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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

A CRITICISM OF THE AUGUSTINIAN
POINT OF VIEW

BY

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
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TO MY WIFE
I AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATE
THIS VOLUME



PREFACE

This book is not intended for the popular reader. It is a rather detailed and technical criticism of the philosophical basis of the Augustinian treatment of the problem of evil. The author does not presume to have fathomed this eternal mystery nor to have reformulated the doctrine of sin. If, however, he has set forth in a true light the historic theory which for centuries has dominated Christian thought, and has shown the absolute necessity of a reconstruction of the doctrine of sin, then in a measure he has realized his purpose. Anyone who may pick up this work, anticipating something more entertaining than a philosophical or theological discussion, would be wise to lay it down at once. If any reader does not care for the detailed arguments by which the author has arrived at his position, it is suggested that the last chapter, which summarizes his conclusions, be read first.

The present volume was written, as it now stands, while the author was still a graduate student in the department of philosophy at Yale University. Parts of it have been delivered before the George Barker Stevens Theological Club of Yale and the Manhattan Congregational Ministers' Association of New York City. While the author occupied the chair of Systematic Theology in Yale Divinity School much of the material here presented was incorporated in lectures before the students of that institution.

The present work grew out of a suggestion made to

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the writer by the late Professor George B. Stevens. The suggestion was that there existed a distinct need for a complete and impartial statement and criticism of the speculative basis upon which the Augustinian doctrine of sin rests. Consequently it has been the definite aim of the writer to formulate such a statement, endeavoring to make it at once historical, critical and constructive. Augustine was a man of keen spiritual insight; he was also a profound philosopher. He affirmed that his mind preferred nothing to the discovery of truth. It is in keeping, therefore, with the Augustinian spirit and mode of procedure to approach our task from the purely intellectual standpoint.

The writer has sought to deal with the problem from a philosophical rather than from a religious point of view. That the problem of evil lends itself to both forms of treatment is apparent, but the task here undertaken concerns itself primarily with the rational grounds of our author's position. It is for this reason that the biblical material pertaining to the origin and nature of sin has not been given fuller consideration. The writer has not felt called upon to enter into a discussion of the questions that might be raised in regard to biblical sources. Those inquiries lie outside the scope of the present work.

The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to Professor George H. Palmer of Harvard University for valuable suggestions relating especially to the conception of evil and the problem of freedom. To Professor Charles M. Bakewell, of Yale University, the author takes this occasion to record his deep gratitude for many suggestions and criticisms which have been invaluable.

PREFACE

The end sought in compiling the bibliography has not been to offer a complete list of works bearing upon every phase of Augustine's thought, but rather to indicate those which have actually been used and have proven especially helpful in dealing with the particular aspect of the system here under examination. We include in the bibliography only a partial list of Augustine's own works, selecting such as bear directly upon the problem of evil.

MARION LEROY BURTON.

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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

THE problem of evil exists because mankind believes in a wise and benevolent Creator. It is because man in his better moods believes that the universe is grounded in love, that evil has demanded an explanation. Abolish God and evil needs no explanation. Consequently we can most readily understand what the problem of evil was for Augustine by beginning with a statement of his conception of God.

GOD, THE SOURCE OF ALL BEING.

To Augustine God was in himself the supreme existence, the author of all being, and the source of all life. At the very apex of all being is God, the only immutable nature. The nine years which Augustine spent in a vain endeavor to understand and to accept fully the principles of Manicheism resulted in his complete rejection and utter repudiation of its dualism, and in his rigorous insistence upon one and only one eternal Being. Remembering that to Augustine anything is good in so far as it exists or is, and that God is the supreme existence, we can understand why God is regarded by him as the "summum bonum."¹

Furthermore God is not only the one immutable

¹ "Ipse summum bonum est"—Liber de Diver. Quæst. LXXXIII. XXI.

good, he is also the author of all life. Here we must not forget the emphasis that Augustine places upon the word "*all*." God is not the source of a part of the life of the universe but of the life of everything that exists. This, too, is his answer to Manichean dualism. He cannot be too explicit. He asserts that there is no life whatsoever, in so far as it is life at all, which does not find its origin in God, the one and only source of true life. "*Nullam esse qualem libet vitam, quæ non eo ipso quo vita est, et in quantum omnino vita est, ad summum vitæ fontem principiumque pertineat: quod nihil aliud quam summum et solum verumque Deum possumus confiteri.*"² In his *Retractions* Augustine takes the opportunity to explain the sense in which he wished this to be understood. While still defending the position that God is the one author of life, he insists upon a distinction between the Creator and the creature.³ The latter is to be regarded as *of* Him but not as *a part* of Him.

In this same writing against the Manicheans he argues further that God is the author not only of all life but of all being and existence. Whatever exists, and just in so far as it exists, receives its being from God. "*Omne quidquid esset, quoniam esset in quantumcumque esset, ex uno Deo esse.*"⁴ There can be no question as to Augustine's view upon this point. Everywhere throughout his writings this conception is frequent: "*qui omnium quæ sunt auctor*

² De Daubus Anim. c. Manich. 1.

³ "Ita dixi, ut tanquam creatura ad Creatorem pertinere intelligatur, non auctm de illo esse tanquam pars ejus existimetur." I. cap. XV. 1.

⁴ De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. 9, 10.

est.”⁵ The only cause of all created things, whether visible or invisible, is the goodness of the Creator. Absolutely nothing is, or has existence, except God Himself, that does not owe its existence to Him.⁶ All natures and all substances, although not parts of God Himself, are made by Him, and owe their being to Him.⁷

Without anticipating a section in Chapter III in which we deal with God’s relation to evil, it must be pointed out at this juncture that Augustine did not regard these statements as making God the author of evil. Evil is that which tends to nonexistence, and therefore, God as the author of that which is, is in no sense the author of that which is not.⁸ But what is God’s relation to all the evil things which exist? Do they subsist without any connection with Him? If so, must not our author admit the necessity of the Manichean principle of evil?

As we shall see in the second chapter, evil tends to nonexistence. Everything in so far as it exists is good. This good nature it has from God. Evil is the diminution or falling away of this good nature. Therefore as the evil increases, being must decrease

⁵ Liber de Diver. Quæst. LXXXIII. XXI.

⁶ Enchir. IX.

⁷ “Item dixisti mihi, Domine, voce forti in aurem interior-em, quod omnes naturas atque substantias quæ non sunt quod tu es, et tamen sunt, tu fecisiti.” Conf. XII. II.

⁸ “Quo circa cum in Catholica dicitur, omnium naturarum atque substantiarum esse auctorem Deum, simul intellegitur ab eis qui hoc possunt intelligere, non esse Deum auctorem mali. Quomodo eum potest ille, qui omnium quæ sunt, causa est ut sint, causa esse rursus ut non sint, id est, ut ab essentia deficient, et ad non esse tendant?” De Mor. Manich. II. 3.

and just as you expect to put your hand on the summum malum it vanishes into non-being. Thus all that exists, even if evil has made its inroads upon its being, still derives all its existence from God, who is the sole principle of the universe. Augustine insists upon this in the most rigorous fashion. "Ego quidem conditorem hominum omnium, quamvis omnes sub peccato nascentur, et pereant nisi renascantur, non dico nisi Deum. Vitium quippe insemminatum est persuasione diaboli, per quod sub peccato nati sunt, non natura condita qua homines sunt."⁹ Here we see that Augustine, while clinging to original sin, still maintains that God alone is the Creator of man.

In another section of this same work he raises this specific question: In what sense does God create evil beings? His answer is that He creates them in the sense that He bestows on them what pertains to the goodness of nature. The very fact that a human being exists, even though he be evil, is proof that he has good which pertains to all nature and is the bestowal of God.¹⁰ This same principle appears when our author attempts to account for the evil will possessed by man. God provides a good nature and just punishment, but the evil will man obtains from himself.¹¹

⁹ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 55.

¹⁰ "Sic itaque creat malos quomodo pascit et nutrit malos: quia quod eis creando tribuit, ad naturæ pertinent bonitatem; et quod eis pascendo et nutriendo dat incrementum, non utique malitiæ eorum, sed eidem bonæ naturæ quam creavit bonus, bonum tribuit adjumentum. In quantum enim homines sunt, bonum est naturæ, cujus auctor est Deus: in quantum autem cum peccato nascuntur, perituri si non renascuntur, ad semen pertinent maledictum ab initio, illius antiquæ inobedientiæ vitio." Ibid. II. 32.

¹¹ "A se quippe habent voluntatem malum, ab illo autem

Evil in man then does not owe its origin to God, nor on the contrary can either man or evil exist except as God provides the good gift of nature. Evil can only arise from nature. It has nothing to which it may attach itself, unless nature is provided, and God alone creates this substratum.¹² The vigor with which Augustine clings to this belief reaches its culmination in the assertions that vicious souls, not in so far as they are vicious, but in so far as they are souls must be regarded as creatures of God,¹³ and that even the devil and all the evil angels subsist only because God provides their life and nature.¹⁴

This is sufficient to show how Augustine's conception of God contributed to the problem of evil as he conceived it. God is the one supreme and unchangeable existence, the source of all life, the author of all being, including that being and nature into which evil has entered.¹⁵

ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTION, "NATURA."

God then is the Creator. But what has He created? The answer is "nature." Here then we come upon a technical term of Augustine's. His use of the word

et naturam bonam et justam poenam." *De Genesi ad Lit.* XI. 12.

¹² "Quia nec oriri malum potest, nisi ex natura; nec ubi sit habet si non fuerit in natura. Confiteor igitur opus Dei esse qui nascitur, etiam trahens originale malum." *Cont. Jul. Pelag.* III. 56.

¹³ *De Duabus Anim. c. Manich.* 5.

¹⁴ *De Trin.* XIII. XII. 16.

¹⁵ Cf. Fairbairn who says, referring to Augustine: "There is but one God, one supreme essence from whom whatever is, holds its existence." *The Phil. of the Christ. Religion*, p. 100.

"natura" must be carefully analysed if we are to understand the problem of evil as he formulated it. Augustine's thought cannot be understood apart from the controversies into which he entered, and the philosophies which he combated. This is pre-eminently true in any effort to understand his conception of "natura." That conception was formulated in his endeavor first to combat Manichean dualism and then on the other hand to oppose the over-exaltation of human nature by Pelagianism.

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of Manicheism. It is sufficient for our purpose to recall that Manichæus asserted a most radical dualism.¹ The evil principle which he set over against God and made continual with Him, was according to Alexander of Lycopolis, 'ύλη: God he affirmed to be good, and matter evil. Thus the Kingdom of Darkness was practically identified with 'ύλη. Or to state it from a slightly different point of view, 'ύλη belonged completely to the Kingdom of Darkness and was without origin. But not only the supposition that all matter was evil and belonged to a Kingdom wholly independent of God, but also the belief that creation was a necessity for God, and that his works were made out of substances derived from other sources than himself, and that these works served as a barrier against his enemies, preventing further rebellion,² —

¹ "Mani teaches: Two subsistences from the beginning of the world, the one light, the other darkness; the two are separated from each other. The light is the first most glorious being, limited by no number, God himself, the King of the Paradise of Light.—The other being is the darkness, and his numbers are five: cloud, burning, hot wind, poison and darkness." Fihrist quoted in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fath. IV. 11.

² Conf. XIII. 45.

all of this was the background against which Augustine developed his conception of nature.

In the first section of this chapter we have seen that Augustine portrays God as the source of all life in opposition to the Manichean principle of evil, in this section we must find his answer to their belief that all created things are evil. Augustine found it necessary to so shape his idea of nature that he could take a position midway between Manicheism and Pelagianism. He would not vituperate human nature as did the Manicheans, for God was the author of all existence, nor could he credulously praise it as did the Pelagians, for his theological opinions demanded that he recognize a fatal "vitium" in all human nature.³ It is only as we remember that Augustine was attempting to steer between this Scylla and Charybdis that we will rightly understand his notion of "natura." Thus three distinct theories are presented to us, that of the Manicheans, that of the Pelagians, and that of the Catholics as represented by Augustine.

Our author himself has attempted to draw a clear demarcation between the three positions. He says: "Catholici dicunt humanam naturam a creatore Deo bono conditam bonam, sed peccato vitiatam medico Christo indigere. Manichæi dicunt humanam naturam, non a Deo conditam bonam peccatoque vitiatam, sed ab æternarum principe tenebrarum de commixtione duarum naturarum, quæ semper fuerunt, una bona et una mala, hominem creatum. Pelagiani

³ "Ac per hoc Manichæus quidem naturam humanam detestabiliter vituperat, sed tu crudeliter laudas." Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CXXXVIII. See also *ibid.* III. CXLIV.

et Cœlestiani dicunt humanam naturam a bono Deo conditam bonam, sed ita esse in nascentibus parvulis sanam, ut Christi non habeant necessariam in illa ætate medicinam.”⁴ This then is the historical setting in which we find Augustine’s conception of “natura” developing.

Now what is this “natura”? It is easier to find Augustine answering this question by telling us that there are several kinds of nature, that it is good, that it is necessary for the existence of everything, even of evil, than it is to find a definite conception as to what nature actually is. But as we go on in this discussion we shall see that nature is practically synonymous with being or existence.⁵ Nature is that which is. Nature, just in so far as it is nature, exists. When, in the second chapter, we come to see what our author’s conception of evil is, we shall find that it is that which is “contra naturam.” But evil is that which tends to nonexistence, to non-being. Nature, therefore, is being or existence.

Nature then, from another point of view is substance, it is “substantia,” the underlying something which gives being and existence to all reality, whether finite or infinite, whether physical or spiritual, whether visible or invisible.⁶ At times Augustine seems to

⁴ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 9.

⁵ “Nam et ipsa natura nihil est aliud, quam id quod intelligitur in suo genere aliquid esse.” De Mor. Manich. II. 2.

⁶ “Dicitur homo, dicitur pecus, dicitur terra, dicitur cœlum, dicitur sol, luna, lapis, mare, ær: omnia ista substantiæ sunt, eo ipso quo sunt. *Naturæ ipsæ, substantiæ dicuntur.* Deus est quædam substantia; nam quod nulla substantia est, nihil omnino est. Substantia ergo aliquid esse est.” Enar. in Ps. LXVIII. 5.

approximate closely Aristotle's conception of *ἄλῃ*. Especially in the *Confessions* we find him speaking of a certain formlessness which is almost nothing and yet is not altogether nothing. It exists and is the formless something whose good is its existence and its capacity for form.⁷ "Nonne tu, Domine, docuisti me, quod priusquam istam informen materiam formares atque distingueres, non erat aliquid; non color, non figura, non corpus, non spiritus? Non tamen omnino nihil: erat quædam informitas sine ulla specie."⁸ A similar conception seems to underlie the phrase "ipsam adhuc informen inchoationem verum formabilem creabilemque materiam,"⁹ which suggests a substance formless but capable of receiving form and making.

"Natura" then is existence or being. This becomes more apparent when our author begins to point out that nature assumes a threefold aspect. There is a mutable nature which falls into two classes, "corpus" and "anima." There is the one immutable nature, which is God, the supreme existence.¹⁰

We are now prepared to observe how Augustine opposes this idea to Manicheism. God is the Creator of this nature, and therefore *all* nature is *good*. Even that material which is absolutely formless and without quality is not to be called evil. It possesses the

⁷ De Natura Boni c. Manich. 18.

⁸ Conf. XII. 3, 24, 25.

⁹ Ibid. 26.

¹⁰ "Est natura per locos et tempora mutabilis, ut corpus. Et est natura per locos nullo modo, sed tantum per tempora, ut anima. Et est natura quæ nec per locos, nec per tempora mutari potest, hoc Deus est." Ep. XVIII. 2. Cf. De Mor. Manich. IV. 6.

capacity for form, and that in itself is an unquestionable good.¹¹ Here he is diametrically opposed to the Manicheans who held that *ύλη* belonged completely to the evil world. But Augustine does not pause with his assertion about *ύλη*, he maintains repeatedly that all nature in so far as it is nature is good.¹² He uses late in life the same thought in combating Pelagianism. Thus he writes against Julianus: "Ita ut omnino nulla natura sit quæ non aut ipse sit, aut ab ipso facta sit; ut quantacumque aut qualiscumque natura sit, in quantum natura est, bonum sit."¹³

This doctrine reaches its fullest expression when our author argues that if the nature is purer when the evil is removed, and does not exist at all if the good is taken away, then it must be the good which makes the nature of the thing, and the evil is not nature, but against nature. "Si ergo malo illo adempto manet natura purgator, bono autem detracto non manet ulla natura: hoc ibi facit naturam quod bonum habet; quod autem malum, non natura, sed contra

¹¹ "Neque enim vel illa materies quam antiqui hylen dixerunt, malum dicenda est.—Sed hylen dico quamdam penitus informem et sine qualitate materiem, unde istæ quas sentimus qualitates formantur, ut antiqui dixerunt. Hinc enim et silva græce *ύλη* dicitur quod operantibus apta sit, non ut aliquid ipsa faciat, sed unde aliquid fiat. Porro si bonum aliquod est forma, unde qui ea prævalent, formosi appellantur, sicut a specie speciosi, procul dubio bonum aliquod est etiam capacitas formæ." De Natura Boni c. Manich. XVIII.

¹² "Quapropter quod verissime dicitur, omnis natura in quantum natura est, bona est—Omnis igitur substantia aut Deus, aut ex Deo, quia omne bonum aut Deus aut ex Deo." De Lib. Arbit. III. 36. See also Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CXIV where he uses the same words, and De Natura Boni c. Manich. XIX.

¹³ Cont. Jul. Pel. I. 36 fin.

naturam est — Unde intelligitur eas, in quantum naturæ sunt, bonas esse: quia cum eis vicissim omne quod bonum habent detraxeris, naturæ nullæ erunt.”¹⁴

Here then the good is the nature, and everything so far as it is nature, is good. Remove the good and no nature remains. It is very apparent that we are dealing here with a metaphysical not a moral good. Confusion between these two conceptions and the failure to distinguish them clearly has led to much error. It is upon this distinction that the question of reality in good and evil must be based.

If we should conclude our statement of Augustine's conception of “natura” at this juncture we would do him an injustice. All nature is good *but all natures are not equally good*.¹⁵ It has already been pointed out in this chapter that Augustine regarded God as the one supreme existence, the one immutable good. God then is the one nature which is supremely good. God is good not by any participation in good, but solely by virtue of his own nature and essence.¹⁶ The things which God has created are all good but their goodness lies in their participation in God's goodness

¹⁴ Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXIII. 36.

¹⁵ Cont. Ep. Manich. XXV. 27.

¹⁶ “Hoc enim maxime esse dicendum est, quod semper eodem modo esse habet, quod omnimodo sui simile est, quod nulla ex parte corrumpi ac mutari potest, quod non subiacet tempori, quod aliter nunc se habere quam habebat antea, non potest. Id enim est quod esse verissime dicitur. Subest enim huic verbo manetis in se atque incommutabiliter sese habentis naturæ significatio. Hanc nihil aliud quam Deum possumus dicere, cui si contrarium recte quæras nihil omnino est. Esse enim contrarium non habet nisi non esse. Nulla est ergo Deo natura contraria.” De Mor. Manich. I. 1. See also *ibid.* IV. 6, and De Perf. Just. Hom. XIV. 32.

and in his bestowal of nature.¹⁷ Hence they are not equal to God. Their good is not supreme and unchangeable, and yet they are good.¹⁸ Thus we find gradations in nature, some natures are more excellent than others, and yet all, from the highest to the lowest order, are good.¹⁹ It is apparent here that Augustine on the one hand is endeavoring to combat the Manichean idea that all matter is evil, and at the same time to state what to-day is recognized as a truism, viz., that the creature is finite, that the very fact of being derived or created involves metaphysical imperfection. This Augustine has clearly formulated in the statement: "*Ita et Deus summum bonum est, et ea quæ fecit, bona sunt omnia quamvis non sint tam bona, quam est ille ipse qui fecit. Quis enim hoc tam insanus audet exigere, ut æqualia sint artificii opera, et condita conditori?*"²⁰

If one asks wherein the various natures differ, or in what sense they are all good but not equally good, the answer lies in the fact that the works of God are capable of change. Augustine attacks the Manichean belief of two principles, one good and the other evil, and asserts that both are good. Applying it to the case of man he affirms that both the spirit and the flesh are good. They differ from the highest good only in that they are capable of change.²¹ Nor can we justly pause here in the analysis of Augustine's conception of nature. All nature is good and

¹⁷ De Mor. Manich. IV. 6.

¹⁸ Enchir. X.

¹⁹ Cont. Ep. Manich. XXV. 27.

²⁰ De Mor. Manich. IV. 6. Also Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 12 and 21.

²¹ De Continentia 18.

without nature, evil could not exist.²² "Non enim potest esse ullum malum nisi in aliquo bono; quia non potest esse nisi in aliqua natura."²³ He even ventures to apply this to human nature, which he always rigorously insists is corrupted by a fatal flaw. But regardless of this original taint, human nature is not evil because it is nature, but because it is vitiated.²⁴ We also find the converse of this. Not only is no evil possible without some nature to which to attach itself, and thus convert its negativity and sham existence into act, but also all evil is good in so far as it is nature.²⁵ The secret of such a paradoxical statement lies in the failure to distinguish between "bonum metaphysicum" and "bonum morale." To assert that evil is a good in so far as it is nature, certainly does not apply to the ethical meaning of the word good. We are dealing with two separate and distinct spheres.

Augustine even uses the existence of evil and vice to prove that nature is good. The vices themselves are testimonials to the fact that nature is good. For were it not good, vices could not hurt it.²⁶ Indeed, evil would never have existed had not good nature,²⁶ though mutable, brought evil upon itself. And this

²² Enchir. XIV. Cf. also Ep. CLIII. 3, and De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48.

²³ Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CXIV.

²⁴ "Natura humana, etsi mala est, quia vitiata est, non tamen malum est, quia natura est. Nulla enim natura in quantum natura est, malum est; sed prorsus bonum, sine quo bono ullum esse non potest malum: quia nisi in aliqua natura ullum esse non potest vitium." Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CCVI. See also Cont. duas Ep. Ped. II. 8.

²⁵ Enchir. XIII, also Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CXCVI.

²⁶ Civ. Dei XII. 3.

very sin is itself evidence that its nature was originally good. For just as blindness is a vice of the eye, this very fact indicating that originally the eye was made to see the light, so vices in man indicate that his nature was originally good.²⁷

It is now evident that to Augustine "*natura*" was a very definite conception. It grew out of his strife with the Manicheans and Pelagians, and formed the basis of his opposition to both these philosophies. His fundamental idea is that all nature is good. All natures are not equally good, for one is immutable, and others are capable of change, but nevertheless all nature, in so far as it is nature, is good. Indeed without nature, no evil could exist, and even evil in so far as it is nature is good. The very existence or presence of evil is testimony to the fact that all nature is good. Clearly this "*bonum*" must be interpreted as "*bonum metaphysicum*." The following sentence sums up his conception of "*natura*" and at the same time prepares the way for his negative view of evil. "*Ei ergo qui summe est, non potest esse contrarium nisi quod non est: ac per hoc sicut ab illo est omne quod bonum est sic ab illo est omne quod naturaliter est; quoniam omne quod naturaliter est, bonum est. Omnis itaque natura bona est, et omne bonum a Deo est: omnis ergo natura a Deo est.*"²⁸

CREATION EX NIHILO.

God then is the Creator, the sole source of all life and being, and that which He creates is nature, which,

²⁷ Civ. Dei XXII. 1.

²⁸ De Natura Boni c. Manich. XIX.

in so far as it is nature, is good. Have we not then a closed circle? How, under this conception of Creator and creatura can any place be found for *malum* and *peccatum*? We would fail to understand Augustine's metaphysics if, at this juncture, we did not recognize his doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*, and what it involves in regard to the possibility of evil. We would not rightly conceive the problem of evil as it shaped itself in the mind of Augustine, if after stating his conception of God and nature, we did not recognize this basal condition which he places over all creation. When in Chapter III we come to a consideration of the question "Whence is evil?" we shall see the importance of this idea. Here for the sake of completeness in the statement of the problem, we need only to recognize this element in his thought, and show what it involves in regard to the possibility and existence of evil.

We find this doctrine stated repeatedly throughout the works of Augustine. In an early philosophical work written in the year 387 A. D. we find this sentence: "*Deus qui de nihilo mundum istum creasti, quem omnium oculi sentiunt pulcherrimum.*"¹ The distinction upon which Augustine insists is that all created things were made *by* God but not *of* God.² Yet the matter out of which God created his works was not some substance not his own, nor any substance that existed before creation.² This doctrine then of creation *ex nihilo* shows evidences of having been developed and set forth in opposition to the Manichean notion of creation, which held that God

¹ Solil. I. 2. Also Sermo CXXVII. 15 and Conf. XII. 7.

² Conf. XIII. 48.

was compelled to create the universe out of material which was inherently evil. Augustine repudiates the thought of an evil matter and enunciates the doctrine that God created the universe out of nothing, and, at the same instant that the formless matter was brought into being, it was given form.

Now in this doctrine of creation "out of nothing" we find the cause of the difference in the various kinds of nature noted in the preceding section. The logical implication of creation *ex nihilo* is the existence of a nature not coeternal with God. "*A Deo factam esse de nihilo, ideoque illi non esse coeternam.*"³ All creatures are good but they are not equal to God because they are created out of nothing. Mutable nature differs from the supreme and unchangeable nature of God, because it has been made out of nothing.⁴ All creation possesses a weakened and defective reality, not because it was not made good by the Creator, but because it was made out of nothing.⁵ No object could exist unless made by God, but nevertheless it could not be equal to Him because made out of nothing.⁶ Thus the instability of mutable nature is the inevitable result of creation *ex nihilo*.

Hence we are prepared to understand why evil arose in man. It arose because he was made out of nothing. This is abundantly and repeatedly set forth.⁷

³ Conf. XI. 31.

⁴ "Ut dictum est, atque incommutabili bono universam conditam dicit esse creaturam, naturasque omnes bonas, quamvis impares creatori quia ex nihilo creatus, ideoque mutabilis. Cont. Jul. Pelag. I. 36.

⁵ Civ. Dei XII. 1.

⁶ Ibid. 5.

⁷ Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XXX-XXXIX.

It need not be dwelt upon here for the proper place for its full consideration is in Chapter III where we deal with the origin of evil. It is important to observe at this juncture that this conception of creation ex nihilo involved not the necessity but the possibility of evil. "Non igitur ideo peccavit, sed ideo peccare potuit, quia de nihilo factus est. Inter peccavit, et peccare potuit plurimum distat: illa culpa est, ista natura."⁸

Augustine is very emphatic in his statement of this conception. He asserts that he knows that the nature of God cannot under any possible construction be conceived as defective, but that all natures made out of nothing can be so conceived.⁹ When pressed to answer in a word the question "Whence is corruption?" his answer is that all natures that are capable of corruption were not begotten by God but rather made by him out of nothing.¹⁰ In one very significant passage where our author endeavors to trace all evil to its very source, he first attributes evil to a corrupt will, but he immediately asks whence arose the corrupt will itself? Whether the corrupt will arose in angel or man both are the good works of God, possessing a good and praiseworthy nature. Therefore evil arose out of good.

But still Augustine must qualify this, and so he concludes: "Nec ideo tamen ex bono potuit oriri voluntas mala quia bonum factum est a bono Deo; sed quia de nihilo factum est non de Deo."¹¹ Nature

⁸ Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LX.

⁹ Civ. Dei XII. 8.

¹⁰ Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXVI. 41, and XXXVIII. 44.

¹¹ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48.

was created good by God, and it could never have been depraved by vice had it not been made *ex nihilo*. Hence, it is nature because made by God, but evil enters into it because it was created out of nothing.¹² "Fecit ergo Deus cuncta de nihilo: id est, omnia quæ ut essent fecit, si eorum originem primam respiciamus, ex his quæ non erant fecit: hoc Graeci dicunt, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων — non ideo potuisse oriri ex bono malam voluntatem, quia bonum factum est a bono Deo, sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo."¹³

We thus see that Augustine, without in any sense withdrawing his belief that all nature is good, has placed an important qualification or condition upon that conception. All nature is good, but some natures are not equal to others. Mutable nature is unstable, and possesses a defective reality because it is created by God out of nothing. Is evil therefore inwrought in the world?

PRESENCE OF EVIL.

Thus far we have seen one side of Augustine's theory of the universe. God is the source of all life, and the creator of all being. All nature is good, and although we must recognize the possibilities involved in creation *ex nihilo* still all being in so far as it exists, is good. Did Augustine then fail to recognize the problem of evil? His voluminous writings, covering a period of over four decades answer an emphatic "no." Augustine faced the prob-

¹² Civ. Dei XIV. 13.

¹³ Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLIV.

lem from every angle. His *Confessions* are sufficient evidence to prove that evil was the subject of much of his thought. He himself felt the same inconsistency which any one feels who states our author's theory of the world as we have thus far attempted to do, and then turns to the realities of life.

Consider this remarkable passage from the *Confessions*, which states concisely the problem as Augustine conceived it at an early period in his life: "Ecce Deus, et ecce quae creavit Deus, et bonus est Deus, atque his validissime longissimeque præstantior; sed tamen bonus bona creavit, et ecce quomodo ambit atque implet ea. Ubi ergo malum, et unde, et qua huc irrepsit? Quæ radix ejus, et quod semen ejus? An omnino non est?—Unde est malum? An unde fecit ea, materies aliqua mala erat, et formavit atque ordinavit eam, sed reliquit aliquid in illa, quod in bonum non converteret? Cur et hoc? An impotens erat totam vertere et commutare, ut nihil mali remaneret, cum sit omnia potens? Postremo cur inde aliquid facere voluit, ac non potius eadem omnipotentia fecit ut nulla esset omnino? Aut vero existere poterat contra ejus voluntatem?"¹ This is sufficient to show that the two sides of the problem were clearly formulated by Augustine. He confesses that he pondered over these problems until his life was miserable and his heart was filled with gnawing cares.¹

Not only did Augustine give his attention to the consideration of what and whence is evil, but he was fully conscious of the evils of life in their most unmitigated forms. John Stuart Mill has portrayed for

¹ Conf. VII. 7.

us in his most vivid fashion the evils which nature inflicts upon man,² but his portrayal seems partial and inadequate when compared with that of Augustine.³ This life, if life it may be called, is filled with a host of cruel ills. Our bodies are threatened with a numberless throng of casualties. Heat, cold, storms, floods, lightning, hail, earthquakes, famine, all combine to make the life of man miserable and uncertain. Bodily diseases are more numerous than physicians suppose or know. Even the human mind is cursed with such profound and dreadful ignorance that all mankind is engulfed in error, and ekes out a pitiful existence full of toil, pain and fear. Human hearts are torn with grief and wrenched with pain. Sorrow, mourning and bereavement is the lot not only of the godless but of the righteous and perfect man. Society is cursed with the evil deeds and crimes of wicked men. Life is marred by wars, treasons, fraud, perfidy, murders, parricides, wickedness, luxury, insolence, impurity and numberless uncleannesses and shameful acts. A still more difficult element of the problem for Augustine was the fact that infants are subject to wasting disease, racking pain and the intense agonies of thirst and hunger.⁴ He felt that it was incumbent upon him to show how it was compatible with justice that infants should undergo these evils through no fault of their own. It was not difficult to discover the purpose of evil when adults passed through such trials for either it was a test of their characters as Job well illustrates, or a

² Essay on "Nature," pp. 28-31.

³ Civ. Dei XXII. 22 seq.

⁴ Ep. CLXVI. 16.

punishment for their sins, as Herod's case proves. But neither of these purposes could apply to infants for they have no righteousness to be tested, nor any *actual* sin to be punished. Clearly Augustine recognized the presence of evils in the world, although in his theory of creation he has apparently excluded them.

THE RELATION OF MALUM AND PECCATUM.

No one can read the works of Augustine, seeking for his treatment of the problem of evil without soon asking this question: What is the relation of "malum" and "peccatum"? Nor would we fully state the problem of evil as Augustine conceived it, if we failed to see the relation which existed between them in his thought. To-day, evil and sin are two distinct conceptions, and evil is defined as disorganization. In a finite world, disorganization seems inevitable. Imperfection is a necessary prerequisite of life. Perfection would mean a dead world. Under some circumstances and in certain conditions isolation seems to be a necessary condition of self-realization. It becomes the duty of every person to be a self-supporting, independent citizen. Thus society itself depends upon the individual regarding his own interests at times as of primal importance. Even competition seems necessary, if the best in man is to be brought into action. Sturdiness and vigor owe their existence to sharp competition and interference. Therefore we see the necessity of these evils as means to the realization of true life. Vice or sin enters when these means are transformed into ends. When these natural evils cease to serve as means to

a higher life and become instead the ideal or end of life, then evil becomes vice or sin. Does Augustine recognize any similar distinction in these two terms?

Without attempting any full analysis here of the conception of *malum*, let us ask Augustine what is the proper use of the word? We find an explicit answer in one of his writings against the Manicheans. He says: "*Ita et malum ostenditur quomodo dicatur: non enim secundum essentiam, sed secundum privationem verissime dicitur.*"¹ *Malum* then in its correct sense is applied not to essence but to privation, negation or loss. It is, as we recall, only mutable nature that is subject to this loss, to this diminution or falling away. But the mutable nature which is thus liable to fall away by defection cannot originate its evil. What then is the cause of the turning to a lower nature? The answer is sin. "*Quapropter si pia fides est ut omnia bona Deus fecerit, quibus tamen ipse multo est excellentior longeque præstantior, origo et caput mali est peccatum.*"² He follows this immediately with a quotation of 1 Tim. vi. 10, which in the Vulgate reads: "*Radix omnium malorum est cupiditas.*" And then adds, "*Si enim radicem omnium malorum quæris, habes Apostolum dicentem, radicem omnium malorum esse cupiditatem. Radicem radicis quærere non possum.*"²

When we remember that for Augustine the scripture was an ultimate authority to be placed alongside of reason and experience as a source of knowledge we can understand why he takes this dictum of

¹ De Mor. Manich. IV. 6.

² Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 21.

Paul³ as final. At any rate there is no doubt but that Augustine regarded evil (*malum*) as originating or finding its head in sin (*peccatum*). This he states very explicitly in one of his sermons. "*Malorum omnium nostrorum causa peccatum est. Non enim sine causa homines mala ista patiuntur. Justus est Deus*—."⁴ The context here seems to imply that "*peccatum*" in the sentence quoted is to be interpreted as "*peccatum originale*" not "*peccatum actuale*," for in the preceding clause he says "*in uno peccavimus*," referring to Adam. But granting that this is the case, it does not sever the connection between "*all our evils*" and "*sin*." The latter is the cause of the former.

This fact is so important that it must be shown that this is no chance statement of our author. In his *Unfinished Work* against Julianus it is stated that the evils of life would not exist if it were not for sin. "*Illud potius intueri, quod mala cum quibus nascuntur homines, quæ congenerari hominibus in paradisi felicitate non possent, profecto nisi de paradiso exisset natura vitiata, nunc eis congenerata non essent*."⁵ Here too the reference is clearly to original sin but in view of the fact, as we shall see in Chapter IV, that Augustine regarded the whole human race as seminally or radically existent in Adam, the casual connection between sin and evil is not broken. Even in his opus magnum, *The City of God*, in the very last book, and therefore the product of his

³ Assuming the Pauline authorship of 1 Tim.

⁴ Sermo CCXL. 3.

⁵ Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. XX. Cf. also VI. 21.

mature thought, we find the belief expressed that no evils would have existed, if sin had not arisen.⁶ But Augustine goes a step farther. He seems almost at the point of breaking away from the thought of *peccatum originale* as the cause of all evils and placing it in present action. There would have been no evil, if we ourselves had not committed it. "*Malum enim nisi experimento non sentiremus, quia nullum esset si non fecessemus. Neque enim ulla natura mali est, sed amissio boni hoc nomen accepit.*"⁷ We can never be quite sure when Augustine speaks in the first person plural, whether he refers the action to our present individual actions or to our action when we were all one in the original man. The former meaning, however, seems to be the meaning both in the passage just quoted and in the following sentence. "*Malum est enim nobis de nobis.*"⁸

Having observed the foregoing relation between sin and evil we are now prepared to hear Augustine assert unreservedly that "*malum est peccatum.*" As we have already seen, the proper use of the word "*malum*" is its application to a kind of falling away. Now we see that this falling away is occasioned by a voluntary act or by sin. "*Malum esse peccatum quod fit voluntate animæ, cum diligit pro ipso Creatore creaturam; sive suo nutu, cum sit mala; sive*

⁶ "*Quæ mala omnino nulla essent, nisi natura mutabilis, quamvis bona, et a summo Deo atque incommutabili bono, qui bona omnia condidit, instituta, peccando ea sibi ipse fecisset. Quo etiam peccato suo teste convincitur, bonam conditam se esse naturam.*" *Civ. Dei* XXII. cap. I. 2.

⁷ *De Genesi ad Lit.* VIII. 31.

⁸ *Sermo* LVI. 3 Cf. with this: "*Etenim homini unde malum, nisi ab homine.*" *Sermo* CCXCVII. 9.

alterius persuasu, cum consentit malo.”⁹ In his dispute with Fortunatus, our author states this even more explicitly. He says that the only thing which is called evil is our voluntary sin. “Et hoc est solum quod dicitur malum, voluntarium nostrum peccatum.”¹⁰ This, however, seemed a little short of the whole truth and so Augustine hastens to add what he has stated elsewhere¹¹ that evil may be of two kinds. It is either sin or the punishment for sin. His own words that he adds to the sentence just quoted are: “Est et aliud genus mali, quod est poena peccati. Cum ergo duo sint genera malorum peccatum et poena peccati, peccatum ad Deum non pertinet, poena peccati ad vindicem pertinet.”¹² We see this same statement together with its reference to freedom as the real source of the action in the words, “sed omne quod dicitur malum, aut peccatum esse, aut poenam peccati. Nec esse peccatum nisi pravum liberæ voluntatis assensum, cum inclinamur ad ea quæ justitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere; id est, non in rebus istis, sed in usu earum non legitimo.”¹³

We now have ample evidence that in a very real sense the problems of evil and sin were one to Augustine. Malum and peccatum were not distinguished by him as they are to-day. But why not? Simply because his universe was theocentric. Malum was a defect, an absence of being, a loss of good. It was caused by a turning or defection from the Creator to

⁹ Cont. Secund. Manich. XVIII.

¹⁰ Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 15.

¹¹ De Genesi ad Lit. Imp. Liber 3.

¹² Ibid. 15.

