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THE
PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.



THE
PHILOSOPHY OF KANT:

LECTURES BY
VICTOR COUSIN.



TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

WITH A SKETCH OF
KANT'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

BY
A. G. HENDERSON.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

METAPHYSICAL Philosophy is looked upon in two different ways by two opposite classes of thinkers. By one class it is considered as a sort of mental gymnastic, valuable in strengthening the intellectual faculties, just as physical exercise strengthens the body; or as a sort of introduction to positive science, just as the search after the philosopher's stone and the elixir of life introduced the science of chemistry, but having no further value. If this view be the correct one, then we must look upon Plato, Descartes, Locke, Kant, and many others, as so many intellectual *trainers* and fencing-masters, or as so many mental Rosicrucians and alchemists. The other class, in which I myself humbly claim to be included, consider philosophy as the expression of a *real fundamental* want of human nature, which, by a law as inevitable in its action as that of gravitation, is compelled, as soon as it has raised itself above the absorbing influences of its material nature, to search into the nature and extent of its own powers, its destiny, its connection with a world which it recognizes as distinct from itself, the nature of the power or powers observed to operate in that world, and its own relation thereto. At the same time acknowledging this fundamental

want of human nature, they also believe that nature has not withheld the power to gratify it, though she may have insisted upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. They consider, too, that being a fundamental want, men will necessarily seek its gratification in some way or other; that all men will think over these momentous questions, however feebly and however imperfectly; and just as we step in with our mental and physical education, in order to *carry out* the designs of nature, in the development of the germs which she has planted within us, so a systematic unfolding and reconstruction of the matter of philosophy is better than the operation of lawless instinct. They think, too, that all the institutions of society, the various forms of religion, the moral code adopted by nations, and their conceptions of beauty, all take their form and colour from these primitive judgments, which philosophy shapes into science; and that it is of the highest importance to have these judgments evolved from the general laws of mental phenomena in their purity, freed from every mixture of a sensual and material nature, in order to fit them for their office of regulators and guiding principles of all institutions. They think that the stream must be pure at its source, or it will never become so in its course. If this be true, the illustrious names before mentioned rise in our estimation, and we are led to look upon them as guides to truth. One of the most illustrious amongst them is undoubtedly Immanuel Kant. His philosophy has had a prodigious effect upon modern literature and modes of thought, and, through these, upon the institutions and general civilization of this age; and whoever would have clear ideas on this literature and civilization, cannot with safety ignore his philosophy. Kant's works themselves present undoubtedly many difficulties, but there is no lack of interpreters more or less faith-

ful. And among these M. COUSIN, the distinguished head of the French Eclectic school, stands pre-eminent. Devoted to philosophy, he spent many years in Germany, studying the great works of Kant, and in personal communication with some of his distinguished pupils and successors.

The work now presented to the public in an English dress enjoys a great reputation as a faithful analysis of the principles of the Critical Philosophy, besides being an admirable critique of the 'Critique.' It is limited to the Critique of *Pure Reason*, though it incidentally developes, to a certain extent, the Critique of Practical Reason. In the biography of Kant, which precedes the Lectures, I have endeavoured to present a more complete development of Kant's moral system, which is indeed the keystone of the Critical Philosophy, and have taken a rapid glance at the various works which embody that philosophy, and a sketch of Kant's works on other subjects. Of the translation, I need say nothing more than that I have endeavoured to make it faithful and perspicuous. I cannot hope that I have in all cases succeeded, but at all events I have done my utmost.

A. G. H.

May 8th, 1854.



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A SKETCH
OF
KANT'S LIFE AND WORKS.

THE life of Kant presents but few of those incidents which form the staple of ordinary biography. He lived a life of celibacy, and had none of the joys nor the cares arising out of the married state: hence we have neither courtship, nor marriage, nor births, nor deaths, to relate. Nor was he a traveller: like Socrates, whom in many other points he resembles, he scarcely ever left the place of his birth. His life was devoted partly to academical instruction, partly to laborious thought. He was no dreamer, no contemplative idler. Almost every part of the wide domain of human knowledge he explored, not as a traveller seeking recreation, but with the mind and the will of a discoverer. Mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, every branch of experimental science, physical geography and ethnography, æsthetics, ethics, and philosophy, all were successfully studied with zeal and persevering industry; while as regards philosophy, his name will always be associated with those of Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato, as a profound and original thinker, and as the author of the greatest revolution that ever took place in metaphysical science. His life is in his works. These supply the place of the ordinary events that mark the lives of men of less note. His mission in this world seems to have been to *think*, to work out by patient and laborious efforts a solution of those problems which the world is either too idle, too busy, or too weak to work

out for itself. Happy for it that such thinkers now and then are born into it!

Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg, an old university town, numbering some sixty thousand inhabitants, formerly the capital of East Prussia, on the 21st of April, 1724. Like Rome, it stands upon seven hills; the country round it is flat, and the climate moist and chilly. But as the birth-place of one of the greatest thinkers that modern Europe has given to the world, its name will be held in veneration when perhaps not a stone shall remain to tell where it stood, and when all knowledge of Rome, her conquests, her palaces, her armies, and her final degradation, shall have passed into the eternal night of time. Kant's father, John George Cant, born at Memel, was a humble saddler, a descendant of a Scotch family, collateral branches of which I believe are still to be found in Aberdeenshire. The name was originally spelt 'Cant,' and was indeed so spelt by Kant's father, but was altered by Immanuel himself (although he always was proud of his Scotch descent), in order to adapt it better to the analogies of the German language*. It is curious that the only effectual antagonist that the Scottish philosopher Hume ever had should himself be a descendant of a Scotch family, but so it is. Scotland may be proud of both of them. Kant's mother, whose maiden name was Regina Dorothea Reuter, came from a genuine German stock. The family consisted of five children, in addition to the subject of this memoir, viz. four sisters and a younger brother, who became a Lutheran clergyman in Courland. Kant was the second child. The circumstances of the family were poor, and the sisters of Kant never emerged from the class of small burghers to which the family belonged. Kant the elder was a man of the most unswerving integrity,

* It is not a very improbable conjecture that Kant may have descended from the celebrated covenanting preacher Andrew Cant, who was a minister at Aberdeen in 1660, who acted so prominent a part in the discussions concerning the Covenant, and who died in 1664. A Mr. Andrew Cant, supposed to have been a son of the Aberdeen teacher, was Principal of the University of Edinburgh in 1675, and the same person, or a son, was consecrated a bishop of the Church of Scotland in 1722. Kant's father had many of the characteristics of the Covenanters. He was a simple, pious, and rigidly upright and honest man, qualities that exercised a marked influence on his celebrated son, both in the formation of his character and in the direction they gave to his moral speculations. It would be a curious circumstance if the *categorical imperative* should thus be traced back to the indomitable and thoroughly honest spirit of the Scotch Covenanters.

uprightness of character, and of simple habits. The mother was a woman of rare excellence. She would have added lustre to any station of life, however elevated, but her character, as the wife of the humble but honest saddler of Königsberg, and the mother of six children, whom she watched and tended with the most exemplary care, and one of whom, thanks to her penetrating intuition, which recognized in her Immanuel (a name dear to her pious spirit, although we may be certain that that spirit originated the name) the germs of future greatness and goodness. She appears to have been a woman of unaffected and genuine piety, and showed an early desire that the young Immanuel should, if possible, be brought up for the Lutheran Church. In this she was encouraged by the advice of an estimable man, then resident in Königsberg, Dr. Albert Schultz, an eloquent and effective preacher, and an enlightened friend of education. He was at the head of the sect of the Pietists of Königsberg, and had the sagacity to see the superior mind of the little Immanuel. The affectionate and pious mother, having formed this project, naturally strove in every way to instil into the mind of her darling those sentiments of piety and noble and religious aspirations which burned so brightly in her own heart, and which she rightly judged to be essential to his future success as a minister. Kant has left us a noble and affecting reminiscence of his mother's pious endeavours. "My mother," he says, "was an affectionate, kind-hearted, pious, and upright woman, as well as a tender parent, one who directed her children into the ways of piety and truth, by religious instructions and a virtuous example. She oftentimes conducted me out of the town, to show me the works of God, spoke with pious rapture of his power, wisdom, and goodness, and impressed my heart with a deep reverence for the Creator of all things. Never shall I forget her; for she it was who planted and nourished in me the first germ of goodness, who opened my heart to the impressions of nature, who awakened and enlarged my ideas, and, by her teaching, has exercised an enduring and beneficial influence over my whole life." These country rambles of the mother and son were continued during Kant's school-days, and even after he had entered the university. "But," to quote the words of M. Cousin*, "now

* 'Kant dans les dernières années de sa vie' (Kant in the last years of his life): Cousin's Literary Works, vol. iii. p. 330. Pagnerre, Paris, 1849.

they had changed sides. It was the mother who asked the questions, she who had become the pupil; it was the son who explained and instructed. The happy mother was indebted to her son for valuable knowledge thus acquired, while viewing, with a mother's joy, a progress which filled her with hope." Here is another addition to the long list of names of celebrated men who have been indebted to their mothers for the first unfolding of nature's gifts. As I have said, his father was a man of the strictest integrity, and a firm lover of truth and plain dealing. Hence Kant's home, though poor, was a home of virtue, piety, and rectitude. Both parents were noble exemplars. We have seen the influence of his mother; that of his father would be equally strong in fixing in his mind those stern, rigid, even stoical sentiments of virtue which, in the maturity of his powers, expanded into one of the noblest and most exalted system of ethics ever given to the world, which shattered to fragments the miserable apology for morals that reigned supreme at the close of the eighteenth century, and which is undoubtedly Kant's greatest claim to the gratitude and admiration of mankind.

Kant's earliest instruction was received in the hospital school of Königsberg. Of these early boyhood days we have no record. His parents, however hopeful in reference to the little Immanuel, could have had no presage of his future greatness, so that no boyish anecdotes have been preserved illustrative of his early character. Kant himself never talked of these days; we may conjecture, however, that his progress was satisfactory, since at the early age of eight he left the preparatory school, and was received into the Collegium Fredericianum, of which the before-mentioned Dr. Albert Schultz was the director. Here he passed the next eight years of his life, that is, from A. D. 1732 to 1740, and underwent the usual course of study of those who enter the German Gymnasia with a view to some future profession. These studies would of course embrace the usual branches of a college education; but it is somewhat singular, when we consider Kant's future career as a physicist and metaphysician, that at this period of his life his chief delight appears to have been a study of Latin literature, and more especially the Latin poets, his favourites being Virgil and Horace. These last he not only read with the greatest avidity, but committed considerable portions to memory, which, to his latest days, he would recite

without hesitation. He continued to read the Latin authors throughout his life, and appears at all times to have taken special interest in those literary remains of classical antiquity. His chief companions at this period were Rhunken, afterwards celebrated as a classical scholar, and Cunde. That Kant was not insensible to future honours, a slight anecdote preserved from his Table-talk will show. The two friends just mentioned and Kant were conversing one day as to how they should spell their names when they came to be celebrated by the writing of learned books, and it was agreed that Rhunken's should be changed to Rhunkenius, Cunde's to Cundeus, and Kant's to Kantius. The former of these, it is well known, kept his word, and, it is said, more than once deplored Kant's infidelity to his early classical aspirations, declaring that had he not been *led astray* by his love of science, he might have won high honours as a classical scholar. In 1737, when he was but thirteen years of age, he had the misfortune to lose his excellent mother, a loss which he felt most deeply. Kant delighted to talk of this good mother, and often spoke of the cause of her premature death. She had, it appears, a friend, to whom she was ardently attached. This friend was betrothed to a man who deserted her; the poor deserted one on this fell dangerously ill, and was attended with the most assiduous and affectionate care by Kant's mother. The latter, in order to induce her sick friend to take some medicine prescribed for her, swallowed a spoonful of it herself. But she had no sooner done so, than she was seized with a shivering fit; and remarking spots on the person of her friend, her excited imagination construed them into the signs of a putrid, contagious fever. She declared herself to be lost, took to her bed the same day, and in a very short time died, a victim to friendship. At this time the elder Kant was in poor circumstances, and had five young children to support, in addition to the subject of this memoir. An uncle on the mother's side, named Richter, who probably had no family of his own, came to the assistance of the family, and by his aid Kant was enabled to continue his studies. He was indebted to the same kind relative for assistance on many occasions, as circumstances required it.

In the year 1740, Kant, then aged sixteen, entered the University of Königsberg, with his mind well grounded in the rudimentary branches of education, and enriched by his clas-

sical studies. He now devoted himself to a study of mathematics, physics, and philosophy, while he continued his classics. At this time the chair of the mathematics, as well as that of philosophy, was occupied by Martin Knutzen, and that of the professor of physics by Teske. Kant attached himself with great ardour to the lectures of both these professors, particularly to those of Teske. Indeed, physical science, in all its branches, had especial attractions for him, and he was not long in storing his mind with all the facts which that fruitful age of experimental philosophy brought to light. Kant, however, being intended for the church, it was necessary for this purpose that he should attend the lectures of the theological faculty, the chair of which was occupied by Dr. Schultz, who held the doctrines of Leibnitz as propounded by Wolf. Kant's mental power and diligence shone forth here as conspicuously as in the other branches of science, and as a proof of this we may mention the fact that he was in the habit of repeating and explaining Dr. Schultz's lectures to his fellow-students, as a means of raising the necessary funds to enable him to continue at the University: another noble and affecting instance of the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties. It was not, however, in the misty regions of dogmatic theology that Kant's penetrating spirit loved to dwell. The sublime laws of physical nature much more powerfully attracted him; and so thoroughly had he mastered the great physical problems of that age, that in 1746, the last year of his college life, he published his first work bearing the following title, 'Thoughts respecting the true estimation of the Living Forces, and a Critique of the proofs which Leibnitz and other mathematicians have employed in this Controversy; together with some preliminary considerations which relate to the Power of Bodies generally*.' The Newtonian philosophy has settled the questions discussed in this treatise, and its chief interest to us now consists in its showing the force of Kant's intellect at this early period of his career, and also in its pointing out to us that thorough independence of mind, without which he never would have effected the revolution in philosophy which he did. While considering it necessary in the Preface to apologize for

* "Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte, und Beurtheilung der Beweise, deren sich Herr von Leibnitz und andre Mathematiker in dieser Streitsache bedienet haben; nebst einigen vorhergehenden Betrachtungen, welche die Kräfte der Körper überhaupt betreffen."

venturing to differ from men so eminent as Descartes and Leibnitz, he nevertheless claims for himself the right of independent thinking: "I am of opinion," he says, "that it is on occasions by no means useless, to place a certain noble confidence in our own powers. A trust of this kind vitalizes all our efforts, and imparts a kind of stimulus which is greatly conducive to the investigation of truth. Here then I take my stand. I have already marked out the path which I desire to keep; I shall henceforth enter upon this course, and nothing shall hinder me from continuing it." Here is a true mind, a "self-balanced," free nature, who has looked abroad over the wide domain of knowledge, much of which it finds to be barren and waste, and who feels within it powers to act, powers to cultivate this domain, feels its own liberty, and determines beforehand that no extraneous force shall drive it hither or thither, but that while seeking light from all sources, it alone must and shall judge for itself. Some may be ready to accuse Kant of pride, in thus exalting his own individual strength; but if we consider, that in him we have a mind of uncommon grasp and range of vision, that although but twenty-two years of age, fourteen years of that period had been spent in the cultivation of his faculties, with an ardour and a passion of which we can form but an imperfect idea; that Kant's subsequent life shows him to have been at all times modest and circumspect in the extreme, and that, above all, he was animated by a sincere and ardent love of knowledge and truth, not for any secondary purpose, but for their own sake, we shall not think of his presumption, but admire the noble and just confidence in the powers that God had given him, powers, whatever judgment may be formed as to the completeness of his philosophy considered as a whole, he exercised for the good of his race. This is a point however which we must reserve.

Of the next nine years of Kant's life, viz. from 1746 to 1755, we know but little. He had finished his college education. His father died in 1746, and he could no longer trust to the support of his uncle; the problem of how to live had to be solved, and this problem the poor student of Königsberg, whom we have just seen nobly relying upon his own mind in the investigation of truth, found to be one of difficult solution; more difficult perhaps than any he had yet undertaken. But solved it must be. He first became a candidate for a vacant post in the Cathedral School, but in this first effort he was

doomed to disappointment: a person of very inferior merit obtained the place. The poor saddler's son, whatever his merits, probably wanted *patronage*. There is nothing new in this. He had tried his hand at preaching occasionally in the neighbourhood of Königsberg, but the bent of his mind seems not to have lain in that direction, and he probably met with little success. Be this as it may, it is certain that he gave up all thoughts of the clerical profession, and accepted a situation as tutor in a clergyman's family a few miles from Königsberg, and afterwards became a private tutor in the house of Count de Hülleson of Armsdorf. This secured him a present livelihood and sufficient uninterrupted leisure for the prosecution of his studies, which were all in all to him. In after-life he used to advert to these days, and while looking back upon them as a happy period, since it was then that he laid the foundation of his future greatness as a philosopher, used to declare that he must have made the worst possible tutor to young children. This however can hardly be accepted: his mild and gentle nature must have made him the friend of childhood, while his vigorous intellect, which seized every subject in its inmost relations, aided by the varied stores of knowledge that he had accumulated, must have given him great power in unfolding the nascent powers of his pupils. His love for and extensive knowledge of classical literature, must also have been an unfailing source of instruction and delight both to himself and his pupils.

This country life terminated in 1755, in which year he returned to Königsberg with the intention of permanently attaching himself to the University, and of attaining an honourable position as a professor. The German universities have three classes of teachers, viz. *professores ordinarii*, *professores extraordinarii*, and *privatim docentes*; these last are allowed to deliver lectures, but have usually no salary. It was as a *privat-docent* that Kant began his professional career. It was necessary, however, that he should take his degree as Doctor in Philosophy, and for this purpose that he should write certain Latin dissertations, and defend them publicly before the senate. Two of these were read in the year 1755. The first was entitled '*Meditationum quarundam de Igne succineta delineatio*;' the second, '*Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicæ nova dilucidatio*;' the third bears the title of '*Metaphysicæ cum Geometria junctæ usus in philosophia na-*

turali.' These were written in the ordinary scholastic method of the period; and though they give no signs of the vast revolution in the domain of abstract thought, which Kant afterwards undertook, they show a profound knowledge of the natural and metaphysical science of the period. Kant now opened his class in the University, and we may have some idea of the range of his knowledge, when we consider the subjects embraced in his lectures: these were mathematics, physics, the metaphysical sciences, logic, ethics, anthropology, and physical geography. On all these subjects he was clear and profound. His was a mind that was never content with incomplete knowledge. With him it was an instinct to trace every subject of thought to its primary principles, while fully alive to the important bearing of facts and experiments on the development of these principles. His mind was justly balanced, and was always ready for the reception of truth, whether it arrived externally from nature, or internally from thought; and it was the clear conception that he had of these two elements of knowledge that led to his subtle analysis of the mind, and that ultimately developed the critical philosophy. That a man thus gifted, with knowledge so various and so complete, should have remained at the university fifteen years as a privat-docent, with no other means than what came from the fees of his pupils, which, notwithstanding the success of his lectures, afforded him but a miserable livelihood, is lamentable to think of. That it was up-hill work with him we may be certain, for we find him in 1766 accepting the post of *under-librarian*, which yielded him but a miserable pittance, in order to add something, however small, to his scanty resources. But he struggled bravely on. His health was good; he was exceedingly regular and temperate in his mode of life, and his poverty seems to have had no other effect upon him than to urge him on to increased labour. Madame de Stael, amongst the thousand beautiful things she has said, has the following; "L'éducation de la vie déprave les hommes légers, et perfectionne ceux qui réfléchissent*." These fifteen years of struggle were years of extraordinary activity and fertility; and something like twenty-five to thirty writings, embracing

* It is stated by Wirgman, that the King of Prussia made him offers of a professorship in the Universities of Jena, Erlangen, Mitau, and Halle, all which he declined, out of an attachment to his native place. He was also offered the Professorship of Poetry in the University of Königsberg, but modestly declined it. Wirgman adds, that he was made Privy Councillor by the King.

almost every branch of human knowledge, some in the form of reviews, some consisting of regular treatises, were successively given to the world. The narrow limits into which this sketch has necessarily to be compressed, will not enable me to do more than take a rapid glance at these various works. In 1754 Kant inserted in a Königsberg journal two articles on cosmology, respectively entitled,—1st. “Examination of the question proposed by the Royal Academy of Sciences at Berlin, viz. ‘Whether the earth, in its rotation upon its axis, by which it produces the succession of day and night, had undergone any change since its origin; what has been the cause, and what are the proofs.’” 2nd. “Physical Examination of the question, whether the earth had become deteriorated by age (*ob die Erde veralte*).” Kant maintained the affirmative of the first question, by a reference to the facts of physical geography and the laws of mechanical science, and announces at the close of the article a larger and more complete work then ready for the press. This work, dedicated to Frederick II., appeared anonymously in 1753, under the title of ‘A Universal History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens; or, an attempt to explain the structure and mechanical origin of the entire Creation on the principles of Newton*.’ In this remarkable work, “which,” says M. Barni, “indicates not only a sublime imagination, but a genius marvellously fitted for the investigation of such a subject,” Kant attempts to prove, that the entire structure of the universe may be accounted for by reference only to the known laws of motion. From a consideration of the regularly increasing eccentricity of the planetary orbits, he proves that some celestial body or bodies should be found between Saturn and the least excentric comet, and this was experimentally verified in 1781 by the discovery of the planet Uranus by Herschel. Other conjectures on the solar system, the milky way, the nebulae, and the ring of Saturn, were confirmed by Herschel, who, on many occasions, expressed his admiration of the penetrating genius that could thus, by reasoning from known laws, anticipate experience. Six years after the publication of this work, which attracted but very little notice, the celebrated French astronomer Lambert, in his ‘Cosmological Letters on the Struc-

* “Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäudes, nach Newton’schen Grundsätzen abgehandelt.”

ture of the Universe,' advanced views on the solar system, the milky way, the nebulae, etc., closely resembling those of Kant. The modest author of the 'History of the Heavens,' instead of expressing any chagrin at the neglect which his own views had met with, testified the most lively joy on learning that those views had been confirmed by the greatest astronomer of the age. The fact however afterwards led to a correspondence between the two philosophers, which continued from 1765 to 1770. In 1756 appeared a 'Natural History and Description of the most remarkable circumstances attending the Earthquakes that occurred towards the close of the year 1755;' and a 'Theory of the Winds.' These constitute a programme of his lectures for the summer semestre (six months) of 1756. In 1758 appeared a 'New Theory of Motion and Rest, in relation to the Elements of Physics,' which was also a programme of lectures; and a tract on Swedenborg, which is an answer to a lady who had requested to have his opinion on the visions of this singular man: the future opponent of thau-maturgy and mysticism shows here a somewhat singular reserve. In 1759 appeared 'Thoughts on Optimism;' in 1760, 'Reflections on the Premature Death of Funck;' in 1762, 'False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures,' in which he takes a clear common-sense view of the nature of logic in its connection with human thought. In 1763 he put forth an essay 'On the Introduction of Negative Quantities into Philosophical Speculation.' In the same year Kant published two works on natural theology; the first was entitled 'An Investigation into the Validity of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals,' which was a memoir presented to the Royal Academy of Berlin; it however obtained but the second prize, the first being awarded to the celebrated Moses Mendelssohn. The second work bore the title of 'The only possible Ground of Demonstration for the Existence of God.' (Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes.) This is a critical examination of the *à priori* arguments for the existence of God that had been advanced by Descartes, Leibnitz, and others. He contends for the insufficiency of these arguments, rather from a speculative consideration of ideas, than from the great principle of the critical philosophy, which as yet he had not evolved. We find however the idea which he afterwards more completely developed, viz. that the only solid basis for our belief in the existence of

God, rests upon a consideration of our *moral* nature distinctly laid down. In 1764 appeared a small treatise entitled 'Observations on the Emotions of the Sublime and Beautiful.' (Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen.) This book is exactly what its title indicates, viz. *observations*. The subjects of the sublime and beautiful are not treated in the profoundly scientific manner that they are in the Critique of the Judgment, to be hereafter noticed. They are rather considered in reference to their objects, to individual and national characteristics, and in relation to the sexes. In this little work Kant displays a mixture of delicate perception, fine feeling, and warm sympathies, all expressed in language so animated and elegant that he was termed the Labruyère of Germany. It was read with great avidity, not only by the philosophers of the day, but found its way into the drawing-rooms of most cultivated families, and was discussed with enthusiasm by the ladies at their tea-tables. The most remarkable part of the work is that in which he considers the sublime and beautiful in reference to the sexes, to the qualities that peculiarly belong to the fair sex, to the education best fitted for them, and on the charm and advantages of their society. No writer of that period has written of women with so much delicacy of feeling, and so fine an appreciation of their nature. "He who first comprised all womanhood under the general denomination of the *fair sex*," he says, "might perhaps have intended nothing more than a little delicate flattery, but it was a much more correct designation than probably he had any idea of; for without considering their figure, which in general is more elegant, their features more delicate and softer, their aspect more lively and attractive in its expression of friendship, gaiety, and affability, than those of men, and without speaking of that magical and secret power by which they lead us by their winning graces to judge favourably of them, we may remark in them peculiar characteristics which distinguish them clearly from our own, and which are marked so correctly by the epithet *beauty*. On the other hand, we might perhaps lay claim to the term *noble sex*, if it were not that a noble character rejects titles of honour, and would rather give than receive; not that I would be understood to say that women are wanting in noble qualities, or that men are entirely destitute of beautiful ones; on the contrary, each sex should unite these two qualities; but that in women all other qualities should concur in heightening that

of beauty, to which the others should relate, while in the man the predominating quality should refer rather to the sublime, all others being held in comparative insignificance. Such is the principle that should guide our judgments of the sexes, whether we praise or blame. Every system of education, every effort made with a view to the moral perfectionment of both sexes, unless we would efface differences that nature has so manifestly established, should be undertaken with a distinct recognition of this principle. We should consider not only that we have human beings to deal with, but that these beings possess different natures. Women have an innate and strong feeling for all that is beautiful, elegant, and adorned. Even in infancy they are fond of ornament. They are very quick in detecting everything of an unpleasing nature. They love pleasantries, and can be amused with trifles, provided they are gay and agreeable. At an early period they are very modest in their manners, very soon acquire an air of refinement, and have much self-possession at an age when a well-educated youth of the other sex is yet untractable, awkward, and embarrassed. They have much sympathy, goodness, and compassion. They prefer the beautiful to the useful, and will lop off everything in the shape of superfluities, that they may have more to spend on dress and ornament. They are extremely sensitive to the slightest marks of offence, and very quick to remark the smallest want of attention and respect. In a word, they represent in human nature the predominance of the beautiful qualities over the noble ones, and become regulators of the masculine sex."

Here are Kant's views respecting the female intellect and the proper method of developing it. They may tend to correct some erroneous and mischievous impressions that exist at the present day. "It is a peculiar characteristic of beautiful actions that they appear to be accomplished without effort. Great exertions, and difficulties surmounted, on the contrary, excite admiration, and properly belong to the sublime. Deep reflection, long and continued meditation, are noble, but difficult, and do not properly belong to those whose natural charms for the most part excite in us no other idea than that of beauty. Exhausting studies and painful researches, to whatever extent a woman may pursue them, have a tendency to efface the advantages which are peculiarly her own. She may indeed, on account of the rarity of the fact, become

an object of cold admiration, but she thereby compromises the charms which give her so much power over the other sex. A woman who has had her head full of Greek, like Madame Dacier, or who writes learned dissertations on mechanics, like La Marquise du Châtelet, would do well to wear a beard, for that would perhaps express better the profound knowledge in which it is her ambition to excel. The elegant mind chooses objects which touch the most delicate of the feelings and emotions, and leaves abstract speculations and useful but dry studies to the laborious, solid, and profound mind of man. Thus women need never study geometry, and need know no more of the 'sufficient reason,' or of the nature of monads, than would be necessary to feel the Attic salt that spices the satires of the small critics of our sex. The fair sex may safely neglect the vortices of Descartes, even when the amiable Fontenelle offers to accompany them into the starry regions of space. They will lose none of their own attractions by being ignorant of all that Algarotti has taken the trouble to write for them respecting the attractive forces of matter, according to the principles of Newton. In the reading of history they may neglect the battles; in geography they may pass over the fortresses and fortified places. They may be quite as indifferent to the smell of gunpowder, as we are to the odour of musk.

"One might almost be tempted to think that men, in wishing to instil into women's minds this false taste, had been actuated by a sort of malicious cunning. For, conscious of their own weakness when opposed to the natural charms of the sex, and knowing that a single cross look costs them more trouble than would the solution of the most difficult question, they know also that as soon as women acquire this false taste, they (the men) recover their superiority, and acquire an advantage which otherwise they could not easily have obtained, that of flattering with a generous indulgence the weakness of their vanity. The science for women is that of the human race, and of man in particular. Their philosophy is not to *reason*, but to *feel*. We should never lose sight of this truth, if we desire that they should develope and manifest all the beauty of their nature. We should be less anxious of strengthening their memory than of developing their moral sentiments, and this, not by general rules, but by putting before them moral actions that appeal to their judgment. Examples drawn from ancient

history, which show the influence of their sex on the affairs of the world, the various conditions to which they have been subjected in other ages and in foreign countries, the character of the two sexes as shown by examples, and the fluctuations of taste and pleasures—here is their history and their geography. It is exceedingly interesting to lay before a woman, in a manner agreeable to her, a map of the terrestrial globe, or of its principal divisions, and to see with what interest she listens to a description of the various races, the diversity in their tastes and moral sentiments, particularly if we show the reciprocal influence of the two sexes on each other, and add some simple explanations as to the influence of climate, and the liberty or slavery of the people. The particular divisions of a country, its commerce, its power and its government, are to her comparatively uninteresting. Of the planetary and siderial systems she is content with such a knowledge as will make her feel the beauty of a summer's evening, and teach her whether there are other worlds and other beautiful creatures. Expressive pictures and music, not that which indicates learned art, but that which inspires feeling*,—all these things purify and elevate her taste, and connect themselves closely with her moral sentiments. No cold speculative knowledge for women, but feelings, sentiments, and emotions, such as apply as near as possible to their respective conditions. But an education of this nature is rare, because it demands talents, experience, and a heart full of feeling; at the same time women can dispense with every other kind of instruction, for they know well how to form themselves without its aid."

I should like to quote the whole of this beautiful chapter, but must refrain. The reader will see, from the above extract, what a penetrating glance Kant has thrown on this delicate subject. The ladies of Königsberg called him the *beau* professor. Alluding to a saying of Rousseau's, that "a woman is never anything more than a great baby," Kant exclaims, "I would not for the whole world that I should have been the author of such a remark." Amongst many just observations on national characteristics, we find the following one on the

* Even Madame de Staël, who combined, in so remarkable a manner, the characteristics of both sexes, could say, speaking of the German music, "I have but one objection to make to their genius as musicians; they put too much *mind* (*esprit*) into their works, and reflect too much on what they do."—(See *L'Allemagne*, vol. iii. p. 393.)

English character :—"The Englishman is cold at the commencement of an acquaintance, and indifferent to the opinion of a stranger : he is little addicted to small acts of politeness ; but as soon as he becomes your friend, he is disposed to render you valuable services. He cares little about appearing clever in society, or cultivating elegant manners, but he is sensible and collected. He is a bad imitator ; he troubles himself little about the opinions of others, but follows his own taste. In relation to the other sex, he has little of the gallantry of a Frenchman, but he holds women in higher estimation, and perhaps carries this too far, by according to them in the married state an almost unlimited authority. He is constant, sometimes even to obstinacy, hardy and resolute even to temerity, yet always faithful to the principles which guide him, even to an extreme. He is easily original, not through vanity, but because he cares very little about others, and because he very unwillingly does any violence to his own feelings, either out of complaisance or by imitation. This is why he is less loved than a Frenchman ; but where he is known, he is much more esteemed."

In the foregoing extract from Kant on female education, we find him alluding to physical geography. This was a favourite subject with him throughout life, and every year it formed the subject of interesting lectures. In 1757 was published, at the request of his auditors, a treatise, entitled 'Sketch of Lectures on Physical Geography, accompanied by some further considerations respecting the westerly winds of that region.' (*Entwurf und Ankündigung eines Kollegii der physischen Geographie, nebst einer angehängten Betrachtung : Ob die Westwinde in unsern Gegenden darum feucht seyn, weil sie über ein grosses Meer streichen?*) In later life, Kant allowed one of his students to publish, from his College Notes, a much more extended course of lectures on physical geography, which are full of interesting facts. Indeed he was always looked up to as the highest existing authority on all matters connected with physical, political, and ethnographical geography. Some few other works of minor importance belong to this period. Amongst others, 'Dreams of a Visionary Explained by the Dreams of a Metaphysician,' in 1766, of which Swedenborg is the occasion, and in which we may perceive a foreshadowing of the mind that produced the critical philosophy. These various works amount in the whole to

about twenty-five and display a vigour of intelligence and an extent of knowledge, particularly in reference to mathematical and physical science, to which but few parallels can be found. Kant was now to reap some reward for these labours. In 1770, then forty-six years of age, he was elected to the chair of Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, in the University of Königsberg, and on this occasion wrote a Latin dissertation, entitled 'De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis,' which contains some of the fundamental ideas of the Critical Philosophy. From 1770 to 1781 Kant published but one work, and this was a programme of lectures, the subject being, 'The Different Races of Men' (Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen, 1775).

Kant, during these eleven years, was patiently thinking out his great system of philosophy, slowly and laboriously erecting an edifice of human thought that should bid defiance to all assaults, and that should at one and the same time form a bulwark against the hypothetical systems of past ages, and the empirical and sceptical, but equally dogmatic systems of Hume and his French followers.

This great system consists of three principal parts or "Critiques," viz. "the Critique of Pure Reason," an analysis of which is contained in M. Cousin's admirable lectures, now presented to English readers, then "the Critique of Practical Reason," and thirdly, "the Critique of Judgment." An attentive perusal of the lectures just alluded to, will, I think, enable any one to obtain a clear view of the fundamental principle of Kant; but as it is of the utmost importance, in any study of this philosophy, that its leading idea should be clearly apprehended, I will endeavour here to develope it, so that the whole philosophy may be placed under the eye of the reader. In Kant's day there were two distinct and opposite modes of interpreting the great problems of human knowledge, according as attention was directed to the mind itself or to its external relations with the material world; and hence two very different systems of philosophy,—one represented by Descartes, Leibnitz, and some others of lesser importance, the other by Locke, Hume, Condillac, and generally by the French philosophers who lived at the close of the eighteenth century. The first were termed *idealists*, or more generally by Kant *dogmatists*, and their systems dogmatism, a term which Kant himself defines as a system based on ideas without inquiry into their

legitimate value. The others were termed empiricists, sceptics, or sensualists, since they looked upon all knowledge as empirical, as coming into the mind from external causes, sceptical in reference to all the principles laid down by the dogmatic schools, and holding the opinion that the senses were the only possible inlets to knowledge. That Locke did not *exactly* hold this opinion I am aware, though his French followers did, but he may be fairly classed with the school now under consideration, particularly in reference to the Kantian system. The worst feature of the empirical school was its blighting influence upon ethics, upon practical morals, upon the imaginative arts, and upon the great questions of man's immortality, and his conceptions of a Supreme Being. Its morals were self-interest, its idea of beauty had merged into that of the agreeable; immortality was held to be an impossibility, because everything like a distinct principle, a spirit, a soul, was denied, and God himself a dream of the imagination. A mere glance at the horrors of the first French Revolution will show to what an extent these degrading doctrines had penetrated, not only the learned of that period, but the great mass of society. Kant, who inherited from his father a firm, upright, and thoroughly honest mind, which was developed and strengthened by the admirable example which that father, though poor, set him, was shocked at the consequences of the sensational school. He therefore set about a searching examination into the principles of that school, with a view to determine the origin of so much practical mischief; and I may here observe, by the way, that so effectually has the critical philosophy demolished this school, that there is little danger of its ever again becoming a dominant principle in modern civilization. It may not be amiss to present the reader with Kant's account of the origin of his own philosophy. "Since the essays of Locke and Leibnitz," he says, in his *Prolegomena to Metaphysic*, "or rather since the origin of metaphysical science, so far as its history can be traced, there is no fact more decisive of its fate than the attack of David Hume upon it. He himself threw no light on the subject, but he struck a spark which, had it lighted upon the proper material, might have thrown a flood of light over the whole region of philosophy. Hume sets out with a single metaphysical concept, that of cause and effect, but it is one of vast importance, involving the relative ideas of power and action. He asks why the reason is led, on the

observation of any event termed effect, to the conception of some anterior state or event termed cause. He proves incontrovertibly that it is totally impossible for the reason to conceive of such a relation *à priori*: for this comprises necessity; but we cannot discover why, because something is, something else must also necessarily be, nor how such a conception *à priori* can be introduced. Hence he infers, that reason, in reference to this particular conception, is the dupe of an illusion; that the conception is the result of experience and imagination, which bring certain representations under the law of association, and so substitutes a subjective necessity, in other words, a habit, for an objective truth. He hence concludes that reason is incapable of conceiving such relations." Professor Stapfer (*Biographie Universelle*, art. Kant) puts this in the following manner:—"When two events succeed each other, or in other words, when the perception of the one succeeds the perception of the other in our consciousness, if we imagine to ourselves that the second could not have existed had not the first preceded it, we are immediately struck with the idea of a cause. Whence do we obtain it? Is it given to us *with* the perception itself of these events? Locke, and all the adherents of his analysis of the human faculties, in answering this question in the affirmative, never imagined until Hume, that their opinion tended to destroy the certainty of the axiom that every event must have a cause, to deprive it of its characteristics of necessity and universality, and thus destroy, in its very foundation, all human knowledge that rests upon its application. Hume distinguished between necessary connection and natural connection or junction, and denied that it was possible to discover any real connection between the cause and the effect. The effect, he says, we recognize as an event distinct from that regarded as the cause, but in the latter we in no way perceive the germ of the former; we see merely the *sequence* of events regarded as cause and effect (for example, a ball set in motion on being struck by another, or the arm raised after a volition), their connection neither is nor can be a matter of perception. If, then, prior to and independently of experience, the notion of that which is a cause does not include the idea of efficiency, it is clear that the idea of causality can only be derived from experience, which can produce nothing more than the expectation of the probable sequence of two events, and not the idea of necessary con-

nection, that is, of a connection that would involve a contradiction to admit the contrary." Reid, one of the most zealous and able adversaries of Hume's theories, candidly admits the truth of this observation.

"Experience," he says, "gives us *no information* of what is necessary, or of what *ought to exist*. We learn from experience what *is* or *has been*, and we thence conclude, with greater or less probability, what will be, under similar circumstances (for example, we believe that the stars will rise to-morrow in the east and set in the west, as they have done from the beginning of the world), but in regard to what must *necessarily* exist, experience is perfectly silent; for no one believes it to be impossible that the sun should have been made to rise in the west and set in the east, that the Creator could not have made the earth to revolve on its axis from east to west. Thus when experience has constantly taught us that every change observed by us is the production of a cause, this leads us reasonably to believe that such will be the case in future, but gives us no right to affirm that it *must* be so, and cannot be otherwise." "I freely own," says Kant, "that it was Hume's hint that first roused me from a *dogmatic slumber* of many years, and gave quite a new direction to my researches in the field of speculative philosophy. I did not regard his inferences, for I knew that he had drawn them because he had not represented to himself the whole of his problem, but a part only. When we begin from a fundamental thought which is left us by another who may never have carried it out, we may hope to carry it further than the mind that first conceived it. I therefore tried if Hume's notion had not a far more extensive application, and soon found that the concept of cause and effect is by no means the only one in which the mind has *à priori* conceptions of the connection of things, and that such *à priori* conceptions are not confined to metaphysic. I next endeavoured to ascertain their number; and as this succeeded with me, I soon felt certain that they are not, as Hume is of opinion, derived from experience, but have their origin in the pure intellect."

Here, then, is the germ of the critical philosophy. If there be an element in human knowledge not derivable from experience, but belonging to and springing from the mind itself, the preliminary step of every system of philosophy must be to determine the exact nature and extent of this element, so that

it shall stand in marked contrast to the other, viz. that which springs from experience, to ascertain, on the one hand, the real truth involved in every dogmatic system, and on the other the extent and bearing of empirical data. This preliminary examination is the *critique* of human knowledge. But was Kant the first to attempt this critique? Did not Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, Berkeley, and Hume, all start by analysing the mind and its faculties, with a view to ascertain the nature, the limits, and the origin of human knowledge? Undoubtedly; but not one of them ever conceived the idea of disengaging from the entire phenomena of consciousness the pure *à priori* elements, and from these elements constructing pure *à priori* science. Here is the profound originality of Kant. This great division of human knowledge once established, and all the *à priori* conceptions evolved and systematized, the sciences assume their proper rank and position, pure *à priori* sciences stand out in marked contrast to empirical ones, and necessary and contingent truth clearly disengaged from each other. Morals are placed beyond the reach of all empirical and sceptical attacks, because grounded upon principles totally different from the shifting and contingent phenomena of experience, upon the immutable, universal, and necessary principles of reason itself.

The first of the three critiques before named, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) first appeared in 1781. In this work the fundamental principles are all established. It is next to impossible for any one to understand Kant's subsequent works without first clearly comprehending this one, while every difficulty will be removed by a thorough comprehension of the principles of this first Critique. M. Cousin's admirable analysis, embodied in the following pages, relieves me from the necessity of going over the ground here. I shall content myself with recapitulating its leading principles, in order that the reader may have the matter of the three Critiques, in other words, the whole of the critical philosophy, under his eye. Starting with the principle already alluded to, that in every possible form of human knowledge there are two elements totally distinct from each other, one consisting of the various representations coming from the external world through the medium of the senses, the other from the mind itself and its necessary laws, the first of which he has termed the *matter* and the other the *form* of knowledge, he proceeds

to the task of eliminating *all* the pure *à priori* concepts which spring from the mental pole of knowledge, to the entire exclusion of the material element. To make use of a figure used by Professor Stapfer, the mind may be compared to a mirror, which, though reflecting external objects from its surface, nevertheless possesses its own properties, viz. its polished surface and its impenetrability to the rays of light, properties without which it could not reflect images of external things. Or, better still, the mind may be compared to a mould, into which all the scattered matter of the senses, rays of light, sounds, and other impressions are poured, and from which they take their form, just as melted wax, applied to an engraved seal, takes the form cut into the seal itself, the head of Minerva, letters, or whatever it may be. Kant shows that all *perceptive* knowledge, every act of perception, implies the fundamental concept, idea, or notion of *space*, and every perception of change, motion, or event, whether internal or external, implies the idea of *time*, and that these two ideas, space and time, are the pure *à priori* forms of all sensible knowledge, and that without them everything like knowledge would be impossible; that the *matter*, the material external representations, would be formless and void; that though we might possess *sensation*, we could never rise to *perception*. If this be true, the entire philosophy of sensation is annihilated. So far from its being true that *all* knowledge is derived from experience, it is not true that *any* is so derived. The mind itself, and its laws, must co-operate in the production of the smallest, most insignificant act of human knowledge; and if this be so, in reference to the simple perception of external objects, how must it be in reference to the more complex acts of knowledge, to moral laws, the laws of beauty, etc. Kant then eliminates twelve other *à priori forms* of the mind, which he looks upon as belonging to the understanding, and which he terms categories. For these, I refer the reader to Cousin's Lectures. These forms are all essential to the building up of the great edifice of human knowledge; they exist *à priori* in the mind itself, independently of any material to which they may be applied, and serve to bring to more complete unity the various representations derived from the sensory. Finally, Kant eliminates three other forms, considered by him as belonging *par excellence* to the reason, and termed *ideas*, a word borrowed from the Platonic philosophy. These three ideas

are the soul, the world, and God, and by means of these all the other elements, those of space, and time, as belonging to the sensory, and the categories as belonging to the understanding, are brought to their highest possible unity. But to all these mental forms Kant attributes no objective reality; they are simply subjective, endowed with a regulative or moulding power, but incapable of *themselves* of furnishing a knowledge of objective reality. Thus the idea of space is necessary to perception; but whether space itself exists as an objective reality, I can have no means of knowing. The category of causality is also necessary in enabling me to comprehend the phenomena of nature, and so of the ideas of reason, but of the actual existence of anything corresponding to these mental forms I can never be assured. Kant, in this first critique, be it observed, has rigidly determined to consider only the *à priori* elements, the forms, the mental pole of knowledge; he lets the other element alone. We shall find him afterwards in the *practical reason* admitting what speculatively he not exactly denied, but which he contended was beyond the reach of the reason. That this separation between the speculative and the practical reason was a philosophical error, few will be hardy enough now to deny; but on this very account it is but fair that the critical philosophy should be considered as a *whole*. Speculatively Kant is a sceptic, but practically he is just the reverse. But setting aside for a moment Kant's moral system, which I shall enter into in the sequel, if Kant had done nothing more than demonstrate the absolute necessity of *à priori* principles, principles independent of experience, for the existence of all knowledge, although it might be a question whether he had accurately determined *all* these principles, and whether some might not be merged into others, he has done an infinity of good to philosophy. He has for ever ruined the sensational school; and whatever differences may have arisen and may still arise amongst thinkers, as to the exact relations that exist between the two elements of knowledge, the mental and the material (and the question is far from being settled), still, thanks to the great Königsberg thinker, the problem has been put on such a footing, that the degrading doctrines of materialism can never again have any permanent footing in Europe. To the honour of France, be it spoken, she has thrown off these doctrines, and her present philosophers, Cousin, Jules Barni,

Rémusat, Saisset, and many others, while differing on many points from their German brethren, are allied to them in their lofty and idealistic tendencies.

Two years after the publication of the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' in 1783, Kant published a small treatise, entitled 'Prolegomena to every future Metaphysic which can appear as a science.' (Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*.) The principles of the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' which had in the Critique itself been treated synthetically, are here exposed analytically. It is written with great clearness and precision, and serves both as an introduction and a summary of the larger work.

To the 'Critique of Pure Reason' stands in relation the metaphysic of nature, that is, the application or *doctrine* as Kant terms it. Metaphysic, with him, is divided into two parts; one which ascends to the principles of all knowledge, with a view to determine their origin, their value, and bearing; the other, which establishes and systematises all *à priori* knowledge that can be built on the former. The first is the *critique*, the second the *doctrine*. The first is the necessary condition, the *propädeutik* (to use a word of Kant's) of the second. Without the first, metaphysic is but a series of chimerical assertions or gratuitous hypotheses, but the first without the second, that is, the critique without the doctrine, constitutes only the foundations of the building; the edifice cannot exist without the material and labour furnished by the doctrine. The critique is the beginning of metaphysic, but it is only the beginning. It is in the union of these two parts, the first as preparation, the second as construction, that true metaphysical science consists. The work which contains the doctrine, or second part of metaphysic, of which the first part, the critique, is comprised in the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' made its appearance in 1786, and is entitled, 'Metaphysical Elements of the Science of Nature.' (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.) It is not easy, within the narrow limits

* The English translation of this work, by Mr. Richardson, was published in 1836; but I cannot honestly recommend the reader to study this or any other of Mr. Richardson's translations of Kant. He had an unbounded reverence for the great German philosopher, but he lacked the art of *recasting* the original thoughts into a purely English mould,—an art that Kant's French translators possess in a remarkable degree in reference to their own language.

of a biographical sketch, to give an adequate idea of this work, which is not intended to develop the general laws of nature as inductively determined, but rather the *à priori* principles which lie at the root of all physical laws. Kant however is here faithful to the principles laid down in the Critique, and while denying that we can know anything of matter in itself, that we can have any absolute objective knowledge, still admits that we may, by a complete analysis of the concept of matter in general, determine *à priori* the elements which constitute it, and so establish a metaphysic of nature. Setting aside the old ideas of solidity and impenetrability as the essential properties of matter, Kant substitutes the idea of *force*, attractive and repulsive, as that which best accords with and explains the entire of physical phenomena. Thus space may be considered as entirely filled, and it is no longer necessary to admit the idea of vacuum at all; and thus the great difficulty of the atomists, who contended that it was impossible to admit different degrees of density in matter, unless empty spaces were admitted to exist between the atoms, is removed. Kant does not deny the *possibility* of a vacuum either in the world or out of the world; but he says it is impossible to demonstrate it. Meanwhile absolute space is admitted as the condition of motion, which is relative,—that this absolute space is nevertheless but an idea; and thus Kant remains faithful to the conclusions of the Critique. Yet notwithstanding this reserve, the positive side of the Kantian metaphysic of nature has exercised no inconsiderable influence over the development of German science and philosophy, and may be considered as the foundation or the starting-point of Schelling's philosophy of nature. The second Critique, the 'Critique of Practical Reason' (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft), was published in 1787. In 1785, however, Kant had published a smaller work, which stands in the same relation to the Critique of 1787 that the 'Prolegomena,' before noticed, stands to the 'Critique of Pure Reason:' it is entitled the 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics' (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten). Two other works on the subject of morals were added, one in 1796, entitled 'Metaphysical Elements of the Doctrine of Rights' (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe in der Rechtslehre), the other in 1797, entitled 'Metaphysical Elements of the Doctrine of Virtue' (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre); the first two em-

bodying the *critique*, the others the *metaphysic* or *doctrine*. I shall here consider them together, as embodying the entire moral system of Kant. This is the corner-stone of the critical philosophy, the central point to which all its other parts tend; and although its fundamental idea, viz. that of founding ethics upon an absolute principle, may not be entirely new, yet it may be safely averred that no philosopher has ever given to the world a system of morals so pure, so grand, and so perfectly consistent in all its parts, as that of the great thinker of Königsberg; and although such a system is at all times needed, in order to keep men from the slough of selfishness into which worldly interests are ever dragging them, yet it was especially needed in that age, when the so-called philosophers could preach nothing better than a moral system founded upon a clever calculation of self-interest. This and some other systems more specious, but equally false, Kant has scattered to the winds.

The reader of M. Cousin's Lectures will have formed a general idea of Kant's moral system (Lecture VII.); but I shall here develope it a little more in detail, and, wherever practicable, allow Kant to be his own interpreter. Kant first endeavours to show that there are certain *à priori* principles which the *practical* reason holds to be objectively valid, and which constitute the moral law. In the following passage from the 'Groundwork' Kant has analytically developed his leading ideas:—"Of all that is possible to conceive in the world, and even in a general point of view out of the world, there is but one thing that can be considered perfectly good, and this is a good will. Intelligence, address, judgment, and *talents* generally; also courage, firmness, perseverance, all qualities referable to *temperament*, are good and desirable in many respects; but even these gifts of nature may be rendered bad and pernicious, if the will, that should guide and govern us in the practical use of these gifts of nature, be not good in itself. It is this which essentially constitutes what is generally understood by the word *character*. It is the same with the *gifts of fortune*. Power, riches, honour, even health itself, every form of well-being, and that state of contentment which we call happiness, all these things tend to give us self-confidence, which not unfrequently degenerates into presumption, when along with them there exists no good will to prevent their exercising an evil influence upon the mind, and enabling us to

refer all our actions to an universal and legitimate principle. Add to this, that no reasonable and disinterested spectator can witness with satisfaction any success unaccompanied by a good will, and it will be evident that without this indispensable condition, there can be no claim to happiness.

“There are some qualities, naturally allied to this good will, which have a tendency to facilitate its action, but which notwithstanding possess in themselves no intrinsic value, since they always suppose a good will which restrains the esteem that otherwise we justly accord to them, and which prevents us from looking upon them as absolutely good in themselves. Moderation in the affections and the passions, self-control and cool self-possession, are qualities not only good in many respects, but they seem to constitute a part of the intrinsic value of their possessor, and yet we cannot look upon such qualities as intrinsically and necessarily good (though the ancients may have so considered them). Without the principles of a good will, they may become thoroughly bad, and the cool self-possession of a villain not only makes him more dangerous, but adds to our contempt for and hatred of him. A good will does not owe its goodness to the *effects* which it produces, nor to its power of compassing any given end, but solely to its own nature, which, considered in itself, should be looked upon as incomparably superior to all that may be effected by it under the influence of any feeling, or of all the feelings together. When any adverse circumstances of life, or any defects of nature, deny to this will the means of executing its designs, when all its efforts are fruitless, and when nothing remains but the good will itself (I do not mean a simple *wish*, but the employment of all the means in our power), even then it shines forth by its own inherent light like a precious stone, for it is self-radiant; neither utility nor inutility can add anything to its value. Utility is but a power which may promote the sale of a picture, or attract the attention of ignorant judges, but forms no sort of recommendation to the discriminating connoisseur. And yet there is in this idea of the absolute value of a simple will, considered apart from its utility or practical value, something so strange, that although it may be perfectly conformable to reason, one is tempted to think that we may possibly be under the delusive influence of the imagination, and carried away by a false enthusiasm in thus interpreting the end for which nature has placed the will under the government of the

reason. Let us examine the idea from this point of view. When we consider the natural constitution of an organized being, that is to say, of a being so constituted that life appears to be the end or object of existence, we may lay down the principle, that in this being there is not a single organ that is not adapted in the best possible manner to the end for which it exists. Now if nature, in giving to a being reason and will, had had in view simply the *preservation*, the *well-being*, in a word, the *happiness* of this being, she would not have taken her measures well in confiding to the reason of its creature the task of attaining this end. In fact, all the actions which this creature should do to attain this end, the system of conduct to be observed, instinct would have revealed to it with far greater exactitude, and the end of nature would have been much more certainly attained by this means than it could possibly be by means of the reason. Now if we suppose that such a creature, in addition to this instinct, had been also endowed with the gift of reason, this faculty could have had no other use than that of enabling it to contemplate the happy dispositions of its nature, of adorning them, rejoicing over them, and of rendering thanks to the beneficent cause that had bestowed them. It would never wish to entrust its happiness to this feeble and deceptive guide, and so frustrate the design of nature. In a word, nature would have prevented the reason from becoming a practical guide, of presuming to discover with its weak vision the entire system of happiness and the means of attaining it. She would not only have deprived it of the power of discovering the end, but also of the power of selecting the means; she would have wisely entrusted both to the unerring operation of instinct. And in fact we see that the more a cultivated reason applies itself to a search after the enjoyments of life and of happiness, the less is the satisfaction experienced; and hence amongst the most refined of this class a certain disgust is soon felt with the objects of pursuit; for having estimated all the advantages to be derived, not only from the acts which minister to the gratification of luxury, but even from science (which appear to them a sort of luxury of the understanding), they find at last that the happiness experienced has been in no way proportioned to the labour bestowed; and that the vulgar, who abandon themselves more to natural instinct, and allow reason to have but little influence over their conduct, are rather to be envied than despised.

Now, so far from charging with discontent and ingratitude towards the Supreme Goodness those who estimate so lightly, and even regard as nothing the pretended advantages of the reason in reference to happiness, it is evident that such a view has its origin in this idea, that the end of our being is altogether a nobler one, that reason is specially charged with the task of accomplishing this end, and not the pursuit of happiness, and that man should subordinate to this grand object, as a supreme condition, his own individual ends.

“In fact, if the reason fails in securely guiding the will in the choice of its objects and in the satisfaction of all our wants (often increased by itself), if we are constrained to admit that this end would have been more certainly attained by means of a natural instinct, and if nevertheless reason had been granted to us to be a practical faculty, that is, a faculty destined to influence the *will*, then it is obvious, since throughout nature we everywhere observe an exact adaptation of means to ends, that its true function is the formation of a good will, not as a *means* of attaining any proposed extraneous end, but good *in itself*, and this the reason necessarily demands. This good will may not be the only good—the sum of all good, but it should be considered the primary good to which every other, even every desire for happiness, ought to be subordinated. There is nothing in this that is not in perfect harmony with the wisdom of nature, and in recognizing the truth that the culture of the reason, demanded by this first end, which is unconditional, restrains in various ways, and may even reduce to nothing, at least in this life, the pursuit and the attainment of the second end—happiness, which is always conditional, it does not follow that nature in this acts contrary to her own design; for reason, recognizing that its highest practical destination is the formation of a good will, finds, in the accomplishment of this destination, only the satisfaction that belongs to it.

“We must develop then the concept of a will good in itself, independently of every ulterior end, the concept which we have always in view in estimating the moral value of our actions, and which is the condition to which all should relate, in other words, the development of that which belongs to every healthy intelligence, for the concept has less need of being made known than of being explained. For this purpose we take the con-

cept of *duty*, which involves that of a good will. It is true that the first implies certain restrictions and certain subjective obstacles which, far from extinguishing the second, or rendering it in any way obscure, brings it out, by force of contrast, and renders it so much the more admirable.

"I pass over all those actions which we judge to be contrary to duty, though they may be considered useful for particular ends. There can be no question as regards them, whether they spring from duty or not, since they are confessedly in opposition to it. I pass over too all those actions which, though conformable to duty, men accomplish not from any *direct inclination* for them, but under the influence of some other feeling. It is easy in this case to distinguish whether the action, thus in conformity with duty, really springs from it, or from personal interest. This distinction is much more difficult when in an action conformable to duty we have an *immediate inclination* for it.

"For example, it is the duty of a tradesman or merchant not to overcharge inexperienced buyers; and a trader, when he has a considerable business, never does so overcharge,—he has for everything a fixed price, and a child may purchase on as good terms as any one else. But it is not certain that he acts thus because it is his duty; it may be his interest so to act; there is no question of immediate inclination; one can hardly suppose him to have such a love for all his customers as to prevent him treating one more favourably than another. Here then is an action which may spring neither from duty nor from immediate inclination, but solely from self-interest.

"On the other hand, though it is a duty to preserve one's life, we are nevertheless impelled to preserve it by an immediate inclination, and hence this care, often so full of anxiety, which most men take to preserve their lives, has no intrinsic value in a moral point of view, and their maxims in this respect have no moral value. The preservation of their lives may be *conformable* to duty, but it may not be done *from duty*. But let *hopeless* misfortune overtake a man to such an extent as to deprive him of all love for life, and if he be strong in character, and irritated with his fate rather than cast down or discouraged by it, if such a man preserve his life without loving it, and while even *wishing* for *death*, uninfluenced either by love or

fear, but solely by the idea of duty, then his maxim* will have a moral character.

“Benevolence, when in our power, is a duty; and there are some so naturally sympathetic, that, without any vanity or interest, they find an internal satisfaction in spreading joy around them, and rejoice at the well-being of others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that even in this case the action, however conformable to duty, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral value, and should be classed along with other inclinations, such as ambition for example, which, co-existing with certain public interests conformable to duty, and consequently honourable, may merit praise and encouragement, without having any claim to our esteem. The maxim fails as respects its moral character, which demands that we should act *from duty*, and not from inclination. Suppose now that one of these benevolent beings should be overtaken by some personal calamity that should extinguish in his heart all compassion for the misfortunes of others, and that, possessing the power of relieving their sufferings, while untouched by the ills that afflict them, but absorbed by his own evils, he nevertheless rouses himself from this sad insensibility and comes to their succour, unsolicited by any inclination thereto, his conduct then acquires a moral value. But I go further; suppose a man whose heart is naturally endowed with but a small degree of sympathy (in every way honest), from temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, and perhaps knowing that he supports the evils that afflict himself with patience and courage, either supposes the same in others or expects the same from them; if in such a case nature had not striven to make such a man (certainly not one of her worst works,) a philanthropist, might he not find the means of stamping himself with a value far higher than a compassionate temperament could have endowed him with? Unquestionably; and it is just in this that the true value of moral character, beyond comparison the highest of all, consists,—that we do good, not from inclination, but from duty.

“To pursue our own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly); for whoever is discontented with his condition may easily, in the midst of the cares and wants that beset him, be tempted to *transgress his duties*. But all men, independent of any con-

* In the Kantian philosophy of ethics *maxim* is the subjective principle of the will, the objective principle being the moral *law*.

sideration of duty, find in themselves the most powerful and deep-seated desire for happiness,—for this idea involves the sum of all their desires, only that the precepts laid down for the attainment of happiness not unfrequently run counter to some desire or another, and, in addition to this, no man can form a determinate and certain conception of this sum of his desires, which he designates by the name of happiness. Thus we need never be astonished when we see a single inclination which holds out some determinate gratification, and which may at a precise moment be gratified, become more powerful than the idea of an uncertain good; the love of wine, for example, may lead to present enjoyment, to be followed, it may be, by suffering; and a man, according to his manner of valuing things under such circumstances, might not consider it to be his duty to sacrifice the enjoyment of the present moment to the hope, perhaps ruin, of attaining the happiness that is the result of health. But though this desire, which leads a man to the pursuit of happiness, may not determine the will, and though health might not be, for him at least, a thing that must be taken into account in his calculations, there would remain in this case, as in all other cases, a law which constrains him to work out his own happiness, not from inclination, but from duty, and it is by this alone that his conduct can have any true moral value.

“In this way must be understood those passages in the Scriptures which command us to love, not only our neighbours, but even our enemies. In fact love, as an inclination (as an emotion), cannot be commanded; but the doing of good from duty, when no inclination impels us to it, or even when a natural and almost insurmountable repugnance repels us from it, here is the *practical* love, not the *pathological*,—the love which resides in the will and not in a feeling of the sensibility, in the principles which should guide the conduct and not in that of a tender sympathy, and this love is the only one that can be commanded.

“My next proposition is, that an action springing from duty does not derive its moral value from the *end* to be attained by it, but from the maxim which determines it, and consequently that the value does not depend upon the reality of the object of the action, but from the *principle* that has guided the will in determining it, to the exclusion of all objects connected with the desires. It follows clearly from this, that the ends which

we propose to ourselves in our actions, and the effects of these actions, considered as ends and as motives to the will, cannot confer upon them any absolute and moral value. Where then resides this value, if it be not in the relation between the will and the expected effect? It can only be in the *principle of the will*, considered independently of the results of the action. The will, in fact, is placed between its *à priori* principle, which is formal, and its *à posteriori* motive, which is material; and since it must be determined by one or the other of these, it will, when the action springs from duty, necessarily be determined by the formal principle; for in this case every material principle is taken away.

