that Mr. Coletti is and *must be* as long as he is Minister at the mercy of the old Pallicari Captains in Greece, and that it is the object and the interest of the pallicari party to foment disorders and disturbances in southern Albania and in Thessaly.

The administration of Mr. Coletti by various means in his power has a fallacious majority in the chambers¹

¹ Count Capodistrias up to his death always had large majorities in all representative assemblies in Greece, but he admitted to his friends that he was obliged to pay his supporters in cash, taking, as he observed, the precaution to pay them by *votes* and not by the *session*. — The usual rate for a vote was ten

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A MR. DE CATACASY,

Conseiller Privé de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie à Odessa.

Particulière. Extrait.

Constantinople 26 Juin 1846.

On fait naturellement une foule de conjectures plus ou moins hasardées sur le but du voyage du Pacha d'Égypte à Constantinople, et le Sultan lui même a été très étonné de la demande que lui a adressée son Visir.

Sa Majesté aurait dit entr' autres choses :

“Si ce vieillard presque octogénaire venait à mourir à Constantinople, on dirait que c'est moi qui a causé son trépas.”

Aussi l'Empereur a donné l'ordre de loger Mehemet Ali dans le nouveau palais de Riza Pasha près de Ichiragan et de lui fournir les vivres de la cuisine Impériale.

En attendant, Hamid Bey, chambellan du Sultan, est parti d'ici hier afin de porter à Mehemet Ali l'autorisation de passer à Constantinople et l'on présume que le Pacha quittera l'Égypte immédiatement après l'arrivée de Hamid Bey à Alexandrie.

Dans ce cas il laissera, selon toutes les apparences, Abbas Pacha comme Gouverneur de l'Égypte.

Beaucoup de personnes et parmi elles des Turcs qui pourraient être bien renseignés prétendent qu'un des principaux buts du voyage de Mehemet Ali serait de faire confirmer définitivement ce choix par le Sultan au détriment d'Ibrahim Pacha qui, depuis longtemps, n'est pas bien vu de Mehemet Ali et sur la naissance même duquel on a émis de temps à autre des doutes, en ce sens que sa mère doit avoir été enceinte avant d'entrer dans le harem de Mehemet Ali.

Abbas Pacha au contraire est fils aîné de Jousoun Pacha, l'aîné des enfans de Mehemet Ali et par conséquent héritier légitime du Gouvernement de son grand père, d'après les loix européennes de Primogéniture.

Les stipulations à cet égard des Hatichérifs de 1841 ne sont pas très claires, mais en tout cas c'est une affaire exclusivement de la compétence du Sultan et de Son Vassal.

Deux choses sont certaines : l'une que beaucoup de Turcs ici pensent que Mehemet Ali veut quitter l'Égypte, pendant l'absence d'Ibrahim Pacha, à fin de pouvoir nommer Abbas Gouverneur provisoire, sauf à le faire confirmer, l'autre : c'est qu'on s'est grandement formalisé à la Porte des honneurs exagérés rendus à Ibrahim Pacha à Paris. — Par conséquent, si Mehemet Ali veut effectivement faire une

dollars a person. — Mr. Dawkins, the British Minister, told me that that was also the usual price for any piece of written information, or for copies of documents from the ministerial offices, whereas the copy of a confidential dispatch of Count Capodistrias' cabinet was from twenty to fifty dollars.

démarche sérieuse en faveur d'Abbas Pacha, le moment est bien bel pourvu qu'il ne demande pas de nouvelles concessions, au delà de celles accordées en 1841 après la suppression de la révolte syrienne.

Plusieurs faits et circonstances viennent appuyer la conjecture précédente.

En 1842 Clot Bey dit au Baron Behr, qu'Ibrahim Pacha était résolu à ramasser de l'argent, non pas pour s'assurer le Gouvernement de l'Égypte, mais pour créer éventuellement en Europe une grande existence indépendante à ses enfans.

Mr. Zinzia, Consul Général de Belgique et banquier d'Ibrahim, communiqua au même diplomate qu'il était chargé par le Pacha de remettre en Europe pour son compte de fortes sommes d'argent comme dépôts permanents dans la banque d'Angleterre et ailleurs.

Vint plus tard (en 1844) la violente querelle entre Mehemet Ali et Ibrahim, à la suite de laquelle le premier faillit devenir fou et le second fut obligé à se soumettre au retranchement arbitraire de neuf mois d'appartemens, après avoir été qualifié d'avare et de traître par son père.

Enfin je me rappelle avoir vu dans les feuilles Égyptiennes qu'il a été question plusieurs fois d'une espèce de Conseil d'administration de l'Égypte, à établir du vivant de Mehemet Ali, et destiné à être présidé par Abbas et non par Ibrahim Pacha.

Toutes ces données paraissent militer en faveur de la conclusion que le plan qu'on prête à Mehemet Ali ne manque pas de fondement, mais outre l'absence de renseignements authentiques, je me défie des déductions "logiques" en politique orientale et je me rappelle constamment du mot de Frédéric le Grand, auquel on demanda, comment il faisait pour à juger de loin si bien les questions turques:

"J'ai." — répondit le Roi — "un petit agent à Pera," — l'aïeul de notre digne ami Hübsch — "qui est habituellement assez bien renseigné; il ramasse et classe les faits et les données et il en tire les conséquences très logiques d'après son bon sens naturel. Moi j'admets comme probable toujours exactement le contraire de ses déductions et je me trouve par là avoir ordinairement raison."

Les Français ici paraissent très contrariés du voyage de Mehemet Ali et en effet il est passablement absurde de voir Ibrahim traité et *Prince héritaire* à Paris et son père venir ici pour faire le Salam au Pacha et baiser les pieds de son maître.

MR. DE CATAASY AU GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS.

*(Answered Constantinople 4 September 1846.)*Odessa le ^{30 Juin}
12 Juillet 1846.

Je suis infiniment sensible, mon cher Général, au bon souvenir que vous voulez bien me conserver et vivement reconnaissant de la lettre pleine d'intérêt que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire. Nous avons été si souvent du même avis sur l'aspect et les impressions du Bosphore que vous me comprendrez sans doute quand je vous dirai que je partage entièrement votre manière de considérer l'événement qui préoccupe à cette heure le public et la Diplomatie de Constantinople.

Il est évident que sans un puissant motif et sans le désir assez naturel à la vieillesse ambitieuse de se voir survivre par un héritier de sa prédilection et de son choix, le vieux satrape ne se serait pas aventuré dans un voyage qui lui coutera plusieurs millions et probablement aussi quelques humiliations *vassaliques*. Je pense d'ailleurs que ses vœux en faveur de son petit fils seront accueillis avec empressement par la Porte qui ne peut pas avoir beaucoup de tendresse pour le *vainqueur de Nedjib*, mais reste à savoir si Therapia et Buyukdéré feront preuve en cette occasion *d'entente cordiale*, et si l'hérédité par *Seigneurial* ou par *droit* de Primogéniture ne fera pas le sujet d'une divergence d'avis et de discussions plus ou moins sérieuses.

Dans quelques semaines vous verrez tout cela de près, mon cher Général, et vous serez assez bon pour m'en écrire un petit mot qui me parviendra probablement à Petersbourg où je compte me trouver dans le courant du mois prochain.

Je crois ne pas avoir besoin de vous redire, mon cher Monsieur Jochmus, tout le prix que j'attache à vos dispositions amicales pour moi et aux preuves de confiance que vous m'avez données durant mon dernier séjour à Constantinople. Je saisirai de deux mains toute occasion où je pourrai vous rendre quelque léger service, ou du moins vous prouver mon désir à cet égard.

On attend ici d'un moment à l'autre le remplaçant provisoire de Monsieur Titow. Je n'ai pas l'honneur de connaître personnellement Monsieur Oustinoff, mais tout le monde en dit infiniment de bien.

Notre Excellence Monsieur Titow a été bien cruellement éprouvé tout ce temps et quoique dans une de ses dernières lettres il m'annonçât une amélioration dans l'état de sa chère femme, Madame Catacasy et moi nous n'en sommes pas moins inquiets et tristes. Dieu veuille que le voyage qu'il veut faire tourne à bien sous tous les rapports.

Tout ce qui m'entoure, ma femme et mes filles, y comprise la petite Nina, me chargent de mille choses amicales pour vous et demandent avec intérêt des nouvelles du petit Carlaky.

Comment se porte notre bon et aimable Baron Behr? pourquoi nous a-t-il oubliés? J'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire il y a quelques semaines, mais je n'ai pas reçu de réponse et je commence à croire que ma lettre s'est égarée. Dans tous les cas rappelez moi je vous prie à son amical souvenir.

Sir Stratford est-il parti en congé ainsi que les journaux l'avaient annoncé? Dans le cas où Son Excellence se trouverait encore à Constantinople veuillez, mon Général, lui offrir mes respectueux hommages.

Agrérez vous même l'assurance renouvelée en toujours cordiale de mes sentimens les plus dévoués.

Catacasy.

76.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY.

Private and confidential. Extract.

Buyukdéré 31 July 1846.

Several years have elapsed since I had the honour to write to Your Lordship on the political occurrences of this country, and I have explained at the time the cause of this temporary interruption of my correspondence.

I think it right, however, now to give to Your Lordship some information on the present state of affairs here, and as a preliminary I have requested Mr. Colquhoun to communicate to you two letters which I addressed him on the 2 and 19 June. — The perusal of the latter will have prepared Your Lordship to hear of the return to office of Riza Pasha, who indeed has been appointed earlier already than was anticipated, for his nomination took place on the 20 July.

Riza Pasha is extremely wealthy and knows how to spend *well* his money — though it be not *well* gotten.

Sure of the secret affection of his Sovereign and strongly supported by the Sultana Valideh, he has assumed already, though still in an inferior post, that air of superiority which implies a feeling of great power and the expectance of the return of great favor. — When he went for the first time to the Sublime Porte he paid the habitual visit to the Grand Visir, and his cawasses on his leaving the audience marched to the bureaux of the Reis Effendi, who on similar occasions receive usually the second visit, but Riza Pasha, without even enquiring after Reshid, went straight to his carriage and returned home.

An accomplished Turkish courtier like Riza Pasha would never have slighted a colleague still in office in so marked a manner, if he were not sure of his own influence and of the approaching fall of the person thus offended.

Riza Pasha, publicly accused of embezzlement of money and then *not* convicted, will never pardon Mehemet Ali and Reshid Pashas to have urged on a persecution which they had neither the power nor

the courage to carry through, neither will the Sultana Valideh and her clique; nor will it be difficult for them to persuade the Sultan — if he is not so already, that it would have been better for the dignity of his Government to *avoid* a scandal or to enact the *punishment* on those who really were culpable.

Public grounds little affect Turkish policy, at least in comparison with personal interest. — In this respect little can be said for or against Reshid, who since the 6 or 7 months that he is in office, has not had power and influence enough to do any thing of importance. — His appearance has been utterly insignificant when compared to his position in 1839/41. He has shown in many instances the same weakness, incapacity, and absence of fixed purpose of which Your Lordship well knows that he has given proofs in former years

Notwithstanding his little Parisian smattering of learning and philosophy, he is not a mind of the stamp of a Kiuprely or even of a Rhagib Pasha, and some good ideas which he may have or which are inoculated to him by others, remain barren, because he is deficient in energy and character, and of late, to my certain knowledge and from my personal experience, he has given several proofs of *bad faith*.

From what I have stated in my former letters to Mr. Colquhoun, Your Lordship will have perceived that the Porte was resolved to receive Mehemet Ali Pasha of Egypt with distinction, but to show at the same time that he was a subject *Pasha*.

I am glad to say that such has been the case, and after the absurd demonstrations of the French Government in honour of Ibrahim Pasha, who is nothing more than a Pasha of three tails "*en disponibilité*" — it is right that the Porte acted with reserve and prudence — Mehemet Ali's steamer fired on arrival a royal salute, and in consideration of his honorary rank of Grand Visir it was returned with 19 guns.

The Pasha immediately went to pay his respects to the Sultan, who advanced a few paces to receive him, whereupon the Pasha went through the customary oriental salutations and ceremonies — stooping down and kissing the Emperor's garments &c. &c. The Sultan then told him to be seated, and after a short conversation allowed him to retire.

Mehemet Ali also made a visit to the Grand Visir, who returned it on the following day, whereupon the principal Ministers and functionaries called upon the Pasha according to the eastern fashion, which herein coincides with the English custom of paying visits to the person who *arrives*.

Since then no peculiar public honours or entertainments have been arranged for Mehemet Ali, except that he dined once at the Imperial palace and another time at old Chosrew Pasha — but neither of those dinners were official banquets.

If one refers to Hammer and other Turkish historians, examples of infinitely more splendid receptions to Visirs and Pashas are not unfrequently described.

For instance the receptions and the public entries into Constantinople of Ibrahim Pasha (the favorite of Soliman the Great) after the pacification of Egypt, and that of Othman Pasha under Murad III after his victorious action against the Persians. In both cases the Visirs and Ministers were ordered to meet those high functionaries at considerable distances from the capital.

Mehemet Ali is understood to be little satisfied with all that has occurred since his arrival, and he must feel that the Sultan and the Porte only attach any real importance to his presence at Constantinople in so far as it is the crowning event of the policy of 1840/41.

The French look upon it as such, and so does Count Stürmer and the diplomatic body in general.

The former of course are displeased at the whole exhibition, whereas the Austrian Internuncio told me that he thought the presence of Mehemet Ali here could only be beneficial to the interest of the Porte, such as it was understood to be since 1840, whereas any indiscreet demands on the part of Mehemet Ali could easily be resisted by the Porte on the plea of the general engagements with the Quadruple Alliance of 1840. He said that he had written in this sense to Prince Metternich

Last year Riza Pasha, then still all powerful, requested me to draw up a Memorandum on the general and in particular on the military measures of precaution to be adopted on the Greek frontiers, and I know that this Memorandum has served as the basis of the instructions sent since to the Pashas and Governors in the border provinces. — I have, however, not the slightest doubt that those instructions are very imperfectly and negligently executed, from the incapacity and slovenliness of the agents, otherwise the Turkish Government would have been long ago in possession of palpable and incontrovertible proofs of the machinations of the Greek and other Emissaries of the Propaganda in Thessaly and Southern Albania; and moreover, the participation in those machinations of Greek Government agents would have been distinctly demonstrated.

The fact is that Coletti himself is in Greece at the mercy of the Pallicari Captains, and the element of these Pallicari is anarchy, both in Greece and beyond her borders.

Anarchy in Greece of course will lead to financial disorders, and I therefore am fully satisfied that Mr. Argyropulo, the Greek chargé d'affaires here, was fully right when he told me that, to the best of his belief, the actual revenue of the Greek Government would not be this year beyond 10,000,000 of drachmes (upwards of 3,000,000 drachmes below the estimate of the budget).

But the same Greek anarchy will lead beyond the borders to incursions of robbers, to local disturbances, and to conspiracies and machi-

nations against the Ottoman Government, got up by the Emissaries of the revolutionary Propaganda.

I now beg to transmit to Your Lordship the enclosed secret Memorandum on the Syrian war (dated 26 March 1846).¹

I have also the honour to enclose an abridged Note on the Belgian Ottoman negotiations referring to my appointment as Ottoman Minister to Brussels, which distinctly shows that Reshid Pasha has broken his pledged word.

I have had several interviews with Rifaat Pasha on this subject.

One of the reasons which Rifaat Pasha assigned for the utility of my mission to Brussels was that there I could render some diplomatic services to Turkey during *times of tranquillity*, whereas I could be easily recalled, if any serious complication arise in Turkey whereby my military services would be required, whilst under present circumstances and considering the Mussulman religious prejudices it would be more difficult to employ me actively in the military service, *according to my rank*, in times of complete internal and external "*tranquillity*".

The fact is that I now receive 1100 £ a year of half pay for doing nothing, and yet the Turks go on paying this considerable salary, most likely chiefly because many of them are convinced or think that times may come where they will require my military service.

Were there not an influential party of this opinion, the adverse party would have long ago disposed of me, as they did of Admiral Walker, altho' the latter had *permanently* the strong support of the British Government.

P.S.

3 August 1846.

News has arrived from Arzroum which seriously complicates the pending negotiations between Turkey and Persia under the auspices of Russia and England.

The Persian Embassy at Arzroum has been attacked by an infuriated mob under the guidance of some Mollahs, who accused one of the Persians having violated a little boy of three years old. The Persian Minister and his servants defended for several hours the buildings of the Embassy, but the Secretary of Legation and several servants were killed in the defence. The Minister now demands his passports, or a public satisfaction and the dismissal of Essaard Pasha, the Governor General of Arzroum.

¹ cfr. Vol. I, p. XXV—LXVI.

(Inclosure in No. 76.)

NOTES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OTTOMAN
LEGATION AT BRUSSELS.

The negotiation about the appointment of General Jochmus as Envoy of the Porte to Brussels opened with Shekib Effendi and Riza Pasha in December 1844.

Riza Pasha refers matters to Shekib, and tells Mr. Rhasis that he has an entire confidence in General Jochmus.

1 12 *January 1845.* Baron Behr to have an interview with Riza Pasha. The latter is unwell.

Negotiations suspended, because Riza Pasha insinuates that he may require the General's services in Turkey itself. Change of Ministry.

2 *August.* Conversation of Baron Behr with Rifaat Pasha. President of the Council.

Rifaat approved the principle of the negotiation, and advises Baron Behr to speak with Ali Effendi and Soliman Pasha, promising himself his support in the Council of Ministers.

3 *August.* Baron Behr embodies the question in a Memorandum, and after Rifaat's perusal and approval of the same, transmits it officially to Ali Effendi, Reis Effendi ad interim.

Chosrew Pasha approves the Memorandum, which is confidentially submitted to him by Baron Behr.

4 24 *September.* General Jochmus dines at Rifaat Pasha, and is promised an answer immediately after the Beyram.

5 3 *October.* Baron Behr has an interview with Ali Effendi to discuss the contents of the Memorandum. Ali Effendi promises his support.

6 4 *October.* Rifaat Pasha sends through the Belgian Dragoman Mr. Henry the assurance to Baron Behr "that the affair will be finished in one month."

7 10 *October.* Ali Effendi informs General Jochmus that he has communicated the Memorandum of Baron Behr to the Grand Visir, and that the latter has directed the affair to be submitted to the Council of Ministers.

Ali Effendi admits the utility of the mission. Questions of detail about a Secretary expences in Brussels discussed. General Jochmus observes that he requires no Dragoman, and only one Secretary of Legation.

8 13 *October.* Ali Effendi assures the first Belgian Dragoman Mr. Rhasis that the affair is to be brought immediately before the Council by order of the Grand Visir.

9 23 *October*. Nomination of Reshid Pasha as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

10 27 *October*. Ali Effendi informs Baron Behr that the conclusion of the affair is to be delayed till the arrival of Reshid Pasha from Paris.

11 Baron Behr writes to his Government, and acquaints it with the *positive promises* of the Ottoman Ministers.

12 About the 25 *November*. Rifaat Pasha tells the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Argyropulo (who had seen the article in the "Journal de Francfort" relating to the affair), that it is the intention of the Ottoman Government to send General Jochmus as Minister to Brussels, and that they wait only for the arrival of Reshid Pasha.

The above article is copied into the *Constantinople* newspaper.

13 28 *December*. Baron Behr discusses in detail the above Memorandum with Reshid Pasha, who not only makes no objection whatever, but admits the utility of the mission, and says that he is already acquainted with the negotiation, and promises to support the affair "*de tout son pouvoir*".

14 1 *January 1846*. Reshid Pasha tells General Jochmus *that he has already submitted* the question to his colleagues, and says:

"Je ferai tout en mon pouvoir pour faire adopter la mesure."

Amongst other things he still adds:

"Nous avons l'intention d'étendre nos relations avec l'Europe, et j'espère que le jour vienne où nous aurons des Légations par-tout. — Pour le moment cela ne peut pas se faire, à cause de "considérations économiques. — Quant à la mission de Bruxelles "c'est différent, vu la position personnelle du Roi Léopold."

15 3 *January*. Ali Effendi says to General Jochmus that he trusts the measure in question will be adopted — "et que l'affaire réussisse".

16 13 *January*. Reshid Pasha's negative letter to Baron Behr, and subsequent controversial correspondence between the Reis Effendi and the Belgian Minister. (*Not yet closed.*)

NOTE.

1848. This breach of faith towards Baron Behr and myself led to further recriminations, and finally to my leaving the Turkish service altogether. All that can be said, on my part, in attenuation of the unfairness is that the Turks in pecuniary matters did not behave ungenerously, as they attempted to do — although unsuccessfully, towards Vice-Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker in 1844, who had rendered great services during the memorable campaign of 1840/41, which restored to the Sultan Syria, Arabia, Candia &c. &c.

LE GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS A MR. DE CATACASY

à Odessa.

Particulière. Extrait.

Constantinople 4 Septembre 1846.

C'est avec un sincère plaisir et avec un véritable intérêt que j'ai lu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 30 Juin/ 12 Juillet, et si j'ai un peu tardé, cher Monsieur de Catacasy, d'y répondre, l'unique raison de ce delay provient de mon désir de vous donner selon votre vœux le peu de détails à ma connaissance sur le séjour de Mehemet Ali à Constantinople.

Généralement parlant on en est encore aux conjectures quant aux véritables motifs de ce voyage, et il paraît que le vieux Pacha, après avoir reconnu le terrain et sondé les hommes, a préféré faire entrevoir des désirs et des vœux plutôt que commencer des négociations réelles. Néanmoins il n'a pas dépensé moins de 26,000,000 piastres soit six millions de roubles pp. en cadeaux et en bakchich, dont 8,000,000 p. au Sultan et 4,000,000 à la Sultane Valideh, le reste aux personnages influents du moment et à la valetaille des palais. — Une telle dépense ne se fait pas sans rime et sans raisons, aussi serais-je porté à croire qu'outre la question de la succession, le vieux Mehemet pût bien avoir envie d'agrandir son pachalik pour lui et ses successeurs, soit par l'annexion permanente des provinces au *Midi* de l'Égypte, dont il n'est que Gouverneur *temporaire*, soit par l'adjonction du territoire de Tripolis en Barbarie, dont il a affecté souvent de déplorer ici ouvertement l'inepte et rapace administration.

La fausseté des nouvelles données par le vieux et rusé Satrape sur l'abréviation ordonnée du voyage de son fils Ibrahim, la vanité des quasi promesses de Mehemet Ali aux partisans de ce dernier pour lequel ils ambitionnaient obtenir la Lieutenance temporaire de l'Égypte, les bruits qui ont eu cours dans cette province même, la position compromise et équivoque enfin d'Ibrahim depuis son retour à Alexandrie me font croire au premier des projets susmentionnés, l'étendue des sacrifices pécuniaires et l'ambition personnelle du Gouverneur de l'Égypte pourraient me persuader que la seconde idée ait existée également ou existe encore.¹

Il est probable que tout en étant peu bienveillante envers Ibrahim Pacha, la Porte n'attache cependant qu'une importance secondaire à la question *personnelle* de la succession égyptienne, mais il est naturellement très contraire à ses intérêts d'augmenter la puissance de son Vassal, et si elle reste fidèle aux principes qui paraissent l'avoir guidée dans sa conduite envers ce Gouverneur durant son séjour à Constantinople, les

¹ See the severe measures taken at the end of 1846 by Mehemet Ali against Saïd and Ibrahim Pashas, both publicly accused of having defrauded the treasury. (Mr. Laurin to Count Stürmer.)

chances de celui-ci d'étendre son patrimoine ne seraient guères considérables.

En effet le Sultan, qui tenait beaucoup à voir venir Mehemet Ali faire acte patent d'obéissance et de soumission, a reçu le vieux pêcheur avec bonté et affabilité, tout en lui marquant sa place parmi les autres Pachas de l'Empire. — Le Divan a toujours eu en vue de traiter le Gouverneur d'Égypte en *Musafir*, auquel selon les usages de l'hospitalité musulmane on ne peut montrer trop d'attention et d'égards, plutôt qu'en *fonctionnaire public* qui vient régler ses affaires.

Ce procédé ne manquait pas de tact ni de finesse et il a parfaitement réussi vis-à-vis de Mehemet Ali qui, dans les premiers jours après son arrivée, a eu quelques vellétés de jouer le petit potentat. Les insinuations égyptiennes et autres ne manquèrent pas afin de faire faire au "*Vice-Roi*" un pompeux accueil sinon une réception demi-royale.

Il s'agissait — à en croire même les journaux français de la capitale — d'envoyer à la rencontre de Mehemet Ali rien moins que le Capudan Pacha et le Ministre des affaires étrangères, et on s'est contenté d'expédier un simple Capidschi Baschi.

On parla après d'un débarquement à St. Stefano et d'une entrée publique par la Porte d'Adrianople, au contraire le Pacha d'Égypte est venu dans son bateau à vapeur descendre à la maison de Riza Pacha et on lui a rendu un salut de 19 coups de canon, comme au Grand Visir *honoraire*.

Il était ensuite de rigueur de faire valoir la circonstance que le Sultan avait ordonné à Mehemet Ali de s'asseoir en sa présence, mais il se trouva que le même honneur avait été souvent accordé aux Grands Visirs, aux Scheiks Ul Islam, à Chosrew et à Riza Pachas etc. etc.

Enfin Mehemet Ali avait fait demander indirectement un caïque blanc — comme ceux des Ambassadeurs — mais qu'on aurait pu *méprendre* pour un caïque Royale, et un logement — à cause de santé — dans le Kiosk *Impérial* à Therapia; — et on trouva une défaite pour la première demande et on n'accorda la seconde prière que pour *une semaine*.

En un mot, les faveurs du Sultan pour le Pacha d'Égypte sont restées infiniment au dessous des distinctions accordées en d'autres temps à d'autres Visirs favoris, victorieux, ou fêtés par les aïeux du Souverain actuel, telles que ces réceptions nous sont rapportées par Hammer et par les historiographes de la Cour Ottomane. L'accueil fait à Mehemet Ali présente cette singularité que tout en marquant de la part de l'Empereur un oubli du passé et la bienveillance du moment, il est caractérisé par l'absence totale de toute *démonstration publique* qui pût faire croire à une supériorité de Mehemet Ali sur les principaux fonctionnaires de la Sublime Porte à telle enseigne,¹ qu'après un cadeau Impérial

¹ A telle enseigne qu'on retira même le bataillon de troupes d'abord placé à l'Alai Kiosk au moment même où Mehemet Ali se rendit à la Porte et que le Dawá Naziri qui d'abord devait le recevoir au débarcadour du Kiosk, ne se joignit à son cortège que tout près de la Sublime Porte, en ayant l'air de sortir comme par hasard de chez un marchand de tabac.

d'un magnifique solitaire évalué à 500,000 roubles et après avoir présenté le vieux Visir à la Sultane Esma et même à la Sultane Valideh — en témoignage de faveur particulière — le Sultan l'a laissé partir le 17 Août même *sans* le salut d'usage des batteries du Sérail; tandis que le 20 Août le Capudan Pacha, sortant avec la flotte, a été salué comme d'habitude.

Le Grand Visir n'ayant pas donné un banquet officiel en honneur de Mehemet Ali, bien que celui-ci ait diné en famille de Ministres chez lui et chez les principaux personnages du Divan, l'Ambassadeur de France avait imaginé l'expédient de donner au vieux Pacha un dîner d'apparat sous prétexte de l'arrivée de l'Amiral Turpin, mais on insinua à Mehemet Ali de refuser l'invitation et la fête officielle eut lieu *sans* celui pour lequel elle avait été arrangée de longue main.

Ce n'est qu'envers le corps diplomatique européen que Mehemet Ali se soit donné un petit air d'indépendance, car ces Messieurs, contrairement à l'opinion de la majorité qui voulait d'abord attendre sa première visite, s'étant rendus successivement chez le Pacha selon l'exemple des Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre, le Gouverneur d'Égypte s'est contenté de les faire complimenter à son tour par son parent Kiamil Pacha. — Mr. de Bourqueney avait même conduit sa femme chez ce vieillard, étiquette peu usitée en pays musulman, mais malgré cette avance hasardée il a du comme les autres se contenter pour lui même et pour Madame de la visite du Kiamil.

Le plus piquant de l'affaire est un effet de la curiosité féminine faible si fatal au beau sexe depuis les temps d'Eve, car la plupart des dames *des grandes puissances*, ayant voulu voir le lion du jour, Reshid Pacha les avait fait prier de venir voir son harem, et soit ignorance soit crainte d'offusquer les vrais croyants, mais en tout cas avec une galanterie peu chevaleresque — au lieu de faire venir le Pacha il conduisit ces dames à travers la foule des employés et de la valetaille et sous l'accompagnement obligé de leurs commentaires orientaux dans les appartements de son Salemlik pour les présenter en corps à Son Altesse Mehemet Ali, qui daigna les accueillir fort poliment.

Le lendemain ces dames furent priées d'être présentes à un repas de Son Altesse chez sa belle fille et je m'attendais d'un jour à l'autre à les voir invitées à assister en toilette orientale au bain du très gracieux Visir. En effet, quelquesunes de ces dames avaient déjà poussé la complaisance jusqu'à danser *devant* Mehemet Ali.

Voilà, cher Monsieur de Catacasy, des détails dignes du fashionable Morning Post. — Je souhaite que vous les lisiez sans vous ennuyer et au moins en bonne santé "and in good spirits": soit à St. Petersburg. soit à Odessa au milieu de votre chère aimable famille. — Veuillez présenter mes sincères hommages à vos Dames et embrasser la charmante petite Nina.

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MR. DE CATACASY AU GÉNÉRAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 14/26 March 1847.)

Odessa 10/22 Septembre 1846.

Je ne saurais assez vous remercier, mon cher Général, de votre bien intéressante lettre du 4 Septembre, grâce à la vérité et aux détails de votre narration je puis presque me vanter d'avoir assisté en personne à la réception qui a été faite à Constantinople au vieux Soudan.

Mais ce que j'y ai trouvé sur tout de fort piquant, c'est que ceux qui ont fait à cette occasion le plus des cajoleries et de Selamaleks et qui ont même mis leurs femmes en campagne, n'ont recueilli que des désappointmens et des refus, tandis que les millions ont coulé ailleurs. Avouons, mon cher Général, que les Musulmans ont quelquefois raison de nous appeler, nous autres Européens et Diplomates, des *Saskin*[†] *Giatwour*. Nous le sommes en effet à l'endroit de la Turquie et nous le serons toutes les fois que nous croirons savoir plus long que les Orientaux en fait de duplicité et de ruses politiques. Du reste, pour ce qui concerne le voyage de Mehemet Ali et ses largesses je ne vois pas encore clair quel est le but qu'il avait en vue. Il doit-y avoir dans tout cela un dessous de cartes qu'un avenir prochain nous dévoilera probablement.

J'aurais voulu, mon Général, en retour de vos intéressantes observations sur Stamboul et ses visiteurs vous donner de mon coté quelques nouvelles dignes d'attention, mais à Odessa on ne s'occupe de politique qu'autant qu'elle peut avoir quelqu'influence sur l'exportation et le prix du blé. Quant à la guerre du Caucase dont on s'occupe en Europe plus que chez nous et qui exerce sur tout la verve de certains journaux, vous pouvez tenir pour sûr qu'elle n'offre et n'offrira probablement de long temps aucun épisode marquant, car le Prince Voronzoff a adopté le système le moins bruyant mais le plus propre à mettre Chamyl et ses montagnards devant l'impuissance de concentrer des masses et d'entreprendre des coups de main. Il ouvre des routes dans l'intérieur du pays, brûle les forêts, élève des forts sur les points les plus importants stratégiquement et établit dans le voisinage de ses forteresses des colonies de cosaques cultivateurs. C'est à peu près le système des stations américaines contre les Indiens qu'on a fait disparaître à force de les faire reculer, avec la différence cependant qu'ici le terrain est plus raboteux et le caractère des habitans plus belliqueux ce qui rend la tâche plus lente et plus difficile.

Mais revenons à Constantinople et à nos communs amis. Il est donc vrai que notre bon Sir Stratford a dit son à Dieu définitif aux habitans de la Turquie, Musulmans et Chrétiens, *fidèles et rênégats*, et que c'est Mr. Bulwer qui le remplace. Voyons, qui sait? peut-être

† "شاشقين étourdi, sot etc." *Zenker*,

l'ancien Ambassadeur à Madrid aura la main assez heureuse à Constantinople pour arranger un mariage entre la reine Isabelle et le Sultan Abdoul Medjid. Il y a tant de paradoxes dans le siècle où nous vivons qu'il est permis de tout supposer, même une alliance de cette espèce, qui aurait d'ailleurs le mérite de faire cesser les sérieuses dissidences qui paraissent s'élever entre Paris et Londres à propos du futur époux de la Souveraine des Espagnes. Vous conviendrez aussi, mon Général, que ce mariage ne serait guères plus surprenant ni plus inattendu que celui que vous nous annoncez dans votre lettre et dont ma femme ne peut pas revenir encore, tant cela lui a paru étrange et comique.

Mr. Titow qui nous a fait dernièrement la surprise de prendre la route d'Odessa au lieu de celle de l'Italie, n'est resté ici que deux jours après sa sortie du Lazaret. Nous avons été charmés de le trouver bonne mine et l'esprit fort calme après toutes les secousses et afflictions morales qu'il a eu à supporter dans ces derniers temps. Le jour de son départ d'ici pour la Crimée qu'il a voulu visiter en passant, il avait reçu des nouvelles fort rassurantes de Malte de sa femme et de ses enfans. Dieu veuille que cette Dame si vraiment bonne et si intéressante recouvre entièrement sa santé et que le séjour de Rome lui fasse oublier les tribulations de Pera.

Cela n'est pas pour la fin de ma lettre mais pour la *bonne bouche* que je me suis réservé de vous parler de notre excellent ami Mr. le Baron Behr. Et moi et ma femme et mes filles nous vous remercions de nous avoir donné de ses nouvelles, car son souvenir ne cesse de circuler au milieu de nous, souvenir d'amitié, d'estime et de reconnaissance que nous lui porterons toujours, à lui comme à vous, mon cher Général, pour toutes les preuves d'intérêt et de sympathie que vous nous avez données durant notre solitaire séjour à Buyukdéré.

Je trouve dans vos lettres une continuation de ces sentimens à notre égard et les recevrai toujours avec infiniment de plaisir; soit ici, soit à St. Petersbourg où je compte me rendre cet hiver ainsi que je vous l'ai déjà écrit.

Si je ne craignais de commettre une indiscretion je vous aurais demandé quelques mots sur votre position actuelle vis-à-vis ces Messieurs du Divan et sur les chances que vous prévoyez pour vous d'une utile activité au service du Souverain de la Turquie. Si Rechid Pacha mérite la renommée de sagacité et de haute civilisation qu'on lui a faite, il doit savoir apprécier vos talents et vous procurer l'occasion de rendre à la Turquie de nouveaux et utiles services, si non, je dirai que c'est un *bacaloum* comme les autres.

A Dieu et *inschallah*, mon cher et aimable ami. Agrérez les plus affectueux compliments de la part de tous les miens.

Votre tout dévoué

Catacasy.

1847

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Vienna.

Private and confidential.

Extract.

Constantinople 1 February 1847.

In conformity with the contents of Mr. Samuel's letter from Vienna dated 29 December I have the honour to transmit by this month's messenger two Memoranda.

My informants on the state of Algiers are chiefly the Spanish Staff-Officers sent from Madrid on a special military mission through all mediterranean states, as well as to some of the northern countries of Europe.

Don Antonio de Larrua, late Intendant General of Espartero's armies, a man of high standing and considerable talents, also gave me many interesting details. He had been an amateur with Marshal Bugeaud during the latter's expedition through Algeria in spring 1846.

None of the Spanish Officers nor of the Mussulmans with whom I have conversed here on the situation of Algiers, have said anything relative to an eventual expedition of the French against Tunis. — This is a conjecture of my own, but I consider that part of the Memorandum as worth serious attention. — The authority of the Sultan over Tunis is undeniable. The Mussulman law is explicit on this head. The Sovereignty is *exclusively* tested by the right of the mint and of the public prayer. Both in Tunis proclaim the Sultan's Sovereignty. — The Porte therefore was bound in justice and in selfdefense to support the claim of its Ambassador at Paris, to present at Court the Bey of Tunis in his quality of Ottoman subject, as exposed in the late protest of the Divan.

We have been witnessing all the gradual *decline of the Ottoman Power*, but my own opinion, erroneous though it may be, would go to maintain that, provided Reshid could remain Grand Visir for any length of time, we should have to date "*the history of the fall of this Empire*" from the day of his appointment.

At a distance and to judge from the newspapers all would appear to be "*couleur de rose*", but it must be borne in mind that most of the newspapers' scribes are either Frenchmen in the employ of the

Government, or others paid by the Turkish Foreign Office. There is also a certain number of Turkish and European employes connected with the press (or informers to its correspondents here) who make money since Reshid's administration is installed, by all sort of trades and enterprises. One of the favorite speculations of these worthies is for instance real or simulated purchase of Turkish house property, which being an illicit transaction for foreigners requires a special protection from the chief authorities of the Porte.

The praise of Reshid and his government by the press must therefore be taken "cum grano salis", and even the Sultan, I understand, has become aware of the value of these literary productions, concocted at Constantinople, inserted into the European papers, and then laid as foreign extracts under Her Majesty's eyes by means of the "Journal de Constantinople", whose present editor, Mr. Rouel, was formerly Reshid Pasha's Secretary.

To those who look more to facts than to the fabrications of the press, it must be clear that a serious crisis is coming on. — The Mussulman interests are considered as menaced by the Ottoman community at large, in just proportion as the Rayah population shows symptoms of unruliness and defiance, because they fancy that any thing may be exacted from an administration based on so-called reform principles. — This allarm has naturally created a reaction, in the provinces first, and at present in the capital itself.

The massacres of Bedr Chan Bey in Kurdistan, the disturbances in Bosnia, the effervescence in Bulgaria, the late riots in Janina and Filipopolis, the audacious robberies and murders¹ in some Pashaliks, the discontent finally of the Turks in Constantinople, and of the regular army in special, are different effects of the same cause.

80.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 2 April 1847.)

Vienna 2 March 1847.

My dear General,

You know that the journeys of our messengers are so skilfully arranged that it is impossible to answer a letter arriving here from London or from Constantinople till after the lapse of weeks. — I expect every hour the arrival of a Courier who will go on to Turkey, and I am writing to be prepared for him.

Your letter dated the 1 February and its accompanyments have given me great satisfaction and pleasure — I will send the Memoir

¹ Upwards of 30 murders were committed a few days ago on the high road from Constantinople to Adrianople ("Journal de Constantinople").

relating to Algeria to England — *probably* to Lord John Russell in order to ensure attention to it, which it might not meet with in the F. O. — I have said *probably*, because I am not quite resolved in that, though I am determined that so valuable a work shall not be lost to our Government. — It has the remarkable merits of embracing and discussing well every topick connected with our policy in the parts it treats of, without being long, or obscure from its brevity.

The affair of the Mission to Belgium seems to be like all Turkish affairs subject to delay, but it promises to be successful. — You are the only person to decide upon its value to yourself. I should be very sorry to have you *out* of the way, should a war ensue between England and France, for I think you ought in that case to be at the head of those Ottoman troops, if they should be employed (as it ought to be the case) in the manner you suggest in your Memoir on Algeria — but perhaps your absence on a Mission to Bruxelles need not necessarily prove an obstacle to you being in that command, and the event of war is not certain — though so many things make it probable that before *very* long the jealousy and ambition of the French will create a state of things incompatible with peace.

I regret that any Turkish Minister should be ignorant of the basis upon which the government of his country rests — Turkey is a Theocracy, and the religion of its people alone protects the Sultan. That religion is intimately blended with natural habits of thinking and acting; if a Minister destroys the customs of a country, he prepares it for internal commotions, and to fall by foreign conquest. — New institutions though perfectly in accordance with what is, foppishly, called the *spirit of the Age*, destroy the harmony of the whole mass. They are mischievous and needless.

The old Institutions of the Turks suffice for every thing they want or desire to have, provided they are well administered — it is in the mal-administration of existing law that lies the evil of that country, and it might be remedied without danger and with the immense increase of power and happiness to all. — One Master Mind could do it, if one Minister should, by good fortune, possess it. I believe there is nowhere a people so fitted by a hundred existing circumstances of situation &c. &c. to be moved by a wise head and firm heart, as the Turkish people.

They are eminently sensible of the virtue of *justice*, and though that Virtue be, amongst all denominations of human beings, the most universally felt, I think it is more so amongst the Turks than any other. — I am well acquainted with the real weakness of the man you speak of, and of his incapacity for seeing the political state of his country, and of his avoiding to permit the characteristic vanity of a demi-savant — *that is* of a Philosopher à la française, to have the absolute direction of his actions. — Were I the Sultan I would make short work with such men. — I conceive, well, the danger you speak of as likely to spring from the Army — How a pretentious, preaching, timid civilian,

suspected of indifference, at least, to the faith of the Mussulman, is to be long able to keep within the bounds of complete submission armed and banded men, who may perhaps despise his personal want of energy — doubt his patriotism — believe in his foreign tastes — and I cannot see particularly men who may be without the restraint which *fear* imposes upon a multitude, and at the same time be animated by the desire to set up above all competition the authority of the body to which they belong, and thereby to place within the reach of their favorites all that such men may wish to enjoy of pre-eminence.

If any thing like what I allude to takes place, the best thing to be hoped for is that some Chief of real ability may arise, and become effectually the Master. *He* may bring out and mature the innate military energies of the nation, and save it from becoming subject to a foreign yoke, but the system on which at present the Porte lives, will expire, and the World will have to fight for the possession of that City which by its position is naturally the very Heart of Europe and Asia, within the Caucasian range and the vast expanse of mountain country extending God knows where —

Assuredly our policy ought to be to preserve Turkey from all such changes as may tend to bring about an universal strife! — This long, tedious, and yet quite incomplete designation of opinions will shew you how much I concur in your views of the situation of Turkey as it is, and as it may be feared to be liable to become if the nonsense of *Progress*, as it is called, should be indulged in — I hope there will be found sufficient of *old Prejudice* strong enough to defeat the scheming movement party! what you tell me of the fires — of the Greek Doctor — of the women sent to Brousa — of the invectives in the Turkish newspapers — are all strong indications of the true feelings of the public, and I expect the consequences.

I expect Shekib Pasha here in a very few days. Pray tell me what he *is*? I forgot his antecedents. I *think* he is rather *anti-french*.

Your speculations about Spain appear to me to be very well grounded in reasoning. I have myself, though little informed of the Spanish affairs — fallen into a similiar train of thought, and I think it is likely we shall have some such issue there, in Spain. — The administration of Lord John is certainly as strong as his best friends can wish, and quite safe, at least, till the meeting of a New Parliament. — Lord John is acting with great discretion and yet with vigor, and people are much pleased with him.

It is said — I hope it is a mere scandal — that Louis Philippe took means to be *certain* by *Medical* information that Isabella is incapable of having children. They say also that her husband is in no better plight; this last would not signify, for in Spain I presume the husband's incapacity might be supplied by the labours of some dozen faithful subjects — but to have the Queen incapable is a great public misfortune and quite irremediable — I think there will be a revolution

in that country before long, unless there shall be much better management than we know of now.

Ireland is in a fearful state. Famine brings Pestilence and together they work the work of Fate. — The feeling of the English public is noble, and does honour to Christian charity. *It is a Public feeling.*

I will conclude (after having written enough to tire you to death) with expressing the great pleasure I have had in reading your letters, and my hope that I may hear again from you — Lady Ponsonby sends her best compliments to you.

Your very faithfully

Ponsonby.

81.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Vienna.

Private and confidential. Extract.

Pera 2 April 1847.

I beg to enclose a Note on the revolt of Bedr Chan Bey of Kurdistan. The Porte is very anxious to augment without delay the number of troops destined to act against the Kurds.