¹³ Ibid. 3.

the creatura. It was not the object to which the will turned that was evil, but the turning, the defection in itself, was the evil. But this is sin. All evil therefore is sin. Thus we see Augustine avoids relating evil to God. Still he must have a just God, and therefore some evils exist which are "pœna peccati." Augustine was not far from modern conclusions when he placed sin in the will, but his theological frame of mind, and his fundamental tendency to center all in God, caused him to regard all evil as sin. How shall we reconcile this with his clear statements of metaphysical imperfection? How can the natural and necessary evils of life, those facts which we recognize as the necessary means to life, be regarded as peccatum? The inconsistency must have arisen from his general point of view and his constant tendency to relate all to God as the source of all being and life, without whom and beyond whom there is nothing.

Here then is our problem. A universe created by a good God. This universe in all its parts is good. Everything that exists and in so far as it exists is good. The matter or substance out of which God created the world was itself created ex nihilo. Nevertheless life teems with evil.¹⁴ Its presence no one can doubt. Evil is sin or the punishment of sin. This is the relation of malum and peccatum. How does Augustine solve this antinomy? If all is good, *what* is evil? If God is the source of all life and being, *whence* is evil?

¹⁴ Augustine expresses this fact in most vivid fashion. "Ab hujus tam miseræ quasi quibusdam inferis vitæ—" Civ. Dei XXII. cap. XXII. 4 initio.

CHAPTER II

QUID EST MALUM?

Augustine, in his controversy with the Manicheans, insisted that the proper mode of approach to the problem of evil was to ask "What is evil?" and then, after having determined its nature, to seek its origin.¹ It is more reasonable to define the object sought before going in search of it. The procedure of the Manicheans, when they begin with the question "Whence is evil?" presents the absurd spectacle of searching for a thing unknown. This method of approach, Augustine argues, was the source of the astounding errors and fanciful deviations from truth into which Manichæus fell.² Before searching for the origin of evil, then, Augustine would have us attempt to define it. Indeed before we can with any success ask "Whence is evil?" we must inquire "What is evil?"³ This then, must be our method if we would be true to Augustinian procedure.

HIS MANICHEAN CONCEPTION.

Just as in dealing with Augustine's conception of "natura" we found that it was evolved and definitely formulated in his controversies with the Manicheans and Pelagians, so here if we recognize the fact that

¹ De Mor. Manich. II. 2.

² Ibid. XXXVI. 41.

³ "Proinde cum quæritur unde sit malum, primo quærendum est quid sit malum."—De Natura Boni c. Manich. IV.

for nine years Augustine was a Manichean and accepted their notion of evil, we shall be able to understand better the exact formulation of his own conception when he had repudiated Manicheism and entered on the path which by way of Platonism led him into Christianity. We only need to recall here that the Manichean teaching made evil a substance, coeternal with God and a limitation upon Him. There were from the very beginning, two substances separate and distinct from each other. One principle was called God, the other *ʿλγ* or Dæmon. Augustine states that he accepted this in his early life. He imagined that there was some unknown substance called evil, and that the summum malum was not only a substance but life, and that, too, life not derived from God. His own statement concludes thus: "In ista vero divisione irrationalis vitæ, nescio quam substantiam et naturam summi mali, quæ non solum esset substantia, sed omnino vita esset, et tamen abs te non esset, Deus meus, ex quo sunt omnia, miser opinabar."⁴ In another passage we find even more explicit testimony as to his early acceptance of this dualism. He not only thought of evil as some kind of a substance, but regarded the whole universe as consisting of two masses, both infinite and opposing one another, but the evil principle less expansive than the good which was unbounded save where the evil mass was opposed to it.⁵ There is no doubt then as to Augustine's

⁴ Conf. IV. cap. XV. 24.

⁵ "Huic enim et mali substantiam quamdam credebam esse talem, et habere suam molem terram et deformem; sive crassam, quam terram dicebant, sive tennem atque subtilem, sicut est æris corpus;—constituebam ex adverso sibi duas moles, utramque infinitam, sed malam angustius bonam grandius."—Ibid. V. cap. X. 20.

early conception of evil. It was a substantia,⁶ not mutable but eternal. It was one of the two basal principles of the universe.

NON SUBSTANTIA.

It is now readily understood why we find Augustine in his Anti-Manichean writings as well as elsewhere, so frequently asserting that evil is not a substance (substantia). For example, he makes the statement, with which we are familiar, that all the various goods or natures are the workmanship of God, but the evils are his judgments and cannot be natures or substances.¹ Again evil is not a substance but rather of the nature of a disease or a wound.² Still again in the *Confessions*, he states this conception of malum, arriving at it from the familiar line of thought that all nature is good, and therefore evil is not a substance, for if it were a substance it would be good.³ Similarly in the same writing, he makes the statement that evil is perversion of the will and not a substance.⁴

⁶ Conf. IV. XV. 24.—“Non enim noveram neque didiceram, nec ullam substantiam malum esse, nec ipsam mentem nostram summum atque incommutabile bonum.”

¹ “Quæ mala nullo modo esse naturas vel substantias non vident Manichæi.” Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. V.

² “Malum non esse substantiam; sed sicut vulnus in corpore, ita in substantia quæ se ipsam vitiavit, esse cœpisse peste inchoata, atque ibi esse desinere sanitate perfecta.” De Continentia 21.

³ “Malumque illud quod quærebam unde esset, non est substantia; quia si substantia esset, bonum esset.” Conf. VII. cap. XII. 18.

⁴ “Et quæsi quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni substantiam sed a summa substantia, te Deo, detortæ in infirma voluntatis perversitatem, projicientis intima sua, et tumiscentis foras. Conf. VII. cap. XVI. 22.

In other writings⁵ he virtually ridicules those who cannot think of good and evil except under corporeal forms, and consequently have an anthropomorphic conception of God. Such persons are able to view evil only as a substance instead of as a falling away or a defection from real being. We are thus able to see that Augustine sets over against his youthful Manichean belief that evil was a substance, his mature conclusion, that evil is not a substance.

VITIUM

But what is evil? The most general and indefinite answer would be that evil is "vitium." This conception we shall have to examine more carefully when in Chapter VI we deal with "*peccatum originale*" and endeavor to trace its effects in mankind. But here we are justified in observing for the sake of completeness if nothing more, that evil is "vitium" or that natures are evil as the result of "vitium." This conception also is connected closely with his fundamental thesis that all nature is good. Evils are evil not by nature but by this inherent fault or flaw. Also in connection with his idea that even evils are good (see pages 13-14) we find this thought with which we are dealing now. "*Sunt mala, sed mutantur; et ipsa erunt bona: quia ipsa mala, vitio sunt mala, non natura.*"¹ There is no question but that this was one of the ways in which Augustine conceived evil. It was not a substance, it had no tangible or self-existent reality, it existed solely as a par-

⁵ E.g. In Joan. Evang. Tract. XCVIII. 4.

¹ Sermo CLXXXII. 5.

asite and by virtue of its attachment to some nature. Thus and thus only could its unreality transform itself into actuality. It was nothing of itself, but found its vague negativity and mock existence simply as the flaw of that which was good. "Quod enim malum est per vitium, profecto bonum est per naturam."² Just as good exists per naturam so evil exists per vitium.

CONTRA NATURAM OR INCONVENIENTIA.

We are now prepared to follow this last thought to more definite expression. In our analysis of Augustine's conception of nature we referred to the fact that evil was conceived as something opposed to nature. Not only malum but also vitium is thus described. We are told that vitium is a malum, not to God but to the persons who possess it. It is an evil to them for the sole reason that it corrupts the good of their nature. In other words vitium is contrary to the good of their nature. "Natura igitur non est contraria Deo, sed vitium. Quia quod malum est, contrarium est bono."¹ The same thought is expressed when instead of saying that vitium is opposed or contrary to *good*, it is stated that it is contrary to *nature*.² It remains to be shown that malum

² Cont. Advers. Leg. et Proph. I. 7.

¹ Civ. Dei XII. cap. III. There are variations in the mms. here but none of the readings would alter our use of the passage, e.g. some of the mms. have "sed vitium, quia malum est, contrarium est bono."

² Civ. Dei XI. cap. XVII. Cf. also "Vitium quippe contra naturam est, quia natura nocet." Cont. Adver. Leg. et Proph. I. 7. "Vitium autem ita contra naturam est, ut non possit nisi nocere naturæ." Civ. Dei XI. cap. XVII.

as well as vitium is thus conceived as "contra naturam." It is succinctly stated in one of the works against the Manicheans, thus:—"Nulla enim natura malum, si quod contra naturam est, id erit malum."³ And again it is stated tersely in these words:—"Quod autem malum, non natura, sed contra naturam est."⁴ This same thought is expressed by the term "inimicum naturæ."⁵

If we ask just what it was that Augustine meant by these terms we find some suggestion of an answer in the term "inconvenientia." Evil is contrary to nature in the sense that it disagrees with nature.⁶ It is a disagreement in the sense that it injures or harms nature. Augustine uses an illustration of a female Athenian prisoner who drank the fatal draught without any harm to her body. She was able to do so because she had gradually accustomed herself to it by partaking of it at intervals. Thus she did not make the poison to be no evil, but rather she had done away with the disagreement between it and her body.⁷ The poison in itself was not evil, but the evil consisted in the disagreement. This, then, is one aspect of the definition of evil. Evil has not been given any real being or existence. Unless we presuppose the nature

³ De Mor. Manich. II. 2.

⁴ Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXIII. 36, *ibid.* XXXV. 39 and cf. also De Mor. Manich. VIII. 11, where we read "malum est quod contra naturam est."

⁵ "Vitium natura non est, sed naturæ inimicum est." Sermo CLXXXII. 3.

⁶ "Hoc enim et bestiarum illi et nobis malum est, id est ipsa inconvenientia, quæ sine dubio non est substantia, imo est inimica substantiæ." De Mor. Manich. VIII. 11.

⁷ "Sed quia inconvenientia malum est, fecit potius ut per moderatam consuetudinem illud corpus suo corpori conveniret." *Ibid.* VIII. 12. Cf. also *ibid.* VIII. 13.

to which it is contrary, evil could not exist. But given a good nature, evil is that which attacks it. Evil is antagonistic, adverse and hostile to the nature upon which it preys.

PRIVATIO BONI, CORRUPTIO, NEGATIO.

Another aspect of evil is expressed by such terms as privatio, indigentia, amissio, corruptio, and negatio. It is not difficult to see that these terms are but the counterpart of those described in the section above. There evil was opposed to nature, here evil is the want or absence of good. But nature is the good. Therefore anything which is antagonistic to nature could, when viewed from the effect of its action, be described as the privation of good. "Non est ergo malum nisi privatio boni."¹ No nature of any kind whatsoever is evil. Evil is a name for nothing but the taking away of the good (privatio boni).² All evils arise out of goods, that is, mutable goods, and the evils are consequently nothing other than "privationes bonorum."³ In fact evil is nothing but the taking away of good until at the last the thing passes into nonexistence, and then the evil must likewise vanish.⁴ The proper use of the word evil is to apply it not to being but to privation or loss (privatio).⁵ A very striking passage in which Augustine followed philosophers before him, and in turn

¹ Cont. Advers. Leg. et Proph. I. 7.

² Civ. Dei XI. 22.

³ Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LX.

⁴ Conf. III. 12 "Quia non noveram malum non esse nisi privationem boni, usque ad quod omnino non est."

⁵ De Mor. Manich. IV. 6.

has been followed by many since, is that which occurs in the *Enchiridion*. Here evil is described as enhancing our admiration of the good. When put into the right relations, and regulated, it enables us to enjoy and value the good. For after all it is nothing but the absence of good (*privatio boni*). For just as in physical bodies, disease and wounds mean the absence of health, and when a cure is effected, the disease or injury does not go elsewhere to reside but actually ceases to exist, so evil has no essence of its own, it is not a substance but a defect or flaw of some good nature. Evil is but the privation of good.⁶

Another term, which Augustine seems to use as a synonym of *privatio* is *indigentia*. He follows Ambrose in saying that badness (*malitia*) is nothing other than the need or want (*indigentia*) of good.⁷ Since evils arise out of good nature, badness, Augustine tells Julianus, is nothing except the want of good.⁸ In the term "*amissio*," which Augustine uses to express this conception, we have another synonym of *privatio*. Evil itself has no nature. It is merely a name which has been applied to the loss (*amissio*) of good.⁹

Another term which may be classified here but which seems to have a more distinct connotation than *privatio*, *indigentia* or *amissio*, is *corruptio*. It was this term which led Julian of Eclanum to charge

⁶ *Enchir.* XI. The key sentence being: "*Quid est autem aliud quod malum dicitur nisi privatio boni?*"

⁷ *Cont. Jul. Pelag.* I. 45.

⁸ *Op. Imp. c. Jul. V.* XLIV.

⁹ "*Neque enim ulla natura mali est, sed amissio boni hoc nomen accepit.*" *De Genesi ad Lit.* VIII. 31.

Augustine with Manicheism.¹⁰ There is no question but that this term was a common one with Augustine for the description of evil. In some instances he seems to show traces of the Greek conception that beauty and symmetry are good and their absence an evil. He argues that evil is corruption, and that by this he means a corruption either of the measure or the form, or the order that belongs to nature.¹¹ In his controversy with the Manicheans he takes up and deals with this definition of evil as corruption. He agrees with them that corruption is undeniably a definition of evil, but also maintains that this does not make it a substance as the Manicheans believed. Corruption is not self-existent, but is always attached to some substance which it corrupts. The nature to which it thus attaches itself is not corruption but rather suffers corruption. The result is a loss of integrity and order. But corruption could not be present unless some good nature were present to suffer corruption.¹² At times he seems ready to embrace all evil under this one term *corruptio*. This is the evil of all things. "*Quis enim dubitet totum illud quod dicitur malum, nihil esse aliud quam corruptionem? Possunt quidem aliis atque aliis vocabulis alia atque alia mala nominari: sed quod omnium rerum malum sit, in quibus mali aliquid animadverti potest, corruptio est.*"¹³ He illustrates his meaning here by

¹⁰ "Julian of Eclanum—insisted that the corruption of nature which Augustine taught was nothing else than Manicheism." B. B. Warfield Intro. essay on Augustine and the Pelag. Con. Nicene & Post-Nicene Fath. V. LIV.

¹¹ *De Natura Boni* c. Manich. cap. IV. Cf. also cont. Ep. Manich. XL. 46.

¹² *De Mor. Manich.* V. 7. Cf. also *Civ. Dei* XII. 3.

¹³ Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXV. 39.

saying that the corruption of understanding is ignorance, of a just mind, injustice, and of a brave mind, cowardice. Likewise in the body the corruption of health is disease, and of beauty, ugliness. He then concludes: "Verum tamen videre jam facile est nihil nocere corruptionem nisi quod labefacit naturalem statum, et ideo eam non esse naturam, sed contra naturam. Quod si non invenitur in rebus malum nisi corruptio, et corruptio non est natura, nulla utique natura malum est."¹⁴ This shows clearly how all of these varied aspects of his conception of evil are not discordant but fit together in an essential unity. Corruption is here said to be "contra naturam," and also his logical inference is that no nature is evil. The former statement is the aspect considered just previous to this one and the latter implication foreshadows the next aspect, namely, the tendency to nonexistence.

But before we consider that phase there remains one term which belongs in this group. It is a term which might be applied to every aspect of his definition of evil. The term to which we refer is "negatio." "Defectus vero utriusque generis non posse alteros alteris anteponi: privant enim tantum, et non esse indicant, quod usquequaque eandem vim habent, sicut ipsæ negationes."¹⁵ Here too, we see a combining of the aspects of privation, nonexistence and negation. The total impression which they convey is that if any one term would characterize Augustine's conception of evil it is this term "negatio."

¹⁴ Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXV. 39.

¹⁵ De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. VI. 7.

NON ESSE.

We come now to a group of terms which seem to indicate Plato's influence over Augustine. At any rate there is a striking similarity of thought between Plato's τὸ μὴ ὄν and Augustine's whole conception of malum, and especially that aspect of it which defines it as nonexistence. This aspect of Augustine's definition of evil begins with the idea that evil is diminution and culminates in the denial of the existence of a summum malum. Any lessening of being is evil.¹ This idea of diminution finds abundant expression. It is everywhere linked with his conception of nature which we have already analyzed. That fatal flaw which is described as contrary to nature is so described because it harms nature, but this harm consists in lessening or diminishing its good.² Existence or being continues only as the good of that being continues. Destroy the good of the being and you destroy the being. Therefore evil consists in diminution of good.³

In one passage in which he is dealing with the Manicheans he ventures to say that there is no evil except this diminution of the good of any nature. The point assumes significance for the Manicheans because it makes evil to consist in the lessening of

¹ "Quidquid autem minus est quam erat, non in quantum est, sed in quantum minus est, malum est. Eo enim quo minus est quam erat, tendit ad mortem." De Vera Relig. 26.

² "Nec (vitium) noceret, nisi bonum ejus minuerit" Cont. Advers. Leg. et Proph. I. 7.

³ "Sed bonum minui malum est; quamvis, quantumcumque minuatur, remaneat aliquid necesse est (si adhuc natura est) unde natura sit." Enchir. XII. 4.

being. As the evil increases the nature to which it has attached itself, diminishes, and just as the Manichean would lay hold of his evil substance it crumbles into nothingness.⁴ It is only another phase of this thought which says that all evil tends to nonexistence. It is viewing evil, not in its process but in its result. Evil is diminution, the inevitable outcome of which is nonexistence. Defects or privations indicate nonexistence.⁵ In dealing with God's relation to evil, Augustine asks how He who is the author of all being, could at the same time be the cause of not-being.⁶ This suggests what Augustine says of himself while still a Manichean. During that period of his life he did not know, he says, that evil was nothing but a privation of good, and culminates in the complete extinction of the thing to which it clings.⁷ When speaking of evil as a disagreement (*inconvenientia*) with nature and as having no substance of its own he raises the question "Whence then is it?" He answers by asking one to observe the end to which it leads. This end is nonexistence.⁸ This is likewise the outcome of corruption. For it causes entities to fall away from their being. This means that they are brought to noncontinuance and noncontinuance is nonexistence.⁹ This corruption in fact comes

⁴ *De Natura Boni* c. Manich. XVII. "Non ergo mala est, in quantum natura est, ulla natura; sed cuique naturæ non est malum nisi minui bono. Quod si minuendo absumeretur: sicut nullum bonum, ita nulla natura relinqueretur."

⁵ *De Duabus Anim.* c. Manich. VI. 7.

⁶ *De Mor.* Manich. II. 3.

⁷ *Conf.* III. 12.

⁸ "Non esse enim cogit omne quod periunt." *De Mor.* Manich. VIII. 11.

⁹ *De Mor.* Manich. VI. 8.

from nothing. For the increase of corruption leads to nonexistence and anything which is nonexistent is nothing.¹⁰ All life which by a voluntary choice falls away from its Creator, preferring to enjoy the works of God rather than God himself, tends to nothing.¹¹ Very early in his literary career Augustine recognized that "*Malum nihil esse.*"¹² As we have already noticed in connection with Augustine's conception of *natura*, he carries this thought of the nonexistence of evil so far that he argues that the devil and all the evil angels are good in so far as they exist. They are evil only in so far as they are nonexistent.¹³ Evil cannot exist, unless it arises out of and is attached to some good nature.¹⁴ Evil itself is absolutely nonexistent, it is *nihilum*, for the moment that any nature is deprived of all its good it no longer exists.¹⁵

These statements find expression from a slightly different point of view when our author maintains that nothing false exists. Falsity is that which tends to be and is not.¹⁶ This thought has a Platonic ring. It is equaled by the statement that "*quia quidquid est, verum est.*"¹⁷ But if all that exists is true, then nothing false exists anywhere.¹⁸ In short nothing has

¹⁰ Cont. Ep. Manich. XL. 46—"Si quis autem non credit ex nihilo esse corruptionem, proponat sibi hæc duo, esse et non esse—corruptio vero aucta cogit non esse, et constat quod non est, nihil esse."

¹¹ "Vergit ad nihilum"—De Vera Relig. XI.

¹² Solil. I. 2.

¹³ Cf. statement of A. H. Newman, Nic. and Post-Nic. Fath. IV. 29.

¹⁴ Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CXIV. and I. LXVI.

¹⁵ Conf. VII. 18.

¹⁶ Solil. II. 16.

¹⁷ Ibid. II. 8.

¹⁸ Ibid. II. 15.

existence, unless truth inheres in its very being.¹⁹ All of these statements enable us to understand that evil must be relegated to the realm of mock existence and empty negativity. If God is the supreme existence, and the only being that truly is, then the nature which is contrary to Him does not exist, or in other words it is no nature. For nonentity is the contrary of that which truly is. Thus there is no being contrary to the supreme being, and the Manichean evil principle and race of darkness must vanish into nonexistence.²⁰ Another formulation of this statement is that there is no summum malum. The moment that being is totally consumed by vitium or corruptio, then the corruption itself must cease to exist.²¹ Vice cannot exist in the highest good, and on the other hand, if it exists at all it must exist in some good. Things wholly good therefore can exist, but things solely evil cannot.²² God then is the summum bonum. He rules the universe absolutely and without any limitation. Summum malum there is not. "Summum ergo malum multum modum habet; caret enim omni bono. Non est igitur."²³

DEFECTUS.

But must we stop here? Is there nothing upon

¹⁹ Solil. I. 25.

²⁰ Civ. Dei XII. cap. II. "Ac per hoc ei naturæ, quæ summe est, qua faciente sunt quæcumque sunt, contraria natura non est, nisi quæ non est. Ei quod quippe est, non esse contrarium est."

²¹ Enchir. XII. "Quæ si corruptione consumitur nec ipsa corruptio remanebit."

²² "Sola mala," see whole passage Civ. Dei XII. 3.

²³ Liber de Diver Quæst. LXXXIII. VI.

which we may put our finger and say this is evil? Must our thought be satisfied with this array of negatives? We have endeavored to outline the varied aspects of the conception of evil as Augustine has described it. We have seen that as he emerged from Manicheism, he attacked its doctrine of an evil substance with the conception that evil is not a substance but rather some indefinite flaw of nature. This flaw is opposed and hostile to nature. It disagrees with nature. Or again evil is expressed by such terms as the absence, want or loss of good. Taking on a more active connotation, evil is conceived as corruption, but all these terms are summed up in "negatio." Evil is a negation. Another aspect of the idea is expressed by the thought of diminution or a tendency to nonexistence. Thus evil followed to its ultimate nature is nothing. There is no such thing as intrinsic evil.

But if this is so, what is this something which seems to float between being and non-being? The only answer with any positive content is found in the word "defectus" when applied to the will, and makes evil consist not in any being, not even that being¹ to which the will turns when it falls away from its Creator, the only true and immutable essence, but in the act of the will itself. The turning of the will from a higher to a lower order of nature, this is evil.² It must not be inferred from this that Augustine always used "deficere" in its application to the will. "Defectus" and "deficere" are common terms in his description of evil, and are applied by him to

¹ Cont. Secund. Manich. XI.

² Civ. Dei XII. 6.

all being and nature. He is very explicit in his statements that God is not the author of this falling away.³ In his writings against the Manicheans he defines evil as that which falls away (*deficere*) from essence and tends to nonexistence.⁴ He uses the noun "*defectus*" as a definition of evil, stating that evil is a certain deserting or falling away of mutable natures from the immutable nature.

It is interesting to observe just how our author defines "*deficere*" and to notice how its connotation harmonizes with all the other aspects of evil which have been described. "*Deficere autem non jam nihil est, sed an nihilum tendere. Cum enim ea quæ magis sunt, declinant ad ea quæ minus sunt, non illa in quæ declinant deficiunt, et minus esse incipiunt quam erant: non quidem ut ea sint ad quæ declinaverunt, sed pro suo genere minus.*"⁵ No clearer statement of Augustine's conception of *deficere* could be desired. Now this falling away is the essence of both malum and peccatum. "*Cum superiora ad inferiora declinant, ubi est omne peccatum et omne quod dicitur malum.*"⁶ Thus by means of the conception of "*peccatum*" we pass naturally to the relation of this idea of "*defectus*" to the will. We have this explicitly and unmistakably stated in the sentence: "*Et quæsiui quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni sub-*

³ "*Omne autem quod deficit, ab eo quod est esse deficit, et tendit in non esse. Esse autem et in nullo deficere bonum est, et malum est deficere. At ille ad quem non esse non pertinet non est causa deficiendi, id est, tendendi ad non esse.*" Liber de Diver. Quæst. LXXXIII. XXI.

⁴ "*Idipsum ergo malum est — deficere ab essentia et ad id tendere ut non sit.*" De Mor. Manich. II. 2.

⁵ Cont. Secund. Manich. XI.

⁶ Ibid. X.

stantiam: sed a summa substantia, te Deo, detortæ in infima voluntatis perversitatem.”⁷ Similarly Augustine declares that the goodness of God is the sole cause of all good, and that “falling away” is the cause of all evil.⁸

Here then we may conclude our endeavor to state Augustine’s answer to the question, “What is evil?” In this last aspect, we seem to have found something which in a measure satisfies the demand for a definite answer. This is not the place to enter into a full discussion of that phase of the conception of evil, for it properly belongs to the treatment of freedom. There we must investigate his conceptions, “Causa efficiens” and “causa deficiens.” But here we may rightly point out that this aspect of the question places evil in an act of the will. Evil is utter negativity and sham existence. It is the absence of reality and the negation of being. It is the turning of the will away from the highest Being to some inferior nature.

We may properly raise the question here, whether evil is so unreal as this definition would lead us to imagine. Evil is just as unreal or we may better say real, as it is to the man who lies suffering upon a bed of pain, or to the sinner as he sits in remorse, brooding upon his evil deeds.⁹ Yet at the same time, evil

⁷ Conf. VII. 22.

⁸ “Rerum quæ ad nos pertinent bonarum causam non esse nisi bonitatem Dei; malorum vero ab immutabili bono deficientem boni mutabilis voluntatem, prius angeli, hominis postea.” Enchir. XXIII.

⁹ “I regard evil as a distinctly real fact, a fact just as real as the most helpless and hopeless sufferer finds it to be when he is in pain.” Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 16.

does have its negative characteristic. Evil is disorganization. Evil is suicide. Taken as an ideal, evil does lead to nonexistence. The solution of these conflicting statements lies in a clearer discrimination and more accurate distinction in the various kinds of reality. Metaphysically, evil is a negation. Ethically, evil is positive and real.

But, if evil is what our author has defined it to be, if it has no existence of its own but is ever attached to some nature, and if the most positive statement that can be made is that only by this attachment to some being can evil transform its unreality into act, whence is it? and who is its author? "Unde est Malum?" This is the question which now demands treatment.

CHAPTER III

UNDE EST MALUM?

WE now have a right, according to Augustine's own order of procedure, to ask "Whence is evil?" Now that we know what it is that we seek we may with reason search for its origin.

REJECTS EVIL PRINCIPLE OF MANICHÆUS.

Manicheism had taught Augustine that evil arose from a principle contrary to God. Evil as a substance, was in rebellion against God at the instigation of this evil principle. God could only resist this rebelling evil substance and conquer it by blending part of his own nature and substance with it, and thus suffer contamination in a part of his being.¹ Thus Augustine brought from this experience of his youth ideas and conceptions which might readily have led him to place the origin of evil in some eternal principle, unoriginated and independent of God. But Augustine's mind could not be satisfied with this dualism. It seemed sacrilegious to him that Manichæus should advocate that God's nature suffered contamination rather than to think that evil was committed by man.² The thought that man sinned when the nature of evil in him prevailed over the nature of God

¹ De Continentia 14.

² Conf. VII. 4.

seemed ridiculous.³ He characterizes the Manichean tenets regarding the origin of evil as impious follies and blasphemous fancies.⁴

Augustine was a monist. The word "unity" possessed a charm for him. Our failure to see the harmony of nature and the universe is what leads us to regard the natural phenomena which operate in utter disregard of man's welfare, as the work of some evil principle. Augustine did not minimize the evils of life. He could set them in array as forcefully as any modern pessimist but when he sought for their origin he was not willing to recognize an essential rift in the universe. God is the sole Author and Maker of all that is.⁵ It is unnecessary to elaborate upon this fact. Reference to Chapter I where Augustine's conception of God is set forth will give ample testimony to the fact that our author was not a dualist. God is the source of all life and being. He himself is the supreme existence, and all else owes its origin to Him. There is no place left for any evil principle. If there was any one thing which Augustine repudiated more than another it was the belief of the Manicheans in an evil principle. Augustine was too much of a Platonist to find any room in his philosophy for dualism.

³ De Continentia 14.

⁴ Cont. Faust. XXXII. cap. XX.

⁵ "Tanta est vis et potentia integritatis et unitatis, ut etiam quæ multa sunt bona tunc placeant, cum in universum aliquid conveniunt atque concurrunt. Universum autem ab unitate nomen accepit. Quod si Manichæi considerarent, laudarent universitatis auctorem et conditorem Deum;" De Genesi c. Manich. I. 32.

GOD'S RELATION TO EVIL.

If then Augustine's thought was essentially monistic and if God is the center and source of all that is, must we regard Him as the cause of evil? If not, what is his relation to evil? Here too we find no uncertain answer. Augustine cannot be too emphatic in his denial of the charge that God is the cause of sin. This protest is found everywhere in his writings. Even while a Manichean he says that it seemed more fitting to believe that God created no evil than to believe that evil as he then conceived it came from God.¹ It must be admitted that in an earlier passage in the *Confessions* he says that he believed God was compelled to err instead of acknowledging that he himself had done evil voluntarily.² But when once Augustine had shaken off his Manichean fetters, he could not be too severe with their deterministic beliefs. To attribute the cause of sin to the inevitable decree of heaven and to release proud man in his corruption from all blame, this was absurdity.³ Against the Manichean belief that God was corrupted by a rebelling evil substance, he maintained that in no way, by either chance or necessity could corruption mar the nature of God.⁴ He is good, and all that he wills is good.⁴

Augustine was a staunch defender of the omnipotence of God, but he did not hesitate to declare that it was impossible for God to sin and that He never

¹ Conf. V. 20.

² Ibid. IV. 26 fin.

³ Ibid. IV. 4.

⁴ Ibid. VII. 6.

wills any evil.⁵ Even the suggestion of the possibility that God is the author of evil calls forth from him the ejaculatory utterance, "Heaven forbid!"⁶ But if God is the Creator of man, is He not also the originator of his sin? Augustine asserts the former but denies the latter. "Quoniam tu fecisti eum, et peccatum non fecisti in eo."⁷ God's relation, then, to evil men is simply this: He creates their nature and all nature is good. Whatever evil or sin is in man is due to his own disobedience. The very fact that man is a human being shows that he is a good. The fact that an original taint, due to the bad use of a free will, clings to all men is no evidence that God caused evil.⁸ The very fact that God is declared to be the source of all life and being excludes the possibility of his being the author of evil, for how could He who is the author of the being of all things, be at the same time the author of non-being, or in other words the cause of their tending to nonexistence.⁹

Augustine deals with this problem very succinctly in the words: "At ille ad quem non esse non pertinet non est causa deficiendi, id est, tendendi ad non esse; quia, ut ita dicam essendi causa est: boni igitur tantummodo causa est: et propterea ipse summum bonum est. Quocirca mali auctor non est, qui omnino quæ sunt auctor est, quia in quantum sunt, in tantum bona sunt."¹⁰ This same position is strongly indicated in

⁵ De Symbolo 2.

⁶ De Spir. et Lit. 54.

⁷ Conf. I. 11. Cf. also Sermo XC. 9.

⁸ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 32. Cf. also De Utilitate Credendi 36.

⁹ De Mor. Manich. II. 3.

¹⁰ Liber de Diver. Quæst. LXXXIII. XXI. Vide Retract. I. 26, also De Gratia Christi 26.

one of the *Letters*. Augustine was much troubled with the problem of the origin of souls. In his endeavor to solve it he had offered four explanations for their origin. He says that in doing this his object was to treat them in such a way that, whatever one of the four theories might be true, it would in no way be a handicap to him in contending with all his might against those who were attempting to make God the author of evil and sin.¹¹ This complete rejection of the thought that God was the author of evil finds its most radical expression in the declaration that the Creator is in no way responsible for the faults and blemishes of the creature. If responsibility is to attach to metaphysical imperfection it would seem unjust to attribute it to the creature, and still Augustine will not attribute it to the blameless and inviolable nature of the Creator.¹² Unmistakably then, God was not the cause of evil.

But does evil exist in the universe in complete independence of God? Is it out of all relation to Him? Augustine would not admit that. God is not the "auctor," but he is the "ordinator" of evil and sin. "Et tamen peccabam, Domine Deus, ordinator et creator rerum naturalium, peccatorum autem tantum ordinator."¹³ Augustine told the Manicheans that there was but one solution for the question of good and evil. That solution consisted in regarding God as the author of all things in so far as they exist, while all desertion of being is not to be attributed to

¹¹ Ep. CLXVI. 7. Cf. De Lib. Arbit. III. 21.

¹² Ep. CLXVI. 7. Cf. De Lib. Arbit. III. 21.

¹³ Conf. I. 16. The text as here quoted seems to be the best reading, especially as the meaning finds ample support in other passages.

God but still is to be considered as always regulated by divine providence so as to preserve the harmony of the universe.¹⁴ Thus Augustine permits nothing to get out of relation to God. The universe is a unit and God is its center and source. He does not originate but He *regulates* the evil of the world. All the privations of good are so *arranged* that they fulfil some good purpose.¹⁵ God has made the day, and by simply passing over certain times and places, and not illuminating them, he has *disposed* the night.¹⁵

Augustine illustrates this doctrine by the case of Judas. By an evil will Judas chose to be evil. Hence, although God had *controlled* this evil, he did not cause it.¹⁶ Augustine thus formulates this conception when writing against Faustus. "Nec auctore, sed tamen ordinatore etiam peccatorum ut ea quæ peccata non esset, nisi contra naturam essent, sic judicentur et ordinentur, ne universitatis naturam turbare vel turpare permittantur, meritorum suorum locis et conditionibus deputata."¹⁷ Our author also applies this term to the will, and while he would deny that God is the cause of the evil will, nevertheless He is its regulator.¹⁸ The motive which underlies this conception is doubtless the unwillingness of Augustine to admit that anything exists out of relation to God, and especially against his all-embracing will.

¹⁴ De Mor. Manich. VII. 10.

¹⁵ De Natura Boni c. Manich. XVI.

¹⁶ Sermo CXXV. 5.

¹⁷ Cont. Faustum XXII. LXXVIII.

¹⁸ "Deus sicut naturarum bonarum optimus Creator est, ita malarum voluntatum justissimus ordinator." Civ. Dei XI. 17. For further ref. see Lectiones variantes Conf. I. 16, especially De Prædest. Sanct. 16.

On the other hand he can not conceive of God as the author or cause of evil. Therefore he denies that God is in any sense the author, creator or originator of evil, but when it has once been originated, He adjusts, arranges and regulates it for the best purposes of his all-wise government.

What then shall we say of the divine permission of evil? If God does not create it, does He permit it? We can readily infer that Augustine would grant this. His theocentric universe surely could not contain anything which God did not either create or permit. God permits evil, Augustine declares, because He judged it better to utilize it for the sake of the good than not to permit its existence.¹⁹ God does not lead man into sin but suffers him to be lead thither.²⁰ When Augustine reaches such a juncture as this in his thought, we see evidences of his early tendency to agnosticism. That God permits man to be lead into sin is difficult for Augustine to understand. He only adds that it must be done in accordance with the most secret plans of God and the most just deserts of man.²¹ In dealing with the Fall, Augustine is very emphatic in his declarations that God did not cause, but only permitted the evil choice.²² This is especially important when we recall the marked and central significance which Augustine attaches to this first evil choice of original man.

¹⁹ *Enchir.* XXVII.

²⁰ *De Sermone Dom.* in *Monte II.* IX. 30.

²¹ *De Sermone Dom.* in *Monte II.* IX. 30.

²² "Modus autem iste quo traditus est homo in diaboli potestatem, non ita debet intelligi, tanquam hoc Deus fecerit, aut fieri jusserit, sed quod tantum permiserit juste tamen."—*De Trin.* XIII. 16.

In the preceding chapter we saw that Augustine defined evil as corruption. It was something which had the power to oppose and diminish nature or being. Doubtless the query at once arose, but what is this corruption which seems to be so transformed that it has the power to attack and diminish being? Our only positive answer was found in the defection of the will. It is in connection with the divine permission of evil that Augustine recognizes this same pertinent query. He asks the very question: "Why does corruption take from nature what God has given it?" His answer is that corruption takes nothing from nature without the permission of God.²³ And just as the definition of evil concludes with a consideration of the term "defectus" whose connotation seems to place evil in the defection of the will from a higher to a lower creation, so this divine permission of evil seems to find its best expression in those passages where the possibility of evil is placed in man's endowment with freedom.

To Augustine it seems absurd to raise the issue whether it was not in God's power to prevent both angels and men from falling into evil.²⁴ The real solution of the question lies in the wisdom of God who preferred to leave the possibility of good and evil in the power of man and thus proclaim both what man's pride could bring upon him and what God's grace could accomplish.²⁵ It was one of the natural out-

²³ "Cur ergo inquis, quod naturæ Deus dedit, tollet corruptio? Non tollit nisi ubi permittit Deus." Cont. Ep. Manich. XLI. 47.

²⁴ Civ. Dei XIV. 27.

²⁵ Ibid. XIV. 27.

flowings of God's omnipotence to permit the existence of evils, arising from the freedom of man.²⁶ As we shall see in Chapter V when dealing with freedom, Augustine found no rational objection to maintaining at one and the same time, God's foreknowledge and man's freedom. Cicero could not do this, but Augustine had no scruples in declaring that God foreknew that some of his creatures, the evil angels, would through their self-exalting pride fall from their happy estate, and yet God deemed it more worthy of his power to permit this defection than to prevent the evil from coming into existence.²⁷ The evil came, but it came because they brought it upon themselves, with God's permission as expressed in his conferring upon them freedom of will.²⁷

God then is not the cause, but He is the regulator and permitter of evil. Our treatment of God's relation to evil will not be complete, however, until we ask Augustine how the evils of human life are related to the life of God. Granted that He does use and adjust them, that they do exist only because of divine permission, are the evils of life entirely separate from God, does He sit aloft, unmoved by human misery and separate from man and his life? It is difficult here to formulate Augustine's answer and relate it to recent discussions of the problem of evil, for almost all that he says on this particular aspect of the question is aimed at Manichean tenets. One passage in the *Confessions* suggests unmistakably that

²⁶ "Jam intelligunt ad omnipotentiam Dei potius id pertinuisse, ut ex libero arbitrio voluntatis venientia mala esse permetteret." De Continentia 15.

²⁷ Civ. Dei XXII. 1.

