

UNIVERSITY OF ST. MICHAEL'S COLLEGE



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THE  
THEOLOGICAL WORKS  
OF  
HERBERT THORNDIKE.



THE  
THEOLOGICAL WORKS

OF

HERBERT THORNDIKE,

SOMETIME PREBENDARY OF THE COLLEGIATE CHURCH OF ST. PETER,  
WESTMINSTER.

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An Epilogue to the Tragedy of the Church of England, being a necessary Consideration and brief Resolution of the chief Controversies in Religion that divide the Western Church: occasioned by the present calamity of the Church of England; in three books: viz. of

- I. THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN TRUTH;
- II. THE COVENANT OF GRACE;
- III. THE LAWS OF THE CHURCH:

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OF THE

COVENANT OF GRACE.



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## CHAPTER XXI.

THE OPINION THAT MAKES THE PREDETERMINATION OF MAN'S WILL BY GOD THE SOURCE OF HIS FREEDOM ; AND WHEREIN JANSENIUS DIFFERS FROM IT. OF NECESSITY UPON SUPPOSITION AND ABSOLUTE. THE NECESSITY OF THE WILL FOLLOWING THE LAST DICTATE OF THE UNDERSTANDING IS ONLY UPON SUPPOSITION ; AS ALSO THAT WHICH GOD'S FORESIGHT CREATES. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIFFERENT AND UNDETERMINED.

THESE things thus premised, as concerning that estate, where-  
in the Gospel overtaketh the will of man, to whom Christ is  
tendered, being under original sin ; I say, that it finds him  
not void of that freedom of choice in doing or not doing this  
or that, which stands in opposition to necessity, but that which  
stands in opposition to the bondage and servitude of sin.  
This position is intended to contradict an opinion, which  
seemeth to be very ordinary among divines, as well of the  
Reformation as the Church of Rome, though more ingenu-  
ously professed and maintained by these ; who, pretending to  
derive the efficacy of God's predestination, and the grace  
which it provideth, from that decree of His will whereby  
He determineth the will of His creature to do or not to do  
whatsoever is indeed done or not done, in order of nature  
before it determine itself, do consequently profess, that, not-  
withstanding this predetermination of the will is no less  
effectual than God's omnipotence (whereof it is the imme-  
diate and indefeasible consequence and effect), yet there is  
no freedom in the creature, no contingency in the effects of  
it, but that which followeth upon this will of God, determin-  
ing understanding creatures to do that which they do freely,  
as it determines natural things to do that which they do  
necessarily<sup>a</sup>.

The opi-  
nion, that  
makes the  
predeter-  
mination of  
man's will  
by God the  
source of  
his free-  
dom.

<sup>a</sup> This account, so far as it relates to the doctrine of the Thomists, is taken from Jansenius, Augustinus, tom. iii. De Gratia Christi Salvatoris, lib. viii. c. 1. p. 348. a. ed. Paris, 1641. "Doctores hujus temporis qui de gratia efficaci magno conatu disputa-  
tant, in duas capitales opiniones dis-  
tracti sunt. Alii," (scil. sectatores S. Thomæ) "naturam ejus in quadam Dei

motione aut impulsu collocant, quæ ex se voluntatem efficaciter determinet ad consensum, ita scilicet et ut, ea posita et passive recepta in voluntatem, statim consensus ejus præsto sit, simulque stare non possit ut dissentiat. Hanc ut aliquis habeat dicunt non esse in hominis potestate, quia datur et negatur ex Divino beneplacito; sine qua tamen fieri non possit, ut quicquam aut boni

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II.

§ 2. This position, though I intend not to admit, yet I count it a point of ingenuity in them, who think they free themselves of great difficulties by supposing it, expressly to maintain the truth of that supposition, whereof they make so much advantage. For they, who, not daring to encounter the difficulties wherewith it is chargeable, do claim the consequences of it without premising the express supposition of it, do as good as say nothing; where they advise not the reader of those difficulties, which the prime principle that they proceed upon is burthened with. But he, that sees how particular instances depend upon general principles, shall not stick to judge of their positions by the dependance they have upon this supposition, so soon as they are informed of the credit which it deserves. Now this predetermination being the immediate effect of God's omnipotency, as for the cause of it, [so<sup>b</sup>] for the nature of it, troubles very much those that maintain it to say wherein it consists; as indeed it may very well trouble any man to say of what colour a *chimæra* is, being in *rerum natura* just nothing. For if they say it is a principle infused by the immediate work of grace into the will, it is straight-ways evident, that the having of it is not to make the will able, which all habitual endowments tend to, but to make it actually to work. It must therefore consist in a certain motion or impulse, immediately wrought by God in the will, which though it is not in the will to have, depending merely upon the will of God, yet that neither good nor ill can be done without it: being necessary (as they think<sup>c</sup>) to the effectual determining of the will upon two accounts; first, as the will is a secondary cause, that cannot work unless moved by the first cause; secondly, as the will, not being determined of itself, cannot be determined to any act but by the same first cause. But these two accounts seem to me both one. For nothing can determine the will to act, speak-

operetur aut mali. Necessitatem ejus tantam ex duplici capite proficisci, ex subordinatione secundæ causæ sub prima, et ex indifferentia liberæ voluntatis, quæ non est apta ut aliquid agat nisi ab agente superiori determinetur. Alii, (viz. Suarez, Lessius, Molina), . . . dicunt gratiam efficacem esse sitam . . . in quadam illuminatione intellectus et motibus voluntatis, quibus

Deus et allicit voluntatem ut velit et vires volendi tribuit simulque concurrat cum voluntate si voluerit," &c. "Primi vocant communiter gratiam illam suam *predeterminationem physicam*, secundi *congruam*."

<sup>b</sup> Corrected from MS. "as," in orig. text.

<sup>c</sup> See note a.

ing of that which determines it formally, or in the nature of a formal cause, but the act of it. For, supposing the will to act, and excluding whatsoever else might be considered, the will remains determined: not supposing that, it may further  
 164 be questioned, what determines it. The question then being only, what it is that determines the will in the nature of the effective cause, the difficulty that causeth the question is but one; because it is presumed, that the second cause cannot act, if not acted, that is, determined to act, by the first. The nature then of this motion, received and lodged in the will, is imagined nevertheless to be successive; such as is the being of colours in the air, when they go to the eye, or that impulse which a handicraft-man moves his tool with<sup>d</sup>. And the necessity of it standeth upon a general account, not of original sin, but of God's creature (such as in<sup>e</sup> all estates is requisite to the acts of the will); because nothing can be done by the creature but that which God shall determine it to do.

§ 3. But there is of late another opinion started in the Church of Rome by Jansenius, in his *Augustinus*; which maintains, that the will, in all actions that are good according to Christianity, is determined by grace, effectually inclining the will by the love of true good, preventing (not expecting) the motion thereof, and producing that influence of the will whereby formally it acteth<sup>f</sup>. The nature of it, then,

And wherein Jansenius differs from it.

<sup>d</sup> "Juxta sententiam istorum recentiorum" (viz. the Thomists), "prædeterminatione physica est motio nescio quæ virtuosa, quæ habet esse quoddam incompletum, et sit in voluntate per modum quo colores sunt in aere, et impetus in re quæ impellitur." Cornel. Jansen., *ibid.* c. 2. p. 349. a.

<sup>e</sup> So corrected in MS. "as the will in," in orig. text.

<sup>f</sup> "Quamvis . . . tanta inter physicam prædeterminationem, prout a Scholasticis defendi solet, et medicinale Christi adjutorium discrepantia sit, in hoc tamen . . . cum ea convenit, quod officium physice prædeterminandi voluntatem ei vere competat, eoque vocabulo non abstracte sed concrete sumpto merito appellari possit. Nam hoc ipso quo, secundum principia sancti Augustini, gratia vera Christi est 'adjutorium quo' fit velle atque perficere, prout ab 'adju-

torio sine quo non' distinguitur; itemque adjutorium non 'potentiale,' quod velle et agere possumus, si volumus, sed 'voluntatis et actionis,' quo Deus facit ut reipsa velimus et agamus; prout ea fuse suis locis demonstrata sunt: perspicue patet, istud adjutorium esse tale, ut voluntatem cum quacunque alia gratia in potentia constitutam ad actum protrahat, non si voluerit (quemadmodum gratia Adami et Angelorum," &c.), "sed ei efficacissime præbendo ut velit. Non enim expectat ut voluntas secum influat, . . . sed facit secum influere voluntatem, applicans eam ad volendum agendumque, quicquid per eam Deus volendum agendumque constituerit. Cum enim per terrenas cupiditates voluntas ad non volendum, imo ad repugnandum, determinata sit; tollit istam depressionem atque determinationem in contrarium, et reflectit eam

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II.

consists in that very act of life, whereby the reasonable creature exerciseth its choice, no ways requisite to the actions of nature, which man is able to do under original sin; but merely upon that account, as the cure of it, restoring the due command over that concupiscence wherein original sin consisteth, and not extending to the state of innocence.

§ 4. Which notwithstanding, the will is no less naturally determined by it, than by that principle which the other opinion advanceth. For they say both, that the will is not determined by the object, howsoever proposed, but morally; as he that outwardly adviseth or persuadeth, determines him that resolves, upon that consideration which he advanceth, to that which he proposeth. And therefore this determination, both agree, satisfies not that efficacy of grace, which the scriptures proposed in the premises require. Therefore, as the former opinion determineth the will naturally, by a principle really lodged in the nature of the will; so this, by the very vital act of willing, really subsisting in the nature of the will, though produced by God, a cause above nature; which, when the delight in good which it importeth is so great as to swallow up all contradiction, it determineth to the same, preventing the determination of itself; when otherwise, acknowledging, that, though of the same nature with that which overcome, it is nevertheless defeasible.

§ 5. From this ground there flows another difference between these two opinions; [as<sup>h</sup>] we go further from the fountain head, still more visible. For the former, admitting free-will to

in bonum, non solum si libero arbitrio hoc videatur et velit; sed ineffabili sua luce atque suavitate faciendo, ut ei sic videatur, et velit. Sic enim Deus avellit cor lapideum," &c. "Non enim hoc aliter facit (Deus) quam voluntatem inclinando, applicando, determinando, et quia prævenit ipsam voluntatis prædeterminationem, etiam prædeterminando, non solum moraliter, sed vera, reali, et physica determinatione. Moraliter enim prædeterminatio illa dicitur, quæ tantum se habet ex parte objecti, quemadmodum facit ille qui consulit, suadet, præcipit, rogat, blanditur sive extrinsecus sive intrinsecus; sed hæc se habet in ipsa potentia voluntatis, quam propriæ suæ suavitatis magnitudine ad volendum

applicat, et applicando determinat, utpote causans in ea hoc ipsum ut se determinet, ideoque prædeterminat." Cornel. Jansen, *ibid.*, c. iii. p. 351. a, b. — "Id quod tam constanter docet Augustinus, adiutorium Christi esse adiutorium 'quo' Deus donat ut voluntas velit, aut ex duobus unum præ altero velit, aut ardentius velit, efficiendo ut delectet, aut amplius delectet; quod enim amplius nos delectat, secundum hoc operemur necesse est . . . Nempe infundendo delectationem objecti, quæ amplius nos demulcent, hoc ipsum necesse est ut velimus et operemur." *Id.*, *ibid.* b.

§ See the passages cited in note f.

<sup>h</sup> Added from MS.



be a faculty, able to act or not to act (supposing all that is requisite to enable it, in particular the helps of God's grace), assoils all difficulties, by distinguishing the compound sense of those sayings, which express contradiction between predetermination and freedom, from the divided sense of the same. For example, if it be said, that to which the will is predetermined must needs come to pass, therefore the will cannot be free to choose whether it shall be done or not; the answer is, that the will is able to do otherwise "*in sensu diviso non in sensu composito,*" dividing it from the determination of it, that is, not being determined, but not putting it and the determination of it together, that is, being determined. So the will hath, as they say, "*simultatem potentiae,*" not "*potentiam simultatis;*" that is, in their barbarous Latin, a power of doing this as well as that at one and the same time, not a power of choosing or acting both this and that at one and the same time. For the ability of doing may well stand with the actual choice of not doing; but actually at the same time to choose to do and not to do, are terms inconsistent: as it may be truly said, that a white wall may be black, though not, supposing it continue white<sup>1</sup>. This dis-

C H A P.  
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<sup>1</sup> "Fere quidquid ab adversariis objici potest, unica illa distinctione sensus compositi ac divisi, quam isti prædeterminationis physicæ defensores adhibent, solvi ac dissipari potest. Non enim necesse est, aiunt, ut cum omnibus illis ad agendum requisitis, inter quæ etiam cœlestis delectatio est, stet simul ut non agat voluntas; sed solum ut possit non agere. In libero enim arbitrio quantumcumque ad agendum præparato, imo determinato et actu operante, reperitur (ut ipsi docent) simulas potentia ad operandum et non operandum; non potentia simultatis, ut videlicet simul agat et non agat. Hoc est, ut clarius dicatur, in libero arbitrio est potestas ad opposita, non tamen potestas ad opposita simul in se habenda. Hoc enim nemo nisi fatuus dixerit. Hoc ergo sensu intelligendum esse docent id quod adversarii ad libertatem postulant, ut videlicet positus omnibus ad agendum requisitis, etiam cœlesti quacumque delectatione et prædeterminatione, stet simul ut possit non velle, non autem ut simul non velit. Potentia enim non volendi non repugnat omnibus illis ad volendum requisitis, sed

solum, quod actualiter non velit. Itaque, in sensu diviso, potest voluntas non facere id quod Deus per gratiam efficacem in ea operatur; in sensu vero composito, nequaquam. . . . . Eodem modo locus Concilii Tridentini, quo dicit, quod 'liberum arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum possit dissentire si velit;' itemque quod 'inspirationem recipiens, illam et abjicere potest;' non difficulter ab eis et a nobis solvi potest. Concilium enim in sensu diviso, inquit, loquitur; quo significatur, ita hominem recipere Dei inspirationem, et motionem, et excitationem istius delectationis aut prædeterminationis (addo, si libet, etiam actualem ipsius voluntatis consensionem ac motum), ut nihil auferat ejus voluntatis potestatem dissentendi, si velit, quamvis actualis dissensus cum illis præsuppositis componi nequeat. Potestas enim dissentendi non repugnat isti excitationi, aut delectationi, aut prædeterminationi, aut ipsi etiam consensui actuali voluntatis, sed tantum dissensus actualis: quemadmodum, cum paries albus vere dicitur esse posse niger, non hoc significatur, quod albedine permanente simul in eo

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II.

inction I cannot see how Jansenius can employ, though he think he may<sup>k</sup>, whether it serve the purpose or not<sup>l</sup>. For that indifference wherein the first opinion maintaineth the very nature of free-will to consist, at least in words (whether they signify any thing or not), the second maintaineth to be so far from the nature of it, that the freedom of the will is not to be had and obtained without either abating or extinguishing all indifference in it: the will being free from sin and slave to righteousness (which is an addition making the 165 slavery of the will no slavery, but the freedom thereof perfect freedom), or else free from righteousness and slave to sin (which slavery is perfect slavery, but imaginary freedom), according as it grows, of indifferent, determined to righteousness or to sin; which he pretendeth to be the only freedom whereof it is capable<sup>m</sup>. And how then should Jansenius employ the distinction premised, to salve that indifference of the will which he disavoweth? And therefore, in consequence hereunto, they can neither admit that any help of grace is sufficient that is not effectual (and so, that he who keeps not the covenant of grace was ever able to keep it), nor that our Lord Christ shed His blood for any but them who are and shall be actually saved by it.

[And those  
of the Re-  
formation.]

§ 6. As for those of the Reformation (amongst whom it is manifest, that this great question of the agreement between grace and free-will is as hotly disputed as in the Church of Rome),

*nigredo reperiri possit, sed quod simul cum albedine sit in eo potentia ut fiat niger. Hæc et similia respondent ii qui physicam tument prædeterminationem, ut per eam non destrui libertatem patefaciant. Quæ sane omnia ad istam veram Augustini gratiam ab adversantium argumentis eripiendam, tuendamque illam arbitrii libertatem quam putant esse necessariam, mutatis tantum vocabulis, huc transferri possent." Jansen., ut supra, c. 4. tom. iii. p. 352. a, b.*

<sup>k</sup> See the end of the passage quoted in the last note.

<sup>l</sup> So corrected both in errata and in MS. But the MS. also reads, "serve the other opinion to any purpose or not;" which seems to be nearer Thorndike's meaning.

<sup>m</sup> "Liquet, quod illa major quasi latitudo libertatis respectu tam boni quam mali, quæ in illo primævo hominum et angelorum statu apparuit, non

*ex natura, multo minus ex perfectione liberæ voluntatis fluxerit, sed potius ex ejus naturali et concreata imperfectione, quæ ex perfectione veræ libertatis sua voluntate excidere potest nisi Deus impediatur; unde fieri non potest ut ista latitudo actuum liberæ voluntatis sit natura vel perfectio libertatis; sicut fieri non potest, ut potestas claudicandi sit natura vel perfectio potestatis progressivæ, vel potestas errandi intelligentiæ, vel mortalitas hominis, vel ægrotabilitas carnis. . . Non enim ideo liberum arbitrium non habent, quia peccata eos delectare non possunt, 'Magis quippe esset liberum, a delectatione peccandi usque ad delectationem non peccandi indeclinabilem liberatum.'" (from S. Aug., De Civit. Dei, lib. xxii. cap. ult.) Jansen., ut supra, lib. vii. c. 10; tom. iii. p. 332. a. And see the whole book, especially c. vii. pp. 323. a, sq.*

upon the whether of these opinions they ground themselves who reject Arminius and the Lutherans, it is not so easy to say; as it may clearly be said, that they must choose the one or the other, if they will speak things consequent to their own principles. It is manifest, that Doctor Twisse hath embraced the former<sup>n</sup>: which he that should say that any of the rest have forborne to employ, either because they could not make it popular to the capacity of vulgar understandings, or because they found not themselves able to manage it, perhaps should not conjecture much amiss. But we have of late a work of one Doctor Strang, late of Glasgow, *De Voluntate et Actionibus Dei circa peccatum*; wherein he maintains at large, against Doctor Twisse in particular, that it makes God the author of all sin, and by consequence plucks up all Christianity by the roots<sup>o</sup>. For the rest, professing to embrace the opinion of Jansenius, as confining the predetermination of man's will to all works of supernatural grace, though not undertaking to maintain it, he hath added unto it that wherein it is certainly defective; to wit, an account how evil can be fore-knownn by God, not determining the will of the creature to act it<sup>p</sup>. For, this being done, the same account will serve to reconcile the free-will of the creature, both to the activity of providence in general, and to the efficacy of predestination in matters concerning the world to come. Which how securely soever Jansenius pass by, he may think that he hath secured the point of faith con-

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<sup>n</sup> See his *Dissertatio de Scientia Media* (fol. Arnh. 1639), and especially lib. i. against Gabriel Penottus, c. xxii. pp. 134, sq.; and lib. i. against Suarez, c. v. pp. 336, sq.

<sup>o</sup> "Saltem hoc evitare nequeunt, quod Deus efficaciter moveat hominem ad ea ipsa, eodemque modo agenda, quæ et quomodo agendo, non potest fieri ut homo non peccet, et nisi Deus sic moverit, homo non peccaret. Unde plane sequitur, necessitatem peccandi, homine libere agente, a Deo impositam esse. Atque id quidem re ipsa concedit Twissius de Scientia Media in Penotti cap. 22," &c. Joannis Strangii S. S. Theol. Doct., et in Academia Glasguensi Prof. Primarii, *De Voluntate et Actionibus Dei circa Peccatum* libb. iv., lib. ii. c. xi. p. 265. Amstel. 4to. 1657, publ. after the author's death. And see the entire chapter.

<sup>p</sup> "Atque hæc quidem obiter et in transcurso de gratia Dei prædeterminante, ut constet quantum abhorreamus a Jesuitarum sententia: qui, ut merita operum et vires arbitrii humani extollant, gratiam Divinam enervant. Qui non tantum egregie a nostris theologis refutantur, sed etiam a Dominicanis," &c.: "maxime autem a Jansenio in Augustino et parallelo suo refutantur," Id., *ibid.* lib. ii. c. vii. (of which the subject is, *Ad quos actus Deus proprie determinet*) p. 181—"Num autem Deus etiam dici possit inclinare corda impiorum ad nonnulla, quæ illi quidem scelerate perpetrant, Ipse autem sancte peragit, postea explicabimus, cum solvemus argumenta quibus probari videtur Deum inclinare ad mala." Id., *ibid.* in fin. cap., pp. 183, 184; referring to cc. xxiii. sq. pp. 410, sq.

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cerning the grace of Christ, but he cannot think that he hath satisfied any divine, that the rest of the question can be resolved according to his opinion, as the reason of Christianity requireth. I am much in fear, that our puritan preachers, when they swagger over the Arminians in their pulpits, do neither inform them, how great a part of the reformation, as all the Lutherans make, is on their side (neither the Church of England nor that of Rome having given sentence in the whole question); nor what difficulties their own opinion is liable to, which it would make their hearts ache to overcome. For my part, finding the determination of the Synod of Dort against Arminius not to reach the whole question (concerning the reconciling of man's freedom, as well to God's foreknowledge and providence, as to His predestination and grace), I have thought best to propose the opinion of predetermination (which pretends to do it, but does it not, as I suppose), together with that wherein Jansenius varies from it, to make such a resolution as I am able to propose in so difficult a business, the better to be understood.

Of necessity upon supposition, and absolute.

§ 7. Now for that which I propose, that the will of man, though under original sin, is free from necessity, though not free from bondage (which is to say, that neither as a second cause, nor upon the account of Adam's fall, it is determined to do or not to do that which indeed it doth); I must distinguish, that necessity upon supposition is not that necessity which the will of man is free from, and which the contingency of the effects thereof is opposite to. For if any thing be said to be necessary upon supposition, not of the cause which necessarily produceth it, but of itself which is supposed to be, well may it be said necessarily to be, because it is upon the like necessity, as every thing that is must needs be, because that you suppose that it is<sup>9</sup>. In like manner, if you suppose any thing which implieth the being of another thing (as if a man see London-stone), because no man sees that which is not, 166 this supposition infers not that necessity which destroys freedom; because it imports the being of that which you suppose

<sup>9</sup> Τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ ὄν ὅταν ᾖ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι ὅταν μὴ ᾖ, ἀνάγκη· οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἅπαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀνάγκη μὴ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν

ἔστι τὸ ὄν ἅπαν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅτε ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἅπλως εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης.”  
—Aristot., De Interpret., c. ix. § 11.

that it is. That necessity that destroyeth freedom and contingence, is antecedent to the being of contingencies, in the nature of an effective cause, though not always absolute. For he which will speak properly and safely, must not call any thing absolutely necessary but God alone, and His perfections; from Whose free-will all the necessity that is found in His creatures proceedeth. But, in regard that we see the sun rise and set always in one constant order, the fire always burn, and the earth always keep the place, truly we distinguish these things as necessary, from those that come to pass either so or otherwise; as having a presumption, from so much experience of the will of God, which all things must obey, already past upon the course of their nature, by the causes, which, being thereby produced, cannot but by the same will be defeated. But of this, I do not see what question can remain.

§ 8. One kind of determination I shall grant upon the premises, that the will of man is liable [to; that is, that<sup>r</sup>] necessity which it inferreth, not prejudicing the freedom of it. I grant, that the will necessarily followeth the last and ultimate dictate of the practic understanding<sup>s</sup>: setting this grant aside, as impertinent to the question in dispute; for the last dictate of the understanding, that advises about doing or not doing this or that, imports more than a judgment that it is best to do or not to do this or that, or that it ought to be done or not done by him that will do as he ought. For it is manifest, that a man many times does not do that which he is resolved that he ought to do. And so it may fall out, that such a dictate or sentence shall not be the last or ultimate dictate of the understanding; because, falling to advise anew after that sentence, it may find some new consideration, whereupon it may resolve to proceed otherwise than afore. Therefore, the last or ultimate dictate of the understanding cannot be understood to be any other than that which is effectual; that is to say, when it is supposed,

The necessity of the will following the last dictate of the understanding, is only upon supposition.

<sup>r</sup> Corrected from MS. "to that," in orig. text.

<sup>s</sup> That "voluntatis electio pendet necessario ab ultimo judicio practicæ rationis," is the doctrine of (among others) Bellarmine, *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.*, lib. iii. c. 8 (*Controv.*, tom. iii. pp. 667.

c, sq.); following therein St. Thomas Aquinas, Cardinal Cajetan, and others (*ibid.*, c. 7. p. 663. C, D). See Bramhall, *Vind. of True Liberty ag. Hobbes*, num. vii.; *Works*, pt. iii. disc. i. vol. iv. pp. 42, sq.



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that the effects follow upon it. And upon these terms I grant, that the will is necessarily determined by the last dictate of the understanding; inasmuch as it is supposed to be necessary, that the will be determined by some judgment of the understanding, either expressly pronouncing, or implicitly resolving, that this or that is for the best to be done or not done. So that he that says, that the will is necessarily determined by the last judgment of the understanding, says no more but this, that the will is necessarily determined by that judgment which determines it. For, supposing it is the last, you suppose that the will proceeds to action upon it. So that the necessity which all this infers is no prejudice to freedom or contingency, being only the necessity of that, which must needs be because you suppose that it is <sup>t</sup>.

As also  
that which  
God's fore-  
sight  
creates.

§ 9. The like is to be said of the foreknowledge or foresight, which God hath, of whatsoever shall at any time come to pass, and the necessity which, though it causeth not, yet it inferreth<sup>u</sup>. For no man can know that which is not true, nor see that which is not in being; neither can that be foreseen, which is not to have being at that time when it is foreseen to come to pass: and therefore all foresight necessarily implies a supposition of the future being of that which is foreseen. A thing necessarily true, howsoever we suppose the will to be determined to do whatsoever it doth; that is to say, whatsoever we suppose to be the ground of God's foresight. For, supposing that God from everlasting foresaw that St. Paul should be converted at such a moment of time, because He had a purpose from everlasting to determine his will freely to embrace Christ at that moment of time; yet was not St. Paul converted because God foresaw that he should be converted; but, because he was to be converted, therefore God foresaw that he should be converted.

§ 10. Indeed we are to distinguish three instances in the knowledge of God concerning future contingencies. In the first, He sees what may come to pass; in the second, what shall come to pass; in the third, what is come to pass. The first, by the perfection of His nature: the second, by the

<sup>t</sup> See Bramhall as above quoted, pp. 43, 44: and num. xi. pp. 61, 62; and num. xxii. pp. 147, 148.

<sup>u</sup> See Bramhall as above quoted, num. xxiv. pp. 153, sq.

decree of His will, giving steady order to things of themselves moveable, as Boethius says<sup>v</sup> (that is, to contingencies; for 167 we suppose contingency to stand with providence, and we enquire how that consistence may appear): the third, by the act of freedom, seen from everlasting, before the will that doth it have being, in those very decrees, in the execution whereof providence consists. There is in an architect, or surveyor of buildings, a certain knowledge of that which he designeth, before he go to work; consisting in a certain idea or form, which his business is to copy out of his mind into the materials. But when his work is done, he sees that in being before his eyes, which he saw in his own design afore. The wisdom of God is that sovereign art, which directed Him in making heaven and earth, and ordaining whatsoever comes to pass in both. The decree of His will (whether immediate or mediate) distinguishes between that which may be, and that which is at the present; and therefore, in the same sort, between that which may be and that which shall be for the future. But though His knowledge increase not, when He sees that in being which formerly He saw was to be, because He goes not beyond Himself for the knowledge of it: yet, to see that it is, supposeth<sup>w</sup> the act of the freedom which doth it, past; to see that it shall be, to come. In like manner, therefore, whilst the act of the creature appeareth to God as to come, He seeth what shall be. But if all future contingencies be present to God from everlasting, then, consequently, He sees also from everlasting the act of that freedom which produceth them, as done in the due time of it: and in this sight consisteth the effect of the same presence of future contingencies in and to God's eternity from everlasting. There is therefore in God a certain kind of knowledge of that which is to come, which divines call "*scientiam visionis*;" whereby God sees from everlasting the greatest contingencies to come to pass at that moment of time when we see them come to pass<sup>x</sup>: which, whatsoever is the ground

<sup>v</sup> "Ita res optime geruntur, si manens in Divina mente simplicitas indeclinabilem causarum ordinem promat, hic vero ordo res mutabiles et alioquin temere fluituras propria incommutabilitate coerceat." Boeth., Consol. Philos., lib. iv. Pros. 6. p. 934. Basil. 1546. And see the whole passage.

<sup>w</sup> "To see it supposeth," MS.

<sup>x</sup> "Concerning the foreknowledge of God, he (Hobbes) confounds that speculative knowledge, which is called the 'knowledge of vision,' which doth not produce the intellective objects (no more than the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects), with that

of it, whether it be possible for us to say how it is possible or not, yet this we must say of it, that it presupposeth the future being of that which it foreseeeth, and therefore is no way the cause of it; though the future being thereof presupposeth also that knowledge in God, which directeth that freedom which bringeth it to pass. So that the fathers of the Church had cause to insist (against those heretics, that derived the source and original of sin in the world from some other cause than the free-will of the creature and the abuse of it), that future contingencies come not to pass because God foretells that they will come to pass; but that God foretells that they will come to pass, because they are future contingencies, that is, things which (though contingent) yet shall come to pass<sup>y</sup>; and, therefore, that God's foresight infers no necessity in those things which He foresees shall come to pass by the free choice of the creature.

§ 11. For though there remaineth yet a further question concerning the ground of this foresight, how that can be other than necessary which is certain, because the knowledge of God that foretells it cannot be uncertain: yet would it be no less evident, that the foresight of God, which supposeth the future being of that which it evidenceth, causeth no necessity in that which it supposeth; though I could give no account, how the future being of that which is contingent can be certain. And as it is not requisite to the maintenance of Christianity to be able to answer all questions that the enemies of it may make; so were it very impertinent, not to allege that which is evident in behalf thereof, because there hangs another question at the end of it which I cannot so evidently resolve.

§ 12. And upon these terms I set aside that necessity, which God's foresight of future contingencies infers, as impertinent to the question in hand: being merely the neces-

other knowledge of God, which is called the 'knowledge of approbation,' or a practical knowledge, that is, knowledge joined with an act of the will; of which divines do truly say, that it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the artist is the cause of his work." Bramhall, *Vind. of True Lib. ag. Hobbes*, num. xi. p. 60. And see Thom. Aquin., *Summ. p. i. qu. xiv. artt. 8, 9.*

<sup>y</sup> E. g.—"Non enim ex eo quod Deus scit futurum aliquid, idcirco futurum est: sed quia futurum est, Deus novit." S. Hieron., *Comment. ad Hierem.*, c. xxvi.; *Op.*, tom. iv. p. 653.—"Hoc enim necessario futurum est quod Ille vult, et ea vere futura sunt quæ Ille præseivit." S. Aug., *De Gen. ad Lit.*, lib. vi. c. 17; *Op.*, tom. iii. p. 207. D.



sity of that which must needs be, because you suppose that it is; all foresight necessarily supposing the future being of that which is foreseen, as all sight supposeth the present being of that which is seen. C H A P.  
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§ 13. Further, when I say, that the freedom, which the covenant of grace supposeth in man to whom it is tendered, requireth, that his will be not determined by God before it determine itself, to wit, in order of nature; I do not therefore require, that it be always indifferent, that is, no more inclined to do than not to do this or that. I have learned out of Aristotle's Morals, that a drunkard may choose whether he will be drunk or not; though it is not possible, 168 that he should in an instant change that inclination to which he is habituated<sup>z</sup>: and that, as the world is, it cannot in discretion seem possible to come to pass, that some opportunity of bringing that inclination to effect shall not come to pass, before the inclination of his habit be changed into the contrary by frequency of practice. But this I say: that, in this latitude and variety of man's inclinations, he is not determined by any of them presently to satisfy and execute it, having so many to please besides; and that God, without determining immediately, by His omnipotence, the will which remains not determined by its own inclination, is able to bring to pass whatsoever His providence shall order, by wills of men left at large to their own choice, though not in a state of actual indifference (without bias inclining them to do, rather than not to do, this rather than that), yet in a capacity of becoming actually indifferent by change of judgment (and, by consequence, of inclinations), which frequent acting according to another judgment shall produce; in the mean time not determined by God, otherwise than as they determine themselves. It is not therefore my meaning to say, that the will proceeds immediately from a state of indifference to determine itself, by choosing that whereon the man's happiness depends. For it is manifest, that all choice is determined by the appearance of good in the object, to reason that sees it, nor can proceed without it. It is mani-

The difference between indifferent and undetermined.

<sup>z</sup> "Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκόλαστον ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γένεσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἐξεστι μὴ εἶναι." Aristot.,

Eth. Nic., III. vii. 15.—"Τοῖς μεθούσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας." Id., *ibid.*, 8.

fest, that all virtues and vices are mere determinations of indifference in the will, to some thing chosen for a chief good. It is manifest by experience, that the proposing of an object determines many times the will to choose it. It is received in philosophy, that from that which is indifferent, as indifferent, no action can proceed; that the same remaining the same can never do but the same; that nothing can come to be anew of itself, without some cause. And how shall the will, from mere indifference, proceed immediately to do this rather than that? How shall indifference prefer doing this, before doing that, or not doing this? My meaning is this: that, without appearance of reason sufficient to convict the mind what is good to be done, there is no freedom in the will that can determine to choose it; that, when there is no appearance of reason to the contrary (as in the general nature of good), there is no freedom to refuse; that all habit of virtue or vice tends to determine indifference to the object and act of it, and effecteth so much in this life, that morally, and speaking of that which<sup>a</sup> experience and discretion will allow, it is as impossible, that some man should do any thing that is good, as some other revolt from all goodness. And therefore [I] do allow a kind of freedom in the blessed, as well as in the damned, who are arrived at the full determination of the will for the better or for the worse, and are past deliberating any more to which side they shall adhere for everlasting. But their estate I account impertinent to the question in hand, concerning that freedom in this life, the use whereof is every man's title to the world to come and his own share in it. As also the estate of the blessed angels, and devils: whom all allow to be as effectually determined to evil or to good, upon their fall or settlement, as men are upon the performing their race here. But as I have granted, that no man can desire that in which he sees no reason why it is good for him; so, seeing sufficient reason, he is not thereby immediately determined to act, but only enabled to act, according to it. The coherence of true good with the utmost happiness of mankind is so dark, the coherence of counterfeit good with his utmost misery so remote; that, as the appearance of counterfeit good may interpose to defeat the prose-

<sup>a</sup> Corrected from MS. "with," in orig. text.

cution of that which sufficient reason convinceth to be true, so may the appearance of true good interpose to defeat the prosecution of that which is counterfeit. So that the race of this life is a continual deliberation about the necessity of the means, even in them that have made choice of their end. It may be disputed indeed, that, when after resolution and choice we have experience of great debate within us what to do, it is not the will, the subject of freedom, that is the seat of this debate, but it is the sensual appetite, that makes opposition to the resolution of reason; and that this opposition is mere violence to the natural exercise of freedom, not  
 169 pretending to introduce a contrary resolution, standing the first, but hindering execution, by degrees upon contrary information to reverse the sentence. But the determination which we suppose sufficient reason had produced, remains always ineffectual: and therefore the question must needs have recourse, what determines the will; till answer be made, that it proceeds effectually, inwardly to choose and outwardly to act, by that choice determining all capacity of indifference in itself, which, redounding to every man's account at the general judgment, must needs be the act of the will, that is, of the person that doth it.

§ 14. By that which hath been said, I conceive I give account, why, having hitherto established the necessity of grace upon the account of original sin, I now advance a proposition tending to reconcile, as well the activity of God's providence generally in all things, as the efficacy of His predestination and grace in supernatural actions, leading to the happiness of the world to come, with our common freedom. For it is manifest, that this opinion of predetermination proceeds not upon any supposition of original sin, but merely of the nature and state of a creature: and intends to affirm, that, whether Adam had sinned or not, the will of man must have been determined by God to do whatsoever it should do, as unable to determine itself; otherwise than as every creature moves, when God moves it. And therefore I am here to acknowledge, the answer is larger than the question, at least than the occasion of it, and the resolution than the ground of the doubt: the necessity of the grace of Christ being grounded only upon the fall of Adam,

[This question of predetermination concerns man simply as God's creature, not as under original sin.]

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and that bringing on the dispute, what free-will hath to do where the free grace of God cannot be spared, and therefore what free-will it is, that remains to be freed from the bondage of sin by grace. But, as the general comprises necessarily all particulars, it is no less destructive to the covenant of grace, that the freedom of the will should be denied upon the account of the constitution of nature, than of depravation by sin. And therefore I find myself bound to answer, in what estate the covenant of grace overtakes man born in original sin; whether upon the account of original sin, or merely of God's creature.

[How far the Reformation and the Church of Rome are in controversy about free-will in the works of salvation.]

§ 15. But I do purposely observe this to all them of the Reformation, that I believe their own consciences will tell them all, if passion or faction give leave, that all the controversy advanced against the Church of Rome, about free-will in the works of salvation, was grounded upon the supposition of the necessity of grace occasioned by original sin, from which so much is derogated as is arrogated to free-will without it; and therefore the controversy never needed about all kind of works, but those only that tend to salvation, the means whereof became necessary upon the account of original sin. Which if it be true, then cannot the interest of the Reformation consist in any opinion concerning all manner of human actions without difference, whether in the state of uprightness or sin; nor can any thing but the spirit of slander impute the maintaining of God's grace without or against such opinions, to any inclination towards the abuses of the Church of Rome, but to the conscience of God's truth, without respect of persons. For further evidence whereof, I shall make good use of the evil of faction, if not of division, now on foot upon occasion of this dispute, as well among those of the Reformation as in the Church of Rome. For seeing that both parties are divided about it, though in the Reformation only the matter hath proceeded to a breach, first, between Lutherans and Calvinists in the empire, then in Holland between these and Arminians; he that goes about to cast the aspersion of popery upon that opinion which the papacy enjoineth not, though it alloweth, must first answer, whether the popery of the Dominicans and the rest of them that hold predetermination, whether

the popery of Jansenius and his followers, be popery or not. With all, I shall think the way made towards the proof of my position, by observing, that the ground upon which I shall proceed to make evidence of freedom from necessity under original sin, will necessarily take place against the predetermination of the will by God, whether under original sin, or in the state of uprightness. And, upon that ground, 170 I shall freely affirm, that this position is not only intended to contradict, but also effectually contradicteth, the opinion of the predetermination of the will by the immediate operation of God.

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## CHAPTER XXII.

THE GOSPEL FINDETH MAN FREE FROM NECESSITY, THOUGH NOT FROM BONDAGE. OF THE ANTECEDENT AND CONSEQUENT WILL OF GOD. PREDETERMINATION NOT THE ROOT, BUT THE ROOTING UP, OF FREEDOM AND OF CHRISTIANITY. AGAINST THE OPINION OF JANSENIUS.

THE ground which I speak of may be branched out into particulars, as large as you please. But it shall be enough for me to say: that whatsoever is read from one end of the Bible to the other, concerning a treaty tendered by God to man, concerning an alliance or covenant contracted upon it, concerning an inheritance or assurance of an inheritance upon that alliance, concerning exhortations, reproofs, promises, threats, inducing to observe that contract and not to transgress it; all this, and whatsoever else may be reduced to this nature, evidenceth, that neither freedom from necessity is lost by original sin, nor the will of man determined by the immediate operation of God to do or not to do this or that.

§ 2. I must further mention here that difference between the antecedent and the consequent, the conditional and the absolute, will of God; the first, suspended upon some act of man's free will, the second, resolute, as supposing the same past, or not requiring it: not because the divines, as well of

The Gospel findeth man free from necessity, though not from bondage.

[Antecedent and consequent wills of God.]



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the Eastern as of the Western Church, have embraced it; but because they all found, that they could not discharge their account of the Scriptures without it.

[Rewards and punishments expressed in the Scriptures.]

§ 3. But I must not forget to mention withal the rewards and punishments, expressed in the Scriptures to be brought upon the compliance with, or resistance of, those helps, which the antecedent and conditional will of God requireth, whether he choose it or not.

[In the Old Testament.]  
[Deut. xi. 26; xxx. 15, 19.]

§ 4. In the Old Testament, you have the contestations of Moses in Deuteronomy; often warning God's people, that He had set before them the good and the bad for them to make choice. You have the prophet Esay, v. 3—6; contesting with God's vineyard, that He had done what He could do for it, and that, having borne wild grapes instead of good fruit, it was therefore just with Him to destroy it. You have the Psalmist; protesting the cause, why He gave over His people to their enemies and to famine, to be their disobedience: Psalm lxxxi. 9—17. You have the prophet Ezekiel, xviii. 30—32, thus reclaiming them: "Return and repent of your transgressions, and wickedness shall not be to you a stumbling block; cast from you all your transgressions which you have transgressed with, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit; for why should ye die, ye house of Israel? for I delight not in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God; but repent ye and live." For is not this to say, of Myself I desire not your death, but because of your obstinacy in rejecting My prophets? By whom He so often protesteth, that He had risen betimes to send them from age to age, if by any means He might reclaim them to His law, and so preserve them in the inheritance of the land of promise.

[2 Chron. xxxvi. 15; Jerem. vii. 13; xi. 7; xxv. 3, 4; xxvi. 5; xxix. 19; xxxii. 33; xxxv. 14, 15; xlv. 4.]

[In the New Testament.]

§ 5. In like manner our Lord in the Gospels: Matt. xxiii. 37, 38; Luke xiii. 34, 35: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent thee, how often would I have gathered thy children, as a hen gathers her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! behold, your house is left unto you desolate." And St. Stephen, Acts vii. 51: "Ye stiffnecked and uncircumcised in hearts and ears, you do always cross the Holy Ghost, as did your fathers." And the Scribes and Pharisees, in the

Gospel, "made void the counsel and purpose of God towards them;" Luke vii. 30. But, above all, you have the purpose of God manifested by the Gospel, of sending our Lord Christ <sup>171</sup> for the salvation of the world: as John the Baptist says, John i. 29, "Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world:" and our Lord to Nicodemus, John iii. 16, 17; "God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish but have life everlasting; for God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world by Him might be saved." And St. Paul commandeth Timothy, that prayers be made by the Church for all men, even for the powers of the world, then their enemies, as a thing pleasing to God: "Who," saith he, "would have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth; for there is one God, and one Mediator between God and man, the Man Christ Jesus, Who gave Himself an expiation for all, to be witnessed in His own time:" 1 Tim. ii. 4—6. And if there be any other passages of the New Testament, as others there are, to witness that Christ is given by God for the reconciliation and salvation of all mankind.

§ 6. One I will not omit, because the mistake which is alleged to divert the sense of it is remarkable. 2 Pet. iii. 9: "God slacketh not His promise, as some men count slackness, but is slow to wrath in our regard, not willing that any should perish, but all come to repentance." Which they will have to signify, that He would have none of "us," that is, of the elect, to perish; because it is said, "μακροθυμεῖ εἰς ἡμᾶς" "He is patient towards us," the elect<sup>b</sup>. They might have seen, that this is not the meaning of the words, by Luke

<sup>b</sup> "Quantum vero ad illum locum, ... 'Nolens aliquos perire,'" &c., "difficultate caret. Præcessit enim, 'Non tardat Dominus promissum Suum,' de adducendo judicii die, eum differendo diutius quam oporteat, 'sed patienter agit propter vos,' hoc est, propter electos." Jansen., Aug., tom. iii. lib. iii. c. 20, p. 161, b. E.—"Nolens ullos perire, &c. Hunc etiam locum nonnulli depravant, ut æternæ electionis et reprobationis discrimen tollant. Spectandum autem est quos alloquatur Apostolus: Dilecti, inquit, vel (ut in duo-

bus veteribus libris legimus) ἀδελφοί, fratres, hoc non lateat vos. Et paulo post, Non tardat, inquit, Dominus, Qui promisit, ut nonnulli existimant; sed patiens est erga nos. Quis vero non videat Apostolum discrete his verbis secernere electos ab istis irrisoribus quorum ante facta est mentio, neque impios dignari responso, sed electos confirmare? quibus et ipse sese adjungit, cum inquit, μακροθυμεῖ εἰς ἡμᾶς, patiens est erga nos." &c. Beza, in loc.

BOOK xviii. 7 [8]: "Shall not God avenge His elect, that cry to Him  
 II. day and night, though slow to wrath in regard of them?  
 ["κα!"] I tell you He shall avenge them speedily." "*Καίπερ μακροθυμῶν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς*"—"though slow to take vengeance in regard of them," upon their oppressors, is here, "*Μακροθυμῶν εἰς ἡμᾶς*"—"slow to take vengeance" upon our oppressors "for us," which He hath promised to take. [ω;ι;] in Syriac, *ἐμακροθύμησεν* in the Greek of the New Testament, signifying the delaying of vengeance (due to them that oppress Christians, as you see by St. Luke), the Apostle attributes to the desire of saving those whom He spares.

[Insufficiency of the expositions by which these texts are explained away.] § 7. Nor will I stop here to shew you the insufficiency of those expositions, which, in despite of the words, are fastened upon these texts, to avoid the difficulties which they create to prejudicate opinions. For it is manifest, that the consequence of them is no more, but the very same that arises from any Scripture, that testifies the means which God uses for the good of any man to become frustrate through his fault: in consideration whereof, that God shall call them to account at the last day, who, either being convict of the truth of His Gospel, or having means offered to be informed of the same, embrace it not; or, having embraced it, notwithstanding persevere not in it by living as Christ requireth; or, on the contrary, that He shall reward them who embrace it, and persevere in it. Which being so many, that they are not to be avoided without setting a great part of the Scripture upon the rack; I count it not worth the while to insist here, that St. Paul's meaning is not, that God would have some of all estates to be saved, or that he would have many to be saved, or those that are saved to be saved, or upon any other of those lame expedients, which have been applied to plaster the wound which these plain texts do make<sup>c</sup>: but I insist upon

<sup>c</sup> "Exponit" (S. Augustinus, in lib. de Corrept. et Gratia c. 14) "predicta verba" (1 Tim. ii. 4) "per distributionem quandam; ita scilicet, ut distributio fiat, non pro singulis generum, . . . sed pro generibus singulorum, ut loquuntur dialectici: ita nimirum, ut sensus sit, Deus vult cujusunque status aliquos salvos fieri." Magalianus, Op. Hierarch. lib. i. in Epist. 1. ad Tim. cap. ii. sect. i.

Annot. 2. § 4. p. 250: quoting also Anselm, Bede, Fulgentius, and Gregory of Ariminum, to the same effect.—"Vulgata, 'Qui omnes homines;' non male, si modo 'omnes' pro 'quosvis,' id est, non universaliter sed collective et indefinite accipiamus," &c. Beza, in 1. ad Tim. c. ii. v. 4.—"Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri: Si est reprobatio, tunc non vult omnes servari.



this, that the meaning of them cannot be, that God would have those only to be saved that shall be saved; having such a swarm of Scriptures to evidence, how many things there are which God would have done and are not done; having all the importunities and complaints which God useth by His prophets, to assure us, that He would have found that obedience at the hands of His ancient people which He found not; all the preaching of His Gospel, all the motives of believing, all the exhortations to accept and perform the covenant of grace in the New Testament, ready to witness, what men are to give account for at the day of judgment. All which must be satisfied, before there can be cause to balk the plain meaning of St. Paul's words: which cannot seem inconvenient in any other regard, but because they make God to will that which comes not to pass; all the Scripture witnessing, that all that shall be condemned, shall be condemned for not doing that which God would have them do. For, wheresoever God's justice punishes, there is it of necessity, that man  
172 had sufficient means to do otherwise: where it rewards, there was possibility of transgressing, there was a capacity of indifference, and a will actually undetermined to do or not to do this or that, notwithstanding original sin.

§ 8. But, first, to declare what I understand this antecedent will of God to be, I must distinguish, with some divines, that God must not be said to will this because of that, or for that, but may be said to will that this be because of that, or for that. "*Deus non vult hoc propter hoc, sed vult hoc esse propter hoc*<sup>d</sup>." When I say, 'because of that,' or 'for that,'

Of the antecedent and consequent will of God.

An igitur omnes omnis generis homines? Nam 'omnes' et multos denotat et aliquando paucos, ut alibi notamus. Aut 'vult omnes homines servari,' tam Judæos quam Græcos." Drusius, Annot. in Totum Jesu Christi Testam., lib. viii. in 1 Tim. ii. 4, pp. 308, 309.—"Secunda" (interpretatio) "est ejusdem" (S. Augustini) "in Enchirid. c. 103," &c.; "existimat namque verba Pauli non esse intelligenda de omnibus in universum, sed de his tantum qui salvantur; eo loquendi modo quo (ut ipse ait c. 8. de Prædest. Sanctorum) dicere consuevimus, quando unus tantum magister docet pueros in aliqua civitate, hujusmodi magistrum docere omnes pueros ejusdem civitatis." Ma-

galianus, ut supra, § 3. p. 250.—"Ita intelligere (debemus), quod scriptum est, Vult omnes homines salvos fieri, tanquam diceretur, nullum hominem fieri salvum nisi quem salvum fieri Ipse voluerit." P. Lomb., Sent. lib. i. Dist. xli. C.—See these and other references in Poli Synops. ad loc.; and Strangius, De Volunt. et Action. Dei circa Peccatum, lib. i. c. 7. pp. 34 sq.; and the entire chapter of Jansenius referred to in § 6. note b, pp. 157, a. D, sq.; and S. Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. I. Qu. xix. art. 6.

<sup>a</sup> "Vult ergo (Deus) hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc." S. Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. I. Qu. xix. art. 5, Respond.

BOOK  
II.

I extend the observation to two kinds of causes: to the final cause, for which a thing is said to be done; and to the motive or impulsive cause, because of which a thing is said to be done; when we speak of the doings of understanding and free causes. For, these having something in consideration to move them to do what they do, this motive which they consider, holds on the side of the effective cause, inasmuch as there had been no proceeding without the consideration of it. Though it is also true, that the motion which consideration produces (being so called but out of that resemblance, which it holdeth with the motions which natural things are visibly transported with), importeth no more, than the appetite of some good thing, the want whereof they apprehend; which is nothing else but the effect of the final cause. So that the motive cause is no other than the final cause, in respect of that effect, which it hath indeed moved the effective cause to produce. So then, when I say, that "God willeth not this for that," or "because of that," I say, that God can have no ends upon His creatures, being from everlasting possessed of all that He can desire, and therefore not to be moved with the desire of any thing which He hath not, to procure it. But when I say, God "will have this to be for that," I say, that God hath appointed not only His creatures, but whatsoever He bestows upon His creatures, for that, as for their end; which therefore if it fail, it is not God that fails of His end, but the creature that fails of the end that God appoints it. And indeed the doubt is vain, though to many it seems difficult that God should fail of His end, if we should say, that He would have any thing come to pass which indeed comes not to pass. For if God would have it come to pass immediately by His own operation, and absolutely, it were indeed a failure of His omnipotence, if it should not come to pass; but that He would have it to come to pass by the operation of His creature, and reserving a condition—if it do as it should do, supposeth His omnipotence in making the creature able to do or not to do this or that, but destroys it not by the failure of that which it is not employed about. So also, when I say, God does this because of that, to wit, in the nature of a motive or impulsive cause, I say no more but this, that God from everlasting deter-

mined that it should come to pass, in consideration of that because of which it is truly said to come to pass. Which no way signifies any motion of desire impressed in His own excellence, but that He orders the reason of all things that come to pass. The antecedent then or conditional will of God, consists in appointing all that He bestows upon His creature, or acts towards it, for several and proper ends; but supposes a possibility in those ends to be brought to pass, grounded upon an ability in the creature to bring them to pass: inso-much as God, otherwise, cannot be said to treat with men as men, nor they ground a conscience of duty from themselves to God, but supposing Him to mean that which His words signify from them by whom they come; and that whose grants, promises, commands, threatens any thing, upon an impossible condition, neither grants, threatens, promises, or commands it, but says right nothing. I will give you my daughter in marriage, if you touch the stars with your little finger; that is, saith the civilian in the Roman law<sup>e</sup>, I will not give you my daughter in marriage. I say not so much; but that God, under an impossible condition, signifies no part of His own intentions.

§ 9. This antecedent will of God, they that understand not in St. Paul's words, when he says, "Christ gave Himself a ransom for all," do think it enough to distinguish between sufficient and effectual; and that, granting the blood of Christ to be a sufficient ransom for mankind, it will be true that He "gave" it "for all," though no way intending it for any but those who are saved<sup>f</sup>: which is far otherwise. For that

C H A P.  
XXII.

[How  
"Christ  
gave Him-  
self a ran-  
som for  
all."]

<sup>e</sup> "Si impossibilis conditio obligationibus adjiciatur, nihil valet stipulatio. Impossibilis autem conditio habetur, cui natura impedimento est, quominus existat: veluti si quis ita dixerit, Si digito cœlum attingero, dare spondes?" Instit., lib. iii. tit. xx. § 11.

<sup>f</sup> "Respondeo igitur, quando Christus ab Apostolo dicitur 'redemptionem Semet Ipsum dedisse pro omnibus,' in cruce videlicet pro omnibus moriendo, ab aliquibus intelligi, quod se dederit redemptionem seu ἀντίλυτρον, id est, pretium, pro omnibus omnino sufficienter, quia sufficiens pretium obtulit; non tamen pro omnibus omnino efficienter, quia non omnibus applicatur ista redemptio: idque juxta regulam a sanc-

to Prospero traditam," &c. . . . "Sed . . . genuinum veriusque respondemus Christum dici 'Se dedisse redemptionem pro omnibus,' hoc est, pro universa Sua ecclesia toto orbe dispersa, et consequenter pro omnibus hominum generibus, regibus," &c., "itemque pro omnibus, hoc est, pro hominibus omnium nationum," &c. Jansen., Aug., tom. iii. lib. iii. c. 21, pp. 162, b. A, E, 163. a. A.—"Multo melius magisque Catholice questionem ita dissolvit B. Prosper; . . . Quod ad magnitudinem, inquit, et potentiam pretii, et quod ad unam pertinet causam generis humani, sanguis Christi redemptio est totius mundi; sed qui hoc sæculum sine fide Christi et sine regenerationis sacramen-

BOOK  
II.

which is not true without an addition abating the proper signification of the words, is absolutely untrue; unless the addition, not being expressed, may by due construction of reason be found to be implied. Now to say, that Christ's blood is only sufficient to redeem all but intended to redeem only some, is to say, that it was not given for all, as St. Paul affirmeth, though being a price sufficient to redeem all, it might have been given for all; which is not enough to make good, that He "gave" it "for all," as St. Paul affirmeth. And that it might have been given for all, being sufficient to redeem all, is no sufficient reason to infer St. Paul's injunction of praying for all men, even for princes, and the powers under them: then no friends to Christianity; so that, whether for them or not, was more questionable than whether for others or not. For it followeth not, because Christ's blood is sufficient to ransom all mankind, therefore we are to pray for the salvation of all mankind, not supposing it given for their ransom. Therefore this addition of abatement can by no construction of reason be found to be implied in the words: but we must have recourse to that antecedent will of God, by which Christ intended to pay that which was sufficient for all mankind; though not intending to oblige God to do the utmost of that which His justice will allow, to bring all to salvation in consideration of it; but only what His own wisdom should think fit to be done, in that consideration, for that purpose. Which alloweth, not only a possibility of salvation, but also a sufficiency of means to bring all mankind to it, provided by God, as purchased by Christ; whatsoever may interpose to defeat the effect thereof, which God, not being obliged to hinder, thinks fit in His secret wisdom to permit. Neither can this secret will of God be any way reconciled to His declared will (that is, neither can this declared will of God, which comes not to effect, be ever maintained to be the will of God as the Word of God calleth it, or to be truly declared) upon those terms; but only to be a declaration or sign, that God would have that come to pass, which indeed He would not have come to pass, as not coming to

to pertranseunt, redemptionis alieni sunt. . . . Hæc ille; prorsus consentaneæ cum eo quod Scholastici dicunt,

Christum sufficienter non efficienter omnes redemisse." Estius ad II. Tim. i. 4.

pass, because He would not have it come to pass. But if God have put no bar to the salvation of any man, antecedent to the death of Christ, but hath, by Christ's death, provided all means sufficient to save all, then it is truly said (John iii. 16), "So God loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have life everlasting;" though God doeth not what He might do, but what He thinks fit to do, to make the ransom which Christ gave for all, effectual to the salvation of all. Nor is this infringed by saying, that the conditional will of God is not absolutely the will of God, but with a term of abatement, His will upon condition; which, without that addition, abating the proper sense of God's will, it were not. A thing which I have professed already, by premising, that God wills not any of those things which come not to pass, as His own end, but as the end of those means which He provides to bring them to pass. For the question is not about the act, but the object, of God's will (which the Apostle also means when he saith, "This is the will of God, even your holiness," 1 Thess. iv. 3): when it is disputed, whether "all" signify "some," and "the world," "the elect;" when the Scripture saith, that "Christ gave Himself for all," and "for the world," and therefore that "God would have all to be saved," and none to "perish."

CHAP.  
XXII.

[John iii.  
15, 16;  
1 Tim. ii.  
4-6.]

The act of God's antecedent will is as properly expressed by that which God "would have" done, as of His consequent will, by that which God "will" do. Nor is there any figure in saying, that God would have that done, which He will not do; because He knows sufficient reason to the contrary, whether He declare it or not, but, setting that reason aside, would have done: or that He would have that done, which He provideth sufficient means to bring to pass. But that "all" should signify "some," and "the world," "the elect," because God will not do all He can to save those whom He would have to be saved, is a figure in rhetoric called *mendacium*, when a man denies the Scripture to be true.

§ 10. The same is the difficulty, when our Lord Christ  
174 (Who saith to the Father, John xvii. 9, "I ask for them, I ask not for the world, but for them whom Thou hast given Me, for they are Thine,") prays upon the cross,

[And how  
He prayed  
for them  
that slew  
Him.]



BOOK  
II.

[Luke  
xxiii. 34.]

“Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.” For though He ask not that for the world which He asks for His disciples, yet He would not have prayed for that, which He knew that God would not have done<sup>g</sup>; His prayer being the reason, moving God to grant means effectual to bring to pass that which it desireth. But had there been in God a purpose to exclude the Jews from the benefit of Christ’s death, considering them as not having yet refused the grace which Christ prayed for, it could not have been said, that He would have our Lord Christ die, or pray for them, and therefore that He would have them to be saved.

Prede-  
ter-  
mination  
not the  
root, but  
the root-  
ing up, of  
freedom  
and of  
Christi-  
anity.

§ 11. This is then my argument, that the will of man is neither by the original constitution of God determinable by His immediate operation, nor by man’s original sin subject to a necessity of doing or not doing this or that; because God treats with the posterity of Adam concerning the covenant of the Law, first, and since concerning the covenant of grace, no otherwise than originally He treated with Adam about not eating the forbidden fruit. For, in conscience, were it for the credit of Christianity, that infidels, whom we would persuade to be Christians, should say: True, if you could shew me, that God by His immediate act determines me to do as you require me, without which, you tell me, I cannot do it, and with which I cannot but do it; or that, by the sin of Adam, I am not become subject to the necessity of doing or not doing this or that: but supposing either of these, if you move me to do what you profess I cannot do, you are either a mad-man yourself, or take me for one. Do they take their hearers for men and Christians, or for beasts, who, having first taught, that man can do nothing but what God determines him to do, infer thereupon, that they must endeavour themselves to do what God commands, and what their Christianity requires? Or that they are obliged by their Christianity to do that, which their corruption from Adam necessitates them not to do? Is it for the honour of God’s justice, that it should be said, that He intends to damn the most part of men for that, which by their original corruption they were utterly unable to do, without giving them sufficient help to do it; no help

<sup>g</sup> Corrected from MS. “He knew not that God would have done,” in orig. text.

being sufficient, which the determination of the will by the immediate operation of God makes not effectual, as they think? Do they not make the Gospel of Christ a mockery, that make it to require a condition, impossible to be performed by any whom God determines not to perform it, having resolved not to determine the greatest part of them that know it, to perform it? Certainly this is not to make the secret will of God contradict the declared will of God, but to make the declared will of God a mere falsehood; unless the declaring will make contradictions true. For to will, that this be done for an end, which God that willeth will not have come to pass, makes contradictions the object of that will; and that, for the same consideration, and at the same time, God from everlasting determining, merely in consideration of His own will, that the condition of that, which He would have to come to pass conditionally, shall not come to pass. What is it then to declare all this to the posterity of Adam, already lapsed, without tendering help sufficient to enable them to embrace what He tendereth? For it is manifest, that Adam had sufficient grace to do what God commanded; and it is as manifest, that God tenders both the Law to the Israelite, and the Gospel to the world, in the same form as He tendered Adam the prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit. Nor can it be denied, that this prohibition contained, in the force of it, all the persuasions, all the exhortations, all the promises, all the threatenings, which either the Law or the Gospel to their respective ends and purposes can be enforced with. It must therefore be concluded, not that they suppose in Adam's posterity an ability to do what they require, as did the original prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit, but that they bring with them sufficient help to perform it, not supposing any thing  
 175 that may bar the efficacy thereof, till the will of him to whom it is tendered makes it void.

§ 12. And truly, speaking of that which the natural en- [Nothing  
 dowment of freedom necessarily imports in the reasonable can formally de-  
 creature, it is utterly impossible, that any thing should termine the will of man  
 determine the will of man to do or not to do this or that, but his own ac-  
 but his own action formally, or in the nature of a formal cause; tion.]  
 which therefore, in the will, cannot be the action of God,

BOOK  
II.

nor be attributed, imputed, or ascribed to Him, to Whom it were blasphemy to impute that, which His creature is honoured with. That God should immediately act upon the soul of man, or his will, is no inconvenience; because that act must end in the will or soul, and not attain that effect which the imperfection of the creature bringeth to pass. Ending therefore in the creature, and not in that which the action of the creature produceth, it leaveth the same, of necessity, in the state wherein God first made it. And I may well suppose here, and will suppose, that God's act of creation continues the same for all the time that He maintains the creature in that perfection of being (that is to say, in that ability of acting), which from the beginning He gave it.

[This argument voideth also the immediate concurrence of God to the actions of man.]

§ 13. This discourse, I confess, extendeth to the voiding of the immediate concurrence of God to the actions of His creature; which my purpose necessarily requires me not to maintain. For 'concurrency' supposeth the creature to act without help of God That concurrerth, and therefore cannot be requisite on behalf of the cause, being supposed to act of itself, but on behalf of the effect wherein it endeth; which, having a being, is supposed necessarily to require immediate dependance upon the First Being, Which is God<sup>h</sup>. A strange subtlety: acknowledging the creature able to act, and supposing it to act of itself, to imagine, that this act can end in nothing, as that which it effecteth, without God's concurrence: which, immediately attaining the effect, in which the action of the creature endeth, will enforce, that God is as properly said to give light as the sun, to burn as the fire, to do that act which is essentially sin, as the man that sins; and therefore, at once, not to sin, because we suppose His concourse tied by the original law of creation to the determination of His creature, and to sin, as producing immediately whatsoever is in that action which is essentially sin. For unless the species or nature of the act, importing generally no sin, were a thing subsisting by itself, as by the understanding it is considered, setting aside the sin which the particular that is acted implieth (as Plato is supposed to

<sup>h</sup> See e.g. Strangius, De Volunt. et Action. Dei circa Peccatum, as above quoted, lib. i. c. 10. pp. 52 sq.: and

Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., lib. iv. c. 15; Controv., tom. iv. pp. 742. C, sq.



have maintained his ideas), it is impossible, that he who doth the act which is essentially sin should be said truly not to sin; the law of concurring to the doing of sin, and producing the act which essentially importeth it, necessarily drawing the imputation thereof upon him, that freely tied himself by settling it. Let it once be said therefore, that God made the fire able to burn, the sun able to shine, the will of man able to make a free choice, as he is a reasonable creature; and it will be very impertinent to require any action but that of the fire to the consuming of wood, but that of the sun to the dispelling of darkness: supposing God to maintain, or rather to issue every moment, the ability of burning or shining once given His creature, from His own spring-head of being, so long as His creature endureth. And therefore, if ever God made the will able to choose the doing or not doing of this before that, upon the direction (not of right reason which directeth not to sin, but always) of reason (for all choice supposes reason to direct it), it is impertinent to suppose any thing requisite to the exercise of this freedom of choice, but the maintenance of reason, issuing from the fountain of God's wisdom, so long as the man continues a reasonable creature.

§ 14. If the immediate concurrence of God to the action of His creature make the actions wherein the perfection of His creature consisteth (much more the imperfections and failures of it) a stain to His excellence; much more shall the act of determining the choice of His creature (free before it be determined) impute to God whatsoever it importeth for  
176 the worse, the imputation whereof for the better is a stain to His excellency. And is it possible, that God, by making the creature capable of such imputations, should depose Himself from the throne of His Godhead, and set up His creature in His stead, in making it able to act that, either naturally without His immediate concurrence, or morally also, by determining that freedom (by the use of his own reason and choice), which He in no instance afore determineth? Certainly they consider not what they grant themselves, when they suppose, that God made it able so to do; when they make the abilities which He giveth unable to do their work, till He determine them so to do, so that, being so determined before they determine themselves, they cannot do otherwise.

BOOK  
II.

§ 15. And suppose it a contradiction, that the will should choose that, which no reason why it should choose appeareth; certainly, when reason pronounceth the motive that appeareth to be sufficient, the action that ensueth cannot be said to proceed from a cause indifferent to act or not, though the determination thereof be not peremptory till the act follow. Now is there any necessity, why God should interpose to determine the indifference of the cause, otherwise than as enabling it to determine its own indifference? Suppose then a sentence passed in the court of reason, importing not only, this is to be done, but this shall be done; do we not see every moment protestations made by the sensual appetite, and acts entered of them by the judge? Indeed, if the matter of them do not bear a plea, the sentence remains; but is it therefore necessary, that execution follow? Witness those that act against conscience. Witness Aristotle's dispute of incontinence, placing the nature of it in doing the contrary of that, which the judgment is resolved ought to be done<sup>i</sup>; as if the one could be absolutely the best, the other the best at this time. Witness Medea in Ovid, when she says, "*Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor*"—"I see the better, but I do the worse<sup>j</sup>." For the mouth of conscience is to be stopped with a pretence of repentance to come, and so present satisfaction is clear gain by the bargain. If at length it come to execution of the sentence, I demand what it is, that makes the resolution from thenceforth peremptory, but the same reason, that determined the choice afore; unless we suppose new matter advanced in plea first, and afterwards voided. If that which was sufficient afore prove not effectual till now, it is not because any thing was wanting, without which the will was not able to proceed, but because reason to the contrary appeared considerable before.

§ 16. I grant there be those, that have so far determined the indifference of their own inclinations, that no reason to the contrary appears considerable, to delay execution of the sentence passed long since. But this appears by experience to take place, as well in those who have degenerated to devils incarnate, as those who have improved to saints upon earth:

<sup>i</sup> "Ὁ μὲν ἀκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πρᾶττει διὰ πάθος," κ.τ.λ. Aristot.

Eth. Nic., VII. i. 6, &c.

<sup>j</sup> Ovid., Metam., vii. 20, 21.

and therefore cannot be attributed to the force of true good, acting beyond the appearance which it createth in the mind, because God's immediate act directs it; but partly to the habitual grace of the Holy Ghost, with the resolution of Christianity, presenting true good as lovely and beautiful as indeed it is; partly to the custom of doing even those acts, which without the assistance of God's Spirit our nature cannot do; upon which, as the habitual endowment of the Holy Ghost follows by God's gracious promise, so there follows naturally a facility of doing even supernatural actions which men habituate themselves to, by the mere force of custom, excluding the consideration of all that reason to the contrary, that hath proved abortive and addle long since. Which notwithstanding, the choice remains free; by virtue of that original freedom, which determined the indifference of every man to those actions, the frequenting whereof hath created an habit.

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§ 17. And this is the ground of that account which we owe; that, God shewing sufficient reason why we ought to be Christians, and the world to the contrary, our choice hath followed for the better, or for the worse. For the efficacy of the said reasons on either side implies, beside the sufficiency of them, only a supposition of that which comes to pass; which the same reasons determine a man to do, that remain uneffectual till the execution of sentence. But if the will of  
177 God interpose to determine the will before it determines, there can be no more ground for any account, why it acteth or acteth not, than the earth is to give why it standeth still, or the heavens why they move. For it is not the nature of heaven and earth, that makes them stand still or move, but the will of God, that made it their nature, and creates all the necessity that follows upon it; as I said afore. If therefore a man can do nothing till God determine him to do it, and cannot but do that which He determines him to do, then is there the same necessity for that which he doth, as for the heavens moving or the earth standing still.

§ 18. Here a difficulty is made in regard of the merits of Jesus Christ: "Who for the joy set before Him underwent the cross, despising the shame, and sat down at the right hand of God" (Heb. xii. 2); and, "Humbled Himself, be- [Of the freedom of the will of Christ.]

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coming obedient to death, even the death of the cross, wherefore God also hath over-exalted Him" (Phil. ii. 8, 9). As if, because the merits of Christ are the acts of a will, by the hypostatical union utterly determined to the will of God, it were not requisite, that the promises of the Gospel should be obtained by performing the covenant of grace, when a man might not have performed it<sup>k</sup>. The answer is not to be cleared more than the mystery of the Holy Trinity is to be comprehended. For, of a truth, how should it be understood, how the will of God the Father freely tendered, how the same in the Son undertook to assume our nature, and to perform the work of our redemption in it? But upon this freedom depends the consideration, which makes the grace of Christ due by God's promise. For though the will of man in Christ were utterly determined to that which the will of God should choose; yet, because it became so determined by the Divine will in Christ, freely assuming our nature, the influence of that freedom into all that He freely did, in virtue of that choice, makes the acts thereof meritorious of the rewards of His cross.

[*Sensus Compositus-Divinus*, how far applicable.]

§ 19. Nor is there any use to be made of the distinction between the compound and divided sense of any propositions, but those that speak of that necessity which follows upon a supposition of the being of those things, which are said to be necessary. That necessity, and only that, it reconcileth with contingency. *Necesse est prædestinatum salvari—Non necesse est prædestinatum salvari*: in English (for we must suppose the property of each language), It must needs be, or it is necessary, that he who is predestinate should be saved—It is not necessary, not of necessity, it must not needs be, that he who is predestinate should be saved. Compounding or twisting in your mind the quality of predestinate with salvation, that is, supposing a man to be predestinate, the affirmative is true, necessity is attributed to the salvation of a man so qualified; dividing them, that is, not supposing the man to be predestinate, the negative: because Christianity supposeth predestination to preserve freedom and contingency. But if you say in Latin, *Prædestinatus necessario salvatur*; in English, He that is predesti-

<sup>k</sup> See Jansen., August., tom. iii. lib. vi. c. 9. p. 275. a, b.

nate is saved necessarily, or by necessity; it must be utterly denied for the same cause<sup>1</sup>. The same distinction may be used, when the necessity is not upon supposition of the being of that which is said to be necessary, but to no purpose. For it is necessary, that the fire burn, or the sun shew us light; if wood be put to it, if it be above our hemisphere: it is not necessary, if otherwise. But this makes not that which is necessary upon such a supposition ever a whit the more contingent; nay, it were ridiculous to express it, because a limitation so unnecessary may be understood. No less necessary will that act of the will be, to which God determines; though, otherwise, the being of it were not only not necessary, but impossible. Nor will it be true to say, that he who doth what God determines him immediately to do, hath power to do the contrary, at the same time, though not to do it at the same time; "*simultatem potentie ad oppositum*," not "*potentiam simultatis*<sup>m</sup>." For if the will cannot act till<sup>n</sup> so determined, it were a contradiction to say, that it hath power to do that which you say it cannot do.

§ 20. Wherefore, if God from the beginning ever gave the reasonable creature a will actually not determined to do or not to do this or that, the same will by which God does this  
178 continuing for all that time that He maintains it, there is no more room left for a will of determining the same in God, until by virtue of His first will it determine itself; than there is room in God, not to will that which actually and presently He willeth. It is therefore too late to say, that God, determining as well the manner by which all things come to pass, as what shall come to pass, can as well determine the acts of His reasonable creatures to be done freely, as the acts of natural things to be done necessarily; having supposed afore, that He determines these acts by determining immediately the will to do them. For though I count it necessary to grant, that God by His providence determines all future contingences, for the reason to be shewed in due time<sup>o</sup>; yet,

[How God determines future contingences.]

<sup>1</sup> "Si enim cum dicis, Prædestinatus non potest damnari, intelligas ita, id est, non potest esse ut prædestinatus sit et damnetur, verum dicis; quia conjunctive intelligas: falsum autem si disjunctive; ut si intelligas istum non posse damnari quem dico prædes-

tinatum; potuit enim non esse prædestinatus, et ita damnaretur." P. Lomb., Sent. lib. i. dist. xl. B.

<sup>m</sup> See above, c. xxi. § 5. note i.

<sup>n</sup> Corrected from MS. "still," in orig. text.

<sup>o</sup> Below, c. xxiv. § 17.



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should He determine the will to do them without supposing it to determine itself, there could remain neither contingence in the effect, nor freedom in the cause. And therefore I say, that God determines those things, that come to pass freely and contingently, so to come to pass; but He cannot determine this by destroying freedom and contingence; therefore, not by determining immediately the will of man to do or not to do this or that. For this determination produceth not that necessity which stands upon supposition of an act freely done (and therefore contingent, as that which need not have been done), or of the foresight of it, or of effectual means to bring it to pass (which cannot be defeated because they are supposed to take effect); but that which stands only upon supposition of the cause, which being the determination of God, and therefore indefeasible, the necessity which it produceth, whatsoever it be for the kind, will be stronger than any necessity, that is antecedent to the being of any thing in the creature. And though I said before, absolutely, that the action of the creature cannot be imputed to God<sup>p</sup>; yet, upon an impossible supposition as this, I can and must infer, that nothing can be imputed to the creature as good or evil, to reward or punishment, but all to God: which is a consequence that Christian ears must not endure.

[To determine to the act of sin is to determine to sin.]

§ 21. For I suppose no Christian ears can endure to hear, that God should infuse any inclination to malice into the heart of His creature: because, when it comes to effect, the effect will be imputable to God; and because, before it comes to effect, the work of God must be called evil, as inclined to evil. How then shall we endure to hear it said, that God, by His indefeasible omnipotence, determines the creature to do all the evil that it does, and that without this determination no evil can be done, with it no evil can but be done? For alas! the covering will be too short, to say, that God produceth only the positive action of sin, the malice incident to it (consisting in the mere want of conformity to the rule which it ought to follow) proceeding from the imperfection of the creature. For the difference between the action of sin, and the sin which it acteth, consisteth merely in the conceit of man's understanding, not apprehending at once

<sup>p</sup> § 11, sq.

all the particulars, wherein the action consisteth: no action possibly being so bad, that in some general considerations, common to those which are good, it may not be counted good. But those general considerations express not the particular act, which is supposed to be sin. So soon as the nature thereof is sufficiently expressed, so soon it will appear to be essentially sin. Therefore, if God determine the creature to the act of sin, He determines it to sin. And though, upon these terms, there can neither be sin nor virtue, good nor evil, Law nor Gospel, providence nor judgment to come; yet, upon these terms, the actions of the creature will be imputable to God alone, though not as good or bad, or as the actions of God, yet as the actions of Him that is supposed to be God in words, but denied to be God in effect.

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§ 22. As for that which was said<sup>a</sup>, as if otherwise the efficacy of God's predestination, and that grace, which by it He appointeth for those that shall be saved, could not subsist; or as if otherwise God could not be maintained to be the first cause; I will say no more now, than what I said of the ground for God's foreknowledge of future contingences<sup>r</sup>: that, when I come to say how God determines future contingences, I will do the best I can, to render such a reason, as may  
179 maintain Him to be the first cause, and so to foresee all future contingences, by the same means, by which He determines that they shall come to pass; without giving just ground to infer, that there is neither contingency in the effect nor freedom in the cause, no providence, no judgment, no Christianity, appointed by God. But if I fail of giving such a reason, I disclaim it here before I give it: and will rather allege that I have none to give, and yet believe both God's effectual providence, and the freedom and contingency of men's actions; than believe the determination of man's will by the immediate operation of God's providence to be the source of freedom and contingency, which I have shewed leaves no room for contingency or providence.

[Objections deferred.]

§ 23. And now I may freely grant, that Jansenius hath avoided the charge of telling what it is, that comes between the last instance of deliberation and the first of resolution; by the immediate act of God, to enable a man to do that,

Against the opinion of Jansenius.

<sup>a</sup> c. xxi. § 6.

<sup>r</sup> c. xxi. § 9—11.

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§ 24. There is extant a brief resolution of the whole question by that learned gentleman Thomas White; where he concludeth (paragraph 10<sup>s</sup>), that God determineth every man

[Of the resolution of the question by Thomas White.]

\* "Dei itaque præmotio, hoc est, impulsus voluntatis ad agendum in communi sive per infusionem amoris boni, ut sic, sive per roborationem intentionis circa finem aliquem particularem, ex qua sequitur necessario investigatio mediorum et electio unius, adeo non officit libertati, ut omnino sit ei-

dem necessaria, et sit causa actionis liberæ et ipsius libertatis. Rursus si per extrinsecam Dei providentiam plures causæ, quantum sese invicem respiciunt, per accidens coordinatæ, in Dei consiliis ad unum conspirantes effectum, faciunt in homine tales intrinsecas dispositiones sive actuales sive



so to determine himself in whatsoever he does (by the love of good infused, and the causes which His providence useth to represent it desirable), that he cannot do otherwise. How he would answer concerning evil, is not so plain by his words. He says, indeed, it is not the same thing to determine and cause to determine; as for the Ammonites, and David, to kill Urias<sup>t</sup>. But if the murder be duly imputed to David for procuring means towards it that might have failed, would he have God procure means that cannot fail? It cannot be allowed, but thus; that though of themselves they might fail, yet, supposing the foreknowledge of God that employeth them, that is, supposing them to take effect (which supposition, all the experience in the world concludeth, cannot be cleared till the effect follow), they cannot fail. And the nature of

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[2 Sam. xi.  
14—17.]

habituales, ut ex eis sequatur hominem sese determinare ad aliquem actum particularem; clarum rursus est neque providentiam Divinam neque has causas aliquo modo impedire libertatem, sed eam adjuvare et perficere. Cum enim non obstantibus his, immo his adjuvantibus et facientibus, homo determinet semetipsum ad talem actionem ex eo quod prædictæ impressiones sunt quasi partes et facultates et instrumenta per quæ sese dirigit in consultatione et resolutione, clarum est quod substantia libertatis integra et illibata est, immo fortior et vegetior, per has impressiones; et ipsæ impressiones sint quæ faciunt ipsum recte vel faciliter sese determinare, et arbitrium suum exercere. Unde si ex hoc quod Deus in Sese prædefinitum habeat effectum futurum, vel quod agat per media in quorum integra collectione præcontineatur volitio futura, dicatur Deus hominem ad eam prædeterminare; clarum est huiusmodi prædeterminationem naturam et exercitium liberi arbitrii nullo modo tollere, sed magis perficere, et esse necessario prærequisitam; nisi in adeo fuse pessundatum errorem *ἀποκινήσεως* voluntatis relabi malimus . . . . Hæc dicta sunt de prædeterminatione in via explicata, quam putem esse D. Thomæ et graviorum ipsius sectatorum. Alia enim, quæ vel est aliquorum ipsius sectatorum vel ipsis imponitur, ut asserant libertatem consistere in potestate sese ambidextre in duas contradictionis partes suoapte marte versandi; sed quia ex indifferente nihil procedit, propterea a Deo Ipso immediate infundi

seu motum seu qualitatem per quam non potest non in unam determinatam partem procedere; nisi fallor, una manu destruit quod altera ædificat, . . . et contradictoria unico flatu effutit." From a book entitled, *Quæst. Theol.*, quomodo secundum principia Peripateticos Digbæanæ, sive secundum rationem, et abstrahendo quantum materia patitur ab autoritate, Humani Arbitrii Libertas sit explicanda, et cum Gratia Efficacia concilianda; authore Thoma Anglo e generosa Albæorum in Oriente Trinobantum Prosapia oriundo; paragr. x. pp. 272, 273, at the end of Sonus Buccinæ sive *Tres-Tractatus &c.* (by the same author); 8vo. Col. Agrip. 1659: and dedicated to Sir Kenelm Digby.

<sup>t</sup> "Objicere conetur aliquis, Saltem præfinitio et causæ mediæ ab ipsa ordinatæ efficiunt ut homo non possit non se determinare ad hanc individuum actionem: determinant itaque hominem. Permisso antecedente, respondetur manifestam esse nequitiam consequentiæ. Nunquid enim idem est facere aliud facere aliquid, et ipsummet illud facere. Num enim idem est me persuadere alicui fornicationem et me fornicari? . . . Et si aliquando eadem voce utrumque significatur, num in eadem etiam significatione vocem usurpari credendum est? Si dicitur ignis urere lignum, et homo admoto igne tabulam urere, eritne eadem vocis acceptatio? Si filii Ammon et David peremerunt Uriam, numquid in eadem usurpatione vocis 'interficere?' " *Id.*, *ibid.*, p. 273.

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freedom, the ground of the account to come, consisteth in this; that, determining a man to act, he might not have acted, till the act was done. For certainly it were a contradiction to say, that which determines the will to act (speaking, not of the thing without, but of the consideration thereof in the mind), may not be extant when a man determines himself in virtue of it. Nay, were this consideration, whereby God determineth, indefeasible of its own nature (for as employed by God's providence, that is, supposing the effect to follow, it is), it were that very predetermination which I 180 have infringed by the premised discourse; coming from God, in order of reason, first, and in the very next instant producing that choice, wherein the determination of the will formally consisteth.

[Conclu-  
sion.]

§ 25. I will therefore conclude, that wheresoever through the whole Bible God calls any man, or His ancient people, or by the Gospel all people, to yield Him that inward obedience and worship in spirit and truth which Christianity requireth (all this proceeding supposing the corruption of man's nature by the fall of Adam), there He will take account of His disbursements by that which the creature shall have done, not finally determined to do it by any thing preceding the choice. Putting you in mind to add to the evidence for this, all that I said in the beginning of this Book<sup>u</sup>, to shew, that the condition of the covenant of grace implieth a resolution generally to obey all that Christianity enjoineth. For whatsoever delight in the true good God may prevent and determine the will with (as prevent it He may and doth, so as to take most certain effect), it must have in it the force of choice upon deliberation, that makes God, instead of the world, the utmost end of all a man's actions. And in virtue of this choice, whatsoever is done in prosecution of it, consisteth in the like freedom of preferring it before the difficulties that impeach it; which therefore he that will, may follow, and fail of his purpose. "He that might have transgressed and did not, his goods shall be firm," saith Ecclesiasticus; xxxi. 10, 11. Christianity then supposeth free choice, as well to do rather than not to do, as to do this rather than that. But Christianity cannot suppose this freedom, till it can sup-

<sup>u</sup> c. ii. § 1, &c.

pose the reason, why every thing is to be done, to appear. For that is it, which must determine the indifference of man's will to proceed. And therefore, if there be any thing, which without Christianity a man under original sin stands not convinced that it is to be done; though, supposing Christianity, his freedom may extend to it, yet, not supposing the same, it doth not. This is that which I come to in the next place.

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## CHAPTER XXIII.

A MAN IS ABLE TO DO THINGS TRULY HONEST UNDER ORIGINAL SIN. BUT NOT TO MAKE GOD THE END OF ALL HIS DOINGS. HOW ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE GENTILES ARE SINS. THEY ARE ACCOUNTABLE ONLY FOR THE LAW OF NATURE. HOW ALL MEN HAVE OR HAVE NOT GRACE SUFFICIENT TO SAVE.

Now to the second part of my position I say, that, though (notwithstanding the inclination of original concupiscence) a man is able to do any kind of act, towards himself, towards all other men, or towards God, yet is he not able to do any for that reason for which it is indeed to be done; and, therefore, that he is by his birth slave to sin, and without the grace of Christ cannot become free of that bondage.

§ 2. The first part of this position stands upon the words of St. Paul, Rom. ii. 14, 15: "For when the Gentiles, that have not the Law, do by nature the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves; who shew the work of the Law written in their hearts, their consciences bearing witness with them, and their thoughts afterwards interchangeably accusing or excusing." I know St. Augustin<sup>v</sup>, Prosper<sup>x</sup>, and Fulgentius<sup>y</sup>, will have this to be said of the Gentiles, that had been converted to Christianity. But having shewed<sup>z</sup>, that the interpretation of the Scripture is not subject to the authority or judgment of particular doctors; and knowing, that the tradition of the Church neither

A man is able to do things truly honest under original sin.

[St. Paul, in Rom. ii. 14, 15, speaks of the Gentiles yet unconverted.]

<sup>v</sup> De Spir. et Lit., c. xxvi. § 43, sq.; Op., tom. x. pp. 108. C, sq.: and elsewhere.

<sup>x</sup> Lib. cont. Cassian. Collatorem, c. x. § 2; Op., tom. i. p. 181. a. Bassan. 1782: adding however (§ 3. *ibid.*), "Sin autem (quod magis vult hic dis-

putator intelligi) de illis ista dicuntur, qui alieni a gratia Christiana," &c.

<sup>y</sup> De Gratia Christi, c. xxv.; ap. Bibl. PP., tom. vi. P. i. p. 90. F.

<sup>z</sup> Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xxi. § 7, &c.

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went before them nor hath followed after them, to make the position upon which their interpretation proceeds a point of faith; I follow peremptory reason from the process of St. Paul's discourse: who, having concluded the Gentiles to be liable to God's judgment in case they embrace not Christianity, and coming to do the like for the Jews, upon a supposition, which he takes to be evident upon experience (as appealing to their own consciences in it), that they kept not God's law, by which they hoped to be saved, proceeds to compare with them the Gentiles whom he had convicted afore, that he may prove the Jews to have as much need of the Gospel, as he had proved the Gentiles to have. He saith then, that the Gentiles have also a law of God; which is the sense of God's will which nature works in their hearts: and that, as the Jews did many things according to God's written law, so did the Gentiles according to the law of nature: but if they could say, that the Gentiles kept not the law of nature, as hitherto he had proved; no less might the Gentiles say, that they kept not the Law, by which they pretended to be righteous before God. This you shall easily perceive to be St. Paul's business, if you compare that which he writes Rom. ii. 12, 13, 17—24. concerning the Jews, with that which went afore from Rom. i. 18. concerning the Gentiles. Indeed, when the Apostle afterwards compares the circumcision of the heart, which makes a spiritual Jew, with the Gentile, who in his uncircumcision doth the same righteous things of the Law, which the said spiritual Jew doth (Rom. ii. 25—29); as I acknowledge, that there is no spiritual Jew by the letter of the Law, but by the grace of the Gospel (which, though covertly, had course and took effect, though in a less measure, under the Law), so I must acknowledge, that none but the Gentile converted to Christianity can be compared to him. But it is no prejudice to the Apostle's argument to say, that the Gentile is capable of that by the Gospel, which the Jew could not boast of by the Law, but by the grace of the Gospel under the Law. Whereas, if the Apostle do not convict the Jew to have need of the Gospel by shewing the Gentile to bear the same fruits by the law of nature which the Jew brought forth by the law of Moses, he leaves him utterly unconvicted of the necessity God had to bring in the Gospel, for

the salvation of the Jew, as well as of the Gentile. And therefore, when St. Paul names “the things of the Law,” he compriseth as well those duties that concern God, as those which concern ourselves and our neighbours. Agreeing herein with the experience of all ages and nations; which allows religion towards God to be a law of all nations, as well as the difference between right and wrong in civil contracts, between honest and shameful in men’s private actions, to be impressed by God upon their hearts, and from thence expressed in their laws and customs.

§ 3. And truly it can by no means be denied, that the difference of three sorts of good things, *honesta, utilia, et jucunda*, things honest, useful, and pleasurable, is both understood and admitted amongst heathen nations<sup>a</sup>; that is to say, that heathen nations do acknowledge, that there are some things, which, of themselves agreeing with the dignity of man’s nature, are more worthy to be embraced, than those which present us either with profit or pleasure without consideration of what beseems us otherwise. To which, assuming this, as evident by experience of the world, that the reason of that which is honest or honourable, as suitable with the dignity and worth of man’s excellency, is not always contradicted in occasions of action, either by profit or pleasure; there will be no possible reason for any man to deny, that (notwithstanding original concupiscence) a man may be led by reason of honesty to do that which it requireth. Whereof we have invincible evidence, not only in the philosophy of the Greeks, and the civility of the Romans, but in the works of mercy and virtue, which every Christian may receive at the hands of the Jews and Mahometans, so often as they are not overswayed by their passion or interest.

§ 4. But now, for the reason which their actions do or ought to follow, whereas it is certain, that the reason of all men’s actions is derived from the end which they propose themselves, and that the end which they ought to propose themselves is the service of God; it is as certain, on the other side, that through the original corruption of nature a

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[Rom. ii.  
14.]

[Heathens could both distinguish and prefer the honest before the pleasant or the useful.]

But [man] not able [under original sin] to make God the end of all his doings.

<sup>a</sup> “Τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις, καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν

ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ,” κ.τ.λ. Aristot., Eth. Nicom. II. iii. 7; and elsewhere.



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man is not able to resolve to make God the utmost end of his actions, and that, not resolving this, he cannot become free of the bondage of sin. This remains already proved by the necessity of the grace of Christ demonstrated afore, and stands perfectly verified by the experience of all ages and nations alleged even now. For though there is in all men conscience, to prefer that which is honest and more honourable before either profit or pleasure: notwithstanding, experience shews, that the world is never without occasions, wherein it cannot be obtained together with profit or pleasure; and the same experience will shew, that the motives of profit and pleasure (which Christians therefore call temptations, because they know from whence they proceed) easily prevail over the conscience of that, which were, according to the due worth of our manhood, more honourable for us. This, if we take every man by himself, considering him as not engaged in society and communion with others: but if we suppose him prevented with such relations, it is admirable to consider, but evident to be observed, that men are more wolves to men than wolves are to wolves; and that by those oppressions and cruelties, whereof there is no example in the wildest of beasts, men make themselves way to the greatest glory that the world can raise. This is that which Macchiavel observes<sup>b</sup>: that the world esteems great things, whether they be good or not; and, magnifying those that follow them, shews, that it is not for want of will, but for want of means and opportunities, that the most do not do the like. Nay, they that have the best resolutions when they are alone, when they engage themselves but in company, do proceed as if they thought it civility to offend God, for love of them whom they converse with. These are the temptations of the flesh and the world, that hold men obnoxious to the bondage of sin, notwithstanding that conscience, which prefers honesty before profit or pleasure. And in regard of this bondage our Lord said in the Gospel (John viii. 31—36), “If ye abide in My words, ye are truly My disciples, and shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free.” And when they answer, that, being Abraham’s sons, they were never slaves: “Every one that committeth sin, is a slave of sin; now the slave abideth not always in the house, but the son

<sup>b</sup> See 11 Principe, c. xv.

183 abideth always; if therefore the Son set you free, then shall you be free indeed." And St. Paul hereupon, Rom. vi. 17, 18: C H A P.  
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 "Thanks be to God, that, being slaves to sin, ye obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine that was delivered you; and being freed from sin ye became slaves to righteousness." For out of the sense of this bondage he cries out again, Rom. vii. 24; "Wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Which, if it be said of the unregenerate man, expresseth the estate of all such; if of St. Paul, concludeth the unregenerate to be in that estate much more.

§ 5. And indeed, original concupiscence having brought into the world the ignorance of that truth, which the fathers had received from God concerning God, as I said afore<sup>c</sup>; it cannot be imagined, that men should be induced by that slender light which remains, of one God and His providence, and that suspicion which was left, that He will one day take account of man's actions, to baulk the temptations of profit and pleasure, out of a resolution to do all things which the light of nature might convince them to be according to God's will, for no other reason but to obey Him and to do Him service; though otherwise convict, that all is due to Him, whatsoever they are able to do for His service. Hence came the worship of idols; even among them, whom St. Paul affirms to have known the majesty of one true God, Rom. i. 20. And hence came those sins, which he hath shewed us, in that first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, to have been the native consequences of the worship of idols. Hence came all counterfeit religion into the world; inasmuch as they, that know themselves to be liable to some religion, are nevertheless unwilling to embrace that which obliges them to resign themselves to the service of God, so long as any [reason<sup>d</sup>] can be shewed them, which may tender them plausible persuasions of peace with God, reserving their own passions and interests. And that very religion, which God had tied His own people to (for a means to bring them to understand the difference between the civil obedience and the outward service, to which He had promised the happiness of the land of promise, and that spiritual service of God, to which He intimated the

<sup>c</sup> Above, c. xx. § 31.

<sup>d</sup> Added from MS.



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promise of the world to come), became so darkened by the same common corruption of nature; that in a manner the whole body of that people, when they had retired themselves from the worship of idols to the observation of the Law, was carried away with an opinion of righteousness before God, in consideration of the outward observation thereof, consisting in those works, which by the force of common nature (I have shewed) they were able to do; without troubling themselves with the true reason from which they are to be derived, and the right intention to which they are to be levelled, which here I shew, that only the grace of Christ enables us to set before us.

[Of martyrdom for a false sect or religion.]

§ 6. By that which hath been said, a difficult objection may be answered, which ariseth from the consideration of those philosophers and heretics, who have not been, nor are, afraid to lay down their lives for the maintenance of their sect or religion by testifying the truth of it; as we read in St. Chrysostom<sup>e</sup>, that many of the Marcionists would do. For if they can endure this (which is the utmost that they can endure) without the help of God, Who requires it not at their hands, what should hinder other men to lay down their lives for God, and by consequence to overcome less difficulties, which hinder them to follow the true goodness which God requireth? This is answered by the terms of my position: that there is no kind of act which a man of himself cannot do, but the reason of God's will, and the intent of God's service, of himself he cannot do it for; though he may think, that he doth it for nothing else. For evidence whereof, I must have recourse to that which I said afore<sup>f</sup>, in resolving, whether there is any such faith to be found as is not the virtue of a Christian. For accordingly I will distinguish, that faith is either the belief of the Gospel and Christianity, or the profession of it, whether sincere or counterfeit. I say then, that the sincere resolution of professing of Christianity

<sup>e</sup> Eusebius (H. E., lib. iv. c. 15; lib. v. c. 16; lib. vii. c. 12; pp. 135, 182, 262. ed. Vales.) and S. Clement of Alexandria (Strom., lib. iv. c. 4; Op., tom. i. p. 571), speak of martyrs so called among the Marcionites. Thorndike perhaps may have confused these passages with St. Chrysostom's

tract De Virginitate, where he speaks (not of martyrs but) of virgins among the same heretics. Tillemont (art. Marcionites) cites no passage from the latter father respecting martyrdom among them.

<sup>f</sup> Above, c. vi. § 7.

(being the condition, to which all the promises of the Gospel are due, as I have shewed<sup>g</sup>) is the work of that grace, which the obedience of Christ hath purchased for us. In order  
 184 whereunto, though the preaching of the Gospel containeth sufficient motives to convince the world of the truth of it; yet, seeing the publishing of those motives by the Apostles of Christ, is the purchase of His blood, and seeing those motives, being (though sufficient, yet) not demonstrative, are resisted by the greater part, it is the work of God's grace, wheresoever they become effectual, to move any man to believe that Christianity is true, in order to the resolution of embracing it. Notwithstanding, inasmuch as the profession of Christianity, when it is protected by the powers of this world, is no disadvantage, but a privilege (especially where there is difference about Christianity, and a man professes what the secular power professes), it is easy to see, that there is reason enough in this world to move a man to profess Christianity for his own sake, and not for God's. Much more to believe the truth of it, for which he hath sufficient reason besides. But, this faith not being that which is called faith absolutely, but with an addition of abatement, we are absolutely to conclude, with the council of Orange<sup>h</sup>, that to "believe as a man ought," is not the work of free-will, but of God's grace; the limitation of, "as a man ought," serving to exclude such counterfeit faith as I have described. Now, though this reason of professing Christianity for advantage of this world, be the most ordinary and visible, when Christianity is protected by the laws and powers of the world; yet may it as well come to pass and effect otherwise, or at least, that which countervails it. For Aristotle observes unto us in his Morals, that all men are not carried away, either with the profit of this world or the pleasures or honours; there are those that prefer virtue, whether speculative, or active: though this active virtue, he describes to consist in that mean, which the discretion of the world determines<sup>i</sup>. For he often repeats

C H A P.  
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<sup>g</sup> Above, c. ii. &c.

<sup>h</sup> "Si quis sine gratia Dei credentibus, volentibus," &c. . . "nobis misericordiam dicit conferri divinitus; non autem ut credamus, velimus, vel hæc omnia, sicut oportet, agere valeamus, per infusionem et inspirationem Sancti Spiritus in nobis fieri confitetur, . . .

resistit Apostolo dicenti, 'Quid habes quod non accepisti,' &c. Concil. Arausic. II. (A.D. 529), can. vi.; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. p. 1668. B, C.

<sup>i</sup> "Γίνεσθαι δ' αγαθούς ολονται οι μεν φύσει οι δ' εθει οι δε διδαχη: το μεν ουν της φύσεως δηλον ως ουκ εφ' ημιν υπαρχει αλλά διά τινας θείας αιτίας τοις ως

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II.

this for his principle, in that work, that the difference of good and bad must be taken for granted, from that which the civility of the world acknowledges<sup>j</sup>. But how easy is it for them, who have addicted themselves to the profession of that civility, or that knowledge, which the world pretends not to, to embrace and profess opinions which the world allows not, and, having made it their business in the world, rather part with their lives, than be constrained, either to believe, or not believing to profess, otherwise? How much more, in the knowledge of God, and the hope of happiness (which we suppose Christianity truly to promise), may a man, that pursues not the truth of it with that humility which it requires, by the judgment of God fastening upon false principles, by virtue of them be induced to embrace those conclusions, which he shall rather part with his life than refuse, and yet for his own sake, not for God's, Who teaches them not?

How all  
the actions  
of the Gen-  
tiles are  
sins.

§ 7. And upon these premises we may determine, whether all the actions of the Gentiles, and unregenerate, are sins or not; at least, so far as it is requisite to determine any thing in it. For, on the one side, it is evident, that (seeing it is impossible, that they should by nature attain to a resolution of doing all that they do in obedience to the will of God and with an intent of His service), it is not possible, that their actions should have that utmost end which they ought to have. On the other side, seeing it appeareth, that nothing hinders them to do things for the mere regard of honesty, or of doing good to others, without making themselves positively and expressly the end of what they do; it is manifest, that the next end which they intend by them may be good, and that the things which they do are such as of their own nature may be ordered and directed to the service of God, though by them not so intended. And therefore, when it is said, that unregenerate men do all for themselves as their utmost end, we must distinguish in themselves the seeds<sup>k</sup> of

ἀληθῶς εὐτυχεῖσιν ὑπάρχει," κ.τ.λ. Aris-  
tot., Eth. Nicom., X. ix. 6.—"Ἔστιν  
ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσό-  
τητι οὐσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὀρισμένη λόγῳ  
καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν." Id.,  
ibid., II. vi. 15.

<sup>j</sup> Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί,  
καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ κα-  
λῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει

δὲ ὡς εἵπομεν." Id., ibid., I. viii. 13.—  
"Ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς,  
καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τᾶληθῆς αὐτῷ φαίνεται . . .  
καὶ διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος  
τῷ τᾶληθῆς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὄραν, ὡσπερ κά-  
νων καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὦν." Id., ibid., III.  
iv. 4, 5.—And elsewhere repeatedly.

<sup>k</sup> Corrected in the errata into, "with  
the seeds," which is unintelligible.

virtue, which the common notions of difference between good and bad contain, from the corruption of original concupiscence. C H A P.  
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For well may we say, when they are moved with regard of honesty to do any thing, that they do it for themselves; because it is the native worth of their manhood which moves them to do it. But when it is said, that, addicting themselves to the riches or honours or pleasures of this world, which they addict themselves to for love of themselves, they make themselves their utmost end; this must be understood, as in 185 moral matters, for the main part of their doings; the love of riches, honour, or pleasure, much less of civil virtue, not disabling them, or so swallowing up all consideration of that, which of itself suits with the worth of man's nature, but that, without any other regard, they may many times choose to do it. And therefore, having made good the grounds aforesaid, I shall leave it to the reader's own judgment; whether he will hold all their actions to be sins, because they are not positively directed to the utmost end of God's honour and service, or those which are done for honesty's sake to be virtues, because they are positively directed to that next end that is according to God's will, and might have been directed to His service: assuring myself, that no interest of Christianity obliges either me or him to determine this or that.

