iitp ||tofrluati0n
:
THE
SANKHYA KARIKA,
BY
ISWARA KRISHNA;
TRANSLATED FKOM THE SANs(UUI HY
HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, ESQ.
Af.sO THE BHAVSHYA, f ";•«, COMMENTARY OF
GAUDAPiDA;
NiSLATKD, AND 1LLU,SIKATK1> BV AU vtiKJLNAt
JJY
HORACE IIAIMAN \VILSON, M.A.i [I PCBLISHED
?,v
MR. TOOKARAM TATYA, )30M1UV.
1887.
HUBBELHOEBER
THE
SANKHYA KARIKA,
BY
1SWAKA KRISHNA;
TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSCRIT BY
HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, ESQ.
ALSO THE BHA'SHYA, OR, COMMENTARY OF
GAUDAPADA •
TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT,
BY
HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A.F.R.S. PUBLISHED
BY MB. TOOKARAM TATYA,
BOMBAY.
r 3 2 '
1887.
t
tOMEAY .— PKISTED AT THE SUBOBIIA-PKAKASII FKESS.
SANKHYA KARIKA
OR
THE inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain ; for pain is embarrassment : nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of allevia tion exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished*
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B NASHYA.
Salutation to that KAPILA by whom the Sdnkhya philosophy was compassionately imparted, to serve as a boat for the purpose of crossing the ocean of ignorance in which the world was immersed.
I will declare compendiously the doctrine, for the benefit of students ; a short easy work, resting on authority, and establish ing certain results.
Three sorts of pain. — The explanation of this Ai*y& stanza is as follows :
The divine KAPILA,. the son of BEAHMA indeed : as it is said, " SANAKA, SANANDANA, and SANATANA the third ; ASURI, KAPILA, BORBU,. and PANCUASIKHA : these seven sons of Brahma" were termed great sages/' Together with. KAPILA were born Virtue-, Knowledge,. Dispassion, and. Power : for he being born, and observing the world plunged in profound dark ness by the succeeding series of worldly revolutions, was filled, with compassion ; and to his kinsman, the Brahman ASURI, he communicated, a knowledge of the TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES ; from which knowledge the destruction of pain proceeds. As it. is said; "He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever " order of life he imy have entered, and, whether he wear " braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he i$ liberated "(from existence): of this there is no-dpubt."
The inquiry is in consequence of the - embarrassment' of ' the- three sorts of pain. In this place the three sorts of pain are, 1. (adhydtniika). natural and inseparable;; 2, (ddhibhautika) natural and extrinsic; and 3. (fclfiidamka) non-natural or, superb uiaan,. The first is of t \yp .kinds, corporeal a,nd mental
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corporeal is flux, fever, or the like, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm : mental is privation of what is liked, approximation of what is disliked. * Extrinsic but natural paiu is fourfold, according to the aggregation or elementary matter whence it originates; that is, it is produced by any created beings : whether viviparous, oviparous, generated by heat and moisture, or springing from the soil ; or in short, by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles, gnats, musquitoes, lice, bugs, fish, alligators, sharks, trees, stones, &c. The third kind of pain may be called superhuman, daivika meaning either divine or atmospheric : in the latter case it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like.
Where then, or into what, is inquiry, in consequence of the embarrassment of three kinds of pain, to be made ? Into the means of precluding them. This is the inquiry. Nor is the inquiry superfluous. That is ; if this inquiry be (regarded as) superfluous, the means of precluding the three sorts of paiu being obvious (seen) ; as for example ; the internal means of alleviating the two inseparable kinds of pain are obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, bitter, and astringent decoctions, or through the removal of t/hose objects that are disliked, and accession of those that are liked ; so the obvious obstruction of pain from natural causes is protection and the like ; and these means being obvious, any (farther) inquiry is superfluous ; if you think in this manner, it is not so ; for absolutej certain, final, permanent, obstruction (of pain) is not (to be effected) by obvious means. Therefore inquiry is to be made by the wise elsewhere, or into means of prevention which are absolute and final
COMMENT,
The first verse of the Kdrikd proposes the subject of the \vork, and not only of that, but of the system to which it belongs, and of every philosophical system studied by the
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Hindus ; the common end of which is, ascertainment of the means by which perpetual exemption from the metempsychosis, or from the necessity of repeated births, may be attained : for life is uniformly regarded by the Hindus as a condition of pain and suffering, as a state of bondage and evil; escape from which finally and for ever is a consummation devoutly to be wished.
The liberation thus proposed as the object of rational exis tence cannot be attained as long as man is subject to the ordinary infirmities of his nature, and the accidents of his condition: and the primary object of philosophical inquiry therefore is, the means by which the imperfections flesh is heir to may be obviated or removed. As preparatory then to their right determination, it is first shewn in the text what means are not conducive to this end ; such, namely, as obvious but temporary expedients, whether physical or moral.
Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first number of his Gymnosophista, containing the translation of the Ifdrikd, has given a version differing in some respects from Mr. Colebrooke's, He thus renders it : " E tergeminorum dolorum impetu oritur-desiderium cognoscendse rationis, qua ii depellantur. Quod cogrioscendi desiderium licet in visibilibus rebus infructuose versetur, non est (infructuosum) propter absentiam absoluti, et omni aevo superstitis rernedii."
In the first member of this sentence, the translation of abhighdta by ' impetus' is irreconcilable with the context. The sense required by the doctrine laid down is * impediment, embarrassment, the prevention of liberation by worldly cares and sufferings.' So the same word abhighdtaka is immediately used to mean ' preventing, removing/ ' depellens," Professor Lassen's text, it is true, reads apagbdtaka, but this is not the reading followed by Mr. Colebrooke, nor that of the citation of the text given in the Sdnkhyu Bhdshya or Sdnkhya Kaiimudi ; it is that of the S. Tat iff a Kaiimudi and 8. Chandrikd&nd although in itself unobjectionable, yet is not a necessary nor preferable
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variation. At any rate there can be no question that the word abhighdia may be used in the sense of ' depellere/ and that sense therefore equally attaches to it in the prior, member of the hemistich. So in the Bhdshya of GAURAPADA we have ddhibhautikasya raJcshddina abhighdtah; l The prevention of ' extrinsic pain is by protection and the like/ It would not be possible here to render abhiyhdta by ' impetus.' By VACHAS- PATI the term abhighdta is denned 'the confinement of the sentient faculty (explained to mean here c life'), through the impediment opposed by threefold distress abiding in spirit.'* NARAYANA interprets it more concisely asahya sambandha,-^ ' intolerable restraint.' * Embarrassment' therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these definitions, or the obstruc tions offered by worldly sufferings to the spirit anxious to be free.
This variation, however, is of no great consequence : the more important difference is in the secjorxd portion of the stanza ; and as Professor Lassen has deviated advisedly from Mr. Colebrooke, it is necessary to examine the passage more in detail. The following are his reasons for the version he has made :
" HaBC posterioris versus (di*is}it6 etc.) interpretatio, sicuti scholiastarum suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatur. Quod ideo moneo, ne leviter rationem, a Colebrookio, V. summo, in hoc versu enarrando initam deseruisse censear. Is enim : 'nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist : for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.' Sed vereover^ ne vir summus constructionem particu!0e chet sententiam claudentis et a negatione excepta3 male intellexerit. De qua re dixi ad Hitop. procem. d. 28, Ex interpret. Colebrook. construendum esset : drishte sc. sati (1. e. yadyapi drishtam vidyate) sd (jijndsd)
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aparthd na ekdnt — abhdvdt .* Sed tit omittarn, particulse chef, nullum omnino relinqui locum in sententia, na inop portune versus loco collocatum 'esse, non potes quin coricedas. Male omnino se habet tota sententia et clautlrcat. Equidem construe : drishte sd ( jijndsd) updrthd (bkavati) diet (tathdpi) na (apdrthd bhavati) vkantd' — ubhwvdt.t Prorsus siniili-ter dicitur ndbhdmt infr. v. 8. Ablativum igitur ekdntyatyantoh abhdvdt, non ad drishte refero cum Colebrookio, sed ad nega- tionem quse cum supplementis suis aspodosm constituit. N-ain quse post chemid sequuntur verba, ad apodosin pertinere sem per observavi. Quam grammatica postulare videtur, patitur prseterea loci tenor enarrationem, imo melior evadit sententia. Ad drishte enim rektis istis verbis, id tantum dicitur, rerum visibilium cognitione non attingi J?osse philosophise finem, liberationem absolutam «t perpetuam a doloribus ; mea posita enarratione non id tantum docetur, sed additur etiam hoc : finern istum posse attingi, licet alio cognitionis genere. Tres omnino positiones altero hemistichii versu oontineatur •: phi losophise (id enim valet gigndsd, i. e. cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam et omne tempus transgredientem ; deinde ad eum non perveniri ea via quae primum initur, quia obvia quasi sit, i. e. remediorum a sensi- bilibus rebus petitorum ope ; denique ea remedia cognoscendi desideriuin posse expleri. Sed aliter atque Colebrookius hasce sententias inter se conjungit noster, et per conditionem etfert, quod ille per negationern enuntiat."
In this view of the meaning of the verse, there is a refine ment that does not belong to it, and which is not Indian : arguments are often elliptically and obscurely stated in Sanscrit dialectics, but one position at a time is usually sufficient for even Brahmanical subtlety. The only position here advanced
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is,* that the cure of worldly evil is riot to be effected by such remedies as are of obvious and ordinary application, as they can only afford temporary relief. Death itself is no exemption from calamity, if it involves the obligation of being born again,
The version proposed by Professor Lasseh rests upon his notion of the grammatical force of the expression chenna or chet, * if,' na, ' not :' the former he would refer to the prior member of the sentence, the latter to the subsequent expressions. But this division of the compound is riot that which is most usual in argumentative writings. The phrase is an elliptical negation of a preceding assertion, diet referring to what has been said, implying, ' if you assert or belive this ;' and no, meeting it with a negator, ' it is not so :' then follows the reason or argument of the denial. Thus in the Mtiktdvali : 4 But why should not Darkness be called a tenth thing, for it is apprehended by perception ? If this be said, it is not so (iti chdn-na) ; for it is the consequence of the non-existence of absolute light, and it would be illogical to enumerate it amongst things.'* So in the Ny&ya Sutra Vritti : ' If by a disturbance in the assembly there be no subsequent speech, and through the want of a reply there be defeat ; if this be urged) it is not so (iti chen-na), because there has been no opportunity for an answer.'t Again in the Sankhya Pravackana Bh­a. Sutra : — ' If it be said that Prakrit! is the cause of bondage, it is not so> from its dependent state.'J Comment : — ' But bondage may be occasioned by Prakriti. If this be asserted, it is not so. Why ? Because in the relation of bondage, Prakriti is dependent upon conjunction, as will be
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explained in the following precept.'* Also in the Veddnta Sara Vivriti : ' If in consequence of such texts of the Ve'das as " let sacrifice be performed as long as life endures" their performance is indispensable, and constant and occasional rites must be celebrated by those engaged in the attainment of true knowledge ; and if, on the other hand, the attainment of true knowledge is distinct from the observance of ceremonies ; then a double duty is incumbent on those wishing to eschew the world. If this be asserted, it is not so (iti chen^na}, from the compatibility of several ty with union, as in the case of articles of khayra or other wood :'~j* that is, where there are several obligations, that which is most essential may be select ed from the rest. In the same work we have an analogous form used affirmatively ; as, ' But how by the efficacy of knowledge, after the dissipation of ignorance, in regard to the object (of philosophy), can the true nature of the essentially happy (being) be attained ? for as he is eternally existent, knowledge is not necessary to establish his existence. If this be asserted, it is true (iti chet\ scitycim). Brahme, one essentially with felicity, is admitted to be eternal* but in a state of ignorance he is not obtained • like a piece of gold which is forgotten (and sought for), whilst it is hanging round the neck.'J Here it would be impossible to refer sati/am to the succeeding member of the sentence, as the apodosis being separated from it$ not only by the sense, but by the particle opi. Passages of this description might be indefinitely
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multiplied, but these are sufficient to shew that the con struction in the sense adopted by Mr. Colebrooke is common and correct.
Accordingly his version is uniformly supported scholiastarum suffragiis. Thus in the Sankya Bhdshya, as we have seen, the passage is explained, dri&hte sd> apdrtha chei evam manyase ncc ekdnta, &c. ; * If by reason of there being obvious remedies, you think indeed the inquiry superfluous, no (it is not so), frorpf their not being absolute and permanent/ So in the Sankyct Tatica Kauinudt, after stating the objection at length, the com mentator adds, nirdJcaroti, na iti ; ' (the author) refutes it (by saying), no, not so :' kutah, ' why' ? ekdntatyantatah abhdrdt* .The Sankhra Chandrikdis to the same effect, or still more ex plicit : ' There being obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous, the conclusion being otherwise attained : if (this be urged) such is the meaning (of the text), (the author) contradicts it ; no, it is not so.f This commentator giving the very reading, drishte sati, which Professor Lassen argues Mr. Colebrooke's version would erroneously require. The remaining scholiast, RAMA KRISHNA, adopts the comment of the Chandrikd word for word, and consequently the commentators are unanimous in support of the translation of Mr. Colebrooke.
With respect to the passages referred to by Professor Lassen as establishing the connection of the negative with the latter member of the sentence, instead of its being absolute, it will be seen at once that they are not at all analogous to the passage in our text. They are declaratory, not argumentative ; and the terms following the negative particle are the parts or circumstances of the negative, not the reasons on which it is grounded. Thus in the Hitopadesa : ' What will not be, will
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not be; if it will be, it will not be otherwise.'* So in v. 8. of the Rdrikd: ' The non-apprehension of nature is from its subtlety, not from its nonentity!.' In neither of these is there any reference to a foregone position which mast be admitted or denied, nor is the negative followed by the reasons for denial, as is the case in our text.
These considerations are more than sufficient to vindicate, what it was scarcely perhaps necessary to .have asserted, Mr Colebrooke's accuracy ; and they are now also somewhat super fluous, as I have been given to understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of his interpretation. The commentary of GAURAPADA distinctly shews that nothing more is intended by the text, than the unprofitableness of recourse to visible or worldly expedients for the relief or removal of worldly pain. In subjoining therefore the gloss of VACHESPATI MISRA, with a translation, it is intended rather to illustrate the doctrines of the text, and the mode of their development by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the correctness of the translation.
' j But verily the object of the science may not need inquiry, 1. if there be no pain in the world ; 2. if there be no desire to
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£,void it ; 3. if there be no means of extirpating it. The im possibility of extirpating it is twofold ; either from the eternity of pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviation : or, though it be possible to extirpate pain, yet that knowledge which philosophy treats of may not be the means of its re moval ; or again, there may be some other and more ready means. In the text, however, it is not said that pain does not exist, nor that there is no wish to avoid it. From the embar rassment of the three kinds qf pain. — A triad of pain, three kinds : they are the ddhydtmika, ' Natural ;' ddhibhautika 1 extrinsic ;' and dcfhidaivika, ' superhuman.' The first is of two kinds, bodily and mental : bodily is caused by disorder of the )mmours, wind, bile, anc} phlegm ; mental is occasioned by desire, wrath, coyetousness, fear, e^vy, grief, and want of dis crimination. These various kinds pf pain are called insepar able, from their admitting of internal remedies. The pain that requires external remedies is also twofolcj, &dhib1iautika and adhidaivika. The first has for its cause, man, beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, and Jp animate things ; the second arises from the evil influence of the planets, or possession by impure spirits (Yakshas, Hdkshasctt, Pwdyakas i&c.). TJiese kinds of pain depending upon the vicissitudes arising froin the quality of foulness, are to be experienced by every individual, and cannot, be prevented. Through the obstruction occasioned by the three kinds of pain abiding in spirit, arises embarrassment, or
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confinement of the sentient faculty. The capability of know ing the impediment occasioned by such pain, is considered the cause of the desire to avoid it ; for though pain may not be prevented, yet it is possible to overcome it, as will be subse quently explained. Pain then being generated, inquiry is to be made into the means of its removal. Tad apayhdtake : tad refers here to the three kinds of pain, tad having the relation dependent upon its being used as subordinate (relative) term. The means (hetu) of removing — These are to be derived from philosophy, not from any other source : this is the position (of the text). To this a doubt is objected ; As there are obvious •means, the inquiry is superfluous ; if so — . The sense is this : "Beit admitted that there are three kinds of pain; that the rational being wishes to escape from them ; that escape is practicable ; and that means attainable through philosophy are adequate to their extirpation ; still any investigation by those who look into the subject is needless ; for there do exist obvious (visible) means of extirpation, which are easily attainable, whilst the knowledge of philosophical principles is. difficult of attainment, and to be acquired only by long study, aud tradi tional tuition through many generations. Therefore, acoortlin g to the popular saying, " Why should a man who may find honey in the arkka flower, go for it to the mountain ?" so wluvt wise man will give himself unnecessary trouble, when he has attained the object of his wishes, Hundreds of remedies for
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bodily affections are indicated by eminent physicians. The pleasures of sense, women, wine, luxuries, unguents, dress, ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental distress. So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating it exist in the skill acquired by acquaintance with moral and politieal science, and by residing in safe and healthy places, and the like ; whilst the employment of gems and charms readily counteracts the evils induced by superhuman agency. This is the objection. (The author) refutes it ; it is not so. Why ? From these means not being absolute or final. Ekanta means the certainty of the cessation of pain ; atyantd, the non- recurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of relief there is) the non-existence of botli these properties ; the affix tasi, which may be substituted for all inflexions, being here put for the sixth case dual ; — as it is said ; " From not observing the (invariable) cessation of pain of various kinds, in conse quence of the employment of ceremonies, drugs, women, moral and political studies, charms, and the like, their want of certain operation (is predicated) ; so is their temporary influence, from observing the recurrence of pain that had been suppressed. Although available, therefore, the obvious means of putting a stop to pain are neither absolute nor final, and consequently this iuquiry (into other means) is not superfluous." This is the purport (of the text).'
The Sdnkhya Cliandrika and 8. Kaumudi are both to the same effect, and it is unnecessary to cite them. The original Sutras of KAPILA, as collected in the 8. PravacJiana, and commented on by VIJGNYA'NA BHIKSHU, confirm the view taken by the scholiasts.
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Sutra : — ' The final cessation of the three kinds of pain is the final object of soul.*'
Comment : — ' The final cessation of these three kinds of pain, the total cessation of universal pain, whether gross or subtle (present or to come), is the final, supreme object of soul f
Sutra : — ' The accomplishment of that cessation is not from obvious means, from the evident recurrence (of pain) after suppression. J'
Comment : — ' The accomplishment of the final cessation o£ pain is not (to be effected) by worldly means, as wealth, and the 4ike. "Whence is this ? Because that pain of which the cessation is procured by wealth and the like is seen to occur again, when that wealth and the rest are exhausted. '§
II.
THE revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffec- tual> for it is impure ; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a dis criminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.
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BHASHYA.
Altliough the inquiry is to be directed to other than to ot)vij ous remedies, yet iu is not to be directed to such as are deri vable from revelation, as means of removing the three kinds of pain. Anusravati, ' what man successively hears ;' anusra- vika, ' that which is thence produced, revealed mode ;' that is, established by the Vedas : as it is said ; " "We drank the juice of the acid asclepias ; we became immortal ; we attained efful gence ; we know divine things, What harm can a foe inflict on us ? How can decay affect an immortal ?" (This text of the Veda refers to) a discussion amongst Indra and other gods, as to how they became immortal. In explanation it was said, " we were drinkers of soma juice, and thence became immortal," that is, gods * further^ " We ascended to, or attained effulgence, or heaven; we knew divine, celestial, things. Hence then, assuredly, what can an enemy do to us ? What decay can affect an immortal ?" dlmrtti meaning ' decay' or * injury :' ' What can it do to an immortal being ?'
It is also said in the Vedas, that final recompense is obtained by animal sacrifice : " He who offers the ashwamedha conquers all worlds, overcomes death, and erpiates all sin, even the 3
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murder of a Brahman." As, therefore, final and absolute con sequence is prescribed in the Vedas, inquiry (elsewhere) should be superfluous ; but this is not the case. The text says, the! revealed mode is like the temporal one — drislitavat ; ' like,- same as the temporal/ drifihtena tiilya,. What is that revealed mode, and whence is it (ineffectual) ? It is impure, defective in some respects, and excessive in others. It is impure from (enjoining) animal sacrifices ; as, " according to tlie ritual of the ashwamedha, six hundred horses, minus three, are offered at midday." For though that is virtue which is enjoined by the Vedas and laws, yet, from its miscellaneous character, it may be affected by impurity. It is also said ; " Many thousands of Iiidras and otter gods have passed away in successive ages, overcome by time ; for time is hard to overcome." Hence therefore, as even Indra and the gods perish, the revealed mode involves defective cessation of pain. Excess is also one of its properties, and pain is produced by observing the superior ad vantages of others. Here, therefore, by excess, atisayci is under stood the unequal distribution of temporal rewards, as the consequence of sacrifice ; the object of the ritual of the Vedas being in fact in all cases temporal good. Therefore the reveal ed mode is like the temporal aiie, What then is the preferable mode ? If this be asked, it is replied, One different from both, A mode different from both the temporal and revealed is preferable, being free from impurity, excess, or deficiency. How is this ? It is explained (in the text :: It consists in a discrltni- native knowledge &c. Here, by perceptible principles, are in tended Mahat and the rest, or Intellect, Egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs (of perception and action), and the five gross elements. The imperceptible one is Pradhana (the chief or great one). The thinking soitl, Purnsha (the incorporeal). These twentyfive principles are intended by the (three) terms ryakla, a-vyakta, and/wa. In discriminative knowledge of these consists the preferable mode ; and he who knows them knows the twenty-five principles (he has perfect knowledge).
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The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible, and thinking principles, is next explained,
COMMENT.
Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly evil are ineffectual, it is next asserted that devotional remedies, such as the rites enjoined by the Vedas, are equally unavail ing ; and knowledge of the three parts or divisions of existence material and spiritual, is the only mode by which exemption from the infirmities of corporeal being can be attained.
The Vedas are inefficient, from their inhumanity in pre scribing the shedding of blood ; the rewards which they propose are also but temporary, as the gods themselves are finite beings, perishing in each periodical revolution. The immortality spok en of in the Vedas is merely a 'long duration, or until a dissolution of the existent forms of things*. The Vedas also cause, instead of curing pain, as the blessings they promise to one man over another are sources of envy and misery to those who do not possess them. Such is the sense given by GTAUKA- PADA to dtisaya, and the Sankhya Tatwa Kaumudi understands it also to imply the unequal apportionment of rewards by the Vedas themselves : ' The jyotishtoma and other rites secure simply heaven ; the vajapeya and others confer the sovereignty of hea ven : this is being possessed of the property of excess (iii- equality)!.'
In like manner, the original aphorism of KAPIJLA affirms of these two modes, the temporal and revealed, that there ' is no diiference between them/]: and that * escape from pain is not the consequence of the latter/ 1| because ' recurrence is neverthe-
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less the result of that immunity which is attainable by acts (of devotion),'* as * the consequences of acts are not eternal.'f Here however a dilemma occurs, for the Veda also says, ' There is no return (regeneration) of one who has attained the sphere of Brahma by acts (of devotion).'^ This is explained away by a Sutra of Kapila, which declares that the Veda limits the non-regeneration of one who has attained the region of Brahma to him who, when there, acquires discriminative wisdom.§
This discriminative wisdom is the accurate discrimination of those principles into which all that exists is distributed by the Sdnkhya philosophy. Vyakta, ' that which is perceived, sensible, discrete ;' Avyakta, ' that which is unperceived, indiscrete ;' and Jna, * that which knows, or discriminates :' the first is matter in its perceptible modifications ; the second is crude, unmodified matter ; and the third is soul. The object of the S&nkhya Karika is to define and explain these three things, the correct knowledge of which is of itself release from worldly bondage, and exemption from exposure to human ills, by the final sepa ration of soul from body.
Cs
III,
NATURE, the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the Great or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor pro ductive.
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BHASHYA.
^ (the root) prakriti (nature) is pmdhdna (chief), from Its being the root of the seven principles -which are production*
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and productive ; such nature is the root, No production. — It is not produced from another : on that account nature (prakritl) is no product of any other thing. Seven principles. — Mahat and the rest ; from its being the great (mahat) ele ment ; this is Intellect (Buddhi). Intellect and the rest. — The
f seven principles are, 1. Intellect; 2. Egotism; 3 — 7. The five subtile rudiments. These seven are productions and pro ductive : in this manner ; Intellect is produced from the chief one (nature). That again produces Egotism, whence it is productive (pmlcriti). Egotism, as derived from intellect, is a production ; but as it gives origin to the five subtile rudiments, it is productive, The subtile rudiment of sound is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production ; but as causing the pro duction of ether, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of touch, as generated from Egotism, is a production ; as giving origin to air, it is productive, The gubtile rudiment of smell is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production ; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtile rudi ment of form is a production from Egotism ; as generating light, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived from Egotism, is a production ; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the Great principle and the rest are
/ productions and productive, J Sixteen are productions ; that is, \ the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements ; these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the terra vikdra being the same as vikrvti, Soul is neither a production nor productive. These (principels) being thus classed, it is next to be considered by what and how many kinds of proof, and by what proof severally applied, the demonstration of these three (classes of) principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the thinking soul, can be effected. For in this world a probable thing is established by proof, in the same mode as (a quantity of) grain by a prastha (a certain measure), and the like, or sandal and
other things by weight. On this account what proof is, is next to be defined.
COMMENT.
