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THE THEOLOGY
OF
JUSTIN MARTYR

Saint. Justin Martyr

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OF
JUSTIN MARTYR

BY

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TO MY PARENTS
IN LOVING GRATITUDE

PREFACE

A word of explanation is due for the inclusion of the two chapters of Introduction. The desirability of defining one's point of view and terminology before beginning upon a discussion of the Theology of Justin Martyr is increasingly demonstrated as one glances through the literature which has been written upon him. The great interest in Justin is his transitional position. In his writings are to be found for the first time in Christian literature many conceptions and phrases which later theologians used to great effect. But granted that Justin's writings contain philosophic elements which the Synoptics do not, one must still ascertain the source or sources whence these bits have been drawn, before their true meaning or the significance of their use for the character of second century Christianity can be understood. Such a search is impossible without a previous understanding as to the character of the thinking which preceded and surrounded Justin in the Greek world, but unfortunately much of the criticism of Justin has been conducted without definition, and too often without understanding, of the development of Greek thought. The same may be said of Judaism. It is customary to contrast Judaistic with Hellenistic Christianity, as though the terms Judaistic and Hellenistic were mutually exclusive, and had not for centuries been united in a school which men still do not know whether better to call Judaistic Hellenism or Hellenistic Judaism. Here again, it was felt, only misunderstanding could have resulted from an attempt to discuss Justin's relation with Judaism without a preliminary statement of the author's point of view.

The references are for the most part self-explanatory, except perhaps for one device which has been introduced to combine brevity with immediate accessibility of full titles: when a title is to be found in the Bibliography, reference is given by the title number, for example Bib. 313. In that case the title will be found at once by turning to number 313 of the Bibliography. References are given to Justin's writings by chapter, and section as divided in all editions of the Apologies and Dialogue later than Otto, together with the page and letter of the edition of Morellus as given in the margin of Otto's third edition. References to Philo are given by sections in the edition of Cohn and Wendland, to which is added in parentheses the pagination of Mangey as found in the margin of Cohn and Wendland.

My sincere thanks for his help in revising the proofs are due my dear friend Theodore M. Hatfield, Esq., of Lincoln College, Oxford.

Alassio, Italy, March 1, 1923.

E. R. G.

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE PHILOSOPHIC ENVIRONMENT OF JUSTIN MARTYR

The aim of the early Greek Philosophers was to find some central principle in the confused multiplicity of existence. They marked the beginning of the Greek Philosophic movement, because the philosopher is essentially characterized by his desire to view life as an ordered whole, rather than as a succession of disjointed phenomena, and it was these early thinkers who for the first time, at least in the west, attempted to explain the world as a unity. The first suggestions were crudely materialistic. All things are one, it was thought, in the sense that all things are manifestations under varied forms of some single material element. Each of the four elements was suggested as this primal element by a different philosopher (solid, γῆ, disguised under the form of atomistic theories), with the impression that each of the other three elements could be derived from the one primal element by the process of rarification and condensation made familiar in the easy changes of water into a solid or a gas. Our fragments from these very early thinkers are so scanty that we do not know in how great detail they attempted to work out their conceptions. It is likewise impossible to state finally that the primal element was ever regarded by them as more than a vague material substrate, the source and power of whose operation was not questioned at all. But it seems probable that even the earliest thinkers regarded their single element as more than the material principle of unity in the world,

for from a surprising number of them, considering the scantiness of our fragments, a passage has survived in which the primal form of matter is called $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$. Of the many theories proposed to explain the meaning of this $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ it seems that the simple interpretation is the best, that which understands these first attempts at philosophic systems not as mere materialisms but as pantheistic materialisms. That is, before the vastness of the conception of the world as fundamentally homogeneous would inevitably have sprung up a sense of reverence which knew no other way of expressing itself than to assert the divinity of the All. But it was an instinctively pantheistic materialism, not an expressly pantheistic system, which the earliest philosophers taught. An interesting illustration is to be found in the advance of Xenophanes upon Anaximines. Anaximines had said that the primordial element was air, and Anaximines had himself called air $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$.¹ Xenophanes seems to have followed Anaximines in his assumption of air as the primordial element, but he called the world God, a living, breathing thing,² and in doing so Xenophanes represents a very definite advance over the vagueness of the earliest use of $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ as applied to the primal material element.

It is a matter of serious dispute whether Heraclitus did or did not advance measurably beyond a vague pantheistic tendency. The primal element of Heraclitus was fire, by which he probably understood intensely hot and greatly rarified mist or aether. But the difficulty in connection with Heraclitus lies in several ambiguous passages where he speaks of Logos. Since the time of the Stoics the traditional interpretation of these passages has been that by "Logos" Heraclitus meant "all-pervading Reason", and that this Logos was to be identified with primordial fire in the sense that fire was more than the material principle of the universe and the source of all things existing, but that it was also intelligent, and that its omnipresence

¹ Diels: *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 3. Aufl. 1912 I. 24 (Anaximines A. 10).

² Arist. *Met.* A. 5. 986. b. 10 et al.

meant an omnipresent and cosmic intelligence and reasoning force. This traditional interpretation, as will be seen, corresponds in general with the teaching of the Stoics, and represents Heraclitus, briefly, as a Stoic before the Stoa. That the Stoics were deeply indebted to Heraclitus cannot be doubted, but on that very account their testimony as to the Logos of Heraclitus must be treated with all the more caution, for the Stoics were never content at purely eclectic appropriations from the older philosophers, but by their avowed practice of "accommodating" (συννοικειοῦν), they tried to represent all their predecessors of note as teachers of Stoic principles. The Stoics insisted that they followed Heraclitus not only in their choice of an ultimate material element, but in regarding that element as identical with a universal Logos.¹ The verbal similarity between Heraclitus' Logos and the Logos of Stoicism made his doctrine so easy a subject for accommodation that their testimony as to what he taught has no independent value. It is hard to understand how Zeller, fully understanding the practice of the Stoics in accommodating, could say that the doctrine of Heraclitus must be understood in Stoic terms.² The difficulty with accepting the Stoic view of Heraclitus is that while his fragments are intelligible as the Stoics read them, yet they can be read equally intelligibly in quite another sense. Thus the two latest antagonists in the discussion, Burnet,³ and Adam,⁴ each advance plausible arguments for opposing interpretations, but neither advances conclusive arguments. Adam defends the traditional interpretation, while Burnet asserts that Heraclitus meant by Logos only his own message to mankind, much as the word "Report" is used in Isaiah 53. 1. The fact seems to be that the evidence we now possess will never warrant a conclusive opinion on the subject, and that it is equally daring to say of Heraclitus either that he did or did not teach a "Logos Doctrine".

¹ Sext. Math. VII. 127 ff.

² Philosophie der Griechen I. ii. (6. Aufl. 1920) 840 n. 3
Engl. Tr.: Presocratic Philosophers, II. 43, n. i.

³ Early Greek Philosophers 3d Ed. p. 133 ff.

⁴ The Vitality of Platonism, Camb. 1911 p. 76 ff. Essay.
The Logos in Heracleitus.

More important than the doctrine of Heraclitus, as an early antecedent of the Logos Doctrine, was the teaching of Anaxagoras, who tried to reconcile the contradictions of the world about him by the introduction of a primordial *νοῦς*.¹ He conceived of the world as the combination of a large group of opposites,² which were at first mingled together in hopeless confusion. Out of this chaos *νοῦς* separated the opposites, and then combined them again in such a way as to produce the phenomenal world. "All things were mingled together, then mind came and ordered them."³ Anaxagoras was fundamentally dualistic: in contrast with the world in which all things are compounds he predicated the *νοῦς* whose nature is uncompounded. Here is the dualism of God and the world which was continued in most of the greater philosophies of Greece, and which, strengthened by a similar dualism from Judaism, went on into Christian theology. The *νοῦς*, according to Anaxagoras, is essentially unlike all other things, and yet it is not infinitely removed from the world, but dwells in all living creatures.⁴ Anaxagoras represents a distinct advance upon the other early philosophers of Greece, and did much to shape the doctrine that later was called Logos, for with him the early and vague *θεός* was beginning to take on the attribute of Reason, and, as Reason, to occupy an important position in an explanation of the Universe.

But it was exactly in the matter of the importance attached to the *νοῦς* that Plato and Aristotle⁵ found fault with Anaxagoras. Plato said, and Aristotle echoed him, that he had hoped to find in Anaxagoras a more satisfactory

¹ Arist. (Met. A. iii. 984. b. 18) says that Anaxagoras learned of the *νοῦς* from Hermotimus the Clazomenian, but nothing is known of Hermotimus beyond this statement of Aristotle. Cf. Zeller I. ii. (1920) 1267 n. 2; Engl. Tr.: Presoc. Phil. II. 365. n. 1.

² Arist. Met. Γ. 1012. a. 26.

³ Diog. Laert. II. iii. 6 (Rit. et Prel. 153) πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν. Cf. Arist. Met. A. 1069. b. 21.

⁴ Arist. De Anima A. 404. b. 3. Here so real is the all pervasiveness of the Anaxagorean *νοῦς* that Aristotle parallels it to his own *ψυχή* theory.

⁵ Plato: Phaedo 97. c. ff. Arist. Met. A. 985. a. 18.

explanation of the world than the other materialists had given. But he found that Anaxagoras used the *νοῦς* only when the operation of material forces proved an inadequate explanation of some phenomenon, so that Anaxagoras, like his predecessors and contemporaries, did not meet Plato's and Aristotle's needs. But if the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras was inadequately developed, at least Anaxagoras gave direction to a tendency to conceive of reality as a dualism between an all ruling, all pervading and all shaping Intelligence on the one hand, and an inert mass, usually called Matter on the other. The next great step was taken by Plato.¹

While drawing heavily upon Socratic general definitions and the Pythagorean doctrine of number, the Platonic doctrine of Forms seems to have been a new departure in human thought. But brilliant a departure as it was, it is an entirely inadequate philosophic system in the form in which Plato first stated it in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Aristotle's criticisms of the Forms, based fundamentally upon the following three points, have never been successfully controverted:

1. If the Forms are separate entities it is easy to show that there must be a greater number of them than of pheno-

¹ Three fragments from other early writers seem like valuable material for understanding the development of the *Logos* doctrine. They are:

a) Leucippus (Stob. Ecl. 1. 160 R. P. 195. b). *Λεύκιππος πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην, τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν εἰμαρμένην. λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ νοῦ· οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.*

b) Empedocles (from Arist. Met. A. 993. a. 17. cf. De Part. Anim. A. 642. a. 18: *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὅσοτον τῷ λόγῳ φησὶν εἶναι.*

c) Epicharmus (frag. 57. 2, 3, Diels):

ἔστιν ἀνθρώπῳ λογισμός, ἔστι καὶ θεῖος λόγος·

ὁ δὲ γε ἀνθρώπου πέφυκεν ἀπὸ γε τοῦ θείου λόγου.

But the same comment is fairly to be made upon each. In each case there are no further fragments to justify assuming any philosophic conception of a *Logos*. Had there been any such doctrine the chances are overwhelming that a specific tradition and further fragments to that effect would have been preserved. In the absence of such testimony the only safe course is to admit that we have no justification for expanding these isolated fragments into a philosophic system.

mena. Consequently the philosopher is still presented with a hopeless multiplicity to organize and explain, and indeed is in greater perplexity to account for the manifold Forms than for phenomena without them.

2. The Forms as beings separable from Phenomena are bound to lead to infinite regress, the most hopeless of all possible contingencies. For if a separable Form is necessary to account for any two things which resemble each other, then a third Form is necessary to account for the resemblance between the Form and the phenomenon partaking in it. That is: Two men resemble each other because they each partake in a common Form, Humanity. But Humanity and an individual man also resemble each other, and can do so, according to Plato's reasoning, only by both partaking in a third kind of Man, a third Form. The third then calls for a fourth Man by its resemblance to the second, etc., ad infinitum. The argument is called "The Third Man", and is a very fair extension of the reasoning of the Platonism of the earlier Dialogues.

3. The third objection to the Forms is that, granted a world of Forms in which matter participates, the Forms are still completely incapable of producing a world of phenomena because Plato ascribed to the Forms no activity. They are represented as passive. Matter partakes in them, but they have no initiative to join themselves to Matter. Hence they are useless, if they do exist, for the philosopher must supplement them with some efficient cause which will act to bring Matter and the Forms together. On the other hand, if such an efficient cause has been assumed, the Forms themselves become altogether superfluous.

But Aristotle is criticizing not the Plato of the *Parmenides*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*, but the Plato of the *Phaedo* and of the *Republic*, with the *Timaeus* as somewhat transitional. For Plato himself, after he had written his earlier works, criticized his former doctrine of the Forms on much the same grounds as Aristotle, and while he uses the Forms thereafter, they no longer occupy the same important place in his system, nor seem to have the same character, which they had in the earlier Dialogues. Plato's

later metaphysic is very puzzling, partly because of its obscure nature, and partly because he alludes to it in only occasional and very slight passages. In the *Parmenides*¹ he saw that separable Forms, whether as essences, thoughts, or patterns, lead to infinite regress of Forms (the "Third Man" argument), and at the same time he saw that to distinguish fundamentally between the nature of the Forms and the nature of phenomena is to introduce manifold difficulties, for there can be no intercourse between the qualified and the absolute. This argument pointed out the deficiency which Aristotle later suggested, when he demonstrated that in order for the Forms, as Plato described them in his earlier works, to be able to affect Matter there must be in addition to them an Efficient Cause. An Efficient cause, then, Plato was driven to assume, and it is precisely the Efficient Cause which most distinguishes the later from the earlier Plato.

Plato found his efficient principle by developing a conception which had already appeared in the writings of the earlier philosophers, that of the Divine *νοῦς*. He seems to begin at the point where he alleges that Anaxagoras failed,² namely with the attempt to give the *νοῦς* consistent reality. The first important passage is found in the *Timaeus*,³ where God as Creator, who up to that point has been called *θεός* is suddenly called *νοῦς*. But the same conception of the *νοῦς* is expressed more philosophically in the *Philebus*⁴ where the *νοῦς* is represented as the efficient principle in the universe. There are four great divisions of reality, says Plato: 1. The Unlimited, *τὸ ἄπειρον*. This corresponds to *τὸ μὴ ὄν*, Not-Being, which Plato in other passages identifies with Matter. 2. The Limit, *τὸ πέρας*. The meaning of the Limit is much disputed, but it appears to be simply a modification of his older doctrine of Forms. The Limit is *τὸ ὄν*. 3. The Combination of the first two, that is, the world as we see it, which is neither un-

¹ 128. e.—136. a.

² *Phaedo* 97. c. ff.

³ *Timaeus* 39. e. Cf. *Crat.* 396. b. 3; 400. a. 8; 416. b. 10 —d. 10; *Phil.* 28. e. 7; *Laws X.* 891. e. 4. ff; *XII.* 966. e. 4. ff.

⁴ *Phil.* 29. b. 3.—31. a. 10.

qualified Not-Being nor unqualified Being, but which lies between the two in the realm of Becoming. 4. The One who affected the combination, or νοῦς.

In contrast with the division of reality in the Republic¹ two great changes appear in this later analysis. The first is the change in the character of the Forms. Either they have been omitted altogether, or are, as has been suggested, to be discovered very much altered in the Limit. They are no longer treated as separable realities, but have once for all been combined with Matter, and are now to be found only in the combination of Matter and Form, that is in the world of phenomena. This was precisely Aristotle's position. He did not at all deny reality to the Forms, but rather said that the only reality in a given thing lay in its Form.² Formless Matter was τὸ μὴ ὄν. What Aristotle could not accept was the conception of the Forms as found in a separable Intelligible World, and it was precisely that Ideal World which Aristotle later rejected, which Plato seems to have abandoned in this passage. Plato and Aristotle alike finally represented that the Forms are not separable, but exist only in connection with material objects.

The second change is found in the new importance of νοῦς, which is conceived as the Efficient Principle in combining Matter and Form, and at the same time as Universal Intelligence. As Universal Intelligence, νοῦς permeates all things, and by its special indwelling different phenomena become intelligent. Zeller's interpretation of the νοῦς is the usual one.³ He represents it as the equivalent of the Idea of the Good in the old sense of that term, that is as the culminating Form of the hierarchy of separable Forms. But Plato is clearly treating νοῦς as a third principle, different alike from both the Forms and Matter, and as such able to combine and control both.

Plato describes the νοῦς by saying that the Supreme Intelligence is eternally associated with a ψυχῆ, for no νοῦς

¹ 509. d. ff.

² Met. Z. 3.

³ Philosophie der Griechen II. i. (1922) 691 ff., 709 ff.

can exist apart from a ψυχή.¹ Therefore he concludes that there is in the nature of Zeus a βασιλική ψυχή, and a βασιλικὸς νοῦς. This ψυχή—νοῦς—θεός is indifferently denoted by Plato by any one of the three terms. It permeates all things. The creation of the Animus Mundi in the Timaeus is familiar,² but Aristotle is probably true to Plato's thinking when he says that this Animus Mundi is a νοῦς.³ For the assertion is substantiated by a passage in the Politicus, where Plato explains that τὸ πᾶν, the Universe, is said to have been given φρόνησις (= νοῦς) by Him who created it.⁴ But since we know from the Timaeus and Philebus that the Creator was also νοῦς, we have here two νόες, or more properly one νοῦς which permeates into the Universe and imparts itself to it. Similarly Plato mentions a single νοῦς which is present in all the stars,⁵ evidently a further permeation or self impartation of the one νοῦς. In the Philebus⁶ Plato contrasts the νοῦς θεῖος with the νοῦς ἑμὸς or the human νοῦς, but a closer examination shows that the contrast is one not of kind but of degree. Our νοῦς is still the divine νοῦς, but in us is hampered because of its close contiguity with Matter. Thomas Aquinas, quoting from Themistius, likens Plato's conception of νοῦς to the sun and its light. The νοῦς θεῖος of Plato would be the sun, our νόες would be rays from that single source of Light.⁷ The comparison is helpful but not completely accurate. For

¹ Philebus 30. d. 1—3.

² Timaeus 34. b.

³ De Anima A. 407. a. 3.

⁴ 269. d. 1.

⁵ Laws XII. 966. d. 9; 967. d. 8.

⁶ 22. c. 5. cf. 28. c. 7 where νοῦς is called king of heaven and earth, but where Socrates suggests that this conception is commonly held only because thereby Man feels himself elevated in importance. Two inferences from this statement are important: 1. that a νοῦς doctrine was fairly widely held; 2. that it meant to those who held it that in some sense they were, as sharers in the νοῦς, rulers of the Universe, so that the νοῦς must have been understood as emanative. The human νοῦς and the divine must have been regarded as one.

⁷ Aquinas: De Unitate Intellectus, in Opuscula Philosophica et Theologica, ed. by A. Michael de Maria, S. J., Tiferini Tiberini. 1886. Vol. I. 479.

in a real sense Plato would have said that we have within us the source of light. Our ἡγεμονικόν, or the chief division of our souls,¹ is divine in its nature as well as in its origin. It is God in us. Whether in God, the World, the Stars, or in men, all νοῦς is one. All are parts without division of the Divine Mind. Our minds are God's mind. In so far as our minds can rise above the material, we are able to think God's thoughts.

Plato uses νοῦς or φρόνησις for the supreme intelligence, never λόγος. Logos in Plato always means expression or explanation.² One of the indications that the Epinomis is later than Plato is the expression in 986. c, where λόγος ὁ πάντων θεϊότατος is recorded as creating the world, or as arranging it in visible form, an activity which Plato always ascribes to νοῦς or θεός. Thus to speak of a Logos doctrine in Plato, as is frequently done, is as misleading as it is inaccurate. For it obscures the fact that we must find Plato's contributions to the later Logos doctrine in his remarks about the νοῦς.

Aristotle was a true Platonist though an outspoken opponent of the men who, succeeding Plato in the Academy, were unable to follow his deeper thoughts, and who were running Platonism into absurdity. Aristotle is closely akin to Plato in his conception of God, though his statements on the subject are so incomplete as to leave room for great diversity of interpretation on many important points. From the few passages where deity is described it seems quite clear that its significance to Aristotle was chiefly that it served as a limit to what would otherwise have been an infinite regress of causation. For Aristotle, like all Greeks, abhorred an infinite regress.³ The infinite regress in this case appeared by the fact that everything in motion has been set in motion by something else in motion, and that by something else, etc. ad infin. To stop this infinite series he assumed a divine principle, which, like Plato and Anaxa-

¹ Laws XII. 963. a. 8.

² See the definitions in Theaet. 291. c. 7 ff.

³ In Met. α. 994. b. 14 Aristotle states that the mind can only function upon a limited subject: it cannot operate at all with an infinite series.

goras, he called $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$, and which he defined as itself unmoved and completely at rest, but able while remaining stationary to impart motion to something else. But how can these things be? Aristotle's explanation of how the divine $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ could impart motion to inert matter without itself moving is one of his most remarkable passages.¹ The $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ he explained, is so perfect that its perfection inspires in matter a desire to be like it. The desire is so strong that matter spontaneously moves itself towards the $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$, is drawn by it. So a beautiful woman attracts others to move toward her by the power of her own beauty without necessarily being herself moved. Before this attraction took place matter was only potentially existent. But in the primal motion it began to take on form, and in so far as it has achieved form matter may said really to exist.

Such is the operation of the First Cause. As to the nature of the divine $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ Aristotle says several things, but leaves us still in mystery. First, this $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ must be actual mind, $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$, not potential mind, $\delta\upsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\iota$.² This fact is assumed to stop another infinite regress. Aristotle thinks in terms of every actuality as coming from a potentiality, and of every potentiality as from an actuality. He took very seriously the problem lightly expressed in the modern riddle about the hen and the egg. Did potentiality ultimately develop from actuality, or actuality from potentiality? Such a proposition, once having begun to revolve in the mind with no way to stop it, was torture to a Greek thinker. He must get through to some solution; he could not leave it in the air. Aristotle arbitrarily settled the question by asserting that the starting point must have been an actuality. Accordingly he assumed a Cosmic Primal Actuality, which he identified with $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$, the Unmoved Mover, asserting that as ultimate Mind it must be actual Mind, not potential Mind. But what is actual mind as distinguished from potential? Actual mind is mind that is thinking, potential mind is something that is capable of thinking, but is

¹ Met. A. 7.

² Met. A. 6.

not thinking. Therefore the Divine Mind, as actual, must be thinking. But what does it think?

The Divine Mind, answers Aristotle,¹ thinks its own thoughts, not of anything outside itself. Here it is easy to show that Aristotle has started an endless chain. For the thought which was the object of thought must have been a thought about something, and if the Divine Mind is self contained, the second thought must have been a thought of a third thought, which involves a fourth and an infinite series of thoughts, or a meaningless circle of thoughts. But Aristotle nowhere recognizes this difficulty, and contents himself with saying that a mind can have its own thoughts as an object of thought. But ingenious as such an explanation is, it is not permanently satisfactory, and it must be admitted that Aristotle has rather avoided than answered the problem of the activity of the Divine Mind.

Aristotle clearly meant to leave the Divine *νοῦς* as absolute. But when he speaks of the human *νοῦς* he comes dangerously near to a doctrine of permeation like that of Plato. For in describing the human mind, Aristotle says that there are present in human beings two minds, one kind a capacity, *δυνάμει*, and the other an actuality, *ἐνεργείᾳ*. The first is pure passivity, a blank sheet of paper which is part of the body and soul and perishes with them. But the second is apparently a spark of divinity, or of the Divine Mind.² Like the cosmic *νοῦς*, of Anaxagoras, the higher *νοῦς* in man, according to Aristotle, is pure and unmixed with the rest of his constitution. It is essentially active, so much so that it is in no sense passive but always active. Hence it can receive no impressions, has no memory. Its function is to act upon the lower mind and impress conceptions upon it. It is itself deathless and eternal, and comes into its own only when removed from the restrictions of the body. It is the only part of man that survives his death and it does so without memory.

¹ Met. A. 9.

² Aristotle does not say this but he speaks of the higher mind in man in such a way as to justify this inference. See de anima II. 2. 413. b. 24—29. See also Zeller II. ii (1921), p. 372. n. 6. (Engl. Tr.: Aristotle I. 404. n. 2.)

as of itself it has no memory. We are here very close to a doctrine of the undivided indwelling of the divine $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$. Aristotle does not himself expressly teach such a doctrine, but he comes so close to doing so that it is difficult to stop with him, even if one does not care to go further and reduce the whole to pantheism. Aristotle's doctrine is indeed sufficiently suggestive of pantheism to have had various expressly pantheistic philosophers refer to him as their authority.¹ There are several paths of argument which Aristotle began upon but did not follow out, which need only slight extension to lead to pantheism. Thus not only that the higher soul or $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ of man is an undivided part of the Divine $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$, but that all matter is at least infused with $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$, if not identical with it, is clear from Aristotle's description of the manner in which the original formless matter, unmoved, inert, $\tau\omicron\delta\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu$, came into its present condition where it possesses form and movement. This process, which has already been described, is based upon the attractive power of the higher over the lower, and is utterly meaningless unless intelligence of some kind is allowed to formless matter, by which it could first recognize the perfection of its antitype and hence be drawn to imitate it. On this basis both partake of $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$, or, one step further, both are $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$; that is, pantheism is a quick and easy inference from Aristotle's description, though Aristotle was himself diametrically opposed to any such conclusion.

In Anaxagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, a fairly consistent dualism of God or $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ and matter had been sustained. But the Stoic tradition went back to the materialism of the early philosophers, and developed the hint of pantheism which they had disclosed in their use of $\theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$. The Stoics followed Heraclitus in taking as their fundamental element

¹ Cf. the pantheistic interpretations of Aristotle by Aristocles of Messene (See Zeller: Eclectics, p. 316, where he quotes from Alexander *Περὶ ψυχῆς* p. 144. a., 145. a., in the 2nd Cent. after Christ); and of Averroes and his followers as described in Thomas Aquinas: *De Unitate Intellectus*, and in M. Horton: *Die Hauptlehren des Averroes nach seiner Schrift: Die Widerlegung des Gazali, aus dem arabischen Originale übersetzt und erläutert*, Bonn 1913. A contrasting realistic interpretation was given by Alexander of Aphrodisias, see Zeller: Eclectics, p. 318 ff.

fire, conceived of as hot aether or very rare mist, which they called πῦρ, or πνεῦμα interchangeably. They denied the existence of immaterial reality, except theoretically for a few conceptions such as time and space. In general all reality was thought of as material, because all things are made up of πνεῦμα. So even virtues, wisdom, emotions, impulses, as states of the πνεῦμα in us, are all material.¹ All things come from, nay are, a single element in various stages of condensation, and some day all will be reduced again to the primal form. In a very real sense all things are one. Among other things identified by the Stoics with this primal element was the deity. The primal fire is God, God is the fire. The conception is as far removed from personality as could be imagined. It is much more akin to the modern "energy" of science than to personality, and indeed the parallel between the Stoic πνεῦμα and modern "Energy" is illuminating if not, of course, everywhere perfect. The Stoics identified this πνεῦμα with Reason, the Logos. Πνεῦμα is rarified, dynamic matter which can think. Sometimes it is confusing to determine whether a Stoic writer is thinking in terms of all material as a manifestation of Reason, or of all Reason as by nature material. Probably the latter is true usually, for materialism is very strong in the Stoics. In any case when the Stoics used the terms πῦρ, πνεῦμα, λόγος, they were referring in each instance to the same fundamental material from which all things are made, a material which is by nature a reasoning force.

The mind of the individual man was conceived by the Stoics as being an especially pure form of the universal substance, very closely akin to its purest and most universal form. As the One Substance became condensed into liquid and solid, it was not in so admirable a condition as when it was in its original fiery gaseous state. Hence, while the Stoics theoretically denied any dualism between the Cosmic Intelligence and matter, yet they were convinced that the individual must live according to the higher

¹ See references as quoted in Zeller: Stoics, pp. 120—124. notes.

rather than the lower part of his constitution, as the result of which Stoic Ethic expressed himself commonly in dualistic language. But dualistic as the language often became, the Stoics never admitted in theory the presence of any dualism, for they ever insisted that all things are some form of manifestation of the one material element.

A comparison of such a conception with the Platonic is most interesting. Plato and the Stoics alike thought that all things are pervaded, not merely controlled, by a single intelligence. In each system all Mind is one, but in the Platonic dualism the All Mind is by nature immaterial and incapable of admixture with material. But the Stoic Logos, though very similar to the Platonic νοῦς, did not distinguish between the material and the immaterial. Thought, like goodness and the other virtues, is material; matter in its purest state, that of fire, is itself thoughtful and thinking.

God with the Platonists and Aristotelians was fundamentally unchangeable. The Stoics identified deity with the fire of Heraclitus which was the synonym of change, and which, taking every form, becomes all things. Hence in practical speech it was essential for the Stoics to speak of the Logos by various names. They called it "Fate" when they thought of it as the unavoidable relentless force of the universe, to conform to which is the highest happiness of man. In this they rather foreshadowed the modern scientist who thinks of primal energy in terms of relentless law. Again the Stoics spoke of God or the Logos as Zeus, Zen, or Athene, as they thought of the deity in terms of its universality, its life-giving powers, its leadership of all things; or as Hera, Hephaestus, Poseidon, or Demeter, according as it was thought of as in the air, in fire, in water, or in the earth.¹ Similarly, says Diogenes, they thought of it in terms of many other names, but in any case it was the One that was meant, and no Stoic thought of the various names as meaning more than aspects of the one deity. Indeed with no loss of unity of conception,

¹ Diogenes VII. 147 (Rit. et Prel. 513). Apparently Diogenes' Stoic source distinguished between the two forms of the same name Zeus and Zen for the purpose of interpretation.

the multiplicity of manifestation of the Logos was often expressed by the plural Logoi.

Of the various uses of the term Logos by the Stoics, none has been more frequently misunderstood than the phrase λόγος σπερματικός or λόγοι σπερματικοί. M. Puech¹ has done a real service in recalling the true doctrine of the Stoics upon this point to the attention of theologians, for the more detailed exposition of the subject by Heinze² has apparently not received the attention it deserves. Λόγος σπερματικός was in Stoic physics a biological term to account for the persistence of types and groups from one generation to another. Theoretically the Stoics were, as M. Puech points out, complete "nominalists". Each individual phenomenon they regarded as the ultimate existence; classes and orders were only convenient fictions with no independent reality of their own. And yet nominalism cannot avoid facing the problems presented by the facts of the persistence not only of types, but even of what are apparently individual peculiarities. For example, though the Stoics denied the existence of a type dog, and only recognized individual dogs, yet they saw dogs continuing to beget dogs, indeed spaniels to reproduce spaniels, while even marking and other individual peculiarities were to be traced from generation to generation.

The Stoics explained this survival of type and of individual traits in successive generations by means of the term λόγος σπερματικός, which should be translated "spermatic principle". According to the Stoics there is in each plant and animal a center, located in animals in the heart, from which the πνεῦμα flows out into all the body. As it flows out through the eyes, it is the sense of sight; through the ears, of hearing; through the voice, it is the power of speech; through the sexual organs, it is the germinal element in the sperma.³ The female has a similar flow from her πνεῦμα, and it is from the union

¹ (Bibl. 334) pp. 315 ff.

² Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie, Oldenburg 1872.

³ Rit. et Prel. 509. a.

of these two pneumatic principles that the new offspring comes into being. The "pneuma" or "gaseous flow" is a co-ingredient with the "damp" to make the complete seed,¹ but it is this pneumatic ingredient in the seed which alone carries on the type, and which alone was signified by the term *λόγος σπερματικός*. The spermatic logos was thus a physical conception, not merely material as all Stoic conceptions were ultimately material, but it was a material thing with a definitely material function. Because of the fact that the senses and the powers of expression were likewise conceived of as outflowings of the pneuma, the *λόγοι σπερματικοί* were properly made co-ordinate with the senses and power of speech in the division of the human constitution.²

But what greatly complicates the comparative simplicity of this conception is that the Stoics used the spermatic logos for similes and metaphors of all kinds, and particularly in cosmological descriptions and in attempts at accommodating Greek myths. The term spermatic Logos was applied figuratively to God, for example, in the passage of Diogenes Laertes VII. 134—137.³ Here the original state of all things is described under the figure of the spermatic fluid as made up, while still being a mist, of two elements, the active and passive. The passive element was damp, the active a gaseous permeation of the damp, whose action within the damp caused the beginnings of the formation of the world by the separation of the four elements. But this statement was intended by the Stoics to be taken figuratively, and not as a statement of fact. *Τούτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου* is a metaphor, and no indication that the Stoics properly associated the term with any cosmological principle. The author is simply using a biological figure in a cosmological exposition. Such figurative use of the biological term is by no means uncommon with the earlier Stoics,⁴ and

¹ Eus. Pr. Ev. XV. xx.

² See Plac. IV. 4. 4 (Dox. 390). Rit. et Prel. 509; Diog. VII. 157. Rit. et Prel. 500. a.

³ Rit. et Prel. 493.

⁴ See also Plac. I. 7, 33 (Dox. 305). Rit. et Prel. 494.

probably became conventionalized. For even so early as Chrysippus we find an explanation of the obscene pictures of the loves of Zeus and Hera, that these represent the infusion of spermatic logoi into matter in order to bring about the formation of the world.¹ But such a passage can by no means be used as representing the true thought of Stoicism, in which God and matter were always ultimately One, though this One contained in itself both active and passive qualities. The Stoics were not careful metaphysicians, and in ordinary writing were content to be bewilderingly loose in the use of terms. The easy lapse into a dualistic manner of speech already mentioned was increasingly common as Stoicism became older and more popular, particularly in the ethical passages, and in the interpretation of myths. As Platonism and Stoicism crossed and recrossed each other's paths, traces of Platonic dualism are increasingly common in Stoicism, until so complete a change had taken place that whereas the older Stoics, in allegorizing myths, had made Zeus equivalent to the Logos, in the first Century after Christ Cornutus asserted that the type of the Logos was the Phallic Hermes, the fertilizing offshoot and messenger of Zeus.² That is, Cornutus was content to think of the Logos, not as a term interchangeable for God, Fate, or the original material substrate, but as a secondary mediatory God, or at least as a distinction of function in the Deity. When the same identification of Hermes and the spermatic Logos is later made by Porphyry,³ the environment is much more harmonious, for such a conception of the Logos was exactly that of later Platonism, as will shortly appear. Loosely then, as the term spermatic Logos was later used, there seems no ground for believing that in strictly Stoic thought the spermatic Logos ever lost its proper biological signification, or that the Stoics, uninfluenced by Platonism, ever thought of a cosmological entity by that name.

¹ Orig. contra Cels. IV. 48 (Arnim. II. 1074). I am not certain that Origen has correctly assigned this interpretation. He may be quoting a much later Stoic.

² Ch. XVI. p. 20 ff. from Lebreton (Bibl. 163) p. 312.

³ Eus. Prep. Ev. III. xi. 42 (114. d).

Another pair of terms which has sometimes been confused with a conception of a δεύτερος θεός are ὁ λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and ὁ λόγος προφορικός. The Stoic use of these terms was, as Zeller has pointed out, Aristotelian,¹ though it was a case of Aristotle's giving technicalities to a distinction which Plato had already pointed out.² The terms were logical technicalities used to distinguish between thought in the mind and thought expressed verbally. On the basis of this distinction, the two departments of Logic were made, first the study of vocal expression, such as singing, elocution, etc., and second the study of mental sciences proper. It is as logical technicalities in precisely the same sense that the terms are used by the Platonist Albinus in the Second Century after Christ.³

The later philosophers of Greece and Rome were divided into many schools, but no attempt can be made in this brief sketch to describe all of them. The Epicureans and Sceptics contributed little if anything to Christian thought and were usually set aside by Christians as men not worthy to be called philosophers. For the other schools, Platonist, Aristotelian, Pythagorean, a spirit of eclecticism was so strong in all, that it is often difficult to say, for example, whether a passage is Platonic with Pythagorean elements, or Pythagorean with Platonic elements. These two schools had different disciplinary programs, as Justin shows,⁴ but fundamentally they were very close to each other. The Pythagoreans clothed their thought in so technical a language that careful discipline in science and mathematics would alone have made their writings intelligible to students. But what they meant by their "numbers", was very similar to what the later Platonists meant by their "ideas". The Aristotelians seem also to have been deeply influenced by Platonism, but taught chiefly logic and science, though Alexander of Aphrodisius, at the beginning of the third Century after Christ, was teaching

¹ Zeller: Stoics p. 72. n. 1. Cf. Arist. Anal. Post. I. 10. 76.

² Theaet. 189. e; Soph. 263. e.

³ Albinus - Introd. to the Plat. Dialogues, c. 2. (Ed. Freudenthal p. 322. line 20 ff.)

⁴ Dial. 2. 3 (219 A).

a strictly Aristotelian philosophy, and even was carrying Aristotelianism into a particularism which Aristotle had never advocated.

For the purpose of this brief review only one school, the later Platonic, needs any detailed examination, for in matters metaphysical it was the philosophic school which most influenced Christianity. The riper conceptions of Plato were surprisingly neglected and misunderstood by his followers. The Republic, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Timaeus, especially the latter, were the standard books from which Platonism seems to have been taught and studied, and consequently Inseparable Ideas and the Ideal World, which it has been shown we have reason to think Plato himself later disregarded, if he did not actually reject, were retained as the distinguishing doctrines of Platonism. The Timaeus, a book cryptic enough to please the growing love of mystical cosmological schemes and myths for expressing philosophical conceptions, had come to be the chief treasure of the Academy. But while the followers of Plato neglected the deeper doctrines of their master, they stood distinguished among the philosophers of their day for their interest in metaphysics, which they followed with such passion that they were led into profound mystical aspirations.

Platonism never lost its fundamental dualism, and it was this dualism which kept the Academy and the Stoa distinct in spite of the constant tendency of philosophers of both schools to borrow from each other. God and the Ideal World stood in eternal contradistinction to the material world. The Platonists never seemed to have personalized in Zoroastrian fashion this antithesis to deity. Matter seemed only to be a great filthy morass, into which the souls of men would inevitably be sucked because of the material element in the human constitution, if by aspiration and philosophy they did not rise above their material nature into union with God. Justin says that the supreme object of the Platonism of his day was to get the vision of God.¹ The highest part of man, his Reason,

¹ Dial. 2. 6 (221 D).

was one with the divine Reason, and could save itself from pollution and destruction in matter only by rising to reunite itself with the All-Reason. God and the νοῦς seem in Academic as in Stoic writings to have been used usually interchangeably, though the late Platonic νοῦς was often used in distinction from Θεός to represent God in relation with the world, as over against God the Absolute. The Academic God was always the Absolute, but his νοῦς, not a separate person by any means, but a distinct attribute of God, bridged the gap between God and the world, so that deity in matter, that is the formal element in what otherwise would have been formless matter, was the divine νοῦς, though God proper was utterly removed from and above the material.

Perhaps the simplest way to give a picture of second century Platonism will be to describe the teaching of a typical Platonist of the time. The philosopher Albinus commends himself pre-eminently for that purpose, for while we possess from most of the second century Academicians only a few fragments, there are preserved from Albinus, besides fragments, two treatises. One of these is entitled ΑΛΒΙΝΟΥ εἰσαγωγή εἰς τοὺς Πλάτωνος διαλόγους, the other ΑΛΚΙΝΟΥ διδασκαλικὸς τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων, but both have been satisfactorily proved by Freudenthal¹ to belong to the single philosopher Albinus. The second of the two treatises sets forth in systematic form the doctrines of Plato for a beginner's use. The pupil is supposed to turn to the Dialogues themselves from this introduction, which probably is a very fair representation of the light in which the dialogues were interpreted to prospective Platonists of the day. The teaching in the Academy at that time was by no means fixed, and the amount of Stoicism and Aristotelianism intermixed into the Platonic substrate would vary widely with the different teachers. So Eusebius has preserved from Atticus, a Platonist of the same period, a vigorous protest against the tendency of Academicians to borrow Aristotelian conceptions, though Zeller has pointed out

¹ J. Freudenthal: Der Platoniker Albinos und der falsche Alkinoos. Berlin 1871. In his: Hellenistische Studien, Heft 3.

marked traces of Stoicism in Atticus himself.¹ On the whole, however, Albinus seems to be a very typical Platonist of the time.

Albinus is dated by the fact that Galen, in a very credible passage, tells us that about the year 152 he studied under Albinus in Smyrna, where Albinus was held in high regard.² Albinus wrote also a greatly esteemed abstract in nine or ten books of the lectures of his teacher Gaius, which cannot now be found, but which Freudenthal shows to have been extant so recently as 1667.³

The first notable point in the extant writings of Albinus is that both treatises are written in a strictly Aristotelian style. The argument is developed throughout by definition and deduction, division and sub-division, while the language and sentence formation are distinctly those of Aristotle. Similarly Albinus' thought is saturated with Peripatetic conceptions. He describes God primarily as *ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς*, which he makes equivalent to *ὁ πρῶτος θεός*.⁴

This Primal Intelligence ever thinks, in truly Aristotelian fashion, *ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ νοήματα*, an activity peculiar to Itself.⁵ The Deity is "eternal, unutterable (*ἄρρητος*), self-sufficient, eternally perfect." It is "divinity, substantive in nature (*οὐσιότης*), truth, symmetry, good It is good since It makes all things actual as far as possible, and as such is cause of all good; It is beautiful because Its form is by nature perfect and symmetrical; truth, because It is the beginning of all truth as the sun is of all light; Father, in that It is the cause of all things, and has ordered the Heavenly Mind (*τὸν οὐράνιον νοῦν*), and the World Soul in accordance with Itself and Its thoughts." But these, says Albinus, must not be considered as attributes in the sense that the Deity is compounded; for Deity is pre-eminently

¹ Zeller III. 1. 839. Engl. Tr.: Eclectics, p. 343.

² Freudenthal p. 242.

³ The two treatises still extant are printed in the sixth volume of Hermann's Plato, pp. 147—189; Freudenthal has edited carefully the treatise preserved under the name of Albinus, in the above mentioned monograph pp. 322—326.

⁴ X (ed. Hermann) p. 164. line 18, 23.

⁵ X p. 164. line 25.

Unity. The Deity is ἀρρητος in that It is comprehensible by the mind alone, and cannot be described, for It has neither class, form, nor distinction (γένος, εἶδος, διαφορά). Freudenthal¹ sees in this latter point an important advance toward the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the indescribable character of God which was expressed by Plotinus: καὶ γὰρ λέγομεν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν, ὃ δὲ ἔστιν οὐ λέγομεν.² Deity transcends all distinctions, even moral distinctions. Thus to say that It is good is as inaccurate as to say that It is evil, says Albinus, basing his argument on the Platonic doctrine that for anything to be good or bad it must be preceded by and partake in the Good or the Bad. Deity cannot be good or bad because Deity precedes the Forms and is above them, hence cannot be qualified by participating in them. Deity is good in the sense that It causes good to others, but in Itself is neither good nor bad. Likewise It transcends both the possession or lack of quality, as well as the distinction between Same and Other. Deity neither moves nor is moved; It is immaterial, does not occupy space, is unchangeable and unbegotten. It is clear that Albinus has constructed a conception of an absolute God from Aristotelian and Platonic statements together. The result is a Deity, much more clearly defined than the Deity of either, but very fairly in harmony with the few statements about Deity in the Philebus as well as with the Unmoved Mover, who is νοῦς, of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

In the same passage Albinus goes on to describe three ways in which Deity can be apprehended by men.³ The first is by Abstraction from the sensible world, as one comes to conceive of a mathematical point by ascending from a surface to a line, and from a line to a point. The second is by Analogy, comparing the Primal Mind, for example, to the sun by which we are able to see, though the sun is not itself the sense of sight. So the Primal Mind by enlightening the truth furnishes knowledge and the object of knowledge to man's soul, though It is not Itself the faculty of knowledge in man. By such analogies, one may come

¹ p. 287. n. 1.

² *Enn.* V. 3. 14.

³ X. 165. line 13 ff.

to understand and comprehend the Deity. The third process is by Generalization of the specific qualities of individual objects. So, Albinus illustrates, one rises from a perception of beauty in bodily objects to a conception of beauty in the soul, thence to beauty in actions and laws, and thence to a conception of Beauty itself, τὸ πολὺ πέλαιος τοῦ καλοῦ.¹ It is hard to see how this method differs essentially from the first method, that of Abstraction, unless the process of Abstraction is to deal exclusively with mathematical symbols, the Pythagorean method, while the other is to deal with general qualities as found in common objects. On that basis the process of Abstraction would be an essentially intellectual process, the other primarily a mystical ladder, much more popular with ordinary people. We shall find that it is this last method which Justin seems to have been using as a Platonist, when he was enchanted, as he says, by the contemplation of Forms and of general conceptions, and hoped soon to rise to the contemplation of God Himself. Both Albinus and Justin show that God in Platonism was conceived of as higher than the Universal Good, the Idea of the Good. One had to rise above all Universals to find Deity, not merely rise to the highest Universal.

The Deity is thus sufficiently abstracted from all things terrestrial. Its connection with the Cosmos is described as mediated by lower deities, the highest of which is ὁ νοῦς τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ.² This νοῦς is not the Primal νοῦς the First Cause. Νοῦς, Albinus says, is better than ψυχή; and νοῦς, actually thinking of all things at the same time and eternally (ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πάντα νοῶν καὶ ἅμα καὶ αἰεὶ), is better than potential νοῦς, while the Cause of this actual universal intelligence is still better than that which is caused. The Cause is ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, and that caused is the mind of the whole heavens, which consequently is a mind thinking actively of all things simultaneously and eternally, as distinguished from the Primal Mind which thinks only Itself and Its own thoughts. The thoughts of the Heavenly Mind are apparently the Forms of the early Plato. When

¹ Cf. Plato, Symposium 210. d. (Freudenthal p. 286).

² X. 164. line 23.

Albinus descends from the Heavenly Mind to the World Soul, he has obviously in mind the passage of the Philebus already discussed in which Plato says that νοῦς is not conceivable apart from a ψυχή, so that if there is a βασιλικὸς νοῦς there must be also a βασιλική ψυχή. Albinus identifies the βασιλική ψυχή of the Philebus with the ψυχή τοῦ κόσμου of the Timaeus. However, although Albinus joins the βασιλικὸς νοῦς, which he calls the Heavenly Mind, with the World Soul, the union may not have been eternal, for the existence of the World Soul began in its present form from an act of creation, while the activity of the Heavenly Mind seems to have been eternal, though not so eternal as not itself to have been caused by the Primal Mind of Deity. The relative times of generation are very confusing, for Albinus gives no account of the origin of the Heavenly Mind. The World Soul, however, is eternal in a certain sense. Albinus becomes very mystical when he speaks of the first ordering of the World, because he is working from a presupposition of the eternity of matter, and yet does not, for some reason, wish to express the doctrine explicitly. He insists upon the eternity of the World, and then hastens to say that he does not mean the world in its present form. There was never a time in which the World did not exist, yet the World was begotten, eternally begotten, if you will. Similarly the Soul of the World always existed. God had only to awaken it and order it (*κατακοσμεῖ*), and give it its νοῦς. The world as consisting of σῶμα and ψυχή is a living thing (*ζῶον*), and is eternal in both its σῶμα and ψυχή, though God had to order both before the world as we know it existed. Albinus probably, in Aristotelian language, would have agreed that in the eternal material substrate there existed the potentiality of both World Body and World Soul, potentialities which became actualities when the World Body was ordered, and when the World Soul was ordered and awakened as from a deep sleep. The World Soul was at the same time made intelligent by being united with the Heavenly Mind. The united Soul-Mind of the universe had now but to look to its own thoughts to find the Ideas and Forms which constitute the Ideal World.

The next step in creation was to make the World Body

by ordering matter, which had theretofore been an un-ordered chaos. First the four elements were separated out, then Deity made the world, only begotten (*μονογενῆ τὸν κόσμον*),¹ using up the totality of matter (*ἐκ τῆς πάσης ὄλης*).² In describing the process of creation Albinus uses the geometrical and arithmetical language of the Timaeus, and from the same source states that the different parts of the universe, the stars, spheres, planets, are intelligent living beings, gods.³ The Soul-Mind was now put into the World Body, so that the World, as constituted of soul and body, is itself a living being (*ζῶον*) while by virtue of the Heavenly Mind in the World Soul, the World is also endowed with the power of thought (*νοερόν*).

But one more act remained to Deity in creation, that of making the lower gods and demons, "whom one should call 'begotten gods,'"⁴ to be found in all the elements. To these was entrusted the formation and rule of the sublunary world. They took as their patterns the Intelligible World, but gave form to individual objects on earth by causing these objects not to partake of the Eternal Forms, but to imitate them. The forms in the individual objects are quite distinct from the Eternal Forms, and perish with the objects. *Τὰ νοητά*, says Albinus,⁵ are of two sorts, first *αἱ ἰδέαι* (by which he meant the Separable and Eternal Forms), and second *τὰ εἶδη* which are inseparable in matter. Albinus is not unique in making this distinction between *εἶδη* and *ιδέαι*, for Seneca had already used it, and it was probably one of the usual ways of attempting to reconcile the early Platonic theory of Separable Forms with Aristotle's assertions that form is the inseparable concomitant of individual phenomena.⁶ But Albinus is not consistent in his later use of these terms.⁷

¹ XI. p. 167. line 11.

² XI. p. 167. line 33.

³ XIV. p. 171. line 11.

⁴ XV. p. 171. line 13.

⁵ IV. p. 155. line 34.

⁶ See Zeller II. i. (1922) 658. Anm. 2. Engl. Tr.: Plato, p. 238. n. 32.

⁷ V. p. 157. line 10. Here *εἶδη* includes both kinds of forms.

Of the constitution of man Albinus teaches like Plato that the human body is the creation of the lower deities out of the four elements, of which they borrowed certain parts on the understanding that the loan was to be repaid. They put the parts of the elements together with invisible nails, and so made a single unified body.¹ The higher part of the soul of man they did not make, for they received it after it had been sent down from the first God.² This part of the soul had been prepared by Deity in the same mixing bowl in which the World Soul had been composed,³ so that the human soul and the World Soul were of similar natures.⁴ However, the lower gods did not put the soul into the body as they received it from Deity, for Albinus says that they created two mortal soul parts which they combined with the immortal soul. The first part of the soul is thus essentially different from the other two parts, called will and desire, since they are both in the realm of the impressionable, *παθητικόν*, and are to be found in animals, while the higher part is the reasoning force in man (*τὸ λογιστικόν*). Albinus feels that reason in the highest sense has no kinship with passivity or impressionability, but is pure activity. The lower and higher parts of the soul are so utterly unlike that it would mean incessant warfare if they were situated in the same parts of the body, so that the creating gods separated the parts of the soul, put the highest part into the head where it would be safely isolated, and the two lower parts into the chest and abdomen respectively. Albinus is of course perfectly Platonic in his division of the soul and distribution of the parts in the head and body, but he goes beyond Plato in the contrast between the *παθητικόν* and the

¹ XVII. p. 172. line 17 ff. οἱ δὲ θεοὶ ἔπλασαν μὲν προηγουμένως τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος μοίρας τίνας δανειζόμενοι εἰς ἀπόδοσιν, συνθέντος δὲ ἀοράτοις γόμοις ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐργασάμενοι, a paraphrase of Tim. 42. e. ff. Albinus continues to borrow from the same source to describe the constitution of the various parts of the body.

² XVII. p. 172. line 20; XXIII. p. 176. line 8.

³ Following Timaeus 41. d.

⁴ XXV. p. 178. line 15 ff.

λογιστικόν. For while Plato admits the utter dissimilarity of the two, he nowhere hints at a fundamental antagonism. Plato taught that the lower part is rebellious and needs to be repressed by the higher, and that the higher is put into the safe isolation of the head to preserve its purity, but he gives no indication that the two are kept apart because their mere juxtaposition would mean warfare.¹ The distinction is a fine one, but is indication of the contemporary tendency to cheapen all the parts of man except the divine and immortal part of the soul. Plato, while teaching the complete superiority of the highest part of the soul, taught at the same time that the soul was best nourished and developed when all its parts were functioning normally. But the Platonists of Albinus' time tended to forget the sane balance of their master in an all engrossing desire for mystical experience.

Albinus comes very near to introducing the double νοῦς of Aristotle when he discusses the various sorts of mental activity possible to man.² The power of judgment, ἡ κρίσις, is double, consisting of the active force which does the judging, which he calls ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, and the natural organ or implement of judgment, by using which the νοῦς acts, and which is itself called ὁ λόγος φυσικός. There are two kinds of reason, or logos: the first is possible only to God, for it is in every way inerrant and incomprehensible, but the second, which is possible to man, is also inerrant in its knowledge of facts.³ But the human logos is also of two kinds, that which is concerned with Intelligible Things (τὰ νοητά), and that which is concerned with sensible things (τὰ αἰσθητά), of which the first is knowledge proper (ἐπιστημὴ, or, νόησις), and the other opinion (δόξα). Albinus thus distinguishes between the νοῦς active and the logos passive, for the logos is active only as the νοῦς acts through it, and is itself only an ὄργανον. The distinction is not merely that of Plato between knowledge and opinion, for

¹ Tim. 69. c ff.

² IV. pp. 154—156.

³ κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γνῶσιν ἀδιάφευτος. IV. p. 154.
line 19.

the logos deals with both *δόξα* and *ἐπιστημὴ*, but its motive force is not in itself but in the *νοῦς*. But knowledge, as contrasted with opinion, is still of two kinds, that possible to be gained in the body, and that possible of acquisition only for disembodied souls. For when the soul is disembodied, the mind, by means of the logos, can have a vision of the Primary Intelligibles, by which Albinus meant the Separable Forms. He lays considerable stress upon the fact that the mind does not judge of or apprehend the Primary Intelligibles apart from Logos.¹ The two must function together, or neither is of any use, even in the disembodied vision of Primary Intelligibles. The second kind of knowledge is that which apprehends the Secondary Intelligibles, by which he means the inseparable forms as found in material objects. To this second knowledge he assigns the Stoic term *φυσικὴ ἔννοια*. It springs, he says, from a latent knowledge of the Primary Intelligibles which the soul, by a process analogous to memory though not accurately so called, has carried on into its incarnate state.² It is to be inferred from what Albinus says that during the incarnation the *νοῦς* by means of the logos can hope adequately to comprehend only the lower inseparable forms.

The mixture of Aristotelian and Platonic elements with Stoic terminology in this passage on the human mind hardly needs elucidation. When Albinus speaks of the latent knowledge of Universals one feels the influence of Aristotle; when he uses the word "memory" to account for the presence of this latent knowledge and bases all upon a pre-incarnate existence of the soul, he is indubitably Platonic. It is clear that Albinus conceived of the higher human soul which was sent down from the First Deity to the lower creating gods as constituted of two parts, the *νοῦς*, the active intelligent force, and the logos or passive instrument of the *νοῦς*. The logos is by no means the material brain, for by it *νοῦς* thinks during its pre-incarnate existence. The logos seems to be in a sense the *ψυχὴ* of

¹ IV. p. 156. line 4 ff.

² IV. p. 155. line 24. *νόησις τις οὔσα ἐναποκειμένη τῇ ψυχῇ.*

the *νοῦς*, and was probably what Plato had in mind when he said that *νοῦς* could not exist apart from a *ψυχή*. The *logos* also corresponds in many points to the lower *νοῦς* of Aristotle, except that Aristotle connected the lower *νοῦς* inseparably with the body, and said that the lower *νοῦς* and body perished together. Albinus' doctrine seems to have drawn upon Aristotle for the functions of the active and passive *νόεσις*, or *νοῦς* and *logos* as he called them, but he remained Platonic in assuming the immortality of both.

In his descriptions of the pre-existence of the soul, of its destiny at death, of its re-incarnation in women or lower animals in case of its failure to prove worthy of restoration to its former place and state in the stars, Albinus follows the *Timaeus* very closely, and need not be elucidated. It has been clearly shown by Freudenthal¹ that Albinus in his logic and ethic follows Aristotle and the Stoics much more than he does Plato, though he uses Platonic passages to illustrate the doctrines of the other schools. One feels on the whole that Albinus is more than half way from Plato to the Neo-Platonists. His philosophy is much more mystical than that of Plato, though not yet so mystical as that of Plotinus. To him the human body still is a reputable part of the human constitution, to be improved by exercise and training, but it has been pointed out that the importance of bodily training is much less real in Albinus' mind than in Plato's. He has made more vivid than Plato the existence of the Heavenly Mind and the World Soul, and yet these conceptions were advanced still further in the next century. Like the Neo-Platonists he is strongly eclectic. He does not say, as did they, that Plato and Aristotle taught the same philosophy, but he feels perfectly free to use Aristotelian conceptions whenever they can contribute to his system. Yet he has no criteria for borrowing. Since he does not admit frankly that Aristotle and Plato are in his mind teaching the same doctrine, he makes no attempt seriously to combine them, but merely draws upon

¹ p. 278 ff.

Aristotle when he feels disposed to do so. Another Platonist might draw more, another less, while the capricious admixture of Pythagorean and Stoic conceptions must have varied greatly among his contemporaries. His philosophy in inspiration and motive is frankly mystical. He defines philosophy as "the aspiration for wisdom, or the loosing and wrenching of the soul away from the body, when we turn ourselves to the Intelligible and the true Existences".¹ His pupils must have found in his teaching chiefly a training in mysticism. The passages in which Albinus treats of the constitution of the world are so extensively and literally taken from the *Timaeus*, that one wonders whether he understood the descriptions of his master, and was not simply rounding out his own system by borrowed statements largely unintelligible even to himself. Of his metaphysical conceptions, those of the soul of man, of the World Soul, and of the Heavenly Mind most seemed to bear the impress of his own thinking, and these he consequently would most sharply have impressed upon the minds of his pupils. Superficial dabblers in his system would have received the impression of a mystical doctrine in which they would first learn about the Heavenly Mind and World Soul, understanding that these were both transcended by the Absolute. They would then have understood that their own souls were akin to or a part of this Universal Mind-Soul, and would have enlivened the whole by speculation upon pre-existence and metempsychosis. It is precisely such a Platonism which we shall find described by Justin Martyr.

An attempt at depicting the philosophical situation in the world at Justin's time would, however, be completely inaccurate if it stopped at trying to reconstruct the close metaphysical thinking of the schools. For there has probably never been an age when philosophy was so familiar a topic for the street corner and barber shop as during this decadent period of Greek Philosophy. Everyone could readily talk the philosophical jargon of his day, so that no normal child would have grown up in a

¹ I. p. 152. line 2.

Greek city (including the cities of Greek culture throughout the eastern part of the Mediterranean basin), without acquiring the vocabulary of, and accustoming himself to taking a part in, popular philosophical discussions.

But if such ignorant and untrained people were freely talking of philosophy and the philosophic schools, it must not be supposed that the discussions were not thoroughly ignorant. The superstition and unchecked fancy of ignorance together with an utterly uncritical use of suggestions from the mythologies and religions of foreign travellers, produced harangues in the name of philosophic schools which must have been completely contrary to the aims and conceptions with which the schools were founded. To satisfy the desires of such people, and incidentally to profit by the large fees they were ready to pay for short terms of easy instruction which would enable them to boast of specialized philosophic training, the leaders of the schools themselves taught "exoteric" doctrines, or philosophy for the unphilosophical, which took the form largely of cosmological myths and accounts of creation, with rudimentary instruction in mysticism and ethical theory. The urge to mysticism, together with the popular craze for cosmological myths had opened the door wide for the mystery religions of the East. These had added their large mythical elements to the Greek traditions, while both were supplemented by the fabricated myths of the philosophers.

It is not to be wondered at that in such an atmosphere the Divine *Νῶς* or *Logos*, as defined by the philosophers, became, like all abstractions, personalities in a sort of philosophical theogony, which graduated down to the most insignificant demons. Such was the popular philosophical environment of Justin, a welter of crude superstitions expressed in myth and in snatches of philosophical terminology. At the same time a few higher spirits were trying to keep pure the better traditions of philosophy, while at least the leaders of the Platonic and Pythagorean schools were driven by a profound desire to find peace in a mystical communion with God.

CHAPTER II

JUDAISM

At the time of the origin of Christianity Judaism had long been developing on two distinct lines which may perhaps be called Judaism proper and Hellenistic Judaism. None of the terms used for these two schools of Judaism adequately describes them. Geographical terms such as Palestinian and Alexandrian have a connotation of localism by which the actual developments were not at all limited. Of the two types of Judaism one had its center in Palestine, the other in Alexandria, but the first was also present very strongly among the Jews throughout the Dispersion, while the Jews whose Judaism was affected to a greater or less degree by Hellenistic speculation were present in appreciable numbers even in Palestine itself. Nor were the two developments mutually exclusive. True Jews, however deeply influenced by heathenism, always had at least a genuine regard for the Law, while Greek terminology is to be found even in the earliest tradition of the Tannaim. But though the two tendencies were not mutually exclusive, they represented attitudes of mind fundamentally different from each other.

A. PALESTINIAN JUDAISM

Palestinian Judaism, or Judaism proper, was primarily characterized by its legalism and by the clarity and simplicity of its religious impulses, as well as by its intensely personal relationship with God.

It has been seen that when the Greeks were at their best they were scientists and their Deity was the Absolute, or in any case utterly impersonal. But when the Jews

were at their best they were loving children of a kind Father, to serve Whom was life's supreme joy because of the intense reality of His personal existence, and the vividness of their faith. The Jewish instinct for monotheism by the time of Jesus had long been fundamental and distinctive. The Greek philosophers strove to reduce all things to Unity under a single ultimate First Cause which they called among other names God, but at the same time they never scrupled to talk of lower beings as gods in a sense very much above the nature of the ordinary demons and powers. The Jews recognised angels and demons of all kinds about them, to be sure, but so far as we know they gave to none of them sufficient prestige so that they should be worshipped. Worship belonged to the one God alone. The Jewish schoolmen went further and denied the independent existence of angels, saying that all celestial beings were merely rays from the glory of God. These rays were of two kinds, the passing and the permanent.¹ The temporary or transient angels came forth each day afresh in great multitudes, sang songs of praise to God, and then perished or were recalled into the glory whence they had come. Justin probably represented a good Jewish tradition about the permanent angels when he said that they were rays from the glory of God which it was the will of God not to recall.² Bentwich has pointed out that the Jews regarded the permanent angels not as independent existences but as personifications of the one God in his dealings with the world.³

Similarly the personifications of Memra, Torah, and Wisdom, like the Bath Kol and Shechina, were never conceived of by the Jews as minor deities, if the Jews ever thought of them as actual personalities at all. The Jewish love for heavenly descriptions was even stronger than the Greek, as the Semite has always been pre-eminently a visionary who told abstractions in concrete language. So in the

¹ Ferdinand Weber: *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud und verwandten Schriften*. Leipzig 1897. p. 166.

² *Dialogue* 128. 3. 4 (358 B, C) see below pp. 189 ff.

³ Norman Bentwich: *Philo Judaeus of Alexandria*. Philadelphia 1910. pp. 141 ff.

early referencés to Wisdom, for example, as found in the Canonical books of the Old Testament, nothing more than Semitic imagery and literary personification can legitimately be inferred.¹ That the Jews at the time when the best Psalms were being written actually thought of a mediatory deity or person as necessary to link the world with a transcendent God, would need far more evidence than exists to make credible. Perhaps by Jesus' time, certainly by a century later, the Rabbis were influenced by Greek-Jewish Wisdom speculation to develop the Wisdom personification in the eighth chapter of Proverbs into what is apparently intended as a separate person. But if a Wisdom personality was later intended, it never constituted an important element in the essential teachings of the Judaism of the Schools. Wisdom was highly important, as will appear, in Hellenistic Judaism, but had little importance in the Palestinian Judaism of Jesus' time. Indeed the importance ascribed to Wisdom and similar conceptions is one of the distinguishing differences between the two types of Judaism. Similarly, highly figurative as the language in the Talmud grew about the Torah, Schechter is quite right in insisting that no personalization of the Torah was ever seriously intended by the Rabbis.²

The monotheism of Palestinian Judaism was thus never broken by any conception of lower intermediary deities. The prejudice against minor deities, indeed, had come to be one of the most deeply rooted of all Jewish religious instincts, so that the representation of Jesus as possessing divine character in any sense was in Jewish eyes the fundamental heresy of Christianity.

Christians have rarely done justice to Judaism in its legalistic aspects. For those not trained in a legalistic religion, the Law would seem to crush all spontaneous expression of religious impulses. This difficulty has been

¹ Cf. Ernst Sellin: *Die Spuren griechischer Philosophie im Alten Testament*. Leipzig 1905. pp. 17, 18. Sellin's dissertation is an answer to M. Friedländer: *Griechische Philosophie im Alten Testament*. Berlin 1904.

² Some Aspects of Rabbinical Theology, in: *Jewish Quarterly Review* VIII. 9.

immeasurably enlarged by the invectives of Jesus against the Pharisees, and the protests of St. Paul against the inadequacy of legalism. But both Jesus and St. Paul were addressing people who understood the circumstances perfectly. Jesus especially would have been understood by his hearers as condemning corrupt Pharisaism, rather than the Pharisees as a class. As in the case of all earnest reformers, their denunciations give a very distorted impression of the system underlying the abuses they are attacking, so that unless checked by the remains of Judaism itself their statements incline to be misleading.¹ The testimony of Judaism itself as to the spiritual value of legalism is of an entirely different character. The Jews thought of God in positive and definite terms, and believed that His will and pleasure for the conduct of men went into the most intimate details of every day life. There was a right and wrong way to do everything. This right and wrong way God had revealed to the Jews in the Law as their supreme mark of distinction, for once in its possession they alone were in a position adequately to know and to do the will of God. To the true Jew, and probably to most Jews, the observances of the Law were hourly reminders of the goodness of God who had so far honored Israel as to reveal this His divine way of living to them. The motive of obedience to the Law was not fear but grateful love.

It was upon this foundation of spiritual enthusiasm for the Law that the scholarship of Rabbinism was built, for to a pious Jew no higher scholarship was conceivable than that which could explain in ever increasing minutiae how the Law of God could be applied to the most detailed incidents of life. So when the Jewish Schoolmen multiplied the great number of precepts and by-laws by casuistry they had no idea, nor had pious Jews, that a burden was being increased. Rather did it seem to all that the joy of observance was being extended. Each

¹ Schürer is an outstanding instance of a great scholar who allowed the invectives of Jesus and Paul against the Pharisees and legalism completely to warp his understanding of Rabbinical Literature.

new definition was a new revelation in the sense that it increased the scope of an old revelation.