§ 8. And now, before I leave this point, I infer again here, from the reasons which I have used to prove the capacity of indifference in the will of man, excluding the actual determination of it, before he determine himself; that all this is not to say, that indifference is requisite to all freedom, but to the freedom of man alone, in this state of travail and proficience. For my ground is God's tender of a treaty and conditions of peace and reconcilement, together with those precepts and prohibitions, those promises and threats, those exhortations and dehortations, which it is enforced with. So that it is utterly impertinent to allege here the freedom of God and angels, the freedom of the saints in the world to come, the freedom of our Lord Christ's human soul<sup>1</sup>; to prove, that this indifference is not requisite to the freedom of man, because it is not found in that freedom which they are arrived to: to whom no covenant is tendered, no precept requisite,

[Indifference in the will requisite only to the freedom of man in his present state.]

<sup>1</sup> See Jansen., August., tom. iii. lib. vi. cc. 7, 8, 9; pp. 270. b. B, sq.

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no exhortation useful, as being either the cause of all rule of goodness, or so united to it that they cannot fail of it. And though the perfection of their estate admitteth no possibility of failing, yet it is no ways prejudicial to the honour of God, to provide men here of such an estate, as is necessarily capable of failing; his perfection being such, as is necessarily capable of improvement. And, therefore, it is no disparagement to God, that He should create a possibility of sinning in that creature, in which, if there were not now a possibility of sinning, there could not be a possibility of attaining happiness by not sinning.

[Whether sufficient grace be granted indifferently to all mankind.]

§ 9. These things thus settled, it remains that we enquire, whether that sufficient grace, which the difference between the antecedent and consequent will of God settles, be granted indifferently to all mankind or not. And my answer is briefly this: that God hath provided for all mankind that grace, which, at a distance, is sufficient to save all mankind; but that grace which is immediately sufficient to save, He hath not immediately provided for all mankind, but hath trusted His Church to provide it for the rest of mankind, having left them means sufficient to do it.

[The Gentiles] are accountable only for the law of nature.

§ 10. My reason is this, because, where God sendeth immediately means sufficient to save by converting to Christianity, there He will demand an account of the neglect of that means which He tendereth. For I suppose from that which I said in the first Book against the Leviathan<sup>m</sup>, that as many as come to the knowledge of Christianity are obliged to receive it. Certainly, he that believes the Christian faith, must needs believe, that God hath done enough to oblige all, that come to know the truth of it, to submit themselves to it; otherwise to remain liable, not only to those sins which they are under when they come to know it, but to the guilt of neglecting so great salvation, provided and tendered by God. Now that those, who never heard of the Gospel of Christ and remain destitute of all means to be informed of the truth of Christianity, shall not be judged, either for neglecting or transgressing that will of God which it publisheth, will appear by manifest consequence from the express words of St. Paul concerning the judgment, which the

<sup>m</sup> Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. ii. § 9, c. iii. § 33, sq.



Jews and Gentiles before the Gospel remain subject to; Rom. C H A P.  
XXIII.  
ii. 12–16. “For as many as have sinned without the Law, shall

perish without the Law, and as many as have sinned under the Law, shall be punished by the Law; for the hearers of the Law are not just before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified; for when the Gentiles, not having the Law, do by  
186 nature the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves, who shew the works of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience also witnessing with them, and their thoughts interchangeably accusing or excusing, in the day that God shall judge the secrets of man according to my gospel.” Some<sup>n</sup> construe these words thus; “As many as have sinned without the Law shall perish without the Law, in the day that God shall judge the secrets of men according to my gospel.” If those that sin without the Law shall perish without the Law, it is manifest, that they shall not be condemned for transgressing the Law, which they never knew: and if the ground why they perish be the law that is written in their hearts, to which their conscience bears witness, when their thoughts accuse or excuse them; whether this be at the day of judgment or not; it is plain, the conscience can never accuse a man (nor, by consequence, God condemn him) for transgressing the will of God which he never knew. And if God proceed not with the Gentiles upon the Law, which the Israelites only knew, but upon the light and law of nature, by which, not knowing the Law, they found themselves obliged to do that which it commanded; then shall He not proceed upon the Gospel with them, who never had means to know it, but upon the light of nature, and the conscience of what they have done or not done, according to it or against it.

§ 11. And indeed the words of our Lord are plain enough [Proof from Scripture.]  
(John iii. 17—21): “God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through Him might be saved: he that believeth on Him shall not be condemned, but he that believeth not on Him is condemned already, because he believed not in the name of the only-begotten Son of God: and

<sup>n</sup> “*Ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὅτε κρινεῖ ὁ Θεός*—Absoluta παρενθέσει, redit Apostolus ad illud quod dixerat, *κρινθήσονται*, et ei suum tempus assignat.” Grot., in

<sup>m</sup> Epist. ad Rom. ii. 16. Others have connected the words with *ἐνδείκνυνται*, or with *κατηγορούντων*, &c., in v. 15. See Poli Synops. ad loc.

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the condemnation is this, that light is come into the world, and men love darkness better than light, because their works are evil; for every one that doth evil, hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, that his works be not reprov'd; but he that doth the truth, cometh to the light, that his works may be manifest, that they are done in God." For he that is condemned for not believing, because he hates the light, must first see the light, before he hate it; and so, positively refuse to believe, because his works will not endure the light. And no man could do the truth, and that in God, but he that was under the law of God; who, if he did not the truth which the Law requireth, would consequently hate the truth which the Gospel preacheth. So, he that is condemned for not believing, is he that heareth the Gospel and receiveth it not. And to this reason we must refer the words of St. Paul, Acts xiv. 16; "Who, in by-past ages, suffered all nations to walk in their own ways:" and again, Acts xvii. 30; "God therefore, Who did oversee the times of ignorance, now enjoineth all men every where to repent:" and Rom. iii. 25, 26; "Whom God hath proposed for a propitiatory through faith in His blood, to declare His righteousness, because of the passing by of sins that went afore; to declare, I say, His righteousness at this present time." For we cannot imagine, that He will not demand account of the sins that have been done from the beginning of the world; of Whom "Enoch the seventh from Adam prophesied, saying, Behold the Lord is come with the ten thousands of His holy" angels, "to do judgment upon all, and to rebuke all the ungodly of them of all the ungodliness which they have committed, and of all the bad words they have spoken against Him, wicked sinners:" Jude 14, 15. And it is not for nothing, that God, when He let the Gentiles alone to walk in their own ways, notwithstanding "left not Himself without witness, doing good, giving us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness;" as St. Paul proceeds, Acts xiv. 17: nor that "He made of one blood all nations of men to dwell upon the face of the whole earth, determining times appointed before [and<sup>o</sup>] the bounds of their dwelling; that they might seek the Lord, if by any means they might

[“of His  
saints.”  
Eng. vers.]

<sup>o</sup> Misprinted, “to,” in orig. text.



find Him by groping, though not far distant from each one of us; for in Him we live and move and have our being; as some also of your poets have said, ‘for we are His offspring;’” as the same St. Paul had premised, Acts xvii. 26—28. For to what serves his witness, but to inform the process of his judgment? But God is said to have let them alone, passing  
 187 by their sins, because, by tendering them His Gospel, He did not aggravate their judgment in case they should refuse it, nor require of them that obedience which it inferreth: whereas, by the Gospel, “the wrath of God is revealed from heaven upon all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, that hold the truth in unrighteousness;” as St. Paul saith, Rom. i. 18, 19: “because,” saith he, “that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath manifested it to them” by His works; as it follows there. So that the Gospel, as it declares the judgment of God upon those sins that are done under the light of nature, so it declares so much heavier vengeance against those, which are done under and against the light which it sheweth. Which is the reason, why, so many times in the Psalms, the bringing in of the Gospel is prophesied under the figure of God’s coming to judgment; Psalm l., xvi., xvii., xviii.

§ 12. And indeed there is necessary reason for this, if we believe that God will judge every man according to his works at the last day: which, as I shewed you<sup>p</sup> in the dispute concerning justifying faith, that it is a principle of our common Christianity, an article of our belief, which no man can be saved that holds not; so I may thereupon further say, that all men that are under the Gospel shall be judged according to that obedience which the Gospel and Christianity requireth. For if St. Paul had only said (Rom. ii. 12, 16), “As many as have sinned without the Law shall perish without the Law, and as many as have sinned under the Law shall be condemned by the Law, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men according to my gospel by Jesus Christ;” as the construction which I spoke of even now requires; he had only said, that the Gospel declareth that God shall judge the secrets of men by Christ: which is that which the Apostles witnessed, as from our Lord Christ, to move men to

[But Christians shall be judged according to the light of the Gospel.]

<sup>p</sup> See above, c. vii. § 5.

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11.

embrace it. But having said also, that the "Law is not given to the righteous, but to the lawless and disobedient, to the ungodly and sinful, to," &c., "and if there be any thing opposite to the sound doctrine," which is "according to the glorious Gospel of the Blessed God, which I am trusted with" (1 Tim. i. 9—11); he sheweth us also, that those who have been under the preaching of the Gospel shall be judged according to that obedience which the Gospel requireth; to wit, according as they have either performed or neglected it. The reason; because I have shewed the Gospel not to contain a mere promise on God's part, but a covenant with man; by which he must stand or fall, as he hath performed the terms of it or not. But to neglect the Gospel, or to transgress it, cannot have been any part of their works that never heard of it: and, therefore, they cannot be judged by it, but by the work of God's law which is written in their hearts, by virtue whereof, their conscience bearing witness of the works that they have done or not done, the thoughts thereof shall accuse or excuse them before God; as St. Paul saith of the Gentiles during the Law. But had they been tendered that grace which is sufficient to save, without doubt they must have given account to God of it, the account being grounded upon that which a man receives, as our Saviour shews by the parable of the talents. "And that servant which knows his master's will, and prepares not and does according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knows not, and doth things that deserve stripes, shall be beaten with a few:" saith our Lord, Luke xii. 47, 48. Not as if any servant knew nothing of his master's will, as I have shewed, by the light of nature; for how should he then do that which deserves stripes? but because many know not that will which our Saviour preacheth, and, not knowing it, are not under account for it.

["neither  
does."]

How all  
men have  
or have  
not grace  
sufficient  
to save.

§ 13. Indeed, God, for His part, hath provided that grace, which is sufficient for the salvation of all mankind, by providing our Lord Christ; Whose obedience and sufferings have purchased the coming of the Holy Ghost upon His disciples, and enabled them, both by the works which He had given them to do, and by the interpretation of the Old Testament concerning our Lord Christ, to tender the world sufficient

conviction of His rising again, and of the faith of those promises, which He hath made to all them that take up His cross, to become conformable to His sufferings. But these 188 promises are so great, that whosoever stands convict that they are true, must needs stand convict, that he is in reason bound to embrace the condition upon which they are tendered; unless he can make a question, whether the world to come is to be preferred before this or not. And this I affirm to be sufficient grace, contained in the preaching of the Gospel, which tendereth this conviction to all mankind; supposing, that no immediate act of God is requisite to determine him that standeth so convict, to embrace it, but that it must be the act of his own free choice, that must resolve him to it. And all this of the mere free grace of God; inasmuch as nothing but His own free grace could have moved Him to provide this means, which only the coming of our Lord Christ could furnish. And though, for the glory of His goodness, this means is common to all mankind, inasmuch as the motives of faith, wherein it consisteth, are of the same force and virtue towards all; yet it is no less the grace of Christ, being the purchase of His obedience and sufferings. For if it be said, that the work of embracing the Christian faith is supernatural, inasmuch as it tendeth to supernatural happiness: it is to be answered, that all the means that God uses to induce us to embrace the same, are also supernatural; being provided by God's immediate act, beyond all the force of nature, and therefore proportionable to the work which they require. And if it be said, that the difficulty thereof (in regard of original concupiscence) is such as no reason can overcome; it is answered, that, as these motives are the productions and instruments of God's Spirit, accompanying His word, whereby it knocks at the hearts of them to whom this conviction is tendered, so they carry with them a promise of the habitual assistance of God's Spirit, to move them that yield themselves to it, to perform that which they undertake, notwithstanding original concupiscence.

§ 14. In the mean time, these being the grounds of this sufficiency, it is manifest, that as many as are utterly destitute of these means, and that by no fault of their own in

BOOK II. neglecting opportunities of being informed, cannot be said to have had that grace, which is immediately sufficient to save them. For if Christ immediately preached is only grace immediately sufficient, then have not they, to whom Christ is not immediately preached, that grace which only is immediately sufficient. So that, the motives of Christianity (the last whereof is the fulfilling of all prophecies concerning the calling of the Gentiles) being absolutely provided, that grace is provided for all, which is sufficient to save all at a distance. But the preaching of Christ to all not being immediately provided by God, but recommended to His Church, under that obligation which He hath laid upon it to that purpose; that grace, which is immediately sufficient to save all, is not immediately given all: being given by that will of God, the effect whereof He hath trusted to the ministry of His Church, and by consequence left the guilt of making void His counsel in it, not upon those that never heard of any such counsel of His, but upon the causers of intestine divisions in the Church, of corruption in the faith, and in the manners of the Church. For it is utterly impossible, that without unity in the faith, without living conformably to that which we profess, that faith, which is destroyed by them that profess it, should prevail over the enemies of it.

§ 15. In particular, let no man think, that I allow that preaching of the Gospel, which I maintain to be sufficient grace, to consist in never so many declamations, or rather exclamations, out of the pulpits, to return to the ways of Christianity: cautioning in the mean time, that all the promises of the Gospel are due by the immediate and personal imputation of the obedience of Christ unto the elect alone; God, in His time, immediately determining their will to embrace Christ, as the wills of the reprobate to cast Him away. For if the true motives of Christianity, represented by the Church as they are delivered by the Scriptures, be sufficient grace to save all men; then is it a preemptory bar to the sufficiency thereof, to make those motives inconsistent with the common sense of all men, in the conviction whereof this sufficiency consisteth. And they who preach so, how much soever they call themselves ‘ministers of the Gospel,’ are not the ministers of God’s word but their own.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

THOUGH GOD DETERMINETH NOT THE WILL IMMEDIATELY, YET HE DETERMINETH THE EFFECT THEREOF BY THE MEANS OF HIS PROVIDENCE, PRESENTING THE OBJECT SO AS HE FORESEES IT WILL CHOOSE. THE CASES OF PHARAOH, OF SOLOMON, OF AHAB, AND OF THE JEWS THAT CRUCIFIED CHRIST. OF GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CONDITIONALS THAT COME NOT TO PASS. THE GROUND OF FOREKNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CONTINGENCIES. DIFFICULT OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

Now that I may resolve you<sup>9</sup>, what it is that makes this sufficient grace become effectual, I say, that, though God determine not by His immediate act the free-will of man to do or not to do this or that, yet He hath determined from everlasting the events of all future contingencies, by determining the objects, whether inward or outward, which all men, in all occasions that shall come to pass, shall meet with; knowing, that the consideration of them will move them effectually to resolve upon doing or not doing that which they shall do or not do. Outward objects I call the things themselves, that present themselves to man's senses: inward, the representations of them laid up in the storehouse of man's mind (whether for the fancy or understanding), the consideration whereof may tender him that which comes under deliberation, under the appearance of good, whether true or counterfeit. And my meaning is, that the providence of God, in determining the objects which every man shall meet with to move him to resolve this or that, proceeds either upon the original right of God toward His creature, in presenting it with that, whereupon He knows a man will resolve to do either good or bad; or upon the reason of reward or punishment, which the foregoing actions of every man, and the impressions and inclinations to good or evil which they have left in him, shall deserve: saving what His own

Though God determineth not the will immediately, yet He determineth the effect thereof by the means of His providence, presenting the object so as He foresees it will choose.

<sup>9</sup> See Preface to the Epilogue, § 17 sq.



BOOK  
11.

free grace shall disburse of mere bounty, over and above that, which His merciful justice (that is to say, those promises, which of His free goodness He hath made to man) doth any way require at His hands. For as it is God's free grace to enter into covenant with man, so it is a part of justice in Him, according to the Scriptures, to make good His promises; even unto them, who by the terms of the covenant, which they so often transgress, can challenge nothing at His hands. My position is averred by all those Scriptures, which declare, how God brings to pass His counsels declared afore. In rendering the sense whereof, I shall not need to suppose that, which, having proved already, I may of right suppose; that God, by His immediate act, determines not the will of man to do this or that, or not to do: because, by the true course, which the Scriptures express God to hold in bringing His purposes to effect, that course will appear to be false; over and above what hath been said.

[1 John i.  
9.]

The case of  
Pharaoh.

[Numb.  
xxii. 12,  
&c.]

§ 2. I begin with Pharaoh. When God intends to deliver the Israelites out of his hands, when God suffered the magicians to do the three first plagues, was it because He, that suffered not Balaam to curse Israel, when he sacrificed thrice to his devils to put a curse against Israel in his mouth (Num. xxiii. 2, 17, 30), could not have hindered their acts to take effect? Or because he had deserved, by oppressing Israel, to be given up to their temptations; which because God knew they would prevail over him, it is truly said, both that "God hardened Pharaoh's heart," and that "Pharaoh hardened his heart," or that "his heart was hard:" Exod. vii. 3, 13; viii. 10, 15, 28; ix. 7, 12, 34; x. 11, 20.

§ 3. There is another passage of the story very much to be observed, because the sense of it lies in the right translation of the original words, which, how unusual soever it seem, is very manifest by the consequence of the text, Exod. 190 ix. 14—16. "For at this time I send all My plagues upon thine heart, and thy servants, and thy people, that thou mayest know, that there is none like Me in all the earth: for already had I sent My plague, and struck thee and thy people with the pestilence" (which had destroyed the cattle afore, Exod. ix. 6), "and thou hadst been destroyed from the earth; only for this have I preserved thee, to shew thee My

power, that My name might be spoken of all over the earth<sup>r</sup>.” It is manifest, that God means to say, that He had destroyed Pharaoh afore, had it not been to shew a greater work. And he that considers, that the Hebrew hath nothing but the indicative to signify all moods and tenses, will make no question of it. The Greek plainly expresseth it: “*ἔνεκεν μὲν τούτου διετηρήθης*.” And the Chaldee of Onkelus, “*די שלחית ארי כען קריב קרמי*”—“*Nunc enim aderat Mihi ut mitterem*”—“For it was now near Me to stretch forth My hand<sup>u</sup>” (that is, I was near doing it), perhaps signifies neither more nor less. And if St. Paul translates part of it word for word, “*ἔνεκα τούτου ἐξηγειρά σε, ὅπως ἐνδείξωμαι ἔν σοι τὴν δύναμιν Μου*”—“For this cause have I raised thee up, that I might shew My power upon thee;” yet is that nothing to the sense of that which went afore: nor to argue any intent in St. Paul, to give occasion for those horrible imaginations, that have been framed upon these words; as if God made Pharaoh, and all in his case, on purpose to shew His power and get glory by damning them to everlasting torments. For it follows a little after in St. Paul: “What if God, willing to shew His wrath, and make known His power, have borne with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fit for destruction; and that to make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He had prepared for glory.” In which words it is manifest, that God spared the life of Pharaoh in the plague of pestilence, though then fit for destruction (for by this discourse it appears, “*κατηρτισμένους*” here signifies “fit” of themselves, not fitted by God<sup>u</sup>), out of His long-suffering, though “willing” (that is, determining) to make

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[Rom. ix.  
17.—“*Εἰς  
αὐτὸ τοῦ-  
το,*” κ.τ.λ.]

[Rom. ix.  
22, 23.]

<sup>r</sup> “For now I will stretch out My hand, that I may smite thee,” &c., “and thou shalt be cut off from the earth. And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to shew,” &c. Exod. ix. 15, 16. Authorized version.

<sup>s</sup> The LXX have “*παράξω—θανάτωσω—ἐκτριβήση,*” in v. 15; but render v. 16, “*Καὶ ἔνεκεν τούτου διετηρήθης, ἵνα ἐνδείξωμαι ἔν σοι τὴν ἰσχύν Μου.*”

<sup>t</sup> “*אָרִי כְעַן קְרִיב־קְרָמִי דִּי שְׁלַחִיתִּי*” פּוֹי יִתְּ-מַחֲתִּי בְּבִרְתִּי וּמַחֲתִּי יִתְּ-וְיִתְּ-“*Quoniam nunc prope est coram Me, ut mittam plagam fortitudinis Meæ, et percutiam te*

et populum tuum peste.” Targ. Onkel., cum vers. Lat., Exod. ix. 15; ap. Walton, Bibl. Polygl., tom. i. p. 263.

<sup>u</sup> “*Dicuntur iidem σκεύη κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπόλειαν* (‘vasa apta in interitum’), ubi more Hebræorum, qui pauca habent verbalia, participium ponitur pro verbali. . . . ‘Apti ad interitum’ sunt, qui dirum exitium meruere. Tales Deus non illico perdit, sed tempus illis dat ad resipiscentiam; quod hic ostendunt illa ἤνεγκεν ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ. . . . Quæ omnia apertissimum faciunt non respici hic homines nude ut creaturas Dei, aut ut Adami posteros, sed ut similes Pharaoni.” Grot., ad Rom. ix. 22.



BOOK  
II.

His power known by destroying him, proving utterly obdurate. But this out of an intent, by the consideration of what they had seen come upon him, to win His own people from the idolatry of Egypt to submit to His law: as, when St. Paul writ, by the judgments of God upon the Jews for rejecting Christianity, He called the Gentiles to it. For this is the inference that St. Paul makes in the next words; "Which are even we whom He hath called, not only of the Jews but of the Gentiles:" introducing in the same words that comparison between the Jews, whom He then called to the Law, and the Gentiles, whom He was now calling to Christianity, which the correspondence between the Old and New Testament importeth. And so the sense of St. Paul is the same with that, which St. Peter said in the words quoted afore<sup>x</sup>; that God delays His wrath in taking vengeance upon the oppressors of His people, because He would have none of them perish, but all come to repentance. The sense which I deliver, you have in Grotius his Annotations<sup>y</sup>; and before the publishing of them, in a book of Milerius<sup>z</sup> concerning this subject; since, in the late Annotations<sup>a</sup>; and before any of them came forth many years, I had declared it for my sense of these words<sup>b</sup>. By which you may see, that Pharaoh, seeing himself and his people not cut off, when their cattle were destroyed by the pestilence, did not believe that it came from God: and also, when God had declared His purpose in preserving him alive to terrify him the more, and when He had caused the plague of hail to cease, which then He moveth him with, is (by the love of rule over those, whom by right he had nothing to do with)

<sup>x</sup> c. xxii. § 6.

<sup>y</sup> "Ὅτι εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐξήγειρά σε," κ. τ. λ. "In Græco est Exod. ix. 16. Ἐνεκα τούτου διετηρήθης," κ. τ. λ. "Quod Paulus vertit ἐξήγειρά σε ('excitavi te') et LXX. διετηρήθης ('asser-vatus es'), in Hebræo est יִיְצַחְךָ, id est, 'stare te feci.' Sic autem 'vivificare' Hebræis dicitur, qui in vita conservat: ita 'stare facere,' ἐγείρειν (excitare), qui non impellit in ruinam." Grot., ad Rom. ix. 17: first publ. in 1641-50. And see the whole note.

<sup>a</sup> Possibly in the *Moyen de la Paix Chrestienne*, &c.: of which the fourth Part (which the present editor has not

met with) contains "l' esclaircissement sur la doctrine de la Predestination et de l'efficace de la grace de Dieu:" by "Theophile Brachet Sieur de la Mille-tière." The first part was published at Paris in 1637.

<sup>b</sup> Scil. the *Critici Sacri sive Doctiss. Virorum in SS. Bibl. Annotationes*, &c., Lond. 1660. Thorndike's Epilogue came out in 1659: so that he must have seen the Annotations before they were published.

<sup>c</sup> This apparently refers to sermons or something of the kind. Thorndike's first printed book came out in 1641.

[Rom. ix.  
21.]

[2 Pet. iii.  
9.]

persuaded to break his promise of letting them go, when it should cease, Moses having told him that he would break it: Exod. ix. 27—35. And because God knew, that these temptations would prevail over Pharaoh, therefore He had foretold the plagues, and the deliverance of His people upon them; Exod. iii. 19; vi. 2: and therefore it is truly said, both that “God hardened Pharaoh’s heart” (to wit, by causing him to meet with these considerations, which made him neglect the plague; for that which elsewhere is called “hardening of his heart,” is called “not setting his heart upon the plague,” Exod. vii. 23): and that “Pharaoh hardened his heart,” or “that his heart was hard:” Exod. vii. 3, 13; viii. 10, 15; ix. 7, 12, 34; x. 1, 20.

§ 4. Lastly, observe, that, when Pharaoh had let the people go, God led them not by the way of the land of the Philistines, which was the nearest, “because God said, lest the people repent them when they see war, and return into Egypt;” but made them go about by the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea: Exod. xiii. 17, 18. And again, Exod. xiv. 1—5: “God spake to Moses, saying, Speak to the children of Israel, and let them return and encamp against Pihahiroth, between Migdol and the sea, before Baalzephon, even against it shall they encamp, beside the sea; and Pharaoh will say of the children of Israel, they are entangled in the land, the wilderness hath inclosed them; and I will harden Pharaoh’s heart, and he shall pursue them, and I will get glory upon Pharaoh and all his host, and the Egyptians shall know, that I am the Lord: and they did so: and it was told the king of Egypt, that the people fled.” For it is to be observed, that God had not yet required of Pharaoh, that he should let them free for ever, though He had made him let them go without any promise of return. When therefore he sees, on the one side, that the meaning of God was not that they should return any more (which made him so unwilling to let them go, as always supposing it); and, on the other side, that by their indiscreet march, as he thought (which God had provided for another cause), there was hope to bring them back: his old thoughts revived, that all these plagues come not from God but otherwise, [and] that he might yet bring them under his rule. Whereby it is most evident:

first, that the destruction of Pharaoh was designed by God, through these means, in consideration, first, of oppressing His people, then, [of] his impenitence upon these extraordinary trials; then, that it appeared to Him that they would take effect, when He saith, "Pharaoh will say they are entangled in the land;" and that this is the hardening of Pharaoh's heart by God. And hereupon dependeth that which is said of the Egyptians, Wisdom xix. 1, 2: "But wrath without mercy pursueth the wicked unto the end, because He also had foreseen what they should do in time to come; to wit, that, repenting themselves, they would straightway pursue those whom they should have let go, diligently entreating them to depart." Seeing the impenitence and unbelief of their obdurate hearts to have been such, that thereby it appeared to God, how, upon the first overture, they would return to their first hope of reducing the Israelites to their bondage.

§ 5. See the like in the enemies that God raised Solomon to punish his idolatries: 1 Kings xi. 14—23—26. Hadad the Edomite having escaped into Egypt, every man knows, that jealousies between neighbouring princes makes them ready to entertain their neighbours' enemies, though under colour of relieving of the oppressed, even when the cause is not clear. And though Hadad were never so welcome in Egypt, yet every man knows, what difference there is between ruling at home, and courting Pharaoh in Egypt. And can there remain any question, how God "raised Hadad for an enemy to Solomon?" How, but by providing that state of things, which He knew would be effectual to persuade a man, in the case which He knew to be his? By the like means, God, foreseeing the rebellion of Rezon against his master Hadarezer king of Zobah, and the success thereof in setting up a kingdom at Damascus out of a conspiracy of banditti, might foresee, that he must needs inherit his master's hostility with the Israelites. As for Jeroboam, God, having appointed Ahiah the Shilonite to prophesy to him the apostacy of ten tribes to his government, knew, that he might do as David had done, to expect the issue of God's purpose from His providence, without any attempt upon his sovereign; and he might do as Hazael did afterwards (2 Kings x. 14, 15), to murder his master, that he might reign in his stead, as Elisha had

prophesied. And was it not possible for God, that knew Jeroboam's heart, to know what he would do, when the Israelites had privately persuaded him to return from banishment, upon Rehoboam's answer to the petition, which it seems he had procured? Certainly, he that believes the Scriptures, can no more doubt, that God designed the punishment of Solomon's idolatries by these means, than that He designed the event itself of it, though by the malice of the parties.

§ 6. Consider now the vision of the prophet Micaiah concerning the enterprize of Ahab upon Ramoth Gilead (1 Kings xxii. 23—26): “I saw the Lord sitting on His throne, and all the host of heaven standing aside Him, on His right hand, and on His left: and God said, Who shall seduce Ahab to go up and fall at Ramoth Gilead? and one said this, and another said that: and a spirit came forth and stood before the Lord, and said, I will seduce him; and the Lord said, Wherewith? and he said, I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouths of all his prophets: and He said, Thou shalt seduce him, and also prevail; go and do so.” God, Who shewed His counsel to His prophet in this manner, knew well enough, what prophets Ahab delighted in, and what they were that sought favour at his hands. Shall we imagine, that, when He lets the evil spirit loose (whom He knew to be of himself officious enough to the ruin of God's people), and says, “go and prevail,” that He considers not their inclination to take fire at his temptation, for obtaining favour at Ahab's hands; or Ahab, to make use of their credit, to win the good king Jehosaphat to his pretences? If these things were in consideration, as the means to bring about God's design upon Ahab—(here you must pardon me, if, speaking as a man to men, I can express the matters of God no otherwise than the Scripture doth, in the likeness of an infinite wise prince, though assured, that one act of God's wisdom, which is God, attains and contains all this),—which the text plainly expresseth; did God go by guess, or doth the Scripture, condescending to our infirmity, speak of Him in “the style of the sons of men,” as the Jews say, and represent to us the order which He designs in those things which He brings to pass, in the fashion of a prince, taking counsel with his servants and vassals what course to take?

BOOK  
II.

The case  
of the Jews  
that cruci-  
fied Christ.

§ 7. But let us not forget the greatest work of God's providence that ever the sun saw, in procuring the redemption of mankind by the malice of Satan and the Jews in putting our Lord Christ to death. The words of St. Peter are very express (Acts ii. 23): "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and through wicked hands crucified and killed." And again (Acts iii. 17, 18): "And now, brethren, I know that you did this ignorantly; as also did your rulers; but God hath thus fulfilled those things, which He had foretold by the mouth of His holy prophets, that Christ should suffer." What was the ignorance of the rulers, we learn by the vote of Caiaphas, that swayed the council (John xi. 49, 50): "Ye know nothing, nor argue, that it is expedient for us, that one man die for the people, rather than that the whole nation perish:" ratifying the reason propounded afore; "If we let Him alone thus, all will believe on Him, and the Romans will come, and take us and this place and the nation away." What was the ignorance of the people, we learn by St. Paul, Rom. x. 3: "Not knowing the righteousness of God, and willing to establish their own righteousness, they were not subject to the righteousness of God." And again, 1 Thess. ii. 15, 16, he thus qualifieth the Jews: "Who both killed the Lord Jesus, and their own prophets, and please not God, and oppose all men; forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles that they may be saved: to the fulfilling of their sins always; for wrath is come upon them to the end." The Scribes and the Pharisees had got possession of the people's hearts, by persuading them, that God accepted them as righteous for the outward observation of the carnal law of Moses, given for the condition, by which they held the land of promise. They then persuaded them to demand our Lord to death, for the same reason for which their predecessors had put their prophets to death, because they preached to them that inward spiritual righteousness, which our Lord demandeth as the condition of obtaining the world to come. And for the same reason their successors persecuted the Apostles; because, not entailing His righteousness upon them, as the sons of Abraham, they shewed the Gentiles how to become as righteous as they thought themselves. The priests and rulers and elders, who, by the means



of the Scribes and Pharisees, carried the people, and were not willing to part with their power by receiving law from our Lord Christ (as not believing, that He preached His Gospel with an intent to establish them in their power but to take it out of their hands, as belonging to the Messiah), made it their business to persuade the people, that it would be the ruin of the nation to acknowledge Him for the Messiah. If God hath assured us, that these were the inclinations, that brought to pass this godly murder of our Lord, shall we believe, that He Himself had them not in consideration, when He designed the redemption of mankind by the means of it? Or that, having them in consideration, He foresaw not what effect they would have in the Jews, being abandoned to the malice of Satan that procured it? If we will learn “the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God” from the Scriptures, we must have recourse to those means, by which the Scriptures teach us that it came to pass. For, truly, it was never designed, nor did God foresee, that it would come to pass by other means, or otherwise, than indeed it came to pass. It is a conceit, that deserves reverence for Ignatius his sake, a disciple of St. John; who in one of his Epistles informs us, that the birth of our Lord, and the manifestation of His Godhead in the flesh, was so husbanded, that the devils themselves (though, when they were constrained to obey Him, they cried Him up “the Son of God”), yet should not loose the hope of destroying Him<sup>c</sup>. Can we think, that God immediately designed such a stratagem upon Satan, and had not regard to the inclinations of his ministers, or knew not what effect those considerations would have, which should arise in them upon those objects, which His providence presented them with?

CHAP.  
XXIV.

[Matt. viii.  
29; Mark  
v. 7;  
Luke viii.  
28.]

§ 8. By this we may see, why our Lord upbraids the cities in which He did His greatest miracles: Matt. xi. 21, 22. “Woe to thee, Chorazin, woe to thee, Bethsaida; for had the

[The case  
of Cho-  
razin,  
Bethsaida,  
and Caper-  
naum.]

<sup>c</sup> “Καὶ ἔλαθεν τὸν ἄρχοντα τοῦ αἰῶ-  
νος τούτου ἢ παρθενία Μαρίας, καὶ ὄτοκε-  
τος αὐτῆς, ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ θάνατος τοῦ Κυρίου·  
τρία μυστήρια κραυγῆς, ἅπαντα ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ  
Θεοῦ ἐπράχθη.” S. Ignat., Ad Ephes.,  
c. xix. pp. 290, 292. inter PP. Apost. ed.  
Jacobson.—“Citantur verba Ignatii ab

Origene, Homil. vi. in Lucam, a Basi-  
lio, Homil. xxv. De Sancta Christi  
Nativitate, Hieronymo, ad Matthæi  
cap. i., Jovio Monacho ἐν Οἰκονομικῇ  
Πραγματείᾳ, lib. vii. cap. 31. ap. Pho-  
tium Bibliothecæ Codice 222.” Cote-  
ler., ad loc.



BOOK  
II.

mighty works that have been done in thee, been done in Tyre and Sidon, they had long since repented in sackcloth and ashes: and thou, Capernaum, that art exalted to heaven, shalt be cast down to hell; for had the mighty works that have been done in thee, been done in Sodom and Gomorrah, they had stood till this day." I do so respect the learning and judgment of Grotius<sup>d</sup> and Jansenius<sup>e</sup>, that I will not take upon me to censure them, when they make these words signify no more, than that, in probability, Sodom and Gomorrah had repented at the sight of such miracles. But I find no good reason to infer, as our Lord doth, that, positively, Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum, shall be tormented more than Tyre and Sidon, than Sodom and Gomorrah, because, probably, Sodom and Gomorrah would have repented at the sight of such miracles. The same I say to others<sup>f</sup>, who would have our Lord say only this; that, had those miracles been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented, but not from the heart; because miracles are not able to convert any man to God from the heart. For, in conscience, is there reason, that Chorazin and Bethsaida should fare worse than Sodom and Gomorrah, because Tyre and Sidon would have repented as hypocrites, continuing no less sinners than they that repented not? But to say,

<sup>d</sup> "Quamquam vero non dubium mihi est, fuisse in Christo certam cognitionem de rebus multis quæ posita aliqua conditione eventuræ erant aut fuerant, tamen cum hi quos alloquebatur eo tempore tantum Christo non tribuerint, satius arbitror hæc, ut alia Christi dicta, exponere populariter, ut dixerit quod humano judicio rebus bene expensis admodum erat probabile. Quo respiciens, ut videtur, Latinus interpres, quod mox sequitur *ἐμειναν ἄν* vertit 'forte mansissent.'" Grot. ad Matt. xi. 21. in fin. annot.

<sup>e</sup> "Dicendum certe, non esse dubitandum quin et Tyro et Sodomis non defuerit Deus ut non eis multa fecerit quæ eos promovebant ad salutem; cætera vero silentio veneranda. . . . Dici etiam potest Dominum hæc de pœnitentia et conversione Tyri et Sodomorum non dicere tanquam præscium eorum quæ futura essent, si illis prædicatum fuisset, sed tantum vulgariter hæc vulgo locutum, quomodo frequen-

ter solet, ut hujusmodi comparatione insignem obstinationem animi civitatum quibus prædicaverat significaret; quem admodum dicere solemus, Si tantum beneficium alteri exhibuissem, gratiorem proculdubio expectus fuisset." Cornel. Jansenius, Episc. Gandav., Comment. in Concord. Evangel., c. xlvii. (in Matt. xi. 21.) His more celebrated namesake, the author of the Augustinus, does not appear to notice the text.

<sup>f</sup> So Strangius, De Volunt. et Action. Dei circa Peccatum, lib. i. c. 8. p. 47. And similarly Voetius, Disp. Theol. P. I., De Conditionata seu Media in Deo Scientia, Sect. iii. num. 12. pp. 287, 288. Ultraj. 1648; quoting Rupertus Abbas Tuitiensis (In Hoseam c. v. Op., tom. i. p. 771. a. Col. Agripp. 1602): J. Cappellus (ap. Poli Syn. ad loc.): Lightfoot (Horæ Hebr. et Talm., in Matt. xi. 21; Works, vol. ii. p. 183): and others.

as others do<sup>g</sup>, that, had God ordained those miracles to be done at Tyre and Sidon, at Sodom and Gomorrah, He would have determined their wills by His immediate act to be converted; is to say, that our Lord by a mental reservation says that, whereof He expresseth not the reason, and so cozens them, that satisfy themselves with the reason which He expresseth. I know these answers are brought to avoid the heresy of Pelagius; that outward calling, without inward grace, is enough to convert a man. But there is no necessity to grant the consequence. The miracles of Christ, supposing His doctrine, import the inward grace of the Spirit to make it prevail. Why else are they, who said they were done by Beelzebub, guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost? And this means, being sufficient to convert them, had been effectual, had they found men better disposed. What was the difference? They had found men not zealous of their own righteousness by the Law; who, therefore, had not resisted the righteousness of God, which Christ teacheth with miracles sufficient to convict them that He was a true prophet. Upon these grounds, God, Who knew all their hearts, might

194 comprehend the event.

CHAP.  
XXIV.

[Matt. xii.  
24—31;  
Mark iii.  
22—30;  
Luke xi.  
15.]

§ 9. The case of David at Keilah is so near this, that I must not mention it any where else; 1 Sam. xxiii. 10—12. “And David said, O Lord God of Israel, Thy servant heareth for certain, that Saul is coming to Keilah, to destroy the city for my sake: will the men of Keilah shut me in his hand? will Saul come down, as Thy servant heareth? O Lord God of Israel, shew Thy servant. And the Lord said, He will come down. And David said, Will the masters of Keilah shut me and my men into Saul’s hands? And the Lord said, They will.” What escape is there here, when God, out of His knowledge of the secrets of their hearts, foretells what they would do, if Saul should come against the city?

[The case  
of David at  
Keilah.]

<sup>g</sup> So, e. g., Retorfort, Disp. Schol. de Divina Provid., c. iii. pp. 12 sq. (Edinb. 1650), on the Protestant side: and, on the other, Alvarez, De Auxiliis &c., lib. ii. Disp. iv. num. 8. p. 69 (Lugd. 1611). And see Twisse, De Scientia Media lib. iii., Cont. Suaesium, lib. ii. c.

1. pp. 425 sq.; and Le Blanc, Theses Theol., De Concord. Libert. Human. cum Decret. Divinis, P. i. pp. 457 sq. (3rd edit. 1683). The interpretation is noticed by Zegeus (ap. Crit. Sac., tom. vi. p. 347), in order to refute it.

BOOK  
II.  
[The Book  
of Wis-  
dom.]

§ 10. Nor will I forget that of the wise Hebrew; for he drew at the fountain-head of the prophets, though he spake not by their spirit. It is thought to be said of Enoch, according to that which we read of him, Gen. v. 24, Heb. xi. 5; but the argument is the same, whether so or not. Wisdom iv. 10, 11, 14: "He pleased [God] and was beloved of Him, so that, whereas he lived among sinners, He translated him; he was taken away [speedily], lest wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his mind; . . . for his soul pleased God, therefore hastened He to take him away from wickedness." For if God knew such occurrences as would deceive Enoch, or one in his state, then by those occurrences He foresees the decree. If He knew none, unless Himself determine his will to be deceived, then can it not be said, that God "translated" him "lest wickedness should deceive him," but lest God should appoint him to be deceived by wickedness. The same author thus commendeth<sup>h</sup> the mercy of God in destroying the Canaanites by little and little (Wisdom xii. 10): "But, chastising them by little and little, Thou gavest them room of repentance; though knowing their perverse disposition to be such, . . . that they could not repent." That is, knowing that this gentle dealing of God would not be effectual, notwithstanding all that He had done to assure His people of the land of promise, to move them to embrace the true God: upon which condition they might have been suffered to live as slaves to the Israelites, if not as strangers among them; as Rahab the harlot was suffered to do among her kindred, because she alone embraced those terms. So that the precept of the Law, that commands the seven nations utterly to be destroyed, stands upon supposition of this impenitence thus foreseen.

[Josh. vi.  
25.]

[Deut. vii.  
1, 2, &c.]

Of God's  
foreknow-  
ledge of  
future con-  
ditionals  
that come  
not to pass.

§ 11. To the same purpose speak those texts of Scripture, in which it is said, that, if such or such a thing be not done, such or such a thing will come to pass. As Gen. xi. 6: "Behold, the people is one, and their language the same; and having begun this, they will not give over whatsoever they have thought to do." Acts xxvii. 31: "Unless these remain in the ship, ye cannot be saved." Esay i. 9; Rom. ix. 29: "If the Lord of hosts had not left us a seed, we had been as

<sup>h</sup> Corrected from MS. "commandeth," in orig. text.

Sodom, we had been like Gomorrah." Matt. xxiv. 22: "Had not those days been shortened, all flesh would perish; but, for the elect's sake, those days shall be shortened." For there is no necessity to say, that God could not have prevented these effects by any other means (the building of the tower of Babel, for the purpose, by any other means but by dividing their language; the saving of the elect at the destruction of Jerusalem, but by shortening their time; the saving of St. Paul's fellow-travellers, but by the mariners abiding on shipboard): but that God knew, that they would go to build the tower of Babel; that, the time not being shortened, even the elect would perish; that, if the mariners left the ship, the rest would be cast away; should not God otherwise interpose. As the Prophet Esay, shewing how great a mercy of God it was, that any of the Israelites should escape that vengeance which he foretellet, and alleged by St. Paul to shew, how great a mercy of God it was, that any of them should be saved by the Gospel from the vengeance to come; declare, that God foresaw this ruin would come to pass if He did not interpose. But to say, that God foresaw this, because He foresaw that Himself had resolved by His immediate act to determine the wills of those men, by which they were to come to pass, to bring them to pass, is to say, that all those means, by which it is signified that He saw they would come to pass, are alleged by the Scripture impertinently and to no  
 195 purpose. It followeth therefore, of necessity, that God foresaw that those things should come to pass, by the cases which He saw stated, and the wills of those men whom He saw concerned in stating the same. And, by the same reason, that holdeth, which is said, Exod. iii. 19: "I know, that the king of Egypt will not give you leave to depart, but by a mighty arm." Upon which the saying of the wise man alleged afore is verified; that God knew, that the Egyptians would repent themselves, and attempt to bring them back into bondage, whom they had just afore entreated to be gone.

[Wisd.  
xix. 1, 2.]

§ 12. In fine, all the scriptures which say, this or that was done that such things as had been foretold might be fulfilled, prove the same without answer.

[Scriptures which speak of "fulfilment" of prophecy.]

BOOK  
II.

§ 13. John xix. 24, 36 : "They said then to one another, Let us not rend it, but cast lots for it whose it shall be; that the scripture might be fulfilled which saith, They shared My garments among them, and for My coat they cast lots." And again; "These things came to pass, that the scriptures might be fulfilled, A bone shall not be broken of it." Did God provide, that Christ's coat should be seamless; that, there being loss in sharing it, the reason of casting lots for it might be unanswerable: did He provide, that our Lord should have visibly breathed out His last; that there might be no reason to break His legs, as the legs of the rest: that, having provided all this, He might at length determine them to do what they did? Which had He intended to do, it was impertinent whether He provided all this or not.

[Matt. ii.  
17, 18.]

[Jer. xxxi.  
15.]

§ 14. Matt. ii. 17, 18 : "Then was fulfilled that which was said by Jeremy the prophet, saying, A cry was heard in Ramah, lamentation and weeping and great mourning, Rachel weeping for her children, and would not be comforted, because they were not." Herod was become jealous of the King of the Jews That was born, and would have taken Him away alone; but when he could not hear of Him by the wise men, resolved to take away all under two years old, that He might not escape. Did God know, that his bloody humour would resolve this wickedness upon these occurrences? Or did He first provide the occasion, and then determine him to do that, which, without providing the occasion, being so determined, he would have done nevertheless?

[1 Kings  
ii. 27.]

§ 15. All the scriptures in which this is said argue as much. I must not omit that which is said of Abiathar, 1 Kings ii. 27 : "And Solomon drove Abiathar from being high-priest to the Lord; to fulfil the word of the Lord which He had spoken against the house of Eli in Shiloh." Had God provided all that had befallen Abiathar, and in the end, according to His unquestionable justice, the occurrences that resolved him to be of the conspiracy of Adonijah; that the prophecies against Eli and his house (1 Sam. ii. 30—36; iii. 11—14) might come to effect, which no reason could be given, why so rather than otherwise: if, after all this, He



must interpose His immediate act to determine Solomon to fulfil it, by setting Abiathar aside? CHAP.  
XXIV.

§ 16. If God thus, by His justice and His mercy, in consideration of man's by-past actions, ordain the occurrences, whereof He knoweth what the issue will be; shall it seem strange, that out of His original right in His creature, having set Adam in Paradise with those abilities, that all agree he might have stood if he would, He checked not the malice of the rebel angels, nor taught him that cunning, which his simplicity had not needed, had he loved to continue (as was elegantly said) "*simplicior quam ut decipi posset*"—"simpler," or "more an innocent, than to be cozened?" Or can we say, that he might have stood had he would: who by God's immediate act, as we see, was not determined to stand; who could not have stood, had he not been determined by God to stand; and, had he been determined, could not but stand? None of which follows, if we say, that God, seeing the state in which He had placed him a sufficient bait to resolve the apostate angels to tempt, seeing the temptation so strong that Adam would not resist it, for the reasons, which He in His secret counsel saw best, resolved to maintain both in acting their own inclinations, and Himself to make the best of that which should be done.

§ 17. And, this precedent being resolved, can it seem strange, that He should order all men to come to the years of discretion, when first they begin to act to their own account, with those impressions received from their education, which He sees how they will incline them to the better or to the worse;—seeing also, that they do not resolve them either for the better or for the worse, but by the means of their own free choice;—can it seem strange, I say, that He should order them to meet with those occurrences, which, suiting with the merit of their by-past actions, He sees will determine their choice for the better or for the worse, in those things, which He sees that it was in them, though perhaps with much more difficulty, and so for more advantage, to have determined otherwise?

§ 18. But to leave the rest of this discourse till I can go through with it<sup>k</sup>: for the present, the reason of this position

[The fall of Adam.]

The ground off. reknowledge of future contingencies.

<sup>i</sup> [The editor cannot trace this quotation.]

<sup>k</sup> Below, c. xxvi.



BOOK  
11.

seems to me demonstrative (if any thing in this subject can be demonstrative); supposing that which hath been proved, that God by His own immediate act doth not determine the will of man to do this or that. For, seeing that Christian faith presupposeth, that God knoweth from everlasting whatsoever future contingencies shall come to pass during every moment of time whilst the world shall endure; and that it is evident, that whatsoever is known, must be knowable before it is known (and, therefore, certain or determined, not by being known, but by being capable of being known); what ground can we imagine in contingencies, to make them capable of being known? For, of their own nature, we transgress the very notion of contingencies which we suppose, and evidently contradict ourselves, if we say there is any thing in them, of themselves, to determine this to come to pass rather than that; supposing the cause to be no more determined to do this than that, which the supposition of free-will necessarily requires. Certainly Aristotle's resolution,—that they are sure in the alternative but that neither part of it can be certain<sup>1</sup> (that is to say, that Peter being tempted shall either deny his Master or not, but that, being contingent, it can neither be certain that he shall nor that he shall not),—is utterly inconsistent with that particular providence of God over all things, which Christianity supposeth; and renders that great master (as a man too cunning not to see the consequence of his own position) very suspicious in a point so nearly concerning the belief of God's providence. Now future contingencies, in the notion of contingencies that are not yet come to pass, being in themselves nothing (that is to say, being only understood to be possible), cannot reduce themselves to the nature and state of future contingencies, in the notion of contingencies that shall come to pass; such as we believe all contingencies, that have or shall come to pass to the world's end, were to God from everlasting. It is therefore a mere contradiction to imagine, that contingencies, either by the possibility of their nature,

<sup>1</sup> “Εἶναι μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἅπῃ ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἔσσεσθαι γε ἢ μὴ· οὐ μόντοι διελόντα γε εἰπεῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον. Λέγω δὲ οἶον ἀνάγκη μὲν ἔσσεσθαι ναυμαχίαν ἀβρίον ἢ μὴ ἔσσεσθαι, οὐ μόντοι ἔσσεσθαι γε

ἀβρίον ναυμαχίαν ἀναγκαῖον οὐδὲ μὴ γενέσθαι· γενέσθαι μόντοι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι ἀναγκαῖον.” Aristot., De Interpret., c. ix. § 14, 15.

or by the capacity of the cause (that is of itself utterly undetermined to do rather than not to do, to do this rather than that), can be an object capable of being known by that knowledge, upon which they may be said to be certain and future, as things "that shall be," not as things "that may be;" not as μέλλοντα but as γενησόμενα, to distinguish with Aristotle<sup>m</sup>. There are indeed those<sup>n</sup>, who undertake, that when it is said, Peter shall deny his Lord, Peter shall not deny his Lord (the one of which sayings must needs come to pass), seeing this necessity must needs be in the object before it be in the saying (because the saying is true or false by reason that the matter of it is so or otherwise before), therefore that part which appears true in time was true from everlasting: but that, they suppose, cannot be by virtue of any or all causes, lest the effects should no more be contingencies; therefore, by virtue of the things themselves, because, of a contradiction, the one part must needs be true, the other false. And this being of future contingencies they imagine it is, which the knowledge of God attaining, is therefore called 'sight,' because it reacheth that which is in being, and therefore present to it. But this imagination is a mere contradiction to common reason: which is able to tell any man, that possibilities differ only in this from nothing, that there are such things as can bring them to pass; and therefore have no being at all, but in the ability of their causes. Whereas, suppose them in being before their causes bring them to pass, what remains for their causes to do? which would have nothing to do, if that which they bring to pass were in being before they bring it so to pass. And what contingency could then remain? seeing whatsoever is, must needs be while it is. For this position prevents

CHAP.  
XXIV.

<sup>m</sup> "Ὅλος γὰρ οὐ πᾶν γίνεται τὸ μελλῆσαν, οὐδὲ ταῦτ' ἂν ἐσόμενον καὶ τὸ μέλλον." Aristot., De Divin. per Somnum, ii. 4.

<sup>n</sup> "Futura contingentia, quæ absolute futura sunt, ab æterno habent determinatam veritatem, secundum quam cognoscibilia sunt et a Deo præsciuntur. Probatur I. ex dictis, quia certum est Deum prædicere futura contingentia; vel ergo vere vel falso prædicet; non falso, quia Deus non errat; ergo vere; at non potest vere prædicere nisi vere futura sint; ergo in se determinate

vera sunt. 2. Quia hæc propositio est vera et necessaria, 'Petrus peccabit vel non peccabit cras;' sed Petrus non potest utrumque facere; ergo alterum tantum facturum est: ergo, si nunc affirmem, illud ipsum futurum esse, quod ipse facturum est, vera erit affirmatio," &c. Becanus, Summ. Theol. Scholast., tom. i. tract. i. c. 10. qu. 6. p. 89. a. Mogunt. 1612; and see the whole chapter. So also Vazquez, In I. Part. D. Thomæ, tom. i. Diss. lxxvii. c. 3. pp. 403, 404. Ingolst. 1609.

BOOK any supposition, that may be made concerning the being of 197  
 II. that, which is said to be, before you can suppose or understand it to be. And where is the difference between the being of God, and that of future contingencies, both being of themselves? Surely, supposing the necessity of this their being because God could not see them otherwise, they would be not only objects, denominating that knowledge of God to be 'sight,' which reacheth the present being of them, but causes, on which the sight of God must depend, as our sight depends on the object that causeth it. The future being, therefore, of contingencies, necessarily supposeth the determination of their causes; the contingency of them, that this determination is from their causes themselves, freely determining themselves; the certainty of them, from the infinite reach of God's understanding, comprehending the resolution of the creature by the present inclination thereof meeting the considerations which it is presented with. Wherefore, as it is impossible that the will should act unless the understanding go before, and the resolution of the will to do, or not to do, this or that, necessarily depends upon some act of the understanding, shewing by sufficient reason an end sufficient to move the will to proceed and resolve; so doth not the will effectually proceed, until the understanding shews that reason which effectually moves it to proceed. Now these reasons proceeding from those appearances, which the objects that every man meets with cause in his mind, either at the present, or by comparing that which outwardly appears at the present, with that which is laid up in the storehouse of the mind; and God having provided what objects every man in every moment shall meet with, to resolve him what to do, in every case that may come in debate: it cannot be imagined, that He provideth this, and knoweth not, by the means which He provideth, what will be the issue; supposing that He knoweth it not by His own resolution, to determine a man by His own immediate act to do whatsoever he does. And indeed, God comprehending what considerations a man every moment is moved with, and what be his own inclinations that is moved with the same, it cannot seem strange, that by this means (seeing it appears impossible that by any other means) He should

comprehend what will so come to pass; though knowing, that he that acteth, had, or might have had, sufficient reasons to have done otherwise. Wherefore, if any man ask me, whether God know what will come to pass, if any case should be put which He knoweth shall never be put; which is now called in the schools God's "middle knowledge," because it hath, on the one side, that knowledge whereby He comprehendeth the natures of all things and the possibilities of all events, on the other side, the view which He hath from everlasting of all things that have been, are, or shall be, for that tract of time which they endure (because I seem to say, that this is it which directs God's providence

o "Inter ea quæ sunt in scholis excogitata ad conciliandam libertatem humanam cum certitudine et immutabilitate decretorum Divinorum circa actus humanos, increbuit in primis scientia illa conditionata, ex qua rationem istius conciliationis petendam esse censuerunt Lud. Molina et Fonseca Jesuitæ primi, et post eos plurimi, tum in schola Romana, tum inter ipsos Protestantes. . . Igitur maxima pars doctorum scholæ Romanæ in ea est sententia, Deum non solum præscire ea, quæ libere et contingenter quidem sed tamen simpliciter et absolute futura sunt; verum etiam illa quæ, licet nunquam futura sunt, libere tamen evenitura essent, posita hæc aut illa conditione. Exempli causa, Deum non tantum cognoscere quid singuli facturi sumus ad finem usque vitæ in variis illis statibus, in quibus ex certa Dei providentia sumus collocandi; sed præterea quid facturi essemus, si plane diversus esset futurus rerum status, et aliæ atque aliæ agendi occasiones sese nobis offerrent. . . Porro hanc scientiam vocant *scientiam mediam*, quoniam juxta ipsos medium tenet inter scientiam quæ dicitur in scholis *scientia visionis*, et illam quæ dicitur *simplicis intelligentiæ*. Per scientiam autem *visionis* intelligunt notitiam illam qua Deus novit ea quæ extra Ipsum existunt in aliqua temporis differentia, nempe quæ sunt præterita, præsentia, vel futura. Quæ omnia Deus ab æterno tum clare, certò, et distincte cognoscit, ac si actu Ipsi præsentia essent, non secus ac illa quæ coram intuemur. Unde est quod dicitur *scientia visionis*. . . Atque hæc scientia dicitur quoque *scientia libera*, quia sequitur liberum decretum Divinæ voluntatis de rebus creandis atque conser-

vandis; sine quo, ut nihil existere potest, ita quoque nihil potest videri præsens vel provideri futurum. . . Per scientiam vero *simplicis intelligentiæ* significant eam qua Deus novit et intelligit omnia possibilea rerumque essentias et connexiones omnes, seu necessarias, sive quomocumque possibilea. Atque hæc scientia dicitur *naturalis*, non libera: quia præcedit, juxta nostrum concipiendi modum, omne Dei decretum de rebus faciendis; neque potuit in Deo non esse, quanquam nihil extra Se creare voluisset. Scientia autem quam Deo tribuunt contingenter futurorum sub aliqua conditione, *media* ab illis vocatur, quoniam nec omnino convenit cum *scientia visionis* nec etiam cum *scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*, sed de utraque aliquid participat. Nec enim est de rebus mere possibileibus et abstracta ab omni consideratione existentia; qualis est scientia *simplicis intelligentiæ*: neque etiam est de rebus absolute futuris in aliqua temporis differentia ex decreto Dei; qualis est scientia *visionis*. Sed partim refert scientiam *liberam*, quia est de rebus libere futuris, si modo conditio poneretur; et in libertate Dei situm est ut conditio illa ponatur: partim scientiam *naturalem*, quia præcedit omne decretum Dei, et Deus ea carere non potuit, etiamsi non decrevisset mundum aut aliquid creare." Le Blanc, Theol. Thes. de Concord. Lib. Hum. cum Decret. Divinis, P. I. § i. ii. viii.—x.; pp. 451—453.—See Fonseca, In Aristot. Metaph., lib. vi. c. ii. Qu. 4. sect. 8; tom. iii. pp. 119. a, sq. (Colon. 1604): and Molina, Lib. Arbit. cum Gratia Donis, Divina Præsentia, &c., Concordia, ad Qu. xiv. Art. xiii. Disp. 52. p. 227. b (Antv. 1595).

BOOK  
II.

in resolving what course to hold, by which resolution it appears to Him what shall come to pass): I shall not answer nevertheless without distinguishing; that God comprehends not the issues of those future possibilities, which men can imagine to themselves; and yet comprehends the issues of those<sup>p</sup> future possibilities, whereof we suppose Him to determine all the circumstances. For let a man infinitely endeavour to limit, by his understanding, all that he can consider in the case of any man left to his freedom, he shall never be able to express that consideration, which shall be effectual certainly to determine him that is presented with it; because it is manifest, that infinite considerations more may present themselves, to move him to do nothing, or otherwise. But when the word of God speaks of those<sup>p</sup> means, which, being provided by God, determine effectually the resolution of him that is moved by them, to wit, by the means of his own choice: though it is impossible, that, speaking to men, it should express all that God considereth to ground His fore-knowledge; yet, by that which it expresseth, it obligeth us to understand all that appeareth either to man to determine his choice, or to God to ground His fore-knowledge: which, though proceeding from His effectual providence, yet, supposing man's freedom, cannot be understood any way to impeach it. And upon these terms it may be understood, how future conditionals may be 198 subject to the infinite capacity of God's understanding: inasmuch as, knowing what a man with these inclinations, being moved with these considerations, will do, He must needs know, what he would have done, had either his inclinations or the consideration[s] presented been other than they are; God comprehending those which might have been, no less than those which are. And thus propositions concerning future possibilities may be said to be known to God, whether true or false, supposing the terms of them to intimate whatsoever may appear to God in the cases whereof they speak; which no terms that man can use can express.

[Of possibilities proposed to depend upon impertinent conditions.]

§ 19. And, therefore, the like cannot be said of possibilities proposed to depend upon impertinent conditions: as who should say, If the Turk take Candy, the Pope will condemn

<sup>p</sup> Corrected from MS. "these," in orig. text.



Jansenius. For what possibility can depend upon a condition, that is supposed not to come into the consideration of him that must effect it? It is alleged, indeed, that Elias saith to Elizeus, 2 Kings ii. 10, "If thou seest me when I am taken from thee, it shall so come to pass to thee; if not, it shall not<sup>a</sup>." But it is no marvel, that Elias, knowing that both his scholar's desire, and his seeing of him as he was going up into heaven, should come to pass, should seem to suspend the one upon the other; not because God had appointed any such dependence, but to signify, that he must be content to expect for the present, and that, when he saw him part, he might rest assured of it. But it is alleged also<sup>r</sup>, that Elizeus said to King Joash, 2 Kings xiii. 19, "Thou shouldest have st[r]uck" the earth with thine arrow "five or six times, then shouldest thou have smitten Aram till they had been destroyed." To which I answer, that it is a prophecy: and that God had revealed to His prophet, that the Israelites should overcome the Syrians as many times as the king should strike the earth; not meaning that, if more or less than three, the number of the victories might be other than three; but knowing that he would strike thrice, and having intended them so many victories. Therefore the prophet is angry at the king for striking but thrice, because he might have expected (knowing no more than I have said), that the Israelites should have utterly destroyed the Syrians, knowing that they should overcome them as oft as he should strike. And this sense agreeth well enough with the Hebrew<sup>s</sup> (where the indicative serves for all the moods); translating it, "Then mightest thou have smitten Aram till he had been destroyed:" because the revelation which he had

<sup>a</sup> e. g. "Similis est necessitas connexionis in illa conditionali enunciatione: quæ eventu comprobata est, 2 Reg. ii. 20" (sic). "Cum Elias dixit Elizæo, 'Si videris me quando tollar a te, erit tibi quod petiisti:' nempe duplex spiritus magistri. Ubi sola veritas infallibilis promissionis verbo Dei revelatæ objecta illa disparata conjunxit." Strang., De Volunt. et Act. Dei circa Peccatum, lib. iii. c. 18. p. 746. 20 is misprinted for 10 in the original text of Thorndike also.

<sup>r</sup> "Quartum testimonium ex 2 Reg.

xiii.; ubi propheta Elizæus dixit ad Joaschum regem Israelis, 'Si percussisses quinquies aut sexies, tunc percussisses usque ad consumptionem.' Respondeo, in hac etiam propositione cernitur necessaria connexio, non quidem ex parte rei; disparata enim sunt quæ connectuntur: sed supposito instituto aut voluntate Dei, quam propheta revelavit." Id., *ibid.*; and see also lib. iii. c. 10. p. 648.

\* "אִזְּ הַכִּיף אֶת־אֲרָם עַד־בְּלֵה." 2 Kings xiii. 19.



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would have borne it, not because God had suspended the event upon a condition so impertinent. For, in conditionals, neither the truth of the condition, nor of that which is inferred, is requisite to make them true; but only the truth of the inference, consequence, or dependence. If the sun rise not at such an hour, we shall not have day. It is a certain truth: not because the sun will not rise at his hour, nor that, rising, we shall not have day; but because the consequence is necessarily true. And therefore he, who by pronouncing a conditional affirmeth a dependence between the parts of it, whenas indeed there is none, speaks not only an impertinence but an untruth. If there be a dependence between them, though God only knew it, he saith true; if none, false.

§ 20. If it be requisite, that divines may understand one another the better, to call this God's "middle knowledge;" be it so called, if you please. Upon terms I contend not. In the meantime let me say, that God not only seeth from everlasting those contingencies, which shall come to pass, every one in their several times; but also foreseeeth, that they shall come to pass: which, though all a thing, yet are grounded upon several reasons. For all sight implying the being of that, whereof it expresseth the presence to that which sees; the view which God hath of future contingencies, implieth, that they are present to Him in His indivisible eternity, in that difference of time, the whole succession whereof the instant of God's eternity without succession answers. But when God, by resolving to produce that state of things which He chooseth, comprehends what will follow, this knowledge, being the ground upon which He sees what will come to pass, cannot be that knowledge, which, representing it to Him as present, must needs presuppose, and not produce, the being of it. And upon these premises I 199 know what to say to the opinion of some of the school<sup>t</sup>:—

<sup>t</sup> "Thomistæ recentiores certitudini isti, qua Deus ab æterno futura quælibet contingentia præscit, duo fundamenta præstruunt. Unum est, res omnes futuras in æternitate Deo præsentibus esse, non tantum in esse objectivo sive in esse cognito sed etiam in esse reali et secundum proprias suas existentias.

'Nam,' inquit, 'ita Se habet Deus in ordine ad futura contingentia, sicut existens in alta specula, ex qua intuetur totam viam in ordine ad transeuntes per illam; licet enim unus pergat post alium, et posterior non videat priorem, ille tamen qui est in specula, omnes simul intuetur, et habet præ-

that the ground of God's foreknowledge of future contingencies stands in their being present to His eternity from everlasting, though in that difference of time, which they hold in the succession which the world is to endure; which whole succession the one indivisible moment of God's eternity answereth. For though it is not to be denied, that God sees all future contingencies, as thus present to Him, from everlasting; yet is it still to be demanded, what is the ground of this their presence, and how they come to be present to God: seeing they neither could be present to Him, not first supposing them to have being; nor could have being of themselves, as capable of not-being as well as of being: for this is the nature of future contingencies. Seeing then, that, the presence of future contingencies to God in His eternity being supposed, we are notwithstanding forced to enquire how it comes to pass; and whatsoever proves the true reason of that, will prove the true ground upon which they may be foreseen: it follows necessarily, that the determination of contingencies, which qualifieth them future (in the notion of that which 'shall be,' not of that which 'may be'), is all the ground, why they are present to the view of God; which presence inferreth, that it is foreknown to God, that they 'shall be' at that time in regard whereof they are called future.

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§ 21. But this opinion, I confess, is liable to divers great difficulties. Here, in the first place, it may be objected: that, by this means, we make God pick up that knowledge, that goes before His providence to direct it, from His creatures; collecting by the inclination which He sees to be in them, what they will do when they come to be in such or such an estate, and accordingly resolving to bring them or not to bring them to it<sup>u</sup>. To which I answer, that this

Difficult  
objections  
answered.  
[1. This  
opinion  
does not  
make God  
depend  
upon His  
creatures.]

sentes sibi: ergo similiter Deus habet Sibi præsentem in specula æternitatis omnes res et præteritas et futuras; licet istæ succedant istis.' Quæ sunt verba Didaci Alvarez lib. ii. c. 8." (scil. De Aux. Div. Grat. et Hum. Arb. Viribus, pp. 93, sq.): "ubi præsentiam istam futurorum in æternitate inde præterea probat, quod æternitas est duratio indivisibilis tota simul existens; ideoque quicquid ullo tempore

co-existit æternitati, illi toti co-existit, et consequenter illi toti præsens est." Le Blanc, *Thes. Theol.*, *Thes. de Concord.* Lib. Hum. &c., § xxx. p. 442.—Strang adopts this opinion (*De Volunt. et Act. Dei* &c., lib. iii. c. 7. p. 620).

<sup>u</sup> So, e. g., Strang. (*De Volunt. Dei* &c. lib. iii. c. 13. p. 664); and Jansenius (*Parallel. Error. Massil. et Opin. Quorund. Recentiorum*, c. i. notæ 47, sq., in fin. Augustini, pp. 475, sq.; and

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imagination is no less abusive, than that upon which Epicurus denied providence<sup>x</sup>; for fear God should be troubled with that infinite care which it would require, as men are with a little part of it. But if all the sight which God hath of the creature, proceed from the knowledge of Himself, whereby, seeing what He may make, He resolves what He will make; though, I say, the sight of His creature at present depends upon the decree of producing it in His own time, yet, seeing I make this decree to depend only upon the infinite wisdom and goodness of God which moves Him to choose what He thought best to do, I make Him to depend upon Himself alone, not upon His creature. In like manner, though I make the decree of God's providence to proceed upon consideration of the free inclination of His creature, moved by the consideration of such objects as He sees are presented to it; and His foresight of future contingencies proceeding from the free will thereof, to stand upon the said decrees: yet, since I derive the free will of the creature from the knowledge and will of God, and the state of it from the course of providence, which His own knowledge directs, I cannot be thought to disparage God with the imperfections of His creatures. I do indeed understand, that simple Christians take it with a grain of jealousy upon a man's Christianity, when a man of understanding shews them the order of secondary causes in effecting the works of God's providence; as if therefore he did not believe, that all comes from God, because he will not have Him, at every turn, to transgress the ordinary course of those causes which His providence hath once set on work: because they understand it not. But though the most understanding know very little of it, yet thus much they know; that it is more for the honour of God, that it should be thought, that God from the beginning hath elected

repeatedly in the Augustinus itself): and it is the common objection of those who lean to Predestinarian opinions. See also Le Blanc's statement of the argument of the Supralapsarians (*Theol. Theol. de Conc. Hum. &c. P. i. § xlii. p. 458*):—"Præcipuum fundamentum quo nituntur Tuissus, Retorfortis, Voetius, Amesius, et alii, dum negant in Deo dari cognitionem contingentis futurorum sub aliqua conditione, ante li-

berum Ipsius decretum, illud est, quod, ex eorum mente, nihil futurum est priusquam decreverit Deus illud esse futurum," &c.: concluding, that "ista futuritio, quæ est ab æterno, causam habeat aliquem æternum, quæ alia esse non potest quam liberum Dei decretum: ut millies repetit Tuissus in sua dissertatione de Scientia Media."

<sup>x</sup> Lucret., ii. 1089, sq. &c.

a certain order agreeable to His own infinite wisdom, justice, goodness, sovereignty, but yet of His own free choice, by which all things come to pass, His creatures serving the turn of His purpose; than that He should at all turns, by moving His creatures to that which they are not inclined to by their first nature, but by His present will immediately, attain His designs. For that He should transgress His own order for the introducing of those effects which are above nature, the whole book of God requires us to believe. And if the glory of God consists in causing natural things, working their own inclinations, to serve to do what He designeth; much more it is for His glory, that, maintaining man in the exercise of his freedom, He makes him nevertheless, whether by good or by bad inclinations, an instrument to bring to pass those events which He in His wisdom determineth.

§ 22. In the second place it may be objected<sup>y</sup>: that, supposing all that can be supposed in the nature of future contingencies, they must appear possible on both sides, they may appear infinitely more and more probable on the one side; but so long as they appear not certain, they cannot be the object of certain knowledge, as God's is; and certain they cannot appear, so long as we suppose them to remain contingencies<sup>z</sup>. To which I answer: acknowledging, that I, who draw my knowledge from that which I see, cannot, by limiting the probabilities of future contingencies, attain to more than probability; but that it would be against all the reason in the world, thereby to take measure what God can attain to, comprehending, not only the inclinations of His creatures, and the considerations which they meet with, but also that they shall meet with no other but what He comprehendeth; and to undertake, that He, by what He sees, cannot discern that to be certain, which I, by that which I see, cannot discern to be more than probable. I know it may be said, on the other side, that it is only the weakness of our understanding, that hinders us to discern the consistence of

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[2. How contingencies can be the object of certain knowledge in God.]

<sup>y</sup> See Preface to the Epilogue, § 18.  
<sup>z</sup> "Nisi objectum sit certo verum, certo cognosci non potest: quamdiu enim res est incerta, certo sciri non potest; nihil autem est certo verum, quod non est necessario verum, necessario inquam vel absolute vel ex hypothesi. . . .

Ac proinde conditionata scientia ut sit certa et infallibilis, oportet ut objectum ejus sit conditionata propositio necessaria, nulla autem conditionalis propositio est necessaria, in qua illatio non est necessaria." Strang., De Volunt. Dei &c., lib. iii. c. 11. p. 651.

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our freedom with the immediate determination thereof by the act of God to that which it chooseth. And it is usually argued, that the work of saving grace, and the difference which it maketh between those that are saved and those that are not, would not remain such a mystery, as the differences on foot about it in the Christian world demonstrate, if the reason of it be resolved into the congruity of that motion, which sufficient reason tenders to a reasonable creature. To which I answer, in the first place: that if it were not a secret, according to that opinion which I advance, this objection, wherein all the difficulty is couched, would not lie against it; and that, supposing all the difficulty thereof voided, it would remain no less a secret, why God should move some, providing that congruity, others, waiving it, than why He should by His own immediate act determine some to be Christians, whilst it remains possible, that those who are not so determined should be the like. To the other I say: that it is one thing not to know, nor to be able to demonstrate, how God can have certain knowledge of things that whilst they are known remain contingencies; another thing to know, that by the knowledge which He hath, they remain not contingencies; Christianity supposing them to remain contingencies. For it is no shame for a Christian, or for a divine, to profess ignorance; when the question is, how it may be evident, that matters of faith are true: as in the matter of the Holy Trinity I have said<sup>a</sup>. But that, in a matter so subject to common understanding as the determination of the will by its own choice (reason and experience justifying that which faith maketh the ground of Christianity), because I cannot answer an objection, I shall make the whole tenor of the Bible, the tender of Christianity, the whole treaty of God with man concerning his happiness, delusory and abusive, as conditioning for that which no man can stir head or foot toward, till, being determined, he cannot do otherwise; [that] I should deny that which appears, because I cannot evidence that which appears not: seems to me very unreasonable. Especially, having so many intimations in the Scripture, to signify, that God hath in consideration the circumstance of each

<sup>a</sup> Above, c. xvii. § 32, sq.



man's case for the ground of His foresight in each man's proceedings. For let God's foreknowledge never so much require, that the truth of those things which He foreseeeth, be determined and certain; it will be no abatement to this certainty, that I believe it is not grounded upon His immediate determining of man's will to do it, but upon His determining of the means, in consideration whereof He seeth that man will certainly proceed to determine his own choice.

§ 23. Lastly, it will be said, that by this means all things shall come to pass necessarily, being determined by God to come to pass. For unless we suppose, that the purpose of God can be defeated, that which He purposeth to bring to pass, must necessarily come to pass. I answer, that I have distinguished<sup>b</sup> between that sense, in which it may be said that a thing 'comes to pass necessarily,' and that sense, in which it may be said, that it 'must necessarily come to pass.' For I suppose, that the property of our English will help me here to distinguish these two senses, to all that consider their mother tongue, and may discern a several meaning, when a man says, The fire burns necessarily, and, Peter must necessarily deny our Lord (supposing that our Lord had foretold it). For when the necessity is understood to be in the cause, which the nature thereof (though by God's will) determines; it is proper to say, that it comes to pass necessarily. But when the necessity is understood to stand upon a supposition of the effect, either being or known to be (which knowledge presupposeth it to be, being supposed to be true), or the like: it is proper to say, This must needs come to pass, or, It must of necessity come to pass; but not, that it comes to pass necessarily; because then the necessity must not fall upon the coming of it to pass, but upon the manner by which it comes to pass. I say then, if any can infer upon my saying, that the necessity which it infers is antecedent to the being of it, I grant I am fallen into the inconvenience which I would avoid, and will disclaim the position upon which it follows; but if it be only consequent upon supposition, either that it is, or that it is taken to be, it is no more than that necessity, which is found in all contingencies, according to all opinions, that must allow all things necessarily to be

[It does not follow from this opinion, that all things come to pass necessarily.]

<sup>b</sup> Above, c. xxii, § 19.



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(though not to be necessarily), supposing that they are. Now when I say, that God determines the events of future contingencies, I say not, that He doth it by determining their causes to do them, speaking of free causes (for the contingencies which come to pass by the concurrence of natural causes I grant to be mere necessities, in regard it is necessary, that when every cause acts to the utmost of his strength, that must not only needs come to pass, but come to pass necessarily, which the concurrence of several forces produceth, and must needs appear in the causes, to any that comprehends the force of them all) : but that this act of His ends in determining the motives, which present themselves to such causes ; which act is consistent with another act, whereby He maintains the cause in an ability of doing or not doing that which it is moved to do : but that, comprehending the inclinations thereof, and the force of the motives which it is presented with, He comprehends thereby, that it will proceed to act, though comprehending, that it might do otherwise, should it regard those appearances, which either habitually it hath or actually it ought to have. Now I confess again, it is hard for me to shew, how it ought actually to have those appearances which habitually it hath ; but, seeing that (supposing this) I shew evidently, how the providence of God is undefeasible, the will remaining free and the effects thereof contingent, I will rather confess, that I cannot shew, where their freedom might or ought to move when it does not, than destroy the ground of all Christianity. Thus much is evident, supposing my saying ; that the certainty of the event includes the supposition of the will acting freely, and therefore infers no necessity antecedent to it, the knowledge upon which providence decrees, foreseeing that it will freely proceed being so moved.

## CHAPTER XXV.

THE GROUNDS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUFFICIENT AND EFFECTUAL.  
HOW NATURAL OCCASIONS CONDUCE TO SUPERNATURAL ACTIONS. THE  
INSUFFICIENCY OF JANSENIUS' DOCTRINE. OF SUFFICIENT GRACE UNDER  
THE LAW OF MOSES AND NATURE.

AND now I shall not use many words, to declare what it is, that makes those helps of grace, which of themselves are sufficient, effectual. For if all particulars are contained in their generals, that which is said of all the works of providence, must hold in those helps of supernatural grace, whereby it conducteth to the happiness of the world to come. And, therefore, the efficacy of God's grace (taking efficacy to imply the effect) consists in the order which providence useth, that the motives of Christianity (whether to embrace or perform the profession of it) be presented in such circumstances, as may render them accepted of the will, to whose judgment for the present they so appear. So that the same for nature and kind prove effectual to one, which to another prove void and frustrate. For it is manifest, that those helps are the grace of Christ, even as they are sufficient, and supposing them not to take effect. And it ought to be manifest, that the circumstances, in which they are present to every particular person, are brought to pass by the conduct of God's Spirit, Which filleth the world, and attaineth from the beginning to the end of all things which come to pass. And this Spirit, and the coming thereof, being purchased by our Lord Christ, and granted in consideration of His obedience, it is easy to be seen, how it is the grace of Christ, not only as sufficient, but also as effectual.

The grounds of the difference between sufficient and effectual.

§ 2. This resolution then presupposeth two things as proved, chap. xviii. : the first, that the preaching of the Gospel is the grace of Christ ; that is to say, a grace granted by God in consideration of Christ's merits and sufferings<sup>c</sup> ; the second, that the grace of Christ attaineth and reacheth the very effect of conversion and new obedience, and resteth

<sup>c</sup> c. xviii. § 1, sq.

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 11. influence of it<sup>d</sup>.

§ 3. To make this part of faith better to be understood among believers, better to be maintained against unbelievers: that which this resolution advanceth, is this; that the grace of the Holy Ghost, purchased by the humiliation of Christ, and by His exaltation obtained, as it is the means which God hath provided for the publishing of His Gospel, to the conviction of all who understand it, that they ought to submit to the faith and live according to it; so it is the means to make it effectual to the conversion of the nations to Christianity, and that conversion effectual in their lives and conversations, by presenting the reasons and grounds thereof (being of themselves sufficient for the work) to every man's consideration, in those circumstances, procured by the providence of God which it executeth, in which His wisdom foresaw that they would take effect and become to the purpose. And truly, when our Lord saith (John xvi. 8—10); "And when He cometh, He will convict the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment; of sin, because they believe not in Me; of judgment, because the prince of this world is condemned:" we must understand, that the Holy Ghost "convinced the world of sin," because those miracles which the Apostles did by the Holy Ghost, convincing the world that they spoke the word of God, shewed the world, that they were under sin, and liable to God's wrath, if they became not Christians; and that He "convinced the world of judgment, because the prince of this world is condemned," by the conversion of those who forsook him to become Christians. Therefore St. Stephen upbraideth the Jews, saying, "Ye stiffnecked and uncircumcised in hearts and ears, ye do <sup>203</sup> always resist the Holy Ghost, even you also, as did your fathers" (Acts vii. 51); because, being convicted by the Holy Ghost Which spoke in him, that he spoke from God, nevertheless they submit not to his message. Therefore our Lord, Mark iii. 28—30: "All sins shall be forgiven the sons of men, and blasphemies which they shall blaspheme; but whoso shall blasphème against the Holy Ghost, hath no remission for ever, but is liable to everlasting damnation; be-

<sup>d</sup> Ibid., § 6, sq.

cause they said, He hath an unclean spirit" (which you have again, Matt. xii. 31, 32, Luke xii. 10); because, being convicted that our Lord spoke and did His miracles by the Holy Ghost, they blasphemed, saying, that He spoke and did them by an unclean spirit. For these words and these works are the means, by which our Lord accomplished His promise (John xiv. 23); "If any man love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him, and abide with him." For before the condition—"If any man love Me"—be fulfilled, the case is that which our Lord expresseth, Apoc. iii. 20: "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; and if any man hear My voice and open the door, I will come in to him and sup with him, and he with Me." But, being fulfilled, the words of our Lord take place, John xvi. 15—17: "If ye love Me, ye will keep My commandments; and I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Advocate, to abide with you for ever, even the Spirit of truth; Which the world cannot receive, because they see It not, nor know It, but you know It, because It abideth with you, and is in you." For seeing it is manifest by the premises, that the undertaking of Christianity is the condition upon which the Holy Ghost is granted as a gift to abide with Christians; the preaching of Christianity, that is, the proposing of those reasons which God by His word hath shewed us why we should be Christians, is the knocking of our Lord Christ by the Spirit at the door of the heart, that He may enter and dwell in us by the same Spirit: according to the words of St. Paul, 2 Cor. ii. 16; "For ye are the temple of the living God, as God hath said; to wit, I will dwell and converse among them, and will be their God, and they shall be My people." That which some philosophers<sup>e</sup>

<sup>e</sup> "Esse multos philosophos non ignotum est, qui animam sibimet ipsi corpus suum fingere et formare asseverant: quorum alii semen animatum esse, aut animam in quovis semine reconditam latere, alii animam in semen extrinsecus a Deo immitti censent. Vide ex multis Dan. Sennertus De Generatione Viventium, tom. i. c. 1. p. 123; Guil. Harveius De Generatione Animalium Exercit. xlix. p. 271. Quamquam, ut verum fatear, ab hac

sententia, quæ plurimorum est Peripateticorum, non videtur alienum Cudworthus esse. Qui quum hoc capite sæpius ita loquatur, ac si natura genitrix res quædam esset per se constans et separata, postremo tamen (§ xxii.) Aristotelis non dubitat probare dogma, censentis naturam esse partem animi ratione præditi et sentientis." Mosheim, In Cudworth. Systema Intellect., ad Diss. de Nat. Genitrice, § ii. note 1: tom. i. p. 151. fol. edition.

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say of the natural generation of man,—that the soul frames its own dwelling,—being fulfilled in the work of regeneration by grace, when the Holy Ghost, by His actual assistance, frameth the man to be fit for the habitual gift of the Holy Ghost, by becoming a true Christian. If then we believe, that the Holy Ghost was given by God, and obtained by Christ, as well to make the Gospel effectual, as to move the Apostles to preach it; there can no doubt remain, that the preaching of the Gospel, that is to say, the means which the Holy Ghost provideth to make it either sufficient or effectual to convince the world of it, is the instrument, whereby He frameth Himself that invisible house of true believers in which He dwelleth. And, therefore, the means whereby God's grace becomes effectual to those who embrace it, is the same that renders it sufficient for those who refuse it; the difference lying as well in the disposition which it meets with (for which the man is accountable), as in the Spirit of God That presenteth it; Which renders God the praise when it takes effect, and leaves man<sup>f</sup> accountable when it does not. If this reason had been in consideration with Socinus<sup>g</sup> (and perhaps with Pelagius<sup>h</sup>), he would have found it necessary, acknowledging (as all that read the Scriptures must needs acknowledge that, which they find so frequent and so clear in the Scriptures), that the habitual gift of the Holy Ghost is granted to enable those who undertake Christianity to perform it, to acknowledge also, that the actual help of it is necessary, to make the motives of Christianity effectual to subdue men to it: and, by consequence, that the coming of the second Adam was necessary, to restore the breach which the first hath made, seeing it was not to be repaired without the same.

How natu-  
ral occa-  
sions con-  
duce to  
supernatu-  
ral actions.

§ 4. Nor is it to be marvelled at, that natural means, conducted by the grace of Christ, should produce supernatural effects, such as I have shewed the obedience of Christianity to be: which, supposing the covenant of grace and freedom of man's will, cannot be otherwise; the reasons which appear to the understanding, and move the will, to act contrary to the inclination of original concupiscence, in 204

<sup>f</sup> Corrected from MS. "men," in original text.

<sup>g</sup> See above, c. x. § 2, 3.

<sup>h</sup> See above, c. x. § 3.



professing Christianity and living according to the same, being sufficient to convict it to give sentence, that so the man ought to do; and the circumstances, in which the Spirit of Christ conducteth these motives to the heart, which It knocketh at by their means, being able to represent them valuable, to take effect with him, who is moved to the contrary by his original concupiscence. And though means natural; because they move a man to proceed according to right reason, which nature requires him to do: yet, as they are brought to pass and conducted by a supernatural cause, nothing hinders the effect to be supernatural, in such a nature as is by them made capable of acting above nature.

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§ 5. I do much approve the discourse of some<sup>i</sup>, that have endeavoured to shew how this comes to pass, thus; supposing the covenant of the Law to be the renewing of that which was made with Adam in Paradise, for the maintaining of him in the happiness of his natural life: which we may suppose, though we suppose not, that God covenanted not with him at all for the life to come. For the dispensation of those blessings of this life, which the covenant of nature, limited by Moses' law to the happiness of the land of promise, tendereth, may well be the advantage which God taketh, to make the covenant of grace acceptable; especially to those, who, by God's blessing, failing of the blessings of the first covenant, and by that means becoming out of love with this present world, meet with the covenant of grace, in such a disposition as may render it acceptable. For so long as things go well with men in this world, it seems harsh to require them to take up the cross of Christ, that they may

<sup>i</sup> Volkel. (De Vera Religione, lib. iii. c. 11. pp. 56, sq.), arguing that neither the Law nor the covenant made with Adam offered any promise of eternal life, proceeds thus (p. 66).—"Existit autem non aliena hoc loco quaestio, quid causæ fuerit, cur Deus tanti boni promissionem in hanc mundi senectam distulerit. Intelligendum igitur est, duas potissimum rei istius causas reddi posse. Primo enim Deus pro summa Sua sapientia hominem capti Se accommodare voluit. Deinde eidem Divinæ sapientiæ consentaneum erat, omnibus modis providere, ne homines sese in hæreditatis cælestis jus

nasci et immortalitatem tanquam rem debitam sibi tribui existimarent; ideoque non tanti illam facerent quanti summum istud bonum atque inexplicabilem Dei beneficentia, quæ in eo tribuendo cernitur, æstimari debet. Eam ob rem Deus per multas sæculorum ætates homines tanti boni promisso destitutos esse voluit; ut et miseram fortunam suam agnoscerent, et meliorem statum sitienter appeterent, et tandem eum assecuti, Divinæ gratiæ magnitudinem suis momentis ponderarent, hæcque ultima tempora longe illis vetustis feliciora esse intelligerent."



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obtain the world to come; but when the comforts of this world fail, it is no marvel, if any condition that tenders hope in the world to come be welcome. If it be said, that this renders the grace of Christ effectual only to the poor and men of mean condition in the world, who have cause to be weary of their estate in it; it is answered, that it is no marvel, if the means that makes the grace of Christ effectual, address itself especially to that estate of men, in which our Lord Christ (to Whom they so become conformable) appeared in the world. And for that very reason—to figure that estate of mind which the Gospel requires—the people of Israel were, by God's law, left unfurnished of many helps of policy and force, by which other nations maintain themselves free from servitude; that they might remain obliged to depend upon God's immediate assistance and providence. But it is to be said further; that, the greatest estates of the world being subject to the greatest crosses, through want of success, and those great changes to which they are liable, this way of preparation to the kingdom of heaven can no way seem wanting to any estate, when a beggar is seen no less to dote upon this world, than an unclean person is seen to dote upon that whore by whom he is abused. It is moreover to be said, that the remembrance of death, which must, and the inconstancy of this world, which may, deprive us of all the benefits thereof, being by God's judgment the punishment of sin, sours all the content of them that drench themselves deepest in the pleasures of this life, and gives them just cause to forsake them all, in case they stand not with the hope of the world to come: and the very enjoying of them (being enjoyed with that conscience, which all Christians have, of God's providence, and the sense of His hand from whence they come), is reasonably an advantage to those, who enjoy the best success that can be expressed in the course of this world, both to become thankful to God for it, and also to prefer eternity before it. Whereby it may appear, that the course of this world, disposed by God upon the terms of the covenant of nature, contains in it those opportunities and advantages, which the act of God's providence, by the grace of Christ, knows easily how to make effectual to the supernatural purposes of it.

§ 6. This is the place for the rest of that which I am to say of the opinion of Jansenius, settling the efficacy of saving grace upon other grounds than those which I use. The ground of it seems to stand upon the observation of St. Augustin, *De Corrept. et Gratia*, cap. xi., xii.<sup>k</sup>: distinguishing between the help of grace, without which the work of grace is not done, and that by which it is done,—“*auxilium sine quo non,*” and “*auxilium quo;*”—and comparing the grace of Christ, which cometh to effect notwithstanding original concupiscence, with the grace given Adam, which might have come to effect, had he pleased, but came not, notwithstanding his innocence; as more powerful in our weakness, than that in his strength. For, hereupon, he will have the grace of Christ to be only that which takes effect; confining that help, without which the work of grace cannot be done, to the state of innocence, as out of date now under original sin. So that the freedom of the will is so far from being requisite to the effects thereof, that it hath no being but by the means of it, consisting in that free love of that which God commandeth, because He commandeth it, which it inspireth. As, on the other side, the counterfeit of it, in them that sin without reluctance because free from righteousness, is nothing but the free love of sin for the satisfaction of concupiscence. It is, therefore, in his opinion, impertinent, how necessarily the grace of Christ determineth the will to embrace the true good; seeing it is the love of it, and the delight in it, which grace worketh in the will, that determines it willingly and freely to embrace it<sup>l</sup>.

<sup>k</sup> “Itemque ipsa adjutoria distinguenda sunt. Aliud est adjutorium sine quo aliquid non fit, et aliud est adjutorium quo aliquid fit. Nam sine alimentis non possumus vivere, nec tamen cum adfuerint alimenta, eis fit ut vivat qui mori voluerit. Ergo adjutorium alimenterum est, sine quo non fit, non quo fit, ut vivamus. At vero beatitudo quam non habet homo, cum data fuerit, continuo fit beatus. Adjutorium est enim, non solum sine quo non fit, verum etiam quo fit, propter quod datur. Quapropter hoc adjutorium et quo fit est et sine quo non fit.” S. Aug., *De Corr. et Grat.*, c. xii. § 34; *Op.*, tom. x. p. 769. A, B.—“Istam gratiam non habuit homo primus qua

nunquam vellet esse malus: sed sane habuit, in qua si permanere vellet, nunquam malus esset, et sine qua etiam cum libero arbitrio bonus esse non posset, sed eam tamen per liberum arbitrium deserere posset. . . . Hæc prima est gratia quæ data est primo Adam: sed hac potentior est in secundo Adam. Prima est enim qua fit ut habeat homo justitiam si velit: secunda ergo plus potest, qua etiam fit ut velit, et tantum velit, tantoque ardore diligat, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiscentem voluntate spiritus vincat.” *Id.*, *ibid.*, c. xi. § 32; *ibid.*, p. 767. C, D.—And see both chapters at length.

<sup>l</sup> “Primo itaque homini,” &c. “Nunc vero sanctis in regnum Dei

CHAP.  
XXV.

The insufficiency of Jansenius his doctrine.

BOOK  
II.

§ 7. To take the more distinct view of this plea, let us put the case in him, who, running full speed in a course of sin, is called by the preaching of the Gospel to become a Christian: or, to the same purpose, in him, who, being a Christian and running the same race, is summoned by his profession, and the grounds thereof, to return to it. In this case, can any man imagine, that the reasons which move us all to be Christians should raise no love of true good, no dislike to sin, no fear of vengeance, no desire of everlasting happiness, in him that considers them as they deserve? Especially being managed by the Spirit of God, Which knocketh at the door of the heart by that means. Or can any man question, that, as it is the fear of vengeance that beginneth, so it is the love of good for God's sake that consummateth, the resolution of becoming a true Christian? But, the question being put about changing the chief end of a man's whole life and doings, can it be supposed, that any man is prevented with such a delight in true goodness, as instantly to abandon the lust, which his business hath been hitherto to satisfy, without demur or regret?

§ 8. I doubt not, that God can immediately create in any man that appearance of true good, that shall without debate or looking back transport him to the prosecution of it: that, notwithstanding the covenant of grace, He may do it; which, though a rule to His ordinary proceeding, is no law to His sovereign prerogative. But him that is thus saved, though saved by grace, yet we cannot count to be saved by the covenant of grace; which proposeth a reward to them, who are led by [the] motives thereof, notwithstanding the difficulties to the contrary: though implying the work of grace in him that overcometh. And this no man more clearly acknowledgeth than Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi* [lib.] VIII. [c.] 2<sup>m</sup>:

per gratiam Dei prædestinatis non tale adjutorium perseverantiæ datur, sed tale ut eis perseverantia ipsa donetur, non solum ut sine isto dono perseverantes esse non possint, verum etiam ut per hoc donum non nisi perseverantes siunt. . . . Illi ergo" (id est, Adamo) "sine peccato ullo data est, eum qua conditus est, voluntas libera, et eam fecit servire peccato: horum vero cum fuisset voluntas serva peccati, liberata est per illum Qui dixit,

'Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis.' Et accipiunt tantam per istam gratiam libertatem, ut quamvis, quamdiu hic vivunt, pugnent contra concupiscentias peccatorum, eisque nonnulla subrepant, . . . non tamen ultra serviant peccato quod est ad mortem, de quo dicit Johannes apostolus, 'Est peccatum ad mortem, non pro illo dico ut roget.'" Id., *ibid.*, c. xii. § 34, 35; *ibid.*, pp. 769. B, C, G, 770. A, B.

<sup>m</sup> "Tertio, prædeterminatio physica

where he confesseth, that the predetermination of the will by the grace of Christ is not indefeasible, but only when it overcomes; as God's predetermination, according to the Dominicans, is. For by this difference (which, in stating of this opinion, I have not neglected afore) the efficacy thereof cannot be attributed to the nature of that help which overcometh, as of another kind than that which proveth frustrate. And therefore, notwithstanding that large and elaborate work of his, he hath left us to enquire further, whence the efficacy of it proceedeth: as having, in effect, only resolved us, wherein the efficacy of grace consisteth, in the nature of the formal cause; not from whence it proceedeth, in the nature of the effective cause, which the question indeed demandeth.

§ 9. And, truly, the very consideration premised—that, as freedom from sin consists in the determination of the will to righteousness, which the grace of Christ effecteth, so freedom from righteousness, in the determination of it to sin, which it acteth,—enforceth another kind of freedom, common to both states, not importing praise or dispraise, but a capacity of either, by doing that which no necessity determineth a man to do: and, therefore, that, though the grace of Christ's  
206 cross be the medicine, yet, till it be freely taken, it worketh not the cure. This is that freedom from necessity by the present condition of our nature, the use whereof produceth the other freedom from bondage, either to sin or righteousness. Not that this state of proficience requires actual indifference, which supposeth so great an inclination and bias as that of inbred concupiscence; not determining the will to any action or object, but the acts thereof to those taints, which the want of a due end and right reason (and therefore of just measure) in a man's desire necessarily inferreth: but because, in passing from the bondage of sin to the love of righteousness, it is necessary, that a man go

talis esse dicitur, ut in quibuscunque circumstantiis voluntas colloetur semper faciat facere et operetur effectum suum, omnemque superet resistantiam: Christi adjutorium nullo modo. Nam *delectatio victrix*, quæ Augustino est efficax adjutorium, relativa est. Tunc enim est *victrix*, quando alteram supe-

rat. Quod si contingat alteram ardentiorē esse, in solis inefficacibus desideriiis hærebit animus, nec efficaciter unquam volet quod volendum est. Qua de re vide quæ in iisdem locis a nobis dicta sunt." Jansen., August., tom. iii. De Grat. Christi Salvatoris, lib. viii. c. 2. p. 319. b.

BOOK through an instance of indifference, wherein his resolution  
 II. shall balance between the love of true good and that which  
 is counterfeit.

Of sufficient  
 grace  
 under the  
 law of  
 nature.

§ 10. It is therefore to be acknowledged, that, in the state of innocence, there had needed no other help than the knowledge of God's will, to enable men to perform whatsoever He should require: [which knowledge had been of the sphere of nature, if we suppose that Adam was made and called only to the righteousness and happiness of this life; but supernatural, supposing him made and called to the world to come<sup>n</sup>.] For where no immoderate inclination of the sensual appetite created any difficulty, what should hinder the prosecution of a reason so unquestionable as the will of God is? But is not therefore the knowledge of God's will revealed by the Gospel, under reasons convincing man of his obligation to do it, upon the account of his utter misery or perfect happiness, the grace of Christ? Knowing, by the scriptures alleged before, that the means of it are purchased by His cross; and that, where the reason is so convinced, there cannot want motives sufficient to incline the will to make choice. Not that I think those reasons, not being necessary but only sufficient, would take place, were they not managed by God's Spirit; whether for the difficulty of supernatural actions, or for the contrary bias of inbred concupiscence: but because, in the nature of a sufficient help, they do actually enable a man to make choice; though, in regard of the difficulties which contrary inclinations create, it is most certain they would prove addle and void of effect, were they not conducted by the grace of God, which is called effectual for the event of it. Not that the nature of those helps which prevail is any other than the nature of those which overcome not (which I may well affirm, if Jansenius, though to the prejudice of his opinion, cannot deny it<sup>o</sup>); but because they are, by the work of providence, presented in several circumstances to several dispositions and inclinations, whether of God's mere will and pleasure, as He is Lord of all things, or upon reason of reward or punishment, in matters wherein He

<sup>n</sup> The passage in brackets is from MS. The orig. text runs thus:—"of the sphere of nature, supposing Adam instituted and called only to the up-

rightness and happiness of this life; or supernatural, supposing him instituted and called to the world to come.)"

<sup>o</sup> See above in § 8. note m.



hath declared Himself by the covenant of grace. So that, the same reasons and motives, which in some prove void and frustrate, coming to effect, and reaching and attaining to the very doing of the work which they enable a man to do, it cannot be said, according to this position of mine, that God, by the grace of Christ, only enableth to do what He requireth (the will of man making the difference between him that doth it, and him that doth it not) : but the very act, as well as the ability of doing, is duly ascribed to the work of God's grace, according to the articles agreed by the Church against Pelagius<sup>p</sup>.

§ 11. And this not only under the Gospel, but even under the Law. For though I shewed you in the first Book<sup>q</sup>, that the Law expressly tenders only the promise of temporal happiness in holding the land of Canaan, for the reward of the outward and carnal observation thereof; yet I shewed you also, that, in the meantime, there was another traffic in driving under hand between God and His people, for the happiness of the world to come, upon their obedience to His law, for such reasons, and to such an end, and with such measures, as He requireth. Therefore, "The Law is spiritual," according to St. Paul, Rom. vii. 14 : and "a grace," according to St. John, i. 16, 17 ; when he saith, "Of His fulness we have all received, and grace for grace ; for the Law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ : " the grace of the Gospel, instead of the grace of the Law. And 207 St. Paul again speaketh of the things which are granted us by the Gospel, "not in words taught by man's wisdom, but by the Holy Ghost, comparing spiritual things with spiritual things ;" 1 Cor. ii. 13 : signifying, that he taught the Gospel out of the Law, comparing the spiritual things of the Gospel, as signified by the Law, to the same spiritual things as revealed by Christ. And again, when he saith, Rom. i. 17, "The righteousness of God is revealed" in the Gospel "from faith to faith ;" his meaning is, proceeding to the faith of Christ from that which was under the Law. True it is indeed, and

<sup>p</sup> "Septimo, ut fateatur gratiam Dei et adiutorium etiam ad singulos actus dari eamque non dari secundum meritam nostram," &c. From the Catholic confession of faith which Pelagius was

compelled to make at the Council of Diospolis in Palestine, A.D. 415 ; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. ii. p. 1530. C.

<sup>q</sup> Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., cc. xii., xiii.



BOOK  
II.