Augustine does not conceive God as sharing in our trials and sufferings. God abides in himself, while man is tossed about in numberless trials.²⁸ When we come to his Anti-Manichean statements, we find most emphatic declarations against any possibility of suffering on the part of God. Fanciful fabrications are those teachings of the Manicheans to the effect that God is corruptible and changeable, that He is liable to injury, and experiences want, weakness and misery.²⁹ Equally absurd is the belief that the soul is a part of God. Man is not a fragment of the Infinite. Furthermore God could by no possibility have suffered.³⁰ One reason for Augustine's formulation of his belief here is the fact that to him all evil is sin

²⁸ Conf. IV. cap. V. 10. "An tu, quamvis ubique adsis, longe abjecisti a te miseriam nostram? Et tu in te manes; nos autem in experimentis volvimur."

²⁹ De Mor. Manich. XI. 20.

³⁰ "Sic confitemur ambo, sic nobis concedimus esse incorruptibilem et inviolabilem Deum, et nihil pati potuisse." Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 7. Contrast with this Royce's thesis: "The true question then is: Why does God thus suffer? The sole possible, necessary and sufficient answer is, because without suffering, without ill, without woe, evil, tragedy, God's life could not be perfected. This grief is not a physical means to an external end. It is a logically necessary and eternal constituent of the divine life. It is logically necessary that the Captain of your salvation should be perfect through suffering. No outer nature compels him. He chooses this because he chooses his own perfect selfhood. He is perfect. His world is the best possible world. Yet all its finite regions know not only of joy but of defeat and sorrow, for thus alone in the completeness of His eternity, can God in his wholeness be triumphantly perfect. This I say is my thesis.

"In the absolute oneness of God with the sufferer, in the concept of the suffering and therefore triumphant God, lies the logical solution of the problem of evil." Studies of Good and Evil. Prob. of Job, p. 14.

or the punishment of sin. The relation between "malum" and "peccatum" as Augustine conceived it, we have already endeavored to trace.⁸¹ But eliminating this false identification from the problem, it becomes quite evident that Augustine has put before himself an insoluble problem in separating God from the sufferings and evils of man. In the last analysis, all existence and all life, if it is to be real life, must be full of tension and strain. Natural evil is a necessity, if growth and development and victory are to follow. Eliminate imperfection, isolation and interference, and life ceases to be life. The world would be perfect but dead. This fact, however, does not maintain that vice is a necessity. It only makes it a possibility. In that respect Augustine is right. He recognized the possibility of sin as involved in God's permission of it through the gift of freedom. We cannot justify his separation of God from the evils and miseries of human life.

ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE.

Thus far, then, in our search for the origin of evil our results are mainly negative. We have seen that Augustine completely rejects all thought of an evil principle as the source and origin of evil. Likewise evil cannot be referred to God as its cause. Our author is equally emphatic on both of these positions. We must abandon then the realm of the infinite in our search for an answer to the question whence is evil. If its source is not in an evil principle, nor in God, then it must lie in the creature, or in some re-

⁸¹ Chap. I. pp. 21-26.

lationship existing between Creator and creature. Hither then reason urges us. In the last analysis we may find ourselves emerging with the same fact that we did when we considered his definition of evil, and his idea of God's relation to it, namely, freedom.

In our search for Augustine's answer to the question, "Whence is Evil?" as it is especially related to the creature, our thought must follow along two main lines. In the first instance Augustine seems to place the origin of evil in metaphysical imperfection, due to creation ex nihilo. In the second instance, when he endeavors to go back to the very source of sources, he emerges with the conclusion that freedom of will is the source of evil. In this chapter we shall not attempt a discussion of the problem of freedom. That subject we reserve for Chapter V. In this and the next chapter we aim to lead up to this theme and to show that in it Augustine finds his ultimate conclusion.

Metaphysical Imperfection.

In our statement of the problem of evil in Chapter I, we regarded it essential to Augustine's conception of the problem not only to state his doctrine of God as the sole source of all being and as the Creator of all nature, which in so far as it is nature is good, but also to refer to his doctrine of creation ex nihilo and its logical implication of the possibility of evil. It would have been unjust to his system not to have recognized that aspect of it, at that time. We are now prepared to see the significance of that phase of his metaphysics when we come to answer the question as to the source of evil. It has arisen because all created

being was formed out of nothing. At any rate that hypothesis accounts for the possibility of the existence of evil.

It is unnecessary to repeat here Augustine's idea that evil can arise only out of good and that its unreality is only present when some nature exists to which it may be attached.¹ If there were no good, there could not possibly be any evil.² In fact when we speak of an evil or faulty being, all we mean is that what is good has evil attached to it.² In short, nothing can be evil unless it is good.² The only source of any evil nature is a good nature. "*Ex bonis igitur mala orta sunt, et nisi in aliquibus bonis non sunt; nec erat alias unde oriretur ulla mali natura.*"³ This is somewhat striking and paradoxical.

How does Augustine account for it? By his doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. All natures, from the highest to the lowest, were formed by God out of nothing.⁴ God is the one unchanging and unchangeable good, but all other natures are mutable because of creation *ex nihilo*.⁵ Hence evil has arisen, because this capacity for change, this mutability of nature, has involved the possibility of this nature falling away and tending to nonexistence. Augustine states emphatically that nature could not have been corrupted, if it had not been made out of nothing.⁶ Because it is

¹ *De Nupt. et Concup.* II. 48, 50. Cf. *Cont. Jul. Pelag.* I. 38, and *Op. Imp. c. Jul.* V. XLIII, XLIV.

² *Enchir.* XIII.

³ *Ibid.* XIV.

⁴ *Cont. Ep. Manich.* XXV. 27 et passim.

⁵ *Civ. Dei* XII. I. et passim. Cf. pp. 5-18 of this work.

⁶ *Ibid.* XIV. 13.

the creation of God we call it nature, but because it is fashioned out of nothing, we must recognize its capacity for diminution. Evil can arise in man because he is made from nothing.⁷ This is supported by abundant references in his Anti-Manichean writings.⁸ Hence it is very clear that one answer which Augustine returns to the question "whence is evil?" is that it arises out of the defective and mutable being of finite and created natures. The inequalities of being are due to the finiteness of created things. Thus does Augustine reconcile the presence of evil in the world, with his rigorous doctrine of creation.⁹

A most interesting aspect of this conception is that which attributes an evil will to creation from nothing. Interesting because we find Augustine's thought gradually but rigorously leading us to the conception of freedom as the key to our whole problem and the center of his own system. In one passage, after recognizing that evil works arise out of an evil will, he propounds the question, "Whence arose the corrupt will itself?" His answer after some deviation is that it is due to the fact that the will was created out of nothing.¹⁰ The importance, then, of this conception

⁷ Op. Imp. c. Jul. XXX.-XXXIX. repeatedly.

⁸ Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXVI. 41. "Primo enim brevissime respondere potest quærentibus unde corruptio est, cum dicitur, ex eo quod hæ naturæ quæ corrumpi possunt, non de Deo genitæ, sed ab eo de nihilo factæ sunt."

⁹ Vide Ueberweg's Hist. of Phil. I. 339 (Eng. trans. by G. S. Morris), and Windelband's Hist. of Phil. 280 (Eng. trans. by J. H. Tufts).

¹⁰ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48. Cf. also, "Cum itaque dicimus, non ideo potuisse oriri ex bono malam voluntatem, quia bonum factum est a bono Deo sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo." Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLIV.

is apparent. We have here the metaphysical basis for his answer to the question as to the origin of evil. That answer is founded in the imperfection attaching to all derived being. His emphasis on "ex nihilo" is but the fruit of his own time and environment. It is doubtless the product of his opposition to the Manichean principle of evil. To avoid their conception of evil matter and compulsory creation, Augustine declares a doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*.

Does this make evil and sin necessities? It makes evil necessary and sin possible. Of course, no such distinction as this is found in Augustine. He never adequately separates the two notions. His thought, however, is so distinct that it is most apparent that his doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* is a clear recognition of metaphysical imperfection and the necessity of evil. But to Augustine evil was sin, and to the question regarding the necessity of sin he has given a definite answer. Julianus was not slow in charging Augustine with this idea. He immediately converted his doctrine of creation "*ex nihilo*" into a doctrine advocating the necessity of sin. In his frequent replies to this, Augustine is very clear and explicit in his distinctions between the possibility and the necessity of sin.

Julianus' charge is worded thus:—"Nam si ideo exortum est in homine malum, quia de nihilo factus erat, a necessario autem habuit homo ut de nihilo fieret; sine dubio malum non a possibili, sed a necessario recepit."¹¹ To this Augustine most fittingly responds: "Non tibi dicitur, necessitatem peccandi

¹¹ *Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LX.* Also *Cf. V. XXXI.*

habuit homo, quia de nihilo factus est, sed tu tibi hoc dicis. Prorsus ita factus est, ut peccandi possibilitatem haberet a necessario, peccatum vero a possibili: Verum tamen nec ipsam peccandi possibilitatem haberet, si Dei natura esset; immutabilis enim profecto esset, et peccare non posset. Non igitur ideo peccavit, sed ideo peccare potuit, quia de nihilo factus est.”¹² Here then in concise form, is Augustine’s first answer. It is that the origin of evil lies in the creation of finite things out of nothing. This involves the necessity of evil and the possibility of sin. He is right. Evil is necessary to a finite world and to real life, but to transform these evils into ideals, to convert means into ends, this is sin and is not a necessity.

Freedom.

We approach now the other phase of Augustine’s solution of the origin of evil. Here we find that Augustine has taken the problem and receded into the uncertainties and difficulties of that pre-existent world where he conceives evil to have originated. He has taken our question and mounted into the air. But we must follow him. It need not disturb our thought for we only have to conceive of the problem as placed one stage farther away. He has merely entered another room with it and if we follow him there, the question will be none other than if he had let us solve it in the arena of this life. He will use conceptions which our day has outgrown. He will deal with beings whose existence we need not accept. The use of these tools, different from our own, need not deprive

¹² Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LX. Cf. also V. XXXVIII, XXXIX, LV, LX.

us of the truth of his result. If his thought is freed from the trappings of his own age, it may reward us with conclusions which are at once sound and true.

The first being upon which we come, and which is significant for our thought is that of "diabolus." This creature is the handiwork of God. "Initium ergo ejus (diaboli) figmentum est Domini."¹³ In fact there is no nature, from the highest to the lowest which is not the work of God.¹³ Thus Augustine is unwilling to grant to the Manicheans that even this being is derived from some primitive evil substance.¹⁴ He may be the most evil being in existence, but he had his beginning in God.¹⁵ This "diabolus" is the author of that fatal flaw (vitium) which pervades all human nature.¹⁶ Of this we cannot see the full significance until in Chapter IV we trace fully his conception of the origin of evil in primitive man. Men in so far as they are men are God's creation, but in so far as they are evil are they under the control of the devil.¹⁷ This hypothetical being is occasionally described as the origin of sin.¹⁸ He is in no sense the author of nature, that is always and unreservedly the work of God, but he is the author of sin.¹⁹ In other passages in which he is likewise denied the power to originate nature or being he is described as the author of blame or fault.²⁰ Still again he is described as the

¹³ Civ. De: XI. cap. XV.

¹⁴ Civ. Dei XI. cap. XIII.

¹⁵ Civ. Dei XI. cap. XVII.

¹⁶ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 21, 43 fin., 49.

¹⁷ Contra duas Ep. Pelag. I. 36.

¹⁸ De Nat. et Grat. 33, and De Nupt. et Concup. I. 26.

¹⁹ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 11.

²⁰ "Non enim naturæ auctor est, quæ Dei bonitate in

author of death.²¹ His control over mankind is held through lust.²² Augustine's whole thought of this being then could be summed up in the one title, "princeps peccatorum."²³

We are now at the very source of sources. This being was himself a work of God. He was originally good. Nay, more than this, evil was absolutely non-existent, it was nowhere, it had never been known or heard of in the universe until this being originated it.²⁴ Augustine has now taken us back into that pre-existent timeless state and pointed to this being and said, "Evil was never known until this good being caused it." But how? If he answers that question then he answers our problem. In his times of meditation Augustine tells²⁵ us that he was accustomed to ponder over the evil propensities which clung to him and to ask himself whence they came. If he answered "from the devil," then instantly the query arose as to the origin of this devil, and if he by the perversity of his own will changed his angelic nature into that of a devil, what was the cause of that evil, seeing that the nature of every angel was the work of God?

In these meditations Augustine has sounded the

homine conditur; sed culpæ cum qua homo ex propagine vitiorum primorum hominum de parentibus nascitur." *Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. LXXXIII.* Cf. *Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. II.* "Quoniam diabolus culpæ auctor est, non naturæ."

²¹ *Enar. in Ps. XLIX. 2.*

²² *De Agone Christiano I.*

²³ *De Symbolo 2.*

²⁴ "Nonne opus diaboli quando primum in angelo, qui diabolus factus est ortum est, in opere Dei ortum est? Quapropter si malum quod omnino usquam erat, in Dei opere oriri potuit." *De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48.*

²⁵ *Conf. VII. 5.*

bottom of the problem as it shaped itself for him. If it was by free will that this strange and hypothetical being, good by nature, originated evil, then what was the cause of that bad will? That is the interesting question to which Augustine gives the answer of "*causa deficiens*" and which must be reserved for the chapter on freedom (V). Here our purpose is to make sure that Augustine did place the origin of evil in freedom. How then did this good being, before whom no evil had existed, cause or originate it? We are ready to listen intently, for although our author has taken us into another world and surrounded us by strange beings, nevertheless the answer, if learned, can be brought back and applied to this world. He does not shrink from giving us his reply. He became the author of evil when through pride, he chose to turn from the highest Being to himself.²⁶ He became the devil by the fault of his own perversity. "*Sed cum diabolus vitio perversitatis suæ factus sit amator potentiæ, et desertor oppugnatorque justitiæ.*"²⁷ But we need not be satisfied with these answers. He asserts without qualification that evil arose in the will of the devil. "*Denique angeli quidam, quorum princeps est qui dicitur diabolus per liberum arbitrium a Domino Deo refugæ facti sunt.*"²⁸ And again in that work which is the very best product of his thought: "*diabolus institutione illius (Dei) bonus voluntate sua malus.*"²⁹ This "*diabolus*" then was good by the creation of God,

²⁶ Enar. in Ps. XLIX. 2.

²⁷ De Trin. XIII. XIII. 17.

²⁸ De Cor. et Grat. 27.

²⁹ Civ. Dei XI. cap. XVII.

but evil by his own will. *In the freedom of this being, we find the very source of all evil. By the act of his will evil was inaugurated.*

But this being is only one of a whole group of creatures who became evil. Their presence raises some very interesting questions. Inasmuch as Augustine has ushered us into these strange realms we may wisely let him shed any further light that he can on our question. We are satisfied in the feeling that he has taken us at once to the source and center of the whole problem, but what of these other creatures? In the first place they have natures, which like all nature is good. In dealing with his race of fallen angels, Augustine is very careful to make it clear that they are in no way related to the Manichean race of darkness which derived its origin from some source other than God.⁸⁰ The very fact that it was injury and punishment for them not to be with God, is ample evidence that their original nature was good.⁸¹ If the fault of these beings was that they did not remain attached to their Creator, it is most evident that to remain so attached was the natural and normal condition of their nature.⁸¹ Therefore, these evil beings, like their princes, were originally good.

Furthermore these beings were originally endowed with freedom.⁸² But now an exceedingly interesting question emerges and clamors for recognition. Were these beings which fell, originally different from those which did not fall? Was evil inwrought in the very make of these beings, or were all the creatures in this

⁸⁰ Civ. Dei XII. 2.

⁸¹ Civ. Dei XII. 1.

⁸² De Catech. Rudibus XVIII. 30.

timeless state equal? The impression, that one inevitably gains from a careful perusal of those passages ³³ in which our author deals most elaborately with this question, is that he is *inclined* to believe that they were originally different, but after considerable wavering he comes out with the conclusion that they were originally alike but places one important qualification upon this statement. In one passage ³⁴ he shows that there is doubt in his own mind upon the question, because he distinctly recognized the possibility of their inequality and on that hypothesis tries to account for the difference in their choices. He does this by supposing one group to have received more of God's grace than the other group.

In another passage ³⁵ we see this doubt in a more pronounced form. The difference in the two groups is here distinctly stated. It is not made to consist in any difference in nature, but a difference in wisdom. The character of this wisdom was supposed to be such that it rendered the life of those beings which possessed it truly blessed because it gave them the certainty of eternal felicity. Now the two groups of angels are said to differ in this respect, for the fallen angels could never have possessed any such wisdom, while the good angels may have had the assurance which such wisdom provides. His conclusion of this interesting passage is this:—"In ejus tamen participatione æquales fuisse istos illis, qui propterea vere pleneque beati sunt, quoniam nequaquam de suæ beatitudinis æternitate falluntur quomodo dicturi

³³ Civ. Dei XII. cap. VI. VII, XI and cap. XI. seq.

³⁴ Ibid. XII. cap. IX.

³⁵ Civ. Dei XI. cap. XI.

sumus? Quando quidem si æquales in ea fuissent, etiam isti in ejus æternitate manissent pariter beati, quia pariter certi.”⁸⁶ But this pronounced doubt as to the original difference of these two groups of beings passes into reasonable certainty in another passage.⁸⁷ Here he states that reason bids us conclude that the fallen angels did not possess, even before their fall, that blessedness which comes from the certainty that present felicity will be eternal. The good angels did possess this happiness. We would seem then to find Augustine fully concluding that there was this clear distinction between the two groups of beings in their original state. But it hardly satisfied his “rigor and vigor.” To be consistent, Augustine was conscious that these beings must be originally equal. But at the same time he must account for their differences. To do this, that is, to recognize at the same time these two sides of the problem, he asserted that there was no difference in their natures and origins, but only in their wills and desires. “Angelorum bonorum et malorum inter se contrarios appetitus non naturis principique diversis, cum Deus omnium substantiarum bonus auctor et conditor utrosque creaverit, sed voluntatibus et cupiditatibus exstitisse, dubitare fas non est.”⁸⁸

We emerge here then with the same result as in the case of the devil. Not only the chief but all these evil beings are evil not by nature but by will. This is the secret of their wickedness.⁸⁹ We have, then,

⁸⁶ Ibid. XI. cap. XI.

⁸⁷ Ibid. XI. cap. XIII.

⁸⁸ Civ. Dei XII. cap. I. 2.

⁸⁹ Ibid. XI. cap. XIX

in this world to which Augustine has conducted us, two orders of created beings. These orders are dissimilar and contrary to each other. They are both good by nature and creation, but one group possesses upright wills, the other depraved wills.⁴⁰ One naturally inquires regarding the actual freedom of these beings. If, in any sense they were different, or unequal, could the evil beings have been expected to choose the good? Augustine repudiates the idea that they did not possess absolute freedom. Evil was in no sense inwrought in their being, there was no efficient cause of their falling away. One might as well ask to see darkness or hear silence as to know the cause of their defection.⁴¹ With the following words he asserts their unconditioned freedom: "*illi ab ea deficiendo mutati sunt, mala scilicet voluntate, hoc ipso quod a bona defecerunt: a qua non defecissent, si utique noluissent.*"⁴²

Unmistakably then, evil originated in the will. In his discussion of the cause of the blessedness of the good angels and the cause of the unhappy lot of the fallen angels, he uses⁴³ the illustration of two men exactly alike in temperament and disposition being placed in the same identical environment but making opposite choices. The significance of this illustration lies in the implication that the two groups of angels were originally equal and placed in identical environments and in its clear purpose to show that the secret of the contrary choices lies in

⁴⁰ Ibid. XI. cap. XXXIII. et seq.

⁴¹ Ibid. XII. cap. VII. init.

⁴² Civ. Dei XII. cap. VIII. The variant reading here would not alter the use of this quotation.

⁴³ Ibid. XII. cap. VI.

the will alone and not in any cause or chain of causes lying back of that choice. This we say is the significance of this illustration here. It helps us in our present purpose which is to make sure that Augustine placed the origin of evil in the will and not elsewhere. One can hardly agree that two men with identical endowments and previous experiences, placed in identical environments would make opposite choices. If they were exactly alike in every particular, causation would seem to demand the same choice on the part of each. Be that as it may, we are now ready to return to *terra firma*. Augustine has shown us that for his thought, evil originated in the will of that hypothetical being called "diabolus." That being was created by God and was originally good. In that pre-existent state no evil was known anywhere until of his own free will, for which there was no efficient cause, he chose not to adhere to God, the supreme existence, and to fall away to an inferior order of being. *That act of his will was the origin of evil.*

It may perhaps be thought that this chapter is not complete until we have returned to this world, and set forth the thought of Augustine regarding the origin of evil in man. Man is certainly to be numbered among created beings. We have been tracing the source of evil in the *creature* and have followed two lines of thought. We have seen in metaphysical imperfection the necessity of evil and the possibility of sin. We have found Augustine gradually leading us from different points of view to the recognition of the fact that in freedom as the endowment of the creature is to be found the source of evil. We have been led by him into another world where he has related this to created beings in a timeless state. In our next

chapter which is logically a part of this, we will follow this same question in relation to man. It seems natural to divide our thought at this juncture. We only need to add that it is to be expected that the answer to our question "Whence is evil?" will be as true for this world as for the one into which our author has led us.

CHAPTER IV .

UNDE EST MALUM? (Continued)

THE origin of evil in man cannot appear so catastrophic as it did in the realm from which we have just emerged. Having penetrated into the mysteries of an unseen and unknown world and postulated there the source of evil in the will of a hypothetical being, having thus broken the charmed circle of a perfect universe which was the direct product of the creative power of the sole source of all being, it will not now be difficult to account for the origin of evil in the human race. Having once originated this blemish of all creation, it can never again be so difficult to explain its presence in any part of the universe. It must not be inferred from this, however, that Augustine did not grapple with this same puzzle in regard to man. In fact, so much of his thought deals specifically with this aspect of the problem that it has seemed wise to separate it from the preceding chapter. Here again we shall find our author dealing with conceptions which our age has rejected. Evolutionary thought has played havoc with many spheres of knowledge, disproving hypotheses and casting various conceptions into an unending oblivion. So in dealing with the thought of Augustine we need not be surprised to find the same results. His anthropology is antiquated. His conception of primitive man, perfectly harmonious with that tendency of all peoples to look back upon the past and idealize some far distant period into a golden age, must be set aside. But, just as

in the last chapter, when dealing with the conceptions and beings of that strange land into which our author conducted us, we endeavored to overcome the impedimenta of ideas alien to our own times and to sift out the truth, so here we may well disregard the trappings which hinder us and attempt to find the truth which lies imbedded in our author's answer to the question "Whence is evil?" We naturally carry with us as our main purpose here, the endeavor to ascertain whether or not the expectations aroused in the previous chapters will be confirmed by the investigations of this aspect of the problem. There we saw unmistakably that Augustine conceived evil to have originated in the freedom with which the creature was endowed. Will the same position be defended here? Did evil originate in man's freedom? This now is our task and if we can establish in this chapter the conclusion that evil originated in an act of the will, we shall then be prepared to deal fully with his treatment of freedom.

REJECTS PRE-EXISTENCE THEORY.

In our last chapter we said that we were now ready to return to terra firma. But, alas, just as we are about to realize this promise, our author makes another excursion into the pre-existent world for the sake of emerging with a negative conclusion. No writer living in Augustine's day and familiar with the writings of Plato could fail to deal with the question of the pre-existence of souls. In his *Meno* and *Phædrus*, Plato laid the basis for this doctrine. In an age when it was easy to emphasize the literal to the exclusion of the symbolical significance of these passages, when Plato the poet was overshadowed

by Plato the philosopher, this doctrine was naturally emphasized. We need not chide Augustine for dealing with this theory in his attempt to answer the puzzle of the source of evil in mankind. Origen, before him, had advocated this belief in a pre-existent state as the explanation of evil in man, while the greatest dogmatic monograph¹ of the nineteenth century, after a most illuminating treatment of the whole problem of evil and sin, concludes that evil originated in the choice of the will, while man still lived in a pre-existent and extra-temporal state.

It is not surprising then to find Augustine dealing with this question. It is rather encouraging to find that he faced this problem and formed a conclusion more sound than that of either Origen or Julius Müller. In the *Confessions* we find him raising the question of his own pre-existence but reaching no positive conclusion.² Augustine evidently found himself early in life swinging away from a full acceptance of the theory of pre-existence. He was revolving this problem in his mind and found that the reasons presented for its acceptance did not fully satisfy him. In a much later passage of the *Confessions*³ in dealing with the question concerning the origin of our knowledge of a happy life, he hints at this doctrine, recognizing it as one of several possibilities. Because we all know and seek a happy life, we must have some

¹ Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, by Julius Müller.

² "Dic mihi utrum jam alicui ætati meæ mortuæ successerit infantia mea: . . . Quid ante hanc etiam, dulcendo mea, Deus meus? Fuine alicubi, aut aliquis? Nam quis mihi dicat ista, non habeo; nec pater nec mater potuerant, nec aliorum experimentum nec memoria mea." Conf. I. 9.

³ Ibid. X. 29.

memory of it, and therefore must have been happy once. Whether this happy state was enjoyed by us individually or only as we existed potentially or seminally in the first man in his original state of perfection, he is unable to decide. This clearly reveals Augustine's wavering attitude to the Platonic reminiscence theory.

His hostile attitude finds abundant expression. No philosopher claimed so fully the approval and praise of Augustine as did Plato, but his recollection theory is rejected. In his work *On the Trinity*⁴ Augustine takes up this theory and endeavors to answer Plato. He refers to Plato's use of a boy to prove that knowledge of geometry is innate and acquired not by learning but by remembrance. His answer is that if Plato's theory were true then all of us must have been geometricians in that pre-existent state, but the facts of this life contradict that hypothesis. Rather we must believe, says Augustine, that the mind acquires a knowledge of these things by some unique inner light. Again, Augustine refutes the theory, that each one suffers in this body for the evil he did previous to this life, by an appeal to scripture. By a mistaken exegesis of a passage of Romans⁵ he finds a direct contradiction to this theory. We must remember that for Augustine the scripture presented a final authority back of which reason could not go. We cannot understand how a thinker to whom self-certainty had such weight, and to whom reason was such a servant, could have persuaded himself to set aside his reason

⁴ XII. cap. XV. 24.

⁵ Rom. IX. 11, 12.

the moment he entered the sacred writings. But such was the case. This argument from scripture was doubtless the concluding proof for our author.⁶

Still again he rejects the idea of pre-existence as an explanation of the origin of sin, because he does not believe that men yet unborn have committed any act which will determine their moral deserts in this life.⁷ Yet he strangely asserts in the same sentence that he is equally certain that every individual bears the evil effects of the sin of the first man. In one of the *Epistles*⁸ he gives three reasons why he rejects and protests against this reminiscence theory. In the first place, it is abhorrent to him to suppose that after a certain number of cycles the soul must return again to the life of flesh and endure punishment. In the second place, he fails to see what is to prevent the soul from sinning after leaving the body, if it sinned prior to its entrance into the body. And thirdly, in a tone almost of ridicule he asserts that it is one thing to have sinned in Adam, but to have sinned in some unknown realm, and then to have been thrust into Adam, that is, into this body, because of that sin, this is absurd and inconceivable.

Furthermore, in replying to a writing of Vincentius Victor, Augustine boldly maintains that we will never

⁶ "Neque enim sicut nonnulli secundum Platonicos opinatur, hoc unius cujusque infantis animæ redditur, quod ante istam vitam sua voluntate commisit, cum haberet ante hoc corpus vel bene vel male liberum vivendi arbitrium: Cum Paulus apostolus apertissime dicat, nondum natos nihil egisse boni vel mali." De Pec. Orig. 36. Cf. De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 31, and De Anima et ejus Orig. III. 9.

⁷ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 33.

⁸ Ep. CLXVI. 27.

be able to know whether the soul in a pre-existent state chose good or evil; nor indeed can we demonstrate that it even existed in any such state. "Neque enim dicere debuit, 'quod anima meruerit peccatrix esse per carnem,' cujus nec bonum nec malum meritum reperire poterit ante carnem."⁹ And, again: "an forte audebis eam dicere ante carnem bene vixisse, quam non potes ostendere vel fuisse?"¹⁰ We are now prepared to hear Augustine utterly reject the theory. In one passage he refers to it as "the now exploded and rejected opinion."¹¹ When dealing with the question of the origin of souls, he is unwilling to advocate any one theory as the sole truth, but he does not hesitate to reject completely the doctrine which maintains that the soul out of some pre-existent state is thrust into this body as the punishment for some action of which nothing is known.¹² Augustine's position, then, is clear. He will not search for the origin of evil in man in some pre-existent state.

In this we believe that he is wise. To postulate, as Julius Müller does, a pre-existent world in order to account for the first evil choice, is only to carry the problem one stage farther away from us. It only shrouds the whole problem in greater obscurity and mystery. For if we grant the existence of this pre-existent world, and even if we are willing to place the origin of evil in some act of the will there, that leaves the problem just where it was when we started. To recede, therefore, into this unknown realm, is to take

⁹ De Anima et ejus Orig. II. 12.

¹⁰ Ibid. III. 9.

¹¹ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 31.

¹² Ep. CLXIV. 20. Cf. also De Anima et ejus Orig. I. 6 and 34.

our problem and "jump overboard with it." The problem is lost, not solved. Consequently we accept Augustine's conclusions here. But one cannot fail to apply this same line of reasoning to that world of creatures into which our author introduced us in Chapter III. Both realms must vanish together. The very arguments that Augustine has marshaled against the implications and theories based on the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence apply with equal force to his own "diabolus" and evil angels. Of course, Augustine's answer is not far to seek. He would find his sole and final reply in the authority of scripture, for it must be recognized as a source of knowledge alongside and even in precedence of reason and experience.

But not only does Augustine's rejection of the pre-existence theory involve him in the contradiction just set forth, but also it raises the question as to whether he has not virtually adopted this theory when he has made Adam the whole human race in potentiality, and made every individual responsible for Adam's evil choice. This aspect of our problem will be more fully developed in the positive portion of this chapter. At any rate, there is an apparent contradiction in Augustine's rejection of the theory of reminiscence and his defense of the pre-existent world of angels as well as his elaborate conception of the representative capacity of the first man. Thus far we have seen that Augustine does not find the origin of evil in man in any act committed in some pre-existent world, as a consequence of which the soul was thrust into the body. His opposition does not lie so much in a rejection of the idea of freedom in that pre-existent state or of the origin of evil in some act of the will,

(for this we are finding to be his own explanation of the problem), as it does in a denial of any such state of existence whatever and especially of our knowledge of it.

REJECTS FLESH THEORY.

Reason forces us, then, to abandon these speculations regarding unseen and unknown realms, and to search for the origin of evil in man in the world and life which lie about us. We have now cleared away every possible hypothesis and are driven out of pre-temporal and eternal worlds into this world of sense and change. If man's evil did not originate *out of* this life it must have originated *in* it. But before we can come to Augustine's positive contribution we must observe that there are other prominent theories of the origin of evil in man which he rejected. Not only did Augustine refuse to receive the idea of the origin of evil in man in a pre-existent state, but he also denied the theory that evil originated in man's sensuous nature. There is need of careful discrimination at this point. We are now searching for the *origin*, not the seat nor instrument of evil. No little confusion has arisen in regard to Augustine on this very point. It would doubtless startle some to read the statement that Augustine did not place the origin of evil in the flesh. A casual reading of almost any writing of Augustine's would lead one to suppose that there is just where he did place it. The experience of his own early life influenced all of Augustine's later thought and he never failed to portray the evils of the flesh. His constant use of the word "concupiscentia" as a description of sin shows how he emphasized the

class of sins due to our sensuous nature and accounts for the false interpretation which has often been placed upon his theory. For example, Baumgarten Crusius¹ has advocated the idea that Augustine regarded the flesh as the origin of evil.

In order to make clear our contention here, it will be necessary briefly to set forth how Augustine did conceive of the apparent connection between the flesh and sin. It would be equally unjust to Augustine to maintain that he regarded man's body as a negligible quantity in the problem of evil and sin. In the life of the individual to-day, his physical body is a very potent factor in his moral life. But, argues Augustine, we must carefully avoid the logical fallacy of interpreting the effect as the cause of sin. This is exactly the error of those who suppose that Augustine placed the origin of evil in man's sensuous nature. As a Manichean, there is no question but that Augustine regarded the flesh as necessarily involving defilement.² But after he had passed over to the acceptance of Christianity, this notion was repudiated. Fairness compels us to recognize that our author did regard the body as a burden to the soul.³ Here his thought is clearly traceable to the book of *Wisdom*,⁴ where our corruptible body and earthly frame is regarded as a weight upon the soul and mind. In his Anti-Pelagian writings where we find so much discussion of the possibility and actuality of a perfectly sinless

¹ Lehrbuch der Sittenlehre, p. 220.

² Conf. V. 20.

³ "Corpus enim quod corrumpitur aggravat animam. Per quod fit etiam sæpe ut invicte delectet quod non licet." De Diver. Quæst. I. 13. Cf. De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 12.

⁴ Wisdom of Solomon IX. 15.

life, our author goes so far as to state that, although man's nature is good, it is impossible for it to be free from evil so long as the soul is hampered by the body.

It is perfectly clear, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, that Augustine held stoutly to the possibility of perfection, but to the denial of its actuality. The cause of the failure to realize this possibility is the body.⁵ Similarly we find him maintaining that no matter how perfect a man's life may become and how sure he may be of his eternal felicity, nevertheless he carries about a corrupt body which weighs down his soul and conditions all his actions.⁶ We find this aspect of his doctrine of the flesh carried to its fullest expression in the assertion that so long as man is in the flesh, certain light sins are necessary. "Quia non potest homo quamdiu carnem portat, nisi habere vel levia peccata."⁷ The peccati lex in membris, which is so easily interpreted as the origin of sin, he regards merely as the weight or burden of mortality.⁸ At another time he interprets it as a certain charm or allurements of the flesh.⁹ But the significant point here is this. This law of sin in the members is for Augustine not the *origin* but the *punishment* of sin; it is not the *cause* but the *effect* of evil. "Quod in potestate non est ne concupiscat,

⁵ "Respondemus, et naturam hominis bonam esse, et eam malo carere posse. Nam ideo clamamus, Libera nos a malo: quod non perficitur, quamdiu corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam." De Perf. Just. Hom. VI. 14.

⁶ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 12.

⁷ In Ep. Joan. Tract. I. 6.

⁸ "Legem appellat in membris suis, onus ipsum mortalitatis in quo ingemiscimus gravati." De Diver. Quæst. I. 13.

⁹ De Genesi ad Lit. X. 21.

quamdiu inest peccatum in membris, id est violentia quædam carnis illecebra in corpore mortis hujus, veniens de vindicta, illius peccati, unde propaginem ducimus—.”¹⁰ The evils of the flesh are due to originale peccatum and consuetudo, and are not originated by the body. These evils are the results not the causes of sin.¹¹ We see then that Augustine recognizes the potency of the flesh for evil, but that so far as our search now is concerned there are clear and indubitable indications that he did not regard our sensuous nature as the source of evil.

But we need not rest content with the statement that the evils of the flesh are the effects and not the cause of sin. Our author passes on into a positive defense of the flesh. This we could easily anticipate as a natural corollary of his metaphysical conception that all things in so far as they exist are good. Consequently he repudiates the Manichean notion that flesh is inherently evil.¹² Instead of attacking as did the Manicheans, he defends marriage.¹³ In one of the

¹⁰ De Genesi ad Lit. X. 21.

¹¹ “Quod si quærit aliquis unde hoc scit, quod dicit habitare in carne sua non utique bonum id est peccatum: unde, nisi ex traduce mortalitatis et assidue voluptatis? Illud est ex poena originalis peccati, hoc est ex poena frequentati peccati. Cum illo in hanc vitam nascimur, hoc vivendo addimus. Quæ duo, scilicet, tanquam natura et consuetudo, conjuncta, robustissimam faciunt et invictissimam cupiditatem, quod vocat peccatum, et dicit habitare in carne sua, id est, dominatum quemdam et quasi regnum obtinere.” De Diver. Quæst. I. 10.

¹² “Quo igitur, non dico, errore, sed prorsus furore, Manichæi carnem nostram nescio cui fabulosæ genti tribuunt tenebrarum, quam volunt suam sine ullo initio malam semper habuisse naturam.” De Continentia 22.

¹³ De Bono Conj. passim. Also De Nupt. et Concup. II. 38.

*Letters*¹⁴ he objects to death being considered a separation of good and evil. For if this is the case, then God who united (commiscuit) the body and soul is either evil or controlled by the fear of one who is evil. But this is absurd. On the contrary Augustine contends that both the spirit and the flesh are good.¹⁵ The flesh is classed among the changeable goods of creation, but this only means that in its own degree it is good. In the *City of God* we read: "Non igitur opus est in peccatis vitiisque nostris ad Creatoris injuriam carnis accusare naturam, quæ in genere, atque ordine suo bona est."¹⁶ This whole passage,¹⁷ to which we shall have further occasion to refer, deals with the point now under consideration and leaves no possibility of doubt regarding Augustine's defense of the flesh.

We are now interested to learn how Augustine will reconcile the statement that the body is a burden to the soul and makes some forms of sin necessary, with the assertion that the flesh is a good. This he does in a way entirely consistent with his whole theory of evil. In Chapter II we saw that evil existed only because it attached itself to some good nature. Thus alone can it transform its negativity and sham existence into seeming reality. So here the flesh was originally good.¹⁸ Of this we shall see the indubitable

¹⁴ Ep. LXXIX.

¹⁵ "Prorsus ista duo ambo sunt bona; et spiritus bonum est, et caro bonum; et homo qui ex utroque constat, uno imperante, alio serviente, utique bonum est, sed mutabile bonum." De Continentia 18.

¹⁶ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. V. init.

¹⁷ Ibid. cap. II. to V.

¹⁸ De Continentia 21.

evidence when our author's conception of the first man is delineated in the positive portion of this chapter. The fact that there is conflict between the flesh and the spirit, argues Augustine, is due not to the supposed union of two natures or hostile principles, but rather to internal strife within one nature due to the first sin. This condition did not exist in the first man before he had made choice of *creatura* instead of Creator.¹⁹ Our author claims that originally the flesh was good and the inner discord and strife between the flesh and the spirit is the *effect* and not the *cause* of sin.

