i V)
/MCE ,0.F
•J»£^>>
\_ >.<jAMi
COL. GEORGE WASHINGTON FLOWERS MEMORIAL COLLECTION
TRINITY COLLEGE LIBRARY DURHAM, N.C.
Established by the family of COL. GEORGE WASHINGTON FLOWERS
Date.
^
jL^ /J^ ((j^
'');^
^.^^^/ ^ ^ Y "^^ -^ rt^^^/^-^a^
Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive in 2010 witii funding from Duke University Libraries
littp://www.arcliive.org/details/tacticsforofficeOObuck
RECOMMENDATIONS.
From Ca plain Dimmock, of the Virginia Public Guard:
Armory, Richmond, Va., January S, 1S(51. .1. W. Ranpoi.pii — Drar Sir :
T!ic popular works upon military matter?, now befnro the i)ul)lic, arc confined to ordinary drills and parades. What is now wanted, is a trea- tise {Toinj; to show when the various movements of Artillery, Cavalry. Infantry and Rifle, as taught in their respective drills, should be used in presence of an enemy; what grounds should be sel.cted for battle and encampment; Avhat precautions to be taken when advancing or retreating; when to act in column; when in line, how to post the <lif- ferent arms to act the most favorably — information most essential to success, and without which, no matter how personally l)rave troops may be, they are exposed to almost certain disaster in i>resence of :»i equal number of well drilled and well mana'uvred trooi)s, and tliis in- formation Capt. 15uckholtz furnishes in his work.
I have no hesitation iu recommending it.
Very respectfully yours,
CHARLErA DI.MMOCK, Capt., &c.. &c.
Col. Tompkins, (late of the U. S. Jnny,) says :
I have examined the manuscript of Cajit. Buckholtz, and consider it a valuable compendium of military maxims. As a text book for mili- tary students or as a condensed epitome of principles essential to the art of war, the work of Capt. Buckholtz should be consulted and under- stood by every citizen wlio hoMs a commission. It is in fact " multuni in parvo." C Q. TOiirKIXS.
Richmond, January 18, 18G1.
T A^ C T I C S
OFFICERS
INFANTRY, CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY*
ARRANGED AXD COMPILED BY
L. V. BUCKHOLTZ,
AUTHOR OF INFANTRY CAMP DUTY, FIELD FOETIFICATION AND COAST DEFENSE.
J. W. RANDOLPH,
121 MAI\ STREET, RICHMOND, YA.
]861.
Entered according to the Act of Conj;ress, in tlie year 18H1, b}
J. W. RANDOLPH,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Easterri District of Virginia.
^■B9 P^IEFACE.
The present work is designed to impart information to Military Sliulents. I submit it to their attention, and trust they will make allowances for its defects.
There are many reasons why an officer should know something on tactics, of the three departments of an army, even though he may never have the supreme command, he may often be called on to give his opin- ion on the merits of plans of operations. This alone should make it a duty, that an officer should be tho- rougldy acquainted with this part of military science.
179017
GRAND TACTICS FOR OFFICERS
0 F
INFANTRY, CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY.
PART FIRST.
BASE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.
OF WAR.
The knowledge of War is acquired by practice, history and theory. The latter will here be considered.
Theory guided by practice and history teaches the nature of war, or applies it to practical use. The mode of carrying on war is an art, and not alone an abstract science. The resources of genius, combined with courage, are infinite; but they are necessarily re- strained by the means at hand, nevertheless these means may be much more available by sound tlieo- retical knowledge.
WHAT IS WAR.?
War is an action by force, to compel an enemy to yield to his adversary's purposes. Political disagree- ments of Governments may produce a war, its duration
179017
8 PURPOSE AND 3IEANS OF WAR.
is governed by lliem, and the resnlts are often new- political arrangements.
Tlierefore war is not independent, it is only a tool of ]V)liti('.s, without any nialliematical (onndation, a hazard of possibilities, probabilities, luck anil ill-lurk. The theory of war cannot exclude human nature, it has to admit valor, boldness, and even temerity. The science of war has to employ active and moral forces, and can nowiiere obtain certainty; a large field is for chance, which only may be rendered of advantage by the noblest valiant virtues, courage and self-reliance.
PURPOSE AND MKAXS OF ^VAR.
Tiie purpose of war is as changeable as the politi- cal cause that provoked it. The surest success is to defeat the enemy, but.even that condition is not always necessary to make peace, mere actions may often suifice, they may render the expected success to the enemy either impossible or loo dear. The way to obtffln any result is, therefore, by completely routing the enemy — down to the mere resistance.
But there is only one medium — '•' it is battle." What- ever is to be done in war will be done by troops. The valiant action comprises all that refers to it, its origin, preservation and employment.
Employment is fight. To fight at the proper time and at the proper place is the problem. Destruction of the enemy's forces is the principal aim.
SCIENCE OF WAR. V
OF THE QUALITIES REQUIRED IN A SOLDIER.
War is a peculiar activity, and demands according to it wits and talents. War is the sphere of danger. Courage is consequently the first condition of a sol- dier. Courage in danger — courage to undertake re- sponsibility. War is the field of corporeal exertions and sufferings, it requires therefore energy of body and mind. War is a field of uncertainty, it demands judgment to find out the truth, it requires firm reso- lution and unshaken presence of mind. To these properties belong also a talent for localities ; the ai)ility to perceive the influence of the ground quickly and correctly, and to be clear in the dispositions of the troops. War is therefore an action which can be rendered most difficult under circumstances; the de- mands are great on every one, but the;y' are not equal to all, they increase in ratio the higher the position is, and the General-in-Chief should be perfect in all these qualities.
OF THE SCIENCE OF WAR.
War is fight. Fight is to try the intellectual and corporeal strength by means of the latter; it requires for the combatants equipment and arms. The pro- perties of these additions exert influence upon the mode of conflict; but it always is a j)eculiar activity, by moving in a most appropriate element in that of danger. Tiie science of war in the strictest sense is.
10
r AVAR.
ihe art of employiiitr to the best advantajre the ijiven means in conibal; it is the lead of war. In a more
exteii(h'(l .-ciise, all actions l)(;lon<r to it which w ill he (lone on accdunt of war; they are the organization of the troops-, the equipment, armament, practice. Sec.
^^he coinniand of war is tlun-efore the disj)osiiion and lead of the battle- and whilst this is divided in single acticMis for themselves, consequently arises bv them the most diilerent activity, to arrange and to guide these actions, and to combine them to the purpose of the war.
'I'lie first is tactics, the second strateiry. 'Tactics — the employment of the troops in condicts. Strate<ry — the science of rendering the conllicts to at! vantage to the object of the war.
Tactics and strategy are two did'erent activities, in space and time indissolubly connected, but essentially different.
This part of the art of war considers only the em- ployment of the troops. ])esides this activity are many others serving to the purpose of war, which belong- nf)\v to tactics, then to strategy.
To the first belong- : marching-, quarters and encamp- ment; tliey belong in some measui-e to battle itself. To the latter belong the supj)ort, the nursing-, the sup- ply of arms and equipment ; they retuler practicable the preservation. These activities attributed to the war, (livitle themselves in two piincipal parts; the prepa- ration for war, and war itself.
To the knowledge and abilities of the first part,
ACTIVE FORCES. 11
appertains tlie orfranizalion, practice and preservation of tlie forces. But to the theory of war appertains the employment of skilled forces. This is the art of war in a stricter sense: Tactics or Stratejjy. The means of tactics are skilled troops. In employin«r those troops locality, ground, soil, the time of day and weather, are of influence, and to be taken into con- sideration; they are tactical elements.
THE ACTIVE FORCES.
Active forces in general, refer to all that belong to a battle ; in a more limited sense to the troops. The troops are to be armed and equipped. The theory demands in this reofard active forces, renderiuir the possibility to be employed every where easy; active forces, whose efforts in battle will not be submitted to too great diflicnlties ; active forces which excel in skill and rapidity; arms well constructed, to effect destruction at a great distance; arms to be nsed as well in a hand to hand fight as in a general attack.
These demands fulfill the diiTerent modes of fires and weapons, the different departments of arms, in/an- try, cavalry, artillery and the auxiliaries — the engineer — troops.
CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF SINGLE ARMS.
Battle consists of two essentially distinct elements : the principle of destruction by fire arms, and the hand to hand fight, either" to attack or to defend.
Iz pm:atlrks of single .\u:\is.
Artillery constitutes ilmt of [hv first. Cavalry the second, Infantry both these elements.
In a hand to hand lii^ht, or in a personal conllict is the element of defense — in position; the element of attack — in(»veni(Mit. Cavalry is entirely in want of the first j)roperly. ll is only of value for attack. In- I'antry has both ])roperties. This renders Infantrv Superior when compared to either of the other depart- ments of arms, for it combines all three active elements in itself.
It will be further evident, that the combination of all three de])artments of arms renders the most ])erfect einjiloyni(Mil possil)le. In re<Tard t(^ iheir jiriority they are classed — Infantry, Cavalry, Artillerv. In regard to purpose and importance in most cases, the destruction by fire-arms precedes the movements. This consid- (^ration leads to the following results :
1st. Infantry is the most independent of the three arms.
2m\. Artillery is entirely dependent. 3rd. Infantry combined with other departments of arms is the most important, 4*|h. Cavalry is tlispensable.
5th. The proper combination of the three arms gives the greatest strength.
Considering the expense, Infantry is in the first rank. If the expenses are to be consid(;red, we lind that one squadron of 150 horses; one battery of eight b" pdr. guns; one battalion of €00 men, require the same amount of expense for armament, equipment and sup- port.
ORGANIZATION OF TROOPS. ]3
The proportion of the three departments of arms exerts influence on the character of the war.
Abundance of Artillery is calculated more for de- fense. Want of Artillery will cause a resort to the principle of manoBuvring; war becomes more com- plicated, more active, but great results are impossible. Large numbers of Cavalry leads to great movements, — daring assaults in the rear, diversions, invasions, and renders easy the security and comfort of the mass. With a Cavalry force inferior in number, more pre- caution, more system, more defense and observation of broken country is required. Th.at considered to- gether, leads to the following principles.
1st. Infantry is the most important, both the others are but auxiliaries.
2nd. Artillery is less dispensable than Cavalry. 3rd. Of good Infantry, the more in number the better.
Artillery should be only in proper proportion, or it is an impediment and a disadvantage. Cavalry not more than is necessary. In general the proportion is : Cavalry, ^ to | of In- fantry ; Artillery, 2 to 4 cannons for every thousand men. These are the principles of the present for- mation of armies.
Organization must render the troops efficient; to that belong equipment, armament, military practice, discipline, subordination, exercise of strength, arms, camp (field) duties. It depends consequently on the administrative, technical, disciplinary and tac- 2
14 ORCAMZATIOX OF TROOl'S.
lical (leniaiuls. lis purpose is to render easy the einployinent of the troops in general, and the co- operation of ilieni. Tiie formation contrihutes to the employment of tlic troops. F'ormaiious of decided orjranic si<rnificance are : the compaiiv, llie scpiadron, the hatiery, for individual piaclice; the re<riment for a uniform completion ami administration. Formations of tariiral im{)()rtaiice are : the companies, the squad- rons, the batteries, and their sub-divisions; the bat- talion of infantry, the cavalry regiment, the brigade, the division, (simple or ctmibined with cavalry or ar- tillery), the corps, the army. Tactical unities are: the battalion, the squadron, the battery. The organ- ised army needs a medical and administrative body, and finally trains for provisions. The General-in- Chief commands the army, his organ is the stafl'.
Oriranization has in view the inner qualilication, the fortuation, ability and skill in movements, the prac- tice, the employment, and all that relates to battle.
IJaltle consists of three elements: fire, attack, and hand to hand light. To these belong position and movements beyond the battle-field, but constantly pre- pared to meet any attack. Consequently the formation should render the disposition, the movements, and the conflict easy, and with great simplicity, facility and uniformity, should be changed from one to another formation. Finally it should be, if possible, executed even under the immediate influence of the enemy's action. The practice must become so perfect that any evolution can be performed as quickas thought; it is
RAPIDITY OF MOVEMENTS. 15
a double one, one alliuling to the meclianism of formations and tlie use of arms, as another act in re- gard to the enemy and ground. The first is mechan- ical and formal practice, also elementary tactics. The second is intellectual — field operations — manceuvring.
The science of war can not be in the same state of perfection in all parts of an army, the higher the posi- tion the more will be expected ; but every one must know so much, that he is perfect in his duties when he is called upon for action. In the inferior branches this can be done quite methodically by practice in camp.
The officer can not be contented with methods, he has to instruct himself, to elevate himself above the position of a common soldier, to be enabled to make use of his own ideas, to be " an artist /" He should be perfect in all the qualities required of an ofllcer and soldier.
RAPIDITY OF M0VE3IENTS.
Pxapidity is of great importance, in some regard, the strategical and tactical combinations are based on it. Its degrees must be known ; unfavorable effects upon it must be avoided by armament, equipment, discipline ; ground, weather, order of march, and the mass exert also some influence upon it. In this regard is to be considered the tactical ra[)i(lity. Infantry (closed) 100— 120 in common march; 140-160 in double quick time; in open order 110-150; in double quick time 150-200 paces in one minute. (2^ feet to one pace.)
The march in double quick time should not last more than two minutes,
16 EKIECT OF FIKE ARMS,
Cavalry at a walk 130-150, at a trot 140-160, at a gallop 400-500, at a charge 500-600 paces.
Artillery on foot, (6 pdr. guns,) common march, 100-120, at a trot 150-200 paces..
Flying Artillery, (6 pdr. guns,) at a walk 130- 150, at a trot 300-400 paces.
Artillery can follow Cavalry or Infantry everywhere, according to their own manner. Cavalry is 4-5 times more rapid than Infantry. These results exert inllu- ence on a battle.
EFFECT OF FIRE ARMS.
The destrnctive power of cannon is so great, that a shot in its full force penetrates 20-30 illes, a grenade disables 16-18 men ; a rifle ball kills or wounds 2-3 men. The probability of hitting and the real eflectis <rreatly diminished by various circumstances — as an uncertain aim, excitement, isLC.
Ranges of cannons: 6 pdr. shots 700-1000, 12 pdr. shots 900-1200, bounding shots about 1800, grape shots 400-700, grenades to 2000, shrai)nells from 200-2000 paces; light 12 pdr. howitzer shells from 200-1000 paces ; rifle balls to 600, musket balls to 300, caral)ines to 150, common horse-pistols to 50 paces.
Result: Artillery can be destructive beyond the range of other arms. Cavalry-fire is much inferior to Infantry-flre. The eflect of the lire can be diminished by the position of the troops.
ELEMENTARY TACTICS. 17
ELEMENTARY TACTICS.
Elementary tactics tletermine the mode of disposi- tion, movement and conflict; the mode and nature of changing from one movement to anotlier, the nso ol' arms, so that the enemy's fire shall be less destructive, and that the enemy's rapidity will not find the troops unprepared. The problem to be solved is, to render the regulations with the arms uniform, simj)]e, sure, sliort; the position based on the principle, that every soldier can make use of his arms, and can he employed according to his capacity •, an organization to change form and front easy, and conformably to the purpose ; a meclianism of the movements simple, sure and (piick ; the words of command and designs of operations infalli- ble and undoubted ; and finally the mass enclosed at the flaidcs by reliable elements.
The existing regulations and tactics do not answer the demands. They require essential alterations.
1st. In regard to the words of command, the word inversion might be omitted.
2nd. All words of command being undoubted, re- main unchanged.
3rd. Formations executed to different directions, for instance: '^forward in line," the commandant only designates the side to which the movement is to be made.
4th. In formations, by which tlie guiding division (troop) will have to change front, the commandant
18
IXFA.NTRV.
designates only tlie division of the guide, and ihe otliers liave to go l)v it.
Olli. In forming coliinins, the ciMuniandant desig- nates tlie division which shall be loreinost, or upon wliicli the column shall be formed.
6lh. In deploying columns, the commandant gives the direction in which the division have to deploy. It will be conceded that one troop being as well skilled as another, it matters little whether the neighbour is posted to its right or to its left, consequently a more simple rule should be adopted.
INFANTRY
Is armed with rifle or musket and bayonet, for fire, attack and defense, supplied with ammunition, a camp hatchet, cooking utensils, and is uniformed. The weight for every man is about 50-60 pounds.
The properties of Infantry are, it can fight wherever a man is able to go, it is able to fight in attack and defense. The troops are classed according to comple- tion. With the increase of the mass increases also the mode of combination.
The battalion shall be independent, easy to be con- trolled, and shall be commanded by tlie voice. Even after some days march, fighting and retreating, its order shall not be lost. It shall be 800-1000 men strong, and divided in four to eight companies, from 120 to 220 men per company.
The number of officers and non-commissioned ofli- cers increases in small companies, they form the moral
INFANTRY. 19
and intellectual part of the mass. Detachments taken from one or the other company render a battalion not dependent. Without considering the expense, smaller companies, in regard to discipline and tactics are preferable. But the more moral confidence and militarj^ completion is infused in the companies by experience in campaign, or else by long service, the larger may be the companies. The companies are divided into two equal parts, or platoons, and these subdivided into lialf platoons. The principle of in- dependence will be effectual if these parties are enclosed at the flanks by most competent men.
The base of organization is 2-3 ranks. The rear rank covered by the front rank, thus forming files. The formation of the line is the base of all formations.
Opinions differ as to whether two or three ranks should be formed, but sure it is, that with two ranks, as much has been accomplished as with three.
The armament of the present time allows the use of fire-arms only for two ranks, the third rank may be ordered to reload in a fire attack, but such services are not now required ; the present construction of fire- arms facilitates the reloading, without loss of time, it might be desirable in squares, but then the fire-arms have to be of the same bore.
In squares, the troops in general are posted one di- vision behind the other, and these can reload. There- fore, considered for its efficiency, the third rank is better omitted ; it is exposed to the fire of the enemy
20
rilOFCRTinS OF TIIR I.IXR.
iuul is of lilile or no advantairo. In iiKivenieiits, three ranks would reiulcM* more stahilily llian Iwo; if inove- inents in lino were nsnal, hut tliey arc only cxrcjjiional, and are replaced by tlie more conipacl columns. Con- sequently the third rank is heller to be entirely abandoned.
PROPERTIF.S OF THE I.l.NE (^CLOSED.)
In regard to formalion : the line requires mucli space for its breadlli, this can become disadvantasreous ; covered ground is of no use to deploy in line, and ol'ien also the space is not large enough.