Palestinian Judaism was however sharply split within itself between the learned and the ignorant. There was no hereditary caste system in Palestine except the High Priestly circle, but there was the sharpest distinction between a peasant and a scholar.¹ The ordinary people seem to have been in many cases deeply pious, to have attended the feasts at Jerusalem whenever possible, and to have had a genuine reverence for the Law. But the small training which the synagogue school gave to every Jewish boy, even though helped out by the weekly sermon of the synagogue, kept the masses, the *Am Ha-areş*, in only the most rudimentary touch with the legal code. These people envied and revered the leisure and learning of the scribes which enabled them to know the Law in its detail, and regarded such a condition as the most happy a human being could enjoy. But for people with heavy common work to do no such life was possible. The attitude still survives occasionally among orthodox Jews. The writer will never forget hearing a young Jewish truckman speak of those who had leisure and opportunity to study and observe the will of God. He, he wistfully said, had no time for such practices. At night he was too tired to study. He had to disregard fasts because his heavy work demanded nourishing food. But life and hope for Heaven must seem entirely different to one privileged to spend his time in religious study.

The dividing line between learned and ignorant was sharpened by the fact that the scholastic definitions of the Law were made by professional legal scholars who had their own needs in mind much more than the conditions of hard working people. Further, intercourse between a clean Jew and an unclean Jew was proscribed and carefully avoided by the meticulous, and since it was a safe assumption that a working man had done in ignorance something

¹ See the valuable note by Professor G. F. Moore: *The Am Ha-Areş and the Habirim*, in Jackson and Lake: *The Beginnings of Christianity*, I. 1. London 1920. App. E. pp. 436—445.

that made him unclean, the avoidance of ordinary people by the professional religious classes must early have become a permanent habit. This was however perfectly understood and approved by all classes. The doors of the rabbinical schools were always open to sons of these unclean masses, and many of the greatest Rabbis, notably Akiba, came from such an origin. But once in the inner circle a man must live the life of the inner circle or automatically, by his uncleanness, necessitate his ejection.

No greater mistake could be made, however, than to suppose that these associations of learned and careful observers of the Law were made up exclusively of self-righteous hypocrites. The literature which this group built up through the centuries, while difficult for Christians to understand, is yet one of the greatest and deepest religious expressions in human history. It would be impossible that such a circle of scholars, with its social prestige among the Jews, should not have attracted many unworthy men, but that it did so is no reflection upon the ideals, motives, and value of the schools.

In general, the distinctive spirit of Palestinian Judaism was its loyalty and love to the one personal God, and its conviction that in the Law it possessed a verbally inspired revelation of the will of God. God was to be pleased, the Jews were convinced, by the minute observances of His commands, and in performing this office devout Jews carried into every department of their lives all the spiritual uplift of a divinely appointed cultus. Strict Jews never had any sympathy with the half proselytes, "God fearers", so numerous in the Dispersion, who thought to get benefit from the pious spirit of Judaism without assuming the obligation of the Law. Rabbi Jose said that such would be laughed to scorn by God in the Messianic Age, if they claimed any share in the portion of true Jews.¹ As Dr. Abrahams has recently pointed out,² to carry into

¹ Abodah zarrah 3b. From J. Klausner: *Die messianischen Vorstellungen des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter der Tannaisten*. Berlin, 1904. pp. 83 ff.

² *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, First Series. Camb. 1917. Preface, p. vii.

Judaism the Pauline distinction between spirit and letter is completely to misunderstand Judaism, because in "orthodox" tradition Judaism has never had the slightest recognition for such a distinction. When God had given the letter, it was not for man to stop to distinguish between the letter and the spirit. The Jew found profound spirituality in the fulfillment of the letter.

But simple as the fundamental spirit of Judaism was, it was complicated by being a religion of expectation, and was still more complicated in Jesus' time by the fact that instead of the original expectation which hoped only for prosperity for the Jewish race, now the newly substantiated belief in a personal survival of death was developing many speculative attempts to explain how all Jews, alive or dead, could share in the coming Age. With some the national element of the expectation was stressed, so that they looked for an Age in which Israel should be the ruler of the physical world. Others looked for a time when all the world would accept the obligation of the Law and become Jews. At the same time different and contradictory ideas of a resurrection or resurrections were being explained in such a way as to make all men sharers in the Age to come, true Jews in its blessedness, the others in its horrors. Always expressing their intense patriotism in love of liberty and ambition to rule others, the spirit of the Jews was at the exploding point in Jesus' time because of their holy hatred of Roman aggression. The focus of discontent was not Jerusalem but Galilee. The Jewish rulers in Jerusalem were educated men who were faring very comfortably as heads of the Jewish cultus. But the less sophisticated Galileans boiled with a fanatic desire for rebellion which was the hourly concern of the Roman rulers as well as of the leading Jews in Jerusalem.

It was in such an environment of simple piety, of religion which was expressing itself fundamentally in an effort to please a beloved Father in the conduct of life, and of a patriotism which was enflamed and fevered to the point of delirious vision, that Christianity was born. When exaggerated patriotism, as is usually the case, had utterly ruined the object of its loyalty, the Christianity

which had tried like its Master to remain a part of the Jewish national religion rapidly dwindled into insignificance. By Justin Martyr's day, as Harnack points out,¹ the appeal of Jewish legalism to Christianity had lost all its force; the Dialogue with Trypho is not a genuine discussion, but the monologue of a victor. It is in the realm of Hellenistic Judaism that this change becomes intelligible.

B. HELLENISTIC JUDAISM

The spirit and problems of the Jews in the Dispersion in places where their contact with Greek thought had been at all close were entirely different from those in Palestine. They found themselves in the situation of having a religious ideal which in their environment was utterly incapable of fulfillment, even when the will to do so was not complicated by the lure of many ideas of the people about them. In strange countries then as now Jews tended to form colonies in which a social life could be created that would rule out all unnecessary contact with the impure Gentiles, and in which they could help each other observe the Law. But their success was only partial; for Judaism no longer seemed to them to be the uniquely correct teaching about God. The ordinary Palestinian Jew, in little contact with other religions, maintained his Judaism almost unchallenged. But the Jews in Alexandria, Tarsus, or Ephesus heard men talking metaphysics and describing cosmological schemes on all sides, and were attracted by many of the heathen conceptions in spite of themselves. It was not long that Jews were thus exposed before a gradual but persistent protest of syncretism had begun. The early demand for a Greek translation of the Old Testament which resulted in the Septuagint meant that the Jewish language had so far lost its hold that at least a large body of Jews could not understand the original. That is they were a Greek speaking, rather than a Hebrew speaking people, who had apparently lost all language tradition of their own, and were familiar only with the language of the Gentile world about them.

¹ (Bibl. 395) p. 92.

The literature of Hellenistic Judaism came thus to have a double foundation. In theory Hellenistic Jews thought themselves orthodox, and were intensely proud of their racial inheritance of legalism; but apologetic and personal interest constantly impelled them toward a philosophic adaptation of Judaism to the thinking of the Gentile world, and in the process many Jewish conceptions were radically changed. The Jews in the Dispersion grew into the cosmic sense of the Greeks. The highest achievement of Old Testament prophetic monotheism had been to declare that Jehovah was the one God of all men, while the conception that He ruled the physical universe was taken for granted and given little thought. But when a Jew met the scientific Greek whose leaders had been inspired to speculation chiefly by the problem of the unification of cosmic phenomena, he found that while the God of his fathers met his religious needs, yet his religion had no scientific tradition at all, and needed a great deal of interpreting in terms of Greek thought to meet the interesting questions which his neighbors were discussing. The sense of the inadequacy of Judaism for science may well have come very gradually, and approaches toward a re-interpretation of Judaism may have been made quite unconsciously, but nevertheless the adaptation of Judaism to its environment in centers of Greek culture was profoundly significant.

One of the first important changes must have been in the direction of a more cosmic conception of God. The Jewish worshipper held to his God the Father, but the new Jewish thinker, usually the same man as the worshipper, began to put God ever farther back toward transcendentalism and the Absolute. The simple and utterly unscientific myths of creation in the first two chapters of Genesis were "adapted" to the theories of the Stoics and Platonists, while the Wisdom of Proverbs was identified with the cosmic force which we have seen the philosophers were calling either *νοῦς*, or *λόγος* or *ψυχή τοῦ κόσμου*. There is not space in this connection to trace the doctrine of Wisdom in detail as it developed in Judaism. In Sirach a long stride appears already to have been taken, for when the writer says that he wishes to explain to the "lovers

of learning" how the Hebrew scriptures may meet their needs, and ultimately suggests the solution in the identification of Wisdom and Law, he implies that Wisdom had already become a philosophic term useful for those interested in Greek thought.¹ At the same time Law was approaching the Stoic νόμος, which was a manifestation or aspect of the Logos, so that Law had also clearly become more universal a conception than the precepts of the Mosaic Code. The philosophic character of Sophia, as found in the Wisdom of Solomon, is quite indisputable. It is a matter of dispute how deeply read in Greek philosophy its author could have been, but that he uses σοφία, λόγος, θεός, φύσις, πνεῦμα, τὰ πάντα, etc., in truly Greek meanings is patent. In the Wisdom of Solomon God appears, especially in the first ten chapters, to be transcendent. He created the world in the presence and with the help of Wisdom, which thereafter extends through and permeates the Universe; by Her presence the order of Creation is preserved.² Wisdom is called interchangeably σοφία, πνεῦμα σοφίας, λόγος, and ἄκρις τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως.³ At one time Wisdom seems Herself to be πνεῦμα,⁴ at other times, and more consistently, Wisdom contains a πνεῦμα, by which the author seems to mean that phase of Wisdom which can be imparted to others.⁵ The author says he has been granted the πνεῦμα σοφίας, which seems here to be a free and special gift. Wisdom is universally present, but the imparting of the πνεῦμα σοφίας implies a unique empowering with the faculty of reason. The author does not try to connect this in any consistent way with a doctrine of human psychology. While usually the personality of Wisdom is clearly implied,⁶ occasionally the author uses figures of speech utterly incompatible with a personal conception, as for

¹ Sirach, Prologue, and xxiv. 22 ff. See also Friedländer: Griechische Philosophie im A. T., p. 166, and Holtzmann, as quoted in Friedländer, p. 175—176.

² Wisd. vii. 24; viii. 1.

³ Wisd. vii. 25.

⁴ Wisd. i. 6.

⁵ Wisd. vii. 22.

⁶ e. g. ix. 4 etc.

example when he speaks of Wisdom as a "clear effluence of the power of the Almighty, and effulgence from everlasting light, an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and image of his goodness."¹ The author is Platonic in passages, as when he speaks of building the temple in imitation of the "holy tabernacle which thou hast prepared from the beginning,"² and in his doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, and the relative defiling power of different bodies.³ On the other hand he is strongly Jewish in identifying Wisdom with the Jewish Law.⁴ The writer seems indeed to be no philosopher, but to be interested in claiming philosophy for the service of Judaism by identifying the *νοῦς-λόγος* doctrines of philosophy with the poetic Wisdom of the Jews, which he does by describing Wisdom in all the catch words of philosophy which he can muster and apply. The Book of Wisdom has none of the earmarks of being a pioneer. The few fragments preserved from Aristobulus and Aristaeus may well represent original speculation, but speculation is not a characteristic of the Book of Wisdom. It is a book of devotion and aspiration such as could only have come from a man whose convictions had far outrun the stage of speculation, while it could only have been received by people who took for granted the doctrines upon which it is based. It is pre-eminently a religious book. Not a trace of argument or demonstration mars the mystical song of prayer and praise to God and Wisdom. Its date is uncertain. Probably Holmes is right in putting it in the last fifty years before Christ; it is almost certainly pre-Pauline, if not pre-Philonic.⁵ But the book clearly indicates that at whatever time it was written, so universal a belief in Wisdom as a cosmic force and personality obtained, that a book of devotion based upon it could be written and soon widely accepted among the Jews of the Dispersion.

¹ Wisdom vii. 25, 26. Holmes' translation in Charles: Apocrypha and Pseudep.

² Wisdom ix. 8.

³ Wisdom viii. 20.

⁴ Wisdom vi. 18.

⁵ In Charles' Apoc. and Pseudep. p. 521. cf. p. 520.

The great Jewish philosopher Philo is thus no unique figure in Jewish theology, nor can he be taken as attempting *de novo* to bridge the gap between Hellenism and Judaism. His allegorical method and doctrine of the dependance of Greek philosophers upon Moses are already found in Aristobulus;¹ his identification of Wisdom with the cosmic *λόγος* or *νοῦς* of the Greeks was a popular by-word; and his choice of Platonism as the best Greek philosophy, with many borrowings from Aristotelian and Stoic schools, appears in his predecessors, though Aristobulus was traditionally a Peripatetic.² But Philo is the only philosopher of Judaism whose writings we possess in any detail, and consequently the only one whose system we can hope to reconstruct. He was far deeper a philosopher than most Hellenistic Jews, and probably refined Hellenistic Judaism on many points far beyond the reach of its ordinary followers. But fundamentally Philo's point of view was typically that of his school.

Some Jews went much further than Philo in that they discredited the Law for the greater glorification of Philosophy. A trace of their point of view is still to be found in Philo's "De Migratione Abrahami,"³ where he mentions people who are not content with the race which loves God, but must try to live according to both human and divine standards. Philo never once allowed himself to admit any inadequacy in the Law. He insisted that all truth could be found in the Law when read in its deeper significance, and because he thus retained the legal tradition, even though he departed in many doctrines from the teachings of the Palestinian Jews, he represents a truly Jewish mode of thought. Because of the importance of Hellenistic Judaism for an understanding of the doctrines of Justin Martyr, and because of the representative character of Philo's

¹ Euseb. Prep. Ev. VIII. x. p. 376 b ff.; XIII. xii. p. 664 a ff.

² Euseb. Prep. Ev. VIII. ix. p. 375 d.

³ 158 (I. 461). See also 89 (I. 450). For fuller discussion of such sects see Friedländer: *Synagoge und Kirche*. pp. 70—121. Friedländer sees in these sects precursors, if not actual founders of Gnosticism. See also Friedländer: *Der vorchristliche jüdische Gnosticismus*.

writings, it will be no digression to attempt very briefly to describe the metaphysical principles upon which Philo based his system.

That Philo was personally much influenced by Persian speculation is highly improbable though the early Wisdom conception of Judaism may well have been inspired from such a source.¹ Philo is pre-eminently an eclectic Greek in his thinking, and a Jew in his piety. He was trying to do what few people have done so well, to join, in some degree of consistency, his philosophy with his religious impulses. To him the Judaism of the synagogue, or rather of the Old Testament, with its myths was intellectual child's play, while the speculations and sporadic mysticism of the philosophic cults utterly failed to satisfy his genuine religious genius. It is quite correct to think of him as a Greek philosopher who was trying to express Greek ideas in terms of Old Testament mythology. But it is just as important to understand that to him the mythology was more than an interesting survival. With Jewish mythology there came to Philo its strong presentation of a God who was at once fully God and yet vividly realized. The problem of distinguishing between Philo the metaphysician and Philo the mystic is often very difficult. But the distinction must always be born in mind if one wants to discover what was the metaphysical system of Philo.

In general it is safe to say that Philo returned to the dualism of Plato between Deity and Matter. As Plato sometimes suggests that Deity is Absolute, the highest of all, to be seen only imperfectly in a mystic union which transcends all Matter, so Philo has his passages where God is similarly represented. Nothing could be more explicitly a reference to the Absolute than some of Philo's statements: "God is not a composition, nor is He combined out of many ingredients, but is unmixed with anything else So God is ordered according to the One and the Monad, or rather the Monad is ordered after the Fashion of the one God."²

¹ Cf. *The False Philonean Logos*, by Prof. Lawrence Mills.

² Leg. Al. II. 2, 3 (I. 66, 67): ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐ σύγκριμα οὐδὲ ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστώσ, ἀλλ' ἀμιγῆς ἄλλω τέτακται οὖν ὁ θεὸς κατὰ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν μονάδα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ μονὰς κατὰ τὸν ἓνα θεόν.

God is inaccessible by direct approach. Our reason breaks down before it comes to Him in His purity.¹ Such passages could easily be multiplied. Unquestionably Philo claimed for his God all that is gained by making Him the Absolute. But if much is gained by conceiving of God as the Absolute, much is also lost, and Philo in the eclectic spirit of his day did not plan to let any good thing be lost. In contrast to the Absolute, in many passages God is represented as immanent in almost the Stoic sense. For example he says: *ἡ γὰρ τῶν ὅλων ψυχὴ ὁ θεός ἐστι κατὰ ἔννοιαν.*² Again he says that God is to be likened to gold because it is incorruptible, but particularly because it is malleable.³ God is malleable because He extends into and permeates all things, is *πλήρης ὅλη δι' ὅλων*. The eye of the living God is itself the source of a supersensual light which pervades all things.⁴

In this last figure is found much more nearly Philo's true conception of God because it makes room for both transcendence and immanence. By this figure God Himself is far off in the remoteness of the Absolute, while in all things is the light which radiates from Him. It is the same figure as that we found Aquinas using to describe the conception of Plato, but it is as inadequate in Philo's hands to describe his own conception, as in Aquinas' to describe the thought of Plato. For while it is true that Philo regards the immanent aspect of God as in a sense inferior to the transcendent, yet there is no division between the two, and both are God Himself. The immanent deity is true deity, not merely an emanation from deity. Philo urges that men be not content with finding God in immanence, but that they go back to God, the transcendent. However they should do so only because a stream in purest

¹ De Posterit. Caini 168 (I. 258). Cf. De Opif. Mundi 8 (I. 2), where God is *ὁ τῶν ὅλων νοῦς*, the Mind of the Universe, unmixed with anything else, and superior to virtue, knowledge, and to the highest Platonic Forms.

² Leg. Al. I. 91 (I. 62).

³ Quis rer. div. Haer. 217 (I. 503).

⁴ De Cherubim 97 (I. 156). Cf. below p. 148 ff.

at its source; the distinction is one of degree of purity not of nature.

Philo's favorite name for the true God in immanence is Logos. The term is in constant use in all his writings and assumes an astonishing variety of meanings. By Philo the mystic it is even called a second God, which is all of deity the mass of men can hope to know, although the wise and perfect, as Moses, get visions of the First.¹ Philo's first description of the Logos, cosmologically speaking, is in a passage in which he identifies it with the Ideal World of the earlier Plato.² God created this Intelligible World, the *κόσμος νοητός*, the Logos. This then acted as the formal cause in the creation of the sensible world.³ How the Logos can thus act as the formal cause Philo typifies by a seal.⁴ Shapeless Matter is impressed with the form of the Logos, and thereby is made into a *κόσμος αἰσθητός*.⁵ But though Philo frequently uses this figure, it by no means exhausts his thought of the action of the Logos upon the material world. For he declares that the Logos was made by God to be the cohesive force of the Universe.⁶ It permeates all Matter and thus supports the world from falling.

Philo is consistent in at least one thing. He nowhere to my knowledge lapses into pantheism, for he is always thinking in terms of unreconciled dualism. When God planned Creation, always Matter was at hand for Him to use. God and Matter are fundamentally contrasting conceptions to Philo. God has shaped Matter, created the phenomenal world out of it, but nowhere does Philo

¹ Leg. Al. III. 207 (I. 128).

² De Opif. Mundi 24 (I. 5) cf. Horowitz, J., "Das platonische Νοητὸν Ζῶον und der philosophische Κόσμος Νοητός". Marburg 1900.

³ In De Cherubim 124 ff. Philo describes the four causes: 1. τὸ αἷτιον (τὸ ὕφ' οὗ), equals ὁ δημιουργός, equals ὁ θεός; 2. the material cause, the four elements; 3. the instrumental cause, equals τὸ ὄργανον, equals τὸ δι' οὗ, equals ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος; 4. the final cause, τὸ δι' ὃ, the goodness of God.

⁴ De Opif. Mundi 25 (I. 5).

⁵ De Plant. 3 (I. 329).

⁶ De Plant. 8, 9 (I. 331).

identify Deity with Matter as did the Stoics, or assert that God created Matter. The Logos permeates all things, without being mixed with the material of the world.¹

But as in the Stoic and Platonic systems, so in Philo the human mind is an especial expression and representation of God. Philo describes two minds in the human constitution in almost Aristotelian terms.² The first is a created mind, and goes with the body as part of the material constitution. It is purely passive, the treasury of impressions. But the higher mind is God in us.³ οἶκον οὖν ἐπίγειον τὴν ἀόρατον ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀοράτου θεοῦ.⁴ This divine element has been given to man as a gift.⁵ Ἀπόσπασμα ἦν οὐ διαιρετόν: it is an extension, not a partition.⁶ Because of its peculiar relationship with divinity the higher human νοῦς is not properly human, but divine, so that the most heinous sin a man can commit is intellectual pride, which means giving himself rather than God the credit for anything that he does or thinks.⁷ By means of his kinship with Deity he can conceive of the Intelligibles, and even of God,⁸ for that, as in Phaedo, is an act of memory.⁹

As the mind is an integral part of God, part without partition, so its existence is continued only as it keeps

¹ Cf. here Wisd. vii. 24 ff.

² Quod Deus sit immut. 41—50 (I. 278 ff.). Cf. Leg. Al. I. 32 (I. 50).

³ De Opif. Mundi 135 (I. 32). γεγενῆσθαι γὰρ τὸ μὲν σῶμα χροῦν τοῦ τεχνίτου λαβόντος καὶ μορφήν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐξ αὐτοῦ διαπλάσαντος, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀπ' οὐδενὸς γενητοῦ τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἡγεμόνος τῶν πάντων· ὁ γὰρ ἐνεφύσησεν, οὐδὲν ἦν ἕτερον ἢ πνεῦμα θεῖον ἀπὸ τῆς μακαρίας καὶ εὐδαίμονος φύσεως ἐκείνης ἀποικίαν τὴν ἐνθάδε στείλαμενον ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν, ἵν' εἰ καὶ θνητόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ὀρατὴν μερίδα, κατὰ τοῦν τὴν ἀόρατον ἀθανατίζηται. Cf. Quod. det. pot. insid. 22, 23 (I. 195).

⁴ De Cherub. 101 (I. 157); cf. De Plant. 18 (I. 332).

⁵ De Opif. Mundi 66 (I. 15) φῶ νοῦν ἐξάαιρετον ἐδώρετο; cf. De Plant. 42 (I. 336).

⁶ Quod det. pot. insid. 90 (I. 209). Τέμνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν τοῦ θεοῦ κατ' ἀπάρτησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκτείνεται.

⁷ De Cherubim 71 (I. 152).

⁸ De Opif. Mundi 53 (I. 12) ὅπερ γὰρ νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦτ' ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν σώματι· βλέπει γὰρ ἑκάτερος, ὁ μὲν τὰ νοητά, ὁ δὲ τὰ αἰσθητά; cf. Leg. Al. I. 37 ff. (I. 50 ff.).

⁹ De Plant. 129 (I. 348).

itself clean from material pollution. It must continue to be turned toward God, and must keep firm control of the lower part of the soul. Philo follows Plato in dividing the soul into three parts,¹ and frequently brings in the figure from the Phaedrus of the higher part of the soul acting as charioteer driving the two lower parts.² The good of the flesh is irrational pleasure, but the good of the soul and of the entire man is *ὁ νοῦς τῶν ὄλων, ὁ θεός*.³ Men are to pray to God that He will dwell within them, and by so doing raise their minds above the earth and join them with the heavens.⁴ Philo's frequent passages describing the achievement of mystical illumination and unity are among the finest in the literature of mysticism.⁵ Indeed like most true mystics, in some passages he goes far towards denying the reality of individuality,⁶ and towards suggesting that death means the collapse of our material bodies and the reabsorption of the higher mind into God whence it came.

But this higher part of our constitution will return to God only if we keep it pure. The body dies, Philo says,⁷ when the *ψυχὴ* leaves it, the *ψυχὴ* when the *λογισμὸς* leaves it, the *λογισμὸς* when *ἀρετὴ* leaves it. And in another passage he describes in language remarkably suggestive of St. Paul the death of the soul in sin.⁸ When God said that the soul which sins should "die the death", He meant that in falling into sin the soul would cease to live in its true character, would really die as a divinely constituted being. Philo has no hope for resurrection after such a

¹ Leg. Al. I. 70 (I. 57). Though Philo is here more like Albinus than Plato.

² Leg. Al. I. 73 (I. 58).

³ De Gigant. 40 (I. 268).

⁴ De Sobr. 64 (I. 402); cf. Leg. Al. III. 29 (I. 93).

⁵ e. g. De Opif. Mundi 69 ff. (I. 16); De Gigant. 47 (I. 269).

⁶ De Cherub. 114 (I. 159). *πόθεν δὲ ἦλθεν ἡ ψυχὴ, ποῖ δὲ χωρήσει, πόσον δὲ χρόνον ἡμῖν ὁμοδαίματος ἔσται; τίς δὲ ἐστὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν; πότε δὲ καὶ ἐκτεθάρμεθα αὐτήν; πρὸ γενέσεως; ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπῆρχομεν· μετὰ τὸν θάνατον; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐσόμεθα οἱ μετὰ σωμάτων σύγκριτοι ποιοί, ἀλλ' εἰς παλιγγενεσίαν ὀρμήσομεν οἱ μετὰ ἀσωμάτων σύγκριτοι ποιοί.* But see the entire section.

⁷ Quod det. pot. insid. 141 (I. 218).

⁸ Leg. Al. I. 105 (I. 64).

death, as St. Paul has in Christ. To Philo the lapsing of the soul into sin is the supreme tragedy of existence.

Such very briefly seems to be the metaphysical scheme of Philo. He enriches every detail with abundant imagery and speaks upon each point now philosophically and now mystically in so inexact a way that few details of his system are not in some passage contradicted. But theoretically he is a pure monotheist, a pure dualist, with a strong belief in the fact that all spiritual and mental forces in the world are One.

It has already been pointed out that while Philo believes the immanent God to be the highest God, the only God, God, yet his supreme reverence is for God as transcendent, apart from any relation with the world. It is thus on the whole his custom to speak of God in emanation by the distinct title *ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος*, or simply *ὁ λόγος*. But by no means is this his consistent practice. There is hardly a function which Philo assigns to the Logos which he does not also assign to God. He often describes the Logos as the Demiurge, apparently distinct from God, but it is most common to find God spoken of as Creator.¹ The Logos is often described as an intermediate, and in one place is called a hostage, neither created nor uncreated, guaranteeing to God that man will not rebel, to man that God will not desert him. But God is Himself called *σωτήρ*.² It has been stated that God created the Intelligible World which was the Logos, but in another passage Philo represents the Logos as the means by which the Intelligible World was created.³ The only way in which any consistency can be found in Philo is to understand that while God in emanation is often apparently distinguished from God the Absolute, and as such is described in many different rhetorical passages in irreconcilable terms, yet Philo by all the terms alike means that God in relation with the world, and God in

¹ De Post. Caini 157 (I, 255); 175 (I, 259); De Ebriet. 30 (I, 361).

² De Post. Caini 156 (I, 255).

³ Leg. Al. I. 21 (I, 47).

Himself, are the same. God transcendent, ὁ Θεός, and God immanent, ὁ λόγος, are one and the same God. There is therefore no room whatever in the Philonian Logos for independent personality. The Logos is the supreme Deity in relationships. Philo's Deity though absolute is personal, and the Logos, as one aspect of Deity, shares in the personality of Deity, but it has no personality of its own distinct from the personality of God. When Philo speaks as a mystic the Logos seems frequently to be personal, but when he speaks as a metaphysician Deity is always one and indivisible, and the Logos has no personality of its own.

Similarly in the case of δυνάμεις and ἄγγελοι. Philo is fond of describing the attributes of God under these terms, and frequently his language is so suggestive of personalization that Kennedy still clings to the misapprehension that Philo attributed to them independent existence and reality.¹ And yet in one passage Philo states explicitly that angels and all such beings are simply God's way of revealing Himself.² When we think we have seen an angel, he says, we have seen God Himself in the form in which He chose at that time to be made visible. Hence it would appear that in Philo's metaphysics there is only one Divine Person, and strictly speaking no minor deities at all.

But like the popular philosophizing of the Greeks, the tendency of the Semitic mind, because of its instinctive concreteness in thought and expression, would be to personalize cosmic forces. When Greek philosophers could speak of a νοῦς or ψυχή or Logos impersonally, the Jewish instinct would be to describe them in elaborate anthropomorphic and personal language. As a result when Philo speaks other than as a Greek metaphysician, scientific conceptions appear much more personal than in strict Greek writings. And yet an equally strong Jewish motive, that of the preservation of monotheism at all costs, necessitated the theoretic

¹ H. A. A. Kennedy: *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, pp. 163 ff.

² *De Somniis* I. 232 (I. 655).

denial of personality to any divinity but the One, so that the personality and impersonality of the Logos, bewilderingly alternated in Philo, must have been far worse confused in popular Hellenistic Judaism. It is this obligation to preserve the unity of the divine nature even while going so far as to affirm the separate personalities of the Divine Beings which marks the Christian metaphysics of Justin and his successors as having its root primarily in Hellenistic Judaism rather than in Hellenism itself.

The distinction between Judaism in its Palestinian and Hellenistic developments has perhaps been made sufficiently clear. Palestinian Judaism believed in a personal God the Father whose will had been expressed in the Law. Cosmic problems received only the most sketchy treatment, and probably in cases where such problems were raised at all it is safe to presume a Greek inspiration. Hellenistic Judaism tried to be scientific and to think of Deity in terms adequate for a scientific mind, while it took over the Greek scheme of a mediatory principle to unite the Absolute Deity with the Universe. Also Palestinian Judaism adhered to its belief in man as made of both soul and body, and asserted that neither soul nor body could have existence apart from the other. Thus in Palestine belief in a continuation of life after death logically took the form of a doctrine of the resurrection of the body, according to which the soul at death went to Sheol or Hades in a state of semi-consciousness, in which it could neither be said to exist nor not to exist. At the appointed time it was again restored to life in the full sense by being reunited to the body. But in Hellenistic Judaism the hope was much more for immortality in the Greek sense, by which the soul is conceived of as relieved from bondage at death so that it can return to God, or go to Heaven, immeasurably benefited by its freedom from the defilement of the body. So did the two currents of Judaism drift far apart on both the doctrines of God and of man.

In their understanding of the distinction between Jew and Gentile, we have reason to believe that the two schools of Judaism were also quite unlike. The Palestinian

Jew would have no recognition for one who did not keep the Law. He was an unclean dog. Business of course necessitated dealing with Gentiles, but no true Palestinian Jew would have recognized that a Gentile had any religious rights or privileges unless he became a Jew. But in the Dispersion, much as Hebrews might group themselves together for mutual help in keeping the Law, and deeply as its observances must have stirred their religious natures, still the code of Judaism must generally have been indeed a "burden". So impossible was it to keep the Law out of Palestine that a member of the Rabbinical group in Jerusalem automatically lost his standing upon leaving the country.¹ Information about life in the Dispersion is sadly incomplete, but passages in Josephus and Acts, as well as the spirit of the writers of Alexandria, indicate a Judaism in the Dispersion which had even in its worship long been making strides toward meeting Gentiles half way. The Synagogues had their nuclei of extreme Jews who possessed the undisputed right to speak for the congregation, but most of them also had their groups, and apparently their large groups, of half-proselytes, "God fearers", who admired the monotheism and moral sturdiness of the Jews, and who wished to identify themselves with that part of Judaism, but who had not sufficient regard for the Jewish Law in itself to comply with its first rite in circumcision. The significance of the situation for judging the Judaism of the Dispersion is not that Judaism had an attraction for Gentiles, but that these Gentiles were so far tolerated and encouraged as even to be allowed to attend the Synagogues in company with full Jews. The strict Jews themselves held in theory that God could be pleased only by the rigorous observance of the Law, but so baffling and unattainable was their ideal in a heathen environment that they quietly made room at their side for those who wanted to worship with them, whether they attempted the observance of the Law or not. The practice had no inconveniences until Pauline Christianity

¹ See G. F. Moore: *Am-Haareṣ and the Haberim*, p. 142, n. 4.

came forward offering all the advantages of Judaistic monotheism and morality, and indeed claiming to be the true Judaism, but explicitly asserting the inconsequential character of the Law. Such a gospel must have been enormously attractive to the "God fearers", because it offered them a pure worship of God in which they could have full and unqualified participation. However once the theory of the strict Jews as to the nature and authority of the Law had been openly challenged, the slack line had to be drawn tight, and the practice of encouraging such half proselytes had inevitably to give place, as we have seen, to a fierce denunciation by the Rabbis of all people who wanted the benefits of Judaism without its legal obligations.

The Hellenistic Jewish character of St. Paul's thought and writings is strikingly clear. That St. Paul, a man of Tarsus, who understood no word of Hebrew, who made no claim to Rabbinical training in any of his writings, in spite of the advantage such prestige would have given him in the controversy reflected in the Epistle to the Galatians, and who on the contrary was steeped in the ideas and fixed in the point of view of Greek Judaism, was actually a trained disciple of Gamaliel is impossible to believe. The author of the seventh chapter of Romans was a deeply conscientious Jew who found observance of the Law impossible in a Greek city. He was fanatically intolerant of any trace of blasphemy in Jerusalem, because in his struggle to be a Jew in the Dispersion, Jerusalem as a place of perfect religious atmosphere was idealized to him as it could never have been to one familiar with all sides of life in the Holy City. His Gospel, which he received from no man, was a conception of Christ as a divine personality, revealed in the incarnation, and described in a mingling of the Philonic Heavenly Man, Wisdom, Nomos, Logos. The Epistle to the Galatians, with its theory of a spiritual Israel, as illustrated by the eclectic character of the line of descent through Abraham and Isaac, only carries Philo's treatise on Nobility one step further than Philo himself cared to do. St. Paul fairly made his choice. Where Philo had philosophized about the superiority of the Heavenly

Ideal Law, Man, Logos, but did not dare himself, except in moments of exalted mysticism, to cut loose from the physical worship of God as prescribed in the Torah, St. Paul found such a reality in Christ that he fearlessly proclaimed the sufficiency of the Spirit, and threatened the loss of all the benefits of the spiritual Christ to those who were so weak in faith that they wanted still to retain both the Law of the Flesh and the Law of the Spirit. It was St. Paul who made the tremendous discovery of the identity of Christ the man of history with the Logos of Hellenistic Judaism. He does not use the word "Logos" for Christ, to be sure, but no attendant of a Diaspora Synagogue could have mistaken the meaning of such statements as those of Paul when he wrote: *Χριστὸν θεοῦ δόξαν καὶ θεοῦ σοφίαν*;¹ and that characteristic passage beginning *ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*.² In such a case, speculation as to whether Philo's writings were a literary source for St. Paul's Epistles is entirely of secondary importance, though it seems that the similarity between Galatians, the ninth chapter of Romans, and the treatise of Philo on Nobility already mentioned is in itself almost adequate proof that St. Paul had read at least some parts of the Philonic corpus. But more important is it to understand that whereas the first stage of Christianity had apparently been conducted on the basis of, and in the atmosphere of, Palestinian Judaism, St. Paul claimed the person of Christ as the solution of the problems of Hellenistic Judaism. The contrast between Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism could not be more adequately represented than that between St. Paul's allegorical account, for example, of the veil of Moses, and the parable of the Prodigal Son. The one is as idiomatic of the philosophic adaptations of awkward passages of Scripture, as the other is true to type of the Haggada of the Tannaim.

Christianity thus almost from its incipency had two interpretations, both Judaistic, but utterly different in character from each other. If there ever was a violent

¹ I Cor. i. 24.

² Col. i. 15 ff.

and prolonged conflict between the two schools of Christianity it has left astonishingly little trace. The solution eventually was a compromise between the two which was apparently early begun, but which it took many years of Christian thought to complete. From this point of view Justin's writings are most valuable testimony, for, as will be seen in the course of the following discussion, they preserve the two traditions still strikingly intact.

THE THEOLOGY OF JUSTIN MARTYR

CHAPTER I

JUSTIN'S LIFE

Justin Martyr was born, by his own record,¹ at Flavia Neapolis in the Roman Province of Syria Palaestina, by which name the Roman Province of Judaea was called after the great rebellion and fall of Jerusalem under Hadrian. Flavia Neapolis, the modern Nablous, was one of the colonies founded as Greek cities by the wise imperialists of the day, but was not organized until A. D. 70. The city was situated in Samaria, near ancient Sichem where was Jacob's well. Justin does not give any decisive information about his race. He says that his father's name was Priscus, a Latin name, his grandfather's Bacchius, a Greek name, and on the basis of these names it is usually assumed that his ancestors were Greek or Roman colonists in the new city. The evidence for his ancestry is, however, confusing. He definitely calls himself in one passage a member of the Samaritan race,² but he nowhere seems to have had any Samaritan training, so that if his blood was Samaritan he was to all appearance bred a heathen. From Dialogue 28 we learn that Justin was uncircumcized, so that whether Samaritan or Greek, he was certainly not a Jew.

In the second chapter of the Dialogue Justin tells of a determination to learn philosophy which drove him from school to school in search of the truth. He says that he

¹ Ap. I. 1 (53 C).

² Dial. 120. 6 (349 C). Cf. Epiphanius Adv. Haer. 46. 1. Epiphanius may not represent testimony independent of the Dial.

first attached himself to a Stoic philosopher, and stayed with him some time (how long Justin does not say), but left him because the master was teaching him nothing about God, and had confessedly put such knowledge among the non-essentials. Justin says that he turned quickly to a Peripatetic of great pretensions. But the disciple of Aristotle, after a few days instruction, requested his pupil for a fee, a demand which aroused Justin's suspicions that the man was an impostor, and prompted him to leave the school at once. His next attempt was with a Pythagorean, a man of great reputation with himself as well as with others. But this man insisted at the first interview that it was useless to come to him for instruction in philosophy unless Justin had already trained his mind in abstract thinking by the mastery of music, astronomy, and geometry, so that when Justin confessed his ignorance of these preliminary disciplines he was peremptorily dismissed. Justin was disappointed at thus being rejected by a man who had impressed him as having what he was seeking, but felt pressed for time and did not think it feasible to learn the Pythagorean preliminaries. In his perplexity he thought he found a way out in Platonism. Here was what he had been seeking. He was ushered at once into acquaintance with immaterial conceptions and the world of Ideas, and was so rapidly growing in his mystical hold upon these that he hoped soon to come to the goal of Platonism and experience the vision of God. It was at this point that his attention was called to the Christians.

This most interesting account of Justin's philosophical quest has always been taken literally by his commentators, although the story of the conversion to Christianity which immediately follows it has long been regarded by many scholars as an idealization of Justin's actual experiences. The fact is, however, that the two narratives are one, unbroken by any transition, and that the chances are very probable that Justin's adventures in the philosophic schools are as ideal as his conversation with the old man which introduced him to Christianity. Justin, in the entire passage, is dramatizing the relations between Christianity and philosophy, and has here adopted the familiar convention

of relating someone's adventures in passing from school to school, and finally to the Christian school, in order to criticize each school by the adventures related. Helm has recently pointed out a remarkable parallel between this account of Justin and Lucian's *Menippus* or *Necromancy* cc. 4-6, a contemporary piece of writing.¹ Here *Menippus* describes himself as having gone through several schools of philosophy, and as having given them all up because their mutual contradictions convinced him that none could speak with authority.² Some of the verbal similarities which Helm points out between Justin and Lucian are striking. They show no interdependence, but only the conventionalization of the literary form. The same form, probably borrowed from the Greeks, is used by the Tannaim to describe the three rabbinic types of true proselytes, Githro, Naaman, and Rahab, who go "through all heathen cults and schools without finding peace. They find their first rest and peace in the haven of the Bible and the Prophets, because the sacred word alone can insure peace of soul and knowledge of God."³

But if Justin is using here a conventionalized form, he is using no less conventionalized criticisms of the schools. His criticism of the Stoics was that they had not sufficient interest in metaphysics, but the Stoic indifference to metaphysics has always been proverbial. It is only with the greatest difficulty that we reconstruct the metaphysical background of the Stoics at all, because their indifference and neglect of that aspect of philosophy was so universal that we have little to build upon, while contradictions are everywhere common. Pfättisch suggests that Justin's difficulty with his Stoic teacher may have been the fact that he had tried to find in Stoicism a personal God, and was not content with ordinary Stoic pantheism.⁴ But no such explanation is necessary. The Stoics were mostly teachers of ethic and of logic, and as a rule had no interest in

¹ Helm "Lucian und Menipp" pp. 40 ff.

² Cf. Ap. I. 4. 8 (55 C); 7. 3 (56 D); 26. 6 (70 B).

³ Goldfahn (Bibl. 389) p. 52.

⁴ (Bibl. 385) p. 9.

speculating about the nature of even their pantheistic deity. When they spoke of conforming to fate or nature they were content to leave these terms largely undefined. Justin's experience in the Stoic schools was thus not necessarily a personal incident, but only reflects a commonplace criticism of the school as a whole.

Similarly in the Aristotelian's greed for money is to be recognized a most typical contemporary criticism. Information is very explicit that at this time nothing was more common than the wearing of a philosopher's cloak by ignorant impostors who made thereby a good living,¹ while Atticus, the Platonic contemporary of Justin, shows vividly a spirit among the Platonists of the day to suspend friendly borrowings from the Peripatetics, and to inveigh in tirades against their morals.² Nothing would be more natural than than for Justin with his Platonic sympathies to join the Academic reproach against Aristotelian morals by representing his peripatetic teacher as a mercenary impostor.

The criticism of the Pythagorean school is likewise perfectly general and typical and does not suggest a personal experience in the least. Lucian laughs at the Pythagoreans, one of whom he calls an arithmetician, astronomer, trickster, geometrician, musician, and magician.³ In general the attitude of most men toward the Pythagoreans is well summed up by Justin, that the Pythagoreans were profound men but so walled in by technical scholarship that a popular scholar could get little from them.

When Justin comes to speak of Platonism he speaks much more in detail and shows here as throughout his writings that he has at least dabbled in Platonic doctrines. In general then it appears that Justin tells in the form of his personal experiences in the philosophic schools only his criticisms of those schools and accordingly at this point it may be well to inquire what is the testimony of the body

¹ See the collection of references in Trollope (Bibl. 28) p. 10. n. 22.

² See Euseb. Pr. ev. XV. 4, 5.

³ Vit. Auct. Ch. 27, from Trollope (Bibl. 28) p. 11. n. 28.

of his writings as to the extent of his knowledge of Greek philosophy.

Of the fundamentals of Stoicism Justin appears on the whole to have little grasp. He speaks of the hopelessness of the Stoic doctrine of metempsychosis and cycles from any teleological or individualistic point of view,¹ and of the contradiction between Stoic monism and fatalism on the one hand, and Stoic ethic on the other.² He knows that the various Stoic departments of instruction are called *Logoi*.³ On the other hand Justin makes the popular error of including Heraclitus among the Stoics.⁴ He likewise states that according to the Stoics God is Himself to be consumed in the final conflagration,⁵ whereby he shows his ignorance of the first principle of Stoic pantheism. For according to the Stoics God was identified with the fire which would ultimately take all things back into itself. In popular Stoicism it has been seen that the dualistic tendency of Stoic ethics was allowed to fraternize with Platonic metaphysical dualism so far as to distinguish between God and fire, which thus became the ultimate state of all matter. Various attempts have been made to establish an immediate connection between Justin's Spermatic Logos and the Stoic teaching, but without success as will be shown later.⁶ Justin's Stoic references are those of the ordinary conversation of untrained men of the time, and show no trace of his having made any study of Stoicism at all.

Justin's references to Platonism are, as has been said, much more detailed. He calls himself a former Platonist.⁷ Socrates and Plato were two of his favorite heroes; the life and death of Socrates had especially made a profound impression upon him. Parallels to Plato can frequently be found in the Apologies and Dialogues, but that they come

¹ Dial. I. 4 (217 E, 218 A).

² Ap. II. 7, 8, 9 (46 A, B). See Blunt in loco.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ap. II. 8. 1 (46 C).

⁵ Ap. I. 20. 2 (66 C).

⁶ See below pp. 161 ff.

⁷ Ap. II. 12. 1 (50 A).

direct from Plato's writings is by no means sure. For example in Ap. I. 68. 2 (99 C) Justin writes ὁ φίλον τῶ θεῷ ταῦτο γενέσθω, which Otto suggests¹ is closely paralleled in Plato's Crito 43 D, Apol. Soc. 19 A, and Phaedr. 246 D. But the parallel is in no case close enough to suggest direct influence in view of the fact that in Stoic and Christian, as well as in Platonic, circles the idea of submitting to the will of God was so common that such phraseology must have been on everyone's lips. The source of the expression, if a direct source must be assumed, is with equal probability assigned to Mat. xxvi. 42 or Acts xxi. 14 by Pfättisch.²

Yet Justin had probably something more than a street philosopher's knowledge of Platonism. He may have read the Apology, Phaedo, Republic, and Timaeus, for with each of these he has a verbal parallel sufficiently close to suggest literary acquaintance with the master.³ But traces of no further Platonic books can be found with confidence in Justin's writings. Indeed such references to Plato as that to the νοῦς βασιλικός⁴ are a fair indication that at least he had never read the Philebus. For whereas in Justin the human ψυχὴ is called a part of the νοῦς βασιλικός, in Plato it is the νοῦς ἐμός, not the ψυχὴ, which is compared and joined with νοῦς βασιλικός. Justin certainly learned of the νοῦς βασιλικός outside the Philebus. It is easy to fancy parallels between Plato and Justin, as for instance to see in Justin's description of the degeneration of the philosophic schools from the master philosophers who founded them,⁵ a reflection of the degeneration of succeeding generations from the truly philosophic type of man, the ideal citizen of Plato's Republic. But actually the evidence that Plato had any appreciable direct influence

¹ Otto in loco, followed by Blunt in loco.

² (Bibl. 44) in loco.

³ Cf. e. g. Ap. I. 8. 1 (57 A) Apol. Soc. 30 d.; Dial. 3. 3 (220 B) Phaedo 85 c, d.; Ap. II. 10. 6 (48 D) Rep. II. 377 ff., X. 595 ff.; Ap. II. 10. 6 (48 E) Tim. 28 c.; (Ap. I. 60. 1 (92 E) Tim. 36 b, c.

⁴ Dial. 4. 2 (221 E); cf. Plato Philebus 22 c. 5, 6.

⁵ Dial. 2. 2 (218 D).

upon Justin is not forthcoming, so that Dr. Holland was right in suggesting that it was quite typical of Justin's understanding of Plato's text, when Justin interprets as a prophetic type of the Cross the statement of Plato in the *Timaeus* that the soul of the world was placed in the universe in the form of a Greek Chi.¹ Indeed Geffken denies to Justin any Platonic training whatever.²

The sort of system which Justin knew by the name of Platonism he has expounded in part in the discussion with the Old Man which immediately follows the narrative of his supposed adventures in the different schools of philosophy. For it was while he was carried away with Platonism, and was seeking lonely places in which to carry on the mystic exercises whereby he soon hoped to get a vision of God, that one day, he says, he met in the course of his solitary walks an Old Man who turned out to be a Christian. They fell into a discussion about philosophy during which the Old Man completely shattered the confidence of Justin in Platonism, and then represented to him so forcibly the superiority of Christianity that Justin soon thereafter became a Christian. Various attempts have been made at identifying the Old Man,³ but there is no reason for supposing that Justin's account is not a fiction, and that the Old Man is not merely an ideal figure. Hubík points out that Eusebius did not treat the introduction to the Dialogue as an historical document, and that he entirely disregards the Old Man incident, because he had apparently a good independent tradition for the conversion of Justin.⁴ But if not historical, the passage is of great value as showing Justin's idea of the doctrines of Platonism, and hence for revealing the true nature of the Platonism whose traces might be found in Justin's theology.

Philosophy is defined as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐπίγνωσις which must be translated, "the knowledge of the existing One and the understanding of the

¹ Holland (Bibl. 153) p. 584. See Ap. I. 60. 1 (92 E); cf. Plato *Tim.* 36 b, c.

² (Bibl. 205).

³ See Semisch (Bibl. 118) I. 9. n. 1.

⁴ (Bibl. 209) pp. 297, 298.

Truth."¹ Here is the first distinction between Justin's Platonism and Plato, for while Justin is in this section obviously drawing in general upon conceptions to be found in the *Phaedo*, yet Plato in the *Phaedo* speaks of τὰ ὄντα, Justin of τὸ ὄν. The change is not an insignificant one, for τὰ ὄντα meant to Plato a scientific field of inquiry, while τὸ ὄν to Justin meant simply God, the goal of Mysticism. Justin shortly after this definition of philosophy speaks in truly mystical language of τὸ ὄν as visible to the purified eye of man. Τὸ ὄν is an indescribable Something which comes suddenly into properly prepared minds because of their kinship to it and desire for the vision.² The Old Man promptly rejoins by asking what is man's kinship with God, thereby showing that it is God and no other that Justin means by τὸ ὄν. Philosophy then is to Justin knowledge about God, or knowledge of God, as the end of philosophy is the vision of God and growing like unto God.³ Of interest in science in the larger sense there seems no trace in Justin's Platonism. Ἐπιστήμη and σοφία are in Justin filled with the popular mystical connotation of the day.

The Old Man asks Justin, after his definition of Philosophy as knowledge τοῦ ὄντος to define τὸ ὄν.⁴ Justin answers at once that it is that which is fixed eternally in its nature and mode of being, and is the cause of existence to all things else, or in other words God.⁵ The aim of Justin is clearly to define the Absolute God of contemporary Platonism, in which the influence of the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover, the First Cause, is distinct. Justin, like Albinus, distinguishes between God and the νοῦς βασιλικός, an expression in many ways coordinate with the

¹ Dial. 3. 4 (220 D).

² Dial. 4. 1 (221 C, D).

³ Dial. 2. 6 (219 D); cf. *Fragm. XVIII* (Otto). τέλος τῶ φιλοσοφοῦντι ἢ πρὸς θεὸν ὁμοίως κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

⁴ Mss. here and all editors read θεόν for τὸ ὄν, except Thirby with whom Aubé very properly agrees. It is clear that Justin is here using the two interchangeably, but the reading is much smoother with τὸ ὄν than with θεόν.

⁵ Dial. 3. 5 (220 E). τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως αἰεὶ ἔχον καὶ τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ θεός.

Logos of Philo. There is, according to Justin's Platonism, the *νοῦς βασιλικός* which is the connecting link between all living beings and God the source of life, but which itself contemplates God in a perfection of mystical clarity which our mysticism can only copy.¹ The *νοῦς βασιλικός* is the universal mind of which all souls, both of men and animals, are only parts;² the distinction between the souls of men and animals is not one of nature, but is the result of the relative hampering power of the different kinds of bodies. A soul in a dog's body is much more intimately ensnared in matter than in a man's body, and hence is kept from mysticism because it cannot rise above such an encumbrance. For mysticism in men is possible only according to the ability of a man to rise above the material part of his nature into pure abstraction. A few men are able with difficulty to do so, but ordinary men and animals are hopelessly tied down by the flesh. Justin's Platonism is typical of the Platonism of his day in that it is founded upon a dualism consisting of an Absolute God who is pure existence, to whom is opposed dead and killing matter, while the two are bridged by a third principle, the *νοῦς βασιλικός* which projects the life of God into matter, and so furnishes life to whatever lives in the world. Justin says very little of the world of Ideas, only mentions that he had been thrilled by the contemplation of them. They appear to have played no essential part in his system, and were apparently carried over, as in Philo, only because the familiar Platonic Dialogues made much of them. The Ideas would then probably with Justin, as with Philo and Albinus, have been identified in some way with the *νοῦς βασιλικός*, if he ever understood them sufficiently to have had a theory about them at all. There can be little doubt that the World Soul of the Timaeus was also identified by Justin as by Albinus with the *νοῦς βασιλικός*, although in the Timaeus it is *νοῦς* which creates the *ψυχή*. The *νοῦς* would then have been regarded by Justin as the

¹ Dial. 4. 2 (221 E).

² This confusion of the terms *ψυχή* and *νοῦς* is Justin's, and is one of the many indications that he had had little close philosophic training.

sustaining, cohesive force in the universe, whose presence in the world prevented a relapse of matter into chaos, and whose especial presence in men furnished them with their higher powers.

But the Old Man is represented as finding in Justin's Platonic thinking a profound ambiguity in the matter of the nature of the human soul and of its relation to the *νοῦς βασιλικός* and to God. He challenges Justin's position and a very interesting discussion ensues. From this point on Justin does not make it at all clear what of the theories suggested he intends to be understood as Platonic, and what as Christian. The Old Man is an ideal Christian who is able to meet Justin on his Platonic ground and lead him thence into Christianity, and it may be that Justin intends his original position on each point to represent Platonism, while the various corrections of his first statements may suggest the Christian improvement upon Platonic doctrines. But toward the end of the discussion occurs a complete break and change of ground, and this break seems the best point to take as the place of departure from Platonism to Christianity. Up to that point, then, the discussion may fairly be taken as concerned with various types of Platonism. It seems most likely that Justin intends in the argument to refute views from the Academy of his day which were incompatible with Christianity, in favor of a Platonism more to his purpose.

Justin's first anthropological position in the discussion, as has been seen, is that the *φυγή* of man is divine and immortal,¹ and a part of the *νοῦς βασιλικός*,² and that all souls, whether of men or animals, are alike as all being parts of the *νοῦς βασιλικός*. As the *νοῦς βασιλικός* sees God, so the proper aim of all souls is to comprehend the Divine, but they are prevented from doing so by ethical

¹ For a similar doctrine see Severus in Euseb. Pr. Ev. XIII. xvii.

² Dial. 4. 2 (221 E). Justin has clearly in mind such a *νοῦς βασιλικός* as we have found in Albinus. It is notable here that there is no hint that the word *μέρος* in such a connection implies a division.

impurity. Only the ethically pure can see God. But Justin is forced to change his point of view because animals are certainly not ethically impure, so that he attempts to explain that the nature of the bodies in which a soul may be implanted may vary widely in hampering power. Only the human body is fine enough to enable the soul to rise above it. The Old Man here questions whether human beings have bodies thus superior to the bodies of animals, but does not press his question, because it is the human soul he is most interested in understanding. Justin assumes that the human soul sees God while still in the body if the man is ethically pure, although the vision is much more perfect after death, while those who are unworthy are condemned after death to be imprisoned in the bodies of wild beasts. But since Justin admits that no permanent advantage accrues to the soul in receiving either the vision or punishment, because both are forgotten in the next incarnation, the Old Man is allowed summarily to reject two fundamental doctrines from Justin's first Platonic views. He denies the power of the soul to get an actual vision of God, and rejects the doctrine of the incarnation of human souls in animal bodies. The argument has thus far not been particularly convincing. The Old Man seems to use practical expediency as an adequate philosophical criterion, and from that test alone he has put aside both doctrines. He argues that it is useless to punish people when they do not remember afterwards either the fact or reason of their having been punished, and concludes that such punishment because useless, cannot exist. Similarly since according to Justin's own statement one forgets the vision of God in the next incarnation, the vision is likewise useless and hence non-existent. The appeal to expediency was evidently in that period of decadent philosophizing considered a legitimate philosophical argument, for Zeller points out that expediency was the ultimate basis of all Atticus' discussion, and that it was on the basis of its practical results that Alexander of Aphrodisius attacked the Stoic doctrine of fatalism.¹

¹ Zeller III. i (1909) p. 840; Engl. Tr.: Eclectics, pp. 322, 343—344. See also Alex. Aphrod. De Fato XVI ff.

This passage in Justin would not then appear so weak to Justin's contemporaries as to us.

Chapter Five of the Dialogue returns to a discussion of the nature of the soul on the basis of new Platonic definitions. Some Platonists, says Justin, define the soul as immortal and hence unbegotten,¹ but Justin now represents a school of Platonism which does not agree with this. The Old Man, with Justin's consent, begins the second discussion by asserting the complete coordination of the world and the human soul, by which if the world is immortal and unbegotten, souls are likewise so, and if the world is not immortal, souls cannot be.² Some Platonists, says Justin, assert that the world is immortal and unbegotten. We have other evidence that his very Aristotelian doctrine was taught in the Academy. Proclus says that Albinus taught the eternity of the world.³ Albinus himself says that while it is not right to think that there ever was a time in which the world was not, because it is entirely in process of generation, yet this very fact reveals some more original cause of its existence.⁴ Severus tried to assume a middle position by saying, "in general the world is eternal, but this world which now exists and is so subject to change is begotten."⁵ But Justin thinks that the correct Platonic doctrine does not teach the eternity of the world. Nothing immortal or unbegotten can be subject to such change and decay as constantly take place in the world. Hence the world, and with it the souls of men, must be mortal and begotten, and live only by the will of God. When God ceases to will that souls should live, they perish. The soul survives the body, those of the good being rewarded and never dying, while those of the evil are punished sufficiently and then cease to exist. There can be no plurality of unbegotten beings

¹ Severus would represent this Platonic point of view.

² On the co-ordination of souls and the world see Zeller III. i. 839. Anm. 2; Engl. Tr.: Eclectics, 342. n. 3.

³ Proclus in Tim. 67 c. (Ed. Diehl I. 219. 2 ff.).

⁴ Albinus: Introduction, p. 169.

⁵ Proclus in Tim. 88 d (Ed. Diehl I. 289. 7 ff.).

for God is uniquely the Unbegotten, a doctrine which he quite correctly says was held by Plato and Pythagoras.¹

The next step is most important, for it finds the solution of the problem of the relation of man to God by introducing into the soul a third principle, the *πνεῦμα*, which bears the same relation to the soul as the soul to the body. The soul as a created thing cannot be a living principle itself, but only can partake of life. It partakes of life by having in itself a part of the *ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα*, a conception which is not defined, but which probably, as will shortly appear, takes the place in Justin's thinking of the *μέρος τοῦ βασιλικῶ νοῦ* which he had recently defined as the soul. The soul now appears to be a created thing, surviving the body, to be sure, but doomed to perish if it is not the will of God that the *πνεῦμα* abide with it. If God withdraws the *πνεῦμα* from a soul, the soul ceases to exist, and at once relapses into that out of which it came, a statement whose meaning Justin does not explain.

Justin has thus far not left contemporary Platonism, though his solution of the problem of the nature of the soul is clearly influenced ultimately by the Aristotelian double *νοῦς*. Albinus has already illustrated to us the tendency of contemporary Platonism to sharpen Plato's distinction between the higher and lower parts of the soul by introducing Aristotle's double *νοῦς*. Similarly Atticus distinguished between the *νοῦς* and *τὸ πνευματικὸν ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς*, and ascribed immortality only to the *νοῦς*.² Porphyry slightly later represents a better tradition of Platonism, according to Proclus,³ in teaching that the *ὄχημα*, while not immortal in its own right, survives the death of the body. Marcus Aurelius divided man into a trichotomy of *σάρξ*, *πνεῦμα*, and *ἡγεμονικόν*, in which the last principle is clearly an Intelligence.⁴

In all these philosophers, the highest principle in man

¹ See Tim. 41 a, b.

² Proclus in Tim. 311 a (Ed. Diehl III. 234. 9 ff.).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Marc. Aurel. Commentar. 2, 4. p. 13 from Lebreton (Bibl. 382) p. 329.

was a *νοῦς*, and there is no reason to suppose that Justin conceived of the *ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα* as merely a principle of life, with no further function in the soul. Expressed in different language in different schools, the highest principle in man was always a rational medium between man as a created being and the Cosmic Intelligence. It was a source and instrument of knowledge of the Eternal Verities, whether these were conceived of as Forms or as Axioms. The *ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα* must have played a similar part in Justin's scheme. He does not say so, but it is entirely probable that in addition to the *ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα*, itself a rational guide, he conceived of a lower type of mind in the *ψυχὴ* proper, which was the intellect dealing with sensible objects according to whose guidance most men were content to live. But the human soul was in itself not especially exalted. Justin had admitted the identity of nature of the souls of men and of animals,¹ and had never seen fit to contradict the statement as his thought developed in the discussion with the Old Man. And yet clearly, though the *ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα* brings much of life and intellectual light to the soul, the centre of personality is the soul. The *πνεῦμα* can be given or withdrawn at God's will. It is at best a borrowed thing. But the soul is the man, and the object of endeavor is to make the soul come into harmony with the life of the *πνεῦμα*. So will a man be worthy of retaining the *πνεῦμα*, or in other words, of continuing to exist.

Thus far in the argument Justin has been only clearing the air as to what he means by Platonism. He is writing from a Christian viewpoint, and is unquestionably choosing those doctrines current in Platonic schools which will best serve his purpose as a Christian Apologist. He has now but to turn the terms *νοῦς* and *ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα* into *Logos*, and to assert the complete incarnation of the *ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα* in Christ to have his Christian *Logos* doctrine in its fundamental aspects. It is impossible to say from what Academic teachings Justin went over into Christianity, but he is perfectly accurate, according to our

¹ Dial. 4. 2 (221 E, 222 A).

evidence of the teaching of Platonists of his day, in insisting upon the system he has just outlined as being a fair statement of Platonism as he would have heard it expounded.

Of the circumstances of Justin's conversion from philosophy to Christianity little is actually known. The ideal story of his philosophic quest and discussion with the Old Man is continued from the point where the ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα is admitted, by a very sudden shift to Christianity. Justin represents himself in Chapter Seven of the Dialogue as deeply perplexed. He has allowed the Old Man to take the last step of the argument, in which the ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα has been introduced and the relative unimportance of the human soul asserted. Justin now intimates that he is beyond his depth. While it has been seen that there is no reason to believe, either from contemporary Platonism or from Justin's later doctrine, that Justin did not consider that he now had a firmer basis than ever for knowledge and mysticism, yet Justin makes himself appear as though thinking that if the ψυχὴ was not itself akin to the Divine he had no means of finding the Truth. He abruptly asks the Old Man what way of finding the Truth is left. The Old Man, likewise abandoning the advantage of the new description of the soul, immediately explains to Justin that the Prophets, more ancient than the philosophers, gave men the Truth because it had been revealed to them by the Holy Spirit, and that they had been followed by Christ, the supreme revelation of Truth. He recommends to Justin a careful study of Christ and the Prophets, and goes away leaving Justin with a strange desire kindled in his heart to search out the new school of philosophy, Christianity. He straightway did so, he says, and soon adopted Christianity as his philosophy. He concludes the remarkable story by saying that as a teacher in this his latest school, he now was wearing the Philosopher's cloak. "In this sense, and for these reasons, I am a philosopher."¹

The Second Apology gives the only direct evidence

¹ Dial. 8. 2 (225 C).

we have as to Justin's conversion.¹ There he states that while still a Platonist he was attracted to investigate the doctrines of Christianity by the moral integrity of the Christians and their fearlessness before persecution. Upon examination he was convinced that Christian doctrines were the pure Truth of which everything else is either an inadequate imitation or a demonic perversion. There is here no fundamental contradiction between the *Apology* and the *Dialogue*, even taking the passage in the *Dialogue* as a record of Justin's actual experiences. It may well have been that just at the time when his attention was called to the Christians by some remarkable instance of Christian fortitude during a persecution, he was in a state of discouragement at the discovery of new teachings in Platonism which he had found difficult to understand. In any case it is perfectly plain throughout Justin's writings that he considered Christianity as superior to philosophy, not only because the Books of Moses were the direct source of Plato's doctrines, but because in Christianity Justin found relief from the necessity of seeking metaphysical knowledge through his own efforts. He consistently regarded philosophy as good so far as it went, but as confusing, contradictory, and unsatisfying. Not by the efforts of man's own reason, but through Revelation, he insists, is the Truth to be had by men. And once in possession of this Truth, all the ethical virtues, honesty, courage, truthfulness, purity, self-control, follow spontaneously and inevitably.

Justin's quest, while probably not autobiographical in detail, is thoroughly autobiographical in spirit. He represents himself as seeking a short and easy way to a foundation for mystic experience. It was a religious, not an intellectual quest. He adopted Christianity at the end because it was able to give satisfaction to a fundamentally unphilosophic mind. Pythagoreanism was utterly too difficult. Platonism was easier, but not easy when one penetrated at all deeply into its teachings. But the necessity for philosophic effort vanished in Christianity with its doctrine

¹ *Ap. II.* 12. 1, 2 (50 A, B); cf. 13. 1 (51 B).

of revelation. According to Justin the ordinary human mind is unable to find the truth by rational processes, and in Christianity does not try to do so. A Christian can exercise himself in cultus and mystical worship, completely at rest in an objective body of revelation, to question which is the height of impiety.¹ Justin was of the stuff that Christian saints are made of, because he could completely accept an external body of teaching, and unhampered by any philosophical inhibitions, could throw the whole force of his enthusiasm and mystical fervour into the single task of living and teaching the Truth. Not great penetration but great conviction makes for sainthood, and it is conviction rather than penetration which we shall find characteristic of Justin's temper and writings.

There is no reason to suppose that Justin has been guilty of a serious hysteron-proteron in putting the writings of the Prophets among the causes and inspirations of his conversion. Justin's age was intensely eager for the mysterious, and found great delight in the allegorical explanation of cryptic language of all sorts. Especially did the mystic urge of the time seek to find expression through oracles, secret passwords, and myths. The appeal to prophecy which now seems to us as the weakest sort of apologetic, exactly met the prevailing taste of the day, and was a powerful weapon against the opponents of Christianity. Justin could seriously challenge the heathen, "That the Prophets were inspired by none other than the Divine Logos, even you, as I fancy, will grant."² Accordingly the incessant use of prophecy, together with the love of elaborate and fanciful exegesis which seems a great barrier to the understanding of the early Fathers today, was the most forcible presentation of Christianity to an age with a morbid love for the unusual and marvellous. Semisch³ points out that Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, and Hilary, all definitely attributed their conversion

¹ For the use of this idea in Justin's Apologetic see below p. 110 ff.

² Ap. I. 33. 9 (75 D).