What then does give the flesh its seeming potency for evil? Every person is conscious that in some very marked way the body is related to sin. Augustine endeavors to answer this by saying that it is not the flesh but its corruption that gives it such driving power in the moral realm. We may well note that his negative idea of evil is assuming a distinctly active connotation. When the power of the flesh for evil is placed not in the flesh but in its corruption, then this blemish, this vitium, has been metamorphosed into an active principle. But that this is his explanation needs proof. In that short treatise from which we have already quoted we find this significant statement: "Non igitur mala est caro, si malo careat, id est, vitio quo vitiatus est homo, non factus male, sed

¹⁹ "Quod ergo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, quod non habitat in carne nostra bonum, quod lex in membris nostris repugnat legi mentis, non est duarum naturarum ex contrariis principiis facta commixtio, sed unius adversus se ipsam propter peccati meritum facta divisio. *Non sic fuimus in Adam*, antequam natura suo deceptore audito ac secuto, suum contempsisset atque offendisset auctorem." De Continentia 21.

ipse faciens.”²⁰ The evil of the flesh then consists in that flaw or fault which is the result of man’s own action. More significant still is this statement taken from our author’s best work. “Quod si quisquam dicit, carnem causam esse in malis moribus quorum cumque vitiorum, eo quod anima carne affecta sic vivit, profecto non universam hominis naturam diligenter advertit.—Et aggravamur ergo corruptibili corpore, et ipsius aggravationis causam, non naturam substantiamque corporis, sed ejus corruptionem scientes, nolumus corpore exspoliari, sed ejus immortalitati vestiri.—Verum tamen qui omnia animæ mala ex corpore putant accidisse, in errore sunt.”²¹ The statement could not be more explicit. Our soul is weighed down with a corruptible body, but the cause of that burdensomeness is not the nature of the body but its “corruptio.” But we must remember that for Augustine this corruption is the result, effect, or punishment, of the first sin, and therefore we must avoid the error of supposing it to be the origin of sin.

It is of interest to note some of the arguments put forth by Augustine to substantiate his defense of the goodness of the flesh in itself. He points to the essential sinlessness of Jesus as an evidence that real flesh does not cause sin.²² The admonition of St. Paul that Christians should seek for that peace typified by the relationship of the various members of the body would be absurd if the body were totally evil.²³ Furthermore if we attribute to the flesh all

²⁰ De Continentia 20.

²¹ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. III.

²² De Continentia 24.

²³ Ibid. 24.

the sins and vices of this life then we permit that "diabolus" to go free of all these evils for he has no flesh.²⁴ And finally, there remains no doubt about our author's position when he asserts that both spirit and flesh will continue forever.²⁵ This is especially significant when we bear in mind that existence is synonymous with goodness.

It now remains to show how adroitly our author transfers this whole idea of the flesh as the origin of sin over into a region which makes it entirely compatible with his own explanation of the origin of evil. He so interprets the term "caro" that he brings this whole doctrine into line with his theory of the origin of evil in freedom. *Flesh*, Augustine argues, *means self*. "*Se itaque dicit esse carnem suam. Non ergo ipsa est inimica nostra: et quando ejus vitiis resistitur, ipsa amatur, quia ipsa curatur.*"²⁶ But not only when explaining the words of scripture as in the quotation just given, but when describing his own experiences he interprets the prompting of flesh as originating in self.²⁷ Furthermore he says that the inner discord in his heart was only self against self.²⁸ Finally, our author describes the inner battle against the flesh as a conflict with self.²⁹ All men

²⁴ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. III.

²⁵ "Sed permanebunt in æternum substantiæ bonæ spiritus et caro, quas Deus bonus et immutabilis bonas, quamvis mutabiles condidit." De Continentia 21.

²⁶ De Continentia 19.

²⁷ "Sic intelligebam, meo ipso experimento, id quod legeram quomodo caro concupisceret adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem. *Ego quidem in utroque.*" Conf. VIII. cap. V. II.

²⁸ "Ista controversia in corde meo, non nisi de me ipso adversus meipsum." Conf. VIII. cap. XI. 27.

²⁹ De Continentia 29.

since Adam have struggled against the flesh, but the first man is described as free from the conflict of self against self.³⁰ Man assumes an evil character not because he has flesh but because he lives according to himself.³¹

Again, in direct line with this interpretation of flesh as self, we find Augustine maintaining that it is the sinful soul that makes the flesh evil. "*Nam corruptio corporis quæ aggravat animam, non peccati primi est causa sed poena; nec caro corruptibilis animam peccatricem, sed anima peccatrix fecit esse corruptibilem carnem.*"³² Not only do we find in this assertion that Augustine regarded the corruptible body as the punishment of sin, but also that it is the soul that has caused this very corruption. In fact, the flesh serves as the means by which the soul lusts.³³ It is the soul, then, that lusts and not the flesh. Augustine has thus led us around from the idea of the sensuous nature as the source of sin to the conception that sin originates in self. We have seen that in the first place he interpreted flesh as self and then pointed out that it is the soul that lusts by means of the flesh. It is, therefore, only a natural inference to assert that evil originates in self. All things that man possesses come from God. Sin alone is man's creation.³⁴ Whatever good we have comes from the Creator, whatever of evil, from one's self.³⁵ The fact that

³⁰ De Cor. et Grat. 29.

³¹ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. III.

³² Conf. XIV. cap. III.

³³ "Non enim caro sine anima concupiscit, quamvis caro concupiscere dicatur, quia carnaliter anima concupiscit." De Perf. Jus. Hom. VIII. 19. Also De Continentia 19.

³⁴ Enar. In Ps. CII. 4 and CXLII. 5.

³⁵ Sermo CLXXVI. 6.

all men and all beings were created good, shows that they must go astray of themselves.³⁶ When men yearn to be free from evil they simply seek deliverance from self.³⁷ Self then is the origin of sin. Augustine is very emphatic about this. He exclaims, I myself, neither fate, nor chance, nor the devil compelled me, but *I* consented to my sin.³⁸ He exhorts his listeners to fear no enemy from without. Conquer thine own self, and thou hast mastered the world.³⁹ Both body and soul were created good, and all the evil is the result of man's own action.⁴⁰ We are evil then, through our own making.

While our main purpose at this point is to show that Augustine rejected the notion that sin originated in man's sensuous nature, we may well observe that our author's main conclusion here is sound. To be sure much that he has said about the flesh seems beside the point. He approached the problem from a point of view entirely different from that of present day thinkers. When, in his effort to recognize the power of the sensuous nature without making it the origin of sin in man, he draws the distinction that fleshy passions and impulses are the effects and not the causes of the first sin, he resorts to an argument which becomes meaningless in the light of evolution-

³⁶ De Bapt. c. Donat. IV. 9.

³⁷ "Quid est quod clamasti, Libera nos a malo? Certe non est malum? Responde illi; ego suum malus; et si liberaverit me a malo, ero de malo bonus: liberet me a me, ne incurram in te." Sermo CLXXXII. 4. Cf. also *ibid.* 5.

³⁸ Enar. in Ps. XXXII. 17.

³⁹ Sermo LVII.

⁴⁰ "Ex utraque enim parte, id est, et anima et corpore a bono Deo factus bonus, ipse fecit malum quo factus est malus." De Continentia 20.

ary thought. But when he argues that the flesh is not the cause of sin, we must agree with him. While he contends that the flesh was originally *good*, we must hold that the body with all its passions and instincts was originally *neither* good nor bad. It was *neutral*. It was the material out of which the developing individual by the use of freedom made either a good or a bad life. This difference, however, does not vitiate his main contention that the origin of evil cannot be placed in the flesh but must be referred to the ego. For him to have placed the origin of evil in man's sensuous nature would have introduced a note of discord into his whole theory of evil, and would have been inconsistent with his entire metaphysical conception of being and creation. If sense were the origin of evil, then all sensuous existence involved evil. He has wisely interpreted "*caro*" to mean self and has thereby transferred this whole doctrine into the realm of freedom. The evils of the flesh are recognized, but for Augustine they are the effect and not the cause or origin of sin. By this device, Augustine has accounted for the power of the body and at the same time resorted to no theory which will be inconsistent with his own answer to the question of the origin of evil in man. By placing the origin of evil in self, he has left the way open to answer his question just as he did when dealing with the pre-existent world of angels. He can still explain the beginning of evil in man by his use of freedom. We therefore emerge from his discussion of the theory which would place the derivation of evil in man's sensuous nature, with another negative conclusion. Evil in man, argues our author, did not originate either in a pre-existent state from which the soul has

been thrust, as a punishment, into a body of flesh, nor can it be explained by an appeal to this same sensuous nature.

REJECTS CONTRAST THEORY.

There remains one more historic explanation of the derivation of evil with which we must deal before we pass on to the endeavor to establish our main contention, namely, that Augustine placed the origin of man's evil in freedom. Thus far in this chapter our conclusions have been chiefly negative. We have seen that in his later thought Augustine completely discarded the pre-existence theory, and while recognizing that man's sensuous nature could not be as summarily dismissed as an explanation of the origin of evil, he so transformed the meaning of the term "caro" that the whole theory was brought into line with his own explanation. In other words, we found that before he gave his negative conclusion against the flesh theory, certain qualifications or interpretations were necessary. Interpreters of Augustine are not wanting who advocate the theory that man's sensuous nature was regarded by him as the source of evil. But if in dealing with the flesh theory, we found it necessary to advance somewhat fully our evidence for believing that Augustine rejected it as an explanation of the origin of evil, in our treatment of the theory now to be discussed we will find ourselves upon even more doubtful ground. But here, too, we contend without qualification that Augustine rejected this theory. Having established this contention, we will then be prepared to pass on to the final and constructive section of this chapter, and will then be face

to face with his whole treatment of the problem of freedom.

The theory to which we refer is that which finds an explanation of the origin of evil in the contrasts of individual life. A cursory glance at the world, says this theory, suggests at once that all life arises from contrasts. This suggestion finds further support in the varied contrasts of nature. Light and darkness, cold and heat, sound and silence, each acquires distinctness and meaning in its opposite. It is to be expected, therefore, that in the moral sphere the same contrast will be apparent. Evil will exist as the foil of the good. Goodness will find its vigor and reality because of the presence of evil. Evil will exist for the sake of the good and as its necessary contrast and correlate. Just as the beauty of the picture depends upon the distribution of light and shade, so man's moral life comes to full expression only in the contrast of good and evil. This is the purpose of evil, to serve as a mirror in which moral good is reflected. When the artist portrays a scene he paints the shade and darkness not for the sake of the darkness itself, but in order to put the light in its proper setting.

So evil is the necessary concomitant of good. In the individual life, the attainment of virtue is impossible, without the presence of evil. It exists to be overcome, to be subordinated, to be resisted, and in this struggle the individual acquires sturdiness of virtue and strength of character. This theory is elaborately stated by Dr. Julius Müller.¹ So elaborately and with such fairness, indeed, that one of his hasty critics supposed that it was Dr. Müller's own

¹ Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde B. II. C. IV.

doctrine. The theory demands recognition here because Dr. Müller finds elements of it in the writings of Augustine, but does not offer any full statement or final decision as to our author's position. Dr. Müller rejects the contrast theory because it makes evil a necessity. His treatment is somewhat vitiated by the fact that he constantly interprets evil as sin and rightly insists that we cannot admit the necessity of sin. This same confusion of terms in Augustine renders it difficult to pronounce upon his position, but we believe sufficient proof can be given to show that he did not accept this theory as an explanation of the origin of evil in the individual.

Fairness compels us to recognize the presence of that element in the thought of Augustine which has led some to regard him as a supporter of this theory. When Prin. Fairbairn says of Augustine, "So he argued, as the Stoics had done, that evil is needed to enhance the beauty and the glory of the world,"² he states a view which may be supported by citations from certain writings of our author, but which is very liable to give a false impression of his doctrine as a whole. Let us then, endeavor to trace Augustine's real position regarding this contrast theory. In the *City of God* he points out that contrasts and antitheses in speech are regarded by rhetoricians as the most beautiful ornaments of language. So, too, argues Augustine, the existence of evil in the world is used by the Creator to embellish the course of the ages. Thus the life of the world may be compared to a beautiful poem, whose beauty lies in the opposition

² The Phil. of the Chr. Relig. p. 101.

of contraries and whose eloquence consists not in the antitheses of words, but of things.³

In another passage we find this idea given even more definite expression.⁴ It is explicitly stated that when evil is put in its proper place, it only increases our admiration of the good and enables us, by comparison with itself more fully to enjoy and value the good. In fact Augustine himself uses the illustration drawn from art. Just as the shade increases the beauty of the picture, so too, the presence of sinners in the universe renders it more beautiful to those who have the skill to see it.⁵ This, however, is not to be so interpreted as to minimize the fact that sin and its adherents are the blemish of creation. Closely similar to this comparison is the statement that just as darkness cannot be *seen* but is thought of in comparison with light, so sin cannot be distinguished by the intellect, but is made clear by the light of right-

³ "Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico Angelorum, sed vel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse præscisset, nisi pariter nosset quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret, atque ita ordines sæculorum tanquam pulcherrimum carmen ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret. Antitheta enim quæ appellantur, in ornamentis elocutionis sunt decentissima, quæ latine appellantur opposita, vel quod expressius dicitur, contrapposita. . . . Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita sermonis pulchritudinem reddunt; ita quadam, non verborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione sæculi pulchritudo componitur." Civ. Dei XI. cap. XVIII.

⁴ "In qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum et loco suo positum, emmentius commendat bona, ut magis placeant et laudabilia sint dum comparantur malis?" Enchir. XI.

⁵ "Quoniam sicut pictura cum colore nigro, loco suo posita, ita universitas rerum si quis possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulchra est, quamvis per se ipsos consideratos sua deformitas turpet." Civ. Dei XI. cap. XXIII. 1 fin.

eousness.⁶ These ideas do, without question seem to suggest the theory with which we are now dealing and are doubtless responsible in part for the belief that he used this theory to explain the origin of evil.

Closely allied to these ideas, moreover, is the conception put forth in the *Confessions*,⁷ that to God nothing whatsoever is evil. What we account to be evil is only that which fails to harmonize with its surroundings; whereas if we only were aware of it this supposed evil does harmonize with other things and is therefore good. Consequently of these evils, Augustine will not say that they ought not to exist. "Et absit jam ut dicerem, non essent ista."⁸ But he does not pause here. His universe is theocentric. Nothing is here contrary to the will of God. We cannot doubt but that God's permission of evil serves some good purpose. Consequently, although evil in so far as it is evil cannot be called a good, nevertheless the existence of evil must be a good otherwise it would not be permitted by omnipotent goodness.⁹ The existence of evil then is made to serve some good purpose.

We must observe carefully that in no sense has our author said that this is the explanation of the origin of evil. It is only the effort, *after evil is once here*, to find some meaning in its existence. It is the fail-

⁶ Prop. ex. Ep. ad Rom. Exp. XLII (in VII. 15, 13).

⁷ Conf. VII. 19.

⁸ Conf. VII. 19. This suggests the statement of Professor Paulsen that "evils are not things that ought absolutely not to be." System of Ethics, E. T. p. 322.

⁹ "Quamvis ergo ea quæ mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen ut non solum bona, sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bonum, ut essent et mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotente bono." Enchir. XCVI.

ure to observe just this distinction that has led to a false interpretation of Augustine at this point. Now to apply this theory to man would mean that no one in this life is without evil. Consequently, when in his controversy with Pelagianism he asserted repeatedly that no one in this life is without sin,¹⁰ it is easy and natural to suppose that we have the confirmation of this theory. At times, it seems that Augustine is willing to commit himself to a belief in the necessity of sin. In one passage, for instance, he says that the very fact that we are men makes it impossible for us to say that we have not sinned.¹¹ For the mere fact that we are in this life, vitiated by the evil choice of primitive man, makes it impossible for us not to sin daily.¹²

We now have before us all the material which could be cited in defense of the hypothesis that Augustine endeavored to account for the origin of evil in man by an appeal to this contrast theory. This material is sufficient to enable us to understand readily why our author has been so interpreted. Should we pause here, however, we would fail to understand why Augustine has made these statements. We may grant that this theory did appeal to Augustine for in it there is a truth which must be recognized, but that truth does not demand that we place here the *origin* of evil. In fact as we have already suggested, and especially in the light of what remains to be said, the foregoing

¹⁰ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 8 init. "Si autem quod secundo loco posueram, quæratum utrum sit, esse non *credo*." Cf. also *ibid.* II. 18, 25, 47. Also, De Spir. et Lit. I, 2, 65. De Nat. et Grat. 45. Enchir. LXIV. Sermo CLXXXI. 2. Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. L. et *passim*.

¹¹ De Cons. Evang. II. XXV.

¹² Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 28.

statements of Augustine were made in the endeavor to see some purpose and meaning in evil, *after it has assumed its place in the universe*. There is no intention here to account for the origin of evil in man.

We see Augustine's real attitude to this theory in a striking passage in his work *On the Trinity*.¹³ In it he states both his belief as to the origin of evils and also his conception of their purpose in the life of man. Here in the compass of a few sentences we see him declaring that evils exist for the sake of the good, for the development of character and the exercise of virtue, but that they have come into existence as the punishment of sin, and especially of original sin. These evils then, Augustine here expressly declares do not owe their origin to the necessity of the moral contrast of good and evil but are instead, the direct deserts of sin. The origin of evil then must be accounted for by some other theory. But when once present these evils have remained to be resisted, conquered and cast down. We see here a peculiar blending of truth and error, but for the present our concern is this: to establish the contention that Augustine did not derive evil from the contrasts of life.¹³ But our evidence need not be based solely on this passage. It is used simply because it shows clearly how Augustine reconciled what might otherwise seem

¹³ "Quamvis enim et ipsa mors carnis de peccato primi hominis originaliter venerit, tamen bonus ejus usus gloriosissimos martyres fecit. Et ideo non solum ipsa, sed omnia sæculi hujus mala, dolores laboresque hominum, quamquam de peccatorum, et maxime de peccati originalis meritis veniant, unde facta est et ipsa vita vinculo mortis obstricta, tamen et remissis peccatis remanere debuerunt, cum quibus homo pro veritate certaret, et unde exerceretur virtus fidelium." De Trin. XIII. XVI. 20.

contradictory elements of his thought.¹⁴ This citation must be given great weight because in it he is dealing at one and the same time with both the origin of evil and this contrast theory, and consequently has placed them in their true relationship for his thought. We now see that the multitudinous references in which Augustine recognizes the purposes of evils can in no sense be interpreted as efforts to account for the *origin* of evil. So when Augustine declares that evils exist to show how God could make good use of them,¹⁵ or for the purpose of training,¹⁶ of testing,¹⁷ of teaching,¹⁸ of cleansing,¹⁹ and of developing²⁰ mankind, he is only endeavoring to find meaning in what already exists and not to account for its derivation.

Any doubt which may now remain as to Augustine's rejection of this theory as an explanation of the origin of evil in man will be dispelled by again referring to his metaphysical conceptions of good and evil. In Chapter II when dealing with our author's

¹⁴ That our author regarded evils as the deserts or punishments of sin has been amply set forth in the first chapter of this work. Vid. pp. 21-26.

¹⁵ Civ. Dei XIV. 11, Ep. CLXVI. 15, De Nat. et Grat. 27. On this point of Augustine's thought, A. H. Newman says: "God would not have permitted evil unless by his own supreme power he had been able to make good use of it. He (Augustine) attempts, with some success, to show the advantages of the permission of evil in the world." Nicene and Post-Nicene Fath. IV. p. 30.

¹⁶ Enar. in Ps. XXXVII. 24, Sermo XV. 5, 9.

¹⁷ De Perf. Just. Hom. XI. 26, De Trin. XIII. XVI. 20, In Joan. Evang. Tract. VII. 7, Ep. CXXXI.

¹⁸ De Cor. et Grat. 24, Conf. II. 4.

¹⁹ Sermones LXII, LXXXI. 7, Civ. Dei I. 8, De Agone Christ. 8.

²⁰ Sermo LXXX. 8, De Perf. Just. Hom. XI. 27, De Grat. et Lib. Arbit 41, Civ. Dei XXII. 23, Ep. CXXX. 26.

definition of evil we saw unmistakably that evil has no real existence of its own. Evil cannot exist without good.²¹ Its seeming reality finds expression only as it is attached to some good. This in itself completely contradicts the theory under consideration which demands evil in order to give vigor and reality to the good. The theory, however, is completely driven from the field by the assertion of our author that although evil cannot exist without the good, good on the other hand can exist without evil. "*Bona tamen sine malis esse possint.*"²²

It only remains to show that our author made similar statements regarding man and extended these abstract metaphysical conceptions until the same principle was asserted to hold good in the life of the individual, in order to establish our contention that Augustine rejected the contrast theory. We have already pointed out and cited ample references to show that Augustine in his Anti-Pelagian writings insisted that no man lives a sinless life. This, however, did not preclude the assertion on the part of our author that there is the *possibility*²³ of a sinless life. If that is so then our author did not find in evil the necessary correlate of good.

²¹ "*Mala vero sine bonis esse non possint, quoniam naturæ in quibus sunt, in quantum naturæ sunt, utique bonæ sunt.*" Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XI. 1.

²² Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XI. 1. Cf. also Enchir. XIV: "*Cum autem bona et mala nullus ambigat esse contraria, non solum simul esse possunt, sed mala omnino sine bonis et nisi in bonis esse non possunt, quamvis bona sine malis possint.*"

²³ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 7. "*Si a me quærat, utrum homo sine peccato possit esse in hac vita; confitebor posse per Dei gratiam et liberum ejus arbitrium.*" Same thought in De Spir. et Lit. 66 and De Perf. Just. Hom. VII. 16.

Here then we emerge from another discussion with a negative conclusion. We cannot with justice fail to recognize that in this contrast theory there is a large element of truth, but that truth does not relate to the phase of our problem now under investigation: viz., the origin of evil. If Augustine had clearly distinguished evil and sin, if he had seen the necessary logical implication of his metaphysical conception of creation *ex nihilo*, he would have reached different results in dealing with the theory now under discussion. But for him evil was sin, and he could not acknowledge the necessity of sin. If on the other hand, he had separated these two conceptions and had recognized in evil the necessary means of real life, he would have approached nearer to the truth. If we should eliminate from life all the evils of disorganization, such as imperfection, isolation, and interference, we would not have a real world. It would be perfect but dead.²⁴ These evils, then, we conceive as necessary to all real life. They are the means by which man acquires virtue and character. Professor Palmer has stated this truth thus: "We do not act till we find something within or about us unsatisfactory. If contemplating myself in my actual conditions I could pronounce them all good, creation for me would be at an end. To start it, some sense of need is required."²⁵

²⁴ "Take away all evils," says Professor Paulsen, "and you abolish life itself." *System of Ethics*, E. T. p. 322.

²⁵ *Nature of Goodness*, page 98. Cf. also this significant sentence from the same author: "'Is' has no other application to a person than to mark how far he has advanced along his ideal line. Were he to pause at any point as if complete, he would cease to be a person." *Ibid.* p. 133. Cf. Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil*, pp. 24-5.

This does not imply the necessity of sin. Sin enters when we convert these means into ends. When these necessary evils of life are set up as ideals and sought as the end of life, sin is present. If Augustine had drawn such a distinction he would not have regarded all the evils of life as the punishments of sin. Here then is that peculiar blending of truth and error to which reference was made above. The error lies in the endeavor to regard all the evils of life as sin, and therefore not necessary. The truth lies in the recognition of the fact that evil exists to be overcome and is the means of moral development. Augustine, with different premises, reaches a result similar to that of Professor Royce, who says: "The justification of the presence in the world of the morally evil becomes apparent to us mortals only in so far as this evil is overcome and condemned. It exists only that it may be cast down."²⁶ With remarkable insight Augustine has found the truth in this theory. He sees the purpose of moral evil in the world. His error lies in the failure to distinguish clearly between evil and sin. His rejection of the theory as an explanation of the derivation of evil, we accept. He has thus left the way clear to realize for us the expectations with which we entered this chapter, namely that the origin of evil must be found in freedom. Thus far we have only cleared away certain theories. His rejection of all three of these theories together with the effort to be fair to the elements of truth in them, only carries us nearer to that explanation of the origin of evil, which we are gradually finding to be the key to our author's thought. We are now done with ne-

²⁶ *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 28.

gations and are prepared for our author's positive and constructive ideas.

DEFENDS FREEDOM.

Just as we found at the close of Chapter III that Augustine, while dealing with the world of angels, placed the origin of all evil in the freedom of the creature, so here, if he is to be consistent, we expect to find that this is his explanation of the origin of evil in man. We have now reached that point where we must state fully our author's conception of primitive man. Perhaps no single idea of Augustine has had a more significant history than his conception of Adam. It is so central in his system and involves such fundamental errors that here we shall confine ourselves even more than heretofore to a statement of his thought, reserving criticism for our concluding chapter.

It is only as we remember Augustine's idea of man's original condition that we are in a position to see how he accounted for the origin of evil. Like all ancient peoples, the Hebrew nation looked back into the remote past and placed there a golden age. This tradition was preserved in the story of the garden of Eden, and received all the embellishment that the imagination of man could form. As a part of the Hebrew Canon, this story was accepted in its most literal form by Augustine, and served as the source of his anthropology. Man's condition was originally perfect. As the creation of God, he was free from all evil, and endowed with every good gift. He knew no want, and was so fashioned that time could make no ravages upon his body. He was destined to live

eternally. In his physical body, there was no corruption, no possibility of disease or accident. Perfect health of body and undisturbed peace of soul were his. He was entirely exempt from all vicissitude. All the evils of life including sorrow, pain and want were unknown and his whole existence was one ceaseless round of joy and gladness.¹

The matter of chief interest here, however, concerns Adam's will. Augustine does not hesitate to describe the freedom of Paradise. He asserts that the soul of the first man, before he had sinned, controlled his body with perfect freedom of will.² Again in contrasting man's condition before and after the Fall, he describes the latter state as not possessing that absolute freedom which man at first enjoyed.³ But we ask instantly what was this perfect or absolute freedom? Augustine's answer can only be grasped by recalling that in the Pelagian controversy he insisted repeatedly that man's freedom was not sufficient to enable him to do good. Pelagius and Cœlestius contended that man could by free will live a sinless life. Augustine on the other hand insisted upon the necessity of "*gratia Dei*."

Augustine's own early experience, in which he found it seemingly impossible to overcome sin without some external aid, exercised a permanent influence over his thought. Man cannot do good by his will alone. Of this he was absolutely sure. Therefore he constantly and repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of God's grace if man is to choose and do good. The point then is

¹ This description of Adam is based on *Civ. Dei* XIV. cap. 26.

² *Ep.* CXLIII.

³ *Ibid.*

this, he must endow Adam with perfect freedom, and yet he is entirely unwilling to eliminate the idea that Adam needed the aid of his Creator. Consequently we find this perfect and absolute freedom of Adam qualified in certain important respects. Now Adam was created with free will but ignorant of his future sin. Consequently, he was happy, because he had no thought other than that his life was to be an eternal and unbroken span of felicity. If now he had chosen by his own free will to continue in his happy estate and had not sinned, he would never have known death or misery, and as a result of his faithful continuance in his perfect condition he would have received the reward of the unfallen angels, namely, the absolute impossibility of falling into sin and the joy of knowing this with all certainty.⁴ Here then is a fundamental distinction between the freedom of the unfallen angels and that of Adam. It was *impossible*, argues Augustine, for those perfect beings to fall, but Adam had both possibilities of continuing in perfection or falling.⁵ His will could have enabled him never to sin. "Quod adjutorium si homo ille (Adam) per liberum non deseruisset arbitrium, semper esset bonus."⁶ Adam then could have persevered if he had wished. Why then did he fall? Simply be-

⁴ De Cor. et Grat. 28. "In quo statu recto ac sine vicio, si per ipsum liberum arbitrium manere voluisset, profecto sine ullo mortis et infelicitatis experimento, acciperet illam, merito hujus permansionis, beatitudinis plenitudinem, qua et sancti Angeli sunt beati, id est, ut cadere non posset ulterius, et hoc certissime sciret."

⁵ In all that is said regarding Adam's freedom it must be remembered that the possibility of *sinning* is always presupposed and that the significant feature lies in the other possibility of not sinning.

⁶ De Cor. et Grat. 31.

cause of a free will which was so constituted that he was able to choose either good or ill.⁷

The distinction that Augustine draws then between Adam's will and that of the angels is this: Adam's liberty consisted in *being able not to sin* (posse non peccare). That is, he possessed the possibility of being free from sin. The liberty of the unfallen beings consisted in *not being able to sin* (non posse peccare).

That is, they had reached that stage where they possessed the certainty of choosing only the good.⁸ We cannot be too emphatic here in stating exactly how Augustine conceived Adam's freedom. Before his fall he was able not to sin. In other words, he could have continued in his perfect state, had he willed it. But he did not will it and so he lost for himself and all mankind, the ability to do good *unaided*.⁹ The "gratia Dei" which as a consequence all men need, was in Adam's case, just this endowment of freedom which involved the ability to do good, if he would.¹⁰ This is what Augustine means when he says that man lost the freedom of his will when Adam sinned.¹¹ He lost this "posse non peccare." He lost what was Adam's gratia. He lost freedom in the

⁷ "Posset enim perseverare si vellet: quod ut nollet, de libero descendit arbitrio; quod tunc ita liberum erat, ut bene velle posset et male." De Cor. et Grat. 32.

⁸ Ibid. 33: "Prima ergo libertas voluntatis erat, posse non peccare; novissima erit multo major, non posse peccare."

⁹ Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. II. 9.

¹⁰ De Cor. et Grat. 31. "Nec ipsum (Adam) ergo Deus esse voluit sine sua gratia, quam reliquit in ejus libero arbitrio."

¹¹ Enchir. XXX. "Ita cum libero peccaretur arbitrio, victore peccato amissum est liberum arbitrium."

sense that now, since Adam's fall man is free to sin.¹² He lost the power to do good without external aid. Thus it becomes clear how Augustine defended his doctrine of grace even in the case of Adam. He did it simply by regarding Adam's freedom as "*gratia Dei*." When Adam fell he lost that part of his freedom which enabled him to do good without aid.

There is one other aspect of man's original condition which must not be disregarded. It follows as a natural corollary of what has already been said. Its significance lies in the fact that Augustine placed so much emphasis upon "*concupiscentia*" and regarded it as one of the immediate results of Adam's fall. The aspect to which we refer is that Augustine regarded sex to be originally devoid of all lust¹³ and subject to the perfect control of the will.¹⁴ The sense of shame was unknown before the Fall.¹⁵ This phase of man's original endowment is dwelt upon frequently and fully.¹⁶

This material is sufficient to help us to understand how Augustine conceived of man's original condition. Adam lived a perfect life, enjoyed a freedom of the will that might have enabled him to continue his happy lot and was free from the lust and passion of the body. How then did sin enter? Once again our author has taken us into a strange place and set before us a perfect being. In Chapter III he led us out of this world into a realm peopled with the perfect

¹² Ibid. XXX. "*Ac per hoc ad peccandum liber est, qui peccati servus est.*"

¹³ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 53 et passim.

¹⁴ De Pec. Orig. 40.

¹⁵ Ibid. 41.

¹⁶ Vide De Nupt. et Concup. I. 18, II. 17, 18, 26, 37, and especially Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XXVI.

creatures of God, and pointed to one and said that evil originated in the act of his will. We now confront a similar situation. Only two differences are manifest. In the first place we are supposed to be dealing with the first historic man upon this earth, and secondly, the crisis here cannot be as critical because evil has already gained its entrance into the circle of a perfect universe. Once originated, it never again is as difficult to account for its origin. But strange to say we do not find so much emphasis placed upon this fact as one might suppose. Instead, we seem to confront the whole problem again upon another arena. Everything is evidently fresh from the hand of the Creator. "Perfection" is written large over every detail of the scene. Man's perfect life and freedom are postulated and then by some strange, startling and catastrophic act, evil enters.

To be sure, the Fall-story has its Serpent. Augustine's "diabolus" is present and is recognized, but in no such way as to relieve man of the responsibility of an evil choice. A terrible wound was inflicted upon the human race by the devil at the fatal moment of the Fall, but nevertheless it was the first man who sinned.¹⁷ In every individual there is original sin, the source of which seems to be two-fold, namely, the subtlety of the devil who deceives, and the will of man who yields to his deception.¹⁸ The conclusion to be drawn in regard to the devil then is

¹⁷ "Persuasit malum diabolus tanquam peccatum, non creavit tanquam naturam. . . . Hoc autem valde tunc majus atque altius diabolus inflexit, quam sunt ista hominibus nota peccata." De Nupt. et Concup. II. 57.

¹⁸ De Pec. Orig. 43. Cf. also De Trin. XIII. cap. XII. 16.

this, he is recognized as the originator of evil in that pre-mundane world, but his influence in Adam's first choice of evil, while recognized, does not free man of the responsibility of the act.

If, then, we have thus disposed of the possibilities involved in the origin of evil previous to Adam's existence, it remains to be shown definitely and positively that Augustine placed the origin of evil in an act of Adam's will. And this he does in terms unqualified and unmistakable. Man's first sin was disobedience, which consisted simply in doing his own will in preference to that of his Creator.¹⁹ An evil will (*malam voluntatem*) is referred to in these words: "*Hoc est omnino peccatum primi hominis, unde in homines mali origo descendit.*"²⁰ Man's disobedience of God is due to his depravity, but this in turn was caused by his own evil will,²¹ by falling from the perfection in which his Creator placed him. Adam loosed himself from bondage to his Creator's commands by an evil use of his free will.²² In fact it was by badly using his free will that man destroyed both his freedom and himself.²³ Even original sin is regarded as voluntary because Adam was free when he sinned.²⁴ In endeavoring to account for the simultaneous generation

¹⁹ *Civ. Dei* XIV. cap. XII. Also *De Cor. et Grat.* 28.

²⁰ *Op. Imp. c. Jul. II. cap. XVII.*

²¹ *De Cor. et Grat.* 9.

²² *Enchir.* XXVII.

²³ *Ibid.* XXX. "*Nam libero arbitrio male utens homo, et se perdidit et ipsum.*"

²⁴ "*Non enim et hoc esset peccatum quod originale traheretur, sine opere liberi arbitrii, quo primus homo peccavit, per quem peccatum intravit in mundum et in omnes homines pertransiit.*" *Cont. Jul. Pelag.* VI. 28.

in each person of a good nature and nature's flaws, Augustine refers the origin of the former to the will of the supreme Creator, the latter to the depraved will of Adam.²⁵ Nothing could be more explicit than the following sentence written in reference to the "originale peccatum." "Origo tamen etiam hujus peccati descendit a voluntati peccantis."²⁶ In writing against Julianus he insists that his doctrine of original sin does not contradict the position that no sin is possible without free will, for original sin likewise found its source in freedom.²⁷ Hence he does not hesitate to pass on to the assertion that original and voluntary actual sin of any individual belong in the same genus for they both owe their origin to free-will.²⁸ If any further question could remain as to whether he placed the origin of evil in man's freedom, it would be completely answered by a statement made in the *Retractions*. We have seen that he regarded all original sin as voluntary. The full significance of this becomes apparent and all further doubts are completely dispelled when we find the assertion that it is not absurd to call even the original sin of infants voluntary, because it is contracted from the evil will of the first man.²⁹ *Unquestionably, then, Augustine*

²⁵ De Pec. Orig. 38.

²⁶ Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. XLVII.

²⁷ "Nec ideo tamen, ut dicis, nostrum dogma consumitur, cum asserimus esse originale peccatum: quia et ad hoc peccati genus ex libera voluntate perventum est, non ejus propria qui nascitur, sed ejus in quo omnes originaliter fuerunt, quando communem naturam mala voluntate vitiauit." Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. XC.

²⁸ Op. Imp. c. Jul. II. CXI.

²⁹ Retract. I. cap. XIII. 5. "Et illud quod in parvulio dicitur originale peccatum, cum adhuc non utantur arbitrio voluntatis, non absurde vocatur etiam voluntarium, quia ex

placed the origin of evil in man in that first evil choice of Adam. In an act of his will sin originated.

But what of the origin of sin in any individual since Adam? Can we establish the same contention here that sin originates in the life of each person through the use of his will? This, we maintain, is Augustine's position which we will now endeavor to set forth. To do so, however, throws us back again into the life of Adam, for Adam held a very unique relation to every individual of the human race. Augustine conceived of the whole human race as a mass. Every individual has in some curious fashion existed first in that bulky something called human nature, and later has been given his particular individual form. "Ex eadem namque massa omnes venimus."³⁰ Moreover this mass of human nature (*massa universa*) is under condemnation.³¹ This has been its condition from the moment that sin entered the world. When Adam fell, the whole mass of our nature was ruined.³² By his evil choice Adam condemned the entire mass of the human race.³³ The man who first sinned made all men evil for he corrupted the whole mass of human nature.³⁴ This corruption of the whole race is frequently expressed by the term, mass of perdition (*perditionis massa*).³⁵ That this thought of condemnation applies to every member of the human

prima hominis mala voluntate contractum, factum est quodammodo hæreditarium." Cf. also *ibid.* I. cap. XV. 2, 4.

³⁰ Conf. XII. 36.

³¹ De Nat. et Grat. 9. Cf. also Enchir. XXVII.

³² De Pec. Orig. 34.

³³ Civ. Dei XXI. 12. "Hinc universa generis humani massa damnata."

³⁴ Sermo XCVI. 6.

³⁵ De Cor. et Grat. 12, 16, 25.

family is made evident by the assertion that infants are worthy of punishment because they belong to the ruined mass and are justly regarded as born of Adam.³⁶ This first man then has assumed remarkable importance. In fact he is the whole human race.³⁷

This relationship of Adam to the race finds expression in a slightly different figure when he is called the *root* of the race. All posterity were in Adam as in a root, and every individual is therefore guilty of the first sin.³⁸ All our evils have come forth out of a "*radix peccati*."³⁹ All men are born with this root of evil.⁴⁰ Adam's sin was of such a heinous character that in him all the human family was *radically* condemned.⁴¹ Out from him as the root of the race flowed the corruption which mars every life.⁴² All human offspring are consequently involved in radical ruin.⁴³ Even infants, though they have committed no evil of their own, are nevertheless ruined in their root.⁴⁴ In other terms the only sin that can be attributed to the new born child is original sin derived from Adam as its source and fountain.⁴⁴

³⁶ De Pec. Orig. 36. "Unde ergo recte infans illa perditione punitur, nisi quia pertinet ad massam perditionis, et juste intelligitur ex Adam natus."

³⁷ "In primo igitur homine per feminam in progenium transiturum universum genus humanum fuit." Civ. Dei XIII. cap. III.

³⁸ Civ. Dei XXI. cap. XII.

³⁹ Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CLXII. "Quæ omnia mala absit ut essent in illa felicitate paradisi; ac per hoc non pullulaverunt nisi de radici peccati."

⁴⁰ Civ. Dei XXII. cap. XXII. 1. "Verum hæc hominum sunt malorum, ab illa tamen erroris et perversi amoris radice venientia, cum qua omnis filius Adam nascitur."

⁴¹ Enchir. XLVIII.

⁴² Ibid. XXVI. Also Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XV.

⁴³ De Pec. Orig. 43.

⁴⁴ Sermo CXV. 4.

