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30
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 910
Estimation Biases in Discounted Cash Flow Analyses of Equity Capital Cost: A Pedagogical Note
Charles M. Linke J. Kenton Zumwaft
IHfiLJWWnroe;
Noia
College o? Commerce and Business Administration Bureau of Economic and Business Research University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
.♦if ll
*
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 914.
Systematic Risk, Leverage, and Default Risk K. C. Chen
College of Commerce and Business Administration Bureau of Economic and Business Research University of Illinois. Uroana-Chamoaign
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 914 College of Commerce and Business Administration University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign November 1982
Systematic Risk, Leverage, and Default Risk
K. C. Chen, Assistant Professor Department of Finance
Abstract The purpose of this note is to investigate the theoretical rela- tionship between the systematic risk of equity, the systematic risk of debt, the systematic risk of the unlevered firm, and leverage in the presence of default risk. The cash-flow approach is adopted in con- trast to the literature. The analysis demonstrates that a truncation factor (or survival probability) exists in addition to Hamada and Rubinstein's traditional formulation. Hence, the result derived here is more general.
SYSTEMATIC RISK, LEVERAGE, AND DEFAULT RISK
In their classical paper, Modigliani and Miller (M&M) [15, 16], based upon the risk-class assumption and the arbitrage argument, have shown the famous propositions I and II. By integrating M&M's proposi- tion I with the mean-variance, Hamada [9] and Rubinstein [18] have shown that the systematic risk of a firm's equity should be positively correlated with the firm's leverage. Numerous subsequent studies have empirically and theoretically investigated the effect of financial leverage on the systematic risk of equity [3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 14], How- ever, only few of them have incorporated default risk in the analysis [7, 8].
The purpose of this note is to investigate the theoretical rela- tionship between the systematic risk of equity and leverage in the presence of default risk within a framework of one-period Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) under uncertainty. We adopt cash-flow approach which distinguishes from [2] and [8] with option-pricing approach and [7] with expected-rate-of-return approach. In Section I, we discuss the pricing of market values of different claims, which is borrowed from Chen [6].* In Section II, we derive the relationship between systematic risks and leverage. Section III presents the conclusion.
I. Market Values of Different Claims Sharpe [19], Lintner [12], and Mossin [17] have derived the fol- lowing two-parameter equilibrium valuation raoidel, referred to as the Capital Asset Pricing Model, in a hypothetical world with three key assumptions.
-2-
where
V ■ the equilibrium value of asset j;
E(Y.) = the expected value of the end-of-period cash flows to the owners of asset j;
R • 1 + R~» where R^ is the risk-free interest rate;
Cov(Y.:,R ) = the covariance between the total cash flows of asset j and the return on the market portfolio;
A = the market price of risk.
Equation (1) states that in equilibrium the value of asset j is
the present value of the certainty-equivalent (CEQ) of the asset's
random cash flow.
A. The Market Value of All- Equity Firm
Denote X as the firm's operating income which is assumed to be jointly normally distributed with the return on the market portfolio so that
X = N(X, o£)
— 2
for any given assessment of R and a . The after-tax cash flows to
mm
the owners of the unlevered firm are
X(1-t) if X > 0
(2)
if X < 0
'"I o
-3-
where x is the proportional corporate income tax. Therefore, the mar-
2
ket value of the unlevered firm is given by
Vu = (1-t)[E0(X) - XCov0(X,Rm)](R)"1. (3)
where
EQ(X) =
Xf(X)dX; Covn(X,R ) = E{ [Xn-En(X) ] [R -E(R) ]},
U m u u m m
"3 the partial covariance between X truncated from 0 upward and R
m
B. The Market Value of Debt
For simplicity, we assume that the total promised payment to bond- holders is tax deductible. Bondholders receive their contractual
claims of D at the end of the period if the firm is solvent, and the
4 entire value of the firm if the firm is declared bankrupt. Hence,
the total cash flows to bondholders at the end of the period are
" D if X >_ D
\-\ . (4)
X if 0 < X < D
0 if X < 0. The market value of debt can be expressed as
VQ = {D[1-F(D)] + [EJj(X) - ACov°(X,Rm)]} (R)"1 (5)
|0 - -
where F(D) = I f(X)dX, the probability that the firm is declared
bankrupt.
-4-
C. The Market Value of Equity
At the end of the period shareholders receive the after-tax residual value of the firm if it remains solvent, and they receive
■
nothing if the firm goes bankrupt. Therefore, the end-of-period cash flows to shareholders are
(1-t)(X-D) if X > D
h'\ - (6>
0 if X 1 D.