I acknowledge, that this spiritual sense of the Law was not to be discovered in the Law, nor was discovered under it, without the revelation of God's Spirit (That placed it there), to His friends the prophets, and by them to their disciples and followers. But the office of those prophets being to call the people to the spiritual service of God and obedience to His Law out of love (which was the intent for which His Spirit strove with them; as with those before the flood, Gen. vi. 2, whereupon Noe is called "the preacher of righteousness," 2 Peter ii. 5); it follows of necessity, that there was means for them to learn and to practise true righteousness, seeing they are charged for "resisting the Spirit of God" calling them to it. St. Stephen, in the seventh of the Acts, insisteth not in convincing the Jews of the truth of Christianity (supposing it done by that which had passed), but infers by all that long speech, clearly this,—that, as the Israelite refused Moses for a judge between him and the Israelite whom he wronged, as the people were rebellious to him in the wilderness, and turned back in their hearts to Egypt, so were they to the Prophet Whom Moses had foretold;—concluding therefore; "Ye stiffnecked and uncircumcised in hearts and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost; as your fathers, so you also; which of the prophets did not your fathers persecute? killing those that foretold of the coming of that righteous One, of Whom you are now become the traitors and murderers." And our Lord, when He telleth them, that by honouring the memories of the prophets, and persecuting the prophets and wise and scribes and apostles, whom He was sending them, they owned themselves heirs of them that killed the prophets (Matt. xxiii. 29—37), sheweth, that the case was the same with the prophets of old, as with Himself and His Apostles. And whatsoever we read in the Old Testament of the grace of God to that people, in granting them His Spirit, or of their ungraciousness in resisting the same, serves to prove the same purpose.

§ 12. It is truly said indeed<sup>r</sup>, in rendering the reason why our Lord Christ came not till towards the latter end of the world, that God meant first to shew the world, that all other means which He thought fit to use to reclaim man by

<sup>r</sup> See above, § 5. note i.

[Acts vii.  
51, 52.]

the fathers, and by and under the Law, were not to purpose; that the necessity of His coming might appear: but that this is not to be understood, as if God meant to render them inexcusable by using insufficient means, that could not take effect; but that, dispensing to those times such means of grace as He found the reasons upon which His secret counsels proceed to require, proportionable to the obedience and service which He required then at their hands, He reserves the full measure of them to the coming of His Son, proportionable to the difficulty of bearing His cross, which He purposed for the condition of those promises which He brought.

§ 13. And the same is to be said of the fathers under the law of nature: which if we understand it to be so called, as if the light of nature then taught and enabled them to please God, we contradict, not only the faith hitherto maintained against Pelagius, but also the appearances in Scripture, of those revelations, of that commerce and intercourse with God, whereby they advanced to the state of his friends; the book of Job (to the time whereof we see this state lasted) presenting most evident instances both of God's correspondence with the godly of the Gentiles, and of Christian piety in their conversations.

§ 14. Now, to that state of innocence wherein Adam was created, it must needs be a grace of God to make known His will; because it cannot be supposed, that God should employ His creature in His service and not reward him for doing it with advantage: but not as if such knowledge could give him ability, but only determine the matter of his obedience, who  
208 had nothing to hinder the doing of that, which, commanded by God, must needs be for his advantage to do. Since the fall, if reasons provided by God, to convince the understanding, to incline the will, to that which He purposeth for our happiness, may and would prove ineffectual, were they not acted and managed by the Holy Ghost; let us not therefore so far mis-ken the counsel of God in providing them, as to imagine the work is not done by them, because it is His special grace that makes them effectual to purpose. The endowments of Adam, how great soever they were, the event sheweth, that they might fail: and, had they not failed, it

must have been ascribed to God for a greater grace than those endowments; inasmuch as those made him accountable to God, that would have entitled him to a reward. So that by this account it will be no marvel, that the grace of Christ, which saveth us in and through this weakness of inbred concupiscence, should be counted greater than that which Adam had in his innocency.

§ 15. And the same is to be said of the angels that fell, and those that stood. How great soever their endowments were, had not the motive (whatsoever it was), that prevailed with the one part to depart from God, been prevented of taking effect with the rest, it might have come to pass as well in all as in some. That it did not, what can it be ascribed to (all being furnished with abilities fully correspondent to that which God required at their hands), but some dispensation of God's secret counsel, being by no reason of His declared justice obliged otherwise? Not that the will of Adam or of angels was not able to do what God required, and had done it, of itself, without any help added by God: but because so great is the influence of the Maker's providence, that the events thereof, how justly soever imputable to the choice of the creature, must of necessity have their springs in and from the secret dispensation thereof, not concerning His justice.

§ 16. Seeing then, that (as I said before<sup>s</sup>) the opinion of Jansenius, though it gives account wherein the grace of Christ formally consisteth, yet gives no account from whence effectually it proceedeth, but the immediate will of God, the question demanding, upon what ground it redounds to man's account; let them either look about them for a better reason, or accept of this, not as destroying that which it saith, but to the introducing of that which it sayeth not. For it is agreed upon both ways, that it is delight in true goodness for the love of God, that makes the grace of Christ's Gospel effectual in men's lives and conversations: how by the act of that will, which in others rejects it, I endeavour to say what the Scriptures and faith of the Church will allow; but Jansenius his opinion goes no further than that so it is; to wit, because love is free, therefore man is freely saved, how-

<sup>s</sup> Above, § 8: and see c. xxi. § 3—5.

soever love be brought to pass. But the necessity of those actions to which grace determineth, which is antecedent in Jansenius his opinion (the cause, which is God's will, being indefeasible), is in mine only consequent; upon supposition of efficacy, which implies the being of that which comes to effect, grounded upon the foreknowledge of God, which supposes the free motion of the reasonable creature. If the advantage be such in reconciling the efficacy of grace with the free will of the creature, in reconciling the same with God's foreknowledge and effectual providence, extending to all, good and bad, it will appear much more. For had Jansenius done his business in the matter of supernatural grace, he had not obliged us much; unless his resolution were an overture to abate the general difficulty that remains. But if he sends us for that to the predetermination of God, which is said to be requisite upon the general account of the creature and the indifference of man's will; he leaves us to seek for a reason, how God is not the author of that sin which He determineth the will to do before it determine itself. If we avoid that, as Doctor Strang, whom I spoke of before<sup>t</sup>, hath done, by maintaining (against Doctor Twisse), that the will is not determined by God to the actions of sin: besides that he is to give account, why the same providence of God, which is general to all things, should be thought to reach this sort and not that (all actions, as appendances of God's creatures, having the same dependence upon God which the prerogative of the first cause requireth); we are left to seek, how that  
 209 foreknowledge of God, which directeth His providence, comes informed of the truth of future contingencies<sup>u</sup>. For if we maintain, that the wisdom of God, comprehending the inclinations of His creatures, and all those considerations which outward occurrences or inward appearances shall present or not present them with, to determine their choice, cannot thereby certainly discern what will come to pass (as Doctor Strang maintains<sup>x</sup>), that so there cannot be in God any certain

<sup>t</sup> Above, c. xxi. § 6.

<sup>u</sup> See the Pref. to the Epilogue, § 23.

<sup>x</sup> "Affirmativam partem tuentur plerimi Jesuitæ, quorum hæc est sententia. Etsi Deus considerando voluntatem creatam, quatenus est libera, indifferens, et indeterminata, non possit scire quid sit eventurum, tamen ex hypothesisi, si hæc

aut illæ agendi aut non agendi occasiones sive angelis sive hominibus offerrentur, aut si voluntas eorum in tali vel tali ordine aut talibus circumstantiis constitueretur, aut tali excitatione moveretur, Deum ante omne decretum Suum certo cognoscere potuisse et ab æterno cognovisse pro Sua infinita sapientia,

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II.

knowledge of future conditionals; I leave to them that shall peruse this writing, what satisfaction it is possible for him to give in the possibility of foreknowing future contingencies. For to say, that they may be foreseen in the decree of permitting them, is to say, that that, which may be otherwise, may be certainly foreseen by certainly knowing that there is nothing to hinder it.

[Of grace  
merited  
de con-  
gruo.]

§ 17. It remains, that I say, what is to be thought of that proposition which some of the school-doctors hold forth; that “to such, as do what is in them to do by their natural abilities, God gives grace”—“*facientibus quod in se est ex viribus naturæ, Deus largitur gratiam*.”<sup>y</sup>—because it seems to follow upon supposition of that which I have maintained; that the unregenerate are, notwithstanding original concupiscence, able to do things that are good for a right end, though not out of a resolution to do all for the right end of all, which is God and His service. For hence it seemeth to be inferred, that those who live in civil righteousness for honesty’s sake (and not for their particular advantage, inconsistent with the general good of mankind), deserve, that God should send them those helps of grace, which are immediately sufficient to save them by the covenant of grace. But it is manifest, that the proposition may be understood in two senses: one in point of fact, the other of right; the one making the proposition universal, the other particular; the one importing that God *may*, the other that God *must*, give those helps of grace, that are immediately sufficient, to them that live well according to the light of nature: there being a vast difference between God’s giving the helps of grace that are immediately sufficient, to them whom He considers to have done such things as the light of nature justifies; and His giving them because of the same, as obliged so to reward

in quam partem voluntas eorum inclinatura esset; et quid esset actura aut ommissura; cum tamen ipsa posset si vellet agere aut non agere aut oppositum agere. . . . Hujusmodi scientiam conditionatam appellat mediam inter scientiam naturalem et liberam aut mistam ex utraque,” &c. “Nos autem nullam talem dari scientiam et doctrinam istam tum inutilem tum noxiam esse breviter ostendemus.” Strang., De Vol. et Act. Dei circa Pecc., lib. iii. c. 11. pp. 650, 651. And see the whole

chapter.

<sup>y</sup> See (besides the schoolmen generally) Jansen., August., tom. iii. De Grat. Christi Salvat., lib. i. c. 5. pp. 7. a, sq.—S. Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund. qu. cix. art. 6. ad secund., &c.—Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., lib. vi. c. 6, Controv., tom. iii. p. 891. A, B:—and Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. An Homo in Statu Peccati solis Naturæ Viribus &c., P. ii. § xli. p. 651.



them. For the one leaves those sufficient helps gifts of God's grace by Christ: the other renders them rewards of men's works, not subject to God's bounty, being prevented with the obligation of justice; and therefore establishes that opinion of "*meritum de congruo*," which had much vogue in the schools, and supposeth not, but inferreth, the covenant of grace, and therefore destroys it, as resolving<sup>a</sup> the effects thereof into those works of man, that oblige God to grant those helps, which the Gospel (pretending to be set on foot by God's free grace in Christ) tendereth. Certainly, admitting that which hath been proved<sup>b</sup>, that the preaching of the Gospel is granted in consideration of the merits and sufferings of Christ, it cannot by any means be maintained, that any works of mere nature can oblige God to send the means of knowing the Gospel, and conviction of the truth of it, without granting by consequence, that the very coming of Christ, whereof these means are the consequence, must be imputed to the works of those, who, in the state of corrupt nature, have obliged God to send them the knowledge of Christ: which they could not have had, had not the coming of Christ been first provided: which, by this reason, must have been in consideration of the original merit of their works. I say, the original merit of their works: because in this case there could be no consideration of God's promise made out of free grace, as the ground of those blessings, which God thereby ties Himself to bestow, upon condition of doing that which His covenant requires; though otherwise infinitely exceeding the value of the condition which He requireth. For here it is evident, that the free grace of God, which tenders the promise upon the condition, is the original ground of all the claim, that any that is qualified can make to the promise. But supposing the works of corrupt nature to oblige God to give His Gospel, it is no more His free grace, but the original merit of those works, to which all the grace of it must be imputed. Which, as it directly falls into

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<sup>a</sup> "Dicitur autem aliquis mereri *ex condigno*, quando invenitur æqualitas inter præmium et meritum, secundum rectam æstimationem. *Ex congruo* autem tantum, quando talis æqualitas non invenitur, sed solum secundum liberalitatem dantis munus tributur quod dantem decet." S. Thom. Aquin., In

Sent. lib. ii. Dist. xxvii. qu. 1. art. 3. Respond.—See Abp. Lawrence's Bampton Lectures, Sermon. iv.

<sup>b</sup> Corrected from errata. The MS. reads also, "resembling;" the original text, "verifying."

<sup>c</sup> Above, c. x. § 1, sq.; c. xviii. § 6.



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the prime article of Pelagius his heresy<sup>c</sup>, that "grace is given according to merit," and that "it is not given to every act,"<sup>210</sup> being prevented by those acts in consideration whereof this opinion supposes it to be granted; so, by consequence, it makes the publication of the Gospel to be no grace of Christ, but the reward of man's merit: which is the true consequence of Pelagius his position. For though, being pressed with those scriptures, in which the grace of Christ is so clearly preached that nothing but impudence could deny it, he granted, that the preaching of the Gospel is as much of God's free grace as the light of nature by which these works are done<sup>d</sup>; yet in very deed he overthrew his own saying (that is, gave the Church an indefeasible advantage against himself) by granting it: his heresy being no ways tenable, without maintaining the very preaching of the Gospel to be the purchase of man's merit, and Christ Himself, the subject of the Gospel, by consequence. And thus the heresy of Pelagius becomes that very opinion which St. Paul writes against; as often as he disputes, that a man is justified by grace and not by works: only with this difference, that when he writes against the Jews, arguing that a man is not justified by the works of the Law but by faith, his meaning is, that the righteousness of the Jews turned Christians is not to be ascribed to the outward observation of Moses' law, but to the covenant of grace; but when he writes to the Gentiles, that they attained not the promises of the Gospel by the works which they had done before they heard of it, but by the mere grace of God that sent our Lord Christ to bring it. But if any man insist<sup>e</sup>, that nothing hinders him to suppose the Gospel already set on foot, and thereupon to say and hold, that by the use of corrupt nature God may be obliged to send the knowledge of it; the insufficiency of the plea will be evident enough. For, those works of moral honesty which

<sup>c</sup> "Tria sunt, ut scitis, quæ maxime adversus eos" (Pelagianos) "Catholica defendit Ecclesia: quorum est unum, gratiam Dei non secundum merita nostra dari:" &c. S. Aug., De Dono Persever., c. ii. § 4; Op., tom. x. p. 823. G. —"Objectum est, eum dicere" (scil. Pelagius, at the Council of Palestine), "... gratiam Dei atque adiutorium non ad singulos actus dari, sed in libero arbitrio esse vel in Lege atque doctrina: et, Dei gratiam secundum me-

rita nostra dari," &c. &c. S. Aug., Epist. Alypii et Aug. ad Paulinum, Epist. clxxxvi. § 32; Op., tom. ii. p. 674. A, C.—See Voss., Hist. Pelag., lib. iii. P. ii. Thes. 1, and 12; Op., tom. vi. pp. 650, sq.; 670. b, sq.: and above, § 10. note p.

<sup>d</sup> See above, c. x. § 2—6.

<sup>e</sup> See the passages from Socinus and Volkel., above, c. x. § 3. notes e, j; and from Arminius in note f below.

corrupt nature is able to do, not serving to discharge the obligation thereof to God in those particular occasions upon which they become due, because they are void of any (whether habitual or actual) intent of that end, which they ought to aim at; it were ridiculous to tie God to grant the effects of His free grace, in sending our Lord Christ, to those that are less sinners than others. And, considering that which is visible in point of fact, it will be impossible to reduce those things, which appear in the propagating and maintaining of Christianity through the world, to any difference of works done before the knowledge thereof, as the reason of God's dispensing of it.

§ 18. Which may also be said of another opinion<sup>f</sup>, that may be (and perhaps is) held upon terms not prejudicial to the faith, as this seems to be; to wit, that God, by declaring the covenant of grace, and His inclination to save all the world by it, hath tied Himself to grant such motions and inspirations of true good to all men, that, if they neglect them not, but do what corrupt nature so prevented is able to do, He shall stand obliged to second the same with means sufficient to bring them to everlasting happiness. For, the beginning of the work being acknowledged to require God's preventing grace, it cannot be said, that those who are supposed to be thus saved are saved by works and not by grace; or that, in their regard, Christ is dead in vain, the said helps being granted in consideration of Christ's death. But though it may without prejudice to Christianity be said, that God may dispense the helps of that grace, which Christ's death hath purchased, besides and without the preaching of the Gospel; yet can it not be said, during the Gospel, that any man attaineth the kingdom of heaven, which Christianity promiseth, but by it. Now to be saved by the Gospel, requires the profession of the faith; and that, the sacrament of baptism, at least in resolution and purpose. So that whether, among those nations where the Gospel is not preached, any man be saved by this way, is a thing visible,

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<sup>f</sup> So e.g. John Cameron and Moses Amyraut; and among the Lutherans, Henichius and George Calixtus: see Le Blanc, *Thes. Theol.*, *Thes. An Homo in Statu Peccati, &c.*, P. i. § ix., xxxii., sq.; P. iii. § i., ii.: pp. 753, 758, 771.—Arminius (*Exam. Prædest. Perkins.*, p. 218. Lugd. 1612) goes a

step further:—"Vide mihi an non isto dicto Christi, 'Habenti dabitur,' promissio ista contineatur, qua Deus spondet Se gratia supernaturali illuminatorum, qui lumine naturali recte utetur, aut saltem utetur, quantum poterit, minus male."

and to be tried by examining who in this case hath been known to have become a Christian. Of which, I assure myself, there will be found so few instances of historical truth, that a discreet man will have no pleasure to introduce a position, so nearly concerning the intent of Christ's coming, whereof there can so little effect appear.

§ 19. For, supposing instances might be alleged<sup>g</sup> to make the matter questionable, how far would they be from rendering a reason of that vast difference, that is visible, between the 211 proceeding of God towards the salvation of those that are born within the pale of the Church, and those that live and die without hearing of Christianity? The one being so prevented with the knowledge of what they are to do to be saved, that they shall have much ado so to neglect it, as to flatter their own concupiscence with any colour of an excuse: whereas the other, whatsoever conviction we may imagine them to have of one true God, of an account to be made for all that we do, of the guilt of sin which they are under without the Gospel, it will be impossible to reduce the reason of the difficulties they are under, more than the former, to an equal desire in God of saving all, together with the difference of men's compliance with the helps of grace which it produceth. And therefore, considering the antecedent will of God is not absolutely God's will, but with a term of abatement, reserving the condition upon which it proceedeth, I conceive it requisite (as I have done<sup>h</sup>) to limit the signification thereof to those effects, which we see God bring to pass by virtue of it. The utmost whereof being the providing of means for the preaching of the Gospel, it is nevertheless no prejudice to it, that the Apostles are forbidden by the Spirit to preach in Bithynia or Asia<sup>1</sup> (Acts xvi. 6, 7); not because God would not have them to be saved, or because the Macedonians by their works had obliged Him to set them aside for their sakes, Who could have provided for both; but for reasons known to Himself alone, and not reducible to any thing that appears to us. Especially considering the case of infants dying before baptism, in whose works it is manifest there can be no ground of difference. For to say, that by

<sup>g</sup> See below, § 20.

<sup>h</sup> Above, § 3.

<sup>1</sup> See Tilenus, *Consid. Sentent. Jac. Arminii, &c.*, c. iii. p. 14 (Franc. 1612):

and Corvinus' reply, *Defens. Sentent. Jac. Arminii, &c.*, c. iii. p. 110 (Lugd. 1613).

the universality of that grace, which God declareth by Christ, we are to believe that they are all saved, as many as live not to transgress the covenant of grace<sup>k</sup>, would be a novelty never heard of in the Catholic Church of Christ: tending to undermine the foundation of our common salvation laid by our Lord to Nicodemus; "Unless ye be born again of water and of the Holy Ghost, ye cannot enter into the kingdom of God." For how should the general tender of the Gospel entitle infants to the benefit thereof, because they never transgressed that in which they were never estated?

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§ 20. It were in vain, then, to look about the Scripture for examples to justify any part of this position. The widow of Sarepta to whom Elias was sent, Naaman the Syrian who was sent to Eliseus, Cyrus, whom many suppose to have worshipped the only God (because, in the end of the Chronicles and beginning of Esdras, he saith, "the God of heaven hath given me all the kingdoms of the earth;" and because the prophet Esay makes him a figure of the Messias, as the kings of God's people were, for the freedom which they attained by his government), the centurion Cornelius to whom St. Peter was sent with the Gospel, are all of one case: which is the case of those strangers, who, living in the commonwealth of Israel, though not circumcised, yet worshipped the only true God, under those laws which (the Jews<sup>l</sup> tell us) were delivered by God to Noe, and by him to all his posterity; and so were capable of that salvation, which the Israelites had the means of under the Law, though themselves not under it. But neither have we evidence, that their works under the light of nature obliged God to call them to the privilege of strangers in the house of Israel; nor can the works of Cornelius be taken for the works of corrupt nature, being in the state of God's grace which was manifested under the Law, and therefore prevented with those means of salvation, which become necessary under the Gospel to the salvation which it tendereth. So far are we from finding in them any argument of a law, obliging God to grant

<sup>k</sup> "Omnes omnium gentium infantes morientes sine peccatis actualibus salvos esse." Art. xiv. of XXXI Articles attributed to Arminius (and A. Borreus), who in his Respons. ad XXXI Art. (Op. Theol., pp. 153. b—155. b. Lugd. 1629) adopts and defends the

statement.—See also Zuingl., De Pecc. Orig. Declar., Op., tom. ii. pp. 120. b, 121. a.

<sup>l</sup> Selden, De Jure Nat. et Gent. juxta Discip. Ebræor., lib. i. c. 10; Works, vol. i. pp. 158, sq.

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them those helps in consideration of their works done in the state of corrupt nature. And, therefore, whatsoever examples we may find of this nature under Christianity, they are to be referred to the free grace of God: which, as sometimes it may come to those of best conversation according to nature (to whom the words of our Lord, "To him that hath shall be given," may be applied without prejudice to Christianity, Matt. xxv. 19, Luke xix. 26), so also it fails not to call those, who for their present state are most strangers to Christianity; that it may appear, that no rule ties God, but that free grace, which His own secret wisdom dispenseth. And, truly, those 212 good works which corrupt nature produceth, necessarily depend upon those circumstances, in which God's providence placeth one man and not another, though both in the state of mere nature; so that the one shall not be able to do that which is reasonable, without overcoming those difficulties, to which the other is not liable. In which regard it hath been said, that the heroic acts of the heathen may be attributed to the Spirit of God moving them<sup>m</sup>; though not as granted in consideration of Christ, but as conducting the whole work of providence. So little cause there is to imagine, that the consideration of them should oblige God to grant those helps of grace, the ground whereof is the obedience of Christ, and the end, the happiness of the world to come.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

PREDESTINATION TO GRACE ABSOLUTE, TO GLORY RESPECTIVE. PURPOSE OF DENYING EFFECTUAL GRACE ABSOLUTE, OF PUNISHING RESPECTIVE. THE END TO WHICH GOD PREDESTINATES, IS NOT THE END FOR WHICH HE PREDESTINATES. GRACE THE REWARD OF THE RIGHT USE OF GRACE. HOW MUCH OF THE QUESTION THE GOSPEL DETERMINES NOT. THAT OUR ENDEAVOURS ARE ENGAGED NO LESS THAN IF PREDESTINATION WERE NOT, IT DETERMINETH. OF THE TRADITION OF THE CHURCH: AND OF SEMIPELAGIANS, PREDESTINIANS, AND ARMINIANS.

Predesti-  
nation to  
grace ab-  
solute, to  
glory re-  
spective.

I AM now come to the upshot of the controversy concerning the covenant of grace, and free will in embracing and performing of the covenant of grace; which is the dispute about God's predestination, whether it proceeds upon the

<sup>m</sup> "Quis ambigat eos, qui de quibuscumque nationibus quibuslibet temporibus Deo placere potuerunt, Spiritu

gratiæ Dei fuisse discretos?" De Vocat. Gentium, lib. ii. c. 5: in fin. Op. Prosper. tom. i. p. 479. b.



absolute will of God, or in consideration of man's being qualified as the Gospel requires: which, though of itself never so intricate, the premises being supposed, must of necessity be thus resolved,—that, predestination being the appointment of grace and glory, as reprobation on the other side the decree of not giving effectual grace, and of condemning to pain, the appointment of glory and misery cannot be absolute, but the appointment to actual grace and perseverance or not, necessarily is<sup>n</sup>. The reason, supposing the premises, is not liable to be contradicted in either part of it. For it cannot stand with the wisdom and truth of God, to execute His counsels upon other reasons, and in other considerations, than from everlasting He purposed to do. Therefore, for what reason, and in what consideration, God shall in due time give life and death to them whom He shall give it to, for the same reason He did resolve to give it from everlasting. But nothing is more evident in Christianity than this; that God, at the last day, shall give sentence of life and death, according as men shall be found to have behaved themselves as Christians or not. And all that I have premised to manifest the condition of the covenant of grace, makes good the same. For the state of life or death cannot become any man's own upon other terms, than the right and title to it becomes his. Therefore God from everlasting determined to give life or death to every man, in consideration of his being found qualified for this or for that, according to those terms which the covenant of grace proposeth. On the other side, it being resolved, that man, as he is born into the world, is not able to do any thing that can oblige God to grant him those helps of grace, which only will be effectual to enable him to embrace and go through with that condition which the Gospel tendereth; it is manifest, that the reason, why He provides effectually sufficient helps for some, which others have not; why He tenders them to some in those circumstances in which He knows they will be effectual, to others not; must take rise and begin at His own free choice, in granting matters of free grace to  
 213 whom He pleaseth, and not to others: though of each man's proceeding or not proceeding in the way of Christianity a

<sup>n</sup> See the Preface to the Epilogue, § 26.



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reason is to be given, from the good or bad use of those sufficient helps which he had been prevented with. For seeing it was in the mere appointment of God, to have caused any man to be born, or after to live, where he should have met with sufficient helps to convict him of the truth of Christianity, and those so presented to him as He best knew they would not be refused; there is nothing more manifest, than that it was only in the mere will of God, that it was appointed so as it is and not otherwise. But this is no hindrance, why the sufficient helps of God's grace should not proceed from the will of man's happiness in God, though they take no further effect through man's fault; and the having or not having of further helps, which God either doth or might have seconded them with, be imputed to the good or bad use of those which went afore: because it hath been made manifest by the premises, that the end of God's gifts is the happiness of His creature, though it come not to pass. But the reason of the particulars, which He actually bestows or refuses, is to be resolved into the quality of the persons that receive them or not; but so, that, the order of all depending upon the first helps of free grace which every man is prevented with, there is no reason to be given for the whole in the nature of a meritorious cause.

The end to which God predestinates, is not the end for which He predestinates.

§ 2. Against the two parts of this resolution there are two objections, one against each; which so far as we shall be able to resolve, so far shall we be able to leave the business clear. For seeing that the end is first desired, and then the means (the reason why the means are desired being derived from the desire of the end, and referred to it); and that the end of all grace is glory, the end of all the means of salvation, the salvation intended by it; it seems, that God's predestination must of force appoint salvation to them that are to be saved in the first place, from thence proceeding to design the way and order, by which the person designed to it may be induced of his own free choice to accept the means of it°. This slight mistake seems to

° "Hic vero singularis est Gul. Twissi sententia" (scil. de decretorum Divinorum ordine circa electos et reprobos). "Nam circa electos et reprobos non vult concipi debere nisi duo decreta, quæ subordinata sunt et quo-

rum unum sit altero prius. Unum est de fine, alterum est de mediis. Decretum de fine est illud, quo statuit Deus gloriam Suam illustrare in exercenda erga certos quosdam homines misericordia, erga alios justitia vindicante.

have been the occasion of many horrible imaginations, which even Christian divines have had; of God's design from everlasting to create the most part of men on purpose to glorify Himself by condemning them to everlasting torments, though in consideration of the sins which they shall have done: that which had been granted in God's predestination to life, upon this mistake, seeming necessarily to extend itself to His reprobation, signifying the decree of condemning to everlasting torments. But the mistake is, that the end of the creature by God's appointment, is taken for God's end; which, though it be His end because He appointeth it for His creature, yet it is not any end that He seeks for Himself. The reason is so punctually laid down in the premises, that it can be but repeated here: that God, being of Himself sufficient for Himself, can have no end upon His creature; because nothing accrues to Him, nothing goes from Him, whatsoever accrues to His creature or goes from it. And though, God having now resolved to make the world for Himself, that is, for His own glory, it is necessary we suppose Him to design the government of it, so as it may be a fit means to obtain that end; yet is it to be much considered, that, God having once given a law to His understanding creatures, tendering happiness as the reward of abiding by His law, it can no longer stand with that tender, that it should be a fit means of God's glory to give happiness to His creature, not considered as qualified by His law, and therefore not to resolve

Decretum de mediis est, quo Deus decrevit in hunc finem homines creare, ut laborarentur permittere, quibusdam Redemptorem et Servatorem præparare, illosque fide in Illum donare, justificare, et glorificare: alios vero in peccato relinquere, indurare, excæcare, atque tandem damnare. Quod decretum de mediis posterius est decreto de fine et illi subordinatum," &c. "Ut videre in Defensione ejus Perkinsiana, Digressione de objecto prædestinationis; et alibi sæpe. . . Sed quamvis singuli propemodum theologi, dum decreta Dei ordinant, in apicibus quibusdam a se invicem discrepant, omnes tamen illi doctores, qui . . . objectum electionis et reprobationis constituunt hominem ut nondum lapsum et conditum in prævisione Divina" (i. e. all Supralapsarians—see below, § 8. note

r), "et inter effecta electioni et reprobationi communia numerant hominis creationem et lapsus permissionem, illi, inquam, omnes in eo conveniunt, primum decretum quod concipiendum est in Deo circa homines illud esse quo Deus constituit in certis quibusdam hominibus gloriam misericordiæ, in aliis vero gloriam justitiæ Suæ ostendere: cui decreto subjiciunt et subordinant tanquam eo posteriora decreta de homine creando, et de lapsu ejus permittendo, ac de Christo Mediatore et Redemptore electis donando, cæteris vero in lapsu et perditione relinquendis. Quæ decreta rursus . . . varie nec omnes eodem modo dividunt et ordinant." Le Blanc, *Thes. Theol., Thes. de Decret. Divin. Ordine circa Electos et Reprobos*, § xxxii., xxxiii., xxxv.; p. 156.

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to give it. Whether we consider the interest of God's justice in requiring that law, it cannot be imagined that the love of any creature can move Him to waive it; or whether we consider His truth in making it good, being once declared, it is manifest, that the thing promised by it cannot be appointed by God as the means to His glory, not supposing the condition which it requireth. For whatsoever may be said of the consideration of our Lord Christ; as it can have no place, till we suppose His obedience to be in consideration, when any man's reward is appointed by virtue of that covenant which He came to treat; so can it not be in consideration, till we suppose him, to whom the benefit of it is appointed, to be qualified as it requires. And this might have been seen by the opposite decree of reprobation; in which everlasting death, appointed as the term of it, not being capable of bearing the notion of that which God aims at of itself, cannot be considered as the end. Which might have been argument enough; that, as the death of the reprobate is not, nor can be, the means of God's glory, but as it is intended to punish men's forfeits, so neither can the life of the elect be the means of God's glory, but as it is intended to reward their performance.

§ 3. It is therefore answered: that the reward of the elect, and punishment of the reprobate, becomes the means of God's glory, not absolutely, but in regard that God, having proposed a law, by the obeying whereof they might attain happiness, though requiring supernatural obedience, the one have observed it, the others not; and, God having proposed a law which the light of nature enableeth all to observe, none have observed it: but otherwise, that it could no more be the means of God's glory to appoint life for the elect, than it could be the means for the same to appoint death for the reprobate; and, therefore, that it is necessary to the glory of God, that the good gifts, which He bestoweth upon His creatures, should all be taken for means of their everlasting happiness by His appointment.

[Scripture  
proof.]

§ 4. To which purpose we have not a few passages of holy Scripture that are very express. St. Paul tells the Athenians, Acts xvii. 26 [27]: that "God made all mankind of one blood, to dwell on the whole face of the earth, determining appointed

seasons, and the bounds of their dwellings, that they might seek the Lord, if by any means they might find Him groping, though not far off from every one of us." And so those of Lystra, Acts xiv. 16 [17]: that "in the by-past ages He suffered all nations to walk their own ways, though He left not Himself without witness, doing good, giving rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." For what can this "witness" mean, if it intend to destroy His own resolution of damning them? And therefore, speaking to them that condemn the sins of others and do the like, "Dost thou condemn the riches of His patience and long-suffering," saith he, "not knowing, that the goodness of God leadeth to repentance; but, according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, heapest up wrath to thyself, against the day of wrath and revelation of the just judgment of God?" Rom. ii. 3, 4. Which are the same terms, that St. Peter useth of the impenitent within the knowledge of Christianity; when he saith (2 Peter iii. 9), "The Lord is not slack of His promise as some men count slackness, but is long-suffering towards us, not willing that any should perish, but come to the knowledge of His truth:" which is, in that place, the effectual acknowledgment of it. As likewise saith the prophet to them that cast off the thoughts of repentance, as despairing of forgiveness; Ezek. [x]xxiii. 11—16. As he had done before, Ezek. xviii. 22. These exhortations signify nothing, unless we suppose, that it turns to every man's account to neglect the means upon which they proceed: which is this; that God on His part hath done what His goodness and justice requires (though not immediately bringing to pass that which was immediately sufficient to the capacity of salvation), and therefore requires this at their hands, intending to judge them in case they fail on their part. For there is none of those gifts, but enables a man immediately to do that which God immediately requires; and therefore condemns him, that neglects to do that, which he is immediately enabled to do. And though God cannot become obliged, upon man's compliance with the light of nature, immediately to give sufficient helps of grace to bring every man to His kingdom (because of the certain failure of man's compliance with them, through the servitude of sin,

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from which we cannot come free by nature); yet is the sin, for which he is condemned, justly imputed to his not doing that, which by the light of nature he might have done. How much more is the refusal of sufficient helps to them, who have neglected the improvement of those helps, which 215 they had, or might have had, to be imputed to them, who have made themselves to be refused them.

Grace the  
reward of  
the right  
use of  
grace.

§ 5. From hence it necessarily follows, that those helps, which God follows His own preventing grace with, are granted in consideration of the good use of His preventing graces: notwithstanding that nothing hinders the goodness of God, both to oversee those failures, for which He might justly have given over those which He had prevented by His grace, and not brought them finally to persevere; or to redouble upon them those helps, which the use that they formerly had made of His former graces, might justly have moved Him to refuse. So, though all God's gifts to man are granted out of God's desire of man's happiness (to wit, as the man's end and not as God's), so the gifts, by which it is purchased, are granted in consideration of the right use of His former gifts; that, in the nature of the final, this, of the meritorious cause: though no way obliging God, but by virtue of His own will to be obliged. And herewith agrees that of Solomon, Prov. xvi. 4: "The Lord hath made all for Himself, and also the wicked for the day of wrath." For whether we translate it, with Grotius<sup>p</sup>, "for itself;" or, as it useth to be translated, "Himself;" the consequence of it will be, that, as the world is, and as things pass in it, all that comes to pass is by God's appointment, or for His glory; which is all one: leaving the account, by which it may appear so, to be given from the rest of the Scripture. But if we join both clauses together, by repeating "for Himself" in the second (as to say, that "God for Himself hath appointed

<sup>p</sup> "Sensus non est malus, si 'propter semetipsum' intelligas, non quod opus quoquam Deus habeat, sed ut proprietates suas notas faciat, et impium non fieri talem a Deo (absit hoc) sed fieri sive poni ad mala. Verum melior erit hæc interpretatio: 'Singula Deus facit' (id est, ordinat) 'ad id quod singulis convenit. Etiam impius ad diem calamitosum' (supple, ordinatus

a Deo). Nam כִּנְיָ inter alia, ut et vox 'respondendi' Latina, significat τὸ συσταιχεῖν ('eadem serie locare'). Sic Eccles. x. 19, כִּנְיָ est 'compensat.' Neque sane aliter sumsere hunc locum LXX. 'Πάντα τὰ ἔργα τοῦ Κυρίου μετὰ δικαιοσύνης: φυλάσσειται δὲ ὁ ἀσεβῆς εἰς ἡμέραν κακῆν.'" Grot., ad Prov. xvi. 4.



the wicked for the day of His wrath"), then is the reason given, how the being of evil is for God's glory; to wit, by punishing them that do it. Herewith also agrees that of St. Paul, far better than it is imagined to do, Rom. viii. 28—30: "Now we know, that all things work together for good to them that love God, which are called according to purpose: for whom He foreknew, those He also predestinated to become conformable to the image of His Son, that He may be the first-born among many brethren; but whom He predestinated, those He also called; and whom He called, those He also justified; and whom He justified, those He also glorified." The "purpose," according to which he describes them to be called, to whose good all things conduce, is either the purpose of God or their own. As Barnabas "exhorteth" them, that were converted, "to cleave to God with purpose of heart;" Acts xi. 23. For "those that are called," are often taken by St. Paul, metonymically, for those that have obeyed their calling by God: as Rom. i. 6, 7; 1 Cor. i. 2, 24; Jude 1; Apoc. xvii. 14; and so *κλησις*, Eph. iv. 1. And so all things conduce to good for those, that not only are professed Christians, but are so from a steady purpose of heart. But though we grant, that they are described by two qualifications, one, that they "love God," the other, that they are "predestinated to life" (that is, called, out of a purpose in God to save them); yet they are not predestinated by God to become conformable to the pattern of Christ (which consists in bearing His cross), but as Christians. And this it is, which here St. Paul says they are predestinated to; not to life. The predestination, which he speaks of here, is not of men to be saved, but of Christians to bear the cross of Christ: whereof he had said a little afore, for the occasion of this discourse (Rom. viii. 17, 18); "If we be sons, then also heirs; heirs of God, but joint heirs with Christ; that, if we suffer with Him, we may also be glorified with Him: for I reckon, that the sufferings of this time are not valuable with the glory that is to be revealed upon us." And when he calleth them "saints," and "those that love God," and "those He foreknew," it is manifest, that the foreknowledge which he meaneth is that whereby God knew them true Christians from the heart, whom He intends to prove; and

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therefore appoints them to bear Christ's cross, that, being justified, that is, approved in so doing, they may be glorified in God's purpose, and the right and title of their own estate. All this being manifest by the proposition of the chapter;—

[Rom. viii. 1.] “There is now, therefore, no more condemnation for them that are in Christ Jesus; that live not after the flesh, but after the Spirit:”—which words, plainly describing those that are Christians from a grounded purpose of the heart, of whom the sequel of the discourse must proceed, manifestly demonstrate, that St. Paul speaks not of God's predestinating any man to be saved, but of predestinating those, whom He knows to be good Christians, to bear Christ's cross, and so to obtain God's promises: as the same St. Paul saith, that it was granted of grace to the Philippians, “not only to believe in Christ, but to suffer for Christ;” Phil. i. 29. And hereby it is manifest, that succeeding graces are bestowed in consideration of the right use of those that went afore. For here you see, that those, who being moved by the helps of God's preventing grace have submitted themselves to the profession of Christianity from the heart, are in consideration thereof designed by God to the happy accomplishment of their course. And this is invincibly evidenced by the promise of the Holy Ghost, tendered by the Gospel to those that obey God's calling, by undertaking to be Christians, for the enabling of them to persevere in that which they undertake. The same is expressed in the words of the Apostle; when, having menaced the Hebrew Christians with the expectation of vengeance upon their apostasy, he thus restores them again, Heb. vi. 9, 10: “But we are persuaded better things, and that belong to salvation, of you, beloved, though we thus speak; for God is not unjust, to forget your work and labour of love, which ye shew to His name, ministering to the saints, as still ye do.” For it is manifest, that the Apostle expects here the supply of grace, enabling to persevere, from the justice of God, in consideration of that which they had done in performance of their Christian profession before.

§ 6. On the other side it may be objected, that, if the whole work of grace in the life of each Christian be resolved into the free appointment of God (in regard that those helps,

which each man is first prevented with, cannot be granted in consideration of any work of our nature, the rest depending on those first helps), it is to no purpose to dispute, how the freedom of the will takes place in every particular act, each man's final estate being no less determined than if there were no place for it. Neither availeth it any man, that God appointeth him not to death, or gives him sufficient helps to bring him to life; seeing that, the efficacy of them depending upon His mere will, the sufficiency of them serves but to aggravate His sentence.

§ 7. To this my answer is, that I conceive I am not to answer further than St. Paul hath done: who, having objected to himself, in the person of the Jews, thinking much they should not be saved by the Law, "Why doth God then find fault? for who hath resisted His will" (Rom. ix. 19), returns an answer, that denies not that God might convert the Jews to Christianity, did He think it fitting; but thus:—"Nay rather, who art thou, O man, that disputest with God? shall the earthen pot say to the potter, Why hast thou made me thus? hath not the potter power over the clay, to make one vessel to an honourable use, another to a dishonourable, of the same compost? what if God, willing to shew wrath, and make known His power, hath borne with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fit to be destroyed? that He might also make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, us whom He hath called, not only of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles, whom He hath prepared for glory:—where, since God forbears the vessels of His wrath with that long-suffering, which St. Peter says leads to repentance (designing to shew His wrath the heavier upon them for neglecting it), it is manifest, that they are not said to be "*κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν*," as if God had fitted them for it, as designed and made to that dishonourable use (which is the reason why I translated it not as a participle, but as a noun, not "fitted for destruction," as by God, but "fit for destruction," as of themselves<sup>1</sup>); and, therefore, that one and the same mass of compost, out of which the potter makes vessels to contrary uses, is to be compared with mankind in that estate in which the Gospel finds it; the question being made

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How much of the question the Gospel determineth.

[Rom. ix. 20—24.]

[2 Pet. iii. 9.]

<sup>1</sup> See above, c. xxiv. § 3. note u.

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why some obey it and not others, why the Gentiles rather than the Jews; and the argument made, that, if God's grace be the cause, then are not they to be blamed that neglect it; and the Apostle having premised for his ground, that all mankind, being overtaken by the Gospel destitute of righteousness, are to become Christians that they may obtain it. This<sup>217</sup> being the case, it is plain, that the objection is the same against St. Paul, as against the resolution proposed. For as this answer supposes the reason, why the Gentiles were converted to be Christians, and the Jews not, to be resolved into the will of God; so the resolution here proposed resolves the reason of the true Christianity, and final perseverance in it, of those that shall be saved, into that disposition of motives, resolving free will, which God's free grace only appointeth. And the question is evidently the same, if, as one ingredient into the disposition of each man's salvation or damnation, it be demanded, why God suffered man to fall from the state of innocence, but procureth that the preaching of the Gospel arrive at the knowledge of some people, and not of others. For if, supposing sufficient helps of grace, the reason whereby they become effectual is nevertheless resolved into the immediate disposition of God; then, though we consider man as not fallen from the state of innocence, and resolve the reason, why God should bring him into that estate in which He foresaw that he would fall (intending to propagate his kind under the condition of this lapsed estate), we have recourse to no other reason than that which St. Paul employed before us.

[Supralapsarian error.]

§ 8. Where we may see the fault, which hath been committed by them, who, to attain the end of His glory by the

r "Non parum quoque variant in Schola Reformata Theologorum sententiæ circa quæstionem illam, sub qua ratione et *αχέρεα* homo sit objectum Divinæ prædestinationis. Primo enim nonnulli in assignando objecto prædestinationis atque electionis, supra lapsum hominis, imo supra ipsam hominis creationem ascendunt. Etenim decretum prædestinationis certorum quorundam hominum ad salutem in Deo, secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, prius fuisse volunt, non solum prævisione lapsus hominis in peccatum, sed ipso quoque decreto de homine creando. Ac proinde objectum præ-

destinationis ipsis est homo non conditus et lapsus in Dei præscientia; sed potius homo creabilis. Unde est quod ab aliis Theologis *supralapsarii* vocantur. Quo de numero sunt Zanchius, Beza, Piscator, Perkinsus, Ursinus, Gomarus, Polanus, Voetius, Twissus, et alii non pauci." Le Blanc, *Theol. Thes. De Æterna Hominum Electione et Prædestinatione*, P. i. § xxii. pp. 129, 130.—" 'Decretum prædestinationis,' inquit (Bucanus), 'est quo Deus homines a Se creando, antequam eos conderet, jam tum quorsum eos conderet constituens, sic Ipsius gloriæ inservire pro Suo jure et mera volun-

absolute salvation of some and damnation of others, no other-ways qualified than as such persons, have made the object of God's predestination to be mankind, not made but to be made; the purpose of making mankind being the next means subordinate to the attaining of that end, which the first decree proposed to God. For besides that this engages God to procure the fall of man, and the sins in which the reprobate finally persevere, no otherwise than the grace in which the elect depart; it makes God to predestinate only a number, and to reprobate the same: there being no other consideration possible to be had upon those, that are supposed not to be as yet, but only that they may be so many as God shall appoint of either kind. So that the glory of God, according to this monstrous imagination, shall consist only in saving such a number, and in damning such an other, rather than one more or one less of either sort.

§ 9. Neither is this inconvenience cured by the position of those that have been called *Sublapsarians*<sup>s</sup>, by as monstrous

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[And Sublapsarian.]

tate decrevit, ut eorum alii essent vasa et exempla Ipsius bonitatis et misericordiae, alii autem vasa Ipsius irae, id est, justae in scelera ultionis, atque potentiae' (Loco 36. quæst. 8). Eadem quoque est doctrina Bezae, qui, in Brevi Explicatione totius Christianismi, decretum prædestinationis in eo constituit, quod Deus homines, ut reliqua omnia, ad gloriam Suam decrevit creare, sed duobus modis penitus diversis: ita, nempe, ut alios, quos Sibi visum fuerit, pro arcana Sua voluntate, faciat per misericordiam gloriae Suae participes, in alteris vero, quod item placuerit in eum usum suscitare, iram ac potentiam Suam ostendat, ut in ipsis quoque glorificetur (Cap. 2. de Prædestin. Aphorism. 2). Et capite quinto, Aphorismo primo, repetit, Dominum idcirco reprobos creavisse, ut in eorum justa condemnatione glorificetur. Porro ad eandem sententiam accedunt Gomarus, Piscator, Twissus, et Voetius. Adeoque illam tenent et profitentur quicunque inter Reformatos vocantur *Supralapsarii*.' Id., *ibid.*, *Thes. De Reprob. Natura, &c.*, P. i. § iv.-vi. p. 142.

<sup>s</sup> "Veruntamen maxima pars doctorum Scholæ Reformatæ Deo prædestinanti objectum fuisse volunt massam peccato corruptam, nec decretum de

homine creando et de primo lapsu hominis permittendo ingredi volunt decretum totale prædestinationis et partem illius facere. Sed ex eorum sententia, in Deo, secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, prius extitit lapsus hominis prævisio, quam de misericordia in salute quorundam hominum exerenda atque manifestanda: quod in Theologis vocatur electio seu prædestinatio. Ac proinde, juxta ipsos, objectum electionis et prædestinationis est homo lapsus et peccato corruptus: neque in eo describendo atque definiendo supra hominis lapsum et creationem assurgere debemus. Atque hæc sententia maxime conformis est canonibus Synodi Dordracenæ, illamque sequuntur longe plurimi Reformatorum." *Le Blanc, ibid.*, *Thes. de Æterna Homin. Elect. &c.*, § xxiii. p. 130.—"Major pars doctorum Ecclesiæ Reformatæ non censet decretum de homine creando, et de permittendo lapsu primi hominis, adeoque totius humani generis ruina inde consecuta, partem facere reprobationis. Totum enim decretum reprobationis revocant ad voluntatem illam, quo Deus statuit certos quosdam homines non eligere, sed eos in peccatis propriis relinquere, et tandem propter eorum peccata juste damnare. Hæc fuit sententia Synodi Dordracenæ, . . capite



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a name as the other of Supralapsarians: that God, seeing mankind lapsed from the state of innocence, resolving to save so many of them, and to damn so many, provided to send our Lord Christ with effectual means to save these, leaving those (unprovided of sufficient means) to find their own ruin. For so long as those, that are appointed to be saved and to be damned, are qualified no otherwise than as men found in the common case of man's fall, the glory of God is made to consist in damning so many of them and saving so many, rather than one more or one less. For the original corruption in which we are born, though it renders the first Adam unrecoverable without the Second, yet it leaves every man, in every instance, undetermined to evil, till by his own choice of evil before good, and the habit which accrues by custom, his natural inclination to it become so determined, that his choice determines without deliberating any more. But suppose so many absolutely appointed to life, and so many to death, in this estate; you suppose them respectively determined (though not, in particular, what good or what evil they shall do, yet in general) to sin and to die in sin, or, on the other side, to attain the state of grace and to die in it: unless we think, that, God being God, the absolute appointment of His providence can be defeated. Whereas, in making God determine to save and to damn those, who are qualified for each according to the Gospel, but to give effectual means of being so qualified to the one, which out of His freedom He refuses the others, granting them what He deems to be sufficient; we make the glory of God visible here in the one point, not disparaging it, if, in the other, it be for the present acknowledged (with St. Paul) to be invisible.

§ 10. For if there were any other religion in the world, which could pretend, maintaining the differences between good and bad, the providence of God in all things, and the <sup>218</sup> reward of good and bad in another world, to give further reason of the coming in and continuance of evil in the world; there might be some pretence of prejudice to the privilege which Christianity claimeth in maintaining those principles, from the inability of declaring the reasons, by which God

de Divina Prædestinatione, articulo xv." Id., *ibid.*, Thes. de Reprob. Natura &c., § vii., viii. p. 142.—See also Burnett, On the XXXIX Articles, Art. 17.

dispenseth the means of His effectual grace. But there never was any other religion in the world, that could pretend any such thing. C H A P.  
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§ 11. The Greekish philosophers (who were the divines of the Gentiles), some of them openly professed necessity and fate, as the Stoic<sup>t</sup>; thereby destroying freedom and contingency, by the consequence religion, and all difference between good and bad; much more the truth of Christianity, consisting in a treaty for embracing good and rejecting bad. Others, supposing this, either renounced providence (and by consequence the being of God), as Epicurus<sup>u</sup> and his predecessors and followers; or at least doubted of it, in which mire it is more than probable that our master Aristotle<sup>x</sup> sticks. If, with Plato and Pythagoras<sup>y</sup>, we suppose them clearly to acknowledge all this; yet is there a way left (either by making the material cause co-existent with God from everlasting, with Plato, or by presupposing those contrarieties of good and evil, which Pythagoras, imagining to have been from everlasting, made by consequence<sup>z</sup> the principles of all that comes to pass in the world) to advance some other cause of good and evil in this world than man's will under God's providence.

§ 12. And it is very remarkable, that Epiphanius<sup>a</sup> observes, all the sects of the Gnostics (whereof he, of all others, hath given us the most particulars) proceeded upon a pretence of giving a reason for the coming in of evil into the world: to wit, by setting up two principles or gods, one the fountain of evil, the other, of good. Which, together with the express testimonies of divers others of the fathers<sup>b</sup>, witnessing that they had their principles from the Greekish philosophers, seems to argue, that they took their rise from

<sup>t</sup> Seneca, De Provid., c. 5.—Chryssippus ap. Aul. Gell., vi. 2.—And see Lipsius, De Physiol. Stoicor., lib. i. Diss. xii.; Op., tom. i. p. 830.

<sup>u</sup> Lucret., ii. 1089, sq.—Cic., De Nat. Deor., i. 2.—&c.

<sup>x</sup> See Mosheim, In Cudworth. Systema Intellectuale, tom. i. c. iv. § xxiv. note 21; p. 500. fol. edition.

<sup>y</sup> See Brucker, Hist. Philos., Period. I. P. ii. lib. ii. c. 10. § 15.

<sup>z</sup> Corrected in MS. into, "imagined

to have been from everlasting, and by consequence."

<sup>a</sup> "Ἐσχέ δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς τῆς κακῆς προφάσεως τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ζητεῖν καὶ λέγειν πῶθεν τὸ κακόν." Epirh., Adv. Hær., lib. i. tom. ii. Hær. 24. § 6; Op., tom. i. p. 72. C.

<sup>b</sup> See the authorities on different sides of this question cited in Burton's Bampton Lectures, note 7. pp. 263—268.

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a pretence of rendering an account of the beginning of evil as well as of good ; intimating thereby, that Christianity did not sufficiently perform it, as not pretending all to be declared till the general judgment. And this is the case of Marcionists<sup>c</sup> and Manichees<sup>d</sup>.

[Jews and Mahometans.]

§ 13. For as for Jews and Mahometans, I suppose there is no man so little read in the difference between them and Christians, as to conceive, that they can give account of God's providence in the evil which He maintaineth to be in the world (together with the means, by which some come to life, others to death), if Christians by their profession cannot do it. Nor is it to be doubted, that the dispute about free will and providence (and consequently predestination, so far as the world to come is acknowledged) hath been and in part remains alive, as well among Gentiles, Jews, and Mahometans, as we see it is among Christians.

§ 14. So that we may justly infer, that—seeing no other religion, either antecedent to Christianity, or that hath come after it, can pretend that satisfaction to this dispute, which Christianity giveth by the coming in of sin upon the fall of Adam,—that it is no disparagement to it, not to be able to declare the reason of God's proceeding with particular persons in dispensing to them the means of effectual grace ; when it remains manifest, both that Christianity goes further in declaring the same than any other religion can do, and, that there may be justly those reasons reserved to God, which He (notwithstanding the grace which He publishes by Christ) findeth no cause to declare.

That our endeavours are engaged no less than if predestination were not, [the Gospel] determineth.

§ 15. The answer, then, to the objection, consists in this ; that, as it is not necessary for the maintenance of Christianity to give account why God disposeth of His effectual grace as He doth, so is there no opinion able to reconcile it to the freedom of man's will, within the bounds of Christianity, but that which maketh predestination to glory conditional, to grace, absolute. It may be the reader's lot, as it hath been mine, to hear an objection cast forth ; that, if God's predestination be unmoveable, it is vain for Christians

<sup>c</sup> Epiph., Adv. Hær., lib. i. tom. iii. Hær. 42. § 3 ; Op., tom. i. pp. 303. D. 304. A.

<sup>d</sup> Id., *ibid.*, lib. ii. tom. ii. Hær. 66. § 14 ; *ibid.*, p. 630. A.

to endeavour to live as Christians: and the answer so insufficient, as to leave more offence in his mind, than before it was made: according to that which is sometimes said, that unskilful conjurors sometimes raise a devil, whom they cannot lay again. For, certainly, it serves not the turn to say, that God, as He hath appointed the end, so hath appointed the means. For it is the secret will of God, which is always effectual, that appoints the end. But His revealed will, that appoints the means by commanding, comes not always to effect. And therefore, if God have absolutely appointed the end, he that knows not whether He hath appointed it or not, can have no reason to go about the means, till he know it as absolutely appointed as the end is. Nor serves it the turn to add, and to say further; that God, as He appointeth the end, so He appointeth also the means, to be freely employed by man for the attaining it: which the opinion of predetermination may say. For all the encouragement this can give a man to employ his freedom to any purpose, is; that, if God determine him, he shall freely employ it, if not, he shall freely not employ it, to that purpose: which is to say, in English, that his freedom (being called freedom, but is not) cannot be employed by him, that is encouraged to employ it. And therefore it is reasonable for him to say, I shall freely do so if God hath appointed it, and freely not do so if He have not appointed it. If it be said further, and that according to my opinion, that no event is determined by God, but supposing man's free will, and foreseeing what choice it will make upon the considerations which a man is outwardly or inwardly moved with; neither will this be enough to move a reasonable man's endeavours, supposing himself absolutely predestinated to life or to death before. For that life and death, being absolutely appointed, becomes God's end (though subordinate to a further end of His glory), and not only the end of the means which He provideth for it; a thing no less destructive to the supreme majesty of God than to that which I said afore. For that which God absolutely desireth, that He engageth His supreme majesty to execute and bring to effect; unless it can be thought, that a sovereign can be sovereign, and not stand obliged, and make it his interest, that no design of his be defeated. Which if

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God do, what availeth it the creature, that the will thereof is free, and the effects of that will are not determined but by the free choice thereof; whenas, being the will of a creature, and necessarily proceeding; upon consideration of those objects which providence inwardly or outwardly presenteth it with, it is, by a former act of that providence, determined to that, which may and must be the means of producing that end, which God had designed afore. And, upon these terms, providence will stand engaged (not to permit but) to procure the sins, upon which the sentence of eternal death, as the good works, upon which the sentence of eternal life, proceedeth. And he who knows, that whatsoever he doth, though never so freely, shall certainly bring him at length to that estate, which God had appointed for him before He considered what he would or would not do; what reason can he have to employ the endeavours of his will to do what God commandeth, for the obtaining or avoiding of that, which He hath appointed before any consideration of his endeavours? But absolute predestination to the first helps, that effectually bring a man to the state of grace, produceth not the like consequence. For as, supposing good and bad in the world, and that the Gospel is refused by some and embraced by others, it is merely the work of providence, that a man is born under the obligation of it or not, and cannot be imputed to any act of his own; so, he that supposeth, that God hath not appointed him to life or to death but in consideration of his own doings, shall no less stand obliged to follow those sufficient reasons of well doing, which God's Spirit by the preaching of the Gospel meets him with, than if it did not lie in the work of providence to make them effectual or not.

§ 16. As for all the rest of every man's life, that falls between the time that he is sufficiently convinced that he ought to live and die a good Christian, and that state of grace or of sin in which he deceaseth; it is evident, that the helps of grace are dispensed all along upon that reason of reward or punishment, which the covenant of grace establisheth. For, seeing the Holy Ghost is promised, to assist all Christians in 220 the performing of that which they undertake by their baptism, it cannot be imagined, that God should destitute any Christian of helps requisite to the fulfilling of his Christianity,



whose profession was not counterfeit from the beginning (that is, not so real as it should have been), until he fail of complying with the motions of it. C H A P.  
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§ 17. There is indeed some difference of opinion, according to which a difference will arise in the terms, by which we express ourselves in this business. There be those in the Church of Rome, who hold, that a Christian, once settled in the state of grace, may by God's ordinary grace here live without even venial sin till death<sup>e</sup>. Supposing this done, the helps of grace, which God assisteth such a man with, are the effects of His justice, which consisteth in keeping promise; though originally the effects of mere grace, because it was mere grace that moved Him to make that promise. Those that hold absolute predestination to life or to death, and justifying faith to be nothing but the revelation of a man's predestination to life, can no more allow, that such a one may fall from the state of grace, than that God's promise can fail, or Christ's death be to no purpose: so that not only the sins which they do are to them occasion of good (as St. Paul saith, that "all things co-operate for good to them that love God," Rom. viii. 28), but the permission (which in that opinion is the procuring) of them is an effect of their predestination to life. According to this opinion, also, the helps of grace are the effects of that justice which consisteth in keeping, as well as of that grace which was seen in making, God's promise: though the condition of that promise be cleared, in this opinion, at the first instant that a man believeth; in the other, not till the last instant that he liveth.

§ 18. Though I have already laid aside both the suppositions upon which this opinion standeth<sup>f</sup>, yet I suppose it not refuted as yet; because there must be a time on purpose to consider the arguments, which it pretendeth<sup>g</sup>. But

<sup>e</sup> See below, in c. xxxii. § 9, the quotation from Andreas Vega. Bellarmine however holds, that, "Nullus, nisi per gratiam renovetur, peccata omnia mortalitatis vitare potest; venialia vero ne renovati quidem possunt, nisi privilegio singulari" (Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. vi. c. 10; Controv., tom. iii. p. 491. A); and, "Non dicit Gregorius, omnia bona opera nostra esse impura, sed non omnia posse esse pura, quia fieri non potest ut non

aliquando subrepat aliquid quo bona aliqua opera vitentur" (Id., De Justificat., lib. iv. c. 21; *ibid.*, p. 1240. D). And see the authorities to a similar effect cited by Le Blanc, *Theol. Theol.*, *Theol. An et Quatenus Homo per Christi gratiam legem implere possit*, § xl.—xlix. pp. 567—569; and *Theol. De Veritat. Bonor. Operum, &c.*, § xxxvi.—xlii. pp. 577—579.

<sup>f</sup> Above, § 1; and c. vii. § 7.

<sup>g</sup> Below, c. xxxi. § 1, sq.

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because one of the contradictions which it involveth, is this, that, making justification to consist in remission of sins, it alloweth the regenerate to become guilty of sin, and yet maintaineth him justified at the same time; another contradiction that it involveth, must needs be this, that the helps of grace requisite to the saving of him that is justified (which, as I said afore, according to this opinion, are due to the elect by the justice of God's promise), are granted of mere grace, to the justifying of him, who, being justified, is notwithstanding acknowledged to need remission of sin. For to tie God by promise to help any man out of sin, as often as he shall please to fall back into sin (who, of grace, may always freely do it), is to make the Gospel a passport for sin. And therefore, notwithstanding this opinion, I shall not let to presume here (before I have spoken to it), that the helps of grace requisite to the recovering of him that is fallen from the state of grace, come not by the virtue of the promise, wherein the covenant of grace consisteth (the right whereof is forfeited in that case), but by virtue of that mere grace which first moved God to tender it, though in consideration of the merits and suffering of our Lord Christ which purchased it. Whereupon, the truth is, that the helps of grace that are requisite to maintain them in the state of grace, which have attained it, are due by that justice of God, which consisteth in keeping promise. And though God's clear dealing with man requires, that from the first hearing of the covenant of grace (that is, from the first preaching of the Gospel, or from the first calling of him that is fallen from the state of grace) a man be enabled to embrace that which is tendered; yet, that he shall effectually embrace it, will always remain the effect of mere grace.

§ 19. So, the gifts of nature, and the death of Christ for mankind, are provided by God for the salvation of all, not as God's end but as the end of the said means which He provideth. But that, by providing the death of Christ for the salvation of mankind, He obligeth Himself to grant them, who never heard of Christ, inspirations and revelations, convicting them that they are to be Christians, as He obligeth the Church to cause them to hear of Christ, I grant not (though I find it not to be prejudicial to the faith): because

221 then must all men be judged by the Gospel of Christ, reason being shewed, that they, to whom it is not preached, shall be judged by the law of nature. And upon these terms St. Paul may [allow<sup>h</sup>] the demand, why God should complain, seeing no man can resist His will, but He may make whomsoever He shall please a good Christian [; and that his Gospel hath no answer for it<sup>i</sup>]. But God to have absolutely appointed all men to life or to death, and so to be engaged by the interest of His sovereign majesty, not to see His design defeated, but to provide the means by which He designeth to bring His appointment to pass; [St. Paul's Gospel will not allow,<sup>k</sup>] and his Gospel to have no answer for it. And therefore the comparison of the potter, that follows, though it hold thus far, that God indeed makes the vessels, that come to honour and shame in the world to come by the government of Him that made them, yet it holdeth not in this, that God's glory is interested to procure them to be saved that shall be saved, and them damned that shall be damned; as it concerneth the potter's trade to be furnished, as well with vessels for dishonourable, as for honourable uses. Nor will the instance of Pharaoh bear it, according to St. Paul's words. For had God spared Pharaoh's life out of a design to bring him to those torments, which his obstinacy in refusing the plagues that succeeded should deserve; He could not be said to "bear with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath that are fit to be destroyed," though intending at length to "shew wrath, and make His power known." The decree, then, of predestination, proceeding partly upon the terms of the Gospel, but in those things to which the Gospel extendeth not, and in those men that shall be judged by the law of nature, upon the sovereignty of God (the reasons whereof either we cannot understand, or God will not declare), containeth all the decrees, that order the motives, upon which God foresees a man will embrace and persevere in his Christianity to the end; or not persevere to the end, whether he embrace it or not; or, finally, not so much as hearing of it, will resolve for the better or for the worse from the beginning of his life to

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<sup>h</sup> Corrected from MS. "reject," in orig. text.

<sup>i</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>k</sup> Corrected from MS. "St. Paul might allow the demand," in orig. text.

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the end of it; which our understanding necessarily distinguisheth by the objects which they bring to pass. The order of them is the same with the reasons, which the Scripture enableth us to give, for the effects which they produce, either in the nature of the final or meritorious cause: speaking only of that which comes from God's declared will, not from His secret pleasure; which, as it always verieth His declared will, so extends to that which the other compriseth not. And it is as easy to comprise in the same decree (which is the pure Essence of God, willing to glorify Itself by doing that, which It might have glorified Itself by doing otherwise) the order of the reasons, upon which all mankind comes to that estate in which they shall continue everlastingly in the world to come. Seeing, then, all the effects of it fall not under God's revealed will, there can be no reason given for the whole decree, whether respective to any man, or to mankind. Seeing there is a reason to be given for all that fall under the same, in the nature of the final or the meritorious cause; God stands as much glorified, man as much obliged to work out his salvation with fear and trembling, as if he knew the bottom of God's secret counsel. And thus the objection is void.

[Phil. ii.  
12.]

Of the  
tradition of  
the Church.

§ 20. It remaineth, that we consider the tradition of the Church, and what it declareth concerning the truth of that which I have resolved, or towards it. Where we must take notice of the monks of Adrymetus under Valentine<sup>1</sup>: who received St. Augustin's doctrine of God's effectual grace, and predestination to it from everlasting, in such a sense, that they inferred from it all endeavours of men, all exhortations, reproofs, instructions, and prayers, to be utterly fruitless and vain; as tending to that which dependeth upon the mere appointment of God, which cannot be defeated, and without

<sup>1</sup> "Propter eos, qui cum defenditur Dei gratia, putantes negari liberum arbitrium, sic ipsi defendunt liberum arbitrium ut negent Dei gratiam, asserentes eam propter merita nostra dari, scripsi librum, cujus titulus est, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. Ad eos autem scripsi monachos Adrumetinos in quorum monasterio de hac re cœperat esse contentio, ita ut me consulere

aliqui eorum cogerentur." S. Aug., *Retract.*, lib. ii. c. 66; *Op.*, tom. i. p. 64. A.—"Rursus ad eosdem scripsi alterum librum, quem De Correctione et Gratia prænotavi, cum mihi nunciatum esset, dixisse ibi quemdam, neminem corripiendum, si Dei præcepta non facit, sed pro illo ut faciat, tantummodo orandum." *Id.*, *ibid.*, c. 67; *ibid.* B.

which nothing can serve. To rectify this mistake, St. Augustin lived to write them his book yet extant *De Correptione et Gratia*; wherein he declareth all that he had said, of the grace of God, and the efficacy thereof, to proceed upon supposition of free will in man, though enslaved to sin by the fall of Adam, from the bondage whereof the grace of Christ, voluntarily though effectually, redcemeth those that are freed by it<sup>m</sup>. Whereby (as by the rest of his writings concerning 222 the grace of Christ against Pelagius) he establisheth two points, belonging to the foundation of the Christian faith: the first, of the freedom of man's will, though not from sin, since the fall of Adam, yet from necessity determining the resolution of it, when by the treaty, which the Gospel advanceth, it is invited to embrace Christianity and to live according to it; which were all a mere nullity, were not any man free to resolve himself upon it; the second, of the grace of God by Christ, which if it may be purchased by the endeavour of man's free will, then was it not necessary to send our Lord Christ, as the second Adam, to repair the breach which the first Adam had made: this being the sum of the Catholic faith in this matter, and the rest, which is advanced to shew how those two points both stand true together, belonging to the skill of a divine, not to the faith of a Christian, so far as, by maintaining them, men destroy the foundation of Christianity on neither side.

§ 21. Which, it is no marvel, that some things which St. Augustin had said in giving a reason hereof, seemed to some to do; seeing those, that accepted of his doctrine in Afric, drew from it a consequence utterly destructive to Christianity. I speak of those in the parts of France about Provence and Marseilles; who, inferring from St. Augustin's saying, that in his opinion God makes the far greater part of men on purpose to condemn them to death, seemed to maintain the beginning of salvation to come from those endeavours of

Of Semi-Pelagians.

<sup>m</sup> "Liberum itaque arbitrium et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum confitendum est nos habere; sed in malo faciendo liber est quisque justitiæ servusque peccati; in bono autem liber esse nullus potest, nisi fuerit liberatus ab Eo Qui dixit, 'Si vos Filii liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis.' Nec ita ut, cum quisque fuerit

a peccati dominatione liberatus, jam non indigeat sui Liberatoris auxilio; sed ita potius, ut ab Illo audiens, 'Sine Me nihil potestis facere,' dicat Ei et ipse, 'Adjutor meus esto, ne derelinquas me.'" Id., *De Corrupt. et Gratia*, c. i. § 2; *Op.*, tom. x. p. 751. B, C. And see the tract at length.



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man's will, born as he is under original sin, which God faileth not to second with those helps of grace which the matter requireth<sup>n</sup>. There is great appearance of that which Jansenius disputeth so eagerly, *De Hæresi Pelag.* [lib.] vii. [c.] 5. et sq.<sup>o</sup>; that the main ground of their opposition was the decree of predestination, which St. Augustin would have to be absolute: as being persuaded, that thereby the effects of free will become fatal, in which that reason of reward and punishment, which the covenant of grace establisheth, requires contingence.

[Faustus.] § 22. And herewith the occasion, which Faustus pretendeth for the writing of his book *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*<sup>p</sup>, agreeth: to wit, that a certain priest called Luci-

<sup>n</sup> See above, c. xix. § 22. notes o to s.

<sup>o</sup> "Tota causa erroris Semi-Pelagiani fuit illud propositum Divinæ vocationis et prædestinationis, quo salvandi a perituris discernuntur secundum Augustinum." Jansen., August., tom. i. De Hær. Pelag., lib. vii. tit. of c. 5. p. 173. b.—"Ut error Massiliensium radicitus intelligatur, operæ pretium est indagare, quid illud tam insolens fuerit in doctrina Divi Augustini, ut, illius declinandis studio, Catholici et 'egregii in omni virtutum studio viri,' per novi erroris commentum tantas tragædias excitaverint. . . Ut igitur breviter id quod res est dicam, nihil aliud eos in scriptis Augustini offendit, quam illud propositum voluntatis Dei, quo certus numerus salvandorum, reliquis pereuntibus, a perditionis massa discernitur. Ex quo proinde juxta doctrinam ejus fit, ut quotquot ita Divinæ gratiæ largitate discreti et secundum propositum illud vocati sunt, infallibilis gubernationis lege 'procuretur eis audiendum Evangelium et cum audiant credant,'" &c.: "quotquot non ita discreti atque vocati sunt, certissime pereant: tota denique salvandorum a perituris differentia, quam vel in hoc vel in futuro sæculo cernimus vel non cernimus, in constitutionem Dei prævenientem voluntates hominum, hoc est, in unicum Divinæ voluntatis cardinem refundatur." Id., ibid. c. 5. pp. 173. b, 174. a.—The same proposition is maintained from the letter of Hilary, in c. 6; and from the writings of Faustus, in c. 7: ibid. pp. 174. b.—176. b.

<sup>p</sup> "Domino beatissimo ac reveren-

dissimo Leontio Papæ, Faustus. Quod pro solitudine pastoralis, beate Papæ Leonti, in condemnando prædestinationis errore concilium summorum antistitum congregastis, universis Galliarum Ecclesiis præstitistis. Quod vero ad ordinanda ea quæ collatione publica doctissime protulistis, operam infirmis humeris curamque mandastis, parum ut reor tanto negotio, parum sanctæ estimationi vestræ consulistis," &c. Faustus, Prolog. ad libb. de Grat. Dei et Hum. Mentis Arbitrio (ap. Bibl. PP. tom. v. P. iii. p. 502. G): adding at the end (ibid. p. 503. A), "In quo quidem opusculo, post Arelatensis Concilii subscriptionem, novis erroribus deprehensis, adjici aliqua synodus Lugdunensis exegit."—See also the Epistle of Faustus, "ad Lucidum Presbyterum e secta Prædestinatorum, . . a multis Episcopis et a Lucido ipso subscripta;" and the "Libellus ad Episcopos Lucidi Presbyteri errorem emendantis;" prefixed to the Council of Arles (A.D. 475), ap. Labb. Concil., tom. iv. pp. 1042. C—1045. D.—"Anathema illi, qui hominem cum fidei confessione solenniter baptizatum, et asserentem Catholicam fidem, et postmodum per diversam hujus mundi oblectamenta prolapsam, in Adam et originale peccatum perisse asseruerit. Item anathema illi, qui per Dei præscientiam in mortem deprimi hominem dixerit. . . Item anathema illi, qui dixerit, quod Christus non pro omnibus mortuus sit, nec omnes homines salvos esse velit." Articles 2. 3. and 6. of those condemned in the Epistle of Faustus above quoted (ap. Labb., ibid. p. 1043. A, B).

dus is required by him, in the name of a synod held at Arles under Leontius, bishop, to recant certain positions tending to maintain the necessity of being damned for original sin, by the foreknowledge of God, in them for whom Christ died not, dying only for [some<sup>a</sup>]; and this, by a letter subscribed by some of the bishops. This recantation being made, Faustus pretendeth to write, at the entreaty of the synod, to lay forth their sense and reasons; but to have added something upon the decree of another synod, held afterwards at Lyons. True it is indeed, which Vossius observeth (*Hist. Pelag.* [lib.] vi. Thesi. 14<sup>r</sup>); that, whereas some of them insisted on nothing else, others proceeded to deny the necessity of preventing grace. For whatsoever we say of Cassian, who hath writ to several purposes in several places<sup>a</sup>; Faustus manifestly affirmeth, that, by the act of free will in beginning to believe, a Christian obtains the grace of God, which his own choice preventeth<sup>t</sup>. Which, if we understand the faith which he speaketh of to signify Christianity, and the act of believing to consist in becoming a Christian, is nothing else but the fundamental faith of Christianity; that the habitual gift of the Holy Ghost is granted in consideration of a man's turning Christian. But, who believes, that the actual grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby the world is converted to be (as well as convicted that it ought to be) Christian, is obtained by the exaltation, as purchased by the humiliation, of Christ (which Faustus, supposing the preaching of the Gospel, being the means which it useth, no way denieth), acknowledgeth by consequence that act of faith, which preventeth the habitual gift of the Holy Ghost, to be prevented by the actual helps of grace, which the preaching of the Gospel importeth. And Jansenius (*De Hæresi Pelag.* [lib.] viii. [cc.] 1—9<sup>u</sup>) acknowledgeth, that they had no

<sup>a</sup> Corrected from MS. "sin," in orig. text.

<sup>r</sup> Subjicit nunc (Prosper), *quosdam* eorum prope adeo ad Pelagium accedere, ut ad Dei cognitionem et sanationis desiderium non alia nos gratia a Deo dicant præveniri, quam naturæ nostræ insita, per cujus usum rectum nos regenerationis gratiam censeant promereri. Ubi cum *quosdam* ita sensisse ait, non obscure significat fuisse item alios, qui licet præfinitionis dogma

respuerent, non tamen prævenientem gratiam negarent. Imo cum *quosdam* dicit, hoc amplius colligere licet, si non multis partibus plures, saltem nec numero fuisse pauciores, qui gratiam prævenientem agnoscentes solum absolutæ prædestinationis dogma impugnant." Voss., *Hist. Pelag.*, lib. vi. thes. 14; *Op.*, tom. vi. p. 758. a. <sup>1</sup>

<sup>s</sup> See above, c. xix. § 23. notes z, a.

<sup>t</sup> See above, *ibid.*, notes b—e.

<sup>u</sup> "Ex his quæ hactenus disserui-

design to destroy the grace of God through Christ, as Pelagius had; and therefore did acknowledge, not only the outward preaching of the Gospel, but inward inspiration to make it effectual: only that, making the effect of that grace which God appointeth, to depend on free will, they fell into the heresy of Pelagius, which they desired to avoid.

[Pelagius.]

§ 23. Now Pelagius, indeed, acknowledged that grace,<sup>223</sup> which the preaching of the Gospel signified<sup>x</sup>, according to his own opinion, which was false. For, not believing that our will is any thing the worse for Adam's fall, he could not allow, that Christ hath purchased any help to repair the breach, and to cure the disease which he had made. But as he could not deny it to be an act of bounty in God, to propose the reward of everlasting life, which is supernatural; so he must affirm, that it is purchased by the mere natural act of free will, without any help of grace, granted of God's mercy in Christ, in consideration of His obedience. And by this means he brought the death of Christ to no effect; seeing God might have assured the tender of His Gospel to come indeed from Him, without it. And so the merit of grace (that is, the reason that obliges God to give it) is originally ascribed to the works of free will, according to Pelagius<sup>y</sup>: but according to those, who, acknowledging original sin, acknowledge the cure of it by the help of grace purchased

mus, facile intelligere quilibet potest, longe aliam fuisse Massiliensibus quam Pelagio . . . intentionem. Siquidem nihil aliud ex professo Pelagiani studuerunt, quam, sublata funditus Christi Salvatoris fide, puram putamque philo-sophiam in Ecclesiam cum gentibus introducere, ut cum philosophis hujus mundi natura hominis illæsa putaretur, 'beatamque vitam virtute propriæ voluntatis efficere.' Massilienses contra, tamquam Catholicæ fidei sectatores, Christum naturæ perditæ Salvatorem omnibus modis sibi retinendum esse duxerunt, tuendamque gratiam Ejus. . . Sed cum istud prædestinationis et electionis propositum, quo quidam pro solo Dei beneplacito, nulla prorsus habita consideratione voluntatis, a perditionis massa quam peccatum fecerat, aliis in eadem causa prætermis-sis, discerni debere dicebantur, et consequenter omnes voluntatis actus, quibus ex illa massa perditionis eripi-

untur, a prima credendi voluntate usque ad ipsam gloriæ coronam accipere, durissimum ipsis esse ac desperationis causa videretur, adeoque Catholicæ veritati et antiquiori Patrum sensui repugnare, aliam viam salva Dei gratia et prædestinatione sibi aperiendam esse duxerunt." Jansen., August., tom. i. De Hær. Pelag., lib. viii. c. 1. pp. 187. a.—188. b.—"Prima gratia generalis Massiliensium est doctrina et Evangelii prædicatio." Id., ibid. tit. of c. iv.; p. 190. b.—"Secunda gratia generalis, reliquæ quædam primæ integritatis." Id., ibid. tit. of c. v. p. 191. b.—"Tertia gratia generalis est actualis interna et sufficiens ad credendum non ad operandum." Id., ibid. tit. of c. vi. p. 192. b.—&c. &c.

<sup>x</sup> See above, c. x. § 2; and Voss., Hist. Pelag., lib. iii. P. ii. Thes. i.; Op., tom. vi. pp. 650, sq.

<sup>y</sup> See Voss., ibid., Thes. xi., xii.; ibid., pp. 669, sq.

by Christ, which the preaching of the Gospel bringeth; not to the intrinsical value of the works, which free will alone doth, but to the promise annexed by God to the works, which free will by the help of grace purchased by Christ produceth. It was no marvel indeed, that they, who had overseen the actual helps of grace, should ascribe the merit of habitual grace (so the language of that time spoke) to the act of free will in beginning to believe (that is, to be a Christian); as not depending upon that operation of grace, which themselves supposed, though they oversaw it. But it were ridiculous to think, that he, who by the preaching of the Gospel, and the reasons which it setteth forth why men are to be Christians, is effectually moved to become a Christian, is not to impute his being so to that grace, which preventeth him with those reasons. How much more, when those reasons are acknowledged to be the instrument, whereby the Holy Ghost worketh a man's conversion at the first, or his perseverance at the last, is it necessary to impute it to the grace of Christ; that is, to those helps, which God in regard to Christ's death preventeth us with? Surely, should grace immediately determine the will to it, the effects that should be imputable to grace would be the same, neither the covenant of grace nor the experience of common sense remaining the same; which will not allow such a change in a man's life, as becoming a good Christian of an enemy to Christ's cross, to succeed, without an express change in the will, upon reasons convincing the judgment, that this world is to be set behind the world to come.

§ 24. It is now to be acknowledged, that St. Augustin, writing against these men's positions, as they were related to him by the letters of Prosper and Hilary, his books (now extant) *De Prædestinatione Sanctorum et De Dono Perseverantiæ*<sup>2</sup>, hath determined the reason, why one man is con-

CHAP.  
XXVI.

[St. Augustin, Cælestinus, the second Council of Orange.]

<sup>2</sup> See the Epistles to S. Augustin, of Prosper ("de reliquiis Pelagianæ hæreseos in Gallia sobolescentibus, deque hujusmodi hominum querelis adversus Prædestinationis et Gratiaæ doctrinam superioribus ipsius Augustini opusculis, præsertim libro de Correctione et Gratia, explicatam"), and of Hilary (on the same subject), prefixed to S. Aug., *De Prædestinatione Sancto-*

*rum* and *De Dono Perseverantiæ*; Op., tom. x. pp. 779—788.—"Ex duobus itaque parvulis originali peccato pariter obstrictis, cur iste assumatur, ille relinquatur; et ex duobus ætate jam grandibus impiis, cur iste ita vocetur, ut vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur, aut non ita vocetur; insertabilia sunt judicia Dei. Ex duobus autem piis, cur huic donetur perseve-



BOOK II. II. verted and persevereth unto death, another not, to consist in nothing, that can resolve into any act of man's will, but ends in God's free appointment: that Pope Celestinus<sup>a</sup>, writing to the Bishops of Gaul, upon the solicitation of the same Prosper and Hilary, in recommendation of St. Augustin's doctrine, then so much questioned in those parts, determines not only the sufficiency, but the efficacy, of the means of grace to come from God's grace: that the second council of Orange<sup>b</sup>, determining the same in divers particulars, concerning the conversion of man to become a true Christian, concerning his perseverance to the end in that estate, hath only determined, that by the help and assistance of Christ, and the grace received in baptism, a Christian may, if he will faithfully labour, fulfil whatsoever his salvation requireth. Is there any thing in all this to signify, that a man's will, before he determine, is determined by God to embrace Christianity, and persevere in it to the end, or not? that every man is determined to everlasting glory or pain without consideration of those deeds of his, for which at the last he shall be sentenced to it, and either suffer or enjoy it? Here I must have recourse again to Vossius his collections<sup>c</sup>, finding them sufficient, and my model not allowing me to say more. Whether no help of grace but that which takes effect, be sufficient; that is, whether men refuse Christianity or fail of performing it, because they could not embrace and persevere in it, or because they would not when they might: let him, that shall have perused what he hath collected in 224

rantia usque in finem, illi non donetur; inscrutabiliora sunt judicia Dei. Illud tamen fidelibus debet esse certissimum, hunc esse ex prædestinatis, illum non esse." S. Aug., De Dono Persever., c. ix. § 21; Op., tom. x. p. 831. B, C. And see both tracts at length.

<sup>a</sup> From certain canons appended to the letter of Celestinus to the Bishops of Gaul, and entitled, "Præteritorum Sedis Apostolicæ Episcoporum Auctoritates de Gratia Dei et Libero Arbitrio," § 2—5: ap. Labb., Concil., tom. ii. p. 1615. A—D. They are decided to be not the work of Celestinus, by Labbè, and Sirmond; and Binius attributes them to Prosper (*ibid.*, p. 1613. D, E). The letter itself was written at the request of Prosper and Hilary (*ibid.*, p. 1611. E).

<sup>b</sup> "Si quis alios misericordia, alios vero per liberum arbitrium, quod in omnibus, qui de prævaricatione primi hominis nati sunt, constat esse vitium, ad gratiam baptismi posse venire contendit, a recta fide probatur alienus." Conc. Arausic. II. (A.D. 529), art. 8: ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. p. 1668. D, E.—"Adjutorium Dei etiam renatis ac sanctis semper est implorandum, ut ad finem bonum pervenire vel in bono possint opere perdurare." *Ejusd.* Concil. art. 10; *ibid.*, p. 1669. B.—See also art. 4—7; *ibid.*, pp. 1667. D—1668. D.

<sup>c</sup> Voss., *Hist. Pelag.*, lib. vii. P. i. De Amplitudine Gratia, Op., tom. vi. pp. 770, sq.; P. ii. De Arbitrii Libertate, *ibid.*, pp. 797, sq.; P. iii. De Causa Reprobationis, *ibid.*, pp. 805, sq.



the second part of his seventh book, say, as to the persuasion of the whole Church. Whether God would have all men to be saved, and hath appointed the death of our Lord Christ to that intent; let him, that shall have perused the first part of the same, thesi ii. and iii.<sup>d</sup>, give sentence, what the Church hath always believed. No less manifest is it, by that which he saith there, parte ii. thesi ii., parte iii. thes. i. and ii.<sup>e</sup>, that there is no reason to be given, why any man sinneth or is damned, because God would have it so. On the contrary, that the reason why a man is not saved, to whom the Gospel is tendered, is, because he refuseth it; which God, for His part, tendereth to all mankind. In fine, that the Catholic Church from the beginning believed no more, than that those, who should believe and persevere to the end good Christians, were appointed by God to be saved; understanding this to be done by virtue of God's grace, for which no reason can be rendered from any thing that a man can do, as preventing all his endeavours: I acknowledge to appear by that which he hath said, lib. vi. thes. viii.<sup>f</sup> When therefore St. Augustin maintaineth (as I have acknowledged that he doth maintain<sup>g</sup>), that the reason why one man is converted and perseveres unto death, another not, resolves into

<sup>d</sup> "Veteris hæc Ecclesiæ sententia fuit, velle Deum conversionem ac salutem omnium:" &c. Id., *ibid.*, lib. vii. P. i. tit. of thes. 2. p. 770. b.—"Veteris Ecclesiæ iudicium fuit, Christum pro culpa universali hominibus providisse a remedio universali, solvendo *λύτρον* infiniti pretii, ne ejus defectu periret quisquam:" &c. Id., *ibid.*, tit. of thes. 3. p. 780. a.

<sup>e</sup> "Deus non prædestinat ad peccandum, sed præscit libere peccatum: nec quia præscit Deus, peccabit homo; sed quia homo peccabit, Deus præscit." Id., *ibid.*, P. ii. tit. of thes. 2. p. 804. a.—"Sensit Ecclesia vetus, eo reprobos detrudi in gehennam atque ibi luere penas æternas: non quia vitâ obedire Deo non potuerunt, sed quia noluerunt. Itaque et anathema illis dixit, qui existimarent hominem prædestinari ad malum, hoc est, qui prædestinatione Dei putarent hominibus imponi peccandi et pereundi necessitatem." Id., *ibid.*, P. iii. tit. of thes. 1. p. 806. a.—"De questione altera, Patrum, tam Latinorum quam Græcorum, hoc judi-

cium fuit, in homine causam esse, quod non regeneretur, vel non perseveret. Quippe qui vocatus, venire cum possit, venire negligat; donaque Dei prior reprobet, et irrita reddat, quam a Deo reprobetur; prior deserat Deum, quam a Deo deseratur." Id., *ibid.*, tit. of thes. 2. p. 807. a.

<sup>f</sup> "Græci Patres semper, Patrum Latinorum vero illi qui ante Augustinum vixerunt, dicere solent, eos esse prædestinatos ad vitam, quos Deus pie recteque victuros prævidit: sive, ut alii loquuntur, quos prævidit credituros et perseveraturos. . . . Verum non intellexere præscientiam eorum quæ homo acturus erat ex viribus naturæ, sed quæ esset facturus ex viribus gratiæ, tum prævenientis, tum subsequentis: eoque antiquitatis ille consensus nihil vel Pelagianos vel Semi-Pelagianos juvat. Nam utrique illi crediderunt," &c. "At Catholici agnoverunt gratiam primam non ex merito sed gratis conferri." Id., *ibid.*, lib. vi. tit. of thes. 8. p. 736. b.

<sup>g</sup> Above, note z.

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God's mere appointment; I will not dispute, whether this be more than the whole Church delivereth for that which it is necessary to salvation to believe. It is enough for me to maintain, that it seemeth to follow, by good consequence of the best reasons that I can see, from that sense of our Lord and His Apostles' doctrine, which the Church hath always taught. Which will allow me to maintain, as well the pre-determination of the will, as absolute predestination to glory and pain, to be inconsistent, as with the covenant of grace, so with the tradition of the Church.

Of Predestinians.

§ 25. I find, that Gennadius, being manifestly one of those in Gaul that contradicted something of St. Augustin's doctrine (by his commending of Faustus and Cassian, and censuring, not only Prosper, who confuted Cassianus, but even St. Augustin, in his book of ecclesiastical writers<sup>b</sup>), in a certain addition to that list of heresies which St. Jerom hath made, reckoneth them in the list of the heretics condemned by the Church, who teach absolute predestination, under the name of Predestinians<sup>i</sup>. After him, not only Hincmarus

<sup>b</sup> "Faustus ex abbate Lerinensis monasterii apud regnum Galliae episcopus factus, vir in Divinis Scripturis satis intentus, . . . composuit librum de Spiritu Sancto. . . Edidit quoque opus egregium de Gratia Dei qua salvamur, et libero humanæ mentis arbitrio in quo salvamur: in quo opere docet," &c. Gennadius Massiliensis, De Illust. Viris, c. 85. p. 27. Helmæstad. 1612.—"Cassianus . . . scripsit experientia magistrante, plano et librato sermone, et ut apertius dicam, sensu verba inveniens et actione linguam movens, res omnium monachorum professioni necessarias, id est, de habitu monachi," &c. : "digessit etiam Collocutiones cum patribus Ægyptiis habitas," &c. Id., *ibid.*, c. 56. p. 20.—"Legi et librum" (scil. of Prosper) "adversus opuscula suppresso nomine Cassiani, quæ ecclesia Dei salutaria probat, ille infamat nociva." Id., *ibid.*, c. 84. p. 27.—"Augustinus Afer, . . . vir eruditione Divina et humana orbi clarus, fide integer, et vita purus, scripsit quanta nec inveniri possunt, . . . Unde et multa loquenti accidit, quod dixit per Solomonem Spiritus Sanctus, 'In multiloquio non effugies peccatum.' Edidit," &c. "Error tamen illius sermone multo, ut superius dixi, con-

tractus, lucta hostium exaggeratus, necdum hæresis quæstionem dedit." Id., *ibid.*, c. 38. p. 14.

<sup>i</sup> "In libello quodam de hæresibus, qui sancto Hieronymo attribuitur, cum catalogus hæreticorum ad Photinum et Eunomium usque perductus esset, qui circa ætatem sancti Hieronymi vixerunt, sic de Gennadio subjungitur: 'Huc usque sanctus Hieronymus: hæc vero quæ sequuntur, a sancto Gennadio Massiliensi presbytero sunt posita.' Prima vero hæresis quam Gennadius ibi ponit, est 'Prædestinatio.' Jansen., August., tom. i. De Hær. Pelag., lib. viii. c. 23. p. 428. b.—The tract thus attributed to S. Jerome is not in the editions of his works, but was published separately by Menardus, with the appendix of Gennadius added to it. That appendix as there published treats of *four* heresies. Three of these (the Prædestinians being omitted) are to be found in the editions of S. Augustin, added to his tract De Hæresibus (Op., tom. viii. p. 28). See Jansen., as above quoted: and, on the other side, Sirmond., Hist. Prædest., c. vi.; ap. Galland., Bibl. Vett. PP., tom. x. pp. 407, 408; and Cave, Hist. Litt., sub art. Hieron. Stridon., and Gennad. Massil.

of Rheims<sup>j</sup>, condemning Gotescalcus, a monk of his province, for maintaining it (being transmitted to him by Rabanus of Mentz, who in a synod there had condemned him for the same), hath supposed it condemned for a heresy by the ancient Church; but also, before Hincmarus, Arnobius<sup>k</sup>, that hath expounded the Psalms (called Arnobius the younger by some), and a certain continuation of St. Hierom's Chronicle, under the name of Tiro Prosper<sup>l</sup>, the one contradicteth them, the latter mentions that they had their beginning from St. Augustin's writings. Sirmondus<sup>m</sup> also, the learned Jesuit, hath published a piece so ancient, that, pretending to make a list of heresies, it goeth no further than Nestorius; reckoning next after him the Prædestinarians, as those who derived themselves from St. Augustin's doctrine. To which it is well enough known what opposition is now made by them<sup>n</sup>, who believe not that there ever was any such heresy, but that the adversaries of St. Augustin in Gaul do pretend, that such a sect did indeed rise upon misunderstanding his doctrine. And, certainly, there are properly no heretics, as to the Church, but those whom the Church condemns, for some position, which they had rather part with the Church than renounce. Neither can it be said, that ever there was any sect expelled the Church upon

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<sup>j</sup> Hincmari Archiepisc. Remensis De Prædestinatione Dei et Lib. Arbit. Posterior Dissert. adv. Gotescalcum et ceteros Prædestinianos, c. ii.; Op., tom. i. pp. 20—22. ed. Sirmond. Paris. 1645.

<sup>k</sup> "Dilexit maledictionem Adæ, . . noluit benedictionem quæ per Christum affertur. . . Nota ex arbitrio evenisse ut nollet, propter hæresim, quæ dicit Deum alios prædestinasse ad benedictionem, alios ad maledictionem." Arnob. Junior, Comment. in Ps. cviii.; ap. Magn. Bibl. PP., tom. v. P. iii. p. 291. D, E.

<sup>l</sup> "Prædestinatorum hæresis, quæ ab Augustino accepisse dicitur initium, his temporibus serpente exorsa." Tiro Prosper, Chronic.; ap. Græv., Thes. Antiq. Rom., tom. xi. p. 326. E.

<sup>m</sup> "Prædestinatus sive Prædestinatorum Hæresis, et Libri S. Augustino temere adscripti Refutatio, ab Auctore ante annos MCC. conscripta; primum edita a Jacobo Sirmondo Soc. Jesu

presbytero anno MDCXLIII.:" ap. Galland., Bibl. Vett. PP., tom. x. pp. 357, sq.—The first book, De Hæresibus, reckons the Nestorians as the 89th and last before the Prædestinarians, with whom the book closes (*ibid.*, p. 377).—See the Prolegom. in Gallandius, tom. x. c. ix. pp. xvii. xviii., respecting the supposed author, and the history of the work.

<sup>n</sup> "De Prædestinarianis et eorum hæresi. Non esse hæresin, sed calumniam, qua Massilienses S. Augustini doctrinam infamarunt." Jansen., August., tom. i. De Hær. Pelag., lib. viii. tit. of c. 23. pp. 227. b, sq.—See on the other side Sirmond., Hist. Prædest., c. vi.: ap. Galland., Bibl. Vett. PP., tom. x. pp. 407, 408; and see also above in note i: and an account of the controversy, whether there was a sect of the Prædestinarians or no, in Mosheim, Eccles. Hist., Bk. ii. Cent. v. Pt. ii. c. 5. § 25; vol. i. pp. 503, 504. and note 8. ed. Soames.

BOOK  
II.

such cause. That there was a council held at Arles, and after that another at Lyons, that decreed something about absolute predestination, is as certain; as it is certain, that Faustus writ his book *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* by commission from them: for both are affirmed by the preface<sup>o</sup>, which is of the same credit as the book. But what was determined, we cannot measure by the letter of Faustus to Lucidus; which goes along with it<sup>p</sup>. Lucidus was a priest, whom Faustus moves to recant his opinion, that God makes the greatest part of men on purpose to damn them. This he does by a letter, which he returns to Faustus, renouncing<sup>225</sup> several articles to that purpose; but which he might have framed out of Faustus his book, always disowned. For why might not Faustus be intrusted to write against the opinion, and exceed his commission so far, as to deny preventing grace? And though Faustus his letter is subscribed by divers bishops, yet are they not the council, nor do the subscriptions appear in all copies<sup>q</sup>. As for the return, neither doth it appear by the date, nor by any other mark, that it was approved or enacted by the council<sup>r</sup>.

§ 26. But, granting it had, the letter of Pope Celestine<sup>s</sup> in favour of St. Augustin's doctrine must needs have given a check to the execution of it; which, having decreed divers articles concerning the necessity of preventing grace, in the end, condemns the determining of difficult questions, that [occur<sup>t</sup>] upon the necessary dispute of preventing grace. And the second council of Orange, in the end, is content to add only, that if any man say, that any man is predestinate

<sup>o</sup> See above, § 22. note b.

<sup>p</sup> Ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. pp. 1042. C—1044. B.

<sup>q</sup> "Though we find at the end of this letter (of Faustus) the subscriptions of several bishops: it is nevertheless true (as Sirmondus thinks), that it belonged to none but Faustus; and that it is he only, that wrote it in his own name. And in Hinemar's time it was believed to be subscribed by him alone, as it still is in the best MSS., and particularly in that which Canisius used." Dupin., *Ecl. Hist.*, Fifth Cent, vol. iv. p. 162. Eng. Transl.—See Sirmond., *Hist. Prædest.*, cc. vii., vi i.; ap. Galland., *Bibl. Vet. PP.*, tom. x. pp. 408—410: Canisius, *Thes. Mon.*

*Ecl.*, tom. i. pp. 344, sq. with Basnage's notes, ed. Basnage Antv. 1725; and Ussher, *Antiq. Brit. Ecl.*, c. xiii.; Works, vol. iii. pp. 488, sq. ed. Elrington.

<sup>r</sup> The letter of Lucidus is addressed to Leontius and 29 other bishops (including Faustus himself). It refers to the Council thus—"Proinde juxta prædicandi recentia statuta concilii damno vobiscum sensum illum, qui dicit humanæ obedientiæ laborem Divinæ gratiæ non esse jungendum," &c. (ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. p. 1044. D.)

<sup>s</sup> See above, § 24. note a.

<sup>t</sup> Misprinted "incur," in orig. text.

to evil (whether of sin or punishment), the synod declares him anathema<sup>u</sup>. Whereby, as whatsoever Faustus or Cassian might have said to the prejudice of preventing grace, is condemned by the synod, so that, which the former synod had said of predestination, seems to be superseded, and void, by a greater authority, of the see of Rome concurring with the council of Orange. Which may be the reason, why there is no further mention in antiquity of the decrees of those councils: which had they not decreed, as some suppose<sup>x</sup>, Faustus would have heard of it by Maxentius; who is so angry with the see of Rome, that they made not the adversaries of St. Augustin heretics<sup>y</sup>.

§ 27. I grant, therefore, that there was never any sect of Prædestinarians. But I do not therefore grant, that ever there was any sect of Semipelagians. Faustus or Cassian might, in opposition to absolute predestination, mistake themselves so far as to deny preventing grace. Some on the other side (as he that writ the treatise which Sirmondus his *Prædestinatus* confutes, though some take it for his own that confutes it<sup>z</sup>) might deserve the censure of those councils; as the positions that prejudice preventing grace are condemned by that of Orange, and the writings of Cassian and Faustus censured afterwards, their persons remaining untouched, upon conformity to the decree. As for Gotescalcus, whom Hincmarus condemned by virtue of the councils of Arles and Lyons, which I think void: I see there is opposition in point of right, what ought to be held between Hincmarus and his party on the one side, and Remigius of Lyons with his; whatsoever Gotescalcus his opinion truly was in point of fact<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>u</sup> "Aliquos vero ad malum Divina potestate prædestinatos esse non solum non credimus; sed etiam si sunt qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione illis anathema dicimus." Concil. Arausic. II., in fin. canonum; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. p. 1672. A, B.

<sup>x</sup> E. g. "M. Mauguin (Vindic. Prædest. et Grat., tom. ii. p. 546. Paris. 1650) a soutenu, que les Conciles d'Arles et de Lyon, et la retractation de Lucide, estoient des choses supposées, feintes par Fauste." Tillemont, Mémoires, &c., art. Fauste, note

vii.; tom. xvi. pp. 777, 778: who proceeds to answer the assertion.

<sup>y</sup> Johan. Maxentius, Epist. ad Hormisd. Papam: ap. Magn. Bibl. PP., tom. vi. P. i. pp. 375. H, sq. See above, c. xix. § 23. note e.

<sup>z</sup> The second Book of the Prædestinatus is entitled "Liber sub nomine Augustini confictus, nonagesimam hæresim continens, quæ adserit Dei prædestinatione peccata committi." The third Book contains "refutationem libri superioris sub S. Augustini nomine conficti."

<sup>a</sup> See Mosheim, Eccles. Hist., Bk.



BOOK  
II.

And therefore, the authority of the Church not being engaged on either side, I am at freedom to refuse absolute predestination to glory (much more predetermination, which is but one way to execute it), admitting absolute predestination to grace.

[Predestinarians not heretics.]