Again, with but a slight change in the figure, Adam is called the seed (semen) of the race.⁴⁵ Everyone while yet unborn was in Adam.⁴⁶ Consequently it is right to insist that original sin is not only another's but ours,⁴⁷ for in Adam there was already present the seminal nature, from which we were to spring.⁴⁸

Augustine seemingly not quite satisfied with these comparisons pushes the relationship between Adam and his posterity until it becomes almost identity. Adam was not only all human nature, conceived in its bulk, nor only the root or seed of the race. *We were all in him.*⁴⁹ The whole race existed seminally and potentially in him.⁵⁰ "*In illo erant omnes.*"⁵¹ And when he acted, all his offspring acted.⁵² But this is hardly sufficient for our author and so instead of saying we were *in Adam*, he makes the identification complete, and insists that *we were all that one man Adam*. "*Omnes ille unus fuerunt.*"⁵³ "*Et hi omnes*

⁴⁵ Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. cap. CIV.

⁴⁶ Ibid. I. XLVIII. "In lumbis Adam fuisse omnes qui ex illo fuerant per concupiscentiam carnis orituri."

⁴⁷ Ibid. I. XLVIII. "Sed peccatis, inquis, alienis non utique perire debuerunt. Aliena sunt, sed paterna sunt. Ac per hoc jure seminationis atque germinationis et nostra sunt."

⁴⁸ Civ. Dei XIII. cap. V. Cf. Conf. XIII. 28.

⁴⁹ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. III. 14. "Sed quidquid erat in futura propagine vita unius hominis continebat." Cf. also ibid. III. 15.

⁵⁰ De Cor. et Grat. 28. "Quæ in illo adhuc posita tota cum illo peccaverat." Cf. Sermo CCXL. 3, which reads: "In uno peccavimus et omnes ad corruptionem nati summus." Also Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. 7.

⁵¹ Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. 7.

⁵² De Cor. et Grat. 9. "Peccata quidem ista originalia ideo dicuntur aliena, quod ea singuli de parentibus trahunt, sed non sine causa dicuntur et nostra quia in illo uno omnes, sicut dicit Apostolus peccaverunt."

⁵³ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 15.

unus ille erant." ⁵⁴ These are typical expressions and show clearly the fact that Augustine regarded every individual as actually present in Adam. If we were all actually present in Adam, and if sin originated in an act of his will, then sin has likewise originated for all of us in freedom.

Here then, we seem to have established our point and to have accounted for the origin of evil in every member of the human race. Nevertheless Augustine is compelled to recognize ⁵⁵ that the particular individual existence of each person is different from his existence in Adam, and so he sets to work to show how that evil originated in Adam and is transmitted to us. This opens a new phase of the question and to it Augustine was compelled by his opponents, especially the Pelagians, to give not a little of his thought.

How then, did Adam's sin gain an entrance to the *actualized individual* existence of each person? The Pelagians found their answer in the doctrine of imitation (*imitatio*). This doctrine asserted that the only way in which Adam's sin affected mankind was by the influence of a bad example. ⁵⁶ If men follow his path and imitate his sin, then by the power of example Adam has transmitted his sin to them. Augustine attacks this Pelagian doctrine and rejects it because it sets up the wrong offender as an example for imitation. His chief argument, frequently reiterated, is that if sin is transmitted to the individual solely by imitation, then the devil ⁵⁷ and not Adam

⁵⁴ Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. cap. CIV. Cf. De Pec. Mer. et Remis. III. 14, 15 and Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XV.

⁵⁵ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. III. 14 and Civ. Dei XIII. XV.

⁵⁶ De Pec. Orig. 16. Also De Nupt. et Concup. II. 45 and De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 9.

⁵⁷ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 18. "Hoc unius delictum, si

should be accused of this influence. But the Pelagians do refer the doctrine specifically to Adam, and therefore argues Augustine, the only other alternative is the principle of propagation.⁵⁸ To "imitatio," then, Augustine opposes "propagatio."

Adam's sin is transmitted to each individual by natural generation.⁵⁹ Among the results of the disobedience of Adam and Eve was concupiscence which has been transferred to all their offspring by natural descent.⁶⁰ We are guilty of original sin, not through our own individualized act, but by propagation.⁶¹ The whole human family has sprung from Adam. His sin has passed by natural descent (*propagatione transisset*) to all mankind.⁶² In other words, original sin is transmitted to each person by physical birth.⁶³ We participate in Adam's sin because we are born of the union of the sexes.⁶⁴ No man is born without this inherent defect for which also he is liable to punishment.⁶⁵ Because birth comes through conjugal union we share in the sin of Adam, whose fault attaches to all his posterity.⁶⁶ That good nature which he re-

imitationem attendamus, non erit nisi diaboli. Sed quia manifestum est, de Adam, non de diabolo dici; restat intelligenda, non imitatio, sed propagatio peccati." Cf. also *ibid.* I. 10, *Op. Imp. c. Jul. II. cap. XLIX. LII.*

⁵⁸ *De Pec. Mer. et Remis.* I. 18.

⁵⁹ *De Dono Persev.* 3.

⁶⁰ *De Nupt. et Concup.* II. 59.

⁶¹ *Cont. Jul. Pelag.* CI. 28. "Parentum autem peccata modo quodam reperiuntur et nostra: aliena quippe proprietate sunt actionis, nostra sunt autem contagione propaginis."

⁶² *De Pec. Mer. et Remis.* I. 9.

⁶³ *Op. Imp. C. Jul. II. cap. XLIX. LII.*

⁶⁴ *De Nupt. et Concup.* II. 15.

⁶⁵ *Enar. in Ps. LI.* 10.

⁶⁶ *De Trin.* XIII. cap. XII. 16. "Peccato primi hominis in omnes utriusque sexus commixtione nascentes originaliter

ceived at his creation, being vitiated by the evil use of his free will, has in this deteriorated condition, passed on and still continues to pass on, by natural descent to all mankind. "Naturaliter concurrit et currit." ⁶⁷

This crass materialism is most striking coming from one who must be classed as an idealist. He has here committed himself to traducianism for he would be the first to reject the idea that the flesh in itself was evil. The sin attaches to the soul. It is the soul, as we have seen,⁶⁸ that lusts by means of the flesh. Nevertheless when Augustine comes to consider the origin of the soul as a separate and specific question, he outlines four theories⁶⁹ and declines to settle upon any one of them, but seems to favor creationism.⁷⁰ At any rate he declares that he has no objection to this theory.⁷¹ In another passage he emphatically declares that the soul is derived either by natural descent or is created by God out of nothing.⁷² The total impression that one gathers from a study of Augustine's writings is that he never was able to fully make up his own mind upon this question.⁷³ He clearly inclined to creationism, but his doctrine of original sin to which he held so rigorously, demanded, as we have pointed out, that Adam's sin be transmitted to the

transeunte, et parentum primorum debito universos posteros obligante."

⁶⁷ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 20 fin.

⁶⁸ Vide pp. 77-78 of this chapter.

⁶⁹ Ep. CLXVI. 7.

⁷⁰ De Anima et ejus Orig. I. 4, II. 5, 21.

⁷¹ Ibid. I. 33.

⁷² Ibid. I. 24.

⁷³ Ep. CXLIII. 5, 6, where the four theories are stated and his attitude of indecision indicated.

individual members of the race by natural generation or propagation.

We have now seen that sin originated in each individual when he was still in some mysterious way an unindividualized part of the mass of human nature, and that this sin reached his actual individualized self by natural propagation. It only remains to point out that in addition to this original sin, each man commits sins of his own. What now is the origin of this *actual* sin? Augustine confesses that he committed many sins over and above the burden of original sin.⁷⁴ By our evil living we constantly add to the sin with which we are born.⁷⁵ That Augustine makes a distinction⁷⁶ between "*peccatum actuale*" and "*peccatum originale*" we will show in Chapter VI. Here we only need to indicate that this actual, as well as original sin, was referred to the will as its source. The only reason that man does not live that perfect life, whose possibility our author maintains, is that he is unwilling to do so. "*Quid homines nolunt.*"⁷⁷ He is unwilling either because of ignorance or infirmity, but nevertheless it is his will to which responsibility attaches.⁷⁸ We come then upon the question of man's freedom and find that whatever else Augustine may have held concerning free will, he did insist that every person since Adam is *free to sin*.

⁷⁴ Conf. V. 16.

⁷⁵ Sermo XCVI. 6.

⁷⁶ Vide De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 16, 20. De Perf. Just. Hom. XIX. 42 and Enchir. XXXIII.

⁷⁷ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 26.

⁷⁸ Ibid. II. 26. "*Ignorantia igitur et infirmitas vitia sunt, quæ impediunt voluntatem ne moveatur ad faciendum opus bonum, vel ab opere malo abstinendum.*"

"Ac per hoc ad peccandum liber est."⁷⁹ "Quoniam liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem parum est."⁸⁰ However we may regard man, whether we think of the first man alone, or of each individual as potentially or seminally present in Adam, or as living his own individualized and actualized existence, whether we contemplate original or actual sin, *the origin of evil is in every instance placed in an act of free will*. "*Non igitur nisi voluntate peccatur.*"⁸¹ Our next task is to enter into that jungle of psychological intricacies and entanglements, and endeavor to state our author's treatment of freedom.

⁷⁹ Enchir. XXX.

⁸⁰ De Cor. et Grat. 31. This aspect of freedom will receive proper recognition in the next chapter.

⁸¹ De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. X. 12 init.

It seems unnecessary to cite further evidence for this point which in the next chapter (pp. 117-123) is supported by abundant material.

CHAPTER V

FREEDOM

THE thought of mankind, in its endeavor to account for the origin of evil, has always revolved about a few representative theories. One type of mind is satisfied with a dualistic explanation of the universe, and like the Manicheans, is willing to account for the presence of evil in the world by referring it to some evil principle. Others, recognizing the finiteness of all created being, place the origin of evil in metaphysical imperfection. Since the days of Plato, or even earlier,¹ the pre-existence of souls has been a favorite doctrine, and has led to the theory that sin originated in some evil choice of the individual in that pre-temporal state. Man's fleshy nature, until the days of evolution, was widely regarded as the flagrant source of man's evil and sin. The suggestive contrasts of life have induced others to find the origin of evil in its necessary existence as a foil to good. Freedom of the will likewise, while serving as an integral part of other theories, has been frequently used to explain the source of evil. Until the time of evolutionary thought, these six theories seem to embrace all explanations of the problem. In the preceding chapters we have found that all of these historic explanations of the origin of evil were dealt with by Augustine, and that he rejected all of them, with the exception of metaphysical

¹ Plato refers to the reminiscence theory as Socrates' favorite doctrine.

imperfection and freedom. Even these two are related in a most interesting fashion. We naturally turn, therefore, at this juncture to our author's treatment of freedom.

This, however, is no easy task, for we find that the exigencies of philosophical and theological controversy forced Augustine into contradictory statements. Against the fatalism of the Manicheans, he advocated perfect freedom of the will.² Later, in his controversy against Pelagius and Cœlestius, who laid such stress upon the power of the will, he was compelled to qualify and restate his thought about freedom in order to defend his doctrine of grace.³ One specific illustration of this change in his thought will be sufficient here, for the material that follows in the next section will illustrate the same truth in a more general way. In writing against the Manicheans about the year 391 A. D., he argued that sin existed nowhere but in the will, for otherwise it would be unjust to hold the sinner guilty.⁴ Here everything points to the idea of

² Ph. Schaff, referring to Augustine's Anti-Manichean writings, says: "In them he afterwards found most to retract, because he advocated the freedom of the will against the Manichean fatalism." *Nicene and Post-Nic. Fath.* Vol. I. 16.

³ A. H. Newman says on this point: "The fact is that in the Anti-Manichean time he went too far in maintaining the absolute freedom of the will and the impossibility of sin apart from personal will in the sinner; while in the Anti-Pelagian time he ventured too near to the fatalism that he so earnestly combated in the Manicheans." *Nicene and Post-Nic. Fath.* Vol. IV. p. 102, n. 1.

⁴ "Quibus concessis colligerem, nusquam scilicet nisi in voluntate esse peccatum: cum mihi auxiliaretur etiam illud quod justitia peccantes tenet sola mala voluntate, quamvis quod voluerint implere nequiverint." *De Duâ. Anim. c. Manich. X. 12 fin.*

personal will. But the Pelagians pounced upon this assertion and used it with telling effect against the doctrine that infants are guilty of original sin before they have made any evil choice. Consequently, in his *Retractions*,⁵ written in 428 A. D., he explains how this passage must be interpreted and transfers the whole affair back into the will of Adam. Thus he shifts his own doctrine in order to make it impossible for the Pelagians to place undue emphasis on the will of the individual. These two passages, then, one of which is an attempted explanation of the other, show how, during the last thirty years of his life, and especially as a result of the Pelagian controversy, Augustine changed the formulation of his thought on freedom. In order to adequately fulfill our task, therefore, we must set down the differing aspects of his doctrine, although they may reveal glaring contradictions.

DEFENDS FREEDOM AGAINST MANICHEISM.

That Augustine, especially in his earlier writings, advocated freedom of the will, scarcely needs mention at this time. The preceding chapters have given frequent reiteration of that belief. Nevertheless, it will

⁵ "Item quod dixi, 'nusquam' scilicet, 'nisi in voluntate esse peccatum,' possunt Pelagiani pro se dictum putare, propter parvulos, quos ideo negant habere peccatum quod eis in Baptismate remittatur, quia nondum arbitrio voluntatis utuntur. Quasi vero peccatum quod eos ex Adam dicimus originaliter trahere id est reatu ejus implicatos, et ob hoc pœnæ obnoxios detinere usquam esse potuit nisi in voluntate, qua voluntate commissum est, quando divini præcepti est facta transgressio." I. cap. XV. 2 init. Cf. also *De Lib. Arbit. and Retract.*

be well to show that he repeatedly made unqualified assertions of man's freedom.⁶

It is unnecessary to repeat here Augustine's conception of the first man.⁷ It will be recalled that he was endowed with perfect and absolute freedom. It was within his power to resist (*posse non peccare*) or to yield to sin.⁸ Hence we are prepared for the assertion that original sin found its source in freedom. The will was the originator of evil.⁹ All the evils with which we are born owe their origin to man's freedom.¹⁰ The great error of the Manicheans, argues Augustine, was that they failed to see that all sins arise from free will and that all evil, both human and angelic, must be traced to this source.¹¹ Unmistakably, then, Augustine asserts the freedom of the will in connection with original sin. "*Sed peccatum sine quo nemo nascitur, crevit voluntatis accessu, originale concupiscentia trahente peccantis assensum.*"¹² Adam, being endowed as he was, willed not to abide in his state of perfection.¹³ Freedom is repeatedly asserted in connection with man's vitiated and fallen state, "Man was lost by free will."¹⁴ By the use of his

⁶ The material here given will also serve as further evidence for the contention made at the close of Chapter IV that our author places the origin of evil in freedom.

⁷ See Chapter IV. pp. 99-114.

⁸ *De Natura et Grat.* 25.

⁹ *Civ. Dei* XIII. cap. XV.

¹⁰ *Op. Imp. c. Jul.* VI. 5.

¹¹ "*Non autem accipiunt (Manichæi) quod veritas dicit, a libero arbitrio exordium sumpsisse peccatum, et ex illo esse omne vel angeli vel hominis malum, quia mali naturam semper malam et Deo coæternam nimis a Deo exorbitantes credere maluerunt.*" *Cont. duas Ep. Pelag.* III. 25.

¹² *Op. Imp. c. Jul.* II. CCXXI.

¹³ *De Cor. et Grat.* 32.

¹⁴ *Sermo* CLXXIV. 2.

own freedom, man is corrupted.¹⁵ The evil which man contracts at birth proceeds from the will.¹⁶ By original sin man inherits an impure spirit. The spirit in itself is good, but its impurity emanates from man's own will. "Ex propria voluntate."¹⁷ Pelagius directed his polemic against this doctrine and denied that original sin could be voluntary. "'Suum enim non est,' inquit, 'si necessarium est. Aut si suum est, voluntarium est: et si voluntarium est, vitari potest.' Nos respondemus: *suum est omnino*."¹⁸ Without any question, therefore, Augustine asserted freedom in connection with original sin.

But the question of greater import is this: Since the will of the whole race was injured by the Fall of Adam, does our author still maintain freedom in connection with the actualized individual existence of each person? In the conclusion of the last chapter we endeavored to show that Augustine placed the origin of actual sin in the life of each individual in the freedom of the will. The evidence there cited would indicate that our author did defend the freedom of the individual and that indication is amply borne out by many passages. In his early writing *Concerning Free Will*, his purpose was to advocate freedom. This work was undertaken with the definite aim of overwhelming the Manichean idea of the origin of sin, and to establish the belief that all evil is to be traced to a free choice of the will. We fortunately are not left to

¹⁵ "Sponte depravatus," Civ. Dei XIII. XIV.

¹⁶ "Sed ex humana voluntate venientem in originis labe contraxit." De Pec. Orig. 46. Cf. also De Nupt. et Concup. I. 26.

¹⁷ De Pec. Orig. 46.

¹⁸ De Nat. et Grat. 34.

our own interpretation of this writing. In the *Retractions*¹⁹ he himself declares clearly that this was the purpose of that discussion. Consequently we find that the turning of the will from the immutable to a mutable good is described as "voluntarium."²⁰ The sins that vitiate nature come from the will of those who sin.²¹ "Quisque malus sui malefacti auctor est."²² Sin exists by virtue of free will since man sins if he wills it.²³ We are forced to one of two conclusions: either we must deny that sin is committed or we must confess that it is committed by the will.²⁴ Voluntary sin can alone be called sin.²⁵ No sin can be actually committed without free will.²⁶ Evils owe their existence to the voluntary sin of the soul.²⁷

¹⁹ "Propter eos quippe disputatio illa suscepta est, qui negant, ex libero voluntatis arbitrio mali originem duci, et Deum, si ita est, creatorem omnium naturarum culpandum esse contendunt: eo modo volentes suæ impietatis errorem (Manichæi enim sunt), immutabilem quamdam et Deo coæternam introducere mali naturam." I. cap. IX. 2.

²⁰ "Propterea, quid opus est quarere unde iste motus existat, quo voluntas avertitur ab incommutabili bono ad commutabile bonum, cum eum nonnisi animi, et voluntarium, et ob hoc culpabilem esse fateamur." De Lib. Arbit. III. 2. Cf. also III. 29.

²¹ De Natura Boni c. Manich. 28.

²² De Lib. Arbit. I. cap. I. 1.

²³ "Fit enim ut sit peccatum per liberum arbitrium, cum homo peccat, si velit." Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. CI.

²⁴ "Quare aut negandum est peccatum committi aut fatendum est voluntate committi. . . . Voluntate ergo peccatur." De Vera Relig. 27. On this passage he says in the *Retractions*: "Et alibi: 'usque adeo, inquam peccatum voluntarium malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium.' Potest videre falsa hæc definitio; sed si diligentur discutiatur, invenietur esse verissima." I. XIII. 5.

²⁵ Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 15, 20.

²⁶ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 65.

²⁷ Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 20.

Even that passage in Romans vii. 19 (*Non enim quod volo, hoc ago; sed quod nolo, hoc facio*), about which so much controversy waged, he declares must not be so interpreted as to take away free will.²⁸ Likewise it is maintained that sins of ignorance are committed by the will.²⁹ Moreover, all laws are subverted, all discipline useless, and all praise and blame without significance, unless the evil acts of man are attributed to the will.³⁰ Again, sin consists in an act of the will. "*Quod si scelus est dicere, neminem natura sua cogit ut peccet. Sed nec aliena. Non enim quisquis dum id quod non vult patitur invitus, sed in eo peccavit quod ita fecit volens, ut quod nollet jure pateretur. Si autem injuste patitur, quomodo peccat? Non enim injuste aliquid pati, sed injuste aliquid facere peccatum est.*"³¹ Finally in one passage³² where sin and original sin are openly distinguished, Augustine affirms that both kinds proceed from the will.

Furthermore, in certain passages, Augustine not satisfied with mere affirmations of man's freedom, passes on to a denial of necessity.³³ Our wills are

²⁸ "*Sed cavendum ne quis arbitretur his verbis auferri nobis liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quod non ita est.*" Exp. quar. Prop. ex. Ep. ad Rom. I. XLIV. (In VII. 19, 20.)

²⁹ Retract. I. XIII. 5, XV. 3.

³⁰ Ep. CCXLVI. 2 and De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. 2.

³¹ De Lib. Arbit. III. 46.

³² "*'Si peccatum' inquit, 'ex voluntate est, mala voluntas quæ peccatum facit: si ex natura, mala natura.' Cito respondendo, ex voluntate peccatum est. Quærit forte, utrum et originale peccatum. Respondeo, Prorsus et originale peccatum: quia et hoc ex voluntate primi hominis seminatum est, ut et in illo esset, et in omnes transiret.*" De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48.

³³ Cont. Faust. XXII. 22. Cf. also De Sermone Dom. in Monte I. XII. 34.

under no necessity, for we do many things which we would not do, unless we willed them.³⁴ The idea that the stars influence the choices of men is opposed by the avowal that the will of man is under no constraint of necessity.³⁵ He expresses the conviction that man fell into sin through no necessity of either divine or human nature, but solely through free will.³⁶ God has in no sense compelled sin (*non cogente Deo*)³⁷ but man has sinned simply because he willed it.³⁸ He even denies the truth of the charge brought against his doctrine of original sin, that all people are thus forced into sin by the necessity of their fleshly nature. His reply is that we retain the sin by our own will.³⁹ To affirm that man sins by necessity is to do away with sin entirely.⁴⁰ “*An tanta fallacia est, ut caveri omnino non potest? Si ita est, nulla peccata sunt. Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest? Peccatur autem; caveri igitur potest.*”⁴¹ It becomes evident therefore, that Augustine maintained the freedom of the will against those who sought to excuse their sins by belief in external compulsion or necessity. Thus far we have seen that aspect of his doctrine which was developed principally in opposition to the tenets of Manicheism. He will

³⁴ *Civ. Dei* V. 10.

³⁵ *Cont. Faust.* II. 5.

³⁶ *Ep.* CLXVI.

³⁷ *Op. Imp. c. Jul.* V. LXIII.

³⁸ “*Utrique igitur Manichæo resistimus, dicentes a bono et justo Deo non sic hominem factum esse, ut ei esset necesse peccare; et ideo peccasse quia voluit, qui posset et nolle.*” *Op. Imp. c. Jul.* V. LXIV.

³⁹ *Cont. duas Ep. Pelag.* I. 7.

⁴⁰ *Acta seu Disp. c. Fort.* 17.

⁴¹ *De Lib. Arbit.* III. 50.

not permit its fatalism to encroach in any way upon man's freedom.

ASSERTS BOTH FREEDOM AND GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE.

Another aspect of his doctrine closely allied to the preceding, is the affirmation of both man's freedom and God's foreknowledge of man's choices. This subject receives detailed treatment in *The City of God*.¹ Without in any sense withdrawing or qualifying his affirmations of the perfect freedom of Adam, he maintains that God foreknew that evil would arise out of good, because in his secret judgment God knew that it would be better to regulate evil than not to allow it to exist.² God, therefore, foreknew, contends Augustine, that man would sin, thus bringing death upon himself, and that he would propagate men doomed to mortality. The Creator knew likewise that sinful man would so give himself over to evil that his condition would be less secure and happy than that of irrational animals.³ Nevertheless this must not be so interpreted as to suppose that man sins because God foreknew it. There is unquestionably no doubt, argues Augustine, that it is man himself who sins. Whether man does or does not will to sin, God foreknows it.⁴ It is a fundamental doctrine with Augustine, as we shall see later, that both the beginning and the continuance in a good life are the gifts of God. Man, since Adam, has not the ability to do good without this external aid. Now, of these gifts,

¹ Civ. Dei V. IX.-X.

² De Cor. et Grat. 27.

³ Civ. Dei XII. XXII.

⁴ Civ. Dei V. X.

Augustine affirms that God foreknew upon whom he would bestow them.⁵ It is perfectly clear that our author was unwilling to give up either man's freedom or God's prescience. "*Nos adversus istos sacrilegos ausus atque impios, et Deum dicimus omnia scire antequam fiant, et voluntate nos facere, quidquid a nobis nonnisi volentibus fieri sentimus et novimus.*"⁶ Our author then embraces both man's freedom and God's foreknowledge.⁷

In this aspect of Augustine's thought upon freedom, we recognize difficulties. We are inevitably forced to ask, what is freedom? In what does a free act consist? If by a free act we mean the reduction of a dual or multiple future possibility to a single actual result, then it seems impossible for even omniscience to know our future choices. Omnipotence cannot perform the impossible nor can omniscience know the unknowable. If our free choices are foreknown according to Augustine's thought, and if this position rests upon anything more than a desire to avoid religious scruples, then we find here an inadequate conception of freedom. We must reserve judgment until we have put before ourselves his further thought upon the subject.

INFLUENCE OF THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

It now becomes necessary to trace the influence of

⁵ "*Omnia porro dona sua, et quibus ea fuerat largiturus, Deum præscisse negare non possunt.*" *De Dono Persev.* 66.

⁶ *Civ. Dei* V. IX. 3 init.

⁷ "*Quocirca nullo modo cogimur, aut retenta præscientia Dei tollere voluntatis arbitrium, aut retento voluntatis arbitrio Deum (quod nefas est) negare præscium futurorum sed utrumque amplectimur.*" *Ibid.* V. IX. 2.

Pelagianism upon our author's thought, and see how his unqualified assertions of freedom gradually assume a different formulation and how the ardent libertarian, although perhaps unconsciously, is by degrees transformed into the determinist. The whole Pelagian controversy centered about the discussion of the will. Pelagius had never felt the chains of sinful habit as Augustine had in his early years. Consequently Pelagius did not feel the need of external aid that Augustine did.¹ In the actual life of these two men we find the beginnings of their conflicting doctrines. Pelagius argued that man can avoid sin by free will alone.² All men therefore may be sinless if they choose,³ the race has not been ruined by the Fall of Adam, and there is no need of grace in the Augustinian sense.⁴ Here we see an attack upon the very foundations of Augustine's system,⁵ and this attack consists in an emphasis of the very thing for which Augustine himself has contended so strongly against the Manicheans.

It was Cœlestius the disciple of Pelagius, who boldly pushed the system to its logical conclusions. He it

¹ Pelagius' doctrine of grace was only another expression of his belief in free will. God's assistance consisted chiefly in free will. Vide *Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. 11*; *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. 23, 26*; *De Spir. et Lit. 4*; *De Grat. Christi 3*.

² *De Grat. Christi 29*, where Augustine quotes the words of Pelagius.

³ *De Nupt. et Concup. II. 8*.

⁴ *De Nat. et Grat. 46*. Cf. also *De Grat. Christi 29, 30, 44, 46*, where Augustine objects strenuously to Pelagius' phrase "more easily," which implies that in any case man can save himself by free will.

⁵ For a concise statement of the leading tenets of Pelagianism, see "Introductory, Essay on Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy." *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fath. Vol. V*.

was who put forth the following contentions: (1) Adam was created mortal and would have died even if he had not sinned; (2) Adam's sin injured only himself and not the race; (3) The law as well as the gospel leads to salvation; (4) Men lived sinless lives before the coming of Christ; (5) New-born infants are just as perfect as Adam before his fall; (6) Mankind did not die in Adam nor rise in Christ.⁶ It is evident that we have here a denial of the central tenets of Augustinianism. Consequently our author immediately attacks their doctrine of freedom,⁷ and in doing so furnishes some perplexing material for formulating his thought upon the subject.

We begin now to hear of a *certain necessity of sinning* which attaches to every person since Adam. This doctrine, of course, is aimed directly at the contention of Pelagius that every man can live a sinless life if he chooses. Augustine's thought is formulated in various ways but the underlying idea is always the same. There is a certain necessary tendency to sin (*quædam peccandi necessitas*)⁸ due to the flaws which have vitiated our nature. A most interesting qualification of this idea, however, is that this necessity may be removed by the assistance of grace, and full liberty again bestowed.⁹ Thus by the introduction of alien

⁶ De Gest. Pelag. 23. Cf. the statement of 16 breviates of Cœlestius and Augustine's answers thereto in De Perf. Just. Hom. I.-VII. in toto. The five points of Pelagianism which Aug. attacked are also stated in Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. I. et seq.

⁷ "Sunt enim quidam tantum præsumentes de libero humanæ voluntatis arbitrio, ut ad non peccandum nec adjuvandos nos divinitus opinentur, semel ipsi naturæ nostræ concessio liberæ voluntatis arbitrio." De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 2.

⁸ De Nat. et Grat. 79.

⁹ De Nat. et Grat. 79.

interference Augustine attempts to maintain both his doctrines of freedom and grace against the Pelagians. Necessity has been produced out of original liberty as a penalty for sin.¹⁰ "Ad hanc autem jam pœnalem peccandi necessitatem non utique pervenisset, nisi prius libera voluntate, nulla necessitate peccasset."¹¹ According to this statement the necessity under which we now live is the penal consequence of sin committed with perfect freedom.

The doctrine then is this. There is a necessity of sinning which is the punishment for sin committed without necessity. "Multum erras, qui vel necessitatem nullam putas esse peccandi, vel eam non intelligis illius peccati esse pœnam, quod nulla necessitate commissum est."¹² Occasionally¹³ our author seems to plunge into bald necessity but these passages are only a vigorous statement of the same idea. It is very evident that the qualification which Augustine has here placed upon his statements of freedom is a direct reply to Pelagianism. Augustine had no desire to deny freedom. His sole aim was to refute the idea that by sheer strength of his own will man could live a righteous life. For Augustine this belief struck at the very heart of his religion and its tenets therefore must be vanquished. Therefore, without in any sense destroying man's freedom, he sought to so qualify it that the necessity of external aid (*gratia dei*) would be recognized. But we ask, if every man, since Adam,

¹⁰ De Perf. Just. Hom. IV. 9.

¹¹ Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLVII. Cf. also *ibid.* I. CV. and V. LIX.

¹² Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CV. Cf. also *ibid.* I. CVI. LXII, De Nat. et Grat. 80 and De Perf. Just. Hom. 9.

¹³ *Ibid.* VI. 13, Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 22 and Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. L.

lives under this "quædam necessitas" and can only be liberated by an alien power, can his condition properly be described as free?

The converse of the notion that there is a certain necessity of sinning is expressed by our author's idea that all good choices are the direct result of God's control of man's will. From the sinful state into which all mankind has fallen, no individual is able by his unaided will to rise and return to God.¹⁴ Each person does it as God awakens and helps him.¹⁵ Augustine seems almost to set aside free-will in the assertion that without God's aid, man is utterly incapable of ruling himself.¹⁶ Man performs no good deed which God does not cause him to do.¹⁷ Both good and bad wills are at the complete disposal of God, who turns them whithersoever and whensoever he wills.¹⁸ That interesting group of people whom Augustine supposed to possess what he called the gift of perseverance, only chose the good because God worked in them to will such choices.¹⁹ In short, it is God who makes them good. "Ipse ergo illos bonos facit, ut bona faciant."²⁰ Such statements as these, uttered no doubt with the desire of emphasiz-

¹⁴ "Quia peccatum sine gratia Dei vinci non posset." De Diver. Quæst. I. 2.

¹⁵ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 31. Cf. also *ibid.* II. 5.

¹⁶ "Ut sine rectore Deo præcipitatus, non se a se ipso regi potuisse, pœnis experiretur." De Gest. Pelag. 7.

¹⁷ "Quapropter multa Deus facit in homine bona, quæ non facit homo nulla vero facit homo, quæ non facit Deus ut faciat homo." Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. II. 21. Cf. *ibid.* I. 7. and Conf. X. 5.

¹⁸ De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. 41. Cf. also De Dono Persev. 12.

¹⁹ De Cor. et Grat. 38.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 36.

ing man's dependence upon God, and for the purpose of undermining the Pelagian exaltation of will, are not compatible with his former declarations regarding man's freedom. In reality, can it be said, in the light of these assertions, that Augustine has left freedom for man in the true sense? He has not entirely excluded the element of personality but he has made man's good choices dependent upon the will of God. Has not the libertarian become the determinist?

It now remains to be shown that Augustine, regardless of how we may interpret the foregoing statements, still clings to the declaration that man is free. His thought, therefore, takes the form of asserting, at one and the same time, both man's freedom and the need of God's grace. He would not permit the Pelagians to exclude him from the use of the conception of freedom, nor would he allow them so to emphasize freedom that a righteous life becomes possible without the help of grace. Consequently, he boldly welds the two ideas into one doctrine and openly defends both sides of the antithesis. There is no call at this time to show that he asserted separately either freedom or the need of grace. That has already been done. The task here is to show that he attempted to affirm *both at once*. Augustine's favorite illustration of the need of both freedom and grace is afforded to him by the eye. When it is enveloped in darkness and no attempt is being made to use it for purpose of sight, the eye is self-sufficient. But to be of use the eye needs the aid of external light.²¹ This is exactly what Augustine means by grace. It is the external aid which our wills receive from God, if they are to

²¹ De Gest. Pelag. 7.

make any good choices.²² In one of the *Letters*²³ our author urges his correspondent to believe *both* that man's will is free and that it is aided by God's grace without which progress is impossible. He explicitly states that the purpose of one of his works is to defend man's freedom against those who deny it for the sake of God's grace, and at the same time to answer those who wrongly suppose that free will is destroyed when God's grace is defended.²⁴ "Proinde arbitrium voluntatis humanæ nequaquam destruimus, quando Dei gratiam qua ipsum adjuvatur arbitrium, non superbia negamus ingrata sed grata potius pietate prædicamus."²⁵ This combination of grace and free will is the secret of a happy life,²⁶ but it must not be so interpreted as to excuse man from all effort. In fact no one is aided who does not put forth some effort in his own behalf.²⁷ Good results do not ensue without our will.²⁸ The neat balance in which Augustine endeavored to keep these two conceptions is revealed in the following sentence: "Non quia hoc sine voluntate nostra agitur, sed quia voluntas non implet quod agit, nisi divinitus adjuvetur."²⁹ It becomes evident, therefore, that Augustine, in order to combat Pelagian-

²² De Grat. Christi 52. Cf. also De Bono Vid. 22 and De Cor. et Grat. 2.

²³ Ep. CCXIV.

²⁴ "Sed quoniam sunt quidam, qui sic gratiam Dei defendunt, ut negent hominis liberum arbitrium; aut quando gratia defenditur, negari existiment liberum arbitrium; hinc aliquid scribere ad vestram Charitatem." De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. I. I.

²⁵ De Bono Vid. 21. Cf. also Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. 3.

²⁶ "Hoc arbitrium liberum adjuvatur per Dei gratiam, ut quod naturaliter volumus, hoc est beate vivere, bene vivendo habere possimus." Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. XXVI.

²⁷ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 6.

²⁸ De Spiritu et Lit. 15 fin.

²⁹ De Perf. Just. Hom. 40.

ism with its rigorous insistence upon the power of free will, maintained both man's freedom and God's grace. We thus see that his former explicit statements of freedom must be viewed with this important qualification, that external aid is necessary for all good choices. But has not freedom, in its true signification, vanished in this endeavor to refute the Pelagians?

VARIOUS MEANINGS OF THE TERM "FREEDOM."

We can now clarify the whole situation by openly recognizing that Augustine did not use the term "freedom" with any one, fixed, connotation. To attempt to force any such interpretation upon his thought, would be absurd. In the light of what has already been said, it is perfectly evident that he conceived different creatures to be endowed with different kinds of freedom. By recognizing these different classes of beings and observing the freedom with which each group is supposed to have been endowed, we shall be able to understand clearly what Augustine's thought was regarding the freedom of the will. He uses the term with at least four distinct meanings.¹

(1). The term is employed frequently in a most general sense. It is simply that power which differentiates man from a machine. It is his power to act, his ability to choose between any two alternative courses of action. Thus we find Augustine defining will in these words: "*Voluntas est animi motus,*

¹ Julius Müller points out three meanings. See *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde* B. III., Th. I. C. I. § 5.

cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum.”² A little later in the same writing he defines will as a movement of the mind free both for doing or not doing.³ This signification of freedom applies to all beings and to all states of man. Whether dealing with angels, demons, Adam, or individual man, all are supposed to possess freedom in this general sense. It is that general spontaneity which distinguishes man from all the other works of creation. The acts of man are “voluntaria” although he is conceived as unable to do good without external aid. So likewise the deeds of the saints are “voluntaria” although they live under a holy necessity.⁴

(2.) Man in his original, perfect condition was supposed to have been endowed with the power to choose between good and evil.⁵ His freedom was in that sense absolute. Adam could have continued in his perfect state if he had willed it.⁶ This aspect

² De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. 14. In the *Retractions*, Augustine interprets this passage thus: “Quod propterea dictum est, ut hac definitione volens a nolente discerneretur, et sic ad illos referretur intentio, qui primi in paradiso fuerunt humano generi origo mali, nullo cogente peccando, hoc est libera voluntate peccando.” I. XV. 3. It is very evident that the definition as thus interpreted would have been of no use against the Manicheans, and yet it was originally written for that very purpose.

³ “Quamobrem illæ animæ quidquid faciunt, si natura, non voluntate faciunt, id est, si libero et ad faciendum et ad non faciendum motu animi carent; si denique his abstinendi ab opere suo potestas nulla conceditur, peccatum earum tenere non possumus.” De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. 17.

⁴ For this general use of the term see De Spir. et Lit. 58, Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. et seq., De Grat. et Lib. arbit. I. et seq., Op. Imp. c. Jul. I., and especially Civ. Dei V. cap. IX.

⁵ Compare the treatment of Adam in Chapter IV. pp. 99-114.

⁶ De Cor. et Grat. 31. Cf. also De Natura Bon. c. Manich. 7.

of freedom Augustine formulated in the phrase "posse non peccare." Adam had it in his power not to sin,⁷ but this phrase always presupposes the other possibility of Adam's sinning. In other words, it was in his power both to will what was right or to will what was wrong.⁸ He was created with both these possibilities. "Et ita homo creatus est, ut et nolle posset et velle, et quod libet horum haberet in potestate."⁹ The same conception finds expression in the words that man was created with a will free to do what was right.¹⁰ Augustine insists then that Adam had full freedom. "Liberum ergo arbitrium perfecte fuit in primo homine."¹¹ He was so constituted that absolutely nothing could hinder his will, if he chose to be good.¹² Consequently he sinned because he willed it, for he was able not to will it.¹³ We have in this conception of freedom, laying aside the fact that Augustine looks upon it as a gift of God, that which appeals to reason. Here a dual possibility existed for Adam. It was in his power to reduce this dual future possibility to a single actual reality. This is freedom in its true significance.¹⁴ In this second

⁷ Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. XLVII.

⁸ "Sic enim oportebat prius hominem fieri, ut et bene velle posset, et male;" Enchir. CV. init. Cf. also De Cor. et Grat. 32.

⁹ Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XL. Cf. also De Agone Christiano II.

¹⁰ De Lib. Arbit. III. 19. Quoted by himself in De Nat. et Grat. 81.