³ (Bibl. 118) I. 14. Anm. 1.

to the peculiar appeal of Old Testament prophecy, and Justin who thought it worth while to rest the bulk of the defence for Christianity with heathens as well as with Jews upon the prophetic argument, may well have been induced to do so because he had been attracted to Christianity by prophecy himself.

Of Justin's life as a Christian we know unfortunately very little. Tradition, begun in the "Martyrdom" and carried on by Eusebius and the later church writers, represents him after his conversion as having dedicated his life to Christian propaganda, and the spirit revealed in the Apologies and the Dialogue completely harmonizes with such a tradition. With the Cynic Criscus (Greek, Criscens) he says he had an open dispute of so violent a character that he expected the hatred of Criscus sooner or later to bring about his death.¹ Trypho is made to say that Justin is obviously a man of wide experience in controversy on the points they are discussing,² while Justin himself says that he is accustomed to answer the questions and objections of all people of all nations who want to examine Christian doctrines with him.³ According to the "Martyrdom", Justin seems to have conducted a sort of school of Christian doctrine. "I live above one Martinus, at the Timiotinian Bath if anyone wished to come to me, I communicated to him the doctrines of the Truth." At the end of the Dialogue Justin appears to be on the point of sailing, though whence, whither, or why is not told.⁴ As the first word about the sailing comes from Trypho, there must have been some earlier conversation on the subject in a lost section of the Dialogue, very likely in the opening remarks of the second day's discussion. In the "Martyrdom" Justin is reported as saying that he has twice lived in Rome, so that usually it has been thought that Justin held the Dialogue in Ephesus (following Eusebius)⁵ on the eve

¹ Ap. II. 3. 1 ff. (46 E ff.).

² Dial. 50. 1 (269 C).

³ Dial. 64. 2 (287 D).

⁴ Dial. 142. 1, 3 (371 C, D).

⁵ Eusebius H. E. IV. 18. 6.

of his second departure for Rome. But there is no evidence for such an assumption. The martyrdom of Justin is very well attested. Tatian,¹ Irenaeus,² and Eusebius,³ mention his martyrdom explicitly, while Tertullian⁴ calls him "Martyr". The very early record of the martyrdom of Justin with others has rarely been challenged as a genuine account of the death of the Apologist. Its verbal accuracy cannot of course be relied upon, but its utter simplicity, together with its harmony with the character of Justin as revealed in his writings, make so strong a presumption in its favour that the lack of external evidence for its genuineness is rightly disregarded. The "Martyrdom" tells that Justin and others were brought up before Rusticus the Roman prefect in accordance with a new law which was particularly directed against the Christians to force them to offer sacrifice to the gods. They refused to comply with this law and opened a brief parley defending their action. Justin said that after an attempt to learn all doctrines he had accepted Christianity as the one true doctrine. Christianity he explained as the worship of the God of the Christians, who is One from the beginning, fashioner of all creation visible and invisible, as well as the worship of Jesus Christ, God's Son, who after having been foretold by the Prophets became a member of the human race, a herald of salvation, and teacher of beautiful doctrines. Justin said that he could not, as a man, speak worthily of Christ, because to do so required special revelation such as was recorded in the prophecies. Rusticus, who seems to have been bored at the prospect of a sermon, abruptly changed the subject by trying to get information about Christian meetings and headquarters, but he met with very little success. Justin told of the meeting at the house of Martinus, but said that Christians had no temples because their God could be worshipped by anyone anywhere. He denies outright knowledge of any other meeting place. The

¹ Orat. c. Gr. 19. 1.

² Adv. Haer. I. 26. 1 (Harvey I. 220).

³ H. E. IV. 16. 1 ff.

⁴ Adv. Valent. V.

fact that a company was brought in together for trial, and that all were most evasive about information as to Christian meeting places other than the one at the house of Martinus, suggests that the company may have represented the fruits of a raid upon this house. Rusticus soon found that while each man was eager to confess being a Christian, yet none would give any useful information. He accordingly cut short the trial by calling upon them for a last time to sacrifice to the gods, and upon their refusal pronounced sentence of decapitation, which was executed at once. Other Christians later went to the place of execution and secretly removed the bodies to a place suitable for Holy Martyrs.

The literature upon the chronology of Justin is very extensive, but Harnack's¹ summary of the evidence and conclusions have been in the main unaffected by later criticism. The evidence for the chronology of Justin's writings will be discussed later. For Justin's general dates a starting point must be made with the martyrdom. Four pieces of evidences are to be considered:

1. Eusebius, though he said that Justin owed his death to Criscus under Pius, yet dated Justin's death in the Chronicon in the year 2,168 (2,170), and said in the H. E. (IV. 16. 7 ff.) that Justin died under Marcus Aurelius. That Justin's death occurred under Marcus Aurelius, Harnack justly concluded was Eusebius' true tradition.

2. The Chronicon Paschale puts the death of Justin in the year 165.

3. The "Martyrdom" puts Justin's death under Rusticus, whose period of office fell between 163—167.

4. Epiphanius also puts Justin's death under Rusticus, and Harnack thinks Epiphanius is using evidence independent of the "Martyrdom".²

Harnack therefore properly concludes that Justin's death must have fallen between 163 and 167, and that the tradition of the Chronicon Paschale, 165, is perhaps exact.

¹ (Bibl. 182). II. i. 274—284.

² Adv. Haer. 46. 1.

Epiphanius in the same passage states that the death of Justin occurred when the martyr was thirty years old, a statement which Harnack, like many of his predecessors, interprets as meaning thirty years after Justin's conversion to Christianity. Harnack therefore thinks that Justin was converted about the year 133, but this date cannot be taken as having at all the same certainty as the date of Justin's death. The statement of Epiphanius is much too ambiguous to be sufficient evidence in itself for dating Justin's conversion. Zahn¹ has tried to demonstrate that the Dialogue, while composed later, was actually held in Ephesus about the year 135, which would of course necessitate putting Justin's conversion at least a few years earlier. But it does not seem that Zahn has made a case for any historic character for the discussion with Trypho, and consequently the historical references in the conversation recorded (as to the Bar Cochba War) cannot be taken as a date in Justin's own life. There is nothing inherently improbable in the idea that Justin was actually converted between 130 and 135, but there is certainly no adequate evidence to prove that the date should not be five or ten years earlier or later. Aside from his extant writings, which apparently, as will be seen, fall in the decade from 150 to 160, Justin's death is the only incident of his career which can with any confidence be dated.

¹ (Bibl. 155) p. 50.

CHAPTER II
JUSTIN'S WRITINGS

Justin Martyr has been one of the outstanding Christian authorities since his own generation, and it is natural that many forgeries and anonymous writings should traditionally have been ascribed to him. Justin's actual literary activity was probably quite extensive. He himself mentions a treatise against all heresies,¹ and Irenaeus reports a special treatise by Justin against Marcion.² Eusebius is our earliest informant that Justin, in addition to two Apologies and the Dialogue, wrote treatises "On the Soul", "On the Unity of God", an "Address to the Greeks" which particularly concerned itself with demonology, and some sort of psalter or hymn book of whose contents we know nothing.³ Photius adds to the list a treatise "On Nature", and a general "Refutation on the chief reproaches against Christianity."⁴

A fairly large corpus of writings has been preserved in Justin's name, whose titles are as follows:

1. Apology for the Christians addressed to Antoninus Pius.⁵
2. Apology for the Christians addressed to the Roman Senate.⁶

¹ Ap. I. 26. 8 (70 C).

² Adv. Haer. IV. xi. 2 (Harvey II. 158).

³ H. E. IV. 11, 18.

⁴ Bibl. cod. 125, see also 95.

⁵ Ἀπολογία ὑπὲρ Χριστιανῶν πρὸς Ἀντωνίνον τὸν Εὐσεβῆ.

⁶ Ἀπολογία ὑπὲρ Χριστιανῶν πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων Σύγκλητον.

3. Dialogue with Trypho the Jew.¹
4. Address to the Greeks.²
5. Hortatory Address to the Greeks.³
6. On the Unity of God.⁴
7. To Diognetus.⁵
8. A fragment on the Resurrection.⁶
9. Exposition of the True Faith.⁷
10. Letter to Zenas and Serenus.⁸
11. Refutation of certain Aristotelian Doctrines.⁹
12. Questions and Answers to the Orthodox.¹⁰
13. Christian Questions asked of the Greeks.¹¹

Of these only the two Apologies and the Dialogue can be accepted as genuine. Some include the "Fragment on the Resurrection", on the ground that it might legitimately be regarded as an elaboration of ideas expressed in the genuine writings. But the stylistic impediments to accepting the Fragment seem insurmountable. Justin's expository method as shown in the Apologies and Dialogue is anything but ordered and compact. But the author of the fragment on the Resurrection proceeds from premise to conclusion in so neat a consecutiveness that it is hard to conceive how Justin could have produced it. The arguments in defence of the other pseudo-Justinian writings are all unconvincing and have been so thoroughly dealt with as to need no exposition here.¹²

¹ Πρὸς Τρύφωνα Ἰουδαῖον Διάλογος.

² Πρὸς Ἑλληνας.

³ Λόγος παραινετικὸς πρὸς Ἑλληνας.

⁴ Περὶ Μοναρχίας.

⁵ Πρὸς Διόγνητον.

⁶ Περὶ Ἀναστάσεως.

⁷ Ἐκθέσεις τῆς ὀρθῆς πίστεως.

⁸ Ζήνα καὶ Σερίνην.

⁹ Ἀνατροπὴ δογμάτων τινῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν.

¹⁰ Ἀποκρίσεις πρὸς τοὺς ὀρθοδόξους περὶ τινῶν ἀναγκαίων Ζητημάτων.

¹¹ Ἐρωτήσεις Χριστιανικαὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας.

¹² Semisch (Bibl. 118) I. 58—176 accepted the Fragment on the Resurrection and the Hortatory Address to the Greeks. Contrary, see Bardenhewer (Bibl. 186) I. 211—249; Harnack (Bibl. 182) I. 99—114, and (Bibl. 173) 130—175.

The text of the three genuine works is based almost entirely upon a single manuscript, Paris 450, written in 1364, which contains most of the writings mentioned above as still preserved under Justin's name. Though incomplete, the text of the Dialogue seems much more reliable than the text of the Apology. The only check we have upon the readings of this manuscript are the few passages where Justin has been quoted by other ancient writers, and an important fragment from the First Apology (Chapters 65 to 67), which has independent tradition in Codex Ottonianus Graecus CCLXXIV, of the Fifteenth Century, in the Vatican Library at Rome.

A. THE FIRST APOLOGY

In the manuscript Paris 450, the shorter Apology with the title "Addressed to the Roman Senate" appears before the longer Apology addressed to Antoninus, and such was the order of printing in the first two editions of Justin's works. But the longer Apology is probably the earlier because it is apparently quoted in the shorter, so that the order is now always reversed, and the longer known as the First Apology.

The First Apology dates itself with sufficient accuracy.¹ It is addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, together with his son Verissimus the Philosopher, and Lucius the Philosopher, etc. Verissimus is obviously Marcus Aurelius whose philosophical reputation began about the same time as his co-regency, 147. Lucius must be Lucius Cejonius Aelius Amelius Commodus who was not born until 130, and who would hardly have been addressed as a philosopher at least until he was eighteen or twenty years of age, while he first entered into a position of political prominence about 153 when he became a member of the Senate.² Harnack³ is inclined to give

¹ The best discussions of the date of the First Apology are Veil (Bibl. 80) pp. xxviii—xxxii; Harnack (Bibl. 182) II. i. 275—281. Blunt (Bibl. 43) pp. xlvii—l, has summed up the evidence in brief.

² Veil (Bibl. 80) p. xxx.

³ Harnack (Bibl. 182) II. i. 277.

more importance to Justin's statement¹ that he is writing 150 years after the birth of Christ than the statement would warrant, for Harnack denies that this figure can be even ten years out of the way. But though some of Harnack's arguments are strained, his conclusion that the Apology is to be dated a few years after 150, or approximately 152 to 154, to which conclusion Veil had already come (153 to 155), received striking confirmation in a discovery by Kenyon in a Greek papyrus in the British Museum.² Justin mentions in the Apology³ that a petition had recently been given to Felix, Governor of Alexandria. Kenyon has identified this Felix as the successor of Marcus Petronius Honoratus. Honoratus was beginning his governorship in 148, and Felix was succeeded by M. Sempronius Liberalis in 154, so that from this papyrus Felix would probably have held office 150 or 151—154. Another papyrus definitely gives Felix's date of accession as 151.⁴ Since Justin's mention of the petition implies a very recent event, it is probable that he was writing about 154 or 155, and this date is now accepted as approximately correct.

There seems to have been no special emergency which inspired Justin to write the First Apology, as we shall see was clearly the case with the Second Apology. No reference is made to any significant events of the immediate past as at all unusual. At the time when the Apology was written the Christian community was temporarily being ignored, although the law still condemned the faith, and Christians knew that any social unrest was likely to turn the grim attention of the governors towards them. Their apprehensions were soon justified under Marcus Aurelius, while in the years of comparative quiet before this great movement against them their precarious position was kept vividly before their minds by frequent minor sallies and local disaffections which resulted fatally for faithful individuals in various parts of the Empire. Justin seems to

¹ Ap. I 46. 1 (83 B).

² Kenyon (Bibl. 244) p. 98. See also (Bibl. 245).

³ Ap. I. 29. 3 (71 E).

⁴ Grenfell and Hunt: *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, London 1899. II. 162 ff.

have been taking advantage of this period of comparative security to register his protest against the general situation. Puech has suggested that Justin naively expected not only that his Apology would be read by the Royal Personages addressed, as well as by the Senate, but that his arguments would appeal to them as so conclusive that they would order the Apology's wide publication and the immediate alteration of official policy toward Christianity.¹ But Heinisch is much nearer the truth when he says that the practice of addressing apologetic epistles to a ruler was taken over from Hellenistic Judaism, and that in neither Christianity nor Judaism was it ever supposed that the august personages addressed would read the apology. Rather was the ambitious dedication put on the work in order to give it dignity in the eyes of the public for which it was really designed, ordinary non-Christian people.²

The Apology falls into two main divisions of unequal length. In the first twelve chapters Justin states his Apology proper by refuting current anti-Christian slanders. Justin deals with three main points, first the fact that the mere confession of Christianity is a crime so grievous that no specific charges of lawlessness are necessary to justify the death penalty (cc. 4, 5); and second and third the charges of atheism and immorality which he treats together (cc. 6—12). He flatly denies the truth of the rumours of Christian immorality and lawlessness. He insists that any Christian who can be proved guilty of such conduct as is generally charged against the faithful is unworthy of the name he bears, and urges that he be given not the slightest mercy. It is true that the crimes slanderously alleged against the Christians are the daily and open practice of a large part of their accusers, but the Christians do not plead this point. They only urge that the acceptance of the Christian doctrine, which stands for the highest morality, be not taken by those who do not understand its teachings as in itself a proof of moral degradation. The Christians

¹ (Bibl. 334) p. 5.

² (Bibl. 394) p. 18.

worship God whom they know in truth, and it is not they but their idolatrous accusers who are atheists. Furthermore Christians are not to be feared as political plotters, for the eyes of the faithful are not upon an earthly human kingdom, else they would try to save their lives, but upon the Divine Kingdom which is with God.

Short as this first division of the Apology has been, Justin asserts that he is confident that he has written enough to ensure a change of policy from any intelligent judge, but that still it will not be amiss to state clearly the real facts of Christianity. Christians, Justin goes on to say, are monotheists who worship first God, then according to His secondary rank, Jesus Christ, and then according to his tertiary rank, the Prophetic Spirit (c. 13). Thereupon he devotes the major part of the Apology to explaining first the moral power of Christ's teachings (cc. 14—20), and then the relation of Christ, as the Logos, to God (cc. 21—60). Here, amidst many digressions, Justin argues for the divine character of Jesus Christ from the fact that Christ has been prophesied from earliest times by those whose unusual relationships with God gave them special insight into the Truth. To these prophetic descriptions the founder of the Christian Faith exactly corresponded. The effective power of the teaching and person of Christ in elevating the moral tone of those who accept the Faith is demonstrated by the exalted character of the Christian cultus, especially in Baptism and the Eucharist (cc. 61—67). The Apology closes with an affirmation of conviction that the innocence of the Christians has been convincingly demonstrated: there is no need for Justin to quote a neglected precedent for toleration. The Christians can rise above these lower appeals and stand upon the justness of their own cause so fearlessly as to threaten the Governors of Rome with the future punishment of the willfully perverse if they persist in their hatred of the only true religion. The Christians themselves are in the hands of God and need only say, "The will of God be done" (c. 68). Nevertheless Justin does quote the legal precedent, a letter from Hadrian and Antoninus concerning the Christians which he has apparently misunderstood.

Various attempts have been made to find in the First Apology a more elaborate plan. Wehofer tried to fit the Apology to the classic form of an oration,¹ and his thesis, while generally rejected, has been revived in slightly modified form by Jene.² Similarly Hubik³ and Pfättisch,⁴ while rejecting Wehofer's thesis, have tried to outline the Apology according to a single unifying principle, but their attempts have rightly met with no greater approval than Wehofer's.⁵ For it is only by violence to the obvious facts that the writings of Justin can be regarded as developed in detail according to a systematized plan. Justin clearly knew in general what he wanted to say when he began upon a piece of writing, but he could not have produced documents so "rambling and fanciful, abounding in digressions, repetitions, and parentheses"⁶ as are the Apologies and Dialogue, had he either begun with a careful outline, or systematically revised his work when he had finished writing.

B. THE SECOND APOLOGY

The document commonly known as the Second Apology presents a much more difficult literary problem. The chapters which we now have are obviously a fragment, for there is no introductory address, and the first sentence begins abruptly with a "but".⁷ Critics have come almost to unity on the Second Apology in describing it as an Appendix or Postscript written because of an unfortunate incident which occurred shortly after the completion of the First Apology,⁸ when a disaffected pagan, whose wife had turned Christian, had caused the execution of two Christians at the command of Urbicus, the Prefect. Justin

¹ (Bibl. 202); cf. Rauschen (Bibl. 203), and Geffcken (Bibl. 205).

² (Bibl. 210).

³ (Bibl. 209) pp. 60—137.

⁴ Pfättisch (Bibl. 385) pp. 131—182.

⁵ Christ (Bibl. 185) p. 1029 Anm. 5.

⁶ Blunt (Bibl. 43) p. xi.

⁷ Bardenhewer (Bibl. 186) p. 216.

⁸ e. g. Veil, Harnack, Bardenhewer. Goodspeed (Bibl. 45) entitles the Second Apology "Appendix".

thinks that he is himself in danger from such a pagan in the person of the Cynic Crescens. The Second Apology opens with an account of this incident, at the close of which Justin goes on to elaborate a few points which he had mentioned in his First Apology, particularly in connection with the Logos doctrine. Into his description of the Logos Justin now for the first time introduces the term "spermatic", and says that reason as found in men is a fragment from the entire Spermatic Logos. In the course of the brief document he at least twice refers to something he has said before,¹ but the passages referred to are both lacking in the Second Apology. They can, however, be identified with tolerable satisfaction in the First Apology,² and this fact has given rise to the theory that our Second Apology is only an appendix to the First Apology which has somehow come to be preserved as a separate document.

General as is the satisfaction with the Appendix theory it is by no means unchallenged, and is open to serious objections. One of the starting points of the theory is the report by Eusebius that he has two Apologies from Justin, one addressed to Antoninus, the other to the Senate.³ But Eusebius quotes from our Second Apology, saying that he is quoting the First,⁴ while he has quotations from our First Apology as well. This has been seized upon by critics as the origin of the separation of the Appendix from its original position, on the supposition that since Eusebius mentioned two Apologies, some copyist wanted to provide two, and did so by copying the Appendix as a separate work. The real Second Apology which Eusebius mentioned, it is explained, is now lost, and our First and Second Apologies together were the First Apology of Eusebius. This explanation is more ingenious than satisfying, and has been rejected by several critics whose grounds for doing so were quite different from

¹ Ap. II. 4. 2 (43 D), cf. Ap. I. 10. 1 (58 B); Ap. II. 6. 5 (45 A), cf. Ap. I. 23. 2 (68 C), and 63. 10, 16 (96 A, D).

² See preceding note.

³ H. E. IV. 11. 11.

⁴ H. E. IV. 17. 1.

each other. Schwartz would reject the dedication from the First Apology as an interpolation, and put the Second Apology as the introduction to the First, representing neither document as an afterthought, but the two as a single unit, produced from a single inspiration.¹ Christ² inclines to agree with Schwartz, but Schwartz's theory leaves in the air the references in the Second Apology to what has already been said. Grundl has attempted a fantastic division of the Second Apology into two documents, the first of which is the original protest against the violence of Urbicus, into which have been interpolated chapters 4—10, and 14, the product of a convert to Christianity from Alexandrian Judaism.³ But this theory has been adequately refuted by Emmerich.⁴ Recently Hubik⁵ has attempted to prove that the Second Apology was written in answer to the speech against the Christians by M. Cornelius Fronto, which very shortly afterward provoked the writing of the Dialogue of Minucius Felix in the Octavius, and from which alone Fronto's speech can be known. This would necessitate the dating of the Apology at least a few years into the reign of Marcus Aurelius (Hubik estimates 165), and accounts for the strong innovation of Stoic terminology. For the attack upon Christianity was being conducted chiefly by Stoics, and Justin was anxious to meet them upon their own grounds. As to the argument from the quotation of the Second Apology as the First by Eusebius, Hubik ingeniously points out that Eusebius might well have been quoting from a manuscript in which our Second Apology came before the First as it does in Paris 450, for Eusebius never confuses the two when he distinguishes them by their dedications.⁶ Hubik weakens his case by trying to carry his theory too far, in attempting to represent a demonstration of probability as a demonstration of fact. As a demonstration of probability

¹ (Bibl. 206).

² (Bibl. 185) p. 1020.

³ (Bibl. 108).

⁵ (Bibl. 201).

⁵ (Bibl. 209).

⁶ *Ibid.* Appendix I. Except possibly in H. E. IV. 7. 5.

Hubik's theory appears to have been accepted two years later by La Grange when he says that there seems to have been a long interval between the writing of the two Apologies, and that the Second Apology was written in the reign of Marcus Aurelius.¹ If our Second Apology is treated as fragment of a longer work, the references which now seem to look to the First Apology may well have had their source in the lost part of the Second, for it is only to be expected that if the Second Apology was itself a long document Justin would have repeated much that he had said in his former writings. It may indeed be true that it is just because of the general similarity of the two that only that part of the Second Apology has been preserved which was actually of value as supplementary to the First. But we are here in the realm of pure conjecture. Hubik can probably not be said to have proved all he started out to prove, but he has greatly weakened the sense of satisfaction attendant upon the "Appendix" theory, or any theory which tries to represent the two Apologies as originally one.

C. THE DIALOGUE WITH TRYPHO

The Dialogue with Trypho, while by no means a neglected piece of writing, has not attracted so much attention nor provoked so much discussion as the Apologies. The reason for this comparative neglect is not hard to find. The piece is nearly as long as the four Gospels combined, and as a whole is so astonishingly dull that to a general theological reader it can by no means have the same attraction as the Apologies.

But that the Dialogue is a genuine production of Justin's can hardly be doubted. The last attack against its genuineness, made in a posthumous fragment by Preuschen,² only demonstrated how few and weak were the arguments which could be adduced against it. The

¹ (Bibl. 167) p. 70. La Grange does not quote Hubik, but includes him in his bibliography, and obviously has him in mind.

² (Bibl. 231). Preuschen has been satisfactorily answered by Fonck (Bibl. 232).

document bears all the peculiarities of Justin's style, quotes from the First Apology, is cited by Eusebius as Justin's, so that the proof against it would have to be very strong indeed to warrant its rejection. The inspiration of the recurrent attempts to reject it is that Justin on several minor points of theology might seem to have different opinions in the Dialogue from those expressed in the Apologies. Lange distinguished between the background of the Dialogue and that of the Apologies, asserting that the latter rested upon Platonism, the former upon the philosophy of Hellenistic Judaism.¹ But it will appear that Lange has made a false distinction and that there is as much reason to see Hellenistic Judaism in the Apologies as in the Dialogue. In the Apologies Justin says that worship is accorded to the Holy Spirit as a Divinity, while in the Dialogue Justin in one passage apparently limits divine character to two Persons, the Father and the Son.² In the Dialogue alone is found the conception of "Dispensation" and of "Chiliasm"; in it the approach to the problem of the Deity of Christ is quite different, and results in apparent inconsistencies of detail. But all of these differences can readily be explained on the basis of the difference in purpose and method between the Apologies and the Dialogue, and constitute no indictment of the genuineness of the Dialogue.

The date of the Dialogue is not to be determined with great nicety. The First Apology is alluded to,³ which necessitates a later date than that decided upon for the First Apology, 153—155, but there is no reason for assigning it to one year rather than another between the writing of the Apology and Justin's death.

In Platonic fashion Justin begins the Dialogue by setting the stage. In his philosopher's cloak he is walking one day by the Xystus when he is saluted by Trypho the Jew and his companions. Courtesies soon deepen into an exposition by Justin of the nature of the true philosophy,

¹ Lange (Bibl. 219, from von Engelhardt (Bibl. 313) p. 26.

² Cf. Ap. I. 6. 2 (56 C); Dial. 56. 15 (277 C).

³ Dial. 120. 6 (349 C).

in describing which Justin uses the fiction of a quest through various schools and the ultimate discovery of the Truth by conversing with the Old Man and by studying the prophets.¹ The Truth, he found, was Christianity. Trypho answers this narrative by saying that Justin had far better have remained a Platonist, for whereas formerly he had been engaged in a noble quest for God, now he had abandoned the quest to repose confidence in the human doctrines of Christianity.² He urges compliance with the Law as the true way to serve God, for the Christians have invented a Christ for themselves in whom there is no salvation. This statement, which Hubík well calls the theme of Trypho,³ is answered by the theme of Justin, a complete denial of the alleged mistaken character of Christianity and a proposal to prove the truth and power of the Christian belief.⁴ The proof which follows falls into three main divisions. The first division (cc. 11—31) treats of the nature and obligation of the Mosaic Law, which Justin insists was given the Jews as a sign of reproach. Justification was possible even before the institution of circumcision, and has always been quite independent of Jewish legalism. Though God undoubtedly gave the Law, justification throughout Jewish history has been a matter of moral integrity and purity of heart, not a matter of legal observance. The second division (cc. 32—110) discusses the nature, history, and significance of Jesus Christ, demonstrating that he is the incarnation of that saving power which has been prophesied from the first by the Prophets in Judaism. This section is the most discouraging of the Dialogue because the chain of argument is repeatedly found only to be lost as Justin wanders from digression to digression. The testimony which Justin adduces is strictly scriptural; the philosophers are forgotten, and the entire case is rested upon exegesis of the Old Testament. In the course of the section Justin deals with

¹ See above pp. 57 ff.

² Dial. 8. 3, 4 (225 D ff.).

³ (Bibl. 209) p. 28.

⁴ Dial. 9. 1 (226 C).

the Incarnation and Crucifixion in particular, and discusses the existence of the Second God, the possibility of the Incarnation, the possibility of the Virgin birth, the divine human character of Christ after His birth, the necessity of the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection of Christ. Justin, by basing all of these points upon the Old Testament, gives the impression that Christ is not a novelty, but the long anticipated consummation and revelation of the true character of Judaism. Accordingly in the third division (cc. 111—142) he insists that those who have followed and will follow Christ are the True Israel, the children of promise, the true successors of those Jews who found justification in times past. He closes with an eloquent exhortation to Trypho and his followers to accept the Truth and become Christians.

The conception in the Dialogue is powerful, but the execution is weak, for only by reading and re-reading does the basic plan of the whole come to light. The traditional opinion that the Dialogue is a record of an actual discussion¹ can hardly be maintained. That the arguments of Justin are those generally used in such discussions is highly probable, but the Dialogue seems far rather to be a collection of all possible arguments than a report of a discussion in which each argument was actually brought up as recorded. Trypho is in many respects a straw man, who says the right thing in the right place; he never seriously embarrasses Justin by his replies, and is a tool in his hands.² Justin frequently represents Trypho as making a show of protest against the course of the argument, but these protests never take the form of rejoinders at all awkward for Justin's purposes. The tradition of the historic nature of the Dialogue goes back to Eusebius who says that the Dialogue was actually held at Ephesus,³ a fact which Eusebius

¹ Best expounded by Donaldson (Bibl. 143) p. 88 ff.

² See e. g. Dial. 65. 1 ff. (289 B ff.), where at the proper moment Trypho brings up just the passage of prophecy which Justin wanted at that juncture, and allows Justin to take it from him and turn it against him without protest. Justin frequently uses such devices to attract especial attention to some Old Testament passage.

³ H. E. IV. 18. 6.

probably took from the lost introduction to the Dialogue, and which hence would have been only a part of Justin's stage setting for the fictitious meeting. Such discussions may have been common, though it seems likely that they would have been of a more violent character than the one described. But to try to explain the incoherencies and repetitions of the Dialogue as being the result of extempore argument lasting two days, necessitates the unjustifiable assumption that Eusebius had independent testimony as to the circumstances of the composition of the Dialogue.

It is equally idle to speculate as to the identity of Trypho. Eusebius has in this also been the origin of an erroneous tradition, for he states that Trypho was one of the most famous Jews of the day,¹ and this statement has given rise to repeated attempts to identify Trypho with Rabbi Tarphon.² Trypho may be the Greek form of Tarphon, so that the identity is at first sight alluring,³ but will not stand scrutiny. Rabbi Tarphon was one of the most bitter and violent of the anti-Christian Rabbis, whose disposition as revealed in his traditional sayings is utterly incompatible with his sitting two entire days as a mildly protesting but friendly antagonist of Justin. Tarphon hated the Christians so bitterly that he said that though it had cost his children's lives he would have burned books containing the name of God, if they were the blasphemous books of the Christians.⁴ Further it is even impossible to say that Justin names the straw man in honor of Rabbi Tarphon whose name he had heard as a great opponent of Christianity, but of whose actual teachings he knew nothing,⁵ for Trypho is never represented as a

¹ H. E. IV. 18. 6.

² e. g. see Christ (Bibl. 185) p. 1030; Zöckler (Bibl. 283) p. 44; Harnack (Bibl. 395) pp. 53 ff. Dr. Kidd speaks of "Trypho, a thin disguise, it may be, for Tarpho": History of the Church, Oxf. 1922, I. 90. These are all based upon Schürer, Gesch. Volk. Jud. II³ 378, 555 ff.

³ See Strack: Einleitung in Talmud und Midrasch. 5. Aufl. München 1921. S. 125, 126 Anm. 1.

⁴ See Bacher, Aggada der Tannaiten, I (2. Aufl.) 351, and G. F. Moore: Def. of Jewish Canon, p. 102.

⁵ With Zahn (Bibl. 155) pp. 61 ff.

Jewish Rabbi. To be sure, Justin could not represent Trypho as speaking from a wider knowledge of Hebrew and Judaism than Justin himself possessed, but Trypho is throughout represented as being helplessly dependant for his ideas upon Jewish Rabbis, and is exhorted to declare his independence of their tyranny over his thinking and to examine the prophecies with an open mind. Had Justin had Rabbi Tarphon remotely in mind when he gave the name to his straw man, he must at least have represented him as a Rabbi, and not as a very dependant layman.¹

But if Trypho is not Rabbi Tarphon his point of view is by no means a figment of the imagination. Straw man he may appear in that he cannot be identified with any historical character, and is obviously a tool in Justin's hands, but there is good reason to suppose that Trypho represents with extraordinary accuracy the attitude of many Jews of the time. Zahn has reviewed very carefully one aspect of Trypho's character, and come to the conclusion that Trypho was a Hellenistic Jew with philosophical training.² Holland has not used the term Hellenistic, but has pointed out that Trypho is far from an ordinary Palestinian Jew in his eagerness for philosophy on account of the poverty of the Law in intellectual appeal, particularly on the matter of its philosophically inadequate conception of God.³ Trypho has read the Gospels, a thing strictly forbidden all Palestinian Jews, and is apparently open to conviction toward Christianity. He professes to be no authority in Judaism, understands no Hebrew,⁴ admits the Alexandrian doctrine of the double sense of Scripture, according to which only the hidden sense was accepted as

¹ Cf. Dial. 38. 1, 2 (256 C, D), 94. 4 (322 B), 137. 2 (366 D), 140. 2 (369 C), 142. 2 (371 C). The latest protest against identifying Trypho and Tarphon is made by A. Lukyn Williams: Tractate Berakoth, London 1921, p. 6 n. 2.

² Zahn (Bibl. 155) pp. 54 ff.; see also (Bibl. 181) I. 468.

³ (Bibl. 153) p. 570. Dial. 1. 3 (217 D, E).

⁴ Dial. 125. 1 (354 A). Justin asks the etymology of the word Israel, and not a Jew in the company has a suggestion.

the true meaning of a passage,¹ and, like the moderate Alexandrians who still held to a part of the Law, he regarded the Law as amply fulfilled by circumcision, by the observance of the Sabbath and the feast of the new moon, and by care in washing after touching prohibited things and after sexual intercourse.² He has no objections to Justin's carrying him along to a denial of the value of the Law,³ to a more philosophic and mystical conception of justification than that founded upon legalism,⁴ and even seems to have no implacable prejudices against believing in an intermediary and secondary Deity, whose complete divine character is yet insisted upon.⁵ Trypho only parts from Justin on the possibility of the incarnation of the Second Deity, and especially of that incarnation's actually having taken place in Jesus. Cohn goes so far as to call Trypho a Judaistic Hellene,⁶ and indeed Trypho in all these respects illustrates remarkably what has been described as the point of view of the Hellenized Jew. But Trypho's character and the problem of Justin's acquaintance with Judaism are complicated by the fact that Trypho's apparently casual comments are remarkably accurate reproductions of the traditional sayings of the Jewish Schoolmen. Trypho allows hope of salvation to upright heathen,⁷ which at first seems a Hellenistic compromise, but which was actually a doctrine of the Tannaim. Rabbi Joshua ben Chanonja taught, in expounding Psalm ix. 18, that only the godless among the Heathen are excluded (from eternal life), for there is a large number of pious men even among the heathen who will have a share in eternal life.⁸ Trypho says that

¹ Dial. 90. 2 (317 C).

² Dial. 46. 2 (264 C).

³ Dial. 67. 6 ff. (292 A ff.).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Dial. 60. 3 (283 B, C), 63. 1 (286 B). Harnack (Bibl. 395) p. 75 denies this, and the point is also missed by Freimann (Bibl. 230) p. 577.

⁶ *Judaica: Festschrift für Cohen*. Berlin 1912. p. 331.

⁷ Dial. 8. 3 (226 A).

⁸ See Bacher I (2. Aufl.) p. 134, similar references in Goldfahn (Bibl. 389) p. 54.

he is disobeying the injunctions of his teachers in holding communication with a Christian,¹ and such prohibitions are preserved in *Babyl. Ab. Sars.* 17a, 27b: "Let no man have dealings with the Christians."² Trypho repudiates the divine character of the expected Messiah,³ and with him agree all the Tannaim.⁴ Trypho says that there must have been both God and an angel in the flaming bush,⁵ which might be taken as a layman's understanding of the statement, "Everywhere where an Angel appears, the glory of God reveals itself; for it stands written (*Exod. iii. 2*), 'and an angel of God appeared to him in a flame of fire', whereupon it immediately continues, 'God called to him'".⁶ Trypho is speaking according to Pharisaic tradition in ascribing *Is. vii. 14 ff.* to Hezekiah.⁷ One of Trypho's companions admits the inability of the Rabbis to explain how Moses could have been commanded to make the brazen serpent when to do so would involve the breaking of the Law against making images.⁸ Goldfahn tries to show that the Rabbis had met this problem, and that Justin's reproach is unjust,⁹ but his evidence quite misses Justin's point, and Justin is probably right in saying that the Rabbis had no answer to his argument. One only of Trypho's statements can not be justified by Judaistic tradition, namely that God had given the sun and moon to the heathen for gods, which seems directly contrary to the tradition. But here Trypho may represent

¹ *Dial.* 38. 1 (256 B).

² Goldfahn (*Bibl.* 389) p. 106.

³ *Dial.* 49. 1 (268 A).

⁴ Klausner, J.: *Die messianischen Vorstellungen des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter der Tannaiten.* Berlin 1904. p. 71. "There are perhaps many indications of the divine nature of the Messiah in the later Midrashim; but in the authentic writings of the Tannaic age no trace of such a thing is to be found."

⁵ *Dial.* 60. 1 (283 A).

⁶ *Exodus Rabba*, end of Ch. 32 p. 135 d. Goldfahn (*Bibl.* 389) p. 113.

⁷ *Dial.* 67. 1 (291 B); cf. *Exodus Rabba* Ch. 18 p. 103 d; Goldfahn (*Bibl.* 389) p. 146.

⁸ *Dial.* 94. 4 (322 B).

⁹ (*Bibl.* 389) p. 197.

a doctrine which was later expressly rejected and contradicted, and so not preserved in the Midrash.¹

Justin is thus by no means beating the air in his discussion with Trypho. He has created in Trypho a Jew who embodies the best of both schools of Judaism, one who knows Scripture and the Rabbinic interpretations, at least the Haggadic interpretations, and yet who has all the open-mindedness and cosmic sense of the Hellenistic Jews. As combining both elements, Trypho may well claim to be an honest attempt on the part of Justin to delineate the character of the ideal Jew. It is useless in such a case to scatter energy in an attempt to class Trypho as either Palestinian or Hellenistic.²

It will further appear in the course of the exposition of Justin's ideas that not only in drawing the character of Trypho but throughout the Dialogue Justin shows the most unexpected acquaintance with the details of Palestinian Judaistic teaching.³ Whence had Justin this knowledge? The Pharisaic teaching was in Justin's time still entirely oral, and Justin had no training in Hebrew which would have enabled him to read the books had they been in existence. It is customary to explain Justin's knowledge of Judaism from a statement of Trypho that he perceives that Justin has had considerable experience in such dispute,⁴ from which statement it is concluded that it must have been in these disputations with Jews that Justin had gathered his information about Pharisaic exegesis. But it seems much more likely that Justin had his information from some written source or sources which he was using. Certainly Justin is not creating a refutation of Judaism. None of his main arguments is at all novel, with the

¹ Dial. 55. 1 (274 B); cf. Goldfahn (Bibl. 389) p. 109.

² Harnack denies for him the character of a Hellenistic Jew, and calls him a Rabbi (Bibl. 395), p. 53, 90 Anm. 1.

³ For the most complete collection of parallels between the Dial. and the Haggada see Goldfahn (Bibl. 389). Harnack (Bibl. 395) has only recast Goldfahn's material.

⁴ Hubík (Bibl. 209) p. 3 Anm. 6 deduces that Justin was accustomed to dispute upon Christianity with Jews and others from Dial. 50. 1 (269 C) and Dial. 64. 2 (287 D).

possible exception of the suggestion that the Law was a reproach, a sign of God's displeasure put upon the Jews because of their misbehaviour'. His doctrines of the non-essential character of the Law and circumcision for justification, based upon the experiences of Abraham and his predecessors, and of the Christians as being the true Israel, are as old as St. Paul. In spite of Justin's elaborate use of Scripture he does not appear as a profound or original student of the Old Testament, but rather leads one to suspect that he has collected all the passages which had ever been used against the Jews, and has incorporated them into his own writing. He quotes one Prophet in mistake for another in several passages, as though he were using material with which he was not thoroughly acquainted. These slips cannot be put down as mere lapses of memory, because Justin from the great length of his quotation is in all probability working from a written source or sources. We have ample evidence that written disputes with the Jews and diatribes against them were in existence long before Justin's time,¹ and the Dialogue of Justin seems a compilation of material from such documents, one of which might well have been a written account of the teachings of the Jewish Rabbis by a converted Rabbi, or possibly a Rabbinical anti-Christian tract. It may be that it was because Justin used sources of different kinds that his completed portrait of Trypho, and his arguments against him, are a composite of Palestinian and Hellenistic elements. The composite nature of the material which constitutes the Dialogue, however, makes it the more valuable as a picture of Judaism and of the struggle between the two faiths.

What was the purpose which Justin had in mind when he wrote the Dialogue? The treatise was addressed to one Marcus Pompey, for he is twice addressed in passing,²

¹ See Corssen (Bibl. 224); Harnack, *Texte und Untersuch.* I. iii (1883); Hirzel (Bibl. 228). Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 44, 45 Anm. 1 has an interesting collection of parallels between the exegetical material of Justin and the letter of Barnabas. See also very important Dr. Rendel Harris: *Testimonies* Cambr. 1916—1950, passim.

² Dial. 8. 3 (225 D), 141. 5 (371 B).

but the dedication is lost, and with it possibly a key to the purpose of the book as a whole. The discussion occupied two days,¹ but the ending of the first day and the beginning of the second are lost, while there are repeated instances of references in the latter part to passages in the earlier part which are no longer there.² As we now have it, the Dialogue is in one unusually long book, but it was probably in two books originally, for chapter 82 is quoted in the *Sacra Parallela* of St. John the Damascene as having been taken from the second book.³ Hirzel seems to think that Justin wrote the Dialogue in a remote or very unsuccessful attempt to imitate the Phaedrus, and that the reference to Marcus Pompey is only a literary gesture.⁴ Harnack on the other hand assumes that there must have been a prologue, and hints that the mutilations throughout the Dialogue have not come about by chance,⁵ but he does not suggest the motive for mutilation. The Dialogue may have been considerably longer and been abbreviated by a lazy scribe, for it is clear that the $\kappa\tau\lambda$ which concludes many of the quotations from Scripture is the work of such a copyist.⁶ Grube's suggestion that the Dialogue is an "introduction into the correct understanding of the writings of the Old Testament, designed for Christian readers" is attractive, but still helps little in showing the connection of the introduction with the body of the work.⁷ That the Dialogue was ultimately designed for propagandist

¹ Dial. 85. 4 (311 D), 92. 5 (320 B). It is customary to assume that the break between the first and second day occurred in the obvious lacuna in Dial. 74. 3, 4 (300 A).

² See Dial. 81. 3 (308 A) *συνήκαμεν*; 105. 4 (333 A). For fuller discussion of the missing passages see Zahn (*Bibl.* 155) pp. 37—66. Otto's theory that the Dial. as we have it is substantially as it left Justin's hands finds no support to-day. See especially Otto (*Bibl.* 26) Dial. c. 74. n. 7.

³ Cf. Holl in: *Texte und Untersuchungen* XX. ii (1899) p. 34 from Bardenhewer (*Bibl.* 186) p. 227.

⁴ (*Bibl.* 228).

⁵ (*Bibl.* 395) p. 47. n. 3.

⁶ e. g. Dial. 56. 2 (275 B).

⁷ (*Bibl.* 391) p. 1.

purposes amongst the Jews has been denied by Battifol¹ and Habik.² Bosse surmises from the dialogue form of writing that Marcus Pompey was a Platonist friend of Justin, but that in the course of the argument he was entirely forgotten by Justin, and that to understand the Dialogue not Marcus Pompey but Trypho must be considered as the person addressed.³ Bosse is avoiding difficulties rather than solving them. Von Engelhardt attempts to explain the connection of the introduction with the body of the Dialogue by suggesting that Justin hoped at the outset to gain weight for his arguments in Jewish eyes by describing his conversion to Christianity as having resulted from reading the Prophets.⁴ But if this was Justin's purpose in writing the introduction, he represents his hope as being singularly unfounded, for he gains no word of sympathy or commendation from Trypho for his interest in Jewish literature. Rather Trypho answers that Justin would have done far better to have abided by the philosophers than to have forsaken them as he did. The study of the Prophets is very pointedly not recommended. Feder says that the introduction is inconceivable as addressed to Palestinian Jews, and is only to be explained on the ground that the Dialogue was designed for Hellenistic Jews.⁵ But Feder's suggestion, while a great advance in recognizing the true problem of the introduction, is still weak because he clings to the thought that the Dialogue is addressed to Jews of some sort, that is, that it is fundamentally a refutation of Judaism.

The probability is strong that whoever Marcus Pompey was, he was at least not a Jew. Besides the strongly Roman character of the name, minor considerations point to his being a Gentile. For Justin obviously is writing for someone unfamiliar with the Scriptures, as is made apparent by the fact that he always identifies the Minor

¹ In his preface to (Bibl. 162) p. xxiv.

² (Bibl. 209) p. 207.

³ (Bibl. 345) pp. 7, 8.

⁴ (Bibl. 313) p. 220.

⁵ (Bibl. 350) p. 41.

Prophets at first quoting as "one of the twelve,"¹ and by the fact that his quotations from the Old Testament, originally probably considerably longer than now, would have been quite unnecessarily extended for one already familiar with the Scriptures, but would be interesting and essential to a heathen's understanding of the argument. That Marcus Pompey was at least not a Jew is made probable by the fact that Justin brings charges of immorality against the Jews which are so palpably unfair as to be inconceivable in a document addressed to a Jewish friend, or designed as a model for use in converting Jews.²

Once the Dialogue is recognized as addressed to a man interested in philosophy and not as a record of a controversy, or a text book for controversy, against Judaism, the continuity of the introduction with the body of the Dialogue becomes clear. It will be recalled that in the introduction Justin led the philosophical argument through to the final declaration that the highest part of man, his higher mind, is a fragment of the Universal Mind or Reason. But the fragment in us is in such a condition that its immediate apprehension of the Truth, which should be very clear, is actually much obscured, so that only by revelation of the Universal Reason in the inspired utterances of the Prophets, and pre-eminently in Jesus Christ, can it pierce the veil into the realm of Universal Truth and Reason. But how can the Prophets and the prophesied Christ claim such unique significance for revealing the Truth when Jews and Christians are in complete disagreement among themselves as to the meaning of this revelation? So long as the controversy between Jews and Christians is unsettled, revelation is at least as bewildering as the unassisted attempts of the human mind. Accordingly the entire case for the superiority of revelation to philosophy must stand or fall with a proof that the writings of the Jews and the doctrines of the Christians are a unified production of the single Spirit of Inspiration and Revelation. It is to prove precisely this that Justin writes the Dialogue

¹ e. g. Dial. 19. 5 (236 E); 22. 1 (238 D); 109. 1 (336 A).

² e. g. Dial. 14. 2 (231 D); 134, 1 (363 D).

with Trypho to his friend Marcus Pompey. Whoever Marcus Pompey was, whether heathen or Christian, the continuity of the Dialogue as a demonstration of the unity of Revelation, and hence of the superiority of Revelation to heathen philosophy, is unaffected. The argument is one most suitable to be addressed to a heathen, and such Justin's "dearest friend" probably was. Trypho is swayed by the argument, but still clings to his faith in spite of the fact that his defences have obviously all been swept away. So must Marcus Pompey consider the Jews. In stubborn error they are holding to their own conception, blind like Trypho to the clearest demonstration that the revelation they cherish in the Prophets has had its culmination in the person and teaching of Jesus Christ. But the blindness of the Jews can be considered by no fair minded heathen as an indictment of the light, nor as an impediment to the Christians to prevent them from using the Jewish Scriptures in spite of Jewish protests. The True Israel is a spiritual succession which since the coming of Christ has been carried on not in the Jewish race but in Christian hearts. Accordingly the Dialogue is Justin's demonstration that Revelation, shining brightly from earliest times and glowing with glory in Jesus Christ, is a path to God as luminous and hopeful as the path of philosophy is obscure and despairing.

CHAPTER III
JUSTIN'S APOLOGETIC

Apart from the reproaches of Judaism, Justin as a Christian Apologist had to deal with two sorts of attack upon Christianity. From the ethical and social point of view it was urged that the Christians were an immoral group whose practices made them enemies of wholesome society; and from the philosophical point of view the Christian doctrines were attacked as repugnant to all good sense. Rejection of the doctrines of Christianity would never of itself have led to persecution in the tolerant Roman Empire, but when persecution had already arisen doctrinal reproaches served as additional justification for harsh measures. An Apologist of the time must therefore meet the two counts, and meet them as more or less confused causes of a general hatred against Christianity. In the First Apology Justin seems to be trying to disentangle the two, and at the outset to clear away the social and ethical reproaches that he may thus be free to deal with Christianity as a system of thought and guide of life.

In general the social and ethical charges were those brought in by the masses of people. As we understand them from Justin, they may be summarized under four heads. First, it was alleged, Christians refused to accept their obligations in society as symbolized by Emperor worship. Second, they were atheists, and consequently their presence in a community was apt to bring a visitation of wrath from the gods. Third, the Christian community aroused suspicion by fact that it was made up almost entirely of people from the lowest classes, very largely of slaves. Then as now patriotic citizens were apprehensive of organizations which brought the slaves and servants of society

into a close knit and secret organization, while suspicion on this count was the more awakened against Christianity by the fact that it was well known that Christians looked for a future Kingdom and a reorganization of society. Fourth, these secret meetings of the lowest order of society were reported to be attended by murderous and obscene orgies.

Justin does not go into any detailed refutation of these popular charges. That the Christians refused to assume their social obligations, he flatly denies, and urges that though they can offer worship to God alone, Christians yet gladly recognize the sovereign rights of the Roman princes and pray for their guidance as rulers, while the Christians pay their taxes of all kinds more readily than any other group of people.¹

The charge of atheism was intimately bound up with the charge of social irresponsibility, because the refusal to worship the Emperor symbolized at once a rejection of what was considered the very minimum of religious observance, as well as a denial of obligation toward the government. Justin says of the charge of atheism that it also is utterly unfounded. The popular gods, he insists, have been very properly denied by all right thinking men from the time of Socrates, because though called gods they are only demons masquerading as gods, and are not gods. Justin is willing to be classed with Socrates as an atheist in regard to such immoral deities. But the Christians actually worship the true God, who, unlike the gods of popular worship, is free from all impurity, and is Himself the Father of righteousness and self-control and all other virtues. And not only the One God, but also "we worship and adore the Son who came forth from Him and taught us these things, and the host of other good angels who follow and are made like to Him, and the Prophetic Spirit, a worship which we perform in reason and truth."²

¹ Ap. I. 17 entire.

² Ap. I. 6 entire. For the credal significance of this statement which was primarily only of apologetic significance see below chapter VI.

Again he denies any sacredness whatever to idols, and contrasts the worship of such man-made gods with the proper worship of the true God.¹

The charge that the Christian communion is a dangerous political organization Justin also treats lightly. The kingdom for which Christians are looking and working cannot be a human kingdom, else the Christians would wish to live to have a share in it, and would not be so willing to die. But the Christian hope is for the Kingdom which is with God, entrance into which is conditioned by fidelity to the faith. As such the Christian organization, he implies, cannot be politically dangerous.² The fact that the Christian community is drawn largely from the lower strata of society, Justin urges, far from being a reproach, is actually a good sign, for it indicates that the Christians are teaching the true doctrines. Teachers of the truth, Justin points out, have always been persecuted and made unfortunate by the demons in proportion to the relative correctness of their doctrines.³ Consequently, he implies, a group of unfortunate people gathered together, like the Christians, by some doctrine are more apt to be guardians of truth than a similar group from higher walks of life. Justin could hardly have expected this argument to have had much weight with any but the lower classes, and must have been aware that he was only inviting harsh measures against the Christians by a frank declaration of war against the upper classes.

The charge that the Christian secret meetings were characterized by obscenities Justin heartily denies. The charges sound strangely inappropriate, he says, in the mouths of people who practice in shameless openness the obscenities which they charge against the Christians. Furthermore the people who circulate such stories of the Christian community utterly ignore the fact that the

¹ Ap. I. 9, 10 entire. In Ap. I. 24 Justin points out that each religious group denies the gods of every other group, and asks why Christians may not have the same privilege.

² Ap. I. 11 entire.

³ Ap. II. 10; 7. 3 (45 D); Ap. I. 5. 3 (55 E ff.).

Christian ethic is by far the highest taught in any religious body. In the secret meetings this ethic is inculcated, rather than lost in such rites as the accusers describe. It is because of the persistent slanders against the morality of the Christian cultus that Justin devotes some space to an explanation of the high Christian standards of speech, thought, and conduct as taught by Christ.¹ Justin begs that any Christian who can be found guilty of evil deeds be condemned as an evil doer, but not as a Christian, for the Christian teaching is opposed to all evil practices.²

In many of these arguments Justin has been profoundly helped by Jewish apologetic tradition which had had to meet the same, or nearly the same, slanders. Against the Jews, like the Christians, was brought forward their refusal to worship idols, and to do patriotic homage to the Emperor, while it was alleged of their cultus also that it was characterized by murderous and obscene orgies. The earlier Jewish apologetes had a slight advantage over the Christians on the matter of their refusal to worship the Emperor,³ but this argument was not ordinarily stressed, and if we may judge from Philo and Josephus the Jewish Apologetes based their defense usually, like Justin and the other Christian Apologetes, upon their group's high moral character and recognized qualities as peaceable and patriotic citizens.⁴ Jewish Apologetic was singularly silent upon the matter of the Jewish Messianic hope. The silence is only explicable on the grounds that in the Diaspora the Messianic hope was so nebulous, if present at all, that attack on this score against the Jews had not yet been made. Not so the Christians. From the first they had proclaimed the imminent and catastrophic coming of the

¹ Ap. I. cc. 12—17.

² Ap. I. 7. 4 (56 E).

³ Josephus B. J. II. 10. 4; c. Ap. II. 6.

⁴ Philo in Flacc. 48 (II. 524); 87 ff. (II. 530, 531). Josephus, c. Ap. II. 4, 5; Ant. XIV. 10, XVI. 6. On the Jewish Apologetic see especially Paul Krüger, *Philo und Josephus als Apologeten des Judentums*. Leipzig 1906.

King of Kings, and they had, beginning from the Crucifixion of their Lord, to meet a resulting storm of indignation from all good people who very properly abhorred the thought of change and revolution. The Christian answer, it has been seen, was not particularly strong, and could not have been at all convincing. Justin said that the expected Kingdom was not a human kingdom but was with God. But he himself, as will appear, clearly taught that the Kingdom was to be of this earth, and was to involve a complete revolution of all human society. As a matter of fact there was no defence to be made of such teaching in the eyes of complete outsiders. Certainly Justin added little to the strength of the apologetic arguments against charges of immorality and social undesirability to which he had fallen heir from Hellenistic Judaism.

But besides these attacks against the Christian community as a social menace, Justin shows that the religious views of the Christians were attacked for their inadequacy as a system. Christianity was accused of being a novel innovation, was ignored or sneered at by philosophers as beneath the notice of intelligent men, and it was this sort of attack to which Justin chiefly devotes his attention. The general scheme of his defence was first to deny the novelty of Christianity by demonstrating its continuity with Judaism,¹ then to show parallels between the teachings of the Pentateuch and of the Greek philosophers, and then boldly to assert, *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, that since Moses antedated Socrates and Plato, any common ideas must have been taken by the philosophers from the Jewish Scriptures. Granted thus the superior dignity of Christianity over philosophy because it was the legitimate completion of Judaism, the original source of knowledge of supermundane matters for all mankind, Justin takes a new course and works from Christianity backwards again to philosophy. The system of Judaism achieved its long expected perfection in the person and teaching of Jesus Christ, who was the incarnation of that Spirit of Revelation which alone could

¹ It has been seen in Chapter II that the Dialogue is primarily devoted to justifying this important part of the Christian claim.

guide the human mind to knowledge of the Truth. But this spirit of wisdom was present in every man as his highest intellect, so that not only does Christ represent the culmination of the prophecy of a single religion, even though that is the most ancient religion, but He is the incarnation of the Universal Intelligence which it has been the hopeless struggle of every philosopher to understand. The answer to the sneers of the philosophers that Christianity was not worthy of an intelligent man's consideration was thus the counter-attack that philosophy had failed, and that only in Christianity was the end of philosophy to be found.

In representing Christianity as the true philosophy Justin is again following Greek Jewish precedent, and it is interesting to see how far it could help him. The claim for Christianity that it was the culmination of Judaism was of course Christian, and is recognizably Pauline in origin.¹ But once this claim was granted Justin was justified in using to establish Christian prestige the arguments of Judaism for the superiority of Moses to Plato. Aristobulus had insisted that, before the Septuagint, there had existed another translation of the Old Testament which Plato and Pythagoras had used.² Artapanus represented Moses as the teacher of Orpheus.³ Philo said that Heraclitus had his doctrine from Moses.⁴ It was thus perfectly in accord with Greek-Jewish tradition for Justin to claim for the Sacred Book and teachings common to Judaism and Christianity that they were the source of much in Greek philosophy.

But the Greek Jewish Apologetic contributed yet another element to Justin's defence of Christianity, in suggesting to Justin the claim for his religion that it was the true philosophy. Philo's entire work is an attempt to

¹ For Christianity as the true Israel see below p. 117 ff.

² Euseb. Pr. Ev. XIII. xii. 1; VIII. x. 3. Cf. Zeller III. ii. 280 Anm. 2.

³ Euseb. Pr. Ev. IX. xxvii ff.

⁴ Quis Rer. div. her. 214 (I. 503); on this argument in Judaism see Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 170 Anm. 3; Krüger, op. cit. 20, 21.

represent the Pentateuch as a philosophical treatise. It is true that Philo is actually trying to find a reconciliation of Greek philosophy and the Pentateuch, and that he is obviously sacrificing the real teaching of the Jewish Scriptures in the interest of Greek conceptions. But in himself Philo is convinced that the Old Testament is actually a philosophical document, and his object in writing is to demonstrate the thesis that the only true philosophy is to be found in the Jewish writings. Not only is this the burden of Philo's entire exegesis, but he twice explicitly mentions the worship and study of the Scriptures in the Synagogue as "philosophizing". In the first passage Philo says that on the Sabbath the Jews "give their time wholly to the study of philosophy, not studying that sort of philosophy which word-catchers and sophists seek to reduce to a system, men who do not blush to sell doctrines and explanations like any other commodity in the market, or eternally to use philosophy against philosophy (Ye Earth and Son); but the Jews give themselves to the study of the true philosophy (τῷ τῷ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν), which they make up of three parts, of volitions, of speech, and of actions, and harmonize them into one species (εἶδος) in order to possess and enjoy happiness."¹ Here the philosophy of the Synagogue appears to be predominately, if not exclusively, ethical. But in the second passage Philo's definition is broader. The Sabbath, he says, is devoted to "philosophizing, that is on the one hand to devoting time to the investigation of the things of nature, and on the other to examining whether there has been anything impurely done on the preceding days," etc.² According to Philo, then, Judaism was a philosophy, immeasurably superior to the teachings of those professional philosophers who spent their time in paid instruction and in mutual disputations. That it was common for Judaism to regard itself as a philosophy is amply illustrated by Josephus, who seems not in the least to have understood Judaism in the philosophic sense of the Hellenistic Jews, but who had

¹ De vita Moses III. 211—212 (II. 167).

² De Decal. 98 (II. 197).

picked up the epithet "philosophy" for Judaism, and frequently used it.¹

Feder overlooks the fact that Judaism in the Dispersion called itself the true philosophy, when he seeks in the mystery religions for Justin's inspiration for so describing Christianity.² There is no need to go so far afield. Converts from Hellenistic Judaism who regarded Christianity as a completion of their former faith must have asserted long before Justin's time that Christianity was the ultimate philosophy.

Justin supplements these Judaistic arguments by expounding three new apologetic propositions. First he claims that many pagan narratives, particularly the popular mythologies, are demonic and perverse imitations of stories truly set forth in the Hebrew Scriptures. The demons were especially active in parodying doctrines and incidents connected with the Incarnation. Second his theory of the Christian character of all truth, because Christ is the incarnation of the entire Logos, is quite new to Christianity.³ Third he did Christian Apologetic an abiding service by distinguishing reason and revelation.

Justin's thesis with regard to the origin of mythological stories he himself states as follows: "The myths which the poets have made . . . have been uttered, as we shall proceed to demonstrate, by the influence of the wicked demons, in order to deceive and lead astray the human race. For having heard it proclaimed through the Prophets that the Christ was to come, and that the ungodly among men were to be punished by fire, they put forward many to be called sons of Jupiter, under the impression that they would be able to produce in men the idea that the things which were said with regard to Christ were mere marvelous tales, like the things which were said by the poets."⁴ With this must be read Justin's statement that the gods

¹ Ant. I. 7. 1, XV. 10. 4; Bel. Jud. II. 8. 2, c. Ap. I. 10; cf. Krüger p. 19.

² (Bibl. 350) pp. 47 ff.

³ See below Chapters V and VIII.

⁴ Ap. I. 54. 1, 2 (89 A, B).

who committed the crimes recounted in the mythologies were not gods but "wicked and impious demons."¹ Such an aggressive Apologetic on the matter of mythology is so far as we know first suggested in Christian literature by Justin. Aristides, writing but a few decades at most before Justin, has no hint of representing mythologies as the work of demons. He simply reproduces some of the arguments common to Xenophanes, Socrates, and Plato, that the gods as described in Hesiod and Homer are shown by their conduct to be utterly unfit for divine dignity and recognition. Positive suggestion as to the real standing of these rejected deities Aristides has none.² But the charge that the popular gods were actually demons is much older than Justin. Conybeare has called attention to the fact that the same teaching is to be met with in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ii. 47) who died B. C. 7. "As R. Heinze truly remarks," says Conybeare, "the substitution by the Christians of evil demons for the ancient gods was suggested and grew out of the Greek philosophy itself."³ Whence Justin himself had the suggestion it is impossible to say.

Justin's second contribution to Christian Apologetic is more striking, though it seems never to have been accepted as a part of the orthodox defence of Christianity. Justin wished to do more than the Greek Jewish philosophy had attempted to do in accounting for the common element between his religion and some of the doctrines of his favourite philosophers. Philo and the Greek Jews had asserted that Moses was the first philosopher, and that Plato, Socrates, and even Heraclitus had learned their great doctrines from him. Therefore Judaism, as the school of Moses, was the true philosophy. But convenient as this argument was in justifying the claim for the antiquity of Christianity, it

¹ Ap. I. 5. 4 (56 B). Justin is here using the words ὄρθοι δαίμονες as "gods", κακοὶ καὶ ἀνόσοι δαίμονες as "demons". His meaning is unmistakable though English equivalents are doubtful. See the entire chapter.

² See Aristides Apol. 8—13. For Justin's demonology see below Chapter VI.

³ Conybeare (Bibl. 328) p. 113; cf. R. Heinze, Xenocrates, p. 116.

after all left the distinctively Christian element in the air. Was not Christ still a novelty, and his doctrines the product of an unphilosophic mind? No, says Justin, for Christ was the total incarnation of that one Universal Mind which has always been found in minute fragments in every man, and which has been the source of whatever real knowledge any man has ever achieved. Christ is True Reason incarnate. Whoever has striven to lead a life according to reason, has lived according to Christ, and has been, however unconsciously, a Christian. Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, were Christians because they regulated their lives by the Logos within them. Whatever is true in other philosophies, then, is Christian, for Christianity is the Truth. Christianity is not a novelty, it is as old as the universe, as old as Reason. It is the ultimate Knowledge toward which all philosophies have more or less falteringly been struggling. There is not the slightest discrepancy between Christianity and philosophy except in so far as Christianity achieves the goal which philosophy has never been able to reach.¹

Upon the basis of this novel claim, Justin went on to distinguish reason and revelation in so clear a way as to have been a great service to Christian Apologetic of all time. We have already seen how Justin represented his conversion as a turning from the hopeless groping of reason to the full light of revelation. Man's higher mind is truly a part of the Universal Mind, but so small a part that man can grasp but very little of the truth, and is subject to a constant tendency to error. If he is to know the truth, man must have it revealed to him. The process of revelation will be more aptly discussed under Justin's anthropology,² but the fact of the distinction between reason and revelation is Justin's greatest contribution to Christian Apologetic. The church early found it wise to ignore Justin's doctrine of the Universal Mind, and the Christian

¹ This is the argument of the second part of the Second Apology, as illustrated by the introduction to the Dial. See above Chapter I, and below Chapter VII.

² See below Chapter VII, and p. 177 ff.

standing of Socrates. But orthodox tradition has ever since Justin's time attempted to hold to reason and yet decry it for revelation at the same time. Reason, it has been insisted, is a good thing, but rationalism is utterly unchristian. We can go only a little way by reason, if we can go any way at all. But the Christian must be prepared to believe certain dogmas which the reason cannot justify, or even may seem to contradict, for these dogmas are built upon truth revealed by God, and as such are not to be questioned. Whether this dogma has ultimately demanded a belief in the inspired infallibility of ecclesiastical tradition, or in the verbal inspiration of a Book which has revealed everything necessary to salvation, orthodox Christianity has always contrasted the weakness of reason with the fulness and security of revelation.

Thus ultimately secure in his revelation, Justin's Apologetic against doctrinal attack is triumphant. What intellectual rest he has found in Christianity he is confident every reasoning man will find as readily. But he who refuses to be enlightened and persists in doing a work of the demons by persecuting the Christians cannot escape the fires of Hell, though he be Emperor of all the Roman Empire. Justin's defence of the Christian doctrine becomes active propaganda. It is not toleration but recognition which he demands, and it is to instill conviction of the moral and metaphysical truth of Christianity that he is really striving.

It has been seen that Justin's defence of Christianity as a revelation of the truth was utterly meaningless apart from the continuity of Christianity with Judaism. Accordingly the Old Testament, even presumably for the Emperor's benefit, was examined much more carefully, and adduced much more frequently than the opinions of Greek philosophers or their schools. The Old Testament was Justin's Sacred Book, more authoritative than any record except possibly the sayings of Jesus Christ, and constituting even the foundation of authority for these. Justin's apologetic task, as he understood it, consisted almost entirely in finding in the Old Testament prophetic descriptions of the person and work of Christ. For he

believed that the representation of Christianity as the fulfillment and completion of the mystical and ancient books of the Old Testament was the strongest possible form of presentation of the Faith to his generation. Accordingly Justin's apologetic evidence is a series of allegorized passages from the Jewish Scriptures. It will not, then, be a digression in an inquiry into the nature and sources of Justin's Apologetic to examine the character and origin of this evidence.