In regard to movements: the movements upon un- dulating ground are rendered dillicuh, often impossi- ble, ami if of any duration, slow.
In regard to battle : all lire-arms can he em])loye(l at tbe same time.
In regard to the enemy : llie enc-my\s balls will be of less efl'ecl ; the llaid^s and ibe rear are defenseless.
I'his latter j)oint is in all tactical formations, and tberefore tbis princij)le may be considered in any con- flict: front against (laidvs or rear: superior against inferior jorces.
The line may be chosen j)articularily in lire-attack of the mass, il" llie ilanks are protected and in jxx-^ition. Consequently it is nu)re defensive.
The efTect (lej)ends upon the j)()wer of lire and tbe condition of tbe trt)oj)s.
The dillerent kinds of fires are : by battalions, by
PROPERTIES OF THE LINE. 21
half-battalions, by companies, by platoons, by half- platoons, by ranks and files. For instance in mass, if the distance be 200-250 paces, in one minute can be fired two or three rounds, therefore at an advancino- enemy can be fired four to five rounds.
Fire by battalions : it is the largest force which can be united in a moment, dependent upon the command of the Chief, he has the troops in this kind of fire completely at his will, but the troops are for a moment deprived of the eflect of tlie fire, and therefore it may be best applied by battalions firing in succession, and when time and rapidity sufiers to reload, and further, immediately before the attack.
Fire by half-battalions is of less efi^ect, but it secures a fire in reserve.
Company-fire has a diminished effect, less con- formity in the actions of a battalion, and is difficult of control, is best applied in successive formations.
Fire by platoons is of less effect than fire by com- panies, and consequently not to be recommended.
Fire by ranks in regard to eflect, is equal to half- battalion fire, but it sets the whole battalion in disor- der and in a guideless state; it may be resorted to in case a reserve fire is necessary, especially against Cavalry.
Fire by files : the eflect is great, owing to the large number of balls fired, but this fire causes the greatest disorder. The control of the Chief is entirely checked, it is of great effect from protected positions against a retreating enemy.
oo
rRortUTIES OF THE I. INC.
Tlie effect of fne i.s more in tlie mass of halls than ill the direction and accuracy in takiiiir aim; aimed shots are impossihle. Tlie efiecl is greater downwards than upwards, and host in horizontal line.
C0LU31.\.s OPEN CLOSED,
Are formed, if the suh-di visions of a haltalion are posted one after tlie oilier. Tiie troop in front desig- nates the name of the columns; ihev are formed of a company in line, down to that of a fde.
PROrCRTIES OF THE COLUMNS.
In reij^ard to position : the mass can be easily con- centrated in the smallest sj)ace, ihey render easy any position on any ground, and admit a perfect control.
In regard to movements : they are of advantage on account of their suitable extent of front and inner strength.
In battle : their lire is inferior and reduced to the ex- tent of the front.
In regard to the enemy: his fire is destructive, but the flank is less exposed than that of the line.
It may be applied : if a mass in a covered position shall be concentrated, in movements, and in attack with the bayonet, which latter is made indtndjle (piick time, and only to a distance of about 100 paces. The attacking columns are better not closed, the nearer they get to the enemy the smaller the intervals become
PROPERTIES OF THE LINE, 23
between themselves-, during the hand to hand fight they shouhl not fire.
Marcli columns have a small front for their own convenience, best double files.
Attacking columns may be best in company or platoon-columns.
THE LINE WITH INTERVALS BETWEEN THE FILES.
This manoeuvre requires the largest space, and re- quires the occupation of favorable ground in the most extended sense.
In regard to movements : it is best, especially in broken ground and woodland.
In battle : favorable for attack and defense, the fire is of good effect, but not destructive; every man is in- dependent; the control of t'.ie Chief is broken, and consequently requires men of great skill and confidence.
In regard to the enemy: it presents not many points to be aimed at; in open ground it is weak ; under some circumstances tlie oj)en order may be com- bined with the mass, especially with columns, if move- ments and fire are necessary, and if impediments are to be overcome in passing woodland, &.c. If single parts of a battalion are ordered to succor the open-line, it is best to order closed companies for those duties.
THE THREE ORDERS OF FORMATIONS
Will answer to meet any eventualities which may occur, hi regard to their properties, they are the
24 THiinK OKI) r. us of formatiox.
means for attack \ attack in closed order, in open order, in colnmn. in line, and hy skirmishers. T() tiie llrst belongs the sqnarc, to the latter the mass, botli lorma- tions are the mode of defense ajrainst cavalry.
The sqnare is the only formation which has no weak point and is ft)rmed in the quickest time from the line as well as from the column ; it sliould have sufiicient space inside to admit of more ranks for reserve fire. The simi)lesl formation is, when the parts (divi- sions) are of equal extent; the formation is rendered re- liable and secure, when advanccil troops will not be required.
The increased ranks may be of some value, if they have all the same lire arms and eqjial ammunition ; four ranks secure the reserve fire; short fronts are prefer- able to long ones.
The results : 1st, in forming three ranks, they are to be of the same element; 2nd, to combine closed order with open order, and to form scpiarcs with security; five companies are better tluin four in a battalion ; IJrd, squares with company front will fulfill the conditions.
The properties of the square are : the movements are difficult, but the firing can be done in all direc- tions, tliey are only eflective in position, and are of "•real value on uncovered ground against cavalry. The formation of the square is exceptional, and depends npon the condition of the attacking cavalry. The square is more secure, less complicated, than any other tactical formation.
The skirmisliers rally under similar circumstances in mass, to render greater resistance.
CHANGE OF FRONTS. 25
FORMATIONS AND CHANGE OF FRONTS.
The organization of a battalion renders the means easy of meeting any emergency which may occur; but the present adopted rule of having the first rank under all circumstances in front, exerts a disturbing influence upon it.
No good reason can be given for it; a soldier of the second rank is of as much value as one in the first rank. This partiality lies only in the order of num- bers. Should this be abandoned and otlier suitable terms adopted, many movements, by simple round- about will be shortened and more quickly and easily ex- ecuted; counter-march, round-about-wheeling, &c., should be abandoned. Consequently by that the excep- tional inversion of the movements becomes a rule, and tlie elementary tactics, according to the nature of the troops, will be freed from all complications. Theory might have here a great field for improvement.
The number of file-closers should be reduced to the utmost, and also the whole system of the lead should be simplified.
Finally, in regard to the form, by wliicii a forma- tion of order of battle shall be executed, the columns of files — flank-march — would suit that purpose the least, if the march is of some duration; therefore this mode of mancEuvring on the battle field is to be rejected
The -column of double files is best on march. If under certain circumstances a weak form should be
26 CAVAI.KV.
adopted, it must he strengthened by combination with otlier forms; the best means are the open-order.
The three moch's of position render easy and vvoh- able the modes for actions; every one lias a j)eculiar significance, advantage and disadvantage; top^ether they combine all desirable means for haitlc.
The form must be directed by the <rcnius of true conrafre, which Lnv(\s life to the wliole, thron<rh the power of knowledire. which i(Mi(hMs the siijierior as well as the inferior con)])etent, accordin^r to jiis position.
The formations of infantry in a concentrated mass, do not nnile hattalions in one body. The unities re- main inde])e!ident. The importance of ci>ncentration rests only in combined actions.
CAA'ALRV.
Horses diflcr in tlieir qualities, size, &c., tlierefore equal qualities will be class:ed, and thus be obtained — light — medium — heavy — cavalry.
In theory any oood cavalry is serviceable, but it can not exist without light cavalry; it C(Uisi(lers the horse not a beast of burden, but the means of moving \\ ilh rapiility from one ])Iace to another. Man and horse are a unity, the brute force submitted to the rational will, and is only serviceable aiul true to its nature.
'I'he horse's power is effective oidy by rapidity, and therefore, motion is the true element of cavalry. It is only offensive, and depends entirely npon the contour of the ground ; it is invincible on level ground, but
CAVALRY. 27
useless in broken obstructed land. Armament and equipment are according to their nature. Equipment is : saddle, bridle, uniform, ammunition, cooking pots, and shoeing. The weight for a horse depends upon its size, the less the better. Armament : sword, lance, carbine, pistol; the sword, curved or straight, is an excellent weapon. The lance is visible from a large distance, its use requires in a hand to hand fight much skill for man and horse; it is of great value in an at- tack. The fire arms of cavalry are considered of little value; rifled carabines should be distributed to the most skillful men ; pistols are only for self-defense, to give sigiTals, to alarm ; it is important not to encumber the single man with arms.
THE FORMATIONS.
A regiment shall have only one kind of cavalry. If single troopers are armed with carabines, they may be distributed to the platoons.
Every squadron and platoon is subject to evcLy duty, and is bound to do it. The strength of a regi- ment may be 600 to 700 horses, it must be lead by the voice and independent in its movements. Cavalry is arranged in two ranks, forming files. Horses and men are not of equal qualities, consequently the best men and horses should be in the first rank.
The regiment should be divided into four squad- rons, these into platoons and half-platoons. A platoon shall not have less tliat twelve to fourteen files. The
28 CAVALUV.
depth of llio smallest division sliould not exceed its breadili, therefore it sliould liave more lliaii seven tiles.
Tiie fundamental position is tlie line. The regi- ment, squa(h-on> and platoons, arc nmnhered from the right to left. This is the present normal organization of cavalry; cavalry is the arm of movement, a very slight impediment can cause any success doubtful.
The manu3uvres on the battle field should only be executed by platoons or half-platoons. lialf-platoous whose strength is 8-9 files have this disadvantage, that both wings cannot always be framed with skilled men, and the platoon for mana3uvring may therefore be preferred. Theory demaiuls : that the manunivres are independent; if both wings of tlie half-platoons are well framed, without being clumsy, the move- ments, by the loss of a lew files, will not be checked. If by any accident men in the first rank are lost, the men in the second rank fill up the place of the lost- ones. A platoon shall not have less than 1:2-14 files. Cavalry, like infantry, forms line, column, open order.
Peculiarities of the line: it occupies in position much space; movements with large bodies are ren- dered difilcull, if they last some time; but they allow greater rapidity than columns; the fire of the enemy is less efl^ective ; with the increased speed of the move- ments the flaidvs become weaker; in regard to action : the greatest nuiuber of troopers can be engaged.
The cohiniii takes less space, the control is easy, ground and position are more easily chosen; but the
CAVALRY.
29
enemy's fire is more destruclive, particularly in posi- tion; only few troops can be engaged; the movements are somewhat slow.
The open-order requires much space, the control is difficult; the enemy's fire of little efi'ect, it is weak in front and flanks, allows the greatest rapidity and em- ployment of the greatest number of combatants.
Result : For cavalry, the line is the only mode for action. Columns and open-order are the auxiliary formations. The column serves to concentrate troops, and to mano3uvre on the battle field. The open-order is of little value — it may be employed to scout in the vicinity, to divert the attention of the enemy, to pursue, if no closed body of troops can be engaged.
The elementary tactics of cavalry are principally occupied in forming and deploying columns. In the organization of a regiment are the means for any for- mations and change of front.
Charge is increasing rapidity to its highest point, and giving the most powerful shock which can be exerted by a horse. The force of cavalry is concen- trated in a charge. Cavalrv in attack cannot change its front, it goes straight on; great relaxation follows the charge; cavalry exhausted and broken down by fatigue is powerless; with the increasing speed are the Hanks weakened; consequently great care is to be taken of the horses, they shall be properly employed in regard to their strength.
The charge shall be short, and the flanks protected..
30
ARTILLERY
It is a jiriiicipal jioiiit to perceive ilie proper nioiiieiit for allack. Surprise is superior to aiiv form.
The ladies of eavalry are most simple. The com- maiKJ is very (lidlctih, in it rests the secret of success. Where tJicrc is no genius^ there can never he jnaslvr- ship,
ARTILLERY.
Batteries are org^anized willi six or eight cannons (guns or liowitzers) mostly combined -^-^ howitzers. Heavy batteries are 12 pdrs., light batteries, flying" or mounted batteries, are 6 pdr. The 12 pdr. gun is drawn by 8 horses, the 6 pdr. by 6 liorses. The limbered cannon is 4 paces in breadth. 18 paces deep; to every cannon belong 20 to 30 men; a wagon Avith ammunition is drawn by 4 horses.
Properties when in j)ositionare : extremely destructive by fire: powerless in a hand to hand light; its Hanks much exposed to fire. Jn motion without efiect, and checked in some deijree by tJie ainniuMiiion rollowino;-. In general defensive, and fullills the conditions only satisfactory, if the troops are perfectly technically in- structed. The large range and the variety of tln^ j)ro- jectiles facilitate their employment.
The batteries are divided into half-batteries; platoons with two guns, and hall-platoons with one gun.
Artillery forms columns to concentrate the mass, or for movements before dej)loying in the order of battle. The intervals in position between the guns arc 12-24
ARTILLERY. 31
paces. The breadth of a battery is consequently 120 -200 paces.
The front presents to the enemy but few points to be aimed at, the flanks more, but the most, when the batteries are lo be limbered up and unlimbered, and that is therefore the weakest moment for about 15- 30 seconds.
Artillery is not bound to any normal position. The various projectiles and modes of firing render easy the means for any eventualities. Its defenseless state in conflict with other arms makes it necessary to be sup- ported by other troops. The elementary tactics of artillery are the simplest. The principal problem is to move quickly and surely, and to be ready for action in the shortest time. Proper control in a battle will be decisive.
The elementary principles here considered in gen- eral, lead to the following points to be observed in the battle :
1st. Ammunition not to be wasted without getting any advantage by it ; to be freely used if a great result is obtainable.
2nd. The strength of every troop is in its front ; the weak points are the flanks and rear ; consequently ; strength against weakness ; the means — rapidity, and surprise. The weakness of the flanks increases in ratio with the higher degree of movements. Artillery is ineflicient in motion, and defenseless in a hand to hand fight.
3rd. Infantry has three modes of formations for at-
32
CAVA I. in
tark. Artillory and cavalry oarh only onr. Artillery lires in position; cavalrv attacks in line — it follows:
Infdnfni aarains/ infantry : defensive : covered ijround; jirolected by reserves ; lire; open order or line; attack; column; nffensivp : fire; the enemy en- jraired ; deceive; attack with fire supported ; attack of the flanks; attack in the rear; the three forms com- bined.
Infanlnj against cavaJrjj : drfensice : covered by (Tround ; squares; reserve fire; offensive : fire; charge with bayonet.
Infintry against arliUerii : defensive : covered by ground; open order; line with intervals; according to circumstances open columns; offensive: open order; well directed fire; hand to hand iiirht.
Cavalry against infantry: defensive: ifpr^ssible, posted beyond the ranj^e of musketry; offensive: at short intervals, successive charges — best by divisions IbllowiniT each other at small intervals; succored by troops in the flanks.
Cavalry against cava'ry : the llaid;s ])r()le('lcd ; the flaidvs attacked.
Cavalry against artiUerji : defensive: open line; covered by ground; posted beyond the range of fire; ojfensive : open order; charge; hand to hand fiirht.
BATTLE. 33
ARTILLERY AGAINST LNFANTRY AND CAVALRY.
Defensive and offensive : fire ; supported by suc- cor.
JlrliUery against artillery: covered by ground; intrenched position ; heavy ordnance ; flanking posi- tion.
BATTLE.
Fight is battle ; bloody and destructive actions to break the physical and moral forces of the adversary. Whatever may be the real cause of a battle, the de- struction of the enemy are the means to succeed. Destruction is the tactical purpose of a battle. De- struction is not only the loss of men in a battle, but it also exerts a depressing influence upon the moral courage of the survivors. Principally in the latter is found the decision.
The loss of a batUe will be perceived by the lost ground, by the diminished reserves, botli cause the retreat.
The loss of moral power continues to increase after a lost batde, until the defeated troops have recovered sufficiently to resume the offensive. This moment of extreme weakness the victor should take advantage of. The losses in a battle are the killed and wounded; their number differs on both sides not much. The losses after a battle are prisoners and cannons taken
ol i!Ai'ii.i: OF 'J 11!: ri:r.M:.NT ti.mi:.
from llie defoatcd parlies — lliov are llio tropliic.*: of the victory, and the only means of estimatiiiir it.
Tlic moral elU'cl of a victory increases wiih tlie mass of the forces, wliich have been entraiicd in the battle. This is least in partial conllicts, most in j)itclu'(l battles, it ellecis not only the army, but also the very existence of the belligerent connlry ; it is of importance in regard to tactics, strategy, and politics. Those trophies, representing the victory, are to be obtained on the return from the battle field. The disposition should be chosen with the view of getting in the rear of the enemy, the success will be more probable and more decided. The tactical and strat- egical maiKenvres aim to cover or to attack the rear.
Three elements are combined in the victory.
1st. The loss of i)hysical j)ower.
2iid. The loss of moral ])()wer.
.3rd. The confession of these losses and the discon- tinuance of the war. This latter is often the (jnly proof of tlie coiupiest.
The loss of moral power can cause tlie defeat; the contrary will animate to the highest degree a victory. From the simple retreat to the complete defeat are maiiv degrees of victory ; every one is ol' imj^ortance lor strategy.
(JUAUACTF.R OF TUF BATTI.F. OF THF. PRliSEN'r TIME.
The losses in a battle are perceived by "the dimin- ished successive engaged reserves." In battles of the
BATTLE OF THE TRESE-NT TIME. 35
present time large masses of troops are formed in line, and one after the other; a proportional small part of them are engaged, they are replaced by another sim- ihir force. Darkness having closed the conflict, it will then be considered what has been gained, what lost, and by that determined eitiier to clear the field of battle, or to resume the battle the following ihw. Tills character of the battle is not accidental, because the armies opposed to each other are generally equal in armament, equipment and skill, and often comprise the whole force of a country, and therefore a defeat would be irreparable ; they should not be hazarded at once, only tlie necessary forces. The disposable forces, (tiie reserves,) exert a continual influence in a battle: they will render ffreat a(]"'dntao['e airainst an independent tactical body. By these means are de- termined the order of battle of the present time, the mechanism and the lead of the battle.
The order of battle disposes of the forces at the will of the commander to an unlimited extent. The progress of the battle is by successive engagements, and a slow consuming of the forces on each otlier in their efforts to exhaust the adversary. The one, whicli at the end of the battle has still strength and disposable reserves, is the victor. The success of battle at the present time is consequendy dependent upon the re- serves.
This characteristic feature is better expressed in pitched battles, than in partial conflicts, and still less, if the destruction of the enemy is not aimed at.
'A6 liATTr-E.