¹¹ Prop. ex. Ep. ad Rom. Exp. XIII.-XVIII. (in III. 20).

¹² "Ille sic factus est, ut nihil omnino voluntate ejus resisteret, si vellet Dei præcepta servare." Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 22.

¹³ "Et ideo peccasse quia voluit, qui posset et nolle." Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LIV.

¹⁴ Professor G. H. Palmer defines freedom in these words: "Freedom is that self-guidance by which, for purposes of

aspect of freedom which is expressed by the words "posse non peccare" and which implies the possibility of either a good or evil choice, we find Augustine's truest conception of freedom. This was limited to the first man.

(3). Every individual since Adam possesses freedom but no one is as free as Adam was.¹⁵ The great powers of freedom which man received at creation were lost by Adam's sin.¹⁶ His free will, therefore, which remains, only avails to induce him to sin.¹⁷ Statements are not wanting in which Augustine boldly affirms that by the Fall, man lost his freedom,¹⁸ or that by sin freedom perished,¹⁹ but these assertions cannot be isolated and set up as our author's doctrine. What is meant is that the freedom which *Adam* possessed was lost.²⁰ The "posse non peccare" which Adam enjoyed now becomes "posse peccare." Man is no longer able to avoid sin. His freedom consists in the ability to sin.²¹ Since man was unwilling to do what he could, when he possessed full freedom, he now, as a just punishment for that disobedience wills

my own, I narrow a future multiple possibility to a single actual result." Lecture before Ethical Seminary of Yale University, Nov. 26, 1906.

¹⁵ "Multa quippe sunt quæ agunt homines mala, a quibus eis liberum est abstinere: sed nulli tam liberum est, quam illi (Adam) fuit." *Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. XLVII.*

¹⁶ *Sermo CXXXI.*

¹⁷ "Nam neque liberum arbitrium quidquam nisi ad peccandum valet." *De Spir. et Lit. 5.*

¹⁸ "Victore peccato amissum est liberum arbitrium." *Enchir. XXX.*

¹⁹ "Libertas quidem periit per peccatum." *Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 5.*

²⁰ *Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 5.*

²¹ *Enchir. XXX.*

to do what he cannot.²² He has lost his power of choice, for that will which availed for his sin is not sufficient to restore him to his original pristine condition.²³ Julianus immediately interpreted this doctrine as robbing man of free will.²⁴ But Augustine vigorously denies this and insists that free will remains, but is of avail only for sin.²⁵ Man does act with free will, but without God's help his choices are only evil.²⁶ Free will is sufficient for evil but is of no avail for good.²⁷ A necessary implication of Augustine's insistence upon both freedom and the necessity of grace is that in man's present condition he is only free to sin. This is clearly formulated in the following way: "*Liberum ergo arbitrium perfecte fuit in primo homine, in nobis autem ante gratiam non est liberum arbitrium ut non peccemus sed tantum ut peccare nolimus. Gratia vero efficit ut non tantum velimus recte facere, sed etiam possimus, non viribus nostris, sed Liberatoris auxilio.*"²⁸

One instinctively asks, why is not the same will which is free to choose sin, also free to choose righteousness? Why may we not use our will in doing good as well as in doing evil? It is rather singular that Augustine did not recognize this difficulty more fully, and attempt to answer it. In one of his shorter treatises he raises the question but his answer fails

²² Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XV.

²³ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 4. Cf. also De Dono Persev.
27.

²⁴ Augustine quotes his words in Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 4.

²⁵ Ibid. II. 9.

²⁶ Sermo CLVI. II.

²⁷ De Cor. et Grat. 31.

²⁸ Prop. ex. Ep. ad Rom. Exp. XIII.-XVIII. (in III. 20).
Cf. also De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 31.

to meet the difficulty. He asserts that sin and lust begin from choices of the will, whereas the impulse to good does not arise from within but comes upon us from God.²⁹ The human will, argues Augustine, is not sufficient for good unless aided and kindled from above.²⁹

An explanation is afforded by Dr. Warfield which is not lacking in suggestiveness, but which upon investigation is found to be somewhat wanting in cogency. He endeavors to maintain a distinction in Augustine's thought "between will as a faculty and will in the broader sense."³⁰ He then points out that the faculty of will remains intact, but that the person who uses the will has been enslaved as a result of the Fall. If Dr. Warfield is contending for the unity of character and the influence of present choices upon subsequent volitions, we gladly recognize the truth of his statement. But just how he conceives the Fall to have been the means of robbing each of us of a part of his freedom and of giving our characters an inevitable bias toward sin, this is difficult to grasp. The influence of the past, whether individual or racial cannot

²⁹ De Patientia 13, 14.

³⁰ His own words are as follows: "But it is clear that he distinguished, in his thinking, between will as a faculty and will in a broader sense. As a mere faculty, will is and always remains an indifferent thing (De Spir. et Lit. 58) . . . after the Fall, as before it, continuing poised in indifference, and ready like a weather-cock, to be turned whithersoever the breeze that blows from the heart ('will' in the broader sense) may direct (De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 30). It is not the faculty of willing but the man who makes use of that faculty, that has suffered change from the Fall." B. B. Warfield, Nic. and Post-Nic. Fath. Vol. V. pp. LXVII.-VIII. The writer prefers the fourfold classification indicated above which is supported by ample citations from Augustine's works,

be ignored nor can it be accounted for by the act of any one man.

(4). There remains a final meaning of freedom which if interpreted in the right way may be incorporated with the second aspect as here presented and form a rational conception of freedom. All men do not remain in that condition which has just been described. Adam's "*posse non peccare*" was diminished to "*posse peccare*" by his own sin, but by "*gratia Dei*" this loss may be more than restored. The evil necessity may be replaced by full liberty.³¹ Adam had the ability to will either well or ill, but in the future life the righteous will not be able to choose evil.³² The negative particle, therefore returns to our clause, but it takes a different position. The reward of the righteous will be a condition described by the words "*non posse peccare.*" The dual possibility of Adam no longer exists. Freedom is present but only for the choice of good. "*Si ergo quæris, ubi vel quando detur homini non posse peccare: præmia quare sanctorum, quæ post hanc vitam illos oportet accipere.*"³³ Augustine likewise insists here that this condition is real freedom. He argues that God is not able to will to sin and yet we do not regard Him as under any necessity.³⁴ Real freedom then includes the impossibility to sin.³⁵ That will is alone truly free which is

³¹ "Ac per hoc opitulante gratia per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, et mala necessitas removebitur et libertas plena tribuetur." De Nat. et Grat. 79 fin.

³² "Postea vero sic erit, ut male velle non possit;" Enchir. CV. Cf. also De Continentia 16.

³³ Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. XII.

³⁴ Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. V. and De Nat. et Grat. 54.

³⁵ "Multo quippe liberius erit arbitrium quod omnino non poterit servire peccato." Enchir. CV.

not the slave of sin or vice.³⁶ Augustine has drawn for us the distinction between the second and fourth aspects of freedom as here presented, in these words: "Prima ergo libertas voluntatis erat, *posse non peccare*; novissima erit multo major, *non posse peccare*."³⁷

It is plain that this last aspect of freedom cannot be regarded as an abridgment of free will if considered from the right point of view. It is only a recognition of the unity of character and the power of habit. He has the greatest personality who has thus mechanized the largest portions of his life. His freedom is greatest who has most largely reduced the number of possibilities open to him. This is only conditioned by the fact that it must be the man himself who has driven out the possibilities. Thus "*posse non peccare*," presenting as it does a dual future possibility, and "*non posse peccare*," representing the result of a continued choice of good may be easily welded into a consistent doctrine of freedom. The one may be described as *formal*, the other as *real* freedom.³⁸ But the difficulty arises from the fact that the former is limited to Adam and the latter to the saint. Poor mortal man about whom we are chiefly concerned must be satisfied with "*posse peccare*." His only possibility for good lies in the aid furnished from an external source. Without "*gratia Dei*" his will is limited to the choice of evil. His choices for good then are determined by himself plus an objective power. Has not Augustine, even amid

³⁶ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XI.

³⁷ De Cor. et Grat. 33.

³⁸ Cf. Julius Müller op. cit. B. III. Th. I. C. I.

his vigorous declarations of freedom, passed over into determinism?

CAUSA EFFICIENS AND CAUSA DEFICIENS.

The conceptions "*causa efficiens*" and "*causa deficiens*" reveal the same attitude to the whole problem of freedom. Augustine is ever searching for some power back of the will of man. His intensely religious frame of mind and his determination to make God the sole cause of all that really exists, do, no doubt, account in a large measure for these conceptions. Augustine's universe, as we have seen, is theocentric and in no respect is it more so than in the problem with which we are now dealing. Every person exists in absolute dependence upon God. Free-will itself is the direct gift of God to each man.¹ Let no one boast of his free will, for this, together with all else, is given him by his Creator.² God is the originator of every movement of the will toward good, for he both created it and then re-made it when it had become evil.³ God then is the "*causa efficiens*" of the good will. "*Si dixerimus nullam esse efficientem causam etiam voluntatis bonæ, cavendum est, ne voluntas bona bonorum Angelorum, non facta sed Deo coæterna esse credatur.*"⁴ Here we see that Augustine insists upon the dependence of the good wills of the angels upon God. Even these beings, Augus-

¹ *Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 20.*

² *Enchir. XXXII.*

³ "*Ad bonum vero ejus prior est voluntas Creatoris ejus, sive ut eam faceret quæ nulla erat, sive ut reficiat quæ lapsa perierat.*" *Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XV.* Cf. also *ibid. XIV. cap. XXI.*

⁴ *Ibid. XII. cap. IX.*

tine continues, would have remained helpless had not the Creator stimulated their wills to good choices. Augustine's doctrine of grace is only another expression of this same conception. This is found everywhere throughout his writings. Man in his present condition makes no good choices, has no good impulses and makes no progress in the moral life, save as God stimulates his will. Every will, therefore, in every choice of good, depends upon God as its efficient cause.

Now, as we have already seen, sin is a voluntary defection. "*Motus ergo aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineat, et ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites. Qui tamen defectus quoniam est voluntarius in nostra est positus potestate.*"⁵ An evil will originates by turning or falling away from its Creator.⁶ The first evil will arose in just this way. It was not any positive deed but a defection from the work of God to its own work.⁷ In the case of both angels and men, the cause of evil was the "*voluntas deficiens*" of a good creature.⁸ Sin consists in the turning of the will from the unchangeable and universal good to its own or to some inferior good.⁹ In short, evil is a defection from good.¹⁰ It is important to note here that there is no

⁵ De Lib. Arbit. II. 54.

⁶ "*Ab eo (Deo) quippe defectus est origo voluntatis malæ.*" De Grat. Christi 20.

⁷ "*Mala vero voluntas prima, quoniam mala opera præcessit in homine, defectus potius fuit quidam ab opere Dei ad sua opera, quam opus ullum.*" Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XI.

⁸ Enchir. 8.

⁹ De Lib. Arbit. II. 53.

¹⁰ Civ. Dei XII. cap. IX.

inconsistency in Augustine's metaphysics. He has not said that the changeable or inferior goods to which the will turns are evil. Everything that exists is, in its own rank and class, good. The evil, therefore, is the defection itself, the turning or falling away, not the object to which the will turns. "Deficitur enim non ad mala, sed male; id est, non ad malas naturas, sed ideo male, quia contra ordinem naturarum ab eo quod summe est, ad id quod minus est."¹¹

We now approach a most interesting phase of our author's thought. In fact we are at the very heart of the whole problem of evil as he conceived and solved it. God is the "causa efficiens" of the good will. Evil or sin is nothing other than the defection of the will from the highest good to a lower good. What now, and this is the crucial question, what is the cause of this evil will? We have found an efficient cause for every good will, what is the efficient cause of the evil will? Why should a being endowed with a good will, deliberately choose an inferior to a superior good? Before giving his positive answer Augustine does just what we would expect him to do. He affirms that God is not the efficient cause of the evil will. In the *Confessions*¹² he declares God to be the Creator of all natures. Only that which is not, together with the defection of the will from the highest good, does not find its source in Him. God is the Bestower of all powers, but wicked wills, which are contrary to nature, do not come from Him.¹³ It is absurd to imagine that the good Creator could be the cause of

¹¹ Civ. Dei XII. cap. VIII.

¹² XII. II.

¹³ Civ. Dei V. cap. IX. Cf. also "Non erit iste motus ex Deo." De Lib. Arbit. II. 54.

evil wills.¹⁴ And yet, Augustine still clings to the necessity of relating all to the Creator. He is not willing that even this blemish of creation should exist utterly unrelated to God and so he maintains that whenever a depraved will has power to accomplish its evil designs, even this is an evidence of the judgment of God.¹⁵

What now is his positive answer? It is the most barren of negations. *There is no efficient cause of an evil will.* "Hujus porro malæ voluntatis causa efficiens si quæretur, nihil invenitur. Quid est enim quod facit voluntatem malam, cum ipsa faciat opus malum? Ac per hoc mala voluntas efficiens est operis mali, malæ autem voluntatis efficiens est nihil."¹⁶ Augustine sustains this declaration by the following argument.¹⁷ If there were an efficient cause of an evil will, that cause would or would not have a will. If it had a will, that will would be good or bad. If it were a good will, it would be absurd to suppose that a good will caused an evil will. If on the other hand that cause had a bad will, we find ourselves with the original problem and to avoid an infinite regress, we ask at once what was the cause of this first bad will.

But that is our problem. If you reply that it was always evil, this is refuted by his conception of nature, and the utter negativity of all evil. It exists only as something attached to a good nature and consequently could not have been eternally evil. We are

¹⁴ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 30.

¹⁵ "Porro cum voluntas mala potestatem accipit implere quod intendit, ex judicio Dei venit." De Spir. et Lit. 54.

¹⁶ Civ. Dei XII. cap. VI. Cf. ibid. XII. cap. IX.

¹⁷ Ibid. cap. VI. in toto.

then left with the second of our original alternatives, which suggests that something without a will was the cause of the first evil will. If so, it must be superior, inferior or equal to that which it corrupted. If superior, it would be expected not only not to be without a will but to have a good will. Similarly, if equal to that which is vitiated, it would have a good will and consequently would not cause a bad will. There only remains the supposition that some inferior thing, without a will, was the cause of the first evil will. But all things in so far as they exist are good. The most earthly of objects is good in its own rank. Consequently, there is no efficient cause of an evil will. When the will turns from that which is above to that which is below itself, it becomes evil. The act of turning, and not the object to which it turns, is evil. *The evil will then has no efficient but only a deficient cause.* "Nemo igitur quærat efficientem causam malæ voluntatis: non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens, quia nec illa effectio est, sed defectio. Deficere namque ab eo quod summe est, ad id quod minus est, hoc est incipere habere voluntatem malam."¹⁸

Augustine continues this passage by stating that the effort to discover the "causa deficiens" of an evil will is just like the endeavor to see darkness or hear silence. Both are known to us not by their positive reality, but by their want of it. ("Non sane in specie, sed in speciei privatione.") Therefore, all that we can know of this deficient cause is that it is unknown. All that we can say is that we know it by not knowing it. All of this argument occurring in a work representing the mature thought of Augustine is remark-

¹⁸ Civ. Dei XII. cap. VII. init.

ably corroborated and foreshadowed by an earlier writing. Referring to the turning of the will from the highest good he says: "Unde igitur erit? Ita quærenti tibi, si respondiam nescire me, fortasse eris tristior: sed tamen vera responderim. *Sciri enim non potest quod nihil est.*"¹⁹ *The evil will is therefore a defection, of which the cause is deficient.*²⁰

In conclusion it is only necessary to recall what has been stated already regarding our author's doctrine of creation ex nihilo.²¹ It has been pointed out that an evil will arose out of the good nature of angels and men, not because that nature was created by God, but because it was fashioned out of nothing.²² The *possibility* of an evil will, therefore, is involved in metaphysical imperfection. Its actual existence can be traced to no "causa efficiens" but only to "causa deficiens." Our author leaves us in complete agnosticism, for "causa deficiens" is only another name for that of which the only thing that is known is that it is unknown. In his search for the origin of evil, he is unable to go back of the choice of an evil will. Metaphysical imperfection accounts for the possibility, freedom for the actuality, of sin.

¹⁹ De Lib. Arbit. II. 54.

²⁰ "Cujus defectionis etiam causa utique deficit." Civ. Dei XII. cap. IX. init.

²¹ Vide pp. 14-18 and 56-60.

²² De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48 and Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLIV.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONCEPTION OF SIN

IT is not our aim in this chapter to offer a full statement of the Augustinian doctrine of sin. We have already seen ¹ the identification that existed for Augustine's mind, between *malum* and *peccatum*. Our second chapter was devoted to answering the question. "*Quid est malum?*" Consequently, it becomes unnecessary to raise the general question "*Quid est peccatum?*" To do so would be only a repetition. We have seen that evil when defined as "*corruptio*" seemed to leave its negative significance and assume a distinctly active connotation. It was that which attacked and destroyed nature or being. Again it was called "*vitium*" or that flaw which attaches itself to any good when it becomes evil. Similarly it was characterized as a defection, a falling away from a higher to a lower good. Now it is one of our purposes in this chapter to attempt to show that even when Augustine is speaking, not only in a speculative, but also in an ethical sense, he always uses "*peccatum*" with a connotation that harmonizes perfectly with this conception of *malum*.

Furthermore, in the preceding chapters, while dealing with the origin of evil, we stated fully our author's conception of the first man, describing the unique relation which he was supposed to have held to the entire race, and dwelling upon the place of freedom in

¹ Chapter I. pp. 21-26. "*Malum est peccatum.*"

the Augustinian system. Consequently in a large measure our author's conception of sin has already been set forth. There remains, however, some important material and some significant distinctions, which demand treatment at this time. In the former chapters we have spoken often of original and actual sin, being compelled to assume that such a distinction existed in Augustine's thought. We must now raise the question, What is original sin *as it exists in any given individual*? What are its evidences? Likewise just what is *actual* sin, and is there some common element in all the varied specific sins? Our author's answers to these questions are of such a nature that they could have been included only with difficulty in the second chapter, and yet they form such an integral part of his system that to omit them would be unjust. Consequently, without in any sense raising the general question of what is sin, we further aim here to set forth our author's answers to these specific questions and to observe that they harmonize with his system as a whole.

ORIGINAL SIN.

What, then, is "originale peccatum"? We are not asking what *the original* sin was. That we have seen was an act of the will of the first man. But what is original sin as it exists in the life of every human being of *every age*, in his present individualized existence? We have seen² that Augustine placed all sin in the will. Our original sin was *committed* by our wills when we were each a part of Adam. The

² Chapter IV. pp. 99-114.

first man was both an individual and a "homo gener-
alis." He was the whole human race in miniature.
When Adam sinned, we sinned. We are guilty of
original sin because we committed sin when we were
still a part of the first man. All of this bald realism
we have met in our endeavor to trace the origin of
evil in man. The precise question before us now is
this: How does this original sin manifest itself in
the individualized existence of each of us to-day? To
this question Augustine gives a full and interesting
reply.

The immediate result, says Augustine, of the first
sin was the *sense of shame*. Here we begin to see
the significance of our author's conception of original
sin.³ Before the Fall, man had no feeling of shame
or occasion to blush.⁴ It was only after man had
sinned that he felt the need of hiding his shame.⁵
This was the first punishment of Adam's sin.⁶ This
idea is characteristically expressed in the following
sentence: "Qua gratia remota, ut pœna reciproca
inobedientia plecteretur, exstitit in motu corporis
quædam impudens novitas unde esset indecens nuditas,
et fecit attentos, reddiditque confusos."⁷ Now the
interesting feature of this notion is this: the sense of
shame which every man possesses to-day is the direct

³ Vide Chapter IV. pp. 99-114.

⁴ Sermo CX 2.

⁵ De Pec. Orig. 41. Cf. also De Nupt. et Concup. I. 1, 23,
24 and II. 52.

⁶ Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XIII. "Quæ prius eadem membra
erant, sed pudenda non erant. Senserunt ergo novum motum
inobedientis carnis suæ, tanquam reciprocâ pœnam inobe-
dientiæ suæ."

⁷ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XVII. Cf. De Genesi ad Lit. XI. 41,
De Cor. et Grat. XI. 31, and Cont. Jul. Pelag. IV. 82.

penalty of the first sin.⁸ Here, then, is the first evidence of original sin. It consists in the "impudens novitas" by which sex and its action are inevitably attended. This is the penalty, the plague, and the mark of sin. It is that law in our members which wars against the law of our minds.⁹ It was the first result of sin in original man and it has attached itself to all his posterity.

A second aspect of original sin, closely allied to the first, is that which is expressed by the much used term, "concupiscentia." Augustine's early life, no doubt, influenced his doctrine at this point. He says that the nine years in which he espoused Manicheism were lived in divers lusts.¹⁰ Man's flesh was originally obedient to his spirit, but since Adam fell, all mankind derive from him the concupiscence of the flesh.¹¹ This defect was unknown before the first sin.¹² Adam was afflicted with concupiscence because he sinned,¹³ in fact it arose only as a penal consequence of his evil.¹⁴ The whole mass of human nature was so altered and changed in Adam, that he experienced the conflict of disobedient lust.¹⁵ Since the first man would not be obedient he brought upon himself the just punishment of being afflicted with a disobedient

⁸ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XX. Cf. also cap. XVIII.

⁹ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 22. Cf. also 25 and 36.

¹⁰ Conf. IV. 1.

¹¹ In Evang. Joan. III. 12.

¹² Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XXI.

¹³ Sermo. LXIX. 4.

¹⁴ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XII. Cf. also De Nupt. et Concup. I. 6.

¹⁵ "Sed hætenus in eo natura humana vitata atque mutata est, ut repugnantem pateretur in membris inobedientiam concupiscendi." Civ. Dei XIII. cap. III.

body. As he had rebelled so he experienced the rebellion of his own flesh.¹⁶ In this aspect also of original sin the interesting feature is that this concupiscence, the punishment of the first sin, is the inevitable heritage of every person. It is the sin with which every man is born.¹⁷ Every individual is under sin because of the concupiscence by means of which he is propagated. "Quia per illam nascuntur concupiscentiam."¹⁸ Augustine makes some interesting statements in support of this doctrine when he defends marriage against the Manicheans. He specifically states that the purpose of one of his writings¹⁹ is to make clear the distinction between carnal concupiscence which involves original sin, and the good of marriage itself. In one passage carnal concupiscence is called sin.²⁰ A striking feature of this aspect of original sin is that it always remains even after regeneration.²¹ It is the sin with which we are born.²² And although it may be diminished gradually,²³ it remains until death.

A third phase of original sin is seen in man's mortality. Physical death is the direct result of Adam's first sin. This is reiterated time and time again. This

¹⁶ De Nupt. et Concup. I. 7 and II. 14, 54. Cf. also De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 36.

¹⁷ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 57 and Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 27.

¹⁸ Cont. Jul. Pelag. IV. 34.

¹⁹ De Nupt. et Concup. I. 1. It is in this writing that Augustine calls concupiscence an accident of original sin.

I. 19. Cf. also I. 6 and Retract. II. 53.

²⁰ Sermo CLV. 1.

²¹ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 4. Cf. also II. 15, 37, 45, 46. De Perf. Just. Hom. XI. 27, 28.

²² De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 4.

²³ De Perf. Just. Hom. XIII. and Sermo CLI. 5.

is all the more striking because Augustine was compelled to face the argument that death came by natural law. This idea he rejected, however, asserting that God had not ordained death for any one by a law of nature.²⁴ Adam's body was regarded by Augustine as capable of either death or immortality. Just as Adam's will was supposed to have the dual possibility of falling into sin or continuing in perfect righteousness, so his body was not necessarily subject to death. Rather it was so constituted that it could not die.²⁵ The only qualification placed upon this assertion is that death was impossible *unless* Adam sinned.²⁶ Therefore if Adam had not fallen he would not have been robbed of his body, but instead it would have been absorbed by life.²⁷ But Adam was cast down and mortality began its reign.²⁸ All human nature was changed by the Fall. After that fatal event man's flesh came into the unhappy state of mortality.²⁹ "Peccato autem ita hunc statum naturæ fuisse mutatum ut hominem necesse sit mori."³⁰ Death, therefore, became a necessity because of sin. Mortality is man's punishment for disobedience and is therefore called sin.³¹ Nevertheless Augustine insists that no one sins simply by dying, but that death is called sin because it is the punishment of sin.³² Neither birth-

²⁴ Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XV.

²⁵ Civ. Dei XXI. cap. VIII.

²⁶ Ibid. XIII. cap. XXIV.

²⁷ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 2.

²⁸ In Ep. Joan. ad Parth. IV. 3.

²⁹ Civ. Dei XXI. cap. VIII.

³⁰ Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. XCVI. Cf. also "per peccatum hominis mutata est humana natura." Ibid. VI. XXVII.

³¹ Cont. Faust. XIV. 3.

³² Ibid. and De Nat. et Grat. 25.

travail, nor the death of human off-spring would ever have ensued, if sin had not preceded.³³ Here, as in the two preceding aspects of original sin we must observe that the death of every individual since Adam is due to that first sin. We fell through Adam's sin and have all come into the inheritance of mortality.³⁴ The first man was so punished that whosoever should arise out of his stock should be punished by the same death.³⁵ This, then, is a third evidence of original sin. Death is due to sin.³⁶ Mortality has accrued to mankind as a result of sin.³⁷ Death here may be interpreted in either sense, for our author asserts that both the first and second deaths were inflicted on man because of sin.³⁸

A fourth aspect of original sin is expressed by the term "vitium." We have already had occasion³⁹ to observe that this was one of Augustine's favorite terms for the description of evil. It finds particular application to man, and yet its full content is rather elusive. Thus far it has not been difficult to grasp our author's thought when he asserted that original sin manifests itself in the life of the actualized individual in the forms of shame, concupiscence and mortality. Those are facts of common experience, but when he tells us that original sin is "vitium" it is more difficult to respond to his suggestion. Original sin, then, in the present individualized existence of

³³ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 29.

³⁴ De Symbolo 2 and De Pec. Orig. 28, 45.

³⁵ Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XXIII.

³⁶ Conf. XIII. 16, Enchir. XXV and De Trin. XIII. XII. 16.

³⁷ Conf. I. 1, De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 4, Sermo XCVII. 2 and In Joan. Evang. III. 13.

³⁸ Enchir. XCIII.

³⁹ Chapter II. pp. 30-31.

each person is manifested by a fault or flaw in his nature. That defect or blemish or imperfection which clings to all mankind is original sin.

In this respect Augustine endeavored to take the middle course between the Manicheans and the Pelagians. He insisted that all nature, including human nature, was good, but also that every man was born with a taint of original sin.⁴⁰ The human infant, contends Augustine, has a good origin, for all nature is created good, but he is corrupted by propagation.⁴¹ Pelagius strenuously denied that human nature could be altered by that airy, unsubstantial something which Augustine called original sin.⁴² He likewise repudiated Augustine's dogma that every infant is tainted by birth.⁴³ Coelestius, as might be expected, reiterated these truths with much more boldness, denying absolutely Augustine's idea of original sin,⁴⁴ and especially repudiating the notion that some contagion clings to every new-born child.⁴⁵ Augustine, nevertheless, insisted that there is present in man this defect or flaw which he expressed by the term "*vitium*." "In homine nato et natura est, quam non negas bonum, de quo laudamus Creatorem Deum; *et vitium*, quod non negas malum."⁴⁶ In man, therefore, two elements are to be distinguished: his nature which comes from God, and his "*vitium*"⁴⁷ which is due to his

⁴⁰ Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. III. 25 and IV. 5.

⁴¹ Ibid. IV. 4.

⁴² De Nat. et Grat. 21, where Augustine quotes Pelagius.

⁴³ De Pec. Orig. 24.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 2, 6 and 21.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 13.

⁴⁶ Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CLIII.

⁴⁷ In Joan. Evang. XLII. 16.

own act.⁴⁸ This evil is referred to Adam's sin for its source.⁴⁹ Original sin then expresses itself in this flaw of our nature.⁵⁰ Augustine is very careful to guard himself against the charge that he makes human nature evil. He insists that human nature is not a "vitium" but only vitiated,⁵¹ that the good nature is diminished by the defect or blemish,⁵² and that this is done by attacking its integrity, beauty and virtue.⁵³

Augustine did not fail to follow his doctrines to their logical conclusions and it is not until we see how rigidly he applied this idea of "vitium" to every member of the race, and especially to infants, that we can fully realize its significance. Infants newly born are guilty of sin, not sin that they themselves have committed, but that which they have contracted by their birth, due to the defect or flaw of their nature (*propter originis vitium*).⁵⁴ Our author even goes to the absurd extreme of asserting that the helplessness of infants,⁵⁵ together with their various ills,⁵⁶ is

⁴⁸ "Fecisti tu aliquid, feci et ego aliquid: quod tu fecisti, natura dicitur; quod ego feci, vitium vocatur. Vitium sanetur, ut natura servetur." *Sermo XIX. 1.*

⁴⁹ "Causa porro hujus mali est, quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum." *Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XXI.*

⁵⁰ *De Nat. et Grat. 3, 50; and De Lib. Arbit. II. 19.*

⁵¹ *Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CXC.* "Non dixeram vitiatum non esse, sed vitium non esse."

⁵² *Cont. Jul. Pelag. IV. 14.* "Quid enim aliud in vitio recte displicet, nisi quia detrahit vel minuit quod in natura placet?"

⁵³ *Civ. Dei XII. 3.*

⁵⁴ "Unde veraciter parvulos in peccatorum remissionem baptizat, non quæ imitando fecerunt, propter primi peccatoris exemplum; sed quæ nascendo traxerunt, propter originis vitium." *De Pec. Orig. 17.*

⁵⁵ *Civ. Dei XIII. cap. III. and De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 68.* Cf. also *II. 48*, where it is alleged that Christ as an infant was exempt from this helplessness.

⁵⁶ *Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. XLVIII. and LXXVII.*

due to this original blemish. Augustine admits in one of his *Letters* ⁵⁷ that the idea of infants suffering for original sin embarrassed him and presented great difficulties to his mind. He concedes that in his early writings he doubted the condemnation of infants for original sin, but in a late work ⁵⁸ he glories in the progress he has made, having banished uncertainty and arrived at the conclusion that they are at birth guilty of original sin. Infants, before they have committed any sins of their own, must partake of sinful flesh and are therefore guilty of this original taint.⁵⁹ For Augustine's mind, the fact that Church usage demanded infant baptism proved that the child was guilty of sin.⁶⁰ It has not yet committed any sin, consequently it must derive it from Adam.⁶¹ Our author pushes this belief to a revolting conclusion when he asserts that infants which die without baptism are involved in condemnation.⁶² Furthermore they are guilty not only for the sins in Adam but also for those of their parents.⁶³ Even the children of regenerate parents are born with this same taint and blemish.⁶⁴ Hence, original sin always continues and

⁵⁷ Ep. CLXVI. 16. Cf. also *ibid.* 6.

⁵⁸ De Dono Persev. 30.

⁵⁹ Ep. CXLIII. 6.

⁶⁰ Enchir. LII, Sermo CLXXIV. 7 and De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 23.

⁶¹ Sermo CLIII. 14 and CLXV. 7.

⁶² De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 21, 35, 62, De Pec. Orig. 22 and De Nupt. et Concup. I. 21, 22.

⁶³ Enchir. XLVI. Augustine, recognizing that this would involve the race in ever-increasing sin, finally suggests its limitation to three or four generations, but prefers to offer no definite solution.

⁶⁴ De Pec. Orig. 44, De Nupt. et Concup. I. 20, 21 and II.

this vitium is ineradicable. It binds all alike. "Omnes prorsus originale peccatum æqualiter colligavit; nemo esset cui malum hoc non in esset."⁶⁵ Here then is another evidence of original sin. It is this flaw of all nature for which every member of the race is guilty.

Finally, original sin manifests itself in our defective wills. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon this aspect. It has already been pointed out that through Adam's sin man's perfect freedom (*posse non peccare*) was reduced to freedom for sin (*posse peccare*). This phase of original sin enables one to put some positive content into our author's conception of "vitium." The defect of man is that, unaided, he no longer possesses the ability to choose the good.⁶⁶

If then we ask our author for the evidences of "originale peccatum" in the life of any individual since Adam, we receive this reply: the sense of shame, concupiscence, mortality, and a fatal flaw, present in the life of every person, are the direct results of that first original choice of evil. These factors of the individual's life are the penalties of Adam's first sin, and are justly endured because the will of the whole human race was in Adam when he sinned. It is not difficult to see that this all harmonizes with our author's speculative treatment of malum. All of these elements are regarded as the corruption of an originally good nature. They describe a lessening or diminu-

58, De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 11 and Cont. Jul. Pelag. VI. 14, which reads: "Mortuus enim peccato parens, et vivens Deo, generat tamen in peccato mortuum, nisi et ipse peccato regeneratione moriatur, et vivat Deo."

⁶⁵ Op. Imp. c. Jul. II. CXCIII. Cf. also De Nat. et Grat. 9. fin.

⁶⁶ De Nat. et Grat. 50.

tion of being. They indicate a tendency to nonexistence. Consequently our author's conception of original sin adjusts itself fully to his system. The errors which underlie this explanation of the evils of the flesh will be treated in the concluding chapter.

ACTUAL SIN.

Our next task is to set forth Augustine's conception of actual sin. That our author drew this distinction between original and actual sin is very evident. In all of his avowals of original sin in infants he is careful to maintain that they have committed no sins of their own. They have done no evil themselves, but they are ruined in their source, and have derived their sin from the first man.¹ There lies latent in these assertions the implication that Augustine distinguished original from actual sin. At other times our author boldly affirms that no proof is necessary to establish the sinlessness of infants as far as this life is concerned.² They possess no sins of their own, but only original sin.³ But we are not limited to such statements as these to establish this distinction. In writing against the Pelagians he demands of them that they distinguish in their use of the word "sin" between that in which all share, and that which is peculiar to each person. "*Certe manifestum est alia*

¹ Sermo CXV. 4. Cf. all the references given in the previous paragraph to establish original sin in infants.

² De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 22. This is enlarged upon in *ibid.* I. 65, and III. 7.

³ "A quibus in hac vita nulla peccata commissa sunt, nisi originale peccatum." De Pec. Orig. 22. Cf. also De Nupt. et Concup. I. 22.

esse propria cuique peccata, in quibus hi tantum peccant, quorum peccata sunt; aliud hoc unum, in quo omnes peccaverunt; quando omnes ille unus homo fuerunt." ⁴ Man increases his burdens by adding his own iniquities to his original sin.⁵ The distinction, therefore, is this: man derives from Adam his original sin (*originale peccatum*) while he himself commits his actual sin (*omnia nostra peccata*).⁶

The question that now confronts us concerns this actual sin. What *is* it? We now find our author speaking of specific sins, of almost innumerable varieties.⁷ It would be useless to enumerate the various acts and states which are described as sins, but it is a significant fact that out from this heterogeneous mass of evil acts, certain sins emerge which may be regarded as typical and as including all the lesser sins. It is just at this juncture that our author's conception of evil and sin must endure the most severe strain. Can all these specific sins be regarded in such fashion that they fit into the general conception of evil as set forth in Chapter II? It is a most striking fact that even when Augustine is speaking in a purely religious or devotional sense, his descriptions of sin harmonize fully with his speculative treatment of evil.

The first of these typical sins which we note, and which includes a great variety of other sins, is disobe-

⁴ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 11. Cf. also *ibid.* III. cap. VII, Ep. CLXXXVI, and Sermo CLXV.

⁵ De Perf. Just. Hom. XIX. 42 and Enchir. XXXIII.

⁶ "Ac per hoc ab Adam, in quo omnes peccavimus, non omnia nostra peccata, sed tantum originale traduximus." De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 16. Cf. also *ibid.* I. 20.

⁷ For example, Adam's sin is analyzed into pride, murder, blasphemy, spiritual fornication, theft and avarice. Enchir. XLV.

dience or transgression. Augustine regarded obedience as the mother of all the virtues. Man was so created that obedience to the Creator was advantageous, while the doing of one's own will in preference to God's involves destruction.⁸ That alone is sin, which is against what the Creator has enjoined.⁹ Sin then is disobedience of God.¹⁰ Adam's sin consisted chiefly of violated obedience.¹¹ The same conception of actual sin is expressed by the term "transgressio." The voluntary infringement of the divine precept was Adam's sin. (Divini præcepti transgressio).¹² The violation of the Creator's commands was the cause of original sin.¹³ This aspect of actual sin Augustine formulates thus: "Ergo peccatum est, factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra æternam legem. Lex vero æterna est, ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari iubens, perturbari vetens."¹⁴

A second aspect of Augustine's conception of actual sin, closely allied to the first, is self-will or the assertion of self against God. This Augustine conceived to be his own special sin before his conversion. His early life of self-will was transformed into a life subject to the will of God.¹⁵ In the *Confessions* after enumerating a series of various sins, he declares that these things are done when the Creator, the fountain

⁸ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XII.

⁹ "Nam nec peccatum erit, si quid erit, si non divinitus jubetur ut non sit." De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 23.

¹⁰ Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXVII. 43.

¹¹ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 35, 37, 48.

¹² De Vera Relig. 38.

¹³ De Nupt. et Concup. II. 43.

¹⁴ Cont. Faust. XXII. cap. XXVI. init.

¹⁵ Conf. IX. 1.

of life, is forsaken and some false thing is selected by self-willed pride, and loved.¹⁶ Sin, therefore, is selfishness. Defining it in terms of love, Augustine formulates it thus: "*Peccatum est autem, cum vel non est charitas quæ esse debet, vel minor est quam debet.*"¹⁷ This suggests the statement found elsewhere that a good will is well-directed love, and a bad will is ill-directed love.¹⁸ It is very clear that the total impression which one gathers from Augustine's writings is that sin is the assertion of self against God. It is preferring one's self to the Creator. This was undoubtedly the sin of that hypothetical "*diabolus*" when he fell from his perfect state. This was the sin of the fallen angels. This was the significant element in Adam's disobedience and transgression. In fact, disobedience was nothing other than the preference of one's own will to the Creator's will. Thus the two aspects of actual sin thus far considered seem to blend into the one idea that sin consists in the creature turning from the Creator and setting up his own will in preference to the Creator's commands.

These aspects find ample confirmation in the third phase which is expressed by the term "*superbia*." There is in fact very little distinction in these varieties of actual sin. They all root back in the idea that sin consists in the setting up of self in opposition to the Creator. We separate them merely because Augustine did, and because they reveal different modes

¹⁶ "*Et ea fiunt cum tu derelinqueris, fons vitæ, . . . et privata superbia diligitur in parte unum falsum.*" Conf. III. cap. VIII. 16.

¹⁷ De Perf. Just. Hom. 15.