Two dogmas were essential to the validity of proof of Christianity from the Old Testament. In the first place the sacred character of the Old Testament must be guaranteed by a dogma of its verbal infallibility. Such a doctrine Justin fearlessly enunciates. No passage can ever be said to be in error, or in contradiction to another passage, he insists.¹ If an apparent discrepancy is pointed out, Justin will not admit a contradiction, but will confess inability to understand the passage, and will try to bring to a similar point of view any person who has been so rash as to conclude that the Scripture is in error. In the second place Justin must insure his right to read the Scriptures in an allegorical sense rather than literally. It would have been hopeless for him to try to find Christianity in the Old Testament on the basis of a literal reading of the text. This right Justin assumes rather than claims. He protests for example against reading the story of the brazen serpent as though God had been teaching faith in such an object. The passage is utterly meaningless, he insists, unless it is taken as a sign of the Crucifixion.²

But Siegfried has demonstrated that there are several other principles of exegesis according to which Justin is reading the Old Testament:³

¹ Dial. 65. 2 (289 B, C).

² Dial. 91. 4 (319 A, B); on Allegory in Justin, cf. Grube (Bibl. 391, 392).

³ Siegfried (Bibl. 390) pp. 337—339. The argument is there given in more detail, with references to Philo and Justin. In still greater detail is the chapter on "Hermeneutische Regeln" in Heinisch (Bibl. 394) pp. 69—125. But Heinisch is throughout worse than careless in his treatment of his sources, and so while suggestive must be used with great caution.

First, the Scriptures say nothing superfluous; repetitions, doublets, and the like, are significant. Second, the silences of Scripture are significant. Third, meanings of words determined by one passage are transferred to other passages; as for example the free application of the idea that a day of the Lord is a thousand years. Fourth, words are to be examined in all their possible senses. Fifth, numbers, objects, and names must also be regarded as symbols.

All of these Siegfried shows to be common to Philo and Justin. All are distinctively Hellenistic canons of criticism. They are not, however, distinctively Hellenistic Jewish canons, and so far as the similarity of method is concerned, Justin might almost as well have learned them directly from the Stoic treatment of Homer as from the Alexandrian Jews. But not only does Justin use the methods and principles of exegesis which mark those writings of Greek Judaism which we now possess, but his explanations of individual verses are marked again and again with details of Philonic hermeneutics. The traces of Philonic ideas to be found in connection with Justin's theology will be mentioned in the course of the description of his different doctrines. Here it is only necessary to call attention to similarities in scattered details of interpretation.

Justin was certainly referring to a Philonic tradition, if not to a specific dissertation of Philo's, when he said that the Jewish teachers speculated upon the introduction of a second Alpha into Abraham's name, and of a second Rho into Sarah's name.¹ Only a Greek discussion could be based upon such a subject, for in the Hebrew text the change in the names is of course quite different. Philo, however, has an unusually detailed discussion of the significance of both the new letters.² Another reference to a Greek Jewish tradition, is Justin's rejection of what he calls to Trypho a "heresy among you", namely the doctrine that the bodies of men were made by angels.³ This doc-

¹ Dial. 113. 2 (340 B).

² De Mut. Nom. 57 ff. (I. 587 ff.).

³ Dial. 62. 3 (285 D).

trine is taught by Philo,¹ though not in the same form, for Philo assigns to the Powers the creation of the mortal part of the soul. It is clearly, however, to a Greek Judaism affected by Platonism that Justin is referring. It can likewise only be a reference to Philonic tradition, which Justin makes in regard to the keeping of the Sabbath. Justin says that the New Law prescribes every day to be observed as a Sabbath, while the Jews think themselves pious for remaining idle one day in seven.² Philo similarly insists that every day is a feast day according to the Law.³ Heinemann has pointed out that Philo has here in mind the Cynic-Stoic doctrine that the true feast is joy in a complete state of virtue, such as is possible only for God and a very few wise men.⁴ Justin has lost the fulness of the Philonic conception, but shows that he has a distant echo of Philo when he goes on to say: "If there is any perjured person or thief among you, let him cease to be so; if any adulterer, let him repent; then he has kept the secret and true Sabbaths of God."

But while no other explicit reference to the Hellenistic interpretations of Scripture can be attributed to Justin,⁵ he is frequently echoing its exegesis. For example, in commenting upon the appearance of the three Men to Abraham, Justin, like Philo, represents one of them as God and Lord of the two others, who were angels.⁶ Justin concludes from the Scriptural passage that this God must have been a messenger of, and hence other than, the First God. That is, Justin uses the passages as a proof of the existence of a Second God, whom he elsewhere calls the Logos of God.

¹ De Confus. ling. 179 (I. 432); De Fuga et Invent. 69 (I. 556).

² Dial. 12. 3 (229 C).

³ De Special. Leg. II. 42 (De Septen. 3) (II. 278); cf. Heinisch (Bibl. 394) p. 250.

⁴ Heinemann, n. in loco (Die Werke Philos von Alex. in deutscher Uebersetzung. Breslau 1910. II. 120 Anm. 4).

⁵ The passage in which Justin mentions the procession of the Powers, Dial. 128, is more in harmony with the Rabbinic than Hellenistic Judaism. See below p. 190 ff.

⁶ Dial. 56 passim.

Philo seems at first quite different in his conclusion, for he says in one passage that the two Powers who accompanied God on this occasion were His Goodness and His Rulership,¹ in two other passages that they were His Creative and Ruling Powers,² while in the latter passages he goes on to a remarkable discussion of God, the Unity, appearing as Trinity. God, he says, (i. e. the Person who appeared to Abraham) was between these two Powers, and Philo makes it appear that the God who was between them was the highest God. Of the two Powers who here accompany God, the Good-Creative Power was to be called *God*, Philo explains, for it is by this that He made and arranged the universe, while the Ruling Power is to be called *Lord*. But on one occasion Philo speaks of a sudden burst of inspiration which revealed to him that "in the One God who is truly existing there are two supreme and pre-eminent powers, Goodness and Authority. And by Goodness did He beget the world, by Authority does He rule over that which has been begotten. And the third which in the middle synthesizes the two is Logos; for by Logos is God both ruling and good."³ That Philo got his inspiration for this interpretation from recalling the "three men" who appeared to Abraham, is most likely, since the two Powers named are in all cases the same. Both are transcended by the Logos of God, and all, we know from elsewhere, are transcended by God Himself. Justin's statement now appears in a fresh light. "The One of the three," he says, referring to the three Angels, "is Lord of the two Angels, and is the *God* and *Lord* who is subject to Him who is in the heavens."⁴ Justin is unmistakably echoing the Philonic interpretation, though he rejects or misunderstands, or had never heard the more elaborate theories of Philo's doctrine of the godhead.

Justin follows Philonic interpretation again when he discusses the polygamy of the Patriarchs. Philo had in-

¹ De Sacrif. Ab. et Caini 59 (I. 173).

² De Abrah. 121 ff. (II. 19). Quaest. in Genes. IV. 2.

³ De Cherub. 27 (I. 143).

⁴ Dial. 56. 22 (279 A).

sisted that Abraham, for example, did not beget children of three women for the sake of pleasure, but in order to propagate the race.¹ Justin similarly insists that the Patriarchs had many wives, "not to commit fornication but that a certain plan and all mysteries might be accomplished by them."²

The similarities and dissimilarities between Philo's theology and Justin's will be discussed with more advantage in connection with the individual doctrines. It may be well however to protest against too narrow a treatment of the evidence presented. Justin does not show trace of ever having made the writings of Philo a careful literary study. Extensive verbal parallels such as Heinisch has adduced between Clement of Alexandria and Philo cannot be found between Philo and Justin. But to dismiss the subject of the influence of Greek Judaism upon Justin's Christianity because of a lack of literary parallels between Justin and Philo, in the face of the obviously profound influence which Philonic conceptions and methods had upon Justin's theological manner and matter, is to beg the entire question. In his interpretation of the Old Testament, Justin is unmistakably a follower of Alexandrine tradition. On the basis of an allegorical treatment of the Septuagint he proposed finding a justification for his theology, and this thesis he demonstrated in a manner that can accurately be described as a weak reflection of Philonic exegesis.

But Justin's aim was something quite different from Philo's. Where Philo allegorized the Old Testament to justify his being a Greek metaphysician, Justin allegorized the same book to find continuity between Judaism and Christianity. We shall see that on the metaphysical side, Justin's Christianity is, like his exegesis, a weak Philonic reflection and adaptation. Justin was not primarily a metaphysician but a Christian propagandist who sought evidence for believing that Christ, the Son of God, was born of a Virgin, and died according to God's plan, rose from the dead, and should come again to judge all men. His traces

¹ *De Nobilitate* 207 (II. 441).

² *Dial.* 141. 4 (371 A); cf. 134. 2 (364 A).

of Philonic exegesis are thus naturally scattered. The astonishing fact is that in one so different in spirit and aim from Philo, so much that is recognizably Philonic is yet to be found.

An excellent illustration of Justin's echoing a Philonic thought is to be found in his last Apologetic argument, that is in his Apologetic against the reproaches of Judaism. Justin's Apologetic in answer to the criticisms of the Jews was fundamentally the same as that to the attacks of the heathen. In both cases he represented Christianity as the fullness and completion of what had been only partial before. Christianity was the True Philosophy over against philosophy, and it was the New or Eternal Law over against the Torah. In both cases Christianity was the final revelation of Truth, so that it was the same view of Christianity as the perfect revelation of God which constituted the foundation for Justin's defence against all attacks. But Justin's applications of this principle to the case of Judaism and to the case of heathenism were quite different. Justin's representation of Christianity as the completion of Judaism has already been mentioned in the analysis of the Dialogue. The argument is as follows:

Judaism claims in its Law to have received a special revelation of the will of God. Jews cannot understand how Christians can profess a desire to serve God, can acknowledge the God of the Jewish Scriptures to be their God, and yet refuse to keep His Law. Many Jews were indeed ready to accept Christianity as a supplement to the Law, but could not see how the Gospel abrogated the Law. Justin's argument is only an expansion of the argument of St. Paul that Christ is the New Law, in whom all necessity for the Old Law is done away; that Christians are the true Spiritual Israel. Justin's argument is not exactly like St. Paul's however. He does not, in the first place, think so highly as St. Paul of the Old Law. To Justin the Jewish Law was not a schoolmaster, a training and preparation for Christianity but was a reproach, put upon the Jews because of their perversity and sin. It had never had anything to do with salvation. Man has never been saved on any other basis than his moral character.

But the Jews, more wicked than other men, refused to follow the light which can guide every man, and preferred to rebel and walk in the ways of wickedness. Circumcision given to Abraham as the founder of the race was a prophetic sign of this future perversity, and indicated that God would cut them off from other nations for unique condemnation.¹ "To you alone was circumcision necessary, in order that the people may be no people, the nation no nation."² It is true that there was value to be found in the Law, but the Jews had ignored this helpful aspect of the Law, and completely misunderstood it. So the unleavened bread signified symbolically the doing away with the old deeds of wicked leaven, and the new leaven after the days of unleavened bread signified starting afresh upon a new conduct of life. But the Jews foolishly thought God was imputing value to the eating of one kind of food rather than another.³ True sacramentalism, he insists in harmony with Philo and all the best Jewish tradition,⁴ is not physical but spiritual.⁵ Similarly the prohibition of certain food was enjoined in the Old Testament in order that in eating the Jews might have their thoughts brought back to God. But this spiritual significance of clean and unclean food was utterly ignored by the Jews in their thought that they were getting virtue in God's eyes in heedlessly fulfilling the letter of His Law.⁶ Similarly in the case of the Sabbaths,⁷ sacrifices and oblations,⁸ and all other Laws; in themselves the Laws were valueless, "statutes

¹ Dial. 16. 2 (234 A).

² Dial. 19. 5 (236 E).

³ Dial. 14. 3 (231 D, E).

⁴ Philo's doctrine of feasts has already been mentioned. The significance of circumcision was to him the putting away of unrighteousness, not the tribal initiation (cf. Heinisch, *Bibl.* 394, p. 270). The Passover meant the leaving of the life of sensation for that of reason (*ibid.* p. 250). Such Judaism had no answer when Christianity pressed the question, "Why then the external rite", and presented Christ as the New Law.

⁵ Dial. 15. 1 (233 E).

⁶ Dial. 20 entire.

⁷ Dial. 21. 1 (238 A); 12. 3 (229 C).

⁸ Dial. 22. 1 (239 D).

which were not good, judgments whereby they shall not live."¹ Salvation has never been dependent upon their fulfillment. Righteous men existed before the Law was given, before even circumcision. But if God knew that the Law would be thus misunderstood and abused or ignored by the Jews, why did He give it to them? Justin answers that the Jews were given the Law rather than other people because God knew they would thus sin, and was trying to adapt Himself to a people of such extraordinary perversity.²

But God is unchanged. There have always existed "eternal righteous decrees",³ and it is according as one lives by these, regardless of time or nationality, that he may be saved. The test is universal, within or without Judaism. "Those who did that which was universally, naturally, and eternally good are pleasing to God,"⁴ and will each be "saved by this own righteousness."⁵ The immeasurable superiority of Christianity to Judaism and heathenism alike lies in the fact that Christ is Himself this "everlasting law and everlasting covenant."⁶ Christ is the New Law in a sense, but more correctly He is the the Eternal Law.⁷ With His complete revelation in the Incarnation a new epoch began. Men were never saved by any other than Christ, for Christ is the Eternal Law, and only as people have lived according to it could they please God. But now is salvation much easier, for what before was hidden in the Old Law is now made manifest in Christ. Justin has thus turned against the Jews with the same method of attack which he used in his theory of the partial validity of reason as contrasted with the fulness of the Logos. Christ is complete Law as He is complete Reason. All is given in Him, who

¹ Dial. 21. 4 (238 D); cf. Ezek. xx. 25.

² Dial. 19. 6 (237 A). ὅθεν ὁ θεὸς ἀρμολογούμενος πρὸς τὸν λαὸν ἐκείνον.

³ Dial. 28. 4 (246 A). τὰ αἰώνια δίκαια.

⁴ Dial. 45. 4 (263 E). τὰ καθόλου καὶ φύσει καὶ αἰώνια καλά.

⁵ Dial. 45. 3 (263 D).

⁶ Dial. 43. 1 (261 C).

⁷ See Windisch (Bibl. 333) p. 27, 28.

transcends the Old Testament Laws as He transcends the philosophy of the schools. Christ is the eternally right Way for all men, as He is the Truth.

Justin is thinking of Law as a much more universal thing than a body of precepts, as in his doctrine of the Universal Logos he is thinking of more than the thought processes of God. Christ is the Right in the ethical realm, the principle of Truth in the metaphysical realm. Only as one conforms to or understands this one principle, whether approached from the point of view of ethics or metaphysics, is it possible to please God, or know Him, or above both, see Him.

The exaltation of the principle of Law as a frequently personified attribute of God is so familiar in Rabbinic Judaism as to need no comment.¹ But Philo understood this higher principle of Law, not in oriental personification, but as identical with what the Stoics meant by the Law of Nature, that is, as with the Stoics, as identical with the Logos.² A natural Law in the universe, the Philonic-Stoic Nomos is a moral law in man. According to Philo the precepts of the Jewish Law are Logoi, graciously given to help beginners on the right path. But the perfect man has risen above the need of precepts, because (Philo is now Platonic) his nature is entirely in accord with the universal Logos-Nomos.³ The doctrine of St. Paul of the passing of the need of precepts with the coming of the eternal principle of Law, which' was the true dynamic and wisdom of God, in the person of Jesus Christ is thus much more in accord with Philo's interpretation of the Torah than with that of Rabbinic Judaism. For Rabbinic Judaism represented God in heaven as worthily occupied in embellishing the letters of the Mosaic code, i. e. in glorifying the precepts as given. The tendency of philosophical Judaism was to interpret the Mosaic Law

¹ See Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*, pp. 14 ff., 153, 157 ff. Schechter, *Some aspects of Rabbinic Theology*. (*Jewish Quarterly Review* VIII. p. 9.

² De Migr. Abr. 130 (I. 456). νόμος δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα ἢ λόγος θεῖος, κτλ.

³ See Drummond, *Philo*, II. 165 ff., 307—309.

as a reflection, or imitation, of an eternal moral principle. When once a man has reached the eternal principle, the precepts of the written law seem superfluous and inferior. The Epistle to the Hebrews is even more in harmony with the point of view of philosophical Judaism in this particular than is St. Paul. Here Christ is an ideal Priest, recognizably the Philonic Logos Priest, serving God in an ideal world according to, and Himself constituting, a Divine Law, of which the code of Judaism was but a shadow.¹ The writer to the Hebrews does not speak so specifically of a contrast between the New and Old Laws as St. Paul and Justin, but the inference from his words could only be that the Christians, as followers of the Eternal Priest and Law, have no need of the shadow. The idea of Law as transcending precepts must have been very popular with Jews in an environment where observance of the precepts of the Jewish Code was largely impossible. The Christian attack against Rabbinic Legalism, then, from its incipiency in St. Paul, and as found more developed in Justin, is conducted in the atmosphere and uses the conceptions of Hellenistic Judaism. As in the case of the Logos, the doctrine of the Eternal Law only becomes peculiarly Christian when it asserts the incarnation of the Eternal Law in the person of Jesus Christ.

But granted this one step of Christianity, the consequences upon which Justin representatively insists are inevitable, inevitable that is to those who are prepared to accept the Alexandrian theory of the Mosaic Code as a *μίμησις* of the Eternal Law.² Philo himself was too consistent a Jew to assert that the real Israelites were those who had risen above the Logoi into conformity with the Logos. But that was probably because he saw

¹ See Hebr. viii. 5; ix. 11, 12, 23, 24; x. 1. See Windisch's note to Hebrews viii. 5, with Philonic parallels, in *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*. Tübingen 1913. p. 68, also p. 15.

² Philo does not so call the Mosaic Code expressly, but this statement of his theory is quite fair to his other statements, and is shown by the writer to the Hebrews to have been a familiar conception. See Hebr. x. 1.

so very few, either in history or in his own circle of acquaintances, who had thus "passed beyond the Law of commandment and restraint,"¹ and Philo had no wish to rule out his beloved compatriots from their heritage as Israelites. But in a community which considered itself as having accessible for every man that Entire Law which made the partial Law obsolete,² a new group feeling would inevitably arise on the Pauline suggestion that the Christian communion was the true Israel. Justin's scorn of the history of Jewish observance of its law is naturally stronger than St. Paul's. The sense of superiority which Christians felt to the Jews had been sharpened by a century of controversy and amplification. It is only remarkable that Justin should still have been liberal enough to admit communion with the conservative party which even yet wanted to try to please God by being Christians and by keeping the precepts of the Jewish Law at the same time. He admits that such toleration is by no means the usual attitude taken by Christians, however, and will himself not allow these people to win the more philosophical Christians to their point of view.³ For the Christians alone were the promises of the Old Covenant intended. What then, asked Trypho, are the faithful Jews of old not to be saved, and are we all cut off now from any heritage in the Holy Mount? The faithful of old, Justin answers, are saved because they were Christians in so far as they conformed to the Eternal Law. But now since that Eternal Law has been revealed in Christ salvation is hereafter possible only by becoming His disciples. All Jews who remain Jews are cut off from any share in the good time coming.⁴ There is one door open for them as for all mankind, through Christ, the Eternal Logos-Law.

¹ Drummond, Philo II, 309.

² Dial. II. 2 (228 B).

³ Dial. 47. 1 ff. (265 D ff.).

⁴ See Dial. 25—30, 45, 46, 119, 120, 123, 124, 135, 137, 140.

CHAPTER IV

GOD

Early Christianity seems to have been for the most part uncritical about its doctrine of God. At its inception, Christianity had a wealth of devotional background in Palestinian Judaism, most of whose views primitive Christians found no cause to question, for they believed that they were Jews in the fullest sense, and that their particular doctrines about Christ were only the message of fulfillment which Jews had long been waiting to hear. As to the nature of God no change from Jewish tradition was dreamed of. Similarly in the Greek world, the Greek Christianity which was born of St. Paul inherited the religious attitudes and aspirations of the Synagogues of the Dispersion. Here again Christianity conceived itself only as changing the faith of its fathers in regard to the substitution of the new Christ-Law for the Torah, while it challenged otherwise as little as possible the Greek Jewish religion and metaphysics. Even in its most elaborate expression, Greek Judaism had proposed no dogmas, and had achieved no consistent unification. Theoretically its promoters were still orthodox Jews who could explain their beliefs in terms of Greek philosophy. Devotionally even Philo was an orthodox Jew worshipping a personal loving God. For Hellenistic Judaism did not question the legitimacy of its worship by the implications of its theories of the nature of God. It philosophized about an Absolute, but prayed to God the Father. Ordinary Greek Jews would only have understood the Jewish God of Abraham, while they would have used the philosophical phrases of the learned with the indiscrimination of unintelligence.

Early Greek Christianity had no incentive for going behind this careless mingling of devotion with philosophical jargon. The devotional personal view of God, helped out by a few mysterious sounding phrases, is all that has ever been needed or desired by the mass of Christians. When Christianity was attacked by Jews or pagans, recourse was had of necessity to the philosophical terminology, which was then brought forward with more confidence than understanding, and given an emphasis utterly disproportionate to its real significance for their Faith. Naturally in such a case the terminology shows no signs of having been applied with a careful eye to consistency or appropriateness. But we shall see that with Justin the phrases and shreds of philosophical speculation about God are still recognizably a Christian adaptation of those of the Greek Jewish school, and show no trace of an immediate borrowing from the pages or even the traditions of the schools of Greece.

When Justin is attempting thus to speak philosophically, the phase of Deity which he most emphasizes is the *Transcendence*. Justin particularly rejects the Stoic conception of immanence, in which God was conceived of as in a sense made up out of the totality of material phenomena. God must not, he insists, be identified with the things which are "ever changing and altering and dissolving into the same things."¹ On the contrary it is one of the chief distinguishing characteristics of God that He alone is *unchangeable* and *eternal*.² The Stoics had taken over much of Heraclitus' doctrine of eternal flux, and believed that the world as a whole, which was identical with Deity, must not be thought of as static, but as totally engaged in a great turning and changing which implied both motion in space and constant transformation of nature. Throughout Greek philosophy, *κινέω* and *τρέπω* have the double sense of spacial motion and of change of nature. The Stoics used these words in both senses in describing

¹ Ap. II. 7. 9 (46 B). *τρέπομενα και ἀλλοιούμενα και ἀναλύόμενα εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεί.*

² Ap. I. 13. 4 (60 E). *τὸν ἀτρέπτου και ἀεί ὄντα θεόν.*

the ultimate nature of God, and Justin answers the Stoics by denying both spacial motion and change of nature to God. God cannot "go up or go down, arrive anywhere, walk about, sleep or rise from sleeping, but remains in His own place, wherever that may be."¹ God is not only unmoved in space, but Justin goes further and denies that God is any sense spacially determined, whether by the universe as a whole or by a single place in the universe.² Spaciality he seems to conceive as having come into existence only at creation, for he argues against God's spaciality on the ground that a God who existed before creation could not have had spacial character.³ Spaciality which itself first came into existence by God's creative act cannot be read back into the nature of God, and it is only with violence that we can associate any spacial objects or conceptions with God.⁴ It is thus on the grounds of God's complete lack of spaciality, and of the corollary to this, His stability and freedom from any motion in space, that Justin attacks the Stoic identification of God and the world, and seeks to establish God's transcendence. Similarly in regard to the unchangeable nature of God, the other sense in which the words of motion would have been understood, Justin insists upon the eternal fixity of character of God. His statement as a philosopher perfectly expresses his view as a Christian: God is *τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχον*.⁵

Both the conception of the non-spacial character of God, and of the eternal unchangeableness of Deity had already been suggested in the Hellenistic-Judaistic books

¹ Dial. 127. 1, 2 (356 D).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ This reasoning is purely Philonic. Cf. Conf. Ling. 136, 139 (I. 425): "For who does not know that he who comes down must necessarily leave one place and occupy another? God generated space and location along with bodies, and we may not assert that the Maker is contained in any of the things produced. . . . Accordingly all terms of motion involving change of place are inapplicable to God in His true nature."

⁵ Dial. 3. 5 (220 E).

of the New Testament. The non-spacial character of God is clearly the philosophic thought behind the popular language put into the mouth of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, when he denies to the Samaritan woman that God can be associated exclusively either with the Temple at Jerusalem or with the mountain of Samaria, for God as a Spirit is only to be worshipped in spirit and in truth.¹ Likewise the Hellenistic Jews to whom the Epistle to the Hebrews was addressed understood perfectly that to say, "Jesus Christ the same yesterday, today, and forever,"² was precisely to say, "Jesus Christ, as unchangeable in nature, is very God." Both the immovability and the unchangeableness of God are of course definitely asserted by Philo,³ and go back to the Aristotelian First Cause who was the Unmoved Mover.

But although Justin denies spaciality to God, he is naïvely driven by his denial of movement to God to assign to Him *location*. In the passage already quoted Justin speaks of God as "remaining in His place, wherever that may be,"⁴ and in another passage God is *ὁ ὑπὲρ κόσμον θεός, ὑπὲρ ὃν ἄλλος οὐκ ἔστι.*⁵ Justin makes no attempt at defining the place of God, and refers to God sometimes as above the heavens,⁶ sometimes as in the heavens.⁷ Wherever God is, it is some remote spot, so remote that it is not to be conceived that He could appear among men. Justin's object in securing the remote location of God is thus twofold, he is trying to impress his readers with God's transcendence, but particularly with a view to the impossibility of God's being able to appear in theophanies.

¹ John iv. 21—24.

² Hebrews xiii. 8.

³ Cf. collection of parallels in Siegfried (Bibl. 390) pp. 201 ff., 333. Drummond, Philo, II. 41—45. The conception was carried on into Rabbinical Judaism. Weber, Jüdische Theologie, p. 149, quotes Bereshith Rabba, c. 68, "God is the place of the world, and His world is not His place."

⁴ Dial. 127. 1, 2 (356 D).

⁵ Dial. 60. 5 (284 A).

⁶ Dial. 56. 1 (275 A); 60. 2 (283 B).

⁷ Dial. 127. 5 (357 C); 129. 1 (284 A).

Justin's argument on theophanies will be discussed later.¹ Here it is only to be noticed that the basis of denial to God of the power of appearing to men is not, as with Plato, the unchangeable character of a perfect being, but the fixity of His location. Philo uses both arguments against theophanies,² and it is not an unjustified suspicion that the argument from the fixed location of God is as generically Jewish as the argument from the unchangeable character of a perfect Being is generically Greek. For it is notable that it is usually in connection with Old Testament exegesis that Justin is prompted to assert the fixed heavenly location of God, while an interesting quotation by Weber from the Midrash upon the Song of Songs, viii. 11, indicates that the Jewish inclination to locate God strictly in the heavens was so strong that it led the Rabbis at least occasionally to conceive of the Torah as the personal representative of God upon earth.³ Philo is much more philosophical than either Justin or the Palestinian Jews on the matter of the location of God when he asserts that God is His own place.⁴ But both Justin and Philo are seriously inconsistent in trying to combine the Jewish notion of a location of God with the Greek denial of spaciality to God. Philo says in one passage:⁵ "God is called place, because He contains all things, but is contained by none. . . . The Divine, being contained by nothing, is necessarily its own place. . . . God is at a distance from everything created." It is hardly necessary to look further for the source of Justin's confusion of location and unspaciality in his doctrine of God. He is clearly following a Philonic tradition.

Justin denies that God is in any sense *composite*. He says to Trypho that the Jewish teachers, when they

¹ See below Chapter V. pp. 142 ff.

² Ibid.

³ Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*, p. 16. "My Torah will I give to the lower world, but I will dwell in the higher. I will give my daughter with her precepts to a city but I remain with you in the upper world."

⁴ Leg. Al. I. 44 (I. 52). First stated in Christianity by Theophil. ad Autolyc. II. 10.

⁵ De Somniis I. 63—67 (I. 630), see entire passage.

interpret the theophanies of the Old Testament as actual appearances of God, must be wrong. God can have no hands, feet, fingers, nor soul, because He is not in any sense a composite Being.¹ Here Justin means that God has not members, nor is He in human form, and yet Justin's mind seems not to be able to dispense with *form* entirely in conceiving of God. In the Apology Justin denies that God has the form which makers of idols seem to think.² His objection is not against conceiving of God as having a form, for he says that God has an "ineffable glory and form." The sin of the idol makers is not that they are ignorant of the true form of God, but that they make their images in the form of demons, and describe these demonic forms as God's form. In speaking of a form of God at all, however, Justin again betrays the popular origin and nature of his philosophic thought. Plato, as has been pointed out,³ in his later life saw that to make God merely the highest form in a hierarchy of Forms was to lead into serious complications, and it is highly probable that in his later works Plato was thinking of God as transcending form entirely. Such certainly was the doctrine of later Platonism, which tried to harmonize Aristotle and Plato. The forms in Albinus,⁴ as in Philo,⁵ are rational projections from God in some way, but God is never Himself formal. But the formlessness of God is a point which might have been easily overlooked in popularizations of philosophy, and the thought of God as completely formless would have occurred only to one possessing a training in careful abstract thinking which there is little ground for ascribing to Justin.

Another favourite term by which Justin describes the transcendence of God and His difference from all other beings is *unbegotten*. It is notable that Justin consistently uses ἀγέννητος rather than ἀγένητος, though in some passages, notably in Dialogue 5 where Justin is discussing

¹ Dial. 114. 3 (341 D).

² Ap. I. 9. 3 (57 E).

³ Compare Introduction Chapter I. pp. 5 ff.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Cf. Introduction Chapter II. p. 47.

philosophy, the word ἀγέννητος is so inappropriate that Otto thinks it is here and frequently in other passages a copyist's error.¹ Ἀγέννητος is the philosophical term applied to Deity to express the fact that He has no beginning, and as such is superior to the exigencies of change and decay to which all other beings, having had a beginning, are subject. The word ἀγέννητος is used consistently in that sense in Greek philosophy and Philo.² Ἀγέννητος, however, means unbegotten. It is much rarer as applied to the Ultimate than the other, but is found in Aristotle as follows: "If there is nothing eternal, neither can there be any coming into existence; for any real thing which comes into existence necessarily pre-supposes some real thing from which it came into existence, and the last term of such a series must be unbegotten."³ That is, this last term must have an existence without exterior source, else we should have one of the infinite series which, as has been seen, were deeply repugnant to Aristotle. Ἀγέννητος is a word of much narrower significance than ἀγέννητος. It means uncaused, not brought into existence by or from anything outside itself, and would be a perfectly correct title to apply to a self-caused being. Ἀγέννητος, however, could only be applied to something which has never had a beginning of any kind, and is a much more expressive term than the other for explaining the ultimate and eternal nature of God. Christianity found the term ἀγέννητος very useful in distinguishing Christ the Son of God, from God the Father who was different from Christ in that He was unbegotten, uncaused in any sense, while Christ was begotten. Ἀγέννητος did not commend itself in distinguishing the Son from the Father, for to state that the Father was without beginning was to imply that the Son had had a beginning, and hence to deny His eternal character. But useful as the word is as a distinctive title when dealing with the problems of Christology, ἀγέννητος is not the proper term to use as an antithesis to ἀθάνατος, and it is because Justin uses it for all purposes, in

¹ See Otto (Bibl. 26) Dial. Ch. 5, n. 1.

² Cf. De Sacrif. Abel. et Caini, 57, 60 (I. 173, 174); Quis rer. div. haer. 206 (I. 502).

³ Metaph. B. 4. 999 b 7 ff.

season and out of season, that Otto suspects the text in some passages where the word is obviously misapplied. The text however probably quite represents Justin's thought. He has confused two words which sounded alike because he knew them largely from hearsay, and did not himself understand the distinction between them. The mistake in Justin's time was a common one, and is quite natural in a philosophic dilettante, but most unlikely to be committed by one who had any training in, or understanding of, Greek philosophy.¹

The force of ἀγέννητος is further illustrated by the fact that Justin deduces God's *namelessness* as a corollary from the fact that He is unbegotten. The connection, which is not at first sight apparent, is founded upon the fact that in Justin's opinion a name, to be truly such, must have been given by a predecessor or maker of the person or thing named. We may call a person by any appellation (πρόσρησις) but only the name given by an elder is properly speaking the person's name. God as unbegotten came into existence from no external impulse, had no antecedents, and hence there was no one to give God a name.² "If anyone dares to say that there is a name he raves with a hopeless madness."³ Thümer, who has attempted to see in the namelessness of God a direct reflection of Plato's own teachings, has fallen into error because he has ignored Justin's explicit reference of the namelessness to the unbegottenness of God, and understood the namelessness solely from Ap. I. 61, where the namelessness and *unutterableness* of God are mentioned together.⁴ Thümer argues that the unutterableness of God has been suggested to Justin by the Timaeus,⁵ and that God is of course

¹ On the general confusion in regard to these two words in the early Christian theology see Lightfoot's note in his edition of the Apostolic Fathers, II. i. (1885) 90—94.

² Ap. II. 6. 1 (49 D).

³ Ap. I. 61. 11 (94 D).

⁴ (Bibl. 380) p. 7, followed by Pfätsch (Bibl. 385) p. 20, and De Fay (Bibl. 381) p. 185.

⁵ Tim. 28 c. τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός . . . εἰς πάντα ἀδύνατον λέγειν.

nameless if He is unutterable. As a matter of fact the two passages of Justin in question¹ are remarkably like a passage in Philo,² where Philo urges, in commenting upon the incident of the burning bush, that God is unutterable and nameless. Any name by which we may speak of God is not a name but only an appellation (*πρόσρησις*), for a name properly so-called describes or limits the one named, while God has only revealed Himself to man as "the Existent", and is not more accurately to be described. Here is the origin of Justin's coupling of the unutterableness and namelessness of God. But Philo goes on to explain that names are a symbol of created things, wherefore God, as the eldest of all beings, and as such having no predecessor who could have created or begotten Him, is the nameless God. The close resemblance of Justin's reasoning to the argument of Philo is here obvious. Justin shows in another passage that he is aware of the association of the incident of the burning bush with the doctrine of the namelessness of God, for in commenting upon that incident he says, "All the Jews even now teach that the nameless God spake to Moses,"³ a casual reference to an argument which he seems to assume will be familiar to his readers, and which was probably a stock bit of exegesis. A similar casual reference, unintelligible in itself, presupposing familiarity on the part of the reader with the reasoning to the namelessness of God from the fact that He had no predecessors, is to be found in the Syriac translation of Aristides: "He has no name; for anything that has a name is associated with the created."⁴ While there is then no ground for supposing that Justin took the argument for God's namelessness direct from Philo, there is ample reason for assuming that the Philonic argument was a familiar part of the intelligent Christianity of the day.

¹ Ap. II. 6. 1 (49 D) and Ap. I. 61. 11 (94 D).

² Philo, *De Mutat. Nom.* 13 ff. (I. 580, 581). This parallel was first suggested by Abbott (*Bibl.* 454) p. 569. Cf. *De Abrah.* 51 (II. 8, 9); *De Somniis* I. 230 (I. 655); *De Vita Mos.* I. 75, 76 (II. 92). See *Cohort. ad Gentil.* 20, 21 (19 B, C).

³ Ap. I. 63. 1 (95 C).

⁴ C. I.

The *unutterableness* of God, which was one of Justin's familiar points of emphasis in describing God, has already been mentioned. It appears in Justin as an unexplained epithet of God,¹ except when the unutterableness and namelessness are combined. The term is intended to indicate the conception that God is beyond the reach of human reason, and that what little we do know of Him is quite inexpressible. The word is frequently found in Philo, but Philo, probably himself recalling the *Timaeus*, conceived the unutterableness in a much more philosophic and mystical sense than Justin. Though our reason, Philo believed, breaks down in the search for God, the aspiration of the true seeker is met by a revelation of Deity given him by the Logos; but knowledge so received is in no sense an achievement of the seeker's own mind, and is quite uncommunicable. For God is beyond human reason either to grasp for one's self or to explain to others. Justin follows this train of thought at a distance. Human reason cannot apprehend Deity, Justin recognizes, and the true seeker must look to revelation to find the truth. But the revelation to which Justin looked for doctrinal instruction had been given objectively in the teachings of the Prophets and Christ. Justin does not recognize the obvious fact that a revelation given through such an objective medium was in the nature of the case largely "utterable". But Justin's motive for preserving this term for God from Hellenistic Judaism, in spite of its inconsistency with his doctrine of revelation, is clear. He was reverently impressed with the immense chasm between God and humanity, not to say God and His world. Immeasurably remote, unmoving, unchangeable, primal, unnamed, God was still beyond Justin's comprehension in spite of his over-confident boasts as to the pre-eminence and adequacy of the Christian revelation. His mind was too unphilosophical to permit him to conceive of God as the Absolute, as probably did Plato, Aristotle, Philo, and Plotinus. Justin's God was transcendent, but not Absolute. The terms which Greek Jewish

¹Ap. I. 61. 11 (94 D); II. 10. 8 (49 A); 12. 4 (50 C); 13. 4 (51 C); Dial. 126. 2 (355 C); 127. 2, 4 (356 D, 357 B).

converts had introduced into Christianity to describe God, Justin eagerly and uncritically accepted. The otherworldly exaltation of the Christianity of Justin's day would have been impossible if God had been conceived of as immanent in the Stoic sense. A Stoic indifference may lift a few strong-minded persons into a state of mind closely resembling otherworldly exaltation, but no such popular movement as Christianity could ever have been based upon such a coldly intellectual foundation. But when God was conceived of as personal and loving, and yet sublimely transcendent in location and nature above the world of change, Christians, with their hope through Christ, could face the vicissitudes of fortune with a passionate scorn which at once puzzled and amazed the pagan world. For the Christians were confident that their souls were in the care of God, and so, in a sense, like God were safe beyond the world of change and suffering.

Justin did not by any means stop in the doctrine of God with His transcendence. He could not consider God as inactive, even though He was unmoved. Aristotle had made an indelible impression upon the thought of the ancient world by his assertion that absolute existences which had no activity were utterly useless and explained nothing.¹ When Aristotle came to describe his own conception of Deity he consistently insisted that this Deity must have activity of some kind: the Primal Mind must not merely be potential thought, but be actually thinking. Similarly Philo in speaking of God's rest on the first Sabbath says: "That which rests is one thing only, God. But by rest I do not mean inaction since that which is by nature acting, that which is the Cause of all things, can never desist from doing that which is most excellent."² Justin reflects this passage distantly when he says that God carries on the same administration of the universe during the Sabbath as during all other days.³ The author of the Fourth Gospel had already used the conception of the activity of God in

¹ See above p. 11.

² *De Cherubim*. 87 (I. 155). Cf. *Leg. Al. I. 5* (I. 44), from Abbot (*Bibl.* 454) p. 576.

³ *Dial.* 29. 3 (246 E).

the expression, "My Father worketh hitherto and I work,"¹ but Justin is much closer here to Philo than to the Fourth Gospel. Justin says that as a philosopher he had defined God as the "Cause to all other things of their existence,"² and later uses the same term to describe the relation between God and the Second God: "God is the cause of His (the Second God's) power and of His being Lord and God."³

But as a Christian Justin more commonly expresses the activity of God in terms of the *creation* and *direction* of the universe, than of causality. That the world was made or begotten by God is a familiar conception found universally in mythologies, and introduced into Greek philosophy by Plato, if not by Anaxagoras. Judaism of course made much of the fact that its God was the creator and preserver of all things, and Justin was following predecessors of all schools in carrying on the doctrine. But he was forced by the teachings of the Gnostics to put unusual emphasis upon the fact that God is the Creator, for the Gnostics were insisting that the God of the Old Testament was in truth the Creator, but that the true God could have had no contact whatever with matter which they made synonymous with evil. They concluded that the God of the Old Testament, whom they commonly called the Fashioner (*δημιουργός*), was, as God of the world of matter, really the God of evil; at the same time they described the good God as absolutely transcendent, and as such as not only infinitely higher than the Demiurge but completely different in kind. Justin, whose intense desire was to demonstrate the unity between the Old and New Testaments, on the grounds that both were the expression of the same revealing Spirit, rejected this Gnostic account entirely, and insisted over and over again that God was Himself the Creator, and that there was no higher God than the Creator.⁴ Justin's theory of creation and of the relation

¹ John v. 17.

² Dial. 3. 5 (220 D); 4. 1 (221 D); 5. 6 (224 A).

³ Dial. 129. 1 (358 D).

⁴ Dial. 11. 1 (228 A); 60. 2 (283 B); 80. 4 (307 A); Ap. I. 10. 6 (63 D, on which last see notes by Veil and Blunt in loco.

of God to matter included the mediating activity of the Logos, and will be more fittingly discussed later.¹ Here it is only to be noticed that Justin never departs from the conception that the responsibility of God in creation is complete, and that in ordinary parlance God is spoken of as the personal Creator, as though the Logos had had no share in the process whatever.

Gods active power and force are further described in His *omniscience*,² and *omnipotence*,³ while His complete *autonomy* is defended in the assertion that the Stoics are utterly wrong in making God subject to fate.⁴ God's action is free. Even the procession of the Logos, described in Greek philosophy as an emanation necessitated by the nature of God, is described by Justin as a free act of God's will, by which, as Duncker has pointed out, Justin goes further than any Greek writer to defend the freedom of God.⁵ But how can a transcendent God keep such intimate contact with the world as to see, hear, and know all that takes place therein? Justin answers that God sees and hears all things not by eyes or ears but by *δυνάμει ἀλέκτω*.⁶ The passage at first tempts one to find in it some *δύναμις* doctrine of the sort increasingly popular in Greek philosophy at the time, but the phrase here seems to mean no more than a confession of ignorance. Justin is confident equally that God sees and hears, and that He has no organ of sight or hearing. But by what power or faculty God then can hear and see Justin confesses in this phrase that he is not prepared to explain.

There is little reason to go back to Plato's Idea of the Good to account for the fact that God is represented by

Von Engelhardt (Bibl. 313) p. 129 notes that Justin rarely speaks of God without describing Him by some such phrase as *δημιουργός τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα*, etc., but does not recognise the anti-gnostic inspiration of the repetition of these epithets.

¹ See Chapter V. pp. 161 ff.

² On the omniscience of God see Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 259.

³ Dial. 84. 4 (310 E). *πάντα δύνασθαι τὸν θεόν, ὅσα βούλεται*.

⁴ Ap. II. 7. 3 ff. (45 D); Ap. I. 19. 5 (65 E, 66 A).

⁵ (Bibl. 339) p. 22.

⁶ Dial. 127. 2 (357 A).

Justin as morally good and holy.¹ The holiness of God is originally a Jewish conception,² and the entire background of early Christianity, in Palestine and Hellenism, was filled with the conception of God as a righteous God. Nor is there any justification for denying to Justin's God the kindly and loving interest in men which has always been the Christian doctrine. Justin, though not so extremely as the Calvinists, was impressed more deeply by the majestic aspects of Deity than by His loving providence, but several passages indicate that he perfectly understood and fully accepted the doctrine of God's loving and even sorrowing solicitude for individuals as for humanity.³ Von Engelhardt has insisted that Justin knew nothing of God as love, and that he completely disregarded this aspect of Deity, alleging that Justin never understood the true message of Christianity as to the nature of God, and never discarded his Platonic conception of God as the Absolute.⁴ He denies that Justin understood or accepted the personality of God at all, or that Justin's theory of God admits of the personal fellowship with God in Christ of which the Apostle speaks. Revelation, von Engelhardt says, opens the way only to the addressing of the true God in prayer, and to service of God. "But God Himself remains far from the world, and will be first approachable when man after death has entered into the sphere of God as an immortal being."⁵ God is to Justin, as to the whole of heathendom, still always and only a cosmic being (*kosmisches Wesen*).⁶ Justin thought of piety and righteousness, von Engelhardt continues, as knowledge about God and active imitation of God, and such a conception "has sense and value only when God is not a personality, love, and grace, but is the creating Prime-Intelligence which man has to recognize, and is the World-Law which man must fulfill."⁷ It is hard to follow such reasoning. That Justin's sense of worship

¹ As, among others, does Pfätsch (*Bibl.* 385) p. 24.

² Cf. Craemer, O. (*Bibl.* 329) p. 235.

³ *Ap. I.* 44. 11 (83 B); 28. 4 (71 C); *Dial. I.* 4 (217 E, 218 A).

⁴ (*Bibl.* 313) *passim*, esp. 231—241, 447 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 240.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 468.

⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 482, 483.

largely found expression in reverence, thirst for knowledge of God, and a passion for imitation of God's virtues in his own life, is perfectly true, but it is a long step from such a worship to a denial of personality to God, and to an assertion that God is only a Cosmic Law which man must fulfill. God was intensely personal to Justin, and the personality in his own thinking meant far more than the catch-words of the Absolute which he had carried over from Hellenistic Judaism in order to defend the existence of the Second God, and to clothe Deity in a transcendent majesty. In not recognizing the Christological motive for much of Justin's emphasis upon the transcendence of God, and in not perceiving how foreign to Justin's real thinking were the implications of his terminology, von Engelhardt has put enormously disproportionate emphasis upon Justin's thought of an Absolute, and in carrying it to a denial of God's personality, has reduced it to absurdity. Von Engelhardt on this point and throughout his important treatise is laboring under a two-fold error. First, to him original and true Christianity means the Lutheran doctrine of Grace and Justification by Faith, and because Justin does not expound Christianity according to these catch-words, von Engelhardt attempts to rule him out of the true Christian succession. Second, von Engelhardt is far too eager to carry Justin's terminology to a logical conclusion which Justin himself never dreamed. We shall have occasion to speak of von Engelhardt's interpretation of justification and grace in Justin later. He could have contented himself with representing Justin's God as an Impersonal Absolute only by ignoring Justin's Christological incentive and his awkwardness in using the Absolute terminology, and the patent fact that Justin speaks again and again of God in the most personal language. Justin does frequently speak of the grace of God through which we are saved,¹ of His love and goodness to men.² Men may be pleasing or not pleasing to God, have fellowship with God, who persuades us and leads us to faith, while it is our part to imitate His excellent

¹ Dial. 32. 2 (249 D); 42. 1 (260 D); 64. 2 (287 D).

² Dial. 43. 2 (261 E). *διὰ τὸ ἔλεος τὸ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ.* Dial. 107. 2 (334 D). *ἐλεήμων ὁ θεὸς καὶ φιланθρωπὸς ἐστὶν ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς μετατιθεμένους ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας;* cf. Stählin (Bibl. 318) p. 37.

qualities, His temperance, justice, and love to men.¹ In such utterances we are very confident, Justin is not speaking by rote. He was consistently a loving child² of a kind Father, and shows no desire in any passage to strip God of all qualities and to make Him an impersonal Absolute. It is entirely misleading to enlarge upon the fact that Justin calls God ἀπαθής in a single passage,³ inasmuch as God is throughout represented as stirred by emotions of many kinds.

To understand Justin Martyr it is essential to bear in mind that his aim in all his teachings and writings was not philosophical or theoretical but practical and apologetic. He was a missionary and not a professional philosopher, in spite of his wearing the philosopher's cloak. He was not a philosopher first and a Christian afterwards, but a Christian first and always who used philosophical terminology of which he was not entirely master to defend his faith. The source of the doctrine of God seems sufficiently obvious. His very inconsistencies are those of the Hellenistic Jews who had long been trying to do just what Justin was forced to attempt, to justify their faith by the help of philosophy. Like them Justin taught at one time that God was transcendent, unbegotten, impassive, perfect, self-contained, unmoved, unchanging, unnamed, the First Cause; at another time that He was the personal creator and sustainer of the universe; at another that He was the kind merciful Father who lead errant individuals into faith and saved them by His grace, or the dread God of righteousness whose final judgment awaited all men. Such a many-sided God was the God of the Wisdom Literature of the Hellenistic Jewish philosophers, and such a God Hellenistic Jews would have brought with them into Christianity. In spite of the fact that Justin does not carry transcendence into absoluteness, still his God is recognizably the God of Hellenistic Judaism.

¹ Ap. I. 10 entire.

² Ap. II. 13. 4 (51 D).

³ Ap. I. 25. 2 (69 B) where God is so called in contrast with the lustful gods of the heathen, and not given this as a generic title.

CHAPTER V
THE LOGOS

In order to understand Justin's Logos and the early Christian Logos in general, it is most important to bear in mind the distinction between the impulse which produced the philosophic Logos doctrine, and the practical necessity which induced Christians very early to appropriate the term for their own use. It has been seen that in Stoic circles "Logos" was a word interchangeable with "God", and expressed the fact that the material All followed a reasonable course in its cycles of change. In dualistic circles of thought, where the tendency was increasingly to represent the Deity as the Absolute in order to free Him from all association with matter, the Reason of God, tending toward, but not yet properly having become, a separate personality, was that phase of God which connected God's otherwise Absolute nature with the world. Aristotle had conceived of an Absolute which had nothing in common with the world of change, and was unconnected with the world by any attribute or power. But the $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ of Plato had not been thus transcendent, and certainly later Greek philosophers had felt the need of some Power of God which could create and direct the world. The Logos then in all circles but the Stoic, and often apparently even in Stoicism, was a link of some kind which connected a transcendent Absolute with the world and humanity. The Logos came into general popularity because of the wide-spread desire to conceive of God as transcendent and yet immanent at the same time; the Logos as variously described in the Schools made possible such a twofold and contradictory conception of God. The term Logos in philosophy was not usually used as the title of a unique attribute of God, but rather as the most important single name among many applicable to the

effulgent Power of God which reasonably had shaped and now governs the world.

Christianity, however, began not with speculation but with a religious experience. In the person of the crucified and risen Christ it found a tremendous spiritual reality, so great that though Christ had taught men to worship not Himself but God, the early Christian community could not think of Him as an ordinary man. But when Christians began to teach Christ as superhuman they immediately encountered opposition from Jews to whom it was the greatest possible blasphemy to teach more than one God. It was in Hellenistic Jewish thinking that the problem was solved by the brilliant stroke of identifying Christ with the Logos. It has been seen that the man who made this identification possible was the Apostle Paul, although he, while clearly having the Greek doctrine in mind, for some reason avoided the word "Logos". The author of the Fourth Gospel found all the preparations made for the definite assertion that Jesus was the Logos made flesh. There is no reason to believe from the Gospel that the identification was then advanced as a novelty in Christian thought. It may thus be correct to say that the Christian approach to a Logos doctrine was from below, for its problem was how a definite and historical person could be represented as a cosmic deity. But the philosophic doctrine had been approached from above, and its problem had been to represent the transcendent Absolute as in some way in touch with the world. Philosophy had never wanted a separate personality in its Logos doctrine, though as the doctrine became more popular and elaborate the tendency toward personality had been inevitable. But Christianity's central interest was precisely in the divine-human Personality.

In the writings of Justin we find the Christian Logos still in a very uncertain state. Feder is right in saying that the Logos is not fundamental for the theology of Justin, but that it is merely an explanation of the really Christian doctrine of the Son of God.¹ It is clear that

¹ (Bibl. 350) p. 154.

Justin has never had any interest in attempting to work out a consistent Logos doctrine. It will be convenient to use the term Logos to represent Justin's general doctrine of the pre-incarnate Christ, and to speak of the incarnate Logos as the Christ. This chapter on the Logos will then treat only of the pre-incarnate Christ, while the chapter on Christ will discuss the incarnate Logos. Justin made no such distinction in terminology, and indeed in the Dialogue prefers the term Second God or Christ for the pre-incarnate Person. But on the understanding that the distinction is not Justin's the division of matter under the two terms will somewhat simplify the subject.

A. THE PERSONAL EXISTENCE OF A SECOND GOD

When Justin wishes to convert Trypho to Christianity, the first essential is to prove to him the existence of the Second God. There is no such necessity in the Apology where Justin is addressing polytheists, for with them he has only to assert the existence of the Logos, while proof is needed solely to identify the historical Jesus with this Logos.¹ But in the Dialogue, which is a much more thorough and idiomatic, though by no means a complete, expression of Justin's Christianity, Justin is compelled to prove the existence of a Second God. Herein the Dialogue is different from the Philonic literature. Philo adduced proof of the existence of God,² which Justin in no passage felt called upon to do. Philo, on the other hand, feels himself under no necessity of justifying his constant appeal to the Logos, for he seems to assume that the existence of the Logos is a corollary to the existence of

¹ The propriety of fully identifying the Logos of the Apologies with the Second God of the Dialogue has often been questioned, but without justification. The Logos in His pre-incarnate state is called Christ as well as Logos in the Apologies, Ap. I. 62. 4 (95 B), while the Second God or Christ, in spite of Feder (Bibl. 350) p. 154, is called the Logos in the Dialogue, e. g. 61. 1 (284 B), 62. 1 (285 A). I therefore use the two sources interchangeably, in the conviction that only by combining the material on the doctrine for the most part peculiar to each document can an adequate view of Justin's Logos doctrine be obtained.

² See Drummond, Philo, II. 3—6, 295, 296.

God. Such an assumption was possible to Philo for two reasons, first because he was writing in an environment where the Logos had for more than a century, at least, been proverbial, and second because he could always remove apparent inconsistencies with monotheism by treating the Logos impersonally. But with the Christians this escape was impossible, for it was precisely upon the personality of the Logos that their religious system was founded. In the Dialogue where the Jewish inheritance of Christianity stands out more clearly than in the Apology, the urge for monotheism is compelling, so that any mention of a Second Divine Personality demands the most careful justification.

Justin states his thesis thus: "I shall try to persuade you that there is and is said to be (in the Scriptures) a God and Lord besides the Creator of the universe, who is also called an Angel because He announces to men whatsoever the Creator of the universe wishes; but there is no other God higher than the Creator."¹ In the Apology, where the argument for the Second God is briefly mentioned, but by no means worked out in detail, the same thesis takes the form: "The Father of the universe has a Son; who also, being the first begotten Word of the God, is a God."² Two arguments are adduced to prove this thesis, the first based upon theophanies, the second upon passages in the Old Testament where God is represented as speaking to some other God.

The argument from theophanies is as follows:³ Justin quotes to Trypho the passage where God appeared to Abraham under the oak of Mamre, and the great discussion occurred concerning the burning of Sodom and Gomorrah. According to the account in Genesis two ordinary angels accompanied One who must definitely be recognized as God, for He entered into the tent to announce the coming birth of a son to Sarah and promised to return later; when He did return He is explicitly called God by the Scriptures.

¹ Dial. 56. 4 (275 C).

² Ap. I. 63. 15 (96 C).

³ Dial. 56 entire.

But this God cannot be the same as the God who rules over all. He is a messenger God who finally secures permission from the God of heaven to rain fire and sulphur upon the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah. There must then be two Gods, One who remains in Heaven and One who appears in theophanies. Justin goes on to quote the appearance of God in the incidents of Jacob's dream of the spotted rams and goats, Jacob's wrestling, the changing of Jacob's name at Luz, Jacob's dream at Bethel,¹ and a little further on the appearance in the burning bush.² In another passage he says that Christ was the Angel with whom Moses communed on the occasion when he had lost faith in the promise of food.³ In all these passages Justin's emphasis is upon two points, first upon the independent personality of this Being who can be manifested to man, and second upon His divine nature. "He is called God, and He is and shall be God,"⁴ Justin exclaims to his Jewish auditors who give their complete assent.

It is in connection with the argument from theophanies that Justin makes his strongest assertions of the transcendence of God. "He who has but the smallest intelligence will not venture to assert that the Maker and Father of all things, having left all supercelestial matters, was visible on a little portion of the earth,"⁵ but Justin's attention here and throughout is primarily not upon the nature of God but upon the existence of the personal Second God.

Philo, who inherited his prejudice against theophanies from Plato,⁶ is clearly in the direct line of ancestry of Justin's protest, and a comparison between Justin's and Philo's interpretations of theophanies is illuminating. Though Philo, like Plato, argued against theophanies from the unchangeableness of God,⁷ he inclined like Justin

¹ Dial. 58.

² Dial. 60.

³ Dial. 126. 6 (356 C).

⁴ Dial. 58. 9 (281 D).

⁵ Dial. 60. 2 (283 B).

⁶ Rep. II. 380 D ff. See above p. 127.

⁷ De Somniis I. 231 ff. (I. 655, 656).

to base the argument more commonly upon the transcendence of God than upon His unchangeable perfection. Philo had no thesis to prove from the appearances of God to man, and mentioned the incidents in his writings only as Scriptural inconsistencies with God's character which must be explained away. Consequently he cared little for general consistency in his explanations of how these incidents really happened, so long as in each individual case he could rid the Scriptures of their primitive anthropomorphism. An excellent illustration of Philo's object is the passage in which he goes into the matter of the appearances of God in some detail.¹ He begins with the quotation, "I am the God who was seen by thee in the place of God."² Are there then, Philo asks, two Gods? By no means, for only the one God who is truly God may be called *ὁ θεός*, but there are numerous beings who are loosely called *θεός* without the article. In this Scriptural statement, says Philo, the reference to the second God is to the Logos. But a few lines below Philo says that God can appear as He is to incorporeal souls, but that He must, without actually changing, appear in the semblance of an angel when there is need of appearing to a corporeal man. Again after a digression Philo adds that it is not surprising that God took the form of an Angel so far as appearance went (though without changing His nature), for man could not endure to see God as He truly is. But those who are unable to bear the sight of God look upon His image, His Angel Logos, as Himself. Philo is obviously not concerned here as to whether he calls the medium of theophany "angels", "an angel", or the "Logos"; far less is he appealing to any secondary deity. His sole object in treating the passage at all is to free the Scriptures from an apparent anthropomorphic aspersion upon God.³ Such after Philo was the

¹ De Somniis I. 227 ff. (I. 655, 656). Cf. similarly De Somniis I. 69 ff. (I. 631) and De Mut. Nom. 15 ff. (I. 581).

² Gen. xxxi. 13.

³ It is because Philo finds his doctrine of Logos, Logoi, and lower divine beings in general a frequent escape from embarrassing blind alleys that Friedländer has strikingly but on the whole in-

incentive which led the poet Ezekiel to identify God in the burning bush with the Logos:

ὁ δ' ἐκ βάτου σοι θεῖος ἐκλάμπει λόγος.¹

The Jews carried on the same thought in the Talmudic use of the Memra to explain theophanies and all other physical or anthropomorphic references to God in the Old Testament. It was the Memra who was the cloud leading the Children of Israel in the wilderness, as well as the Deity which gave the Law on Sinai.² But here as in Philo the device is not an end in itself, for not the conception of the Logos or Memra, but the doctrine of God, is the interest of the commentators.

It is thus apparent that Justin, in proving the existence of a second personal God from theophanies, has used material from Greek Judaism,³ but has given it an implication never found in any Judaism, and in deducing therefrom a second divine Personality has come to conclusions which Jews have always felt to be unjustified.

Similar is the case of the second argument to prove the existence of a Second God. This argument is based upon Scriptural passages where God is represented as speaking to another God or to other Gods, or where mention is apparently made of two Gods. Justin considers to whom the *ποιήσωμεν* of Genesis i. 25 could have been addressed. Jewish teachers, he asserts, vary in their explanation of this passage. Some say God addressed Himself in soliloquy, others that He addressed the "elements, to wit the earth and other similar substances of which we believe man was formed," while others say that He spoke to the angels who themselves proceeded to create man's body.⁴ But these suggestions are of no help, says Justin,

accurately generalized: "The Logos is only an emergency device (Notbehelf) in order to be able to explain Creation." (Bibl. 222) p. 38.

¹ Euseb. Pr. Ev. IX. 29 (p. 441).

² Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*, pp. 180—184.

³ Cf. The Philonic nature of Justin's comment on the incident of the "three men" who appeared to Abraham, above pp. 114 ff.

⁴ Dial. 62. 1 ff. (285 A ff.). Who these Jewish teachers were we cannot now ascertain. Justin's summary of their teachings reproduces a Tannaitic tradition (but with one important modi-

for God addressed another person who was numerically distinct from Himself and a rational being. To prove this statement Justin adduces the passage, "Behold Adam has become as one of us, to know good and evil." Clearly the person addressed must have been rational. Other passages which are found useful witnesses to the existence of a second rational personal God are: "The Lord made me from the beginning of His ways for His works."¹ etc.; "The Lord says to my Lord;"² "Thy throne, oh God, is forever and ever God, even thy God, hath annointed thee," etc.³ Trypho is by this time quite willing to admit the existence of a Second God who is distinct from the Father of All in number, but who fully deserves the title of God.⁴

So far as I know, Justin is here the first to attempt a term for personalities in the Godhead. He frequently uses ἕτερος ἀριθμῶ which is always, and on the whole wisely, translated "numerically distinct", but which meant to Justin "different in person."⁵ This sharp personality of Justin's Logos is the element which distinguishes it from the Philonic Logos more than anything except its incarnation. Feder, who attempts to minimize the Philonic

fiction): "With whom has He taken counsel? 1. With the Creation of Heaven and earth (that is the elements which Justin has mentioned) 2. With Himself 3. He took counsel with the Angels and said to them, Let us make, etc." (Mish. Gen. Rabba c. 8, p. 7 c, d, from Goldfahn [Bibl. 389] p. 245.) Goldfahn says that such passages are frequent, but that in no orthodox Jewish tradition were the Angels ever represented as creators of the human body. Philo of course teaches a very similar doctrine (see above p. 114, n. 1 and below p. 211), and the idea certainly came originally from Plato's Timaeus. Justin may be actually denying a doctrine from some Jewish Gnostic Sect. See Philo, De Opif. Mundi 72—75 (I. 16. 17). Justin is here apparently summarizing all Jewish comments upon the passage which he could find, and so has combined orthodox and unorthodox Jewish traditions.

¹ Dial. 61. 3 (284 C), Prov. viii. 21 ff.

² Dial. 56. 14 (277 B), Ps. cx. 1.

³ Ibid., Ps. xlv. 6, 7.

⁴ Dial. 63. 1 (286 B).

⁵ Dial. 56. 11 (276 D); 62. 2 (285 C); 128. 4 (358 C); 129. 1, 4 (358 D, 359 D).

influence upon Justin, draws up six points of contrast between the Justinian and Philonic Logos.¹ In four of his six points the distinction is purely in the matter of the personality of Justin's Logos. But nothing could be more inaccurate than to conclude that Justin was not influenced by Philonic tradition merely because his Logos or Second God is personal, while the Logos of Philo is not; or because Justin, when discussing theophanies and the Second God, usually prefers to call the Second God Christ rather than the Logos.² The Philonic arguments and materials, as will shortly appear more clearly, are present in Justin's writings in marked detail.

B. THE ORIGIN OF THE LOGOS

1. MANNER OF ORIGIN

Justin has two main methods for explaining how the Logos came into being.

The first explanation centers around the word *begotten*, or its synonyms, and may be best summed up by Justin's phrase *πρωτότοκος τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ*.³ God begat this begotten thing before all creation.⁴ Justin did not intend to imply creation in the origin of the Logos, for though he represents Trypho as using the word *ποιέω* in that connection,⁵ Justin himself did not use it, and while he does not contrast the term "begotten" and "made" as Christianity soon came to do, the contrast is clearly in his mind by his pointed avoidance of the latter term. So he quotes from Prov. viii. 21ff. where Wisdom describes her origin in terms both of creation and begetting, but he quietly

¹ (Bibl. 350) p. 143.

² As he does even in the Ap. I. 62. 3 (95 B), and of course almost throughout the Dialogue. In Dial. 113. 4 (340 D) theophanies are even referred to "Jesus".

³ Ap. I. 53. 2 (88 A); cf. also *πρωτόγονος τοῦ θεοῦ* Ap. I. 58. 3 (92 B), and *πρωτότοκος τοῦ θεοῦ* Ap. I. 46. 2 (83 C) etc. Justin does not distinguish between the two words *πρωτόγονος* and *πρωτότοκος*. Only the latter is found in the New Testament, while the former is the word preferred by Philo. See Abbott (Bibl. 454) p. 571.

⁴ Dial. 129. 4 (359 B).

⁵ Dial. 64. 1 (287 C).

ignores the first term in expounding the passage to lay stress on the conception of begetting.¹

But helpful as the terms *γέννημα* and *πρωτότοκος* are in distinguishing the two Gods, and adequate as they might have been for ordinary use, especially with Christians converted from popular Palestinian Judaism or from the heathenism of popular mythologies, both words are much too anthropomorphic to suffice in explaining the origin of the Second God to one at all acquainted with philosophy. Justin retains, and is personally fond of using, the simple explanation of the Logos as "begotten", but he is aware that he must explain such a conception in philosophic language if he is to appeal to educated minds. The difficulty with the analogy of begetting, aside from its anthropomorphic connotations, lies in the fact that it implies an abscission from and a diminution of the begetter, both of which Justin is most careful to deny.

The origin of the Logos was secondly typified by other figures such as were in common and increasing vogue in the philosophy of the day to represent *emanations*, and which Hellenistic Judaism had long found useful. Justin found no single figure adequate for his purpose, and could describe his conception only by combining several figures.

By the figure of light from the sun² Justin expressed his conviction that the Logos was still one with the Father, because the process of His begetting or emanation (a term which Justin does not use) was attended by no abscission. The light has no independent existence apart from the sun, but is only an effulgence from the sun. When the sun sets, Justin points out, the light disappears. So the Logos is not an existence independent of the Father. According as the Father wills it, there radiate from Him Powers which may go forth, as some do, only to return and vanish in the great Source from which they have gone out,³ or which may be sustained in

¹ Dial. 129. 3, 4 (359 A, B).

² Dial. 128. 3, 4 (358 B ff.).

³ By contemporary science, when a light went out it recalled its beams, or fiery extensions, back into itself. As a source of light God would have this same power, but arbitrarily. See Athenagor. Supplic. 10. 3.

a permanent outflowing if the Father so will. Such permanent outflowings are the angels of permanent existence. But though permanent they have no independent existences and represent no abscission from the Source. They are permanent beams from the Eternal Light. Δυνάμεις was a word for rays in Justin's vocabulary. In one passage he speaks of δυνάμεις from the sun in a way to suggest that the meaning of the word as actual light rays would be perfectly intelligible to his audience.¹ But since Justin thought of light as a fiery stream actually flowing from a fiery source,² his meaning might perhaps be more accurately illustrated for us today by a river.³ God is an eternal and infinite source, from which, without diminution of the source, flow streams of water. These streams may be named, bridged, treated as independent reality, but they actually have no existence apart from the water which flows from the source. Cut from the source the water ceases to flow, and the river has vanished. So the permanent angels are permanent outflowings of the power of God. Of these the Logos is chief. He is the first effulgence, the first outflowing, and by far the most important, but His existence is in no sense independent of the Father. Thus does Justin protect himself from the charge of ditheism. There are two Gods, but only one source, only one ultimate existence.