§ 28. And truly, though I impute it for a charge to those, that maintain the determination of man's will by the immediate act of God before it determine itself, that they destroy free will by pretending to maintain it (because the determining of it, which they make the ground of freedom, is indeed the ground of necessity, which stands not with freedom), which is no small fault in divines; yet, as Christians, I count them so much the less enemies to the faith. For, inasmuch as they do this under the pretence of establishing freedom, it is manifest, that they ground their salvation upon the covenant of grace which supposeth it; and, therefore, think themselves notwithstanding obliged to apply their utmost endeavours to the fulfilling of it: though the difficulty of the question entangling, and as it were maleficiating their understanding, makes them imagine, that it is maintained by that which indeed destroys it.

[Presbyterians not similarly excusable.]

§ 29. And, therefore, I cannot in the like manner excuse them, who, besides the predetermination of the will by God, do hold that faith, which only justifieth, to consist in believing that God predestinates to life in consideration of the obedience of Christ, provided for the elect of God alone: because, not requiring that voluntary conversion of the will to God for the condition of the covenant of grace (the revelation of the will of God aforesaid not implying any thing, 226 but the evidence of God's word manifested by His Spirit to that effect), they disoblige themselves of employing that freedom of the will which Christianity supposeth, to perform that condition which Christianity requireth; as if the loss of freedom from sin did infer the loss of freedom from necessity, by virtue of original concupiscence, extending nevertheless to the state of innocency. In fine, the free grace of God and the free will of man belonging both to the foundation of Christianity, there are two extremities to be [avoided<sup>b</sup>] in

iii. Cent. ix. Pt. ii. c. 3. § 22—24;

vol. ii. pp. 236—241. ed. Soames: and authorities there quoted.

<sup>b</sup> Corrected from MS. "argued," in orig. text.

this question, consisting in destroying the one, out of a desire to preserve both; which he that hath not, in plain terms, destroys Christianity. And therefore I blame not the determinations of the council of Orange<sup>c</sup>, that have secured us, on the one hand, against the merit of grace by works of nature; but I find reason, that we should be secured, on the other hand, against the determination of the will, that introduces necessity, to the overthrow of Christianity. For it is possible for the understanding of him, that desires to maintain both grace and free will, to be so intricated with the difficulty of reconciling them both, as to make the freedom of man's will to depend upon the immediate act of God's will, determining it freely to act when it acteth, out of pretence of maintaining the efficacy of God's free grace; whereas it is, indeed, no help of grace, that enables not freely to do what the covenant of grace requireth. I do not therefore pardon our Presbyterians, when they bring into their confession of faith<sup>d</sup> (which we must all be obliged to forsooth) the determining of man's will by God, having no ways secured us from the position of justifying faith, to consist in believing that we are predestinate to life. But I forewarn their misled hearers, that, though they think themselves bound to pay them well for their pains, to make them partizans in questions which they understand not, and give them the confidence to censure for Arminians, those that resolve them in such terms as they comprehend not; nevertheless, at the last judgment of

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<sup>c</sup> "Si quis sicut augmentum, ita etiam initium fidei, ipsunque credulitatis affectum, quo in Eum credimus Qui justificat impium, et ad generationem sacri baptismatis pervenimus, non per gratiæ donum, id est, per inspirationem Spiritus Sancti corrigentem voluntatem nostram ab infidelitate ad fidem, ab impietate ad pietatem, sed naturaliter nobis inesse dicit, apostolicis dogmatibus adversarius approbatur," &c. Concil. Arausic. II. (A.D. 529), art. 5; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. pp. 1667. E, 1668. A. And see above, § 24. note b.

<sup>d</sup> "All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, He is pleased, in His appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by His word and Spirit, out of that state of sin

and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by His almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by His grace." Westminster Confession, chap. x. On Effectual Calling, § 1.—"The Confession of Faith of the Assembly of Divines agreed unto by the House" (of Commons), "except the 30 and 31 chapters, which are touching Church censures and synods, March 1659." Whitelock's Memorials, p. 699.

BOOK II. God, they may have cause to complain of them, if not for teaching them to tie knots which they cannot teach them to loose, yet for inducing them to break the peace of the Church, to obtain freedom of professing, or imposing upon others, the belief of things thus prejudicial to Christianity.

§ 30. In the mean time, it shall be enough for me, by this short resolution, to have drawn a line, which they that will tread the labyrinth of this dispute may be guided by, the best that I can shew, from falling headlong on either side. Not doubting, that the skill of those, who, being more traded in it, resolve to avoid both extremities, may produce that information, which may oblige me for further intelligence, as well as the rest of the Church: but having confidence, that the denying of God's predetermination, is not the denying of God's effectual grace; which I have shewed, that it doth stand with free will, according to the supposition that I advance; though I undertake not to shew, how reason reconciles the parts of it.

§ 31. And truly I am confident, that, when St. Augustin, in his book *De Correptione et Gratia*, distinguishes between that help of grace without which we cannot obey the Gospel of Christ, and that help by which we do it, "*auxilium quo, et auxilium sine quo non*;" and whensoever else he makes the efficacy of grace to attain the doing of that which it effecteth, not only the enabling of man to do it; he never intended to determine the manner how it is effected. For though St. Augustin himself hath balked the ground which himself had laid, for the distinction between the antecedent and consequent will of God, in his book *De Spiritu et Litera* cap. xxxiii.<sup>f</sup>, by bringing in other expositions<sup>g</sup> of St. Paul's words, — "God would have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth,"—that are inconsistent with it; though I have not found him distinguish between necessity

[1 Tim. ii. 4.]

<sup>e</sup> See above, c. xxv. § 6. note k.

<sup>f</sup> "Vult autem Deus omnes homines salvos fieri et in agnitionem veritatis venire; non sic tamen, ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes justissime judicentur. Quod cum fit, infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum Ejus evangelio non credunt; nec ideo tamen eam vincunt, verum seipsos fraudant

magno et summo bono, malisque pœnalibus implicant...Ita voluntas Dei semper invicta est: vinceretur autem, si non inveniret quid de contemptoribus faceret, aut ullo modo possent evadere quod de talibus Ille constituit." S. Aug., *De Spiritu et Littera*, c. xxxiii. § 58; *Op.*, tom. x. p. 118. E, F: and see the whole chapter.

<sup>g</sup> See above, c. xxii. § 7. note c.

upon supposition and antecedent, as Anselm<sup>h</sup> in pursuance of his doctrine hath done: yet he, that shall read what he hath said of the redemption of all mankind upon Psalm xcvi.<sup>i</sup>, besides abundance of other passages<sup>j</sup>, whereby he concurrerth to witness that sense of the redemption of all mankind, of 227 God's will that all be saved, of sufficient grace that is not effectual, which the Church generally declareth, as I shewed you before<sup>k</sup>; I say, he that considereth them, will find it more reasonable to reconcile him to his own doctrine, than to pretend a change in his judgment<sup>l</sup>, where he acknowledges none; as in the matter of preventing grace he doth not acknowledge. Certainly, seeing that Prosper, in defending him, frequently and clearly acknowledges Christ to have died for all mankind, out of God's will that all might be saved<sup>m</sup>; but the author of the book *De Vocatione Gentium* (never yet suspected for a partizan of the Semipelagians) hath so plentifully maintained it<sup>n</sup>, during the time that the parties in Gaul charged one another for Semipelagians and Prædestinatians (for during that time was it writ, without peradventure); they will never deserve well of St. Augustin, that defend him otherwise.

<sup>h</sup> "Nam cum dico, Si erit, ex necessitate erit, hic sequitur necessitas quæ rei positionem non præcedit. Idem valet si sic pronuncietur; Quod erit, ex necessitate erit. Non enim aliud significat hic necessitas, nisi quia quod erit, non poterit simul non esse." S. Anselm., *De Concord. Præscientiæ et Prædestinationis necnon Gratia Dei cum Lib. Arbit.*, § 1; *Opusc.* p. 86. H. ed. Ressonæus 1544.

<sup>i</sup> "Nam 'judicabit orbem terrarum in æquitate:' non partem, quia non partem eruit. Totum judicare habet, quia pro toto pretium dedit. Audistis Evangelium, quia cum venerit, inquit, congregabit electos Suos a quatuor ventis. Congregat electos omnes a quatuor ventis: ergo de toto orbe terrarum." S. Aug., *Enarr. in Ps. xcvi.* § 15; *Op.*, tom. iv. p. 1039. E.

<sup>j</sup> *Enarr. in Ps. xcvi.* § 3; *Op.*, tom. iv. p. 1056. E.—*Serm.* cccxii. § 4; *ibid.*, tom. v. p. 1171. C.—*Serm.* ccciv. § 2; *ibid.*, p. 1235. D.—*et alibi sæpe.*

<sup>k</sup> Above, § 24. notes c—f.

<sup>l</sup> So Jansen, *Aug.*, tom. iii. *De Grat. Christi Salv.*, lib. iii. c. 20. p. 157. a, b.

<sup>m</sup> See e. g. his *Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum* (written in defence of

S. Augustin); especially cc. viii., ix., where the objections to S. Augustin's doctrine to which Prosper replies, are respectively, "Quod non omnes homines velit Deus salvos fieri sed certum numerum prædestinatorum," and, "Quod non pro totius mundi redemptione Salvator sit crucifixus." *Op. S. Prosp.*, tom. i. pp. 120, 121. 4to. Bassani 1782.

<sup>n</sup> E. g. the subject of lib. ii. c. xvi. of the *De Vocatione Gentium* is, "Quod Christus pro omnibus impiis mortuus sit" (in fin. *Op. Prosper.*, ap. *Magn. Bibl. PP.*, tom. v. P. iii. p. 179. C—F). The book has been attributed to S. Ambrose, to Prosper (of Aquitaine or Regiensis), to S. Hilary of Arles, to S. Leo; and Voss. (*Hist. Pelag.*, lib. i. c. 20. *Op.*, tom. vi. pp. 575. b, 576. a) sums up the question thus:—"Sane ut non esse Regiensis Prosperi pro certo habemus, ita quin vel Arelatensis Hilarii vel Prosperi Aurelianensis sit, vix dubitandum putamus." See also Cave, *Hist. Litt.*, art. *Prosper Aquitan.*; who assents to Voss's conclusion: and the *Vita S. Prosperi*, art. xi. pp. xxxv., xxxvi. prefixed to his works, 4to. Bassani 1782.

BOOK  
II.

§ 32. So far are we from being obliged by his doctrine to acknowledge grace to come to effect by God's predetermining the will of man to all that comes to pass: when I have shewed a supposition, according to which it may be done without prejudice to Christianity; though beyond my understanding to shew how. For supposing the common faith to be this, that God appointeth them to life or to death, whom He foreseeeth to embrace or not embrace Christianity, and to persevere or not persevere in the practice of it till death; can it not be true also, that He hath appointed some and not others the means, whereby He foresees that they will persevere? Nay, if some only persevere in the state of grace, when all might, as the council of Orange hath decreed<sup>o</sup>, what is there but God's will to create the difference? Much more, between them that never hear of the Gospel, and those that refuse it. And what hath Christianity hereupon to answer, but Porphyry's question; why Christ came not afore<sup>p</sup>? that is, why God suffered man to fall, and sin to come into the world? why He maketh not all men true Christians when He might? For one answer would serve all these questions. Which if it be a scandal to Christianity that it is not answered, it remains, that Christians be Porphyry's disciples. In the mean time, absolute predestination to grace infers not absolute predestination to glory: nor obliges God to procure sin, as the means to His end; or as the means to that means, to predetermine man's will to do it. But did St. Augustin's doctrine, in my opinion, contain any thing contrary to the doctrine of the rest of the Church, concerning the antecedent and consequent will of God—the coming of evil into the world—and that the foreknowledge of God does not effect but suppose it—the freedom of the will from necessity, while slave to sin; I would think myself obliged to renounce him, that I might adhere to the rest of

<sup>o</sup> "Hoc etiam secundum fidem Catholicam credimus, quod accepta per baptismum gratia omnes baptizati, Christo auxiliante et cooperante, quæ ad salutem animæ pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare voluerint, adimplere." Concil. Arausic. II. (A.D. 529), art. 25: ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. p. 1672. A.

<sup>p</sup> "Si Christus Se, inquitur" (after

Porphyry), "salutis viam dicit, gratiam et veritatem, in Seque solo ponit animis Sibi credentibus reditum; quid egerunt tot sæculorum homines ante, Christum?... Quare Salvator Qui dictus est, Sese tot sæculis subduxit?" S. Aug., Lib. ad Deogratias, seu Epist. cii., Quæst. 2. § 8; Op., tom. ii. p. 276. A—C.



the Church: counting it a thing ridiculous, and contrary to the principles of Christian truth, acknowledging the tradition of faith to come from the whole Church, to advance the doctrine of a member thereof, though so eminent as St. Augustin, against that which the rest of the Church is acknowledged to have taught.

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§ 33. If it be said, that the supposition of God's foreseeing the event of men's resolutions by the objects and considerations which He appoints them to be moved with, is an invention of the Jesuits, or at least hath been much maintained by them; I demand, what advantage they have, that espouse the supposition of the Dominicans (the first inquisitors, that is, ministers of persecution for religion, by the interest of the Church of Rome with secular powers)? especially, adding unto it the position of justifying faith by believing that we are predestinate, so destructive to the covenant of grace. Yet I give the reader, that is willing to take the pains of being informed, notice, that the supposition which I advance, is rather in the form that is to be collected out of Durandus<sup>q</sup>, than in that which the Jesuits<sup>r</sup> since have given it. In fine, let Maldonate<sup>s</sup> and [the] Jesuits think it their honour to profess, that they like not such and such expositions of Scripture because they come from the "heretics" (by which name we know whom they mean): let Puritan preachers coif their simple hearers with a prejudice against all that they like not, as drawn from Arminians or Jesuits (whose positions they understood not, and when they are understood, are nearer the truth than their own). I shall find myself nevertheless obliged to follow that truth, for Christ's sake, which I conceive maintains the interest of Christianity best; though

<sup>q</sup> "Durandus . . . censuit et docuit, Deum cum causis secundis concurrere remote et mediate solum; nempe quia rebus omnibus propriam naturam et essentiam dedit, et facultatem agendi contulit, ac utramque virtute sua continuo conservat: ea lege, ut creaturæ singulæ, virtute semel a Deo indita et perpetuo conservata, proprios motus deinceps obeant: absque eo quod Deus eorum actus et effectus immediate et per Se attingat: unde sequitur Deum actuum creaturæ causam tantum remotam esse, solam vero creaturam causam proximam et immediatam."

Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. de Conciliat. Arbit. Hum. cum Div. Concurat. et Cooperat. § i.; p. 435: and see Durandus de S. Portiano, In 2 Sent. Dist. 37. qu. 1, &c.

<sup>r</sup> See above, c. xxiv. § 18. note p.

<sup>s</sup> "Hæretici—Hæreticorum magister—Hæreticus interpret"—&c. &c. are phrases of common occurrence in Maldonatus' Commentary on the Gospels: Calvin and Beza being the two, to whom such phrases are most commonly applied by him.

<sup>t</sup> pp. 228—231 (both inclusive) are omitted in the paging of the fol. edit.

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II.

a Jew or a Pagan, much more a Jesuit or an Arminian, had said it.

Of the Ar-  
minians.

§ 34. As for the opinion of Arminius, and the decree of the synod at Dort, having already said why I have enlarged my considerations beyond the compass of those terms upon which they disputed<sup>u</sup>, it shall suffice me to say; that his opinion concerning election and reprobation is that, which I have shewed that all the Church hath always held for matter of faith: to wit, that God appoints them to be saved, and to be damned, who receive Christianity and persevere in the profession of it till death, or not<sup>v</sup>:—that, in mine opinion, they might have admitted something more; to wit, that God is not obliged by any works of free will, preventing the help of His grace through Christ, but by His own free pleasure, to grant those helps of grace, which He knows will be effectual to final perseverance in Christianity, to some, which He refuseth to others:—and that the decree of granting them is God's absolute predestination to grace. For I am confident, that Arminius doth acknowledge the calling of God's grace to become effectual, by means of the congruity of those helps which God provideth, with that disposition which God foreseeeth, in him whom He appointeth to be moved by the same. Whether or no the decree of the synod require further, that they should acknowledge predestination to glory to be absolute, I hold not myself anyways obliged to dispute. For I find, that those persons, that were employed to the synod from England, have professed, as well in the synod, as otherwise, that they came not by any commission or instruction from the Church of England; but only as trusted by King James of excellent memory, to assist his good neighbours, the States of the United Provinces, in composing the differences in religion raised among their divines and people<sup>x</sup>. And,

<sup>u</sup> Above, c. xxi. § 6.

<sup>v</sup> "Electio singularium personarum peremptoria est, ex consideratione fidei in Jesum Christum et perseverantiæ; non autem citra considerationem fidei et perseverantiæ in vera fide, tanquam conditione in eligendo prærequisitæ. Reprobatio a vita æterna facta est secundum considerationem antecedentæ infidelitatis et perseverantiæ in infidelitate; non autem citra considerationem antecedentæ infidelitatis et perseve-

rantiæ in infidelitate." Remonstrant. Sentent., artt. 7, 8; ap. Act. Synod. Dordrecht., Sess. xxxi.; P. i. pp. 126. b, 127. a. Dordr. 1620. See also Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. de Remonstrant. Sententia circa Hominum Prædestinationem, § i—xxix.; pp. 159—163; and Jacob. Arminii, Examen Prædestin. Perkinsian., especially pp. 32, 89. 8vo. Lug. Bat. 1612; and above, c. xxv. § 18. note f.

<sup>x</sup> "Sed et Rex noster, serenissimus noster rex Jacobus . . . nobis in man-

therefore, I cannot be concerned in the decree, to which the Church of England never concurred. Yet I say further, that the persons that concurred to it, whose opinions as divines I cannot esteem at an easy rate, by waiving the opinion of pre-determination, by acknowledging the death of Christ for all, and the operation of grace not irresistible, but such as stands not with actual resistance<sup>y</sup>, do seem not to insist upon absolute predestination to glory; and that, if the decree do necessarily import it, I do not know how to reconcile it with their own opinions. Which whether it be also to be said of them of the Reformed Churches in France, who, holding the decree, do now acknowledge the death of Christ for all mankind<sup>z</sup>, let them that read their writings judge.

datis dedit, illud totis viribus urgere, illud unum inculcare, ut receptæ hæc tenus fidei communique et vestræ et aliarum Ecclesiarum confessioni adherere usque velitis omnes." Orat. Paræn. Joseph. Hall., habita in Conventu Synodico Nov. xxix., Sess. xvi.; ap. Acta Synod. Dordrecht., P. i. p. 47. a.—"Eorum qui missi erant Theologorum, hæc sunt nomina: a serenissimo et potentissimo Magnæ Britanniæ Rege Jacobo I., Georgius Episc. Landav., Joseph. Hall.," &c., "Johannes Davenant.," &c., "Samuel Ward.," &c. Act. Syn. Dordrecht., Sess. iii.; P. i. p. 11. b.—See also the King's instructions to these divines in Collier, Eccles. Hist. of Gt. Britain, Pt. II. Bk. viii.; vol. ii. pp. 716, 717.

<sup>y</sup> "Deus, lapsi generis humani miseratus, misit Filium Suum, Qui Seipsum dedit pretium redemptionis pro peccatis totius mundi." Sentent. Theol. Magnæ Britanniæ de Artic. II do, Thes. iii.; ap. Act. Syn. Dordr., P. ii. p. 100.—"Ne electi quidem ipsi in hisce præcedaneis ad regenerationem actibus ita se gerunt unquam, quin propter negligentiam et resistentiam suam possint juste a Deo deseri et derelinqui: sed ea est erga eos specialis Dei misericordia, ut, quamvis hanc gratiam excitantem et illuminantem aut repellant aliquamdiu aut suffocent, eos tamen iterum iterumque urgeat Deus, nec desistat promovere, donec eosdem gratiæ suæ prorsus subjugaverit, ac in statu filiorum regenerantium collocaverit." Sentent. eorundem de Artic. III. et IV., Thes. vi.; *ibid.*, p. 168.—"Decretum electionis, seu prædestinationis ad salutem, est efficax voluntas

Dei, qua pro Suo beneplacito, ad demonstrationem Suæ misericordiæ, salutem hominis lapsi intendit, eique media talia præparavit, quibus electos ad istum finem efficaciter et infallibiliter perducere voluit." Sentent. eorundem de Artic. I., Thes. i.; *ibid.*, p. 3.—"Electionis decretum est definitum, inconditatum, completum, irrevocabile, immutabile: ita ut electorum numerus nec augeri possit nec minui. In prædestinatione media salutis non minus absolute decreta sunt, quam salus ipsa. Nam licet salus in executione pendeat ex conditionato usu mediæ, tamen Dei ad salutem eligentis voluntas non est conditionata, incompleta, aut mutabilis: quia absolute statuit dare electis vim et voluntatem implendi ipsas condiciones, scilicet respicientiæ," &c. "Dei enim prædestinantis decretum non in hanc formam concipitur, Ego Petrum, si contigerit eum credere et perseverare, eligam ad vitam æternam; sed potius hoc modo, Ego eligo Petrum ad vitam æternam, quam ut infallibiliter consequatur, Ego ei dabo fidem perseverantem." Sent. eorund. in Art. I., Thes. iv.; *ibid.*, pp. 516.

<sup>z</sup> Deputies were sent to the Synod of Dort by the Reformed Churches of France, but were prohibited from going by Louis XIV.: see the Acts of the Synod of Alez in 1620, c. vii. § 16. (ap. Quicke, Synod. in Gallia Reform., tom. ii. p. 14). The First Synod of Charenton, in 1623 (c. xxvi.; ap. Quicke, *ibid.*, pp. 126, sq.), adopted canons and decrees similar to those of the Synod of Dort on the subjects of Predestination, Universal Redemption,

## CHAPTER XXVII.

THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST, WITH SOCINUS.  
THE REASON WHY SACRIFICES ARE FIGURES OF CHRIST, COMMON TO ALL  
SACRIFICES. WHY, AND WHAT SACRIFICES THE FATHERS HAD, WHAT THE  
LAW ADDED. OF OUR RANSOM BY THE PRICE OF CHRIST'S PROPITIATORY  
SACRIFICE.

The ques-  
tion con-  
cerning the  
satisfaction  
of Christ.

HAVING thus shewed, how the Gospel tenders a covenant of grace, though requiring the condition of Christianity, in regard of those helps which the grace of God through Christ provideth for the performance of it: I am now to shew the same, in regard of that right to which God accepteth that performance. For if it appear, that God, out of His grace in Christ, and not for the worth of that which we do, accepteth it for a title duly qualifying us for remission of sin and life everlasting; then is it a covenant of grace which the Gospel tenders, though it require the profession and practice of Christianity on our part.

With So-  
cinus.

§ 2. And here I have to do with the Socinians on the one extremity, in the first place: who will not allow the Gospel to continue the covenant of grace, if it be said, that it tendereth remission of sins and life everlasting to those that are qualified as it requireth, in consideration of the obedience and sufferings of Christ, as the ransom and price of our sins; acknowledging always, that Christ died to settle and establish the new covenant, but not to oblige God by His death either to declare and become engaged to it, or to make it good having declared it, but to assure mankind, that God (Who of His own free grace was ready to pardon and accept of those, that should accept of the terms of reconciliation which His Gospel tendereth) will not fail to make good that, which, by delivering His well-beloved Son to death, He hath signed for His promise to us<sup>a</sup>. Indeed, they go about to strengthen this opinion, by adding another reason and end of Christ's

&c.: but at the Third Synod of Char-  
renton, in 1645 (c. ix. ; *ibid.*, p. 449),  
a Form was adopted for baptizing  
(among others) Mahometans, wherein  
question 4 runs thus,—“Do you not  
believe, that His' (Christ's) “death is  
the propitiation for our sins, yea, and

for the sins of the whole world?”  
Question 4. in the Form for Jews  
(*ibid.*, p. 448) is to the same effect.

<sup>a</sup> See above, c. i. § 5. note m: and  
Socinus, *De Jesu Christo Servatore*,  
passim.

death; to wit, the attaining of that Godhead, wherewith God, they say, hath rewarded His obedience in doing the message which He trusted Him with, that thereby He might be able, of Himself, to make good that which God by Him had promised, confounding all that may oppose the salvation of them that embrace the covenant of grace<sup>b</sup>. But that it should be said, that God declareth, or giveth, remission of sins and everlasting life to them that embrace the same in consideration of the obedience and sufferings of Christ, as satisfied thereby for that punishment which our sin deserved of His justice; this is that, which they deny<sup>c</sup>, and the Church teacheth.

§ 3. And therefore this it is, which we must shew how it is delivered by the Scriptures. Which every man may observe to stand chiefly in those texts of Scripture, which say, that “Christ died for us,” that He “redeemed” us, and “reconciled us to God by His death and bloodshed” (which, being the utmost of His obedience, comes most into account at all occasions of mentioning this subject). In fine, it is easy to be observed, that the expressions of this point in Holy Scripture have relation to the sacrifices of the Old Testament, as figuring the death of Christ; whereby both agree we are *delivered* from sin, the question remaining, whether *ransomed* or not.

[Scripture evidence.]

[Rom. v. 8; 1 John iii. 16: 1 Pet. ii. 21; iii. 18: Tit. ii. 14; Eph. i. 7; 1 Pet. i. 18, 19: Rev. v. 9: Col. i. 20; Eph. ii. 13—16; 2 Cor. v. 18: &amp;c.]

§ 4. And therefore I shall first consider, how, and to what effect, the sacrifices of Moses' law are figures of the sacrifice of our Lord upon the cross. Where I must, in the first place, infer from the principle premised of the twofold sense of the Old Testament<sup>d</sup>, that all the sacrifices thereof were figures of the death of Christ, and our reconciliation with God by the same. So far I am from yielding them that unreasonable demand, that only expiatory sacrifices, and especially that of the solemn day of atonement, are properly so<sup>e</sup>.

The reason why sacrifices are figures of Christ, common to all sacrifices.

<sup>b</sup> See above, c. i. § 9. note y; c. x. § 5. note m; c. xiv. § 5. note q.

<sup>c</sup> See above, c. i. § 5. note m.

<sup>d</sup> Above, c. iii. § 4; c. viii. § 16; c. xvi. § 2; and Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xiii. § 26—47.

<sup>e</sup> “Non omnia (sacrificia Legis) Christi mortem figurabant. Sed figura mortis Christi erant tantummodo sacrificia illa, quæ publice, hoc est, pro

universo populo, ipso etiam aliquando summo sacerdote non excluso, et statis quibusdam temporibus fiebant: præsertim vero illud, quod semel in anno summus sacerdos in sancta sanctorum ingrediens peragebat; ut ex epistola ad Hebræos cuicumque non oscitanter eam legenti constare poterit.” Socin., De Jesu Christi Servatore, P. ii. c. 9; Op., tom. ii. p. 156. a.



BOOK  
II.

Why, and  
what sacri-  
fices the  
fathers  
had; what  
the Law  
added.

§ 5. Only I must declare my meaning to be this: that, whereas the sacrifices of the fathers were so, as they were pledges of God's favour generally; the sacrifices of the Law <sup>234f</sup> (being the condition, upon which that people in general, and every person thereof in particular, held their interest in the land of promise) express more correspondence with that interest in the world to come, which Christians hold by Christ's death on the cross. For, the land of Canaan being promised them upon condition of keeping the Law, and every man's interest in the goods of it depending upon the same, it is manifest, that, whether the sacrifices which the congregation was bound to offer of course upon ordinary or solemn days, or those which purged legal impurities, inferring only incapacities of conversing with<sup>s</sup> God's people, or those which were offered for sins properly so called, or for acknowledgment of blessings received, or whatsoever they were, all were made and offered upon the general claim to the land of promise, and every man's share in it. Neither is there any greater argument hereof than this; that there is no sacrifice appointed by the Law for capital offences, Num. xv. 22—29: as those which the Law deprived of all interest in the land of promise, all right to converse among God's people. Which what it signified to Christians, you may see by the Apostle, Hebr. ii. 1—[4], x. 28, [29]; to wit, that they, who stick not to the terms of their Christianity, must expect so much the heavier vengeance at God's hands. And therefore, when the Apostle argues (Hebr. x. 4), "It is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin;" the answer is given by the same Apostle (Hebr. ix. 13),—"If the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the defiled, sanctifieth to the purity of the flesh,"—that it takes not away the guilt of sin from the conscience, which shuts Heaven upon us, but it takes away the incapacity of coming into the tabernacle, or conversing among God's people, or other forfeitures of legal promises. And therefore I may conclude, that the sacrifices which the Law was established with (Exod. xx[iv]. 4—[8]), though not expiatory, gave the people right to the land of promise; to wit, as done to so-

<sup>f</sup> Misprinted 178 in folio edition.

<sup>s</sup> Corrected from MS.; misprinted "which," in orig. text.

lemnize their resolution of submitting to the Law. For, the people having been idolaters in Egypt, as we understand by the prophet (Ezek. xx. 6, 7), and now submitting to a covenant with God for the land of promise, by obeying His law, are they not thereby accepted by God for heirs of it?

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§ 6. This seems, indeed, not to stand well with the opinion of the fathers; St. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and divers others<sup>h</sup>, the best expositors of the Scriptures that the ancient Church hath: that the sacrifices of the Law were appointed by God, not of His own original intent, but upon occasion of their proneness to worship idols, as the heathen did; granting them those rites, which they had known them serve their idols with, so as they might be performed after that particular manner which He should enjoin, as done to Him alone. And this they make the meaning of the prophet<sup>i</sup>; when he saith, that God “commanded their fathers nothing concerning sacrifices at their coming out of Egypt” (Jer. vii. 22): because, we see, that in their first coming out of Egypt He treats with them about keeping His laws but not about sacrifices (Exod. xv. 25, 26). But nothing hinders those sacrifices, which were brought in occasionally, to have been intended to figure the sacrifice of Christ. As nothing hinders those sacrifices, which from the beginning had been delivered

[Why the sacrifices of the Law were appointed, in the opinion of the fathers.]

<sup>h</sup> “Μη τοίνυν ἀνάξιον εἶναι νομίσειν Ἀυτοῦ, τὸ δι’ ἀστέρας αὐτοῦ” (Magos) “καλέσαι· ἐπεὶ οὐτός καὶ τὰ Ἰουδαϊκὰ πάντα διαβαλεῖς, καὶ τὰς θυσίας, καὶ τοὺς καθαρμούς, καὶ τὰς νεομηρίας, καὶ τὴν κιβωτὸν, καὶ τὸν ναὸν δὲ αὐτόν. Καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἑλληνικῆς ταῦτα παχύτητος ἔλαβε τὴν ἀρχήν. Ἄλλ’ ὅμως ὁ Θεὸς διὰ τὴν τῶν πλανηθέντων σωτηρίαν ἠνέχετο διὰ τούτων θεραπευθῆναι, δι’ ὧν οἱ ἐξώθεν δαίμονας ἐθεράπευον, μικρὸν παραλλάξας αὐτά· ἵνα αὐτοὺς κατὰ μικρὸν τῆς συνηθείας ἀποσπᾶσας ἐπὶ τὴν ὑψηλὴν ἀγάγῃ φιλοσοφίαν.” S. Chrys., Hom. vi. in S. Matt., § 3; Op., tom. vii. p. 90. B. ed. Montfaucon. So also Hom. iv. cont. Judæos, § 6; *ibid.*, tom. i. p. 624. D: and Opus Imperf. in S. Matt., Hom. xxxii.; *ibid.*, in fin. tom. vi. p. cxxxiv. b. B—D: and repeatedly elsewhere.—“Ἐν γὰρ δὴ τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ πλείστον ὅσον τὸν Ἰσραὴλ διατρίψαντα χρόνον, καὶ τὰ πονηρὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων εἰσδεξάμενον ἔθνη, καὶ θύειν εἰδώλους καὶ δαίμοσι παρ’ ἐκείνων μεμαθηκότα, καὶ παίξειν καὶ χορεῦειν καὶ ὄργανοις μουσι-

κοῖς ἐπιτέρπεσθαι, τούτων ἐν ἑξεί γενομένων ἐλευθερώσαι θελήσας, θύειν μὲν ξυνεχώρησεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντα θύειν, οὐδέ γε τοῖς ψευδωνύμοις Αἰγυπτίων θεοῖς, ἀλλ’ αὐτῶ μόνῳ τοῖς Αἰγυπτίων προσφέρειν θεοῦς· . . ἵνα τοίνυν μὴ δυσχεραίνωσιν, ὡς τῶν ἔθῶν ἐκείνων πάμπαν κεκωλυμένοι.” Theodoret, De Cur. Græc. Affect., Serm. vii.; Op., tom. iv. p. 584. B—D.—So also Justin Martyr, Origen, Tertullian, S. Cyril of Alex., Epiphanius; quoted at length by Spencer, De Leg. Hebr., lib. iii. Diss. ii. c. 1. sect. 2 (tom. ii. pp. 746, 747. Cant. 1727): who refers also to many other fathers.—So Grotius ad Exod. xv. 26. “Respicit ad hunc locum Jeremias vii. 22. . . Lex de sacrificiis (excepto Paschate . .) data non est nisi ex occasione idololatriæ a populo sanari nisi multo rituum, ad victimas maxime pertinentium, onere.”

<sup>i</sup> See Spencer, *ibid.* sect. 3. p. 749: and Cornelius a Lapide, in Jerem. vii. 22.

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11.

the fathers as pledges of God's love to them through Christ, to be, by the malice of the devil, diverted and employed to the service of idols. Certainly, the fathers before the flood sacrificed nothing but whole burnt offerings; because, at that time, they were not to eat of their sacrifices, feeding only on things that grew out of the earth (Gen. i. 29). For afterwards, when He gave the sons of Noe license to eat flesh, "Noe offered peace offerings;" whereof, part being burnt upon the altar, the rest went to the use of those that had sacrificed, to feast upon (Gen. viii. 19, 20; ix. [3,] 4). And those which Moses solemnized the covenant of the Law with, were "holocausts and peace offerings" (Exod. xxiv. 5): those which the Law makes properly expiatory, being afterwards introduced by the Law.

[חֶלֶב—  
"burnt-  
offerings."  
Gen. viii.  
20.]

[Figures  
of Christ  
in particu-  
lar sacri-  
fices.]

§ 7. Now, that all sacrifices are figures of Christ, we have not only the general reason premised, but particular instances <sup>2354</sup> in the New Testament. The paschal lamb; 1 Cor. v. 7. The holocausts and peace offerings which the Law was enacted with; Exod. xxiv. 5, Hebr. ix. 18—22: together with those, the blood whereof purgeth by the Law. The daily burnt-offerings of the congregation; Heb. x. 11. (for Socinus is ridiculously wilful, to understand "*καθ' ἡμέραν*" there once a year<sup>l</sup>, as if the speech were only of the sacrifice for the day of atonement): and, by consequence, all anniversary oblations. And whereas Socinus observes, that no lamb is appointed by the Law for a propitiatory sacrifice<sup>m</sup>: I suppose, when the Baptist saith (John i. [29,] 36), "Behold the Lamb of God, That takes away the sins of the world;" when St. John saith (Apoc. i. 5), "To Him that loved us, and hath washed us from our sins in His blood;" when the martyrs

<sup>k</sup> Misprinted 179 in fol. edit.

<sup>l</sup> "In quibus verbis" (Heb. x. 11) "notandum est, adverbium Quotidie, non singulis diebus, sed sæpe, vel certo quodam tempore perpetuo, significare. Nec enim agitur hic de alio sacrificio, quam de illo anniversario pro omnibus peccatis: quod (ut sæpius dictum est) vera oblationis Christi umbra fuit: et de quo hucusque institutus fuerat sermo. Id quod probe animadvertisse videtur Theodorus Beza," &c. Socin., De Jes. Chr. Servat., P. ii. c. 16; Op., tom. ii. p. 168. a: and so also in his Prælect. Theol., c. xxv.; ibid., tom. i.

p. 590. b. Beza merely translates the verse thus—"Omnis igitur sacerdos adstat quotidie, operans," &c.

<sup>m</sup> "Sequitur aliud erratum tuum in supra scriptis verbis; multos scilicet agnos pro peccatis immolatos fuisse: cum in nullo sacrificio, quod pro peccato fieret, agnus immolaretur; sed tantummodo agna, sive capella, pro peccato privati. Quod etsi per se leve erratum est, quia tamen postmodum addis huc respexisse Baptistam, cum dixit, 'Ecce Agnus Dei, Qui tollit peccata mundi,' gravius fieri constat." Socin., ibid. c. 9; ibid. p. 156. a.

say (Apoc. v. 9), "Thou wast killed, and hast bought<sup>n</sup> us to God out of every kindred and tribe and language and nation;" when the Apostle (Apoc. xiii. 8) mentions those, "whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world;" these, I suppose, knew well enough what creatures were sacrificed, and yet declare, that Christ was figured by lambs: to what purpose, let their words argue.

§ 8. It is manifest indeed, that the Epistle to the Hebrews argues most upon the anniversary sacrifice of the day of atonement: whereof one thing I must observe to him concerning the accomplishment of that which it figureth; that, as he maketh it (together with all other sacrifices, the blood whereof is sprinkled upon the ark) to signify Christ crucified without the walls of Jerusalem, so he maketh the sacrifice of Christ crucified, signified thereby, a peace offering for the Church to feed upon (as we do in the sacrament of the Eucharist); though by the Jews not to be touched, because they killed it without the city as abominable: Hebr. xiii. 8—16. But Socinus<sup>o</sup> will not have this sacrifice made (at least not perfected), nor Christ a high-priest, till He entered into the heavens to present it to God, as the high-priest into the Holy of Holies to sprinkle the blood. How then is He figured by those sacrifices, the blood whereof is not carried within the veil? I grant, the sacrifice of Christ is not done till Christ come to judgment; as that was not done, till the high-priest came out of the Holy of Holies, declaring the accepting of it (Levit. xvi. 18—20). But, as he must be a high-priest that sacrificed what God accepted, so must Christ be high-priest before He was killed; and therefore a sacrifice: as the Apostle expressly saith (Hebr. ix. 26—28),—that, "having abolished sin by the sacrifice of Himself, He shall

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["ἡγόρα-  
σας,"—  
"hast re-  
deemed."]

[The sa-  
crifice of  
Christ per-  
fected in  
His death.]

<sup>n</sup> Misprinted "brought," in folio edit.  
<sup>o</sup> "Animadvertendum præterea in hac collatione" (Christi cum legali pontifice) "omnino videtur, quod, quemadmodum legalis sacerdos in sacrificio illo anniversario, quamvis non prius in sancta sanctorum ingredi posset, quam hostias pro peccato extra mac-tasset, sanguinem tamen ipsarum hostiarum in sacrarium inferre debebat, et ibi coram Deo expiationem, quæ eo san-

guine fiebat, peragere; sic Christus, quamvis seipsum hostiam pro peccatis nostris tradere debuerit, antequam in cælum ingrederetur, Se tamen, per Quem expiatio perficienda erat, coram Deo in ipso cælo deinde pro nobis sistere, et ibi nostrorum peccatorum expiationem peragere debuit." Socin., ibid. c. 21; ibid. p. 174. a. And see also c. 15, ibid. p. 165. a: and elsewhere repeatedly.

BOOK  
II.

appear again to the salvation of them that expect Him ;” as the high-priest out of the Holy of Holies. The same is many ways evident by Hebr. ix. 14—20. For where Socinus will have Christ to “offer Himself unspotted to God by the eternal Spirit,” by presenting Himself in heaven immortal upon His resurrection<sup>p</sup>, free from the punishments of sin which He had upon Him here on earth ; you have seen, that the everlasting Spirit is the Godhead of Christ<sup>q</sup>. And, had the Apostle meant the presentation, which is now in doing, he would [not<sup>r</sup>] have spoken in the time past—“*προσήνεγκεν*.” And he that considers, that all sacrifices were visited before they were killed whether legal or blemished (which is called in one word, “*μωμοσκοπεῖν*”<sup>s</sup>), must believe, that He is called here “*ἄμωμος*,” as “found spotless ;” and so, fit to be slain. And does he not make the death of Christ the sacrifice, when he makes the new covenant, in correspondence to the old, to be enacted by it? It is true, the same Apostle (Hebr. ix. 2—6), shewing the highest heavens to be the Holy of Holies where the priesthood of Christ is exercised, adds, that “if He were upon earth, He should not be a priest, there being other priests to offer gifts according to the Law ;” but this is only to say, that His priesthood is not earthly, Who hath carried His own blood into the heavenly tabernacle, not meddling with the sons of Levi, or their office. For, “*ἐπὶ γῆς*” is (according to the Hebrew, which for want of composition expresses adjectives by prepositions) for “*ἐπιγῆιος*”<sup>t</sup>. “If He were upon earth,” signifies, If He were an earthly priest ; as those of the Levitical priesthood. It is true, He was to “learn compassion for us by His sufferings here” (Hebr. ii. 17, 18 ; v. 1, [2 ;] 7, 8) ; but might He 236

[Hebr. viii. 4.]

<sup>p</sup> “Per Spiritum autem æternum Deo Se obtulisse Christus dicitur, quia jam in æternum vivit, et ideo in æternum pro nobis in conspectu Dei apparebit.” Id., *ibid.*, c. 15 ; *ibid.*, p. 166. b : and repeatedly elsewhere.

<sup>q</sup> Above, c. xv. § 10.

<sup>r</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>s</sup> “Cum dicit *ἄμωμον* (‘inmaculatum’), respicit legem victimarum Levit. xxii. 20, Numer. xix. 2, Deuter. xv. 21. In victimis legalibus nullum debebat esse corporis vitium ; in Christi vita nihil fuit vitiosum : et ideo Spiritu Illo æterno statim donatus est.” Grot., ad

Heb. ix. 14.

<sup>t</sup> “Nam ‘si terrenus,’ inquit, ‘esset sacerdos,’ ut Aaron, non esset utique sacerdos, legalis scilicet, quia Leviticæ tribus nequaquam fuit. . . Sunt præterea mediæ ætatis theologi aliquot, inter quos est is qui Glossæ interlinearis autor est, qui locum hunc ad proxime præcedentem particulam, ‘necesse est habere quod offerat,’ referentes, edisserunt ad hunc modum ; ‘Si ergo esset super terram,’ i. e. si id quod Christus obtulit terrenum esset munus legali hostiæ simile.” Zeger., ad Heb. viii. 4 ; ap. Crit. Sac., tom. vii. p. 4233.



not, as well as other high-priests, learn that compassion by sacrificing Himself for us here, which He hath for us to the end of all things? CHAP. XXVII.

§ 9. In fine, every sacrifice is a sacrifice from the time that it is consecrated to God, as the paschal lamb from “the tenth day of the month” (Exod. xii. 3): thence it is “קרבן”—[an “offering<sup>u</sup>] due<sup>v</sup>,” and “δῶρον”—a “gift.” Or let any Jew say, if it might not many ways become “פסול”—“reprobate,” before it came into the Holy of Holies, because a sacrifice or [an<sup>u</sup>] offering before. And was not Christ consecrated when He was “the Lamb of God?” Of Himself He says (John xvii. 19), “For their sakes do I sanctify Myself;” to wit, to be a spotless sacrifice. [John i. 29, 36, &c.]

§ 10. This is therefore no exception to the general argument: the force whereof consisteth in this;—that, seeing it cannot be denied, that the inheritance of the land of promise, and each man’s share in the goods and rights of it, is assigned the Jews in consideration of their sacrifices, to wit, as the condition of that covenant by which they were prescribed; it must not be doubted, that the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven is assigned to Christians by the covenant of grace, in consideration of the obedience and sufferings of Christ, which they figure. [Conclusion.]

§ 11. But this is still more evident by the terms of “ransom<sup>x</sup>,” and “price<sup>y</sup>,” and “buying<sup>z</sup>,” attributed to the sacrifice of Christ. The heathen had sacrifices that they called *Lustralia*: and “*lustrare*” signifies to “expiate” among the Romans; to wit, by paying a price. For Ennius, translating into Latin a Greek tragedy called “*Ἐκτορος Λύτρα*” (out of Homer, where he speaks of Priamus ransoming Hector’s corpse from Achilles), entitled it *Hectoris Lustra*<sup>a</sup>. There- Of our ransom by the price of Christ’s propitiatory sacrifice.

<sup>u</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>v</sup> “קרבן—Sacrificium quod offertur vel offerri debet.” Buxtorf, Lex. Chald. sub voce.

<sup>x</sup> Λύτρον; Matt. xx. 28, Mark x. 45; Ἀντίλυτρον, 1 Tim. ii. 6; Λυτροῦμαι; 1 Pet. i. 18: &c. See Socin., De Jesu Christo Servat., P. ii. c. 3; Op., tom. ii pp. 146. b—148. b.

<sup>y</sup> Τιμὴ: 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23. See Socinus, *ibid.*

<sup>z</sup> Ἀγοράζειν: 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23; 2 Pet. ii. 1; Rev. xiv. 4: and see Acts xx. 28, 1 Pet. ii. 9, Rev. v. 9. See

Socinus, *ibid.*

<sup>a</sup> “Latinum titulum” (Ennii tragœdiæ) “puto fuisse Hectoris Lustra. Lustrum enim (ut est apud M. Varro-nem . . .) tempus quinquennale dictum est a luendo, hoc est, solvendo; quod quinto quoque anno vectigalia et ultro tributa per censores persolvebantur. Itaque Lustra apud Ennium idem erat quod apud Græcos Λύτρα. Λύτρον autem pecunia est quæ pro redemptione solvitur.” Prolog. in Hector. Lustra, ap. Enn. Fragmenta, p. 227. ed. Hessel. Amst. 1707.—See Grot., In Matt. xx. 28.

BOOK  
II.[“thy sins  
by righte-  
ousness.”][“Break  
off.” Eng.  
vers.]

fore it is the Latin of *λύτρον*. And *ἀπολυτρόω* signifies “deliverance by paying a ransom.” In the words of the prophet (Daniel iii. 57, iv. 24),—“Redeem thy sins by repentance, and thy misdeeds by having mercy on the afflicted<sup>b</sup>,—” many<sup>c</sup> blame the Vulgar Latin, and would translate פרוק, “break off:” but the words of Solomon (Prov. xvi. 6),—“By mercy and truth iniquity is redeemed,”—shew, that it is truly translated. And having shewed afore<sup>d</sup>, that such considerations do qualify us for remission of sins, I may well argue from hence, that the term of “ransom” imports the consideration for which it is bestowed. Wherefore, let the “sweet-smelling sacrifice” of Christ (Ephes. v. 2) be understood in the same notion, as the good works of Christians are called “a sweet savour” (Phil. iv. 18, Hebr. xiii. 16); seeing Socinus will have it so<sup>e</sup>: provided that it be understood, that the sacrifice of Christ is accepted to purchase mankind the right of coming out of sin into everlasting life; the sacrifices of Christians, to the qualifying of their persons for the benefit of the same. To the same sense, Prov. xiii. 8; “The ransom of a man’s life is his wealth.” For, literally, a man’s wealth is the saving of his life with the world, that spares a man’s life in consideration of his wealth (or sets not upon him in regard of it): which, the Psalmist saith, God does not (Psalm xlix. 6—8). Mystically, it is the same that Solomon

<sup>b</sup> This is c. iv. verse 24. in the Hebrew and Vulgate and LXX: c. iv. verse 27, in the Eng. Version. It is the 57th verse from the beginning of c. iii., omitting the Song of the Three Children.

<sup>c</sup> “Ubi” (scil. in Dan. iv. 24) “nihil aliud intelligi debet, quam justitiæ operibus sive eleemosynis et misericordiis pauperum liberari hominem a peccatis et ab iniquitatibus suis; vel quia eo pacto ab iniquitate et peccato recedit, et ita ab eis liberatur sive eripitur (ut verbum Chaldaicum, quod redimendi verbo versum fuit, vere significat); vel quia . . . ea ratione per benignitatem Dei poenam suis peccatis debitam effugere ei datur.” Socin., De Jesu Chr. Serv., P. ii. c. 3; Op., tom. ii. p. 148 b.—“Verbum פרוק hic (Dan. iv. 27) vertunt Redimere. Significat autem sæpe vel abrumperre vel separare vel conterere: ideo commode hoc loco verti posset, separa, vel abrumpe, peccata tua misericordia et

humanitate: quasi diceret, sic facias peccandi finem, ut ingrediaris novum cursum.” Calvin, in loc.; Op., tom. v. p. 60.—And see, for others who follow the same interpretation, Poli Synops. ad locum.

<sup>d</sup> Above, c. xv. § 14.

<sup>e</sup> “Ut Ephesii ad singulare hoc Christi facinus imitandum magis accendantur, per appositionem subjungitur, hanc Ipsius Christi eximiam charitatem, hoc Ipsius egregium opus, fuisse Deo oblationem et hostiam gratissimam. Itaque non de Ejus corporis oblatione, sed de oblatione præstantissimi facti agit. Nam ipsum factum hostiam appellari posse, patet ex eo, quod scriptum est Hebr. xiii. 16. . . Quin similem prorsus loquendi modum, cum eadem appositionis usitatissima figura, habes ad finem Epist. ad Philipp.; ubi scriptum est,” &c. Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 15; Op., tom. ii. p. 166. a.

said in the place afore quoted. But when Solomon saith (Prov. xxi. 18), “The wicked is a ransom for the upright, and the sinner comes instead of the righteous;” and the prophet (Esai. xliiii. 3), “I have given Egypt for thy ransom, Cush and Seba instead of thee:” God signifieth by a parable, that, having employed Sennacherib to execute His judgments upon those nations, He had given him the Egyptians and Ethiopians that He might spare the Israelites. So He pays him his hire, which discharges His own people of that which they had suffered otherwise. So, in the words of Otho (Tacit. Hist. ii. f),—“*Hunc animum, hanc virtutem vestram, ultra periculis obicere, nimis grande vitæ meæ pretium duco*”—“I hold [“puto.”] it too great a price for my life, to cast this courage and valour of yours any more upon dangers,”—it is manifest, that a “ransom” or “price” imports the consideration of that for which it is laid out; the blood of his soldiers, for their general’s life. And shall it be otherwise, when the Apostle saith, that Christ’s death intercedes “for the redemption of those transgressions, that remained under the Old Testament” (Hebr. ix. 15)? when St. Paul saith, that “the Man Christ Jesus gave Himself a ransom for all, to be witnessed in due time” 237 (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6)? when our Lord saith the same (Matt. xx. 28, [Mark] x. 45)? and St. Paul again (1 Cor. vi. 20): “Ye are bought with a price; glorify therefore God with your body and with your spirit, which are God’s?” and again (1 Cor. vii. 23): “Ye are bought with a price; be not servants of men?” and of Christ (Titus ii. 14): “Who gave Himself for us, that He might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to Himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works?” The same, Apoc. v. 9, Rom. iii. 24, Gal. iii. 13, Ephes. i. 7, Acts xx. 28: where I must needs call it mere impudence in Socinus<sup>g</sup>, to say, that God redeemed His Church “by His own blood,” because Christ’s blood, which it was redeemed with, was, as Christ[’s], God’s own.

<sup>f</sup> Tacit., Hist., lib. ii. c. 47.

<sup>g</sup> “Ratio porro, eaque potissima, cur ita frequenter . . . Christi mortis mentio fiat, hæc est: ut scilicet ad Dei, Cujus jussu Is animam Suam . . . pro nobis posuit, . . . Christique Ipsius charitatem nobis commendandam, jugiter ante oculos ea nobis obversetur . . . Quandoquidem

Deus Ipse fuit, Qui vitam Filii Sui, ut nos ab iniquitatibus nostris redimeret, et Sibi assereret et vindicaret, pro nobis impendit. Hinc Paulus, ab Ephesiis discessurus, inquit senioribus Ecclesiæ, ‘Attendite vobis et universo gregi,’” &c. Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 3; Op., tom. ii. p. 147. a.

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II.

§ 12. It is not here to be denied, that these terms may, by figure of speech, signify mere deliverance<sup>b</sup>: and that so they do signify in the figures of Christ in the Old Testament; when the judges and kings of Israel, when God above them, are said to redeem Israel, that is, to deliver him, without paying ransom for him: nor that the New Testament speaks likewise, when the effect only is considered. See Exod. xv. 13; Deut. vii. 8, ix. 26, xiii. 5, xxi. 8; 2 Sam. vii. 23; Nehem. i. 10; Psalm lxxxvii. 16 [Hebr.], xxxi. 6 [Hebr.], cxi. 9; Esai. xxix. 22; Luke ii. 38, xxi. 28, xxiv. 21; Acts vii. 35; Rom. viii. 23; Ephes. [iv]. 30<sup>i</sup>. As also for the terms of “buying” and “selling:” Rom. vii. 14; Esai. l. 1; Deut. xxxii. 30; Jud. iii. 8; iv. [2], 14; Ephes. v. 16; Col. iv. 5. And, therefore, it is not to be marvelled at, that the Jews, denying Christ, should deny His ransom; as not expecting to be delivered by paying ransom. But the figures of the Old Testament being performed in the New: where the sacrifice of Christ determines the ransom of Israelites (by their kings, priests, and prophets, as well as their sacrifices) to the ransom of the world by His blood; where the words of the Apostle and of our Lord express the guilt and punishment of sin, from which it redeemeth; next to the obstinacy of the Jews in not believing, it will be, to acknowledge freedom given, with the Jews, without acknowledging the consideration of a ransom, with Christians. Let us hear the Apostle ([1] Pet. i. 18—20): “Knowing, that you were not redeemed from your vain conversation delivered from your fathers with corruptible things, gold or silver, but [with<sup>j</sup>] the precious blood of Christ, as of a Lamb without spot or blemish; foreknown indeed from the foundation of the world, [“for you.”] but manifested in these last times for us.” For though the end of this ransom be expressed, because it is not immediately

<sup>b</sup> “Quis est ita hebes, quis vel in sacris Literis vel in aliis bonorum auctorum scriptis ita parum versatus, quis denique ita communis loquendi usus ignarus, qui nesciat ‘redimendi’ verbum, non dicam aliquando, non etiam sæpe, sed plerumque, et fere semper, potissimum vero apud sacros scriptores, metaphoricam prorsus significationem obtinere, adeo ut nihil aliud sit redimere, quam liberare, aut sibi asserere,

quamvis veri pretii vera solutio aliqua non interveniat? . . . Lege igitur primum Exod. xv. 13. . . Idem legitur Deut. vii. 8.” &c. Socin., *ibid.*, c. 1; *ibid.*, p. 142. a. The passages of Scripture cited above are all quoted, and in the above order, by Socinus, *ibid.*, pp. 142. a—143. a.

<sup>i</sup> For the term of “redeeming.”

<sup>j</sup> Corrected from MS. “which,” in orig. text.

attained by the paying of it, but by our will concurring with God's;—"Glorify God, because ye are bought with a price—Be not slaves to men, because ransomed by Christ—By the blood of Christ ye are redeemed from your vain conversation received from your fathers;"—yet, if the meaning were only to assure them that their deliverance will not fail them, there could no cause be given them, why the purchase of it by way of ransom should be expressed: which every man that goes to market, must needs understand to import the consideration, in which we have it. There must be indeed freedom and deliverance, where a ransom is paid; as there is in our case, if the service of God be freedom. But where the guilt of sin goes before, a clear score follows, and the death of Christ comes between them; must not the consideration, which compares them together, make even the reckoning?

CHAP.  
XXVII.  
[1 Cor. vi.  
20, vii.  
23; 1 Pet.  
i. 18, 19.]

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHRIST TOOK AWAY OUR SIN BY BEARING THE PUNISHMENT OF IT. THE PROPHECY OF ESAY LIII. WE ARE RECONCILED TO GOD BY THE GOSPEL IN CONSIDERATION OF CHRIST'S OBEDIENCE. THE RECONCILEMENT OF JEWS AND GENTILES, MEN AND ANGELS, CONSEQUENT TO THE SAME. OF PURGING AND EXPIATING SIN BY CHRIST, AND MAKING PROPITIATION FOR IT. OF CHRIST'S DYING FOR US.

THERE is further, in sacrifices, a consideration of bearing the punishment due to the sins that are expiated by them, and so taking them away: wherein the Scriptures declare the sacrifices of the Law to figure the sacrifice of Christ. So St. Paul (Gal. iii. 10, 13): "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law" (where it saith, Deut. xxvii. 26, "Cursed is every one that abideth not in all things written in the book of the Law to do them)," "becoming a curse for us; as it is written, 'Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree.'" Christ took away our sin by bearing the punishment of it.

§ 2. The exception of Socinus <sup>k</sup>,—that this belongs only to [Socinus' objection

neither pertinent nor true.]  
<sup>k</sup> "Execratio Legis, de qua in eo loco ad Galatas, non justitiam Dei in Lege expressam, cui satisfaciendum esset, sed execrationis pœnam a Lege



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II.

Jews, as a discharge of that curse which the breaking of Moses his positive law inferreth,—is neither pertinent nor true. For where the letter of the Law takes place to civil effects, there the spiritual sense thereof takes place to spiritual effects; by that which hath been said. Therefore, if the law of Moses bind the posterity of Abraham over to a curse, because they keep it not; which St. Paul supposeth; then the law written in the hearts of mankind (which the law of Moses, as it is spiritual, both containeth, and improveth), binds over mankind to that curse, which the transgression thereof inferreth. And there is no appearance, that those, whom the Apostle writes to, were Jews<sup>l</sup>; but such as, out of error, thought themselves bound to be Jews (whether in part or in whole), as they were Christians. We are, then, ransomed from the curse by the curse which Christ endured for us. When St. Paul says (2 Cor. v. 21), “Him that knew no sin He made sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him;” Socinus saith, that Christ was “made sin,” and “a curse,” because the Jews used Him as if He had been ‘sinful’ and ‘accursed’ by the Law<sup>m</sup>. But if God gave Him up to them so to be used, then was He used as sinful and accursed by the will of God, not only by the sentence of Pilate. And if we become righteousness to God, then He became not sin to man alone. Therefore, being so used, not because He, but because mankind, was sinful and accursed, the effect must be to the account of mankind, where the reason is grounded upon the consideration of it.

[It is proved by the rites of sacrifice according to the Law.]

§ 3. But why do the Israelites lay hands on the Levites, the Levites and sacrificers both on the sacrifice, but to signify the discharging of themselves, and charging their guilt upon the priests and sacrifices respectively (Levit. i. 4, Num. viii. 10—14): which their constitutions enjoin to be done “with all their might,” and “with confession of sins” (Maimoni, Of

statutam, significat. A qua pœna redempti sumus, non quia illi aliquod pretium solum fuerit, quod ridiculum est dicere: sed quia ab ea sumus exempti.” Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 1; Op., tom. ii. p. 142. b.

<sup>l</sup> See above, c. viii. § 8.

<sup>m</sup> “Præterea non potest eo loco” (2 Cor. v. 21) “peccati vocabulum

hostiam pro peccato significare, sed hominem pro peccatore habitum aperte significat. . . . Ex eo enim Dei charitas vehementer elucet, quod Eum, Qui innocentissimus erat, nostri causa, tamquam pessimum hominem atroci et infami morte occidi voluerit,” &c. &c. Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. i. c. 8; Op., tom. ii. p. 137. b.

Offering Sacrifices, iii. 6, 8, 9<sup>n</sup>). For this reason the sin offerings are given the priests, “for bearing the iniquity of the congregation, and making propitiation for them before the Lord;” Levit. x. 17. The Greek indeed translates it, “*Ἰνα ἀφέλητε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τῆς συναγωγῆς, καὶ ἐξιλάσησθε περὶ αὐτῶν ἔναντι Κυρίου*.” But the meaning is, “That ye may take iniquity away from the synagogue” (to wit, by taking it on themselves), “and make propitiation for them before the Lord.” For, in consideration of their taking the sin upon them, they are properly rewarded with the sacrifice. So Aaron “bears the iniquity of their consecrated things;” Exod. xxviii. 38. And the Levites “make propitiation, lest the people be slain for coming near.” This is the reason of that, which the Apostle observeth, Hebr. xiii. 11; that “those sacrifices for sin, the blood whereof is carried within the veil, are burnt without the camp:” because, being charged with the sin which they expiate, they are to carry it away from among them, whom they clear of it. Wherefore, going on to apply this to Christ’s suffering without Jerusalem, he sheweth the figure to be accomplished in His taking away our sins, but because they were laid on Him first. And, truly, the customs and opinions<sup>p</sup> of the heathen, in purging their sins by laying them upon their sacrifices, are so plain to this purpose; that to deny this to be the intent of that pattern, which the devil thereby corrupted, is to offer violence to common sense.

C H A P.  
XXVIII.

[Numb.  
viii. 19.]

§ 4. Here I come to the prophecy of Esay liii.: wherein, being obliged, literally, to expound it with Grotius<sup>q</sup> of the prophet Jeremy, I shall be thought by some to make it the more difficult to prove this to be the mystical sense of it.

The prophecy of  
Esay liii.

<sup>n</sup> “Manus impositio nisi in atrio non fiebat. . . Quodsi hic, qui victimam offerebat, omnino staret extra atrium sed manus intromitteret atque victimæ imponeret, legitima fuisset impositio, *siquidem totis viribus fieret.*” Moses Maimonides, De Cultu Divino (ex R. Mosis M. Secunda Lege seu Manu Forti, Libro viii.), Tract. v. De Ratione Sacrific. Faciendorum, c. iii. § 11, p. 152, as translated by L. de Veil, Paris. 1678.—“Qui manus imponebat, . . . positus inter hostiæ cornua manibus peccata confitebatur.” Id., ibid. § 14, p. 152.—“Confitens ita dicebat, Peccavi, inique egi, prævaricatus sum, commisi hoc et illud, ad pœnitentiam revertor,

atque ecce piaculum meum.” Id., ibid. § 15, pp. 152, 153.—The sections seem to be misquoted above in the text.

<sup>o</sup> Levit. x. 17. LXX. The Vulgate renders, “Ut portetis iniquitatem multitudinis et rogetis pro ea in conspectu Domini.”

<sup>p</sup> Corrected from MS. “opinion,” in orig. text.

<sup>q</sup> “Hæ notæ in Jeremiam quidem congruunt prius, sed potius sublimiusque, sæpe et magis *κατὰ λέξιν* (secundum verba), in Christum.” Grot., ad Isai. liii. 1: proceeding to expound the whole chapter in detail of Jeremias, as literally and in the first instance intended by it.

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II.

But having given myself a rule<sup>r</sup>, to maintain the difference between these two senses in the prophecies of the Old Testament; I shall forbid Socinus any advantage against the Church by it. Thus then saith the prophet (Esai. liii. 4—[12]). “But He took our sicknesses, and bore our griefs. And we thought Him plagued, smitten of God, and afflicted. But He was wounded for our transgressions, and beaten for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon Him, and by His marks we are healed. We all had gone astray like sheep, every one was turned his own way; and God made all our iniquities to meet Him. He was oppressed and afflicted, yet opened He not His mouth; He was led as a sheep to the slaughter; and as a sheep is dumb before him that shears her, so opened He not His mouth. He was taken from restraint and judgment; and His generation, who shall declare? For He was cut off from the land of the living, He was smitten for the transgression of My<sup>s</sup> people. And He made His grave with the wicked, and with the rich at His death; for no wickedness that He did, nor deceit in His mouth; yet the Lord was pleased to afflict Him with sorrows. If thou make His soul an offering for guilt, He shall see a seed; He shall prolong His days; and the good pleasure of God shall come to pass by His means. For the labour of His soul shall He see, and be satisfied. By His knowledge shall My righteous Servant justify many, and He shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I give Him a share with the great ones, and with the mighty shall He divide the spoil; because He poured out His soul to death, and was counted among transgressors, and bore the sins of many, and interceded for transgressors.”

[How the prophet Jeremy is a figure of Christ.]

§ 5. That the prophet Jeremy should be a figure of our Lord Christ in his doings and sufferings, is no more, than I have shewed that all the prophets were. That the prophet Esay should foretell the same for a figure of Christ, is no more, than that he should prophesy of our Lord Christ under the figure of himself; which he doth many times. The reason, why the prophet Jeremy is a figure of our Lord, imports no more than this: that, being sent by God to reduce

<sup>r</sup> Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xiii. § 38; and see above, c. xvi. § 2.

<sup>s</sup> Misprinted “any” in orig. text.

His people to His law, that they might continue enjoying the land of promise, he was by them taken for an enemy of his country, and used accordingly, because he foretold their ruin in case they obeyed not; and so God brought on him the merit of their sins, which he laboured to cure; but so, that, his doctrine and the event of his prophecies having reduced them to God and His law, their restitution from captivity, which he had foretold, came to pass by his means. Upon this account the prophet Jeremy is a sacrifice for his people: though no otherwise than as St. Paul exhorts the Romans, to “present their bodies [a] living sacrifice, holy, and acceptable to God” (Rom. xii. 1); or as he saith to the Philippians, “If I be poured forth” (as a drink-offering) C H A P.  
XXVIII. [“σπένδο-  
μαί” —  
“offered.”  
Eng. vers.] “upon the service and ministry of your faith” (Phil. ii. 17); or as to the Colossians (i. 24) he “supplies the remains of the afflictions of Christ in” his “flesh, for His body, which is the Church.” For the proportion will be just, between that reconcilement, which the prophet procures between God and His people by his intercession and doctrine as to their temporal estate, as a minister of God, and a figure of Christ; and that, which our Lord Christ procures between God and His Church as to the everlasting estate of it. Seeing then that Socinus acknowledges all this to be meant of the redemption of the world by the sufferings of Christ<sup>t</sup>, what advantageth it him, that it is understood literally of the prophet Jeremy? For the importance of the prophet’s words in Him 240 will take place according to the pretence of His coming, not according to the nature of the prophet Jeremy’s office.

<sup>t</sup> “Isti Esaiæ loco” (c. liii.) “jam satis responsum est, cum de hircu emissario, de quo Levit. xvi. agitur, locuti sumus. Nam, quemadmodum dicitur ibi Aharonem ponere omnia populi errata super hircum, non quia ipsi hircu imputarentur aut quia hircus ille pœnas erratis populi debitas penderet, sed quoniam ea secum asportare censebatur, non secus ac si super illum universa posita fuissent; sic Deum in Christo iniquitatem omnium nostrum sive pœnam iniquitatibus nostris debitam posuisse scriptum est, non quia Illi errata nostra imputata fuerint vel eorum pœnas Ipse vice omnium nostrum subierit, sed quoniam, non aliter atque si super Se omnes iniquitates

nostras et supplicia illis Divina lege debita habuisset, quam longissime a nobis ea asportavit atque projecit.” Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 5; Op., tom. ii. p. 150. b: proceeding to explain away similarly other portions of the same chapter, but throughout applying it to Christ.—Volkel. also (De Vera Relig., lib. v. c. 26. p. 592) expressly expounds Isaiah c. liii. of our Lord; saying, that “adeo perspicue atque evidenter in Jesum Nazarenum convenit, ut præter Hunc nemini accommodari posse videatur.”—And Socinus himself uses equally strong expressions in his Explic. Locor. S. Script., in Isai. liii.; Op., tom. i. p. 143. b.

## BOOK

## II.

[Of taking  
away sins  
by bearing  
them.]

[Isai. liii.  
4.]

§ 6. And, therefore, what if the Evangelist say, that the words of the prophet Esay—"He took away our infirmities, and carried away our diseases"—were fulfilled, when our Lord cured the blind and the lame; Matt. viii. 17. "Ἐλαβε" and "ἐβάστασε" in the Evangelist, נָשָׂא and סָבַל, I confess, signify "taking away," as well as "bearing<sup>u</sup>." And, therefore, that which the Baptist saith (Mark i. 7), "Οὐδὲ οὐκ εἰμι ἱκανὸς κύψας λῦσαι τὸν ἱμάντα τῶν ὑποδημάτων Αὐτοῦ"—"Whose shoe-latchet I am not worthy to stoop and untie," is, in St. Matth. iii. 11, "Τὰ ὑποδήματα βαστάσαι,"—not to "carry," but to "take away His shoes;" which he that looses, intends to take away. Therefore Tertullian (*Ad Marc.* iv.): "*Ipsē igitur est Christus remediator valetudinum; Hic, inquit, imbecillitates nostras aufert et languores portat*"—"Therefore Christ Himself is He that cures sicknesses; he saith, He takes away all<sup>v</sup> infirmities, and bears our diseases;"—"Portare autem Græci pro eo solent ponere, quod est tollere"—"Now the Greek is wont to put bearing," βαστάσαι, "for taking away<sup>x</sup>." And, indeed, the cure of bodily infirmities

<sup>u</sup> "Eundem prorsus loquendi modum eandemque verbi Hebræi Nasa significationem habes Num. xiv. 18, et multis aliis in locis illud verbum istam significationem obtinet; eoque usus est Esaias. . . Unde Scriptores Novi Fœderis et ipsi aliquando βαστάζειν, quod proprie 'portare' sive 'bajulare' significat, pro 'auferre' usurparunt. . . Propterea cum apud Esaiam legitur de Christo, 'Vere languores nostros Ipse tulit et dolores nostros Ipse portavit,' non intelligendum est, Christum sustinuisse universas pœnas, quas nos sustinere debueramus. . . Sed sensus eorum verborum est, Christum a nobis omnes dolores et languores nostros abstulisse, et nos (ea ratione potissimum quam paullo ante exposuimus) ab omnibus nostris malis redemisse et liberasse." Socin., *De Jesu Christi Serv.*, P. ii. c. 4; *Op.*, tom. ii. p. 149. a: quoting Tertullian as cited in next note.—"Dices vehementer coactam esse hanc interpretationem, et translationem istam verborum portandi et ferendi raro a scriptoribus sacris usurpari, immo fortasse nunquam in verbo Sabal, quo secundo loco in illis verbis utitur Propheta." Socin., *ibid.*—Gesenius gives no such meaning for the verb סָבַל.—"Ἀνήγεικεν hic est 'abstulit,' quod sequentia ostendunt:

quomodo idem verbum sumi notavimus Heb. ix. 28. Eodem sensu 'αἶρει ἀμαρτίαν,' Joh. i. 29; et נָשָׂא et סָבַל, Esai. liii. 4, ubi Græci 'φέρει.'" Grot. ad 1 Pet. ii. 24. But the same Grotius, in his Defens. Fidei Cathol. de Satisfactione Christi (*Works*, vol. iii. p. 298. b): "Materia" (satisfactionis Christi) "est tum cruciatus mortem antecedentes tum præcipue mors ipsa. Cruciatu Esaias efficaci vocabulo חֲבוּרָה (livorem), liii. 5; et Petrus 'μώλωπα' (livorem), appellavit, 1 Pet. ii. 24. (sic erat in Græca editione Esaiæ, citante Origene contra Celsum lib. 1)." And, "Hebræi ut significant quod Latini dicunt 'pœnas pendere,' nullam habent magis receptam phrasim quam hanc 'ferre peccatum;' cui similis est Latinorum locutio, luere delicta, hoc est, delictorum supplicia: eadem plane phrasi dixit Petrus, Christum peccata nostra sursum tulisse in corpore Suo in lignum" (*Id.*, *ibid.*, p. 299. b). And see *Poli Synops.* ad 1 Pet. ii. 24.

<sup>v</sup> So in orig. text: by mistake, seemingly, for "our."

<sup>x</sup> Tertull., *Adv. Marcion.*, lib. iv. c. 8; *Op.* p. 418. D. Venet. 1744.—"Ipsē igitur est Christus Esaiæ remediator valetudinum," &c.



by Christ could not be foretold by the prophet to come to pass by taking them upon Himself, but by taking them away from the people. But if we say, that He was to cure our spiritual infirmities no otherwise, neither will the figure of Jeremy, nor the words of Esay, hold so properly; which, as I said afore, are fulfilled more properly in the mystery, than in the history. For it is manifest, that bearing our sins serves to amplify the sufferings, whether of Jeremy, or of our Lord; which taking them away does not: and yet it is as well understood, that they are taken from them, by consequence; to wit, because laid on Him. For Jeremy bare the sins of the people first, as our Lord on the cross; but the cure came afterwards. Besides, when the prophet says, "If thou shalt make His soul a sacrifice for guilt;" it is manifest, that God lays the guilt on Him, which He takes from us. Thirdly, when the prophet says, "יִהְיֶה הַפְּנִיעַ בּוֹ אֶת כָּל עֲוֹנוֹתֵינוּ" (where one case of the person, another of the thing, follows the הפניע); and Socinus translates it, "God by Him met with all our iniquities<sup>z</sup>;" I say confidently, he makes it no Hebrew. Had the prophet said לְכָל עֲוֹנוֹתֵינוּ, it might have passed for Hebrew, to signify that which he says; but as it lies, at no rate. Fourthly, no man shall expound the prophet but the Apostle (1 Pet. ii. 24, 25): "Who Himself took up our sins upon His body to the cross, that being dead to sins we may live to righteousness; by Whose blue marks we are healed; for ye were as sheep going astray, but are now returned to the Pastor and Bishop of our souls." First, when St. Peter repeats the very words of Esay; to question, whether he allege this passage or not<sup>a</sup>, I suppose is ridiculous. Neither will it be of consequence, though we take ἐπι τὸ ξύλον for ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ<sup>b</sup>. For whether Christ "took our sins

[Isai. liii.  
10.][Isai. liii.  
6.]["of your  
souls."]

<sup>y</sup> The two concluding words of this verse in the original are עוֹן כָּלֵנוּ, i. e. "the iniquity of us all." Thorndike has substituted equivalent words, apparently by an oversight.

<sup>z</sup> "Necesse, ut arbitrator, omnino est, verba ita interpretari, 'Et Jehova occurrit per Eum,' sive potius, 'cum Eo, iniquitati omnium nostrum,' aut, 'Et Jehova occurrere fecit Ei iniquitatem omnium nostrum.'" Socin., De Jesu Christi Serv., P. ii. c. 5; Op., tom. ii.

p. 150. b.

<sup>a</sup> Crellius, Resp. ad Grot. de Satisf. Christi, c. i. (p. 21. b. Lond. 1656), seems to doubt it:—"Ex quo consequitur ne verisimile quidem esse aliter Petrum hac voce usum, si modo statui debet, quod vult Grotius, Apostolum ad ista Prophetæ verba respexisse." Socinus and Volkelius admit it expressly (Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 5; Op., tom. ii. p. 151. a: Volk., De Vera Relig., lib. iii. c. 18. p. 99).

<sup>b</sup> "Imo vero, si Petrus illis verbis

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up to the cross," or "bare<sup>c</sup> them upon the cross," still they remain charged on Christ, fastened to the cross. As for the Apostle, Hebr. ix. 24—28 :—where (having said, that Christ went "into heaven to appear before the face of God," without any intent to suffer Himself any more, "as the high-priest entered once a year into the Holy of Holies, with the blood" of a sacrifice; "for then must He have suffered many times since the foundation of the world;" but "was once manifested at the end of the world, to abolish sin by the sacrifice of Himself") he concludes, that, "being once offered *εἰς τὸ πολλῶν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας*"—"to take away the sins of many, He shall appear the second time without sin to the salvation of those that expect Him :"—it is here evident, that Christ was manifested at the end of the world to such in the world as knew Him not; not to God in heaven, That did. And therefore sin is abolished by the sacrifice of the cross, if by His intercession in heaven, in consideration of it. And His second appearance is "without sin," because He shall have taken sin away; but He shall have taken it away, by being offered. Therefore, if he will needs translate "*εἰς τὸ πολλῶν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας*," to "take away the sins of many<sup>d</sup>," yet can he not deny, that they are taken away by being borne upon the cross. For must we not have account from the text, in what consideration He takes them away? And is the assuring of us, that God will make good His promise, or is the moving of God to make it good, the pertinent reason <sup>241</sup> why He is said to "take away our sins by a sacrifice?" There is no doubt, that St. Peter expresses the end of Christ's sufferings<sup>e</sup> in that which follows; "Ye were as sheep going

[1 Pet. ii.  
25.]

voluisset exprimere pœnarum pro peccatis nostris perpersionem, dixisset potius '*τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἤνεγκεν ἐπὶ τῷ ξύλῳ*'—'peccata nostra tulit in ligno,' quam '*ἀνήνεγκεν ἐπὶ τῷ ξύλῳ*'—'sus-tulit' (seu mavis) 'sursum tulit in lignum.'" Crell, *ibid.* p. 20. b.

<sup>c</sup> Corrected from MS.: "bear," in fol. edition.

<sup>a</sup> "Animadvertere oportet primum, in Græco verbum, quod interpretes verterunt 'pertulit,' esse '*ἀνήνεγκεν*;' quod non 'pertulit,' sed 'abstulit,' vertendum erat." Socin., *De Jesu Christo Serv.*, P. ii. c. 6; Op., tom. ii.

p. 152. a.

<sup>e</sup> "Annon vides, quomodo Christi livor sanitas fuerit nobis? Nimirum, quia, ut Petrus dicit, . . mors Christi nos ad Deum seu mavis ad Ipsum Christum convertit, atque ab errore et perditione nostra in viam salutis revocavit. Et hac de causa Esaias quoque, quem (ut dixi) Petrus illustravit, post ea verba 'Et in livore Ejus sanitas nobis,' statim subjicit, 'Omnes nos sicut oves errabamus, quisque in viam suam declinaverat.'" Id., *ibid.* c. 5; p. 151. a.

astray," &c. : but is not therefore the consideration to be expressed, upon which that end is attained? C H A P.  
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§ 7. As for that little objection of Socinus<sup>f</sup>, that, when the prophet says, "For the labour of His soul He shall see and be satisfied; by His knowledge shall My righteous Servant justify many, and He shall bear their iniquities;"—that it must mean, "He shall take away their iniquities," because justifying went afore :—neither uses the language of the Scripture always, according to order of nature and reason, to put that first which gives the reason of that which follows; so that "bearing their iniquities" (not "taking them away") may well follow, as the reason why He justifies: and if instead of "and" we translate "for" (which is usual in the Scriptures), we silence the objection, and make the reason why He justifies, to follow in due place; to wit, "because He bears their iniquities."

§ 8. Lastly, that the prophets and righteous in general, and the Messias in particular, were to bear the sins of the world, and expiate the wrath of God for them; you may see by Grotius upon Matt. xx. 28<sup>g</sup>, that the Jews have under-

<sup>f</sup> "Verba prophetæ sunt: 'Propter laborem,'" &c. "An non ea, quæ portationem illam proxime antecedunt et laboris Christi effecta constituuntur, mortem Christi tempore sunt consequuta et per tot secula adhuc fiunt? At quid absurdus est, quam, his enumeratis, tum demum eum mortis Christi (ut Grotius vult) effectum subijcere, quod luiturus sit pœnas multorum, qui ceteros, quos propheta jam expresserat, tempore antecessisset, et, nedum ut hodie adhuc duret, quemadmodum isti, una cum morte Christi cessasset?" Crell., Resp. ad Grot. de Satisf. Christi, c. i. (p. 25. a). And see Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 6. (Op., tom. ii. p. 152. a).

<sup>g</sup> "Fatetur Josephus Albo, in disputatione adversus Christianos, proditum ab Hebræis, solere sapientes in semetipsis tolerare supplicia multitudini peccatorum debita; atque ita jussum Ezechielem 'recumbere in latus suum et sustinere supplicium, in se transferendo iniquitatem domus Israel.' Et Philoni *ὁ σπουδαῖος τοῦ φαύλου λύτρον* ('vir bonus mali hominis redemptio'). Sic Joseph Jacchiades, ad Danielis xi. 35, ait doctores Israelitarum durissima quæque passuros, et fore eos altare ex-

piationis pro peccatis populi. Idem dicit, ad Esaiæ liii. 5, gentes alias expiatis Deumque eis placatum per pœnas Israelitis impositas. Sic populus Israeliticus dicere solebat sacerdoti maximo, Nos tibi piamento simus; id est, In nos cadat siquid male tibi esset eventurum. Eleazar, in Sermone de Septem Fratribus qui Josepho adscribitur, Deum pro populo sic deprecatur: 'Καθάρισον αὐτῶν ποιήσαι τὸ ἡμῶν αἷμα, καὶ ἀντὶ ψυχῶν αὐτῶν λάβε τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν.' . . Dicit et Abarbanel Josiam pœnam tulisse peccatorum populi, non suorum. De Mose et Aaron Moses Alschech dicit similia, et de justis generatim. Idem de Daniele Chaldæus Cantici vii. 8. Et Jalcud, 'suscipere in se peccata,' quod dicto loco liii. cap. Esaiæ est, per 'expiare' exponit. Et Chaldæus propter eum de quo Esaias agit ait Deum reatum remissurum, propter ipsum fore peccatorum remissionem. Messiam pœnas toleraturum pro Israele ad eundem locum ait Moses Alschech. Nec alienum hinc illud Philonis; 'Ὁ ἀληθὴς θεραπευτὴς τε καὶ ἰκέτης, κὰν εἰς ἂν ἀνηρ ἀριθμῶ τυγχάνη, δυνάμει, καθάπερ αὐτὸς αἰρεῖται, σύμπασι ἐστὶν ὁ λῶσις, ἰσότημος ὕλας ἔθνεσι γεγο- νῶσι.'" Grot., ad Matt. xx. 28.

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stood out of this place of the prophet Esay. Which is prejudice enough: if they, who understand not the reason why and how we say our Lord expiates sin by bearing it, and whose interest it concerns not to understand it by the native sense of the prophet's words, find that, which Christians deny, and by denying prejudice the common cause. Which to acknowledge, prejudices not Christianity; understanding as much difference between that expiation which they make, and that which Christ makes, as Christianity puts between Christ and Christians.

We are reconciled to God by the Gospel in consideration of Christ's obedience.  
[2 Cor. v. 18—21.]

§ 9. Let us now consider that "reconciliation," which, St. Paul saith many times, is wrought for us by Christ's death. 2 Cor. v. 18—[21]: "All things are of God, That hath reconciled us to Himself by Jesus Christ, and given us the ministry of reconcilement; as that God was reconciling the world to Himself by Christ, not imputing to them their transgressions, and putting the word of reconciliation upon us: we are therefore ambassadors in Christ's stead, as if God did exhort you by us; we beseech you in Christ's stead, Be reconciled to God: for Him, That knew no sin, He made sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him." Socinus marvels, how any man can imagine, that Christ can proffer us reconcilement, and not be reconciled to us when He proffers it<sup>h</sup>. An imagination as ridiculous as his, that fancied he should meet his fellow, before his fellow met him. For if reconcilement be between two, though one may provide the means (as in our case God), though out of love, yet, seeing as yet He only offers friendship, that is to say, seeing as yet we are not made friends, it is manifest, that both are reconciled at once. And doth not experience of the world shew, that, when princes and states are at war, the one out of a desire of peace seeks means of reconcilement, but is not reconciled before the other agree. So, God engages to be reconciled, by publishing the Gospel, while He gives

<sup>h</sup> "Ex his verbis" (2 Cor. v. 17—21) "liquet primum, Ipsum Deum fuisse Qui nos per Christum Sibi reconciliavit; . . . et ideo reconciliationem per Christum factam non Dei erga nos placationem sed nostri erga Illum conversionem, unde stabilis cum Eo amicitia consecuta fuerit, significare; et tantum

abesse ut in reconciliatione hac peragenda Christus nobis Deum placaverit, ut potius Eum jam placatum ostenderit, et ab Eo jam placato ad nos, qui adhuc Illius inimici eramus, Sibi reconciliandos missus fuerit." Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. i. c. 8; Op., tom. ii. p. 137. a.

man leave to deliberate ; but is not reconciled, till man undertake Christianity by being baptized. So, when God seeks to be reconciled to men, it is true, as St. Paul says, He “ imputes not their transgressions to them :” for if He should prosecute their sins by imputing them, He should not seek reconciliation. But when He is reconciled, it is a contradiction, that He should impute them. Now, though the Apostles are messengers of reconciliation “ in Christ’s stead,” yet with this difference, that He also furnished the means, they only brought the message. St. Paul therefore, having signified this means afore (when he says, that, “ not imputing to the world their transgressions,” He sought to be reconciled with them by Christ), and inferring, “ Him That knew no sin He made sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him ;” either he makes no difference between our Lord, and the Apostles, or it is expressed by these words in reference to that which went afore ; to wit, that God was willing to be reconciled with the world, because He had provided Christ, and Christ had undertook the sins of it.

§ 10. So again, Rom. v. 10, 11 : “ For if, being enemies, <sup>[Rom. v. 10, 11.]</sup> we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much <sup>242</sup> more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by His life : nor only so ; but we glory in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom we have received reconciliation.” From what shall we be saved by being reconciled ? “ From wrath,” saith <sup>[Rom. v. 9.]</sup> the Apostle, in the words next afore. Therefore, before reconciliation we were under wrath. And surely there is a difference between the right and title that we have to be reconciled with God (though upon condition of our conversion to Christianity), and between the state of reconciliation, which is our right to life : but so, that, if the state be from Christ (as St. Paul saith, “ we have received reconciliation by Christ”), then is the right to it in consideration of Christ ; when he saith, that, “ being enemies, we were reconciled to God by His death.”

§ 11. St. Paul again, arguing, how God hath “ abolished” the difference between Jew and Gentile by the Law, pursues it thus, Eph. ii. 15, 16 : “ That He might make up both into one new man, through Himself making peace ; and reconcile both in one body to God, by the cross, slaying the enmity

The reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles, men and angels, consequent to the same.



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by it." Here Socinus will have us to construe "τῷ Θεῷ," not with "ἀποκαταλλάξῃ," but absolutely, "to the behoof and glory of God<sup>1</sup>." Which had a schoolboy done, he should have been whipt; for seeking something out of the text to govern that case, which he hath a verb in the text to govern. Therefore the Gentiles are indeed reconciled to the Jews, according to St. Paul. But why? Because "both to God."

§ 12. And therefore the reason is the same in the reconciliation of "men and angels," Col. i. 19—22: "For in Him He pleased that all fulness should dwell; and by Him to reconcile all to Himself, pacifying through Him by the blood of His cross, whether the things that are on earth, or that are in heaven: and you, being once estranged, and enemies in your mind through evil works, now hath He reconciled by the body of His flesh through death." Especially comparing this with the purpose of God, which he declareth, Ephes. i. 10: "For the ordering of the fulness of time, to recollect all in Christ, whether things in heaven, or on earth." For that which here he terms "ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι εἰς Χριστὸν"—  
 ["ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ."] "to recollect unto Christ" (that is, by Christ to reduce to the original state of dependence upon God), is in part the same with "ἀποκαταλλάξαι εἰς Ἐαυτὸν"—"to reconcile to Himself," afore; but wholly agrees not; inasmuch as this particularly concerns the case of mankind, whose sin required reconciliation, that they might be reduced to God in one body with the holy angels, that had no sin. All this the Apostle meant to express at once, and yet imply what was particular to man, besides that which belonged to the angels. And we must either admit reconciliation between men and angels, because both reduced to God ("ἀποκαταλλάξαι εἰς Αὐτὸν" signifying "ἀποκαταλλάξαι Αὐτῷ,"—that is, "Ἐαυτῷ," because of Christ mention had been made afore, Col. i. 20;— as "τετηρημένη εἰς ἡμᾶς," 1 Pet. i. 4, is "τετηρημένη ἡμῖν;" and 1 Pet. i. 25, "τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς" is "ἡμῖν;" and "νίθεσσία εἰς Αὐτὸν," Ephes. i. 5, is "νίθεσσία Ἐαυτῷ;" and "ἡμεῖς εἰς Αὐτὸν," 1 Cor. viii. 6, Αὐτῷ): or shew, how the

["εἰς ἡμᾶς."]

<sup>1</sup> "Ita interpretor ego illa verba, ' Ut reconciliaret ambos in uno corpore Deo;' ut scilicet significet, non quidem reconciliatos Deo ipsos" (Judæos

et Gentiles) "fuisse, sed inter se: Deo tamen, id est, ad serviendum Deo, Eique sese totos dedicandum." Socin., *ibid.*, P. i. c. 8; *ibid.*, p. 138. a, b.

angels are reduced to God by the death and blood-shed of Christ His cross. CHAP.  
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§ 13. It remains, that I say something of the effect of all this in “cleansing” and “purging of sin,” and in “making propitiation and atonement for it.” Of which you have the words of the Apostle, 1 John i. 7 : “If we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship with one another, and the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin.” Where, cleansing of sin by Christ’s blood supposing the condition of Christianity, it is manifest, that the effect of Christ’s blood in cleansing of sin, is not to bring us to Christianity. Again, 1 John ii. 1, 2 : “If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous ; and He is the propitiation for our sins ; and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world.” Saith Socinus<sup>k</sup>, “Jesus Christ the righteous,” that is, “Jesus Christ the faithful :”—(1 John i. 9 ; “If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive our sins, and cleanse us from all unrighteousness :”)—that so He may be thought to expiate our sins by testifying the covenant which engages God’s faith. So far he goes for an interpretation, that destroys the virtue of Christ’s intercession, founded upon His innocence : 1 Peter i. 19 ; Isaiah liii.

243 7—9. For if Christ be an effectual advocate because He suffered innocently for God’s will, then, not only, because He hath obliged God by dealing in His name to make good what He hath promised us. Whereas, if His blood be a propitiation for the sins of Christians, that are not any more to be moved to receive the faith, as well as for the sins of the rest of the world, that are ; it must be the same consideration of Christ’s obedience, that moves the goodness of God to send the Gospel to the world, and to make it good to Christians. And what *ἰλασμός*, *ἰλάσκω*, or *ἴλαος* means, is seen by the Latin *hilaris*, according to Hesychius : “*ἴλαος*,” saith he, is “*ἰλαρὸς* ;” and “*ἰλαρὸς, περιχαρῆς τῇ ὄψει*”—“cheerful in countenance ;” and “*ἰλαρῶς, εὐθύμως, φαιδρῶς*”—“cheerfully,

<sup>k</sup> “Ex eo igitur quod Jesus Christus, Qui justus est, id est, fidelis et verax, in cælo apud Patrem in dextera majestatis considet ; Ejus patrocinio sustentamur ac fovemur : etiam quæ

Ille promisit, nobis præstitum iri certo statuere possumus.” Id., *ibid.*, P. ii. c. 21 ; *Op.*, tom. ii. p. 174. b : commenting upon 1 Joh. ii. 1, 2 : and see also *ibid.*, c. 13. p. 163. b.

Of purging and expiating sin by Christ, and making propitiation for it.

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II.

["ἰλάσ-  
κεσθαι."]

["παρα-  
βάσεων."]

merrily<sup>1</sup>." So, the condition of Christianity being supposed in these words also, the consideration of Christ's blood makes the face of God cheerful to a Christian, that sinneth. Here they allege "ἐξιλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας," Hebr. ii. 17, to signify "expiating sins;" and that must presently be by bringing men to be Christians<sup>m</sup>. But there is in diverse speeches of this subject that figure, which Servius so often observes in Virgil, calling it Hypallage<sup>n</sup>. As "καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν," Hebr. i. 3: it is not the sin, that is cleansed; but man from sin. And yet the Apostle says of Christ, "Who having made purgation of sins." So, neither are sins ransomed, but men from sin. And yet he saith again, Hebr. ix. 15, "Εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ ἁμαρτιῶν"—"For the ransoming of the sins that were under the former covenant." And this is the true sense of Dan. iv. 24<sup>o</sup>; "Ἀπολύτρωσον τὰς ἁμαρτίας σου"—"Redeem thy sins." For though a man ransoms not his sins, yet he ransoms himself from his sins, by repentance; as I said afore<sup>p</sup>. So, seeing propitiation tends to make God propitious, of angry; it is manifest, that "ἐξιλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας," for variety, or brevity, or elegance of language, stands for "ἐξιλάσκεσθαι Θεὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν." As for the Hebrew verb, כפר, whereof ἐξιλάσκεσθαι is alleged to be the Greek, in the signification of "expiating a man of sin," which the sacrifice of Christ does, say they<sup>q</sup>, by persuading him to be a

<sup>1</sup> "Ἰλάως, ἰλέως, ἰλαρῶς, εὐμενῶς." Hesych., Lexic., sub voce Ἰλάως.—"Ἰλαρὸς, περιχαρὴς τῇ ὕψει." Id., ibid., sub voce Ἰλαρὸς.—"Ἰλαρῶς, εὐθύμως, φαιδρῶς." Id., ibid., sub voce Ἰλαρῶς.

<sup>m</sup> "Ex quibus verbis" (Heb. ii. 17) "planum fit, Christum, postquam passus est, expiare peccata nostra. Quod certe de perenni vi et efficacia expiationis quæ in cruce peracta fuerit intelligi non potest." Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 21; Op., tom. ii. p. 174. b.—"Adeo autem verum est expiationem peccatorum nostrorum, antequam Christus in cælum ingrederetur, peractam non fuisse, ut etiam, postquam in cælum ingressus est, expiare adhuc, et quidem in perpetuum, nostra peccata dicatur; non quidem, ut vos creditis, ob vim et efficacitatem expiationis jam in cruce peractæ, quæ

perennis sit: sed quia perpetuo, in cælis ad Dei dexteram collocatus, Divinæ liberalitatis nos admonet et ad eam amplectendam jugiter movet, et summa auctoritate qua apud Deum pollet, . . . nos et servat et servaturus est." Id., ibid., p. 174. a, b.

<sup>n</sup> E. g. in Virg. Ecl. iii. 43:—"Necdum illis labra admovi;" Hypallage est; pocula enim labris adhibebimus." And so in more than thirty other places; for which see the Index to Servius.

<sup>o</sup> See above, c. ix. § 14. note m: and c. xxvii. § 11. note b.

<sup>p</sup> Above, c. xxvii. § 11.

<sup>q</sup> See above, note m: and Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 11; Op., tom. ii. pp. 158. b, 159. a: and Volkel., De Vera Relig., lib. iii. c. 38. pp. 150, 151.

Christian: sometimes it is said of the priest making propitiation for the sanctuary or the altar, with the particle  $\pi\alpha\varsigma$ ; or for the people, with the particle  $\beta\gamma$ , as Levit. xvi. 33. And then, out of that which hath been said, it may appear, how the sacrifice is the consideration whereupon it is made. But if it be said of God, as Jer. xviii. 23, Ps. lxxix. 9, with the particle  $\beta\gamma$ , it seems to express God propitious to sin (when it is said, "Be propitious to our sins, Be not propitious to their sins"), without signifying how, or upon what consideration, He becomes propitious.

§ 14. The Apostle says again, Hebr. ix. 12; that "Christ entered into the Holy of Holies, not with the blood of goats and bullocks, but with His own blood, having found," that is, obtained, "everlasting ransom:" to wit, by the sacrifice of the cross. They say the indefinite tense signifies not always the time past<sup>r</sup>. And I grant, it is enough, that the time which it signifies be past to him that speaks; as "*ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν*," which you have so often in the Gospels, "He answered and said," arguing no priority between answering and speaking: but necessarily, that our Saviour "answered and said" before the Evangelist related it; for sometimes it concerns not which is first, as whether our Lord first answered or first said. So, Hebr. ii. 10. When therefore the Apostle says, that "Christ entered into the Holy of Holies, *ἀπολύτρωσιν αἰωνίαν εὐράμενος*," he saith not "*εὐρήσομενος*" (which he might as easily have said); nor meant, that He should or would find ransom by delivering His brethren from sin: but that He "had found ransom" by paying the price of their sin. For deliverance from sin is future in respect of the Apostle, and the time when he writ; which *εὐράμενος* cannot signify. Besides, if there be question, what but the nature of the thing signified can determine the order that is between them? Now, in our case, ransom is ascribed always to the sacrifice (as I have shewed), never to the sprinkling of the

<sup>r</sup> "Deinde, quod attinet ad locum" (Epist. ad Heb.) "cap. ix. v. 12, animadvertere poterat Grotius, aoristos illos participiorum, qualis est *εὐράμενος* seu *εὐράμενος*, verbis quæ antea actum tempus significant, adjunctos, non semper requirere, ut actio illis expressa præcesserit eam, quæ designatur verbis

quibus junguntur, sed interdum vim habere participiorum temporis præsentis aut imperfecti, quando verbis præteriti temporis (quo aoristos etiam complectimur) adjunguntur." Crell., Resp. ad Grot. de Satisf. Christi, c. x.; p. 225. a.

[ "*ἀγαγό-  
τα*," of  
time pre-  
sent. Heb.  
ii. 10.]  
[ "*λύτρω-  
σιν*." ]

blood before the propitiatory. So, Hebr. i. 3; when it is said, "Christ, having made purgation of sins, sat down at the right hand of God." For if it be said, that He "made purgation of sin" by that assurance of pardon, which the appearance of<sup>244</sup> His blood before God gives Christians; manifest it is, that what is attributed to the sprinkling of the blood before the propitiatory, must be understood to be effected by virtue of the blood shed at the altar. The case is plain; (Hebr. xii. [22], 24.) "You are come . . . to the blood of sprinkling, that speaks better things than that of Abel." Abel's blood shed called for vengeance; therefore Christ's blood shed for remission of sins.

§ 15. Herewith agreeth St. Paul, Rom. iii. 25; "Whom God hath proposed a propitiatory through faith in His blood." Late writers<sup>s</sup> so translate *ἱλαστήριον*, in the notion of a place; as *δεσμοπήριον*, *κοιμητήριον*, *ἄκροατήριον*, of the same form. For my part, I rather follow Hesychius<sup>t</sup>, or rather those that he followed: who most certainly had regard to this text, when they expound "*ἱλαστήριον*," "*καθάρσιον θυσιαστήριον*"—"a purging sacrifice," or an "altar," as the means to make God propitious; which is clear for our purpose. But whether the place or the means, why did God appear propitious upon the ark, but because made propitious by that which it signified, Christ incarnate, and by the blood of the sacrifice signifying the blood of His cross? Therefore they prayed towards the ark under the Law, as under the Gospel towards the east; and found God propitious, because of the consideration in which they directed their prayers; directed by our Lord, John xvi. 23—26. To which purpose we may observe the purging of the altar, tabernacle, and all within the veil, by the blood of the sacrifices: Levit. xvi. 16, 20, 33; Ezek. xliii. 20, 22, 26; xlv. 20. For what purging needed they, but as they became polluted by the sins of the people? As the land, which was holy, "being polluted by blood-shed, must be cleansed by the blood of him that shed it;" Num. xxxv. 33. Therefore the congregation became

<sup>s</sup> So e. g. Hammond (in loc.): and Grotius (in loc).—"Propitiationem." Vulg. — "Placamentum." Beza.—"Propitiation." Eng. Vers. — The translation "propitiatorium" is as old

as Theophylact (in loc.).

<sup>t</sup> Hesych., Lexic., sub voce ἱλαστήριον. — "ἱλαστήριον, θυσιαστήριον." Suidas, sub voce.—And see Suicer, Thesaur., sub voce.



guilty, when he that did a murder was not taken, because the land was promised to the congregation; and therefore an expiation is appointed, Deut. xxi. 1—9. In correspondence whereunto it must be granted, that the world and the heavens, being polluted with man's sin (which is that "bondage of vanity and corruption, under which," St. Paul saith, that "the whole creature groaneth, desiring to be delivered into that freedom" which the resurrection shall restore; Rom. viii. 19—22), were to be expiated by the sacrifice of Christ's body brought in, and His blood sprinkled there (Hebr. ix. 23); that in consideration of His obedience and sufferings God might be found propitious there.

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§ 16. So the everlasting intercession of Christ is grounded upon the everlasting ransom. Hebr. vii. 24 [25]: this "Priest, remaining for ever, hath an everlasting priesthood; wherefore He is able perfectly to save those, that come to God by Him, always living to intercede for them:" to wit, by pleading His own blood, the ransom of all sin. This is the ground of all our prayers, and the confidence which we may make them with; in particular, for the cleansing of sin, after reconcilment. Of which St. Paul, Rom. viii. 34: "Christ it is That died, or rather That is risen again; Who also is at the right hand of God, making intercession for us." And this is the necessity of Christ's sufferings, which the Apostle pleads Hebr. ii. 14—18: that He might be sensible of ours. For if the guilt be taken away by His intercession succeeding His sufferings, then did He suffer that it might succeed. And thus are our sins forgiven "for His name," [“διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ.”] or "by His name;" [1] John ii. 12. Which Socinus<sup>u</sup> will have to be God's name; as in the Old Testament, Esai. xliii. 25, Psalm xxv. 11, lxxix. 9, cvi. 8, cxliii. 11. But if the name of God be in Christ under the New Testament, as in the

<sup>u</sup> "Primum id, quod illi asserunt de significatione pronominis *αὐτοῦ* apud Johannem, non recte dictum est. Non enim Christum eo pronomine magis, quam Deum, designare solet. . . . De Deo igitur, non minus quam de Christo, ea verba 'propter nomen Ejus' dicta fuisse, ex Johannis loquendi consuetudine merito suspicari possumus; præsertim cum aliis in locis apud Divinos scriptores legatur, Deum remittere et

delere peccata propter Se seu propter nomen Suum; ut Esa. xliii. 25, et Psal. xxv. 11, et lxxix. 9: propter nomen Suum servare ac vivificare, ut Psal. cvi. 8, et cxliii. 11: et alia ejusmodi plurima. Quod autem propter Christum sive propter nomen Christi nobis peccata remittantur, nusquam alibi (ni fallor) disertè scriptum extat." Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 25; Op., tom. ii. p. 182. a, b.