Iii this stanza the three principal categories of the Sankhya system are briefly defined, chieBy with regard to their relative characters.
Existent things, according to one classification, are said to be fourfold : 1. prakriti ; 2. vikriti ; 3; prakriti-vikriti ; and tinubhaya fupa neither pr&kriti nor vikriti, Prakriti, according to its ordinary use, and its etymological sense, means that which is primary, that xvhich precedes what is made ; from pra, prce and kri,''to make.' This, however, is further distinguished in the text into the mula prakriti ; the prakriti which is the root and substance of all things except soul, matter or nature ; and secondary, special, or relative prakriti, 01* every production that in its turn becomes primary to some other derived from it. By prakriti may therefore be understood the matter of which every substance primarily or secondarily is composed-, and from which it proceeds, the primary, or, as Mi*. Colebrooke renders it, * productive' principle of some secondary substance or production. This subsequent product is termed Vikriti, from the same root, kri, ' to make,' with vi, implying ' variation,' prefixed. Vikriti does not mean a product, or thing brought primarily into exis^ tence, but merely a modification of a state of being, a new development or form of something previously extant. We might therefore consider it as best rendered by the tertn ' development,' but there is no objection to the equivalent itt the text, or ' product/ In this way, then, the different sub stances of the universe are respectively nature, or matter, and form. ' Crude or radical matter is without form. Intellect is its first form, and Intellect is the matter of Egotism. Egotism is a form of Intellect and the matter of which the senses and the rudimental elements are formed ; the senses are forms of Egotism. The gross elements are forms of the rudimental elements. We are not to extend the materiality of the grosser elements to the forms of visible things, for visible things are compounds, not
( 24 )
simple developments of a simple base. Soul coffles uftder the fourth class ; it is neither matter nor form, production nor productive. More particular definitions of each category sub sequently occur.
PERCEPTION, inference, and right affirmation, are ad mitted to be threefold proof; for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise every mode of demon stration. It is from proof that belief of that which is to be proven results.
( 25 )
^FR
f^rr ^rffr ?r 5%
fftf II ^FW Tir I
I aPTRt ^TUT I
MWH
frM"
( 26 )
BHASHYA.
Perception ; — as, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, the nose, are the five organs of sense; and their five objects are respectively, sound, feel, form, flavour, and odour: the ear apprehends sound ; the skin, feel ; the eye, form ; the tongue taste ; the nose, smell. This proof is called, (that which is) seen (or perception). That abject which is not ascertainable either by its being present, or by reference, is to be apprehended from right affirmation ; such as, INDRA, the king of the gods ; the northern Kurus.; the nymphs of heaven; and the like. That which is not ascertainable by perception or inference, is derived from apt (or sufficient) authority. It is also said ; "They call scripture, right affirmation; right, as free from error. Let not one exempt from fault affirm a falsehood with out adequate reason. He -who in his appointed office is free from partiality or enmity, and is ever respected by persons of the same character, such a man is to be regarded as apt (fit or worthy)" In these three are comprised all kinds of proof. JAIMINI describes six sorts of proof. Which of those then are not proofs ? They are, presumption (arihdpatti), /proportion (sambhava), privation (abhdva) comprehension (pratibhd), oral communication (aitthya), and comparison (upamdna). Thus " Presumption" is twofold, * seen' and ' heard.' * Seen ' is where in one case the existence of spirit is admitted, and it is presumed that it exists in another. 'Heard;' DEVADATTA does not eat by day, and yet grows fat.: it is presumed then that he eats by night. "Proportion;" By the term one prastha, four kuravas are .equally designated. "Privation" is fourfold ; prior, mutual, constant, and total. * Prior ;' as DEVADATTA in childhood, youth, &c. ' Mutual ;' as, Water jar in cloth. ' Constant ;' as, The horns of an ass ; the son of a barren woman; the flowers of the sky, 'Total' priva-
( 27 )
tion, or destruction ; as when cloth is burnt, or as from, contemplating withered grain, want of. rain is ascertain ed In this manner privation is manifold. " Comprehen sion ;" as, The part of the country that lies between the- Vindhya, mountains on the north and Sahya mountains on the south^ extending to the sea, is pleasant. By this sentence it is intended to express that there are many agreeable circumstances comprehended in that country, the name of the site indicating its several products. "Oral communication ;" as, When people report there is a fiend in the fig -tree. " Com parison ;" The Gravaya is like a cow ; a lake is like a sea. These are the six kinds of proof; but they are comprised in- the three; for presumption is included in inference ; and proportion, privation, comprehension, oral communication, and comparison, are comprehended in right affirmation. There fore from the expressions (in the text), they, comprise every- mode of demonstration, and are admitted to be threefold proof, it is said, that by these three kinds of proof, proof is esta blished. Belief of that which is to be proven results from proof. — The things to be proven are,- Nature, Intellect Egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, and Soul.- These five and twenty principles are- classed as the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the percipient ;. and some are verifiable by perception, some by inference, and', some by authority ; which is the threefold proof. The definition of each kind (of proof) is next, given..
COMMENT,
The work pauses in its enumeration- of the physical and; metaphysical principles of the system, to define its dialectical portion, or the proofs which may be urged in support of its principles.
The doctrine that there are but three kinds of proof, is said ; to be supported by a text of the Veda? : ' Soul is either to be perceived, to be learned from authority, or to be inferred: from*
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reasoning*.' It is opposed to the tenets of the Naiydyikas and Mimdnsakas, the former of whom describe four kinds, and the. latter six kinds of proof. The proofs of the logicians are, pratyaksha^ ' perception ;' anumdna,\ 6 inference ;' upamdna ||, ' comparison ; ' and sabda §, ' verbal authority.' Of these, comparison and verbal authority are included by the Sdnkhyas under right affirmation ; the term dpta IF mean ing ' fit, right,' and being applied either to the Vedas** , or to inspired teachers ff, as subsequently explained. The Mimdnsakas do recognise six kinds of proof ; but GAURAPADA has either stated them incorrectly, or refers to a sj^stem differ ent from that now found in the best authorities of this school. KUMARILA BHATTA alludes to the sixfold proof of an older scholiast or Vrittikdra, but those six proofs are, as Mr. Cole- brooke states, perception, inference, comparison, presumption, authority, and privation ; and the author of the Sdstra dipikd excludes expressly sambhava, pratibhd and aitihya from the character of proofs. With regard to the terms specified, it may be doubted if exact equivalents can be devised. Arthd- patti is literally, ' attainment of meaning ;' conjecture or pre sumption, < inference ;' from which it differs only in the absence of the predicate or sign from which the subject is inferred. The illustrations of the commentator do not very clearly explain the purport of the two kinds of this proof, ' seen' and ' heard.' In the S'dstra dipikd the first is exem plified by the sentence, " DEVADATTA is alive, but not in his house ; it is presumed therefore that he is abroad." ' Heard,' s'ruta, is referred to the Ve'das, and applies to the interpretation of receipts by the spirit as well as the letter, as in a direction to offer any particular article, it may be presumed, that should that not be procurable, something similar may be substituted.
t SRZ^- i J arrjnr^r i n
IF ^H I "*'* 3n*TO> ' tt
( 29 )
VACHASPATI also considers arthdpatti to be comprised in infer ence, as well as sambhava, ' identity' or ' proportion.' Privation, he argues is only a modification of perception ; and aitihya, or ' report,' is no proof at all, the person with whom it origi nates being undetermined. Pratibhd he does not mention. The concluding expressions of GAURAPADA, Pratijdnvdsa sanyndnam, are of questionable import, and there is possibly some error in the copy. The ' objects of proof,' prameya, are, according to the Sankhya, all the principles of existence. Siddhi, ' accomplishment, determination,' in the last hemistich, is explained by pratiti, ' trust, belief.'
-I II ^ II
V.
PERCEPTION is ascertainment of particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argu ment, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. Right affirmation is true revelation.
f 5
( 30 )
SIT
ffa wtF^rafr ?SFT HT^nns i t^rror^s u
i *rar
* i
BHASHYA.
Drishta £ seen,' or pratyaksha, ' perception/ is application or exertion of the senses in regard to their several objects, as of the ear, and the rest, to sound, &c. Inference is of three kinds,. subsequent, antecedent/ analogous. Inference antecedent is that which has been previously deduced ; as rain is inferred from the rising of a cloud, because formerly rain had been the consequence. Subsequent ; as, having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred. Analogous ; as, having observed their change of place, it is concluded that the moon and stars are locomotive, like CHAITRA : that is, having seen a person named. CHAITRA trans fer his position from one place to another, and thence known that he was locomotive, it is inferred that the moon and stars also have motion (because it is seen that they change their places). So observing one mango tree in blossom, it is inferred that other mango trees also are in flower. This is inference from analogy.
Again ; premises an argument, and (deduce*) that which is argued by it. That inference. Premises a prior argument - that is, the thing which has a predicate, is inferred from the predicate, as, a mendicant (is known) by his staff; or it premises the subject of the argument, when the predicate is
( 31 )
deduced from that of which it is predicated as, having seen a mendicant, you say, this is his triple staff. Right affirmation is true revelation. — Apia means dchdryas, ' holy teachers,' as Brahma and the rest. S'ruti means Ve'das,' ' Teachers and Ve'das' is the import of that compound, and that which is declared by them is true revelation.
In this manner threefold proof has been described. It is •next explained by what sort of proof ascertainment is to be effected, and of what objects.
COMMENT.
The three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and right affirmation, are here more particularly explained.
The first is defined, ' what severally relates to, or is engaged in, an object of sense*. Adhyavasdya is explained by VACHASPATI, ' Knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual facultyf. NARAYANA explains it, ' That by which certainty is obtained]:.' The organs do not of themselves apprehend objects, but are merely the instruments by which they are approximated to the intellect : ' neither does intellect apprehend them (rationally), being, as derived from (prakriti) matter, incapable of sense ; but the unconscious impressions or modifications of intellect, derived through the senses, are communicated to soul, which, reflecting them whilst they are present in the intellect, appears by that reflection actually effected by wisdom, pleasure, and the like §.'
t
fire \ J arttresfaft f^facrs^nr t
^ ft sTOTOT^RRrfaftr fl^sQregnftscsfarF i ir<j jf^c^r pfMisft Tfr^m^r ^^r. \ 3^3 \ i
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The explanation given by GAUKAPADA of the three kinds of inference is not exactly conformable to the definitions of the logicians, although the same technical terms are employed. Thus in the Ny&ya Sutra Vritti, in the comment on the Sutra of (rautama,* we have the following : ' Threefold infe rence. Prior, that is, cause ; characterized b}^ or having, that (cause) ; as inference of rain from the gathering of clouds. Posterior, effect ; characterized by it, as inference of rain from the swelling of a river. Analogous (or generic) ; characterized as distinct from both effect and cause, as the inference of any thing being a substance from its being earthy)*.' Here then we, have inference a priori, or of effect from cause ; inference a posteriori, or of cause from effect ; and inference from analogy, or community of sensible properties : for sdmdnyato drishtam is ' that which is recognised from generic properties^ its own specific properties being unnoticed^.' The Sdnkhya Chandrikd gives a similar, or logical, explanation of the three kinds of inference.
The definition of inference in general is the subject of the first member of the second hemistich. The expressions linga § and lingi \ \ are analogous to ' predicate and subject/ or the mark, sign, or accident by which any thing is characterized, and the thing having such characteristic mark and sign. Thus linga is explained by logicians by the term vydpyd , H and lingi by vydpakd **; as in the proposition, There is fire, because there is smoke, the latter is the linga, vydpya, ' major or predicate ;' and fire the lingi or vy&paka, the ' minor or subject/ or thing of which the presence is denoted by its characteristic.
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Inference, then, is a conclusion derived from previous determination of predicate and subject ; or it is knowledge o^ the points of argument depending on the relation between subject and predicate ; that is, Unless it were previously known that smoke indicated fire, the presence of the latter could not be inferred from the appearance of the former*.' This is what the logicians term paramersha, ' observation or experience.' Aptcrf; according to GAURAPADA, means dchar.ya ; and apt a srutil implies ' holy teachers and holy writ.' NARAYANA expounds it in a similar manner] |, and adds, that dpta means Iswara, or ' god,' according to the theistical Sdnkhya§. VACHASPATI explains the terms similarly, though more obscurely. Apia is equivalent with him to prdpia, ' obtained/ and yukta, ' proper, right ;' and dp ta sruti is * both that which is right and traditional, holy know- ledgelf ;' for sruti is defined to be ' knowledge of the purport of texts derived from holy writ ; which knowledge is of itself proof, as obtained from the Ve'das, which are not of human origin, and fit to exempt from all fear of error**.' The first term, vdkya is explained to signify, the Ve'da is the teacher of religiontf ;' and the expression vdkydrtka is equivalent to dharma, ' religion or virtue.' Religion is heard by it ; as, " Let one desirous of heaven perform the jyotishtoma sacrifice :" such is a text (of scripture) JJ.' The texts of the Ve'das and of other inspired works are authority, as having been handed down through successive births by the same teachers as JAIGISKAVYA
**
fr i tt
( 34 )
*ays, ' By me living repeatedly in ten different great creations*/ So ' the VeMa was remembered by KAPILA from a former state of beingf .' The Mimdnsakas distinguish between dpta vdkya and v<*da vdkya : the former is human, the latter inspired, authority.
VI.
SENSIBLE objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained : and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.
firaf
(35
BHASHYA.
By inference from analogy ; of things beyond the senses — tha ascertainment of existing things which transcend the sonsoa. Nature and soul are not objects of sense, and are to be known only by reasoning from analogy. For as the predicates Mahat and the rest have the three qualities, so must that of which they are effects, the chief one (nature), have the three quali ties ; and as that which is irrational appears as if it was rational, it must have a guide and superintendent, which is soul. That which is perceptible is known by perception ; but that which is imperceptible, and which is not to be inferred from analogy, must be learnt from revelation, as, INDRA, the king of the gods ; the northern Kurus ; the nymphs of heaven : these depend upon sacred authority. Here some one objects, Nature or soul is not apprehended, and what is not apprehended in this world does not exist ; therefore these two are not, any more than a second head, or a third arm. In reply it is stated, that there are eight causes which prevent the apprehension of existing things.
COMMENT.
In this verse, according to the translation followed, the application of the three kinds of proof to three different objects is described : according to a different version, only one class of objects is referred to, those which transcend the senses, and of which a knowledge is attainable only by inference from analogy, or revelation.
The Sdnkhya Tativa Kaumudz concurs with the S&nkhy* Bhdshya in understanding the terms of the text, sdmdnyato-
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drishtdt*, to refer to anumdndtf, intending ' inference from analogy^.' A similar explanation occurs in the Sdnkhya Pravachana Bhdshya : ' Thence, from reasoning by analogy, the determination of both, of nature and soul, is effected§/ It appears therefore that in this place the text does not refer either to perception or to inference in general, as evidence of perceptible things, but solely to inference from analogy, as proof of imperceptible objects. For inference a priori or a posteriori regards things not necessarily beyond the cognizance of the senses, like nature and soul, but those only which are not at the moment per ceptible, as fire from smoke, rain from floods or clouds, and the like. It might be preferable, therefore, to render the verse somewhat differently from the text, or, ' It is by reasoning from analogy that belief in things beyond the senses is attained ; and imperceptible things, not thereby determined, are to be known only from revelation.' The version of Mr. Colebrooke in which he is followed by Professor Lassen.' (" ^Equalitatis intellects est per perceptionem : rerum quoe supra sensus sunt per demonstrationem vel hac non evictum, quod prseter sensus est, probatur revelatione"), rests apparently upon the authority of the S&nkhya Chandrikd and Sdnkhya Kaumudi < Sdmdnyatas has the affix tasi in the sense of the sixth (posses sive) case. The ascertainment of all objects appreciable by the senses, whether actually perceived or not, is by perception : there fore knowledge of earth and the other elements is by sense ; but knowledge of things beyond the senses, as natnre and the rest, is from inference!).'
J 3
T faftraft i § sr*n«rat
jfir
( 37 )
When inference from analogy fails, then, according to all the authorities, the remaining proof, or revelation, must be had recourse to, agreeably to the Sutras ; ' Oral proof is fit instruc tion/ and ' fit instruction is communication of the proofs by which the nature of both prakriti and purusha may be discriminated.*
VII.
FROM various causes things may be imperceptible (or unperceived); excessive distance, (extreme) nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interpo sition of objects, predominance of other matters, and intermixture with the like.
i * i
cl1 I ^^TRT^T ^^q^ fqff cf c
( 38 )
BHASHYA.
N on -perception of things here existing may proceed from,, their remoteness, as of Vishnumitra, Maitra, and Chaitra, dwelling in different countries ; or their propinquity, as the eye does not see the collyrium applied to the eyelids ; from defect of the organs, as sound and form are undiscernible by the deaf and the blind ; from inattention, as a person whose thoughts are distracted does not apprehend what is said to him, however intelligibly ; from minuteness, as the small particles of frost, vapour, and smoke in the atmosphere are Hot preceived ; from interposition, as thing is hidden by a wall ; from predominance of others, as the planets, asterisms, and stars are invisible when their rays are overpowered by those of the sun ; from intermixture with the like, as a bean in a heap of beans, a lotus amongst lotupes, a myrobalan amongst myrobalans, a pigeon in a flock of pigeons, cannot be perceived, being confounded in the midst of similar objects. In this way non-perception of actually existing things is eightfold.
Be it granted, that whatever is to be ascertained (by any means) is ; by what cause is apprehension of nature and soul prevented, and how is it to be effected.
COMMENT.
Reasons are here assigned why things may not be perceived, although they actually exist.
( 39 )
The terms of the text, as illustrated by the comment, are easily understood : the particle cha, in connexion with the last, is considered to imply the existence of other impediments besides those enumerated, such as non-production, as of curds from milk*. But these circumstances, for the most part, account for the non-perception of perceptible things, and it is still to be considered why nature and soul, which are not amongst things ordinarily perceptible are not perceivedt.
IK ii
VIII.
IT is owing to the subtilty (of nature), not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative prin ciples are effects; ( whence it is concluded as their cause) in some respects analogous, but in other dissimilar.
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BKASHYA.
From subtilty the non-perception of that nature. Nature is not apprehended (by the senses) on account of its subtilty, like the particles of smoke, vapour, and frost, which are in the atmosphere, although not perceived there. How then is it to be apprehended ? Its perception is from its effects. Having observed the effects, the cause is inferred. Nature is the cause, of which such is the effect. Intellect, egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, are its effects. That effect may be dissimilar from nature : ' nature/ prakriti ; 'the chief one/ pradhfrna ; dissimilar from it: or it may be analogous, of similar character ; as in the world a son may be like or unlike his father. From what cause this simi larity or dissimilarity proceeds, we shall hereafter explain.
Here a doubt arises, from the conflicting opinions of teachers, whether intellect and other effect be or be not already in nature. According to the Sankhya doctrine, the effects are in nature ; according to the Bauddhas and others, they are not ; for that which is, cannot cease to be ; and that which is not, can by no means be : this is a contradiction. Therefore it is said —
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COMMENT.
Nature is said to be imperceptible, from its subtilty : it must be therefore inferred from its effects.
The effects are the products of nature, or intellect, egotism, and the rest ; some of which are of a similar, and some of a dissimilar character, as subsequently explained.
Effect, according to the Sankhya system, necessarily implies cause, as it could not exist without it *: but on this topic there are different opinions, thus particularized by VACHAS- PATI : ' 1. Some say, that that which is may proceed from that which is not. 2. Some say, that effect is not a separate ly existent thing, but the revolution of an existent thing. 3. Some say, that that which is not may proceed from that yffiich is. 4. The ancients assert, that that which is comes from that which is (or ens from ens). By the three first pro positions the existence of nature would not be proved ; for.
' 1. The materiality of the cause of the world, of which the qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness are the natural properties, comprises sound and other changes of its natural condition, and is diversified by pleasure, pain, and insensibility » but if that which is, is born from that which is not, how can that insubstantial cause which is not, comprehend pleasure, pain, form, sound, and the like ? for there cannot be identity of nature between what is and what is not.
* 2. If sound, and other diversified existences, were bufc revolutions of one existent thing, yet that which is could no t proceed from such a source, for the property of manifold existence cannot belong to that which is not twofold : the notion of that which is not manifold through its comprising manifold existence is an obvious error.
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<3. The notion of the Kanabhakshas, Akshachatanas, and others, that that which is not may proceed from that which is> excludes the comprehension of effect in cause, as that which is and that which is not cannot have community : consequently the existence of nature is not proved ; and in order to establish its existence, the existence of effect in it must first be determined*.'
Of the doctrines here alluded to, the first is said to be that of some of the Buddhists, who deny the existence of prakriti, or any universal cause, or of any thing which they cannot verify by perception. The second is that of the Ve'dantis, who maintain that all that exists is T>ut the vivarttas, literally th« ' revolutions ' — the emanations from, or manifestations of, one only universal spirit. It might be said that the Sankhya seems to teach a similar doctrine, in as far as it refers all that exists, exclusive of spirit, to one common source, and makes all else identical with prakriti. It differs however in this, that it regards the substances evolved from the radical prakriti as substantial existences, as effects or products of a cause which exists no longer except in its effects. The Ve*dlntis, on the other hand, maintain that it is cause which is eternal, and that effects are only its present operations. The popular form
ff[
( 43 )
of Ve'dantism 'asserts, indeed, that nothing exists but cause, and that its effects, or all that appears to exist, are unreali ties, illusions, the phantoms of a dream : but the commentator on the Sdnkhya Pravachana declares, that the doctrine of mdyd, or ' illusion/ is modern, and is contrary to the V£das, and that those who advocate it are nothing but disguised Bauddhas : ' The cause of the bondage of soul asserted, by those concealed Bauddhas, the modern advocates of may a, is here refuted'*.' In the third case we have the authors specified as Kanabhakshas, ' Feeders upon little/ or upoa atoms, perhaps ; and Ak&hacharanas, ' Followers of contro versy/ contemptuous terms for the Vaisfahikas, who main tain the origin of all things from primaeval atoms, or monads ; and who may therefore be said to deduce what is not — the insubstantial forma of things — from actual corpuscular substance.
The fourth or ancient doctrine, that that which is comes from that which is, em from ens, TO oi/, from TO ov, is the converse of the celebrated dogma of antiquity, ex nihilo, nihil fit ; and although in this place it is especially restricted to the relation of certain effects to a certain cause, yet it comes to the same thing a& regards the world in general, the things of which cannot be derived from no primary existent thing ; agreeably to the Sutra of KAPILA ; ' The production of a thing cannot be from nothing t / QvSev yivcTai e/c TOV /j.tj QJ/TO? : not only according to Democritus and Epicurus, but according to all the ancient philosophers, who, Aristotle states, agreed universally in the physical doctrine, that it was impossible for any thing to be produced from nothing : TWrow Se TO /JLCV CK M OVTWV yive(r6ai advvaTOv' ire pi yap TCIVTW oyuoyyw/xoji'own Ttj?: aVai/Te? oi Trept ^uo-ewy. Phys. I. 4,
* sritarofo JTw^rsrt frr^r^r^Tt ^^ fMrf *
t
( 44 )
IX.
EFFECT subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause) ; for what exists not, can by no operation of cause be brought into existence. Materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose : every thing is not by every means possible : what is capable, does that to which it is competent ; and like is produced from like.
( 45 )
BHASHYA.
From there being no instrumental cause of ivhat exists not — non-existent, what is not — there is no making what is not : therefore effect is. In this world there is no making of what is not ; as, the production of oil from sand : therefore the instrumental cause produces what is, from its having been formerly implanted. Hence perceptible principles, which are effects, exist in nature.
Further, from selection of materials. — Updddna is ' (material) cause,' from the selection of it : thus, in life, a man who desires a thing, selects that by which it may be produced ; as he who wishes for curds, takes milk, not water (for their material cause). Thence effect is.
Again, every thing is not by every means possible. The universal possibility of every thing is not ; as of gold in silver, &c. or in grass, dust, or sand. Therefore, from the non- universality of every thing in every thing, effect is.
Again, what is capable does that to which it is competent; as, a potter is the capable agent ; the implements, the lump of clay, the wheel, rag, rope, water, &c. (are capable), by which he makes the jar, which is capable of being so made from earth. Thence effect is.
Lastly, like is produced from like. Such as is the character of cause, in which effect exists, such also is the character of effect ; as, barley is produced from barley, rice from rice. If effect was not (did not pre-exist), then rice might grow from pease ; but it does not, and therefore effect is.
By these five arguments, then, it is proved that intellect and the other characteristics do (pre) exist in nature ; and therefore production is of that which is, and not of that which is not.
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COMMENT.
Arguments are here adduced to shew that the effects or products pf nature are comprised in, and coexistent with, their cause or source ; consequently they are proofs of the existence of that primary cause or source.
It is laid down as a general principle, that cause and effect are in all cases coexistent, or that effect exists anteriorly to its manifestation ; sat-Jcdryyam * in the text meaning * existent effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause t ;' or, as the phrase also of the text asadakarandt \ is explained, ' If effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause does not exist, its existence cannot by any means be effected ||.' The expression sat-kdryyam, therefore, is to be understood throughout as meaning ' existent effect/ not the effect of that which exists : and the object of the stanza is to establish the existence of cause from its effects, and not of effects from the existence of cause, as Professor Lassen has explained it: "Qusenam sint rationes docetur quibus evincatur mentem ceteraque principia eftecta esse a TW OVTI" Mons. Pauthier (Traduction de la Sdnkhya Kdrikd, 105) is more correct in his view of the general purport of the verse; " Ce qui n'existe pas ne 'peut arriver & Petat d'effet ;" but he has mistaken the particulars — the reasons why that which is not can never, be, for the means which would be fruitlessly exercised for its production ; it is not that such existence cannot be effected " par la co-operation d'aucune cause mate'rielle," &c., but became an effect requires an adequate material cause, and the like.