Sir.NIFICANCn OF nA'lTI.E,
^^■,u• at the present time is seldom eixied hy one pitched battle; it consists mostly of several battles, separated by space and time, whose intentions are based on variojis pnrposcs; they may be:
1st. The destruction of the enemy's forces.
2nd. Conquest or defense of any locality.
3rd. Conquest or defense of some object.
4ili. Sliam-baltle, to entice the enemy to imj^roper dispositions and movements.
The importance of these purposes decreases in the above mentioned classiliration. Battles of the second and third kind are; neirative for the defender, they will only he of value if tliey facilitate some jiurpose positive — some great success. It is a bad sign if negative battles are often fouirlit. The ifiiportance of the object to be ol)tained rules the battle, and conse- quently belongs to .strategy.
DURATION OF A HATTLF.
Duration, depending on relative resistance, on gain of time, is important, and leads to success. The du- ration of a battle depends upon essential circumstances, upon the troops opposed to each other, u[)on the ar- mament and battle-field, it has principally strategical importance. This inllnence exerts itself in tactics, in determining the intervals between the tro()])s and the reserves.
CATTLE VICTORY. 37
DECISIOV OF A BATTLE.
No battle of any importance will be ended in a moment, bnt in every battle there is a mpiijent from which it may be considered as either gained or lost.
1st. If a movable object whose possession has been purposed, is lost.
2nd. If an important locality, whose occupation has been purposed, is lost.
3rd. In pitched battles, if no ne\v reserves will be re- quired for succor.
The disposition of ihe reserves is therefore of infin- ence at the decisive moment. The events of a battle must determine the proper intervals between troops, beinir desisned for combined actions.
Is a strategical element, that renders success tlie greatest possible advantage.
The question arises here, what is to be done with the victory ? The arms opposed to each other, the nature of the ground, the tactical form will have to solve it. Great success is only gained by pitchcf! battles^ they are tlie first means for superior, and the last means for inferior forces.
The pitched battle is superior in importance to any other event in war. The highest qualities of the Chief will be perceived in the arrangements of tlie ■the means, in proper dispositions, in regard to localiiv, time and troops. 4
JS Ri:iiii:Ai — NUiin u.vitlk.
Tlie only means are tlie piirs^iiit of llie deftatcd Tor- res, ii lias also its degrees of eiieriry ; either the troops i'oljow or press on, or endeavor to cnl oil the retreal- m(r enemy. The success is the greater, the (luicker the enemy retreats, the more he is completely r<Mited.
Continued marches in the nitrht exert a most de- structive eflect on rctrealinij troops.
KE'i ul:at.
It is the most difficnlt prohlem to be solved in war. quick movements, scatterini^ of the troops cause ruin. Losses are inevitable, but they decrease in ratio if the power of resistance of the defeated trooj)s is not en- tirely lost. Success rests in the power of soul.
THE MCIIT BATTLE.
The efiect of a night battle is great, the greater, the less the enemy is prepared for it. The lead is ex- tremely diflicult ; it is piefcrahh', that only small forces shoidd be engaged, and under the following circum- stances : If the enemy is careless or too daring; if the moral power of the enemy is broken ; if the enemy's line is broken ; linally, under desperate circumstances ; but only under the coiuHlion, thai the enemy's mass is not posted near antl succor cannot be ordered timely enough to support the attacked forces.
•fIC.MFlCANCE OF NlMERICyVL SUPKRIORITV.
The more the forces equal each other in corporeal
RESERVES. 39
Strength, and the less the influence exerted by tlie genius of the Chief, the more important is superiority in number. If it is large enough, it will overcome counteracting circumstances, and will secure the vic- tory. Its presence alone often leads to success, with- out action. Consequently the maxim is to be ob- served, to deploy on a battle-field superior forces. If, according to circumstances, an absolute superiority caanot be had, (which it is not in the Chief's power) a relative superiority must be resorted to. Conse- quently superiority at the proper place. That's science — correct estimation of the enemy and of the battle- field; to distract the enemy's attention by false move- ments, quick attacks, animated activity; surprise is most sure against superiority. Consequently: it is an evil to divide the forces which renders any uniform action in a battle impossible, and may only be excused, if demanded, by unavoidable circumstances. Strategy knows no reserves, but the more a battle becomes par- tial, and no groat aim is in view, the easier can be esti- mated tlie force which would be required to secure success.
RESERVES.
They have two designs: to prolong — to renew the battle, and to be employed against unexpected casual i- ties. By their support they allow the troops to con- tinue the conflict with more security^ without being in danger of being cut ofl^"; to meet any approach of the enemy, and to correct any mishap in a battle, which
40 HAT II. i: (;R0I M) SOIL.
call never he lorsecii. Tliey an^ tlic iiu'aiis of injlii- enrini: a battle. Heserves are iiuli-speiisahle for llie iVee will of the Chief, without theni. he is eiilircly cliecked in his j/laii of operations.
OUDKR OF n.MTLE,
Is the arrangement and conibinatioti of single parts of the mass. Formerly it consisted of one mass. Modern limes broke these forms and divided the mass into parts. An army shonid not have too few nor too many parts — eight parts are to be preferred, divi- sions from 10 to :20,000 men; divisions with 4.-0 brigades, best brigades with t2,000 to -5,000 men each.
The cond)i:iali<)n of the three (l('j)arlments oi" arms is represented in tlie })arts oi' every army, which are designed to act independently, in divisions or corps but seldom in fjrigades. Tlie disj)osiiion of these parts in regard to eacli other, is not submitted to any restraint.
The order of battle of the j)resent lime is conse- quently the organization ami disj)osilion of an army in one co-operaling mass for battle. The parts are so cond)ined, that their (MUploymenl is rendered pos- sible and completely at the will of the Chief.
GUOl'.NO A.M) SOIL.
Ground in its general appeaianct- is eill'.er level or broken, I'ree from obstacles, or overgrown, or coin-
ELEVATED POSITIONS. 41
posed of all these kinds. These properties have a most decided influence on a battle, in regard to move- ments, free view, and cover against fire. By this influence the battle becomes more complex, and there- fore requiring more skill.
In undulating and covered ground, Cavalry is more or less ineflicient; Artillery less on account of the great range of its fire.
The superiority of Infantry over Cavalry and Artil- lery, is evident on ground, which renders movements diflicult.
IMPORTANCE OF ELEVATED POSITIONS.
The attack is more powerful from above than from below, and the effect of fire greater; the troops on elevated positions observe better. The particulari- ties of ground render it easy to cover the troops, to deceive and to surprise. Obstacles to any ap- proach hinder the employment of large forces. Some formations of ground cover against fire, without di- minishing the effect of fire at the enemy. The ground makes tactics an art. That party being in possession of the ground will have the advantage. Tiie groinid is the base of life for the weak. But it is only the means of attaining some purpose, the principal aim is battle and victory. The ground can be turned to great advantage by art. The auxiliary means to tac- tics, particularly for defense, are the field-fortification :
they are indispensable and of decided importance. 4*
42
nF.FENSR A\D ATTACK.
The p^roiind leriiitheiis llie duration of ihc halllr, faciii- laies a surrcssivo riii|)l«)\ nient of tlie forces, and com- pels to greater preeaniioi).
DEFENSi: A.\D ATIACK,
Defense is to resist and to be prepared for at lark, based on proper measures. 'Vhv l)e<rinning of .iciions is attack. Defense is to maintain, attack to <rain. In general it is easier to preserve than to jiain. Defense takes ailvanta^e of localities u\u\ of the contour of the ground. Ground particularly renders defense supe- rior in strength, even against a far superior mass. The defense is therefore considered the stronger form of actions of war. Confined to localities it can only have a nesjcative pmpose; if the defense can free itself from these chains, and become morally and numeri- cally superior to the adversary, it can prosecute positive purposes — it can attack and ijuin. Ihil even the defense can obtain a negative purp«)se by actions •. and not by remaining in a j)assive condition. Any lalioiial ojieralion of war will reject pure j)assiveness. The means of aciicMi for defense are to fue froui covered positions.
If the idea |)redominates, as it has often happened, that the (pialilies of the ground render success easy, which can oidy be obtained by troops, then a dispro- j)()rlion of actions of war aiiscs, which results in scat- tering the forces, line and cordon, aiul a less powerful attack will cause destruction. A defense, lost in self-
PLAN AND LEADING TO BATTLE. 43
delusion, builds — with the qiialiiies of the ground — the enemy a o-olden bridge.
Tlie attack is considered the weaker form of war, but wiilj a positive aim. The attack depends upon ground, if it gives more than a cover it is an obstacle ; its advantage rests in the numerical superiority, in sur- prise, in well selected points for attack.
The nature of defense and attack compared wiiii the previous named elements of conflicts, shows, that fire-arms have the superiority for defense, and are the only means to render defense possible.
Hand to hand fight corresponds with attack ; the latter will have greater success if the enemy has lost in strengtii and number; the destructive eflect rests principally in lire arms ; the preparatory means of he- ginning a battle are fire-arms.
Attack and defense each has two moments, the ac- tion of destruction, and the action of decision. The first learns also the position of the enemy, in order to take proper measures, and to make the disposition for furtlier action, and changes from the deploy to the most vigorous attack of fire-arms. This is the pre- lude to the second act, the decision, by hand to hand fight. This, in general, is the progress of a battle.
PLAN AND LEADING TO BATTLE.
To concentrate a superiority of forces at the deci- sive point, must be the principle purpose ; tliis point is in the fianks, or in the rear of the enemy, it can be in
44 n ATI Li: — oi 1 i:.\siVE.
front only by an improper disposition of the enemy, and by scatt('rin«r liis forces. A direet attack at the decisive point will seldom fiul of success ; the enemy would direct his forces to tluit point, and chansre his iVont. Consequently the enemy's attention must be distracted, that he may become uncertain about the designs, and may not coiuiteract by proper measmes.
The j)lan of a batilc contemplates the purpose of, and what is to be observed du rini: its projrress.
The leading into battle unfolds the plan, with re- gard to reciprocal actions of the enemy, which may frustrate the plan, but then another plan may be sub- stituted ; these possibilities are to be considered beforehand in the dispositions. I'he successive em- ployment of the forces are the only means to secure free action, — consequently reserves and columns are necessary.
RTLES rori PLANS OF I?ATT[.r.. OITKN SI V I-.
1st. The attack with tlu; whole i'orce against the enemy's flanks; generally only to be executed uiuler j)eculiar circiuustances.
'2m\. Oblique and echelon formations allord chance for success.
3rd. I^lrallel formations arc the worst.
TIh; oblique position is of value, if it ojiposes to the enemy superior forces; that position oidy is in- deed rejectable, which neglects the principle of supe- riority in forces ; the attack is only to be given up
BATTLE OFFE.NSIVE.
45
wlien the gToniul renders it inadinisable, or wlien the position of the enemy is too strong.
The advaiitaoe of a flaidv attack seems to be doubled
o
if botli flanks be attacked at the same time; but not so, if tlie forces have to be divided, unless every part should be strong- euouirh to succeed indepeudentlv, then it may be attacked in any way; maxim is to gain the flanks, to attack the flap.ks. Exceptions' can be made if the superiority in forces renders any success probable, but also the success becomes more decisive and cheaper, if the troops are guided and engaged ac- cording to tlie adopted maxims.
The flank-attack will have a chance of success, if proper measures are taken, and if the enemy does not change his position ; to prevent this : —
1st. The design is to be concealed from the enemy as long as possible.
2nd. The attack is to be commenced and ended with the utmost energy.
The means for both these maxims are : movement covered by ground, or in the night; false-attack, delu- sion, menace, &c.
Whatever may be the proportion of the troops on both sides, the rear is to be gained to secure victory.
Moral influence will animate physical strengtli.and may increase the power immeasurably, even in forces of inferior numbers; movements — marcli — :\re the means to action, and consequently : to know how to march, is a chief point in the lead of v>ar. Equip- ment— armament, exert an influence, besides activity.
46 n A 1 1 1. K — n f, f i: n s i \ e .
The coiulilions of war are to be conssidrred with tliose of ()r<raiiizalion ; and only a complete kiiowl- ed<,^e of the dciiiaiids of war can solve these questions ; if they are solved contrary to the rides of war, it is
DEFKNSIVE.
Defense is not oidy niiidc hy troops, but sustained by nature and art; it should not he passive; it must allow of any niovi'uiciit. ^Vllat a sham-light is tt) a battle, a proper selected ground is for defense ; it en- tices the enemy to advance to localities, which will render his approaching most destructive ; the design must be to have the enemy's forces divided, and to render impossible uniform action by his troc.ps. Ii;- trcnchcd positions combined with natural obstacles are best for tiiose purposes, they renth-r dilllcidt any attack, facilitate the movements, and protect the Hanks.
ill ii'gard to tlic (lis|)osiiion of balllc, the d('fensi\e lorccs should oiler the strongest resistance at the j)oint, where liie fight is holiest; this is generally not in their jiower, oflen nol until towards the close of the battle.
Groimd .-liotdd be prolecled bv lire, and lire should be covered b\- <rroun(l ; to obtain that, will recpiire in- trenc hmeiit, which is tlu; true element of defense. The Held-fortilication is its lu-rve. The artificial groinid renders defense less dependent than ilie natural,
MAXIMS DEFENSE ATTACK. 47
it is therefore superior, and best for the positive part of defense, for the act of decision ; the defense then becomes attack.
TACTICAL MAXIMS. DEFEXSE.
1st. Co^'ered positions for the troops. 2nd. Not to be surprised.
3rd. The troops should be successively engaged. 4th. The battle order should have more deplli than frontal breadth.
5th. Reserves should be posted sidewards.
6th. There should be no inattention.
7th. Intrenclied where no action will be desired.
8lh. In the engagements the utmost enerofv is to be
DO 0»
exerted.
9th. Perseverance and energy in execution. lOtii. Great risk for a great object.
ATTACK.
1st. Sham-manoeuvres, surprise.
2nd. To deceive with few men, and to attack the point of decision witli a large force.
3rd. Flank attack w-ith combined forces.
4th. Long lines to be avoided.
oih. Reserves ready for action.
6th. Principal point to drive the enemy from the battle field.
JS KMn.oV.Mr.M v)I- TROOPS GROI .\P.
7ili. Tlio lead of ilif batile should not be checked by llic plan of operation. - ^
Sill. To prosecute a j^rcat aim, >
0;h. Energy and system in tiie execution.
L>iri.(i\ .m::nt or tkoops.
1st. T!i(! fire-anack precedes the hand lo hand fiiiht. Arlillei-y is for this juirjiosc concentrated at the nioj^t imj)orlanl p<»ints, suj)p()rte(l by infantry; cavalry is posted in the rear of infantry. Artillery op(Mis fire, infantry tleplovs in open order and line and advances; fire at the mass, finally attack by columns; cavalry follows closely.
'2nd. This mechanism of battle gives the rides also for liie order of march of combined lrooj)s.
.'3rd. If a large mass is concentrated, artillery and cavalry reserves will be formed.
•llli. If the mass designed for action is ordered to advance at the decisive moment, it must be animated with the utmost courage.
f5:h. Horse artillery and cavalry are best to attack the rear and to pursue.
GROUND.
1st. The ground often is an obstacle to approach, and covers positions and movements; this is particu- larly important; the first ([uality renders easy only defense, the second, defense and attack.
EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS GROUND. 49
2ii(l. Obstacles to any ap[)roach are important : (a)^ to cover flanks; (b)^ to strengthen fronts; flanks can be perfectly protected by impassable ground, by rivers, swamps, lakes, etc.; any ground which is not impass- able will not give suflicient security, it requires troops, reserves; intrenched positions will be essentially ef- fective. Any obstacle in front is of value, if it renders defense easy and approach difficult.
Declivities (or slopes) may be considered as ob- stacles; the first line will be posted at the first height; or this shall be posted with skirmishers, and the first line posted so far back, that the enemv, the moment he approaches the height, will be in the most destruc- tive fire.
Obstacles — rivers, creeks, narrow-passes, etc., will cause the enemy to break his front, he will have to re-order his front, which will check his advance. Con- sequently, they must be occupied in the range of fire ; artillery 400 to 600 paces distant, infantry about 200 paces. But the resistance rests not alone upon the fire, columns are in readiness for action on a distance from 600-800 paces.
An applicable method is also, that artillery occu- pies the ground in the range of its fire, 1000-1500 paces from the obstacles; but this needs only to be done when the obstacles are of some magnitude.
Isolated obstacles may be : (a)^ steep hills ; (they must be intrenched;) (b), defiles, bridges, dams, ra- vines, by which the enemy can approach only at one point. If the enemy should be compelled to pass
OU cHoiNns — vir.i,Aui:s — low .\s.
ilnoii^h a certain dt'lllc, ihe whole force is jxislcd at the poiiii wlieie the fire is mosi deslriiclive ; a con- .si(lcral)k' lorcc slioiild he posted in the real lor support, in case the eiiemv may have sn-ceeded in jjassiiijr niiohserved at some j)hic('. and is aliaclxi;i<r from the rear.
vir.T.AHF.s. 'l•()^^^■s.
\l the forces arc to he icdicd upon, and ihey cairy oti tlie war with enthusiasm, tlie defense in houses of a few men airainsl far superior forces is ofien possihie.
1st. It is in <reneral l)etter to occupy j^ardens and houses with skirmishers, the approaches widi arliUery, and to post the hirirpr j)art ol' the forces, foimed in (•(diimiis, in the place, or in the rear of it. covered l)y some means, lint in rcachness for aciion, if the encmv enters.
•Jiid. If those points are desitrued for oreal operations, liie troops shouhl he constantly on their ijuard, anil prcj)ared lo support relrcatiuii troops, 'riii-se jxtints should h(^ defended lo the last exiremity.
.'^rd. rndnlalin^- i;ronnd, overflown land, houses, e!c., cover positions and moMinenls; the troops are formed in colunms lo Ijicilitate these movements.
The attackinir li<K)])s have more dilliculiies in cover- nii; iheir m<irch than the lrooj)s have in difendino- their j)usition.
•4ih. I /I Idhinii piisilioii nunj he oh.scrml :
(I, One or hoth Hanks shall rest on im])assable •rround.
GROrxns ATTACK RKTRLa i'. Ol
Z/, Free view in front and flanks.
f, The approaoli in front obstructed.
r/, Covered pof?ition of llie troops.
r, Favoralilc L'Tound for retreat ; it maybe nmhi- latin<r; but the deliles not too near.
5. For atlack is obserced :
r/. To march to the battle fiehl throngli ijround wbicli renders (bfFicnlt any observation.
hn For atlack, a point should be selected, \vhos(> formation does not ren(!er too dillicidt the movements of the troops.