¹⁸ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. VII.

of approach to the same fundamental conception. "Superbia" and "elatio" are Augustine's favorite terms for expressing this aspect of sin. This was the sin of the devil. He cannot be charged with fornication nor drunkenness nor sensual indulgence, but his sin is pride. This is the sin which rules him although he has no flesh.¹⁹ Similarly, pride and impiety caused the evil angels to rebel against God.²⁰ Likewise Adam and Eve fell into disobedience because of the pride of their hearts.²¹

Consequently, it is not surprising to find this aspect of actual sin emphasized beyond all others. Every one, says Augustine, has fallen by pride, which is the beginning of all sin.²² "*Vitiorum namque omnium humanorum causa superbia est.*"²³ Our author even goes so far as to say that the cause of our evil wills is pride. To this question we have found that Augustine was unwilling to return any answer, save that of "causa deficiens," but this statement occurs: "Porro malæ voluntatis initium quod potuit esse nisi superbia? Initium enim omnis peccati superbia est."²⁴ Of all such sins as hatred, variance, emulation, strife, envying, the origin and head is pride.^{24a} "*Omne*

¹⁹ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. III and De Nat. et Grat. 33.

²⁰ Enchir. XXVIII.

²¹ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XIII. Cf. also: "In paradiso ab animo quidem cœpit elatio, et ad præceptum transgrediendum inde consensio, propter quod dictum est a serpente, Eritis sicut dii; sed peccatum illud homo totus implevit." Cont. Jul. Pelag. V. 17.

²² Enar. in Ps. XXXVI. 18.

²³ De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 27. Cf. also De Spir. et Lit. II and De Nat. et Grat. 31.

²⁴ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XIII. 1.

^{24a} Ibid. XIV. cap. III.

ergo peccatum et superbia est."²⁵ Under these three general aspects of actual sin, therefore, can be included practically all of the multitudinous varieties of sins.²⁶ It is very apparent that these various modes of expressing actual sin harmonize perfectly with Augustine's conception of evil and sin as "defectus."

THE COMMON ELEMENT IN ALL SIN.

It only remains to ask, What is the common element in all these sins? Having seen our author's conception of original sin, both as it transpired in Adam, and as it exists in individualized persons today, having recognized the various forms of actual sin, we may now, according to the Socratic fashion, ask what is the common element in all these sins? If we can answer this question, we will arrive at what may be called with propriety, our author's conception of sin. It is well to remember, however, that sin in the abstract is rather a delusive phantom. Sin never exists apart from the sinner, but nevertheless we may rightly ask our author what is common to the sins of all created beings.

Our author's answer, like his conception of actual sin, falls under three aspects. These likewise do not lie entirely outside one another. They overlap and

²⁵ De Nat. et Grat. 33.

²⁶ A classification which Augustine occasionally uses is that of sins of ignorance and sins of infirmity. Both are the result of original sin, and therefore represent a *defect* or *diminution* of human nature. Vide Enchir. LXXXI, Sermo CLXXXII. 6, De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 26, Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 23, and Ep. CXCIV. 27. Furthermore Augustine recognizes degrees of sinfulness. In this respect he combats the Stoics. Ep. CIV. 13, 17, Ep. CLXVII. 4, 13, De Spir. et Lit. 48, Enchir. LXXVIII.

in reality simply serve as different points of view from which to survey the same fact.

(1). All sin is related to the will. Whether dealing with his diabolus, the fallen angels, Adam or individual man, sin has always been referred to freedom. Even that original sin which is manifested in the present existence of the individual is supposed to have been committed by each of us when we were a part of Adam. No sin exists apart from the will of the creature. No one is condemned on any other ground than because he possesses an evil will.¹ This aspect is emphasized by the affirmations of our author that that person is guilty who wishes to do an unlawful deed, although he is deterred from it by fear of punishment.² He is already sinning within his will who refrains from sin only because of fear.³ Not concupiscence but consent to it involves sin,⁴ for he alone offends who permits himself to be persuaded by its allurements.⁵ "*Nec esse peccatum nisi pravum liberæ voluntatis assensum, cum inclinamur ad ea iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere.*"⁶ Sin, therefore, always involves an act of the will, whether we are dealing with original or actual sin.

(2). Every act of the will, however, does not involve sin. It is only when the will is used to make a particular kind of choice that sin ensues. This choice consists in preferring a lower to a higher form

¹ Ep. CLXXIII. 2.

² CXLIV. 4.

³ "Nam sic profecto in ipsa intus voluntate peccat, qui non voluntate sed timore non peccat." Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 15.

⁴ De Perf. Just. Hom. XXI. 44.

⁵ Ibid. Cf. also De Nupt. et Concup. I. 25.

⁶ De Genesi ad Lit. Imp. Liber 3.

of nature. The cause of the misery of the fallen angels is that they forsook the supreme Existence for their own finite selves.⁷ Becoming enamored of their own power, they lapsed to their own changeable good instead of adhering to the immutable good.⁸ The first defect of these creatures was simply that they preferred themselves to their Creator.⁹ Likewise this is the fundamental flaw of any creature. Not to adhere to the Creator, this is "vitium."¹⁰ Here we find positive content for this most elusive term. To choose the creature in place of the Creator, this is sin. "Diligit pro ipso Creatore creaturam."¹¹ Sin then is not an effort to obtain an evil nature, but it is the desertion of a better.¹² All natures are good and beautiful in their various classes, but to descend from a higher to a lower, this is to be false to our nature and involves guilt.¹³ Now we have seen that this is precisely what Adam did when he committed the first sin. He turned from the highest nature to a lower. Similarly, the three aspects of actual sin, disobedience, self-assertion and pride are in essence just this defection from the Creator. Here, then, is the common element of all sin. It is all gathered up in the one term "defectus." It now becomes apparent, also, how our author's negative con-

⁷ Civ. Dei XII. cap. VI.

⁸ Civ. Dei XII. I.

⁹ Ibid. XII. cap. VI.

¹⁰ "Profecto non illi (Deo) adhærere, vitium est." Ibid. XII. cap. I. 3.

¹¹ Cont. Secund. Manich. XVIII.

¹² "Item quia peccatum vel iniquitas non est appetitio naturarum malarum, sed desertio meliorum." De Nat. Boni c. Manich. cap. XXXIV.

¹³ De Sermo Dom. in Monte I. XII. 34.

ception of sin sometimes assumed a positive quality. The inherent negativity of all evil and sin, however, lies in the fact that every evil choice in which alone evil can originate, is a defection, a turning or falling away from what is higher to what is lower.¹⁴ Thus we find no inconsistency between our author's speculative and religious descriptions of "peccatum." In both instances his thought culminates in "defectus" as applied to the will.

(3). Finally, this defection of the will from a higher to a lower nature leads us back to the conception of sin as a tendency to nonexistence. He who deserts his Creator, says Augustine, and inclines to that whence he was made is tending toward nothingness.¹⁵ "Et manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines cum peccant."¹⁶ Similarly he says: "Sed quia nos nihil fieri volumus peccando."¹⁷ Sin then is self-destructive. The man who deserts God, argues Augustine, deserts himself in the true sense.¹⁸ In order to avoid inconsistency in his metaphysical conceptions, our author qualifies these assertions by saying that man did not so fall (defecit) from his Creator, as to become absolutely nothing, but nevertheless he has approximated to that. "Relicto itaque Deo, esse in semetipso, hoc est sibi

¹⁴ Dr. Martineau's definition of right and wrong is strikingly similar to this. He says: "Every action is *right*, which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher: every action is *wrong*, which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower." *Types of Ethical Theory*, 3rd ed. II. 270.

¹⁵ Enar. in Ps. VII. 19.

¹⁶ In Joan. Evang. I. 13.

¹⁷ Sermo XXII. 9.

¹⁸ Conf. III. 16.

placere, *non jam nihil esse est*, sed *nihilo propinquare*.”¹⁹ The common element of all sin, therefore, consists in an act of the will, by which the choice of a lower nature is made in the presence of a higher, and thus a tendency to nonexistence is manifested. That this conception of sin harmonizes perfectly with Augustine’s treatment of *malum* is apparent on the face of it. Similarly, our author’s identification of *malum* and *peccatum* not only becomes more evident, but also is seen to rest upon a rational basis. It only remains to set forth our author’s conception of the final outcome of the strife between good and evil, before passing, in our concluding chapter, to an estimate and criticism of the doctrine as a whole.

¹⁹ Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XIII. 1.

CHAPTER VII

THE FINAL OUTCOME

It is the aim of this chapter to trace briefly Augustine's thought regarding the ultimate relation of good and evil. Much that he wrote about the future need not concern us. There is no purpose in this chapter to enter in any sense into a discussion of the eschatological conceptions of the Augustinian system. We only aim, therefore, to raise this question: What is to be the final result of the strife between good and evil? Is the latter necessarily inwrought in the very make of the universe or will it finally cease to exist? Does Augustine look forward to the final destruction of all evil or will it exist eternally as inherent in the very constitution of things? Is it a necessary correlate of all life, even of perfect life, or does its existence mean the curtailment of real life? This aspect of the problem of evil leads us again into a field where we find our author dealing with conceptions which time has outgrown. Nevertheless, Augustine offers us a definite answer to the questions here proposed, and that answer throws further light upon his conceptions of freedom and guilt.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION.

Without endeavoring to state fully our author's doctrine of predestination,¹ we can with propriety note

¹ Vide *De Prædest. Sanct.*, and *De Dono Persev.*

its bearing upon the special aspect of the problem of evil that is now before us. If we ask what is to be the relation of good and evil in the life of any individual in this world, we receive a reply in which there lies implicit the doctrine of predestination. Evil and sin seem to be a necessary part of every human life. The reason for this is that Adam fell from his perfect state. Sin was not a necessary part of his life, but for all his progeny no other possibility than sin exists. Many of the evils and sins of the individual to-day are the consequence, penalty, or punishment of that first sin. This conception is frequently reiterated.² Men live lives of misery, good and evil are mingled in them, because of that first sin. Furthermore, and this is the significance of the thought, this evil life is the permanent and eternal condition of every individual unless God actively interferes. All mankind are condemned because of original sin.³ Augustine does not hesitate to affirm that anyone who rightly appreciates the subject, could not possibly criticize the justice of God for wholly condemning all men.⁴ It ought not to disturb anyone, says Augustine, because the gift of perseverance is granted to only a few, for if no one was delivered from the guilt of original sin, there would be no basis of complaint against God.⁵ This is unmistakably our au-

² Vide de Lib. Arbit. III. 52, 53, De Nat. et Grat. 24, Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. Manich. 25, Ep. CXI. 3, Sermo CLXVII. 1 and Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. XXXI.

³ De Nat. et Grat. 5 init.

⁴ "Qui recte nullo modo posset culpae justitiam universos omnino damnatis?" Ibid. 5 fin.

⁵ "Cur autem non omnibus detur, fidelem movere non debet, qui credit ex uno omnes isse in condemnationem, sine dubitatione justissimam: ita ut nulla Dei esset justa rep-

thor's doctrine. It is reiterated frequently in his later writings which bear upon the subject: "unde etiamsi nullus liberaretur, justum Dei judicium nemo juste reprehenderet."⁶

Moreover God does not actively condemn any. He only passively ignores those who deserve to be left alone or forsaken.⁷ It must be borne in mind that this condemnation involved the complete and eternal separation of these unhappy creatures from their Creator.⁸ Of Augustine's conception of the future life of the wicked, nothing need be mentioned save that feature which is of significance here, namely, that the wicked are finally to be cast into a region separate from the righteous. His doctrine was based upon a most literal interpretation of the eschatological material of the Bible.⁹ But if the great bulk of mankind are thus by virtue of their evil choice in Adam condemned to eternal separation from the righteous, there are likewise some who must be saved. To them God's grace is irresistible. Augustine, therefore, insists upon both condemnation through original sin and salvation through the gift of perseverance which the recipient cannot reject or resist.

What then in brief is predestination? "Hæc est prædestinatio sanctorum, nihil aliud: præscientia scilicet, et præparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur. Cæteri autem ubi nisi in massa perditionis justo divino judicio

rehensio, etiamsi nullus inde liberaretur." De Prædest. Sanct. 16. Cf. also De Dono Persev. 16.

⁶ De Cor. et Grat. 28.

⁷ De Nat. et Grat. 25.

⁸ Ep. CII. 27.

⁹ Vide Civ. Dei Liber. XXI. in toto.

reliquantur.”¹⁰ We see in this succinct definition of the doctrine a distinct foreshadowing of our author’s conception of the ultimate relation of good and evil. The saints are to be delivered, the rest of mankind are to be simply and passively left in the ruined mass of mankind. The significance then of this doctrine for our present purpose lies in its distinct and unqualified declaration of the complete separation of the good and evil in the life to come. The mere mention of the orthodox conceptions of heaven and hell give ample attestation of this statement.

This, however, is not the full significance of the doctrine. We may well observe in passing that if every individual by virtue of his choice in Adam is thus condemned to an eternal life of evil, and only those are delivered from it upon whom God actively confers¹¹ the gift of perseverance which can not be resisted, then, herein lies another evidence of the deterministic tendency of our author’s thought. No matter how loudly he may assert his belief in man’s freedom, this doctrine, if followed to its logical conclusions, would compel its believer to adopt a quietistic attitude to life. Against this very criticism, however, our author directs one of his works.¹² He argues that since it is impossible for us to know those who are predestinated from those who are not, we ought on this very account to labor for the salvation of all.¹³

A second observation upon this doctrine, important for our author’s treatment of sin and evil, is the conception of guilt which it involves. It declares with-

¹⁰ De Dono Persev. 35.

¹¹ Enchir. XCVIII. init.

¹² De Cor. et Gratia.

¹³ Ibid. 49. Cf. also De Dono Persev. 34.

out reserve that original sin is sufficient for condemnation. Every man is guilty because of his choice in Adam and because of that original sin is worthy of eternal separation from the righteous. "Quia sufficeret ad condemnationem etiamsi non esset in hominibus nisi originale peccatum."¹⁴ This aspect of the doctrine, however, is only another statement, from a different point of view, of the idea expressed in the previous paragraph. They both rest upon the conception that our wills were present in Adam's will. Consequently we acted when Adam did, and are therefore justly separated from the righteous in the life to come. The doctrine of predestination, therefore, clearly asserts the final separation of the good and evil and defends the justice of the wholesale condemnation of the race by an appeal to the misuse of freedom¹⁵ when mankind existed potentially or semi-nally in the first man.

TEMPORARY MINGLING OF GOOD AND EVIL.

This conception of the ultimate separation of good and evil which is the logical implication of the doctrine of predestination, receives explicit formulation in the idea that in this world we have the temporary mingling of good and evil. In the *City of God*¹ Augustine has left abundant evidence that he so conceived this world. There exist two distinct cities among men, the earthly and the heavenly. These two

¹⁴ De Pec. Mer et Remis. I. 15. Cf. also ibid. I. 16, 17, De Nat. et Grat. 9 fin., De Pec. Orig. 34 and In Joan. Evang. LIII. 8.

¹⁵ Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. Manich. 25.

¹ Liber XI. et seq.

cities owe their origin to two kinds of love. The earthly city originated in the love of self which went to the extent of contempt for God; the heavenly city in love of God which included contempt of self. The one glories in the creature, the other in the Creator.² The foundation of these two cities, therefore, as far as man is concerned, must have been in Adam.³ The members of both cities were derived from him although some were destined to be associated with the good, others with the evil angels. This, however, does not imply the existence of four but rather two cities for the good angels and men are grouped in one society, and the evil angels and men in the other.⁴ The origin and nature of these two cities need not be enlarged upon here, for our former treatment of the origin of evil in that pre-existent world of angels⁵ and our portrayal of the conception of the first man,⁶ have, we trust, adequately presented Augustine's thought in this regard. The matter of consequence for our present purpose is this: Augustine conceived these two cities to be temporarily mingled in this world but destined to be ultimately separated forever, after the judgment of man.⁷ In the present life

² Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XXVIII. "Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo; terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, cœlestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui." Cf. also De Gen. ad Lit. XI. 20.

³ Civ. Dei XII. cap. XXVII.

⁴ "Ut non quatuor, duæ scilicet Angelorum totidemque hominum, sed duæ potius civitates, hoc est societates, merito esse dicantur; una in bonis, altera in malis, non solum Angelis verum etiam hominibus constitutæ." Civ. Dei XII. cap. I. 1.

⁵ Chapter III. pp. 60-69.

⁶ Chapter IV. pp. 99-114.

⁷ Civ. Dei XX.—XXII. in toto. It is unnecessary to en-

"kingdom heavenly" groans amid the citizens of "kingdom earthly."⁸ It becomes the duty, says Augustine, of the righteous to endure patiently the admixture of good and evil persons here, remembering that it is only temporary. "*Hæc quippe commixtio, non æterna, sed temporalis; nec spiritualis, sed corporalis est.*"⁹ These two communities, one composed of the holy and righteous, and the other of the ungodly, began in this life with the first man and will continue to the end of the world. They are mingled here only in body and separated in will, but are destined to be separated in both body and will upon the day of judgment.¹⁰ Here, then, we find explicit affirmation of the conception that the good and evil are not necessary to each other, and that their co-existence in this life is only temporary and accidental.

FINAL DESTRUCTION OF EVIL.

Furthermore, Augustine passes on to affirm the final destruction of all evil. He recognizes the value of the evils of this life as a training school for the righteous. They serve as a means for developing the goodness and strength of the faithful but only to the end that they may be prepared for a new world devoid of all evil?¹ The life there is described as true

large upon this conception for it is involved in the perfectly familiar orthodox doctrines of heaven and hell.

⁸ Enar. in Ps. LII. 4.

⁹ Cont. Lit. Petil. III. 4.

¹⁰ "*Duæ itaque civitates, una iniquorum, altera sanctorum, ab initio generis humani usque in finem sæculi perducuntur, nunc permixtæ corporibus, sed voluntatibus separatæ, in die vero judicii etiam corpore separandæ.*" De Catech. Rud. 31.

¹ "*Ut novus homo per testamentum novum inter mala hujus sæculi novo sæculo præpararetur.*" De Trin. XIII. XVI. 20.

and perpetual blessedness.² If the Creator in his perfect wisdom disposes the evils of this life so that they serve some good purpose, what may the righteous not expect when set free from all evils? (*Cum liberaverit ab omnibus malis?*)³ The greatness of such felicity seems beyond description, for it will be tainted with no evil, will lack no good of any kind and will afford perfect leisure for the praises of God.⁴ There the reward of victory over vice and evil will be enjoyed. "*Ibi virtutes, non contra ulla vitia vel mala quaecumque certantes, sed habentes victoriae præmium æternam pacem, quam nullus adversarius inquietet.*"⁵ The struggle with all vice is past. That perfect life has no need for further conflict and effort. All dissatisfaction with self has vanished and eternal peace reigns.⁶ The final outcome of the struggle of good and evil then is tersely stated in these words: "*Erit quandoque etiam perfectio boni, quando consumptio mali: illud summum, hoc erit nullum.*"⁷ The good comes to perfection, and evil ceases to exist.

That this conclusion is entirely consistent with the Augustinian system becomes apparent when we recall our author's conception of the original condition of heaven before the fall of the first evil angel. God and his creatures lived a perfect life in which

² Ibid. XIII. XVI. 20.

³ De Continentia 16.

⁴ Civ. Dei XXII. cap. XXX.

⁵ Ibid. XIX. cap. X.

⁶ The marked contrast here between Augustine and Professor Royce is very apparent. The latter would ask Augustine "what next?" in the life of these righteous beings. The difference between Augustine and Professor Royce lies in their conceptions of what constitutes real life.

⁷ De Continentia 20. Cf. also: "*consumpto penitus omni malo.*" Ibid. 21.

evil was absolutely unknown. Similarly Adam's original pristine condition was regarded as devoid of all evil, both natural and moral. Furthermore, the conceptions that good can exist without evil and that a perfectly sinless life is a possibility (though never realized), both of these point to the same general attitude to the ultimate relation of good and evil. Finally, our author's fundamental and underlying metaphysical conception, that all nature is good and that evil exists only as a parasite, as an empty negation whose seeming reality results from its attachment to a good nature, indicates clearly that evil is not regarded as a part of perfect life and that its final extinction is necessary accompaniment of the consummation of the "Civitas Dei."

"CIVITAS TERRENA" ETERNAL.

But has the "civitas terrena" vanished? Do these statements apply to the whole universe or only to the abode of the righteous? Clearly to the latter. The souls of the bulk of mankind together with the fallen angels under the leadership of "princeps peccatorum,"¹ still exist. Nothing is ever permitted to go to the length of nonexistence.² A casual reading of the twenty-first book of the *City of God* shows fully that these evil spirits are expected to live forever. Whole chapters are devoted to proving that it is possible for bodies to exist forever in burning fire,³ and examples are cited from nature in defense of the

¹ De Symbolo 2.

² "Nihil per divinam providentiam, ad id ut non sit pervenire permittitur." De Mor. Manich. 9 fin.

³ Civ. Dei XXI. cap. II.

notion that bodies may exist alive and unconsumed in eternal fire.⁴ This region of evil then exists. Bearing in mind his metaphysical conception that all things in so far as they exist are good and that evil can exist only as a parasite upon some good nature, it becomes evident that the evil of these spirits consists in their falling away from the true being and preferring self to God.

That the ideas presented in this chapter lay Augustine open to the charge of dualism is very evident. This evil region has been separated from the good and exists as a dark spot upon the universe. The antinomy of good and evil has not been solved but only transcended. Evil has been excluded from one region, only to give it full dominance in another. Both good and evil still exist, only now they are geographically separated. In his conception of the two cities there lies implicit an unconcealed element of inherent dualism. There is an essential rift in his universe. Like Plato's conception of τὸ μὴ ὄν it forms an unsolved element in his system which neither of them ever fully overcame.

The philosophical basis of Augustine's conception of sin is now before us. In our concluding chapter, it remains to enter into a criticism of these conceptions, with the endeavor to sift out the truth from the error and to indicate the fundamental fallacies that underlie the whole doctrine.

⁴ Ibid. cap. IV.

CHAPTER VIII

A CRITIQUE

IN the foregoing chapters, while endeavoring to set forth the speculative basis upon which the whole Augustinian doctrine of sin rests, we have from time to time offered brief criticisms, accepting or rejecting certain aspects of our author's thought. The purpose in this method has been twofold: (1) We have aimed to avoid the necessity of too much repetition which would have been involved in a complete separation of statement and criticism, and (2) we have attempted to clear away legitimate criticisms of what might be termed the minor phases of our author's thought in order that the present chapter, relieved of the burden of details, might the better be devoted to a more searching criticism of the underlying and fundamental principles of the whole doctrine.

EVIL AS NEGATION.

It has become perfectly apparent that one of the most significant features of Augustine's thought was his conception of *evil as negation*. No doubt he was led to the exact formulation of this conception by his opposition to Manicheism. In his determined resistance to the fatalistic dualism of Manicheus and in his complete repudiation of his irrational exaltation of evil into a principle coeternal with God, he was naturally and inevitably led toward a privative conception of evil. He insisted without qualification that

God was the author of all nature and consequently of all that exists. To him, likewise, it was unthinkable that God was the author of evil, and thus his rigorous logic compelled him to regard evil simply as the negation of what was good, as a flaw of nature, as that which metamorphoses its utter negativity into apparent reality by attacking and diminishing the goodness of nature. To make a place for evil in the universe he was forced to conceive it as desertion, as a falling away from true being.

That there is a large element of truth in the negative conception of evil is unmistakable. That it possesses this characteristic in some sense is apparent from the fact that philosophers in widely different periods have so conceived it. Plato was evidently unable to put any positive content into his idea of evil. His conception of non-being (*τὸ μὴ ὄν*) is ample witness to the fact that he did not conceive evil as anything really existent. The change, unreality and instability of the world of sense in contrast to the permanence, reality and fixity of the eternal world was referred for its cause to this negative conception. Plotinus served as a source for Augustine's own thought of evil as negation. John Scotus Erigena, like Augustine, was unable to conceive of anything outside of God and consequently looked upon evil and sin as separation from the Creator. It is therefore nothing real, but only a privation devoid of all true existence. Spinoza maintained that sin and evil were real only for our finite minds. Nothing is evil to God. Sin, therefore, is purely relative and possesses no real existence. It is mere negation or privation. Its character is wholly negative. Leibniz also has been accused of reducing moral to metaphysical evil and

conceiving it, not as anything real, but merely as the absence of perfection, or privation. Likewise, Hegel may be cited among those who have thus conceived of evil. It is mere sham existence and utter negativity. (*Der absolute Schein der Negativität in sich.*) Finally, Professor Paulsen affirms that evil as such possesses no value and enjoys no real existence. It is a purely negative quality and receives it seeming reality only from its opposite, the good. Clearly, then, we find historical support for this conception.

Is it not possible to find in the differing terminologies of these philosophical systems that essentially the same truth has been struggling for expression? These thinkers have felt the inherent unreality in evil and have formulated it in the terms of their own day. Whether it is expressed by *τὸ μὴ ὄν*, vitium, corruptio, negatio, defectus, or Negativität, it involves the recognition of the essentially negative character of evil. This same element of truth finds expression to-day in the affirmation that evil is disorganization. It is then in a very real sense the diminution of being. It is that which diminishes life. Says Professor Palmer. "Poverty of powers is everywhere a form of evil. For how can there be largeness of organization except as a mode of furnishing the smoothest and most compact expression to powers? Wealth and order are accordingly everywhere the double trait of goodness, and a chief test of the worth of any organism will be the diversity of the powers it includes."¹ Consequently it becomes apparent that evil

¹ *Nature of Goodness*, p. 40. Compare with this the following statement from the same author: "Ethical writers of our time have come to see that the goodness of a person or thing consists in its being as richly diversified as is

must be regarded as that which is self-destructive. Evil in the last analysis then becomes suicidal. Mr. Herbert Spencer has rightly affirmed that "we regard as bad the conduct tending to self-destruction."² The negative tendency implied in this formulation of the truth is very apparent.

On the other hand we find a strange recognition in our author of an essentially active aspect of evil. Amid all his rigid insistence upon the unreality of evil we find it at times suddenly metamorphosed into an active principle. "Negatio" has been replaced by "corruptio" and to this conception positive and active content has been given. We have seen that Augustine insisted, in complete accord with his metaphysical conceptions, that the flesh must not be considered as evil but as good, the evil propensities arising therefrom being regarded as the action of "corruptio." Again, we see a curious mingling of the negative and positive aspects of the conception in the term "defectus." It is a distinct choice or act of the will, but an act of a negative character in the sense that it chooses the lower instead of the higher good.³ In these respects, therefore, we find our

possible up to the limit of harmonious working, and also in being orderly up to the limit of repression of powers. *Beyond either of these limits evil begins.*" Ibid. p. 43.

² Principles of Ethics, Vol. I. p. 25. Compare also: "Al-ways, then, acts are called good or bad, according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends; . . . bad is the name we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved." Ibid. "Other things equal, conduct is right or wrong according as its special acts, well or ill adjusted to special ends, do or do not further the general end of self-preservation." Ibid. p. 20.

³ It is interesting to observe here how Dr. Martineau has formulated his thought on this aspect of our problem: "So

author recognizing that element of the truth which those emphasize who insist upon the positive reality of evil.

Principal Fairbairn endeavors to draw the distinction that physical evil is negative; but that moral evil is positive and real.⁴ Professor Royce insists that evil is a "distinctly real fact."⁵ In the sense in which he uses the phrase, the truth of his contention must be admitted. Evil is real to the helpless sufferer or to the remorseful sinner. Similarly we agree that none of our experiences of evil may be rightly described as mere illusions.⁶ But at the same time Professor Royce defines evil as "whatever we find in any sense repugnant and intolerable."⁷ Evil exists to be overcome, cast down and subordinated. It is a challenge to our moral manhood. It becomes apparent, therefore, that even here evil assumes a negative significance. Its existence is real, but it exists to be cast down and defeated. It is just this mingling of the negative and positive aspects of evil that Edward Caird recognizes in Augustine's conception of evil when he says: "He could not believe in the sub-

far, therefore, it seems undoubtedly correct to regard evil as simply negative,—a detention among lower things,—a failure of reverence for the higher,—a withholding of the will from God, and a living in the meanwhile entirely out of the desires and affections of the self." *Types of Ethical Theories*, 3rd ed. Vol. II. p. 90.

⁴ His own words are: "They belong, indeed, to entirely distinct categories: physical evil is incidental, occasional, or relative, and may be termed negative or privative; but moral evil is positive, and may be termed actual or real." *Phil. of the Christ. Relig.* p. 134.

⁵ *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 16.

⁶ See *ibid.* p. 17.

⁷ See *ibid.* p. 18.

stantiality of evil, but must hold that there is a point of view from which it disappears or appears only as an instrument, or transitory stage to higher good.⁸ Now Professor Royce would not agree to the "transitory" character of evil but he does plainly regard it as an instrument to higher good. We believe that Augustine by means of his conception of "defectus" has succeeded in giving due recognition to both phases of evil. He does not deny its active positive quality, nor does he exalt it into a reality co-ordinate with the good. Schleiermacher's negative conception of sin recognizes the positive phase of it by making it subjectively real. Sin *is* the consciousness of sin. This suggests the basis upon which a reconciliation may be made between the two opposing ideas of evil.

Evil, viewed from one position, does undoubtedly appear to be a stern reality. Every experience of evil emphasizes this aspect of it. From another point of view evil is inherently negative, the disorganizing, suicidal principle of all life. But, have we not in these two sentences shifted from one sphere of thought to another. Subjectively and ethically, the reality of evil cannot be denied. Metaphysically, however, its reality is only seeming and privative. Here then we transcend the antinomy, without denying either of its parts. A distinction between *bonum metaphysicum* and *bonum morale* resolves the antithesis. In his own terms Augustine has accomplished this result. He did not deny the reality of the experiences of evil. We have seen that he could portray the evils of life with a fullness and vigor arising only out of personal experience. At the same time he could not find any

⁸ The evolution of Religion, Vol. II. p. 288.

place for evil in his metaphysics. It must exist solely as "contra naturam." In his conception of "defectus" he has welded these two seemingly contradictory elements into one whole.

Has then our author reached any adequate conception of sin? In his denial of the reality of evil and in his practical identification of evil and sin has he not robbed the term "sin" of its full content? The question may be rightly asked when our author's negative conception of evil is under emphasis, but a brief perusal of his writings will reveal a most intense denial of this proposition. Few have conceived sin in all its awfulness as did Augustine. His doctrine of grace and the idea that external aid is necessary for overcoming sin, are ample evidence that ethically he did not underestimate sin. We have found that the common element of all sin consisted for Augustine in a defection of the will from that which was higher to that which was lower. Stated ethically it was transgression or disobedience, self-assertion and pride.

All these aspects root down into the idea of setting up of self in opposition to the Creator. Sin is "defectus." It is essentially negative in that it chooses a lower for a higher nature. Hence it is selfishness. It is lovelessness. In this Augustine has sounded the bottom of the problem and given utterance to a truth which even to-day is not gainsaid in the theological world. Essentially sin is the exaltation of self. It represents the utterly false and futile effort of the individual to realize his low desire, or his highest good, in complete independence of or opposition to his fellow man and the changeless, rational, and beneficent will of his Creator; that is selfishness; *that is sin*. This idea Augustine has formulated for us in his

conception of "defectus." We accept, therefore, our author's contention that evil is negative⁹ and that sin is selfishness. That no inner inconsistency exists between these two affirmations we have already endeavored to prove in our sixth chapter.

METAPHYSICAL IMPERFECTION.

A second fundamental doctrine of Augustine's was that of *creation ex nihilo*. Just as we have seen that the exact formulation of our author's idea of evil as negation was due to the exigencies of the Manichean controversy, so here we come upon a striking feature of Augustine's thought which may be traced to the same influence. Over against its inherent dualism which made creation compulsory, which asserted that God created the world out of material essentially evil, which insisted that all created things, all substance and all matter are evil, Augustine maintained his doctrine of *creation ex nihilo*. It therefore becomes apparent why our author put such emphasis on the source of the material out of which finite things were created.

Manicheism insisted that the primeval stuff was inherently evil. Augustine repudiated this idea and set up in its place the conception that the world was made out of nothing. Thus he seeks to make it absolutely impossible for the Manicheans to affirm an evil source for created being. It is clear, therefore, that this special aspect of his doctrine was due to the historical setting in which it developed and, like many other

⁹ At the same time, insisting upon the recognition of the important qualification implied in his conception of "defectus."

ideas of our author, has no significance or value for the present day. Disregarding the apparent influence of the controversy in which this doctrine was developed as it is manifested in the particular formulation of the idea, we may with propriety enter into a criticism of what it signified for our author.

It was by means of this doctrine that he accounted for the different kinds of nature. God was the supreme and immutable good. All other natures are good in their class or rank, but their mutability, instability and imperfection are due to the fact that they have been made out of nothing. The significance then of this doctrine is twofold: (1) It asserts that all natures, of whatever rank and just in so far as they exist, are good. Clearly this is directed at the Manichean tenet which asserted with equal vigor that all these natures were evil. If it becomes a choice between affirming with Augustine that all derived being is good, or with the Manicheans that it is all evil, then we must choose the former.

That Augustine has here given utterance to an important truth as compared with that of his adversaries is evident. We naturally raise the question, however, whether he, too, was not in error in asserting that these natures are *good*. Our reply must depend upon the definition of the term "good." If it is distinctly understood that what Augustine meant by "*bonum*" is simply that the object so described has existence, then agreement is possible. To-day we must replace his adjective, affirming that finite nature as such is neither good nor bad in the ethical sense, but simply non-moral or neutral. Evil does not inhere in things but in the will. (2) This doctrine is also a clear recognition of metaphysical imperfection. He has

formulated in it his own statement of what to-day is an accepted truism. It points out with correctness the separation between infinite and all finite or derived being.

Again, Augustine found in this idea of creation *ex nihilo* an explanation of the *possibility* of evil. It seems to serve as the metaphysical basis for his theory of the origin of evil. He reconciles this with his fundamental doctrine of freedom by saying that the possibility of evil wills was due to their creation out of nothing. This relating of metaphysical and moral evil, was a striking anticipation of Leibniz, who affirmed that not only the ability but the certainty of sinning was based on the metaphysical imperfection of the creature.¹ Augustine, of course, would not go to this extreme and yet no doubt unconsciously he has laid himself open to the same criticism. But while Augustine repeatedly affirms that this doctrine explains the possibility of evil, he protests with equal vigor against the charge that it involved the *necessity* of evil. When this criticism is brought against him, he specifically distinguishes between the two ideas, maintaining that creation *ex nihilo* accounts for the possibility of evil without making it a necessity.

Here we come upon a peculiar intermingling of truth and error. It seems as though the real truth of metaphysical imperfection is struggling for expression and yet he rigorously insists that it does not involve the necessity of evil. The difficulty reveals a fundamental error in our author's thought: namely, his attempted identification of evil and sin. Beginning with that assumption, it became an impossibility

¹ Theodiceé, § 156.

to come to terms with metaphysical imperfection. How could one reconcile it with the idea that all evil is sin? Had our author distinguished between natural and moral evil, between *malum* and *peccatum*, he would not have fallen into this fallacy. He saw clearly the implication of metaphysical imperfection, but he could not recognize the necessity of natural evil, for to him all evil was defined as moral evil. This was due in large measure to the confusion introduced by his idea of original sin. Consequently metaphysical imperfection meant to Augustine only the possibility of sin, whereas it should have included the necessity of evil.

We are now prepared to understand the secret of another fallacy of our author's thought. Because of his failure to recognize that the necessity of natural evil is a logical implication of metaphysical imperfection, he was led into a false conception of real life. His insistence upon the possibility of the good existing without evil, his conception of the perfect life of the pre-existent angels, his vivid portrayal of the original pristine glory of the first pair, his beatific visions of the perfect life of the saints, are all evidences of the error which failed to realize the necessity of imperfection, with its consequent struggle, strain and effort for all real life. If man's life can be regarded as a type of true life, then it becomes perfectly apparent that all the evils consequent upon finiteness cannot be rightly excluded. Life to be real must include resistance and exertion.² Let the sense of dissatisfaction

² Professor Royce says: "I pass from these instances to point out what must be the law, not only of human nature, but of every broader form of life as well. I maintain that this organization of life by virtue of the tension of manifold

with one's present attainments disappear and life ceases to develop, even if it does not perish. Evil therefore is involved in all finite life, but in such a way that it may become the means to a higher good. A life which provided no obstacles and could be lived in one effortless span of existence would be unendurable. Remove the possibility of self-realization through the mastery and overthrow of difficulties, and you remove life itself. If this is a true conception, and we believe it is, then we must reject our author's notions of original unfallen man and his picture of the life to come. His own dualism as portrayed in his ultimate separation of all created beings into good and bad realms must likewise be set aside or materially modified. He has not solved the ultimate relation of good and evil by thus separating them into distinct compartments of the universe. Rather a clearer recognition of the implications of created being, together with a more rational conception of the type of organization of all life must offer the solution. Acceptance of the eternal necessity of natural evil as a permanent element and inevitable factor of all life in every sphere, but nevertheless a factor which exists as defeated and cast down, is necessary for any adequate treatment of the problem.

Furthermore, a difficulty closely allied to this error, is our author's conception of God's relation to evil and suffering. To separate the Creator entirely from the life of the world in so far as that life includes suffering and misery, is to propose an insoluble prob-

impulses and interests is not a mere accident of our imperfect human nature, but must be a type of every rational life." *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 22. Cf. Fairbairn, *The Phil. of the Christ. Relig.* p. 135. Bowne's *Theism*, pp. 276, 278.

lem. Professor Royce's interesting thesis here is this: "Grant Job's own presupposition that God is a being, other than this world, that He is its eternal creator and ruler and then all solutions fail.—The answer to Job is: God is not in ultimate essence another being than yourself.—Your sufferings are God's sufferings."³

While it is difficult to accept Professor Royce's full thought regarding the relation of the individual to God, nevertheless he has rightly pointed out that our life does not exist in utter independence of God. This universe is not a chaos but a unity. Augustine's conception of God sitting aloft unmoved while man is tossed about in misery and woe must be rejected. All of these errors issue from our author's conception of metaphysical imperfection and its implications regarding the possibility and necessity of evil. His chief fallacy arose from the inability to recognize the necessity of evil which in turn resulted from the failure to distinguish clearly between natural and moral evil.

MAN'S ORIGINAL PERFECTION.

We now enter into the consideration of a series of untenable propositions all of which grow out of our author's realistic conception of the first man. Thus far we have found elements of truth in Augustine's conception of evil as negative and in his partial recognition of metaphysical imperfection and its real significance. From this point onward, however, we shall be compelled to attack unsparingly the very foundations of Augustinian doctrine of sin and attempt to show that it rests upon a group of such un-

³ *Studies of Good and Evil*, pp. 13-14.

tenable suppositions that its validity can not be maintained. In the present section we wish to deal with the idea of *man's original perfection*.