“Hence I deduce another proposition, viz. *Duty is the necessity of doing an action out of respect for the law*. I may have an *inclination*, but never *respect* for an object to be obtained by an action, precisely because this object is only an effect, and not the activity of a will. In like manner I can have no respect for an inclination, whether my own or that of another, though I may like the first, and sometimes love the second, that is, look upon it as favourable to my own interest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, not as an effect—not what ministers to the desire, but what triumphs over it, or at least excludes it entirely from deliberation, and consequently the law only considered in itself, that can be an object of respect and a command. Now, if an action springing from duty necessarily excludes every influence arising from desire, and consequently every object of the will, there remains nothing to determine the will, except objectively the *law* and subjectively a pure respect for the law, and hence the maxim that the law must be obeyed even in opposition to all inclinations and desires.

“Thus the moral value of an action is not due to the effect which it is expected to produce, nor to any principle of action derived from this effect, since all effects (contentment, and even the happiness of others) may be produced by other causes, and do not require the will of a reasonable being. It is in the will alone that we must look for the supreme and absolute good; consequently the representation of this law in itself, *which is in the power of every reasonable being to do*, and the placing in this representation the determining principle of the will, constitute alone the supreme good which we call moral

good,—a good existing in ourselves, and not produced by any action whatever.

“ But what is this law, the representation of which ought to determine the will independently of any effect to be expected from it, and which constitutes an absolutely good will without restriction? Since I have set aside every impulse, there remains nothing but the universal legitimacy of actions in general as the ground of a principle, that is to say, that *I ought to act in such a manner that the maxim of my will might become a universal law*. The only operating principle here, the only one that should operate, if duty is to be considered something more than an empty word void of meaning, is simply this, conformity of action to a *universal* law (not a law applicable to a certain number of cases). Common sense shows itself in perfect harmony with us here in its practical judgments, for it has always this principle before its eyes.

“ Put the question, for example, Can I, in order to relieve myself from embarrassment, make a promise which I have no intention of keeping? It is easy to see that the question may involve two different meanings; first, is it prudent, and second, is it legitimate to make a false promise? I may see well that it is not enough that I should, by means of this subterfuge, be relieved from my embarrassment; but I ought to examine whether I do not, by this lie, entail upon myself greater evils than the one from which for the moment I am relieved; and whether a misplaced confidence may not entail upon me greater evils than the present one; since, notwithstanding all the *penetration* with which I believe myself to be endowed, the consequences are by no means easy to calculate; it therefore becomes necessary to examine whether it be not *more prudent* to adopt a general maxim, and acquire a habit of promising nothing that I do not intend to perform. But it is easy to see that such a maxim originates in a *fear* of consequences. And it is one thing to keep faith, because we conceive it to be a *duty*, and another thing to keep it from a fear of mischievous results. In the first case the conception has all the force of a law, in the second I have to search in the effects of the action for the consequences that may effect me. In throwing aside the principle of duty, I shall certainly commit a bad action; it may be advantageous to me to abandon my prudential maxim, though I may be more secure in fol-

lowing it. Now, in order to arrive in the quickest and most certain manner at a solution of the question, whether it be legitimate to make a false promise or not, I ask whether I could with satisfaction see my maxim (of relieving myself from embarrassment by a false promise) made a universal law (for myself and for others), and whether I could admit this principle? Any one may make a false promise in order to relieve himself from an evil from which he cannot be relieved in any other manner. I see well that I may indeed will the lie, but I cannot desire to make a universal law of it. In fact, with such a law, there could be no promises whatever; for what would be the use of announcing my future intentions to men who no longer believe me, or who, supposing them to attach some degree of faith to me, might very well see such to be an error, and pay me back in my own coin. Thus the maxim could not be made into a universal law without destroying itself.

“ There is no need then for much penetration in order to discover what I have to do that my will shall be morally good. Ignorant of the cause of events, and incapable of foreseeing all the consequences of action, all I have to do is to ask myself this question: Wouldst thou have thy maxim made into a universal law? If I would not, then the maxim itself is not admissible; not on account of its effect, either upon me or upon others, but because it could not become a principle in a system of universal moral legislation. Reason immediately evolves my reverence for such a legislation; and though I may not be able to perceive on what it is founded, (this is the task of philosophy,) it is at least very easy for me to understand that it confers on our actions a value far higher than if they spring from inclination, and that the necessity of acting *solely* out of reverence for this practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive ought to give place, because it is the condition of a will good *in itself*, whose value is above all.”

The foregoing somewhat lengthy extract will give my readers a tolerably correct idea of the fundamental principles of Kant's moral system. The first position he establishes is that an action, to have any true moral value, must not only be *conformable* to duty, but must *spring from duty*, and not from inclination or self-interest. This is what Kant terms the “*categorical imperative*.” The second is, that an action which springs from duty owes none of its moral value to the *end* in view,

but from the maxim which determines it, from the *principle* which actuates the will in its moral resolutions; and third, that duty is the necessity of acting from reverence of the moral law. The reader of M. Cousin's Lectures will already have perceived the manifest contradiction that appears between Kant's speculative and his practical critique, in thus admitting the objective reality of a law in the latter, and denying everything like objective reality in the former; for why admit the objective reality of the moral law, and deny that of the principle of causality in reference to phenomena? And yet, however difficult it may be to reconcile the contradiction, it is easy enough to see how Kant was led into it. The *à priori* principles of the speculative critique had reference to *external* knowledge only; the forms space and time, and the categories, are but *à priori* conditions of external experience, while the ideas of the reason serve only to bring the other elements to their highest unity. It has no right to transfer these subjective principles out of itself, and attribute to them objective reality. But it is otherwise with the moral law; here there is no question of an external world. The reason itself, the will, the moral law are all subjective, and in no way dependent upon sensible experience. In addition to Cousin's forcible strictures on this contradiction of Kant's, the following admirable remark of M. Willm (Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel) may serve to show that Kant's real error lies not in his moral system, but in his speculative:—"To an absolute intelligence things exist such as they *are*; for a finite intelligence things exist such as they *appear*; but it may very easily be conceived, that between nature intelligent and nature objective, there may be such an agreement, that the latter *may appear to the former exactly as it is*, or at least that what appears should be exactly what it appears to be. It is not necessary that we should suppose that anything interposed between objects and the reason, either alters or falsifies, so to speak, the aspect of things; and it may be that the laws of the mind are at the same time the laws of things as they are. Hegel has justly said, "that after having penetrated behind the scene which is before us, we might possibly enough find nothing. But let us add, that this pretended veil which seems to cover the picture, and which we seek to remove, may be the picture itself." But let us resume our consideration of Kant's moral system.

Having developed the moral law as the only determining principle of the will, Kant deduces the *freedom* of the will as a necessary condition. "If no other principle can serve as a law to the will except this form of universal legislation, we must conceive the will as entirely independent of the natural law of phenomena, that is to say, of the law of causality. Now this independence is termed *freedom*, in the most restricted sense, that is, in a transcendental sense. Therefore a will to which legislative maxims can alone serve as a law, is a free will." (Critique of Practical Reason, chap. i. problem 5.) Kant here adopts two words in reference to the will, which it is necessary to explain. These are the *autonomy* of the will, and the *heteronomy* of the will; the first, in which the will is itself *its own law*; the second, in which it is moved by some motive external to itself. "When the will," he says, "seeks the law which should determine it otherwise than in the aptitude of its maxims to form a legislation proper to it, and be at the same time universal; when, consequently, *going out of itself*, it seeks this law in the nature of some of its objects, then the heteronomy of the will arises." Kant then passes in review the various moral systems that have been given to the world, founded on the heteronomy of the will, all of which he looks upon as false, since they are not founded upon the moral law. First, that which is founded upon education (Montaigne); second, the civil law (Mandeville); third, physical pleasure (Epicurus); fourth, moral sentiment (Hutcheson); fifth, perfection (Wolf and the Stoics); sixth, the will of God (the theologians generally). The first four of these are termed *empirical*, the other two *rational*. Of the first he remarks, "these can never be the foundation of moral laws, for the universality with which these laws are necessarily invested disappears as soon as we seek their principle *in the particular constitution of human nature*, or in the accidental circumstances in which we are placed. But the principle of *personal* happiness is the worst of all. Besides being false, experience altogether contradicts the idea that happiness is the result of good conduct; and besides contributing in no way to establish morality, since it is one thing to render a man happy, and another to make him good; one thing to make him prudent and attentive to his own interest, and another to render him virtuous, this principle brings down morality to motives which degrade it and deprive it of everything like sublimity, *for it classes to-*

gether the very same motives that lead to virtue and those that lead to vice; and in teaching us to calculate cleverly, it effaces all specific difference between these two sorts of motives.

"Amongst the rational principles of morality, the ontological concept of perfection, (however empty, indeterminate, and therefore useless it may be, when it seeks to discover in the immense field of reality the source of reality suitable for us, and in so seeking tries to distinguish the reality in question from every other, and thus itself to turn in a circle and tacitly suppose the morality which it seeks to explain) this concept, with all its defects, is preferable to the theological one, which makes morality spring from a divine will absolutely perfect; for we have no *intuition* of this perfection, and are obliged to derive it from our concepts, the principle of which is that of morality; or if we do not like to proceed in this manner (in order to avoid this vicious reasoning in a circle), the only concept of the divine will which we could adopt as the foundation of a system of ethics, would be that of a will endowed with a love of glory and dominion, powerful and vindictive, and consequently terrible, than which nothing could be more contrary to morality."

In the 'Critique of Practical Reason,' Kant has a beautiful chapter (Part 1st, chap. iii.), in which he enters more fully than in the 'Groundwork,' into the question of reverence for the moral law, which he terms the moral sentiment, as the subjective motive of the will. This moral sentiment he analyses with amazing subtlety and depth of thought, speaks eloquently of duty and virtue, and shows us the ideal of holiness that we should constantly pursue, though we may not have the power of arriving at it. In the following passage Kant has described with great precision the moral sentiment, the only *feeling* that he admits as legitimate considered as a motive to the will. This is a point of considerable importance in Kant's moral system, and should be well understood. Kant saw the insufficiency of the bare conception of moral law as an *operative principle* on the will, and not admitting as a legitimate spring of action any feeling directly connected with sense and pathological feeling, he recognized in the moral sentiment, in the *love* of the law, the pure spring and active principle. "This sentiment," he says, "does not serve to judge actions or to originate the objective moral law, but solely to evolve from the law maxims that shall be ours, in

other words, that shall serve as a motive. . . . Reverence has reference to *persons*, never to things. These may excite *inclination*, and even love, in reference to inferior animals (classed here as things, personalty only belonging to man himself), or fear, as from the sea, a volcano, a ferocious beast, but never *reverence*. The feeling most akin to it is *admiration*, which, as an affection of the mind, is a species of astonishment at things, as for example, the mountains elevated to the heavens, the grandeur, the number, and the distance of the heavenly bodies, the strength and agility of certain animals, etc. But all this is not reverence. A man also may be an object of love, fear, or admiration, and of astonishment, without being an object of reverence. His social qualities, his courage and his strength, his rank in life, may inspire these sentiments unaccompanied by any respect for his person. '*I bow before the great,*' said Fontenelle, '*but it is not my mind that bows.*' I would add: before the humble burgher [was not Kant thinking of his father when he wrote this?], in whom I see honesty of character carried to a degree which I do not find in myself, *my mind bows* whether I will or not, and however high I may carry my head to show the superiority of my *rank*. And why so? Because his example recalls to my mind a law which confounds my presumption, when I compare my conduct with it, and which I cannot look upon as practically impossible, since I have before me a living example to the contrary. But though I may be conscious of being equally honest, the reverence still subsists. In truth, since all that is good in man has some defect or other, the law, thus exemplified, always lowers my pride, for the imperfection belonging to every man, which is the measure for me, being to some extent hidden from me, each appears better than he really is, and is judged more favourably. *Reverence* is a *tribute* which we cannot withhold from merit whether we will or not; we may not in all cases manifest it, but it is impossible for us to avoid feeling it internally.

"This reverence is in so small a degree a pleasurable feeling, that we do not voluntarily cede it to a man. We look about for something that may lighten the burden of it, some motive for disapprobation that shall lessen the humiliation caused by the example before our eyes. Even the dead, particularly when the example afforded by them appears too inimitable, are not always beyond the reach of this feeling. The

moral law itself, notwithstanding its imposing majesty, does not escape from this tendency to defend ourselves from the feeling of reverence; and when we desire to lower it to the rank of a common feeling, and constrain ourselves to turn it into a precept of interest well understood, is it not to deliver ourselves from this terrible reverence which reminds us so forcibly of our unworthiness? On the other hand, so far is it from being a *painful* sentiment that, when we have once put our pride and presumption under our feet, and allowed this sentiment its due practical influence, it is impossible for us not to admire the majesty of this moral law. Our souls become elevated as we see this holy law elevated above us and our frail nature."

It is impossible not to be struck with the grandeur, the elevation, and the purity of these views. Towards the close of this chapter, we have the following magnificent apostrophe to duty: "*Duty*,—great and sublime word,—thou who neither charimest nor flatterest, who commandest submission without employing threats to excite terror and aversion, in order to move the will, but limitest thy task to the introduction of a law which enters the soul, and forces it to reverence (if not always to obedience), before whom all desires are mute, though they may secretly conspire against thee; what origin is worthy of thee? Where shall we discover the root of thy noble trunk which proudly disdains all alliance with selfish and interested desires, that root, from which springs the indispensable condition of the value which men attribute to themselves!"

Kant next enters into a consideration of the *Sovereign good* (the *summum bonum*), which is neither virtue alone nor happiness, but consists in the harmony between the two. "Virtue," he says, "is not the entire complete good, as an object of desire to reasonable finite beings; for, to have this character, it should be accompanied by happiness, not as it appears to the interested eyes of our personality, which we conceive as an end of itself, but according to the impartial judgment of reason, which considers virtue, in general, in the world as an end in itself. . . . Happiness and virtue then, together, constitute the possession of the sovereign good in an individual, but with this condition, that the happiness should be exactly *proportioned* to the morality (this constituting the value of the individual, and rendering him worthy of happiness). The sovereign good, consisting of these two elements, represents the

entire or complete good ; but virtue must be considered as the supreme good, because there can be no condition higher than virtue, whilst happiness, which is unquestionably always agreeable to its possessor, is not of itself absolutely good, but supposes as a condition a morally good conduct."

Kant compares this conception of the sovereign good with that of two of the most celebrated schools of ancient Greece—the Epicureans and the Stoics; the former placed the sovereign good in happiness alone, and the latter in the consciousness of virtue; the former identified *prudence* and morality (a very common error by the way), the latter considered morality as the true wisdom. The *realization* of this sovereign good is necessarily the object of a will determined by the moral law. But the *perfect conformity* of the intentions of the will to the moral law, is the supreme condition of the sovereign good. But this perfect conformity, which Kant calls *holiness*, is a perfection which is not possible in this world, and since it is required as practically necessary, it must be sought for in an indefinite progress towards this conformity, and hence the necessity of a life prolonged beyond the limits of the present one, in order that the soul may realize this ideal of moral perfection, and consequently the *immortality of the soul* as a postulate of the practical reason, and as a necessary condition of the fulfilment of the moral law. On this important point it is desirable that Kant should speak for himself, especially since both in Germany and in this country he has been accused of not believing in the immortality of the soul and a future life. "This proposition," he says, "concerning the moral destination of our nature, viz. that it is impossible for us to attain this perfect conformity to the moral law except by a progress indefinitely continued, is of the highest importance, not only as it supplies a remedy for the weakness of the speculative reason, but also as a support to religion. Without it we either deprive the moral law of its holiness by accommodating it to the exigencies of the present life alone (the selfish system), or we hope, by a false exaltation, to attain in this short life, *what it is our destiny to pursue throughout one or more future states of existence*, viz. a perfect holiness of will, (we see how closely Fichte followed Kant here), and lose ourselves in theosophic dreams altogether opposed to a true knowledge of our nature; in both cases we do away with that *struggle or effort* by which we ought constantly to aim at the complete and constant ob-

servation of a law of reason severe and inflexible, but yet real and not ideal. For every reasonable but finite being, the only thing possible is an indefinite progress, which proceeds by degrees towards moral perfection. The *Infinite*, with whom time is nothing, sees in this series, endless for us, an entire conformity to the moral law; and the holiness which he inflexibly demands through the moral law, that justice may be satisfied in the distribution of the sovereign good, he seizes in one intellectual intuition of the existence of reasonable beings. All that a creature can hope for, relative to the distribution of this sovereign good, is the power to continue uninterruptedly, throughout his existence here and hereafter, that progress by which he ascends, step by step, the steep ascent towards moral perfection and moral holiness, and from which he derives a consciousness of a fulfilled intention and a fixed resolution; and consequently he can never hope to be able here, or in any point of his future existence, perfectly to fulfil the will of God (who commands without indulgence and without remission, for otherwise where would be his justice?), but may hope to do so in the infinity of duration (which God alone can embrace)."

So far the moral element of the sovereign good. But there necessarily attaches the other element, happiness, to the moral law, and since this happiness is not within the power of any finite, rational, and moral being, even on the supposition of immortality and eternity, there must exist a cause, distinct from nature, adequate to the effect of adding to this perfect conformity of the will the happiness which the reason necessarily postulates as connected with it. Man has power granted to him to conform his will to the moral law throughout eternity, but he has no power to confer happiness upon himself, while, if he make happiness the spring or motive of his will, he misses the moral law altogether, and the will then becomes infected with heteronomy. All that he can attain by conformity to the moral law is, to render himself *worthy* of happiness, but it requires a power beyond himself, a supreme will and an intelligence, to assure him of it; and hence *God* as a postulate of the practical reason. The Being, which in the speculative reason was *hypothetical*, is a *reality* in the practical reason, necessitated by the nature of the moral law. "The sovereign good," says Kant, "is not possible in the world unless we admit a Supreme Being endowed with a causality con-

formable to moral intention. Now a being which is capable of acting according to the representation of certain laws, is an intelligence (a rational being), and the causality of such a being, as determined by this representation, is a will. Therefore the supreme cause of nature, as a condition of the sovereign good, is a being who is the cause of nature, as intelligence and will (consequently the author of nature), that is to say, *God.*" Kant then deduces the attributes of the Deity as necessarily flowing from the concept of the sovereign good, and enters into a refined analysis of the morals of the Greek sects as compared with those of Christianity. The following passage I would recommend to the attention of those who imagine that Kant was an enemy to Christianity:—"It is sometimes thought, that the moral doctrine of Christianity does not exceed in purity that of the Stoics. The difference however is manifest. The Stoics made the consciousness of moral strength the pivot of all moral intentions, and though the supporters of this system speak of duty, and even determine it exactly, they nevertheless place the motive and the veritable principle that determines the will in a certain greatness of soul, which elevates man above all the inferior motives springing from the sensibility, which only become strong by our weakness. Virtue with them is therefore a sort of heroism, by which the wise man is elevated above his animal nature, by which he becomes a law to himself, prescribes duties to others, above which he himself is placed, without the fear of ever being tempted to violate the moral law. But they would not have thought thus if they had represented to themselves this law in all its purity and severity, as the Evangelists have done. If the Christian morality be considered in its philosophic aspect, and compared with that the Greek schools, they may briefly be characterized by saying, that the ideas of the *Cynics*, the *Epicureans*, the *Stoics*, and the *Christians* are respectively represented by the *simpli-city of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness*. In reference to the different modes by which they arrived at these, the Greek schools were distinguished amongst themselves in this, that the Cynics contented themselves with the *common sense of mankind*, while the two others did not believe that they could ever pass the bounds of science and knowledge. Both relied upon *natural forces*. The Christian morality, on the other hand, by the purity and severity which mark its precepts, takes away from man this self-confidence, but, on the

other hand, allows us to hope, that if we act up to the full extent of our powers, that which is not in our powers will be brought about in another manner, though we may not comprehend how."

By the moral law, then, we are conducted to religion, and all our duties may be considered as emanating from the will of God, not as arbitrary orders, not as a will acting upon our wills, and so dispensing with the moral law, but as essential laws established by God, and acting through the moral law itself and the moral nature of finite rational beings. To obey *blindly* the will of any being is the morality of a slave; but a rational being, and no other strictly speaking, is even capable of acting morally,—obeys the will of the Supreme Being because it has arrived by its reason at a knowledge of the existence of this Being through a moral law which it acknowledges itself bound to obey, but which would be a contradiction, without the supposition of a Being whose will is perfectly holy and just, and who must therefore restore that harmony between virtue and happiness which we, as finite and imperfect beings, while conceiving such harmony to be necessary, have no power to introduce. The following sublime passage occurs in the conclusion of the 'Critique of Practical Reason.' The translation is Sir William Hamilton's. (Discussions on Philosophy, p. 301.) "Two things there are, which the oftener and the more steadfastly we consider, fill the mind with an ever-new, an ever-rising admiration and reverence,—*the starry heaven above, the moral law within.* Of neither am I compelled to seek out the existence, as shrouded in obscurity or only to surmise the possibility, as beyond the hemisphere of my knowledge. Both I contemplate lying clear before me, and connect both immediately with the consciousness of my being. The one departs from the place I occupy in the outward world of sense; expands beyond the limits of imagination, that connection of my being with worlds rising above worlds and systems blending into systems; and portends it also into the illimitable times of their periodic movement—to its commencement and continuance. The other departs from my invisible self, from my personality, and represents me in a world, truly infinite indeed, but whose infinity is to be fathomed only by the intellect, with which also my connection, unlike the fortuitous relation I stand in to the world of sense, I am compelled to recognize as necessary and universal. In the former, the first

view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates as it were my importance as *an animal nature*, which, after a brief and incomprehensible endowment with the powers of life, is compelled to refund its constituent matter to the planet—itsself an atom in the universe—on which it grew. The aspect of the other, on the contrary, elevates my worth *as an intelligence*, even to infinitude*; and this through my personality, in which the moral law reveals a faculty of life, independent of my animal nature,—nay, of the whole material world; at least, if it be permitted to infer as much from the regulation of my being, which a conformity with that law exacts; proposing as it does my moral worth for the absolute end of my activity, conceding no compromise of its imperative to a necessitation of nature, and spurning in its infinity the limits and conditions of my present transitory life.”

We now come to the metaphysic or doctrine of ethics, a science founded on the principles of the practical reason, the object being to determinate and co-ordinate the various duties of men. It is not a collection of rules or maxims, but a science founded on *à priori* rational principles. As before stated, it is divided by Kant into two parts, to each of which a separate treatise is devoted, the first being the *metaphysic of rights*, the second the *metaphysic of virtue*. The leading principle of the first is, that whatever is not inconsistent with the liberty of all is right, so that rights are thus founded upon the idea of liberty. Hence the maxim laid down by Kant as the embodiment of this principle is, “*So act that the use of thy freedom may not circumscribe the freedom of any other.*” Rights Kant divides into *natural* rights and *positive* rights; the former resting upon the *à priori* principles of the reason, the latter emanating from the will of a legislator, and generally but the imperfect image of the natural right with which Kant alone has to do. Natural rights are again divided into *innate* rights, that is, rights which all men possess *as men*, the rights of humanity at large; and *acquired* rights, that is, rights arising out of the civil institutions of society, contracts, conventions, treaties, etc. Another division is into private rights and public rights, and the last into *political* rights, *social* rights, and *cosmopolitan* rights. This work was published in 1796, at the time of the first French revolution, in which event Kant took especial

* This conception was afterwards expanded by Kant, and formed the principle of his theory of the sublime.

interest, and which he hailed as the dawn of the rights and liberties of humanity, while respecting the laws of order; indeed, he severely condemned the death of Louis XVI. Kant's ideas on social and cosmopolitan rights are equally liberal in their applications. He contended for the right of war under certain circumstances, but confined this right within narrow limits, and lays down his ideal of the conduct of states with a view to attain a perpetual peace. In reference to the metaphysic of virtue, he lays down the principle that every duty to which we are not impelled by an external power, but which we feel impelled to internally by the action of the moral law, is an act of virtue. The duties appertaining to virtue suppose certain subjective conditions, which it is necessary to cultivate and develope, such as the moral sentiment, conscience, love of our fellow men, and self respect, all arising necessarily out of the concept of the moral law. The doctrine of virtue is divided into two parts, the first comprehending the duties themselves, the other the rules for *instruction* in virtue, and the exercise or practice of virtue. The duties themselves are divided into duties towards ourselves and our duties to others. There is much here I should like to quote, but I must content myself with a few extracts. Passing over the first division which treats of the duties man owes to himself, he divides the duties we owe to others into "such duties as oblige our fellow men when we discharge them; and into those which we have observed entail upon the other no obligation whatever." The former are meritorious, the latter are simply *due*. The emotions which accompany these, are *love* and *reverence*. Thus love of our neighbour may take place although we cannot feel for him any reverence, while the latter is due to *all men*, though they may not be worthy of our love. "Thus," says Kant, "we feel ourselves compelled to assist the poor and needy; but inasmuch as their welfare thus becomes dependent upon our bounty, and so humiliating to them, our gifts should be so conferred that they may know that we are impelled to act so towards them by a sense of duty, or as a small mark of friendship, thus sparing them from humiliation, and allowing them to preserve their self-respect." He adds, "When we speak not of laws of nature, but laws of duty as regulating the external relations of man to man, we then consider ourselves as designers of a rational and moral world, in which, analogically with the physical laws of nature, the combinations of

rational beings are compared to attractive and repellent forces. By the principal of mutual love, they are destined for ever to *approach*, and by that of reverence to preserve their *due distances* from each other ; and were either of these great principles to become suspended, the moral system could not be upheld." Kant further explains love to be "the practical maxim of good will issuing in beneficence as its result," and reverence "the practical maxim of circumscribing our own self-esteem by the representation of the *dignity of humanity* resident in the person of another ; that is a *practical reverence*."

Again, "Whether mankind be found worthy of love or not, a practical principle of good will (active philanthropy) is a duty which men owe to each other, according to the precept, Love thy neighbour as thyself ; for every ethical relation between men having its origin in the pure reason, reference made to moral freedom, and according to maxims of universal applicability, such maxims can never be founded on any selfish emotion." Kant then enters into a consideration of the duties of beneficence, gratitude, sympathy, and their opposite vices. In the methodology of the metaphysic of ethics, he contends for the propriety of a *moral catechism* in the instruction of youth, which should stand much in the same relation to morals, as religious catechisms stand to theology ; and he has given a sketch of what such a moral catechism ought to be. As it may be considered a sort of recapitulation of Kant's ethics, I will quote this fragment entire. The preceptor's questions are directed to the reason of the scholar in such a way as to suggest what he desires to teach him, and if by chance the pupil cannot answer, the other suggests the answers.

Preceptor. What is thy chief desire in life ?

Scholar is silent.

P. That everything should succeed and prosper with thee, according to thy whole heart and wish ? What would such a thing be called ?

S. is silent.

P. It is called happiness (welfare, comfort, felicity). Now suppose thou wert in possession of all the happiness that is possible to thee, wouldst thou keep it to thyself, or wouldst thou impart some of it to others ?

S. I would share it with my fellows, that they also might be happy and contented.

P. Good : that speaks well for thy heart. Let us see how

it stands with thy head. Wouldst thou give the sluggard cushions to idle away his time in sloth? Wouldst thou allow the drunkard wine, and opportunities for indulging to excess, or give the deceiver captivating form and manners to enable him to entrap the innocent and unwary? Wouldst thou give the robber intrepidity and strength? These are some of the means by which each of these hopes to become happy in his own way.

S. Oh no, not at all.

P. So that if thou hadst at thy disposal all possible happiness, and hadst also the goodwill to bestow it upon others, thou wouldst not unreflectingly confer it upon the first comer, but wouldst previously inquire how far he might be worthy of the happiness he derived; but thou wouldst probably not hesitate to provide for thyself whatever would conduce to thy welfare.

S. Yes.

P. But would not then the question occur to thee, whether thou thyself wert really worthy of such happiness?

S. Yes, it would.

P. That within thee which pants for happiness is appetite; that which limits and restricts this desire for happiness to the prior condition of being worthy of it, is thy reason. But thou hast the power of restraining and conquering by the force of thy reason, thy appetites, and this is the freedom of thy will. And in order that thou mayst know what thou hast to do to gain this happiness, and at the same time render thyself worthy of it, thou hast but to consult thy reason; that is to say, it is not necessary that thou shouldst learn the rule of thy conduct from observation and experience, nor from others by way of education. Thy *own reason* teaches and commands thee what thou hast to do. For example, suppose the case were put, that by a dexterous lie thou couldst extricate thyself or thy friend from some near embarrassment, and that without prejudice to any other, what would thy reason say in such a case?

S. Reason says, I might not lie, however great the advantages of falsehood may be. Lying is mean, and renders a man wholly unworthy of happiness. Here is a positive command of the reason, in the presence of which all appetite and inclination must be silent.

P. What dost thou call this absolute necessity of acting conformably to a law of reason?

S. Duty.

P. The observance then of duty is the only unalterable condition of his meriting happiness; and these two are identically the same. But supposing that thou wert conscious of possessing such a good and effective will, whereby thou mightst deem thyself worthy of happiness, or at least not unworthy of it, canst thou ground upon that any certain hope of one day becoming happy?

S. No, not upon that alone; for it is neither in our own power to secure our welfare, nor is the course of nature so adjusted as to fall in with good desert; and the chances of life depend on events over which we have no control. Our happiness must be limited to a bare *wish*, and cannot even convert itself into a *hope*, unless some foreign power undertake it for us.

P. Has reason any ground for believing it *as real*, any such supreme power, dealing out happiness and misery according to desert and guilt, having sway over the whole physical system, and governing the world with the most unerring wisdom,—in other words, that *God* exists?

S. Yes; for we discover in those works of nature that we can judge of, marks of wisdom so vast and profound, that we can account for it only by ascribing it to the unsearchable will of a Creator, from whom we deem ourselves entitled to expect an equally admirable adjustment of the moral order of the world, that is, a harmony between virtue and happiness, and that we may hereafter hope to become partakers of this happiness, provided we do not by a neglect of our duty render ourselves unworthy of it."

In the division of moral duties, Kant, it will be observed, omits those usually classed as duties towards God. His own explanation of this is, that although the Formal of religion is the aggregate of the duties *considered as divine commandments*, Religion, considered as the doctrine of the duties owed towards God, falls far beyond the limits of pure ethics. This subject he resumes in his work on Religion, presently to be noticed.

Such is the moral system of Kant, which has often been compared to that of the Stoics. But it is far higher than that of the Greek school. It has the severity and grandeur of the latter, but it has also the purity and simple sublimity of the morals of Christianity. That it takes too little account of the *emotional* nature of man, and accords too little value to

the virtues of heroism and lofty devotedness of conduct, may indeed be admitted. But, on the other hand, by insisting on the moral law, based upon the reason as the sole standard of right, to the exclusion of all mere pathological instincts and feelings, he places morality upon a firm basis; and in thus destroying all the so-called moral systems of self-interest, founded upon a refined calculation of the consequences of actions, and setting aside mere sentiment as a moral spring of the will, he compels us to found our conduct upon maxims of reason, which can have no moral value unless capable of being created into universal laws. Man is to render himself *worthy* of happiness; and, while conceiving there to exist a necessary connection between moral worth and happiness, leaves to an Almighty Being, in whom are all power and all holiness, the task of introducing harmony between the two. Besides, Kant's system is not *opposed*, as some have imagined, to the most heroic, the most devoted manifestations of feeling, but it requires that *all* conduct, in order to have a *moral* value, shall be founded on the moral law of reason. With this condition, there are no limits set to heroism, love, or charity. And surely no one would have even these separated from morals and from reason. It is true that the world presents instances in abundance of the separation, but this proves nothing as to the value of it. Be the defects of Kant's moral system what they may, I think it is quite impossible for us to rise from a study of that system without having our minds enlightened and our moral principles strengthened; and when it is considered that Kant lived in an age when Christianity and the morals of Christianity were scoffed at and derided, and when philosophy (so called) could offer nothing to man except a miserable apology for a moral system, we have every reason to feel thankful to the great thinker of Königsberg, who has systematically promulgated a system of morals in accordance with the rational laws of our being here, and the hopes which, as spiritual beings, we entertain of a life hereafter. Having done this great work for the civilization and progress of the world, I, for one, am not disposed to look too narrowly into errors of detail.

The 'Critique of Judgment' (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*) appeared in 1790, two years after the 'Critique of Practical Reason.' It has two main divisions: 1st, *Æsthetic* judgment, comprehending the beautiful, the sublime, and the fine arts;

2ndly, the teleological, or a consideration of the ends of nature, irrespective of the subjective conditions involved in the first division. It is preceded by an introduction, which forms an admirable exposition of Kant's general system. The Critique of Judgment may be considered a sort of intermediate one between that of the pure reason and the practical reason. All our judgments concerning the beautiful and the sublime, though these objects are confined to the sensible world, involve on the one hand *à priori*, and therefore universal and necessary principles, and in this way are allied to the Critique of Pure Reason, which furnishes from the understanding a principle which raises us above the concept of nature; and they are allied to the practical reason, since they suppose the idea of liberty; in the words of M. Jules Barni, "The ideas of the beautiful and the sublime, and that of the finality of nature (the teleological judgment), while confining us within the limits of the world of sense, introduce an intellectual element, and in this way may be considered as a transition state between the idea of nature and that of freedom, or between speculative philosophy and practical." Here is the groundwork of most German speculation on the subject of the fine arts, the foundation of the science of *Æsthetics*. The perception of the beautiful takes place when there is an harmonious action between the understanding and the imagination; in other words, when the beautiful object presents a unity furnished by the understanding, and a variety presented by the imagination, added to such a disposition of the parts amongst themselves, and of the parts to the whole, as shall produce a special feeling of pleasurable satisfaction. Kant considers our judgments of taste under four points of view, and gives four corresponding definitions, which form together a general explication. The first definition is, "*The beautiful is the object of a pleasure free from all interest in the object,*" that is, that the object in every other respect is indifferent to us. These judgments are also considered *æsthetical*, not logical, and the feeling which accompanies them quite distinct from that arising from the agreeable or the good. The second definition is, "*Beauty is that which pleases universally, independent of any intellectual concept.*" In order that we may recognize a thing as beautiful, it is not necessary that we should compare it with any determinate concept; the perception arises on the bare contemplation of the object. The

principle of these judgments, freed thus from any anterior concept, and arising out of the free play of the understanding and the imagination, and freed also from sensation (sensation of course accompanies the perception of the object, but is not the source of the judgment), is universal. The third definition is, "*Beauty is the form of the finality of an object, so far as it is perceived without the representation of an end.*" According to Kant, when we judge a thing to be beautiful, we recognize in the disposition of facts a certain conformity, which appears the work of design, but which we consider independent of every idea of end or destination; we judge of it simply by the free play of the understanding and the imagination. It has the form of a finality, but is not dependent upon it. The fourth definition is, "*The beautiful is that which is recognized independently of an intellectual concept as the object of a pleasure which is necessary.*" This is connected with the third. The pleasure derived from beauty, though not resting on an intellectual concept, is universal, and therefore necessary. These two characteristics Kant insists on as belonging to our judgments of taste, though at the same time they are held to be strictly æsthetical, that is, independent of any intellectual concept. This part however of Kant's critique is not without obscurity. Kant next proceeds to a consideration of the sublime, which is allied to the beautiful in this, that the judgment we form of it is neither intellectual nor sensational, but, like the beautiful, has its origin in a free play of the faculties exercised on any given object, and in the pleasure which accompanies it. But it differs widely from the judgment of the beautiful, for while the latter is the result of the *concord* between the understanding and the imagination, the sublime is the result of a *discord* between the imagination and the reason, freely exercising themselves on determinate objects. There are two species of sublime, one which arises on the contemplation of *immensity*, *grandeur of extent*; the other on the perception of *power*. Kant terms these respectively *mathematical* and *dynamical*, the first having reference to *quantity*, the second to *quality*.

For instance, on contemplating the starry heavens, and perceiving their immense extent, and the vast number of stars scattered throughout space, we feel humiliated to the dust, incapable as we are of grasping their extent in one intuition, but at the same time the feeling arises within us that we

have the power of comprehending them; and hence arises within us the consciousness of a faculty superior even to them, and before which all nature is small. We feel ourselves superior to nature, considered in its immensity, and the resultant feeling is that of the sublime. But, properly speaking, it is not nature which is sublime; it is the feeling which it awakes in us, by its action on the imagination. In order that the judgment shall be æsthetical, the faculties must enter into free harmonious action, independently of any determinate concept of the object on which they may be exercised, otherwise the judgment becomes intellectual, and not æsthetical; hence the pleasure resulting from a sublime object is mixed, while that from a beautiful object is simple. In the former, the mind is both attracted and repulsed: the one is calm, the other troubled; one allied to gaiety, the other to gravity. The same remarks apply to nature considered in reference to its power. "Stupendous rocks suspended in mid air," says Kant, "which seem to menace the traveller with destruction; dark clouds gathering tumultuously together, while the lightnings flash and the thunder reverberates through space; volcanoes letting loose all their terrible powers of destruction; hurricanes spreading devastation and waste; the mighty ocean lashed into fury by the impetuous winds; the cataract of a great river, etc.: these are things which reduce to nothing all our feeble powers of resistance. But their aspect is more attractive than terrible, provided we are out of danger; and we call these things sublime: for they elevate the powers of the soul beyond their ordinary level, and reveal within ourselves a power of resistance of a totally different character, which inspires us with courage to measure ourselves with those apparently all-powerful things." That sublimity, and also beauty, attach to moral and intellectual objects, Kant admits; but here he considers them purely under an æsthetic point of view. But both are closely allied to morals. The moral sentiment and that of the sublime have the same origin. Both imply a consciousness of a superior destiny; only that in the one case this consciousness is allied to the idea of law and duty; in the other it is but a play, though a serious play, of the mind. Kant establishes the most intimate relations between beauty, sublimity, and morality, and finishes his æsthetic critique by considering beauty as the symbol of morality. I have only room for the following remark of Kant's, made with a view of

showing how close is the connection between them. He says, "The consideration of this analogy is frequent, even amongst uncultivated minds; and we often designate beautiful objects, both in nature and art, by names indicative of moral qualities. Thus we call trees and buildings *majestic* and *magnificent*. We speak of a *gay* and *smiling* landscape; and colours are called *innocent*, *modest* or *tender*, because they excite sensations which involve something analogous to the disposition assumed, produced by moral objects. Taste thus permits us to pass without a too sudden transition from an attractive object of sense to an habitual moral feeling, by representing the imagination in its free play as being harmoniously determined towards the understanding, and teaching us to find in objects of sense a satisfaction free and independent of their attractions." Thus Kant comes again to his great central idea, morals.

From a consideration of the sublime and beautiful, Kant passes on to that of the fine arts; considers their nature and characters, the different faculties of the mind which they call into exercise, and the parts which each plays in the different arts; the nature of genius (which he holds to be a natural gift, and so incapable of being acquired), and the connection between taste and genius. He then makes a systematic division of the arts, without however pretending to a complete development of the subject; simply one of those essays which, as he says himself, it is interesting and useful to attempt. The Critique of *Æsthetic Judgment* is undoubtedly one of the most important works that have been given to the world on the delicate and different subjects of the beautiful, the sublime, and their representations in art. It has formed the groundwork of most of the subsequent works on these subjects which have appeared in Germany since Kant's time. The reader will find in Schiller's *Æsthetic Letters* a pretty complete development of Kant's principles, and in Schiller's works a practical manifestation of them.

The second part of the Critique of Judgment is the *Teleological*. We have seen that in every æsthetic judgment, every judgment having reference to taste, there is a certain concordance between the object and our faculties. But though beautiful objects would seem to be especially made to please, yet it is not necessary in any æsthetic judgment that we should attribute to nature any relation of means to ends, or any defi-

nite finality. If however, passing beyond the æsthetic judgment, we attribute an objective reality to these relations, the judgment is no longer æsthetical but logical. Kant calls it *teleological*. Then the question is as to the value of this species of the judgment. Kant carefully distinguishes between ends, properly so called, and means; he calls the first *interior*, the second *relative*; the first manifested in *organized* beings, the second in the various parts which serve as means for the end proposed, for the working out of the destiny of organized beings. In every organized being, as in every work of human industry, each part can only be conceived in its relation to the whole; but all organized beings, unlike the products of human industry, are not simply *effects*, they are also *causes*. An organized being produces others of the same species; assimilates into its own structure other substances; its parts act on each other, and reciprocally preserve each other, while endowed with a reparative power, by which it throws off all agents whose action is not in harmony with the laws of its own being. In all this we recognize a power quite distinct from a *mechanical* one; there is a causality at work totally different from that which regulates the action of physical nature generally. Therefore, in the consideration of organized beings, we are necessarily led to suppose in nature a causality similar to what we find in ourselves, whose action consists in the adaptation of means to specific ends. Hence the principle that, in reference to organized beings, there is no part, no organ, that has not reference to a distinct end, that nature has made nothing in vain. This principle is universal and necessary; that is to say, we always apply it, and are *constrained* to apply it in the consideration of the nature of organized beings. "We can no more," says Kant, "reject this teleological principle, in reference to organisms, than the principle of 'nothing happens by chance,' in reference to nature generally; for as in the absence of the latter there would be no possible experience in general, so without the first there would be no connecting links to enable us to follow up the observation of any things in nature, which we have once conceived teleologically, under the concept of ends of nature." But what is the value of this principle in an objective point of view? Here Kant is faithful to the Critique of Pure Reason. The teleological principle has no more objective value than the *forms* of the sensory, the *categories* of the understanding, and the *ideas* of

the reason. It is but a *regulative* principle, necessary to enable us to conceive the production of organized beings, which involve a species of causality different from the laws of nature; that is, the principle is simply subjective. But once introduced, it is extended throughout nature. We no longer limit its application to organized beings, but conceive it as universal. All nature is considered as a vast assemblage of ends linked together by a concatenated series of means and ends. The principle, which is applicable to organized beings, expressed itself as "In organized beings nothing exists in vain," becomes, when extended to the whole of nature, "Throughout the world nothing exists in vain; all has been created for a specific purpose." At this point Kant enters into an examination of the various systems on which the question of final causes has been resolved, viz. the system of Epicurus, which attributed all to chance; that of Spinoza, which made all to result from a blind self-development of a unique substance,—two systems which, denying the existence of final ends, do not even explain the concept itself; then the system of the Stoics and that of Theism, both of which admit a finality in nature; the first seeking its principle in a soul of the world, the second in an intelligent cause in nature. All these systems Kant looks upon as an assemblage of hypotheses on the finality of nature, objectively considered; but as none of them can establish themselves on the ruins of the other, there is free room for the Critique, which declares them all to be vain; and while admitting the principle of final causes as a regulative, necessary principle, he does not admit that it has any objective value. He then examines the various hypotheses of those who have sought, in an intelligent cause of the world, the principle of the production of organisms, with a view to determine the relation between the intelligent cause and these organisms; he rejects, as unphilosophical, the theory of *occasional formations*, as well as that of individual creations, and agrees with Blumenbach, to whom he pays honourable tribute in his theory of generic preformation or epigenesis. This theory recognizes a reproductive power in organized beings, according to certain laws; but admits a supernatural cause for their first commencement. The teleological principle, making, as we conceive, the world as a vast system of ends, obliges us at last to suppose a final end, which however the physical world cannot determine, for it should be unconditional or ab-

solute. Kant finds it in the *summum bonum* which he has made the object of the practical reason; and this brings him to the moral proof of the existence of God, to which it is a corollary. In this way he concludes this great work, as he had concluded the two other critiques, by condemning as impotent the speculative reason, and opposing to it the practical, which assures us of what the other holds to be hypothetical*.

Closely allied to the three critiques that have now been considered,—viz. the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgment, with their supplementary works, the Prolegomena, the Metaphysic of Nature, the Groundwork of Ethics, the Metaphysic of Rights, and the Metaphysic of Virtue,—is a work which has exercised no small influence on the theological literature of Germany, and, by the spread of German literature, on theology generally. It is the starting-point of modern rationalism, and has formed the battle-field for much discussion. This is the work entitled ‘Religion within the bounds of Pure Reason’ (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft). The first book (about one-fifth of the whole work) was published in the ‘Berlin Monthly Magazine’ for 1792. About four years previous to this, that is, in 1788, an edict had been published by Frederick II. of Prussia, less liberal than his great predecessor in this respect, greatly hampering, or even suppressing freedom of discussion on all matters connected with theology. The consequence of this was, that when the second book was forwarded to Berlin for publication in the same magazine, the then Philosophical Censor, M. G. R. Hillmer (who had allowed the publication of the first book), on reading it, considered it to be theological and not philosophical, and accordingly sent it to the Theological Censor, Hermes, who unhesitatingly refused his *imprimatur*, and took Book II. into custody for illicitly poaching (as Mr. Semple has it) on the preserves of theology. It appears however that some of the ancient German universities have the rights of appellate jurisdiction in matters of this kind, and among these is the University of Königsberg, before which Kant resolved to bring his case. He completed the work and sent it to the theological faculty, contending however at the same time, that it did not fall within the jurisdiction of that faculty, being a purely philosophical

* See ‘Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques;’ art. Kant.

speculation upon theology. After mature deliberation, the theological faculty decided that Kant was right as to the character of the book, and remitted it to the philosophical faculty, who at once sanctioned its publication. It was accordingly published in 1793*. The main object of the work is to give a moral interpretation and direction to the dogmas, the writings, and the institutions of Christianity, and to convert them into a means of moral instruction and moral perfectionment, independently of the historical and metaphysical truth involved in them. In fact, as the title of the book indicates, it is to bring religious belief and reason into harmony with each other. We may look upon this work therefore as a continuation of the *Ethics*. Since the foundation of our belief in God and the immortality of the soul rests upon the moral law, all natural religion must be based upon moral principles. Kant does not reject as false or impossible the fact of a *supernatural* revelation; neither, on the other hand, does he admit that the impossibility of such a thing could be proved. He does not however consider it necessary to admit it, but leaves it, like the great questions of his speculative critique, an open question. He insists however upon this, that reason must be the final judge of the truth of every religion, and that the only real proof of its truth must consist in its conformity to rational principles. No parts of God's works could contradict each other; and since the reason is the gift, and the highest gift, of God, it is *à priori* impossible for there to exist any real contradiction between its principles and religious belief. Those therefore who would have the reason bow before any religious dogmas, resting as many must do upon obscure traditions and doubtful historical relations, commit a far greater error than those who, starting from acknowledged rational principles, endeavour to elevate the dogmas into the region of pure truth, and thus introduce harmony where, apart from these principles, it would have seemed impossible. This is Kant's aim: it is, under a sort of poetic guise, one of the most profound of all his works, replete with the grandest and most elevated

* An English translation, by Mr. J. W. Semple, was published in Edinburgh in 1838. Mr. Semple had previously published translations of the 'Groundwork,' part of the 'Critique of Practical Reason,' and the 'Metaphysic of Virtue,' the whole under the title of 'Metaphysic of Ethics;' all of which I believe to be faithful translations, though certainly expressed in English far from transparent. They are, however, much better than Mr. Richardson's translations.

views of the dignity and high destiny of humanity ; and may be read and studied with profit, even by those who would contest the principle of resting religion upon morals alone. I cannot make room for much in the way of extract, but the following, from sect. 5 of Book III. entitled "The pure ethical belief is the supreme judge of all ecclesiastical creeds whatever," wherein Kant discusses this fundamental principle, will give a good idea of the subtlety and depth which he brings to the investigation. He says, "My readers are already aware, that although a church wants one most important mark of its being the true church (the word church, it must be understood, is used in the widest signification, and referable to *any* religion whatever, true or false), viz. a valid claim to universality, when founded on revealed tenets ; inasmuch as their historical groundwork, though clothed in writing, spread far and wide, and thus guaranteed to the latest posterity, never can become the object of a united and universally exceptionless conviction ; still such is the natural infirmity of mankind, that they always require for the highest abstractions, the grounds and ideas of pure reason, some tangible cover and confirmation from the testimony of observation and experience (a consideration which cannot well be neglected in the *introduction* of any doctrine intended to be of catholic extent) ; and hence some one ecclesiastico-historical creed, from among those already extant, must be made available for that purpose."

Successfully to combine a firm moral faith with this *à posteriori* belief thus thrown into our hands, will depend mainly on the exegetical mode in which the revealed text is expounded and unfolded ; and this will depend in great measure upon the acknowledged principles of the religion of pure reason. The theoretical and speculative parts of any church creed are for us devoid of moral interest, unless they assist us and are found conducive to the discharge of all our duties as divinely commanded (regard had to the imperatives of morality as if they were divine commandments, being in fact the very essence of all religion). An interpretation of this sort may not unfrequently seem strained, and yet the text must be thus forced into a moral dress (assuming of course the impregnable truth of the moral law), in preference to the verbal and literal meaning, whenever this last seems in contradiction to morality, or tends in any way to contaminate its pure springs."

Kant then refers to the polytheism of Greece and Rome,

the religion of India, Mahomedanism, Judaism, and Christianity, as proofs of varied interpretations of outward facts, whether committed to writing or not, according as the reason was more or less employed on this object; and continues: "Admitting that a particular document contains a divine revelation, the preliminary grounds of this credence must be, that the doctrines taught are worthy of God; and therefore the surest test and criterion is, that 'all Scripture given by inspiration of God must be profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction and instruction in righteousness,' etc.; and since this last, the moral amendment of our species, is the proper aim of the religion of reason, it follows that natural religion must supply the supreme canon of all scriptural exegesis. This religion it is, that is 'the Spirit of God guiding us into all truth,' and that does, by instructing and redressing the depravities of ignorance, quicken us with principles of conduct. Moreover it refers all the historic contents of the Scripture to the standard and springs of the pure moral law of righteousness, which is the sum and substance of pure religion; no searching or expounding of Scriptures can, at any time, proceed on a different principle, 'and we can only find in them eternal life, so far as they bear witness to this truth*.'" In the following passage, which I cannot refrain from quoting, Kant has administered a well-merited rebuke to the theologic censor Hermes, who endeavoured to *burke* Kant's work. It contains, moreover, some wholesome truth which is worth a place here. "Priestcraft," he says, "obtains, wherever a mal-conformation of the church polity has introduced Fetishism, which worship of a fetish god is always to be met with whenever statute laws of the church, formulas of faith, and ceremonial observances, not principles of morality, constitute the groundwork and essentials of worship. There are some churches, indeed, where the fetish belief is so mechanical and abundant as almost to supplant both morality and religion, and which therefore approach very near to unminged paganism. But be the sacerdotal statutes to which obedience is demanded few or many, still, whenever the free homage due to the moral law is not first and supreme, then a servile worship, based on a fetish creed, prevails. By this last, the multitude are governed, and, through obedience extorted by the church (not rendered to religion), *stand bereft of all mental and moral free-*

* Slightly altered from Semple's translation.

dom. The constitution of such a church may be hierarchical or democratical—that is a matter of no consequence, since it concerns only the mode of its organization. The administration is, under every form of fetish creed, out-and-out despotic; *and wherever statute articles of belief are interwoven with the constitutional charters of the church*, then the clergy usurp the *sway*, and *domineer*; they think to trample on the understandings of their fellows, and even, by degrees, attempt to get rid of biblical learning; for being the *patented* interpreters and expounders of the will of the unseen lawgiver, to them belongs the exclusive right of dealing out the rules of faith; and, armed with this authority, they fancy that they have not to *convince* but to *command*. Again, since beyond churchmen all are laies (not even excepting the sovereign head of the realm), it is plain that in the long-run the church (where it *can*) lords it over the state, not by force or violence, but partly by *compressing the minds*, partly by air-drawn visions of the benefits accruing to the state from those habits of blind obedience to which spiritual discipline moulds and biases even the very *thoughts* of the people. But inveterate customs of hypocrisy at last, though gradually, undermine the honesty of the subject; even his civil duties become tainted by being rendered with eye and lip service, and thus, like all false principles, the spurious church-worship ends by bringing about the very contrary of what it professed to aim at.”

Language like this naturally excited a good deal of enmity against Kant, not only amongst the clergy of Germany, but also among the more pious of the laity, and not a few of the thinking men of the time. Some of these discussed Kant's principles with fairness and sincerity, while others contented themselves with using the weapons which ignorant bigotry has always at its command on such occasions. It required a mind, not only honest and pervaded with a love of truth, but of some calibre and depth, to do Kant justice in reference to his theological opinions, based as they were upon principles evolved by a profound examination of the essential conditions of human knowledge. I must not however omit to state, that the publication of the present work drew from Frederick II. a letter of remonstrance, at the instigation probably of Hermes or some of the theologians about the person of the King. It was however private, and was not made public till after Frederick's death, when Kant published it himself in

1798, in a small work entitled 'Der Streit der Facultäten' (Disension concerning the academical Faculties), wherein he discusses the question, how far a public teacher may be permitted to publish opinions contrary to the doctrines taught in the schools by order of the Church and the Government, and to which he is bound to conform in his official instructions? Professor Stapfer (Biographie Universelle, art. Kant), speaking of this letter, remarks, "In the Preface to this work (Der Streit der Facultäten) Kant gives a detailed account of the only event which disturbed the peaceful course of his life, his difficulties with the royal censorship of Berlin respecting his treatise on religion. These difficulties produced a serious interruption of his tranquillity on account of the interference of the King of Prussia, who was prejudiced against him. Kant showed upon this occasion, which affected him deeply, a great deal of dignity, but at the same time a great deal of resignation and the greatest deference for the wishes of the monarch, in everything which could be reconciled with truth and honour. He firmly refused to make a kind of recantation which his prince required of him; but whilst he forcibly represented that he had only used a right which belonged to him as a professor of philosophy and a citizen, he promised the King that he would henceforth publish nothing further on the subject of religion, an engagement which he scrupulously observed until the death of Frederick William II.*"

* I am sorry to find amongst Kant's detractors Mr. Thomas De Quincey. In the second volume of his works, now publishing in this country, page 161, he has an attack upon Kant, which, had it come from a man of less note than De Quincey, might have been passed over in silence. That I may not do the English Opium-eater any injustice (for I know that Kant has nothing to fear from attacks like this), I will quote the entire passage, which many of my readers will see contains a clue to the attack itself. After speaking of Hartley and some other matters, Mr. De Quincey says, "However, I confess that being myself, from my earliest years, a reverential believer in the doctrine of the Trinity, simply because I never attempted to bring all things within the mechanic understanding; and because, like Sir Thomas Browne, my mind almost demanded mysteries in so mysterious a system of relations as those which connect us with another world; and also, because the further my understanding opened, the more I perceived of *divin analogies* to strengthen my creed; and because nature herself—mere physical nature—has mysteries no less profound; for these, and for many other becauses, I could not reconcile with my general reverence for Mr. Coleridge the fact, so often reported to me, that he was a Unitarian. But, said some Bristol people to me, not only is he a Unitarian, he is also a Socinian. In that case, I replied, I cannot hold him a Christian. I am a liberal man; this judgment is no proof of it, Mr. De Quincey, and have no bigotry or hostile feelings towards a Socinian; but I can never think that man a Christian who has *blotted out* of his scheme the very powers by which only the great offices and functions

I have now gone over the principal works which embody Kant's entire system, so that, however short this exposition has necessarily been, the reader will be able to form a general idea of its leading features, and be enabled to estimate in some

of Christianity can be sustained; neither can I think that any mind, though he make himself a marvellously clever disputant, ever could tower upwards into a very great philosopher, unless he should begin or should end with Christianity. [Nor do I: but the question is, what *is* Christianity? Kant would have made sad havoc with the Opium-eater.] Kant is a *dubious exception*. Not that I mean to question his august pretensions, so far as they went, and in his proper line. Within his own circle, none durst tread but he; but the circle was limited. He was called, by one who weighed him well, the *Alles Zermalmender*—the world-shattering Kant. He could destroy,—his intellect was essentially destructive. He was the Gog and the Magog of Hunnish desolation to the existing schemes of philosophy. He probed them, he showed the vanity of vanities which besieged their foundations, the rottenness below, the hollowness above. But he had no instincts of creation or restoration within his Apollyon mind, for he had no love, no faith, no self-distrust, no humility, no childish docility; all which qualities belonged essentially to Coleridge's mind, and waited only for manhood and for sorrow to bring them forward. Who can read without indignation of Kant that, at his own table, in social sincerity and confidential talk, let him *say what he would in his books, he exulted in the prospect of our absolute and ultimate annihilation*, that he planted his glory in the grave, and was ambitious of rotting for ever! The King of Prussia, though a personal friend of Kant, found himself obliged to level his state thunders at some of his doctrines, and terrified him in his advance; *else I am persuaded that Kant would have formally delivered Atheism from the professor's chair, and would have enthroned the horrid Gaulish creed (which privately he professed) in the University of Königsberg*. It required the artillery of a great king to make him pause; his menacing or warning letter is extant. The general notion is, that the royal logic applied so austere to the public conduct of Kant in his professor's chair, was of that kind which rests its strength upon 'thirty legions.' My own belief is, that the King had private information of Kant's ultimate tendencies as revealed in his table-talk. The fact is, that as the stomach has been known by means of its own potent acid secretion to attack itself and its own organic structure, so, and with the same preternatural extension of instinct, did Kant carry forward his destroying functions, until he turned them upon his own hopes and the pledges of his own superiority to the dog, the ape, the worm."—This is fine writing, no doubt, but are the alleged facts *true*? Is it true that Kant, at his own table, "exulted in the prospect of absolute and ultimate annihilation," and that, but for the "state thunders" of Prussia, he would have formally delivered atheism from the professor's chair. These are grave charges: but what are the proofs of their truth? Mr. De Quincey is well acquainted with Kant's accredited German biographers, Borowski, Hasse, Wasianski (Kant's private secretary), and Jachmann, and he translated considerable portions of Wasianski's work for 'Blackwood's Magazine' (January, 1827). In introducing these translations, he says nothing of the above thoughts, but speaks of the "purity and dignity of Kant's life." These biographers, while relating Kant's table-talk, say nothing of the "exultation" alluded to, nor anything whatever that could justify the drawing of so unwarrantable a conclusion as the one above in reference to Kant's atheistical tendencies. But in the face of these two charges, we have the fact that Kant, in his moral system (and be it remembered, *this* is the central point of Kant's philosophy, and that it was in order to place morals beyond

degree its value. Leaving out of view all consideration of its abstract and mathematical *form*, which will always render a study of it through Kant's own works a task of considerable difficulty, except to minds familiar to mathematical reasoning,

all sceptical doubts, that he lowered the pretensions of the speculative reason), distinctly and deliberately laid down as *necessary postulates*, both the immortality of the soul and the belief in a Supreme Being, without which his ethical system must have crumbled to pieces. That Kant *undervalued* the speculative proofs for the existence of God and immortality we know, and no one has shown this so convincingly as M. Cousin in the following pages; and it may readily be conceded that Kant, in the freedom of social discussions, might have strongly urged the difficulties which appeared to him to exist in these speculative proofs; but, even on this supposition, he could not have urged anything stronger, at least in reference to the being of God, than what he had given publicly to the world in his work on the subject, published so early as 1763. The proof to the mind of Kant was the *moral* one; and because the speculative proofs appeared to him insufficient, is he to be branded with atheism, and charged with indulging in a devilish exultation at the idea of annihilation? But Mr. De Quincey knows that Kant's works give the direct lie to these monstrous charges, for he says, "Say what he would in his books." But Mr. De Quincey knows also, that Kant's life was in perfect harmony with his works. There never was a man in whom this harmony was more perfect; for, notwithstanding the high-minded stoical severity of his moral system, *he carried that system into practice* throughout a long life, and could say at the close, "I have never, to my knowledge, done an unjust act, nor been the cause of pain to any living being." And let me ask Mr. De Quincey, first, how *he* would like to have *his works* thrust aside as in no way expressing his convictions, and, second, am I right in taking the above as his *real* opinion of Kant? But as regards the table-talk: he was never likely to have discussed the questions of the immortality of the soul or the being of God at all at his table; these questions, and all questions connected with philosophy, and particularly such as had reference to his own speculations, he systematically banished. It was his custom to make his table-talk social and free, rather than grave and argumentative; the topics selected were politics, the arts, natural science, and generally the questions of the day. I know not upon what authority Mr. De Quincey makes these strange assertions, but I am afraid that he has allowed his theological predilections to pervert his judgment, and has been led to commit an act of injustice to the character of a great and good man.

Since writing this note, the last volume of the American edition of Mr. De Quincey's writings has been put into my hands. In this volume is a reprint of an article on Kant, which appeared in 'Blackwood's Magazine' for August, 1830, signed N. Y. Z. I had, before the American volume made its appearance, read this article, but I came to the conclusion that it *could not* have emanated from the pen of the English Opium-eater, because it contains the following remark, which stands in marked contradiction to the passage before cited, and which first appeared in 'Tait's Magazine' for October, 1835. In 'Blackwood' Mr. De Quincey says, "I will never believe that Kant was capable (as some have represented him) of ridiculing in conversation the hopes of immortality; for *that* the italics are Mr. De Quincey's is both incredible for itself, and in contradiction to many passages in his writings." The article in which this passage occurs is generally hostile to Kant, besides being exceedingly offensive in tone, except perhaps to those who can see no good out of Church-of-Englandism and Tory politics; and I am therefore warranted in concluding that if Mr. De Quincey had been in possession of any evidence that he considered at all

let us consider it with reference solely to its matter. Its main defect, as M. Cousin has so admirably shown in the Eighth Lecture, is the manifest support it lends to scepticism, and this, singularly enough, arising out of a dread of scepticism itself, and a desire to place philosophy beyond its attacks. But Kant, by refusing to grant any objective value to the *à priori* laws of the mind in reference to external objects, though he inconsistently, and without the slightest examination, admitted the *existence* of the external world, in one respect did not differ much from Hume himself. For, in a practical point of view, what does it matter, whether our notion of causality is to be looked upon as springing out of the imagination and the laws of association, or to be considered an *à priori* law of the understanding, independent of experience, it is true, yet entirely *subjective* in its character? In both instances it is deprived of its character of a *law* of nature, and the consequences in one case are as mischievous as in the other. But there is this difference in the Kantian view; the idea of causality, and all the other fundamental ideas of the mind, *were incontestably traced to the operation and laws of the mind itself, and so not dependent upon experience*; experience itself was impossible without these mental laws, and every mental act whatever rising above mere sensation, involved the action of the mind itself. Here the philosophy of sensation was shattered to pieces, its fundamental prop was removed, and it fell to the ground, never to rise again, except on the ruins of the ‘Critique of Pure Reason.’ A deeper philosophy has taught us to believe *that the laws of mind are also the laws of nature*. But Kant’s mathematical mind would have rejected this, and did reject it, as an hypothesis.