B O O K angel that represented God in the Old (as I have shewed<sup>x</sup>);  
 II. then, when we pray in Christ's name, we pray in God's name,  
 though in consideration of Christ's merits.

Of Christ's § 17. Upon the premises depends the true meaning of all  
 dying for those Scriptures, where Christ is said to have "died for us,"  
 us. and "for our righteousness." Not as if the preposition "for"  
 [John xi. 51, 52; could determine, whether we are to understand the final  
 Rom. v. 6, 8; xiv. 15; cause in respect of man, to move him to accept of Christ, or  
 1 Cor. viii. 11; xv. 3; the impulsive cause in respect of God, moving Him to grant  
 2 Cor. v. 14, 15; the Gospel. For when St. John says, that "we ought to lay  
 1 Thess. v. 10; &c.] down our lives for the brethren," as "Christ for us" ([1] John  
 iii. 16); it is manifest, that our life is no ransom for the  
 brethren, as Christ's for us. And when St. Peter saith, he <sup>245</sup>  
 "will lay down" his "life" for Christ (John xiii. 37, 38); he  
 means not, to move God thereby to spare his Master's life.  
 And yet notwithstanding, when Esau sold his birth-right "for  
 a mess of pottage" (Hebr. xii. 16); he gave away his birth-  
 right in consideration of it. And should God have taken  
 St. Paul's life upon condition of saving the Jews, they must  
 have been saved in consideration of his becoming "anathema  
 for" them; Rom. ix. 3. And Caiaphas thought, that Christ  
 must be destroyed, lest the Romans should think that they  
 would rebel under Him as their true prince; and so it was  
 necessary, that "Christ should die for the people:" John  
 xi. 50—52. But in what sense do Christians find it true?  
 Surely, no man, that ever prayed to God in Christ's name,  
 need to be told it.

§ 18. It is requisite, therefore, that we have recourse to  
 the consideration of those things, which the Scripture uses to  
 join with the mention of Christ's "dying for us;" if we will  
 rightly determine the meaning of it. And so, having pre-  
 mised the consideration of a sacrifice upon which our sins  
 were charged, of our ransom by the price of it, of reconcilia-  
 tion and propitiation for sin obtained for us by it, we must  
 conclude, that when the Scripture speaks of Christ's "death  
 for us," the meaning of it cannot be satisfied by granting,  
 that He died to move us to be Christians.

<sup>x</sup> Above, c. xiii. § 6.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

THE GRANT OF GRACE IN CONSIDERATION OF CHRIST SUPPOSES SATISFACTION MADE BY HIM FOR SIN. NEITHER OUR SINS IMPUTABLE TO CHRIST, NOR HIS SUFFERINGS TO US, FORMALLY AND PERSONALLY ; BUT AS THE MERITORIOUS CAUSES WHICH SATISFACTION ANSWERETH. THE EFFECT OF IT, THE COVENANT OF GRACE : AS WELL AS HELP TO PERFORM IT. THE FATHERS SAVED BY THE FAITH OF CHRIST TO COME. THE GOSPEL A NEW LAW. THE PROPERTY OF SATISFACTION AND PUNISHMENT IN CHRIST'S SUFFERINGS. OF THE SENSE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

THERE remains one argument from the premises, where I concluded, that effectual grace is appointed from everlasting, and therefore granted in time, in consideration of Christ and His merits ; according to St. Paul, Ephes. i. 3—6. For if this grace be granted in consideration of Christ, and life everlasting appointed from everlasting, and granted in time, in consideration of that quality which this grace effecteth ; it cannot in reason be avoided, that remission of sin and life everlasting is granted here in right and title, and in effect in the world to come, in consideration of that quality, which the effectual helps of grace of their own nature tend to produce, which they are appointed by God to produce, and which really and in effect [by them<sup>y</sup>] are produced, being granted by God in consideration of Christ's obedience.

§ 2. But why should I be so solicitous to restore all those Scriptures to their true meaning, which they have set upon the rack to make them speak a false ; having such evidence of reason, that by this position they make the death of Christ void and needless, even in their own judgment ? For though, if they should say, that Christ came only to shew those works that might be sufficient to make His Gospel credible and give us good example, I could not say, that the death of Christ were to no end ; yet would they say, that it were to no competent end, complaining (as they do) how much they are wronged, when they are understood to acknowledge no

The grant of grace in consideration of Christ supposes satisfaction made by Him for sin.

[The death of Christ rendered void and needless by the position of Socinus.]

<sup>y</sup> Corrected from MS. "thus," in orig. text.

further end of His coming<sup>z</sup>. But when they say, that He died to induce men to be Christians by enacting the covenant of grace (that is, assuring them, that God will stand to it on His part, and that, according to the example of Christ, bearing His cross, they shall attain His glory<sup>a</sup>); I demand, how all this can be more assurance than every man hath, that is peremptorily assured otherwise (as no man doubts, but competently it may be assured otherwise), that the Gospel of 246 Christ is God's message. For when sufficient evidence is once made, and a man is convinced to believe, that God promises remission of sins and everlasting life to them that embrace it; can he, that believes God to be God, remain any more doubtful of the truth of His promise? To Pharaoh and to his people, it was necessary, that the wonders of God should be repeated; till they stood convict, that there was no God else, which they believed not afore: but to them, that admit the God of Israel to be the only true God, being convict that the Gospel is His promise, is any further assurance requisite, that He will stand to it; Who were not God, if He should not stand to it? When they say, that Christ died to the end, that being advanced to be God He might be able to bring His promises to effect<sup>b</sup>; I refer myself to the

<sup>z</sup> "Satisfactionem Christi non agnoscere dicimur: nos vero agnoscimus Deo dignam et Sacris Litteris consentaneam; Deo indignam, et a Scripturæ sententia vehementer abhorrentem merito repudiamus." Crell., Præf. ad Respons. ad Grot. de Satisf. Christi; sign. \*2 b. (not paged).

<sup>a</sup> "Ego censeo et orthodoxam sententiam esse arbitror, Jesum Christum ideo servatorem nostrum esse, quia salutis æternæ viam nobis annuñciaverit, confirmaverit, et in sua Ipsius persona, cum vitæ exemplo, tum ex mortuis resurgendo, manifeste ostenderit, vitamque æternam nobis Ei fidem habentibus Ipse daturus sit. Divinæ autem justitiæ, per quam peccatores damnari mereremur, pro peccatis nostris neque Illum satisfecisse, neque ut satisfieret opus fuisse, affirmo." Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. i. c. 1; Op., tom. ii. p. 121. a. And see *ibid.* cc. ii—viii.; *ibid.* pp. 124. a, sq. and his Præl. Theol., c. xx. Op., tom. i. pp. 577. a, sq.—"Ex dictis intelligi potest duplex potissimum ratio, qua mors Christi remissionem peccatorum ac salutem no-

bis peperit: altera est, quod Deus morte Christi, veluti pignore dato, ad illam nobis dandam Sese obligarit; altera vero, quod hac via Christus potestatem amplissimo hoc beneficio nos afficiendi fuerit consecutus. . . . Verum hic alia præterea Christi mortis subest utilitas. Consentaneum enim immensæ Dei bonitati erat, Eum fidelibus constituere salutis principem, Qui non solum viam ea qua diximus ratione ad illam muniret, sed etiam omnibus istis malis prægustatis misericors pontifex fieret, in tantoque propter istam obedientiam dignitatis ac potentiæ gradu collocatus non modo posset sed et vellet nobis periclitantibus subvenire." Volkel., De Vera Relig., lib. iii. c. 18. pp. 96, 101. And see also lib. v. c. 31. p. 623.—"Postquam jam Christum pro nobis seu via nostra legem minime præstitisse . . . ostendimus, consequens est, ut nec Illum cruenta morte Sua justitiæ Dei pro nobis satisfecisse . . . demonstramus." *Id.*, *ibid.*, lib. v. c. 22. p. 570.

<sup>b</sup> See above, § 2. note b; and c. x. § 5.

sense of any man, that is able to think of God with due reverence, whether it be possible to imagine, that a mere man, having made promises to mankind in God's name, can live with God to see God's promises frustrate: and, by consequence, whether it can appear necessary, that our Lord Christ should be advanced to be God, that He might be able, in His own person, to fulfil the promises which He had made us in His Father's name. I refer myself to that which I have said<sup>c</sup>, to shew the Word of God, Which took the flesh of man from the Virgin, to be God from everlasting, as the Son of God, and His everlasting Wisdom and Image: and, therefore, not advanced to be God in consideration of His obedience; but that, having condescended to that state, which His obedience in doing His Father's message and testifying the truth thereof required, the Son of God incarnate was advanced in our flesh by the appointment of God, in reward of His obedience, to the privilege of sending the Holy Ghost, to make His Gospel effectual to convert the nations to Christianity, that by them He might be acknowledged and glorified for that which He was from everlasting. So that, the end of His coming being to obtain that grace, by which the world might be converted to Christianity, and, being converted, obtain remission of sins and life everlasting for it; and neither of these purposes admitted by Socinus: we may well say to him, as St. Paul says to the Jews, Gal. ii. 21; "If righteousness be by the Law, then is Christ dead in vain." So, if righteousness came as Socinus would have it, then is Christ dead to no purpose; because all that he requires might have been as well effected without it: whereas a due valuable consideration, in regard whereof the converting grace of the Holy Ghost, and remission of sins and life everlasting in consideration of the effect thereof, should be granted, could not have been had without it.

§ 3. It is strange to be observed, how little Socinus hath to produce out of the Scriptures, to prove a position of such consequence as this; all his business (in a manner) being to draw those texts, which hitherto have been understood in the sense of the Church, to his intent<sup>d</sup>. I can, for the present,

[How little Socinus hath for his position out of the Scriptures.]

<sup>c</sup> Above, cc. xiii.—xvi.; and especially c. xiv. § 5, c. xv. § 15.

<sup>d</sup> This is almost exclusively the purpose of Parts ii. and iv. of Socinus De



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II.

recal no more, than those frequent passages of the Apostles (especially St. Paul), whereby they affirm the righteousness and salvation of Christians to come by the mere grace of God and our Lord Christ. Which I need not here repeat; no ways apprehending the inference, that it cannot be said to come from the mere grace of God, if I suppose the consideration of Christ's obedience and sufferings as the purchase of it. It is true<sup>e</sup>, in the words of the prophet, Jeremy xxxi. 31—34. (alleged by the Apostle, Hebr. viii. 8—12, to be meant of the Gospel), we find a promise of God to pardon the sins of His people, without expressing any consideration in regard whereof He would do it. And likewise our Lord, in the parable of the master that forgave his servant "ten thousand talents<sup>e</sup>" (Matt. xviii. 23—[34]), seems to express God's pardon, which His Gospel publisheth, to be free from any consideration in which it is either proclaimed or granted. But as I said<sup>f</sup> to our Antinomians (who will needs believe, upon the warrant of the prophet's words, that their sins are pardoned, merely in consideration of Christ, without regard to any disposition requisite to qualify them for it by the Gospel<sup>g</sup>), that it was neither requisite nor fit, that the terms, <sup>247</sup> upon which the blessings promised by the Gospel are granted, should be expressed by the prophecy, that only foretelleth the coming of it (being to be gathered from that proportion, which the Law, in regard of the land of promise, holds to the Gospel, in regard of the world to come); so say I to the Socinians (who will needs have the same words to signify, that, supposing the disposition that qualifies for the promises of the Gospel, they suppose no consideration of the obedience of Christ<sup>h</sup>), that (though the terms of the Gospel are not ex-

Jesu Christo Servatore, and forms no small portion of the other two Parts of the same work.

<sup>e</sup> "Quæ" (penitentia et resipiscencia) "modo adsit, Deum pro ingenti bonitate Sua, nulla vera satisfactione accepta, nobis peccata remittere voluisse in Novo Fœdere, quod nobiscum per Christum percutere dignatus est, constanter affirmo, et nunc potissimum contendo. Id quod verissimum esse, vel ex illis Divini illius oraculi verbis" (Jerem. xxxi. 34.) "constare potest: 'Quia propitius ero iniquitati eorum, et peccati eorum non recorda-

bor amplius.'" Socin., *ibid.*, P. iii. c. 2; *Op.*, tom. ii. p. 191. a.—"Primum igitur considerandum est, in hac parabola nullam mentionem fieri satisfactionis, quam rex ille a quoquam servo, cui debitum remisit, aut accepit aut requisierit. Quod satis demonstrare videtur, Deum similiter pro nobis, quibus peccata remittit, nullam satisfactionem a quoquam vel accepisse vel requisivisse." *Id.*, *ibid.*, p. 193. a.

<sup>f</sup> Above, c. iii. § 9.

<sup>g</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>h</sup> See above in note e.

pressed by the prophet, foretelling the coming of it, as being included in those of the Law, by virtue of the proportion aforesaid) it were strange to think, that the coming and death of Christ is not sufficient since to determine the meaning of the prophet's words to it. And so likewise to the parable: that, if our Saviour found it not fit to express the consideration, upon which the pardon which the Gospel publishes is passed, yet, His death and sufferings coming after to interpret the intent of that which He had said before, that was to be declared, it is strange, that they should not be thought sufficient, to add that consideration, which before He had neither expressed nor denied.

§ 4. As for the free grace of the Gospel, I challenge all the reason in the world to say;—if God's free act, in providing the means of salvation by Christ and sending Him to publish the conditions upon which He is ready to be reconciled to those that accept them (tendering withal sufficient help so to do), be not a valuable reason, for which the Gospel is to be called the covenant of grace; though granted in consideration of that ransom by Christ, which the free grace of God provideth;—whether our Antinomians have not as good reason to say, that the promises of the Gospel are not free, if they require the condition of Christianity, as the Socinians, if they suppose Christ and His obedience.

§ 5. Here follows, I confess, a very valuable reason of Socinus, so long as that satisfaction of Christ which the Church teacheth is not understood; which it is no marvel if it carry them aside, not understanding the faith and doctrine of the Church aright. They allege<sup>i</sup>, that there can be no

[How far Socinus has reason to say, that one man cannot be punished for another man's sins.]

<sup>i</sup> "Jam si . . . nemo corporales pœnas pro alio pendere potest, nec etiam pro alio id, quod is omnino facere tenetur, quisquam præstare poterit. Par enim est utrobique ratio. Nec magis unius factum alterius fieri potest, quam unius mors aut corporis vexatio alterius esse. Et quemadmodum in pœnis corporalibus infligendis non ipsa mors aut corporis vexatio simpliciter quæritur sed cujusdam certi hominis mors aut corporis vexatio; sic, in factis ex Legis præscripto præstandis, non ipsum factum simpliciter quæritur, sed unius-cujusque, qui legi illi obnoxius sit, proprium factum." Socin.; De Jesu

Christo Serv., P. iii. c. 3; Op., tom. ii. p. 197. a. And see the beginning of the chapter, p. 195. a.—"Potest quidem alius pro alio satisfacere: sed interim non ab eo, qui pro alio satisfacit, sed ab eo, pro quo satisficit, debitum exigitur. . . . At enim dices, Christum in Se universum debitum nostrum transtulisse: et ita, non a nobis, sed ab Ipso, id quod nos debebamus, jure optimo exactum fuisse, nos vero liberatos esse. Jam ista ratione non eodem tempore satisfactio et remissio peracta esset. Nam simul atque istiusmodi translatio debiti fit, quam 'novationem' juris-consulti appellant, liberatur prior de-

BOOK ground in reason, upon which one man may be punished  
 II. for another man's sin; guilt being a moral consequence of  
 an act, that is naturally past and gone (that is, for the present,  
 nothing *in rerum natura*), upon a due ground of reason, which  
 imputes the acts of reasonable creatures to their account, because  
 they are under a law of doing thus and not otherwise. But that  
 the sins of one man should be imputed to another, who cannot be  
 obliged for another to do or not to do that, which redounds to  
 the other's account if done or not done; is no more possible, than  
 that he should have done or not done that, which the other is  
 supposed to have done or not done. If it be said, that Christ  
 voluntarily took upon Him the punishment of our sins, as a surety  
 answers for his friend's debt; it is acknowledged, that this way  
 turns off the debt from him, that it is paid for, to the surety;  
 but extinguishes it not, as the undergoing of punishment  
 extinguishes the crime in all the justice of the world, so that  
 he, who had right to punish, can exact that no more, for which  
 he hath received satisfaction once: which is to say, that the  
 sufferings of Christ are not the punishment of our sins.

§ 6. And I, truly, do freely acknowledge, that the instances  
 which have been brought<sup>k</sup>, either out of the scriptures, or to  
 shew, that one man hath been punished for another man's  
 sin among civil people (so that it is not to be thought  
 against the light of nature), are either insufficient or  
 impertinent to the case. For I have learned from my  
 beginning in the schools, that God, when He "visits the  
 iniquities of the fathers upon the children," does not inflict  
 upon them more punishment than their own sin deserves,  
 but makes their sins His opportunity of bringing to pass  
 His judgments against the sins of their predecessors, or  
 those, who in regard of other relations are reasonably taken  
 to be punished by their punishment. And this I will here  
 prove no further; but, taking it for granted, infer, that it  
 comes not home to the case of our Lord Christ, purchasing us  
 by His death remission of sins [and<sup>l</sup>] everlasting life.

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bitor. Creditori vero non antea satisfit, quam is, qui in se debitum transtulit, ipsi pecuniam numeret. Nec tamen istic ulla debiti remissio intervenisset."

Id., *ibid.*, c. 2. p. 192. b.

<sup>k</sup> See below, § 20. notes z-b.

<sup>l</sup> Added from MS.

§ 7. But my reason is, because it is evident to me, that one man's doings or sufferings may be understood or said to be imputed to another two ways. First, immediately and personally, supposing that there is a ground in reason for it. And this that opinion requires, which holds that faith, which alone justifieth, to consist in believing that a man is predestinate to life merely in consideration of Christ's death, suffering for the elect alone. For how should we be justified by believing this, but supposing, that Christ suffered upon this ground to this purpose? But having shewed this opinion to be utterly false, by shewing, that the Gospel supposes the condition of Christianity in that faith which alone justifieth<sup>m</sup>: I must here presume, that this sense of the imputation of Christ's merits (and, therefore, this intent of His death) is merely imaginary; and the supposition whereupon it proceeds, to wit, that one man's doings or sufferings may be personally and immediately imputed to another man's account, utterly unreasonable: and therefore must and do say, that, as it is sufficient, so it is true, that the sufferings of Christ are imputed unto us in the nature of a meritorious cause, moving God to grant mankind those terms of reconciliation which the Gospel importeth.

§ 8. This is evident by the opposition, which St. Paul maketh between the disobedience of Adam and the obedience of Christ; Rom. v. 12, 18, 19. Where, discovering the ground of our reconciliation with God, which the Gospel publisheth, he imputeth it to the "obedience" of Christ; in the rest of his discourse attributing it to His death. For, having said, that "Christ died for us being sinners," and that "we are justified by His blood," and "reconciled by the death of His Son, being enemies," he inferreth; "Therefore, as by one man sin came into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all:" signifying by the other part of the comparison, which he rendereth not till after a distance, that, "as by the offence of one it came to all men to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one it came to all men to justification of life; for as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one many shall be made righteous." And hereupon, as the exaltation

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XXIX.

Neither our sins imputable to Christ, nor His sufferings to us, formally and personally; but as the meritorious causes which satisfaction answereth.

The effect of it, the covenant of grace; as well as help to perform it.

[Rom. v. 8—10.]

<sup>m</sup> Above, c. vii. § 1—6.

BOOK  
II.

of Christ is imputed to His obedience in the state of His humiliation (by St. Paul, Phil. ii. 8, "He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death"), so are the effects and consequences thereof (Rom. iv. 25; "Who was delivered for our transgressions, and rose again for our justification") to be ascribed to the same. And that which the Father proclaims of the Son (Matt. iii. 17, xvii. 5, "This is My beloved Son in Whom I am well pleased;") cannot be understood in any other regard, but of His obedience, performed in publishing the message which the Father sent Him upon into the world, and suffering for it (in which He testifies so often in St. John's Gospel,—that He "came not to do" His "own will but" His "Father's"—that He "sought not" His "own glory but" His "Father's"—He "did not," He "said not, any thing of" Himself, "but what" He "had seen" His "Father do," what He "had heard" His "Father say,"—that it were tedious to repeat the several places). And this according to the figure of David, Ps. xl. 9, 10 [Hebr.] :

[Mark i. 11; Luke iii. 22.]

[John v. 19, 30; vi. 38; vii. 16, 28; viii. 28, 42; xii. 49; xiv. 10, 24.]

[Ps. xl. 8, 9. Eng. vers.]

"Then said I, Lo I come; in the volume of the book it is written of me, that I should fulfil Thy will; I am content to do it, O Lord; yea, Thy law is within my heart." Whereupon the Apostle saith, that "we are sanctified by this will, through the once offering of the body of Jesus Christ" (Hebr. x. 10); to wit, the will of God, which, by doing His will, Christ had moved to favour us. Even as, in the figure, punishment is remitted to David's posterity; for the "promise" indeed (2 Kings viii. 19, xx. 6, 1 Kings xi. [3]6), but made in consideration of David's obedience (2 Sam. vii. 13).

[How the obedience of Christ is meritorious.]

§ 9. Here I suppose further, that this obedience of Christ is not tendered as of debt (which they that believe Him to have been born a mere creature must hold); but, having proved, that He assumed man's nature, being the Word of God, God of God from everlasting afore, do necessarily presume, that this obedience, being undue, is meritorious to whatsoever purpose God, That sent Him, accepts it: and hereupon infer, that God granted those terms of reconciliation, which the Gospel importeth (in derogation to His own original law), in consideration of it.

[The Gospel a new

§ 10. For I do suppose, that man, being fallen from God,



yet knowing God, and himself to have been made by God, and to be governed by His providence, necessarily understood himself to be under the obligation of making God the end of all his actions, and therefore of enjoying no creature otherwise than the service of God should either require or allow; though that ignorance of God, which original concupiscence hath since brought into the world through the worship of idols and the corruptions that attend upon the same, had since so extinguished or darkened the light of nature in man, that the greatest part of mankind, though they could not deny this truth, nevertheless "held it prisoner in unrighteousness:" as St. Paul says, Rom. i. 18. This is that, which I call the original law of God; the transgression whereof bindeth over to that punishment, which God by His word declareth. And of this law the necessary immediate consequence is, that we submit to all such laws as God shall publish to man, inasmuch as He requires, and upon such penalties as He declares. So that, by publishing the Gospel, the original law of God is not abrogated, continuing still the rule of men's actions, but rather strengthened, and enlarged to all those precepts, which are positive under the Gospel, and come not from the light of nature, as necessary conditions to salvation in all estates: but the publication of the Gospel is a dispensation in the exercise and execution of the original law, by the penalty which it enacteth, in consideration of Christ's obedience; though (being general to all mankind after the publishing of it) it may be called a new law, as proposing new terms of salvation; which if any man challenge to be a derogation to God's original law, I will not contend about words.

§ 11. As for the law of Moses, if we consider it as containing the terms upon which that people held the land of promise, the publishing of the Gospel neither abrogates it nor derogates from it: being only given to hold "till the time of reformation" (as the Apostle calls it, Hebr. ix. 10); therefore expiring when the Gospel was published, which limited the intent of it. But if we consider it as containing an intimation of that spiritual obedience, which God required of those that would be saved under that light by the outward and civil obedience of those positive precepts, whereby they were

CHAP.  
XXIX.  
law, not  
abrogat-  
ing but  
strengthening the  
original  
law of  
God.]

[In what  
sense the  
law of  
Moses is  
abrogated  
or not by  
the Gos-  
pel.]

BOOK II. restrained from the worship of idols and commerce with idolatrous nations, in proportion to the reward of the world to come, signified by the happiness of the land of promise; then must we acknowledge another dispensation in the same original law by the law of Moses, and for the time of it; which was also in force under the fathers from the beginning, though not burdened [with<sup>n</sup>] that multitude of positive precepts, which the law of Moses brought in for the condition upon which they were to hold the land of promise. And, in opposition to those, it is called by the fathers of the Church<sup>o</sup> “the law of nature,” not in opposition to grace; the very giving it by God’s voluntary appearing to the fathers, and instructing them by familiar conversation, as it were, being a work of mere grace: as also the effect of it in the works of their conversation, which we find so truly Christian, that the fathers of the Church do truly argue from thence that Judaism is younger than Christianity.

The fathers saved by the faith of Christ to come.

§ 12. And, therefore, I do here acknowledge this His dispensation, by which the fathers obtained salvation before the Gospel, to have been granted also in consideration of that obedience, which our Lord Christ had taken upon Him to perform in the fulness of time: nothing hindering us to understand, in God’s proceeding with them, something like that, which in the civil law is called “*novatio*” or “*delegatio*” —“renewing of bonds” or “assignation of payment<sup>p</sup> ;” God’s accepting the interposition of our Lord Christ to the recon-

<sup>n</sup> Corrected from MS. “which” in original text.

<sup>o</sup> “Lex igitur Mosis, . . habere debuit quædam tratatitia ex jure naturali, quædam vero propria isti populo istisque temporibus accommodata. Agnoscit hoc discrimen in lege patria Josephus. . . Justinus in Colloquio cum Tryphone” (c. 45, Op., p. 141. A, B) “idem discrimen clare Judæo ob oculos ponit, cum alia ait esse ‘καθόλου καὶ φύσει καὶ αἰώνια καλὰ,’ . . quæ qui olim præstiterunt, communem cum Christianis gloriam erant reportaturi, alia vero ‘πρὸς σκληροκαρδίαν τοῦ λαοῦ’ (addere poterat, ‘et ob occasiones temporum ac locorum’) ‘διαταχθέντα.’ . . Sic in Constitutionibus” (Const. Apost., lib. i. c. 6; lib. ii. c. 5, 35; lib. vi. cc. 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23: ap. Coteler., PP. Apost., tom. i. pp. 207, 218,

248, 345, 352—356), “quæ dicuntur Clementis, plurimis locis distinguuntur ‘τὰ φυσικὰ τοῦ νόμου’ et ‘τὰ ἐπίσασκτα.’ Irenæus quoque iv. 27” (Adv. Hær., p. 313. a) “illa prioris potiorisque generis ‘naturalia Legis’ vocat.” Grot., Ad Matt. v. 17.

<sup>p</sup> “Novatio est prioris debiti in aliam obligationem vel civilem vel naturalem transfusio atque translatio: hoc est, cum ex precedenti causa ita nova constituatur, ut prior perimatur.” Digest., lib. xlv. tit. ii. § 1 (tom. i. Corp. Jur. Civil. p. 1665. ed. Gothofred. Col. Allobr. 1624): from “Ulpianus lib. xlv. ad Sabinum.”—“Delegare est vice sua alium reum dare creditori, vel cui jusserit.” Ibid. § 11. (p. 1667): from “Ulpianus lib. xxvii. ad Edictum.”

cilement of them, being as if He accepted a new bond for an old debt, or of payment by proxy to be made at a certain term. CHAP.  
XXIX.

§ 13. This is a point as manifest in the Scriptures of the New Testament, as it was requisite, that a point, not concerning the salvation of those that live under the New Testament but the understanding of the reason thereof in the salvation of those that died under the Old, for the maintenance of it against unbelievers, should be manifest. [Scripture  
proof.]

§ 14. For St. Paul thus writeth, 1 Cor. x. 1—4: “I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea, and all were baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all eat the same spiritual meat, and all drank the same spiritual drink; for they” all “drank of the spiritual rock that followed them; now the rock was Christ.” They that entered into a covenant of works to obtain the land of promise, as I have shewed they did<sup>q</sup>, entered not expressly into a covenant of faith in Christ for obtaining the world to come. No more than, being “baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea,” as he says here they were (that is, into his government, into the observation of the laws he should give, in hope of the promises he should give), they can be said to have been baptized expressly “into Christ,” and that profession which His promises require. Wherefore, when he saith that “the rock was Christ,” his meaning is not, immediately, and to those that rested in this temporal covenant of works; but as the manna was Christ, and Moses was Christ, by the means of that faith, which God then received at their hands: to wit, the assurance of everlasting happiness for them, who under this calling should tender God the spiritual obedience of the inward man, upon those grounds, which His temporal goodness, the tradition of their fathers, and the instruction of their prophets, afforded at that time. Now I appeal to the sense of all men, how those can be said to have that interest in Christ, which I have shewed that Christians have (and therefore upon the same ground), if there were no consideration of Christ in the blessings of Christ which they enjoyed. Wherefore, when St. Paul proceeds hereupon to exhort them

<sup>q</sup> Above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., cc. xii, xiii.

BOOK  
11.

[1 Cor. x.  
9.]

[Other  
Scrip-  
tures.]

not to "tempt Christ as some of them tempted," we must not understand, that he forbids us to tempt Christ, as they tempted God; but that they also tempted Christ, Who went along with them in that angel, in Whom the name of God and His word was, as I said afore<sup>r</sup>.

§ 15. So, when the Apostle saith, that Moses "counted the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt, for he looked at the recompense of reward" (Hebr. xi. 26); when, putting them in mind to follow their teachers, considering the end which they had attained and Moses aimed at, he addeth, "Jesus Christ" is "the same yesterday and to-day and for everlasting" (Hebr. xiii. 8); when St. Peter says, that "the prophets," who foretold the Gospel, "searched, against what time the Spirit of Christ, That was in them, declared and testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glorious things that followed" (1 Pet. i. 10, [11]); when St. Paul saith, that "all God's promises are yea and amen in" Christ (2 Cor. i. 20): methinks it is strange, that a Christian should imagine, that there was no consideration of Christ in those<sup>s</sup> promises, under which they ran the race of Christians<sup>t</sup>. Nor could St. Paul say, "As by Adam all die, so by Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. xv. 22); nor could the comparison hold between the first and second Adam, which he makes Rom. v. 12—19: if that life, which I have shewed how Christ restores Christians to<sup>u</sup>, were given to the fathers before Christ without consideration of Christ. Nor could the Apostle otherwise say, that Christ "is the mediator of a new covenant, that, death coming, for the ransom of those transgressions that were under the old, they that are called may receive the promise of an everlasting inheritance" (Hebr. ix. 15); but because those sins, which were redeemed only to a temporal effect by the sacrifices of

<sup>r</sup> Above, c. xiii. § 2—7.

<sup>s</sup> Corrected from MS. "these" in original text.

<sup>t</sup> "Objicitur porro, veteres illos et Messiam expectasse, et una cum Illo summam quandam felicitatem, idque (ut testis est Petrus) Divino Spiritu patefaciente. Hic primo respondemus, nequaquam probari posse omnes illos priscos homines Messiam expectasse; cum nec universo illi populo nec omni

tempore promissus fuerit. Ea enim tantummodo ad universam populum semperque spectabant, quæ fœdere illo per Mosem cum illis facto continebantur. Atque in horum numero futuri Messiae promissum nequaquam fuit; cum id nusquam in legis Mosaicæ disciplina expressum reperitur," &c. Volkel., *De Vera Relig.*, lib. iii. c. 11. p. 64.

<sup>u</sup> Above, c. xviii.

the old law (as also those, which were not redeemed at all by any, as I said), were by the sacrifice of Christ redeemed to the purchase of the world to come. Which is that which St. Paul tells the Jews, Acts xiii. 39; that, "through Christ, every one that believeth, is justified from all things which they could not be justified of by the law of Moses." For as the Law did not expiate capital offences, so it expiated none but to the effect of a civil promise.

§ 16. And though we construe the words of St. John (Apoc. xiii. 8), "Whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb, slain from the foundation of the world," out of the same sense repeated Apoc. xvii. 8,—not that the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world, but that their names were written in His book from the foundation of the world;—yet, inasmuch as it is called the book of the Lamb, "That was foreknown from the foundation of the world" (1 Pet. i. 19,) when Moses demands not to be written in God's book, or when mention is made of it in the New Testament, it must be the book of Christ in the mystical sense.

§ 17. And when St. Paul says that "Christ gave Himself a ransom for all, a testimony for due time;" what can he mean, but that, though He "gave Himself for all," yet this was not to be "testified" till the proper time of preaching the Gospel. And what is this, but that, though this is testified only by the preaching of the Gospel, yet He was "a ransom for all." Which reason suffers not the same term "all" (Hebr. ii. 9, Rom. iii. 23) to be restrained from that generality which it naturally signifies.

§ 18. Lastly, when the Apostle argues, that, if Christ should offer Himself more than once, that He might more than once enter into the Holy of Holies, "He must have suffered oft from the foundation of the world," that is, before the end of the world, in which He came indeed (Hebr. ix. 25, 26); he must needs suppose, that He suffered for all that were saved before the Gospel. For what pretence can there be, that He should suffer for sins under the Gospel before the Gospel; more than that the high-priest before the Law should expiate those sins which were committed against the Law by entering into the Holy of Holies.

C H A P.  
XXIX.

[Rev. xiii.  
8.]

[Exod.  
xxxii. 32;  
Luke x. 20;  
Phil. iv. 3;  
Rev. iii. 5,  
xx. 12,  
xxi. 27.]  
[1 Tim.  
ii. 6.]

[See Rom.  
v. 18, viii.  
32.]

[Heb. ix.  
25, 26.]



BOOK  
II.

And here you may see, that I intend not to affirm, that all that were saved under the Law, though in consideration of Christ, did know, in what consideration Christ should be their salvation; as Christians under the Gospel do: but to refer myself to the determination of St. Augustin<sup>x</sup>, and other fathers and doctors of the Church, that they understood it in their elders and superiors, the prophets of God, and their disciples the judges of Israel (who were also prophets), and the fathers of several ages, of whom you read Hebrews xi.; who, being acquainted with the secret of God's purpose, were to acquaint the people with it so sparingly and by such degrees, as the secret wisdom of God had appointed.

The Gos-  
pel a new  
law.

§ 19. These things thus premised, I do acknowledge, and challenge, the act of God in dispensing in the execution of His original law, and bringing the Gospel into effect instead of it, not to be the act of a private person, remitting his particular interest in the punishment of those sins whereby his law was transgressed; but the act of a master of a household, or the prince and sovereign of a commonwealth, which you please, disposing of mankind as his "subjects or household servants<sup>y</sup>:" not denying, that a man, considered as free from all obligation of civil society and a member of no commonwealth,—that a sovereign in respect of another sovereign,—yea, in some sort, the subject of one sovereign in regard of another sovereign and his subjects,—may have right to exact punishment, which he may as freely remit; but resolving, that whatsoever can be said of such cases, is impertinent to ours, God being necessarily and essentially sovereign prince over His own subjects, His creatures, and master of them as His household goods: and this act, whereby He

\* See Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., cc. xii. § 12. note n, xiii. § 28. note h, xxvi. § 21.

<sup>y</sup> "Deus, in hominibus vel puniendis vel absolvendis, non tanquam iudex aliquis statuendus est, qui de alieno jure agat, cuique non liceat a legum præscripto recedere; sed tanquam dominus et princeps, Cujus sola voluntas, cum de Ipsius jure tantum agatur, omnium rerum lex est et perfectissima norma." Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. iii. c. 1; Op., tom. ii. p. 186. b.—"Siquidem triplex Dei actus in hoc negotio

venit spectanda, . . in omnibus quidem his actibus Deus præcipue spectandus est ut dominus absolutus, isque liberimus ac nullius alterius potestati subiectus; sed aliquo modo etiam ut rector. . . Quia dominus est noster absolutus ac herus, ipso creationis jure; cum quanti quanti sumus, Ipsius simus, ab Ipso toti producti;" &c. Crell., Resp. ad Grot. de Satisf. Christi, c. ii.; p. 60. a: speaking afterwards of the "potestas gubernandi quam Deus in nos habet, ut herus quivis in suos servos ac mancipia."

dispenseth in the effect of His original law so as to introduce another instead of it, being such, that His glory must necessarily consist in the consideration upon which it is done, as the principal act that can be done in the government of the principal creature.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

§ 20. And, therefore, I say on the other side, that the cases of Damon and Phintias the great friends (whereof the one suffered, or would have suffered, for the other under Dionysius the usurper of Sicily<sup>2</sup>), and of Zaleucus (who, having made a law for his country to punish adulterers with loss of both eyes, and his son being taken in adultery, pulled out one of his own and one of his son's, to satisfy the law<sup>a</sup>), are not pertinent to our case<sup>b</sup>. Suppose a friend had right to lay down his life for a friend; suppose the usurper had right to take away one life, and to accept another for it; suppose Zaleucus had right to dispose of his own eye to his son's interest; suppose the people, that enacted the law, did dispense so far in it: the effect of a civil law is utterly satisfied by the evil alone suffered (proportionable to the forfeit in the judgment of the law), not considering out of what intent of mind it was suffered, nor claiming any thing

[How  
Christ's  
sufferings  
imputable  
to us.]

<sup>2</sup> Excerpt. ex Diod. Sic. de Virtutibus et Vitiis, e libro vi.; tom. ii. p. 554. ed. Wesseling. Cic., de Offic., lib. iii. c. 10; Tusc. Qu., lib. v. c. 22: &c.—“Sic et in capitalibus judiciis vades capite plecti solitos, si rei se non sisterent (unde Græcis ἀντίψυχοι appellantur), tum aliunde, tum ex nobili illa Damonis et Pythiæ” (sive Phintia) “historia satis apparet.” Grot., Def. Fid. Cathol. de Satisf. Christi, c. iv.; Op., tom. iii. p. 314. a.—See Crell., Resp. ad Grot. de Satisf. Christi, c. iv.; p. 116. b.

<sup>a</sup> Ælian., Var. Hist., lib. xiii. c. 24; Valer. Max., Exemp. Memor., lib. iv. De Amicit. c. 7. Externa § 1.—“Conseuerunt ii” (those who hold the doctrine of the Atonement), “exemplo quodam nescio cuius regis aut legislatoris (Zaleuci Locrensis opinor) hoc facinus defendere: qui, cum ipsius filius delictum quoddam commisisset, propter quod, lege ab ipso patre lata, utroque oculo privandus erat; ne filium cæcum haberet, et interim, scilicet, legi satisfaceret, sibi unum, filio item unum oculum eruit.” Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. iii. c. 3; Op.,

tom. ii. p. 195. b.—See also Grotius, Def. Fid. Cathol., &c., c. iv. p. 315. a: and Crell., Resp. ad Grot., c. iv. p. 117, a, b.

<sup>b</sup> The examples (both from Scripture and from profane history) referred to here, and above § 6, are debated between Grotius and Crellius.—“Affirmo non esse simpliciter injustum aut contra naturam pœnæ, ut quis puniatur ob peccata aliena . . . Dictum probò. Exod. xx. 5, et xxxiv. 7; ‘Deus visitat parentum iniquitates in filios, nepotes, et abnepotes.’ ‘Patres nostri peccaverunt, et nos pœnas eorum ferimus;’ Thren. v. 7. ‘Ob factum Chani execrationi subjicitur Canaan, Gen. ix. 25. ‘Ob factum Saulis suspensi sunt filii ejus et nepotes Deo approbante, 2 Sam. xxi. 8, 14. ‘Ob factum Davidis pereunt LXX millia, et exclamat David, ‘Ego peccavi et inique feci, hæc oves quid fecerunt:’ 2 Sam. xxiv. 15, 17. Sic ob factum Achani filii puniuntur, Jos. vii. 24; et ob factum Jeroboami posteritas ipsius, 1 Reg. xiv. 10.” Grot., Def. Fid. Cathol., &c., c. iv. p. 312. a.

further, when it is suffered. But I have shewed<sup>c</sup>, that the 252 sufferings of Christ were accepted of God to the redemption of mankind in consideration of that free and pure obedience to God wherewith they were tendered to God; not to satisfy His wrath against us by the evil which He endured (for the time of mere punishment is not till the world to come), but that He might shew that virtue, and that obedience, which is not to be shewed but through the difficulty of afflictions: and this, not to the effect of making personal and immediate recompense for the sins of so many as shall be saved (which were it made, God could not in any justice impose upon them any condition, for obtaining remission of those sins, which He had received satisfaction for); but to give God that satisfaction (by so undue and so perfect obedience in such trials, that the world can never see the like virtue), as might move Him, in consideration thereof, abating that debt of punishment which we are engaged to, by transgressing His original law to publish an act of grace, admitting all to remission of sins and right to life everlasting, that will undertake to live true Christians. And this consideration, I conceive I may say, redounds as much to the glory of God, as it is possible to conceive that any can do; there being nothing more valuable than this obedience, nothing more acceptable in him that is a sinner than new obedience for the future: but the consideration, in the meantime, not personal, but in the nature of the meritorious cause, to which all satisfaction is reducible, as purchasing freedom from evil, though not right to good; for no man's debt is immediately paid by the pain which Christ suffered, but, in consideration of His obedience to God in undergoing such trials, all that will undergo the condition are admitted to remission of sins and everlasting life.

The property of punishment in Christ's suffering.

§ 21. Therefore the punishment, which Christ endures for our sins, importeth not that there was any ground of reason, why He should be accounted to have done them, or we accounted to have undergone His sufferings; but in regard to the evil which He suffered in consideration of our sins, with an intent to take them away in freely offering Himself to undergo what God should think fit to that pur-

<sup>c</sup> Above, § 7.

pose. Neither can it be pretended, that any thing is wanting to manifest the justice of God's proceeding with Him, nor the reason why it redounds to our benefit. Now Socinus, having in detestation that opinion, which places justifying faith in believing that we are predestinate in consideration of the merits of Christ, suffering only for the elect, and abhorring as much the doctrine of the Church, which he took to be tainted with the leaven of Antichrist from the Apostles' time; it remained, that he should run into another extreme, making the Gospel an act of God's grace excluding all consideration of Christ, which could not be brought in but by voiding the faith of the Holy Trinity into the bargain<sup>d</sup>.

§ 22. But though I allow Socinus to dispute, whether the sufferings of Christ be properly the punishment of our sins, or not<sup>e</sup>; because I have shewed, that they are not the punishment which civil laws require (though not allowing him to blame St. Augustin, or other Church writers, that have so called them<sup>f</sup>, much less to depart from the faith of the Church for the signification of a word); yet can it not be denied, that the death of Christ is properly "satisfaction," upon the premises. For satisfaction is, properly, a payment that may be refused, as not in the nature and kind of that which was due. Suppose, for the purpose, when a band is forfeit, the forfeit incurred; recompense satisfies not. Indeed, it is contrary to natural equity in man, to refuse to be satisfied with such a recompense as makes up his interest: but between God and man it is otherwise. For, the forfeit of sin consisting in this, that the act is done which cannot be undone, suppose the sufferings of Christ (supposing His Divine nature from everlasting) both voluntary and meritorious of themselves, and that to an unvaluable value, even in justice, yet are they refusable<sup>g</sup> in point of God's justice; because He is not to be obliged by any thing, as receiving advantage by it. But, being accepted by Him, they become a full recompense to the purpose for which they are ten-

And of  
satisfac-  
tion.

<sup>d</sup> See above, c. i. § 5, 6. 9.

<sup>e</sup> See above, § 5, note i.

<sup>f</sup> See the Testimonia Veterum collected by Grotius at the end of his Def.

Fid. Cathol. (Op., tom. iii. pp. 339—348).

<sup>g</sup> Corrected from MS. "refutable," in orig. text.

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 II. them that embrace Christianity; and that, in the strict and

rigorous estimate of justice, for the infinite value of the Person from Whom they proceed. And this according to Ulpian, 46. ff. iii. l. 52; "*Satisfactio est pro solutione*"—"Satisfaction is that which succeeds instead of payment not made<sup>b</sup>:" and according to Caius, 2 ff. viii. [l.] 1; "*Satisfacere est desiderium alicujus implere*"—"To satisfy is to fulfil a man's desire<sup>1</sup>." For that God cannot be obliged but by His own will to accept it to this effect, whereas man is bound by natural equity to accept that for full satisfaction, which makes up his whole interesse, when civil law obliges him not; makes the tender of Christ no less the substitute to our payment of that debt which God's law requireth (for how is it less fit to be tendered, when it is not due to be accepted, than when it is?), no less able to fulfil God's desire: seeing nothing can be imagined more acceptable to Him, than the voluntary obedience of His own Son; consisting in those sufferings, wherein the greatest virtue that man's nature is capable of was seen; and tending to the redemption of mankind, which His love to His creature inclined Him so much to desire, as His wisdom found to comport with His native goodness and the exercise of His justice.

Of the sense of the Catholic Church.

§ 23. I shall not here, as in other points, stand to clear the faith of the Catholic Church. When Pelagius is alleged for one, that held not the satisfaction of Christ<sup>k</sup>; it is plain

<sup>b</sup> Digest, lib. xlvi. tit. iii. § 52 (tom. i. Corp. Jur. Civil. p. 1679. ed. Gothofred. Col. Allob. 1624): from "Ulpianus, libro quarto decimo ad Edictum."—ff in the text is the customary abbreviation for the Digesta, and l. stands for lex.

<sup>1</sup> "Satisfactio eodem modo appellata est quo satisfactio: nam ut satisfacere dicimur ei, cujus desiderium implemus, ita satisfacere dicimur," &c. Digest., lib. ii. tit. viii. § 1. (Corp. Jur. Civil. ibid. p. 43): from "Gaius, lib. v. ad Edictum provinciale."

<sup>k</sup> "Quod Socini sententiam opinionem nuper natam appellat (Grotius), id, nisi docuerit eam ex Christi et Apostolorum dictis non esse excerptam, non magis nobis curandum est, quam

curarunt ii qui hoc seculo veritatem denuo cœperunt ex tenebris Pontificiis in lucem proferre," &c. "Verum hac in parte non videtur satis convenire Grotio cum amico et defensore suo Vossio, qui adversus Ravenspergum scripsit" (Respons. ad Judic. Ravensperg. &c., c. iii.; Op., tom. vi. pp. 884. a.—886. b), "eandem, quæ Socini sit, saltem in præcipuo capite, ante annos quingentos sententiam fuisse Petri Abailardi; . . . quin etiam idem Vossius, tum Augustini auctoritate nixus, tum Driedonis verbis in eam rem adductis, docere conatur, annis circiter septingentis ante Abailardum idem docuisse Pelagium. Driedo vero affirmat hanc sententiam Augustini tempore ecclesiam Christianam (ut ipse judicat) in-



enough, that it can have no footing in, or allowance from, the authority of the Church, which hath disclaimed Pelagius. Only we may take notice, how well the evidence, which the witness and practice of the Church renders to the rule of faith, is understood by them, who, instead of alleging some allowance of the Church (by some person of noted credit openly professing it, and nevertheless esteemed to be of the Church), name us one that was cast out of the Church for holding it, whether expressly or by consequence. As for Lactantius<sup>l</sup>, who, alleging the suffering of Christ for our example, adds further, nevertheless, "*Pro crimine nostro*"—"For our crime" (Instit. iv. 23, 24, 26)<sup>m</sup>: though I might safely have said, as afore, that a word of his upon the by may well have passed without censure, because his credit was not such in the Church as to create appearance of offence; yet I shall not need to have recourse to this answer, his own words having given so much advantage for a fair interpretation of his meaning in the sense of the Church. As for Petrus Abailardus, that is thought to have said something to the same purpose<sup>n</sup>, I shall not need to

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fecisse, et usque ad tempora Bernardi ejus reliquias mansisse. Ab iisdem non videtur sejungendus Lactantius." Crell., Resp. ad Grot. de Satisf. Christi, c. vi.; p. 142. a.—"Nam annis circiter septingentis ante Abailardum idem docuisse videtur Pelagius: ut qui et ipse gratiam Christi statuere soleat in doctrina et exemplo Christi; quemadmodum sexcenta Augustini loca evincunt. Unde etiam Joh. Driedo Pelagium Abailardi præcursorem facit." Voss. as above quoted, p. 886. b.—See Joh. Driedo, De Captiv. et Redempt. Generis Hum.; Op., tom. ii. p. 1. Lovan. 1556.

<sup>l</sup> "Lactantium, quem itidem prodixit Grotius, cum ipso sentire valde incertum est: imo si quis ea, quæ scripsit lib. iv. Instit. Divin. cap. 26, conferat cum iis, quæ superioribus capp., præsertim 23. et 24, disputarat, videbit eum minus morti Christi tribuere, quam revera tribuendum erat; et hanc vel solam vel potissimam ejus causam statuere, ut patientiæ exemplum nobis præbeat: nec Grotius quicquam ex illo protulit aliud, quam quod Christum 'pro crimine' nostro 'passum' dicat: quod significare potest, Christum passum ut nos a crimine

nostro liberaret." Crell., as just quoted, p. 141. b.

<sup>m</sup> "Quisquis ades mediique subis in limina templi, Siste parum, insontemque tuo pro crimine passum Respice Me, &c." Lactant., De Beneficiis Christi, as quoted by Grotius in the Testimonia Veterum added to his Def. Fid. Cathol. &c. (Op., tom. iii. p. 340. a). The poem, which has nothing to do with the Institutions, is entitled "Incerti Auctoris Carmen de Passione Domini Lactantio aliquando adscriptum," in the Bipont edition of his works, tom. ii. p. 445. (vv. 1-3).—The passage in the Institutiones Divinæ (lib. iv. De Vera Sapientia, cc. 23-25; Op., tom. i. pp. 301-308) appears at the worst only *negatively* erroneous.

<sup>n</sup> "Abailardus ille, ut testatur Bernardus Clarævallensis Epist. cxc. ad Innocentium Papam" (Op., tom. ii. pp. 221. B, sq. Paris. 1586), "primus docuit non alio fine apparuisse Christum in carne, aut mortem subiisse, quam ad instructionem nostri per verbum et testationem charitatis suæ per mortem: mysterium vero incarnationis, quod post Apostolos ab omnibus doctoribus creditum esse fatebatur, partim eo impugnabat, quod nulla opus fuerit sa-

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insist what his opinion was. For as I allow, that he lived in such an age, when something that is true might be entertained with the censure of the Church; so, when it is said to be in a point, wherein he is partizan with Pelagius, the Church that condemned him, must needs, in condemning him for it, be partizan with the Church that condemned Pelagius. I will only allege here a doctrine, which I take to be generally received by the ancient fathers of the Church<sup>o</sup>: —that the devil, by bringing Christ to death That had not sinned, forfeited that “power of death,” which the Apostle speaks of (Hebr. ii. 14); to wit, that which he had over man that had sinned, in bringing him to death. And I allege it, because the Socinians seem to take it for granted, that the Church is now ashamed to maintain this<sup>p</sup>; which I confess I am not. For if the devil be “prince of this world,” as our Saviour calls him (John xiv. 30), because he is employed by God as His gaoler (or the executioner of those judgments, to which He abandons those that forsake Him, by giving them up to his temptations); shall we not understand the justice of God to be seen towards him in limiting this employment, as under the grace of Christ we believe it is limited, in consideration of his attempting upon Christ beyond his commission, because without right, He being without sin? And therefore, the justice of God having appointed him this employment, and this justice satisfied by the obedience of

tisfactione, quia sola verbi prædicatione potuerit Deus instaurare genus humanum; partim quod crudele et iniquum sit, ut per cruentam et ignominiosam mortem Ejus, Qui innocens et Ipsius Dei Filius sit, pro alienis peccatis Deo satisfiat.” Voss., as above quoted, p. 886. a.—See note k, above.

<sup>o</sup> E. g. “Quæ est justitia qua victus est diabolus? Quæ nisi justitia Jesu Christi? Et quomodo victus est? Quia cum in Eo nihil morte dignum inveniret, occidit Eum tamen. Et utique justum est, ut debitores, quos tenebat, liberi dimittantur in Eum credentes, Quem sine ullo debito occidit. Hoc est, quod justificari dicimur in Christi sanguine.” S. Aug., De Trin., lib. xiii. c. 14. § 18; Op., tom. viii. p. 939. F.—See also Origen., In Epist. ad Rom., lib. ii. c. 13; Op., tom. iv. p. 495. b. C, D. ed. Bened.: and

S. Ambros., Lib. de Tobia, c. ix. § 33 (Op., tom. i. p. 601. B, C); and Super Lucam, lib. vii. cc. 113, 117 (ibid. pp. 1436. F, 1437. D): and other passages of the Fathers, quoted (with these) by Grotius, Test. Veterum, in fin. Def. Fid. Cathol. &c., Op., tom. iii. pp. 339 sq.

<sup>p</sup> “Quod si testimonia patrum, quæ longo ordine recenset Grotius, inspicias, comperies illum esse primum, qui a nostra sententia discedat, qui idem a Grotio. Is vero est Origenes; qui Diabolo vult Christi sanguinem, redemptionis nostræ pretium, persolutum: quod Augustinum quoque et Ambrosium, patrum Latinorum lumina, statuisse, Socinus jam monuit. Ab hac vero sententia quis hodie non abhorret?” Crell., Resp. ad Def. Grot. &c., Præfat., sign. \* 2. b.

Christ; it is but due consequence, that this employment, in which the principality of this world consisteth, should become forfeit and void<sup>q</sup>, so far as the grace of Christ determineth it. By virtue of which reason our Lord Christ, rising from death, because, not having sinned, "He could not be held by death," draws after Him all, that upon the sound of His Gospel embrace the profession of Christianity.

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### CHAPTER XXX.

GOD MIGHT HAVE RECONCILED MAN TO HIMSELF WITHOUT THE COMING OF CHRIST. THE PROMISES OF THE GOSPEL DEPEND AS WELL UPON HIS ACTIVE AS PASSIVE OBEDIENCE. CHRIST NEED NOT SUFFER HELL-PAINS THAT WE MIGHT NOT. THE OPINION THAT MAKETH JUSTIFYING FAITH TO BE TRUST IN GOD, NOT TRUE; YET NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE FAITH. THE DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT, AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE SCHOOL; HOW IT IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE FAITH. AS ALSO THAT OF SOCINUS.

I WILL not leave this point, till I have inferred, from that which hath been said, the resolution of two or three points in question, necessarily following upon it.

§ 2. And first, that, though (as I have said) it is impossible for the wit of man to propose any course for the reconciling of men to God, by which the glory of God in the exercise of His Divine perfections should have been more seen, than is that which it pleased God to take; yet was it not impossible for His Divine wisdom to have taken other courses to effect the same, His glory remaining entire: according as St. Augustin hath long since resolved<sup>r</sup>; though

God might have reconciled man to Himself without the coming of Christ.

<sup>q</sup> See the arguments of Bp. Bilson (as quoted below in c. xxx. § 9. note f, pp. 229—233), who cites copious passages from the fathers.

<sup>r</sup> "Eos itaque qui dicunt, Itane de-  
fuit Deo modus alius, quo liberaret  
homines a miseria mortalitatis hujus,  
ut unigenitum Filium Deum Sibi coe-  
ternum hominem fieri vellet, induendo  
humanam animam et carnem, mor-  
talemque factum mortem perpeti? pa-  
rum est sic refellere, ut istum modum,  
quo nos per Mediatorem Dei et homi-  
num Hominem Christum Jesum Deus

liberare dignatur, asseramus bonum et  
Divinae congruum dignitati: verum  
etiam ut ostendamus, non alium modum  
possibilem Deo defuisse, Cujus potes-  
tati cuncta æqualiter subjacent, sed  
sanandæ nostræ miseriæ convenientio-  
rem modum alium non fuisse nec esse  
oportuisse." S. Aug., De Trin., lib.  
xiii. c. 10. § 13; Op., tom. viii. p. 936.  
C, D.—See also a very striking passage  
in S. Gregory the Great, Moral. in  
Job., lib. xx. c. 36. § 69; Op., tom.  
i. p. 670. A.: and others quoted by  
Bilson (as above), p. 287.

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to the great displeasure<sup>s</sup> of all them, who distinguish not the imagination of immediate satisfaction by the death of Christ for the sins of them that shall be saved, from that dispensation in the original law of God, which the Gospel declareth to all that embrace the terms of it; to the effect whereof, I have shewed, that God provided and accepted it. For if God did not provide nor accept *de facto* the death of Christ for immediate satisfaction to His vindicative justice, in behalf of their sins that shall be saved; then was He not tied, in point of right, to seek that satisfaction for the same, either from Christ, or from us. And, truly, this opinion (that God was tied to execute His vindicative justice either upon Christ or us) seems to represent God to the fancies of Christians, as taking content in the evils and torments which Christ suffered (that being the only recompence that vindicative justice seeks), without consideration of that perfect obedience and zeal to God's glory in the saving of His creature, together with His justice and holiness; in regard whereof God indeed accepteth the same. Now, though it be necessary for the maintenance of Christianity to say, that the course which God taketh for the reconciling of man to Himself according to it, preserveth His glory entire, as being agreeable to His Divine perfections (for to say, that man cannot propose a course more for His glory than that which it advanceth, is rather honourable for Christianity than necessary for the maintenance of the truth of it); yet to say, that God's wisdom, in designing this course according to the

\* "Cæterum cum iis (Socinianis) solummodo mihi res non est. Sunt et alii pii, probi, doctissimi Theologi, et ad caput satisfactionis Christi quod attinet, τῆς ὀρθοδοξίας retinentissimi, qui quamvis tale attributum et virtutem" (scil. justitiam) "essentialem Deo inesse directe negare non sustineant, omnes tamen ejus egressus, et totum circa peccata exercitium, adeo liberum et ex mero libero voluntatis Divinæ motu et beneplacito dependens esse asserunt, ut, illa non obstante, potuerit Deus, *nutu Suo, verbo, nullo cum negotio*, aliis, extra satisfactionem Christi, modis et viis (si modo sapientiæ Sux sic visum fuisset), peccata auferre, condonare, abolere, neque ullam pœnam transgressæ legis irrogare; et sententiam hanc

Augustino scilicet acceptam ferunt." Diatriba de Justitia Divina seu Justitiæ Vindicatricis Vindicix, quibus essentialis illa Naturæ Divinæ proprietates ex sacris Literis demonstratur, et contra Socinianos . . . asseritur: necnon exercitium ejus necessarium, *una cum indispensabili satisfactionis Jesu Christi ad salutem peccatorum necessitate*, adversus virorum doctiss. G. Twissi, G. Vossii, et S. Rhetorfortis, aliorumque impugnationes, præterea astruitur: auctore Johanne Owen, Coll. Æd. Christi &c. Decano, c. ii. § xviii. p. 25. Oxon. 1653.

<sup>t</sup> This is the express doctrine of Owen's book as quoted in the last note: see in particular c. vii. § 5. pp. 134, 135.

exigence of all His perfections, is so exhausted and equalled by the work of it (as it were), that His own wisdom could have designed no other course to attain the same end, preserving His own glory entire, is to make the wisdom of God subject to be comprehended by man, supposing what He hath revealed of the works of it. But as nothing is more derogatory to the glory of God, than to say that God can do nothing but that which He doeth; so, supposing the fall of man, the will of God to propagate mankind, and to tender him means of reconciliation, to say that God could take no other course to effect this but that which He took, is, without doubt, in the next degree, derogatory to His glory.

§ 3. In the next place, I infer, that as well the active as the passive obedience of Christ is imputed to us, in consideration of remission of sins and everlasting life.

§ 4. It is said, that this opinion,—that we are justified only in consideration of the sufferings of Christ,—was first heard of in the parts of Germany contained in the upper <sup>255</sup> Palatinate; and, being censured by the divines of Wittemberg, went no further among those of the confession of Augsburg<sup>u</sup>. But the remains of it subsisting at Heidelberg, John Cameron,

The promises of the Gospel depend as well upon His active as passive obedience.

<sup>u</sup> “Affirmant nonnulli Protestantes, Christum nullo modo obedientia activa, sive vitæ, ut ipsi loqui malunt, sed sola passiva, sive mortis, nobis justificationem meruisse. Sed errorem errant crassissimum. Nova enim est hæc sententia; ac in Ecclesiam primum invecta a quodam M. Georgio Kargio, Pastore Onoldino, anno 1570, teste Mentzero, et Joanne Gerharo: quam tamen ille, rectius a viris piis et eruditissimis edoctus, revocavit. Eadem tamen postea a Zachario Ursino, et J. Piscatore theologo Herbornensi imprimis, ... denuo excitata, et animose imo pertinaciter defensa fuit. Hos complures postea sequuti sunt. Eandem etiam sententiam defendit Carolus Molinaeus.” Forbes., *Consid. Modest.*, De Justific. &c., lib. ii. c. 2. § 7; pp. 102, 104, 4th. edit. Oxf. 1850.—See the Disput. Theol. in Acad. Giessena habit. sub Præsidi J. Winckelmanno et B. Mentzero, tom. iii. disp. xv. De Justific. (against Piscator), pp. 434 sq. Giessæ Hassorum 1611: Joh. Gerhard., *Loc. Theol.*, tom. iii. c. xix. § 57. pp. 1098, sq. Jenæ 1613 (also against Piscator):

Joh. Piscator, *Theses Theol.*, vol. iii. loc. xxxix. pp. 457 sq. Herborn. 1618; and *Scripta Quædam Adversaria D. J. Piscatoris Herbornensis et M. Ludov. Lucii Basiliensis de Causa Meritoria Nostri coram Deo Justific.*, una cum T. Gatakeri Londin. *Animadv.* Lond. 8vo. 1641: and F. Feuardent., *Theomach. Calvinist.*, lib. iv. c. 19. p. 134. a. (Paris 1604), quoting Car. Molinaei *Annot.* in 51. Part. Harmon., and also Calvin's contradiction of the dogma in his *Institut.* (lib. ii. c. xvi. § 5).—Ursinus distinctly affirms the contrary doctrine in the second edition of his *Explic. Catechet.* Qu. xxix. (Op., tom. i. p. 139. 2. B. Heidelb. 1612); but he had expressly maintained it in the first edition of the book (see Mentzer's disputation above quoted, § 128. p. 470). It appears also (*ibid.* § 68. p. 451), that some divines of Wirtemberg, and especially Brentius, had written in refutation of the dogma. See also Bossuet, *Hist. des Variations &c.*, liv. xii. § 27 sq.; *Cæuvres*, tom. xx. pp. 279 sq. Versailles 1816.



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it seems, studying there in his younger time, brought it with him into the Reformed churches of France: where it caused such a heat as had come to a breach, had not the dispute been put to silence<sup>x</sup>.

[John Cameron's arguments to the contrary.]

§ 5. I have not seen what reasons that ingenuous man maintained it with. This I may take upon me to say: one of the principal was this<sup>y</sup>:—because that, which we are released of in consideration of Christ, that of Christ is imputed to us, not that, which we are not: now, as it is certain, that we are released of punishment in consideration of Christ, so it is certain, that we are not released of the obligation to new obedience, according to the performance or neglect whereof God will judge us: therefore, in regard of the sufferings of Christ, our debt of punishment is discharged; whereas, were the active obedience of Christ imputed unto us, we could not stand bound to the like obedience, nor be judged by our bond to it: so that, ascribing remission of sins to the sufferings of Christ and faith in His blood alone, he ascribeth salvation to our new obedience; according to the manifest

<sup>x</sup> John Cameron spent a year at Heidelberg as tutor to the sons of the Chancellor of Navarre in 1607, 8 (Bayle, Diction.). After passing the next ten years at Bourdeaux as minister of the Reformed Church there, he was summoned in 1618 to be Professor of Divinity in the Academy of Saumur (Id., *ibid.*); opposed by the synod of Poitou on the ground of his holding the tenet of Piscator above mentioned (Id., *ibid.*); but admitted after some delay by the National Synod of Alais in 1620 (Id., *ibid.*: and Aymon, *Syn. National. des Eglises Reformées de France*, tom. ii. p. 173. Hague 1710, or Quicke, *Synod. in Gall. Reform.*, vol. ii. p. 29, in *Syn. Alez.* c. viii. § 53). He did not however introduce Piscator's tenet into France. It had been condemned (as Piscator's) by the Synod of Gap in 1603 (Aymon, tom. i. pp. 257, 258; or Quicke's translation, as above quoted, vol. i.); by that of La Rochelle in 1607 (Aymon, *ibid.*, pp. 301, 302); by that of Privas in 1612 (*ibid.*, pp. 399, 400), which issued a detailed "Refutation" of the doctrine (*ibid.*, pp. 457—461); and by that of Ton-neins in 1614 (*ibid.*, tom. ii. p. 13); but was "tacitly received, or at least

pronounced void of error" (Mosheim, *Eccles. Hist.*, Bk. iv. Cent. xvii. Sect. ii. Pt. ii. c. 2. § 13, vol. iv. p. 230. ed. Soames 1841) in the Council of the Isle of France. See also Bossuet as quoted in note u.

<sup>y</sup> Piscator certainly urged this among other reasons.—"Si imputatur nobis obedientia Christi quam Is præstitit legi Divinæ, sequitur Christum illam præstitisse pro nobis, id est, vice nostra; ac proinde nos ab obedientia legis Divinæ esse liberatos. . . Atqui nos non sumus liberati ab obedientia legis Divinæ. . . Ergo obedientia Christi, qua Is obedivit legi Divinæ, nobis non imputatur." *Piscat., Theses Theol.* (as above quoted), vol. iii. loc. xxxix. pp. 440, 441. And see also the *Scripta Quædam Adversaria de Causa Meritoria Nostri coram Deo Justificationis &c.*, quoted in the same note. The same argument is attributed also to Piscator by Mentzer and Gerhard as there cited.—Cameron's own arguments do not appear to have been published. In one of his later tracts (entitled, *Argumenta in Disputatione adv. Præcedentes Theses Proposita*, Op., p. 364. b. Francof. 1642) he gives up the dogma itself.

sentences<sup>z</sup> of the Scripture, which I have produced in due place<sup>a</sup>.

§ 6. In the mean time you see, this opinion stands upon the same imaginary presumption of the immediate and personal imputation of Christ's death in consideration of the remission of sin, which the adversaries thereof proceed upon, as well in consideration of God's assigning everlasting life, as of His forgiving of sin. And therefore I shall easily shut it out of doors: upon supposition, first, of that which hath been said concerning the condition that qualifyeth for remission of sins; having shewed<sup>b</sup>, that it is no other faith but the sincere and cordial profession of Christianity: secondly, of that which hath been said here<sup>c</sup>, to shew, that the immediate imputation of any thing done or suffered by Christ to any man's person in satisfaction for his sins, is a mere imagination, which the Gospel of Christ never taught us; but only, that, in consideration of the obedience of Christ in publishing the Gospel under such difficulties as ended in the death of the cross, God grants remission of sins and life everlasting to all them, that take upon them resolutely and sincerely to profess Christianity. For, these things being admitted, it is manifest, that as well the active as the passive obedience of Christ is considered, in passing the promises which the Gospel brings, upon the terms which it requires. Neither indeed can there be any consideration of Christ's sufferings in the business, without the consideration of the free and voluntary and perfect obedience which He undertook and underwent them with; all the course of His life, wherein He displayed that only accomplished mirror of virtue that ever the sun saw, being a continual course of suffering that hardship, which He was no otherwise obliged to undergo, than because He had undertaken to shew such example to such effect and purpose. And therefore, if any Scriptures seem to make mention of His sufferings without speaking of that obedience which He undertook and endured them with; it is easy to have recourse unto those, whereby I have shewed the account which God had of that free and constant obedience, which He undertook and went through them with.

<sup>z</sup> Corrected from MS.; "sentence," in orig. text.

<sup>a</sup> Above, c. viii, ix.

<sup>b</sup> Above, c. vi. § 3; c. vii. § 1, sq.

<sup>c</sup> Above, c. xxix. § 7.

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§ 7. And, truly, it is an inconsequence, which no reason pardons, to imagine any other consideration for that remission of sins which the Gospel tenders, than for everlasting life: seeing it is manifest, that the Gospel tenders not remission of sins without everlasting life; nor can any man attain really the state of remission of sins without attaining as really and effectually the right of everlasting life. For as it is evident in reason, that in what consideration<sup>d</sup> God one day actually gives everlasting life, in that consideration He determined from everlasting to give it; so it is no less evident, that the person that becomes so qualified as the Gospel requires, is, at that time and from that time that he becomes so qualified, invested in the right of those promises which the Gospel tenders, in the same consideration, for which they are either granted from everlasting, or bestowed in due time. And I conceive, that neither Cameron nor any of his opinion would undertake, that eternal life is assigned to the new obedience of Christians without consideration of what Christ hath done for us; which surely was not done but in suffering-<sup>256</sup> ing, and by suffering for us.

§ 8. It is therefore for the honour of Christianity to maintain, that God, for Christ's sake, is ready to admit the heirs of everlasting damnation into the inheritance of everlasting happiness, in never so short a time, as we can believe, that they can change their resolution from following sin to profess that belief and conversation which Christianity importeth. Suppose we believe Zosimus, when, to the disgrace of it, he reports, that Constantine was persuaded to become Christian in hope to come clear of those sins, which were so great that he could find no other means to expiate them<sup>e</sup>; provided we understand always the condition which Christianity requires. Be a man's by-past sins greater or less, it is the claim of Christianity, that there is no sin so small as to be cleansed without it, none so great as not to be cleansed by it: all in consideration of Christ, Whom it preacheth. If this be as soon done as a man's mind can change, it is to be remembered, that the change of a man's mind infers the change of all his life that remains; and that the change of

<sup>d</sup> Corrected from MS.; "considerations," in orig. text.

<sup>e</sup> Zos., Hist., lib. ii. c. 29; pp. 149, 150. ed. Heyne, Lips. 1784.

his life must obtain the effect of those promises, the right whereof he is invested with upon the change of his mind: all in the same precious consideration of our Lord Christ and His obedience. C H A P.  
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§ 9. Lastly, I infer, that there is no reason to imagine, that the redemption of mankind should require our Lord Christ to suffer the pains of the damned; supposing that we are delivered from damnation by His sufferings: and, therefore, that this cannot be the intent of Christ's descent into hell, which the Apostles' Creed declares<sup>f</sup>. I pretend not here to dispute, what are the pains of the damned, or what were the pains of the soul which our Lord Christ endured upon the cross; or, in order to it, how essentially requisite it is, in the pains of the damned, that they should despair of God's favour for ever, and therefore ever to come free of that estate. This I infer upon the premises, that the redemption of mankind doth not require, that Christ should suffer the same kind of pains, which we must have suffered had not He interposed for us; but that He tendered that obedience to God, in undergoing whatsoever the execution of that commission, which God had imposed upon Him, required, which, coming from the Son of God, was valuable

Christ  
need not  
suffer hell-  
pains that  
we might  
not.

<sup>f</sup> "Nihil actum erat, si corporea tantum morte defunctus fuisset Christus: sed operæ simul pretium erat, ut Divinæ ultionis severitatem sentiret; quo et iræ Ipsius intercederet, et satisfaceret justo iudicio. Unde etiam Eum oportuit eum inferorum copiis æternæque mortis horrore, quasi consertis manibus, luctari. Correctionem pacis nostræ Illi impositam fuisse ex propheta nuper retulimus, fuisse propter scelera nostra a Patre percussum, attritum propter nostras infirmitates. Quibus significat, in locum sceleratorum sponsozem, vadem, adeoque instar rei submissum, Qui dependeret ac persolveret omnes, quæ ab illis expetendæ erant, pœnas: uno hoc duntaxat excepto, quod doloribus mortis non poterat detineri. Ergo si ad inferos descendisse dicitur, nihil mirum est; quum eam mortem pertulerit, quæ sceleratis ab irato Deo infligitur." Calvin, *Instit.*, lib. ii. c. xvi. § 10; *Op.*, tom. ix. p. 132. b. "It was rife in pulpits" (i. e. in England), "and usuall in catechismes,

that the death of Christ Jesus on the Crosse, and His bloud-shed for the remission of our sinnes, were the least cause and meane of our redemption; but He did, and must, suffer 'the death of the soule,' and 'the very same paines which the damned doe in hell,' before we could be ransomed from the wrath of God; and this was that descent of Christ to hell, which we are taught by the Creed to beleieve. This opinion began to preuaile so fast, that children were trained to it, and the people led to controle the Scriptures," &c. &c. Bilson, *Survey of Christ's Sufferings for Man's Redemption, and of His Descent to Hades or Hell for our Deliverance*, Pref., p. 3, Lond. 1604.—See also Rob. Parker, *De Descensu Domini Nostri Jesu Christi ad Inferos* (Amst. 1611), written in defence of Calvin's dogma against Bilson: Heylin, *On the Creed, Art. Descent into Hell*, pp. 279 sq. (Lond. 1673): and Pearson, *On the Creed, Art. Desc. into Hell*, vol. i. p. 388. (Oxf. 1833), and notes.

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in worth to move God to dispense in that original law, which He had made the rule of our actions by right of our creation upon pain of everlasting death, and to allow everlasting life upon remission of sins to all that should embrace Christianity. For seeing the sufferings of Christ were not intended for mere punishment (so that, He enduring that which we were liable to, we should no longer remain chargeable with it), but to tender God a consideration, valuable to satisfy Him, not to execute the penalty of His original law upon us, but to abate of it by tendering us new terms of reconcilment and peace with Him; there can be no reason, why He should undergo the same kind and nature of punishment, which we must have suffered had not He interposed. And therefore, whatsoever the pains were which Christ endured in His soul, either upon the cross or in order to His cross, being abandoned by God to the will of Satan and his ministers, even unto death (which here I am not concerned to dispute); this I must infer from the premises, that we are to seek for no other consideration for which we are admitted to grace, but that, which the whole tenor of the Scriptures and the consent of Christ's Church holds forth to us; that is to say, the precious blood of our Lord Christ shed upon the cross for us.

§ 10. Having thus excluded the two extreme opinions concerning the justification of sinners by the Gospel of Christ, which I hold to be equally destructive to Christianity on contrary sides: the one acknowledging no condition to qualify us for the promises of the Gospel but the immediate imputation of the merits and sufferings of Christ, sent to die for us; the other acknowledging no consideration of Christ, in tendering or accepting the covenant of grace, and the condition which it requires: I will now proceed to resolve the merit of mean opinions concerning the same, from the premises.

§ 11. The first is the opinion of many of the Reformation: that make the justification of sinners by the Gospel to consist in remission of sins, tendered and embraced by that faith, which consisteth in a resolution of trusting and reposing confidence in God for the obtaining of His promises tendered us in Christ Jesus; but supposing always and

The opinion that maketh justifying faith to be trust in God.



premissing repentance, as a condition requisite to make this confidence lively and Christian, not sensual, carnal, and presumptive; and supposing always, and inferring upon it, the promise of God's Spirit, sanctifying, and enabling to perform that new obedience, which qualifieth for the world to come.

§ 12. That there is this opinion amongst the reformed, and those of them, that labour most to interpret the Reformation so as not to contradict the faith of the Church, I may well say, without going further than myself; who do acknowledge this to have been mine opinion for many years, and do certainly know, that it was maintained in my time, against the furious pretences of zealots, in the University of Cambridge.

§ 13. And of this opinion I will say three things. First, Not pre-judicial to the faith. that it is not destructive to the true faith of God's Church. My reason is, because of that repentance, which it supposeth, and the consideration of new obedience in obtaining everlasting life, which it inferreth. For repentance, in this argument, cannot signify conversion from any particular sin, but the change of the whole man, of his intentions, and by consequence of his actions, to seek God instead of himself and this world: and therefore containeth in it whatsoever the Gospel can require, to make any man, that is surprised in the state of sin, capable of God's grace by Christ; inasmuch as this change cannot be wrought without the tender of pardon for Christ's sake, upon that which His Gospel requireth. For repentance thus understood, as it turneth from all sin, so it importeth a resolution to all that goodness which Christianity prescribeth; which is all, that he who is presently surprised in sin can have, to come out of it: supposing this resolution not to be superficial, but rooted in him by frequent prayers, and tears, [with<sup>g</sup>] such works of humiliation as are only able, and absolutely requisite, to make effectual impression in man's mind, always apt through variety of objects to entertain impressions tending to contrary resolutions. And therefore, this repentance being required to the truth of living and justifying faith, as new obedience to the attaining of the world to come, and every thing required by God's law being of necessity that, which quali-

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fieth for God's promises in His account who tenders the law; the condition, which this opinion requireth to qualify for the promises of the Gospel, is materially, and for the things it contains, the same which I have shewed that the Gospel requires: though formally, and in express terms, it renounces all consideration, in the justification of sinners, but that of Christ and His obedience embraced by faith; as I have said. This I may say, that in the remembrances of those things, which I have said in public to the people concerning this point during the time that I was of this opinion, I do not remember now, that there is any thing, that I could not presently say, my judgment being thus far changed.

Yet not  
true.

§ 14. For, secondly, I must say, that this opinion is not true. As may appear by that which hath been said<sup>h</sup>, to shew, what it is the Gospel requires on our part to qualify us for the promises which it tenders on God's; and, by consequence, what is that faith which alone justifieth. For having shewed the true sense of the Scriptures, according to that which the Jews' opinion that St. Paul disputes against<sup>i</sup> (still extant and visible in their constitutions), which the consent of Christ's Church<sup>k</sup>, which the consequences of the difference between the literal and mystical sense of Moses' law (pointed out in part by some modern writers<sup>l</sup>), hath taught me; I do conclude the sense of them, which this opinion inferreth, though it be not destructive to Christianity, yet [is<sup>m</sup>] not deducible from the principles of it by good divinity. And, truly, to require repentance to the truth of that faith which only justifieth, and not to make it part of that quality, in consideration whereof God for Christ's sake allows remission of sins; is to say things utterly inconsequent: inasmuch as<sup>258</sup> I have said, that God's consideration imports only this, that He decrees remission of sins for repentance in the nature of a motive cause, not that He is moved by repentance to decree it. Neither is it any way consequent for him, that admitteth new obedience to be in consideration in bestowing everlasting life, to stick at admitting repentance to be in consideration

<sup>h</sup> Above, cc. vi. vii.

<sup>i</sup> See above, c. viii. § 5—16.

<sup>k</sup> Above, c. ix. § 17—42.

<sup>l</sup> See above, cc. v. § 10. note h, and

viii. § 17: and Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr, c. xiii.

<sup>m</sup> Added from MS.

in bestowing the right of it. For though the promises of the Gospel in this life are many (remission of sins, and reconciliation, regeneration, justification, sanctification, adoption of sons, and if there be any thing else of that rank), yet, whatsoever difference a divine may justly argue between these from the Scriptures, it were a gross inconvenience to say, that, the condition of the Gospel being performed, they are not all due to him in whom it is found. The term of sanctification itself, though it necessarily imports the habitual dwelling of the Holy Ghost in him that is reconciled to God, because we know the Gospel promises it; yet it supposes not only that promise, but also another, that God will accept it for holiness in him, in whom original concupiscence notwithstanding remains. And if the term of regeneration import that inherent disposition of mind, to which a man by becoming a Christian is born anew; yet that of adoption expresses the free will of God, by which He accepteth him, that is changed to such a disposition, for His son. So that neither remission of sins, nor right to the kingdom, can be understood to be assigned under the title of justification in consideration of Christ, without consideration of that condition which the Gospel of Christ requireth.

§ 15. Lastly, I say, that the said opinion is apt to give just occasion of a mistake in justifying faith, that may be destructive to the Christian faith. My reason is, because it is hard so to provide (as hitherto sufficient provision could never be made), as to distinguish from it the opinion of justification, by believing that Christ died for him that believes as one of the elect, for whom alone Christ died; which is no less destructive to the faith, than the heresy of the Antinomians, that a man is justified in consideration of Christ, before we believe it<sup>n</sup>. And, truly, the manifold controversies and everlasting wrangles, which the misunderstanding of the nature of that faith which alone justifieth hath raised among those that depart from the Church of Rome (some making it to consist in believing that a man is predestinate to life, others in trusting in God through Christ; some making only the passive obedience of Christ, others both active and passive, to be imputed to us; some making justification to

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[And apt to give occasion to a mistake that is destructive to the faith.]

<sup>n</sup> See above, c. i. § 11. note c.

consist only in remission of sins, others in that and in the imputation of Christ's merits both<sup>o</sup>), may justly move them to retire to the simplicity of the Gospel, which they will never find in any terms but those which I propose;—that all the promises thereof are due, upon making good the true profession of Christianity.

[Doctrine of the Homilies respecting justifying faith.]

§ 16. If it be said, that those homilies, which the article of the Church of England<sup>p</sup> refers us to for the right understanding of justification and justifying faith, seem to express this opinion<sup>q</sup>, which I esteem neither true nor yet destructive to the faith: I answer ingenuously, that they seem to me so to do; but that, so doing, the sense of it is utterly unreconcilable with those things which I have quoted out of the office of baptism, and the beginning of the catechism<sup>r</sup>. Which being as much subscribed by the clergy as the articles and homilies are, and also containing the whole religion of the people, and the clergy's therefore as Christians (for the people, being not acquainted with the articles but when they change their curate, had no means to take further notice of them), is by consequence to be preferred in case of competition. Unreconcilable I say, as far as this opinion is unreconcilable to that which I have proposed: the communion of the Church no ways requiring, that men should be reconciled in the interpretation of the Scriptures, provided it draw no consequence destructive to the faith; as this doth not,

<sup>o</sup> See e. g. the opinions enumerated by Bp. Forbes, *Considerationes Modestæ, De Justificatione*, libb. I., II.

<sup>p</sup> XXXIX Articles, art. xi.

<sup>q</sup> E. g. "St. Paul declareth here nothing upon the behalf of man concerning his justification, but only a true and lively faith; which nevertheless is the gift of God, and not man's only work, without God. And yet that faith doth not shut out repentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of God, to be joined with faith in every man that is justified: but it shutteth them out from the office of justifying. So that, although they be all present together in him that is justified, yet they justify not all together. Neither doth faith shut out the justice of our good works, necessarily to be done afterwards of duty toward God: . . . but it excludeth them, so that we may not do them to this in-

tent, to be made just by doing of them." Homily of Salvation, Pt. i. in fin. and similarly in Pt. ii. init.—On the other hand:—"This saying, that we be justified by faith only, freely, and without works, is spoken *for to take away clearly all merit of our works*, as being unable to deserve our justification at God's hands" (Ibid. Pt. ii. init.): and, "The true understanding and meaning thereof is, that, although we hear God's word and believe it, although we have *faith*, hope, charity, repentance, dread and fear of God within us, and do never so many good works thereunto; yet we must *renounce the merit of all our said virtues*," &c. (ibid.): and again (Pt. iii.), "This *form of speaking* use we, in the humbling of ourselves to God, to give all the glory to our Saviour Christ."

<sup>r</sup> Above, c. iv. § 17.

but that which in terms it complies with doth. And, therefore, I have held it my duty (that opinion having broken forth into a manifest heresy of the Antinomians, and the detestation of that tending to let in a contrary heresy of the Socinians, as first it bred it) to declare to all, that are not professed enemies to the Church of England, and the Catholic Church with it, the first misunderstanding, from whence I conceive such dangerous errors proceed; that, if God ever send order out of that confusion in religion which now rules among us, I may have contested, that there can be no sure ground for it, but the plain faith of the Catholic Church<sup>s</sup>.

§ 17. It is well enough known, that there is still another opinion concerning justification; to wit, that of the school doctors<sup>t</sup>, which the council of Trent seemeth to have made matter of faith<sup>u</sup>: which maketh the beginning of justification

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The decree of the council of Trent, and the doctrine of the School[, about justifying faith].

<sup>s</sup> "The publishing of this book may serve for my protestation, what is to be considered, if ever God send order, for the ground of the said order." Added in margin in MS.

<sup>t</sup> See Abp. Laurence's Bampton Lectures, Lect. iv. and the notes to it; and Le Blanc, *Thes. Theol.*, *Thes. de Fidei Justificantis Natura* &c., P. ii., pp. 235, sq.

<sup>u</sup> "Declarat præterea (sancta synodus) ipsius justificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Christum Jesum præveniente gratia sumendum esse" &c. "Disponuntur autem ad ipsam justitiam, dum excitati Divina gratia et adjuvi, fidem ex auditu concipientes, libere moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse quæ Divinitus revelata et promissa sunt, atque illud in primis, a Deo justificari impium per gratiam Ejus, per redemptionem quæ est in Christo Jesu, et dum, peccatores se esse intelligentes, a Divinæ justitiæ timore, quo utiliter concutiuntur, ad considerandam Dei misericordiam se convertendo in spem eriguntur, fidentes Deum sibi propter Christum propitium fore, Illumque tamquam omnis justitiæ fontem diligere incipiunt; ac propterea moventur adversus peccata per odium aliquod et detestationem, hoc est, per eam pœnitentiam, quam ante baptismum agi oportet; denique dum proponunt suscipere baptismum, inchoare novam vitam, et servare Divina mandata. De hac dispositione scriptum est: 'Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est:'" &c. &c. "Hanc dispositionem,

seu præparationem, justificatio ipsa consequitur, quæ non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio, et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum: unde homo ex injusto fit justus, et ex inimico amicus, ut sit hæres secundum spem vitæ æternæ. Hujus justificationis causæ sunt: finalis," &c. &c.: "demum unica formalis causa est justitia Dei: non qua Ipse justus est, sed qua nos justos facit, qua videlicet ab Eo donati renovamur spiritu mentis nostræ, et non modo reputamur sed vere justi nominamur et sumus; justitiam in nobis recipientes, unusquisque suam, secundum mensuram quam Spiritus Sanctus partitur singulis prout vult, et secundum propriam cujusque dispositionem et cooperationem." Concil. Trident., Sess. vi. capp. 5-7: ap. Labb., Concil., tom. xiv. pp. 758. C—759. D.—"Quibus verbis justificationis impii descriptio insinuat, ut sit translatio ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius Adæ, in statum gratiæ," &c. "Quæ quidem translatio, post evangelium promulgatum, sine lavacro regenerationis, aut ejus voto, fieri non potest." Ibid., cap. 4. p. 758. B. C.—"Sacrosancta œcumenica et generalis Tridentina Synodus," &c. &c. "exponere intendit omnibus Christi fidelibus veram sanamque doctrinam ipsius justificationis, quam . . . Christus . . . docuit, apostoli tradiderunt, et catholica ecclesia, Spiritu Sancto suggerente, perpetuo retinuit; districtius inhibendo, ne deinceps audeat quisquam aliter cre-



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to consist in that faith, which believeth the Gospel to be true; whereupon, as there necessarily follows servile fear of that punishment, to which it discovers all that refuse it to be liable, so it gives ground enough of hope to all that resolve not to refuse it; so that, the mind balancing between the love of God (which prefers the next world) and the love of ourselves and of this world (which prefers this), if a man (conceiving that sorrow for his sins, which the love of God, not the fear of punishment, suggests, and acting those works of penance, which, if a Christian before, the neglect of his calling and profession requires) resolve to prefer the love of God in all his actions for the time to come, the faith and the hope, which he had before without form, now being informed by the love of God above all, and his servile fear turned into filial, he becomes just, because formally endowed with this love, which makes all his endowments supernatural, and proportionable to the reward of everlasting happiness which the Gospel tenders; provided that he receive the sacrament of baptism, or effectually desire it, if it were to be had.

[It committeth as great a fault as the former in its definition of justifying faith.]

§ 18. Of this opinion I say, first, that it committeth as great a fault as the former in assigning the true conceit and notion of justifying faith. For whereas there are indeed (as I have shewed<sup>x</sup>) three significations of faith in the writings of the apostles (wherein only there is express question of the justification of Christians), the first and last whereof depend upon the middle, as the cause and effect of it; and that the apostles intend the second sense properly, when they dispute against the Jews, that a man is not justified by works nor by the Law, but by grace and by faith (that is, by the Gospel, tendering the covenant of grace, and by that faith, whereby we undertake that Christianity whereinto we are baptized); they, who make the office of faith in justifying no more than believing the Gospel to be true, seem as void of the truth in that, as those who place it in reposing trust and confidence in God upon it. For as the Gospel gives sufficient ground of trust and confidence in God from the first moment that any man hears of it (what state soever it is, and how sinful, in which it overtakes him), if we speak of confidence that we

dere, prædicare, aut docere, quam præ-  
senti decreto statuitur ac declaratur."   
Ibid., præem. in Decret. de Justifica-

tionē, p. 757, B, C.

<sup>x</sup> Above, c. vi. § 1—3; c. vii. § 1, 2.

may or shall obtain remission of sins upon condition of embracing and performing the condition which it advanceth; so, if we speak of trust and confidence in God, as indeed and actually reconciled to God, seeing it supposeth justification, it must needs suppose that faith which justifieth: and so justifying faith cannot be said to consist in it, but by consequence of nature to produce it. On the other side: whereas all the works that a man can do, after he sincerely believes the truth of the Gospel, but before he hath made profession of Christianity by being baptized, cannot avail to the forgiveness of sin, much less to entitle him to everlasting life, according to the doctrine of the apostles; it can by no means be imagined, that when they attribute justification to faith, whether alone, or in opposition to works or to the Law, they do attribute it to that faith, whereby he remains not justified, not to that, which he is necessarily justified as soon as he hath. And this is the true end of that endless dispute between faith and good works; when it is questioned, whether true faith can be without good works, or not. For it is manifest, that heretics, schismatics, and sinful Christians, do as truly believe, either the whole Gospel (so far as the common salvation of Christians requireth), or at least that part which their heresy or schism contesteth not, as a good Christian really doth. It is no less manifest, that not only heretics and schismatics, but even bad and sinful Christians also, not only may, but really have a true and real confidence in God as to the world to come; without which those that believe the world to come could not live and die in that course, which indeed renders them incapable of it. But the faith, which whosoever is baptized plighteth to God, to profess the faith which He hath taught to the death, and to live according to it, must needs either be counterfeit (and so produce no effect but the damning of him that is baptized with it), or produce the works of faith, so long as it is and continues sincere. And thus is the tradition of the Church concerning justification by the good works of Christians<sup>†</sup>, reconciled not only with the doctrine of the apostles,—that a man is not justified by the works that go before Christianity<sup>‡</sup>,—but also with the tradition of the Church concerning the

<sup>†</sup> See above, c. ix. § 17—12.

<sup>‡</sup> See above, c. viii. § 11 sq.

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ingredience of baptism into the same work<sup>a</sup>: and with the doctrine of the fathers, manifestly distinguishing that true faith, which produceth good works, from that dead faith, which doth not, not by the accession of love, but by marks intrinsic to the nature of it<sup>b</sup>; manifestly distinguishing those good works which indeed do justify, from those, which for the mind which they are done with do not justify, but for their kind might, had they been done by Christians, by the boundary between them, which is baptism; but so, that the works themselves are but the material part, that is, the thing which the covenant of grace requireth; but the reason and consideration, in which they are accepted by God to that effect, is not the influence of our free will, though cured of concupiscence (as cured it may be in this life) and acted by God's Spirit, but the grace of God, moving Him in consideration of our Lord Christ's sufferings, first, to publish the Gospel, then to accept the profession and life of Christians according to it for a condition qualifying them for that which He promiseth by it. Which is but the English of that which is commonly said, that God accepteth of our works as dipped in Christ's blood; which He accepteth not, if He accept them not to that effect which His Gospel promiseth, having excluded<sup>c</sup> (as He doth, if the Gospel be true) all that He accepteth not to that purpose.

How [nevertheless] it is not prejudicial to the faith. [Two ways of explaining it.]

§ 19. Having said this, in common, as it were, to both these opinions, in particular, to that which I proposed last, or rather to the rest of it, I say three things. First, that it may be understood two ways; to wit, that this holds, either by virtue of the original law of God, or by virtue of that dispensation in it, that abatement of the penalty of it, which the Gospel imports. For so long as it is only said, that God infuseth into him, that receives the sacrament of baptism out of a resolution of loving God above all, a habit of supernatural righteousness; which is formally the remission of sins, as extinguishing them by contrary dispositions; and that this is the righteousness, which he pleads to God for the reward of the world to come: I say, all this while it is

<sup>a</sup> See above, c. iv.

<sup>b</sup> See above, c. vi. § 9.

<sup>c</sup> So corrected in errata to the folio

edition. That edition omits the word "excluded;" and the MS. corrects, "hating (as He doth,)" &c.)

not said, whether the nature and kind of the quality thus produced oblige God to give him that happiness of the world to come in recompence of it; or whether the promise of the Gospel, decreed and declared out of His mere goodness, render that due by way of recompence, which otherwise this disposition could no way claim. For he that says, that the natural worth of the qualities here supposed claims the reward, as due by God's justice, must needs say, that they justify by God's original law; but he that says, by God's promise, and only by that justice which consists in keeping promise, by the covenant of grace. Now then I say, if that this opinion proceed upon [the<sup>d</sup>] first ground, it is destructive to the Christian faith. For I have shewed<sup>e</sup>, that the Gospel contains a covenant of grace, not only in regard of helps of grace to fulfil the condition which it requires (which I have shewed, that God grants in consideration of our Lord Christ and His obedience), but also, because in the same consideration He accepteth of the condition, both to extinguish the debt of sin, and to entitle us to everlasting life, which otherwise it enables us not to claim; and both these regards, I have shewed<sup>g</sup>, belong to the Christian faith. Now he that affirmeth, that the righteousness which God infuses into those that are baptized, challengeth remission of sins and everlasting life (or rather challengeth everlasting life, because it extinguisheth sin) by God's original justice, acknowledges indeed the grace of God in granting those helps, by which we attain the said righteousness (and that in consideration of our Lord Christ and His obedience), but acknowledgeth not the grace of God through Christ in accepting of it to such purpose; and therein, as I suppose, denies the covenant of grace which the Gospel contains.

§ 20. Secondly, I say, that there is enough in the doctrine of the School, or in the decree of the Council of Trent, to shew, that they cannot intend the first sense; but that they must acknowledge it to God's free promise, which being accepted becomes the covenant of grace. This follows upon several points of their doctrine. First, as they make at

[Taken by the schoolmen and by the Council of Trent in the better sense.]

<sup>d</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>e</sup> Above, c. viii. § 4.

Misprinted 253 in folio edit.

<sup>g</sup> Above, cc. viii. § 4, sq.; x. § 1, sq.

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least the material of original sin to consist in concupiscence<sup>h</sup>: the remains whereof in the regenerate are therefore (even with them) of the same nature and kind, though rebated and acquitted of the nature and effect of sin; which is, to make liable to death. For this cannot hold, but in regard of several laws, whereof the one forbiddeth this concupiscence, the other allows reconciliation and grace supposing it; as I said afore<sup>i</sup>: that law that succeeds, being the covenant of grace. Secondly, as it requires the sacrament of baptism to the allowance of this righteousness, in lieu of the reward which it challenges<sup>k</sup>. For, the sacrament of baptism being a part of the Christian law, which is the covenant of grace, and so a secondary and positive provision for the salvation of mankind, lost by God's original law; it were a contradiction to say, that any thing claimed by virtue thereof should be due by God's original law. Thirdly, and lastly, in regard of that sound sense, in which they clearly and freely maintain the satisfaction of Christ<sup>l</sup>; which, by the premisses, is nothing else, but the consideration, for which God accepts the acts and the qualities which the Gospel requires in due plea for that which it promises. For, imputation being nothing else, in common reason, but the immediate consequence of satisfaction, the righteousness which God imputes to Abraham's spiritual seed, as to his person, according to St. Paul (Rom. iv. 16—24), cannot depend upon the mere worth of the condition required, but upon the free grace of God, accepting it for that it is not worth, in consideration of the obedience of Christ.

[Yet in such way as to give appearance of reason for imputing the worse.]

§ 21. Lastly, I say, there is appearance of reason, to move

<sup>h</sup> See above, c. xx. § 4. note s; and Laurence's Bampton Lectures, note 12. on Lect. iii.

<sup>i</sup> Above, c. xx. § 32.

<sup>k</sup> See above, § 17. note u.

<sup>l</sup> "Sicut revera homines, nisi ex semine Adæ propagati nascerentur, non nascerentur injusti, . . . ita nisi in Christo renascerentur, nunquam justificarentur, cum ea renascentia per meritum passionis Ejus, gratia, qua justi fiunt, illis tribuatur." Conc. Trid., Sess. vi. cap. 3: ap. Labb., Concil., tom. xiv. p. 758. A.—"Declarat præterea (sancta synodus) ipsius justificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per

Christum Jesum præveniente gratia sumendum esse, hoc est, ab Ejus vocatione, qua, nullis eorum existentibus meritis, vocantur." Ibid., cap. 5. ibid. C, D.—"Gratia autem justificari ideo (dicimur), quia nihil eorum quæ justificationem præcedunt, sive fides, sive opera, ipsam justificationis gratiam promeretur." Ibid. cap. 8. ibid. p. 760. B, C.—"Quamvis autem necessarium sit credere, neque remitti, neque remissa unquam fuisse peccata, nisi gratis Divina misericordia propter Christum, nemini tamen fiduciam et certitudinem remissionis peccatorum suorum jactanti," &c. Ibid. c. 9: ibid. C.



men that are jealous of the glory of God's grace, to think, that they claim the promises of the Gospel as due by God's original law to that infused righteousness, by having whereof they say we are righteous before God<sup>m</sup>. First, in that they depart from the language of the Scripture, and the true meaning thereof, in making justification to consist in the infusion of righteousness; which though it presupposeth, by the premisses, formally it signifieth not. For having shewed, that the condition which the Gospel requires, is allowed of grace, in consideration of Christ, to qualify us for the promises of it: it remains beyond question, that the righteousness which the Gospel requires, is of itself real true righteousness; because it is God, That allows it and accepts it to that effect, to which He accepts not the righteousness of a hypocrite: always understanding it to be the righteousness of one, that turneth from sin with a sincere and effectual resolution to serve God in all things for the future; whose righteousness may well be called infused righteousness, in regard of the helps of God's grace whereby it is effected, though we suppose no other kind of quality (beside that disposition which brings a man to baptism) to succeed upon it, but only the habitual assistance of the Holy Ghost, promised to enable all them, that sincerely undertake Christianity, to perform what they undertake. Thus then, making justification to consist, not in God's allowance, but in His act of infusing righteousness, they create appearance to reason, that the  
 262 righteousness so infused is in their opinion that righteousness before God, to which the promises of the Gospel are due by His original law. For if there were not other points of their doctrine to create another interpretation of it, there could be no other sense for it than this. Secondly, in that they make this righteousness to consist, not in any acceptance and allowance of God, but in His grace really infused into that soul, which, out of an act of the love of God raised by the helps of His grace, supposing faith and hope joined with servile fear afore, had resolved upon baptism<sup>n</sup>. For what allowance can this love be imagined to need, as of grace, to make the promises of the Gospel by God's original law due

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<sup>m</sup> See e. g. the quotation from Vasquez, below in note u.

<sup>n</sup> See above, § 17. notes t, u.

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to it, if it be admitted for righteousness before God? Here I must do them right. I must not say, that it is the Council of Trent<sup>o</sup>, or that it is any act of the Church obligatory to all the communion that owns it, that obliges them to attribute the effect of justifying to God's infused grace by virtue of the nature of it, and not by virtue of His grace in accepting it to that purpose. For it is notorious; and you may find the names of the doctors in Vasquez (*In Prim. Secund.*, Disput. cciv. numm. 1—3<sup>p</sup>), that hold this grace not to render men graceful to God for itself, but by His free accepting it to that effect; the Nominals<sup>q</sup> in particular, besides Durandus<sup>r</sup> and Alliacensis<sup>s</sup> by name. In the mean time, no man can

<sup>o</sup> See below, § 22.—That the Council of Trent does not assert this extreme doctrine *in terminis*, may be seen from its words quoted above, § 17, note u: and from Vasquez' arguments (as cited in next note, c. iii. p. 681. a, b) to prove that those words *imply* it. The decree of the Council asserts, that the one formal cause of justification is inherent justice, "qua videlicet homo fit ex injusto justus;" and in explaining this, speaks of it, as "renovatio" &c. "per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum." But it does not decide, whether such inherent justice justifies *per se*, or by the free acceptance of God. Vasquez argues (which seems an additional step), that "nemo probabiliter dicere posset Concilium loquutum fuisse de gratia, prout est non tantum justitia inhærens, sed etiam prout habet annexam acceptationem Dei, qua homo diligatur." See also § 22, note y, below.