The annex Nr. II¹ is a Memorandum on the antecedents of Shekib Effendi in the Turkish service, according to Your Lordship's request in your letter of the 2 March², which I had the honour to receive by the last messenger

It is with the greatest satisfaction that I have read what Your Lordship is pleased to say regarding my Memorandum on Algeria. I am anxious to know how it has been received in London

The Barrier of Tunis becomes the more important, as Mehemet Ali has demanded from the Porte either proprio motu or instigated by the French, to be invested with the government of African Tripoli. — He threw out strong hints on the subject when he was here last year, and I understand that he has renewed his insinuations and propositions some months ago.

The conduct of the French Government towards Tunis and the projected voyage of Mehemet Ali to Paris and the fortifications of Alexandria against a maritime attack may be connected with the above plan, and give an insight into the general views of France in Northern Africa; especially for the case of eventual war.

¹ is not annexed.

² vide No. 80.

The fortifications of Alexandria are carried on under the special direction of Colonel Galice of the French engineers, who has been lately promoted to a superior rank in the Legion of Honour.

The importance of Algiers, Tunis, Tripolis, and Egypt as *Mohamedan* states cannot be too highly prized by those who consider in its true light the theocratical organization of Turkey and the *Caliph* of the Sultans.

If the Ottoman Empire were to lose for instance the mayor part of its European provinces (and the *Reshid system* may lead to this ere many years are over), still it would remain a first rate Mussulman Power, provided the Sultan and Caliph rule *by the Coran* from Algiers to Bagdad and from the Black Sea to Mecca and the Arabian Gulf.

In Asia and in Africa the Christians form scarcely a perceptible minority of the general population, in European Turkey on the contrary they live in the proportion of 12 to 3 in a country surrounded by powerful Christian states.

If Turkey ceases to be a *Mohamedan Theocracy* it will fall to pieces, not only in *Europe*, but also in Asia and in Africa, where the devout Mussulmans will scorn and abjure an infidel Caliph. Well does Your Lordship say with practical wisdom that the Mohamedan religion alone protects the Sultan. The maintainance of Turkey is a question of general policy, and not of Christian philanthropy.

Yet a Theocracy does not necessarily exclude neither religious tolerance nor a just and liberal administration.

It certainly was a great fault and a stumbling block of Riza Pasha's Ministry that it showed reminiscences of "*intolerance*", and was "*anti-christian*" on political principle.

Nowhere more than in Turkey does the old rule hold good that deficient or imperfect laws *well* administrated are infinitely preferable to good laws *badly* carried out.

The Turks of eminence in our days are, generally speaking, not so much opposed to *substantial reforms*, especially in the arts of war and industry, as to the *hollow innovations*, such as they are barefacedly practised by Reshid Pasha and his adherents "*pour jeter de la poudre aux yeux de l'Europe*."

To quote one example amongst hundreds, no body will deny that medical, military, industrial, and scientific schools are excellent institutions in themselves. They have been patronised successively by Sultans Selim, Mahmoud, and Abdoul Medjid.

But if Reshid Pasha tells Mr. Jossati, the architect, that the *principal* consideration in the selection of a piece of ground for the so-called University is the conspicuousness of the site, in order that the building may attract the eyes of the steamboat travellers, then I maintain that such an act of charlatanism is unworthy of the Prime Minister of a great Empire.

And if the erection of schools must necessarily be followed by the general introduction of the French language, as intended by Reshid

then I hold (however meritorious schools may be still as philanthropic creations) that the Turkish Empire, *as an independent state*, incurs a signal danger out of proportion with the advantages to be derived from the above schools.

For the French language, if ostensibly patronised by the Ottoman Government, will become the fashionable and the practical vehicle of official and social intercourse, and it will be studied by the Rayahs, in preference to the Italian, which was hitherto the European language most current in the Levant, and which from the most important political reasons ought to be especially favored by this Government.

In the train of the French language will come the French journals, and with them the anarchical and democratic doctrines of the Propaganda. — Thus the dose of daily poison already dealt out in Turkey by the revolutionary press of Athens will be augmented until 11½ millions of Christian Rayahs will think themselves strong enough to rise, under the auspices of the demagogues of all countries, against the millions of European Mussulmans of this Empire, and there Russia and Austria will step in to preserve their own dominions from social conflagration and disorganization.

In conformity with its late Ultimatum the Porte has broken off yesterday all diplomatic intercourse with the Greek mission here.

It is much to be regretted that the Turkish Commander-in-chief in Southern Albania, Thessaly &c. &c. (Head-Quarters at Monastir) is a certain Darbhor Reshid Pasha, appointed about 2 months ago. Of all ignorant Turkish Grandees he is *the* most ignorant, and it is his utter insignificance and incapacity, which inspire no jealousy even in Turkey, that account for his promotion under the late and the present administration. Riza made him a Mushir and his second in command, because he was quite certain that he never could exercise any influence over the Sultan, but I question if Riza would have entrusted him with a great detached command.

Riza's very jester said once in Darbhor Reshid Pasha's presence, pointing at him, that the Turkish Empire must be safe and in a capital condition since it could afford to make Mushirs out of Darbhors.

Reshid Darbhor succeeded in the command of the army of Rumili to one Mehmed Reshid Pasha, like himself brought up a slave in the Seraglio of Sultan Mahmoud.

A story goes about that, when Mehmed Reshid Pasha's Nishan was returned to the Porte, as it customary on the death or the dismissal of a Pasha, there just happened to be a great throng of people near the gates of the Sublime Porte.

"See," said somebody, "they bring back Reshid Pasha's Nishan." — "Glory to God and the Prophet," shouted the crowd, "we are at last delivered from the Giaour Visir!!" They mistook the name of Mehmed Reshid Pasha, the late Serasker of Rumili, for that of the present Grand Visir.

(Annex to Nr. 81.)

THE REVOLT OF BEDR CHAN BEY IN KURDISTAN.

(Confidential Note.)

Constantinople 31 March 1847.

Next to the system of interference of foreign Consuls in the interior administration of Turkey the attempts of the Christian missionaries at sectarian conversions and influence amongst the Rayah population of the Empire range with the foremost causes of the decline of Ottoman authority in the provincial Governments.

Consuls as well as Missionaries are frequently ignorant of the language and of the habits of the people among whom they temporarily reside, and they are usually surrounded by a set of Dragomans whose character is at least doubtful, but whose protection is of great value to a host of clients of the lowest moral standard.

It is therefore not astonishing that the provincial Governors are often not only unable to enforce in special cases the existing laws and regulations, but that they become objects of derision amongst certain classes of the population: until goaded into violence. they commit injudicious or unjustifiable acts of main force and arbitrary authority.

There can be no doubt that the first combinations between Bedr Chan Bey and the Pasha of Mossoul against the unfortunate Nestorians in 1843 were mainly caused by the dissensions between the American and the English and French Missionaries in Kurdistan. The English¹ and the French sectarians, supported by their respective Consuls, first joined in counteracting the Americans,² and then quarrelled amongst themselves. --- The Americans, who in the beginning seem to have limited themselves to the erection of schools, were represented by the other Missionaries and their partisans as building defensive castles in the Nestorian mountains. The Turkish and Kurdish authorities were subsequently frightened about plans of influence and domination harbored by the French and by the English, each party rendering the adversary an object of suspicion, until some real or pretended act of aggression or resistance on the part of the Nestorians became the signal for Bedr Chan Bey to begin an exterminating warfare against the Christians of the Hakiara.

The consequences of this civil conflict and the working of the evil passions which it has kindled, distracted for a long time the Pashalik of Mossoul, and extended into the Governments of Arzroum and even of Trebizonde.

In the latter Kiör Hussein Bey, the most influential Chief of the Adjura, leagued himself with Bedr Chan Bey, combining ultimately an insurrectionary movement for the autumn of 1846.

¹ The Reverend Mr. Badger &c. &c.² The Reverend Dr. Grant.

The so-called reform system has numerous and powerful adversaries in all the Pashaliks situated on the Persian frontiers, and the authority of the Porte, already precarious in the border provinces, is there becoming merely nominal whenever innovations are attempted which are opposed to the religion, the customs, and the manners of the great Mussulman majority.

The presence of Reshid Pasha in the Ottoman Ministry considerably alarmed the Mohamedan interests at large, his nomination to the post of Grand Visir was received in the border provinces with a mixed sentiment of defiance, scorn, and contempt.

I was at the time in Sinope, Samsoun, and Trebizonde, where authentic information could be collected, and excepting the opinion of a few amongst the Europeans and Levantines, the general and the popular feelings were decidedly adverse and even hostile to the new administration.

The revolt of Kiör Hussein Bey was suppressed by Halil Pasha of Trebizonde, who bribed the Selictar of that Chieftain to deliver him into the hands of the local authorities. Kiör Hussein was sent a prisoner to Constantinople in the month of October or November last, and sentenced to the bagno for life, but by the influence of the Sultan's Imam he was removed to a common prison, from whence he contrived to escape a few days afterwards (end of February), and is supposed to have now returned to his haunts of the Adjura.

The hostile demonstrations of Bedr Chan Bey were of a much more serious character.

Provoked by the Nestorians and their protectors, who seem to have reckoned on illusory support from Constantinople, the powerful Kurdish Chieftain collected from 10 to 12,000 of his devout followers, and just as in the year 1843 he destroyed by fire and sword the Nestorian districts.

It is difficult to ascertain the actual number of the victims of all ages and sexes, and the real extent of damage and ruin amongst the Nestorian Christians.

The loss of life is great, 600 people at least have been killed and massacred. — The emigrants into Persia are computed at above 1200.

The Turkish Ministry cowed by the language of the foreign representatives thought it expedient to menace Bedr Chan Bey, but pleaded bad weather as an excuse for not executing their threats ("Journal de Constantinople", 11 November 1846), whilst a secret negotiation was opened with Bedr Chan Bey by the intermediary of one Nasim Effendi, sent ad hoc from Constantinople.

In the meantime a report got abroad that Nasim Effendi was to offer money and presents to Bedr Chan Bey, if he would but remain quiet. — Turks of high respectability, as well as other people, who have daily access to the palace, maintained that there could be no equivocation as to the fact of the disgraceful offer being made, whereas

the friends of Reshid Pasha not only rejected the report, but qualified it as a malicious invention.

Mr. Boscovich, the first Prussian Dragoman, assured me that he had personally spoken on the subject to the Grand Visir, and that Reshid Pasha had most positively *denied* all knowledge even of a special mission entrusted to Nasim Effendi.

Reports and information from Mossoul, however, soon left no uncertainty as to the fact of Nasim's mission, and individually I firmly believe that Bedr Chan Bey accepted money on the condition of not plundering the Nestorians emigrating into Persia, the Porte hoping by these means to evade further foreign representations and clamours.

Neither is there any doubt in my mind that Nasim Effendi was authorized to promise to Bedr Chan Bey the gift of a Nishan and a sword, *in case* he would voluntarily come to implore the Sultan's pardon at Constantinople, but the haughty and diffident Kurd scorned the proposition and the recompense.

The kind of manifesto against Bedr Chan Bey, published by the Porte on the 16 March last, distinctly states what had been at first denied, that Nasim Effendi *was* charged with a conciliatory mission, that his negotiations failed, and that the Kurdish Chief now hurls defiance at the Divan, whilst he levies troops and fortifies his strong holds, having at the same time begun new persecutions against the Christians.

The proclamation says that 45,000 men will be concentrated at Kharpout under Osman Pasha, Commander-in-chief, and his subordinate Generals Chair-el-Din and Omer Pashas to act against Kurdistan.

My present impression is that the camp at Kharpout will not amount to 20,000 men.

The provocations evidently come now from Bedr Chan Bey who, himself a warlike and illiterate barbarian, has been led to overrate his power and resources by the hesitations and shifting demeanor of the Ottoman Ministers.

Omer Pasha called on me late in the month of January. I asked him about the projected campaign, but he said that, although last autumn he had been destined to have a command in the Kurdistan army, he now apprehended that war would not take place, and that he should remain in Constantinople to be employed there under the Serasker Said Pasha.

Since the open insurrection of Bedr Chan Bey, however, Omer Pasha has been ordered to join the camp of Kharpout.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered *Buyukdéri* 2 June 1847.)

Vienna 28 April 1847.

Dear General,

The messenger arrived last night, and must be sent off immediately, I was engaged with formal duties and have only time to write a few lines. — I thank you for your most able letter, it contains views which are luminous and to my apprehension just — and I hope I may expect to hear from you when you have nothing better to do than to write to me.

So far as things in our parts of the world are to be the guide to our opinions I think there will not be any outbreak of a hostile nature. — The French Government are afraid of war against us at present and will probably take measures to avoid it, but the world is not the less like a heap of gunpowder, and a spark *may* ignite the mass at any time. — The state of Prussia is very disagreeable in some respects, and many people foresee the existence there of dissensions which may be serious.

I will not speculate upon the chances of our futurity lest I should talk nonsense, except so far as to say that I fear the return of financial prosperity and the cessation of the evils of famine will give scope to the schemers, who are now obliged to rest in comparative repose.

I am very curious to see what internal measures will be taken by the Grand Visier. — I thank you much for the information respecting Shekib Effendi. — I must conclude.

Yours faithfully

P.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Vienna.

Private and confidential. Extract.

Pera 2 May 1847.

I have acted in conformity with the advice which Your Lordship has been kind enough to give me

I communicated confidentially with Prince Voghorides on the subject of the military command on the Greek frontiers, mentioning to him what had occurred, and what I have had already the honour of stating to Your Lordship, — adding that since then I had an interview with the Serasker Said Pasha, who had wished to see me

"I am very glad to find," said Prince Voghories, "that Lord Ponsonby, whom the Turks continue to consider as their best friend, approves of the idea of placing you in command on the Greek frontiers. My own impression is that the plan is not only good, but that it would be a safe and advantageous measure to adopt. Turkish affairs in general assume a serious aspect, and although the follies committed at Athens may now lead to the fall of Mr. Coletti, yet we must be prepared even after that event to meet possible difficulties in Albania and Thessaly, where permanent causes of disturbances cannot be denied to exist. — It is always better and wiser to *prevent* than to *repress*, and in order to prevent great disorder an act or two of vigour may be necessary in given cases. Now if a Turkish Pasha commands the frontiers and were to act (which is at least doubtful) with becoming resolute prudence, it is ten to one, but there would be an outcry against his barbarous severity, whereas, if *you* hold the command, people will not easily be duped into a belief that you have been beyond the limits of military rules and general or international laws."

"I beg you will state all this to Lord Ponsonby, and say that it would be a very good thing, if His Lordship were to speak in a similar sense either to Shekib Effendi, or find other means to make his opinions on the subject known here, where they will have the greatest weight."

Since the arrival of the last Russian instructions on the Greco-Turkish differences to the diplomatic agents of the Emperor at Constantinople and at Athens, little or no doubt is entertained here as to the fall of Mr. Coletti's Ministry.

Prince Metternich will have been much surprised to learn that instead of following his advice, the King of Greece has sent orders to Mr. Argyropulo to demand his passports. "Sa Majesté a une tête de fer," said a person on this occasion. "C'est vrai," was the reply, „mais c'est une tête de fer creuse."

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO GEORGE SAMUEL,

attached to Her British Majesty's Embassy at Vienna.

Private. Extract.

Pera 2 May 1847.

Mr. Longworth is come back from a tour in Asia Minor. He says that the troops, collecting against Bedr Chan Bey, will not amount to 20,000 men, and adds that the Turkish Government have sent two or three millions of piasters with a view to buy over the allies of Bedr

Chan Bey, viz to the north of Djesiré Mahmoud Khan and to the South Nourullah Bey &c. &c. &c.

I understood Mr. Longworth to say that he had paid a personal visit to Bedr Chan Bey.

He told me also that there are many complaints in Mossoul about French clerical interference in the spiritual concerns of the Chaldeans, who will not introduce the Latin litany of the Roman church. The Pasha of Mossoul is foolish enough to tolerate that the Chaldean non-conformists are arrested by the cawasses of the French Consul, instructed to this effect by Mr. Trioche, the Catholic Bishop of Bagdad.

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A. J.

85.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY
at Vienna.

Private. Extract.

Buyukdéré 1 July 1847.

My Lord,

Not knowing the exact time when the monthly messenger will leave Pera, I write a few lines at an early hour.

The news from Kurdistan are said to be favorable, many Chieftains of Bedr Chan Bey's party having been *bought over with the three millions of piasters* which I mentioned in a previous letter as having been sent for that purpose to the principal officers acting against the Kurdish rebel. — A similar essay of quelling an insurrection is, however, not unefficient mode of ensuring permanent tranquillity.

It was partially resorted to in Albania during the disturbances of 1843/44 with temporary success, but the present insurrectionary movements there show the superficial nature of the result then obtained. — Indeed, what dependence can be placed on Chieftains of whom some were kept quiet by dint of money, and others first taken prisoners by treachery, and then released from the bagno on principles of philanthropy. — The natural consequences are that the one class got unruly as soon as they heard of Turco-Greek differences, and the other parties began to conspire the moment they put the feet on their native soil.

The insurrection, although not formidable as yet, is headed by one Djouléka, who had passed a year in the bagno of the arsenal. It began in the province of Argyro Castro, and seems to be spreading to Delvino, Dibra, and Jacova. — I beg to refer Your Lordship to the apprehensions which I expressed in this respect in my former letters.

There can be no doubt that the rebels are in communication with Greek agents, and more than mere causes of suspicion — perhaps

proofs — exist for instance against the Greek Consul at Salonich Mr. Soutzo.

Mr. Cordoba told me that stringent orders have been sent to the Mushir of Salonich to withdraw by main force a number of Greek berats and passports, delivered or sold quite lately by this person to certain Ottoman Albanian subjects. He is to be *expulsed* publicly (without further reference) from Turkey if he resists or gives any further cause of complaint. — The circulation in Turkey of all Greek newspapers has been again rigorously prohibited, and with every possible reason.

The partisans of the present Greek Ministry are much alarmed since the last estafet arrived from Vienna. — They maintain that King Otho will rather abdicate, than receive again Mr. Mussurus at Athens. — I cannot understand by what process of reasoning or feeling people can be brought to suppose that a Prince who has submitted to the conditions imposed on him by the Greek insurrection of 1843, could all at once be inspired to renounce a throne because the mediator of his very choice declares that His Majesty is wrong in a difference brought about by his own doing.

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86.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered *Buyukdéré* 1 September 1847.)

Vienna 2 August 1847.

My dear General,

With respect to your excellent Memoir on Algeria I have acted as I thought best for your interest. I know that a Memoir sent home at a time where nobody there *will* act in the question to which it is directed, always is thrown into a drawer and forgotten, whereas if it arrives when the subject occupies the mind of Ministers, it will be alluded to.

I know that the present is not the moment where any thing will be done about Algiers, but I think the day is not far off when that question will become a great one. I have therefore hitherto kept the Memoir — but whenever you direct me to send it home, I will do so.

The world is alive with questions of Constitutions, and things very like Revolution have taken place, this is another reason why Algiers is not at present thought of.

I do not know what will be the end of Mussurus' affair. We get no intelligence here: you may know what the Porte has done and will do.

I hope you are well, give my best remembrance to Cordoba. I would write to him, only I do not think he likes to correspond, and perhaps he may be right to extremely caution.

Yours truly

Ponsonby.

87.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Vienna.

Private and confidential.
Extract.

Buyukdéré 1 September 1847.

With reference to the letter which Your Lordship has done me the honour to write to me regarding the Memoir on Algeria, I have no hesitation in subordinating my own wishes to your experience and judgment; — yet I should like to take the liberty of suggesting that the Memorandum contains much more a mere outline of operations than a complete plan of campaign, and that many details are required on various points, regarding which my informants and myself are still in the dark. — A partial change has also taken place in the state of affairs in Algeria, as mentioned in my letter of the 1 July, and other occurrences, both in French possessions and in Marocco, contribute to modify the general situation of Northern Africa.

Yet it strikes me that reasonable hopes may still be entertained in case of a maritime war to cut off from Europe and eventually to capture the French forces in Algeria, and then either to strengthen Turkey by the restoration of her former dependencies — or at least to destroy the effect of the aggressions and the attempts of France in the Mediterranean, such as French policy develops them in Algiers, Tunis, Egypt, and Greece.

If the plan or the outline sketched in my Memorandum of the 27 January be substantially approved of in England and deemed susceptible of application and improvement under given circumstances, I have no doubt that the general experience in military affairs which characterizes Lord Palmerston, would indicate at once to His Lordship many imperfections in the Memorandum and a number of points on which his agents, although remaining *unacquainted with the general question*, could furnish him with useful or essential information.

It is for the purpose of securing in time this information that I should beg leave to suggest the transmission of the Memoir to the proper quarters, subordinating, however, altogether this idea to the wisdom of Your Lordship.

Riza Pasha is working by means of the Sultana Valideh to be appointed Serasker. — Sarim Pasha is reported to have tendered his resignation of the finance department, probably because he shrewdly

thinks to withdraw before the general break up of the present cabinet. The whole Ulema party are up in arms against Reshid, they accuse him "à tort ou à raison" of laxity of morals, under the pretense that he has tried to protect his physician Dr. Paleologue (brought up under his care at Paris) from the consequences of the discovered amorous intrigue which the latter has had with the handsome wife of Mourtaz Effendi, the Mustechar of the War-Office.

The Doctor has just been exiled to Candia and Madame Mourtaz Effendi to Trebizonde,¹ whilst the wife of the Amedji Fuad Effendi, also implicated in the affair, is separated from her husband. — The rigorists recall now to memory the scandalum magnum in consequence of which, as Your Lordship may remember, two Turkish women were exiled this spring to Brussa, and they pretend that Paleologue and his frail beauty were only saved from death (the award of the Mohamedan law) because Paleologue was in fact nothing more than indiscreet, and "ce qu'à la cour on nomme l'ami du Prince et qu'en province on appelle maquereau". They declare that he would not have been exiled even if it had depended merely on Reshid Pasha's decision, and that, although crim. con. be not punished with transportation neither at Paris, Vienna, nor even at London, yet they are decided to maintain in Constantinople the usages which protect the sanctity of the Harem.

J.

88.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Buyukdéré 2 November 1847.)

Vienna 5 October 1847.

My dear General,

I wish you would send me your Memoir with those additions which you said have been made to it! The change in the position of Algeria is very considerable, and if I am well informed, the time may be approaching when all information respecting it will be very acceptable at home.

I wrote to Palmerston on the subject. — I sent him the interesting information contained in your letter concerning what has been done in Albania and concerning the state of Turkey. Every thing in Europe wears the appearance of coming troubles. -- The Money Interest will do every thing possible to keep off war — but that Power may prove to be unable to effect the purpose it wishes to obtain.

All you read in the Newspapers or elsewhere about the interference of the Austrian Government with the Romans, the King of Sardinia, the Tuscany, the Lucca &c. &c. *all is a lie.* — There has been no

¹ "Changed to Nicomedia."

interference and none is intended by Austria — but if attacked Austria certainly will defend her rights.

I hope to hear from you. I am always instructed and high pleased by your letters.

Your most truly

Ponsonby.

89.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY
at Vienna.

Private and confidential.

Buyukdéré 2 November 1847.

My Lord,

A month's absence in Bulgaria and the Balkan has prevented me from having the honour of writing to Your Lordship by the last overland messenger.

On my return here I found Your Excellency's letter of the 5 October, and beg now to enclose the asked for additional Notes to the Memoir on Algiers. If a copy of the latter is also required I will send it.

Mr. de Cordoba, who is appointed a member of the Royal Council at Madrid, and who leaves Constantinople on the 7 instant, requests me to say that he will answer Your Lordship's very kind letter of the 5 October in a few days, from Smyrna, it being just now impossible for him to write in time for to-morrow's messenger.

Since my arrival from the remote and unfrequented parts of Turkey which I have been examining, I have not yet been able to ascertain what is really going on here in the higher political spheres. Cordoba, who is a friend and partisan of Reshid Pasha, tells me, however, that as the late hurricane which was nigh upsetting the present administration, has blown over, he considers the Grand Visir safe at least for a couple of months, but that a compromise is very likely to take place regarding the Serasker's office.

Riza, who along with Reshid and Chosrew has received a new Nishan, as a special mark of favor, seems to continue bent on becoming Serasker, and once in that office, by a transaction or without it, there can be scarcely a doubt but he will renew his struggle for supremacy with Reshid, whose present position resembles that of old Raouf Pasha in former times, who was nominal Grand Visir but not master of the cabinet.

I find that the news from Albania is favorable. — The comparative facility with which Djouléka and Rappocalli were put to flight even by such poor men as Darbhor Reshid and Emin Pashas, will prove to Your Lordship how easy it would have been with a little common

sense and foresight, *to prevent* those disturbances and consequently to save Government from great discredit at home and abroad and from very considerable expenses. The Porte was prepared to throw all the blame and very deservedly on Darbhor Reshid Pasha, as Your Lordship will perceive from the annexed extract of the Journal de Constantinople (6 August 1847). — I have had the honour to state to Your Lordship as early as the 2 of April and in subsequent letters my opinions and those of Prince Voghorides on these Albanian affairs, and I am surprised that the Porte should only lately have found out how intimately they are connected with the Turco-Greek differences.¹

Regarding these and the general state of Greek affairs it is most satisfactory that Turkey as well as England — after perhaps overgenerous delays — should have applied the screw in the right place, that is on the money interest of a country where lucre and a love of gain are the leading national features. — This will very shortly bring the Greeks to a due sense of their value and position. — No Greek Ministry of present times will pay a fraction of either loan or interest, except when obliged by *main force*.

Even Mavrocordatos, who certainly is an honest man and quite careless of money for himself, would not be allowed by his colleagues to pay were he in office this very day. — The Greeks have been enormous gainers this last two years, especially by the carrying trade. Except therefore the revenue be mismanaged or misapplied and civil war be brought about mainly by this misapplication, it is a matter of impossibility that the revenue should have diminished instead of increasing, whatever may be the estimates produced by the Finance Minister.

I do not believe that Mr. Coletti's death² will much mend matters in this respect. Unscrupulous as he was, his present successors are not of a higher moral nor intellectual standard, and how they are to quell the anarchy and the civil war which Mr. Coletti spread over the country before he died, is a consideration which ere long must call the serious attention of those Powers who have direct financial or permanent political interests in Greece

There is a report come up from town that the fine Selimié barracks which burnt at Scutary on the 26/27 ultimo, were fired by the guards who are quartered there, because they are dissatisfied and two months in arrears of pay. — In fact, if there had been good will on the parts of the troops, I cannot understand how the fire should not have been put down, in a building where day and night large bodies of men are on duty, most or rather all of whom are well trained firemen, having every necessary implement close at hand.

It was the "gaspillage" of the revenue which in reality ruined Reshid Pasha's administration in 1840/41, and it was Izzet Mehemet's integrity

¹ Memorandum of the Porte to the Five Powers.

² 12 September.

which restored the shaken finances of the Empire. — The lavish expenses in the capital, where the young Sultan is encouraged to throw away 30,000,000 piasters or £ 270,000 on the circumcision festivals at Haider Pasha,* and to present nearly as much to his principal Ministers, servants &c. &c. in the course of 18 months, in all £ 550,000 or about the $\frac{1}{10}$ of the whole revenue, are publicly known and commented on, Reshid Pasha himself got 4,000,000 piasters extra or £ 35,000. These examples bear their fruits in the provinces, and I am not astonished to hear from Baron Behr and Mr. Tchihasseff, who have lately visited many parts of Asia Minor, that the exactions of the local authorities are exorbitant, to a degree such as could not be much surpassed in times when the prescriptions of the Tanzimat hairié¹ were still unknown; whilst the bridges and roads are neglected, the provincial police often left unpaid, and hence crime not punished.

At Trebizonde thirty Tchorbashis of Lasistan were thrown into prison by the Governor Ismael Pasha,² because they resisted an illegal tax, and they were only released when a deputation of 200 persons were threatening to go to Constantinople.

I myself can certify from my last extensive excursion in European Turkey that the general rule laid down by Mr. Urquhart in 1831 holds still good: The country is only happy and flourishing wherever the Government meddles little, or is reduced to be just because it is helpless. — Hence the wretched, depopulated state of the fine plains in the neighbourhood of large populous towns, and the happy condition and the easy, highly comfortable circumstances of the peasantry, both Mussulman and Christian, in the secluded districts, in the remote valleys, for instance of the high Balkan ranges.

Your Lordship will hear without astonishment but with dissatisfaction that in 1847 I found in the Balkan peasants, and Mohamedan

* vide *Fallmerayer Werke* I, p. 313—331 „das Diplomategastmahl auf Haider-Pascha.“

¹ A Turk told me that, although the Hattisherif of Gulhané laid down *principles* favorable to the Christian populations of Turkey, yet it required only a *change* in the *means* to extort money from the Rayahs.

“Here is a case of my own,” said laughingly the Mussulman Seigneur.

I wanted money, and not knowing where to get it, I sent for the richest Rayah on my estates, and told him that appreciating his excellent character, and wishing to honour Christians in conformity with the Tanzimat-hairié I had appointed him Super-Intendant of a certain number of my villages.

The man was delighted for his new place, had formerly always been occupied by Turkish Agents who, I dare say, now and then mulcted the Rayahs.

I soon heard complaints against my Super-Intendant, and I confess that was precisely what I expected and wanted.

I sent for him, reproached him for his conduct as a persecution against the Rayahs, who were to be protected according to the famous Hattisherif.

Having done this publicly and with some ostentation, I put my man in prison, and my conduct was highly approved of in Constantinople.

I must add for truth's sake that my Super-Intendant remained in prison until he offered half his fortune, which his relatives had to pay to me in hard cash.

² A grand-son of the famous Ali Pasha of Janina.

peasants too, cutting down and burning the finest oak trees near their villages, in order to escape the forced and *unremunerated* labour of bringing the timber down to Missivria and other sea ports. — The Government, said these people, orders the timber, and we suppose pays for it, but between the treasury at Constantinople, the Pasha of the province, and the Mudirs of the districts they manage it so that we do not get a single para for our labour.

Again between the thriving port of Varna, the first fortress of the Empire Schumla, and the ancient and still important capital of the old Bulgarian Kings Tirnova communications should be imagined to be well regulated and secured, the more so as the wide road lies through well watered, rich, undulating plains producing all common necessaries of life. — Yet on this line the inhabitants of the village of Gebeckshé destroyed by night a bridge, *in order that their village might be cut off from the high road.*

Mr. Fucar, an English merchant at Vienna, complained that he could not travel on business without an escort, because the number of mounted police, an excellent institution in the Turkish provinces, were insufficient to keep down brigands and robbers.

From near Schumla two children were carried off and returned to their parents after payment of 5000 piasters, exacted by threats of torture. The men who committed this crime were well known at Schumla, but they were not punished being protected by some local Artillery men, over whom to the number of 800 the Commandant exercises only a nominal authority, because the Government allows them merely a pay of 10 piasters (2 shillings) a month.

If one reflects on the long chain of abuses of which all these facts, occurring in a province lately visited by the Sultan and his Grand Visir, are unequivocal symptoms, there can remain but little doubt that the so-called reform system works hitherto in a wrong direction.

As it is *now* practised here it attacks *forms*, pour jeter de la poudre aux yeux de l'Europe, and thereby weakens the executive provincial authorities instead of cutting down *abuses*, and thereby securing to the Sultan the affections of his subjects.

The millions which His Majesty is made to throw away on festivals at Haider Pasha and on palaces and pleasure gardens of his Ministers on the Bosphorus, could certainly be much better employed in the provinces for the security of the life, property, and trade of this nation.

Yet I should be wrong were I not to state that generally speaking there have been great material changes in the Turkish Empire during the eighteen years which have elapsed since the treaty of Adrianople. — Always keeping in view a fact which would be principally the reverse in any well organized European Government, viz: the slow progress of the open country and the more rapid development of the difficult, secluded, or unfrequented parts of Turkey, it must be admitted that the splendid resources of this Empire and its natural fertility have augmented the general ease, comfort, and trade of the nation.

But this happy result must be on the whole attributed to three main causes:

- 1 The suppression of the military exactions of the Janizaries and the irregular troops, and the organization in their lieu of the present army;
- 2 The abolition of most of the local and provincial taxes and exactions on foreign and home trade;
- 3 The benefit conferred on Turkey by steam navigation.

The late Grand Visir Reshid Mehmed Pasha is entitled since 1831 to claim the honour of the first of these blessings for Turkey, England by the treaty of 1838 was the first foreign power to confer the second, and the Austrian Lloyd is the principal agent of the third.

With regard to the Balkan in special and to certain parts of Bulgaria which I visited of late, it must be added that, since the Bulgarians in 1829 took up arms in favor of the Russians, the Government has done and well done many things in order to conciliate that population. One great result of this line of policy has been that out of 25,000 families who from fear of persecution emigrated into Russia, about 20,000 have returned to their native country.

Whenever the elder people in the provinces speak about the advantages accruing to them from the "new order of things" ("Tanzimati hairié"), and appreciate their present condition in comparison with their situation twenty years ago, I always could trace the improvements they were alluding to, as springing from one or several of the three main causes which I have just now enumerated. My knowledge of the Turkish and Greek languages gave me great facilities to ascertain their feelings.

It would be the height of illusion to imagine that the so-called reform party, such as it momentarily rules at Constantinople, has any thing to do with these practical ameliorations. The Ministry here attaches value to *words* and newspaper-talk, not to *facts* and deeds. — In point of *reform* I know that since a year and a half it only has *reformed*, id est *emptied* the treasury.

I am aware, my Lord, that some people find fault with me for not approving the tendency of the present administration, yet I doubt that any person in good faith can contradict or even modify the facts which I have discussed in this letter, however erroneous may be found my deductions or my reasoning.

I have no rancour against Reshid Pasha because he broke his engagement or rather that of his Government to send me as Minister to Brussels. Of this transaction the written and uncontested proofs exist in the archives of the Belgian Legation, but that is no reason for me to attack Reshid in an ungenerous manner.

I have learnt so much in my late excursion that I wished to write a few words to Your Excellency about what I have seen and heard, but I fear I have become too verbose and prolix, yet I could say ten times as much on not uninteresting matters

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered Pera 2 December 1847.)

Private and confidential.

Vienna 27 October 1847.

My dear General,

I enclose a letter I received by this Messenger from Lord Palmerston. — I think it must please you and I flatter myself you will not think me guilty of a breach of your confidence in me by having sent to Palmerston the letter about which he speaks so handsomely. I knew what I was doing when I sent it. — I am anxious to have the *augmented* Memoir about Algiers and I hope the next Messenger will bring it to me.

Never mind what Palmerston says about Italian affairs. — Metternich will be quiet, as he has been hitherto, and war if it come will not be the fruit of any fault of his, but of the *folly* and *vanity* and ambition of our old friends the Liberals. Metternich has acted with the greatest temper and the greatest prudence from the beginning of the stir, and it is *mainly* due to him that hitherto there has been no commotion in Italy.

I wish you to tell Sturmer that I applaud Metternich's conduct in the highest terms. — It is right that praise should be given where praise is deserved.

I hope you are well.

Yours very faithfully

P—

I take it for granted that the Chevalier Cordoba will have left Buyukdéré before my letter to him enclosed with this arrives in Turkey, but I presume you may find out how to send it to him safely.

P—

Send me back Palmerston's letter by the Messenger!

(Inclosure in No. 90.)

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PONSONBY.

Copy.

Bd^s 28 September 1847.

My dear Ponsonby,

I return you with many thanks this interesting and amusing letter from Jochmus. I wish they could be persuaded to make some use of

him at Constantinople, but it is the characteristic of ignorance to be jealous of talents and attainments, instead of turning them to account.

I trust Jochmus is misinformed as to the slippery state of Reshid Pasha's Ministry. I rather incline to think that it will last some time longer.

Italian affairs are in an unsettled state, but if Metternich is quiet, there will be no war.

Coletti's death is a great good thing for Greece, but still I fear that Otho will not easily be brought to change his system of government, and he will to find another Coletti, unless these insurrections compel him to become a better boy.

Yours sincerely

(signed) Palmerston.

91.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Vienna.

Private and confidential. Extract.

Pera 2 December 1847.

My Lord,

Since I had the honour to write to you on the 2 November I have sent a few lines by the Vienna post to acknowledge the receipt of your very kind letter of the 27 October.

Your Excellency receives by this messenger under a separate cover the *augmented* Memoir on Algiers.

From the annexed extract it will be seen that the Turkish authorities here have refused to clear two Greek vessels from Constantinople to Algiers, on the plea that the *coasting* trade is interdicted to ships under that flag; thereby substantiating that Algiers is to be considered still "*de jure*" as a Turkish port.

The stumbling block of Reshid will be as in 1841 the state of the finances.

I hear that in consequence of the late expeditions into Curdistan and in Albania and of the unnecessary and lavish expenditure in presents and festivals on the banks of the Bosphorus, coupled with gaspillage and peculation in the provinces, there is a deficit of nearly £ 2,000,000 or upwards of 33 per cent of the annual revenue.

This deficit has been covered during the last 18 months by the circulation of about 220 millions piasters of paper money at 6% interest per annum, a dangerous experiment in a Government unacquainted with the working of public credit in monetary affairs and which, more-

over, is embarrassed with a deteriorated currency of 900 millions of piasters, representing only an intrinsic value of 450 millions, and thereby constituting another deficit "*de facto*" though not nominal of 450 millions or £ 4,000,000.

It must be remembered that, notwithstanding all professions to the contrary and the pretended monetary reform, not one single para of deteriorated coin has been withdrawn from circulation, the Government having limited itself to cease the issue of base coin from the Imperial mint.

The circulation of good and full valued money, instead of the old deteriorated piaster, which notwithstanding remains the *legal* tender of the country, will, however, only increase the propensity of hoarding so general in the East and the facilities of procuring silver for the fabrication of the old false currency. — Clandestine mints are constantly at work in Servia, Moldavia, Walachia, the Greek Islands &c. &c. without speaking of the constant supplies furnished by those established in Constantinople, Smyrna &c. &c., to say nothing of Birmingham, where a prosecution for coining old Turkish money has been carried on by the Ottoman Consul General in England

The Swedish Chargé d'affaires, well acquainted as Your Lordship knows with the state of resources of Turkey, said before several of his colleagues: "Si on me demande mon opinion sur les causes du déficit je dirai qu'elles sont très faciles à comprendre"; sous l'administration de Riza on ne permettait qu'à trois ou quatre personnes de "bien" voler et de s'enrichir, aujourd'hui "*toute le monde*" prend ce qui est à sa convenance."

J.

(Inclosure I in No. 91.)

MEMORANDUM ON THE PRESENT STATE OF ALGIERS.

Copy. Confidential.

Constantinople 20 January 1847.

The details contained in these notes — as far as they relate to facts — are chiefly the compared result of information, collected on the spot by various persons, who are well qualified judges, both from professional education and from military experience.

Several amongst these gentlemen, who left Algiers as late as six months ago, had frequent occasions to ascertain facts and opinions from habitual intercourse with Marshal Bugeaud and with other Algerine authorities, french as well as native.

At the clear cost of about one hundred millions of francs¹ or four millions Sterling per annum, the French maintain in their North African possessions a picked army of 106,000 men.

¹ According to the valuation of Mr. Desjobert the general expense is now even 125 millions of francs.

This large force protects a body of 60,000 European emigrants, called colonists, but properly falling under the denomination of trade-people and camp-followers of an African or Asiatic army.

The french official returns give a larger number of emigrants.¹

The discrepancy arises from the periodical presence, in Algeria, of a fluctuating population of the lowest Spaniards male and female,² who find an adventurous and often criminal existence on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea.

About six months ago the French army and, under its protection, the European emigrants were distributed in seventeen principal stations, along the sea shore as well as in the interior, but, except the places of Algiers, Constantinié, and Oran, — the French towns and boroughs are miserable ruins, often only with 10 or 12 inhabited houses or hovels, under the walls of fortified barracks and their immediate apper-tenances.

In each of these military stations a constant supply of one year's provisions is kept up, the soldiers' rations being thus allotted:

3	months	fresh	meat	}	with a due proportion of dry vege- tables &c. &c. &c.
3	"	salt	meat		
3	"	salt	porc		
3	"	salt	fish		

The hospitals, at first much neglected, are now in an excellent state, with full allowances and necessaries of every description, always for a year in advance.

Yet such is the exhausted and utterly ruined state of the new French colony that all supplies for peace and war are imported, almost entirely, from abroad.

Corn, formerly a staple produce of Algiers, is, since years, contracted for in the ports of the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and hay has been brought occasionally from as far as Great Britain and Holland.

This constant dependence of the colony on foreign supplies in times of peace, and this permanent danger of a famine in case of a maritime war must continue as long as the state of Algiers remains unsettled and disturbed like at present, when no agriculturist can venture in safety — for any length of time — beyond the reach of the French guns.

The number of so-called colonists murdered or utterly ruined by the Arabs is very considerable, but the French authorities, of course, withhold from the public all correct statistical information on this head.

A conjecture at the extent of these losses of life or property may, however, be made from the fact that the army, notwithstanding all pre-

¹ 100,000 emigrants, of whom, however, not above two thousand agricultural labourers. (*Revue des deux mondes* 1 Février 1847.)

² With regard to the moral standard of the generality of Algerine immigrants the Duke de Rovigo (Savary), when Governor General of Algiers, said: "Les honnêtes gens ici sont tous arrivés par terre."

cautions and its excellent military training, loses 2,25 men destroyed (and generally even buried), *clandestinely* for 1,00 killed *in action*.

A secret official document in the archives of Marshal Bugeaud calculates the casualties in the wars against Abd-ul-Kadr, up to the end of 1845, as follows:

killed in action	4000
id. clandestinely	9000
id. by disease, excessive fatigue and privations	<u>52,000</u>
Total of men	65,000

besides those disabled and sent back to France as invalids and unfit for duty; an effective loss the more appalling, as all weakly men of any regiment, leaving home for Algiers, are invariably kept in France.

The war system of Abd-ul-Kadr is the Cavalry Guerilla, where rapidity of the general movements and skill of the individual horsemen supply numbers.

It has been stated to me on most creditable authority that — notwithstanding all exaggerations of the French bulletins — the great Arab Chief never has had with him a regular retinue of more than 1200 picked horsemen, enabling him to act on the native tribes, and that he personally has never been within reach of the French gun- and musketry.

His genius having discriminated the most destructive species of native warfare against a regular European army, acting in the wilderness of Algeria, he has wisely abstained from all general actions, which naturally must lead to results similar to the issue of the short conflict on the banks of the Isly.

Intuition and subsequently experience has taught Abd-ul-Kadr and the principal lieutenants, who occasionally supply his place, that for one man killed in action the French can be made to lose 2,25 by stealthy surprise, and 13 by the fatigues of harassing marches and consequent disease.

So clearly is the nature of the Algerine warfare traced and established at present that the French columns, though encumbered with provision, ammunition, and hospital trains (on mule's back), are reported not to have of late exceeded 2000 effective Infantry and 500 horse each, and that even corps so small as these have found it usually superfluous to carry along Field-Artillery.

Marshal Bugeaud's last spring expedition mustered not more than the above number, and yet moved without any serious opposition through the whole country west and south of the town of Algiers, by roads now safely and frequently marched over by other French corps.

Still there are patches of country and lines of communication — such as the road along the sea-shore from Mostaganem to Algiers — so impracticable and so difficult that even choice forces are often obliged to make long detours, in order to avoid conflicts on ground too disadvantageous for regular troops.

France has found in the African war a safety valve against internal commotions.

The same national spirit of turbulence and vanity which imposes on the present Government the necessity of continuing, in general, a ruinous and barbarous war, obliges, in special, Marshal Bugeaud to pursue Abd-ul-Kadr at the risk of destroying annually a great number of the best French soldiers.