But helpful as is this representation of the origin of the Logos, Justin does not feel that it is adequate, for any figure of outflowing from a source inevitably suggests a diminution of the source. Water that flows out from the source into the stream, no less than light which reaches the earth from the sun, has left the source, and by however small a proportion, the source must have been diminished. He therefore balances the figure of light from a source by the figure of fire from fire.⁴ One may light a second torch from a burning first torch without having taken at all from the fire of the first torch.

¹ Dial. 121. 2 (350 A). See below p. 246.

² Cf. Hans Leisegang, *Der Heilige Geist*, I. i. (Leipzig 1919), p. 31.

³ For this figure see Athanasius, *De Sententia Dionysii*, 18.

⁴ Dial. 128. 4 (358 C, D); cf. 61. 2 (284 C).

God must not be conceived of as having flowed out into the Logos in such a way that there is any diminution of the source. There can be no cutting off or departure from the *οὐσία* of God, as this figure by itself might seem to suggest. Nor is God exhausted by his outflowings; He remains eternally unchanged in spite of them. This outflowing of the *δυνάμεις* from the Father must not be considered in any sense as a process inevitable from the nature of God. A power goes forth only when God wills it to do so. Hence the Logos, angels, and all powers, are the result of an action of God's will.¹

Justin's thought of the emanation of the powers from the Father, of which the Logos was the chief, is thus to be found between the two figures. Light from a source illustrates the radiating of divine powers without abscission from the Father, or the extension of a single *οὐσία* into a plurality of persons. Fire from fire illustrates a giving forth from a source without any diminution of the source, while at the same time sharpening the individuality of the emanation.

Both the figures of fire from fire and of beams from a light as illustrations of the dissemination of spiritual power from God had been clearly expounded in Philo. Of fire from fire Philo speaks in commenting upon, "I will take up my spirit which is upon thee, and I will pour it upon the seventy elders." Philo says, "But think not that this taking away could be by means of cutting off and sundering, but as would happen from fire, which even though it kindled ten thousand torches remains in the same condition, in no respect diminished."² Of light from a source of light Philo says, "Being itself archetypal source of light (*ἀρχή*), the eye of God throws out

¹ On the freedom of God see above p. 135. Duncker (Bibl. 339) is probably right in concluding that Justin, in making the Logos the expression of God's will, was protecting the character of God as a Being who loved and cared for the world, but Justin himself never draws such a conclusion.

² Numb. xi, 17.

³ De Gigant. 24, 25 (I. 266). See above p. 46. Justin seems here however still closer to the figures of the Tannaim than to those of Philo. See below pp. 189 ff.

innumerable rays, not one of which is a sensible, but all are intelligible." ¹

Justin has one more important figure to explain the emanation of the Logos from the Father. Justin makes the following statement which loses half its force in translation because of the double sense of the word Logos. Λόγον γάρ τινα προβάλλοντες, λόγον γεννώμεν, οὐ κατὰ ἀποτομήν. ὡς ἐλαττωθῆναι τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν λόγον. προβαλλόμενοι.² "In giving forth anything rational we beget speech, not giving it forth in such a way as to make an abscission so that the rational in us is diminished." Justin could use the same word "Logos" to express both the process of thought which lay behind an utterance, and the utterance itself, so that the passage may be paraphrased: in telling our thoughts to others, while something has gone out from us our thought life has not in the least been diminished within us. Justin does not use the scientific terms, but he has obviously in mind the distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός which we have seen³ were terms of contemporary Logic. But it is particularly interesting to note Justin's use of the figure. As thought can be transmitted from one man to another without the thought of the first man having in the least been diminished, Justin says, so the Logos has gone forth from the Father without the slightest division or diminution of the *Father*. That is, Justin stops just short of carrying the figure too far and representing a cosmic duality of the Logos, a cosmic λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and a cosmic λόγος προφορικός. If the figure must be pressed into the cosmic, it was God Himself who was typified by the human λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, while the Logos was typified only by the human λόγος προφορικός. The point is interesting for two reasons, first because Justin stops just short of a step which was very soon taken, when Theophilus explicitly taught a stage of existence of the Logos which could be described as the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος of God.⁴ But

¹ De Cherubim 97 (I. 156) et passim. On Light as a title for the Logos see below sect. E. 5.

² Dial. 61. 2 (284 B, C).

³ See p. 19.

⁴ Ad Autol. II. 22 (100 B) et passim.

the second reason for interest here is the fact that Philo also comes very close to ascribing the two human logoi to God,¹ so close that Gfrörer says that it was only by inadvertence that Philo did not complete his figure by an explicit sentence.² Philo however does refrain from taking the step, and Drummond has pointed out that Philo here knew perfectly well what he was about, and that he refused to take the step because the figure did not quite fit his theories of the Logos. A theologian of a slightly more developed stage than Justin, then, dared to make an assertion about the Logos which Justin, like Philo, did not yet care to make, and one feels that only a very close dependence upon a Philonic tradition could have brought him so near to speaking of a cosmic *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and yet kept him from doing so.³

In general the lightness with which Justin touches the problem of the emanation of the Logos is well explained by Irenaeus. The emanation theory was the only theory which was at hand to explain philosophically the origin of the Logos, but the doctrine was extremely dangerous to use, for it was the chief weapon of the Gnostics. Irenaeus criticizes people who ascribe all steps of human ratiocination to God, for we have no right to be certain that God thinks by the same processes as ourselves, and still less have we the right to represent each step in the process of God's thought as an emanation, itself father of the next emanation-step. Not only so, says Irenaeus, but the representation of emanations at all is a contradiction, for it is impossible to conceive of anything as proceeding out from the Infinite and Omnipresent.⁴ Justin is not, like Irenaeus, prepared to give over the whole thought of emanations, but he clearly uses the conception with the greatest caution, and is careful to keep figures only as figures, and not to represent them as

¹ Vit. Mos. II. (III) 127 (II. 154), see Drummond II. 171 ff.

² Philo und die jüdisch-alexandrinische Theosophie. Stuttgart 1835. I. 177, 178.

³ See below p. 165. n. 1.

⁴ Adv. Haer. II. 13 entire.

assertions of actual events in the Godhead.¹ But however inexplicable was the begetting or procession of the Son from the Father, that some such thing must have happened was witnessed to Justin by the palpable fact that the Second God did exist.

2. TIME OF ORIGIN

Unfortunately Justin has avoided or not recognized the problem of the time at which the Logos was begotten from the Father, and has given us little from which to infer what his opinion might have been. All of Justin's figures, whether of begetting or procession, suggest the previous existence of the Source from which the Logos came forth, and Justin has nowhere attempted to soften the temporal implications of his illustrations. He knows nothing, at least says nothing, of the Logos as being eternal.

The begetting of the Logos probably took place as a preparatory step toward creation. Certainly it did not take place after creation. The Logos is the "Beginning before all created things"² and Justin probably thought that He was the beginning, immediately after which came the created things. This is the sense in which he understands the *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, for in one passage the Logos is described as *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως και ἀρχή πάλιν ἄλλου γένους*³ that is, the Logos was the first born of all creation, and now (by His incarnation and saving power) marks the starting point of a race for a second time, the spiritual race of Christians. The parallelism will probably hold good. For as the incarnate Logos marked the beginning of Christian people, so the Logos, though Himself not created, marked the beginning of created things, which seems to mean that the *begetting* of the Logos marked the beginning of created things. The inference is very remote, but slightly suggests that the Logos was begotten not long before creation.

¹ Justin also, but much more slightly, reproaches those who identify the thought processes of God with goddesses. Ap. I. 64. 4 (97 B).

² Dial. 62. 4 (285 D).

³ Dial. 138. 2 (367 D). On the title *ἀρχή* see below, section E. 4.

Justin has given us but one bit of real evidence for the time of the procession or begetting of the Logos, but the meaning of that passage is much disputed. *ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκείνου, ὁ μόνος λεγόμενος κυρίως υἱός, ὁ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ συνῶν καὶ γεννώμενος, ὅτε τὴν ἀρχὴν δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε καὶ ἐκόσμησε, κτλ.*¹ "But His Son, the only Son properly so called, the Logos who was with Him and was begotten before the Creation, when He created and set in order all things through Him at the beginning," etc. The controversy which is still unsettled concerning the passage springs from the problem of the reference of the *ὅτε*. Semisch proposed to take the *ὅτε* only with *γεννώμενος*, and hence to distinguish two stages in the existence of the Logos-Christ.² At the first stage He was an impersonal attribute, the Logos of God, and as such was eternal. But at the beginning of creation this hitherto impersonal and unbegotten attribute was begotten, and for the first time became a personality. In other words Semisch tried to find in this passage a doctrine of a divine *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *λόγος προφορικός* which we have seen Justin pointedly avoided in another passage. Aside from the danger of basing so large an inference upon so slight a foundation, the objections are potent against even a possibility of Justin's having meant here to distinguish between *συνῶν* and *γεννώμενος*. Justin has expressly marked the two words as parallel by the double *καί*, so that it is quite forced to associate the *ὅτε* with the word *γεννώμενος* alone. The passage seems only to mean that when God created the world the Logos was already in existence and dwelling with Him, and was of assistance in the process of creation.³

We must then agree with Holland that concerning the time of the emanation of the Logos Justin knows only that the Logos was already-existent and at hand to assist in creation, but that Justin has apparently made no attempt

¹ Ap. II. 6. 3 (44 D, E).

² (Bibl. 118) II. 278 ff. Otto, Veil, Pfäffisch, et al. agree with Semisch; von Engelhardt, Donaldson, etc., disagree. Feder seems undecided.

³ On the creative activity of the Logos see below pp. 161 ff.

to speculate about events in the timeless eternity which lay behind creation.¹

C. THE NATURE OF THE LOGOS

From Justin's arguments for the existence of a Second God, and from his descriptions of the begetting of the Only Begotten, it has appeared that Justin was attempting to explain a birth or begetting in the Godhead which produced a Second Person without any separation or division of the Godhead. But in general Justin found his Philonic figures of the unity of the οὐσία much less important than the dual divine Personalities, and consequently he makes the real basis of his argument for monotheism not the unity of οὐσία but the subordination of rank of the Second God. The Logos, in passage after passage is represented as subordinate to the Father. Probably the figure of Light beams from a source of light expressed his conceptions much more fully than he wanted explicitly to admit. Bosse has accurately pointed out that in the title ἕτερος θεός the term θεός is of much less importance than ἕτερος.² It is quite true that in places Justin checks himself from making the distinction between God and the Logos too sharp, as in the passage where he says that the Second God is "distinct from Him who made all things: I mean He is distinct in number but not in intellectual initiative."³ But even here, where Justin has apparently asserted the equality of the Logos with the Father, a second glance will at once reveal the fact that to deny independence γνώμη is quite the reverse of asserting equality of rank. The sentence is ordinarily rendered as

¹ (Bibl. 153) pp. 573, 574. But here Holland is quite wrong in representing Justin's interest as primarily cosmological rather than theistic. Cosmology was at that time, with the exception of mysticism, the only approach to theism, so that when Justin wished to describe reality in the pre-creation Logos he naturally would have used cosmological language to do so. But Justin's real interest was not in cosmology, but in the personal Father and His Son Jesus Christ.

² (Bibl. 345) p. 22.

³ Dial. 56. 11 (276 E). ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ τὰ πάντα ποιήσαντος θεοῦ, ἀριθμῶ λέγω ἀλλὰ οὐ γνώμη.

though γνώμη here were equivalent to θελήματι, will, but it means much more than that. It means that though the Second God is a distinct personality He yet has no impulsive power in His thinking, for there is only one such centre in the Godhead, the ὄντως θεός. The beam of light has an independent existence, in a sense that it can be treated as a thing in itself. It can be broken by a prism, reflected in a mirror, or checked by a screen without anything having happened to the source. It is intelligible to speak of a light *and* its beams, making a plurality of number. Nevertheless the beam remains nothing in itself apart from its source. So the Logos, while different in person or number from the Source, has no independence of intellectual initiative in Himself. He is never a cause, but only a means, the personal vehicle through whom God may express His will and intentions. "For I say that He (the Second God) has never done (or said) anything other than what He who made the world, above whom is no other God, has wished Him to do or say."¹ So Justin says again that Christ "is also God according to His (God's) will, His Son, and He is an Angel because He ministers to Gods purpose (ἐκ τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ αὐτοῦ)."² But the similarity between Christ and the angels is deeper than one of function. It has been seen that His origin was of the same nature as that of the angels, and at least in this point His character is like theirs. For though the angels were granted freedom of choice³ they are not self-directed. There are not two or more centers radiating δυνάμεις λογικὰς but only One, and to that Center Christ, as the angels, must look for direction as well as origin. It is this similarity of nature between the Logos and the angels which prompted Justin, to the great discomfort of later Christian Apologists, to say that the objects of Christian worship were God, "and the Son who came forth from Him and taught us those things, and the host of other good angels who follow Him and are

¹ Dial. 56. 11 (276 D).

² Dial. 127. 4 (357 B); cf. Dial. 60. 3 (283 C).

³ Ap. II. 7. 5 (45 D). ἀντεξουσίαν; cf. Dial. 88. 5 (316 A).

made like to Him," etc.¹ This passage Father Martindale has recently wished to explain as meaning "and the others, the ministering angels," by a familiar Greek idiom.² But such an interpretation is dubious from the fact that Justin describes the origin of the Logos and of the angels as of the same nature. Justin's confusion of the Logos as a distinct and unique existence, and at the same time as similar ultimately to the angels is entirely Philonic. For Philo has passages where the Logos seems a unique existence, as when he identifies it with the κόσμος νοητός but in other passages he repeatedly calls the Logos an Angel³ and one of the δυνάμεις of God, and gives it the angelic title ὑπηρέτης.⁴

But in spite of Justin's identification of the metaphysical nature of the Logos with the angels, no greater injustice can be done Justin's thought than to regard the Logos as adequately described in terms of His angelic character. The Logos is the *Only* Begotten, the only one properly called Son of God, and it is impossible to suppose that Justin thought of the Logos as simply the chief of the Angels. If He is an angel in nature, He is not one in rank, for He alone, except the Father, merits the titles κύριος and θεός.

The title θεός which Justin repeatedly insists is properly applied to the Logos is very hard to define, for Justin by no means meant to teach that there are two First Gods. To express the distinction between the First and Second Gods Justin took over a locution which Philo was the first to my knowledge to have defined, that is the distinction between ὁ θεός and θεός, which has already been quoted.⁵ Justin had no occasion to define this distinction

¹ Ap. I. 6. 2 (56 C). τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἐξομοιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατόν.

² (Bibl. 169) p. 67. n. 1.

³ e. g. De Somniis I. 239 (I. 656). τὸν ἄγγελον αὐτοῦ λόγον.

⁴ In Dial. 57. 3 (279 E) Justin has Trypho called the Logos ὑπηρέτης τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ. Cf. Philo, De Nomin. Mut. 87 (I. 591) ἄγγελος ὑπηρέτης τοῦ θεοῦ, λόγος, and Quod Deos immut. 57 (I. 281) suggested by Thirlby.

⁵ See above p. 144.

as Philo did, for apparently it was a perfectly familiar manner of speech. It was indeed familiar enough by the time when the Fourth Gospel was written to enable its use without definition in that Prologue which is only intelligible on the assumption that the writer was summarizing in familiar language a familiar conception. The Prologue says, *ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*. But Justin departs from the Philonic use to make *θεός* not only a title distinguishing Him from the First God, but also a mark of the superiority of the Logos to the other angels. Philo says that many may loosely be called *θεός*, but Justin indicates the title as the distinction of the unique rank of the Logos,¹ though in the Apology he prefers the equally Philonic term *θεῖος λόγος*.² Justin says that the Logos is *θεός* because He is the Son of God,³ but this means nothing. However when he says that the Logos is *θεός* because it is the will of the Father that He should be *θεός*⁴ we have a statement of much greater significance. For this statement recalls the fact that Justin says the Logos is Son of God because God wills it. Indeed all of the glory and power which the Logos possesses is His, not by His own right but by the will of the Father. He is *ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν κατὰ τὰ θέλημα τοῦ πέμφαντος αὐτὸν πατρὸς καὶ δεσπότου τῶν ἄλων*.⁵ God gave His glory only to His Christ.⁶ Christ Himself

¹ The title is thus used: Dial. 48. 2 (267 C); 56. 8 (276 B); 125. 3 (354 D); 126. 2 (355 C); 127. 4 (357 B); 128. 1, 4 (357 D, 358 C). It must however be borne in mind that Justin is by no means a nice writer, and does not check his terminology. Hence when he has just quoted an Old Testament theophany in which the God of the theophany is called *ὁ θεός*, Justin occasionally applies the article to the God of the theophany. Donaldson (Bibl. 143) pp. 227 ff. has entered into elaborate analyses of the passages where Justin does so, and has offered some ingenious explanations. But the carelessness of Justin deserves no such ingenuity.

² Ap. I. 10. 6 (58 D); 33. 9 (75 D); 36. 1 (76 D). The term *θεῖος λόγος* would be more easily intelligible to people not familiar with the Philonic tradition than the simple *θεός*. The Apology was probably designed for readers unacquainted with the Philonic tradition, the Dialogue for readers who had such acquaintance.

³ Dial. 125. 3 (354 D); 128. 1 (357 D).

⁴ Dial. 127. 4 (357 B).

⁵ Dial. 140. 4 (369 D).

⁶ Dial. 65. 3 (289 E).

received from the Father the title of King, and Christ, and Priest, and Angel, and such like other titles which He bears or did bear.¹ The Logos is worshipped because God wills it.² The Logos is then *θεός, κύριος*, Son, King, Christ, Priest, Angel, glorious, and worshipful only because God wills this to be the case. Otherwise, we must conclude, He would be merely like any of the other angels. For the Logos was an emanation of Power, a permanent *δύναμις* like all the other permanent *δυνάμεις*, but by the will of God granted powers, glory, and eminence so far superior to the others that He alone is properly called Son, and Lord, and to Him alone is the word *θεός* (or *θεῖος*) to be applied.

D. COSMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOGOS

Justin's conception of the cosmic significance of the Logos must be reconstructed from fragmentary references.

We have seen that He called Christ the *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως και ἀρχὴ πάλιν ἄλλου γένους*.³ If the new race was considered by Justin in the Pauline mystical sense of existing in Christ, or of Christ in us, which we shall see good reason for believing to have been Justin's view, it may be that this parallelism of Justin's may be taken as implying that as Christ is the mystic Person in whom all the new race dwells, and who dwells in the new race, so all creation is sustained and permeated by the First Born of God.

A clearer hint of the cosmic significance of the Logos is found in the discussion of the cosmic significance of the Cross.⁴ Justin finds in the Cross an omnipresent mystic symbol. The sails of ships hung on crosses indicate the power of the Cross on the sea; ploughs are crosses which mould the dry land; tools are for the most part made in the shape of a cross, and show that the Cross is all-powerful in manufactured articles (which Justin seems to be following Platonism in representing as a distinct sort and class of

¹ Dial. 86. 3 (313 C).

² Dial. 93. 2 (321 A).

³ See above p. 147.

⁴ Ap. I. 55 entire.

existence); the human form is in the shape of a cross formed by the projection of the arms from the body; the face is especially marked with the cross by the projection of the nose, while respiration through the nose indicates a special and immediate linking of spirit and matter in man. The Cross is a symbol of human power and achievement, for it is carried as a banner before all state processions; while it is the form adopted by sculptors as that best adapted to symbolize deity (for it has been seen that the human form is cruciform). The Cross is thus an omnipresent symbol. But what does it symbolize? Justin says that the Cross is τὸ μέγιστον σύμβολον τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ ἀρχῆς αὐτοῦ,¹ the most important symbol of His strength and rulership, so that any cosmic significance of the Logos in the passage depends upon the reference of the αὐτοῦ. Does it refer to Christ, or merely to the Cross? The immediate context helps not at all in deciding this matter, but since Justin has been speaking of Christ in the preceding chapters, the probability is strong that Christ was intended here. If that is the case, the passage as a whole will mean that as the Cross is found everywhere, in all classes and sorts of existence from the elements to the mind and power of man, so is the cosmic Christ or Logos the guiding and sustaining force of the universe.

A similar hint of cosmic importance of the Logos is found in the strange passage where Justin finds the Cross referred to in a statement of Plato in the *Timaeus*.² He refers explicitly to the passage in the *Timaeus* where Plato describes the disposal of the *Animus Mundi* in the world by a splitting of the *Animus Mundi* and joining of the two halves to form a Greek Chi. This Chi, says Justin, was intended by Plato to represent the Cross. Astonishing a bit of Platonic interpretation as this is, it obviously implies some sort of resemblance between the Logos-Christ and the *Animus Mundi* of Plato, and at least makes clear that Justin thought of the Logos as a cosmic Being.

Again Justin hints at a cosmic significance of the

¹ Ap. I. 55. 2 (90 B).

² Ap. I. 60. 1 (92 E); cf. *Timaeus* 36 b, c.

Logos by using the adjective βασιλικός in the expression, "The Logos, than whom, after God who begat Him, we know that there is no ruler more kingly and more just" (βασιλικώτατον καὶ δικαιοτάτον, superlative used for comparative).¹ Here the ruler is a royal ruler, but His kingdom is still undefined. But in view of the implication of these terms in current speech it seems likely that the reference is here as in the other passages to a cosmic significance and function of some sort of the Logos.

Justin gives but one clue to what may have been his real thought of the cosmic significance of the Logos, namely the fact that he uses the expression λόγος σπερματικός. It has been seen² that in Stoic physiology λόγος σπερματικός represented a very fine gas which flowed, among other bodily senses and functions, into the damp seminal fluid, and which was the active element, the truly germinal property, of the entire sexual excretion. When this gaseous element from the male united with a similar gaseous flow in the female, germination took place. As a figure this term was applied to God to indicate that in the universal Matter there were two elements, the active and the passive. The active element was called the λόγος σπερματικός or the πνεῦμα indifferently, with the understanding in connection with both terms that they referred to a very fine gas which was the dynamic element in matter. It was this dynamic element which caused in Matter the flow in cycles of the Stoic universe and which made possible the coming into being of the various phenomena of the universe. The term was apparently a very familiar one, for it appears in many philosophical schools and is used by people who had little philosophical training.³ In the dualistic philosophies such

¹ Ap. I. 12. 7 (59 E).

² See above *Introd.* pp. 16 ff.

³ Origin in Joh. xx. 2—5, 13, 37; c. Cels. I. 37, IV 48; Athenag. Suppl. 6. 4. For its more philosophic application in Christian theology see the Commentary upon Gregory of Nyssa in Karl Gronau: *Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesis-exegese*, Leipzig-Berlin 1914, pp. 113 ff. Cf. C. H. Kirchner: *Die Philosophie des Plotin*, Halle 1854, p. 144; Zeller III. ii, 139 (140. n. 1).

as Platonism and Neo-Pythagoreanism, the term was used to represent that spiritual (i. e. gaseous) effluence from God whose entering into matter caused it at first to take on form, and afterwards to have the power of growth and generation. Philo speaks of the Logos as ἡ σπερματικὴ τῶν ὄντων οὐσία, the germinal substance of all things.¹ The passage is a very difficult one, but from the general meaning of the adjective σπερματικός we can see that Philo means that the substance (οὐσία) of all things is a spiritual effluence from God, the Logos. It had two functions, the creative and the ruling. That is, Philo is using a physiological term legitimately to figure the relation between God and the world. The Logos as spermatic had to do with creation and providence, was at once a spiritual principle of life (i. e. a πνεῦμα) and a regulating principle which could rule the world. The Logos by this conception, while an extension of the Being of God, is fundamentally a mediator. The Spermatic Logos of physiology presupposed a person out of which it could flow, and a substance or material into which it could flow; by a projection into this substance the Spermatic Logos could function in producing a new life and form similar to the source whence it had come.

There is no reason to suppose that Justin did not so understand the term when he used it, as a spiritual effluence from God, bringing the life and intelligence of God into the world of matter. Unfortunately he has little to say about the Logos as spermatic. But that he regarded the title as a legitimate one for the Logos cannot be denied. All men, says Justin, have a part of the Spermatic Logos in themselves,² and Justin contrasts the part which is in

¹ Quaest. in Ex. II. 68; Harris, Fragments of Philo, p. 67. Freudenthal, Max, Die Erkenntnislehre Philos von Alexandria, Berlin 1891, p. 27, n. 3, says that the word σπερματικὴ means "hier doch wohl nichts anderes als 'schöpferische Kraft'." However not only has Freudenthal made a noun of an adjective, but Philo in the next sentence represents δύναμις ποιητικὴ as one of two offshoots from the σπερματικὴ οὐσία, so that σπερματικὴ οὐσία must itself mean more than Freudenthal allows.

² Ap. II. 13. 3 ff. (51 C ff.).

men with the Spermatic Logos in totality.¹ The Logos as an entirety is the σπέρμα τὸ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ.² On the whole there are grounds for supposing that with Justin as with Philo the projection of this spiritual principle from God into Matter was the real creative act. So can Justin's statements that the world was made by God and no other be best reconciled with his insistence that the world was made διὰ τοῦ λόγου.³ For as the outflowing Spirit of God the Spermatic Logos would be truly God, not separated nor distinct from God, and the activity of the Logos would be still the creative work of God Himself. If the Spermatic Logos be thus understood, the cryptic passage becomes clear in which Justin says that God is averting the final catastrophe of the world διὰ τὸ σπέρμα τῶν Χριστιανῶν, ὃ γινώσκει ἐν τῇ ψύσει ὅτι αἰτίον ἐστιν.⁴ For here the seed of the Christians, the Spermatic Logos, is correctly referred to as the Universal Cause in nature. Such again is the significance of Justin's comparison between the creation of the animal world and the incarnation.⁵ Christ became incarnate, says Justin, by the power and will of the Creator of the universe, just as Eve came into existence from one of Adam's ribs, and in the same way as all living things were *begotten* in the beginning by a logos of God. The comparison is profoundly illuminating. We know that Justin thought that the Logos from God entered

¹ Ap. II. 8. 3 ff. (46 C ff.).

² Ap. I 32. 8 (74 B).

³ For the presence of a μέρος τοῦ σπερματικοῦ λόγου in man see below Chapter VII. p. 214 f.

⁴ Ap. II. 7. 1 (45 B). Veil (in loco) thinks that this statement of Justin reproduces the thought of Aristides Apol. 16. 1, 6: "Ut homines qui deum cogoverunt supplicationes ei offerunt quae aptae sunt ei ad dandum et sibi ad recipiendum; et ita aetatem suam consummant. Et cum beneficia dei in se agnoscant, ecce, propter eos pulchra quae in mundo sunt, profluunt Et mihi haud dubium est quin Christianorum propter precationem mundus consistat." But Justin's language suggests a much deeper thought than the passage of Aristides. See below p. 282.

⁵ Dial. 84. 2 (310 C) δυνάμει καὶ βουλῇ τοῦ τῶν ὄλων ποιητοῦ γενόμενον ὡς καὶ πλευρὰς μιᾶς τοῦ Ἀδάμ ἢ Ἐῶα γέγονε, καὶ ὡσπερ τᾶλλα πάντα ζῶα λόγῳ θεοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐγεννήθη.

into the womb of Mary and became the God-man Christ.¹ If Justin's comparison is to have meaning then he must imply that the creation of the animal world was a begetting in which the Spermatic Logos was projected into something. So Eve came into existence by the projection of such Spermatic Principle into the rib of Adam. The result of the one action was the God-man Christ. The result of the other was the creation or begetting of Eve, or of the animal world.

In this passage we see that Justin's *λόγῳ θεοῦ* is an instrumental dative, and not a dative of agent. The same instrumental dative, or the instrumental preposition *διὰ* is used in speaking of the activity of the Logos in the creation of the physical universe. The preposition *ὑπό* is never used in that connection. So Justin says, "And God said, Let there be light; and it was so. So that by means of a logos of God (*λόγῳ θεοῦ*) the whole world was born from a substrate about which also Moses had previously spoken."² Here not only is the *λόγῳ θεοῦ* mentioned exactly as in the case where the action of the Logos of God in producing the animal world was compared to the action of the *δύναμις θεοῦ* in Mary, but the action of this same principle is extended to the physical universe, and the recipient of the Logos is specified as chaotic matter. The projection of the Logos of God into this matter resulted in the *birth* of the physical universe. Again Justin says, "God, having taken thought (*ἐννοηθέντα*) by speech (by a logos, *διὰ λόγον*) made the world."³ Here the manner of the procession of the Spermatic Logos into matter is made clear. God thought and then uttered His thoughts. The utterance of the thought (as recorded in the Genesis story) was that projection of the Spermatic Logos of God into matter which produced the world. Such an interpretation of the words of Justin is justified by a comparison of Justin with Philo.⁴ The expression comes from Genesis

¹ See below pp. 235 ff.

² Ap. I. 59. 4, 5 (92 D). For the significance of the reference to matter here see below pp. 207 ff.

³ Ap. I. 65. 5 (97 B).

⁴ Quod deos sit immut. 33, 34 (I. 277); 49 (I. 280).

vi. 6, on the basis of which same verse Philo distinguishes the *ἔννοια* and *διανόησις* of God. The first is the thought, the second the projection of the thought of God. It was this projection of the divine *ἔννοια*, of the Logos, the divine *διανόησις* which formed, according to Philo, the phenomenal world.¹

In all these passages it must be noticed that the Logos is entirely impersonal, as fitted the impersonal philosophic Spermatic Logos which Justin was using. But as all the Christian doctrine of the Logos is complicated by the insistence upon personality in the case of a fundamentally impersonal conception, so is Justin's Spermatic Logos complicated by a single passage where Justin speaks of the Spermatic Principle of creation as a Person, or rather asserts the identity of this principle with the personal Logos-Christ. After speaking of this divine Personality Justin says: "At the beginning He (God) created and set in order all things through Him (δι' αὐτοῦ)."² But we can now see in the light of Justin's other declarations that this statement is only an attempt to add glory to the pre-incarnate Christ by identifying Him with the Spermatic Principle of creation. If an impersonal *λόγου* is understood for the *αὐτοῦ* the sentence becomes identical in meaning with those we have just explained. That is, when Justin thinks of creation and its process he speaks of the emission of the Seminal Logos from God entirely impersonally.

¹ We seem to be here very close again to the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and the *λόγος προφορικός* which has just been denied to both Philo and Justin. But if such a distinction may be read into both writers in these passages, in the case of both the distinction would be meaningless. In fact the passage in Philo represents an awkward escape from the Old Testament passage rather than a fundamental part of his thinking. With Philo, God was utterly too abstract to have thoughts, which He could express. There emanates from God the Logos Principle of intelligence, but even the *κόσμος νοητός* is the Logos which has emanated. The Forms are not the thoughts of God, for God is properly above Form and hence above thoughts. There is thus no room for significance in Philo for a *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*. Since Justin is obviously here only echoing Philonic phraseology, it is unjustified on the basis of this one passage to ascribe the twofold Logos conception to him.

² Ap. II. 6. 3 (44 E).

When he thinks of the Christ he asserts the identity of the personal Logos-Christ with this Spermatic Principle. But the personality of this Spermatic Logos had nothing to do with creation. It never acted as an inferior creating deity, a *δημιουργός*. God is, by this figure, represented as coming into the closest of all relationships with Matter, that of sexual intercourse. Of course Justin is not crass enough to represent this in anthropomorphic myth, and rather describes the emission of the Seminal Principle in the figure of "speech". But there was no personal Deity or Mediator between God and Matter functioning *as a personality*. The creating Personality was One, the Supreme God.¹

The Apology and Dialogue are thus at one on the doctrine of creation. There is room in the Apology for all the insistence of the Dialogue upon the fact that one of the chief characteristics of the Highest God was His activity as the personal Creator of the world, and that there was no higher God than the Creator.² Completely misunderstanding Justin's doctrine of creation, von Engelhardt has imputed to Justin precisely the belief which Justin was most anxious to refute. For he says that in Justin God is so completely separated from the world that He could create the world only through a Being who was at once divine and not divine.³ But in the Dialogue Justin proves the existence of the lower Deity in answer to a request from Trypho that he substantiate the Christian doctrine of the existence of a God other than the One who made all things.⁴ In precisely the same spirit Justin turned against

¹ One other passage, Dial. 114. 3 (341 D), has been made to bear upon this question by a change of text. The passage is not adduced as evidence, for the reason that determining texts by reference to an author's doctrines, and then determining the doctrines by the changed texts has never seemed a profitable sort of scholarship. But if the change suggested by Otto (see note in loco) is accepted, there is no discrepancy between the passage and the doctrine of creation here described.

² Dial. 11. 1 (227 E); 56. 4, 11 (275 C, 276 D); 60. 5 (284 A).

³ (Bibl. 313) p. 481.

⁴ Dial. 50. 1 (269 D); 56. 3 (275 B, C).

Marcion with the assertion that he would not have believed the Lord Himself (Christ) if He had announced any other God than the Fashioner and Sustainer of all things.¹ Directed against Marcion, Justin's remark shows at once the incentive of his insistence upon God as the personal agent of creation. It was one of the chief doctrines of Gnosticism that God was so remote from the material world that creation could only have been the work of a sub-deity, and Justin's insistence upon the fact that God created the world is part of his anti - Gnostic Apologetic. Still by the identification of the pre-incarnate Christ with the Spermatic Logos of creation, Justin plainly regards the Logos as being the chief medium of creation. To use Philo's adjective, the Logos, while not ὁ δημιουργός, was ποιητικός.

Philo also said, as we have seen, that the Spermatic Logos implied a second δύναμις in the Logos, the βασιλική as well as the ποιητική. It is probably in harmony with this conception that Justin's use of the adjective βασιλικός, which before seemed undefined, is to be referred, and with this also the identification of the Logos with the Animus Mundi of the Timaeus and the cosmic omnipresence and power of the symbol of the Cross. The seminal principle, once projected, not only formed the new child but remained as the ἡγεμονικόν of its constitution, according to Stoic physiology. So the Seminal Logos of God, the σπέρμα τοῦ θεοῦ, remained as the cohesive and ruling force in the universe. Such a conception could be expressed in personal terms with less misrepresentation than in the case of the creative activity of the Spermatic Logos, and the transition was easy from a personalized cohesive force in the universe to the world ruling Christ of eschatological speculation. But still it must be remembered that as a ruler of such an origin, the Logos was still a subordinate, and when necessary, an impersonal, effluence from the Father, so that Justin had no thought of removing the Father beyond the possibility of providential care over the world.

¹ Fragment I. (ed. Otto) from Irenaeus Adv. Haer. IV. 6.

E. TITLES APPLIED TO THE LOGOS

There is no more illuminating aspect of Justin's discussion of the Logos for revealing the true nature of the material with which he was building, than the matter of the titles by which Justin says the Logos is mentioned in Scripture. The following is only a selection. Several titles, θεός, κύριος, ἄγγελος, δύναμις, etc., have already been explained.

1. The statement is four times made of the Logos that "The East is His name (ἀνατολή ὄνομα αὐτοῦ),"¹ with reference to Zach. vi. 12. The application of this verse to the Logos had already been made by Philo, who said that ἀνατολή here could not refer to a man of body and soul, "but is most properly applied to that incorporeal One, who differs in no respect from the divine image of God."² Philo could only have been thinking of the Logos when he wrote this.

2. Another title for the Logos is Stone or Rock (λίθος καὶ πέτρα), which Justin derives from several Old Testament passages.³ Philo in commenting upon the rock from which water flowed in the wilderness says that this rock is "the Wisdom of God (which term Philo frequently equates with the Logos) which as the highest and first rock He cut off from His own Powers, from which He gave drink to God-loving souls."⁴ Philo is obviously writing with the "stone cut out without hands" in mind, and this Philonic exegesis is accurately preserved in Justin, who in commenting upon the same verse as a description of the Logos says that it was so cut out, "to signify that it is not the work of a man, but of the will of the Father and God of all things, who caused Him to go forth

¹ Dial. 100. 4 (327 C); 106. 4 (334 B); 121. 2 (350 A); 126. 1 (355 C).

² De Confus. Ling. 62 (I. 414).

³ Dial. 34. 2 (251 D); 36. 1 (254 C); 70. 1 (296 B); 76. 1 (301 B); 90. 5 (318 B); 100. 4 (327 B); 113. 6 (341 A); 114. 2, 4 (341 D); 126. 1 (355 B).

⁴ Leg. Al. II. 86 (I. 82). St. Paul is a parallel dependent upon Philonic exegesis for identifying Christ with a rock. See I. Cor. x. 4.

(προβάλλοντος αὐτόν).¹ Justin's phraseology constitutes an accurate description of a δὴναμις of God.

3. The Logos is the Ἄρχή. In one passage Justin insists that the Second God was begotten as the Ἄρχή before all created things, not ἐν ἀρχῇ, but Christ was Himself Ἄρχή.² In the same way the term is twice used by Philo in lists of titles of the Logos.³ I have not been able to find whence Philo derived the word as a title of the Logos, but the probability is that he like Justin based it upon Proverbs viii. 22.⁴

4. Justin is the first to use the word ἡμέρα as a title for the Logos according to our records, though the word had a varied history in later Christian controversy.⁵ Justin does not explain the meaning or origin of the title, though later writers (Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, Augustine) derived it from "This is the Day which the Lord hath made."⁶ In commenting upon the use of the word in Justin, Trollop made a guess that "possibly ἡμέρα may be synonymous with φῶς,"⁷ a guess that has never received any attention. But an important clue to the meaning of the term, and the passage from which it was originally derived, is found in a passage in Philo, where "Day", though not used as a Logos title, is yet very pointedly associated with the Logos.⁸ Philo is

¹ Dial. 76. 1 (301 B).

² Dial. 62. 4 (285 D).

³ De Confus. Ling. 146 (I. 427); Leg. Al. I. 43 (I. 52).

⁴ Although Philo, in the only passage where he quotes Prov. viii. 22, while using it as a description of Creation, has according to our text πρωτίστην. where the Septuagint reads ἀρχήν. Feder (Bibl. 350) p. 127. n. 9, has attempted to explain the title ἀρχή in Justin from the proposition of Aristotle, πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια ἀρχαί (Met. Δ I. 1013 a. 17). Upon this Feder bases the statement that in Greek philosophy ἀρχή signifies "die erste, nicht weiter ableitbare Ursache der Dinge". Feder has obviously converted an unconvertible proposition.

⁵ Dial. 100. 4 (327 B). See Rendel Harris, "A New Title for Jesus Christ", The Expositor, 8th Series, Vol. XIV, London 1917, pp. 145—151.

⁶ Ps. cxviii. 24.

⁷ See Trollop, ed. Dial. p. 209. n. 30.

⁸ De Opif. Mundi 35 (I. 7). See foregoing context.

commenting upon the division of light from darkness to form day, though it is of the making of the *κόσμος νοητός* rather than of the physical world that he is speaking. The light he clearly equates with the Logos,¹ but he becomes very obscure in accounting for darkness which must be represented in the *κόσμος νοητός* because it is found in the physical world, but which is still most anomalous as part of a conception (the *κόσμος νοητός*) which he has just wholly identified with light. Philo tries to find a solution by including both in the *κόσμος νοητός*, but partitioning them off from each other by the two barriers, evening and morning. Such an expedient, however, threatens seriously the unity of the *κόσμος νοητός*, one of its chief characteristics. He hastens to add then that though evening and morning partition light from darkness, they do not divide the unity of the Intelligible World, but constitute unity when taken together. The totality of light and darkness, morning and evening, are thus represented by the single word *ἡμέρα*, which consequently must be treated as a unity. As such the word "Day" can not be modified by the adjective "first", but is properly called in Scripture "one". "The evening and the morning are *one* day," and this locution, Philo explains, is necessitated by the nature of the *κόσμος νοητός*. The totality *ἡμέρα* must then be treated exactly like the *κόσμος νοητός*, for it symbolizes the *κόσμος νοητός*, symbolizes it so closely that no adjective can be applied to the first which is not suitable to the second. That is, *ἡμέρα* is an appropriate title for the Intelligible World. But as such it would be a title for the Logos, for Philo frequently equates the Logos and the Intelligible World. It seems most probable then that the title *ἡμέρα* for the Logos came to Justin as part of his tradition from Hellenistic Judaism.

5. In view of the preceding, and of the description already given of the origin of the Logos as light from a source, little further comment need be made upon the fact that Justin calls Christ *ὁ μόνος ἄμωμος καὶ δίκαιος φῶς*.²

¹ De Opif. Mundi 31 (I. 7). τὸ δὲ ἀόρατον καὶ νοητὸν φῶς ἐκείνο θείου λόγου.

² Dial. 17. 3 (235 B).

Though the Logos is identified with light in the Fourth Gospel, the identification is clearly not original there, but looks back to the Alexandrian speculation.¹

6. The σοφία of God as a term for the Logos was one of the earliest titles used in Hellenistic Jewish expositions. Justin uses it several times² basing it, like his Jewish predecessors, upon Proverbs viii. 22.³

7. Justin says that the Logos is called "άνήρ and άνθρωπος because He appears in the likeness of such form as the Father wills,"⁴ or because He appeared to Abraham ἐν ιδέα άνδρός, to Jacob ἐν ιδέα άνθρώπου.⁵ These sound very much like a title which Philo ascribes to the Logos, ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα άνθρώπος.⁶ Justin also says that He is called άνήρ by Ezekiel,⁷ but he gives no passage, nor does Philo throw any light upon such a derivation.

8. Two titles must next be considered together. Justin calls the Logos or Christ "Israel" and "Jacob", and is evidently fond of using the two titles together.⁸ He expounds the names as signifying only a parallelism between Jacob, who was surnamed Israel and who gave his name to the Israelites, and Christ from whom the Christians have received their name. Philo uses "Israel" as a title of the Logos, and explains it to mean "Him who sees God".⁹ So the "House of Israel" signifies the human soul in which dwells the νοῦς which is capable of seeing God, that is, the Universal Intelligence in the individual soul.¹⁰ "Jacob" is not used as a Logos title by Philo but the fact that Jacob is still commonly called Jacob after his name has been changed to Israel typifies to Philo the fact that the Logos, who made the change, cannot

¹ Wisdom is called ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς ἀδίδιου in Wisd. vii. 26.

² Dial. 62. 4 (285 D), etc.

³ Cf. De Ebrietate 30, 31 (I. 361, 362).

⁴ Dial. 128. 2 (358 A).

⁵ Dial. 58. 10 (281 E).

⁶ De Confus. Ling. 146 (I. 427).

⁷ Dial. 126. 1 (355 B).

⁸ Dial. 123. 8, 9 (353 A, B); 126. 1 (355 B).

⁹ De Confus. Ling. 146 (I. 427); De Mut. Nom. 81 (I. 590).

¹⁰ De Somniis. II. 172, 173 (I. 681).

make anything permanent and unchanging.¹ Jacob is contrasted with Abraham whose name was changed once for all by God. If these interpretations of the names Jacob and Israel ever reached Justin he has abandoned them for a Christian explanation. But it is not all unlikely that the two titles were originally suggested to him by Greek-Jewish tradition.

9. A still more definitely Christian title is *παθητός*, which Justin says is applied to the Logos by Isaiah.² The word seems to be a Christian inference from Is. liii. There was probably no trace of the term in Jewish Logos titles, for twice Trypho singles it out as particularly inappropriate for the Second God.³

10. Justin's favorite title *πρωτότοκος* is a verbal variant of Philo's *πρεσβύτατος θεοῦ υἱός, πρωτόγονος*, etc.⁴ The word which Justin uses may have come immediately from St. Paul, but it seems more likely that both found it in Hellenistic Jewish tradition, for only so would St. Paul's use of the term have had significant meaning to his readers.

11. It will be sufficient to mention two more titles of the Logos which Justin likes to use together, "Priest" and "King".⁵ Justin derives the title "Priest" from the verse in the Psalms made familiar in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek."⁶ Philo does not use this verse from the Psalms, but finds in Melchizedek a figure both of the Kingly and Priestly character of the Logos.⁷

There can no longer be any doubt that in his titles for the Logos Justin has received much from a Philonic tradition. But even the impulse to speak of the Logos by many names has come through the same tradition. Philo,

¹ De Mut. Nom. 87 (I. 591).

² Dial. 126. 1 (355 B) et al.

³ Dial. 36. 1 (254 C); 39. 7 (258 D).

⁴ De Agr. Noe. 51 (I. 308); De Confus. Ling. 63 (I. 414); 146 (I. 427); De Somniis I. 215 (I. 653); Leg. Al. III. 175 (I. 121).

⁵ e. g. Dial. 118. 2 (346 B).

⁶ Ps. cx. 4.

⁷ Leg. Al. III. 79 ff. (I. 102, 103).

like Justin, is not only always interested in finding new names which he can apply to the Logos, but is fond of drawing up lists of such names. He even uses as one title of the Logos πολυώνυμος, "many-named".¹ Drummond has shown that this title itself came from the Stoics and that the multiplication of names for the Logos was one of the Stoic methods of expounding its nature.² Philo adopted this method from the Stoics, but worked out Old Testament names to take the place of the Stoic names from Greek mythology. But that Justin took over his inspiration for explaining the nature of the Logos by titles not directly from the Stoics but from Greek-Jewish tradition is amply demonstrated by the overwhelmingly Greek-Jewish character of his names and derivations.

F. CONCLUSION

In describing the Logos Justin has had to reckon with at least three different traditions. First and foremost there was the Christianity of Synoptic tradition, which was to Justin the authoritative source of Christian teaching, but with which was now associated the fundamental conviction that Jesus of Nazareth was the Son of God, a divine Personality. Second there was a large Greek-Jewish tradition which Christians were regarding with great favour, and in terms of which they had now for some time been attempting to explain the divine character of Jesus. Third there was the Gnostic tradition already strongly working in Christianity. The first of these demanded above all reverence for God and the *Person* of Jesus Christ, and to this Justin was always true. His Logos was always a divine *Personality*. The Greek-Jewish tradition had for its central point the One God, and explained the divinity of the Second God in terms which obliterated its personality. Philo conceived first and foremost of the God who was Himself Absolute but who radiated Powers by which the world was

¹ De Confus. Ling. 146 (I. 427); Leg. Al. I. 43 (I. 52).

² Drummond, Philo I. 88, II. 206, 270 πολυώνυμος was used in the first line of the Hymn of Cleanthes as preserved in Stob. Ecl. I. 30.

created and sustained. It was ultimately a matter of no importance to Philo whether he summarized this radiation of Powers under the singular "Logos", or spoke of them as "Logoi", "Powers", or "Angels", for it was in any case the impersonal radiation of power from the Father which he had in mind. The Logos of Philo was thus truly undivided from the Father. But in order to get the separate Personality for the Logos which the Christian tradition demanded, Justin was compelled to make far more of a division between God and the Logos than Philo had done. As a follower of Greek Judaism Justin denied that there could have been any division of the Second God from the First. As a Christian he asserted the separate Personality of the Son, and was thereby forced to describe a subordinationism of the Logos to the Father which was of quite a different character from Philo's description of subordination. But the Gnostic leaven in Christianity, whose working Justin was trying to check, prevented Him from conceiving of any sort of cosmology wherein the Logos could act consistently with His truly subordinate character. Granted the Logos as an emanation distinct in nature and activity from the Father, the entire Gnostic point of view was at once admitted.

In trying to solve the problem presented by these three factors which were together shaping the Logos doctrine, Justin appears not to have been aware of the possibilities of his figures representing the plurality of personality in the single *οὐσία* which the Church later adopted as the official explanation. He would probably have welcomed the suggestion as a priceless boon had it been made to him, but in its absence he was forced to develop a doctrine of the Logos which expressed the Logos Personality in a subordinationism which possessed little cosmic significance or value.

The Logos of Justin has indicated its sources with gratifying clarity. Thus far we have seen no reason whatever to think that Justin was working Platonic or Stoic doctrines over directly into Christianity. Specific Stoic elements, such as had not already been used in Hellenistic Judaism as witnessed by Philo, have thus far not appeared

at all, or have been mentioned by Justin only to be rejected with scorn. When Justin attempts a comment upon a Platonic document his suggestion ludicrously illustrates how little he understood of its real significance. But in point after point we have found the closest similarity between Justin's and Philo's speculations. Much of Philo's deeper thought, conspicuously the Intelligible World, has either not reached Justin or has been beyond his power of adaptation to the Personal Son of God. For Justin was primarily not a speculative thinker but a Christian who wanted to find for Apologetic use an explanation of his experience through Christ in terms of what he thought was sound science. Throughout his writings it was not the science but the experience through Christ to which he gave first heed. As a result he describes in Greek-Jewish terminology a Logos doctrine which was as strange to Greek Judaism as to the Synoptic tradition. But as a Logos doctrine it is still recognizably the Logos of Philo which Justin has in mind, though popularized, diluted, intensely personalized, and represented as incarnate in the historical Jesus Christ.

In all this there is little reason to see in Justin a lonely pioneer. Begun with St. Paul, explicit in the Fourth Gospel, the pagan Christian community had been brought up from the beginning with the idea that the divine Christ of their experience was to be identified with the Logos of Hellenistic Judaism, and there is no reason to doubt that their leaders had long and commonly been working the mine of Greek Judaism to explain Christianity in philosophic language. Only on such grounds is it conceivable that Justin's Logos should have been unhesitatingly received by his fellow Christians, who had early been made sensitive to the approach of heresy by Gnosticism and reactionary Judaism, and should have gone unchallenged until the Sixteenth Century.

CHAPTER VI

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE LOWER POWERS

It has been seen that unique in rank as Justin conceived the Logos to be, the origin of the Logos was ultimately described in terms which were also used to account for the origin of an unnumbered host of other superhuman beings. When one tries to reconstruct what Justin probably believed about these beings, difficulties multiply. For the material in Justin on the subject is not only very scanty, but is on many points contradictory, so that probably the more vague the subject is left the better Justin's actual notions are represented. He, like most people of his time, was almost animistic in his belief that the universe was swarming with superhuman, invisible powers, some weak, others strong. So much Justin knew, but he was certain of very little more about them. The fact of their existence was daily if not hourly in his mind, but their nature, functions, mode of action, and interrelation he had not attempted systematically to explain.

A. THE HOLY SPIRIT

There is no doctrine of Justin more baffling than his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and no doctrine which has been more differently understood. Orthodox writers have tended to find the doctrine of the Christian Trinity in Justin's writings,¹ while others have denied any personality whatever to the Spirit, and insisted that ultimately "Logos" and "Spirit" were two names in Justin's mind for the same conception.² Von Engelhardt represents a middle school

¹ e. g. Stählin (Bibl. 318) p. 10.

² See e. g. Paul (Bibl. 344) 1890. pp. 571—576; Clemen (Bibl. 324); Duncker (Bibl. 339) pp. 37—39.

which sees in Justin's Spirit a distinct Personality but which denies real divinity either to the Logos or the Spirit.¹

Justin mentions the Holy Spirit mainly in connection with prophetic inspiration. When he wishes to explain the baptismal formula he states of the Holy Spirit that He was the inspirer of the Prophets.² Consequently Justin's doctrine of the Spirit is best approached from the point of view of his theory of inspiration.

Justin is quite a child of his time in his theory of prophetic madness. Peoples of all nations understood in the same way the ecstasy of inspiration, and had the profoundest respect for oracular utterance. It was because this respect for inspired utterance was so universal that Justin could use the Hebrew Scriptures for Apologetic arguments with people who were utterly outside the pale of any Hebraistic influence. "That the Prophets are inspired by no other than the Divine Logos, even you, as I fancy, will grant," Justin fearlessly says to the heathen.³ For inspiration meant practically the same thing in the mystery religions,⁴ in oracular utterances,⁵ to Plato, to the ancient schools of the Prophets,⁶ to Philo.⁷ It is because Justin and the early Christian community had nothing to add to the doctrine that they theorized little about it. The Christians were busy expounding the peculiar doctrines of their Faith, and had no occasion to speculate about conceptions common to Christianity and the heathen world. An inspired man was thus to all people of the time one whose faculties had come to be completely under the control of a spirit or god. He was "out of himself", had lost all initiative, had

¹ (Bibl. 313) pp. 141 ff.

² Ap. I. 61. 13 (94 E).

³ Ap. I. 33. 9 (75 D).

⁴ Cf. Toussaint, *L'Hellénisme et l'Apôtre Paul*. Paris 1921. p. 60.

⁵ Represented accurately by the Sibyll. Oracul. Ed. Geffcken [II] ll. 4, 5. p. 26.

οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδα
ὅτι λέγω, κέλεται δὲ θεὸς τὰ ἕκαστ' ἀγορεύειν.

From (Bibl. 118) II. 19. n. 1.

⁶ Cf. I. Sam. x. 10.

⁷ Quis rer. div. Haer. 259 ff. (I. 510).

sometimes even lost consciousness, and had become a passive medium through which the god or the divine spirit spoke or acted.

Such a theory of inspiration was Justin's. In one passage, where Justin quotes a description of a prophetic vision from the Old Testament, Justin explains that the prophet was in an ecstasy in which his physical senses, particularly those of sight and hearing, were completely quiescent.¹ He nowhere else uses the word ecstasy, or implies so complete a submergence of the normal personal activity of the Prophet, and it is not right, as has frequently been protested, to conclude from this one passage that Justin regarded ecstasy as the normal prophetic state.² But though he nowhere else speaks of prophecy as coming out from ecstasy, the words of the prophet are always regarded as divine utterances, and not the words of the prophet himself. Justin says, "When you hear the utterances of the Prophets spoken as it were by a person, you must not suppose that they are spoken by the inspired men themselves, but by the Divine Logos who moves them."³ The Psalms were "dictated" to David by the Holy Spirit.⁴

In Justin's day such a theory had only to be stated to be credible. Only one point concerning the theory of the inspiration of the Prophets did he think required elucidation. Other oracles spoke out in a recognizable way. If a myth told the story of a visit to an oracle, the words of the oracle alone were regarded as definitely inspired. But Justin wished to find inspiration not only in formal prophetic utterance but in the entire Old Testament, much of which was in the form of simple narrative. Statements made

¹ Dial. 115. 3 (343 A). The complete incompatibility of physical sight with such spiritual sight as could be capable of perceiving an appearance of the Lord is discussed by Philo in the *De Mut. Nom.* 3 ff. (I. 578 ff.).

² (*Bibl.* 394) p. 44. In n. 3 Heinisch refers to others who have made a similar protest. Semisch is carried into an overstatement of Justin's theory of inspiration by the fact that he treats the *Cohort. ad Graec.* as genuine. This work actually goes much further than Justin to describe the prophetic trance.

³ *Ap.* I. 36. 1 (76 D).

⁴ Dial. 34. 1 (251 B).

about the past,¹ as well as the future, statements made in all connections, even by the Israelitish mob,² were used indifferently by the Christians to furnish a prophetic background for their Faith. Such a prophetic authority needed a defence to which Justin devotes considerable attention in the Apology. The explanation given is that multifarious as the form of the utterance may be, it is always the same Spirit (or Logos) inspiring the utterance.³ For the Spirit may assume various roles, act various parts, and hence speak in various characters. Justin's phrase for this playing of parts is ἀπὸ προσώπου. The Spirit speaks ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ πατρὸς,⁴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ,⁵ τέκνων Ἀβραάμ,⁶ τῶν ἀποστόλων,⁷ but the Spirit must be recognized as the speaker in every case, regardless of the form of utterance.

It is interesting as contributory evidence for the ultimate source of Justin's metaphysical ideas to find that this, the only point which seems at all valuable in his treatment of the theory of prophetic inspiration, had already been expounded in the same words by Philo. Philo also wished to regard as inspired many statements in the Pentateuch which were not in prophetic form. He justified his doing so by saying that prophetic inspiration may take several forms, but that whether the prophetic utterances were spoken ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ or ἐκ προσώπου Μωύσεως, their character as inspired words is unchanged.⁸

There is however one original attempt at explanation of a difficulty about inspiration, and, like most of Justin's own contributions it obscures more than it clarifies. Justin wishes to justify his use of scriptural statements in the past tense as prophetic utterances foretelling what Christ was to be and do. Such a use of Scripture is perfectly legitimate, he says, for when the Prophetic Spirit was absolutely certain that an event would take place, He prophesied

¹ Ap. I. 42. 1 ff. (80 B).

² Ap. I. 47. 1 (84 A).

³ Ap. I. 36 entire.

⁴ Ap. I. 37. 1 (77 A).

⁵ Ap. I. 38. 1 (77 C).

⁶ Dial. 25. 1 (242 B).

⁷ Dial. 42. 2 (260 D).

⁸ De Vita Moses III. 188 (II. 163).

it as though it had already happened.¹ It does not seem to occur to Justin that by such an explanation he has discredited every other form of prophecy in the defence of what he recognizes to be only one among many forms. He would certainly have repudiated the implications of his own statement that the Holy Spirit was only guessing when the prophetic utterances were put in the future tense.

Indeed Justin seems to have had very few clear ideas about the person and nature of the Prophetic Spirit. He believed in general that inspiration was a filling of the prophet by the Spirit. Prophets were οἱ ἐμπνεύσμενοι.² But sometimes the Spirit which inspired was called the Holy Spirit,³ sometimes the Prophetic Spirit,⁴ sometimes the Logos,⁵ and sometimes God.⁶ Of these terms, "Holy Spirit" and "Prophetic Spirit" are used in the majority of instances, and are terms almost constantly to be encountered throughout Justin's writings. But did he think of a Personal Spirit, or was this only a convenient and intelligible term for one aspect or activity of the Logos? The question cannot be answered with certainty. In one passage Justin says that inspiration of the Prophets must be referred to none other than to the Divine Logos.⁷ Again the utterances of the Prophets have been spoken by the Divine Logos who has moved or changed them.⁸ But when he mentions the threefold baptismal formula and explains the nature of each of the three Persons referred to, it is the Holy Spirit who is described as the One who foretold all things about Jesus through the Prophets.⁹ To choose arbitrarily between these contradictory statements is only to do violence to the one rejected. Von Engelhardt has with

¹ Ap. I. 42. 2 (80 B).

² Ap. I. 36. 2 (76 D).

³ E. g. Dial. 25. 1 (242 B).

⁴ E. g. Ap. I. 31. 1 (72 B). This expression was Jewish, and is twice to be found in the Targums. See Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*. pp. 190 ff.

⁵ Ap. I. 36. 1 (76 D). See Ap. I. 33. 9 (75 D); Ap. II. 10. 7 (49 A).

⁶ Dial. 84. 1 (310 B).

⁷ Ap. I. 33. 9 (75 D).

⁸ Ap. I. 36. 1 (76 D).

⁹ Ap. I. 61. 13 (94 E).

little explanation declared that Justin referred prophetic inspiration ultimately to the Logos, and considered the Holy Spirit to be only the personal agent whom the Logos used for that purpose.¹ Von Engelhardt adduces no evidence for the suggestion because there is none to adduce. One must frankly admit that Justin leaves unsettled the matter of the agent of inspiration. For though Justin thus confuses the Logos and Holy Spirit, it must be recognized, with Semisch,² that the confusion is one of function, and that confusion of function is possible without confusion of personality.

But against the personality of the Holy Spirit reproaches have been adduced other than Justin's confusion of prophetic agency. Justin in one passage states explicitly: τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις ἢ τὸν λόγον, ὃς καὶ πρωτότοκος τῷ θεῷ ἐστὶ.³ Since the time of Lange, at least, this passage has seemed to many to be decisive proof that to Justin the πνεῦμα and the λόγος were two names for the same person.⁴ But the passage, as Semisch argues,⁵ is not decisive for a general conclusion about the nature of the Spirit because the statement in its context is not intended to be general. Justin has been speaking of the δύναμις καὶ πνεῦμα which Luke records overpowered Mary with His glory⁶ as the result of which she became pregnant. Justin's own theory of the incarnation, as will be seen later,⁷ was that the

¹ (Bibl. 313) p. 160.

² (Bibl. 118) II. 311.

³ Ap. I. 33. 6 (75 C).

⁴ Ausführliche Geschichte der Dogmen. I. (1796) p. 107.

⁵ (Bibl. 118) II. 309; Donaldson (Bibl. 143) p. 267 as usual repeats Semisch.

⁶ Κατασκιάζειν, as Hatch has pointed out, means in late Greek not "to overshadow", but to overpower by a dazzling brilliancy. Read in that sense the passage in Luke has a meaning which translations have ordinarily obscured. The detailed discussion of Leisegang on the meaning of this word would have been much improved had he read Hatch. See Leisegang, Pneuma Hagion. Leipzig 1922. pp. 25—31.

⁷ See below p. 235. Justin in thus thinking of the Logos, rather than the Spirit, as the agent of incarnation is clearly following the same tradition as that recorded in the Protevang.

Logos came down and entered into the womb of Mary, acting as His own agent of incarnation. Accordingly Justin insists that the Spirit and Power mentioned in the traditional account of the Incarnation was the Logos. Since the Logos was of course a Spirit and a Power of God, such an identification was perfectly legitimate, and in no way effects the fact that Justin might have believed in another Spirit which was properly *the* Spirit.

It is a more serious reflection upon Justin's belief in the personality of the Holy Spirit that in the Dialogue there are only two divine Personalities described, the Father and the Son. Had we only the Dialogue from which to reconstruct Justin's conception, it would be impossible to account for the repeatedly mentioned Holy Spirit who inspires prophecy. But it must be born in mind that the Dialogue does mention the Holy Spirit frequently, and confuses Him with the Logos as inspirer of the Prophets less than the Apologies. But the Dialogue does not purport to be, even so slightly as the First Apology, a statement of Christian doctrine. It is an essay upon a definite theme, and much stress cannot be laid upon omissions of extraneous matter. A probable reference to the Holy Spirit is found in the Dialogue, where if the reference actually be to the Spirit the thought is quite impersonal.¹ Justin distinguishes between the way in which Christ now dwells among the Christians and the way in which He is to be with them after the Second Coming. He is now with men *δυνάμει*, but will then be with them *ἐναργῶς*. The language is of course

of James, xi. 2, *καὶ ἰδοὺ ἄγγελος κυρίου ἔσται ἐνώπιον αὐτῆς λέγων· μὴ φοβοῦ, Μαρίαμ, εὖρες γὰρ χάριν ἐνώπιον τοῦ πάντων δεσπότου καὶ συλλήψῃ ἐκ λόγου αὐτοῦ*. But the passage is not witness to the fact that Justin used this Gospel. He may have had the Gospel, but if he did he by no means regarded it as having the same authority as the Synoptic tradition. It seems still more likely that the conception that the agent of incarnation was the Logos was part of Justin's oral tradition which he in this passage is trying to reconcile with the written Gospel record representing Mary as having conceived of the Holy Ghost. See, contra, Heinisch (Bibl. 304) p. 140. n. 2 and Zahn (Bibl. 181) I. ii. 539. Anm. 1.

¹ Dial. 54. 1 (273 D).

Aristotelian, and probably the famous *δυνάμει—ἐναργῶς* antithesis of the philosopher was proverbial in Justin's day. But did Justin intend a pun upon *δυνάμει*, and imply that the Holy Spirit, now present with the Church, is the presence of Christ *δυνάμει*? It is highly probable that Justin intended such an inference, and if so he was thinking impersonally of the Spirit. But one cannot be certain of the meaning here of *δυνάμει*, because later in the Dialogue Justin speaks of Christ as appearing in the Old Testament theophanies *δυνάμει*.¹ The meaning of neither passage is clear, and each obscures the other.

Furthermore in two passages of the Dialogue the Holy Spirit is mentioned in a way that must be admitted to be impersonal. The locution "pouring the Spirit on all flesh" seems to Dr. Paul to be incompatible with a personal conception of the Spirit.² Dr. Paul has evidently not noticed that the expression occurs in an Old Testament quotation,³ and hence cannot be taken as evidence for Justin's views on so delicate a point. But still it must be admitted that the conception of pouring the Spirit, and of baptism in the Spirit, are impersonal.⁴ In the other passage Justin speaks of the transference to John the Baptist of the Spirit of God which was in Elijah.⁵ There is no intelligible explanation of this passage in terms of a personal Spirit. Trypho asks Justin how such a thing could happen, and Justin's only explanation is a Scriptural precedent, the transference to Joshua of the spirit of Moses. But the precedent no whit explains the metaphysics of such a transition of Spirit, and there is no material for reconstructing what Justin may have thought. As a matter of fact Justin probably did not in the least understand it himself, but was simply passing on part of the Christian tradition about John the Baptist. Nevertheless it is apparent that impersonal references to the

¹ Dial. 128. 1 (357 D). The meaning of *δυνάμει*, several times repeated in this chapter is very obscure. See p. 256.

² (Bibl. 344) 1890. pp. 571—576, from Pfäffisch (Bibl. 385) p. 47.

³ Joel ii. 28.

⁴ Dial. 29. 1 (246 C).

⁵ Dial. 49. 3 ff. (268 C ff.).

Spirit, whether in the form of Old Testament quotation or of Christian tradition, do not disturb Justin at all.

Did he then believe in a personal Spirit? Aside from the fact that Justin's mention of the Prophetic Spirit is usually personal, there is considerable evidence to show that he did believe in a personal Spirit. Justin writes the following exposition of some passages in Plato. "And as to his (Plato's) speaking of a third, he did this because he read, as we have said above, that which was spoken by Moses, that the Spirit of God moved upon the waters. For he gives the second place to the Logos which is with God, who he said was placed crosswise in the universe; and the third place to the Spirit who was said to be borne upon the water, saying 'and the third around the third'."¹ Here Justin is clearly thinking of two Beings similar in nature although unequal in rank, the Logos and the Spirit. Again he says that the devils imitated the Scriptural conception of the Spirit moving upon the waters by setting up statues to Cora at springs, and worshipping her there as the daughter of Zeus.² Justin must then at least sometimes have understood the Spirit to be an offshoot of God, and personal, in order for his parallelism to hold. Justin four times quotes the formula, "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,"³ on one of which occasions he explains the significance of each term and gives a personal activity to the Spirit as well as to the other two, saying that the Spirit through the Prophets foretold all things about Jesus. He says that the Christians regard Jesus Christ as in the second place after God, and the Prophetic Spirit in the third place.⁴ Again he says that the Christians worship the Holy Spirit, but lists the Spirit not only after the Father and the Logos, but also after the angels.⁵ Still Justin's mention of the Spirit here implies a distinct Person.