<sup>p</sup> The title of c. i. of this Disputation (tom. ii. p. 674. b. Ingolst. 1612) is, "Justitiam inhærentem, sine favore et condonatione addita, nec justificare animam, nec eam a peccatis mortalibus purgare, varie scholastici senserunt." In § 1. (*ibid.*) Vasquez states, that "circa hanc quæstionem duæ solum opiniones esse videntur: altera est nihil nobis inesse, sive habitum, sive operationem, quod suapte natura possit justificare animam et a peccatis eam purgare, sed ad hoc necessario indigeat favore Dei acceptantis illud, et condonantis, aut remittentis peccatum, quo quidem favore accedente justitiæ inhærenti et intrinsicæ nobis nostra justificatio compleatur. In quam quidem

sententiam non pauci scholastici conspirarunt, tametsi varie ipsam defendant." He proceeds to name Ricardus, Scotus, Gabriel, Occam, Joannes Medina, in § 1. (*ibid.*): and in § 2. (*ibid.*), as holding the same view on a somewhat different ground, Ricardus, Scotus, and Gabriel, again; with Bonaventura, Durandus, Paludanus, Conradus; and in § 3. (*ibid.* p. 675. a.), in a third way, Occam with the Nominalists; and acquiescing in their view, Gregorius (de Valentia), Gabriel again, and Petrus Alliacensis.

<sup>q</sup> Gul. de Ockham, In Sentent. P. Lomb., lib. I. Dist. xvii. Qu. 1. (fol. Lugd. 1495): in which Quæstio, "impugnat sententiam eorum, qui dicunt inhærentem justitiam esse qualitatem, quæ suapte natura non possit Deo non placere, et non possit non reddere hominem justum, et a peccato ipsum purgare" (Vasquez, as quoted in last note, p. 675. a.).

<sup>r</sup> Durandus a Sancto Portiano, In Sentent. P. Lomb., lib. I. Dist. xvii. qu. 10. num. 4. (p. 140. a. Lugd. 1587): "Circa essentialium habituum supernaturalium quos infusos dicimus, nihil omnino possunt actiones nostræ bonæ vel malæ nisi meritorie quoad generationem vel corruptionem, augmentum vel diminutionem, sed omnia sunt effective a Deo:—"and lib. III. Dist. xxxi. qu. 1. num. 6. (*ibid.* pp. 599. b, 600. a.).

<sup>s</sup> Petrus Alliacensis, In Sentent. P. Lomb., lib. I. Qu. ix. art. 2.—e. g. "4ta propositio" (fol. cxl. C. Svo. Paris. s. a.) "est, quod aliquis non est dignus vita æterna ab aliqua causa creata sed a sola acceptione Divina. Patet satis ex prædictis," &c.

deny, that it is lawful<sup>t</sup> to hold, that we are justified by the worth and natural perfection of God's infused grace; which though He freely giveth, yet can He not refuse justification having given it. And, therefore, they who place their religion in making their distance from heretics (as our Puritans from Antichrist) as wide as they can possible, have taught and still do teach, that the supernatural infused righteousness of Christians (which, as I said, they make to consist principally in the love of God above all things), of its own worth and intrinsical perfection, and not by God's accepting of it to that effect, not only formally remitteth sin, as formally it expelleth the same, but so justifieth, that God were unjust should He not justify Christians in consideration of it<sup>u</sup>. And what could have been said more express, that it is due by God's original law, not by any dispensation in it which the promise of the Gospel importeth? that the grace of God in Christ is not seen in rewarding that disposition which the Gospel requireth, but in giving those helps whereby we attain unto it? A thing never a whit more contradictory to that which hath been proved here, than to other points of their own profession alleged even now.

§ 22. Before I leave this point, for the clearing of that which I said,—that the Council of Trent seemeth to have enacted the doctrine of the School for matter of faith, not that indeed it hath so done,—I will observe, that it hath not decreed that we are justified by grace habitually dwelling in the soul; but only, that, “through the merit of Christ's

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[How far the Council of Trent falls short of the extreme doctrine of the School.]

<sup>t</sup> I. e. according to the decree of Trent, and within the Roman Communion, in which either doctrine is left admissible.

<sup>u</sup> E. g. Non possum non mirari antiquos scholasticos, quos hactenus memoravi, quod de justitia nobis inhærente ita abjecte senserint, ut veram ei adscribere formidaverint rationem justitiæ, et sanctitatis inhærentis, quæ suapte natura Deo necessario placeat. Recentiores vero Theologos multo magis miratus sum, quod post præclarum Concilii Tridentini definitionem . . . tam exilem justitiam inhærentem justis concesserint, ut ex se non habeat virtutem tergendî maculas peccatorum, nec eos purgare valeat, nisi favore et condonatione Dei relaxentur. Utrique autem,

si eorum sententiæ recte expendantur, veram rationem justitiæ inhærentis e medio tollere videntur, quam Patres Tridentini pro viribus adstruere et defendere moliti sunt, sicut ratione convincere conabor. In hoc autem capite solum ostendam, talem esse justitiam nobis inhærentem, ut suapte natura absque ullo favore nos justos reddat, ita ut per eam renovati non possimus tanquam justî Deo non placere. In sequente vero monstrabo hac inhærente justitia ex natura ipsius solum considerata ita nos a peccato purgari, ut nulla indigeamus condonatione, et favore Dei condonantis, et remittentis peccatum.” Vasquez, as before quoted, c. ii. p. 676. b.

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passion, the love of God is diffused in the hearts of those that are justified, and is inherent in them, so that, in their justification, with remission of sins, they receive faith, hope, and charity, as infused into them" (Sess. vi. cap. 7<sup>x</sup>). For here it is expressly claimed by doctors of that Church, not that the grace whereby we are justified is a quality habitually informing the soul of man, as supernaturally infused by God into it; but only, that faith, hope, and charity are infused into them that are justified, and inherent in them, as shed into their hearts by the Holy Ghost; which, they say, may all be understood, supposing that a man is justified by the acts of faith, hope, and love, infused or shed into the heart by the Holy Ghost, as well as by habits supernaturally created to reside in the soul. For you may see by Morinus in his late work *De Administratione Pœnitentiæ*, VIII. 2, 3, 7<sup>y</sup>, that for twelve hundred years after Christ, a good while after the school doctors were come in, there was no question at all made, whether we are justified by an infused habit of grace or not; and that it was about the year 1250 that this opinion entirely prevailed in the schools. Whereby it appeareth, that, as this opinion contains nothing destructive to the faith, if it be understood in that sense which the Church of Rome allows,—that it is not the natural worth of it which justifies,

\* "Quamquam enim nemo possit esse justus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi communicantur, id tamen in hac impii justificatione fit, dum ejusdem sanctissimæ passionis merito per Spiritum Sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhæret: unde in ipsa justificatione cum remissione peccatorum hæc omnia simul infusa accipit homo per Jesum Christum, Cui inseritur, fidem, spem, et caritatem." Concil. Trident., Sess. vi. can. 7: ap. Labb., Concil., tom. xiv. p. 759. D, E.

y "Quando in scholis de habitibus infusus disputari cœptum. Tandem circa annum 1250 deferbuit disputatio, plerisque originem et meriti et justificationis causam formalem ab habituali gratia potius quam ab actuali pœnitentibus." Morinus, *De Admin. Pœnitent.*, lib. viii. title of c. ii. p. 503. I. B, C. (Antv. 1582): and see § 13, 14. (p. 505) of the same chapter, and c. iii. § 18. p. 411. 2. C—E.—"Scholastici

plurimi et celeberrimi referuntur, qui affirmant mille supra centum annis totam habituum infusorum doctrinam in Ecclesia ignoratam fuisse, Patres ante hoc tempus sacramentorum effectum, hominis impii justificationem, fidei operumque nostrorum meritum, sine gratiæ habitualis mentione explicasse." Id., *Ibid.*, title of c. vii. p. 525. 2. D: and see § 1—12. of that chapter, pp. 525. 2. E—528. 1. D.—Of the schoolmen thus quoted by Morinus in c. vii., one (Barthol. Medina) remarks, that "Concilium Tridentinum, . . . ut recte admonet . . . Soto, . . . consulto abstinuit a nomine habitus, sed tantum definivit hominem justificari per justitiam diffusam in cordibus nostris, quæ illi inhæreat:" and again, "Utrum vero Deus efficiat hanc interiorem renovationem per aliquam qualitatem permanentem et infusam, vel potius per solam motionem actualis auxilii Divini, Concilium Tridentinum non definit." Morin., *ibid.*, § 5. p. 526. 2. C—E.

263 but God's accepting of it to that effect,—so, if it did, yet could not the Church of Rome be said to teach any thing destructive to the faith, but only to allow [some<sup>2</sup>] such things to be taught. For the Council of Vienna under Clement V. determines it not as matter of faith, but as the “more probable opinion;” as you may see, *Clement., De Summa Trin. et Fide Cathol.*, tit. i. cap. 3.<sup>a</sup> And therefore Albertus Pighius, *De Libero Arbitrio*, lib. v.<sup>b</sup>, notwithstanding this decree, sticks not to count this doctrine forged without any authority of Scripture. And those that speak of it with more respect than he, think not themselves tied to that, which the Council holds the more probable. It is indeed manifest by the experience of all Christians, that the custom and practice, even of supernatural actions, to which the inclination of corrupt nature is utterly averse, breeds in a man an habituated disposition of doing those things with ease and pleasure, which, at the beginning of his Christianity, he could not do without offering himself much violence. But that habit which custom and practice leaves behind it, though supernatural for the cause or effect of it, because the acts upon which it accrues, as also those which it produces, cannot accrue from mere nature without the help of Christ's grace, is notwithstanding, for that wherein it consists, a disposition really qualifying the nature and substance of the soul, and inclining it to act

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<sup>a</sup> Corrected from MS. “To allow since such,” in folio edit.

<sup>a</sup> “Quibusdam ex iis (theologis) dicentibus, per virtutem baptismi parvulis quidem culpam remitti sed gratiam non conferri: aliis e contra asserentibus, quod et culpa eisdem in baptismo remittitur, et virtutes ac informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum, etsi non pro illo tempore quoad usum: nos autem attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis Christi (quæ per baptismum applicatur pariter omnibus baptizatis), opinionem secundam (quæ dicit, tam parvulis, quam adultis, conferri in baptismo informantem gratiam et virtutes) tanquam probabiliorum et dictis sanctorum ac doctorum modernorum theologiæ magis consonam et concordem, sacro approbante concilio, duximus eligendum.” Constituciones Clementis Papæ V. in Concilio Viennensi (A.D. 1312) editæ, tit. i. De Summa Trin.

et Fid. Cathol., § 3: in Corp. Jur. Canonici, tom. ii. p. 351. Paris 1687.

<sup>b</sup> “Gratiæ acceptionem variam non ex scholis sed ex Divinis Scripturis petemus. Quandoquidem in illis fere imaginantur gratiam Dei qualitatem aliquam, increatam animæ nostræ a Deo: vel eandem cum charitatis habitu, vel distinctam ab eodem. Quæ commentitia universa existimo nec ex Scripturis ullam auctoritatem habere.” Albert. Pighius, *De lib. Arbit.*, lib. v. fol. lxxvi. a. Colon. 1542: quoted in part by Morinus (as above, c. vii. § 8. p. 527. 1. D); who adds, “Dictum forsitan intemperantius æquò; tantus scholarum consensus in habitibus ponendis, et Concilii Viennensis sententia, quæ eorum probabilitatem asserit, modestius excipere debuerat:” but quotes also many other Roman Catholic divines to a similar effect.



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otherwise than without it. Besides, the Gospel promising the Holy Ghost for a gift to abide with and dwell in those that are baptized, nothing hinders the gift thereof to be held and termed an habitual grace. In these regards, I find it neither prejudicial nor inconsequent to the Christian faith, to acknowledge habitual grace; though neither Scripture nor tradition of the Church own any habit of grace, created by God, and infused into the soul in a moment, as the School imagineth.

[The doctrine of the School on this subject, how entangled with Pelagianism.]

§ 23. But they seem to have committed another mistake; in that, the Church having decreed against Pelagius, that the grace of Christ is necessary to all truly good actions, and, therefore, that man cannot merit the first grace, this infused habit of grace they have made to be that first grace which God giveth, before man will endeavour any thing towards it. For so the Master of the Sentences determineth that grace, which preventeth man's endeavours, to be faith with love (libro ii. distinct. 26. D<sup>c</sup>); which, though it be capable of a very good sense,—that the motion to believe the truth of Christianity out of the love of God is that which God's grace prevents all man's compliance with,—yet, in what sense they swallowed it, will appear by the difficulties and disputes they were entangled with, about that sorrow, which the heart conceives for sin out of mere love to God, not fear of punishment, which the love of ourselves breedeth. For this sorrow being necessarily a disposition preparing him for justification that cometh to God, in regard the first grace which God preventeth all man's endeavours with is to them this infused habit of faith and love which formally justifieth; how he should come prepared for justification by that contrition, which without God's grace man cannot have, who is justified by that infused habit of grace, which he was first prevented by God with; hath been among them the subject of endless jangles<sup>d</sup>. Whereas it is manifest, the maintenance

<sup>c</sup> “Et si diligenter intendas, nihilominus tibi monstratur, quæ sit ipsa gratia voluntatem præveniens et præparans, scilicet fides cum dilectione.” Pet. Lombard, Sentent., lib. ii. Dist. 26. D.

<sup>d</sup> “Scholastici disputando tandem assecuti sunt, gratiam qua peccator

justificatur habitum esse a Deo animæ infusum. Multi doctores contra hos habitus reclamarunt, diuque æquo Marte pugnatum; sed tandem circa annum 1240 deferbuit tota illa disputatio, omnesque doctores in habituum positionem consenserunt. Interea multi magnique viri . . . in hunc usque diem

of the faith against Pelagius requireth no more, than that the resolution of persevering in Christianity to the end be thought necessarily to depend upon the motion to embrace it, which God first preventeth man with, without respect to any act of man obliging God to grant it. And therefore it is manifest, that the Church decreed no more against Pelagius, but that the first motion to become a good Christian, that every man is prevented with, must be ascribed to God's free grace through Christ, not engaged by any act of man's going afore<sup>e</sup>. Now, requiring only the actual assistance of God's preventing grace, it is easy enough to say, not how "attrition," that is, sorrow for sin in regard of punishment, accompanied with slavish fear, is changed into "contrition," that is, sorrow for sin out of the love of God Whom it offendeth<sup>f</sup> (for it is not possible, that he who loveth God should be sorry for sin for the same reason, which he was sorry for while he loved the world); but how the man, that was "attrite," becomes "contrite." For when first the Gospel reveals unto a man his desperate estate in and by the first Adam, it is not possible that he should remain untouched, either with sorrow for the present, or apprehension for the future. And yet no less impossible is it, according to God's

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contenderunt, licet reapse justificatio impii per habitum infusum fieret, sine illo tamen fieri posse per actus a voluntate cum auxilio Spiritus S. sine novo habitu elicitos. Cum autem ex antiqua Ecclesiæ traditione per S. Augustinum potissimum elucidata constaret neminem mereri primam gratiam, sed Deum eam in nobis operari sine nobis, statim judicantur plurimi, habitum illum infusum quo peccator ex eorum sententia ex impio fit justus, esse primam illam gratiam quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur; et consequenter nulla opera meritoria gratiam illam præcedere posse, quam primam gratiam et gratiam gratum facientem vocarunt. Hinc concluderunt contritionem, qua ex omnium sententia peccatum pellitur et homo justificatur, esse natura, sive, ut loquebantur antiquissimi scholastici, causa, posteriorem prima illa gratia gratum faciente. Hinc sane apud multos scholasticos antiquis illis succedentes, qui licet eodem modo de contritione philosopharentur, eam

tamen asserebant esse dispositionem ad justificationem, difficultatum maximarum seges amplissima pullulavit, cum illis explicandum fuit qua ratione contritio justificationem impii natura subsequens posset ad eandem esse dispositio: nec hodie lis apud eos derempta est." Morinus, as above, c. ii. § 13. p. 505. 1. E.—2. C.

<sup>e</sup> Scil. in the Council of Orange (A.D. 529), art. 5; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. pp. 1667. E, 1668. A. See above, c. vi. § 7, note t, and c. xix. § 17, 18.

<sup>f</sup> Morinus (as above, c. iii. § 12—18, and c. iv. § 1 sq., pp. 509. 2. E. sq.) enumerates seven different solutions of the question, "Qua ratione Attritio virtute sacramenti fiat Contritio:" adding, that it had then been debated in the schools 350 years, "nec unquam ab eo tempore deferbuit disputatio sed semper in caluit viresque acquisivit eundo."

§ Misprinted 252 in fol. edit.

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ordinary way of working, even by His grace, that he should in an instant resolve to embrace the only way to give him peace in that exigence. But while he neither casts off the motion of grace, nor resigns his interest in himself and the world to it, but considers upon what reason it behoves him to resolve; this consideration by the work of God's Spirit discovering to him, how much God and the next world is to be preferred before himself and this; as the love of God and the world to come prevails in him above the love of himself and this, accordingly of necessity must the grief of having offended God afore prevail in him above all that he can conceive for the misery he hath incurred. And all this, by virtue of those helps which God grants, though always in consideration of our Lord Christ, yet not by virtue of that covenant, which is not contracted till a man be baptized, but of His own free goodness, dispensing the effects of Christ's coming according to the reason of His secret wisdom, which the covenant of grace discovers not.

§ 24. I need say no more to shew, how a man, that comes into the world with concupiscence, becomes either habituated to the love of God above all things, or endowed with the habitual assistance of God's Spirit, by that promise which the Gospel importeth. Thus much is to be seen by that which hath been said,—that in the justification of a sinner by Christianity (which I have shewed to be the condition of it) there is a twofold change either implied or signified. For that a man should become reconciled to God, continuing in the same affection to himself and the world as before he heard of Christ, is a thing which the soberest of them that dispute justification by faith alone abhor. And that a man by the Gospel should be entitled to no more, than that disposition, which he is changed to, obligeth God to give, is no less horrible to them that dispute justification by the works of faith. And therefore, besides that change in the nature and disposition of him that becomes estated in the promises of the Gospel, which justification involveth, there is another change in God's esteem, which is moral, by virtue of His free promise; which the change which his nature hath received signifieth not, because God's will only infers it.

The former of these the School insist upon<sup>h</sup>: and they seem to follow St. Augustin<sup>i</sup> in it; who, though he have nothing to do with any conceit of habitual grace, yet most an end attributeth the effect of justifying, even before God, to those inherent acts of righteousness, whereby the grace of God translateth His enemies into that state of His grace<sup>k</sup>. The latter, though it be that, which both the Scriptures and the most ancient records of the Church do express, yet, so long as the effect of justifying is attributed to the disposition which is inherent in the soul, not for the worth of it, but by God's grace, it can contain nothing either formally destructive or by consequence prejudicial to the faith. That the one is fundamentally implied, the other formally signified, in the justification of a Christian, belongs rather to the skill of a divine in understanding the Scriptures, than to the virtue of a Christian in holding the faith.

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§ 25. What the Church thinks of the works of those, who believing, do not yet declare themselves Christians by procuring baptism; as it is a consideration fit for this place, so is it manifest, by the doubt which they make of the salvation of those, that die in that estate<sup>l</sup>. For though the life that they live, supposing the preventing grace of the Holy Ghost to bring them to that estate, must needs be ascribed to the same, yet is it not as yet under the promise of reward, because they are not yet under the covenant of grace, but only disposed to it. And how good soever their life may be, yet, so long as it proceeds not to an effectual resolution of undertaking Christ's cross, it is but actual; and dependeth *de facto* upon the assistance of God's Spirit, which *de jure* they can challenge no title in, being not yet estated in God's promises, but only prevented by those helps, which they can claim no difference of right in from those that are not prevented with the same. But he that undertakes Christ's cross by coming to baptism with a good conscience, obtaineth

[Of good works before baptism.]

<sup>h</sup> This needs little proof: but see e. g. the Comment. of Vasquez in l. 2. S. Thomæ, just quoted, Disputt. cii.—civ. sq. (tom. ii. pp. 633 sq.); and the authorities there cited.

<sup>i</sup> See above, c. ix. § 15, notes n, o.

<sup>k</sup> See above, c. ix. § 15. note o: and the ample admissions, as regards St. Augustin's statements, of Calvin, Kem-

nitz, Beza, Zanchy, Bucer, Paræus, Chamier, quoted by Forbes, *Consid. Mod., De Justif.*, lib. ii. c. 5. § 1. pp. 175—179. For quotations from St. Augustin himself, see Bellarmine, *De Justific.*, lib. ii. c. 8; *Controv.*, tom. iii. pp. 1062. D—1064. C.

<sup>l</sup> See above, c. iv. § 5—7.

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II.— remission of sins, adoption to be God's son, and right and title to everlasting life; which adoption, and which title, as they are moral rights and qualities, so are they mere appendences of that justification, which God alloweth the faith of those that are baptized sincerely, without consideration of works, according to the doctrine of the fathers<sup>m</sup>: supposing, it is true, as much change as between a Christian and no Christian in him that obtains them (in which regard it is no marvel, if remission of sins or justification be ascribed to the said change many times, in their writings<sup>n</sup>; for how such sayings are to be understood, imports only the signification of words, not the salvation of a Christian); but not importing God's consideration of their qualities, the consideration of whose works is excluded.

§ 26. St. Augustin, it is true, considering this change in him that is justified (which is indeed the ground upon which God accepteth of his faith to that purpose), and using the word "justifying" to signify the same, hath occasioned the School to agree in that form of doctrine which the Council of Trent canonizeth<sup>o</sup>. But though he frequent the term more than others in that sense, yet can he no ways be thought to depart from the meaning of the rest: who do sometimes describe justification by the ground which it supposeth, sometimes by the quality in God's account which it signifieth; acknowledging, all of them, the gift of the Holy Ghost to be obtained by this faith which justifieth; of God's free grace indeed, which only moved Him to set the Gospel on foot, but as due by the promise which it containeth, to abide and to dwell with him that voids not the condition upon which it is granted. This grace of the Holy Ghost, habitually dwelling in them that have undertaken Christ's cross, to enable them to go through with the work of it, as it cannot be unfruitful in good works, so are those works henceforth under the promise of reward, which no works done afore baptism can challenge.

<sup>m</sup> See above, c. ix. § 18—42.

<sup>n</sup> Some quotations, to this effect, from S. Ambrose, S. Jerom, S. Prosper, S. Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory the Great, and others, are in Bellarmine, *De Justific.*, lib. ii. c. 8; *Controv.*, tom.

iii. pp. 1064. C—1065 D: and see Le Blanc, *Theol. Theol.*, *Theol. de Accept. Vocis Justificandi*, &c., § xxxi. sq.; pp. 260 sq.

<sup>o</sup> See above, § 24, note k.



§ 27. I must not leave this point till I have said a word or two of Socinus his opinion, as to this point of justifying faith. For as concerning the two points premised, I conceive I have shewed you, that it is no less destructive to faith: in teaching, that a man is able of himself to embrace and to fulfil all that the Gospel requires at his hands, without any help of God's grace granted in respect of our Lord Christ's obedience; then, that God accepteth what a man is so able to perform, not out of any consideration thereof, but of His own free goodness, which, moving Him to settle such a decree, moved Him to send our Lord Christ to publish and assure it<sup>p</sup>. As for the rest of his opinion: having maintained, that the efficacy of all acts, whether of God's grace or of man's will, toward the obtaining of the promises of the Gospel, necessarily depends upon the receiving of baptism, where the outward fulfilling of the promises of a positive precept (which the only will of him that is converted to Christianity fulfilleth not) is not unavoidably prevented by casualties which his will cannot overcome<sup>q</sup>; I suppose I have by that means shewed, that his opinion is destructive to Christianity, because destructive to the precept of receiving baptism, without which no man is a Christian. And truly this imputation reflects upon the other extreme opinion concerning the justification of a Christian: which, ascribing it to believing that a man is predestinate, excludes it from being necessary, either as a means to salvation, or as a thing commanded; both which considerations concur in the necessity of it, supposing the premisses. For the necessity of that which is necessary as the means, and the necessity of that which is necessary as a thing commanded him that will obtain salvation, differ only in this; that the necessity of the means of salvation is undispensable in regard of whosoever will be saved, but the necessity of a thing commanded takes not hold, till a man becomes liable to the precept whereby it is commanded. The want of baptism then not being peremptory to the salvation of them that are prevented of it by unavoidable casualties, but of all others; choose whether you will call it necessary as the means, not supposing that excep-

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The opinion of Socinus [concerning justifying faith].

<sup>p</sup> See above, c. i. § 5, 6; c. x. § 1—3.

<sup>q</sup> Above, c. ii. § 1; and the following chapters.

tion, or necessary as a thing commanded, supposing it. But that opinion which justifies without it, because before it, and makes it signify nothing to the not-predestinate, to them that are, only to signify that which is done without it, is necessarily destructive to the covenant of grace: whereas, supposing repentance to justifying faith, the necessity of the baptism of repentance may be maintained; nay, repentance implying a conversion to all that Christianity requires, and Christianity requiring baptism, in reason implied it is in that repentance, which that opinion presupposeth to justifying faith. But that Volkelius<sup>r</sup> (*Instit.*, iv. 3.) makes justifying faith to consist in believing all that Christ taught, and trusting in Him, out of a resolution to keep His commandments; I take to be the meaning of St. Paul, when he saith, that a man is justified by faith alone: provided that a man be baptized with that disposition which he calls justifying faith, believing, that, being enabled by the Holy Ghost in consideration of Christ's merits accompanying his baptism to perform what he undertakes, he shall attain the life to come in consideration of the same.

<sup>r</sup> "Intelligendum igitur est, fidem istam tribus veluti gradibus contineri, intellectus ratione distinctis: quorum primus est, credere Jesum esse Christum; alter, toti Ipsius disciplinæ nudum assensum præbere; tertius est, Ipsi confidere, perque Ipsum Deo, atque adeo spe immortalitatis subnixum, totum sese ad Dei studium accommodare, id est, Christi et sic etiam Dei præceptis obtemperare." Volkel., *De Vera Relig.*, lib. iv. c. 3. pp. 177, 178.—

"Quare ejus fidei nomine, quæ ad justificationem ac salutem homini ex Divina gratia pariendam virium satis habet, pietatem tanquam animam ejus includi est necesse. Aninadvertendum autem est, nequaquam de eo pietatis sanctimoniamque studio hoc loco agi, quod perfectum, absolutum, omnisque prolapsionis prorsus experts sit," &c. *Id.*, *ibid.*, pp. 179, 180.—See also above, c. i. § 6. notes o, p.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE PERSEVERANCE OF THOSE THAT ARE ONCE JUSTIFIED. OF THREE SENSES, ONE TRUE, ONE INCONSISTENT WITH THE FAITH, THE THIRD NEITHER TRUE NOR YET DESTRUCTIVE TO THE FAITH. EVIDENCE FROM THE WRITINGS OF THE APOSTLES, FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT. THE GRACE OF PROPHECY—WHEN IT PRESUPPOSETH SANCTIFYING GRACE. ANSWER TO SOME TEXTS: AND OF ST. PAUL'S MEANING IN THE SEVENTH OF THE ROMANS. OF THE POLYGAMY OF THE FATHERS. WHAT ASSURANCE OF GRACE CHRISTIANS MAY HAVE. THE TRADITION OF THE CHURCH.

THAT which hath been said, properly concerns only them, that first hear of the Gospel at man's age, and are justified by being baptized into the profession of it; but the reason of it is the rule of that, which is to be said of all. To extend it so as to answer all questions concerning all men's cases; there remains yet another question, whether those [that\*] are once justified, can fall from the state of grace, so as finally to be damned: which he that will speak truth, must allow to have been burdened with unchristian prejudices without any cause. For who knows not, that commonly it hath been given to understand, that whoso alloweth this, granteth God's everlasting grace and purpose towards him, whom He accepteth in Christ as righteous, to fail and become void? Which I grant to be truly consequent to the opinion of those, that hold justifying faith to consist in believing that a man is predestinate to life. For if that were so, then he, that should fail of his justification, must by consequence fail of his predestination; that is to say, the decree of God, by which He purposed finally to save him that is justified by believing that he is predestinate, must fail and become void, whensoever he ceaseth to be justified. But what is that to him, that believes, and hath proved, that God absolutely decreeth, whom He will give and whom He will refuse the helps of effectual grace, whereby they attain that disposition which qualifies them righteous before God? that the helps of

The state of the question concerning the perseverance of those that are once justified.

\* Added from MS.

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grace, whereby they are effectually enabled or not enabled to continue or not to continue in the same disposition, are granted in consideration of the right use of those helps which went afore? that the decree of reward or punishment passeth in consideration of persevering or not persevering to the end in the same? Is there any ignorance in the world so slanderous, as to pretend any change in the purpose of God, when His sentence changes upon the change of the condition, upon which He grants remission of sins and right to everlasting life? If any man do, let him first call himself to account, whether he will undertake to maintain that position, <sup>267</sup> whereupon it followeth; to wit, that to believe a man's self predestinate to life, is that faith which alone justifieth. And, undertaking it, let him take this defiance from me, that his opinion is destructive to the foundation and ground of Christianity.

Of three senses, one true, one inconsistent with the faith, the third neither true nor yet destructive to the faith. [1. The last, not destructive of the faith.]

§ 2. But as I said before<sup>t</sup>, that there is so great difference between those that hold justification by believing a man's self to be predestinate to life, and by trusting in God for the obtaining of His promises in our Lord Christ, that the one opinion is destructive to Christianity, but the other not; at least, in those that require and presuppose true repentance to go before that trust in God, wherein justifying faith in their opinions consisteth: so must I consequently say concerning this point, that it may be held, and I have some reason to think that it is held, by divers, upon such terms as seem not to render it destructive. For when I see, that they require repentance to go before justifying faith, as a condition requisite to that trust in God, wherein justifying faith consisteth<sup>u</sup>; I must needs infer (as I see some authors of that opinion to grant<sup>x</sup>), that, when the children of God fall

<sup>t</sup> Above, c. xxx. § 13.

<sup>u</sup> See Le Blanc, *Theol. Theol.*, *Theol. de Justit. per gratiam Fidelibus Inhærente*, § li. sq. p. 284: quoting express admissions to this effect from Paræus, Ames, and the English divines at the Synod of Dort.

<sup>x</sup> E. g.—“*Tametsi enim non raro gravissimis lapsibus Deum (sancti) offendant, Spiritum Sanctum contristent, plurima Ejus dona excutiant et amittant, conscientiam polluant, fidem labefactent, et quantum in se est, fran-*

*gant: . . nunquam tamen sic toto corde adversus Deum ruunt, ut fiant hostes Dei,*” &c., “*quoniam semen Dei in eis manet: tametsi efficax vis et sensus donorum Dei ad tempus sese non exerat, sed sub carnis infirmitate, velut ignis sub cineribus, delitescat, . . donec Deus per veram pœnitentiam eandem iterum exsuscitet: quod utique fit ante finem vitæ, ne pereant.*” *Miscellanea Catechetica*, auctore Dav. Pareo. p. 55; in fin. *Corp. Doctr. Christianæ Zach. Ursini*, edit. a D. Pareo, 8vo. Francof.

into such sins, as (Tertullian says<sup>7</sup>) lay waste the conscience, neither remission of those sins, which justification includeth, nor that trust in God, wherein that faith which only justifieth consisteth, can be understood to have place before repentance; if they speak things consequent in reason to their own positions. How then shall they pretend, that the sentence of justification once granted, or rather the promise obtained by virtue of that contract which the Gospel tendereth, as I have shewed, can remain firm, the condition failing which it necessarily presupposeth? Surely, I suppose, in that manner as it is ordinarily said in many disputes (and that very truly, how much soever to the purpose), that a thing is in some respect false, which is absolutely true, or, contrariwise, absolutely false, which notwithstanding in some respect holds true. So seem they, that are possessed with this prejudice, to imagine, that, when God admits any man into the state of grace by virtue of that contract which the Gospel tendereth (that is, as I say, by being baptized upon a sincere profession of Christianity), if this be done with an intent of granting the grace of perseverance, then is that person said absolutely to be justified; who, when he falls into such sins as I have named, becomes in some respect not justified, to wit, for the present, and in respect of those sins of which he is not yet reconciled by repentance. And, consequently, the act of justifying faith is suspended and interrupted; as in him, that cannot have confidence in God, as reconciled to God in regard of those<sup>2</sup> sins: the seed of it notwithstanding remaining, by virtue of that act of faith, whereby, being reconciled (as those<sup>2</sup> are, that are

1621.—“We grant, . . . that all sinnes whatever, without repentance, in that kind and degree, that is appointed and accepted of God, are exclusive of the kingdom of God. . . . We say then, that believers may so fall, as that, being on that account rejected from the communion of the Church, so as not to be restored but upon the evidence of their repentance (and we say that repentance is required for all sinnes, or men cannot be saved . . .), and yet not commit such sinnes as whereby their faith must needs be wholly lost. . . . We say also, that repentance for sinne being a thing promised of God for those that come to Him in Christ, upon account

of the engagement of His grace for the perseverance of believers, all such fallers into sinne shall certainly return to the Lord by repentance, Who heals their backslidings.” Owen, *Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance Explained and Confirmed*, c. xv. § 38. pp. 349, 350 (fol. Oxf. 1654): who censures Pareus and Ursinus (*ibid.*, § 37. p. 348.) for the strong terms in which they describe the (possible) sins of believers.

<sup>7</sup> Tertullian speaks of “*scientiam magiæ*,” as “*salutis pariter animæque vastatricem*,” in the *De Anima*, c. lvii.: *Op.*, p. 305. D. Venet. 1744.

<sup>2</sup> Corrected from MS. “these,” in fol. edit.



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for ever reconciled to Him), he remains certain of helps of grace, that shall be effectual to work in him true repentance, and of reconcilement upon supposition of them<sup>a</sup>. Whereupon it must be said, [on<sup>b</sup>] the contrary: that those, whom God receiveth into grace without any purpose of granting them the grace of perseverance, cannot be said to be justified, without some term of abatement; signifying the justification granted them, to be as to the sense of the Church, or to an opinion unduly conceived by themselves, but not as to God: so that their faith also must be understood to be a confidence unduly grounded, the failing whereof is not the disannulling of that, which once was good, but the discovering of that, which once seemed good and was not.

[2. Yet  
not true.]

§ 3. This opinion, so limited as I have said, I should not think destructive to Christianity; for the reason delivered afore<sup>c</sup>, concerning that opinion of justifying faith, upon which it follows. But as I then concluded, that, though not destructive to the faith, yet that opinion from whence it followeth is not true according to the true sense of the Scriptures, wherein the skill of a divine consisteth<sup>d</sup>: so must I here conclude, that this opinion of perseverance, which proceedeth upon that supposition of justifying faith, which though not destructive to the faith yet is not true, is also not true, though not destructive to the faith; the other, which proceeds upon that supposition of justifying faith and predestination, which is destructive to the faith, remaining both untrue and destructive to the faith. I grant, that, though the gift of the Holy Ghost (which is, as I have said<sup>e</sup>, the habitual 268 assistance of it), being granted in consideration of a man's undertaking Christianity, becomes void upon not performing that which a man undertakes, yet God, of His free goodness, not as obliged by any promise of the Gospel, may continue the assistance thereof; but upon the same terms, as He first grants the help of it to bring men out of the state of sin into the state of grace. I grant, that the resolution of believing the faith of Christ, and of living according to the same in the profession of Christianity, having been once made.

<sup>a</sup> Corrected from MS. "it," in fol. edit.

<sup>b</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>c</sup> Above, c. xxx. § 13.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid., § 14.

<sup>e</sup> Above, c. ii. § 9.

upon reasons convincing a man that he is bound so to do, cannot be changed at his pleasure in an instant; though it fall out, that he be overtaken with some sin that “lays waste the conscience.” But the promises of the Gospel being made in consideration of undertaking the profession of Christianity (and therefore incompatible to those, that live not according to it), I say, that they all become void to him that falls into such a sin. For, the covenant of grace passing upon supposition of original concupiscence remaining in the regenerate, and ensnaring them all with the occasion of sin, it cannot be imagined, that all sin makes it void. But, on the other side, some sins, being of so gross a nature, that a man cannot be surprized by them (but that the being so conquered must imply a resolution to prefer this world before the world to come), must needs forfeit those promises, which depend upon the covenant of grace, a rebellion against which they contain and declare: so that, unless the free grace of God, by the operation of His Spirit, bring a man back to repentance, the whole resolution of being a Christian shall in time be blotted out, though the profession, because it imports the benefit of this world in Christian states, remain counterfeit. This is then the reason of my resolution, necessarily following upon the premisses, that the sincere profession of Christianity is the condition of the covenant of grace: seeing it is not imaginable, that any man should hold any privilege at God’s hands by professing that, which he performeth not; the profession, as it serveth to aggravate the sin which is committed under it (as done in despite of all the grace of God, and the conviction which it tendereth to reduce us to Christianity, and the profession made in submission to the same condemning a man by his own sentence), so containing the condition, upon which all the promises become due; upon the violation whereof, on the contrary, they must of necessity become void.

§ 4. And this is the reason, that leaves no place for any composition of this difference; by saying, that a man remains absolutely justified, when the particular sin which is not yet repented of is not pardoned. For seeing “the wages of” it “is death,” so far as the covenant of grace dispenses not; and seeing the covenant of grace cannot protect him, that trans-

[Rom. vi.  
23.]

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gresseth the terms of it ; of necessity he falls into the same estate, which he was under setting the covenant of grace aside : as if to him our Lord Christ had neither been born, nor crucified, nor risen again. Those, that suffer the truth of this condition to be obscured by defective interpretations of that faith which alone justifieth, and the scriptures concerning the same ; it is no marvel, if they can imagine a reconciliation between the state of sin and the state of grace in the same man at the same time : which makes the positive will of God, declared by the Gospel, to dispense with the necessary and natural hate He bears to all sinners for their sin. But when it is once discovered, that, by the terms of the Gospel, God, Who declares Himself ready to be reconciled to all sinners, is declared unreconcilable to any, so long as he continueth in sin ; then must it necessarily appear, that, the positive will of God declared by the Gospel concurring with the natural detestation of sin which is essential to the purity of His nature, whosoever is under the guilt of sin remains liable to His wrath.

[No need to answer disputants who proceed upon wholly different grounds.]

§ 5. And proceeding upon this ground, as I do, I shall not think myself obliged to take notice of those things, which have lately been disputed in great volumes upon this point<sup>f</sup>, to and again. For (presuming that the parties have not the ground upon which I proceed, in debate), as, of necessity, he who seems to come short of proving his intent without it,

<sup>f</sup> Viz., in Dr. Owen's book (quoted above in § 2. note x), entitled, "The Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance Explained and Confirmed; with a preface, manifesting the Judgement of the Antients concerning the truth contended for; also a discourse touching the Epistles of Ignatius, the Episcopacy in them asserted, and some animadversions on Dr. H. Hammond's] his dissertations on that subject" (folio Oxf. 1654). It was an answer to a treatise by John Goodwin, called, "Redemption Redeemed; with the discussion of the great questions relating hereunto, and touching election and reprobation" (folio, Lond. 1651).—The same question had been debated a little earlier between Rich. Thomson (Diatriba de Amissione et Intercisione Justificationis et Gratiae, 8vo. Lugd. Bat. 1616, and 1618), and Robert Abbot,

Bishop of Salisbury (De Gratia et Perseverantia Sanctorum Exercitationes Aliquot, &c., quibus accessit Ejusdem in R. Thomsoni Anglo-Belgici Diatribam, &c., Animadversio brevis, 4to. Lond. 1618).—Dr. John Prideaux also had published XXII Lectiones de Totidem Religionis Capitibus, &c., &c., of which Lecture VI. is De Perseverantia Sanctorum on the Calvinist side (3rd edit. folio, Oxon. 1648).—And Prideaux's colleague, Sebastian Benefield, Margaret Prof. of Divinity at Oxford (De Perseverantia Sanctorum, 8vo. Francof. 1618), held the Calvinist side of the same argument against Barthol. Battus (De Possibilitate Apostasias Sanctorum sive Amissionis Intercisionisque Gratiae in Renatis et Electis, libri duo, 8vo. Gryphiswald, 1621 and 1625).

269 may with it be able to make the conviction effectual which he tenders, so he, that seems to have made the worse cause seem the better without considering it, must provide new evidence, to make the condition of the covenant of grace seem otherwise than I have shewed it to be, before he can think to have done his work.

§ 6. Notwithstanding, because there are many texts of Scripture, which evidently fortify the sum of Christianity settled upon the terms of the covenant of grace, by demonstrating the failure of the promise upon failure of the condition to which the Gospel makes it due, I take it to be part of my business to point at the chief of them: without being much troubled to bring all that might be alleged; because I may make this general inference from the premisses,—that all precepts, all exhortations, all promises, all threats, made to induce man to perseverance in that estate to which the promises of the Gospel are any way signified to be due, are necessary arguments to shew, that those to whom they are made may fail of the perseverance to which they induce. And this, by virtue of the general reason premised, that they are all evidences of that free will of men, which the grace of God destroyeth not but cureth. And therefore, as, when they are used to induce men to embrace Christianity, they contain an evidence that he may do otherwise; so also, when they are used to induce man to persevere in that profession which he hath once undertaken, they must necessarily, by the same reason, contain an evidence, that it is possible for any man not to persevere, who is induced by them to persevere in the course of a Christian. For if it be said, that without the grace of God they cannot, with it they cannot but, be effectual: either it is supposed, the grace of God here named shall become effectual to induce them to persevere to the end, supposing that God foresees that they shall so persevere, or something else including the foresight of the perseverance itself, or not; if so, it is no marvel, that the said exhortations cannot but prove effectual, because God foresees they shall be effectual, and that which shall not be, can never be foreseen; but if, not supposing this, any man undertake to say, that the exhortations<sup>s</sup> of the Gospel with the

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Evidence  
[from  
Scripture].

\* Corrected from MS. "exhortation," in fol. edit.

BOOK II. help of God's inward grace must necessarily prove effectual, he will necessarily fall into all the inconvenience which I have charged them with, who maintain, that the will of man is immediately determined by the will and operation of God to do whatsoever it doeth; which is no less than the destruction, as well of all civility, as of Christianity.

From the writings of the Apostles. [Hebr. vi. 4-8.]

§ 7. But let us see what the Apostle writes, Hebr. vi. 4—8. "For it is not possible to renew unto repentance those, that, being once enlightened, and having tasted the heavenly gift, and been partakers of the Holy Ghost, and relished the good word of God and the powers of the world to come, fall away and crucify to themselves and traduce the Son of God: for the earth, that drinks the rain that oft comes upon it, and bears herbs fit for them by whom it is tilled, receives a blessing from God; but that which bears thorns and thistles, is reprobate and near a curse, the end whereof is to be burned." Could more have been said to express the state of grace? For if any man can undertake to have the Spirit of God without premising Christianity, I say confidently there is no cause why any man should be a Christian. Therefore "*φωτισθέντες*" here, as Hebr. x. 32, signifieth neither more nor less than "christened" (as "*φωτισμὸς*" with the ancient Church signifies baptism)<sup>h</sup>; because of the darkness of heathenism or Judaism, which it dispelleth. What is then the "heavenly gift," which Christians "taste?" Be it remission of sins<sup>i</sup>, or be it the gift of the Holy Ghost that follows<sup>k</sup> (expressing the same thing in several parallel terms),

<sup>h</sup> See above, c. ii. § 7. note n, and so also Hammond (in loc.).—Grotius (ad loc.), admitting, that "verum est baptismum apud veteres nomen habuisse *φωτισμοῦ*, qui *φωτισμὸν* promittit, . . . quo spectans Syrus vertit 'Qui ad baptismum descenderunt,'" adds, that "simplicius est intelligi hic eos qui cognitione Evangelicæ doctrinæ imbuti fuere."—See Owen, Saints' Perseverance, c. xvii. § 30. p. 430; and Expos. on the Epist. to the Hebrews, on c. vi. vv. 4—6. tom. iii. p. 42. folio Lond. 1680; in the latter of which places he denies baptism to be meant.

<sup>i</sup> So Hammond in loc.—Estius (in loc.) interprets it to be "sacramentum Eucharistiæ," but says also, that "Græci remissionem peccatorum in-

telligunt, qualis nimirum accipitur in baptismo, nullum post se relinquens pœnæ reatum."—And this is the interpretation of S. Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Œcumenius (so Ribera ad loc. ap. Poli Synops.).

<sup>k</sup> So Owen, Expos. on Epist. to the Hebrews (in loc.), tom. iii. pp. 43, 44 (which book of his however Thordike could not have seen):—"The context makes it plain, that it is the Holy Ghost. . . That which riseth up against this interpretation, is, that the Holy Ghost is expressly mentioned in the next clause. . . Answ. 1. It is ordinary to have the same thing twice expressed in various words. . . 2. The following clause may be exegetical of this," &c., &c.



my business is done; if the gift of the Holy Ghost be not granted but upon that condition, which makes all other promises of the Gospel due. Wherefore I am content, that “relishing the good word of God” shall signify no more than that condition<sup>1</sup>; to wit, that sense of Christianity, which resolveth a man to undertake it: but to “relish the powers of the world to come,” no man can be understood, but he, that, upon supposition of the said condition, becomes sensible of that peace and joy of the Holy Ghost, which, under Christianity, only Christianity can give. And, therefore, though I dispute not here, how he means, that, “it is impossible to renew those, that fall” from Christianity, “to repentance;” yet I challenge that impossibility of renewing to contain both a former right in, and a possession of, that estate, to which they are renewed by repentance, and also the present loss of it, by falling from the condition which gives it. So that the comparison, which follows, of fruitful and barren land upon tillage, as it expresses a promise of following helps of grace to them that use those which went afore aright, contained in the promise of giving the Holy Ghost to enable them who sincerely profess Christianity to perform that which they undertake, so it convinceth the fruitless to be liable to the curse of fire; which it is said to be “near,” because it is called “reprobate.”

§ 8. The same is the effect of the like exhortation, Hebr. x. [Hebr. x. 26—29.] 26—29: “For if we sin voluntarily after receiving the acknowledgment of the truth, there remains no more any sacrifice for sin, but a certain terrible expectation of vengeance, and glowing of fire that is to consume opposers: if one set at naught the law of Moses, without mercy he dies upon two or three witnesses; of how much worse punishment, think you, shall he be thought worthy, that treads the Son of God under foot, and esteems the blood of the covenant by which he is sanctified unclean, and doth despite to the Spirit of grace?”

<sup>1</sup> “Gustui huic” (scil. of the good word of God) “inest quidem intelligentia et assensus Evangelii, lætitiā aliquam in corde excitans, sed deest vis charitatis et fiduciæ effectiva. “Gomarus ap. Poli Synops. ad loc.—“Studiose eandem phrasim servat Apo-

stolus” (scil. tasting), “ut hos distinguat ab iis qui per fidem veram Christum percipiunt et comedunt et quasi in succum et sanguinem vertunt.” Owen (Expos. on Epist. to Hebrews) ap. Poli Syn. ibid.—And so also in his Saints’ Persever., c. xvii. § 33. p. 432.

BOOK  
II.

I say, this is to the same effect; if it be once granted, that this sin may be committed by a true Christian: which no man can deny. For can a Christian be thought to do that "despite to the Spirit of grace," which the Scribes and Pharisees are said in the Gospel (Matt. xii. 24—32, Mark iii. 29, Luke xii. 10) to do, sinning that sin against the Holy Ghost, which our Lord there pronounces irremissible? Is it not manifest, that their sin consisted in attributing the miracles, by which our Lord sought to convert them, to the unclean spirit, being in judgment convinced that by the Holy Ghost alone they were done? And is it not as manifest, that a Christian, having received the Spirit of grace, promised to those that are baptized out of a sincere resolution of Christianity, abuses the Spirit Which is so given him, and Which he hath, and Which had already wrought that work of conviction, which the Scribes and Pharisees suffered not to take effect in their hearts? Especially, when the Apostle expressly premiseth the "washing of them," called here "sanctifying by the blood of the covenant;" which is the cleansing of that vessel by remission of sins, into which the new wine of the Holy Ghost is to be put. Wherefore I will not say, that the faith of these men is "true faith," if you mean that only to be "true faith," which lasts to the end; which is many times, in common language, that which truth signifieth: but if you mean that to be "true faith," which effecteth remission of sins and qualifieth for the world to come, he must set the Scripture upon the rack, that will make it confess any other sense<sup>m</sup>.

[2 Pet. ii.  
18—22.]

§ 9. Now consider, what the Apostle writeth of those Christians, who, he saith, are seduced by the heretics which he speaks of (2 Pet. ii. 18—22). "For, speaking bombast words of vanity, they catch with the bait of fleshly concupiscences, in

<sup>m</sup> "There is no mention of faith or believing, either in expresse termes, or in termes of an equivalent significancy in either of the places mentioned" (scil. Hebr. vi. 4, 7, and x. 26—29). "Therefore true believers are not the persons intended to be described in these places." Owen, *Saints' Perseverance*, c. xvii. § 28. p. 426; who labours to prove, that "temporary be-

lievers are not true believers," *ibid.* c. i. § 17—22. pp. 10—14.—That temporary faith is *at no time* true faith, was the common doctrine of (among other Protestants) the Calvinist school: and was maintained by the Synod of Dort (Act. Syn. Nat. Dordr. in reject. errorum circ. doctrin. de Persever. Sanctor., § 7. p. 270. fol. Lugd. Bat. 1620).

uncleanness, those that had really escaped them that converse in error; promising them freedom, themselves being slaves to corruption; seeing a man is slave to that, by which he is conquered. For if, having escaped the pollutions of the world through the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and being entangled in them again, they be conquered; the last error is become worse to them than the first. For it had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than, having known" (or "acknowledged) it, to turn from the holy precept once delivered to them. But it is fallen out to them according to the old proverb: the dog that returns to his own vomit; and the sow that is washed, to wallow in the mire." Is it possible, that all this should be thought to import no more, than profession as to men; without any effect as to God, but only to the Church<sup>n</sup>? For if we suppose them all to have counterfeited Christianity, not really resolving to live as Christians, how comes he to say, that they had

271 "really escaped those that live in error," whose ways they had not really left? And if they had "escaped the pollutions of the world by the knowledge of" Christianity, had they done no more than a man by mere nature may do? Then may a man by mere nature be disentangled of the pollutions of this world. But if they had conquered sin by those helps of grace which brought them to be Christians (for otherwise, how should they be "conquered by the baits of sin," which those heretics deceive them with), then had they obtained those promises which the Gospel rewardeth that conquest with. In fine, can a "dog return to the vomit, or a sow to the mire," which they never left? Or can "the latter" end be "worse than the beginning" to them, who never were clear of that damnation, in which they were overtaken by the preaching of Christianity?

[“ἐπιγνοῦ-  
σιν.”]

[“the true  
proverb.”]

<sup>n</sup> “By the dispensation of the Word, especially when managed by a skilful master of assemblies, men are every day so brought under the power of their convictions, and the light communicated to them, as to acknowledge the truth and power of the Word, and, in obedience thereunto, to leave off, avoid, and abhor, the wayes and courses wherein the men of the world . . . do pollute themselves; . . . and yet are not

changed in their natures so as to become ‘new creatures,’ but continue indeed, and in the sight of God, ‘doggs and swine returning to their vomit and mire,’ though some of them hold out in the professions to the end.” And this is “the state and condition of men here” (2 Pet. ii. 18—22) “described by the Apostle.” Owen, *Saints’ Persever.*, § 45. pp. 441, 442.

BOOK  
II.[1 John ii.  
19.]

§ 10. To that of St. John, speaking of the antichrists of the time, them and their followers ([1] John ii. 19);—"They went out from among us, but they were not of us; for, had they been of us, they would have continued among us:”—I will use no other answer than that which St. Augustin hath given us (*De Corrept. et Gratia*, cap. ix.°);—that those, who are qualified by attributes signifying predestination, cannot fall away; as long as they are described by present righteousness, they may. For, saith he, had they persevered, they had persevered in grace, not in unrighteousness; neither was their righteousness counterfeit, but not durable: "therefore they were not in the number of sons, when they were in the faith of sons, because those are truly sons, that are foreknown and predestinate, and called according to purpose, that they may be like the Son°." For St. John and St. Paul being assured of their own adoption according to purpose, it is no marvel, if they presume the like of those, whom they comprise in the same quality with themselves in regard of their present righteousness, the profession whereof was visible.

[Rev. ii.  
iii.]

§ 11. I must not here omit the Epistle to the Seven Churches (Apoc. ii. iii.), and the exhortations, promises, and threatenings tendered the angels of them; whether in behalf of themselves, it matters not much to this purpose, or (which is certain) in behalf of the Churches. In particular

° "Nec nos moveat quod filiis Suis quibusdam Deus non dat istam perseverantiam. Absit enim ut ita esset, si de illis prædestinatis essent et secundum propositum vocatis, qui vere sunt filii promissionis. . . . Sunt . . . quidam, qui filii Dei propter susceptam vel temporaliter gratiam dicuntur a nobis, nec sunt tamen Deo: de quibus ait idem Johannes, 'Ex nobis exierunt, sed non erant ex nobis; quod si fuissent ex nobis, permansissent utique nobiscum.' Non ait, Ex nobis exierunt, sed quia non manserunt nobiscum, jam non sunt ex nobis: verum ait, 'Ex nobis exierunt sed non erant ex nobis;' hoc est, et quando videbantur in nobis, non erant ex nobis. Et tanquam ei diceretur, unde id ostendis? 'quod si fuissent,' inquit, 'ex nobis, permansissent utique nobiscum' . . . Cum ergo filii Dei dicunt de iis qui perseverantiam non habuerunt, 'Ex nobis exierunt, sed non erant ex nobis;' et addunt, 'Quodsi

fuissent ex nobis, permansissent utique nobiscum:' quid aliud dicunt, nisi, Non erant filii etiam quando erant in professione et nomine filiorum? non quia justitiam simulaverunt, sed quia in ea non permanserunt. Neque enim ait, Nam si fuissent ex nobis, veram, non fictam justitiam tenuissent utique nobiscum: sed, 'si fuissent,' inquit, 'ex nobis, permansissent utique nobiscum.' In bono illos volebat proculdubio permanere. Erant itaque in bono, sed quia in eo non permanserunt, id est, non usque in finem perseveraverunt, 'non erant, inquit,' 'ex nobis,' et quando erant nobiscum; hoc est, non erant ex numero filiorum, et quando erant in fide filiorum; quoniam qui vere filii sunt, præsciti et prædestinati sunt conformes imaginis Filii Ejus, et secundum propositum vocati sunt ut electi essent." S. Aug., *De Corrept. et Gratia*, c. ix. § 20; *Op.*, tom. x. pp. 760. F.—761. D.

to that of Ephesus (ii. 4, 5): "But I have this against thee, CHAP.  
XXXI. that thou hast left thy first love: remember therefore whence thou art fallen, and repent, and do thy first works; otherwise I will come to thee suddenly, and remove thy candlestick out of the place thereof, if thou repent not." How should any man be exhorted by the Spirit of God to return to those works that were not the works of a true Christian? How should the judgment threatened take effect, and no soul perish that had been saved otherwise? To that of Thyatira (ii. 25—28): "But hold what you have until I come: he that conquereth, and keepeth My works to the end, I will give him power over the nations, and he shall rule them with an iron rod, as a potter's vessels are broken; as I also have received of My Father: and I will give him the morning star." What means this exhortation, to them that are not capable of doing otherwise? What means the power of Christ, and "the morning star," if not the reward of the world to come? To that of Pergamus (iii. 11): "Behold, I come suddenly; hold what thou hast, lest another take thy crown." Is it not plain, that he shall be saved if he "hold what" he "hath?" that he shall not, if "another take" his "crown?"

§ 12. Can St. Paul's severe sentences be avoided? 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10: "Know ye not, that the injurious shall not inherit the kingdom of heaven? be not deceived; neither whoremongers, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor the soft, nor abusers of themselves with mankind; nor thieves, nor those that defraud, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor robbers, shall inherit the kingdom of God." Gal. v. 19—21: "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; adultery, fornication, uncleanness, wantonness, idolatry, witchcraft, enmities, strifes, jealousies, animosities, provocations, divisions, sects, envies, murders, drinkings, debauches, and the like to these; of which I told you beforehand, as I foretold you, that they who do such things, shall not inherit the kingdom of God." Eph. v. 5—8: "For this ye know, that no whoremaster, or unclean person, or that defraudeth, who is an idolater, hath inheritance in the kingdom of God and of Christ: let no man deceive you with vain words; for for these things cometh the wrath of God upon the children of

[St. Paul's severe sentences.]  
[“nor thieves, nor covetous.” Eng. vers. —“πλεονέκται.”]  
[“nor unclean person, nor covetous man.” Eng. vers. —“πλεονέκτης.”]



BOOK  
II.

[Ezek.  
xiii. 18.]

disobedience : be ye not therefore partners with them : for ye were darkness, but are now light in the Lord ; walk as children of the light." They that "sew pillows" under sinners' elbows (" *excusantes excusationes in peccatis*," according to the Vulgar translation, Psalm cxl. 4P, and treating terms of reconciliation between Christ and Belial, between the promises of the Gospel for everlasting and the pleasures of sin for a moment), will not have this to belong to the godly, whom they allow to do such things for a snap and away, without forfeiting their interest in the world to come ; but to the unregenerate, who live in a settled course of such sins without remorse<sup>a</sup>. And I freely allow, that so soon as the godly man, whom they suppose to be overtaken with any such sin, shall take such a course to turn from it, as may restore in him that resolution of mind, for which God accepts a true Christian ; he is restored to the place which he held in God's grace, not as never forfeited, but as recovered anew. In the mean time, if any pretence be made, that being once in God's favour he can never fail of it, it is as easy to wipe it off with St. Paul's argument, as any of those "vain words," that were advanced in his time. For, if "for those things the wrath of God cometh upon" Gentiles, that are "darkness," much more upon them, who, being become "light," have a share in the works of "darkness : " if St. Paul's argument be good. And whatsoever induces a man to believe otherwise, belongs to those "vain words," which St. Paul forbids them to be deceived with.

<sup>P</sup> "Non declines cor meum in verba malitiæ, *ad excusandas excusationes in peccatis ; cum hominibus operantibus iniquitatem.*" Ps. cxl. 4. Vulg.—"Incline not my heart to any evil thing, to practise wicked works with men that work iniquity." Ps. cxli. 4. Eng. vers.

<sup>a</sup> "The major proposition he" (Goodwin) "confirms from Gal. v. 21, Eph. v. 5, 6, 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10: all affirming that neither 'whoremongers, nor adulterers, nor idolaters, nor the like, have any inheritance in the kingdom of God,' or can be saved. That the intentment of the Apostle is concerning them, who live in a course of such sinnes, who sinne with their whole wills, and from an evil roote, with whose sappe they are

wholly leavened and tainted throughout, not them who through the strength of temptation, and the surprisalls of it, not without the reitency in their wills, unto all sin, any sin, the sinne wherewith they are overtaken, may possibly fall into any such sinne (as did David and Peter), was before declared, and in that sence we grant the Proposition." Owen, *Saints' Perseverance*, c. xv. § 28, pp. 340, 341 : the first fourteen sections of which chapter (pp. 325—330) are occupied in drawing the distinction, according to Owen's judgment, "between the sins of believers and the sins of unregenerate persons," viz. that the former do not "sin with their whole will," the latter do.

§ 13. The prophecy of Ezekiel must needs have a room here; which, in order to induce the backsliding Israelites to repentance, protests, that God judgeth the righteous that turneth from his righteousness, and the sinner that turneth from his sin, not according to the righteousness or to the sin from which, but according to that to which, they turn: Ezek. xviii. 5—[28]. For to say, that the prophet of God, speaking in God's name of the esteem and reward which God hath for righteous and unrighteous, speaks only of that which seems righteousness and unrighteousness to the world, or which an hypocrite cozens himself to think such<sup>r</sup>, is such an open scorn to God's word, as cannot be maintained, but by taking "righteousness" to signify unrighteousness, and "turning" for not turning, but continuing in that wickedness which was at the heart when he professed otherwise. Which is nothing else, but to demand of us to renounce our senses, and the reason common to all men, together with the signification of those<sup>s</sup> words whereby God deals with us in the same sense as we among ourselves, to make good a prejudice so prejudicial to Christianity.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

[Evidence]  
from the  
Old Testa-  
ment.  
[Ezek.  
xviii. 5—  
28.]

§ 14. And what shall we do with those examples and instances of holy men, recorded in Holy Scripture to have fallen from God's grace into His displeasure; beginning with our first parents Adam and Eve, whom no man doubteth to have been created in the state of God's grace, that will not have their fall redound upon God's account. For if it be said<sup>t</sup>, that this is a difference between the covenant of works, first set on foot with our first parents in Paradise, and

[Instances  
in the Old  
Testament  
of holy  
men who  
have fallen  
into God's  
displea-  
sure.]

<sup>r</sup> "Hic exoritur quæstio, an qui vere justus est, a recta via deficiat? . . . Quæstio ista facile solvitur, quia non agitur hic de viva justitiæ radice, sed de externa specie, vel apparentia, ut vulgo loquuntur." Calvin, in Ezech. xviii. 24.—See also Owen, Saints' Perseverance, c. xvii. § 14—16, pp. 408—412: and so Prideaux, Lect. de Persev. Sanct., § 14. pp. 89, 90: and Benefield, De Sanct. Persev., lib. i. c. 9. p. 33: and indeed most of that side; except Owen himself, who evades the text in another way—by interpreting it of *temporal* promises only.

<sup>s</sup> Corrected from MS.; "these," in orig. text.

<sup>t</sup> "Thus was it with God and Adam.

It could not be undertaken, that that covenant should be kept inviolable, because though God continues faithful, yet Adam might prove (as indeed he did) faithlesse: and so the covenant was disannulled, as to any power of knitting together God and man . . . In this covenant" (of the Gospel) "the case is otherwise. God Himself hath undertaken the whole, both for His continuing with us, and our continuing with Him." Owen, Saints' Perseverance, c. iv. § 7. p. 99.—So also Benefield, De Sanct. Persev., lib. i. c. 9. pp. 42, 43: and Zanchy, De Persev. Sanct., Confirm. Thes. ex scriptis P. Melancthi., c. ii.; Op., tom. vii. p. 119.

BOOK  
II.

the covenant of grace, tendered by our Lord Christ: it is said indeed, but it cannot be maintained, without destroying all that hath been premised of the covenant of grace, and the condition of the same; which, though it take place under the covenant of works, which is supposed forfeit, to restore mankind to the hope of a heavenly reward upon conditions proportionable to their present weakness, hath notwithstanding appeared to be tendered to their free choice, as containing conditions, by transgressing whereof they forfeit as much as Adam could do.

[St. Peter.] § 15. The examples of Saul, and Solomon, and David, and St. Peter, have in them indeed some difference one from another; but is there any of them, that imports not the state of damnation after the state of grace? St. Peter, it is plain, forfeits the condition of professing Christ; Whom he that denieth (if our Lord say true in the Gospel, Luke xii. 8, 9), shall himself be denied at the general Judgment. And can we imagine his tears to have been shed without sense of this <sup>273</sup> forfeit? Wherefore (whatsoever seeds of grace remained in him to move him to repentance, as soon as he was become sensible of his estate) it is manifest, that he had lost the state of grace, which he laboureth to recover by repentance.

[David.]  
[2 Sam.  
xi., xii.]

§ 16. I will not examine, how much longer David lay in his sins than St. Peter, before the prophet Nathan brought him to the sense of them<sup>u</sup>. It is enough, that he prays so for pardon, as no man could do for that which he thought he had afore. He prays also for the restoring of God's Spirit to him again. Psalm li. 10—12: "Make me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me; cast me not away from Thy presence, and take not Thine Holy Spirit from me; O give me the comfort of Thine help again, and stablish me with Thy free Spirit." For that which he prays God not to take away, he acknowledges to be forfeit: so that it is but of reason, that he further desires, that it be restored him, rather than continued. Some think they avoid this, by understanding only the spirit of prophecy to be his desire;

<sup>u</sup> "David integro fere anno nondum pœnituerat" (licet enim criticis libitu suo loqui), 'nondum ergo peccata fuerunt remissa; non itaque toto illo tempore justificatus fuit.' Abbot,

in Thomsoni Diatribam, &c. c. xxiv. p. 211; quoting from Thomson, Diatriba, c. xxii. pp. 112, 113.—And see Goodwin's Redemption Redeemed, c. xiii. § 25. p. 326.

not wanting the spirit of regeneration, whereby he desires it<sup>x</sup>: which, in the case of David, no way takes place without offering violence to the words. And I have sufficiently advised<sup>y</sup>, that, by the help of God's Spirit granted out of that grace which preventeth the covenant of grace, and that state of grace which dependeth upon the undertaking of it, a man is enabled to desire the gift of God's Spirit to dwell in him, according to that which the covenant of grace promiseth.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

§ 17. As for Saul and Solomon, both of them endowed with God's Spirit; the one of them must not be understood ever to have been in the state of grace<sup>z</sup>, the other to have ever fallen from it<sup>a</sup>.

[Saul and  
Solomon.]

§ 18. For it is alleged<sup>b</sup>, that Balaam and Caiaphas prophesied; and our Lord shall say to those that had prophesied and cast out devils and done miracles in His name, "I never knew you" (Matt. vii. 22, 23). But St. Paul's words would be considered, concerning his apostle's office (2 Cor. iii. 4—6): "This confidence we have towards God through Christ; not because we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God; Who hath made us able ministers of the New Testament, not of the letter but of the spirit." For if the grace of an apostle suppose not the grace of a Christian, how hath St. Paul "confidence to God" in the grace of an apostle given him by God, which a Christian obtaineth through Christ? Certainly, no man spares to

The grace  
of proph-  
cy—when  
it presup-  
poseth  
sanctifying  
grace.

<sup>x</sup> "Et Spiritum Sanctum Tuum—i. e. vel spiritum propheticum, quem K(imchi) a Davide post peccatum sublatum autumat, vel potius," &c. Vers. Chald., et Hebræi, et Lyra in Muisio; ap. Poli Synops. in Ps. li. 13. See Sim. de Muis, Comment. in Psalm., In Ps. l. (Hebr. li.) v. 13, tom. i. p. 266. 2. D. Paris. 1630.

<sup>y</sup> Above, c. x. § 7; and c. xix. § 24.

<sup>z</sup> So say some of those with whom Thorndike is here arguing. E. g.—"Recessit a Saulo non spiritus regenerationis et adoptionis, quem nunquam habuit, sed spiritus prophetiæ, prudentiæ, fortitudinis," &c. "Fuit autem electus non ad vitam sed ad regnum, sicut Judas ad apostolatam." D. Pareus's edit. of Ursinus's Corpus Doct. Christ., P. ii. Qu. liii. § 9. p. 290. Francof. 1621.—See also Abbot, In Thomsoni Diatribam, c. v. p. 109; and Zanchy, De Persev. Sanct. as above

quoted, p. 120.

<sup>a</sup> "Horum porro recitatis flagitiis, inferunt . . . amisisse fidem et Spiritum Sanctum. Si aliquo modo, concedo; si prorsus, nego." Zanchy, as above quoted, speaking of Solomon. So also Deodate and others at the Synod of Dort (see Goodwin, Redemption Redeemed, c. xiv. § 6, 7. pp. 349-352). Gomarus, Defens. Doctr. de Persev. Sanct., § 94, 95; Op., P. iii. p. 354. b.—Others, on the same side, prefer denying that Solomon ever was in a state of grace.

<sup>b</sup> This reference has not been traced. Abbot says, that, "Sentiant motus Spiritus in cordibus suis: scil. quatenus ad illuminationem," &c.; "non sentiunt ad regenerationem," &c. "Nempe ut Balaam, ubi ait, 'Moriatur anima mea morte justorum, et fiant novissima mea similia illorum:' qui tamen interim in populum Dei quam improbus mansit." In Thomson. Diatr., c. vi. p. 113.

BOOK  
II.

argue from these words, that we are not able of ourselves to think any thing towards the discharge of a Christian man's office; as taking it for granted, that a good apostle supposes a good Christian. And what an inconvenience were it to grant, that God employs men that are not good upon His messages to mankind, giving them the operation of the Holy Ghost to demonstrate that He sends them, which is sufficient credit for all that they deliver as in His name: unless we will imagine it no inconvenience, that God gives testimony to those whom He would not have to be believed.

[Balaam.]  
[Numb.  
xxii.—  
xxiv.]

§ 19. As for Balaam, it is manifest, that he was employed by unclean spirits, to maintain men in their idolatries by foretelling things to come by their means; and that God's appearing to him, to hinder him from cursing His people, was upon the same account as Arnobius<sup>c</sup> saith, that magicians did use to find the virtue of spirits opposite to those unclean spirits whom they employed, not suffering them to bring to effect those mischievous intentions, for which they set them on work. And by this means it was, that Balaam, not being employed by God, is forced to declare that will of God which he would have made void.

[Caiaphas.]  
[John xi.  
49—52.]

§ 20. As for Caiaphas, it is not to be imagined, that he had any revelation of that truth, which he declareth, by the inspiration of God's Spirit: but that God, Who from the beginning had used the High Priests by Urim and Thummim to declare His direction to that people, directed his words so, that they might serve to declare that will of His, which He had never acquainted him with as a prophet of His<sup>d</sup>; nor could have been acknowledged for that will, which God intended to declare by him, had not St. John by the Spirit of God declared God's intent in so directing his words.

[Saul.]

§ 21. Wherefore, when God changed Saul's heart at his parting with Samuel and sent His Spirit upon him straight-<sup>274</sup> ways (1 Sam. x. 9, 10), it seems, that, having liked so well of

<sup>c</sup> "Nonne accidere, fieri, licet astu dissimuletis, potest, ut alter pro altero" (scil. of the spirits invoked by haruspices) "subeat, fallens, ludens, decipiens, atque invocati speciem præstans? Si magi haruspicum fratres suis in accitionibus memorant antitheos sæpius obrepere pro accitis, esse autem hos

quosdam materiis ex crassioribus spiritus, qui Deos se fingant, nesciosque mendaciis et simulationibus ludant, cum ratione non dispari credamus hic quoque subicere se alios pro his qui non sunt," &c. Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. iv. p. 134. 4to. Lugd. Bat. 1651.

<sup>d</sup> So also Grotius, in loc.



him as to call him to be prince of His people, He endowed him with the grace of His Spirit for the discharge of that place, which only a good man could rightly discharge. Whereupon it follows, that the taking away of this Spirit, and sending an evil spirit instead thereof to torment him, are the evidences of his fall from that inward grace, which the gift of God's Spirit presupposed afore. Whereby we may judge, what the parable of the unclean spirit, cast out and returning with seven spirits worse than himself (Matt. xii. 43—45, Luke xi. 24—26), imports, [no less<sup>e</sup>] to our purpose; though, being a parable<sup>f</sup>, I bring it not into consequence.

§ 22. The like is to be said of those, who, having prophesied and done miracles in our Lord's name, shall not be acknowledged by Him at the day of judgment. For when He saith, "I never knew you," He speaketh out of the knowledge of God: which, reaching from one end to the other at the same instant, when they had the grace of prophecy to witness their employment from God, foresaw that they would fall away, and becoming apostates retain no part in the kingdom of heaven which they had preached. No marvel if He take them not for His, who, He sees, are not to be His for everlasting: to which purpose the graces of God's Spirit are promised true Christians, Mark xvi. 17, Acts ii. 38, v. 32. And though Origen<sup>g</sup> hath excellently said, that the name of Christ had such power over devils, that sometimes being alleged by evil men it did the deed, though rather when out of the sound and genuine disposition of believers (as those Hebrews, who in our Lord's time did exorcise devils, as He shews us Matt. xii. 27, and as we learn by Justin Martyr<sup>h</sup>,

CHAP.  
XXXI.

[Of those who prophesied in our Lord's name, whom yet He "knew not."]

[Matt. vii. 23.]

<sup>e</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>f</sup> The rule is borrowed from a suggestion as old as Irenæus (Adv. Hær., lib. ii. c. 47. p. 174. ed. Grabe), that "αἱ παραβολαὶ τοῖς διαβρῆθην εἰρημένοις συμφωνήσουσι, καὶ τὰ φανερώως εἰρημένα ἐπιλύσει τὰς παραβολάς:" whence later theologians lay down, that "Theologia parabolica non est argumentativa."

<sup>g</sup> "Τοῦ δ' Ἀβραάμ τὸ ὄνομα οὐ Μωϋσῆς ἀναγράφει μόνος, οἰκειῶν αὐτὸν Θεῶ· ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐπαδόντων δαίμονας χρώνται ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τῷ Ὁ Θεῷ Ἀβραάμ· ποιοῦντες μὲν διὰ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ Θεοῦ οἰκειότητά· διὸ παραλαμβάνουσι

τὴν, ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραάμ, λέξιν, οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ τίς ἐστὶν ὁ Ἀβραάμ. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τοῦ Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ περὶ τοῦ Ἰακώβ, καὶ περὶ τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ· ἄτινα ὁμολογουμένως Ἐβραῖα ὄντα ὄνοματα, πολλαχοῦ τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις ἐπαγγελλομένοις ἐνέργειάν τινα ἐνέσπαρται μαθήμασι." Origen, Adv. Celsum, lib. i. § 22; Op., tom. i. pp. 339. C—340. A. So also lib. iv. § 34; *ibid.*, pp. 527. A, E, F, 528 D.—Quoted by Grotius, ad Matt. xii. 27.

<sup>h</sup> "Εὰν δὲ κατὰ παντὸς ὀνόματος τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν γεγεννημένων ἢ βασιλείων ἢ δικαίων ἢ προφητῶν ἢ πατριαρχῶν ἐξορκίζητε ἡμεῖς, οὐχ ὑποταγήσεται οὐδὲν

BOOK  
II.

Irenæus<sup>i</sup>, Tertullian<sup>j</sup>, and Theophilus of Antiochia<sup>k</sup>, produced there by Grotius<sup>l</sup>, that so they did till their time): yet the doing of miracles in evidence of the Gospel which they preached, alleged by those whom our Lord shall disclaim, seems to import a great deal more than the casting out of devils by naming the name of Christ; and, therefore, to contain the approbation of those men, whose employment from God they seemed to witness.

Answer  
to some  
texts.

§ 23. Here is the place, where I will give the true meaning to three or four scriptures (for so many there are); that, in opposition to the whole stream of God's book, men will needs produce, to reconcile the promises of the Gospel with the present guilt and love of sin in Christians, that have been overtaken with it.

St. John  
iv. 13—  
15.]

§ 24. "Jesus answered and said" to the Samaritan woman (John iv. 13—15): "Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again; but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall not thirst for ever; but the water that I shall give him, shall be in him a well of water springing up to life everlasting: the woman said to Him, Lord, give me that water, that I may not thirst, nor come hither to draw." I allow him, that hath a mind to it, to

τῶν δαιμόνων· ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα ἐξορκίζου τις ὑμῶν κατὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ Ἀβραάμ, καὶ Θεοῦ Ἰσαακ, καὶ Θεοῦ Ἰακώβ, ἵσως ὑποταγήσεται." S. Just. Mart., Dial. Adv. Tryphon., c. lxxxv.; Op., p. 182. B: quoted by Grot., *ibid*.

<sup>i</sup> "Altissimi et Omnipotentis appellationi omnia subjecta sunt: et Hujus invocatione etiam ante adventum Domini nostri salvabantur homines et a spiritibus nequissimis et a dæmonibus universis." S. Iren., Adv. Hær., lib. ii. c. 5. p. 123. a, b. ed. Grabe.—"Et propter hoc Judæi usque nunc hac ipsa adfatione dæmonas effugant, quando omnia timeant invocationem Ejus Qui fecit ea." Id., *ibid*., pp. 123. b, 124, a.—Quoted by Grotius, *ibid*.

<sup>j</sup> "Si Ego, inquit, in Beelzebule ejicio dæmonia, filii vestri in quo ejiciunt? Hac voce quid magis portentat, quam in Eo ejicere Se, in Quo et filii eorum? In virtute scilicet Creatoris. Nam si putas sic accipiendum, Si Ego in Beelzebule ejicio dæmonia, filii vestri in quo? quasi illos sugillaret in Beelzebule ejicientes; resistet tibi prior sensus, Non posse Satanam di-

vidi adversus semetipsum. Adeo nec illi in Beelzebule ejiciebant, sed (ut diximus) in virtute Creatoris." Tertull., Adv. Marcion., lib. iv. c. 26; Op., p. 442. D: quoted by Grotius, *ibid*.

<sup>k</sup> "Ἐκ τούτου δὲ σαφῶς δεικνύται, εἰ καὶ οἱ δαιμονῶντες ἐνόησε καὶ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο ἐξορκίζονται κατὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ ὄντως Θεοῦ, καὶ ὁμολογεῖ αὐτὰ τὰ πλάνα πνεύματα εἶναι δαίμονες, οἱ καὶ τότε εἰς ἐκείνους ἐνεργήσαντες." Theoph. Antioch., (Adv. Nationes, but commonly entitled) Ad Autolyicum, lib. ii. c. 10, pp. 112, 114. ed. Wolf. Hamb. 1724: quoted by Grotius, *ibid*.

<sup>l</sup> "Filii vestri:—Non Apostoli, . . sed populares Phariseorum atque discipuli: neque inter eos illi qui herbis," &c., "utebantur, . . sed ii qui dæmonas ejiciebant, non quidem Ipsius Jesu nomine, quod tum nemo faciebat præter eos qui Jesum sectabantur, sed invocantes 'Deum Abrahami, Deum Isaaci, Deum Jacobi.'" Grot., *ibid*.—See above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. iii. § 9—12.

translate our Lord's words "shall never thirst<sup>m</sup>." For it is plain the woman understood Him, as if He had told her of a water, which whoso should once drink of, should never be athirst any more as long as he lived. But if she failed of His meaning, because she understood not that He spake of thirsting in the world to come; do not they fail of His meaning, who, when He saith, "he that drinks of My water shall not thirst for everlasting," understand it to be, that he shall never thirst in this world<sup>n</sup>? being so plain, that he "shall not thirst" in the world to come. They make Him say, He that once tastes of My grace, in him the spring of it shall never die in this world; which is that the woman understood Him to say in the literal sense, because she understood not that He spake of the world to come. He, comparing this world with the world to come, saith, "He that drinks of My water" in this world, "shall not thirst" in the world to come. Which is to say, that he, who departs from the Christianity which once he professed in this world, does not "drink of My water" in this world; because he comes short of My promise, that "in him it shall be a well of water springing up to life everlasting."

§ 25. I have no reason to be afraid any more of the difficult<sup>275</sup> culty of St. Paul's words, Rom. viii. 28—39; having shewed by evident arguments<sup>o</sup>, that the subject of them are "they, that love God—they that are called according to purpose—they that He foreknew" to be such, "they that walk not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit, in Christ Jesus." For to such I may well allow, that "all works for the best;" because God, having "foreappointed them to be once conformable to the pattern of His Son, that He might be the first-born of many," calleth them to their trials, and, finding them faithful in them, justifieth and glorifieth them therefore. Nor can St. Paul's words signify more,—supposing, when he

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XXXI.

[Rom. viii.  
28—39.]

[Rom. viii.  
28, 29.]

[Rom. viii.  
1, 4.]

[Rom. viii.  
28.]

[Rom. viii.  
29.]

<sup>m</sup> "Saith our Saviour, he that hath this Spirit of Grace, 'shall never thirst.' It is most emphatically express by two negatives, and an exegetical additional term for weight and certainty, 'οὐ μὴ διψήσῃ'—'he shall never thirst to eternity:' or as it is expressed, John vi. 25, he shall never thirst at any time." Owen, Saints' Persev., c. viii. § 30. p.

206: who is there occupied in discussing the text at length.

<sup>n</sup> This is the pith of Owen's interpretation of the text (as referred to in the last note), although not his express words. See also Benefield, De Sanct. Persev., lib. ii. c. 3. pp. 151, sq.

<sup>o</sup> Above, c. xxvi. § 5.

BOOK  
II.

[Rom. viii.  
29, 30.]

[Rom. viii.  
31, 32.]

[Rom. viii.  
33, 34.]

[Cant. vi. 9;  
Mal. iii. 17;  
Jer. ii. 3;  
Jam. i. 18;  
Rev. xiv.  
4.]

saith, "Whom He foreknew those He predestinated, whom He predestinated those He called, whom He called those He justified, whom He justified those He glorified," that he speaks of those whom God foreknew to be qualified as afore,—than this, that, knowing them to be such, He appointed them to bear Christ's cross, and to inherit His glory for the reward of it. Wherefore, when it follows, "What shall we then say to these things? if God be with us, who can be against us? He That spared not His own Son but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him give us all things?" it is manifest, that the quality, which St. Paul understandeth in them, whom he comprehends when he names "us," is no other but that which he hath described true Christians by, thus far. And therefore, when he proceeds, "Who shall impeach the elect of God? it is God That justifieth—who shall condemn?—it is Christ That died, or rather That is risen again, Who is also at the right hand of God, Who also maketh intercession for us;" it is manifest, that this word "elect" hath no manner of reference to God's everlasting decree, but to the present Christianity of those, whom God declareth to account His "choice ones," His "jewels," His "first-fruits," out of all the rest of the creatures. So is ἐκλεκτός often used, in the New Testament especially, to signify "egregius" or "eximius," or that which they signify in Latin, when they speak of creatures chosen out of the flock to be sacrifices, or dedicated to God for first-fruits. Examples you have in abundance; Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14, xxiv. 22, 24, 31; Mark xiii. 20, 22, 27; Luke xviii. 7; Rom. xvi. 13; Col. iii. 12; 2 Tim. ii. 10; Titus i. 1; 1 Pet. i. 2, ii. 9; 2 John i. 13; Apoc. xvii. 14. In all which texts there is nothing to be found, that enforceth any more than the choice esteem, which God has of those that are there qualified His "elect;" without intimation of any decree of His, whereby He hath designed them to life everlasting.

▷ "Ἐκλεκτός, 1. proprie, *electus* . . .  
2. *eximius*, maxime præstans, ad imitationem Hebræi עֲבֹדָה, Genes. xxiii. 6.  
1 Tim. v. 21, 2 Tim. ii. 10; ἐκλεκτοὶ ἄγγελοι, angeli venerabiles, *eximii*.  
3. *carus*, dilectus, probatus, beneficiis ornatus. . . 1 Pet. ii. 9. γένος ἐκλεκτὸν

populus Deo valde gratus et acceptus. . . Hinc ἐκλεκτός speciatim in N. T. dicitur 4. *verus Dei cultor, quem amat et probat*, et maxime is, cui offertur et confertur felicitas Christiana." Schleusner, Lex. N. T., sub voce.



§ 26. Which those<sup>q</sup> that will not content themselves with, when the Apostle exhorteth to make our “calling and election sure” (2 Pet. i. 10),—to wit, to assure ourselves of the state and condition of God’s choice ones,—do entangle themselves in everlasting difficulties, how any man can assure himself of that, which he can never forfeit, being passed from everlasting.

§ 27. Let St. Paul then go forward.—“Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Tribulation, or anguish, or persecution, or hunger, or nakedness, or peril, or the sword? (as it is written, For Thee are we killed all the day long, we are accounted as sheep to be slain.) Nay, in all these we are more than conquerors, through Him That hath loved us. For I am persuaded, that neither death nor life . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is through our Lord Christ.”—Is there any thing in all this to signify, that sin cannot separate Christians from the love of God? not, that “neither life nor death, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth, nor any other creature, can separate” those, whom St. Paul comprehends with himself in the plural “us,” from the love of God to sin? Surely I cannot allow the curiosity of those, that would have St. Paul say all this out of a revelation made to him in particular of his salvation<sup>r</sup>. For what shall become of this “us?” Whom besides St. Paul shall it comprise? But when St. Paul says “*πέπεισμαι*”—“I am persuaded,” he says no more of himself, than I can maintain every one of those, whom he comprises with himself in the plural “us,” to say: which is, that every

C H A P.  
XXXI.  
[2 Pet. i.  
10.]

[Rom. viii.  
35—39.]

[Ps. xlv.  
22.]

[Rom. viii.  
38, 39.]

<sup>q</sup> E. g.—“Electionis confirmatio hic intelligitur non ratione Dei, . . . sed ratione conscientie humanæ, tum, 1. nostræ, sive in mentibus nostris, quæ ex bonis operibus ut propriis effectis probat causam procreantem, nempe vocationem et electionem: . . . tum, 2. alienæ, ut per bona opera (vestra) alii sibi persuadeant vos esse electos.” Gomarus, Calvin, Vatablus, and others, ap. Poli Synops. ad loc.—“Quamvis enim firma (electio nostra) sit in Deo, . . . tamen quoad nos et notitiam nostram firma redditur electionis fructibus,” &c., “sine quibus fieri non potest, ut Spiritus Sanctus testimonium præbent spiritui nostro quod simus filii Dei.” Benefield, De Sanct. Per-

sev., lib. i. c. 11. p. 63.

<sup>r</sup> “Excepte he meane of himself by special revelation, or of the predestinate in general (in which two cases it may stand for the certitude of faith or infallible knowledge): otherwise that every particular man should be assured infallibly that himself should be justified, and not that only, but sure also never to sinne, or to have the gift of perseverance, and certaine knowledge of his predestination; that is a most damnable false illusion and presumption.” Rhemists on Rom. viii. 38, p. 403. Antv. 1600.—Compare Bellarmine, De Justif., lib. iii. c. 11. (Controv., tom. iii. p. 1138. D), and cc. 8, 9. (ibid., pp. 1118. A, 1123. B—D).



BOOK  
II.

good Christian may aim at as firm a persuasion of attaining salvation, as he finds his own resolution to be firm to abide in the way of it; and that, having digested the greatest difficulties to which he is liable, and being assured not to fail of God's help in not failing of his endeavours by grace received from God, none of them shall be of force to cast him<sup>s</sup> away. Indeed I find St. Paul more confident in the same purpose, when he speaks nearer death:—2 Tim. iv. 7, 8; "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith; henceforth is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord the righteous judge shall render me:"—as having it from God, that there was not much of his course remaining, and having digested in his mind the terrors of death. But when he saith further, "And not only to me, but to all that love His appearance;" I am confident, as those that "love His appearance" have the same crown laid up for them, so they, that know they "love His appearance," may as well know, that they have the same crown in store: and, therefore, that St. Paul meant not to abate any thing of this confidence, when he said (1 Cor. ix. 26, 27), "I therefore so run as not at random, so fight I as not beating the air, but chasten my body and enslave it, lest having preached to others I leave myself a reprobate;" but that he expresseth hereby the supposition, upon which his confidence was grounded, together with his resolution to undergo the utmost of it.

[“ὁ στέφανος.”]

[1 John iii. 7—9.]

§ 28. The words of St. John have no difficulty in them, if we take them together. 1 John iii. 7—9: "Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness, is righteous, even as He is righteous; he that sinneth, is of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning: the Son of God was manifested on purpose to dissolve the works of the devil: every man that is born of God, doth not commit sin, because His seed abideth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." Was there not reason for St. John, to warn them against all deceitful pretences of righteousness before God in them, that live not in righteousness; when it is manifest, that he writes against heresies, which, wallowing in uncleannesses, pretended a secret ground whereupon they

<sup>s</sup> Corrected from MS.; "them," in orig. text.

continued righteous before God? I say not, that this is the opinion I write against; but I say, that, if the Apostle's argument be true,—that sin is from the devil, and that Christ came “to dissolve the works of the devil,”—then he, that doth the works of Belial, hath no part in Christ, more than Belial hath. And therefore, when it followeth, “Every man that is born of God, doth not commit sin, because His seed abideth in him:” he means not to shew us a distinction, to sin, and enjoy the pleasure of sin, without committing of sin; as if the sins of the regenerate, overcoming so many more obligations, were not committed more than those of the unregenerate: neither doth he discover that, which every man knew before, by saying, that a Christian if he do like a Christian sins not, “because the seed” of his Christianity “remains in him:” unless we think our Lord's words to no purpose (Matt. vii. 16—18), “Do they gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles? so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, and a corrupt tree bad fruit; a good tree cannot bring [forth] bad fruit, nor a corrupt tree good fruit;” and that, speaking of the same heresies of which St. John is to be understood, as I have shewed<sup>t</sup>, that they might not admit any pretence against that mark: or unless we think St. Ignatius<sup>u</sup> his words to no purpose, who uses the same sentence in the same case. Wherefore, when St. John saith, that “he, who is born of God, cannot sin, because His seed is in him;” his meaning is that, which Tertullian expresseth (*De Præscript. Hæret.* cap. iii.<sup>x</sup>), “*Non futurus Dei filius si admiserit*”—“Because he cannot continue the son of God if he sin.”

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XXXI.

§ 29. It hath been much argued, that St. Paul, Rom. vii. 7—25, sets forth in himself, as regenerate, such a conflict between the law of his members and the law of his mind, that as a carnal man he confesses himself to be “sold under sin:” because, saith he, “what I do, I allow not; for what

Of St. Paul's meaning in the seventh of the Romans.

[Rom. vii. 15—17.]

<sup>t</sup> See above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Ch. Tr., c. vii. § 27; c. ix. § 24.

<sup>u</sup> “Φεύγετε οὖν τὰς κακὰς παραφύδας, τὰς γεννώσας καρπὸν θανατηφόρον, οὗ ἐὰν γεύσῃται τις, παρ' αὐτὰ ἀποθνήσκει. Οὗτοι γὰρ οὐκ εἰσιν φτεῖλα Πατρὸς· εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν, ἐφαίνοντο ἂν κλάδοι τοῦ σταυροῦ, καὶ ἦν ἂν ὁ καρπὸς αὐτῶν ἄφ-

θαρτος.” S. Ignat., Epist. ad Trall., c. xi.: ap. PP. Apost., tom. ii. pp. 336, 338. ed. Jacobson.

<sup>x</sup> The passage is in the *De Pudicitia*, c. xix.; *Op.*, p. 572. C. Thorndike has confused with it a somewhat similar sentence in the *Præscr. Hæret.*, c. iii.; *ibid.*, p. 203. C.

BOOK  
II.

I would, I do not, but what I would not, that I do: which if I do when I would not, I agree with the law that it is good; but it is not I that do it, but sin, that dwelleth in me." And this law in his members, warring against the law of his mind, he says, lead[s] him captive to the law of sin in his members; so that he cries out, "Miserable man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

[Rom. vii. 24.]

[Of St. Augustin's exposition of this text.]

§ 30. Whereunto is added the authority of St. Augustin, pressing this exhortation<sup>y</sup> so hard, that it serves for an aspersion of Pelagius his heresy for a man not to allow it<sup>z</sup>. Though St. Augustin is not alone in it. Methodius against Origen (in Epiphanius<sup>a</sup>, writing against his heresy), St. Gregory Nazianzen<sup>b</sup>, and others perhaps among the fathers<sup>c</sup>, follow the same sense. But the aspersion is too abusive. For I have shewed<sup>d</sup>, that the tradition of the Church, declared by the records of the fathers, extendeth not to the exposition of

<sup>y</sup> ? exposition.

<sup>z</sup> That St. Augustin, after explaining the passage of the unregenerate man, changed his sentiments owing to the Pelagian controversy: see Bull, Apol. pro Harmon., sect. ix. § 5: Works, vol. iv. pp. 491, 492. But even when holding the latter view, "aperte docet, locum Apostoli, si de actualibus peccatis explicetur, non posse de regenito intelligi; si vero de regenito explicandus sit, necessario de concupiscentiæ tantum internis actibus, quibus homo non consentiat, intelligendum esse." Bull, *ibid.*, § 6. pp. 492, 493: proceeding to prove the statement by quotations.

<sup>a</sup> Epiphanius, Adv. Hær., lib. ii. tom. i. Hær. 64 (Origeniani), cc. 56, sq.: Op., tom. i. pp. 583. C. sq.: quoting Methodius at great length.—"Ex Patribus qui tribus primis sæculis floruerunt, . . unus affertur Methodius, qui tertio sæculo vergente floruit. Et tamen ipse locum exposuit longe aliter, quam ab iis, quos sequitur D. Tullius, factum est: ut fuse ostendit Grotius." Bull, Apol. pro Harmon., sect. ix. § 5: Works, vol. iv. p. 490. See Grotius as cited below in note c.

<sup>b</sup> "De Gregorio Nazianzeno nondum mihi constat, ipsum de homine vere regenito locum controversum intellexisse; certe id non probat testimonium ex ipso collatum ab Augustino, lib. ii. contra Julianum, cap. 3" (§ 7:

Op., tom. x. pp. 530. D, 531. C). "Imo alicubi in carminibus (si memini) contrariam interpretationem non obscure tradit." Bull, *ibid.*, pp. 490, 491.

<sup>c</sup> "Ante Augustinum quatuor omnino ecclesiæ doctores a nostris in hac causa adversariis . . allegantur: nempe Methodius, . . Hilarius, Gregorius Nazianzenus, et Ambrosius." Bull, *ibid.*, p. 490.—"Bifariam hunc locum interpretatus fuit Augustinus" (scil. 1st. of the unregenerate under the Law, 2nd. of the regenerate under grace): and (after quoting St. Augustine's assertion—in *Retract.*, lib. i. c. 23,—that even the former opinion overthrows the Pelagian heresy): "Quæ (prior Augustini sententia) etiam fuit cum Irenæi et Tertulliani, . . tum Macarii (Homil. 1), Basilii (in Psalm. 1. et exhortatione in baptismum), . . Cyrilli (contra Julianum lib. iii. et epist. ad Successum et lib. i. De Recta Fide ad Reginas); item Origenis, Chrysostomi, Theodoret, scriptoris commentariorum Ambrosii tributorum, et Theophylacti (notis in c. vii. ad Rom.)." Voss., *Hist. Pelag.*, lib. ii. P. i. Thes. 2: Op., tom. vi. p. 601. a.—See also many other authorities on the same side, in Bull, Apol. pro Harmon., sect. ix.: Works, vol. iv. pp. 484, sq.: and see Grotius, *Rivet. Apolog. Discuss.*, Op., tom. iii. pp. 728, 729, 743.

<sup>d</sup> Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. vi. § 1, &c.

particular scriptures, but to give bounds within which the Scriptures are to be understood. Wherefore, had St. Augustin and his party truly expounded this scripture, yet ought it not to be a mark of Pelagianism to maintain another exposition without supposing any part of Pelagius his heresy. But if they consider further, that St. Augustin acknowledges no more than the motions of concupiscence, which are alive in the regenerate, to divert the rigour of their intentions from the course of Christianity; not the committing of any sin, that "layeth waste" a good "conscience," to be consistent with the state of grace; they will have little joy of St. Augustin's exposition of this place. For what is that to the murder and adulteries of David, to the apostacy of St. Peter, to the idolatries of Solomon? Or what consequence is it,—because concupiscence is alive in Christians, that are at peace with God until death,—that, therefore, David, St. Peter, and Solomon, were at peace with God, before they had washed away those sins by repentance? Wherefore I must utterly discharge St. Augustin, and those of his sense, of having said any thing prejudicial to Christianity by expounding St. Paul according to it<sup>e</sup>.

§ 31. The question that remaineth will be, how St. Paul can call himself "carnal and sold under sin:" how he can say, "I like not that which I do, for I do not what I would but what I hate;" and, "To will is present with me, but how to do that which is good, I find not;" and, "I find a law, by which, when I would do well, evil is at hand to me;" and that this "law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, leads me captive to the law of sin that is in my members;" and, "Wretched man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this death?" The question I say will be, how all this can be said of him, of whom it follows (Rom. viii. 1, 2, 5—8): "There is therefore now no damnation for those in Christ Jesus, that walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit; for the law of the Spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath freed me from the law of sin and of death: . . . for they, that are according to the flesh, mind the things of the flesh; they, that are according to the Spirit, the things of the Spirit: for the sense of the flesh is death, but the sense of the Spirit,

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[Not meant literally of St. Paul himself.]  
[Rom. vii. 14, 15, 18, 23, 24.]

<sup>e</sup> See above in note z.

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II.

life and peace; because the sense of the flesh is enemy to God, for it is not nor can be subject to the law of God; neither can they, that are in the flesh, please God." For if these things cannot be said of the same man at the same time, it remains, that though we allow St. Augustin and those of his sense, that a Christian falls continually into sin, and by continual offices of Christianity comes clear of it; yet, when he wilfully runs into that sin which he cannot but know that it cannot stand with his Christianity, he cannot be of that number, for whom St. Paul says "there is no condemnation in Christ Jesus," that "walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit."

[But spoken by him of another under the person of himself; by a μετασχηματισμός.]

§ 32. And, therefore, for the true meaning of the scripture in hand, it will be requisite to have recourse to that figure of speech, whereby St. Paul himself declareth, that he speaks that of himself which he would have understood of others, merely for the avoiding of offence (1 Cor. iv. 6)<sup>f</sup>. So is it no marvel, if, to make those that were zealous of the Law believe, that they could not be saved but by Christianity, he, whom they took for an Apostle, shew it in his own case, before he was a Christian; saying, "Is the Law sin? nay, I had not known sin but by the Law" (Rom. vii. 7).

[Whether of an Israelite before and under the Law: as Grotius thinks.]

§ 33. I have shewed you, how Grotius hath understood him to speak of himself in the person of an Israelite, comparing himself, considered as having received the Law and under the Law, with himself before he received it<sup>g</sup>.

[Or of an Israelite to whom the Gospel is proposed.]

§ 34. If any man think this consideration too far fetched for St. Paul to propose to those, zealous of the Law, that he

<sup>f</sup> "Τὰυτα δὲ, ἀδελφοί, μετεσχημάτισα εἰς ἑμάντων καὶ Ἀπολλῶν, δι' ὑμᾶς." 1 Cor. iv. 6.—"Μετασχηματίζειν proprie est 'mutare habitum.' . . Inde transfertur ad orationem, quæ aliud videtur dicere, aliud innuit: cujusmodi locutiones vocari a Græcis solent λόγοι ἐσχηματισμένοι, quas 'controversias figuratas' dixit Quintilianus ix. 11, et 'figuras' Suetonius," &c. Grot. ad 1 Cor. iv. 6.—"Notandum est hoc loco" (Rom. vii. 7) "ac deinceps Paulum in prima persona loqui, non quod de se agat, sed quod modestiæ causa res odiosas sic exprimere malit; quod ipse dicit μετασχηματίζειν, 1 Cor. iv. 6. Similia loquendi genera habes, 1 Cor.

vi. 12, 15, x. 23, 29, 30, xiii. 2, Gal. ii. 18. Chrysostomus ad 1 Cor. xii.; 'Ἄελ τὰ φορτικά ἐπὶ τοῦ οἰκέλου προσώπου γυμνάσει' ('semper de odiosis disserit sua persona'). Hieronymus ad Dancielem; 'Peccata populi, quia unus e populo est, enumerat persona sua, quod et Apostolum in Epistola ad Romanos facere legimus.' Neque vero non et alibi talia occurrunt," &c. Id., Ad Rom. vii. 7.

<sup>g</sup> "Apostolus autem hic" (Rom. vii. 7) "sub prima persona describit Hebræum genus quale fuit ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (maxima ex parte), primum ante Legem, deinde post Legem." Id., Ad Rom. vii. 7.—See above, c. x. § 15.



writes to; he may understand him to speak in the person of one of them, to whom the Gospel had been proposed (and thereby conviction of the spiritual sense of the Law); which therefore the concupiscence, which we are born with, cannot but make great difficulty to embrace, according to the premisses. For seeing the Scribes and Pharisees, having received the tradition of the world to come, in opposition to the Sadducees, had prevailed with the body of that people to believe, that the outward observation of the Law according to the letter was the means to bring them to the rewards of it; it is no marvel, if St. Paul, in the person of one so reduced, say, "I had not known concupiscence," had I not found "the Law" to say, "Thou shalt not covet." For he that understood not the law of God to prohibit the inward motions of concupiscence, till by the preaching of Christianity he learned that to be the intent of the precept, may very well say, that he "knew not concupiscence but by the Law" so preached<sup>h</sup>. By that same reason might he say, as it followeth, "Without the Law sin is dead, but I was once alive without the Law;" to wit, when he thought himself in the way to life under the doctrine of the Pharisees: but "when the commandment came" to be declared to him in that sense, which the salvation tendered by the Gospel requireth, it is no marvel, if "sin" that was in him, and concupiscence of it, "revived;" and he was discovered to be "dead" in sin, as not yielding to the cure of it. But that "the commandment which was given for life became unto his death, because sin, taking occasion by it, deceived and slew him;" all this takes place in that Pharisee, who, being persuaded by the Pharisees, that by not contriving to take away his neighbour's wife and goods he stood qualified for the world to come, now coming to know, by the preaching of the Gospel, the restraint of inward concupiscence is commanded by it, found himself by means of the Law cozened and slain, as enemy to Christianity, which tenders the only cure of sin. Whereunto the conclusion agrees well enough: for when, having questioned, "Miserable man that I am, who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" he answereth, "I thank God by Jesus Christ our Lord;" he seemeth to declare, that, the Gospel having over-

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[Rom. vii.  
7.]