Thus it will be seen that Kant’s scepticism was a different thing from that of Hume and his school; for one of the first consequences of Kant’s scepticism was not empiricism, not

trustworthy tending to substantiate this strange charge, he would not have expressed the decided disbelief contained in the above passage. He says it is “in contradiction to *many passages* in Kant’s writings.” I should think it is; I repeat, that Kant’s moral system, which is the keystone of the Critical Philosophy, would be an *abortion* without the ideas of God and Immortality; and for this reason alone it is altogether incredible that Kant should at any time either have preached Atheism or gloried in the idea of annihilation. His head was too clear and his heart too good to permit us to believe either one or the other. The contradiction between Mr. De Quincey in ‘Blackwood,’ and Mr. De Quincey in ‘Tait,’ I leave him to explain. All that I care about is the character of Kant, which I believe in this instance to have been unjustly assailed.

any return to sensational philosophy, but Fichte's subjective idealism, followed by Schelling's beautiful system, in which both elements are conmingled, to which succeeded Herder's philosophy of identity*. I have already alluded to Kant's moral system. It has often been reproached with being too rigid, too stoical; it is however a fault on the right side. It grounds morals upon *law*, and leaves little room for sentiment. But it appears to me that Kant's system admits of any expansion on the emotional side, *provided* it be in *harmony* with the moral law itself. Every part of Kant's philosophy has exercised a vast influence over German literature, and by means of that literature (for Kant's works, I believe, are not much known out of Germany) it has acted strongly upon the literature of Europe generally, as well as of America, and will continue directly or indirectly its action. Kant's mind was one of extraordinary depth and penetration. There was no subject that he took up on which he did not throw a flood of light, by seizing in the first instance its fundamental principles, and then looking at it in every point of view, and exposing it with the demonstrative accuracy of an anatomist; any half-a-dozen pages of his form matter for a volume, such was the concentrative energy and subtlety of his intellect.

In order to complete this sketch of Kant's works, it only remains now to run rapidly over his miscellaneous writings, written for the purpose of elucidating or defending the principles enunciated in the preceding critiques. Connected with the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' we have the following:—'What are fixed principles in reference to Thought?' (*Was heisst im Denken sich orientiren?*), published in 1786, in which Kant defends the reason against the attacks of Jacobi. 'On a pretended discovery according to which every new Critique would be rendered useless by one more ancient,' 1791: this was an answer to Eberhard, who had advanced the proposition that the philosophy of Leibnitz rendered any new Critique unnecessary. Kant shows in what manner his own theory differed from that of Leibnitz, concerning innate ideas. 'On the Failure of all Philosophical Essays on Theism,' 1791; in

* M. C. de Rémusat, in his public discourse at the Academy of Sciences, in May, 1845, pithily sums up the four great German philosophies in the following words:—"The idea is assured of nothing but itself, said Kant; Fichte added; the idea produced being. Being reproduces the idea, continued Schelling. The idea *is* being, concluded Herder."

which Kant reiterates the insufficiency of the *speculative* proofs for the existence and attributes of the Deity, contending that the one from morals alone was valid. 'On the progress of Metaphysic in Germany since Leibnitz and Wolf,' 1791, a question proposed by the Academy of Berlin, but not published till 1804, the year in which Kant died. 'On the lofty tone recently assumed by Philosophy,' 1794; a small essay directed against Jacobi, who wished to replace reason by sentiment, and reflection by enthusiasm. 'Announcement of an approaching treaty of perpetual peace in Philosophy,' 1794; addressed to Goethe's friend Schlosser, who had violently attacked the critical philosophy. 'On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,' 1788; a forerunner of the 'Critique of Judgment,' to the second part of which it relates. Connected with the metaphysic of ethics, are the following: 'Critique on the work of Schulz, a preacher at Gielsdorf, entitled: 'On the teaching of Morality to all Men, without Religious Distinctions,' 1784. 'On Literary Piracy,' 1785. 'On the Principle of Natural Rights proposed by Hufland,' 1786. 'On the proverbial saying: It may be true in theory but useless in practice,' 1792. 'On a justification of Lying,' 1797. 'On the trade in Books, two Letters to Nicolai,' 1798. 'Philosophical project for a perpetual Peace,' 1795. We may mention also a 'Treatise on Pedagogy,' a recapitulation of Kant's lectures on this subject, published by Rink in 1803, at the request of Kant.

Connected with the Critique on Religion is a dissertation, entitled 'Probable beginning of the history of Man,' 1786, in which Kant, taking up the scriptural account in Genesis, puts a philosophical interpretation upon it, and endeavours to sketch out what was probably the early history of the species. I have already mentioned the 'Streit der Facultäten,' published in 1798. Connected with the lectures on 'Physical Geography,' and the treatise on 'Practical Anthropology,' already mentioned, several smaller writings on physics, anthropology, and the philosophy of history may be alluded to. In 1784 appeared 'Project of a universal history from a cosmopolitical point of view.' In the same year, 'Answer to the question, What is Light?' In 1785, 'On Volcanoes of the Moon.' In the same year, 'Determination of the concept of a Human Race,' and 'Critique on the first part of Herder's Ideas on the philosophy of Human History.' In 1790, 'On enthusiasm and its remedies.' In 1794, 'On the influence of the moon on the

weather.' In the same year: 'The End of all things.' In 1796, letter to Sömmering, 'On the organ of the Soul.' Kant's treatise on *logic* was not published till 1800. It formed the substance of his lectures on that subject, and was published by his pupil Jäsche in 1800 (it has been translated into English by Mr. Richardson). In 1817, M. Pölitz published Kant's lectures 'On the philosophical doctrine of Religion,' from notes, and in 1821, 'Lectures on Metaphysic,' also from notes*.

In the composition of these various works, and in the exercise of his duties as a professor, Kant's life flowed tranquilly on, presenting but little material for a biographer beyond the works themselves. Somewhere about 1786, he was elected Rector of the University, and re-elected to the same honourable position a few years afterwards. In 1787 he was inscribed among the members of the Academy of Berlin.

Kant, as I have said, was never married. His household,—that is, after he obtained the means of maintaining a household, for we have seen that his early life, indeed up to his forty-seventh year, when he was elected Professor of Philosophy, was one of poverty and struggle,—consisted of two domestics, viz. an old man-servant of the name of Lampe, who had been a soldier in the Prussian army, and a female servant, who acted as cook, &c. &c. Kant was one of the most methodical of men. Old Lampe had strict orders to call him punctually every morning at a quarter before five, summer and winter. At the exact hour he entered his master's room, pronouncing the laconic phrase, "*It is time,*" a summons which Kant never hesitated to obey under any circumstances whatever, even if his sleep had been broken. Sometimes Kant, when the old soldier was waiting at table, would jocularly accost him with the following question: "Lampe, during the last thirty years, have I failed twice to get up when you called me?" "No, Mr. Professor," was Lampe's reply. Having dressed himself, he sat down at five exactly, to what I suppose

* Of the smaller writings which appeared subsequent to 1781, amounting on the whole to twenty-five, Stapfer observes, "None of these smaller works are destitute of interest; they are almost all filled with new and important ideas upon the greatest variety of subjects. They are all, like the smallest of the treatises of Aristotle and Bacon, worthy the attention of the literary man, as well as of the philosopher, of the theologian, the jurist, and the historian, as much as of the naturalist and the student of physics; they are a mine of original and profound thoughts, of erudite notices, of ingenious conjectures, which it will long be difficult to exhaust."—(Biographie Universelle, art. Kant.)

must be called his breakfast. He took, however, nothing more than a cup or two of tea, after which, like a true German, he smoked his pipe, generally with great rapidity, his mind occupied no doubt with the contemplated labours of the day, or revolving some knotty point of the critical philosophy. At seven o'clock he went to the University to deliver his lectures,—at least up to the year 1793, when he ceased to lecture,—and on his return occupied the remainder of the morning, until one, in composition. After 1793, the whole morning from five till one was thus occupied. Exactly at a quarter to one the cook entered his study, and, as laconically as Lampe, said, "The three-quarters have sounded," handing him at the same time a small flask of Rhenish or Hungarian wine, a glass of which Kant was in the habit of taking immediately after his soup. In order however that it might be ready for him, he hastened to the dinner-table and poured out his glass, leaving it standing with a bit of paper over it to prevent its becoming vapid, and hastened back to prepare himself for his company, whom he always received neatly dressed, for he was an utter enemy to all slovenliness. But did he never dine alone? a curious reader may inquire. No, he never did if he could help it; and it is stated that on one occasion, on some friends whom he had invited being unable to come, he actually asked old Lampe to go into the street and bring in the first person he could meet with. He was particular about the number of his guests; his rule was that they should never be fewer than the Graces, never more than the Muses. Another rule was, to vary the character of his guests as much as possible: they consisted usually of public functionaries, professors, doctors, ecclesiastics, intelligent merchants, in order that the conversation might be sufficiently varied. He was fond too of having young men at his table, that he might be spared the pain of seeing those with whom he associated removed by death; and this leads me to mention a peculiar trait in Kant: this was, that if any of his friends became ill, he was troubled in an extreme degree, and would despatch messenger after messenger to make inquiries. But if it happened that the patient died, Kant immediately became tranquil and easy, and even indifferent. His idea was, that as life is a perpetually changing and shifting state, everything that put it in jeopardy might rationally be the source of inquietude, but that if death, which is a fixed state, really came, there was no longer ground for

hope or fear, and grief was unreasonable. His philosophy however gave way on the occasion of the death of a young friend to whom he was much attached, Mr. Ehrenboth, possessed of extensive attainments and a fine mind; and during his long life he must have had the pain of losing many objects of esteem and affection. But to return to the dinner. This usually consisted of three dishes, with wine and a small dessert. This was Kant's *only* meal; he took nothing in the morning beyond tea, and invariably went supperless to bed. It can easily be imagined therefore, that when old Lampe announced dinner, that Kant was quite ready for it, and that he did it full justice. Indeed, he entered upon this, his only meal, with the intention of social enjoyment. His rule was to permit each guest to help himself, and he considered him as the best guest who helped himself first, for by this means Kant's turn the sooner arrived. He was the declared enemy of all ceremony, and disliked everything like a pause in the conversation. He had a mortal antipathy to beer—that is, the black strong beer of Germany—which he declared was a slow poison; and if any one died prematurely, Kant would say, “I suppose he has been a beer-drinker;” or in case a person were indisposed, he would ask the question, “Does he drink beer?” and regulated his opinion of the patient's recovery accordingly. Kant's table-talk was in the highest degree instructive and interesting, without being in the slightest degree pedantic. In fact he always expressed great contempt for those learned men who could never at any time divest themselves of their learning, and who thrust it upon others at all times and seasons. He never by any chance introduced his own philosophy. He usually selected politics, the general topics of the day as given in the periodical journals, natural philosophy, chemistry, meteorology, natural history, and physical geography. He took especial interest in politics, and watched with a keen eye the interesting events of that day, particularly the progress of the French Revolution, on which subject he discoursed with the air and knowledge of a diplomatist who had access to cabinet intelligence, rather than as a spectator far removed from the scene of action.

But it must be recollected, that Kant's was a mind of uncommon penetration; and that his mental vision, from the nature of his studies and the unremitting labour with which they were pursued, was far-seeing and acute. The same per-

ceptive power that penetrated into the vast regions of space, and filled up the hiatuses that existed in the planetary system, was brought to bear upon the revolving events of man's history. And the retired philosopher of Königsberg, while unbending over the social board from the labours of the day, threw out many conjectures as to the progress of events, even military events, which appeared paradoxical enough at the time, but which were fully confirmed. He had a rule, which had been previously adopted by our own John Locke, of talking to each of his guests on the topics which, from his profession, he was supposed to be familiar with. Therapeutics with a doctor, politics with a statesman, philology with a grammarian, and so on. M. Hasse, one of his biographers, appears to have been somewhat deceived by this habit of Kant's, and gave him credit for being a great etymologist. He gives us a long dialogue on this subject, which occurred between him and Kant, on the exact meaning of the term philosopher. Hasse, it must be known, was a distinguished philologist; he was, in fact, Professor of the Oriental Languages in the Königsberg University, and is known by several works that are held in great estimation, particularly a Grammar of the Semitic Languages. It has already been seen that Kant was in the habit of introducing words from the Greek language, such as *antinomy*, *autonomy*, *heteronomy*, etc., in order to express with precision his ideas; his reason for which was, that he conceived the popular language of Germany at that time to be deficient in words expressive of his meaning, and found the Latin language not sufficiently philosophical for his purpose. M. Hasse says he was very curious as to the manner in which certain ideas were expressed in languages of which he was ignorant, and paid great attention to foreign words which he found in the books of voyages and travels that he was in the habit of reading. He seems to have been particularly fond of his own name, *Immanuel*, and loved to have the exact sense of its Hebrew elements given to him,—*Im*, with, *Imman*, with us, *El*, God; Immanuel, God is with us. Kant appears to have been an amiable and delightful host; and Wasianski states that every one appeared to consider it a privilege and a pleasure to be invited to his table. Sometimes, as a relief to the more serious parts of the conversation, he would recite long passages from the Latin poets, particularly from the *Æneid* of Virgil, and, by way of amusement, would

cite humorous verses which he had learned in his youth; and this he did with such a *naïf* manner, that he often excited roars of laughter. On such occasions he would relate anecdotes of himself and others, of Frederick the Great, whom he much admired, and also of Napoleon. Sometimes, to excite a little fun, he would ask Lampe, who appears to have been a stupid old dog, who was the King of England? the answer was, "Mr. Pitt;" and he never had any other idea than that Pitt was really the King of England. Kant was brilliant and happy at repartee, and would give utterance to some of the happiest and most delicate sallies of wit and pointed expressions; for instance, on some one speaking of Philosophy as the servant of Theology, "Yes," said Kant; "but the question is, Is she the *torch-bearer* or the *train-bearer*?" In fact, no one would have imagined, on seeing Kant on these occasions, that he was in the presence of the greatest metaphysician of the age.

On rising from the table, it was Kant's invariable custom to take a walk, which lasted usually about an hour. No sort of weather, neither frost nor snow, hail nor rain, ever interfered with these promenades, which continued summer and winter. They were invariably taken *alone*, except, indeed, when the ground was slippery from ice, and then old Lampe accompanied him to prevent him from falling. He had two reasons for being alone: one was, that he might tranquilly indulge in his own meditations, and enjoy the beauty of nature, undisturbed by any interruption from a companion; the other, that he might be enabled to keep his mouth shut, and so have the power of breathing entirely through the nostrils. He imagined that the cold atmospheric air, having thus further to travel before it reached the lungs, would be warmed in its passage, and by this means he would avoid coughs, colds, and sore-throats. It was a practice he constantly recommended to his friends; but whether it acted in the way he imagined or not, I cannot tell; it is certain that he was very seldom troubled with these disagreeable visitors. On his return, he read the scientific journals and the newspapers; and at six o'clock sat down to his library table, and either read till dusk, or meditated on what he had previously been reading. Summer and winter he placed himself near the stove, whence he could see through the window the old tower of Löbenicht, on which his eye delighted to

dwell, so long as the decreasing light of day rendered it visible ; and even when the shades of evening began to shut out the scene, his outward eye dwelt on the spot where the old tower was, while the mental eye was, perhaps, directed to the unfathomable depths of space, among the wheeling orbs of the system. This old tower seemed to act on Kant's mind something in the same way that the diamond ring, presented to Haydn by the King of Prussia, acted upon the composer's imagination ; for, when some young poplars, which had been planted in a garden adjoining Kant's study, began by their growth to shut out the beloved old tower from the philosopher's view, he became restless and uneasy, and could no longer continue his meditations : strange effect of habit ! However, the case was not desperate. The owner of the poplars was a reasonable man, and had a great regard for Kant : on a representation of the case, he caused the trees to be cropped, and the old tower once more delighted Kant's eye. Good-natured owner of the garden, you could never know what good you did !

After candles were brought, Kant prosecuted his studies till nearly ten o'clock. About a quarter of an hour before retiring to rest, he withdrew his mind from every object demanding any effort so as to tranquillize the brain and induce sleep, for any diminution of sleep was for Kant a serious evil. At ten he retired to rest, laying his clothes in such a manner that he could easily dress himself without assistance. He would never allow any fire to be made in his bedroom, whatever the temperature might be outside ; and it was with the greatest difficulty that, shortly before his death, he would allow this rule to be violated. Nor would he allow either light or air to penetrate his sleeping apartment, day or night, for the shutters were kept constantly closed. His reason for this we are not told : no doubt he had one. But we may by this have an idea of the vast strides that physiological knowledge has made during the present century, when we find a man like Kant, possessed of all the scientific knowledge of the day, adopting a practice which we know to be opposed to the ascertained laws of hygiene. Kant had by practice acquired a dexterous mode of folding himself up in the bedclothes, by passing them under and over his shoulders, so that, when the operation was complete, he was shut up like the silkworm in his cocoon. "When I am thus snugly folded up in my bed,"

he would say to his friends, "I say to myself, Can any man be in better health than I am?" He was immediately asleep; no corroding care, no anxious fears, no tumultuous passions, disturbed the quiet serenity of his soul. And thus time passed on; one day was like another, varied only by the company of different friends whom he invited to share his hospitable board. He had, by degrees, declined all invitations, and never would, if he could avoid it, receive any visitors either morning or evening. It was at his dinner-table that he loved to receive his friends.

Kant, though the declared enemy of *coddling*, was particularly careful of his health. He used to say it was his work; and in his old-age would compare himself to an artist who, for fourscore years, had kept himself upon the tight-rope without falling to the right or to the left. Indeed, when the prodigious brain-labour he underwent is considered, and the fact that he was exceedingly narrow-chested, and had considerable constitutional tendencies to disease, his longevity seems indeed something surprising. It is true that he had none of the cares and anxieties that attend the rearing of a family, and that his pure, moral, and gentle character preserved him from depressing and exciting passions; things which, above all others, eat into and destroy by degrees the human fabric. He was exceedingly small and thin, and never perspired day or night, which is the more surprising from the fact that he always kept the temperature of his study at 75° Fahrenheit, and became uneasy if it fell below this point. If in the heats of summer his usual exercise brought on anything like sensible perspiration, he would retire to some shady place, and, in the attitude of a man listening to something, keep still until he had become cool and *dry*. In the summer he wore silk stockings, which he had a whimsical way of keeping up, in order to avoid the wearing of garters, or any other ligatures that might impede the circulation of the blood in the lower extremities. On each side of his person, and in the position where the watch-pocket is usually placed, he had two small pockets or gussets which held a little case, something like a watch-case, and having a small spring and a wheel, over which were run two elastic cords. These, passing down each side of the thigh, caught hold of two loops fastened to the stockings. There was a separate contrivance for moderating the strength of the spring; but the whole apparatus, as may be easily imagined,

sometimes got out of order, and, if not speedily remedied, had a tendency to disturb the philosopher's serenity. In person Kant was exceedingly small and thin; his forehead lofty and serene, nose elegantly formed, and his eyes brilliant and penetrating.

This care of his health led him to take great interest in the art of medicine, and the various scientific subjects which bore indirectly upon it, such as chemistry and galvanism. The first he was particularly attached to, and spoke of it as likely to effect wondrous results. The latter he took up too late in life for time to master: Augustin's book on this subject was one of the last books he read; it has many original remarks in his own hand. He was fond of having young medical students who had travelled abroad, at his table, and whom he would question as to the scientific knowledge they had gained: MM. Motherby, Reusch, Oelsner, Lobmeyer, and some others, were among these guests. Brown's 'System of Medicine' he set much value on; also, Dr. Beddoes' work on the Cure of Consumption, and Reech's work on Fevers. Of the value of Dr. Jenner's discovery he entertained doubts; he feared that vaccination would be the means of introducing dangerous miasma into the blood, and that at any rate it required caution in the practice. That these fears were groundless, we know now; and yet it was interesting (says Wasianski) to hear Kant support his views. He had a great fertility of argument, and his subtle, penetrating intellect, like that of Swedenborg's, often saw analogies in nature invisible to less gifted minds. It may *yet* turn out that vaccination is not the unmixed good that it is thought to be. We know too little of the recondite laws which govern organisms generally, and especially an organism so complex as that of man; in which we have to consider not only the physical laws of his being, but also the action and re-action between those physical laws and his mental and spiritual attributes, to justify any large amount of dogmatism.

It is somewhat singular that although Kant's works exhibit the greatest mathematical formality, in his lectures he was totally free from anything of the kind. Adopting some well-known work as a text-book, he developed his own views with the utmost freedom. Sometimes he came prepared with carefully written notes, at others he had merely the heads of the subject written on a scrap of paper, or a few marginal remarks

in the work selected as his text-book. He never lectured on any subject until he had profoundly excogitated the whole matter in his mind; and such was the extent of his knowledge, and the accuracy and power of his memory, that he was enabled at all times to bring forward the amplest illustrations. His object was not so much to give to his pupils a formal exposition of the science chosen, as to enable them to think it out for themselves; not to *cram* them, but to enable them to *think*. His lectures on logic were generally the easiest to comprehend. His metaphysical lectures, as may easily be imagined, were more difficult, and demanded on the part of the pupil a good deal of preliminary discipline, and the severest attention. It was, however, in the region of morals that Kant shone out. "Here," says one of his biographers (Jachmann), "he was not merely the speculative philosopher, he was the inspired *orator*." Kant's pupil, Herder, who became a severe critic of his master's general system, took a malicious pleasure in contrasting the scholastic dryness of his writings "with the charm, interest, and perspicuity of his instructions as professor, and the variety of instructive facts, acute and interesting thoughts, and the gay and spirited touches with which he enlivened lectures of a character purely scientific" (Stapfer). This reliance on the natural action of his faculties, while lecturing, necessarily made him very sensitive to interruption. He required the utmost silence in the room, which was rendered doubly necessary by the weakness of his voice. His conduct towards his pupils was marked by a kind consideration, although he insisted upon strict punctuality and industry. Animated by a noble faith in the dignity and high nature of his calling as a teacher, his wish was that his pupils, destined in after-life to become in their turn the guides and instructors of future generations, should think and feel with him. From the depth and power of his mind, and the vast extent of his knowledge, Kant, it may be easily imagined, was not very patient under contradiction, particularly when it came, as it frequently did no doubt, from shallow ignorance, but he at all times respected enlightened and well-meant opposition. And while speaking of the extent of Kant's knowledge, it might be easily supposed that he was in the possession of a large library. No such thing. The whole of his library consisted of somewhere about 450 volumes, of which a large proportion had been presented to him. It must be remem-

bered, however, that he had been librarian at the Royal library of the Castle, and besides, had an arrangement with his bookseller to send him for perusal (if he thought fit) all the new books which appeared; and at that time, it must be remembered, Germany was not *quite* so prolific in this respect as it is now. Kant, however, in the ordinary sense of the word, was not a *reader*, he was a *thinker*. But so far was he from being *behind* the knowledge of his age, it may be safely averred that there were few men of his time whose knowledge was so complete, not only in metaphysics and kindred sciences, but in mathematics, astronomy, general physics, natural history, and physical geography. In this latter he was, as before stated, considered the highest living authority. The truth is, that whatever Kant read, he *retained*; his mind was not one of those *sieves* so common in the present day, where knowledge is poured in only to run out again.

Kant showed himself quite indifferent to the speculations of his successors, Reinhold, Fichte, and others. Herder he accused of wishing to be dictator. Reimarus he esteemed most, and often praised Krause and Schulz. He received every day numerous communications from all parts of Germany, and from foreign countries,—from Holland, France, Switzerland, and Italy, in languages and dialects which not unfrequently he could not comprehend. Some of these Hasse translated for him, and some few of them got answered. By degrees, however, as age stole upon him, he paid no attention to them, nor to the books that were dedicated to him, and sent. Kant showed little sensibility to music, except indeed to military music, which pleased him much. The higher, subtle, and more imaginative music was thrown away upon him, and he had consequently little power of distinguishing good music from bad. Adverting for a moment to Kant's memory, it is worth recording that although towards the end of his life he lost all recollection of recent events and of common things, he retained a perfect knowledge of all facts connected with science, with natural history, physical geography, and chemistry. He could repeat Kepler's logarithmic tables; and only a few months before his death, although in most things he had sunk into a state of second childhood, he exhibited this power. While one day some of his friends were becoming terrified at the lethargy which appeared to be steal-

ing over Kant, Wasianski said, "Let us speak of some scientific subject, and I will engage that he will comprehend all that is said, and even enter into the conversation. They would scarcely believe it, but I made the attempt, and, addressing Kant, I asked him some questions relative to the Moors of Barbary. Rousing himself up, he related to me, in a few words, their manner of living, and even pointed out the proper pronunciation of the word Algiers."

"To the liveliest feelings of gratitude," says M. Cousin, "towards those who had in any way benefited him, he joined an extreme charity for all men. He never spoke ill of any living being. He avoided all conversation about the grosser vices of humanity, as if the mere mention of them was contaminating, while small defects and peculiarities he did not consider worth talking about at all. He was ever ready to do justice to merit, and would seek occasion to advance it unknown to its possessors. The slightest shade of rivalry, much less of envy, never found its way to his heart, but he was always ready to afford assistance to any one starting in life*. He always spoke of his colleagues with the greatest consideration, and did ample justice to the merits of each. One of these, according to Wasianski (though we are not informed who it was), Kant reckoned equal to the illustrious Kepler, whom he considered the most profound thinker that ever existed. With this benevolent feeling towards the whole world, one may be sure that Kant despised no profession whatever. He reserved his contempt for those who unworthily acted in each, but even this he rarely expressed. The more you knew of him, the more you admired the high virtues which characterized him,—the strength of his principles, the firmness of his conduct, his constancy in carrying out his resolutions, the regularity of his life, his resignation to his destiny. 'Come what may!' he would say; and when things ran counter to his wishes through no fault of his own, his

* It is difficult to understand Kant's refusal to assist Fichte, after the touching and noble letter that Fichte addressed to him. He did however refuse. Mr. Smith, the admirable English translator of Fichte's works, commenting upon this, says, "We are not informed of the cause of Kant's refusal, and can therefore only hope that it arose from no motive less honourable than that which animated his noble-minded suitor. It is proper to state that Fichte continued, after this occurrence, to regard Kant with the same sentiments of deep admiration and even reverence, which he had previously entertained towards him." (See Smith's *Life of Fichte*, p. 56.)

maxim was to look at everything on its best side. He was one of the mildest and gentlest of men, and throughout life had never caused pain to a child." ('Kant dans les dernières Années de sa Vie.')

He hated all flattery, and nothing pleased him so much as simplicity and naturalness of manners. Like Beethoven, he had a contempt for rank *as such*, but welcomed all who were in any way marked by intellectual and moral qualities. All affectation, all exaggeration, whether in manners or language, were extremely distasteful to him, while straightforward manliness, even if opposed to him, won his respect. His whole conduct was based upon fixed principles, from which he never swerved. As I have before said, what he taught he practised. He was charitable to the poor, though in this respect he was circumspect; he would never relieve a beggar in the streets; the objects of his bounty he would know to be worthy. In this way he gave yearly a tenth part of his income, which never exceeded 2000 rixdollars per annum (about 290l.). Another tenth he gave to his family, who probably, from the humbleness of their station, required his assistance. He had little intercourse with them,—not because he was ashamed of them, he was too noble for that,—but the vast difference in culture made intercourse embarrassing to him, and probably to them too. The goodness of his heart is shown by his conduct to his old servant Lampe. This old fellow, presuming upon Kant's indulgent nature, and thinking that he had become necessary to Kant's existence, not only robbed him, but, by his drunkenness, disobedience, and general misconduct, kept the house in an uproar. Frequent were the rows between him and the cook. Kant stood it for a long time, but at last some very flagrant act put an end to his reign. Kant determined to dismiss him, and, once resolved, neither prayers nor entreaties could move him. He was dismissed, with a pension for life, but Kant would have nothing more to do with him. Lampe, however, applied to Kant for a written character, and here Kant was embarrassed; his love of truth came into conflict with the goodness of his heart: "Long and anxiously he sat," says Wasianski, "with the certificate before him, debating with himself how he should fill up the blanks. At last he took up his pen and filled up the blank as follows:—"——— has served me long and faith-

fully [Kant was not aware that he had robbed him], but did not display those particular qualifications which fitted him for waiting on an old and infirm man like myself." Ah, Kant! you did not carry out your "categorical imperative" here, but you are forgiven nevertheless.

Kant's character may be summed up in a few words: its distinguishing features were a sincere love of truth *for its own sake*, and a love of moral honesty and integrity. The very errors of his philosophy sprang from his love of truth, and it may be added, to his eternal honour, that though we may dispute about the errors of his intellect, there can be but one opinion as to the goodness of his heart, the strength of his moral principles, and the purity of his life.

Kant died of old-age, and not of disease. He had ceased to lecture in 1793, and in 1799 he took leave of the public. From this time his faculties began to decay, and the darkening shades of death began to dim the brightness of that majestic intellect. His private secretary, Wasianski, who appears to have had a sincere love and reverence for his good old master, has left us some affecting details of the gradual decay and final extinction of his powers, but I would rather not dwell upon these. Two or three characteristic traits, however, will not be without their interest. Kant perceived the change that was coming over him as he became every day weaker and weaker. He was obliged to retire earlier to bed, and his walks were limited to a turn or two in the gardens of the King. Returning from these one day, such was his weakness that he fell in the street. Two young ladies hastened to his assistance; he thanked them in the warmest manner, and presented one of them with the rose that he held in his hand, which was kept as a memorial of the illustrious philosopher. This accident put a stop to his promenades, and becoming more and more feeble and incapable of conducting his affairs, Wasianski, towards the close of 1801, was entrusted with the entire management of his household. "I have not long to live," he said to some of his friends, "but I shall leave the world with a pure conscience, and with the consoling feeling that I have never to my knowledge committed an act of injustice to any living being, nor been the cause of pain to my fellow-creatures." Life became a pain to him; and more than once he wished for death. "Life is for me a burden," he said

on one occasion, "and if this night the angel of death should summon me, I would lift my hands and say with all my heart, God be praised! I am not a coward, and I have sufficient strength to put an end to this frail existence if I would, but such an action is immoral." (Hasse.) Wasianski relates this somewhat differently: "I do not fear death; I know how to die, and I protest to you before God, that if I felt that this night was to be my last, I would lift my hands and say, God be praised! but if a demon could whisper into my ear, 'Thou hast caused misery to one of thy fellow-creatures,' the case would be different." "Words," says M. Cousin, "which mark the truly good man, who did not desire to hold life by such a feeble thread, and who often repeated, and indeed adopted as a motto, the words of the Latin poet:—

‘Summum crede nefas animam præferre pudori,
Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.’”

Like Lord Bacon, Kant had a childish love of birds, and took some pains to get the sparrows to build their nests above his study-window. When they did so, he would watch them with intense delight. This love never left him, and Wasianski tells us that, in the spring of 1802, Kant watched the return of one of these birds that had been accustomed to sing before his window with childish expectation, and experienced great disappointment as the cold weather of a late spring retarded its reappearance.

On the 12th of February, 1804, (having been confined to his bed but four days,) Kant, without pain and without struggle, and with all the tranquillity of healthy childhood sinking into soft slumber, breathed his last within two months of his eightieth year.

On the body being laid out, vast numbers visited the house to get a look at the illustrious deceased, and great was the astonishment at its extreme meagreness.

His funeral was attended by the dignitaries of the church and state from the remotest parts of Prussia, by the whole body of the University, and a train of many thousands on horseback and on foot. After the usual burial-rites, accompanied by every possible expression of national veneration for the deceased, and the performance of a grand selection of music, the remains of Kant were lowered into the academic

vault. There his dust now rests; let us hope that that spirit which so worthily began to work out its destiny here, is yet unfolding its powers in some higher sphere; and let us be thankful to the Almighty for sending us, even though it may be in what we call long intervals, teachers and examples like Immanuel Kant.

A. G. H.

Manchester, April, 1854.

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

LECTURE I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

I HAVE now completed the history of the moral philosophy of the eighteenth century, and have brought you from Scotland to Germany. After developing, in the concluding months of last year, the Scottish philosophy, that first and noble protest of common sense and human dignity against the philosophy of Locke, Condillac, and Helvetius, I propose during the present year to introduce you to a second and still more noble protest, which, springing from the north and corresponding to the first, though eclipsing it by its brilliancy, opens out to philosophy in general, but more particularly to moral philosophy, an entirely new route. I speak of the Philosophy of Kant.

Kant may be said to be the father of German Philosophy. He is the author, or rather the instrument, of the greatest revolution that has taken place in philosophy in modern Europe since that of Descartes. Now every revolution worthy of the name is the work of time, and not of any one man. The world goes onward in its course, but that course no man can either hasten or retard. There are two main antecedents to the philosophy of Kant, which it is necessary to refer to : first, the general intellectual activity which characterized Europe at that period ; and secondly, the mental features peculiar to the mind of Germany.

Spirit of Europe
at the end of
the Eighteenth
Century.

The general spirit of Europe towards the close of the eighteenth century is sufficiently known. At this epoch a secret fermentation was manifested, evidently the forerunner of an approaching crisis. To the credulity of former ages had succeeded a passionate desire for examination and investigation, which was eminently conducive to the discovery of truth. The application of reflection to a study of the rights and duties of men had exposed the hollowness of existing institutions, and had given birth to the conviction that an entire regeneration of the social fabric was urgently needed.

State of Ger-
many.

The state of Germany at this particular period naturally claims my first attention. The history of every nation, however, being essentially a unity, an organic whole, it is nearly impossible to understand well the moral position of Germany at the close of the eighteenth century, without some knowledge of those preceding events which gradually prepared and heralded the epoch now under consideration. It becomes therefore necessary to present you with a rapid sketch of the history of German civilization, from its first feeble beginnings, up to Kant's own time, in order that you may seize the fundamental and abiding spirit of the great nation to which our own philosophy belongs, and of which it may be said to be the representative.

Forms of civi-
lization.

Human nature is everywhere the same. There is no privileged race to whom belongs the true, the good, and the beautiful. The power of external circumstances has often been withstood,—sometimes by the energetic will of individuals in reference to their own fortunes, sometimes by governments and social institutions in reference to the masses; and history disproves those absolute theories which connect liberty or slavery with particular zones of the earth. Civilization however assumes many different forms according to the varying circumstances of time and place; and in no way do we see this more strikingly illustrated, than in the contrast that exists between the natives of southern and northern climates. The one is receptive of the same truths as the other, yet the difference in their respective modes of viewing them is everywhere marked, in poetry, in religion, and in political institutions. Philosophy follows the same fortune; for, while it is sometimes the hidden base, and sometimes the summit, of those three great forms of human development, it

is at the same time their purest and noblest expression. Sismondi, in his beautiful work on the literature of southern Europe, has traced the character of Italian and Spanish poetry in relation to the political and religious institutions of those countries ; and were the same thing done in reference to northern nations it would clearly appear that while the southern and the northern are fundamentally the same, the former is by his very nature characterized by greater expansiveness than the latter, who, from the very action of external circumstances, is as it were driven in upon himself, and forced to a more inward and self-concentrated mode of existence.

Germany is that great northern plain, watered by several noble rivers, separated from the rest of Europe by natural barriers that are seldom passed ; by the ocean and the Baltic, the Carpathian mountains, the Tyrol, and the Rhine. Within these limits exists a nation of strong original character, speaking the same language, and uninfluenced in any marked degree by neighbouring states. The character common to the numerous populations that compose it, and the bond of union amongst them, is a love of meditative and imaginative life, of sentiment and solitary thought, and the cultivation of the domestic affections ; a tendency to reverie rather than action, and drawing from the soul itself, the invisible entity, the regulating principles of real life and external government.

Sketch of German civilization.

The history of this nation may be divided into three great epochs. The first, the beginning of which is lost in the night of time, ended about the age of Charlemagne. The Annals of Tacitus present us with the different German tribes scattered over a vast territory, which they occupied rather than cultivated. Accustomed to a wandering life, constantly attacked by the Romans, but never conquered, we see them in their forests waiting the hour that should enable them to precipitate themselves in countless hordes upon their aggressors. Up to this point, and for some time after the conquest, these northern tribes had a civilization, a form of government, a religion, and a poetry, peculiarly their own. The spirit of their government is marked by their recognizing only such chiefs as they themselves elected, and the absolute authority which they awarded to superior physical and moral qualifications ; and alternately were seen the anarchy arising from the

Three Epochs of German history.

First Epoch.

weakness of a chief, and the despotism of a skilful and fortunate warrior. The most superficial reader of the Edda and the Niebelungen, will discover that tendency to meditation and deep feeling, whether sombre or otherwise, which indicates that the bards and heroes of these old poems had never seen the skies of Italy or Spain. They act their parts in the world of realities, but all these realities are clothed with forms drawn from the inner life. This epoch has likewise its philosophy; but it is the philosophy of barbarians, vague and indeterminate, an instinctive development, springing spontaneously from nature, and not the product of reflection, which alone constitutes true philosophy. This primitive philosophy is religion. In the mythology of the Edda and the Niebelungen, the superiority of man over external nature is everywhere expressed; a conception which already involves a sort of philosophic theory. Sigurd, Siegfried, Attila, and other northern heroes, make a mock of natural accidents; sport amidst the ocean's tempests, feast after their battles as after their religious rites, smile upon death as upon a friend, and to a profound contempt for life add a strong feeling of love and of duty, the former infinitely purer than can be found among any southern nations. We have here, in the very cradle of Germany, the germs of its future philosophy.

During this first epoch, the north was pagan, warlike, free, and poetical. With the conquest of the Roman Empire, this first form of civilization became modified. In overleaping the barriers which separated them from the Gauls and from Italy, these northern hordes, while destroying the Roman form of civilization, were nevertheless compelled to recognize it in part; and many of the usages of the conquered nations they transplanted to their own soil. Military despotism followed the victorious chiefs as the reward of their glorious exploits, and conquest, as usual, generated despotism, not only for the conquered, but for the conquerors themselves. Soon however the religion of the victors gave way to that of the vanquished. Christianity, with its worship and its works of sacrifice and love, won the hearts of these brave barbarians, and, repassing successively the barriers which they had themselves passed, it penetrated into the very heart of Germany. The Scandinavian and Germanic polytheism, attacked by the combined powers of the sword, knowledge, and heroic charity, a thing till then unknown, was com-

pelled to succumb. With paganism perished the poetry of paganism. Charlemagne, who was more a Frank than a Gaul, while delegating to the Church the task of fixing and organizing this rude society, terminates this first epoch and introduces the second.

The second period of the history of Germany combines a deep feeling of Christian truth with Second Epoch. monarchical and free institutions. The electors and princes of the Empire chose their chief, sometimes from one house, sometimes from another. The chief, or emperor, thus elected, recognized certain limits to his authority, expressed in laws, rude, but religiously observed, particularly as regards the principle of election, which at that time was no sham. The rights of the people were defended by the nobles themselves against the usurpation of the imperial power, and against the nobles by institutions which have never been entirely destroyed. It was a semibarbarous form of civilization yet full of strength, in which German liberty, resting on a religious unity with which all hearts and minds were deeply imbued, rendered Germany a truly great nation, respected and feared throughout Europe.

The poetry of this period is to be found in the songs of the *Minnesängers* and the *Meistersängers*, which bear a strong resemblance to our Provençal troubadours, which were probably their origin. The name of *Meister* indicated a sort of *school*, and was on this account less original and less popular than the poetry of the first period. Nevertheless it was popular in this sense, that it was in harmony with the general spirit of the age. The feudal castles, however, were its chief places of resort: here it received all respect and honour. Yet, notwithstanding its more artificial character, it possesses that charm of tender melancholy unknown to the poetry of Spain and Italy, and that air of mysticism in religion and in love which characterizes the older Germanic poetry. Poetry of the Second Epoch.

The philosophy of this age was the scholastic, then as deserving of respect, as subsequently it merited contempt. By striving to preserve an authority which time had deprived it of, from a legitimate sovereign, which it was, it degenerated into a tyrant and a persecutor. The scholastic philosophy was neither more nor less than an assemblage of formulæ, in which the growing reason, resting upon the *Organum* of Aristotle, had arranged the Philosophy of the Second Epoch.

doctrines of Christianity for the purposes of instruction. The theologians of the age were the philosophers, and were distinguished by a character of simplicity and gravity, by a depth of feeling and an elevation of thought, which entitle them to a high rank in the history of philosophy. Prior to the establishment of the universities, many important schools flourished throughout Germany, at Fulda, Mayence, Ratisbon, and particularly at Cologne. The scholastic philosophy of Germany was doubtless less original and less fertile than that of France, which had neither equal nor rival. Nevertheless it furnished some distinguished names, of which the greatest is that of Albert*. Despise not this philosophy; for, notwithstanding its rude form, it was animated by faith,—faith on the part both of doctors and disciples. Thus, on the one hand, there existed genuine faith on the part of the people, and a consequent liberty, since their belief was as free as the love which was the principle of it; and, on the other, firm authority on the part of the government, because such government was established with the free consent of the people, and was founded on the noblest religious belief. Such was the philosophical, religious, literary, and political state of this second epoch. It was the golden age of the Empire, and Germany's greatest writers invoke it with enthusiasm.

Foreign
Influence.

This form, like all forms, passed away; it became enervated, and subsequently degraded, by undue foreign influence, both in its politics and its religion. Gradually it came to pass, that strangers to the country played a far more conspicuous part than her own sons, and finally an Italian city was allowed to dictate both belief and manners even in the smallest matters throughout the whole of the country. The imperial throne of Germany became occupied by a prince whose power likewise extended over Holland, Spain, and the half of Italy; and in the eyes of the people everything like a *national* government was obliterated. Charles the Fifth, more a Belgian or a Spaniard than a German, had reached the summit of a power which, incapable of increase, had a natural tendency to decline. But though Germany might bend to the yoke in all that concerned her political institutions and external relations, yet she could not be otherwise than true to her own genius in all that related to the world of intellect and morals. The rejection of some claim of

* M. Cousin means in all probability Albertus Magnus, a learned Dominican friar who flourished at Ratisbon in the twelfth century.—Tr.

minor importance excited a spirit of resistance, which called forth renewed repression, and this again fresh resistance, until there was generated and widely spread that political and religious reformation which broke up the unity of Europe, and snatched the sceptre of Germany from the grasp of Austria and the Court of Rome.

This Reformation was the work of two Ger- Third Epoch.
mans, two northerns, one of whom protested with passionate eloquence against the religious despotism, while the other supported that protest with his sword,—I speak of Luther and Gustavus Adolphus. The eloquence of Luther undermined Catholicism, the sword of Gustavus pierced Austria to the heart and emancipated Germany. It must however be admitted, that these two great men, while destroying a form no longer suited to the general spirit of the age, failed to replace it by any other of a firm and stable character. Hence the anarchy which followed, and which is not yet eradicated. As soon as the religious domination was broken up, and the title of Emperor had become an empty name, referring in reality only to Austria, the nobles and the electors, now independent, gradually became absolute monarchs, and in the place of one central despotism, a number of smaller ones became established. In like manner, when Luther had destroyed the influence of Rome in a large portion of Germany, the mind of the age, emancipated from the old authority, was not in a position to recognize a new power. Lutheranism had its schismatics, Calvinism its burning stakes, and the faith that remained knew not what form to assume, nor at what point to stop. The old poetry, which sang of the belief, the feelings and events of a form of civilization, political and religious, that had now ceased to exist, lost all its popularity; and, as a revolution is not a position, and as poetry demands for its existence fixed and determinate forms of civilization, this ceaseless agitation effectually checked the birth of any new poetry, which now seemed to be totally extinguished. The philosophy of Protestantism followed the same fortune. An infinite variety of new schools now sprang up, in which the old scholastic philosophy underwent considerable modifications, that is to say, continual alterations. In the midst of this confusion there existed nothing great or original, nothing worthy the serious attention of the historian.

Meantime the scholastic philosophy fell, never again to rise,

Rise of a New
Philosophy.

before the assaults of a man of genius in France; and on its ruins was erected a system entirely new both in its method and general features. This system, or at least its leading principles, soon spread amongst the brightest minds that flourished in the reign of Louis XIV. Bossuet himself, though he never avowed it, Fénelon, Pascal, Arnauld, Malebranche, the members of the Oratory and the Port Royal, were all Cartesians, while Spinoza's system is but the rigorous consequence of Descartes' principles. The new philosophy likewise won over Germany, and was taught and imitated by the German doctors, as aforetime the Provençal poetry had had its imitators on the banks of the Rhine. Leibnitz himself was a disciple of Descartes, —a disciple, it is true, equal or superior to his master, but he was led away by a passion for universal knowledge and the *éclat* and turmoil of political life; and though he has thrown out admirable hints and suggestions, he has not founded any system. Wolf endeavoured to bring all the scattered views of the great polygraph to a common centre, and to reduce them to a regular system; but Wolf reproduced rather the form than the spirit of the Leibnitzian philosophy. Those who succeeded him but repeated the formulæ of this new scholasticism; and it is an incontestable fact, that from the middle to the end of the eighteenth century Germany possessed no system that had sufficient hold of her thinking minds to constitute a veritable philosophy.

Sensationalism.

Things were in this position when Germany, in a philosophical point of view, became more intimately connected with the other countries of Europe, which had entirely thrown off the doctrines of Descartes. England was devoted to the system of Locke, and France had substituted superficial imitations of the English philosophy for the sublime, though exaggerated, Cartesianism of Malebranche. A political condition which I cannot now stop to describe, had somewhat checked original thought. The sensational philosophy had taken complete root both in England and France, and soon found its way into Germany, with all that it usually brings in its train, viz. a taste for the small and common in all things, and of course a taste for mediocore poetry, generally destructive of all that is truly great. Frederick the Great then reigned in Berlin; and such of the French wits as felt that their small light burned but dimly beside the dazzling

star of Voltaire, went thither to assist in the amusements of the court and its master. Here they made a mockery of what remained of Christianity and theology in Germany. Frederick delighted in the skirmishes that took place between the old theologians and the new philosophers; and, while political motives led him to support the first, in private he did not hesitate to expose them to the sarcasms of La Mettrie and the Marquis d'Argens. And thus the ancient theology gave way before the spirit of the new philosophy.

Thus, then, faith, liberty, and the national poetry had disappeared, despotic governments maintaining in their pay foreign sophists for the destruction of the old Germanic spirit; a theology yielding to sarcasm and incredulity, and incapable of defending itself; and, as regards philosophy itself, a species of dogmatic frivolity that showed itself in epigrams and in brochures of a few pages, in place of the old folios, in themselves respectable witnesses of ancient theological science. Such was the state in which Kant found Germany.

I am wrong: there was one man who preceded Kant, to whom must be awarded the honour of Klopstock. having first raised a voice against the servile and despotic frivolities of the Court of Berlin. Klopstock, a provincial, simple-hearted and earnest, a Christian and a German of the eighteenth century, gave to his country those inspired songs which, from one end of Germany to the other, were welcomed as the morning of a truly national poetry. The Court of Berlin alone remained unmoved by them. In vain did Klopstock present to Frederick, in sublime verses, a defence of the German muse. The great king could not comprehend the loyal patriot. But his country understood him: the entire literature of Germany took the direction which Klopstock had opened out, and, even prior to the death of Frederick, many national poems were produced, which were eagerly committed to memory. What was the character of this new poesy? Along with the patriotic sentiment reappeared the religious spirit, the dreamy and melancholic spirit of ancient and immortal Germany, and those soft and pure embodiments of love, which in Klopstock and Bürger form so noble a contrast to the insipidity and grossness which characterized the Anacreontic poetry of the *salons* and the royal courts of the eighteenth century.

In the midst of this great movement, an ob- Kant.

seure man, born in Königsberg, who, like Socrates, had scarcely ever stirred out from his native town, published a philosophical work which at first was but little read, indeed scarcely noticed. It gradually however penetrated a few superior minds, and at the end of eight or ten years produced a prodigious effect throughout Germany; finally it re-established philosophy, as Klopstock had re-established poetry. Kant, at first, was a student of theology, and appears to have had an extraordinary aptitude for the mathematics and the learned languages; some astronomical discoveries are even attributed to him. But philosophy presided over all his labours, and finally absorbed all other studies. It was his true vocation, and became his highest claim to fame. His distinctive character was evinced by a determined honesty. His upright and firm mind revolted against the scandalous consequences of the sensational doctrines of Condillac and Helvetius, which then constituted the fashionable philosophy. On the other hand, Kant belonged to his age, and dreaded the conclusions of the schools, which in his eyes were no better than those of sensationalism itself. Hume is a perpetual phantom to Kant. The moment the German philosopher is tempted to take one step in the old route, Hume stands in the way; so that all Kant's efforts are directed to the task of placing philosophy between the old dogmatism and the sensationalism of Locke and Condillac, beyond the reach of the sceptical attacks of Hume.

It is however in the philosophy of morals that Kant has opposed the sensationalism of the eighteenth century, without at all reverting to the mysticism of the middle ages. When on all sides, in France, in England, and in Italy, the sole question was that of pleasure, self-interest, and happiness, one voice at least was raised in Königsberg, recalling the human soul to the perception of its dignity, and proclaiming to individuals and to nations that above the allurements of pleasure and the calculations of self-interest, there existed a rule, a law, obligatory, at all times, in all places, and under all conditions, private or social, viz. the law of duty. The idea of duty is the key-stone of Kant's moral system; and his moral system is the key-stone of his metaphysical. The doubts which are raised by a rigid adherence to metaphysical data are dispelled by moral considerations, which throw light at once over the region of ethics and politics. If there be in man the idea of

Moral philosophy of Kant.

a law superior to passion and self-interest, either man's existence is a contradiction and an insoluble problem, or it is incumbent on him to fulfil the law thus imposed on him. If he *ought*, it follows that he *can*; and duty thus implies freedom. On the other hand, if duty is superior to happiness, happiness, in extreme cases, must be sacrificed to duty. There is nevertheless an eternal harmony between them, which may for a time be disturbed, but which reason re-establishes and imposes, not only on all created things, but on their author. There must therefore be a God, superior to all secondary causes, to restore, in another state, the balance between virtue and happiness. Hence God and a future life. Finally, the idea of duty implies that of right: my duty towards you is your right over me, as, on the other hand, your duties towards me constitute my rights over you; from which follow a social morality, natural rights, and a political philosophy very different from the unbridled politics of passion or the crooked policy of self-interest.

Such, in a few words, are the main outlines of the system which Kant gave to Germany, and Germany to Europe. There can be no doubt that the Scottish philosophy was, in its general features, very similar, and that between the views of the Edinburgh philosopher Reid, and the great philosopher of Königsberg, there was no material difference; but that which in Scotland was but an imperfect sketch, became in the hands of Kant a perfect and finished design. Here, then, is the last step, the highest development of the spiritualism of the eighteenth century, of which the Scottish philosophy is the first. Kant crowns and closes the eighteenth century. I hesitate not to say that he is for this age, in regard to philosophy, what the French Revolution is, for the same age, in regard to political and social science. Kant, born in 1724, published the "Critique of Pure Speculative Reason" in 1781; the "Critique of Pure Practical Reason," 1788; "Religion in harmony with Reason," in 1793; "The Metaphysical Principles of Right," in 1799; and, after publishing other works, died at Königsberg in 1804. He belongs to the eighteenth century, but begins another, in which a new destiny is reserved both for philosophy and political science. It is this new philosophy, born at the close of the eighteenth century, but which already fills our own with its renown, with its development, and its struggles, which are not yet

ended,—it is this great philosophy, considered particularly in its moral relations, that I have undertaken to elucidate. I was desirous of presenting you, at the outset, with a sketch of its general character, and of its relation to the spirit of the civilization from which it emanates. I shall have need of all your patience in the laborious study of works, obscure in themselves, written in a foreign language, and of which there exist no French translations. I am the first who, from any public chair in France, has attempted an exposition of the Kantian philosophy; happily we are not left entirely without guides, and I conceive it to be my duty to give you a list of such works as may be consulted with advantage.

French works
on the Kan-
tian philoso-
phy.

Charles Villiers, a French emigrant who took refuge in Germany, and became professor of philosophy at Göttingen, published in 1801, at Metz, a celebrated work on the philosophy of Kant.

This work is divided into two parts, one consisting of vague generalities against French philosophy, the other of a brief and dry analysis of the new doctrine. I doubt whether such a method is well adapted for popular instruction in France. The author has great talent, elevation of thought, and noble aims, but he loses his subject amidst perpetual flights of declamation.

M. de Gerando, in his “Comparative History of Philosophic Systems in relation to the Principles of Human Knowledge” (3 vols. Paris, 1804), has given a place to Kant’s system. He has given a sketch of it, much superior to that of Villiers. Madame de Staël, in her beautiful work on Germany, has devoted a chapter to the philosophy of Kant, in which, seizing by intuition, with her marvellous intelligence, what she had evidently neither studied nor even read, this extraordinary woman has given to us, not indeed a regular exposition of the Kantian philosophy, but a brilliant reflection of its general spirit. If this chapter does not furnish certain knowledge, it excites what perhaps, at the commencement of such a study, is of greater value—a vivid curiosity,—and gives a powerful impulse to the study of the new philosophy, which I am now to present to you in greater detail and with stricter analysis.

A Dutch philosopher and poet, Kinker, has published an “Essay towards a succinct Exposition of the Critique of Pure Reason.” A translation of this essay was published in 1801,

and has furnished to M. de Tracy matter for his observations, inserted in the *Memoirs of the Academy of Moral and Political Science* ("The Metaphysical System of Kant, or Observations on a work entitled 'Essay towards a Succinct Exposition,' etc.," vol. iv. p. 544). Both the essay and the observations are worthy your attention. Finally, I may mention the article "Kant" in the '*Biographie Universelle*,' which we owe to the learned pen of M. Stapfer, and which gives a true idea of the character of Kant's moral system.

LECTURE II.

THE TWO PREFACES TO THE 'CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.'

Writings of
Kant.

It is not a mere recapitulation of Kant's writings, brought together to serve the purpose of a new exposition of his philosophy, that I am about to present you with : I wish to make you acquainted with this great philosopher more truly and more deeply. As far as possible, I shall let him be his own interpreter. I shall successively enter into an analysis of the great works that embody his entire system : first, the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' which contains his metaphysical system ; then the 'Critique of Practical Reason,' containing his moral system ; and lastly, two or three other writings which develope more fully the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' and which form an application of the general principles of the Kantian moral philosophy to individual and social morality, and to public rights and duties* ; for it must not be forgotten that the *moral* system of Kant is our main object. We seek it, however, through his metaphysics. We commence then with the 'Critique of Pure Reason.'

'Critique of
Pure Reason.'

This work appeared in 1781. It was a ponderous volume, written after the manner of Wolf, marked with the greatest precision, but with such a multitude of divisions and of subdivisions, that the fundamental thought is not unfrequently lost amidst its lengthy development. It had also the misfortune to be badly written ; there were indeed many fine thoughts in the details, and from time to time some admirable passages ; but, as Kant himself candidly admitted in the preface to the edition of 1781, though the work might evince great *logical* clearness, it nevertheless contained but little of that species of lucidity which he called "*æsthetical*," which embodies the art of conveying the mind of

* For an analysis of these writings, see the Introduction to the present volume.—T.R.

the reader from the known to the unknown, from the simple to the complex ; an art generally rare, but particularly so in Germany : the philosopher of Königsberg was almost entirely destitute of it. If we look at the general table of contents of the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' where the logical order and connection of the various parts of the work are displayed, nothing can be more closely linked, more precise, more luminous. But take each chapter by itself, and all is changed. The order which should be here displayed, does not appear ; every idea, it is true, is always expressed with the greatest precision, but it is not always in the place it ought to be, in order that the reader may readily seize it. Add to this defect, another arising out of the structure of the German language of this epoch : I allude to the irregular synthesis of the German phraseology, which forms so striking a contrast to the analytical precision of the French. But this is not all : independently of this rude language, so ill adapted to the decomposition of thought, Kant has another, peculiar to himself,—a terminology which, once well understood, is compact, clear, and practically valuable, but which, brusquely presented to the reader without any preliminary explanations or definitions, is the source of much obscurity, and gives to the whole an appearance of cloudy singularity. The 'Critique of Pure Reason' therefore produced at first but little impression in Germany. Its progress was the work of time, and it required the labours of many independent thinkers, students of the new doctrine, to excite the general attention by an exposition of its principles in a more popular form. A second edition was published in 1787, containing many grave alterations on several points; it embodies the final corrections of Kant, and forms the basis of all subsequent editions.

The 'Critique of Pure Reason,' (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*), is preceded by two Prefaces ; Prefaces to the
'Critique.' one which appeared in the edition of 1781, the other in that of 1787 ; the latter being accompanied by a long Introduction. These three writings are of the greatest importance ; they contain what is perhaps the most essential and the most durable in the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' viz. the *method* of its author. Now in reference to every discoverer or inventor, every original thinker, his method must be carefully sought for ; it is the germ of all the rest, and often survives the vices of its application. These two Prefaces and the

Introduction are for the Kantian philosophy, what the 'Discourse on Method' is for the philosophy of Descartes. I shall therefore endeavour to place their contents clearly before you, and shall devote the present lecture to an analysis of the Prefaces, which are closely connected with each other, one elucidating the other, and forming together a compact whole.

Indifference to Kant was quite conscious of the revolution that
Metaphysical he had undertaken. He saw the true state of the
Studies. epoch in which he lived, and comprehended fully

its wants. The dogmatic* systems of the seventeenth century, based on ideas without any examination of the mind itself, had engendered the scepticism of Hume; and throughout Europe, in reference to metaphysical science, there existed the most thorough indifference. This indifference however was not the result of a spirit of levity, but of discouragement; it was even more apparent than real; it pointed however clearly to the fact that the old systems had perished, and that a new philosophy was wanted. There was a time, says Kant, when metaphysics passed for the queen of sciences; now, abandoned and repudiated, she might exclaim with Hecuba :—

"Modo maxima rerum
Tot generis natisque potens
Nunc trahor exsul, inops."—*Ovid. Metam.*

The government in the realm of philosophy was at first a despotism, viz. that of the dogmatists; to this had succeeded a spirit of anarchy and sceptical rebellion; finally, a sort of mental physiology, introduced by Locke, seemed to reconcile all dissentients, and led to the general recognition of experience as the central authority. It was however soon found that this experience involved a vast amount of pure hypothesis, and that the new authority was nothing more nor less than a despotism quite as tyrannical as those from which the science was intended to be freed. All authorities then appeared to have been vainly appealed to, and the last and the saddest of states fol-

* It is very desirable that the reader should have a clear conception of the meaning of this word, as used by Kant and other German writers. Kant's own definition of dogmatism is, "The presumption that we are able to attain a pure knowledge based on ideas, according to principles which the reason has long had in use, without any inquiry into the *manner* or into the *right* by which it has attained them." To this, as well as to empiricism, or knowledge founded on experience alone, the *critical* philosophy is opposed. (See Morell's Elements of Psychology, page 236, note.)

lowed, viz. that of complete indifference, mother of night and chaos. But this very chaos, in combination with the instincts and strength of human nature, was but the prelude of a new transformation, the aurora of a brighter day.

This indifference, at first sufficiently disheartening, is worthy of serious consideration. Between the various schools which for ages have been at war with each other on that battle-field of endless controversy—metaphysic, and the public of our time, who confess an entire ignorance of these controversies, and who evince not the slightest desire to know anything about them, who is right, and who is wrong? Men do not become disgusted with mathematical science, nor with physics. Why then, if metaphysical science be as well founded as the other two, should it meet with so different a fate? Our age is one of critical investigation, from which nothing escapes; neither religion, notwithstanding its sanctity, nor law, nor government, notwithstanding their authority. Why then should not the same critical acumen be brought to bear upon metaphysical science? I do not mean by this, a critical examination of this or that particular system; but a criticism much more profound, and applicable to *all* systems, namely, one that shall embrace the *faculty* of knowledge itself, the reason, and determine its internal constitution, its extent, and its limits.

Causes of Indifference.

"Teum habita et nôris quam tibi curta supellex."

Philosophy deprived of this critical investigation is nothing more than a sort of magic, which Kant altogether repudiates. You may discard ancient dogmas, but the human mind will not discard *truth*. To this it constantly aspires, but now it is to be sought for in another direction. It is indifferent to the philosophy of the schools, but might not be so to a philosophy founded on the rigid examination of the faculty of reason, such as the critical philosophy undertakes. In order to establish this philosophy, in order to attain this new mode of eliminating truth, Kant passes in review those sciences which have made the greatest amount of progress, with a view to discover the secret principle of such progress, and by such means arrive at the causes of the uncertainty which prevails in metaphysic. Here endless controversies exist, but very few in logic, in the mathematics, and in physical science; if controversies arise, they are of short duration. Why then are the mathematics,

logic, and the physical sciences, *positive* sciences, ever advancing, and ever becoming more and more perfect?

Metaphysics
compared with
Logic.

From the time of Aristotle, the science of logic has never in any way receded. There is not a single axiom or rule that is not as incontestable to our minds as it was to that of the Greeks. But this is not all; logic has not only not retrograded, but it has never advanced. *Additions* have been made to it, such as dissertations on the faculties of the mind, the cause of and remedies for errors, etc.; but this is not to augment, but to pervert the sciences, by confounding and misconceiving their proper boundaries. Logic, strictly speaking, has not moved one step from the time of Aristotle, neither in advance nor in arrear. And why so? Because it rests on rules founded upon self-evident propositions, independent of all practical applications. These propositions, reduced to their first principles, are no other than the laws of the mind itself,—laws to which it must submit in every act of reasoning: as the nature of the mind does not vary, so likewise are its laws invariable. They are to it a firm foundation for certainty. Here error cannot arise: if it exist, it must come from other sources. If, then, it be asked why logic has the character of a perfect science, the answer is, that it does not *necessarily* apply itself to any particular subject; that it is perfectly independent of any of its applications; and that its value is to be found in the laws of reason, considered in themselves, apart from any extraneous element.