This Commander has been heard to admit freely himself that political reasons force him, against his better military judgment, to undertake continually useless and harassing marches and countermarches.

In his opinion it would be safest and more effectual to limit the French occupation of Algiers to the present seventeen chief stations and their lines of communications, to protect there efficiently the few civilians and natives in their manufactural and agricultural pursuits, until new emigrants widen each separate circle of peaceable and military occupation, abandoning in the meantime the waste country to the independent Arabs, at the risk of diminishing temporarily the influence over some of the half submitted tribes.

This plan, however, cannot be followed up, because the Marshal apprehends evil consequences, more indeed for France than for Algiers, from an apparent yielding to Abd-ul-Kadr, who has it thus in his power to compel 100,000 French troops — at immense sacrifices — into a constant but useless chase of his 1200 Arab horsemen.

In case of a maritime war between France and England, and of a hostile reaction in Algiers and Marocco, it seems to be Marshal Bugeaud's opinion that the French-African army will be obliged to fall back first on the little Atlas (extent 76 leagues), and then (excepting Constantinié) on the fortified places of the sea shore.

This necessity arises apparently from a conviction — generally prevalent — that a prolonged maritime war and the consequent blockade of Algiers must lead to the captivity of the French army there, just as the last naval conflict between England and France led amongst other results to the capture of the French forces in Egypt.

Now it is evidently preferable to capitulate eventually to a civilized foe, rather than to be starved and murdered by the Arabs, who would ultimately cut off all communication between the garrisons of the interior and those of the coast.

All of them in the beginning would be hampered, and in the end paralyzed in any enterprise of mutual support from want of provisions and supplies cut off by the blockade.

England, in case of a maritime war, is mistress of the sea.

The French, at the very outbreak of hostilities, could not possibly contemplate nor effect the withdrawal of their entire army from North-Africa.

Yet they can concentrate their forces, nearly exclusively, on the coast, and may then purpose sending back to France 50,000 men, in order that the 56,000 men remaining in Algeria shall have about two years' provisions instead of twelve months supply.

From what has fallen from the French Ambassador here, the Foreign Office at Paris must have cognizance of some plan of this kind.

The Ambassador said at the time that, in case of war, France would do well to "exchange" 50,000 old Algerine troops against as many young soldiers, but as M. de Bourqueney is no competent military judge, little value can be laid on the word "exchange".

The first object of a maritime blockade of Algiers, besides attacking or bombarding the *minor* places, would thus be probably to prevent the return into France of 50,000 trained soldiers.

If the blockade be stringent, the 60,000 European emigrants, who by that time would be collected chiefly in the maritime towns, might seriously straighten the resources of the army, for if France is at war with the natives, next to nothing is found in the country.

Under such circumstances a year's uninterrupted blockade would apparently lead to the capture of the whole French force in Africa.

There exists, however, an expedient to which a French Commander-in-chief could resort in case of great emergency.

He may detach 50,000 men against *Tunis*, and take or buy it if only defended by the present Bey.

If the expedition be successful, the troops remaining in Algeria not only keep provisions for nearly two years, but supplies may be sent them from Tunis.

If, on the contrary, the expedition fails, and is forced ultimately to capitulate to an English fleet on the coast, the army in Algiers still have their two years' provisions, except indeed the captured troops be sent back to Algiers, an event doubtful from many obvious reasons.

To judge from late diplomatic proceedings in Paris, the French Government is evidently aware of the great importance of Tunis as a means of saving eventually the Algerine army, but for the same reason the naval Commander-in-chief of Great Britain in the Mediterranean Sea should be enabled in times of war to dispose of an amount of land forces, sufficient to protect or to coerce the Bey of Tunis, who at present, not only makes the police for the French on the eastern frontiers of Algiers, but also has fostered a considerable trade with their African possessions.

How ever favorably disposed the present ruler of Tunis may be towards France, as long, at least, as that power nourishes his pretensions of independence, yet it cannot but be supposed that the religious feelings of his subjects would make him pause before he declares openly in favor of a Christian power, in case the "Djihad" or holy war be proclaimed by Abd-ul-Kadr and by Marocco, whenever Algiers be blockaded by a British squadron.

But it is not sufficient that the Bey of Tunis remain neutral, he must be induced or coerced into hostilities against France.

If the possession of the province of Constantinié could be guaranteed to him, subsequent on a favorable peace, his interest and the

fear of his own subjects might lead him to act in concert with Abd-ul-Kadr and Marocco.

Yet even then there would exist elements of strife and opposition in the camps of the Mussulman coalition; — rivalry between the Emperor Abd-ul-Rahman and Abd-ul-Kadr, hatred between the Arabs and the Kabyles, jealousies between the followers of Abd-ul-Kadr and the old Janizary party of Ahmed Bey of Constantinié, suspicion and distrust of all against the policy of the Pasha of Tunis.

Indeed it is impossible, according to the opinions and statements of competent authorities, to overcome entirely those distractions.

They will remain a dangerous evil inherent to the situation, but it seems not impossible that many difficulties might be removed and others mitigated by the interposition and military co-operation of the Emperor of Turkey, as Caliph and supreme head of all true believers.

In the knot of the inaccessible Jurjura mountains which separate the province of Constantinié from that of Algiers proper, the unsubdued Kabyles have maintained themselves in complete independence against the French invaders.

The ancient rancour, however, of these aboriginal possessors of the African soil towards the Arabs, their former foes and conquerors, has always prevented them hitherto from joining actively Abd-ul-Kadr in his campaigns against the French.

Yet the Kabyles are fervent and fanatic Mussulmans, and would as such collect round the standards of the Caliph of Stamboul, if the "*Djihad*" or holy war were proclaimed in their country.

8000 Turkish Infantry and 2000 Albanians, landed in the Jurjura near Bougia or Dellys, and supported by its warlike mountaineers, would probably be inexpugnable in this central position of Algiers.

The Jurjura with safe depôts of arms, ammunition, provisions, and money would become immediately a pivot of highly important operations, and Abd-ul-Kadr and his Arabs would obtain, notwithstanding all antipathy of races, most efficient aid and support.

In the war by land one thing above all should be avoided at any price: that is to engage a general action, on ground practicable for regular troops.

The whole Turkish army — were it in Africa — could not resist the shock of 30,000 European troops; — the men of Marocco have experienced on the banks of the Isly the value of modern tactics, and Abd-ul-Kadr knows long ago that 2500 regular troops will resist any individual and isolated efforts of his Arabs.

The effectual means and elements of attacking the french army in Algiers, with great chances of ultimate success, are in summary as follows:

1 The stringent blockade and the partial attack of the Algerine coast by a British fleet;

2 The coercion and eventual defense of Tunis by British or by Anglo-Turkish sea- and land-forces;

3 The coalition of Ad-ul-Kadr with Marocco and Tunis supported by the Ottoman troops and the Kabyles in the Jurjura:

4 Unity of direction of the war, as far as obtainable by means of Ottoman interposition, based chiefly on the moral authority of the Sultan.

If the war finishes successfully, *England* captures or ruins an inimical army of 100,000 men; *Turkey* obtains back the towns of Algiers, Bougia &c. &c., which have become important military and mercantile stations.

Further *Tunis*, a hereditary Government, but under the suzerainty of the Porte, acquires the province of Constantinié, whilst *Abd-ul-Kadr* under the nominal authority of the Sultan remains master of the whole of Algeria, west of the Jurjura.

Marocco and the Kabyles finally are delivered from a powerful foe and from apprehensions of future attack or subjection.

The above details have been collected and co-ordinated under the influence of the political atmosphere of Constantinople, with a view to furnish additional proofs of the unstable and precarious tenure of the French on their North-African possessions.

Algiers — unfairly withheld from the Sublime Porte — in the first instance by the actual French Government, embarrasses at present the foreign policy of its cabinet in a twofold manner:

In times of peace, and as long as the colony cannot furnish itself the necessary supplies and means of subsistence for its inhabitants and for the army, Algiers offers means of moral coercion against France.

In times of war, on the contrary, Algeria is a proper theater for great naval and military operations, where — with comparatively limited efforts — immense results may be obtained by resolution, policy, and exertion.

(Inclosure II in No. 91.)

MEMORANDUM ON THE PRESENT STATE OF ALGIERS.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

Confidential.

Constantinople 31 October 1847

Since the preceeding Memorandum was written, some changes have taken place in Algeria, but although they modify the situation of that colony, it cannot be said that they subvert any of the fundamental data and ideas on which reposes the general plan of operations, discussed in the preceeding notes.

The reports of Marshal Bugeaud, dated Oued Sahel 17 May and Algiers 26 May, certainly prove that the French General was fully aware of the importance of Government Kabylia and especially of the Jurjura mountains, but it never could be expected that a Commander of great

local and general experience should not know that *there* was and *remains* the most vulnerable point of French Northern-Africa.

The last expedition of Marshal Bugeaud (6 May to 25 May 1847)¹ by Hamza on Bougia through part of the Beno-Abbes country,² and the march of General Bedeau³ from Setif to the same town have *not* touched the Jurjura mountains proper.

The highlands between the left bank of the Summain River and the Sea are still the seat, as heretofore, of Kabyle independence under their Chief-leader Sidi-Joudi.

The highest summits of the Jurjura chain, which runs parallel to the coasts of Dellys and Bougia, are estimated to be elevated 6500 to 7000 feet above the sea.

The Kabyles round Dellys and along the banks of the Wadi Sebaon, which falls into the sea a little to the west of that place, have secured in a recent convention the respect of their territory on the part of the French, who treated with one of their Chieftains Belkassem or Kassi.

Marshal Bugeaud also has stipulated with the natives on the right bank of the Summain River, and with those who inhabit the triangle between Hamza, Setif, and Bougia, especially with the republican confederation of the Marabout Sidi Ben Ali Sheriff, that their country is *not* to be occupied by the French, but that they are to recognize their nominal authority, to furnish means of transport, if required, and to pay a moderate impost.

The Duke d'Aumale may be imagined to derive in his new position great moral advantages from his superior rank, but he will have less experience than the late Governor General, and the democratic spirit of the French army will require proofs of his actual value as a Commander, before the Prince inspires the soldiers with that confidence which the Marshal had gained by long and successful service.

In the mean time Kabylia is *not subjected*, and the partial advantages obtained there are at least balanced by the hostile influence and by the increasing power of Abd-ul-Kadr in Marocco.

A great Mohammedan confederacy in Northern-Africa, for the purpose of expulsing the French, appears to be no more impracticable now than nine months ago, on conditions such as traced in the above Memorandum.

Tunis, situated as it is on the frontiers of Algeria, becomes in this respect daily more important for England, and the Divan has not abandoned all hopes for re-establishing one day or another the Sultan's authority over Tunis and Algiers.

It will be easily perceived that the Memoir in question is much more an outline of operations than a complete plan of campaign. Many details are still required, which can probably be obtained only on

¹ with 8000 men.

² through the difficult defile of Fellaye.

³ with 7000 men.

the spot, and by closely following up any changes which bear on essential points and facts, but information of this kind may be collected by agents who remain *unacquainted* with the *general* plan.

A. Jochmus.

92.

LORD PONSONBY TO GENERAL JOCHMUS.

(Answered *Pera* 1 February 1848.)

Vienna 29 December 1847.

My dear General,

I have received with great pleasure your letter and the Memoir with additions. I will take the best occasion that presents itself so that I can make to speak about the affair for the Colonel (*Herman*). My own opinion co-incides with yours respecting his capacity and fitness. — There are many things that may delay my acting in this matter, and I beg that you will not speak of it to Colonel H. — I have some reason to think it not at all improbable that the Person to whom I may have to apply, will be himself found well inclined towards the Colonel, but I always *wait* for which I think is a good opportunity.

If what is said of the disastrous position of Abd-el-Kader be true, the conduct of our English Government will ere long *strongly* be influenced by the *new* state of things. — That which at present has been by so many people supposed to be an interminable case of *weakness* may speedily shew strong symptoms of rapidly coming strength -- and you and I know from the Scriptures that Samson did not use his regained strength for the amusement of the Philistines. --

Pray look after the affairs of Algiers and let me hear your opinions. The Storm with which the World is so evidently threatened, may not burst as yet, and I do think we may have time to take measures to meet it when the black clouds shall open, as assuredly they will. --

Believe me to be

yours faithfully

Ponsonby.

1848

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Vienna.

Extract.

Pera 3 January 1848.

I had the honour to write to Your Excellency on the 2 December, and to inform you by my P.S. of the same date that Chosrew Pasha had been superseded by old Raouf Pasha, in consequence of a temporary alliance between Reshid and Riza. Since then the struggle between the two parties who divide the Divan, and who are headed by the Grand Visir on one side and by Saïd Pasha, the Serasker, on the other, has not abated

This cabinet war, of course, will continue until one faction gains a decided advantage over the other.

Some incidents of the struggle during the last month tend to show that Reshid has obtained two partial advantages by the appointment of Emin Pasha to the command of the army of Rumili, and of one Goslukly Reshid Pasha to that of the army of Anatoly. — Emin Pasha supersedes Darbhor Reshid Pasha, who never ought to have held the important independent command of Rumili, Albania &c. &c. — He is not a military man, but would make a middling teacher in a military school. His colleague for Anatoly is the same person whom Commodore Napier describes, with truth, in his book on the Syrian war, as the coward who hesitated after our successful campaign to go into Ibrahim Pasha's presence, exclaiming: "Il me coupera la tête". — At last Colonel Bridgeman and Captain Stewart R.N. forced him to follow them into Ibrahim's Quarters.

This choice of Goslukly Reshid Pasha and the former of Darbhor Reshid Pasha are additional proofs of the want of tact in the present Grandvisir for the selection of his agents.

I still beg to transmit a Memorandum on the finances of Turkey and the existing deficit. The Memoir is very long, but I could not compress it into a shorter space on account of the necessary details of a topic so weighty and important

(Inclosure in No. 93.)

MÉMOIRE SUR LA RÉFORME MONÉTAIRE ET LE DÉFICIT DES FINANCES TURQUES.

Secret.

Constantinople 1 Janvier 1848.

L'histoire Ottomane constate la dépréciation graduelle des espèces monnayées turques qui avaient cours légal dans l'Empire, ou qui l'ont encore.

En 1843, après de fortes importations de marchandises étrangères, le cours du change, contraire à la Turquie, éleva rapidement la valeur de la Livre Sterling à 127¹ piastres, avec apparence d'une hausse ultérieure.

Le commerce indigène et étranger s'alarme.

Il fit des représentations réitérées à la Porte Ottomane sur les sérieux inconvénients des grandes et continuelles fluctuations des valeurs d'échange, oscillations provenant principalement du système monétaire de la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman, en effet, avait autorisé jusque là non seulement la circulation de toutes sortes de monnaies détériorées, frappées sous les règnes précédents, mais encore il continuait lui même l'émission d'argent d'un titre de plus de 50 pour cent au dessous de sa valeur nominale.

En considération des démarches faites par les principaux négociants et banquiers de Constantinople, et en égard de l'augmentation journalière des relations commerciales et internationales de la Turquie, avec presque toute l'Europe, le Divan s'engagea, par des décrets impériaux, à entrer dans une voie d'amélioration du système financier de l'Empire.

Bientôt des ordonnances du Sultan prescrivirent les changements suivants :

1 L'hôtel des monnaies, cessant l'émission des anciennes espèces altérées, ne devait plus, dorénavant, frapper que de l'argent de bon aloi, au titre de 110 piastres par Livre Sterling.

2 La Porte promit de maintenir, par la suite, au taux de 110 piastres le cours du change de la Livre Sterling, moyennant certaines opérations de Banque sur la place de Constantinople et sur les principales échelles &c. &c. de l'Empire.

3 Le Ministère des Finances, tout en déclarant argent légal (angl. "legal tender") comme par le passé les monnaies turques détériorées de 6, 5, 2¹/₂, 1¹/₂ &c. &c. piastres et de 20 paras, s'engagea cependant à retirer de la circulation ces espèces dites Altılıks, Bechlıks &c. &c. dans l'espace donné de sept ans et à démonétiser ainsi "par degré" les 900 millions en ces monnaies, qu'on calcule exister en Turquie.

¹ 1857. Il est monté à présent au dessus de 150 piastres!!

Comme corollaire de ces trois mesures le Divan mit immédiatement hors de cours toutes les autres anciennes monnaies turques.

En même temps il établit, pour leur rachat par le trésor, un tarif arbitraire, tout en donnant un cours forcé aux espèces étrangères, basé sur leur valeur intrinsèque.

C'était agir dans l'un et l'autre cas contrairement aux principes économiques qui ne reconnaissent l'or et l'argent que comme marchandise.

L'ensemble de ces arrêtés est nommé à Constantinople la réforme monétaire.

Cependant jusqu'à présent le Gouvernement n'a rempli rigoureusement que le premier article de son programme financier.

L'hôtel des monnaies a frappé en nouvelles espèces métalliques à peu près 300 millions de piastres.

Le Ministère n'a rempli que partiellement la seconde promesse.

Il y a fréquemment dans le courant des dernières 4 années des fluctuations ascendantes du cours de change dans les échelles du Levant, à Bagdad &c. &c., bien qu'à quelques légères oscillations près la cote de la Livre Sterling n'ait pas dépassée à Constantinople même le taux régulateur de 110 piastres.

Finalement le 3^{me} article de l'engagement doit être considéré comme non-avenu, car jusqu'aujourd'hui le Gouvernement n'a pas retiré une seule pièce détériorée des 900 millions d'anciens piastres.

Il n'a pu même parvenir à racheter, qu'en lots limités, les autres anciennes espèces turques, parceque le tarif arbitraire, fixé par l'hôtel de la monnaie, ferait subir aux vendeurs une perte de 3 à 8 pour cent. On calcule donc qu'il doit en exister encore pour près de 300 millions de piastres, dont une partie entre clandestinement dans le commerce, mais dont la majeure portion est gardée dans des coffres-forts ou est cachée.

Or la réforme monétaire ne s'exécute pas par le seul fait de la suppression de l'ancien abus, de frapper des espèces altérées, ni par l'émission partielle de la nouvelle monnaie de bon aloi.

La réforme ne se réalise pas non plus par l'opération transitoire du maintien des cours de change étrangers, mais elle est renfermée essentiellement dans le troisième article du projet, qui annonce la conversion des 900 millions de piastres détériorés en autant d'espèces, au titre de 110.

C'est là que se concentrent les difficultés pratiques de la question financière, et le Ministère actuel, tout en tâchant de jeter le blâme sur ses prédécesseurs, en fait l'aveu semi-officiel dans un exposé du 6 Novembre 1846, extrait des journaux turcs:

"Nous avons déjà indiqué" — y est-il dit — "les mesures prises par le Gouvernement pour la réforme monétaire et la fixation des changes avec l'Europe."

"Dès le principe on avait compris, que la véritable base de cette double opération reposait sur la démonétisation des mon-

“naies dites Bechliks &c. &c., dont la valeur intrinsèque est à peine la moitié de la valeur nominale et l'on avait annoncé que des mesures avaient été prises pour cette démonétisation.”

“*Cependant jusqu'à présent rien n'avait été fait.* Le principe était admis, il est vrai, mais on avait toujours reculé devant les dépenses considérables que l'exécution devait entraîner. On a calculé, en effet, que les Bechliks &c. &c. doivent s'élever à la somme énorme de 8 à 900 millions de piastres. — Cette question a été soumise au Conseil suprême de Justice (!) et l'on a décidé de nommer, à l'hôtel des monnaies, une commission qui sera présidée par le directeur de cet établissement Tahir Bey (depuis Pacha). Cette commission, composée d'hommes compétens, devra rechercher les moyens les plus sûrs et les plus économiques pour retirer *'peu à peu'* de la circulation les monnaies dites Bechliks, de manière à établir l'unité monétaire

En d'autres mots, on avoue que, depuis le commencement de 1844 jusqu'au 6 Novembre 1846, le projet de conversion a été éludé dans sa partie essentielle, par l'ancienne administration.

Pour rester dans le vrai il faut ajouter que, pas plus que ses prédécesseurs, le Ministère actuel n'a retiré de la circulation *“un seul”* piastre dans les 13 mois qui viennent de s'écouler depuis le 6 Novembre 1846.

Cependant l'hôtel des monnaies aurait pu opérer, par exception, jusqu'au mois de Mai de l'année courante sur une valeur en espèces étrangères de 250 millions de piastres, importées en Turquie par suite des achats de grains, pour compte de l'Angleterre et de la France en 1846/47.

Le moment favorable, qui probablement ne se représentera pas de long temps, a été négligé, et à moins qu'on ne change complètement le mode projeté de conversion, il est très certain, qu'au commencement de 1851, c'est-à-dire au bout de 7 années fixées comme terme définitif de la conversion, le trésor Impérial sera précisément aussi avancé, au point de vue de la réforme, qu'il l'est aujourd'hui.

Les 900 millions de piastres en espèces détériorées circuleront alors dans l'empire tout comme par le passé.

En effet, les premières notions d'économie politique suffisaient pour démontrer, que le Gouvernement turc essaie à peu près l'impossible par sa réforme monétaire, telle qu'elle existe à présent *sur le papier*.

Le trésor prétend maintenir à titre d'argent légal (angl. *“legal tender”*) à la fois et optionnellement une monnaie de bon aloi et des espèces altérées au moins de 50 pour cent.

Il veut réaliser ce projet en présence de *“l'exportation étrangère”* et d'un *“faux monnayage”* toujours croissant, à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur. — Encore faut-il s'entendre sur les mots.

Le faux monnayage n'est pas en Turquie ce qu'il est en Europe. — Dans le premier pays c'est la simple contrefaçon des anciennes espèces

altérées ayant encore cours légal dans l'Empire. — C'est-à-dire le faux monnayeur ici fabrique avec la valeur d'une Livre Sterling, soit 25 francs ou 110 piastres en nouvel argent, une autre valeur courante de 220 piastres, exactement selon l'ancien étalon monétaire du Gouvernement. C'est cependant vouloir remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes que de prétendre à conserver par des moyens artificiels un pareil état de numéraire, en face d'une absorption *inévitable*.

Or cette absorption devient inévitable, par les deux raisons qu'on vient d'indiquer, plus la thésaurisation habituelle du pays.

Quant à la première cause — c'est-à-dire la balance du commerce — on peut évaluer à un terme moyen annuel de trois millions de piastres (de 1844/47) en faveur de l'étranger le solde du commerce général de la seule place de Constantinople, et comme à Smyrne et sur les autres places et échelles de l'Empire le cours des échanges a une tendance de hausse presque continuelle — car il y monte souvent de 4 et de 5 pour cent — il est évident que l'exportation du numéraire de bon aloi s'opère dans des proportions considérables.

La seconde cause de la diminution des bonnes espèces agit tout aussi puissamment, vu que le Gouvernement lui même fournit aujourd'hui aux faux-monnayeurs de ses propres états la matière première de leur fabrication au taux de 110 piastres par Livre Sterling, tandis qu'en 1827 ils la payèrent à raison de 127 piastres. Sous ce rapport le nouveau système présente le funeste résultat d'augmenter de 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ pour cent les chances du gain et partant du crime, et d'animer par là les opérations des ateliers clandestins, non seulement de la Turquie, proprement dite, mais encore de la Servie, de la Valachie et de la Moldavie.

En Grèce et dans les îles Joniennes on pratique largement le faux monnayage, mais on s'y procure la matière première en espèces européennes ou en lingots.

Le gain des monnayeurs dans tous ces pays est d'une moyenne d'à peu près 100 pour cent brut, et ils peuvent compter au moins sur un bénéfice net de 70 ou 80 pour cent. Leur difficulté principale est l'écoulement des espèces frappées clandestinement.

C'est le petit commerce du pays et surtout le cabotage grec qui s'en chargent.

La troisième des raisons indiquées — la thésaurisation — est l'agent le plus actif dans la disparition graduelle du numéraire de bon aloi.

C'est là un usage caractéristique de l'Orient, comme de toute l'Asie, où le manque de sûreté dans la propriété et l'instabilité des emplois publics portent toute la nation à se créer des réserves pour l'imprévu.

Certainement on ne cachera, ni n'enfouira pas l'argent détérioré, si on peut se procurer des espèces de bon aloi.

Aussi la rareté des bonnes espèces turques et l'agio commercial de l'or et de l'argent étranger, même sur la place de Constantinople, sont des faits incontestables et d'autant plus remarquables, que le Gou-

vernement a frappé plus de 300 millions de nouveaux piastres au titre de 110, selon ce qui a été dit plus haut.

L'hôtel de la monnaie et le Ministre du Trésor cependant prennent des soins exceptionnels de faire effectuer, en or ou en argent de bon aloi, les paiements aux personnages influents du Sérail Impérial même, ainsi qu'à quelques-uns des autres dignitaires, non initiés aux mystères des finances.

Ordinairement aussi les banquiers des légations étrangères, surtout ceux qui réunissent le double emploi d'agents du Gouvernement turc et de payeurs des missions européennes trouvent des facilités pour se procurer, en bonnes espèces, l'argent nécessaire aux besoins de la diplomatie.

Ce sont là des moyens détournés et assez bien calculés pour faire croire au Sultan et à beaucoup d'autres personnes, que la réforme monétaire marche toujours, qu'elle est peut-être près de s'accomplir, si elle terminée.

Cette illusion est partagée par un grand nombre de négociants et industriels étrangers et indigènes.

Ceux-ci, peu portés en général à approfondir des mesures d'état se contentent de voir le cours du change maintenu à 110, ce qui est l'essentiel pour leurs spéculations d'affaires.

Dès-lors l'erreur est devenue presque générale.

Les journaux turcs ont reçu l'ordre de dire et de répéter, que la réforme monétaire en Turquie était consommée et la presse européenne — médiocrement renseignée d'ici — l'a considérée comme un fait accompli.

Pendant une personne qui soutiendrait, en connaissance de cause, que cette réforme est en bonne voie d'accomplissement, mériterait à peu près autant de confiance, que celle qui assurerait, que l'esclavage est aboli en Turquie, parcequ'on vend les esclaves dans des maisons particulières, au lieu de les exposer dans l'ancien Awret-Bazar.

Autant vaudrait dire qu'on ne corrompt plus les employés turcs, parcequ'une ordonnance Impériale défend d'offrir des présents aux fonctionnaires publics.

Il faut le répéter, la réforme monétaire est renfermée essentiellement dans la démonétisation et dans la conversion des 900 millions de piastres Altılıks, Bechlıks &c. &c. &c. car l'émission des nouvelles espèces métalliques -- sans la conversion des anciennes -- n'est qu'une demi-mesure, et le maintien artificiel du cours de change à 110 piastres n'est qu'un palliatif onéreux, qui cessera probablement d'agir au premier embarras sérieux des finances turques, tel que le produirait la guerre étrangère ou une grande commotion intérieure.

En définitive qu'est-il résulté pour l'état de l'adoption isolée de ces deux dernières mesures?

La disparition presque totale du numéraire turc, de bon aloi, de la circulation générale et une charge annuelle pour le trésor d'au moins 2,920,000 piastres.

En voici les preuves :

ad primum

L'hôtel de la monnaie avait émis jusqu'en
 Octobre 1844 la somme de piastres 110 millions

On calcule que depuis le mois de Novembre
 1846 jusqu'à la fin de 1847, il a été converti en
 bonnes espèces turques les $\frac{3}{5}$ ^{mes} de l'importation
 étrangère susmentionnée de 250 de piastres soit „ 150 „
 et l'on doit admettre que dans l'intervalle d'Octobre
 1844 jusqu'en Novembre 1846, on a émis au
 moins „ 40 „

faisant un minimum de piastres 300 millions

de nouveaux piastres, au titre de 110.

Toutefois l'exportation étrangère, le faux-monnayage ou plutôt la contrefaçon et la thésaurisation de toute la nation ont tellement absorbé ces espèces, qu'on les voit à peine dans la circulation générale du pays, si l'on en excepte la masse limitée qui, de temps à autre, est jetée sur la place de Constantinople et sur la bourse de Pera, à la suite des manoeuvres susmentionnés du trésor et des banquiers du Gouvernement turc.

Cela est si vrai, que les paiements ordinaires de l'état se font presque exclusivement en anciennes monnaies altérées dites *Bechliks &c.*, au point que dans des versements par exemple de 500,000 piastres en rates mensuelles on n'a perçu que 1000 piastres de bon argent soit $\frac{1}{500}$ ^{me} du montant.

Cette surabondance des pièces détériorées, maintenues à titre d'argent légal, s'explique d'abord par le faux monnayage ou la contrefaçon et puis par les effets de réaction de la thésaurisation.

Le fonds de la grande thésaurisation de la Turquie roulait, jusqu'au commencement de 1844, sur les 300 millions d'anciennes espèces que le Gouvernement a démonétisées alors et mises hors de cours, et, plus, sur peut-être autant de millions ou plus en espèces dites *Bechliks &c.*

Or le Gouvernement turc, par l'émission de 300 millions de nouveaux piastres, est venu offrir à ceux qui thésaurisent, un moyen facile d'échanger leur *Bechliks &c. &c.* contre de l'argent de bon aloi, et dès lors celui-ci a été gardé ou enfoui, et, par contre, les espèces altérées, libérées des coffres-forts et des cachettes, sont venues inonder les marchés du pays. — La disparition des bonnes espèces monnayées n'a donc rien de surprenant.

ad secundum

Après avoir eu avec la maison française de Pera Allion, depuis 1844 jusqu'en 1847, un contrat onéreux pour le maintien à 110 piastres du cours de change de la Livre Sterling, le Gouvernement turc a conclu,

dans le courant du mois d'Avril passé, un arrangement moins désavantageux pour la même opération avec la maison de banque Autrichienne Baltazzi de Constantinople.

Les conditions de cette dernière convention sont que ces banquiers jouissent des intérêts d'une somme de 32 millions de piastres, que le Gouvernement leur confie à titre de dépôt, pendant la durée du contrat, plus une compensation en effectif de 1,000,000 de piastres par an, pour fraix de commission, pertes sur les échanges &c. &c.

En d'autres termes, l'opération coute au Gouvernement les intérêts de son dépôt de 32 millions, au minimum du taux payé sur le papier monnaie, émis par l'état' soit à 6 pour cent . . . piastres 1,920,000 plus la bonification susmentionnée de 1,000,000
Total de la dépense onéreuse piastres 2,920,000

Il s'agit à présent de remarquer, que la maison de banque subventionnée peut faire valoir les 32 millions, dans ses opérations du Levant, certainement à raison de 10 pour cent, ce qui lui constitue un bénéfice de 4 pour cent, ou bien de 1,280,000 piastres.

On évaluait à au delà de cette somme les gains annuels dans cette opération de la maison Allion qui, supplantée dans cette branche du service financier par la maison Baltazzi, continue néanmoins les affaires de banque très lucratives de l'hôtel des monnaies, proprement dit.

Cette estimation de gains approximatifs des maisons de banque précitées n'est pas sans valeur dans l'appréciation des causes qui ont amené la réforme monétaire à son point d'arrêt.

Rien de plus probable que l'absence de connaissances positives et spéciales dans le Ministère turc à l'égard des systèmes de finance et de crédit public, tels qu'ils sont établis dans les grands et florissants états de l'Europe.

Mais il n'est guères possible, que MM. Baltazzi et Allion soient tellement ignorans de loix financiers de l'économie politique, qu'ils n'aient reconnu, de prime abord, que le Gouvernement allait s'engager dans une impasse, dès qu'il voulut tenter d'opérer une conversion "graduelle" des 900 millions de piastres altérés Bechliks &c. &c. dans le terme prolongé de sept années.

On fait dire à l'ancienne administration que l'opération s'exécute "par degrés".

Le Ministère actuel soutient qu'il la fera "peu-à-peu".

La variante sur les mots est ingénue, mais les mesures sont identiques et également impuissantes jusqu'ici.

Qu'on suppose le cas, que par un système de crédit rationnel un financier entendu pût opérer la conversion dans neuf mois ou dans une année.

Le premier résultat indubitable d'une pareille mesure serait la suppression des gains susmentionnés de MM. Baltazzi et Allion de 1,280,000 piastres ou plus. En outre il y aurait la perte définitive de certains gros bénéfices d'agiotage et de manipulation, perte qui tomberait principalement sur Tahir Pacha, directeur de l'hôtel de la monnaie.

Demander à ce dignitaire lui même et aux banquiers, ses affidés, la condamnation d'un système financier qui les enrichit personnellement, c'est taxer trop haut la vertu des employés en Orient.

C'est en même temps expliquer la cause principale de la stérilité des efforts des commissions nommées jusqu'ici pour la réforme monétaire, car Tahir Pacha et MM. Baltazzi et Allion en ont toujours été les membres les plus influents ou les inspireurs.

En Turquie on peut bien porter le Gouvernement à émettre 300 millions de nouveaux piastres, en pure perte, au point de vue de la conversion.

On n'y fera jamais consentir le directeur de la monnaie et les banquiers qui servent l'état à abandonner "proprio motu" leurs gros gains et bénéfices dans le simple but d'améliorer les finances de l'Empire.

D'après les données qui précèdent, il ne paraîtra plus surprenant, que l'état général des finances turques ait empiré plutôt que gagné, depuis le 1 Janvier 1840 jusqu'au 1 Janvier 1848.

A la première date le trésor couvrait encore, il est vrai, ses déficits annuels par l'émission d'espèces métalliques altérées, mais par contre il n'avait pas une forte dette inscrite de bons du trésor 6 pour cent, comme en 1848.

A la première époque le cours du change de la Livre Sterling était encore à un taux moyen de 100 piastres; en 1848, au contraire, il n'est maintenu à 110 piastres que par un expédient onéreux, qui coûte annuellement, à l'état, un minimum de 2,920,000 piastres.

Or comme l'importation des marchandises étrangères et l'exportation des produits turcs ont suivi (année commune), depuis 1840, un mouvement ascendant à peu près parallèle, il est évident, que la dépréciation des piastres turcs dans la proportion de 110 à 100 pendant les 8 années qui viennent de s'écouler, doit être attribuée, surtout, aux défectueuses mesures de finance, adoptées depuis 1840.

Aussi le déficit avoué et le déficit occulte, mais non moins réel, du trésor public, est-il plus fort au commencement de 1848, qu'il ne l'a été à aucune époque antérieure.

On appellera ici déficit avoué l'arriéré du trésor couvert, temporairement, par des bons du trésor au porteur, donnant 6 pour cent d'intérêt pour an.

On nommera déficit occulte la dette de l'état provenant de la différence entre la valeur nominale des 900 millions de piastres altérés, en circulation comme argent legal, et leur valeur intrinsèque.

Cette dernière dette est d'autant plus positive et réelle, qu'elle est, non seulement reconnue implicitement par le principe même de la réforme monétaire, mais encore par les engagements de plusieurs règnes antécédants.

Très souvent de nouvelles espèces détériorées ont été émises avec la promesse de leur retraite, à terme plus ou moins éloignée.

La première émission de papier monnaie eut lieu sous le Ministère Rechid de 1839/41.

Vers la fin de cette administration, le trésor était tellement obéré, qu'il dut se résigner à émettre des bons pour 80 millions de piastres, portant l'énorme intérêt de 12½ pour cent par an.

Encore le crédit du Gouvernement était-il si bas, que les bons du trésor ne se vendirent sur place qu'à un escompte de 4 à 8 pour cent.

Sous le court Grand-Vizirat d'Izzet Mehmed Pacha, en 1841/42, le crédit public se releva comme par enchantement de plus de 100 pour cent.

Dès-lors on put remplacer les bons 12½ pour cent par d'autres billets ne portant que 6 pour cent d'intérêt.

Encore n'émit-on successivement que soixante millions en nouveaux bons 6 pour cent, au lieu des 80 millions en papier retirés de la circulation.

Le Vizir Izzet Mehmed n'était qu'un rude et intègre soldat, vieux Musulman.

A peine, peut-être, appréciait-il lui même un tour de force, qui aurait porté aux nues la réputation d'un Ministre de finance en Europe. En tout cas était-il trop altier pour descendre jusque dans l'arène des journaux à fin de le faire valoir.

Izzet Mehmed était entré pauvre au Ministère, au bout de neuf mois il en sortit plus pauvre, pour aller plus tard en exilé.

Depuis lors le chiffre de la dette inscrite de 60 millions de piastres en papier, six pour cent, est resté à peu près stationnaire jusqu'en 1846.

Sous le second Ministère Rechid il a été porté successivement à 80 millions de piastres ou au delà, — car le minimum de son évaluation actuelle est de 80 millions de piastres,¹ le maximum est de 200 millions.

A cet égard il n'y a de certain, que le fait de l'obération et les embarras, plus ou moins cachés, du trésor, dont la recette annuelle totale doit varier entre 550 millions et 600 millions de piastres, soit entre £ 5,000,000 et £ 6,000,000.

Quant au déficit occulte la valeur intrinsèque des espèces dites Bechliks &c. &c. a été computed très diversement.

Selon la maison Baltazzi il y aurait une perte approximative de 50 pour cent sur l'opération de la démonétisation des espèces altérées ayant encore cours légal dans le pays.

Selon l'aveu du Gouvernement dans son exposé précité du 6 Novembre 1846 "la valeur intrinsèque des monnaies dites Bechliks &c. &c. est à-peine de la moitié de la valeur nominale".

Selon les données enfin de l'ancien Ministre de Prusse près la Porte Ottomane, M. de Lecoq, la valeur intrinsèque des dites espèces métalliques ne serait que du tiers de leur valeur nominale.

Le minimum du déficit occulte serait donc, d'après ces calculs, de 450 millions de piastres, soit de cinquante pour cent de perte sur les 900 millions de piastres en circulation.

¹ L'évaluation du Banquier Fzino est de 120 ou 130 millions.

Le maximum, au contraire, monterait à 600 millions de piastres, soit $66\frac{2}{3}$ pour cent de perte sur la même somme de 900 millions.

Par conséquent le total du déficit avoué et du déficit occulte du trésor de l'Empire présenterait les proportions suivantes au 1 Janvier 1848 :

	minimum	maximum
déficit avoué, couvert en papier monnaie 6 pour cent	piastres 80,000,000,	piastres 200,000,000
déficit occulte, gisant dans les 900 millions de piastres altérés	„ 450,000,000,	„ 600,000,000
Total piastres	530,000,000,	piastres 800,000,000
soit au taux de piastres 110	£ 4,818,181,	£ 7,272,727

formant approximativement l'équivalent du revenu de l'Empire turc d'une année ou de dix huit mois.

A. Jochmus,
Lieutenant-Général.

P.S. du 2 Janvier 1848.

La commission de finance, nommée en vertu du décret impérial du 6 Novembre 1846 et présidée par Tahir Pacha, directeur de la monnaie, a décidé, après 13 mois de délibération, qu'on consacrerait, pour l'année 1848, une somme de 4 millions de piastres à la démonétisation d'une égale somme d'anciens *Bechliks*.

On vient d'annoncer officiellement, que S. M. le Sultan s'est rendu le 30 Décembre à l'hôtel de la monnaie, accompagné du Grand Vizir et des principaux fonctionnaires de l'empire, pour être présent aux premières opérations de la démonétisation.

Cet expédient est derechef une fin de non-recevoir, et une déception financière inventée au profit de l'hôtel des monnaies et suggérée par l'espoir de cacher l'embarras du trésor de l'Empire.

C'est un sacrifice auquel on condamne, encore une fois, l'état, pour faire croire à un projet sérieux de conversion, mais, par contre, l'opération pourra bien présenter un bénéfice notable aux principaux membres de la commission de finance, qui sont en même temps les exécuteurs de l'arrêté susmentionné.

On se procure indifféremment et "au même prix", sur les marchés de Constantinople, de Smyrne &c. &c., les espèces altérées dites *Altılıks* au titre de 40 à 50 pour cent de leur valeur nominale, et celles dites *Bechliks* au titre de 20 à 30 pour cent de leur valeur nominale.

Le Sultan ayant ordonné la démonétisation de 4,000,000 de piastres *Bechliks*, la fonte de ces monnaies n'est censée de donner au titre moyen de 25 pour cent, que 1,000,000 de piastres d'argent pur, tandis que si l'on leur substitue 4,000,000 en *Altılıks* la fonte de ces espèces, au titre moyen de 45 pour cent, produira une valeur en argent de 1,800,000 de piastres, ou bien une différence de 800,000 piastres.

Il dépendra donc entièrement de la volonté et de la conscience du président de la commission de finance et des employés supérieurs de la monnaie, si ce surplus sera réalisé à leur avantage personnel, ou bien au bénéfice de l'état.

En tout cas si l'on procédait à la démonétisation à raison de 4 millions de piastres par an, il faudrait non pas 7 années (selon le programme), mais bien 225 années pour convertir les 900 millions de piastres altérés, ayant encore cours légal dans le pays.

Mais il faut ajouter que la dépense de 4 millions par an est une pure perte, car le faux monnayage ou la contrefaçon rempliront la lacune des Bechliks retirés par l'hôtel de la monnaie.

Conséquemment on ne fait *rien* pour la conversion définitive pas plus en 1848, que dans le terme écoulé de 1844 jusqu'en 1847.

A. J.

94.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Vienna.

Private. Extract.

Pera 1 February 1848.

My Lord.

I have read with great satisfaction the letter which you did me the honour to write to me on the 20 December.¹ Soon afterwards Your Excellency will have learnt the conditional surrender of Abd-ul-Kadr to the French authorities of Algiers. We do not know, as yet if the French Government will *keep* or *break* the promises made by the Duke d'Aumale.

The most striking circumstance in the submission of Abd-ul-Kadr is the extraordinary fact that the Chieftain, who has kept at bay for fourteen years a hundred thousand good french troops, has not been able to maintain his ground for one year against the poor levees of the Emperor of Marocco, whose whole army was defeated by 10,000 Frenchmen.

The spirit of Abd-ul-Kadr's followers slackened from the moment that he was in actual revolt against the Emperor of Marocco, who is the Emir el Muminin of the orthodox Maliki, just as the Sultan of Turkey is the Caliph of all the Sunni.

Considered from this point of view the defeat of Abd-ul-Kadr is an evident proof of the overwhelming strength of the religious feeling in the North-African population, and I continue therefore to believe that the Algerine tribes with or without Abd-ul-Kadr will be found

¹ No. 92.

ready to renew the war against the French sooner or later, and especially if ever the great Mussulman coalition should be formed, such as I have sketched its out-line in my Memorandum on Algiers.

Arabs, Moors, and Turks, though generally at variance and often at war amongst themselves, coalesce easily against the foreign invader and common enemy.

In the 16th century for instance notwithstanding the oppressive wars against the nation of Aruch Bey Barbarossa and his brother Chaireddin Pasha, the Moors and Arabs of Algiers, as well as the Fez and Marocco people joined those celebrated Turkish Chieftains against the Spaniards, then in possession of Oran and many other places on the African coast.

The great event of the day here is the brilliant reception of the Ambassador of His Holiness Pius IX.

Monsignore Ferrieri, who is a highly accomplished prelate (*homme du monde*), is treated with the greatest distinction since his arrival on the 16 January.

Yet many years ago Pertew Effendi in the official document which announced the exile of the Catholic Armenians from Constantinople into Asia Minor applied the term "hanzir" to the Pope (*"le porc qu'on appelle le pape"*).

At present such is the general interest and curiosity created by the extraordinary mission of the Archbishop of Sida that the Sultan himself went incognito to the Porte in order to see the Ambassador from behind a screen on the 19 of last month, when he paid his first visit to the Grand Visir.

To-day the Sultan received the Nuncio with the highest marks of satisfaction. — His Majesty is reported to have said that after the official visit he should be very happy to receive the Ambassador without ceremony at any time he wished to come.

In former days one point of the etiquette at certain official receptions was that the Aga of the Janizaries used to express in a loud voice the hope that the next year's payment of his troops would be effected by the Sultan in Rome.