¹ Ap. I. 60. 6, 7 (93 B ff.); cf. Plato Tim. 36 b, c, and Plato (?) Epist. II. p. 312 e.

² Ap. I. 64. 1 ff. (97 A).

³ Ap. I. 61. 3, 13 (94 A, E); 65. 2 (97 D); 67. 2 (98 C).

⁴ Ap. I. 13. 3 (60 E).

⁵ Ap. I. 6. 2 (56 C).

Justin prefers then to speak of the Spirit in personal language as a Being distinct from both the Father and the Son. He confuses the functions of the Spirit with those of the Logos, and he has no objection to speaking of the Spirit impersonally, but he would apparently ordinarily think of the Spirit as a distinct person. Still it must be admitted that the Spirit was never so vividly personal to Justin as was the Logos-Christ. Herein Justin is at one with the overwhelming mass of Christians of all time. By the Incarnation the person of the Logos was given a sharpness of detail which the Spirit has never achieved. In spite of the dogma of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit is still commonly spoken of, and thought of even in most orthodox minds, as "It". The same mystical experience may still correctly be described indifferently as God in us, Christ in us, or the Spirit in us. But the Spirit is not on that account thought of as personally identical with either Christ or the Father. The term Spirit has still its own distinctive connotation, though the connotations may or may not be personal at any given time. So Justin regarded the Holy Spirit as a Person, the third in divine rank, but allowed himself to speak impersonally of the Spirit when he found the impersonal language more convenient.

As to the origin or generation of the Holy Spirit Justin gives little information. Justin had but one theory for the generation of Divine Beings, that of emanation from the One Divine Source. In the Dialogue, much as he wished to make the Son different from the other celestial beings, we have seen that Justin had to represent the Logos as produced in the same way as the other *δυνάμεις τοῦ θεοῦ*. Of a distinction between created and uncreated celestial persons about which Semisch labours Justin knew nothing. The Logos, like the lowest angel, was ultimately a *δύναμις* of God. There is no reason for trying to imagine for Justin a different sort of emanation of the Holy Spirit. The Rays from the Divine Light varied in importance. The Spirit was no ordinary *δύναμις*, but a *δύναμις* of God Justin must have considered Him. Indeed so completely did Justin regard Him as a power of God that we have

seen in one case, where Justin is listing the divine objects of Christian worship, that he puts the entire group of angelic personalities before the Holy Spirit,¹ though in point of rank Justin ordinarily thought of the Spirit as before the other powers. The Dialogue leads us to suspect that the Spirit was not divine in the sense in which the Son was divine. But as to what sort of divinity Justin would ascribe to a Divine Person whom the Christians worshipped, who yet was not included either as *ὁ θεός* or as *θεός* in the Dialogue, he gives us no information.

Doctrine of the Trinity Justin had none. Justin believed in One God the Father, and neither the Logos nor the Holy Spirit nor any other power could be ranked with the Father. The Logos was divine, but in the second place; the Holy Spirit was worthy of worship, but in the third place. Such words are entirely incompatible with a doctrine of the Trinity.

The functions of the Spirit have already in part been described. Pre-eminently the Spirit was the inspirer of the Prophets. In one passage Justin shows how, since the coming of Christ, a great change had taken place in the operation of the Holy Spirit. Before the Incarnation the Spirit had operated upon the Prophets apparently directly from God. But when the Spirit settled upon Christ at the baptism, it rested from its former mode of activity and thenceforth became the Spirit of Christ, to be given out to men only by Christ.² But Justin's explanation of the incident of the descent of the Spirit upon Christ must be used with caution. The explanation comes out as a *tour de force* to avoid a difficulty, suggested by Trypho, that Christ could not have been of divine nature, else He would have had no need of having the Spirit rest upon Him.³ As divine, it was urged, Christ would already have possessed all that the Spirit had to give. The incident of

¹ Ap. I. 6. 2 (56 C).

² Dial. 87. 3 ff. (314 C ff.).

³ Trypho does not suggest that Is. xi. 2 has reference to the baptism of Jesus. But the discussion in Chapters 87 and 88 show clearly that this verse had been connected with the incident of the baptism to substantiate the adoptionist position.

Christ's baptism must have been a most perplexing one to Christians who had accepted the Logos theory, for it was and is the chief evidence of adoptionists. Justin's explanation of the incident very dubiously represents his actual opinion of the activity of the Spirit with the Prophets. It would have been more in harmony with his usual confusion of Logos and Spirit in the Prophets to say, with von Engelhardt,¹ that Justin regarded the Spirit as always having been the Spirit of the Logos, while from this exposition we should be led to infer that the two were united for the first time at the baptism of Christ. But in speaking of Christ's baptism, if Justin has been unfair to the pre-Christian activity of the Prophetic Spirit, his explanation of the event precisely represents his theory of the activity of the Spirit in his own day. The Spirit was found by Christians in their worship of Christ. Christian baptism is baptism in the Spirit.² The gifts of the Spirit, wisdom, knowledge, understanding and counsel, might and piety, fear, (sc. of the Lord) and others which had formerly been bestowed on the Prophets are now given through Christ by grace to those who believe in Him according as each man is worthy.³ It is easily possible to find Christians possessing these gifts which before the coming of Christ had been given only to the Prophets.⁴ Christian illumination, the guide to truth which made Christianity the supreme philosophy, came from the Holy Spirit.⁵

The Holy Spirit was to Justin, then, the guide of piety, the gifts of the Spirit were the goal of spiritual endeavour. It is likely that had we a sermon of Justin addressed to Christians we should hear more of the Spirit, but the controversial documents which we possess have no occasion to enter minutely into the heart of Christian worship and aspiration. Semisch closes his discussion of the theory of the Holy Spirit in Justin's writings by saying that the

¹ See above p. 181. n. 1.

² Dial. 29. 1 (246 C).

³ Dial. 87. 4 (314 D).

⁴ Dial. 88. 1 (315 B).

⁵ Dial. 4. 1 (221 C).

Holy Spirit was too idiomatically Christian to be intelligible to outsiders, and that Justin on that account allows a temporary confusion with the Logos.¹ But was the Holy Spirit to the heathen a "strange name and conception"? One wonders how much the Christian Spirit differed from the *δαίμων* of Socrates.² But even granted (which I do not by any means grant) that it was strangeness which made Justin hesitate to expound the Holy Spirit to the heathen, surely the Holy Spirit was not strange to the Jews. The Holy Spirit as the inspirer of Prophecy and the guide of piety is certainly one of the Christian heritages from Judaism. John the Baptist preached no riddles, and his statement that his Successor would baptise in the Holy Spirit was the statement of a Jew to Jews. The Holy Spirit became Christian when the gifts of the Spirit became also the gifts of Christ, when the indwelling Spirit was in a sense the indwelling Christ also. But not the doctrine of the Spirit but the doctrine of Christ was the novelty which was at once attacked from without and studied within Christianity. Little explanation is made of the Spirit during the first two Centuries of Christian writing because the Spirit of whom Christians spoke, except that He came from and through Christ, was too well known both in Hellenism and Judaism to need an introduction, was too traditional to need defence.

¹ (Bibl. 118) II. 331.

² A valuable collection of material on the Holy Spirit is Hans Leisegang's new work: *Der Heilige Geist, das Wesen und Werden der mystisch-intuitiven Erkenntnis in der Philosophie und Religion der Griechen. I. Teil: Die vorchristlichen Anschauungen und Lehren vom Pneuma und der mystisch-intuitiven Erkenntnis.* Leipzig und Berlin 1919. II. Teil: *Pneuma Hagion: Der Ursprung und Geistbegriff der synoptischen Evangelien aus der griechischen Mystik.* Leipzig 1922. Leisegang has brilliantly demonstrated how universal was the notion of the Divine Spirit, but he is carried away with the Greek element, and does not give sufficient weight to the Hebrew doctrine. To assume as he does (e. g. II. Teil, pp. 45 ff.) that the Philonic doctrine of the Spirit is in every particular Greek is to beg a very large question.

B. THE LOWER POWERS.

Of the other powers in addition to the Holy Spirit it has already been said that though Justin had an ever-present sense of their existence, he had little explanation of their origin or nature. His only account of the origin of the angelic host has been already mentioned, but should be here examined in detail. "The Father, when He chooses, say they, makes His power to spring forth (*προπιθάν ποιεῖ*) and when He chooses, He recalls it to Himself. In this way, they teach, He made (*ποιεῖν*) the angels. But it has been taught that there are certain angels which always exist, and are not reabsorbed into that out of which they have sprung."¹ There seems still to be some misunderstanding as to Justin's intention in this passage. Heinisch appears to think that Justin is controverting the doctrine of the origin of the angels here described.² But Justin is doing no such thing. He has just stated his great thesis that God who appeared to Moses in the burning bush was the Second God, Christ, and now he proceeds to deal with a counter argument which had been raised by Jews to this thesis. Some people, he says, deny such an interpretation and assert that the appearance here was actually that of an angel. But, they insist, the appearance of an angel does not involve a second divine Personality, as the Christians claim, for the angels are a company of powers who are continually proceeding from the Father, and as continually being reabsorbed in the original Source. The appearance of one of these then as a representative of God by no means involves the existence of a Second God. This is all very true, Justin admits, but he insists that there are certain angels who, though generated in the same way, are permanently sustained, and do not lose their personality by reabsorption into the Source. Now the particular Power, or Angel who appeared on the occasion in question was of such a kind, but of unique dignity. And so Justin goes on as we have already seen, to describe the generation of the Christ. Justin has not

¹ Dial. 128. 3, 4 (358 B, C).

² (Bibl. 394) pp. 139, 140.

controverted a syllable of the doctrine of angels proposed by his hypothetical opponent. But he has claimed that the opponent has only half stated the doctrine, and that the part concealed is the part applicable to Christ. The doctrine of the emanation of these angels, whether of temporary or permanent existence, seems to Justin to need no proof, but to be sufficiently well known and widely believed so that he could use the conception to explain the origin of the Second God.

Justin's doctrine of the origin and nature of the angels is much illuminated by comparison of the passage under discussion with some of the sayings recorded from the Tannaim. There is preserved a comment upon the description in the book of Daniel (vii. 9, 10): "His throne was like the fiery flame, and his wheels as burning fire. A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him: thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him." The comment is: "Every day are ministering angels created out of the Stream of Fire singing songs of praise and perishing, for it is written, 'New are they every morning, for great is thy Grace.'" The same passage continues: "An angel is created out of my word from the mouth of God; for it is written 'Through the word of God even the heavens were created, and through the breath of his wrath all his company.'"¹ Another parallel, which Goldfahn does not suggest, is even closer to Justin's thought. The following conversation is recorded between two very early Tannaim:

"*Hadrian*: You say no angel emanation sings praises twice, but that God daily creates new angels, which sing a song in His honour, and then depart; whither do they go?

"*Joshua* (b. Chananja): Thither whence they were created.

"*Hadrian*: Whence were they created?

"*Joshua*: Out of the Stream of Fire.

"*Hadrian*: And how is it with this 'Stream'?

¹ Chagiga 14 a. Goldfahn (Bibl. 389) p. 114.

"*Joshua*: It is as this Jordan, which ceases not to flow day and night.

"*Hadrian*: And whence comes this Stream of Fire?

"*Joshua*: From the sweat of the beasts at the Chariot of God, which flows from them under the weight of the Chariot of God."¹

Weber insists that, in addition to the temporary angels, who have no independent existence, the Rabbinic theology taught also that there were permanent emanations from God, with permanent existences.²

Justin's angelology is clearly dependent upon this tradition which seems to have been strictly Palestinian, grown up upon the statement quoted from the Book of Daniel, if that statement does not itself show that at the time of its composition such a conception of the origin of angels was already extant. The closeness of Justin's thought to that of the Rabbinic passage is apparent when it is recalled that *δυνάμεις* in Justin's account of emanation is used in a double sense, that of powers, superhuman personalities, and that of rays. Both meanings are found elsewhere in Justin. Since a ray of light was regarded as a stream of very fine fire flowing from the source, it is clear that Justin's description of the *δυνάμεις* radiating from the Father meant to him a fiery streaming from the central fiery Source, while the second meaning of the word implied to his mind, and to those of his readers, something of personal existence at the same time.³ But as Justin, in representing the angels as permanent, even personal, rays from God is clearly Palestinian, he is just as clearly not Philonic. Philo was troubled by the angels, for while he believed in them as a good Jew, they had little place in his metaphysics. Accordingly he at one time seems to identify them with the powers which were impersonal emanations from God;⁴ at another time with

¹ Gen. rab. 78; Echa. to 3:23, from Bacher, *Die Aggada der Tannaiten*. I. (2. Aufl.) p. 172.

² Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*. pp. 166 ff.

³ Cf. above p. 148.

⁴ Cf. Ling. 168 ff. (I. 430 ff.). See Drummond, *Philo II*. 148 ff. Drummond has not made his point here of a distinction

the demons,¹ or with souls not yet born.² His object in thus classing the angels with some other familiar conception is to reduce their importance so that they could by no means be made parallel to the gods of the heathen and hence suggest polytheism. With the same purpose he at times even denies them any existence at all, and says that the angels of the Old Testament were visions of God Himself who appeared as an angel in order to come within the power of comprehension of mortals in the flesh.³ With such speculation Justin has nothing to do. He holds here unmistakably to his Hebrew tradition.

Did Justin understand this entire emanation process to be a sort of creation? It is notable at first that Justin says here that by this process the angels were "made", and that he uses the Greek word *ποιεῖν* which later, at least, was used in Christian theology as a specific term for creation. Did Justin so use the word? At first it seems to appear that he did think of the angels as "created", for *ποιεῖν* is applied to the angels on three other occasions,⁴ in two of which they are classed together with men as "made",⁵ and in all three passages are said to have been made with free power of choice. But in these passages it is asserted of the angels that they were "made like men", not in the process of their origin, but in virtue of the fact that both men and angels are endowed with free power of choice. For the origin of the angelic host we must then rely entirely upon the single passage first quoted. But here though the angels are said to be "made", the process by which they were made is entirely different from that described elsewhere for the creation of men, but precisely the same as that which produced the Son of God. Indeed the statement most strongly suggestive of

of powers and angels. The identification is clear, but not necessarily did Philo always think of the angels as powers, nor of the powers as angels.

¹ De Gigant. 6 ff. (I. 263 ff.).

² Ibid.

³ De Somniis I. 232 (I. 655). See above Chapter IV.

⁴ Ap. II. 7. 5 (45 D); Dial. 88. 5 (316 A); 141. 1 (370 B).

⁵ Ap. II. 7. 5 (45 D); Dial. 141. 1 (370 B).

creation in the passage is made in connection with the origin of the Second God rather than of the angels, though we understand that it should apply to them as well. For Justin makes it distinctly plain that the emanation which generated the Son was put forth from God by an act of God's will. If this passage seems then to represent the angels as created, the same must with even greater confidence be said of the Son of God. Actually Justin thought of neither the Son of God nor the angelic host as created. By the same process each was begotten, generated from the Father.

Justin thus conceived of two sorts of angels, the temporary and the permanent. Were either or both of these groups made up of distinct personalities? On the whole, Justin probably thought of the permanent angels at least as personalities; but he has nothing to say of outstanding angelic persons such as later were understood in Christian teachings.

The question of the angels' relation to Divinity, or their claim to divine character, has been made a pressing one by Justin's mention of the angelic host as one of the objects of Christian worship, listed even before the Holy Spirit.¹ The passage bears all the ear-marks of genuineness, and is not to be dismissed by altering the text or by ingenuity of explanation. Does Justin regard this *pleroma* of personal emanation as itself divine? Justin continually insists in the Dialogue that there is only one God the Father, and that there are only two divine Personalities, which may perhaps be extended to include the Holy Spirit. But that there is any *pleroma* of divinities is precisely the thought that he is controverting alike in the Apologies and the Dialogue. The only illumination I have been able to find for the passage is the fact that Philo represents Moses as praying to the powers,² which may conceivably be a philosophic reflection of a popular angelolatry. If such was a popular practice in the Judaism of the Diaspora, it may be that Justin's statement

¹ Ap. I. 6. 2 (56 C).

² De Plant. 46 (I. 336). Moses prays to τὸ ἀντεξούσιον τοῦ θεοῦ κράτος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἕλως καὶ ἡμέρους δυνάμεις.

is a survival from such an antecedent. It is however inconceivable that the angels, whether in Judaism or Christianity, were worshipped as more than intermediaries, who would bear petitions directly to God. It is not at all impossible that the Christian doctrine of the mediation of Christ, and later of the Saints, has had such a forgotten ancestry. But we are here in the region of pure conjecture. Actually, Justin's statement that the Christians worshipped the angels hangs unsupported in the air.

As to the nature of the angels, it is highly probable that Justin followed his Palestinian Jewish tradition still further, and thought that the angels were made of fire. The angels were made of fire in the Epistle to the Hebrews,¹ while Weber shows that the Palestinian tradition of the angels was also that they were so constituted.² Nothing would be more natural than so to think of the angels in view of the description of their fiery origin. That Justin so believed, and that the origin of his belief was ultimately the Palestinian tradition is witnessed by his explanation of manna, the food of angels, as well as of the phenomenon of the angel's eating before the tent of Abraham. For Justin says that angels must receive nourishment of some sort because the Scripture says that the manna which the Children of Israel ate in the wilderness was the bread of angels (*ἄρτον ἀγγέλων*).³ Here Justin follows the Septuagint rendering of the Hebrew "bread of the mighty", but the Septuagint itself was quite true to the Palestinian tradition in interpreting the "mighty" in this verse as the angels, for such was Akiba's understanding of the passage. So explicit, indeed, was Akiba's explanation that it sounded to his opponent Ismael as too crass, and provoked the rejoinder: "Go out and tell Akiba that he is wrong; for do the angels eat? Much more does the expression signify a nourishment which is entirely absorbed by the members."⁴ In another passage

¹ Hebr. i. 7.

² Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*. pp. 166 ff.

³ Dial. 57. 2 (279 C). See Ps. lxxviii. 25.

⁴ Bar. Joma 75 b, from Bacher, *Die Agada der Tannaiten*. I. (2. Aufl.) 245.

it is denied that manna is the *bread* of angels on the basis of the passage, "Bread have I not eaten."¹ The Hebrew tradition made the angels thus a consuming fire which was nourished by some celestial substance that was consumed or devoured by the angels as fire consumes fuel, but not as human beings consume bread. In the light of this Hebrew belief Justin's remarks about the angels' eating become at once intelligible. He thus explains the circumstance where the angels (*including the Logos*) ate before the tent of Abraham: "The Scripture which says that they ate bears the same meaning as when we would say about fire that it has devoured (*κατέφαγεν*) all things; yet it is by no means to be understood that they ate, masticating with their teeth and jaws."² Here is clearly a reproduction of the Palestinian Jewish thought. The angels are made of a fiery substance which consumes nourishment; but they do not eat food after the manner of men. One has only to glance at Philo to feel how pre-eminently here we are in the midst of a Palestinian rather than a Hellenistic Jewish tradition. Manna was by Philo explained as "heavenly wisdom, which God sends from above to those who have a longing for virtue."³ Semisch concludes from Justin's comment upon the angels' eating that he considers the angels as having a bodiliness between the corporeality of man and the pure spirituality of God.⁴ Aside from the ambiguity of his language Semisch is on treacherous ground. That Justin ever conceived of immaterial reality is most doubtful. The material figures by which the procession of emanations was represented always speak of a source as material as the emanation, and insist upon the identity in character of the fire which is lighted with the fire from which the new flame has been kindled. The very word *πνεῦμα* was of course a material expression, and it is certainly beyond anything Justin says to conclude that in applying the word to God Justin purified it entirely of its physical

¹ Goldfahn (Bibl. 389) p. 112 (No. 13).

² Dial. 57. 2 (279 C).

³ De Mut. Nom. 259 (I. 618).

⁴ Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 342. "Diese Körperlichkeit als ein Mittelding zwischen reiner Geistigkeit und menschlicher Leiblichkeit."

implications. Since all the powers and demons, even the evil ones, were to Justin also πνεύματα,¹ it is impossible to speak of a "spirituality" which God has but which cannot be applied to the angels. Indeed the word spirituality (in modern use of most uncertain meaning) is well avoided in any such discussion.

Justin probably thought of the powers or angels ordinarily as in human form. In this the imagery of the Old Testament would have helped him. He even carries his attack against mythology so far as to say that the statues of the gods have the names and *forms* of the evil demons, not the form of God.² We are told little about the faculties of these beings. The whole spirit world, after the Father and the Logos, seems not to be omniscient. Spirits are easily deceived, though of course they know more of God's ways and plans than an uninspired human being. The demons imitated the prophecy about the coming Incarnation, but on many details missed the point of the prophecy.³ The angels, called here "the rulers in heaven", seeing the returning Christ in his loneliness and humility did not recognize their Lord in such disguise.⁴ In thus setting a limit upon the intelligence of the angels Justin is quite in accord with the teaching of Jesus that the day and hour of the Second Coming were not known to the angels of heaven, but only to God.⁵

But if the angels of heaven were not omniscient, Justin was confident that they had freedom of choice.⁶ "God, wishing men and angels to follow His will, resolved to make them self-determining (αὐτεξουσίους) to do righteousness; possessing reason (μετὰ λόγου) that they may know by whom they were made, and through whom they, not existing formerly, do now exist; and with a law that they

¹ Dial. 7. 3 (225 B); 30. 2 (247 B); 35. 2 (253 A); 76. 6 (302 A).

² Ap. I. 9. 1 (57 C, D). For the relation between demons and other powers see below p. 198.

³ Ap. I. 54. 4 (89 C).

⁴ Dial. 36. 6 (255 B).

⁵ Mat. xxiv. 36.

⁶ On the freedom of the angels see further p. 230

shall be judged by Him, if they do anything contrary to right reason (τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον); and of ourselves we, men and angels, shall be convicted as having acted sinfully unless we repent.”¹ It is remarkable that Justin seems to include angels among those needing repentance and salvation. Justin says nothing which will help the understanding of this statement. His insistence upon the free power of choice of angels was of course a part of his theodicy. If some of the angels were sinful, as some very clearly were, either God had made them sinful or they had made themselves so. To represent God as the cause of sin was of course impossible. Justin had to take the other alternative and represent the angels as free moral agents in order to be able to blame the bad angels for their own sinfulness. But Justin probably did not choose in the matter, for he had merely to continue to follow the Palestinian Jewish angelology. It is recorded that Pappos at one time interpreted, “Man has become as one of us,” as meaning, “Man has become as one of the angels.” Akiba added to this the comment that to be as one of the angels meant to have free power of choice, to go either the way of life or the way of death.² Justin expressly rejected the interpretation of the passage, “Man has become as one of us,” as referring to the angels, for he had need of this passage to prove the existence of a Second God,³ but he retained the conception that man was like the angels in having free power of choice. Unfortunately Justin says no more about an atonement of the angels, and it is useless to try to build a theory of angelic atonement upon this passage. Justin thought usually, it appears, in terms of good and of bad angels. The first he worshipped, the second were all destined for damnation, and there is no other hint of a passing from the bad class to the good class, or of any further lapses among the angels than those which had long ago occurred. The power of choice of the angels then seems to have played a vital

¹ Dial. 141. 1 (370 B, C); cf. 140. 4 (370 A); 88. 5 (316 A; Ap. II. 7. 5 (45 D)).

² Bacher, *Die Aggada der Tannaiten*. I. (2. Aufl.) p. 318. By an oversight Bacher has omitted a reference for this quotation.

³ Dial. 62. 3 (285 C); 129. 2 (359 A).

part in Justin's system only in defending the righteousness of God who had permitted some of the good angels to fall.

The circumstances of this evil event are described by Justin as having taken place in connection with the angels' exercise of care over men in the world. The statement of Justin about this function of the angels presents in itself a perplexing problem. Normally the angels were regarded as the messengers of God, but in one passage Justin says: "God, when He made the whole world, and subjected things earthly to man . . . committed the oversight (*πρόνοιαν*) of men and of all things under heaven to angels whom He appointed over them."¹ Did God then exercise providence only through the angel company, while He Himself in Platonic remoteness was unconcerned about the world of matter? The entire teaching of Justin is opposed to such a theory. To enlarge upon this passage upon the basis of the Timaeus, as does Pfäffisch,² for example, is to misunderstand Justin entirely. It is inconceivable that he thought of the angels as anything more than the messengers and helpers of God. They were God's footmen, not his vice-regents. The idea of giving certain angels certain definite tasks is to be seen in Hebrew tradition as old as the cherubim who guarded the garden of Eden. But the cherubim in the garden of Eden were not considered as the gods of the garden of Eden, nor as rulers acting on their own initiative. No more did Justin regard the angels appointed to watch over various parts of the world as rulers in God's place.³

The occasion of the fall of the wicked angels was this their appointment as overseers of the world. Justin goes on from the above quotation to say, "But the angels, overstepping their appointment, were drawn to have intercourse

¹ Ap. II. 5. 2 (44 A).

² Pfäffisch's peculiarly unsatisfactory work is typically fallacious in its treatment of angels. See (Bibl. 385) pp. 37 ff. Pfäffisch overlooks the fact that it was part of the Christian tradition before Justin that the angels in a sense supervised the world, for such a statement is preserved in almost the same words from Papias. Fragment 4, quoted below p. 200. n. 5.

³ Cf. Athenagoras, Suppl. 24. 3 ff.; Enoch xxi. 6; Josephus Ant. I. 3.

with women, and begat children who are called demons." So far as I know this statement of Justin is the first record we have of the conception that the union of angels and human women produced demons. The Hebrew reads that the "children of God" were attracted by women, and in uniting with them begat giants.¹ The phrase "children of God" was translated in the Septuagint as "angels of God", and accordingly it is stated in Philo,² Josephus,³ and the Book of Enoch,⁴ that the union of angels and human women produced giants. Justin is the first to substitute demons for giants, or at least to understand the giants to be demons, though Athenagoras⁵ and Tertullian⁶ both followed Justin later. Justin may have been speaking of this fall of the angels more in detail in a passage in the Dialogue which has apparently been mutilated.⁷ Trypho is represented as indignant at something which Justin has just said about the sin of the angels as having been a revolt against God. But the statement of Justin against which Trypho directs his protest is so obscure upon the subject of the angels, makes indeed such slight and passing mention of them, that the remark objected to by Trypho must be lacking from our text. Had Justin actually been describing his doctrine of the fall of the angels at greater length, it is not surprising that the passage was later mutilated, for Justin's explanation was afterwards expressly rejected by Christian theologians. Indeed not only were the demons not allowed to be identified with the giants of this verse of Scripture, but the translation of the Septuagint was itself challenged, the "children of God" was restored in place of the "angels of God",⁸ and the

¹ Gen. vi. 2.

² De Gigant. 6—27 (I. 263 ff.).

³ Ant. I. 3.

⁴ Enoch xxi. 6.

⁵ Suppl. 25. 1.

⁶ Apol. 22.

⁷ Dial. 79. 1 (305 B).

⁸ Philastrius, Haer. 107, "Quae de gigantibus asserit quod angeli miscuerint se cum feminis ante deluvium, et inde esse natos gigantes suspicatur." Augustine also calls the doctrine a fable, Civ. Dei XV. 23.

verse was explained as the union of the sons of Seth with the daughters of Cain.¹

Veil has made a bad guess that Justin first evolved his theory of the fall of the angels by elaborating the argument of Aristides Apol. 8, where the misdeeds of the Greek gods with mortal women are cited against their divine character.² Justin is probably here still following Christian tradition from Palestinian Judaism. The Ebionites had the same explanation as Justin of the production of demons by intercourse of angels with human women,³ and Semisch's analysis of their statement is quite convincing that both they and Justin had received the same Jewish tradition, rather than that Justin had his doctrine from the Ebionites.⁴ Further the fragment of Papias already mentioned seems to have been taken from a statement of a similar, if not the same, tradition,⁵ so that it is quite possible that Justin is here only the first whose record has reached us of a tradition which had long been incorporated from Judaism into Christianity.

But after the unfortunate lapse of the angels, and the begetting of their demonic children, both the fathers and sons were called interchangeably demons or evil angels.⁶ Together they constituted an army of evil powers which

¹ Chrysost. in Gen. 6, Homil. 22. On the history of this doctrine see Baumgarten-Crusius, *Compend. der Dogmengeschichte*. Leipzig 1846, II. 213 Anm. e. The note is probably by the editor Hase.

² (Bibl. 80) p. 120. chap. 4. n. 1.

³ Clem. Homil. 6. 18 (I. 677).

⁴ Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 389—392.

⁵ Fragment 4, Ἐνίοις δὲ αὐτῶν, δηλαδὴ τῶν πάλαι θεῶν ἀγγέλων, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν γῆν διακοσμήσεως ἔδωκεν ἄρχειν, καὶ καλῶς ἄρχειν παρηγγύησε, καὶ ἐξῆς φησὶν· Εἰς οὐδὲν δέον συνέβη τελευτῆσαι τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν; from Gebhardt, Harnack, Zahn: *Patrum Apostol.* Op. I. ii (1878). p. 94. Notice here that the rulership is given to the angels who were *formerly* divine, but that they in no respect fulfilled their τάξιν. Cf. Justin's remark: "the angels παραβάντες τήνδε τὴν τάξιν." Ap. II. 5. 3 (44 B). If Justin is thus verbally reproducing Papias, it seems likely that the parallelism of ideas goes much further than this limited fragment reveals.

⁶ Ap. I. 5. 2 (55 E); Dial. 79. 4 (306 B).

was much more real to Justin than the host of good angels which he reverently names before the Holy Spirit.

The company of demons and fallen angels was led by an arch fiend Satan,¹ who fell in an uniquely sinful manner. It was he who deceived Adam and Eve, and as a result of this treachery he was cursed and fell with a great overthrow.² His name, said Justin, is a Hebrew compound meaning Apostate Serpent.³ Justin had a much more elaborate account of the fall and activity of this Serpent or Apostate than he cares to narrate, for on one occasion he but mentions the subject to drop it with the remark that with this matter it is aside from his present purpose to deal.⁴ From what height Satan fell we can only judge from the statement that he was εἰς τῶν ἀρχόντων,⁵ an expression which is probably to be found more complete elsewhere as οἱ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄρχοντες,⁶ when it means the angelic host. The title may have reference to the rulership which God gave to particular angels.⁷ Satan then, from our meagre information, was apparently one of the many angels thus given duties in the universe, but was the first and chief apostate of the group.

The activity of the evil host is manifold. Their evil presence is everywhere felt. They are the princes in Tanis,⁸ and Damascus;⁹ they stand by the altar while the priest sacrifices;¹⁰ they even appear before God Himself.¹¹ Magicians of all sorts help them in their evil

¹ Dial. 131. 2 (360 C). Here the demons are called the army of Satan, understandig καί as explanatory. Cf. Ap. I. 28. 1 (71 A).

² Dial. 124. 3 (353 D); 79. 4 (306 A).

³ Dial. 103. 5 (331 B); 125. 4 (354 D).

⁴ Dial. 124. 3 (353 D).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Dial. 36. 6 (255 B).

⁷ See above p. 198.

⁸ Dial. 79. 3 (305 D).

⁹ Dial. 78. 9 (304 D).

¹⁰ Dial. 79. 4 (306 A).

¹¹ Ibid.

work,¹ while wicked men are tools in their hands.² Their attack on mankind Justin divides into two kinds.³ First they try to rivet men to this world and to things made by hands, by which he probably means to the sins and lusts of matter and mammon, which in Justin's day, not only to Christians but to all serious people, was an adequate description of the way to destruction. But some men persist in trying to walk by a larger view of life. These are attacked in the second way, for the demons try to lead them into fallacy, and to undermine their philosophic temper of reasoned self-control and superiority to the material phases of life.⁴ In connection with this latter activity Justin has conceived that the demons mask themselves as the gods of the Greeks, in order to mislead men by their bad example.⁵ Further the demons have listened carefully to the utterances of the Prophets and have tried to caricature the events foretold in order that when they came to pass the events themselves might seem to be as absurd and blasphemous as the demonic imitations.⁶ This has particularly been evident in the case of the Virgin Birth,⁷ and of the birth of Christ in a cave, which is parodied in Mithraism.⁸ But bold and clever as the demons have been, they have failed to grasp the prophecies of the Cross, and hence have never caricatured that supreme event.⁹ Since the coming of Christ they have been as busy as before if not busier.¹⁰ Their attack upon the truth has been

¹ Ap. I. 26. 2 (69 D); Dial. 69. 1 (294 D); 78. 9 (304 D). In this last passage the magi who came to the new born Christ were magicians from Damascus, and witnessed that Christ at His birth had broken the power of the demon ruling there. A similar idea was long prevalent in the Church. See Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 383 Anm. 9 for references.

² Ap. I. 5. 3 (56 A).

³ Ap. I. 58. 3 (92 B).

⁴ Ap. I. 28. 4 (71 C).

⁵ See above p. 108.

⁶ Ap. I. 53, 54, 64.

⁷ Ap. I. 33. 3 (74 E).

⁸ Dial. 78. 6 (304 A); 70. 1 (296 B).

⁹ Ap. I. 55. 1 (90 B).

¹⁰ See fragment II. (ed. Otto), from Irenaeus Cont. Haer. V. 26. 2.

continued in the form of the institution of heresies by which they hope to pervert the knowledge of the true way as revealed in Christ,¹ and by parodies of the Christian cultus, especially of baptism in the heathen temple purifications,² and of the Eucharist in the mysteries of Mithras.³ They have now entered into a large extension of an activity which had been only occasionally undertaken before the coming of Christ, namely the attack upon good men externally by persecution through men who are subject to demonic direction.⁴ So great is the activity and power of this host for doing what are apparently wonderful miracles that Justin feels he has little advantage in stressing the miraculous power of Jesus as witness of His divine character. The countercharge has been made, says Justin, that a wonder worker is a person in league with demons, and that hence, since Jesus was a wonder worker, He must have been in league with demons.⁵ Justin accepts the reasoning as generally valid outside of Christianity, though he believes that Christian miracles are worked by inspiration of the Spirit; but he is aware that he has little material with which he can demonstrate a distinction between Christian and non-Christian miracles.

Justin believes in demonic possession as did the authors of the Synoptics, and apparently Jesus Himself.⁶ But he makes a statement, surprising at first glance, that possession by demons is possession by souls of the dead.⁷ However, the introduction of "souls" as a further complication of Justin's demonology was quite to be expected in view of his strong tradition of angelology and demonology from Hebraism. Josephus says that the so-called demons are the souls of evil men.⁸ Philo has this tradition in mind in

¹ Dial. 82. 3 (308 D); Ap. I. 56. 1 (91 A); 58. 1 (92 A).

² Ap. I. 62. 1 (94 E).

³ Ap. I. 66. 4 (98 C).

⁴ Ap. I. 5. 3 (56 A); Dial. 131. 2 (360 C).

⁵ Ap. I. 30. 1 (72 A).

⁶ Ap. I. 18. 4 (65 A); Ap. II. 6. (45 B).

⁷ Ap. I. 18. 4 (65 A); cf. also W. Baldensperger, *Urchristliche Apologie: Die ältesten Auferstehungskontroversen*. Strassburg 1909. p. 13.

⁸ Bel. Jud. VII. vi. 3.

the passage where he says that souls, demons, and angels are to be distinguished only in name, for they are all three actually the same.¹ The confusion of terms was clarified by Tatian soon after Justin's time, for Tatian denied that the demons who attacked men were human souls.²

But malignant and terrible as is the activity of the demonic host, it is not altogether beyond control. Before the coming of Christ the demons were controlled when exorcised in the name of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,³ and now their power has been broken by the coming of Christ, as was symbolized by the coming of the magi to the infant Christ.⁴ Christ is now Lord over the demons, and they are always subject to exorcism in His name.⁵ The ritual of exorcism evidently culminated in a recital of the creed, especially that part relative to the life and death of Jesus Christ.⁶ When this form of exorcism was used the power of demons, who had defied all previous exorcisms, was at once broken.⁷ Thus fortified the Christians might hope to succeed in the struggle against the unending activity of these evil spirits. At the end, the triumph of the Cross, which was a triumph over the demons,⁸ would be finally demonstrated, and they would be completely subdued,⁹ and damned.¹⁰ It is the foreknowledge of this event which makes Satan desperate, and has prompted him since Christ's death to a complete

¹ De Gigant. 16 (I. 264).

² Tatian, Orat. 16. 1.

³ Dial. 85. 3 (311 C).

⁴ Dial. 78. 9 (304 D).

⁵ Dial. 85. 1, 2 (311 B); 76. 6 (302 A); III. 2 (338 B); 30. 3 (247 C); Ap. II. 6. 6 (45 A).

⁶ Ap. II. 6. 6 (45 A); Dial. 85. 2 (311 B). Otto, n. 7 in loco, gives references to similar passages in other Christian writers. Was this not the original use of the Creed, introduced into Christian worship to purify the place of meeting as well as the worshippers of all demons?

⁷ Dial. 85. 3 (311 C).

⁸ Dial. 94. 2 (322 A); cf. 41. 1 (260 A); 49. 8 (269 C). On this point see Behm's excellent notes (Bibl. 321) p. 480.

⁹ Ap. I. 45. 1 (82 D).

¹⁰ Dial. 76. 3—6 (310 C ff.).

abandonment of all restraint in his evil activity against men.¹

In Justin's demonology we are as close as in any of his doctrines, with the dubious exception of his ethics or eschatology, to the mode of thought and the ideas of the Synoptic Gospels.² Justin is thus close to the Synoptic conceptions, not because he was expounding the Synoptic statements about demons, but because in his tradition about demons from Palestinian Judaism he had the same background on the subject as the Synoptic writers. To think that Justin's demonology is a system worked out by himself on the basis of borrowings from Platonism³ or Ebionism,⁴ is to speak from a partial knowledge of the real nature of his demonology as Hebrew parallels enlighten it. Justin felt no need of softening the animism of his belief in demons, as Philo had done, because to Justin the existence of demons was a self-obvious fact, and his was not the sort of mind which made itself useless trouble. He and the Christians about him were abundantly satisfied with the simple explanations of demons which Hebrew tradition furnished, and with the assertion that the demons as described in this tradition were to be controlled by the power of the name of Christ. The chief attention of the Christianity of Justin's day was centered upon winning in the never ending fight against the actual incursions and seductions of the demonic host.

¹ Fragment II. (Otto) from Irenaeus Cont. Haer. V. 26. 2.

² See Conybeare (Bibl. 328) pp. 597—599.

³ For old writers see references in Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 387 Anm. 1. The mistake has recently been renewed by Pfäffisch (Bibl. 385).

⁴ E. g. Credner (Bibl. 416) I. 98.

CHAPTER VII
THE CREATED WORLD

A. MATTER

Justin's theory of the germinative activity of the Logos as a spermatic principle introduced by God into the material substrate has already been discussed.¹ It remains here to examine what Justin has to say of the material substrate. The evidence is most unsatisfactory, for, aside from insuring the divine origin of the world and the good character of the Creator,² Justin has little interest in the process by which the universe came into existence. He has, as we have seen, connected the creative Word of God of the Genesis account with the Spermatic Logos of the Greek and Greek-Jewish traditions. But when he had done this, his mild speculative curiosity about the Creation ceased, and he was content to take the remainder of the Genesis narrative quite literally. His utter lack of scientific interest is nowhere better illustrated than in the fact that though a doctrine of matter was necessary to complete his doctrine of the Spermatic Logos, and though the origin and nature of matter were among the most important points of philosophic and religious discussion of the day, Justin seems to have no interest in the

¹ See above pp. 161 ff.

² Justin, in correction of the Gnostic idea that the δημιουργός was a bad rather than a good deity, adds to a statement of Jesus as follows, "No one is good but God, *the one who made all things.*" Ap. I. 16. 6, 7 (63 D, E); cf. notes by Veil and Blunt (following Veil) in loco. That this additional phrase was not in Justin's text is witnessed by his quotation of the same saying of Jesus in another connection. See Dial. 93. 2 (321 A).

subject whatever. The few statements in which he mentions matter have been very differently interpreted. It is universally admitted that Justin thought of God as having created the world out of unformed matter. Indeed Justin says this much explicitly.¹ But whence came this matter? Did it constitute an eternal existential antithesis to God, or was it itself a creation of God in an unformed state, and then made into the phenomenal world? Or is there some third explanation?

The answer to these questions, if answer may be given at all, depends upon the interpretation of a single passage in the First Apology. Justin has been developing his thesis that the philosophers of Greece derive their doctrines from the writings of Moses and the Prophets,² and proceeds to give the following illustration:

"And that you may also learn that it was from our teachers that Plato borrowed his statement that God, having altered matter which was shapeless, made the world, hear the utterances exactly as made by Moses, who, as has been shown, was the first prophet, and was older than the Greek writers. Through him the Prophetic Spirit indicated how and out of what ingredients God in the beginning fashioned the world, as follows: 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth. And the earth was invisible and unfurnished, and darkness was upon the deep; and the Spirit of God moved upon the waters. And God said, Let there be light. And it was so'. So that both Plato and his followers and we ourselves have learned, and you may learn, that the whole world came into being by means of a *logos* from God out of the existing substance about which also Moses had already spoken."³

A persistent interpretation of this passage represents Justin as here criticizing a doctrine of Plato. Plato, says Justin by this interpretation, is right in asserting that God made the world by shaping it out of an unformed

¹ Ap. I. 10. 2 (58 B).

² See above p. 105.

³ Ap. I. 59 entire. *λόγῳ θεοῦ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ προδηλωθέντων διὰ Μωϋσεως γεγενῆσθαι τὸν πάντα κόσμον.* For the significance of the *λόγῳ θεοῦ* here see above p. 164.

material substrate, but is quite wrong in thinking that this material substrate was eternally existing. For according to the account of Moses, God created heaven and earth, and then began the process of shaping the world from the matter that had thus been described as having been created in an unformed state.¹

Before criticizing this interpretation it must be noticed that the passage hangs quite unsupported. Several other passages have been adduced to support the above theory, but none of them give any information at all as to the origin of matter. In one passage Justin says that in the beginning God created all things good from unformed matter.² In another he speaks of God as having turned or changed darkness and matter, and as thus having made the world.³ Semisch even tried to use as evidence the statement that a world like ours could not be eternal in itself, but must have been made by a Creator.⁴ The irrelevancy of the last passage to the question of the origin of matter needs no comment; the two former passages at least mention matter, but do not give the slightest hint as to whether it was eternal or created, unless the *τρέψας* of the second quotation be misunderstood. For *τρέψας* means turning or changing, and cannot of course be understood as creating.

The interpretation of the first quoted passage then is not assisted by any other statement of Justin, except perhaps his declaration, "When we say that all things have been arranged and brought into being (*κεκοσμηθαι καὶ γεγενῆσθαι*) by God we seem to be expressing a doctrine

¹ This interpretation, stated clearly by Otto (see n. 6 p. 159 in loco), is most elaborately developed by Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 336 ff. His arguments have been reproduced more or less completely by Weizsäcker (Bibl. 311) p. 84, von Engelhardt (Bibl. 313) pp. 139 ff., La Grange (Bibl. 167) pp. 149 ff., Windisch (Bibl. 333) p. 8 (who says that this denial of the eternity of matter is the starting point of Justin's theodicy), and Blunt (Bibl. 43) n. 10 in loco, to mention only a few.

² Ap. I. 10. 2 (58 B).

³ Ap. I. 67. 7 (99 A). τὸ σκότος καὶ τὴν ὕλην τρέψας κόσμον ἐποίησε.

⁴ Dial. 5. 2 (223 A).

of Plato."¹ This last statement of Justin's accentuates an aspect of the main passage under discussion which has usually been disregarded,² namely that Justin mentions pre-creation matter at all only to assert that the Mosaic and Platonic doctrines are identical. For Justin says no syllable in the passage which can be taken as indicating a contrast at any point between the doctrines of creation of the two. He declares that Moses and Plato both alike taught that when God created the world He altered matter and gave it form whereas before it was formless. But if Justin is not criticizing Plato, did he still believe that the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," where a description of the creation of unformed matter, as theologians later interpreted them?³ The only ground for attributing such a doctrine to Justin is the presence of the plurals ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ προδηλωθέντων διὰ Μωϋσέως, with which he refers to the material substrate. Here προδηλωθέντων is a modifier of ὑποκειμένων agreeing with it in number while the καὶ is intensive, to be translated "also". Justin is here only saying then that τὰ ὑποκείμενα from which God made the world have been mentioned by Moses. But it will be at once recognized that τὰ ὑποκείμενα is a Stoic word for ultimate matter, and that the Stoics used the singular and plural interchangeably to indicate the single material substrate which they regarded as underlying and constituting all things.⁴ Τὰ ὑποκείμενα, in referring to matter, does not then imply a plural but rather a singular reference, and is here much more naturally to be understood with ἡ γῆ which was ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκέυαστος, than with the two words "heaven and earth". The invisible and unfurnished earth, then, is the unformed

¹ Ap. I. 20. 4 (66 D). Such a doubling of terms to describe creation is frequent in Justin. Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 337 wishes to represent this use of doublets as a contrast between the creation matter and the shaping of the world out of matter. Cf. Ap. II. 6. 3 (44 E); Dial. 11. 1 (228 A). But without other evidence that Justin held such a view, it cannot be considered that he believed in the doctrine from this mannerism of speech.

² Except by Pfäffisch (Bibl. 385) pp. 96 ff.

³ Cf. Theophilus, ad Aut. II. 10.

⁴ See Zeller III. i. pp. 93 ff. Engl. Tr.: Stoics p. 101. n. 3.

material substrate which Justin asserts was common to Plato and Moses. How Justin understood the first sentence, that God in the beginning created heaven and earth, he does not indicate, and in the absence of evidence it is natural to assume that he understood it correctly as the topic sentence of the description of creation which follows. There seems to be no valid reason for reading into the passage a doctrine that matter was itself a creation of God.

But if it cannot be said that Justin taught the creation of matter, it is equally erroneous to go to the other extreme and insist that Justin believed in the eternity of matter in the full Platonic sense of an existential antithesis to God.¹ To do so is to misrepresent Justin's unphilosophic mind, for he had no interest in matter further than to assert that out of it, in an unformed state, God made the world. The origin and nature of matter, one of the most burning questions of contemporary philosophic speculation, did not arouse his curiosity. A parallel to this indifference to the nature of matter can only be found in Palestinian Judaism. While the Platonic and Stoic schools, with which Justin is often represented as being more in accord than with Christianity, made the origin and nature of matter the basis of most ethical and many metaphysical doctrines, and while Hellenistic Judaism had taken over a late Platonic and Pythagorean view of life as a dualism between God and matter, Palestinian Judaism like Justin regarded matter as a fact rather than as a problem. Palestinian opinion is not consistent as to the origin of matter. One tradition says that when God created the world He found shapeless matter ready at hand to be used.² Another tradition says that this matter was itself created.³ But the question

¹ This extreme conclusion mars Pfäffisch's otherwise excellent analysis of this passage. See (Bibl. 385) pp. 96 ff. The best comment on the passage is by Möller (Bibl. 307) pp. 146—149.

² Rab. Josh. b. Chananja thought it sufficient explanation of creation to say that God created the world out of the six elements which are stated figuratively in Gen. i. 2 (Bacher I. 171). Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*, pp. 200 ff., says that the creation of the world out of a previously existing matter was the persistent Talmudic tradition.

³ Gamalied II answered R. Josh. b. Chananja that these six elements were also created. Bacher I. 81.

had never caused much comment or controversy because it had no importance in Jewish eyes. By neither of these two traditions for the origin of matter were the origin of evil and the origin of matter considered as having any connection with each other. This is exactly Justin's position. It was the identity of evil with matter which gave to philosophic schools and Hellenistic Judaism their keen interest in the origin of matter. Justin lacked this incentive, and was not sufficiently philosophical to have interested himself in the problem on other grounds.

The purpose of creation, Justin explains, was the benefit of the human race.¹ All earthly things were directly made subject to man, while the heavenly elements and seasons, and the laws which govern them, though not of course subject to man's control, were still ordained for man's profit.² Of a real explanation of the purpose of creation Justin has no trace. Why God should have wished to create a human race to be thus favoured by the rest of creation Justin does not explain. The later orthodox Christian doctrine that the purpose of creation was a display of the goodness, and the revelation of the glory of God, came into Christianity also from the Hellenistic-Judaistic tradition,³ and Justin himself seems to believe that God was motivated to create the world by His goodness.⁴

B. MAN

In general Justin could say with Philo that man was created from the material elements.⁵ The body at least

¹ Ap. II. 4. 2 (43 C, D).

² Ap. II. 5. 2 (44 A); cf. Dial. 41. 1 (260 A).

³ Cf. Philo De Cherub. 127 (I. 162).

⁴ Ap. I. 10. 2 (58 B).

⁵ Dial. 62. 2 (285 C) τὰ στοιχεῖα, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, ἐξ ὧν νοοῦμεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεγονέναι. Cf. Philo, Opif. Mundi 146 (I. 35). The body συγκέκραται ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, ἐκάστου τῶν στοιχείων εἰσενεγκόντος τὸ ἐπιβάλλον μέρος πρὸς ἐκπλήρωσιν αὐταρκεστάτης ὕλης, ἣν ἔδει λαβεῖν τὸν δημιουργόν, ἵνα τεχνιτεύσῃ τὴν ὀρατὴν ταύτην εἰκόνα.

was shaped by God Himself,¹ and Justin would have nothing to do with those Jewish teachers who said that the body of man was a creation of angels.²

Justin's psychology has already been partially discussed in connection with his analysis of Platonism under the guidance of the Old Man. It was then found that Justin regarded man as endowed with a soul which included apparently all his non-bodily constitution except the reason, and which was probably to be considered as possessing a sort of mentality, and as being the seat of personality. The soul however was not especially exalted, though higher than the body, because human souls and animal souls were of the same nature. To this soul was granted a ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα which never became an integral part of the soul, but which imparted life and true reason to it. It was the business of man to guide his soul by this reason, and thus to make his soul worthy of retaining the πνεῦμα. The important assumption in this description, that the πνεῦμα imparted reason as well as life to the soul, was made formerly on the basis of analogy with the doctrines of contemporary Platonism which Justin clearly had in mind in writing the introduction to the Dialogue. A study of the remarks of Justin about human psychology in the rest of his writings confirms the impression that Justin believed man was thus equipped both with a personal soul and in addition with a divine element which at once gave life to the soul and imparted the highest reason.

From the few passages outside the introduction to the Dialogue where the soul is mentioned, we may conclude that Justin thought of it as a very human thing. It is no more to be conceived that God has a soul than that He has fingers and feet.³ Justin must have had material connotations with the word soul because he insisted that souls, after the death of the body, are still ἐν αἰσθήσει, have power of sensation,⁴ and he probably regarded the

¹ Dial. 29. 3 (246 E). Here God is represented as having *personally* formed even the foreskin.

² Dial. 62. 3 (285 D). See above p. 145.

³ Dial. 114. 3 (342 A).

⁴ Ap. I. 18. 3 (65 A).

soul as the seat of sensation in the body. Certainly the soul is the seat of desire¹ and hope.² But the soul has higher powers than sensation, emotion, and desire. It is in a sense intelligent. For Justin speaks of a "soul" which is confined by ignorance as being hard to change.³ so that he must have thought of both ignorant souls and souls which had some sort of knowledge. That is, the soul had to do with conceptions as well as with sensations and emotions. Similarly he exclaims that it should be far from a self-controlled soul to have certain erroneous conceptions about the gods.⁴ In both of these last references the soul evidently is intelligent to some extent, and in both, *ψυχή* might as well be translated "person" as "soul". Indeed the soul was the determining center of personality. Not the body, and, as we shall see, not the spirit or higher mind, but the soul is the focus of personal existence. It is the merging of personalities to make one great personality, the Church, which Justin describes as "being in one soul"⁵ The survival of the soul after death involves the survival of the personality.⁶ The great need of man is to make this soul pure,⁷ for when the soul is pure the person is himself pure.

Justin does not account for the origin of the soul. He probably did not think it existed before its appearance in a body, or at least he did not describe the soul of one man as the re-incarnation of another. In the introduction to the Dialogue Justin examines this Platonic belief and completely rejects it; the soul is something begotten (here in the sense of created),⁸ and hence cannot be the eternal subject of metempsychosis. But Justin says that though souls are begotten, they are not begotten in connection with

¹ Dial. 8. 1 (225 B).

² Dial. 44. 4 (263 B).

³ Ap. I. 12. 11 (60 B).

⁴ Ap. I. 21. 5 (67 C).

⁵ Dial. 63. 5 (287 B).

⁶ Dial. 105. 4 (333 A).

⁷ Dial. 14. 2 (231 D).

⁸ Dial. 4. 5.

the body.¹ That is, Justin also expressly rejects the Aristotelian belief that the soul was *σώματος τι*,² a property or attribute of the body, in the sense that no soul can exist where there is no body. Apparently in Justin's opinion each soul is begotten to be joined to a particular body, but in its begetting it is an independent existence. The reason for Justin's rejection of the Aristotelian doctrine is obvious. Aristotle concluded from his explanation of the soul that the soul could not survive the death of the body. Justin, wishing to teach a doctrine of the immortality of the soul, was accordingly careful to keep the soul's origin and nature independent of that of the body.

But Justin speaks repeatedly of a part of man which is much more intimately connected with the Divine Logos than he admits in the case of the soul. In every man there is a divine particle, his reason, which at least before Christ's coming was man's best guide in life, Justin believes.³ Only as one directs his soul life by the leadings of reason can he become pure. An individual man can live *μετὰ λόγου* or *ἄνευ λόγου* as he pleases,⁴ but the consequences are for himself to bear. What distinguished the ancient philosophers was the fact that they were exceptional men who had lived *μετὰ λόγου*, and their reward is not lost by the fact that they were killed by man living *ἄνευ λόγου*.⁵

Justin has two terms for this higher divine principle in man. He called it a part of the Logos,⁶ or of the Spermatic Logos,⁷ or the πνεῦμα in man.⁸ The apparent discrepancy of these terms has already in part been explained in the discussion of the Spermatic Logos.⁹ What-

¹ Dial. 5. 2 (223 B) ὅλως κατ' ἴδιαν καὶ μὴ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων σωμάτων αὐτὰς (ψυχὰς) γεγονέναι.

² De Anima 417 a. 14 ff.

³ Ap. II. 10. 8 (49 A) ὁ ἐν παντὶ ὄν might mean "all pervading", but probably means "present in every man".

⁴ Ap. I. 46. 3, 4 (83 C, D).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ap. II. 10. 8 (49 A).

⁷ Ap. II. 13. 3 (51 C).

⁸ Dial. 6. 2 (224 C).

⁹ See above pp. 16, 161.

ever else may have been the activity of the Spermatic Logos, it is present in a unique form in man. For while it probably is the ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα in all other forms of life, in man it is a σπέρμα in the specially technical sense of being the principle of resemblance between man and the Ancestor of whose Spermatic Logos he is constituted. That is, its presence is a higher intelligence like to the mind of God. But the presence of the Spermatic Logos is a presence of the Logos Himself in man. It has been customary, since Duncker's exposition, to think of a contrast between the σπέρμα παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, that is the personal Logos, and the Spermatic Logos in man, on the understanding that the Logos fragment in man is an emanation from the Logos, in the same way as the Logos Himself is an emanation from God, and hence that as the part of the Logos in man is inferior to the entire Logos, so the entire Logos is inferior to God.¹ But Justin betrays no sense of such a contrast. The Logos, he thought, was a spermatic effluence from God which appears in fragments in individual human beings. Justin confuses the subject by asserting the incarnation, and hence the personality, of this seminal spiritual effluence from God as a totality. But the fact that he has left strict philosophy to personalize sharply the totality of the Logos does not imply that he has changed also the significance of the "part" of the total Logos or νοῦς. We have already seen that to say that the human mind is a τοῦ βασιλικῶν νοῦ μέρος² does not imply a mutilation or partition of the βασιλικὸς νοῦς. The βασιλικὸς νοῦς, or the Logos, can be present in partial representation in the human constitution without itself being divided. So as the Logos according to Justin is God's Spermatic Logos, or the Sperma of God, it can be present in man without a second emanation or series of emanations from itself, and at the same time without being divided. The higher mind of man is thus itself the Spermatic Logos of God. The inferiority of the human mind to the Logos is the inferiority of a part to the whole, not of a derivative to its source.

¹ Duncker (Bibl. 339) pp. 25 ff.

² Dial. 4. 2 (221 E).

A single statement of Justin throws light upon two phases of this divine presence in man. Justin has been describing the fact that Socrates lived his life in harmony with what of the Logos he could apprehend. It was accordingly Christ that Socrates was unwittingly following, for Christ "was and is the Logos in every man, and it was He who foretold all things through the Prophets For He (Christ) is a power of the ineffable Father, and not the mere instrument of the human reason."¹ Here again it is asserted that it is the universal Logos Himself, and not a seed from the universal Logos, which is present in *all* men, and that through this spiritual presence may come the inspiration to prophecy. The implication is clear. At ordinary times the higher mind plays a co-ordinate part in the human constitution, though it always should be the guide of all the lower parts. But occasionally this spiritual divine element is greatly expanded. With the expansion comes supernormal perception of the truth, immediate apprehension of divine thought, and, either then or later, expression of the truth thus revealed. Such inspiration, we have seen, is usually though not always attributed to the Spirit. But here the confusion of Spirit and Logos is complete, and makes abundantly clear the fact that to Justin the Spermatic Logos, in man as well as universally, is a spiritual flow rather than a "kernel".

This sort of inspiration we have seen to have been the great source of metaphysical knowledge in Justin's opinion. But there was an inferior method of getting at such knowledge. For, small an amount of this divine seminal Spirit as each man has, if he disciplines himself properly he may make some progress by it toward understanding the truth and pleasing God. For the operation of this particle in man is one of immediate perception of the truth. It is the principle which produces the likeness between man and God. In true Stoïc fashion Justin taught that the presence of the Spermatic Logos implies *μετουσία και μίμησις*, participation and resemblance.² By

¹ Ap. II. 10. 8 (49 A).

² Ap. II. 13. 6 (51 D).

the presence of the sperma we have participation in the divine Source of the Logos, that is in God Himself, and are granted similar characteristics. The similar characteristics can only refer to rational potentiality, for so only in that day could any likeness between man and God have been considered possible. The sperma provides man with "natural conceptions" (*φυσικὰς ἔννοιαις*),¹ just as the presence of the higher mind accounted to Aristotle for the innate knowledge of the axioms upon which all knowledge in his opinion was founded. Especially, Justin is convinced, is this true in the moral realm. All men know certain general principles of right and wrong, he argues,² because all man have this particle of the Divine Mind within them. The Father has always taught men through the Logos to do the same things as Himself.³ This has been the way of living the Christian life before the coming of Christ. As one suppressed his lower nature, and lived according to the direction and light of this divine guide he was a follower of Christ, in a partial sense (*ἀπὸ μέρους*) knew Christ.⁴ For this reason the Christians claim as part of their system whatever has been well and rightly said at any time and under any conditions, for no one can speak the truth except in proportion to his share in the Spermatic Logos.⁵

The presence of this particle implies an active not a passive apprehension. What truth the philosophers and historians have been able to discover and relate they have *found* and *reasoned* out by the instrumentality of this fragment of the Logos.⁶ As Puech has well observed, Justin's language implies not mystic contemplation so much as active rational inquiry. The highest part of man is not a capacity but a force and power. This agrees with Justin's calling the highest part of man a spirit of life, and is in

¹ Dial. 93. 1 (320 D).

² Ap. II. 8. 1 (46 B ff.).

³ Ap. II. 9. 2 (48 A).

⁴ Ap. II. 10. 8 (49 A).

⁵ Ap. II. 13. 3 (51 C) ἀπὸ μέρους τοῦ σπερματικοῦ θεοῦ λόγου.

⁶ Ap. II. 10. 2, 3 (48 C). Cf. Puech (Bibl. 334) p. 67. n. 1, and the translation of Veil which is here excellent.

harmony with the best thought of the Greek world about the highest intelligence in man. Justin conceived that the true object of knowledge was Deity. Christ, Justin says, was the incarnation of the entire Rational Principle, while Socrates had only a part of the Rational Principle.¹ But the activities of the part of the Rational Principle in Socrates led him to a partial knowledge of the Logos-Christ, that is of the Rational Principle as a whole. Socrates' knowledge was ἀπὸ μέρους, and did not embrace τὰ πάντα τοῦ λόγου. In other words the Logos was functioning in Socrates with partial success to discover by rational investigation the entire Logos. The Rational Principle as a whole, the Logos-Christ, in turn functions by rational investigation to discover the Father and to reveal Him to all men. Accordingly, as all rationality is an effluence from the Father, its activity may be described as ever back toward the Father. The same conception Justin expressed in the introduction to the Dialogue as follows: after asserting that a part of the βασιλικὸς νοῦς is in us, he says that as the βασιλικὸς νοῦς sees God, so it is also possible for us by means of our minds to comprehend divine things.²

It is quite evident from the nature of the particle of the Logos in a man that it is not the seat of his personality. The individual has a share in the divine effluence, and receives certain intellectual abilities thereby, but the center of personality of this indwelling part of the Logos is not in the individual man but in the Universal Logos. Feder has tried to minimize the connection between the Logos-Christ and the sperma in every man, but without conviction.³ The totality of the Logos is the personal Christ; the sperma in man is a μέρος of this personal Logos. Such a conception is of course utterly foreign to the true signification of the terminology. To distinguish the personality of the Spermatic Logos from the personality of the Source was a contradiction of terms. But such contradiction of terms had for at least decades been the Christian explanation of the divine personality of Christ, and Justin

¹ Ap. II. 10. 1, 7, 8 (48 B—49 A). Cf. below p. 240.

² Dial. 4. 2 (221 E).

³ (Bibl. 350) p. 137.

is here only passing on the tradition which he had received.

The activity of the Logos or Spirit in man is particularly the object of demonic attack. Once the demons can suppress its influence, darken its light,¹ the soul is helplessly in their power. The soul is at once the battlefield and prize of victory between two warring factions, the demons and the Logos in man. Ordinarily the demons are victorious, but occasionally the battle has gone the other way. The victory of the Logos means a victory over the baser elements of the soul, a raising of the moral tone of the soul, and hence its purification and preparation for salvation after death. Victory of the demons means the exaggeration of the lower elements of desire in the soul, which the demons use as their allies in the struggle,² and consequently the total unfitness of the soul for future life with God.

In a real sense the soul can turn the tide of this struggle. Justin everywhere is positive in his assertion that the results of the struggle are fairly to be imputed to the blame of each individual. The Stoic determinism he indignantly rejects. Unless man is himself responsible for his ethical conduct, the entire ethical scheme of the universe collapses, and with it the very existence of God Himself.³ The presence of the higher reason in the soul removes all excuse. Men were made λογικοί καὶ θεωρητικοί,⁴ and there is in the soul of every man the ability to ally himself with this part.

The will is thus a function of the ψυχή, of the personality. The higher intellect would of course exercise no compulsion upon the soul. It can lead and persuade,⁵ but cannot do so against the will of the soul.⁶

Whether Justin ever actually thought of a trichotomy or not is difficult to say. Philosophers who taught

¹ Ap. I. 10. 4—6 (58 B ff.).

² *ibid.*

³ Ap. II. 7. 3 ff. (45 D ff.).

⁴ Ap. I. 28. 3 (71 C).

⁵ Ap. I. 10. 4 (58 D).

⁶ For Justin's argument in favor of human freedom see below p. 226.

practically the same doctrine varied in calling this rational principle only the higher part of the soul, or a separate and co-ordinate part of the human constitution. Justin is not greatly interested in the question because from the ethical point of view the decision is quite indifferent. In either case the lower instincts of man are to be made subject to the higher intelligence which is alone divine and immortal of its own right and nature. On the whole however Dialogue 6 seems slightly to turn the balance in favour of a presumption that Justin believed in a threefold division of human nature. There, it has been seen, Justin concludes that the soul of itself is not immortal, nor even alive. It only lives in virtue of there having been put into it a living Spirit, which we have concluded was to be identified with the *μέρος τοῦ σπερματικοῦ λόγου*. Also careless as Justin usually is in terminology, he never outside the introduction to the Dialogue confuses the word *ψυχή* with this higher intelligence. The indications seem to point to the fact that he believed in a human trichotomy.¹

Whence had Justin this doctrine of the higher nature of man, the *μέρος τοῦ σπερματικοῦ λόγου*? It has been seen that though Justin is using the terminology figuratively, he is surprisingly careful in his use of terms about the Spermatic Logos to keep the figure accurate, except in attributing personality to the Spermatic Logos. That the *σπέρμα* in man involved both *μετουσία* and *μίμησις* could not be improved upon as a description of the Stoic doctrine. The use of this terminology is indeed usually represented as Justin's personal elaboration of Christianity in the hope of making Christianity attractive to Stoics.² But is Justin personally borrowing direct from Stoicism? "The supposition is an unnatural one," said Neander; "forming our estimate of Justin especially from his own writings, we could hardly

¹ If Justin believed in trichotomy, which seems very likely, the soul was part of the creation of man from the dust. *τὸ πλάσμα, ὃ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν Ἀδὰμ, οἶκος ἐγένετο τοῦ ἐμφυσηματος τοῦ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ.* Dial. 40. 1 (259 A). Cf. below pp. 240 ff.

² E. g. Duncker (Bibl. 339) pp. 25 ff., Feder (Bibl. 350) p. 137, and Puech (Bibl. 334) pp. 71 ff., alike represent Justin as importing Stoic terminology, but unable to adapt himself to it accurately because of his Platonic bias.

give him credit for possessing versatility of mind enough to range so freely in a circle of ideas which had merely been borrowed from abroad to answer a present purpose." The judgment of Neander can only be justified by the discovery, outside Justin, of a link which his psychology might have had to connect it with that of the Stoics. Such a link is to be found in Philo.