The market value of equity can be expressed as
V£ = (1-T){ED(X) - XCovD(X,Rm) - D[1-F(D)]} (R)"1. (7)
D. The Market Value of the Levered Firm
The market value of the levered firm is simply the sum of market values of its debt and equity. Adding V_ in (5) and V_ in (7), we get
D J-
V = {(1-t)[E0(X) - XCovQ(X,Rm)] + t[E°(X) - ACov^X.R^ ]
+ tD[1-F(D)]} (R)"1 (8)
Then, substituting Vu in (3) and VD in (5) into (8), the market value of the levered firm can be expressed as
V - VE + VD = Vu + TV (9)
Equation (9) shows that the market value of the levered firm is the sum of the market value of the unlevered firm plus the tax subsidy on debt. This result is consistent with M&M [16] within a framework of risky debt.
-5-
II. Systematic Risks and Leverage In this section we are trying to develop the theoretical linkage between systematic risks of equity, debt, and the unlevered firm and leverage.
A. The Systematic Risk of Equity, the Systematic Risk of the Unlevered Firm, and Leverage
From Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin's CAPM, the systematic risk of equity
is defined as
s Cov(Y Rm) g , - (10)
2 . where a is the variance of market portfolio's returns. Substituting
m ™
(6) into this definition yields
(l-T)Cov(X,Rm) 8 ~ • [l-F(D)] (11)
E m
By the same token, substituting (2) into the definition of the systematic risk of the unlevered firm yields
Cov(Y ,R )
„u u m
V a2 u m
(1-t)Cov(X,R ) m
u m
[l-F(O)] (12)
" " 2 By solving (11) and (12) for (l-T)Cov(X,Rm) /a , we can derive the
relationship between the systematic risk of equity and the systematic
risk of the unlevered firm as follows
-6-
E This result shows that the systematic risk of the levered firm is equal to the systematic risk of the unlevered firm adjusted for the difference in equity value of the two firms and the survival proba- bility (the bracket in (13)). When no bankruptcy risk (or no truncation of the firm's operating income distribution) is assumed, (13) is identical to Hamada's [9] result. Furthermore, substituting the accounting identity in (9) for V , we derive the following expression:
This result states that the systematic risk of equity is equal to the systematic risk of the same firm without leverage times one plus the leverage ratio (debt to equity) multiplied by one minus tax rate and times the survival probability. If no bankruptcy risk is assumed, the second bracket in (13) disappears and (14) is identical to what Hamada [9] and Rubinstein [18] have shown. Hence, the model we derive here is claimed to be more general.
To further study the comparative statics of (14), we use numerical analysis instead of mathematic analysis for the sake of simplicity. The data for the numerical example is given in table I.
Insert Table I
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of leverage (debt ratio) on the systematic risk of equity. As is expected from this figure, the systematic risk of equity increases monotonically with leverage.
-7-
Insert Figure 1
Figure 2 shows the effect of the face value of debt on the systematic risk of equity. Not surprisingly, the systematic risk, of equity is a positive function of the face value of debt.
Insert Figure 2
In figure 3, the impact of business risk on the systematic risk of equity is depicted, where business risk is represented by standard deviation of the firm's operating income. To isolate the leverage effect, we designate the face value of debt equal to 150,000. As is evident from this figure, the more risky the firm (the higher the standard deviation) , the smaller the systematic risk of equity because stockholders profit from the probability that the value of the firm will exceed the face value of debt.
Insert Figure 3
In the option pricing literature, Black and Scholes [2] and Galai and Masulis [8] have shown that
3 = nsB
VD 3VE V
= (1 + r> t? s (15)
E
where
-8-
3VE V nc = ~^T7 * TT~ » the elasticity of equity value with respect
E to firm value;
V 6 = the systematic risk of the firm,
Comparing (14) with (15) without corporate tax, both equations are quite similar in the sense that the truncation factor in (14) and the partial-derivative factor in (15) both reflect the default risk, and the relationship between the systematic risk of equity and leverage is curvilinear. However, (15) with elasticity concept is not as empir- ically appealing as (14) with truncated distribution. The latter can be estimated in a way similar to Aharony, Jones, and Swary [1J, who estimate the probability of bankruptcy from a truncated normal distribu- tion. Omitting the truncation factor is (14) which is always less than one with positive leverage will cause the systematic risk of equity overestimated. Hence, the implication of this model stands along the same line as Hamada [9, p. 445] in the sense that it should be pos- sible to improve the forecast of a stock's systematic risk by fore- casting the total firm's systematic risk first, and then make adjust- . ments on leverage and survival probability.