The object of Monsignore Ferrieri's mission is understood to be the conclusion of a treaty with the Porte, granting to the subjects of His Holiness the same advantages as those enjoyed by other foreign nations, and securing to the Catholics of the Ottoman Empire the direct officious intervention of the Holy See, in purely religious questions.

The Turkish Government seems to be quite disposed to grant the demands of Rome.

It is a great point for the Porte that henceforth religious questions be not made use of as vehicles for political encroachments by Catholic powers, and especially by France.

I hear that Count Rossi at Rome has done every thing in his power to prevent the Embassy being sent here; but that seeing His Holiness resolved to do so, he offered a *French* steamer to take out the Nuncio.

This offer was finally declined, and the lender of a Sardinian steamer accepted. — When Mr. de Rossi complained about this unfriendly disposition, the Pope in person is reported to have told him that he had resolved on following this line of policy, because it had come to his certain knowledge that the French Government had employed its influence at Constantinople to counteract Mr. Escalon, the papal Consul General, sent to Turkey with instructions to open negotiations about a commercial treaty.

The Armenian Catholic Patriarch was charged to make the preliminary communications to the Porte regarding the new Embassy, and since its arrival the Sardinian mission is especially employed in assisting the Nuncio.

Monsignore Valerga, the new Patriarch of Jerusalem, went direct to his see.

The papal Ambassador will make a journey of inspection thro' Syria, Egypt, and Greece before he returns to Rome.

The Prince de Podenas, a French legitimist, and the Count d'Angogna, a Sardinian nobleman, accompany the Nuncio by special permission, although they are not attached to the mission. — This gives certainly neither an ultra liberal nor an ultra *French* Catholic colour to the Embassy.

The Italian residents and refugees here wanted to get up some absurd political demonstration on the arrival of Monsignore Ferrieri. tricolored revolutionary flags were to be carried in procession &c. &c. but Stürmer and Tecco got the Porte to put a timely stop to the projected demonstration. — The Nuncio also refused a public Italian dinner.

The return of Mr. Mussurus to Athens has been delayed for a month by an accident. He fell from his horse and broke two ribs.

The Sultan has evinced his satisfaction with the conclusion of the Greek differences by promoting Ali Effendi to the rank of Mushir or Pasha of three tails, and by granting to Reshid Pasha a pay for life of 50,000 piastres per month, a sure sign that His Majesty cannot be very exactly informed as to the real state of the Imperial treasury.

There is this to be said that rank and pay in Turkey are given to-day and taken away to-morrow by a simple Hattisherif or vice versa. Nafiz Pasha, as Your Lordship will remember, was condemned for misconduct and degraded to the level of Aga. Three or four years afterwards he presided again as Mushir the identical Council of Justice which had proclaimed his "*perpetual disability for office*".

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY

at Vienna.

Private. Extract.

Pera 2 March 1848.

With reference to my letter on the state of the Turkish finances, I have to inform Your Lordship that Rifaat Pasha has been appointed Malyé Mushir or Minister of Finance in lieu of Sarim Pasha, who persisted in offering his resignation. Nafiz Pasha, the late head of the Treasury Department, has refused obstinately to reassume that direction, and the Sultan was obliged to tell Rifaat personally that he was to take charge of the Department. — The Treasury is deeply oberated, and Rifaat is very much out of spirits about his appointment.

The Sultana Valideh has been very dangerously ill. Her life was saved by Dr. Spitzer, Millinger, Caratheodory &c. &c. all of whom have received magnificent recompenses amounting for some of them to about £ 5000 each.

The reports from Egypt are that Mehemet Ali is not expected to live.

When he embarked from Alexandria[†] for Malta in a French steamer &c. &c. his medical attendants declared that the chances were that he would die before 48 hours were over.

They write since that the danger was not so eminent, but that French intrigues have induced the medical advisers of Mehemet Ali to insist sine qua non on the necessity of a sea voyage. It is supposed amongst other things that it is hoped thus to find a pretext in the absence of Mehemet Ali or in his dangerous illness for the French Ministers not executing the promise of the Duke of Aumale to Abd-ul-Kadr, covering the break of faith by the alledged force of adverse circumstances.

The Nuncio continues to be the object of great attention on the part of the Turkish Government, but his stay here is unexpectedly prolonged by the underhand manoeuvres of the French and Austrian Legations against the success of his mission.

He dined on the 27 ultimo at the Grand Visir, who wore on this occasion side by side the two Nishans with the Sultan's and the Pope's portraits, whilst an envoy from the Sheriff of Mekka happened to sit at the same table with the Pope's Ambassador.

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[†] Abbas Pasha has again been appointed ad interim Governor General of Egypt, and Saïd Pasha Governor of Alexandria.

GENERAL JOCHMUS TO VISCOUNT PONSONBY
at Vienna.

Private. Extract.

Constantinople 3 April 1848.

I had the honour to transmit to Your Excellency by the Vienna post of the 15 March the copy of a letter from the Serasker announcing me that the Turkish Government had "*granted*" me my retreat, leaving me the Nishan of the honorary rank of Ferik Pasha or Lieutenant-General.

The word "*grant*" implies a demand which I never made. — This is a trick.

The fact is that I believe Prince Voghorides took some indirect steps to ascertain, if the Turkish Government really intended to send me as Minister to Greece in lieu of Mussurus. My former letters to Your Lordship explain the conduct of the Turks.

They are *great children* and act more by impulse than principle. It is useless to scrutinize their motives, but Prince Voghorides says that he has every reason to think that the Turks in this affair, like in most others, have been led by the nose, and that a *foreign intrigue* is the real cause of their sudden resolution. He believes that they would not have come to this determination, if the great news from Europe had arrived here eight days sooner

The news from Vienna has produced amongst the thinking Turks a much greater effect than the revolution in Paris

They are afraid of disturbances in many parts, especially in Greece, in the island of Candia, and in those of the Archipelago and in Bosnia.

They have now heard that the Emperor of Austria is obliged to swear as King of Hungary that, if the former frontiers of this latter kingdom be ever recovered, the conquered provinces are to be restored to Hungary.

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APPENDIX.

ABRISS
DER GESCHICHTE DES KRIEGES 1840—1841
IN SYRIEN
VON
HEINRICH FREIHERRN VON SCHOLL.
OBERST IM K. K. GENIE-STABE.

WIEN 1866.

Die Beispiele dass der an Zahl schwächere aus einem Kampfe als Sieger hervorgeht, gehören immer zu den lehrreichsten. Ein solches Beispiel war der 1840—41 in Syrien geführte Krieg, bei dem Oesterreich auf der Seite der siegreichen Partei stehend einigen Antheil hatte. Wir haben daher in doppelter Beziehung ein starkes Interesse, diesen Krieg, mit dem sich die Literatur verhältnissmässig sehr wenig beschäftigt hat, näher kennen zu lernen. Gestützt theils auf geschriebene und gedruckte Mittheilungen, theils auf mündliche Ueberlieferungen solcher Personen welche thätig mitgewirkt haben, soll nachstehend der Versuch gemacht werden, den Abriss der Geschichte dieses schon wegen des Auftretens sehr verschiedener Streitkräfte interessanten Krieges unter vorheriger Aufzählung jener Hauptbegebenheiten zu liefern, welche denselben hervorgerufen haben. Befremden darf es nicht, wenn wir in dieser Aufzählung mit der Lebensgeschichte einer einzelnen Person, des Mehemet Ali, Pascha's von Egypten, beginnen; denn dieser herrschsüchtige Vasall war, obwohl damals schon alt und gebrechlich und fern von den Kampfplätzen, doch die Hauptursache des in Rede stehenden Krieges.

Im Jahre 1769 zu Kavala in Rumelien geboren, hatte Mehemet Ali schon im 14. Jahre seines Lebens bei Ausbruch eines Aufstandes in seiner Vaterstadt so viel Energie und Geschicklichkeit bewiesen, dass ihm der dortige Pascha zur Belohnung eine Anstellung im Militärdienste gab. Einige Jahre später trat Mehemet Ali aus dem Militärdienst und verlegte sich in Gesellschaft mit einem türkischen Kaufmanne auf den Handel mit Tabak. Im Jahre 1800 wurde er an die Spitze jenes Cou-

tingents gestellt, welches Kavala zur Vertreibung der Franzosen an Egypten liefern musste. Dort zeichnete er sich durch grosse Tapferkeit aus und erlangte nachher den Befehl über alle in Egypten befindlichen Albanesen, mit denen er sehr bald die Mameluken die sich wie die alleinigen Gewalthaber benahmen, in mehreren Gefechten bis zur Vernichtung oder völligen Unterwerfung schlug. Da er sich der Bewohner von Kairo stets sehr angenommen hatte, so wurde er von denselben schon 1804 zum Pascha von Egypten ausgerufen, eine Stelle die er jedoch erst dann annahm (1806), nachdem sich der von der hohen türkischen Pforte dazu ernannte Reschid Pascha in Folge seiner schlechten Verwaltung als unmöglich gezeigt hatte. Von der Pforte in seinem neuen Amte bestätigt, war Mehemet Ali vor Allem darauf bedacht die Finanzen zu bessern, denn diese waren durch die verkehrten Massregeln seiner Vorgänger trotz des Reichthums des Bodens so wenig ergiebig und dabei so sehr in Unordnung gebracht, dass die Truppen nicht mehr besoldet werden konnten, und ein Aufruhr entstand der nur mit grösster Mühe zu dämpfen war. Aber noch mehr machten die übrig gebliebenen Mameluken zu schaffen, die ihre angestammte Herrschsucht nicht aufgeben konnten. Die grosse Gefahr erkennend, die von dieser Seite drohte, entschloss sich Mehemet Ali 1811 zu einem drastischen Mittel Zuflucht zu nehmen. Er lud 470 Mameluken, darunter ihre vornehmsten Häupter, zu einem grossen Feste in die Citadelle ein und liess sie nach dem Male theils niederschliessen, theils enthaupten. Einem einzigen Mameluken gelang es ein Pferd zu besteigen und sich durch einen Sprung über die Escarpemauer,¹ wobei das Pferd todt blieb, zu retten. Aber auch in der Stadt wurden an 500 Mameluken überfallen und niedergemacht. Ihre im Lande noch verbliebenen Genossen sammelten sich in Ober-Egypten, wurden aber geschlagen und nach Nubien zurückgeworfen. Durch diese glückliche Bekämpfung derjenigen Rasse, welche den jeweiligen osmanischen Sultanen und Statthaltern stets die grössten Schwierigkeiten bereitete (die Janitscharen waren weit weniger herrschsüchtig), durch die Hebung der Finanzen (freilich im Sinne des Monopols), endlich durch die zeitweilige Zufriedenstellung der culturliebenden Bewohner der Nilufer wuchs die Macht und das Ansehen Mehemet Ali's derart, dass die Pforte ernste Besorgnisse zu nähren anfang. Um diese zu verschweigen, glaubte man kein besseres Mittel in Anwendung zu bringen, als den mächtigen Vasallen in Arabien, wo sich die kräftige und fanatische Secte der Wahabiten empört hatte, zu beschäftigen. Aber dieses Mittel brachte die entgegengesetzte Wirkung hervor, denn als Mehemet Ali's Sohn Ibrahim Pascha die Wahabiten (1816—18) geschlagen und in Folge dessen als vorher ausbedungenen Preis das Paschalik von Hedschas mit den heiligen Städten erlangt hatte, griff des Vaters Macht tief nach Arabien. Dazu kam noch dass dieser gelegentlich einer letzten Expedition gegen die Mameluken auch Sennaar und Kordofan erwarb.

¹ Napier gibt die Höhe dieser Mauer zu 30 bis 40 englische Fuss an.

Von jetzt an war Mehemet Ali bedacht seine Macht gründlich und nachhaltig zu befestigen. Er liess daher die Abgänge in den Reihen der Albanesen durch Eingeborene decken und organisirte seine Truppen ganz nach europäischem Muster, wobei ihm namentlich die Franzosen sehr behilflich waren. Er legte Gewehrfabriken und Geschützgiessereien, Schiffswerften und Festungen an, sorgte aber auch für die weitere Hebung der Cultur, da er sich zu sehr bewusst war dass diese in erster Reihe das Mittel liefere, um eine militärische Macht dauernd zu erhalten. Dabei ereignete es sich allerdings dass auch so manches Ungereimte zum Vorschein kam, denn es traten damals viele französische Projectenmacher auf, die bei der Vorliebe Mehemet Ali's für das Franzosenthum sehr bald Anklang fanden und er, sowie seine Minister hatten in Folge ihrer vernachlässigten Erziehung nicht immer die nöthigen Kenntnisse, um das Wahre vom Falschen und das Gute vom Schlechten zu unterscheiden. Einen Beweis davon liefert der 1819 im October begonnene und schon im December des nämlichen Jahres beendigte Mahmudieh-Schiffahrts-Canal, welcher den wichtigen Hafen von Alexandria mit dem Nil bei Kafteh verbinden sollte.¹ Er erhielt eine Länge von fast 10 Meilen, eine Breite von 90 Fuss und eine Tiefe von 18 Fuss. Aber an den Enden blieben, weil die Niveauverhältnisse nicht gehörig berücksichtigt wurden, Dämme stehen, so dass sowohl in Alexandrien als bei Kafteh stets eine zeitraubende und kostspielige Umladung erfolgen muss. Auch sollen wegen der grossen Eile, die Mehemet Ali hatte, für die beim Bau beschäftigt gewesenen 250,000 Arbeiter keine Unterkünfte hergestellt worden sein, so dass von Ersteren an 30,000 um's Leben kamen, was in diesem Lande bei der grossen Hitze am Tage und bei dem starken Thaufall in der Nacht sehr begreiflich ist.

Unterdessen hatte Mehemet Ali, trotzdem dass seine Truppen sehr bald nur aus Eingebornen (jedoch fast ausschliesslich nur von Türken befehligt) bestanden, eine Kriegsmacht zusammengebracht, welche im Verein mit der eigenen Flotte selbst zu kräftigen überseeischen Unternehmungen vollkommen befähigt war. Als der griechische Aufstand ausbrach, säumte die Pforte nicht den Statthalter von Egypten mit der Bewältigung desselben zu betrauen, und war sie zu dieser Massnahme nicht allein durch die sich mehrende Besorgniss vor einer weiteren Machtvergrösserung Mehemet Ali's, sondern wohl auch durch die unzureichende Stärke der eigenen Kräfte veranlasst. Gerne gab Mehemet Ali diesem Auftrage Folge, denn er konnte sich jetzt zur Bedingung machen, dass ihm für diese Hilfeleistung das Paschalik der das ägäische Meer beherrschenden Insel Candia gegeben werde. Indessen fiel die Expedition nach Griechenland unter Ibrahim Pascha in Folge des combinirten Angriffes der Engländer, Franzosen und Russen so unglücklich aus (die ägyptisch-türkische Flotte wurde 1827 bei Navarino verbrannt), dass Mehemet Ali, wollte er sich ferner erhalten, auf die Beschaffung

¹ Um von Kairo zu Wasser nach Alexandria zu gelangen, musste man früher auf dem Nil bis Damiette und dann zur See bis Alexandria fahren.

ganz neuer militärischer Kräfte Bedacht nehmen musste, und der erlittene Verlust, statt ihn zum gefügigen Werkzeug der Pforte zu machen, war bei der angeborenen Herrschsucht nur um so mehr geeignet, das Gewaltigste zu leisten. Mit verdoppeltem Eifer wurde die Reorganisirung des Heeres und der Flotte betrieben, und zur Beschaffung der nöthigen Mittel wurden sogar Erpressungen in Anwendung gebracht, die freilich wieder den Nachtheil hatten dass viele seiner Unterthanen nach Syrien flüchteten, wo sie von Abdallah, dem mächtigen und trotzigem Pascha von Acre, sehr gut aufgenommen wurden.

Um diese Zeit mochte bei Mehemet Ali ganz gewiss schon jener Traum von einem neuen grossarabischen Reiche entstanden sein welches, zum grossen Theil auf eine durch französische Ideen aufgefrischte arabische Cultur sich stützend, alle Länder von der libyschen Wüste bis zum persischen Golf und vom arabischen bis zum schwarzen Meer begreifen würde. In vollkommener Unabhängigkeit von der Pforte die, als aus türkischen Elementen zusammengesetzt, von jedem Araber gehasst wird, sollte dann die Dynastie des ehemaligen Tabakhändlers von Kavala von Kairo aus im Angesichte 4000 Jahre alter Baudenkmale ein Reich beherrschen, welches, beiderseits der wichtigen Landenge von Suez ausgebreitet, der Vermittler zwischen Orient und Occident werden konnte. Diese Hintergedanken bewogen Mehemet Ali, der sich bis dahin noch immer als sehr gefügiger Vasall gezeigt hatte, bei der Pforte ganz leise anzuklopfen und unter Hinweis auf den in Griechenland erlittenen und durch die Erlangung des Paschaliks von Candia keineswegs gedeckten Schaden für seinen Sohn Ibrahim um das von diesem sehr gewünschte Paschalik von Syrien anzusuchen, ein Land welches wegen seiner Nähe, wegen seines Bodenreichthums und wegen der Möglichkeit neue kriegerische Kräfte zu gewinnen, die Aussicht gab die egyptische Macht um ein Bedeutendes zu vermehren und zu befestigen. Aber die Pforte ging auf dieses Begehren nicht ein, daher Mehemet Ali nach langem Warten den Plan fasste das Gewünschte mit Gewalt durchzusetzen. Die Nichtauslieferung der nach Syrien geflüchteten Egyptier gab ihm einen schicklichen Vorwand mit Gewalt aufzutreten. Auf sein Geheiss rückte Ibrahim Ende 1831 an der Spitze von 40,000 Mann in Syrien ein, um vor Allem den widerspenstigen Pascha von Acre, der sich in seiner Feste eingeschlossen hatte, zu bezwingen. Aber erst im Mai 1832 konnte Ibrahim, nachdem mehrere Stürme abgeschlagen worden waren, Herr des Platzes werden. Dass der hiebei in Gefangenschaft gerathene Abdallah Pascha nicht allein am Leben gelassen, sondern später in Egypten bestens aufgenommen und beherbergt wurde, zeugt nicht allein für die Grossmuth Mehemet Ali's, sondern auch dafür, dass seine Action in der Hauptsache weniger gegen Abdallah als gegen die Pforte gerichtet war. Diese hatte merkwürdiger Weise während der ganzen Zeit, die mit dem Kampfe um Acre verstrich, gar nichts anderes gethan als ruhig zugesehen, denn es war ihr gar nicht so unangenehm, dass diese zwei mächtigen Vasallen sich gegenseitig zerfleischten. Als nun Acre gefallen war, Mehemet Ali neuerdings um das Paschalik von Syrien ansuchte,

und dieses Begehren abermals fruchtlos blieb, liess er, zum ersten Male die Maske abwerfend, sein Heer mit der Weisung weiter vorrücken, die in Syrien unter Ali und Hussein Pascha stehenden türkischen Truppen aus dem Lande zu treiben. Nach zwei siegreichen Gefechten am 6. Juli 1832 bei Khan-Kousseir and am 29. Juli 1832 bei Aleppo war Ibrahim Meister von ganz Syrien bis zum Taurus. Die Pforte hatte mittlerweile im Inneren von Kleinasien ein Heer von 50,000 Mann unter Reschid Pascha aufgestellt. Da sie aber Mehemet Ali's Begehren noch immer nicht befriedigen wollte, ihn vielmehr des Paschaliks von Egypten entsetzte und ächtete, so liess dieser sein Heer sogar über den Taurus rücken. Nach vielen Hin- und Hermärschen erfocht endlich Ibrahim bei Konieh am 21. December 1832 einen so entscheidenden Sieg (selbst der türkische Feldherr ward gefangen), dass die Pforte, alle Fassung verlierend, sich zur grössten Nachgiebigkeit bereit zeigte und in ihrer Angst vor den siegreichen Fahnen Ibrahim's sogar ihre Erzfeinde, die Russen, zu Hilfe rief, welch letztere auch wirklich ein stattliches Armeecorps am Bosphorus aufstellten. In dem darauf unter Vermittlung der europäischen Grossmächte zu Stande gebrachten Frieden von Kutahia blieb Mehemet Ali nicht allein im Besitze der Paschaliks von Egypten, Arabien (beziehungsweise Hedschas mit den heiligen Städten) und Candia, sondern er erhielt auch für seinen Sohn Ibrahim das lang gewünschte Paschalik von Syrien mit den nordwestlich gelegenen Districten von Adana und Merasch. Aber Mehemet Ali war damit noch keineswegs zufrieden, denn fortan sollte er Vasall bleiben und Tribut zahlen, und bezüglich der Erblichkeit war keine Garantie gegeben worden. Die Pforte ihrerseits sah wieder diesen Friedensschluss nur als ein Provisorium an und sann auf Mittel, um den rebellischen Vasallen im Laufe der Zeit dennoch zu Paaren zu treiben. Von beiden Seiten ward daher gerüstet, aber diese Rüstungen gingen auf türkischer Seite trotz aller Ungeduld des Sultans Mahmud II in Folge der schlechten Administration so langsam vorwärts, dass die Pforte erst 1839 ein ansehnliches Heer ins Feld schicken konnte. Während dieses langen Zeitraumes, den beide Theile mit Rüstungen zubrachten, wurde in einiger Beziehung verschieden vorgegangen. Die Pforte, wie Mehemet Ali, schickte junge Militärs aus, um in den grossmächtlichen Staaten Europa's militärisch erzogen zu werden und später als Instructoren im Vaterlande dienen zu können, aber Mehemet Ali schickte nebenbei auch hoffnungsvolle Jünglinge aus, die in Europa den Bergbau studieren und später die reichen Erzstätten in Sennaar abbauen sollten; denn vom Bergbau versprach er sich, dass er ihm eine neue Quelle des Einkommens und der Macht werde. Syrien, wo sein Sohn Ibrahim als General-Gouverneur zurückgeblieben war, suchte er möglichst auszubeuten. Weil aber dabei manche Erpressungen vorkamen und Ibrahim Vorstellungen dagegen machte, so wurde diesem nur das Militärgouvernement gelassen, und für die Civilangelegenheiten ein eigener Gouverneur in der Person des Scheriff Pascha dahin geschickt. Ibrahim, über diese Machtverringering verletzt, suchte seinen Gram durch Hebung der Cultur zu

stillen und kümmerte sich darüber weniger um das Militärische. Wegen dem ambitiösen Scheriff Pascha unter solchen Umständen die Möglichkeit erwuchs, sich in militärische Angelegenheiten zu mischen, und so sehen wir den merkwürdigen Fall, dass, während der Civilgouverneur von Damascus aus in Acre und Antiochia Kasernen baute und die Engpässe des Taurus befestigte, der commandirende General in Aleppo Indigo und Zuckerrohr pflanzte.

Aufgebracht über die unregelmässigen Zahlungen des Tributs und über die Missachtung des mit England und Oesterreich abgeschlossenen auf das ganze osmanische Reich sich beziehenden Handelsvertrages glaubte endlich die Pforte 1839, als die Stärke des Heeres auf 50,000 Mann gebracht und eine ansehnliche Flotte zusammengestellt worden war, Mehemet Ali zu Wasser und zu Land angreifen zu sollen. Ohne viele Umstände rückte das in Kleinasien stehende türkische Heer unter dem Befehle von Hafiz Pascha über den Taurus in Syrien ein. Aber dieses Heer wurde trotz aller im fränkischen Sinne erlebten Massregelungen von Ibrahim am 24. Juni 1839 bei Nisib auf's Haupt geschlagen und mit einem Verlust von 104 Geschützen in wilder Flucht über den Taurus zurückgeworfen.¹ In gewisser Beziehung einen noch grösseren Schlag erlitt die Pforte durch das am 14. Juli erfolgte Uebergehen der Flotte, welche unter dem Befehle von Ahmed Fewzi Pascha (Kapudan Pascha) in der Stärke von 9 Linienschiffen, 16 Fregatten und Corvetten, und 5 Briggs gegen Mehemet Ali ausgesendet worden war. Eine Erklärung für diesen in der Geschichte fast unerhörten Verath lässt sich nur dadurch geben, dass Ahmed Fewzi den Plan fasste, im Verein mit Mehemet Ali den jungen Sultan Abdul-Meschid, dessen Vater am 1 Juli 1839 starb, aus den Händen des ihn beeinflussenden und angeblich von den Russen captivirten Grosswessiers Chosrew Pascha, welchen auch Mehemet Ali gründlich hasste, zu befreien. Ibrahim wäre nach der Schacht von Nisib im Stande gewesen bis Constantinopel vorzudringen, denn in Kleinasien konnte die Pforte keinen Widerstand mehr entgensetzen, die asiatischen Schlösser an den Dardanellen und am Bosphorus hätte Ibrahim leicht von der Landseite nehmen können, und mit der Flotte wäre er im Stande gewesen nach Constantinopel überzusetzen. Gleichwohl machte er am Taurus Halt, wozu ihn nur das nun energisch auftretende, später auch von den drei nordischen Mächten unterstützte England veranlasste.

Das Anwachsen der egyptischen Macht und der neue Sieg des egyptischen Heeres hatten in England bezüglich des Landweges nach Ostindien ernste Besorgnisse rege gemacht, denn ein selbstständiges Reich an dieser Stelle, und obendrein von Frankreich unterstützt, würde

¹ Der bei dieser Schlacht auf türkischer Seite befindlich gewesene Hauptmann Freiherr von Moltke des k. preussischen Generalstabes hatte das Missgeschick, seine Bagage und damit auch sehr viele werthvolle Aufzeichnungen zu verlieren. Derselbe, gegenwärtig General-Lieutenant und Chef des Generalstabes, ist auch Verfasser des so ausgezeichneten Werkes, betitelt: "der russisch-türkische Feldzug in der europäischen Türkei, 1828 und 1829."

den Weg über die Landenge von Suez, beziehungsweise vom mittelländischen zum rothen Meer, gänzlich verlegen können, das türkische Reich würde noch mehr geschwächt und der Bosphorus leicht in die Hände der Russen, die ihn schon 1832 kennen gelernt hatten, gefallen sein. Die drei nordischen Mächte (Oesterreich, Preussen und Russland) hatten, wieder auf den Wiener Congress sich stützend, ein Interesse daran, dass die Souveränität des Sultans respectirt und der rebellische Vasall gezüchtigt werde. So ward es dem brittischen, damals von Lord Palmerston geleiteten Cabinet nicht schwer, zu London am 15 Juli 1840 einen Vertrag zu Stande zu bringen, kraft dessen sich über Ansuchen der Pforte England und die drei nordischen Mächte verpflichteten gegen Mehemet Ali noch energischer aufzutreten. Nach diesem Vertrage sollte Mehemet Ali, wenn er innerhalb 10 Tagen die türkische Flotte ausliefert und Befehle zur Räumung der nicht egyptischen Landesheile erlässt, das Paschalik von Egypten erblich, und jenes von Acre ungefähr in der Ausdehnung des alten Palästina sammt der Landenge von Suez lebenslänglich unter Fortbezahlung des schuldigen Tributs erhalten. Würden die ersten 10 Tage nutzlos verstreichen, so sollte er auch das Paschalik von Acre verlieren, und würden noch weitere 10 Tage nutzlos vergehen, so sollte die Pforte jeder weiteren Verpflichtung gegen Mehemet Ali enthoben sein und dasjenige thun können, was ihr eigenes Interesse erheischt, und was ihr von den übrigen contrahirenden Theilen angerathen wird. Als militärische Action wurde für den Augenblick das sogleiche Unterbrechen der Verbindungen zwischen Egypten und Syrien zur See festgesetzt, und war es erst späteren diplomatischen Verhandlungen für den Fall, als Mehemet Ali sich nicht fügen wollte, vorbehalten, die militärische Action weiter auszubilden. Diesem gemäss sollte dann die Pforte alle ihre disponiblen Land- und Seekräfte, England seine Mittelmeerflotte, welche damals schon wegen des Thiers'schen Lärmens sehr vermehrt worden war (sie zählte nicht weniger als 17 Linienschiffe etc.) und Oesterreich eine kleine Escadre zur Verfügung stellen, während Russland bei Sebastopol ein Corps von 20,000 Mann zur Einschiffung bereit zu halten hätte. Zur eventuellen Verwendung dieses Corps wurde der russische Oberst Baron Lieven¹ mit den nöthigen Vollmachten nach Constantinopel gesendet. Preussen wurde wegen seiner Entfernung vom Kriegsschauplatz, und weil es damals noch keine Flotte hatte, um keine materielle Mitwirkung angesprochen. Oesterreich sollte insbesondere für die Landoperationen, wenn es für nöthig erachtet wird, noch einige Officiere des Generalstabes und des Ingenieurcorps nachschicken; auf die vorgeschlagene Absendung von Jäger-Bataillonen, die durch längeres Garnisoniren in Italien und Dalmatien an ein südliches Klima gewöhnt waren, wollte aber das Wiener Cabinet damals nicht eingehen.

Wie nun die Dinge standen, stellten sich den Verbündeten für den Fall, dass die Sache nur mit dem Schwerte entschieden werden konnte,

¹ Derselbe wurde später als General-Lieutenant Chef des Generalstabes zu St. Petersburg, dann General-Gouverneur von Livland.

augenscheinlich zwei Angriffsobjecte zu Gebote. Sie konnten entweder à la Buonaparte auf Egypten direct losgehen und Mehemet Ali nach Nubien oder gar nach Abessinien zurückwerfen, also den Degen in die Brust des Feindes stossen — oder sie konnten sich auf die Abnahme der usurpirten Gebiete, insbesondere Syriens mit Adana und Meraſch, beschränken und das feindliche Heer nach Egypten zurückwerfen, wobei dann die egyptische Macht in Arabien von selbst gefallen wäre, geschweige erst in Candia, wo Mehemet Ali fast gar keine Streitkräfte hatte. Das Erste würde, da man sich von der Flotte zu sehr entfernt hätte, eine vielfach grössere Zahl von Landtruppen erforderlich gemacht haben, als die Verbündeten ins Feld stellen wollten, und würde bei der damaligen Disposition der Franzosen sehr wahrscheinlich eine lähmende Intervention hervorgerufen haben, daher es unter den gegebenen Umständen zweckmässiger erschien, sich auf die Abnahme von Syrien zu beschränken und höchstens noch die egyptischen Häfen des Mittelmeeres, insbesondere Alexandria, wo die ganze feindliche Flotte vor Anker lag, so lange zu blockiren, bis sich Mehemet Ali eines Besseren besann.

Um nach Syrien zu gelangen, standen wieder zwei Wege zu Gebot, nämlich der Landweg vom Bosphorus schräge durch Kleinasien, wobei sich die Seekräfte auf die Blockade der feindlichen Häfen beschränkt hätten, oder der Seeweg nach Syrien und eine daran sich knüpfende Ausschiffung der Landtruppen. Wählte man den Landweg, so wären die türkischen Truppen auf dieser langen Binnenlandstrecke ausser aller Verbindung mit den Seekräften geblieben und bei ihrer geringen Stärke, sowie bei ihrer durch frühere Niederlagen gesunkenen Stimmung Gefahr gelaufen, von dem viel stärkeren und von Siegesstolz erfüllten Heere Ibrahim's ebenso wie einst bei Konieh geschlagen zu werden. Bei glücklichem Vordringen hätten sie in dieser späten Jahreszeit vielleicht am Taurus Halt machen müssen, und im Frühjahr nach Passirung des Taurus wären sie wieder Gefahr gelaufen, von dem dort noch besser concentrirten Heere Ibrahim's ebenso wie bei Nisib geschlagen zu werden. Es erschien daher weit zweckmässiger den Seeweg einzuschlagen, denn so konnten alle Kräfte bis zum Erreichen des feindlichen Bodens beisammen bleiben, die syrische Küste konnte noch vor dem Eintreten der Winterstürme erreicht werden, und in jenem theilweise sehr cultivirten und mit einem sehr milden Klima begabten Lande konnte der Winter den Landoperationen keine wesentlichen Hindernisse entgegensetzen. Doch auch der Seeweg hatte manches Nachtheilige an sich, was bei Beurtheilung der Dinge nicht überschen werden durfte, und bei Feststellung des Operationsplanes sowie bei Ausführung desselben wohl beachtet werden musste. So war der nächst gute als Operationsbasis dienende Hafen jener von Marmarizza in Kleinasien (nördlich von Rhodus), und dieser lag noch sehr weit von der syrischen Küste (an 100 geographische Meilen), und an letzterer befindet sich kein einziger Hafen, der so gut wäre, dass er nach der Besitzergreifung mit jenem von Marmarizza hätte vertauscht werden können; denn alle jene Küstenstellen, welche in Syrien den Namen „Hafen“ führen, verdienen kaum diesen

Namen, mit etwaiger Ausnahme des im Meerbusen von Alexandrette befindlichen gleichnamigen Hafens, der aber mit Bezug auf das Kriegstheater sehr abseits lag. Wählte man was immer für einen Landungsplatz, so musste dieser, da er auf feindlichem Boden lag, erst genommen werden, was in Verbindung mit der dazu gehörigen Ausschiffung von Truppen und Kriegsmaterial bei einiger Aufmerksamkeit und Schlagfertigkeit des Feindes immerhin ein Wagniss, zum mindesten ein Kunststück ist. Endlich entsteht bei jeder einer Landung folgenden Ausschiffung naturgemäss eine derartige Trennung der Land- und Seekräfte, dass es, selbst wenn sich die Landtruppen von der See nicht zu weit entfernen, bei dem begreiflichen Streben der Commandanten nach Selbstständigkeit sehr leicht zu einem gefahrvollen Mangel an Uebereinstimmung im Handeln gelangen kann. Ungeachtet dessen zeigte sich doch der Seeweg, besonders wenn man die nahe Insel Cypem, obgleich auch diese keine guten Häfen hat, zur Errichtung von Spitalern und Kohlenstationen benützen wollte, als der weit bessere.

General Jochmus, mit den orientalischen Verhältnissen von früher bekannt, hatte in diesem Sinne einen Operationsplan ausgearbeitet, welcher von Lord Palmerston adoptirt wurde und schon bei Abschluss des Vertrages von 1840 als Grundlage diente. Lord Ponsonby, zur Zeit englischer Botschafter in Constantinopel, wurde dann angewiesen, alle weitere Detailarbeit mit der türkischen Regierung und mit den Vertretern der drei übrigen Vertragsmächte zu vereinbaren. In richtiger Würdigung der Sachlage bestand Ponsonby vor allem darauf, dass nicht etwa ein türkischer General selbstständig auftreten sollte, da ja die Türken seit 60 Jahren nur unglückliche Kriege geführt und nicht einen einzigen fähigen General zur Disposition hatten, sondern dass der Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, zur Zeit Commandant der englischen Mittelmeerflotte, den Oberbefehl über alle Land- und Seekräfte erhalten und denselben auch nach der Ausschiffung über die Landtruppen behalten sollte, welches letzteres mit Bezug auf die geographischen Verhältnisse insoferne zu begründen war, als die Truppen doch nie tief ins Innere vorzudringen brauchten, und die Flotte selbst nach der Landung noch immer ein gutes Stück Arbeit haben würde, um an der 100 Meilen langen syrischen Küste die Wegnahme anderer Punkte zu begünstigen, die eigenen Nachschübe zu decken, die feindlichen zu verhindern, ja selbst die egyptischen Häfen zu blockiren und der feindlichen Flotte die Spitze zu bieten.

Dem Lord Ponsonby machte es allerdings grossen Kummer, dass er in dem greisen Stopford bei all seiner bekannten Tapferkeit nicht den Mann erkennen konnte, der für eine so combinirte Operation die nöthigen Eigenschaften besässe, doch tröstete er sich dabei mit der Hoffnung, dass Instructionen und die Macht der Umstände den Admiral zum Handeln zwingen werden. Für die Functionen eines Chefs des Generalstabs wurde demselben der englische Oberst Sir Charles Smith beigegeben, der zu Land stets als Delegirter Stopford's auftreten sollte. Für die türkischen Landungstruppen welche, in zwei Divisionen getheilt,

unter die Befehle von Selim¹ und Hassan Pascha gestellt waren. suchte man Seitens der Pforte speciell nach einem Chef des Generalstabes, und es waren zu dieser Stelle die damals in Constantinopel anwesenden Generale Jochmus und Chrzanowski² ausersehen worden, beide sehr intelligente und erfahrene Militärs. Die Pforte in der Wahl zwischen beiden entschied sich für Jochmus, weil dieser von grosser und stattlicher Figur war, und der Sultan, gleich wie sich Chrzanowski vorstellte, die Bemerkung gemacht hatte, dass letzterer für einen Chef des Generalstabes um den türkischen Truppen gehörig imponiren zu können, viel zu klein sei. Dieselbe Bemerkung des Sultans mochte auch schon bei der englischen Seite vorgenommenen Wahl des an die Seite Stopford's zu stellenden Generalstabs-Chefs, der späterhin mit den türkischen Truppen zu Lande operiren sollte, nicht ohne Einfluss gewesen sein, denn Smith war 6 Fuss hoch.

Die Kräfte welche von beiden Seiten in den Kampf kommen sollten lassen sich nicht mit bestimmten Grenzen angeben. Speciell nimmt dies Bezug auf die englischen Kräfte, weil sie nur einen Theil der englischen Mittelmeerflotte bildeten, somit im erforderlichen Falle an dem Reste gleich einen Rückhalt gefunden hätten. Auch ereignete es sich im Laufe des Krieges, dass die betheiligte gewesene englische Escadre bei Einbruch des Winters umkehrte, und dass viele Schiffe ab- und zukamen. Im allgemeinen dürfte folgender Status der richtige sein:³

Nation	Bezeichnung	Name der Schiffe	Zahl der Geschütze	Gattung der Schiffe	Charge und Name der Commandanten	
Engländer	+	o	Princess Charlotte	104	Linienschiffe	Capitän Fanshawe
	+	o	Powerful	84		Commodore C. Napier
	+	o	Thunderer	84		Capitän Berkeley
	+	o	Bellerophon	80		„ Austin
	+	o	Revenge	76		„ Waldegrave
	+	o	Benbow	72		„ Stewart
	+	o	Edinburgh	72		„ Henderson
	+	o	Asia	72		„ Fisher
	X	X	Implacable	72		„ Harvey
	.	.	Rodney	92		„ R. Maunsell
	+	.	Ganges	84		„ Reynolds
	.	.	Vanguard	80		„ Sir David Dunn
.	.	Cambridge	72	„ Barnard		
+	.	Hastings	72	„ Lawrence		

¹ Derselbe commandirte zur Zeit des Krimkrieges in Kleinasien und ward daselbst von den Russen geschlagen. Die Reste des Heeres Selims wurden dann in Kars eingeschlossen.

² Chrzanowski hatte sich in dem polnisch-russischen Kriege sehr bemerkbar gemacht und war 1849 Chef des Generalstabes der piemontesischen Armee.

³ Eine "List of Ships composing the Mediterranean Squadron" in Levant Papers I, p. 703 (d. H.).

Nation	Bezeichnung	Name der Schiffe	Zahl der Geschütze	Gattung der Schiffe	Charge und Name der Commandanten.
Engländer	+ 0	Pique	36	Fregatten	Capitän Boxer
	+ 0	Castor	36		„ Collier
	+ 0	Carysfort	36		„ Martin
	. 0	Talbot	36		„ Codrington
	+ .	Dido	18		„ Davies
	+ .	Magicienne	24	„ Michell	
	. 0	Hazard	18	Corvetten	Capitän Elliot
	X .	Daphne	18		„ Dalling
	+ 0	Wasp	16	Briggs	Capitän Mansel
	+ .	Zebra	16		Commander J. Stopford
	+ 0	Gorgon	6	Dampfer	Capitän Henderson
	. 0	Stromboli	6		„ Williams
	. 0	Vesuvius	6		„ Henderson
	+ 0	Phönix	6		„ Stopford
	X .	Cyclops	6		„ Austin
+ .	Hydra	4	„ Robinson		
+ .	Hecate	4	Commander Ward		
+ .	Alecto	1	Lieutenant Hoseason		
. .	Megara	2	„ Goldsmith		
. .	Medea	4	Commander Warden		
. .	Prometheus	1	Lieutenant Spark		

Oberbefehlshaber aller Streitkräfte der Verbündeten, insbesondere der englischen Mittelmeerflotte: Admiral Sir Robert *Stopford*. Sein Chef des Generalstabes und sein Stellvertreter zur Leitung der Landoperationen: Oberst Sir Charles *Smith*. Commandant der englischen, aus der Marine-Infanterie gebildeten, später auch durch Landartillerie und Sapeure verstärkten Landtruppen: 1. Oberstlieutenant *Walker*, 2. General *Michell*, 3. Oberst *Bridgeman* und 4. Oberst *Hugh Rose* (später Oberbefehlshaber in Ostindien). *Michell* und *Bridgeman* starben während des Krieges.

Oesterreicher	+ 0	Medea	46	Fregatten	Fregatten-Capt. Buratovich
	+ 0	Guerriera	46		1. Liniensch.-Capt. Erzherzog Friedrich v. Oesterreich
	+ 0	Lipsia ¹	18	Corvetten	2. Corv.-Capt. Maddalena
	X .	Clemenza	18		„ Legoteti
. .	Marianne ²	6	Dampfer	Schiffslieutenant Manessi	

Commandant der Escadre: Contre-Admiral Freiherr von *Bandiera*. Sein Adjutant: Fregatten-Lieutenant Freiherr von *Bourguignon*.

¹ 1859 zur Verrammung der Hafeneinfahrt von Malamocco verwendet.

² 1853 auf der Ueberfahrt von Venedig nach Triest untergegangen.

Nation	Bezeichnung	Name der Schiffe	Zahl der Geschütze	Gattung der Schiffe	Charge und Name der Commandanten
Türken	+ 0	Mokaddemé-i-heibét (der Vorläufer d. Furchtbarkeit)	72	Linien- schiff	unbekannt
	+	Dewan (der Schnell-Läufer)	unbekannt	Fregatte	„
	+	Güli Sefid (die weisse Rose)		Corvette	„
	.	Tekéri Bahri (das Meer-Rad)		Dampfer	„
	+	26 Segeltransportschiffe			

Commandant der Escadre: Contre-Admiral *Walker-Bei*, Chef des Generalstabes: General *Jochmus*, später Commandant der türkischen Truppen. Diese zählten 20,000 Mann, darunter 600 Mann Cavallerie und 12 Geschütze unter *Mehemed Selim* und *Hassan Pascha*, von welchen vorerst nur 5000 Mann mit 12 Geschützen unter *Selim Pascha* zur Ausschiffung in Syrien bestimmt waren, die anderen 15,000 Mann aber, darunter die Cavallerie und die übrigen Geschütze, unter *Hassan Pascha* zur Deckung von Constantinopel zurückbleiben sollten.

Anmerkung. Alle mit einem stehenden Kreuz bezeichneten Schiffe befanden sich zur Zeit der ersten Landung (10. September 1840) an der syrischen Küste, jene mit einem liegenden Kreuz bezeichneten Schiffe aber um eben dieselbe Zeit vor Alexandria, während die nicht bezeichneten Schiffe erst im Laufe des Krieges hinzukamen. Die mit einer Null bezeichneten Schiffe befanden sich beim Angriff auf Acre.

Da die englische Escadre 1400 und die österreichische 400 Mann Marine-Infanterie abgeben konnte, so belief sich die Stärke der zur ersten Landung bestimmten Truppen im Ganzen auf 6800 Mann. Es war übrigens zu hoffen, dass die Pforte im Laufe der Zeit noch 8000 Mann ins Feld stellen könnte, so dass im Ganzen auf 20,800 Mann zu rechnen war. Mit allen später erfolgten Zuschüben an türkischen Truppen, dann an solchen, die in Syrien aus egyptischen Deserteuren gebildet wurden, erreichte die Gesamtstärke der zu Lande operirenden Truppen einschliesslich von 3000 Mann irregulärer Cavallerie doch nie den Stand von 33,000 Mann. Das Zurückbleiben jener 15,000 Mann zur Deckung von Constantinopel war eine Folge des Schreckens, welchen Ibrahim durch den Sieg von Nisib eingejagt hatte. Erst als der Sommer vorüber war, und man die Ueberzeugung erlangte, dass der Taurus derart mit Schnee bedeckt war, dass die Egyptier denselben nur mit Mühe passiren konnten, athmete man in Constantinopel etwas freier.

