
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Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy

FIRST EDITION ..... MARCH, 1915.
SECOND ,, ... MAY, 1915.
THIRD ,, ... SEPTEMBER, 1915.

Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy

AN UNHEEDED WARNING

(Being a Reprint of "Morocco in Diplomacy")

(London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1912*)*

By

E. D. MOREL

Author of "Affairs of West Africa," "The British Case in French Congo," "King Leopold's Rule in Africa," "Red Rubber," "Great Britain and the Congo," "Nigeria: its Peoples and its Problems," etc.

With Five Maps

LONDON: AT THE NATIONAL LABOUR PRESS LTD.

1915

PUBLICATIONS BY THE SAME AUTHOR

BOOKS

Nigeria: Its Peoples and its Problems

London: Smith Elder & Co.: Two Editions, 1911-12

"There have been few travellers, indeed, who have given us so accurate a picture of the great African region, or who have discussed the problems arising from it with so much sound sense and sympathy."—*The Nation.*

"A fascinating book."—*Public Opinion.*

Red Rubber: *The Story of the Rubber Slave Trade in the Congo*

T. Fisher Unwin: Five Editions, 1906-08

"If there are any who are not yet believers in the reality of the Congo Government's misdeeds, Mr. Morel's new book may be recommended as a certain means of conviction. To the author, more than to any man alive, is due the ventilation of this crime against civilisation. He has fought a long uphill battle against apathy, misrepresentation, and the power of an unscrupulous purse. And he has been successful. He has made Congo Reform a part of the sworn creed of many of our chief public men."—*The Spectator.*

King Leopold's Rule in Africa

London: Heinemann, 1904

"An amazing book to be written in the dawn of the Twentieth Century of the Christian era."—*Morning Post.*

Great Britain and the Congo

London: Smith Elder & Co., 1905

The British Case in French Congo

London: Heinemann, 1903

Affairs of West Africa

London: Heinemann, 1902

French Edition: "Problemes de l'Ouest Africian"

Translated by A. Duchene, Chief of the Staff of the African Department of the French Colonial Office.

PAMPHLETS

The Outbreak of the War

(Letter to the Executive of the Birkenhead Liberal Association, 1914: Letchworth Garden City Press: 1d.)

The Problem of our Social Conditions

(Speech at Birkenhead, 1913: Birkenhead: Willmer Bros. Ltd.)

The Future of the Peoples of West Africa

(Open Letter to a West African Friend, 1912: Liverpool: Richardson & Son)

Morocco and Armageddon

(Manchester: The National Labour Press, 1915: 1d.)

The Treatment of Native Races

(Address delivered to the Church Congress at Southampton, 1913)

etc., etc.

ORIGINAL DEDICATION.

TO THOSE

WHO BELIEVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

FRIENDLIER RELATIONS BETWEEN

BRITAIN AND GERMANY

TO BE ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSPERITY AND WELFARE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN PEOPLES AND TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE WORLD'S PEACE

AND TO

THOSE WHO ARE PERSUADED THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF NATIONAL LIABILITIES TOWARDS FOREIGN POWERS BY SECRET COMMITMENTS WITHHELD FROM THE BRITISH PEOPLE, IS BOTH A MENACE TO THE SECURITY OF THE STATE AND A BETRAYAL OF THE NATIONAL TRUST

THIS VOLUME

IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

FOREWORD.

BY J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, M.P.

I REMEMBER well the unpleasant effect this book had upon me when I first read it over two years ago. I did not want to believe it, and yet its facts were so authoritative and its conclusions so logical that I had to believe it. No more merciless exposure of the dishonour which is accepted as honour in diplomatic circles has ever been made.

"It is all ancient history now," it may be said. "We have our Egypt and France has her Morocco, and the end has justified the means." *But the fact is that the events and the policy exposed in this book form an introduction to the present war.* The Morocco affair slammed the doors in the faces of the peacemakers in Europe.

I wrote at the time that it looked as though we had ended the policy of French pin-pricks in Egypt at the price of an enormous navy in the North Sea and an ultimate war. The Morocco experience had a most unfortunate influence on the mind of Germany. It convinced many of my own Socialist friends (particularly those of the Revisionist School who concern themselves more than the others with real politics) that Germany was the victim of an evil conspiracy and that our friendship was merely feigned; and it is also said with some show of authority that our readiness to go to war in support of the French claims in Morocco (though they were in violation of a treaty only a year or so old and in contradiction of our openly professed intentions though not of our secretly made agreements) convinced the Kaiser that sooner or later he would have to yield to the militarist advisors to whom he had hitherto lent but a deaf ear. In any event, 1911-1912 are the years of the diplomatic changes which immediately preceded the

war. Then Fate became mischievous and malevolent, and even those who were but onlookers could not help seeing the gathering of the clouds on the horizon. This book explains those years, and the most strikingly dramatic part of its revelation is that the agreements we made with France openly were good and made for peace, whilst those we made secretly were the cause of trouble, ill-feeling, and war. This is a most significant circumstance and has an important bearing on the demand of growing strength that secret diplomacy should be done away with.

Mr. Morel has written history with a merciless accuracy. It ought to be read by everyone who is thinking of what the settlement after peace can be, for it reveals a method of government which is as inconsistent with and as subversive to democracy and popular freedom as Prussian militarism itself.

PREFACE TO FIRST AND SECOND EDITIONS

December, 1914.

EXCEPT for a few structural and verbal alterations which make the meaning and chronology easier to follow, this volume is a mere reprint, *minus* the appendix of documents, of the one entitled "Morocco in Diplomacy," which was published by Messrs. Smith, Elder and Co. in the spring of 1912.

I have deliberately refrained from all other changes and from any attempt to bring the subject up to date,[1] because whatever value and importance this work may have is now concerned in my eyes with the circumstance of its explanation of the events of 1914 being not retrospective, but prospective.[2]

The book was written in the hope of helping to avert a catastrophe such as has now overwhelmed us. It was a chapter of the mistaken policy which already in 1911 had made the present European War a threatening possibility. It was a passionate and hopeless appeal to get that policy abandoned while it was still time.

[1] Except in the matter of the new Note facing page 178.

[2] *e.g.*, page 183. "To-day (Spring, 1912) we are confronted with this situation. The German *nation* firmly believes not only that it is threatened by Great Britain, but that Great Britain intends to take the first favourable opportunity to force a war. The British nation knows itself to be absolutely innocent of any such desire or intention. Is there a way out of the *impasse?* Only, it seems to me, if British public opinion will think out the problem for itself, face the issues squarely and resolutely, and decline any longer to tolerate being in the position of finding itself involved in war without any real knowledge of the why and the wherefore."

Again, page 200 *et seq.* "It is in the interest neither of the British nor of the French *peoples* that they should be fettered in their intercourse with other peoples; or committed by their Governments to a definite course of action in advance."

And page 202. "Especially is it necessary for the common-sense elements in the British nation to set their faces like flint against the sections in Britain and France desirous of distorting the existence of friendly relations with France into an instrument of aggression against Germany.' '

Needless to say that the story of our diplomatic entanglements in the past, and the warning against their continuation in the future, remained equally unnoticed. The danger we had run in 1911, evident and enormous though it had been, was a danger escaped; and having escaped it, Englishmen remained lazily willing to leave once more the fate of Europe at the mercy of a system which had, after all, brought only the peril of war, not war itself. Indeed it is probable that the diplomacy which had created that peril of 1911 was even given credit for having averted it!

But now the catastrophe has come. It has become evident that Secret Diplomacy and the "Balance of Power," with their alliances and commitments, have not saved Europe from a universal loss of life, of wealth, of international goodwill far surpassing the most frightful examples and the most frightful forecasts. We are now in the presence of the utter failure of the old-fashioned methods of safeguarding peace by preparing for war. And it may therefore be that the story of Morocco in Diplomacy, that is to say of ten years of secret diplomacy, will now command more attention and that its lesson will now be taken to heart by a reading public which was indifferent to warnings of future perils, but which is already, and will be more and more, seeking eagerly for the origin of present calamities. And the story of Morocco in Diplomacy is not merely one of the historical explanations of the present war; it is also the type of many other similar explanations.

For this reason, as already said, I have chosen to leave the book as it was, feeling that its value, that is to say whatever influence it may possibly have in preparing a less dangerous future, consists largely in the circumstance that if it helps to explain 1914, that explanation had already been furnished in 1912.

E. D. MOREL.

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION

October, 1915.

I explained in the "New Preface"[1] why I had authorised this reprint of the original volume, and why I had not developed the sequel of the story therein set forth through its various phases to its logical consummation—the great war. This reprint has now reached a third edition, and it seems appropriate to allude briefly to two collections of diplomatic documents which have appeared since the issue of the second edition, and which throw a vivid light upon the facts adduced and the arguments advanced by the Author in the Spring of 1912—the date of the original publication. The first of these collections is contained in the French Yellow Book[2] on the war. The documents it embraces demonstrate beyond any possibility of doubt the capital *rôle* played by the Morocco quarrel in bringing about the cataclysm which has overwhelmed civilisation. If these documents, upon which I have commented in a recent pamphlet,[3] stood alone, they would justify to the hilt what I wrote here, three-and-half years ago. But they do not stand alone. It now transpires that at the very time I was engaged in writing this book the diplomatic representatives of a neutral country, which has since suffered so cruelly—Belgium—resident at Berlin, London and Paris, were expressing to their Government, precisely the same views as to the character of Anglo-French diplomacy in the Morocco affair and towards Germany generally, which I was endeavouring to express to the British Public; that they were consumed by the same fears as I was, and that they had come to the same conclusions as I had, reluctantly and by the sheer weight of evidence, arrived at. Moreover, they had been expressing similar views for several years before my book appeared, and they continued to do so with an ever-increasing vehemence to within a few weeks of the crash. So extraordinary, indeed, is the similarity, not only of ideas but, in some cases, of actual language, that I might have had access to the majority of these State documents when compiling my volume! Never before, I imagine, have such disclosures become publicly accessible in the life-time of the contemporary generation.[4] Never, certainly, has an author dealing with international affairs been able, in *his* life-time, to invoke such a mass of corroborative testimony. In many respects, indeed, these Belgian diplomatic reports go further than anything which is to be found in my book. My object was at once to appeal and to warn. They conceived it to be their duty not only to warn, but to denounce the diplomacy of the British and French Foreign Offices with a vigour as direct as it is uncompromising. These are samples of their language at the time of the second Morocco crisis: "France signed the Algeciras Act with the firm intention of never observing it," writes

[1] P. xv.

[2] Cd. 7717.

[3] "Morocco and Armageddon," National Labour Press, 1d.

[4] The documents in question are 119 in number, and cover the period of 1905-1914. They were discovered in the Belgian Archives, and have been published in the original French and in German, by the

Baron Greindl from Berlin (April, 1911). "England, which has pushed France into the Moroccan morass, contemplates complacently her work," writes Baron Guillaume from Paris (April, 1911). "There will be much less chance of reaching an understanding with Germany if England takes part in the conversation," this from the same pen (July, 1911). And again, in the course of a despatch, in which he states his disbelief in a French desire for war at that moment, and expresses "very great confidence in the pacific sentiments of the German Emperor":

"I experience, generally speaking, less faith in Great Britain's desire for peace, for she does not dislike to see other parties devouring one another. . . . As I thought from the first day, the key of the situation is in London." (July, 1911).

"I am assured," writes the same Belgian diplomatist:

"that the first intention of England was to propose to France that the two Governments should each send without delay a couple of men-of-war to Agadir. The Paris Cabinet opposed the proposal in the strongest terms, and there it ended." (August, 1911).

The Count de Lalaing, referring to Lord Courtney's speech in the House of Lords criticising the policy of the Government on the ground that it appeared to aim at the isolation of Germany, remarks:

"It is rare to hear this truth stated in the British Parliament." (November, 1911).

There are several remarkable despatches towards the close of that year from Baron Greindl and Count de Lalaing, reviewing the crisis. The former writes:

"Sir E. Grey declared that there is no secret Treaty between England and France other than the one which has been published.[1] I do not question his sincerity; but it is none the less true that with or without a written or verbal engagement, everyone in England and France considers the *entente cordiale* as a defensive and offensive alliance against Germany. . . The *entente cordiale* was founded, not on the positive basis of a defence of common interests, but on the negative basis of hatred against the German Empire. . . . It is the *entente* which has revived the spirit of revenge in France which had largely

German Government in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, of which they fill several special supplements in July and August. Their authenticity has not been questioned. The authors of the Reports are as follows:

Belgian diplomatic representatives accredited to the BRITISH Government: COUNT DE LALAING and M. E. DE CARTIER.

Belgian diplomatic representatives accredited to the FRENCH Government: BARON GUILLAUME, COUNT D'ARSCHOT SCHOONHOVEN, and M. A. LEGHAIT.

Belgian diplomatic representatives accredited to the GERMAN Government: BARON GREINDL and BARON BEYENS.

[1] *I.e.*, the secret clauses of the Anglo-French Declaration and the Secret Franco-Spanish Convention, revealed by the French newspapers in November, 1911.

subsided. The condition of anxiety and discomfort in which Europe has been writhing for the past seven years originates with it."

". . . . Until advised to the contrary, we must, therefore, regard as admitted that the project of helping France in a war with Germany by landing 150,000 men has been discussed in London.[1] There is nothing in this which need surprise us. It is the continuance of the singular proposals which were made a few years ago to General Ducarne by Colonel Barnardiston.[2] . . . Was it not tantamount to claiming a right of veto upon German enterprise to raise such a clamour because a German war-vessel had anchored at Agadir when England had observed without a tremor the progressive conquest of Moroccan territory by France and the crushing of the Sultan's independence? England could not act otherwise. She was tied by her secret Treaty with France. The explanation is of the simplest—but not at all calculated to appease German irritation. The consequence (of the secret Treaty) was that, that at the very moment the Act of Algeciras was signed, three at least of the participating Powers were contracting undertakings among themselves which were incompatible with their public professions."[3] (December, 1911).

Count de Lalaing is equally outspoken. Commenting upon the reaction which set in against the anti-German character of our diplomacy when the facts became better known and the nation realised that it had stood on the brink of war, Belgium's representative in London remarks:

"People here hardly dare to admit that they have been more loyalist than the King, more intractable than the friend they desired to support.[4] . . . The *entente,* solely designed to dispel certain specified clouds, was not an Alliance. The fault of the Asquith Government has been to look upon it, in fact, as such, with the result that serious enmity against Great Britain has arisen in Berlin." (January, 1912).

All through 1912 and 1913 we find anxiety displayed by these Belgian diplomatists as to the far-reaching effect of the Morocco affair upon the peace of the world. In this respect Baron Guillaume's despatches from Paris are most illuminating. The growing popularity of President Poincaré he considers ominous:

"One must see in this, first of all a manifestation of the old French jingoistic spirit which had been eclipsed for many years, but which has assumed new life since the Agadir incident. M. Poincaré is a Lorrainer, and never loses an occasion to recall it. He was the collaborator and instigator of the militarist policy of M. Millerand." (February, 1913).

[1] Compare with p. 146 of text and foot-note (1) to p. xxii.

[2] In connection with the possible landing of British troops in Belgium. The statements made by Colonel Barnardiston, our military attaché, have been disavowed by Sir E. Grey.

[3] Compare with Chapter XIII.

[4] Compare with p. 148 of the text.

The dangerous lengths to which French jingoism is proceeding is the constant theme of the Belgian despatches, and the sinister effect of the Morocco affair is alluded to :

"Steps should be taken to stop this tendency which the Government has really encouraged since the Agadir affair and the formation of the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé Ministry. . . . Half the theatres in Paris are now playing jingo pieces. . . . The *Journal* publishes this morning an article entitled 'To the Frontier.' " (April, 1913).

The pessimistic note becomes more and more accentuated :

"The propaganda in favour of the three years (military) law which is calculated to bring about an awakening of chauvinism, has been admirably prepared and carried out ; it began by bringing about the election of M. Poincaré to the Presidency. It continues its work without thought of the dangers to which it gives rise ; uneasiness is great in the country." (June, 1913).

In a grave passage he denounces French chauvinism (or rather the chauvinism of certain powerful French political groups, "the General Staff and the jingoes," because he pays a tribute to the generally pacific dispositions of the French people) as a danger to Europe and Belgium :

"I have already had the honour of reporting that it is Messrs. Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand, and their friends who have invented and pursued the nationalist, boastful, and chauvinistic policy, whose renascence we are witnessing. It is a danger for Europe and for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril which threatens the peace of Europe to-day, not because I am entitled to suppose that the Government of the Republic intends deliberately to break it—I think rather the contrary—but because the attitude of the Barthou Cabinet is, in my opinion, the determining cause of the increase of military tendencies in Germany."

In the same despatch he refers to the incessant calls for more soldiers from the French military commanders in Morocco. (January, 1914). A few days before Baron Guillaume was expressing himself thus, Count de Lalaing was reporting from London that the fall of the Barthou Cabinet was looked upon as an attack upon President Poincaré, "*persona grata* with the London Cabinet" ; that the opposition in France to the three-years' law was regarded "with some bitterness," and that the somewhat "unusual" course had been taken to issue an exchange of official telegrams with the new French Premier (M. Barthou's successor) and with M. Sazanoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, announcing a common intention to collaborate in maintaining the Franco-Russian alliance. The bellicosity of M. Poincaré, "*persona grata* with the London Cabinet," continues to be accentuated by the Belgian Minister in Paris, Baron Guillaume. He speaks of the "military and nationalist policy" which M. Poincaré has "systematically pursued since he became Premier" :

"With Messrs. Delcassé, Millerand and a few others he postulated persistently a political and military uplifting (*relèvement*) for France, combined with closer and more trusting relations with Russia.

He went to Petrograd as Premier; he will return thither in a few months as President. He recently despatched thither M. Delcassé, to whom he had confided the mission of seeking by every means to exalt the benefits of the Franco-Russian alliance and to induce the great Empire to accentuate its military preparations." (March, 1914).

Baron Guillaume insists again and again upon the impossibility in which France will find herself to maintain the three-years' law for more than a relatively short period. He speaks of the dislike of the country for the law and of the extreme violence of the Paris Press campaign in favour of it:

"Every possible means has been adopted to influence public opinion, even to the point of seeking to compromise General Joffre. We have even seen the French Ambassador at Petrograd take a step—contrary to all usages—and somewhat dangerous for the future of France. Is it true that the Petrograd Cabinet imposed the three-years' law upon this country, and is pressing with all its weight for the maintenance of that law? I have not been able to secure light upon this delicate matter, but it would be all the graver because the men who direct the destiny of the Empire of the Tsars cannot be ignorant that the effort which is being thus demanded of the French people is excessive and cannot be long sustained. Is, then, the attitude of the Cabinet of Petrograd based upon the conviction that events are near enough to use the tool which it intends to place in the hands of its ally." (June, 1914).

A week later the Count de Lalaing reports what he conceives to be the British view, which is that the three-years' law "can alone permit the Republic to honour the engagements which bind it to its ally, Russia, and to its friend England." The last despatch but one is from Baron Beyens in Berlin, who speaks of Russia, "who is directing the Dual Alliance to her exclusive profit, and who is also increasing her armaments in enormous proportions." He hopes that in the interests of Belgium the three-years' law may be dropped.

Such is a very bald epitome of some of the Belgian documents which have now seen the light of day, which have doubtless been communicated to the Government of every neutral State, and which have probably appeared in the papers of neutral countries. Their importance to the people of Britain and of France in the future work of European reconstruction, in consort with the people of Germany—which is the world's only hope—cannot be exaggerated. Their character is such as to bring conviction to any sane mind that if the *Entente* Governments imagined themselves to be threatened by the Teutonic Powers, the latter had equally good reason to believe themselves threatened by the Governments of the *Entente*. In the eyes of these Belgian diplomatists, neutral observers stationed in the innermost sanctuaries of the great world of diplomatic intrigue, British and French diplomacy had for the past seven years been steadily directed to the isolation and discomfiture of Germany all over the world. If *they* thought that, how must the German Government, and Germany's diplomatic representatives abroad, have interpreted the situation! In the face of these documents the charge that Germany cynically planned this war and let Hell loose upon Europe is no longer tenable by anyone who retains a sense of judgment. The blame has not been hers alone. Ten years of secret diplomacy have done their deadly work. If the British Parliament were wisely inspired it would insist upon the integral publication of these documents in this country.

E. D. MOREL.

ORIGINAL INTRODUCTION.

February 29, 1912.

PERHAPS I should preface this volume by a brief profession of faith which is my justification—to myself—for having written it.

I believe that the greatest national interest of the British people is at this moment, and will continue increasingly to be, the establishment and maintenance of friendly relations with Germany; a full and frank examination by responsible statesmen in both countries of the national problems peculiar to each in their relations with one another, leading to an appreciation of their respective national necessities, and to a mutual adjustment of the same with the sacrifice neither of honour, nor prestige, nor legitimate needs on either side.

I believe that no greater disaster could befall both peoples, and all that is most worthy of preservation in modern civilisation, than a war between them.

I reject the theories, based for the most part upon faulty and inapplicable historic similitudes, pointing to the inevitableness of such war.

In common with every Briton of ordinary intelligence, I perceive that in the early part of last year the relations of the two peoples which, after passing through a period of recurrent crises, were beginning to show visible signs of steady advance towards the old friendly feeling, have received a deplorable set-back.

The information which reaches me accords with that which persons of weight declare to be such as they themselves are in receipt of, viz., that not one school of thought only, but the whole German nation, is seething with an absolutely genuine sense of grievance against the British Government.

In common with every Briton of ordinary intelligence, I am aware that this set-back in Anglo-German relations is due to the view taken in Germany of the attitude adopted by the British Foreign Office, endorsed by a considerable section of the British Press, towards Germany last summer

in the course of the negotiations between that Power and France relating to the question of Morocco—a question which had already given rise to considerable friction in 1905.

Moreover, it is now no secret—it has been publicly vouched for by several members of Parliament and naval officers—that the British Government had fully determined to support, if necessary, the French case against the German by force of arms, and had, indeed, undertaken naval and military preparation to that end.[1]

Holding the beliefs stated above, it seemed to me that the German view was deserving of careful study in the light of facts publicly accessible in order to ascertain whether it reposed upon any sort of foundation.

At an early stage in the investigation, I acquired the conviction that Germany's action in despatching the small gun-boat *Panther,* of 1,000 tons[2] burthen and an equipment of 125 men, to anchor off an open roadstead on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, had been grossly misinterpreted; the step being an incident in a series of inter-connected circumstances extending over a period of nearly ten years, in the course of which Germany had had legitimate causes of complaint at her treatment by French and British diplomacy.

To this conviction I have already given utterance.[3]

[1] Recent Ministerial statements have been concerned in denying that the British Government meditated a gratuitous attack upon Germany last summer. This denial may have been necessary to calm German opinion. It was not required to convince home opinion of the inaccuracy of the allegation. The denial does not, from the British national standpoint, touch the kernel of the question. The incontestable facts remain: (1) that the British Government assured France last summer that France could count upon British naval and military support in the event of war arising out of a Franco-German rupture over Morocco, and had taken elaborate preparations to that end; (2) that this assurance went beyond any British national commitment, then or now avowed, towards the French Republic; (3) that the French Government's case was intrinsically bad since it reposed upon the violation by France of an International Treaty; (4) that this violation was committed with the approval of the British Foreign Office, and arose out of secret arrangements between the British, French and Spanish Governments contracted in 1904, and of which the British people, and the world, knew nothing until November, 1911; (5) that the attitude of the British Foreign Office in the early, and most critical, stage in the Franco-German negotiations was such as gravely to increase the possibilities of a Franco-German rupture.

[2] With two guns, calibre 10.5 cm., and six machine guns.

[3] *Vide The Nineteenth Century and After,* for November, 1911, and February, 1912; a series of letters entitled "How Wars are Made," in *The Daily News* in October, 1911, etc.

But as more and more light was thrown upon the subject, as disclosures of secret arrangements, unknown to the British people, negotiated by the British Foreign Office with the Foreign Offices of France and Spain, assumed precision; as successive revelations in France showed both the inadequacy, and in several important respects, the inaccuracy of the statement explanatory of the British official attitude given by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on November 27 last, the necessity of a fuller treatment became apparent.

It was increasingly obvious that the policy recommended in distinguished quarters of attempting to soothe German feelings by homeopathic doses in the shape of friendly speeches of a general character, combined with a studious avoidance of the source of the trouble, was somewhat lacking in courage and perhaps not quite dignified. From another point of view, too, this policy was not one which, so it appeared to the author, could be regarded as adequate. It is of vital moment the nation should realise that in this matter it has been led blindfold to the very brink of war, *as the outcome of liabilities secretly contracted by its diplomatists without its authority*. Also that, in the final resort, the existence of these secret liabilities has only been acknowledged by the Foreign Office subsequent to their publication in a couple of Parisian newspapers.[1] To write *Finis* over the Morocco controversy, assuming that to do so were in other respects wise or even possible, would be, under these circumstances, for the nation to admit that it is prepared to assent to such treatment being meted out to it in the future, and for my part I cannot bring myself to believe in so humiliating a confession of national impotence.

[1] The existence, and in part the actual substance of Secret Articles attached to the Anglo-French Declaration over Morocco was revealed in *Le Temps* of November 11, 1911. A question was then put in the House of Commons; Sir E. Grey admitted in reply the existence of Secret Articles, and they were subsequently communicated to Parliament. The Secret Franco-Spanish Convention of October, 1904, was published in *Le Matin* of November 9, 1911, reproduced in *Le Temps* of the same evening, and afterwards published in a British White Book together with the Exchange of Notes between Lord Lansdowne and the French Ambassador concerning it. The effect of these two Treaties—the second arose out of the first and was, indeed, imposed upon France by the British Government—was to involve this country in approved and diplomatic support of a partition of Morocco between France and Spain, and thereby, to inevitable conflict with Germany, as explained in this volume. That is not an expression of opinion: but a bald statement of fact.

It seemed, then, advisable to place in the hands of the British public a connected narrative of the dealings of their own diplomacy and that of three other Powers chiefly interested in Morocco—France, Spain, and Germany —together with a comprehensive appendix, foot-notes and maps which should enable the reader, at any rate to a very great extent, to exercise a check upon the statements of facts in the body of the volume and upon the conclusions drawn from those facts by the author.[1]

His conclusions the author makes no attempt to conceal. They are that from first to last the British people have been systematically misled and misinformed as to the part played by Germany in the Morocco question. And for these reasons: first, because the genesis of German action has lain in the existence of secret conventions and arrangements between the British, French and Spanish Governments, withheld from the knowledge of the British people, who have, therefore, been induced to form their judgment upon incomplete data; secondly, because a concerted effort, inspired by certain influences connected with the British diplomatic machine, and conveyed to the British public through the medium of powerful newspapers, has been consistently pursued with the object of portraying German policy in the Morocco question in a uniformly sinister light. That effort, it is right to add, has been much assisted by a section of German chauvinists and German jingo newspapers, who have throughout striven to goad their Government into departing from the logical and straightforward, if sometimes clumsy, policy it appears to me to have steadily followed.[2]

[1] The publishers of this reprint have thought it well, in order that the book might be produced at a popular price, to republish it minus the appendices, which, in the original, covered 133 pages of text.

In certain cases, some of the least known documents have been either incorporated bodily in the text, or quoted from at length.

[2] In the Economist of December 30, 1911, and January 8, 1912, will be found a "valuation of the leading newspapers of Germany" which may be commended to all who desire to appreciate the international significance attaching to the utterances of specific German Press organs. The writer of these interesting articles accentuates a circumstance to which sufficient importance has not been attached in this country, viz.: That during almost the entire course of the Morocco crisis of last summer the German Government had a hostile Press, some papers attacking it for not claiming a portion of Morocco; others because the French Congo was not regarded as worth the abandonment of the German diplomatic position in regard to Morocco, and—at one time—all of them because they believed the German Government had lacked firmness in its diplomatic dealings with Britain.

The Morocco problem itself, and that of the Congo which (in another aspect than the one the public is familiar with) has now been grafted upon it, still contain numerous elements of international friction—possibly of very grave friction. As a French writer of repute has put it—

"The arrangement of 1911 is either the prelude to a real understanding between France and Germany, or it is the prelude to war."

In a considerable, it is not perhaps too much to say in a preponderating measure, the issue one way or another is on the knees of the British people and their Government.

If this book succeeds in carrying conviction to the mind of the Briton possessed of normal common-sense and sanity, that, on the one hand, Germany's actions throughout this entire controversy *have* been misrepresented, and on the other hand, that the British and French peoples alike have been led to the verge of war with Germany, not because of alleged deep-rooted antagonisms or conflicts due to "elemental forces," but through the intrigues, the lack of straightforward dealing, and the absence of foresight on the part of diplomacy working in the dark and concealing its manœuvres from the national gaze—the author will have achieved his purpose.

E. D. MOREL.

P.S.—This book was already in the printers' hands when Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin was announced. That visit has been followed by official expressions on either side of good augury for the future. Everyone will rejoice at these first-fruits of a resolute public pressure upon Downing Street[1] during the past four months. I am tempted to think that a detailed history of the Moroccan imbroglio, far from being less necessary, is now more than ever required. And for these reasons. If a genuine movement for an understanding has really begun in the official world as the result of public insistence, it is essential that the popular feeling provoked should be reinforced by additional arguments reposing not on admirable but more or less vague desires, but upon a study of concrete facts on the specific issue which has caused the ill-feeling it is proposed to attempt to remove. It is essential, too, for the durability of any understanding that may be reached, that the British public should thoroughly apprehend the reasons which have brought about a situation all now

[1] The British Foreign Office.

realise to be fraught with the gravest peril. Finally, the circumstance that so happy but so brusque a change in the British official attitude should be possible, and should be (again, happily) supported by influential British newspapers which only a few weeks ago were replete with sentiments completely at variance with those given utterance to in their columns to-day, constitutes in itself the most convincing of reasons why the nation should appreciate the events and the influences responsible for the opposite policy so long followed, and with which the nation—without altogether understanding it—is clearly out of sympathy. The welcome change indicated by Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin is a tribute, first and foremost, to the popular will in Britain. Let but the reflecting members of the community apply themselves to a comprehension of what preceded this change, and a lesson will have been learned, the outcome of which should serve to place Anglo-German relations upon a footing of permanent friendliness and security—to the inestimable advantage not of the present generation only but of generations to come.

The Morocco problem is not settled. In one sense it may be said to be only beginning. It will boom largely on the horizon during the lifetime of the present generation.

E. D. M.

CONTENTS.

CONTENTS.

PART IV.

THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS

PART V.

GERMANY'S ACCEPTANCE OF FRENCH ASSURANCES.

PART VI.

GERMANY'S FIRST INTERVENTION (1905)

PART VII.

PROLOGUE TO GERMANY'S SECOND INTERVENTION

PART VIII.

GERMANY'S SECOND INTERVENTION (1911), AND THE ENSUING ANGLO-GERMAN CRISIS

CONTENTS.

MAPS.

[*These Maps have been specially drawn for publication in this volume.*]

I. Map of Morocco, showing Towns and Districts mentioned in the Text.

II. Map of Morocco Illustrating the Sphere recognised to Spain under the Franco-Spanish Secret Convention of October, 1904, which remained secret until published in the Paris *Matin*, in November, 1911.

III. Map of Part of West-Central Africa, showing the Area affected by the Franco-German Negotiations of June —November, 1911; and the Neighbouring Dependencies.

IV. The Same indicating the Area which formed at one time in the Franco-German Negotiations, the subject of special discussion.

V. The Same showing (A) Area ceded by France to Germany under the Convention of November 4, 1911; (B) Area ceded by Germany to France under the same Convention.

PART I.

FOREWORD.

CHAPTER I.

On July 3, 1911, it became known that the *Panther* (a German gunboat of 1000 tons burthen, carrying two guns calibre 10.5 cm., six machine guns and 125 men) had cast anchor (but without sending a landing party on shore) in front of Agadir, a village of three hundred inhabitants, on the inhospitable, storm-tossed, surf-cursed coast of Atlantic Morocco.

The event, which in itself seemed hardly worth chronicling in a newspaper paragraph, possessed, nevertheless, considerable international importance, inasmuch as it was interpreted, and rightly interpreted, to mean that Germany was not prepared to acquiesce tacitly in the changed condition of affairs in Morocco.

Changed in what way?

To answer that question we must consider what had been the preceding relations of the chief European nations with Morocco, and what was the then ostensible position of Morocco according to the public agreements subscribed by those Powers at the Algeciras Conference of 1906.

I will take the Moroccan relations of the Powers one by one, beginning with Great Britain.

PART II.

Explanatory of the respective attitude towards Morocco of the four interested Powers—Britain, France, Spain, and Germany—prior to the events of the past decade.

CHAPTER II.

BRITAIN AND MOROCCO

"You will observe—wrote Lord Salisbury to Sir Charles Euan-Smith upon his appointment as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of Morocco on May 16, 1891[1]—that it has been the constant aim of His Majesty's Government and of your predecessors at Tangier, to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Morocco, while neglecting no favourable opportunity of impressing upon the Sultan and his Ministers the importance and advantage of improving the government and administration of the country. Unfortunately, their efforts in this direction have hitherto been unsuccessful, and herein lies the great danger of the situation, as the decease of the present Sultan will, in all probability, give rise to internal disturbances, the issue of which it is impossible to foresee."

This policy of Great Britain towards Morocco in what may be termed modern times was inspired, until the opening years of the present century, by the sentiment that the national interest required an independent Morocco. The view dictating this policy was primarily the strategic one that were the coasts of Mediterranean and North-Atlantic Morocco to fall into the hands of a European Power, the route to India would be threatened and the British position in the Mediterranean compromised.

The larger policy, that of an independent Morocco, has now been wholly abandoned, although it was nominally revived by the Act of Algeciras in 1906, as will subsequently be explained. The strategical view has undergone a profound modification. Retained to the extent of excluding a first-class Power from occupying the sea-board referred to; it has altered to the extent of allowing that occupation by a second-class Power under certain conditions. Those conditions are that no fortifications or strategic works shall be erected on the part of the aforesaid sea-board whence

[1] British White Book Cd. 6815.

the security of the Straits of Gibraltar might conceivably be menaced. It does not appear beyond the bounds of possibility that the limits within which such menace was held to be possible in 1904, may be restricted as the result of the Franco-Spanish negotiations now proceeding with the cognisance of the British Government.

Whether these changes of policy were avoidable or unavoidable, wise or unwise, from the point of view of the national interest, it would be futile to discuss. The circumstances under which they have come about will appear as this narrative proceeds.

The secondary but nevertheless extremely important consideration influencing British policy, until the opening years of the present century, was that of our commercial interests in Morocco which were, and are, extensive. The desire to preserve Morocco as an open market for British trade, and to remove the numerous disabilities under which British trade suffered at the hands of the Moorish Government, were matters regarded as worthy of attention by British diplomats in the latter half of the nineteenth century. With these united ends in view, Sir John Drummond Hay, the British representative at the Moorish court, laboured for many years: in the main successfully as regards the larger policy: with scant progress so far as inducing the Sultan to follow a more liberal line in his treatment of European commercial interests.

In 1891 Lord Salisbury decided to make a serious effort in this direction. He despatched a special Mission to Fez, attended by some pomp and circumstance,[1] under Sir Charles Euan-Smith. The chief object of the Mission was the conclusion of a commercial Treaty; but it was arranged that the slavery question should be tentatively referred to, and also that if the Sultan showed a friendly disposition, the good offices of the British Government should be used with the other Powers to diminish the evils connected with the system then, and still, existing, whereby Moorish subjects

[1] Sir C. Euan-Smith was accompanied by three members of the British legation, and by a military staff consisting of Colonel Hallam Parr, Major Monds, Surgeon-Captain Macpherson, Lieutenant Kirkpatrick, Lieutenant Wilson, and D. Beaufort, Esq. The Sultan deputed *Kaid* Harry Maclean to take charge of the Mission, which was received with military honours as it progressed towards the capital. Four ladies—members of Sir C. Euan-Smith's family—also accompanied the party.

shed their allegiance to the Sultan by becoming the "protected" subjects of this or that European Power.[1] Lord Salisbury was at special pains to emphasise that the British Mission had no ulterior or secret motives, and impressed upon his envoy the necessity of so conducting himself that suspicions of British motives should not be aroused either in the mind of the Sultan or among the representatives of other European Powers.[2]

The Mission entirely failed. It was delayed for many weeks at Fez, while the Sultan tergiversated in the most approved Eastern style. That the failure was partly due to Sir C. Euan-Smith's somewhat autocratic bearing a perusal of the Despatches suggests. But the chief cause was unquestionably the misrepresentations which, as Lord Salisbury afterwards remarked, "attended the Mission from the first."[3] Nor is it possible to doubt whence came the numerous intrigues which wrecked the effort. Lord Salisbury, who acted throughout with the utmost straightforwardness towards the Powers, had communicated the draft commercial Treaty Sir C. Euan-Smith had drawn up for presentation to the Suitan, to the German, Italian, Spanish, French, and Austrian Governments,[4] and had suggested to these Governments that their support for a measure calculated to serve the interests of all the Powers, and in no way aimed at securing "the slightest privilege in

[1] The system had given rise to gross abuses, indeed to a species of blackmail at the expense of the Sultan, of which he justly complained.

[2] *Vide* quotation at the beginning of the chapter. To Sir C. Euan-Smith's early request that he should be authorised to use vigorous language to the Sultan were the latter intractable, Lord Salisbury demurred: "I should wish you to abstain from anything in the nature of a menace, which would be doubly dangerous, because, if resisted, it might bring about a serious crisis, and, if successful, would place her Majesty's Government in the position of having undertaken the protection of Morocco." (Despatch to Sir C. Euan-Smith, March 2, 1892.) "You should bear in mind the risk of leading other Powers to suppose that you are endeavouring to obtain exclusive advantages for this country." (Despatch, March 28, 1892.) [British White Book Cd. 6815.]

[3] British White Book Cd. 6821.

[4] Yet so important a French paper as the *Journal des Débats,* which had openly accused the British Government of ulterior motives on July 21, actually stated on August 12 that Sir C. Euan-Smith's object was "to insert the thin end of the wedge which would force Morocco to accept her (Britain's) authority," *adding that France intended to maintain Moroccan independence and integrity in spite of England.* How passing strange it is to recall these utterances when contemplating present events!

favour of England," would be welcome. The German,[1] Italian, and Austrian Governments had at once responded, the two former with marked cordiality. Spain, after slight delay, had followed suit. France alone had held aloof, M. Ribot contenting himself with the statement that the draft Treaty would be studied. A later request had met with the repetition of the former statement, accompanied by the expression of a doubt as to the Mission's intentions being confined to the subject-matter communicated. Meantime, the French Colonial press had started a fierce campaign against the British Mission, and throughout its stay at Fez had published a series of untruthful rumours as to its proceedings, inspired by the French representatives at Fez and Tangier, and followed, on one occasion, by a visit to the Foreign Office on the part of the French Ambassador.[2] At his last interview with the Sultan, Sir C. Euan-Smith was told by the latter that he "acknowledged to the full that he had made many promises regarding certain articles in the Treaty, and regarding the signing of the Treaty, which he had not fulfilled. He said that other people had advised him that the promises he had made would have evil results for himself, and, therefore, he could not act up to them."[3] Referring to the intrigues directed against the British Mission, Lord Salisbury added, rather contemptuously: "It is not necessary to inquire with what object these inventions were

[1] The German and Italian ministers at Tangier showed themselves particularly anxious to assist the British Mission. (Sir C. Euan-Smith to Lord Salisbury, April 20, 1892.) The British Mission "was supported by the representatives of Germany, Austria, Spain, and Belgium." (*Times* Tangier Correspondent, July 18, 1892.)