B. The Systematic Risk of Equity, the Systematic Risk of the Unlevered Firm, and the Systematic Risk of Debt
Like the systematic risk of equity, the systematic risk of debt
Q
can be defined by the CAPM as
jj Cov(VV
2 D ra
Cov(X,R )
m
D m
f- [F(D) - F(0)] (16)
-9-
Given the result shown in (16), we can further demonstrate the
linkage between the systematic risk of equity, the systematic risk of
the unlevered firm, and the systematic risk of debt (the proof is
shown in the Appendix) .
V V
6S = BU[1+(1-t) =£] - 6D[(1-t) =2] (17)
E E
This result is consistent with Conine [7] in the presence of
risky corporate debt. The same result without corporate tax can be
9
derived from the option pricing model. The model says that the system- atic risk of equity is a weighted average of the systematic risk of the unlevered firm and the systematic risk of debt (with negative weight), which is intuitively appealing in a portfolio sense. By using the same numerical example, figure 2 illustrates that the systematic risk of debt not only is a positive function of the face value of debt but cannot in equilibrium exceed the systematic risk of the unlevered firm. Under this kind of formulation, the truncation of the distribution due to default risk is not shown in (17), instead is embedded in 6 and leverage. When corporate debt is riskfree, 0 is equal to zero and (17) is identical to the traditional formulation shown by Hamada and Rubinstein.
III. Conclusion The purpose of this note is to investigate the theoretical rela- tionship between systematic risks and leverage in the presence of default risk. The cash-flow approach is used in contrast to the literature. The analysis shows that a truncation factor (or survival probability) exists in addition to Hamada [9] and Rubinstein's [18] traditional for- mulation. Hence, the result derived here is claimed to be more general.
-10-
Footnotes
*University\of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign.
(1) There exists a fixed risk-free interest rate in perfectly competitive capital markets; (2) all investors have homogeneous ex- pectations with respect to the probability distributions of future yields on risky assets; and (3) all investors are risk-averse and the expected utility of terminal wealth maximizers.
2 Because of the existence of default risk, the assumption of
quadratic utility is implicitly required to apply the CAPM.
3
For discussion of truncation, refer to Lintner [13] and Chen [6].
4 This is an agency-cost issue. A numerical example can illus- trate why bondholders will not receive the entire after-tax value of the firm if the firm is declared bankrupt. Let D = $100, t = 50%, and X = $99. In this case, the firm is declared bankrupt because X < D. If bondholders had to receive the after-tax value of the firm, $49.5, they would be better off by making side payments of the one dollar short to stockholders to persuade them not to go bankrupt. Hence, bondholders would net $99, which is exactly equal to X.
We assume that there are no costs of voluntary liquidation or bankruptcy, e.g., court or reorganization costs.
We should expect to get identical results as shown by Galai and Masuli [8] in an option pricing context.
No corporate and personal taxes are assumed.
Q
Sfnce the debt by nature is a single-period discount bond, the problem of duration on the systematic risk of debt does not arise.
9
Black and Scholes [2] and Galai and Masulis [8] have shown that
6S = N(d )rp 6V (18)
E
6D = [1-N(d )] ^- 6V (19)
D
where N(») is the standardized normal cumulative probability density
V function. Then, multiplying (19) by—, adding (18), and rearranging
E yields
-11-
E VE
6va+^)-sDA.
E VE
Q.E.D,
-12-
Ref erences
1. J. Aharony, C. P. Jones, and I. Swary. "An Analysis of Risk and
Return Characteristics of Corporate Bankruptcy Using Capital Market Data." Journal of Finance (September 1980).
2. F. Black and M. Scholes. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities." Journal of Political Economy (May /June 1973).
3. A. J. Boness, A. H. Chen, and S„ Jatusipitak. "Investigations of
Non-Stationarity in Prices." Journal of Business (October 1974).
4. R. Bowman. "The Theoretical Relationship Between Systematic Risk
and Financial (Accounting) Variables." Journal of Finance (June 1979).
5. M. J. Brennan and E. Schwartz, "Corporate Income Taxes, Valuation,
and the Problem of Optimal Capital Structure." Journal of Business (January 1978).
6. A. H. Chen. "Recent Developments in the Cost of Debt Capital."
Journal of Finance (June 1978).
7. T. E. Conine, Jr. "Corporate Debt and Corporate Taxes: An
Extension." Journal of Finance (September 1980).