Ueber die Stärke des unter Ibrahim in Syrien und Concurrenz stehenden Heeres cursirten sehr verschiedene Angaben. Die zuverlässigsten Nachrichten erhielt man im Wege des österreichischen General-Consuls in Kairo, Herrn Laurin, durch den im Libanon wohnenden Maronitenfürsten Emir Beschir,¹ wornach 35,000 Mann im nördlichen Syrien und zwar vorzüglich in den Küstenstädten standen. In Zusammenstellung mit anderen Nachrichten schätzte man die Gesamtstärke auf 70,000, in der Wirklichkeit war sie aber, wie man nach dem Kriege erfuhr, 85,000 Mann, darunter eine vorzügliche Cavallerie von etwa 10,000 Mann und 150 Feldgeschütze. Ibrahim's Hauptquartier war ursprünglich in Damaskus. Als Unterbefehlshaber waren besonders bekannt: Soliman² Pascha in Beirut, Osman Pascha und Hassan Pascha in Bekfaja und Meruba zur Beobachtung des Libanon, Ahmed Menikli Pascha, der speciell die Cavallerie commandirte, in Aleppo, dann die Paschas: Kurschid, Selim, Ahmed Dramaly und Ismael.³ Ueber die in Egypten selbst verbliebenen Landtruppen fehlten genauere Nachrichten, doch wusste man dass erstere keineswegs beträchtlich sein konnten, während die Seekräfte, von welchen die meisten Schiffe im Hafen von Alexandria vor Anker lagen, im Verein mit der übergegangenen türkischen Flotte sehr genau bekannt waren und aus 21 Linienschiffen, 16 Fregatten, mehreren Corvetten und Briggs und 2 Dampfern bestanden.

Vergleichen wir nun die beiderseitigen Stellungen und die zur Verfügung stehenden Streitkräfte, so werden wir oberflächlich betrachtet finden, dass die Egyptier viel besser daran waren als die Verbündeten; denn während erstere, insoferne es sich um einen Kampf zu Lande handelte, vielfach überlegen waren (im Anfang im Verhältniss wie etwa 12 : 1), hatten sie den Vortheil in einem fruchtbaren Lande zu stehen, welches auf den feindlichen Angriffsseiten im Westen durh das Meer, im Nordwesten durch den mit Schnee bedeckten und obendrein in den Engpässen befestigten Taurus und im Nordwesten durch den wasserreichen Euphrat geschützt war. Durch die langjährigen Bemühungen Mehemet Ali's trefflich organisirt und eingeübt, durch die glänzenden Siege von Konieh und Nisib: moralisch gestärkt und noch unter demselben Feldherrn stehend, der in jenen Schlachten commandirt hatte, konnte das egyptische Heer allen Ereignissen mit Ruhe und Zuversicht entgegensehen. Ganz anders war es um die Verbündeten beschaffen, welche ein Conglomerat von Leuten bildeten, die unter drei verschiedenen Bannern dienten und gegenwärtig unter einen Befehlshaber gestellt wurden, von dem es nicht bekannt war, dass er je einen Sieg erfochten habe, und bei dem es, da er stets nur in der Marine gedient hatte, sehr fraglich war, ob er die nöthigen Kenntnisse und Erfahrungen besitze, um Landoperationen, die doch sehr bald an die Reihe kommen mussten, mit

¹ Derselbe hielt es anfänglich mit beiden Parteien, später erst begab er sich unter den Schutz des Sultans.

² Ein bekannter französischer Renegat, der früher Sèves hiess und schon in der Schlacht von Navarino auf der Seite der Egyptier focht.

³ vgl. I. Band, p. 17, 18, 82, 83.

Geschick zu leiten; dazu die geringe Zahl der Landtruppen, von denen der bei weitem grössere Theil (die Türken) aus Leuten bestand, die entweder ganz neu angeworben oder durch die früheren Niederlagen moralisch herabgestimmt waren. Und mit einem solchen Conglomerat sollte an einer Küste gelandet werden, um ein etwa 12mal stärkeres Heer aus dem Lande zu jagen! Selbst die ägyptische Marine war der feindlichen an Zahl wenigstens überlegen; denn vergleicht man im Sinne der damaligen Anschauungen die Zahl der Linienschiffe und Fregatten, so findet man, dass sich Seitens der Verbündeten am Kriegsschauplatze Anfangs nur 12 Linienschiffe und 8 Fregatten befanden, während die Egyptier 21 Linienschiffe und 16 Fregatten zählten.

Beim Lichte betrachtet stellten sich aber zu Gunsten der Verbündeten doch manche Vortheile ein, die bei einer kritischen Beurtheilung der Einleitungen zu diesem Kriege nicht übersehen werden dürfen, und die es in hohem Grade rechtfertigen, wenn die Verbündeten, speciell die Lords Palmerston und Ponsonby, welche hier als eigentliche Feldzugsprojectanten auftraten, so und nicht anders vorgingen. In Folge der weit besseren Qualität der eigenen Marinekräfte und bei dem Umstande, dass die ägyptische Flotte, die zum grössten Theile unbeweglich in Alexandria vor Anker lag, in diesem Hafen bei der Schwierigkeit des Auslaufens für ausgerüstete Linienschiffe und Fregatten leicht festgehalten werden konnte (solche Schiffe müssten erst ausserhalb des Hafens, also im Angesicht des Gegners armirt werden), waren sich die Verbündeten einer solchen maritimen Ueberlegenheit bewusst, dass sie die eigenen Nachschübe ebenso sichern als die feindlichen verhindern konnten. Letzteres war in dem vorstehenden Fall von hoher Wichtigkeit, weil Ibrahim's Heer, welches fast alles Kriegsmaterial aus Egypten beziehen musste, bei der Unwegsamkeit und Unwirthbarkeit der Landenge von Suez alle Nachschübe nur zur See erhielt, daher schon das blosse Erscheinen der verbündeten Escadren in diesen Linien gleich bedeutend war mit einem Durchschneiden der feindlichen Hauptlebensadern. Dazu bestand ein Theil von Ibrahim's Heer aus Syrern, die nur gepresste Soldaten waren, und von denen man annehmen konnte, dass sie beim ersten Unfalle Reissaus nehmen, vielleicht sogar zur Fahne des Sultans übergehen würden. Selbst von Soliman Pascha war die Meinung verbreitet, dass er durch Bestechung gewonnen werden könnte. Von den Bewohnern des Libanon und des im östlichen Syrien befindlichen Districtes Hauran wusste man, dass sie wegen der argen Bedrückungen sich schon einmal erhoben hatten, und dass sie die erste günstige Gelegenheit ergreifen würden, um sich abermals für die Sache des Sultans zu erheben, während von den in der arabischen Wüste wohnenden Beduinen bei ihrer Plünderungssucht zu hoffen war, dass sie den ägyptischen Colonnen manchen Schaden zufügen würden. Zudem hatte der Name des Sultans in ganz Syrien noch einen so guten Klang, dass man annehmen konnte, wie auch die übrigen Stämme was immer für einer Nation und was immer für eines Glaubens den Verbündeten eher gute Dienste leisten als ihnen feindlich begegnen würden. Endlich wusste

mān, dass ein grosser Theil der Officiere und der Matrosen der zu Mehemet Ali übergegangenen türkischen Flotte mit der Verrätherei des Kapudan-Pascha durchaus nicht einverstanden, vielmehr zum offenen Aufstande bereit war. Ein von den Egyptiern rechtzeitig entdecktes Complot, die Schiffe in die Luft zu sprengen, hatte sogar zur Folge, dass einige Tausend türkische Matrosen in Ibrahim's Heer gesteckt wurden. Nimmt man daher alle diese Factoren in Rechnung, so sieht man, dass Ibrahim's grosse Ueberlegenheit an Landtruppen ein bedeutendes Gegengewicht erhielt, und dass sich das Zünglein der militärischen Waage bei fortgesetztem Verweilen in Syrien, besonders wenn gleich im Anfange einige wenn auch nur an und für sich unbedeutende Erfolge errungen werden, immer mehr gegen die Seite der Verbündeten sich neigen werde.

Unter solchen Auspicien begannen nun die Verbündeten, nachdem sie die Verbindungen Syriens mit Egypten bereits unterbrochen hatten, und die aus dem Londoner Vertrage erfließende Sommation an Mehemet Ali fruchtlos geblieben war, den Krieg.¹ Stopford, welcher sich um diese Zeit vor Alexandria befand, liess zur Blockirung dieses Hafens die Linienschiffe Asia und Implacable, die Corvetten Daphne und Clemenza und den Dampfer Cyclops zurück, während er mit den Linienschiffen Princess Charlotte und Bellerophon, mit den Fregatten Medea und Guerriera und mit der Brigg Zebra am 6. September 1840 nach Beirut segelte, dessen Rhede (wohl auch Georg's-Bai genannt) als Sammelplatz für alle zur syrischen Expedition bestimmten Streitkräfte bezeichnet worden war. Von diesen Kräften kam ein Theil, wie erwähnt, von Alexandria, ein anderer von Malta, ein dritter endlich, besonders Contre-Admiral Walker mit den türkischen Landtruppen, von Constantinopel, unter Berührung von Kleinasien und Cypern. Napier, welcher mit Powerful und Edinburgh schon am 7. Juli vor Beirut stand, hatte einen Theil der Küste recognoscirt und zur Zeit, als Stopford ankam (9 September), befanden sich an dieser Küste und grössten Theils vor Beirut die im obigen Ausweise mit einem stehenden Kreuz bezeichneten Schiffe. Oberst Smith war mit dem Pique am 8. September eingetroffen.

Unter den gegebenen Umständen mag es gerechtfertigt gewesen sein, einen Punkt an der feindlichen Küste als Sammelplatz zu bezeichnen. Immerhin bleibt es aber ein Wagniss, weil Stürme gewaltige Störungen und Verspätungen verursachen konnten, und der Sammelplatz ausserhalb eines Hafens in Ansehung der mitgekommenen 26 schwer belasteten Transportschiffe kein günstiger war. Auch hätten jene egyptischen Schiffe, welche sich noch an der syrischen Küste befanden, bei einigem Unternehmungsgeiste leicht gegen solche Schiffe der Verbündeten

¹ Dieser Krieg, sowie der spätere Krimkrieg, hatten in ihrem innersten Wesen englischer Seits eine und die nämliche Ursache, d. i. die Freihaltung des Weges nach Indien (Overland-Route) in der Ausdehnung des Osmanenreiches, und äusserlich unterscheiden sich beide Kriege in Bezug auf Frankreich dadurch, dass England im syrischen Kriege in versteckter Weise gegen Frankreich auftrat, im Krimkriege aber dessen Streitkräfte in ausgiebigster Weise ausnützte.

siegreich auftreten können, welche vor Beirut zuerst ankamen und gewiss in der Minderzahl waren. Endlich fragte es sich, ob nicht die in Alexandria eingesperrten kleineren Schiffe im armirten Zustande auslaufend die Blockade brechen, sich auf die einzeln fahrenden Schiffe der Verbündeten werfen und später als Piraten hätten auftreten können? Wir glauben daher, dass es besser gewesen wäre sich mit den zur Landung bestimmten Kräften, ohne jedoch die egyptische Flotte aus dem Auge zu verlieren — vorerst in dem geräumigen Hafen von Marmarizza zu sammeln¹ und dann unter Berührung von Cypern, wo zugleich ein Spital und ein Kohlendepot zu errichten gewesen wäre, mit vereinten Kräften auf das feindliche Object loszusteuern. Jedenfalls konnte Ibrahim aus dem Erscheinen der ersten Schiffe vor Beirut Folgerungen machen und, da eine Landung vernünftiger Weise erst nach dem Erscheinen mehrerer Schiffe möglich war, so viel Zeit gewinnen, um entsprechende Gegenmassregeln zu treffen. Wenn übrigens die Rhede von Beirut Seitens der Verbündeten als allgemeiner Sammelplatz bezeichnet wurde, so war es damit selbstverständlich noch keineswegs ausgemacht, dass die Landung in dieser Gegend erfolgen musste, am wenigsten aber in Beirut selbst, von welchem Orte man wusste, dass er von mehreren tausend Mann unter Soliman besetzt war. Den Verbündeten stand jetzt noch immer die Wahl der Landungsstelle frei, und Ibrahim musste wohl beherzigen, dass das Erscheinen vor Beirut vielleicht nur ein Mittel war, um ihn über die projectirte Landungsstelle zu täuschen. Auf jeden Fall war es noch keine mit Blutvergiessen verbundene Action, es war nur ein Sammeln der Kraft, wie es das Thier thut, wenn es sich zum Sprunge auf die gewünschte Beute anschickt, und Mehemet Ali hätte noch immer Zeit gehabt seinen Starrsinn zu brechen und einem Kampfe vorzubeugen, der sicherlich mit vielem Blutvergiessen verbunden gewesen wäre und bei der Nachhaltigkeit der ihm gegenüber stehenden Kräfte doch zu seinem Nachtheile hätte enden müssen.

Ohne die Frage weiter zu besprechen, wie sehr Mehemet Ali Unrecht that, dass er französischen Einflüsterungen folgend den Forderungen der Verbündeten auch jetzt nicht nachgab, und bevor wir zur Geschichte des eigentlichen Kampfes übergehen, dürfte es nicht uninteressant sein, Betrachtungen über dasjenige anzustellen, was auf jeder der beiden zum Gefechte sich anschickenden Parteien unter den gegebenen Verhältnissen die wahre Kriegsraison sein musste. Wie schon die diplomatischen Verhandlungen zu erkennen gaben, und wie auch die Dinge jetzt standen, übernahmen die Verbündeten augenscheinlich die Rolle des Angreifers und die Egyptier die Rolle des Vertheidigers. Die ersteren waren in ihrer Spitze durch Stopford und die letzteren durch Ibrahim repräsentirt.

¹ Im Krimfeldzuge 1854 wählten die Verbündeten sehr sachgemäss Varna, und im italienischen Feldzuge 1859 hatten die Franzosen mit ihren Verbündeten ebenso sachgemäss Antivari zum Sammelplatz gewählt. Trotzdem glaubten die Franzosen bei ihrem projectirten Angriff auf Venedig wohl zu thun, sich vorerst noch des Hafens von Lussin piccolo zu bemächtigen, um daselbst Kohlen-Depots und Spitäler zu errichten.

und Syrien war das Object welches in erster Instanz bestimmen musste, wie sich Angreifer und Vertheidiger zu benehmen hatten. Die politische und militärische Abgrenzung Syriens fällt eigentlich im Westen in eine und dieselbe Linie zusammen, und ist es hier eine 100 geographische Meilen lange Küste welche, im Norden an dem Meerbusen von Alexandrette beginnend und südlich in die Landenge von Suez übergehend, vom mittelländischen Meere bespült wird. Ansonst grenzt das Paschalik von Syrien mit seiner Hauptstadt Damaskus im Norden und Nordwesten an die Paschalike von Adana und Merasch, im Nordosten und Osten an jene von Diarbekir, Mossul und Bagdad, während es im Süden an Arabien und nur in dem einzigen Punkte El Arisch am mittelländischen Meere an Egypten grenzt. Die militärische Begrenzung hingegen findet im Norden (eigentlich Nordwest) durch den cilicischen Taurus, im Nordost und Ost durch den wasserreichen Euphrat und durch ein weit vorgehendes Stück der arabischen Wüste, im Süden endlich durch diese fast gänzlich statt. Bei so guten natürlichen Grenzen die durch die Kunst leicht einen erhöhten Grad von Haltbarkeit erlangen können, ist es augenscheinlich, dass sich der erste Kampf lange Zeit um das Behaupten oder Erobern der Grenze drehen konnte. Es war daher Seitens der Egyptier auch nicht unterlassen worden, die befestigten Plätze an der Küste, insbesondere Acre, in besseren Stand zu setzen, den Taurus aber ganz neu zu befestigen, wogegen die übrigen Grenzen, da von hier aus keine Gefahr drohte, füglich vernachlässigt werden konnten.

Unter den Bodenerhebungen Syriens sind offenbar der die Nordküste begleitende Libanon mit dem nördlich sich fortsetzenden Dschebel Anzarieh und der etwas östlicher liegende mit ihm parallel laufende Antilibanon die bemerkenswerthesten. Beide sind lange Bergrücken, deren höchste Spitzen beim Libanon der Sunnin und der Dor-el-Kodib eine Höhe von 8245 und 9689 und beim Antilibanon östlich von Ain-Havar eine Höhe von 6748 Fuss erreichen. In der Verlängerung des südlichen Antilibanon liegt der Dschebel-esch-Scheik, eine Gebirgsmasse, deren höchste Spitze, der Hermon, eine Höhe von 9038 Fuss erreicht. Die südliche Küste wird weiter von einer mit vielen Höckern versehenen breiten Bergmasse begleitet, welche westlich im allgemeinen sehr sanft, nach Osten aber ziemlich steil abfällt. Ihr höchster Punkt ist der Hebron, der zur südlichen Zone gehört und eine Höhe von 2911 Fuss erreicht. Zwei Abästungen dieser Bergmasse, die je nach den Städten welche sich auf ihr befinden, benannt wird (von Norden nach Süden: Safeth, Nazareth, Naplus, Jerusalem, Hebron), reichen bis an das Meer, und es heisst die nördliche der weisse Berg und die südliche der Carmel, welcher südlich der Bai von Acre ins Meer taucht. Im übrigen ist der Küstenstrich längs dieser Bergmasse entweder nur sehr sanft fallend oder namentlich südlich in die völlige Ebene übergehend. Oestlich des Antilibanon und des Dschebel-esch-Scheik liegt eine Hochterrasse, welche sich bis nach Süden erstreckt und gegen Westen das Jordanthal vor sich lassend steil abfällt. Sie verliert sich im Norden am Taurus, wird

im Osten vom Euphrat bespült und weist ungefähr im Centrum eine niedrige Berggruppe auf, welche den Namen Hauran trägt.

Die merkwürdigsten Flüsse des Landes sind der Euphrat, der Dschihan, welcher den cilicischen Taurus vom armenischen Taurus trennt, dann der Orontes, der Leontes und der Jordan. Die drei letzteren entspringen in dem langen Thale zwischen dem Libanon und dem Anti-libanon. Der Orontes umgeht den Libanon auf der Nordseite und stürzt sich unterhalb Antiochia ins Meer, wogegen der Leontes die Umgehung südlich des Libanon bewirkt und etwas nördlich von Tyrus ins Meer fällt. Der Jordan nimmt gleich eine südliche Richtung an und behält dieselbe bis zum Einströmen in das todte Meer, nachdem er schon vorher zuerst den See Merom und dann den grössern See Tiberias durchströmt hat. Eine Merkwürdigkeit dieses ganzen Rinnsals ist, dass der Wasserspiegel der südlichen Strecke von der Jakobsbrücke angefangen (ein Punkt etwas südlich vom See Merom) unter den Wasserspiegel des mittelländischen Meeres gelangt (im todten Meere nicht weniger als 1260 Fuss), so zwar dass, da die grösste Wassertiefe des todten Meeres 1260 Fuss beträgt, der tiefste Punkt des todten Meeres 2530 Fuss unter dem Wasserspiegel des mittelländischen Meeres liegt. Das todte Meer ist übrigens nicht allein für den Jordan ein Wassersammelbecken, sondern auch für jenen Fluss El Seib, welcher ihm aus dem nach dem rothen Meere führenden Thale Araba zuströmt.

Aus dieser kurzen, mehr nur auf die Hauptgrenzen und die Bodenplastik sich beziehenden Terrainbeschreibung geht allein schon hervor, dass Ibrahim zwar ein grosses Gebiet zu vertheidigen hatte, dass es aber, weil in vielfache Abschnitte getheilt, auch einer sehr zähen Vertheidigung fähig war. Die Nachrichten die Ibrahim durch die Franzosen schon lange vor der Eröffnung des Feldzuges über den feindlichen Angriffsplan erhalten konnte, mehr aber noch das Erscheinen der feindlichen Kräfte in der Rhede von Beirut mussten ihn die Meinung fassen lassen, dass für den Augenblick die Küste als wahre Front d'attaque erscheinen würde, und dass er von der Seite des Taurus um so weniger etwas zu besorgen habe, als die am Bosphorus stehenden 15.000 Türken lediglich aus Furcht vor dem egyptischen Heere dort aufgestellt worden waren. Sonach lag die strategische Front nicht mehr wie in den früheren Kriegen im Taurus, sondern in der Küste, und diese durch das Eingreifen der fränkischen Mächte jetzt erfolgte Verdrehung der strategischen Stellung, verbunden mit dem Durchschneiden der nach Egypten führenden maritimen Verbindungen, musste Ibrahim bei dem Umstande, dass seine Rückzugslinie jetzt auf einmal eine sehr nachtheilige Lage erhielt, zu entsprechenden Massregeln bewegen. Denn ihm standen im Grunde genommen nur zwei Rückzugslinien zu Gebot, entweder die arabische (gegen die heiligen Städte) oder die egyptische über die Landenge von Suez. Erstere lag in der Verlängerung seiner Front über den linken Flügel hinaus, und letztere stand senkrecht auf seine Front auf den linken Flügel treffend. Die arabische Rückzugslinie hätte

höchstens sein Heer in Sicherheit gebracht, denn zu einer Fortsetzung des Kampfes oder gar zu einer Wiederergriffung der Offensive wäre es untauglich geworden, weil Arabien zu diesem Zwecke nicht die nöthigen Ressourcen liefert, und eine Ueberschiffung des Kriegsmaterials aus Egypten quer über das rothe Meer durch ein Paar Schiffe, welche die Engländer aus den ostindischen Stationen dahin geschickt hätten, gar leicht verhindert worden wäre. Somit blieb dem egyptischen Feldherrn nur die egyptische Linie über, und für diese durfte er nicht den Küstenweg über El Arisch wählen, wo sie den Anfällen der maritimen Kräfte der Verbündeten völlig blossgestellt wäre, sondern lieber die egyptische Pilgerstrasse über Suez. Da aber diese Strasse auf eine geraume Strecke hin durch ganz wüstes Land führt, so hätte Ibrahim's erste Sorge sein müssen, hier ordentliche Etappen einzurichten, die wichtigsten Punkte durch Befestigungen sicherzustellen und einen Theil seiner guten zahlreichen Cavallerie als fliegendes Corps zur Verbindung der befestigten Punkte zu verwenden.

Das nächste wäre gewesen, sich in der Nähe der Küste derart aufzustellen, dass er die Landung verhindern oder, falls sie geglückt wäre, rasch einen Schlag gegen die bereits gelandete Truppe ausführen konnte, und zwar mit der Schwerkraft des Angriffes gegen jenen Küstenpunkt gerichtet, welchen die Anstalten der Verbündeten als deren Rückzugspunkt bezeichnet hätten. Dazu wäre es hinreichend gewesen, die Küste einfach zu bewachen und etwas hinter derselben eine concentrirte Aufstellung zu nehmen. In einer späteren Periode, d. h. wenn ein Festhalten der Küste und des dahinter liegenden Landstriches nicht mehr möglich, hätte Ibrahim hinter den Jordan zurückgehen müssen, um hier eine neue Abschnittsvertheidigung einleiten zu können. In einer dritten Periode endlich, wo also das Halten auf dieser Linie nicht mehr möglich gewesen wäre, und selbst das Aufgeben des Taurus und der Landschaft Damaskus nöthig gewesen wäre, hätte Ibrahim, mit seiner ganzen Macht nach Süden und um das todte Meer marschirend, eine Stellung nehmen können, welche sich rechts an die Südspitze des todten Meeres und links an die Küstenpunkte Gaza und El Arisch gelehnt hätte. Diese dritte Stellung, ist sie auch in der Front durch kein solches Hinderniss gedeckt wie es die beiden vorgenannten sind (der Hebron und die nächsten Berge müssten sogar dem Feinde überlassen werden), so hätte sie als fast ganz in die Ebene fallend für Ibrahim den grossen Vortheil gebracht, dass er von seiner sehr überlegenen Cavallerie guten Gebrauch machen konnte. Würde er endlich auch aus dieser Stellung verdrängt worden sein, so hätte er nahe hinter seiner Front die über Suez nach Egypten führende Rückzugslinie gefunden, die ihm die Möglichkeit verschafft hätte, sich noch mit Ehren aus dem Kampfe zu ziehen. Zu allem diesem hätte es natürlich gehöriger Vorbereitungen und eines rechtzeitigen Handelns bedurft, wie z. B. Einrichtung eines guten Küstenbewachungs- und Telegraphensystems, Instandsetzung jener Strassen welche von dem ersten Centralaufstellungspunkte nach der Küste und rückwärts über den Jordan führen, Herstellung von Brückenköpfen am

Jordan, Instandsetzung der östlich vom Jordan liegenden syrischen Pilgerstrasse mit Abzweigungen gegen die Landenge von Suez theils in die Linie: todtes Meer — Gaza, theils in die egyptische Pilgerstrasse mündend — Befestigung von Gaza und El Arisch, des Ueberganges über den Seba (Strasse von Jerusalem nach Suez) und der rechts davon liegenden Höhen von Muzeikah, wo die Strasse von Jerusalem nach Mekka führt.

Stopford konnte wohl annehmen, dass Ibrahim im allgemeinen einen solchen Vertheidigungsplan adoptiren musste, und bei hinreichender Zahl von Landtruppen hätte ersterer in der Weise vorgehen müssen dass er, ohne seinem Gegner das Vertheidigen in der ersten und zweiten Stellung zu gönnen, gleich auf seine dritte Stellung, die in ihrem Flügel von der See aus erreichbar war, losgegangen wäre, denn eine Landung im südlichen Palästina, z. B. bei Jaffa (der südlichste Punkt an welchem sich tief gehende Schiffe den Küsten im Schussbereich nähern können hätte Ibrahim, von dem man wohl voraussetzen konnte, dass er sich zur Vertheidigung des ersten Abschnittes zwischen der Küste und dem Jordan aufstellen würde, gezwungen, schleunigst noch auf dem westlichen Ufer des Jordan und des todten Meeres etwa über Jerusalem nach Süden zu marschiren, um dort in der Linie: Gaza — todtes Meer, mit der Front nach Norden gekehrt, Stellung zu nehmen. Bei der geringen Zahl der Landtruppen und bei der schlechten Beschaffenheit der südlichen Küste in Ansehung einer Landung und eines längeren Aufenthaltes der Schiffe, dann bei dem Umstande dass ein mehr nördlich gelegener Punkt, besonders in der Küstenstrecke zwischen dem Orontes und Leontes, die Möglichkeit gewährte, sich nach bewirkter Landung sogleich mit den die egyptische Herrschaft hassenden und auch zum Aufstande geneigten Bewohnern des Libanon in Verbindung zu setzen, war es aber in dem vorliegenden Falle vollkommen gerechtfertigt, wenn Stopford im Einklang mit den darüber schon in Constantinopel gefassten Ansichten der dortigen Diplomaten eine nördliche Stelle im Angesichte des Libanon zur Landung wählte. An die daselbst zu bewirkende Ausschiffung musste im Verein mit den für diesen Zweck eigens zu bewaffnenden Bewohnern des Libanon sogleich ein Angriff auf die nächsten Truppen des Feindes geschehen, um den im Land zerstreuten feindlichen Kräften keine Zeit zur Vereinigung zu geben und einen Sieg zu erringen der, wenn auch von keinem grossen materiellen Erfolge, die Aussicht geben konnte, dass im ganzen Lande, besonders im Hauran, also im Rücken der zweiten feindlichen Stellung, eine allgemeine Schilderhebung erfolgen würde. Gleichzeitig sollten die Seekräfte dazu verwendet werden, um verschiedene Küstenpunkte zu überfallen und die feindliche Aufmerksamkeit zu theilen. In einer zweiten Periode sollte Palästina in Besitz genommen und gegen die feindliche Rückzugslinie gewirkt werden, so dass Ibrahim gezwungen werde, die syrische durch die Wüste führende Pilgerstrasse einzuschlagen, während in einer dritten Periode, falls Ibrahim in seiner dritten Stellung noch Stand halten würde, diese in ihrer Front angegriffen werden sollte — mit der Schwer-

linie auf den feindlichen linken Flügel gerichtet, da er derjenige ist, wo nicht allein ein Mitwirken der Seekräfte, sondern auch ein für den Feind gefährliches Drücken auf seine über Suez führende Rückzugslinie erfolgen kann.

Gehen wir jetzt, nachdem wir den Kriegsschauplatz und die jeder kämpfenden Partei zukommende Kriegsraison in allgemeinen Zügen geschildert haben, zu den factischen Ereignissen über, so finden wir, dass Stopford auf Grund der vorausgegangenen, durch Napier bewirkten Recognoscirungen die dreiviertel Stunden nördlich von Beirut gelegene halbkreisförmige Bai von Dschuni als Landungsstelle bezeichnete, und war es am 10. September 1840, als die Flotte dort vor Anker ging, und die Ausschiffung und Landung von 5000 Türken mit 12 Feldgeschützen, 1500 Engländern und 200 Oesterreichern erfolgte. Die Einbiegung der Küste hatte allerdings den Vortheil, dass die Landungsboote in ein Wasser gelangten, welches ruhiger als die hohe See war, auch befand sich südlich derselben ganz nahe der von steilen Ufern eingefasste Kelbfluss, so dass auf dieser Seite jedem feindlichen Angriffe leicht begegnet werden konnte; dennoch hatte diese Stelle den Nachtheil, dass sie vom Feuer der Schiffe nicht umfasst werden konnte, so dass man von der See aus auch nicht im Stande war zu bemerken, ob nicht feindliche Truppen in jenen Schluchten lagern, welche der die Landungsstelle umfassende Höhenkranz vom höhern Libanon trennen. Da man sicher wusste dass der Feind in der Nähe stand, so war um so mehr Vorsicht nothwendig, um nicht noch während der Landung einen argen Unfall zu erleiden. Aber das einzige was man in dieser Beziehung vorkehrte, war dass man mit einigen Schiffen Beirut und jene Brücken beobachtete, mittelst welcher der Küstenweg von Beirut nach Dschuni die Flüsse Beirut und Kelb¹ übersetzte, während die Ausschiffung und Landung ohne alle Hinausgabe der nöthigen Detailbefehle auf das einfache Signal "*Land the troops*" erfolgte. Diese so schwierige und gefährliche Kriegsoperation geschah also nicht allein mit Vernachlässigung der ersten militärischen Vorsichtsmassregeln, sondern auch in grösster Unordnung. Truppen der verschiedensten Racen, bunt durcheinander gemengt, bedeckten mit ihrem Kriegsmaterial Schiffbrüchigen gleich die Küste, keine einzige Compagnie der Türken war beisammen, und es bedurfte mehrerer Stunden, um nur die nothwendigste Ordnung herzustellen, geschweige erst um sich derart zu rangiren, wie es Angesichts des Feindes zur Einnahme der ersten Stellung nothwendig gewesen wäre.² Merkwürdigerweise hatte sich Soliman, der von Beirut aus das Treiben der Verbün-

¹ Kelb, deutsch: Hund, ein Name der von einem an der Mündung liegenden assyrischen Monumente herrührt, welches die Gestalt eines Hundes hat.

² Dschuni war in der Zeit vom 10. bis zum 23. September ein Vorbild der späteren Unordnung von Balaklawa im Krimkriege; Stopford wie auch Smith gaben damals schon (23. September) ihren Entschluss kund die Truppen nach Cypern zurückzuziehen, was jedoch durch das energische Protestiren Napier's verhindert wurde, der dann auch preemtorisch darauf drang, dass Jochmus zum Chef des Generalstabes des sogenannten Heeres vom Libanon ernannt werde.

deten mittelst eines Fernrohres sehr gut beobachten konnte, trotz der ihm zur Verfügung stehenden überlegenen Kräfte nicht allein ganz ruhig verhalten, sondern wurde derselbe von Angst derart befallen, dass er an der Brücke über den Beirut eine Batterie aufwerfen liess, in der Absicht, die Verbündeten, sobald sie Beirut von der Landseite angreifen würden, zurückzutreiben. Diese Passivität Soliman's lässt sich nur dadurch erklären, dass er um Beirut zu sehr besorgt war, und dass er über die Stärke der feindlichen Landungstruppen übertriebene Nachrichten erhalten hatte. Bei einer so geringen Entfernung des feindlichen Landungsplatzes wäre er immerhin im Stande gewesen, einen Theil seiner 4000 (nach andern Angaben sogar 6000) Mann starken Truppe nach Dschuni zu entsenden, um den Verbündeten, die doch nur allmählig landen konnten, die Spitze zu bieten. Diess war der erste Fehler der Egyptier, denn nun hatten die Verbündeten trotz aller Unordnung während der Landung auf der feindlichen Küste bereits Posto gefasst. Statt des angeblich erkrankten und nach Constantinopel abgegangenen Oberst Smith bestimmte Stopford den Commodore Napier¹ zum Befehlshaber der Truppen, was mit Hinblick auf die bevorstehenden Landoperationen und bei dem Umstande, als Napier nach seinem eigenen Geständnisse von derlei Dingen nicht viel verstand, eine merkwürdige Erscheinung war. Napier, sein Linienschiff in der Nähe haltend, etablirte sich nun im Lager von Dschuni und suchte dasselbe bestens einzurichten und sicherzustellen. Eine kleine Maronitenkapelle diente ihm als Schlaf- und Speisezimmer, aber auch als Pulvermagazin. Nicht zufrieden mit dem geringen Umfange der von den englischen Ingenieurofficieren angelegten Befestigungen, wollte er dieselben vergrössern lassen, ein Ansinnen dem sich die durch Stopford unterstützten Ingenieure widersetzen.

Stopford, der fortwährend auf der Rhede von Beirut an Bord der Princess Charlotte verblieb, liess bald darauf den Soliman Pascha zur Uebergabe von Beirut auffordern. Dieser aber ging auf ein solches Begehren nicht ein und bezog ausserhalb der Stadt ein Lager, wodurch er den Vortheil erlangte, seine Truppen beisammen zu haben und gegen das feindliche Feuer sicher zu stellen. Nur in den zwei Castellen, die einzigen Befestigungen, welche die Stadt hatte, liess er kleine Besatzungen zurück. Stopford liess nun am 11. September die Castelle durch $\frac{1}{2}$ Stunde beschliessen, und diese Beschiessung sogar am 12. und 13. September wiederholen. Da aber viele Geschosse darüber und daneben gingen, so erlitt auch die Stadt, die man dem Sultan eher erhalten sollte, nicht geringen Schaden, und der eigentliche Zweck, die Uebergabe der Stadt zu erlangen, wurde damit gar nicht erreicht, daher auch

¹ Napier, geboren 1786, trat frühzeitig in den Seedienst, wurde 1800 Capitän und eroberte in dem nämlichen Jahr das Fort Eduard auf Martinique. 1810 kämpfte er in Spanien. 1811 eroberte er die Insel Ponza bei Gaeta, 1832 im Dienste Don Pedro's siegte er über die miguelistische Flotte bei Cap S. Vincent und wurde in Folge dessen *Vicomte de Cabo de San Vincente*. 1846 wurde er Contre-Admiral und 1853 Vice-Admiral, und 1855 erhielt er das Commando über die englisch-französische Flotte in der Ostsee.

die ganze Operation eine unnütze Munitionsvergeudung war. Jedes der dabei verwendeten 6 Linienschiffe hatte 1000, und die Fregatte *Medea* 300 Schuss gemacht, letztere auch noch Raketen geworfen. Diese nutzlose Beschiessung hatte noch den Nachtheil, dass die Bewohner des Libanon eine geringe Meinung von den Streitkräften der Verbündeten erlangten und eben desshalb den Muth verloren, sich in Masse für die Sache des Sultans zu erheben, während andererseits auch der Feind die Versicherung haben konnte dass, weil die Verbündeten ohne zu landen am 11. September die meisten Schiffe zurückzogen, sie keine genügende Zahl von Landungstruppen bei sich haben. Soliman machte sich dieses Abziehen der Verbündeten auch noch insoferne zu Nutzen, dass er den Bergbewohnern vorgab die Flotte der Verbündeten zurückgeschlagen zu haben. Hier verdient übrigens eines merkwürdigen Falles von gegenseitiger Höflichkeit erwähnt zu werden. Noch während der Beschiessung langte in Beirut das ostindische Felleisen an, welches damals über Syrien kam. Unter Aufhissung einer Parlamentärsflagge wurde es sodann von Soliman an Stopford geschickt, welcher seinerseits mit einem höflichen Schreiben dankend dem egyptischen General eine Kiste mit Wein zurückschickte; doch muss beigefügt werden, dass der Wein nicht von einem englischen, sondern von einem erst kürzlich gekaperten egyptischen Schiffe herstammte.

In der Absicht die Bewohner des Libanon zu bewaffnen, liess Stopford durch einen Theil der englischen Escadre (*Carysfort*, *Cyclops* und *Dido*) unter Capitän Martin am 12. September das vom Feinde sehr schwach besetzte *Dschebail* wegnehmen, was mit einem Verluste von 5 Todten und 18 Verwundeten geschah. Hierauf wurde die Vertheilung der Gewehre begonnen, deren Beischaffung und Ausschiffung in der Zahl von 22,000 Stück der Energie des englischen Dolmetsch Herrn Wood¹ zu verdanken war.

Sobald Ibrahim, der schon lange sein Hauptquartier von Damaskus nach dem Libanon verlegt hatte, von der Landung der Verbündeten unterrichtet worden war, begab er sich an der Spitze von 14,700 Mann in die Richtung gegen *Dschuni* und liess, in der Stellung von *Mar-Elias* bleibend, weitere Verstärkungen folgen, so dass am 19. September 24,000 Egyptier in einem Halbkreis um Beirut und *Dschuni* standen, den rechten Flügel etwas nördlich von *Dschebail* und den linken bei *Saida* ans Meer lehrend. Das schnelle Erscheinen Ibrahim's vor der feindlichen Landungsstelle beweist, dass er richtig voraussah, wo die Verbündeten landen werden, was bei einer 100 Meilen langen Küste immerhin viel Scharfblick verräth. Aber einen Angriff auf die Stellung der Verbündeten wagte Ibrahim nicht, sei es weil er diese Stellung für zu fest und den Feind für zu stark hielt, oder weil er hoffte dass, wenn einmal die Flotten sich wegen der Winterstürme entfernen mussten, er dann leicht die auf dem Lande verbliebenen Streitkräfte zur Waffenstreckung nöthigen könnte. Augenscheinlich liess er dadurch in diesem

¹ Wood wurde später englischer General-Consul in Tripolis und Tunis.

Kriege bei der geringen Stärke der feindlichen Landungstruppen die schönste Gelegenheit entwischen, und da er obendrein einen weiteren Theil seiner Streitkräfte zersplitterte und zur Behauptung des Libanon verwendete, so beginnt von nun an jene Periode, wo sich die Dinge für die Verbündeten günstiger gestalteten. In der Stellung vor Dschuni konnten ihre Landtruppen gemächlich ausharren und besser, wie von Constantinopel aus, sichere Nachrichten über die wirkliche Stärke und Stellung des feindlichen Heeres erlangen. Auch wurde es jenen Soldaten welche in diesem Heere ungerne dienten, wie es namentlich mit den Syrern und mit den von der übergegangenen Flotte stammenden Türken der Fall war, leicht möglich zu den Fahnen des Sultans zurückzukehren, was auch in kurzer Zeit in solchem Masse stattfand, dass man ein ganzes Bataillon daraus formiren konnte. Endlich wurde es dem unermüdlichen Wood leicht möglich, sich mit den Bewohnern des Libanon noch besser als bisher in Verbindung zu setzen. Augenscheinlich war es, dass Ibrahim jetzt nicht mehr daran dachte und auch nicht mehr daran denken konnte, seinen auf das Vordringen gegen Constantinopel abzielenden Plan zu verfolgen, und die Pforte, von ihrem alten Schrecken sich erholend, säumte auch nicht, auf Grund eines Berichtes des General Jochmus und einer sich darauf stützenden Vorstellung des Lord Ponsonby, die bisher zur Deckung der Hauptstadt verwendeten Truppen in der Stärke von 15,000 Mann abtheilungsweise nachzusenden. Nach Massgabe als diese Abtheilungen auf dem Kriegsschauplatze eintrafen, konnten die Verbündeten an verschiedenen Küstenpunkten jene feindlichen Kräfte überfallen, welche Ibrahim in der Absicht, sich überall zu decken, längs der ganzen Küste aufgestellt hatte, und im Vereine mit den nunmehr bewaffneten und im Rücken Ibrahim's aufstehenden Bewohnern des Libanon konnten sie endlich von Dschuni aus selber offensive vorgehen und sich direct auf Ibrahim werfen. Schon am 24. September gelang es dem Commodore Napier mit vier türkischen Bataillonen, einem englischen Marinebataillon und einer österreichischen Raketenbatterie (letztere unter Commando des Schiffsführich Baldisserotto) den Feind, der sich auf dem linken Ufer des Kelb-Flusses festzusetzen suchte, zu vertreiben und dabei mit dem sehr geringen Verlust von 2 Todten und 1 Verwundeten gegen 400 Gefangene zu machen. Doch hielt es Napier für angemessen sich am anderen Tage zurückzuziehen, um nicht von Soliman, der damals bis auf 10,000 Mann verstärkt worden war, angegriffen zu werden.

Am nämlichen Tage wollte Stopford in Tyrus, welches Capitan Collier schon in Folge eines Befehles vom 14. September angreifen sollte, für die Truppen Winterquartiere einrichten und all dort den neu ernannten und im Lager von Dschuni bereits eingetroffenen General-Gouverneur von Syrien Izzet Pascha etabliren. Napier aber, in der Meinung dass Tyrus für diesen Zweck zu nahe an Acre liege, und Saida besser sei, brachte es bei Stopford dahin, dass, wie schon einmal befohlen aber wieder aufgegeben wurde, Saida angegriffen und ihm die Leitung dieses Unternehmens übergeben werde. Am 25. September

begab sich Napier mit Contre-Admiral Walker und dem preussischen Hauptmann Laue,¹ dann mit einem türkischen Bataillon und einem englischen Marine-Infanterie-Bataillon an Bord des Gorgon, Cyclops und der Hydra nach Saida, woselbst am 26. September auch noch die Schiffe Thunderer, Guerriera, Güli Sefid, Wasp und Stromboli versammelt waren. Als letzterer wegen der herrschenden Windstille die Segelschiffe einbugsirt hatte, und die Aufforderung zur Uebergabe des Platzes abschlägig beschieden wurde, begann die Beschiessung und hierauf die Landung und Einnahme der Stadt und ihrer zwei Castelle, bei welcher Gelegenheit sich österreichischer Seits vor allem Erzherzog Friedrich,² Schiffsführich Pörtl und Marine-Cadet Chinca, dann auch der Marine-Artillerie-Lieutenant Schewczik und die Marine-Cadeten Rota und Kohen rühmlichst hervorgethan haben. Der Verlust der Verbündeten betrug nur:

Engländer: 4 Todte, 16 Verwundete.

Oesterreicher: 1 Todter, 1 Verwundeter.

Türken: 5 Todte, 18 Verwundete.

Jener der Egyptier: 200 Todte und Verwundete (unter ersteren der Commandant) und 2000 Gefangene.