Not only has the meaning of this verse been misapprehended by its translators, but the doctrine which it conveys seems to have been somewhat misconceived by high authority. M.
t
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Cousin, referring to this passage, observes, " L'argumentation de Kapila est, dans 1'histoire de philosophic, 1'antdcedent de celle d'^En^sideme et Hume. Selon Kapila il n'y a pas de notion propre de cause, et ce que nous appelons une cause n'est qu'une cause apparente relativernent a 1'effet qui la suit, mais c'est aussi un effect relative ment a la cause qui la precede, laquelle est encore un effet par la meme raison, et to uj ours de m&me, de maniere que tout est un enchainement necessaire d'effets sans 'cause veritable et inddpendente." M. Cousin then supports his view of the doctrine by selecting some of the arguments contained in the text ; as, " That which does not exist cannot be made to exist ;" and, " Cause and effect are of the same nature :" and he adds, as a third, that " il ne faufc pas s'occuper des causes, mais des effets, car 1'existence de 1'effet 'mesure 1'energie tie la cause ; done I'effet e'quivaut la cause." In this instance, however, he is scarcely justified by his authority, whose object is not to dispense with the con sideration of cause altogether, but to prove its existence from that of its effects. Kapila, therefore, is far from asserting that " il n'y a pas de cause," although he may so far agree with the philosophers referred ^to, in recognising no difference between 'material cause and material effects : for it must be remembered, that it is of material effects, of substances, that he is speaking. His doctrine is, in fact, that on which Brown enlarges in his lectures on power, cause, and effect — that " the forms of a body are the body itself ; and that all the substances which exist in the universe are every thing which truly exists in the universe, to which nothing can be added which is not itself a new substance : that there can be nothing in the events of nature,' therefore, but the antecedents and conse quents which are present in them ; and that these accordingly, or nothing, are the very causes and effects which we are desir ous of investigating." Lect. on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 175. KAPILA, however, has not asserted a series of antecedents and consequents without beginning ; and whatever we may conceive of his mtila-prakriti, his original and un-
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originated substance whence all substances proceed, it is a fixed point from which he starts, and the existence of which he deduces from its effects : the mutual and correlative existence of which, with their cause, ho endeavours to establish by arguments, which, as regarding a curious and not unin teresting part of the Sankhya philosephy, it may be allowable to recapitulate a little more in detail.
1. Asadakarandt ; f Because efficient or instrumental cause cannot make or produce that which is not.* Professor Lassen renders this, ' E nulla nonentis efficacitate, nonens nil efficit. A sat in this passage, however, is the object, not the agent ; and karana is employed technically to denote the efficient or operative cause, the energy of which would be exerted in vain unless applied to materials that existed : that which does not exist cannot be brought into existence by any agent. It would be useless to grind the sesamum for oil, unless the oil existed in it : the same force applied to sand or sugar-cane would not express oil. The appearance or manifestation of the oil is a proof that it was contained in the sesamum, and consequently is a proof of the existence of the source whence it is derived. This dogma, in its most comprehensive appli cation, is of course the same with that of the Greeks, that nothing can come from nothing, and makes the creation of the universe dependent upon pre-existing materials. Here^ however, the application is limited and specific, and as Sir Graves Haughton, in his vindication of Mr. Colebrooke's ex position of the Vedanta philosophy, has justly observed, it means no more than that things proceed from their respective sources, and from those sources alone ; or that certain sequents follow certain antecedents, and indicate consequently their existence.
2. Updddna grahandt ; ' From taking an adequate material cause : a fit material cause must be selected for any given effect or product.' There is no difference of opinion as to the purport of updddna j ' Such as the substance evolved, such is
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that from which it is evolved :' or as illustrated by GAURAPADA. ' He who wishes to make curds will employ milk, not water :' but this being the case, the effects which we behold, or infer, must proceed from something similar to themselves, and consequently prove the existence of that substance. ' The relation between cause and effect is the generation of effect ; but there can be no relation (between cause and) a non-existent effect, and there fore effect is*," and consequently so is cause.
3. * From the unfitness of all causes for every effect ;' sarva, sambhav&bk&v&t. There must be an identit}' of character be tween the sequent and its antecedent, and the existence of one indicates that of the other : a jar is made with clay, cloth with yarn ; the latter material could not be used to fabricate a water- pot, nor clay to weave a garment. If this was not the case, all things would be equally fit for all purposes/
. . . ex omnibus rebus Orrine genus nasci possit.
It is not, however, here intended to assert, that *' idonea causa non est ulla quam sad, TO ov" but that the effect must have a determinate existence in that cause, and can be the only effect which it can: produce ; as in the commentary on this expression in the Sankhya Prdvachana Bhdshya : ' If effect prior to pro duction do not exist in cause, there would be no reason why cause should not produce one noil-existent effect, and not another!.'
4. ffaktasya s'akydkarandt ; ' Frorn the execution of that which the agent is able to do/ Active or efficient causes cart do only that to which they are competent : the potter and his implements fabricate a water-jar, not a piece of cloth ; they are not competent to the latter, they are capable of the former. If effect did not pre-exist, if it were not inseparable from cause,
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power, or the exertions of an agent, and the employment of means, might derive from any antecedent one consequence as well as another.
5. Kdranabhdvat ; ' From the nature, of cause ;' that is, from its being of the same nature or character with effect, and consequently producing its like ; or, according to VACHASPATI * from the identity of cause with effect *:' ' Cloth is not differ ent from the threads of which it is woven, for it is made up of themf.' Here, then, we have precisely the discovery of modern philosophy^ " that the form of a body is only another name for the relative position of the parts that constitute it ; and that the forms of a body are nothing but the body itself:" (Brown's Lectures :) a discovery Which, simple as it may appear to be, dissipated but recently the illusion of substan tial forms,' which bad prevailed for ages in Europe. It seems, however, to have been familiar to Hindu speculation from the remotest periods, as the commentator on the Sankhya Prava- chana, and the author of the Sdnkhya Chandrika, cite the Ve'das in its confirmation : * Before production there is no difference between cause and effect J.' There is good reason, however, to think that the conclusion drawn from the doctrine by the Ve'das was very different from that of the Sankhyas, being the basis of Pantheism, and implying that before creation the great First Cause comprehended both cause and effect : the texts illustrating the dogma being such as, ' The existent TO ov verily was unevolved ||— TL his, the Existent, was oh pupil, before all things § — The Unborn was verily before all IF.' The Sankhyas, like some of the old Grecian philoso phers, choose to understand by tad, idam> TO bvy TO eV, * the comprehensive, eternal, material cause/
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From the arguments thus adduced, then, it is concluded that effect is, sat kdryam * ; that is, that it exists in, and is the same with, cause ; or, as GAURAPA'DA has it, mahat and the other characteristics of pradhdna are in pradhdna. Sat kdryam is therefore neither ' ponendum est existens ( sad) emphatice ita dictum TO ovrofxs ov, per se ens,' nor * effectus existentis, ah existente effectum, effectum a TW OVTL\ the question is, whe ther effect exists or not before production ; and not whether it is produced ' a ro> ovrt an a TO) /w,*/ ovrt ' It is the production > or appearance, OF that which is or is not ; not the production of any thing BY that which is or is not ; agreeably to the Sutra of &APILA : * There is no production of that which is not, as of a man's honrf* — The production of that which is not is impossi ble, as would be that of a human hornj.' Agreeably to the same doctrine also is the reply made in the Sutras to the objection, that if effect exists already, existence is superfluously given to it ; 'It is absurd to produce what is already extant||.' The answer is, 'It is not so ; for the actual occurrence or non-occur rence of production depends upon rnanifestation§ :' that is, the present existence of an effect is not the production of any thing new, but the actual manifestation of a change of form of that which previously existed : something like the notions which Aristotle ascribes to. ancient philosophers, that all things were together, and that their generation was merely a change of condition : ^Hi/ 6/xou ra Trdvra KGU TO yivearOai TOiovSe Ka9e<TTt]K€v a\\oiov(rOai : and it is curious enough to find the doctrine illustrated almost in the words of Hobbes : " Faciendum est quod faciunt statuarii, quimateriam exculpentes, supervacaneam imaginem nan faciunt sed inveniunt ;" or as VIJN YANA BHIKSHU has it, ' The active exertion of the sculptor produces merely the manifestation of the image which was in the stonelf.'
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Although however, as identical with cause, and regarded as proofs of its existence ; effects or products, in their separated or manifested condition regarded as forms only, possess proper ties different from those of their source or cause : these differ ences are detailed in the next stanza.
A DISCRETE prinpiple is causable, it, is inconstant, unperyading, mutable, multitudinous, supporting, mer- gent, conjunct, governed. The undisorete one is the reverse.
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( 54 ) BHASHYA.
Discrete ; intellect and the other effects. Causable ; that of which there is cause ; the term hetu meaning * cause,' as synony mous with updddna, kdrana and nimitta. Nature is the cause of a discrete principle ; therefore discrete principles, as far as the gross elements inclusive, have cause : thus, the principle intellect has cause by nature ; egotism by intellect ; the five rudiments and eleven organs by egotism ; ether by the rudiment of sound ; air by that of touch : light by that of form ; water by that of taste ; and earth by that of smell. In this way, to the gross elements inclusive 3a discrete principle has cause. Again, it is inconstant, because it is produced from another ; as a water- jar, which is produced from a lump of clay, is not constant. Again, it is unpervading, not going every where : a discrete principle is not like nature and soul, omnipresent. Again, it is mutable ; it is subject to the changes which the world undergoes : combined with the thirteen instruments, and incorporated in the subtile frame, it undergoes worldly vicissitudes, and hence is mutable. It is multitudinous ; it is intellect, egotism, the five rudiments, and eleven organs ; and the five gross elements are supported by the five rudiments. It is mergent ; subject to resolution ; for at the period of (general) dissolution, the five gross elements merge into the five rudiments ; they, with the eleven organs, into egotism ; egotism into intellect ; and intellect merges into nature. Conjunct ; conjoined, made up of parts, as sound, touch, taste, form, and smell. Governed ; not self-dependent; for intellect is dependent on nature, egotism on intellect, the rudiments and organs on egotism, and the gross elements on the rudiments. In this way the governed or subject discrete principle is explained: we now explain the undiscrete.
The undiscrete one is the reverse. An undiscrete principle is the contrary in respect to the properties attributed to the discrete : that, is causable ; but there is nothing prior to nature whence follows its nou-production, and therefore it is without
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cause. A discrete principle is inconstant ; an undiscrete is eternal, as it is not produced. The primary elements are not produced from any where ; that is, nature. A discrete principle is unpervading ; nature is pervading, going every where. A discrete principle is mutable ; nature immutable, from the same omnipresence. Discrete principles are multitudinous ; nature is single, from its causality: "Nature is the one cause of the three worlds ;" thence nature is single. Discrete principles are depen dent ; the undiscrete one is independent, from its not being an effect : there is nothing beyond nature of which it can be the effect. A discrete principle is mergent ; the undiscrete immer- ;gent (indissoluble), being eternal : intellect and the rest, at the period of general dissolution, merge respectively into one another ; not so nature ; and that therefore is immergent (indissoluble). A discrete principle is conjunct (or compound, made up of parts) ; nature is uncompounded, for sound, touch, flavour, form, and odour, are not in (crude) nature. Discrete principles are governed ; the undiscrete is independent, it presides over itself. These are the properties in which discrete and undiscrete principles are dissimilar: those in which they are similar are next described.
COMMENT.
It was stated in the eighth stanza, that intellect and the other effects of nature were in some respects similar, and in others dissimilar, to their cause : the properties in which the dissimilarity consists are here enumerated.
The generic term used for the effects or products of primae val nature (vyakta*) means, in its etymological and commonly received senses, that which is evident or manifest, or that which is individual or specific ; from vi distributive particle, and anja, ' to make clear or distinct'. The purport is there fore sufficiently well expressed by the equivalent Mr. Colo*
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broke has selected, 'discrete,' detached from its cause, and having a separate and distinct existence. Nature (or primary matter) is the reverse of this, or avyakta* 'undiscrete, unseparated, indistinct.' If natura were substituted for tellus these lines of Lucretius would illustrate the application of the terms in question :
Multa modis multis multarum semina rerum Quod permixta gerit tellus discretaque tradit.
Discrete or separated effect or principle (meaning by principle a tatwa, or category, according to the Sankhya classi fication of the elements of existent things) is described by its properties, and they are the same which arc specified iii the original Sutra. 1. Hetuinat'f, ' having cause, or origin;' hetu implying ' material ^ efficient, and occasional cause ;' 2. Anitya J,- ' temporary ;' for whatever has cause has begin ning, and whatever has a beginning must have an end. At the same time this is tov be understood of them in their actual or present form or condition : * Of their own nature (or as one with their cause) they are eternal, but they are perish able by their separate condition's' ||.' So in the Sutras 6 destruction ' is explained * resolution into cause§ ' 3. Un- pervading IF :' ' Every one of the effects of nature is not observable in every thing, they are dispersed as different modifications**.' Tydpli is the essential and inherent presence of one thing in another, as of heat in fire, oil in sesamum, &c. 4. SdJcriya^-f, 'mutable/ or 'having action:' perhaps ' movable ' or ' migratory ' would perfectly express the senses for the phrase is explained to signify that the effects of nature migrate from one substance to another ;' Intellect and the rest leave one body in which they were combined, arid enter into
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the composition of another : this is their transition : the transi tion of the gross elements earth and the rest, composing body, is well known *.' 5. ' Multitudinous ;' many, aneka f being repeated in various objects and persons, as ' the faculties in different individuals, and the elements in different forms $.' 6. Supported by, referable to, asrita §; as an effect may be considered to be upheld by its cause, or an individual referable to a species ; as trees form a wood. 7. ' Mergent,' linga ||; that which merges into, or is lost or resolved into, its primary elements, as subsequently explained. Intellect and the rest are the lingas, signs, marks, or characteristic circumstances of nature : and when they lose their individuality, or discrete existence, they may be said to have been absorbed by, or to have fused or merged into, their original source. Although therefore, the application of linga as an attributive in this sense is technical, the import is not so widely different from that of the substantive as might at first be imagined. VACHASPATI, explaining the term, has, ' Linga, the characteristic of pra- dhdna, for these principles, buddhi and the rest, are its charac teristics, as will be hereafter explained IT:' and the author of Sankhya Chandrika has, ' Linga is that which charac terizes, or causes to be known ** ;' it is the anumdpaka^, * the basis of the inference:' ' For this effect (of nature) is the parent of inference that an undiscrete cause exists Jf.' (See also Com. on V. 5. p. 24.) According to these interpretations, ' predicative' or * characteristic' would perhaps be a preferable equivalent ; but * mergent' or 'dissoluble §§' is conformable to the Sankhya Bhdshya.
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'The commentator on the S. Pravachana explains it by both terms ' inferential' or ' resolvable :' Effect is termed linga either from its being the ground of inference of cause, or from its progress to resolution *.' 8. ' Combined, conjunct,' s&va- yavat ; explained by VACHASPATI, ' mixing/ misrana$, or 'junction/ samyoga§, as the elements combine with one another. It might be said, then, that nature is a compound as its products combine with it ; but this is not so, for their union with nature is not mere 'mixture or conjunction, but identification from the sameness of the cause and effect ;|| a notion which distinguishes the pradhana of the Sankhyas from the first principles of those Grecian philosophers, who, if their doctrines have been rightly represented, taught that substances existed either as distinct particles of an aggregate, or component parts of a mixture, in their original form. In the Sankhya they separate or reunite as one and the same, 10. c Governed H:' the effects of nature depend upon its exis tence, and each in its turn produces its peculiar effect or product, in furtherance of the influence of nature, or in con sequence of its existence, without which they would cease to be, and their effects would be null; as, 'In the effect of egotism, which intellect has to produce, the fulfilment of nature is regarded; otherwise intellect, being ineffective, would not be able to produce egotism.**'
The properties of nature, or the undiscrete principle, are the reverse of these ; it has no cause; it has no end; it is omni present; it is immutable ; it is single; it is self-sustained ; it is the subject, not the predicate; it is entire, or one whole; it is supreme.
IF
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Although the especial object of the text here is the dis similarity between the effects of nature and their material cause yet the term avyakta applies equally to purusha, or ' soul,' also an invisible or undiscrete principle; and accordingly soul differs from discrete principles in the same circumstances as nature. In the properties, therefore, of non-causability, constancy, omnipresence, immutability, singleness, self-support, substantiveness. entireness, and supremacy, soul and nature correspond. They differ, however, in other respects, and particularly in those in which nature and its effects assimilate, as enumerated in the succeeding stanza.
XI.
A DISCRETE principle, as well as the chief (or un discrete) one, has the three qualities : it is indiscrimi- native, objective, common, irrational, prolific. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse.
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( 61 )
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BHASHYA.
t/ie iArce qualities : it is that of which goodness, foul ness, and darkness, are the three properties. A discrete prin ciple is indiscriminative ; discrimination does not belong to it : that is, it cannot distinguish which is a discrete prin ciple and which are properties, or that this is an ox, that is a horse : such as the properties are, such is the principle ; such as is the principle such are the properties ; and the like. Objective; a discrete principle is to be enjoyed (made use of), from its being an object to all men. Common ; from being the common possession of all, like a harlot. Irrational ; it does not comprehend pain, pleasure, or dulness. Prolific ; thus, egotism is the progeny of intellect ; the five rudiments and eleven organs of egotism ; and the five gross elements of the five rudiments. These properties, to prolific inclusive, are specified as those of a discrete principle ; and it is in them that the chief (or undiscrete) one is similar: " Such as is a discrete principle, such is the chief (or undiscrete) one/? Therefore as a discrete principle has three qualities, so has,
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the undiscrete, or that of which intellect and the rest, having the three qualities, are the effects : so in this world effect is of the like quality with cause, as black cloth is fabricated with black threads. A discrete principle is ^discriminative- ; so i& the chief one, it cannot discern that qualities are distinct from nature, that qualities are one thing, and that nature is an other ; therefore the chief one is indiscriminative. A discrete principle is objective ; so is the chief one, from its being the object of all men. A discrete principle is common ;. so is the chief one, being common to all things. A discrete principle is irrational ; so is the chief one, as it is not conscious of pain or pleasure, or dulness. Whence is this inferred ? From the irrationality of its effects ; from an irrational lump of clay proceeds an irrational water-pot. Thus has (nature) the chief one been explained. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse : this is now explained.
Reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles. Soul is the reverse of both, thus : Discrete and undiscrete have (the three) qualities ; soul is devoid of qualities : they are indis criminative ; soul has discrimination : they are objects, (of sense or fruition) ; soul is not an object (of sense or fruition) : they are common ; soul i.s specific : they are irrational ; soul is ra tional ; for inasmuch as it comprehends, or perfectly knows, pleasure, pain, and dulness it is rational : they are prolific ; soul is unprolific ; nothing is produced from soul. On these grounds soul is said to be the reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles.
It is also said, as in those, referring to the preceding verse ; for as the chief (or undiscrete) principle is there said to be without cause, &c. such is the soul. It is there stated that a discrete principle is causable, inconstant, and the like ; and that the undiscrete one is the reverse ; that is, it has no cause, &c., so soul is without cause, being no production. A discrete principle is inconstant; the undiscrete one is constant; so is soul; and it is immutable also, from its omnipresence. A discrete principle is multitudinous ; the undiscrete is single ; so is soul.
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A discrete principle is supported ; the undiscrete is unsup ported ; so is soul. A discrete principle is mergent ; the un- diserete immergent (indissoluble) ; so is soul ; it is not in any way decomposed. A discrete principle is conjunct ; the un discrete one uncorabined ; so is s©ul ; for there are no (com ponent) parts, such as sound, &o., in soul. Finally, discrete principles are governed ; the undiscrete one is independent *, so is soul, governing (or presiding over) itself. In this way the common properties of soul and nature were described in the preceding stanza ; whilst those in which they differ, as possession of the three qualities, and the like, are specified in this verse. Next follows more particular mention of these three qualities, with which both discrete principles and the undiscrete one are endowed.
COMMENT.
In this verse the properties common to crude nature and to its products are specified, continuing the reference to the eighth verse, in which it was asserted, that in some respects the effects of nature itself were analogous. This being effected, the text proceeds to state that soul has not the properties which are common to nature and its products, but possesses those which are peculiar to the former ; agreeing therefore in some respects with crude nature, but dissimilar in every respect to its effects or products.
The three qualities,* or satwa^, ' goodness/ rajasl, ' foulness,' and tamas\\, ' darkness', which are familiar to all the systems of of Hindu speculation, are more particularly described in the nextaverse ; soul, has them not. Pradhana? 'the chief one,' crude nature, and its products, have not discrimination, iiveka§, tha faculty of discerning the real and essential differences of things, of < distinguishing between matter and spirit, of knowing self. the exercise of which is the source of final liberation (from' -existence)T. By the term ' objective**' is intended that which
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may be used or enjoyed, such as the faculties of the mind and the organs of sense; or such as may be perceived by observation, vijndna* : such nature, or pradhdna, may also be considered as the origin of all things inferable by rea son. Soul, on the contrary, is the observer or enjoyer, as after wards explained. Achetana'f ' irrational;' that which does not think or feel unconscious, non-sentient; as in the Meghaduta; 'Those afflicted by desire seek relief both, from rational and irra tional objects,!'' explained either ' living and lifeless§' or * knowing and ignorant)!' chetana^ being defined knowledge of right and wrong, or ' of what ought, and what ought not, to be done **.'
The general position, that the properties of soul are the reverse of those of the products of nature, requires, however, some modification in one instance. A discrete principle is said to be multitudinous, many, awe/caff; consequently soul should be single, eka JJ; and it is so, according to the 8m JBhdshya§§. On the other hand, the S. Tatwa Kaumudi makes soul agree with discrete principles, in being multitudi nous : The properties of non-causability, constancy, and the rest, are common to soul and nature ; multitudinousness is a property common to (soul and) an undiscrete principle||||.' The 8. Chandrika confirms the interpretation, ' The phrase tathd, cha implies that (soul) is analogous to the undiscrete principle in non-causability and the rest, and analogous to discrete principles in manifold enumeration1^.' This is, in fact, the Sankhya doctrine, as subsequently laid down by the text, ver. 18, and is conformable to the Sutra of KAPILA ; * Multitude
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( 65 )
of souls is proved by variety of condition* :' that is, ' the virtuous are born again in heaven, the wicked are regenerated in hell ; the fool wanders in error, the wise man is set freet/ Either, therefore, GAURAPADA has made a mistake, or by his 4ka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations ; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans, vol. I. p. 31), ' individual/ So in the Sutras it is said, ' that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of ves- selsj.' This singleness of soul applies therefore to that par ticular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage, and liberation ; for, as the commentator observes, ' one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)||.' The singleness of soul therefore, as asserted by GAURAPADA, is no doubt to be understood in this sense.
: sRjRrafRrftwil:
XII.
THE qualities respectively consist in pleasure, pain, and dulness ; are adapted to manifestation, activity, and restraint ; mutually domineer ; rest on each other; produce each other ; consort together ; and are reci procally present.
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( 66 )
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( 67 )
BEASHYA.
The qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness, are severally the same as what is agreeable, what is disagreeable, and what is indifferent : thus goodness is all that is pleasure, priti meaning ' pleasure ;' being one with (or consisting of) that (pleasure) : foulness is one with, or consists of, disagreeableness (apriti) : darkness consists of, or is the same with, dulness ; vishdda meaning moha, ' dulness, stupidity.* Next, are adapt ed to 'manifestation, &c. ; a-rtha signifying ' competency' or ' fitness.' Groodness, then, is for the sake of manifestation ; it is fit for, or adapted to it : foulness is for activity ; darkness for restraint : that is, the qualities are connected with, or possessed of, manifestation, action, and inertia. They mu tually domineer : they are mutually paramount, sustaining, productive, cooperative, and coexistent. Thus, they are said to domineer mutually ; that is, they severally prevail or pre dominate over each other, or they are displayed by the pro perties of pleasure, pain, or dulness. When goodness is dominant, it overpowers foulness and darkness by its own pro perties, and is exhibited or identified with light and joy. When foulness predominates, it overpowers goodness and dark ness, and exists in pain and action. When darkness triumphs* it suppresses goodness and foulness, and is supreme as one with insensibility and inaction. So they rest on each other : the qualities combine with one another, like binary atoms. They produce each other, as the lump of clay generates the earthen jar. Tliey consort together, as males and females cohabit: as it is said, "Goodness is the consort of foulness* foulness of goodness ; darkness is called the consort of both "
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that is, they are respectively associates. They are recipro cally present : they abide or exist reciprocally, according to the text, " qualities abide in qualities" (that is, the same qualities may be regarded as different, according to their different effects) : thus, a beautiful and amiable woman, who is a source of delight to every one else, is the cause of misery to the other wives of her husband, and of bewilderment (insensibility) to the dissolute : and in this manner she is the cause of the influence of all three qualities. Thus also, a king, assiduous in protecting his people, and curbing the profligate, is the cause of happiness to the good, of misery and mortification to the bad : here foulness (activity) produces the effects of good ness and darkness. So darkness, by its investing nature, pro duces the effects of goodness and foulness, as clouds, over shadowing the heavens, cause delight upon earth, animate by their rain the active labours of the husbandman, and over whelm absent lovers with despair. In this manner the three qualities are reciprocally present (or perform the functions of one another).