[2] July 15, 1892.

[3] "The action of the Moorish Government is attributed to French intrigue." (Reuter's Agent at Tangier, July 18, 1892.) "French action in this matter is, apparently, purely selfish, if not vindictive, as their Mission is prepared to start for Fez in September, expecting to obtain credit for negotiating a treaty and other proposals on the same lines as the British envoy." (*Times* Special Correspondent with the Mission, *Times*, July 22.) "News from Fez states that the Moorish Ministers who prevented the Sultan from concluding the British Treaty have each received $10,000 from the French agent." (*Times* Tangier Correspondent, August 13.) (In this connection it is worthy of note that the Sultan offered Sir C. Euan-Smith £20,000 if he would drop certain clauses in the commercial Treaty, and when the offer was declined expressed surprise, seeing that he had often induced certain representatives of other Powers to withdraw objectionable requests by the simple method of squaring them in this way. British White Book Cd 6815.)

framed, or from what source they came."[1] Assuredly it was unnecessary. The French Press—even its leading organs—openly expressed its delight at the defeat of an unselfish attempt to save Morocco from itself and from the designs of its enemies.

"The correspondence which has now been published"—concludes Lord Salisbury in his closing despatch to Sir C. Euan-Smith—"will sufficiently establish that there was nothing in your Mission prejudicial to the independence and integrity of Morocco, or threatening in any way the Sultan's prerogative, or his territorial rights. It was conceived and carried out in a spirit entirely conformable to the policy which her Majesty's Government have uniformly pursued, of upholding the Moorish Empire, and discouraging all efforts either to diminish its extent or to precipitate its fall."[2]

Sir C. Euan-Smith's Mission constituted the last serious effort made by Britain to maintain the integrity and independence of Morocco, although British influence continued to preponderate until about 1902.

Nine years later (1901) the Moorish Government, filled with dismay at the sudden attitude assumed by France,[3] appears to have decided to throw itself upon the protection of Britain, and arranged to send a Mission to London. But here again French diplomacy effectively intervened. A Mission did come over, it is true, but another one

[1] British White Book Cd. 6821.

[2] "As usual, France stood out. The Power which 'protects' the Shereef of Wazan, and which with scarcely any disguise supports him in his attitude of something like rivalry to the Sultan of Morocco, has yet obtained influence enough with the latter to put a stop to negotiations which were directed to the common advantage of Europe. Probably this will be represented to-morrow, by the Parisian journals, as 'a triumph of French diplomacy.' That Spain, Austria, England, and France herself are not to be allowed to import corn or horses from Morocco is 'a triumph for French diplomacy.' What it really means is that, even for a great common gain to Europe, France will not permit Great Britain to obtain influence at Fez lest, perchance, at some future time the claims of the mistress of Algeria to succeed to the Sultan's dominions should find themselves barred. The object is very problematic, and the immediate loss is very real. But there are some people to whom no present advantage counts in comparison to some sentiment of *amour propre*, especially of a national kind, and among these, we fear, are to be reckoned the French consular and diplomatic agents in backward countries, almost without exception, together with a large portion of the official and journalistic world of Paris." (*Times* Leader, July 19, 1892.)

[3] *Vide* Chapter III.

accompanied it . . . to Paris,[1] and the envoys to Britain merely talked commercial affairs, Lord Lansdowne securing a few of the minor advantages for international trade urged upon the Sultan by Sir C. Euan-Smith.

[1] *Vide Ibid.*

CHAPTER III.

FRANCE AND MOROCCO

FRENCH interest in Northern Africa was confined until 1881 to Algeria, which, after nearly twenty years' incessant and sanguinary fighting had been definitely declared French territory in 1848. From that time until 1870 the problems of Algerian administration proved sufficiently intricate and absorbing to keep in check the growth of ambitions in other directions. The disasters of the Franco-German war ensured a further period of the maintenance of the *status quo* in Northern Africa. But with that marvellous and rapid recovery which earned the admiration of the world, France entered upon a career of colonial activities which were to carry her far indeed.

In this course of action Jules Ferry, who incarnated the new colonial spirit, was personally encouraged by Bismarck, not, it may well be supposed, from altruistic motives, but because the grim German calculated that the more the interest of the hereditary foe he had overcome was immersed in oversea enterprises, the less fiercely would burn the fires of "La revanche" at home.

The aspirations of the new colonial party turned westwards towards Morocco and eastwards towards Tunis upon which Italian statesmen were casting covetous eyes. The scheme of a great North-West African Empire which should in time rival the lost Empire of the Indies, and which Prévost-Paradol had, long before, predicted it must be France's destiny to found, began to take firm root.

In 1881, fearing a previous move by Italy, but on the flimsiest of intrinsic pretexts, Tunis was invaded, its ruler reduced to the position of a puppet, and French control established.

There remained Morocco. A long conterminous frontier with Algeria, vague and undetermined, offered an excellent basis for those multifold measures which precede political absorption. The opportunities were not neglected. But here France had to reckon not merely with the Moors themselves—very different material to handle from the more

peaceable inhabitants of Tunis [1]—and with a European Power which she could afford to defy, whose claims were no better than her own, but with Britain, with Spain, and with Germany. The task confronting her diplomacy was very similar to the secular policy of the Moorish Government. While the ingenuity of the latter was exercised in playing off one Power against another in order to preserve the integrity of his dominions, French diplomacy had to bring its designs to fruition by "feeling" the three other interested Powers with the purpose of purchasing the acquiescence of one or more of them at the expense of the other or others.

The motives inspiring the French were neither better nor worse than those which have animated other nations, or governments, from the remotest times. There will be eternal differences of opinion as to whether the control of their destinies by a race advanced in arts and crafts conduces to the happiness and welfare of a race less advanced. There will be everlasting disputes as to whether a nation in the position of the French, *i.e.*, with no surplus population and not essentially commercial, is strengthened or weakened by such enterprises. Assuredly no one dreams of blaming France for entertaining ambitious projects; but the methods taken to bring them to fruition become a matter for detailed discussion when they affect the interests of other Powers and international Treaties.

In its dull and inefficient manner the Moorish Government was fully alive to the intentions of the French, and despite the lavish expenditure of money, the activities of an admirably organised intelligence department working from Algiers, and incessant intrigues at Fez, the French cause advanced but slowly.

It was not until 1901 that under the impulse of an energetic Minister, then burning to avenge the final collapse, at Fashoda, of the French challenge to the British position in Egypt, and profiting by our embarrassments in South Africa, determined to force the pace. The annexation of the Tuat oases, threatened in 1891, was proclaimed, together with that of Igli and the Zusfana oases. The French Minister at Tangier informed the Moorish Government that France would herself take action against the periodical invasion of her frontier by roving bands nominally under Moroccan suzerainty, and "engaging directly the

[1] The subjugation of Tunisia was over in two years.

responsibility of the Moorish Government." Providentially (for M. Delcassé) a French subject got himself murdered by a Moor at the psychological moment, and the French Minister at Tangier demanded the despatch of a couple of French men-o'-war.

Seized with panic the Sultan sent an embassy to Paris, and an agreement was drawn up giving France satisfaction on a number of points, including assurances as to the peace of the frontier. This "Protocol" was based upon—

"respect for the integrity of the Shereefian Empire on the one hand, and, on the other, an improvement in the situation affecting the close neighbourhood *(de voisignage immédiat)* which exists between them, by all the special arrangements which the said neighbourhood necessitates."[1]

On July 27, 1901, M. Delcassé dotted the *i's* and crossed the *t's* in a communication to the new Minister at Tangier. After referring to the "evident proof of the frankly friendly feelings towards Morocco" displayed by France according to the terms of the "Protocol," M. Delcassé went on to say that France could be, as the Moorish Government should decide, "either the most reassuring of friends or the most redoubtable of enemies." Then occurs the following passage typical of French diplomacy from that period onwards :—

"You should make the Sultan understand that it will depend upon himself to find in us friends the surest, the most anxious for the integrity of his power, the most capable of preserving him in case of need from certain dangers. Our loyalty as also our interest are guarantees to him that we shall not encroach upon it."[2]

Thus was heralded the policy of "pacific penetration." The time had not come for France to place her cards upon the table. But it was rapidly approaching.[3]

[1] French Yellow Book.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Vide* Chapter IX.

CHAPTER IV.

SPAIN AND MOROCCO

CENTURIES upon centuries of strife and enmity; the scars of wounds beyond the power of time to heal; the bitterest remembrances of racial hatred and of terrible deeds committed on either side; the cumulative memories of a struggle lasting for nearly eight hundred years—such is the history of Spanish relations with the Moors. It is a strange history in the sense that both participants have so curiously dwindled in stature. Of the erstwhile splendour of Moorish civilisation, only the monuments in Spain, the Alhambra, the Cathedral at Cordova, and so on, remain. The grandeur to which a consolidated Spain attained has likewise waned and passed away. While Morocco crumbles into decrepitude and dust, Spain's connection with the land of her ancient enemy to-day serves but the temporary uses of British insurance against a potential French peril.

Before the events of the past few years, which it is the purpose of this volume to narrate, made of Spain a factor of some importance in the European dispute over the Moorish carcase, her interests in Morocco had fallen to vanishing point, although sentimentally the link is still powerful enough. The proverbial Spanish pride may still have to be reckoned with.

Apart from their settlement at the Rio del Oro—probably so-called because no gold ever came out of it—on the Saharan coast of nominal Morocco, and the ensuing undefined claim to that coast as far north as Cape Bojador with an undelimitated strip of interior sand-dunes, the Spaniards possessed in 1900, on the Mediterranean littoral, the four *présides* of Ceuta,[1] Melilla,[2] El Penon de Velez de la Gomera,[3] and Alhucemas,[4] plus a small group of islands at the mouth of the Muluya, the Zaffarinas. On

[1] An inhospitable, rocky promontory, upon which stands a fort, with a tiny strip of land around it.

[2] An island, insignificant in size, with 500 yards of hinterland.

[3] A rock.

[4] An island.

the Atlantic coast of Morocco proper the Sultan had consented to cede to Spain her ancient settlement of Santa-Cruz-de-Mar-Pequeña, which modern geographers have doubtfully identified with Ifni; useful, perhaps, like the settlement at the Rio del Oro further south, to the picturesque fishing-boats from the Canary Islands which, at certain seasons of the year, make great catches along the dreary, surf-bound sea-board of Atlantic Morocco.

From time to time fierce and purposeless combats had taken place with the Riffians round Melilla. Spanish honour was apparently satisfied, and possibly the Riffians were equally pleased to recall their daring exploits of past ages by indulging in powder play.

A few privileges resulting from ancient treaties, of an economic kind, in some of the ports—when one has said this, one has said all of Spain's modern concern with Morocco, until M. Delcassé, in his anxiety to secure the prize, sought to convert her into the instrument of his designs. Of this more anon.

CHAPTER V.

GERMANY AND MOROCCO

If I contribute a little more detail to Germany's interests in Morocco it is because the average Englishman appears to imagine that she had none at all until the gunboat *Panther* cast anchor, early last July, opposite Agadir,[1] and that her appearance upon the scene as a contestant was purely gratuitous, provocative, and unjustifiable. Germany's interest in Morocco is, of course, a modern interest, just as United Germany is a modern product, and, although, even in Germany's case, research would show us old connections and relationships between certain German ports and principalities and the Moors, this volume is only concerned with the interested Powers and Morocco in modern times.

Two of the foremost explorers of Morocco were Germans, Lenz and Rohlfs, and, in the sixties and seventies, their narratives attracted much attention in Germany, especially from the point of view of possible trade development. A German Resident to the Shereefian Government was first appointed in 1873.

Germany not only participated but played an active *rôle* in the first international Conference on the affairs of Morocco held at Madrid, and known as the Madrid Convention, in 1880, and her influence, joined to that of Britain, it was which resulted in the most useful outcome of that Conference being secured, viz., the extension of the "most favoured nation treatment" (hitherto confined to France and Britain) to all nations. Thenceforth international trade in Morocco was placed upon an equal footing for all countries. It may be usefully emphasised that it was this Madrid Convention which made of Morocco a problem of *international* interest.

In 1887 Germany acquiesced in the tentative proposals for a renewed Conference put forward by Spain with the

[1] On the South Atlantic coast of Morocco.

object of improving and amplifying the Madrid Convention in sundry respects. Nothing, however, came of these proposals.

In 1889 the Moorish Government sent an embassy to Berlin.

In June, 1890, the German Minister at Fez signed a commercial Treaty with the Moorish Government for five years. This Treaty, which was signed at Fez on June 1 of that year, provided that "commerce will be carried on without privilege and will be free for the two contracting parties." It also stipulated that: "the subjects of the two parties will have the same rights and advantages as those which exist, or may come to exist, as regards subjects of the most favoured nation." It is worthy of note that the German Government informed the other signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention that it would not ratify that Treaty unless they gave their adhesion to it. The British Government raised no objection to its ratification, and ratified it was.

In 1892 Germany cordially supported, as we have already noted, Sir C. Euan-Smith's Mission to Morocco.[1] This co-operation did but perpetuate the spirit of the Anglo-German African settlement of July 1, 1890, characterised as follows by the then German Chancellor, Von Caprivi, when attacked for his undue friendliness to England: "We have desired above all to ensure our understanding with England."[2] In this connection it is instructive to bear in mind that even at this early period the policy of the German Government in regard to Morocco was vigorously criticised by the Pan-German party, and the

[1] "The actual dealings between the British Minister and the Sultan, who, by the law and practice of Morocco, takes personal cognisance of every detail of public diplomatic business, are believed to have been amicable, as are those between the Mission and most of the other European representatives. Germany, in particular, which negotiated the last commercial Treaty in 1890, has supported British diplomacy, and Spain and Italy are stated to have done the same. . . . The support of nearly all the interested Powers was accorded very freely to the British Envoy; *and it is believed that Count Tattenbach, the German Minister, has been especially prominent in supporting the British attitude to obtain rights which would benefit all European nations.*" (*Times*, July 19, 1892.)

[2] "Our relations with England form one of the most important guarantees for the maintenance of European peace, and our Government cannot support colonial enterprises which, with no benefit to Germany, are directed against the interests of England." (*North German Gazette*, July, 1890.)

advanced colonials, who desired that Germany's *rôle* in Morocco should exceed the limits set to it by the German Government. This kind of pressure, from jingoes who wished to drag Germany into territorial adventures in Morocco, has never been lacking throughout the last decade, and now that the problem has been finally settled, in a sense, contrary to these aspirations, chagrin, as we see, has led to virulent onslaughts. Whether successive German Chancellors have invariably displayed the wisest tactics in dealing with these influences, only the most intimate knowledge of the internal difficulties German statesmen have had to face from these sources would enable an opinion to be formed of any value. And that knowledge no Englishman possesses. But there can be no serious doubt that the German Government and the German Emperor have repeatedly disavowed these attempts to force them into such channels, and have steadily refused to allow their Moroccan policy to be deflected from its normal and proclaimed course.

It can be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that not one iota of proof from any quarter has been adduced that the rulers of Germany ever formulated or endorsed the wider aims of the German colonials: ever sought or laboured for the acquisition of coaling stations, or for a share in a dismembered Morocco.[1] Considering the determined efforts made in recent years to portray the policy of the German Government towards the Morocco question in the blackest of lights, and the god-send which a calculated indiscretion revealing the existence of such

[1] For the utmost that can be said in a contradictory sense the reader is referred to a recent article by *Diplomaticus* in the *Fortnightly Review*. The article, which sets out to prove that the German Government's fixed idea for years has been the acquisition of a part of Morocco, fails to produce anything whatever in the nature of proof. On the other hand, it serves the very useful purpose of showing with what obstinacy the German Government resisted the persistent agitation of the Pan-German Colonials, who, of course, have continuously preached this policy, although opposed by several well-known German naval strategists. The article in question appeared before the frank admission of the French Foreign Minister in the Chamber in December of last year (*vide* Part VIII.), to the effect that from the very outset of the Franco-German negotiations which ensued after the *Panther's* arrival at Agadir, the German Government expressed its complete willingness to admit a French Protectorate over Morocco, subject to economic pledges and compensation elsewhere—an admission which effectually disposes of the whole story, and corroborates from a source beyond suspicion, the good faith of the German Government in the matter.

designs would have proved to those desirous of scoring off Germany, we may safely assume, I think, that if there had been anything to disclose to this effect, the world would certainly have been informed of it. At the same time Germany made it perfectly clear, from the first warning addressed to M. Delcassé by Prince Radolin, the German ambassador at Paris, in June, 1901, onwards, that she stood for an independent Morocco and complete commercial equality within it, and when the force of events had compelled a modification of the first of those *desiderata* (even as they had compelled a change in the identical policy of Britain) Germany made it equally plain that she would not suffer such a modification without being consulted, and without exacting her price.

That she was intrinsically justified in taking up that position has, curious to relate, been more freely acknowledged in France than it has in England, although the official policy of France collided with the German standpoint, and although the bitter recollections of a great war still cast their shadow over the relations of the two peoples. Speaking in the French Parliament[1] M. Deschanel, President of the French Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the course of an explanation of the reasons which had led the Committee to recommend a ratification of the Franco-German Convention of November, 1911, by the Chamber, observed—

"Could we affect to ignore the efforts of Germany in Morocco for half a century, the travels of her explorers, the activity of her colonists, her agricultural and mineral enterprises, her steamship lines, her post-offices, and especially that movement of ideas which gravitated towards the Shereefian Empire, not in Pan-German circles and colonial committees alone, but in intellectual circles among that *élite* which, to the honour and power of that nation where all co-operate for the same ends, prepares the work of the diplomatists and soldiers."

M. Deschanel was right. German interests in Morocco have steadily grown during the last ten years, and, potentially, are very considerable. They are being assisted in every possible way by the German Foreign Office and Consular staff, as is the case in South America, and, in fact, all over the world.

[1] On December 16, 1911.

In the domain of Moroccan finance Germany is a large creditor upon Morocco, and a participant to the extent of no less than 20 per cent. in the 1910 Loan (as compared with France's 40 per cent. and Britain's 15 per cent.) negotiated through the Morocco State Bank, in whose capital she shares and on whose Board she is represented. She is a participant in the tobacco monopoly, formed as a supplementary guarantee to the bondholders of the 1910 Loan, and is represented on the Board. Through the Krupps, the Mannesmanns, and other firms, she holds such a preponderating position in the mining interest (at present virtually confined to the extraction of iron ore) that the German share-capital in the international *Union des Mines,* will, it is understood, be no less than 40 per cent. if and when the negotiations now proceeding are finally completed. In the share capital of the *Société Marocaine des Travaux publiques,* whose purpose, as its name implies, is the construction of sundry public works in Morocco, Germany is represented to the extent of 30 per cent., and has four representatives on the Board. The enlargement of the port of Larash is due to German enterprise.[1] Upon German enterprise[2] has devolved the construction of the projected harbour works, lighter basin and breakwater at Tangier, and also the drainage of that town. German enterprises at Tangier include a tobacco factory which employs one hundred and fifty hands, a bank, and a newspaper published in German.

Germany maintains nine Consulates in Morocco, which are also entrusted with the defence of Austrian interests.

The actual volume of German trade is not enormous, but has steadily grown, as the under-noted details show,[3]

[1] Messrs. Sager and Wörner, of Munich.

[2] Messrs. Holzmann & Co., of Frankfurt-on-Maine.

[3] Morocco's commercial statistics are notoriously untrustworthy and difficult to ascertain, and the ceaseless alarms and excursions of the last three years have greatly interfered with normal trade. Consul White's report for 1909 states that German trade retains its rank of third on the list, Great Britain being an easy first, and France second. The French figures, however, include the trade of the Algerian ports with Eastern Morocco, which is given on that account as "French," which is misleading, since a portion of the so-called French trade *viâ* Algeria is of British and German origin. The totals given in the British Consular report for 1909 show an export from Morocco to Britain of £800,030, to France of £629,818, to Germany of £339,428. Germany's total trade with Morocco for that year is given as £564,147, against £2,204,771 for Great Britain, and £2,195,109 (including Algeria) for France. According to the trade statistics of

and she is everywhere actively pushing it as the lamentations of French official reports—echoed in the Chamber

the German Empire, vol. 242, XIV., the following is the table of German trade with Morocco for the past ten years in millions of marks, but these figures are exclusive of precious metals; neither do they include the German trade with Melilla and the Riff (Spanish territory) or the German trade through the Algerian ports, but only the direct traffic with German ports :—

	Exports from Germany to Morocco.	*Exports* from Morocco to Germany.	*Total Trade* (exclusive of precious metals).
	(In Thousands of Marks)		
1901	3,632	1,564	5,196
1902	3,645	1,438	5,083
1903	4,651	1,664	6,315
1904	5,577	1,283	6,860
1905	6,017	1,725	7,742
1906	6,219	2,131	8,350
1907	10,134	1,673	11,807
1908	10,156	2,399	12,555
1909	8,589	4,175	12,764
1910	9,634	5,770	15,404

From all I can learn German trade is very much more extensive than this table would appear to suggest, although the growth it indicates is in itself considerable. The system pursued in elaborating these statistics seems to be thoroughly faulty. Thus, the Swiss, Italian, and Hungarian imports and the Italian, Levantine, and American exports appear as French or British trade, Marseilles on the one hand and Gibraltar on the other being the last (or first, as the case may be) port from (or to) which merchandise has been shipped. Similarly goods exported to Morocco from West Germany through Dutch and Belgian ports appear in the statistics as Dutch and Belgian goods; and goods exported from Morocco to Germany by British and Belgian boats *viâ* England and Belgium go to swell the British and Belgian trade figures. Then, again, Belgian sugar, Indian tea, etc., are consigned to Morocco direct on account of German firms, and, once more, figure as either Belgian or British imports. The fact is that German trade with Morocco, like that of the British firms, is largely international, German and British merchants not merely trading with Morocco direct from Germany and Britain, but between Morocco and France, England, Spain, America, and Italy. In this general world-trade of Morocco the British and the German share is, I gather, pretty equally divided, amounting to about 30 per cent., on either side, of the total, while 20 per cent. passes through Moorish-Jewish houses. In this general trade French trade plays very little part indeed. The French possess, however, the largest banking business in Morocco, and have an important place in the local retail business. According to the Berlin publication, *Murokko und Persien,* the local statistics of the two ports of Hamburg and Bremen combined show a total turn-over of business with Morocco of 14,940,119 marks in 1907, and 14,621,166 marks in 1908. It will be seen from these figures that Germany plays a very much larger part in the genuine trade of Morocco with the outer world than would appear from the statistics issued by the British Foreign Office. I have taken a good deal of trouble to get at the true facts as regards Morocco's international trade, and I believe tha‘

last December—bear witness. German merchants are to be met with in nearly every trade centre, such as Fez, Mogador, Marakesh, Agadir, Tangier, Larash, Casablanca, Saffi, etc. In 1907 the Germans held 40 per cent. of the trade of Casablanca, where there are a German bank and some fifty German residents. Three German steamship companies call at Moroccan ports, and in 1907 three hundred and twenty-four German vessels, with a combined tonnage of 350,777 tons, were registered as having entered or cleared at eight Moroccan ports

The German post offices are admittedly, I believe, the most numerous and best equipped in Morocco.

German prospectors for minerals are now numerous in Morocco, and have penetrated regions supposed for many years to be inaccessible to European travellers.

The importance which Germany attaches to the potentialities of mineral enterprises in Morocco is shown in the clauses of the recent Convention[1] with France and in the Exchange of Notes attached thereto.

impartial investigation will confirm in a general way the statements made in this footnote. It should be added that a number of German firms, such as the Mannesmann Bros., Marx & Co. of Hamburg, Victor Sperling of Leipzig, Dörken of Gevelsberg, Hauss of Weissenburg, Herrman of Nurnberg, to mention a few, have invested a considerable amount of capital in Morocco. Mr. Rosher, who is thoroughly well acquainted with Morocco, records in his interesting little booklet, "Light for John Bull on the Morocco Question," that "The Germans hold more land in Morocco *paid for in cash* than all other nations combined, and without massacre or pillage they have established industries and performed genuine pacific penetration."

I hope that these figures will be borne in mind by the reader as he peruses the singular story developed in this volume.

[1] November 4, 1911.

MAP I.



Stanford's Geog.l Estab.t London

Map of Morocco, showing towns and districts mentioned in the text.

PART III.

The Public Law of Europe regulating the international position of Morocco and its violation

CHAPTER VI.

THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS

In the last four chapters we have described the relations of the chief European nations with Morocco prior to the Algeciras Act.

We have now to consider the Algeciras Act itself, *i.e.*, to say the Public Law of Europe regulating the international position of Morocco.

We shall then have to examine what alterations had been brought about in the actual position of Morocco since that Public Law was framed, and whether those alterations had received the sanction of the Powers which framed that Public Law.

The Public Law of Europe regulating the international position of Morocco at the time the event mentioned in the opening lines of this chapter occurred was known as the General Act of Algeciras, framed conjointly by the representatives of the Sultan of Morocco, and by the representatives of the following Powers in the order given under the Act, viz. Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden.

The immediate origin of its promulgation was as follows :—

On May 30, 1905, the Sultan of Morocco had invited the Powers[1] to a Conference to discuss the reforms which the internal State of Morocco required. That Conference[2] had met at Algeciras early in 1906. An Act had been drawn up in April, "In the name of God Almighty"—"based upon the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of his Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of

[1] "On the invitation which had been addressed to them by his Shereefian Majesty . . in order to arrive at an understanding respecting the said reforms, as well as to examine the means of providing the resources necessary for their application." (Act of Algeciras.)

[2] Besides the four interested Powers, viz. Britain, France, Spain, and Germany, the following Powers also signed the Act: Austria, Belgium, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, and the United States (with reservations).

his dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality."

The Sultan's representatives having declared that they could not sign the Act with the representatives of the other Powers as time would not allow of their receiving the Sultan's reply to the points they had thought it necessary to refer to him, the Italian Minister at Tangier, as Senior Member of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, had been requested to assume the duty of obtaining the Sultan's ratification and to convey to him: "the great advantages which would result for his Empire . . ." thereby.[1]

This request the King of Italy had transmitted to the Sultan in the following communication:—

"Victor Emanuel III., by the grace of God and the will of the nation King of Italy, to the most High and Mighty Prince His Majesty Abd-el-Aziz, Emperor of Morocco.

"Most High and Mighty Prince, my dear and good friend. A Conference having met, by your Majesty's invitation, at Algeciras, at which there assembled the Representatives of the Powers friendly to your Empire, the decisions reached by common agreement are now collated in a General Act to which the signatures of your Majesty's Delegates only are wanting, they having wished to reserve its acceptance for the high judgment of their Sovereign. The Conference have therefore desired, and I have most willingly consented, that my Minister accredited to your Court, who is also doyen of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, should repair to the presence of your Majesty, should present to your Majesty the General Act which has been agreed upon, and, speaking in the name of all the Powers assembled at Algeciras, should ask for your Majesty's adhesion and your Majesty's entire ratification.

"Your Majesty is aware of the affection which, as a tradition bequeathed us by our ancestors, unites me to your Majesty's person; these sentiments and the conviction that, by the adoption of the General Act in its entirety, much honour will accrue to your Majesty, and incalculable good to your Majesty's Empire, make me rejoice that the Powers should have intrusted this important duty to my Minister, whom I recommend by these presents

[1] Act of Algeciras.

to your Majesty's favour. I further wish your Majesty every happiness, while assuring your Majesty of my high esteem and my unalterable friendship.[1]

"Given in Rome, the 26th day of April, 1906.

"Most affectionate and good friend,

"(signed) VICTOR EMANUEL."

The Sultan had ratified the Act on June 18 as being—

"based in the first instance on three principles, namely: maintenance of our sovereignty (in the text, 'of our sovereign rights') of the independence of our aforesaid Empire, and of economic liberty in the matter of public works."

The reforms stipulated in the Act affected (*a*) the organisation of the police, (*b*) the illicit trade in arms, (*c*) the creation of a "Moorish State Bank," (*d*) an improved yield of taxes and the creation of new sources of revenue, (*e*) the regulation of the customs and the suppression of fraud and smuggling, (*f*) the public services and public works. They may be summarised here.

As to the police, the Act provided that a force of from 2,000 to 2,500 men should be raised "under the sovereign authority of the Sultan," recruited by the Moorish Government from among Moorish Mohammedans, commanded by Moorish chiefs, and distributed among *eight ports* of commerce; that from forty-six to sixty French and Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers approved by the Sultan should be appointed as instructors to assist in the organisation of the force *for a period of five years*;[2] that the force should be placed for the same period under a Swiss Inspector-General, who would report to the Moorish Government, with whom his contract would be entered into, a copy of the same, together with a copy of his reports, to be communicated to the "Diplomatic Body" at Tangier.

As to the illicit trade in arms, the Act contained eighteen Articles, of which it is unnecessary here to speak except the last, which provided that in the "region adjoining the

[1] The one thing lacking in this effusive message was, it will be perceived, an inquiry for his Shereefian Majesty's personal health at the moment.

[2] The arrangement was, therefore, due to expire on June 18, 1911, if the period of its duration is reckoned from the date of the Sultan's ratification, or in December, 1911, if the period is reckoned from the date of ratification by all the signatory Powers.

Algerian frontier" the enforcement of the regulations shall be the "exclusive concern of France and Morocco"; and similarly that in the neighbourhood of the Spanish possessions the matter shall be the "exclusive concern of Spain and Morocco."

As to the State Bank, the Act provided that a Bank called "The Morocco State Bank" should be established with power to exercise for forty years certain privileges "granted to it by his Majesty the Sultan." The privileges comprised the sole duties of "disbursing Treasurer of the Empire," and the position of "financial agent of the Government," but "without prejudice" to the right of the Government applying to other banks for its public loans, although with a "right of preference, other conditions being equal, over any other" banks. Other provisions on this head were that Spanish money should continue to circulate as legal tender: that the Bank should be constituted a limited liability company "subject to the law of France governing the matter": that it should be administered by a board consisting of as many members "as there are allotted portions in the initial capital": that the German Imperial Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Spain, and the Bank of France should each appoint a Censor: that the Moroccan Government should exercise "its high control over the Bank[1] through a Moorish High Commissioner."

As to the improved yield of taxes and the creation of new sources of revenue, the most important provisos of the Act were that as soon as the *tertib*[2] tax was regularly enforced upon Moorish subjects, the subjects of the Powers settled in Morocco should also pay it: that foreigners should be free to acquire real property throughout the Empire[3]: that taxes might be imposed on town buildings on Moorish and foreign proprietors without any distinction: that in regard to the complaint of the Moorish Government that foreigners held Moorish Crown lands without regular title-deeds or revisionary contracts, an equitable settlement should be effected between the Diplomatic Body

[1] The capital of the Bank is £616,000 divided into 30,800 shares of £20 each. The capital is distributed into fourteen parts, each part consisting of 2,200 shares. Twelve of these parts are held by the twelve participating Powers, Messrs. Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. representing the British group, and Mendelsohn & Co. the German group. A number of French banks hold the remaining two parts.

[2] A tax imposed, in lieu of the old Koranic taxes, upon arable land; fruit trees, and cattle. It is unpopular on religious and other grounds.

[3] A reform vainly urged by Sir C. Euan-Smith.

and "the Special Commissioner whom his Shereefian Majesty may be pleased to appoint": that 2½ per cent. customs duty should be imposed upon foreign goods, the revenue thus obtained to be expended on "public works undertaken for the development of navigation and trade generally in the Shereefian Empire," the programme and execution of these works to be settled by agreement between the "Shereefian Government and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier": that export duties on certain articles should be reduced: that a general coasting trade should be authorised: that any modifications in these and kindred provisions must be arrived at between the Moorish Government and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

The regulations as to customs and suppression of fraud and smuggling it is unnecessary to detail, but they provided *inter alia* for the creation of a mixed Customs Valuation Committee and a Mixed Customs Committee. On the French and Spanish frontiers the application of the regulations as to cases of illicit trade in arms was exclusively left to the Moorish and French and Spanish Governments respectively.

As to the public services and the construction of public works, the Act declared that in no case should the rights of the "State over the public services of the Shereefian Empire be alienated for the benefit of private interests": if the Moorish Government had recourse to foreign capital or industries in connection with the public services or public works, the Powers undertook to see that "the control of the State over such large undertakings of public interest remain intact": tenders "without respect to nationality" should regulate all orders for public works or the furnishing of supplies: no specification for tenders should contain either "explicitly or implicitly any condition or provision of a nature to violate the principle of free competition or to place the competitors of one nationality at a disadvantage as against the competitors of another": regulations as to contracts should be drawn up by the Moorish Government and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

The concluding Article (123) read as follows:—

"All existing Treaties, Conventions, and Arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco remain in force. It is, however, agreed, that in case their provisions be found to conflict with those of the present general Act, the stipulations of the latter shall prevail."

Such, then, had been the Public Law of Europe regulating the international position of Morocco since June 18, 1906.

Two Powers, France and Germany, had since that date signed a Declaration between them concerning Morocco, on February 8, 1909. It is advisable to give the text of this Declaration in full, if only because it has been cited *(mirabile dictu!)* as an arrangement whereby Germany undertook to recognise in advance any action in Morocco it might please France to adopt.

FRANCO-GERMAN DECLARATION RESPECTING MOROCCO (FEBRUARY 8, 1909).

The Government of the French Republic and the Imperial German Government, being equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the Algeciras Act, have agreed to define the meaning which they attach to the articles of that Act with a view to avoid in the future all sources of misunderstanding between them.

Therefore,

The Government of the French Republic, firmly attached to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire, being resolved to safeguard the principle of economic equality, and, consequently, not to obstruct German commercial and industrial interests in that Country;

And the Imperial German Government, pursuing only economic interests in Morocco, recognising on the other hand that the special political interests of France in that country are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace, and being resolved not to impede those interests;

Declare that they do not pursue nor encourage any measure of a nature to create in their favour or in that of any Power an economic privilege, and that they will endeavour to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may obtain a concession.

JULES CAMBON.
KIDERLEN-WAECHTER.

It will be seen, therefore, that this Declaration, while in itself implying on the part of France the admission of a very special German interest in the Moroccan question; and while in itself implying on the part of Germany a recognition of very special French interests in the Moroccan question,

did not in the least modify or affect the Act of Algeciras. It merely indicated that the two Powers treated one another on a footing of equality in their discussions on the subject of their joint and several concerns in facilitating the execution of the Act.

Our first question is thus answered. The integrity of Morocco and the independence of its Government had been solemnly proclaimed by the Powers. Discussions centring round the application and execution of the reforms, eventually agreed upon between the Powers and the Moorish Government, were to be conducted by representatives of the Sultan on the one part, and by the diplomatic representatives in Morocco of the Powers on the other, and this control of the foreign Diplomatic Body as a whole was even made to apply to the working *in eight ports* of the Police force, in which a limited number of French and Spanish officers, under a Swiss Inspector-General, were to serve as inspectors. Only in matters such as the illicit traffic in arms and contraband were two European Powers —France and Spain—authorised to act with the Moorish Government independently of the General Diplomatic Body, and then only on the frontiers of their respective possessions.

Whether, in practice, the programme was, as a whole, workable or whether it was not, the fact remains that it was the programme which the Powers had themselves elaborated, and in which the Sultan had concurred.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CRUCIAL ARTICLE OF THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS

"Nothing less than a general renunciation of all rights to individual interference on any pretext in the affairs of Morocco *and a common agreement collectively to require the reforms so much needed,* will ever accomplish the regeneration of the Moorish Empire. In face of such a united demand, with offers of support if needed, no refusal could be expressed, and provided that too much was not asked at once, and capable advisers were found, these reforms might be as peacefully carried out as under the English in Egypt. *But will Europe make this possible?*"[1]

"ALL existing Treaties, Conventions, and Arrangements, between the signatory Powers and Morocco remain in force. *It is, however, agreed that, in case their provisions be found to conflict with those of the present General Act, the stipulations of the latter shall prevail.*"

This, as we have seen, was the 123rd and concluding Article of the Act of Algeciras.

Continuing the prosecution of our inquiry in the Socratic manner, what, let us ask, could the final and italicised sentence of the above Article mean? All through the Act of Algeciras there runs one continual refrain—coupled with insistence upon the collective control of the Diplomatic representatives of the Powers at Tangier[2]—viz. the integrity and independence of Morocco. The preamble explicitly declares that the reforms embodied in the Act are "based upon the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan and the integrity of his dominions." The Police force is placed under the sovereign authority of the Sultan; the nomination of the foreign Officers are to be submitted to the Sultan; the foreign Inspector-General reports to the Sultan and to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier. Even in

[1] Budgett Meakin, "The Moorish Empire," 1899.

[2] Except in regard to the illegal traffic in arms and smuggling on the French and Spanish frontiers.

the matter of the control of the State Bank, the Sultan's dignity and position are alike pointedly emphasised and international Censors are appointed. In the Articles dealing with improvements in the taxation and methods of raising revenue, the discussion and application of these reforms are left to the Moorish Government and to a majority vote of the Diplomatic Body; and similarly the regulations affecting changes in the Customs. The question we have asked admits, therefore, of but one reply. In laying down that no provisions existing in precedent treaties, conventions, or arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco should be allowed to prevail over the stipulations of the Act, the Powers laid down that no change in the political *status* of Morocco as declared in the Act should take place without their consent. On the face of it, Article 123 gave to any Power or Powers signatory to the Act the right of objecting to any such change. On the face of it, Article 123 made it incumbent upon any Power or Powers desirous of changing that *status* to obtain the consent of the other signatory Powers. This, moreover, was quite unquestionably accepted in the Report of the French Parliamentary Committee appointed by the Chamber to draw up a report on the Algeciras Act. M. Hubert, the Reporter, points out that the Act, while abolishing none of the antecedent conventions, must be held to predominate over them in the event of a dispute. The Act, he goes on to say, has the character of a Charter imposed upon Morocco, and postulates as its essential basis what the Reporter describes as the "traditional" (!) French policy of the sovereignty of the Sultan and integrity of his dominions. The Reporter goes on to recognise that the Madrid Conference of 1880 "*made of Morocco an international question.*" The importance of this admission, however obvious, will appear later.

It was important to bring this out clearly, for, as the narrative proceeds, we shall find that Article 123 is the true basis upon which the German case reposes, and whatever views may be entertained as to the manner in which Germany has urged her case or as to her motives in urging it, the solid fact remains that in holding out as long as she could for an independent and territorially inviolate Morocco, Germany's position has been based upon the Public Law of Europe, and has been intrinsically unshakable on that account. That in doing so Germany pursued her own national interest; that in doing so she was

no more concerned than were the other Powers in upholding Moroccan independence, from any altruistic considerations towards the Moors and their Ruler, such as might have inspired a united Europe animated by the high ideals described in Mr. Budgett Meakin's words at the head of this chapter; that she finally abandoned her position for compensations elsewhere—these things cannot impair the fundamental legality of her attitude.

Had the *rôles* been reversed; had British interests, in the opinion of those charged with defending them, lain in the direction in which Germany's interests lay during the years succeeding the Conference at Algeciras; had the policy of Britain in 1907-11 been concerned, as it was between 1880 and 1900, to maintain an independent Morocco, Britain would have urged her case upon precisely the same ground as Germany has urged hers, and those who have denounced Germany for doggedly sticking to the stipulations of the Act, would have been employed in denouncing her for allowing them to be violated. But on its merits Britain's case would have been equally unanswerable.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PROGRESSIVE VIOLATION OF THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS—IN BRIEF

We have now to consider what alterations between June, 1906, and July, 1911, had been brought about in the position of Morocco, *i.e.* since the Public Law of Europe regulating its international position was framed, and whether those alterations had received the sanction of the Powers which framed that Public Law.