With Mathematics.

Such also is the principle of the certainty which exists in mathematical science. Whilst this was limited to actual practical application to the measurement of objects in space or time, it is probable that it had its epoch of uncertainty and mere experiment. But as soon as Thales, or whoever it might have been, neglecting the variable part, and fixing attention only on the constant and invariable properties of equilateral triangles, had demonstrated the essential properties of the equilateral triangle, this first step opened up the route, and by degrees true mathematical science arose. What, in fact, does it consist of? Of the study of constant properties, which do not exist in nature, but which are conceptions of the mind, of the reason, acting by virtue of its own laws on the facts furnished by nature, abstraction first made of everything in these facts of a variable and uncertain character.

As the mathematics prior to Thales, so physics With Physics.
prior to Galileo. The ancient physics were but
a mass of hypotheses. The physical philosophers anterior to
Galileo, abandoning the region of hypothesis, put themselves
in the presence of nature, and observed and registered the
facts which she presented to them. This was something.
True physical science, however, dates not from this; it
commenced with Galileo. He and others conceived the idea
that simple observation and superficial classifications of the
phenomena presented, were not sufficient. They saw that
man should be the *judge*, and not the *passive disciple* of
nature. They started *à priori* physical problems, and, in order
to solve these problems, undertook experiments conformably
to the principles suggested by reason. It was reason, there-
fore, which they followed while experimenting on nature. It
was the principles of reason which they sought in nature, and
physics became a science when thus based upon reason. But
instead of interpreting Kant, we shall here let him speak for
himself.

"From the time that Galileo had experimented with balls
of known weight on inclined planes, or that Toricelli had
applied to the atmosphere a weight which he knew to be equal
to a column of water of a certain height, or that Stahl, at a
later period, had transformed the metals and metallic oxides
by the addition or abstraction of certain elements, from this
moment a light was thrown on the path of the physical philo-
sophers. They learnt to recognize the truth that the reason
conceives only what she herself originates according to her
own ideas; that in all cases *she* ought to take the initiative, in
conformity with her own laws, and to *force* nature to answer
her questions, instead of allowing herself to be led, as a child,
in leading-strings. If this be not done, accidental observa-
tions, made without any reference to preconceived ideas, can
have no agreement amongst themselves, since they have no
reference to any necessary law. It is *this law* however that
the reason seeks, and from its very nature *must* seek. Reason
should present herself before nature, holding in one hand her
principles, which alone can give to the whole and to the
harmony of the phenomena the authority of laws, and on the
other hand the experiment which she has instituted in con-
formity with these same principles. Reason requires instruc-
tion from nature, not as a scholar that repeats whatever the

master dictates, but as a legitimate judge, which forces a witness to answer truly the questions put to him. Natural philosophy owes the happy change of its method to this idea,—that reason *seeks*, I do not say *imagines*, in nature, in conformity with her own principles, what she desires to learn, and what she could not learn of herself, independently of nature. Thus physics have been established on the solid ground of science, after having stumbled in darkness and error for so many centuries.”

Why, then, has metaphysical science not advanced in the same manner as the higher branches of physics, logic, and the mathematics? Let us remark, in the first instance, that the study of metaphysics is not an arbitrary one, one born of pride or caprice, which we are free at any time to renounce. God, the world, the soul, a future life,—these are the objects which incessantly excite the curiosity of the human mind, and to which it unceasingly turns. Our nature feels itself degraded when such subjects are neglected. The human mind has indeed voluntarily condemned itself to ignorance and to indifference on these great questions, but it has been forced to annul the judgment so given. Man *must* accept his condition as given to him; and since that condition obliges us to be men, we cannot avoid these great human problems.

But why so many different solutions to these problems, and why so much diversity in their solution? If it were intended that man should elicit the truth involved in these metaphysical questions, how comes it to pass that so many great men, possessed of the sublimest genius, have not discovered it? In a word, why so much certainty in other sciences, and so little in metaphysic?

Principle of progress. If we consider the progress of the sciences, and reduce the principle involved in such progress to its simplest form of expression, we shall find that the main condition of their advance is that of neglect of the variable and fluctuating, while exclusive attention is given to the invariable and constant; that is to say, to that element which belongs to the *mind itself* and not to the object. The fundamental laws of logic, the higher branches of physics and mathematics, from which these sciences derive their certitude, are no other than laws of the mind itself. Strictly speaking, then, it is in the nature of the mind, independent of every application, and of all external objects, that the

certainly which belongs to all veritable science must be looked for.

Now if we examine the point of view under which metaphysical science has hitherto been viewed, we find that that which alone could be productive of truth, viz. the mind itself and its laws, considered independently of the objects to which it may be applied, has been neglected. We have been occupied with the objects of knowledge, not with the mind which knows; we have tried to discover what God is, and whether he exists or does not exist; we have formed systems of the world, and compared its various beings with each other; we have determined their relations, traced their effects, and drawn conclusions, while the very existence of such objects was an hypothesis. Few philosophers have considered the various modes of knowledge, in their relation to the thinking principle; and yet this was the only means of arriving at any fixed point, and of elevating metaphysical science to the certainty possessed by the sciences of physics, mathematics, and logic.

Struck with this idea, Kant undertook to apply to the *subject* of knowledge the investigation which previously had been applied only to its *objects*. He undertook, in metaphysical science, a similar revolution to that which Copernicus introduced into astronomy. Copernicus, seeing that it was impossible to explain the motion of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that these bodies moved round the earth considered as an immoveable centre, adopted the other alternative, of supposing all to move round the sun. So Kant, instead of supposing man to move round objects, supposed, on the contrary, that he himself was the centre, and that all moved round him.

Method of
Kant.

Apart from the human mind and its necessary constitution, there remain but hypothetical notions of objects. Hypothesis after hypothesis may be formed, only to be destroyed by others. Systems and schools may succeed each other without any advance in truth, and metaphysical science, thus the subject of successive revolutions, may vainly strive after a certainty which flies its approach. But by taking the mind itself as a starting-point, endeavouring to determine exactly its nature, and to describe with precision its laws and their legitimate action, we place metaphysical science on a solid basis.

Such a process however, though a necessary condition of science, is not science itself. "To deny its utility," says

Kant, "is like denying the utility of the police, because the sole function of the police is to prevent those acts of violence to which we might be subject without it; in other words, it permits every one to attend to his own affairs in security."

Influence of the 'Critique' on Philosophy. Kant avows that the effect of such a method would be the destruction of all preceding dogma-

isms, which, according to him, were but so many hypotheses of the reason, acting spontaneously without any critical investigation of itself. "Yes," he exclaims, "the 'Kritik' will uproot many a renowned argument, but it will substitute others of unassailable strength, because founded upon the laws of reason itself." He indicates the arguments for the existence of God, free-will, and immortality, as given by the old systems, and those which the new philosophy will put in their place. He maintains that although the 'Kritik' may damage the monopoly of the schools, it will be to the advantage of the human race, because it will build securely upon the ruins. Here we enter into no contest with Kant, neither, on the other hand, do we grant anything. We reserve ourselves, not certainly in favour of the monopoly of the schools, but certainly in favour of arguments which they have employed for two thousand years, and which are perhaps not so futile as our author supposes. We however postpone this discussion till we arrive at the end of the 'Kritik.' We have brought forward Kant's ideas on this subject in order to show you the extent and vigour of his purpose. The two Prefaces, which we have now analysed, mark this purpose in a general manner; the Introduction developes it with more depth and precision.

LECTURE III.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTRODUCTION TO THE 'CRITIQUE
OF PURE REASON.'

HERE commence the difficulties that surround any investigation of Kant that shall be at once faithful and perspicuous. The Introduction absolutely *bristles*, so to speak, with a multitude of distinctions, delicate and just, yet subtle in appearance, expressed with a brevity sometimes enigmatical, and in a language which, in its severity and quaintness, bears a strong likeness to that of the old scholastic.

The following is the first distinction, which, though never very precisely developed nor expressed in the Introduction, is nevertheless the leading idea, and is, in point of fact, the foundation of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.' In every case of real knowledge, there are two points of view which we should be careful not to confound. Take the following proposition:—"The murder which has taken place supposes a murderer." What are the elements of this self-evident proposition? First, there is the particular idea of a certain murder, committed under certain circumstances, with such and such instrument; there is also the idea, not of a murderer in general, but of some particular murderer whom we desire to discover. These elements might be infinitely varied, since every case of murder presents circumstances which distinguish it from every other. But is there nothing else involved in the proposition, "This murder supposes a murderer"? It is easy to see that this particular proposition involves a more general one, including the first, but not included in it, viz. "*every* murder supposes a murderer," a proposition which is itself involved in one still more general, and beyond which it is not possible to go, viz. "Every event supposes a *cause* of such event." Here is the very foundation of the proposition in question. Deny this principle, and there is no reason why any individual case of murder

should imply a murderer. But that is not possible. The character of this new element is, that, throughout all the variable circumstances which surround every event like the one considered, this one remains invariably the same.

This is a real distinction. Kant, in his desire for exactitude of expression as well as of thought, has designated it by two words, somewhat strange, yet expressive, drawn from the Peripatetic and the Scholastic philosophy. In the proposition in question, and in every similar proposition, he terms the particular, variable, and accidental elements of knowledge the "*matter*," while he gives the name of "*form*" to the general or logical element*.

Thus, in all knowledge there is one element
 Subjective and which comes from circumstances, and another
 Objective. which does not so come, but which is added to
 the former to complete the mental act of knowing. The *matter* of our knowledge is furnished from *without*, from external objects, while the *form* comes from within, from the thinking subject. It follows, that knowledge, thus distinguished into matter and form, may also be designated as *subjective* and *objective*; subjective knowledge being that which is derived from the *subject*, from the form which it impresses upon knowledge from the necessity of its existence as an element; and objective knowledge, which comes from without, from the necessary relation between subject and object.

* It cannot be too urgently impressed upon every student of the Kantian philosophy, the absolute necessity of attaching clear conceptions to the terms that are used. This once done, few difficulties will present themselves. Kant is never obscure nor mystified, though, strangely enough, he is in this country often charged with being both. Mr. Morell, who has done so much by his writings, distinguished by their admirable clearness and precision both in thought and expression, to inspire a taste for, and spread a knowledge of, metaphysical science, has paid a just tribute to Kant in the following passage:—"There is a very prevalent opinion in this country, that the writings of Kant are obscure and mystical. This opinion, I am bold to say, is wholly due either to the entire want of philosophical culture in the minds of popular writers who undertake to sit in judgment upon him; or to a positive ignorance of the meaning of the terms he employs. No one, I believe, who has taken the most moderate pains to read the works of this greatest of modern critics *intelligently*, will hesitate to agree with me in affirming, that a more clear, steady, penetrating, dispassionate, *unmystical* mind is not to be found in the whole circle of modern literature. His style is incomparably more lucid than that of Locke; his use of terms far more defined, and his meaning grasped, on the whole, by a less stretch of thought. All he demands (which is surely not very unreasonable) is, that you *should learn the force of his terms at starting*, and then keep to their proper meaning throughout."—*Elements of Psychology*, p. 241, note.—Tr.

In the proposition, "There must be a cause for the existence of the universe," *there must be a cause* is the subjective, or form; and *the universe* the objective, or matter. The consequences of this distinction are of the highest importance.

As the matter of knowledge enters into the mental act only by means of the form, so the objective is known to us only in and through the subjective. We do not prove the principle from any object to which it may be applied. We do not, for example, set out from God, to arrive at the principle of causality, but just the contrary, it is the principle of causality which leads us to the cause of the world; whence it follows, that the logical mode of procedure is, to set out from the thought, the form, the subjective, and not from the objective, from Being. By this method, the whole face of metaphysical science becomes changed, and two rival schools are levelled with one blow; each is convicted of a vicious method, since both set out with premises equally hypothetical. Assuming the existence of an exterior world in order to arrive at man, sense to arrive at intelligence; or, assuming at once the existence of God, and thence inferring the existence both of the world and of man, are modes of reasoning equally erroneous. Neither the reasoning of the sensationalist, nor that of the theologian, can be maintained; for both proceed from matter to form, from object to subject, from being to thought, from ontology to psychology; the opposite method being the only one that can be considered legitimate. We here proclaim our entire adhesion to these simple and pregnant views, the result of wise and extended observation. We flatter ourselves that our public teaching, during the last five years, has firmly established them amongst us, and therefore, without further pause, we take up our analysis of the Introduction.

Besides distinguishing knowledge into material and formal, objective and subjective, it may be considered in reference to its origin, thus giving rise to the question, whether all knowledge does or does not come from experience.

The Origin of Knowledge.

To this question, Kant, in accordance with the entire spirit of his age, answers, that all knowledge presupposes experience. It is impossible for any one to be more explicit than he is on this point. "There can be no doubt," he says, "that all our knowledge commences with experience; for what could act upon the knowing faculty, and urge it to movement, but the various

objects of sense, which, on the one hand, produce in us representations of themselves, and, on the other hand, put in motion our intellectual activity, exciting it to a comparison, separation, and reunion of these objects, working up the raw material of sensible impressions, and so forming that knowledge of things which we term experience? No knowledge precedes experience; all commences with it."

But Kant distinguishes between *commencing with* experience, and *coming from* experience.

All our knowledge presupposes experience; but experience alone does not afford a sufficient explanation of the whole mental phenomena. Take the example already employed: "Every murder supposes a murderer." If experience had never made us acquainted with such a thing, the mind would never have possessed the idea of a murderer at all. It is then experience, and experience alone, that in this case furnishes us with the matter of knowledge. At the same time, the formal or subjective element, which expresses itself in the following terms, "Every change supposes a cause of change,"—this formal part of our knowledge, while presupposing the experience of such and such a change, at the same time *surpasses* this experience. It could not commence without experience, but it is not derived from it, since it is a matter of demonstration, that no amount of experience whatever can give the notion of causation. The mind searches into causes, because such is its nature, while experience furnishes the circumstances of each individual case. The proposition, therefore, "every murder supposes a murderer," along with the one which contains it, viz. "every event must have a cause," while it possesses one element clearly drawn from experience, possesses also another which is as clearly derived from another source.

A priori and
à posteriori.

Those truths which not only presuppose experience but are derived from it, Kant terms *empirical*, or *à posteriori*; while those which, while they cannot exist without experience, are nevertheless not derived from it, being given by the mind's own native power, he terms *à priori*. And here there should be no mistake. "I judge," says Kant, "although the fact has not been experienced, that if the foundation of my house were removed it would fall." This judgment, it is true, appears to precede experience; but in reality it follows it; since it owes all its force to the fact, that bodies which are not upheld fall to the

ground. But when I aver that every event that can happen *must* have a cause, I enunciate a judgment which not only anticipates all *future* experience, but is independent of all *past* experience. Experience can show us that a particular event is due to a particular cause; but no amount of experience whatever can show me that it is so *necessarily*. Kant justly remarks that it is quite impossible to reduce this notion of necessity to a habit springing from the observation of constant sequence. This is to *destroy*, and not explain, the principle of causality, which waits not the slow process of custom. It arises on the happening of the first event observed, as well as on the hundredth; and the faith that such event could not have existed without a cause for its existence, is equally strong in both instances. The idea of necessity is not formed in detail, by piecemeal; it springs up full and complete in the intellect. Thousands upon thousands of successive generalizations would not engender it: its nature is specifically and absolutely different from any generalization whatever. The judgment then that every event must be caused, is one that does not rest upon experience, and is therefore a true *à priori* judgment.

But even amongst truths *à priori*, thus separated from all others, it is necessary to distinguish. In the first place, then, there are principles properly termed *à priori*, since their foundation is not in experience, though containing one element drawn from actual observation, as the one before given, viz. "Every event must have a cause." It owes nothing to experience as far as its certainty is concerned; but it contains the notion of change, through which the mind conceives that of cause; and this notion of change is obviously due to experience. The principle of causality, though an *à priori* one, therefore contains an empirical element. But there are *à priori* principles absolutely independent of all experience, which Kant therefore terms *pure*: such are the principles of the mathematics.

Now if it be true, that there do exist in the mind these *pure à priori* elements, it is of the greatest importance that we should be enabled at all times to recognize them. What then are their essential characteristics? These Kant reduces to two, viz. *necessity* and *universality*. He had already indicated them; here he determines them with greater precision. Experience teaches us that things *are*, but not that they *cannot*

Characters of
pure *à priori*
knowledge,
Necessity and
Universality.

be. It teaches us what things are in the moment of observation, and in the place where we are, but not what they are in *all times* and in *all places*. Universality and necessity then are the proper characteristics of pure *à priori* truths. Where these characteristics are wanting, we immediately recognize an *à posteriori* element. All knowledge logically founded upon experience is contingent; it may have a generality founded upon comparison and induction, but never an absolute universality. In the enunciation of an empirical law, we can only affirm that hitherto no exception to it has ever been observed; we cannot say that no exception *never has* and *never will* be observed; much less can we affirm that no exception ever *can* occur.

That faculty in us to which these pure *à priori* principles specially relate, is the *reason*, the *pure reason*; and an exhaustive study of this faculty is the *Critique of Pure Reason*. We now comprehend the signification and range of the title of Kant's book.

Seeing our author thus engaged in the investigation of the faculty of pure reason, a rational fear might arise of his losing himself in the labyrinth of such an analysis, and that by dwelling too long in a world of pure *à priori* abstractions, he might get clean away from the world of reality; but there is little ground for fear. So far from his unduly exalting the functions of the reason, we shall soon discover that Kant has really bound it within too narrow limits. No sooner has he described this knowing faculty, but he hastens to assure us that the whole phenomena arise in the mind in the reason, or the subject, and that we should carefully guard ourselves against rashly inferring therefrom any corresponding objective reality. He at once opposes the pretension of idealism, that we may legitimately transport these mental conceptions out of the reason which conceives them; and thinks that the ideas of pure reason once recognized, we should limit ourselves to the task of inquiring what are their legitimate rank, and what their extent and bearing. "The reason," he says, "from the very fact of its being able to conceive such principles, becomes blinded by such a proof of its power, and sets no bounds to its thirst for knowledge. The light-winged dove, when she traverses in free flight the ambient air, whose resistance she feels, might easily imagine that her flight would be more rapid and easy if such resistance were removed, and

she could spread her wings in vacancy. So Plato forgets the world of sense, because it confines the reason within narrow bounds, and trusts himself upon the wings of ideas in the void space of the understanding. He does not see that, notwithstanding all his efforts, he makes no progress; for he has no point of support on which to sustain himself, and thus transport the understanding out of its natural sphere. Such is ordinarily the fate of human reason in speculation: it erects its edifice with all possible speed, and it is not until long after that it desires to be assured that the foundations are safe.

We want then a science which shall on the one hand discover and lay down the natural powers of the reason; and, on the other, determine its exact limit and possibilities. This science is the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant, in the remaining portion of the Introduction, determines the principles upon which such a critique must rest, by a searching analysis of the judgment.

He distinguishes two kinds of judgment. Analytical and
 "Sometimes," says he, "the relation between the subject and the attribute is such, that the latter is inherent in the former; that is, the attribute is logically and necessarily contained in the very notion of the subject; so that in expressing the relation, we do not express two different cognitions, but rather present one cognition under two points of view. When we say, 'All bodies are extended,'—since it is impossible to conceive body without extension, nor extension without body, we do not by the proposition announce a new cognition, but simply develope one already possessed. In these judgments we separate a part from the whole; and affirm the same of the same, by virtue of the principle of identity. But there is another kind of judgment, in which we affirm of the subject an attribute which is not necessarily and logically inherent in it. In these judgments we do more than present two different forms of one cognition: we express a new one; we add to the notion of the subject one which is not inherent in it. In saying 'All bodies are heavy,' we affirm of the subject an attribute which is not logically contained in it. A simple analysis of the subject does not in this case bring to view the attribute. We may decompose the idea of body, but I shall not find the notion of weight as an integral portion of it. The relation here is not that of identity, as in the first case; since, one term being

given, the other cannot be deduced. The relation being no longer the same, the judgment which expresses it is of a different kind to that previously spoken of."

Kant, as is usual with him, strongly marks this distinction, by applying the term *analytical* to those judgments which simply affirm the same of the same; because in fact an analysis of one of the terms of the relation suffices to eliminate the other term, and so obtain both the relation, and the judgment which it expresses. On the other hand, he applies the term *synthetical* to those judgments which affirm of the subject an attribute not logically contained in it; because in order to discover this relation, a simple analysis of one term no longer suffices. In these cases we must connect together two terms logically independent of each other, making thus a *synthesis* of two ideas, otherwise isolated.

In order to place these two different kinds of judgment in the strongest possible light, and to show the distinctive characters of each, Kant applies names to them equally significant; and since the analytical judgments only develop and explain a truth already possessed, without in reality adding anything to it, he calls them *explicative*. And since, on the other hand, the synthetical judgments neither develop nor explain a truth already acquired, but add to a thing known, a property or attribute unknown; Kant calls such judgments *extensive*, because in point of fact they extend our knowledge. We must now distinguish two classes of synthetical judgments. The character common to the species is to affirm of a subject, an attribute not logically contained in it. Now the connection which we affirm to exist between the subject and the attribute, may be given to us in two different ways: either it is furnished to us by experience, or it is furnished by the mind itself, independent of experience. "All bodies are heavy," "Every event must have a cause," are two synthetical judgments; for in reference to the first, *weight* is not included in our notion of body, and in reference to the second, *cause* is not included in the notion of event. But these two judgments differ in this,—that in the first it is experience that makes known to us the reality of the connection between body and weight; while in the second the connection is known independently of experience. Experience teaches us that facts *succeed* each other, but never makes known to us a relation like that of causality. Synthetical judgments then are of two kinds. The truth involved in one kind rests

upon experience, and Kant calls this kind *synthetical à posteriori* judgments. The truth involved in the other kind does not rest upon experience, but on the reason alone, and Kant terms this species *synthetical à priori* judgments. It is necessary to remark, that all analytical judgments must also be *à priori* judgments; for the reality of the relation which they express being independent of experience, it rests upon the principle of identity, which affirms that the same is the same; and unless this principle itself is to be explained by reference to experience, it follows that all analytical judgments are also non-empirical and *à priori*.

If these distinctions are justly founded, we are now in a position to estimate the truth or falsehood of two assertions that have attained some celebrity: first, that all knowledge is derived from the experience of the senses; and second, that all judgments depend upon the law of identity.

Refutation of
Empiricism.

It is not true that all knowledge is derived from the experience furnished by the senses; for all knowledge may be resolved into a proposition, and every proposition into a judgment analytical or synthetical, *à priori* or *à posteriori*. Now, in the first place, every analytical judgment is founded upon the principle of identity, which is not empirical; secondly, synthetical *à priori* judgments cannot be derived from experience; so that there remain but the synthetical *à posteriori* judgments, the truth of which can depend upon experience. This however may be contested when these judgments are *general*, that is to say, when inference is made by induction from *observed* cases to *observable* cases; for all induction rests upon the principle of the stability of the laws of nature, a principle in itself clearly above and beyond all experience.

If it be false, then, that all knowledge is derived from experience, it is also false that all our judgments can be referred to the law of identity; since if this were true, it would follow that in all synthetical judgments, *à priori* as well as *à posteriori*, the two terms which express the relation, the subject and attribute, must be identical, that is to say, one being given, the other would logically follow. Now, in what manner can it be proved that the idea of body implies that of weight, or the idea of change that of causation? Neither synthetical *à priori* judgments nor synthetical *à posteriori* judgments express the relation of iden-

The Law of
Identity.

tity. So far then from its being true that *all* judgments rest upon the principle of identity, there is but one of the three orders of judgments that can be considered so to rest, viz. the analytical judgments. Strange! the sensational philosophy, which pretends to deduce all knowledge from experience, at the same time bases all judgments upon the law of identity. Psychologically it sets out with the synthetical *à posteriori* judgments, the judgments derived from experience; and when it comes to logic, the law of identity is found to be necessary. Now either the principle of identity itself is derived from experience, or we are obliged to refer its origin to some other source. If it be derived from experience, it necessarily partakes of the character of contingency and variability, and in that case the logic of sensationalism no longer reposes on necessity, but is variable, like sensation itself; in other words, it is no longer logic. If, on the other hand, it be conceded that the principle of identity is not contingent, but necessary, so as to form a proper foundation for logic as a science, the philosophy of sensation has to reconcile this principle with its psychology: it cannot deduce the necessary from the contingent, and is forced to admit, in the development of its system, elements which it rejected at the commencement. The philosophy of Kant then has irretrievably ruined both the logic and the psychology of sensationalism.

Theoretical and Empirical Sciences. After having classed and divided all the forms of human knowledge, that is to say, all our judgments, into analytical *à priori*, and synthetical, and the latter into synthetical *à priori* and synthetical *à posteriori*, Kant proceeds to examine the different species of judgment on which the various sciences rest, and distinguishes two kinds,—those which are founded upon synthetical *à posteriori* judgments, or *empirical* sciences, and those which are founded upon synthetical judgments *à priori*, or *theoretical* sciences. The former are sciences of pure observation. The only part the mind takes in their formation is to observe, classify, and generalize. The natural history of animals, plants, and minerals, and some other portions of external nature, are ranged under this division. Theoretical sciences are those of arithmetic, geometry, the higher branches of physics, mechanics, and metaphysics. Kant shows that this latter class of sciences are entirely based upon synthetical *à priori* judgments.

In studying the process of mathematical reasoning, we are

struck with the fact, that it rests entirely on the principle of identity. But because this principle is essential to the *progress* of the science, it has been inferred that it is the *foundation* of it. But the inference goes for nothing. The principle of identity does not *engender* mathematical demonstration; it is simply a condition of its existence. Without it, the mathematics could not advance a step; but nevertheless it is not the true cause of its advance. If it were the principle of all mathematical truths, these truths would be embodied in propositions purely analytical; but Kant proves, by examples drawn from arithmetic and geometry, that such is not the case.

In order to ascertain whether the proposition, 7 added to 5 is equal to 12, is analytical or synthetical, all we have to do is to examine whether we can have the notion of $7+5$ without that of 12; the notion of the subject without that of the other term, and of the relation of equality which unites them. Now, after having added 7 to 5, we have the idea of the union of two numbers into one; but what is the new number which contains the two? We know that 7 and 5 form a sum, but what is that sum? Of this we are ignorant; and the ignorance becomes much more manifest when higher numbers are made use of. When small figures are used, the habit which we have acquired of passing from the separate figures to the sum, the rapidity with which we seize their equality, blinds us as to the true nature of the mental process. But if we wish to add together into one sum several large numbers, the difficulty which is experienced in finding the number that unites them all, soon convinces us that we do not reason from the same to the same, but that a new cognition is involved in the proposition.

How is it, then, that the propositions of arithmetic have been considered as simply analytical? Because the process of the mind in the formation of knowledge has been less considered, than the knowledge itself relatively to its objects and independently of the mind. Since $7+5$ and 12 are in effect identical numbers, it has been thought that, in the proposition $7+5=12$, we simply pass from the same to the same. But though the idea of the second term may be implicitly in the first, it is not so explicitly and psychologically; and the question is, whether, having the notions of the two unities, 7 and 5, we have also the notions of the total unity 12 which represents them.

Neither are the truths of Geometry dependent upon the principle of identity. If the proposition, "A straight line is the shortest that can be drawn from one point to another," be analytical, it would follow, that the idea of the *shortest* line is logically contained in that of *straight* line. "But the idea of *straight*," says Kant, "has reference to *quality*, and not to *quantity*." Therefore geometrical truths belong to the synthetical class, and not to the analytical.

It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the axioms of geometry and its true principles. The first are purely analytical, the others partake of the synthetical character. The axioms, as, for instance, $a=a$; the *whole is equal to itself*; the *whole is greater than a part*; these, which are no other than different forms of the principle of identity, are indispensable to the science. Is there, in fact, a single theorem which does not suppose them? and is it possible to make a single step in geometry, if we admit not that the same is the same, that the whole is greater than a part? But, on the other hand, let any one show a geometrical truth that directly springs out of these axioms. It is impossible. The axioms, then, are indispensable, but unproductive. On the contrary, take the highest truth of geometry, and trace it to its source; that source is to be found in some preceding truth, which, in its turn, can be traced to its antecedent, each one appearing, alternately, principle and consequence, and so backwards from one to another, until we arrive at those primitive truths which are self-evident, or, in other words, principles without being consequences; in point of fact, to the definitions of the triangle, angle, circle, straight line, etc. The definitions alone are productive. The science is impossible without the axioms, but they do not generate it. Without them, no principle can be established, no deduction made; but they neither produce the principles nor the consequences. The true geometrical principles are the definitions, which are synthetical *à priori* judgments.

The principles of the higher branches of physics are of the same nature. I take two examples cited by Kant: "Throughout all the changes which the world undergoes, the quantity of matter remains the same." "In all communication of motion from one body to another, action and reaction must be equal." These are evidently synthetic judgments; for the notion of matter cannot for a moment be supposed to imply an invari-

able quantity of matter. In like manner, we may have the notion of motion, without knowing that action and reaction are equal. We add, in the first case, to the notion of matter, and, in the second, to that of motion, other notions not involved in them. We make a synthetic judgment; one, too, which bears the characters of universality and necessity, therefore not drawn from experience, consequently synthetic *à priori*.

It is not difficult to satisfy ourselves that metaphysical science rests equally upon synthetic *à priori* judgments. According to Kant, there is a natural metaphysic which always has been in existence and always will be; that is to say, the ardent desire which the mind has to solve those questions which human intelligence unceasingly puts to itself. These questions are God, the soul, the world, its eternity or beginning, etc. These are the objects of metaphysical science. Its principles are those by whose aid human intelligence attempts the solutions of those questions from which it cannot escape. We may cite a few of these: Every event must have a cause; every phenomenon, every quality supposes a subject; every event supposes time; every body space, etc., etc. Examine these questions, and you will find that they all involve synthetic judgments; the second term of the relation which they express, is in no way contained in the first. The idea of *time* is not contained in that of *event*, nor space in that of body, nor subject in that of quality, nor cause in that of event; such judgments are therefore not analytical. It is not experience which introduces into the mind notions of cause, substance, time, space, etc. These are *à priori* notions, and the judgments which express them are *à priori* synthetical.

It is then evident, that all the sciences that are worthy the name of theoretical, are founded on *à priori* synthetic judgments; it remains to be seen how such judgments are possible; in other words, how there can be judgments containing an element independent of all experience, and what is the value of such judgments. This question is no other than the value of the pure reason itself, from whence such judgments spring. Hume took up this question with greater boldness than any other philosopher, (though his was but a one-sided view,) in the celebrated principle of causality. We know how he solved this question. Kant remarks here, that if Hume, instead of confining himself to the question of causation, had

examined the various other necessary principles, he would probably have recoiled before the rigorous consequences of his opinions; for, in rejecting the notion of necessity implied in the principle of causality, he was equally bound to reject it in other principles in which it is implied; to reject, in fact, every *à priori* synthetic judgment, that is to say, the mathematics and the higher physics, an extreme consequence that might have saved this fine mind from the abyss of scepticism into which he fell.

Metaphysical
science.

Since synthetic judgments *à priori* exist, they are possible; and the same may be said of all theoretical sciences that depend upon them. That pure mathematics and pure physics are possible, is certain, because they also unquestionably exist; but we cannot say the same of metaphysics, which hitherto are so far from having attained the end proposed, that we are not in a position to deny to any one the right of raising the question whether metaphysical science be indeed possible.

If by metaphysic we understand a natural disposition of the human mind to propose to itself the solution of a certain number of problems, it is certain that such a thing is possible, because it exists. But according to Kant, all systems that have hitherto sprung out of this natural disposition are so defective and unsatisfactory, that they scarcely deserve the name of science at all; so that if we understand by metaphysic, not a natural disposition of the mind, but a true existing science, we are compelled to admit that no such thing exists. At the same time Kant does not hesitate to declare his conviction that such a science is possible. He appeals to the eternal wants of human nature, and compares metaphysic to a plant, from which you may cut away all the buds, leaves, and shoots hitherto put forth, but cannot destroy its roots. He does not despair of metaphysic as a science, but he refers it to the future, and limits himself to the task of laying the foundation and verifying the instrument. This instrument is the pure reason, with all its powers. The foundations are the *à priori* synthetic judgments, which the pure reason developes, as it developes itself; and according to the value of this instrument and these foundations will be the future value of the entire edifice.

The 'Critique of Pure Reason,' then, strictly speaking, is but an introduction to science, a "*propädeutik*." Its scope

is at once extensive and limited; limited, since it does not concern itself with the objects of reason, which are infinite, but with the reason itself; extensive, since it is necessary to follow this reason in all its developments, so long as these developments have nothing to do with experience and with sensation, and so long as they preserve that character of purity which mark the *à priori* synthetic judgments. Now, since Kant has been pleased, in his adopted phraseology, to designate by the term *transcendental* all which bears the double character of being independent of experience, and not applied to external objects, he gives the name of *transcendental philosophy* to that system which applies itself solely to the development of knowledge *à priori*. What he undertakes himself is simply an essay, or sketch of such a philosophy. There must be constructed, he says, a *novum organum* distinct from that of Aristotle or that of Bacon, the organum of pure reason. The 'Critique' is a canon of this new organum. Kant does not hesitate to declare that the 'Critique' aims at being an entire and radical reform of philosophy, and consequently of the history of philosophy, since the 'Critique' alone can furnish to history an infallible touchstone wherewith to test the value of all systems. Without it, history could but declare all systems to be vain, on the faith of its own assertion, equally destitute of foundation.

The Introduction clearly lays down the main features of this great enterprise. At the first view we are struck, as in the 'Discours de la Méthode' of Descartes, with the boldness and the energy of thought that are displayed. Kant sets himself to the task in a thoroughly revolutionary spirit. Like Descartes, he has an absolute disdain of all systems anterior to his 'Critique;' on all past philosophy he expresses himself in the lofty and proud tone of the philosophers of the eighteenth century. In speaking thus disdainfully of all the systems that preceded him, and in characterizing them as a mass of arbitrary hypotheses, almost destitute of truth, it seems never to have occurred to him that the authors of these systems were men who were his equals, if not his superiors,—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibnitz. But why should he show respect to genius, when he does not show it to human nature, to which he accords an innate disposition to metaphysic, at the same time that he characterizes this disposition as an unfortunate one, it having

The Method
of Kant.

up to his time produced nothing but chimeras. He flatters himself that he alone, at the end of the eighteenth century, begins, for the first time, a true system of metaphysical science, after three thousand years of useless efforts. One would be tempted to think that such a design, expressed in such language, indicated an enormous amount of pride. But it is not so: Kant was the most modest and circumspect of men. But the spirit of his age was in him. Revolutions were not undertaken on small pretensions, and Kant was a revolutionist in metaphysic. And as in all revolutions it is necessary to proclaim the absurdity of the past, in order to justify the attempt at destruction, with a view to entire reconstruction instead of cautious reform, Kant, like Descartes, whom he constantly brings to mind, preoccupied with his method, could see nothing else. It is not his own genius of which he has so high an opinion, but he values his own critical method.

General con-
siderations.

It is with this that he aspires, with this that he triumphs. Descartes has somewhere said, that in comparing himself with other men, he found himself superior to but few, but inferior to many, and that he owed all to his method. Socrates also, two thousand years before Kant and Descartes, referred all to his method, which fundamentally was the same as that of the French and German philosophers, and this method is undoubtedly the true one. It is the psychological one: it begins with man, with the subject which knows, with the knowing faculty, its laws, its range, and limits. It originated with Socrates, was further developed by Descartes, and was completed by Kant. With all the three, it produced a thorough revolution. It belongs not however to any one man to commence a revolution and to complete it. Socrates was neither Plato nor Aristotle, but he was the father of both; Descartes, in his turn, was not Leibnitz; and Kant, who commenced the philosophy of Germany, neither controlled it nor terminated it. It still progresses, and has not yet attained its highest development. Our own more fortunate revolution, which originated at the same time as the German revolution in philosophy, which set out from pretty nearly the same point, with the declaration of the primitive and eternal rights of man, independent of all society, of all history, as the other set out with the laws of the pure reason, independent of all

experience, both expressing equal contempt for the past, and the proudest hopes for the future, has in a few years experienced its necessary vicissitudes, and has terminated in the tempered and organized charter which now governs us. The charter of the philosophy of the nineteenth century has yet to be written. Kant was not called upon to do this; his idea was very different. It was to effect an entire revolution against all false dogmatisms, and against the hypothetical idealism of the seventeenth century, and against the wretched and quite as arbitrary hypotheses of the sensationalism of his own time. This enterprise he has accomplished, thanks to the method, the character of which I have laid before you from the two Prefaces and the Introduction of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.' It is now time for us to commence the study of this 'Critique' itself, and to introduce you into the interior of this great temple.

LECTURE IV.

TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC.

YOU now know the reform that Kant intended to introduce into metaphysical science; you also know what, according to him, is the true end of that science, and the only legitimate method by which it can be prosecuted. Both the end and the method he has taken care to establish, with the most perfect precision, in the Introduction, an analysis of which I have already presented you with, and which has already made you familiar with some of the essential principles, as well as with the phraseology, of the Kantian philosophy. You can now therefore more rapidly follow me in the exposition of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.'

First, the 'Critique' is divided into two main divisions, very distinct from each other. Remember the object that Kant has in view: it is to give a general theory of all the *pure* or *à priori* elements that enter into the composition of human knowledge. In order that this theory should be complete, a mere enumeration and exposition of such elements are not all that is required. It is necessary likewise to determine their relative and absolute value, and the means to be adopted to ensure their legitimate and proper use. Hence the two main divisions of the work; one, which comprehends the enumeration of all the pure elements of the human knowledge, which Kant terms *elementary doctrine*: the other, comprehending the method to be applied to these elements, in order to form from them a philosophical or co-ordinated system: this he terms *methodology*. The former obviously claims our first attention, and several lectures will be required in order to place this part of the 'Critique' in its true light, and enable you to seize it fully and with precision.

Human knowledge, according to Kant, is derived from two sources of equal importance, but essentially different from each other. What are these two sources? in other words, what are the two fundamental faculties from which they spring? What is the specific function of each, and how are they combined with each other for the production of human knowledge? These two faculties are the sensory, and the understanding. The first is the capacity of receiving representations of external objects by means of the impressions or sensations which these objects make upon us, or excite in us. This faculty is purely *passive*, and is designated by Kant the *receptivity* or *receptive* faculty. It is by means of the sensory that objects are made known to us; or, in other words, the immediate representations which we have of such objects can arise only on the condition that these objects act upon or affect us in a certain determinate manner. Kant calls these representations, *intuitions*; the object of any intuition being an *appearance*, or *phenomenon*.

These intuitions are the foundations of all knowledge. "A complete analysis," says Kant, "shows that every thought can be directly or indirectly traced to the intuitions, and consequently to the sensory."

This pretty nearly corresponds to the theories of Locke and Condillac, and in some measure to the philosophy of the present day. The new philosophy however has another principle. Besides the sensory, there is another, which is not limited to a capacity of *receiving* the representations of objects, but is endowed with a *power* of knowing or cognizing these objects by means of the representations received. This new faculty is the *understanding*, which is the source of *notions* or *concepts*, and just as the other faculty, the sensory, is the source of intuitions. The understanding is not a simple *capacity*; that is to say, it is not simply passive; differing widely from the other in this respect, it merits truly the name of *faculty*, for it is a *power which spontaneously develops itself*.

Thus Kant admits two faculties, or attributes, differing in their character and in their functions, but both of equal importance in reference to human knowledge. This distinction being clearly established, it is necessary, in order fully to go along with Kant, that we should carefully distinguish between the study of the sensory in general, or æsthetic, from the study of the understanding in general, or logic.

Transcendental
Æsthetic. But once again, do not forget the end, the true end, of the 'Critique.' It is not intended to comprise a general study of the sensory and the understanding, with a view of developing all the relations of these two faculties: but rather to determine the *à priori* pure elements which they contain. It is then—availing myself of a word which is now tolerably well known to you—it is under a *transcendental* point of view that Kant considers the sensory and the understanding. Thus in the 'Critique of Pure Reason' the study of the first is designated *transcendental æsthetic*, while that of the other bears the title of *transcendental logic*. The former comprises the first part of the elementary doctrine, and it is this first part which I propose to make known to you in the present Lecture.

But before seeking for these pure *à priori* elements as belonging to the sensory, we must be certain that such elements can really and truly exist in that faculty. Are they possible? and if possible, how are they so? This is a preliminary question, and one of life and death to the transcendental æsthetic.

The *à priori*
principles of
Sensory. Now, according to Kant, these elements are not only possible, but, without them, all perceptive knowledge would be perfectly inexplicable. Recollect the part which the sensory plays in the system of Kant. It is the capacity of receiving certain representations of objects by means of the sensations which such objects produce in us, and which representations, whatever the sense that furnishes them, Kant always designates *intuitions*. Now in every object of an intuition, that is to say, in every *phenomenon*, two things must be distinguished: first, that part which is variable and multiple, all that has reference to the sensation, and which Kant calls the *matter* of the phenomenon; secondly, that part which is fixed, which changes not, and which enables us to regard objects according to certain fixed relations: this Kant calls the *form* of the phenomenon. Now, though the matter which relates to the sensation may be given to us *à posteriori*, it is not so with respect to the form: this must be given anterior to all experience, because it is a condition of experience. It exists therefore in us *à priori* as a law, or as a form of the sensory itself. This form, this pure form, since it exists independently of all sensation, is designated, in the language of Kant, by the term *pure intuition*, to distinguish it from *empirical* intuition, which comes only from sensation.

You now understand why Kant has considered it necessary to include the sensory in his elementary doctrine. It contains pure *à priori* elements not derivable from experience. What are these elements? To ascertain this, we must carefully eliminate from the sensory all that specially belongs to the understanding, so that there shall remain nothing but what essentially belongs to the sensory; and in like manner separate the sensational element, so that nothing shall remain but the pure intuition or simple form of the phenomenon: such is the point of view under which Kant undertakes an examination of the sensory. The general result of this examination is, that there exists two pure forms of sensitive intuition, viz. space and time.

Mode of ascertaining these Elements.

Consider for a moment what is space in relation to body. Can you conceive the latter without the former? And do you not place all bodies, however numerous and however varied, of which the senses inform you, out of you, that is, in space? It is only by their being in space that we can determine their figure, their size, and the relations that exist amongst them.

The Idea of Space.

Kant also connects the idea of time with the sensory, and, like space, makes it a form of sensitive intuition. Why is this? Is it because we conceive all external objects as existing in time as well as in space? In this sense time, like space, would certainly be a form of sensitive intuition. But it is not only *external* phenomena that we place in time; we also consider internal phenomena as made known to us by consciousness, as existing in time. It follows from this, that time is not only the form of external intuitions, but also that of internal or conscious intuition, and we may add, that primarily it is of the latter. "Time," says Kant, "is the *à priori* condition of all phenomena in general; an immediate condition of the facts of consciousness, and through that same condition mediately of external phenomena." How then does Kant regard time as a form of the sensory in general? Because, according to him, the internal intuition, consciousness, enters likewise into the sensory. This is a most important point, if we would rightly comprehend the way in which Kant regards the sensory, and the manner in which he regards time, like space, as a form of that faculty.

Time.

When we say that we have a consciousness of ourselves, we can only mean that we can seize

Consciousness.

that which passes in our own minds, that which constitutes our internal condition or state. Yet even this, which is the only object of our internal intuition, we perceive only as we are affected in a certain manner. It is only on this condition that consciousness is possible. There is therefore nothing spontaneous in this internal perception or intuition. Like the external senses, consciousness is a *passive* faculty, simply a capacity for *reception*. This is the reason why Kant connects it with the sensory; the term by which he usually designates it, viz. *the internal sense*, exactly expresses this opinion.

The following is the passage which contains this strange theory:—"All that can be represented by means of a sense are on this account phenomena; therefore either the internal sense must be rejected, or the mind, which is the object of this sense, must be represented by it as a phenomenon, and not such as it would judge itself if its intuition were spontaneous, that is to say, if it were intellectual. Consciousness of self is the simple representation of a *me*; and if all diversity in the subject were spontaneously given in this representation, then the internal intuition would be intellectual. But consciousness supposes the internal perception of the diversity which exists in the subject; and the manner in which it is presented in the mind without spontaneity, shows, by this very absence of spontaneity, that it strictly belongs to the sensuous system. In order that the mind should be conscious of what is in itself, it must be affected by it. It is only on this condition that an intuition of self becomes possible, an intuition the form of which, originally existing in the mind, determines, by the representation of time, the manner in which the diversity manifests itself; for the mind is conscious of itself, not as if it represented itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the mode in which it is inwardly affected, and consequently such as it *appears* to itself, and not such as it *is*."

This confused and superficial passage, notwithstanding the air of depth which marks it, was not in the first edition of the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' that of 1781. It first appears in the second edition of 1787, and contains the only proofs which Kant on reflection could bring to support a doctrine that would have startled Locke himself, and which might have been borrowed from the 'Traité des Sensations,' from the system of transformed sensations, viz. that consciousness is but a *mode* of the sensory. The inconceivable coolness with which

this strange notion is advanced, hidden as it were in a corner of the transcendental æsthetic, has hitherto screened it from any general attention, though it merits the closest examination. The consequences of it are of serious magnitude; it is in fact the hidden root of Kant's entire system. Closely examined, you will find in the passage that I have cited but two arguments. *Firstly*, consciousness supposes a certain affection or impression, which affection or impression necessarily belongs to the sensory. But does it follow, because consciousness is accompanied by a certain affection, that it is not something more? Our judgments of the true, the good, and the beautiful are nearly always accompanied by certain emotions or affections which envelope and modify them. This however does not prevent Kant from considering them apart, and placing them in the reason, and not in the sensory. It is the same with consciousness: in itself it is an intellectual perception, though it may be mixed up with feelings and other mental phenomena more or less vivid; it possesses its own authority, its unalterable certitude, the highest indeed in date and importance. *Secondly*, consciousness is not spontaneous, therefore it is not intellectual. If Kant by spontaneousness meant the will, we should admit at once that consciousness is involuntary. But the understanding is also involuntary. The understanding does not, by means of the categories (to be explained in future Lectures), judge because it *wills* to do so, but because such is its nature. Our judgments are not voluntary: are we therefore to conclude that they are not intellectual, and that they must be referred to the sensory? If, on the other hand, Kant by spontaneousness means an activity which, without being voluntary, has its principle of action within itself, we may observe that consciousness has this spontaneousness just as the understanding and the reason have. It is indeed the understanding and the reason in their primitive manifestation; it has relation not to sensation, which is blind, but to the knowing or cognitive faculty; it implies knowledge, knowledge of a being, of ourselves, that is to say, of something endowed with consciousness. Descartes established this in the most convincing manner. With a stroke of the pen however, and without any discussion, Kant removes the solid foundation of modern philosophy, the rampart that Descartes erected against the assaults of scepticism. He is here the disciple and the emulator of Condillac; and it is no wonder, after having

reduced consciousness to the sensory, that he found it impossible to prevent himself from falling into that scepticism which every form of sensationalism inevitably entails.

But let us not anticipate the general conclusions of these Lectures. At present we content ourselves with pointing out this almost incredible theory of consciousness, and the consequences derivable from it. Let us now resume our analysis.

The important passage above cited shows the manner in which, in the system of Kant, consciousness, the intuition of self, is considered as belonging to the sensuous system; and how time, which is the form of this intuition, belongs also to the same system.

Space and time then are the two forms of the sensory; in other words, it is impossible for us to represent external objects otherwise than as existing in space, and all objects whatever, whether external or internal, otherwise than as existing in time. That both time and space in this sense are the indispensable conditions of sensuous intuition, must be evident and incontestable to every one. But what are space and time in themselves? Are they real things, real substances? or are they rather modes or qualities of things? If so, are they such modes that they would not cease to be in the things even if unperceived? or do they depend solely on the intuition itself, and consequently on the nature of the subject which perceives them? In a word, do space and time exist as substances, or attributes, independent of us? or are they but pure forms of our sensuous nature, without any objective reality? In the eyes of Kant this is a great question, indeed the principal question, and he undertakes the analysis of the ideas of space and time with a view to determine it. From the manner in which he puts it, you may anticipate the solution which he gives. This solution I shall presently point out, without however discussing its truth. The question indeed is included in the more general one as to the reality of our knowledge; and though great in itself, Kant has magnified it by the profound and original manner in which he has treated it. On a future occasion I propose to examine it with all the care that it merits; at present I shall content myself with stating Kant's views as to the objective reality of space and time, having first pointed out the character which he assigns to these ideas. The idea of space first occupies Kant's attention. First, the exposition which he gives of it, he divides into two parts. The

development of every idea is double: it is *metaphysical* and *transcendental*. It is metaphysical, when it is shown that the idea must be given *à priori*; it is transcendental, when it is shown that the idea is a principle from which new additional synthetic *à priori* knowledge can be derived.

Kant commences with the metaphysical expo-
sition of the idea of space.

Metaphysical
exposition of
Space.

First, is this idea, or is it not an *à priori* idea?

Ask the sensational school, whence comes the idea of space, whose existence in the mind it is impossible to deny. It answers, that this idea, like every other idea, comes from experience. But this answer satisfies no one who is not led away by the spirit of system. Is it possible to regard the idea of space as derivable from external experience? for there cannot here be a question of any other experience. Kant convincingly shows that it is not. Do we not refer certain sensations to an external object, that is, to something which occupies a space different from that which we ourselves occupy? Do we not represent such external objects as being in juxtaposition, that is to say, altogether out of each other, and consequently not only distinct from each other, but as occupying different places? Then, I ask, could all this take place, unless the idea of space were already in the mind? The *à priori* mental existence of this idea is absolutely essential to all external experience. So that to derive the idea of space from experience, is to argue in a vicious circle, since all experience supposes the idea, and is therefore *à priori*.

This will appear still more evident, if we reflect upon the true character of the idea. It is a *necessary* idea. Try to imagine objects existing without space: no effort whatever could enable you to do it; the very supposition is impossible. On the other hand, the supposition of the *non*-existence of bodies in space, presents to the mind no difficulty; we can in thought annihilate all bodies existing in space, but not the space which contains them. What is the inference from this? Assuredly not that the idea of space is derived from that of body, that is to say, from external experience.

Space a necessary idea.

It may be contended that the idea of space is *collective*, and springs from generalization. That it is what the logicians term a discursive idea, because the mind, in order to form it, is obliged to compare objects, and

Not collective.

to pass (*discurrendo*) from one to the other. Let us examine this hypothesis. If the idea of space be a general and collective idea, it must be formed by the union of a certain number of individual or separate ideas. Now, in reference to space, what are the particular ideas that go to form the general one? Are they the ideas of certain determinate spaces? For when we speak of several spaces, we can mean nothing more than parts of one and the same space. So far is it from being possible to form the idea of space by a union of the parts of space, that we can have no idea of these parts themselves, except by a previous idea of space considered as a whole. These parts are limitations which we establish in space, but which can never serve as elements for the formation of the idea, since they suppose the very idea itself. Therefore space being a unity, it is impossible that the idea which we have of it should be a general one. It follows that the intuition of space is *à priori*, and that it serves as the foundation for all the ulterior notions which we form from it.

Space an infinite idea.

Finally, and this furnishes Kant's metaphysical exposition, space is infinite. But do not here do what is often done, confound *infinite* with *indefinite*. When we speak of an infinite magnitude, we speak of a magnitude to which we cannot conceive any bounds, nay more, to which any such conception implies a contradiction. A magnitude is to us indefinite when we do not assign to it any bounds, not because it really has none, nor because we cannot conceive it as having any. The geometers are familiar with this distinction, and in metaphysics it is one of the greatest importance. Now the extension which Kant assigns to space is infinite, and not indefinite. And here we must be careful not to confound a real infinitude with what may be called an infinitude by representation. Let us take an example, in order to render Kant's meaning perfectly clear. *Whiteness* represents the quality *white*, applied to all possible objects; it is therefore an infinite representation. But it is not a real infinite, like space. Space is not infinite because it can be almost endlessly applied, nor because it represents a quality common to innumerable objects, but because all possible objects are contained in it. And it is because space is a real infinity, and not an infinity by representation, that the idea we have of it cannot be a general one, like that of whiteness, but rather an *à priori* intuition.

Here terminates the metaphysical exposition of the idea of space, and here commences the transcendental exposition, which is intended to show, firstly, that *à priori* synthetic knowledge is really derived from the idea of space, and secondly, that such knowledge, the possibility of which is established by the idea itself, would be impossible under any other supposition.

Transcendental exposition of Space.

What knowledge, then, is really derived from our idea of space? Obviously the propositions of geometry; for what conception could we possibly have of lines, triangles, and circles, if we had not the idea of space? Is it not space conceived as existing between straight and curved lines, whose properties are the objects of the geometer's search? If this idea did not exist in the human mind, geometry itself, as a science, could not exist. If now we examine the character of geometric propositions, we find from this character itself the condition upon which they are derived from the idea of space. The character of all geometric propositions is, that they are *à priori* synthetic. They cannot possibly be derived from experience, directly or indirectly, since they are marked with a character of absolute necessity. Then on what condition are such propositions derived from the idea of space? Only on one, that the idea itself is a pure *à priori* intuition, anterior to all experience.

Sciences derived from the idea of Space.

"How," asks Kant, "can there be in the mind, before any objects whatever have been presented to us, an internal intuition, which shall determine the conception of such objects? It must be," he says, "that it exists in the subject as a formal capacity of being affected by objects, and of receiving from them, by this means, an immediate representation, that is to say, an intuition, a *form* of the external sense."

I have now made known to you the metaphysical and transcendental exposition of the idea of space. That you may have a clear idea of the

Condillac's theory.

originality of this theory, I would refer you to one totally opposed to it, and show you with what fruitless efforts the sensational school has endeavoured to trace the idea of space to experience, to give it an empirical origin. I quote from Condillac, in the 'Treatise on Sensations,' and refer to his celebrated hypothesis of the statuesque man:—"The idea of the space which the statue passes over becomes the type or model of that which it has not passed over; and when it has

once imagined a space to which it has not already transported itself, it imagines several spaces distinct from each other. Finally, not conceiving any bounds beyond which it can cease to imagine space, it is forced, as it were, to imagine other spaces, and finally believes that it perceives immensity itself." (Treatise on Sensations, p. i. c. 8.)

First, I cannot see how the statue, reduced as it is to pure sensation, can thence draw the idea of the space which it passes over, for this is to take the idea for granted, and the question really is, whether the idea admits of such an origin. But setting aside this difficulty, which in fact upsets the whole theory, let us admit that the statue might get the idea in this way. According to Condillae, "this becomes the type or model according to which it *imagines* the space which it has not traversed." Carefully note the word *imagines*. What is it to imagine, I ask? Is it not to represent something under a determinate image, under a certain form, a certain magnitude? We represent to ourselves bodies that exist in space, but we do not represent to ourselves space itself; we *conceive* it. Besides, to imagine is an operation which sometimes takes place, sometimes not, according to certain conditions. I imagine at this moment something which tomorrow will be impossible from the changed conditions of the imagination itself. But there is nothing arbitrary in the conception of space; it is necessary, and exists in all time, and in all men, as soon as they have acquired the notion of body.

"When it (the statue) has once imagined a space which it has not traversed, it imagines several spaces out of each other." Since Condillae considers these individual spaces as distinct things, forming by their union space, he should, in order to be consistent, consider space as a generalization of that which is common to the individual spaces. Far from this, he is obliged to admit as distinct from these individual spaces, a something which contains them. For what does he mean when he says that the statue imagines several spaces *out of* each other? If certain spaces exist out of each other, there must be something which contains them all thus existing out of each other. Now what can this something be but space itself, space absolute and universal, which includes all limited spaces? So that Condillae, after having identified space with certain determinate spaces, is forced to place these determinate spaces in the universal space which he had denied. In

point of fact, do what we will, we cannot get rid of the conception of absolute space. Condillac denies it by confounding the conception with the image, the necessary with the arbitrary, by denying and affirming at the same time the same thing."

He continues: "Finally, not conceiving any bounds, etc., it is forced as it were to imagine other spaces." What does this *constraint* imply? Is it, with Kant, a veritable necessity, or not? This Condillac, who draws the idea of space from the imagination, cannot admit. It is then a necessity which is not a necessity, and in fact Condillac applies to it a restriction ("it is forced *as it were*") which is the negation of true necessity; for true necessity, like liberty, is destroyed by the slightest modification. But then I ask, what is the meaning of Condillac's language?

He finishes by saying, that the statue believes that it perceives immensity. First, this should be *conceive*, and not *perceive*. We cannot possibly perceive that which has no determinate form, no limit, but we may *conceive* it. Then we cannot even conceive immensity, but immense space: immensity is an abstract quality of space. But can we say that we believe that we conceive immense space? Have we, or have we not, the conception of an infinite space, space without limits? That is the question; not whether we believe, or do not believe, that we have such a conception.

But let us now return to Kant, and endeavour to place before you his exposition, metaphysical and transcendental, of the idea of Time, in the same manner as we have done in reference to that of Space.

Metaphysical
exposition of
the idea of
Time.

As we have the idea of events which appear and succeed one another, we have also the idea of time, in which such appearance and succession takes place. Can this idea of time be explained by reference to experience? No, because experience, as in the case of space, supposes it, and because it itself can only be explained by reference to the idea. It would be impossible for the mind to represent to itself events as contemporaneous or successive, if it did not possess the idea of time, which contains them.

The characters of the idea of time are the same as those of the idea of space. Having developed one, it will be an easy matter to develop the other.

Same characters
as that of
Space.

The idea of time is a necessary one; in thought we can ab-

stract all phenomena which take place in time, but not time itself. Like space, it resists all efforts of the mind to rid itself of it,—a new proof that the idea of time cannot be derived from experience, but is given *à priori*.

You have already seen that it was an error, to regard the idea of space as a general one, as a discursive notion. It is the same with the idea of time; for it is impossible to show the elementary or individual ideas whose union would form the general one. Such ideas could be no other than those of certain limited portions of time, and these suppose the idea of time itself to be already in existence. Finally, time, like space, is infinite: I say infinite, and not indefinite, that is, as implying any limits. This new character again establishes the impossibility of considering the notion of time as a general idea.

The exposition of the characters of the idea of time which I have just presented to you, will enable you to estimate the value of Condillae's opinion, that the idea is presented by the imagination. I content myself with simply alluding to this opinion without staying to refute it, and pass on to the transcendental exposition of the idea.

There are certain principles that are derived from our notion of time: for example, time has but one dimension; or different times are successive, and not simultaneous. What is the distinctive character of these principles? They are universal and necessary. They cannot be derived from experience, since experience presents us with nothing having these characters. If therefore they spring from the idea of time, this idea itself must be a pure *à priori* intuition. It is the foundation of our notions of change and motion, which is change of place. Try to comprehend motion, supposing you had neither the idea of space nor that of time. When we say that a certain object has been put in motion, and that now it was here, then there, such a mode of speech most certainly implies the idea of time, and would be impossible without it. Now we have an entire science which treats of motion; and its propositions, like those of geometry, are *à priori* synthetical; so that mechanical science is founded upon the idea of time, as geometry is founded upon that of space.

The Objective
Value of these
ideas.

You are however aware of the question with which Kant is particularly concerned, and which led him to undertake this analysis of the ideas of

space and time. This analysis completed, he takes up anew the question so dear to him; and though he but develops the consequences of the facts already established, he develops these consequences with more care and complacency than he has developed the principles themselves.

Kant proves that our ideas of external objects necessarily imply the idea of space which contains them, and that this idea is in the mind anterior to all experience; in other words, and speaking the language of Kant, the intuition of space, which is the subjective condition of every external empirical intuition, is a pure *à priori* intuition. But what right have we to pass from this subjective condition, from this form of our sensuous nature, to the objective reality of space? We may indeed assert, that all objects, so far as they come within the cognizance of the senses, are in space; but we have no right to affirm that all objects, considered in themselves, exist in space, and that space itself is a really existent thing. To affirm that space exists out of us, is to transfer to the object what belongs only to the subject, and to realize a pure form of our sensory. Kant is very explicit: "It is only from our own point of view, from our own humanity, that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc.; if we depart from this subjective condition, which is the law of our nature, then space has no longer any significance." He grants to it only what he calls an *empirical reality*, or a *transcendental ideality*, which, as you have already seen, is nothing more nor less than the negation of all true or objective reality.

Of the idea of time then, what have we learnt? Simply, that whenever we have the idea of a certain phenomenon or event, we place such phenomenon or event in time, and so represent all things as contemporaneous or successive. We know also that the intuition of phenomena, which is given to us by means of the impressions of sense, is readily distinguishable from the intuition of time, which is a pure intuition, anterior to all empirical representation, and having its origin in the subject itself. What follows from this? Why, solely, that the idea of time is the *à priori* formal condition of phenomena in general. Like space, time is a pure form of the sensory. The difference between them is, that whereas space is only the form of *external* intuition, time is the form of *all* intuition, whether external or internal. "Time," says Kant, "is not a thing that exists in itself, neither is it

a mode inherent in things so as to exist along with them, if in thought all the subjective conditions of the sensory were annihilated. In the first case it might be said that time was something that could exist without any real object; and in the second, it could not be apprehended *à priori* before the things themselves. It is therefore simply a form of our sensuous nature." To assert that time exists in itself independently of the subject which conceives it, is to form an hypothesis. It is a departure from the conditions of human nature, in the vain hope of apprehending what is not permitted us to know. Time then, like space, has but an empirical reality, not an absolute one.