[Rom. vii.  
8, 9.]

[Rom. vii.  
10, 11.]

[Rom. vii.  
24, 25.]

<sup>h</sup> See above, c. x. § 15.

BOOK; taken him in this estate and discovered him to himself in it, II. the embracing of it cured him, and gave him cause to "thank God through our Lord Jesus Christ" for his deliverance from it: all the rest, that followeth between these terms in the discourse of St. Paul, serving for a very lively description of that man's estate, who, being convinced of the truth of Christianity, findeth difficulty in renouncing the pleasures which sin furnisheth, for the obtaining of those promises which the Gospel tendereth.

Of the polygamy of the fathers.

[Mal. iii. 17; Cant. vi. 9; James i. 18.]  
 [Gen. xi. 29, xx. 12, xxix. 15—28; Exod. vi. 20; Numb. xxvi. 59.]  
 [2 Cor. iii. 18: "ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ ὑφ' ἁπλοσύνης."]  
 [Lev. xviii. 12, 13, xx. 19.]

§ 35. There remaineth yet one difficulty, concerning the polygamy of the ancient fathers before and under the Law<sup>i</sup>; which to me hath always seemed an argument for the truth which I maintain, rather than an objection against it. If any soul, sensible of the fear of God, can imagine, that God's "jewels," His "choice ones," the "first-fruits of His creatures," knowing themselves to be under the law of having but one wife not to be parted with till death, should notwithstanding take many (and those many times so qualified, as the Law, much more Christianity, allows not; as Jacob two sisters, Abraham his niece, and so Amram), and to outface the law, hold them till death, and never come short of God's favour, Whose law they transgress "with bare face<sup>k</sup>," as the Scripture speaks; let him believe, that a Christian, living in sin, can be in the state of grace. But he that sees the Law to have restrained marrying with the niece, which he sees practised afore; and sees withal, that plurality of wives is not forbidden by the Law (for, besides wives of an inferior rank, which may be called concubines, a captive Deut. xxi. 11, and a Hebrew maid sold for a slave Exod. xxi. 8—10, there can be no question in the Law of two wives, whereof the one is

<sup>i</sup> "Quod rigidiores Protestantes affirmant, polygamiam, et divortium extra casum adulterii, lege morali non fuisse concessa, sed legibus tantum forensibus, et Mosem ut politicum magistratum, majoris mali vitandi causa, utrumque hoc contra moralem Dei legem permisisse, falsum est; Christus enim, Qui res forenses nunquam attingere voluit," &c., "hisce de rebus tamen veras nobis leges tulit: adde quod . . . hinc manifeste sequeretur, sanctos Veteris Testamenti toties scientes (nisi forte communi eaque satis crassa igno-

rantia laborasse illos omnes affirmare malis) contra legem moralem peccasse. . . Vide præter plurimos alios H. Grotium (De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. ii. c. 5. § 9): Vorstium (in Scholiis Alexicacis, pp. 240, 241)." Forbes, *Consid. Mod.*, De Justif, lib. iv. c. 2. § 5. pp. 326, 328.—Vorstius (as above quoted, 4to. Goudæ 1614) was arguing against one Sibrandus Lubbertus, who denied "Christum esse legislatorem," and was trying to avoid the force of the Gospel laws prohibiting polygamy and divorce.

<sup>k</sup> See below, c. xxxii. § 41.

beloved the other not, Deut. xxi. 15 ; besides that the law restraining the king from having many wives seems to allow him more than every man had, and therefore that David might be within compass of the law, though Solomon trod it under foot): I say, he that considers these things, will be moved to be of opinion, that the Pharisees' interpretation of 279 Levit. xviii. 18<sup>1</sup>. is true, and that, before that law, there was no prohibition for a man to marry two sisters, which is there first introduced ; and yet with an exception in Deuteronomy, in the case of a brother dead without issue ; which before the Law was also in force, as by the story of Judah (Gen. xxxviii. 8.) doth appear. I will therefore conclude, that, as the knowledge of God increased by giving the Law, so was the posterity of Abraham restrained from more by the Law, than the posterity of Noe, upon the promises given them, had been restrained from after the deluge. From whence in all reason it will follow, that the posterity of Abraham according to the Spirit, which is the Church of Christ, should be still restrained from more, than the posterity of Abraham according to the flesh by the Law : and so, that the fathers before and under the Law, living in God's grace, did not withal live in open violation of God's law ; but that they knew themselves not to be under the law of one wife to one husband (though intended in paradise), by virtue of God's dispensation in it, till Christianity should come. For unless we presume, that not only all things necessary to our salvation, but all things necessary to the salvation of all men since the world stood, are recorded in the Scriptures ; there can be no reason to presume, that they could not understand what laws they were under, but by those Scriptures, which for our salvation have been granted us.

§ 36. I argue yet further, that it will be impossible for true Christians, and good Christians, to attain unto assurance of the state of grace ; if it be to be had for them, that commit such sins as Christianity consists not with : and this, upon supposition of the premisses, for the ground of this assurance. For, without doubt, were not some thing in the condition which the Gospel requireth impossible for flesh

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XXXI.

[Deut. xvii.  
17.]

[Deut. xxv.  
5.]

What  
assurance  
of grace  
Christians  
may have.

<sup>1</sup> See Hammond, Of Marrying the Wife's Sister, § 17 sq.; Works, vol. i. pp. 583—585; and Of Polygamy and Divorce, c. i. § 7; *ibid.*, p. 591.

BOOK  
II.

and blood to bring forth, it were not possible for him, that embraceth the Gospel, to assure himself, that he doeth it out of obedience to God, not out of those reasons which hypocrites may follow. But I, having declared afore<sup>m</sup>, and maintaining now, that no man, by the force of flesh and blood (that is to say, of that inclination to goodness which a man is born into the world with), is able to profess Christianity out of a resolute and clear intention to stand to it, am consequently bound to maintain, that he who so doeth not only may but must needs assure himself of the favour of God, inasmuch as he cannot but assure himself of that which himself doeth. For inasmuch as he knows what himself means, and what he does; as St. Paul says, that no man “knows what is in man, but the spirit of a man which is in him;” so sure it is, that a man’s self knows what he means and what he does, as it is sure that another man knows it not. But, not allowing nor presupposing this ground of a man’s knowledge, how shall he know it? Shall a man, by having a persuasion that he is in the number of God’s elect, or by having in himself an assurance of God’s love to the effect of everlasting happiness, be assured, that his assurance is well grounded, and that he is of that number which is elected to life everlasting? As if it were not possible for the temptations of Satan, and carnal presumption, to possess a man as much, even to this effect, as the Spirit of God can do. Where is then the effect of Christianity seen, if not in limiting such grounds, and such terms, as he that proceedeth upon, shall not fail of that grace of God, whereof he assureth himself upon those grounds?

[1 Cor. ii.  
11.]

[What they, who hold presbyterian views about justifying faith.]

§ 37. But he that placeth that faith, which alone justifieth, in believing that he who believeth is predestinate to life everlasting, or in the confidence of God’s grace in attaining the same; I demand, upon what ground he can pretend to distinguish this faith from that, which he cannot deny that it may be false. For if it be said, that the Spirit of God That is in him assureth him, that his persuasion is well grounded; it is easy for me to say, that the question to be cleared (that is to say, whether it be the Spirit of God That

<sup>m</sup> Above, cc. x., xviii., xix.



tells him so, or not), cannot be the evidence to clear itself; and, therefore, that he standeth obliged to bethink himself of some means, whereupon he may assure himself that it is the Spirit of God, not the temptation of Satan, or carnal presumption, that assures him to be of the number of those  
 280 that are predestinate to life everlasting. For if any man say, that he is assured that the act of his faith, which he first conceived when he was first converted from sin to righteousness, assures him of the grace of God, because it was grounded upon that conversion to God which the Gospel requireth; I will yield him all that. But then I will demand of him, who presupposeth true conversion to God according to the terms which the Gospel requireth (that is to say, joined with a sincere resolution of living for the future in that conversation that the Gospel prescribeth), to be the condition of those promises which the Gospel tendereth; I say, I will demand of him, upon what ground he can persuade himself, that having professed Christianity and failed of it he remains in that favour of God, which he obtained by professing that Christianity which he performeth not.

§ 38. Indeed, could it be said, that the condition which the Gospel requireth is a thing that God immediately determines man to do without and before any determination of his own, I should not much marvel, that a man, who is accepted by God upon such a condition, should continue in favour till it come again, and make him hate that sin for which he forfeited it. But having proceeded thus far in shewing, that the condition which the Gospel requires, is no less than the total change of a man's intentions from seeking the world to seek God; and that the helps of grace determine him to this no otherwise, than by determining him to choose the better and leave the worse: for me to say, that, waving this determination, he remains possessed of the promises which it produceth, would be to say, that there is no reason why any man should require repentance as a condition, which justifying faith presupposeth.

§ 39. And therefore it is very much to be admired, that those, who would seem truly religious, should think it an abridgment to that security and confidence, that peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, that boasting assurance, which St. [Assurance upon just ground only, no abridgment of a



BOOK  
II.

Christian's  
peace and  
joy in the  
Holy  
Ghost.]  
[2 Cor. xi.  
17; Eph.  
iii. 12;  
Heb. x.  
22.]

Paul professeth to be the privilege of true Christians, that they cannot maintain it but upon just assurance, that upon their true conversion to God there was just ground for it: nay, further, that God invites not men to Christianity upon fair terms, unless He allow it. For I demand, is it not an act of infinite mercy in God, to set up a standard of confidence to all the world, conditionally that they embrace those terms which He propounds, out of His own mere goodness? is it not enough, that He allows them pardon upon condition of repentance? that He allows this to them, that have forfeited their repentance never so often by repenting them of their repentance? especially, to them, who ground themselves upon their repentance as the condition whereupon they obtained His favour, can it seem strange, that His favour should become void, when they repent them of their repentance?

[The  
case of  
Caleb and  
Joshua.]

[Numb.  
xiii. 30;  
xiv. 6, 24,  
38; Josh.  
xiv. 6—  
11.]

§ 40. Some object the case of Caleb and Joshua; who, upon perseverance when their fellows fell away, are assured of the land of promise: to argue, that under Christianity, by perseverance in it, a man may obtain assurance of salvation, such as that which God's word createth to those who know it to be God's word, as to that which it assureth. The difference of the case is this, that they had God's word for their assurance: which I must needs have granted in St. Paul's case, had I granted, that the assurance of salvation which he professeth had been grounded upon a revelation made to him in particular, that he should be saved; but, seeing I have grounded that assurance, which he expresseth, merely upon that conscience of the common Christianity which he had, I say, that, supposing Caleb and Joshua to be certain of their inheritance in the land of promise by virtue of the promise there recorded (which nothing hinders to imply that condition of walking according to the law of God, upon which it is made), it is enough, that the Gospel can assure us of eternal life upon supposition of that disposition of mind, upon which St. Paul assures himself of it. For if it be said, that he who assures a man of God's grace upon condition of doing what he can to hold it, assures nothing; seeing it is agreed upon, that he which doth no more than he can shall certainly fall from it: the answer is easy,—that

nothing can be more injurious, than to measure that which man can do, when by the grace of God he hath been resolved  
 281 to Christianity (and thereupon hath received of God the promise of the habitual assistance of His Spirit for the performance of that, which he hath undertaken upon confidence of God's assistance), by that which no man by mere nature is able to do. For, these promises being passed upon supposition of that weakness and perverseness by nature which they come into the world with, it cannot be imagined that they can become void by the means of those subreptions and surprises of native concupiscence, to which all men are liable. Though, if a man shall openly transgress his Christianity in that which he must needs know that it cannot stand with it, or if by continued negligence he cast off that regard that he hath professed to it; can any reason be imagined, why God should continue His favour or the inward effects of it, but that which all men have, to reconcile the present love of sin to the promises of the world to come?

C H A P.  
 XXXI.

§ 41. Wherefore, though I cannot allow that saying, which the School hath allowed in many doctors,—“*Facienti quod in se est Deus largitur gratiam*”<sup>n</sup> ;—unless it be restrained to him, that complies with the helps of preventing grace; whom, I am persuaded, God will not fail to bring to the state of grace by following helps of grace: yet there is another saying of the School, which I do utterly allow;—“*Deus neminem deserit, nisi desertus*”—that “God leaves no man that leaves not Him first<sup>o</sup> ;”—because it is evident in reason, that the promise of the Holy Ghost must come to nothing, unless it may be held upon such conditions, as are possible to him that comes to be a Christian with original concupiscence; that is to say, so as not to forfeit it upon those surprises and subreptions, which morally no man can avoid; but upon departure from that, which a man upon deliberation had professed afore. He that considers, how many times God in the Old Testament delivers the Israelites from those oppressors, to whom He had given them up for their transgressions of

[“Deus neminem deserit nisi desertus.”]

<sup>n</sup> See above, c. xxv. § 17. note y.

<sup>o</sup> The Schoolmen borrowed the words from St. Augustin.—“Non enim deseret (Deus) opus Suum, si ab opere Suo non deseratur.” S. Aug., Enarr.

in Psalm. cxlv. § 9; Op., tom. iv. p. 1629. D.—“Non deserit si non deseratur.” Id., De Nat. et Gratia conf., Pelagianos, c. xxvi. § 29; Op., tom. x. p. 140. A.

BOOK  
II.

His covenant; will never believe, that upon every transgression of Christianity He will break with those, that sincerely desire to continue in His favour upon condition of it. And he that considers, that it is not commendable amongst men to break off friendship upon every offence, with them whom a man hath entertained it with in matters of privacy, and a long time; will never apprehend, that the Scripture, representing the friendship of God with His children according to His Gospel by the pattern of that love, which the best men shew to those whom they entertain friendship with, doth intend to express Him disobliged upon every offence: but unless we think it commendable for God to love men more than righteousness for the love of Christ, to Whom the same righteousness is no less dear than to God, will never think it agreeable to the honour of the Gospel, to propose the reward of that righteousness which it requireth, but upon supposition of performing of it. Certainly, Celsus<sup>p</sup> had done the Christians no wrong, in slandering them, that they received all the wicked persons, whom the world spued out, into an assurance of everlasting happiness; nor could Zosimus<sup>q</sup> be blamed, for imputing the change of Constantine the Great to a desire of easing his conscience of the guilt of those sins which Paganism could shew him no means to expiate: had the Christians of that time acknowledged, that they tendered assurance of pardon to any man, but upon supposition of conversion from his sin.

[Assurance of salvation not the act of justifying faith, but the consequence of it.]

§ 42. These things supposed, it will be easy to resolve, that the assurance of salvation, which the Gospel enables a good Christian to attain, is not the act of justifying faith, but the consequence of it. Indeed, if a man were justified by believing that he is justified; so far as a man hath the act of justifying faith, so far he must necessarily rest assured, not only of his right to salvation at present, but of his everlasting salvation in the world to come. But neither is that opinion, which maketh justifying faith to consist in the trust and confidence which a Christian reposeth in God through Christ for the obtaining of His promises, liable to the horrible and gross consequence of the same. To exclude all Christians

<sup>p</sup> Origen, Cont. Celsum, lib. iii. c. 59; Op., to n. i. p. 486. D—F.

<sup>q</sup> Zos., Hist., lib. ii. c. 29; pp. 149, 150. ed. Heyne, Lips. 1784.

282 from salvation, that are not as sure that they shall be saved as they are of their Creed<sup>r</sup>, is a consequence as desperate, as it is gross to make that assurance the act of justifying faith. The true act of justifying faith, which is constancy in Christianity, the more lively and resolute it is, the more assurance it createth, of those consequences which the Gospel warranteth. For no man is ignorant of his own resolutions: nor can be less assured, that it is God's Spirit that creates this assurance, than he is assured, that his own resolutions are not counterfeit. And, therefore, his trust in God, not as reconcileable but as reconciled, must needs be answerable. And the same trust may warrant the same assurance; though not of itself, but upon the conscience of that Christianity whereupon it is grounded.

§ 43. And by those things which were disputed, not only during the Council of Trent, but also since the decree thereof, it is manifest, that the Church of Rome doth not teach it to be the duty of a good Christian to be always in doubt of God's grace: but alloweth that opinion to be maintained, which maketh assurance of salvation attainable upon these terms; and therefore encourageth good Christians to contend for it<sup>s</sup>.

§ 44. As for the assurance of future salvation, which de-

<sup>r</sup> "Homo vere fidelis, id est, fide justificante præditus, certus est certitudine fidei de remissione peccatorum suorum et salute sempiterna sua per Christum." Sixth of the Lambeth Articles as originally drawn up by Whitaker. And see below, § 49. note u.

<sup>s</sup> "Communior Romanensium hæc de re sententia negat certitudinem fidei Divinæ justo de sua justificatione citra speciale revelationis privilegium: libenter tamen admittit ex vivæ fidei sensu, seu charitatis et bonorum operum experimento, certitudinem aliquam minoris et inferioris gradus oriri, quæ conjecturalis et probabilis nominari potest, et quæ, licet non omnem formidinem pellat, tamen tollit omnem anxietatem et hæsitationem," &c. "Ideoque quando de aliqua aliqui Romanenses dubitatione loquuntur, non aliud intelligere, quam quandam formidinem, quæ in omni assensu, etiam certo, qui non sit infallibilis aut evidens, reperitur, et late dubitatio vocatur: vide Bellarminum (De Justif., lib. iii. c. 11.

sect. Tertia sententia, &c.) aliosque plurimos. . . Progrediuntur quidam alii Romanenses ulterius; et certitudinem aliquam aliam, minorem quidem certitudine fidei Divinæ, conjecturali tamen majorem, quam certitudinem Moralem appellandam censent, admittunt." Forbes, *Consid. Mod.*, De Justif., lib. iii. c. 1. § 6, 7. pp. 228, 230: proceeding to quote, for the latter opinion (ibid. § 7, 8), Dominicus a Soto, Gregory de Valentia, Carthusianus, Andreas Vega, and (§ 9, 11. pp. 232—237) Tapper, Pererius, Thomas a Jesu, Eisengrenius.—"Progrediuntur adhuc etiam ulterius alii Romanenses, et hominem fidelem vel posse vel etiam debere certitudinem fidei Divinæ, sine peculiari revelatione, habere de propria gratia et justitia affirmant. Pro hæc sententia citatur communiter inter veteres scholasticos Alexander Alensis, sed multum renitente A. Vega aliiisque, et Johannes Baconus Carmelita." Id., ibid. § 12. p. 236. And so also Catharinus, after the decree of Trent (ibid. § 18. p. 244).

CHAP.  
XXXI.

[The Church of Rome doth not deny assurance of salvation.]

[Of assurance of future salvation.]

BOOK  
II.[Rom. viii.  
38, 39.]

pendeth upon the assurance of perseverance till death, or a man's departure in the state of grace; you see St. Paul involveth all Christians in it with himself, by saying, "I am persuaded, that neither life nor death . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Jesus Christ our Lord." And therefore, I conceive, it was a very great impertinence to dream of any privilege of immediate revelation for the means by which he had it<sup>t</sup>. Whosoever is a Christian, so far as he is a Christian, hath it. "A double-minded man, that is unconstant in all his ways," as St. James speaks, (that is, who is not resolved to live and die a good Christian,) cannot have it. Whosoever hath that resolution, inasmuch as he hath that resolution [hath it]; that is, so firm as his resolution is, so firm is his assurance. For, knowing his own resolutions, he knows them not easily changeable, in a matter<sup>u</sup> importing the end of a man's whole course; and, therefore, knowing God unchangeable while he so continues, is able to say full as much as St. Paul saith,—“I am persuaded, that neither life nor death shall be able to separate me from the love of God in Christ Jesus.”

[James i.  
8.][Rom. viii.  
38, 39.]The tradi-  
tion of the  
Church[,  
as shewn  
by its  
laws].

§ 45. As for the sense of the primitive and Catholic Church (putting you in mind of that which I said before<sup>x</sup>, to shew, that it placeth justifying faith in professing Christianity, the effect whereof in justifying must needs fail, so soon as a man faileth of performing that Christianity, in the profession whereof his justification standeth): I shall not need to allege the opinions of particular fathers to make evidence of it, having laws of the Church to make evidence, that those who were ruled by them must needs think the promises of the Gospel to depend upon the covenant of our baptism; and, therefore, that they become forfeit by transgressing the same. The promise of persevering in the profession of the faith until death, and of living like a Christian, was always expressly exacted of all that were baptized<sup>y</sup> (as now in the Church of England): and upon this promise, and not otherwise, remission of sin, right to God's kingdom, and the gift of His Spirit, was to be expected. As, if it were not made

<sup>t</sup> See above, § 27, note r.<sup>u</sup> Corrected in MS.; misprinted  
'water,' in orig. text.<sup>x</sup> Above, c. ix. § 17, sq.<sup>y</sup> Above, cc. ii.—v.



with a serious intent at the present, baptism did nothing but damn him that received it; so [it did damn him<sup>z</sup>], if it were transgressed by gross sins, not to be imputed to the surprises of concupiscence. For, the condition failing, that which dependeth upon the same must needs fail. For the means by which they expected to recover the state of grace thus forfeited, we have the penitential canons (which, as they had the force of law all over the Church all the better times of the Church, so I shew from the beginning, that they had their beginning from the Apostles themselves<sup>a</sup>); to assure us, that all believed that, without which there could be no ground for that which all did practise. Can any man imagine, that the Church should appoint several times and several measures of penance<sup>b</sup>, for several sins, to be debarred the communion of the Eucharist, and to demonstrate unto the Church by their outward conversation the sincerity of their  
285 conversion to their first profession of Christianity; had not all acknowledged, that the promises of the Gospel, forfeited by transgressing the profession of baptism, were not to be recovered otherwise? and that, the deeper the offence was, the more difficulty was presumed in replanting the resolution of Christianity in that heart, which was presumed to have deserted it, according to the measure of the sin whereby it had violated the same? This is enough to prescribe unto reasonable men, against such little consequences, as now and then are made upon some passages of the fathers, which upon by occasions seem to speak otherwise.

§ 46. St. Augustin is the main hope of the cause<sup>c</sup>, so far [St. Augustin.] as it hath any joy in the consent of the Church. But what joy they can have of St. Augustin, may easily be judged, by his opinion of the seventh to the Romans, and the difference which I have observed between it and theirs<sup>d</sup>. For what can any man imagine to be the reason, why he should

<sup>z</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>a</sup> See Bk. I. Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. i. § 37; and Right of Ch. in Chr. State, c. i. § 21, sq.

<sup>b</sup> See Morinus, De Pœnitentia, lib. v.: and Bingham, Bk. xvi.; and Bk. xviii. c. 4.

<sup>c</sup> "But because I shall not burden the reader, being now entred upon the place and time wherein very many witnesses call aloud to be heard about the difference in hand, of the first opposers

of the Pelagian heresy, I shall insist only on him, who is indeed *instar omnium*, and hath ever been so accounted in the controversies about the grace of God: and I shall the rather lay this weight on him, because it's evident that he spake the sense of the whole Church, in those days wherein he lived. This is Austin." Owen, Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance, &c., Preface, sign. E. 4 (not paged).

<sup>d</sup> See above, § 30, note z.

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understand St. Paul to speak only of the surprises which the regenerate are subject to, remaining regenerate; but because he was assured, that they remain not such, when they fall away to these gross sins, which no man is surprised with? And he that shall take the pains to peruse what St. Augustin hath written in his books *De Correctione et Gratia*, and *De Predestinatione Sanctorum*<sup>e</sup>, may justly marvel, how any man could come to have such an opinion of St. Augustin. Besides, in his work *De Civitate Dei*<sup>f</sup>, and in many other places<sup>g</sup>, he hath so clearly expressed himself; that, unless a man resolve not to distinguish between the state of grace and the purpose of God to bring a man to everlasting life (which he that useth the common reason of all men cannot but distinguish), it is a marvel how St. Augustin should be taken to say, that the state of grace cannot become void, because (it is true) he says so often, that the decree of predestination cannot become void.

[St. Gregory the Great.]

§ 47. St. Gregory is taken for one of the same opinion<sup>h</sup>; because, expounding the words of the prophet Jeremy (Lament. iv. 1).—"How is gold obscured? the pure mass changed? the stones of the sanctuary scattered in the head of every street"—concerning Christians that fall from their profession, according to the true reason of the mystical sense, he hath the words,—*Aurum, quod obscurari potuit, aurum in conspectu Dei nunquam fuit*'—"That gold, which could be darkened, was never gold in God's sight<sup>i</sup>." But is it not easy to understand, that the "sight of God" is that foreknowledge<sup>k</sup>, which the decree of predestination either sup-

<sup>e</sup> See above, § 10. note o; and below, § 47. notes m, n: and Voss., *Hist. Pelag.*, lib. vi. *The. xiii.*; *Op.*, tom. vi. pp. 752. a, 753. a.

<sup>f</sup> E. g., lib. xi. c. 12. (*Op.*, tom. vii. p. 282. B, C); and lib. xx. c. 7. § 3. (*ibid.*, p. 582. A—E).

<sup>g</sup> See quotations in Voss., *Hist. Pelag.*, lib. vi. *The. xi.*; *Op.* tom. vi. pp. 746. a—748. a: and Andrewes, *Judgment of Lambeth Articles, and Censura Censuræ D. Barreti*, pp. 294sq., 301 sq. *Oxf.* 1846.

<sup>h</sup> "After this was Gregory I., who, lib. i. *Epist.* 99, speaks to the same purpose with them in these words, 'Redemptor noster,' &c., &c. . . "This is the summe of what we contend for. . . And most expressive to our purpose is that discourse of his which you have lib. 34. *Meral. cap. 8.*" (*sic*) Owen,

*Saints' Persev.*, *Pref.*, sign. F. 2: proceeding to quote the passage given below in note i.

<sup>i</sup> "Aurum quod pravis ejus (Diaboli) persuasionibus quasi lutum sterni potuerit, aurum ante Dei oculos nunquam fuit; qui enim seduci quandoque non reversuri possunt, quasi habitam sanctitatem ante oculos hominum videntur amittere, sed eam ante oculos Dei nunquam habuerunt." S. Greg. M., *Moral. in Job.*, lib. xxxiv. c. 15. § 29; *Op.*, tom. i. p. 1129. D: quoted by Owen, *Saints' Persev.*, *Preface*, sign. F. 2.—S. Gregory had been commenting just before (§ 26. p. 1128. D, E) upon the passage above cited from the *Lamentations*.

<sup>k</sup> Corrected from MS. "free knowledge," in orig. text.

poseth or produceth? and that those, whom God foresceth to fall from their Christianity, “were never gold” in His esteem, in regard of it? As I said afore<sup>1</sup>, that He never knew them, whom He ever knew that they would not ever continue His.

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§ 48. And, seeing St. Augustin expressly distinguisheth between sons of God according to that which they are at present and according to God’s foresight and purpose<sup>m</sup>, it will be necessary, consequently, to distinguish upon the attributes of “members of Christ,” and “of His body, ingrafted into Christ,” and “His disciples;” that those are truly called such, according to St. Augustin, that shall continue such for everlasting: though those, that shall not so continue, are so for the present, according to St. Augustin. As it is peremptorily evident by one exception;—in that he maketh the difference between some of them who have the gift of perseverance, and others that have it not, to consist in this; that some are cut off by death, while they are in that estate, others are suffered to survive till they fall from it<sup>n</sup>:—a thing many times repeated in the books aforementioned, and which could not have been said, but by him that held both for the present to be in the state of grace. Nor could he indeed dispute of perseverance, not supposing the truth of that, in which he requireth grace to persevere.

§ 49. I acknowledge to have seen the preface to one of the volumes that I spoke of<sup>o</sup>, and in it some pretence of making St. Augustin, and St. Gregory especially, for the contrary purpose<sup>p</sup>. But I do not acknowledge to have found any thing at all alleged there, that had not been fully an-

[Of the  
Preface to  
Dr. Owen’s  
book.]

<sup>1</sup> Above, § 22.

<sup>m</sup> “Isti cum pie vivunt, dicuntur filii Dei; sed quoniam victuri sunt impie et in eadem impietate morituri, non eos dicit filios Dei præscientia Dei. Sunt enim filii Dei, qui nondum sunt nobis, et sunt jam Deo. . . Et sunt rursus quidam, qui filii Dei propter susceptam temporaliter gratiam dicuntur a nobis, nec sunt tamen Deo.” S. Aug., Lib. de Corrept. et Gratia, c. ix. § 20; Op., tom. x. pp. 760. F—761. A.

<sup>n</sup> E. g.—“Ut enim alia innumerabilia taceam, quæ aliis dantur, aliis non dantur hominibus a Domino Deo, . . sicut sunt celeritates, vires, bonæ valetudines,” &c.: “ut non immorer etiam in baptisate parvulorum, . . cur illi parvulo detur, illi non detur; cum sit

utrumque in potestate Dei, et sine illo sacramento nemo intret in regnum Dei: ut ergo hæc taceam vel relinquam, illos ipsos intueantur de quibus agitur. De his enim disserimus, qui perseverantiam bonitatis non habent sed ex bono in malum deficiente bona voluntate moriuntur. Respondeant, si possunt, cur illos Deus, cum fideliter et pie viverent, non tunc de vitæ hujus periculis rapuit, ‘ne malitia mutaret intellectum eorum, et ne fictio deciperet animas eorum.’ Utrum hoc in potestate non habuit, an eorum mala futura nescivit?” Id., *ibid.*, c. viii. § 19. p. 760. A—C.

<sup>o</sup> “Owen, Of Perseverance:” added in margin in MS.

<sup>p</sup> See above, § 46. note c; § 47. note h.

swered before it was alleged there, in Vossius his Collections *Historiæ Pelagianæ*, libro vi. thesi. xii—xv.<sup>q</sup> And therefore I will discharge myself upon him in this point, rather than repeat briefly in this abridgment, that which he hath fully said there. For you shall find also there, upon what terms <sup>284</sup> and by what means Christians may and do overcome that anxiety of mind, which the possibility of falling from grace may affect them with, according to the fathers<sup>r</sup>: even the same as according to St. Paul; whose assurance needed no revelation of God's secret purpose, but the knowledge of that resolution which God's Spirit had settled in his spirit; which, being assured that God will not forsake [him] while he forsakes not God, assureth him, that by God's help he will not forsake God: and not only him<sup>s</sup>, but all, whom St. Paul comprises in the plural "us," as grounded like St. Paul<sup>t</sup>. Other-

<sup>q</sup> Op., tom. vi. pp. 748, b—761. b. —“ Ex altero hoc Augustinianæ sententiæ addimento satis clare liquet, tam Augustinum et Prosperum, quam Pelagium et ejus reliquias, super eo convenisse, quod fides justificans et gratia regenerans amitti possit, et a plerisque amittatur: sed sanctos illos Patres præterea contendisse, Deum ab æterno statuisse, quosdam infallibilibus mediis perducere ad vitam æternam, quorum iccico fides et caritas vel nunquam deficiat, vel amissa certo restitatur ante finem vitæ,” &c. “ Neutiquam igitur antiquitatis mentem assequuntur, qui cum apud Augustinum et alios legunt, electos Dei vel deficere nunquam, vel ad Deum ante obitum redire; inde colligunt, ex eorum sententia fideles semper in fide perseverare, aut saltem nunquam penitus Divina gratia excidere. Quorum argumentum hac nititur hypothesi, quod fideles et electi ἀνιστρέφονται, cum juxta Augustinum non reciprocentur electi et fideles, sed fideles perseverantes.” Title of Thes. xii.; *ibid.*, p. 748. b.

<sup>r</sup> “ Illud interim maximopere in considerationem venit, quod, cum Patres fidem posse amitti, eoque ex fide haut recte æternam electionem colligi posse contendunt, non omnes de quacunque fidei mensura loquuntur: cum plurimi eorum distinguant tres fidei gradus: quorum primus dat fidei essentiam, secundum quam justificat, et dicitur fides viva; . . . alter gradus addit durationem, qua ratione salvificat;

tertius gradus superaddit soliditatem, et dicitur perfecta, solida, radicata; quæ quocunque vitæ tempore certificat: hoc est, . . . sic confirmat, ut quis ulterius cadere non possit et hoc de sese certissime sciat: cui gradui opponitur fides debilis, qualis etiam multorum est electorum.” Voss., *ibid.*, title of Thes. xiii. p. 750. b.—“ Quid quod antiquitas tota indeficibilitati adversatur? nec quemquam, quantum meminisse valeamus, veterum invenire est, qui fideles omnes omnimodam de perseverantia sua certitudinem habere arbitretur. Fatentur quidem, animos filiorum Dei dubitationis anxietate cruciari non debere; cum spei fiduciam habeant, quæ sufficienti consolatione et lapsuros sustentet, et lapsos levet: at nihilominus negant, posse quemvis, exinde quod impræsentiarum fidelium se in numero esse sciat, tantum sibi de reliquo vitæ tempore favorem Dei pro certo polliceri, ut tanquam Divina revelatione de se edoctus spondere ausit nunquam se adulterii, homicidii, idololatriæ, reum fore, quamcumque David, Solomon,” &c. “ Vel si cum illis in tantum scelus prolabatur, tum, uti David, ita sibi quoque pro rogatum iri vitæ tempus, usque dum serio penitentiam agens reconcilietur Deo. Cujusmodi omnimodam certitudinem negant infirmis expedire in hac vita,” &c. *Id.*, *ibid.*, in title of Thes. xii. pp. 748. b, 749. a.

<sup>s</sup> Corrected from MS.; “ he,” in orig. text.

<sup>t</sup> See above, § 27, 44.



wise, that a Christian, from the first instant of his conversion, should be able to say so; that whosoever is saved, before death must say so; out of the same confidence, knowing by faith that he is predestinate<sup>u</sup>: as it is mere frenzy once to imagine, so never did any of the fathers maintain.

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§ 50. Only, whereas the author of that preface, acknowledging that the Dominicans and Jansenians (who hold up the doctrine of St. Augustin concerning the grace of perseverance) suppose nevertheless them to be regenerate, that are not predestinate nor shall be saved, imputes it to “the abominable fictions of implicit faith, and the efficacy of the sacraments, in exhibiting and conveying the grace which they seal<sup>x</sup>;” I would not have him think the efficacy of baptism can be counted a fiction by any but feigned Christians. Of the sacraments I say nothing in this place: for I need not so much as suppose what a sacrament is; and whether baptism be a sacrament or not (though a thing no man questions), is nothing to my present purpose. That God contracteth with man for the promises of His Gospel upon condition of Christianity; and that this contract is not only solemnized but enacted by receiving baptism; is not now to be proved, having been done from the beginning of this Book. And he that would be free of that, which he contracteth for by his baptism, whereby he holdeth his title to all that the Gospel promiseth; would make that step to the renouncing of his Christianity. What “implicit faith” should

[Noise made in that preface to no purpose about implicit faith and the sacraments.]

<sup>u</sup> E. g. “Nostra est confessio, Christianum hominem non esse, qui non eadem fidei certitudine credit, et Christum esse Filium Dei, et se per Eum esse percepturum vitam æternam.” M. Bucer at the Conference of Ratisbon, as quoted by Forbes, *Consid. Mod., De Justif.*, lib. iii. c. 3. pp. 270 sq.: and see above, c. vii. § 7. notes h, k.

<sup>x</sup> “He (Didacus Alvarez) further proves at large, that the perseverance given to the Saints in Christ, is not a supplement of *helps* and *advantages*, whereby they may preserve it if they will; but such as causes them, on whom it is bestowed, certainly and actually so to do: and that in its efficacy and operation, it cannot depend on any free co-operation of our will, all the good acts tending to our perse-

verance, being fruits of that grace which is bestowed on us, according to the absolute unchangeable decree of the will of God. This indeed is common with this authour and the rest of his associates (the Dominicans, and present Jansenians) in these controversies, together with the residue of the Romanists, that having their judgments wrested by the abominable figments of *implicite faith*, and the *efficacy of the Sacraments* of the New Testament, *conveying* and really *exhibiting* the grace signified, or sealed by them; that they are enforced to grant, that many may be, and are regenerate, and made true believers, who are not predestinate, and that these cannot persevere, nor shall eventually be saved.” Owen, *Saints’ Persev.*, Pref. sign. F. 4.



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II.

pervert the understanding of doctors, whose faith is explicit in all matters of faith, I understand not: unless he mean to acknowledge,—that which is most true,—that there never needed any express decree of the Church in this point (as in other points questioned by Pelagius), because never any man held otherwise. If this be the “implicit faith,” which he means,—because the whole Church always held it but never decreed it;—I shall agree to it, but not that any Christian can be seduced by following it. Jovinian we read only of, confuted in this opinion by St. Jerom, not condemned by the Church; because he could never make it considerable, and so dangerous to the Church<sup>7</sup>. But, in very deed, “implicit faith” here signifies nothing; being only employed to make a noise, for a reason of that for which no reason can be rendered,—how that can be thought to be the sense of St. Augustin, which never any of his followers, all zealous of his doctrine in the matter of grace, could find in his writings. And, therefore, the whole Church before the Reformation, and since the Reformation all that adhere to the Confession of Augsburg, in this point are in the balance against Calvin and his followers.

[Sense of  
the Church  
of Eng-  
land.]

§ 51. As for the Church of England: if we consider matter of right, that is, what ought to be the sense of the Article, which alloweth penance, because men may cast off the Holy Ghost Which they have received; it is manifest, that the addition of “neither totally nor finally” is a gloss that destroys the text<sup>2</sup>. For that facility of returning to grace once received, which frequent custom, even of supernatural actions, disposeth men to, may remain, when the gift of God’s Spirit is forfeit. And though God may as well continue the assist-

<sup>7</sup> “Secunda propositio est, eos qui fuerint baptizati, a diabolo non posse tentari. Et ne hoc stulte dicere videretur, adjecit: Quicumque autem tentati fuerint ostendi eos aqua tantum et non Spiritu baptizatos, quod in Simone Mago legimus.” S. Hieron., Adv. Jovin., lib. ii. init.; Op., tom. iv. P. ii. p. 193.—See Bull, Apol. pro Harm., Sect. vii. § 21; Works, vol. iv. pp. 440, 441.

\* Dr. Reynolds, at the Hampton Court Conference in 1603, “mooved his Majesty, that the Booke of Articles of Religion . . . might be explained in places

obscure, and enlarged where some things were defective. For example, whereas Art. xvi. the words are these; ‘After wee haue received the Holy Ghost, we may depart from grace:’ notwithstanding the meaning be sound, yet he desired that, because they may seeme to bee contrary to the doctrine of God’s Predestination and election in the 17th Article, both these words might be explained with this or the like addition, ‘Yet neither totally nor finally;’ and also,” &c. Barlow, Summe and Substance of the Hampton Court Conference, p. 24. 4to. Lond. 1625.

ance of it, totally forfeited, as He did first give the help of it : yet is all title to the promises of the Gospel totally forfeit; and that finally, to those whom God hath not appointed the grace of perseverance : whom had He cut off at another time, they had been saved, according to St. Augustin. Besides, making justifying faith to consist in trust in God, according to the Article and Homily<sup>a</sup>, it will be utterly unreasonable to imagine, that this trust, which is not attained but premising repentance, should not fail, when that repentance is recalled by sin. But, making it to consist in the trusty undertaking of baptism, according to the Service and Catechism<sup>b</sup>, it is a mere contradiction to imagine, that it can stand entire supposing such sin. This for the sense of the Church of England, in point of right. In point of fact; as there have been always those, that have understood the Article according to that gloss which destroyeth the text, so is that force, whereby they have prevailed to destroy the Church of England withal, no means to prevent the damnation of their souls, that give themselves up to be taught according to it.

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## CHAPTER XXXII.

HOW THE FULFILLING OF GOD'S LAW IS POSSIBLE, HOW IMPOSSIBLE, FOR A CHRISTIAN. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN. WHAT LOVE OF GOD AND OF OUR NEIGHBOUR WAS NECESSARY UNDER THE OLD TESTAMENT. WHETHER THE SERMON IN THE MOUNT CORRECT THE FALSE INTERPRETATION OF THE JEWS, OR ENHANCE THE OBLIGATION OF THE LAW. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MATTER OF PRECEPT AND MATTER OF COUNSEL ; AND THE PERFECTION OF CHRISTIANS.

IF it be the mark of a good resolution, that it assoileth all difficulties incident to the question that is resolved; I shall not doubt, that this will prove such, by the ready means which it furnisheth to resolve those endless disputes which depend upon the premisses : as, in the first place, whether it is possible for the regenerate to fulfil the law of God in this

How the fulfilling of God's law is possible, how impossible, for a Christian.

<sup>a</sup> See above, c. xxx. § 16.

<sup>b</sup> See above, c. xxx. § 16, note q : and c. iv. § 17.

BOOK life, or not. For, supposing that which hath been said, the  
 II. resolution is unavoidable:—that, if we consider the original  
 law of God (which, under the Gospel, continueth the rule of  
 that righteousness which we owe), it is not possible, that  
 man, coming into the world with his original concupiscence,  
 should fulfil it by doing every thing according to it; but, if  
 we consider the terms of the covenant of grace (which is the  
 law, by which God hath declared that He will proceed with  
 all them that are under it), that no man can be saved but by  
 fulfilling it. The reason is clear on both sides. For, seeing  
 that original concupiscence remains in them who are rege-  
 nerate by grace, and that it is confessed on all hands that  
 by the means thereof all do commit sin, either there is no  
 law of God which that sin breaks (and so it is no sin, which  
 we suppose to be sin), or that law is not fulfilled which that  
 sin violateth. On the other side, if God, of His grace, in  
 consideration of our Lord Christ and His merits and suffer-  
 ings, hath declared Himself ready to accept of all them, that  
 return to Him by true repentance, and serve Him in the  
 profession of Christianity with that new obedience which it  
 requireth: either the Gospel is false, which tendereth remis-  
 sion of sins and everlasting life upon condition of this new  
 obedience; or whosoever fails not of the condition, cannot  
 come short of fulfilling of that law.

[How God  
 obligeth  
 Himself to  
 pass by the  
 failures  
 and weak-  
 nesses of  
 Chris-  
 tians.]

§ 2. For every contract is, by the nature thereof, a law  
 to the parties that make it. And though the covenant of  
 grace, according to which our Lord Christ will judge, is  
 merely God's law, because He chooseth the terms upon  
 which He enacteth it with those<sup>c</sup> that are baptized (and,  
 declaring them, becomes engaged to stand to them, before  
 man engageth): yet He becomes further engaged by our  
 embracing the terms which He proposeth; and much more,  
 by our endeavours, in forcing our natural weakness and  
 crookedness to perform what we undertake, and by the per-  
 formance which these endeavours produce. And if, among  
 civil men, friendship long exercised suffer not a man that  
 stands upon his credit to break upon ordinary offences: we  
 see the reason, why God so often helps His ancient people

<sup>c</sup> Corrected from MS. ; "these," in orig. text.

in respect of that covenant, which they for their parts had made void and forfeit; and, therefore, how much more He C H A P.  
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286 obligeth Himself to pass by those failures and weaknesses, which Christians endeavour to overcome, and cannot fully do it.

§ 3. It is indeed most manifest, that the Gospel requireth of Christians the full innocence and holiness of paradise; all that the first Adam was created to, because created in it. But it is manifest also, that they, who undertake to be Christians, come into the world with concupiscence: and therefore cannot undertake never to sin; though they may undertake to persecute and to crucify their own inclination to sin, and to deny themselves things otherwise lawful, when they find themselves subject thereby to be seduced to sin. And it is likewise manifest, that our Lord Christ, Who shall judge all men according to their works, shall not judge the works of Christians according to that which they might have done, had not Adam failed, but according to that which every one in his estate may attain to in the performance of his Christianity. Here is then the ground, why those things, that are done against the rule which the Gospel proposeth, out of invincible ignorance or out of mere surprises of concupiscence (though, for the matter of them, contrary to that law which the Gospel enacteth for the rule of their actions), cannot, by the Gospel, be imputed to Christians, striving toward that perfection which Christianity importeth. For those, who do not study to mortify the concupiscence, whereby they have been seduced to sin; to watch over their thoughts, whereby they knew they may be seduced to sin; cannot be understood so to do. And, therefore, though sins of invincible ignorance, and upon mere surprise of concupiscence, are sins against the original law of paradise, and the directive part of Christ's law, which revives it: yet are they not sins against the covenant of grace, contracted upon supposition of original sin; nor against the vindicative part of Christ's law, according to which He will judge Christians. [How far the fulfilling of the law is required by the covenant of grace.]

§ 4. Certainly, it is a gross inconvenience, to acknowledge any thing to be sin, which no law of God forbids. That venial sin should be beside the law of God but not against [Distinction between sins against God's law

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—  
and against  
the cove-  
nant of  
grace.]

it<sup>d</sup>, would make it no sin; which nothing but the transgression of the law determineth (1 John iii. 4, Rom. iv. 15). For why is any thing sin, but because it ought not to be done? Or why ought it not to be done, but because it is God's will that it should not be done? Or what would God have done, that is not a law to His creature? Therefore all sin transgresseth that will, whereby God would not have that done, which it, doing, transgresseth His law. On the other side, how clearly agreeth it with the goodness of God, how necessarily followeth it upon that grace which His Gospel publisheth; that those, who are called to it, supposing them obnoxious to that concupiscence, which will certainly induce them to sin notwithstanding the grace whereby they are regenerate, should neither forfeit their estate in it by every sin which they commit, nor by any sin which they forsake by timely repentance? Therefore; how exact soever that obedience is, which the Gospel requireth at our hands; so long as it leaveth him, that returneth by repentance from that sin whereby he faileth of it, right of being re-estated in his reconcilment with God; it is manifest, that his estate in the promises of the Gospel is not forfeit by falling into sin, but by persevering in it. How much more, when it is acknowledged on all hands, that there are in the world so many means to divert our minds from the true end and rule of our doings, so numberless snares for our inclinations (naturally biassed towards that which seemeth best for the present); that no Christian can keep an exact account of the occasions, whereby he findeth himself to fail of that righteousness which he aimeth at: how much more, I say, is it to be presumed, that the grace of the Gospel reacheth further than any man's repentance, and in consideration of

<sup>d</sup> "Quærunt autem hic theologi Ecclesiæ Romanæ, An peccatum veniale sit contra Dei legem, an vero tantum præter Dei legem. Et quidem sunt inter eos multi qui existimant peccatum veniale non tam esse contra legem quam præter legem, et in eo constituunt discrimen peccati mortalis et venialis, quod mortale sit contra legem, veniale solum præter legem. Quæ est Bellarmini sententia lib. i. De Amiss. Gratiæ et Statu Peccati cap. 11. in Explicatione quinti Argumenti" (Con-

trov., tom. iii. p. 73. D). "Alii vero censent tam veniale quam mortale peccatum esse contra Dei legem; quam sententiam tenet Vasquez, tom. 1. in 1. 2, disp. cxliii. cap. 3" (§ 4—6. pp. 931. b, 932. a). Le Blanc, Theol. Theol., Thes. de Distinct. Peccat. in Mortale et Veniale, P. i. § xxiv. p. 320. —"Illud (mortale peccatum) cum caritate, quæ vita est animæ, pugnat; hoc (veniale) non tam contra, quam præter caritatem est." Bellarmine, as just quoted.



our Lord Christ accounteth not that to be a breach of covenant, which only the general study of new obedience extinguisheth. C H A P.  
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§ 5. In this consideration, if any man will say<sup>e</sup>, that some sins are venial, others mortal, in regard of those terms of reconcilment with God, which the Gospel proposeth (which as no sin voideth if repentance follow, so those sins which the present weakness of our mortal nature cannot easily avoid, must not be thought to infringe); he shall say no more, than the Gospel of Christ will warrant by necessary consequence. But whether any sin be originally venial by that first law of God, the transgression whereof it is; as it is manifest, that we are not enabled by the Scriptures to dispute (tending only to reveal by degrees God's purpose of dealing with man under sin, which the Gospel at last hath clearly set forth), so it is certain, that it no way concerns either my purpose or any man's salvation to determine.

§ 6. And this distinction of God's law is founded upon the express words of St. Paul (Rom. iii. 27); where he saith, that "glorying is excluded by the law of faith," not "by the [This distinction of God's law founded on Scripture.]

\* "Nonnulli sunt inter doctores Ecclesie Romanæ et quidem non infimæ notæ, qui docent omnia peccata juste a Deo morte æterna puniri posse; quod vero quædam eorum ad penam solummodo temporalem imputantur, nec mortis æternæ reatum in peccatum inducunt, et iccirco a peccatis mortalibus distinguuntur, id tribuendum esse Dei clementiæ atque indulgentiæ, quæ hac in parte toto Suo jure erga hominem uti non vult. Hæc est sententia Joannis Gerson. . . . His consentanea docet Joannes Roffensis. . . . Verum quum hæc sententia sub finem superioris sæculi ab aliquot theologis in Belgio teneretur et publice assereretur, singulari Bulla, cum multis aliis eorum assertionibus, damnata fuit tanquam erronea, a Pontificibus Pio V. et Gregorio XIII. Qua in Bulla inter multos alios articulos hunc quoque damnant, 'Nullum est peccatum ex natura sua veniale, sed omne peccatum meretur penam æternam: ut refert Bellarminus lib. i. De Amissione Gratiæ et Statu Peccati, c. 10. parag. Confirmatur' (Controv., to n. iii. p. 10'. B). "Unde est quod Schola Romana hodie communi con-

sensu contrarium statuit, viz. quædam peccata natura sua venialia esse, et non tantum ex Dei misericordia atque indulgentia; licet istud nondum habent pro fidei articulo, et re omnino certa et definita." Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. de Distinct. Peccati in Mortale et Veniale, P. i. § xi—xviii. pp. 318, 319.—"Wee say therefore that some sinnes are mortal and some veniall, not because some deserve eternity of punishment and others do not; for all deserve eternity of punishment; . . . but because some sins, either in respect of the matter wherein men do offend, or *ex imperfectione actus*, in that they are not committed with full consent, exclude not grace, the roote of remission and pardon, out of the soule of him that committeth them; whereas other, either in respect of the matter . . . or the full consent wherewith they are committed, cannot stand with grace. See that, contrary to Bellarmine's position, no sin is venial in its own nature, without respect had to the state of grace." Field, Of the Church, Append. to Bk. iii., c. 9. p. 277.

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law of works:" and St. James (ii. 12); "So speak ye and so do ye, as those that shall be judged by the law of liberty." For those terms which God hath proposed to Christians, whom He hath freed from sin, are that very law of Christianity, whereby those that are so freed shall be judged, whether they have walked in the freedom to which they were called or not; the original law, which differenceth good from bad, being set aside as to the purpose of giving sentence by it. And upon these terms, whosoever dieth in the state of God's grace, fulfilleth God's law, obtaining the promise which the Gospel tendereth by fulfilling the condition which it requireth.

[Of the question in the schools, whether a Christian can live without sin by grace.]

§ 7. But whereas it is further questioned among the school doctors, whether, according to the ordinary measure of God's Spirit which the Gospel bringeth, it is possible for the regenerate to live without sin; and that, distinguishing whether without mortal sin or whether without venial sin<sup>f</sup>: (because I have allowed the distinction in some sense, and to some purpose;) having already answered that which was necessary to be satisfied, I am not solicitous of the rest.

[Determination of the Church and of the fathers.]

§ 8. The Church supposed the faith secured; when it was resolved against Pelagius, that the law is not to be fulfilled without the grace of Christ<sup>g</sup>. For the rest: St. Augustin<sup>h</sup> was

<sup>f</sup> See Le Blanc, *Theol. Theol.*, *Theol.* An et Quatenus Homo per Christi gratiam legem implere possit, § xl. sq. pp. 567—569: and Forbes, *Consid. Mod.*, *De Justif.*, lib. iv. c. 3. pp. 338, sq.: and Field, *Of the Church*, *Append.* to Bk. iii. c. 11. pp. 293, sq.

<sup>g</sup> See above, c. xix. § 19; and c. xxv. § 10. note p.

<sup>h</sup> "Nam qui dicunt esse posse in hac vita hominem sine peccato, non est eis continuo incauta temeritate obsistendum. Si enim esse posse negaverimus, et hominis libero arbitrio, qui hoc volendo appetit, et Dei virtuti vel misericordiae, Qui hoc adjuvando efficit, derogabimus. Sed alia quæstio est, utrum esse possit; alia utrum sit: alia, si non est cum possit esse, cur non sit; alia, utrum qui omnino nunquam ullum peccatum habuerit, non solum quisquam sit, verum etiam potuerit aliquando esse vel possit. In hac quadripartita propositione quæstionum si a me quærat, utrum homo sine peccato

possit esse in hac vita, confitebor posse per Dei gratiam et liberum ejus arbitrium," &c. "Si autem quod secundo loco posueram, quærat, utrum sit, esse non credo." S. Aug., *De Peccat. Meritis et Remissione*, lib. ii. c. 6. § 7, 8; *Op.*, tom. x. pp. 43. D—44. B.—"Non tamen ibi esse quæstionem, sed in ipsa non peccandi possibilitate contendit, in qua nec nos adversus eum certare opus est. Nam neque illud nimis curo, utrum fuerint hic aliqui, vel sint, vel esse possint, qui perfectam, cui nihil addendum esset, habuerint, vel habeant, vel habituri sint caritatem Dei (ipsa est enim verissima, plenissima, perfectissimaque justitia): quoniam id, quod voluntate hominis adjuvata per Dei gratiam fieri posse confiteor et defendo, quando vel ubi vel in quo fiat, nimium certare non debeo." *Id.*, *De Nat. et Gratia cont. Pelag.*, c. xlii. § 49; *ibid.*, p. 148. C, D.—"De B. Augustini et quorundam aliorum, sed paucorum, Patrum sententia super

tender of denying, that a Christian may live without sin by grace;—for what may it not do?—yet could have no good opinion of him, that should think himself the man that lives without sin. St. Jerom, with many of the fathers<sup>l</sup>, found it an inconvenience to grant, that God commandeth impossibilities, and therefore punisheth that, which a man must needs do; and yet he makes difficulty to grant, that a man may live without sin<sup>k</sup>.

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hac re, multum inter doctiores theologos contenditur: ille enim acerrimus aliqui Pelagii oppugnator, pacis tamen Ecclesiæ studiosissimus, . . disse-reus ubi fuerit sinus Abrahæ cum Pelagio, de potentia per gratiam Christi absque peccato vivendi contendere nolebat, utut neminem qui id fecisset, ostendi posse putaret (vide lib. ii. De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, cap. 6. § 7 et 8. Op., tom. x. pp. 43. D, 44. E: et Lib. de Natura et Gratia contra Pelagium, cap. 60. § 70; *ibid.*, p. 157. E: et De Spiritu et Litera, cap. i. § 1. *ibid.*, p. 85. B, et cap. ii. § 3.” *ibid.*, pp. 86. B, 87. A: “et libro De Sancta Virginitate, c. 50. § 51. Op., tom. vi. p. 366. E). Immo libro De Natura et Gratia (cap. 42. § 49; Op., tom. x. p. 148. C), a potentia ad actum progressus, diserte affirmat, se non velle acriter contendere, an sit aliquis, qui ad eam justitiæ perfectionem hic perveniat, ut sit sine peccato, quanquam non esse ei verius videatur: ‘Nam neque illud,’ inquit, ‘nimis curo, utrum fuerint hic aliqui,’ &c. Vide etiam, ut sæpe notatum est, cap. 60. (§ 70; Op., tom. x. p. 157. E), et 63. (§ 74. p. 159. D), libri de Natura et Gratia; et De Gestis Concilii Palæstini (scil. De Gestis Pelagii ad Aurelium, cap. 7. § 20. Op., tom. x. p. 202. D—G; et cap. 11. § 26. p. 205. G); et De Peccato Originali (lib. ii. cap. 11. § 12; *ibid.*, p. 258. A): vide et Epistolam (95, nunc 177) ab Episcopis quinque Africanis, quorum unus Augustinus, ad Innocentium Papam missam, in qua fatetur (haud procul a fine,” § 16, Op., tom. ii. p. 627. F), “esse viros Catholicos, quibus non videretur a veritate alienum, esse, qui per gratiam legem Dei sine peccato præstare valeant in hac vita; atque hos, si errent, ‘tolerabilius’ sane ‘errare’ dicunt, quam Pelagium (§ 16. p. 627. F); ‘diligentius hoc pertractandum,’ &c., ‘nec diabolicam impietatem sed errorem humanum esse, elaboranda et optanda affirmare, etiamsi’ is, ‘quod

affirmat, non possit ostendere; id enim,’ inquiunt, ‘credit fieri posse, quod certe laudabile est velle. Nobis autem sufficit, quod nullus in Ecclesia Dei fidelium reperitur in quolibet propectu excellentiaque justitiæ, qui sibi audeat dicere, non necessariam peccationem Orationis Dominicæ, Dimitte nobis, &c., et dicat se non habere peccatum,’ &c., ‘quamvis jam sine querela vivat’ (§ 18. p. 628. D, E).” Forbes, *Consid. Mod.*, De Justif., lib. iv. c. 3. § 4. p. 340.—“Augustini hac de re sententiam rigidiores Protestantes (inter quos P. Molinæus et Davenant) non satis recte explicant, cum affirmant, Augustinum, quando concedit hominem posse esse sine peccato, ac legem Dei perfecte implere per Dei gratiam, hoc tantum velle, Deum posse, si etiam vellet, alicui istam gratiam in hoc sæculo præstare, neminem tamen inveniri, cui eam præstet: Augustinus enim locis multis citatis non tantum simpliciter affirmat, ‘hominem posse esse sine peccato per gratiam, si voluntas ejus non desit, ope Divina adjuvante,’ ut loquitur (De Spiritu et Litera cap. 1. § 1. Op., tom. x. p. 85, B); sed etiam, licet ei probabilius videatur neminem esse sine peccato, tamen se nolle id cum contentione negare profitetur.” *Id.*, *ibid.*, § 5. p. 342.—And see Voss., as quoted below in note n.

<sup>l</sup> See quotations in Voss., as quoted below in note n, *Anth.* vi. pp. 719. a—720. a.

<sup>k</sup> “Potest, inquit, esse sine peccato, potest esse perfectus si voluerit. Quis enim Christianorum non vult esse sine peccato, aut quis perfectionem recusat, si sufficit ei velle; et statim sequitur posse, si velle processerit? Nul-lusque Christianorum est, qui nolit esse sine peccato: omnes ergo sine peccato erunt, quia utique omnes cupiunt esse sine peccato. Et in hoc ingratus teneberis, ut quia nullum aut rarum quemquam sine peccato proferre potes, omnes sine peccato esse posse

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II.  
[Of the  
Council of  
Trent: and  
Andreas  
Vega.]

§ 9. The Council of Trent decrees, sess. vi. can. xviii.: "*Si quis dixerit, Dei præcepta, homini etiam justificato, et sub gratia constituto, esse ad observandum impossibilia, anathema esto*"—"If any man affirm, that the commandments of God are impossible for a man, that is justified and in the state of grace, to keep; let him be anathema<sup>l</sup>." Thus an opinion when Pelagius was condemned, becomes an article of faith by the Council of Trent. But my opinion is not pressed by the decree. For, having excepted invincible ignorances, and mere surprises of concupiscence, because the Gospel supposes concupiscence, the commandments of God may be possible; and yet not possible for a man, whose intentions are distracted about many, to avoid all sin. And it follows in the decree of the council, can. xxii.: "*Si quis hominem semel justificatum dixerit . . . posse, in tota vita, peccata omnia etiam venialia vitare, nisi ex speciali privilegio, quemadmodum de beata Virgine [Maria] tenet Ecclesia; anathema sit*"—"If any man say, that a man once justified may avoid all even venial sins through all his life, unless by special privilege, as the Church holdeth of the blessed Virgin; let him be anathema<sup>m</sup>." What Church holdeth that the blessed Virgin never sinned, I know not. That the Catholic Church holds it not, is evident by the opinions of doctors of the Church to the contrary; which you shall find, with the rest which I have alleged in this point, in Vossius his collections *Historiæ Pelagianæ* libro v. parte 1.<sup>n</sup> But Andreas Vega, who main-

fatearis. Possibilia, inquit, mandata dedit Deus. Et quis hoc negat? Sed quomodo hæc intelligenda sit sententia, vas electionis apertissime docet; ait enim, 'Quod erat impossibile Legis,' &c.; 'et iterum, 'Ex operibus Legis non justificabitur omnis caro.' Quod ne de lege Moysi tantum dictum putes, et non de omnibus mandatis, quæ uno legis nomine continentur, idem Apostolus scribit, dicens, 'Consentio enim legi Dei,' &c. S. Hieron., Epist. xliii. Ad Ctesiph. adv. Pelagianos; Op., tom. iv. P. ii. p. 480.—'Pudeat ergo eos principum et sociorum suorum, qui aiunt, posse hominem sine peccato esse si velit, quod Græci dicunt ἀναμάρτητον.' Id., ibid., p. 475.—So also, Dial. adv. Pelag., lib. i. ibid., pp. 487, 488: arguing against the Pelagians' assertion, that "posse hominem in per-

petuo esse sine peccato si velit."—See Voss., as quoted below in note n.

<sup>l</sup> Labb., Concil., tom. xiv. p. 766. B, C. De Justificatione.

<sup>m</sup> Ibid., pp. 766. E, 767. A.—"Si quis" &c. "dixerit amplius peccare non posse, nec gratiam amittere, atque ideo eum qui labitur et peccat, nunquam vere fuisse justificatum; aut contra posse in tota vita," &c.

<sup>n</sup> Hist. Pelag., lib. v. P. i. Quæ est de Imperfectione hominis in hac vita; Op., tom. vi. pp. 706—723.—"Catholicorum vero, tam eorum qui ante Pelagium quam qui ejus tempore vel postea vixerunt, sententia istæc fuit, neminem virtute naturæ implere legem: neminem per gratiæ vires transgisse vitam omnem sine peccato: neminem ad eum pietatis et sanctimonix gradum pervenisse in hac vita, ut omne



tains stiffly, that a Christian may live all his life without sin,<sup>o</sup> CHAP. XXXII.  
will have much ado to shelter himself from this anathema.

§ 10. Thus far, then, I quarrel not the Council of Trent. [Of the 2nd Council of Orange.]

omnino peccatum longissimo tempore evitaret. Nec negare poterant, perfectionem quibusdam tribui in Scripturis: sed dicebant, eam non fuisse a virtute naturæ, sed gratiæ: nec per omnem vitam, imo nec ullo vitæ tempore, fuisse plenam, et omnibus numeris absolutam; sed quæ crescere posset et operibus malis misceretur. Hoc est, ut vulgo dici solet, partium, non graduum perfectionem." Voss., *ibid.*, title of *Anth.* I. p. 707. a.—"Catholici negabant, ita sanctos esse laudandos, vel efficaciam baptismi ita extollendam esse, ut perfectionis honos, qui (præterquam Christo) homini convenit nemini, sive vita tota sive post seriam conversionem, ullis dicatur hominibus cum Christo fuisse communis. Aliquis tamen de Maria dissensus erat: quam nonnulli ex hoc numero excipiebant; ac fortasse nec Augustinus ipse ab hac sententia abhorrebat, quamquam certi aliquid de eo statuere non auderet." *Id.*, *ibid.*, title of *Anth.* ii. p. 710. b.—"Si Pelagius, Catholicorum more, gratiæ vocabulum intelligeret, et hoc solum se velle diceret, non quidem nativitate ipsa posse hominem vivere sine peccato, sed a conversione sua, vel statim, vel paulatim, ad tantam posse perfectionem pervenire, ut sine peccato vivere semper valeat: Catholicorum non pauci (nec enim constantes in eo sententiæ eorum fuerunt) sic quoque erraturum Pelagium dicebant: sed tamen tolerabilem fore hunc errorem: partim quia idem senserint aliqui doctores Ecclesiæ: partim quia non admodum periculosum videatur, putare, illud hominem posse, quod præclarum est velle." *Id.*, *ibid.*, title of *Anth.* v. p. 715. b.—"Patres vero, quibus cum Pelagio negotio esset, fateri volebant, Deum impossibilia præcepisse. De Augustino non mirum, qui hominem putaret per gratiam Dei sine peccato vivere posse, ut nemo, qui id fecisset, posset ostendi. At magis mirum de Hieronymo et aliis; qui negarent, in cujusquam esse potestate, ut longo tempore vivat absque peccato. Tamen illi etiam concedebant, Deum non præcepisse impossibilia." *Id.*, *ibid.*, title of *Anth.* vi. p. 718. b.

<sup>o</sup> "Cum hæc tamen incontroverta sint et esse debeant inter Catholicos, illud discutiendum superest, . . . an in po-

testate sit nostra vitare singula et omnia venialia, non tantum pro aliquo parvo vitæ tempore, sed etiam pro tota vita. Hujus autem quæstionis enodatio explanationem requirit duplicis potestatis vel impossibilitatis, quæ communiter ponitur ab scholasticis. Quædam enim dicuntur moraliter possibilia seu impossibilia, alia logice seu metaphysice. Et moraliter ea dicuntur possibilia, quæ sæpe et sine magna difficultate fieri possunt. Contra vero impossibilia moraliter dicuntur, quæ fieri non possunt nisi rarissime et cum magna difficultate. . . . Logice vero seu metaphysice possibilia dicuntur, quæ utcumque fieri possunt; et e contrario impossibilia, quæ nullo modo. Porro si de nuda potentia nostræ libertatis sit quæstio, certum fecerunt Aug. et Hieron. et alii nobiles auctores, . . . neutro modo subesse nostræ potestati vitare omnia venialia. . . . Si vero de potentia nostræ libertatis ope Divina subnixæ tractemus, secundum legem communem constitutissimum omnibus crediderim esse debere, neminem quantumcumque justum, excepta Deipara Virgine, posse aut potuisse moraliter tota vita cuncta devitare venialia." Andreas Vega, Trident. Decret. De Justificatione Expos. et Defens., lib. xiv. c. 20: p. 577. b. Complut. fol. 1564.—"Sive tamen," &c.; "si de potentia dialectice aut metaphysice disputemus, et quid absolute in nostra situm sit potestate pro auxilium et gratiam Dei inquiramus, simpliciter crediderim posse nos per opem et favorem Dei et omnia singula peccata tota vita devitare. . . . Asserimus, posse hominem cum Dei gratia vitare omnia peccata, quantum est ex parte suæ libertatis et gratiæ Divinæ, etiamsi hoc non sit possibile per solas liberi arbitrii vires. Quoniam autem hoc novum et durum plerisque videbitur, sicut et mihi sæpe visum est," &c. *Id.*, *ibid.*, c. 21. p. 578. b.—In c. 25 (*ibid.*, pp. 589. b.—591. b), Vega endeavours to reconcile his doctrine with the decree of the Council of Trent, confessing that "ipse per se canon satis aperte militat contra nos, et palam videtur opponi sententiæ quam tuemur" (*ibid.*, p. 589. b). And see Forbes (§ 7. p. 350) and Field (pp. 296, 297), as quoted above in § 7. note f.



BOOK  
II.[“*Hoc etiam.*”]

And those, who have the second council of Orange at their 288 fingers' ends whensoever the absolute efficacy of grace is questioned, will be ashamed to refuse the last canon of it: which saith; “*Hic etiam secundum fidem Catholicam credimus, quod, accepta per baptismum gratia, omnes baptizati, Christo auxiliante et cooperante, quæ ad salutem [animæ] pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare voluerint, adimplere*”—“Here also we believe according to the Catholic faith, that all that are baptized, having received grace by baptism, may and ought to fulfil those things which belong to their salvation, if they will faithfully labour it<sup>p</sup>.” Which is no more than to say, that they have sufficient grace to preserve them from falling away; or from falling into those sins, which forfeit the state of grace: though I easily yield, this possibility is rather natural than moral; and that, considering the many opportunities and provocations even to those sins, which the occasions of the world present the inclinations of concupiscence with, it is in the judgment of discretion impossible, that a man should not forfeit the state of grace; though absolutely there is nothing to enforce, that it must necessarily come to pass.

[State of those who have fallen into presumptuous sin.]

§ 11. And truly the prophet David's prayer,—to be “cleansed from secret sins,” but to be preserved “from presumptuous sins” (Psalm xix. 12, 13),—shews difference enough between the kinds: but the obtaining of this prayer, not to fall into any presumptuous sins, depends upon that diligent watch, which even the regenerate may neglect to keep over themselves. Now, for him that shall have committed this forfeit, though the promise of the Holy Ghost and the habitual assistance thereof is thereby void, yet the knowledge of Christianity, that is, the obligation and matter of it, and that facility of living the life of a Christian which custom leaves behind it, remaining; the actual assistance of the Holy Ghost, which always accompanieth the preaching of the Gospel, cannot be wanting, where so great effects of it are extant, to procure the recovery of him that is fallen away. Whether they shall take effect or no, it is in the justice and mercy of that providence, which only maketh

<sup>p</sup> Concil. Arausic. II. (A.D. 529), can. 25. et ult.; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. p. 1672. A.

them effectual. The wisdom of God, which “shall laugh at the calamities, and mock when the fears of them come,” that “refuse” when it “calls,” and “regard not” when it “stretcheth out hands” (Prov. i. [24, 26]), representeth the condition of those that forfeit the promise, exceedingly terrible; in that they are fallen under God’s mere mercy: though it be granted, that they want not sufficient helps to restore them, till they be come to the end of their race.

§ 12. But, in very deed, the hardest of this point is, to give account how this holds under the old Law: how any man could be saved by fulfilling that Law, which the Gospel declares to be taken away because no man could be saved by fulfilling it.

§ 13. To which my answer must be (according to the supposition premised concerning a twofold sense of Moses’ law<sup>q</sup>; that is to say, a twofold law of God, under the Old Testament); that it is no marvel, if the civil happiness of God’s ancient people (which the law of Moses, in the literal sense, tendered for the reward of it) were to be obtained by worshipping the only true God, and that civil conversation according to it, which [the<sup>r</sup>] people of their natural freedom were able to perform. True it is, indeed, which St. Peter says, Acts xv. 10; that “neither they nor their fathers were able to bear the burden” of Moses’ law: and that, for that reason, which not only Origen<sup>s</sup>, but divers others of the ancient fathers<sup>t</sup>, have alleged against the Jews, that there went so many scruples to the precise observation of it, as it

<sup>q</sup> See above, c. v. § 10.

<sup>r</sup> Corrected from MS.; “that,” in orig. text.

<sup>s</sup> “Carnem Legis sine dubio literam Legis dicit. Per literam namque infirmabatur Lex, ut non possit impleri. Quis enim impletet vel de Sabbato quod scriptum est: ‘Non te movebis de loco tuo in die Sabbatorum’ (quomodo enim fieri poterat, ut se aliquis penitus non moveret de loco suo in die Sabbatorum?): vel de legibus lepræ in stamine, vel in pariete, vel in pellicula exortæ, et mille alia in quibus secundum literam tanquam secundum carnem infirmata est Lex?” Origen., Comment. in Epist. ad Rom., lib. i. § 10; Op., tom. iv. p. 469. 1. A, B.—And see also, *ibid.*, lib. ii. § 9 (*ibid.*, p. 486. 1. C, D); and lib. vi. § 12 (*ibid.*,

pp. 588. 1. A—590. 2. B): and Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, lib. iv. c. 17 (*ibid.*, tom. i. p. 179).—See above, c. xxix. § 11. note o: Huet., Origenian., lib. ii. qu. xiv. § 2, in fin. Op. Origen., tom. iv. p. 241: Spencer, De Legib. Hebræor., lib. i. c. 14. vol. i. pp. 196 sq. Camb. 1727: and Grotius, ad Matth. xxiii. 4. and Acts xv. 10.

<sup>t</sup> E. g. S. Chrysostom, In Galat. c. v.; Op., tom. x. pp. 713. E, 714. A. ed. Montfauc.—So also Pseudo-Ambros., Comment. in Epist. ad Galat. iii. 10: in Append. ad Op. S. Ambros., p. 219. F.—And Tertullian (Adv. Marc., lib. ii. c. 18; Op., p. 391. A, B) speaks of the “sacrificiorum onera et operationum et oblationum negotiosas scrupulositates” of the Mosaic law.

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was not possible for any people in the world to overcome. For there being such variety of cases, incident to the observation of such variety of precepts, as no man could further be secured in, that he proceeded according to the will of God, than as the determination of those, whom God by the law of Deut. xvii. 8—12, xvi. 18, had referred it to, might secure him; and that always new cases must needs prevent new determinations: of necessity, the precise observation of Moses' law, even outwardly and in the literal sense, was in ordinary discretion a thing impossible. Which is effectual indeed to convince the Jews, that God never was so in love with their Law, as to accept them for precisely keeping of it, even in the world to come; but provided it for an outward and civil discipline, to countenance the inward godliness and righteousness of the heart, till He should think fit openly to enact it for the condition of the world to come. In the mean time, having tendered the Law for a condition by which they might hold the land of promise, it is manifest, that the obtaining of it depended not upon that precise observation of all scruples, which the nature of the subject rendered in human reason impossible; but that, in case they worshipped God alone, and observed the precepts of the Law with that diligence which a reasonable and honest man would use in that case, the promise must become due. Whereby the Law, in this sense, is a fit figure to represent, both the impossibility of God's original law, and the gentleness of that dispensation thereof, which the Gospel importeth.

[2. In its inward and mystical sense.]

§ 14. As for the inward and mystical sense of Moses' law: it is manifest, that the countenance which the Law gave true righteousness, by enforcing the worship of the only true God (together with so many acts of righteousness among men, and temperance, chastity, and sobriety) with temporal penalties; with the faith of the world to come, and the doctrine of spiritual righteousness of itself acceptable to God, received from the fathers, and maintained by the prophets and their disciples in all ages; maintained always a stock of such men, as God accepted of, even to the reward of the world to come. In whose condition, notwithstanding, we must observe a kind of limitation or exception to the temporal promises of the Law; not only at such time as the

people fell away from God to the worship of idols, but in regard of hypocritical governors, who, pretending zeal to God's laws of sacrifices and ceremonies and the promises of God due to them in that regard, under that colour took advantage sufficiently to abuse and oppress His poor people. For when these cases fell out, the prophets, whose office it was to reprove such things in God's name, and their disciples and followers, must needs fall under great persecution at these men's hands. So that their right in the land of promise turning to a sorry account of happiness for them, who of all men were the most severe observers of God's law; of necessity, the temporal promises thereof were supplied and made good to them by the hope of the world to come. Which (as Origen<sup>u</sup> wisely and ingeniously observes) if a man well consider, he shall find that flaw in the promises of the Old Testament to be as a chink, or breach in a wall, through which we may discern the light of the Gospel beyond it.

§ 15. For if the matter be rightly considered, it will appear, that these hypocritical governors of God's ancient people (which thought the promises of the Law for ever entailed upon themselves and their successors upon the observing of sacrifices and other ceremonies thereof, how little soever they minded the true intent and meaning of it) were the true predecessors of the Scribes and Pharisees in our Lord's time; and the prophets and their disciples, the forerunners of our Lord, and His apostles: and that both persecuted both upon the same score of account; the inward righteousness of the heart, which God only alloweth, being that which both preached and professed, though the former under that knowledge of God and of His will which the Law, the other, which the Gospel, advanceth. And this [is] the true and real ground, why they, and that which befel them under the Old Testament, do bear the figure of our Lord and His apostles, and that which befel them by the rulers of the Jews in the New: according to the words of our Lord, Matt. xxiii. 34—[39]; where He sheweth, that by crucifying Himself, and persecuting His disciples, they

[How the prophets, and those who persecuted them, were types of our Lord and His apostles, and the Scribes and Pharisees.]

<sup>u</sup> Cont. Cels., lib. vii. c. 18; Op., tom. i. p. 707. A—E: and see also c. 7. p. 699. A: and for the phrase “δὲ ὀπίσθας,” to express the discerning the

mystical sense through the letter of Scripture, see Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, lib. iv. c. 10; Op., tom. i. p. 167.

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do but fill up the measure of their fathers' wickedness. And St. Paul of the Jews to the same effect, 1 Thess. ii. 15, 16: "Who both killed the Lord Jesus, and their own prophets, . . . and please not God, and oppose all men; forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles, that they may be saved: for wrath is come on them to the end."

What love of God was necessary under the Old Testament.

§ 16. I say then, that, under that dim light of God's will which the saints of the Old Testament enjoyed, when the world to come was not yet covenanted for, nor the sayings and doings of our Lord Christ manifested, to invite to Christianity, it is necessarily consequent, that God should accept of that obedience under the Law, which, as it must come from a sincere heart and studious of pleasing Him, so must it needs come short of that perfection which the Gospel requireth. For, as I said before<sup>x</sup>, that love of God "with all the heart and all the soul and all the might," which the Law requireth, is limited by the precepts of the Law; which whoso observes with all the heart and so forth, must be thought to have performed that love, wherein then the observation of God's law consisted. As for the precept of "not coveting," of which St. Paul says (Rom. vii. 7—11), that he "had not known concupiscence, had not the Law said, Thou shalt not covet;" and St. Augustin<sup>y</sup> observes, that, being joined to the precept of loving God above all things, they comprise all Christianity: though all this be true according to the spiritual sense of the Law, yet, according to the letter, it cannot be denied, that the last precept of the decalogue forbiddeth only compassing that which is another man's; counting his wife in that number, because there was then means to compass another man's wife without breaking the Law, which allowed of divorces. And, therefore, this is the sense of that which followeth in St. Paul:—"Sin, taking

[Deut. vi. 5, x. 12, xxx. 6; Matt. xxii. 37; Mark xii. 30; Luke x. 27.]

[Exod. xx. 17; Deut. v. 21.]

[Rom. vii. 8—11.]

<sup>x</sup> Above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xii. § 8, 29—31.

<sup>y</sup> See above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xii. § 9. note h.—"In his, inquit, duobus præceptis tota Lex pendet et Prophetæ. Quidquid ergo Dei lege prohibemur, et quidquid jubemur facere, ad hoc prohibemur et jubemur, ut duo ista compleamus. Et forte generalis prohibitio est, Non concupisces; et generalis jussio, Diliges. Unde breviter et Apo-

stolus Paulus quodam loco utrumque complexus est. Prohibitio enim est, Nolite conformari huic sæculo; jussio autem, Sed reformamini in novitate mentis vestræ. Illud pertinet ad non concupiscere, hoc ad diligere; illud ad continentiam, hoc ad justitiam; illud ad declinandum malo, hoc ad faciendum bonum." S. Aug., De Perfect. Justitiæ Hominis, c. v. § 11; Op., tom. x. p. 171. D, E.



advantage, wrought in me all concupiscence by the commandment; for without the law sin is dead: but I once lived without the law; but, the commandment coming, sin revived and I died; and the commandment, which was to life, was found for me to death: for sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and so slew me:”—all this, I say, as the rest of that Epistle concerning the inability of the Law to bring us to righteousness, is to be understood of the outward and literal sense of the Law. To wit, that the Israelites, before they received the Law (and so, other men without the Law), understood not that it was a sin, but a piece of wit, to compass a man's wife or goods without violence, or to commit that uncleanness to which the Law had assigned no penalty. So, the Law being given, and having assigned no penalty to the transgression of this precept, was it marvel, that sin, prevailing over that conviction of the conscience which the precept tendered, should seduce a man to give way to concupiscence, and turn the precept that was given for life to his death? He then, that was not imposed upon with this slight of sin, but received the commandment as God's, Who hath other penalties in store than those which the Law assigneth: if, out of conscience to God, he observed the laws of His worship from the heart; if he kept all that, which not only the penalties assigned by the Law, but the will of God declared by the precept, convinced him to take hold of his conscience; is it not reason to conclude, that he fulfilled that measure of spiritual righteousness, which God for that time required of them, whom He assured of the world to come upon condition of such obedience? Which if it be so, that obligation to this righteousness, which was so declared under the Law, is that law of spiritual obedience, which God judgeth those by, whom for that time He accepted unto the reward of the world to come.

§ 17. As for the precept of loving our neighbour as ourselves: having shewed that it concerned only Israelites under the Law, I have also by the same means shewed<sup>z</sup>, that they were to detest the Gentiles as idolaters, that detestation being the means to keep them up to the service of God from falling away to idols; whereupon, as by the Law, he

And what  
love of our  
neighbour.

\* Above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xii. § 32—36.

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that fell from the Law, and seduced his kindred to do the like, was to find no manner of pity at the hand even of his brethren (Deut. xiii. 8), so also it is provided by the Jews' constitutions<sup>a</sup>, that they shall observe no rule of common equity in seeking evidence against such a one, to bring him to conviction, and to make him an example. And as for those hypocrites, which, under pretence of the outward and carnal observation of the Law, persecuted the preachers of true spiritual righteousness (the prophets of old, and our Lord and His apostles, who pretended to carry it unto the Gentiles, whom they [held<sup>b</sup>] themselves obliged to hate as having been once idolaters); it is visible, that those saints, who suffered persecution at their hands, did not find themselves tied to that measure, which the Gospel prescribeth, of praying for their enemies to the utmost. 291

[Of the  
curses in  
the Old  
Testa-  
ment.]

§ 18. This is seen in those curses, which David and Jeremy pursue their enemies with: the Gospel having prescribed for a general rule to all Christians, "Bless them that curse you" (Matt. v. 44, Luke vi. 28, Rom. xii. 14, 1 Pet. iii. 9, James iii. 9). I deny not, that herein they were figures and fore-runners of our Lord and His disciples; and their sayings, prophecies of the curses, that should overtake the people of the Jews, for persecuting them<sup>c</sup>: for I have shewed just now the ground, upon which this is to be received. But I challenge that ground also, which I settled at the beginning<sup>d</sup>;

<sup>a</sup> "Hujusmodi obstinatum traditionis oppugnatorem impune cujuslibet manu trucidari posse asserit (Moses Maimonides) in tract. Mamrim sive de Rebellibus, cap. 3; etiamsi nulli adfuerint testes, nullum judicii vel indicii præcesserit examen; hocque magni beneficii ac meriti loco ducit." Vorstius, in M. Maimon. Constitut. de Fundamentis Legis, c. ix. § viii. pp. 132, 133. 4to. Amst. 1638. Maimonides is treating in cc. viii.—x. of the Constitutions themselves, of the marks to discriminate a true and false prophet.

<sup>b</sup> Corrected from MS.; "hold," in orig. text.

<sup>c</sup> E. g. "Scatet hic Psalmus (Ps. lxi.) mysteriis; Christo convenit, non Davidi, proprie et plane; estque prophetia de Christi Passione et evectione, Judæorum rejectione," &c. Cocceius ap. Poli Synops. in Ps. lxi. argum.—"Psalmum hunc vaticinium esse

de Christo multa docent," scil. (inter alia), "imprecatio facta hostibus v. 23, 24, non Davidis, sed Christi, nempe Judæis, . . et Judæ proditori; . . Achitopheli autem nuspian hæc dicta sunt." Calovius, *ibid.*—St. Augustin explains such passages as prophetic: "Hæc facile solvuntur, quia et propheta per imprecationem quid esset futurum cecinit, non optantis voto sed spiritu prævidentis: . . prophetæ autem maxime solent figura imprecantis futura prædicere," &c.: "nec tamen de his verbis quisquam calumniatur nisi qui non sentit varietatem istam figurarum in loquendo nihil veritati rerum minuire, et plurimum addere affectibus animorum." (De Serm. Dom. in Monte sec. Matt., lib. i. c. 21. § 72; Op., tom. iii. P. ii. pp. 196. E—197. A.)

<sup>d</sup> Above, c. xvi. § 2; and Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xiii. § 26 sq.

that the mystical sense of the Scripture always supposeth a literal sense, and that these things cannot be understood to be fulfilled in our Lord Christ, but that first they must have been verified in the prophets themselves: in whom, as it is plain, that the persecutions, for which they curse, did come to pass, so plain it is, that their curses fell upon their persecutors. CHAP.  
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§ 19. For nothing can be more manifest, than that the prophet Jeremy first prayed for the people, that God would not destroy them: and when their sins were so great, that God would not hear him, but commanded him to publish their ruin; that they thereupon so hated and persecuted him, that his patience was overcome, and he prayed to God to punish their ingratitude to him with the judgments which he had denounced: Jer. vii. 16; xi. 14, 19, 20; xvii. 16—18; xviii. 18—23. [Jerem-  
miah.]

§ 20. And it is plain, that the case is the same with the prophet David; and that he, receiving evil for good of his enemies, thereupon proceeds to those prayers which he makes against them: Psalm xxxv. 11—14; lxix. 5, 8, 10—12, 22—29; cix. 3—20. [David.]

§ 21. And what is the difference between this and that of Elias? Of whom St. James (v. 17) says, that “he prayed that it might not rain, and it rained not for three years and six months:” so that, when he says (1 Kings xvii. 1), “There shall be neither dew nor rain upon the earth, but according to my word;” he speaks upon the obtaining of that prayer of his. For afterwards the rain came not till he prayed for it (1 Kings xviii. 42). Whereupon it follows in St. James; “And again he prayed, and the heavens gave rain, and the earth budded forth her fruit.” For by these things you see, that he prayed for judgment upon the land of Israel for refusing his prophecies; even as he executed it upon the prophets of Israel, 1 Kings xviii. 40. And is not the reason the same, when he destroys two captains of fifties with their bands, by praying for fire from heaven upon them, for taking in hand to execute the command of an idolatrous king, and coming to seize him (2 Kings i. 10, 12)? [Elias.]

§ 22. Is it not the same in his scholar and successor Elizeus, when he curses the children of Bethel for despising [James v.  
18.] [Elisha.]

BOOK II. of him, being a prophet of God; whereupon two and forty of them are destroyed with bears out of the forest: 2 Kings ii. 23, 24? For had these children been bred in the fear of the true God, and not under idolatrous parents, it cannot in reason be thought, that they would have reviled one of God's prophets; who were held in, and treated with, such reverence, even by the princes of his people.

[Samson.] § 23. And, truly, when Samson cast away his own life to do mischief to God's enemies and the enemies of his people, out of this express consideration, of being revenged upon them for putting out his eyes; can any man's heart be so hardened by misunderstanding the Scriptures, as to say that this can be reconciled with the principles of Christianity, which forbid all revenge? Jud. xvi. 28—31; Rom. xii. 19; Matt. v. 22, 38—48. It is said indeed<sup>e</sup>, that Samson did this as a figure of Christ; Who killed His enemies, the powers of darkness, by His death. And it is certainly true. But that will not answer the reason formerly alleged. Whether we say, that Samson's death was a figure of Christ's by the intent of Samson, or by the intent of God, Whose providence so ordered things to come to pass, that his death might figure Christ's death; it cannot be said, that the intent of figuring Christ's death could make that agreeable to God's law, which otherwise was not. Rather we are to advise, whether sinful actions, and not according to God's own law, were fit to figure

<sup>e</sup> "Fortasse poterimus dicere hæc in Veteri Testamento criminosa vel damnabilia non fuisse, quando quidem hoc quod dicebat vel agebat" (scil. Samson), "prophetia erat. . . Quid erat Samson? Si dicam, Christum significabat; verum mihi dicere videor." S. Aug., Serm. cccxiv. De Samsone, § 1, 2: Op., tom. v. pp. 1441. E, 1442. C.—"Christus autem a Judæis et comprehensus est et occisus: sed magis interficientes occidit. Adduxerunt ergo Eum inimici, ut illuderent Ei. Jam hic imaginem crucis adtendite. Expansas enim manus ad duas columnas, quasi ad duo ligna crucis extendit: sed adversarios Suos interemit oppressit, et Illius passio interfectio facta est persequentium. Et ideo Scriptura ita conclusit, 'Plures mortuus occidit, quam vivus occiderat.' Quod mysterium in Domino nostro Jesu Christo evidenter

impletum est." Id., *ibid.*, § 5. p. 1445. C, D.—This sermon is placed by the Benedictine editors among the better class of the Sermones Dubii.—Elsewhere St. Augustin takes the other ground mentioned in the text:—"Nec Samson aliter excusatur quod seipsum cum hostibus ruina domus oppressit, nisi quia Spiritus latenter hoc jusserat, Qui per illum miracula faciebat." Id., *De Civit. Dei*, lib. i. c. 21: Op., tom. vii. p. 21. C. And similarly, Cont. Gaudent. Donatist. Episc., lib. i. c. 31. § 39; Op., tom. ix. p. 657. B.—For the Jewish arguments in defence of Samson's self-murder, see Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, lib. ii. c. xix. sect. v. § 4. Grotius himself (*ibid.*, c. xx. sect. viii. § 3) defends his revenging himself on the ground of the natural right of self-defence.

292 Christ. Nor will it serve the turn to say, that he did it by the motion of God's Spirit; which we are indeed to allow, that the judges being prophets were endowed with<sup>f</sup>. For it is not to be said, that the Spirit of God moveth any man to do that, which the will of God declared by His law forbiddeth.

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§ 24. And, therefore, the fact of Razias (2 Mac. xiv. 37—46), though not undertaken with that confidence of doing mischief to God's enemies, which Samson had by the assurance of his being called to deliver God's people from them, yet, being done to deprive them of their pleasure they should have in insulting over God's people, destroying so faithful a servant of His, must needs be said to proceed from the same motive with Samson's: though I say not, therefore, that this can serve to prove that book of the Maccabees to be either canonical or otherwise<sup>g</sup>. Thus much, I conceive, is to be granted: that the Maccabees' taking arms for maintaining their religion and nation against the tyranny of Antiochus Epiphanes, is not to be condemned as against God's law; because we see them commended by the apostle (Heb. xi. 35—38): and yet, for Christians to take arms for the maintaining of themselves in the free exercise of their religion (much more, for the power of imposing of it upon others), is certainly contrary to the instructions of the apostles (Rom. xiii. 1—6, Titus iii. 1, 1 Pet. i. 13—17); as it appears by the practice of all the primitive Christians, who, maintaining themselves to be for number able to defend themselves by arms against persecution, maintain withal, that their profession did not allow them so to do<sup>h</sup>. And indeed, though the godly Jews endured death rather than renounce God's law (as the Christians afterwards), yet a man may see a great difference between the motives of their several sufferings: if he consider, that they died for the laws of their country (which the heathen themselves have reputed a due consideration for a man to part with his life for, though out of carnal self-love); how much more to obey God's law (Whom

[The fact  
of Razias  
in the Mac-  
cabees.]

<sup>f</sup> See above, note e; and c. xv. § 9. notes c, d.

<sup>g</sup> See Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xxxi. § 39. note e.—“Numquid melior est Razias quam Samson?” S. Aug., Cont. Gaudent. Donatist. Episc., lib. i.

c. 31. § 39; Op., tom. ix. p. 657. A: the question under discussion being the example of Razias.

<sup>h</sup> E. g. Tertull., Apol. c. xxxvii.; and Lib. ad Scap., c. ii.; Op., pp. 30. B, 69. D, 70. A.



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they maintained to be the only true God), by suffering death for the laws which He had given them? whereas Christianity requires to be maintained with our lives, though we become ignominious by the laws of our countries for maintaining it. Whereby we see, how true it is, that God allowed them some motives of temporal good, to invite them to undergo the hardship, which the profession of His laws should infer<sup>1</sup>: whereas from Christians He challenges the same constancy, when He allows no presumption of help in this world, no hope but that of the world to come.

[Temporal blessings and punishments held out under the Law.]

§ 25. Which is, indeed, another strong argument, that God accepted of a lower measure of obedience under the Law, than He requireth under the Gospel of Christians: because, forsooth, He always managed His ancient people (like babes, with the fear of the rod and the hope of cakebread, so) with the fear and hope of the blessings and punishments of this present world, habituating them to presume of His favour or disgrace according to the same. Let any man read the Book of Psalms, and consider throughout the whole tenor of it;—what presumptions of God's favour, those, who indited them by God's Spirit, do raise upon temporal deliverances; of His disgrace, upon the insultations of God's and their enemies;—and tell me, if it be according to the style of the Gospel, which alloweth only the assurance of God's providence for subsistence in this world, to persuade us to take up Christ's cross? Well then saith St. Paul (Rom. viii. 15): "Ye have not received any more the spirit of bondage to fear, but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby ye cry, Abba," that is, "Father." For those that are led with the hope of temporal promises (as all must necessarily be led under that law, which was established upon such), must needs be subject to fear of disgrace with God, whensoever their sins allowed not those promises to take place. So then, though they were then partakers of God's Spirit, as the prophet Ezekiel shews us (xxxvi. 27, xxxvii. 14, xxxix. 29), yet, inasmuch as it is called "the spirit of fear," there is due argument, that they were not partakers of that peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, which Christians after-

[2 Tim. i. 7: and see Rom. viii. 15.]

<sup>1</sup> So Volkel, *De Vera Relig.*, lib. ii. c. 21. p. 33. See above, cc. v. § 10. note h, and x. § 15.

wards were moved with to endure all persecution for the maintenance of their profession. But the apostle pointeth CHAP. XXXII.  
 293 us out further the source of this fear (Heb. ii. 14, 15); when he saith, that our Lord Christ “took part of flesh and blood, that by death He might abolish him that had the power of death, even the devil, and discharge all those, that through the fear of death were all their life long subject unto bondage.” For so long as the promises of this life ended in death, and the punishments thereof conducted to it, they, who knew that death came into the world upon the transgression of Adam, could not think themselves discharged of God’s wrath, so long as they found themselves liable to the debt of it. No marvel then, if the Spirit of God were “the spirit of fear” in them, who saw not as yet the kingdom of death dissolved by the rising of our Lord Christ from the dead.

§ 26. Another argument I make from the words of our Lord, when the disciples were ready to demand fire from heaven upon those Samaritans that received them not, after the example of Elias (Luke ix. 52—56): “Ye know not what spirit ye are of,” saith our Lord; “for the Son of man came not to destroy, but to save men’s lives.” Whereby He declareth, that, because the Gospel bringeth salvation, whereas the Law wrought wrath (as St. Paul saith) by tendering conviction of sin without help to overcome it (Rom. iii. 20, iv. 15, vii. 8—11), therefore God requireth under the Gospel of those, that are His, the spirit that seeketh only the good of them from whose hands they receive it not; whereas, under the Law, even His prophets revenged themselves of their enemies, by vengeance obtained at God’s hands. And, by this means, we have an answer for that difficulty, otherwise insoluble, in our Lord’s words of John Baptist (Matt. xi. 11): “Verily I say to you, there never arose among those that are born of women one greater than John the Baptist; but the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.” For if God under the Law required not of His prophets that perfection of charity, which the Gospel exacteth of all Christians; if in those things, which they said and did by God’s Spirit, they have not expressed it: well may it be said, that “the least” of all those, that belong to the Gospel in truth, which [How revenge allowed under the Law, forbidden under the Gospel.]

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here is called "the kingdom of heaven," is in a respect of so great concernment "greater" than the prophets of the Old Testament.

[Jael—  
Judith—  
Simeon.]

§ 27. As for the example of Jael the wife of Eber the Kenite, who, being in league with Jabin and Sisera, for the good of God's people, knocked him on the head, being retired into the protection of her house, and is commended for it by the Spirit of God in Deborah the prophetess (Judg. iv. 17—21, v. 24—28): the instance indeed is difficult enough. And they, that are so ready to condemn the fact of Judith<sup>k</sup> in cutting off Holofernes by deceit, and that by the example of her father Simeon, that spoiled and destroyed the men of Shechem contrary to covenant (Judg. ix. 2, Gen. xxxiv. 25), are not advised, how to come clear of it.

[Simeon  
and Levi.]

§ 28. Suppose there was just cause of hostility between them, a daughter of the house being dishonoured by the prince of that people (for among God's people their chastity was always as highly valued, as it was little regarded among idolaters); suppose, that they condescended to be circumcised, not for love to the true God, but for hope of increasing their own power and riches by bringing the Israelites under their government (as there is appearance enough in the words of Hamor, Gen. xxxiv. 20—22): yet, a league being enacted upon such a pretence, the zeal of Simeon and Levi in destroying those that were come under the covering of God's wings so far, very well figures the zeal of the Jews in persecuting the apostles, and not allowing the Gentiles any room of salvation by their own only true God. And, therefore, it is excellently observed by St. Jerom (*Tradit. Hebr. in Genesis*<sup>l</sup>), that the scribes were of the tribe of Simeon, as

<sup>k</sup> See above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xxxi. § 19, and § 38. note c.—The ordinary arguments against Judith's act, as above referred to, may be seen in Reynolds, Censur. Libb. Apocryph., Prælect. lxxiii. tom. i. pp. 846—867. 4to. Oppenh. 1611.—Grotius allegorizes the history, principally however on account of historical difficulties; as others, e. g. Rabanus (Comment. in Judith., Op., tom. iii. pp. 245, sq.), had done before him. Of Romanist Commentators, some, e. g. Serarius, defend her conduct without qualification; others,

as Lyranus, with much such qualification as that of Thorndike in the text.

<sup>l</sup> "Levi enim hæreditatem propriam non accepit, sed in omnibus sceptris paucas urbes ad habitandum habuit. De Simeon vero in libro Jesu scriptum est, quod et ipse proprium funiculum non fuerit consequutus, sed de tribu Juda quiddam acceperit. In Paralipomenon vero manifestius scribitur: quod quum multiplicatus fuisset, et non haberet possessionis locum, exierit in desertum. Quidam propheticæ interfectos homines, Apostolos; et sub-

the priests of the tribe of Levi; in whom the curse of Jacob by the Spirit of God detesting their fact (and prophesying the like to those their successors in the case of our Lord Christ and His apostles,—“I will divide them in Jacob, and scatter them in Israel;” Gen. xlix. 5—7), was evidently fulfilled in the mystical sense: the tribe of Levi for gathering of tithes, and the tribe of Simeon for employment of clerks and notaries, dwelling dispersed through all the tribes; as <sup>294</sup> Solomon Jarchi in his gloss upon the place<sup>m</sup> literally expoundeth it.

§ 29. But the case of Judith is the case of a stratagem in [Judith.] professed hostility; which, whether Christianity allow or not, certainly no law of nations disallows. And therefore, though she propose to herself the zeal of Simeon and Levi for the honour of their people, and the success they had against their enemies, yet, if we understand her not to commend the means by which they brought it to pass (to wit, by violating the public faith), we shall not find her contradict the Spirit of God, which by Jacob condemns them for it. C H A P.  
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§ 30. As for the fact of Jael, it is in vain to allege any mystical sense<sup>n</sup> to justify it, as some would do: unless we can undertake, that there was no such thing done in the way of historical truth; which, I suppose, no man will be so mad as to do. And, therefore, if any man will not believe, that

nervatum taurum a Pharisæis, Christum interpretantur.” S. Hieron., Lib. Quæst. Hebraic. in Genesim, in cap. xlix. 7: Op., tom. ii. p. 546.—Thorndike seems to have partly confused the comment of Solomon Jarchi (as quoted below in note m) with that of S. Jerom.

<sup>m</sup> “Dividam eos in Jacob—Separabo eos invicem, ne sit Levi in numero tribuum; et ecce illi (hoc modo) divisi erant. Alia explicatio: non erunt tibi pauperes scribæ et infantium doctores, nisi ex (tribu) Simeonis, ut sint dispersi; tribum autem Levi fecit (Jacobus) circumire per areas ad (colligendas) oblationes et decimas, hanc ejus dispersionem (Jacobus) dedit ei (tribui Levi) per modum honoris.” R. Solomon. Jarchi, Comment. Hebr. in Pentateuch. Mosis, Latine vers. &c. a J. F. Breithaupto, in Genes. xlix. 7; tom. i. pp. 374, 375. 4to. Gothæ 1710.