Die Familie des Soliman Pascha hatte sich noch vor dem Angriff auf einem französischen Dampfer eingeschifft. Der geringe Verlust der Verbündeten erklärt sich dadurch, dass die zur Vertheidigung dieses Platzes bestimmt gewesene Artillerie auf dem Wege von Egypten durch Napier schon früher aufgefangen worden war, daher auch Napier voraussetzen konnte, dass er auf keinen grossen Widerstand stossen würde. Gleichwohl hätten die Egyptier, wenn sie sich in die Errichtung von Barricaden eingelassen haben würden, mehr Widerstand leisten können als sie gethan haben. Napier liess in Saida, dessen Castelle durch Capitän Boxer und Lieutenant Schewczik in besseren Stand gesetzt wurden, 1 Bataillon Türken und eine kleine Escadre und kehrte noch am folgenden Tage nach Dschuni zurück.

Die Waffenthat von Saida war von guter Wirkung, denn gleich darauf stellte sich der Emir Beschir Cassim, ein Neffe des alten Emir Beschir, im Lager zu Dschuni ein. Derselbe übernahm dann den Befehl über die Bergbewohner zur Beobachtung von Ibrahim und Osman Pascha, welche um diese Zeit in Meruba standen. Sogar der alte Emir schickte einen Geistlichen, um wegen Beibehalt seines früheren Regierungsverhältnisses zu unterhandeln. Er wurde aber der Localregierung entsetzt, und statt seiner der Neffe zum Fürsten der Christen im Libanon ernannt. Ibrahim, als ihm die Nachricht vom Falle Saida's zukam, war sehr bestürzt und schickte sogleich ein kleines Corps aus, um es wieder zu nehmen; aber Napier, hievon unterrichtet, schickte seinerseits 1 Bataillon Türken und 1 Bataillon englische Marine-Infanterie zur See nach Saida, was Ibrahim wieder bewog, von seinem Vorhaben abzustehen.

¹ Derselbe machte diesen Krieg als Volontär mit.

² Dieser ritterliche Prinz war zu Wien am 14. Mai 1821 geboren und starb, allgemein bedauert, als Vice-Admiral zu Venedig am 5. October 1847.

In Folge des obenerwähnten Befehles Stopford's an Capitän Collier war dieser am 16. September mit den Schiffen Castor, Pique und Dewan vor Kaiffa erschienen, dessen 500 Mann starke Besatzung am folgenden Tage zur Uebergabe aufgefordert wurde. Als diese Aufforderung abschlägig beschieden wurde, liess Collier das Feuer eröffnen, in Folge dessen die Egyptier das Weite suchten und die Stadt in Besitz genommen wurde. Acht Kanonen und zwei 13zöllige Mörser nebst vielen Vorräthen an Munition und Lebensmitteln fielen den Verbündeten in die Hände. Noch befand sich aber das Castell im Besitze des Feindes, ohne dass dies Seitens der Verbündeten gleich bemerkt wurde. Als dieses Tags darauf beschossen wurde, flüchtete sich die Besatzung, worauf die Verbündeten einzogen und die darin befindlichen Geschütze gegen die ausserhalb Kaiffa lagernde Besatzung richteten. Der einzige Verlust den die Verbündeten bei dieser Gelegenheit erlitten, rührte von dem Springen eines jener Geschütze her, welche in dem Castell gefunden und gegen den Feind abgefeuert worden waren, und wodurch ein englischer Officier und ein englischer Zimmermann schwer verwundet wurden. Am 24. September erschien Collier mit seiner Escadre in weiterer Befolgung der von Stopford erhaltenen Befehle vor Tyrus. Als dessen 500 Mann starke Besatzung die Uebergabe verweigerte, wurde das Feuer eröffnet, worauf die Besatzung das Weite suchte. Am nächsten Tage wurde die Stadt ohne allen Blutverlust in Besitz genommen, wobei 2 Geschütze, viel Korn und einige Munition vorgefunden wurden. Sonderbarerweise hatte sich ein in der Nähe befindliches, 1500 Mann starkes feindliches Corps nicht allein während, sondern auch nach der Action ganz passiv verhalten. Minder glücklich war der am 25. September erfolgte Angriff auf Tartus, welchen Capitän Stewart mit den Schiffen Benbow, Carysfort und Zebra in der Absicht ausführte, um die dortigen Magazine zu zerstören, was bei den Engländern, ohne zu bedenken dass dieselben eher im eigenen Interesse erhalten oder geleert werden sollten, sehr Sitte ist. Nach der üblichen Beschiessung wurde die Landung vorgenommen, wobei auch ein Apparat zum Sprengen der Magazinsmauern mitgenommen wurde. Die gegen die See sehende Ringmauer hatte durch das Schiessen einige Löcher erhalten, und obwohl man wahrnahm, dass diese Mauer durch eine andere crenellierte Mauer flankirt war, so glaubte man bei grosser Schnelligkeit des Angriffs (der Quai vor der Ringmauer war nur 8 Klafter breit) unversehrt zu jenen Löchern, folglich auch in das Innere der Stadt gelangen zu können. Da aber die Landung durch Untiefen (wahrscheinlich von altem Mauerwerk herstammend) verzögert wurde, und die Besatzung, bestehend aus 200 Mann Infanterie und 100 Mann unberittener Cavallerie, auf ihrer Hut war und nicht allein von den Schiesslöchern der flankirenden Mauer, sondern selbst von jenen Breschlöchern in der Ringmauer ein mörderisches Feuer eröffnete, so musste die Landungstruppe (sie zählte wahrscheinlich nur 50 Mann) mit dem verhältnissmässig grossen Verlust von 5 Todten und 15 Verwundeten und ohne dass jener Sprengapparat zur Anwendung kam, den Rückzug antreten. Dieser Unfall ist ein gutes Zeugnis

für die Möglichkeit, dass man eine Landung, sobald nur der Vertheidiger seine Truppen bei der Hand hat, leicht verhindern kann; es ist ferner ein Zeugniß für den guten Dienst, den eine crenellirte Flankenmauer leisten kann, wenn sie auch nur wenige Schiesslöcher aufweist. Endlich soll man aus diesem Unfalle die Lehre ziehen, dass man sich selber auch leicht eine Grube graben kann, denn eine solche Rolle spielten die Breschlöcher, die der Vertheidiger sogleich zu benützen verstand. Für die nur 300 Mann starke Besatzung, welche bei dieser Gelegenheit nur 2 Todte zu beklagen hatte, war diese Affaire sehr glänzend ausgefallen, denn ohne im Besitze von Geschützen zu sein und zu einem Drittheil aus unberittener Cavallerie bestehend, hatte sie einen Feind zurückgeworfen, der am Bord seiner 3 Schiffe nicht allein viel mehr Mannschaft, sondern sogar an 124 schwere Geschütze hatte.

Noch vor Anfang October tauchte in Stopford abermals der Gedanke auf, nichts weiter zu unternehmen, was wieder ganz gegen die Ansicht Napier's war, der es sehr bedauerte, dass man Beirut so nahe an Dschuni noch immer in den Händen des Feindes lasse. Diese Verschiedenheit der Ansichten, entsprungen aus der Verschiedenheit der Charaktere, zieht sich wie ein rother Faden durch die ganze Geschichte des syrischen Krieges und findet ihren Anfang in Smyrna, als nämlich ein Theil der Flotte dort vor Anker lag und Stopford, damals noch in Malta anwesend, das Commando über die Escadre beim Abgehen des Commandanten Parker nicht dem nächst höhern anwesenden Officier (Napier), sondern dem bisher in Malta gestandenen Hafensadmiral Sir John Louis, der aber später wieder eine andere Bestimmung erhielt, übergab. So wurde Stopford von seinem eigenen Commodore fortwährend harcelirt, und es fehlte nicht viel, dass, wie wir später sehen werden, vielleicht auch noch ein Kriegsgericht hinzugetreten wäre.

Am 2. October brachte ein Ueberläufer die Nachricht, dass ein Pulvertransport auf dem Wege nach Beirut sei, und es gelang den Engländern mittelst einiger Imbarcationen den Train zu überfallen und an 100 Fässer Pulver zu erobern, von welchen ein Theil zerstört, der andere aber mitgenommen wurde.

Mittlerweile drang Izzet Pascha, der sich gerne als oberster Befehlshaber der Landtruppen geriren wollte, darauf, dass Napier den Osman Pascha bei Meruba angreifen solle, was aber bei der Schwierigkeit, das tiefe Thal des Kelbflusses im Angesicht eines Feindes zu überschreiten, der sich noch während des Gefechtes durch die Besatzung von Beirut verstärken konnte, und bei der Schwäche des eigenen Truppenstandes (die türkischen Verstärkungen waren bis damals erst zu einem kleinen Theil eingetroffen, und ausser dem Lager von Dschuni mussten noch andere Küstenpunkte besetzt bleiben), dem Commodore Napier bei allem seinem Unternehmungsgeist doch noch zu gewagt erschien. Um aber dem Izzet Pascha dennoch einen Gefallen zu erweisen, liess er bei Stopford um Verhaltensbefehle bitten, wohl wissend, dass dieser bei seiner schon früher an den Tag gelegten Disposition dem Unter-

nehmen nicht zustimmen werde. So geschah es auch, und der Angriff unterblieb.

Diese Zeit benützte Napier, nachdem er den Befehl über die Truppen im Lager von Dschuni dem General Jochmus übergeben hatte, zu einer Recognoscirung von Acre und kehrte nach Dschuni mit einem englischen Marine-Infanterie-Bataillon zurück. Beim Eintreffen im Lager hörte er von dem Siege, den der Emir Beschir Cassim am 4. October bei Meruba über Osman Pascha davongetragen hatte, wo die Egyptianer mit dem Verluste von 500 Mann bis Basquinta zurückgetrieben worden waren. Nun glaubten Stopford und Napier, dass der Moment zur Ergreifung der Offensive gekommen sei, sie differirten aber in ihrer Meinung insoferne, dass ersterer Beirut unter Mitwirkung Napier's direct angreifen wollte, wogegen dieser wieder daran dachte, sich mit dem Emir Cassim in Verbindung zu setzen und auf Soliman loszugehen, wodurch dann Beirut von selbst fallen würde. Ohne viel zu fragen, verfolgte nun Napier seinen Plan. Er besprach sich mit dem Emir, zog am 7., 8. und 9. October mit 7 Bataillonen aus dem Lager und besetzte, den Kelb überschreitend, die Höhen von Ormagacuan, im Lager nur 2 Bataillone zurücklassend. Da es im Falle eines Missgeschickes zu schwierig gewesen wäre, den Kelb in seinem obern Lauf zu übersetzen, so gedachte er diess an seiner Mündung zu thun, wesshalb daselbst ein Linienschiff aufgestellt wurde. Aber schon am Abend des 8. kam ein Schreiben von Stopford, der sich gegen jeden Angriff aussprach. Am 9. October kam ein zweites Schreiben mit dem Beifügen, dass Oberst Smith mit einem Ferman aus Constantinopel zurückgekehrt sei, worin dem Serasker Izzet Mehmed Pascha befohlen wurde, die Operationen aller türkischen Landtruppen nur nach Anordnung des Oberst Smith einzuleiten, und dass von nun an ohne diesen nichts mehr geschehen dürfe. Ein drittes Schreiben Stopford's, noch vom 10. October, enthielt für Napier den Befehl, augenblicklich umzukehren. Ungeachtet dessen und des Umstandes, dass nicht Soliman gegenüberstand, sondern Ibrahim, der sich in aller Eile zu concentriren suchte, blieb Napier bei seinem Plane feststehen, denn schon hatte sich Emir Cassim genähert, und schon war Omer Bei¹ an

¹ Omer Bei war der ehemalige Oguliner Grenzer Lattas, der später berühmt gewordene Omer Pascha.* 1811 zu Plaski geboren, war Omer Cadet im Oguliner Grenz-Regiment, wo er sich durch eine schöne Handschrift bemerkbar machte und in der Auditoriats-Kanzlei angestellt wurde. 1833 war er Schreiber bei der Genie-Direction in Zara und entwich in diesem Jahre nach Bosnien, wo er Lehrer bei einem Kaufmann wurde und zum Islam übertrat. Später kam er nach Constantinopel, wo er Lehrer des Prinzen und nachmaligen Sultans Abdul-Medschid wurde. Er erhielt dabei den Rang eines Capitäns, und als der Krieg 1840-41 ausbrach, den Rang eines Oberst, 1840 wurde er Brigade-General. Einige Zeit nach dem syrischen Kriege kämpfte er sehr erfolgreich gegen die Kurden und wurde Corps-Commandant in Bagdad. 1843 half er die albanesische und 1847 die türkische Rebellion niederwerfen. 1853 operirte er mit viel Einsicht und Glück an der Donau, 1854 befand er sich in der Krim und 1855 in Kleinasien. Seine letzte That war die Bekämpfung Montenegro's 1860. Während des syrischen Krieges zeichnete er sich stets durch kluge Ausstellung der Vorposten aus, und

* vide Vol. I p. 43 (d. H.).

ler Spitze dreier Bataillone zur Umgehung des Feindes in seiner rechten Flanke ausgeschildt worden. Ein Zurückgehen nach Dschuni hätte denibelsten Eindruck gemacht, und Omer Bei wäre der Gefahr ausgesetzt gewesen gefangen zu werden. Auch hatte Napier von seinem Standorte aus gesehen, dass in Beirut bereits die englische Flagge wehte, dass also Soliman Pascha sehr wahrscheinlich schon auf dem Wege zu Ibrahim sei. (Wirklich hatten die Verbündeten, als sie von dem Abziehen Soliman's Nachricht erhielten, von ihnen auf der Rhede befindlichen Schiffen aus Beirut ohne Schwertstreich in Besitz genommen.) Aus dem Lager wurden noch zwei Bataillone geholt, und Bandiera um Zusendung der mittlerweile wieder einbarkirten Raketenbatterie ersucht, ein Ansuchen, welches jedoch aus der Ursache erfolglos blieb, weil Stopford die Absendung verweigerte. Napier, vor Ungeduld brennend, konnte den Augenblick nicht erwarten, wo der Emir Cassim eintreffen sollte. Kaum war die Kunde von seiner Annäherung gekommen, so liess Napier angreifen (10. October Nachmittags). Es kam nun bei Boharsof¹ zu einem hartnäckigen aber entscheidenden Gefecht, wobei die Egyptier (von Ibrahim persönlich commandirt) von einer Position zur andern zurückgetrieben wurden, bis endlich das Erscheinen des Omer Bei in ihrem Rücken sie unter Verlust von 600 bis 700 Gefangenen und der grünen Fahne der Leibgarde Ibrahim's in wilde Flucht brachte, während der Verlust der Verbündeten nur 50 Tode und Verwundete betrug. Alles dies erfolgte ohne dass noch Emir Cassim am Schlachtfelde eingetroffen war, aber seine Annäherung hatte für die Verbündeten den Vortheil, dass die Verstärkungen, welche Ibrahim erwartete, so in Schach gehalten wurden, dass sie ihm von keinem Beistande mehr sein konnten. Am Ende des Gefechtes hätte eine Irrung leicht von übeln Folgen sein können, weil eines der im Rücken des Feindes erschienenen Bataillone des Omer Bei für ein feindliches angesehen wurde, und weil dieses ein entgegenstehendes Bataillon der Verbündeten, welches aus übergegangenen Arabern bestand, für ein egyptisches hielt, das den zufällig bei ihm befindlichen Napier nach der Meinung des andern Bataillons gefangen hatte. Man schoss gegenseitig aufeinander, bis es endlich dem Commodore mit vieler Mühe gelang, den Irrthum zu berichtigen. Napier hatte überhaupt auch während der Affaire manche harte Arbeit, denn als eines der türkischen Bataillone in Folge des starken feindlichen Feuers nicht vorgehen wollte, schlug er mit dem Stocke, die einzige Waffe, die er am Tage der Schlacht trug, tüchtig drein. Bei einer andern Gelegenheit, wo er den Truppen die Marschrichtung geben wollte, warf er, da er sich wegen Unkenntniss der türkischen Sprache nicht verständlich machen konnte, mit Steinen dahin, was ihm später in England irriger Weise dahin ausgelegt wurde, dass er auf die Truppen selbst mit Steinen geworfen und sie somit

die im Gefechte von Boharsof geschickt ausgeführte Umgehung verschaffte ihm auf Vorschlag des General Jochmus den Rang eines Brigade-Generals.

¹ Boharsof ist ein Theil des Ortes Bekfaya. Nach anderen heisst dieses Gefecht jenes von Calat Meidan, ein Name der von daselbst bestandenen Bergwerken herkommt.

brutal behandelt habe. Denkt man sich hierzu noch seinen wunderlichen Anzug (weisser Strohhut, blauer Marinefrack, aufgeschürzte Beinkleider und Schuhe zu Pferd), so hätte man in ihm nicht einen Feldherrn gesucht, wie er von den Malern in Schlachtbildern dargestellt wird. Die eroberte Fahne der Leibgarde Ibrahim's war während des Gefechtes verschwunden und kam angeblich später in Beirut wieder zum Vorschein, wo sie in die Hände Smith's gelangte, der sie dann durch Oberst Hodges' dem Lord Ponsonby zur Uebergabe an den Sultan schickte. Darüber hatte sich später zwischen Napier und den Genannten eine eigene Correspondenz ergeben, aus welcher zu ersehen ist, wie sehr sich Napier grämte, dass er diese Trophäe dem Sultan nicht persönlich zu Füssen legen konnte. Mit der erwähnten grünen silbergestickten Fahne hatte es indessen eine eigene Bewandniss. Sie war in der ersten Gefechtsstellung von einem Bataillon unter persönlicher Anführung des General Jochmus genommen worden, und wahrscheinlich mit einem tödtlich verwundeten türkischen Officier in der zweiten Gefechtsstellung in einen Abgrund gestürzt und verloren. Die Fahne welche später Lord Ponsonby in einer feierlichen Audienz dem Sultan zu Füssen legte, und welche für die Fahne der Leibgarde Ibrahim's ausgegeben wurde, war aber eine ganz andere, nämlich eine weisse goldgestickte, von einem jener Bataillone herrührend, welche, wie wir später sehen werden, von Soliman Pascha im Stich gelassen bei Beirut capitulirten. Oberst Hodges, der zur Zeit des Gefechtes von Boharsof die grüne Fahne leicht gesehen haben konnte, dürfte wohl in der Lage gewesen sein, einer Verwechslung vorzubeugen, die, als sie hintendrein entdeckt wurde, dem unschuldigen Lord Ponsonby grosse Verlegenheiten brachte.

Die Folge des siegreichen Gefechtes von Boharsof war, dass Ibrahim bis Zachleh zurückwich, wo er nur mit 4000 Mann eintraf, und dass sich Soliman auf die erste Nachricht mit einigen hundert Reitern aus dem Staube machte und vier Bataillone ohne Befehl zurückliess, welche dann mit 20 Geschützen nach Beirut marschirten und dort nach abgeschlossener Capitulation in die Hände der Verbündeten fielen. Einen weiteren Verlust erlitt aber Ibrahim dadurch, dass jetzt eine grosse Zahl der in sein Heer eingereihten Syrer von ihm abfiel und sich nach der Heimath zerstreute. Napier scheint von den Erfolgen seines Sieges im ersten Momente gar nicht in Kenntniss gekommen zu sein und die Meinung gefasst zu haben, dass Ibrahim bei weiterem Zurückgehen sich so verstärken müsse, dass er (Napier) nicht wohl mehr in der Offensive bleiben könnte. Vielleicht wollte er erst den von Stopford erteilten Befehlen folge leisten — denn statt den Feind zu verfolgen, liess er Omer Bei mit zwei Bataillonen in den eingenommenen Stellungen, während der Rest der Truppen nach Ormagacuan marschirte, um gegen Soliman, von dessen Flucht man noch nichts wusste, Front zu machen. Für seine Person kehrte aber Napier nach dem Lager von Dschuni

¹ Dieser Officier hatte den Halbinselnkrieg mitgemacht, war englischer General-Consul in Cairo und befand sich zur Zeit des hier beschriebenen Gefechtes an der Seite seines Freundes Napier.

zurück, wo er ein Schreiben Stopford's vom 10. October vorfand, der ihm nochmals jede Offensivbewegung untersagte und den Rückmarsch in's Lager befahl, dabei sonderbarer Weise bemerkend, wie er (Stopford) dahin instruirt sei, die Directiven Smith's zu befolgen. Auf dieses Schreiben antwortete Napier mit drei Berichten. Der erste, noch vom 10. October datirt, war eine kurze Anzeige von dem stattgefundenen Gefecht und von der Niederlage Ibrahim's. Im zweiten, vom 11. October, frug sich Napier etwas ironisch an, ob er dem erhaltenen Befehle jetzt noch Folge leisten soll, beifügend, dass es dermalen besser wäre, die Marine-Infanterie landen zu lassen und Soliman anzugreifen, der sonst entkommen würde, und im dritten, vom 13. October datirt, wird eine detaillirte Erzählung des Gefechtes geliefert.

Noch am 4. October hatte Napier Soliman's Flucht erfahren, daher die Einnahme einer Stellung gegen diesen für überflüssig erachtet und die Rücksendung von zwei Bataillonen nach dem Lager verfügt wurde, zum Theil auch desswegen, um Izzet Pascha, dem es im Lager ohne genügende Truppen nicht gut zu Muthe war, zu beruhigen. Uebrigens wurde das Lager bald darauf aufgehoben, die Truppen aber verlegte man nach Beirut. Napier war noch am Abend des 11. October an Bord der Princess Charlotte gegangen, um sich mit Stopford und Smith zu besprechen und die Leitung der Operationen zu Land an Smith zu übergeben. Er bestand auf der Verfolgung Ibrahim's, doch fand dieser Vorschlag bei Stopford und Smith, die viel eher an einen Rückzug dachten, kein Gehör, und Napier nahm sich in Folge dessen vor, sich nicht weiter in Angelegenheiten zu mischen, welche sich auf die Landoperationen beziehen und von ihm, dem englischen Seemann, als "*military affairs*" bezeichnet wurden. Stopford und mit ihm Smith hielten trotz aller errungenen Erfolge den Stand der Dinge für so ungünstig, dass sie nicht allein von einer Verfolgung Ibrahim's, der in Zachleh nicht mehr als 6000 Mann und 7 Geschütze zusammenbringen konnte — nicht allein von einem Angriff auf Tripolis, welches sehr leicht zu nehmen war (von den Bergbewohnern auch am 16. October unter Mitwirkung der österreichischen Corvette Clemenza¹ genommen) — nicht allein von einer Unterstützung des Emir Beschir Cassim, nicht allein von einem Angriff auf Acre, wie dieser namentlich von Bandiera und Walker vorgeschlagen wurde, nichts wissen wollten, sondern sie erklärten auch alles Geschehene für nutzlos und die eigene Stellung bei dem geringen Truppenstande für zu gefährdet. Die türkischen Truppen seien zu wenig gedrillt und sollten zu diesem Behufe lieber nach Cypren zurückgebracht werden. Ibrahim sei ein tüchtiger Feldherr, der es noch immer in der Hand habe nach Constantinopel zu marschiren. Endlich stehe zu besorgen, dass die französische Flotte zu Gunsten Mehemet Ali's eine Diversion mache, welche dann die Stellung der Verbündeten

¹ Die Clemenza war bis zum 8. October vor Alexandria geblieben, wo es ihr gelang das Auslaufen des egyptischen Admiral-Schiffes zu verhindern. Am 16. October erschien sie vor Tripolis, allwo sie bis zum 16. November verblieb und dann nach Beirut segelte.

in die nachtheiligste Lage bringen würde. Solche Aeusserungen liessen Stopford und Smith zu wiederholten Malen fallen. Vielleicht glaubten sie auch an deren Richtigkeit, in der Wirklichkeit aber scheint es dass sie das Verweilen an der syrischen Küste während des Winters für zu ungemächlich hielten und eben deshalb nach Gründen suchten, die in der That nicht stichhaltig waren. In ähnlichem Sinne mussten auch die Berichte an Lord Ponsonby gelaftet haben, da dieser, die Fortsetzung der Operationen, insbesondere einen Angriff auf Acre wünschend, in einem Schreiben vom 2. November an Lord Palmerston die Befürchtung aussprach, dass Stopford die Küste schon verlassen habe, um in dem Hafen von Marmarizza Schutz zu suchen. Wie dem nun immer sein wolle, so ist es eine Thatsache, dass seit dem am 10. October gelieferten Gefechte von Boharsof lange Zeit gar nichts geschah. Erst am 24. October wurde Walker auf sein vieles Drängen von Beirut nach Acre geschickt, um im Verein mit den dort schon befindlichen Schiffen (Revenge, Thunderer und Pique) eine Demonstration zu machen. Ab Bandiera, der vor Ungeduld brannte an einem Angriffe auf Acre Theil zu nehmen, dies sah, folgte er freiwillig nach, und nun erst setzte sich Stopford in Bewegung, aber nicht etwa um den Angriff wirklich zu unternehmen, sondern nur um Bandiera zurückzurufen, den er auch vor Saida einholte.

Um das Ende der für die Schifffahrt günstigen Jahreszeit nicht ganz unbenutzt vorüberfliessen zu lassen und sich dabei doch nicht allzu grossen Chancen auszusetzen, beschloss Stopford auf Anrathen Smith's noch einen unbefestigten Küstenpunkt wegzunehmen. Statt aber einen solchen zu wählen, welcher der egyptischen Rückzugslinie nahe liegt und jedenfalls südlich von Acre hätte aufgesucht werden müssen, wurde das sogar von Beirut nördlich liegende Latakia gewählt, und demgemäss die Einschiffung von 2400 Türken eingeleitet. Zum Glück für die Sache des Sultans kam in dem Augenblicke, als die Einschiffung beendet war, von Lord Palmerston die bestimmte Weisung, Acre anzugreifen, daher die Expedition nach Latakia zu nichte wurde. Dessenungeachtet berief Stopford einen Kriegsrath, in welchem sich er und Smith ebenso entschieden gegen, als Bandiera, Walker, Napier und Erzherzog Friedrich für den Angriff auf Acre erklärten. Schon die Berufung eines Kriegsrathes, um die Frage zu entscheiden, ob Acre angegriffen werden solle oder nicht, war ein Zeugniß für die Schwäche des Oberbefehlshabers, da er diese Frage auf Grund der erhaltenen Berichte über die Vertheidigungsfähigkeit des Platzes und über die Art und Weise des günstigsten Angriffes wohl allein entscheiden konnte und sich dabei auch nicht viel zu kümmern brauchte um den vom Kriegsschauplatze 500 Meilen entfernten Lord Palmerston. Dass er aber gegen den Angriff war und dann doch angreifen liess, zeugte für die grosse Wankelmüthigkeit, die dem Obercommando innewohnte. So kam also eine Hauptunternehmung gegen den Willen des Feldherrn zu Stande! Zu bemerken ist hierbei auch noch, dass Stopford die österreichischen Schiffe ihrer geringen Caliber wegen aus dem Spiele lassen wollte, und dass deren Zuhilfe-

nahme erst dann beschlossen wurde, als Erzherzog Friedrich und Oberst Ritter von Lebzelter erklärten, dass sich die Oesterreicher auf keinen Fall einer Gefahr entziehen wollen, welcher sich die übrigen Verbündeten aussetzen.

Die bereits eingeschifften Türken wurden bis auf 3000 Mann unter Selim Pascha verstärkt, während Omer Pascha, der sich jetzt in Saida befand, den Befehl erhielt, zu Land durch einen Vormarsch bis zum weissen Berge mitzuwirken und für weitere Operationen sich bereit zu halten. Am 30. October setzten sich auch die sonst noch verfügbaren Schiffe in Bewegung, und am 2. November Nachmittags war die Flotte, bestehend aus den im Ausweise (oben S. 234) mit einer Null bezeichneten Schiffen, an deren Bord sich auch kleine Detachements von englischer Landartillerie und englischen Genietruppen unter Artillerie-Major Higgins und Ingenieur-Lieutenant Aldrich befanden, vor Acre versammelt. Die dort früher stationirt gewesenen englischen Schiffe hatten den Grund gepeilt, was deswegen sehr nöthig war, weil über diese Localität keine genaue Seekarte zur Verfügung stand, und der Strand in der nördlichen Strecke von einer Untiefe (Sandbank) begleitet wird, die aber zwischen sich und dem Lande einen fahrbaren Canal lässt, so dass die Schiffe, wenn sie richtig einfahren, in einer der Beschiessung der Küstenbatterien günstigen Entfernung aufgestellt werden konnten. Die Wegnahme von Acre, dieses festesten Küstenpunktes, würde die egyptische Stellung am Meere ebenso geschwächt, als jene der Verbündeten verstärkt haben. Zudem lag Acre schon so südlich der Stellung des egyptischen Gros, dass von da aus auf die egyptische Rückzugslinie leichter gewirkt werden konnte als von Beirut. Allerdings bedurfte es, da die Seeseite von vielen Küstenbatterien vertheidigt war, eines energischen Angriffes; gelänge es aber, diese zum Schweigen zu bringen, so liess die geringe Stärke der unter dem Gouverneur Ismael Bei und speciell unter Mahmud Bei¹ stehenden Besatzung, die vom österreichischen Consul Laurin zu 4000 Mann, von andern Kundschaftern zu 5000 bis 6000 Mann angeeignet wurde, hoffen, dass man den Platz im ersten Anlauf nehmen werde. Ibrahim war durch die französischen Consuln schon lange davon unterrichtet worden, dass die Verbündeten Acre angreifen wollen; gleichwohl stand bei ihm die Absicht fest es zu halten, daher er auch an seinen Vater schrieb, wie es wohl möglich sei, dass Acre angegriffen werde — wie aber, bei der Stärke der Befestigungen und der Armirung, von einer Einnahme des Platzes keine Rede sein könne; denn in Acre befanden sich 313 Geschütze, von welchen 107 auf der Seeseite und 122 auf der Landseite aufgestellt waren, und ausserhalb des Platzes lagerte Soliman Pascha mit 800 bis 1000 Mann Cavallerie.

Noch am 2. November Abends berief Stopford sämtliche Schiffs-Commandanten an Bord der Princess Charlotte, wo schon ein vom Capitän Boxer entworfener und von Stopford adoptirter Angriffsplan

¹ Der englische Oberstlieutenant Alderson nennt ihn: "Mohammed Bei" (siehe *Papers on subjects connected with the duties of the corps of royal Engineers*, Vol. VI.)

vorlag. Um den Angriff am frühen Morgen beginnen zu können, sollen die Segelschiffe in Voraussicht der wahrscheinlichen Windstille durch die Dampfer in die Schlachtlinie bugsirt werden, welche letztere zu $2\frac{1}{2}$ Kabel' von den feindlichen Batterien entfernt angenommen wurde. Napier, überzeugt dass bei der geringen Zahl der Dampfer (es waren deren nur vier vorhanden) eine zu lange Zeit vergehen, und eben dadurch für den Feind die Möglichkeit entstehen würde, jedesmal nur wenige Schiffe bekämpfen zu brauchen, machte gegen diesen Plan die lebhaftesten Einwendungen; trotzdem blieb derselbe in Kraft, und Stopford befahl dass wenn die Küstenbatterien zum Schweigen gebracht worden wären, in der gegen die Seeseite sehenden Escarpe Breschen gelegt werden sollten, welche dann von den in Landungsbooten dahin geführten Truppen zu erstürmen seien. Als der Morgen des 3. November anbrach, hatten sich die Dampfer bereits in Bewegung gesetzt, um die ihnen zugewiesenen Schiffe eines nach dem andern in Schlepp zu nehmen; aber Napier, der sich über diese Angriffsart noch immer nicht beruhigen konnte, verfügte sich nun zu Stopford und machte mit Berufung auf den mitgenommenen Capitän Henderson, einen im Fahren mit Dampfschiffen kundigen Officier, die gründlichsten Vorstellungen, beifügend, dass der enorme Zeitraum von zwei Stunden vergehen müsste, um nur ein Schiff in die Schlachtlinie zu bringen. Dagegen schlug Napier vor dass es, weil sich in dieser Jahreszeit um Mittag gewöhnlich eine von Nordwest kommende Brise einstellt, gerathener wäre, bis dahin zu warten, indem dann alle Segelschiffe sich selbst in Bewegung setzen könnten. Auch erschiene es bei der Configuration der Küste rätlicher, von Norden, als, wie es Boxer vorgeschlagen hatte, von Süden einzufahren, indem das letztere eine geraume Zeit hindurch Angesichts einer weit grösseren Zahl von Küstengeschützen stattfinden müsste, während das Einfahren von Norden von der Seite her geschehen, das Küstengeschütz aber sein Feuer nicht früher eröffnen könne, bis die wahre Stellung erlangt sei. Die einzige Einwendung die gegen diesen Plan gerechter Weise erhoben wurde, war die späte Stunde des Angriffes, aber Napier antwortete hierauf: „Wenn Acre angegriffen werden soll, so muss es ordentlich oder lieber gar nicht angegriffen werden.“ Stopford, die Richtigkeit der Einwendungen Napier's einschend, gab für den Augenblick nach, Boxer's Plan ward aufgegeben, und der Angriff bis zum Beginne der Brise verschoben. Wir sehen also hier den merkwürdigen Fall, dass ein Feldherr, ohne dass sich die Verhältnisse irgendwie geändert haben, seinen Plan zurücknimmt. Der Grund warum Stopford anfänglich den Plan Boxer's angenommen hatte, lag darin, dass er glaubte, es müsse dieser Officier, weil er als Commandant des Pique früher Acre recognoscirt hatte, über die Art und Weise des Angriffes den besten Bescheid geben, darüber ganz vergessend dass Recognition und Gefechtsdisposition zwei sehr verschiedene Dinge sind. Zudem scheint Boxer die Leistungsfähigkeit der Dampfer überschätzt, die Wirk-

¹ 1 Kabel -- 100 Klafter.

² Damals gab es in der englischen Marine noch wenige Officiere, welche mit Dampfschiffen fahren konnten.

samkeit der Küstengeschütze hingegen unterschätzt zu haben, sonst wäre es dem Commodore Napier bei der Aversion, die Stopford gegen diesen hatte, nicht so bald möglich geworden, die Unzweckmässigkeit des Boxer'schen Planes ad oculos zu demonstrieren und den Feldherrn zur Zurücknahme bereits hinausgegebener Befehle zu veranlassen. Napier's Vorschlag fand übrigens auch bei den Commandanten der Princess Charlotte und des Powerful Beifall, welche alsbald den oben erwähnten Canal an Bord des Vesuvius recognoscirten und ihn vollkommen practicabel und nur von wenigen Geschützen vertheidigt fanden. Diese nachträgliche Recognoscirung bildet zugleich ein Misstrauensvotum gegen Boxer, denn hatte dieser so gut recognoscirt, wie Stopford glaubte (und Zeit zur Recognoscirung stand in den vorhergegangenen Tagen genug zur Verfügung), so war es nicht allein unnöthig, sondern sogar unzweckmässig neuerdings zu recognosciren, da jetzt der Feind mit gespanntester Aufmerksamkeit zusehen musste.

Stopford theilte nun seine Segelflotte in Uebereinstimmung mit der Tags zuvor gefassten Ansicht in zwei Divisionen. Die erste: Powerful, Princess Charlotte, Thunderer, Bellerophon und Pique, mit dem Revenge in Reserve unter Napier, sollte von Norden und die zweite, bestehend aus den übrigen englischen Segelschiffen unter Collier, aus den österreichischen Schiffen unter Bandiera und aus dem türkischen Linienschiff unter Walker, sollte von Süden her angreifen, während sich die vier Dampfer als eine Art dritte Division inzwischen aufzustellen hätten. Auch befahl Stopford dem General Jochnus und dem Capitän Henderson vom Edinburgh, dass sie die eventuelle Erstürmung Acre's leiten sollten. Bald nachdem sich die Brise eingestellt hatte, sprang sie in der Richtung von Südwest kommend um, daher auch an Napier der Befehl gegeben wurde, von dieser Seite her einzufahren. Später aber nahm die Brise wieder ihre alte Richtung von Nordwest kommend an, was Napier wieder veranlasste seinem alten Plan treu zu bleiben, wie er diess auch auf eine an ihn ergangene Anfrage der Princess Charlotte durch Flaggen-signale bekannt gab. Als Napier an Bord des Powerful, welcher hier als Führerschiff diente, die Mitte der Curtine der Westfront passirt hatte, nahm er bald darauf Stellung in $6\frac{1}{2}$ Faden¹ tiefem Wasser, ebenso die nächsten Schiffe Princess Charlotte und Bellerophon den von Stopford erhaltenen Instructionen gemäss und im Kielwasser des Powerful, nebenbei glaubend, dass dieser vielleicht wegen einer Untiefe nicht weiter zu fahren wage. Der Thunderer, im gleichen Sinne handelnd, bemerkte zwischen der Princess und dem Bellerophon einen beträchtlichen Raum und fuhr zwischen diese Schiffe ein. Der Pique machte den Schluss, und der Revenge stellte sich Anfangs, wie es Stopford befohlen hatte, rückwärts in Reserve auf, wurde aber später von Napier zur Verlängerung des rechten Flügels vorgezogen. Bei der 2. Division diente der Castor als Führerschiff; es fuhren ihm nach dem Ankerwerfen Hazard, Edinburgh, Benbow, Wasp und das türkische Linienschiff vor, während Carys-

¹ 1 Faden = 6 Fuss.

fort, Talbot, Guerriera, Medea und Lipsia im Kielwasser des *Castor* ankerten. Stopford und Smith hatten sich an Bord des *Phönix* begeben, und sonderbarer Weise blieb die Admiralsflagge auf der *Princess Charlotte*. Die Dampfer welche sich in dem Raum zwischen den beiden Divisionen aufzustellen hatten, ankerten etwas rückwärts und derart, dass vom linken zum rechten Flügel die Reihenfolge: *Gorgon*, *Phönix*, *Vesuvius* und *Stromboli* zum Vorschein kam.

Die 1. Division ankerte auf $3\frac{1}{2}$ Kabel Entfernung von der feindlichen Feuerlinie und nahm mit ihren 6 Schiffen eine Länge von 300 Klaftern ein, so dass, weil diese Division im Ganzen 464 Geschütze an Bord hatte, auf jedes Geschütz 0.64 Längenklafter der eingenommenen Aufstellungs- oder Seelinie entfielen. Die 2. Division ankerte mit dem Centrum auf $3\frac{1}{2}$ Kabel Entfernung von der feindlichen Feuerlinie und nahm mit ihren 11 Schiffen eine Länge von 550 Klaftern ein, so dass weil diese Division im Ganzen 468 Geschütze an Bord hatte, auf jedes Geschütz 1.17 Längenklafter der eingenommenen Seelinie entfielen. Die 4 Dampfer stellten sich ungefähr auf 5 Kabel Entfernung von der feindlichen Feuerlinie auf 1 Kabel auseinander und mit den Flügeln auf 2 Kabel von dem nächsten Flügel der 1. und 2. Division. Sie hatten dadurch genügenden Raum zum Manövriren, wogegen die Segelschiffe sehr gedrängt standen. Die Gesamtlänge der Seelinie der Verbündeten, vom linken Flügel der 1. Division bis zum rechten Flügel der 2. Division gerechnet, betrug circa 1600 Klafter, so dass, weil die vor Acre gestandene Flotte im Ganzen 956 Geschütze an Bord hatte (von denen jedoch bei der batterieartigen Construction der damaligen Schiffe selbstverständlich nur die Hälfte, hier nur jene auf der Backbordseite, gleichzeitig feuern konnte), für jedes Geschütz 1.67 Längenklafter der eingenommenen Seelinie entfielen. Dagegen betrug die Länge der egyptischen Feuerlinie von der Norwestbastion angefangen bis zur seeseitigen Ostbastion mit Vernachlässigung der durch die kleinen Vorsprünge oder durch Linien des 2. Treffens sich ergebenden Vermehrung circa 700 Klafter, und waren daselbst 107 Geschütze aufgestellt, von denen jedoch bei der von den Verbündeten eingenommenen Stellung nur 96 in Thätigkeit gesetzt werden konnten. Es entfielen daher für jedes wirkende Geschütz der egyptischen Feuerlinie 7.29 Klafter;¹ doch muss hiebei bemerkt werden, dass von jenen 96 Geschützen einige wie die Mörser oder wie die Kanonen in den zwei Cavalieren ein 2. Treffen bildeten, und dass einzelne Strecken besonders auf der Südostseite ganz unbesetzt waren.

¹ Beim seeseitigen Angriff auf Sebastopol (17. August 1854) entfielen für jedes Schiffsgeschütz 1.38 Klafter und für jedes Küstengeschütz 9.33 Klafter. Wir haben in diesem Aufsätze wie in jenem über Sebastopol (siehe Mittheilungen des k. k. Genie-Comité 1865, Aufsatz No. 4) absichtlich den für jedes Geschütz entfallenden Quotienten der Feuerlinie (Seelinie) bemerkbar gemacht, weil bei Küstenbefestigungen die Zahl der aufzustellenden Küstengeschütze in erster Instanz von der Zahl jener Geschütze abhängt, welche der zur See erscheinende Gegner im wirksamen Ertrag vorzuführen im Stande ist.

Um 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Uhr Nachmittags begann das Feuer, welches mit grösster Lebhaftigkeit 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ Stunden dauerte. Die egyptischen Batterien, von dem gleich im Anfange des Gefechtes verwundeten Genie-Oberst Schulz (einem Polen) commandirt, konnten einem solchen Feuer nicht widerstehen und wurden innerhalb jenes Zeitraumes vollständig zum Schweigen gebracht. Dennoch hätte eine Landung unter dem Feuer der egyptischen Infanterie um so weniger leicht erfolgen können, als in die 30 Fuss hohen Escarpen noch gar keine Bresche geschossen war. Zwar flog noch während der Beschiessung das Hauptpulvermagazin in die Luft, wobei an 1000 Egyptier¹ zu Grunde gingen und panischer Schrecken hervorgebracht wurde; aber die Verbündeten merkten bei dem allgemeinen Getöse und bei dem grossen Rauche kaum, dass ein Magazin in die Luft geflogen sei, und von den Folgen dieser Explosion geriethen sie an diesem Tage wenigstens schon gar nicht in Kenntniss, so dass Stopford, als die feindlichen Batterien schwiegen, das eigene Feuer einstellen, und der späten Stunde wegen das Breschelegen auf den nächsten Morgen verschob. Bei der 2. Division, woselbst sich auch Selim an Bord des Mokaddemé und Jochmus an Bord des Edinburgh befanden, gedachte man in Folge einer von Stopford am 3. November gegebenen Weisung eine Bresche in einem auf der Südostseite befindlichen, in die Umfassung eingeschobenen Waarenmagazine zu legen, wo die Mauern bei einer im Jahre zuvor durch Albert Graf Nugent² gemachten Recognoscirung nur wenige Fuss dick befunden worden waren, und nach bewirkter Bresche hätten die in Bereitschaft gehaltenen Imbarcationen landen sollen. Um das Eine und das Andere zu erleichtern, nahm Henderson mit dem Edinburgh im Laufe der Nacht eine nähere Aufstellung. Aber noch vor Tagesanbruch erfuhr der dem Lande zunächst stehende Walker durch den Hafencapitän, dass die Besatzung abgezogen und namentlich das Wasserthor ganz frei sei. Ohne Stopford's Zustimmung eingeholt zu haben (dieser war nicht zu finden), und ohne von Smith irgend welchen Befehl erhalten zu haben (derselbe war damals unwohl), und nur den Erzherzog Friedrich um Unterstützung ansuchend, landete Walker³ mit einem Detachement, welches, da das Thor verrammelt war, in einiger Entfernung rechts desselben durch Kanonenschiesslöcher kriechend in das Innere der Festung gelangte. Der Erzherzog dagegen mit Graf Nugent, Oberst Wilhelm Ritter von Lebzelter⁴ und einem Detachement der öster-

¹ Nach dem Bericht des englischen Ingenieur-Oberstlieutenant Alderson sogar 1600 Mann, dann 30 Kamele, 50 Esel, 12 Kühe und einige Pferde.