Admitting that Kant has faithfully developed the character of our ideas of time and space, does it follow that we are to adopt the consequences which he has drawn from that analysis, the scepticism with which the subjective idealism which I have just presented to you terminates? Here let us pause: such consequences are of too grave a nature to warrant our approval or rejection of them without a serious examination. We shall come upon them again, with others of a similar character, in the course of our analysis, and the whole, later on, will form the subject of a general and close examination.

LECTURE V.

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

IN my last lecture I introduced you to that part of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' which Kant terms the transcendental æsthetic. I now commence an exposition of the transcendental logic, which, as you are aware, comprises the study of the understanding, and which, with the sensory, is one of the two great sources of human knowledge.

Subject of the
Lecture.

The sensory furnishes the intuitions,—that is, certain representations of objects by means of the sensations which these objects excite in us. These representations however are but the scattered elements of knowledge, not knowledge itself. This requires these elements to be brought into a whole or unity, and so form from our isolated and separate intuitions an idea, notion, or concept. To the sensory therefore, to that passive faculty by means of which we receive intuitions, we add an active power, a veritable faculty, which, gathering together these intuitions, forms them into a whole, and so produces veritable knowledge. This new faculty, whose function Kant expresses by describing it as that which *thinks*, the objects, the representations of which are furnished by the sensory, is the *understanding*. There can be no knowledge without the concurrence of these two faculties.

The Under-
standing.

"Of these two faculties," says Kant, "one cannot be said to be preferable to the other. No object could be presented to us without the sensory, no object would be *thought* without the understanding. Thoughts without material are empty; the intuitions without concepts are blind. So that it is as necessary to render our concepts sensorial (that is to say, to apply them to some object furnished by the intuitions), as to render our intuitions intelligible (that is, to link them to concepts). These two powers or capacities can never exchange functions.

the understanding can apprehend nothing intuitively, while the senses can think nothing, so that the parts which they respectively play should never be confounded with each other, but carefully distinguished."

Imagination, Memory, and Consciousness. This however is not all: in order to form an exact idea of the faculty of the understanding in the system of Kant, it is necessary that we should know the separate faculties that are involved in this fundamental one of the understanding, the function of which is to bind together the various representations or intuitions. But this could not take place if we had not a faculty endowed with the power of bringing together the various parts or elements, forming the whole. This faculty is the imagination, and its office is to effect this union, this synthesis, without which the understanding could not apprehend the objects. But this union is not effected by a single stroke, so to speak: it takes place successively. All the separate parts must be taken up one after the other; and in order that this should be done, it is necessary for the imagination, as it passes from one part to another, to reproduce all the preceding parts; otherwise they would be lost, and the union would be impossible. Under this point of view, therefore, the imagination is a reproductive faculty, it is memory. Finally, it is not sufficient that the imagination should reproduce the various parts. To render this reproduction effective, we must be inwardly convinced that this reproduction by the imagination is the same as that which it produced at first, and this conviction is given us by consciousness. There are therefore three faculties by means of which the understanding apprehends the objects furnished by the sensory, viz. imagination, memory, and consciousness.

Theory of consciousness. Here we meet with a contradiction so striking, that it is surprising that none of Kant's critics have pointed it out, and that he himself should not have perceived it. In the transcendental æsthetic, consciousness is treated as a modification of the sensory, while in the present chapter it figures as one of the three faculties which go to form the understanding. At first, Kant describes it as entirely passive, having no power of spontaneous action; now he declares it to be endowed with the spontaneous activity which characterizes the understanding. The two assertions are entirely contradictory. We have seen that the passage in the transcendental æsthetic first appears in the second edition

of the work. The transcendental logic too, about which we are at present occupied, underwent many modifications from one edition to the other, though in both editions consciousness is treated as belonging to the understanding. It is always consciousness which gives the conviction that the present thought of the mind, arising from an act of memory, is the same as that which was formerly there. In other words, Kant refers that primitive synthesis, through which every proposition, every judgment is presented, to the faculty of consciousness. In the second edition is a paragraph headed, "The Primitive Synthetic Unity of Perception," of which the following is the first sentence: "The *I think* should accompany all my representations, otherwise a representation might exist in one without being apprehended; which means, that representation would be impossible, or, at all events, that it would, to me, be as if it were not." The remainder of the paragraph (§ 16 of the second edition) is devoted to the development of the psychological truth, that the diversity of the representations or intuitions could not have place, if to this diversity, which, strictly speaking, is the sensuous intuition, something were not added to give a unity to the various intuitions furnished by the sensory. Kant calls the perception* of the diversity, *empirical perception*; and the unity necessarily added to the diversity in order to form an object for the understanding, this unity Kant ascribes to what he calls *pure perception*, to distinguish it from *empirical perception* or *primitive perception*, "because it is this consciousness of self which originates the *I think*, which accompanies all the phenomena of thought, but which cannot be preceded by any:" in other words, *a transcendental unity of consciousness*, in order to indicate that it is the foundation of the possibility of *à priori* knowledge. This theory is continued throughout the obscure windings of the whole paragraph, and also of the one which follows it, entitled, *The principle of the synthetic unity of perception is the supreme principle in the use of the understanding*.

Paragraph 17, of the second edition:—"The synthetic unity of perception is the highest point to which we should apply every operation of the understanding to logic, and through this latter to the transcendental philosophy. Nay more, this faculty is the understanding itself." "Every union

* The word "perception," here and subsequently, designates a *mental* act, just as we are said to perceive the truth of any given proposition.—TR.

of the representations demands a unity of the consciousness, which is the only thing that forms the relation between the representations and the object; consequently their objective value thus converting representations into knowledge." "The first pure cognition of the understanding, that on which every subsequent use of it rests, that which is entirely independent of sensuous intuition, is the principle of the primitive and synthetic unity of perception." "All my representations in any given intuition conform to this condition, that I can consider them as *mine*, consider them as appertaining to an identical self."

Having thus expressed himself, is it not astonishing that in the eighteenth paragraph of the same edition Kant should term the unity of consciousness an empirical unity, simply because it binds together the representations or intuitions? "It is," he says, "nothing more than a phenomenon itself, and is entirely accidental." Here we shall set up Kant against himself. All that bears the character of accidental are the intuitions, the representation, the facts or phenomena of the sensory. But the unity which the consciousness adds to them, has no such character. The phenomena of the sensory, the matter of sensation, are empirical, but not the unity of consciousness. The diversity is a phenomenon certainly perceived by consciousness; but does it follow that the identical one of which Kant has been speaking, this one whose identity and unity lies at the very base of consciousness itself, —does it follow, I say, that this identical one should be a pure phenomenon, simply because it arises along with the perception of other phenomena? If this be so, simply because every conscious perception is accompanied by empirical elements, by phenomena, then all perception becomes empirical and phenomenal; it is impossible for us to know aught but phenomena or diversity, since the identical one can only be known in and through a perception, and which perception, however pure it may be, must contain some diverse element; so that all becomes empirical. Even the intuitions of space and time, which Kant calls pure *à priori* intuitions, become empirical intuitions, because they are connected with sensuous and empirical elements. This new theory is the destruction of the general theory of knowledge; for all knowledge when complete contains empirical elements, as well as elements *à priori*.

Lastly, Kant elsewhere says ('Transcendental Logic,' in the chapter treating of the distinction between phenomena and noumena), "We can only know ourselves by an internal sense; consequently, as phenomena."

He contradicts himself on this point, as on the preceding, and we cannot help feeling that he did not feel well assured of his ground, from the numerous passages in which he returns to the same point, without throwing any additional light upon it. In the new edition is a passage, forming paragraph 25, wherein, after saying, "We recognize our own being only as phenomena, and not as it is in itself," he expresses himself as follows:—"On the contrary, I am conscious of myself, in the transcendental synthesis of the diversity of the representations in general, consequently in the primitive synthetic unity of perception, not as I *appear* to myself, nor as I *am* in myself; I am simply conscious that I am." But what signifies that? We are simply conscious that we are. Be it so. But on what ground? On the ground of being, or phenomena? That is the question. This subtle distinction is however a concession to the common sense, and to the belief in the reality of our existence. But here, in the same paragraph, is a declaration quite as decisive on the other side:—"My own proper existence is not a phenomenon, much less is it a simple appearance." Nothing can be clearer nor more to the point; and yet a few lines after returns the notion that we are nothing but phenomena, because consciousness is purely empirical. At this systematic result Kant stops, and this result has become the foundation of all German philosophy. By these assertions, unsupported by anything like proofs, thrown, as it were, in the midst of an entirely opposite theory, the author of the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' in opposition to his own principles, has, by a roundabout way, gone over to Loëke and Hume, opened out the road to scepticism, and deceived his successors. If consciousness be empirical, because it contains an empirical element, psychology, whose instrument it is, must be considered a study which can only have empirical results, which is false in itself, and which obliges us either to put up quietly with empiricism or scepticism, or, avoiding both, and with a view to obtain something better than mere phenomena, to have recourse to hypothesis, suppositions, and methods, unworthy of the name, and already condemned in the Introduction to the 'Critique

of Pure Reason' itself. If the identical self is but a phenomenon, what is the foundation, the substratum of this phenomenon? Has it a foundation, a substratum? To answer this in the negative may be consistent enough, but it is a species of consistency which involves the most manifest absurdity, as well as the most absolute scepticism. If a substratum be admitted at all, I ask how is it known? By what process do you arrive at it, apart from consciousness? If this process, whatever it may be, comes within the sphere of consciousness, then it is empirical, and nothing absolute can be the result. If consciousness has nothing to do with it, consciousness can know nothing of it; and then what can we know, and what right have we to talk of it. And, after all, what is this substratum to which we are led, in so marvellous a manner, through so many sophisms? It is necessarily a substance void of every conscious perception, in order that it shall not be a phenomenon, an indeterminate being, a pure being, which, in the immensity and voidness of its own indetermination, can support every species of phenomenon,—the water which flows, the wind which blows, the insect that hums, and Kant, who reflects. In one true and sublime sense we are but phenomena compared with the Eternal and Absolute Being; for we are relative, dependent, limited, and finite beings, whose principle of existence is not in ourselves, just as the causative force with which we are endowed supposes a first cause, from which everything has proceeded, ourselves with the rest. But because we are not the *first* cause, it does not follow that we are not a cause at all; so likewise, because we are not the eternal substance or being, it does not follow that we are no substance whatever. The one identical self is, for us, the permanent subject of every intuition, of every form of knowledge, and is the base of consciousness itself. Without experience, there would be no sensations, no intuitions, no representations; consequently no consciousness: the subject of consciousness must for ever have been unknown. But because knowledge is impossible without experience, does it follow that all knowledge is experimental? I appeal to Kant against himself, in the admirable Introduction already presented to you. Does it follow, because there must be in every act of consciousness something phenomenal, that consciousness itself is purely phenomenal? and is not the unity upon which it rests that of a real being,

a being that affirms its existence, in saying *I, me?* Subsequently this being, by a perception of its own limits, elevates its thoughts to an existence superior to its own, while recognizing itself as an existence, and perfectly distinguishing such existence from the phenomenal diversity which accompanies the recognition. So far from the *me* being a phenomenon, it only becomes self-conscious by distinguishing itself as a unity, apart from the shifting phenomena to which it is related. To deny this, and to pretend, without any proof whatever, that the unity of consciousness is empirical, and that the *me*, because it is recognized through consciousness, is strictly speaking but a phenomenon, is dragging philosophy into a path whose end, I repeat it, if we must be consistent, is either absolute scepticism or a tissue of gratuitous hypotheses. We do not hesitate to say, that all the errors with which modern German philosophy is reproached by the good sense of Europe, springs from this very error of Kant, which meets us at the very threshold of the transcendental logic, mixed up with other contradictory assertions, yet totally opposed to the principles laid down in the Introduction. But to resume our analysis of the transcendental logic.

In the addition to the second edition, just presented to you, we have seen Kant reducing the transcendental logic to empiricism, by considering as empirical the unity of consciousness, without which the understanding is incapable of apprehending any of its objects; although the end of the logic is to determine the pure *à priori* elements contained in the understanding. Kant's object is to consider the understanding as he has done the sensory, not in relation to objects, nor as subject to conditions, nor generally in relation to other existing elements, whatever their origin; but independently of all accidental circumstances whatever; freed from all material, and from every element of an empirical character. Such a logic is therefore not special, since it does not embrace any special objects. It is not an *applied* logic, since it passes over all those empirical conditions under which the understanding is exercised, such as the influence of the senses, the play of the imagination, the laws of the memory, the power of habit, inclination, etc. Neither is it a *general* logic; for it does not embrace all the elements of knowledge. It sets aside everything of an empirical character, and confines itself to a consideration of the truly *pure* elements of the understanding. It

is a *transcendental* logic; a science whose object is the development of pure understanding, and the determination of all the pure *à priori* concepts which it contains.

But Kant's object is not only to determine the pure elements of the understanding, but to ascertain their objective value. We have here the same question that we have encountered in the transcendental æsthetic, viz. Do we know anything of objects in themselves? Hence in the logic two distinct parts.

Object of the Transcendental Logic. In order to determine the legitimate power of the understanding in relation to things themselves, or to estimate its objective value, the nature and functions of this faculty must be examined; and as these functions constitute the formal principles, without which no object could be apprehended, the principles themselves must undergo a strict analysis. Such is the first part of the logic which Kant terms *transcendental analytic*. On the other hand, as the mind of man ardently desires to know what is not permitted him to know, and as he too often allows himself to be led away by sophistical illusions, the transcendental logic, after examining and developing the real power of the understanding in that of the principles through which it is exercised, proceeds to determine the boundaries beyond which it cannot pass, and to moderate its ambitious pretensions by proving the futility of them. This is the object of the other part of the transcendental logic, called *transcendental dialectic*. The word *dialectic* however is not used in the sense in which it was used by the ancients; with them the word meant the logic of *appearance*, the sophistical art of dressing out ignorance in the garb of truth; an art which could affirm or deny at pleasure with an equal show of reason. The dialectic portion of the Kantian philosophy has a far different end: it does not propose to justify, but to make known to the eyes of reason the illusions which seduce it. With this however we are not as yet occupied: let us proceed with the analysis.

Pure Elements of the Understanding. The transcendental analytic, while seeking to discover the pure elements, the *à priori* principles which belong to the understanding, neglects all derived and complex conceptions, and fixes its attention solely on those which are truly elementary; and of these last to give a complete list, so that the concepts comprised therein shall embrace the whole domain of the pure un-

derstanding. The nature of the concepts you already know; they are used by the understanding in forming its judgments. Hence the understanding is the faculty of judging; and since all its operations are resolvable into judgments, it follows, that if we know all the forms or modes of the judgment, we shall know all the forms of the understanding. It is therefore necessary to study the judgments, and, throwing aside all considerations as to their contents or material, to seek to determine their elementary forms.

This done, the results are as follow:—

All judgments* may be considered under four points of view, viz. *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, and *modality*. The Judgment.

First. The *quantity* in a judgment determines the greater or less extension of the subject. Quantity. The subject may be individual, part, or universal; so that, considered in relation to quantity, judgments are either individual, partial, or general.

Secondly. A judgment is considered in relation to *quality*, when, instead of considering the subject, we consider the attribute; when, instead of considering the extent of the first, we examine the extent of the second in its relation to the other. Quality. Now the attribute may be either affirmed or denied of the subject. Hence the judgments are *affirmative* and *negative*.

There are other judgments, which, while they belong to the preceding, are nevertheless to be distinguished from them. Such are what may be called *limitative* judgments. *The soul is not mortal*: this judgment, though negative in its form and meaning, contains nevertheless an affirmation; for while predicating of the soul that it is not mortal, we at the same time affirm that it belongs to that indeterminate class of beings which are immortal. As all the beings that are mortal form a part of the totality of possible beings, and all that are immortal the other part, the proposition in question simply signifies that the soul forms one of the indefinite number of beings that remain, when from the whole of existent beings we deduct those that are mortal. Now in ranging the soul amongst this indefinite class of beings, we indeed assert that

* The term "proposition" might have been here used, though not with equal accuracy; the proposition is the formal *expression* of the judgment by means of language.—TR.

which it is not, without affirming precisely what it is, and rather avoid an error than secure the possession of a truth.

Thirdly. A judgment is considered in reference to *relation* when we do not limit ourselves to a consideration of the attribute in its relation to the subject,—for example, whether the attribute is denied or affirmed of the subject,—but when we examine the *nature* of the relation itself. In this point of view, a judgment is either *categorical*, *hypothetical*, or *disjunctive*. It is categorical, when the relation which exists between the two terms is a relation of substance and quality, that is to say, a relation of inherence; for example, “God is just:” in this judgment there are but two ideas, two concepts, that of God and that of the quality just. The judgment is hypothetical, when the relation of the two terms is one of principle and consequence, a relation of dependence. Example: “If there be such a thing as perfect justice, he who persists in the practice of injustice will be punished.” Observe, that in this judgment the two terms are not simply two ideas, but two judgments, two propositions, viz. *there is a perfect justice*, *he who perseveres in injustice will be punished*. The judgment decides nothing as to the intrinsic truth of either proposition; it simply asserts that between them there subsists a relation of principle to consequence. Finally, a judgment is disjunctive when there exists among the different conceptions, or the different propositions, which compose it, a relation of community, although these propositions may mutually exclude each other. Example: “The world either exists by chance, or by an internal necessity, or from an external cause.” The three propositions which form this judgment are not dependent upon each other, but mutually exclude each other. The truth of any one involves the falsehood of the rest. But they involve another relation besides that of opposition. Taken apart, they exclude each other; but united, they form an assemblage of the different hypotheses that may be given to explain the origin of the world. In this point of view they are necessary to each other, and involve a relation of community.

Fourthly. When a judgment is considered in reference to *modality*, we examine the relation which subsists between the judgment itself, on the one hand, and the thinking subject on the other; in other words, the value which the mind attaches to the relation existing between the terms of the judgment. As in the preceding, we here dis-

tinguish three kinds of judgments, *problematical*, *assertive*, and *apodictive*. In a problematic judgment the affirmation or negation is announced as simply *possible*; in an assertive judgment both are announced *as true*; and in an apodictive judgment they are regarded as *necessary*. Thus the two judgments whose relation constitutes the hypothetical judgment, as well as the judgments comprising the disjunctive form, are problematic. The proposition already given, "If there be perfect justice," is not an assertive judgment, but one on the truth of which we do not pronounce; it is problematic. When I say, "Man is endowed with reason," I make an assertive judgment; if I say, "Every circle has a centre," an apodictive judgment.

Such, according to Kant, are the four points of view under which all judgments may be considered. Now the forms with which the judgments may be thus invested, considered quite apart from the contents or matter, are the pure *à priori* concepts, without which we could not *think* or *judge* the objects of intuition in general; and as the understanding or the faculty of thinking is but the faculty of judging, it follows that these *à priori* concepts, necessary to the act of judging, are no other than the pure forms of the understanding. Consequently, if all possible forms of judgment were known to us, we should likewise know all the primitive forms or *à priori* concepts of the understanding. To these *à priori* concepts Kant applies a term celebrated in the history of philosophy, and which Aristotle applied to the laws of thought, whose classification he undertook, viz. *Categories*.

You have seen the manner in which Kant arrives at these categories. With a list of the judgments just presented to you, a list of the categories or concepts of the understanding may be easily constructed.

Quantity, quality, relation, and modality, are the four points of view under which every judgment is to be considered; thus constituting so many primitive and fundamental concepts, or categories. Could any judgments whatever be formed, if these conceptions did not exist in us *à priori*? Manifestly not. These concepts, without intuitions, without material to which they could be applied, are doubtless empty, and to us would be as if they were not. But they are not *derived* from the intuitions. These without the concepts are blind, and their objects could not be *cognized*; in other words, no judgment whatever could be formed. The concepts belong to the mind itself, and exist

in it *à priori*; and, as it would be vain to seek for any judgment that had not a reference to one of the four forms above laid down, so there is no concept or category which does not fall within those of quantity, quality, relation, and modality*.

In relation to quantity, judgments are either singular, plural, or general. Would these judgments be possible without the concepts of unity, plurality, and totality? Yet these concepts are not intuitions, for these represent an object, while the concepts represent nothing. Besides, there is a wide difference between the simple representation of the various elements of things, and the conception of a bond or tie amongst them, which forms either a totality, a plurality, or a unity. To explain this conception, we must admit that we possess the pure *à priori* concepts of totality, plurality, and unity. Here then are three categories which evidently range themselves under the head of pure concepts of the understanding. In like manner, the three judgments appertaining to quality, are founded on three pure concepts or categories, viz. that of *reality* (affirmative judgment), that of *negation* (negative judgment), and that of *limitation* (limitative judgment). I content myself with an enumeration of the categories involved in the other forms of judgment. Substance and accident, cause and effect, and the reciprocity or reciprocal influence of cause and effect, are the *à priori* concepts, or pure forms of the understanding, upon which the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments are founded. Lastly, the judgments of modality, that is, the problematic, assertive, and apodictive judgments, presuppose the categories of possibility, which implies its contrary impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency.

All the categories are *à priori* conditions of
 Locke and experience; they could not spring up and deve-
 Hume, lope themselves in the mind without material fur-
 nished by the senses; but the senses furnish no explanation

* It must be understood here that in every judgment reference must be made to *four* of the twelve categories, that is, to one out of each class; in other words, every judgment must involve the four general forms, quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In the proposition, "God is just," for example, the *quantity*, or God, is individual or singular, since it has reference but to one subject; the *quality* of the proposition is affirmative, since it affirms the attribute *just* of the subject God; its *relation* is that of substance and quality, and is therefore categorical, while its *modality* is assertive, since the judgment is given as true. The intelligent reader may easily form for himself other judgments involving all the other categories.—TR.

of them, because without them, all sensuous experience is impossible. Kant reproaches both Locke and Hume with being ignorant of this truth. "Locke," he says, "finding in experience the pure concepts of the understanding, deduced them from experience, and at the same time committed the error of deducing, with this starting-point, knowledge very far beyond the limits of experience. David Hume saw that, in order to justify our passing these limits, an *à priori* origin must be accorded to these concepts; but he could not see how the understanding should conceive as necessarily connected in an object concepts which are not connected in the understanding; and it never occurred to him that the understanding might itself, by means of these concepts, be the originator of that very experience itself. He was thus obliged to refer them to experience, that is to say, to that kind of subjective necessity which the mind creates for itself by the principle of association and erroneously applied to objective experience; in other words, to habit. But he afterward proved himself to be entirely consistent, for he contended that it was impossible, with concepts and principles having such an origin, ever to pass the limits of experience. Unfortunately, this empirical origin of knowledge, which Locke and Hume felt themselves compelled to adhere to, cannot be reconciled with the existence of *à priori* scientific knowledge, such as we have in the pure mathematics and in general physics, and is therefore refuted by the fact. The first of these celebrated men opened the way to many extravagancies, for the mind, having once admitted certain principles, is not easily arrested in its course by vague suggestions of the value of moderation: the second fell into an abyss of scepticism, upon the supposed discovery that what had been hitherto referred to the reason, was but a pure illusion of the thinking faculty." "We are now in a position," says Kant at the close of some historical considerations, "we are now in a position to undertake the task of piloting the human reason between these two rocks, and, while fixing its limits, open out a free field for its activity."

Is it possible that he who penned this just criticism of Locke and Hume should have maintained that consciousness is but a modification of the sensory, simply because it could not exist without sensation; that the unity of consciousness is empirical and accidental, because it is necessarily connected with empirical and accidental elements, and that we know

ourselves simply as phenomena, because the same act of consciousness which reveals our own proper existence, contains also intuitions or phenomena! After this, has Kant a right to accuse Locke with being inconsequent, and to reproach him with having opened the door to extravagance, when he himself has opened the door to so many absurdities; when, through the empiricism which he wished to destroy, but which he himself has unwittingly re-established, he along with the reality of the one has put in peril all other realities; resuscitated scepticism, and decried as incapable of giving anything but phenomena, the method that had been so much insisted on, the only one capable of yielding any valuable results, viz. the study of the human mind and its universal and necessary laws, psychology!

Before proceeding further, let us enumerate the judgments and the categories. The former are comprised in the following table:—

1. <i>Quantity.</i>	2. <i>Quality.</i>
General.	Affirmative.
Particular.	Negative.
Individual.	Limitative.
3. <i>Relation.</i>	4. <i>Modality.</i>
Categorical.	Problematical.
Hypothetical.	Assertive.
Disjunctive.	Apodictic or necessary.

Corresponding to the following categories:—

1. <i>Quantity.</i>	2. <i>Quality.</i>
Unity.	Reality (or affirmation).
Plurality.	Negation (or privation).
Totality.	Limitation.
3. <i>Relation.</i>	4. <i>Modality.</i>
Substance—accident.	Possibility—impossibility.
Causality—dependence.	Existence—non-existence.
Community—reciprocity between agent and patient, or law of action and reaction.	Necessity—contingency.

According to Kant, this list of the Categories is complete, and contains all the pure or *à priori* concepts by means of which we think the objects: it exhausts the domain of the understanding.

This difficult search into the laws of thought Aristotle had instituted prior to Kant; and it is Aristotle. curious to observe how the philosopher of Königsberg regarded the labours of his predecessor, the Stagyrte. "The enumeration of the fundamental conceptions," he says, "was a task worthy of such a man as Aristotle. But he was guided by no principle; he took them as they presented themselves to his mind, amounting at first to ten, which he called Categories, or *predicaments*. Subsequently five others were added to the list, and these he termed *post predicaments*. The list nevertheless remained imperfect. Besides these, certain modes were included that belonged to the sensory (*quando, ubi, situs*, with *prius* and *simul*), as well as an empirical mode (*motus*), all of them modes which cannot with propriety find a place in any list of the primitive notions of the understanding. He even reckoned derived conceptions (*ratio, possio*) amongst the primitive concepts, some of which have been completely forgotten."

I do not mean to defend Aristotle's categories. I am far from thinking that the labours which this great man has bequeathed to us are perfect; but it was an admirable beginning nevertheless. One of Kant's reproaches is evidently unjust: Aristotle's list no doubt contains categories which refer only to empirical data, such as motion, position, etc., but this is to be explained by the fact that Aristotle's object was not, like that of Kant, to determine all the *pure* elements of the understanding, but all the elements which the understanding *employs*, without reference to their origin, about which Aristotle did not trouble himself. But is Kant's list everything that can be desired? does it fulfil all the conditions which a truly scientific method imposed upon him? I think not; and I shall by-and-by attempt to show that it is by no means beyond the reach of criticism. I must first however complete the exposition of the categories, by pointing out some important features of the transcendental analytic.

It has already been remarked, that each of the four principal categories contains three separate ones. I may now point out the fact that the third in each case forms the synthesis of the other two. Thus, what is totality, but plurality considered as unity? what is limitation, but reality connected with a negation? Reciprocity is the causality of one substance determining that of another substance, while necessity is but existence produced by possibility itself.

Use of the Categories.

The categories are the primitive and fundamental laws, according to which the understanding, by means of the imagination, the memory, and consciousness, thinks the objects presented by the intuition or the sensory. These objects removed, the categories are nothing more than logical forms. But if the functions of the concepts be their union with objects of sense, it is important for us to know how, and under what conditions, this union is effected, and the principles to be derived therefrom. These two questions the transcendental logic undertakes to answer. Let us commence with the first.

The schemes of the Categories.

We unite our various sensuous intuitions by means of the concepts of the understanding; or, to speak the language of Kant, we *subsume* them under the concepts. But this *subsumption* supposes an intermediate term; for how can the application of the categories be otherwise explained? that is to say, an application to sensuous objects of that which cannot in any manner be considered an object of sense. We want, then, some middle term, having, on the one hand, an affinity for the categories, and on the other an affinity for the objects, in order to render possible the application of one to the other. This middle term, at once intellectual and sensuous, is time. Time is analogous to the categories in this, that, like them, it exists *à priori* in the mind, and is analogous to objects, inasmuch as it is the general condition of the sensory, the form that all phenomena presupposes. Time is consequently the bond of union between the categories and the phenomena. Such is the condition under which the application of the understanding to objects is effected, and without which the pure concepts would be of no value. This is what Kant calls the *sensible form* or the *scheme* of the intellectual concepts, while the process or mode of action of the understanding, in reference to this form or scheme, he calls the *schematism* of the pure understanding. We must not however confound the scheme with the *image*: the scheme is indeed a product of the imagination, but the synthesis formed by it has no reference to the forming of any *particular* intuition, consequently the scheme is not an image. If, for example, we place five points one after another, we have an image of the number of five; but if we conceive a number in general, this conception furnishes us with a method or rule, by means of which we re-

present to ourselves a certain multiplicity in one image, rather than with the image itself. The representation of this rule, or the general process by which we join an image to a concept, is the scheme of the concept. The grounds of our sensuous concepts are not images of things, but schemes; no image whatever of a triangle would enable us adequately to conceive a triangle in general, because it could not possess the generality of the concept, applicable, as it must be, to all triangles, right-angled, isosceles, etc. The scheme of the triangle can exist nowhere but in the thought, and it designates a rule for the synthesis of the imagination in reference to pure figures in space. Finally, there is this difference between the scheme and the image, that the image cannot be referred to the concept except by means of the scheme, while the scheme can never be reduced to an image. There are as many classes of schemes as classes of categories. I merely present you with a list of them.

First. Scheme of quantity. This is the idea of the successive addition of the homogeneous parts of time, the series of time, the number comprehending individuality, plurality, and totality.

Second. Scheme of quality. This marks the quality of existence in time, non-existence in time, and the transition from one to the other: expressed by the schemes of affirmation, negation, and limitation.

Third. Scheme of relation. This indicates the *order* of time. The scheme of *substance* is the permanence of the real in time; that of *cause* consists in diverse succession, in so far as it is submitted to a law; and that of *reciprocity* is the simultaneous relation of different substances.

Fourth. Scheme of modality. This indicates the manner of existence in time; either the *possibility*, the *reality*, or the *necessity*.

Such are the schemes of the pure concepts of the understanding. They alone render the application of the concepts to sensible objects possible. The categories without schemes cannot be applied to any objects, and are consequently useless. Let us now see what principles are derivable from this application. This is the second of the questions before indicated. "The table of the categories," says Kant, "gives us that of the *principles*, which are no other than rules for the objective use of the categories."

Results.

I shall rapidly run over these principles. I commence with the category of quantity. By means of this category, we conceive phenomena as extended magnitudes; as composed of parts, in time or space; and it may be remarked, that the conception of the union of parts is essential to our having that of the totality. We cannot, for example, form the idea of a line, however short, without representing to ourselves successively all the separate parts from one to another, as well as the additions of one to the other. It is in like manner, by adding together divers instants of time, that I arrive at the idea of any determinate quantity of time, the idea of any period. As extension and quantity are the objects of the mathematics, Kant terms the categories comprised in that of quantity mathematical categories, and the principle which we obtain by applying this category to phenomena, a mathematical principle.

The judgments of quality applied to phenomena make known to us the degree of their existence. The degree in the reality of phenomena is an *intensive* magnitude or quantity. It differs from an extensive quantity in this, that the latter supposes the union of several individual parts, while the former is always conceived as a certain simple unity, and never appears to us as continuous. But though it may be correct to say that the judgments now under consideration do not imply the conception of phenomena as a continuous quantity, yet they do imply quantity, since there are degrees of reality attributed to them. Thus Kant calls them also categories, mathematical categories, and the principle of quality a mathematical one. To designate the principle of quality, Kant adopts an expression which modern philosophy owes to the ancient (*πρόληψις*); he calls it the *anticipation of experience*, because this principle explains how the degree of reality attributable to phenomena may be known *à priori*, notwithstanding that the phenomena are given *à posteriori*, thus anticipating experience. Kant here determines the value of the mathematics themselves. In presenting them as the developments of the categories of quantity and quality, he refers them to the mind itself, which communicates to them the certainty of its own laws.

The principles derived from a consideration of the categories of relation, Kant calls the *analogies of experience*; because their chief object is to establish amongst the facts of experi-

ence certain relations which serve as rules or signs for our guidance. In judging according to the categories of relation, the mind looks upon phenomena as simple appearances destitute of reality; in their succession it considers their existence to finish and recommence incessantly, without any duration attaching to them; that they exist only in a permanent substance, of which they represent the various states whence they originate, and in which they succeed each other. This is the *first analogy*, or the principle of the permanency of substances. In like manner the mind judges that phenomena have not in themselves the reason of their existence, and that all changes take place by virtue of the law of *causality*: this is the *second analogy*. Finally, and this is the *third analogy*, or the principle of reciprocity, the mind judges that the reason of certain changes of state which substances undergo, exists in some other substance, when these substances co-exist in space, so that nothing is isolated, that all phenomena are mutually subordinated, and that the world is not a mass of inert matter, but made up of real living forces, existing in a reciprocal and universal action.

The judgments of modality lead us to conceive the possibility, the existence, and the necessity of things: these are the three *postulates* of modality. They add nothing to the conception of things themselves, but they simply show in what manner the conception is in general linked to the knowing faculty; hence their name of *postulates*. Possibility is simply that which does not stand in contradiction to the laws of the understanding. "I can, for example," says Kant, "conceive man to be endowed with a faculty by means of which he might foreknow events otherwise than by induction; or be endowed with the power of communicating in thought with other men however far removed they might be: these are possible things, though they may be far from being real. Reality, which is distinguished from possibility, is likewise distinguished from necessity: it results from the application of the laws of the understanding to the matter of experience. If we do not set out from experience, if we do not follow the empirical connection of things, it is in vain for us to hope for any knowledge of actual existences. When, in place of asserting simply that a thing exists, it implies a contradiction for us to suppose that it does not exist, we have the idea of a necessary existence. But we do not recognize the necessity of things by virtue of

their being substances; we only recognize the necessity of certain states by their relation to other given states, and that by virtue of the law of causality.

Since the judgments of relation and modality have no reference to the nature of objects, but to the principles of their existence, they are called by Kant dynamical categories; and these, together with the principles, he puts in opposition to the mathematical categories and principles: all the categories of the understanding are therefore ranged under these two great classes.

The objective
value of the
Categories.

Such are the primitive and fundamental laws of the understanding, according to Kant; but what confidence does he place in these laws in relation to objective reality, or what by their means do we learn of the things themselves? This question, which I have already introduced to you as the great question of the Kantian philosophy, Kant himself discusses in the following passage: "Hitherto," he says, "we have been content with traversing the domain of the understanding, and carefully examining its various parts. We have measured it, and have assigned to each thing the place to which it belongs. But this country is an island, shut up by nature within immoveable bounds. It is the country of truth (flattering word!), surrounded by a vast and tempestuous ocean, an empire of illusion, where mists and floating icebergs present deceitful images of new lands, and attract with vain shadows the navigator buoyed up with the hope of discovering new countries, and undertaking perilous adventures which he is unable to renounce, but in which he is doomed to perpetual disappointment. Before trusting ourselves on this ocean for the purpose of exploring it, and with a view to determine whether there is anything to hope from it, we should do well once more to cast our eyes on the chart of the country which we propose to quit, and ask ourselves first, whether we might not, or rather whether we ought not, content ourselves with what it had to offer, here, for example, where there may not really exist beyond us any solid earth on which to rest our feet; and secondly, what is our title to such a country, and whether we should have strength enough to defend it against the pretensions of an enemy."

This passage contains two questions. First, can we pass beyond the limits of the pure understanding? Second, if we confine ourselves within its limits, what guarantee have we of

its value? These two questions are implicitly resolved by what precedes, and the logic ends with the same solution as the æsthetic.

The pure concepts of the understanding, or the categories, would be empty forms, would be indeed as if they were not, in the absence of material to which they could be applied. This material is furnished by the intuition, or sensory. But does the sensory furnish us with objects such as they exist in reality, that is to say, as they exist in themselves? We are incapable of representing to ourselves any external objects except by means of certain forms—space and time. Now these forms do not belong to the objects themselves, but are simply laws of our sensory. Objects therefore cannot appear to us as they are in themselves, but under the forms which our sensuous nature is compelled to invest them with, in order that they may be represented to us: thus represented, they are but phenomena, and nothing more. So much for the sensory. Then as regards the understanding. If a material be absolutely essential to the pure conceptions or categories of the understanding, and if this material must be furnished by the sensory, it follows that the pure understanding can be applied only to phenomena, and not to real objects; and since the categories can have no other material than that furnished by the senses, the understanding can arrive at no objective reality. Besides, as the sensory cannot represent to itself any objects except by means of certain forms which are proper to it, and which constitute its laws and subjective conditions, so the understanding has its particular forms, without which it could not think the objects of sensuous intuition, but which, being nothing more than the conditions of its use, can have no relation with objects as they exist in themselves. So that neither the pure forms of the sensory, nor the pure forms of the understanding, the categories, can give us any objective reality whatever. To expect it by resting on the categories, is to go beyond the conditions of the understanding,—is, in fact, to transport the subjective into the objective. In the æsthetic, Kant contends that we have no right to go beyond this simple expression,—in such a way we represent objects, or in such a way objects appear to us. Also in the logic we are limited to the expression, In this way we think the objects of the intuition. Any further affirmation would be erroneous, and unworthy of any true philosophy. It is thus that Kant answers

the first of the questions proposed. In reference to the second, as to the dependence to be placed upon the transcendental logic, Kant has no difficulty in replying in the affirmative.

The logic, reduced to a simple analysis of the pure concepts of the understanding, may and must be within these limits an infallible science. In this region truth is established *à priori* with perfect certainty. Yes; but do not forget that this certainty has reference only to the notion or concepts, to the categories or logical forms, more or less happily related to each other, but entirely void, having no relation to reality, and subject to such inherent weakness, that it can neither assure us of external reality nor even of the reality of our own proper personality. Externally we have but pure phenomena, having no other virtue than the power of setting our faculties in motion, and these faculties condemned to an internal development, without any objective bearing: such is the final result of the transcendental logic.

I shall complete this exposition by pointing out a distinction of some importance in the doctrine of Kant, and which plays a conspicuous part in German philosophy generally, viz. the distinction between *phenomena* and *noumena*.

The word phenomenon has no meaning except as opposed to something intelligible,—to a *noumenon*, as Kant says. Now either we understand by the latter word a thing which cannot be the object of a sensuous intuition, without determining the mode in which it is perceived, and in this case we take it in a negative sense; or we understand it as the object of a real intuition, though not a sensuous one, an intellectual one, and then we take it in a positive sense. Which of these two is the truth? It cannot unquestionably be affirmed *à priori* that the only possible manner of perception is sensuous intuition, and it implies no contradiction to suppose that an object may be known to us otherwise than by the senses. But, says Kant, this is only a possibility. To justify us in affirming that there really is any other mode of perception than sensuous intuition, any intellectual intuition, it must come within the range of our knowledge; and in fact we have no idea of any such faculty. We therefore cannot adopt the word *noumena* in any positive sense; it expresses but an indeterminate object, not of an intuition, but of a conception,—in other words, an hypothesis of the understanding.

At this point Kant brings forward the philosophy of Leibnitz, which he estimates by reference to his own, whether true or false. Leibnitz. Reviewing the fundamental positions of the Leibnitzian philosophy, he evolves and explains their radical errors as tried by the critical philosophy. I cannot quit the transcendental logic without putting before you the judgment which the philosopher of Königsberg formed of his great compatriot, in order to convince you of the striking difference that exists between the old German philosophy, which sprang from that of Descartes, and the new philosophy, which, as already stated, much more nearly approaches that of Locke and Hume than that of Descartes and Leibnitz, and, true to the spirit of the eighteenth century, inclining much more to scepticism than to dogmatism.

The concepts of the understanding must be applied to sensible objects, which objects can be no other than phenomena. According to Kant, this is a truth which must be admitted if we would avoid falling into grave error. If, while confining ourselves to the domain of the understanding, we imagine that we can, by means of the concepts of the understanding, attain to things themselves as they exist in themselves, we are the dupes of an illusion,—an illusion brought about by the fact that we misconceive the true use, the empirical use, of the concepts of the understanding. Kant calls this an amphiboly, which consists precisely in confusing the two terms before mentioned, *phenomena* and *noumena*. How avoid this confusion? how escape from the illusion? By learning to recognize the *sources* of our ideas, and their objective value. The transcendental logic, by pointing out these sources, and by determining their real values, furnishes us with a sort of transcendental *topical remedy*, by means of which we avoid the confusion in question. From this you will see that the transcendental *topic* of Kant is as much distinguished from the peripatetic *topic*, as the transcendental dialectic is distinguished from ordinary dialectic.

It was because Leibnitz was ignorant of this logic, that, according to Kant, he fell at every step into some amphiboly.

His first error was in attaching too little importance to the sensory, and confining himself to a consideration of the understanding: just the opposite error of that which Locke committed; for he, neglecting the understanding, fixed his attention too exclusively on the sensory. His second error,

a consequence indeed of the first, was in the supposition that the knowing faculty could ever attain to a knowledge of things in themselves; an error which he would have avoided if he had seen that the concepts of the understanding have no use nor value except in their application to the senses. Let us apply this rule to the fundamental points of the Leibnitzian philosophy.

Take, for example, the principle of Leibnitz, that things perfectly similar and perfectly equal could not be distinguished, and would in point of fact be one and the same thing. This is the principle of indiscernibles (*principium identitatis indiscernibilitum*). Leibnitz was led to this principle, because he took no account of sensuous intuition, and because he mistook phenomena for things in themselves. No doubt, if we set aside the sensory, and suppose things to be known in themselves, the principle is valid; and under such a supposition one drop of water could not be distinguished from another drop of water, if the concept of the one was identical with the concept of the other, that is to say, if they differed neither in quantity nor quality. But a drop of water is not a pure object of the understanding: a necessary condition of its existence is, like all other bodies, that it should exist in space; it is a phenomenon. Now, since the parts of space are exterior to each other, the objects which exist in space, however close their resemblance, must at least be distinguishable in this, that they occupy different spaces. The law of Leibnitz therefore is not a law of nature. Leibnitz applies this law to phenomena, because he mistakes them for objects themselves, for *noumena*, thus misconceiving the conditions of sensuous intuition.

Kant then examines a proposition of Leibnitz, not originating with him, as he says, but adopted by him and made much of by his successors: this is, that there can be no opposition amongst realities. It is upon this principle that the theory of evil propounded in the Theodicea is founded. If good really exists in the world, evil cannot exist, for the two realities would be naturally opposed. How then does Leibnitz explain the existence of evil? Simply by making a negation of it; evil is a consequence of the finite and limited nature of created beings. Thus understood, good and evil may have a co-existence. But Leibnitz's principle has only a logical value: of course, if realities are to be considered logically, that is to say, as simple affirmations of the mind, we cannot affirm of the

same subject attributes which exclude each other. But leaving the logical order, and coming to sense, to the world of phenomena, here realities are to be met with which do mutually oppose and repulse each other. In mechanical science, opposing forces are to be met with, starting from the same point; and everywhere pain is to be met with alongside of pleasure.

The same considerations are applicable to the principles of *monadology*; the foundation of this theory lies in the confounding of the sensory with the understanding, phenomena with noumena.

When substances are considered as phenomena existing in space, their determinations are but relations springing from the reciprocal action of bodies upon each other. When, on the contrary, they are considered as objects of the pure understanding, and so freed from the conditions which attach to them in space, then their modifications have no relation to other substances, their compound character disappears: the substance is simple, and its modifications spring from the play of the internal forces, which incessantly modify its mode of existence. But what are these modifications? Those simply which the internal sense reveals to us,—representations. Here is the system of monads. Each monad is a simple subject, endowed with a representative faculty. The pre-established harmony is a consequence of this system. If every internal modification of a substance be a representation, the monads are active only amongst themselves, and consequently have no influence on each other. How then are substances connected? We are obliged to recognize a new substance that shall re-establish the correspondence between different states of various others; and this substance, which is God, does not interfere in each instant and in each particular case, as in the system of occasional causes, but has once for all fixed the general laws according to which substances should stand related.

Finally, Kant takes up Leibnitz's opinion as to time and space, and shows by what illusion he was led to consider these ideas as real relations of co-existence and succession in the monads, or, in their condition, not seeing that what he attributes to things in themselves, is but the form with which the sensory invests them.

Comparing Leibnitz and Locke, Kant characterizes both in the following celebrated judgment. "Leibnitz," he says,

“intellectualizes sensible phenomena, while Locke sensualizes the concepts of the understanding.”

Such are the principal results of the transcendental analytic. I purposely postpone all discussion as to the objective value of the categories of the understanding, as also of that of the forms of the sensory; for Kant's system in both these is in perfect accordance, and the time has not yet arrived for a consideration of the whole and its results. We must first know what it really is. There are however three important points on which a few observations may in this place be made. They are: first, the distinction between the sensory and the understanding; secondly, the omission of all reference to active power, except that of the understanding; and thirdly, the list of the categories.

Unquestionably a great distinction must be made between the sensory and the understanding, if by the first we understand the faculty of receiving or experiencing sensations, and by the second, the faculty of knowing and thinking in general. But Kant makes the sensory more than this; he refers to it our ideas of space and time, which he considers to be its forms. It is indeed true, that without these ideas all representations of sensible objects would be impossible; but does it follow that these ideas belong to the sensory at all? It is in vain to be told that the sensory cannot fulfil its functions without these ideas; this does not establish the principle that the faculty which gives us the necessary and universal ideas of space and time is in effect different from the faculty to which we owe other necessary and universal ideas, those of cause and substance for example; and the same remark applies to another of Kant's distinctions, which we shall have to consider further on, viz. that between the reason and the understanding. Kant's great merit is in his having sought to determine all the *à priori* elements of human knowledge; but in distinguishing, as he does, the pure forms of the sensory, the conceptions of the understanding, and the ideas of the reason, he erroneously separates what should have remained united, and be referred to one and the same faculty, viz. the cognitive faculty in general: that superior faculty, which surpasses experience, renders sensuous knowledge possible, by furnishing, by virtue of its own nature, the purely intellectual ideas of space and time, by means of

General obser-
vations.

which the intuitions of sense become united and co-ordinated, and subsequently renders all human knowledge possible through the categories and ideas that are successively eliminated as the faculty itself becomes developed.

Here is the first error of Kant's doctrine. Besides this, he is wrong in not recognizing any active power other than that of the understanding. In point of fact, the sensory, in order to possess the attributes which Kant assigns to it, should contain one active element, or at least the intervention of an element different from itself,—different from the understanding, viz. activity, the will, the free will, in its various degrees of activity. Kant appears entirely to have overlooked this essential element, though without it sensation is as if it were not. How comes it that under the same circumstances the mind sometimes recognizes, sometimes does not recognize, the same phenomenon. But now I perceived a certain object, which object is still before my eyes, which are open, how is it that I no longer see it? All the external conditions are the same, but my mind has withdrawn from the phenomenon the attention which before it had accorded; the sensation is unperceived, it does not reach the consciousness. A purely passive being knows not, and cannot know, either itself or any other thing. The omission of all free and voluntary activity in the development of knowledge, is an immense hiatus in the Kantian metaphysic. Kant no doubt supplies this omission in his moral system, where the free and voluntary power occupies a conspicuous position. But it should be in the metaphysic, in order rightfully to belong to morals. These classifications of human science have no correspondence in reality. Nearly all the faculties have a simultaneous action quite independently of any arbitrary classification. The moral application of the faculties tends to expand them in a special degree, but does not create them. But we will not here anticipate the important discussion to which this question will give rise. Meantime it will be evident, from the critical observations which have accompanied our exposition, that the Kantian psychology contains many grave defects; here the omission of the active element, the will, there the attributing to the sensory notions which truly belong to the understanding, for no other reason than because they were necessarily applied to sensible intuitions; the confounding of the consciousness with the sensory, and the consequent weakening, or rather

destruction of the legitimate authority of consciousness, and the predominance given to the sensory in a system which in appearance is so strongly idealistic.

The third point which I proposed to touch upon was the list of the categories. Here I do not enter into the question as to whether Kant was right or wrong in separating the categories from the pure forms of the sensory. I take the list of ideas which Kant terms the pure concepts of the understanding, and I ask whether all these ideas are essentially different from each other,—whether they are not reducible. Now, it does not require a long examination to enable us to obliterate these broadly marked lines of Kant's classification. I select at random. First, then, are affirmation and negation two essentially different categories? To deny, is to affirm that a thing is not. Both grammar and logic will satisfy us on this point: whether the mind judges and pronounces for or against, it essentially affirms. As to the category of limitation, it is in vain that Kant tries to separate it from the two other categories. Let us call to mind the reason on which it is founded: according to him, when I say, "The soul is not mortal," the proposition simply means that I class the soul amongst that indefinite number of beings which exist, after having separated those which are mortal. But this proposition evidently adds nothing to our knowledge of the soul. Kant here evidently labours under an illusion; led away by the desire of preserving the perfect symmetry of the faculties, he did not see, or perhaps did not wish to see, that these two propositions, "The soul is not mortal," "The soul is immortal," are fundamentally one and the same. In the categories of quality, therefore, a deduction must be made, which leaves simply the judgment of affirmation. In like manner, in the categories of relation, cause and reciprocity are one and the same thing: cause is the productive power; reciprocity is the same power in the form of reaction; but action and reaction cannot be essentially distinguished from each other, they are simply action. In both cases there is but one category, one notion, the notion of cause: any difference that exists is simply a difference of application.

Substance and existence, which figure as two distinct notions in Kant's list, one amongst the categories of relation, the other amongst those of modality, are nevertheless easily reducible to one. Every substance, every subject of inher-

rence (if it be not simply an abstraction) possesses existence, and all that really and truly exists is substance. There is nothing in one conception that there is not in the other.

I have elsewhere (Lectures of 1818, IV., V., and VI.) made a complete examination of this subject; here I shall not continue it. I have however said enough to show, that if something remained to be done in reference to Aristotle's reduction of the laws of thought, there is yet something, nay, much to be done in reference to Kant's own labours in this field.

LECTURE VI.

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

Subject of the
Lecture.

THE sensory and the understanding do not comprise the whole of human knowledge; they commence it, but do not complete it. A third faculty is required, which, beginning where the others end, conducts it to its ultimate end. This third faculty, which Kant has termed the Reason, will now occupy our attention.

First, what is the precise function of this new faculty? The last Lecture explained the part which the understanding plays, and in what manner it carries forward the work of the sensory. It remains now to be seen in what manner the reason carries forward the work of the understanding, and finishes what the other two faculties commenced. The function of the understanding is to unite, by means of the concepts, the representations which the sensory furnishes separate and isolated. But these unities themselves, these products of the understanding, do not remain in the mind in an unconnected manner; they, in their turn, are formed into a systematic whole, the highest point to which we can elevate ourselves, and beyond which nothing can be conceived. Now as the union or synthesis of the various representations presupposes a faculty superior to the sensory, so the union of the products of the understanding supposes a faculty superior to it. This faculty, the crowning point of human knowledge, is the reason. As the understanding can unite the intuitions of the sensory only by means of the concepts, so the reason can act on the products of the understanding, in order to form from them a unity, only by means of certain principles existing in it *à priori*, and which are to this faculty what space and time are to the sensory, and pure concepts to the understanding. The transcendental logic comprehends also the study of the reason,

the pure reason. It seeks to develop these principles or forms of the reason, in order to determine their objective value. Let us begin, then, by forming an exact and complete idea of the Reason in the system of Kant.

As understanding may be defined the faculty of judging, so the reason may be defined as the faculty of reasoning. From a certain principle it

Kant's Theory
of the Reason.

deduces a certain consequence, and concludes from one to the other by means of a third term, which shows in effect that the consequence is involved in the principle. Take for example this proposition, "*Caius* is mortal." By means of experience and the understanding, I can acquire this truth of this proposition; but I may arrive at it in another manner, by referring the particular idea of *Caius* to a more general idea which involves it, viz. that of man. Having arrived at the general truth that *all* men are mortal, I can affirm the particular truth, *Caius* is mortal. This second process belongs not to the understanding, but to the reason. But

Function of
the Reason.

it does not suffice that the reason should thus ground a particular truth on one more general, by showing that the truth of the former was conditional upon that of the latter; it aims at the development of a principle to which *all* others are referable, without being itself dependent upon a superior, and for this purpose it ascends from generality to generality, from conditional to conditional, until at last it attains to the absolute or unconditional. This, the absolute, the unconditional, is the principle which, in all things and in all kinds of knowledge, it aims at, and in which it rests. This principle is a rational concept, which establishes amongst the products of the understanding that synthetic unity before mentioned. It is by rising to the unconditional or absolute that the reason attains to those primitive and fundamental principles sought by the transcendental logic. To these principles or rational concepts Kant applies a particular name, in order to distinguish them from the concepts of the understanding; and having borrowed from Aristotle the word *category* to distinguish these, so he borrows from the language of Plato the word *idea*, in order to designate the former. Kant's adoption of this term, consecrated by the Platonic philosophy, shows that he recognized between the Platonic theory of ideas and his rational concepts, something in common, notwithstanding the differences which separated

Plato. them. "Plato," he says, "made use of the word *idea* in order to designate something which did not come from experience, and which was higher than the concepts of Aristotle, there being nothing that he could find in experience corresponding to them. Ideas are to Plato the archetypes of things, and not, like the categories, merely the keys of all possible experience. According to him, they flow from the Divine reason, in order that they may become part of human reason, which, no longer in its original state, experiences the utmost difficulty in recalling, by means of the memory (that is to say philosophy), these old ideas, now become so obscure. . . . Plato saw clearly that the knowing faculty stands in need of something much more elevated than that of spelling phenomena, in order to read them as experience; that our reason naturally aspires to knowledge far higher than any that can be derived from experience, but which nevertheless possesses a reality that is not a dream of the imagination." Kant does not content himself with these remarkable expressions respecting Plato. After defining the meaning of the word 'idea' in the Platonic theory, and showing the foundation of the theory itself, he, like Montesquieu, meeting Alexander, accosts him with the expression, "Let us talk about this at our ease." (Spirit of Laws, book x. chap. xiii.) Once in communication with the author of the 'Theory of Ideas,' he appears unwilling to quit him hastily, and seems to take a pleasure in considering him under his different aspects. Let us follow him in this pleasant digression.

"It is more particularly," says Kant, "in the region of morals that Plato discovers his ideas. Moral truth rests upon liberty, and liberty is under the government of laws which spring from the reason itself. Whoever would rest the idea of virtue upon experience, and establish as a model that which can scarcely serve as an example in any important practical application (and many have done this), would render virtue altogether uncertain, make it dependent upon time and circumstances, and render the formation of any rules impossible. Every one, on the contrary, can see, that if any person were held up to him as a model of virtue, it is only in himself that the true type exists, to which the proposed model might be compared, and consequently appreciated. Now this type is the *idea* of virtue; the objects of experience may indeed serve as *examples*, to show that what the reason demands is, up to a

certain point, possible in practice ; but the archetype itself is not there. Because a man never acts in exact accordance with the pure idea which he has of virtue, it does not follow that the idea itself is a mere chimera ; for it is only by means of this idea that moral judgments are formed at all ; it is consequently the foundation of moral perfection, so far at least as this is possible, considering the obstacles which human nature presents, which are however indeterminate.

“The Republic of Plato has become proverbial as the expression of an imaginary perfection, which can only exist in a disordered brain, and Brucker ridicules the notion, that a prince could never govern well unless penetrated by the theory of ideas. But instead of throwing aside Plato’s thought as useless, under the miserable and shameless pretext that it is incapable of realization, would it not be better to attempt a development of it, and by renewed efforts draw it from the obscurity in which that excellent genius has left it ?

“A constitution having for its end the greatest possible amount of human liberty, so that the liberty of each might co-exist with the liberty of all (the question here is not as to the greatest possible amount of happiness, since this would be a natural consequence of such a constitution), is a necessary idea which ought to serve not only as the primitive plan of a state, but of all its laws, and where from the first it would be necessary to abstract all existing obstacles which arise, less perhaps from the inevitable evils attached to human nature, than from a neglect of these veritable ideas in legislation. There can be nothing more miserable and more unworthy of a philosopher, than to appeal to an experience which is acknowledged to be in contradiction to these ideas ; for what would have been the experience itself, if the institutions in question had been established under happier auspices, conformably to ideas, and if instead other ideas, gross and rude, just because they are derived from experience, had not rendered every good design useless.

“The more legislation and government are in accordance with ideas, the less frequent will be punishments ; and it is quite in accordance with reason to affirm with Plato, that in a perfectly constituted government punishments would be altogether unnecessary. Though the time may never come when punishments can be dispensed with, it is not the less necessary to recognize the justice of proposing this *maximum* as a type,

in order that civil constitutions, in conforming to it, may approach more and more to perfection. No one can determine the limits of humanity, the distance that must exist between the idea and its realization; for human liberty may pass any bounds that may be assigned to it.

"But it is not alone in the moral world that human reason shows a veritable causality, and where ideas are causes (of actions and their objects): Plato sees throughout nature abundant proofs that ideas are the foundation of all things. Plants, animals, the regular order of the world (apparently the entire order of nature), clearly show that their existence and maintenance are dependent upon ideas; that in truth no being, considered under the particular conditions of its existence, can be found to be in exact conformity with the idea of the greatest perfection of its species, just as no man can be found to be in perfect conformity with the idea of humanity, which the mind carries in itself as a type; but that these ideas are determined in the supreme mind in a manner unchangeable, eternal; that they are the primordial causes of things; and that it is only in the entire union of all things, that their adequate expression can be found."

Kant then considers the theory of ideas, even in reference to natural phenomena, as of inestimable value. "But," says Kant, "in all that has reference to the principles of morals, legislation, and religion, where ideas alone render experience possible,—that is to say, the appreciation of the good, without however any perfect expression of it,—Plato possesses a merit which is peculiar to him, and which we are prevented from recognizing, only because we judge according to empirical rules, whose value, as principles, is as nothing compared with that of ideas. In reference to external nature, experience may indeed furnish rules, since in this case it is the source of truth; but in reference to morals, experience, alas! is the mother of illusion; and it is altogether a vicious error to reason from that which *is done*, or attempt to limit by it laws which have especial reference to that which *ought to be done*."

Thus both Plato and Kant make the starting-point of the reason to be in experience, though its range goes far beyond experience; both consider ideas to be conditions of experience, though not the objects of experience; and both consider the reason, in its most general acceptation, as the faculty by which we unceasingly aim at the highest possible unity.

Before proceeding further, let us endeavour to free the Kantian theory of the reason from an error which disfigures it. In the last Lecture it has been pointed out that the pure sensory and the pure understanding are not two different faculties. It may now be asked, whether pure reason is really different from the other two, or whether it be not simply a different application of one and the same faculty. Let us see what, according to Kant, is the function of the reason. Its law, its fundamental principle, is the attainment of the highest possible unity. But is not unity also the law of the sensory and the understanding? We have by the pure sensory obtained the notions of space and time; but could we conceive space and time, without conceiving each of them as one, as a union of all individual spaces and times? Kant considers the function of the understanding to be the bringing into a unity, by means of the concepts, the various representations of the sensory. But if this be the case, why distinguish the reason from the understanding? Is it because the unity arrived at in the former is superior to that arrived at by the latter? I see indeed two different applications; but it is the same faculty that gives rise to them. We therefore conclude at once, that the pure reason is neither to be distinguished from the pure understanding nor from the pure sensory.

The Reason
and the Un-
derstanding.

Knowing then the function of the reason in Kant's system, you can now embrace at a single glance the play of all the intellectual faculties in it. The scattered elements of phenomena are first united in one representation; representations are then subordinated to a few general notions, which are themselves referable to universal ideas; so that the work of human knowledge, roughly sketched out by the sensory, becomes more finished by the understanding, and is completed by the reason.

But in what manner does the transcendental logic arrive at these ideas of the pure reason? By an examination of the functions of the reason, or the different forms of reasoning, as will be evident by considering what has previously been established. In ascending the series of conditions in the process of reasoning, as many unconditional or absolute principles as are found, so will be the number of pure ideas of the reason. As there are but three kinds of judgments or cate-

Three abso-
lute Ideas,—
the Me, the
World, and
God.

gories which have reference to the synthesis of the subject with the attribute, viz. the categories of relation; and as all the others regard either the subject alone, or the attribute alone (categories of quantity and quality), or the possibility, the necessity, or the reality of the predicate (categories of modality), so there are but three kinds or forms of reasoning by which the mind can arrive at a synthetic union of all conditions in general. These are the categoric, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive forms. Now when we examine these three forms of reasoning, with a view to discover this synthetic union of all conditions, or this unconditional or absolute, we arrive, in the categoric form, to a subject which is no longer an attribute, viz. the thinking subject, the *me*; in the hypothetical form, to something which is no longer an effect dependent upon an anterior effect, but to the absolute union of the series of phenomenal conditions, that is to say, to the universe; and in the disjunctive form, to the absolute unity of the conditions of all objects of thought in general. The *me*, the *world*, and *God*, are the three unconditionals, the three absolutes to which the reason ascends; they are the three ideas of the pure reason. "The thinking subject," says Kant, "is the object of psychology; the union of all phenomena (the world) is the object of cosmology; and that which contains the supreme condition of the possibility of all that can be thought, the being of all beings, is the object of theology. Thus the pure reason furnishes the ideas of a transcendental science of the soul (*rational psychology*), a transcendental science of the world (*rational cosmology*), and, lastly, a transcendental science of God (*transcendental theology*).

The objective value of the Reason. What then is the objective value of the reason, of the ideas which govern its exercise, and of the results which spring from it?

Twice has this question been already asked, and you can anticipate the answer given to it by Kant. The reason has no more objective value than the pure understanding and the pure sensory. But the momentous ideas now in question, the soul, the world, God, demand of us a careful examination and development. Let us commence by stating the principle in its most general form.

"There are," he says, "conclusions which have no empirical premises; by means of which we conclude from something which we do know, something which we have no idea of, and

to which we nevertheless, by an inevitable illusion, assign an objective reality. Such conclusions, considered in reference to these results, merit the name of sophisms, rather than that of veritable conclusions. It is only by considering their origin that we are enabled to give them this latter name, for they are not in the nature of ordinary fictions or chance guesses, but spring from the very nature of reason itself. They are sophisms, not of man, but of reason; the wisest man cannot avoid them; painful experience may enable him to avoid error, but he can never relieve himself entirely from their deceptive appearances."