8. D. Galai and R-.-W. Masulis. "The Option Pricing Model and the Risk
Factor of Stock." Journal of Financial Economics (January/ March 1976).
9. R. Hamada. "The Effect of the Firm's Capital Structure on the
Systematic Risk of Common Stocks." Journal of Finance (May 1972).
10. N. C. Hill and B. K. Stone. "Accounting Betas, Systematic
Operating Risk, and Financial Leverage: A Risk-Composition Approach to the Determinants of Systematic Risk." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (September 1980).
11. E. H. Kim. "A Mean-Variance Theory of Optimal Corporate Structure
and Corporate Debt Capacity." Journal of Finance (March 1978).
12. J. Lintner. "The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of
Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets." Review of Economics and Statistics (February 1965).
13. . "Bankruptcy Risk, Market Segmentation, and
Optimal Capital Structure," in Risk & Return in Finance,
I. Friend and J. Bicksler (eds.), Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977.
-13-
14. G. Mandelker and S. G. Rhee. "The Impact of Financial and
Operating Leverages on the Systematic Risk of Common Stocks." (Forthcoming, Journal of Finance).
15. F. Modigliani and M. Miller. "The Cost of Capital, Corporate
Finance, and the Theory of Investment." American Economic Review (June 1958).
16. and . "Corporate Income Taxes and
the Cost of Capital: A Correction." American Economic Review (June 1963).
17. J. Mossin. "Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market." Econometrica
(October 1966).
18. M. Rubinstein. "A Mean-Variance Synthesis of Corporate Finance
Theory." Journal of Finance (March 1973).
19. W. Sharpe. "Capital Asset Price: A Theory of Market Equilibrium
Under Conditions of Risk." Journal of Finance (September 1964).
M/E/286
Table I Parameters for Numerical Example
Corporate tax rate (t)° =0.5
Expected market return (R ) = 0.15
m
One plus risk free rate (R) =1.05
Standard deviation of market return (a ) = 0.2
m
Standard deviation of operating income (a ) = 80,000
Mean of operating income (X) = 120,000
Correlation coefficient between the firm and the market = 0.5
B E T R
|
BU |
||||
|
1.4 |
- |
BS |
||
|
12 |
- |
• |
• |
|
|
1C |
:' |
|||
|
8 |
'm |
;' |
||
|
c |
' |
|||
|
b |
||||
|
4 |
,.-'" |
|||
|
2 |
|
|||
|
c |
||||
|
i i ! |
1 I.I |
i 1 1 1 |
0 0. 1 0. 2 0. 3 G. 4 0. 5 0. 6 0. 7 0. 8 0.9 I
DEBT RRTIQ
Figure 1. The relationship between systematic risks and debt ratio
B E T R
|
BD |
||||
|
14 |
BU BS |
/ / |
||
|
12 |
/ / / |
|||
|
10 |
/ / s / |
|||
|
8 |
• |
|||
|
6 |
||||
|
4 |
._--"' |
^" " |
||
|
2 |
_ — -"" |
|||
|
— — — — |
||||
|
0 |
||||
|
I i l |
\ |
1 1 1 1 1 |
25 50 75 100 125 150
FACE VALUE OF DEBT
175 200 225
THOUSANDS
Figure 2. The relationship between systematic risks and face value of debt
B
E T
10
BS
a
i i '" i ~ i ~ I i 1^ i i i I I i
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
STANDARD DEVIATION THOUSANDS
Figure 3. The relationship between systematic risk and standard deviation
Appendix Let's restate equation (14) as follows
RS _ fiu ,V rl-F(D), S " 6 X} [1-F(0)J
a ,Vux „u ,V rF(D)-F(0).
- 8 M - .8 (v~) [ 1-F(0) 1 (18)
E E
We also can derive the relationship between the systematic risk
of the unlevered firm and the systematic risk of debt by solving (12)
and (16) for Cov(X,Rm)/a2.
m
V
ftu = «D t\-r\ -2. r_l=£i2i_i (19)
& - 3 (1-t) v LF(D)_F(o)J K^>
u Then, substituting (19) into the second term of (18) yields
E E
V V
= eu[i+(i-x) -2.] - sd[(i-t) =2.]
E E
Q.E.D.
BT7D £jM3
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 915
N
Measuring Portfolio Skewness
o o
Stephen Sears Gary L Trennepohi
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College of Commerce and Business Administration Bureau of Economic and Business Research University ot Illinois, UrDara-Crutrnpaign
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