The answer can be given in a single sentence. In the five years which had elapsed since its ratification by the Sultan, the Algeciras Act had been, in effect, although without international sanction, torn across and reduced to waste paper, partly as the result of internal conditions in Morocco, mainly as the external result of the political action of France concurred in by Britain (and to a lesser degree of Spain) combined with the operations of international finance exercised through the medium of the French Government, to which the internal condition of Morocco was in the largest measure due. The circumstances under which the changed state of affairs had been brought about must be briefly outlined at this stage in our inquiry. They will be referred to more fully later on.[1]

The young Sultan—Abdulaziz-ben-Hassan—was well-meaning, but extravagant and unpopular. He had become, to a great extent, Europeanised, and, in a national sense, debauched, by those whose interest it was to debauch him. Moreover, he had already contracted—*i.e.* before the Act of Algeciras—heavy cash liabilities. In the course of 1903 he had borrowed £800,000 from French, Spanish, and British syndicates. In the summer of 1904 these loans had been paid off, but only at the price of contracting a much heavier liability towards France *alone*, amounting to £2,500,000, bearing interest at 5 per cent. I say towards France alone advisedly, because the loan was confined to French banking

[1] *Vide* Chapter XVII.

establishments[1] and practically forced upon Abdulaziz by M. Delcassé. According to M. Jaurès' unchallenged statement made in the French Chamber on March 24 last year,[2] the emission of this loan was attended by such clever manœuvring on the part of the French banks that Morocco actually obtained £1,920,000 (forty-eight million francs), the Banks made a profit of £500,000 on the transaction, Morocco paying interest on the full amount of course. To secure the interest on this loan the Sultan had been induced to consent to set aside 60 per cent. of the Customs receipts, which virtually gave France control over the Customs to that extent. Further smaller loans and liabilities were contracted in various directions during 1905 and 1906. A proportion of these monies was expended in purchasing guns and ammunition from the great French manufacturing house of war material, *Le Creusot*, in order to crush tribal risings which were becoming increasingly frequent, especially in the neighbourhood of the Algerian frontier. Indeed, there seems to have been a close connection between the willingness of French finance to oblige Abdulaziz and the willingness of Abdulaziz to oblige *Creusot* on the one hand, and the willingness of the tribes in closest proximity to the Algerian-Moroccan frontier to play the game both of French finance and *Creusot* on the other. It was not surprising under these circumstances that various Pretenders should have arisen in Morocco and that the authority of the Sultan should have become more than habitually undermined.

But all this was merely a preparatory disturbance in the growing womb of the future.

On March 22, 1907, a Frenchman had been murdered at Marakesh, a town in the far interior of Southern Morocco. France had immediately used this regrettable incident as a pretext for invading Moorish territory and occupying the town of Udja and neighbourhood, situate just over the Algerian boundary. There she had remained (despite frequent pledges to evacuate the place), the first step in the process of infringing the integrity of Morocco.

The next step in the process had been far more comprehensive. A Franco-Spanish syndicate had obtained a concession for building a railway from Casablanca, an important trading town on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.

[1] All the leading French and French Colonial banks participated.
[2] *Journal Officiel.*

Outside and to the east of Casablanca lay a vast Moorish cemetery of great antiquity. Through this cemetery the company, despite local protests, determined to drive their line. A collision occurred between the population and the European workmen in the company's employ, in the course of which several of the latter were killed. This led to a confused *melée* inside and outside of Casablanca. The French thereupon bombarded Casablanca[1] and overran the whole of the extensive Shawiya district which lay behind it. Further and sanguinary fighting involving the slaughter of a great number of Moors took place.[2]

French troops settled down in the occupation both of Casablanca, of Rabat, another important coast-town north of Casablanca, and of the entire Shawiya district, and there, notwithstanding repeated public pledges to evacuate, they had remained (and remain).

The integrity of Moroccan territory had gone by the board.

The financial strangulation of Morocco had thereupon been resumed. France presented the Moorish Government with a bill of £2,400,000 for the expenses she had incurred by her own conduct in seizing Moroccan territory and killing thousands of the Sultan's subjects. A further bill was presented embodying the claims for compensation for losses suffered by European and Moorish merchants through the bombardment of Casablanca! Morocco had to pay that too![3]

"The incalculable good to your Majesty's Empire" which the King of Italy as mandatory of Christian Europe (through his representative), to secure the Sultan's ratification of the Act of Algeciras, had assured the Sultan would accrue to him as the result of his acceptance of that Act, was, as will be seen, already in a fair way of being realised.

The natural consequence of these cumulative occurrences had been an outburst of fury against Abdulaziz, which was to cost him his throne. Mulai-Hafid, his brother, was proclaimed Sultan at Fez on January 4, 1908. Morocco became rent with civil war. In August,

[1] Thousands of Moors were killed in Casablanca alone.

[2] "*La pacification du pays des Chouias a fait couler beaucoup de sang.*" (M. Augustin Bernard, at the North African Congress held in Paris in October, 1908.) Spain co-operated in the Casablanca operations; but her co-operation was merely nominal.

[3] They were eventually settled for £522,784.

1908, Abdulaziz was decisively and finally defeated by his brother's forces.

Almost at once international finance, used by the French Government as a convenient lever, had dug its talons afresh into now dying Morocco. (Spain also undertook a small campaign against the tribes near Melilla and presented a bill for £240,000.) France had pressed the Sultan to contract another loan. After innumerable intrigues all liabilities contracted since the consolidated French loan of 1904 were merged into a £4,040,000 loan—secured upon various sources of Moorish revenue including the remaining 40 per cent. of the Customs—by an international syndicate in which France held the lion's share. Morocco's indebtedness to Europe by the autumn of 1910 was thus £6,520,000!

This loan, like the previous one, was literally forced upon the Sultan. It was negotiated outside the Sultan altogether, insult being added to injury through the nomination by France as so-called guardian of Morocco's interests of . . . . . a Coptic journalist! Mulai-Hafid refused to ratify the agreement, and only yielded in the face of a French *ultimatum*. The French interest in the loan was 40 per cent., the German 20 per cent., the British 15 per cent., the Spanish 15 per cent., the balance being distributed among other countries. The bonds, of 500 francs, were issued to the public at 485 francs, and in Berlin and Madrid were many times over-applied for. According to M. Jaurès' unchallenged statement in the French Chamber on March 24 last year, the participating French banks were allowed to take up the bonds at 435 francs, the public was not permitted to come in at all even at 485 francs, and in the afternoon of the day of issue the bonds went up to 507 francs. The remaining 40 per cent. of the Customs, certain harbour dues, and the tobacco monopoly were mortgaged as security for the bondholders—thus depriving the Moorish Government of all its resources save those which it might succeed in raising by direct taxation. The loan itself the Sultan could not touch, for it was already earmarked to pay off Morocco's previous debts.

In order to carry on the machinery of Government, indeed to keep up any form of native Government at all, the unfortunate Sultan had no alternative but to spend his remaining strength in wringing tribute by violence from

the tribes. By this time he had become a helpless puppet in the hands of France, and the exactions and cruelties to which he was driven in order to make both ends meet, resulted in the last vestige of his authority being flung off. His surrender to the European financial octopus was described by the *Times* Tangier Correspondent as having "humbled" his "arrogance in the eyes of Europe and *of his own people.*" A few weeks later we find the same Correspondent exclaiming that the "greater part of the country has been driven almost desperate by Mulai-Hafid's exactions." But what else could have been expected? What else, it may be added, was desired? It was merely the operation of cause and effect. Europe had emptied his exchequer and prevented him from refilling it. He was faced with an ever-increasing anarchy and with the desertion of the troops he could no longer pay. And all the while, France pressed her "reforms" and extended the area of her military occupation. The condition of Morocco became absolutely chaotic, and the Sultan, unable to fight, unable to rule, unable to move, finally appealed to France. The French were only too ready to oblige!

In April, 1910, General Moinier, at the head of 30,000 troops, had marched upon Fez, meeting with little or no opposition, occupying Mequinez and other places *en route*, and had finally entered the capital where he proceeded to settle down.

Spain, alarmed at the now open consummation of French designs, had, despite French protests, proceeded on her part to occupy Larash and El Kasr, the former an important seaport on the North Atlantic coast of Morocco, the latter an important inland place in the Gharb, and also Ifni[1] on the South Atlantic coast, and had flung 20,000 men into the Riff (Mediterranean Morocco).

Such was the position when Germany sent the *Panther* to anchor off Agadir, neither landing a man, nor occupying a yard of territory, still less shooting down a single Moor; but intimating to the world that she did not propose to allow the Act of Algeciras to be set aside through the action of France and Spain without discussion.

Before considering the step taken by Germany and its international effects, our inquiry must be directed towards ascertaining how it has come about that the Public Law of Europe affecting Morocco, embodied in the Algeciras

[1] *Vide* Chapter IV.

Act, has been so flagrantly set aside, and why the British Government in particular has been the passive spectator not only of the violation of an Act ratified by Britain, but of the systematic destruction of the independence and integrity of Morocco, which for long years it had been the traditional policy of successive British Governments to prevent.

To do this we must unravel the history of the events leading up to the Conference of Algeciras, and display in their unattractive nakedness those complicated evolutions which, when the destinies of nations are concerned, go by the name of diplomacy, and whereby the happiness, the prosperity, and the lives of millions of men and women are often placed in deadly peril without their knowledge or consent.

PART IV.

The Antecedents of the Act of Algeciras

CHAPTER IX.

FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS THE MOORISH GOVERNMENT, 1900-1903

NOTWITHSTANDING the failure of Sir C. Euan-Smith's Mission in 1892—owing, as we have seen,[1] to French intrigue—Great Britain continued to enjoy greater moral influence in Morocco than any other Power. The Moors, at any rate the ruling classes, dislike all Europeans, but they, nevertheless, trusted us, because they knew that we stood between them and French absorption. They were aware that we had no designs on their country, and that we treated them fairly in commercial matters. For the French they entertained both fear and hatred. The cause of this fear was obvious enough, and hatred went along with it, heightened by recollections of the past. The long and bloody struggle between the French and Abd-el-Kadr had had its repercussion among his co-religionists in Morocco, whence, at one period in the contest, the Arab patriot had drawn many recruits: certain incidents in that struggle,[2] such as the forging of Abd-el-Kadr's Seal, whereby the French forces gained a passage through the "Iron Gates," and the tragedy of the caves on Dahra plains had never been forgotten. After ourselves, but a long way after, came the Germans in Moorish estimation, owing to their honest commercial methods, their habit of paying for land in cash, and their genuine enterprise free from political intrigue. Later on, when the Moors found themselves left to French devices by Britain, it was to Germany, as we shall see, that they turned for help,[3] only to be forsaken when it no longer became Germany's interest to protect their independence,[4] which, however, it is but fair to add Germany could only have then defended at the cost of a European war.

[1] *Vide* Chapter II.

[2] For an impartial account of these episodes, and the general story of the Franco-Algerian Wars, see Sanderson's "Africa in the Nineteenth Century."

[3] 1905-1910, especially in 1905. *Vide* Chapter XVII.

[4] 1911.

Absorbed in wider schemes of African conquest in the western and central equatorial regions, France had not forced the pace in Morocco during the seven years following the failure of the Euan-Smith Mission. The recrudescence of her activity was contemporaneous with the prolongation of the Boer War. In 1900 she annexed the Tuat oases,[1] to which Morocco laid nominal claim. In 1901 she signed a treaty of friendship with the Moorish Government, followed by M. Delcassé's formal declaration of attachment to Moorish integrity and independence given in Chapter III. In 1902[2] a further arrangement was signed on the same lines, accompanied by the same assurances and especially concerned with ensuring peace in the continually troubled Moroccan-Algerian frontier region. By Article I. of this arrangement the Moorish Government undertook to—

"consolidate its authority by every possible means throughout its territory from the mouth of the Kiss to Figig."

The French Government undertook, for its part, to assist the Moorish Government, if necessary, in the task. Article I. further provided that—

"The French Government will establish its authority and peace in the regions of the Sahara, and the Moorish Government, its neighbour, will assist by every means in its power."

The establishment of "mixed Franco-Moorish markets" in the frontier regions, and mutual assistance in the collection of customs dues were also stipulated in the arrangement. In other words, there was to be Franco-Moorish control in the vague undetermined region bordering the common frontier which, from time immemorial, raiding bands had crossed and recrossed in search of plunder; a system of "dual and mutual support." Such was French policy in appearance, and very possibly in intention at that time, at least among some of the governing elements in France; but not, undoubtedly, in conformity with the views either of the French Colonial Party in Paris or of the forward school in Algeria. At the close of that year (1902) Abdulaziz began contracting his loans upon the French market.[3] In April, 1903, M. Loubet, the President

[1] At a cost to the French tax-payer which, by 1910, had reached £2,400,000, *vide* Colonial Budget Report for that year: the occupation was then costing £140,000 per annum for a total trade of £60,000.

[2] April 20.

[3] *Vide* Chapter VIII.

of the French Republic, paid a visit to Algiers, and the Sultan despatched a special Mission to Algiers to salute him. The Yellow Book gives the speech delivered by the Moorish envoy, of which the following sentence may be quoted as crystallizing, in Moorish eyes, the policy embodied in the friendly arrangements of 1901-1902—

"To increase the prosperity of the two neighbouring countries (Algeria and Morocco), to develop and improve their relations, to extend their trade by reciprocal penetration, and definitely to establish peace and security in the frontier region, such is the object we are pursuing, and which does not appear impossible of attainment between two countries naturally united by their geographical positions, and which are destined mutually to help and assist each other."

Writing at the time of the Algeciras Conference, a French author of repute, whose vigorous attacks upon Germany absolve him from any charge of *lèse*-patriotism, but who, like many other Frenchmen, blames the precipitate transformation of a policy of honest and progressive influence exercised from outside, and consistent with formal and reiterated pledges, into one of aggression and intrigue—M. Bérard—tells us that the Moorish envoy expected M. Loubet to confirm his previous words which had had the effect of lulling Moorish suspicions of French designs. Those words referred to "a formal guarantee of territorial and sovereign authority, of Moroccan integrity, of the Moorish Government's independence, neither invasion, nor annexation, nor Tunisification, but the system of 'dual and mutual' support." To this repeated assurance, says M. Bérard, the Moorish envoy was to have answered that—

"Satisfied with French friendship and needing no further guarantee, since Morocco had no other (European) neighbour, Morocco would no longer require to lean upon other Powers for the proclamation and the maintenance of Morocco integrity."[1]

"If only this exchange of promises had taken place," comments M. Bérard, "how much easier the work of the Conference would have been to-day."

[1] The substance of this proposed public exchange of pledges was discussed between the Sultan and the French representative at Fez—doubtless with the authority of Paris—as an inducement for the former to send a special mission to greet M. Loubet.

But M. Loubet disappointed the Sultan's expectations. He gave no such pledge, contenting himself with a few pleasant common-places. The influences in France and in Algeria inimical to the policy consecrated in the arrangements of 1901-1902 had become too strong, as events in Algeria and in Morocco were speedily to demonstrate. Uprisings against the Sultan's authority had again occurred on the Morocco side of the Algerian frontier, and two months after the Loubet interview Figig was bombarded by orders of the Governor-General of Algeria, thereby ruining the prestige of the Sultan in a district recognised as Moorish by the arrangement of 1901. The General commanding the French troops informed the leading men of the place after the bombardment that France was not concerned in the dispute between the Sultan and his subjects, thereby further damaging the Sultan's authority. From that time onwards the influence of Algiers succeeded step by step in negativing the efforts made by the French representative at Fez, who desired to uphold the spirit of the arrangements of 1901 and 1902. None of the stipulations of the agreement in regard to mutual assistance in preserving order and collecting customs revenues were kept. The Sultan's authority suffered humiliation after humiliation. Incessant demands came from Algiers to Paris for "energetic action" and incitements for further military displays.

So far the contents of this chapter have wholly been taken from French sources. From British sources worthy of credence it has been constantly asserted that the "stirring up" of the tribes on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier partook then, and since, of the nature of a fixed policy on the part of the French authorities in Algiers.

So much for the characteristics which marked the recrudescence of French activity in Morocco itself from 1900 to 1903. On the European stage French diplomacy was engaged in preparing the way for the first "combination" contemplated by M. Delcassé, viz. a Franco-Spanish protectorate accompanied, there is some reason to suppose, by formal guarantees of an economic order towards Germany to ensure her neutrality in the transaction, but to the total exclusion of Britain, which "for twenty years" —in the words of M. André Tardieu—"had been in Morocco our (France's) most redoubtable adversary."[1]

[1] At the National African Congress, held in Paris, October, 1908.

MAP II.



Stanford's Geogl Estabt, London.

p of Morocco illustrating the Sphere recognised to Spain under the Franco-Spanish
et Convention of October, 1904, which remained secret until published in the Paris
Matin in November, 1911.

CHAPTER X.

M. DELCASSE'S ATTEMPT TO PARTITION MOROCCO WITH SPAIN, 1900-1903

THE cynicism of a certain school of diplomacy has seldom been better illustrated than in M. Delcassé's public professions towards Morocco in 1901 and 1902, and his concurrent secret negotiations with Spain. To moralise upon it would be superfluous. Not to profit by the lesson it conveys would be foolish. However easily it can at times be led astray upon international affairs, Public Opinion in Britain is essentially a healthy one, and so much prejudiced nonsense has been written during the past twelve months on the relative straightforwardness of French and German diplomatic methods that, apart from its historical interest, this particular chapter of the Moroccan affair is worthy of the most careful attention by Englishmen.

Having insured himself (in 1900) against any possible trouble on the Italian side by giving Italy a free hand in Tripoli so far as France was concerned, M. Delcassé proposed to Spain the following year a partition of Morocco. To what extent Germany may have been cognisant of the scheme is as yet unrevealed. Possibly there is nothing to reveal. Certain indications, however, would seem to suggest the contrary, but as no public documents are accessible—at least to the writer's knowledge—which would throw light upon the subject, it seems useless to wander in the domain of speculation and surmise. The nature of the negotiations with Spain was, however, placed beyond all doubt by the speeches of the Duke de Almovodar del Rio, the Foreign Minister in the Sagasta Cabinet,[1] and of Señor Maura, the then Premier, in the Spanish Cortes, in June, 1904, two months after the conclusion of the Anglo-French "Declaration." The story as disclosed by these high personages and by the publication of Señor Silvela's[2] letter

[1] March, 1901, to December 6, 1902.

[2] Premier from December 7, 1902, to December 5, 1903.

to the Duke de Almovodar del Rio in the *Imparcial* on June 10,[1] was as follows :—

The scheme submitted to the Sagasta Cabinet by M. Delcassé proposed a division of Morocco in the following manner : Spain was to obtain North Central Morocco, including Fez and Taza, and the North Atlantic Coast, France the remainder. The negotiations, begun in the summer of 1901, continued all that year, and were prosecuted throughout 1902. M. Delcassé's main idea was to settle the Moroccan question once and for all, and behind the back of Great Britain, and the fact was not concealed in the debates to which I am alluding. Señor Sagasta hesitated a long time, and during the late summer and autumn of 1902 M. Delcassé pressed the Spanish ambassador in Paris repeatedly to hasten the proposed solution, promising that the "diplomatic support" of France would be assured to Spain in case of difficulties with a third Power. At the end of September it seemed as though the matter were going through, and the Treaty was put into final shape. In December Señor Sagasta suddenly resigned, and his successor, Señor Silvela, who, when in Opposition, as he himself admits in his letter to the Duke de Almovodar del Rio, had been taken into the fullest confidence of the Sagasta Cabinet, and had at one time approved the project, refused to ratify the Treaty, and broke off the negotiations.

What had happened? The explanation was explicitly and implicitly avowed in the Cortes, and in Señor Silvela's letter. Britain had been left out in the cold, and the British Government, having got wind of what was in the air, did not conceal its displeasure.[2]

The attitude of Britain determined the Sagasta Cabinet to resign at the last moment rather than make itself responsible before the country for the consequences, and Señor Silvela took the same line. "For the remainder of my days I should have been unable to sleep"—exclaimed Señor Maura in the Cortes[3]—"if I had belonged to a Government which had affixed its signature to the Treaty." "It was Providence which intervened at that moment to

[1] 1904.

[2] Englishmen who consider unreasonable Germany's displeasure at having been treated in the same cavalier fashion by M. Delcassé in 1904, may do well to bear this in mind. Our annoyance in 1902 was as justifiable as that of Germany two years later.

[3] June 9, 1904.

show its love for Spain," added the Spanish Premier, with unconscious humour.[1] In his letter Señor Silvela says bluntly—for a Spaniard—that for weak nations it is especially indispensable that "the most complete loyalty towards neighbours and interested parties in international affairs must be an inflexible rule of diplomacy." He was not satisfied on that score :—

"France offered us her diplomatic support, but this was not sufficient to comfort me under the circumstances."

He had, therefore, determined to suspend his signature to the Treaty until he had taken steps to remove all doubts as to the views of "friendly Powers" by sounding them. Having done so he preferred that Spain should, if necessary, content herself with lesser gains rather than run the risk of "adventures."

Thus was frustrated M. Delcassé's first attempt secretly to secure a French protectorate over the greater part of Morocco.

[1] Señor Maura was a member of the Silvela Cabinet.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION OF APRIL, 1904, AND ITS SECRET ARTICLES

On April 8, 1904, the numerous outstanding causes of friction which had arisen between France and Britain in various parts of the world were simultaneously settled by a series of separate arrangements. A Convention regulated the Newfoundland fisheries[1] and the West African boundaries problem[2]; a Declaration put an end to the Siamese, Madagascar and New Hebrides disputes,[3] the former of which, under Lord Rosebery's administration, had brought us to the eve of war. Finally, and most important, a Declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco had rid us of irritating pin-pricks in Egypt at the price of surrendering our traditional policy in Morocco. To the latter arrangement were attached secret articles which only saw the light last November (1911).[4]

Public opinion rightly regarded these collective understandings with a favourable eye. But the last of them found a strong critic in Lord Rosebery, who scandalised a great many people by denouncing it as the most "one-sided agreement ever concluded between two Powers at peace with each other," and adding thereto an expression of hope "that the Power which holds Gibraltar may never have cause to regret having handed Morocco over to a great military Power."[5]

The agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco differed from the others inasmuch as it affected, while the others did not, the interests of third parties. The British Government, as the party more particularly interested in the Egyptian section of it, formally notified the Powers—notably Germany. A similar courtesy was incumbent upon

[1] British White Book Cd. 2383.
[2] British White Book Cd. 2383, completing the Convention of June 14, 1898—C. 9334.
[3] British White Book Cd. 2385.
[4] British White Book Cd. 5969. *Vide* also Introduction.
[5] Queen's Hall, June 10, 1904.

the French Government as concerned the Morocco section of the agreement. But, for reasons which appear to have been purely personal, M. Delcassé failed formally either to notify Germany or Spain, the two other particularly interested Powers.[1] In the case of Spain this breach of diplomatic courtesy, which was the subject of criticism in the course of the debate in the Spanish Cortes in the ensuing June, was subsequently rectified in the manner which will be explained hereafter. In the case of Germany it was never rectified, and from this incident, coupled with the nature of the agreement itself, and aggravated by further proceedings which will be described in due course, dates the Franco-German dispute, which in its later phases has brought France, Germany, and Britain, and with them all Europe, to the very brink of war.

The crucial Article (2) of the arrangement, made public at the time, concerning the future of Morocco was this—

"The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

"His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

"They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901."

As in the case of many agreements arrived at between diplomatists, it is possible to argue various shades of

[1] *Vide* Chapters IV. and V. "The declaration of April 8, 1904, between the United Kingdom and France was not officially communicated to the German Government, and there was no communication between H.M. Government in regard to it, so far as it had reference to Morocco." (Lord Percy, in the House of Commons, April 6, 1905.)

significance from the above stipulations. Paragraph One appears to constitute a categorical pledge on the part of France to maintain the independence and integrity of Morocco. Paragraph Two appears to convey no more than the recognition on the part of the British Government of an obvious truth, and is in no sense incompatible with the public declaration of the French Government in 1901[1] or with the tenor of the Franco-Moorish "Protocol" of that year and the Franco-Moorish agreement of 1902.[2] From this point of view Article 2, while undoubtedly conveying a declaration of British political disinterestedness in Morocco, and thereby indicating a notable change in British policy, cannot be interpreted as implying British assent to a French Protectorate over that country, which could not come about without "altering the political status of Morocco." On the other hand, it may equally be contended that the term "political status" is vague: that it does allow of an actual, although not a nominal, French Protectorate being exercised over Morocco, and that in recognising that it appertained more particularly to France to "preserve order" in Morocco, the British Government clearly bound Great Britain to recognise a French Protectorate.

That the latter interpretation is the one which accurately represented the views of the diplomatists concerned is evident from the secret articles and from subsequent events. But in 1904, and in the years that followed, the wording of Article 2 of the published part of the agreement was sufficiently anomalous to complicate our share in these transactions in the event of any international trouble arising out of them—which, in fact, was what happened. That anomaly was emphasised by the public Franco-Spanish Declaration of October 3, 1904, which is dealt with further on, and which contains an explicit mutual adherence to the "integrity of the Moorish Empire." But since November *last* the world has become aware that the Franco-Spanish Declaration was merely a blind—so far as the independence and integrity of Morocco were affected—to a secret Convention postulating partition. Taken together both *public* Declarations uphold the independence of Morocco; taken together the *secret*

[1] *Vide* Chapter III.

[2] *Vide* Chapter IX.

arrangements tacked on to them provide for the destruction of that independence. Therein has lain the root of the entire mischief. It was a dishonest policy; it was dishonest diplomacy; and it has brought its own inevitable Nemesis. It has cost the British and French taxpayers millions of money in increased armaments.

By Article 4 the British and French Governments declared themselves, both as regards Egypt and Morocco, "equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty"; that they would not "countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway charges"; that the trade of both nations should "enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa," and that "concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., should only be granted on such conditions as would maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest." These provisions were to hold good for thirty years only.

How entirely inadequate was this Article to protect and safeguard the commercial interests of Britain, and those of other Powers concerned in the trade and general economic development of Morocco, may be seen at a glance. The prohibition of differential tariffs upon trade in favour of the Power politically predominant in Morocco did not extend beyond thirty years—a very small fraction of time in the life of a nation. At the end of thirty years it was open to France to put into full vigour those processes which have so greatly hampered British trade, and trade other than French, in Algeria and Tunis, and virtually strangled it in Madagascar and French Congo. Not the slightest provision was made in the Article to ensure for international enterprise a participation, on equal terms of contract and tender, either in the construction of public works in Morocco or in the future mineral development of the country whose mineral wealth was known to be potentially immense. So far as Britain and other Powers were concerned, Morocco was in future and in an economic sense handed over to French industry by the British Government to the detriment of British and foreign—other than French—industry and enterprise.

Article 9 provided that the two Governments should "afford to one another their diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration."

Their "diplomatic support." Let the words be retained.[1]

But while content to abandon its traditional policy of an independent Morocco and to leave British commercial interests in that country to the tender mercies of French *entrepreneurs* and French *fiscalitis,* in exchange for the immense advantage of relief from perennial difficulties in Egypt, the British Government was not prepared to compromise the safety of the Straits altogether. Article 7 stipulated that neither Government should "permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou."[2] Article 8 stipulated that France should come to an understanding with Spain, bearing in mind the latter's interests derived from her "geographical position and her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean."

Now for the secret Articles.[3] Article 1 foresees the possibility of either Government "finding themselves constrained by force of circumstances to modify this policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco." In that event the provisions of the public Declaration are to hold good. Article 3 is of capital importance, prefiguring as it does a French Protectorate and imposing upon that French Protectorate a permanent Spanish mortgage on the Mediterranean and North Atlantic coasts of Morocco. It reads as follows :—

"The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other *présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.

"Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles 4 and 7[4] of

[1] "An agreement to afford diplomatic support *does not impose on any Power an obligation either to give or to withhold military or naval support.*" (Mr. Acland, replying for the Foreign Office to a question in the House on November 27, 1911.)

[2] See Map.

[3] First published, in part, by *Le Temps,* November, 1911.

[4] The economic stipulations and the non-erection of fortifications between Melilla and the Sebou River.

the Declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

"She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence."

Having thus disposed of France's "most redoubtable adversary in Morocco,"[1] M. Delcassé turned once more to Spain.

[1] *Vide* closing paragraph of Chapter IX.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FRANCO-SPANISH DECLARATION OF OCTOBER, 1904, AND THE SECRET CONVENTION ATTACHED THERETO

If the character of the Anglo-French Declaration of April, 1904, *i.e.*, the understanding come to between Britain and France, as the world was permitted to know it, was modified by the secret Articles of which the world was not apprised; the public Franco-Spanish Declaration of the ensuing October 3 was a mere blind for the secret Convention signed at the same time. The Declaration consists of two sentences. Its purport, the solitary assertion that both Powers—

"remain firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan,"

and on the part of Spain a declaration of adherence to the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8.

In the secret Convention,[1] France and Spain calmly arrange for the partition of Morocco. They do so, of course, with British concurrence, in accordance with Article 8 and secret Article 3 of the Anglo-French understanding,[2] and the secret Convention is communicated by M. Delcassé to the British Government, which acknowledges receipt of it on October 6.[3] It may be well to insert these communications.

LETTER FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE COMMUNICATING THE TEXTS OF THE FRANCO-SPANISH PUBLIC DECLARATION AND SECRET CONVENTION RESPECTING MOROCCO.

M. Cambon to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

DEAR LORD LANSDOWNE,

I am instructed to communicate to you the arrangements which have just been concluded between France and Spain on the subject of Morocco. They were

[1] First published in *Le Matin* in November, 1911.
[2] *Vide* Chapter XI.
[3] British White Book, 6010.

signed on the 3rd inst. by our Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Spanish Ambassador at Paris; they consist of a general Declaration, which will be made public, and of a Convention, which is to be kept secret.

M. Delcassé, in instructing me to forward to you the text of this agreement, in accordance with Article 8 of our Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, pointed out the confidential character of this communication, and instructed me to request you to be good enough to keep the Convention entirely secret.

I have, etc.,
PAUL CAMBON.

LETTER FROM THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGING THE RECEIPT OF THE TEXTS OF THE FRANCO-SPANISH PUBLIC DECLARATION AND SECRET CONVENTION RESPECTING MOROCCO.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to M. Cambon.

DEAR M. CAMBON,

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of to-day's date, covering the two documents which you had been instructed to communicate to me in accordance with Article 8 of the "Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco" of the 8th April last.

I need not say that the confidential character of the "Convention" entered into by the President of the French Republic and the King of Spain in regard to French and Spanish interests in Morocco is fully recognised by us, and will be duly respected. The shorter paper, or "Declaration" made by the two Governments is, I understand, public property.

With best thanks, I am, etc.,
LANSDOWNE.

The chief provisions of the secret Convention are these—

Article 2 establishes the—

"sphere of influence which falls to Spain by virtue of her possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean."[1] and where she shall possess the same "right of action" as France has acquired by the Anglo-French understanding in the remainder of the country, *i.e.*, "to preserve order in" and to "provide assistance for . . . all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it

[1] See Map.

may require."[1] Spain, however, undertakes not to exercise her "right of action" for fifteen years without the consent of France, unless, and here Article 3 leaves the way clear for a cynical breach of the public Declaration, whenever it may suit the French purpose.

"In case"—says Article 3—"the continuance of the political status of Morocco and of the Shereefian Government should become impossible, or if, owing to the weakness of that Government and to its continued inability to uphold law and order,[2] *or to any other cause*,[3] the existence of which is acknowledged by both parties, the *status quo* can no longer be maintained, Spain may freely exercise her right of action in the territory defined in the preceding article, which henceforward constitutes her sphere of influence."

Article 4 defines the Spanish sphere in Atlantic Morocco.[4] Article 8 provides that if in the course of exercising this above-stated "right of action" one or other Government is—

"obliged to take military action, the other contracting party shall at once be informed. In no case shall the assistance of a foreign Power be invoked."

Article 10 provides that all schemes for public works, railways, etc., mineral development and "economic undertakings in general" in the French and Spanish spheres respectively, *i.e*, *in the whole of Morocco*, "shall be executed" by French and Spanish enterprise.

Thus British enterprise, and all international enterprise other than French and Spanish (Spanish "enterprise" being what it is—read French), was doubly mortgaged in favour of the French, first by the Anglo-French understanding, secondly by this Convention.

The further secret Franco-Spanish Accord (September 1, 1905), although antecedent to the Act of Algeciras, and in one sense belonging to that period of our inquiry, may more fittingly be touched upon at a later stage.

We may now summarise the preceding chapters, which will focus more readily to our intelligence the antecedents to the Act of Algeciras.

[1] Article 4, *vide* Chapter XI.

[2] Which the French Government, the Algerian Administration and French finance had combined to bring about. *Vide* Chapter III.

[3] These words are really worthy of being italicised.

[4] See Map.

CHAPTER XIII.

SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS OF 1900-1904 AND REFLECTIONS THEREON

A REVIEW of the events of 1900-1904 must be a review covering three distinct factors, viz., the public and secret diplomatic commitments which three out of the four Powers specially interested in Morocco had undertaken towards one another; the position in which the fourth was left through those commitments, and the obligations entered upon by those three Powers towards the independent State of Morocco and its ruler.

The latter point may be taken first.[1]

France had in 1901 and 1902 publicly assured Morocco upon repeated occasions that she had not the least intention of threatening the independence or the integrity of that State. France had formally and publicly declared in an agreement with Great Britain that she had no intention of altering the political *status* of Morocco. France and Spain had formally and publicly declared their firm attachment to the independence and integrity of Morocco. France and Spain, and, by implication, Great Britain, were, therefore, publicly pledged towards Morocco and towards the world at large to maintain the independence and integrity of Morocco.

Meanwhile, in point of fact, France, Spain, and Britain had privately entered into contracts with one another whereby the destruction of the independence and integrity of Morocco was decreed, the date of the event to depend upon circumstances.

I understand that in the current jargon of diplomacy that sort of thing is called "high politics." The plain man may be permitted to dub it by one word only—dishonesty;

[1] At the close of 1904 no international agreement, collectively signed by all the Powers, explicitly proclaiming the independence and integrity of Morocco, existed. But the Madrid Convention of 1880 (British White Book Cd. 3503) implicitly recognised that independence since the Powers had on that occasion negotiated with the Sultan on a basis of equality. Moreover, the independence of Morocco had never been questioned any more than the independence of Persia, or Russia, or the United States. Morocco *was* independent.

and to contend that dishonesty in diplomacy, even as dishonesty in business or in ordinary social life, does not ultimately pay. It certainly has not paid the British people in this particular case. On the contrary, it has involved them in enormous expenditure. If only the citizen of education and intelligence would shake himself free from the superstitions with which custom has invested the functions of the diplomatist; if only he could be brought to understand that the mental powers of those engaged in diplomacy are really no greater than his own, and that he is quite as well able to arrive at sound conclusions, if the facts are placed before him, as these highly but narrowly trained persons to whom he blindly confides the negotiation of his affairs with foreign Powers, the peace of the world would rest upon a surer foundation than it does to-day. Because if he did awake to the truth of those simple facts the citizen of education and intelligence would treat the diplomatists he employs just as he does other public functionaries, not as supermen, but as servants of the State, of which he and they are members. He would not for one moment tolerate that they should, unknown to him and his fellow-citizens, commit the nation to which he belongs to secret arrangements with foreign Powers calculated, under given circumstances, to involve him and his fellow-citizens in war, and lower the national standard of civic morals. He would not sanction one standard of honesty for the magistrate, the civil servant, the naval and military officer, and a totally different one for the diplomatist. The secret diplomacy of 1904 in connection with Morocco makes a revolting picture. That it was in the interests of the nations concerned, common sense and a robust belief in honesty alike reject.

I resume the narrative with apologies for the digression.

A sentence of doom had, therefore, been secretly pronounced against Morocco. France was to play the *rôle* of executioner, Spain that of interested assistant, and Britain that of interested witness.

What had each Power obtained as the result of the deal?

France had removed British opposition to a French absorption of four-fifths of Morocco at the price of a Spanish mortgage over Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco.

Spain had secured a mortgage over Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco.

Britain had acquired two things, at the price of surrendering her traditional policy of an independent Morocco, viz., relief from an irritating incubus in Egypt, and the exclusion of France from Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco.

But in thus disposing, contrary to their public pledges, in the real or fancied interests of the peoples they represented, of the future of an independent African State 219,000 square miles in extent, containing eight million inhabitants, and of great natural wealth, the British, French, and Spanish diplomatists had acted without any international sanction, and had, moreover, deliberately deceived the world.

The only feature in the deal of which the world at large, outside the three contracting Powers, had public cognisance so far as Morocco was concerned, was that Britain had declared her political disinterestedness in that country, and had recognised a special French interest within it—on certain conditions.

Even the British, French and Spanish peoples immediately concerned were allowed to know no more than that! The Spanish form of government permits of democracy playing but a microscopic part in the affairs of the country. But Britons and Frenchmen, who boast of their democratic constitution, may well feel resentment as they look into this history, at having been treated like babes and sucklings by the men they indirectly, at least, nominate for office, and whose salaries they directly pay. For what was the upshot, to the British and French people, of the secret manœuvres of their diplomatists in the assumed interest of those people?

To Frenchmen it meant *inter alia* this. Inveiglement blindfolded into a policy of precipitate absorption and conquest in Morocco as opposed to the advertised policy of "peaceful penetration" which had secured for their ephemeral and constantly shifting rulers the support of virtually all classes in the nation, and which consistently, honourably and peacefully pursued might well have led to a slow evolution and assimilation more in conformity with the nation's real interests. Blindfolded because they were unaware that their Foreign Minister had heavily mortgaged their potential interests to a third Power—Spain. Blindfolded because—supremely important among all things—

they were being led, *without knowing it,* into collision with Germany.

To Britons it meant *inter alia* this. Inveiglement within the orbit of the continental system of alliances; commitment to a revival of the era of British participation in the pursuit of that elusive phanton known as the balance of power, and aggravation of Anglo-German relations. For let it be well understood. *It was not the general settlement of 1904 with France of our outstanding disputes with her which was the cause of these happenings. That was an excellent and desirable thing in itself and it received national sanction. It was the unsanctioned secret commitments to France and Spain which worked the mischief. It was those unsanctioned secret commitments which marked the abandonment of Lord Salisbury's policy of the Concert, for the policy of entangling so-called "ententes."*

This secret diplomacy has already involved the British and French peoples in an increased expenditure on armaments amounting to millions sterling. Its future consequences may be even more disastrous, especially for the French people, perhaps. And when I speak of the British and French peoples, I do not refer to the governing classes, nor to the financiers, nor to the manufacturers of war material: I refer to the equally deserving and hard-working middle classes and labouring classes who pay and who suffer, for a state of things which, through lack of proper leadership, they continue to tolerate.

From what precedes it must be perfectly clear that despite what I have termed the "Crucial Article" of the Act of Algeciras,[1] *i.e.*, the Article which provided that in the event of the provisions of any antecedent treaties, conventions, or arrangements conflicting with the Act, the Act should prevail; the secret commitments of Britain, France, and Spain (Spain, of course, has only been the British Government's cat's-paw in the matter) were of such a character as to make the loyal fulfilment of that Article by those Powers in the highest degree unlikely.

The Public Law of Europe affecting the *status* of Morocco, embodied in the Algeciras Act, publicly proclaimed the independence and integrity of Morocco.

Britain and France were signatories to that Act. Secretly France, with British concurrence, had

[1] *Vide* Chapter VI.

previously arranged for the partition of Morocco between herself and Spain.