(i. Too much confidence must not be placed in the strenijih of the groimd ; it should never inckice to pas- sive defense. Inaccessible ground should be avoided, and is therefore of no value.
Ground which is an obstacle sliould be only occu- pied for partial defense, in order to resist with an in- ferior, a projiortional superior force; to gain lime — to resume the ofTensive; the victory may be gained under favorable ciicumsiances, and by pro])er measures.
PART SECOND.
EMPLOYMENT OF THE TROOPS.
EATTLCS O.V LEVEL UXCOVEREIJ NOT UXDLLATING
GROU.ND.
This kind of ground does not cover nor protect against fire, and does not check the movements; for attack these properties are ftivorable, they are the true elements for cavalrv. The employment of troops on level ground is elementary. Superiority in number is of predominating significance, if strong enough, it will overcome valor and skill. It lias only to conquer the intensive power which exists in every troop. This power increases geoiuetrically with the increa.-e of the mass.
ELEMENTARY BATTLES.
Infantry against Infantry — in general. — The bat- tle of Infantry has mostly three moments, dis])Osition. deployment, decision.
In disposing the forces we should endeavor to get perfectly acquainted witli the movements and position of the enemy^bv forced reconnoisance. 5*
54 EI.EMKMARV BATTLES.
Deployment is iho action of (Icstniriion, tlic tiir- atlack; it lasts till the intensive force of the enemv is broken. Tlieoretirally, its duralion rnnnnt be deter- mined; besides nnnierical slrenijtb, the condition of the troops has inllnence.
It may be observed : a combined briiradc can resist a troop hall' superior in slrcnijth for 1 to 1 .\ hours, a division '2 to 3 hours; three or four divisions double this time, (4-6 liours,) and 8-10 divisions four-fold iliis lime, (16-24 hours).
The decision aims at the final expulsion of the enemy from the battle-field, by a hand to hand fiirhl. These tiiree moments are not expressed in all battles. In conflicts of small |)arties the second moment is often omitted ; the third moment is not forced to the utmost.
Tiiese three moments are most distiiicilv «'X|)resse(l in battle of large forces, which nearly ecpial in com- pletion and number; in this case also, a hand to hand flight will he avoided, and the field left by one or the other j)arty, before it comes to a decision.
One parly may perceive in time, that in the battle nolliinir will be irained, and theri^fore the battle will be disconliniied. Wlialever the cnciimsiances mav he, these three njomenls shoidd be carefully consid- ered. Fresh troops are required for every moment, and the rule is therefore to have the order of battle divided into three; j)ar!s. 'i'he stren>rth of the troops for every pari dej)ends u|)on the importance of these m(»meiils. The disposition reipiires the least number
EI,E3IE\TARY BATTLES. 55
of troops, the deployment the most. This leads to a certain rule in regard to the numerical proportion of the parts, ^ at the utmost for the preliminary engage- ment— advanced troops ; ^ at the utmost — deployment — mass ; \ at the least for decision — reserves.
Smaller parties have no reserves; in large bodies the reserves are reinforced. The open order is the element of the preliminary engagement — the line, that of deployment — the column, that of decision.
In the beginning of the battle, the distance of these parts from each other is determined by their strength ; it may be, from the range of a rifle shot to a half a day's march ; if the advanced troops are not independ- ent enough in themselves, they have to be posted in front of the main body, not farther off than from 300 to 400 paces; in this positon |- to ;^ of them form open order, the rest is about 80-100 paces either be- hind the centre or behind both wings of the chain ; this mode renders easy relief, reinforcement and suc- cor; the chain is extended to the right and left, to cover the front and flanks of the main body. If the main body consists of some battalions, it may, accord- ing to circumstances, be divided into two battle lines, posted one behind the other, with about 80-120 paces interval between each other; they are designed to re- lieve and support each other mutually; therefore the distance should not be greater than is required for regu- lar movements.
The mass is in line or in columns ; the line is rather
56 r.AirLES of si.xr.i.n hattai.io.x-.
r«)r defence, the coliiinii for allack ; tltc line is noi al- \\a\s cloijed, if llie reserves are near, it may have some iniervals. The enemy^'s fire is thus n iiilered less efleciive, iis own (ire more deslrueii\i .
The reserves should be in columns, iheir distance from the main hody should depend upon ihe mntiial streno^th : if the lrooj)s are inferior in strengdi. it should he 200 to 300 paces, they are either behuui thecentic or the flanks of the main hody.
With ihi'se piineiples any fundamental order of bat- tle can be formed wiihonl re;^ard*to the ground.
Tiiis order of battle is based upon tiie following maxims :
(a.) Columns.
(b.) Successive employment of the li-oops.
(c.) The Chief not to be checked in thr" lead (hir- ing the progress of the battle.
(d.) Tlie forces which are not eniraircd shall he covered against the enemy's hre.
f:XAMl'I.ES.
TtdlfJes of Sivglc BiiffdJimis — dcfcnac^ pnsilinn. — ff, reserves are tiol required; /», the main body may be in line or in column, in order to meet the enemy's ailack,
i. 7V/r .Main Jiodi/ furmrd in Line. — 'i'lic greatest ellect results from the lire <>f the mass. An ojicn chain of skirmishers at a distance of 300 paces covers the line; 80 to 100 ])aces behind each wing of the chain IS a reserve.
BATTLES RETREAT. 57
Progress of the Bat'Je. — The skirmishers are en- gaged ; they are supported by reserves, they fall slowly back. The front of the mass will be unmasked as soon as the enemy approaches witliin the ranj^e of fire, the skirmishers rally on the flanks of the mass, if they are still in condition to render assistance in the conflict. The line delivers its fire at the command of the Chief, and continues the (ire until the enemy is about fifty paces distant; then charg-e with the bayonet or retreat, according to circumstances ; fire at the files c €JJf the retreating enemy; skirmishers deploy and pur- sue; the first position of battle line is reformed; in this position the battle line remains or pursues accord- ing to circumstances. The offensive is t!ie last means for the defender; the strength and condition of the enemy determine the moment, and whether it shall be resorted to. A battle can only be discontinued if the strength is not broken; the enemy must be opposed by new imposing forces.
2. The Main 'Body is formed in CoJinnns. — The most stress is laid upon the fire of the skirmishers, which is continued with energy; closed columns fol- low ; the exhausted are relieved; finally attack before the troops are too much fatigued.
RETREAT.
The enemy cannot pursue with rapidity, it is there- fore not diflicult to retreat. The main body is covered
Ob! i:aiili.s of sf:vi:hal n.vTrAi.KtNs.
hy the cliaiii df sikiniiisliiMs, all at ur.cv rclreat in order.
.lilac/: — ])osil}on : open order and coiuniiis.
The 8l;iinii:s!iers engaged a.id reinforced; ilio ail- vanced troops of the enemy ."should be repwlj^ed and re- strained l)y /ire and alarm.
The main bodij : lire, if rccpiired ; atiaclv snpj)orled by the skirmishers.
Pursuit (ir rclrcnl : in ihc latter ea-o ihe troops fall back beyond the range of the eiiemv's lire.
BAITI.KS OF SEVHIIAL 15 ATT A I. ION S.
Defense : two ballle-Iines and or.e reserv(>.
Proirress of ihe Balile. (lispusiliou. — Thi advanced troops are engaged; they coniinue liring and lorce the enemy to dejiloy, the front will be nnmasked ; llic ijiaiji h.xlij will \ni engaged: fire, partial allacks; tlie balile-lines have to be relieved, thi.s shall be ihnie at a panse (hiring the eniragement, o"r in eond)ination with a bayonet eluuge; ihc IVt)nt battle-line falls back ihnjujrh the middle l)altle-line ; irreat caution is to be observed.
JJulies if llie reserve — They cover and .snj)port the liaidcs; relieve the main body; ciiarL^e with the bayo- net; jjursiiii; relical in Ut\\n of eciielon^s or sncces- >ively in battle-lines.
'i'iiis (Mily is to be done if the em my is hotly })i-essing. The intervals beiweeii the batlli'-lines are sniaM. As soon as circumstances will allow, fresh
IXl'ANTRY AGAINST AND WITH CAVAI.RV. 59
troops are ordfred lo support the nuiin b()(]y ; a rear guard is to be ordered also.
AUack — position : chain, support, columns.
Disposition : forced reconnoissance ; dej^loy; skir- mishers; sliam-maiKPuvres ; the mass secretly to be concentrated against the principal point of attack; company columns will render movements and sham- niancKuvres easy; they should be concentrated in pro- per time and in readiness for attack in the flanks; fire by the mass.
Decision : attack of the whole force, pursuit or re- treat. C;ival:y and artillery must not be wanting in the co-o])eia!i(^n, if success is to be expected.
IXFANTKY AGAINST AND AYITH CAVAI.r.Y.
Level ground is the element for cavalry, and that it can make gomplcte use of its rapidity. Cavalry is four to five times quicker than inOintry, it passes the most favorable range of fire-arms in 15 to 20 seconds. The fire of cavalry is inefiective, its power is the charcre and tlie hand to hand fioht. Infantry ao-ainst cavalry must be defensive ; if cavalry can be preventerl jrom cliarging, idl is gained, this only can be done by well directed volleys.
The formation of the mass is of importance in at- tack ; every weak point should be reinforced, no flanks, no rear, (ul all sides must be strength and front; if the ground aflbrds not protection.
The form in which infantry fights and protects it-
00 INFANTRY AGAINST AND WITH CAVAI.RV.
self against ravaliy is, tlie scpiare and mass; nn con- (lilioii that this forniatioM can he done in the quickest linio ; the posiiion uIdhc rciKh-rs any success favorable ; the fi-onts of the square sliouhl be shorter, than those of the attacking columns. Battalions form best tlie squares of the breadih of a couqiaiiy, or ol' that of a platoon; companies may form squares o! the breadth of platoons or half-j)laIoons ; smaller sections and skirmishers lorm irregular masses; lamer bodies than battalions form l)attalion scpiares ; tiiese s(|uares in position of echelons will render mutual assistance possible.
Tlie squares mav bo so combined that oiu^ corner rests on that of anollier s(|uare, aiul forms an iuuue- diale connection. This fornuition is of inq)ortance. if the enemy's line shall be broken. Advanced skir- mishers fall back to the corners of the s([uares, or in ihe centres of them.
Prlnci [ilrs : not to be su!j)rised durinii^ formations or ill movements ; the mass ordered for action shall be comj)lelelv closed and united in whatever form they mav attack; self-jiossession ; supported by skirmishers as long as j)ossible ; the (ire as iwar as j)ossi!)l(\
Cara/ri/ : its ellorts should be to surj)rise infantry in its movements and during its formations. No mat- ter by what means this may be done.
If this fails, infantry must be engaged in some way anil caused to fire at improper distances, and then is the moment lor charge; open order may render easy
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 61
an attack; an unfailing but a dear metliod is quickly repeated charges, to prevent reloading.
Attack is best against one and the same point. IT several squares are formed, that square will be at- tacked which can be the least supported by others; the attack is executed in open platoons or open squad- ron-columns.
Remarks : 1st. Cavalry attacks rarely in closed col- umns; this form has sometimes been applied in battles of the present time with heavy cavalry at decisive moments.
2ud. Cavalry should not expose skirmishers to trie fire of infantry, except to entice or to provoke it; alarm, smoke, may often be applied with some success.
3rd. Rapidity is superior to fire; against an inferior enemy any form is strong.
Infantry attacks cavalry very seldom, and requires no further explanation.
If cavalry alone or combined with other arms, is opposed to infantry, it will force upon it the following considerations :
1st. Greater precaution.
Und. The open order near to the mass.
3rd. The movements are in some way checked.
4th. Order of batile is unfavorably exposed.
5th. The initiative actions are lost.
This result is important in the battles of infantry,
if cavalry on one or the other side is the auxiliary
troop. Cavalry takes advantage of all weak points of
the enemy, and is best for a successful pursuit or to
6
(V3 INFANTKV AGAINST AND Wl'lH A li I 1 1.I.F, liV.
cover a rftirat. Cavaliy, the auxiliary of iiifantrv, shoiilil be near it. Cavalrv opjioscd to far superior forces should be posted williiti squares of infantry.
INFANTRY AGAINST ANP WITH Ainil.I.F.IlV.
Artillery can only he of value hv iir(> in position. Its rani:e of i'wv is from five to six limes trreater than the ranoe ol" other fire-arms ; its irieatesi elleet isairainst the mass. Artillery is to be j)rotecte(l by troops, which are jjariicularily ordereci-to su|)jiort it. consisiin>r in jreneral of one-hall t(^ one s{|tia{lron of c:i\alrv. or o!ie-half to one comjianv of iiilimirv. in this case we will consiiler infantr\' in an oll'ensixc state against ar- tillery.
Inlantrv will haxc to li^ht two enemies, ilie cannons and the support; the puri)ose of attack may be to drive the artillery from its position. The capture of the cannons can he ell'ected only under jx'culiar cir- cumsiances.
^Ma.ri//ts : the skirmishers advance, lirint,'- aL'^ainsi men and horses, the support follows in such loi-m and direction as to be the least exposed to the enemy's lire; the support observes well all the movements of the t?nem\''s sup[)oii, and endeavors to irain tiuMlaidvs, or better still, to trc't between the siij)j)orland thei,'-ims ; if this cannot be prevented, and the enemy's skir- mishers are repidsed, his artillery will limber up and fall back. Artillery will have to observe : fire aj^ainst
INFANTRY, CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY. 63
mass ; its support is not posted behind ilie position of the guns, and shall not be in the way to check its movements or its line of lire; if the enemy's skir- misliers get too tr(MibIesome, artillery falls back; ar- tillery combined with infantry observes :
Defense : 1st. Well selected positions for a destruc- tive file.
2nd. Not to be exposed to the enemy's fire.
3rd. If the enemy attacks, to fall back.
4th. Fire against the mass.
5th. Not to be separated without good reasons.
Attack : 1st. Positions which do not check the for- ward movements.
2nd. Not exposed.
3rd. Not to approach within range of fire.
4th. Fire against artillery.
0th. Artillery concentrated.
If artillery is combined with infantry, the fire con- flict is generally more intense, and the duration of the battle prolonged, particularly in the beginning.
Artillery and cavalry are of great value, both in pur- suit and in retreat.
The security of artillery, in combination with other arms, can lead to unfavorable positions; if posted in the centre, it renders ditlicult any control, command and movements; the position is best on tjie wings and supported by companies or a battalion.
The Batteries should not be separated, exceptions may be, it long fronts and squares are formed, the divi-
G4 ARIII.I.KIiV A(;AI.NsT AKIILLCIIV.
sion in platoons may then he best ; in the roar of halleries no troops sliould be posted.
AUriI,I,i:ilV AfJAINST AKTILLKIIV.
Battles, in wliich ai-iiilt'iy is rulinix, are not in open Held; it is the anxiliary of the oilier troops; ibis ex- cludes not the maxims A^r its employment ; these are,
1st, inenieienl in movements.
2nd. Vulneral)le in the Ihmks.
3r(l. l^nfavorably expostnl al the moment of limbcr- inir and unlimherinir tlie i,Mins.
The llanks shall not he exposed to the enemy's lire, but the enemy's Hank siionld be fired at, to force the eneniy lo change his position ; and to lire at the moment of limberin<r; the position of artillery shall be covered by any obstacles in front, without being hin- dered in its lire; the most favorai)l(' nioniciit for lire- attack is al a distance of about -lOO jiacts. llic range of ^rape shots. A greater number of cannons, heavier ordnance, raj)idity in liring, are of imjjortance ; if one })arl is superior to die other in oims and calibre, ihe inferior part must manti'iivrc wilii skill and j)r('caulion lo overcome the disadvantage.
Of great value is rapidity in movements; Hying and nioiiiiled arlilleiy will have ihcrcfore some advantage over heavy artillery ; by their movements their ability to lire (piicker, to approach nearer; they are sullicienl- ly recouij)eiise(l for the latd; of heavier ordnance.
CAVALRY ARTILLERY. 65
111 clianginir positions, the guns may be divided in two parts, one continues firing-, tlie other falls back, takes position, and begins fire, then the one in front falls back, and so on alternately.
ARTILLERY AGAIXST AND ^\lTll CAVALRY.
Cavalry against artillery is in a decidedly unfjivorable position as long as it cannot get into a hand to hand figlit ; its fire is of no value •, its rapidity alone will ren- der the accomplishment of its purpose easy. An un- expected attack in open order, supported by a reserve which observes the movements of the supportingtroops of the enemy's artillery, is of great importance. The weak moments of artillery are rendered to advantaue.
Cavalry combined with artillery, is rapidity with the greatest eflect of fire ; notwithstanding if op])osed to cavalry, it requires favorable circumstances, and great skill to turn it to advantage; the reason is, cavalry rarely halts in position, and therefore artillery will have to fire at cavalry in motion.
Artillery commences attack, and covers the retreat; posted in the centre of a battle-line, it will check its movements. Artillery opposed to infantry, is an ex- cellent support to break the squares, and to loosen their compactness.
CAVALRY AGAINST CAVALRY.
It is most difficult to give rules which cavalry against cavalrv will have to observe. ' 6*
66 CAVAi.ifV ai;ai.nst cavalry.
\>\. Its rapidity is jrieat.
*Jii(l. lis wcaknoss in the llanks iunrascs in ratio as- its iVoiilal sirciiL^lli increases.
'3r(l. Tlie rliarire jroes stiaii^lit on, and the dircclion cannot be clian<red (liirin«r its forward movements.
4tli. In one moment extremely powerful, in the other totally e.xhaiisted.
Therefore, it may l)e observed :
Isl. 'Vo sii!j)ri>e in a moment, when the least re- sistance can he maile.
2nd. Front attacks are t(^ he avoided, principally those with sliorl fronts.
3rd. Tlie llanks constantlv covered hy tro(>j)s hein«^ ordered for these duties.
4th. The moment for char^re properly selected.
5ih. The troops as litth' fatiufued as possible.
All this is at the will of the connnandiuij olVicer, but the moments change <[uickly ; it is more dillicull to lead cavalry than any other arm ; on level irround, tj'oops of (Mpial excellence, and the Ciiiefs jiossessins:^ e(}ual intelligence, the chance of success will he on that side which is superior i;i number.
Cavalry can l)e emjiloNcd to attack at the same time, front and Hanks.