Of these sorts of illusions, he says in another place, "We can no more avoid them than we can prevent the sea appearing to us more elevated at a distance from us than when nearer the shore, owing to the more elevated direction of the rays in the first case; or than the astronomer himself can help seeing the moon of a greater diameter at her rising, though he may not be actually deceived by such an appearance."

Now, just as the science of optics makes us acquainted with the illusions of vision, without having the power to prevent their occurrence, because they are natural, in like manner, though the illusions of the reason may be inevitable, we may at least have the power of recognizing them, so as not to be eternally the sport of an appearance which we might not even have suspected. This second part of the transcendental logic Kant terms *transcendental dialectic*, the function of which is to discover and develop all the illusions of the pure reason.

There are as many classes of reasonings which carry with them a natural illusion, as there are ideas of pure reason. Those which refer to psychology, Kant calls *paralogisms*; those which refer to cosmology, *antinomies*; and those which refer to theology, *ideal*. He successively examines these three classes of reasoning. We shall accompany him, and shall in the first place point out the paralogisms of the pure reason.

Purpose of the
Transcendental
Dialectic.
Paralogisms
of Rational
Psychology.

The following are the results which psychology claims to have established:—first, the soul is a substance; second, it is simple; third, it is identically one and the same. Whence follow the three concepts of immateriality, incorruptibility, and personality. These three together form its spirituality, which spirituality is the foundation of immortality.

Kant proposes to prove that all these results are no other than paralogisms of the reason. Perhaps it would not be difficult to show that his own scepticism rests on no better foundation than paralogisms of the 'Critique.'

The principle which here and elsewhere (though never very clearly developed) is the instrument of the 'Critique,' is this: in order to arrive at any certain results, whether in psychology or the rest, we must abstract all experience; no experience whatever must be mixed up in any degree in the judgments which are the base of all reasoning. These judgments must be freed from empiricism; they must be entirely and altogether transcendental. Now since consciousness has been declared to be empirical, Kant puts that aside and seeks to arrive at a proposition, a judgment, which, in order to be entirely freed from empiricism, shall be unconnected with consciousness; and this proposition or judgment is, "*I think*," which implies *I exist*; that is to say, the Cartesian principle, which since Descartes' day, has always been considered the foundation of psychology.

Kant labours hard to prove that the "*I think*" is a proposition which contains nothing empirical, which depends not upon experience external or internal, and has no reference even to consciousness. Nothing can be more confused than the whole of this discussion, of which three-fourths at least first appeared in the edition of 1787. Generally speaking, the moment Kant touches directly or indirectly upon the theory of consciousness, he hesitates, passes from one contradiction to another, and labours to put the problem under such conditions that it becomes an easy matter for him to show that it is insoluble. A pure theory of consciousness soon puts an end to scepticism; and so, as if by instinct, without ever taking up and frankly discussing this vital question, Kant has no want of contradictions to produce a *misrepresentation* of consciousness. We will here, as we have done elsewhere, state the character of consciousness, the real conditions of the problem, and show that it is far from being insoluble.

Pure or rational psychology, according to Kant, is distinguished from empirical psychology in this, that the latter rests on the evidence of consciousness, being nothing more than a sort of internal physiology; while the former rests on the pure reason, that is to say, on transcendental concepts, which ex-

clude everything of an empirical character. "If the slightest degree of empiricism," says Kant, "if any particular perception of any internal state be mixed up with the fundamental knowledge of this science, psychology is no longer a rational science of the soul, but an empirical one. We need a science that shall be grounded entirely on the proposition *I think*."

And again: "The slightest perception of an internal object, were it merely that of pleasure or pain, would immediately change rational psychology into empirical. The *I think*, then, is the only foundation of a rational psychology, which must derive all its force from it."

And lastly: "If there were any other foundation for our rational knowledge of thinking beings in general, than the *I think*, if we have recourse to observations on the course of our thoughts, in order to draw from them the natural laws of the thinking principle itself, there would result an empirical psychology, a species of internal physiology, which might indeed serve to explain the phenomena observed, but not to discover those attributes which cannot lie within the province of experience, such as simplicity, nor teach the nature of the thinking principle in general; this would not be a rational psychology."

It has yet however to be proved that the *I think* is a judgment free from all empiricism, from all conscious perception. This Kant has failed to do. He shows, indeed, that the *I think ought* to have this character in order to serve as a basis of transcendental reasoning, and of a rational science of thinking being in general; but he establishes nothing but a supposition, the supposition of an abstract *cogito*, freed from all consciousness, that is to say, a *me*, as Kant himself recognizes it, void of all material. "By this *me*," he says, "that is to say, by that which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = *x*."

Here then we have the foundation of rational psychology, viz. an abstraction; and the *me* to which this abstraction leads is an *x*! But this *x* can attain knowledge "only by the thoughts which are its attributes," and we are thus referred to conscious internal perception. We thus either move in a circle, or set out from conscious thoughts, which, falling within the province of experience, cannot justify a rational science, or from the transcendental concept, *I think*, which gives a transcendental subject = *x*, only to be afterwards developed by

means of this same consciousness, this same experience, from which nothing transcendental can ever issue. If I am content to remain in entire ignorance of this *x*, if I am to affirm nothing of it whatever, well and good; but if I am to know anything of it, I can only attain this knowledge by means of consciousness; and Kant acknowledges this: "I cannot," he says, "have the slightest representation of a thinking being, except through consciousness;" and yet, according to the general theory, he would contend that consciousness can make known nothing of the nature of thinking beings more than of other beings. "All modes of self-consciousness, considered in themselves, are not intellectual concepts of objects, and give no knowledge of any object to him who thinks, and consequently can no more give *self* as an object, than it can give any other." Kant's conclusion then is, first, that the *me*, which results from the *I think*, is only a logical subject, and not a real substance; secondly, so far from being simple substance, it is but a subject logically simple. It is the same with personal identity, which is but a logical identity, and "not a personal identity, by means of which the consciousness of the identity of its own proper substance, as a thinking being, would be apprehended throughout every change of condition," etc.

"It would be," says Kant, "a fatal objection to the Critique, if it were possible to demonstrate *à priori* that all thinking beings are simple substances, which, as such, necessarily carry with them a personality, and have a consciousness of their existence distinct from all matter; for we should thus have made one step out of the world of sense, we should have entered the field of noumena, of which no one could contest our right to take possession, cultivate, and build on. It would be a mortal blow to our Critique, and would justify the old method; but looking at the matter closely, we perceive that the danger of this is not great."

Let us remark in passing, that the *old* method is the Cartesian method, transmitted from Descartes to Leibnitz, from Leibnitz to Wolf and to the entire of Europe, a method which on the *I think* establishes the real existence of the soul, its identity, its simplicity, and its spirituality. The danger then which Kant speaks of would be a return to the certainty of personal and spiritual existence; this is the danger that Kant wishes to avoid; but he is more ingenious than wise, since his own mode of reasoning, against what he calls the sophisms of

the old method, are themselves sophisms which rest, as I have already said, on the artifice of deliberately laying down a problem with contradictory and insoluble data. Let us pull down this scaffolding to its foundation, this attempt to give to rational psychology, to the true science of the soul, a foundation free from all experience.

Let us make ourselves well understood. Reason derives its authority from itself; all certainty comes from it, and from it alone; it is the only foundation of true science, of rational psychology, as of the higher physics, mechanics, logic, and mathematics. But reason, though essentially independent of experience, cannot, in the present state of things, be manifested except in connection with *some* experience external or internal. If in external and sensible experience we had never been presented with the phenomena of magnitude and quantity, with *imperfect* triangles and circles, the reason would never have conceived the *perfect* figures, the definitions of which are the base of the mathematics. Are these definitions empirical because experience is a *condition* of the reason concerning them? If the reciprocal actions of bodies had never been presented to the senses, the reason would never have developed the principles of mechanics. If individual thoughts had never been presented to the internal eye of consciousness, we could never have discovered the general laws of thought. Are these laws empirical because they manifest themselves through internal experience? We must not confound these two notions, being *distinct* and being *separated* from experience. In itself, reason is distinct from experience, but it is not separated from it. Before recognizing its authority, are we to expect or pretend that it must show itself alone? If so, we expect the impossible; we obtain simply an abstraction, easily obtained, but at the same time entirely futile. In the real life of the soul, all is given with all; the senses, consciousness, reason, are reciprocally and simultaneously developed. Distinguish, but do not separate. Would you separate the reason from the senses? Then the reason is mute. The senses by themselves present you with phenomena, isolated and confused, destitute of order and law; reason by itself shows us nothing. It is only in connection with phenomena that she can unfold the laws of phenomena. In like manner, if we throw aside consciousness as empirical, and neglect every determinate and particular thought, reason can never teach us the universal and necessary laws of thought.

Set aside all phenomena, and reason cannot reveal to you any being whatever; for as there is no being without phenomena, so there are no phenomena without being; as there are no general laws without individual and particular things, so these again cannot exist without general laws which link individuals to species. As there can be no longer order and legislation without a world to regulate and to govern, so there can be neither government without society, nor society without government. In the interior world of the soul, the government of the reason is established amidst the diversity and multiplicity of the phenomena of consciousness. To lay down the problem thus:—find a rational elementary principle, not only *distinct*, but *separated* from all experience, from all determinate ideas, from all consciousness;—is to lay down a problem both chimerical and insoluble. It is to expect that we can draw from an abstraction by artificial means—what? another abstraction which we vainly twist and turn, to get out of it a reality, and which we soon banish to the region of dreams. But the real process of the mind is not thus, although it may so have figured itself. And it is not at all wonderful that, after having at pleasure destroyed all reality, it should find itself in a vacuum destitute of all solid support:

Without doubt (and this is addressed more particularly to the Scottish school) psychology ought, as Kant says, to be something more than a mere internal physiology. It should consist of something more than a series of observations on the phenomena of consciousness, or a table of statistics without end or law, as many actual statistics are, a description of thousands upon thousands of individual facts; it should aim at a development of the *laws* involved in these phenomena. Psychology, to be entitled to the name of science, should be rational; here Kant and Germany are in the right. But it is necessary to remind them in their turn that a rational psychology, to be other than hollow and empty, is intimately connected with empirical psychology; that we ought not to be the dupes of a distinction, and then convert it into an absolute separation; and that the search for a rational psychology separated from all experience must end in an abstract psychology easily seen to be destitute of all authority.

It is the same with consciousness as with psychology; it has two parts; two terms indissolubly connected, yet essentially distinct,—one consisting of objects, intuitions, or representa-

tions diverse, multiplied, changeable, accidental: this is the domain of empiricism; and another interior or subjective, referable to an identical subject amidst the variety of phenomena with which it is in relation, which thinks and wills, which perceives both itself and the phenomena, which thinks, wills, and perceives under certain universal and necessary laws, which nevertheless appear, with the characters which mark them, only in the midst of the contingent and individual phenomena which compose the other term of consciousness. The subject of consciousness, that which thinks, which wills, which perceives,—in the language of Descartes, the thinking subject,—is manifested only with phenomena that determine it; whilst its unity and identity are manifested only in their relation, and by their contrast, to the variety of their phenomena. Consciousness embraces at once the thoughts and their subject. It is not by the aid of the logical formula, ‘every thought presupposes a thinking subject, every plurality supposes a unity,’ that we obtain at first the subject of thought; for this logical formula is at first hidden from us; it is the reason without formula, and by virtue of its own law, and manifesting itself in the midst of experience, that discovers to us, through the consciousness of our various thoughts, a thinking subject, identical and one, really existing, and really in relation with the diverse phenomena which it supports. It is even the reality of the existence of the subject, which is the basis of all other reality; and as it is not this subject which revolves round the accidental phenomena with which it is in connection, but rather these phenomena that revolve round the subject, we conclude that the thinking subject exists by itself, and not by the phenomena which it upholds, though its existence may not be manifested, isolated, and separated from the phenomena; in the language of philosophy, it is a substance. Not that it is a pure substance: far from that, it is given only in connection with the phenomena, attested by consciousness. But because this substance is only made known to us through the phenomena of consciousness, does it follow therefore that it does not really exist? Quite the contrary; for it is this consciousness itself, accompanying its existence, which properly characterizes its personality. So too, because its identity and its unity, though always accompanied by variable elements, are not the less real. The simplicity of the soul is simply the indivisible unity of the

me. This simplicity becomes manifested even in its relation to its opposites, the plurality and divisibility of phenomena, which reveal, but do not alter, the simplicity of this thinking subject. And as the spirituality of the soul is nothing more than the simplicity, unity, and identity, in opposition not only to the phenomena of consciousness, but also to the external world, extended and divisible, which we call matter, this spirituality is scarcely a deduction : it is the immediate development of the notion of simplicity, itself involved in that of identity and unity. The spirituality of the *me* is therefore by a final analysis as certain as its identity, that is to say, as its existence, which is implied in every fact of consciousness.

But, says Kant, and Germany along with him, there is no certitude in all this, because it rests upon empirical data. This subject, one and identical, simple and spiritual, possesses no reality for us only in the consciousness, along with the phenomena of consciousness ; and since this is empirical, because it attests only phenomena and simple facts, it can never form the ground of true rational and scientific certainty. Answer : first, consciousness, as a whole, not only gives simple phenomena, but also their subject, which can never be considered as a phenomenon ; and because it contains one part empirical and phenomenal, it does not follow that it is exclusively empirical, and that it may not at the same time contain an element that is rational and fixed. Secondly, be honest and admit that the problem, as you lay it down, is insoluble ; for if you cut away the consciousness as being empirical, along with the phenomenal and empirical plurality, the thinking subject, really existing as a personality, escapes you. There remains nothing but a logical subject, a pure substance, which you have no right to call a *me*. It is even the contrary of the *me*, for there is nothing more definite than this latter, while a pure substance is indefiniteness itself. Thirdly, do you know the sacrifice you make in obtaining such a substance ?—first, by the destruction of all reality, the primitive reality of consciousness, through a vain fear of empiricism ; then by a monstrous contradiction, which the half natural, half studied obscurity of a phraseology the most confused cannot hide from attentive eyes, viz. the supposition that the *I think* is not given by consciousness, but is a principle free from all empiricism, having a general transcendental character. What ! *I think*, the *cogito*, not given by consciousness ! What ! *I think*, nor the *I exist*,

which it implies, involves nothing special ! But independently of the protest of consciousness itself, does not grammar show that the *I* is involved both in the premiss and the conclusion, if conclusion there be ? Elsewhere, for no other reason than because the *I think* falls within the region of consciousness, you accused it of manifesting merely a phenomenal *me*, opening thus the door to Fichte ; now you do worse : in order to avoid making the *I* a phenomenon, you make it, what ? Why, even less, much less, than the *hæccity* of Duns Scotus, which involved individuality : you make of it an indefinite *quiddity* of the very worst scholasticism ; you make it a perfect contradiction, viz. an indeterminate *I*, an $I=x$. And all this, as you ingenuously admit, that you may not endanger your *critique*, that you may avoid the extreme peril of obtaining by reason and by experience a real *me*, one and identical, simple and spiritual, the universal belief of the human race. But this belief you have not destroyed ; you have rather damaged yourselves by coming into collision with it. This experience, which you condemn, which it is the fashion to condemn in Germany,—this experience, united to the reason, exciting it to action, but not constituting it, establishes on the theatre of consciousness, eternal truths, attacked by a critical philosophy unfaithful to its own principles, and which, in order to establish a predetermined scepticism, accuses the reason of paralogisms, while condemning itself to paralogisms, to perpetual contradictions, and *artificial* methods, I had nearly said *unworthy*, forgetting for a moment the respect which is due to an eminent mind thus led away by erroneous conceptions.

Notwithstanding the length of this discussion, we must add a few words upon Kant's opinion of the immortality of the soul. From the preceding observations, it will not be difficult to conjecture this opinion. If the thinking subject be nothing more than a logical subject, if it do not possess substance, identity, unity, and simplicity, its spirituality must be exceedingly uncertain, and much more so its existence after death. Kant here does not go so far as he might do : if the *me* be not a spiritual substance, instead of affirming its existence to be *doubtful*, it would be more correct to affirm it to be *impossible*. For death is decomposition of parts ; and the characteristic of spirit being simplicity, if the *me* has not this attribute, nor consequently that of spirituality, it must inevitably undergo decomposition. On the contrary, if it be a

spirit, it can be immortal, and spirituality thus renders its immortality at least possible. Descartes took the greatest possible care to establish the spirituality of the thinking subject. This Kant reverses, without giving himself any further trouble than that of repeating his maxim, that phenomena alone being given to us by sensuous intuition (including consciousness), things in themselves and their nature, whether spiritual or material, of necessity elude our grasp. He thus rejects both spiritualism and materialism, finding it as easy to maintain one as the other, while it is impossible to demonstrate either. Not only may the substance of the *me* be either material or spiritual, since it is totally inaccessible to us, but the phenomena of matter, and those of the *me*, do not necessarily differ, and may consequently be attributes of the same subject. "If we consider," says Kant, "that these two species of objects (internal and external phenomena) do not intrinsically differ from each other, but simply appear to exclude each other, and that consequently that which serves as a foundation to the phenomena of matter, considered as a thing in itself, may indeed not be so different, the difficulty disappears." This is exactly what Hume himself said, and in this way does Kant go back to the worst systems that spring from the school of Locke. There can be no question that substances are not made known to us in themselves, independent of their phenomena. If this be all that is meant to be asserted, there can be no objection made. But we must take care to add, that substances *are* made known to us by their phenomena, and that the conclusion from the phenomena to their subject is a perfectly legitimate one. Thus if phenomena differ, we may affirm a difference in their subjects. Now the phenomena of thought and will, accompanied by consciousness, have evidently nothing in common with the phenomena of impenetrability and solidity, which constitute extension. What is there hypothetical, then, in supposing that these different orders of phenomena imply two different substances? On the contrary, passing lightly over this difference in phenomena, and then, without reference to the phenomena themselves, pretending that these substances may either be the same or different, because they are unknown to us, is not this to accumulate hypothesis upon hypothesis? Is it not to separate the substance from the phenomena, in order that we may have the gratification of proclaiming our ignorance of

the substance, and, under the appearance of a circumspect doubt, confound what, in the eyes of consciousness and reason, is evidently distinct? Can anything be less wise than such a wisdom? which nevertheless has seduced more than one eminent mind. It is not perceived that, while declaiming on the unknown essence of substances, we are in danger of mistaking the true character of phenomena. The direct and immediate consciousness of the phenomena of thought, irresistibly reveals to us, with scientific accuracy, the knowledge of the *me* as an entity. This entity does not exist, at least of itself, independent of the phenomena which characterize it; but these phenomena themselves reveal to us its true nature. We know of mind, in fact, all that we can know, since on the one hand we know that it *is*, and on the other *what* it is: we know what it is, since we know the phenomena that characterize it; and we know that it is, since we know that these phenomena could not exist without a subject, without a substantial and real being, which is the principle and foundation of them. As the nature of a *cause* is known from its *effects*, so the nature of substances is made known by their phenomena, their qualities, their attributes, their properties. We need seek for nothing beyond: to seek a knowledge of causes in themselves, substances in themselves, separated from their effects and their attributes, is to aspire, not to a knowledge which is for man impossible, but to a false knowledge, to a chimera, since there is neither pure cause nor pure substance. God is no more a substance without attributes, than the mind of man itself. This pretended ideal of knowledge is but an abstraction, from which we vainly endeavour to draw a reality; and then, when we have demonstrated to ourselves that this reality perpetually eludes us, we think we have ascertained the limits of the human mind, while in truth we have been concerned only with a bodiless phantom. There is no thinking subject in general, there is no spirit in itself, there is no being in itself. There are only determinate beings; and God himself, the Being of beings, in himself unites individuality and universality, while knowing that He is, and that He is all-powerful and infinite.

The *me*, then, is a being,—not a pure being, but one that manifests itself by certain qualities, which reveal to itself its nature, its spiritual nature. This we are assured of in this world, such as it is, and under the actual conditions of our

existence. But because the *me* is a spirit, does it necessarily follow that it is immortal? Here there is room for wise circumspection. Since the *me* is essentially distinct from the body, it can survive it; but being in permanent relation with the body, it must depend upon the body for its development: will then this development continue exactly the same, independent of the actual conditions which surround it, after the dissolution of the organs which minister to it? Neither consciousness nor psychology gives any direct proof of this. We must therefore have recourse to another science, to another order of considerations, and require of moral science to complete that of metaphysical. We agree, in the main, with the opinion expressed in the following passage of the 'Critique,' except that we cannot participate in the exaggerated disdain with which Kant treats the speculative proof, which, after all, no one has ever thought of exclusively relying on.

"The purely speculative proof has never exercised any influence on the common sense of mankind. This proof rests on a hair's point, so that the schoolmen have succeeded in maintaining it only by making it constantly turn on itself like a top, and without discovering any solid base whercon to found it. On the contrary, the proofs that are commonly advanced, preserve all their value, and, separated from every kind of dogmatical pretension, they gain in clearness, and produce a more natural conviction. According to the analogy of the nature of living beings, respecting which reason must necessarily admit as a principle that there is not an organ, a faculty, or a feeling, nothing in fact that has not a distinct use assigned to it, nothing without a distinct end, but that, on the contrary, all is exactly proportioned in reference to a determinate end; following this analogy, man, who may contain in himself the final end of all things, cannot be the sole exception to the principle. The endowments of his nature,—I speak not alone of the qualities and feelings which he has received for a specific purpose, but more particularly of the moral nature which he possesses,—these endowments are so much beyond the utility and the advantages which this life enables him to draw from them, that he learns from the moral law itself to prize above all things the simple consciousness of the rectitude of his sentiments, at the sacrifice of worldly good, and even of the phantom glory, and feels himself called upon to render himself worthy, by his conduct and by his

willing renunciation of all other advantages, of becoming the citizen of a better world, of which he has the idea. This powerful and incontestable proof, if we add to it a knowledge of the final end of all things, a knowledge ever on the increase, and the idea of the immensity of creation, and the consequent consciousness of the possibility of an unlimited extension of our knowledge, as well as the feeling which corresponds to it, —this proof remains even when we feel obliged to renounce the idea of founding on pure theory the necessary duration of our existence."

We cordially agree in these views of Kant ; we acknowledge the argument drawn from the principle of final causes applied to the *me*, the instinct of duration, the want and the idea of perfection, particularly of moral perfection, which cannot have been given in vain. We think that the argument from final causes, joined to that of the spirituality of the *me*, unduly exalted by some, and unduly decried by others, raises in us hopes of immortality which reason may fairly oppose to all contrary arguments. But what is the ground of this argument from final causes, to which Kant attributes a value which we certainly do not contest? A principle of reason which leads us to conceive an end wherever there appears a certain order of means. This principle is unquestionably valid, but it is neither more nor less than the principle which leads us to conceive a substance wherever we observe phenomena, a cause wherever we observe effects. The root of these principles is in consciousness. We are self-conscious causes, that consciously premeditate a certain series of movements, in which we take the initiative. These we continue or suspend at pleasure ; and while distinct, not separate, from the movements of which we are the origin, and which, as regards their external development, fall under other laws. We have a personality, a being which perceives itself to be one and identical, simple and indivisible, amidst the diversity of its essential attributes and the indefinite multiplicity of the phenomena of every kind of which it is the subject. We are not only a substance and a cause, we are also a final cause ; that is, a cause which produces certain effects, certain movements having reference to an end of which we are conscious. It is because we are ourselves a cause, acting constantly with purpose and design, and with reference to certain ends by certain means, that the reason acknowledges and employs the general principle of final causes,

just as it acknowledges and employs the principle of causality and that of substance. We have seen that Kant accepts the principle of substance simply as a regulating principle of thought, giving indeed a logical subject endowed with a logical unity, identity, and simplicity, but powerless in enabling us to gain a knowledge of beings themselves. Now what right has Kant to attribute a greater value to the principle of final causes? Why is not this principle, in his eyes, the same as the other principles of reason,—a regulating principle of thought, and having reference to logical combinations only? Simply because Kant, metaphysically a sceptic, is not willing to be one in morals; and so he re-establishes with one hand, what he had destroyed with the other. The man stands absolved, but not the philosopher. But we must pass on to the cosmological part of the transcendental dialectic.

The object of the cosmology being to arrive at the absolute totality of phenomena, there should be as many cosmological ideas as there are series of conditions, and as many series of conditions as there are categories. We have then only to pursue the thread of the categories, to see how in each the reason ascends from condition to condition, until it arrive at the unconditional or absolute. Let us commence with quantity.

Time and space are the two primitive and original quantities in reference to phenomena. If time be a series, it has a past, a present, and a future; the present moment has its condition in the preceding moment, which in its turn is dependent upon a third, and so on; so that with reference to any single moment, I conceive those that have preceded it, and thus embrace the entire series of conditions. As to space, I know at first that part of space in which I exist, then this space supposes another which contains it, this other a third, and so on; I can therefore say that the first has its condition in the second, the second in the third, the whole forming a series which I travel over in order to arrive at the totality.

According to the category of quality, we consider matter as a reality in space. This matter is an assemblage of parts, which are its conditions. To arrive at these, it is necessary to decompose it. This leads to parts still smaller, but yet composed; these we decompose anew; and so we pass from one division to another, until the whole series be attained.

In the category of relation, reason finds but one series, viz.

that of causes and effects ; this series it ascends until it arrives at the unconditional.

Finally, in the category of modality, it is contingency alone which gives rise to a series. Contingent phenomena, in fact, have neither their reason nor their conditions in themselves. We seek them in other phenomena, and if these be contingent, we pass from one contingent phenomenon to another until the series be exhausted.

It follows from this, that there are four cosmological problems ; and there are two, and only two, possible solutions for each, because there are but two modes of conceiving the completion of a series. It is complete if it be infinite ; it is also complete if it have a first term. In an infinite series, it is not any portion taken alone, but the entire series, which is unconditional. In a finite series, the unconditional is one of the terms of the series, but it is the first term. This first term, in reference to past time and to space, is called *commencement* and *limit* of the universe ; in reference to parts of a given whole, it is *simple* (that is, incomplex) ; in relation to causes, it is *liberty* ; in relation to the existence of contingent things, it is *necessity*.

Reason is satisfied as well with an infinite as with a finite series, and reciprocally, because both are complete ; both solutions therefore are maintainable. It may, for example, be maintained that the world has a beginning in time and a limit in space, and also that it has never had a beginning nor any boundary. "Thus," says Kant, "these sophistical affirmations create a dialectical arena, where each is the strongest party so long as he is permitted to assume the offensive, but the weakest when put on the defensive. Vigorous champions, whether their cause be good or bad, are sure of receiving the triumphal crown, provided they preserve the advantage of the last attack free from any new assault from the opposite side. This arena has often been trod, many victories have been gained on different sides ; but often, when it has come to the final struggle, to that which was to decide the affair, care has been taken, in order that the champion of the good cause should remain master of the field of battle, to decree that henceforth his rival should not be allowed to carry arms." Kant calls these combats of the reason with itself, *antinomies*. He states successively each of the four cosmological problems, gives the thesis in favour of the ordinary solution, and the antithesis ; and then

balancing the arguments for and against, shows that the reason contradicts itself. He reviews this fight of contradictory assertions, not, as he himself says, "with a view to decide which side is the stronger, but to ascertain whether the object be not perchance an illusion, which deceives both parties, and where neither party can be the gainer." It is indeed a sceptical method, which must not, he says, be confounded "with that scepticism which saps the foundations of all knowledge, and leaves everywhere doubt and uncertainty. The end of such a method is truth, since it seeks to discover, by a trial undertaken with intelligence and good faith, the points of difference; it acts as a wise legislator, who learns from the discussions of his judges the defective state of the laws." Kant however acknowledges that this sceptical method applies only to the transcendental philosophy; that in every other field of investigation, as for example the mathematics, experimental and moral science, it has no place. You observe Kant's anxiety to place morals beyond the reach of the contradictions involved in the transcendental philosophy. But on what grounds, and whence comes this privilege? This we shall hereafter examine. I return to the antinomies of the pure reason. I cannot indeed put before you the vast labours of Kant, with all their details; you know however the method and the purpose. I shall endeavour to give you an exact idea of their nature. Here is the first antinomy:—

The Antinomies.

The *thesis* is: "The universe has had a beginning in time and has a boundary in space." To establish this thesis, Kant shows that the contrary supposition is inadmissible, and that it is impossible to regard the universe as not having a beginning. In fact, if it never had a beginning, it follows that every moment is in eternity,—in other words, that at each instant the successive states of things in the universe form an infinite series. Now the characteristic of an infinite series is this, that it can never be completed by a successive synthesis. Consequently this infinite series of successive states is impossible. Therefore we have a right to conclude that the world has had a beginning. In the same manner it may be established that space is limited, by showing the impossibility of its being unlimited. If the world fills space entirely, we can only conceive it as an infinite number of parts. If this composition (of parts), which can only be successive, requires a time proportioned to it, viz. an infinite

time, it supposes an infinite time already passed, and we thus admit the hypothesis that has already been rejected ; therefore the world is limited in space.

Such are the arguments in favour of the thesis. Those in favour of the antithesis, that *the world has not had a beginning in time, and that it has no limits in space*, are as conclusive. To establish the thesis, Kant has previously shown the impossibility of admitting the antithesis ; now in order to establish the antithesis, he shows the impossibility of admitting the thesis.

If the world has had a beginning, the time which preceded its existence must have been void. Now in such a time nothing can begin to be, because existence in such a case must be as unconditional as non-existence, and we are driven to the supposition of things either passing from nothing to existence of themselves, or by the action of a foreign cause. On the other hand, if the world be limited in space, there is an empty space which limits it, which empty space is impossible. In fact space, as we have seen, is simply the form of external intuition ; its existence vanishes the moment it is considered independently of objects ; consequently, though there may exist a relation amongst things in space, there cannot exist a relation of things to space, which it would be necessary to admit, under the supposition that the world is limited ; it is therefore infinite.

SECOND ANTINOMY.—*Thesis* : “Every compound substance is made up of simple parts ; and everything in the universe is either simple, or composed of simple elements.” If we suppose that compound substances are not composed of simple elements, these substances once decomposed, there would exist neither compound nor simple ; there would in fact be nothing ; and consequently the existence of substance itself might be denied, which is absurd. It follows that all substances are simple, and that compound bodies must be composed of simple parts, which demonstrates the thesis. But here is the antithesis :

“No compound thing is made up of simple parts, and nowhere do any such simple parts exist.” Suppose a compound body to be composed of simple parts, all such parts, like the compound body itself, must exist in space. Now space itself, not being composed of simple parts, everything which occupies a space must have elements external to each other, and must consequently be compound. The simple would therefore be compound, which is a contradiction. Besides, we can have no

intuition of an ultimate uncomposed object; a simple substance is therefore but an idea, to which, in the sensible world, nothing corresponds. It may therefore be affirmed that no simple bodies exist in the world.

THIRD ANTINOMY.—*Thesis*: "Everything that happens in the world cannot depend upon natural laws alone, we must admit the action of a free cause." If there be only physical and natural laws, every event succeeds some anterior state. But this anterior state must have had a beginning, and therefore it supposes a state anterior to itself, and we arrive at a series of successive states, each engendering the other; so that we can never arrive at a commencement, and thus the series remains without any absolute condition. Now it is a law, that nothing happens without an efficient cause: it is therefore a contradiction to admit only the causality of nature, we must also admit an absolute and primitive causality, producing a series of phenomena by its absolute spontaneity; that is to say, a free cause.

Antithesis: "There is no such thing as liberty; everything in the world submits blindly to the laws of nature." In any given moment, a cause is operative only on condition of its being itself previously uncaused. Now either these two states of action and inertia are related to each other, or they are not. If one engenders the other, it may be asked, whence comes the first in its turn; and in this infinite series of causes which we are obliged to acknowledge, the liberty of the agent disappears. If, on the contrary, these two states are independent of each other, then an effect may take place without a cause, which is absurd. Therefore everything in the world is governed by the fatality of natural laws.

FOURTH ANTINOMY.—*Thesis*: "A necessary condition for the existence of the world is, that there should exist at the same time, whether in the world as making part of it, or out of the world as its cause, a necessarily existent being." The sensible world, considered as an assemblage of phenomena, contains at the same time a series of changes. Now every change, every contingent phenomenon, implies an anterior condition; and reason obliges us to ascend from condition to condition, until we arrive at something which does not depend upon any other, that is to say, something necessary. But this necessary being belongs himself to the sensible world, otherwise he would not exist in time, and could not in any sense be said to be the

cause of a series of events. There is therefore in the world something absolutely necessary, which is either the totality of the phenomena or simply a part of them.

Antithesis: "There is nowhere, neither in the world nor out of it, as its cause, an absolutely necessary being." Suppose that the world should either be itself, or contain in itself, a necessary being, there is then in the series of changes a beginning absolutely necessary, which is freed from the law of causality, or the series itself is without any beginning; and although all the parts are contingent, the union is necessary, which is contradictory. And again: we cannot suppose a being placed *out* of the world, whose action takes place in time, who is himself consequently in time, that is to say, *in* the world. There is then nowhere a necessary being.

Such are the contradictions into which the reason falls in its efforts to resolve the four cosmological problems. "Philosophy," says Kant, "in leaving the field of experience, and elevating itself by insensible degrees to these sublime ideas, evinces so much dignity, that, could she but *sustain* these pretensions, she would leave far behind her all other human sciences, for she thus promises to give a foundation to our greatest hopes, and to reveal to us the end to which all our efforts tend. These questions:—Has the world had a beginning in time, and has it boundaries in space? Is the thinking *me* an indivisible and indissoluble unity, or is it divisible and perishable? Am I free in my actions, or am I, like other things, under the power of nature and destiny? Is there a supreme cause of the world, or do the nature of things and their order form the highest object of our researches? These are questions for the solution of which the mathematician would not hesitate to give all his science, for this can never satisfy the desire of humanity to know its end and its destination." Kant adds, that if mathematical science, which is the pride of human reason, is invested with dignity, it is precisely because, by aiding the reason to discover the order and regularity of nature, and the wonderful harmony of the forces which move it, reason itself becomes elevated above experience, while it furnishes rich materials to philosophy. "But unfortunately for speculation," he says, "reason, in the midst of her proudest hopes, becomes so embarrassed with arguments *pro* and *contra*, that being unable, as much from prudence as from honour, either to retire or to regard

Reply to
Kant.

with indifference this great process as a simple game, and unwilling to accept terms of peace, so long as the object in dispute is of so great a value, it only remains for her to reflect on the origin of this internal war, with a view to determine whether it may not be due to some misconception, and whether, this conception once set right, her lofty pretensions might not give place to a durable and peaceful reign over the understanding and the senses."

If the thesis and the antithesis can be equally maintained and demonstrated, how comes it that some men passionately attach themselves to the former, that is to say, to dogmatism; while others as passionately defend the second, that is to say, empiricism? Because dogmatism and empiricism possess very opposite attributes, which attract some, while they repel others. Thus dogmatism, by establishing that the *me* is a simple, and therefore incorruptible substance, that in its actions it is free and independent of the fatality to which nature is submitted, that there is a Supreme Being upon whom the entire world depends, gives a solid foundation to morals and religion. Dogmatism possesses a practical value which interests all intelligent men; it has also a certain speculative interest: reason is more satisfied with finding a starting-point, a solid support, than continually starting questions which inevitably give rise to others. Finally, owing to this speculative interest which it possesses, dogmatism is popular, and this is not its least claim. Empiricism has none of these advantages: with it all morality, all religion seem to vanish; for what becomes of one or the other, if we deny the existence of the soul as an indivisible and incorruptible substance, if we deny God, if we deny liberty? But on the other hand, empiricism is both clear and safe; it is unattackable so long as it remains within its own limits, that is to say, so long as it has no other end in view in its antithesis than that of lowering the presumptuous temerity of the reason, which prides itself on its penetration and its knowledge, precisely where penetration and knowledge are not possible. But if empiricism, in its turn, become dogmatical, if it positively deny what is altogether beyond its jurisdiction, it then becomes a mental intemperance which is infinitely mischievous, since the interests of practical reason thereby suffer irreparable wrong. Besides, empiricism rarely goes beyond the precincts of the schools; it never conciliates the multitude; it is unfavourable to practical results, and is too

severe in speculation ; demands ever principles and rigorous consequences, and often forces from us the humiliating confession of our weakness. Common sense will always lean to the brilliant thesis of dogmatism ; its affirmation is in proportion to its ignorance, and where the judgment is at fault, it calls in the aid of the imagination.

Such are the opposite characteristics of dogmatism and empiricism ; a genuine philosophy ought not, from these characters alone, to decide for one or the other : it ought to free itself from all foreign or outward influences, and, by examining these antinomies with impartiality, try to discover the illusion that both parties labour under.

Recollect the conclusions of the transcendental æsthetic : every object of experience is given to us under the conditions of space and time, which are but pure forms of intuition, having no reality out of experience. We apprehend therefore nothing but phenomena, as far as they are represented as extended things, or as forming a series of events, but having no existence out of the thinking subject. We must not lose sight of this ; it is by this light that we may examine the principle or the reasoning on which cosmology is founded. The conditional being given, the entire series of conditions is given along with it, and consequently the absolute or unconditional itself ; and as sensible objects are given to us as conditional, the entire series of conditions is also given, and consequently the unconditional or absolute. The error involved in this mode of reasoning is manifest ; there is no relation between the major and the minor, and consequently the conclusion is worthless. The first has reference to an object in itself, the second to an object of sense. But we can only speak of phenomena, of objects such as they appear to sense. Then since we are limited to phenomena, we cannot say that the absolute totality of conditions can be apprehended by us. In experience, a complete totality of conditions is impossible ; we can only ascend from condition to condition, without ever arriving at any final and absolute condition, or to the totality of all the conditions, or consequently to the unconditional or absolute. It follows from this, that the reasoning for the support of the existence of the world is a sophism, a pure sophism, and just as inevitable as that involved in the psychology.

From this point of view the contradictions of the reason vanish ; the several antinomies, so considered, become freed

from all contradictions, and the theses and antitheses are easily reconcilable.

From the moment that we cease to speak of objects in themselves, but of phenomena solely, we can determine nothing as to the extent of the world, except by experience. The whole question resolves itself into this: In representing to myself phenomena, in ascending the series which they present, is there any point at which I am constrained to stop? Thus put, the question is easily answered. I can always continue experience; at least I can conceive the possibility of its continuance. I do not say that the series of phenomena is infinite: of that experience teaches me nothing; to affirm that the world is infinite is to quit experience, it is to speak of an object in itself, consequently of that of which we know nothing. All that we can say is, that for us such a series is indefinite, that we can discover no bounds to phenomena, neither in time nor space; in this way, we keep within the limits prescribed to us. We remain within the field of phenomena, and both the thesis and the antithesis of the first antinomy, by quitting these limits, are equally false; for when one affirms that the world is finite in time and space, and the other affirms that it is infinite, the conditions of every sensuous intuition are forgotten, and we speak of the world as an object in itself.

It is the same with the second antinomy: the error, both of the thesis and the antithesis, lies in considering matter as an object in itself; hence the affirmations, equally false, that matter is infinitely divisible, and it is divisible within certain limits. The truth is, that matter, considered as it ought to be, that is, as a sensible object, is neither indivisible nor divisible to infinity.

As respects the third antinomy, doubtless if phenomena are considered as things in themselves, we must, in order to explain them, admit either a free cause, or necessity. But if they are considered as they ought to be, that is to say, as simple representations, whose conditions are space and time, all is clear. In any phenomenon presented to us, experience cannot anywhere stop in the series of conditions: it shows us all phenomena linked together by the invariable laws of nature; there can be no place for liberty. But, on the other hand, it is not necessary that the cause of phenomena should be of the same nature as phenomena themselves. If then phenomena are sensuous, if they presuppose time and space, if

their action have always its cause in some anterior state, there is nothing to prevent us conceiving the cause of these phenomena as intelligible, as existing independently of time and space, and endowed with spontaneous causality, that is, with liberty. The existence and the action of this cause might be out of the world, its *effect* only falling within time and space. We may then consider this cause under two different points of view: considered in reference to the world of sense, all its effects might be submitted to the law of causality, having their rank, with other phenomena, in the order of nature; considered in reference to an intelligible world, it is absolutely free from this law of phenomena, which supposes that every change has its reason in some anterior change. "Thus liberty and nature may each be traced in the same events, without involving any contradiction, according as such events are compared with their *intelligible* or their *sensible* cause."

To do away with the fourth antinomy, we have only to conceive, *out* of the world, a primary and necessary condition of all the contingent phenomena which take place in the world. This conception contains nothing but what is conformable to reason. But does there really exist beyond the sphere of phenomena a world purely intelligible? This Kant does not affirm. He seems by these considerations less desirous of adding to our knowledge than of limiting empiricism, and of preventing it from deciding that to be impossible which it cannot by any possibility attain to.

Here then we have the means of reconciling the theses and the antitheses. In the first antinomies the thesis and the antithesis are contradictory, simply because, instead of considering the world and matter as *sensible* objects (phenomena), they are considered as objects *in themselves*. The contradiction vanishes the moment they are considered in their true light; then both thesis and antithesis appear equally false. It is quite the contrary with the other antinomies; in them, things are considered as contradictory, which can easily be reconciled; and in order to remove the apparent contradiction, it is only necessary to show that it is only apparent, and that the theses and antitheses are really not at variance with each other. In all the antinomies, the aim of the 'Critique' is to show that the object for which the theses and antitheses argue, is but a phantom, an illusion, and that a complete analysis shows the dispute to be worthless.

Such are the famous antinomies of Kant. Having placed them before you with scrupulous exactitude, I cannot dismiss them without adding some few remarks on the value of this much-vaunted theory, the ingenious and learned construction of which you must have admired during my rapid analysis.

Kant has fallen into a grave error, in thinking that the questions raised in the antinomies necessarily require the same method of solution, viz. reasoning. There are some which doubtless cannot be resolved in any other manner; and in such case, it is conceivable that two solutions, two reasonings, may appear equally conclusive, and seem to establish with equal force both the thesis and the antithesis; this is possible, and it only remains to examine whether in fact it be so or not, whether or not there be any veritable antinomy. But, amongst the questions raised by Kant, there are some which can never be resolved by reasoning at all, so that in reference to such questions an antinomy is not possible.

Compare, for example, the questions raised by the first antinomy and those composing the third, and see if the questions are of the same kind. In the first antinomy we desire to know whether the world is eternal or whether it has had a beginning, whether it has limits in space or is infinite; these are questions strictly within the province of reasoning. But is it by reasoning that we are enabled to solve the question comprised in the third antinomy, viz. whether liberty exists in the world, or whether all things blindly follow the laws of nature? To ask whether liberty subsists in the world, is to ask whether I, existing in the world, am a free being, gifted with a causality which is peculiarly mine, or whether I only obey an irresistible fatality. Now, how can I answer such a question? Is it by reasoning? No, but by the testimony of consciousness, by the aid of that immediate internal perception which we have of ourselves. I am conscious of possessing a power of resisting, to a certain extent, forces foreign to my own. What are all the arguments in the world in opposition to a fact like this? They do not prove to me that I am not free, so long as I feel myself to be free; while, in order to feel that I really am free, I have no occasion for reasoning, but simply require a consciousness of myself. If this be so, then the antinomy raised by Kant vanishes; one cannot suppose that the mind finds two modes of reasoning equally conclusive, the one for, the other against liberty, since reasoning

in such a case is not admissible on either side. Suppose that by reasoning we could demonstrate the existence of liberty, what would be the liberty so obtained? A something united to ourselves only by a purely logical tie, not recognizable by consciousness, and of which we should have no feeling; now is this our liberty? Besides, it is impossible to suppose, without a paralogism, any mode of reasoning which could establish our liberty; for in order that it should be in the conclusion, it would be necessary that the general idea of liberty should be in the premises. Now, whence could come this general idea of liberty? Kant could not have recourse to consciousness without destroying the very foundation of his work. But from what other source could the first idea of liberty come? Thus Kant, in trying to get at a knowledge of our liberty by means of a syllogism, not only attains a liberty foreign to us and foreign to the liberty established by consciousness, but, we are quite correct in saying it, he arrives at no kind of liberty whatever, and that his syllogism itself is impossible. The error here committed is precisely the same as that already encountered amongst the paralogisms of psychology, and springs from the false idea of consciousness already noticed. Why should Kant deny to consciousness the right of establishing our liberty? Because, according to him, it can attain to nothing beyond the empirical and the phenomenal; and though it may be evidence of our acts as phenomena, it is beyond its province to attest anything of the voluntary and free cause which produces them; so that his idea of liberty is indeed transcendental, and altogether beyond the cognizance of any internal sense. But what we have already said sufficiently refutes such a psychology. The error being the same, the same mode of refutation suffices. We content ourselves then with briefly recalling the two following points: first, because consciousness is subject to certain empirical conditions, that is to say, because it could not be if certain phenomena were not produced, it does not follow that it is incapable of cognizing the cause of such phenomena; it does cognize it, and so places itself, not *out of* but *above* experience, above the flux and reflux of phenomena. Secondly, to expect that our liberty or our personal causality should be manifested independently of our acts, is to expect an impossibility; just as the substance of the *me* is nothing without its modifications, so the *me*, as a cause, is nothing without its

acts; it is simply an abstraction. As Kant puts the question of liberty, it is a chimera. If he had seen that the knowledge of the acts which we produce, and that of our causality, are primitively developed in the consciousness, only to be afterwards separated by an effort of abstraction, he need not have had recourse to reasoning to prove our liberty, and he would not have substituted a logical antinomy for an intuitive and immediate truth.

The question of liberty is not the only one in reference to which Kant has had recourse to reasoning. Take the two questions comprised in the thesis and antithesis of the second antinomy. It is asked whether the world contains anything indivisible; but since the world contains two sorts of beings, bodies and spirits, the question is double: first, are *bodies* composed of simple, indivisible parts? and secondly, is the soul a simple substance, and can it consequently survive the composition of matter? Now admitting that the first of these two questions properly comes within the province of reasoning, it is very certain that the second may be solved directly and immediately, by reference to the evidence of consciousness, which, in the unity and identity of the *me*, attests the simplicity of the being which we are, just as it attests our liberty. Kant is wrong in supposing these two questions are resolvable by the same means; if there be any antinomy, it must be in reference to matter.

There remains the question contained in the fourth antinomy, the question of necessary being. Now do we arrive at this idea by reasoning? Consciousness can evidently have nothing to do with *this* question, since it has no reference to ourselves. But is the process which evolves the idea of necessary being that of a syllogism, or is it not a totally different process, rational, it is true, but quite different from ratiocination, supposing neither premises nor conclusion to be deductively established? Descartes saw clearly that the moment consciousness shows us to be imperfect beings, we conceive the idea of a perfect being; and in like manner, as soon as consciousness attests the existence of contingent things, *i. e.* things dependent upon other things, the reason conceives a necessary being, which exists of himself, independent of any other. Experience serves as a point of departure; but this once gained, then immediately, without the support of any major premises, without passing through any logical process, conse-

quently without the formation of any syllogism, we conceive a necessary being, a being whose existence is absolute. Doubtless we cannot conceive this being until experience has made us acquainted with something contingent; but we conceive him as independent of every contingency, and as immutable and eternal in the midst of constant succession and change. We reject the idea that what is the principle of contingency should itself be contingent. If therefore it be true that we rise to the idea of necessary being otherwise than by reasoning, there can be, on this point, no possible antinomy. We do not here raise any doubt as to the validity of the faculty of knowledge itself, this is a totally different question, which we reserve for a future occasion.

From what has been said, it is evident that, of all the questions raised by the antinomies, there are but three which have any reference to reasoning, viz. the two questions comprised in the first antinomy, those of the eternity and infinity of the world; and one of the two questions comprised in the second, that of the divisibility of matter. In reference to these three questions, the mind finds itself placed between opposite reasons. Here the point is, whether these opposite conclusions can be equally maintained, whether any real antinomy exists; but as respects the other questions, the antinomy is evidently chimerical, and a deeper psychological insight shows that it is not even possible.

It may be remarked that, as if by a design of Providence, it is precisely those questions that are the least interesting to humanity, that give rise to reasonings for or against, and in which doubts may be entertained; but as regards those questions that deeply concern humanity, "Providence," as Kant himself has somewhere written, "has ordained them to be independent of the subtlety of ingenious reasonings. It has, on the contrary, placed all such questions within the reach of the common understanding, which, when not led away by pretentious science, never fails to lead the mind to the true and the useful." Now is it of the same importance for man to know whether or not the world is eternal, or has had a beginning,—whether it be limited in space, whether matter be infinitely divisible, as to know whether the *me* is a simple substance which may on that account survive the body,—whether we are free beings, endowed with an activity proper to us, and for the use of which we are responsible, or whether,

like the *things* of nature, we but obey an irresistible fatality,—whether there exists a necessary Being, the principal of the world, or whether the world subsists by itself? Between these two kinds of questions there is most assuredly a vast difference; the first possess a speculative interest, and are most agitated in the seclusion of the schools, and by metaphysical minds; but the others “come home to men’s business and bosoms.” Whether the world be eternal or not, whether it has had a beginning or not, whether it be bounded in space or infinite in extent, the *moral* world nevertheless exists. But take away liberty, God, and the unity of the soul, and what signification has the word virtue, and what becomes of the dignity and the hopes of man? So that, admitting that in reference to the first questions the mind may be incapable of arriving at any definite conclusions, is it not something that metaphysic, as well as common sense, can, whatever Kant may say to the contrary, solve the second with certainty?

So much for the theory of the antinomies; I shall add but a few words on the solution which Kant gives to them. How does the transcendental dialectic attempt to solve the two first? By showing that both in the thesis and the antithesis the mind is the dupe of an illusion. But has Kant proved that the illusion, which he supposes, is not itself an illusion? I have before showed you the artificiality of his psychological paralogisms, and I have just proved that the last antinomies are not even possible. Kant pretends that since liberty and necessary being are things which do not come within the cognizance of sensuous intuition, we can neither affirm nor deny them. What we have already said is sufficient to refute this opinion. We think we have the right to affirm our liberty, because it is given to us in the same primitive and immediate perception as the *me* itself, and to affirm the existence of God, independently of any syllogism, good or bad, by the direct and irresistible application of the faculty of knowledge itself. We therefore range ourselves on the side of dogmatism, not only because it possesses a practical interest, which, as Kant says, conciliates all intelligent men, but because, at least on the points which have just been considered, it is invulnerable, and because the empiricism which Kant opposes to it, under the guise of a circumspect moderation, involves more than one extravagance. The admission that although we cannot in truth affirm the existence of God, and

that of liberty, so neither have the right to deny them, is not a sufficient concession. No! we have no right to deny them, and have every right to affirm them. To contest this right is to throw a doubt on the faculty of knowledge itself; it leads us to absolute scepticism, as we shall hereafter show. We shall at the proper time return to this subject. We now take up the last division of the ideas of pure reason, Theology.

Though ideas are widely separated from sensible reality, there is something, if possible, still more widely separated, and that is the *ideal*. A few examples will enable you to comprehend the difference between ideas and the ideal: Perfection is an idea; humanity in all its perfection is an ideal; human virtue and wisdom in all their purity are ideas; the wisdom of the Stoics is an ideal. The ideal, then, is the intellectual existence of a thing which has no other characters than those determined by the idea itself. The idea, thus individualized, so to speak, serves as the rule of our actions; it is a sort of model, which we may approach in a lesser or greater degree, but from which we are nevertheless infinitely distant. "We compare, for example, our conduct with the dictates of the monitor that exists within us. We all judge and correct ourselves with reference to this ideal, without the power of ever attaining to its perfection. These ideas, though destitute of any objective reality, cannot however be regarded as purely chimerical. They furnish a unit of measure to the reason, which requires a conception of what is perfect in each kind, in order to appreciate and measure the various degrees of imperfection. But would you realize the ideal in experience as the hero of a romance? It is impossible, and is, besides, a senseless and useless enterprise; for the imperfection of our nature, which ever belies the perfection of the idea, renders all illusion impossible, and makes the good itself, as contemplated in the idea, resemble a fiction."

The highest ideal is that of God, and is formed in the following manner. In order perfectly to determine what a thing is, it is necessary to conceive the union of all the attributes that *can* belong to it, and then to abstract from this assemblage of attributes all inconsistent attributes, in order to attain to those in reality belonging to it, which constitutes a disjunctive reasoning, the major of which is an idea of the reason. The absolute totality of all the possible attributes is the plenitude of reality. "The diversity of things is but the di-

verse manner of limiting this idea of supreme reality, which is their common substratum, just as all figures are but different modes of bounding infinite space." Now the object in which the reason places all this reality is its ideal. It is also the primitive being, and, inasmuch as there is no being above him, the *supreme* being. As he is the condition of all existence, he is the being of beings. If we conceive this being as a substance, this substance will be one, simple, omnipotent, eternal, etc., that is to say, God, and hence theology.

But reason is not deceived as to the value of this ideal, and dares not admit as a real being what is but a creation of thought. The dialectic easily dissipates the illusion raised by these pretended proofs of the existence of God.

Speculative reason has but three species of arguments to demonstrate the existence of God: Kant calls them *physico-theological*, *cosmological*, and *ontological*.

Three kinds
of Proofs.

The two first set out from experience: in the *physico-theological* proof, we examine the order and beauty of the world, and establish the existence of God, as an explanation of this order and beauty. In the *cosmological* proof, we take no account of the harmony revealed to us by experience; it is sufficient that this experience should attest any contingent existence, to enable us to pass from this contingent existence to that of an existence absolutely necessary. Finally, in the third proof, the *ontological*, we throw aside all experience, and conclude from the *idea* of perfect being to its existence.

The Ontologi-
cal Proof.

Kant begins by discussing the *ontological* proof, because, according to him, the two others rest upon this one.

This proof is no other than that of St. Anselm. It was introduced into modern philosophy by Descartes, and the last form under which it appears was given to it by Leibnitz. It is under this form that Kant considers it, and undertakes to refute it: perfect being contains all reality, and it is admitted that such a being is possible, that is to say, that its existence implies no contradiction. Now all reality supposes existence. There is therefore a thing possible, in the concept of which is comprised existence. If this thing be denied, the possibility of its existence is also denied, which is contradictory to the preceding. You see here Leibnitz's argument, viz. God is, if

he is possible, since his possibility, that is to say, his very essence, carries with it his existence; and thus to admit it as possible, and not at the same time to admit it as existing, is a contradiction. Kant attacks this argument in the following manner:—

First, we must carefully distinguish between logical necessity, or that species of necessity which connects together an attribute with its subject, with the real necessity of things, and guard ourselves from concluding the second from the first. When I say, a triangle is a figure which has three angles, I indicate a necessary relation in such a way that the subject once given, the attribute is inevitably linked with it. But although it is contradictory to suppose a triangle after suppressing in thought the three angles, it involves no contradiction to suppress both one and the other, both subject and predicate. In like manner, though it is a contradiction to deny omnipotence when we suppose God, it is no contradiction to deny both; here all disappears, attribute and subject, and there is no longer any possible contradiction. If it be said that there is such a subject which cannot be suppressed, and should therefore remain, the answer is, that this is reaffirming an absolutely necessary subject, and is begging the question.

Kant insists that there is no contradiction in the negation of God's existence. When we say of such and such a thing whose existence we regard as possible, that such a thing exists, what species of proposition is employed? Do we employ an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If, in affirming the existence of anything, an analytical proposition be employed, we add nothing to the idea we have of it, and we consequently affirm this existence only because it is already in the idea which we have already of the thing itself, which is but a repetition. It proves nothing in reference to the *real* existence, for it is not already given as existent. On the other hand, is the proposition which affirms the existence of any certain thing, synthetical? In that case, there is no contradiction in suppressing the predicate of existence; for analytical propositions are the only ones in which, according to Kant, any contradiction is implied by a denial of the predicate, the subject being once given. It is by this means that we recognize such propositions. It is thus a contradiction to suppose a triangle, if in thought we suppress the three angles,—to suppose God,

if we deny omnipotence; because these propositions, a triangle is a figure which has three angles, God is omnipotent, are analytical propositions. But if the proposition which affirms the existence of God be synthetical, how can it involve any contradiction to suppose the non-existence of God? The contradiction would only be possible on the supposition that the proposition is analytical, and this can only be on the condition of its proving nothing.

Again, how can we conclude, from the mere conception of a perfect being, that it exists, so long as the existence itself is not an attribute, a predicate which determines the idea of the subject? Now existence cannot be regarded as an attribute, whose idea, added to that which we have of the subject, develops it, completes it, determines it. When I say, God is all-powerful, the attribute all-powerful determines the idea of God; but when I conceive God as simply possible or real, the idea of him rests the same in both cases: here it is certain that the real involves nothing more than the possible; if it were otherwise, the idea which we have of anything would not be complete, until we had conceived it as possible. It follows, that if I conceive a being as perfect, I may perplex myself as much as I please by trying to evolve from the idea the real existence. The question of existence always remains, and it is not from the conception of the object, conceived as possible, that we can draw the concept of its reality. We are therefore obliged to quit the concept of an object, if we would accord to it any real existence. This conclusion, if just, upsets the ontological argument, since this argument pretends to conclude from the idea of a perfect being, conceived as possible, its reality. "Thus," says Kant, "Leibnitz is far from having done what he intended, though he may have arrived at the knowledge *à priori* of the possibility of the existence of an ideal being so elevated. In this celebrated ontological proof for the existence of a supreme being, all labour is in vain; and a man no more augments his knowledge by ideas, than a merchant augments his fortune by adding a few cyphers to the sum which expresses his capital."

But though the argument which has just been examined may prove nothing, and may not establish the real existence of God, may we not hope to succeed by adopting a different mode of argument? No, according to Kant; and here reappears the difficulty, insoluble according to him, which the tran-

scendental dialectic opposes to the validity of human knowledge. As the existence of God, or of the perfect being, is placed beyond the conditions of experience, we have no right either to deny or affirm it: to suppose it, is to make a supposition which may be useful, perhaps necessary to the development and perfection of intelligence, but which can in no other manner be justified, at least under the actual conditions of human existence. We shall elsewhere reply to this general argument from the transcendental dialectic; it contains nothing new; it is the same that we have already encountered in reference to the objective reality of time and space, as well as of that of personal existence. We shall find Kant again recurring to it, and we shall thoroughly examine it at a more convenient time; meanwhile it is important that we should examine, without delay, the direct and positive arguments which Kant opposes to the ontological proof, to the Cartesian proof, as exhibited by Leibnitz. These arguments, we think, are at once both strong and feeble. In a certain point of view, far from opposing, we should support them; in a different point of view, it might easily be shown that they are inconclusive. The Cartesian proof, as exhibited by Leibnitz, is this; I cite, in the original text, the syllogism formed by Leibnitz himself, in a letter to Bierling.

“Ens ex cujus essentia sequitur existentia, si est possibile, id est: si habet essentiam, existit. Est axioma identicum demonstratione non indigens. Atqui Deus est ens ex cujus essentia sequitur ipsius existentia. Est definitio. Ergo Deus, si est possibilis, existit (per ipsius conceptus necessitatem);” which means, as I have before said, that God is, if he is possible, because his possibility, that is to say his essence itself, carries with it his existence, and because it would be a contradiction to recognize this essence and refuse to it existence. Such is the argument of Leibnitz, and it is that which Kant exhibits in the order and in terms which differ little from the original syllogism.

This syllogism is perfectly regular, and there is either no such thing as logic in the world, or the conclusion is demonstrated. But what is the nature of this conclusion? According to the laws of logic itself, it should be conformable to the nature of the major and minor premises united. Let us examine these premises. The major, as Leibnitz says, is an identical axiom (*axioma identicum*). It is a general and abstract

proposition. The existence and the essence spoken of are taken in a purely abstract point of view. As to the minor, it contains a general definition of God, in which the existence of this being is also considered in an abstract point of view, and not as a real being, since it is this reality itself which is required in the conclusion, and to suppose it in the minor, would be to make a *petitio principii*, to beg the question. If then the major is abstract, and the minor partakes of the same character, I ask again, what should be the nature of the conclusion? Necessarily an abstract conclusion, in which existence is taken abstractly, as in the premises. From the combination of the two abstract premises, nothing but an abstraction can follow. The syllogism therefore, though good in itself, has, and can have, no other than a syllogistic value. The existence which it involves, can be only existence in general, an abstract state, destitute of any true reality. Leibnitz then has perfected the Cartesian syllogism, if indeed Descartes had any design of forming a syllogism; but so far from having strengthened the Cartesian proof, he has compromised it. Logically the argument may be perfect, but it wants the character of objectivity and reality to which it pretends. Kant looks upon it as artificial, and as an innovation of scholasticism in no way satisfactory to common sense.

But if this proof, which Kant repudiates, and the defect of which we have just shown, belongs truly to Descartes, and if it be from Descartes that Leibnitz has borrowed it, to be reproduced by him, it must not be forgotten that it is not the only proof that Descartes advances, and not even the first that he gives. In the Discourse on Method, and in the third Meditation, it is not this proof that he urges. It is another, which I am about to present to you; and as to the one before given, it is only to be found in the fifth Meditation. Descartes has three proofs of the existence of God. The first is this:—at the same time that I recognize myself as an imperfect being, I have the idea of a perfect being, and I am obliged to conclude that this idea has been introduced into my mind by a perfect being, having in himself all the perfections of which I have an idea, that is to say, God. The second proof is this:—I do not exist of myself, for in such case I should have given myself all the perfections of which I have an idea; I exist therefore from another, and this being by which I exist is a perfect being, or I might apply the same mode of reasoning to him

as to myself. The third proof is:—I have the idea of a perfect being; now existence is comprised in the idea of a perfect being, as clearly as in the idea of a triangle is comprised the property that the three angles are together equal to two right angles; therefore God exists.

Of these three proofs, the second is analogous to the first, but the third differs from it; and it is precisely this, and this alone, that Leibnitz has endeavoured to develope and complete. Most certainly, however, it is not the most convincing proof. The Cartesian proof, *par excellence*, is that which concludes from the idea of imperfect being to that of perfect being. Consider it attentively; it is the foundation of the others, it is the logical foundation of them, and more especially is it the psychological foundation of them, the real antecedent in the mind of man, and in the order of knowledge, for it is that which furnishes the idea of perfect being. Let us then examine the character of this argument. We maintain that it is not a syllogism at all, but simply an enthymeme, not reducible to a syllogism, and that any syllogism that might be erected on this enthymeme would be an artificial argument destitute of all force, just as the *cogito, ergo sum*, is an enthymeme which could only be converted into a syllogism by destroying it.