Technically, in law, from the standpoint of international morality, the Act of Algeciras superseded this secret arrangement, and any assault by one or more Powers upon the independence or integrity of Morocco would be an offence against any other Power or Powers who chose to regard it as such.

A strong British Foreign Minister would have found in the Algeciras Act, signed by his instructions, not only the duty but the obligation of so directing his policy and so influencing the policy of France and Spain as to prevent complications with any other Power interested in Morocco from arising out of a conflict between the antecedent secret commitments[1] of Britain towards France and Spain, and the stipulations of the Act adhered to by Britain. No strong British Foreign Minister would have allowed his country to be placed in the invidious position of adhering to an international Act proclaiming the independence and integrity of Morocco, and laying down specifically that the provisions of the Act must prevail over the provisions of any arrangements previously arrived at between various Powers, unless he had seen his way clear to reconcile mutually destructive pledges.

Sir Edward Grey proved himself incapable of breaking through the vicious circle in which British and French policy was involved by the secret evolutions of their respective diplomats.

And, as subsequent events were to show, two out of the four Powers specially interested in Morocco, with a third following in their wake, assisted in elaborating the Public Law of Europe embodied in the Algeciras Act, with the firm intention on the part of one of them to flout that Public Law and on the part of the others to condone and support its violation even to the point of risking a great war. Ere the signatures were affixed to the document, the capital provisions of the Act of Algeciras were doomed to sterility, and the process of tearing them up was begun soon after their formal ratification by the Powers, *i.e.*, early in 1907.[2]

[1] It should be constantly borne in mind that the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration, and the secret Franco-Spanish Convention only became publicly known in *November*, 1911, through the "indiscretion" of a couple of French newspapers.

[2] *Vide* Chapter VIII.

PART V.

Germany's Acceptance of French Assurances

CHAPTER XIV.

THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM

To judge impartially, nay, even to examine with intelligence, the attitude of Germany in the Morocco question from the date of the Anglo-French (public) Declaration to the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir, it is necessary, I submit, that we should divest ourselves of such prejudices as we may individually entertain and honestly study the proceedings of that Power in the light of *facts*.

Britishers lay claim to the possession of a sense of fair play, and, in the main, justifiably. The above suggestion is, therefore, peculiarly adjustable to the national character, even if the national interest were not closely concerned in its adoption.

At this stage of our inquiry we are only called upon to deal with the first German intervention which led to the Morocco problem being brought before the Areopagus of the Powers, and which culminated in the elaboration of the Public Law we have analysed and explained.

If the facts, covering that first period of German action, as here stated are inaccurately or incompletely stated, public opinion will rightly reject the arguments drawn from them by the author of this volume. If, on the other hand, they remain unchallenged, it may be that British public opinion will be disposed to modify, if not to reverse, the adverse judgment it has formed. In that event the British people, being essentially a great people, will not hesitate to admit that they have been induced, through lack of information and through misrepresentation, to form an unjust estimate of German conduct. They will do so spontaneously, impelled by their sense of fair-play. It is only the small-minded man who declines to allow that he can ever be liable to error. The same holds good in the case of nations, at least in a democratic State where the nation has means of expressing itself. But hard upon the heels of that spontaneous acknowledgment will come the consciousness that British relations with Germany have suffered acutely through this misunderstanding, and the British people will set to work resolutely to heal the sore,

hew out the path to an understanding, and compel their diplomatists to follow it.

I assume that a perusal of Chapter V. of this volume has already convinced the reader that Germany was entitled to a voice in the future of Morocco, and I shall not, therefore, labour the point further.

The attitude of the German Government upon becoming informed of the Anglo-French (public) Declaration appears to have been one of friendly expectation. Before the Declaration was signed, but when it was known that negotiations were proceeding between London and Paris, the *North German Gazette*, the recognised official organ of the German Government, stated (March 25, 1904) that in view of the "reiterated assurance" that France had in view "neither the conquest nor the occupation" of Morocco, German interests were, "so far as can be gathered at the moment," in no jeopardy. How emphatic have been these assurances we have seen.[1] But those already quoted were given to the Moorish Government and, incidentally, to the world. Were there others? Yes. Similar statements had been made by M. Delcassé himself in the Senate and Chamber.[2] Moreover the German ambassador in Paris, Prince Radolin, had asked M. Delcassé on March 27 whether it were true that he was negotiating a general understanding with England, and M. Delcassé had replied in the affirmative. After a reference to Newfoundland, Prince Radolin had inquired if Morocco had been mentioned, and M. Delcassé again answered in the affirmative, adding—

"But you already know our point of view on the subject. *We wish to uphold in Morocco the existing political and territorial status;* but that status, if it is to last, must obviously be sustained and improved."[3]

[1] *Vide* Chapters III. and VIII.

[2] French Yellow Book.

[3] It is perhaps interesting to point out how closely this statement approximates to Lord Salisbury's instructions to Sir C. Euan-Smith in 1892 (*vide* Chapter II.): "It has been the constant aim of her Majesty's Government . . . to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Morocco, while neglecting no favourable opportunity of impressing upon the Sultan and his Ministers the importance and advantage of improving the government and administration of the country." The difference between the two statements consisted in the intentions behind them. Lord Salisbury meant what he said and had acted up to it. M. Delcassé did not mean what he said, and had already taken steps in a directly contrary sense.

On April 12 the German Chancellor, Count Bülow, questioned in the Reichstag on the subject of the just published Anglo-French agreement,[1] replied that he had no reason to believe that it was directed against Germany in any way, but that he had no official notification of it. Germany had no interest in the existence of unfriendly relations between Britain and France "which would be a danger to the peace of the world of which we sincerely desire the maintenance." So far as Morocco was specially concerned, Prince Bülow said :—

"We are interested in that country, as, moreover, in the rest of the Mediterranean, principally from the economic standpoint. Our interests therein are, before all, commercial interests; also are we specially interested that calm and order should prevail in Morocco. We must protect our commercial interests in Morocco and we shall protect them. We have no reason to fear that they will be set aside or infringed by any Power."

The German Press took, in the main, the same line.

Thus, apparently, peace and harmony.

[1] *Vide* Chapter XI.

PART VI.

Germany's First Intervention (1905)

CHAPTER XV.

THE GERMAN EMPEROR'S VISIT TO TANGIER AND ITS EFFECT UPON BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION

On March 31, 1905, the *Hamburg*, with the Emperor William on board, escorted by the cruiser *Friederick Karl*, cast anchor at Tangier.[1] The visit had been planned early in the year and thus constituted a deliberate act of policy.

The Emperor landed at Tangier and spent two hours there. Welcomed with much enthusiasm by the natives, the Emperor received the Diplomatic Corps, held a conversation with the Sultan's representatives, who had come from Fez to meet him, then received the German residents, and wound up with a further conversation with the Sultan's representatives. The following is the authorised version of the gist of the Emperor's remarks to the latter—translated from the French account :—

"The object of my visit to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined to do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco. I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign, and it is with him that I desire to come to an understanding as to the best means to bring that result about. As for the reforms which the Sultan intends to introduce into his country I consider that he should proceed with much precaution, and should take into account the religious feelings of his subjects so that at no moment shall public order be troubled as a consequence of these reforms."

Such was the German Emperor's famous Tangier speech. It was evidently a challenge intended and understood as such.

But what was Germany, through the voice of its Emperor, then challenging?

To us, who now have become acquainted with the Secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration of April, 1904, and with the Secret Franco-Spanish Convention of October

[1] The previous day the *Hamburg* had called at Gibraltar, and the Emperor had dined with Sir George White.

of the same year, it is evident that what was being challenged in the Tangier speech was this secret Anglo-Franco-Spanish understanding providing for the partition of Morocco.

But this secret understanding, concluded in 1904, was not published until 1911, and its existence was unknown to public opinion in 1905.

So public opinion referred the Tangier challenge to the only thing it had been allowed to know of, namely the *published* portion of the Anglo-French Declaration respecting Morocco.

Instead of challenging, as he did, the secret partition of Morocco between France and Spain with Great Britain's connivance, the German Emperor was supposed to be challenging the Anglo-French public proclamation of Morocco's independence and integrity, and, by an easy transition, he was represented as desiring to "drive a wedge" between England and France.

Not only had the French and British Cabinets (in the case of the French Cabinet without the knowledge of some of the Cabinet's members[1]) made an arrangement to the exclusion and detriment of Germany, but, by keeping their arrangement from the public, and by issuing a public Declaration in contradiction with it, they had, intentionally, or unintentionally, caused Germany's act of protest to be utterly misrepresented.

As a consequence, public opinion in England was naturally astonished and incensed.[2]

All through 1905 the clamour continued, and—no careful student of the journalistic literature of that period can entertain the slightest doubt upon the subject—was incited both in England and in France by the "diplomatic machine"[3] concerned in working for and executing the secret arrangements of 1904.

[1] See foot-note 2, page 78.

[2] I discuss in Chapter XVIII. the various public incidents which combined to apprise Germany that the published Declaration did not represent the full or real character of the Anglo-Franco-Spanish deal. It would be surprising if the German Government did not acquire, in addition to these public disclosures, further corroboration of the true facts through its Secret Service.

[3] The "man in the street" is apt to suppose that the Foreign Minister of the day incarnates in his person the foreign policy of the country subject to Cabinet approval. That, of course, is a delusion. He only does so nominally. Foreign policy is the work of many—not of one, with very rare exceptions There are the embassies

Editorials and despatches from special correspondents, written for the most part, one may well believe, in complete good faith because for the most part in ignorance of facts, ridiculed the idea that Germany's interests in Morocco were sufficient to account for the Emperor's action. Morocco was merely a pretext. Germany's aim was to break up the Anglo-French *entente* by "browbeating" France. Why, if so, she had not acted on the morrow of the publication of the agreement was very easily explained. Russia had not then been beaten to her knees. The Battle of Mukden had not been fought. The parlous state of Russia was Germany's opportunity, for, crippled by the temporary loss of her Eastern ally, France was "at the mercy" of Germany, and must be made to see that her safety depended upon breaking with Britain and

abroad, and it happens that some one or other of the ambassadors may have different views from those entertained by the Foreign Minister at home on a specific issue. If the latter has no very decided views one way or another, or if he does not keep a tight hold over his mouthpieces abroad, the influences directed from a particular embassy in a certain direction may have the most far-reaching effects upon policy. That, to my own personal knowledge, has occurred within the past four years, in two questions of foreign policy. Then there are the permanent officials at home, some of whom have decided views, and consider themselves the real directors of the nation's foreign policy and not only exercise that influence to the uttermost upon the Foreign Minister of the day, but impose it upon the public (and so, indirectly, exercise pressure upon their chief) through social circles and by the medium of the journalists *de confiance* with whom they are permanently in touch. It may even be—here again I speak in one such case from personal knowledge—that certain events may be prepared and worked for by members of the Foreign Minister's *entourage* entirely without the latter's knowledge. So that to speak of a diplomatic machine is strictly accurate. Among the units composing the machine are to be met with rivalries, private grudges, exaggerated notions of personal prestige and dignity, personal ambitions, and all the concatenation of ills to which ordinary flesh is heir. Among the embassies abroad, promotion may depend, often does depend, upon keeping on good terms with a particular permanent official at home. In that you have the usual inconveniences from which Government Departments can never be free, doubly aggravated in the case of the Foreign Office by the close caste system therein traditionally prevailing which makes of it the glorious preserve of a favoured few, and the lack of any real, effective control from the outside. All Foreign Offices are more or less tarred with the same brush. Some are worse than ours in certain respects (*i.e.* indiscretion and personal corruption, from the latter of which we are free), but in several cases (notably in the United States and in France) there *is* an effective outside check in the shape of a Parliamentary Committee which can often cut the knot of personal intrigue or at least expose it, and so prevent further mischief for a time. In our case there is no such corrective.

allying herself with her Teutonic neighbour as a preliminary step to that famous combined onslaught upon Britain which should end by dictating terms in London to the shattered remnant of a British Parliament driven to seek refuge upon Exmoor or somewhere in the Welsh hills.

And when it became apparent that all Germany was aiming at was an international Conference to adjudicate upon the future of Morocco, and that every one of M. Delcassé's colleagues and the overwhelming majority of the French Parliament[1] was in favour of treating Germany less cavalierly than M. Delcassé had treated her, the clamour, instead of lessening, redoubled. The "diplomatic machine" worked full time through its chosen organs. M. Delcassé was represented as the unhappy victim of German resentment for the leading part he had played in concluding the Anglo-French general settlement, and France as being harried at the point of the bayonet into compassing his fall. As upon a more recent occasion, we were goaded into being more French than the French, and the powerful occult influences which move behind the scenes and mould public opinion did their utmost to counteract the more moderate sections of French public life.

I commend a perusal of the foreign pages of the *Times* of this period—say from May to November, 1905. They make astonishing reading. The insults and threats to Germany mingled with personal abuse of the Emperor William, in the Paris and Berlin telegrams, especially the Paris telegrams, are incessant. No less remarkable is the partisan bias in favour of M. Delcassé against his home critics. Praise of M. Delcassé is the test of statesmanship, and the rare expressions of it are religiously recorded; criticism of his policy and the numerous expressions thereof, are rigidly curtailed, or explained as evidence of the narrowest party politics. Germany's right to a say in the Moroccan settlement is scornfully denied. The idea of a Conference is violently opposed. "It ought not to be entertained for a moment."[2] It would be a "humiliation,"

[1] The French Parliament was, of course, ignorant, as a body, of the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration and of the Franco-Spanish secret Convention. So, indeed, were some of the Foreign Minister's colleagues. *The Minister of Marine, and also the Minister for the Colonies in the Rouvier-Delcassé Cabinet of 1904, publicly protested in November last,* i.e. *when the secret Convention with Spain was published, that they had been kept entirely in the dark.*

[2] June 12.

a "capitulation," the "sooner the whole matter is negatively disposed of the better."[1] The correspondents cease to be impartial or even faithful recorders of events to become vehement units of the machine bent upon forcing again and again a particular view upon the public. Observe these typical despatches :—

"There is no Moroccan question. It was finally settled by the Anglo-French *entente.*" (*Times*, April 7 : Paris despatch.)

"The idea of a conference can never have been seriously entertained even in Berlin. If Germany wants to court another failure, she has only to propose or get it proposed by the Sultan of Morocco." (*Times*, April 10 : Paris despatch.)

"Germany is evidently retiring as gracefully as she can . . . and as to M. Delcassé's position, it has certainly not been weakened." (*Times,* April 12 : Paris despatch.)

"The international Conference which it is suggested should be proposed by the Sultan of Morocco, and which Count von Tattenbach (the German Minister at Fez, the same official whom the *Times* praised in 1892 for helping the British mission) says will be supported by Germany, will probably never take place. . . . Its object could only be to revise or stultify the agreement recently concluded by France and to give Germany a voice in matters with which she has nothing to do."[2] (*Times,* May 2 : Paris despatch.)

"Consequently it may be announced with confidence that the Moroccan proposal for a European Conference will be entertained by only one of the Great Powers—namely, Germany. On all sides it is recognised that Germany must have foreseen that an invitation coming from Morocco would meet with no response, and this confirms the general opinion as to Germany's whole Moroccan policy being a mere blind for something else." (*Times*, June 5 : Paris despatch.)

The more French opinion gravitates towards a Conference the more bitterly is the Conference condemned. When the British Foreign Office, through the mouth of its representative at Fez, informs the Sultan that Britain will not attend a Conference, a pæan of triumph is set up in the editorial columns. I do not question for a moment

[1] June 9.

[2] *Let it be repeated again and yet again, that the public to which this sort of thing was ceaselessly repeated, was in entire ignorance of the secret agreements, which only saw the light in November, 1911.*

the good faith of all this. I assume that the writers of these despatches and editorials were unaware of the secret arrangements in existence. But those that inspired them undoubtedly were not, and the whole affair illustrates the dangerous lengths to which a secret diplomacy is willing to go in the manipulation of public opinion in order to save "face," or promote specific ends even at the risk of precipitating a great war. The motives may be of the highest. But the whole system involves the nation in terrible dangers, and is vicious and unhealthy in the extreme.

In this particular case the secret policy of France and Britain can fairly be described as having been Machiavellian, and the object pursued by its promoters (when they found it openly and resentfully challenged) was to inspire the public mind with the belief that it was on the contrary the policy of Germany that was inspired by the precepts of the great Italian.

Englishmen have, apparently, failed so far to grasp how fundamentally the entire history of the Morocco affair—as interpreted to them in the course of the last seven years has been altered by the now revealed secret Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish (insisted upon by the British Government) compacts. We have a curious inability to credit that our nationally uncontrolled diplomacy can be anything but honest and straightforward; although ready enough to believe that Continental diplomacy is invariably dishonest and tortuous. The plain truth of the matter is that the Anglo-Franco-Spanish secret diplomatic arrangements of 1904 constituted a breach of trust towards the peoples of Britain, France, and Spain. The House of Commons does not appear to have realised the nature and effect of these commitments, since they were avowed at the close of last year by the British Foreign Office, or the painful impression caused by their revelation in France. The numerous allusions thereto in the French Chamber and Senate, have been studiously withheld from the British public. It is well, perhaps, that one or two extracts from the speeches of French Senators in the debates of February, 1912, should be here appended.

Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, speaking on February 6, 1912, remarked—

"The French Parliament, by an abuse morally, if not constitutionally, unpardonable, was kept in ignorance of

this policy. . . . Far from ensuring general peace, the arrangements of 1904 tended to compromise it. . . . Why was the French Parliament told only half the truth when it was asked to pass its opinion upon our arrangement with England? Why was it not allowed to suspect that this arrangement had as its complement and corrective some secret clauses and other secret Treaties? It is this, it is this double game towards Parliament and towards the world which becomes morally an abuse of trust. . . . Now the whole effort of the arrangement of 1904 appears to-day in its truth and in its vanity. It was a Treaty of friendship with England recognising the freedom of our political action in Morocco and also proclaiming our will to respect the integrity of that country; that was what the public knew and approved. But the public was ignorant that at the same time, by other Treaties and by contradictory clauses hidden from it, the partition of Morocco between Spain and France was prepared, of that Morocco of which we guaranteed the integrity. There existed two irreconcilable French policies in Morocco, that of public arrangements, that is to say, a policy of integrity which was not the true one; and that of secret arrangements postulating a Protectorate and the partition of Morocco."

M. de Lamarzelle was even more emphatic—

"This secret Franco-Spanish Treaty interests Spain, no doubt, but it interests still more England, by whom and for whom it was made. . . . Why was this secret Treaty hidden? I can find no other reason than this, that perhaps if Parliament had been told all the sacrifices which were imposed upon us by this secret Treaty, the public Treaty would not have been voted." (Feb. 7.)

M. Ribot, the "Father of the House," speaking on the 9th, also accentuated the cynical contradiction between public professions and private commitments—

"In 1904 a Treaty was signed—a secret Treaty—whose clauses we have only recently learned . . .; it was a Treaty of partition and has created difficulties which are not yet all cleared away. Spain was bound to consider, and did consider, that it was a partition of sovereignty between France and Spain at the very time when a public Act declared that the two nations were profoundly attached to the independence and to the integrity of Morocco."

British and French tax-payers have paid a heavy bill. One wonders whether they have learned a lesson.

No desire to crush and humiliate France; no designs upon the Anglo-French *entente;* no personal dislike to M. Delcassé were *needed* to explain the change in the attitude of Germany. The facts germane to the subject immediately at issue were fully sufficient not only to explain but to justify that change. For in the interval between Prince Bülow's first references in the Reichstag to the Anglo-French settlement and the German Emperor's visit to Tangier, Germany had gradually awakened to the fact that she had been flouted in a way seldom meted out to a great Power, and which no great Power could by any possibility tolerate, ever has tolerated, or ever will tolerate. This, I venture to think, the next chapter will make abundantly clear.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE GERMAN CASE IN 1905

THE initial and gratuitous offence committed against Germany by the French Foreign Minister was his deliberate failure officially to *notify* the Anglo-French (public) Declaration of 1904 to the German Government; a policy repeated by him in the ensuing October in connection with the Franco-Spanish (public) Declaration. In the case of the former of these arrangements, even the courtesy call upon the Wilhelmstrasse of the French ambassador was delayed for three weeks after the publication of the Declaration in the *Journal Officiel*. Whether M. Delcassé did or did not enter upon negotiations with Germany in the 1901-1902 period—*i.e.*, when his policy was directed at partitioning Morocco with Spain behind the back of Great Britain[1]—is immaterial. Of course, if he did, his attitude in 1904 was the more inexcusable.

But apart from that consideration altogether, Germany as a party, and an active one, to the first (and, at that moment, the only) International Conference which had been held on the affairs of Morocco, was entitled to have the opportunity given her, which an official notification alone afforded according to the unwritten law of diplomatic etiquette between States, to ask questions and to discuss the tenor of an agreement arrived at between two Powers concerning the territory of a State in which Germany was interested and in whose concerns she had already, and upon several occasions, intervened. In addition to this technical and unquestionable right, Germany's commercial Treaty with Morocco; her friendly participation with and assistance to Lord Salisbury's envoy in his endeavours to strengthen the "open door" for trade in Morocco, to improve the Shereefian administration, and to uphold the independence of Morocco against French designs; her own Missions to the Sultan's Court; the fact that she maintained a legation at Fez as well as at Tangier; her

[1] *Vide* Chapter X.

not inconsiderable and growing commercial interests in the country; her quarter of a century's active relations with it[1] were, in themselves, more than sufficient to justify her claim to be advised and consulted. Those who have argued the contrary can only have done so in ignorance of facts publicly accessible.

Can it be seriously contended that because France had succeeded in inducing Britain, for a consideration, to disinterest herself in the future of Morocco and to recognise a special French interest therein, that France was, therefore, entitled to proceed as though the interests of other Powers were of no account? We know that she did not do so in regard to Spain, whose economic interests were much smaller than Germany's, because the British Government, in the interest of British policy, had not only willed otherwise but had imposed upon France[2] a Mediterranean Morocco in the hands of Spain. Yet, not only had France concluded an arrangement with Britain closely and, indeed, vitally affecting the future of an independent State with which Germany had long historical connections and important interests, both existing and potential, but she had not even given Germany the chance of having a friendly discussion as to its purport after its conclusion. She had followed this up by signing a joint Declaration with Spain, treating Germany in regard thereto with the same conspicuous aloofness.

It is no secret—indeed, the documents printed in the French Yellow Book virtually admit it—that the French ambassador at Berlin would have personally preferred that the Declaration should have been notified in the usual manner. When the omission and its significance became known in France, subsequent to the German Emperor's entry upon the scene, M. Delcassé's countrymen almost unanimously took the same view. When at the famous Cabinet Council which led to his resignation, M. Delcassé defended his action and vehemently opposed any modification in the French official attitude towards Germany, he was overruled by his colleagues without a single exception. His fall from power was not due, as a mischievous legend has attributed it, to German intrigue, but to the disapproval of his methods entertained by Frenchmen quite as patriotic as himself. I defy anyone who has impartially studied the

[1] *Vide* Chapter V.
[2] Unknown to the French Parliament and people.

French published literature on the point—Parliamentary, Press, and other—to arrive at any other conclusion. Moreover, to credit the legend is to display an abysmal ignorance of the French character with which the author of this volume may claim to be closely acquainted. The French are a very proud and a very sensitive[1] people, and had they really believed, as M. Delcassé's friends and British journalists inspired by the British embassy in Paris, or by the Foreign Office, ceaselessly dinned into the ears of the public, viz., that their Foreign Minister was being hounded from Power by German pressure upon the French Cabinet, nothing would have induced them to part with him.[2] The fact was, of course, that M. Delcassé had become impossible; for French common sense, and French logic too, desired to arrive at an understanding with Germany, and M. Delcassé's policy was leading direct to an open rupture. That is why M. Delcassé disappeared, and for no other reason. Indeed, M. Delcassé's obstinacy had made the problem so acute that even before his resignation, M. Rouvier, the French Premier, as the Yellow Book reveals, had found it necessary to enter into direct *pour parlers* on the situation with the German ambassador at Paris.[3]

Prince Bülow subsequently explained German sentiment on M. Delcassé's action in several quarters[4] and notably in a despatch to the German ambassador at Paris,[5] from which it may be useful to make the following extracts :—

[1] It is a pity, for the harmonious relations of the two peoples, that this characteristic is not more generally recognised by the German Press.

[2] In an incautious Paris despatch in the *Times*, describing, not indeed, as it purported to do, the "general feeling" in France, this truth was incidentally admitted : "The general feeling here is that whoever might succeed M. Delcassé would be the nominee of the German Emperor, a fact which is alone likely to prolong M. Delcassé's term of office." (*Times*, May 16, 1905.) In point of fact M. Delcassé resigned three weeks later (June 7). In passing—could anything be more offensive than that message—both to Germany and to France? It is a revelation in itself of the desperate efforts of the "machine" to keep M. Delcassé in power.

[3] *Vide* Prince Bülow's despatch April 28, 1905. M. Delcassé resigned on June 7. In other words, M. Rouvier acted in 1905 as M. Caillaux acted in 1911. In both cases the motive was the same, to come to an understanding—a peace policy instead of a war policy.

[4] *Inter alia* to a correspondent of the *Petit Parisien* and to M. Georges Villiers of *Le Temps* (October, 1905).

[5] May 1, 1905. Yellow Book.

"A diplomatic document so far-reaching as the Morocco Convention cannot be judged on the strength of oral and fragmentary statements: it is not necessary to prove this. For overtures of such importance the written formula is that which diplomatic usage consecrates. The formal and material insufficiency of the allusions and indications communicated here last year by your Highness and by M. Bihourd (the French ambassador) from M. Delcassé, is a fact which neither of the two parties concerned can remove. . . . It would have been, as we have already said, conformable to international usage for France, upon the conclusion of the Anglo-French accord concerning Morocco, to communicate this accord in the usual manner, to all the interested Powers which are sufficiently designated as such by their signatures at the bottom of the Act of the Madrid Conference."[1]

"But," one can imagine a reader at this stage reflecting, "if you have proved to my satisfaction that Germany had a legitimate grievance in her treatment by M. Delcassé, I still do not altogether understand why she waited for the best part of a year before giving expression to her resentment." The question would be reasonable, and the answer is not far to seek.

M. Delcassé's attitude had two consequences. It had given umbrage. It had aroused suspicion: had thrown doubt upon the sincerity of his professions as to French intentions towards Morocco. The ambiguous character of Article 2 of the Anglo-French (public) Declaration, even taken by itself (*i.e.*, without the context of the secret Articles together with the secret Franco-Spanish Convention), has already been commented upon,[2] opening as it did with a formal declaration on the part of France that she did not intend to alter the political *status* of Morocco and closing with a recognition on the part of Britain that it appertained to France "more particularly . . . to preserve order" in Morocco. Germany was on the alert, watchful and suspicious. If there was anything more behind the Declaration, then, clearly, the economic Article[3] left the field wide open to serious future injury to German commercial interests.

In October, 1904, Germany was confronted with the further spectacle of France signing a joint Declaration with

[1] Yellow Book. [2] *Vide* Chapter XI.
[3] Chapter XI.

Spain, variously described as "a Spanish endorsement of the Anglo-French Agreement of last April," and as "an annex to the Anglo-French Convention." Here again came from France neither formal notification, nor any proposal for a similar friendly agreement with Germany, notwithstanding that her actual and potential interests in Morocco were far greater than any of which Spain could boast. It now became patent that Germany was being studiously left on one side: that France, backed by Britain, and in conjunction with Spain, was bent upon pursuing a certain policy in Morocco without either consultation or discussion of any kind with Germany. The intention was so deliberate on the face of it that it could no longer be ignored. From this time onwards the German Government and German opinion passed from suspicion to angry certainty. To considerations of positive interest were now added considerations of national prestige, which Reuter's note did not certainly tend to assuage:—

"Every detail of the negotiations"—declared this obviously authorised pronouncement—"has been made known to the British Government, and the terms of the new Treaty are regarded with satisfaction by the Governments of London, Paris, and Madrid. *The Treaty contains a number of secret clauses which will not be made public.*"

So the cat had been let out of the bag! There was a secret Treaty as well as a public one! France, Britain, and Spain were calmly disposing of Morocco between them, and treating Germany "as of no account in the Cabinet of nations."

Thenceforth dated the situation which for more than seven years has poisoned the whole European atmosphere; embroiled British, French, German, and Spanish relations, and placed an enormous and constantly growing burden of added expenditure upon the peoples of those countries. Thenceforth dated the situation which Sir Edward Grey instead of seeking to improve by orienting his policy after Algeciras in a more friendly spirit towards Germany—retaining what was good but rejecting what was bad in the policy of his predecessor—has aggravated and worsened to such a degree that only yesterday we escaped a general conflagration. Veritably the process of being a party to the stealing of another man's land brings with it its own Nemesis. Unfortunately it is the people in whose

name, but without whose sanction, these things are done who have to pay.

When did German diplomacy ascertain the substance of the secret Franco-Spanish Convention, and of the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration? No one outside the charmed circle can pronounce upon that definitely. But all the circumstances point to the German Government having become aware of the former very shortly after its conclusion, and after Reuter's public announcement quoted above that secret clauses existed. Its contents were communicated to the head of the French Colonial Party, M. Etienne, at the time. So much is clear from the interview with that politician which was published in *Le Temps* of October 8, 1904. The indiscretion of French politicians and journalists is, moreover, notorious. The way in which copies of secret documents whose originals repose at the Quai d'Orsay are hawked about for sale to the highest bidder is equally notorious to any student of French diplomatic history. Quite recent events have yielded an astonishing crop of this kind of revelation, disclosing depths of corruption which cast doubts upon the stability of French Republican institutions. (The Convention was finally published last November by *Le Matin!* The secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration last November by *Le Temps!*) The undisguised indignation[1] which pierce through the German official despatches of the period, subsequent to the German Emperor's visit to Tangier, argue the possession not only of a case sound in itself but of a case so fortified by unavowed proof as to be irresistible. That the Kaiser's visit to Tangier was the outcome of a thorough knowledge of the entire intrigue for the political dismemberment of Morocco, and the future monopolisation of its resources by France, cannot, I think, be for one moment in question.

Can any man who is not hopelessly prejudiced contest the justification of Germany's action when he reviews this

[1] Was it surprising when, with the knowledge she possessed, Germany was still treated to this sort of thing from M. Delcassé? The extract is from one of the French Foreign Minister's speeches in April, 1905: "Morocco knew that France was not seeking a pretext to enlarge the scope of her programme of policy in that country. . . She could secure her future in the Western basis of the Mediterranean *sans froisser aucun droit, sans léser aucun interêt.*" And that was the statesman who had just secretly arranged with Britain and Spain to put Morocco in his pocket!

story and recalls the character of the Franco-Spanish secret Convention?[1] Acquiescence in the accomplished fact would have meant for Germany the meek acceptance on the one hand of an unparalleled rebuff; on the other the gradual strangulation of German economic development—the work of twenty years—in one of the great potential markets of the world.[2] Should we, in Germany's place, have turned the other cheek? No Britisher will be prepared to answer in the affirmative.

If any further proof had been lacking as to the character of French designs, and British concurrence in those designs, it would have been provided by events in Morocco itself. These events explain the concluding portion of the Emperor's remarks to the representatives of the Sultan at Tangier.[3] The publication of the Anglo-French Declaration had struck the Moors, already, as we have seen, disappointed at the absence of any categorical assurances from M. Loubet,[4] and profoundly disquieted by the increasing anti-Moorish character of French policy on the Algerian-Morocco frontier region, with consternation. The Sultan appealed privately, and as the months went on again and again, to the German representative at Tangier for support. The French representatives at Fez strove without effect to calm the Moorish Government's apprehensions. Then came the publication of the Franco-Spanish Declaration with its avowed but unspecified secret clauses. This arrangement does not appear to have been even communicated to the Sultan. On the top of everything M. Delcassé pitched a whole series of proposed reforms at the head of the now thoroughly alarmed Sultan.[5] It was the final drop in the cup: the last link connecting up the interests of Germany and the interests of the Moorish Government in a common resistance to a policy planned in

[1] *Vide* Chapter XII.

[2] The way in which France treats foreign trade in her overseas possessions is of public notoriety, and has been a matter of serious loss to British interests, whenever the flag of France flies outside of Europe. On the other hand, there is no differential treatment of trade in the German oversea dependencies.

[3] *Vide* Chapter XIV.

[4] *Vide* Chapter IX.

[5] An anti-German, but also an anti-Delcassé French authority—M. Bérard—makes the following comment: "At one blow everything must be carried out: army, justice, administration, routes, frontiers, State-bank, custom-houses, education, sanitary measures, police. Then everything fell to pieces (*Alors tout craque*)."

secret and openly provocative both to Morocco and to Germany.

Even in France some far-seeing men had become disturbed. Speaking in the Chamber on November 3, M. Deschanel, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, remarked :—

"Everything has been sacrificed to Morocco, but there was one great danger, viz., that the policy of France in Morocco would so tie her hands as to embarrass her policy in Europe."

And so the Kaiser went to Tangier and Baron von Tattenbach a little later to Fez,[1] where he was received as a liberator and Morocco's only friend, as the Kaiser had been received at Tangier. And so, after a prolonged and desperate struggle by M. Delcassé, by the British Foreign Office, by the British Embassy in Paris, and by the *Times*, the Sultan's suggestion for a Conference, advised by the Germans, was accepted, first by Italy, then by Austria, then by the other Powers in succession, and, finally, by France and Britain. And so was framed that Public Law of Europe embodied in the Act of Algeciras concerning Morocco's future, "based upon the independence of the Sultan, and the integrity of his dominions," and providing that if any precedent arrangement between the Powers and Morocco conflicted with the stipulations of the Act, the stipulations of the Act should prevail. Germany had acted in accordance with her rights, her dignity, and her interests. She was not the provoking party, but the provoked. She had been treated with contumely and contempt. She had been humbugged and flouted. For twelve months she and her Emperor had been abused and insulted almost daily in the columns of powerful British newspapers, believed to be inspired by the British diplomatic machine; accused of every imaginable perfidy and conspiration against the peace of the world. But she had consistently stuck to her guns, had declined to be led into retaliatory measures by the clamour of her own jingoes, and basing herself solely upon the incontestable legitimacy of her position as a signatory to the Madrid Convention, as

[1] To Reuter's agent at Tangier, who interviewed him before he left, Baron von Tattenbach said: "Germany's course is clear. She claims equal rights with other nations, and insists upon the integrity of the Moorish Empire."

possessor of a commercial Treaty with Morocco, as the upholder of an independent Morocco, and as the holder of a considerable economic interest in that country, she had gained her aim, not because of her strength placed at the service of an unjust case, but because of the essential and intrinsic justice of her case. And her aim was an International Conference.

In numerous documents other than those already quoted, the German Government has explained and defined its fundamental position. I select the following :—

(Extract from Prince Bülow's despatch to the German Embassies abroad) :—

" *April* 12, 1905.—The German Government took no action (*i.e.* upon the publication of the Anglo-French (public) Declaration of April 8, 1904), seeing that the Anglo-French arrangement postulates the *status quo* and that, consequently, we thought ourselves entitled to suppose that the Powers interested in the Morocco Convention (*i.e.* the Madrid Convention) would be consulted by France in case France had in view in Morocco innovations tending to circumscribe the rights and liberties of the other signatory Powers of the Convention, in their extent or their duration. We perceived, however, that this opinion was erroneous, and that the time had come to think of the protection of German interests, when the Morocco Government inquired if it were true that the Minister of France at Fez was, as he professed, the mandatory of the European Powers,[1] and it became known that different features in the French alleged programme of reforms were in contradiction with the maintenance of the *status quo*. . . Seeing that we must now reckon with the possibility of a French Protectorate over Morocco, that is to say, with the complete expulsion of non-French economic enterprises, such as has taken place in Tunis, the interests of foreigners are threatened in their totality and a Conference would be more than ever advisable. That is an issue which should not infringe the legitimate sensibilities of anyone, seeing that it only means recourse to an expedient already often employed."

[1] *I.e.* in December, 1904, when M. Delcassé presented his programme of reforms to the Sultan through the French representative.

(Extract from Prince Bülow's despatch to the German Ambassador at London) :—

"*April* 15, 1905.—We are acting in regard to our interests, of which there is apparently the desire to dispose without our assent. The importance of these interests is in this connection (*ici*) a secondary matter. Any man from whose pocket it is proposed to take money will defend himself to the extent of his capacities, whether five marks or five thousand marks are concerned. We possess economic interests in Morocco. That does not require proof. If, by our silence, we renounce them, we shall thus encourage the world, which is watching us, to adopt a similar lack of consideration to our detriment in other questions, perhaps more important."

(Extract from Prince Bülow's despatch to the German Ambassador at Paris) :—

"*April* 28, 1905.—Express in my name all my thanks to the Minister-President (*i.e.* the French Premier, M. Rouvier) for his conciliatory declaration. I think I may conclude therefrom that he realises the situation in which Germany would find herself if third parties disposed of German interests without consulting us. If a great Power were to admit this fashion of ignoring its existence, the said Power would be incurring inconvenience in the future, not to say dangers. The material value of the threatened interests only comes in here as a secondary factor. I think I may conclude from the overtures which the Minister-President has made to your Highness, that the idea of a unilateral (*i.e.* one-sided) and brutal solution of the question of interest is as far from his spirit as it is from the Government of his Majesty the Emperor. The Imperial Government is conscious that its interests in this question are identical with those of a certain number of other States. It is to be hoped that the existing tension will cease, and will be settled in a satisfactory manner, thanks to the participation of all the interested parties. We are fully disposed to assist therein."

(Extract from the Speech of the German Emperor upon the opening of the Reichstag on November 28, 1905, *i.e.* after France had agreed to a Conference) :—

"The difficulties which have arisen between us and France on the Morocco question have had no other origin

than an inclination to settle without our co-operation affairs in which the German Empire had also interests to maintain. To my satisfaction an understanding has been arranged on the Moroccan question by diplomatic means and with consideration for the interests and honour of both parties regarding the convocation and the programme of a fresh Morocco Conference."

The distinguished French publicist, M. de Pressensé, strongly pro-British in his sympathies, and for many years the Foreign Editor of *Le Temps*—when *Le Temps* enjoyed a very different reputation from what it does at present—has summarised in a few scathing sentences the Delcassé policy towards Germany :—

"We know by what a series of faults an excellent situation was compromised. M. Delcassé, inebriated by the *entente* with England, of which he had been but an eleventh-hour artisan, hypnotised by the favour of the Tsar, thought the hour had struck for heroic enterprises. He dreamed, if he did not conscientiously project, a sort of *revanche* by the humiliation of Germany."

Prior to last November (1911)—*i.e.* prior to the publication of the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904, and the secret Franco-Spanish Convention—those who took the view that despite her legitimate grievance arising from the obvious attempt at ostracisation pursued by M. Delcassé, Germany's action in 1905 was needlessly emphatic, could have made out a reasoned argument in support of their contention. But with the disclosure of all this secret diplomacy, now public property, but as yet insufficiently appreciated, Germany's action at the time is seen to have been cumulatively justified.