Res(M"ves follow at a |u-ope;- distance to support the llanks ; (laiiking att;ick is ol' great advantage, tiie eche- lon-form leads to it; if the grouml is not favorable for flanking movements, movements in echelons must be resorted to. The formation in line is best for attack ; rule is to spare the strength of the troops for
I
INFAXTRY, CAVALRY AND AKTILLERV. 67
Uie proper moment-, sham attacks will cause the enemy lo take wrong measures; in pursuit, precaution ; all movements most simple; cavalry must be perfectly skilled in performinij its duties, i[ it is to be of value.
Attacks of cavalry have two moments : disposition and decision — beginning and ending ; a proper disposi- tion will secure success; the enemy should be enticed to improper movements ; whilst the real designs are concealed ; liglit cavalry and open order are tlie best ineans for this.
Cavalry attacks quick; and tlie quicker the most complete the success; larger bodies have to mantjeuvre with a front and a rear battle-line in conformity with mutual movements and actions.
INFANTRY CAYALRY ARTILLERY.
These three arms combined, are the strongest and m<^st independent.
Cavalry and arlillery combined mith iiifonlry : 1st. 5f the parts of infantry (for instance divisions) are independent.
':hu\. If smaller forces receive orders of suel^ impor- tance that it is necessary to strengthen them.
In both cases, one squadron of cavalry is ordered Co a battalion; for larger bodies the slrenglh of cav- alry Vv'iil not exceed otie regiment; artillery is rarelv ordered more than one-half or one battery.
Both these arms are in the capacity of auxili- aries of inf\\ntry ; their duty is to assist infantry in
68
CAV.M.iiv — AU1 ir.i.r:KV,
«'l)lainiriir '>•'' •'liiu '>>' aiiin-k ; in rases whcro iiifantrv is not sti()n<r cnoijfj^h to snccocil by its own stioiiglli; the point o\' (lopcndcncf shall be sliicllv ob^icrved ; the duties ()f llic auxiliaries are:
AUncI: — cavulni : to scout, to support ibe skirmish- ers and the attaekinir colunnis; under certain circum- stances, it may maiueiivre in the llanks; it covers retreat and j)iusues.
^■irtillcnj : the enemy's ariillcrv lired at; theaftack prepared; in the pursuit assisiinir; tiie retreat cov- ered.
DcfrnbC — cavalnj : it will cover the llaidvs.atid will take advanta<^e of imj)rojH'r measures or weak mo- ments of the enemy; the atlackini^ columns shall be su])portod ; the j>ursuit resisted; the retreat covered.
.IrllUcri/: lli<> allackinir mass of the enemy lired at; the pursuit resisted; the retreat covered.
In general : the auxiliaries shoidd not be too jnucb fatigued before tlie batlle beconx's decisiAc; the am- munition of artiller\' shall not be wasted without having some pm-pose in view. A further advaiitai^^e of combined arms is, that ihe fnc is more destructive ; the reconnoisance is rendered easier; the llanks are belter protected; tl)e llanks can he. more easily turned; iidanlry in a slale of great relaxation can be easily siij)porte(l ; mutually greater j)recaution can be observed; the retreat and jiursuit will be done by luiiform action, and will he essentially sujiporled.
MECHANISM OF THE ORDER OF BATTLE. 69
RULES OF DISPOSITION DEFENSE AND ATTACK.
Infantry: mass formed in line or C(:»lumns wilh ad- vanced troops; artillery (in the rear of this mass in column) covered in rear of tlie mass; cavalry covered in rear of artillery.
Meduinism of the order of bailie ; defense : Artillery commences firing as soon as the enemy advances within the range of its fire; its position is in the battle-line, on some point from where its fire will be most destructive ; it is of value to change the position as little as possible; and to remain concen- trated. The front of the first battle-line should be pro- tected by grape shots; if the battle-line extends itself more than 500 paces, the artillery should be divided in unequal parts; the positions are better on the wings than in the middle ; cover by ground is most import- ant; the intensity of the fire depends upon the critical moment of the battle.
Cavalry in general is in reserve and in readiness for attack ; smaller troops scout on tlie flanks ; the enemy's cavalry is rarely attacked ; the infantry should be sup- ported to the utmost; the enemy's infantry will be attacked (successively) at proper moments; for in- stance if an advancing column halts or deploys for fire action, or retreat; the enemy's troops must be pre- vented from turning the flanks; the retreating troops should be pursued ; your own retreat covered ; in all these cases the auxiliaries are to support.
70 Mi:( iiAMs.M OF I in: ounr.K of nATii.n.
./illach'. — Cavalrv reromioitrriiiL^ ; thf^ cnoniyV ;nl- vanccd troops should hv it'|nils(Ml l)y ligl»l iroops, sup- ported hy cavalry; artillery will sil'.Mice the (Miciny's artillery ; the main body advances for attack, accom- panied l>y artillery to the range of grape-shols ; lire at the niMss ; it repulses open and closed lines; skir- mishers deploy supported hy columns ; the attack hecomes partial; cavalry is near, and lakes advanlajre of (avorahle accidents ; if the mass of tlu^ enemy falls l)ack, cavalry pursues; during these actions the other forces occupy the enemy\s position. If the attack should he repulsed, cavalry will delay the enemy in his attacks, that the repulsed troops may restore their order. If. with the attack on the front, the Hank can he attacked, then for tliis purpose one-fnurlh t)f the streu^lh of forces is ordered.
:sio\ I'. M i: N r s i \ i; a i 1 1 . i: .
JMd.r'iDis : The trooj>s heini; comj)l('tely ready for aclioH, will lake the shortest route to the hallle-licld ; the colunms and maiui-uvi-es with single ])arts will render easy the j)urpose ; tlie dilK'renl arms will sup- port each other, if one h)iius a sironir j)osiiion, the other will resort lo a weak form, as necessity recpiires.
m:THEAT.
The retreat is llie imxt (hllicult problem afteralost battle; besides the uiifavoiable siiualion in regard to
RETREAT PURSUIT. 71;
the enemy, tlie (lepressed state of the troops is aggravat-- ing; the troops must be animated to self-confidence by anv means; the enemy mnst be resisted to the utmost.
Consequently: the troops must ntit be separated, and in no way checked in their retreat; infantry formed in columns; skirmishers in the intervals ; the artillery- manoeuvring. Cavalry attacks according to circum- stances; if the enemy pursues hotly, the retreat willi be in batile-Iines, artillery combined and supporting iui the successive retreat, it takes po«:ition on the right or- left llank of the second or middle battle-line, (or ar- tillery may be divided and a part ordered to each bat-- tle-line.)
Tiie rear guard wiliaflord the security if the ground is favorable ; the enemy in his pursuit must be checked, that the main body may gain time toi retreat in such order as circumstances will allow ; and to have the communications with the different troops unintersected. Movements and resistance must be done at proper mo- ments; troops shall be placed in ambush; the lead becomes most important, it requires particular caj)aci-- ties of genius and heart; best to retreat in the night.
PURSUIT.
The enemy must be constantly alarmed in rear and' flanks, he will thereby he forced to greater haste in his retreat, and be thrown into greater disorder, which produces great physical and moral weakness.
iKPUisi: AM) AM nrscADr..
BRKAKI.XC; THKOrCill 1 M i: r..M:MV
1.1 m:
Confidence niiisi not, even in the most (listressiMf:^ situations, he h)sl, ilie utmost must he done.
Infuntrv eohimns eonrentiale themselves into wedjje form; aitilU'rv joins the troops at projicr jxiinls, the wagons will he taken in the middh;; eavalry ojiens the way for the van-fruaids ; if cavaliy is not slrong^ enougii, it must he taken in \\\o middle of the ci^lumns ; no precipitation ; ail must he well considered; night is best to succeed.
SIRPRISE AM) AMIirsCADE.
On level ground a surprise is only possible in ihe night; surprise will render advanlaiie, because, the at- tacked troops are in a weaker tactical and m a weakei- moral state; if any success can he exj)ecte(i, the sur- l)rise must be kept secretly ; the main attack is against llanks and rear; sham-attacks, by (•ond)inati()n of all the troops, may be important. Tiie lead of a night battle is somewhat dilllcidt; therefore oidy propor- tionally small forces will be employed.
Jlmbuscadcs are excellent means in retreat, to ren- der the pursuing enemy more cautious; they are of value, if the enemy is careless, or the ground too rough, to allow him a careful reconnoissance and a quick deployment.
BATTLES GROUND. 73
BATTLES IN COMRINATION WITH GROUND.
Ground changes from the j^entle slope to the inac- cessible bluff, either covered or intersected, or both ; these peculiarities designate the character of the coun- try or ground; they are : rolling huid, hilly-land, mountains, flat-land, etc.
These peculiarities of ground have influence on the employment of troops, they render the movements difficult, they conceal, they cover against fire. The effect is not the same for the different arms; artillery and cavalry have more difficulties, infantry less.
Undulating and covered ground is to a certain ex- tent the theatre for infantry, whereas cavalry and artillery are entirely checked in their actions; the three arms combined have the greatest strength, and it must therefore be considered, which ground may he selected for employment of the combination ; but such a choice is seldom allowed by the prevailing circum- stances; the problem is to employ only those troops which best suit the present battle ground, and the others to be posted in reserve ; but in such a position and state of readiness, that, if in the progress of the battle, the ground changes, and will admit their em- ployment, that it can be done without loss of time — tliaVs tactical art.
The peculiarities of ground render the inferior forces strong, if they understand how to use them properly ; but it is only of value, if the space is in proportion to the forces ; any disproportion turns to
74 ItATlLK^ GROUND.
(lisa(lvaiilao[P ; a disproportion will exist, for instance: if llie prinri|i!(' of l)atile-or(!er, the roliunn forma- tioii is sacrificed to the line formation. It iuis also essential influence on the lead and control of the battle; the uniformity of actions is more or less lost, by the aggravated control and the aj^gravaled movements. The single parts heconje more or less independent. The accidents and cliances of the bat- tle are entirely in their power; trilling eventualities often cause decided consequences. The leader can only exert an influence on the progress of the battle, if he can employ new forces; but their employment may also involve difliculties. Under such changing circumstances the numerical superiority loses to a certain extent its importance; the efliciency of the troops and moral power will excel; with perfectly reliable troops, that can be executed on ground pro- perly rendered to advantage, which never could be expected even on level ground; it follows — that the efliciency of the troops forms the base of the com- binations of battles.
For battle order, on grounil ol" peculiar formation. is to be considered :
Defeiis". — The shortest fronts possible; the flanks resting on inaccessible ground ; the approaches ob- structed ; tiie position covered ; the movements in the rear in no way checked; the positions intrenched; the single parts in(le])endent ; artillery protects the approaches; strong reserves; proper measures to be taken to prevent any attack in the retx
BATTLES BROKEN GROUND. 75
Jlttack. — Light infantry and artillery deploy ; heavy fire against the approaches ; important positions of artillery are to ihe utmost defended ; if the enemy can be repulsed from positions of importance, they are to be occupied; cavalry supported by infantry; sham- manoeuvres; attack in the rear; the route for retreat should be secured.
If the peculiarities of the ground are considerable, it may be observed :
Attack. — Open-order in undulating ground ; the re- serves are drawn near the columns, the nearer the troops approach open-land ; the approaches will be protected by artillery; cavalry ordered in front for action ; artillery and infantry will force the approaches to undulatino- orround.
o o
Defense. — The approaches to undulating ground will be occupied; cavalry and artillery will have to support in open-land ; the positions intrenched ; the roads rendered impassable; communications betvveen the troops established ; ground changing considerably in its contour requires another mode of attack ; the duties to be performed by each part are therefore to be changed ; during these moments the troops are in a state of weakness, the defending party must prolong this moment as far as possible, to check the assailants.
BATTLE ON BROKEN GROUND.
Gently undulating ground checks the movements of the troops very little, or not at all ; it renders easy
/b HATILKS — HltOKE.N GRfJl.ND,
rover lo llie posting of troops in irscrvp sonic tlistanci in rear, and to arlillL'ry in taking position ; the move' nienls can be executed without being observed, and renders surprise easy. In general tlie em|)Ioynient of the troops is elementary. On both sides are advantage and disadvantage etjiially ; tlie superiority in ninnber will prevail at the impending nn^menl. Attack is superior to defense; tlial's not tlie case in cavalry battles, tlie peculiarities of cover can be luiiied to ad- vantage. Activity leads to victory.
Isolated hills can l)e turned to advantage only by intrenchment ; they comj)rise a small space with an extending Iront, which must be attackeil.
Slopes render movements di/Ticult, particularly lor large and closed bodies of cavalry and artillery. A sudden unexpected attack becomes impossible, they are therefore only of defensive value.
If the inclination of the slope allows troops to march up the hill in closed order, or so that it can be fired at with efTect, the iire-line may be posted on the crest of the slojie, and therefrom the lire commenced; if the inclination is too sleep, and it caniiol be iired at with effect, the skirmishers will form a chain along the crest, and the fne-line takes position some distance in rear, that llie enemy, the moment he aj)j)i()aclies in the range of musketry, will be received with an overwhelming volley, "^riie position of infantry may be in this case about 1:20-2U0 paces, artillery 400-600 j)aces in rear of the crest; columns are in reserve to at- tack the enemy ; the pursuit should be made very cau-
BATTLES COVERED GROUND. 77
tioiisly and should not go farther than to the crest of the slope. The enemy may attempt by a false retreat to turn suddenly upon the pursuing troops, and by this manoeuvre gain the top of the hill ; cavalry under certain circumstances may be employed to support infantry; roads for retreat must be rendered practi- cable.
Attack — Attack from the rear; tlie crest of the slope should be occupied by skirmishers ; columns fol- low ; sham-attacks by skirmishers ; the enemy will be enticed to pursue, and by turning suddenly upon him, tiie top of the hill may be gained; how far artillery and cavalry may be effective depends upon circum- stances.
If the height is gained and the enemy repulsed, his return may be expected — great effort should be made to occupy the crest; perhaps a quick and vigorous attack to a greater distance may be risked, to frustrate the enemy's aim to retake the height.
BATTLES ON COVERED GROUND.
Woodland. — It covers and protects against fire, it renders movements difficult, intercepts communica- tions, checks free view, control, impedes cavalry and artillery, and aggravates the lead of the battle. The greater or less significance of the influence depends upon the special condition of the woodland ; rough, thickly grown woodland without roads is favorable 7*
78
PR K PARA I IONS K«)R DF.FE.NSE.
for retrpat; iho dcfeiise is ronlined in tliis case to the approaches. LaijLJcr hochcs of troops may take posi- tion ill the rear of ihe woodland and attack the enemy if he deploys from the woods ; they are in this regard an ohstacle to approach ; open woods, as ihev are in cultivated countries inleicejjicd w iih roads, are of im- portance in the haltles of the present time. Those troops wliich are in possession of the woodland will have the advantaye ; this is important for tiie defender; he should have the woods in his rear, or he sjioukl avoiil it entirely.
Properties of t lie iroodland. — Ground: level and cleared; the enemy cannot approach unoI)S('rvi il.
Borders of woodland. — Their form, either j)rojecl- inir or re-enleriniT angles; thickly and heavily lim- bered; some bushy; impenetrable parts; fences, ditches.
Williin the woods. — Hard ground; j)iaetiea!)le roads, open timber, undergrovvlii.
PRKPAUA'IIONS FOR DF.FF.NSE.
The ;ij)i)roaches rendered impassable; j)arapets for artillery; weak positions intrenched; salient j)arts obstructed, at pioper ])oints the woods cleared ; roads rendered practicable for artillery and oilier tro()j)s.
Disposition of the trooj)s. — The bordcns of wood- land are the j)rincij)al points, and should be defended to the utmost; cavalry cannot be enii)l()yc(l, and should therefore be posted in rear, or should guard the Hanks.
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENSE. 79
Jlrtillpry. — Posted at the entrances, and so that it can sweep all along the borders ; cross-fire on tiie sa- lient-angles.
Iiifantry. — A covered chain of skirmishers; the salient-angles and entrances deserve particular atten- tion ; snj)ports and reserves of closed companies, and at hand. The main reserve, concentrated or divided, in or behind the woods ; the reserves are ^-\ of the whole foice, according to the extent of woodland ; upon this depends the strength of the chain. The front is divided into independent parts; turnpikes and cross-roads are strictly guarded.
Battle. — Reserves have to support ; tlie troops on the fire-line should not support eacl» other ; the borders unmasked ; charge with bayonet against the entering enemy; he should be driven out; no pursuit in the open-field ; the first fire-line of defense reformed.
Retreat. — Care is to be taken to get the artillery in the rear; within the woods the resistance is to be continued, if possible, under tlie cover of the woods; the communication of the troops should not be inter- cepted; no haste; ambuscades; in the rear of the woodland artillery and cavalry is posted, to support the retreating troops ; the enemy must be prevented from debouching from the borders; fire willi grenades.
Attack. — Reconnoissance; attack in the rear ; well selected points for attack, the salient parts are prefer- rable, also openings; the approach by all means to be covered ; chain of skirmishers, sudden attack or alternate advance; reserves ready to succor in the
80
PRF PA RATIONS FOR PEFE.VSE.
shortest lime; company-columns actinjr simultane- ously for the same purpose; sliam-figlit ; vijrorous bayonet charge of all troops.
If artillery can he employed, it fires at the enemy's artillery, particularly ajjainst that, which protects the position, selected for attack ; irronades, irrapc-shots will be fired against the borders ; the borders occu- pied; the columns concentrated near; systematical advance; the troops deploy on the borders, and ad- vance in complete order; the most passable roads will be occupied, the troops not intercepted ; precau- tion ; artillery in front of the columns on the main roads; before leaving the woods the troops are to be concentrated and re-formed for further action.
Houses. — If the troops are brave and fi<jht with en- thusiasm, a few can defend themselves in houses against a far superior force.
If the men cannot be relied upon, it is better to occupy the houses and gardens with skirmishers, and the approaches wiili ariiMery; the greater part «if the troops \ to ^ will be posted in columns within the place or in the rear of it, in order to charge with the bayonet, if tiie enemy enters. Houses of soliil struc- ture, are of importance in an attack; those built of lijrht and combustible materials are of no value.
Siliialinn nf houses. — Isolated positions should not be suHered to be attacked in the rear; the position must render easy uniform action. The best position is at the foot of a gentle sloping hill, on roads near intersected ground, on rivers, creeks, &c., &c.