COMMENT-
The three qualities are here described, by their effects and relations; by the production of pleasure, pain, and indifference; and by the manner in which they are detached or combined in their operations and influence.
The terms priti and apriti are here used as synonymes of sukha, l pleasure,' and dukha, ' pain ;' vishdda as a synonyme of moha, ' bewilderment, stupefaction, dulness, or insensibility.' The composition of dtma with these terms, prity&tmaka, implies ' essential or inseparable presence,' like that of life or soul in the living body. &n exact equivalent for such a compound can scarcely perhaps be supplied, but the sense maybe conveyed by such expressions as 'consists of, com prehends, is one or identical with/ and the like. A'tma is here used also to shew that the properties have positive
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existence ; that is, pleasure is not the mere absence of pain ; pain is not the mere absence of pleasure ; as, ' Negatives could not be essential ingredients in any thing : pleasure, pain, and insensibility are therefore entities ; the work dtma implying being, existence, existent nature, or property*.'
The absolute and relative influence of the several qualities is sufficiently illustrated by GAUKAPA'DA ; but VA'CHASPATI understands the text as in some respects differently construct ed. Instead of considering the last term, vrittaya^, as a dis tinct condition, anyonyavrittaya]., expounded in the 8. Bhdshya, parasparam varttante\\, they are reciprocally present, he inter-^ prets vritti by kriyd, ' act, operation, function,' and compounds it with each of the foregoing terms§. In all other respects his explanation of the terms coincides with that of the elder commentator. The passage quoted by GAUBAPA'DA is cited by VA'CHASPATI, with some difference, from the Vedas : * As it is said in the dgctma, all universally present are the associates of each other : goodness is the partner of foulness, foulness of goodness ; both are the companions of darkness, and darkness is said to be the associate of both. Their original connexion, or disjunction, is never observedHV The Chandrikd concurs with the 8. Tatwa Kaumudi in the explanation of vritti**. This commentary likewise offers some additional interpretation of the terms priti, &c. Thus prtti is said to comprise ' recti-
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tude, gentleness, modesty, faith, patience, clemency, wisdom :' apriti, besides c misery,' implies * hatred, violence, envy, abuse, wickedness ;' and vishdda is not only ' insensibility/ but ' tardi ness, fear, infidelity, dishonesty, avarice; and ignorance. When ever either of these is observed, it is referable to the corres ponding quality*.'
In speaking of qualities, however, the term guna is not to be regarded as an insubstantial accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul through the medium of the facul ties. It is, in fact, nature, or prakriti, in one of its three constituent parts or conditions, unduly prominent ; nature en tire, or unmodified, being nothing more than the three qualities in equipoise, according to the Sutra, Prakriti is the equal state of goodness, foulness, and darknesst, on which the com mentator remarks, Satwa and the rest are "things," not specific properties, from their being subject to combination or disjunc tion, and from their having the properties of lightness, heavi ness, and strength} ;' and again ' From the construction of in tellect and the rest endowed with the three properties, like cords wherewith to bind the victim the soul||.' So in the S. Sara, i Goodness and the rest are not the faculties of that (prakriti), being of the same nature§' — ' Such expressions as " qualities of nature" are to be understood (in the same sense) as (the term) " the trees of a f orest"HV that is, the forest is
*
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surfer,
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nothing different from the trees of which it is the aggregate, although particular trees or clumps may sometimes be indivi dualized. In like manner nature is not different from the qualities, but is the aggregate of them. ' Ingredients or con stituents of nature,' therefore, would be preferable term per haps to ' quality ;' but ' quality' is the more ordinary accepta tion of the word guna, and it may therefore be used, re membering only the distinction made by the Sankhyas of its materiality, as a constituent part of nature itself; the qualities being, in fact, only the conditions of things, and therefore not separable from the things themselves. It may be thought possible that there is some connection between the qunas which are the constituents, of prakriti, and the qualities, pas sions, or affections of primary matter of the older philosophers, alluded to by Aristotle ; from the changes produced by which on one unaltered substance all things originated : Trjg (J.GV ovo-ias v7ro/uL€vov(rr]$, TOt$ Se TraOeon /u.eTa/3a\\ovarr]$, TOVTO <TTOiyeiov Kal Tavrrjv TCOV OVTCOV TY\V ap\/jv <pa<Tiv elvai. Metaph. I. 3. Another analogy may be conjectured in the identification of the two, gunas, satwa and rajas, with prtti, ' affection,' and apriti, ' aversion,' as they thus correspond with the <pi\la and vetKo?, the ' love' and ' strife' of Empedocles as the principles of creation ; respectively the source of what is good or evil.
The sense in which the several terms for the three gunas is employed is sufficiently clear from the .explanation given of them in the text ; and the meaning of the equivalents which Mr. Colebrooke has assigned them must be understood ac cording to the same interpretation. Prof. Lassen renders them essentia, impetus, and caligo ; which, similarly understood, are equally unobjectionable : but as the name of a £ quality t sativa, is not perhaps well rendered by ' essence,' or even by ' existence,' which is its literal purport, ' goodness,' denoting exemption from all imperfection, seems to be preferable. Impetus is rather the effect of rajas, than the quality ; and the term ' foulness,' derived from its etymology from ranf
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' to colour or stain/ will better comprehend its characteristic results. The quality bears a striking analogy to the perturbatio of the Stoics, and might be rendered by that word, or by * passion/ in its generic acceptation. ' Darkness/ or caligo, expresses both the literal and technical signification of tamas.
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XIII.
GOODNESS is considered to be alleviating and en lightening : foulness, urgent and versatile : darkness, heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp, they cooperate for a purpose (by union of contraries).
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( 73 ) BHASHYA.
Goodness is alleviating, &c. — When goodness predominates, the frame is light, the intellect is luminous, and the senses are acute. Foulness is urgent and versatile. — What urges, urgent, exciting: as a bull, upon seeing another bull, exhibits vehement excitement; that is the effect of foulness. Foulness is also seen to be versatile ; that is, a person under its influence is capricious. Darkness is heavy and enveloping. — Where darkness prevails, the members of the body are heavy, the senses obtuse, or inade quate to the performance of their functions. But here it may be said, If these qualities are contraries to one another, what effect can they produce by their several purposes, and how therefore can it be said, they co-operate, like a lamp, for ct (common purpose). Like a lamp, their operation is for a (common) purpose : as a lamp, which is composed of the op- posites, a wick, oil, and flame, illuminates objects, so the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, although contrary to one another, effect a (common) purpose.
This question involves another. It was said (in ver. 11) that a discrete principle, as well as the chief one, has the three qualities, and is indiscriminative, objective, and the like. Admitting this to be true of the chief one (or nature), how is it ascertained that intellect and the rest have also the three qualities, and are indiscriminative, and the like ? This is next explained.
COMMENT.
The description of the three qualities is continued in this Verse.
Goodness is alleviating ; lagliu, ' light ;' it is matter, elastic and elevating, generating upward and lateral motion, as in the ascent of flame, and the currents of the air. It is the cause of
active and perfect functionality also in the instruments of vita" 10
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iity* ; enlightening, prakdsakam, < making manifest/ the objects of the senses. The term ish'tam, meaning ordinarily ' wished, desired/ imports in the text merely drishtam, ' seen, regarded, considered' — * by the Sankhya teachers-)-.' Foulness is urgent and versatile. — The qualities of goodness and dark ness are both inert and inoperative, even with regard to their own peculiar consequences ; and it is only by the restless activity and stimulating agency of the quality of foulness that they are roused to action ; upash'tambhakam } being here ex plained to signify ' stimulating, impelling/ udyotakam, preda- kam\\, contrary to its usual sense of ' opposing, hindering.' It might be supposed to imply some relation to the primitive shtabhi§, ' stop, hinder, oppose, be stupid ;' inasmuch as the idea appears to be that of action consequent upon obstruction, or inertia, ' reaction.' Thus, as illustrated in the 8. Bhdshya, a bull displays excitement on beholding, or being opposed by, another. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi has, ' The qualities good ness, and darkness, on account of their own inertia, are in operative, in regard to the exercise of their own effects, until excited by foulness. Having been roused from inactivity, they are made to put forth vigour and energy ; and therefore foul ness is said to be uigentK.' The Chandrikd is to the same effect : ' The meaning is this : From the production of combi nation and activity by foulness, the definition of that quality is excitement and versatility**.' It is not necessary, however, to take into consideration the sense of the primitive sh'tabhi, for upasKtambhaka is not derived from that root, but from stambhu^, a Sautra root ; which therefore, although the meanings of sh'tabhi are usually also assigned to it, may take the import required by the text, of ' urging' or * exciting.'
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The quality of darkness is ' heavy/ guru, causing sluggish ness of body and dulness of mind. It is also varynaka, ' sur rounding, enveloping/ so as to obstruct light, retard motion, &c.
But these qualities, although contraries, co-operate for a common purpose ; as the cotton, the oil, and the flame, al though mutually destructive, combine in a lamp to give light. The common object of the qualities is the fulfilment of the purpose of soul, as is subsequently explained.
XIV.
INDISCRIMINATIVENESS and the rest xof the properties of a discrete principle) are proved by the influence of the three qualities, and the absence thereof in the reverse. The undiscrete principle, moreover, (as well as the influence of the three qualities,) is demonstrat ed by effect possessing the properties of its cause (and by the absence of contrariety),
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BHASHYA.
That which is the property of indiscriminativeness and the rest is proved from the influence of the three qualities in mahat and the other discrete principles : but this is not proved in the ur discrete ; therefore it is said, by the absence the reverse of it : the reverse of it ; the absence ; the non-existence of the reverse of that: thence the undiscrete principle is established; as, where there are threads, there is cloth ; the threads are not one thing, and the cloth another. Why so 1 From the absence of the reverse (they are not contraries to each other). In this manner the discrete and undiscrete principles are established. The latter is remote, the former is near : but he who perceives discrete principles, perceives the undiscrete one also, as there is no contrariety between them. Hence also the undiscrete one is proved by effect possessing the properties of cause in this world : such as is the nature of the cause, such is that of the effect; thus from black threads black cloth is made. In the same mariner, as the characteristics of intellect and the rest are their being indiscriminative, objective, common, irrational, prolific, such as they are, such the undiscrete is proved essenti ally to be. From the influence of the three qualities, indis, criminativeness and the rest are proved to be in discrete princi ples ; and from there being no difference between them (and
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the undiscrete), and from essential identity of the properties of cause and effect, the nndiscrete principle also is demon strated.
But it is replied, this cannot be true ; for in this world that which is not apprehended is not ; but the undiscrete one is, although not applicable.
COMMENT.
It was stated in ver. 8, that mahat and the other effects of prakriti were in some respects like, and in others unlike, to their original. The circumstances in which they were dis similar were specified in ver. 10, and those in which they agreed in ver. 11. In the latter stanza, the first of the con current properties that was named was that of their possessing the three qualities ; and in verses 12 and 13 it was explained what was meant by the three qualities. In the present stanza it is asserted, that as the effects of prakriti have the three qualities, they must have, as a necessary consequence, the other properties, want of discrimination and the rest, enumerated in ver. 11 ; and that as they have them, their origin, or prakriti, must have them also, as there is no essential difference bet ween the properties of cause and effect.
The influence of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or the varied affections and conditions of all substances, is the obvious cause of perplexity, or want of discrimination, &c.; being, in fact, the same state or condition. Traigunya is the influence or any consequence of the three gunas. The next expression is variously interpreted.
Mr. Colebrooke renders tad viparyaya abhdvdt*, i and from the absence thereof in the reverse ;' that is, the absence of want of discrimination, &c. in that subject which is the reverse of the
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material products of nature, as, for instance, soul, is a negative proof of their existence in the former. The properties of contraries are contrary. Soul and matter are contraries, and consequently their properties are mutually the reverse of each other : but one property of soul is freedom from the three qalities, whilst that of matter, or any material product of pra kriti, is their possession ; consequently the former must be cap able, of discrimination. The same may be said of the other properties of mahat arid the rest. Thus YACBESPATI observes : ' It (the assertion) is first plainly affirmatively expressed in the natural order : it is then put negatively, or in the inverted °rder ; from the absence thereof in the reverse ; from; the ab sence of the three qualities in soul, as the reverse of the pro ducts of prakriti, in regard to want of discrimination and the like*/ The S. Chandrika has- a similar explanation : ' The reverse of that want of discrimination j where that is that is the reverse (of mahat, &c.), or soul: for in soul there are not the three qualities ; or, where there is not want of discrimination there are not three qualities, as in sourf :' intimating, therefore, that tad, ' thereof,' may refer either to the three qualities traigunya, or to want of discrimination, &c.
There is, however, another sense attached to the expression T and the reverse is understood not to signify souly or any thing contrary to mahat and the rest, but to imply contrariety or in compatibility in the properties of their origin, or prakriti: that is, iiidiscriminativeness and the rest are the properties of mahat &c. not only from their possessing the three qualities, but be cause there is nothing contrary to indiscriminativeness, &c. in prakriti. This proposition is indicated by VACHESPATI, who, after explaining the passage as above, adds, ' Or it may be understood as taking for its two subjects vy&kta and avyakta
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((discrete and undiscrete matter), and by the inverted proposi tion (or negatively) asserting that there is no reason (to the contrary) arising from one being exempt from the three quali ties*.' The same is more explicitly stated by GAURAJPADA. The absence of indiscriminativeness, he observes, as deduced from the influence of the three qualities, relates in the first in stance to vyakta, 'discrete matter/ mot to avyakta, or 'indiscrete:' but the same must apply to the latter also, because there is no .property belonging to it which is incompatible with, or the re verse, of, the properties of the vyakta, or * discrete matter,' mahat, &c,; as in the case ©f the cloth sund the threads of which it is woven, there is no incompatibility between them.
The first portion of the stanza having shewn, then, either simply that discrete matter is possessed of indiscriminativeness, ^&c. or that both it and indiscrete matter are equally devoid of discrimination, proceeds to draw the conclusion that such an indiscrete cause must exist, endowed with properties similar to those of its indiscrete effects, because there is no difference of .property between cause and effect; agreeably to the Sutra, ' The three qualities, insensibility and the -rest, belong to both ^prakriti and its .products)!:' and VACHESPATI observes, ' Effect is seen to be the same in its properties with cause, As the .properties of the threads, &c. are identical with those of cloth and the like, so the attributes of pleasure, pain, and insensibi lity, evidenced in the effects, which are distinguished as mahat •and the rest, are .proofs that similar conditions must belong to their cause : the existence of $radh&na or avy&kta^ as a, cause, of which pleasure, pain, and insensibility -are the conditions, is consequently established!/
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XV.
SINCK specific objects are finite ; since there is homo- geneousness ; since effects exist through energy ; since there is a parting (or issue) of effects from cause, and a reunion of the universe, —
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( 81 )
BHASHYA.
The undiscrete principle is cause : this is the completion of the construction of the sentence. Since specific objects are finite : as in the world, wherever the agent is, his limits are observed : thus, a potter, makes certain jars with certain por tions of clay ; so with intellect: intellect and the other charac teristics (of nature) as finite, as specific effects o'f it. Intellect is one, egotism is one, the subtile rudiments are five, the organs eleven, the gross elements five : from the limitation of these species nature is their cause, which produces finite discrete principles. If nature were not the cause, then discrete princi ples would have no limit: from the measure (or limit) of specific objects, therefore, nature exists, whence discrete principles are produced. Since there is homogeneoiisness : as in the world ^ that which is notorious is observed ; for having seen a religious student engaged in sacred study, it follows that his parents were assuredly of the Brahmanical tribe : so having observed that mahat and the other characteristics have the three quali ties, we conclude what their cause must be ; and in this way 11
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from homogeneousness the chief one exists. Since effects exist through energy : in life, that which is effective in any thing is active in the same : a potter is able to make a jar, therefore he makes a jar, not a piece of cloth. Since there is a parting of effect from cause : the chief one is cause ; that which makes is cause, that which is made is effect : the separation of cause and effect : thus ; a jar is competent to hold curds, honey, water, milk ; not so is its cause, .or the lump of clay ; but the lump of clay produces the jar, the jar does not produce the lump of clay. So having observed intellect and the other effects, it is inferred that cause must have been separated, of which these discrete principles are detached portions. Again, since there is a reunion of the universe (vaiswarupa). Viswa here means ' the world ;' rupa, ' individualization' (or specific form) : the abstract condition of the form of the world is the uni verse: from its reunion, nature exists (as cause) ; whence there is no mu tual separation of the five gross elements, earth &c., composing the three worlds ; or, the three worlds are comprised in the gross elements. The five gross elements are earth, water, fire, air, ether ; which at the season of general dissolution return in the order of creation to a state of non -separation, or into the modified five subtile rudiments : they and the eleven organs reunite in egotism ; egotism resolves into intellect ; and intellect into nature. Thus the three worlds, at the period of general dissolution, reunite in nature; and from such reunion of the dis crete and undiscrete principles, like that of curds and milk, it follows that the undiscrete principle is cause.
COMMENT-
. The sentence is incomplete, the government being in the first member of the following verse ; kdranam asti-avyaktam, There is (a general) cause (which is undiscrete).' Hitherto the subjects discussed haye been the existence of effects, and their correspondence or disagreement with their cause. It if now she>rn that cause exists imperceptible, or undiscrete.
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From specific effects being finite : from the certain or definite measure of the varieties of discrete principles, as one intellect, one egotism, five rudiments, and the like. If there were no certain and defined cause, the effects would be indefinite and unlimited : the water-jar, however, must be limited by the earth of which it consists, and which, as a distinct body, is no longer extant. ' Homogeneousness/ samanwaya, is defined * the common nar ure of different things*,' as the property of generating pain, pleasure, and dulness, which is possessed by intellect and the rest. Effects exist through energy : ' through the energy, ability, or power of cause they become activef:* A parting, or issue, of effect from cause, and final reunion of the separated effect. Vaiswartipa is merely a synonyme of kdrya, { effect ;' that which is of various, or every, sort of form» or nature. The evolution of effect from unseparated cause is illustrated by comparing nature to a tortoise, the limbs of which are at one time protruded, and at another retracted within the shell : ' As when the limbs which are in the body of the tortoise protrude, then they are distinguished, or (it is said) this is the body, those are the limbs : so when they are with- drawn into it they are undistinguished (from the body)!'. $• Tatwa Kaumudi. In like manner the water-jar or the diadem exist in the lump o-f clay or of gold, but are distinguished from it only when individually manifested ; they become mere clay or gold again on losing their detached condition : thus earth and the rest exist in the subtile rudiments ; those and the organs of sense and action in egotism; egotism in intellect; and intellect in nature: when manifested or put forth they are separated or dis tinguished from their several sources, but at the period of univer sal dissolution lose their distinct form, and become progressively
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ene with their common original : the existence of which there fore, as their undiscrete cause, is proved both by their appear ance or separation., and disappearance or reunion.
XVJ.
THERE is a general cause, which is undiscrete. It operates by means of the three qualities, and by mix ture, by modification, as water; for different objects are diversified by influence of the several qualities re spectively.
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BHASHYA.
That which is known as the undiscrete principle is the cause ; whence intellect and the other effects proceed. It operates by means of the three qualities. — That in which are the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, is the (aggregate of the) three qualities. What then is that ? The equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness, is the chief one (nature). Also, from mixture. — In like manner as the Ganges unites into one river the three streams that descend upon the head of Rtidra, so the (aggregate of the) three qualities, the undiscrete, produces a single discrete principle . or, as many threads combined from one piece of cloth, so the undiscrete generates intellect and the rest from the inter weaving of the three qualities : and thus from the influence of the three qualities and their aggregation the discrete world proceeds. But if discrete principles proceed from one un discrete, then one form should be common to all. This objec tion is invalid ; for it is by modification, like water, from a variety in the receptacles of the several qualities, that the three worlds, derived from one undiscrete principle, assume different conditions of being. The gods are united with plea sure, mankind with pain, animals with dulness ; so that a
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discrete principle, emanating from one nature, becomes modi fied, like water, according to the diversified receptacles of the q ualities. Prati prati implies ' several order :' gund srayat ' a receptacle of the qualities,' by the difference of that recep tacle (according to that several receptacle) in which it is lodged. Discrete principles are varied from modification ; as the simple element water, when fallen from the atmosphere, ia diversely modified as various fluids, according to its various combinations, so from one pradhdna proceed the three worlds, which are no longer of one (uniform) character. In the divinities the quality of goodness predominates, foulness and darkness are inert ; therefore they are supremely happy. In men the quality of foulness abounds, and goodness and dark ness are inert ; therefore they are supremely miserable, la animals goodness and foulness are inactive^ and darkness pre vails ; and therefore they are supremely insensible.
In these two stanzas the existence of nature (pradhdna) has been determined : in the next place, that of soul is to be •stablished.
COMMENT
In this verse, besides the conclusion drawn from the argu ments in the preceding stanza, it is here explained how nature, which is one, produces diversified effects. This is said to be through the influence of the three qualities, the combination, or several predominance of which in various objects is attended with a modification and diversity of that which is essentially one and the same.
' Modified condition/ according to VA'CHESPATI, ' is the cha racter of the three qualities, which are never for a moment stationary*,' except when creation is not : and from this constant vicissitude ensues combination in different proper-
< 87 )
tions, or the predominance of one or other in different objects for they are always combined, or mixed, in different propor tions. This is the mixture, the blending, or contention of the qualities which the text intends. Hence proceeds the modi fication of the original matter ; as rain water, falling upon different trees, is modified as the juice of their different fruits. ' As simple water shed by the clouds, coming into contact with yarious situations, is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, or astringent, in the character of the juice of the cocoa-nut, palm, bel karanja, and wood-apple.*' S. Tatwa Kaumudi. So, according to Cud worth, the Italic philosophers maintained that the forms and qualities of bodies were only different modifications of primary matter. " The same numerical matter," he observes, " differently modified, causing different phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things, as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice." Intellect. System, III. 426.
It may be doubted if the latter portion of the verse should not be preferably rendered, By ' modification, like water, according to the receptacle, or subject, of the qualities-f*.' Such is evi dently the sense in which the S. Bhdshya understands it, and such appears to be that of the above illustration ; the simple water being modified, as sweet, sour, &c., according to the tree by which it is absorbed, and the fruit of which it constitutes the juice. So certain objects are fitted for certain qualities ; as the gods for goodness, men for foulness, animals for darkness ; and nature is modified in them accordingly ; that quality pre dominating which is conformable to the receptacle : the ques tion here being, not the origin of things, but of their different properties, VACHESPATI, however, seems to make the diversity
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of objects depend upon the qualities, not the difference of qualities upon the subject ; explaining the pharse prati gund- sraya vishfahdt, ( The difference which is produced by the recipience of each several quality ; thence, &c.*' The Chan- drikd, has the same explanation, adding, ' Diversity is from diversity (different ratio) of qualitiesf.' There is no incom patibility, indeed, in the two views of the meaning of the text, as the variety of things depends upon the difference or dispro portion of the three primary qualities, whether those qualities modify, or be modified by. the subject to which they belong : in either case the variety is not a different thing, it is only a modification of the same thing, pradhdna.
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XVII.
SINCE the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use ; since the converse of that which has the three qualities, with other properties (before men tioned,) must exist ; since there must be superinten dence ; since there must be one to enjoy ; since there is a tendency to abstraction j therefore, soul is.
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BHASHYA,
As 'it is,11 said, " Liberation is obtained by discriminative knowledge of discrete and undiscrete principles ;" and whereas the undiscrete has been shewn to be distinct from the discrete by five arguments (ver. 9), so soul being, like the undiscrate
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principle, subtile (not cognizable by the senses), its existence is now established by inference. Soul is. — Why ? Because the assemblage of objects is for another's use. — The assemblage of intellect and the rest is fpr the use of soul : this is inferred from the irrationality (of nature and its effectf), like a bed. In like manner as a bed, which is an assembk.gc of bedding, props, cprds, cotton, coverlid, and pillows, is for another's use, pot for its own ; and its several component parts render no mutual service ; thence it is concluded that there is a man who Bleeps upon the bed, and fpr whose use it was made : so this body, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for an- pther's use ; or, there is soul, for whpse enjoyment this enjoy- $ble body, consisting pf an aggregate of intellect and the rest* has fyemi produced.
Again, soul is, because the reverse, of thai which has the three qualities Jias been declared : as it was stated in a former yerse (11), ' A discrete principle has the three qualities- is indiscriminatiye, objective, &c.;" an 4 it is added, " Soul L in these respects the reverse."
Again, soul is, because there must be superintendence. — A It charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses able to curvet, to prance, to gallop, so the soul guides the body : as it is said jn the Shasjithi Tantra, " Nature, directed by soul, proceeds.' Soul is, because there irnust be an enjoyer. — In like manner as tliere must be some one to partake pf food flavoured with sweet, spur, salt, pungent, bitter, and astringent flavours, so as there is no capability pf fruition, in intellect and the other products pf nature, there must be soul, by which this body is to be enjoyed.
Again, soul is, because there is a tendency to abstraction. — • Kaivalya is tjie abstract noun? derived from kevala, ' sole pnly' — i'or, on account pf, tiiat (abstraction) ; the practice of it : from the exercise of (or tendency to) abstraction (for the sake pf its own separation or detachment) it is inferred that soul is. [That is, Every one, whether wise or unwise, equally desires im- perishable release from succession of worldly existence.
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It is next to be determined whether this soul be but one superintendent over all bodies, like the string that supports sdl the gems of a necklace ; or whether there be many souls pr^~ siding severally over individual bodies.