<sup>n</sup> “Quid est illa mulier plena fiducia hostis tempora ligno transfigens,

nisi fides Ecclesiæ, cruce Christi regna diaboli perimens?” S. Aug., Cont. Faust., lib. xii. c. 32; Op., tom. viii. p. 342. F.—So also Origen, In Lib. Judic. Homil. v. § 5; Op., tom. ii. p. 469. 1. F, 2. E; and S. Ambros., Lib. de Viduis, c. viii. § 48—50; Op., tom. ii. pp. 198. F, 199. C: and the unknown author of the tract De Promiss. et Prædict. Dei, P. ii. c. 17; inter Op. S. Prosper. Aquitan., tom. ii. p. 97. b.—See Serarius, in Judic. c. v. qu. xxxiii., pp. 139—141. Mogunt. 1609: but the fathers above quoted are not directly occupied in discussing the morality of the act.—Later commentators either defend Jael’s act *wholly* (as e. g. Serarius and Montanus), or, more commonly, make some similar distinction to that used by Thorndike in the text (as e. g. Magalianus, and Estius); but do not resort to the mystical sense in order to avoid the difficulty: see Poli Synops. ad loc.

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the Spirit of God in Deborah extols only the temporal benefit, which the people of God reaped by that fact of hers (for which she was always to be famous amongst them), leaving to herself the justification of her conscience; let him seek a better answer. But he, who, transgressing that charity that is fundamental in Christianity (and, therefore, without which no Christian can obtain the Spirit of God), shall make her example a motive to that, which he cannot justify even in God's ancient people<sup>o</sup>; though I allow him to mistake Christians for pagans and idolaters (whose professed enmity to God's people upon the account of religion was the ground of that revenge, which they were allowed then to pursue them with), yet I must not allow him to be a Christian, that teaches that wickedness, which a Jew dare not maintain: though it be just with God to suffer them, that presume of the assistance of God's Spirit in understanding the Scriptures before they be principled in Christianity (which the gift of God's Spirit to Christians presupposeth), to be led unto such wicked imaginations by reading the Scriptures; as He suffered those, that, setting up their idols in their hearts and putting the stumbling block of their iniquities before their faces, came to seek direction from God, to be seduced by the prophets by whom they should come to enquire, as the prophet threateneth (Ezek. xiv. 8—10).

[David and Hushai; and other similar cases.]

§ 31. As for the fact of David and Hushai in ruining of Absalom (2 Sam. xv. 32—37, xvi. 16—19, xvii. 5—14); there is the less difficulty in it, because we are not obliged to maintain the actions of the fathers to be without sin, and the Spirit of God doth no where commend it. Which also holds in those officious lies, wherewith Rebecca, and the midwives of the Israelites, and Rahab the harlot, seduced Isaac, and the king of Egypt, and the rulers of Jericho, to the good of God's people (Gen. xxvii. [6—13], Exod. i. 15—21, Josh. ii. 4, 5): because, whatsoever were the success which God blessed them with, yet (as St. Augustin<sup>p</sup> observes) it is no

<sup>o</sup> This allusion has not been traced. —Peter Martyr (Epist. Theol., ad calc. Loc. Commun., p. 1124. fol. Tigur. 1587), thus addresses Queen Elizabeth: "Age itaque nostrorum temporum sancta Debora, quempiam tibi adjungas pium Barac; . . . ne verearis

(conatus enim istos favore Deus non solet destituere) illum tecum habebis, ut *instar Jaelis*, mulieris fortissimæ, *Jabin* caput malleo tuæ potentie percutias, atque terræ unde ortum habuit infigas, quo pia tuæ genti molestus esse desinat."

<sup>p</sup> "Fortassis ergo, sicut de obstetri-



where said, that God blessed them for lying; but for that love to His people, which, though joined with their own weakness, He then rewarded. Though he, that well considers the nature of these acts (comparing them with those sayings and doings of David, and Jeremy, of Elias, Elizeus, and Samson, which I have shewed the Spirit of God alloweth), will without doubt find cause to believe, that the reason, why their acts, which were joined with such infirmities, were blessed by God at that time, is to be drawn from that measure of knowledge, which the means allowed by God at that time afforded; and the obligation which God required at their hands, proportionable to the same.

§ 32. From the premisses we may proceed to resolve that endless dispute concerning the intent of our Lord's Sermon in the Mount: whether it was to take away those false glosses, which the Scribes and Pharisees had put upon the law of Moses (importing, that nothing but the overt act of murder, adulteries, and the like, stood prohibited by it); or to enlarge it unto a further extent of forbidding the first motions of concupiscence, in regard of that further light which the Gospel bringeth'. For I have shewed, that the

Whether the Sermon in the Mount correct the false interpretation of the Jews, or enhance the obligation of the Law.

cibus diximus, non hoc in eis remuneratum quod mentitæ sunt, sed quod infantes Hebræos liberaverunt, ut propter hanc misericordiam illud peccatum veniale sit factum, non tamen existimetur non fuisse peccatum: sic etiam de Raab intelligendum est, remuneratam in illa liberationem exploratorum, ut propter eandem liberationem venia sit data mendacio. Ubi autem venia datur, manifestum est, esse peccatum." S. Aug., Quæst. in Levit., lib. iii. Qu. 68; Op., tom. iii. P. i. p. 520. C, D.—Elsewhere (e. g. De Mendacio, c. v. § 7: Op., tom. vi. p. 423. D—G; and Cont. Mendac. ad Consentium, c. xii. § 26; *ibid.*, p. 463. F, G) S. Augustin speaks of these cases (as well as that of Samson), as defensible because figurative.

<sup>a</sup> Corrected from MS.; "these," in orig. text.

<sup>r</sup> "Eadem etiam communis fuit Patrum sententia, ut constat: plerique enim omnes fere, maximo consensu, Christum a versu 21. capituli 5. Matthæi usque ad finem capituli, existimant, non tantum falsas Scribarum ac Phariseorum traditiones et veterum

legum interpretationes correxisse (sicut Protestantæ communiter arbitrantur, et quidam etiam Romanenses—vide Maldonatum in cap. 5. Matth. vers. 21.—in quibus Bellarminus ipse; qui tamen affirmat, non tantum Phariseorum corruptelam et depravationem legis de repudio emendasse, sed 'et legem' ipsam 'de libello repudii,' quam scilicet Moses tulerat, 'penitus' hic 'abrogasse,'" &c.), "sed etiam 'Legem ipsam veterum correxisse,' sive, 'ad-junctis iis quæ ad perfectionem Evangelicam desiderabantur,' partim præceptis, partim consiliis, perfecisse; 'non quod Lex in suo genere perfecta non fuerit, sed quod minus perfecta quam Evangelium,'" &c. "ut loquitur Maldonatus, qui acerrime hanc sententiam propugnat; cui etiam fovet Nicolaus Serarius Jesuita (in suo Trihæresio, lib. ii. c. 8. p. 66): . . . vide etiam Adamum Contzen Jesuitam (in cap. 5. Matth. § 2. p. 82). . . . Vide etiam Erasmus (in idem cap. Matth.); et inter Protestantæ, Hugonem Grotium, virum juris et Divini et humani peritissimum (De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. I. c. ii. n. 6. p. 26); 'Sed ne illos

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most difficult passage of all, which saith, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy" (Matt. v. 43), is according to the practice of the law in David, Jeremy, Elias, and Elizeus; which is without question the best interpreter of the Law and the extent of it. How much more, if you translate it (as questionless the Hebrew will allow us to translate it<sup>s</sup>), "Thou shalt love thine neighbour, but *mayest* hate thine enemy." For it is manifest, that, when the fourth commandment saith, "Six days shalt thou labour and do all that thou hast to do," the meaning is no more but this, "Six days thou *mayest* labour;" to wit, as for this commandment. So that this clause is nothing else, but the consequence of that limitation, which the Law puts to the precept of loving a man's neighbour as himself; understanding his neighbour to be only an Israelite, and teaching to pursue idolaters with all manner of hatred. Now when our Saviour saith, "*Ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις,*" His meaning is plain enough;—"Ye have heard that it was said to them of old" (that is, to the fathers at the giving of the Law):—not, "Ye have heard it said by your predecessors;" to wit, the Scribes and Pharisees, who about some hundred years before had begun to gloss the Law with their traditions: Matt. v. 21, 27, 33, 38, 43: the subject matter in all the rest, besides that which I have spoken of, being always the express letter of Moses' law, no tradition of the elders<sup>t</sup>.

[Exod. xx. 9; Deut. v. 13.]

quidem sequar,' inquit, 'qui aliud sibi sumunt non exiguum, Christum scilicet in tradendis præceptis quæ extant Matthæi 5. et deinceps, interpretem tantum agere legis per Mosem datæ; aliud enim sonant verba toties repetita, Audistis dictum fuisse veteribus—Ego vero dico vobis; quæ oppositio, sed et Syriaca et aliæ versiones, ostendunt illud *veteribus* significare, ad veteres, non, a veteribus' (nota contra Bezam—in locum—aliosque), 'ut vobis est, ad vos, non, a vobis. Veteres autem illi non alii fuerunt quam qui Mosis tempore vivebant,' &c. Forbes, *Consid. Mod.*, De Justif., lib. iv. c. 2. § 4. pp. 320—324.

\* That the Jews were divided between a command, and a permission, of revenge, would appear from the passages quoted in Cartwright (Mellific. Hebr., lib. ii. c. 1. in Mat. v. 43, ap. Crit. Sac., tom. ix. p. 2979): e. g.—

"Dixit igitur R. Jochanan nomine R. Simeonis filii Josedecei, Omnis discipulus Sapientis' (seu 'sapientiæ studiosus), qui sese non ulciscitur et servat' (inimicitiam) 'instar serpentis, non est discipulus Sapientis'" (quoted from the Codex Ioma, cap. ii. fol. 22. p. 2. et fol. 23. p. 1):—"Jac. Cappellus in Observat. in N. Test. ad Mat. v. 43. citat R. Mosen de Kotsi, Mand. Neg. 5, sic scribentem; 'Non silentio premes altum corde dolorem,'" &c.: "quod si sæpius corripueris et non admisit correctionem tuam, tum tibi *licebit* illum odisse."

<sup>t</sup> "Ὅτι ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, . . De horum quoque verborum sensu qui non parum ad consequentium intelligentiam facit, variant Interpretes. Alii enim τοῖς ἀρχαίοις . . positum putant pro ὅπο τῶν ἀρχαίων, . . alii pro πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους; . . rursum ἀρχαίους, . . alii referunt ad Mosis tempora, alii ad

§ 33. Yet it is not my intent to say, that our Lord's intent is not to clear the true meaning of the Law from the false glosses of the Scribes and Pharisees. For I acknowledge a false gloss of theirs upon Moses' law, which it is the intent, not only of the Sermon in the Mount, but of all the New Testament, to clear. I say, the Scribes and Pharisees, taking advantage of the truth of the world to come (which they thought to be covenanted for, and not only intimated, as the truth is, by Moses' law), did infer the reward thereof to be due to the outward and carnal observation of it. And this is that false gloss of theirs, which, as every where else, so here especially, our Lord cleareth; when He saith, "Unless your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v. 20). But this He doth, by clearly enacting that conversation which the Gospel requireth: whereof the fathers of the old Law had only expressed the rudiments and principles, out of that light, which the Law joined with the tradition of the fathers and the doctrine of the prophets had supplied; though so well accepted by God at that time, that He failed not to grant His Holy Spirit to them, who had attained that measure of righteousness. And therefore we are to conclude, that, during the Law, there was a sincerity of righteousness, consisting in the observation of the precepts thereof, not out of any temporal respect or hope of this world, but out of the

[How the righteousness of Christians is to exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees.]

ætatem quæ Esdræ et Christi tempora intercessit. Ego pro comperto habeo dandi casu non eos qui verba fecerant, sed eos ad quæ verba facta erant, indicari. Evidens enim est oppositio, 'Dictum est antiquis—Ego autem dico vobis:' quare, quomodo hoc 'vobis,' ita et illud 'antiquis,' sumendum est. . . Superest videamus ad quæ tempora antiquitas hæc sit referenda. Cur eorum accedam sententiæ qui ab ipso Mosis tempore hanc antiquitatem repetunt, has causas habeo." scil. 1. the meaning of the word ἀρχαίως. 2. because, "verba quæ recitat Christus, ea ipsa sunt quæ in Lege reperiuntur, interdu nulla interpretatione adjecta, ut infra vv. 27, 31, 33, 38: et quod hic' (v. 21) "adjicitur, 'obnoxius erit iudicio,' quodque infra additur conamine 43, 'Hostem odio habebis,' non

esse extra Legis sententiam infra explanabitur," &c. Grot., ad Matt. v. 21. And see above in note r.—'Καὶ μισήσεις τὸν ἐχθρόν σου: . . Hic multi putant firmum se habere argumentum quo probent omnia quæ Christus antiquis ait dicta, non ad Mosis legem, sed ad interpretationem legis peritorum, referenda. Nos autem, qui cum veteribus plerisque arbitramur Mosis verba respici, sed ita ut simul refellatur prava interpretatio eorum qui ex obedientia legis illius, qua propria erat Judæorum, non tantum vitæ hujus commoda, sed et regnum cœleste, sibi spondebant, neglectis naturæ et caritatis legibus, etiam horum verborum sensum in Mosis lege exstare non dubitamus." Grot., ad Matt. v. 43: proceeding at some length to explain the clause in the same way as Thorndike does.

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sense of God's will, Who searcheth the heart and judgeth the thoughts thereof; according to which the prophets of old and their disciples, as Zachary and Elizabeth in the New Testament (Luke i. 6), are to be counted "perfect" and entire in righteousness: comparing them, forsooth, with the Scribes and Pharisees, and all their sect, who in all ages of that people, as I have shewed, standing so much upon the precise observation of the positive precepts thereof for their own power and advantage, grossly failed in all performance, where the sincerity of the heart became requisite: but that, when our Saviour saith, "Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect" (Matt. v. 48), it is manifest from the premisses, that He requireth of Christians that charity towards God, and all men for God's sake (or, to speak in those terms which I take to be more general, that respect to the will of God, and His glory and service, in all our doings), which He did not covenant for with His ancient people.

Of the  
difference  
between  
matter of  
precept  
and matter  
of counsel;  
and the  
perfection  
of Chris-  
tians.

§ 34. Which point before I conclude, that we may the better understand wherein I make this perfection of Christians to consist, it will be requisite to resolve, whether or no Christians can do more than the law of God requires; and whether there are those offices, which the law of God commands not, but the Gospel only commends, as matters of counsel, to those that aim at perfection among Christians, not matters of necessity, for all that would only be saved; so that the works whereby they are pursued must be called "works of supererogation," because he that does them, lays out more upon God's service than he is obliged to do.

[Our  
Lord's  
words in  
St. Mat-  
thew.]

§ 35. They are the words of our Lord to the disciples, 296 Matt. xix. 11, 12: "All are not capable of this word" (of not marrying): "for there are eunuchs, which were so born from their mother's womb; and there are eunuchs, which were made eunuchs by men; and there are eunuchs, that have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven: he that is capable, let him hold this." Here it is said, that God hath made some men of such constitution of nature, that they are able to contain themselves from marriage: and that this is the gift of continence; which whoso hath, falls under a command of not marrying, whoso hath not, of mar-

<sup>u</sup> Corrected from MS.; "these," in orig. text.

rying. But when our Lord exhorts those, that are able to contain themselves from marriage, to strive for that grace, certainly He makes not that a gift of nature, which He would have a man endeavour to attain. He that is exhorted to make himself an eunuch, is not so made by God: but from God he hath the grace to prefer the kingdom of heaven before even that content which God alloweth him here; and if he betray not that grace by preferring that content before the clearest and securest means of attaining it, he will not fail of grace to perform that which he resolves for God's sake. And, truly, it were strange, that the Gospel should make that grace, which conducts to the height of Christianity, to consist in an endowment of nature.

§ 36. But St. Paul's words will take no nay: 1 Cor. vii. 25—28, 36—38. “Of virgins I have no precept of the Lord, but give advice, as having received mercy of the Lord to be faithful. I think then this expedient for the present necessity, that it is good for a man to be thus. Art thou tied to a wife? Seek not to be loose. Art thou loose from a wife? Seek not a wife. But if thou marry, thou sinnest not; and if a virgin marry, she sinneth not. Only such shall have affliction in the flesh. But I spare you.” Again: “If a man think he deals unhandsomely with his virgin, if she pass her flower, and so it must be, let him do as he please; he sinneth not; let them marry: but he that standeth firm in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will, and hath resolved this in his heart, to preserve his virgin, doeth well: so he that marrieth her, doeth well; but he that marrieth her not, doeth better.” Is the sunshine more manifest than this? A man may resolve either of both for his daughter a virgin (supposing her will to follow his, as generally the duty of the children is, which St. Paul here supposeth), and not sin but do well; yet better in containing from marriage, because of the advantage which that state yieldeth Christianity, as St. Paul shews. Therefore he declares, that God hath given no law in it; but His apostle gives that advice for the best, which his Lord had done.

§ 37. The same apostle, of widows; 1 Tim. v. 5, 9—14: [And in 1 Tim. v.] “She that is a widow indeed and desolate, hopeth in God, and continueth in supplications and prayers night and day:”



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and; "Let no widow be listed under threescore years old, having been the wife of one husband, having a testimony for good works, that she hath bred up her children, entertained strangers, washed the saints' feet, helped the afflicted, followed every good work; but refuse younger widows, for when they grow wanton against Christ, they will marry; being to be condemned, because they have renounced their first faith: and withal they learn to be idle, and to go about from house to house; and not only idle, but tattlers, busybodies, speaking things unfitting; therefore I would have the younger marry." Here is again a clear case. Timothy is directed to list some widows for the service of the Church in the state of widows, others to refuse. That which commends the one for the preferment, is the exercise of those works, which they could not have had opportunity for in the state of wedlock. That which renders the others dangerous, is, because for them to desire marriage is to "grow wanton against Christ." Wherefore, when St. Paul would have them to marry, it is not because he denieth in the next words that state of proficiencie, which he had acknowledged just afore; but because it is better to hold the mean, than to fall from the highest rank of Christianity.

[And in  
1 Cor. vii.  
1—7.]

§ 38. Which serves to resolve his meaning, as well as his Master's, 1 Cor. vii. 1, 2, 6, 7: "For that which you writ to me about, it is good for a man not to touch a woman; but, because of fornication, let every man have his own wife, and every woman her own husband: . . . but this I speak of indulgence, not by command; for I would all men were even as myself: but every one hath his proper grace of God, some<sup>297</sup> thus, some otherwise." Doth not the grace of God, in married people, assist in the offices of Christianity towards those relations which marriage procureth? Correspondently, therefore, the grace of God in the continent is not a natural temper, obliging them so to live; but the help that enables<sup>x</sup> them to discharge themselves like Christians in a higher rank among Christians: so that the perfection of Christianity lies not in the state of continence, but in the work of it; that is to say, in those offices of Christianity, wherein their estate gives them opportunity to be conversant; the state

\* Corrected from MS.; "helps that enable," in orig. text.

being no otherwise so accountable, than because there is a presumption that persons are such as they ought to be, and as their state gives them opportunity to be. The perfection of Christianity, then, consisteth in the love of God and in His service, and the service of Christians for God's sake; that is, in spending a man's life in those offices, in which there is most regard to God, least to our own temporal interest. But is it unreasonable to count that a state of perfection, which generally and in reason is the means for it, because it is found to be practised to other effects? Is it unreasonable to think, that God, Who hath need of all states for the service of His Church, and giveth those several graces which are requisite to make several men serviceable for several states, should not determine by law, but leave to their choice whom He endues with those graces, that which contains not the work of Christianity, but, being indifferent by kind, is nevertheless by kind the means to procure it?

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§ 39. St. Paul gives this reason, why he wrought for his living rather than take any thing of the Corinthians, in these terms: "It were better for me to die, than that any man should void that which I glory in: for if I preach the Gospel, I have nothing to glory of, for necessity lies upon me, yea, woe to me if I preach not the Gospel; for if I do it willingly, I have a reward; if unwillingly, a stewardship I am trusted with: what is then my reward? that I bestow the preaching of Christ's Gospel without charge; so as not to use my right in preaching it" (1 Cor. ix. 15—18). The necessity of preaching the Gospel stands in opposition to the preaching of it freely, which is therefore a matter of free choice. The woe to St. Paul is for not preaching the Gospel; therefore, not for not preaching it for nothing. Wherefore the reward he means, when he saith, "What is my reward" (that is, wherein lies my claim, my plea, or my pretence to it), is not that which the Gospel covenants for with all Christians. For that St. Paul was not to fail of, though he preached not for nothing. Seneca<sup>y</sup> saith, that a slave may oblige his master,

[Of St. Paul's doing more than he need in preaching the Gospel for nothing.]

<sup>y</sup> "Quæritur a quibusdam, sicut ab Hecatone, an beneficium dare servus domino possit." Seneca, De Beneficiis, lib. iii. c. 18: who discusses the question at length on the affirmative side in cc. 18—28: Op., pp. 45—47. Paris. 1607:

alleging, inter cætera, that "quædam sunt quæ leges nec jubent nec vetant facere; in his servus materiam beneficii habet. Quamdiu præstatur quod a servis exigi solet, ministerium est; ubi plus quam quod servo necesse est,

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by doing not only what he commands, but what he knows will please him, though he command it not. Such are not those whom our Lord speaks to, Luke xvii. 6, 10: "So ye also, when ye have done all things that are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants, we have done what we were indebted to do:"—"ye," that "have faith as a grain of mustard seed," that is, a small seed of Christianity; to whom the parable there is proposed. For it speaketh of those, who sit down when their Master hath supped: whereas there are others, that must sit down with their Master (Luke xxii. 30); others, that shall sit down as soon as He comes and Himself wait on them (Luke xii. 37). And therefore there are servants of God under the Gospel, that fail not of their wages, but oblige not their Master's goodness without promise. Above these wages, is the reward which St. Paul means; which though he pretend not, by discharging his trust so cheerfully as to preach the Gospel for nothing (which God commanded him not), he may nevertheless obtain his wages by giving a just account of his office. Therefore the word *καταχρησασθαι*, when he says, "*εἰς τὸ μὴ καταχρησασθαι*," signifies not "abusing," but "fully using<sup>z</sup>." As in Plato<sup>a</sup>, "*Οὐκ ὀρθῶς κατακέχρηται δωρεᾷ*"—"he used not the gift aright." And in St. Paul (1 Cor. vii. [31]), "*Οἱ χρώμενοι τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ ὡς μὴ καταχρώμενοι*"—"they that use this world as not freely using it;" not, "as not abusing it," though it hath been so translated<sup>b</sup>; because the rest of the opposites

[1 Cor. vii.]  
29—[30.]

before run in the like correspondence,—“They that have wives as having none, those that weep as not weeping, those that rejoice as not rejoicing, those that buy as not possess-

beneficium. Ubi in affectum amici transit, desinit vocari ministerium. . . . Quidquid est quod servilii officii formulam excedit, quod non ex imperio sed ex voluntate præstat, beneficium est." &c. Id., *ibid.*, c. 21. p. 46.

<sup>z</sup> "*Καταχρᾶσθαι* idem est quod *χρησθαι*, nisi quod videtur plenius quiddam significare. Plato, *Οὐκ ὀρθῶς κατακέχρηται δωρεᾷ*—'dono non recte usus est.' Lysias, *Ἀργύριον κατεχρήσατο*—'absumpsit.' Sicut et Romani 'abuti rem' dicunt pro 'utendo consumere.' Sic *σχολὴν καταχρᾶσθαι*—'tempus insumere.'" Grotius, in 1 Cor. vii. 31.—And so also Erasmus, ap. Poli Synops.

in eundem locum; and Estius.—“Non est *καταχρησασθαι*, 'male uti,' ut quidam putarunt; sed, 'uti,' aut 'peruti,' ut supra vii. 31." Grot., in 1 Cor. ix. 18.

<sup>a</sup> Plato (Epist. viii. tom. iii. p. 353. C. ed. Stephan. 1578), quoted by Grotius as above. And see numerous instances of the same use of the word in Mitchell's Index Græc. Platonicæ, tom. i. sub voce *καταχρησθαι*.

<sup>b</sup> E. g. in both places, in the authorized English version; and in the former of the two, by Theodoret, Theophylact, and Cæcumenius, quoted by Estius, who himself so translates the latter passage.

298 ing;" so, "those that use this world as not using, or not freely using, it:" and in the Latin St. Hierome (*Quæst. Hebr. in Gen.*<sup>c</sup>), "*Sancti Apostoli his fere testimoniis abutuntur quæ jam fuerant in gentibus divulgata*"—"The holy apostles use" (I suppose no man will say St. Hierome meant that they abuse) "those testimonies which had been already divulged among the Gentiles:" and in Plautus<sup>d</sup>, and the Civil Law<sup>e</sup>, *abuti* is to spend, which is the full use of things that may be spent. For seeing St. Paul, in the beginning of the chapter, challengeth, that he might have done otherwise as well as the rest of the Apostles; either he might have done otherwise without sin, or he had not that right in point of conscience to God, which he saith they used without sin.

§ 40. If then the law of God determine not a man to abstain from marriage, to abandon the world, and riches of the world, which he hath just title to; and yet this may be done to oblige God in point of goodness, not in point of promise: what is St. Augustin's fault in saying of St. Paul; "*Voluit S. Paulus ex Evangelio victum sibi quærere; quod maluit operari, amplius erogabat*"—"St. Paul might have got his living by preaching the Gospel; in that he choosed to work, he laid out more in God's service?" For this is not to say, that the love of God, for which he did it, is not commanded; but that he was not commanded to exercise that love in forbearing his due. Therefore, if any man shall teach the precepts of loving God above all, and all for God, and of morti-

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[“Works of superelevation,” as taught in the Church of Rome, a blasphemous doctrine.]

<sup>c</sup> “Hoc autem generaliter observandum, quod ubique sancti Apostoli, aut Apostolici viri, loquuntur ad populos, his plerumque testimoniis abutuntur, quæ jam fuerant in gentibus divulgata.” S. Hieron., Lib. Quæst. Hebraic. in Genesim, in cap. xlvi. 26; Op., tom. ii. p. 544.

<sup>d</sup> “Qui abusus sum tantam rem patriam.” Plaut., *Triumm.* III. ii. 56. So also *Bacchid.* II. iii. 126.—And Cic., In *Verr.* iii. c. 9, “Nisi omni tempore quod mihi lege concessum est, abusus ero.”—And Terence, *Andr.*, prol. 5.—See *Facciolati* in voc.: and other instances from Plautus in *Pareus*, *Lexic. Plautin.* sub voce.—“Propriissime, inquit Donatus, hoc verbo Plautus utitur, scilicet in vino, unguentis, pigmentis.” Ph. *Pareus*, *Lex. Crit.* sub voce.

<sup>e</sup> “Consumere . . . hoc enim proprie

est ‘abuti’ apud Jurisconsultos.” P. *Pareus*, *Lex. Plautin.* sub voce.

<sup>f</sup> “Mulieres voluit (Dominus) ut Se ad præparanda et ministranda necessaria sequerentur, ostendens quid evangelistis et ministris Dei tamquam militibus, a plebibus Dei tamquam provincialibus, deberetur; ut si quis eo quod sibi deberetur, uti nollet, sicut Paulus Apostolus noluit, amplius impenderet Ecclesiæ, non exigendo stipendium debitum, sed quotidianum victum de suis laboribus transigendo. Audierat enim stabularius” (sc. in *Luke* x. 35), “ad quem vulneratus ille perductus est, ‘Si quid amplius erogaveris, in redeundo reddam tibi.’ Amplius ergo erogabat Paulus, qui suis, ut ipse testatur, stipendiis militabat.” S. Aug., *De Op. Monachor.*, c. v. § 6; *Op.*, tom. vi. p. 479. C, D.—So also again, *ibid.*, c. xx. § 23. p. 491. E.

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fyng the first motions of concupiscence, together with the particulars into which our Lord's Sermon in the Mount brancheth those generals, to prescribe "works of supererogation," and matters not of precept but of counsel; as too many have been allowed (I say not, enjoined) to do in the Church of Rome<sup>g</sup>: worthily, in that regard, is this professed in the Church of England to be a blasphemous doctrine<sup>h</sup>. Neither can it appear, that the ancient fathers ever intended any such sense by it: who, notwithstanding, all with one voice agree in the difference between matter of precept and matter of counsel under the Gospel; which difference Doctor Field, in his learned work of the Church<sup>i</sup>, having acknowledged in the Church of England, no man can justly charge me with novelty in maintaining of it.

[Christian perfection not perfectly attainable in this life.]

§ 41. Now though the perfection of Christianity consist, as hath been shewed, in loving God above all, and all for God; or in resolving to do all in respect of God's will and for His service: yet is not this perfection perfectly to be ob-

<sup>g</sup> See e. g. the argument of Bellarmine, *De Monachis*, lib. ii. c. 13. (Contr., tom. i. pp. 1551. D, sq.), against the reasoning of Peter Martyr from the command to love God "ex toto corde, ex tota anima, et ex omnibus viribus."—And again: "If I should preach either of compulsion and servile feare or mere necessitie, . . . I could not looke for reward in heaven: but now doing it, not onely as enjoined me, but also as of love and charitie, and freely without putting any man to cost, and that voluntarily and of very desire to save my hearers, I shall have my reward of God, yea and a reward of supererogation, which is given to them that of abundant charitie do more in the service of God then they be commaunded; as S. Augustine expoundeth it, *De Op. Mon. c. 5.*" Rhemists on 1 Cor. ix. 16. p. 444. Rhemes 1582.—And: "Holy saintes or other vertuous persons may in measure and proportion of other men's necessities and deservings, allotte unto them as wel the supererogation of their spiritual workes, as these that abound in worldly goods, may give almes of their superfluities to them which are in necessitie." Rhemists on 2 Cor. viii. 14. p. 485.

<sup>h</sup> "Voluntary works, besides, over

and above, God's commandments, which they call works of supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogancy and impiety." XXXIX. Articles, art. xiv.

<sup>i</sup> "The Papists imagine certaine degrees of morall goodnesse: the lowest whereof, who so attayneth not, doeth sinne, as not doing that the precept requireth; the higher, such as men are counselled unto, if they will bee perfect, though not by any precept urged thereunto; they that attaine to such height of vertue, are sayd by them to doe workes of supererogation. But Gerson sheweth, that these men erre, in that they discern not betweene the matter of precepts and counsailes, imagining that the precept requireth the inferiour degrees of vertue, and the counsailes the more high and excellent: whereas the precept requireth all the acts of vertue in the best sort they can be performed, and the counsailes are conversant in another matter, namely, in shewing us the meanes whereby most easily, if all things bee answerable in the parties, men may attaine to the height of vertue." Field, *Of the Church*, Append. to Bk. iii., c. 13. p. 331. ed. 1628.—See also Jer. Taylor, *Duct. Dubit.*, lib. ii. c. iii. rule 12; Works, vol. xiii. pp. 59 sq. ed. Heber.



tained during this life. The reason is manifest:—because it is not morally possible, that the work of it should not be interrupted by original concupiscence; the mortification whereof, which proceeds by degrees, is that perfection which a Christian arriveth at, whatsoever he aim at. St. Paul had gone as far as another man, when he said (Phil. iii. 13—15): “Brethren, I count not myself to have seized; only, forgetting that which is behind, and stretching at that which is before, according to the mark, I drive to the prize of the heavenly calling of God by Christ Jesus: as many therefore as are perfect, let us be so minded.” And 2 Cor. iii. 18: “We all, looking as in a glass upon the glory of God with bare face, are changed after the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord;” to wit, by the same degrees, as the mortification of our own concupiscence makes room for God’s Spirit. And, therefore, he saith again of himself, 1 Cor. ix. 26: “I therefore so run, as not without appearance of going forwards; so fight, not as beating the air: but I cuff and enslave my body, lest, having preached to others, I myself become reprobate.” Notwithstanding the law of Christianity, which the Gospel preacheth, supposing this concupiscence; and providing a right of re-establishment into God’s grace for all, that being cast down in this course shall return by repentance: manifest it is, that, though we are not saved by fulfilling the original rule of that righteousness to which the creation of our nature on God’s behalf obligeth us, yet by undertaking and pursuing that perfection, which the profession of Christianity importeth; provided that we persevere in pursuing it unto the end, though sometimes this pursuit consist in turning from those sins, by which we had started aside.

§ 42. Now the law of Moses is, certainly, a transcript or rude draught of this original righteousness due from man to God: and, therefore, purposely made so curiously scrupulous, that even the earthly promises of the land of Canaan, and temporal happiness in it, should not be obtained by the exact observation thereof; as I observed afore. But it was also an intimation of the Gospel of Christ, not only in the provision which it made for expiation of transgressions (the signification whereof the greatest part never understood), but in those

C H A P.  
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[“ἀνακακα-  
λυμένῳ  
προσώπῳ”  
—“with  
open face.”  
Eng. Vers.]

[“ὡς οὐκ  
ἀδήλως”  
—  
“not as un-  
certainly.”  
Eng. Vers.]

[Of per-  
fection un-  
der the  
Law.]

B O O K  
II.

[Gal. iii.  
11; Heb.  
x. 38.]

grounds of assurance, which it gave those that should observe it from the heart, as before God and for His love, of the reward of the world to come. In which regard St. Paul and the apostles so often allege the saying of the prophet (Habak. ii. 4), "The just shall live by faith:" and St. Paul (Rom. i. 17) saith, that "the righteousness of God is revealed" by the Gospel "from faith to faith;" that is, from the faith of Christ to come, to the faith of Christ come: and St. John Baptist saith of our Lord (John i. 16, [17]); "Of His fulness we have all received, grace for grace; because the Law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." So that, though the grace of the Gospel came by Christ, yet it succeeded the same grace under the Law; though, as under a fainter light, so in a scarcer measure. And St. Augustin<sup>k</sup> rightly accounteth those, that attain true righteousness under the Law, to belong to the New Testament; as carnal Christians under the Gospel, to the Old. But if the faithful at that time were saved by that scarce measure of righteousness, which the faint light they were under required; then were they also saved, though not by fulfilling the original law of righteousness due from man to God, yet by fulfilling that rule of evangelical righteousness, which God under the Law required at their hands. In which regard, if the fathers, by things recorded of them in the Old Testament, may be seen to have attained that perfection which St. Paul calls his "glory," in doing that which he was not commanded as a means to the discharging of that wherein the perfection of Christians consisteth; that which became matter of precept under the Gospel, is necessarily to be taken for matter of counsel under the Law: always understanding, that, as those helps of grace, without which I have shewed that they had not been able to perform such righteousness under the Law, were granted even then in consideration of our Lord Christ's interposing His mediation to the redeeming of mankind, so was the righteousness then performed, accepted in no consideration but of the obedience of Christ and His righteousness.

[1 Cor. ix.  
15, 16.]

<sup>k</sup> See above, cc. xix. § 3. note j; and xxix. § 12—18.

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

WHETHER ANY WORKS OF CHRISTIANS BE SATISFACTORY FOR SIN, AND MERITORIOUS OF HEAVEN; OR NOT. THE RECOVERY OF GOD'S GRACE FOR A CHRISTIAN FALLEN FROM IT, A WORK OF LABOUR AND TIME. THE NECESSITY AND EFFICACY OF PENANCE TO THAT PURPOSE, ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES, AND THE PRACTICE OF THE CHURCH. MERIT BY VIRTUE OF GOD'S PROMISE NECESSARY. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AGREES IN IT. THE PRESENT CHURCH OF ROME ALLOWS MERIT OF JUSTICE.

ANOTHER dispute there is, that makes an endless noise; never to be decided, but upon this ground; not to be maintained, admitting it: that is, whether the works of Christians merit heaven or not. Which I must enlarge into another point, of so near nature to it that both may as easily be resolved as the one: whether humiliation<sup>1</sup> for sin, in praying, fasting, giving alms, by Christians, in confidence of the satisfaction of Christ, to obtain pardon of God, be satisfactory for sin or not. For inasmuch as to be free from evil is good, and to obtain a discharge from punishment is as much as to deserve a reward; in so much it is all one to satisfy for sin, so as to be discharged of punishment, and to fulfil an obligation, so as to claim a reward. Whereupon I said afore<sup>m</sup>, that all satisfaction is necessarily of the nature of merit. To this question then, or to these questions, the answer is necessarily consequent from the premisses: that, if we regard the original law of God, neither can any man make God satisfaction for his sin, nor merit the reward of everlasting life at His hands; but if we regard that dispensation in it which the Gospel preacheth, in consideration of the merits and satisfaction of our Lord Christ, neither shall any man attain forgiveness of sin without making satisfaction for it, nor the reward of everlasting life without making it due to him by virtue of God's promise.

§ 2. The proof of the first point consists in all those passages of Scripture, which require repentance as a condition

[1. Proof from Scripture re-

<sup>1</sup> Corrected from MS.; "the humiliation," in orig. text.

<sup>m</sup> Above, c. xxix. § 22.

Whether any works of Christians be [1.] satisfactory for sin, and [2.] meritorious of heaven; or not.

BOOK  
II.

pecting  
the first  
question.]

[Rom. i. 1  
—iii. 20.]

requisite to the obtaining [of<sup>n</sup>] remission of sins: whether in the New Testament or in the Old; inasmuch as I have shewed<sup>o</sup>, that the promises of the Gospel were obtained under the Law upon the same terms and conditions for substance, as under the Gospel; though, for the measure, proportionable to that light of knowledge and those helps of grace, which the dispensation of God under the old law afforded. In particular, taking notice of the theme of St. John Baptist, which our Lord also took for the argument of His preaching; “Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Matt. iii. 2, iv. 17; Mark i. 15): which the apostles also followed; Acts ii. 38, iii. 19. Upon that ground, which St. Paul also debates in the beginning of the Epistle to the Romans; that the necessity of the Gospel and Christianity is grounded upon a supposition, that both Jews and Gentiles are liable to sin without Christ, and by consequence to judgment. And again, of those texts of the apostles’ writings, wherein there is mention or intimation of penance required or enjoined by them, or by the Church in their time, for the obtaining of remission of sins by the keys; which I have handled in another place<sup>p</sup>. And, thirdly, of those passages which I have quoted in this Book, disputing of justification by faith<sup>q</sup>; to shew, that remission of sins done after baptism is obtained for Christians by prayer joined with fasting and giving of alms, to move God to give us pardon, as we forgive or give to our brethren.

[And from those scriptures, which speak of the satisfaction made by Christ.]

§ 3. But this proof consists also in those scriptures, which I have alleged<sup>r</sup> to shew, that the blood of Christ and His sufferings are truly and properly satisfaction for the sins of mankind. For as he, that believes this, can by no means imagine, that any man can make satisfaction for his own sins by the original law of God (for then the coming of Christ had been in vain, as not necessary, neither had there<sup>301</sup> needed that dispensation in God’s proceeding with mankind upon the original rule of righteousness, which the Gospel declareth); so can he by no means imagine the satisfaction, which any man can tender God for his sin, to import any

<sup>n</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>o</sup> Above, c. xxxii. § 16—25; and Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., cc. xii., xiii., &c.

<sup>p</sup> Right of the Ch. in a Chr. State, c. i. § 21—28.

<sup>q</sup> Above, c. ix. § 35—42.

<sup>r</sup> Above, c. xxvii. § 1—12.

more, than the fulfilling of that condition, which God by His Gospel requireth to qualify any man, that is fallen from grace by sin after baptism, for remission of sin: because he supposeth aforehand, that the satisfaction of Christ's blood consisteth in obtaining such terms at God's hands, that, the condition being obtained, a man should become qualified for remission of sins. On the other side, the Gospel importing a promise of remission of sin in consideration of the sufferings of Christ, to them that turn by true repentance to that new life which it prescribeth; it cannot be denied, that those works, wherein the reality of true repentance consisteth, are properly satisfaction for sin (as for that respective sin for which they satisfy), by virtue of that promise, which God by the Gospel declareth, in consideration of Christ's cross. For if the civilian say true, that "to satisfy" is no more than "to fulfil a man's desire"; God by His Gospel requiring nothing else to be performed by us (that is, by any Christian that is overtaken in the state of sin) but to turn from sin, of necessity it follows, that God is satisfied with our repentance (which otherwise He would not accept of for payment at our hands); though the satisfaction of Christ is the consideration that makes it acceptable.

§ 4. The mistake seems to lie in this: that men take any kind of displeasure for sin to be that repentance, which qualifieth a man for remission of sin; presuming, that faith alone justifieth, and that the grace which the Gospel tendereth would come to too short an account, if at every instance a man might not have recourse to the blood of Christ for assurance of remission of sins. Whereas I have shewed, that in all estates, at any instant, a Christian hath assurance of remission of sin to be had, upon condition that he see himself qualified for it; but that absolute assurance of remission of sin, actually had and obtained, is not to be had by the Gospel, but upon performing the condition which it requireth: unless we would make Christ the "minister of sin" (as St. Paul speaks), by saying, that he came to discover a way, by which, standing in the love of sin and enjoying the pleasure of it, we may assure ourselves of pardon for it. For it can in no reason be imagined, that he, who hath wilfully

The recovery of God's grace for a Christian fallen from it, a work of labour and time.

[Gal. ii. 17.]

\* See above, c. xxix. § 22. note i.

† Above, c. xxxi. § 36.



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committed sin, can instantly come to such a resolution of mind, as may reasonably be thought effectual to move him never to do the like any more. Will any body, that is capable to consider what a change it is for a man to undertake Christianity, being by the preaching of it become convict of that sin which it pretendeth to cure; will any man say, that it is possible for such a one, at the instant that he is first informed of a thing concerning him so much, to resolve to take the course, overcoming all difficulties which all the custom of sin can create? As for him, who, having made profession of Christianity, is notwithstanding overtaken with one of those gross sins, that express a formal contradiction to his profession so made; can he be assured of a firm resolution to stand to all that his Christianity requireth for the future, who sees himself so shamefully cast from a resolution solemnly professed, and perhaps grounded in him by so many years' practice as he hath been a Christian? This is the reason, why repentance is not to be measured by a wish that a man had not sinned (which those, that are not past remorse, necessarily have, because they must needs wish themselves at peace with God); nor by a desire of forgiveness (because they must needs wish themselves what the Gospel promiseth); nor by being sorry for the punishment which they have incurred (for that is not out of love to God, but to themselves); nor by being only sorry for having offended God (for who would not wish, that he could enjoy both the love of God and the pleasure of his sin). In fine, no disposition can qualify a man a convert, or penitent, but that which produceth a change in his actions. And that disposition not being produced, but by frequenting such actions of humili-<sup>302\*</sup> ation as may settle the impression of it upon a man's spirit; those actions, by which this disposition is wrought, are justly counted satisfaction to God, because they fulfil that, which He desireth of a sinner to qualify him for remission of sin.

[Of objections to this from Scripture.]

§ 5. One material difficulty there is, that may be objected against all this from the Scriptures, especially of the Gospels; and those manifold invitations, whereby our Lord woeth those, which are weary of sin, to come to Him for their cure. For, in very deed, the parable of the prodigal representeth

\* Misprinted 298 in folio edition.

God so desirous to be reconciled, that there is no room left for conditions, limiting the pardon; which is granted, before it can be demanded, upon a bare desire expressed by returning home. And the Psalm of David seems to signify the same; when he saith, "I said I will confess my transgression to the Lord and Thou forgavest the wickedness of my sin" (Psalm xxxii. 5): which may be so understood, as if, David only having purposed to make confession of his sin, God prevented him with pardon before he did it. But, to say truth, this is more than the words can bear; because it is said just afore, "I made known my sins to Thee, and my iniquities I concealed not:" so as David's sin was not pardoned before he confessed it, but having confessed it, upon a grounded resolution so to do; and that, after so much trouble of mind for his sin, as the premisses of the Psalm express. As for the expressions of our Lord in the Gospel: having shewed, that it tendereth high promises, but upon conditions proportionable, considering the present weakness of our nature; there is no reason in the world to infer, that those, who have forfeited the promises by failing of that which they undertake, may as easily promise themselves reconcilment with God by repentance, as they are freely invited to be reconciled by baptism. For that which is done in the state of ignorance, is easily passed by upon condition of amendment. But where breach of amity may be reproached (especially tendered by God of mere grace, and upon His own charge, as it were, of Christ's cross), to presume of reconcilment upon mere acknowledgment of a transgression, were to tread under foot so great grace. And, therefore, that which hath been produced\* out of the Apostles' writings, soundeth to another tune. St. John saith, indeed; "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us; if we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to remit our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness; if we say we have not sinned, we make Him a liar, and His word is not in us" ([1] John i. 8—10). For it appeareth by the premisses, that His word concludeth even Christians to be sinners. For St. John goeth forward and saith: "My little children, these things I write to you, that you sin not; and if any man sin,

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

[Ps. xxxii.  
5.]

[1 John ii.  
1, 2.]

\* Above, c. xxxi. § 7—12.

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II.[Ps. xix.  
12, 13.  
Eng. vers.]

we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous, and He is the propitiation for our sins." And when David (who had the Spirit of God upon the same terms as Christians have it, excepting that which hath been excepted<sup>y</sup>) prayeth, (Psalm xix. 13, 14 [Hebr.]); "Who understandeth his errors? cleanse me from hidden sins; keep Thy servant also from presumptuous sins, that they bear not rule over me; then shall I be upright, and clean from great transgressions:" he sheweth sufficiently the difference between venial and mortal sins, as to Christians (which, in case of invincible ignorance and mere surprise, comes to no sin, as to Christians); but he sheweth also, that Christians, neglecting themselves, may come to fall into sins of presumption, which he prayeth against.

[Of the sin  
unto death,  
and apo-  
stacy from  
the faith,  
and the  
blasphemy  
against  
the Holy  
Ghost.]

§ 6. For the rest, the same St. John, encouraging Christians to pray for the sins of Christians, with this limitation (as I suppose)—if by their advice they appear to be reduced to take the course, which may procure pardon at God's hands,—acknowledgeth further, that "there is a sin unto death; I say not that ye pray for it," saith he, 1 John v. 16. And the Apostle to the Hebrews, vi. 4—6, speaketh of some sin, which he acknowledgeth not that it can be admitted to penance for the obtaining of forgiveness; which he protesteth again, Hebr. x. 26—31, xii. 16, 17. It is commonly thought indeed<sup>z</sup>, that to deny the true faith against that light which God hath kindled in a man's conscience, is hereby declared to be a sin, that repentance cannot cure; or rather, that God hereby declareth, that He will never grant it repentance. 303\*

<sup>y</sup> See e. g. above, c. ix. § 10: and c. xxxii. § 16 sq.

<sup>z</sup> "Peccatum ad mortem" (1 John v. 16.).. "non est partialis lapsus nec præcepti unius transgressio; sed apostasia universalis (Calvin, Beza, Gomarus, Lightfoot, Menochius, Tirinus), sive defectio a Deo (Beza), vel a fide (Menochius, Tirinus, Lightfoot), quam semel professi sunt; qua penitus a Deo se alienant (Calvin); qua quis Evangelii veritatem agnitam oppugnat (Gomarus), et directe se opponit Deo et Christo (Tirinus), sciens et volens (Gomarus, Beza, Tirinus), destinata malitia (Beza, Tirinus), ex odio Christi (Gomarus): quod et 'peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum' dicitur (Gomarus, Beza, Calvin)." Poli Synops. ad

1 Joh. v. 16.—"Rursus, &c. Πάλιν ἀνακαινίζου εἰς μετάνοιαν—Rursus vel denuo renovari, . . ut subaudias vel 1. se, q. d. ut seipsum iterum renovent, utpote in tali statu existentes (Paræus); vel 2. τινὰ, q. d. ut quisquam renovet ipsos, i. e., absolute ut renoventur (L. de Dieu, Piscator) . . . Græcismus est," &c. "Refertur hoc vel 1. ad doctores," &c. "vel 2. ad Deum, qui tales renovare nequit, non per impotentiam, sed per justitiam et veritatem Suam qua non potest mentiri (quidam ap. Paræum) aut Seipsum negare; vel ob naturam Ejus constantissimam et immutabilem (Junius)." Poli Synops. in Heb. vi. 6.

\* Misprinted 299 in folio edition.

And, truly, that “blasphemy against the Holy Ghost,” which our Lord saith “shall never be pardoned neither in this world nor in the world to come” (Mat. xii. 31, 32; Mark iii. 28, 29; Luke xii. 10), manifestly consisteth in attributing the works, which the Holy Ghost did to convert men to Christ, to the devil; being convinced, that our Lord came from God, by the works He did for that purpose. Just as St. Stephen reproaches the Jews for “resisting the Holy Ghost as” their “fathers had done” (Acts vii. 51). And that there is no cure for this sin, it is manifest; because it consisteth in rejecting the cure. And apostacy from Christianity (which is manifestly the sin which the Apostle to the Hebrews intendeth) differeth from it, but as the obligation to Christianity once received differeth from that Christianity, which being proposed with conviction a man is bound to receive. But, otherwise, not only the Church, but the Novatians themselves, supposed, that those who had denied the faith might recover pardon of God by repentance. Nor can it become visible to the Church, what is that conviction, which whoso transgresseth, becomes unpardonable, because God hath excluded him from repentance. In the mean time, how difficult the primitive Church accounted it to attain pardon of such sins, appears by the excluding of the Montanists and Novatians first<sup>b</sup>; then by the long penance prescribed apostates, murderers, and adulterers, lest the admitting of them to penance might seem to warrant their pardon upon too light repentance<sup>c</sup>.

§ 7. St. Paul “admits” the incestuous person at Corinth, whether to penance or to communion with the Church; but upon what terms? Lest the offender “should be swallowed up with extreme sorrow;” and “lest Satan should advantage himself” against them, should he refuse it: and because, having “written out of great anguish of heart with tears” for them, who presumed to bear him out in it, he had found them moved with sorrow according to God, to repentance, with all

The necessity and efficacy of penance to that purpose [of recovering God's grace], according to the Scriptures. [1. Of the New Testament.]

<sup>b</sup> See Right of Ch. in Chr. State, c. i. § 19; and Review, c. i. § 31, sq.: and Epilogue, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. ix. § 11, sq.

<sup>c</sup> “Antiqua illa Theologia peccata in tres classes distinguebat. . . . In prima classe tria tantum collocabant,

Idololatriam, Mæchiam, et Homicidium, eorumque manifestas species et ramusculos. . . . Primum peccatorum genus grandi illa et luctuosa pœnitentia sanabant et castigabant.” Morinus, De Pœnit., lib. v. c. 1. § 2. pp. 249. b, 250. a.



BOOK II. satisfaction, and desire of peace with the Apostle: 2 Cor. ii. 1—8, vii. 7—11. For we understand by St. Paul (1 Cor. v. 2, 2 Cor. xii. 21), that even the Church themselves, when they shut a sinner out of the Church, did make demonstration of sorrow for his case; and, therefore, himself much more was put to mourning, and to profess by his outward habit, that he thought his sin incurable without sorrow answerable to it. And when St. Paul commands the Colossians (iii. 5[6]), “Mortify your members that are upon earth, fornication, uncleanness, passion, evil desire, and covetousness (which is idolatry); for which the wrath of God cometh upon the children of disobedience:” it is manifest, that he placeth the mortifying of these vices in the afflicting and humbling of our earthly members, wherein the lusts of them reside. Therefore he serves his own body no otherwise: but, striving for the prize of Christians (like one of their Greekish champions, that would not beat the air), he beats his own body black and blue, to bring it under servitude; “lest, having preached to others, himself should become reprobate” (1 Cor. ix. 26, 27). And certainly, if Christianity require this discipline over St. Paul’s body, lest he should fall into sin: it will require very great severity of them, that are fallen into sin, to be exercised upon their bodies, the lusts whereof they have satisfied by those sins; to regain the favour and appease the wrath of God, and to settle that hatred of sin and that love of goodness in the heart, which the preventing of sin for the future necessarily requireth.

[“*ἑνωπιδ-  
ῶ.*”]

[2. Of the  
Old Testa-  
ment.]

§ 8. The practice of the Old Testament sufficiently signifieth the same. Though David, in the Psalm that I mentioned afore<sup>d</sup>, seem to make the pardon of his sin a thing easily obtained at God’s hands (as it is indeed a thing easily obtained, supposing the disposition which David desired it with; but not that disposition a thing easily obtained); yet you shall find the same David, elsewhere, “wetting his bed and watering his couch with his tears,” so that his “beauty is gone with mourning,” his “flesh dried up for want of fatness,” and his “bones cleave to” his “flesh for the voice of his mourning.” Indeed, he always expresseth his affliction to be the subject of his mourning: but always acknowledg-

[Ps. vi. 6,  
7.]

[Ps. cix. 23  
(Prayerbk.  
vers.); cii.  
5.]



304 ing his sins to be the cause of those afflictions ; which he therefore takes the course to remove, by taking this course for his sins. The prophet Esay (i. 16, 17.) thus calleth the Jews to appease God's wrath : " Wash ye, make ye clean, remove the evil of your works from before Mine eyes, cease to do evil, learn to do good, seek righteousness." Sure this was never intended to be done by the mere thought of doing it. But, the Prophet Joel having threatened a plague, what doth he prescribe for the cure ? " And now, saith the Lord, return to Me with all your heart, with fasting, weeping, and mourning ; and rent your hearts, and not your garments ; and turn to the Lord your God ; for He is gracious and merciful, long-suffering, great in mercy, and repenteth Him of evil : . . . blow the trumpet in Sion, sanctify a fast, invite the assembly, gather the people, sanctify a congregation, make the old and young and the sucking infants meet, let the bridegroom come forth of his chamber, and the bride of her closet ; let the priests, the ministers of the Lord, weep between the porch and the altar ; and say, Spare, Lord, Thy people, and give not Thine heritage for a reproach : " Joel ii. 12—17. Sure this is something more than not allowing a man's self to sin, or not liking that which he does when he sins ; which no man, that ever heard of Christianity, can do, till he have contracted such a custom of sinning, that he is not sensible of any remorse for it. And it is a thing most strange, that those, who pretend to be the cream of Christianity, should think the sins of the regenerate not to forfeit the state of grace, nor contract God's displeasure, because they are done with dislike<sup>e</sup>. Judas might have robbed the poor so oft, that at length he might be without remorse ; but certainly he betrayed not his Master without reluctance. The regenerate, if truly so, and not hypocrites, must needs find the burden of sin, which they commit, aggravated by the grace which they had received afore ; and, therefore, must needs find themselves obliged to a deeper measure of humiliation, to expiate their ingratitude, and to recover the favour

<sup>e</sup> See e. g. the long argument of Owen (Saints' Perseverance, c. xv. § 2—26. pp. 325—340), to prove, that *the* difference between the sins of regenerate and unregenerate persons, which

do not, and which do, forfeit God's favour respectively, is simply, that the former are not done " with the whole will and full consent," the latter are.

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of God, which they had forfeited by abusing it afore. This seems, in my opinion, to persuade a good Christian, that works of humiliation and penance are requisite to recover the state of grace, and to render God again propitious to those that have fallen from the grace of their baptism; as that which I said afore<sup>f</sup> [serves<sup>g</sup>] to shew, that it is not prejudicial to the satisfaction of our Lord, that God should be satisfied by such means.

And [ac-  
cording to]  
the prac-  
tice of the  
Church.

§ 9. Now the original and general practice of God's Church punctually agreeth with that, which hath been said. Our Lord preacheth repentance; but admitteth all that profess it to be His disciples, not taking cognizance what they had been, professing to become such as He requireth for the future. So His Church, knowing that there is no sin so deep that His blood cannot wash away, admitteth all to baptism; declaring, that without repentance it availeth only to their damnation, but demanding no visible satisfaction of it in them, that were not hitherto of the Church. But those, who falsify the profession upon which they were admitted to baptism, and that so visibly, that the forfeiture of God's grace is visible by the same means; those were so excluded the communion of the Church (which ought to suppose a presumption of the state of grace, at least the possibility of it), that, at the first, the greatest question was, whether they should be admitted to any hope of reconcilment by the Church or not: as it appeareth by the breaches of the Montanists and Novatians, and partly of the Donatists, and Meletians<sup>h</sup>. If this admission were granted, it was only to this effect, at the beginning; that they might tender the Church satisfaction of the sincerity of that sorrow, wherewith they pretended to satisfy God; that is, to appease His wrath, and to recover His grace. Those, who think penance was enjoined to no other effect, in the ancient Church, than to make satisfaction for the scandal which the notoriousness of sin had contracted<sup>i</sup>,

<sup>f</sup> Above, § 3.

<sup>g</sup> Corrected from MS.; "seems," in orig. text.

<sup>h</sup> See above, § 7. note b, and the passages there referred to. Meletius, according to Epiphanius (*Adv. Hær.*, lib. ii. tom. ii. *Hær.* lxxviii. c. 2; *Op.*, tom. i. pp. 717. D, 718. A.), was deposed for excessive severity to the lapsed.

<sup>i</sup> See Bk. III. Of the Laws of the Church, cc. ix., sq.—"Vocarunt autem (Patres) ut plurimum satisfactionem, non compensationem, quæ Deo redderetur; sed publicam testificationem, qua qui excommunicatione mulctati fuerant, quum in communionem recipi vellent, Ecclesiam reddebant de sua penitentia certiore." Calvin., *Instit.*, III. iv. 39.

are as far wide of the truth as those, who think it only made satisfaction for a debt of temporal punishment, the stain of sin and guilt of eternal punishment being abolished by submitting it to the keys of the Church, out of that sorrow which they call "attrition;" which they will have to be changed into "contrition" by the humility of that confession, which submitteth a man's sin to the keys of the Church<sup>k</sup>. In what sense "attrition" may be said to be changed into "contrition" by the ministry of penance, I shall have occasion to debate again in the third Book<sup>l</sup>. For the present, I must not forget the ground which I have presupposed<sup>m</sup>, that the Gospel is presupposed to the being and constitution of the Church: and, therefore, that remission of sins by the Church, and the ministry of penance in the Church, supposeth the accomplishment of that condition, and the production of that disposition, which by the Gospel qualifyeth for remission of sin. Neither can the ministry of the Church be otherwise necessary, than as it may be effectual to produce the same. How, in the penitent, that sorrow for fear of punishment which the first sight of sin necessarily causeth (which is "attrition" in their terms), is changed into that sorrow for having offended God which the love of God causeth; is to be understood, I conceive, by that which I said afore<sup>n</sup>. That the ministry of the Church cannot supersede or dispense with the means whereby that change is brought to pass; as the argument proposed evidences by the Scriptures, so from the tradition of the Church, I conceive, I have peremptory evidence. For those, that deferred their penance till danger of death, then, confessing their sins, submitted to the keys of the Church, though they were not refused reconciliation in that estate, though they were admitted to the communion

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<sup>k</sup> "Attritionem virtute clavium fieri contritionem," is the accepted doctrine of the later Roman schools. See below in Bk. III. Of the Laws of the Church, c. ix.: and Bellarm., De Pœnitent., lib. ii. c. 18; Controv., tom. ii. p. 1342. C: and Morinus, De Pœnitent., lib. viii. cc. 2, 3. pp. 507. 1. 2, sq.—"Cum primum Attritionis nomen in lucem erupit, erupit quoque hæc quæstio, An Attritio fieri posset Contritio. In scholis agitata est annis

prope centum nulla prorsus ad justificationem in Sacramento Pœnitentiæ facta relatione." Morinus, *ibid.*, c. 2. § 1. p. 507. 1. C: who proceeds to trace the "iliades quæstionum," which arose when the subject was connected with Penance.

<sup>l</sup> Bk. III. Of the Laws of the Church, c. xi. (misprinted ix. in folio edition).

<sup>m</sup> Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., cc. iii., iv.

<sup>n</sup> Above, c. xxx. § 25.

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of the eucharist, yet their salvation remained questionable, in case they survived not to perform their penance°. This you shall find at large in St. Augustin (Homilia xli. *ex L.*<sup>p</sup>); though some<sup>q</sup> attribute it to St. Ambrose: but you have it in St. Augustin again, *De Tempore*, Sermone lvii.<sup>r</sup> And when it is found in a letter of Faustus in answer to Paulinus of Nola<sup>s</sup>,

° See Bingham, XVIII. iv. 6; and Morinus, *De Pœnitent.*, lib. iii. c. 9. § 2—18. pp. 155. 1.—158. 2. The title of the chapter in Morinus runs, that “de Christiani salute pœnitentiam et reconciliationem in iisdem angustiis” (scil. in mortis articulo) “suscipientis plurimum diffidebant” (scil. Patres). However, in § 17. p. 157. 2. E, he cautions his reader not to suspect, “eos de salutis tum temporis acquirendæ possibilitate dubitasse.”

<sup>p</sup> “Si quis autem, positus in ultima necessitate ægritudinis suæ, voluerit accipere pœnitentiam, et accipit, et mox reconciliatur, et hinc vadit; fateor vobis, non illi negamus quod petit, sed non præsumimus quia bene hinc exit. Non præsumo; non vos fallo, non præsumo. Fidelis bene vivens, securus hinc exit. Baptizatus ad horam, securus hinc exit. Agens pœnitentiam et reconciliatus cum sanus est, et postea bene vivens, securus hinc exit. Agens pœnitentiam ad ultimum et reconciliatus, si securus hinc exit, ego non sum securus. Unde securus sum, securus sum, et do securitatem: unde non sum securus, pœnitentiam dare possum, securitatem dare non possum.” S. Aug., *Lib. Quinquaginta Homil.*, Hom. xli. (edd. before Bened.); Hom. cccxciii., *Op.*, tom. v. p. 1507. D—F. ed. Ben.—S. Augustin had just been employed in contrasting the condition of a catechumen seeking baptism on his death-bed, and a Christian in a similar state desiring to be reconciled by penance.

<sup>q</sup> “Eadem prorsus sententia, et pœnitentiæ cum baptismo comparatio, legitur iisdem verbis apud S. Ambrosium lib. ii. de Pœnitentia c. 12. vel in aliis codicibus ad finem ejusdem libri sub titulo exhortationis ad Pœnitentiam.” Morinus as above quoted, § 3. p. 155. 2. A.—“Dubius erat Lovaniensibus, Verlino autem et Vindingo falsus aut centonis in modum ex variis laciniis conflatus videbatur” (scil. the above cited homily). “Extat etiam inter opuscula Ambrosii ac Cæsarii, sed cum insigni varietate. Apud Ambrosium et Cæsarium, prætermisissis,” &c., “incipit in

hæc verba,” &c. “Sic in veteri quoque libro Ecclesiæ Carnutensis, in quo tamen Augustini nomen præfert.” Note of Bened. editors of S. Augustin: who place the homily among S. Augustin’s genuine works.

<sup>r</sup> “Ad emendanda enim crimina vox pœnitentis sola non sufficit: nam in satisfactione ingentium peccatorum non verba tantum sed opera quæruntur. Datur quidem etiam in extremis pœnitentia, quia non potest denegari; sed auctores tamen esse non possumus, quod qui sic petierit, mereatur absolvi. Quomodo enim agit pœnitentiam lapsus? Quomodo agit pœnitentiam in extremis vitæ finibus constitutus? Quomodo enim pœnitentiam agere possit, qui nulla jam pro se opera satisfactionis operari potest? Et ideo pœnitentia quæ ab infirmo petitur, infirma est. Pœnitentia quæ a moriente tantum petitur, timeo ne ipsa moriatur.” S. Aug., *Serm. lvii. de Tempore* (spurious accord. to Ben. editors); *Serm. cclv. in Append. ad Op.*, tom. v. pp. 418. G, 419. A. ed. Ben.—See many other authorities in Morinus as quoted in note o.

<sup>s</sup> “Primo loco inquirendum putavisti; si incumbitibus extremæ necessitatis angustiis momentanea pœnitentia capitalis inimica persuasionem mentitur, qui maculas longa ætate contractas subitis etiam inutilibus abolendas gemitibus arbitratur: quo tempore confessio esse potest, satisfactio esse non potest. Nam quia ‘Deus non irridetur;’ ipse se decepit qui mortem multis temporibus vicit, et ad quærendam viam jam semi-vivus adsurgit; ut tunc officiosus appareat, quando dominicæ servituti omnia corporis et animæ subtrahuntur officia. Circa exequentem interioris hominis sanitatem, non solum accipiendi voluntas, sed agendi expectatur utilitas. Ita enim legitur: ‘Si’ (inquit) ‘peccator pœnitentiam egerit pro peccatis suis’ (*egerit*, memoravit; non solum dixit, *acceperit*), ‘in sua,’ inquit, ‘justitia, quam operatus est, vivit.’ Advertis, quod hujusmodi medicina, sicut ore poscenda, ita opere consummanda est? Insultare Deo vi-



it cannot be excepted<sup>t</sup>, that Faustus is a suspected author because of his opposition to St. Augustin, in a point, wherein it is evident that he concurreth with St. Augustin. But in the fourth Council of Carthage also, can. vii. and viii.<sup>u</sup>, those, that submit to penance and receive the eucharist in danger of death, are not to think themselves acquitted of their sin, if they survive, “*sine manus impositione* :” that is, without performing their penance, during which they were, at the service of the Church, prayed for, with imposition of hands<sup>x</sup>. And therefore he, who having thus submitted to penance and received the eucharist recovered, might be promoted to the clergy, according to the fourth Council of Toledo (can. liii.<sup>y</sup>) and Concil. Gerund. (can. ix.<sup>z</sup>) ; whereas, whosoever had done penance in the Church, could never be admitted to the clergy afterwards<sup>a</sup> : because such a one had not been

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detur, qui illo tempore ad medicum noluit venire quo potuit; et illo, tunc incipit velle, quo non potest. Opus itaque est, ut quam in peccando fuit abrupta et vegeta ad malum mentis intentio, tanta sit in vulnerum curatione devotio.” Fausti Rhegiensis Galliar. Episcopi ad Benedictum Paulinum Epistola, ap. Bibl. PP., tom. v. P. iii. p. 433. E—G. ed. De la Bigne.

<sup>t</sup> “Hæc Epistola et sequentia quæ subjiciuntur Fausti opuscula caute legenda, utpote opera rejecta et damnata a Romana Ecclesia. Cum judicio lege quæ hic Faustus disserit; nam etsi extrema necessitate momentanea vera pœnitentia difficile habeatur, veram tamen et legitimam interdum posse tunc contingere nullus unquam orthodoxus dubitavit.” Admonition prefixed by De la Bigne to the Epistle of Faustus above quoted.

<sup>u</sup> The canons intended are the lxxvith and lxxviiiith.—“Is qui pœnitentiam in infirmitate petit, si casu, dum ad eum sacerdos invitatus venit, oppressus infirmitate obmutuerit, vel in phrenesim versus fuerit, dent testimonium, qui eum audierunt, et accipiat pœnitentiam. Et si continuo creditur moriturus, reconcilietur per manus impositionem, et infundatur ori ejus eucharistia. Si supervixerit, admoneatur a supra dictis testibus, petitioni suæ satisfactum; et subdatur statutis pœnitentiæ legibus, quamdiu sacerdos, qui pœnitentiam dederit, probaverit.” Conc. Carthag. iv. (A.D. 398), c. lxxvi.;

ap. Labb. Concil., tom. ii. pp. 1205. E, 1206. A.—“Pœnitentes, qui in infirmitate viaticum eucharistiæ acceperint, non se credant absolutos sine manus impositione, si supervixerint.” Ibid., c. lxxviii.; *ibid.*, p. 1206. B.—And see Morinus, De Pœnitent., lib. x. c. 5. pp. 726. 2. E, sq.

<sup>x</sup> See Bingham, XVIII. iv. 3.

<sup>y</sup> “Hi qui in discrimine constituti pœnitentiam accipiunt, nulla manifesta scelera confitentis, sed tantum peccatores se prædicantes, hujusmodi, si revaluerint, possunt etiam pro morum probitate ad gradus ecclesiasticos pervenire. Qui vero ita pœnitentiam accipiunt, ut aliquod mortale peccatum perpetrasse publice fateantur, ad clerum vel ad honores ecclesiasticos pervenire nullatenus poterunt, quia se confessione propria notaverunt.” Concil. Tolet. iv. (A.D. 633) c. liv.; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. v. p. 1718. C, D.—See Morinus, De Pœnit., lib. v. c. 18. § 11. p. 299. 1. D—2. B.

<sup>z</sup> “Is vero qui ægritudinis languore depressus, pœnitentiæ benedictionem (quam viaticum deputamus) per communionem acceperit; et postmodum reconvalescens caput pœnitentiæ in ecclesia publice non subdiderit; si prohibitis vitiis non detinetur obnoxius, admittatur ad clerum,” Concil. Gerund. (held at Gerona in Catalonia, A.D. 517). c. ix.; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. p. 1569. A.—See Bingham, IV. iii. 6.

<sup>a</sup> See above, c. iv. § 15. note u.—



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properly under penance, the sin that is supposed in the case of the former canon not being specified, but only generally confessed for sin. Whereby it appeareth sufficiently, that, in regard it is possible the sorrow wherewith a man submitteth to penance in that case should be so sincere as to obtain pardon at God's hands, therefore the communion was not refused; but, in regard of the doubt that remained in the business, the Church warranted not the pardon, till satisfied of his conversion by the performance of his penance. And therefore it is manifest, that the ancient Church did not believe "attrition" to be changed into "contrition" by submitting to the keys of the Church; making question of the salvation of those upon whom the keys of the Church had passed, because the operation of penance enjoined was prevented by death. And so the practice of the ancient Church concurrereth with the doctrine of the Apostles, to assure us of the necessity and efficacy of the works of humiliation and mortification for sin, in appeasing the wrath and recovering the favour of God, in obtaining forgiveness of sin, and restoring to the state of grace; which the ancient Church calleth satisfying for sin<sup>b</sup>.

[Penance not enjoined with the intent of extinguishing a debt of temporal punishment.]

§ 10. By the same means it remains manifest, that these satisfactions are neither enjoined grievous sinners by the Scriptures, nor notorious sinners by the Church, out of any intent of extinguishing a debt of temporal punishment, remaining after the sin is pardoned<sup>c</sup>. That God, when He

Such was the rule among the Latins. In the Eastern Church, on the contrary, not the publicity of the crime, constituted the bar to holy orders.—"Crimina apud Orientales incapacitatis ad ordines causam fuisse, non publicam Pœnitentiam." Morinus, De Pœn., lib. v. c. 19. title, p. 303. 1. D.

<sup>b</sup> See e. g. the admission of Morinus, and of Maldonatus quoted by him, De Pœnitent., lib. iii. c. 11. § 14. p. 163. 1. E, 2. A. "Ideo non mihi videtur a vero abhorrere quod scripsit Maldonatus tom. ii. De Sacramentis c. 2. 'Et si sententia nostra' (Catholicorum) 'de pœnæ satisfactione vera est; tamen veteres scriptores valde parce et valde raro fecerunt mentionem de illa; sed quotiescunque fere agunt de satisfactione, agunt de satisfactione pro culpa,

ut perspicuum est ex superius citatis: non quidem quod ignorarint hanc satisfactionem pro pœna, sed quod cum egissent tam accurate de satisfactione pro culpa, quæ difficilior est, non putarint esse opus agere de altera satisfactione.'"—And see the whole of c. 12. of Morinus himself, *ibid.*, pp. 163. 2. C—168. 2. A.

<sup>c</sup> "Quod sæpe, remissa culpa, maneat debitum luendæ pœnæ:—"Reatum pœnæ temporalis, qui interdum remanet post amicitiam cum Deo reformatam, bonis operibus redimi posse:—"Opera laboriosa, quibus reatus pœnæ temporalis expiatur, sponte suscipi posse:—"but also, "Opera quibus reatus peccati præteriti expiatur, recte a sacerdotibus injungi:—"Opera satisfactoria esse, Orationem, Jejunium, et Eleemosynam:—"and, "Posse ho-

gave the Gospel, might have reserved a debt of temporal punishment upon them, whose sin He pardoneth by virtue of it; I question not. That He hath reserved it, can never be proved: the penalties, which He exerciseth His children with, being rather chastisements of love than revenges of wrath. That this debt, if not extinguished here by satisfaction enjoined in penance, remains for purgatory in the world to come<sup>d</sup>, I cannot here dispute: not having yet considered the effect of the keys of the Church in penance<sup>e</sup>: and therefore, for the ground of it, which must come from hence, I shall conclude according to the premisses—

§ 11. That the condition, which the Gospel requireth to bring a man to the state of God's grace for remission of sins and right to everlasting life, in point of conscience as to God (as well as in point of profession as to the Church), is presupposed to every man's being a Christian, and a member of the Church: with this difference, indeed, between them, that are invited by the Church to be Christians, and them, who being Christians shall relapse to those sins which by their Christianity they profess to forsake; that, to those that are without, the cure of sin is tendered merely as physic, which the physician hath no means to constrain a man to take, but his own interesse; but to those that are within, out of that authority and jurisdiction, which the corporation of the Church foundeth. The last resolution whereof, though it end in the interest of a man's own good, which moveth him to profess Christianity; yet, that profession having engaged him to be a Christian, by it he stands bound to stand

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[How the  
Church  
pardons  
sins.]

minem justificatum vere Deo satisfacere pro reatu pœnæ temporalis:”—are the propositions which Bellarmine successively sets himself to prove, De Pœnitent., lib. iv. cc. 2—7. (Controv., tom. ii. pp. 1423. B—1441. B).

<sup>d</sup> Bellarm., De Purgatorio, lib. i. c. 1. (Controv., tom. 1. p. 1775. C): “Purgatorium, locus quidam, in quo tanquam in carcere post hanc vitam purgantur animæ quæ in hac non plene purgatæ fuerunt, ut nimirum sic purgatæ in cœlum ingredi valeant.”—And see Id., De Indulgentiis, lib. i. c. 7. Prop. 4: p. 45. Colon. 1619.—And Eugenii IV. Bulla Unionis inter Græcos et Latinos (Concil. Florentini. A. D.

1439, Sess. xxv.; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. xiii. p. 515. B): “Si vere pœnitentes in Dei caritate decesserint, antequam dignis pœnitentiæ fructibus de commissis satisfecerint et onissis, eorum animas pœnis purgatoriis post mortem purgari.”—And Bellarmine again, De Purgatorio, lib. i. c. 7. (Controv., tom. i. p. 1822. D): “Cum reconciliantur Deo peccatores, non dimittitur semper cum peccato tota pœna temporalis: at potest fieri, et sæpe fit, ut in tota vita aliquis non satisfecerit plene pro temporali illa pœna: ergo necessario statui debet Purgatorium.”

<sup>e</sup> See below in Bk. III. Of the Laws of the Ch., cc. ix., sq.

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to the judgment of the Church, in all things within the authority of it. Now if the Church ought to presume, that he, who is admitted to the communion thereof, is qualified for remission of sin, before he be restored to it; then cannot a man, by being restored to the communion of the Church, become qualified for it: unless it can be said, that the absolution of the Church can presuppose that which it effecteth; which without a contradiction cannot be said. The Church then pardons not sin otherwise, than as, by the power of the keys, obliging the relapsed to use that cure which it prescribeth, upon presumption of the cure wrought, it warranteth pardon, as having effected that disposition which qualifyeth a man for it. So that all the satisfaction that the Church can have, that a man is qualified for pardon, proceeds upon a presumption, that God first is satisfied by the conversion of a sinner to that disposition, which He requireth to remission of sin; but evidently, in consideration of our Lord Christ, because by the Gospel, whereof He is the subject.

[2.] Merit  
by virtue  
of God's  
promise,  
necessary.

§ 12. As for the merit of Christian men's works in relation to the world to come: if it be considered, on one hand, how many ways the Scripture declareth, that it is impossible for any creature of God to come before-hand with Him that made it (because His all-sufficiency allows Him not capable of any advantage, that He may receive from it); on the other hand, that by original concupiscence we are utterly disabled to satisfy for that, in which we are come behind-hand with God, and for the future to satisfy that original rule of righteousness due from man to God, which our creation establisheth: I shall not need to use many words in a plain case, that by the original law of God no man can merit the reward of everlasting life. But, by the promise of the Gospel, God is tied to reward them with it. For, on the other side, it is most evident [by<sup>f</sup>] the Scriptures, as well of the New Testament as of the Old (in which I have shewed how that salvation which we attain by the Gospel is intimated<sup>g</sup>), that the favour of God, and everlasting life, is the prize of that goal, the crown of that conquest, the wage of that good fight

<sup>f</sup> Corrected from MS.; "that," in orig. text.

<sup>g</sup> Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. v. § 33, and cc. xii., xiii.

of faith, which a Christian in this warfare upon earth professeth: the scriptures that contain this sense being every where so express, and so well known, that I conceive I do the reader an ease in sparing him the pains of reading them here again, after so many canvasses. But, besides, the main point established at the beginning of this Book<sup>h</sup> enforces inevitably all that this resolution imports. For if God have by the Gospel imposed upon Christians the condition of new obedience, which Christians through His grace by Christ are able to tender Him, [promising<sup>i</sup>] to recompense them with such a reward; [then God<sup>k</sup>] stands by His free promise engaged to it, in consideration of that new obedience which He requires. This is the utmost, which the name of "merit" can enforce; understanding it to be grounded upon the promise of God, declared by the Gospel, which nothing but His own free grace, designed through and in consideration of our Lord Christ, before all consideration of any new obedience of Christians (which wholly dependeth upon the same), could ever have moved Him to set on foot. For having said before<sup>l</sup>, that a meritorious cause can have no place in respect of God, otherwise than as He designs us good in consideration of good, though the good He considers be originally His own gift (whereas men are obliged, in reason and justice, to reward that good which themselves are prevented with, originally, as to them, moving and obliging them to reward it); be the merit of Heaven never so fully ascribed to the works of Christians (who are obliged to understand it so to be ascribed by virtue of the covenant of grace), it can be understood to signify no more, than a quality which it requireth, upon which the reward becomes due by virtue of that promise which requireth it.

§ 13. And that this is the sense of the Catholic Church, among infinite arguments, this is enough to demonstrate: because, whereas it is very well known, that the Latin fathers do attribute the style and virtue of merits, and meriting at God's hands, to the works of Christians, in respect to everlasting life<sup>m</sup>; the Greek fathers, in whose mouths the word

The Catholic Church agrees in it.

<sup>h</sup> ec. ii., sq.

<sup>i</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>k</sup> Added from MS.

<sup>l</sup> Above, c. xxvi. § 5.

<sup>m</sup> "Omnia quæ patimur, minora sunt et indigna quorum pro laboribus tanta

BOOK  
II.

could not be, expressing the same sense in such terms as their own language affords<sup>n</sup> (for who ever undertook to shew any difference of sense between them?); those of the Reformation have always maintained, that their sense is the same with the sense of the ancient Church in the mouth of the fathers<sup>o</sup>. For if in their mouth that word can import no prejudice to Christianity, neither can it import any now; unless the signification thereof be further limited by other terms, which being added to it, every man will allow, may determine a sense utterly prejudicial to it. True it is, divers have observed, that the word "*mereri*" in good Latin (especially of those later ages, in which the fathers writ) signifies no more than to "attain, compass," or "purchase<sup>o</sup>:" arguing from thence, that the works of Christians merit heaven in their sense and language no otherwise, than because they are the means by which we attain it. So Cassander<sup>p</sup> ob-

pendunt futurorum merces bonorum, quæ revelabitur in nobis, cum ad Dei imaginem reformati gloriam Ejus facie ad faciem aspicere *meruerimus*." S. Ambros., *Epist.* xxxv. § 5. *Op.*, tom. ii. p. 926. A.—"Ut omnis peccator propterea de se non desperet, quia Paulus *meruit indulgentiam*." S. Aug., *Serm.* clxx. c. 1, § 1; *Op.*, tom. v. p. 819. C.—And see below in note q; and Ussher as quoted in note o, from whom the above quotations are borrowed.—"Hæc autem omnia breviter et argute complexus est Bernardus, cum inquit, *Ea quæ vocantur merita, viam esse regni, non caussam regnandi*." Cassander, *Hymn. Eccles.*, *Op.*, p. 263: quoting S. Bernard., *De Gratia et Lib. Arbit.*, c. xiv. § 51; *Op.*, vol. i. tom. ii. p. 630. B. ed. Mabillon Paris. 1719.—"Quanto quis Eï (Domino) familiaris pro vitæ meritis ac mentis puritate appropriat," &c. S. Bernard., *Super Cantic.*, *Serm.* xxii. § 1; *Op.*, vol. i. tom. iv. p. 1340. A.—"Ita anima peccatrix aut in inferno pro peccatis cruciatur, aut in paradiso pro bonis meritis collocatur." Id., *Meditat. Piissinæ*, c. iii. § 10; *ibid.*, vol. ii. tom. v. p. 337. C.

<sup>n</sup> "Κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν πράξεων"—"ἀποδοῦσαι (ὁ Θεὸς) τὰ κατ' ἀξίαν"—"ὁ τῆς εὐπειθείας μισθός"—κ.τ.λ.—See passages containing these and similar expressions, from S. Ignatius, Justin Martyr, S. Irenæus, Origen, S. Basil the Great, S. Chrysostom, S. Gregory Nazianz., S. Gregory of Nyssa; in

Bellarm., *De Justif.*, lib. v. c. 4; *Controv.*, tom. iii. pp. 1252. C, 1253. B.—So in the Scriptures themselves, ἀξίον, ἀξιοῦσθαι, καταξιοῦσθαι (*Juke* xx. 35, 2 *Thess.* i. 5, *Revel.* iii. 4).

<sup>o</sup> See Ussher, *Ans. to Jesuit* c. xii. *Of Merits; Works*, vol. iii. pp. 551, sq. ed. Elrington: and Forbes, *Consid. Mod.*, *De Justif.*, lib. v. c. 1. § 5. pp. 432—436. The latter cites, of Protestants, using or defending the word in the sense here given, both as true and as the meaning of the word in the fathers, the Apology for the Confess. of Augsburg, the Confession of Wirttemberg (c. 7. *De Bonis Operibus*, § 9), Chemnitz (*Exam. Conc. Trident.*, P. i. *De Bonis Operibus*, Qu. iv. *De præmiis et meritis bonor. operum*, § Hæc doctrina, p. 185), the Acts of the Conference of Altenburg (pp. 110, 265), Bucer in the Acts of the Second Conference at Ratisbon, G. Voss. (*Theol. Disp. v. De Bonorum Operum Meritis*, p. 66), Davenant (*Disput. de Justitia Actuali*, c. liii. p. 569), Hooker (*Eccles. Polit.*, V. lxxii. 9), Covell (*Defence of Hooker*, art. vi. pp. 43, 44).

<sup>p</sup> "Vocabulum merendi apud veteres ecclesiasticos scriptores fere idem valet quod consequi seu aptum idoneumque fieri ad consequendum; id quod inter cætera vel ex uno Cypriani loco apparet. Nam quod Paulus inquit 1 *Timoth.* i. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἠλεήθην, quod vulgo legitur, 'misericordiam consecutus sum,' vel ut Erasmus vertit, 'mise-



serves, that St. Paul's "Ἀλλ' ἠλεήθην" (1 Tim. i. 13) is by St. Cyprian translated "*misericordiam merui*<sup>a</sup>:" not intending to say, that St. Paul "deserved" that mercy, which he professes to have received of grace; but only to signify, that he "found" mercy, and "attained" it. But though I should grant, that this word may signify no more in the language of the fathers; yet the faith, and the sense out of which it is evident that they spake, will enforce, that it doth signify as much as I say, when they speak of our coming to heaven by our works. For having once resolved, that the covenant of grace renders life everlasting due by God's promise to those, that live as at their baptism they undertook (though not for the worth of their works, yet by the mercy of God in Christ, which moved Him to tender such a promise); he that says, a man attains heaven by the means of those works which he lives in like a Christian, says, that those works of his do merit heaven, in the sense that I challenge.

§ 14. For as for those, that will have the works of Christians to merit heaven of their own intrinsic value; of those I have already said<sup>r</sup>, that I conceive they do prejudice the Christian faith; in not allowing the necessity of God's grace through Christ, in accepting the condition, which the Gospel requires, for such a reward as the intrinsic value of it cannot deserve by God's original law. For granting those helps of God's grace in Christ, being supernatural and heavenly, to hold proportion and correspondence with the reward of life everlasting<sup>s</sup>, which is the same; yet will it not follow, that in all regards (for the purpose, in that the actions which they produce are momentary, the reward everlasting; which is the consideration St. Paul uses, Rom. viii. 18, 2 Cor. iv. 17, 18<sup>t</sup>)

CHAP.  
XXXIII.  
["but I  
obtained  
mercy."  
Eng. vers.]

[Merit of  
works for  
their own  
intrinsic  
value, pre-  
judicial to  
the Chris-  
tian faith.]

ricordiam adeptus sum,' id Cyprianus (Ad Jubaianum) legit, 'Misericordiam merui:' et multa loca sunt in ecclesiasticis officiis et precibus, ubi hoc vocabulum hoc intellectu accipi debet. Quæ vocis notio si retineatur, multa quæ durius dici videntur, mitiora et commodiora apparebunt." Cassander, Hymn. Ecclesiast. (Op., p. 179. fol. Paris. 1616, and see also p. 263); commenting on the words of the hymn, "Cum suis sanctis mereamur aulam Ingredi cœli, simul et beatam Ducere vitam." Forbes, who quotes the pas-

sage (as cited in last note, § 4. p. 432), adds, "Quæ verba more suo, hoc est, plane tyrannico, expungi jusserunt Hispanici Censores."

<sup>a</sup> Epist. ad Jubaianum, Ep. lxxiii. p. 204. ed. Fell: quoted by Cassander as above. So also S. Aug., De Baptism. cont. Donatistas, lib. iv. c. 5. § 7; Op., tom. ix. p. 124. G.

<sup>r</sup> Above, c. xxx. § 19.

<sup>s</sup> See a statement of the Roman doctrine to this purpose, in Forbes, Cons. d. Mod., De Justif., lib. v. c. 4. pp. 479. sq.

<sup>t</sup> "1 Cor. vii. 17, 18;" in folio edi-

the correspondence will produce an equality of value. And though the first principle of them be heavenly and supernatural (which is the help which God for Christ's sake allows), yet, seeing that it comes not immediately to effect, but by the means of the faculties of man's soul infected with original concupiscence, it cannot be said, that they can demand a reward correspondent to heavenly grace alone, when earthly weakness concurs to imbase and allay the value of that which it produceth.

The present Church of Rome allows [but does not enjoin] merit of justice.

§ 15. But as it cannot be denied, that the Church of Rome, in which that order which maintains this extremity<sup>u</sup> hath so great credit, allows this doctrine of merit to be taught; yet can it not be said to enjoin it: because there have not wanted, to this day, doctors of esteem, that have always held otherwise. Among whom I may very well name Sylvius, now or lately professor of divinity at Douay<sup>v</sup>: who, in his commentaries upon the second part of Thomas Aquinas his Sum<sup>x</sup>, expounds that "*meritum de condigno*," which the

tion: which seems an evident misprint. It is corrected in MS. into "1 Cor. iv. 17, 18;" and plainly should have been further corrected as above given in the text.

<sup>u</sup> viz. the Jesuits. See above, c. xxx. § 21: and Forbes as quoted in c. xxxiii. § 14. note s.

<sup>v</sup> Francisci Sylvi a Brania Comitis, S.T.D., et ejusdem in Acad. Duacena Regii et Ordinarii Professoris, &c., Commentarius in Totam Primam Secundæ S. Tho. Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici et Communiis, folio Duaci, 1635. His proper name was Francois du Bois. He died at Douay in 1649. See Moreri.

<sup>x</sup> "An necessaria sit promissio et pactum de mercede reddenda, ad hoc ut opera bona sint vitæ æternæ meritoria de condigno." F. Sylvius, *ibid.*, Qu. cxiv. art. ii. title of Qu. 4: tom. ii. p. 875. I. C.—"Sunt doctores non contemnendi, qui negant:" but "Resp. communiorem ac omnino probabiliorem esse sententiam eorum, qui affirmant requiri pactum seu promissionem mercedis, ad hoc ut justorum opera veram ac proprie dictam habeant rationem meriti de condigno; non sic quidem quasi illa opera valorem sui dignitatem suam intrinsecam habeant ex ejusmodi pacto; sed quoniam ultra dignitatem quam totam ex gratia habent, necessarium sit

pactum seu promissio de reddenda mercede, ad hoc ut illi qui ex gratia sunt bene operati, habeant jus ad vitam æternam tanquam ad mercedem; utque ipsorum opera vere ac proprie sint talis vitæ meritoria." *Id.*, *ibid.*, I. C, E. 2. A.—"Confirmatur: si bona opera justorum tantum ex natura sua et non ex vi alicujus promissionis essent apud Deum meritoria de condigno, Christus non meruisset nobis vitam æternam directe, sed solum indirecte, quatenus gratiam et in ea perseverantiam nobis promeruit: certum est autem quod non minus directe nobis meruit gloriam quam gratiam, ut et per se patet, et habetur ex Concil. Trident. . . Assumpt. probatur, quia secluso Christi merito quoad respectum vitæ æternæ, illa vita nihilominus esset debita propter naturam et qualitatem ipsorum operum, si verum foret quod eam de condigno mereantur absque pacto vel promissione quæ propter Christi merita sit facta." *Id.*, *ibid.*, p. 875. 2. E, 876. I. A.—"Denique, si quis alienum agrum colat, . . nullo prorsus interveniente pacto vel promissione mercedis, alter non tenetur ex justitia mercedem ei dare, ac per consequens ipse non est eam ex condigno meritus." *Id.*, *ibid.*, p. 876. I. C. D.—He says however afterwards, that "audiendi non sunt

School attributes to the works of Christians, to be grounded ‘*in dignatione Dei* ;’ because God vouchsafes and ‘deigns’ to accept them, whose they are, as worthy of the reward ; expressing also the promise of the Gospel, whereby this condescension of God is declared.

§ 16. The school doctors found out the terms of “*meritum ex congruo et ex condigno*”—“merit of congruity and condignity :” some of them, because they thought, that the works of mere nature deserve supernatural grace, in regard that it is fit, that God should reward him that doth his best with it ; [some of them,] that works done in the state of grace are worth the glory of the world to come. But as the former

C H A P.  
XXXIII.

[“*Meritum ex congruo et ex condigno.*”]

qui valorem seu dignitatem operis meritorii desumi volunt ex *sola Dei externa* acceptatione,” &c. ; for “*juxta hanc sententiam opera justorum non habent condignitatem veram et intrinsicam ad mercedem vitæ æternæ, ac per consequens non essent etiam proprie meritoria de condigno, sed deberetur eis vita æterna solum propter promissionem et non propter opera.*” Id., *ibid.*, art. iii. Qu. 2. p. 882. 2. C, D.

According to Vasquez, Scotus, Biel, and Cardinal Cajetan, teach, that “*posse hominem dolere de peccatis, propter Deum super omnia dilectum, ex propriis viribus, et hanc esse ultimam dispositionem ad gratiam habitualem justificantem, et meritum ad illam, non quidem condignum sed congruum : atque hanc contritionem posterius natura informatam gratia habituali esse jam meritoriam de condigno regni cælorum.*” Vasquez, In Prim. Part. D. Thomæ, Disp. xci. c. 10. § 59 ; tom. i. p. 645. b. Ingolst. 1609.—“*Ex historia Concilii Tridentini*” (Father Paul’s Hist. of the Council of Trent, Brent’s translation ; “lib. ii., ad annum 1546,” pp. 197, 198. Lond. 1640) “*patet in eo concilio Franciscanos magna cum contentione defendisse jam dictam opinionem*” (that above cited from Vasquez) “*Gabrielis et Scoti, affirmantes opera moralia, ex viribus naturæ ante gratiam facta, hominem vere et proprie præparare ad justificationem, ac illam infallibiliter et ex certa lege de congruo mereri, hominemque per naturam posse talem dolorem de peccato concipere, ut remissionem ejus de congruo mereatur.*” Le Blanc, *Thes. Theol.*, *Thes.* an homo in statu peccati solis naturæ viribus, &c., § 7. p. 645.—

And after the council of Trent,—“*Quamvis nullus sibi mereatur primam gratiam, secundum quod dictum est, potest tamen peccator se habilitare ad gratiam, faciendo quod in se est, quia nulli talium gratia denegatur : hoc autem non est ex merito digni vel condigni sed congrui.*” J. de Combis, *Compend. Totius Theol. Verit.*, lib. v. c. 12. p. 405. 12mo. Lugd. 1579. And in the preceding chapter, “*Dicendum ergo quod nullus meretur sibi primam gratiam merito digni vel merito condigni sed tantummodo merito congrui.*” Id., *ibid.*, c. 11. p. 404.—And see the whole Thesis of Le Blanc, just cited, whence these passages are borrowed.—“*Quamvis communiter doceant (doctores scholæ Romanæ) bona opera justorum ad vitam æternam habere condignitatem et proportionem quandam, attamen alii plus, alii minus, hac in parte bonis operibus tribuunt. Siquidem nonnulli sunt qui bonis operibus ex gratia Christi factis æquale omnino pretium cum vita æterna tribuere videntur. Inter hos numerare possumus Gabr. Vasquez. Nam tom. ii. in l. 2. Disp. cexiv. c. 11” (§ 80, 81. p. 818. a, b.) “*dicit vitam æternam et bona justorum opera inæqualia quidem esse secundum id quod formaliter habent, . . sed hoc non obstat quominus inter bona illa opera et vitam æternam sit æqualitas secundum dignitatem et meritum. . . Unde postea disp. cexv. c. 2” (§ 6. p. 823. b.) “*collegit a Colonien-sibus Jesuitis recte dictum cælum proponi nobis venale, et quod meritis condignis tanquam pretio æquali comparandum sit. . . Alii vero minus dure hac in parte loquuntur. . . Bellarminus, De Justificatione, lib. v. c. 17” (Con-***

part of the position, which is planted upon these terms, is rejected by many; so they, who only acknowledge "*meritum congruū*" in works done in the state of grace (that is to say, that it is fit for God to reward them with His kingdom), say no more, than that it was fit for God to promise such a reward: which whoso denieth, must say, that God hath promised that which it was unfit for Him to promise. And if the dignity of our works, in respect of the reward, may have this tolerable sense, because God deigns and vouchsafes it; the council of Trent, which hath enacted no reason why they are to be counted merits<sup>z</sup>, can neither bear out these high opinions, nor be said to prejudice the faith in this point. For "the kingdom of God is not in word but in power," if St. Paul say true. And therefore, though I affect not the term of merit (which divers of the Reformation do not reject<sup>a</sup>), yet can I not think it so far from the truth, so prejudicial to the faith, as the peevish opinions of those, that allow not good works necessary to salvation, but as signs of faith<sup>b</sup>. For that which necessarily comes in consideration

[1 Cor. iv.  
20.]

trov., tom. iii. p. 1300. B.) "dicit quidem bonum opus justi esse 'par et æquale mercedi' vitæ æternæ: sed istud postea exponit de æqualitate proportionali, c. 18" (ibid., p. 1304. B.); ubi dicit ad meritum ex condigno non requiri æqualitatem absolutam inter meritum et premium; sed satis esse proportionalem, qualis inter fontem et flumen, . . . inter semen et rem cujus est semen, . . . inter viam et terminum ad quem via illa ducit" (c. 17. pp. 1301, 1302). Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. de bonor. operum relat. ad vitam ætern., P. ii. § 3—5. pp. 597, 598.—And see the Thesis itself at length.

<sup>z</sup> "Si quis dixerit, hominis justificati bona opera ita esse dona Dei ut non sint etiam bona ipsius justificati merita, aut ipsum justificatum, bonis operibus, quæ ab eo per Dei gratiam, et Jesu Christi meritum, . . . fiunt, non vere mereri augmentum gratiæ, vitam æternam, et ipsius vitæ æternæ, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem, atque etiam gloriæ augmentum; anathema esto."—Conc. Trident., Sess. vi. can. 32; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. xiv. p. 768. A.

<sup>a</sup> See above, § 13. note o.

<sup>b</sup> So e. g. Bucanus, Instit. Theol., Locus xxxii. De Bonis Operibus, Qu.

xxiii. (p. 366. 12mo. 1604): "Annon etiam in Evangelio passim promittuntur bonis nostris operibus multa beneficia tam temporalia quam æterna? Promittuntur sane. . . At non sub conditione operum, quæ ipsa nobis procurent illa beneficia, sed quæ ostendant et arguant, tanquam effecta notiora nobis, participes nos esse conditionis illius, quæ est in fœdere gratiæ, quaque sola impleta procurantur illa beneficia, nec ut debita sed ut gratuita præmia rependuntur."—And Beza, Confess. Christ. Fidei, c. iv. § 19 (pp. 46—49. Genev. 1586): "Quorsum nobis utilia sint bona opera apud Deum et apud homines? . . . Primum hac ratione solemus proximis nostris vel Christo lucrifacere," &c. "Secundo, bonis operibus certiores fimus nostræ salutis, non tanquam causis. . . sed tanquam testibus et effectis causæ instrumentalibus per quam adipiscimur salutem, fidei videlicet. . . Tertio, . . . profitemur, tantam esse Dei bonitatem, ut, quoniam adoptivos Suos filios non in ipsis sed in unico Suo Filio. . . considerat, neque in æstimandis donorum Suorum fructibus rationem habeat ejus pollutionis quæ a nostræ carnis imbecillitate promanat, sed purissimi illius fontis a quo profluit, id est Spiritus Christi:?" and so,



with God in bestowing the reward (which the condition He contracteth for, must necessarily do), though it cannot have the nature of merit (because the covenant itself is granted merely of grace, in consideration of Christ's death), yet it is of necessity to be reduced to the nature and kind of the meritorious cause. Nor can the glory of God, or the merit of Christ, be obscured by any consideration of our works, that is grounded upon the merit of our Lord Christ, and expresseth the tincture of His blood.

"eo usque probet (opera nostra), ut mercede dignetur, tum in hac vita tum etiam in futura; . . . minime id quidem quasi hæc merces operibus nostris debeat, sed pro mera Sua gratia et misericordia." . . . Quarto quum bona opera sint fidei nostræ testimonia, consequitur etiam inde petendam aliquo ex parte justificationem æternæ nostræ electionis."—And to the same purpose, in his *Quæst. et Respons. Christian. Libellus*, P. 1. p. 65. 12mo. 1587.—And, at a later time, *Placæus*, *Thes. Theol. Salmur.*, vol. i. *De Justif.*, *Thes.* xli. p. 35 (quoted by *Bull*, *Harm. Apost.*, *Diss. Post.*, c. iii. § 4: *Works*, vol. iii. p. 90); "Justificamur etiam operibus quatenus iis fides ostenditur."—And *Tully*, in his answer to *Bull's Harmony*, ap. *Bull. Apol. pro Harm.*, *Sect.* iii. § 6. *Works*, vol. iv. pp. 340, 341: "Nec contrahitur, an sensu declarativo sua bonis operibus tribuenda sit justificatio, tum domi scilicet et in foro conscientiæ apud ipsum justificatum, tum foris apud alios."—Again; "We confesse a necessary use of good workes: as, first, they doe serve as notable meanes and instruments to set forth God's glorie by. Secondly, by them also our faith is shewed, published, and made knownen,

for the good example of others. Thirdly our owne conscience also is thereby quieted, and our election daily made more sure unto us." *Willet*, *Synops. Papsimi*, p. 1037. *Lond.* 1614.—And, not to multiply quotations, the position is naturally inferred by *Bellarmino* (*De Justif.*, lib. iv. c. 9; *Controv.*, tom. iii. p. 1203. A) from such language as that used by the conference of *Altenberg*, affirming good works to be necessary to a Christian, "non necessitate efficientiæ, sed necessitate presentia."—It should be added, that *Chamier* (*Panstrat.*, tom. iii. lib. xv. c. i. pp. 509, sq.), in answering *Bellarmino*, explains away this distinction: and that even such a theologian as *Paræus* admits, when the proposition is put in express terms, that "vitam æternam promitti operibus, non solum ut sunt signa fidei, sed etiam ut sunt obedientia filialis Patri cœlesti debita; seu ut sunt positio conditionis, sub qua Deus filiis hæreditatem vitæ æternæ donare promittit." *Paræus*, *Resp. ad Bellarm.* *De Justific.*, lib. v. c. 3. p. 1242. *Heidelb.* 1615. And see *Forbes*, *Consid. Modest.*, *De Justif.*, lib. v. c. 1. § 12. pp. 444, 446.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

LAUS DEO.



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\*.\* An Index to the whole of Thorndike's Works will be given in the concluding volume.



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When the two parts of Vol. III. are bound in one vol., the binder will place the table of Contents immediately after the General Title, printed with Part I., omitting the Titles, &c., given with the 2nd part.

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