Those who have constructed a syllogism from the *cogito, ergo sum*, have proceeded in this manner:—that which thinks must exist; now I think, therefore I exist. There are two defects in this argument. First, it is reasoning in a circle: the real difficulty is to conclude from thought to being, which are two things very different in themselves. Now this conclusion, from one thing to another different thing, is not rendered legitimate, when, without any other proof, instead of particularizing, we generalize that we may finish by particularizing. The major premiss, the general proposition, ‘that which thinks exists,’ involves indeed the particular conclusion; but it does not justify it, because it itself needs justification. The tie that binds together thought and being in the major is just the difficulty to be resolved. The major contains it, but does not solve it. We are therefore after the ratiocination just as we were before, and the whole argument has been rightly compared to the following: *lucet, atqui lucet, ergo lucet*. Secondly,—not only does this syllogism involve a vicious reasoning in a circle, but it is open to this great objection,

were it legitimate, that it gives a logical character to personal existence. In fact, the major being entirely general and abstract, the conclusion must be of the same character, although the minor may contain an individual element. By virtue of the abstract principle, whatever thinks, exists; my thought, strictly speaking, supposes a subject, a substance, since every thought supposes a substance; but this substance, given by reasoning and not by consciousness, would be a substance in general, a logical entity merely: such is the conclusion established by ratiocination. But it is easy to prove from Descartes himself, that he never intended to construct a syllogism, and that his proof does not rest upon a major premiss, which is entirely hypothetical, besides being purely logical and abstract. It is not the formula 'that which thinks exists,' or, to alter it into one more simple and more general, 'every phenomenon supposes a substance,' it is not the formula on which the primitive personal existence rests, the *me*, the subject of my thought: no, it is, on the contrary, the fact of consciousness, the direct perception of thought, and the indirect, it may be, but real perception of the *me*, the subject of my thought, which, gradually evolved by reflection, has generated the general formula; every phenomenon supposes a subject, whatever thinks exists. The reason, very different from *reasoning*, does not discover the real and living *me* by the pale light of an abstract formula; but it conceives it by virtue of the synthetic power with which it is endowed, as soon as the phenomena of thought become known by experience. The primitive conception of the reason does not precede the phenomena of consciousness, nor do the phenomena of consciousness precede the conceptions of the reason; they are both contemporaneous in the unity of the primitive fact of consciousness. The conception of the reason again is not a process of reasoning, for on what could it rest? Where would it find its principle, its major premiss? Every major premiss, whatever it might be, would possess the twofold defect of taking for granted what was intended to be proved, and of resting on a merely logical entity. No, there is no question here of a major; as Descartes profoundly said to Gassendi, you begin by imputing false major premises to me, that you may have the pleasure of refuting them. No major premiss can fill up the gap which separates being from thought, phenomena from substance, attribute from subject. It is reason itself which, by its own

inherent power, overleaps this abyss, which *reveals* (the word is here perfectly legitimate) the hidden but real subject of every phenomenon, of every thought. We should rather say that there is no real abyss, but simply a logical one; in the reality of consciousness, there is distinction, but not separation; thought is given to consciousness and to reason in the subject, and the subject is given to them with the thought. Better still, and using the language of Descartes, there is not primitively thought and subject; this language is too abstract; it is logical, not psychological; at first there are but particular thoughts, which are recognized as *mine*, and a determinate subject of these thoughts, which is *I*: their bond of union is not logical, it is real; mark it, if you like, by *ergo*,—this is but the form, the shadow of a syllogism. It is an immediate conception, resting upon no principle, on nothing intermediate; it is the living perception of a living thought in a living personal self. The science of the soul's life, psychology, terminates in reality, because it sets out with reality.

Thus psychology furnishes natural theology with the ontological proof of the existence of God, and this *à priori* proof, when seen from its true point of view, and established on its true basis, has great strength.

We have seen this ontological proof, when presented in a logical form, successfully attacked by Kant; but his arguments are worth nothing against the true Cartesian proof, which is valid against all his attacks, because it does not rest upon an argument at all. To invest it with all its force, we have only to consider it in its true character.

When, by means of thought, I have recognized my own existence, I have the consciousness of a being which really exists, of a substance, which is myself. Little time however is required, little experience of myself is needed, to convince me of the weakness of this substance in the errors of the thoughts which belong to it. Sensation, which first excites thought, sometimes obstructs it, even obscures it, by its vivacity, or weakens it by its own want of force. Passion, which often invests it with so much energy, more frequently blinds it. A small stone, as observed by Pascal, placed in one position rather than another, or the buzzing of a fly, will trouble the strongest mind. Every night, sleep, suspending the memory and extinguishing consciousness, interrupts and seems to annihilate our existence, since we lose all knowledge, at

least what constituted knowledge in our eyes. I am, for I think; I am really, for I really think; I am therefore a substance which knows itself by a science the most certain of all, since it is the most immediate, consciousness. But this substance which I am, which I know myself to be, I know also and feel to be finite, and limited on all sides. I know and feel it to be imperfect, in the evident imperfection of my thoughts. This is a fact as certain as that of existence. But it is no less a fact that, at the same time that I recognize the imperfection of my own being, I conceive a perfect Being, the principle and foundation of my existence. As the reason conceives being as the basis of thought, so this same reason, as soon as it conceives my imperfect, limited, finite, and contingent existence, conceives the existence of a being perfect, unlimited, infinite, and necessary. It ascends from the imperfect to the perfect, from the finite to the infinite, from the contingent to the necessary, by an inherent force, which is its own authority, needing no support from other principles; and dispensing with all major premises. The two terms are here in absolute contrast, the imperfect and the perfect, the finite and the infinite, the contingent and the necessary, in a synthesis which is neither an induction from experience nor a deduction by reasoning. There is here no syllogism. What principle could enable us to develop, in the conclusion, the infinite, the perfect, the necessary? The principle must either involve the infinite, and in that case we should reason in a circle; and if it did not involve it, the conclusion would be impossible. Neither is there any abstraction involved. As I do not set out with an imperfect substance in general, but from an imperfect being, myself, the perfect being which I conceive cannot be abstract: it is a really existent being, existing in his perfection and infinitude, just as the being constituting myself really exists, with its imperfections and limitations. The existence of this being has all the reality of mine to be the principle of it, as the substance of my thought has all the reality of my thought. The principle of a real and living self is not, and cannot be, a logical entity. Whence could come the reality of the *me*, if the principle of it were an abstraction? Reasonings come afterwards. The truth is, that primitively the reason, as soon as it conceives the imperfection of my being, conceives a perfect being. Here is a primitive fact, marvellous indeed, but incontestable. Subsequently re-

flection and reasoning take up this fact, and produce it in the schools under the appearance of general formulæ, which are legitimate as long as this fact serves as their foundation, but which, when this is removed, falls with it. It is not this general formula—the imperfect supposes the perfect, the finite supposes the infinite, the contingent supposes the necessary—which, logically applied to the imperfect, finite, and contingent *me*, gives the perfect, infinite, and necessary Being. It is the natural conception of the perfect Being, the principle of my imperfect being, which the reason at first spontaneously evolves, and which, subsequently abstracted and generalized, engenders formulæ which the reason accepts, because in them it recognizes its own primitive and legitimate action. These formulæ are excellent and true; they serve as principles to reasoning and to logic, but their root is elsewhere,—in the natural energy of the reason. Logic governs in the schools, *illa se jactat in aulâ*, but reason belongs to humanity entire; it is the light of every man on his entrance to the world, it is the treasure of the poor in mind as of the richest intelligences. The lowest of men, in the feeling of the inherent misery of his limited nature, obscurely and vaguely conceives the all-perfect Being, and cannot so conceive him without feeling himself comforted and relieved, nor without experiencing the want and the desire of again finding and possessing, were it but for a single fugitive moment, the power and sweetness of this contemplation, notion, idea, or sentiment; for what signify words? the soul has no need of words. The poor woman whose prayer Fénelon envied, was destitute of learned words; she wept in silence, absorbed in the thought of the infinite and perfect Being, the invisible witness and secret consoler of her miseries. All these strong expressions paint the interior scene which passes in all souls, in that of Plato or of Leibnitz, as of the humblest man, which solaces one, humiliates the other, but confounds all in a sentiment of the same nature, the same misery, the same greatness. The man is always in the philosopher; he at once inspires and restrains him, and incessantly recalls him to the feeling of reality. It is thus that psychology enlightens and impregnates logic, by infusing into it real and living elements, which logic subsequently combines, developes, and legitimately systematizes, so long as it does not become separated from psychology. If it become separated from it, and its general formulæ, its abstract prin-

ciples, its most regular syllogisms be presented for the purpose of founding realities, it assuredly fails; it misses the end in trying to shoot beyond it, while it opens the door to scepticism. The syllogism of Leibnitz, as it stands, justifies the objections of Kant; but they vanish when it is traced to its source, to the true Cartesian proof, just as the objections of Kant against the substantial reality of the *me* vanish in restoring to the *cogito, ergo sum*, its true meaning, and when, instead of attempting to construct a syllogism, we invest it with the unquestionable authority of an immediate and spontaneous perception, of a primitive and permanent fact of consciousness.

Cosmological proof. The argument which Kant calls *cosmological*, is that which Leibnitz has named *à contingentid mundi*. Kant thus presents it: "If anything whatever exists, then there must exist an absolutely necessary being; now something does exist, as, for example, myself, therefore an absolutely necessary being exists. The minor contains an experimental fact, and the major concludes from an experimental fact in general, to the existence of a necessary being. The proof thus sets out from experience, and is not therefore *à priori* or ontological." For this reason, Kant considers this proof somewhat more within the reach of common sense, and less scholastic than the former one. But the difference which seems to him to exist between the two proofs, arises simply from the fact, that he considered the ontological proof in its logical form, and not in its psychological form as originally presented by Descartes. That proof has also a minor premiss, which contains a fact from experience, viz. the imperfection of my being, as in the other we have in the minor the contingency of my being, and that of the world. The two minors have therefore the same characters, and the arguments so far resemble each other, that in exhibiting one, according to the spirit, and not according to the letter of Cartesianism, we have already exhibited the other. The imperfection of my being is intimately connected with its contingency; we have at the same time the feeling of both, and therefore conceive perfect being and necessary being. But we add what Kant had never even suspected, that neither argument is syllogistic, and that in this case, as in the other, the syllogism is a parallogism. In fact, the true major premiss of the cosmological argument should be, that all contingent

existence is not self-sufficient, and therefore supposes necessary existence. Now it is perfectly clear that this major already contains the conclusion. It is not therefore a syllogism, it is a pure enthymeme, just as the ontological argument, the *cogito, ergo sum*.

Kant makes necessary Being a sort of monstrosity. "The Absolute Necessity," he says, "which we seem to consider so indispensable a thing as the last support of all things, is the veritable gulf of human reason. Eternity itself, however sublime and however terrible, as depicted by Haller, turns the brain less, for it but measures the duration of things, and does not attempt to sustain them. We can neither banish the thought, nor can we support it, that a being, which we represent to ourselves as the highest of all possible beings, might say to himself, 'I am from all eternity; out of me nothing exists but as I will. *But whence am I, then?*' Here we are lost."

This language is that of the imagination, and not that of the reason. Most certainly imagination can never body forth a necessary being, it is impossible; neither can it represent an infinite and a perfect being, nor, in fact, any substance whatever. Imagination can only represent to itself magnitudes and forms, that is to say finite, limited, imperfect, and contingent phenomena. It vainly strives to go beyond these. But reason is stronger than the imagination: the invisible is its domain: it does not imagine, it conceives. It has the most precise idea possible of necessary being, as of perfect being, of being itself; if not, then we have no precise idea of the contingent, the imperfect, the phenomenal. We know too well the contingency of our own being,—we know it directly and immediately,—and as certainly do we conceive the contrary, that is to say, a being who has the principle of his existence within himself, while the principle of ours is elsewhere; who consequently cannot cease to be, who is self-sufficient and perfect in his essence, as he is perfect in all his attributes. We have only to enter into ourselves to conceive God by contrast, and in this way psychology sheds a light upon ontology and theology.

Kant always intrenches himself in his favourite argument. The principle which from the contingent draws the idea of necessary being, can have no value out of the world of sense. Out of that, it is simply a regulating principle of the reason

that enables it to effect the unity which it seeks, but only gives it an ideal without reality; to attempt to realize this idea, is a dialectic illusion. But what a strange position in which to place the reason and the principle itself! He denies to it all validity out of the sensuous world, beyond the limits of experience; but this concession is a mockery, for it is but too evident that in the sensuous world, and within the limits of experience, all is contingent, as all is imperfect. Nothing, absolutely nothing is there, nor can be there, of the necessary or the perfect. To confine the principle in this way, is to prevent all possible application of it; and when, according to its nature and the nature of things, it leaves the sensuous world where all is contingent, to arrive at the necessary which is its object, it then becomes but a regulating principle, which amuses and cheats our reason with a chimerical illusion, with a frivolous and self-contradictory science, a principle which for us is like Descartes' evil genius, as pure reason, gifted with wings only that it may soar into vacaney, a power of the mind which in reality is but a poor feeble thing, a senseless ideal given to us necessarily, yet vainly, and the vision of which is at once an incomprehensible enigma, an irrational and endless torment.

Kant treats with a little more indulgence the last proof, the physico-theological, which is drawn from a contemplation of the order of the world. The principal points of this proof are—First, there are to be found everywhere in the world visible marks of an order executed with the greatest wisdom, a marked design and an admirable variety of means. Second, this order of ends is altogether foreign to the things themselves, and does not essentially belong to them. Third, there exist one or more intelligent causes; and this cause is not a cause that acts blindly, but an intelligence that acts with freedom. Fourth, the unity of this cause may be predicated with certainty, from the unity of the reciprocal relations of all parts of the world. "This argument," says Kant, "is deserving of respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the best adapted to the common sense of mankind. It vivifies and strengthens the study of nature; it leads to the discovery of ends which observation alone would probably never have attained to, and at the same time extends our knowledge. . . . It would then not only be depriving us of a consolation, but attempting the impossible,—the attempt to lessen the authority of this proof. Reason, inces-

santly elevated by arguments so powerful, and which are perpetually increasing in strength, can never be so lowered by the uncertainties attaching to a subtle and abstract speculation, as not to be drawn from every sophistical doubt, as from a dream, at the sight of the marvels of nature, and the majestic structure of the world, and so from greatness to greatness arrive at the supreme power."

You see with what respect Kant speaks of the argument from final causes, and what confidence he appears to have in it; but he only makes a concession by passing over a mode of reasoning "which," he says, "could not perhaps be supported by the severity of a transcendental logic." Here the sceptic reappears, and forgets what he himself had just said of those *sophistical doubts* from which the spectacle of nature should relieve us. For ourselves, we have no fear of the most rigid transcendental logic in reference to the physico-theological argument, that is, the principle of final causes; but we think with Kant that we should not attempt to push it too far. Kant himself shows that this argument, which may be called the argument *à posteriori*, needs to be supported by *à priori* proofs. In fact, the harmony exhibited by the phenomena of nature, simply proves the existence of an architect of the world. We may, by setting out from this harmony, admit a supreme architect as the ancients did, and at the same time deny him to be the creator of the world. These are two different questions, and must be solved by a reference to different principles. In the second place, if we go not beyond the physico-theological argument, this greatness of the workman, which we suppose to be proportioned to his works, is nothing determinate; and experience, that is to say, the knowledge which we have of the world, however extended such knowledge may be, never furnishes us with the idea of the omnipotence, perfect wisdom, and absolute unity of the Supreme Being. If therefore in this argument we seem to arrive at the necessary existence of one only and perfect creator, it is because we mix up this argument with the cosmological and ontological arguments. "The natural theologians then are wrong," says Kant, "when they despise transcendental proofs, and regard them with the pride of enlightened experimental philosophers, as the spider's web of obscure investigators. For if they would examine for themselves, they would find that, after having for a long time marched on the highway of nature and experience,

and finding themselves as far off as ever from the object which the reason seeks, they abandon, all on a sudden, this trodden path, and pass into the region of pure possibilities, where, on the wings of ideas, they hope to attain what had escaped their empirical investigations."

The transcendental critique terminates with an Appendix, on the true and legitimate use of the Pure Reason. We shall finish this Lecture, already very long, by a brief analysis of this Appendix.

All that is founded upon the nature of our faculties should be appropriate to an end, and be in accordance with their legitimate use. The ideas of pure reason therefore should have their legitimate use. But what is it? A usage purely regulative; they serve to direct the understanding towards a certain end, viz. the most perfect unity and the greatest possible extension. By ideas, all the notions which would otherwise remain scattered and without bond of union, are converged to a point, which nevertheless is but an imaginary focus, for it is placed out of the limits of experience, that is, beyond the limits of human knowledge. The illusion consists in regarding as real, this imaginary focus. At the same time, the illusion is inevitable, for there is a natural tendency to go beyond the limits of experience; so that, strictly speaking, ideas teach us nothing in reference to their objects,—they are simply directions to the knowing faculty, to guide it in its researches.

That he may be fully understood, Kant re-
The use of the Ideas. turns to the psychological, cosmological, and theological ideas, and indicates the use of each.

"First. In psychology we unite, by virtue of these ideas, all the phenomena, all the actions, all the powers of our minds, in following the thread of internal experience, as if this mind were a simple substance, existing with personal identity (at least in this life) in the midst of the perpetual variation of the internal states, and the corporeal phenomena, which are their external conditions. In cosmology, we pursue our search for the conditions of natural phenomena, internal and external, as if this search could never terminate; without however denying that these phenomena might have, out of themselves, first causes purely intelligible, which could never be physically explained. In theology, we consider all the facts of experience, as if these facts formed an absolute unity, but always within the limits of the sensuous world; and, at the same time, as if the assem-

blage of all the phenomena (the sensuous world itself) had a principle placed out of the world, that is to say, a supreme reason existing by itself and creative."

Such is the legitimate usage of the ideas. If you wish to accord to these ideas an objective reality, nothing prevents you. But the mere fact that no obstacle exists, is not sufficient to justify such a procedure. Because the ideas are not contradictory, you are not therefore justified in assigning an objective reality to them. The opinion which Kant here develops with so much complacency may be exhibited in a few words; the transcendental ideas of a me and of God, have no value only in relation to the experience which they guide and systematize; but we cannot affirm the reality of their objects, because this reality goes beyond the limits of experience. "Thus," says Kant, "the pure reason, which seemed at first to promise nothing less than the extension of our knowledge beyond the bounds of experience, if rightly considered, contains but regulative principles, principles which in fact prescribe a unity higher than what the understanding itself could attain, . . . but which, ill understood, and taken for principles leading to transcendental knowledge, engender, by a brilliant but delusive appearance, everlasting disputes." As this appearance "is and always will be natural, it was desirable to set forth all the steps of the process, to deposit them in the archives of human reason, that similar errors might be avoided in the future."

Such is the conclusion of the transcendental dialectic. It serves as the principle and as a passage to the *Methodology*, which we shall consider in the next Lecture.

LECTURE VII.

METHODOLOGY.

Subject of the
Lecture.

WE have now completed the exposition of the first part of the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' the elementary doctrine, comprising the æsthetic and the transcendental logic. In this first part, Kant enumerates and determines all the pure or *à priori* elements of human knowledge. Here he collects together all the materials necessary for the construction of the edifice of pure speculative reason. But in order to erect this edifice, something more than the materials is required: there must be a plan, a method, by which the legitimate and regular use can be determined. Hence the 'Critique' has a second part, the end of which is to unfold this plan, this method; and hence the name *Methodology* which it bears.

Kant resumes, in the methodology, the results previously established as to the objective value of the pure reason. We shall leave him to establish and develop his principles in his own way, and shall afterwards offer our own observations. The present Lecture will be little more than exposition, with numerous quotations. We shall add as little as possible of our own, but give you Kant's own words.

Analysis of the
Transcendental
Methodology.

The preceding Lecture has pointed out the illusions to which the pure reason is subjected; our first care therefore should be, not to attempt to extend our rational knowledge, but, on the contrary, to confine it within its true limits, that is to say, to subject it to a *discipline*. The pure reason needs such a discipline; it has hitherto escaped this humiliation, "because while witnessing its grave and solemn air, no one could suspect it of foolishly taking images for ideas, and words for things." It is true that the utility has but a negative value; it is limited to the prevention of the errors of the reason by repressing its ten-

dency to go beyond the bounds of experience, but it is not the less important for that. "Just where the boundaries of our possible knowledge are extremely limited, the inclination to judge very great, appearances deceitful and error pernicious, negative instruction, which tends to save us from error, is of greater importance than positive instruction, which tends to increase our knowledge."

The transcendental dialectic contained a discipline of the pure reason; but this regarded simply the material, the elements themselves of knowledge. Here method is the chief object in view.

Discipline of
the Pure
Reason.

In considering the certainty involved in the results of mathematical science, results altogether independent of experience, philosophy is tempted to think that by following a similar method results equally certain would follow; but this is to overlook the just difference that exists between the two kinds of knowledge.

Take for example the concept of a triangle. This concept is purely *à priori*, for the triangle is nothing more than a limitation of space given to us by pure intuition. Whether I represent to myself a triangle as a pure intuition, or whether I represent it under an empirical form, that is to say, by drawing it upon paper, in both cases I construct it from an *à priori* principle without the aid of experience. The triangle thus constructed is undoubtedly a particular triangle, but the properties which I discover in it are independent of the greatness of the sides, and are applicable to all possible triangles. But is it thus with philosophical knowledge? For example, the concept of cause must be applied to some sensuous object given by experience, otherwise it is an empty form belonging to the understanding; it therefore supposes an empirical intuition. So that, in reference to the triangle, pure intuition suffices; in reference to causation, experience is implied.

Mathematical propositions are *à priori* synthetic, for they rest upon the pure intuitions of space and time. Hence the evidence that attaches to them. In philosophy the conditions of knowledge are not the same; here the intuition no longer suffices. No doubt experience itself would be impossible without the concepts, but the concepts in their turn demand experience, since they must be applied to phenomena, that is to say, to the matter of the intuition, which is not given

Difference between Mathe-
matical and
Philosophical
Knowledge.

à priori, like the form of the intuition supposed, space and time, but *à posteriori*.

If such be the difference between mathematical and philosophical knowledge, it followed that the method applicable to the one cannot be applicable to the other.

"The pure reason," says Kant, "has this about it, that notwithstanding the weightiest and the clearest admonitions, it is ever led away with the hope of extending itself beyond the boundaries of experience, to the attractive regions of the intelligible world; it is here therefore necessary to raise in some way the last anchor of a fantastic hope, and to show that the application of a mathematical method to this kind of knowledge cannot be productive of the least advantage, unless indeed it be that of showing more clearly that geometry and philosophy are two sciences totally different, and that consequently the process employed by one is not applicable to the other.

Definitions, Axioms, and Demonstrations not applicable to Philosophy. Since mathematical evidence rests on the definitions, the axioms, and the demonstrations, it is sufficient for me to show that nothing of all this can have place in philosophy; that geometry, in applying its method to philosophy, would but build a house of cards, and that philosophy, applying its method to the mathematics, would produce nothing but verbiage."

First: The Definitions.—If the definition of any object be the laying down clearly the properties which belong to it, then empirical objects are incapable of definition. In order that the definition should be accurate, the observation of the object must be certain and complete; but observations are corrected and extended; the characters that were at first thought to belong to the object, and which had been described, disappear; others are discovered, and thus the definition changes, and the knowledge never remains within the same limits. It is the same with the *à priori* ideas of philosophy as with empirical concepts. The notions of cause, substance, etc., may be gradually apprehended and rendered clearer; some characters are not at first discovered, and the completeness of the analysis is always doubtful.

Since neither empirical concepts nor *à priori* notions can be accurately defined, there remain in such a definition but arbitrary concepts. In this case, there is no occasion to ask

if the definition be correct, and contain the true characters and all the characters of the object, since I put in the object only the characters that are expressed by the definition. But though these sorts of definitions are true, the objects themselves are not always real. It is only in the mathematics where the truth of the definition and the reality of the object are united; the truth of the definition is always adequate to the object itself, the reality of the object, for we can represent it to ourselves *à priori* in an intuition. So that mathematical definitions are never erroneous. There can be correction, except in the form, which admits of more or less precision. Mathematical definitions then are the only true definitions. The definitions of philosophy must be content with a more modest title. While the first, synthetically formed, constitute the concept itself, the second can only be explained by a decomposition, an analysis; they are but *expositions*.

What follows from this? "That in philosophy we cannot, as in mathematics, begin with definitions, if we would avoid the formation of hypotheses. Since, in point of fact, the definitions are but decompositions of given notions, these notions precede them, though it may be in a confused state, and the imperfect exposition is anterior to any perfect one; and thus we draw conclusions from certain characters obtained by an incomplete analysis before we have arrived at a complete one; in other words, to a definition. In philosophy, the definition, as possessing a certain recognized clearness, ought to follow rather than precede the work. In mathematics, on the contrary, no notion precedes the definition; which notion being founded upon the definition, the latter is necessarily the starting-point."

"Philosophy," adds Kant in a note, "abounds with faulty definitions, and particularly with definitions which, though containing many essential elements, do not contain all. If we could not make use of a concept without having first defined it, it would be a difficult matter to philosophize. But as we can always make a good and legitimate use of the elements of analysis, whatever may be the extent of such analysis, we may thus very usefully employ incomplete definitions, that is to say, propositions which are not yet properly definitions, but which are true, and which approximate to them in exactness. Definition in the mathematics applies to *esse*, in philosophy to *melius esse*. It is always an interesting process, but often a

very difficult one. The juriconsults are yet seeking for a definition of their conception of law."

Second: Axioms.—There are in the mathematics veritable axioms, since there are intuitive principles, principles derivable from pure intuition. This proposition, for example,—there are always three points in a plane,—is a synthetic proposition *à priori*, and in order to form it I need not depart from the pure intuition of a plane. The evidence for this proposition, and in general for all mathematical propositions, is dependent upon their very origin. The origin however of philosophical principles is different; their certainty has not the same evidence; they are not axioms. In order to pass from the notion of cause to this principle, "every event must have a cause," I must have recourse to experience, which alone can make any event known to me; that is, a thing which commences to be (or appear) in time. This principle, and all principles of this nature, I cannot acquire by concepts without the aid of experience; and hence they can never have the certainty of mathematical propositions. "No proposition of pure transcendental reason," says Kant, "has anything of the certainty, though it is often proudly asserted, of the proposition, two and two make four."

Third: Demonstrations.—The principles of philosophy thus failing in the evidence, it follows that it can demonstrate nothing necessarily. In philosophy therefore, there is no true demonstration, but only in sciences which rest on pure *à priori* intuitions, independent of experience, that is to say, in the mathematics.

"It follows from all this that it belongs not to the nature of philosophy, particularly when in the field of pure reason, to assume a high tone of dogmatism, and to decorate herself with the titles and insignia of the mathematics; for philosophy belongs not to the order of these sciences, though she may have reason to hope for a paternal union with them. These pretensions, with which philosophy generally flatters herself, prevent her attaining her true end, which is to discover the illusions of a reason which mistakes its limits, and to recall it, by the aid of a sufficiently complete explanation of our concepts, to the modest but certain knowledge of itself. Then the reason, in its transcendental investigations, will no longer look before it with blind confidence, as if the road she followed must conduct it straight to the end, and the premises on which it rested could have such a value in its eyes that it might con-

sider it to be a useless labour to look back, with a view to discover in its course of reasoning faults which may have escaped it, and which may necessitate a stricter examination of its principles, or perhaps lead to the discarding of them altogether."

Whatever desire we may have to let Kant speak entirely for himself, it is difficult for us to refrain from interrupting him here for a moment, in order to defend philosophy, and to correct some of these sharp and hypothetical assertions accumulated in this part of the Methodology. Assuredly the mathematical method is inapplicable to philosophy, and it is not by definitions, axioms, and demonstrations that it is possible to establish a true metaphysical science, as was generally thought in the seventeenth century, in which the mathematical genius governed all minds and invaded all sciences. Subsequently, when the physical sciences became more perfected, their method, to which we owe so many discoveries, so many grand conquests over nature, was given as a model for philosophy. But the true philosophical method is neither that of the mathematics, nor that of the natural sciences, because the problems of philosophy and the truths which it seeks are of an entirely different order. There is no one method exactly applicable to every kind of knowledge. It is the particular nature of each that determines the method to be applied to it. Mathematical science is the domain of *deduction*, founded on a certain number of self-evident principles. Natural science is the domain of *induction*, resting on facts which carry their own evidence. Philosophy participates in both these methods, and has besides a method which is peculiar to her. Thus the phenomena of consciousness are facts as certain as any possessed by natural science. These facts are observed, classed, and referred to their laws, according to the Baconian method. On the other hand, human reason possesses necessary and universal principles like the mathematics, their evidence is the same, and they scarcely differ in their origin. Kant thinks that the pretension of philosophy to the possession of any principle as certain as the one which asserts $2 + 2$ to be 4, is a presumptuous one. But we would ask him (as modestly as he would desire) whether this principle, or indeed any other furnished by arithmetic or geometry, that he might choose to select, is more evident than the metaphysical one so often referred to by himself—all that begins to appear must have a cause. Setting aside the origin of the principle of causality and its extent, consider it

in itself, and how does it fail in respect of evidence! Is it not universal and necessary? Is it not self-evident? What could we add to it after these, and what greater evidence could any principle possess? In this case, how can Kant pretend that the principles of philosophy fall short of those of the mathematics? He appeals to the difference of their origin: for example, the principle, 'every event must have a cause,' supposes experience, that is, that *some event* has taken place, so that, without experience, the principle could not have been formed. Granted: but it is just the same with mathematical principles; for without some experimental element they never would be in the human mind at all. If the eyes had never perceived in nature *imperfect* triangles and circles, reason never could have conceived *perfect* triangles and circles. Experience here is not the foundation of the definitions, but it is an indispensable condition of their existence. It is the same in arithmetic: without the empirical intuition of concrete quantities, no *à priori* synthetic judgment could have been formed. Thus, even in relation to their origin, mathematical principles have no superiority over certain philosophical principles: the *condition* of both is experience, but their foundation is in the human mind itself. It is by a recognition of this striking analogy between the principles of the mathematics and those of philosophy, that the great thinkers, with Plato at their head, have recommended the study of geometry as a preparative to that of philosophy; and here too is the reason why the Cartesian school in general aspired to give to philosophy the evidence of the mathematical sciences, borrowing at the same time their processes, their forms, and their method, as far as external development went. This however was the error that was really committed; for though philosophy touches the mathematics at several points by its universal and necessary principles, that is to say in the domain of logic, it touches the natural sciences on the side of empirical psychology, and differs as much from the mathematical as from the natural sciences, in the nature of the objects which it pursues. In its two most elevated branches, rational psychology and ontology, the object is not the attainment of the phenomena of which consciousness is the seat, nor the most perfect classification of these phenomena, nor abstract formulæ, in which may be comprehended, by an exhaustive analysis, all the conceptions of the human mind; it seeks beings, not being in general, pure

logical entity, but determinate and really existent beings, whose real existence may be questioned, viz. the *me*, the world, and God. Now we do not attain a knowledge of such beings by sensation, nor by syllogism, nor by observation and induction, nor by deduction,—that is to say, neither by the method of the natural sciences, nor by that of the mathematics; we arrive at such knowledge, as we have already seen, by a very different process, but not less certain. But because philosophy cannot properly employ either the method of the natural sciences or that of the mathematics, must we conclude with Kant, that philosophy is incapable of arriving at any truth, whose certainty is as perfect as the truths of the mathematics? As regards general and abstract principles, the certainty in both is of the same nature; in other respects, the processes differ with the objects. On which side are the results the most certain? Man, out of the schools and left to himself, is as certain of his personal and identical existence, and consequently of his indivisible and spiritual existence, even though he may be ignorant of the meaning of metaphysical terms, as of any mathematical truth. Why then should mere scholasticism change this? Why should philosophy be placed beneath humanity? Why should reflective reason have less authority than natural reason? With these unavoidable animadversions, let us follow the course of the Kantian methodology.

According to Kant, the true office of the reason in its polemics of the soul, the world, and God, consists in placing the affirmations of speculative reason side by side with the contrary affirmations, so that it shall be the dupe of neither. The Critique should be satisfied, when it has opposed to every negative assertion respecting God and the soul the *non liquet*, which equally applies to every affirmative assertion. Dogmatism doubtless has nothing to hope from the future, since the objects which it pursues are placed eternally beyond the reach of experience; but, for the same reason, it has nothing to fear from the opposite thesis, which is equally powerless. “In the field of theology and speculative psychology, no champion can maintain his ground; he may assume a brave air, but after all it is but child’s play. This is a consoling reflection, and should inspire the reason with courage.” A consoling reflection truly, and well fitted to animate the reason,—that what destroys atheism and materialism destroys at the same time every hope

The part
which Reason
plays in Po-
lemics.

from dogmatism, and places the objects which we desire to know beyond the limits of our knowledge !

Defence of the Independence of Philosophy. Here follows a long passage, of a most elevated character, in which Kant defends the unlimited liberty of discussion in the name of the dignity of the reason, and as a means to its perfectionment against hypocrisy, often concealed under the most specious pretensions, and in favour of the sincerity of conviction and the internal rectitude of the soul. He goes so far as to propose to introduce this unlimited liberty into education, and to introduce into schools these objections of the reason to its own power, in order to demonstrate, beforehand, its inherent weakness. This would be running too great a risk ; but without adopting the whole of Kant's ideas, we find them, generally speaking, so just, and always so remarkable for their sincerity, courage, and dignity, that we shall quote this beautiful passage entire.

“All that nature exhibits to our view, is established for some end. Poisons even are antidotes to other poisons, and should have their place in every complete pharmacopœia. The objections against the exaggerated pretensions of our speculative reason, proceeding from the very nature of reason itself, cannot fail to have a good tendency, and should not be overlooked. Why has Providence placed so many objects, possessing so great an interest for us, at so great a height that we can only perceive them in an obscure and doubtful manner, and where the desire for knowledge is rather excited than satisfied ? In all cases, the reason should have perfect liberty of investigation, in order that it may, without hindrance, occupy itself with what concerns its own advantage, which requires it to put limits to its views, even while seeking to extend them, and which always suffers when strange hands attempt to turn it from its natural course, and direct it towards ends which are opposed to it. Listen then to your adversary, provided he speaks only in the name of reason, and fights only with her weapons. And do not be anxious about the good cause (practical morality), for its interests are not concerned in any purely speculative combat. This combat will probably bring to light an antinomy of the reason, which, resting on the nature of the faculty itself, should be examined. The combat itself is a useful exercise to the reason ; it forces it to consider its object in two points of view, and correct its judgment while circumscribing its power.”

If any one had inquired of the grave David Hume, who was so well fitted to preserve the equilibrium of the judgment, what had induced him to attempt to upset, by objections laboriously brought together, the conviction so consoling and so useful, that the reason has the right to affirm the existence of a Supreme Being, and to have a determinate idea of him : nothing, he might reply, nothing but the desire of enabling the reason to attain a knowledge of itself, and, at the same time, the indignation which I feel when I see the violence that is done to it, when it is forbidden from avowing frankly the weakness which it discovers by self-examination. On the other hand, interrogate a man accustomed to make but an empirical use of the reason, an enemy to all transcendental speculation ; ask Priestley what motives urged him, a pious and ardent minister of religion, to sap the foundation of all religion, human liberty, and the immortality of the soul (the hope of a future life with him was the expectation of a miracle at the resurrection),—he would reply, with great simplicity, that it was for the good of reason itself, which suffers by every attempt to withdraw certain objects from the laws of material nature, the only laws permitted us to know and determine with exactness. It would be unjust to blame Priestley, who reconciles all his paradoxes with the ends of religion, and to expect more from him, simply because he could not clearly see his way out of the field of nature. Yet Hume, whose intentions were always good, and whose moral character was irreproachable, ought not to be less favourably treated. He could not give up his scepticism, because he rightly considered that the object of dogmatism was altogether beyond the limits of the science of nature, and placed in the field of pure ideas.

What then should be done in relation to a danger which seems to threaten the common good ? Nothing more natural, more just, than the part you have to perform. If these men show talent, and a new and profound mode of investigation, in a word, if they have reason, reason will always gain by them ; if you employ other means than those of free reason, if you raise the cry of treason, if you appeal to the public who understand nothing of these subtleties, you will only render yourselves ridiculous ; for it is not here a question of what may be useful or injurious to the common good, but simply how far reason may go in the way of speculation, independent of practical interests, and whether we may rely upon it or have

recourse to practical reason. Do not therefore throw yourself, sword in hand, into the struggle; but standing on the firm ground attained by the Critique, content yourself with tranquilly watching the fight, which may be hard enough for the champions engaged, but which should be a source of amusement to you, while the issue will neither be bloody nor disadvantageous to your own knowledge. It is altogether absurd to seek light from the reason, and at the same time prescribe the part which it ought to take. Besides, reason will always retain herself within true limits, and you will have no occasion to call the guards, and oppose a public force to the party whose power has given you umbrage. In these dialectic struggles, no victory can occur that should alarm you; nay, the reason is benefited by such struggles, and we would wish that it should be oftener engaged in them, and with entire liberty. We should not have been so long without this mature Critique, to do away with all the quarrels, by teaching the combatants to recognize the illusion of which they were the sport, and the prejudices which have engendered their animosities.

“There is in human nature a certain error, which should, like everything else that springs from nature, have reference to some good end, viz. a disposition to conceal our true sentiments, and to exhibit certain others grateful to us, because they seem to have a good and honourable tendency. It is very certain that this disposition, which leads men to put on an advantageous appearance, has not only helped to civilize them, but, to a certain extent, gradually to improve them in a moral point of view; for as no one can see through this external crust of propriety, honesty, and morality, we find in these seeming good examples everywhere around us a source of good. Nevertheless this disposition to appear better than we are, and to evince sentiments which we do not in reality feel, has but a provisional utility; it frees a man from his rudeness, and makes him at least assume the appearance of worth; but the true principles once evolved and presented to the mind, all deception should be strenuously though gradually resisted, otherwise it will corrupt the heart and stifle the good sentiments under a fair but deceitful cover.

“It is painful for me to observe this deception manifested in speculative thought, where indeed there exist fewer obstacles to the free expression of opinion. What can be more hurtful to human knowledge than the reciprocal communica-

tion of doubtful thoughts, the concealment of the doubt which we feel to rise against our assertions, and the giving the colour of evidence to arguments which do not satisfy ourselves? As far as these secret artifices are raised by simple individual vanity, they may give way before the vanity of others, aided by public opinion, and things may arrive at a point where true sentiment and upright intentions would very much sooner have carried them. But when the public once imagines that sophistical reasoning tends to put in peril the foundations of public good, then it seems that it is not only prudent, but perfectly allowable, and even honourable, to come to the support of the good cause with specious reasons, rather than reduce our language to the tone of a conviction purely practical, and to avow that we do not possess any speculative and demonstrative certitude. Nevertheless I am much disposed to think that nothing in the world accords worse with the design of maintaining a good cause than stratagem, deception, and lying. The least we should demand is an entire sincerity in the appreciation of the principles of pure speculation. It is a little thing; but if we could be sure of that, the controversies of speculative reason on the important question of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, would have been long ago decided, or at all events soon would be. But sincerity of sentiment is often inversely proportioned to the goodness of the cause, and is perhaps oftener found among the adversaries of the good cause than among its defenders.

“ I suppose that my readers would not have a good cause defended by bad reasons. Then it must be pretty evident that, according to the principles of the critical philosophy, if we regard not that which *does* take place, but that which *ought* to take place, there can, properly speaking, be no polemics in reference to pure reason. Indeed, how could two persons engage in the discussion of anything, the reality of which neither the one nor the other could ever be assured of either in actual experience or possible experience, and the idea of which they would be obliged, in some way or other, to incubate or impregnate, in order to produce something more than the idea, viz. the reality of the object itself? By what means could they ever finish such a discussion, since neither of them could establish his own cause, but each must content himself with attacking and trying to upset that of his op-

ponent? Such is the fate of all the affirmations of the pure reason; for they overlook the conditions of all possible experience, beyond which there can be no evidence for the truth, and are, nevertheless, obliged to refer to the laws of the understanding, of which only an empirical use can be made, and which alone can originate any synthetic judgment; they thus present their flanks to their adversaries, until in turn the adversaries' weak side becomes exposed."

The Critique of Pure Reason may be considered as the veritable tribunal that judges all the controversies originating in this faculty; the Critique does not meddle with the *objects* of the disputes, but its authority and office is to determine the rights of the reason in general, according to the principles of "its original constitution."

"Without the Critique the reason remains in a state of nature. It can only make its assertions and its rights respected by victory. The Critique, on the contrary, whose decisions are based upon the very principles of reason, and whose authority cannot be doubted by any one, procures for us the peace of a civil state, where all quarrels and differences must be decided by reference to established laws and forms. In the first state, the quarrel is put an end to by a victory claimed by both parties, a victory ordinarily followed by an uncertain peace established by the intervention of some superior power; but in the second, it is a sentence which, founded upon the very principle of the dispute, must bring about a lasting peace. The interminable disputes of speculative reason compel us to seek rest in a critical analysis of this reason, and a legislation founded on this analysis. Thus, in the opinion of Hobbes, a state of nature is a state of injustice and violence, which it is necessary to exchange for legal restraint, which, in limiting individual liberty, harmonizes it with the liberty of all, and with the general good.

"In this state of regulated freedom we have the right of submitting to the public judgment, without incurring the character of a dangerous citizen, the doubts which we ourselves have been unable to solve. This right is nothing more than the primitive right of human reason, which recognizes no other tribunal than that of the common reason, in which every one has a voice; and since it is this common reason that must originate all the reforms that society may need, such a right is sacred, and ought to be respected. There would be

little wisdom in holding up certain hardy assertions as dangerous, or certain inconsiderate attacks against things which are supported by the greatest number and the best part of the public, since it is to give them an importance which intrinsically they do not deserve. When I am informed that some mind of more than ordinary calibre has by his arguments destroyed the liberty of the human will, the hopes of a future life, and the existence of God, I am curious to read his books, for I expect to have my ideas enlarged. I am perfectly certain beforehand, that no such destruction will have been made; not because I believe myself to be in possession of any irrefutable arguments in support of these important objects, but because the transcendental analysis has taught me, in the most convincing manner, that though the reason may be incapable of establishing any affirmative assertions out of the field of experience, it is still more incapable of proving negative assertions. Whence could this hardy logician, for example, draw his proofs of the non-existence of a Supreme Being? Such a proposition would lie totally out of the field of experience, and consequently beyond the limits of all human knowledge. The dogmatic defender of the good cause I do not read, because I know beforehand that he attacks the specious reasoning of his adversary only to make way for his own, and because I know, in addition, that no common occurrence ever gives rise to so many novel remarks, as something striking in itself and ingeniously imagined. On the contrary, this adversary of religion, who is a dogmatist in his own fashion, furnishes food for my Critique, and enables it to develope its own principles, without the slightest obstruction.

But ought youth, while passing through the process of scholastic instruction, to be protected against writings of this nature? And ought we to conceal from them the knowledge of such dangerous propositions until they have attained a riper judgment, or until the dangerous doctrine may have become so completely eradicated, that they may have the power of resisting any opposite opinion, from whatever quarter it may come? There can be nothing more useless than putting the reason of young men under tutelage, even for a time. If subsequently either curiosity or anything else should put these dangerous writings into their hands, will their convictions stand these unexpected attacks? He who carries dogmatic arms only to defend himself against an adversary, unaware of the hidden dialectics of which both he and his antagonistic are the sport,

may see specious reasons, which come recommended by their novelty, opposed to other specious reasons which have no such advantage, and may harbour the suspicion that the credulity of his youth has been imposed on; he may see no better method of showing that he is free from the discipline of his infancy than by despising the wise caution that he has received, and, becoming accustomed to dogmatism, may take long draughts of the poison that has corrupted his principles.

In academical instruction the case should be just the reverse, that is, provided the principle of the critical philosophy be kept steadily in view. In order that a young man may as speedily as possible be able to apply the principles of this philosophy, and be made to comprehend their power in discovering the greatest dialectical delusions, it is above all things necessary that the attacks, so formidable to dogmatism, should be directed against his yet feeble reason, enlightened nevertheless by the critical principles, and that he should be trained to the exercise of examining the vain assertions of the adversary under the guidance of these principles. It will not be difficult for him to grind these assertions to dust, and so in good time he will be able to free himself from these noxious appearances which then in his eyes will be stripped of all their seductive influence. It is very true that the same force which reduces the citadel of the enemy, may be brought to bear upon any speculative stronghold he may desire to erect for himself; but he need not fret on this account; he has no need of such a fortress; the great field of practical reason will lie before him, in which he may justly hope to find more solid ground for the erection of a rational and useful system.

Thus polemics, properly speaking, can have no place within the domain of pure reason. On both sides the blows fall wide of their mark, and the combatants fight with shadows; for they quit the limits of nature, and pass into a region in which dogmatism becomes deprived of all power. As each believes himself the victor, the shadows that he thinks he has destroyed, start up again in the twinkling of an eye, like the heroes of *Walhalla*. The bloodless combats may be again commenced, and with satisfaction.

Kant again carefully distinguishes the critical philosophy from scepticism. What is the action of scepticism? It follows on the track of dogmatism, everywhere planting a negative where the latter has planted an affirmative; and because reason has

Distinction
between Scep-
ticism and the
Critique.

been convicted of ignorance on some points, scepticism holds it in general suspicion. Now this scepticism, though it may oppose a dogmatism which gives no account of its knowledge, and neither knows the origin nor the value of it, breaks down when it pretends to supply its place, and in its turn tries to introduce laws of its own. Reason rests only in the certainty either of its strength or its weakness; never on a scepticism which, though it may show that the reason is ignorant of this or that, can never teach it what it can or cannot know: while it may always look to the future for more successful efforts. The human mind desires to know if its ignorance be necessary; but the necessity of this ignorance, and the uselessness of all further research, can never be empirically established by observation. To do this, the depths of human knowledge must be fathomed; and this *à priori* determination of the limits of human reason, is precisely the critical philosophy. Scepticism is but the second step of human reason, of which dogmatism is the first; but "a third step is necessary, which can only be made by ripe and mature judgment, resting on firm and universal laws, in order to determine the limits of the reason itself and to estimate its real power."

So that the error of scepticism is its not having made this third step, that is to say, its having attacked the reason on such and such points, but not in reference to its own nature and powers, or in other words, not being sufficiently systematic, universal, and absolute. We can discover no other difference between ordinary scepticism and the Critique of Pure Reason. The close relationship between Kant and Hume is unquestionable; Kant does not disguise it; he continually reverts to Hume, and at one time, as if dissatisfied with having spoken of him too briefly and episodically, he declares that he will once for all deliberately examine the nature and the steps of his scepticism.

"Hume being perhaps one of the most ingenious of sceptics, and his system better than any other, leading to a fundamental examination of the reason, it is desirable to show the progress of the reasoning and the errors of a man so acute and so estimable, errors which have sprung up on the very paths of truth.

"Hume perhaps thought, though he may never have fully explained himself on this head, that there are certain judgments in which we add to our concept of an object something

which is not contained in it. I have called this species of judgment synthetical. This passage from the concept of an object, by means of experience, could create no difficulty. Experience itself is a synthesis of perceptions, which augments the concept which I already have of an object by means of a perception, by adding to it new perceptions. But we think also that we can *à priori* go beyond our concepts, and extend our knowledge. We try to do so either by means of the pure understanding, in reference to what may be objects of experience, or by means of the pure reason, in reference to attributes or existences which lie beyond the limits of experience. Our sceptic did not distinguish as he ought to have done these two species of judgments, and this augmentation of concepts by themselves: this spontaneous generation, so to speak, of the understanding and the reason, he held to be impossible; he consequently considered all the pretended *à priori* principles as fancies of the imagination, nothing more indeed than a habit explainable by experience and its laws, and so purely empirical rules, contingent in themselves, and to which we could not rightly attribute necessity and universality. To support this strange opinion, he appeals to the universally recognized relation between causes and effects. Since no intellectual faculty can pass from the concept of a thing to the existence of some other thing given necessarily and universally by the first, he thought he was justified in concluding that, without experience, there was nothing to authorize us in forming a judgment which could, *à priori*, properly have such an intention. That the sun's rays, which illuminate and melt wax, should at the same time harden clay, is a fact which the understanding could never divine, much less regularly conclude from the concepts of things already possessed; nothing but experience could make us acquainted with such a law." Kant, taking the example just cited, replies to Hume: "When," he says, "the wax, which before was solid, comes to be melted, I can declare *à priori* that something has preceded this fact (for example, the heat of the sun); that the fact is due to the operation of a constant law, though I may not be able *à priori*, and without experience, to know in a determinate manner the cause by the effect, or the effect by the cause. Hume erroneously concludes from the contingency of the determinate objects to which we apply the law, to the contingency of the law itself. He consequently reduces the principle of causality,

which relates to the understanding and which expresses a necessary connection, to a rule founded on the association of ideas, which depends upon imitative imagination, and which indicates only contingent relations in no way objective. But the sceptical errors of this man, in other respects of a most penetrating character, arose particularly from a defect which he had in common with all dogmatists, viz. the want of any systematic *à priori* consideration of the various species of synthesis belonging to the understanding; for he would have found that the principle of permanence (for example, the principle of the permanence of the subject in the midst of accidental variations), only to mention this one, is, like the principle of causality, an anticipation of experience. He might thus have prescribed exact limits to the pure reason. But when contenting himself with a vague and general distrust, in place of the necessary knowledge of a clearly determined ignorance, reviewing some of the principles of the understanding, instead of the understanding as a whole, and denying to the understanding what it really did not possess, he goes further, and denies to it all power of self-extension *à priori*, though he has never examined the faculty as a whole: then his system suffered that which upsets all scepticism; it puts itself in doubt, because its objections are founded on accidental facts, and not on principles which necessarily oblige us to renounce the right of making dogmatical assertions."

Since Hume, besides, recognizes no difference between laws founded by the understanding and the dialectic pretensions of the reason, against which his attacks are principally directed, the reason feels that there is yet space to extend itself, and that it may yet continue its efforts, though it may often have been in error; it therefore puts itself on the defensive, and becomes more obstinate in its pretensions; but a complete study of the entire faculty banishes every dispute, baffles the vanity of lofty claims, and leads us to be content with a limited but secure possession.

The object of the critical philosophy being thus to limit our assertions, that is to say, to prevent us from affirming where we cannot legitimately do so, by this means extends vastly the regions of hypothesis; and Kant undertakes here to measure the limits within which the hypotheses of the pure reason should be confined.

Discipline of the Pure Reason in reference to Hypotheses.

It is not every fiction of the imagination that can be seriously put forth as an hypothesis. There are no legitimate hypotheses that cannot be justified by experience. The ideas of the pure reason are not veritable hypotheses, since their objects are placed beyond the limits of experience; but we may make use of these ideas as necessary conditions of experience itself; thus we may conceive the soul as simple (that is, incomplex), in order to give, by means of this idea, a perfect unity to all the internal phenomena; but to admit the soul, considered in itself, to be a simple substance, is to form an hypothesis in no way justified by experience, consequently arbitrary and illegitimate. The ideas of the reason being thus incapable of acquiring the character of true hypotheses, they cannot be used in the explanation of real phenomena. This, according to Kant, would be to explain something which we did not sufficiently understand, by something which we did not understand at all; the explanation of a physical phenomenon by a physical hypothesis, however bold it might be, would always be more admissible than by a metaphysical one; convenient, it is true, to the reason, but useless or even mischievous to science. Such then is the first condition of hypothesis; it must be justified by experience.

A second condition is, that it be self-sufficient and independent of the aid of any other hypothesis. This condition also excludes the ideas of the reason; for neither the idea of God's perfection, nor the soul's simplicity, can explain, on the one hand, the existence of evil, and, on the other, the growth and decay of our faculties, vicissitudes closely resembling those of matter.

Meantime, though the hypotheses of the pure reason may have no value to establish a dogmatic proposition, they may be legitimately employed as a means of defence against the assaults of empiricism. They cannot, it is true, be proved, but neither can they be denied, and it is through this last characteristic that they may be useful in polemics.

"Hypotheses are permitted," says Kant, "as the bearing of arms is permitted, not to establish a law, but to defend it. But here it is in ourselves that we should seek the adversary; for the speculative reason is essentially dialectic in its transcendental use, and the most formidable objections come from within . . . an external peace is but apparent. We must exterminate the germ of hostilities which is in the nature of the

reason. But how can this be brought about, if we do not allow this germ freely to develop itself, and gain strength to face the light of day, and so lay itself open to radical destruction? You yourself must originate objections that have never been made; furnish your adversary with arms, and place him in the most favourable position. There is nothing to fear, and everything to hope; for you will thus acquire a possession which you cannot be deprived of. . . .

“The hypotheses of the pure reason, though but a leaden sort of arms, since they are not sharpened by experience, will always be as good as those brought against you by your adversary.”

Finally, Kant does for transcendental proofs what he does for hypotheses of the same kind; he traces the rules to be followed in reference to them. With reference to Proofs.

The first rule is, to attempt no transcendental proof without first ascertaining the source of the principles upon which such proof is to rest; it is necessary to examine whether such principles belong to the understanding or to the pure reason; in the first case they have no value beyond the limits of experience, and in the second they can only be regulative principles without any objective value.

The second rule is, to admit for every transcendental proof only one single argument. Every transcendental proposition is in fact a synthesis, the second term of which has its sole condition in the first, which alone should be the foundation of the demonstration. The proposition ‘Every event has a cause’ rests upon the single concept of an event in general, and the transcendental proof of the existence of God rests solely on the reciprocity between a perfect and necessary being and a real being. “Consequently,” says Kant, “if dogmatism present us with ten arguments, we may be very certain that none of them are good for anything; for if one of them were certain, what need would there be of the others? Such a case resembles that of the advocate who had different arguments for different judges.”

The third and last rule is, that the proofs should be direct, not roundabout; to speak with Kant, they should not be *apagogic*, that is to say, that we ought not to seek amongst the consequences of a proposition contrary to the one we wish to establish, some erroneous consequence, in order to prove that

the principle of this consequence, the proposition contrary to our own, is equally erroneous, and that thus ours is true. Each should be bound to speak directly of his own cause, and not against that of his adversary. The apagogic proof is that of a champion who would demonstrate the honour and the right of his own side, by undertaking to fight with whomsoever should doubt it. He does not by this prove the truth of what he affirms; the spectators seeing each champion triumph in turn, end by questioning the object of the combat. When each party acts directly, each feels the difficulty of his task, and the critical philosophy forces the pure reason to give up its speculative pretensions, and to enter into its own territories, viz. into the practical.

Here finishes the discipline of the pure reason. The Canon of Pure Reason. This discipline is entirely negative and sceptical.

In order to arrive at certainty, Kant takes refuge in the moral, seeks light in the practical, seeks a rule which shall not limit the reason, but direct it and enable it to arrive in another way at the three great objects which speculation could not attain, viz. freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. The assemblage of the moral and practical considerations which establish these three great truths, forms what Kant calls the *canon* of pure reason, using a name familiar to ancient philosophy and the church. Here Kant, anticipating his great work on the practical reason, takes up the moral proofs of freedom, the future life, and the existence of God.

That the practical Reason makes up for the defects of the speculative.

Kant himself is fully cognizant of the contradiction, at least apparent, between a doctrine metaphysically sceptical and morally dogmatic, and would avoid making any episode here, any violation of systematic unity. In this he takes infinite but useless trouble, for the problem, as he puts it, is insoluble, and the middle term, which he seeks, is a chimera. In fact, this is the problem to be solved; to abandon the transcendental reason, which surpasses experience, and which consequently wants reality, without falling (Kant expressly says it) into psychology: on the one hand, empty forms, regulative principles without any objective bearing; on the other hand, experience alone, without rational foundation, without certitude.

Let us see how these conditions are fulfilled by Kant.

The practical demonstration of freedom is here very brief and somewhat confused. In order to see it clearly we will take together the passage of the 'Critique of Speculative Reason,' and the corresponding passages of the 'Critique of Practical Reason.' Here is the demonstration in a somewhat clearer form; it forms, and ought to form, a syllogism, that it may belong to the reason as Kant has defined it; only that the major of this syllogism should not be, and is no longer, a principle of speculative reason, but a principle of practical reason.

1st, Major: We have a certain knowledge of moral principles, moral laws, that do not *counsel*, but *command*, that do not announce what *is done*, but what *ought* to be done; on this account they are called by Kant "imperative laws, that is to say, objective laws of freedom."

2nd, Minor: These objective laws of freedom require the objective existence of freedom.

3rd, Conclusion: Therefore there is a real practical freedom which (we cite the text) "may be known by experience."

Here all is false and contradictory, both premises and conclusion. Kant would avoid both transcendental reason and psychology, and yet comes into collision with both.

First, the premises. We admit, that the reason discovers to us the laws relative to conduct, apart from all the suggestions of sense. But what right have these laws to the character of objective? Because they are imperative, answers Kant, in the phrase just cited. There is no other reason alleged; and we have not been able to find any, either here or elsewhere. We must, then, examine the motive. What, then, is an imperative law,—an imperative principle? It is a principle which the reason declares to be universal and necessary, and which, having reference here to conduct, is no longer termed necessary but obligatory; which is precisely the same thing, as far as the internal and intrinsic character of the principle itself is concerned. The principle which makes us conceive, universally and necessarily, time and space, wherever there are successive or juxtaposed phenomena, is also an imperative principle; imperative, not in reference to action, since here can be no reference to action, but in reference to conception.—Is this Kant? he who has so decidedly separated the internal from the external,—the subject from the object? Is this Kant, who would give to a principle of the reason such and such a character, according to its external and accidental applications, and not

according to its own intrinsic nature? Just as, in reference to successive phenomena, the reason conceives time and not space, and space and not time in reference to juxtaposed phenomena; so, in reference to acts to be done, or not to be done, the principles of the reason are called practical, and not speculative, yet their intrinsic character remains the same; they belong to the pure reason, and not to the sensory; they are universal,—they are necessary, for practical necessity is obligation. Here is all the mystery of the moral imperative law. If this be so, in what way does this law, imperative as all the universal and necessary laws of the reason, acquire the objective character that Kant attributes to it, but which he denies to all the others? Apply to this new law the critical philosophy. Either this philosophy is worth nothing in reference to the other laws, or it is confounded by this one, which is really and truly given us by the reason, our reason—human reason—such as it is constituted according to its own nature, that is to say, speaking with Kant, the subjective reason. If the reason be objective because it commands, we must also recognize this character in the transcendental æsthetic, in the rational psychology, in the cosmology, and in the theology; for here also it commands. It has manifestly an imperative character; or we must say that here, although it commands, yet, commanding only by virtue of its own nature, it is quite as subjective in one case as in the other. We avow, then, that the objectivity of the principle of the moral imperative is an hypothesis in contradiction with the entire system of Kant.

Second, the conclusion: If, in Kant's system, the major be purely subjective, the conclusion must likewise be subjective, and practical freedom has no objective reality. But this is not the only defect of the conclusion. What is remarkably extraordinary is, that Kant affirms, without any proof, that this freedom, this practical freedom, is known by experience. First, how can the conclusion of a syllogism,—a conclusion, the whole force of which depends upon the major premiss, that is to say, on a rational principle,—how can this conclusion become a truth from experience, that is to say, a fact? How! freedom, which was not a fact of experience, or at all events one destitute of all value, before the syllogism founded on the moral law, becomes, after this syllogism, a fact of experience endowed with legitimate authority! The major of a syllogism, whatever it may be, can only warrant a conclusion conform-

able to it. Here the major is objective, if you like, but then it is rational; the conclusion therefore should be rational, and it is absurd to reason and then conclude from experience. Experience does not prove syllogistically, it proves by itself; it carries with it its own evidence. Observe however that the experience to which Kant appeals, is internal experience, viz. consciousness; but we must not forget that Kant does not grant to consciousness any authority whatever. According to him, consciousness is dependent upon the sensory: in any case, whether it has reference to sense or to the understanding, consciousness—Kant incessantly repeats it—gives nothing but appearances, phenomena: how then, contrary to its nature and its general laws, can it here give no longer the appearance and the illusory phenomena of freedom, but a real and objective freedom! Here then we have experience and consciousness giving us the objective, and psychology, hitherto despised, assuming an authority above all the objections of the critique! But if consciousness has this authority in reference to morals, why should it not have it in all the rest? Internal experience, consciousness, does not demonstrate to me that I am free, for example, to move or remain where I am, to read a particular book and no other, to do, or not to do, this or that; and yet this very consciousness is suddenly invested with absolute authority, invincible to all transcendental dialectics, when it becomes a question of moving or remaining, of acting or not acting, no longer according to the orders of reason itself, but according to those of the practical reason! Wonderful metamorphosis, which, closely examined, altogether vanishes, and is explained in the simplest manner possible, as the systematic exaggeration of an incontestable fact a thousand times observed. Consciousness attests freedom, it alone attests it; it attests it with sovereign authority; but its testimony has more or less vivacity according to circumstances. Thus, in the ordinary circumstances of life, in reference to acts of small significance, consciousness sufficiently testifies that we are free; but it does so with greater clearness and energy when the actions to be done, or to be refrained from, are important, and particularly where there is question of good and evil, virtue and vice. In every virtuous act, the greater the sacrifice, the greater the power which accomplishes it, freedom, becomes manifested; the more painful the resolutions we make against the suggestions of sense, the more evident is it that we are, to a certain extent,

independent of sense. The first reward of a free and virtuous act is to engrave deeply on the soul the conviction of freedom and duty. Who that has ever done one free act, has not the idea of freedom? Whence will absolute egotism derive its idea of sacrifice? The smallest act of freedom demonstrates freedom itself better than all the reasoning in the world; it is the best refutation of contrary arguments; freedom, then, is not only possible, it is realized in a certain fact, in a fact of consciousness. If faith leads to practice, practice no less teaches faith and morals from the best school of philosophy. If Kant had said nothing more than that, he would have said the truth; but then he would not have founded a system. To do this, to lower metaphysical philosophy before moral, it was necessary to maintain that freedom is altogether doubtful, and that is only in reference to morals that evidence of it can be adduced, because there it is proved by experience. But we have not to wait for some extraordinary position to satisfy us that we are free, in the smallest as in the greatest things; only the feeling of our freedom is never so forcible as in the struggle between duty and passion, in the sacrifice of passion to duty. Here indeed is the triumph of freedom, but not its only foundation: our moral freedom energetically announces our general freedom, but at the same time supposes it. The authority of consciousness is legitimate here, only because it is always so, as the reason. Is it pretended that the reason, called speculative, can only produce regulative laws, without teaching us anything of the reality of objects themselves? This is to deprive the reason, called practical, of the virtue which should be attributed to it: the moral law is nothing more than an empty form of the reason, and open to the objections of the transcendental dialectic. This right of consciousness to attest the real existence of the *me*, and that of our freedom, once renounced, the only light we have is extinguished, and the only witness we can produce for our cause is challenged beforehand: by lowering psychology before empiricism, we condemn ourselves to a scepticism, the only remedy for which is an inconsistency.