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENSE. 81
Singh houses. — Preparations for defense; tlie de- fense may be absolute or relative. The absolute de- fense demands houses and rows of houses of solid structure; the doors and windows in the lower stories obstructed; any approach rendered dilTicult; in ibe upper stories walls and windows loop-holed for fire ; the wood work of the roof may be used for obstruc- tions. Inside between the stories and also between the houses a communication is to be established ; the access in the rear; means in readiness to extinguish hre; provisions and water; bandages; ammunition; the surrounding trees within the range of musketry are to be cut down, in order to render the view unob- structed.
Em])loijmcnt of the troops. — Tlie fire line with re- lief; each story rendered independent; the reserves will be posted in the lower stories ; fire ; bayonet charge against the attacking troops ; the breaches will be repaired ; retreat to the upper stories, or abandon' the house.
Attack. — Attack from the rear; artillery will set the houses on fire; battering breaches through doors and corners ; skirmishers ( eploy in open order; every man must be strictly informed as to his duties; storm with all troops. The necessary tools to break in, and remove the obstructions ready for use.
Farms. — The bouses barricaded, and connected by barricades; preparations should be made for flanking fire ; obstacles which hinder the free view should be re-
82 PRFPARATIONS FOR DEFENSE.
nioved ; rc(]()iil)ts may be coiLsiruclcd, if nccesFary ; preparations for retreat.
Emplnyrucnf of Iraops. — Tlie simple iiitreiirhed ])o- sitioiis independent; fire line and sujiport j)r(>perly posted, if possible a main reserve.
Progress of the haltlr. — Fire; bayonet rl\ar<(e ; no pursnit; successive retreats systematically ordered.
Allack. — The same to be observed, as in attack of houses; the conquered houses occupied; the troops concentrated, and measures taken accordinjr lo cir- cumstances.
Villages — If they are surrounded by fenced gar- dens, the gardens will be occupied by skirmishers and form the Hrsl line for defense; a second line will occupy the outer row of houses; if the village can be divided in sections for defense, the belter. SiiiLde houses of solid structure on the main streets or w ithin the place will be intersected l)y intrenchments and occujiied.
Prcpdralions for dcfensr. — The first line for de- fense will l)e j)oste(l, covered and connected together as much as possible; obstacles which obstruct the view and aflbrd cover lor the enemy, will be removed ; the entrances obstructed; the cannons posted behind parapets ; the gardens divided itito sections, and posted with a sufhcient force to be indc])endent ; materials in readiness to obstruct the entrances; the retreat for every section is to be secured. Second line, the com- munication establisiied, the sections put in a proper slate of defense; materials on hand to obstruct the entrances ; the roads for retreat rendered practicable.
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENSE. 83
In {he interior. — The sections and intrenched places prepared for defense.
Employment of the troops. — As long as the first line occupies its position, matters stand well; if the enemy enters by force, he may be repulsed in the first moment; hut if he has succeeded in occupying a po- sition, it will be difficult to drive him out ; all these points must be well considered in the employment of the troops; cavalry if it cannot be of immediate ser- vice, may prevent any attack in the rear; sometimes it may check the enemy in its advance.
Artillery will be posted in the flanks of the village, in order to sweep the ground in front ; the cannons are posted behind parapets.
Platoons are posted in positions to defend the en- trances, they fire at the attacking columns at a short distance.
If a redoubt can be constructed, to defend the main roads, it should be occupied by artillery, but its retreat must be secured.
Infantry. — First line; an independent position of the principal points on the fire line and reserve; to every two or three succors will be ordered companies as reserves ; the main body is posted in the interior or in the rear of the village; the communication should be so arranged that it cannot be interrupted; the place not too much crowded with troops ; if a second line is posted, new forces are ordered for it, they must support the retreat of the first line.
Engagement. — Artillery posted on the flanks com-
84 rnnPA RATIONS FOR PF.FF.VSK.
mences firing; llie skirmishers advance and fire ; <runs postt^! at ihf enlraiK-es will fire at the storminij mass; hilt not ;»<rainst ar.illeiy; the assailants will he met with the hay«)npt and repnlsed ; or retreat in the in- terior, without preveiitin<r the second li.ie from fire; the houses occupied and defended; cohunns which attempt t«"/ attack, the flanks should he repulsed.
Rclrrnl. — As loiicj as the enemy mav not have occupied positions within the phu^e, he may he re- pulsed and the place retaken. 'I'hose moments are to he chosen for attack, in wliich the enemy cannot make use of his concentrated troops; the pursuit siiould not he farther than to the (irst line.
Attack. — Thf rear attacked ; the eiuMiiy\s artil- lery silenced ; in general the same to be observeil as for attack in woodland. If the first line is repulsed the troo()s will be conceiilrated and re-lormed ; the troops storm the village with vigor, but with precau- tion ; the colmnns are on both fianks supported by skirmishers; the whole vilhiLie or |)art of it should be ill rear of the trooj)s ; they occupy the plac(! and take position for defense; they concentrate and will be re- formed; the returning troops of the enemy to be resisted and repulsed ; the retreat provideil for.
Remarks. — Closed places belong rather to the class of intrenched positions; the principal purpose is to enter by force in someway; the necessary prepara- tions will be conducted secretly; the defender's at- tention is distracted ; sham-attacks, storm, position, rally, re-form, advance.
I
I
BATTLES ON UXDULATLNG GROUND. 85
Atlack of barricades. — Tliev will be fired at by artillery, the nearest houses slioiiid be stormed, and occupied ; the skirmishers will keep up firing on the (h^fenchnir troops; attack from the rear; storm; in villaires or towns, where the inhabitants are revoltinjr, the tr<io[)S shouhl b(3 concentrated ; the main points oc- cupied ; the main roads kept in a passable condition ; single hotiscs of the place should be separated by in- trenchments ; severe measures must be applied; no quarters given.
BATTLES ON UNDULATING GROUND.
Any fbstacles in front, which check tlie communi- cation to the approach, serve to break the front of the enemy, and force him to reform the troops for attack, and thereby delay him; tlie (fefenders must t lere- fore take position, from wjience the fire will be most destructive; the distance of artillery fiom those points is for grape-shot 400-600 paces; for infantry only 150-200 paces, if artillery camiot be engaged in sulficient strength ; but the resistance should not rest alone on this fire, reserves | to ^ of the mass must be in readiness to atlack.
If the troops are inferior in strength, tlie skirmishers and artillery are posted very near, and fire at the de- ploying mass ; the other troops will be posted 600- 800 paces in the rear, and if possible covered.
If the troops are too much exposed to the enemy's artillery-fire, they may be posted 1000-1500 paces
OO SWAMPS AND DAMS.
back, and will attack the enemy from all sides if he deploys; at all events, if any attack from the rear is possible, strong reserves must be ready for support.
SWAMPS AND DAMS.
Swamps are frequently along rivers, their breadth and lenjiih is of imporlance; the condition of the cumuiuniraiions and whether the lire may be edective from one side to the other side is of value; the move- ments in large fronts are principally checked; the passage is limited. Two points are considered :
1st. If a passage is to be established, it will be most didicull; dams can only be constructed slowly, and the work cannot be defended by advanced troops; sometimes a passage may be eOected by joining tim- bers together; shouTd a swamp ix' intercepted by a creek, the obstacle may with chlliculty be surmounted, or not at all.
2nd. Dams cannot be removed like bridges; the de- jender must occtipy them, he is bound to the locality and to passiveness; if one passage is hist, it cannot be regained, and the defense must be given up. If the breadth of the swamp is of such extent that die fire will not have any effect from one side to the other side, and if only a few passages are through the swamj), the defense of such points will be very strong. \U\i in regard to this there should be no mistake; it is most dangerous to defend a swamp, which is not absolutely impassable, except by a few known pass-
DAMS RAVI.NES A!VD DEFILES. 87
ages, it cannot be much relied upon. Surprise, par- ticularly in the night are rendered easy; llie weather has also great influence.
DAMS.
Dams are not to be defended in front; but if cir- cumstances demand it, redoubts will be constructed to render them strong. This is a rule for the defense of all defiles. The defense in the rear may be imme- diate or mediate.
Preparalions for defense. — The bridges will be rendered impassable, the dams cut through, parapets for artillery constructed; breastworks for infantry; pit-Jioles lor skirmishers.
Employment of ike troops. — Artillery must fire along the dams; infantry in a defensive position ; fire of the skirmishers and closed troops; charge with the bayo- net; cavalry attacks, — no advance — no pursuit.
Attack. — Attack from the rear; surprise; passages established ; false-attacks ; storm ; fascines ready tor sto'-ming.
RAVINES AxND DEFILES.
Their tactical value consists in the degiee to which they render diflicult the movements. Jf movements are confined to a few points, or entirely checked, the defensive value will be the more increased The de- fense will be made immediate or mediate according to circumstances.
88
rtlVEUS. CREF.KS.
Jii(aiilry may oflcn be j'avorahly pasted in dc/ilcs, if an elll'Ciivc iiie is possible in froiil and ihe retreat is seemed. The reserves and cavalry are in llie rear.
Redoubts connected with deliies slrengilieii the posi- tions; under these circunislanci's ramj.s may be cut for saMies.
Deliles and obstacles to approach are of {^reat im- portance to iiderior troops, if attacked by cavalry on level ;jroiind. Valleys are often lavorable for com- bined j)(>siii(>ns on both sides and in tiie centre. Po- sitions may be taken on this side, in the centre and on the opj)osite side, as the jx'culiarities of ihe irnumd, such as midergrowtii, houses, creeks, rouirh contour and so fortli will admit; btil mider all circiimstar.ces it must be observed, that the retreat is so secured and protected, as to prevent the enemy from comini^ uj) with the defender on this side.
In all kinds of deiiles, tlie defense, besides the ground, depends upon the mass of the trooj)s ; what may be e.\j)edient lor one part, may be im xpedienl for another; therefore the mass in the rear, smaller forces, according to circmnstances, in front.
Aie of no importance, unless they are (!ee|i, s\vamj)y and banks high and ^teejx If they are overgrown, they become important; for instance they oiler a verv limiled ])assage, on accoimt of their (!e])th ; the
I
PASSAGE OF A RIVER.
89
contour of ilieir banks, whether brid<re(] or not; these circiimslances are to be considered.
Walcr-cou.rse. — If the stream is very crooked and Ihe cnrrent strong, the defense is unfavorable ; a salient angle renders the attack easy; are-entering iacilitates the defense; a straiglit course is in(hfFerent; lliis to be considered in regard to the nature of the course; it will be of value in tiie arrangements for defense of a bridge or ford ; and in the choice of a point for an artificial passage.
JVidl/i — It is of value in regard to an efll'ctive lire, the less available to the enemy the better.
High Banks. — The height of a bank is important, when the width renders eflective the fire from one side to the other; in addition, the condition of the adjacent ground is of value, as it renders a position strong, if overgrown with woods; it is an impediment if the view and the movements are obstructed.
PASSAGE OF A RIVER.
1st. Bridge. — The destruction of a bridge is the surest way for the defender; but it is not always pos- sible ; if only a partial destruction can be eliected, it should be done on that side furthest from the enemy; if it is necessary to preserve the bridge, the approach to the bridge, and the adjacent ground must be intrenched ; but best if the fire can be effective from this side; if the bridge is located on a sharp re-entering angle, favored bv the contour of ground and the width of 8*
90
PASSAGE OF A UIVF.R.
the sliTaii). \\ siirli a jioiiil is sclcclcd, the ncressary arms and Hoops will he j)(islc(l ; ihe troops not being eniploved will he ordered in the rear. The utmost precision niiisi he observed in the lead of the battle, and j)ncauli()n in tiie attack.
Defense ail this Side — innnrdlale — If the circum- stances demand it, or time will admit of j^roper meas- ures being taken for defense.
Prejxtrations. — The approach to the bridge on the enemy's side must be under cross-fire of artillery. The l)ridge shall be fired at length-wise by artillery, which is covered by parapets; infantry will be posted in pits or ditches on points from which the bridge can be best iired at; if the Qm\ of the hridire on this side cannot he j)rotected by lire, barricades should be con- structed.
Proirirss of the. Jltlach. — Fire anil attack ; cavalry will he of service.
'I'he enemy should not be alloweil to occuj)y ground on this side.
JSIediale. — If circumstances demand it, the defense will be conducted with great vigor, the most favorable moment is, if the enemy will have the obstacles of the ground closely in his rear, and is prevented from deployinir, and from retreating quickly, aiul his sup- ])ort cannot render assistance in time, he will be in regard to strength, form and locality, in a most difli- cult situation, in all events, a pursuit should not go further than to the bridge.
I
PASSAGE OF A RIVER.
91
J3llack. — If rivers and creeks can be crossed on foot, the main attack will be directed at a salient angle, and from thence pressed forwards. If the fire from one side to the other is eflective, the surest success will be obtained by a superiority in number.
If bridges cannot be avoided or taken by surprise, an effort must be made to get troops, unobserved by the enemy, on the other side, to support the attack. If the defender is posted on this side, by a vigorous attack, tlie crossing the bridge may be effected at tlie same time with the enemy. In a well conducted at- tack, the fire of artillery and skirmishers is important. Infantry will be ordered to storm ; under particular circumstances cavalry may precede. Infantry having passed the bridge will form with the utmost valor a live bridge head. Artillery and cavalry follow the first battalions, the reserves also without losing time \ then vigorous attack.
" The maxims for retreat over bridges may be derived from the foregoing : they are to mask and to select favorable points for retreat, protected by artillery ; the enemy's pursuit should be checked to gain time to retreat.
2nd. Shallow fords render the passage of one or the other of the arms easy, tlieir defense is analogous to that of a bridge with modifications; the tr(»ops will not be posted on the other side ; if the ford will not be used, it should be rendered impassable; the attack^ is like that of a bridge, with this exception, that cav- alry will precede if possible.
92
A in I FI C I A L P A S S A G E H E POT MTS.
AirnriciAL passage.
The tcclmiral roiistniriioii of hridirr's will not i)e roiisidcrcd licrc. The main j>(»int is. to have iho liridi^e (inislied al tlie proper time. 'I'lie best chance for suc- cess is siirj)ii>e ; troops should he carried over the river in order to resist ilie eii('mv''s appri»ach. The de- fender's duty is to j)revenl the comj)h'tion of llie bridge, and to hustrale surprise; theeuemy"'s troops which may iiave crossed the river, slionid ix^ driven back.
In rc^rard to the emph>\nienl of iroops : liiey shouki atlack with eneri:\- ; the conlliel should be ended before tiie brid^M' conM be rendered passable.
KEnoiirrs.
Field-works are essential to render jjround for de- fense strouij;. P.n-apets ant! redoubts are constructed i'or these purposes. Breast-works for infantry, com- bined with redoubis, principally to establish a bridge head, and lor ai tillcrv lo have a covered position within the ranije ol fiic. Open-works are inelhcient. Oidy closed works, redoubts. Sec, are indej)endent. Ifar- tillei\- is posted in redoubts, ihev have to lire airainst the eiu'iny's artillery and the mass. Infantry will be posted Ixdiind the interior slope of the breast-works, and will lire airainsi the assailants ; on each side of the I #breasi-woik is a second and a third rank ready to ■ support. The main reserve is inside.
if the (ire does not prevent the enemy from scaling
ARTIFICIAL PASSAGE REDOUBTS. 93
the breast-work, lie will be met upon it wiili the bayo- net and repulsed by a hand to hand tight; if the de- fenders siicceed, tiiey lake their former position and commence tiring.
Allack. — The redoubts fired at with grenades; the enemy's guns silenced; attack from the rear; skir- mishers combined with closed forces get possession of the (htch, scale the parapet, and enter by force the re- doubts; support follows closely.
The maxims for troops to be observed in these varieties of ground are considered. These peculiarities are seldom separated; they are often times combined. This renders war more complicated and more artful. Not in regard to the effect of the troops, but in regard to the plan of the order of battle, to apprehend quickly advantages and disadvantages, and to employ the troops according to mass, arm and order. The new battle order, the open order, the columns, the deep position, the reserves, render advantage easy.
EXAMPLES "WITH VARIETIES OF GROUND.
Positions in regard to the ground, attack or de- fense, have been fully considered ; positions are not upon the hill, but beliind the hill ; not in front of wood- land, but wiihin or in the rear of it, if the woodland will admit of it. The troops are formed in columns, to be more easily covered in position; villages, wood- land, rolling land, are selected for cover. Even in cultivated countries it will seldom happen, that ground
94
r.XAMiM.F.s \virn vauik'uks of groind.
ran he foinnl upon wliicli I)V projior mrasnrcs troops raiiiiot be covered; but the (]isj)()silioii must be in ronfonniiy wilb purpose and the desijrn of combina- tion; the |)reservation of the baltle order j)rincipally is lo be observed.
A position is therefore, a l)atde-li('ld, wliirli in recjard to lenL^lli. brea(hh, and peeuliariiics of irronnd, renders most favorable tlie purpose aimed at bv the troops, accorthnj^ lo streiiirtir and nature of the troops.
It follows that there are certain forms of ground, widcii, lo I)(^ in a slate of defejise, demand a certain strenj^ih of troops; otliers which demand a certain armament. In tiiis regard prevails the greatest variety.
But in reirard to the employment of the troops, the lead of war at llie present time is entirely indejjendent, and this variety is a decided advantage. liatties occur every where, and demand for the inferior only that the superior in strength shall he eliectked in en)ploy- nient and movements ol' his irooj)s.
7V/C ]>j'incip/('s arc :
(a.) In regard lo s/rafari/ : favorahh^ condiiion for their own line of retreat as well as lor llaidving j)osi- tion in n'gard to the enemy's retreat.
(h.) In regard lo fac/ics :
1st. Extension of the troops according to their
strength; that is, the front batlle-line slundd not make
u^e of the reserves (in the beginning of the battle) too
soon. The order of battle-line shall be preserved.
2iid. One or both flaidis shall have resting points.
EXAMPLES WITH VARIETIES OF GROUXD. 95
Only insunnountable ground, rivers, creeks, swamps, lakes, valleys with blu(fs, rarely mountains, render se- cure resting points. Sucii obstacles will rarely be found, in most cases the ground is to be intrenched, and occupied by troops.
Jn selecting resting points for the flanks, it will be observed: (a) not to rely upon their security; (h) both flanks shall not rest on impassable ground, thev would compel to a mere passive position. The less the flanks are protected, the more reserves will be re- quired ; it is preferable to have redoubts combined with those obstacles. Ground intersected is better than overgrown ground, to cover the flanks ; woodland is dangerous. The more or less flanks are protected, the greater influence they exert in regard to strateo-y and to the proportion of arms, (cavalrv.) 3rd. Unobstructed view in front and flanks. 4th. A covered position of the troops without being checked in their movements, if they can be executed unobserved by the enemy, the better.