COMMENT-
Arguments for the existence of soul as a distinct principle are here adduced.
The existence of soul is established by inference : a bed im plies a sleeper ; nature, made up of its effect s, is for the pro duction of pain, pleasure, and insensibility, of whidh soul alone is conscious*. But admitting that the assemblage is for the benefit of another, why should that other be soul ? because soul is not a similar aggregate ; it is not made up of qualities and the like, but is the reverse of nature in these respects, as was explained in verse 11 : or, as the commentator on the Sutra* Sankata par&rthatwat^, observes, because the property of pain or pleasure, which is identical with body, must be dif ferent from that which enjoys the cine, or suffers tlie other; Because there must be an enjoyer.—ThQ existence of an en- joyer implies the existence of both pleasure and pain ; election between which cannot be made by intellect and the rest, which are inseparable from them, and it must be the act of something else, which is soul. ' Intellect and the rest are the things to be used (bhogya) or perceived (drisya), and consequently imply one who perceives^:.' S. Tatwa Kaumudi.
The term kaivalya, rendered ' abstraction,' signifies ' detach ment from the world ;' or,as itis explained, 'absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must therefore be something different from intellect and the rest, which are th@
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same thing as pain, and cannot effect a separation from their* own essence*/ S. Tatwa Kaumudi. So VIJNANA BHIKSHU explains kaivalya, ' absolute extirpation of paint.'
The arguments in the text for the existence of soul are so many original aphorisms ofKAPiLA; as, 1. 'Soul is distinct from body, &c.J:' 2. ' From an aggregate being for another's iise||:' 3. ' From (the properties of) soul being the converse of the three qualities, &c.§:' 4. ' From superintendence's. 'From the tendency to abstraction**.' The commentator notices a different reading of the last Sutra, ' From nature not being competent to abstraction :' but this he considers erroneous**-)-. The fifth book of the 8. Pravachana contains other Sutras affirmative of the separate existence of souL
11
ra^ rn<"?re^i in c n
XVIII.
SINCE birth, death, aiid the instruments of life are allotted severally ; since occupations are not at once universal ; and since qualities affect variously ; multi tude of souls is demonstrated.
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( 93 )
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BHASHYA,
ii/e and death, and the instilments (of life). — Fwm the several allotment of these : this is the meaning of the text. Thus, if there was but on6 soul) then when one was bonij all would be born ; when one died, all would die ; if there was any defect in the vital instruments of one, such as deafness, blind ness, dumbness, mutilation, or lameness, then all would be blind, deaf, dumfy maimed, and halt : but this is not the case ; and therefore, from the several apportionment of death; birth, and instruments of life, multiplicity of soul is demonstrated. Since occupations are not at once universal. — Yugapat means, ' at one time.' Not at once ; or, at one time. Occupa* tion : as engaging in acts of virtue and the like are not observ ed to occur at one moment ; but some are busy with virtuous j others with vicious, actions ; some cultivate indifference to the world, and some acquire true wisdom : therefore) from the non-
Contemporaneousness of occupation, multitude bfsoulsis conclud ed. Also, since qualities affect variously. — From the contrary fcature of the qualities multitude of souls is proved ; as, in birth in general, one endowed with the quality of good-ness is happy; another with that of foulness is wretched ; and a third having that of darkness is apathetic : hence, therefore, multitude of souls is proved.
Soul is hot agent : this is next declared.
dOMMENT-
The multitudinous existence of soul, or the individual in- borporatibn of soul in different bodies, is here maintained.
Birth is defined to be the association of soul with body ; death its detachment : soul being always existent, and not in itself, Subject to birth or death ; as in the S. Pravachana Bhdshya*- also the S. Tatwa Kaumudi ; ' Life is the combination of soul with the pains incident to body, &c.; not any modification of soul. Death is the abandonment of those bodies, &c. ; not the destruction of soulf/ The ins tr urn eats of life are the brgans of perception and action, with egotism and intellect. 8 Allotment/ niyama, properly ' rule, regulation/ is explained by vyavasthd, which may import ' distribution ;' as, ' The distribution is in regard to different souls in several bodies^:' so also the Sutra of KAPILA ; * From the distribution of life &c. folltiws the multitudinousness of soul.il' The term is especially understood, however, of the distribution which is laid down by religious and legal authorities, ' a prescribed distribution or allotment/ as the commentator o'n the Sutra observes, after stating, ' The virtuous man is "happy in heaven*
?r 3
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.&c, (see p. 48), • Souls are many, as otherwise there would not .be the occurrence of such division, or appointment of conditions, as is laid down in the Ye'da and the law.'* If soul were one, all the accidents, vicissitudes and interests of existence would, simultaneously affect all individuals.
But though manifold, as individualized, this individual soul is one and unchanged, through all its migrations into various forms, until its final liberation. It is the disguise which is changed, not that which wears it, as has been before explain ed (p. 48).
The multiplied existence of soul ig in especial contradiction to the doctrine of the Ve'dantis, of the universality of one sup reme soul of the world, from which all human souls are derived. as in such texts as this ; ' One only existent soul is distributed in all beings ; it is beheld collectively or dispersedly, like the reflection of the moon in still or troubled water. Soul, eternal omnipresent, undisturbed, pure, one, is multiplied by the power of delusion, not of its own nature f.' This is undoubtedly the doctrine of the Vedas, and the Sankhya teachers, who profess to receive those worfcs as authority, are obliged to interpret the texts unfavourable to their dogmas in a peculiar manner. Thus the Sutra of KAPILA asserts, ' There is no contradiction (to the doctrine of many souls) in the unity of the Vedas, from its reference to the comprehensiveness of genus J:' that is, Soul, considered as genus, is but one ; its nature and properties are common to all souls, individualized and manifold in connection with individual aggregates of the products of nature. ' G«nus here means community, unity of nature ; such is the purport of the unity of the Ve'das ; not indivisibility, from the absence of
* ^ ff
any motive (for its continuing undivided.) This is the meaning of the Sutra*. ' The subject is discussed at considerable length by VIJNANA BHIKSHU ; but, notwithstanding his arguments, it is clear that the Sankhya doctrine is contradictory to that o the Vedas.
f
1
The doctrines of those Grecian philosophers, who maintained the immateriality and eternity of soul, conformed to that of the Ve'das. As far as we are able to learn of the doctrines of Pythagoras, he taught that human souls were portions of one supreme soul. Plato held the souls of men to be emanations from God, through the soul of the world. Souls and bodies were both portions of the TO Jy, the '• one existent,' of the Stoics ; and even Aristotle appears to, have conceived the> human soul to, be an intellectual energy, derived from an, eternal intelligence. Cudworth, asserts that none of the ancient philosophers maintained the Sa,nkhya notion of the eternity of individual souls. " It doth not follow/' he remarks, "because they held sou Is to be ingenerable, that therefore ^hey supposed souls to have existed from eternity of themselves unmade- This was never asserted by theist or atheist. The philosophic theists, who maintained ceternitatem Q,niniorw&i, did, notwith standing, assert their essentia.1 dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun, as if they were a kind of eternal effulgenoy, emanation, or eradiation, from an eternal Sun." Intell. Syst. III. 429.
II
ii
( 97 ) XIX.
And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows, that soul is witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, and passive.
BH/SHYA.
Vom ito contrast : the contrast of the possession of the three qualities. Contrast : reverse. Soul is void of quali ties, is discriminative, enjoyer, &c. The contrast is that pre sented by these attributes of soul ; and thence, the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness being agents (active), it
follows that soul is (passive) witness. This sentence is syn.. 13 *
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tactically connected with the preceding, regarding the multi- tudinousness of soul. The qualities, as agents, act ; a witness neither acts nor desists, from action. Again, abstraction (de tachment) is an attribute (of soul) ; the property of being sole is detachment or abstraction, difference or distinctness (from all others) ; that is, it is distinct, or separate, from the three qualities. Next, being a bystander (is an attribute of soul) : the condition of a middle man (or looker-on, or neutral). Soul is a bystander, like a wandering mendicant : as a vagrant ascetic is lonely and unconcerned, whilst the villagers are busily engaged in agriculture, so soul does not act where the qualities are present. Hence also proceed the properties of being a spectator and passive. From being a bystander, soul is a spectator, and is not a performer of those acts (which it contemplates). The three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, engage in acts in the relation of agent and act ; not soul : and in this manner the existence of soul is demonstrated.
But if soul is a non-agent, how does it exercise volition ? as I will practise virtue, I will not commit crime : here soul must be the agent ; for if soul is not the agent (then these purposes cannot be entertained). This is a dilemma: to explain which it is said —
' COMMENT-
In the preceding verse it was stated that soul was many ; in this, its other attributes are enumerated.
The conjunction cha, in the term tasmdt-cha, connects the sentence with the preceding, or with baJtutwam, ' inultitudi- nousness.' The contrast alluded to is that intimated in ver. 14, and is this : Soul has not the three qualities, it is discrimina tive, it is perceptive, it is specific, it is rational, it is unprolific ; being the reverse, in these respects, of nature and its effects. Not being an object of sense, but percipient of such objects, it observes and testifies to the existence of nature and its pro-
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ducts, like au evidence in a lawsuit being plaintiff and defen dant. ' That which is irrational cannot observe, and that to which an object is apparent is a witness*.' Solitariness is ' ex emption from the three kinds of painf ;' or, in fact, total ab straction from the world : this is the necessary consequence of being devoid of the three qualities, which are essentially the same with pleasure, pain, and dulness ; and from them, there fore, soul is equally free. From the same cause, absence of qualities and insusceptibility of agreeable or disagreeable emo tions, proceeds the next property of soul, that of being a bystander ; madkyastJia, * neutral, indifferent, unconcerned ;' vtddslna, ( neither rejoicing in pleasure, nor sorrowing in pain. Qualities, and particularly foulness, are indispensable to acti vity ; and being without them, soul is consequently inert : the same is considered to be also the necessary result of its being
* discriminative and uuprolific, or unproductive;.' VUNA'NA BHIKSHU restricts the term sdkski, ' witness,' to the sense of
* beholder,' distinguishing it from the other term, to which such a translation is more applicable, dmshtri, as importing one who has the object near to, or before, his eyes ; the latter* implies seeing in general : hence he says, ' Soul witnesses or contemplates Iniddlu (intellect), and sees the other principles)),'
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( ioo )
XX.
THEREFORE, by reason of union with it, insensible body seems sensible : and though the qualities be ac tive, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent.
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BHASHYA.
Here soul is said to "be possessed of sensation ; and in connec tion with it, intellect and the other predicates of nature assum ing the appearance of sense seem sentient : as in life, a jar •with cold water appears to be cold, with warm water seems to be warm ; so intellect and the rest, from union with it, with soul, seem sensible. But the qualities perform the active application, (of sense), not the soul : for although in common it is said, soul is the doer, the goer, yet soul is not the agent. How so ? Though the qualities be active, (soul) the stranger appears as the agent. There being activity of the qualities,
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which is indifferent, or inactive, appears as if it was the agent ; which it is not. Here is an illustration : as a man who is not a thief, being taken np along with thieves, is suspected to be a thief also ; so soul, being connected with three active qualities, is supposed, though inert, to be active also.
In this manner the distinction of the perceptible, impercep tible, and thinking principles (ver. 2. p» 13) has been explained ; from the discrimination of which liberation is obtained. It is next expounded why the union of the two (chief) principles, nature and soul, takes place*
COMMENT.
It is here taught that the sentient faculty resides in soul, mid not, as it appears to do, in the products of nature ; and that activity resides in the qualities, not, as it appears to do, in soul.
The term chetand, from chUt ' to reflect/ means in general c reason, intelligence ;' but it is here applied to the possession or exercise of every faculty proper to a sentient and thinking being. It is the attribute of soul only, as will be more dis tinctly made clear when the functions of the senses, of con sciousness, and intellect are explained, and they are shewn to be merely the vehicles or instruments through which ideas and notions are conveyed. They seem, however, to act indepen dently, but this is merely from their union with, or, more correctly, proximity to, soul ; samyoga being explained by the commentators to mean here merely sannidhdna, ' approxima tion. In like manner, soul, which is contemplative, not active^ mover, though itself unmoved, appears to be active through a similar contiguity. ' I am sentient ; wishing to do, I do : here a common origin or subject of action and reflection is appre-
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liendecl*.' 8. Tcdwa RaumufU. But this is an error, as the site or subject of action and reflection is distiuctf. The term linga in the first line is explained to denote makat and the subtile products of pradlidna. UOA^ina^ ' indifferent,' is said also to mean ' inert J.'
But it appears that there are passages in the Vedas and in the law-books which attribute agency to soul, and knowledge to buddki\\: and to meet this is supposed to be the purpose of the aphorism, ' Agency from affection, intelligence from propin quity^' that is, c The apparent agency of soul is from the affection (or operation) of buddhi ; the apparent intelligence of buddhi (understanding) is from the proximity of soul ; neither is actual. Their mutual transfer of properties is like that of fire arid iron in a heated bar, or of the sun and water, in the reflected rays of the former from the latterHV & Prav. 8. In like manner the & Chdnd riled exemplifies the doctrine by reference to buddhi, the organ of the understanding ; and furnishes also an example of the sense in which cketand, * intelligence,' is to be understood : ' Thence the effect (of pradhdna), the category buddM?, which is unintelligent, is as it were intelligent, (seems to be that which says) I know, be comes as it were endowed with knowledge** :' that is, it is not the understanding, but soul, that knows. This, however, ap plies equally to all the other products of nature, as far as to the subtile rudiments, whether individually considered, or
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as composing subtile body*. They are all non-sentient, or irrational and inert. Their activity depends on combination with the qualities; their sentient power on proximity to soul : and the conjoint presence of these two properties leads to the erroneous belief that soul is agent, as well as sentient.
XXI.
For the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction, the union of both takes place, as of the halt and blind. By that union a creation is framed.
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BHASHYA.
The union of soul with nature is for its contemplation (of na ture); that is, soul contemplates nature (in the state of) intellect and the other effects to the gross elements inclusive. For that object is the union of nature with soul ; and the same union, which is also for the abstraction (of the latter), is like the association of the halt and blind. As, a lame man and a blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers, who in making their way with difficulty through a forest had been dispersed by robbers, happening to encounter each other, and entering into conversation so as to inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of walking and of seeing ; accordingly the lame man was mounted on the blind man's shoulders, and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion. In the same manner the faculty of seeing is in soul, not that of moving ; it is like the lame man : the faculty of moving, but not of seeing, is in nature ; which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, as a separation takes place between the lame man and the blind man, when their mutual object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey's end, so nature, having effected the liberation of soul, ceases to act ; and soul, having contemplated nature, obtains abstracted ness ; and consequently, their respective purposes being effected, the connexion between them is dissolved.
Again, By that, by that union, a creation is framed. — As the birth of a child proceeds from the union of male and female, so the production of creation results from the connection of na ture and soul.
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The text next describes the particulars of all the products of nature.
COMMENT.
The object of the union of soul and nature, or the final libe ration of the former by its knowledge of the latter, is here explained.
1 Contemplation,' darsana, is considered to comprise ' frui tion/ bkoga. As nature is devoid of sensibility and reflection, it can neither enjoy nor observe ; and its existence would be therefore without an object, unless there were some other one capable both of observation and fruition*. This other one is soul. But, again, as pain is inseparable from nature, so enjoy ed soul desires, after a season, to be loosed from the combina tion ; and this detachment, or the liberation of purified soul, necessarily requires some one froni which to be liberated : that some one is nature : consequently, for the fulfilment of their respective ends— the fruition of nature, and liberation of soul — their mutual cooperation and combination are essential. ' Ab straction/ kaivalya, is explained by YACHESPATI, ' The cause of the attribution of separation to purified soul, which cannot be without previous union with nature f.' But these results cannot be attained without the evolution of the products of nature, and consequently they assume their several develop ments, or, in other words, a creation is framed ; as it is only in the state of discrete principles that nature is to be contem plated by soul, and it is only by the exact appreciation of the same, and of their source, that soul can detach itself from na ture. For both purposes, therefore, the world must exist, as developed from its material cause.
There are passages in the Vedas, however, attributing crea tion to soul ; as, ' That was from it— From this soul was ether
STOR
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14
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joroduced.*' To this ib is replied, that all that is herein in tended is the attribution of the act of the inferior, or nature, to the superior soul : ' As in the world it is said that a king triumphs or is defeated, - when it is not he, but his army, that suffers a defeat or achieves a victoryf.' 8. Prav. Sdra.
XXIL
FROM nature issues the great one ; thence egotism : and from this the sixteenfold set : from five among the sixteen proceed five elements.
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BHASHYA.
Nature (pratriti) is also termed ' the chief one' (pradhdna\ ' the supreme' (brahmi/Q,\ 'the undistinguished' (avyaktam), 'the. multi-comprehending' (bakudhdndka) and mdyd. Such are. its synonymes. From that which is devoid of characteristic at tributes, or from (crude) nature, the great one (mahat) is pro duced : this is also termed ' intellect' (buddfii) ; it is also called dmri, or 'demoniac;' mat-it or 'understanding;' 'notoriety' (khydti), ' knowledge' (jndna), ' wisdom' (pr&jna). From thence proceeds egotism, also called ' the origin of the ele ments/ &o. (bhutddi), ' the luminous, (taijasa), 6- the modified' (vaikrita), ' conscience' (abhijndna). From this the sixteen fold set. — From this, from egotism, the class of sixteen is de rived. This consists of the five subtile elements, or the arche types of sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour : the synonymes, of tan-mdtra are all words denoting ' subtile' (sukshma) : also
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the eleven organs, the ear, the skin, the eye. the tongue, the nose, which are the five organs of perception ; the voice, the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation, which are the five organs of action ; and, besides these, mind, making the eleventh, and being an organ of both action and sensation. These constitute the class of sixteen produced from egotism. From five among the sixteen. — From the five subtile elements proceed the five gross elements : as it is said, " From the archetype sound, ether is produced ; from touch, air ; from form, light (or fire) ; from flavour, water ; from odour, earth : and thus from these five rudiments the five gross elements proceed." As also it is said, " From discriminative knowledge of perceptible and imperceptible principles and the thinking soul (see ver. 2) liberation is obtained." Now therefore intel lect and the rest, to the gross elements inclusive, forming twenty-three categories, have been specified (in the text) ; the undiscrete principle has been described (see ver. 15,16); and soul has been explained (ver. 18, 19) ; and these constitute the tiventy-five tatwas (physical and metaphysical categories of the Sa"nkhya system of philosophy). He who knows the universe to be composed of these principles — called tatwas, from the abstract of 'tad, ' that,' implying the abstract existence of those principles — as it is said, " He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven* he is liberated : of this there is no doubt." (See p. 1.) The twenty-five categories are, nature, soul, intellect, egotism, the five subtile (or rudimental) elements, the eleven organs of sensation and of action, and the five gross elements.
It is stated in this stanza, from nature issues the great one. What is meant by that great one is next defined.
COMMENT.
The categories of the Sankhya system have been before alluded to (ver. 3. p. 16), in explanation of their mutual re lations, and of the properties which they have in common, or
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by which they are discriminated from one another; but we have them here enumerated in the order of their production, as prefatory to a detailed description of them and of their func tions contained in the following stanzas.
The generic term for the twenty-five principles, tattwa, or as usually and with equal correctness written tatwa, is ex plained by GAURAPADA to mean ' the abstract existence/ astitiva*, ov<rla, essentla of tat+t THAT ; that thing, which is the object of philosophical investigation, or which has a real existence, and must be known. The more common etymology, tat, ' that/ and twam, ' thou' belongs to the Ve'danta system ; as in the Mahdvdkya, tat-twam asi, l that (supreme soul) thou art/ implies the identity of universal and individualized spirit. We have in the scholia of GAURAPADA, on this stanza some synonymes of nature and the two first principles, the analysis of which elucidates the ideas entertained of them by the San- khyas. The succeeding stanzas will afford an opportunity of adverting to the terms used for intellect and egotism, and we may here confine the enquiry to the synonymes of nature, or matter.
PraJcriti, as has been previously, mentioned (p. 17), inti mates, that which precedes, or is prior to, making ; that which is not made from any thing else. It is also used relatively, to signify that which is the source from which a product is deriv ed ; so that mahat is the prakriti of ahankdra, &c. (see p. 18). Here, however, our business is with the primary source of all material products, and the term indicates merely that which preceded (pro) production (kriti) ; what that may have been is left wholly undefined or unimplied by the particular term. The same maybe said of it agreeably to another etymology given in the Sdnkhya Sara, where pra is interpreted by prak- rishta, ' principal, chief, best/ analogously to its other denomi nation, pradhdna, 'the chief/ Pradhdna is derived from pra, * principal/ and dhd, to ' hold :' ' that in which all genera-
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ted effect is comprehended*.' The next synonyme, avyakta Hhe unseparated, the undistinguished, the unperceived/ has teen also previously noticed (p 41). as derived from anja, ' to, make clear/ with vi, separative preposition, and the negative a prefixed : the term is of as frequent occurrence as either of the preceding, and is constantly used as a synonyme of prakriti in the Puranas and in Manu. Brahme, which is to be carefully distinguished frp,m ftrqhmd, the personified creative power, is ordinarily applied either to the Ve'das or supreme spirit, and is an uncommon synonyme of prakriti', hut as derived from vriha, ( to increase/ it implies the first principle of which the expansion becomes all perceptible objects. Bahudhdnaka is derived, like pradhdna from dfyd, ' to hold ;' dhdnaka, ( the holder' or ' cornprehender' of bahu, ' much/ of all things. Md- yd, \0( ita ordinary sense of ' illusion/ is applied to prakriti, not by the Saukhyas, for they maintain the reality of existing things, but by the Vedantis arid Pauranikas, who regard crea tion as a delusion or as a sport of the creator : it is derived from the root md, ' to measure/ and may here perhaps imply either ' comprehension/ like pradhdna, or ' extension.' There is no explanation of the term by any of the Scholiasts, VIJNANA BHIKSHU quotes the Vedas to shew that it is synony mous with prakriti-^. In the Sdnkhha we have other syno- nymeS; as, sakti, ' power, §vvcyjLi$; aja, 'the unborn, the un- produced ;' tamos, darkness ;' and avidyd, ' ignorance^/
Now what is tp. be considered as the sense of these words ? By what equivalent is prakriti to be best i^en^ered ? Professor Lassen. translates it procreatrix, but this seems to convey too much the idea of personality, and therefore, although very well agreeing with the original term as, used by the Pauraniks, where prakriti is commonly personified, yet it can scarcely be
t
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considered as indicative of that which not only produces, bufc is the thing produced, being at once the origin and substance 'of all things. Mr. Colebrooke has rendered the term some times by ' nature/ and sometimes by * matter:' the former ex presses both the parent and the progeny, and agrees in being also the constant subjects of prosopopeia. It is therefore, pre ferable to perhaps any synonyme that the English language can offer. At the same time the correct equivalent is ' matter, materia, quasi matter, ' the substance and source of material things ;' not, however, crude, visible, or divisible matter, but that first principle of the Pythagoreans and Platonists, and of Aristotle, which having neither parts, nor form, nor seiise, nor quantity, nor any of the properties of body, was yet the one universal-, .incorporeal, invisible substance from which all bodies were derived. Ato 8r] r^y TOV yeyoi/oro? opctTov /ecu TTCLVTW? 'aio-Ot]TOV /ULtjTepa KOI VTroSoxw /m^re yr\v /^re aepa /x>/re 7rvp jjirjrG vS(*)p Aeyco/xei/, /xrjre oera e/c TOVTCOV juujTe e£ &v TOUTO. yeyovev. aXX' avoparov e?Sd<? ri KCU a/jLop(f>ov Trav$\e<s. Timoeus. See also the Physics, p. III. c. 6. That w£ are to understand this of the prakriti of the S&nkhyas is evident from the mean ing of its several appellations. It is also said by YIJNANA BHIKSHU, that ' the world is merely modification of form, of which prakriti is the materiality*.' ' It is not individual or formal, but universal materialf .' S. Pr. fehasJiya. Its invi sibility is, as we have seen (ver. 8. p. 29), attributed, not to its non-existence, but to itg subtilty (saukshmya). Prakriti is also defined € the equilibrium of the three qualities^ ;' and here it differs from the subject matter of Aristotle in having quali ties. These qualities however, whilst prakriti is yet unevolved, neutralize each other, and are scarcely qualities as regards primary nature, because their loss of equilibrium, or their ac tivity, is concurrent with the discontinuance of prakriti as Separate from its products. So far, however, prakriti may
t i
be considered as different from the brute matter of the ancient physiologists, that it produces products of its own energy or power for a special cause, and is therefore friore akin to the " plastic nature that acts, evexa TOV, for the sake of something." In the Sankhya system, how- erer, such nature is not distinct from matter itself, whilst it appears to be a different principle in the writings of the Greek philosophers, although not always very intelligibly 'described ; for, as Cudworth observes of Aristotle, " he nowhere declares of this nature of his, whether it be corporeal or in corporeal-, substantial or accidental." To conclude, we are to understand of the pmkriti of the Sankhyas, primary, subtile, universal substanc'e; Undergoing modification through its own energy, and for a special motive, by which it is manifest as individual and formal substance, varied according to the pre dominance of qualities, which are equipoised a'nd inert in the parent, and unequal and active in the progeny.
XXIII.
ASCERTAINMENT is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dis passion, and power are its faculties, partaking of good ness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse.
I
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BHA'SHYA.