² Derselbe war früher österreichischer Marine-Officier und befand sich in Syrien als Volontär beim Stabe des General Jochmus. Bei dem Angriffe auf Acre ward dem Grafen Nugent das Commando eines aus englischen Sapeuren und Mineuren und aus türkischen Freiwilligen zusammengesetzten Detachements zur Bildung der Spitze einer Sturmcolonne auf sein eigenes Ansuchen zugestanden. Albert Graf Nugent ist jetzt österreichischer Oberst in Pension.

³ Derselbe wurde für sein Benehmen bei Acre zum Ferik-Pascha oder Vice-Admiral mit dem Namen Yawer Pascha befördert und war später Superintendent der englischen Marine und englischer Vice-Admiral.

⁴ Ehemals Hauptmann im österreichischen Ingenieur-Corps, jetzt Feldzeug-

reichischen Marine landete mehr südwestlich und zwar am Molo, also an der nämlichen Stelle, wo sich sein Vorfahre, der Herzog Leopold von Oesterreich 1190, bei dem Angriff auf die 'Tour des mouches', so sehr ausgezeichnet hatte. Als die Oesterreicher, ebenfalls durch Kanonenschliesslöcher kriechend, in das Innere des Platzes gedrungen waren, eilte der Erzherzog nicht ohne grosse Gefahr und trotz der Dunkelheit der Nacht gleich nach der Citadelle und pflanzte daselbst die drei Flaggen der Verbündeten auf. Da dies gerade am 4. November, also am Namens- tage des Siegers von Aspern erfolgte, so war es ein schönes Angebinde, welches der tapfere Sohn dem heldenmüthigen Vater brachte. Als es Tag wurde, liess der auf der Guerriera zurückgebliebene Corvetten- Capitän Marinovich 21 Salutschüsse geben, welchem Beispiele dann auch die übrigen Schiffe folgten. Hierauf wurde die völlige Besetzung der Stadt vorgenommen, in welcher noch 700 Gefangene gemacht, 313 Geschütze, an 2000 Centner Pulver und viele andere Vorräthe erbeutet wurden. So hatten die Verbündeten in weniger als 24 Stunden den festesten Punkt an der syrischen Küste in eigene Gewalt bekommen, und seine Stärke auf der Landseite, von der sich Bonaparte 1799 und Ibrahim 1831/32 sattsam überzeugt hatten, musste sie die Ansicht fassen lassen, dass sie fernerhin noch im Stande wären, an der syrischen Küste zu verharren.

Ueber den Munitionsverbrauch der Verbündeten während der $3\frac{1}{2}$ - stündigen Beschiessung fehlen die näheren Daten. Nur weiss man sicher, dass die Guerriera 854 und eines der Linienschiffe sogar 1100 Schuss gemacht hat, und dass im Ganzen $\frac{2}{3}$ der eingeschifften Munition verschossen wurden. Nach anderen Berichten sollen 40,000 Schuss gemacht worden sein, wozu jedes in Thätigkeit gewesene Geschütz, wenn man selbst die ganze Hälfte zu 478 Geschützen annimmt, bei der $3\frac{1}{2}$ - stündigen Beschiessung alle $2\frac{1}{2}$ Minuten einen Schuss gemacht haben würde. Der Verlust der Verbündeten betrug nach den englischen Berichten:

Engländer	12	Todte,	32	Verwundete,
Oesterreicher	2	„	6	„
Türken	4	„	3	„
Zusammen	18	Todte,	41	Verwundete.

Den grössten Verlust erlitten Castor und Edinburgh, auf welchem letzterem Schiffe gleich im Anfang eine Granate niederfiel und mehrere Mann ausser Gefecht setzte. Der Schaden an den Schiffen war verhältnissmässig sehr gering und beschränkte sich zumeist auf das Takelwerk. Dem Powerful wurde die Grossmarsstange und die Kreuzmarsraa durchgeschossen. Von den österreichischen Schiffen erhielt die Medea drei kalte Vollkugeln und die Guerriera eine Granate in den Rumpf. Ueber den Munitionsverbrauch der Egyptier fehlen alle Daten. Ihr Verlust wird zu 2000 Todten und Verwundeten angegeben, und die

meister in Pension; derselbe war schon beim Angriff auf Saida an der Seite des Erzherzogs Friedrich gewesen.

Zahl der Gefangenen, unter welchen sich auch Oberst Schulz befand, vermehrte sich in Folge eingerissener Desertion in den nächsten Tagen auf 1200, nach andern Angaben sogar auf 3000 Mann.

Gehen wir nun in eine kritische Beurtheilung des Angriffes und der Vertheidigung über, so finden wir, indem wir zuerst das Thun und Lassen der Verbündeten betrachten, es als ganz sachgemäss, dass Stopford in Berücksichtigung der Configuration der Küste, insbesondere der Feuerlinie, die ihm zu Gebote stehenden Segelschiffe in 2 Hauptdivisionen theilte, um mit der 1. die Westseite und mit der 2. die Süd- und Südostseite anzugreifen. Diese Disposition entsprach vollkommen der Lage der Dinge, und die Verbündeten hatten Kräfte genug, um gegen beide Seiten vorzugehen. Nichts desto weniger erlauben wir uns im nachstehenden auf mehrere Punkte aufmerksam zu machen, welche uns als Gegenstände der Befremdung vorkommen, und zwar:

1. Dass die 2. Division unter drei verschiedene Commandanten (Bandiera, Walker und Collier) gestellt wurde, daher in diesem Umstande die hauptsächlichste Ursache zu finden ist, warum das Einfahren in die Schlachtlinie bei jedem dieser drei Commandanten ganz nach Belieben erfolgte. So geschah es dass, weil Collier mit dem Führerschiff *Castor* zuerst einfuhr und viel zu spät ankerte, um auch Bandiera vor sich ankern zu lassen, dieser im Kielwasser der englischen Schiffe zurückbleiben musste, was die Gefahr hervorbrachte, dass die österreichischen Schiffe, weil jedes gleich in den Rauch des vorderen Schiffes kam, entweder sich selbst oder das nächste englische Schiff beschädigen konnten.

2. Dass der *Revenge* ursprünglich zur Reserve, folglich zur Unthätigkeit bestimmt wurde. Da es sich darum handelte, gleichzeitig mit so vielen Geschützen als nur immer möglich in den Kampf zu gehen und zwar um so mehr, als die Egyptier die ansehnliche Zahl von 96 wirkenden Küstengeschützen aufgestellt hatten, was zu den Seitens der Verbündeten an Bord befindlichen 956 Geschützen das für den Vertheidiger sehr günstige Verhältniss von 1 Küstengeschütz zu 10 Schiffsgeschützen gibt¹, so hätte der *Revenge* mit seinen 76 Geschützen gleich in die erste Linie kommen sollen, wie es dann auch von Napier, ohne viel zu fragen, gleich angeordnet wurde, als dieser sah, dass hier noch ein Schiff nöthig war. Das Bestimmen eines oder mehrerer Schiffe zur Reserve mag in einer Schlacht zwischen zwei Flotten am Platze sein, um im entscheidenden Augenblicke mit frischen Kräften ins Gefecht zu kommen oder um im Falle eines Missgeschickes den Rückzug zu decken; bei Beschiessung von Küstenbatterien aber, wo die grösstmögliche gleichzeitige Entwicklung von Geschützfeuer nöthig ist, und wo, wie im vorliegenden Falle, für eine Deckung des Rückzuges nicht gesorgt zu werden braucht, (der Vertheidiger hatte ja nicht ein einziges Schiff zum Nachsenden), dürfte eine solche Massregel in den meisten Fällen über-

¹ Smola bezeichnet das Verhältniss von 1 : 25 noch als ein günstiges, und bei dem abgeschlagenen Angriff auf Sebastopol war dieses Verhältniss = 1 : 17.

flüssig und insoferne auch schädlich sein, als das Hintereinanderstellen von Schiffen die Trefffähigkeit der Küstenartillerie vermehrt.

3. Dass Stopford die militärische Stufenleiter insoferne nicht berücksichtigte, als er auch an die einzelnen Schiffscommandanten Befehle gab und dadurch die Divisions- und Divisionsunterabtheilungs-Commandanten übersprang. Dem Thunderer befahl er direct sich aus der Linie herauszuziehen, und schon in der Nacht hatte er an die einzelnen Schiffs-Commandanten Befehle gegeben, von denen die Divisions-Commandanten nichts wussten. So schrieb er an den Commandanten des Thunderer: „*Lieber Berkeley! Wenn der Wind von Südwest kommen würde, meine ich, dass von Süden eingefahren werden sollte. Powerful, Prince Charlotte, Bellerophon und Thunderer in Aufeinanderfolge etc. Ihr wahrhafter Freund Robert Stopford*“; — ein Befehl, von dem Napier erst nach dem Gefechte in Kenntniss kam, und der noch den Formfehler hatte, dass er nicht präcis genug lautete. Dadurch, dass Stopford mit jedem einzelnen Schiffs-Commandanten verkehrte, hatte er es in dem vorliegenden Falle mit nicht weniger als 21 Commandanten zu thun, eine Zahl die viel zu gross ist, um dem Feldherrn am Tage der Schlacht die Möglichkeit zu verschaffen, alles einheitlich zu leiten.

4. Dass Stopford die Art des Einfahrens gegenüber den Divisions-Commandanten präjudicirte und, wie das vorerwähnte Schreiben schliessen lässt, ein Manöver in Scene setzte, welches gegen die Regeln der Seetaktik verstösst. Soll nämlich jedes Schiff im Kielwasser des vorderen bleiben, so muss das Führerschiff und jedes folgende im Verhältniss zu demselben so weit vorfahren, bis alle rückwärtigen Schiffe vor die Küstenbatterien gelangen, daher das Einfahren in die Linie eine geraume Zeit unter dem feindlichen Feuer ohne alle Erwidderung desselben geschehen muss, während es dem Commandanten des Führerschiffes schwer fällt, den Augenblick zu treffen, wo sein Schiff halten soll, um weder zu wenig noch zu viel vorzukommen. Und beginnt das vordere Schiff zu feuern, so kann es wegen des Rauches leicht geschehen, dass das folgende Schiff auf den Achter (Hintertheil) des vorderen Schiffes stösst, daher schon die alten spanischen Admirale und mit ihnen auch Nelson selbst Angesichts feindlicher Flotten immer die Regel befolgten, dass das Führerschiff, sobald es zur Action gelangen kann, stehen zu bleiben, die übrigen Schiffe aber successive sich in seiner Verlängerung vor demselben aufzustellen haben, und Napier hatte hier die nämliche Regel vor Augen gehabt. Da nun Napier nach der Meinung Stopford's, der für das Führerschiff eine Aufstellung vor der Südwest-Bastion und eine Aufstellung der übrigen Schiffe in ihrer Reihe wollte, zu früh ankerte, so gab letzterer dem Thunderer den Befehl, sich in der Verlängerung vorwärts des Powerful aufzustellen. Weil aber der Thunderer zwischen seinen Nachbarschiffen so eingepfercht war, dass er nicht herauskommen konnte, ohne anzustossen, so liess Napier den in Reserve gehaltenen Revenge vorfahren. Bei der 2. Division fand die eine und die andere Art des Einfahrens statt, denn zuerst ankerte, wie bereits gesagt, der Castor.

dann Hazard, Edinburgh, Benbow, Wasp und Mokaddemé vor ersterem, Carysfort, Talbot, Guerriera, Medea und Lipsia hingegen hinter ihm, so dass nicht der Castor oder ein anderes englisches Schiff, sondern der Mokaddemé den äussersten rechten Flügel bildete, während die Lipsia den Schluss machte. Diese 2. Division hatte unstreitig ein weit schwierigeres Einfahren als die 1., da sie schon von weitem von jenen Geschützen beschossen werden konnte, welche an der Südfront aufgestellt waren. Auch handelte es sich darum, mit dem rechten Flügel, aber ohne aufzufahren, der Küste so nahe als möglich zu kommen.

5. Dass sich Stopford nicht darüber aussprach, welche Division zuerst angreifen solle, oder ob dies von beiden gleichzeitig zu geschehen habe. In Berücksichtigung der Configuration der Küste und der feindlichen Feuerlinie wäre es unstreitig zweckmässig gewesen, zuerst die 1. Division, und dann die 2. Division einfahren zu lassen. Denn die 1. Division konnte, ohne vorher beschossen zu werden, von der Seite her gut anfahren und jene Geschütze in Rücken nehmen, welche, weil auf der Südostseite befindlich, vorläufig unthätig bleiben mussten. Dadurch wäre es dann der 2. Division, die schon von weitem in die feindliche Schussrichtung gelangte und Acht geben musste, um nicht auf die Küste zu stossen, möglich geworden, viel leichter einzufahren. Augenscheinlich ist es, dass so manche der auf der Süd- und Südostseite des Platzes stehenden Geschütze durch jene Kugeln demontirt worden wären, welche, weil sie über die Brustwehr der Westfront hinwegstrichen, fast als verlorene angesehen werden konnten. Weil nun Stopford in dieser Beziehung gar nichts befohlen hatte, und Napier in Folge eines Unfalles an seinem Schiffe noch weit zurückblieb, so geschah es gerade, dass die 2. Division zuerst einfuhr und der Castor den ersten Schuss gab, daher auch diese Division (Collier, Bandiera und Walker) den schwersten Stand hatte.

6. Dass Stopford die 2. Division nur aus Segelschiffen bestehen liess, während er doch noch ausser dem Phönix drei Dampfer zur beliebigen Verfügung hatte. Da die 2. Division jene war, deren rechter Flügel bis zur Küste reichen musste, so wäre es besser gewesen, diesen Flügel aus Dampfern bestehen zu lassen, die wegen ihres geringeren Tiefganges und wegen ihrer grösseren Manövrirfähigkeit in seichtem Wasser und nahe der Küste weniger Gefahr liefen zu stranden, als so schwere Segelschiffe, wie es der Benbow und der Mokaddemé waren. Dieser 6. Punkt ist übrigens der mindest befremdende, denn damals hatte man von der Verwendbarkeit der Dampfer zum Gefechte eine sehr geringe Meinung oder auch vielleicht noch gar keine Meinung. Selbst Napier sprach sich noch 1854 öffentlich dahin aus, dass sich die Dampfer erst noch zu bewähren hätten, und die Besorgniss, dass der Maschine irgend etwas geschehen könne, mag Stopford nicht wenig dazu veranlasst haben, seine Dampfer in einem Seeraum aufzustellen, der so gross ist, dass sie nach jedem Schuss einen anderen Aufstellungsplatz nehmen und durch

diese Veränderlichkeit vom Feinde nicht so gut aufs Korn genommen werden konnten. Endlich

7. dass Stopford seine Flagge auf der Princess Charlotte ~~lies~~ für seine Person mit dem Phönix herumfuhr. Er hatte zwar ~~noch~~ vor dem Gefecht bekannt geben lassen, dass alle Signale vom Phönix gegeben werden, aber gleichwohl hätte dies bei der Gewohnheit der Seeleute, den Admiral dort zu vermuthen, wo seine Flagge aufgehängt ist, leicht zu Irrungen und auch zu dem Verdachte Anlass geben können, als ob Stopford nicht auf jenem Schiffe bleiben wolle, wo der Feind die Anwesenheit des obersten Befehlshabers vermuthen könne. Bei der bekannten Tapferkeit aller englischen Seeleute, also auch Stopford's, glauben wir übrigens, dass die Flagge auf der Princess Charlotte ~~zu~~ aus Versehen zurückgeblieben ist, und dass Stopford den Phönix ~~zu~~ deswegen bestieg, um, da dieser ein Dampfer war, wo es Noth thut, schneller als mit der Princess Charlotte zur Hand zu sein.

Gehen wir sofort zu den Divisions-Commandanten über, so ~~findet~~ wir zuerst dass, als schon der Befehl zum Einfahren gegeben und alle Schiffe in Bewegung waren, Napier's Schiff wegen einer Unordnung an dem Ankertau eine lange Zeit nicht von der Stelle kommen konnte, und dass Stopford, dies bemerkend und begreiflicher Weise ungeduldig werdend, gleich Befehle erliess, die zwar durch das Eintreten dieses Missgeschickes gerechtfertigt waren, ansonst aber nicht wenig dazu beigetragen haben, um die Fehlerhaftigkeit der ganzen Angriffsart der ersten Division zu vermehren. Die nähere Beschreibung dieser Unordnung hat Napier in seinem Werke „*The War in Syria*“ in der seemannischen Ausdrucksweise selbst geliefert, und fügen wir hier die wortgetreue Uebersetzung bei, welche wir der Gefälligkeit des Herrn Schiffsleutnants v. Mariassy verdanken:

„Unser Springtau war unklar angebracht: es war nämlich innerwärts ausgeschädelt, lief durch die Achter-Stückpforten entlang der Länge des Schiffes in die Klüse, wo es wieder eingeschädelt wurde: die Bugt blieb an Bord. Ich gab Befehl, diese Unzukömmlichkeit zu beseitigen, und ging an Bord des Flaggenschiffes, wohin ich mit Signal gerufen war. In dieser Zeit blies der Wind von Süden.¹ Der Admiral machte Signal zum Ankerlichten; als ich bugschiffs vom Powerful kam, sah ich zu meinem Verdruss, dass die Leute in der Absicht, das Versehen beim Springtau gut zu machen, das ganze aufgeschossene Springtau durch die Klüse schlüpfen liessen, so dass das Gewicht des Kabels beinahe den Anker vom Bug herunterriss. Ich beorderte alle Leute in die Batterie, um das schlaff hängende Kabel einzuwinden, doch blieben alle Versuche ohne Erfolg. Während dies am Bord des Powerful geschah, lichtete die Flotte ihre Anker, und ich war gezwungen, das Kabel seinem Schicksal zu überlassen. Kaum hatte ich jedoch damit begonnen, als die Sorrgung des Ankers nachgab und das Schiff vor dem Achtertheil zu

¹ Recte Südwest.

liegen kam; es blieb mir nichts übrig, als das Kabel zu kappen und den Stromanker klar zu machen, mit welchem ein Schiff gewiss unsicher vor einer Batterie zu liegen kommt. Ich glaube kaum während meiner ganzen Dienstzeit mich je so geärgert zu haben. Die ganze Flotte lichtete ihre Anker, während der Powerful ruhig vor Anker lag, ohne dass Jemand ausser uns den triftigen Grund hievon gekannt hätte, und dazu noch zu einer Zeit, wo kein Augenblick zu verlieren war. Glücklicherweise starb der Wind ab und gab uns Zeit, unseren Stromanker klar zu machen.“

Da Napier schon seit Beginn des Krieges den Powerful commandirte, so blieb er für die Nachlässigkeit verantwortlich, welche sich seine Schiffsmannschaft hat zu Schulden kommen lassen, und welche gerade in diesem wichtigsten Augenblicke zu einer so entsetzlichen Unordnung geführt hat. Wenn er ferner trotz des erhaltenen Befehles, von Süden einzufahren, von Norden einfuhr, so war diess allerdings ein gegen die Disciplin verstossender Act, aber der Umstand, dass der Wind in der Richtung von Nordwest umsprang, und dass das Einfahren von Norden her das militärisch Richtige war, muss ihn vollkommen rechtfertigen. Nicht so ist dies möglich bezüglich seines Verhältnisses zu den übrigen Commandanten seiner Division, denn da ihm schon einmal diese ganze Division von Stopford zugewiesen worden war, so hätte er die Commandanten kurz vor dem Angriff versammeln und instruiren sollen, wie sich zu benehmen sei, und bei dieser Gelegenheit wären dann sicher jene Befehle zur Sprache gekommen, welche Stopford den Commandanten vorher direct gegeben hatte. So aber ging Napier in die Schlacht, ohne seine Untergebenen instruirt zu haben und ohne zu wissen, dass sie specielle Verhaltensbefehle in der Tasche hatten. Ganz sachgemäss dachte Napier gleich nach Passirung der nordwestlichen Bastion zu ankern, in der Wirklichkeit ankerte er aber seinem Grundsatz entgegen, wahrscheinlich in Folge einer optischen Täuschung, vor der Mitte der Curtine, daher zog er zu viel Feuer auf sich, und die letzten Schiffe gelangten nicht gehörig vor die Küstenbatterien.

Collier, der das Führerschiff commandirte, beging wieder, vielleicht aus zu grosser Tapferkeit, den Fehler, dass er zu spät (zu nahe am Lande) ankerte, daher zwischen dem Castor und dem Lande nicht genug Platz blieb, um ausser Hazard, Edinburgh, Benbow, Wasp und Mokaddemé auch noch die Fregatten Carysfort und Talbot und die drei österreichischen Schiffe einfahren zu lassen. Auch war die Aufstellung seiner Schiffe in gewisser Beziehung eine für den vorliegenden Fall unzweckmässige. Da nämlich Collier bestimmt wusste, dass sein rechter Flügel an die Küste sich anlegen musste, so wäre es besser gewesen, alle kleineren Schiffe auf diesem Flügel aufzustellen, wo sie wegen ihres geringeren Tiefganges leichter manövriren konnten, als die Linienschiffe Benbow, Edinburgh und Mokaddemé. Die Aufstellung des Wasp lässt übrigens vermuthen, dass Collier daran dachte, den rechten Flügel mit einem kleineren Schiffe zu besetzen, und dass es nur der kühne Walker war, welcher, als er noch Platz fand, sich mit seinem Linienschiff vorwagte.

Bandiera¹ konnte unter den obwaltenden Umständen füglich keine andere Stellung nehmen als diejenige, die er einnahm, und weil seine Schiffe in der Qualität nicht viel differirten, so war es auch gleichgültig, in welcher Ordnung sie aufeinander folgten. Da übrigens zwei der österreichischen Schiffe in der Verlängerung der Westfront lagen, so mussten sie durch ihr enfilirendes Feuer und bei dem Mangel an Traversen auf jener Front viel dazu beigetragen haben, um den Angriff der 1. Division zu erleichtern. Nach dem Gefechte konnte sich Bandiera nicht erhalten, dem Oberst Smith, der zur Zeit des Kriegs Rathes nur einen Landangriff nach den Regeln der Kriegskunst für erfolgreich hielt, zu bemerken: „*Eh bien, nous avons pris Acre malgré les règles!*“ Es lässt sich nicht leugnen, dass dieser Ausspruch des österreichischen Admirals, insofern man unter „*règles*“ jene eines Landangriffes versteht, mit Bezug auf den Erfolg seine Richtigkeit hatte; aber zu beachten ist doch dabei, dass die Tags darauf erfolgte Einnahme hauptsächlich dadurch erleichtert wurde, dass das grosse Pulvermagazin in die Luft flog, und dass in Folge dessen die Besatzung abzog.

Was nun das Benehmen der Egyptier anbelangt, so liegen zu wenig Daten vor, um darüber eingehend zu urtheilen. So viel ist aber gewiss, dass die Artilleristen zu spät in die Batterien kamen, und dass sie sehr schlecht schossen, denn die grösste Zahl der Kugeln ging zu hoch (die Lipsia erhielt nicht einen einzigen Schuss). Auch scheinen sie keine glühenden Kugeln angewendet zu haben, da es nicht bekannt ist, dass auf irgend einem Schiff Feuer ausgebrochen wäre, oder dass man bei der späteren Besitzergreifung von Acre einen Kugelglühofen gefunden hätte. Lobenswerther war ihr Benehmen in den Tagen vor der Action, denn die egyptischen Batterien wurden von den früher vor Acre gestandenen Schiffen zu verschiedenen Malen in der Absicht harcelirt, um die Tragweite und den Caliber der Küstengeschütze in Erfahrung zu bringen. Aber die Egyptier antworteten nicht ein einziges Mal, und so ereignete es sich, dass die Verbündeten erst zur Zeit des Gefechtes dasjenige in Erfahrung brachten, was sie schon früher wissen wollten. Commandanten von Küstenwerken sollten sich diese Conduite der Egyptier möglichst zum Muster nehmen, da sie auf diese Art dem Feinde die Leistungsfähigkeit der eigenen Artillerie verborgen halten. Die Explosion des grossen Pulvermagazins,² nach den Muthmassungen der Engländer von einem Hohlgeschoss des Castor herrührend, muss allerdings einen grossen Schrecken hervorgebracht haben, da nicht allein eine lange Strecke der inneren Umfassung dadurch einfiel, sondern auch in der äusseren Umfassung eine Lücke entstand. Aber desswegen war es noch nicht nöthig den Platz zu räumen, denn der Commandant hatte

¹ Derselbe, als vorzüglicher Seemann bekannt, war am 24. Mai 1785 geboren und starb am 16. September 1847 als Contre-Admiral in Pension.

² Dasselbe war bloss mit einem dünnen Ziegelgewölbe überdeckt, welches nach Aussage des Oberst Schulz 18“, nach Aussage des Civil-Ingenieurs Valon aber nur 9“ zur Dicke hatte. Auch behauptete letzterer, dass Thüren und Fenster gar nicht versichert waren.

noch immer so viel Infanterie übrig, um jene Breschen zu vertheidigen, welche die Verbündeten Tags darauf auf der Seeseite gelegt hätten, und die Verbündeten hätten aus dieser Ursache nur mit Landungsbooten sich nähern können, welche durch die auf der Ringmauer stehende Infanterie leicht beschossen werden konnten. Was aber die durch die Explosion des Pulvermagazins hervorgebrachten Zerstörungen an den Umfassungen anbelangt, so hatte vorläufig nur die Lücke in der äusseren Umfassung einige Bedeutung, und selbst diese durfte keine grosse Besorgniss erregen, weil sie von zwei Seiten flankirt werden konnte und hinter dem Ravelin lag. Auch hätten die Verbündeten zu diesem Behufe erst einen Landangriff vornehmen müssen, der gegenüber den Festungscalibern mit blossem Feldgeschütz schwer durchzuführen gewesen wäre. Nichts destoweniger mag man aus diesem den Egyptiern zugezogenen Unfälle die Lehre ziehen, dass Pulvermagazine stets in der vollkommensten Weise gegen feindliche Geschosse sicher gestellt werden müssen, um nicht durch ihre Explosion einem bestürzten Festungs-Commandanten einen vielleicht sogar willkommenen Anlass zur Räumung der Festung zu geben.

Die in wenigen Stunden erfolgte Demontirung der Küstenbatterien verbreitete bei dem grossen europäischen Publikum, welches seit den Kriegen gegen das französische Kaiserreich keinen ersten Kampf zwischen Schiffen und Küstenbatterien erlebt hatte, die Meinung, dass Küstenbatterien, selbst wenn sie zahlreich armirt sind, dem Feuer der Schiffe nicht widerstehen können, eine Meinung, welche selbst die erfolglose Beschiessung der seeseitigen Werke Sebastopols 1854 nicht paralyisiren konnte. Man vergass aber dabei zu berücksichtigen: 1. dass die egyptischen Batterien keine sehr beherrschende Lage hatten¹ und schlecht oder auch gar nicht traversirt waren; 2. dass ihre Brustwehren und Escarpen ganz aus Mauerwerk bestanden und bis zum Fusse sichtbar waren, und dass sich dicht hinter den Geschützständen der Westfront eine alte Ringmauer befand, deren Steinsplitter gegen die Geschützstände flogen; 3. dass die egyptischen Caliber den feindlichen nicht überlegen waren (die Verbündeten hatten sehr viele 32- und 36-Pfünder, während die stärksten Caliber der Egyptier, die 32-Pfünder, nur in geringer Zahl vorhanden waren; auch hatten die Verbündeten 24 und die Egyptier nur 14 Paixhans); 4. dass die Egyptier sehr schlecht schossen, wie dies aus dem geringen Verlust der Verbündeten und aus der geringen Grösse des Schadens an den Schiffen hervorgeht; 5. dass die Egyptier sehr wahrscheinlich gar keine glühenden Kugeln gebraucht, oder dass, wenn sie es thaten, die Kugeln nicht genug glühend waren; 6. dass Ismael Bei gegen 1 Uhr die Artilleristen von den Batterien weg in die Kasernen schickte, um die dort bereit stehende Mittagskost einzunehmen, weil er in jener Stunde nicht mehr einen Angriff der Verbündeten, noch im Laufe des 3. November erwartete; das nach-

¹ Der Wallgang befand sich durchschnittlich nur 23' über dem Meeresspiegel. Es ragt aber schon ein Zweidecker 28' und ein Dreidecker 35' mit dem Schiffskörper über Wasser!

liegende Saumein der Letzte in den Batterien war; dannen her später theils unvollständig: 7. dass die Verbündeten, weil ihnen zu Acre eine Batterie fehlte, um die Stellung der 2. Division zu sichern, den Platz umfassend anzugreifen und vier Batterien im Rücken nehmen könnten: 8. dass endlich die See nicht bewegt war.

Der Glaube an die Unwiderstehlichkeit der Schiffsgeschütze ist nach dem syrischen Kriege eine neue Bestätigung in dem von den Franzosen später unternommenen Beschussungen von Tanger, Mogor und St. Juan de Ulúa; doch vergass man, dass auch bei diesen Beschießungen ähnliche Verhältnisse wie bei Acre vorgekommen sind, während das Beispiel von Traste, 1850, wo das Dampfkrüseneschiff *Napoleon* (wa einer kleinen österreichischen Küstenbatterie¹ gleich nach den ersten Schüssen zum Weichen gebracht wurde (es musste nach Antra zu Ausbesserung kommen), sowie das Beispiel der erfolglosen Beschussung einer Erdbatterie an der Po-Mündung durch die Dampfregate *Impetieuse*, 1850, theils unbekannt blieben, theils zu klein waren, um das Publikum eines Bessern zu belehren. Selbst das schon früher erwähnte Beispiel von Sebastopol konnte die herrschende Meinung nicht ändern, was zum Theil darin seinen Grund fand, dass man diesen Angriff nur als eine Demonstration betrachtete. Hiernach bedurfte es erst des nordamerikanischen Krieges, wo der Angreifer sogar mit Panzerschiffen auftrat, um zu beweisen, wie es lediglich von den Umständen abhängig bleibe, auf wessen Seite der Vortheil ist; denn während der Angriff auf *Mobile* gelang, misslang gänzlich jener, bei welchem *Charleston* nur von den Schiffen angegriffen wurde. Der obenerwähnte Glaube an die Unwiderstehlichkeit der Schiffsgeschütze fand übrigens bei den Beispielen von Acre dadurch die meiste Bestärkung, dass der Platz wenig Stunden nach der Demontirung der Küstenbatterien ohne Schwerekräft in die Hände der Verbündeten fiel. Aber hieran war wohl nicht allein das Demontiren der Küstenbatterien, sondern, wie bereits erwähnt, weit mehr das Auffliegen des Pulvermagazins und der Umstand Schuld, dass der Festungs-Commandant darüber den Kopf verlor; denn mit der Infanterie hätte er, so wie es bei Tartus geschehen, noch immer sich vertheidigen können, und wer weiss, ob dann die Verbündeten nicht hätten das Weite suchen müssen? Der kriegserfahrene Herzog von Wellington hatte, wenn später von Acre gesprochen wurde, jedesmal die Bemerkung gemacht, dass ein solcher Fall nicht als allgemeine Regel dienen kann. Wie dem auch immer sein mochte, so ist der am 3. November 1840 stattgefundene Kampf um Acre jedenfalls in negativer Beziehung ein sehr interessanter, denn er lehrt dem Genie-Officier, wie er nicht befestigen, und dem Marine-Officier, wie er nicht angreifen soll.

Noch am Morgen des 4. November kam *Napier* an Bord des *Phoenix* (wo sich noch immer der Admiral befand), um zu der Einnahme von Acre Glück zu wünschen. Als aber *Napier* die Hoffnung ausgesprochen

¹ Diese Batterie war durch die Küsten-Artillerie und durch Mannschaft des Infanterie-Regimentes Br. Mamula Nr. 25 bedient.

hatte, dass Stopford mit der von ihm eingenommenen Stellung wohl zufrieden gewesen sein durfte, antwortete Stopford in barschem Tone: „nicht im mindesten (*not at all*), Sie hätten sich vor der Südwestbastion aufstellen sollen!“ Diese einem Verweise gleichkommende Antwort veranlasste den im höchsten Grade sich gekränkt fühlenden Napier, nachdem er sich entfernt hatte, um die Aufstellung eines Kriegsgerichts zu bitten, und, als diess verweigert wurde, schrieb Napier einen Brief an die in London residirende Admiralität, bittend, dass die Sache untersucht werde. Seine Cameraden bewogen ihn aber, den Brief nicht abzusenden, was er nach langem Zögern unter der Bedingung einzugehen versprach, dass Stopford die Sache brieflich beilege. Die Cameraden schienen nun bei Stopford Schritte gethan zu haben, denn noch am 6. November liess sich dieser in versöhnlicher Weise herbei, an Napier einen Brief des Inhaltes zu schreiben, dass mit jener Antwort keineswegs die Ertheilung eines Verweises verbunden war. So endigte zwar nach vielem Reden und Schreiben diese unliebsame Angelegenheit, doch hatte sie vorläufig gleich zur Folge, dass Stopford in seinen Berichten an Lord Palmerston und an die Admiralität seines unternehmenden Commodore, der doch unstreitig dadurch ein grosses Verdienst hatte, dass der Boxer'sche Plan verworfen wurde, gar nicht erwähnte. Napier konnte sich dabei mit seinem Collegen Collier trösten, von dem ebenfalls keine Erwähnung gemacht wurde, denn Stopford beschränkte sich dabei bezüglich der englischen Officiere die guten Dienste hervorzuheben, welche die früher mit der Peilung betrauten Capitäne Boxer und Codrington, dann sein Schwager, der Capitän Fanshawe des eigenen Flaggen-schiffes und der Flaggenlieutenant Granville geleistet haben. Am Ende eines dieser Berichte (jenes vom 5.) wird auch des Oberst Smith Erwähnung gethan und bemerkt, dass er bestrebt ist, Acre in Vertheidigungszustand zu setzen, und dass seine Genesung ihm erlaube, dem Dienst mit der gewohnten Einsicht obzuliegen. Napier konnte sich übrigens in gewisser Beziehung sogar mit dem Erzherzog Friedrich trösten, da Stopford in einem Schreiben vom 5. November an Bandiera förmlich rügt, dass der Erzherzog, ohne von Smith autorisirt zu sein, in Acre eingedrungen sei! Es bedarf aber keiner Rechtfertigung des Erzherzogs, da dieser mit Bewilligung Bandiera's, als seines unmittelbaren Vorgesetzten, landete.

Einen grösseren Verlust als während der Beschiessung erlitten die Verbündeten am 6. November, als plötzlich an der Stelle der ersten Explosion eine zweite erfolgte, wobei an 200 Mann Engländer und Türken getödtet oder verwundet wurden, der brave Collier ein Bein verlor, und die nahe gelegenen Schiffe Castor und Wasp solche Schäden erlitten, dass sie zur Reparatur nach Malta geschickt werden mussten. Da an der Explosionsstelle seit dem 3. November fortwährend Rauch aufgestiegen war, so gab man sich der Vermuthung hin, dass vielleicht ein abgesonderter Magazinsraum übrig geblieben war, welcher durch das glühende Holz und das Nachexplodiren von Hohlkörpern erst

später Feuer fing.¹ Zu diesem Unfalle kam gleich noch ein zweiter. Wahrscheinlich in der Absicht zu plündern, waren zahlreiche Schaaren von Bauern vom Lande in die Stadt gedrungen, und die türkischen Truppen erhielten den Befehl, dieselben hinauszutreiben. Als diess vor sich ging und die Bauern mit grosser Eile zu den Thoren hinausstoben, verbreitete sich die Meinung, dass noch eine Explosion erfolgen müsste. In Folge dessen ein Theil der Besatzung gegen den Hafen stürzte, um an Bord der Schiffe Schutz zu suchen. Da nun die am Ufer liegenden Boote nicht alle Leute fassen konnten, so fielen viele derselben bis über den Kopf in's Wasser oder verwundeten sich wechselseitig. Wenn auch dieses ganze Ereigniss ziemlich unblutig, ja selbst komisch abließ, so dient es doch als Beweis, wie übel die Besorgniss, dass noch eine Mine losgehen könnte, selbst auf eine tapfere und siegreiche Truppe einwirken kann. Merkwürdig bleibt es übrigens, dass am 12. Januar 1841, also zwei Monate später, an der nämlichen Stelle eine dritte Explosion vorkam, die noch so stark war, dass ein in der Nähe befindlicher Thurm in Folge der dadurch erlittenen Schäden abgetragen werden musste.

Die Einnahme von Acre hatte für die Verbündeten nicht bloss die schon früher erwähnten localen Vortheile, denn schnell verbreitete sich die Nachricht davon im ganzen Lande, und es erfolgte ein Aufstand der Eingeborenen, welche Jerusalem und Jaffa in Besitz nahmen, nachdem sie einen Theil der Besatzung niedergemacht hatten. Ganz Palästina und die Beduinen erklärten sich für den Sultan, und Mehemet Ali, schon durch frühere Hiobsposten geschreckt, gerieth in eine solche Bestürzung, dass er an Ibrahim den Befehl schickte, Syrien zu räumen. Stopford, statt sich die günstige Wendung der Dinge zu Nutzen zu machen, glaubte jetzt genug gethan zu haben und seine alten Rückzugspläne wieder aufnehmen zu können. In Acre die mitgebrachten türkischen Truppen unter Selim und vor diesem Platze den Pique und Zebra zurücklassend, sammelte er den grössten Theil der Schiffe, darunter auch die *Medea*, *Guerriera* und *Lipsia*, wieder vor Beirut. Von dort aus sandte er am 15. November Napier mit dem *Powerful* zur Uebernahme des Befehles über das Blockadegeschwader von Alexandria, welches nun aus den Schiffen *Powerful*, *Revenge*, *Ganges*, *Carysfort* und aus den neu hinzugekommenen Linienschiffen *Rodney*, *Vanguard* und *Cambridge* und aus dem englischen Dampfer *Medea* bestand, während die früher dort vor Anker gewesenen Schiffe nach anderen Stationen des Mittelmeeres zurückgegangen waren. Diese Absendung Napier's nach Alexandria findet, wie bereits erwähnt, zunächst ihren Grund in der gegen denselben vor Acre entstandenen Misstimmung, während sie für Napier wieder die Folge hatte, dass er, sich auf einmal selbständig fühlend, mit Mehemet Ali eine diplomatische Unterhandlung eingieng, wozu er von Stopford

¹ Das Nachexplodiren von Hohlkörpern ist eine Erscheinung, welche auch bei den Explosionen zu Temes-var 1851 und zu Mainz 1857 vorkam.

nicht im mindesten autorisirt war. Napier gibt zwar an, dass er diese Unterhandlung nur in der Besorgniss eingeleitet habe, dass die Flotte durch die Winterstürme von der Küste abgetrieben werden könnte. Aber nicht allein, dass dies mit den in einem Briefe an Lord Minto gemachten Aeusserungen in vollem Widerspruch steht, so scheint es in der Wirklichkeit, dass er, da es an der syrischen Küste für ihn keine Arbeit mehr gab, irgend etwas thun wollte, um nicht müssig vor Alexandria zu liegen und mit dem Blockiren einen Dienst zu versehen, welcher für jede Marine nicht allein höchst langweilig, sondern auch wegen des Respectirens der neutralen Schiffe mit vielen Unannehmlichkeiten verbunden ist. Von diesen Gedanken geleitet, schloss daher Napier auf eigene Faust hin mit Mehemet Ali am 27. November eine Convention ab, laut welcher derselbe die türkische Flotte herausgeben und Syrien räumen sollte, wogegen die Verbündeten alle Feindseligkeiten einzustellen hätten, und Mehemet Ali erblicher Pascha von Egypten bleiben würde. Tags darauf schickte Napier eine Abschrift dieser Convention mittelst des am 27. November angekommenen Prometheus an Stopford nach Beirut, und eine andere mittelst des Dampfers Medea direct an Lord Ponsonby und die Admiralität in London, ein Vorgang, zu dem er, da Stopford noch immer der Oberbefehlshaber war, ebenfalls gar kein Recht hatte. Am 28. November erhob sich ein starker Sturm, bei welchem drei der Linienschiffe nicht unbedeutenden Schaden erlitten. Das schlechte Wetter und der Glaube, dass die Convention sicherlich angenommen werde und in Folge dessen nichts mehr zu thun sei, bewogen Napier nach Marmarizza zurückzukehren, allwo er am 8. December eintraf; ein Vorgang, der wieder durchaus nicht gerechtfertigt, sogar ein arger Verstoß gegen die Disciplin war, da er von Stopford noch nicht den entferntesten Befehl erhalten hatte, die Blockade von Alexandria aufzuheben.

In Marmarizza war schon der Gorgon angekommen, und vom Capitän desselben erfuhr Napier, dass Stopford die Convention verworfen hatte. Am 9. December kamen Princess Charlotte (mit Stopford an Bord) und Bellerophon, und in den folgenden Tagen der grösste Theil der übrigen englischen Schiffe nebst der österreichischen Escadre;¹ die französischen Kriegsschiffe aber, welche mittlerweile in der Stärke von drei Linienschiffen, einer Corvette und zwei Briggs² zur Beobachtung gekommen waren, dann die Hecate und ein anderer Dampfer (letzterer zur Bewachung des Wrack des Zebra in Acre) blieben an der syrischen Küste, ein Beweis, dass es auch für die übrigen Schiffe der Verbündeten möglich gewesen wäre, an dieser Küste zu bleiben, wenn auch mit etwas Ungemach; denn der Sturm, den Napier vor Alexandria erlebte, hatte auch an der syrischen Küste getobt, wo der Pique

¹ Die Guerriera wurde unterwegs in der Nacht vom 9. zum 10. November zwei Male vom Blitze getroffen, wobei ein Mann getödtet und ein Mann verwundet wurde.

² Brief des General Michell de dato Acre 31. December 1840 an Lord Palmerston (sich Napier's "War in Syria" 2. Theil, Seite 106).

bei Caiffa und die Lipsia bei Beirut, um nicht zu stranden, genöthigt waren ihre Masten zu kappen, während der Zebra bei Acre mit dem Verlust von zwei Mann scheiterte und der ebendasselbst befindliche Wasq die Kanonen über Bord werfen musste. Napier selbst hatte noch am 14. November, als er von seiner Absendung nach Alexandria noch nicht bestimmtes wusste, vielmehr von einem Angriff des in Zachleh stehenden Ibrahim träumte, an Lord Minto von Beirut aus geschrieben: „Ich hoffe dass der Admiral (Stopford) die Küste nicht verlassen werde; der Ankerplatz auf der Rhede von Beirut ist zwar ganz offen, aber der Ankergrund ist sehr gut, die syrischen Schiffe bleiben den ganzen Winter da; desshalb ist keine Ursache vorhanden, warum nicht auch eine Flotte dort bleiben solle. *It never blows home!*“ Nur auf vieles Drängen des General Jochmus schickte später Stopford den Benbow und Hazard nach der syrischen Küste zurück, welche am 24. December dort ankamen, und trotz dieser Verstärkung sehen wir hier den merkwürdigen Fall, dass eine scheinbar wenigstens ganz neutrale Macht, d. i. Frankreich, seitdem Stopford nach Marmarizza segelte, an der syrischen Küste bis zu Ende des Krieges mehr Kriegsschiffe aufgestellt hatte, als die Verbündeten, die in den syrischen Krieg verwickelt waren. Lassen wir nun das Gros der Flotte der Verbündeten in Marmarizza, und kehren wir unter Vorbehalt einer weiteren Erzählung der Napier'schen Conventionsgeschichte auf den eigentlichen Kriegsschauplatz zurück.