5th. A front-line without interruption; the contour of the ground rendering easy the Are in front; there- fore, best gently sloping; the manoeuvres on this point from which the rear of the enemy can be best attacked. Defensive positions, ditches, hedges, walls, woods, farms, villages, redoubts, which render easy the com- bat of a few against a far superior strength ; the open order supporting each other without checking the necessary movements.
96
EXAMPi.Ks Willi VAinF/nns of c.iioiNn.
Oili. Tlic .ipproarhes in front should \w ohstriicted, llial llie (Miciny may he conipelUMl to have his troops roiiijilaiiily separated, hut posted so far oil' that thev are within the range ofeU'eclive lire. Where this can-, not he done, open re(h)ni)ts may he ronstrueled for ar- tillery son)('\vh;it in advancr, within the ranj^c of lire.
7tl). .Movements in front not checked, particularly where the enemy njay he encountered.
8ih. Cironnd is to he selected which renders retreat in the rear easy ; it may Ite partly covered, j)ardy in- tersected ; the deliles not too near.
These advantatres are rarely IduuvI in every position in war; nor are all jiosiiions of the same value; they are ihe more important the more the prohahility j)revails ilial tliev in.iv l>e attacked. These advantaii[es are only demanded hy the most iniiXMiaiii posiiioiis.
The nuixims in rei^ard to the delense of a position are: a, tiiat advantage from the locality iiself shouhl he attained.
/>, That ill this position tiie troops should act with energy.
These maxims di<j)ose of the emjiloyment of the
troops, ami <»f the necessarv arlilicial works; at lirst
" • . . .
the formation and position of the troojjs in Iroiil; m
the hegimiiiiii the most important is, the ellbcl of lire;
then follows the engairement, if it siic(;eeds. it hecomes
olfensive; if the tr<)ops have to retreat tney ohserve
the rules considered in former chapters.
The strength of the ground, which might mislead to
a passive defense, should not he too muca relied upon.
MOUNTAINS. 97
The assailants will have to observe :
1st. Ground wilh loo many difliculties siioukl not be selected for attack.
2nd. To advance through ground which entirely covers the movements.
The employment of the troops should be, according to the rules for a proper selected attack : the retreat to be secured ; mass against one flank ; to break the line with the mass, if the flank cannot be attacked, or if the front of the enemy is weak. The lead of a battle is uniform, and the plan is based upon this, that every employed force exerts all its energy ; relying with all self-denial and with the greatest confidence upon the Chief.
MOUNTAINS.
In no kind of ground are defensive properties so clearly expressed, as in mountains. They have long been considered of o-reat value for defense. Extended chains of mountains combined with redoubts have been defended and resisted with success. The attacking troops respected them.
The lead of war at the present time, differs in this view; it condemns any passiveness, where the defense attempts to attain a favorable final decision ; and also it condemns any scattering of troops. The troops should not be checked in their movements. Moun- tains rendering tliese conditions easy are exceptions, and they may therefore be considered unfavorable for masses. But the more the troops are inferior in
yo MOINTAINS.
streiit^lli, and the iiKue passivrno^s of siiit^le detnrli- inenls is (Io^irable lor the common pnrpose, the more thai mode of defence mav l)e resorted to. Mountains are a refuge for inferior troo])s, and favorable of ijain- inir time.
To he observed — Defense : the mass to be posted in the rear; ilie positions in the valleys in front in- trenched ; the main posts on important points of rom- munications; security ajrainst attack in the rear; tiie advancing enemy is to be met and attacked, or Ins flanks are to be turned and atlacketi in the rear, if lie is in a defile.
Attack. — To turn the Hanks; false attack ; to attack with energy on the main line ; the enemy to be routed ; small detachments of the enemy may be turned and repulsed; infantry forms the main body; litrjit howit- zers will be most useful.
Finally, an iinjjortanl rule is : He moves in war with security, who is guided by rules derived from the na- ture of the troops and the character of battle ; and who considers form and ground as auxiliary means, and who relies upon the praciical and theoretical elliciency of the troops, and upon their employment accord- intr to their nature.
APPENDIX.
LA PETITE GUERRE.
War cannot be imagined without a battle-field, without a base and line of communications. The army, the base and line of communications form an organic unity. The base comprises a piece of land upon which those provisions and materials of war are magazined, which are designed to supply the wants of the army, implements of war which an army cannot get from the theatre of war; being troops, arms, am- munition. The base, therefore, is the condition of existence, and its possibility of continuing operations. The army depends upon the base, it is compelled to have an uninterrupted communication; a line of posts will render possible the line of communications. Not every route from the army to the base is a line for communications, only that particularly established for those transactions.
Supplies of all kinds, as ammunition, transports, detachments, posts, couriers, hospitals, depots, spare ammunition, officers of the administration are con- stantly upon this route; whose total value is of deci- ded importance ; this line of communication is the channel of life which never should be intercepted for
100 I.A PETITE GUEHRE.
a long lime. The duty of the army is llierefore, to protect this line; ihe enemy's purpose is to have it intercepted and the communications cut oil".
if tliese (hities he {\nue widi the whole streni^lh of the army, they desijrnate the kind of war. If t!iey are (^nly done hy small parts of tiic army, or l)y troops which are not immediately cond)ined with the army, as volunteers and militia, then these dulies belong lo la pe/i/c if/zc/vc, and form an irrciiulariy organised kiiul of war: the j)arlis(ifi''siuu\ national war; it is principally a means for defense; it serves the war only partially, by rendering itscll' obnoxious to the enemy, its attacks are directed to the strategical rear of the enemy, it avoids his forces, and will attain success by their knowledge of localities, popularity, ability and rapidi- ty in movements, cunning, surprise, valor and reso- luteness.
Another kind of la pclUe guerre^ originating also IVom the strategical necessities of the army, comprises llie regular organised duties for security.
A war will not be commenced and ended in one battle ; there may be several battles, separated by loralilics and lime; in the meanwhile the army is in camp, (jnarlers, or on march ; in these situations an army cannot be completely prejiared for action, it is more (^r less in a degree of laclical weakness; and the necessity therefore demands seeurity against the enemy's influence. The activity orginated from these demands belong to la pe/ilc guerre^ ami ct)mprises the duties in field for security.
DUTIES FOR SECURITY. 101
Straleg-y demaiuls furlher, to render possible its combinations, most exact reports in regard to enemy and ground ; these duties demand patrols.
And, finally, the army must have provisions, they should be received by the line of communications and from the vicinity ; tliis leads to transports and foraging.
Tliese different activities are in tlie most immediate connection witii ihe war; they are the conditions of its existence. Their duly is not to fight, but in realiz- ing their purposes, they may have to meet some con- flicts, and therefore the possibility of being complicated in conflicts gives tliem a tactical character.
Such is the meaning of la pelile guerre.
DUTIES FOR SECURITY.
Tntn' purpose is to protect the army in camp, quar- ters, or on march. The purpose is obtained, if the army has gained time, to be completely prepared for action.
Time may be gained : a, by being in time informed of the enemy's plan; Z*, by checking the enemy's advance ; these rules properly observed, alone wdl give guaranty.
The enemy's movements observed as soon as pos- sible, must be checked, if tlie ground will admit, by advanced detachments, van-guards and patrols.
Van-guards and advanced posts have various degrees of strength, they may be, a combined corps, or an in- 9*
10-J
lUTIKS OF ADVANCKD COUPS.
trenrlied lino of {Icft'iise, oronlv small cavalrv troops, pickets and ritld-frnanls. Tho condition of the army determines their sirencrth, it is in inverse jjroportion to the forces re^ly (or action.
The distance of the troops in advance, wliich are ordered for resistance, depends upon liie detrree of their independence and w])on the contour of the coun- try, and may be from the ranije of musketry to a dayV march.
The arrangements of the duties for security ditfcr also. The shorter time the troops are resiin<r, the less precaution is demanded; the longer time they camp, the greater precaution is demanded. The extent of the front which sliall be prv)tected, is also of im- portance ; suHlcient protection may be rcuth'red i)y a closed hotly or by several j)osts, according to circum- stances.
nUTli:S OF ADVANCED CORPS.
Tlu'V have to observe tliQenemv's movcintMits, they will not absolutely check them, but delay them. 'JMiey are, compared with tlie forces of the enemy, inferior in strength; it is therefore, their duty to know how to act.
The enemy is protected al<o; the lirst conflict is therefore, not disproportional. The enemy's ignorance of the distance of the o])poser\s mass, compels him to precaution, and to slow action; by that and the resis- tance, time will be gained. The retreat under the cover of ground will be done as slowly as their own secu-
MODE OF SECURITY.
103
rity will admit. The single conflicts being of short duration, should be quickly and often repeated.
The result of such resistance depends upon the strength of the troops, upon the character of the coun- try, the length of the march, support and day-time.
In general : it may be observed, that at least, double tlie ordinary time is required for troops to march a certain (hstance.
Cavalry will be best to support advanced troops.
Advanced corps effect more by their presence than by their efforts, more by the possibility of conflicts than by a battle. By resistance, time will be gained, and the enemy is compelled to show his strength and purpose.
MODE OF SECURITY.
The arvuj may he campings quartered or inarching : Camp : At the present time, the troops camp in open air, or in tents or huts, if lime will admit, and material can be had. without any regard to weather, season and ground, and even purpose and plan of operation, may render it necessary.
Such bivouacs will not render troops less prepared for action, but they are most obnoxious to the health of men and horses; therefore they will only be chosen if the enemy is near, or if time and the want of mate- rials will not admit other preparations for camping.
But war at the present time, is conducted so rapidly, that this manner of camping has become almost a rule ; it causes an uncommon loss of physical strength, and
104
Moni: or skc. run v.
an uiiroiiiiiion (Icslrnrlioii orirromul ; on accouiil of ilie latter reason, this manner ofcampinijf will only be re- sorletl to. wiien the localities are (piickly i'han;rpil or the operations demand it.
QiKirlcrs are : to have the troops housed and siij)- plicd by the inhabitants; thev are either marrh-(pjar- ters or cantonments. The lirst are ol' short (htration, the latter may last some time.
T/ie fnarcli-qun7'/ers are confined to a limiit'd space, they check verv litih^ tht; rcacHness of the tr()0|)s {"or action; they render easy the supply of j)rovisions lor the troops, and preserve the health of men and horses ; they are chosen when circumstances ailniit, and olten resorted to, for single detachments and arms, whilst others are camping.
In regard to readiness for action of the tro(»ps, and iheir secm-ity, cam])s and march-ipiariers belong to one class.
Cantonments serve to relVesii the troops, they de- mand a lari^e space; thev are exceptions in the wars of the present time. (Jiound will l)e chosen (or them, if possibly obstructed by nature in front and llanks ; but notwithstanding that, llie troops are scattered in iheir (piarlcrs and less j);(>j)ar{'d for unl'orsecn events; therefore j)erl"ect measures of security are to be taken, according to their extent and form of the ground.
Marches, in time of wj.r, are oidy transitions from one position to another; they demand cond'orl i'or troops ; regularity in movements; njarch-discipline ; conve- nient uniform ; light weight for each man ; in order to
MODE OF SECURITY. 105
render these conditions satisfactory, the mass must be divided into columns; each one must be independent ; and therefore must be combined witli all arms ; each one must have intensive strength to a certain degree. The mode of dividing a mass, is ruled by the forma- tion of the order of battle of tiie present time. Those parts march next to one another, and one after the other at intervals, according to their strength, and so ren- dering easy support and the camping of the troops.
For instance : The depth of a column of a com- bined division of 8000 men, is about iwo-and-a-half miles, a common day march for troops is fifteen miles. A division of 8000 men marches this distance in eight to ten hours, and in a mountainous country, in ten to twelve hours. The greatest march in a day is twenty- five miles, to the utmost, thirty miles; if the march lasts several days, only twenty miles can be made. To twenty-five miles are required sixteen hours. Long continued marches exert a most destructive influence upon men and horses.
The march, in regard to enemy, is either advance, retreat, or fiank-march ; the latter demands greater precaution, on account of its exposed flanks. March and camp security, demand van and rear-guards.
Quartered troops are guarded by a line of posts. The security of a camping troop is more easily effected, than that of a troop on march.
The van-guards, composed of all arms, strength- ened by light cavalry, will advance against the enemy, as far as possible, and as their strength may admit,
106
.MOnn OF SECURITY,
and as to he supportod in tiino; llioy orrii|)y, if possi- ble, ground (avoralde for defense. Combined detach- ments will be posted in front and flanks on proper points. For these (hities I-}, of tlie trooj)s will be employed; they are posted iialf a mile to three miles hom the main troop, on <^round, which renders defense easy.
Detachments are guarded by pickets, which, ac- cording to ground are infantry or cavalry; ^ of iheir strength will be ordered for that purpose; the distance of the pickets from the detachment, and between each other, is, for infantry 800 paces, for cavalry 1500 paces. U the connection with the detachments by pickets are not complete, posts are to be ordered behind the intervals, these troops are taken from the main Ix^ly of the van-guards, according to circum- stances they niay have onl-guards too.
The pickets, guards, Slc, should be bcliind cover and on ])oints important for communications.
Pickets of infantry post single or double guards about iiOO-400 paces distant; the intervals between the guards is about 100-150 paces, and so arranged, that nothing may pass unobserved; cavalry pickets post vetlettes 400 — 600 paces distant, and according to circumstances about 150-200 paces between them. The chain of the pickets shall be well connected, and so j)osted, that they can observe the ground in front and between them, and if possible covered. Chains of mountains are parlicularily I'avorabie for these duties.
MODE OF SECURITY. 107
The smaller guards will be posted, during- the night nearer to the detachments, and the line of posts from the heiijht a little backwards on lower ground.
The duty of the posts is : to observe ; the resistance will be done partly by the pickets and detachments, and partly by the main-body.
From time to time the line is by small troops pa- trolled, to control the guards and to keep them vigi- lant; they serve also to carry orders from one picket to another; it is important, that they pay attention to all, that is going on, to scout and examine, what is doubtful, and to report all.
In spite of these precautions the enemy may possi- bly pass tlie posts unobserved, and attack with superior forces ; to prevent this, patrols of light cavalry are to be ordered from the detachments or from the main troop, to scout in those directions, from which larger bodies might possibly approach, and with order to observe the enemy in his movements as closely as possible.
In attack is to be observed : the purpose of an at- tack is eitlier to alarm or to surprise single posts or pickets, or it is of higher importance.
The commonest sentinel is not to be suffered to desert his post without cause.
Vedettes and guards form the chain ; the pickets
have to support. Counter-attack is often sufficient to
drive back the enemy ; pickets retreat slowly, covered
by the ground in the direction nearest the support.
The pickets in the flanks attack the enemy in his
108 SECURITY 0.\ :\IARCH.
Hanks \ witli perseverauro in llio ipsisiiinco, tlie purpose of ihc eueiny's attack ran be learned.
Pickets shall not rely uj)on their (lelaehnicnts, nor these upon the main-body of the van-gnard ; a nmiual support of tlie detachments is rarely possible, and is advi.>>able only, if lliey are themselves secure from attack.
SECURITY O.V MARCH.
The det:irhine:its are replaced, by van-guards in front, and patrols in the flanks, consisiing of infantry and of light cavalry. They inarch with their wings somewhat in the rear, about 1000 paces from each other. The distance from their support is to the utmost the range ol a gun-shot ; patrols are iu achaiice also with connections between iheni. In open land it is sudicient to see each other, in unihdating ground thev form a chain, if the contour of the ground changes, it will not be entered before it is carefully scouted and occupied. Great j)recaution is to be ob- served in passing deliles. Nothing shall remain un- scouted, the greatest precaution is demanded, if the column is dee]) and protection in the Hanks is neces- sary, detachments in the Hanks and cavalry jialrols should be ordered out. For Hank-marcii the van- guard is in the direction ol' tin; enemy, and suHiciently str(!ngihened ; patrols of light cavalry are essential.
If the troops are engaged, they must take advantage of the ground, and according to circumstances, they
SECURITY IN QUARTERS. 109
will advance or retreat. Van-guards well supported
have easier duties than rear-guards.
Rule is in retreating not to be turned and cut oft' The uniformity of the duties in march and in camp
renders easv the chanore from one mode to the other.
SECURITY IN QUARTERS.
Security in extended cantonments cannot be con- fided to one closed advanced troop; independent de- tachments are required. It is therefore of importance to select a country for cantonment, which is covered by important obstacles, rivers, mountains, bluffs, &c., and whose approaches are obstructed. The ap- proaches will be occupied by independent detach- ments intrenched, and guarded by vedettes and patrols. \n mountains several chains of guards may be posted. If their contour will admit approach, great caution is to be observed in order not to be turned.
The nearer troops in cantonments are to the cordon, the more they have to be prepared for defense. It is conditional, that the troops are concentrated^ before the enemy attacks.
The problem, in case of attack, is simple : it is re- sistance ; the position in regard to resistance is select- ed, the security of the whole force consists principally in gaining time, therefore the utmost resistance must be made.
A decisive attack is best to be made by masses, combined with sham-attacks. 10
110 iinco.NNOissANci: — DrTir:soF patrols.
The rcsistaiicp must be hiokon \v\\\\ vt'lu'incnre, if llie troops liave forced within the caiUomiu'iiis. they should prevent by rapidity and resoluteness the camping forces from rallyiii«r.
RECO.WOlSAXCt: PITIES OF TATROLS.
Known objects are observed ; unknown objects, ground, enemy, are reconnoitered. Open-land can be observed by single guards, being posted on proper points, with those, patrols may be coml)ined, scouting the ground.
Overgrown and intersected ground will be occupied, and if the approaches ihemseives afford obstructions, thev should be ornarded. patrols may scout in front far- ther ofl.
Rivers and creeks must be observed by a cordon. Points, which rendor easy the passage ol' trooj)s, will be intrenched and occujiied. it dej)cnds uj)on circmn- slances how far an attack is to l)(! resisted, it sullices often to know the i)resence of the enemy, often it is necessary to learn the purpose and strength of the en^my, which can only be eflected by resistance ; in order to observe the enemy, the troops must lollow closely, and unobserved; it requires favorable cir- cumstances to accomplish this. Smaller forces are preferable to larger ones.
The assault of a fortress belongs to this class of duties; it is to be observed; what communications and how they are made, and how they can be checked.
DUTIES OF PATROLS. Ill
If a fortress is completely blockaded, it must be pre- vented from sallyiiig as well as from raising the block- ade; it requires therefore a strong force; strong reserves, intrenched detachments, covered guards, patrols scout- ing in the vicinity, are the means.