This noble inconsistency, Kant has been guilty of. While we accuse him of it, we rejoice at it. To have been consistent in morals, Kant should have admitted only a transcendental freedom, in conformity with the mode of reasoning adopted by him, or an empirical freedom, by virtue of the internal expe-

rience which he invokes. It is by a similar contradiction that his moral theology establishes the existence of God and a future life, against the arguments of his dialectic.

The point of departure is the same, the existence of the moral law. We must however be careful not to confound interested prudence, which teaches us what we should do in order to be happy, with the law which commands us to do what we ought, not solely to be happy, but to *verit* happiness. Prudence rests upon empirical principles; for we can only learn from experience what conduct tends to produce happiness: the moral law is imposed *à priori* on the will of all rational beings; it is not subjected to certain conditions of sense, but absolute, and this it is that constitutes the true objective reality of the law.

This is not all. If there be necessary moral principles which command us to do that which shall merit happiness, we must (Kant's own expression) admit, that every man has the right to hope for a sum of happiness equal to that which he has merited by his conduct; and that thus there must be a necessary connection between virtue and happiness. The hope of felicity should not be the foundation of morality; for its purity would thus be affected, and the very essence of a moral motive would be destroyed. But morality, once accomplished, looks for happiness as a necessary consequence, as a debt; and it is the union of these two things that constitutes the sovereign good. Now this union, to be realized, supposes a supreme reason, which, uniting a most holy moral will to Omnipotence, dispenses happiness to every being that merits it. In the kingdom of nature, quoting from Kant an expression of Leibnitz, reasonable beings, though under the dominion of moral laws, can expect no other consequences from their conduct than those derivable from the natural course of things. But as reason elevates us above this kingdom, and enables us to conceive that of the spirit and grace, where happiness follows virtue, as a consequence follows a principle, we must admit the existence of a supreme being, who shall render this latter kingdom possible, that is to say, who shall realize the union of virtue and happiness; and in this way is demonstrated the existence of God, whom Kant calls the ideal of the sovereign good. But the world which we inhabit scarcely ever manifests the perfect harmony that should exist between virtue and happiness; and since this harmony is ne-

cessary, since it ought to be, we must suppose another world in which it shall be established. "Consequently," says Kant, "God and a future life are two suppositions inseparable from the necessity we are under of conceiving the harmony of virtue and happiness. . . . Consequently," he says further, "without a God, and without a world, as yet unknown to us, but which we hope for, virtue is worthy of approbation and admiration, though it does not realize the sovereign good which the reason conceives."

It is thus that the practical reason determines the existence of God and the divine attributes. God must be one; for different wills would not explain the unity which reigns in the moral world;—all-powerful, in order that all beings, and all the relations which exist between them and the moral laws, should be subjected to him;—all-knowing, that the inward sentiments and their moral value should be known to him;—present in all places, that all may be under his guidance;—eternal, that the admirable harmony of nature and freedom may never be broken, etc.

At this point Kant endeavours to connect the speculative and practical reason, by connecting the unity of the physical laws to this same idea of sovereign good, which is the principle of the unity of the moral world; by this he confers upon physics the dignity of theologic science, according to which, the unity of the world is no longer fortuitous, but necessary, and rests on the existence of a supreme and only being. He shows that theology is indebted for its progress to that of moral ideas. "Before moral ideas became sufficiently purified and determined, the knowledge of nature and of other sciences which had received a remarkable degree of culture, had produced but vague and gross ideas of God, and had produced an astonishing indifference amongst men with reference to him. The infinitely pure law of our religion, by perfecting the moral ideas, led to a better knowledge of God, without the progress of the physical sciences, or any just and true transcendental views (such views have always been wanting) having contributed to it. It is thus that we have arrived at that idea of God which we now regard as just; not because speculative reason has demonstrated the truth, but because it accords so perfectly with the moral principles of reason."

Kant here remarks, that we have no right to set out with the idea of God in order to derive thence moral ideas; for it

is precisely moral ideas that leads us to recognize a supreme being, the model of all holiness; consequently we cannot consider moral laws as fortuitous, and as resulting simply from the will of God. Virtue is not obligatory, simply because it is an order from God that we should be virtuous; but it appears as an order from God, only because it internally constrains us. It is this obligation that must be borne in mind.

In belief, we have the three following degrees; opinion, faith, and science. When our belief is such, that it exists not only for us but for all the world, and that we have a right to impose it upon others, we have then knowledge, certainty. If the belief suffices only for ourselves, so that we cannot have the right to impose it upon others, it is faith or conviction. Opinion is a belief insufficient, not only for others, but for ourselves. Science excludes opinion; thus, in pure mathematics there can be no such thing as opinion; we must either have absolute knowledge, or abstain from forming any judgment. It is the same with moral principles; the *opinion* that certain actions are permitted is not sufficient, we must *know* that they are so. The belief produced by speculative reason has neither the weakness of an opinion, nor the strength of a certainty; it is faith; such is that species of belief which belongs to natural theology. When, in order to guide me in my study of nature, I suppose a wise creator, and that the result of my researches goes to confirm the truth of such a supposition, the falsehood of which nothing shows, then I should say too little were I to call my belief in God a simple opinion; I can go further and say, that I firmly believe in God. We thus likewise find sufficient grounds for believing in the immortality of the soul, by reflecting on the glorious qualities of human nature and the shortness of human life, a shortness so little in harmony with so rich a nature. But this faith in the existence of God and a future life is apt to waver, and is often confounded by the difficulties which speculation sets up against it. It is quite otherwise with the belief founded upon the arguments of the practical reason. This is as indestructible in me as the moral law itself. Yet Kant does not give this belief the name of science. "No one," he says, "can boast of a knowledge of a God and a future life (that is, a scientific knowledge); for if any one could, this is precisely the man that I should long ago have sought; all knowledge can be communicated, and I might

Distinction
between Opin-
ion, Science,
and Faith.

hope to see my science marvellously extend itself by means of his instructions. No ; certainty here is not logical, but moral ; and as it rests upon a subjective foundation, the moral sentiment, I ought not to say, *It is morally certain*, but, *I am morally certain that there is a God.*"

Faith in God and a future life is then intimately connected with moral consciousness ; they grow and decay together, and rendering men virtuous is the best means of rendering them sincere believers.

The moral proof on which Kant establishes the existence of God and a future life, may be thus presented :—

There must necessarily be harmony between virtue and happiness ; now, this harmony does not exist in the world of sense, therefore we must suppose a God and a future life, in order that virtue may be restored to that happiness which it merits.

What is the character of the proposition which forms the major of this syllogism—there must necessarily be harmony and happiness ? Kant would conduct us by his moral theology to a God which is no longer a simple idea of the reason, but which has a real existence ; to another world, to a spiritual kingdom which exists out of the reason that conceives it, out of the soul which hopes for it. He must therefore accord to the principle upon which he founds it, an objective value. Now, has Kant any right to regard the principle of merit and demerit as an objective principle ? He says *it is necessary* to admit that virtue implies happiness, that every good action should be recompensed ; but does he not also consider it necessary to admit, that everything that begins to appear must have a cause, that bodies are in space, and events in time ? Why should the necessity be a sign of an objective reality in the one case, if not in the other ? Why should the principle of merit and demerit have a value which no other necessary principles have, and which may equally be imposed upon others as upon ourselves ? Would Kant say that this principle is linked in an indissoluble manner to the moral law, and that this law communicates to it the objective value which it possesses itself ? This would only be to shift the difficulty, and we have shown that the moral law, imperative and obligatory, can have no greater objective value in Kant's system than any other necessary principle, because the obligation at the bottom has no other foundation than necessity itself.

That we may perceive distinctly the contradiction that exists between Kant's moral theology and his metaphysical, it is only necessary to bring together the moral proof of the existence of God, and one of the speculative proofs. The principle of final causes, applied to the world, leads us to the idea of God. But whatever preference Kant may have for this proof over other speculative proofs, God, according to him, remains for us but a pure ideal. Now, if God, as a final cause, be nothing more than an ideal, the God deducible from merit and demerit must also be ideal; only, that while the first is the regulative principle of our physical knowledge, the other is the regulative principle of our moral conceptions, and consequently a moral ideal; this is all the difference that can be established. To go beyond this, and substitute a difference of ideal and real existence, is a manifest contradiction.

You have already seen how Kant, setting out from the same principle, from the union of virtue and happiness, evolves the principal attributes of God, the unity, the omnipotence, the omniscience, the eternity,—attributes which till now were as much ideal as God's existence. These give rise to new inconsistencies. In fact, the moral proofs by which he establishes the attributes of God themselves, presupposes the speculative proofs which he has rejected as powerless, so that the first may indeed confirm the other, but can never supply their place. Kant therefore entirely fails in his design of constructing a moral theology that shall be self-sufficient.

Kant was right in saying, in reference to the physico-theological proof, that though the order and harmony which we perceive in the world may lead us to suspect the unity of God, they are not sufficient to convince us of it; for the harmony of the physical world has its dissonances, at least apparent, and in fact its absolute unity is not and cannot be known to us; it implies therefore no contradiction to suppose, that several causes have concurred in the production of a work whose unity is not evident; it is therefore true that, without the *à priori* idea of a Being, perfect, infinite, necessary, and consequently one, the physical proof of the unity of God would be insufficient; but this is also true of the moral proof. No doubt the moral unity which serves Kant as a ground for the unity of God is an absolute unity; for it is the very essence of the moral law, and the law of merit and demerit, to be conceived as universal and necessary, the same everywhere

and always; but side by side with this moral world where these laws prevail, and which reveal to us their unity and that of their author, is the physical world, in which these moral laws are opposed, where different laws are in existence, that might have had different authors. We thus might easily conceive different Gods for different worlds, if we had not from another source the conception of the absolute union of God. The same remark may be made in reference to the omniscience and eternity of God. These attributes are derived from the conception of an absolutely necessary and perfect being; the moral proofs as well as the physical throw light on and confirm them; but both of them would hardly have made these attributes known to us without the metaphysical proofs, which are badly opposed and as badly replaced by the Critique of Pure Reason.

We have seen that Kant has no right to be dogmatic in reference to practical reason; and so in certain passages, as if to render the inconsistency less striking, he has somewhat lowered his dogmatism by denying to the moral theology a scientific character, a logical certainty. But here likewise we may set up Kant against himself; he either accords too much or too little to what he calls moral theology; he attributes too much to it when he attributes to it a value which in his system it cannot possess; he attributes to it too little, when, after setting out with a necessary principle which he declares to be objective, he does not consider himself justified in calling the knowledge of God scientific, though rigorously deduced from this principle. Unquestionably, if the union of virtue and happiness be necessary, and if this union cannot exist without God, God exists; if we suppose the truth, or the absolute certainty of the premises, as Kant does, why not accord the same character to the conclusion? It would seem as if Kant desired here to disguise the enormous contradiction that exists between his moral theology and his metaphysics, but he has only added another inconsistency to the rest.

For ourselves, we may speak, if you will, of our faith in the existence of God; but in our eyes there is no such difference between faith and certainty as Kant supposes. Both come from the reason; but the first is spontaneous, instinctive: it supposes no exercise of reflection; it is the state in which the reason believes in itself without giving any account of its belief, without having analysed it or examined it; the second is

the state of reason after it has examined its belief, after it has submitted it to reflection, and then puts new confidence in it. Between faith and certainty there is the same difference as between common sense and philosophy; they are identical in this sense, that there is nothing in the one that there is not in the other. Philosophy does not destroy faith, but converts it into certainty; neither does it destroy the common sense, it enlightens it and elevates it to its highest and simplest expression.

Kant himself, in the methodology, has written these beautiful words: "Nature, in that which concerns all men without distinction, has not been guilty of any partial distribution of her gifts, and the most sublime philosophy, in reference to the destination of human nature, cannot go further than the most vulgar intelligence." One would not assuredly have expected to find this sentiment in the mouth of a man who has put himself so decidedly in contradiction with the opinions of human nature; for it is not true that human nature finds, with Kant, faith or certitude only in morals, and that in all other things it is in doubt, feeling no right to affirm anything but its own ideas. The critique of Kant does not represent the sense of mankind; this demands a critique larger and more impartial, which, ceding to moral laws all the importance which they merit, attempts not to construct them on the ruins of metaphysics,—a critique which, expressing the same truths as the common sense of humanity, affirms it without fear of error, limits itself to the task of converting a spontaneous and instructive belief into a reflective one, into a scientific certainty. But let us terminate our exposition of the methodology by a rapid analysis of its two latter parts, the *architectonic* and the *history of pure reason*.

The architectonic of pure reason is the act of forming a system of the different forms of knowledge, by grouping them into a scientific unity, so as to appear as members of a whole. The architectonic is therefore an essential part of the methodology, and completes the discipline of the canon of pure reason. Kant but sketches the main outlines.

Architectonic
of the Pure
Reason.

He first distinguishes historical knowledge (*cognitio ex datis*) from rational knowledge (*cognitio ex principiis*). Knowledge is historical when he who possesses it, however it may have come to him, whether from experience or from education, can

render no account of it by tracing it to its true principles, to the reason. Thus he has but an historical knowledge of the system of Wolf, who, having learnt this philosophy, and possessed himself of all the propositions, definitions, and proofs, so as to be able to enumerate them, to count them on his fingers, as it were, becomes embarrassed if any definition should be disputed, not knowing how he ought to defend it nor how to construct another. His opinion is the work of another mind; he may have comprehended and retained, may have learned, but he is, says Kant, but the plaster statue of a living man. Historical knowledge does not suffice; he who contents himself with it, goes no further than the school, and remains a pupil all his life. Knowledge should be rational; that is to say, the general sources from which it is derived, and the principles on which it is founded, should be known. We may learn to philosophize, but we cannot learn philosophy; we cannot receive it ready made from the hand of another; here we must be something more than imitators, we must be inventors. "Philosophy is but the idea of a possible science. . . . We cannot learn it, for where is it? who possesses it? by what signs are we to recognize it? We can only learn to philosophize, that is to say, to exercise the faculty of reason, by seeking the general principles which govern certain questions, but reserving to ourselves the right of examining their source, and of confirming or rejecting them."

We should not then have an exact and complete idea of philosophy, if we represented it as a system of knowledge, the object of which was simply a scientific unity, logical perfection. It should be considered in another point of view, viz. as the science of the relation that exists between knowledge and the essential end of human nature (*teleologia rationis humane*).

Amongst the essential ends of reason, there is one, the primary, the most elevated, to which all others are subordinated, and for which they are but means; this end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which has special relation to this is called moral philosophy. It was owing to the pre-eminence of moral philosophy over every other research of the reason, that the ancients understood by the philosopher the moralist, whence we now apply the name to him whom reason has taught the difficult art of self-government.

It is in this lofty way that Kant looks upon philosophy. He constantly returns to this idea, and so brings us to the

philosophy of Plato. Our admiration here would be unbounded, if Kant had not been led to absorb metaphysical science in that of moral, and to sacrifice the first entirely to the second.

Let us now follow him in the divisions which he establishes in respect to philosophy.

First, according as philosophy embraces knowledge derived from the pure reason, or knowledge derived from empirical principles, it is pure or empirical.

Pure philosophy has two parts: in the first, which is the critique, it seeks and examines all pure *à priori* knowledge; in the second, which is metaphysical, it systematizes the results of the critique.

Metaphysic, according as it is applied to one of the two objects of science, that which *is*, that which *ought to be*, is either the metaphysic of nature or metaphysic of ethics; the one is the study of pure speculative knowledge, mathematic knowledge excepted, the other comprehends the principles which determine, necessitate, and make obligatory *à priori* such and such a course of conduct; it consequently neglects all the empirical conditions of human nature, all *anthropology*.

Kant shows why the idea of metaphysic has remained so long vague and obscure.

"Human reason," he says, "from the moment in which it began to think, or rather to reflect, has never been without a metaphysic, but it has failed in disengaging it from every foreign element. The idea of such a science is as old as speculative reason; and when did reason ever cease to speculate, whether in the manner of the schools, or in a popular manner? It must at the same time be admitted that the distinction between the two elements of knowledge, one of which is given altogether *à priori*, while the other is only known to us *à posteriori* by experience, has ever been obscure even to professed thinkers; and thus the true idea of a science that for so long a time has occupied human reason, has never yet been accurately determined. When it is said, Metaphysic is the science of the first principles of human reason, we do not mean to designate any particular *species* of principles, but simply a more elevated degree of generality; we do not precisely distinguish metaphysic from empiricism; for even amongst empirical principles, some have a greater degree of generality

than others, and are consequently more elevated, and in the degree of generality (when no distinction is made between that which is known *à priori* and that which is known *à posteriori*), how can we draw the line that should separate the first from the last, the superior from the inferior? What would be said if chronology could only divide the epochs of the world into primitive ages and ages that followed? It might soon be asked whether the fifth, the tenth, etc., belong to the first or the second divisions? So I ask, Does the idea of extension belong to metaphysic? You answer, Yes. And the idea of body also? Yes. And that of fluid bodies? You are astonished; for if we continue in this way, all would appear to belong to metaphysic. When we see that the degree of generalization cannot serve to determine the limits of a science, there must be a radical distinction, a difference of origin. What obscured the fundamental idea of metaphysic was the resemblance between it, as knowledge *à priori* with mathematics. Hence it has happened that philosophers, having failed in the very definition of their science, have been unable to attach any determinate end, any sure direction, to their labours, and, with a plan so arbitrarily traced, ignorant of the way that they should have followed, always at variance as to the discoveries which each considered he had made, they rendered their science contemptible to others, and finished by despising it themselves." We want, then, a definition that shall be free from the defects just noticed. According to Kant, metaphysic is that which should give systematic unity to *à priori* knowledge. Hence he determines the nature and origin of metaphysical principles; and you have already seen in what way, at the commencement of the methodology, he distinguishes mathematical from philosophical knowledge, in order to avoid all possible confusion between them.

What now are the subdivisions of the metaphysic of nature? Here we are only concerned with that which is, not with what ought to be.

Metaphysic comprehends the *transcendental philosophy* and the *physiology of pure reason*. The first seeks in the understanding, and in the reason, all the concepts and principles which relate to objects in general, without admitting any determinate object, and independently of all experimental verification; it is ontology which divides itself into *transcendental cosmology* and *theology*. The second considers nature as the

assemblage of objects, whether given by the senses or by intuition; but as it considers objects only in reference to *à priori* knowledge, it is a rational physiology; and since there are but two kinds of objects in nature, material beings and thinking beings, there can be but two kinds of sciences which result from this study, viz. *rational cosmology* and *rational psychology*.

Kant, as we have seen, does not comprehend in metaphysic empirical psychology, from which he says so much has been expected in our time, after having lost the hope of doing any good with *à priori* principles. He ranks it, with empirical physics, as applied philosophy, of which pure philosophy contains the *à priori* principles. "Nevertheless," he says, "in order to conform to the usage of the schools, one may yet leave it a corner, but only by way of episode, in metaphysic. In other respects it is not sufficiently rich in matter to be alone an object of study, and yet too important to be entirely overlooked or to be classed with other sciences, with which it may have less relation than with metaphysic. It has been admitted there for so long a time, only as a stranger, until it it might be able to establish itself as a branch of an extensive anthropology (itself a branch of empirical physics)."

Kant here returns to the question as to the negative value of metaphysic, that science whose value has lessened, only because more has been expected from it than it was capable of giving, because the chimeral hopes that have been raised respecting it have not been realized. If it be not the foundation of religion, it is its main bulwark, and if it do not establish the truths of dogmatism, neither on the other hand does it lend any aid to empiricism. "We may be sure," says Kant, "that notwithstanding all the disdain that may be shown towards it, by those who judge of a science, not according to its nature, but according to its accidental effects, we shall always return to metaphysic as to a friend with whom we may have quarrelled, because the reason, when as in this case it has to deal with the great question of its own destination, must labour indefatigably either to establish fundamental knowledge, or to clear itself of ideas already received."

Under the title of 'The History of Pure Reason,' Kant throws a rapid but systematic glance over the history of philosophy.

"It is somewhat remarkable," says he, "though naturally

it could scarcely have been otherwise, that men, in the infancy of philosophy, should have commenced where now we would gladly finish; that is to say, that they took as the objects of their first studies, God, and the hope, or even the precise nature of another life. The grossness of the religious ideas which ancient traditions had preserved with respect to the primitive state of nations, did not prevent more enlightened minds from giving themselves up to free inquiry on the same objects, and thus there would be little difficulty in supposing that there could be no other way of pleasing the invisible power which governed the world, and of attaining happiness, at least in another life, than by well doing. Thus theology and morals were the two results of all efforts of the reason, or rather the two points to which all subsequent speculations necessarily tended. It was theology however that particularly, and by degrees, attracted the speculative reason towards those inquiries, which in the end became so celebrated under the name of metaphysic."

Kant does not take up in their historical order the various revolutions in metaphysical science, but indicates three points of view under which may be classed the various philosophical systems.

First, if we consider what philosophers have thought of the *objects* of rational knowledge, we find that while some here would deny to the objects of reason all reality, and accord it only to objects of sense, others have affirmed that it was reason alone could take cognizance of truth, and that the senses could only furnish to us appearances. The first are the sensationists; the second, the rationalists; Epicurus and Plato are the most celebrated representatives of these two views.

If, instead of considering the *objects* of our knowledge, we consider its *origin*, it may be said that it is either derived from experience alone, or from reason alone; hence empirical philosophers and those which Kant calls *noologists*: at their head are Aristotle and Plato amongst the ancients, and Locke and Leibnitz amongst the moderns.

Lastly, under the head of *method*, Kant distinguishes the *natural* method and the *scientific*.

The first is content with the common sense of mankind for the determination of the great problems, considering all speculation as sterile. It would affirm that we may more certainly determine the size and distance of the moon by simple

sight than by calculation, and is but a pure misology put into practice. We must not confound this method, if method it can be called, with that which accepts and recommends the common sense while still accepting speculation ; we think this method the true one, but Kant has passed it by. The scientific method is that of the philosophers who rely upon speculation. Its modes of procedure have varied. It may be developed dogmatically, after the manner of Wolf, or sceptically, like that of Hume.

Kant however indicates another method, the only one which, according to him, is admissible. "If the reader," he says, "has been pleased, or has had the patience to go along with me, he can judge whether, in the wish to convert this path into a royal road, there might not, even before the end of the present century, be accomplished, what a great number of centuries have not been able to effect, viz. the satisfying entirely the human reason in a matter which it has ever ardently but uselessly pursued."

Such are the last words, such the conclusion of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.' We have finished the analysis of this great work, we have gone over its various parts, first the elementary doctrine, that is to say, the transcendental æsthetic, the transcendental logic, divided into analytical and dialectic ; and lastly, the methodology. I have placed each of these parts before you by lengthy and detailed expositions that contain everything of importance in Kant's work, all that has had any influence over his contemporaries or his successors. I have allowed Kant to speak for himself, contenting myself with simply translating. I have often assumed simply the office of historian, and on many points Kant has been convicted of contradiction or error. There is however one question which as yet we have not submitted to a regular examination, and which we have postponed till all the elements of the Kantian solution of it should be in our hands. This question, which in the Kantian philosophy governs all others, is the general question as to the objective value of human knowledge. It is now time to take this question up and so complete our critique of the 'Critique.'

LECTURE VIII.

CONCLUSION.

Examination of Kant's Theory of the objective value of Knowledge. If it be true that from the time of Descartes the question as to the validity of our knowledge, is the great problem of philosophy, it particularly applies to the system of Kant. To determine this question, he undertakes an analysis of cognition generally, and it is the original and profound manner in which he has effected this task that has imprinted a peculiar character to his philosophy, and to that of Germany generally. Let us consider it in detail. Kant was right to place in the foremost rank, amongst the questions of philosophy, that of the objective value of knowledge; and he clearly saw, that if a scientific solution of this problem were possible, it must be attempted by a profound analysis of the mechanism of human intelligence. But though Kant may have clearly discerned the proper method to be followed, may he not have erred in the application of that method? On several individual points, on the question of the *me* and of God, we have already shown the error of the Kantian solution, but we have not yet submitted it to a general discussion, and it is this task that we now undertake.

Opposed to the Common Sense of Mankind. First, then, Kant's opinion is opposed to that of all men, to the common sense of mankind.

Kant denies the objective reality of space and time: all men on the contrary believe in this reality, and this belief they manifest every moment by their words and actions. When I speak of the situation of this room with relation to adjoining rooms, and when in this room I distinguish the place that I occupy from that which you occupy, by saying here and there, it never occurs to me that, in speaking thus, I do so simply that I may understand myself and establish a certain order in any sensuous knowledge. I believe that I

occupy in reality a certain portion of space that exists quite independently of me, and that would not cease to exist were I to cease to have the idea of it; and if I rise in order to go towards you, or to pass into an adjoining apartment, I believe that each of my steps measures a certain portion of space, and that in going towards you, or in passing into another apartment, I in fact change my place, that is to say, that I pass over different parts of space. Should any one contest the legitimacy of this belief, and tell me that these places which I distinguish, these different points of space that I pass over, that this space itself does not in reality exist; that he sees in all this nothing but a mode of representing phenomena,—he may indeed speak to me thus in the name of philosophy, his discourse may call forth a smile, but it will never shake my conviction.

The doctrine of Kant in reference to the idea of time, is as much opposed to common sense as that of space. When a man says that it has taken him an hour to pass from one place to another, just as he believes that he has in effect passed over a certain portion of space, in like manner he believes that the passage has occupied a certain portion of time; and if you tell him that all this exists only in the mind, and that in reality there exists neither space nor time, and that consequently there can be no parts of either one or the other, he will laugh at you; at all events he will not comprehend you. That the divisions which we establish in time and space are more or less arbitrary, and that in dividing time into minutes, hours, days, and years, we do but adopt a means of understanding ourselves and others; well and good; that offends no one, though it is easy to see that such divisions are not entirely arbitrary; but let it be maintained that such divisions are not divisions of a real time, that time is a pure form of the mind, by means of which we represent to ourselves phenomena, and the effect will be uselessly to shock the common sense of humanity.

Let us now take another part of the theory of Kant, and let us from amongst the categories of the understanding select the category of causality. Is this principle in the eyes of mankind but a form, a purely subjective condition of the application of the mind to phenomena, to sensible objects? or, on the contrary, do they not believe, that just as there is really something, some phenomenon which begins to be, so this

something, this phenomenon, has a real and objective cause? To answer this question, we have only to notice the way in which men apply the principle in practice. If a murder be anywhere committed, public indignation is immediately raised against the author of the murder, though he may be totally unknown; justice immediately sets out in pursuit, and ceases not its search till he be discovered; or should it ever fail in the discovery, it ceases not to proclaim that there is such a murderer; that there is a real cause for the murder. If the supposed author of the crime be discovered, he is tried, and if the evidence be considered sufficient to convict him, he is put to death. This is what really takes place, and certainly this does not take place because we apply to events, for the purpose of connecting them in our minds, the principle of causality, but because, when we apply this principle, we accord to it implicitly or explicitly, that objective value which the Kantian system denies. According to this system, in the case supposed, the public feelings are excited, justice puts forth all her powers, and a man is publicly put to death only to satisfy a law of our minds, which demands that we should conceive a cause, yet one purely ideal, whenever we see any event produced! And let no one accuse us of combating the theory of Kant by ridicule, for we might reply, that ridicule is but the expression, and, so to speak, the energetic cry of common sense, and that consequently it may justly be employed against philosophy whenever, as in this case, it wanders so far astray.

Consider the opinion of Kant on the *me*, the personality of man, and compare this with that of mankind in general. In Kant's view, the idea of our own being represents nothing but a logical tie, which serves to unite all psychological phenomena. Now, is this the opinion of common sense? When a man speaks of himself, does he think that what constitutes his personality, that which makes him to be an identical individual, is but the logical tie which he establishes amongst the modifications proper to his existence, in order to bring them to a certain unity? And when he speaks of the individuals which he distinguishes from himself and from each other, does he imagine that he does nothing but group a certain number of phenomena round certain unities which he afterwards calls Peter and Paul, but to which he ascribes no objective reality? In a word, is the idea of a *me* simply a regulative

principle, and the distinction of individuals purely a matter of classification? Most certainly the *me* of Kant's system is not the *me* of consciousness. Let us add, that Kant's God, or at least the God of his metaphysic, is not the God of humanity. What indeed is he? A pure ideal, at the summit of human knowledge, which allows the mind to raise it to the highest possible unity, but which can have no legitimate value. Is it this ideal, destitute of reality; is it this hypothetical object of a regulative idea, which all men look up to as the cause and primitive substance of all things, the Being of beings and the father of the human race?

From the foregoing you may see how remote are the results of Kant's system from the common judgments of mankind; but since they are, according to Kant, the results of philosophy, however strange they may be, let us examine them philosophically, and see whether philosophy, that is, a sound critique of human knowledge, will justify them, or whether, far from being opposed to the vulgar opinions, it does not confirm them.

Why does Kant deny the objective reality of space and time? Here is the reason: Although we may not be able to conceive time and space as not existing; yet we can never be justified in affirming such existence, owing to the subjective character with which such ideas are invested. Why does Kant deny the objective value of the principle of causality, and, in general, of all the categories of the understanding? for the same reason. To conclude from the subjective to the objective cannot be legitimate, according to the critical philosophy. And again, why does Kant, if in his metaphysic he is unable to deny the objective value of the idea of God, why is he, on the other hand, unable to affirm it? For the same reason, again. Thus the origin of all Kant's scepticism on this head is, by a final analysis, the subjective character which necessarily marks every development of the knowing faculty.

The subjectivity of human reason; this it is that troubles Kant. But is this subjectivity a form peculiar to the reason? How do I know that any reason is subjective? because if I try to affirm the contrary of that which the principles of reason naturally teach, I discover my inability to do so, in other words, I discover the necessity of these principles; it is in the feeling of this necessity, in this observation, that I am compelled to admit such and such truths, that I recognize the

The ground of Kant's Scepticism Spontaneous and Reflective Reason.

subjective character of the reason. But does the mind start with this observation? We have just seen that it supposes reflection; for it supposes that the mind turns its eye inwardly, and essays to doubt as to the certainty of its principles. Now, it is implied that the mind begins with reflection, by these trials of doubt, by means of which it discovers the necessity of the principle of reason, and subsequently the subjectivity of the reason itself. That the mind should seek to affirm the contrary of that taught by the principles of reason, it must, at first, have affirmed without any act of reflection; consequently the human reason, primitively, has not that subjective character which Kant uses as a weapon against it, and that it must begin by an affirmation, pure, absolute, and without suspicion of error. Subsequently it turns inwardly upon itself, and tries to affirm the contrary of that which it had already affirmed spontaneously; and as it cannot succeed in this, it persists in its belief; but the manner of the reason has changed,—from being spontaneous, it has become reflective. In the first case, it has no more of the personal and subjective than is necessarily implied in the relation between every mixed perception and consciousness; in the second case, it requires that decided character of subjectivity imposed upon it by the act of reflection, that is to say, by the will, that faculty which has special relation to the human personality. Unfortunately, Kant did not see that this form of the reason is, in a certain sense, foreign and inferior to it; he did not recognize the reason in that sublime and pure state in which reflection, will, and personality are yet absent. If he had known this intuition, this spontaneous revelation which is the primitive state of the reason, he might, in the presence of this fact, have given up his scepticism; for, on what does this scepticism definitively rest? We have just said it. On the assumed fact, that the laws of the reason are subjective, personal to man. But there is a state of the reason in which these same laws are, so to speak, stripped of all subjectivity, where the reason manifests itself almost entirely impersonally. Would this suffice for Kant? or would he require, in order that the reason should be objective and legitimate, that it should no longer make its appearance in any individual subject, in man, for example? But if the reason is entirely severed from a subject such as man, for example, it is nothing for me; that I may have a consciousness of it, it must

descend into any being, should make itself mine, and in this sense become subjective. A reason which is not mine, which, however universal in itself, does not incarnate itself in some way in my consciousness, is, as far as I am concerned, as if it were not; consequently, to demand that the reason, in order to be valid, should cease to be subjective, is to demand something impossible.

It is to demand a thing which God himself could not accomplish. I suppose that God is desirous of bestowing upon me a knowledge of the external world. If the me is to remain me, and if the not-me is to remain the not-me, the former could only become cognizant of the not-me by means of the faculties it possesses; and it would be therefore true to say, in this sense, that he could only attain the objective in and through the subjective. Try to conceive it otherwise, and you will find that any other supposition would involve an absurdity.

Nay more, God himself could not know in any other manner what is not himself, because he could only know by means of his own intelligent nature. According to the dicta of the Kantian philosophy, the Divine reason would be no less subjective, since this reason must reside in a determinate subject, which is God; therefore, if the character of subjectivity alone justifies scepticism, then God himself must be involved in a scepticism from which he could no more escape than men. Kant, to be consistent, must have admitted this; or, if the knowledge which God has of the action of his intelligence does not justify scepticism, neither does the subjectivity of human reason justify it.

Now it would be easy to show that Kant has deceived himself in yielding to such a scepticism; and that logic, the principles of the critical philosophy, once admitted, upsets, by means of these very principles, all that Kant has wished to preserve.

Though Kant denies the objective reality of space and time, he does not deny the existence of the external world: he has even attempted to give a demonstration of its existence; but this demonstration rests upon the cognitive faculty. Now, by what privilege does this faculty, which has a character entirely subjective when it furnishes to us the ideas of space and time, acquire an objective value in reference to the world, or to those same phenomena which we can only represent to ourselves by the

The subjectivity of the Divine Reason.

The external World.

aid of these ideas,—ideas destitute of all objective reality, according to Kant? If it be said that, in admitting the reality of the external world, he admits nothing more than phenomena, this matters nothing. On whatever ground he admits the existence of the external world, he admits something really exterior, phenomena or composed of phenomena, appearance or Being, which can only be admitted through the principle of causality, or through some other principle, which Kant declares to be purely subjective. If this be so, why not admit at once that, in representing to ourselves any thing in space or in time, we do but transport to the object what in reality belongs only to the subject? We have thus a right to deny to Kant the existence of the external world, as he denies that of space and time. With his subjective reason, he is condemned to remain invincibly shut up within the limits of the subject.

But within these limits, what remains? The idea of *me*, of that identical substance which we are, has, in his eyes, but a purely ideal value, and all that he can consent to admit as existing within us, are the phenomena of consciousness, nothing more. But what are these phenomena that Kant would preserve? If the *me* has no reality, can the phenomenal determinations by which its existence is manifested, can they be anything? If we suppress the *me*, and convert it into some unknown thing, or an abstraction, must we not do the same for the phenomena? The internal phenomena, and the subject of these phenomena, are, as already seen, given to us in one single psychological fact. We may *consider* them separately, that is to say, abstractedly; but if, after having separated them, you reject the reality of the subject, while you preserve that of the phenomena, you fall into an evident contradiction. Kant, in fact, has no more right to admit the existence of internal phenomena, than he has to admit external phenomena: what, then, remains? nothing.

Nihilism should be the final word of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.' We have a right to fasten this on the Kantian metaphysic. But this is not the only inconsistency.

While in theory Kant denies all objective value to the *à priori* ideas, in practice he has no difficulty whatever in according objectivity to the idea of duty; while in one he thinks he has no right to affirm the existence of liberty and God, in the other, he thinks he has

The phenomena of Consciousness.

Practical Reason.

the right to do so with the most perfect confidence. But, can there be any real distinction between moral principles and metaphysical principles? What are the characteristics of a moral law? Necessity and universality. But are not these the characteristics of all the principles which Kant has recognized in the metaphysic, of the principle of causality, for example? Why then are these metaphysical principles purely subjective, simple forms of the mind, whilst the law of duty is, in his eyes, an objective law, independent of the subject which conceives it, and possessing an absolute value? Metaphysical principles and moral principles are derived from one and the same source, the reason. Kant recognizes this; since he uses the words speculative *reason* and practical *reason*. He does not assume them to be two different faculties, but two different applications; or as he himself says, two different uses of the reason. If therefore Kant should persist in denying the legitimate value of the speculative reason, he must also deny it to the practical; he must deny that the moral law has any absolute value; that it also depends upon our own special and individual nature, and that, out of ourselves, it can have no legitimate bearing. What then becomes of the new foundation for Kant's moral dogmatism? What becomes of the superstructure raised on this base? Scepticism attacks the reason in all its applications. All the consequences drawn from this law of duty can, like this law itself, have but an ideal and subjective character. Kant would have been forced to admit this, if, in his desire of saving his moral system from the wreck of his metaphysical, he did not look for aid from logic. But logic is inexorable. Either Kant must give up his dogmatism in morals, and accept all the consequences of his metaphysical scepticism; or, if he would retain his certainty in morals, he must accept the dogmatism in metaphysic, and recognize the legitimacy of the speculative reason, as well as of the practical; for there is between them no essential difference.

It follows from the foregoing, that scepticism should be the final conclusion of Kant's philosophy; not only in its speculative, but in its moral part. Such is, in fact, the necessary result of every system that puts in question the authority of the cognitive faculty, instead of directing and guiding it, and recalling it to the necessity that it is under of exercising the caution and circumspection imposed upon it. But, prudence

is not scepticism. Scepticism, were it consistent with itself, would be the negation of all science and all philosophy. A severe examination of dogmatic methods is, on the contrary, of great value to philosophy. Kant, as it usually happens, has gone beyond the end which he proposed to himself; and, though he had no other wish than to retain human knowledge within its true limits, his system, carried to its extreme consequences, destroys all certainty. Let this example warn us; and, though it may be good and useful to admit doubt as an element in philosophy, let us learn to assign to it its true place and function. Let us not imagine that there are no difficulties for the mind in its pursuit of philosophical truth; such an idea would be foolish; but neither let us think that the human mind is incapable of affirming anything with certainty; and that, on those points which bear so strongly upon our own destiny, we are condemned to error or to ignorance.

Recapitulation.

We now know the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' we have studied it as a whole and in detail, in its purpose and in its results, but before quitting it we must for a moment return and gather up the scattered observations which the study of this great work has suggested; and as a wise and impartial critique should not only expose the errors, but also point out excellences, I will endeavour here, as elsewhere, to put before you what is true in Kant's system, while pointing out its errors.

We may look at the 'Critique of Pure Reason' in two points of view; we may consider it in reference to its pervading spirit and its general method; and then, passing by the principles of its execution, examine the results obtained. We shall consider it in these two points of view.

The pervading spirit of the Kantian Philosophy, absolute Independence.

What then is the spirit which pervades the work? This spirit is that of philosophy itself, that which gives to this science, I do not say the dignity which belongs to it, but its very life; I speak of that spirit of independence without which philosophy cannot exist. We find it in

Kant, for he was a philosopher, and followed the steps of Descartes; he has carried it to the highest possible degree, for Kant was a true philosopher of the eighteenth century. A contemporary of the French revolution, whose birth he hailed and whose principles he adopted, Kant claimed for philosophy an absolute liberty. The right of free inquiry, proclaimed by

the eighteenth century, he declared to be sacred and inexpressible. Dogmatism must submit to the free examination of reason, otherwise no authority could shield it. All systems must be received with impartiality; to refuse to hear scepticism or empiricism, to condemn them under the pretext that they were dangerous to the good cause, is to interfere with that independence which philosophy has a right to enjoy. Kant fears no system; he would have each develop itself in its own way; the reason cannot suffer by its own efforts, but must be the gainer. This is a language quite new in the history of philosophy; no voice was ever raised, not even excepting that of Descartes, to proclaim an independence so complete. Far be it from me to deny that this spirit of independence, which shines throughout Kant's work, is not the true spirit of philosophy; no! we thank Kant for proclaiming it so loftily. But we think we have shown, that in submitting the reason to the freest examination, we may, whatever Kant may say, justify dogmatism in speculation as well as in morals, and that a critique, quite as free as the Kantian, but more profound, leads to a different result.

You have just seen that in all that concerns the general spirit of his philosophy, Kant belongs to his age. He is with his age too in reference to his method. What, in fact, is the Kantian method? To answer this question, we have only to look at the title of his work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason.' To make a critique of the reason, is to examine the cognitive faculty, with a view of determining its nature, its bearing, and its limits. What then does this method imply? simply the method of observation applied to the mind, the psychological method, which, proclaimed for the first time by Soerates, introduced by Descartes into modern philosophy, Kant applies, as Locke had done in the 'Essay on the Understanding;' and setting aside the error into which he has fallen, he sometimes applies it with a depth of which there is no example before him. No philosopher has so well shown the necessity of establishing the entire science on a critique of the faculties, or the sources of human knowledge. It is to his age assuredly that Kant owes that contempt for hypotheses which is one of the principal characteristics of his philosophy. But he openly breaks with it when, conducted by more exact observation, he admits into human knowledge elements which, though not produced without the

Kant's Method, the Psychological.

aid of experience, cannot be explained by reference to experience, and are not derived from it. Here Kant is in opposition to the philosophy of his time, sensationalism and empiricism, and attaches himself to the great family of Idealists of which Descartes is the father. The 'Critique of Pure Reason' consists almost entirely of a refutation of sensationalism. I have endeavoured to show you what there is new and original in Kant's doctrine, by comparing his theory of the idea of space with that of Condillae; elsewhere Kant directly attacks the empiric theory of Locke; he has ever in view this narrow and exclusive school, which had become the philosophy of the day. It will always be to Kant's eternal honour his having undertaken a refutation of this philosophy, nay his having for ever destroyed it, by opposing to it an analysis more true to human knowledge. Kant has erred in his turn; and in another sense he has taken a wrong direction, and has paid a tribute to the genius of his age. But he has nevertheless established a truth which at one blow struck down sensationalism, viz. that in human knowledge there is an element quite distinct from experience: that experience is indeed a condition of all knowledge, but not the only condition of it. The originality, the depth with which Kant has incontestably established this great truth, perceived by Plato, resuscitated by Descartes, defended by Leibnitz, the new light that he has shed over it, is most certainly one of his strongest claims to the fame he has acquired.

Now that we know the general spirit of the Kantian philosophy, the method on which it is founded, and the idealistic character with which it is imprinted, we may descend into the interior of this great system, and endeavour to form a clear idea of its principal results; our task here becomes more difficult. But now Kant commanded our entire approbation; we willingly ranged ourselves on his side, when the question was concerning the spirit, the method, and the general character of his system: but looking at the execution, at the system itself, here we shall often be compelled to dissent from the German philosopher.

The Faculties in the Kantian system. You already know that in the system of Kant, human knowledge is derived from three great sources, or three principal faculties, viz. sense, understanding, and reason; you will recollect what in this system is the proper function of each of these faculties, and the

manner in which Kant distinguishes them. I have no need to repeat a theory which is now sufficiently known to you. But is this theory exact? Does it not, on the one hand, suppose distinctions which do not really exist, and on the other hand, confound that which ought really to be distinguished? Then again, is it complete? Does it omit no essential element necessary for the development of knowledge? Does it in fact give a true statement of the course of ideas? Does it explain the problem of their origin and formation? These are very important questions, and I have to a certain extent answered them in the preceding Lectures. I now resume the discussion.

Kant defines the sensory to be the faculty, or rather the capacity which we have of receiving the *intuitions* or *representations* of objects, by means of the impressions or sensations which these objects produce in us. Kant seems to distinguish what he calls the *intuitions* or *representations* of objects from the sensations or impressions, since, according to him, we obtain the first by means of the second.

But what distinction is there in reality between these two kinds of phenomenon? All that we can find in the 'Critique' on this head is, that he regards one as the condition of the other, and refers both to one and the same faculty,—the sensory. For ourselves, we hold that, without sensations, we should have no idea of external objects; but we think that, without the principle of causality, the sensation experienced by the mind would be a sign without value, and would represent in fact nothing; that it is this principle that leads us to pass from ourselves, and reveals to us objects external to us, the foreign causes of our sensations. If Kant had seen that here the principle of causality is already in operation, he would have recognized the fact, that the sensory reduced to itself, is absolutely null; that by itself it teaches us nothing as to an external world; that if it existed alone, we should experience sensations, but nothing more than sensations, and he would never have thought of referring to one and the same faculty, the sensations which external objects excite in us, and the representations which we have of these objects. Here, we think, is the first error of the Kantian system. By not sufficiently distinguishing sensations from representations, and by failing to give a correct account of the relation between them, he has deceived himself as to the true function of the sensory, and has given it too great an extent.

But, putting aside this difficulty, let us suppose with Kant that the sensory, along with sensation, furnishes us with the representations of objects. Does Kant stop here? Whenever we represent to ourselves a certain object, we place it in space, and whenever we represent to ourselves a certain event, or series of events, we place it in time; in other words, it is impossible to have the idea of body without having an idea of the space which contains it, or the idea of an event without the idea of the time in which it is produced.

Kant has firmly established this; he has also perfectly established, in the teeth of the sensationalists, that though experience may give us ideas of external objects, and in general of phenomena, it cannot give us the ideas of space and time; these ideas therefore exist in us *à priori*, and that, so far from their being derived from experience, without them experience would be impossible. Kant, I repeat, has firmly established these points. Let him, if he please, call that which is derived from experience the *matter* of our knowledge, and *form* what is not so derived; so that while the idea of phenomena, internal or external, is the matter of our knowledge, the ideas of space and time are the form; we accept these expressions, which have the merit of clearly marking by language what is profoundly distinct in reality. But when Kant tells us that space and time are the forms of the sensory, we have a right to stop and inquire what he means by this. Does he call space and time forms of the sensory, because these ideas are the logical conditions of sensuous knowledge? Very well, but we must know whether, in speaking thus, he means to say that the ideas of space and time belong to the sensory or not. If this was his thought, it is an opinion altogether inadmissible. In fact, if the sensory be defined to be the capacity of receiving sensations, or, with Kant, the capacity of receiving intuitions by means of sensations, we cannot in any case consider it as the real source of the ideas of space and time, ideas so very distinct from sensations, and even from the contingent and relative ideas of body, events, and phenomena. If Kant be asked, What is the source of the ideas of space and time? he will answer, the sensory; he will add, it is true, that it is the *pure* sensory, but this is an abuse of words. The truth is, that here Kant has got into confusion; while refusing to recognize experience as the origin of these ideas, he has not clearly seen that it was necessary to

leave altogether the domain of the sensory, and that the adjective destroys the substantive. His error is in not recognizing under a special name a faculty different from the sensory, to which might be referred the ideas of space and time, and thinking that because these ideas always accompanied ideas of sense, and so being the formal condition of such ideas, that therefore they belonged to the sensory. We said before that Kant had granted too much to the sensory, and we may again urge this reproach upon him; Kant in both cases has failed to distinguish that which properly belongs to the sensory, and what does not properly belong to it. Here he failed in recognizing the sensory in its proper restricted character; there, the general faculty of knowledge, the reason, the understanding, or whatever name we may choose to give it.

Instead now of considering the sensory apart, let us view it in relation to the understanding, and inquire whether there be any real distinction between these two faculties such as Kant supposes.

When by the sensory we only understand the faculty which we have of receiving the sensations of external objects, we discover between this faculty so understood, and the cognitive faculty, in whatever degree we take it, and whatever name we give it, a wide distinction, an abyss. But in Kant's system the sensory is not this simply, it is something more. It is not limited to the power of rendering us capable of receiving sensations, it gives us representations, intuitions of objects, that is to say, certain ideas of objects, isolated if we will, without order and without connection, but still ideas; for if not, what are they? And besides, it is not limited to the giving us ideas or intuitions of these objects, it has the appearance at least of furnishing us with the superior ideas of space and time. After this, there is no reason for distinguishing the sensory on the one hand from the cognitive faculty on the other; for the sensory becomes endowed with the attribute of the cognitive faculty. What difference, then, does Kant establish between it and the understanding? The function of the understanding, according to him, is to bind together in a whole the various isolated representations furnished by the sensory. I accept for a moment this definition of the understanding, but I do not see in it a new faculty, a faculty different from the first; for the faculty which furnishes us with the ideas of space and

False distinction between the Sensory and the Understanding.

of time, co-ordinates in space and time the isolated and distinct objects and events, and forms them into a distinct unity. Neither does the originality of the understanding rest on the fact that it is a source of *à priori* notions not derivable from experience. Since there are similar notions in the sensory, and that if the one has its categories, the other has its pure forms; in what are the categories of the understanding distinguished from the pure forms of the sensory? Are they not both ideas or notions? are they not both pure, or *à priori*? are they not superior to experience, while being at the same time the necessary conditions of it? Kant tells us that the understanding is a veritable faculty, a power, while the sensory is a simple capacity; he marks the first by the word *spontaneity*, the other by that of *receptivity*. But if by spontaneity he understands the power of drawing certain ideas from our own inward nature, by the virtue which is in us, is there not also spontaneity in the pure sensory? If this faculty be simply receptive when it experiences sensations, it is no longer so when it elevates itself to the ideas of space and time. These ideas come not from without; they do not imprint themselves upon our minds by the action of an external world, but we produce them ourselves spontaneously, under certain conditions; and Kant acknowledges this, since he declares that they are in us *à priori*. If so, the sensory, which furnishes the forms of space and time, is as spontaneous as the understanding.

Thus the sensory, at least the pure sensory and the understanding, cannot be considered as two faculties essentially different; and I have shown you, in a preceding lecture, that the reason does not differ from the understanding and the pure sensory. What in Kant's system is the function of the reason, and wherein does it differ from the understanding? While the understanding binds together, by means of concepts, the representations which the sensory furnishes separate and isolated, the reason, in its turn, acts on these unities produced by the understanding, and combines them into a systematic whole, the highest and most complete unity that we can attain. But is not this function, this law, the same as that of the understanding? No doubt of it, since the function of the understanding is to co-ordinate and unite the diverse representations of the sensory. And is not this the law of the latter also? Kant must admit this, if he persists in referring

the ideas of space and time to this faculty; for how conceive space and time without conceiving each of them as the union of all spaces and all times? If so, what difference is there between the reason and the other two faculties? The unity to which reason brings knowledge is, you say, the unity *par excellence*, the supreme and highest; but what follows from that? Simply that there is a difference of *degree* between that which you call reason and what you call understanding, and the sensory, which furnishes the ideas of space and time, but not that there is any radical or essential difference.

Not only is Kant wrong in establishing be- Omission of
free and volun-
tary activity.
tween the reason, the understanding, and the
faculty, which furnishes the ideas of space and
time, a distinction which a more complete analysis of these
faculties shows to be but different modes of the same faculty,
but we have a much greater fault to charge him with. Here
it is not a charge of confusion or arbitrary distinction, but of
the complete suppression of an element, without which know-
ledge itself would not be possible. I speak of the voluntary
activity. Kant, it is true, gives us, in his moral system, the
voluntary and free activity which he suppresses in his meta-
physical. But does not this active power play its part in the
development of knowledge? Run over all the circumstances
which concur in the formation and development of knowledge,
and see if they do not suppose different degrees of voluntary
activity,—sometimes feeble, sometimes energetic. I have often
proved this. Without attention, consequently without volun-
tary activity, sensations exist unperceived by consciousness;
they are as if they were not. Consciousness in general is in-
separable from activity; the energy of the one seems to in-
crease and diminish with the other. When fatigue overtakes
us, and our voluntary activity seems to demand repose, con-
sciousness also droops. Suppress this activity, and what be-
comes of reasoning? If our spirit does not accord its attention,
how can certain conclusions be drawn from certain premises?
If it arrived at the former, the latter would be lost, for me-
mory supposes attention; or rather, the mind would be un-
able to form either premises or conclusions; and if a process
of reasoning were presented, it would appear to have no
meaning. It follows, that in omitting the voluntary activity,
the theory of Kant, were it exact in every other point, would
not furnish us with a true and complete explication of human

knowledge. Kant appears never to have suspected the importance of this active element in its relation to knowledge. He indeed recognized a sort of spontaneity proper to the understanding and the reason, which he distinguishes from the receptivity of the sensory; but this spontaneity is nothing more than a power of drawing certain ideas from our own internal nature, instead of receiving them from without, in opposition to the receptivity, which consists in receiving from objects sensations and intuitions. Properly speaking, this is not the free and voluntary activity which assumes the government of the faculties and constitutes at once the personality and the consciousness.

If Kant had recognized this important fact, he would not have thrown any doubt over the freedom of the will in his metaphysical system, and he would have had no occasion to refer us to his moral system. Let Kant once admit the fact of voluntary activity, and his whole system is changed; so pregnant with consequences is this fact, and so dangerous to science is the admission of one real element. There is here a double error to be avoided. We must not exaggerate the part of the will to the point of absorbing another element altogether different but not the less real, as Marie de Biran has done, the intellectual element, the reason; but neither must we commit the error of Kant, neglect altogether the influence of the will in human knowledge, or, as Malebranche did, efface altogether the personal faculty which all possess, before the divine reason. It is between these two opposite errors that true psychological truth exists.

I have just pointed out, in the system of Kant, a grave omission,—a considerable blank; but this is not all. Here is a metaphysical problem which Kant has passed by.

When we undertake an examination of the ideas that are in the human mind, two very different questions arise; first, as to the ideas that are now actually in the mind and their exact characteristics, and then as to how, and under what conditions they have been developed in us for the first time, and how they have passed from their primitive state to that in which they now appear. These two questions exhaust the entire problem of knowledge, and it is of the highest importance clearly to understand them, if we would aspire to an exact and true theory. Unfortunately Kant has not done it. The categories of the understanding may now present themselves to us un-

der the abstract and general form, and in which they are presented by Kant; but have they always had this form? How were they originally produced, and how have they acquired their present character? This is what Kant should have endeavoured to determine. He limits himself to postulating here the idea of substance, there that of cause, etc., and shows that these ideas are the regulating principles of our judgments. But this is not enough. Kant, like Reid, comprehended very well that all knowledge is expressed in the form of judgments; but, like Reid, he erred in not tracing up knowledge to the primitive judgments; had he done so, he would have seen that the mind begins with certain concrete and particular judgments, and that from these concrete and individual judgments it disengages certain ideas, afterwards invested with an abstract and general form. He would have seen, for example, that we commence by judging that we are a certain individual cause, producing certain determinate acts, and that from this individual judgment we draw the general proposition, that whatever begins to be must have a cause; he would have seen that the idea of substance is given to us in the same manner, enveloped in an individual and concrete judgment, and thus, by a series of operations and abstractions, we arrive at the general and indeterminate idea of substance. But Kant never imposed on himself an examination of the important question as to the origin and formation of our ideas, so that the categories are conceived by him only under a general and abstract form; and hence his theory, in place of being a complete explication of human knowledge, by wandering away from the primitive focus, if I may thus express myself, from that focus in which we seize reality and life, comes to us under a sort of algebraical formula; and hence that abstract and scholastic character which is one of the defects of the Kantian metaphysic.

But this omission of a great philosophical question, naturally entails graver consequences than those which I have just indicated. Here we may recall the errors of his rational psychology. It is because Kant considers the idea of the *me* under an abstract form, that he is led to consider it only as a regulative principle, serving to give unity to the multiplicity of internal modifications, but not designating anything real. In denying the objective reality of the *me*, such as he puts it, Kant is consistent, for the *me* of which he speaks, the *me* to which we are conducted by the reason, in his system, rising

from condition to condition, is not the true *me*, the *me* of consciousness. To upset the rational psychology of Kant, and the scepticism to which it leads, we have only to recapitulate the facts, and place them in the point of view of consciousness. No doubt, in considering ourselves, our nature, we may consider, on the one hand, the substance, the being by itself, and on the other the phenomena; but we must not transport this distinction or separation from the domain of abstraction to that of reality. The truth is, that we perceive ourselves directly and immediately as the subjects of the modifications that we experience, as the cause of the acts which we produce; our modifications and the beings that we are, our acts and the causes that we are, all this is revealed to us by a direct and immediate perception, in a unity which abstraction may indeed decompose afterwards, but which is nevertheless real. To say that phenomena alone are known to us, but that the substance itself, or the subject of these phenomena, escapes us, is to overlook the fact, that the substance, considered independent of its modifications, is nothing more than an abstraction. To have the right of affirming the reality of the *me* in Kant's system, we must have the power of knowing it independently of its modifications and its acts; and because the idea of the *me* is given to us only mixed up with phenomena, this idea, in his eyes, ceases to have any objective value. Kant is easily answered: we know ourselves only as far as our existence is determined, and is of such and such a character; we could have no consciousness of ourselves, if we had not a consciousness of such and such a modification, if we did not produce such and such acts. Existence, for us and all other beings, is existence in a certain determinate manner, and, for beings endowed with causality, it is to produce certain acts. Try to comprehend any other mode of existence; every other is not existence, but the negation of existence. We complain that we do not know what the soul is independent of its faculties, its modifications, its acts. We deplore the weakness of our minds, which it is said, can know nothing of itself, and we do not see that we create for ourselves an insoluble problem, as if the limits of human intelligence were not already sufficiently narrowed.

Omission of
the Psychological
Problem
as to the origin
and form-

I repeat it, the error of Kant consists in his having considered our ideas only in their actual state under abstract forms, instead of ascending to the origin of knowledge, to the very source of

psychological truth. Here is the explanation of his scepticism as to the soul; why he has been led to form an idea of the *me* purely transcendental, purely as a regulative principle, thus mistaking the true function of consciousness. It is on the theory of consciousness that the Kantian philosophy has most erred. Sometimes he attaches consciousness to the sensory, and so falls into one of the grossest errors of the school which he attacks with so much force; on the other hand, when he speaks of the *me*, it is only to withdraw it from consciousness, and convert it into a pure regulative idea, the real existence of which we cannot affirm without being guilty of a paralogism. The most of the pretended *antinomies of cosmology* have no better foundation than the *paralogisms of the rational psychology*. Here we come again upon one of the errors Kant has fallen into by his false theory of consciousness. It is because he did not see that consciousness tells us with unerring certainty that we are free beings, that he has introduced an opposition of the reason against itself, which we can only get rid of by an appeal to the practical reason. In giving to consciousness the direct and certain knowledge of our liberty, we have proved that Kant's antinomy is chimerical, and chimerical also, or at least useless, the solution which he pretends to give of it.

This is not the only point on which Kant has established an artificial antinomy; on the question of necessary being, the antinomy is no more real than in the other case, since it is not by reasoning, but by immediate intuition, that we are elevated to the conception of a necessary being wherever any contingent phenomenon is manifested. So in the rational theology, if we admit that the Leibnitzian argument has nothing more than a logical value, we think we have proved that the true Cartesian proof, and that drawn from the principle of final causes, remains untouched. In fact we have proved, in opposition to the attacks of Kant, the legitimate authority of the cognitive faculty, and have shown that the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' notwithstanding the corrections made in it by the practical reason, is nothing more than inconsistent scepticism.

Yes, scepticism once again, such is the rigorous result of the 'Critique of Pure Speculative Reason;' but this very scepticism is a great service rendered to human reason, since it is thereby forced to turn the eye in-

ation of our
Ideas.


The Antino-
mies and ratio-
nal Theology.

Conclusion.

wards and examine itself yet more severely, with a view to a justification of itself and its author. Placed between the two errors of philosophy, hypothesis and scepticism, the well-grounded fear of the one has thrown Kant on the other; and once on this downward track, he could only take refuge under the sacred principles of morals. This inconsistency is the most characteristic point in the Kantian philosophy. Kant belongs to his age by his tendency to scepticism in speculation; he is superior to this age in this, that he could not accept the consequences of scepticism, and wished to save the moral law at least from the universal wreck. From the ravages made by the speculative critique, there was no firm resting-point for him but the idea of duty; with this idea he set about to reconstruct all the rest. We may compare him with those great stoical souls of Greece and degenerated Rome, who, carried away by the sublime dogmatisms of Plato and Aristotle, and seeing the world invaded by empiricism, repudiated this shameless doctrine, and took refuge in the sanctuary of conscience. Kant is a Stoic of the eighteenth century. His metaphysical system belongs to his age; his moral system belongs to all ages, to that of Zeno and Chrysippus, Helvetius, Thrasias, and Marcus Aurelius. It is more than ever necessary to make him known in these days, when the doctrine of Epicurus, revived and spread abroad by the spirit of the eighteenth century, by Helvetius, St. Lambert, and their disciples, has ruined or enervated all great moral convictions. And if these great convictions formed an asylum for some noble minds in the days of bondage, for us they are a want, a necessary aliment, under a reign of public freedom. I have before said it, and they were the first words that I pronounced in this hall. The morals of slaves are not fit for a free people. On private morals must representative government and constitutional monarchies rest; and it is certain that the moral sentiments of every age depend greatly upon the metaphysical doctrines which prevail in it.

You may now see that I am not a blind disciple of German philosophy. This critique of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' may seem severe; but in passing from the metaphysical system of Kant to that of the moral or practical, thanks to God, I can change my tone, and have little more to do than analyse and praise. This part of my task will be less painful both to you and to myself.

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