The absurd extremes to which men have gone in developing this conception is a sad commentary upon the intelligence of mankind. Bishop Bull dwells upon the marvellous wisdom of Adam exhibited in his naming without meditation the innumerable varieties of animals which were brought before him. The astounding fact is that God approved the nomenclature.¹ He says in concluding this account: "What single man, among all the philosophers since the Fall, what Plato, what Aristotle, etc., among the ancients, what Descartes or Gassendi among the moderns, nay, what Royal Society durst have undertaken this?" Similarly Bishop South characterized Aristotle as but the rubbish of Adam.

If we endeavor to account for the origin of this belief, two facts appear: (1) It is an inevitable tendency of all nations to look back into a distant and remote past and idealize their progenitors; (2) such a tendency is manifested in the Story of Eden. Once in the Hebrew Canon this splendid allegory was accepted as actual history by the Church and her teachers, and consequently found its natural place in Augustine's thought.

In rejecting this idea of man's original righteousness, there is no need of denying the universal sinfulness of mankind. To do so is only to confuse the facts of experience with a purely speculative explanation as to the origin of those facts. To reject the idea of a catastrophic moral fall, does not deny the

¹ Bull's Works II. 349.

present existence of that all-prevailing blemish of human life which for centuries has been explained by that Fall. That all men sin is a fact beyond doubt. The denial of any theoretic explanation of the reason for that universal fact will never alter its truth.

The real question then becomes not what the present condition of mankind is, but what it was originally. Now clearly two hypotheses present themselves: (1) Man was originally righteous and perfect but by some strange and striking accident he became hopelessly sinful. (2) Man was originally a non-moral being and gradually emerged from that stage into a state of increasing moral value. The real issue then is this: Was man's original condition chaos or harmony? That both possibilities may be conceived cannot be denied. "A chaos not yet reduced to order" and a "wreck and ruin of a once fair and perfect harmony" cannot be distinguished from one another. The struggle to control the heritage of a sensuous past must present the same scene of inner conflict as the discord arising from strife with a ruined but originally perfect moral nature. That this double possibility exists is then to be conceded.

Which of these possibilities shall we choose? We are dealing with this problem from a purely speculative point of view and do not feel it incumbent upon us to recognize the seeming difficulties which might arise in regard to biblical sources. It is sufficient to say in passing, that historical criticism² has fully solved any perplexities that might arise from this quarter. Nor is it within the scope of this work to enter into any argument touching evolution. It is

² See esp. "The Fall and Original Sin," by F. R. Tennant.

perfectly evident that its major contentions must be accepted. It is becoming increasingly difficult to imagine any such original state of perfection for man as Augustine continually presupposed. The various sciences all add their weight to this general conclusion. Astronomy, cosmic chemistry and geology reveal a world developing through long ages. Paleontology, embryology and anthropology point to unnumbered cycles and generations even before the historic curtain rises. Comparative religion reveals primitive moral conditions which argue ill for original righteousness. The whole basis of the doctrine of original sin is thus undermined and made unstable. The mind familiar with modern scientific conception finds it impossible to conceive of any originally perfect condition of man. We are compelled, therefore, to reject the idea of a catastrophic fall and regard man's moral condition from another point of view. *Man's fall was his rise.* His present sinful condition is not due to some falling away from an original uprightness. His condition must be described rather as a present non-attainment.

INDIVIDUAL WILLS IN ADAM.

We now turn to investigate the tenability of the Augustinian conception which so regarded Adam as to suppose that in him were contained *all the wills* of the still unindividualized human race. The realism involved in Augustine's conception of Adam suggests the later Medieval thought. That he did regard the will of every individual as actually present in the first man has already been set forth. Although this idea involves error of fundamental significance its criticism need not delay us long.

It clearly rests upon a false conception of personality. How can an individual be conceived as having two existences? Just what was that existence which each of us was supposed to have enjoyed in Adam? To answer that we were only present in a germinal, seminal or potential sense does not relieve the question of its difficulty so long as he insists that our wills were present and acted when Adam's did. In what respects did our Adamic existence differ from our present individual existence? To raise these questions is to reveal the utter untenableness of the whole idea. If personality means anything, it means among other things the possession of a will. But how can we conceive that our wills existed in Adam?

We have already seen how Augustine repudiated the idea of pre-existence as an explanation of the origin of evil in man. The same reasoning which repudiated the Platonic reminiscence theory must vanquish his own doctrine of the pre-existence of our wills in Adam. That Augustine consciously transformed the outer appearance of the theory cannot be affirmed. But in the last analysis wherein does the Platonic pre-existence theory differ from his own notion of our presence in Adam? Origen, influenced by Plato's doctrine of reminiscence had explained the source of evil in man by an appeal to an evil choice of the will in a pre-existent state. Augustine rejected this only to fall into precisely the same error disguised by another garb.

The Old Testament instead of Plato's dialogues furnished him the form of his thought.¹ The two

¹ For an excellent comparison of the systems of Origen and Augustine see Dr. Baur's *Vorlesungen über die christl. Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. I. P. II. p. 30 seq.

systems rest upon the same basal idea of pre-existence, the one appealing to an individual choice in a pre-temporal state, the other endeavoring to confine it within the bounds of historic life by merging our personalities into the supposed organic head of the race. Both assert an unconscious but responsible act in a pre-existent life.² If a choice must be made between individual existence in a pre-temporal state and a germinal, non-personal existence in a supposedly representative man, then the former is far more appealing. Augustine by merging our personalities in Adam, has robbed us of real individuality.

Furthermore, the logical correlate of this untenable conception of personality is the false idea of guilt or responsibility which it involves. *This is the fatal error in the doctrine of original sin.* Any theory which purports to satisfactorily account for the presence of sin in the world must grapple with both horns of a dilemma which for centuries has seemed intractable. The universality of sin is an acknowledged fact of human experience. But at the same time every individual believes himself responsible for his acts. How then shall we reconcile the two seemingly contradictory but accepted facts of universal sinfulness and individual guilt? That the Augustinian doctrine accounted for the former, although upon a false premise, we shall see later, but that it failed utterly to form a tenable theory of guilt is evident from its insistence upon the presence of our wills in Adam. If this can now be established, it suggests the necessity of a revision of the theory propounded for the other side

² See Ph. Schaff's formulation of this in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fath.* Vol. I. p. 14.

of the antinomy. It was just this historic antithesis between the universality of sin and personal guilt, together with the failure of our author's doctrine to recognize adequately the latter fact, that compelled Dr. Julius Müller in his most searching and analytical disquisition upon the whole doctrine of sin, to resort to the explanation of an evil choice upon the part of every individual in an extra-temporal state.

Upon a little investigation the utter absurdity of Augustine's conception of guilt becomes evident. We have seen that he asserts that because of Adam's evil choice every individual is guilty. Every new born babe which departs from this life without baptism is condemned to eternal punishment. Even more revolting is the doctrine of predestination which defends the justice of God for condemning the great mass of mankind to eternal punishment because of their evil choice in Adam. Such a theory of guilt can never satisfy the consciences of men. *All* are sinners, *each* is responsible,—this is readily admitted, but while men honestly acknowledge their responsibility they repudiate the idea of guilt attaching to a choice made while yet they existed potentially in the first man.

The most absurd of contradictions is involved in the idea of original guilt. It is in fact simply unthinkable to suppose that before the individual's personality exists he can make a voluntary choice for which he is guilty. Personality ceases to exist in any true sense the moment you rob it of responsible choice. If Augustine had not been so subservient to the letter of scripture and if he had not been determined upon the complete overthrow of the truth as well as the error involved in Pelagianism, he might have recognized that the more rational way of interpreting his concep-

tion of Adam would have been to regard him as guilty of all the sins of his posterity rather than they of his.³ Or, if mankind is guilty of Adam's first sin it must be guilty of all the sins he committed. Again, if the details of the Fall-story are to be magnified, then in reality man should be regarded as guilty of Eve's rather than Adam's sin for she it was who first fell. Furthermore, if in our present individualized existence we are guilty of Adam's sin, then in reality as each succeeding generation comes on, the burden of original sin grows heavier. Mankind is gradually becoming worse and the last individual becomes guilty of all the sins of innumerable generations.

Such are the absurdities into which our author's idea of guilt leads him. The consciousness of mankind demands another explanation of that ineradicable feeling of responsibility. It can attach no value to a theory which imputes guilt to the newborn child. It demands an explanation which, while accounting for the universality of sin, puts positive content into the idea of responsibility. It insists that responsibility attaches only to those acts committed by a voluntary choice of the will. The evolutionary explanation of the doctrine of sin fulfils both these demands. It recognizes the common elements of sin in every life as the inevitable heritage of countless ages of sensuous life. It attaches responsibility to the individual by holding him responsible for every failure to obey the call to a higher morality. Plainly, the idea of our author which places all our wills in Adam is utterly untenable both because of its false conception of per-

³ Compare Principal Caird's "Fundamental Idea of Christianity," Vol. I. pp. 210-211.

sonality and its consequent inadequacy in dealing with the question of responsibility.

CATASTROPHIC FALL AND FREEDOM.

Continuing our method of pointing out a basal error in Augustine's conception of Adam and following it out to its logical consequences in his system as a whole, we may now turn to another aspect of the idea of will, which naturally involves a criticism of his doctrine of freedom. The aspect to which we refer is that *a sinful act is supposed to have arisen directly out of a state of perfection*. Our criticism in the preceding section was directed against the fallacies involved in the supposition that our wills were actually present in Adam. We now come to deal more specifically with Adam's own individual will and to pass on from that to our author's whole treatment of freedom.

We have seen in our effort to state Augustine's explanation of the origin of evil, that he led us into a pre-existent world, asserted its original absolute moral perfection and goodness, and then affirmed that by the act of will of a particular being, evil arose. This marvellous transition is difficult to conceive. When we arrive upon this earth and are ushered into a similar situation of unqualified perfection, this same being, now evil, is introduced into the scene as a tempter of the first man but not in any way to relieve Adam of his responsibility. To introduce this "diabolus" may lessen the startling effect of man's first choice of evil, but it only shifts the problem to another room, where the first transition from a hypothetical state of perfection to a state of sin, is beyond the bounds of rational conception and where its utterly catastrophic

character must be accounted for by something more than free-will. With the understanding then that the introduction of this evil being does in no sense effect the problem but only presents the same difficulties in a more mysterious fashion, we may with entire propriety ask how we are to account for this most striking transition in the life of Adam. To be sure we have already rejected our author's conception of an original state of perfection but it will not be carrying coals to Newcastle to develop the inconsistencies involved in this notion of a catastrophic fall. Assuming then that Adam did enjoy this perfect condition, how can we account for the sudden transition to evil? To posit mere formal freedom will not explain it. Augustine found it necessary to postulate a sinful state (*originale peccatum*) to account for our choices of sin, why did he not recognize the necessity of some such inner solicitation in the case of the first man? To suppose that sin would arise out of a perfectly good being is beyond all comprehension. F. R. Tennant says: "It is the approach to evil, the indwelling propulsion to a wrong course which, on the theory that man was made at once an innocent and a moral being, precisely needs to be accounted for."¹

The very formulation of our author's conception of Adam's freedom assumes the precise thing that most needs explanation. To say that his freedom consisted in "*posse non peccare*," begs the question. It presupposes the possibility of sin, due to some evil choice. It is just here that Augustine's pre-existent world of angels in which evil was supposed to have originated introduces the greatest difficulty, but if we bear in

¹ "The Origin of Sin," p. 28.

mind that the same problem is left for solution in that realm, if we allow its evil to affect our thought at this juncture, then that element is instantly eliminated. Precisely here then our author has failed to explain how this transition to evil could have occurred. The moment he says "*posse non peccare*" he imports the necessary presupposition to account for the Fall. But in what did that possibility consist? Why should this perfect being feel drawn toward evil, if no evil existed? How can he introduce this totally new element into his universe? On his hypothesis of a perfect moral state and a pre-established harmony it becomes an impossibility.

Augustine's thought in its entirety fully recognizes the unity of character but the atomistic conception of life which would permit any such startling transition as the Fall to occur is a greater error than the Pelagian over-emphasis of the power of free-will. To suppose that a moral being who has never known or committed evil would suddenly perform such an act as the first sin was imagined to be, is to disregard completely the influence of antecedent upon subsequent volitions.

That all these difficulties vanish upon the evolutionary hypothesis is readily seen. To account for the first sin out of perfect morality is beyond the power of reason, but that view which looks upon man's moral progress as an effort to moralize the non-moral at once relieves the difficulty. The material for sin is ready at hand. After countless generations of mere brute existence, man has emerged with the burden of a sensuous nature. Now "*posse non peccare*" has some real significance and is not a question-begging epithet. Here is all the necessary inner solicitation and propulsion that is needed to account for the choice of evil.

But to postulate a perfect moral condition at the beginning and to eliminate every known allurements to evil, and then to imagine a terrible act of sin to appear upon that background seems strangely incongruous. Consequently we are compelled to reject the idea of a catastrophic fall, implying as it does a sudden transition from moral perfection to sin, and to substitute in its place the idea that man's rise was his fall, that sin emerged when man failed to subordinate his lower animal propensities to his dawning higher nature and the rule of conscience.

Although we are thus compelled to reject our author's conception of Adam's freedom which affirmed the power to choose either good or evil, *when a perfectly moral condition was presupposed*, we must at the same time recognize the very large and important element of truth which is here affirmed. We believe that Augustine was thoroughly right in placing the origin of sin in an act of free-will. When he accounts for the possibility of sin by an appeal to freedom we accept his result with unqualified agreement. That this was Augustine's endeavor, no one can doubt. But the exigencies of theological controversies led him into such curious deviations from this general contention that in our next paragraph we must enter into a criticism of his treatment of freedom. It is in fact our author's deviations from this basal contention that open the way to error. But that for Augustine, good and bad inhere in the will is perfectly evident. However we may differ from him in our formulation of the truth, Augustine has here taken an unassailable position. No solution of the problem of evil emerges until we recognize the responsibility of the individual in freedom. That his conception of re-

sponsibility was defective we have already seen, but that in his own terms, and with qualifications forced upon him by opponents, he contended stoutly for the origin of sin in free-will no one can question. And in this he was right. We must of course eliminate all that he contends for in regard to Adam's will injuring all the individual wills of mankind, but when he places in freedom the origin and the possibility of sin then we heartily accept his statement.

In other words we believe that the duty incumbent upon every man of working out his character involves the possibility but not the necessity of sin. It is only thus that we may rightly regard man as a moral, personal being. If we once grant that moral being is a desirable form of existence, then we must grant the possibility of sin. Obedience loses all its moral content unless the possibility of disobedience exists. Unless the opportunity to do evil is granted, then no value can be attached to the term good. If we once admit the wisdom of a moral universe we must grant the possibility of moral evil. The only rational world is a world of persons capable, through freedom, of doing good or evil. Consequently when Augustine finds, as we have seen that he does, the common element of all sin in the will, we gladly acknowledge the truth of his conclusion. We would only formulate the statement of it from a different point of view.

Instead of postulating an original state of moral perfection and accounting for the origin of evil by a catastrophic fall, that is, by a sinful act arising out of a pre-established harmony, we would regard man's original condition as simply non-moral, as chaotic, and contend that evil arose when by a voluntary choice man deliberately failed to subordinate the non-moral-

ized element to his developing conscience. We would maintain that no moral evil existed until the will emerged. Consequently moral evil is possible because of man's freedom. Sin becomes the failure of the man as expressed in his will to overcome and cast down the evil propensities of his inherited constitution. It is the failure to moralize the non-moral, to subject the hitherto neutral heritage of his animal nature to his growing consciousness of the right. This is sin. It becomes apparent therefore that Augustine reached a most tenable conclusion when he insisted upon the central significance of freedom. Sin in the last analysis *is* a matter of the will.

Having thus endeavored to recognize the essential element of truth in our author's defense of freedom, without in any sense accepting the premises upon which it rests we may now with justice attempt to point out the inconsistency into which he fell in his endeavor to formulate that general truth. It must not be forgotten at this juncture that every age has its own terminology. We have no right to suppose that a writer of the fourth century of our era, no matter how keen or subtle his reasonings, would express his conceptions by means of the same terms as present day writers. Consequently it may be that Augustine was endeavoring to state the same ideas and to think the same thoughts in his own way that we are in passing our criticism upon him. If this is so, then our criticism is but the translation of his thought into modern terminology. In any case it is an endeavor to state the truth. The total impression which one gathers from our author's handling of the problem of freedom is that the essential truth is struggling for expression but is constantly stifled by the burden of theo-

logical dogma and false philosophical conceptions which rest upon it. At any rate we cannot accept his own expression of the doctrine of freedom and must now indicate the errors which we detect in it.

The first observation which we make concerns our author's entire attitude to the will. One constantly feels that he looks upon it as something too objective. It almost seems to be a tangible entity thrust into man by the Creator. Not that we seek in any sense to sever the bond existing between the infinite and the finite will but because the will is constantly treated as something conferred upon man and as something that can be broken into pieces and doled out in various ways, do we make this criticism. Free-will is constantly referred to as a "donum." It is something handed over to man by his Creator. Adam possessed the ability to choose either good or evil but at the Fall this freedom was reduced to freedom for sin only. In other words a piece of the human will dropped out of man at that crucial moment. We would prefer to regard the will as the eternal possession of man, as something which necessarily inheres in the very idea of a moral universe, as something essential to the very constitution of personality itself.

On the other hand we must guard against the supposition that we entirely disregard the power of habit or the influence of past volitions upon present choices, or the basal truth of the unity of character. What we contend for is simply this: the will cannot be tossed about and broken up like some separate and objective entity but belongs to the eternal world. It inheres in the very nature of personality and is a necessary prerequisite of a moral universe. Consequently we con-

tend for the clear independence of man's finite will. If it is to possess any real power, if it is to assume any vital significance, it must in a very distinct sense be man's own possession.

We are conscious of the fact that this leads us upon very uncertain ground. Just what the relation of the finite will is to God's will is a subject which has received very different treatment. Professor Royce merges the will of the individual into the will of God. Our wills are God's will. Yet he would insist that this in no sense robs man of his volitional independence. It is this very point for which we contend. Man's will is eternal. It does not, of course, exist in complete independence of the world-will nor at the same time must its identity be lost by absorption in God's will. This may involve a pluralism within an essential monism, but this need not frighten us. Unless we maintain the independence and real power of the finite will our moral universe collapses.

Again, the Pelagian controversy led our author, as we have seen, to make some very important qualifications upon his assertions of freedom. This at once raises the general question whether Augustine after all must not be ranked as a determinist. His conception of the freedom of all men since Adam, as formulated in the phrase "*posse peccare*" seems to be something more than a recognition of heredity and environment. The common man, if Augustine's repeated declarations mean what they distinctly seem to say, has lost a part of his freedom. To be sure he is free in a certain sense. He has the capability of choosing between various non-moral possibilities but the moment you enter the moral realm his freedom

is limited to the choice of evil. His will avails for sin. It is described by "*posse peccare*." This fearful condition came about solely through the first evil choice. Since that time all finite wills are evil. This raises to prominence the constant classification of all wills as either good or bad. The distinction is rigid. The bad will is free to sin (*posse peccare*), the good will is unable to sin (*non posse peccare*). Experience on the contrary teaches us that often the same will makes both good and evil choices. This distinction then while not disregarding the element of character seems either to over-emphasize its truth or to rob man of his freedom. No man is truly free, who is unable to make a good choice. That "*quædam necessitas*" which attaches to all of Adam's posterity is, we fear, a fatal blow to our author's libertarianism.

This brings us to the consideration of the implications from our author's doctrine of grace. No man can make a good choice without *gratia Dei*. Here it is difficult to pass judgment upon our author. Perhaps he was trying to recognize that element of truth which declares the influence of the divine upon man. This is especially suggested by his emphasis on the thought that *gratia Dei* does not relieve man of the necessity of action. Nevertheless he seems to have completely overstated this truth and to have advocated the absolute necessity of external aid, if man is to make any good choice. His illustration of the necessity of external light for the eye clearly emphasizes this aspect of his doctrine. His Pelagian opponent, Cœlestius, did not hesitate to convert his conception of grace into determinism. He says: "*Si gratia Dei est quando vincimus peccata; ergo ipse est in*

culpa, quando a peccato vincimur, quia omnino custodire nos aut non potuit, aut noluit." ²

We are inclined to agree with Cœlestius. We believe that Augustine, owing to the Pelagian contentions, converted his doctrine of freedom into complete and absolute dependence upon God. If by determinism we mean that choices of the will are the result of character and external influence combined, then Augustine must be classed as a determinist. He himself would not escape this by identifying man with God. He would not reject the idea that God's grace is an external influence. The total impression of his writings is that man and God are to be separated completely in nature and essence. Man's good choices then are the product of alien interference. To suppose that any man since Adam has possessed that "*æquilibrium arbitrii*," that "*posse non peccare*" by which he is capable of choosing either good or evil, is to entertain heretical notions. It abandons the necessity of grace. But if by freedom, we mean with Professor Palmer, the ability to reduce a dual or multiple future possibility to a single actual result, then freedom is gone upon the Augustinian premises.

The doctrine of predestination only serves to confirm this contention. Indeed this belief makes freedom a mere name. Every man since Adam is condemned to choose only evil. A few elect ones have conferred upon them the "*bona boni necessitas*," and they are equally condemned to a holy life. They are unable to choose aught but the good. Evidently man

² De Gest. Pelag. 30, where Augustine quotes these words of Cœlestius.

has been transformed into a tool. Since Adam, his every choice is determined from without. To recognize formal freedom without excluding the influence of God upon man, we must grant to man the full power to accept or reject any influence from without. We must conclude, therefore, that Augustine in his endeavor to overthrow the atomistic Pelagian conception, and to defend his own inner sense of the need of divine grace to save a man from sin, has even in his determined insistence upon man's freedom, permitted it to crumble in his hands.³

The conception of "*causa efficiens*" is only another statement of the same deterministic tendency, but what shall we say of that curious idea found in "*causa deficiens*"? Unwilling to relate the evil will to God, he resorts to this idea which harmonizes perfectly with his whole tendency to make evil run off into the dark. He is constantly looking for something back of man's will and in the case of the good will it was most natural to make God its efficient cause. But having banished his evil principle and being unwilling in any sense to make God the cause of evil, he endeavors to combine his desire for a cause of the bad will with

³ That we are not unsupported in this interpretation of Augustine, we quote the following sentence from Edward Caird, which we chanced upon after reaching our own conclusion. Speaking of St. Paul, he says: "Thus he prepares the way for those Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrines, which practically involve the idea that man is the inert victim of external influence, and that since the Fall at least, he has become the plaything of an evil power which can only be driven out by the equally external influence of the Divine Spirit . . . doctrines which set religion in direct antagonism to morality and the grace of God to the activity of man." *Evolution of Religion*, Vol. II. p. 213.

his privative conception of evil, and welds the two into the correlative term "causa deficiens."

The striking fact which we observe here is this: it seems that Augustine realizes that something more than freedom⁴ is necessary to account for the transition from a perfect moral state to evil. He tries to find the cause but ends in a barren negation. His fundamental presupposition of an original state of perfection compels him to reach such a conclusion. How successful his search would have been had he been able to utilize the results of evolutionary thought it would be hard to overestimate. Just that inner solicitation is furnished by the still unmoralized heritage of man which would have enabled him to place a positive content into his idea. That he clung tenaciously to the idea that evil is to be attributed to an act of the will is most praiseworthy.

HUMAN NATURE A MASS.

Again we return to Adam, to find the basis of another element of both truth and error. The idea which we now approach is closely allied to the one already dealt with, namely, that all the wills of individual men were in Adam. We now propose to consider another phase of the same idea which receives expression in the words that *all human nature existed as a mass in*

⁴ Compare this statement from Professor Royce: "There is I doubt not, moral free will in the universe. But the presence of evil in the world simply cannot be explained by free will alone. One who maintains this view asserts in substance, 'all real evils are the results of acts of free and finite moral agents.'" *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 10.

Adam. When dealing with the former aspect we found that it contained the fatal error of the doctrine of original sin in that it failed utterly to account for individual responsibility. In the phase that is now to be considered we find the essential truth of the doctrine of original sin in that it recognizes, though upon false premises, the solidarity of mankind and the truth of universal sinfulness.

It was just here that Augustine made his most successful attack upon Pelagianism. The latter doctrine stands for isolation. It not only fails to recognize the unity of character but makes each man a solitary unit.¹ Over against this error we find that Augustine not only endeavors to recognize the power of habit² but specifically and consciously attempts to explain the solidarity of the race. He conceives this to be the purpose of God in the creation of a single man in whom he placed all human nature. It was not done that Adam might live a solitary life but that thus the unity of society (*societatis unitas*) might be emphasized and that men might be united both by similarity of nature and by family affection.³ He asserts that nothing is so social by nature as the human race.⁴ Here then we find a profound truth coming to ex-

¹ See Peter Holmes' statement, "The Anti-Pelagian Writings," in Works of St. Aug., Vol. I. Preface pp. XVIII.-XIX.

² Conf. VIII. 10.

³ "Unum ac singulum creavit, non utique solum sine humana societate deserendum, sed ut eo modo vehementius ei commendaretur ipsius societatis unitas vinculumque concordiae si non tantum inter se naturae similitudine, verum etiam cognationis affectu homines necterentur." Civ. Dei XII. cap. XXI.

⁴ Civ. Dei XII. cap. XXVII.

pression. All human nature existed as a mass in Adam that in this way all mankind might be bound together. Similarly the moment that Adam sinned all human nature was contaminated and the basis is laid for the recognition of the truth of universal sinfulness. His observation in experience of the universality of sin was thus accounted for upon the theory that all human nature was originally one mass in Adam and was deranged, tainted or injured by the Fall. That blemish, fault, flaw or imperfection, of all human nature which is expressed by the term "vitium" is thus accounted for. Bearing in mind that the seemingly insoluble antithesis which the doctrine of sin has been called upon to deal with is summed up in the words "universal sinfulness" and "individual guilt" we see that Augustine has proposed a theory which accounts for the former but not for the latter. Consequently his defective conception of individual responsibility suggests the necessity of a reformulation of the other member of the antithesis.

Wherein then lies the error of his recognition of universal sinfulness? Just in the conception of human nature as a mass. All of the difficulties which arose in our effort to understand how individual wills of unindividualized persons could exist in Adam, arise here also. What was that potential human nature that was massed in Adam? How is it related to and how does it differ from our individual human nature? In fact, to raise the crucial question at once, what is human nature apart from the individual? Obviously our author's realism is again responsible for the error underlying his explanation of the solidarity of the race. We must reject the idea that human nature

existed as a mass in Adam. This need not involve the rejection of the truth involved in the idea of race solidarity.

Similarly how could all human nature be injured in Adam? We understand from experience that occasionally some choice irremediably affects all the future of an individual, but usually such a choice is but the full flower of a germ that has developed for years. But to transfer such an idea back into the life of Adam and suppose that his first evil choice could have had such a damaging effect upon all mankind is to overleap the bounds of rational thinking. Again we find truth and error wedded—truth in that the solidarity of mankind and the universality of sin are recognized; error in that all human nature was supposed to have been injured *en masse* and that as a consequence every man is born a guilty sinner.

It is rather astounding to find our author's own opponent voicing the remarkably modern statement that nothing good or evil is born with a man for which he is responsible. He enters this world in an undeveloped state with capacity for either good or bad conduct. Man is before the action of his own will neither good nor bad. Neither vice nor virtue can be attributed to him for he comes fresh from the Creator's hand.⁵ That this line of thought is a striking anticipation of modern conclusions is most apparent. Universal sinfulness, no more than individual

⁵ "Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis: capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur: atque ante actionem propriæ voluntatis, id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit." Quoted from Pelagius by Aug. in *De Pec. Orig.* 14.

guilt, can be accounted for upon the basis of our existence in Adam. Evolutionary thought saves the truth of race solidarity and of the universality of sin, by giving to man a common heritage of instincts and natural endowments which in no sense are to be regarded as a ruined nature, but simply as man's natural inheritance. They are, moreover, the common inheritance of all men, and thus the organic unity of the race is recognized. Similarly these propensities and instincts exist as the neutral non-moral material out of which each man, by his own free-will, may make a good or evil life. Thus the universality of sin is made a possibility and is adequately accounted for together with a full recognition of man's freedom. Consequently the age long antinomy of universal sin and individual guilt is transcended not by abolishing either member but by a full and adequate recognition of both. Sin is universal because of our common natural heritage, the individual is responsible because by his will he may or may not moralize the neutral material which his life furnishes to him.

PROPAGATIO.

We have now in the last four sections entered into a discussion of the untenable features of our author's conception of Adam. We have been compelled to set aside his idea of the original perfection of man and to account for his present sinful state by regarding it simply as present non-attainment rather than the wreck of a previous perfect morality. We have seen the false conception of personality involved in the idea that our wills were all in Adam and the consequent impossibility for the doctrine of original sin to

maintain the responsibility of the individual. We have likewise endeavored to indicate the impossibility of a sinful act arising directly out of perfection, and the necessary rejection of a catastrophic fall. At the same time we attempted to give full credit to his recognition of freedom while being forced to point out his deterministic tendencies. Finally we have found in his conception of human nature as a mass in Adam a worthy effort to recognize the solidarity of mankind and to account for the universality of sin, but were unable to retain the idea because of its apparent error and its vain endeavor to account for the injury of all human nature. We are, therefore, prepared to leave Adam, and in our attempt to do so come upon the final error of our author's doctrine which demands criticism.

The fallacy to which we refer is his doctrine of "propagatio" which he developed in opposition to the Pelagian term "imitatio." When asked how the fatal flaw incurred by the Fall was transmitted from the germinal existence of each person to his individualized self, our author replied with this doctrine of propagation. That it lays him open to all the charges against traducianism is apparent. We must not forget that for our author this sin inhered in the soul but was transmitted by the flesh. That the doctrine of original sin rests on traducianism cannot be denied with any appearance of reason. To cite passages from our author's writings in which he asserts that he has no quarrel with creationism¹ or refers the origin of souls to creation *ex nihilo*,² is beside the

¹ E.g. *De Anim. et ejus. Orig.* I. 33.

² *Ibid.* II. 21.

mark. It is of far greater importance to see the unavoidable implications of the whole doctrine of original sin and the idea of "propagatio." The very fact that Augustine wavered so much in his own thought is ample evidence that he recognized this difficulty. His own mind could not be satisfied with its crass materialism but it seemed impossible for him to throw it off. The church dogma of the necessity of baptism for infants held him to the belief that they were born with sin transmitted to them through their fleshly origin. This birth-sin could only be accounted for by their derivation from the one primeval soul which sinned in the first father of mankind.³ It was precisely this difficulty which made it impossible for Augustine to accept Jerome's view of creationism.⁴ Perhaps Augustine's nearest approach to an admitted opinion on the question of the origin of the soul is his assertion that we are forced to regard the soul as derived by natural descent (propagatio) from the parent *or* by creation *ex nihilo*.⁵ If, then, we had not already found our author's conception of Adam totally untenable, we would find here in his mode of transmitting original sin to the individual an insuperable difficulty.

Furthermore this doctrine of "propagatio" leads our author into an erroneous conception of man's sensuous nature. Augustine was right in not regarding the flesh as the origin of evil but he was in error in regarding all its allurements and propensities as

³ De Anim. et ejus. Orig. I. 16. "Sed ad hoc peccatum subeundum cur damnata sit, quærimus, si non ex illa una trahitur, quæ in generis humani primo patre peccavit."

⁴ Ep. CLXVI. 10.

⁵ De Anim. et ejus Orig. I. 24.

the direct punishment of the first sin. To attribute man's sense of shame, and the power of concupiscence to Adam's Fall seems preposterous. Similarly his notion that natural death was the consequence of the Fall needs no comment. His idea of "vitium" as attached to all human nature has already been discussed. All of these ideas arose out of the conception that man's present bodily endowments which compel the soul to combat the body are the penalties for a sin which arose when no such conflict existed between them.

The difficulties involved in such a conception have already been suggested. It throws us back into the question of man's original state of righteousness and our whole attitude to the probable course of man's development. It is increasingly difficult in the light of evolutionary thought to postulate any such conception of man's original fleshly nature or to look upon his sensuous propensities as in themselves evil. On the contrary when we recall that these very instincts, passions and appetites have been the means by which through countless ages he has arrived at his present stage of development, their marvelous strength and continuous solicitation are not to be wondered at. They are not to be regarded as the evidences of a past sin but rather as the non-moral neutral material which the dawning higher nature of man must cast down and subject to his growing moral consciousness. The first sin, then, instead of being the most heinous and degrading was rather comparatively insignificant. Paradoxical though it may seem man's first sin becomes the occasion of his glory in the sense that it forced the emergence of moral consciousness and human freedom. We are not therefore to deplore hu-

man passions in the mastery of which life has been evolved and made possible, but rather to look upon them as elements out of which character has been and is being developed.⁶ To suggest this line of thought is to reveal the utter untenability of Augustine's doctrine of "propagatio" together with his whole conception of man's fleshly nature as the punishment of that hypothetical moral catastrophe.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

It only remains by way of conclusion to gather together our results. This may be done best by endeavoring to bring together the essential truth of the Augustinian system and then set over against it the inherent fallacies. Having done this we shall then be prepared to draw our final conclusion as to the strength or weakness of the doctrine as a whole.

(1). That Augustine, after nine years of instruction in a system thoroughly dualistic, emerged with a monistic philosophy is to be placed to his credit. In the last analysis it is this basal truth that shaped much of his thought which we have accepted. To this general philosophical point of view must be referred his insistence upon the goodness of all nature whatever may be its rank or class. Likewise his recognition of metaphysical imperfection as the necessary implication of creation may be traced to the same point of view. In it he found the possibility of evil instead of attributing it to an evil principle coeternal with his ground of the universe. Similarly this monistic stand-

⁶ Compare T. Gomperz' recognition of this truth while commenting on Plato's *Philebus*. "Greek Thinkers," Vol. III. p. 197.

point compelled him to look upon all evil as something unreal and at bottom nonexistent. It could find no place in his perfect universe save as a blemish upon good nature. Its utter negativity only attained to a seeming reality by attacking and destroying real being. Consequently his conception of sin as "defectus," as a falling away from the highest reality harmonizes perfectly with his system. Sin becomes an attempt to destroy the essential unity of the universe.

Again, Augustine has given expression to an unassailable truth when he insists upon the central significance of freedom. In our endeavor to state his explanation of the origin of evil we found the lines from all points converging upon this truth. His terminology differs from that of the present, his devotion to certain theological dogmas led him into curious deviations, the exigencies of theological debate forced him into qualifications, but amid them all rings the one clear note that man is free. The common element of all sin is in the will.

Furthermore that it is the glory of the Augustinian doctrine to have emphasized the important truths of the unity of character and the organic oneness of mankind has always been conceded. Though the premises upon which his thought rests must be rejected, nevertheless, the recognition of the truth, though the theoretic explanation was false, must always stand to the credit of our author.

(2). Similarly we find the fallacies of the system centering about certain basal ideas. Doubtless the confusion introduced into our author's thought by the failure to carefully distinguish "malum" and "peccatum" is responsible for much of his error. It was just because his philosophy was monistic that he fell

into this mistake. His universe was theocentric and all evil must be regarded either as actual or original sin, either as sin or its punishment. Consequently, we find that his conception of real life failed to make room for the imperfections of all finite existence. He looked forward to the elimination of all evil. His perfect life was to be one of leisure, where all resistance and effort to overcome were absent. His explanation of the ultimate relation of the good and evil may be traced to the same conception.

Again, much of the error noted in our author's thought may be referred to his endeavor to treat sin in the abstract, not realizing that no sin can exist apart from the sinner. The bald realism of his Adamic conception is the prolific source of flagrant error and a veritable nest of absurd fallacies and ridiculous inconsistencies. It was just this realism that led him to regard Adam as the whole race in embryo. Adam was the "*homo generalis*." Consequently all our wills were in his will and out from this grew the unendurable conceptions of personality and responsibility which have made the doctrine of original sin so revolting. It was precisely this fundamental method of thought combined with his over-emphasis of man's dependence upon God (which in turn was due to his rigid monism) that led him into his chief errors regarding freedom, enabling him to conceive of it as being permanently reduced at the Fall, and to resort to the idea of "*quædam necessitas*" when driven to it by the Pelagian conflict. A further evidence of this realistic tendency is his conception of human nature as a mass, which led him straight into traducianism and its untenable materialism.

Furthermore, much of our author's error may be

traced to his false conception of the past and his general view of man's moral development. It is true that we ought not to expect Augustine to have anticipated the evolutionary idea but his errors illustrate its necessity. His conceptions of an original righteous state of man and the sudden and catastrophic transition to sin reveal the need of a different point of view. His false idea of man's sensuous nature, his underestimate of its natural instincts and passions, and his vain endeavor to regard all its propensities and solicitations as an evidence of an original taint in all nature, likewise demand a new point of view.

(3). Finally we have seen that the ultimate test to which any satisfactory doctrine of sin must be brought is its ability to solve the antinomy of universal sin and individual responsibility. That Augustine recognized fully the first member of this antithesis has been made clear. That he did so, however, upon a false premise, became apparent after his utter failure to grapple successfully with the second member had suggested the necessity of a revision of the first. It becomes evident, therefore, that the validity of the Augustinian doctrine of sin cannot be maintained. It must be replaced by some theory which recognizes at one and the same time the solidarity of mankind, the universality of sin and the responsibility of every individual. It must explain why all men sin and why each man is guilty for his sin.

That such a theory becomes possible upon the basis afforded by evolution has already been repeatedly suggested. It does not fall within the scope of this work to enter into the positive construction of a new

theory of sin in all its details and implications.¹ But that the general basis of such a theory has been suggested as a necessary part of our criticism of the Augustinian system we trust is apparent. It finds a recognition of the organic unity of the race and of man's universal sinfulness in his common heritage of physical instincts and appetites. It holds each person responsible for his failure to overcome and subordinate all these lower instincts and passions to his developing moral life. Sin, therefore, is not mere sensuousness, but is the moral state which emerges when the will yields its consent. Thus the historic and hitherto irreconcilable antinomy of universal sin and individual responsibility disappears, while at the same time the primal and central significance of the will is adequately recognized.

¹ The only partial attempts at such a result which have come under the notice of the writer are those of F. R. Tennant in his four Hulsean Lectures entitled "The Origin and Propagation of Sin," and of Professor Otto Pfleiderer in his "Philosophy of Religion," E. T. Vol. IV. pp. 34-38. Mr. Tennant also suggests an earlier but very brief attempt of Archdeacon Wilson.

The writer is especially indebted to Mr. Tennant, and to the late Professor Stevens. The latter embodied his thought in a very brief article in the *Yale Divinity Quarterly*, May '04.

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
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
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