In marchinor through a country, the van-guards and patrols have to reconnoitre. Tlie reconnoissance can have a common or a special purpose. Circumstances decide whether this can be accomplished secretly, by surprise, or with combined forces by attack.
Patrols and detachments are designated for these purposes; patrols are small parties of infantry or cavalry, and sometimes composed of both combined. Their strength depends upon the order, distance, and can be from three men to one company or squadron.
Light cavalry is best for the duties of patrols, and if to a great distance is to be patrolled, its facility in movements secures success.
No rules can be given for single cases ; in general it may be observed that any separation of the troops is inexpedient. '•'■ Fortune favors the Brave.''''
Large patrols gain their purpose more surely if they follow the enemy closely^ alarm the line of posts and surprise the patrols. But, it is evident, tliat both the chief and the troops must be possessed of courage and wit.
The more the contour of the country is known, and the inliabitants are not opposed, the more can be effected.
The duties of larger patrols resemble the partisan's
llii I'ORAniNf; AM) TRANSPORTS.
war, tlicy are hij^lily intorfstiuf and of jrrcat value; their streiifrili renders thein oflen indepeiideiU, they are the best means to preserve the comniunirations between columns; their purpose is not aliark and not the destruction of the enemy, exce[)t under jxcuHar circumstances.
FORAGI.XG A\D TRAXSPORTS.
An army is subsisted in a fourfold manner :
1st. Bij magazines ; establislu^d on a complete thea- tre of war ; which compels the troops to be in their vicinity.
2nd. lit/ regular requisilions ; the provisions will be furnished by the inhabitants on the line of opera- tions; this maimer is most convenient, but requires that the military authorities are masters of the coun- try, and it also requires time.
3rd. By foraging, an inevitable evil, and rather for small parties ; van-j^nards and jxitrols iiave to be re- sorted to.
4th. The best means, and particularly in settled countries are. to be provisioned in (piarters by the in- habitants, if tlie troops are only (inarlcrcd for a short linw.
The (list three methods of sustenance re(piire trans- jKU-ts and measures of security.
roniirJnL,^ troops are divided into two parts, one part foraging, the other part protecting the foragers. It
FORAGl.XG AXD TkAXSPORTS. 113
should be properly coiulticted and controlled; no dis- order, no brulal actions, no plunderino; should be sul- iered ; light artillery should protect the foragers.
TrauspnrlH ; a transport should not be stronger than 80-100 wagons; it should be well protected, and proper measures should be taken to prevent any (h>or- der on the march by discipline, regular limes for rest and feeding, and by removing the obstacles from the road.
It is important to be timely informed of the approach, of the enemy; the troops being designed to ofier resistance, are constantly concentrated. Patrols of cavalry scout carefully to prevent surprise; the mosi dangerous moment is if convoys are attacked in |)ass- ing defiles.
A transport of prisoners is o{ singular nature, they assist often the attacking troops ; lo prevent tliis, strin- gent measures are demanded.
It is a rule in defense of foraging parties and trans- ports to gain time, and to prevent any inlliience by the enemy; the wagons may [)e defended like a redoubt, according to circumstances.
The attack of foraging parties and transports is best by surprise; the principal aim: to attack the wagons and not the convoy ; the convoy may only be attacked, if circumstances compel it.
THE FARTISAN''s WAR.
War, in order not to be checked in its progress, demands manv necessities. An armvis much embar-
Ill I 111". I'AKI1ZAN% WAII.
rassed, if any of llicse iiorcssilies should Ix* ciil oil. One party\s zciil is, to ruiiiisli the necessities lor e.xistenrc, which deinaiul an nninteirupted coininiiiii- Ciition in the rear of the army, aiiMiIier ])arlv al- lenipts to check and counteract theoperaiinn of their opposers; this is the reason, that even in the rear oi an army, nothint^ can be {K)ne witliont proiecii<>n h\ delachuicjils ; smali forces are employed for that ; n ajfainst those measures .shall he counleracU'd. small detachments are also ordered ; a decision of impori- ance can only he gained hy the mass. Support must he ohtained by oiher means, and not Iiy numeii- cal superiority; liy skilU'ul maiHeiivres in weak mo- ments of the enemy.
This reijuires knowledire of the counlry and ol the enemy's intention and means. 'I'he more pt rlicl ihi> information, the more chance of success.
The lroo|)s einj)loved for such (hilii's should be lii^'hl, int(dlii;enl, persevering and obdurale. \'<)hmteers well (iisci|)line(l will be best for this kind of war.
Th(; partisau\s dulies are, to chccl;. lo destroy, to liarrass, to capluie persons, (•oiiricrs. deiachments, traiisporls ol" aJI kinds, and lo ahiriii coiislaiilly ihc line of communications.
Some j)atrols have lo f(»llow the eiieiny ( losely or to carrv orders from one cohimn to another.
Inielligence, boldness, sur])rise will lead to success.
Tliis kind of war moves in an atmosphere of secrets ; its object is to surjn'ise and to disaj)pear. False re[)orts, circuhited, are essential. The troo])s sliouhl not be
NATIONAL ARMAMENT. ilo
separated witliout good reason. As soon as anibuslied troops are discovered, they attack with vigor; tiie enemy must not be allowed to recover his senses, he must be checked, routed. Protracted conflicts must be avoided; a sure though a small success is better than a great but an uncertain one; an active partisan will render great service in the prosecution of a war.
NATIONAL ARMA3IENT.
A national armament is an irregularly armed organi- zation of the people, to rank not with the army, but an organized militia ; it is a defensive orofanization, whose Strength is more extended, more marked, and easier animated by soul and good will ; it is a co-operation of the population, who cannot form a part of the regular army, but both pursuing one aim.
Such an activity can only be efiective in those parts of a country v»diich are occupied by tlie enemy, in the rear and in its strategical flanks.
Its conditions are : ' 1st. The war is to be conducted in the interior of the country.
2nd. Its decision should not depend upon one ca- tastrophe.
3rd. The theatre of war should be of considerable extent.
4th. The inhabitants should be in favor of par- tisan o|)erations.
5th. The country should be undulatins'i in some
116
N A T I () N A I, A R M A M V. N T.
way iii)jiassal)lc, l)y luouiitains, woodland, swamps, or improvemcMls and soatleifd selllemenls.
The eniployineiUof the armed peoi)lc t;liould not be against the enemy's mass, and not against considerable corps ; best to be employed where it will be diiricult I'or the enemy to apj)ear superior in forces; they fol- low closely the line of comniunication, "the nerve of life"; they check, alarm, annoy, and harrass the ene- my, whenever it is in their power, they render the roads impassable, and barricade narrow passes.
These small parlies sur])rise and disappear more easily tiian regular troops.
The enemy is in a state of uncertainty, but he ofiers no resistance. Their t)perations should have a strategical, but never a tactical character of defense.
The nature of their coidlicls is : vehemence in at- tack, but little cool blood, and no duration in t'luhi. Armed peoj)le may be defeated, driven olK but they never should be routed.
A nation may be brave and valiant in its habits, great in its contcnipl for the cncniy, liivorable the country \ but ii i.s uniieniable, that the national war can not e.xist in the loo dense atmosphere of danger.
liul assisted by the inhabitants, the Commander-in- Chief will have means for defense.
To animate them, they should be suj)porled by small regular forces; that the enemy may not be compelled to oppose large forces; so that the inhabitants may not feel themselvessafe enough' by the presence of reg- ular troops.
NATIONAL ARMA3IENT. 117
Tiie iialure of the |xiilis:iii war is closely coiiiiecled with the national war. Supported and animated by that, it may be conducted everywhere, where the con- ditions of its existence are aflorded.
War lives in la petite guerre^ and in that — is its condition of life; it is principally of strategical nature, and becomes only of tactical nature by becoming su- perior in strength, and if it should be compelled to gain its purpose by fight.
In most cases it will be conducted with small forces ; it ofiers an interesting field for independent actions, and whilst only officers of inferior rank are employed for these duties, they will have opportunity to prove their abilities, and to open to themselves an infallible way to gratify their ambition.
]n a war with masses at the present time, based on Ja 'petite guerre^ lies a pleasant consolation for the subalterns. *
// / have succeeded in demonstrating the nature of
* war^ and in enlisling admiration for an art which, in
regard to its importance,, gravity and extent^ catmot
be compared icith any other^ I have accomplished my
purpose.
END.
CONTENTS
PART FIRST.
BASE OF .-MILITARY OPERATIONS.
or war 7
What is war? 7
Purpose and means of war 8
Of the qualities required in a soldier 9
Of the science of war 9
Tile active forces 11
Cliaracteristic features of single arms 11
Rapidity of movements 15
Etfect of fire arms 16
Elementary tactics 17
Infantry 18
Properties of the line 20
The column — opened — closed 22
Properties of tlie column 22
The line with intervals between the files 23
The three orders of formations 23
Formations and change of fronts 25
Cavalry 26
The formations 27
Artillery 30
Battle 33
Character of the battle of the present time 34
Significance of battle 36
Duration of a battle 36
Decision of a battle 37
Victory '^7
120
co.N'rr.NTS.
Retroat :{s
Battle in the night :5S
Sii«[nificance of numerical superiority in Torres :!S
Reserves .'?!)
Order of battle 10
Ground and soil »ii
Importance of elevated positions »1
Defense atu) attack \2
Plan and leadinfj to battle J.")
Rules for plans of battles H
Defensive Jt»
Tactical niaxims 17
Attack 17
Employment of troops -IS
Ground ts
Villages,. touiis 5()
PART Si:CC)ND.
EMIM-OV.MENT OK TIIK TnooTS.
liattles on level— uncovered— not undui.iiiii;: i,'roiind. . . 53
Kleinentary battles .")3
P'xampUiS j()
Retreat 57
Battles of several battalions 58
Infantry a<^ainst and with cavalry 59
Infantry a-^ainst and with artillery ()2
Artillery a;^ainst artillery <J4
Artillery against and with cavalry ()5
Cavalry aj^ainst cavalry ()5
Infantry, cavalry, artillery (i7
Rules of disposition — tlefense and attack G9
Movements in batile 70
Retreat 7o
Pursuit 71
CONTENTS. 121
Breaking the enemy *s line 72
Surprise and ambuscade 72
Battle in combination with grou'n<} 75
Battle on broken ground 75
Battle on covered ground ^ 77
Preparations for defense ,. 7S
Battle on undulating^ ground 85
Swamps ^ 8S
Dams 87
Ravines and defines 87
Rivers — creeks 88
Passage of a river. ... ^ SB- Artificial passage 92
Redoubts 92
Positions, (examples^) ^ 93:
Mountains » . ^ ^ 97
APPENDIX.
lA PETITE GUERRK.
Duties for security 10 J
Duties of advanced corps 102
Mode of security lOS
Security on maFch lOS
Security in quarters lOD"
Reconnoissance 110
Duties of patrol 1 10
Foraging and transports 112
The partisan's war 114
National armament. IVS
NEW MILITARY WORK
INFANTRY CAMP DUTY, FIELD FORTIFICATION, AND COAST DEFENSE.
Prepared and arranged by Capt. L. r. Btckholtz, with plates, 16m o. muslin. Price 50 cts. by mail, post paid.
R E C 0 !ini E N D A T I 0 N S
•' This is a mere pocket-book in size, but it is crowded with instnic- tion for military men — instiuction gatliered and condensed from the gieat bulk of works on military science. It encloses grains of wheat, threshed, as it were, out of the great stack — is simple, convenient and Comprehensive. It is from the ptn of Captain Buck' oltz, of this city, a gentleman who has seen service on the continent of Europe, and who is an accomplished officer." — Richmond Disjyatch.
" We are always pleased to meet with a Southern book, one written, jirinted and bound in our own section by our own peojile, and we there- fore greet with i)leasure two military works now before us, by Captain Buckholtz. and published by J. W. Randolph, Richmond.
The first is " On Infantry Camp Duty, Field Fortification., and Ctiast Defense.'' Under the head of Infantry Camp Duty we are in- structed in out guards, patrols, vanguard, side-guard, rear guard, am- buscade, surprise, and transports. In Field Fortifieation we have in- structions on fortifications, regularly constructed forts, attack and defense, fortresses, and a description of the principal parts of fortified works.
The chapter on Coast Defense is most excellent.
As an elementary work on the subjects treated, this lx)ok has no su- perior, and we commend it to our military.
The second book is, '' Tactics for Officers of Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery.'" This is a most complete military work, comprising in- struction in the three dejjartments of the army, and contains much information which we have never met with in the popular military works of the day." — Xorfolk Southern Aigus.
Published and for sale by
J. W. RANDOLPH, Richmond, Va.
Also for sale by Booksellers generally.
PLANTATION BOOK.
M..\NTATinX am. FARM INSTJiUrTlON, RKGULATIOX, RECORD,
LWKXTORY AM) ACWUXT IU)oK.
I'or Ihc use of Manajrcrs of Esstates, and for the better ordering and
management uC{>laiitat<on an«l farm husincjjs in many particulars,
Hy a Soiitlit-rn Planter. "Order is Hoaven"s fii-st lawr/'
New and improved edition, cap folio^ half calf, price $1.60. Also a larKcr edition, for Cotton I'la.ntations, price $2,00. Either sent by mail, posi paid.
The author of this book is one of the most successful farmers in the Southern Slates, aiKl tlie .«ystieuiatic use of it has added tens of thou- sands of dollars to his estate.
" We consider it as indispensable to the farmer as tlie knlger to the merchant." — »V, C. Planttr.
"This book supplies a real want on every plantation."" — SotUhtrn J'lnnter.
"This is a most admirable work, and one which every farmer should possess." — American Former.
" Every farmer who will get one of these books^ and rc«ulat4' all his movements by its sag^estions, c^innot fa*! to realize K«"e«t benefits from »t. We cannot too lii>,'lily commend it to the consideration of agricul- turists."— Jiichmond H'/iig.
" It will prove a most valuable assistant to the jtlanter, manager or overseer, and a work lliat will facilitate them greatly in the Iraii.sactiou of business.'' — Richmowl l>i,<pti(<h.
"We hope many farmers will buy the work and make an effort to keep things straight. "^ — ,SV>«//«»;i J'lanttr.
"The form is eoncise and nullio(lie:il, while it em))races everything aj)propriiite to such records." — I'Umyh^ Loom and Anvil.
" It is the result (tf mature experience and observation."' — Methodist <Ju(irt<rlii Jitri^w.
" It is full of useful information. "— A'ic/(ffto7!<i £nf Mirer.
" A frienti, in whose judgment we have great confidence, an<l who is one of the best farmers in \irgiuia, assures us that tins publication is one of real value lo Southern agriculturalists."" — tHoulhfrn Literary Jiessenfier.
Publislied and for sale by
J. W. RANDOLPH, R1CH.MONI), Va. Also for sale by Booksellers generally.
^' If this he Treason, make the uiost of It.'' ANTICIPATIONS OF THE FUTURE,
TO SERVE AS
LESSONS FOR THE PRESENT TIME.
In the form of Extracts of Letters from an English Resident in the United States, to the London Times, from 1864 to 1S70.
With an Appendix on the Causes and Consequences of the Independ- ence of the South.
By EDMUND RUFFIN.
12mo. muslin, 426 pages. Price $1.00 by mail, post paid.
" A book entitled ' Anticipations of the Future.'' published recently in this city, and eminently disunion in character, is in great demand here and throughout the South. The book is made up of letters to the London Times, dated at Washington, the dates commencing with No- vember 11, 1864, and ending with May 27, 1868. The correspondence then opens at Richmond, commencing with May 29 of that year, and running down to September 20 of the same year. It is resumed again at Charleston, October 10, 1868, and closes with the 27th of January. 1870. These correspondences embody, as it were, tlie passing events of the periods at which they are written, and are nothing more than pre- dictions of what the writer su])poses will then be the political condition of the country. The correspondence of November 11, 1SC4, opens with the announcement that California, (Oregon, Washington, and also Sonora. (the new Pacific free State, formed of territory last purchased from ^lexico), all have voted the ticket of the Republican party, as called by its members, or the Black Republican or Abolition partly, as designated bj' its opponents. Wm. H. Seward, of New York, is elected by a much greater majority than his ])redecessor, President Lincoln, obtained in 1860. The corresi)ondence then treats successively upon the course of Lincoln's administration; sectional parties and their necessary effects: army land grants; protective duty system; fishing and navigation bounties; Southern aspirants to the Presidency suited to the Northern market, ahd their injurious influence on Southern rights and interests ; direction and policy of the governifl^t patronage; oi)eration of Black Republican measures on slaves in t^e South ; the Supreme Court sec- tionalized; negro citizens and negro officers of government ; negro am- bassadors and negro diplomatic relations. This book bids fair to create a furor in the South, similar to that caused at the North hy the notoii- ous Helper book. The work displays considerable ability, and its pre- dictions are not at all inconsistent with the principles of the Black Republican party." — Richmond Coi^respondent of the JS'. Y. Herald.
Published and for sale by J. W. RANDOLPH, Richmond, Va. Also for sale by Booksellers generally.
SOUTJIEHN
nooK rrBLisTiixG norsK,
KiTAULISUED lSo3.
0 . W . R A X 1) 0 T. P IT ,
BoohsclU r, P nbl I'skL r^ ^S tat tunc
MfSIG DEALER,
Offers on tlie l)cst terms for cash or approved creilit, the largest astort' mcnt of goods ill his line to be found south of IMiUjulelphia.
THK STOCK EMBRACES
LAW, MKDICIXE, THEOLOGY. HI:?TORY, BIOORAl'HY, IMU,!-
TICS, SCHOOL, CLASSICS, JUYEMLK, NOYKLS, rOKTHY, and
MiaCELLAXEOlS BOOKS, in English and other languages.
riirli<.ul(ir attention Kivtn to tht- ooUoi-tion of Hiue >VuiU-«. HooUs im- pi>rt(.(l to iiider.
AMEHICAX, E\(;EISI1 am. FKENCII STATI<»NEIiV Of tlie bo!«t quality.
A large stock of STAXDARD MUSIC, and all the Xcw Popular Pieces are for sale soon as published.
In.AXK HOOKS made to ord-r, and all kinds of noOK-PINniXG ex- ecuted in good style.
Cat.\looi-E8 will be nv'' d to all who send a .-tamp to pay th«' postage.
OLD IIOOK.S Taken in Exchange 'or Xew Works,
J. W. E^NDOLPH, I
lai MAIN STREET, Richmond, Va. |
:j. :«
|
'■^ ■ 'v ' |
>M^}
t ''^