What an opportunity lay before Sir Edward Grey after Algeciras to repair the errors of the past, and to satisfy Germany, that, while remaining faithful to the spirit of our happy settlement of differences with France, we had no desire to persist in a policy of antagonism towards the German Government! How egregiously he has failed to take it; how, on the contrary, he has allowed the Morocco sore, for which the Algeciras Act provided the needed balm, to fester and putrify, the following chapters will, I think, give abundant proof to all who have preserved the

faculty of weighing evidence and of passing a reasoned judgment upon facts.[1]

A review of this period would, however, be incomplete without a brief reference to an incident which must have revealed only too clearly to German statesmen the peculiar interpretation, even then, placed in certain quarters upon the settlement of Anglo-French differences. Soon after his fall, M. Delcassé had allowed himself to be interviewed by a Paris newspaper,[2] in the course of which he delivered himself of the following opinions :—

"Of what importance would the young navy of Germany be in the event of war in which England, I tell you, would assuredly be with us against Germany? What would become of Germany's ports, or her trade, or her mercantile marine? They would be annihilated. That is what would be the significance of the visit, prepared and calculated, of the British squadron to Brest, while the return visit of the French squadron to Portsmouth will complete the demonstration. The *entente* between the two countries, and the coalition of their navies, constitutes such a formidable machine of naval war that neither Germany, nor any other Power, would dare to face such an overwhelming force at sea."

But worse was to follow. In October, M. Stephane Lauzanne, the well-known publicist, came out in the columns of *Le Matin* with what purported to be an account of the final and fiercely controversial meeting of the French Cabinet, already referred to, in the course of which M. Delcassé had found himself in a minority of one, and had been forced to resign in consequence. The crux of the narrative was that M. Delcassé had informed his colleagues of England's willingness, if a rupture occurred between

[1] It is worth while just noting here that there are numerous indications about the middle and end of 1905, suggesting that Count Bülow and M. Rouvier were anxious, as *Le Temps* put it on July 4, that, "When the Moroccan question is settled, arrangements may be concluded on other points which will strengthen the friendly relations between France and Germany." It was about this time that compensation in the French Congo was first mooted—as the German Chancellor and M. Caillaux have both recently admitted—in the event of further development of French designs in Morocco. The subject does not appear to have been revived until early in 1909, when the long and obscure negotiations began under the Briand Ministry. I shall deal with these later on.

[2] *Le Gaulois*, July 12, 1905.

France and Germany, to mobilise her fleet, seize the Kiel Canal, and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. A curiously worded denial was issued in England. M. Delcassé declined to be drawn. M. Jaurès, whose honesty is unquestioned, declared that he had been told exactly the same by a member of the Cabinet soon after the meeting.

There was a great outcry in Germany, naturally. The "Faber" revelations of 1911 are the pendant of the obviously inspired Lauzanne disclosures of 1905. It needs a certain hardihood, in view of these occurrences, to describe Germany as the aggressor in the Morocco affair.

PART VII.

Prologue to Germany's Second Intervention

CHAPTER XVII.

HOW FRANCE (WITH BRITISH CONCURRENCE) TORE UP THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS, AND HOW SPAIN FOLLOWED SUIT

HAVING examined the events which led up to Germany's first intervention, we have now to examine the events which provoked Germany's second intervention.

Before doing so it is necessary to revert to the positive action of France and Spain and to the attitude of French and British diplomacy after the French and British Governments had affixed their signatures to an International Treaty, the Algeciras Act, which solemnly proclaimed the integrity and independence of Morocco and which provided, in effect, that all Treaties, Conventions and Arrangements precedently negotiated between the Powers and Morocco should be superseded by the Algeciras Act.[1]

The present chapter will therefore be devoted in part to a recapitulation, in part to an amplification, of the events briefly referred to in Chapter VIII.

With the close of the Algeciras Conference, two opposing currents became plainly visible in the French outlook upon Moroccan affairs and persisted with varying fortunes almost up to the middle of 1909, when one of the two became engulfed in the swollen dimensions of the other. We have seen[2] that the Parliamentary Committee reporting to the Chamber on the Algeciras Act had recognised that the Madrid Convention of 1880 had "made of Morocco an international question," that the Algeciras Act had confirmed this international character, had imposed the priority of its stipulations over antecedent arrangements between Morocco and various of the signatory Powers, and had, in effect, drawn up an international Charter for Morocco of which the essential bases were the independence and integrity of that State. *To that programme one school of thought in France was sincerely desirous of loyally adhering, and as I shall have occasion to point out further on, an enlightened view of British national interests would*

[1] Article 123 of the Act: *vide* Chapter VI.
[2] Footnote, Chapter VII.

have directed the considerable influence wielded by the British Government in the whole affair, in support of that school.[1] Its adherents were not confined to one Party. They naturally included the Socialists, and their eloquent leader M. Jean Jaurès; but they also included the general opponents (of varying political views) both in Parliament and in the editorial offices, of the Delcassé tradition of ostracising and offending Germany. And in the Chamber they possessed, with the help of the Socialists, a large majority. Indeed, men of weight and substance even in the Colonial Party itself were to be found on that side, although very much in the minority. What may, for lack of a better description, be termed the moderate *Imperial* view in this regard as distinct from the political or the purely Socialist view, was tersely expressed by M. Augustin Bernard at the North African Congress held at Paris as recently as October, 1908:—

"We desire"—said M. Bernard—"a Morocco free and independent as the Emperor William remarked at Tangier; we are more interested than any one that it should be so. We are concerned that no Power should establish itself in Morocco.[2] But it does not follow that we wish to establish ourselves in Morocco. There is for France a paramount interest that no one should infringe the independence of Morocco, but we are entitled to exercise in that country, Algeria's neighbour, a preponderating influence."

On the other hand, the necessity of coming to some understanding with Germany if a free hand was to be secured in Morocco was also recognised even in the Councils of the Colonial Party (though here again it was rather a case of *vox clamantis in deserto*). Nevertheless it is notable that at this same Congress no less an authority than M. René Millet declared that—

"If we wish Germany to leave us in peace in Morocco, we must offer her satisfaction elsewhere."

The opposing school consisted of the great bulk of the Colonial Party, dealing specially with Morocco under the name of the *Comité du Maroc*, composed of, or in touch

[1] *Vide* Chapter XIX.

[2] The secret Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904, whereby Lord Lansdowne had secured that Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco should not come into French hands, was, of course, still unpublished.

with, genuinely convinced upholders of a *Tunisification* of Morocco, financiers who were engaged in the process of strangling Morocco, and the value of whose securities stood to rise with a French occupation, concession hunters, land grabbers and speculators, and their journalistic partners; the "forwards" of the Algerian political and military staffs, and the anti-Germans. This school was "out for" absorption and conquest at the earliest possible moment, for elbowing to one side German "pretensions" and the Act of Algeciras together. It was destined to carry the day.

It should be pointed out once more that the French Parliamentary and general Public (apart from a few politicians and journalists in the swim, so to speak) were totally ignorant of the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration and of the secret Franco-Spanish Convention. They had not the remotest idea that the Morocco dangled before their eyes was not the Morocco of the maps but a Morocco in which Spain had been placed by Britain's insistence and assistance in prospective possession of the Mediterranean and North Atlantic littorals, "a Morocco decapitated and mutilated," as M. Dubois bitterly exclaimed in the Chamber on December 18 last; "a Morocco bereft of all its Mediterranean ports, but with a magnificent view of . . . the Sahara," as his opposition colleague, M. Delahaye, lamented on the same occasion. Had these secret arrangements been known it is safe to say that the opponents of the policy of conquest and violation of international treaty obligations would have been so immensely strengthened that the world would have been spared the events of the past year, and their actual and future consequences. In order to appreciate how utterly British public opinion has been misled in the matter, not only as regards German policy and its motives, but as regards the real state of French opinion, it is necessary for Englishmen to understand that the policy of aggression pursued in Morocco after Algeciras through the weakness and vacillation of successive French Governments exercising their precarious tenure beneath the pressure of the *Comité du Maroc* on the one hand, and the unsanctioned activities of the military, inspired from Algiers, on the other, was not as Englishmen have been persistently taught to believe) a national policy; but, on the contrary, was a policy pursued against the repeatedly declared wishes of the French people expressed through their Parliamentary representatives. *It is surely one of the most astounding features in*

this astounding story of two great peoples involved by their respective diplomats in an international quarrel which brought them to the verge of war in ignorance of the true inwardness of the quarrel, that from the close of 1906 down to the very eve of the Fez expedition the French Chamber passed resolution after resolution by large majorities expressive of its determination to observe the Algeciras Act and disclaiming intervention in the internal affairs of Morocco.[1] And yet, swiftly and surely, step by step, France was all the time being imperceptibly dragged into the adventure which was to bring her into collision once more with Germany. Now, clever as were the wire-pullers behind the scenes they could not have succeeded if the French people had known what lay beneath it all—viz. the arrangement to *divide* Morocco with Spain when the Sultan's authority no longer prevailed (which authority the *militaires* and the *coloniaux* were putting forth all their energies to destroy). The conditions would then have been clearly realised, and French public opinion, which did not desire further trouble with Germany, would have immediately perceived that what its colonials and jingoes were preparing was another edition of the incidents of 1905. Morocco, at least the non-Spanish part of it, would have ultimately passed under French sway, but later, and the event would have been *preceded* by a friendly understanding with Germany.

No case quite analogous to this one is, I think, anywhere recorded. There could be no more poignant illustration of the utter helplessness of modern democracies in the face of secret-treaty-making diplomats—the paid servants, forsooth, of the State whose citizens are as clay in the hands of the potter!

It is difficult fittingly to comment on the lavishly distributed and perfervid declarations of the French Government during this period, such as M. Pichon's (the new Foreign Minister) statement to an assembly of Parisian journalists on October 28, 1906, in the *Journal* on December 4, and to the *Neues Weiner Tagblatt* on

[1] *Inter alia.* [I may have missed some]. December 6, 1906; November 12, 1907; January 24 and 28, 1908; June 19, 1908; December 23, 1908; January 10, 1909; November 23, 1909; March 24, 1911. The Chambers said, "No," preserve the rights of France, but uphold Algeciras; the wire-pullers said to the Government, "If you don't move we'll throw you out." The politicians in power preferred to remain in possession of it!

December 25 of the same year, etc. Or take, as a sample of more official language, his despatch to the French *chargé d'affaires* at Madrid on March 30, 1907, after the Udja affair—the first open violation of Morocco territory :—

"Our action on Udja is *not a step towards Fez.* We are resolved to maintain our intervention within the limit which we fixed at the outset."

And so after Casablanca, and so before and after Fez. It is all very nauseous, and if one had any illusions left after plunging through these labyrinthine intrigues, it would be very disillusioning.

Suffice it to say that while in Paris they were *jurant leurs grande Dieux* ("swearing their great gods") that nothing was more remote from their minds than an invasion of Morocco, Morocco itself was all the while being steadily absorbed, a mouthful here, a mouthful there, preparatory to the final meal.

Two little incidents marking this period of boa-constrictor assimilation, trivial in their way, perhaps, are nevertheless of interest as throwing light upon two aspects of the Morocco problem. The first shows what the Moors might have accomplished if Europe had shown a modicum of honesty in dealing with them, if Europe had helped them to clear out the devil on their hearths instead of introducing seven other devils worse than the first. The small town of Arzila, twenty-five miles from Tangier, had been captured by brigands. The affair was enormously magnified as indicating the powerlessness of the unhappy Moorish Government; as a matter of fact, the "brigands" numbered . . . twenty-five! The disloyal Moorish Governor of the district—Raisuli—had recaptured the place and used the additional prestige conferred upon him thereby to defy the Sultan more or less openly. He was said to have a numerous following, and his conduct provided another theme for numerous homilies on the anarchy of Morocco. The chauvinists eagerly seized upon the opportunity, right deftly were the strings pulled, and a small landing party from a French cruiser at Tangier, having had a few stones flung at them by Moorish wastrels about the same time, the French and Spanish Government made solemn preparations for the despatch of a strong naval force "capable of dealing with any emergency," and, if necessary, of "landing detachments." After portentous discussion, a Franco-Spanish note was drawn up and despatched to the

Powers.[1] A little more and the Sultan's authority in the Tangier district would have been replaced by that of his kind Latin friends. Inspired, so it was announced at the time, by the wicked Teuton, the Sultan perceived the danger and despatched an army of 2000 men to Tangier. Arzila was reoccupied, Raisuli's forces which were going to annihilate the Sultan's troops melted away without firing a shot, Raisuli himself was publicly dismissed and promptly made himself scarce. The Sultan was just too quick for the "liberating" Armada, which was about to set out from Cadiz and Toulon! The second incident illustrates the esteem which Germany had acquired in the eyes of the Moors by the stand her legitimate interests had caused her to make for their independence. The Moorish Governor, Ulai Hafid of Marakesh, publicly thanked the German residents for attending the celebrations connected with the Bariam festival, saying :—

"The presence of your countrymen at to-day's celebrations is a double pleasure to me, inasmuch as it is a proof of the friendship existing between your Emperor and my illustrious master and brother, the Sultan, and also because just now conditions, particularly in the south of the Empire where I am Khalif, are wilfully represented as affording no security of the person, while complaints are made concerning events which are partly pure inventions and partly artificially produced."

It seems useless to recount in detail the peripatetics of the Morocco question throughout the four years, 1907-1910 —of which, indeed, something has been told in Chapter VIII., especially on the financial side. It suffices to say that, with resources mortgaged to international finance (let the reader bear in mind that the *whole* of the customs were mortgaged to guarantee the interest to European bondholders on the two loans—to the extent of 60 per cent. on the 1904 loan, and 40 per cent. on the 1910 loan); rent by internal disturbances and civil war; its territory violated; its coffers empty; its subjects ground with taxation; compelled to perpetrate abuses in order to sustain itself and feed its troops; intrigued against by the French on every hand; harassed with incessant demands for apologies and reforms and compensations; its prestige irrevocably impaired; with French expeditionary columns foraging

[1] December 5, 1906

in every direction from their base in the Shawiya; the Moorish Government fell to pieces, while the country itself sunk into bloody chaos. And, concurrently, Franco-German rivalry in Morocco and in Europe became intensified. In Morocco the official representatives of Germany fought to preserve the international machinery set up by the Algeciras Act, while German firms sought to push their commerce and their enterprises. The official representatives of France, both civil and military, fought with equal energy, and in the case of the latter fought literally to break that international machinery and to promote French interests, political, commercial, and, above all, speculative, in a whole series of localities, by operations often of a most disgraceful character.[1] In Europe the French and German newspapers abused one another with copious invective, and the anti-German British newspapers joined in the fray—always, of course, on the side of the French.

To the clamour of the French fife and the German bassoon was now added, in the closing months of 1910, the rattle of the Spanish castanets. Spain had been getting increasingly uneasy at the prolongation of the French military occupation and at the ever-growing perimeter of the French military operations. Her politicians began to wonder whether the contemptuous disregard of the Algeciras Act by the French would not be followed by equally high-handed proceedings towards Spanish claims as defined in the secret Franco-Spanish Convention which, failing the application of the Algeciras Act, Spain was resolved to maintain. Questions and complaints multiplied themselves in the Cortes and Senate, and the newspapers harangued. To Spanish grumbling official France continued to oppose the entire "correctness" of its intentions as proclaimed in the resolutions of the Chamber and the pledges of its public men, which, to be sure, were numerous enough. In these assurances the Spaniards appeared to find but cold comfort in view of what had actually taken place on the spot. So they sent large reinforcements to their existing garrisons in the Riff, and began the occupation of the outlying districts of the zone which, under the Convention, fell to Spain. The tone of the French Press thereupon became openly threatening.

[1] The "Udja" scandals have been filling the French Press for months and the *Times* Tangier correspondent has courageously exposed others.

And now the curtain goes up upon the final scene which is to witness the triumph of the *Comité du Maroc*. In April, 1911, Fez is reported blocked by insurgents and the Europeans in danger; General Moinier sets out for its relief at the head of 30,000 men, and the French Government, continuing its everlasting assurances of respect for the integrity and independence of Morocco, announces that General Moinier will withdraw to the coast after succouring the menaced Europeans. Sir Edward Grey declares in the House of Commons that the march on Fez has his approval. The German Government at once issues through the *North German Gazette* the warning which, as we now know and as will be subsequently explained,[1] it then addressed to France. If the French Government, declares in effect the official organ of the German Government, considers its subjects to be in danger, Germany, while not in receipt of similar information so far as German subjects are concerned, sees no cause to oppose that view, but, taking note of the French Government's public pledges not to occupy the capital, expresses the hope that it will succeed in carrying out its programme. Were the French Government to fail to fulfil its pledges the Act of Algeciras would finally have ceased to exist, and full freedom of independent action would be automatically restored to the signatory Powers. So Britain approves, Germany warns, and the storm approaches.

Spain, however, is not content with a warning. She takes immediate action, pouring more troops into the Riff; and, prosecuting further her intention not to be jockeyed out of any of her rights under the secret Convention, sends a strong force to occupy *manu militari* Larash and El-Kasr in the North Atlantic section of the zone. Thus, Spain's answer to the occupation of Fez.

Furious clamour arises in Paris.[2] The *Comité du Maroc* moves heaven and earth to prevent the Government from giving the order for the evacuation of Fez, and the chauvinist organs use language of unveiled menace to Spain. May closes with General Moinier still at Fez, and the sentiments precedently prevailing both in Germany and in Spain as to the validity of the urgency pleaded by France

[1] Chapter XX.

[2] Very different, as we shall see presently, to the calm which generally prevailed, when the *Panther* anchored off Agadir. *We* clamoured then!

for her march upon the capital, are strengthened by the inconvenient revelations which begin to appear, even in the French Press, as to the non-existence at any time of any panic among the Europeans in the capital and, *per contra*, the existence therein of plentiful supplies.

One of the best informed and the most distinguished of French publicists, M. Francis de Pressensé, has with accuracy and scorn painted the true picture of the Fez comedy, and as it is a piece of excellent writing, I give it in lieu of any description of my own—

"Nevertheless matters were still not sufficiently to the liking of the *impressarii*. To justify the financial operation which was to crown the sordid tragic-comedy, something else was still needed. And at this point the *Comité du Maroc* and its organs surpassed themselves. They organised a campaign of systematic untruth. Masters of almost the entire press, they swamped the public with false news. Fez was represented as threatened by siege or sack. A whole European French colony was suddenly discovered there living in anguish. The ultimate fate of the women and children was described in the most moving terms. Even in the absence of independent information one could not fail to be struck by the singular contradictions of these alarmist despatches. Now, Fez was lost because the *Mehallah* commanded by a French instructor was away. Anon the return of the said *Mehallah* was calculated to lose Fez. One day, the alarmed public learned that the town had undergone a formidable assault. The next day the public was gravely told that the rebels had not yet assembled, but in a few days would surround Fez with a circle of iron and flame. The most lamentable details were given of the state of the expeditionary *Mehallah* which only possessed an insignificant quantity of cartridges and shells, but this did not prevent the subsequent announcement that, thanks to the heroism of its leader, it had achieved a great victory and scattered the enemy with a hailstorm of shot and shell. Finally it was affirmed that in case of siege the city was only provisioned for two or three weeks. Thus carefully cooked, public opinion soon took fire. What was the Government thinking of? At all cost the Europeans, the Sultan, Fez itself must be saved. . . . As ever, from the beginning of this enterprise, the Government knew nothing, willed nothing of itself. With

a salutary dread of complications it would have preferred not to move, perhaps, even, had it dared, to withdraw from the hornet's nest. But the greater fears it experienced from another quarter prevailed; those inculcated by the so-called patriotic shoutings, the concerted clamours of the orchestra of which the *Comité du Maroc* holds the *bâton,* and whose chief performers are to be found in *Le Temps* and *Le Matin.* The order to advance was given. . . . Already while the expedition was on its way, light began to pierce. Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared like the dew in the morning. Barely did a few ragged horsemen fire off a shot or two before turning round and riding away at a furious gallop. A too disingenuous, or too truthful, correspondent gave the show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely records, of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the phantom so dextrously conjured by the *Comité du Maroc* for the benefit of its aims disappear in a night. . . . Avowals and disclosures then began in right earnest. One of the correspondents who had contributed his share to the concert of lying news, wrote with an admirable *sang-froid* that, in truth, there had been some exaggeration, that, in point of fact, at no moment had the safety of Fez and its inhabitants been seriously menaced; that the idea of a regular siege and of a sudden capture had been alike chimerical and that, moreover, so far as the provisioning of the place was concerned, he could reassure the most timorous that there was sufficient corn in the city to feed the whole population, plus the expeditionary column, for more than a year! The farce was played. After Casablanca, Fez. France, without realising it, without wishing it, almost without knowing it, had taken a decisive step. An indefinite occupation of the capital was the natural prelude to a Protectorate. For the clever men who had invented and executed the scenario there only now remained the task of reaping the fruit of their efforts. The era of concessions, profits, dividends was about to open. Premature joyfulness! It was the era of difficulties which was at hand."

Such was the operation with which the British Foreign Office hastened diplomatically to identify itself. Not only so—but to take upon itself, and to impose upon an ill-

informed British public, the defence of all the international consequences following from that operation, and, under cover of vague talk about "British interests" (where none were involved), to compromise British interests to the extent of risking a European conflagration.

The close of June saw the French Government still protesting its "correctness"; General Moinier still in occupation of Fez; the entire country between the coast and the capital overrun by French troops; with Spain strengthening her position at Larash, El-Kasr, and in the Gharb generally, fighting in the Riff and descending upon Ifni; Morocco in the death-throes—and the *Panther en route* for Agadir.

PART VIII.

Germany's Second Intervention (1911) and the ensuing Anglo-German Crisis

CHAPTER XVIII.

WAS GERMANY JUSTIFIED IN SENDING THE "PANTHER" TO AGADIR?

As in 1905, so in 1911, events had compelled the German Government to assume a decided position in the Morocco affair. And as the German Emperor's visit to Tangier in 1905 had been described as "dramatic" and "tempestuous," so the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir has been denounced as diplomacy of an "aggressive" and "brutal" kind. It was certainly less subtle than the diplomacy which Germany had to contend against. This diplomacy had started by ignoring altogether Germany's right to be consulted in the future of Morocco, secretly partitioning that State between France and Spain, while loudly professing the intention of maintaining its independence. That was period number one. Then, in the teeth of the Algeciras Act, by which, thanks to Germany's intervention, the integrity of Morocco had been guaranteed, this same diplomacy, while professing to respect that integrity, had intrigued, manœuvred, and acted until, little by little, Germany was confronted with an accomplished fact—to wit, the substitution of a French Protectorate over Morocco upon the ashes of the Algeciras Act. And throughout both periods it had manœuvred successfully to convince public opinion of its eminent straightforwardness. The contrast between the complacency with which the exploits of France and Spain had been accepted in the quarters that greeted the advent of the little German gunboat off Agadir[1] with horrified cries of outraged propriety, is certainly comic.

Germany's action in this regard has, however, been widely condemned even by those who have admitted the shabby treatment which Germany has received all through this miserable business. Let us look at the matter a little closer and put one or two pertinent questions.

Short of acquiescing in the, by then, undisguised destruction of the Act of Algeciras, and thus throwing up her whole case, what could Germany have done? She

[1] It has been repeatedly stated that the *Panther* "occupied" Agadir. There was, of course, never any occupation.

should have insisted, urge some critics, upon a return to the *status quo, i.e.,* the *status quo* established by the Act of Algeciras. But how? How was that possible with nearly 100,000 French and Spanish troops in Morocco, with a French army of occupation established in the capital, with the Sultan's authority gone never to return? Morocco as an independent political entity had, in point of fact, ceased to exist. That Germany would have been within her legal rights in demanding a return to the *status quo* is obvious. It was that self-evident fact which made her position impregnable internationally whatever she chose to do, and despite all the screaming on the other side. But at the stage matters had reached France could no more have evacuated Morocco without national humiliation than Germany could have accepted defeat and retired beaten from the diplomatic field without humiliation. That was the impasse to which the Colonial Party in France and the Forward School in Algeria, with the concurrence of the British Foreign Office, had brought matters.

If Germany had desired war she would either have demanded a return to the status quo *with its indispensable accompaniment, the withdrawal of the French and Spanish military forces from the soil of Morocco, whose integrity, formally proclaimed by the Public Law of Europe, their presence upon it violated. Or she would have sent not a two-penny-half-penny gunboat to Agadir: but half a dozen men-o'-war, landed troops and done at Agadir and in the Sus what France had done at Casablanca and in the Shawiya, what Spain had done at Larash and in the Gharb—and with justification at least equal to theirs. For did the Algeciras Act authorise France and Spain any more than it authorised Germany to occupy Moroccan territory?* Will it be seriously contended that because of an affray between European workmen and the Moorish populace at Casablanca, France was morally or legally entitled to bombard that town and spread her soldiers over the Shawiya district[1]; or that Spain was morally or legally entitled to make a descent upon Larash and El-Kasr, without, so far as the Moors were concerned, the very ghost of a pretext?

[1] In that case—seeing that the Act of Algeciras had proclaimed the integrity of Morocco—England would have been equally justified in occupying, shall we say Mequinez, because Mr. Madden was murdered at Mazagan (January 10, 1908).

Had Germany wanted war her course was clearly indicated, and it has been one of the most shameful features of the persistent misleading of the British public in favour of a diplomacy immoral from its inception, that Germany, the provoked party, has been represented both in the crisis of 1905 and in the crisis of 1911—crises entirely brought about by that diplomacy—as working for war.

I submit that, intrinsically, Germany must be held to have been entitled to raise the question of the legality of the new situation created by France, in such manner as would compel a final settlement of the problem. To assert, as Sir Edward Grey and the newspapers who support his policy have asserted, that the new situation was created by Germany in despatching the *Panther* to Agadir, is to fly in the face of the most patent and irrefutable facts. It is easy to make such an assertion before an ill-informed Parliament and to a worse-informed public. But it is impossible for anyone to prove it in argument. Whether the German Government could have selected any other form of effective protest against the attempt to elbow Germany out of her lawful position, appears doubtful. At any rate, no alternative between the acceptance of defeat and a summons which must have resulted in war has been suggested by Germany's critics.

But, if, intrinsically, and taking her stand upon the Public Law of Europe, Germany was justified in calling a halt to the actual process of a Franco-Spanish partition and occupation of Morocco, she had also the justification in a series of negotiations carried on with France subsequent not only to the Algeciras Act, but to that Franco-German Declaration of February, 1909, the text of which is given in Chapter VI., and which described both Powers as equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the Act. As will have been observed from the terms of that Declaration, the German Government, far from pursuing a policy of bitter ill-will towards France in Morocco (which has been laid to her charge by persons in this country who, if the truth were known, are much less concerned with that idea than they are by the fear of seeing France and Germany draw closer to one another) had taken an important step towards dissipating the Moroccan shadow which clouded Franco-German relations. It is, perhaps, worthy of note also that

already in January of the same year, when Mulai-Hafid, the Sultan of Morocco, applied to Germany for the loan of military instructors, Germany informed France of the request and declined to grant it. It may, then, be recalled that, while extracting from the French Government a renewed declaration of firm attachment to the independence and integrity of Morocco, the German Government by this Declaration had confirmed in more precise terms than those used in the Exchange of Notes of July, 1905, its recognition of special French interests in Morocco; had proclaimed that Germany's interests in Morocco were purely economic, and had paved the way to co-operation in economic questions. Both Governments had interpreted the reference to economic co-operation as applying not only to Morocco but to other parts of Africa where their mutual interests touched, and the Agreement was soon followed by the initiation of comprehensive negotiations covering a wide field of business enterprise. These had relation, in Morocco, to the famous *Union des Mines,* an international Association constituted in 1907, whose founders and adherents comprised powerful French, German, British, Spanish, Italian, Austrian, Belgian, and Portuguese manufacturers, bankers, and even political personages[1]; to the *Société Marocaine des Travaux publiques,* another international concern like the Morocco Tobacco Monopoly,[2] with French, German, British, and Spanish capital; finally to the participation of Franco-German capital in the construction of railways in various parts of Morocco.

Outside Morocco, in the French Congo and German Cameroons, the negotiations affected conflicting economic interests which had long given rise to friction, and in one case—the affair of Missum-Missum—to armed collision between a German military detachment and the Agent

[1] The French "group" included the Cie. des Forges de Chatillon-Commentry et Neuves Maisons, Schneider et Cie., Banque française pour le commerce et l'Industrie, Count Armande, etc; the German "group" included Krupps, the Metallurgische Gesellschaft of Frankfurt, the Nationalbank fur Deutschland of Berlin, etc.; the British "group" included A. E. Harris of Harris Dixon Ltd., London, Mr. Bonar Law, M.P., Mr. W. B. Harris, correspondent of the *Times* at Tangier, etc.; the Spanish "group" included the Marquis de Villamejor, and so on. *Vide L'Humanité,* of March, 1911, which published a list of them. *Vide* also *Manchester Guardian* of May 8, 1911.

[2] *Société international de regié co-interessee des tabacs du Maroc,* in which the Paris and Netherlands Bank, Mendelsohn and Co., Sir Ernest Cassel, and others, were interested.

of a French Concessionnaire Company. The genesis of these incidents lay on the one part in the rivalries of German merchants and French concessionnaire companies, on the other to ill-defined frontiers and absence of means of communication. To put an end to these irritating affairs by a combination of the clashing interests at stake and to elaborate a scheme for Franco-German railway construction, was the desire of the German Government, and, to all seeming, that of the French politicians with whom that Government successively negotiated. Discussion continued all through 1909, 1910, and down to June, 1911, with a uniform ill-success which appeared in German eyes, systematic, and which has since been publicly admitted in numerous quarters in France, to have been deplorable and well-calculated to annoy the German Government.[1]

It is no part of my task to disentangle the innumerable financial, personal and political intrigues with which these "conversations" were honeycombed on the French side, still less to apportion responsibility with the magnificent assurance displayed in certain editorial offices in London. Broadly speaking two tendencies were at work—pro-German and anti-German—in French official and political life, throughout this period, as they were in the period immediately following Agadir; and these tendencies were reflected in the actions of respective members of the Cabinets which succeeded one another with such bewildering rapidity last year.[2] Behind them, and mixed up with them, all kinds of strings were being pulled by individuals with axes of their own to grind.

Confining one's self merely to what is now established, there is no denying that the German Government was confronted with a state of affairs which, as it developed, became inextricably chaotic. Side by side with official

[1] *Vide* the Debates in the French Chamber (December, 1911) and Senate (February, 1912); the published summaries of the examinations of Ministers and others by the French Senatorial Committee (January, 1912); numerous articles in *Le Temps, La Liberté,* and, notably, the articles in *La Republique française* by the well-known Deputy, M. Jules Roche (January 9, 1912, *et sequitur*); the revelation attending the resignation of M. de Selves and the Caillaux Cabinet (January, 1912), etc., etc.

[2] The Briand Cabinet fell at the end of February, 1911. It was succeeded by the Monis Cabinet which fell at the end of June; to be in turn succeeded by the Caillaux Cabinet. (The Caillaux Cabinet resigned in January, 1912, to be succeeded by the Poincaré Cabinet.)

overtures, proposals were put forward now by one Minister, now by several Ministers, only to be subsequently explained away or withdrawn. There were official "conversations" and private "conversations": emissaries said to be authorised passed to and fro: inopportune disclosures in the Paris Press added to the confusion, which was made worse confounded by constant Cabinet changes. The negotiations made no progress. One combination after another fell through. The growing irritation in German official circles reached its climax with the collapse of the so-called *consortium,* an arrangement whereby the N'Goko Sangha Company (whose concession extended to the German border and in whose undelimited territory frequent disputes had occurred with German merchants) was to have become a Franco-German Chartered Company with police rights over an extensive area of the French Congo. An agreement had actually been signed in regard to this matter in December, 1910, between M. Pichon, Foreign Minister in the Briand Ministry, and the head of the German "group," subject to the approval of the Chamber. The Briand Ministry, having ascertained that the feeling of the Chamber was hostile for the reason explained in the footnote further on, dropped the matter and reopened it on a somewhat different basis with the German Embassy in Paris. A final agreement was signed on February 15, 1911, subject to the approval of the Chamber. But Parliamentary and public hostility to the *consortium* had steadily grown, and M. Briand's fall from power, attributed at the time to internal questions, was due to the certainty he had acquired that if he faced the Chamber with this *consortium,* his defeat, under circumstances prejudicial to his future political career, was inevitable. The Monis Ministry came in, and, a fortnight later, M. Messimy, Colonial Minister in that Ministry,[1] announced to the Chamber the Government's intention of abandoning the *consortium.* The rebuff to Germany was direct and all the more exasperating since the Monis Ministry was, at the very time it was inflicted, making no secret of its intention to send French troops to Fez.[2]

[1] Afterwards War Minister in the Caillaux Cabinet.

[2] The *consortium,* excellent in principle, was vitiated by the "indemnity" which the French side of the arrangement stipulated should be handed over to the N'Goko Sangha Company as a charge upon the budget of the French Congo, already in a parlous state. Many causes contributed to make of this payment a "job" of the worst

Before the Monis Ministry fell (end of June), General Moinier's army was in occupation of the capital of Morocco.

When it became quite clear that the French were at Fez to stay, the German Government made up its mind that the time had come to move, although desultory negotiations on several points (notably the French-Congo Cameroons railway scheme) were still going on. The fall of the Monis Cabinet at the end of June placed M. Caillaux in power with M. de Selves as Foreign Minister [June 28]. Three days later the German ambassador at Paris informed the new French Ministry that the *Panther* had been despatched to Agadir.

The German Government which, in the previous May —*i.e.* at the time of the expedition to Fez—had informed the French Government that it reserved henceforth complete liberty of action in connection with the Morocco question,[1] made known the step it had taken to the signatory Powers of the Act of Algeciras in the following despatch communicated to those Powers by Germany's accredited representatives :—

"Some German firms established in the south of Morocco, notably at Agadir and in the vicinity, have been alarmed by a certain ferment among the local tribes, due, it seems, to the recent occurrences in other parts of the country. These firms have applied to the Imperial Government for protection for their lives and property. At their request the Imperial Government have decided to send a warship to the port of Agadir to lend help and

description, and both it and its principal advocate, M. Tardieu, Foreign Editor of *Le Temps,* an extremely able, but most dangerous factor in French political life, were furiously assailed by Felicien Challaye, Pierre Mille, Peaix-Seailles, and other high-minded and honourable Frenchmen connected with the French League for the Defence of the Congo natives. as much in the interests of the natives as of public morality. Their opposition led to a Parliamentary investigation which concluded in rejecting the whole transaction. See in this connection more particularly the French Parliamentary Paper No. 376 of 1911; numerous articles in the *Courrier europeén, Journal de Genève, Dépêche de Toulouse,* etc., and my own letter to the *Daily News* on October 3, 1911, based upon Felicien Challaye's "*Politique internationale et journalisme d'affaires*" (Paris, Felix Alcan), particularly interesting to English readers, as it reveals the very suggestive and highly unpleasant fact of the existence of relations between M. Tardieu and the British Foreign Office.

[1] *Vide* Chapter XX.

assistance in case of need to their subjects and *protégés* as well as to the considerable German interests in the territory in question. As soon as the state of affairs in Morocco has resumed its former quiet aspect the ship charged with this protective mission shall leave the port of Agadir.

"Please convey this information verbally to the Government to which you are accredited, if possible, on Saturday at noon, leaving the text as an *aide-mémoire*.

"KIDERLEN."

That the German Government would have strengthened its position in the eyes of the world by laying less stress upon the alarm of German firms and by stating the further reasons dictating its resolve, is certain. *When one reviews carefully the whole position, however, one is led to the conclusion that such a procedure would have been unwise unless the German Government desired a rupture, probably resulting in war, which it is quite obvious the German Government did not. And for this reason, however diplomatically worded, a statement of the German case at that juncture, and in an official communication to foreign Powers, would have conveyed a censure upon French action, and, consequently, upon British approval of French action,*[1] *which would have immediately resulted in a very strained situation.* Such a course would, moreover, have rendered virtually impossible the prosecution or rather the continuation of direct negotiations with France which it was the aim of German policy to promote. At first sight, too, one might be disposed to blame the German Government for not having incorporated in its communication a more explicit disavowal of any intention to occupy Agadir. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the German Government had, in its Agreement with France in February, 1909, categorically proclaimed its interests in Morocco to be purely economic, which was not, indeed, the enunciation of a new attitude *but the confirmation of the attitude to which it had consistently adhered.* Nevertheless one cannot help feeling that the German Government would have been well advised to have disclaimed once more, at that moment, and, categorically, all political and territorial designs. No doubt it did so to the various Governments

[1] Sir Edward Grey had, in the House of Commons, publicly approved of the French march to Fez.

concerned, as we shall see later. But not to the world, officially at least—which gave a handle to its enemies.

The opening portion of the German Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag on November 9 may, perhaps, be usefully reproduced here :—

"The Algeciras Act was intended to maintain the independence of Morocco with a view to the economic development of the country for the benefit of the trade of all the Powers parties to it. It was soon evident that one of the essential conditions was lacking, namely, a Sultan who was actual ruler of the country, and was in a position to carry out the reforms contemplated. Even Sultan Mulai-Hafid could not do so in spite of his personal qualities. He became more and more dependent upon foreign influence, and came into constantly increasing conflict with the tribes of his own country in consequence. This led to ever-growing influence on the part of France, for, of the four Powers which since the seventies possessed treaty rights to maintain military missions at the Sultan's Court, only the French Mission had succeeded in establishing its position. In the same way France had for long supplied Morocco with money. The position of the Sultan, surrounded by hostile tribes and shut up in Fez, became eventually so precarious that France informed the Powers that grave apprehensions must be felt for the lives and property of her officers at the Sultan's Court, and of the European colony.

"France accordingly declared that she proposed to send troops to Fez, and to conduct the Europeans back to the coast. We had received no such threatening reports from Fez, and therefore declared that our colony did not require foreign assistance. Since, however, we could naturally assume no responsibility for the lives of the French citizens who were apparently threatened, we raised no objection to the advance to Fez to bring back the threatened French citizens to the coast. We added the explicit reservation, however, which we also announced publicly, that we retained our liberty of action should the French expedition go beyond its alleged object, even should such action be merely the result of circumstances arising out of the expedition. This occurred, as was to be expected. France exerted practically unlimited sway over the relieved Sultan in virtue of her influence, which had gradually become absolute. The independence of the Sultan assumed by the

Algeciras Act thus ceased to exist. It has, indeed, been urged that the Sultan himself summoned the French to his assistance, but a ruler who summons foreign troops to his assistance, and who relies solely upon the support of foreign bayonets, is no longer the independent ruler on whose existence the Algeciras Act was based. We let this be known, and suggested to France an understanding, leaving, of course, the initiative to her. We indicated the general outlines only of our programme to the effect that we should be ready to take into account the altered position of France resulting from the changed conditions, but that in return we must demand more precise guarantees for the equality assured to us in the domain of commerce and industry, especially in regard to public works, besides compensations for the rights assumed by France without previous understanding with us and going beyond the letter and spirit of the Algeciras Act. At first we received no positive proposals from Paris, whilst the French military power continued to spread in Morocco, and the fiction began gradually to become established, not only in France, but also with the other Powers, that France was acting in pursuance of a European mandate. When, therefore, German interests appeared to be threatened in consequence of the events in Morocco, we sent a warship to Agadir. The despatch of this ship was primarily intended for the protection of the lives and property of our subjects. It represented at the same time a clear intimation of our right and our intention to defend our subjects in Morocco just as independently as France protected hers, so long as she came to no understanding with us. This object of the despatch of our warship and its limitation to this object were announced, immediately before the arrival of the ship, to the Powers through our Ambassadors and Ministers accredited to them. It is, accordingly, an untrue assertion if the despatch of a ship to Agadir was represented in the press—in the foreign press—as a provocation and a threat. We provoke and threaten no one; but we protect our rights and we shall not allow ourselves to be deterred or hindered by any one.

"The discussion with France then began."

We have now to examine the respective manner in which the French and British Governments greeted the German official despatch.

CHAPTER XIX.