The definition of intellect is ascertainment. Ascertaining (discerning, determining) is ascertainment : as in the seed the future germinating shoot is contained, so is determination (in intellect). This is a jar, this is cloth : that intellect which will so determine is so denned. This intellect has eight members, according to the twofold affection of goodness and darkness. The first kind, or intellect, partaking of goodness, is of fou* kinds, virtue, knowledge? di&pa&sion, 'power. Virtue, comprises humanity, benevolence, and acts of restraint (yrnna)< and of obligation (niyama). The former are said in the Pdtan- jala to be, restraint of cruelty, of falsehood, of dishonesty, of incontinence, and of avarice : the latter are the obligations of purification, contentment, religious austerity, sacred study, and worship of God. Knowledge has for its synonyrnes,. manifesta tion, certainty, light. It is of two kinds, external and internal, The former is (knowledge of) the Yedas and their six subordi nate branches, recitation, ritual, grammar, glossary, prosodyr and astronomy ; also (of) the pwrdnas, and of logic, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is that of nature and soul, or (the discrimination that) this is nature, the equipoised condi tion of goodness-, foulness, and darkness : that is soulr perfect; devoid of qualities, pervading, and sentient. By external knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is acquired ;: by internal knowledge, liberation. Dispassion is also of two kinds, external and internal. The former is the indifference of one who contemns sensible objects from observing their defects, or the trouble of acquiring and preserving them ; the incon venience of attachment to them ; their liability to decay ; and the injustice they cause. The latter is the indifference of one
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who Is desirous of liberation, and looks upon nature as if it was a piece of witchcraft or a dream. Power, is the abstract property of a superior (or divine) being : it is eightfold, (the capacity of) minuteness, magnitude, heaviness, lightness, reach, gratification of will, dominion, subjugation, and irresistible purpose. Atomic existence is meant by ' minuteness;' so that u person becoming atomically subtile or minute may traverse the world : ' magnitude' is said of one who may make himself a giant :" lightness5 is having limbs like the fibres of the lotus stalk, or like cotton, so as to be able to stand upon the tops of the filaments of a flower : ' reach' is attainment of a desired object by going to the place where it is situated, wherever that may be: 'gratification of will' is obtaining or effecting what ever is desired : r dominion' is governing the three worlds, as a king: 'subjugation' is having all things subject :' irresistible purpose' is compelling the site, rest, and motion of all things, from Brahma to a block, agreeably to the will of the person endowed with this faculty. These are the four properties of intellect which soul obtains when the qualities of foulness and darkness -are overcome by that of goodness.
But those partaking of darkness are tJie reverse. — When Intellect is influenced by the quality of da-rkness, then its four properties are the reverse of the above ; they are, vice, igno rance, passion, and weakness. In this manner intellect having -eight members, as it is affected by goodness or foulness, is produced from the imdiscrete principle having the three -qualities.
Intellect feas thus been explained. Egotism is next des cribed.
COMMENT-
The first product of nature, or intellect, is here described by its properties.
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Intellect (buddhi) is adhyavasdya*. It is not easy to offer a satisfactory equivalent for this word, nor to understand pre cisely what is meant by it. In the Amara Kosha it occurs as a synonyrne of utsdlia"^, ' effort, strenuous and continued effort* perseverance ;' according to RA'MA'SRAMA, ' possessing gieat power}/ He derives it from so antakarmmani\\, ' finishing, making end of/- with adhi§, ' over/ and aralT, ' off ;' that is, en tirely or absolutely ending or effecting ; as in the Hitopadesa : ' The precepts of knowledge confer not the least benefit on one who is afraid of exertion : of what use is a lamp to a blind man, though it be within his reach**/ In the Mitdkshara, utsdha is explained, * Effort (or perseverance) in the performance of acts accomplishing the objects of manft/ In the Bhatti Kavyct, we have the word used in the sense of ' wish, purpose* determination :' ' The bird said to the monkeys; You have not studied the law, if at such a season you wish (or resolve) to die^J/
In a preceding passage (ver. 5) the phrase prati vishaya adhyavasdya\\\\j ' ascertainment of several objects, was given as the definition of drish'ta, ' perception ;' and the explanation of the Scholiast, buddhivyapdra jndnam§§, ' knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty/ was cited (p. 23). The same commentator, YACHESPATI, here defines it, ' the specific function of intellect, not differing from intellect, itself;' or, to quote the passage at length, 'Ascertainment is intellect, from the identity of the act and the agent, as will be explained.
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Every one who engages in any matter first observes, or crni* siders ; he next reflects, it is I who am concerned in this ; arid then determines, this is to be done by me ; thence he pro ceeds to act : this is familiar to every one. Thence this as- certainment that such act is to be done is the determination of intellect, which is as it were endowed with reason, from the proximity of the sentient principle. This is the specific func tion of intellect, not differing from intellect itself; and the defi nition of intellect is ascertainment, as that comprehends both its generic and specific distinctions*.'
The explanation of the $. Chandrikd is to the same effect : Adkyavasdya is a sort of modified condition of intellect, as flame is of a lamp ; it is certainty in this form, such an act is to be done by me.f
The explanations, however, would rather seem to intimate intention, or volition, or, at least, the determination to act after reflection ; but the determination or conclusion that such an act should be done, does not necessarily signify that it shall be done : it is only the conclusion or ascertainment of its fitness. This function of the intellect, also, is not indispensably con nected with the notion of will ; as in the example given by GAURAPADA ; where, in the simple conclusion after considera tion, "this object is ajar; that, is a piece of cloth/' no wish, or will, is indicated; no act follows. It is clear also that he considers adhyavasdya merely as the functions of intellect, in
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exercise : they are in intellect, and part of it, as the germ is in the seed, until brought into activity. Intellect is only an instrument ; that which, having received the ideas or images conveyed through the organs of sense, and the mind, constructs them into a conclusive idea, which it presents to soul. Its function in exercise, therefore, is ascertainment or certainty, as described in the >Sf. Pravackana Bhashya, which explains adJiyavasdya, ' the synonyme, as well as buddhi, of great prin ciple (mahat), and its specific function denominated ascer tainment *.'
The other synonymes of this principle are, buddhi, derived from biidh, * to know/ ' knowing, intellect.' Mahat, 'great, the great principle ;' * The first and most important of the products of nature, and presiding over and pervading the wholet/ Asuri^: this is a very unusual and questionable denomination. It occurs only in the S. JShashya, and may be an error, perhaps for semushi, one of the synonymes of buddhi in the Amara koska. It cannot be connected with asura, ( a demon/ as if the faculty were incompetent to convey divine knowledge ; for one of its properties, in connexion with the quality of goodness, is jnydna, ' true knowledge/ There is no good reason why it should be derived from ASURI, the pupil of KAPILA, unless allusion is made to some personification of intellect, as the bride of the sage. No explanation of the word is given in the Bhashya, and I must confess my inability to suggest one en titled to any confidence. Matl means ' understanding :' man- ydte anaya, that by which any thing is understood. Khy&ti properly signifies ( fame but here means ' notoriety, notion, familiar knowledge ;' as in the Smriti, ' The great one it is, whence the familiar notions of the universe are always pro-
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duced*/ Jnyana is usually the term for * true or divine knowledge ;' knowledge of matter and spirit leading to libera tion ; but it is here employed in its generic purport, ' that by which things are known.' The same may be said of prajna, which is also commonly used in the sense of ' true wisdom/ but here implies merely, ' that by which knowledge is obtain ed,' prajndyate anayti, as RAMASRAMA expounds it. Several of these terms, in their technical, as well as literal application , bear an analogy to the vovs of Aristotle, and the ^>poi>ri<Ti<s of Plato. M. Cousin considers the category to be ' une sorts d'ame du monde.' It is, however, the instrument most proxi mate to soul, by which the latter perceives, wills, and acts.
Intellect is of two kinds, or has two sets of properties, as it is influenced or affected by the opposite qualities, goodness and darkness. The former are, 'virtue,' dhcrnta] 'knowledge1, jnyana ; ' dispassion/ wiragya , and ' power/ ai&waryya. The latter are their negatives, ' vice,' ad/tcrmu ; ' ignorance,' ajuyana', 'passion/ avniragya\ and * weakness/ anuwjvaryya. These again comprehend specific varieties.
Dherma, ' virtue/ according to the S. Bhasliya, comprehends morality and religion. The S. Tutwa KoMinudi explains it, ' The cause of happiness arid liberationf.' As the source of prosperity and happiness in life, it is the discharge of religious and moral obligations! ; as the means of liberation, it is the observance of the eightfold yoya, or eight modes of contempla tive devotion[j. Jnyana, or ' knowledge,' is defined by the same Scholiast to bey ' distinct notion of the difference between the three qualities and soul§.' ' Dispassion/ vaimqya, is the- extinction of rdqa, ' colour,'' or passion, which like dyes of vari ous hues tinctures the soul^l.' ' Power,' a'ixwaryya, is the posses-
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fclon of superhuman faculties, It is always termed eightfold, even in the S. Bhdshya, although nine varieties are there named : one of them, however, ' heaviness/ garimtni) finds no place among the definitions given there, any more than in other authorities. It may be supposed to be included under the faculty of magnitude.
The four first faculties, minuteness/ animd ; ' lightness/ laghimd ; ' reach/ prdpti ; and * magnitude,' mahiwd; explain ed and illustrated every where in the same way. According to VACHESPATI. the person endowed with the first can make his •way into a solid rock; with the second, he may ascend to the solar sphere upon a sunbeam; or, as Moore has it, " may dance on a beam of the sun :" with the third, he can touch the moon •with the tip of finger : and with the fourth, he may expand himself so as to occupy all space. The latter four faculties are less distinctly defined, and are sometimes confounded : the shades of difference are indeed so slight, that they may all be resolved into one, * absolute power over matter.7 ' Gratifica tion of will/ prakamya, is generally defined by ichchha-ntibhi- ghata*, unobstr notion of wish ;' or. as explained by HEMACHAN- DRA, in his commentary on his own Lexicon, ' The wishes of a person possessing this faculty are unimpeded by the properties of material nature, such as form and the like ; so that he can swim, dive, or float in earth as readily as in waterf/ This is sometimes adduced in illustration of the meaning of the next faculty, but less accurately. That, is termed vasitd, which VACHESPATI defines, ; absolute subjugation of the elements and elementary beingsj/ The Chandrikd makes it ' independance on matter||/ which is much the same as prakdmya ; and A similar confusion occurs in RAMASRAMA's commentary on AMARA, for he illustrates it by ' swimming or diving on dry land§/ ' Subjugation of nature' is the usually accepted import
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as HEMACHANDRA. * Thus as (with this faculty) any one deter mines the elements shall be, so they remain*." The next faculty is ' dominion,' foitd, According to VACHESPATI, it is ' disposition at will of the production, arrangement, and ex penditure of the elements and elementary beingarj".' NARA- YANA explains it, ' directing or impelling them at will}.' RAMAS- RAMA interprets it prabkutva, ' dominion, sovereignty ; under which inanimate things obey command)].' The last faculty is termed yatrakdmdvasdyitd. In RAMASRAMA'S commentary he reads the word kdmdvasdyitd§ ; and the only variety he notices is that of the sibilant, which is sometimes, he observes, the dental, instead of the palatal letter^". According to the latter reading it is derived from si* * ' to sleep ;' to the former, from sof-f^ ' to destroy :' in either, with ava prefixed, meaning, as RAMASRAMA explains it, 'he who tranquillizes or destroys (that is, accomplishes) his desires}}.' The reading of GAURAPADA is, however, yatrakarndvasdyitd, as one compound ; and the common definition of the term is ' true (infalliable) purposej|||,' wherever exercised : ' Whatever the person having this faculty intends or proposes must be complied with by that which is the subject of his pur pose ; the elements themselves must conform to his designs§§. The Cliandrikd has, ' Whatever the will proposes, that it obtainslfllV HE'MACHANDRA, in his text, gives the word as in the BhAshya, yatrakdmdvasdyitwom ; and explains it, 'he who accomplishes his desires, to whatever they may be direct ed*** :' and he illustrates it by saying that •' an arhat, or
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Bav.ddha saint, can, by virtue of this faculty, convert poison into ambrosia, and administer it as means of vitality*/
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XXIV.
CONSCIOUSNESS is egotism. Thence proceeds a two fold creation. The elevenfold set is one : the five elemental rudiments are the other.
BHASHYA.
The elevenfold set: the eleven organs. The five elemental rudiments : elementary matter of five kinds, or the rudiments, sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour. What sort of creation proceeds from that which is thus defined is next explained.
COMMENT-
The third category is here specified, and described as the source of the senses and their respective objects.
The term here given as the synonyme and definition of
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'egotism,' ahankdra'f, is abhimdn&Zr translated 'conscious ness/ The ordinary sense of both words is pride, and the- technical import is ' the pride or conceit of individuality •/ ' self-sufficiency ;' the notion that 'I do, I feel, I think, I am/ as explained by VACHESPATI : c I alone preside and have power over all that is perceived and known, and all these objects of sense are for my use. There is no other supreme1 except I ; I AM. This pride, from its exclusive (selfish) application, is egotism!!/ The principle, therefore, is something more in Hindu metaphysics than mere consciousness, or conscience. It might be better expressed, perhaps, by 'Te nM>i,' as it adds to the simple conception of individuality the notion of self- property, the concentration of all objects anJ raterests and feelings in the individual,
The other synonymes of this category express rather modifi cations of it, as the next stanza intimates. Taijasa, ' the active' or ( the ardent/ from tejas*, ' light, splendour, ardour,' refers to its animating or exciting influence on human actions, in con nection with the quality of foulness-: Bh&tddvf9 ' primitive element/ and vaikrita]., t the modified,' as explained in the Bhdshya o-n the next verse, regard its being, in connection with darkness and goodness,, the principle from which the organs and objects of sense proceed: for it roust not be for gotten, that this category of egotism or consciousness has a physical, not a metaphysical, character, according to the Sankhya philosophy, being the organ or instrument by which the impression of individuality is conveyed to so-ui. It is in this capacity that it may be considered the primary element, the parent of the rudiments of the elements, or the objects of sense, and of the organs by which they are perceived. It is,
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in fact, the same with both these, as it is only by the applica tion of our own senses to the objects of sense that we can become conscious of individual existence.
XXV.
FROM consciousness, affected by goodness, proceeds the good elevenfold set : from it, as a dark origin of being, come elementary particles : both issue from that principle affected by foulness.
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BHASHYA.
When goodness predominates in egotism over darkness and foulness, that egotism is of the pure kind ; the name of which, according to ancient teachers, was vaikrita, ' the modified/ From this modified egotism the class of eleven organs is pro duced. The good set: perfect organs ; adequate to their func tions : the set is thence called good. Again -from it as a dark origin of beings, &v. — When darkness predominates in egotism over goodness and foulness, that egotism is called dark, or, as it was named by the old masters, * primitive element/ bhiitddi. From it come elementary particles ; the fivefold set. The first element of the elements is darkness ; therefore it is usually called the dark : from that primitive element the fivefold nidi- mental set proceed. Both issue from that principle affected by foulness : that is, the egotism in which foulness predomi nates over goodness and darkness takes the denomination taijasa, ' the active ;' and from that both proceed ; both the eleven organs and five rudiments. For the pure egotism, which is vaikrita, ' the modified,' becoming so modified, produces the eleven organs : but to do this it takes active egotism for its assistant ; for pure (sdtwika) egotism is inert, and is only able to produce the organs when combined with the active. In like manner the dark egotism, or that which is called ' primi tive element/ is inert, and becomes active only in union with the active, when it produces the five rudiments. Therefore it
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as said, both the organs of sense and their objects issue from the modification of egotism affected by foulness. The good elevenfold set proceeds from modified egotism, or that which is affected by the quality of goodness. They are next particularized.
COMMENT.
The products of egotism are here described as proceeding from three modifications of that principle, varied by the in fluence of the three qualities.
The terms used to designate the ' pure/ &r sdfwika principle; the ' dark,' or tdmasa ; and the ' foul,' or vdjasa ; ' variety of egotism,' or vaikrita, bJtutddi, and taijasti ; have been explain ed. According to our text, as understood by the Scholiasts, the eleven organs of sense issue from pure or modified egotism, and the five rudiments from elemental egotism ; both being influenced by ardent or active egotism.' The commentator on the S. Pravachavia has a rather different explanation, in terpreting e'kadasaka, ' eleventh/ not ' elevenfold :' according to* him, this eleventh, which is mind, proceeds from the first kind of egotism ; the other ten from the second kind ; and the ele ments from the third. " Sutra :. The pure eleventh (organ)' proceeds from modified egotism. Comments Eleventh, is mind, which in the class of sixteen organs and rudiments is of the quality of goodness ; there-fore it is born from egotism,, affected by goodness, called vaikvita*. This is the sense. Hence it follows, that from egotism, affected by foulness, proceed the other ten organs of sense ; and from egotism, affected by darkness, proceed the rudiments*/* This interpretation he defends by the authority of the law-books and Puranas ;
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and he gives a similar turn, although rather indistinctly expressed, to the text of the Karika. In the stanzas subse quent to this, to ver. 37, the organs of sense are fully described, and in ver. 38 the text returns to the ele ments. It is not necessary, therefore, to enter upon any explanation of them in this place. There is a remarkable ex pression in the Bhdshya, which presents a notion familiar to all ancient cosmogonies. GAURAPADA says, ' the first of the elements was darkness*.' It is the first of the ' elements/ not the first of ' things ;' for it was preceded hy unevolved nature and intellect, and it is itself a modified form of individuality. It therefore harmonizes perfectly well with the prevailing ideas in the ancient world, of the state of things anterior to ele mentary or visible creation, when " chaos was, and night," and when
Nullus adhuc mundo prwbetxit lumina' Titan, Nee nova crescendo reparabat cornua Phoebe.
In the influence of the quality of foulness, or passion, for the word rajas has both senses, may be suspected an affinity to the doctrine of an active principle, the moving mind, the eros, that set inert matter into motion, and produced created things.
II
XXVI.
INTELLECTUAL organs are, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin : those of action are, the voice, hands, feet, the excretory organ, and that of generation.
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BHA'SHYA.
Beckoning from the eye to the organ of touch, the organs are called * intellectual.' Touched by it, the organ of touch, which is the skin : thence the term for the skin which is used (in the text), * that which touches,' sparsanaka. Intellectual organs are five, as they ascertain or know (severally) five ob jects, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell. Those of ac tion, &c. — They perform acts, whence they are called ' organs of action :' thus, the voice articulates ; the hands variously manipulate ; the feet effect motion ; the excretory organ, excre tion ; and the sexual organ, generation. Thus are enumerated ten organs, five of intellect and five of action. The character and nature of the eleventh, or mind, is next described.
COMMENT-
The five instruments or means of perception and five of ac tion, products of egotism, are enumerated in this stanza.
The term ' organs' is correctly applicable to the material instruments by which perception is exercised ; but it is not to be understood of the gross corporeal bodies, the visible eye, ear, hand, &e., which are parts of gross body. The werd * sen*
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Be's' would therefore be a less equivocal term, only that it does not so distinctly convey the idea of an instrument which, though subtile, is substantial. The original word, indriya, is defined to mean whatever relates or belongs to i/nd/rfy said to be a synonyme of soul, the senses being indicative, being marks or signs, of the presence of soul*: accordingly each is donomina- ted a linga (see p. 24), 'a characteristic feature or indication.'f
.11 II ^ II
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XXVII,
(!N this set is") mind, which is both (an organ of sensation and of action). It ponders, and it is an or gan as being cognate with the rest. They are numer ous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities*
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BHASHYA.
Here, as one of the class of organs, mind is said to be both. Among the organs of sensation it is one of sensation, and among those of action it is an organ of action also. As it performs the function of the organs of sensation and of those
of action it belongs to .both. It ponders (or purposes) ; whence the term sankalpaka. It is also an organ as being cognate with the rest ; for such is the meaning of the word sadhermya. The organs of sensation and action being (cognate or) produced, along with mind, from egotism affected by goodness, have this (property, of origin) in common with mind ; and from this com mon property mind is an organ likewise.
Thus eleven organs are produced from egotism affected by goodness. What, then, is the function (vritti) of mind ? Re flection (sankalpa) is its function. Sound and the rest are the functions of the organs of sensation. Speech and the rest are the functions of the organs of action. Now are these various organs, apprehending various objects, so created by Iswara ? or are they self-generated ? since nature, intellect, and egotism, are devoid of sense ; and soul is devoid of action. Thence according to the Sankhya doctrine, a certain spontaneity is the cause (of the variety of the senses). Therefore it is addded. They are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities : that is, the several objects of these eleven organs, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour, which are the objects of five ; speech, manipulation, motion, excretion, and generation, the objects of other five ; and reflexion, the object of mind; these all proceed from specific modification of qualities. From the variety (or special difference) of such modifications of the qualities the multifari- ousness of the organs proceeds, as well as the diversity of external objects : consequently this variety is not the work of Iswara, nor of egotism, nor of intellect, nor of nature, nor of soul ; but from modification of the qualities, produced by spontaneity. It does not proceed designedly (it is not the re sult of a will to act), because the qualities are non-sentient (unconscious or irrational). How then does it take place ? This, as will be afterwards explained, is in like manner as the secretion of milk is for the growth of the calf, so the proceed ings of nature take place for the liberation of soul, without
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soul's being cognizant of them ; so the unconscious qualities become modified by the existence of the eleven organs, and their varieties are thence derived. Hence the eye is placed in its elevated orbit for the purpose of looking up to heaven ; and in like manner the nose, the ear, the tongue are comrnodi- ously situated for the apprehension of their respective objects : the organs of action are also distributed conveniently for the discharge of their several duties of their own nature, through the modification of the qualities, not as their objects ; as it is elsewhere said, " Qualities abide in qualities ; that which is the function of the qualities is their object." External diversi ties, therefore, are to be regarded as made by the qualities : this is the meaning of the text. Of which nature is the cause.
The several functions of the organs are next specified,
COMMENT.
After defining mind as an instrument both of sensation and of action, this verse explains how it is that there are various organs and objects of sense ; and it is said to depend in both cases upon specific modifications of the qualities of nature.
Mind is an instrument both of sensation and of action. Its function is sankatya, a word that more commonly means ' re solve, purpose, expectation ; as in the Hitopadesa, ' the crow,' Laghupatanaka, says, ' All has been heard by me ; and this is my resolve, that we must be friends*.' And MENU: 'Desire is the root of expectation ; sacrifice is its productf:' or, as KULLUKA BHATTA explains it, ' Sankalpa is understanding to this effect, that by a certain ceremony a desired consequence is effected}.' In both passages the notion of * conclusion from
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( 133 )
foregone premises' is conveyed, and that seems to be its mean ing here. Thus VACHASPATI explains it: 'The mind carefully considers a substance perceived by an organ of sense, (and determines) this is simple, that is not so ; or discriminates them by their condition of predicate and predicable*.' Again, it is said, " First, knowledge or perception ia simple (inconsiderate), like the knowledge of a child, a dumb man, or the like : it is produced by the mere thing ; but when, after this, the thing, as distinguished by its properties, by its genus, and the like, is recognised by the understanding, and intellect is in accor dance with perception, that period (or interval) of determina tion is the operation of the mind." Here, then, sankalpa is the process of reflection, the consideration of the object of simple perception, so as to form a definite idea, which mind transmits, through individuality and intellect, to soul. In this way mind is an organ both of perception and action ; perceiving the ob jects presented by the senses, and forming them into a positive idea. It is further identified with both classes of organs by originating from the same source, egotism affected by goodness ; and consequently it consists of the same materialf.
The second portion of the stanza conveys a doctrine that is not very intelligible. The variety of the senses and of the ob jects of the senses is said to arise spontaneously in them, from specific modification of the three qualities. VACHASPATI under stands the allusion to external objects to be merely illustrative ; that is, the internal organs are diversified by modification of the qualities, in the same manner that external objects are varied by the same modification^:' and the translation follows this explanation. In the Bhashya a different reading in the original occurred, which would require the passage to be ren dered, ' and from variety of external objects)!:' thus ascribing
( 134 )
the diversity of the organs, not only to modification of the qualities, but to the diversity of external objects, which require suitable, and therefore various organs for their apprehension. The reading is, however, clearly incompatible with his argu ment, although GAURAPADA is somewhat obscure ; but the variety is noticed and admitted by the author of the Chandrika*. The S. Pravachana Bhashya considers the multifariousness spoken of in the Sutra, which conveys apparently a similar doctrine to that of the Karika, as restricted to mind : ' Multi fariousness is1 from modification of qualities, as the variety of human condition (is from various association) : that is, as the very same individual assumes different characters, according to the influence of his associations ; becoming a lover with a mistress, a sage with sages, a different person with others ; so mind, from its connection with the eye or any other organ, becomes identified with it, and consequently is diversified according to the function of sight and the rest of the organs with which it is severally associated^.' The association of mind with the organs is intimated by the Ve'das, as in the text, ' My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear.J' The very illustration used by Locke : " A man whose mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, takes no notice of im pressions made by sounding bodies upon the organ of hearing : therefore it is evident that perception is only when the mind receives the impression," says the English philosopher ; and the Hindu infers, that ' the mind must cooperate with the organs of sense, even for perception, as they would otherwise be in capable of performing their f unctions. ||
* s s : i t JTUT-
nr% grrf J ^
( 135 )
The materiality of mind, considered as distinct from con sciousness, intelligence, and soul, and as neither more nor less than an internal sense, a sensorium, is much less absurd than the same character of it when considered as part of, or identical with, soul, as was the doctrine of the Epicureans, whose des cription of mind, as an organ merely, agrees well enough with the Hindu notion :
Primum ; animum clico mentem quam ssepe dicamus
Esse hominis partem nihilo minus ac mantis ac pes
Atque oculei, partes aiiimantes totius exstant. LUCRETIUS, III. 94,
\\'\c\\
XXVIII.