Nach dem Falle von Acre hatte sich Ibrahim nach Damaskus zurückgezogen und sich dort am 27 November mit jenen Truppen vereinigt, welche ihm Ahmed Menikli zuführte. Dieser stand die ganze Zeit im nördlichen Syrien mit dem Hauptquartier in Aleppo, fühlte sich aber in Folge der Desertion der in seinem Corps dienenden Syrer sehr geschwächt, dass er genöthigt war sich zurückzuziehen, um bei etwaigem Vordringen der Verbündeten über Zachleh nicht abgeschnitten zu werden. Kaum dass Menikli das nördliche Syrien verlassen hatte, erklärte sich auch dieser Theil des Landes für den Sultan, und es kam jetzt Seitens der Verbündeten nur darauf an, energisch gegen die Rückzugslinie Ibrahim's zu wirken und diesen so in die Enge zu treiben, dass er zur Waffenstreckung genöthigt werde. Sie konnten dies jetzt um so leichter thun, als sie durch die mittlerweile am 9. November beendigten Nachschübe an 20,000 Mann mit 30 Feldgeschützen zur Verfügung hatten. Freilich zählte Ibrahim's Heer nach der Vereinigung mit den Truppen, die Menikli zugeführt hatte, noch immer 40,000 Mann mit 150 Feldgeschützen, aber dieses Heer war bedeutend demoralisirt, und in Damaskus eiferte die türkische Geistlichkeit so sehr gegen die Egyptier, dass sich Ibrahim in seinem eigenen Hauptquartier nicht mehr sicher fühlte. Sogar der egyptische Civil-Gouverneur, von den Ulemas überredet, erregte solchen Verdacht, dass ihn Ibrahim verhaften liess.

Zum Glück für den egyptischen Feldherrn hatten die Verbündeten seit dem Fall von Acre gar nichts gethan. Statt ihn, wie es Napier und Jochmus vorgeschlagen hatten, noch in Zachleh im Verein mit den Bergbewohnern anzugreifen, wie es auch von den Lords Palmerston und Ponsobny

dringend empfohlen wurde, liessen sie ihn ganz ruhig weiter ziehen. Ja sie setzten sich selbst einer grossen Gefahr aus, als die Flotte anfangs December die syrische Küste verliess, wo ihre Streitkräfte (darunter 300 Mann der englischen und 200 Mann der österreichischen Marine-Infanterie) in sieben verschiedenen Plätzen: Tripolis, Beirut, Saida, Tyrus, Acre, Jaffa und Jerusalem,¹ vertheilt waren. Zudem zeigte sich der in Beirut zur Leitung der Operationen zurückgelassene Oberst Smith so wenig geeignet, dass man dies endlich selbst in Constantinopel ein- sah, ihn zurückberief und den General Jochmus an seine Stelle setzte. Smith gieng, ohne irgend welche Uebergabe zu pflegen, am 15. Decem- ber von Beirut weg, und da Stopford den Befehl, welcher die Ersetz- ung Smith's durch Jochmus enthielt, sonderbarer Weise nicht verlaublich hatte, so kam der merkwürdige Fall zum Vorschein, dass die in Syrien befindlichen, von der Flotte fast gänzlich verlassenen Landkräfte vom 15. December an durch mehrere Tage ohne obersten Führer waren. Dies hätte von um so grösserem Nachtheil werden können, als sich jetzt Izzet Pascha den Oberbefehl anmasste, und seine schlechte Civilverwalt- ung unter den syrischen Stämmen, besonders unter den Bewohnern des Libanon, eine im beständigen Wachsen befindliche Misstimmung her- vorgerufen hatte.² Die daraus für die Sache des Sultans entstehende Gefahr erkennend, hatten es Jochmus und Wood unternommen, in Con- stantinopel triftige, auch durch die damals in Beirut befindlichen General- Consuln von Cairo bestätigte Vorstellungen zu machen, deren Folge war, dass Stopford den schon früher erhaltenen Befehl publiciren musste. So wurde Jochmus auf die Verwendung Lord Ponsonby's hin nach schon am 12. October erfolgter Beförderung zum Ferik³ (Pascha von zwei Rosschweiften d. i. General-Lieutenant) als Oberbefehlshaber sämtlicher Truppen proclamirt, während der englische General Michell speziell den Befehl über die in Syrien verbliebene englische Marine-Infanterie er- hielt. Ungeachtet dessen wollte Izzet Pascha noch immer die Land- operationen leiten, und nur die Drohung des General-Lieutenants Jochmus,

¹ Jaffa und Jerusalem wurden am 28. November von türkischen Truppen in der Gesamtstärke von 2000 Mann besetzt.

² Wie Izzet Pascha Recht sprach, davon gibt folgende Geschichte Zeugniß: Omer Bei hatte sich noch vor dem Gefechte von Boharsof drei prächtige arabische Pferde zugeeignet, welche den für die Sache des Sultans aufgestandenen Drusen- Chefs gehörten. Da diese Zueignung erst längere Zeit nach jenem Gefechte bekannt wurde, und Omer Bei in Folge dessen vor ein Kriegsgericht gestellt wurde, so war er nahe daran, der Beförderung für welche er gleich nach dem Gefechte von Boharsof vorgeschlagen worden war, verlustig zu werden, und schon war aus Con- stantinopel das Generalspatent mit der dazu gehörigen Decoration eingetroffen. Um allen Rechens vorzugehen, liess sich Izzet Pascha als Präses dieses Kriegsgerichtes vorher das *corpus delicti*, bestehend aus jenen drei Pferden, vorführen. Aber kaum dass er sie gesehen hatte, liess er Gnade für Recht ergehen, denn nicht allein dass er den Omer Bei von aller Anschuldigung frei sprach, so gab er ihm sogar das Generalspatent mit der dazu gehörigen Decoration und noch aus dem eigenen Stall drei freilich sehr schlechte Pferde, jene drei schönen arabischen Pferde behielt aber Izzet für sich (vgl. Vol. I, p. 43 Note).

³ Jochmus ist der erste Christ, dem diese Würde verliehen wurde.

sich nach Constantinopel einzuschiffen, und die Bemühungen Wood's brachten den einflussreichen Türken¹ dahin, von seinem Begehren abzustehen. Dazu traf ihn am 24. December die Weisung, dass er durch den Serasker Achmed Zacharias Pascha ersetzt werde. Von nun an gab Izzet vollständig Ruhe, sein Nachfolger traf aber so spät ein, dass er in die militärischen Operationen gar nicht mehr eingreifen konnte: doch wurde seine hohe Würde insoferne respectirt, dass man ihm die Berichte über die Kriegereignisse zuschickte. Unter Jochmus blieben auch fortan Selim und Hassan Pascha, und obwohl diese Muselmänner waren, so ist kein Beispiel von Ungehorsam gegen den christlichen Oberbefehlshaber vorgekommen. Die Sache des Sultans stellte sich jetzt wegen der angegebenen Personalveränderungen entschieden günstiger; denn Stopford, froh in Marmarizza zu sein, kümmerte sich nicht mehr um das was zu Lande vorging. Smith war nach Gibraltar zurückgegangen,² Izzet Pascha war unschädlich gemacht, und der Oberbefehl befand sich in den Händen eines Mannes, dessen Handwerk der Landkrieg war. Jochmus konnte jetzt besonders in seinem neuen türkischen Range als Jochmus Pascha selbstständig auftreten und so, wie es die Lords Ponsonby und Palmerston in verschiedenen Briefen an ihn aussprachen, die energische Fortsetzung des Krieges *„selbst für den Fall in die Hand nehmen, als Stopford dagegen wäre“*.

Mittlerweile hatte auch Ibrahim Massregeln getroffen, theils um dem Befehle seines Vaters zur Räumung Syriens nachzukommen, theils um für seinen Vater günstigere Friedensbedingungen zu erhalten; denn wissen konnte er Ende December schon, dass die mit Napier abgeschlossene Convention verworfen worden war. Zu diesem Behufe wollte er sich auf die Räumung des nördlichen und östlichen Syrien beschränken, Palästina hingegen, wo noch viele Mundvorräthe lagen, festhalten. Die Brücke bei Madjuma, wo die Caravanenstrasse von Damascus nach Egypten den Jordan übersetzt, liess er sicher stellen, und durch Bestechung der Scheiks im nördlichen Palästina suchte er sich auf dem Lande Ruhe zu verschaffen, während ein Complot erdacht wurde, um den Pulverthurm von Acre in die Luft zu sprengen und auf solche Art die Wiedereinnahme dieses Platzes zu ermöglichen. Ibrahim hätte sich dann nordwärts bloss in der Strecke von Acre bis zum Tiberiassee zu vertheidigen gebraucht, während er von der Seeseite, da Stopford abgezogen war, gar nichts zu fürchten hatte, und die schwach besetzten Plätze Jaffa und Jerusalem von selbst gefallen wären. Endlich würde ihm für einen solchen Fall die Rückzugslinie nach Egypten ganz offen gestanden sein. Zu solchen Unternehmungen bedurfte es aber immerhin eines energischen Handelns, welches man an Ibrahim seit dem Treffen von Boharsof gänzlich vermisse; denn füglich konnte er zu der

¹ Izzet Pascha wurde später zweimal Grossvezier des Reiches.

² Smith lebte 1842 zu S. Roque bei Gibraltar ganz abgeschieden von seinen Landsleuten, war aber dabei noch immer sehr guten Humors, hatte nur spanische Diener und sprach nur spanisch. So traf ihn Erzherzog Friedrich auf einer Reise an Bord der Fregatte Bellona.

Zeit, wo die Verbündeten Acre angriffen, von Zachleh nach Beirut marschiren, die sowohl dort als in Saida und Tyrus stehenden feindlichen Landtruppen in die See werfen, und dann gleich in Palästina Stellung nehmen. Alle die oben erwähnten neuen Pläne Ibrahim's wurden von der türkischen Geistlichkeit in Damaskus ausspionirt und in das Hauptquartier der Verbündeten berichtet. Es kam nun für diese darauf an, den Einmarsch in Palästina zu hindern, um Ibrahim auf die syrische Pilgerstrasse zu werfen, wo es vorauszusehen war, dass er durch den Aufenthalt in der Wüste vielem Ungemach und grossen Verlusten ausgesetzt werde. Auf jeden Fall musste er zum Abmarsch von Damaskus gezwungen werden. Dies geschah nun theils dadurch dass der türkische Pascha Hadgi Ali mit 8000 Mann von Kleinasien her bis Hamah vordrang, theils dadurch dass Jochmus am 22. December eine allgemeine Vorrückung gegen den Jordan anordnete und die Bewohner südlich von Damaskus zu einer allgemeinen Schilderhebung anfeuerte, in Folge dessen auch der auf der syrischen Pilgerstrasse gelegene Ort El Mezarib am 26. December von türkischen Parteigängern in Besitz genommen wurde. Dadurch sich ernstlich bedroht sehend, marschirte Ibrahim am 29. December von Damaskus ab, anfänglich die Caravanenstrasse nach Jerusalem einschlagend. Da dies offenbar auf einen Marsch durch Palästina hindeutete, so musste sich Jochmus, der mittlerweile sein Hauptquartier nach Hasbeya verlegt hatte, gefasst machen, dem Feinde am Jordan in der Strecke zwischen dem Tiberiassee und dem todten Meere zu begegnen, was aber bei der Ueberlegenheit der Egyptier an Cavallerie und Artillerie (sie hatten noch 9000 Mann Cavallerie und 150 Feldgeschütze, die Verbündeten hingegen nur 600 Mann reguläre Cavallerie und 30 Feldgeschütze) grosse Achtsamkeit erforderte. Jochmus roquirte daher in drei parallelen Colonnen nach Süden, und jede Aufstellung in der Ebene vermeidend, setzte er sich in den naplusischen Bergen mit dem Hauptquartier in Dschenin derart fest, dass Ibrahim, wenn er auch den Jordan überschritten hätte, vor jedem Weitermarsche gezwungen gewesen wäre, seinen Gegner aus dem Felde zu schlagen. Dann aber hätte er von seiner überlegenen Cavallerie, ja selbst von einem grossen Theil seiner Artillerie keinen Gebrauch machen können, und Jochmus hätte eine Schlacht geliefert, welche unter den obwaltenden Umständen und bei der Hilfe, welche die noch immer unter Waffen stehenden Bergbewohner unter dem Emir Cassim leisten konnten, sicher zum Vortheil der Verbündeten ausgefallen wäre.

Am 2. Januar 1841 recognoscirte Ibrahim für seine Person, über Feik vorausgehend, die Gegend am Jordan. Als er die vortheilhafte Stellung des Gegners erkannt hatte, gab er den Rückzug über Palästina auf und schlug die syrische Pilgerstrasse auf dem östlichen Ufer des todten Meeres ein. Von diesem Augenblicke war Ibrahim's Schicksal ziemlich entschieden, denn er hatte nur für 15 Tage Lebensmittel, während der Rückzug durch die Wüste, wo bis Maan hin keine Verpflegsanstalten vorhanden waren, einen Monat beanspruchte. Dadurch gab er auch die in Palästina befindlichen Magazine auf, die, an drei

Millionen Portionen fassend, sämmtlich in die Hände der Verbündeten fielen und diesen vortrefflich zu Statten kamen. Ehe Ibrahim's Heer völlig in die Wüste gelangte, hatte seine Nachhut noch zwei für sie missliche Gefechte zu bestehen, die ihr von der irregulären Cavallerie des Chebli-el-Arian am 6. Januar zu Remtha und von einem Partiegängercorps unter Graf Széchény¹ am 7. Januar zu Jerasch geliefert wurden. Jochmus folgte wohlweislich nicht in die Wüste, sondern roquirte, auf dem rechten Jordanufer bleibend, weiter südwärts bis in die Linie Jaffa-Ramleh-Jerusalem. Trotzdem musste er auf grosser Hut bleiben, denn noch immer hätte Ibrahim den Versuch machen können, mit seinem ganzen Heere umzukehren und den Durchmarsch durch Palästina zu erzwingen.

Auf dem langen Marsche durch die Wüste hatte das ägyptische Heer sowohl durch die heimischen, als auch durch die seit Wochen aus den näheren Wüsten herangezogenen und durch schriftliche Weisungen vorbereiteten Beduinen ausserordentlich viel zu leiden; denn nicht allein dass sie es fast in jeder Nacht allarmirten und alle Nachzügler gefangen nahmen, so stahlen sie auch des Nachts die Pferde und Kamele, was jede in der Wüste mit Gepäck und Proviant marschirende Truppe in eine höchst nachtheilige Lage bringt. Den empfindlichsten Schlag erlitt aber Ibrahim's Heer durch die Zerstörung des grossen Magazins von Maan. Es ist diese That nicht allein in der Idee, sondern auch in der Ausführung eines der glänzendsten Reiterstücke und liefert den Beweis, was selbst eine an Zahl schwache Reitertruppe leisten kann. Maan war nämlich der Ort, wo die ägyptische Regierung jene Cerealien sammelte, welche die weit umher befindlichen Stämme als Tribut abliefern mussten. Selbstverständlich ward es dermalen als Kriegsmagazin angesehen, und da es nach dem Marsche durch die Wüste das erste Magazin war, welches das ägyptische Heer vorfinden konnte, so musste diesem um so mehr zu thun sein, es sobald wie möglich zu erreichen, als daselbst auch noch die Verproviantirung für den weiteren Marsch nach Egypten stattfinden musste. Jochmus, frühzeitig einsehend dass die Zerstörung dieses Magazins dem Gewinne einer Schlacht gleichkommen werde, gedachte nun dies in der Art zu bewerkstelligen, dass hiezu nur ein kleines Detachement Cavallerie verwendet werden sollte, indem es die lange Strecke von 22 Meilen von Jerusalem bis Maan weit leichter zurücklegen könnte als ein grösserer Körper, der schon wegen der Verpflegung auf dem Wege dahin auf manche Schwierigkeiten stossen würde. Auch könnte sich ein kleines Detachement, wenn schon der Feind vorgerückt wäre, leichter durchschleichen als ein grösseres, und im schlimmsten Falle wäre der Verlust eines so kleinen Detachements leichter zu verschmerzen. Jochmus bestimmte hiezu 400 Mann Cavallerie und gab derselben, weil Rittmeister Graf Széchény von jenseits des todten Meeres noch nicht zurückgekehrt und sonst kein ge-

¹ Rittmeister in der österreichischen Armee, machte den Krieg als Volontär mit und starb nach dem Kriege in Damaskus an der Pest.

eigneter Cavallerie-Officier disponibel war, den österreichischen Infanterie-Oberlieutenant Freiherrn Du Mont von Monten¹ als Führer. Dieser brach nun am 10. Januar von Jerusalem auf und musste bei dem Umstande, als er leicht schon auf das ägyptische Heer, insbesondere auf die zahlreiche Cavallerie Menikli's stossen konnte, schnell und doch mit grosser Vorsicht marschiren.

Am 14. Januar gelangte Du Mont nach Maan, und zwar zu einer Zeit wo die erste ägyptische Colonne gerade durchpassirt und die zweite Colonne im Anzuge war. Die dort befindliche sehr kleine Besatzung, bestehend aus 20 Mann mit 4 Geschützen, flüchtete sich, ohne Widerstand zu leisten, und sämtliche Vorräthe wurden theils verbrannt, theils sonstwie vernichtet. Nachdem dies geschehen war, kehrte Du Mont ins Hauptquartier zurück. Allerdings hatte derselbe in Folge der grossen Strapazen, die sein Detachement auf diesem kühnen Zuge durch grösstentheils wüstes Land erleiden musste, viele Pferde eingebüsst, aber dieser Verlust verschwindet gegen jenen, den der Feind durch die Zerstörung des Magazins, von Maan erlitt — es war unter den gegebenen Umständen ein Stich, den Jochmus in's feindliche Herz führte, und Du Mont, die Wichtigkeit der Aufgabe erkennend, überhob sich, das ist sein grösstes Verdienst, jener Aengstlichkeit, welche sich oft als Folge der Verantwortlichkeit für das eigene Material einstellt. Mit dem Verluste von 200 Pferden (so viel mussten auf diesem angestregten Marsche liegen gelassen werden), hatten Jochmus und Du Mont ein Heer, vor dem man noch vier Monate vorher in Constantinopel zitterte, in eine verzweifelte Lage gebracht.

Um diese Zeit war also das Gros der ägyptischen Streitkräfte südlich vom todtten Meere im vollen Rückzuge begriffen, wogegen Ibrahim, mit seiner Garde weit zurückbleibend, den verzweifelten Versuch machen wollte, mitten durch das vom Gegner bereits besetzte Land nach Gaza, als einem Hauptrückzugspunkt des ägyptischen Heeres, zu entkommen. Wirklich überschritt er, während ihn die Verbündeten beim Gros seines Heeres anwesend wähnten, den Jordan und stand am 15. Januar zu Jericho. Auf die erste Nachricht dieses Wiedererscheinens brach sogleich Hassan Pascha mit 12 Bataillonen und 12 Geschützen von Jerusalem auf, um dem tollkühnen Ibrahim die Spitze zu bieten. Als aber dieser die Annäherung des Gegners erfuhr, hielt er wahrscheinlich dessen Aufmerksamkeit für zu gross, um anstandslos zwischen den feindlichen Colonnen durchbrechen zu können. Ibrahim ging daher wieder über den Jordan zurück und suchte eilends auf dem nächsten Wege das Gros seines Heeres zu erreichen. Dies erfolgte aber nicht ohne grosses Ungemach, denn bei Passirung des Jordans, der um diese Zeit sehr angeschwollen war, musste er viele Munition und Lastthiere im Stiche lassen, und bei Kerek musste er sich durch die ihn umzingelnden Beduinen förmlich durchschlagen. War dadurch Ibrahim's Plan auch

¹ Derselbe machte den Krieg in Syrien als Volontär mit und ist jetzt Oberst in Pension.

vereitelt, so hatte er wenigstens für das Gros seines Heeres den Vortheil erreicht, dass die Verbündeten nicht ihre ganze Kraft gegen dasselbe entwickeln konnten. Indessen thaten sie was möglich war, und da es sich unter Einem darum handelte, auch das grosse Magazin in Gaza noch vor Ankunft des egyptischen Heeres zu zerstören, so brach Jochmus, in Anbetracht dass Gaza eine nicht unbedeutende Besatzung unter dem Befehle des von Acre dahin gegangenen Ismail Bei hatte, und durch ein kürzlich aus Egypten gekommenes Corps von 3200 Mann Cavallerie beschützt war, mit der Division des Selim Pascha (10 Bataillone und 10 Geschütze) am 14. Januar von Ramleh in der Richtung auf Aschhod auf und langte am 15. Januar in El Medsched an, wo am selben Tage ein kleines, von Omer Pascha vorausgeschicktes Corps von 150 Mann Infanterie und 1800 Mann irreguläre Cavallerie mit einigen Geschützen eine recognoscirende Abtheilung der Egyptier zurückgeworfen hatte.¹ Da aber ein anhaltender Regen eintrat, so war es zu gewagt, die Unternehmung auf Gaza angesichts der feindlichen Cavallerie fortzusetzen,² und erschien es rätlicher bis zu dem Augenblicke zu warten, wo die zur Beobachtung Ibrahim's nöthige Cavallerie zu Hilfe genommen werden konnte. Ehe noch diese Cavallerie gänzlich herangekommen war, erfuhr man dass Ahmed Menikli mit der ganzen egyptischen Cavallerie sein Lager an demselben Tage schon westlich von Tafila aufgeschlagen hatte, daher vorläufig von einem weiteren Vorgehen um so weniger die Rede sein konnte, als der an der Küste weilende Capitän Stewart unter Vorgabe eigener Verhaltensbefehle jede Mitwirkung verweigerte, und auch am 17. Januar in Jaffa die Abgesandten mit der Nachricht von dem mittlerweile abgeschlossenen Frieden eingetroffen waren. Hassan Pascha, der, weil in Hebron stehend, dem Lager Menikli's zunächst war, machte diesen mit der erhaltenen Nachricht bekannt, worauf Menikli in kleinen Märschen gegen Gaza zog und dort am 21. Januar einrückte. Die übrigen egyptischen Colonnen langten in den folgenden Tagen dort an, Ibrahim aber, von dem seine eigenen Generale lange Zeit nichts wussten, mit den Trümmern seiner Garde, die auch ihre 8 Kanonen verloren hatte, erst am 31. Januar, während der Artilleriepark nebst der Infanterie-Munitionsreserve schon von Maan aus auf die egyptische Pilgerstrasse dirigirt worden war. Auf diesem weiteren Zuge um das todte Meer hatte das egyptische Heer durch

¹ Diesem Gefechte wohnten jene Officiere bei, welche österreichischerseits nachträglich auf den Kriegsschauplatz geschickt worden waren: der Oberstlieutenant Philippovich des S. Georger Grenzregiments und der Major Pott des Generalstabes, dann der Major Trattner von Petrocza und der Hauptmann Ritter von Platzer des Ingenieurcorps; dieselben hatten später einen Plan zur Verstärkung von Acre verfasst.

² Das Unwetter war so stark dass General Michell's alte Wunden wieder aufbrachen und den Tod dieses tapfern Soldaten verursachten. Er starb zu Jaffa am 24. Januar 1841. Michell commandirte um diese Zeit jene englischen und österreichischen Marine-Infanterieabtheilungen, welche von Stopford in den Küstenstädten zurückgelassen und in letzterer Zeit durch kleine Abtheilungen von englischen Artillerie- und Genietruppen verstärkt worden waren.

Hunger und Durst so gelitten, dass eine Menge von Menschen und Thieren zu Grunde gieng, und noch lange nach dem Kriege konnte man an den zurückgebliebenen Skeletten und Heergeräthen die Spur dieses Zuges erkennen. Es kam eine Periode vor, wo durch drei Tage das Wasser fehlte, und in den letzten sieben Tagen fehlte auch jede ordentliche Nahrung. Indessen muss man diesem Heere volle Gerechtigkeit widerfahren lassen, denn unter solchen Umständen einen Marsch von 50 Meilen¹ in 19 Tagen zurückzulegen, würde selbst einer spanischen Infanterie alle Ehre gemacht haben. Man hat übrigens selbst nach dem Kriege nie genau in Erfahrung bringen können, ob Ibrahim schon von El Mezarib aus den festen Plan gehabt hat, die eine Hälfte seines Heeres über Akaba nach Suez und die andere Hälfte über Tafila nach Gaza zu dirigiren. Die noch am meisten verlässlichen Berichte lauteten dahin, dass Menikli mit dem Gros der Cavallerie von El Mezarib direct auf Maan im Marsche war, und erst als ihm die Kunde von der Vernichtung des Magazins in Maan unterwegs zu Theil wurde, von der syrischen Pilgerstrasse über Tafila nach Gaza abschwunkte. Aus den nämlichen Gründen folgte später Ibrahim mit der Garde, als er von dem Marsche Menikli's hörte, von Kerek über Tafila nach Gaza.

Von dem Augenblicke an, als Ibrahim das todte Meer umgangen hatte, wäre er, geographisch betrachtet, allerdings im Stande gewesen, eine zur Fortsetzung des Kampfes günstige Stellung, wie ihrer oben erwähnt wurde, zu nehmen, und auf der Seeseite hatte er nichts zu fürchten, weil Napier, der wieder vor Alexandria erschienen war und durchaus seine Convention zu Ehren bringen wollte, den an der syrischen Küste commandirenden Capitän Stewart dahin instruirte, die Egyptier ja nicht zu belästigen. Aber fast ohne Artillerie und genügende Infanterie-Munition wäre Ibrahim mit seinem auf 22,500 Mann herabgeschmolzenen Heere nicht im Stande gewesen, dem Angriffe des ihm gegenüberstehenden Heeres zu widerstehen, welches jetzt schon in der südlichsten Stellung 18,000 Mann Infanterie, 3500 Mann regulärer und 3000 Mann irregulärer Cavallerie mit 30 Geschützen zählte und durch die Verstärkungen, die Ali-Pascha aus Kleinasien zugeführt hatte, in kurzer Zeit leicht auf 32,500 Mann gebracht werden konnte. Wohlgenährt und durch die erfochtenen Siege in die beste Stimmung versetzt, wäre dieses Heer leicht im Stande gewesen, einen Gegner aufzureiben, bei dem nur noch die Cavallerie einige Leistungsfähigkeit hatte, während die Infanterie ganz herabgekommen, die Artillerie aber nur mit wenigen Geschützen noch zugegen war. Unter solchen Umständen hatte sich Ibrahim nothwendiger Weise zum weiteren Rückzug entschliessen müssen.

Das Verdienst, das egyptische Heer in eine so nachtheilige Lage gebracht zu haben, gebührt, wie es auch Bandiera in einem Schreiben d. d. Marmarizza den 8. Februar 1841,² und Lord Ponsonby in einem

¹ Soviel beträgt die Entfernung von Remtha über Maan bis Gaza. Die Nachhut war am 6. von Remtha aufgebrochen und am 25. in Gaza eingetroffen.

² vgl. Vol. I, p. 150.

Schreiben an Lord Palmerston d. d. Therapia den 23. Februar 1841¹ hervorhoben, unstreitig dem General-Lieutenant Jochmus, und keinesfalls dem Admiral Stopford, der seit Anfangs December gar nicht mehr auf dem Kriegsschauplatze war und dem Capitän Stewart ebenfalls die Weisung gab, dem Rückzug der Egyptier keine Hindernisse in den Weg zu legen. So trat auch die merkwürdige Erscheinung ein, dass Stopford und Napier, beide hatten noch immer eine übertriebene Meinung von der Stärke und Schlagfertigkeit des ägyptischen Heeres, in diesem Kriege und zwar zum Schlusse das erste Mal einer und der nämlichen Meinung waren, jeder aber aus verschiedenen Gründen; der greise Stopford, um überhaupt bald Ruhe zu bekommen, und Napier, damit seine eigenmächtig abgeschlossene Convention wieder zu Ehren komme. Am 16. Februar hatte Ibrahim Syrien vollständig geräumt. Bloss 17,300 Mann und 82 Geschütze kehrten nach Egypten zurück, daher sein Verlust seit Anfang dieses Krieges 67,700 Mann und 68 Geschütze betrug, nicht eingerechnet das in den Festungen zurückgelassene oder in der Schlacht von Nisib erbeutete Geschütz. Ibrahim war in Gaza an der Gelbsucht leidend angekommen und wurde dort von einem aus dem Hauptquartier der Verbündeten ihm zugeschickten Arzte behandelt. Allein seine unmässige Lebensweise gab wenig Hoffnung zur vollkommenen Herstellung, und da er auch moralisch sehr niedergedrückt war, so beschloss er sich vom öffentlichen Leben ganz zurückzuziehen.² Die Niederlage der Egyptier brachte den Sultan wieder in den Besitz von Syrien, Adana, Merasch, Hedschas und Candia, und Mehemet Ali ward als Pascha von Egypten auf den Stand eines tributpflichtigen Vasallen herabgesetzt, doch wurde ihm nachträglich die so sehr gewünschte Erblichkeit des Paschaliks in seiner Familie zugestanden. Ohne die Zusicherungen Frankreichs hätte es Mehemet Ali wahrscheinlich nie gewagt, sich gegen seinen Oberherrn aufzulehnen und in dieser Auflehnung so lange zu beharren; denn noch am 19. August 1840 schrieb Boghos Bei, der ägyptische Minister für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, an Soliman Pascha (wie dies ein aufgefangener Brief bewies), dass Frankreich eine Hülfe von 100,000 Mann, 24 Linienschiffen und 80 Dampfern schicken will. So wagte es Mehemet Ali³ gegen eine Allianz von fünf Mächten Stand halten zu wollen, welche vorerst nur einen sehr geringen Theil ihrer Streitkräfte ins Feld gestellt hatte.

Um nun auf die Geschichte der Convention Napier's und auf andere Nebeneignisse zurückzukommen, verdient vor allem erwähnt zu werden, dass Stopford, als ihm die Convention Napier's auf dem Wege von Beirut nach Marmarizza durch Capitän Fanshawe am Bord des Prometheus vorgelegt wurde, denselben Officier bald darauf nach Alexandria mit der Weisung zurückschickte, Mehemet Ali dahin zu

¹ vgl. Levant Papers III, 331; Vol. I, p. LXII.

² Als aber Mehemet Ali am 17. Juni 1848 für irrsinnig erklärt wurde, übernahm Ibrahim die Regierung und starb am 10. November 1848.

³ Derselbe starb am 2. August 1849 zu Alexandria und ruht in der Gruft seiner Familie zu Cairo.

verständigen, dass diese Convention null und nichtig sei. Als Fanshawe am 8. December am Bord der Megara in Alexandria ankam, fand er dort vor dem Hafen nur den Carysfort, im Hafen aber die französische Fregatte Embuscade, dann einen Dampfer, letzteren zum Abgehen nach Frankreich bereit, und die französische Brigg Bougainville, welche gerade nach Beirut abging. Fanshawe kehrte am 13. December von Alexandria mit einer Antwort Mehemet Ali's zurück, wornach sich dieser bereit zeigte, auf alle von den Mächten gemachten Vorschläge einzugehen. Hierauf schickte Stopford schon in Folge früheren Drängens Seitens des Generals Jochmus den Capitän Stewart mit dem Benbow und einigen kleineren Schiffen nach Beirut mit dem Auftrage, die Feindseligkeiten einzustellen, ebenso erlaubte er dem Mehemet Ali, einige Dampfer nach Caiffa zu schicken, um Kranke und Verwundete wegzubringen. Fanshawe setzte an Bord des Stromboli seine Reise nach Constantinopel fort, um die Unterwerfungserklärung Mehemet Ali's vom 11. December dem Lord Ponsonby zu überbringen. Nach einer in Constantinopel abgehaltenen Conferenz zwischen den Repräsentanten der Vertragsmächte und nach vielem Hin- und Herschreiben ward Fanshawe am 29. December wieder flott und überbrachte dem Admiral Stopford in Marmarizza eine Depesche des Grosswessiers, des Inhalts dass die Unterwerfung unter den vorgeschlagenen Bedingungen angenommen sei und Mehemet Ali auch Pascha von Egypten bleiben solle (von einer Erblichkeit war indess noch keine Rede), dann dass Mazlun Bei und Walker (Yawer Pascha) als Bevollmächtigte zur weiteren Austragung dieser Angelegenheit abgesendet werden. Die Genannten verliessen aber Constantinopel erst am 6. Januar 1841 und brachten nebenbei Befehle von Lord Ponsonby an General-Lieutenant Jochmus und an Herrn Wood, nicht allein die Feindseligkeiten nicht einzustellen, sondern dem ägyptischen Heere womöglich noch alle Waffen wegzunehmen.

Am 17. December kam aus England eine Depesche an, wornach Stopford Gouverneur von Greenwich-Hospital wurde. Napier erhielt den Bathorden und die Weisung zum Aufhissen der rothen Flagge, und alle Commandanten, welche beim Angriff auf Acre anwesend waren, wurden befördert. Am 27. December kam Zacharias Pascha aus Constantinopel, um Izzet Pascha zur Rückkehr zu veranlassen. Stopford empfahl dem neuen General-Gouverneur die Feindseligkeiten einzustellen, und Napier rieth ihm, „den General-Lieutenant Jochmus zu controliren, der ein junger ruhmsüchtiger Mann sei und lieber Krieg als Frieden haben wolle“. Stopford und Napier handelten also hier wieder ganz gegen die Ansichten der englischen Diplomatie. Am 5. Januar kam der Dampfer Megara aus England und brachte die Abschrift eines Schreibens von Lord Palmerston an die Admiralität vom 15. December 1840, in welchem wieder die Convention Napier's gebilligt wurde. Am 6. Januar 1841 schickte Stopford den Commodore Napier nach Alexandria, um die neue von der Diplomatie verfasste Convention, zu welcher übrigens die Napier'sche Convention als Grundlage gedient hatte, in Ausführung zu bringen. Napier kam dort am 8. Januar am

Bord des Stromboli an und übergab an Boghos Bei die mitgebrachten Depeschen, aus denen Mehemet Ali zwar ersah, dass seine Unterwerfung angenommen, ihm aber nicht die gehoffte Erblichkeit des Paschalis zugesichert worden sei. In einer hierauf stattgefundenen Zusammenkunft sassen Napier und Mehemet Ali ganz gemüthlich nebeneinander, rauchten Tabak und schlürften Kaffee, während sich Jochmus und Ibrahim in Syrien noch immer herumschlugen. Napier suchte den Mehemet Ali thunlichst zu beschwichtigen und versprach, sich dahin zu verwenden, dass ihm die Erblichkeit zugesichert werde, wie dies auch später erfolgte. Am 10. Januar kamen auch die türkischen Bevollmächtigten, um die türkische Flotte in Empfang zu nehmen. Dies geschah am 11. Januar unter vielen Salutschüssen, und noch an demselben Tage schickte Napier den Stromboli mit der Nachricht ab, dass die türkische Flotte übernommen worden sei. Am 13. Januar besuchte Napier den Admiral Walker, der sich an Bord des Mahmudieh eingeschifft hatte, wobei nach Napier's Bericht mehr Pulver als in einer Schlacht verschossen wurde. Ungeachtet dass die Nachricht von der endlichen Annahme der Unterwerfungserklärung und von dem Abschluss des Friedens erst am 20. Februar in Alexandria eingetroffen war — bis dahin war eigentlich nur Waffenstillstand — hatte es Napier nicht verschmäht, einer Einladung Mehemet Ali's nach Cairo zu folgen und sich dort bestens bewirthen zu lassen. Als aber die Nachricht des abgeschlossenen Friedens eintraf (Mehemet Ali und Napier befanden sich wieder in Alexandria), wurde Napier eingeladen, Mehemet Ali an Bord des ägyptischen Admiralschiffes zu besuchen. In dem Augenblicke als Napier in die Cabine des Paschas trat, gaben alle Geschütze des Admiralschiffes auf einmal Feuer, und wurde dieses sogleich von allen übrigen im Hafen befindlichen ägyptischen Kriegsschiffen wiederholt. Dies war in der kurzen Zeit, seit die türkische Flotte übernommen wurde, schon die dritte grosse Kanonade, die in dem Hafen von Alexandria stattfand. Der übermässige Verbrauch von Pulver ist bei allen Orientalen nicht allein gelegentlich von Friedensfesten, sondern auch nach gewonnenen Gefechten der Fall, wie dies Napier schon nach dem Gefechte von Boharsof zu erfahren Gelegenheit hatte. Nur geschieht es dann mit scharfer Munition und im höchsten Grade so willkürlich, dass Napier es nur ein Wunder nennt, dass er damals mit heiler Haut davorkam. Am 1. März verliess Napier Alexandria und langte am 3. März in Marmarizza und am 22. März in Malta an. Nach überstandener Quarantaine¹ ging er mit Urlaub nach England. Stopford mit einigen Schiffen war schon früher in Malta eingetroffen, und säumte auch nicht in die Heimat zurückzukehren und das ihm verliehene neue Amt anzutreten. Die österreichische Escadre hatte nach Rückkehr der in Syrien gelassenen Abtheilung der Marine-Infanterie Marmarizza fast gleichzeitig mit dem

¹ Während des Krieges waren Pestfälle nicht selten. Graf Széchény soll den Keim zu dieser Krankheit in Acre in sich aufgenommen haben, was sich dadurch erklärt, dass in diesem Platze lange Zeit noch viele jener Thiere unverscharrt herumlagen, welche zur Zeit des Angriffes gefallen waren.

Reste der englischen Flotte verlassen, und kehrte dann in die Heimat zurück.

Der vorstehend im Abrisse beschriebene Krieg hat der österreichischen Marine verschiedene Auszeichnungen und Belobungen eingebracht. Es erhielt inländische Orden: Seine k. Hoheit der Erzherzog Friedrich[†] das Ritterkreuz des militärischen Maria Theresienordens, Contre-Admiral Freiherr von Bandiera den Orden der eisernen Krone erster Classe, Oberst Ritter v. Lebzelttern (Vorstand des Hofstaates des Erzherzogs Friedrich) den Orden der eisernen Krone zweiter Classe, Corvetten-Capitän Marinovich und Maddalena, Fregatten-Capitän Buratovich, Schiffsleutnant Ritter v. Kudriaffsky und Fregatten-Lieutenant Pörtl den Orden der eisernen Krone dritter Classe, Corvetten-Capitän Legoteti das Ritterkreuz des Leopoldordens, Marine-Cadet Chinca die goldene Tapferkeitsmedaille, endlich Pilot Vuchetich, Guardian Boncallo und die Matrosen Miani und Baldo die silberne Tapferkeitsmedaille. Ausserdem wurde noch eine grosse Zahl ausländischer Orden, Medaillen und Ehrensäbel vertheilt, und participirten hieran nicht allein Freiherr Du Mont und Graf Széchény, sondern auch die vor Ende des Krieges hinzugekommenen vier österreichischen Officiere. Auf Anregung des General-Lieutenants Jochmus und in Folge eines Vorschlages Bandiera's wurden Du Mont zum Hauptmann und Széchény zum Major befördert.

Napier schrieb nach der Einnahme von Saida an den Erzherzog Friedrich: „Ich kann Saida nicht verlassen, ohne Eurer k. Hoheit meine volle Anerkennung der Tapferkeit der Officiere und der Mannschaft der „Guerriera“ zu bezeigen, welche im Verein mit der britischen Marine-Infanterie die ihnen zugewiesene Stellung auf dem Castell eingenommen haben. Ebenso danke ich Eurer k. Hoheit für die Stellung, die Sie mit Ihrem Schiffe genommen haben, sowie für die Präcision des Schiffsfeuers. Bei jeder künftigen Unternehmung wird mir nichts genugthuender sein, als Eure k. Hoheit in meiner Escadre zu wissen“. Stopford schrieb nach der Einnahme von Acre an Bandiera unterm 5. November: „Nach dem glänzenden Erfolge Ihrer britischen Majestät Flotte, welche in Uebereinstimmung mit den unter Ihrem Befehle stehenden Kräften operirte, ergreife ich mit wahren Vergnügen den ersten Augenblick der Ruhe, um Ihnen für die beim Angriff auf Acre geleisteten nützlichen Dienste Seitens der unter Ihrem unmittelbaren Befehle stehenden österreichischen Kräfte den lebhaftesten Dank auszusprechen. Ich bitte Sie, diese meine Gefühle auch Sr. k. Hoheit dem Erzherzog Friedrich und allen Officieren und Mannschaften der österreichischen Escadre auszudrücken“.

[†] Ueber die Ereignisse in Syrien hat der Erzherzog ein schätzbares Tagebuch geführt, welches mit den Angaben des General-Lieutenant Jochmus (sieh dessen Broschüre: der syrische Krieg und der Verfall des Osmanen-Reiches) genau übereinstimmt. [Hier wäre noch zu erwähnen: „Erzherzog Friedrich von Oesterreich und sein Antheil am Kriegszuge in Syrien im Jahre 1840. Von Joseph Bergmann. Wien 1857“ — welchem Buche *Fallmerayer*, auch unter Hinweis auf Jochmus' Broschüre als einer „vortreflichen Schrift“, eine besondere Anzeige gewidmet hat, Augsburger Allgem. Zeitung 1857 17. Mai.]

Auch schrieb Stopford zu Marmarizza am 17. December 1840¹ an Bandiera: „Auf den Wunsch der Lords der Admiralität erstatte ich Eurer Hochwohlgeboren den lebhaftesten Dank und das höchste Wohlgefallen für die Dienste, welche die unter Ihnen stehende Escadre in eifriger Mitwirkung bei verschiedenen Unternehmungen an der syrischen Küste und besonders bei der Einnahme von Saida und Acre geleistet hat, mit dem Beifügen der grössten Anerkennung Seitens der geehrten Lords für die Art und Weise, mit welcher Euer Hochwohlgeboren, Seine k. Hoheit der Erzherzog Friedrich und die Officiere die ihnen ertheilten Aufträge erledigt haben, und bitte ich die Gefühle der geehrten Lords Seiner k. Hoheit, den Officiern und Mannschaften der unter Euer Hochwohlgeboren stehenden Escadre auszudrücken“. Endlich verdient bemerkt zu werden, dass Seine Majestät der Kaiser Ferdinand sich allergnädigst bewogen fanden, dem Admiral Stopford das Commandeurkreuz und dem Commodore Napier das Ritterkreuz des militärischen Maria Theresien-Ordens zu verleihen.

Die österreichische Marine hatte in diesem Kriege alle ihr zugekommenen Aufträge mit dem regsten Eifer erfüllt und sich bei den zwei glänzendsten Waffenthaten, welche dieser Krieg zur See aufwies, betheilig. Der österreichische Admiral, wie auch Seine k. Hoheit der Erzherzog Friedrich, haben sich nebenbei ein besonderes Verdienst erworben, dass sie im Kriegsrathe für den sofortigen Angriff auf Acre stimmten, und wenn die Thätigkeit der österreichischen Marine wegen des anfangs December erfolgten Umkehrens der Flotte noch vor Beendigung des Krieges zum Stillstande kam, so war es nur die Folge ihres Gehorsams gegen den Oberbefehlshaber, nicht aber die Besorgniss vor schlechtem Wetter; denn die nämliche Marine hatte noch im Winter von 1863—64 ihre Schiffe in die Nordsee gestellt, und dies unter Umständen welche wegen der Unbekanntschaft mit jenem Meere und wegen des Experimentirens mit Panzerschiffen weit ungünstiger war als im syrischen Kriege, wo das Gestade und die Leistungsfähigkeit der Segelschiffe der österreichischen Marine sehr bekannte Dinge waren.

¹ Diese schon am 17. December gemachte allgemeine Danksagung war jedenfalls eine verfrühte, denn noch war der Krieg nicht aus, Stopford selbst musste ein paar Tage darauf den Benbow und den Hazard zur Verstärkung der englischen Schiffe nach der syrischen Küste schicken, und noch am 27. December schiffte die Hecate ein Detachement englischer Artillerie und Genietruppen in Acre aus. Aber Stopford wünschte den Krieg schon im December beendigt zu wissen, obgleich er auf der andern Seite die Landoperationen unterstützen musste.

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
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
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