It has been already seen that Philo applied the adjective Spermatic to the Universal Logos with apparently the same meaning as the word bears in Justin. Philo had, while much more elaborate, a conception very similar to that of Justin about the presence of the Logos in the soul of man as the organ of the soul for metaphysical knowledge. When man was made, Philo says, the thing that God formed from the earth was the mind which was to be infused into the body but had not yet been so infused. (The body was made by the lower powers and not directly by God.) This mind would have been a very earthly thing had God not breathed into it *δύναμιν ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς*. By this act the earthly mind became a soul intelligent and truly living.¹ That is, Philo, while retaining a dichotomy, had the same distinction as Justin between the earthly mind and that Divine Spirit in man whose presence furnished true intelligence and life at the same time. Thus far Philo and Justin, with the exception of the dichotomous division, are perfectly agreed.² The same argument is to be found in the matter of the metaphysical nature of this divine Life-Intelligence Power which was breathed into the earthly mind of man. That which was inbreathed was itself the only true *νοῦς* in man.

¹ Philo Leg. Al. I. 32 (I. 50); somewhat abridged. An elaborate analysis of this passage will be found in Hans Leisegang's *Der Heilige Geist*, I. i (Leipzig und Berlin 1919) pp. 85 ff. Leisegang's otherwise highly valuable treatment of Philo's doctrine of the *πνεῦμα* is marred by his regarding the *πνεῦμα* too much as an independent conception, while he does not pay sufficient heed to the intricate complication between the *πνεῦμα* and *λόγος* of Philo.

² The origin of Justin's trichotomy is ordinarily assigned to I. Thess. v. 23. See Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 363, Heinisch (Bibl. 394) p. 167. But caution must always be exercised in saying that any statement of Justin comes from a definite literary source. Trichotomy is also found in Josephus, and was probably widely believed. See Josephus, *Ant. I. 1. 2.*

The soul already possessed νοῦς, a ἡγεμονικῶν of the soul. But with the inbreathing of God there came into this νοῦς such a spirit of intelligence as transformed it from being unworthy to being a mighty instrument which could even in a similar way inspire the rest of the body. Philo continues his discussion by contrasting that which was breathed into the ideal type man, and that into the human man. The ideal type man, says Philo, received the actual Spirit of God, but the man made from matter can have not the full Spirit but only a faint vaporous exhalation from the Spirit like the fragrance of spices.¹ The closeness of this idea to the spermatic logos of the Stoics will be at once recognized. For the physical spermatic logos of the Stoics was a vaporous presence in the damp, a part of a flow of inexpressibly fine vapour which might go out from any sense organ to constitute that sense, but which flowing into the damp of the seminal fluid was called the spermatic logos. The cosmic spermatic logos of Philo was the generative substance of all things, generating an effluence which is the spirit in the human man, but which is only properly present in the Heavenly Man, the Platonic type man.² The similarity to Justin's thought is made more striking when it is recalled that the Heavenly Man of Philo, which he here says alone can receive the Logos entirely, was one of the first Hellenistic Jewish conceptions applied to Christ by St. Paul.³ Similarly Philo says that the souls of more perfect men are nourished by the entire Logos, but that we must be content to be nourished by a part of it (μέρει αὐτοῦ).⁴ Here is the thought of a contrast of a part of the Logos with the whole, and (from the context) the notion of relatively large apportionments of the Logos ac-

¹ Leg. Al. I. 42 (I. 51). It will be noticed that the double emanation of Logos from God, and of human πνεῦμα from the Logos denied above to Justin is admitted by Philo. Justin had no need of such a doctrine when he had rejected Philo's intermediary type man from creation. For the type man is only partially to be compared to the Logos-Christ of Justin.

² On Philo's Spermatic Logos see Karl Herzog, *Grundlagen und Grundlinien des philonischen Systems*, Leipzig 1911, pp. 36—40.

³ E. g. I Cor. xv. 45.

⁴ Leg. Al. III. 176 (I, 122).

ording to the virtue of the individual. Again Philo speaks of God as sowing seeds in men which cause them to bring forth the fruits of virtue. "God, opening the wombs, sows good actions into them. When the womb has received virtue from God it does not bring forth to God, . . . but to me, Jacob, for it was for my sake, probably, that God sowed seed in virtue, and not for His own."¹ Likewise Philo says that that which "openeth the womb of the mind, so as to enable it to comprehend the things appreciable only by the intellect, or of the speech so as to enable it to exercise the energies of voice, or of the external senses, so as to qualify them to receive the impressions which are made upon them by their appropriate objects, or of the body to fit it for its appropriate stationary conditions or motions, is the invisible σπερματικός και τεχνικός θεϊος λόγος."² Here is a perfect jumble of Stoic figures. The Logos is itself the σπέρμα which empowers every human function, including the activity of the mind. The important point for our purpose is Philo's obvious familiarity with the Stoic doctrine of the spermatic logos, the use of the technical language figuratively in connection with the Universal Logos, and the conception that the presence of this Spermatic Logos in man was an incomplete presence of the universal λόγος-πνεῦμα, which empowered the lower mind to grasp metaphysical truth (τάς νοητάς). So Philo says that every man in virtue of his intelligence is inhabited by the Divine Logos.³

It is clearly quite unnecessary to go beyond the supposition, which we have already seen much reason for making, of a strong Philonic tradition in Justin's Christianity, in order to account for Justin's doctrine of the Spermatic Logos, and with it for his psychology.⁴ It is

¹ Leg. Al. III. 181 (I. 123).

² Quis rer. div. Haer. 119 (I. 489).

³ De Opif. Mundi 146 (I. 35). πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὑκρίεται λόγῳ θεῖῳ, τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως ἔκμαγεῖον ἢ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γεγονώς. A statement of Philo's views on this point will be found in modern philosophical terminology in Karl Herzog, op. cit., pp. 85 ff.

⁴ Friedländer has unsuccessfully tried to connect Justin's fragment of the Logos in the heathen with the early Jewish saying

probably an early form of the same tradition in Christianity which was expressed in the words, "In him was life, and the life was the light of men, That was the light which lighteth every man which cometh into the world."¹ The entire conception is only difficult for us because of our instinctive connotation of kernel or grain with the word seed. Once it is understood that Justin's generation thought of the seminal, germinal force in a seed as being a spiritual gaseous presence, it is easy to see how Justin's few remarks about the Spermatic Logos might not be going beyond a very popular comprehension of his subject.

At death the body was cut off from the soul, while the soul, still retaining the spirit, continued to live. Justin finds proof of the survival of the soul after the death of the body in necromancy, divinations upon children of abortive birth, spiritualistic evoking of the departed, the power of magicians through their familiar spirit, mad men and demoniacs (who were possessed by souls of wicked dead man), and the oracles, as well as in the literary testimony of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, Socrates, the pit of Homer,² and the descent of Odysseus.³ But the few remarks which Justin makes in passing concerning the state of existence of souls after death are so contradictory as to make certainty about his beliefs impossible. For example he says that after death the souls of all men are ἐν αἰσθήσει,⁴ but in another passage that the souls of the blessed live ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ καὶ ἀφθαρσίᾳ καὶ ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ ἀθανασίᾳ.⁵ The two passages may be reconciled perhaps on the basis of a contrast between the life of the wicked and good souls after death, but the first statement is clearly intended as applying to all souls. All dead men go to Hades, we may infer from the statement of Justin that God did not allow Christ to remain in Hades like an ordinary man.⁶ But Hades itself

that the Hebrews had the entire word of God, while the Gentiles had only half. Cf. (Bibl. 222) p. 88, 143 Anm. 1.

¹ John i. 4, 9.

² Odys. xi. 25.

³ Ap. I. 18. 2—5 (65 A. B).

⁴ Ap. I. 18. 3 (65 A).

⁵ Dial. 45. 4 (264 B).

⁶ Dial. 99. 3 (326 C).

seems to have been divided. For Justin says (in the person of the Old Man) that at death the souls of the good in a better place, the souls of the wicked in a worse place, await the coming judgment.¹ But they are there not cut off from human and demonic annoyance. The souls of the wicked apparently join the demonic host at once upon death. It is they whose presence in human beings causes demonic possession.² But even though in a better place in Hades, the souls of virtuous men are also in great danger of demonic captivity. For in one passage Christ is represented as praying that His soul, after His death, may not fall under the power of necromancers or evil angels of any kind, and Justin gives the slavery of the ghost or soul of Samuel to the Witch of Endor as an example of the danger even the best of men encounter after death.³ Christians may be spared this ignominy by praying like Christ for special deliverance; but since Samuel, one of the Old Testament saints who are to be saved, suffered such an indignity, his condition may be taken as typical of the state possible for all souls awaiting the resurrection. Justin denies as a terrible heresy the belief that at death souls return at once to God. To be Christians men must believe in a resurrection from the dead which all souls await.⁴ But Justin is insistent that all souls survive death; the good souls live eternally, the bad souls so long as God wishes them to exist and be punished.⁵ Justin did not explain this statement, but it is intelligible in terms of the psychology Justin elsewhere elucidates. When the wicked soul is sufficiently punished the *πνεῦμα* is withdrawn, and thereupon the soul at once ceases to exist. But Justin also says, and more

¹ Dial. 5. 3 (223 B). Feder thinks that this means that the division of souls for heaven and hell takes place at death. But he is certainly wrong. Justin's language does not in the least suggest heaven. See (Bibl. 350) p. 247. n. 5.

² Ap. I. 18. 3 (65 A).

³ Dial. 105. 3 ff. (333 A, B), cf. Ap. I. 18. 3 (65 A).

⁴ Dial. 80. 4 (307 A).

⁵ Dial. 5. 3 (223 B); cf. 88. 5 (316 A) where Justin says that punishment is allotted to each sinner according to the discretion of God.

usually thought, that the punishment of hell is eternal.¹ Justin's views about the Resurrection and Judgment will be discussed under his Eschatology.

C. SIN

It has been stated that Justin believed in man's moral freedom, as well as in moral freedom for the angels. He would have nothing to do with predestination, and stops in his argument repeatedly to explain away any such implication which might appear in Scriptural passages he is quoting. There is, Justin believed, a sort of physical necessity which is about us. We are begotten without our knowledge or consent and brought up into bad habits by wicked training. As such we may be called the children of necessity. But we all have an opportunity to become children of choice if we accept the new birth of baptism.² In other words, we are brought up in a world where the environment prompts a normal choice of sin. But every man is born intelligent and capable of making the choice for good for himself, and hence he alone is responsible if he refuses to choose properly.³ Justin adduces Scriptural proof of human liberty, and even asserts that the famous Platonic dictum, "The blame is his who chooses, but God is blameless," was taken by Plato directly from Moses.⁴ In almost the same words Justin says in the Dialogue that neither men nor angels have ever been made wicked by God's fault, but each man by his own fault is whatever he shall appear to be.⁵ God's foreknowledge of future events which makes prophecy possible does not imply predetermination.⁶ Similarly in God's providential care and rulership in the world Justin says that there has

¹ Ap. I. 8. 4 (57 B); 18. 2 (65 A); Ap. II. 1. 2 (41 C); Dial. 130. 2 (359 D); cf. below p. 287.

² Ap. I. 61. 10 (94 C).

³ Ap. I. 28. 3 (71 C). See above pp. 219.

⁴ Ap. I. 44. 1—8 (81 B—E); cf. Plato, Republic, X. 617 e.

⁵ Dial. 140, 4 (370 A). οὐκ αἰτία τοῦ θεοῦ οἱ προγενωσκόμενοι καὶ γενησόμενοι ἄδικοι, εἴτε ἄγγελοι εἴτε ἄνθρωποι, γίνονται φαῦλοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστος αἰτία τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, ὅποιος ἕκαστος φανήσεται.

⁶ Dial. 141. 2 (370 C).

never been any real encroachment of the moral freedom of man. God would warn Mary and Joseph of the coming massacre of the innocents and bid them fly to Egypt, but He would not prevent Herod's committing the crime by killing him. This would be using compulsion on human beings, and compulsion God does not see fit to exercise.¹ He says that those who are prepared aforetime and repent and are baptised, will be saved,² but here repentance can be taken as defining the nature of the preparation for baptism which Justin had in mind, so that the statement in no way implies determinism. Similarly Justin speaks of Christians as being called through Christ to the salvation prepared beforehand by the Father,³ but the echo of Pauline phraseology cannot be pressed against Justin's frequent and sweeping statements of the freedom of moral choice which all men possess. For Justin states the issue fairly. Without free choice for all men there is no reason for thinking of the universe as moral in any sense, and the meaning of God as ruler of the world, if not His personal existence itself, is completely lost.⁴

But with man equipped with knowledge of what is right and wrong, and with complete freedom to choose, why does the vast majority of humanity choose the wrong? Justin answers this question by appealing not to a racial taint of sin from the first man, but to the activity of the demons. The sin of Adam is typical of our sin; the sins of our ancestors result in an evil atmosphere into which we must be born, a constant evil influence in which we must grow up,⁵ but there is no inherited guilt, and no racial depravity aside from the totality of individual offences. "Behold ye die like men and fall like one of the princes," means according to Justin that we all die like Adam and Eve (that is like men) and fall like the Serpent, who as one of the princes fell with a great fall because he deceived Eve. Each man might have become free from suffering

¹ Dial. 102. 2—4 (328 D, 329 A).

² Dial. 138. 3 (368 A).

³ Dial. 131. 2 (360 C), cf. Romans ix. 23.

⁴ Ap. II. 7. 9 (46 B).

⁵ Ap. I. 61. 10 (94 C).

and death like God if he had kept God's commandments, but instead of doing so each man wrought his own death for himself. As every man, then, has power like Adam and Eve to become a god, and a son of the Highest, so shall each man by himself be judged and condemned.¹ Justin speaks of an analogy between Mary and Eve. The activity of the Serpent began with Eve. Eve conceived from the logos of the Serpent and brought forth disobedience and death. Mary conceived from the Logos of God, and brought forth a Son by whom God destroys the serpent and the angels and men who are like him, but saves from death those who repented their wickedness and believe upon Him.² The analogy is not worked out in detail. As it stands the passage might be harmonized with a doctrine that subsequent generations after Eve were in bondage to disobedience and death because of her act, but it can as well be interpreted as referring to a succession of sinners who followed Eve's example. Such we gather from other passages was Justin's belief. The human race has fallen under the power of death and the guile of the Serpent from the time of Adam (not from the offence of Adam), and each member of the race has committed personal transgression. Men and angels alike are free to make their own decision on the important question.³ That is, the activity of the Serpent began with Adam and has continued ever since that time.

For our sins are not due to an inherited guilt, but to the fact that, hampered by the bad environment and influences in which we form our habits, and by the fact that the demons from Satan down are busy in unceasing activity to try to mislead us, the little divine element in us is hopelessly overpowered, and we of our own wish consent to follow the demons into disobedience. The only inherited tendency to sin in man seems to have been τὴν ἐν ἐκάστῳ κακίην πρὸς πάντα καὶ ποικίλην φύσει ἐπιθυμίαν, "the naturally wicked

¹ Dial. 124. 3 (353 D ff.).

² Dial. 100. 5, 6 (327 C).

³ Dial. 88. 4, 5 (316 A). On translating ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀδάμ, "from the time of Adam", cf. Dial. 92. 2 (319 C) ἀπὸ Ἀβραάμ. μέχρι Μωϋσέως . . . ἀπὸ Μωϋσέως and Mattes' (Bibl. 306) exhaustive analysis of the passages.

lust in every man which draws variously to all manner (of vice)."¹ But this ἐπιθυμία in man Justin must have regarded as one of the parts of the soul from creation, and cannot be taken as an inheritance of guilt from Adam.

Weber's description of the doctrine of universal depravity in the Talmudic literature precisely corresponds to Justin's belief. The Jews, according to Weber traditionally held that the fall of Adam brought death upon the race, put men under the influence of Satan, and made God more remote. But free will remained so that there is no idea of Sin as a universal necessity. There is no inherited sinfulness which has any actuality apart from the commission of acts of sin.² Philo retained the doctrine of free will as a popular explanation of the origin of human sin, but said that in reality the human mind could produce nothing on its own initiative, and that ultimately all action was of God. It is only to the uninitiated that one can speak of free choice.³ Drummond admits himself at a loss to reconcile the various statements of Philo about free will,⁴ but the explanation is not difficult. Philo accepts the Jewish doctrine of free will as well enough for practical purposes, and often speaks as though the popular doctrine were correct. But those initiated, that is those who can rise from the simple Jewish traditions to a philosophic point of view, may see a deeper truth underlying free will. We cannot agree then with the statements of von Engelhardt⁵ and Windisch⁶ that because Justin's doctrine of free will is not to be traced to any Old Testament or New Testament

¹ Ap. I. 10. 6 (58 D) ποικίλη seems to have been a familiar Cynic description of the evil nature of lust and pleasure. The word is thus used also in Philo, Leg. Al. II. 74, 75 (I. 79), and Justin probably had it from his Hellenistic Judaistic tradition. See Heinemann's note 2 in loco to his translation of the Leg. Al. (Breslau 1919, p. 75, n. 2).

² Weber, Jüdische Theologie, 224, 239 ff.

³ Drummond has collected the Philonic testimonies to the doctrine of free will, I. 346—350, though he has not quite correctly interpreted them.

⁴ Drummond, Philo, II. 347 note.

⁵ (Bibl. 313) p. 160.

⁶ (Bibl. 333) p. 14.

statements, it must therefore have been taken direct from Greek philosophy. For whether Justin's tradition came directly from Palestinian Judaism, or indirectly through Hellenistic Judaism, his doctrine of free will as the explanation of human sin is exactly the doctrine common to popular adherents of both sects of Judaism.

Windisch has further misrepresented Justin in arguing that a choice between good and evil, a knowledge of good and evil, such as Justin teaches, implies an objective good and an objective evil from which man may choose.¹ Justin would not have accepted these implications of his statements. He did not believe in an objective evil. Indeed, positive evil would in Justin's mind have been a contradiction in terms. Knowledge of good and evil is knowledge of the good, and knowledge that it is evil to depart from the good. Practically the heaped up sins of generations appear to represent an objective, positive evil which man may choose in preference to the good. But this evil is not an ontological antithesis to the good. Why the demons should have chosen to rebel against God Justin does not explain. But once they rebelled and made themselves into an army of renegades determined to defeat the purposes of God in man, their evil influence was the positive evil with which man was called upon to do battle. God is accordingly free from all responsibility in the origin of sin. He has made only the good. The necessity of attributing freedom of choice to the angels becomes apparent, for only by their having been free of choice could they have changed themselves, without any shadow of responsibility on God's part, from angels to demons, from the helpers to the cosmic enemies of God. Granted the existence of the evil demons, which was to Justin's mind as patent a fact as sunshine, they must either be the followers of an evil principle in ontological opposition to God (as the Manichaeans taught); or have been the evil creation of the good God, which is unthinkable; or have made themselves evil. Justin accepts

¹ (Bibl. 333) p. 14. "Die Wahlfreiheit hatte zwei Objekte zu ihrem Gebrauch: Gut und Böse. Das Böse ist das eine Glied eines konträr-gegensätzlichen Begriffspaares." Windisch has here the reasoning of von Engelhardt (*loc. cit.*) in mind.

this last proposition, not because he had any adequate explanation of the fall of the angels, but because if the angels had made themselves evil he could defend the character of God without necessitating ontological dualism between good and evil. Man is a sinner because he allows the demons to lead him into rebellion against the Law of God which every man has within him as part of his divine equipment for life.¹ He is in need of salvation, for his rebellion has made him like the demons, and worthy to share their condemnation. But it is a race sinfulness made up of the sins of individual men, rather than a race corruption inherited from a fallen first parent, which, Justin thinks, Christ came into the world to counteract.

It must then be noticed that Justin has no trace of a horror of sin as sin. His conversion was not in the least prompted by a "conviction of sin", and the sin-sickness of the seventh chapter of Romans has no echo in his writings. Sin is an act of rebellion against God, not a state of corruption. Sin must result in damnation, and without a doctrine of future rewards and punishments morality has no meaning. So, as we shall see, Justin looks for a salvation which will remove the penalty of sin and ensure escape from hell. But in his regarding human sin from the point of view of the activity of the demons, if he departs from the Pauline conception it is not to become more philosophical, but more primitively Christian in the sense of being more in accord with the notions of popular Judaism. The point has been clearly demonstrated by Dr. Conybeare.² In the Synoptics, and even in the Fourth Gospel,³ the origin of sin is the fault of demons who enter into a man and prompt him to sin, while the conception of redemption in the Synoptics, especially, is exclusively expressed in terms of exorcism. Similarly the struggle with demons is the outstanding characteristic of Justin's scheme of salvation.

¹ Dial. 141. 1 (370 B).

² (Bibl. 328) see especially p. 582.

³ Cf. the instance of Judas in John xiii. 2.

CHAPTER VIII

CHRIST

Justin Martyr lived in an age which was marked at once by the decadence and yet the transitional character of its thinking. The magnificent attempt of the classic philosophers to read the mystery of life by the sheer power of their own rational efforts had patently failed. Philosophers were arguing against philosophers, while each compounded his own theory of the universe by an eclectic harmonizing from the same few great sources of philosophic lore. The spectacle was regarded as a confession of failure by those outside the professional philosophic ring, and was secretly so interpreted by the philosophers themselves. For all schools of thinking and all classes of men admitted that the human constitution, in its normal condition, has no faculty which is sufficient in itself to guide men to the truth, or to bring them to that salvation which, under various explanations, all classes of men were seeking. The philosophers still looked upon the human mind as a divine thing, and glorified the rational processes of man as the manifest presence of Deity in the soul. But all schools put their main hope of being truly reasonable not so much in their own efforts and practice in reasoning as in the expansion of this reasoning faculty by a larger and ever larger indwelling of the divine *νοῦς* or *λόγος*. They found their peace of mind in dwelling not upon the powers of man as man, but upon the privileges of man as a part of God. The solution of their difficulties they found in a mystical union of self with the Universal Mind if they were of the Platonic tradition, or in a mystical sense of conformity to the decrees of Fate or the Universal Law if they were of the Stoic tradition.

The unphilosophic world similarly was seeking salvation from itself. The salvation it sought was only a popularization of the salvation for which the philosophers strove. By magic and mystery, rites and initiation, the man of the street sought likewise a sense of union with the divine, and an assurance that death would not mark the end of his existence. But however they explained it, both philosophical and unphilosophical men looked to a revelation, to an act of God, for their salvation. They could not save themselves; only as the God would come and dwell in them and enlighten them, could they hope to know adequately or follow the Way. In Plato's time it had been sufficient to declare that all men knew the right and wrong, and that each man chose for himself, while God was blameless. But that was not sufficient theodicy in Justin's day. The God whom the people of his generation demanded was one who did something for men besides leaving them to make their own choice. He must be a God who would help when men cried for assistance against the cruel odds all must face who wish to live according to their higher light. The Jews in the Dispersion who had the Law but could not keep it had long been in this position, and had long been as one of the many cults who were seeking in all possible ways for the God who could displace their weakness with His strength.

In this quest Christianity was not the first cult to shout Eureka, but it shouted it with a sustained conviction which eventually made it victor over all its rivals. It shouted it, most importantly, from crosses and in the arena, before judges and in the faces of executioners. The ancient world was amazed at such conviction, perceived that these despised people had the supernormal spiritual inspiration and enlargement of power which all were seeking, and, in spite of the prejudices which shut Christianity off from respectability, became Christian.

And so while Justin's age was one of decadence, it was also one of transition. In the philosophic world the breakdown of intellectual courage produced Neo-Platonism. In the popular world it resulted in the wide-spread acceptance of Christianity. The bitter enmity between the two which

at first characterized their relations gave away inevitably before a recognition of their similarity of purpose, and led to their ultimate amalgamation. Christians shouted their Eureka not only because in the Person of Jesus Christ they found their ideal, but because from that Person they believed that they were receiving the spiritual illumination, power, and peace which their souls were craving.

Justin's Christianity was precisely of this sort. Reason had been to him of no avail, the innate apprehensions of ethical truth had not been sufficient. He turned to a revelation, begun in the Prophets, culminating in Jesus Christ, which showed him the way. Christianity said, and Justin believed, that the Universal Reason, the beneficent Spirit, which men were everywhere seeking, had at last been made available to men by having become incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ. In Mary's womb the Mediator and Messenger of God, the Cosmic Reason, had become a human Being.

The divine human Person in whom Justin found his salvation was in his eyes also the Jewish Messiah. Extended as are Justin's demonstrations of how Christ fulfilled Old Testament prophecy, they do not lead one to believe that Justin associated a proportionate importance with the conception of Jesus' Messianic character. As an apologetic argument, to prove the antiquity of the Christian faith and the essential unity between revelation such as was given to the Jews and revelation in Christ, the Messianic character of Jesus was of the greatest significance. It gave probability and background for the Christian worship. But as to the significance of the Messianic character of Jesus for Gentiles, Justin has little to say. The contrast between Christianity and Judaism was in Justin's mind complete. It is the Son of God, the incarnate Logos, the Personality revealing the will and dispensing the mercy of God which attracts Justin's personal worship.

Justin practically ignores the problem of the purpose of the Incarnation as such. He has only one passage in which he comes near to speculating upon it. The conception of the Son of God by the Virgin Mary Justin contrasts with the conception of disobedience and death by

the virgin Eve after her intercourse (*συλλαβοῦσα*) with the *logos* of the Serpent.¹ But the passage appears to be only a literary figure suggested by the two virgins, both impregnated by a *logos*, rather than a complete antithesis between the fruits of the two. We have seen that no true doctrine of original sin is here implied,² nor is there any indication of a Pauline conviction of a racial significance in the Incarnation.

Justin's story of the Incarnation follows the narrative of Luke very closely, but with one important variation. Justin knew nothing of the mediation of the Holy Spirit in the impregnating of Mary. His tradition was the same as that which has come down to us. He says that the *δύναμις* of God, coming upon the Virgin, overwhelmed her and caused her while yet a virgin to conceive. Here is no mention of the Holy Spirit, but Justin introduces the Holy Spirit into the annunciation at a place where our text has no such reading, "Behold thou shalt conceive of the Holy Spirit, and shalt bear a Son." Whether Justin had a different reading, or whether he is not recalling from memory all the details in the right order, is a matter of no importance for us here, because in either case it is clear that both Holy Spirit and the *δύναμις θεοῦ* were included in Justin's tradition, and that the two were, as in Luke, identical. But in spite of his tradition Justin did not understand the significance of the words, at least as they were later interpreted, and said that this *δύναμις θεοῦ*, or *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* was none other than the *Logos*.³ Justin of course thought of the *Logos* as a *δύναμις θεοῦ*,⁴ as well as a Holy Spirit.⁵ We

¹ Dial. 100. 5 (327 C).

² See above p. 228.

³ Ap. I. 33. 6 (75 C). τὸ πνεῦμα οὖν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις ἢ τὸν λόγον, ὃς καὶ πρωτότοκος τῷ θεῷ ἐστὶ, ὡς Μωϋσῆς ὁ προδεδηλωμένος προφήτης ἐμήνυσε. See above p. 181.

⁴ Cf. Ap. I. 23. 2 (68 C); 32. 10 (74 B); 60.5 (93 B); Ap. II. 10. 8 (49 A); Dial. 105. 1 (332 C).

⁵ See Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 310. This is the only passage where the *Logos* is called a Spirit, but we have seen how the *Logos*, from the figure of the Spermatic *Logos*, was probably conceived of by Justin as a spiritual effluence from God. See above pp. 161 ff.

have seen no grounds for concluding that Justin identified the Holy Spirit and the Logos personally, but that it is very possible that he had no clear notion of either their metaphysical or functional distinction. He at least had not sufficiently clear a notion of the Holy Spirit to suppose that He could introduce the Logos into the womb of Mary. Such a function on the part of the Holy Spirit would have implied a parental relation and hence a superiority of the Spirit over the Logos. Justin did not wish to be obliged to reconcile such a contradiction with his usual doctrine that the Spirit was subordinate to the Logos, so he cut the knot by representing the Spirit and *δύναμις θεοῦ* of this passage as only other names for the Logos.

But this explanation of the traditional account of the Incarnation was not the only one Justin suggests. For in two passages, one in the First Apology and the other in the Dialogue, Justin suggests that the *δύναμις* was a *δύναμις τοῦ λόγου*. The statement in the Apology is that "through the agency of the *δύναμις* of the Logos He was born of a Virgin as man in accordance with the will of God who is Father and Ruler of all things,"¹ which is explained in the statement in the Dialogue that "Christ has come according to the *δύναμις* of the omnipotent Father which was given to Him."² The *δύναμις* of the Logos mentioned as the agent of incarnation in the Apology was thus something given to the Logos. It has been suggested that Justin meant by this *δύναμις* a personal Power, the Holy Spirit,³ but it is much more likely that Justin meant here only that God endowed the Logos with power to become incarnate. A glance at Justin's manner of speaking makes this clear. In one passage Justin says that Christ, as a *δύναμις* of God, had done by His own *δύναμις* what Plato had declared to be most difficult for men; Christ had found the Father of all and declared Him to men, for He is a

¹ Ap. I. 46. 5 (83 D, E). *διὰ δυνάμεως τοῦ λόγου κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς πάντων καὶ δεσπότητος θεοῦ βουλὴν διὰ παρθένου ἄνθρωπος ἀπεκνήσθη.*

² Dial. 139. 4 (369 A). *ὁ Χριστὸς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ παντοκράτορος πατρὸς δύναμιν δεθεῖσαν αὐτῷ παρεγένετο.*

³ By Trollope, Dial. in loco.

power of the ineffable Father.¹ Justin means that the Logos, as a *δυναμεις* of God, had God as His natural object of knowledge, but that this knowledge did not come to the Logos in passivity by a mystical impartation, but by the exercise of His own faculties or powers. That is, the *δυναμεις* of the Logos means here a faculty or ability of the Logos, not a personal Power. In this same sense Christ is said by Justin to have possessed a mystic power of God, by which He could overcome the demons.² Here again the power is definitely an ability given Christ by God. Justin's object in thus speaking of a power of the Logos is easily explained, for it is only a part of Justin's device for impressing upon his readers the subordination of the Son to the Father. The ability or faculty by which the Logos could vanquish the demons, or even could Himself know God, was nothing of Christ's own, but had been imparted to Christ by the Father to whom Christ "referred all things."³ The power thus given was still the Father's, for Christ made no boast of ever having done anything of His own will and strength,⁴ but it was not a personal Power, but only power which Christ had from the Father. It will thus be apparent that in declaring that Christ became incarnate *διὰ δυνάμεως θεοῦ* or *τοῦ λόγου*, Justin means in each case that God empowered the Logos to enter into the womb of Mary. There is not the least implication of a mediating personality in the Incarnation. The Logos, of His own God-given power, entered into the womb of Mary.⁵

¹ Ap. II. 10. 6—8 (48 E, 49 A).

² Dial. 49. 8 (269 C); 30. 3 (248 D).

³ Dial. 98. 1 ff. (324 D ff.).

⁴ Dial. 101. 1 (328 A).

⁵ The traditional character of the conception that Christ was completely subject to the Father, and received commandments and ability to execute the commandments from the Father, is demonstrated by the similarity between an element of Justin's theory of the Resurrection of Christ and a statement in the Fourth Gospel. Justin says that on the third day after the Crucifixion Christ rose from the dead, *ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ λαβὼν ἔχει*, Dial. 100. 1 (326 D). The Fourth Gospel says: *ἐξουσίαν ἔχω θεῖναι αὐτήν* (sc. *τὴν ψυχὴν μου*), *καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχω πάλιν λαβεῖν αὐτήν. ταύτην τὴν ἐντολήν ἔλαβον παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου*, John x. 18, cf. Mat. xi. 27.

Justin has no explanation of the way in which the Logos acted upon Mary.¹ He is content with the Lukan figure by which the Logos ἐπισχίασεν Mary, overwhelmed or overpowered her by His divine brilliance. Such a dazzling approach of Deity, we learn from the Gnostic tradition, was in itself normally attended by divine impregnation according to the thought of the time,² and Justin adds no refinement to this explanation. A virgin birth was the process of incarnation chosen because this process did not involve the sin of intercourse.³

The Incarnation was however in a sense a process of creation. The Incarnation was an operation of the power and will of the Creator of all things, in the same way as Eve was made from one of Adam's ribs, and as all living beings were created in the beginning by means of a logos of God.⁴ It is in this sense that the fragment of Justin in Irenaeus must be understood, "unigenitus filius venit ad nos suum plasma in semet ipso recapitulans."⁵ But the assertion of so remarkable a phenomenon needed evidence and defence. Justin considered that he had sufficiently proved his case when he first removed its antecedent improbability by comparing the Christian story with the myths of divine-human intercourse and children in the Greek legends. He insists that the Virgin Birth of Christ is no more incredible than the stories of the birth of Perseus,⁶ Dionysus,⁷ or Hercules,⁸ though these myths are only crass demonic imitations of the truth, because they represent the deity as having intercourse with human wo-

¹ As Eusebius did later for example when he compared the impregnation of Mary with Prophetic inspiration. See Leisegang, *Pneuma Hagion*. Leipzig 1922. p. 41.

² Cf. *Iren. Adv. Staer.* I. iv. 5.

³ *Dial.* 23. 2 (241 B); cf. Semisch's note on the passage, (*Bibl.* 118) II. 406. n. 2. The mss. reading has been much disputed here. Cf. Otto, n. 8, in loco. See also *Ap. I.* 21. 1 (66 E); 33. 4 (75 A).

⁴ *Dial.* 84. 2 (310 B). Cf. above pp. 163, 228.

⁵ *Iren. c. Haer.* IV. 6. 2.

⁶ *Ap. I.* 22. 5 (68 B); *Dial.* 70. 5 (297 B).

⁷ *Dial.* 69. 2 (294 D).

⁸ *Dial.* 69. 3 (295 A).

men.¹ Having removed the antecedent improbability, Justin seeks to establish an antecedent probability by proving that the Virgin Birth was long ago foretold by the Prophets. He adduces Is. vii. 14, "Behold a Virgin shall conceive", and against all the opposition of Trypho maintains his contention that the words refer to the birth of Christ.² The "Stone cut without hands" indicated the divine nature of His birth;³ Christ's blood was made by God not man, as typified by the blood of the grape.⁴ Actual contribution of evidence to the Virgin Birth Justin does not make. In only one point does he improve upon the accounts of Luke and Matthew. He traces the Davidic line of Christ not through Joseph but Mary.⁵ Indeed Justin's own belief in the Virgin birth has not the ring of conviction which he manifests on other points. He accepts the doctrine, but does not care to rest his whole case upon it. In both the First Apology⁶ and the Dialogue⁷ he admits that the Virgin Birth is not an essential part of the Christian Faith, and says that the divine nature of Christ can be proved quite independently of the story of His birth.

By the divine impregnation of the Virgin Mary, then, a God-Man came into being. Justin insists upon the fact that the Person thus born was both divine and human. Christ, a crucified man, was the first born of the unbegotten God, who shall Himself be appointed judge of all men;⁸ He was given the second place after God.⁹ Most of the statements about the relation of the Logos to the

¹ Ap. I. 21. 2 (67 C); 25. 2 (69 B); Dial. 67. 2 (291 B).

² Ap. I. 33. 1 (74 E); Dial. 67. 1 (291 A); 71. 3 (297 C); 84. 1 (310 A).

³ Dan. ii. 34. Dial. 76. 1 (301 B) et passim.

⁴ Gen. xlix. 11. Dial. 76. 2 (301 B) et passim.

⁵ Dial. 43. 1 (261 C); 45. 4 (264 A); 100. 2, 3 (326 D, 327 A); 120. 2 (348 B).

⁶ Ap. I, 22. 1 (67 E).

⁷ Dial. 48. 2, 3 (267 B—D).

⁸ Ap. I. 53. 2 (88 A).

⁹ Ap. I. 13. 4 (61 A). The apparent adoptionism of this phraseology must not be understood of the incarnate Christ. It has been shown that Justin regarded the Logos emanation as singled out by God for peculiar dignity among the other emanations. See above p. 158.

Father already discussed are made by Justin to describe the Christ. They apply as fully to the incarnate Christ as to the pre-incarnate Logos.¹ Indeed it is Justin's great argument that whereas in man there is only a part of the Spermatic Logos, Christ is the Entire Logos. Justin states his doctrine as follows: "It thus appears that our doctrines are more exalted than all human lore; for Reason in its entirety (that is Christ who appeared for our sake) became both body, and reason, and soul. For whatever the philosophers or lawgivers have ever uttered or discovered well, they have worked it out by discovery and dialectic by virtue of a part of the Logos (sc. with which they were endowed). But since they did not understand all about the Logos (who is Christ) they likewise contradicted themselves frequently Christ was the Logos who was and is in every man; as such He was partly known by Socrates, and He foretold future events, speaking both through the Prophets and in His own person when He became of like passions (sc. as ourselves) and taught these doctrines."² The significance of the latter part of this passage for anthropology has already been discussed. Here it is only necessary to notice two points. First the incarnate Christ is here completely identified with the entire Logos. Second the entire Logos, Justin says, became body, logos, and soul. There is no idea in Justin's mind that the Logos simply assumed a body, or that He took on humanity. In the incarnation the Logos became a man in all three respects, body, soul, and logos or spirit. We have seen grounds, entirely aside from this statement, for thinking that Justin regarded man as composed of three parts, body, soul, and the third part which Justin called indifferently a fragment of the Logos or the Living Spirit. Here, in this statement about the incarnation, Justin shows at once that to him "body, soul, and logos or spirit,"³ was a formula inter-

¹ Cf. e. g. Dial. 100. 4 (327 B); 125. 3 (354 C); 93. 2 (321 A).

² Ap. II. 10. In the last sentence the clauses have been slightly rearranged.

³ The fact that Justin mentions these three in an order to which we are not accustomed, body, logos, and soul, cannot cause any real difficulty as to their meaning.

changeable for the total constitution of man, and at the same time that he believed that the Logos of God became entirely a man. Christ was, as body, soul, and spirit, the Logos become man. He was not man in body, or in body and soul, and divine in a higher part of His nature; He was not human in body and soul, but possessing the entire Logos in place of the usual fragment of the Logos; He was man entirely inasmuch as He was a being made up of body, soul, and spirit, but He was the Logos entirely inasmuch as this body, soul, and spirit was what the Logos Himself in His entirety had become.

Justin's use of the tripartite formula for the human constitution of Christ has often suggested comparison with Apollinaris' teachings. There is however a great difference between them. Apollinaris was working on the problem of the relation of human and divine natures, and in the end denied any reality to the human nature. Apollinaris' real difficulty was the standing of the flesh of Christ. If it was human, there could be no salvation through it. Apollinaris answered in brief that as flesh of God, the flesh of Christ was not *ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν*.¹ Apollinaris' error was that he sacrificed the humanity of Christ to secure a consistent divinity. The "soul" which he in later life admitted to be a part of a human constitution would, in the case of Christ, like the flesh of Christ, be *θεός*, as a *ψυχὴ θεοῦ*.² That is, Apollinaris is thinking in terms of the *ἐνσάρκωσις τοῦ λόγου*, while Justin is thinking in terms of the Logos as having become a man. Justin resembled Apollinaris in teaching a trichotomous division of the human constitution, but was utterly unlike him in his approach to a doctrine of Incarnation, and in

¹ Fragm. 161 (ed. Lietzmann p. 254). Apollinaris says that this is too downright a statement of his position, but that there is little to be said against it. He preferred to consider the flesh of Christ as *ὁμοίωμα* rather than *ὁμοουσία*. When Apollinaris would say that *ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς καὶ μετὰ τῆς σαρκὸς ὁμοούσιος τῷ μόνῳ θεῷ* (Fragm. 153, ed. Lietzmann p. 248), he had indeed little ground for objecting to the doctrine that the flesh of Christ was not *ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν*.

² Paraphrasing Fragm. 153 (ed. Lietzmann p. 248).

his application of trichotomy to Christology. So Justin says that "Jesus Christ is the Son and Messenger of God, who formerly, being the Logos, appeared at one time in the form of fire, and in another in the likeness of bodies; now, by the will of God He has become man for the sake of the human race."¹ That is, Jesus Christ is at once the Logos of God who used to appear in theophanies, and that same Logos become a man.

The Christ was truly a man. He became *ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀνθρώποις*² not *ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων*.³ His blood was not from the human race but from the power of God. Humanity had no more to do with the making of the blood of Christ than with making the blood of the grape.⁴ He is no human product, no *ἀνθρώπινον ἔργον*.⁵ These statements together with Justin's declaration that Christ was not of human seed, are all made to prove that He was born of a Virgin. But they go much further than they need to go for such a purpose, since they deny to Christ all relationships with the human race, and their implication is not softened by admitting any contribution which the Virgin made to the formation of the God-Man. The process of man-becoming took place in the womb of the Virgin, but His blood was not made from Mary's blood, His flesh was not her flesh. The Virgin was an instrument in the process. Christ was made flesh *διὰ τῆς ἀπὸ γένους αὐτῶν παρθένου*, and as such He claimed to be descended from Adam, whence He received the title "Son of Man."⁶ But Justin insists that the title "Son of Man" should more properly take the form "*Like* the Son of Man", which indicates truly that he was a man, but not with human connections.⁷ Christ was a new creation, like the first creation of old, made directly by God.⁸ Thus the Logos

¹ Ap. I. 63. 10 (96 A). Reading a comma after *πρότερον*. Cf. Donaldson (Bibl. 143) p. 233.

² Ap. I. 23. 3 (68 C).

³ Dial. 76. 2 (301 B); 54. 2 (274 A).

⁴ Dial. 54. 2 (274 A).

⁵ Dial. 76. 1 (301 B).

⁶ Dial. 100. 3 (327 A).

⁷ Dial. 76. 1 (301 A).

⁸ Dial. 84. 2 (310 B) see above p. 238.

did not assume humanity, but became a human being. He was a man like men, but He had no real blood relationships with the human race.

But the humanity of Christ, though unique and not received from other men, was truly humanity.¹ Justin repeats with emphasis the fact that the coming of Christ, at least in the first advent, was *παθητὸς καὶ ἄδοξος καὶ ἄτιμος καὶ σταυρούμενος*.² He had become a man truly capable of suffering.³ Justin is found of using the adjective *ὁμοιοπαθῆς* to show Christ's complete similarity with other men in His humanity.⁴ He truly had flesh and blood.⁵ He grew from true infancy⁶ to manhood by normal steps; He ate normal food.⁷ Justin explicitly contradicts a docetic view of the sufferings of Christ when he says that in the Garden of Gethsemane Christ trembled in His heart and bones, His sweat fell down like drops of blood, His heart melted in His belly like wax. All this happened, Justin explains, that we might recognize that the Father for our sake wished His Son truly to experience such suffering, and that we might not say that as Son of God He did not feel what was happening to Him and being inflicted upon Him.⁸

But though He was thus human in His bodily life and growth, Christ had at all times His full powers as the Logos of God. As the Logos laid aside no part of His divine nature, as was explained above, so He was still able of His own God-given power to find God just as before the Incarnation, and was still able to speak the entire truth which men with only a fragment of the Logos had been able to find but imperfectly. Christ spake inspired truth not as the Prophets, who were moved

¹ Dial. 98. 1 (325 A). *ἀληθῶς γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ἀντιληπτικῶς παθῶν.*

² Dial. 110. 2 (336 D); cf. Dial. 14. 8 (232 D); 32. 2 (249 C); 36. 6 (255 B) et al.

³ Dial. 99. 2 (326 B).

⁴ Ap. II. 10. 8 (49 A); Dial. 48. 3 (267 C).

⁵ Ap. I. 66. 2 (98 A).

⁶ Dial. 84. 2 (310 B).

⁷ Dial. 88. 2 (315 C).

⁸ Dial. 103. 8 (331 C, D).

by a power outside themselves, but by the exercise of His own God-given faculties in finding the truth and declaring it.¹ Even as a child just born the demons recognized His supremacy by the coming of the magi. These had formerly been under bondage to the demons, but the coming of Christ gave the magi power to revolt from their bondage, and the visit to Christ was in thankful recognition of their new Master.² Even at His birth, concludes Justin, Christ was in possession of His power.³ It is with this view of Christ as the entire Logos become a true man while yet remaining the Logos that Justin comments upon the incidents recorded from the life of Christ.⁴

Justin tells the story of the birth of Christ by harmonizing the accounts of Matthew and Luke,⁵ only adding his strange interpretation of the mission of the magi, and the detail that Christ was born in a cave.⁶ After His normal growth to manhood⁷ He occupied Himself as a carpenter in making ploughs and yokes⁸ until at about the age of thirty⁹ He was publicly proclaimed to be the Son of God by the circumstances of His baptism by John. At that time a fire was kindled in the Jordan, the Spirit descended upon Him in the form of a dove, and a voice said, "Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee." Justin's protest against the natural implications of this incident, namely that Jesus came to baptism an ordinary man and was here chosen to be the Son of

¹ Ap. II. 10. 6, 7 (48 E).

² Dial. 78 entire.

³ Dial. 88. 2 (315 C).

⁴ Feder (Bibl. 350) devotes pp. 247—263 to the subject "Das Leben Jesu nach Justin."

⁵ See note 2.

⁶ Dial. 78. 5 (304 A); cf. Protev. Jac. xviii. 1, Is. xxxiii. 16. Donaldson (Bibl. 143) p. 237 says that Justin got this information from the passage of Isaiah mentioned, but this is impossible. Justin was uniting traditional fact with prophecy, not declaring all prophetic catchwords to have been facts.

⁷ See note 3.

⁸ Dial. 88. 8 (316); cf. Ev. Thomae xiii. 1.

⁹ See note 3.

God, annointed as such by the Spirit, and declared to be such by the Heavenly Voice, has already been examined in connection with Justin's doctrine of the Spirit. The change of text in the saying of the Heavenly Voice had not yet been made, or at least the change had not reached Justin, and he was bound to make some sort of explanation of the incident. The Spirit had therefore, Justin says, worked among the Jewish Prophets, but when it descended upon Christ in baptism it ceased from such activity, rested in Christ, and was thenceforth dispensed not to Jews but to followers of Christ. But Justin does not press this point, is content to let the baptism and its meaning go if he can avoid the obvious implication of the narrative. So the Voice is interpreted as a mere proof of Christ's divinity to men,¹ and an invitation to salvation by knowing Christ.² Whatever the passage may mean, Justin is saying, it must not mean that Christ at this time received His powers. For with these divine powers Christ was born.

The temptation which followed the baptism was only a typical incident from the entire career of the Logos. His name was from the beginning Israel, which signifies a man overcoming a power, Justin explains, and the temptation in which Christ overcame the power which is called Satan was only one of Christ's many victories over Satan.³ The significance of the passage for the work of Christ will be discussed later.

Justin firmly believed in the power of Christ to work miracles. It was prophesied that Christ should have such powers,⁴ and Justin, in a world where miracle workers were everywhere known, had no reason to question this power in his Lord. But because miracles were so common, they were not adequate evidence for His divine Sonship.⁵

¹ Dial. 88. 6 (316 B); cf. Dial. 8. 4 (226 B).

² Dial. 88. 8 (316 D). This is the generally accepted explanation of an obscure passage.

³ Dial. 125. 3, 4 (354 C—355 A). Understanding the *τότε* of section 4 (355 A) as indicating a temporary departure.

⁴ Ap. I. 48. 1 (84 C); Dial. 69. 4 ff. (295 C ff.).

⁵ Ap. I. 30.

and Justin gives the miracles actually very little attention. He asserts that the miracles of Simon Magus and Menander were the work of magical power, that is of demonic intervention,¹ and implies that the Christian miraculous power is of the Spirit.² But the nature of Christ's miraculous power he does not discuss.

The teaching of Christ, which he quotes exclusively from Synoptic tradition (with the exception of a few passages not in our canonical records),³ Justin regards as a power in its own right. "The word of His truth and wisdom is more inflaming and more illuminating than the rays (*δυνάμειων*) of the sun, even piercing into the depths of the heart and mind."⁴ Here Justin is thinking temporarily of the radiation of power from Christ as though Christ were Himself a source. But that such was not Justin's real explanation is shown in the assertion that Christ's preaching (His *logos*) was a *δύναμις θεοῦ*.⁵ Justin does not leave the impression that the *Logos* was ever a source of radiation of Powers. God Himself was the one source, and the *Logos* was always to be regarded as a mediatorial subordinate, not as a coordinate source of life. Christ found God and declared His message to men by the exercise of His God-given faculties, but the message which was uttered, the spiritual force which went from Him to men, was not originally a *δύναμις Χριστοῦ*, but a *δύναμις θεοῦ*. The conception of the Christian message as a Word of Power is familiarly Pauline, and will be discussed further under Justin's doctrine of salvation. Justin regarded the unique character of Christ's teaching as in itself sufficient demonstration of the Christian claim for His Messianic character and divine Sonship.⁶

¹ Ap. I. 26. 2 (69 D ff.); 56. 1 (91 B).

² Dial. 87. 5, 6 (315 A, B).

³ A collection of such passages is to be found in Otto, Dial., ed. 3, p. 590, 591.

⁴ Dial. 121. 2 (350 A). See above p. 149.

⁵ Ap. I. 14. 5 (62 D); cf. Dial. 102. 5 (329 C).

⁶ Cf. von Engelhardt (Bibl. 313) pp. 178, 179. In addition to evidence there quoted see Dial. 76. 3 (301 C).

Justin's comment upon the events of the week preceding the Crucifixion have little interest for his theological position except in the matter of his interpretation of the incident of the Garden which has already been discussed, and of the Last Supper which will be examined in connection with his doctrine of the Eucharist.¹

Christ was arrested on the day of the Passover and after His trial by Pilate was crucified on the same day.² That the Crucifixion of Christ was the supreme incident in the drama of the humanized Logos is attested again and again in Justin's reverent allusions to the Cross. He finds references to the Cross in all parts of the Old Testament.³ He sees the Cross in every aspect of nature.⁴ He reads it into Plato's *Timaeus*.⁵ The Cross is the supreme symbol of Christ's strength and rulership.⁶ It is the horn of a unicorn which shakes the peoples of all nations from idolatry, that is from demon worship, and turns them to the worship of God.⁷ The place in Justin's scheme of salvation which the Cross held will be discussed later. Justin adds to the Synoptic account of the Crucifixion only a few minor details of the mockery of the bystanders.⁸ The soldiers at the Crucifixion cried out, "Judge us."⁹ After the Crucifixion the disciples fled and denied Jesus,¹⁰ an action which they repented after Christ's Resurrection.¹¹

At death Christ descended into Hades. Justin says of this that the following passage has been taken out from the text of Jeremiah by the Jews; "The Lord God remembered His dead people of Israel who lay in the grave; and He

¹ See pp. 271 ff.

² Dial. 111. 3 (338 C). For the date implied by this statement see Otto n. 10 in loco.

³ E. g. Dial. 73. 1 (298 C); 86 entire; 97 entire; Ap. I. 35. 7 (76 B).

⁴ Ap. I. 55 entire.

⁵ Ap. I. 60. 5 (93 B).

⁶ Ap. I. 55. 1 (90 B); cf. above p. 159.

⁷ Dial. 91. 3 (319 D).

⁸ Dial. 101. 3 (328 B). On the text cf. Otto notes 13 and 14 in loco.

⁹ Ap. I. 35. 6 (76 B).

¹⁰ Ap. I. 50. 12 (86 A).

¹¹ Dial. 106. 1 (333 C).

descended to preach to them His own salvation."¹ Justin does not apply this directly to Christ, but apparently the verse was so familiar in that application that it needed no comment. In another passage Justin points out the ignorance of the people who supposed that they could put Christ to death, and that Christ would then remain in Hades like an ordinary mortal.² Here the emphasis is upon the word "remain". But Christ did not "remain" in Hades, for He received from His Father the ability to rise from the dead on the third day after the Crucifixion,³ or was raised from the dead by the Father.⁴

In His earthly career, Christ was completely sinless.⁵ But Justin says that notwithstanding His sinlessness, Christ was in need of salvation from God like any other man.⁶ Not in virtue of the divine Sonship, not by His own strength or wisdom, could Christ be saved. Without God even He was lost. But the meaning of this salvation is indicated in a statement that Christ was saved in being raised again after His death.⁷ That is, though Christ was sinless, once He had died He was like every other man in being completely in the power of death. Only an act of God could bring Him back from Hades into real life again. It is true that He had a sort of life in Hades, but true life, such as earth, and better still, such as heaven knows, would have been forever denied Him had not an action of God taken Him away from the land of the dead. The risen Christ

¹ Dial. 72. 4 (298 C). Not found in our texts, and supposed to be a Christian interpolation. It is twice quoted by Irenaeus, once as from Isaiah and once from Jeremiah. C. Haer. III. 20. 4, IV. 22. 1. The tradition of such a Scriptural passage is very old, however, for it clearly is assumed as familiar in I Pet. iii. 19, and iv. 6. Cf. Gosp. of Nicodemus. Donaldson (Bibl. 143) p. 239 goes too far in his reaction against Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 413 in not admitting the presumption which Justin's word's make in favor of his belief in Christ's descent into Hades.

² Dial. 99. 3 (326 C).

³ Dial. 100. 1 (326 C).

⁴ Ap. I. 45. 1 (82 D); Dial. 95. 2 (323 A); 106. 1 (333 B).

⁵ Dial. 17. 1 (234 D); 102. 7 (330 A); 103. 2 (330 C); 110. 6 (337 D).

⁶ Dial. 102. 7 (330 A), cf. Dial. 101. 1 (328 A).

⁷ Dial. 73. 2 (298 C).

returned to heaven with all the marks of His earthly career upon Him, so much so that He was at first not recognized by the Heavenly Host.¹ Now in heaven He is being detained by God until proper preparation has been made for His second coming.² While Christ awaits He is sitting upon the right hand of God.³

¹ Dial. 36. 5 (255 B).

² Ap. I. 45. 1 (82 D), cf. Hebr. x. 19.

³ Dial. 32. 3 (249 E).

CHAPTER IX
REDEMPTION AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

•It has been seen that according to Justin's view the human race is made up, practically without exception, of sinners. In spite of the fact that God has given to all men a divine guide to righteousness, and a free will by which they may, if they choose, live according to the eternal principles of right, men, under the influence of the demons and a sinful environment, actually choose the wrong. As a result we are all in urgent need of salvation, else, having chosen to follow the demons rather than the Logos, we shall be condemned by Him at the last judgment to suffer with the demons in eternal fire. Justin in no passage betrays a horror of sin as such, but he has a most vivid conviction of the imminent and frightful character of damnation.

•Thus with him the preparation for salvation is begun on earth in the forgiveness of sins, but salvation is actually received only when at the judgment the Christian is taken from the ranks of doomed humanity to be included in the number of the blessed. The Christians are brands snatched from the burning. They have lost their old filthy garments, but do not get new pure ones until the establishment of the eternal kingdom.¹ Justin says that as Noah was saved by water, faith, and wood, so shall those who have been prepared by baptism, faith, and the power of the Cross escape the coming Judgment of God.² This last statement is perhaps the best way in which Justin's views may be expressed. •The operation of grace which cleanses the soul from sin is a preparation for that salvation which is not received until the judgment day. Purity of life is a prerequisite for

¹ Dial. 116. 2, 3 (344 A, B).

² Dial. 138. 3 (368 A).

salvation, not a result of it, for Justin says that harlots and sinners of all nations, who have received the remission of sins and who no longer commit sins, are to be saved.¹ Salvation is synonymous with entering into the kingdom of heaven.² It is the same thought which Justin expresses in representing this ultimate salvation as a delivery from death. The kingdom into which good Christians are to enter when they are finally saved is one of eternal and unending life. So in this sense we have seen that Christ Himself, once dead, was like every dead person in need of salvation if He were to become alive again.³ Hence the work of Christ is expressed in terms of crushing death. "By the Son, God brings freedom from death to those who repent of their sins and believe upon Him."⁴ Death became despised in the first advent, and in the second appearance of Christ it will "cease completely from those who trust Him and live well pleasing to Him; for death will not exist any more after this when the one class shall be sent to be punished unceasingly, but the others shall live together in freedom from suffering, and decay, and grief, and death."⁵

Only one passage has with any probability been adduced⁶ to show that Justin conceives of salvation as a present deliverance from sin rather than as a future deliverance from death and hell. The passage is Justin's analogy between the Cross of Christ and the saving power of the brazen serpent. Those who believe on Christ receive "salvation from the fangs of the serpent which were wicked deeds, idolatries, and other unrighteous acts," for Christ on the Cross has "broken the power of the Serpent which occasioned the transgression of Adam."⁷ The significance

¹ Dial. III. 4 (338 D). The context immediately before this statement shows that the *σώζονται* here means "they are to be saved".

² Ap. I. 16. 8, 9 (64 A). The kingdom in Justin is of course always eschatological.

³ See above p. 248.

⁴ Dial. 100. 6 (327 D).

⁵ Dial. 45. 4 (264 A, B).

⁶ As, e. g., by Donaldson (Bibl. 143) p. 242, and Stählin (Bibl. 318) p. 38.

⁷ Dial. 94. 2, 3 (322 A, B).

of the passage for the power of the Cross will be considered later. That Justin considered forgiveness of sins as a part of the preparation for salvation is obvious from the statements already quoted, but it is quite exceptional to his usual manner of speech to call that forgiveness itself "salvation" as he does here. He ordinarily thinks of forgiveness only as a preparation for salvation, and his loose confusion of the end with the means in this instance cannot overbalance the great frequency with which he speaks of salvation as something eschatological.¹ In this respect Justin is in accord with St. Paul, who regarded salvation as only made actual in the future though as a present expectation it was in a sense already in the believer's possession.² •

The work of Christ for salvation is primarily directed against the demons. Here is the cause of all sin. God made man of such a nature that he would normally have chosen the right, and lived by the guidance of the Logos fragment within him. But even if one does choose so to live, he cannot long unassisted continue to act in a way pleasing to God. The demons are so powerful in their seductiveness that they must be destroyed, or man must be equipped with power greater than he normally has, if he is not sooner or later to become their victim. Against this demonic activity Justin seems to think that God opposes the Logos. A war in heaven is not described by Justin, nor is there any eternal struggle between good and evil. But it seems a particular activity of the Logos to oppose the demons, as the Logos is the particular object of demonic attack through humanity. Before the Incarnation the demons had been consistently victors in all but a few isolated individual cases, but that was because the full demonic power was being exercised against fragments of the Logos seriatim. The tide of battle is now turned because Christ, as the entire Logos, represents a concentration of all the small logos elements into a single force against which the demons are powerless. At the second coming the word will be

¹ Cf. e. g. the frequent future references in Dial. 47.

² Cf. Handbuch zum N. T. III, An die Römer, erklärt von Prof. Hans Lietzmann, 2. Aufl., Tübingen 1919, p. 29, note on Romans i. 16.

finally spoken which will end their activity forever. Meanwhile each man may have the benefit of the entire Logos to whose united strength he can appeal, and in the power of whose totality he need have no fear of the outcome.

The operation of this collected power of the Logos in man is first that of a revelation. To Justin it is inconceivable that anyone can be convinced of the Christian doctrine of the future, that eternal happiness or eternal agony hang upon our conduct in this life, without such an overmastering determination to choose the good that even death by torture will by every man be unhesitatingly preferred to the certain penalties that await sin after death. Philosophy has inklings of this doctrine, but the revelations of the Spermatic Logos in every man, while perfectly true, do not bring the unmovable conviction that can defy the activities of the demons. The demons darken the light of the higher mind. They deceive and lead astray the race,¹ they are robbers² who steal its counsels. They make slaves and servants of men.³ But the apprehension of truth which before was weak has now been made abundantly strong in the illumination given by the teaching and person of Jesus Christ. The long succession of revelation, all pointing toward the culmination in Christ, and fulfilled in Him to the smallest detail, has given to the teachings of Christ an authority which attends the utterance of no other man. And when Christ came, His teaching was, as Justin reads it, of the future coming, of the dread Day of the Lord, and of eternal rewards and punishments, while He spoke many maxims and guides for us as to how we should prepare ourselves for the great division of humanity.

Thus far Justin justifies the statements of von Engelhardt and Windisch that he rationalized the doctrine of salvation. According to their view, Justin teaches that Christ gave light and information. He destroyed the demonic influence, increased the true knowledge of man, and so made it possible for men to purify themselves by choosing the higher life. In Christ man is awakened, by

¹ Ap. I. 54. 1 (89 A).

² Fragment in Tatian, *Oratio ad Graec.* 18. 2; 3.

³ Ap. I. 14. 1 (61 B).

a revelation of the complete Logos and of the plan of creation and of the future, to a recognition of his moral powers and inherent kinship with God as a partaker in the Spermatic Logos. There is no change in the relationship of God to man in a forgiveness of sin. Only is there change on the part of those men who choose to claim their kinship with God and to use the latent power that is in them. This true liberty is consummated after death in a *συνουσία* with God. The reason why there can be no such change on the part of God as Christian theology represents, they explain, is that Justin's God is impersonal, while the God of Christianity proper is personal.¹

We have already seen that Justin's God is most certainly personal. As to the doctrine of salvation itself even what Justin says of Christ as teacher makes room for a mystic working of the personal God upon man which goes much further than von Engelhardt would admit.

For the great difficulty with von Engelhardt's criticism is that he has vastly overestimated certain aspects of Justin's theology. So he has not noticed that even in the representation of salvation as knowledge, Justin gives active power to the knowledge. The Gospel story and the Christian doctrine are in Justin's thought themselves an active force, a *δύναμις* from God. Christ received from God a special message (*λόγος*), and was not to be killed until after He had delivered it to men.² This logos was active, a power flowing from Christ like the gushing of a mighty spring, so that when He kept silent it was as if such a rush of water had suddenly been cut off. The dynamic quality of the word of Christ was illustrated by the easy way in which it had vanquished all the teachers of Judaism.³ The power of the words of Christ is no whit diminished by time. Justin speaks in the present tense, saying, "The word of His truth and wisdom (that is, Christ's true and wise preaching) is more inflaming and illuminating than the rays of the sun, even piercing into the depths of the

¹ See (Bibl. 313) pp. 195 ff., (Bibl. 333) pp. 14—19. Cf. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte* I. (1909) p. 543.

² Dial. 102. 5 (329 C).

³ *Ibid.*

heart and mind."¹ The Christian revelation is thus not a coldly convincing lecture on metaphysical or ethical theory. It is a burning force which sets the heart afire. In this Justin's doctrine is clearly Pauline: βραχεῖς δὲ καὶ σύντομοι παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγοι γεγόνασιν· οὐ γὰρ σοφιστῆς ὑπῆρχεν, ἀλλὰ δύναμις θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἦν² says Justin, clearly making use of the Pauline contrast: καὶ ὁ λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως, ἵνα ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν μὴ ᾗ ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ.³ The word which the Apostles went forth to preach was likewise possessed of strength.⁴ Justin illustrates in his autobiographical remarks the working of this illuminating power. When the Old Man left him, he says, he found suddenly burning within him a fire of love for the Prophets and Christ.⁵ The significance of the knowledge of the doctrine then is not simply a marshalling of facts before the mind of man so that he will be able to make the choice of life more fully advised of its consequences, but an impartation of illumination and power. We may now fight the demons not with a part of the Logos but with its entirety. In the possession of the Christian message we are possessed of the entire Logos, and in that vast increase of power we are invincible. Justin gives no details for the working of the entire Logos in human psychology. But the entire Logos, he believes, is made subjective in every Christian by the acceptance of the preaching of Christ and the Apostles. The δύναμις θεοῦ has been sent to us through Jesus Christ, and when the devil would tempt Christians this δύναμις rebukes him and he departs from us. For the Christians are vehemently inflamed διὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς κλήσεως αὐτοῦ,

¹ Dial. 121. 2 (350 A), cf. above pp. 149, 246. The δύναμις is there shown to be originally from the Father.

² Ap. I. 14. 5 (62 D).

³ I Cor. ii. 4, 5. Cf. Rom. i. 16 τὸ εὐαγγέλιον δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστὶν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι.

⁴ Ap. I. 45. 5 (83 A). τὸ οὖν εἰρημένον· Ῥάβδον δυνάμεως ἐξαποστελεῖ σοι ἐξ Ἱερουσαλήμ, προαγγελτικὸν τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ, ὃν ἀπὸ Ἱερουσαλήμ οἱ ἀπόστολοι αὐτοῦ ἐξελθόντες πανταχοῦ ἐκήρυξαν.

⁵ Dial. 8. 1 (225 B).

“through the doctrine, or preaching, of His calling.”¹ Christians live no longer *κατὰ σπερματικῶν λόγων μέρος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς λόγου (ὅ ἐστι Χριστοῦ) γνῶσιν καὶ θεωρίαν.*² No one can say that to Justin’s contemporaries *γνῶσιν καὶ θεωρίαν* could mean objective knowledge. It is a mystic apprehension which makes the entire Logos a factor of the inner life of the Christian. He no longer lives according to a part of the Logos; the part is swallowed up in the whole. And just as salvation comes from a mystical *γνώσις καὶ θεωρία*, so it does not come from *σοφία*. Christ, says Justin, was like us. He could not be saved by His ancestry, His wealth, His strength (that is, any powers or faculties of His own), or His knowledge (*σοφία*).³ Only an act of God, a power of God, can save a man. And that power is given to man through a mystic impartation of *ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἀποπτον καὶ γνῶσιν τὴν ἀνέλεγκτον*,⁴ which is the *δύναμις θεοῦ διὰ Χριστοῦ*.

In this sense it is that Christ is here among men *δυνάμει* since His first coming.⁵ The force of this conception is weakened in Justin by the fact that in one passage he puns upon *δυνάμει*. The Christians, he says, are called His robe since He always dwells among them *δυνάμει*, and in the second coming will dwell *ἐναργῶς*.⁶ The last phrase is an after-thought. It is true that Justin believed in a contrast as sharp as the Aristotelian contrast of *δυνάμει* and *ἐναργῶς* between the state of affairs now and those which are to obtain after the second coming. But he believed also in a stronger and more real indwelling of Christ in Christians even in this interval between His two comings than the Aristotelian *δυνάμει* expressed. For Justin comments in the First Apology upon the same figure as follows; the men who believe upon Christ are His robe, that is, those in whom the Logos in its entirety,

¹ Dial. 116. 3 (344 A—C).

² Ap. II. 8. 3 (46 C).

³ Dial. 102. 6, 7 (329 D ff.).