THE function of five, in respect to colour and the rest, is observation only. Speech, handling, treading, excretion, and generation are the functions of five (other organs).
f%:
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( 136 )
BHA'SHYA,
The term 6 only' (matra) is to be understood in the sense of speciality, or the exclusion of what is not specified ; as in the sentence, " Alms only are received ;" that is, nothing else is received. Thus the eyes are observant of colour (form), not of flavour and the rest ; and so of the other senses. And in this way the function of the eye is colour (vision) ; of the tongue, taste ; of the nose, smell ; of the' ear, sound (hear ing) ; of the skin, touch : these are the functions of the Intellec tual organs. Speech and the rest (are the functions) of the five organs of action ; or, speech is the function of the voice (larynx, <&c.) ; handling of the hands ; treading, of the feet ; dejection of excrement separated from food, of the rectum ; and generation of offspring, of the sexual organs : ' function or ob ject' being required for each term by the grammatical eronstruc- tion of the sentence.
The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind are next described.
COMMENT.
The text particularizes the functions of the organs of sense severally.
The general term for the office of the sense is dlochan-a* , literally ' seeing, beholding, perceiving, observing.' According to ancient authorities it is said to comprise both the first un- deliberative, and the second deliberative knowledge ; or, in short, what is understood by ' perception-*-.' The commentator on the 8. Pravachana, who gives this explanation, observes, however, that some consider deliberative perception to be the property of the mind only, whilst simple or tftadetiberative per-
t swr nwtf i qrrnir ^wrrnrrT i <rere r-
( 13? )
fception is that of the external senses ; and this appears to be the doctrine of the Sankhyas : the senses receive simple im pressions from without of their own nature ; whether those im pressions are perceived, depends upon the cooperation of the internal sense, or mind. The term for ' function' is vritti, ex plained by vyapara, ' active exercise or application ;' also by samarthydm, ' ability, adequacy ;' and phala, ' fruit, result.' GAURAPADA has vishayd, ' object ; and it may be said, that the function and object of a sense is the same thing, sight being both the function and the object of the eye. There is some difficulty in translating some of the terms satisfactorily, al though there is none in understanding what is meant by them, Thus rtipa, ' form,' or, as rendered in the text, ' colour,' is the object and office of the eye ; it is therefore equivalent both to visible substance and sight. So of sabda, ' sound ;' it is both hearing and that which is heard. Spersa, ' touch,' is the faculty and the substance to which contact may be applied. In rasa> '* taste,' and gandha, ' smell,5 we have the double equivalents, as both words in English, as well as in Sanscrit, express both the sense and the sensible property. In English, ' voice' is a function ; but here, at least, vach* is also the instrument of speech. In the other organs of action the function is more readily rendered ; but the difficulty in any case is only that of language, and the sense is sufficiently explicit.
n
II
is
( 138 ) XXIX.
OF the three (internal instruments) the functions are their respective characteristics : these are peculiar to each. The common function of the three instru ments is breath and the rest of the five vital airs.
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( 139 )
f
BHA'SHYA.
The natural properties, which are the several characteristics, are the respective characteristics (as previously defined). As certainment is intellect (ver. 23) : that also is the function of intellect. Consciousness is egotism (ver. 24) : consciousness is both its characteristic and its function. Mind ponders (ver. 27) : such is its definition ; and reflection, therefore, is the function of mind. Of these three, intellect, egotism, and mind, their respective characteristics are their specific functions. The functions of the intellectual organs, as before explained, are also specific (the same is the case with the organs of action). But now their common function is described. The common function of the instruments. — The function of the instruments in common is breath and the rest of the jive vital airs ; the airs called prana, apana, samana, udana, and vyana. These are the five airs which are the common function of all the organs of sense. The air, for instance, called prana is that which is perceptible in the mouth and nostrils, and its circulation is the common function of the thirteen kinds (of instruments) : that is, where there is breath, the organs acquire (are connected with) soul (they become living). Breath, like a bird in a cage, gives motion (vitality) to the whole. It is called prana * breath' or ' life,' from ' breathing.' From carrying downwards (apanaya/na)) the air apana is so named ; the circulation of which, also, is the common function of the organs. Samana is so named from conducting equally (samanayana) the food, &c« (through the frame). It is situated in the central part of the body, and its circulation is the common function of the in struments. The air udana is denominated from ascending, or from drawing or guiding best (un-nayana). It is percep tible in the space between the navel and the head, and the circulation that it has is the common function of the organs.
( 140 )
Lastly, the air by which internal division and diffusion through the whole body is effected is called vyana, from its pervading (vyapti) the body like the etherial element. The circulation of that, also, is the common function of the assemblage of the organs. In this manner these vital airs, as the common func tion of the instruments, are explained ; that is, the common function of the thirteen kinds (of organs).
COMMENT.
Besides the peculiar functions of the three internal instru ments, mind, egotism, and intellect, which as the same with their definitions have already been specified, they have a com mon office in the evolution or circulation of the internal aerial humours which constitute vitality.
The translation limits this community of function to the three internal instruments only, or to intellect, egotism, and mind ; and such is the interpretation of VACHASPATI MISRA ; ' The five airs, or life, is the function of the three (internal) instruments, from being present where they are, and absent where they are not*." So the 8. Pravachana Bh explains the Sutra Sdmdnya karana vrittit ; which is also the phrase of the Kdrikd, ' the function of the three internal instruments^. GAURAPADA, however, understands, vitality to be the common function of all the organs, external and internal ; or thirteen instruments, ten of the former, and three of the latter kind. The expression of. the text also is general, and applicable either to all the organs, or to any of them, as variously understood. The two meanings are not irreconcilable, although, strictly speaking, the sense followed in the translation is most correct ; for although vitality is the common function of all the senses, yet it is essentially so of the internal senses only ; it might
J a^
( 141 )
continue with the privation of any or all of the external senses, but could not, as VACHESPATI states, subsist without the inter nal organs, as it depends upon their existence for its own. So also the 8. Pravachana Bhdshya calls the vital airs not only the 'functions,' but ' modifications, of the internal instruments)].' These vital airs are not to be confounded with vdyu, or ' elemental air,7 for the Vedas are authority for their different origin : * From him is born vital air, mind, and all the senses, heaven, wind, light, water, and the all-sustaining earth§.' ' The attribution of aerial operation to modification of the internal instruments arises from their being susceptible of a sort of motion similar to that of air and from their being governed by the same deitylf.' The vital airs are, in fact, the vital func tions of breathing, circulation, and digestion. That these functions, resulting from organization, should be supposed to partake of the nature of aerial humours, originates very possibly from some misapprehension of the phenomena of breathing, flatulence, and arterial pulsation. The term used by GAUIIA- PADA to designate their action occurs syandana, * moving, circulation,' in the copy ; but spandana, ' throbbing, pulsation/ were perhaps a preferable reading. The offices assigned to them are evidently connected with notions either of circulation or a pulse. Thus Prdna is breath, expiration and inspiration. Apdna is flatulence, crepitus. Samdna is eructation, supposed to be essential to digestion. Uddna is the pulsation of the arteries in the head, the neck, and temples ; and Vydna is the pulsation of the rest of the superficial arteries, and occasional puffiness of external parts, indicating air in the skin. The situations assigned to the five airs by the 8. Tatwa Kaumudi are much less consistent and intelligible. Thus Prdna is there said to be the function of the tip of the nostrils, head, navel,
( 142 )
and great toes ; Apfaia, of the back of the neck, the back, the feet, and the organs of excretion and generation ; Samdna, of the heart, the navel, and the joints ; Uddna, of the head, throat, palate, forehead, and root of the nose ; and Vydna, of the skin. With exception of the last, it is not easy to under stand how such absurd situations should have been selected. The S. Bhdshya may be taken as the expression of the earlier notions.
ftfegT II : II 9 • li
^
XXX.
OP all four the functions are instantaneous, as well as gradual, in regard to sensible objects. The func tion of the three (.interior) is, in respect of an unseen one, preceded by that of the fourth.
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( 143 )
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BHASHYA.
O/ a^ four the functions are instantaneous. — The four are3 Intellect, egotism, and mind, in connection with any one of the organs of sense. Of these four the function is instantaneous in regard to perception, or in the ascertainment of perceptible •objects. Intellect, egotism, mind, and the eye see form at once, in one instant, (coming instantly to the conclusion) that is a post. The same three, with the tongue, at once appreciate flavour ; with the nose, odour : and so with the ear and skin. Again ; their functions are also gradual in regard to sensible objects. — Of that aggregate of four the function is also (oc casionally) gradual (progressive). Thus, a person going along a road sees an object at 'a distance, and is in doubt whether it be a post or a man : he then observes some characteristic marks upon it, or a bird perched there ; and doubt being thus dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the understanding discriminates that it is a post ; and thence egotism inter poses, for the sake of certainty, as, verily (or, I am certain) it is a post. In this way the functions of intellect, egotism, mind, and eye are (successively) discharged. And as in the case of a visible object, so it is as to sound and the rest of the objects of perception.
But in respect of an unseen one, the functions of the three are preceded by that of the fourth.— Unseen implies time past,
( 144 )
or future : for instance, in respect to ' form,' the function of thd eye has preceded that of intellect, egotism, and mind, as has that of the skin in respect to touch ; of the nose in regard to smell ; of the ear iti relation to sound ; and of the tongue in respect to taste. The functions of intellect, egotism^ and mind are preceded in order by those of tho senses in regard to time future or past whilst in regard to time present they may be either instantaneous or gradual. Further —
COMMENT.
The consentaneous or successive operation of the three in ternal and any one ot the external organs in the formation of ideas is here described.
The cooperation of the three internal organs and any organ of sense may be instantaneous (yuga-pat). like a flash of lightn ing, or as at the sight of a tiger, when the recognition of him, knowledge of his ferocity, conclusion of personal peril, and determination to try to escape are the business of one and the same moment : or their operation may be gradual or succes sive (kramasas), allowing leisure, for instance, for the eye to see, for the mind to consider, for egotism to apply, and for intellect to conclude. GTAURAPADA rather disarranges the order of succession, and places the function of egotism last, assigning to it the office of belief or conviction. VACHESPATI'S illu stration is more regular : ' Thus, the ear hears the twang of a bowstring ; mind reflects that this must be for the flight of an arrow ; egotism says, It is aimed at me ; and intellect determines, I must run away*.' Whenever the object is un seen, adristita, not present, whether it be past or be to come, there must have been a prior perception of it ; that is, as the text is explained by the commentators, there must have been a prior perception of it by an organ of sense. The expression
( 145 )
of the text, tat purviJcd vritti, ' their prior function,9 might be thought to refer to a prior notion gained by the conjoint opera tion of the internal and external organs at some former period* This, however, would be recollection, the seat of which, as well as of judgment or inference, is in buddhi, or ' intellect,' alone ; as in the Pdtanjala Sutra, ' Proof, refutation, delibera tion, sleep, memory; these are said to be the functions of intellect*.' The prior operation, therefore, is merely percep tion or observation by the external sense, alockanam (see ver. 28), conveying simple ideas to the mind. Taking, then, this prior simple idea acquired through an external organ, any fur ther consideration of it is the gradual operation of the three internal instruments. Where the object is present, conviction may be either momentary or successive : the Sankhyas main taining the possibility of consentaneous operation of the organs of sense and mind, egotism and intellect, in opposition to the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas, that the formation of ideas is in all cases a graduated process : Where the object is absent, the idea must be formed by the internal organs so far in successive order that they must be consequent upon a former impression received by an external sense ; but as concerns themselves, their action may be either simultaneous or successive^. The illustration which occurs in the Bhdskya and other commen taries, of the course of reasoning by which the nature of a distant object is determined, is something like that with which in the Philebus, the formation of opinion is elucidated.
RT%<TCF% q^qnf fTf prf |T% II
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( 146 ) XXXI.
THE instruments perform their respective functions, incited by mutual invitation. The soul's purpose is the motive : an instrument is wrought by none.
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BHASHYA.
Swam is repeated, implying ' several order :' that is, intellect, egotism, mind, perform their respective functions, the incite ment to which is mutual invitation. Akuta implies ' respect and alertness.' They do this for the accomplishment of the purpose of soul. Egotism and the rest effecting it through intellect : that is, intellect, knowing the wishes of egotism and the rest, proceeds to its own peculiar function. If it be asked, why it does so 1 the answer is, the purpose of the soul is the. 'motive. Soul's purpose is to be fulfilled : for this object the activity of the qualities occurs, and thence these instruments make manifest the object of the soul. How is it that (being devoid of intelligence) they act ? They act of their own accord. An instrument can be wrought by none. — The purpose of soul alone causes them to act : this is the meaning of the sentence :
( 147 )
an instrument is not made — not roused — to act by any human superior.
It is next specified how many (instruments) intellect and the rest are,
COMMENT-
The circumstances that induce the internal and external organs to perform their respective functions are said to be mutual incitement, and spontaneous disposition to effect tha objects of soul.
The organs of sense are said to act by mutual invitation or incitement. Their cooperation in the discharge of their respec tive functions is compared to that of different soldiers in an army, all engaged in a common assault, but of whom one agrees to take a spear, another a mace, another a bow. It is objected, that the organs being declared non-sentient, incapable of intelligence, cannot be supposed to feel, much less to know, any mutual design or wish, dkuta* or abhiprdya'f ; and the terms are explained to signify the insensible influence which the activity of one exerts upon that of another, if there be no impediment in the way ; a sort of sympathetic or consentane ous action. * Akrtta here means incitement to activity ; that is, at the time when one organ is in action, the activity of another, if no obstruction hinder itj.' * With this view the several instruments are directed by a presiding power, which may be termed the adaptation of the mutual fitness of their natures) (.' The motive for this sympathetic action is the pur pose of soul, fruition or liberation ; which purpose they of their own accord, but unconsciously, operate to fulfil, in the same way as the unconscious breast spontaneously secretes milk for
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( 148 )
the nourishment of the infant ; according to the Sutra, ' As the cow for the calf:' that is, as the milk of the cow of its own accord exudes for the use of the calf, and awaits not the effort of another, so the organs of their own accord perform their office for the sake of their master, soul*. S. Pravachana Eh. They must act of their own nature ; it is not in the power of any one to compel them to act. GAURAPADA'S expression is, ' Not by any sovereign manf :' perhaps some particle, such as V&, may have been omitted in the copy, making the sense, ' Neither by a deity nor a mortal ;' or the phrase may imply, that they are not compelled to action even by soul, as a divi nity ; but fulfil soul's purposes through an innate property, undirected by any external agent,
n
M ^ II XXXII.
INSTRUMENT is of thirteen sorts. It compasses, main tains and manifests : what is to be done by it is ten fold, to be compassed, to be maintained, to be manifested.
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( 149 )
BHASHYA.
Instrument. — Intellect and the rest are three ; the intellec tual organs are five ; the organs of action are five : all together thirteen. What this performs is next declared : it compasses, maintains, and manifests ; that is, the organs of action com pass and maintain ; those of perception manifest. How many kinds of action there are is next specified. Its action, that which is to be done by it, is tenfold ; of ten kinds, as hearing, touch, &c. by the instruments of perception ; speech and the rest by those of action : and thus by the former, manifestation, and by the latter, comprehension and support, are effected.
COMMENT.
The sense of the term karana, ' instrument' or ' organ/ is here explained, as a generic denomination for the external and internal organs.
The instruments or organs are thirteen ; that is, three inter nal, intellect, egotism, and mind ; and ten external, or the organs of sensation and action. Their respective functions as organs have been explained : their effects as instruments are classed under three heads, ' compassing/ dharana*; ' maintain ing/ dhdrana'f ; and ' manifesting/ prakdsana].. The first which means, literally, ' taking, seizing/ and rendered in the text ' compassing/ signifies ' the application of an organ to the
( 150 )
cbject to which it is adapted*/ and is the especial function of the organs or instruments of action. * Maintaining/ dhdrana* Supporting, upholding/ is, according to the S. Bhdshya, also the office of the instruments of action ; but the authors of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi and S. Chandrikd assign it to the three internal instruments, intellect, egotism, and mind, as being es pecially the supporters of vitality. ' Buddhi, ahankdra, and mind uphold, through their function being designated as the production of the vital airs, &c.f The elder commentator could not, of course, admit this doctrine ; for we have seen (ver. 29) that, according to him, all the senses or instruments contri bute to support the vital principle. All the Scholiasts agree in attributing ' manifestation, enlightening/ prakdsana, to the intellectual organs. The objects to be effected by the instru ments are tenfold, reducible to the same three classes : speech, manipulation, walking, excretion, and generation are to be compassed, to be effected, dhdrya%, by the actual application of the several organs : sound, taste, touch, smell, form to be manifested, to be made sensible, prakdsya : and all of them, together with the vital airs, constituting in fact animal life, are to be dhdryya\\t upheld or maintained.
II ^ II XXXIII.
INTERNAL instruments are three ; external ten, to make known objects to those three. The external organs minister at time present : the internal do so at any time.
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( 151 )
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BHA'SHYA.
..'
Internal instruments. — Intellect, egotism, and mind are three, from the difference between intellect and the others, External ten. — The five organs of perception and five of action are the ten external instruments, and they are to make known objects for the fruition of intellect, egotism, and mind. Time present : that is, the ear hears a present sound, not one that is past, nor one that is to come : the eye sees present form, not that which is past, nor that which is future : the skin touches present substance : the tongue tastes present flavour : the nose
( 152 )
smells present odours, nor past nor future. It is the same with the organs of action : the voice articulates actual, not past nor" future words : the hand takes hold of a present water-pot, not one that has been or is to be : the feet traverse a present, not a past nor a future walk : and the organs of excretion and generation perform present, not past nor future offices Exter nal organs, therefore, minister at time present. The internal ones do so for any time. — Intellect, egdfism, and mind regard objects of any period : thus intellect forms an idea, not only of a present water-jar, but of one that has been or will be made : so egotism exercises consciousness of an object past, present, or future : and mind considers the past and future, as well as the present. Internal instrument is, therefore, for all times.
It is next explained which of these instruments apprehends specific, and which unspecific objects.
COMMENT-
The difference between the functions of the external and internal organs, as concerns time, is here explained : the action of the former being confined to time present ; that of the latter comprehending also the past and the future.
Internal instrument is so denominated from operating within the body* ; the external from being applied to exterior objects making them known to the internal organization. The term vishaya, i object/ is also explained by bJiogya, ' that which is to be enjoyed;' and vydpara, 'exercise;' and vishaydkhya^ ' that which declares or makes objects known.' It is also defined as ' that which occasions the exercise of the functions of the three internal instruments"!*.' External sensation is necessarily confined to present objects, but mind, conscious ness, and intellect apprehend from present objects those which
( 153 )
have past, or are to come ; as past rain from the swelling of a river ; and future rain, in the absence of any other prognostic, from the destruction of the eggs of the ants*. This last phrase • alludes probably to the well known destruc tion of various species of the ant tribe, which in the East takes place immediately before the setting in of the rainy season : they then take wing, and fly abroad in vast multi tudes, of which few survive ; according to the Hindustani proverb, ^f& j* y ^5* ^T ^^ & ^ \£* *¥$ When the ants are about to die, their wings come forth.' The expres sion " ants' eggs," pipttikanda, is, however, rather question able. It occurs in both copies of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi.
\\
xxxiv.
AMONG these organs the five intellectual concern objects specific and unspecific. Speech concerns sound. The rest regard all five objects.
sfsftra i
20
( 154 )
BHASHYA.
The intellectual organs concern specific objects : they ap prehend objects which have specific properties. The intellec tual organs of men distinguish sound, touch, form, taste, smell, along with objects of indifference, pleasure and pain. The organs of the gods apprehend objects which have no specific distinctions. So, amongst the five organs of action, speech concerns sound. Speech, whether of gods or of men, articu lates words, recites verses, and the like ; and this instrument is the same in both orders of beings. The rest — all except speech ; the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation — regard all Jive objects : that is, sound and the other four objects of perception belong to all the other organs ; for there may be sound, touch, form, taste, and smell in the hands ; the foot treads upon the earth, of which sound and the rest may be characteristics ; the excretory organ separates that in which the five objects abide; and the generating organs produce the secretion which is equally characterised by the five organs of sense.
COMMENT.
Another distinction is made in the functions of the external instruments, as they regard objects with or without specific characteristics.
Objects arc distinguished as having specific characters or effects, savise'sha* , and as devoid of them, nirviseslia^ and the
( 155 )
instruments are discriminated according to their capability of conveying notions of either the organs of sense in mortals can apprehend only those objects which have specific charac ters ; either sensible, as colour, form, taste, &c. ; or moral, as pleasant, painful, or indifferent. The faculties of the gods and of sages can apprehend objects without such characteristic properties, and which exercise no moral effect, producing neither pleasure, pain, nor indifference. The S. Tatwa Kau- mudi identifies ' specific' with ' gross corporeal' objects*, and ' unspecific' with 'subtile and redimental' objects! ; the latter of which are cognizable alone by the organs of holy men and deitiesj. This distinction applies to all the external organs, except the voice, which in men, saints, and gods can articulate sensible, specific, or corporeal words alone ; for it is the organ of the voice that is the origin of speech. Speech cannot, like sound, taste, &c., originate with any thing gross or subtilo exterior to the speaker ; it must proceed from him, through the agency of a gross material instrument, and must therefore be gross or sensible itself. Gross corporeal mechanism cannot bo the source of a subtile product, and therefore with every order of beings speech must be specific. e The rest,' seskdni refer ring to the organ of speech, implies the other organs of action, all of which may regard the five objects of perception ; that is, they may comprehend them all ; as ' from the combination (or capability) of sound, touch, colour, smell, taste, in objects like a water-jar and others, which may be compassed or taken hold of by the hand, &c,||' S. Tatwa Kaumudi.
f RII ?T*?TFf II 3 H II
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( 156 ) XXXV.
SINCE intellect, with the (other two) internal instru ments, adverts to every object, therefore those threo instruments are warders and the rest are gates.
BHASHYA.
With the internal ; that is, intellect, with egotism and mind. Adverts to ; takes, apprehends ; that is, apprehends sound and the rest at all three seasons. Therefore these three are ward ers, and the rest are gates. — The rest ; the other instruments ; instruments being understood. Further. —
COMMENT-
A metaphor is employed to illustrate the functions of the external and internal instruments.
The internal instruments are compared to warders, door keepers, or to persons having charge of a door or gate ; not opening and closing it merely, but as taking note of all that enter : the external senses being the doors or gateways by which the objects of perception gain admission.
( 157 ) XXXVI.
THESE characteristically differing from each other, and variously affected by qualities, present to the intellect the soul's whole purpose, enlightening it as a lamp.
: i
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BHASHYA,
These, which are called instruments : they variously affected by qualities. How affected? Like a lamp] exhibiting objects like a lamp. Characteristically differing ; dissimilar, having different objects ; that is the sense. Objects of the qualities is intended. Variously affected by qualities; produced or proceeding from qualities. Soul's whole purpose. — The in struments of perception and action, egotism and mind, having illustrated the object of soul (as attainable) through each res pectively, present it to the intellect, place it in the intellect ; and consequently soul obtains pleasure and the rest ; that is, every object seated in intellect. Further —
COMMENT-
The process by which ideas are conveyed to soul is her* described,
( 158 )
Intellect (buddhi or mahat) is the instrument or organ which is the medium between the other instruments or organs and soul ; that is, all ideas derived from sensation, reflection, or consciousness must be deposited in the chief or great in strument, intellect or understanding, before they can be made known to soul, for whose use and advantage alone they have been assembled. They are variously affected by tlie quali ties. They convey impressions or ideas, with the properties or effects of pleasure, pain, and indifference, accordingly as they are influenced by the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness. In fact these organs are identified with the qualities by all the commentators. GAURAPADA says. f they proceed or are born from them*:' and in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi and 8. Chandrikd they are called also ' products or modifications and varieties of the qualities ;' thus the former has, c The external organs, mind, and egotism are affections of qualities ; they are changes of condition of the qualities goodness, foulness, and darknessf :' the latter, ' These affections of the qualities are kinds (or varieties) of themj' It might have been preferable, therefore, to have rendered the expression yunavise'sha, ' modifications or affections of the qualities.'
The progressive communication of impression to soul is thus illustrated by VACHESPATI : ' As the head men of a village collect the taxes from the villagers, and pay them to the governor of the district ; as the local governor pays the amount to the minister . and the minister receives it for the use of the king ; so mind, having received ideas from the external organs, transfers them to egotism ; and egotism delivers them to intellect, which is the general superintendent, and takes charge of them for the use of the sovereign, soul. The same idea is more concisely expressed in the $. Pravacliana Bit. '• Sutra : In the com-
: T<J[Rt
( 159 )
hion employment of the organs the chiefship belongs to buddhi as in the world. Comment : As the function of the organs is in common, through subservience to the purposes of soul^ so the most important is that of intelligence ; like the office of the prime minister amongst the chiefs of villages and the rest, who arc all alike engaged in the service of the king*/ The cooperation of opposites for a common purpose has been once before (p. 54) compared to the light of a lamp, derived from the combination of oil, cotton, and flame,
.* «\__* fv
N3
^ rv ^.
Sfo II
XXXVII.