HOW THE DESPATCH OF THE "PANTHER" TO AGADIR WAS GREETED IN PARIS AND LONDON RESPECTIVELY

If one desired to select from an abundance of accessible material an ideally symptomatic introduction to the amazing narrative of the policy pursued by the British diplomatic machine towards Germany in the month of July, 1911, one's choice would fall upon the incident which, by natural sequence and by no artificial device, takes its appointed place at the stage we have now reached in recounting the exploits of "Morocco in Diplomacy." I allude to the profound divergence between the reception of the German notification by the French and British Governments respectively.

M. de Selves, Foreign Minister of the Power directly concerned and supposedly threatened, by Germany's "brutal" act, went off to Holland with President Fallières, and did not return to Paris until July 7.[1]

Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary of a Power indirectly concerned, apprised, as was M. de Selves on July 1, sent for the German ambassador on July 3, summoned a Cabinet meeting, held it, sent for the German ambassador on July 4, told him that "a new situation had been created," and that the British Government "could not recognise any new arrangement that might be come to without" it. On July 6 Mr. Asquith[2] stated in the House that he wished it "clearly to be understood that his Majesty's Government consider that a new situation has arisen in Morocco, in which it is possible that future developments may affect British interests more directly than has been the case." After expressing confidence that "diplomatic discussion" would find a solution, the Prime Minister went on to say that "in the part we shall take in it we shall have due regard to the protection of those interests and to the fulfilment of our treaty obligations to France, which are well known to the House."

[1] The despatch of the *Panther* was announced to the various Governments on July 1. Its arrival at Agadir was reported on July 3.

[2] Replying to Mr. Balfour.

Thus from the very outset the attitude of the Foreign Office may fairly be described as (1) an unreserved declaration in favour of the French case by accentuating the creation of a "new situation" through Germany's action, whereas the French occupation of Fez, precedently endorsed and applauded by Sir Edward Grey[1] (plus the long-drawn-out and abortive negotiations described in the last chapter) as the factor in bringing about the "new situation" was ignored. (2) An intimation that the British Government would insist upon taking part in the ensuing negotiations—an intimation which was *mort-né*,[2] because in point of fact, as explained in the last chapter, negotiations had been going on for a considerable time, and the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir had resulted at once from the impossible position in which the German Government found itself of bringing them to a head, and from the march on Fez while they were actually in progress and within a year of France's categorical pledge of firm attachment to the independence and integrity of Morocco.

In short, at the very outset, the British Foreign Office went out of its way to make this Franco-German dispute its own, adopted a distinctly though not then pronounced anti-German tone, tinged with suspicion, and was, at least, the reverse of dispassionate. There was no suggestion of a wish to keep the scales balancing even for a time, while the French Foreign Minister was paying his official visit to the Dutch Court; but, on the contrary, the indication of a somewhat precipitate desire to weigh them down in a certain direction.

To inquire whether this was wise would be superfluous. It was merely illustrative and symptomatic of British foreign policy on the Morocco question since the Conference at Algeciras. Let us digress for a moment and glance backwards, though at the risk of repetition. Three things must be obvious, I venture to think, to those who have followed the narrative thus far. First, that official France was determined—quite rightly, from the point of

[1] On November 27, 1911, Sir Edward Grey was asked if he would give the House the information upon the strength of which he had approved the Fez expedition. He declined to do so.

[2] The British Government never participated in the ensuing negotiations, but the French Government kept the Foreign Office fully informed throughout, as stated by Sir Edward Grey in the House later on, an admission damaging to British foreign policy, as will appear in due course.

view of those of her rulers who believed that her interests demanded it—to convert Morocco into a French Protectorate. Secondly, that France relied upon British support to achieve her ambition. Thirdly, that in French official circles opinion was divided as to the advisability of executing the design (*a*) by relying solely upon British support with Russia in the background, and thus again risking a rupture with Germany, (*b*) by securing German acquiescence for a consideration, as British, Spanish, and Italian acquiescence had been secured by the diplomatic arrangements concluded prior to the Conference of Algeciras.

Such being the case, a really far-sighted British policy, really pursuing its oft-advertised concern for good relations between France and Germany, and its frequent repudiation of the slightest wish to cause friction between its friends and their neighbours, but surely, a line of action clearly mapped out before it. Upon its support of the French aim, *unaccomplishable* without that support, it *could have put a price*. That price would have been an arrangement between France and Germany. That price would have been an insistence—justified to the hilt by Britain's signature at the foot of the Act of Algeciras—that the British Government could not, in honour, treat as non-existent Article 123 of that Act[1]; that the Act, assented to and signed by France, had materially modified precedent engagements and that British diplomatic support of French unavowed—indeed repeatedly disclaimed—but nevertheless, existing ambition, must be subject to a treatment of Germany commensurable with Germany's legal position, and with Germany's unquestionable rights. Such a policy was, I repeat, plainly designated from the point of view of British interests, British good faith, and that widest of all interests—solicitude for the peace of the world. Such a policy would also have been in the manifest interest of France herself. The men who bullied and harassed successive French Governments into comminatory measures in Morocco, who transformed "pacific penetration" into financial strangulation, violent reprisals, incessant intrigues and sometimes cruel outrages, were

[1] Postulating (*Vide* Chapters VI. and VIII.) that the stipulations of the Act should prevail over any provisions in antecedent arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco, conflicting with these stipulations.

the men who for the past twenty-five years had brought France to the verge of war with England on three occasions[1]; and who, between them, had cost the French tax-payer millions in armaments.

Whether such a policy ever entered Sir Edward Grey's mind I do not know. Suffice it to say that it was not followed: that the party in France, and a strong party it was, not confined to one section of public opinion, which favoured a complete break with the Delcassé tradition, received no support from the British diplomatic machine. The party of the strong hand, the party of violence, the party which wrecked the negotiations of 1909-1911, the party which drove the Algerian frontier far into the Sultan's dominions, hypocritically declaring its attachment to Moroccan integrity, while it filched town after town, district after district, and having by the proceedings of its agents produced a state of chaos and disruption from one end of the country to the other, marched to Fez over the scattered remnants of the Public Law of Europe, thereby rendering a collision with Germany unavoidable—*that party it was which, from first to last, received the support of the British diplomatic machine and the plaudits of its mouthpieces in the British Press.*[2]

Public opinion in France was not more excited than M. de Selves. On July 5, M. Poincaré—now Prime

[1] Siam, West Africa, and over the Nile Valley (Fashoda).

[2] One might add, the Party which has filled North Africa from Udja to Sfax, with the pestilence of administrative and financial scandals; which has determined the policy that has driven thousands of Algerian families to migrate to Syria, and which, if its activities be not curtailed, will bring about, before many years are over an uprising against French rule, extending from the North Atlantic to the borders of Tripoli; the party whose machinations led to the enforcement of the Leopoldian system in the French Congo, and strewed bloodshed and devastation in its tracks—a hideous story studiously suppressed from the British public, but upon which several well-known Frenchmen have shed a sombre light. For a summarised version of one of the blackest pages of African history, *vide Contemporary Review*, December, 1911.

I commend Felicien Challaye's article in *La Revue du Mois*, for January, 1912. Here is a striking extract, *and it is the bare, unvarnished, incontestable truth:* "Honesty would in Morocco and the Congo have been the best of policies. France committed lamentable errors when, for the satisfaction of private interests, she violated in Morocco the Act of Algeciras, and in the Congo the Act of Berlin. . . Under what influences have been committed these violations of the Act of Algeciras? Incontestably through the influence of private interests." The whole article is an admirable piece of cool, honest, and informed writing by an expert on Colonial questions.

Minister—delivered a speech before the Democratic Republican Alliance, collected and moderate in tone—

"It may be," he said, "that we are paying the penalty of indecision and, in some respects, of our past mistakes. Let us leave all this on one side. It is futile to recriminate. We must not look behind us, we must look ahead with firmness and tranquillity. Let our policy be frank, straightforward, and resolute. Let us found it firmly upon our treaties with other nations; let us, if necessary, lend ourselves to courteous negotiations, and we shall soon see the clouds disperse that have just rolled upon the horizon."

What of the French Press? A section of it certainly expressed itself strongly, in terms, however, rather of indignant surprise than denunciation.[1] Even if the comments of this section of the Press had been stronger than they were it would not have been surprising—*the French were the directly interested parties:* moreover, three or four of the numerous Parisian newspapers are always strongly anti-German, such as the *Echo de Paris* and the *Eclair.* But another section, the more important and better-informed section, took the "Crisis" in a very matter-of-fact way—notably *Le Temps,* which had been cognisant of and (for private reasons of its own) had endorsed, the attempt on the French side to bring the negotiations of 1909-1911 to a satisfactory termination. The speech of that very able deputy, M. Marcel Sembat, in the Chamber last December, reveals so accurately the general feeling which prevailed in France at the time that one is dispensed from further illustration. After declaring—what has since become well known, but was not so widely understood in December—that Germany's claims for compensation in the French Congo in exchange for her recognition of a French Protectorate over Morocco had arisen "in part from French suggestions,"[2] he went on to say—

[1] LET IT BE AGAIN REPEATED THAT THE FRANCO-SPANISH SECRET CONVENTION, AND THE SECRET ARTICLES OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION, WERE NOT PUBLICLY KNOWN, NOR WAS THE FULL STORY OF THE ABORTIVE 1909-1911 NEGOTIATIONS.

[2] *I.e.* the Franco-German combination in the French Congo and Cameroons, signed by the Briand Cabinet, and upset by the Monis Cabinet—*vide* preceding chapter. No doubt M. Sembat also referred to the negotiations of the then French Premier, M. Caillaux, with the German Government.

"One has to admit the despatch of the German boat to Agadir was regarded by a large part of the French Press, as expressing, not any hostile feeling or desire, but a wish to talk matters over. It was also described as the 'ringing of a bell.' . . . On the morrow of Agadir one had the impression (I had it not only in following the affair and the newspaper comments day by day, but also yesterday, when I reread those newspapers in the Library) that what was intended (*i.e.* by the despatch of the *Panther*) was to quiet down the French public, which was not a bad thing: and, moreover, to quiet it by saying: 'Don't you understand? This is all in order that the discussions on the *consortium* be renewed. Don't imagine anything else: don't get alarmed: that is simply a business matter.'"[1]

In other words, public opinion in France—the country directly affected by Germany's action—was by no means convulsed. Quite the contrary. A great many persons in political, journalistic, and financial circles, in the Parisian *Salons* (which make public opinion in France) were perfectly well aware that Germany, through a whole series of inter-related circumstances covering a protracted period, had a case, and a very strong case indeed. The repeated warnings conveyed to the French ambassador at Berlin by the German Government that if France stayed in Fez Germany would resume her complete freedom of action in Morocco,[2] Germany's unconcealed displeasure at the action of the Monis Ministry in rejecting the French-Congo Agreement signed by the Briand Ministry[3]—these things had been known and openly discussed in the *Salons* for some time. That Germany would take some sort of action was, it is now quite clear, fully anticipated in well-informed quarters in Paris. And when she did, Paris, that most sensitive of cities, did not go into hysterics.

[1] *Journal Officiel,* December 16, 1911.

[2] *Vide* the cross-examination of M. Cruppi (Foreign Minister in the Monis Cabinet) by the Senatorial Commission on December 26. I refer to this later.

[3] When the Monis Cabinet came in (March, 1911) the French Foreign Office staff handed M. Cruppi, then Foreign Minister, a detailed report on the subject, pointing out that the German legation in Paris had "manifested on several occasions the importance attached by the Imperial Government to the settlement of the negotiations," and warning the new occupant of the Department that a "regrettable demonstration" was to be feared if they broke down, etc. *Vide* M. Jules Roche (Deputy) in *La Republique française,* "Le Secret d'Agadir," January 12, 1912.

In England, the *Times* echoed from the first the note of hostility observable in the attitude of the Foreign Office. If I quote the *Times,* it is for three reasons, and for no other. First, because its admirable service of foreign telegrams makes of it, deservedly, the inspirer of a considerable section of British newspapers, consequently of a considerable section of the British public; while it exercises a quite special influence over one of the two great political parties in the State. Secondly, because it is widely believed to have close relations with the Foreign Office and the British diplomatic machine generally, especially noticeable during the past eight years, and in Continental eyes is almost universally held to be the exponent of the views of those who direct British foreign policy. Thirdly, because the *Times* has played, ever since 1905, a part in influencing British opinion over this Morocco affair which, whether it be regarded as sound and wise, or as unsound and mischievous, has been so conspicuous that to ignore that part would be impossible. The *rôle* of the *Times* must appear, indeed, to any student of the subject an integral factor in the diplomatic history of Morocco since 1905. It should also be stated that a careful study of the despatches of the *Times* correspondent at Tangier shows, on the whole, a remarkable desire to be impartial, and that the *Times* especially of late, has displayed its usual impartiality as a *news-recorder* by printing several despatches from its correspondent commenting severely upon French action in the matter of land-grabbing.

The hostile note was sounded very early in the day, and continued up to Mr. Asquith's speech in the House on July 27, when the editorial tone, at least, underwent considerable modification, maintained for a time, but, afterwards, again departed from. Thus on July 5 the Paris despatch of that date shows knowledge that the British Government had—

"explicitly intimated its desire to take part in the discussion of a matter which very directly concerns important British interests of various kinds. Certain French journals are therefore mistaken when they lay stress upon the probability of a *tête-à-tête* between France and Germany on the subject of the Agadir incident."

That, of course, was what the British Embassy in Paris was aiming for—that there should be no Franco-German *tête-à-tête*—which both the German and the

French Governments, on the contrary, desired; the German for the obvious reasons that it considered itself quite as much entitled to negotiate direct with France over a question in which "important *German* interests" were at stake, as the British Government had considered itself so entitled in 1904; that it had already negotiated a Treaty direct with France in 1909, and that it had been engaged for the past eighteen months in direct negotiations with France; the French Government because—to put the matter bluntly—many of its members were desirous of wiping the slate clean with Germany, and were doubtful whether they would succeed in doing so if the British Government stepped in.[1]

From Berlin the same day the identical string was pulled—

"One thing"—says the Berlin despatch—"however, is certain—that in any conversations that take place England will have to take part."

And this from the editorial of the 6th—the same issue, *i.e.* in which the above despatches appeared—

"It is not our habit to draw back from our pledged word, or to suffer other Powers to settle important interests of ours in 'conversations' held behind our backs. . . No 'claims' can be admitted and no 'compensations' allowed in an international matter which concerns us nearly and deeply, without our participation and assent."

Pretty good that—in view of the circumstance that the British diplomatic machine had settled the "Morocco question (as it thought) behind the back" of Germany by secret treaties concealed from the world, in 1904! And note the arrogance of the second quoted sentence. If Englishmen would put themselves in the shoes of Germans sometimes, I wonder how *they* would appreciate this sort of thing. As a revelation of the working of the diplomatic machine these three extracts are quite interesting.

M. de Selves returned to Paris on the 7th; saw M. Cambon, French ambassador at Berlin (then in Paris conferring with M. Caillaux, the Prime Minister), the same day. M. Cambon left Paris for Berlin that night.

[1] This explains in part the violent onslaught upon M. Caillaux in certain British newspapers. See concluding chapter.

CHAPTER XX.

FURTHER LIGHT UPON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL ATTITUDE FROM JULY 1 TO JULY 12.

THUS closed the first week of July. M. Cambon and the German Foreign Minister began their protracted bargaining bout on the 9th. On that interview and the succeeding ones the basis of negotiations which lasted some four months and went through many vicissitudes was determined by mutual consent.[1]

The basis was that Germany and France would negotiate direct without the intervention of third parties as they had done in February, 1909, and as France had negotiated in 1904 direct with Britain and then with Spain: that Germany would recognise an unqualified French Protectorate over Morocco subject to (*a*) binding guarantees as to the permanence of the open door for trade[2] coupled with securities for open tenders in the construction of public works,[3] (*b*) territorial compensation in the French Congo with reciprocal exchange of German West African territory.

By July 15, the general lines the discussion was taking became publicly known, and the information was, on the whole, calmly received in the Paris Press.

Let us pass at once to the further and disastrous development in the anti-German attitude of our Foreign Office. Sir Edward Grey's opportunities at this moment

[1] There are, indeed, very strong presumptions for assuming that the ground had been prepared before the official negotiations began, perhaps as far back as June, when it was known in French Government and diplomatic circles, that Germany contemplated action of some sort, and M. Cambon had been sent (on June 20) to Kissingen to see the German Foreign Minister: and during the three days' absence of M. de Selves in Holland, when the Premier, M. Caillaux, took the conduct of foreign affairs under his charge. See in this connection also M. de Selves' speech in the Chamber (*vide* Chapter XXII.). But the fact is not yet absolutely established from amid the clamours of personal affirmations and denials let loose by the investigations of the French Senatorial Committee. In any case it is a matter which chiefly concerns the French—not the national interests of Great Britain.

[2] Stipulated for thirty years only by the British Government in the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 (*vide* Chapter XXIV.).

[3] Not stipulated at all in the Anglo-French Declaration.

were immense. It depended upon him to make Great Britain's *rôle* in the matter an influence for harmony or discord. The *Journal des Débats* expressed the situation in a nutshell when it said[1]: "The turn which the conversations will take between Paris and Berlin must inevitably depend upon the attitude of England." Spanish opinion was similarly reflected in the *Imparcial,* and from Madrid the *Times* correspondent reported: "It is generally agreed that the main interest . . . centres in the attitude of England." What could a mind, free from prejudice, sweeping in broad survey over the position with its long chain of antecedent links, not have accomplished at this juncture?

But Sir Edward Grey had started badly, had already committed himself to a position he was unable from the first to sustain, that of insistence upon becoming an official party to the Franco-German discussions. He was full of suspicion, and, obviously, ill-informed.[2]

An examination of his speech in the House on November 27 shows how vain was the hope that he could shake himself free from the anti-German atmosphere in which the Foreign Office and the British embassy in Paris were saturated. The German ambassador had accompanied the formal notification[3] of the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir by a verbal explanation,[4] the substance of which was that a situation had gradually arisen "which rendered the provisions of the Algeciras Act illusory," that while the German Government" had in no event the intention of making any reproach to France on account of her action"—

"In view of the state of affairs it might appear questionable whether it would be possible for France to return to the *status quo ante, e.g.,* the *status quo* of 1906. We were, therefore, prepared, if it became necessary, to seek, in conjunction with France, some means, which would be compatible with the interests of the other signatory Powers, of arriving at a definite understanding on the Morocco question. Direct negotiations could hardly

[1] July 5.

[2] At no time, for example, did he give the slightest indication that he possessed any knowledge of the protracted 1909-1911 negotiations (*vide* Chapter XVIII.).

[3] *Vide* Chapter XVIII.

[4] British White Book Cd. 5992.

meet with insuperable difficulties in view of the good relations existing between us and France."

This explanation, Sir Edward Grey has told us, seemed to him "much more important than the actual communication of the sending of the ship"—

"The explanation given to us made it clear that the Moroccan question was being opened—the whole Moroccan question—by the sending of the ship to Agadir. They made it clear that the German Government regarded a return to the *status quo* in Morocco as doubtful, if not impossible, and that what they contemplated was a definite solution of the Moroccan question between *Germany, France, and Spain.* The whole question, or at least the kernel of the question, after that communication was received, was what was the definite solution of the Moroccan question. What was the nature of that? What was clearly the objective Germany contemplated? Was it to be the partition of Morocco, or what was it to be? That was what occupied our minds after receiving that communication."

With what the reader has gathered from the precedent analysis of the facts as given in this volume, the obvious comments upon that statement at once suggest themselves. What was there of surprise or menace in the German view that a return to the *status quo* of 1906 was doubtful if not impossible? Was it not a self-evident fact? How could Sir Edward Grey affect to consider a return to the *status quo* in Morocco—the *status quo* embodied in the Public Law of Europe framed at Algeciras—possible with the French in occupation of Fez, Rabat, Mequinez, Casablanca, Udja, and the whole of the Shawiya, with Spain in occupation of Larash and El-Kasr, with nigh upon 100,000 French and Spanish troops spread over Morocco? What authority had the Act of Algeciras given for this situation? Did any fraction of the *status quo* remain? And then, why did Sir Edward Grey jump to the conclusion that Germany contemplated a partition of Morocco with France *and Spain?* No allusion whatever to Spain had been made in the German ambassador's communication. What grounds had Sir Edward Grey for supposing that Germany aimed at a partition of Morocco at all? No action of Germany's from 1880 onwards had given rise to that supposition. The official repudiation of successive German Governments that

they entertained any such idea had been observed in the letter for a period of thirty years, and this in the face of incessant attacks from quarters in Germany desirous that she should effect a political footing in Morocco, which—in point of fact—she was just as much, or as little, entitled to do as either France, Spain, or Britain. In February, 1909, the German Government had corroborated all its previous declarations—declarations supported by acts—in that respect, by its Treaty with France. *France it was, and Spain, which with the concurrence of Sir Edward Grey's predecessor had, in secret "partitioned" Morocco seven years before, and were then actively engaged in carrying out that British-approved programme, despite the Algeciras Act, signed by Great Britain, proclaiming the independence and integrity of Morocco!*

Moreover, if Sir Edward Grey really believed that Germany harboured these designs, surely there was an obvious way of satisfying himself as to the foundation of his belief? The German ambassador had told him on the 4th that in his (the German ambassador's) view "the Imperial Government had absolutely no wish to exclude England from the new arrangement of things, or to prevent any possible safeguarding of British interests in Morocco."[1] If Sir Edward Grey judged the German notification and the German ambassador's assertion insufficient, why did he not request more definite explanations? He made no such request, either to the German ambassador or through the British ambassador at Berlin.

Why? Why did he hug these suspicions and make no attempt to clarify the situation? Between the 4th, when he had summoned the German ambassador and told him that the despatch of the *Panther* had created a new situation and that Great Britain must be a party to the negotiations which ensued, and the 12th, Sir Edward Grey took no steps whatsoever in this direction.

What happened on the 12th? Sir Edward Grey has told us. The British ambassador at Berlin "had occasion to see the German Foreign Secretary on some minor matters."[2] He "took the opportunity to say that there had been at one time some mention of a conversation *à trois* between Germany, France, and Spain, the inference

[1] British White Book Cd. 5994.
[2] Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons, November 27, 1911.

being that we were to be excluded from it."[1] What did the German Foreign Secretary reply? In Sir Edward Grey's words he "told our ambassador to inform us that *there never had been such an idea.*"[2] The German version is—

"Once only, on the 12th July, did the English ambassador here speak to the Secretary of State of the possibility of a negotiation *à trois* in regard to Morocco between Germany, France, and Spain, and added the remark that this would make an unfavourable impression in England. The ambassador *received a reply on the same day, as an official statement of the German Government* that such an intention had never existed."[3]

Thus, by July 12, Sir Edward Grey had received, in addition to the statement in the notification, the personal assurance of the German ambassador in London and the official assurance of the German Government that Germany did not contemplate, and never had contemplated, a negotiation for the partition of Morocco with France and Spain.

By that time, too, he had had similar assurances from France,[4] unless his statement to the House on November 27 that the French Government had consulted him "at every point where it seemed at all likely that British interests might be affected—most loyally at every point,"[5] was devoid of meaning. It is most important that that statement should be borne in mind, confirmed as it is by similar statements made later by the French Foreign Minister.[6] For the negotiations between M. Cambon and the German Foreign Secretary had already, as we have recorded, begun, and we shall see in a moment that the position taken by the German Government at the outset was such as described at the opening of this chapter.

It would seem necessary at this point to refer to a matter which is within the personal cognisance of a number of persons, the writer included. When Mr. Lloyd George's speech—to which I am coming in a moment—was delivered, it caused the utmost surprise (except in one quarter) not only in Germany, but in England: not only to the general

[1] Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons, November 27, 1911.
[2] *Ib.*
[3] British White Book Cd 5994.
[4] *Vide* Chapter XXII.
[5] Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons, November 27, 1911.
[6] *Vide* Chapter XXII.

public in England but among the supporters of the Government and even among the members of the Cabinet itself.[1] Many well-known members of Parliament, publicists, and others made inquiry as to what might lie behind so direct, and at the same time so unusual a method of communicating a warning—almost a menace—to a foreign Government. These inquirers were informed, I will not say by whom, but at any rate they were informed, and they were informed under conditions permitting them to pass on the information to others, that the speech was intended as a protest against the discourtesy of the German Government *in keeping a British despatch unreplied to for a fortnight.* And that story—that discreditable and utterly untrue story—was permitted to go the round of the clubs and editorial sanctums. When the diplomatic machine is seen to be capable of such performances, most men will agree that it is badly in need of repair.

It is also advisable before proceeding with the general narrative to draw attention to the misleading impression left upon the public mind by Sir Edward Grey's reference (in the speech defending his policy in the House on November 27) to the German view of the French occupation of Fez. He said—

"The German Chancellor and the German Foreign Secretary have already disposed of one misapprehension with regard to the Moroccan question. It was imagined in some quarters, I think I have seen it on the paper of this House in a question put, that Germany had protested against the French action in going to Fez at all, and that France had persisted in going there in the face of the German protest. The German Government have now explained what the German view was of what the French going to Fez really was, and I have no comment or criticism to make upon what they said."

This utterance, made at the opening of the "narrative" part of Sir Edward Grey's speech, has naturally strengthened the public view, for the most part ignorant of the data set forth in this book, at any rate in their cumulative significance, that the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir was remote from the Fez expedition, and was merely an afterthought with sinister intent. Now, what had the German Chancellor and Foreign Secretary admitted in the

[1] Only Sir Edward Grey and the Prime Minister were aware of what Mr. Lloyd George was going to say.

public statement to which Sir Edward Grey had alluded? They had admitted that Germany had not objected to France going to Fez *with the proclaimed French object of withdrawing to the coast the Europeans alleged to be in jeopardy.* But the German Chancellor had stated—

"We added the explicit reservation, however, which we also announced publicly, that we retained our liberty of action should the French expedition go beyond its alleged object, even should such action be merely the result of circumstances arising out of the expedition."[1]

How faithfully the German Government dealt with France on the point the French Senatorial Committee's investigations reveal.

"During to-day's (19th of December) cross examination of M. de Selves"—runs the authorised account of these proceedings[2]—"it was ascertained that in preliminary conversations between the German Foreign Secretary and the French ambassador in Berlin with regard to the French occupation, first of Rabat and then of Fez, Herr von Kiderlen Waechter made repeated and definite reservations as to the eventual attitude of Germany in case the occupation were prolonged. As regards the French march to Fez, Herr von Kiderlen Waechter had from the outset insisted that this step would become inevitable after the advance to Rabat. To this suggestion M. Cambon at first demurred, but in the face of subsequent events, he was compelled to admit its accuracy. Herr von Kiderlen Waechter then urged that if the French went to Fez they would remain there. M. Cambon again demurred, but Herr von Kiderlen Waechter replied that an evacuation in the circumstances would be unprecedented. M. Cambon ultimately admitted the possibility of the occupation of Fez, whereupon Herr von Kiderlen Waechter replied that in that case Germany would resume complete liberty of action as regards Morocco."

Therefore, if France had not gone to Fez "in the face of the German protest"—a "protest" under such circumstances involving an *ultimatum, i.e.* war—she had gone to Fez, *and stayed in Fez,* in the teeth of an explicit German warning that the German Government would regard her

[1] British White Book Cd. 5970.
[2] In all the Paris and many British newspapers of December 27.

action as the culminating episode in her destruction of the Public Law of Europe embodied in the Algeciras Act, and would, thenceforth, resume the entire liberty of action it possessed before Germany had co-operated with the other Powers in framing that Public Law. Presumably Sir Edward Grey had full cognisance of that German warning at the time—unless, indeed, those desirous of influencing him in an anti-German direction had concealed it from him, which is possible. In any case, Sir Edward Grey, as the head of the British diplomatic machine, must bear the responsibility for the policy which, taking no account of this warning, endorsed French action to the uttermost, with all the consequences which were bound to flow from it as touching the future of British relations with Germany. When the inevitable happened Sir Edward Grey professed to be greatly astonished, perturbed, and not a little indignant. The amazing thing is how British diplomacy could for a moment have imagined that it was not bound to happen.

MAP III.

Stanford's Geogl Estabt, London.

) of part of West-Central Africa showing the area affected by the Franco-German negotiations of June-November, 1911; and the neighbouring dependencies.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE STORY OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT, AN INTERVIEW, AND A SPEECH

FROM July 12 to July 19 the discussions in Berlin and Paris went on, in silence so far as the outward world was concerned, Sir Edward Grey, as he has himself told us, being kept informed throughout, presumably both by the French ambassador and by the British embassy in Paris. A sort of expectant calm reigned. It was destined to be rudely disturbed on the 20th.

On that day Morocco passed into the background for the time being, and the French Congo took its place—that portion of the French dependencies in tropical Africa where, by mutual consent and by protracted antecedent negotiations, Germany was to find compensation for the final forced abandonment of her stand on behalf of Moroccan integrity and for her acquiescence in the final consummation of the French designs; even as Britain had found compensation by the surrender of the French position in Egypt, Italy a free hand to make good her aims in Tripoli, Spain in Morocco itself.

On July 20 the *Times* published a despatch of over a column in length from Paris, entitled "German Policy and *British* Interests" (not French, be it noted!). The despatch opened with a quotation from Mr. Asquith's statement on July 6,[1] in which the latter had spoken of "British interests" being possibly affected, and went on to say that "developments affecting British interests are already in progress." Mr. Asquith had, of course, meant British interests in Morocco; but here, it seemed, was a question of British interests elsewhere also. The despatch continued that Germany was pressing proposals which, "as German statesmen must be well aware, could not for one moment be entertained by any conceivable French Government." Those proposals had nothing to do with Morocco, it appeared, but with French Congo where Germany was

[1] *Vide* Chapter XIX.

"demanding impossible 'compensations.'" The bargain was "so monstrously unfair" that its proposers could not "seriously have believed that it would be entertained in Paris." What Germany was really after, we were told, was the acquisition of the Agadir hinterland, which, "by directly compromising British interests," would put "a, perhaps, fatal strain upon the Anglo-French *entente*." The wiles of the German Government might be deadlier still, for had not the *Frankfurter Zeitung*[1] been making suggestions which—

"amount to nothing less than a general reconciliation of France and Germany on the basis of the unreserved opening of the French money market for the benefit of the German national credit and German industrial enterprises at home and abroad. . . . It has now been universally recognised that the political consequences of a settlement on this scale would be too far-reaching, and that, quite apart from the question of Anglo-French relations, it would mean the death-blow to the Russian Alliance."

"It would be regarded," concluded this part of the contribution, "as entirely in keeping with Mr. Asquith's statement on July 6, if Great Britain should decide to see for herself what the Germans are doing at Agadir." In other words, send a warship there, as the *Times* had recommended in a leading article on the 20th.[2] This message, in which the finger of the British diplomatic machine—abroad!—is as clearly indicated as the clock on the face of St. Stephen's (note in particular the insinuation that a "reconciliation" of Franco-German relations would be a catastrophe for Britain's relations with France), was introduced by an *Editorialette* headed "The Moroccan Crisis. German demands in West Africa. Strong feeling in France," which went one better than the Paris despatch

[1] One of the most independent papers in Germany, by the way, and often a ruthless critic both of the Emperor and of the Government.

[2] By a coincidence—shall we say?—that suggestion had already come before the British Cabinet and was rejected, the majority of the Cabinet doubtless being of the opinion that the British Empire was, after all, not imperilled by the presence on the God-forsaken coast of South Atlantic Morocco, at a spot five hundred miles distant from Gibraltar, of a German gunboat with an equipment of one hundred and twenty-five men. The French Cabinet was divided on the opportuneness of the step. Note that the *Daily Mail* had announced the probabilty of the despatch of a British and French cruiser on the 4th.

by holding that Germany had also demanded "the contingent reversion held by France over the Congo State." Where, one wonders, did the *Times* get *that* from? There is no hint of it in the Paris despatch.[1] These "compensations"—concluded the editorial introduction—"would obviously touch Britain's interests in Africa in several very important directions. . . ."

Denunciation was left to the editorial proper, which was of extreme violence. Headed "The German Demands," it opened thus—

"The German demands are at last known. They are understood to be surrender by France to Germany of the whole of French Congo from the sea to the River Sanga, and also the renunciation in Germany's favour of the contingent claims of France to the acquisition of the Congo State should circumstances at any time lead to the alienation of that vast and important territory by its present possessors. This is the "compensation" which Germany demands for the aid which France has given to the Sultan of Morocco at his express request for the maintenance of his sovereignty and the restoration of order and peace within a portion of his dominions."

To the above may be added the following—

"German statesmen, as our Paris Correspondent says, must know perfectly well that no French Government could for a moment entertain them. They must know equally well *that no British Government could consent to suffer so*

[1] The German Government issued a denial. No French Minister has asserted that Germany ever made such a demand. Sir Edward Grey said not a word about it in defending his attitude in the House on November 27. That the future of the Congo State (Belgian Congo) was repeatedly discussed, and that various *suggestions* were made *on both sides* we know. That the French Prime Minister himself made at one time a suggestion somewhat similar in character to the "demand" attributed to Germany I happen personally to be aware. The upshot of the discussion on this particular point may be seen in Article 16 of the Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911, which the effect is to substitute for a right of pre-emption of questionable legality, secretly obtained by France from King Leopold, in 1884, as her price for signing the Act of Berlin of 1885, the submission of any change in the *status* of the Congo to all the Powers signatory to the Berlin Act which created that State. Thus Germany is seen, so far as these negotiations are concerned, to have founded her attitude on the Congo State question upon the Public Law of Europe as she did her attitude on the Morocco question. Less subtle, no doubt, but more honest, it seems to me! See in this connection Chapter XXIV.

great a change to be made in the distribution of power in Africa, even were a French Government to be found feeble enough to sanction it.[1]

The editorial wound up by again expressing the hope that British ships might be sent to Agadir to "hasten developments."

To all outward seeming, the heavy guns of Printing House Square shattered the nerves of Downing Street, for the *next day—i.e.* July 21—Sir Edward Grey sent for the German ambassador and told him that the silence of the British Government in the absence of any communication from the German Government since July 4[2] must not be interpreted as a slackening of British interest in the matter. He had been "made anxious by the news *which appeared the day before* as to the demands which the German Government had made on the French Government." The demands involved "a cession *of the French Congo,*" which it "was obviously impossible for the French Government to concede." If the negotiations were unsuccessful "a very embarrassing situation would arise." According to "native rumours" the *Panther's* people were "landing and negotiating with the tribes." Agadir was a suitable place for "a naval basis." It might be necessary to "take some steps to protect British interests." In his speech in the House, Sir Edward Grey subsequently explained that—

"I was afraid, and I spoke to the German ambassador because I was afraid that things were developing in a way that would bring up the Morocco question, force the Moroccan negotiations back not upon an arrangement between France and Germany about the Congo and Morocco respectively, but upon something in the nature of the partition of Morocco or some sort of solution which might make the question of British interests to be directly affected, and which would certainly bring into operation our treaty obligations with France."

[1] Italics mine.

[2] It is a little difficult to see what the German Government could have done further in the interval. The German ambassador had given his personal assurance on the 4th that Sir Edward Grey's suspicions were groundless; the German Government had categorically given a similar assurance to the British ambassador at Berlin on the 12th. Sir Edward Grey had not made any request for further information, and the French Government at no time intimated a desire that the British Government should become an official party to the negotiations.

The version of this conversation given by Sir Edward Grey to the House—the only British version extant—was obviously much abridged. The German official version is fuller, and it appears therefrom that Sir Edward Grey suggested the advisability of an exchange of views before events developed further. As the German official version has been issued as a White Book by the British Foreign Office it may be assumed that the above statement is an accurate representation of Sir Edward Grey's words. After registering a sort of general protest against Sir Edward Grey's assumption that Germany had made impossible demands upon France, repeating that Germany had not the slightest intention of injuring British interests, pointing out that no third Power was bound by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904, and that Germany for her part was only bound by the Algeciras Act and her treaty with France of February, 1909, both of which were based upon the independence and integrity of Morocco; that no one could pretend that the independence and integrity of Morocco had not been violated; that although Germany made no complaint against France on that score "she must offer some compensation approximately equivalent to the great goal she had in view"—even as England had secured in Egypt; and that he "could not conceal from the Minister (Sir Edward Grey) that he seemed to be applying two standards," one standard for France and another for Germany; the German ambassador immediately communicated the interview with Sir Edward Grey to his Government. The German Government replied at once: the reply was in London on July 23, and the German ambassador called at the Foreign Office on July 24.

But, meantime, an event had happened which brought to its culminating point the anti-German attitude adopted by the Foreign Office from the outset. Without even waiting for a reply to this, his first communication with the German ambassador since the formal assurance received from the German Government that any thought of a partition of Morocco with France and Spain, from which Britain was to be excluded, was remote from that Government's mind, Sir Edward Grey communicated with the Prime Minister and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.[1] That very evening Mr. Lloyd George, speaking at a banquet given in his honour at the Mansion House, after a reference to the blessings of peace said—

[1] Though not with the other members of the Cabinet.

"But I am also bound to say this—that I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. Her potent influence has many a time been in the past, and may yet be in the future, invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than once in the past redeemed Continental nations, who are sometimes too apt to forget that service, from overwhelming disaster and even from international extinction. I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international goodwill except questions of the gravest national moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. National honour is no party question. The security of our great international trade is no party question; the peace of the world is much more likely to be secured if all nations realise fairly what the conditions of peace must be. And it is because I have the conviction that nations are beginning to understand each other better, to appreciate one another's points of view more thoroughly, to be more ready to discuss calmly and dispassionately their differences, that I feel assured that nothing will happen between now and next year which will render it difficult for the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this place to respond to the toast proposed to you, my Lord Mayor, of the continued prosperity of the public peace."

All momentary doubt as to the precise significance of the speech was set at rest the next morning by the *Times*, which printed it in two places in its issue (July 22) with suitable accentuating notes and head-lines, and accompanied by an editorial entitled "The European Crisis," which I think should be reproduced here in full—

"Mr. Lloyd George's clear, decisive, and statesmanlike reference, at the Bankers' dinner last night, to the European situation created by the German demands in West Africa will be endorsed without distinction of party by all his countrymen. In making public the amazing character

of those demands on Thursday last we called attention to the extreme gravity of the claim which they imply. It is not merely that Germany, in advancing them, demands concessions out of all proportion to the interests which she is able and prepared to cede, though that aspect in itself is serious enough. Far more serious, because the present *démarche* is only the last of several attempts of kindred nature, is the light which it throws upon the whole method and purpose of German statesmanship. Some indignation is expressed in the German Press at the fact that Herr von Kiderlen Waechter's suggestions have been brought into the light and at the criticism which they have evoked. We cannot pretend to regret either the publicity or the criticism. Europe has nothing to lose by revelations which show the true pretensions of its greatest military Power, even though the diplomacy of that Power itself may prefer to move, as Dick Turpin preferred to move, in the dark. The purport of such demands as were outlined in Berlin last week is nothing less than a claim for absolute European predominance. Neither France nor Great Britain could have entertained them for a moment without confessing themselves overborne by German power. That is not the intention of our French neighbours, nor is it our own. Mr. Lloyd George made that perfectly clear last night. 'If a situation were to be forced on us ' he said, 'in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Great Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.' We have insisted on the gravity of the position, because humiliation of that kind for the interested Powers was implicit in the German demands, but we have every confidence that, with the better understanding of British temper which Mr. Lloyd George's speech is calculated to produce, those demands will assume a more reasonable form. Mr. Lloyd George is under no suspicion of jingoism, and it may be taken that in what he said last night he spoke not only for himself, but for the British Government. He spoke, indeed, for his countrymen as a whole. Even at such a moment of internal crisis as the present, party divisions can in no way affect the unity of English sentiment upon a question

involving the honour as well as the interests of the country in the outside world. We ourselves know that that is so; it is time it were realised abroad."