⁴ Ap. II. 13. 3 (51 C).

⁵ Dial. 138. 1 (367 C). For the implications of this passage for the doctrine of the Spirit, see above p. 182.

⁶ Dial. 54. 1 (273 D).

the σπέρμα παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, dwells.¹ The Power of God, the Gospel dwells in man, and is itself the presence of the entire Logos.

It is very likely that Justin regarded this entire Logos as coming into a man normally in what he calls the φωτισμός. Christians are spoken of as τοὺς διὰ Ἰησοῦ φωτισμένους.² Justin uses the word as a synonym for baptism, and calls a baptized man one who has been illuminated, as to say, one who had been baptized.³ But he explains the term: "And this washing (baptism) is called illumination since those learning these things (sc. the doctrine of salvation) are illuminated in their understanding."⁴ Baptism is called in the Dialogue "the laver of repentance καὶ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ."⁵ Clearly then φωτισμός, as a name for baptism, has a real significance. The term was taken, as Otto says, from the Mysteries. But it is not a mere name of a rite: it describes what Justin thought to be the spiritual experience of one who is baptized.⁶

It must be noticed that in this scheme of salvation there has been no mention of the Cross, and that there is no admission of a real significance for the Incarnation. It is in the incarnate Logos that men come to know the entire Logos, but the special value of the fact that the Logos became a man is not included in this theory of the work of Christ. But nevertheless Justin has a great deal to say of the Cross. So closely did he identify the Cross with the Work of Christ that when he wished to prove the Logos to be cosmic force in nature he sums up the whole by proving the presence of the Cross in all the elements and in all forms of life. For "the Cross is the most important symbol of His might and rulership."⁷ So it is by the power of the mystery of the Cross as typified by the horn of the unicorn that some in all

¹ Ap. I. 32. 8 (74 B); cf. above pp. 214 ff.

² Dial. 122. 1 (350 C). Cf. Hebr. x. 32.

³ Ap. I. 65. 1 (97 C); 61. 13 (94 E).

⁴ Ap. I. 61. 12 (94 D).

⁵ Dial. 14. 1 (231 C).

⁶ For Justin's theory of baptism see below pp. 265 ff.

⁷ Ap. I. 55. 2 ff. (90 B. ff.); cf. Dial. 86 entire.

nations, having been "horned, that is pricked,¹ have turned from empty idols and demons to the worship of God."² Justin may have here in mind the preaching of the Gospel which had a similar effect upon the hearts and lives of men. But if it is the Christian message which Justin has in mind, he states unmistakably that the supreme part of that Christian message is the Cross. Even more unmistakably does Justin make the Passion of Christ the act of Redemption when he says that Christ "served, even to the slavery of the Cross, for the various and many-formed races of mankind, acquiring them by the blood and mystery of the Cross."³

Justin may have connected the Cross with the breaking of the power of the demons because of the conspicuous part which the Cross played in exorcisms. The formula of exorcism which Justin has preserved lays great stress upon the Crucifixion.⁴ The demons, he says, are "subject to His name and to the dispensation of the passion which He experienced."⁵ Through the mystery (of the Cross) the power of the Serpent was destroyed.⁶ But just how Justin conceived that the Cross achieved this victory he does not explain. Indeed he speaks repeatedly of the demons as having been conquered "by the crucified Christ," but not "by the Crucifixion of Christ." The matter is made more complicated by the fact that at the temptation,⁷ in exorcising demons,⁸ even at His birth,⁹ Christ had already complete power over the demons, was "Lord of the demons."¹⁰ The Incarnation, whose purpose is never made very clear, is at least twice alluded to as

¹ Κατανογέτες, cf. Acts ii. 37 κατενόγησαν τῇ καρδίᾳ.

² Dial. 91. 3 (318 D).

³ Dial. 134. 5 (364 C).

⁴ Dial. 85. 2 (311 B); cf. Dial. 30. 3 (247 C).

⁵ Dial. 30. 3 (247 D). τὰ δαιμόνια ὑποτάσσονται τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ γενομένου πάθους αὐτοῦ οἰκονομίᾳ.

⁶ Dial. 94. 2 (322 A).

⁷ Dial. 125. 4 (354 D).

⁸ Dial. 49. 8 (269 C).

⁹ Dial. 78. 9 (304 D ff.).

¹⁰ Dial. 85. 1 (311 A, B); cf. 100. 6 (327 D).

finding its object in the destruction of the demons.¹ The concealed power of God was in Christ the crucified, before whom the demons and all the principalities and powers will be revealed, and the devils condemned.² We must then agree with von Engelhardt that the Cross receives little real significance in Justin's writings as marking the triumph of Christ over the demons.³

Justin deals more directly with the problem of the significance of the Crucifixion, when he says that Christ took upon Himself a curse for the sake of men when He was crucified. Justin's argument on this point is apologetic, but his meaning is tolerably clear so far as he goes. He begins by challenging Trypho as to why God would command Moses to break His own Law against the erection of images by telling Moses to set up the brazen serpent.⁴ Justin himself answers that the reason is that men are healed from the bites of the serpents by the Cross. Christ, as one who hung upon a tree, was accursed in the eyes of the Law. This was all foreshadowed in the action of Moses in breaking the Law to make an accursed image of a serpent, that the people might be saved from the bites of the serpents. But why and in what sense did Christ become accursed? All men, Justin explains, have become accursed in the eyes of the Law because all men whether Jews or Gentiles have failed in some particular in the observance of the Law, and thereby have brought upon themselves a curse. By dying upon the Cross Christ became, in accordance with the Law, an accursed person, but the curse which was upon Him He took upon Himself, and it was, we infer, a collection of all the curses upon the entire human family. This collected curse Christ took upon Himself at the wish of the Father, for the Father knew that the curse would not abide upon Christ since He, the Father, intended to raise Christ up after His death. The Son was thus never in a full sense accursed. Blameless and unaccursed

¹ Dial. 45. 4 (264 A); 125. 3, 4 (354 C, D); cf. 100. 6 (327 A).

² Dial. 49. 8 (269 C).

³ (Bibl. 313) p. 270.

⁴ See Dial. 94 and 95 for the argument.

in His own right, He took upon Himself our curses, and, Justin implies, dying with them upon Him, they died with Him. Thus Christ, though He fulfilled the saying that every man is accursed who hangs upon the tree, as the Jews insist, was never personally accursed. Justin therefore exhorts the Jews to recognize the real significance of this verse which they are using against Christ and the Christian faith, and to claim the privilege which the curse upon Christ opens to all men, that of becoming free from the curses which are upon themselves.

The disappointing part of the section is that two very important steps in the argument are omitted. That the curse which was upon Christ as a crucified man was identical with the collected curses of all men, and that these curses died with Christ, while Christ was raised up without them, Justin does not explicitly say. But the argument as a whole seems to imply both these steps with sufficient obviousness.

Justin may have had other explanations of the significance of the Cross, but this is the only explanation which he has allowed us to reconstruct.¹ Certain he is, however, that in the Cross of Christ and in the blood of Christ, the guilt of our sins may be removed. For Justin repeats many times that through the passion and the Cross men now have and have always had their only hope for salvation.² Christ's death was a sacrifice for our sins.³ It is by the blood of Christ that our souls are washed pure of the old stains of sin.⁴ But if Justin has only traces of theories to explain the action of the Cross upon

¹ E. g. Justin says in Ap. I. 63. 16 (96 D) that "Christ endured both to be set at naught and to suffer, that by dying and rising again He might conquer death." But how far Justin carried this Pauline thought we cannot tell.

² Dial. 13. 1 (229 D); 17. 1 (234 D, E); 41. 1 (260 A); 43. 3 (261 D); 89. 3 (317 B); 94. 2 (322 A); 137. 1 (366 D); Ap. II. 13. 4 (51 D).

³ Dial. 40 entire; 89. 3 (317 B); III. 3 (338 C).

⁴ Ap. I. 32. 7 (74 A); Dial. 13. 1 (299 D); 24. 1 (241 D); 44. 4 (263 C); 54. 1 (273 D); III. 3 (338 C).

the hearts of men, rather than a consistent doctrine which meant very much to him as a theory, and if he views the atonement rather from the practical than the theoretic point of view, the fact is not to be explained by calling him a "philosopher". Windisch has rightly interpreted Ap. I. 53 as indicating something of a hopeless feeling on the part of Justin to explain the Crucifixion on any theoretical grounds.¹ The proof of an otherwise incredible fact, Justin there says, is the prophetic evidence for a Crucifixion, while we may only answer the question, "Why did God choose that way," by saying, "It was His will." But it was not, as Windisch implies, Justin's philosophic viewpoint which made him thus unable to explain the Crucifixion. "A philosopher like Justin" had adequate explanation for little or nothing, whether in Christianity or in philosophy. Nor is the absence of an adequate theory of the Crucifixion to be taken as an indication that the Cross meant little to Justin.

From the point of view of Christ, then, the salvation of men was accomplished by a power which, coming from God through the crucified Christ, enlightened them and empowered them to overcome the demons and to choose to live according to the eternal moral verities. Christ incarnate was the antithesis of Eve's offspring by the Serpent. As she produced disobedience and death, so did Mary produce the Son of God who destroys both death and the devil.² This achievement was accomplished supremely on the Cross and in the Resurrection. His death meant an atonement for the sins of all who care to claim it.

From the point of view of the Christian believer, salvation is to be hoped for after the following preliminary steps.³ First one must recognize the truth of the Gospel message; second one must repent of the sins which he has committed; third he must be baptized; fourth he must live a pure life thereafter until death. Those who die after such a life may hope to be saved from death and destruction in

¹ (Bibl. 333) p. 29.

² Dial. 100. 4, 5 (327 C); 45. 4 (264 A). "

³ Dial. 44. 4 (263 C); 95. 3 (323 B); 138. 3 (368 A).

the last day, that is to receive remission of sins rather than punishment for their sin.¹

On the importance of believing the Gospel Justin is most explicit. Along with those who have lived wickedly will go to hell those who do not believe that those things which God has taught us by Christ will come to pass.² Von Engelhardt has rightly pointed out that in Justin faith is not spoken of in the Luthero-Pauline sense of the term.³ Von Engelhardt concludes from this fact that Justin is primarily a heathen who did not understand Christianity. Feder and Martindale conclude from the same fact that Justin was a true Catholic because he had the traditionalist viewpoint as contrasted with the later individualistic interpretation of Christianity.⁴ In his exposition of Christianity Justin's aim is not to expand or elaborate, but to reproduce the doctrines of Christianity as he had received them. Heretics, even those who made so slight a departure from the faith as to reject the intermediary period when the souls of the just await the Resurrection, and who believed that the just went to heaven at once upon death, had no toleration from Justin.⁵ It is true that he makes room for the salvation of such men as Socrates and Abraham, but in both cases it was because of their faith which believed in the truth of the utterances of God. Socrates believed in the truth of the utterances of the fragment of the Logos within himself, and lived according to the knowledge of right and wrong which his own higher mind gave him, while ordinary men refuse to believe in the utterances of the Logos within them, and hence surrender themselves to the leadership and instruction of the demons. Abraham believed that what God said to him was true, and acted

¹ Dial. 95. 3 (323 B).

² Ap. I. 19. 8 (66 B).

³ (Bibl. 313) p. 188. See below p. 264. n. 2.

⁴ Martindale writes that to Justin "denial or distortion of the taught traditional faith is anti-Christianity The whole structure and scheme of Justin's Christianity is Catholic throughout: the individualist and fideist theories of later ages do not so much as dawn."

⁵ Dial. 80. 4 (307 A).

accordingly.¹ God has spoken to us now through Christ. The first essential for salvation for us is, like Socrates and Abraham, to take God at His word, and live according to His instructions. Echoes of a more mystical faith Justin has. But faith whatever else it may include must begin with the intellectual acceptance of a revealed body of truth. There is no compulsion toward this acceptance. We may reject God's saving power if we will, for to refuse to believe the truth of God's revelation is completely to resist the grace of God. Justin believed with St. Paul that the Gospel is foolishness to one who will not accept it, but the power of God unto salvation to anyone who believes it.² There is no contradiction between the facts that we may refuse to believe the Gospel, and that the Gospel is yet an active power from God through Christ. Once we accept the doctrine it will inflame us. But Justin always preserves the liberty of man to choose in the first place to accept or reject the divine operation.³

Acceptance of the doctrines of Christianity must be followed or accompanied by repentance.⁴ Christ died, it would appear, not for all men, but only for those who are willing to repent.⁵ Repentance is a condition of mercy,⁶ a prerequisite for baptism.⁷ "For the goodness and loving-kindness of God, and His boundless riches, hold righteous and sinless the man who, as Ezekiel tells us, repents of sins."⁸ Hence Justin's exhortations to repentance are urgent in both the First Apology and the Dialogue.⁹ It is true that he does not always include repentance among the

¹ Dial. 11. 5 (229 A); 23. 4 (241 B). To Justin, believing God and acting according to His instructions were inseparable. See below pp. 267 ff.

² Rom. i. 16. See above pp. 254 ff.

³ Ap. I. 43 entire.

⁴ Dial. 26. 1 (243 C).

⁵ Dial. 40. 4 (259 D).

⁶ Ap. I. 28. 2 (71 B); Dial. 26. 1 (243 C); 141. 2. 3 (370 C ff.).

⁷ Ap. I. 61. 10 (94 D).

⁸ Dial. 47. 5 (266 D ff.); cf. Ap. I. 61. 6 (94 A).

⁹ Ap. I. 40. 7 (79 A); Dial. 95. 3 (323 B); 108. 3 (335 D); 118. 1 (345 D); 138. 3 (368 A).

essentials for becoming a Christian.¹ But he certainly considers repentance at least as the normal way to secure the remission of sins. However repentance is not in itself an act of purification. Von Engelhardt says that in the Apologies repentance is only a turning from the bad to the good, probably with sorrow for the past; man is saved by that act because he is thereafter no longer a sinner but a righteous man, and hence can not well be condemned by God as a sinner. God's only part in the change is to call men to repentance. Justin, says von Engelhardt, rejects the formula *ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*, and even *ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέ σε, for ἐκ μετανοίας σωθήσῃαι*.² But a glance at the context of this formula shows at once that Justin does not use it as a general formula for salvation in the single passage where it appears. Justin has been trying to account for the delay of the second coming, and says that that great event is awaiting the fulfillment of the number of those who are to be saved. There are still more to come in, says Justin; some shall be saved by repentance, and some are yet to be born. That is, Justin means here no more than that there are still men who shall repent and be saved. Von Engelhardt gives repentance a disproportionate emphasis, for he makes repentance itself the act by which a man purifies himself from sin, while the forgiveness of sin by God is merely the declaration by God that the repentant man is

¹ E. g. Dial. 28. 4 (246 A). Here the *γνώσις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ* and the observance of *τὰ αἰώνια δίκαια* are the sole requirements for becoming a friend of God.

² (Bibl. 313) p. 191; cf. Ap, I. 28. 2 (71 B). Von Engelhardt here shows the great disadvantage of his method of expounding Justin's theology. He begins with the Apologies, which are of course more pagan in point of view and argument than the Dialogue, and draws extreme conclusions therefrom for the Greek character of Justin's thinking. Then he treats a few problems in the Dialogue, but never checks the two together to come to Justin's real thought between the two. It may be possible to come to so extreme a conclusion as von Engelhardt has done when one considers the Apologies alone, for they have comparatively little to say, for example, about repentance. But the error of his conclusion appears at once when the statements about repentance in the Dialogue are considered. This evidence von Engelhardt ignores.

no longer a sinner.¹ But Dial. 141 gives quite another account of the relation of the two. /Justin is here explaining the necessity for repentance: "If they repent, all who wish for it can obtain the mercy of God; the Scripture foretells that they shall be blessed, saying, 'Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not sin'; that is, having repented of his sins, he may receive remission of them from God; and not as you deceive yourselves, and some others who resemble you in this, who say, that even though they be sinners, but know God, the Lord will not impute sin to them. We have as proof of this the one fall of David, which happened through his boasting, which was forgiven then when he so mourned and wept, as it is written. But if even to such a man no remission was granted before repentance, and only when this great king, and annointed one, and prophet, mourned and conducted himself so, how can the impure and utterly abandoned, if they weep not, and mourn not, and repent not, entertain the hope that the Lord will not impute to them sin?"² /Here repentance is represented as an indispensable preparation, but only as a preparation, for that remission of sin which comes from God, and which we have seen is given to men through the blood of Christ. Von Engelhardt is right in making repentance itself the free act of man. The mercy of God is to be had by those who wish for it and repent. Always the human volition is left free to choose. But the human volition is not empowered to cleanse away the guilt of past acts. /We may always obtain remission of sins by repenting, but it is always God who acts through Christ to forgive.

/The change of character consequent upon repentance is normally brought about in baptism. Baptism is thus described:³ The candidate is first to be convinced of the truth of the Christian doctrine. He next promises to live by Christian precepts, and enters upon a preparation of prayer and fasting which is shared by the congregation. When this has been completed he is brought to the water where he receives the washing with water "in the name of

¹ (Bibl. 313) p. 192.

² Dial. 141. 2, 3 (370 C, D).

³ Ap. I. 61. 2 ff. (93 D ff.).

God the Father and Lord of the universe, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, thereby being regenerated in the same manner in which we were ourselves regenerated." The washing with water was prophesied by Ezekiel as a putting away of evil from the soul, and was possible only to men who had repented. The candidate "washes himself" which may mean that he goes under the water unassisted while the formula of baptism is being repeated over him,¹ but which probably refers to the fact that this is a birth which cannot be possible without the complete concurrence of the will of the person baptised. In the fleshly birth our wills have no part, but the second birth is impossible without our assent. /The middle voice does not, however, indicate that we *purify* ourselves in baptism. We there receive, not achieve the remission of sins.² Baptism is the washing in behalf of remission of sins, and into a rebirth.³ But the new birth is not merely negative in character. It is here that man receives the great enlightening from God which gives the power of the entire Logos in place of the defeated fragment which man naturally possesses.⁴

Baptism is thus a regenerative rite. Veil is wrong in saying that it merely expresses outwardly an experience which has already happened within the soul.⁵ /Justin does not regard the ceremony as mechanical or magical,⁶ but the new birth, while spiritual, actually does take place during the external rite, and, in a sense which Justin does not explain, by the instrumentality of the external rite. The spiritual character of baptism, and the impotence of any ceremony, especially a ceremony of purification, apart from the attitude of mind of the participant, is further explained in the Dialogue. Justin says there that the old rites of Judaism were broken cisterns, for they were performed without a turning from evil doings. "Baptize the soul from

¹ See Blunt (Bibl. 43) p. 92. n. 9.

² Ap. I. 61. 10 (94 D).

³ Ap. I. 66. 1 (98 A).

⁴ See above p. 257.

⁵ (Bibl. 80) p. 91, c. 61. n. 2.

⁶ Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 432 ff. is right in his argument on this point against Credner and Otto.

wrath and from covetousness, from envy, and from hatred; and, lo! the body is pure."¹ But the spiritual circumcision which alone is of any value for purification, Christians receive in baptism,² which is a laver of repentance and of the knowledge of God.³

But Justin did not regard baptism as an essential for salvation. The heroes of the Old Testament, as for example David, were purified by God at once upon repentance,⁴ and repentance was alone necessary for salvation for those who might sin after they had become Christians.⁵ Not even repentance is named as necessary for salvation in such cases as Socrates and Enoch, while any man, whether "Scythian or Persian, if he has the knowledge of God and of His Christ and keeps the everlasting righteous decrees, is circumcised with the good and useful circumcision, and is a friend of God, and God rejoices in his gifts and offerings."⁶ But nevertheless baptism is the normal way for becoming a Christian, and ordinarily the second birth or spiritual circumcision must thus be found. It is probably to the Christian sacraments, and particularly to baptism, that Justin refers when he says that salvation is only to be received by faith and the observation of the mysteries.⁷

Only adult baptism could have been known to Justin. The second birth in baptism was a matter of the free choice of the candidate, in contrast with the fleshly birth. This could only apply to adult baptism, or to baptism after an age when at least the form of consulting the inclination of the candidate could be carried out.

But salvation is not achieved by the new birth in baptism. Even admitting the strongest force of Justin's conceptions of the *ῥωτισμός*, man is only empowered in

¹ Dial. 14. 1, 2 (231 C, D).

² Dial. 43. 2 (261 C, D); cf. Col. ii. 11, 12.

³ Dial. 14. 1 (231 C).

⁴ Dial. 141. 2, 3 (370 C, D); cf. above p. 265.

⁵ Dial. 47. 4 (266 D).

⁶ Dial. 28. 4 (246 A).

⁷ Dial. 44. 2 (263 A). The discussion in the preceding chapter and the statement at the end of this chapter make the reference of these "mysteries" tolerably definite.

baptism with a divine force with which he can achieve salvation. For at the judgment nothing will be taken into consideration but man's moral character as witnessed by his actual deeds in life. / Christian baptism and repentance have insured a fresh start for the new convert. He may be sure that his old sins will not be brought up against him at the judgment. It has further given him a new power. He has now the entire Logos as a force in his own life by which he may be guided, instead of the faltering fragment with which he began life. / But this means only that he is empowered to earn salvation by his own conduct, not that he is already accepted into kinship with God. One who lives aright, like Socrates or Abraham, though he has never heard of the Christian doctrine of salvation, has far better hopes for the last day than a Christian who has not lived a good life. / Grace in Justin's mind did not take the place of human effort. God by grace will so equip a man that he can have a fair chance in the struggle against the influence of the demons, but man must still fight for he can still fall. Just as eternal punishment seemed to Justin as immoral, meaningless, and hence not a true doctrine, unless each person punished is himself responsible for his sin, so eternal happiness and reward only become an acceptable doctrine when the recipient is conceived of as having earned the right to his blessing.

In terms of Justin's psychology, the action of the *φωτισμός* is apparently a replacement of the entire Logos for the fragment, but of course man at the Judgment is to be judged for his personal character, that is, for the condition not of his spirit but of his soul. / The proper aim of man is to make his soul a fit habitation for the spirit. His chances for doing so are hopeless when he has only the fragment, but are sure when he has the entire Logos. Still he earns the final approbation of God, not for having the entire Logos in his soul, but for having guided his soul by the leadership of this entire Logos. / This is still the achievement of the individual man. It is by a co-operation of work and grace that salvation is achieved. God gives the power, and without this special grant of power man is helpless; but man must use the power once it is given, or

he is one of the unworthy Christians whom Justin despises as worse than the heathen.

In this Justin would not have agreed with the Luther-Pauline conception of grace which could not be earned or affected by human efforts. His conception of divine morality was much more instinctively true than Luther's. /But in making the test for salvation ethical rather than mystical Justin is in accord with the spirit of the best at once of Judaism and of the Synoptic tradition. To rule Justin out from the true Christian succession because his view of religion was ultimately ethical, and because he saw in the Cross of Christ a means whereby we may receive power from God to live lives worthy of His friendship, is inconceivably narrow. The best Catholic tradition has never agreed with Luther's rejection of the Epistle of James, and insistence that the Christian was saved by his faith, to the exclusion of a wholesome emphasis upon his moral life. Justin, as we have seen, follows St. Paul in a great many details. It is not at all impossible that his belief in the Gospel Message as a Power of God in the believer's heart represents St. Paul's conception of faith with greater accuracy than the Protestant definitions of the Sixteenth Century. In any case he is much more true than those Protestant theologians to the thought of his Master when he insists that the test of a tree, in God's sight as in man's, is the quality of its fruit, and that the fruit God wants is not so much mysticism as purity of soul expressed in ethical integrity.

/Justin had a divine guide to conduct in the sayings of Jesus. The true ethical ideal has been pronounced by Christ, he says, in the double commandment, love of God and of one's neighbor. To love God with a whole heart excludes worship of any other God, and includes reverence to Christ because God wishes us to revere Him. To love our neighbour means both to pray and to work for that to befall the neighbour which we should particularly like to have befall ourselves. A neighbour is any human being whatever,¹ and hence includes our enemies. The

¹ Dial, 93. 2, 3 (321 A, B).

Christians die in persecution praying for their persecutors, and refuse to give the least retort to accusations.¹ They pray for the Jews and call them brothers, in spite of the hatred the Jews bear them.² The Christians have given up personal ambition for wealth and have all things in common.³ They are so strict in their reverence for truth that they refuse to take an oath with mental reservations.⁴ They are peaceful instead of warlike.⁵ The Christians live in remarkable sexual purity. They never marry except for the begetting of children, and are perfectly continent out of matrimony.⁶ Each man sits under his own vine, that is, Justin explains, with his own wife.⁷ All sorts of demon worship and magic have been given up, and the Christians now serve the one God alone.⁸ Justin quotes most of the moral maxims of the Sermon on the Mount, and demands that anyone who is not living according to these teachings be punished, for such can be a Christian only in name.⁹ The Christian doctrine, he says, enjoins civil obedience, and he quotes the incident of Christ and the denarius, but says that rulers must beware how they conduct themselves, for as they have been given much by God, He will require much from them again.¹⁰ Justin's ethics are clearly based upon the Synoptic tradition. In only one point does he present a contrast to New Testament ethics. He goes much further than St. Paul and prohibits absolutely the eating of meat offered to idols.¹¹ The fact has been frequently exaggerated to show that Justin was not of a Pauline school of Christianity. Justin's point of view seems not in the least to warrant such a generalization. Justin lived nearly a hundred years after St. Paul, and in the meantime Christian

¹ Dial. 18. 3 (236 A).

² Dial. 96. 3 (323 D); 108. 3 (325 D).

³ Ap. I. 14. 2 (61 C).

⁴ Ap. I. 39. 4, 5 (78 C).

⁵ Ap. I. 39. 3 (78 B); Dial. 110. 3 (337 A).

⁶ Ap. I. 29 entire; 14. 2 (61 C); 15. 1—8 (61 E ff.).

⁷ Dial. 110. 3 (337 B).

⁸ Ap. I. 14. 2 (61 C).

⁹ Ap. I. 16. 14 (64 C).

¹⁰ Ap. I. 17 entire.

¹¹ Dial. 35. 1 ff. (253 A ff.).

experience might well have found that St. Paul's liberal counsel on the matter of meat offered to idols was impracticable. The eating of meat offered to idols by any Christians had probably become so scandalous to most Christians that it had seemed advisable to debar its use altogether. It is not the only instance where orthodox Christianity has been forced to set aside one of St. Paul's practical counsels. But Justin has very few such restrictions for Christians. In general it is by lives of peace, honesty, purity, and love to all men that he thinks God is to be pleased and the ultimate happiness won. / The eternal moral law of which all men have had inklings is to Justin practically complete in the Sermon on the Mount. He can imagine no higher ethical standard.

As part of the Christian life Justin speaks in several passages of the Eucharist. But no element of Justin's teaching has been so much disputed. He has been demonstrated as teaching every known theory of the Eucharist, and in spite of the fact that the literature on the subject is very large, the disagreement among later expositors of his Eucharistic theory is as profound as that of fifty years ago.

Justin describes two celebrations of a sacred meal. The first is the closing rite of baptism and is the more important description of the two.¹ At the conclusion of the baptismal ceremony the new member is brought to the place of meeting (evidently the baptisms were not performed at the meeting place, probably in an open stream), where are assembled all the brethren. The company is made up of those who have become Christians by the steps already described, that is of those who believe in the truth of the Christian doctrines, who have been washed for the remission of sins unto regeneration, and who are living according to Christ's instructions. Their object in meeting on this occasion is to unite in prayer for the newly baptized member and for themselves and all others, "that, having learned the truth, they may be accounted worthy to be in their works good citizens and keepers of the commandments, so that they may be saved with everlasting

¹ Ap. I. 65, 66 entire.

salvation." At the conclusion of these prayers they salute one another with a kiss. Then are brought to the president of the brethren bread and a cup of wine mixed with water. The president takes these and offers a special prayer of praise to the Father of the universe through the name of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and of "thanksgiving at considerable length for being counted worthy to receive these things at His hand. And when he has concluded the prayers and thanksgivings, all the people express their assent by saying Amen." Then "those who are called by us deacons give to each of those present to partake of the bread and wine mixed with water over which the thanksgiving was pronounced, and to those who are absent they carry away a portion."

The second description of the celebration of the Eucharist is of that which was done each Sunday at the weekly meeting of the Christians.¹ This service was opened by a reading from the Prophets or the Memoirs of the Apostles which varied in length with the time at the company's disposal, and which was followed by an address of instruction and exhortation by the president. The company then stood and prayed, and at the conclusion of the prayer the elements were brought in and distributed as before described, after the president had "offered prayers and thanksgiving according to his ability." This last phrase which has caused considerable difficulty seems on the whole best understood as indicating an extemporary prayer. The service was accompanied by a collection for the poor and needy.

Thus far the description has been sufficiently straightforward and clear. On only two points of the account has there been any important difference of opinion. The standing of the president and deacons in Justin's narrative is undefined, and has consequently been open to conflicting interpretations. The president is a man who conducts the Eucharist, preaches to the congregation, and has charge of the community funds and of the relief of the distressed. But Justin has not given a phrase of indication that the

¹ Ap. I. 67. 1—5 (98 C—E).

president was a specially ordained person rather than one who held a temporary office of pre-eminence in the congregation.¹ Likewise the deacons might as well have been the deacons of Congregationalism as of Catholicism from Justin's description. Justin tells us practically nothing about Church organization. He was evidently one in whose thinking the theory of the Church meant comparatively little. The Christians constitute the garments of Christ, he says,² but their organization was not a part of the scheme of salvation. It is unfair to infer from this silence that the church organization was unsystematic, or that church theory interested Justin's contemporaries as little as it did him. But unless Justin keeps silent upon the question of Church theory for apologetic reasons, his instruction in theology could not have put so much stress upon the subject as Christian instruction of later centuries.

∕ The other point which Justin's description of the celebration of the Eucharist has raised is the matter of whether the elements of the Eucharist are described as being bread and wine or bread and water. The discussion upon this point was opened by an interesting dissertation by Professor Harnack defending the thesis that Justin's elements were bread and water.³ But Harnack's argument depends upon some serious changes of text, and consequently has been judged on the whole as unconvincing.

∕ It is, more particularly, upon the Eucharistic theory of Justin that discussion is still unsettled. Justin's words appear to the present writer to represent so primitive a mode of thought about the Eucharist that the advanced or detailed interpretations which have been given to his statements seem for the most part more interesting from the speculative than from the historical point of view. The statement which has always constituted the center of controversy is the following: "For not as common bread

¹ Veil's note 5 to c. 65 (p. 97) is an excellent instance of a discussion which has gone far beyond the actual data. A theory of Church government can only so be read into Justin.

² Dial. 54. 1 (273 D).

³ (Bibl. 362). Harnack's opponents are indicated in the Bibliography in loco.

or common drink do we receive these things; but just as Jesus Christ our Saviour, having been made flesh by the word of God, had both flesh and blood for our salvation, so likewise have we been taught that that food for which thanks was given by the word of thanksgiving offered by him (the president?), and by which our blood and flesh are by transmutation nourished, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh. For the Apostles in the Memoirs composed by them and which are called Gospels, have thus delivered to us the things which had been commanded to them; that Jesus took bread, and when He had given thanks, said, 'This do in remembrance of me; this is my body'; and that having similarly taken the cup and given thanks He said, 'This is my blood', and gave it to them alone."¹ The passage is most interesting, but inconclusive. Of the various interpretations that of Semisch is the most attractive. He saw in Justin's remarks a contrast and comparison between the Incarnation and the introduction of the divine Logos into the elements of the Eucharist. He concluded that Justin conceived of a new incarnation of the Logos in the elements; that the elements became united, not with the divine flesh and blood by consubstantiation, but with the Logos Himself by a fresh incarnation, by which the bread and wine became His flesh and blood without changing nature or ceasing to be bread and wine.²

¹ Ap. I. 66. 2, 3 (98 A, B) οὐ γὰρ ὡς κοινὸν ἄρτον οὐδὲ κοινὸν πόμα ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν· ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον διὰ λόγου θεοῦ σαρκοποιηθεὶς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ σὰρκα καὶ αἷμα ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ἡμῶν ἔσχεν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ πατρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφήν, ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σάρκες κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν, ἐκείνου τοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντος Ἰησοῦ καὶ σὰρκα καὶ αἷμα ἐδιδάχθημεν εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ ἀπόστολοι ἐν τοῖς γενομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀπομνημονεύμασιν, ἃ καλεῖται εὐαγγέλια, οὕτως παρέδωκαν ἐντετάλθαι αὐτοῖς· τὸν Ἰησοῦν λαβόντα ἄρτον εὐχαριστήσαντα εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἀνάμνησίν μου, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμά μου· καὶ τὸ ποτήριον ὁμοίως λαβόντα καὶ εὐχαριστήσαντα εἰπεῖν· τοῦτό ἐστὶ τὸ αἷμά μου. καὶ μόνοις αὐτοῖς μεταδοῦναι.

² Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 437 ff. The same interpretation has recently been made by G. P. Wetter, *Altchristliche Liturgien*: I. Das christliche Mysterium. Göttingen 1921. p. 143.

But on the whole it must be admitted that Justin has given here no theory of the Eucharist. He says only that the bread and wine which are blessed, and by which our bodies are nourished, are the flesh and blood of the Christ who has been incarnate, and as such that they are no ordinary food and drink. To go beyond this into an explanation of how the bread and wine becomes or may be called the flesh and blood of Christ is to go beyond our evidence.

Equally baffling are the references to the Eucharist in the Dialogue. In chapter 41. 1—3 (260 A, B) Justin describes the Eucharist as a celebration prescribed by Jesus Christ in memory of the suffering which He endured on behalf of those who are purified in soul from all iniquity. The thanksgiving which the name of the sacrament implies is offered for two things, first for the fact that God has created the world and all things therein for the sake of man, second "for delivering us from the evil in which we were, and for overthrowing principalities and powers with a complete overthrow through Him who suffered according to His will." The bread and cup of the Eucharist are sacrifices offered to God, by which the name of God is glorified. We have here probably a very early form of the prayer of thanksgiving for our creation and preservation, and perhaps more phrases of the present Prayer of General Thanksgiving were then in use.¹ But in spite of the fact that Justin here calls the Eucharist a sacrifice by which God is glorified, he still offers no explanation of the Eucharist, whether as to its nature or as to its operation upon the communicant. The sacrament seems indeed to be rather a celebration for benefits already received than a source of new blessings.

In another passage Justin states that the prophecy "Bread shall be given him, and his water shall be sure," refers "to the bread which our Christ gave us to do (*ποιεῖν*), in remembrance of His being made flesh for the sake of His believers, for whom also He suffered; and to the cup which He gave us to do (*ποιεῖν*) in remembrance

¹ Cf. Ap. I. 13. 2 (60 D).

of His own blood with giving of thanks."¹ Here Justin has clearly St. Paul's account of the institution in mind, and is giving the Apostle's words a sacrificial interpretation. But still he gives no basis for a theory of the Eucharist.

In another passage, Justin speaks of the Eucharist as a sacrifice presented by Christians through all the world.² He admits that prayers and thanksgivings offered by worthy men at any time and anywhere are perfect and well pleasing sacrifices to God, but insists that the Christian Eucharist is the only prayer and thanksgiving which has been worthy to be called truly a sacrifice. The Christian offering then is apparently unique only in the degree of its worthiness as a prayer and thanksgiving and not because of any peculiarity of its nature.

Justin's remarks on the Eucharist, taken together, show that he regarded it as the supreme form of worship. In partaking of the sacrament which had been instituted by Christ Himself Christians partook of the body and blood of Christ, in remembrance of His incarnation and suffering.³ The sacrament was a sacrifice to God, of so exalted a character that it alone could be truly called a sacrifice pleasing to God. But theory of the Eucharist he probably did not have at all. He was content to take the spiritual blessing of the Eucharist without questioning just how the elements he was eating had become, or in what sense they could be called, the body and blood of Christ. But he makes quite clear that by his time the separation between the Agape and the Eucharist was complete, and that the Eucharist was celebrated as a conclusion to the rites of baptism as well as at the weekly assembly of the congregation.

It would be wrong to close an account of Justin's thought of salvation and the Christian Life without protesting against too rigid a use of our sources. Justin

¹ Dial. 70. 3, 4 (296 D ff.).

² Dial. 117. 1—3 (344 C ff.).

³ I cannot agree with Veil's distinction between St. Paul's and Justin's emphasis in the Eucharist. Justin's reference of the sacrament to the death of Christ is even more significant than that to the Incarnation. See Veil (*Bibl.* 80) n. 2 to c. 66. pp. 103—106.

has little to say of a Christian life of mysticism and communion with God. His emphasis upon the ethical side of Christianity is very strong. But before concluding, as has often been done, that Justin is barren of a mystical interpretation of the believer's life, one must take into consideration the apologetic and exoteric character of all the three genuine writings. Justin, in addressing outsiders, would naturally be concerned with giving evidence and with preaching conversion, heaven and hell, and the ethical standards and achievements of Christianity. Herein the contrast with St. Paul is complete. While all of St. Paul's remains are intimate letters to Christians, all of Justin's are apologies to unbelievers. It is almost as though, granted the verbal accuracy of the reports of St. Paul's addresses in Acts, we were restricted to that book alone for our knowledge of his thought. In that case St. Paul the mystic might have been guessed, but could not have been known. So it is utterly unfair to Justin to think that his Christianity is adequately represented in the apologetic documents that have come down to us. He was certainly no such mystic as St. Paul, but he was certainly a Christian mystic. It was a hunger for mystic experience which he represents as his incentive in philosophic inquiry, and though there is little likelihood that the account of his philosophic quest is accurate, it still is plain that he regarded the philosophic sects in the light of mysticism rather than of philosophy proper. He talks about the entire Logos as being in the Christians, but to Christians he would undoubtedly have been speaking, like St. Paul, of the indwelling Christ. It was not an external guide so much as the Christ within him from which he got his ideas and direction. The proper understanding of the Scriptures was to be had not by study or skill in reasoning, but by drinking of the living fountain of God.¹ If this passage refers to baptism, it refers clearly to the *φωτισμός* which is one of the most mystical interpretations of baptism ever given. Trypho, as a Jew without this illumination, cannot comprehend the Scriptures.² But

¹ Dial. 140. 1 (369 B).

² Dial. 38. 2 (256 C); 55. 3 (274 D).

Justin, as a partaker in grace, has been granted understanding.¹ Likewise the indwelling Logos repels the attacks of the demons. "Though the devil is ever at hand to resist us," he says, "and anxious to seduce all to himself, yet the Angel of God, that is the Power of God sent to us through Jesus Christ, rebukes him, and he departs from us."² Justin may not have been a profound mystic. But he is still less a man who approached Christianity from a rationalist's point of view, or who restricted the operation of God to an acknowledgment that man had left the path of sin by his own free choice. He did not conceive of his own Christian life as lived from baptism till death guided only by his own mind, and warding off evil with only his own strength. The Christian may live his life and bravely face death inwardly led and inspired by Christ, and blessed and empowered by the gifts of the Spirit. "We continually beseech God by Jesus Christ to preserve us from the demons which are hostile to the worship of God, and whom of old times we served, in order that, after our conversion to God, we may through Him be blameless. For we call Him Helper and Redeemer."³

¹ Dial. 58. 1 (280 A, B).

² Dial. 116. 1 (344 A).

³ Dial. 30. 3 (248 C).

CHAPTER X

ESCHATOLOGY

The first coming of Christ did not fulfill the Jewish expectation, and was regarded by Jesus Himself as but a tentative step toward the solution of the world's problems. The early Church looked upon the coming in humility as the foundation of their hope, but their hope itself looked forward unto a fuller manifestation of the power of their Saviour. To early Christians the first coming was utterly meaningless apart from the consummation in the Parousia, and it is one of the marvels of history that Christianity did not collapse when its eschatological hope had to be indefinitely postponed. St. Paul in his later life saw the danger of his early emphasis upon the second coming, and it was probably his magnificent courage in facing and correcting the mistake of his early thinking which opened the way for the ultimate change of thinking of orthodox Christianity. But the change was gradual, and was at first possible only to the most thoughtful of the Church. Simple Christians held to the plain statements of Jesus and of the early Apostles, as many simple Christians still do today, and insisted that Christ was yet to come to found an earthly kingdom, while they interpreted the events of their generation as indicating the probability of a momentary fulfillment of their hopes.

Justin takes his place in this long line of simple Christians to whom the written and oral traditions of early Christianity in their literal significance have meant more than the attempts of thoughtful men to reconcile them with the facts of life. A Christian by Justin's definition is a man who "has been persuaded that the unjust and intemperate shall be punished in eternal fire, but that the

virtuous, that is those who live like Christ, shall dwell in a state that is free from suffering."¹ This statement represents Justin's real belief. His eyes were ever fixed upon the future. But it is quite characteristic of the sort of Christian thinking which Justin represents that in spite of the overwhelming emphasis he lays upon the second coming of Christ and the last judgment he has not a definite and consistent conception of what is to happen.

Proofs of the second coming of Christ Justin found chiefly in the Old Testament. The Christians had always to face the difficulty in proving the Messianic character of Jesus that the Jews utterly scoffed at their description of a Jewish Messiah, and at their claim that a crucified man could pretend to fulfill the Jewish expectations. The Christian answer as found in Justin was to take all that the Jews said of their Messiah and apply it to the second coming, while many new passages were adduced as being also Messianic, with the claim that they had been fulfilled in the first advent of Christ.² "He shall drink of the brook in the way, therefore shall he lift up the head," describes the humility and then the grandeur of the two comings.³ In the first advent Christ was to be pierced; in the second advent they will look upon Him whom they have pierced and bitterly mourn.⁴ The glories of the prophecy of the dying Jacob are to be fulfilled in the second coming.⁵ "He shall be the desire of the nations" can only refer to a second advent of Jesus Christ who is now the anticipation of the pious of every race.⁶ Moses and Joshua together saved the Israelitish hosts. For Moses stretched out his hands, and Joshua led the army to victory. Moses with his arms outstretched symbolizes the first coming and the Cross; but Joshua whose name is the same as Jesus, symbolizes the second coming when the power of the name will finally be

¹ Ap. II. 1. 2 (41 C); cf. von Engelhardt (Bibl. 313) pp. 199 ff.

² Dial. 14. 8 (232 D).

³ Dial. 33. 2 (251 B); cf. Ps. cx. 7.

⁴ Dial. 32. 2 (249 D); cf. Zech. xii. 10, 12.

⁵ Dial. 52. 1 ff. (271 C); cf. Gen. xlix. 8—12.

⁶ Dial. 52. 4 (272 B); cf. Gen. xlix. 10.

victorious over the demonic hosts.¹ The two goats offered during the fast are likewise symbols of the two advents.² In the second advent all the marvels of the prophecies of Daniel are to be revealed.³

This second coming is not to take place without adequate preparation, though as to the nature of the preparation Justin gives two contradictory explanations. Christ, Justin says in the Dialogue, is to sit at the right hand of God until God has made Christ's enemies His footstool.⁴ In the Apology Justin says that God will keep Christ in Heaven until He has subdued His enemies the devils, and until the number of those foreknown by Him as good and virtuous is complete.⁵ We should infer from these passages that Justin looked for an increased checking of the demonic activity by the power of the first coming, and that when these evil personalities have at last been conquered, and the number of the righteous completed, Christ will come in glory. But Justin explains also that the Man of Apostasy foretold by Daniel shall have dominion for a time, times, and a half a time, and shall speak daring blasphemies against the Most High.⁶ The second coming is to be preceded by a rampant propagation of heresy which will deceive even many of the faithful.⁷ In contradiction to his first quoted scheme these latter passages would lead us to conclude that Justin looked for an increasingly evil time, which is to be consummated in the person of the Man of Apostasy speaking strange things against the Most High and doing unlawful things against the Christians.⁸ When the time of tribulation shall have thus reached its height, Justin looked for the second advent. The contradiction of ideas is typical of the confusion in which Justin was content to leave his eschatology in

¹ Dial. III. I ff. (338 A).

² Dial. 40. 4 (259 C); cf. Levit. xvi. 5 ff.

³ Dial. 31, 32.

⁴ Dial. 32. 3 (250 A).

⁵ Ap. I. 45. I (82 D).

⁶ Dial. 32. 3 (250 A).

⁷ Dial. 35. 2 ff. (253 A ff.); cf. 5I. 2 (271 A, B).

⁸ Dial. 110. 2 (336 D); cf. II Thes. ii. 3, 4.

spite of the importance with which he regarded it. Besides the time of apostasy and the coming of the Man of Apostasy, the suppression of the demons, and the fulfilling of the number of the righteous, Justin looked for one more sign of the advent. Elijah is to return a second time to be the herald of Christ, the immediate precursor of the great event.¹ But Justin tells us no particulars about this second reappearance of Elijah.

Justin looked for the Parousia momentarily. He advises the Jews in the Dialogue to make their decision for Christ with the least possible delay, because Christ is to be revealed in a very short time, and once He has come all opportunity for repentance will be closed.² The times are now running on to their consummation.³ Justin refers to the statement in Daniel that the Man of Apostasy is to rule for a time, times, and a half a time,⁴ and says that many people take this "time" to mean a century, in which case the Man of Apostasy would rule at least for 350 years. Justin says that it was urged that on the basis of this interpretation there will be ample opportunity for repentance and becoming Christian after the nature of the Man of Apostasy is fully established and revealed. But though this interpretation of "time" is certainly the traditional one,⁵ Justin rejects it. The Man of Apostasy could not possibly be allowed so long a period of rulership, he says. Once the last signs begin to appear, events will move very rapidly, and to Justin's thinking the Man of Apostasy was even then at the door. Justin says that the destruction of the world has been thus long postponed only because of the "seed of the Christians, which God recognizes as a cause in nature."⁶ Here Justin has complicated an Old Testament idea of the saving from destruction of a city which included a small remnant or seed of righteous people, by punning upon the word *σπέρμα*. Apparently the *σπέρμα*

¹ Dial. 40. 2, 3 (268 B, C).

² Dial. 28. 2 (245 C).

³ Dial. 32. 3 (250 A).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Cf. Goldfahn (Bibl. 389) p. 58.

⁶ Ap. II. 7. 1 (45 B).

which is an *αἴτιον ἐν τῇ φύσει* refers to the Spermatic Logos conception,¹ but the connection between this conception and that of a nucleus of good people who avert destruction from a large group of wicked people is hard to see, while the passage is not particularly simplified by denying to it any Spermatic Logos sense. For in that case the significance of the Christians for the *physical* universe is still unexplained. As a matter of fact Justin represents the Christians as earnestly looking forward to the end of this order of existence, and the destruction of the world, so that as they are to have no part in the destruction, it is hard to understand why the consummation should be delayed for their sakes.²

The beginning of the coming is to be a sudden appearance of Christ together with His angels in the clouds of heaven.³ The resurrection will follow immediately. This is to be a reuniting of the soul with the actual body discarded at death.⁴ Justin faces frankly the difficulty of the restoration of a decayed or destroyed body, but says that it is no whit more remarkable that God can reunite the elements which constitute a body, than that He can make a body in the first place from a small drop of human seed. Wonders great as the resurrection of the flesh are familiar. It is only the strangeness of this particular wonder that makes it seem impossible. With God all things are possible. "We shall receive again our own bodies, though they be dead and cast into the earth."⁵

From the Dialogue we should infer that the resurrection at this time will be the resurrection of the saints, who will then join Christ in an earthly rule in Jeru-

¹ See above p. 163.

² Otto's explanation (in loco) that the Christians are the reason why the world was created is at once not accurate to Justin's thought (for he says that the world was created for the sake of men in general), and still does not help to explain why these Christians should be regarded by God as a cause for delay in carrying out His plans for their salvation.

³ Ap. I. 51. 8, 9 (86 E.); 52. 3 (87 A ff.); Dial. 31. 1 (247 D).

⁴ Ap. I. 19 entire.

⁵ Ap. I. 18. 6 (65 C).

salem. Justin speaks of a "holy resurrection"¹ which is to be followed by a distribution to the Christians of an eternal possession. As Joshua led the Children of Israel into Palestine and distributed the land, so shall Christ gather the faithful and "distribute the good land to each one, though not in the same way." Christ will then shine as a light in Jerusalem eternally.² Again Justin says, "Christ came calling men to a . . . living together of all the saints in the same land whose possession He has promised, as has been shown already. Whence men from all parts, whether slave or free, who believe in Christ and know the truth in His and the Prophets' words, know that they will be with Him in that land, there to inherit the things that are eternal and incorruptible."³ "Jerusalem will be really rebuilt," and the Christians "will be collected and made glad with Christ, along with the Patriarchs and Prophets and the holy men of the Jewish race, and with those who were Jewish proselytes before Christ came."⁴ Since Justin seems to imply that this rule in Jerusalem is to be preceded by a renewing of heaven and earth,⁵ we might, without further information, be led to suppose that the "holy resurrection" means the general resurrection, and that the coming of Christ means an immediate judgment, the renewing of heaven and earth, and the establishment of a new eternal kingdom with the new Jerusalem as its capital, and all Christians of all ages as sharing in the eternal rule.

But Justin is not always consistent with this comparatively simple eschatology. For he introduces an idea of a special age of one thousand years during which this reign shall be exercised from Jerusalem, the period to be preceded by a resurrection of the just, and closed by a resurrection of all (that is all others, the wicked), and the final judgment. "But I and whatever Christians are of the true

¹ Dial. 113. 4 (340 C) *ἀγίαν ἀνάστασιν*, which should be understood as the resurrection of the saints though the text be not, with Thirlby, changed to *ἀγίων*.

² Ibid.

³ Dial. 132. 4, 5 (369 A); cf. Donaldson (Bibl. 143) p. 259.

⁴ Dial. 80. 1 (306 B).

⁵ Dial. 113. 5 (340 D).

faith understand that there is to be a resurrection of the flesh and a thousand years in Jerusalem which will have been rebuilt, adorned, and enlarged, as the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah and others declare."¹ "And further, there was a certain man with us whose name was John, one of the Apostles of Christ who prophesied by a revelation made to him that those who believed upon our Christ would spend (ποτήσειν) a thousand years in Jerusalem; and that thereafter the general and, in short, the eternal resurrection of all men at the same time, and the judgment, would take place."² The character of existence and rulership which is to be given to the faithful during this period Justin does not describe. Semisch has inappropriately applied Justin's citation of the return of Christ to Jerusalem to eat and drink with the Disciples after His resurrection to the millennial period.³ Justin in that passage means the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus, because he cites the instance among other events, which, already having happened, had fulfilled prophecy. Justin believes however that it is in this period that the prophecies of Isaiah lxxv. will be fulfilled, and he probably understood the words as referring to actually material conditions.⁴ For it is only after the general Resurrection that he applies the saying of Jesus, "They shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, but shall be equal to the angels, children of God being (children) of the resurrection."⁵

There seems to be no way of reconciling the millenium with the clear implication of Justin's other remarks that the new Jerusalem will be an eternal inheritance.⁶ On the

¹ Dial. 80. 5 (307 B).

² Dial. 81. 4 (308 A, B).

³ Dial. 51. 2 (271 A). Semisch (Bibl. 118) II. 471.

⁴ Dial. 81 entire.

⁵ Dial. 81. 4 (308 B). Justin's quotation τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ὄντες is probably an abridgment of Luke xx. 35, 36. Since these words, without altering the text, can be taken in the sense in which I have translated them, that is in the sense of Luke's text, the translation of Reith (which follows Otto), "the children of the God of the resurrection" seems to introduce unnecessarily a discrepancy of sense between Justin and the text of Luke.

⁶ Donaldson's remarks (Bibl. 143) pp. 261 ff., are excellent.

other hand it is impossible to use the contradiction to soften the unorthodoxy of Justin's chiliasm.¹ The fact that the millennial hope and the earthly kingdom from Jerusalem are not mentioned in the First Apology is no argument either for a separate authorship of the Dialogue and First Apology, or for the inconsequential nature of Justin's belief in the Thousand Years.² The doctrine of the collapse of all earthly power, and the rule of the world by the despised Christians under the despised Christ at Jerusalem must have been a most untactful piece of propaganda and apologetic to be used in the non-Christian world. That Justin has seen fit not to mention such a doctrine in the Apology does not in the least reflect upon the possibility that he believed in it with all his heart. Like the contradictory descriptions of the preparation for the second coming, the contradiction between the eternal rule from Jerusalem and the millennial rule must be allowed to stand.

The event which Justin put either immediately after the second advent, or at the close of the Thousand Years, is the focus of Justin's eschatological thinking, if not of his entire Christianity. For that all men will rise from the dead, with their own bodies, to be judged before the throne of God according to their deeds is the chief incentive in Justin's mind to a holy life. He even threatens the Emperor with damnation. "We forewarn you that you shall not escape the coming judgment of God, if you continue in your injustice."³ "And if you also read these words in a hostile spirit you can do no more, as I said before, than kill us; which indeed does no harm to us, but to you and all who unjustly hate us, and do not repent, brings eternal punishment by fire."⁴ All men, living and dead, even back to

¹ As does Feder (Bibl. 350) pp. 236, 237.

² The mention of the future kingdom in Ap. I. 111 is nothing more than an extremely awkward attempt to avoid the subject. The chapter has no significance for Justin's beliefs except to show that the kingdom was a matter which he did not then care to discuss. Indeed the reign of Christ from Jerusalem is entirely consistent with every word in the chapter.

³ Ap. I. 68. 2 (99 C).

⁴ Ap. I. 45. 6. (83 A, B).

Adam, will be haled before this tribunal.¹ The judgment, as always in Christian tradition, is to be based upon works. "Each man will go to eternal punishment or eternal salvation according to the merits of his conduct."² "Our Lord Jesus Christ said, in whatsoever things I take you, in these things also will I judge you."³ As Isaiah was sawed in two with a wooden saw, so will Christ divide the human race at the judgment, some for the everlasting kingdom, some for unquenchable fire.⁴ Both men and angels are to be judged at the same judgment, as both alike have been given free will.⁵ Christ is to be the Judge, acting, as always, for the Father. God, Justin says, will conduct the judgment *διὰ τοῦ κυρίου μου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*.⁶ The office of Judge has been given to Christ (sc. by God).⁷ This will be the final glorification of Christ. The demons will here be finally and completely subdued and sent to eternal fires.⁸ while Christ, unchallenged, will become the eternal King and Priest.⁹

The damned go at once to the fires of hell. "Hell is a place where those are to be punished who have lived wickedly and who do not believe that those things which God has taught us by Christ will come to pass."¹⁰ But here, as has already been pointed out,¹¹ Justin once more is not consistent. From most of his remarks we should suppose that all men and angels not worthy of salvation are to be condemned to an eternal fire, where in spite of the fire they will retain their immortality in order to suffer forever.¹² Justin says explicitly that the punishment

¹ Dial. 118. 1 (346 A); 132. 1 (362 A).

² Ap. I. 12. 1 (59 B).

³ Dial. 47. 5 (267 A).

⁴ Dial. 120. 5 (349 B).

⁵ Dial. 141. 1, 2 (370 B).

⁶ Dial. 58. 1 (280 B).

⁷ Dial. 46. 1 (264 B).

⁸ Ap. I. 28. 1 (71 B); 52. 3 (87 B).

⁹ Dial. 36. 1 (254 C).

¹⁰ Ap. I. 19. 8 (66 B).

¹¹ See above p. 225.

¹² Ap. I. 18. 2 (65 A); 52. 3 (87 B); Ap. II. 1. 2 (41 C); Dial. 130. 2 (359 D).

of the wicked is not to endure only a thousand years, as Plato said, but eternally.¹ But Justin also says that in the eternal fire each man will suffer "according to the merit of his deed, and will render account according to the powers he has received from God."² Each man is to be punished as God sees fit,³ or for whatever sins he has committed.⁴ The wicked are punished so long as God wills them to exist and be punished.⁵ Justin is here again retaining distinct traditions. It is idle to speculate as to which he regarded as the true one.

In the matter of the world conflagration, which can only be supposed to happen after the judgment, Justin again suggests that he is retaining contradictory traditions. In one passage Justin speaks of a doctrine of the Christians which is vastly superior to the similar Stoic teachings. Both believe that the world is to be consumed in a final conflagration. But, says Justin, the ultimate destruction of all things is not correctly described in the Stoic doctrines of a metabolism of all things into each other.⁶ It is evident that Justin's criticism of the Stoic doctrine is based not upon its aimless cycles,⁷ but upon the Stoic identification of God with destructible phenomena. For the Stoics represented the eternal changing and dissolving matter as itself deity, and it is against this notion that Justin roundly protests. The Christians believe, he says, that the end of the world will come by the raining of fire upon

¹ Ap. I. 8. 4 (57 B).

² Ap. I. 17. 4 (64 D, E) *πρὸς ἀναλογίαν ὧν ἔλαβε δυνάμειον παρὰ θεοῦ*. This phrase suggests a greater or less share of the *δύναμις παρὰ θεοῦ* in each man, which might indicate that the Spermatic Logos, the highest power in each man, varies in amount in different individuals. But as the reference in the passage is very uncertain the statement was not adduced as evidence in discussing Justin's anthropology. Still the probability seems to favor such an interpretation.

³ Dial. 88. 5 (316 B).

⁴ Ap. II. 7. 5 (45 D).

⁵ Dial. 5. 3 (223 B); cf. above p. 225.

⁶ Ap. II. 7 entire; cf. Ap. I. 20. 4 (66 D).

⁷ Such is Veil's interpretation in loco.

the earth as God rained water in the days of Noah, and that in the destruction all wicked angels, demons, and men will perish. Only those who are Christians, whether before or after Christ, it is to be inferred, will escape. Over against this very explicit passage stand the passages already discussed of an eternal rule, with Jerusalem, and apparently the earthly Jerusalem, as its capital,¹ which led Donaldson to the statement: "Heaven was the peculiar habitation of God; they assigned some definite place to dead Christians, and they all looked forward to a complete renovation of the earth . . . Justin was therefore consistent in looking to earth as the final habitation of the blessed."² Donaldson can only be justified by allowing him to identify the destruction of the earth already described with a statement in the Dialogue that the Father will renew both heaven and earth ἀπὸ καὶ διὰ Χριστοῦ.³ But Donaldson does not himself so interpret this latter passage,⁴ and it is hard to see how the renewing of the earth can be taken as synonymous with its complete destruction. We shall have to be content with leaving another unreconciled contradiction in Justin's eschatology. It must be recognized that it is only in the Apologies we hear of the final conflagration,⁵ and only in the Dialogue that mention is made of the eternal rule from Jerusalem, as well as the chiliastic form of that tradition. But we have found already too many inconsistencies in Justin's eschatology to draw any hasty conclusions as to a different authorship of the two works on that account.

But the divergence between the two doctrines about the end of the world makes the doctrine of the future state of the blessed different in the Apology from that in the Dialogue. Von Engelhardt rightly concludes that the destruction of the world with all the wicked, as described

¹ See above p. 284.

² (Bibl. 143) p. 259.

³ Dial. 113. 5 (340 D).

⁴ Donaldson looks upon this renewing as a process begun in the Incarnation and consummated after the Judgment. Loc. cit.

⁵ Though that the world will perish is clearly the implication of the argument in Dial. 5. 1, 2 (222 E ff.).

in the Apologies, makes it essential to look to heaven as the place of the reward of immortality for Christians,¹ while it is just as fairly concluded by Donaldson from the statements in the Dialogue that earth was the scene of the ultimate happiness of the blessed.² But Justin becomes in some measure consistent with himself when he remarks about the condition of the blessed. In the Apologies he speaks of the saved as being immortalized.³ All men after death retain their powers of sense perception,⁴ but this is said particularly of the wicked to insure the fact that they will feel the full horrors of the fires of damnation. The process of "immortalizing" may indicate the fact that the souls of the blessed will in some way be transformed, so that Justin is justified in speaking of the saved as existing in a state beyond sensation (*βιώσαντες ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ*).⁵ In this state they will live with God (*συγγενήσεσθαι τῷ θεῷ*),⁶ an eternal and pure life where nothing evil can cause disturbance.⁷ In the Dialogue they are similarly described as *ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ καὶ ἀφθαρσίᾳ καὶ ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ ἀθανασίᾳ*.⁸ But one cannot see in these phrases the hunger of a Greek for freedom from the flesh. The passages are mere rhetoric, made up of the catchwords of the day for describing the future state of blessedness. Justin had no Hellenistic horror of the flesh. He only means that the blessed shall live eternally without a shadow of pain or sorrow, and with no diminution of powers.

Accordingly in the second coming of Christ Justin looked for a consummation of all his hopes. Christ Himself is to be Judge of all and Ruler in the new Jerusalem. With Him and with God are to be the Christians, that

¹ (Bibl. 313) p. 205.

² Loc. cit.

³ Ap. I. 21. 6 (67 D) *ἀπαθανατίζεσθαι*, translated by Dods "deified", following Otto's note in loco. Otto does not himself so translate, however, and the use of the word in Tatian's Orat. ad Graec. 10. 3; 16. 2; 25. 2 is not so strong.

⁴ Ap. I. 18. 1 (64 E); 20. 4 (66 D).

⁵ Ap. II. 1. 2 (41 C).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ap. I. 8. 2. (57 A).

⁸ Dial. 45. 4 (264 B); cf. 117. 3 (345 B).

is all those who have ever lived rightly, whether Jews, heathen, or followers of the incarnate Christ. Then will the problems of life all find their solution, and the justice of God be made manifest to every man. One of the chief values of a study of Justin's eschatology is the testimony it bears to the completely uncritical character of his thinking. In spite of the overwhelming importance which he lays upon the doctrine of the future, he holds consistently to hardly a single important detail. The preparation for the coming is to be an increase of good things, at the same time a terrible riot of evil. The advent is to mean the founding of an eternal kingdom on earth, though the kingdom is to last only a thousand years, and though the earth itself is to be destroyed in fire. The wicked are punished in fire not for a thousand years, but eternally, though Justin says that each man is punished in proportion to his crimes, and exists in the fire only so long as God wishes him to exist and be punished. If Justin could be thus uncritical in his use of tradition in this his most important doctrine, it can only be explained on the grounds that his was an inferior mind, and that to him the Christian life was immeasurably more important than its explanations or theology. On only one point in eschatology does he appear to reject a tradition which has come to him; he denies the Hellenistic doctrine of death as a release of the soul from the body to return to God, and instead retains the Palestinian Jewish notion of a resurrection of the body.

CONCLUSION

Justin's full title, St. Justin, Philosopher and Martyr, is in part deeply deserved, in part misapplied. That Justin was a Martyr there is no reason to doubt, and there is still less reason to doubt that his spirit burned with that conviction and courage in life which in death transformed executions into martyrdoms. But he burned also with a gentler and purer flame than those of conviction and courage, for the hand that traced the writings we assign to his name, the heart that yearned for the soul of Trypho, are unmistakably the hand and heart of a Saint. The world would be richer did it still possess some of the quiet talks Justin used to give Christians in the upper room above Martinus at the Timiotinian Bath. But while we honour the Martyr and revere the Saint the fact must definitely be admitted that Justin was in no sense a philosopher. He was not a philosopher in that he had had a philosopher's training, for we have repeatedly seen that his use of philosophical terminology betrays only a superficial and popular understanding of philosophical conceptions. He was still less a philosopher in the sense that he approached his problems from a cosmic or metaphysical point of view. His excursions into the cosmic are necessitous and inadequate attempts to gain a plausibility in philosophical obscurity for conceptions which as he usually held them were not only unphilosophical, but often irrational and contradictory. Justin is not even a philosopher in the sense that he is concerned about consistency or system in the beliefs for which he is willing and eager to die. A tendency to analysis and criticism, the first traces of a philosophical instinct, are completely absent from his writings. His Roman Catholic commentators are entirely

correct in insisting that he is first and always a traditionalist, whose chief desire is to explain Christianity as he learned it.

The Christianity which Justin learned could have differed from his own theology in only the smallest details, else he, like Marcion, would have been rejected by his own generation. It is inconceivable, for example, that he had learned from other Christians only so much of the Logos Doctrine as was to be found in the Fourth Gospel, and that he wrought out for himself the developments we have already described. He does not reveal the sort of mind by which intellectual pioneering is done. It is possible, though by no means certain, that he introduced a few phrases; he may have been the first to apply the Spermatic Logos conception to Christian Theology. But if he added anything to Christianity at all, it was not by transplanting foreign conceptions into Christianity, but by going deeper than ordinary Christians into a body of thought which was recognized as a legitimate source for Christian metaphysics. For Justin found Christianity an escape from speculation, not a barbarous faith which needed recasting and restating to be intelligible to Greek thinkers. Revelation, as he understood it, satisfied all doubts, settled all problems. The Prophets and Christ, in their perfect harmony, constitute the True Philosophy. Such a point of view is utterly inexplicable if Justin was a Greek in his thinking who never really understood the Christianity to which he had been converted, and who was trying to reconcile a mere Faith with the rationality of the Schools. It is Justin's chief joy in Christianity that what he teaches is not his own, but is the revealed and accepted Faith.

It must then be admitted that the Christianity of Justin's day had already its powerful tradition of orthodoxy, and thus that this tradition included: a God who was first the personal Father, and then as much as possible of the Philonic Deity; a Christ who was the Logos of Hellenistic Judaism, though only half understood, sharply personalized, and declared in His entirety to have been incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth; a host of other spiritual

emanations from the Father of whom the most important was the Holy Prophetic Spirit; a company of evil spirits of all sorts of the type believed in by ignorant people everywhere, but recognizably akin to the demons of the Synoptic Gospels; a doctrine of Man, of which the elements are recognizably Philonic, but which falls immeasurably short of Philo's conceptions; a belief in the universal need for salvation, but only a feeble account of the cause of such a need; a popular (Palestinian Jewish) conception of sin as disobedience, rather than as a state of corruption; an overmastering conviction that eternal salvation was given through Christ, but only contradictory fragments of explanations of such a belief; a conviction that salvation was conditioned by man's conduct in this life; and a momentary expectation of the return of Christ when many great, but not certainly known, events would take place which would culminate in the judgement and division of humanity for heaven or hell. In brief, the Christianity which Justin has described, with its foundation of primitive Palestinian Judaistic Christian beliefs, was almost entirely dependent for theory upon a Hellenistic Judaistic tradition which had been running in through the doors opened by St. Paul, and by the authors of the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the Fourth Gospel.

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