For two or three days preceding the announcement in the *Times* one or two Paris newspapers had changed their previous tone for one of greater aggressiveness, and the chauvinist organs had become openly violent. Mr. Lloyd George's speech and the *Times* comment the next day, punctuating its significance, and comparing the German Government to Dick Turpin, added fuel to the flames. A furious Press campaign followed, not in France only but in England as well, taken up in the weeklies and magazines. In France it subsided as soon as it arose—French diplomacy having secured its end. But it raged in England for three months, German resentment and bitterness growing as it progressed—not against France, but against Britain, and concentrating upon the obvious torch which set light to the edifice, viz. the attitude of the British Foreign Office as crystallized in the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, of course, was merely used by Sir Edward Grey as the latter's mouthpiece.

On the top of everything came the disclosures of Captain Faber, M.P., which could not be denied, because in their substance, though not in every detail, they were true, as every one with relatives or friends in both Services knew. Confirmed by Mr. Arthur Ponsonby and Mr. Noel Buxton, later on by Lord Charles Beresford, Mr. Sidney Low, Admiral Fremantle, and others, the German public learned that last summer the British Government was prepared under certain contingencies to support the French case in Morocco—which legally was unsound, morally was doubtful, and was in its relation with Germany's, at the very least, no better—with the whole naval and military power of Britain.

CHAPTER XXII.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS OF JULY 20 AND 21 IN THE LIGHT OF FACTS NOW ESTABLISHED.

WAS the *Times* announcement of July 20 designed to force Sir Edward Grey's hand by whatsoever influences suggested; or was it inspired directly or indirectly by the Foreign Office in order to have its hand forced?[1] Or was it solely and simply an expedient by French diplomacy, in order to create a diversion in England in France's favour, so that the compensation bill the French Government would have to pay should be as small as possible? Probably it may have been a mixture of the first and last hypotheses. Anyway the announcement succeeded in enormously embittering Anglo-German relations.

Of Sir Edward Grey's action on July 21—and the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech must, of course, be regarded as part and parcel of it—it is difficult to judge otherwise than severely. Whether he was in receipt of news similar to that published in the *Times,* either from the French Government direct through its ambassador in London or through the British embassy in Paris—in which case the information given to him was inaccurate in its most essential aspects and incomplete in others; or, as his conversation with the German ambassador and his speech

[1] In this connection the following despatch from Berlin in the *Times* of November 10 is interesting. It is part of a criticism of the German Chancellor's remarks on the 9th :—

" In view especially of what followed it must be observed that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's version of events is remarkable for its omissions. The acuteness of the recent ' crisis ' was beyond all question due in large measure to two things which are not here mentioned—the manner in which Germany chose to conduct the conversations with France, and the original presentation by Germany of demands enormously in excess of the gains which ultimately satisfied her. The demands were presented in the middle of July and they were withdrawn at the beginning of August. *Mr. Lloyd George's speech was delivered on the morrow of the publication of the demands. The speech would presumably not have been delivered if the demands had not been presented and pressed. There would presumably have been war if the demands had not been withdrawn."* [1]

[1] Italics mine.

in the House indicate, although it appears hardly credible, his information was taken solely from the *Times*—is immaterial. The fact remains that he adopted the *Times'* statement,[1] the *Times'* views, and the *Times'* tone. He spoke of German "demands"—in the sense in which the ordinary man interpreted them in reading the *Times, i.e.* as a species of *ultimatum,* Germany's last word, "I demand this or I shall go to war" attitude. He spoke of these demands as "obviously impossible for the French Government to concede," not, it is true, going quite so far as the *Times,* which had added, as we have seen, that no British Government ought to permit them to be conceded even if a French Government were found weak enough to do so. On another point he had gone even further than the *Times,* speaking of a cession of the "French Congo," although even according to the *Times* map, the "demands" only embraced about one-third of the French Congo.[2] *He could not surely have been more emphatic in defence of a purely French interest had he been the servant of the French Republic instead of a servant of the British Empire?* He reverted again to the partition scheme he had previously attributed to Germany, thus plainly intimating that he did not believe the formal repudiation of the German Government conveyed to him on the 12th. He had wound up[3] by suggesting a formal exchange of views. Then, presumably as an encouragement thereto, without giving the German ambassador time to communicate with his Government,[4] he had promptly put up the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make a speech which, delivered under the circumstances of the moment, no proud nation in the world would have regarded otherwise than as a gratuitous interference, as a menace—the more exasperating as the German Government knew itself to be grossly misrepresented, but could have proved it only by breaking off negotiations with France.

Now what were the facts? First, as to the "demands." There do not appear to have been any "demands" in the sense used by the *Times*, endorsed by Sir Edward Grey,

[1] Except the statement regarding the Congo State.

[2] See Map.

[3] According to the uncontradicted German version. *Vide* Chapter XXI.

[4] Bear in mind that this was the first conversation Sir Edward Grey had held with the German ambassador since the meeting of July 4.

and thus, of course, understood by public opinion. There were *discussions* on the basis of a negotiation agreed upon by both parties certainly not later than the second week in July (perhaps in the middle of June) whereby Germany had undertaken to recognise a French Protectorate over Morocco subject to economic guarantees, and in exchange for a territorial compensation in the French Congo, which Germany on her part was disposed to make easier for the French Government to grant by ceding German territory to France. The speech of M. de Selves, the French Foreign Minister in the French Chamber, of December 14 has made this clear beyond the possibility of doubt in the following words :—

"*Very well!*" M. de Selves describes the German Foreign Secretary as having stated. "*We can arrange some exchanges. We will abandon you Togoland, we will make you territorial concessions in the Upper Cameroons. But this is what we ask.*"[1]

"*Voici ce que nous demandons*" does not mean this is what we *demand,* but this is what we *ask.* Not much of the Dick Turpin stand-and-deliver kind of thing about this !

It will be seen that M. de Selves' account tallies with the German Chancellor's—

"At no stage in the negotiations was any language used, any idea mooted, in any quarter which would have been incompatible with the honour of one of either party. There was never any occasion for the 'banging on the table with the fist' which was recommended to us."[2]

So much for the mischievous legend which has been incessantly dinned into the ears of the British public. And, observe another feature of it. Neither the *Times* in its original pronouncement of July 20, nor Sir Edward Grey in defence of his policy in the House, said one word about the offers with which Germany accompanied her so-called "demands." Yet Sir Edward Grey, at least, must have known of them if, as he says, and as the French Foreign Minister says, the French Government kept him constantly

[1] *Journal Officiel,* December 14, 1911.

[2] British White Book. Cd. 5970. It may be well to state that the German Chancellor's personal character is regarded in Germany as highly as Sir Edward Grey's personal character is regarded among us.

informed of the course of the negotiations. In suggesting the surrender of Togoland the German Government was offering a small but flourishing little dependency, the only self-supporting German dependency overseas, and one which enjoys the reputation—as students of West Africa have long been aware—of being splendidly administered; a dependency where more genuine work has been accomplished than in the whole of the mismanaged and maladministered French Congo up to date. She also offered German Bornu—*i.e.* the Upper Cameroons.

Now, as to the exact area in the French Congo—the area indicated in the *Times'* announcement map—round which the discussions had centred at one time, probably about the third week of July. In this particular direction some obscurity still remains. M. de Selves' version is that when Germany's desires for this area were manifested—we may assume in the absence of any positive indication that it was on or about July 18—he declined to entertain them, and that the discussions were temporarily suspended. The German version differs. Without affording us any additional means of ascertaining whether the *Times* announcement coincided with the stage when the discussions were concerned with this particular part of the French Congo, the German version is to the effect that the temporary suspension of the discussions was taken on the initiative of Germany as a protest against the direct or indirect action of the French Government in violating a secrecy mutually agreed upon. Here is the passage from the German Foreign Secretary's speech bearing on the incident—

"The negotiations had begun; both parties had mutually agreed to observe the strictest secrecy. We took this obligation seriously, and did not even inform our allies. France adopted a different course, and unfortunately communicated not only to the Press, but, it appears, also in part to her friends, information which, inaccurate and incomplete as it was, was calculated to arouse suspicion as to our intentions. We therefore did not negotiate further for a time so long as the secrecy of the negotiations was not guaranteed."

The reader must form his own conclusions on these conflicting statements. In any case the suspension of discussion was brief, because M. Cambon and the German Foreign Secretary met again on the 24th.

There is, however, a certain amount of external evidence to suggest that M. de Selves' story of a prompt rejection of the German proposal to cede the maritime region of the French Congo, from the point of view of *French* interests, of course, must be taken *cum grano salis*. Apart from the *size* of the territory indicated by the German Foreign Secretary, when he and M. Cambon were wagging their respective heads in amiable converse[1] over a map of Africa, there was no special reason why the French Government should have been less willing to cede this part of the French Congo than any other part, for instance, than the part France did eventually cede. (The *size* no doubt represented the opening feature of most bargains where a man who wants, asks the *maximum*, and the man who has to give, sets out the *minimum* he is prepared to concede; moreover, there were the German proposals of a cession of German territory to be set against it.) Indeed, in several well-known quarters in France, notably in *Le Temps* of November 4, and in the able articles of Commandant Thomasson in the *Questions diplomatiques et Coloniales*, to select two opinions out of a number, the belief finds expression that France's interests would have been much better served by the surrender of a portion at least of the maritime zone than of the central zone actually ceded. The arguments supporting this view are technical but powerful. But if *French* interests would not have suffered, the British diplomatic machine which affects to regard an increase of Germany's sea-board possessions in any part of the world as a menace to the security of the Empire, was, there is good reason to think, strongly averse to a Franco-German settlement which would have prolonged the German Cameroons coast-line and added to it a good natural port,[2] over and above the one it already possesses. In this connection the following passage in the *Times* editorial of July 26 is significant—

"There are districts in the interior which might suit Germany as well as the coast-line, and the acquisition of which by her might not arouse other susceptibilities in the same degree."

[1] Instead of the picture mentally conjured up by the ordinary Englishman upon reading the *Times* of July 20, viz., that of the unfortunate French ambassador shrinking before the brutal *ultimatum* of the German Foreign Secretary.

[2] Libreville.

For my part, although I admit that inferential evidence is all that can be advanced, I am fully convinced that the British diplomatic machine put great pressure upon the French Government not to cede any part of the French Congo *coast-line,* and so drove the compensation settlement in a direction which surely will prove far more disadvantageous to the French, if only because it offers innumerable causes for further local friction between the two Powers. The settlement actually arrived at is, indeed, what M. Millerand termed it in the French Chamber "*une solution biscornue,*" and a glance at the Map must be sufficient to convince any one of the trouble which may lie ahead with such a frontier and such a settlement, interposing, as it does, two German *antennæ* between the French possessions in the north and in the south.

But the chief fact to remember so far as the French Congo is concerned, is that Sir Edward Grey was willing to take the line against Germany he did over the exact locality and area of African jungle which Germany should acquire as compensation for recognising a French Protectorate over Morocco!

And what can one say of Sir Edward Grey's renewed raising of the "partition" bogey in the light of facts? His defence of his policy in the House was delivered, unfortunately, before the debate in the French Chamber, so that members did not possess at that moment the French version of the events of July.[1] Had they possessed it they would have known not only that the French Government was entirely opposed to bringing Spain into the negotiations with Germany in any way, and never entertained the idea, but that, as stated at the head of Chapter XX., the German Government *from the very beginning of the negotiations* was fully prepared to recognise the principle of a *French Protectorate over Morocco!*

M. de Selves' statement is categorical. After explaining that when he became Foreign Minister (June 28) discussions between France and Germany had been proceeding for *some time*—first at Berlin, then again at Kissingen—arising out of Germany's view that the Act of Algeciras had been "profoundedly modified" by the French military occupation of Fez and of many districts in Morocco; M. de Selves went on to say that the French Government

[1] The debate in the House took place on November 27. The French debates began on December 14.

had laid down from the first that France must be the predominating Power in Morocco and could not allow any Power (other than Spain) to take a footing there. The German Government had at once agreed—

"Right (*soit!*) *We accept. Take Morocco, establish therein your Protectorate.* But, since you have made a treaty with England in this matter, that you have made a treaty with Italy, that you have made a treaty with Spain, on what basis will you treat with us? Our public opinion will not permit that we should not obtain compensation elsewhere for our abandonment in your favour and the undertaking we shall give you that our diplomacy will assist in getting the Powers to ratify the arrangement we arrive at."[1]

And later on in his speech M. de Selves showed with equal clearness the spontaneity of the German attitude—that it was not on the part of the German Government a yielding to the inevitable, but of a position mutually assumed from the outset—

"People have asked why territorial concessions were thus spoken of. Why had these questions been examined? I have already told you, it is because THE FIRST WORD WHICH THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD PRONOUNCED had consisted in saying: 'Morocco you shall have it.' He had even added, 'Establish therein your Protectorate, draw up yourselves the arrangement which shall specify the details.' "[2]

Thus the French Government itself testifies to the absolute straightforwardness of the German Government's

[1] "L'allemagne nous a dit: Soit! nous acceptons. Prenez le Maroc, installez y votre protectorat. Mais, alors que vous avez traité avec l'Angleterre à cette occasion, que vous avez traité avec l'Italie, que vous avez traité avec l'Espagne, sur quelles bases traiterez-vous avec nous? Notre opinion publique ne permet pas que nous n'obtenions pas par ailleurs quelque compensation à l'abandon que nous allons vous consentir et à la promesse que nous allons vous donner que notre diplomatie s'emploiera à faire ratifier par les puissances l'accord que nous aurons conclu." (*Journal Officiel*, 14 December, 1911.)

[2] "On s'est demandé pourquoi il avait été ainsi parlé de ces cessions territoriales. Pourquoi ces questions là avaient été examinées? prononcée le ministre des affairs étrangères en Allemange avait consisté à dire: 'Le Maroc, vous l'aurez'—il avait même ajouté; 'installez-y-votre protectorat, libellez vous-même l'accord qui doit en determiner les précisions.'" (*Journal Officiel*, 14 December, 1911.)

attitude from the first, corroborating the official German declaration to the British ambassador at Berlin on July 12.

If Sir Edward Grey was kept continually posted by the French Government of what was going on, as he says he was, and as the French Foreign Minister says he was, Sir Edward Grey knew before the second week in July had expired that the German Government not only meditated no partition of Morocco with France and Spain, but had, on the contrary, spontaneously admitted the principle of a French Protectorate over that State subject to economic pledges and compensation elsewhere—which were to form the subject of negotiations.

He knew that from the French.

On July 12 the German Government gave him an official assurance to the same effect.

Yet, on July 21, he adopted a course of action which in the ultimate resort very nearly brought about a rupture with Germany—which would have meant a European war—and which did, in fact, produce the state of tension still unhappily prevailing, and which the British Government is now endeavouring, under the spur of public opinion, to remove.

[New Note.—The French Yellow Book (*Affaires du Maroc,* VI. 1910-12) published after this volume appeared, contains, *inter alia,* an account of the famous interview between Herr von Kiderlen Waechter, the German Secretary of State and M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, which was so disastrously distorted in the *Times* of July 20. The interview took place on July 16. On July 19, a distorted account of it appeared in *Le Matin* of Paris. It is No. 455 of the Yellow Book. M. Cambon's despatch begins by recalling how the conversation opened from the standpoint "precedently" agreed to by the Secretary of State, viz. Germany's willingness to recognise in favour of France, the altered condition of affairs in Morocco. M. Cambon reports that this fundamental point having been disposed of, he then asked the Secretary of State for his views as to the form that compensation should take. The Secretary of State replied, according to M. Cambon, thus—

"He told me that he had only formed vague ideas (*qu'il n'avait que des indications très générales*) and having sent

MAP IV.

Stanford's Geogl Estabt, London.

indicating the area which formed at one time in the Franco-German negotiations the subject of special discussion.

MAP V.

Stanford's Geogl Estabt, Lond

ceded by France to Germany under the Convention of November 4, 1911

ceded by Germany to France under the same Convention - - - - -

for a map, he showed me the French Congo from the sea to the Sangha."

M. Cambon replied that it was too much, whereupon the Secretary of State said that—

"He would be disposed to offer us the northern part of the Cameroons, and even Togoland, according to what we gave."

M. Cambon objected that the area indicated by the Secretary of State would cut off the French Congo *hinterland* from access to the sea.

There ensued a fencing bout of words between these two practised diplomats, in the course of which each ventilated the case of his Government, and went over old ground. The conversation, in the words of the French Ambassador, closed as follows—

"Finally I closed by saying: 'The point is whether you want to come to terms. Speak in that sense to your colleague at the Colonial Office. When do you expect to see him?' 'To-morrow,' he replied, 'and we can meet again at the beginning of next week, Monday or Tuesday. I shall let you know.' "

The above are the closing words of the despatch. The Congo Free State was not mentioned in the course of the conversation.—AUTHOR.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE EVENTS OF JULY 20 AND 21

Mr. Lloyd George's speech, and especially the interpretation (uncorrected on our side) placed upon it by the French and British Press, immediately led to very strained relations between the two Governments, while the Press of the three countries lashed itself into a state of fury. When diplomatists talk about "Public Opinion" being incensed, they turn a blind eye upon their own performances in bringing that condition about; posing as peacemakers, whereas, more often than not, the responsibility is wholly theirs. In his speech in the House on November 27 Sir Edward Grey expressed the opinion that the diplomatists ought to be congratulated upon having prevented war in view of the "political alcoholism" which had prevailed—a sample of diplomatic irony which would, indeed, be hard to beat. For who mixed the alcoholic brew which the public partook of? Mr. Lloyd George's speech was comparable to the action of a man who, observing a smouldering fire, pours upon it a can full of kerosene and then seeks to place the blame upon the onlookers because the flames leap up to Heaven. That speech set the whole world by the ears, and, then, forsooth, the world is at fault! *If Sir Edward Grey did not intend the speech as a menace why did he not, when he saw the interpretation placed upon it by the* Times *next morning (the 22nd), at once correct the impression it had produced, in order to prevent the flames from spreading?*

Sir Edward Grey's conversation with the German ambassador on the 21st, had, as we have seen, been immediately transmitted to Berlin. It was the first conversation in the course of which Sir Edward Grey had definitely asked for information and formulated more than vague suspicions. It was the first time Sir Edward Grey had raised the question of the "compensation" negotiations then proceeding between France and Germany. The German Government's answer was in London two days after the conversation. Why in the world could not Sir Edward Grey have waited for that answer? Was it fair to Germany, was it statesmanlike, was it even reasonable

that as soon as the German ambassador had left the Foreign Office Sir Edward Grey should arrange for Mr. Lloyd George to make a speech that very evening—a speech suggesting that Germany was treating us as of no account in the Cabinet of nations, and that we should go to war with her if she did not mend her manners? What terrible performances could the wretched little *Panther* with its complement of one hundred and twenty-five officers and men have carried out in the interval? Why this precipitation to credit "native rumours" that the *Panther's* formidable naval contingent was landing and negotiating with the tribes? Since when have we based a hectoring attitude towards a great Power on the strength of "native rumours" which, apparently, were not believed in Paris[1] and which turned out to have no foundation in fact?

But for the Lloyd-George speech it may be assumed that the atmosphere of ill-will and suspicion against Germany, the mingled *parti-pris* and reluctance frankly to ask for the further explanations seemingly required which had reigned at the Foreign Office since July 1, would have been dissipated by the German Government's reply.

As it was, an "exceedingly stiff" interview took place between Sir Edward Grey and the German ambassador on the 24th. Both Governments hereafter stood on their "dignity," and millions of men and women who knew nothing of the whole miserable business, the vast majority of whom could certainly not have pointed out Morocco on the map, were on the verge of being precipitated into all the horrors, all the miseries and privations and losses of a great war as the result thereof.

Could there be a more scathing satire upon "civilisation"? Could there be a greater travesty of human government? Do not all the proposals for preventing such a state of affairs, such as greater publicity on foreign questions, greater public control of the diplomats, the break-up of the caste system in diplomacy, and so forth, immature, and incomplete, and unthought-out as they may be, appear the very embodiment of common sense as compared with that state of affairs itself?

[1] "Mais il nous est apparu, d'après nos renseignements, que si l'Allemagne envoyait un bateau à Agadir, elle n'avait pas l'intention d'y opérer un d'ébarquement." (M. de Selves in the French Chamber, December 14, 1911.)

Both Governments stood on their "dignity"—the word is Sir Edward Grey's, not mine. In view of the Lloyd-George speech, which the German Government looked upon as a threat, that Government declared it could not authorise Sir Edward Grey to make public use of the pledge given on the 12th to the effect that Germany had no territorial designs on Morocco. German public opinion, the German Government argued, would look upon such a declaration at that moment as a retreat before a British menace. Sir Edward Grey, for his part, could not, in view of the very stiff tone adopted by the German ambassador, condescend to give any public explanation as to Mr. Lloyd George's speech. Such an explanation would not have been compatible with the dignity of Great Britain.

On the 27th, a further conversation took place between Sir Edward Grey and the German ambassador, and the high-and-mighty attitude on both sides was to some extent departed from. The Prime Minister's speech in the House that evening showed a very different tone. There is some reason for believing that several Members of the Cabinet had expressed themselves pretty vigorously on the subject of Mr. Lloyd George's speech. Be that as it may, Mr. Asquith declared that he thought an issue of the Franco-German negotiations without prejudice to British interests quite possible, and earnestly desired such a solution. The British Government did not dream of interfering with territorial arrangements between the two Powers outside Morocco. Any statements that the British Government had so interfered were "mischievous inventions without the faintest foundation in fact." An utterance which in the light of facts can only be described as amazing.

Still the effect intended was produced. The relations between the two Governments became less strained. But henceforth the bickering of the Governments became drowned in the popular anger. The mischief had gone too far. The wound was too deep and recent for the plaster to adhere. The whole of Germany, without distinction of party or class, was rocking and seething with indignation, at what it regarded as an insulting and unwarrantable interference on the part of Great Britain in the negotiations with France, as an arrogant British embargo upon Germany acquiring territory in Equatorial Africa, as proof that Britain was determined to block and hamper Germany's expansion; that, in short, Germany had been deliberately and wantonly provoked. Far from dying down, this feeling

gathered intensity with the weeks, and there is not, unhappily, the slightest doubt that the German Foreign Secretary interpretated with absolute accuracy the popular sentiment held by the entire German nation when he said—

"If the English Government had intended to complicate and embroil the political situation, and to bring about a violent explosion, they would certainly have chosen no better means than the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which took so little into account for us the dignity and position of a Great Power which was claimed by him for England."[1]

Finally, can we wonder that this view should be held, and should have crystallized into conviction since the Faber revelations and their *sequelae?*

To-day we are confronted with this situation.

The German *nation* firmly believes not only that it is threatened by Great Britain, but that Great Britain intends to take the first favourable opportunity to force a war.

The British nation knows itself to be absolutely innocent of any such desire or intention.

Is there a way out of the *impasse?* Only, it seems to me, if British public opinion will think out the problem for itself, face the issues squarely and resolutely and decline any longer to tolerate being in the position of finding itself involved in war without any real knowledge of the why and the wherefore.

Meanwhile let us note the substantial advantages which British interests have reaped from Germany's double intervention in Morocco.

[1] British White Book, Cd. 5992.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN SETTLEMENT AND ITS EFFECTS UPON BRITISH INTERESTS

So far as Morocco is concerned, the conclusion finally reached in the Franco-German negotiations and embodied in the Convention of November 4, 1911, constitutes a reversal of the Public Law of Europe formulated in the Algeciras Act. Subject, of course, to the agreement of the signatory Powers—which may be taken for granted—the independence and integrity of Morocco disappear.

For that independence and integrity, a French Protectorate is substituted on certain conditions.

France thus gets her way, and adds, on paper, 219,000 square miles and some eight million inhabitants to her Colonial Empire.

Germany abandons her long fight for Moroccan independence in exchange for guarantees as to equality of treatment in economic matters, upon which I shall touch in a moment, receiving as compensation 107,270 square miles of the French Congo, sparsely populated and of moderate intrinsic value, and ceding to France 6450 square miles of German territory in the Upper Cameroons by way of *quid pro quo*. Even a casual glance at the Convention will show that the utmost goodwill on both sides will be required if its provisions, as they affect both Morocco and the French Congo, are to work out harmoniously in practice, and several years must, in any case, elapse during which the French and German Governments will be engaged in constant discussions arising out of those provisions. It will also be apparent from Article 16 of the Congo section of the Convention that the way has been left open for the question of the Congo State (or Belgian Congo) to be raised on some future occasion—a question which involves the interests of Belgium and those of Great Britain, as well as those of France and Germany, and, nominally at least, the interests of all the signatory Powers of the Berlin Act of 1885.

It is obvious, therefore, that this settlement must multiply the possibilities of friction between the two Powers to a very considerable extent, since it leaves many highly controversial problems in Morocco itself unsettled, since it adds to their land frontier in Europe a greatly extended land frontier in equatorial Africa, and since it places—on the basis of a political agreement defining a variety of specific stipulations—their economic interests in close contact in Morocco. Conversely, this settlement may conduce, if handled tactfully and with a genuine desire for a political and economic co-operation, to bring the two Powers more closely together upon a field of common endeavour, than they have ever been before.[1]

In any event, the relations of France and Germany cannot be the same in the future as they have been in the past. They must be more continuous, more intimate, more complicated, affording greater opportunities for interference to a foreign diplomacy that, inspired by interested friendliness towards one of them, might be disposed to the display of unfriendliness towards the other. That is the chief conclusion of a general character which can be drawn from the understanding which has been reached; and it is eminently satisfactory, as conveying proof of the real wishes of both Governments, that they should have mutually agreed to refer differences of interpretation to the Hague Tribunal and disputes as to the delimitation of the new Congo frontier to an independent arbitrator.

Examining these documents at close quarters it will be observed that Germany has been able to secure for the trade of all nations in Morocco, conditions, unlimited by time, infinitely more advantageous than the situation in which the British Government was content to leave international commercial interests by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904. British trading interests in particular may take full measure of the debt which they owe to the double German intervention in Morocco, by recollecting how those interests, at present ranking foremost in importance, were neglected by their own Government in 1904. Under the 1904 Treaties the open door for ordinary trade *was limited to*

[1] Far-seeing Frenchmen—as far removed from one another in political thought as M. Jaurès and Senator de Lamarzelle—realise this perfectly, and both in the Chamber and in the Senate have publicly given expression to the obvious truth, viz., that the Convention of November, 1911, is workable only if the general attitude of Germany and France becomes inspired by genuine good-will.

thirty years only. Apart from ordinary trading transactions, not only was no provision made for a British share in the enormous number of public works—railways and harbour-works, electric light installations, mining plant, telegraphs, post offices, and so on—which the opening up of Morocco will entail, besides the endless purchases of material, stores, etc., which a Moroccan Government equipped on modern lines will require, but as a study of the Franco-Spanish secret Conventions of 1904 and 1905 (especially the former, which was submitted to and approved by the British Government) will show, this unlimited field of enterprise was virtually handed over, lock, stock, and barrel, to a Franco-Spanish monopoly.

After binding down the French Government to equality in trade matters in every direction whereby a loop-hole might be found for favoured treatment despite the non-existence of a differential tariff, Germany has secured the expansion—certain to be very large—of the iron-ore industry from being restricted by export duties, and has imposed a common treatment for all mining undertakings, particularly stipulating that no taxes, uniformly levied, shall be privately remitted in favour of a given company. Germany has insisted upon open tenders for all contracts for public works and supply of material, under conditions of time and circumstance which shall not place the subjects of any one Power in a position of inferiority. She has postulated that all nations shall be equally privileged to participate in the actual working of great public undertakings, and that industrial and mining concerns shall not be hampered in laying down light railways to connect their enterprises with a port of shipment. She has thought problems out ahead with remarkable thoroughness. In every respect minute precautions have been taken by Germany that international enterprises of every kind are as assured as public pledges can make them, of an absolutely fair field and no favour. That in so doing Germany has sought to benefit her own nationals goes without saying, but in benefiting them she has benefited the nationals of every great commercial Power, and notably Great Britain. Morocco is not to become another Tunis or Madagascar, and British trade and enterprise, shabbily treated in both owing to the well-known fixed rule of French policy overseas and the incapacity of the British Foreign Office, has to thank, not its own Government, but the German Government for the fact. The anger and dismay which fills a

certain school in France at contemplating these restrictions upon time-honoured French Colonial methods, may be surmised by perusing some of the speeches made in the course of the Moroccan debate in the French Chamber last December. M. Caillaux, the then Premier, met these complaints in a broad and statesmanlike manner, but which did not tend to increase his popularity. It may be hoped that the French Government will not yield to the importunities it is bound to be plagued with by the initiators of "affaires," who haunt the *Quai d'Orsay,*[1] the *Pavillon de Flore*[2] and the editorial sanctuaries of Parisian newspapers not a few; but that it will carry out the economic conditions attaching to its acquisition of political control over Morocco, both in the letter and in the spirit.

As the economic aspect of the Moroccan section of the Convention is all in favour of British commercial interests, so is the arrangement under which some 100,000 square miles of equatorial African territory pass from French to German control. The increased area of German Cameroon and the decreased area of the French Congo, it cannot be too emphatically asserted, is a distinct and unquestionable gain for British commerce. In the Cameroon, Germany has always treated British trade and British merchants on a level of absolute equality with her own. Nay, more, as the directors of one of the largest British firms and the oldest therein established have recently testified,[3] the German local authorities have repeatedly gone out of their way to show courtesy to our merchants and to assist them in their business, so far as a local West African Government can do so. Messrs. John Holt speak in the highest terms of their treatment at the hands of the Germans. I have reason to know that their experience is by no means singular. Contrast that story with the notoriously

[1] French Foreign Office. [2] French Colonial Office.

[3] Messrs. John Holt & Co., of Liverpool. A curious and significant story attaches to this firm's testimony affecting a *purely British interest.* During the crisis last autumn, when British newspapers were repeating *ad nauseam* the unfounded statement that Germany differentiated against British goods in her oversea possessions, Messrs. John Holt & Co. wrote a letter to a certain very prominent British newspaper, inspired by no love for Germany, describing their own experiences in the Cameroon. The letter was acknowledged. As three weeks later it had still not appeared, Messrs. John Holt & Co. sent a copy to the *Manchester Guardian,* which published it. It was afterwards widely reproduced in England and Germany.

abominable manner in which British trade has been persecuted in the French Congo, where France has violated the Act of Berlin in the most flagrant way.[1]

In this connection it is difficult not to apprehend future complications arising from the contradictory character of Articles 5 and 12 of the Convention. By the former the German Government undertakes to respect the concessions granted by the French Government to certain financiers in the part of French Congo which has now become German. By the latter both Governments bind themselves to observe the commercial clauses of the Berlin Act which those concessions grossly violate. In point of fact the whole area which Germany has acquired, with the exception of an infinitesimal corner of it, has been long subjected to that iniquitous system of pillage of the natural riches of the country accompanied by forced labour which the French Colonial Party forced upon the French Colonial Minister of the day in emulation of King Leopold, and largely through his personal intrigue. And eighteen months ago this particular rubber syndicate obtained a ten years further lease of life from the French Government. If respect for this arrangement is to be taken in a literal sense, it means that the Act of Berlin will continue to be violated in the ceded territory for ten years longer, to the detriment of the natives and of international trade alike, and that Cameroon merchants, whatever nationality they may belong to, will be unable to extend their business to the new German territory. Such a state of things would be so clearly alien to Germany's policy and to German interests that it may be hoped some way may be found out of the difficulty and that Germany may be able to set an example in relation to this matter, of faithful adherence to international Treaties which besides, in this particular instance, redounding to the benefit of black humanity and legitimate trade,[2] will free her hands when presently (as I devoutly hope she may, and, if the Foreign Office by that time is cured of its Teutophobia, in concert with Britain) she sets

[1] *Vide, inter alia,* " The British Case in French Congo " (Heinemann, 1902), and the paper in the *Contemporary Review* for December, 1911, by the author.

[2] The *Concessionnaire* system in equatorial Africa involves and necessitates the most horrible abuses, of which the world has had an unforgettable object-lesson in King Leopold's management of the Congo State.

herself to insist upon the Belgians fulfilling *their* Treaty obligations in the Congo State.[1]

Politically speaking, the form the French Congo territorial compensation has eventually taken is extremely awkward and inconvenient for the French and irritating for the Germans. A study of the map and of the Appendix will suffice to make this plain to any one. Geographically it is an impossible arrangement, and a well-informed French friend compares it to the accumulation of barrels of international gunpowder along the banks of the Congo. Either of the plans first discussed would have been better than this solution, *i.e.* if the territory ceded had been further south, Gaboon-wards; or if the German river frontage in the ceded territory had spread over the intervening space between the two existing *antennæ* or horns (see map). The former need not have been so extensive as the Germans originally asked—in exchange for a considerably larger German territory than they have actually conceded—but it might well have embraced the basins of the Ogowe and Kwilou, following a straight line, parallel with the 12th Parallel, to the Congo State frontier. There would then have been no "cutting in two" of the French dependency, and communication between the Middle and Upper French Congo and the coast would not have been modified, since it is and has always been, entirely dependent upon the Belgian railway from Stanley Pool to Matadi. But, as indicated in Chapter XXII., the British diplomatic machine was opposed to the extension of the German coast-line and to Germany acquiring Libreville, which, in all probability, was the immediate cause of the uproar of July 20 and 21. The second solution, which was actually proposed by M. Caillaux, was defeated, or rather modified, by the opposition worked up in Paris to the "cutting in two" idea. As a matter of fact, the solution actually adopted has consecrated this disadvantage, without any of the compensating advantages in the shape of absence of future friction, which the present arrangement inevitably entails.

An interesting feature of the Convention is the cession of France's right of pre-emption over Spanish Guinea, the Corisco Islands, and the Elobey Islands, should Spain be willing to sell these places to Germany. Equally interest-

[1] Representations in regard to this problem have already been made to the German Government by the German Congo League and the German Colonial Society, and to the British Government by the Newcastle, and, I think, other Chambers of Commerce.

ing, and far more important, is Article 16, whereby France's right of pre-emption over the Congo State is modified to such an extent as to have become, practically speaking, non-existent. Germany has secured that if the Congo State ever comes into the market through the unwillingness or inability of the Belgians to control it, the signatory Powers of the Berlin Act must adjudicate as to its future. German insistence upon this provision was, doubtless, inspired by the knowledge—which the Congo Reform Association, I may say, also obtained early in 1909—that France had made tentative proposals to Germany and Great Britain, at the time that King Leopold and his Parliament were wrangling over the terms under which the Congo State was to be annexed, for a Franco-British-German partition of the Congo State. Article 16 places the Congo State question in its international aspects on the *terrain* from which M. Jules Ferry succeeded in 1884, secretly and behind the back of the Powers, in removing it—*i.e.* upon its true basis as an *international* problem.

A brief reference may be made in conclusion to France's dispute with Spain which presumably will be settled before this book is in print.[1] As British strategic policy requires that Spain shall remain in possession of Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco, it may be presumed—unless Sir Edward Grey gives way—that she will retain Larash and El-Kasr (despite the annoyance of the French Colonials, who have been indulging in sundry threats about sundering the *entente,* if the British Government does not force Spain to clear out of those places); abandoning Ifni and perhaps the Rio del Oro region on the South Atlantic to France.

[1] The origin of the Franco-Spanish dispute is, briefly, this: France declares that Spain, in occupying Larash and El-Kasr, has violated the secret Convention of 1904, because that Convention only recognised Spain's right to occupy these places with French consent, and so long as the *status quo* of Morocco was not altered. Spain replies that France had herself altered the *status quo* by occupying Fez and the surrounding country, and that as regards French consent, that Spain twice asked for French consent between April and June of last year, and only decided to act when France withheld that consent—unjustly, in view of her own performances. In other words, as Felicien Challaye puts it most excellently in "La Vie Internationale": "Thus this initial dispute has for its primary cause the duplicity which both France and Spain have displayed in regard to Morocco, both having undertaken to respect its independence and integrity, both having worked in secret to partition and conquer Morocco." The truth could not be more tersely stated.

It may be hoped that the forthcoming Franco-Spanish settlement will regularise the doubtful and peculiar position in which Tangier is left by this hotch-potch of treaties superseded, treaties set aside, old treaties, new treaties, secret treaties, and public treaties—the strategic importance of Tangier being, of course, for Britain a matter of considerable moment.[1]

[1] Sundry French Colonial papers have insisted that France must be politically preponderant at Tangier, and that the future Tangier-Fez railway must be wholly in French hands, even when it passes through Spanish territory. These statements must not, however, be taken too seriously. More significant is the fact that Germany has not taken Spain into account at all in dealing with France, but has recognised a French Protectorate (subject, of course, to the conditions specified) to the *whole* of Morocco, the Spanish zone included. This makes France technically responsible for the fulfilment in the Spanish zone of all the stipulations formulated by Germany in the Convention of November, 1911. This responsibility France has accepted, and now seeks to make Spain swallow the additional pill—at which the Spanish gorge rises, partly because it will upset the calculations and enterprises of certain influential Spanish *concessionnaires*.

CHAPTER XXV.

AN APPEAL FROM PREJUDICE TO REASON

"The nation does not desire peace at any price. People talk about peace at any price, but there is something far worse—and that is alliance at any price, and especially alliances the price of which is not disclosed." (The Dean of Worcester [Canon Moore Ede], speaking at the first Annual Meeting of the Church of England Peace Congress, January 26, 1912.)

THERE are three keys with which to unlock the door to a permanent improvement in Anglo-German relations if the British people desire it, as I firmly believe they do.

The first is the honest admission that in the one case where a quarrel has occurred over a specific issue—Morocco—we have not treated Germany fairly, and that Germany has a legitimate grievance against us on that score. This I have tried to show from an analysis of the facts, not because it was a pleasant thing to do, assuredly not because it was a popular thing to do, but because to any one who believes an understanding[1] with Germany to be a supreme British national concern, the national interest demanded that it should be attempted. If the thinking public after reading this book share that view, a public force will have been created to prevent the recurrence of a similar episode, whether in connection with further developments which the Morocco question with its now inevitable *annexes* the French Congo and Belgian Congo questions may have in store for us, or as regards any other specific problem which may arise, either in Asia-Minor, in China, or in the Portuguese African dependencies. There is no need to clothe ourselves in a white sheet for the world's sneers. But we shall be no weaker; we shall be stronger if we allow ourselves that we have been misled, quietly make up our minds to take the fact into account in our future dealings with Germany, and imitate our French friends to the extent of insisting upon a final close to the era of secret treaty making, whether such secret treaties be between us

[1] Not an alliance, but an *understanding*.

and another Power, or between other Powers, but involving our national responsibility, as in the case of the secret Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904.

The second key is the indispensable duty that devolves upon the House of Commons to ascertain the real nature of our relations with France, and if, as the public are assured, there are no positive commitments, to insist that neither in regard to Morocco nor in regard to any other dispute which events may occasion between France and Germany, shall this nation's foreign policy be directed as though such positive commitments existed.

It is well to be absolutely plain-spoken in this matter. In 1904 Lord Lansdowne was successful in removing various specific and long-standing causes of friction between ourselves and France by a series of arrangements. Only in one of these arrangements was an avenue left open for future national liabilities if, as an outcome of it, France found herself at loggerheads with another Power. Those liabilities were limited, but even in their limitation they went beyond what the nation was aware of, or had sanctioned, because their nature was kept from the nation. Such liabilities as existed were still further reduced by the Act of Algeciras. Such as they were before the close of the Algeciras Conference, and *a fortiori* from the date of its conclusion, they did not make it incumbent upon this nation, either in honour or in law, to support France in violating the Act of Algeciras if her Government chose to take the risk of doing so without having previously come to an understanding with any Power signatory of the Act that might consider its interests and rights jeopardised and set on one side by such violation; much less to support France to the extent of being prepared to involve this nation in a great war as the outcome of the French Government's proceedings.[1] *There* was an unwarrantable, unsanctioned transmutation of a strictly limited agreement with France into an instrument of aggression against the Power which challenged France's infringement both of that Power's

[1] Even those who argue that our commitments to France under the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 were not modified by the Algeciras Act, cannot assert that the giving of "diplomatic support" to France entailed the granting of naval and military support, in face of the Foreign Office's assertions to the contrary. Let me recall here, once more, the statement made by the Foreign Office on November 27, 1911: "An agreement to afford diplomatic support does not impose on any Power an obligation either to give or to withhold military or naval support."

interests and rights under its own Treaty with Morocco, and under the Algeciras Act. Parliament should place beyond doubt or question that this nationally unauthorised transmutation must cease. Parliament should place beyond doubt or question that France having, thanks to the British Government, succeeded in her long-matured design of acquiring a Protectorate over the greater part of Morocco, cannot expect us to fight her battles for her in any subsequent squabble which may arise between her and other Powers over the exercise of her Protectorate, any more than she can expect us to play the part of wet nurse to her in any other portion of the globe. *This nation, through its elected representatives, should absolutely decline to allow itself to be tied to the cartwheels of the French Colonial Party or of any other Party or Parties in France.*

Not to make a firm and unambiguous stand now would mean for the British people an unending vista of prospective and unknown liabilities, with which they would be absolutely insane to permit themselves to be saddled. If the House of Commons does not pronounce unmistakably on the matter it will be betraying its trust to the nation. A means must be found for curtailing the virtually unlimited discretion of the executive in foreign affairs. On March 19, 1886, the following resolution was moved in the House of Commons by Mr. Richard—

"That in the opinion of this House it is not just or expedient to embark in war, contract engagements involving grave responsibilities for the nation, and add territories to the Empire without the knowledge or consent of Parliament."

The motion was only lost by four votes. A similar resolution should be brought forward and pressed again and again until it passes.

Moreover, if the British position for the future is not made clear, it can only be a matter of time before the friendly feeling happily existing between France and ourselves will be changed into one of open tension, for the simple reason that the nation will not put up with being made the cat's-paw of French colonial adventures; neither will it put up with a situation whereby it might become to-morrow the agent of some one or other ephemeral French Government bent upon a war with Germany for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. The time *may* come when, if the Republican régime cannot purge itself of the financial

corruption, the incessant personal intrigues and the dangerous irresponsibility which undermine and honeycomb the body politic, it will be so shaken as to find in a successful war its only chance of survival. That event, if it should occur, must find the British people unfettered and at liberty to pursue the course best suited to the national interest. The disorganised condition of our own Foreign Office, the personal rivalries which obtain within it, its extraordinarily faulty intelligence system, the way in which the embassies abroad have got out of hand through the absence of a strong directing head at home with clear ideas and personal knowledge of European languages, countries and peoples—these things, which, unhappily, do not appertain to the region of gossip, but to the realm of fact, are in all conscience bad enough. But that the British national interest should be in any sense at all tied up with the vagaries prevailing in the Public Departments, Parliamentary lobbies and editorial offices of the French Republic is altogether intolerable, and would not be tolerated for twenty-four hours by the British people if they realised the true position. The revelations of the last few months should surely open the eyes of our statesmen to the appalling state of chaos and intrigue which has been, in part only, dragged to light by the French Senatorial investigations into the inner history of the Moroccan affair.

It is in the interest neither of the British nor of the French *peoples* that they should be fettered in their intercourse with other peoples; or committed by their Governments to a definite course of action in advance. Such commitments play into the hands of certain sections in Britain, France and Germany, who, whether they be actuated by motives of honest conviction, or inspired by class or personal interests, or merely governed by fixed and narrow ideas, are the enemies of peace, which is and must be the paramount interest both of the creative elements and of the working masses in each country.[1] There is such a section in Germany which, seeing, or affecting to see, in Great Britain the implacable foe of Germany's national and inevitable expansion in commerce, industry and power, urges war. There is a section in Great Britain which, seeing, or affecting to see, in the growth of Germany a rival animated by aggressive and sinister designs, works for war and would use the *entente* with France to that end. There

[1] Except the manufacturers of war material.

is a section in France which, adhering to the cult of *"La revanche"* and dismayed at a stationary if not falling birth-rate which twenty years hence will place the French in a position of conspicuous and incontestable military inferiority *par rapport* with their eastern neighbours, dreams of replenishing the dwindling fighting strength of the nation by regiments of brown and black Africans, and, agitated and restless, loses no opportunity of envenoming Anglo-German relations with the intent of using the *entente* as a lever to precipitate a struggle before France has fallen altogether behind Germany in point of military numbers.

The task of the peoples concerned is to find statesmen who will shake themselves free from these influences. Or, to state the proposition inversely, statesmen worthy of the name must shake themselves free of them by taking the people more and more into their confidence and appealing more and more to the national interest of the vast mass of the population to counteract these influences.[1] In other words, foreign policy must be democratised, which does not mean in the least, as certain pompous persons rooted in fossilised ideas which no longer respond to the world's imperative requirements, urge in panic horror, that diplomatists should carry on their conversations in the public squares, any more than the shipowner informs the neighbourhood of his negotiations over a charter-party, or the novelist invites his readers to follow the unravelling of his plot while he is engaged upon it.

Especially is it necessary for the common-sense elements in the British nation to set their faces like flint against the sections in Britain and France desirous of distorting the existence of friendly relations with France into an instrument of aggression against Germany. If Englishmen will stop and think for a moment they will realise that the idea sedulously thrust into their brains by certain newspapers—the idea that the French are living in daily terror of a descent upon them by Germany which, but for a British fleet, would indubitably take place—is on

[1] The surest proof that both the German and the French Governments were animated with peaceful intentions in the crisis of last summer and autumn, is to be sought in the fact that the great labour demonstrations for peace, held in Berlin and Paris respectively, were inspired by the respective Governments concerned, acting independently of one another. This has been denied; but it is true. I have this on the authority of one of the great Continental Socialist leaders.

the face of it extremely unlikely; that, as a matter of fact, the persistent encouraging of this idea among us may conceivably be doing France the greatest disservice by increasing the power of certain persons, and, perhaps, certain forces, in Britain and France anxious to prevent a Franco-German *rapprochement,* not at all, in the former case, as an act of love for France, but from a muddle-headed conception of the national interests of Britain. Let them, for example, turn over the following points in their minds. Until a few months ago it was a cardinal article of faith among us that the German army was the most efficient fighting machine in the world. Well, for *forty years* the Imperial controllers of that most efficient fighting machine in the world have not once used it for carrying out one or other of the numerous schemes with which they have from time to time been credited by certain wiseacres in Fleet Street, by the compilers of blood-curdling articles in the popular magazines, or by excited and badly informed politicians. Then, again, if the rulers of Germany meditate far-seeing designs of conquest, they would be, surely, playing a fool's game to give effect to them now, as regards France at any rate. The German population is increasing by nearly a million a year. It is now somewhere in the neighbourhood of sixty-seven millions; that of France somewhere in the neighbourhood of thirty-nine millions, and the population of France is slowly declining. In another quarter of a century France, for all her incomparable intellectual genius, will, in the ordinary course of events, short of some far-reaching internal thought-revolution, which is extremely unlikely in view of the steady decay of religious faith and the corresponding increase in every influence making for the spread of sexual licence (or short of an alteration of the map of Europe in her favour), have fallen, so far as fighting strength is concerned, immeasurably below the level of Germanic capacity. What is a quarter of a century in the life of a nation? Germany can afford to wait. Time is on her side, and all the evolutions of all the diplomatists in the world cannot affect the great national forces at work. Pondering over this, Englishmen might well consider whether causes, which, in the case of Germany, they are told, operate as a *prima facie* warrant for crediting the existence of German designs upon her neighbours, do not apply with equal if not greater logic in the case of France. That *France must,*

within the next half century, increase the population owning allegiance to the French flag, or crumble to ruin, approximates at least nearer to the truth than that the growth in the German population is a "world menace." An attempt to expand beyond the line of the Vosges might be too hazardous to entertain, even now, say within the next year or two. Postponed for two decades, or even one decade, it would be suicidal. But the risks of expansion northwards into the Low Countries, or southwards beyond the line of the Pyrennees, would not be so considerable. Then, again, the Englishman who prefers to think for himself, instead of letting half a dozen gentlemen invested with the power (how often abused, alas!) of transmitting their thoughts daily to an aggregate of millions do their thinking for them, might ask themselves whether there is not a suspicion of crocodillian tactics in this perpetual lament over poor, plucky little France, brow-beaten by brutal, sabre-rattling Germany, combined with the appearance of learned articles—such, for example, as Colonel Repington's[1] in the *Times*—in which we are told, in effect, that the German army is very over-rated and inefficient in many respects, while the French army is greatly under-rated and conspicuously efficient.

Finally, Englishmen might pause and think for a moment whether they are *quite sure* they are being accurately informed as to the real sentiments of the peace-loving, laborious, thrifty masses of the French nation in regard to Germany and the relations of France with Germany. Are they *quite sure* that the same people who invited them to believe that the German Government had offended the Russian bureaucracy (misnamed "Russia" with pleasing complacency) for at least a generation because the Kaiser had stood in shining armour beside his ally Austria over the Bosnian business are altogether safe

[1] I am told by military friends that Colonel Repington's reputation as a military expert is internationally recognised. M. Philippe Millet, reviewing these articles in *Le Temps* of November 21 last, remarks: "Although Germany still continues to loom large in the imagination of her neighbours by reason of the number of her battalions, and because of her admirable mobilisation system, it is beginning to be whispered in Europe that the French army excels its rivals in essential military qualities. Our weight in the diplomatic scale cannot fail to increase if, while conscious of our strength, we are wise enough not to relax our efforts." So we cannot have it both ways, and on this showing Germany's increased estimates for 1912 respond to necessities pointed out by the *Times* and hailed by *Le Temps*.

guides to follow? Have they forgotten that this Russian bureaucracy was so little offended that before two years had passed it had concluded a general understanding with the German Government known as the Potsdam Agreement—an agreement which caused these prophets the acutest discomposure? Englishmen might be reminded of a saying attributed to M. Hanotaux, one of the shrewdest politicians who in recent years has wielded the French Premiership—

"An Anglo-French alliance destined, whether desired or not, to arouse keen anxiety in Germany, would be a source of great strength for England. It would not, however, be a source of strength for France."

They might reflect that those who would stand to suffer most in an Anglo-French-German war would—the chances are ninety-nine to one—not be ourselves, nor the Germans, but the French. The chances that English soil would be violated and that we should be driven to defending our homes and hearths are appreciably less than in the case of either Frenchmen or Germans.[1] And, reflecting upon these things, they would be led to inquire whether, in point of accuracy, it is not a fact that many of the clearest-headed men at the head of affairs in, or prominent in the councils of, France are strongly in favour of a permanent understanding with Germany, that the sore of Alsace-Lorraine is gradually healing with the up-growth of the new generation, and that the process has been assisted by the Kaiser's recent statesmanlike action in granting self-government to those annexed provinces—one of which, at least, has always been more German than French. In this connection an article by M. Hanotaux—the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and distinguished historical student—in *La Revue Hebdomadaire* is worthy of note. After repudiating the charge that he is opposed to friendly relations with England, he declares himself—

"a convinced partisan of the policy of 'equilibrium'; I demand that France shall make it her business as far as possible to hold the 'balance even' between the great Powers."

[1] If those who in this country speak so light-heartedly of war had experienced in their persons the anguish of belonging to an invaded nation, they would call a very different tune. It is so easy to stir up strife from the depths of an editorial chair—so easy, and yet of all forms of cowardice there is none, surely, so contemptible.

Was it France's interest, he asks, in regard to recent events—

"to throw our sword violently into the balance of European quarrels when there was still need for us to proceed with the greatest circumspection in order to complete in Africa what had been undertaken—that is the question. After having pursued without success the chimera of the ring-fence *(encerclement)*,[1] we have had to abandon it, and we find ourselves confronted with the painful reality which compels us to cede the Congo[2] in exchange for a diminished Morocco."

M. Hanotaux echoes, for France, as a Frenchman, the sentiment I venture to suggest here that Englishmen should give expression to when perpetually reminded that we must think of France and French interests: "Friends with England"—he says—"very well. But France first," and he recommends the adoption, for France, of the policy here urged in these pages for Britain—

"If it be question of Germany, I should ask that France shall keep her hands free, that she shall act always in accordance with her duty and her actual and permanent interests, fearing nothing, forgetting nothing; but that French diplomacy shall always and everywhere work, according to circumstances, for the greatest profit of the present and for the best preparation for the future."

Precisely. Let Britain do the same, rejecting Sir Edward Grey's formula that such a policy would leave

[1] *I.e.* the policy of making a ring-fence around Germany which Germans have alleged to be Britain's object since Sir Edward Grey's accession to office, but which Sir Edward Grey has denied. That M. Hanotaux does not stand alone, however, is notorious. Another very distinguished Frenchman of international reputation, but belonging to a totally different political school, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, gave expression to the same belief in the Senate on February 6th last. After denouncing as absurd the idea that Germany could adopt a line of action in international affairs which would place her morally in the rear of other nations, and pointing to her willingness to submit any cause of dispute arising out of the Convention of November 4, 1911, to the Hague tribunal as the best answer to the allegation, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant added—

"And here appears the puerile character of our policy of the isolation of Germany substituted for the irreproachable policy of equilibrium and of truth which ought to be the policy of France."

[2] That, of course, is an exaggeration. The French have not ceded "the Congo" or anything approximately to its total area.

us "without a friend in Europe." "Friendships" which fetter a nation's freedom are unnatural compacts and the most dangerous of illusions.

Englishmen will not fail to perceive in the narrative of the events of last year a steady tendency in French official circles to draw nearer to Germany, and to bring a long-festering squabble (a sentiment which took into account the existence of a strong and legally unassailable German case) to a satisfactory solution. And they will, perchance, not dissociate the attacks indulged in in certain quarters here against the men who in France were working for that end,[1] and the proportionate sympathy expressed for those who were pulling in another direction, from the existence of sentiments among a section of thought at home which contemplates such a *rapprochement* with ill-disguised irritation. If they are at all affected by these observations, Englishmen will conclude that Britain's true *rôle,* the one responding alike to her real interests and to the professions of her public men, is to use her influence not to impede, but, should she be required to use it at all one way or another, to facilitate a thorough reconciliation between France and Germany.

The third key is to be sought in a serious effort at comprehension of both the difficulties and the necessities

[1] As a specimen of these attacks the article entitled " The New French Ministry " in the *Spectator* of January 20 last may be cited. In perusing it the reader will do well to bear in mind that, with one exception—that of M. de Selves, who had precedently quarrelled with his chief and resigned—the whole of M. Caillaux's colleagues (including M. Delcassé) spontaneously signed a public declaration immediately upon the fall of the Caillaux Cabinet, in which they asserted that M. Caillaux had not acted without consulting them, and that they were in full agreement with everything he had done. And yet the *Spectator* holds up M. Caillaux to execration, and goes far towards insinuating that he was a traitor to his country, unconscious, apparently, that in so doing it labels an entire French Government with the same stigma, and not only one French Government but three, because M. Caillaux, whatever may have been his mistakes, was merely carrying out, with more courage and consistency, the policy of his two predecessors (MM. Briand and Monis; *vide* Chapter XVI.). When will Englishmen realise the grotesqueness of this kind of history-making which they are asked to swallow? The article touches the sublime in its concluding paragraph when French public opinion is adjured to show " no mercy " to wicked Ministers who conceal their designs, well knowing that M. Delcassé has been in this respect the greatest offender the Third Republic has known M. Delcassé, for whom the *Spectator* has nothing but rhetorical flowers.

which confront German statesmen and the German people. Such an effort is surely not incompatible with a fixed and unvarying determination that, come what may, no decrease of the British fleet below the level of safety, can for one moment be entertained?[1] The analogy the anti-German party at home seeks to draw between the France of Napoleon 1st and industrial modern Germany, in order to make our flesh creep, must strike any one who tries to think it out, as even more comical than it is foolish. The France of a hundred years ago, drunk with military glory, at the feet of a military genius whose god was War and whose personal ambition was at once limitless, and uncontrollable by any force within France, bears as much resemblance in its motives, its needs, and its possibilities to the Germany of to-day as . . . well as the two most dissimilar objects which the reader's mind can conjure.

Germany's supreme need to-day is not war but peace, is not military conquest but trade, is not the acquisition of colonies peopled by a German-speaking race, but *markets*. The extension of trade, the extension of markets to feed an enormously expanding home industry, outcome of a yearly increase in population equal to the combined yearly increase of the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, and Italy—these are matters of life and death to Germany. A fair and open commercial field in every undeveloped area of the world's surface is a vital national necessity for Germany. The closing of potential markets to her trade

[1] This, however, does not imply that the nation should fail to guard itself against a recurrence of the unworthy panics which convulsed it in 1908 and 1909—panics as Captain Burgoyne, the editor of the *Navy League Annual*, who describes himself as "a hardened Tory, an enthusiastic Navy Leaguer, and an ardent (if imperfect) advocate of an all-powerful and ultra-efficient fleet," and who may be assumed to know what he is talking about, describes as being built "upon the flimsiest foundation." The agitation at that time this enthusiastic advocate of an all-powerful British navy declares to have been "one of the most portentous pieces of parliamentary humbug ever practised upon the electorate." It may be that Captain Burgoyne's political views are inclined to tinge his indictment of the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey and Mr. McKenna, but the tables and statements with which he supports it are impressive, and I am not aware that their accuracy has been challenged. (See "The Dreadnought Controversy" in the *Oxford and Cambridge Review*.) Unless Captain Burgoyne can be proved wrong in his facts the ordinary citizen will be forced to the double conclusion that, as in the Morocco controversy, he has been badly misled, and that the German Government has been much misrepresented.

in Africa, in Asia, in South America, Germany is bound to regard as a blow aimed straight at her heart. She cannot help herself. Either she must find work at home to do for her rapidly increasing population or she must be content to see that population emigrating *en masse* to foreign lands over-seas. To find her people in work, she not only requires expanding markets in which to sell her goods, but she requires the raw material of the tropics and sub-tropics to sustain her industries and manufactures. Moreover, she must feed her people too, and she is no longer able to do that from her own soil's output. Owing, on the one hand to growth of population, and on the other to the current which, as in our case, is sweeping the people from the land into the towns, aggravated in the case of Germany by the political and social disadvantages under which the rural population, or at least a considerable section of it, suffers by comparison with the urban population; Germany is becoming increasingly less able to support her own people with the products of her own agriculture. These national necessities automatically entail both a constant and growing addition to German shipping, and the necessity of adequate protection for that shipping on the high seas.

The guiding motive of German foreign policy to-day is to secure for the German people unfettered access to markets over-seas, as large a share as possible in the development of those markets, and a voice in the acquisition of over-sea territories which may fall, through the course of events, into the international melting-pot. It is not land hunger, but trade hunger which inspires her, and trade hunger responds to the fundamental demand of her national existence. That is the bed-rock reason why Germany opposed the secret partition of Morocco between France and Spain, when she got to know of it. That is why Germany stood out pertinaciously for her acquired and her legal rights, and insisted that if France was to get Morocco it should only be at a price (in which she did but follow the lead of Italy, Britain, and Spain), and on the understanding that Morocco should not be turned into a preserve for the French financier and *concessionnaire*. That is why she exacted a price from Russia in exchange for standing aside while Russia—with Britain looking helplessly on—proceeded to absorb the largest and commercially most valuable section of Persia preparatory, so the *Novoe Vremyia* is good enough to inform us, to the absorption of the whole. That is why Germany will fight against any

attempt to close the Chinese markets in favour of any particular Power, or group of Powers. That is why Germany insisted last autumn that if Belgian rule in the Congo should ultimately become impossible, France must so far modify her reversionary claim to the Congo State as to consent to the problem being carried before the Signatory Powers which created the Congo State. That is why Germany will find it impossible to allow that her newly-secured territory in the French Congo, or that the French Congo outside that territory and subject to the freedom of trade clauses of the Berlin Act, shall remain a vast rubber monopoly for the benefit of a handful of French and Belgian *concessionaires*. That is why, if the Portugese West and East African dependencies come into the market she will demand her share.

But to carry out this necessity of her national life, Germany must be secure of such a position in the councils of the nations as to make her ever and always a factor to be reckoned with. This she can only attain by the possession of a fleet which will make the strongest Power hesitate either to attack her or to ignore her. People who persist in representing the German fleet as built for purely aggressive purposes, pointing to Germany's great army as sufficient to secure her safety, altogether overlook the fact that if Germany is still, as ever, compelled to protect her land frontiers and maintain her position in Europe, the old Germany of continental-limited interests has passed away, and has been replaced by a Germany whose national existence is equally bound up with her over-seas commerce and industry, which have largely become the life-blood of the nation.[1]

Germany's naval armaments will expand and contract in the measure in which her national needs are, or are not, regarded by Britain as a cause for blocking action. The matter is largely in our own hands. It is a matter of general policy. For example, it is perfectly obvious that Germany must have coaling and repair stations at some point or points over-seas. She is so situated to-day that, even under easy steam, she would be unable to reach her

[1] This chapter was written before Mr. Winston Churchill described the German navy as a "luxury." It seems a pity that some of our governing statesmen do not take the trouble to make themselves acquainted with the elementary national problems of the countries they refer to.

possessions in the Pacific in case of war. That is an intolerable position for any great Power to submit to in perpetuity. Is it reasonable, is it just, that we should for ever oppose Germany's acquisition of coaling stations on the high seas? Yet it is well known that we have been so opposing her. A few years ago the Foreign Office was convulsed at the idea of a German purchase of one of the Canary Islands. If to-morrow there were a question of Germany's buying the Azores, we should have half the Press of Great Britain asserting that the purchase would sound the death-knell of the British Empire.[1] Sir Edward Grey was appalled at the phantom of a German naval base at Agadir, a mud-hole which would involve an expenditure of millions even to turn into a decent port, let alone a naval base. The Foreign Office was prepared to take immense risks in order to prevent Libreville falling into German hands. How much longer is this insane dog-in-the-manger policy to be pursued?

The growth of modern Germany may be very inconvenient for us, but we have to make up our minds that it is inevitable, just as the increasing vigour of German industrial competition is inevitable. We have become so long accustomed to supremacy in the world of business, circumstances favoured us with such a tremendously long start, that the awakening is necessarily unwelcomed. But to credit the Germans with all sorts of Machiavellian designs is childish and undignified. We should be better employed in turning our Foreign and Colonial and Board of Trade Offices inside out; strengthening our Consular Service; publishing the reports of our Consuls broadcast, instead of suppressing them; effecting some much-needed changes in the representation of our diplomatic interests in certain foreign capitals; making it part of the functions of our Embassies and Legations abroad to report upon all the diplomatic and political aspects affecting trade problems; infusing some new life into our Chambers of Commerce; correcting many of our antiquated methods of conducting trade abroad, and recognising that, in these days, commerce must be treated as a science, and not merely as an occupation.

Nationally speaking, is there, for us, anything in the German national requirements, such as here defined, and,

[1] We should have had a month ago.

I believe, accurately defined, which threatens vital British interests other than in the sense of keen commercial competition? If so, what? Does Germany close her over-sea dependencies to our trade? No. Does she impose differential tariffs therein in favour of her own, as the French and the Portuguese do? No. The British merchant and British trade are treated in German West and East Africa and in the Pacific on exactly the same equal footing as we treat German merchants and trade in our oversea possessions. In her home market Germany's fiscal policy and ours differ. Whether Germany's home fiscal policy is the best for Germany is a matter upon which opinion in Germany is divided, and judging from the recent elections is tending more and more towards free trade. But it is worthy of note that, in the main, the bitterest critics of Germany in Britain are precisely to be found among the supporters of a fiscal policy similar to that which they denounce Germany for practising, although France (be it said *en passant*) practises it also. But over-seas, Germany's commercial policy is like ours, the "open-door" which she pursues and is bound to pursue in her own interests, it seems to me, wherever she acquires a political footing, for the simple reason that, unlike France, Belgium and Portugal, she needs to find employment for the *nation* primarily, not profits for the favoured individual; *i.e.* she seeks *an abundance* of raw material from the tropics rather than large profits upon a smaller output—and *that* she can only get by a system of free commerce. *That* she can only get by making every brown and black man who acknowledges her flag a richer man than he was before, inasmuch as the richer he is the more he will buy of her goods with the raw products of his soil. I contend that if Germany adheres to the policy of the open-door for trade over-seas, the national interest of Great Britain lies in the direction of not hampering her over-sea expansion in the undeveloped tropical and sub-tropical regions of the world in favour of a Power which closes the door; but rather in that of facilitating this expansion, assuming, of course, that our rulers mean what they say when they tell us that, save here and there,[1] we have got enough exotic territory on our hands already.

[1] Which means, of course, that they want Delagoa Bay and the Katanga, and are now more or less driven—alas! for both honour and strategy—to absorb Southern Persia.

But if these conclusions are contested, what is the alternative? Does any thinking Briton really believe that we can suppress Germany, that we can stop the works of that mighty human engine, arrest the flow of that rising population, contain its development to strictly circumscribed limits, *smash or crush nearly seventy million people* by a successful war? A successful war would not be the end but the beginning of a legacy of hatred—of which no man could estimate the final reckoning. If the German fleet were hopelessly shattered, what would the patriotic German say? Why, that it was his own fault. He did not build enough, he would argue, and he would promptly, tirelessly set to work to build another navy in its place—if he had to go without beer and sausages. If it comes to France or Germany as an ally of Great Britain, look at the potentialities of each as a world-force, and let us beware of backing the wrong horse. But it should be neither. Let us, on the contrary, keep our hands free, unfettered by alliances or understandings of a compromising character from which our partners may profit but from which, as John Bright said long ago, we stand in the long run to lose; and let us come back to the only sound ideal of policy for Great Britain at the opening of the twentieth century, *i.e.* to play our own part in the Concert of Europe when necessity arises; to uphold, if necessary by our whole strength, international treaties when violated *to the detriment either of our honour or of our interests,* but not to assert our intention of upholding them when neither our honour nor our interests are directly affected, especially if we do not mean to carry out our proclaimed intention; to use our moral influence, which is enormous (so long as it is not compromised by such inconsistencies as querulously objecting to a breach of international etiquette one moment and participating in a similar breach the next), in favour of a just policy towards weaker peoples and coloured races which, in the ultimate resort, is wise as well as right; to draw nearer by some well-thought-out scheme of Imperial partnership in matters of defence and foreign policy to our great self-governing Dependencies.

Let us not allow ourselves to be mentally confused by such arguments as Sir Edward Grey used the other day in order to turn criticism away from the policy with which he has become identified, and which consisted in an attempt to represent the critics of that policy as being desirous of interfering here, there and everywhere, whereas

the gravamen of complaint is precisely the contrary, viz. : that *he* interfered, unnecessarily and unhappily, in the Franco-German dispute over Morocco, and that, having himself concluded a Treaty with Russia over Persia, he has shown himself unable to make Russia conform to that Treaty.

Let us on the contrary, made wiser, perchance, by this Morocco affair, persist in demanding until we obtain it, some measure of effective national control over our own foreign policy. Let us hold out the hand of friendship to Germany, not ostentatiously, not by sacrificing in the remotest degree our self-respect, not by offering her absurd "concessions," but in a spirit of frank recognition that between our two nations there is neither sense, nor dignity, nor justice, in petty jealousy and unworthy recrimination. In a spirit of frank recognition that Germany's industrial progress does but demonstrate the need for renewed activities of our own in a field of honourable economic rivalry—that as she has learned from us, so may we have to learn from her. In a spirit of frank recognition that she is as fully entitled as we may be to make such naval provision as her statesmen consider advisable, adequately to protect her extensive over-sea connections.[1] In a spirit of determination that we shall allow no influences on our side, no personal prejudices or incitements to suspicion and mistrust, to prevent a gradual but sure advance towards the reestablishment of those harmonious relations which are alone worthy of two great peoples who have fought side by side on many a stricken field, who have never fought against each other, who come of the same stock, between whom association and history have forged innumerable links, whose respective prosperity and progress are indispensable to each other's welfare, and whose reconciliation would remove the mists of apprehension and uncertainty which weigh like a nightmare upon the world.

[1] According to the recently published edition of the *Navy League's Annual,* the relative British and German position is as follows :— *Dreadnoughts in commission March,* 1911 : British 12, German 5. *Pre-Dreadnoughts:* British 40, German 20. *Armoured cruisers:* British 34, German 9. *Smaller cruisers:* British 96, German 41. *First-class destroyers:* British 61, German 18. *Submarines (built and building):* British 83, German 36.

CHRONOLOGICAL PRECIS

1880

First international Convention over the affairs of Morocco, held at Madrid. Largely owing to German influence, the "most favoured nation treatment" in the matter of trade is extended by Morocco to all nations.

1889

The Moorish Government sends an embassy to Berlin.

1890

The German Minister at Fez signs a commercial Treaty with Morocco for five years. The German Government informs the signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention that Germany will not ratify the Treaty if the Powers object.

1891-2

Lord Salisbury despatches a special Mission to Morocco, and in a letter of instructions to the British envoy, defines British policy as being aimed at the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Morocco. The text of the draft commercial Treaty to be submitted to the Sultan by the British envoy is communicated by Lord Salisbury to the signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention and their support invited, seeing that Treaty "does not seek to secure the slightest privilege in favour of England." All the signatory Powers except France give their support.

The British Mission at Fez is supported by the German and Italian Ministers. It fails owing to French intrigue. Its failure is heralded in the French Press as a triumph of French diplomacy.

1894-1900

Outward quiescence in Moroccan affairs, but the years 1899-1900 marked by increasing tension between the Algerian (French) Government and the Moorish Government in relation to "frontier incidents."

1901

April. French annexation of the Tuat, Igli and Zusfana oases over which Morocco exercised a shadowy sovereignty.

Increased Franco-Moorish tension.

July. The Sultan sends a mission to Paris. M. Delcassé, French Foreign Minister, receives it. A " Protocol " is signed in which the French Government declares its respect for the integrity of Morocco.

The Sultan sends a commercial Mission to England.

June-July. M. Delcassé opens secret negotiations with Spain for a Franco-Spanish division of Morocco.

1902

April. M. Delcassé signs a further agreement with Morocco in which both Governments promise one another " dual and mutual support " in dealing with raiding bands in the undetermined regions bordering their common frontiers.

Jan.-Sept. M. Delcassé's secret negotiations with Spain continue. M. Delcassé promises France's " diplomatic support " in the event of objections by a third Power (England). In September the Franco-Spanish Treaty assumes its final shape.

December. In December the Spanish Premier resigns and his successor declines to ratify the Treaty, owing to British diplomatic representations (revealed in November, 1911).

1903

May. The President of the French Republic visits Algiers, whither the Sultan of Morocco despatches a special mission to meet him.

Increasing demands by the French Colonial Party in Paris and by the Algerian Government for " energetic action " in Morocco.

November. The Sultan of Morocco begins contracting loans upon the French market.

1904

April. General settlement of outstanding questions between France and Great Britain.

April. Publication of a general Anglo-French Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco, in which the French Government declares that it has no intention " of altering the political status of Morocco."

October. Publication of a Franco-Spanish Declaration regarding Morocco, in which both Governments declare themselves " firmly attached to the integrity of Morocco."

April. Conclusion of a secret understanding between Britain and France, in which the British Government postulates that Mediterranean Morocco shall fall to Spain in certain eventualities. (Revealed in November, 1911.)

October. Conclusion of a secret understanding approved by the British Government between France and Spain prefiguring the division of Morocco into French and Spanish spheres of political and economic action (revealed in November, 1911).

A French Syndicate takes over the Moorish loan and Morocco contracts a total debt of £2,500,000 towards certain French banking establishments.

March. M. Delcassé assures the German Ambassador at Paris that France desires to "uphold the existing political and territorial status" of Morocco.

March. The *North German Gazette* (the official organ of the German Government) declares that, in view of the "reiterated assurances" of the French Government that France had no territorial designs upon Morocco, German interests, "so far as can be gathered at the moment," are in no jeopardy from the Anglo-French negotiations, of which news has been in circulation.

April. Prince Bülow, the German Chancellor, being questioned in the Reichstag on the Anglo-French public Declaration, three days after its publication, declares that he had no official notification of it, but that he had no reason to believe it is directed against Germany, which has commercial interests in Morocco, and will protect them.

October. Reuter's Agency in Paris declares that every detail of the Franco-Spanish negotiations has been made known to the British Government, that the terms of the Treaty are regarded with satisfaction by the French, Spanish, and British Governments, and that it contains a number of secret clauses which will not be made public.

October. *Le Temps* publishes an interview with M. Etienne, the leader of the French Colonial Party, in which the existence of secret clauses receives further corroboration.

M. Delcassé presents a formidable series of reforms to the Sultan of Morocco. Growing alarm of the Moorish Government at French designs.

1905

March. The German Emperor [1] calls at Tangier and declares to the Sultan's representatives that he intends to safeguard German interests in Morocco, and that he looks upon the Sultan as an "absolutely independent Sovereign."

April. Explosion of Anger in the French and British Press.

April. The Sultan of Morocco rejects French reform scheme.

April-June. German diplomacy presses for a renewed International Conference on the affairs of Morocco following the precedent of the Madrid Convention.

M. Delcassé does not officially notify Germany of the conclusion of the arrangement with Britain.

M. Delcassé does not officially notify Germany of the Franco-Spanish arrangement.

April-June. M. Delcassé and the British Foreign Office oppose International Conference.

[1] Acting upon the advice of Prince Bülow.
(*Imperial Germany*, Cassell.)

April-June. The *Times* adopts an attitude of extreme violence towards Germany, and denounces all idea of a Conference. It declares that the Moroccan question was settled in 1904, and that another Conference would be a " capitulation " and " humiliation " for England and France.

June. The British Foreign Office informs the Sultan that Britain will be no party to a Conference.

June. M. Delcassé resists a Conference, which the French Premier, M. Rouvier, and M. Delcassé's other colleagues favour. M. Delcassé resigns.

June. The *Times* represents M. Delcassé's resignation as having been demanded by Germany.

July. M. Delcassé, soon after his fall, is interviewed by *Le Gaulois* and foreshadows the annihilation of Germany's ports, trade, and mercantile marine through an Anglo-French naval coalition.

October. *Le Matin* publishes a statement purporting to be an account of the last meeting of the French Cabinet before M. Delcassé's resignation, in the course of which the latter is said to have informed his colleagues that, in the event of a Franco-German rupture, Britain had undertaken to mobilise her fleet, seize the Kiel Canal, and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein.

October. M. Jaurès, leader of the Socialist Party in France, affirms the general accuracy of the revelations in *Le Matin.*

Year closes with Anglo-German relations much embittered.

1906

February. Opening of International Conference at Algeciras attended by Moorish representatives. The Conference draws up an " Act," " in the name of God Almighty," and " based upon the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality."

The concluding Article of the Act provides that:

" All existing Treaties, Conventions and arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco remain in force. It is, however, agreed that in case their provisions be found to conflict with those of the present General Act, the stipulations of the latter shall prevail."

June. The Sultan ratifies the Act.

1907

March. French occupation of Udja (Moorish territory) in punishment of the murder of a French subject. Promises of withdrawal not kept.

March. M Pichon, French Foreign Minister, denies that the occupation of Udja is " a step towards Fez."

September. Franco-Spanish Syndicate, in the course of constructing a railway at Casablanca, desecrates a Moorish cemetery; collision with populace, several European workmen killed; Casablanca bombarded by French, many thousands of Moors killed.

Permanent occupation by French of Casablanca, Rabat, and, by degrees, of the whole of the Shawiya district.

November. French Chamber votes an Order of the Day disclaiming an intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Morocco.

November. France presents the Moorish Government with an indemnity bill of £2,400,000.

1908

January. Outburst of Moorish fury against Abdulaziz the Sultan. Mulai-Hafid proclaimed Sultan.

January. French Chamber disclaims any intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Morocco, and proclaims France's intention to observe the Algeciras Act.

June. French Chamber again registers intention to observe Algeciras Act.

December. French Chamber again registers intention to observe Algeciras Act.

1909

January. French Chamber repeats intention to observe Algeciras Act.

February. Franco-German Declaration respecting Morocco. France therein declares herself "firmly attached to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Morocco."

Franco-German discussions as to joint economic enterprises in Morocco and elsewhere continue.

November. French Chamber registers once more intention to observe Algeciras Act.

1910

Fresh inroads of international finance into Morocco. By the close of 1910 Morocco's indebtedness to Europe is £6,520,000. Moorish customs and virtually all other sources of local revenue mortgaged to meet interest.

Franco-German colonial "conversations" continue.

Mulai-Hafid, unable to raise revenue from ordinary sources, indulges in many cruel exactions. Condition of Morocco becomes chaotic.

1911

Jan.-June. Franco-German discussions continue.

January. Preliminary Franco-German Agreement of December, 1910, dropped by Briand Cabinet.

February. Franco-German Agreement revived by M. Briand on a new basis.

February. New Agreement signed.

February. Fall of Briand Cabinet.

March. Monis Cabinet repudiates Agreement.

March. French Chamber declares its intention of upholding the Algeciras Act.

April. Fez reported blocked by insurgents.

May. General Moinier starts for its relief at the head of 30,000 men.

May. Germany informs France that she (Germany) reserves to herself complete liberty of action in view of altered *status* in Morocco.

May. Sir E. Grey publicly approves of French march on Fez.

June. Fez relieved. French troops remain in occupation.

June. Spain, disbelieving French disinterestedness, and fearful of losing her advantages under the secret Convention, pours troops into the Riff, and answers the occupation of Fez by occupying Larash and El-Kaser.

June. Monis Cabinet falls.

June. Fierce attacks upon Spain in French Press.

June. 100,000 French and Spanish troops in Morocco. Authority of Moroccan Government entirely disappears.

June. Stale-mate in Franco-German Colonial Conversations.

July. Germany sends *Panther* to Agadir. Advises Powers.

July. Outcry against Germany in British Press headed by the *Times*. Opinion in France not so pronouncedly hostile.

July 4. French Foreign Minister leaves Paris for Holland with the President of the French Republic on an official visit.

July 4. Sir Edward Grey adopts strong pro-French attitude, and insists that British Government must be a party to any Franco-German discussions.

July 9. Negotiations opened between the German and French Governments.

July 20. *Times* announces that Germany is making unfair demands upon France for compensation in equatorial Africa and declares that no British Government can tolerate these demands even if a French Government were feeble enough to sanction them; presses for the despatch of British men of war to Agadir.

July 21. Sir Edward Grey sends for German Ambassador, and, after saying that Germany appeared to be making impossible demands upon France, hints that it may be necessary to take steps to protect British interests. German Ambassador protests Germany has made no such demands, and that she has not the least intention of injuring British interests.

July 21. Mr. Lloyd George makes a threatening speech at the Mansion House.

July 22. The *Times* emphasises the anti-German character of Mr. Lloyd George's speech, and compares Germany to Dick Turpin.

November. The Paris Press discloses the secret Anglo-Franco-Spanish arrangements concluded in 1904.

November. Franco-German Agreement.

Nov.-Dec. Revelations by Captain Faber, M.P., and others that the British Government was prepared to lend military and naval aid to France in the event of a Franco-German rupture. Qualified denial by British Foreign Office.

Year closes with Anglo-German friction poisoning the international atmosphere.

INDEX

G

H

L

INDEX

U