SINCE it is intellect which accomplishes soul's frui* tion of all which is to be enjoyed, it is that, again, which discriminates the subtile difference between tho chief principle fpradhanaj and soul,
?rfTfcf
srr^Nf
( 160 )
5
?RL
BHASHYA,
All: whatever comes within the reach of the organs, and in all three (past, present, and future) periods. Fruition ; several or respective enjoyment, through the instrumentality of the organs of perception and action, whether in gods, men, or animals. The internal instrument intellect accomplishes, completes or effects : consequently it is that, again, which discriminates, makes a distinction between the objects of na ture and soul, (or establishes) their difference or severally* Subtle ; not to be apprehended by those who have not practised religious austerities, (or such distinctions) as, this is nature, the equipoised condition of the three qualities, goodness, foul- nesSj and darkness ; this is intellect ; this is egotism ; these are the five subtile rudiments ; these the eleven organs ; these the five gross elements ; and this, which is different from them all, is soul. He whose intellect explains all this obtains liberation.
It was said above (ver. 34) that "objects are specific and Unspecific :3> which these are respectively is next described,
COMMENT-
The function of discriminating between. soul and nature is here also assigned to intellect.
The immediate contiguity and communication of intellect With soul, as that of a prime minister and a sovereign, enables it to appreciate the latter ; whilst its being the medium of conveyance to external objects familiarizes it with them also ; &nd thus it is enabled to distinguish between both : cr as ex plained in the Ohandrikd, this discrimination is the neces sary consequence of its relative function ; for as it conveys ideas of pleasure or pain to soul, and is in this way the cause
( 161 )
of its fruition, it is subservient to another, to something different nature from its own ; and the knowledge of this is discrimination between nature and soul. ' All, sound and the rest, with which the preposition pratl (implying several ty) is to be connected. The fruition is that of soul. As intellect accomplishes this, consequently although it be as it were a chief principle, yet it is for another's use, not its own ; and as hence arises the purpose of liberation, this sense is accordingly intended to be expressed in the phrase, It Is that ayain ivhich discriminates, &c.*'
XXXVIII.
THE elementary particles are unspecific : from these five proceed the five elements, which are termed speci fic ; for they are soothing, terrific, or stupifying.
*
21
( 1G2 )
^iTft rawn *rcr
^rr
BHA'SHYA.
The five subtile elements, which are produced from egotism, or the rudiments sound, touch (substance), form flavour, and odour, are said to be unspecific ; they are the objects (of per ception) to the gods, characterised by pleasure, producing neither pain nor stupefaction. From these five proceed the five elements, called earth, water, fire, air, and ether. These are said to be specific. From the rudiment smell, earth proceeds ; from the rudiment flavour, water ; from form (colour), fire ; from touch (substance), air; and from the rudiment sound ; proceeds ether. These gross elements are termed specific. They are the objects of the senses of men, and are soothing, causing pleasure ; terrific, causing pain ; and stupifying, causing insensibility ; as the ethereal element may give delight to one person coming forth at once from within a house, so the same may be the source of pain to one affected by cold, or heat, or wind, or rain ; and if he be going along a road leading through a forest, in which he loses his way, it may then, from the perplexity of space, occasion stupefaction : so the air (or wind) is agreeable to a person oppressed by heat, disagreeablo to one feeling cold ; and when tempestuous and loaded with clouds of sand and dust it is stupifying. The same may be said of fire and the rest, There are other specific varieties.
( 163 )
COMMENT.
It was intimated in vcr. 34, that objects were both specific and imspecific ; and it is here explained, that by the former is meant the various property which the same element possesses at different times, and under different circumstances, in regard to mortals ; and by the latter, the uniform and unvaried opera tion of the subtile rudiments in respect to the gods.
The precise nature of the rudimental elements is not very intelligible, according to their usual identification with what we are accustomed to consider as qualities, not substances, or sound, tangibility, form or colour, flavour., and odour ; mbda, sparsa, rupa, rasa, and yandha. It seems, however, that we should regard the rudimental elements as the imperceptible subjects of these qualities, from which the grosser and visible elements, ether, air, light, water, and earth, originate. So VUNANA BHIKSHU calls them ' subtile substances, the elements which are the holders (sustainers or subjects) of the species of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell ; but in Avhich, as a genus, the three species of pleasurable, painful, and indifferent do not occur : they arc not varieties of the gross elements, but in each respectively the elementary property exclusively resides whence they are said to be rudiments. In those elements that elementary property resides alone (without being diversi fied, as agreeable, &c,) ; and as there is nc distinction between a property and its subject, that which is a rudimental substance is called a rudiment, tan indtra ; the existence of which as a cause is inferred from that of the gross element as an effect*.' Tan mdtra is a compound of tad, ' that,' and rtidtra, ' alone ;' im plying, that in which its own peculiar property resides, without
( 164 )
ciny change or variety : so VACHESPATI explains the text, c Sound and the rest ; the subtile rudiments ; for the proper* ties of agreeable, &c. do not belong to them, they have no quality which is fit for (mortal) fruition. This is the meaning of the word matra*.1 — c These rudiments, though not appre ciable by human sense, are said to be sensible to sages and to gods, producing to them pleasure only, from the pre dominance with them of the quality of goodness, and con sequently of happinessf.'
The notion of something more subtile than the elements was not unknown to early Grecian philosophy, and Empedocles taught that they were compounded of some more minute matter, or of elements of the elements, crroiyeia o-roixeiovt Plutarch and Stobseus, according to Cudworth, understand by these rudiments of the elements primary atoms ; but it may be doubted if they are to be so understood, for, according to Aristotle, Empedocles held that there were four elements, out of which all bodies were composed, and which were not mutually transmutable. In fact the doctrine of Empedocles, which was that of the school of Pythagoras, offers another analogy to the Indian, in the assertion, not of four, but of five elements, according to Plutarch, or the author De placitis phi- losopliorum, 1. II. c. 6, or ether, fire, earth, water, and air. In tellect. Syst. I. 97. That Empedocles was not of the atomic school is evident from Lucretius, who specifies him as one of those who greatly misunderstood the principles of things :
Principles tanien in rerum fecere minus
Et graviter niagnci magno cecidere ibi casu. I, 741--2.
It may be suspected that something like the Hindu notion that the senses, or their faculties, and the gross elements, par-
? fit
take of a common nature, is expressed in the celebrated, though otherwise not very intelligible verses of the same philosopher :
Fa/0 IJLGV yap yjuav o7ru>7ra/UL€i>, vSan
A.i6epi 8' aiOcpa Slav, arup irvpl irup u By the earthy element we perceive earth ; by the watery, water ; the air of heaven by the aerial element ; and devour- ing fire by the element of fire.'
As opposed to the simple unvaried rudiments, the derivative gross elements, which are sensible to men and animals, are susceptible of three qualities ; they may have specific or varied effects, may be diversified as species ; they are said, accord ingly, to be soothing or agreeable*, terrific or disagreeablefi and stupifying, bewildering^ ; that is, they may be either of these, according to the different circumstances in which the influence of one or other of the three qualities predominates. When goodness prevails, whether it be in themselves or in the object affected, they are sdnta, ' tranquil or pleasant ;' when foulness they are yhora, ( frightful, disagreeable ;' and when darkness prevails, they are ' perplexing/ murha : as VACHES- PATI ; ' In the gross elements, ether and the rest, some, through the predominance of goodness, are soothing, pleasant, agree able, light ; some, through the prevalence of foulness, are terri fic, painful, restless ; whilst others, through the influence of darkness, are stupifying, depressing, heavy ||.'
t sfar. i
( 160 ) XXXIX.
SUBTILE (bodies), and such as spring from father and mother, together with the great elements, are three sorts of specific objects. Among these, the subtile bodies are lasting ; such as issue from father and mother are perishable.
ftgft
g*»r% Trcrfajs
!j«ffa
%
sr
( 167 ) BHASHYA.
Subtile : the rudimental elements, that, when aggregated, form the rudimental or subtile body, characterised by intellect (mahat) and the rest, and which always exists, and undergoes successive states of being (transmigration) : those are subtile (bodies). SucJi aft spring from father and mother are the cementers or means of the aggregation of gross bodies, or by the effect of the mixture of blood and seminal secretion in sexual cohabitation, at fit seasons they form the envelopment of the subtile body in the womb ; that subtile body then is nourished, through the umbilical cord, by the nutriment derived from tea food and drink received by the mother ; and the (en tire) body, thus commenced with the triple ingredient of the subtile rudiments, the cognate investure, and the gross ele ments, becomes furnished with back, belly, legs, neck, head, and the rest ; is enveloped in its sixfold membranes ; is provided with blood, flesh, tendons, semen, marrow, and bones ; and is composed of the five gross elements ; ether being supplied for its cavities (or extension), air for its growth, fire for its nutri ment, water for its aggregation, and earth for its stability : and thus being equipped with all its (component) parts, it comes forth from the maternal womb. In this way there are three kinds (of bodies) : which of these is constant, and which temporary, is next described. The subtile bodies, are lasting* — Subtile ; rudimental elements : these are lasting^ constant ; by them body is commenced, and migrates, according to the im perative influence of acts, through the forms of beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, or immovable substances ; or, in consequence of virtue, proceeds through the heaven of Indra, and other celes tial abodes. So the subtile body migrates until knowledge is attained ; when that is attained, the sage, abandoning all bodyt acquires liberation ; these sorts of bodies, or subtile, therefore, are called lasting. Such as issue from father and mother are pevwhafole. — Having left that subtile body, the frame that proceeds from mother and father ceases, eveu here, at the time
( 1G8 )
that th« breath departs ; the body born of parents ceases at the time of death, and merges into earth and the other gross elemente,
What subtile body is, and how it migrates, is next described.
COMMENT.
Objects were distinguished in the preceding verse according as they were with or without specific or diversified effects : they are here classified according to their forms, their origin, and duration.
A question of some difficulty, however, arises here, as to the objects of the classification. Are they bodies in general ? or are they gross bodies only ? In the preceding stanza it was stated, that the subtile elements, the tan mat-ras, were un- specific; whilst their effects, the gross elements, were 'specific/ vise'sha, It is now stated, that there are three kinds of vise'vkas, ' sorts, species, specific differences ;' but it is not explicitly de fined of what these are varieties. Mr. Colebrook, following the principal commentators, renders it * sorts of objects ;' that is, of bodies in general. Professor Lassen, carrying on the sense of vl-sesha, l specific,' from the preceding stanza, considers the variety here spoken of to concern only gross or perceptible elementary bodies : " Distincta, elementa quae distincta dicun- tur (ver. 38). Distinctorum triplex est divisio in subtilia, a parentibus progenita, crassa" (ver. 39). He admits that the commentators are against this interpretation, but concludes rather that they are in error, than that ISWARA KRISHNA should have employed the word viseska in a double sense.
The interpretation of Prof. Lassen is highly creditable to his critical acumen and judgment, and is possibly correct al though it is scarcely compatible with the notions of subtility and durability which the text ascribes to this branch of the triad. His view is not, as he supposes, wholly unsupported by the commentators ; for VIJXANA BHIKSHU similarly ex plains the stanza, as will presently bu noticed, The passage
is one of some importance, as it regards apparently the history of the Saakhya doctrines respecting the nature of that subtile body which is the imm3diate vehicle of soul, as we shall have occasion to notice more particularly, when we come to verse 40. If the meaning of the text be as Prof. Lasseri renders it, it furnishes reason to suppose that the author of the Karikoi had introduced an innovation upon the original doctrine, as will be subsequently indicated.
According to GAURAPA'DA and NA'KA'YANA, the sorts or species intimated in this verse are different from those des cribed in the preceding ; the former calls them, as above, ' other varieties* ;' and the latter has, referring to ver. 38, ' So many are the specific varieties ; but these are not all, there are othersf .' VA'CHESPATI'S expression, ' A further species of speciesj, might be thought to refer to the gross elements ; but, from the explanation that follows, it is evident he does not intend to limit the specific differences to gross elementary bodies. Agreeably to the explanation, then, in which these writers concur, bodies in general are threefold, subtile, gene rated, and elementary ; and consistently with this view they consider ' subtile,' trilkshma, as equivalent to tan-mdtra, 6 rudi- mental :' thus GAUKAPA'DA has, ' Subtile is the aggregated rudimental elements, forming a rudimento-elemcntal subtile bodyll :' so also VA'CHESPATI ; ' Subtile means subtile bodies ; subtile body is one specific object§ :' and the Ghandrikd ; « Subtile are what are called rudimental bodieslF.' Consequently they also conceive the subtile objects spoken of in this verse to be something entirely different from the gross elementary r-ixc'xkas, or ' species/ of the preceding verse ; not merely sub species or varieties of the same : and it must be admitted that
t
i t- r^mRra^r-crt fatreurf i
rfa^ f 5*mii i § g$nr: tf^sr: fatto; i "
( 170 )
there is some inconsistency in the Kdrikd's speaking of subtile bodies being a species of gross bodies ; of the 'imperceptible being a variety of the perceptible. According to VIJNA'NA BHIKSHU, however, the text merely intends by ' subtile, stikshma, a modification of gross elementary body ; a corporeal frame, which is subtile only relatively, or which is more refined than the second kind of body specified in the text, that which is begotten : ' The nature of that body which is the support of rudimental body is explained in the Kdrikd, " subtile, gene rated," &c. : here is meant, body aggregated of the five ele ments, the (product or) effect of the rudimental elements* which is subtile relatively to generated body*.' The same notion is again intimated by expressions which will be subse quently cited ; and there remains no doubt that this commen tator understands by the sukskma of the text, ' a subtile variety of gross elementary body,' dist'mctorum dist'mctio. The other commentators understand by it, ' rudimental bodies/ element a indixtincta. Either interpretation is therefore al lowable : the latter agrees best with the construction, of the original.
In the second variety of bodies of course specific or sensible bodies only are intended ; bodies generated or begotten are made of the gross elements, agreeably to the Sutra, ' Body consists of the five elements t :' they are, however, in some degree distinguished here from the elements ; holding, accord ing to GAURAPA'DA, a middle place between them, and rudi mental bodies serving to combine them ; u$xtckdyalca causing ujxichaijd, ' proximate aggregation ;' the parts of the embryo being derived in the first instance from the parents, and their development being the result of the accession of the elements, for purposes which he describes. There is some incongruity, however, in this explanation, as it makes a distinction where there is no essential difference ; organized matter being, in fact,
;
i ^ t ifaftftwit 31 : i
( 171 )
the same with elementary matter. The other commentators, therefore, give a different explanation of the term ' great ele ments/ restricting it to inorganic matter. Thus VA'CHESPATI observes, 'Subtile body is one variety of objects ; generated bodies are a second ; and the great elements a third : water- jars and the like (inorganic bodies) are comprised in the class of the great elements*.' So also the Ckandrikd,: 'Subtile bodies are those called rudimental ; generated, are gross bodies ; and the great elements are mountains, trees, and the like^.3
In this threefold division of bodies, as explained by the Scholiasts on the Kdrikd, we have, in fact, but two distinc tions, subtile and gross ; the latter being subdivided into organic and inorganic. The twofold distinction is that which is especially recognised in the Sutras : thus in the S. Prava- chana Bhdshya, the Sutra, ' Thence (the origin) of bodyj,' is explained, ' from the twenty-three tativas (or categories) two kinds of bodies, subtile and gross, proceed! | :' and again, ' Gross body is for the most part generated (some bodies being inor ganic), the other (subtile body) is not§,'
The chief object of the stanza is, however, to assert the different duration of these three kinds of bodies ; subtile are permanent : and here we have an argument in favour of the translation adopted ; for no form of gross body could be con sidered as lasting : as composed of the elements, in however delicate a form, it must resolve into them at the time of death ; whilst the subtile bodies, consisting of the subtile ele ments, endure either till liberation^, or until the great Pralaya.**
Dissolvi quo qutuque supremo tempore possint.
r fttrc
( 172 )
XL.
(SouTiLE body), primaeval, unconfined, material, com posed of intellect, with other subtile principles, mi grates, else unenjoying ; invested with dispositions, mergent.
«ffT«f
BHASHYA.
Primaeval ; whilst yet the universe is uncreated : in the first creation of nature, at that season subtile body is produced. Unconfined ; uncombined either in the state of animals, men, or gods ; and from its subtilty wholly unrestrained, or passing into rocks and the like without obstruction ; it migrates ; it goes. Permanent: until knowledge is attained it migrates. Composed of intellect, with other subtile principles ; having makat and the rest : that is, intellect in the first place, with egotism and mind, to the h' ve subtile rudiments, to the subtile principles, to the rudimental elements. It migrates; it tra verses the three worlds, as an ant the body of Siva. Unenjoy- ing ; without enjoyment : that subtile body becoming capable of enjoyment only in consequence of acquiring the property of action, through its aggregation by external generated body. Invested with dispositions. — Dispositions, as virtue and the rest ; which we shall hereafter explain (see ver. 43). Invested with ; coloured or affected by. Subtile body is that which, at the period of universal v dissolution, possessed of makat f in telligence, and the other subtile principles, merges into the chief one (or nature), and, exempted from further revolution, remains extant there until creation is renewed, being bound 111 the bondage of the stolidity of nature, and thereby incom petent to the acts of migrating and the like. At the season of re-creation it again revolves, and is hence called linya, ' charac teristic' or ' mergent,' or sukshma, ' subtile/
From what cause the thirteen instruments (intellect, egotism, and the eleven organs) revolve, as has been said, is next explained,
COMMENT.
The condition of subtile body, in regard to commencement, duration, and term, is here described.
The commentators are agreed that the subtile body here spoken of is the linya, or the linya sarira, l rudiment/ or
' rudimental body ;' ordinarily, though perhaps not quite accu rately, confounded : the liny a consisting, as intimated in the last phrase of the Bh&skya, of thirteen component parts, in tellect, egotism, and the organs of sense and action ; whilst the llnga sarira adds to these a bodily frame, made up of the five rudimental elements. In this form, however, they always coexist, and i,t is not necessary to consider them as distinct : thus the Sutra of KAPILA states, c one llnga of seventeen* ;' that is, according to the Scholiast, c in the beginning, at crea tion : there is but one rudimental body at the period of creation, consisting of an aggregate of the eleven organs, five rudimental elements, and intellect^.' This was at first embodied in the person of HIHANYAGARBHA, or BRAHMA', and afterwards 'multi plied individually, according to variety of actions^' In this enumeration egotism is omitted, being included, according to the commentator, in intellect. ' Unconfined,' asakta, means unobstructed, capable of passing into any bodies. The next epithet, nlyata, translated ' material/ is explained by GrAUKA- PADA as above, by nltya, ' permanent, lasting ;' and VACHES- PATI attaches to it the same signification. ' It endures till the period of universal dissolution |j; and the 8. Pr. Bhdvhya ob serves, also, that it ceases, or is destroyed, only at the same season§ : a property, of which it may be observed by the way, that it furnishes another reason for identifying the silkshmat or * subtile body,' of the foregoing stanza with the linga, or ' rudimental body,' of this verse. The Chandrika explains niyata differently, ' distinct in different persons^.' The com position of subtile body is explicitly described by YACHESPATI : 1 Subtile body is an assemblage of intellect, egotism, the eleven
fetf i t irat H'rr
( 175 }
senses, and the five elements*.' He ascribes, however, to this a specific or ' diversified existence, from its endowment with senses, which arc the sources of pleasure, pain, or indifference!.' The commentators agree that subtile body is subject to enjoy ment or suffering only through its connection with generated body ; understanding apparently thereby, not its abstract capability of either, but the actual condition in which it par takes of them ; for it is repeatedly declared that the seat of enjoyment and suffering is buddhi, or 'intellect;' through the presence of which as an ingredient in subtile body, it is im mediately added, the latter is invested with ' dispositions,' bhdvas ; that is, with the properties of intellect enumerated in ver. 23, virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, &c. The term bhdva was rendered by Mr. Colebrooke in that place by ' senti ments/ but in another (ver. 43) he expressed the same ' dis positions,' which, as far as relates to the mental bhdvas, ap pears to be a preferable equivalent. Of the consequences of these dispositions, reward in heaven, or punishment in hell, dead, decomposed animal body is no longer susceptible : ' In a dead body there can be no sense of pleasure or pain ; this all admit:J:.' In order, however, to be placed in circumstances leading to such enjoyment or suffering, generated body is necessary ; and therefore subtile body migrates, sansarat-i, goes from one body to another continually : hence the world is called sansdra, i migration' or ' revolution.' ' Through the influence of intellect the whole of subtile body is affected by dispositions or conditions, in the same manner as a garment is perfumed from contact with a fragrant cliampa flower||.' S. Tdtu'a Kaiirnudi. Subtile body is called linga from its con-
( 176 )
sisting of those principles which are so termed, either from their indicating or characterising that nature from which thy proceed, or from their being ultimately resolvable into it. Thus the Chandr'ikd, has, ' Linya, from designating, apprising*:' GAURA- PADA, as above, ' It merges into nature at the season of dissolu tion :' and VAOHESPATI, ' Linya is so termed because it suffers resolution (lay a), or from its characteristic indication of the source from which it proceeds*)".' See also remarks on ver, 10 p. 43.
c
3% f^ri Wf msm f^i«r4 fejpr^ 11 « m
XLI.
As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, &c. so neither does subtile person subsist supportless, without specific (or un- specific) particles.
^ Iff^r
i1 fair Mt ^ fair 'Tr^H fair
I ^^
fan
' i t
; t
( 177 ),
BHASHYA.
As a picture without the support of a wall or the like does not stand ; as the shadow does not stand without the stake (the gnomon of a dial) ; that is, without them does not exist. The term et cetera comprises (other illustrations) ; as, wator cannot be without coldness, nor coldness without water ; fire without heat ; air without touch ; ether without extension ; earth without smell ; so by this illustration it is intimated that it, the rudiment (linga), does not subsist without unspecific or rudiinental particles. Here also specific elements are implied, or body composed of the five gross elements ; for without a body, having specific particles, where can the place of the linya, be ; which, when it abandons one corporeal frame, takes refuge in another. Supportless ; devoid of support. Subtile (person) ; Instrument of thirteen kinds : this is the meaning of the text.
For what purpose (these subtile elements are embodied) ii next described.
COMMENT.
Iii the preceding verse it was stated that subtile person migrated, or as soon as deprived of one body it took refuge in another. It is now explained why this must be ; and that it proceeds from the necessity of something to give to subtile principles asylum and support.
The text accordingly states,' that the 'rudiment' the linya, cannot exist without such support; but with regard to the sup port itself there is some difference of opinion, the passage being variously read and interpreted.
GAURAPADA. reads the expression, rnvV.x7,,<r<V r] lt(i, ' without unspecific particles ;' by which lie states that lie means the ' rudimental particles,' the tail ncdtra*. He adds, that specific 23
( 178 )
particles, gross elementary bodies, are also necessary ; using the terms avwesha and vis&ka as th ey were before employed (ver. 38), to represent severally the rudiinental and gross elements. VACHESPATI and NABAYAXA read the phrase viseshair vind, 1 without specific particles / but they use the term ' specific' apparently in its general acceptation of ' species,' without re ference to its technical employment in vcr. 38 ; for they con fine its purpose to that of ' subtile bodies.' ' Without specific particle* ; without subtile bodies : that is the meaning*.' S. Tatwa Kanmudi. ' Without specific particles ; without very subtile bodies : the rudiment (linga), being unsupported, does not remain ; but being supported by subtile bodies it existst/ S. CJiandrikd. So far therefore, although the reading be different, the interpretation appears to be the same. The linya, or ' rudiment' — for it is to be observed, that it is this which is spoken of by both text and comment, and not the linger, sarira, ' rudimental body' — cannot subsist without a bodily frame. Whence that frame is derived, GAUBAPADA makes sufficiently clear. The linya, or ' rudiment,' consists of but thirteen principles — the unclothed faculties and senses : the rudimental body, by which they are aggregated and de fended, is a tan rndtrika body, composed of the rudimental elements (p. 123). This again, for worldly existence, is enve loped in a bodily frame of gross elementary composition.
It may, however, be suspected that the authors of the 8. Tatwa Kaainudi and the Chandrika have not attended to the distinction, and that they intend by their ' specific or subtile bodies' only one of the ' species,' or viseshas, which may be intimated in ver. 38 ; a modification of the gross ele ments enclosing, not the naked ' rudiment/ the linga, but the * rudimental body/ the linya sarira. Such, at any rate, is the interpretation of VIJXAXA BHIKSHU, who commenting on
fa^r
( 179 )
this stanza of the Kdrikd, explains ' specific particles, those which are called subtile amongst gross ; a species or variety of gross elements :' and he says, that ' the definition of subtile body which is given in the preceding stanza, " composed of intellect with other subtile elements" (p. 128), as compared with the expression of the present verse, proves that there is a distinction made between subtile body and the specific variety of the gross elements, which is also called subtile*.'
The question then is not one merely of a difference of inter pretation, but it is a difference of doctrine. According to GAURAPADA'S explanation, which appears to be the original theory, living bodies consist of two parts, one of a subtile, and one of a gross nature ; the latter perishes or decomposes at death ; the former may live on through the existence of the world : the latter gives cover to the former, which is the imme diate vehicle of soul, and accompanies it constantly, through successive perishable bodies, until soul's liberation, or until a period of universal dissolution restore its component parts to their primitive and common parent. To this body the term of linga sarira, ' rudimental body,' is properly applied ; it is also called dtivdhika, that which is swifter than the wind in pass ing from body to body ; and, as Mr. Colebrooke observes, " il seems to be a compromise between an immaterial soul and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter." Tr. R. As. Soc. I. 32.
But some of the expounders of the Sankhya doctrines have not thought even the rudimental body sufficiently material for the purpose of independent existence, when separated from gross body ; and a third corporeal frame has been devised for its support, to which the present verse of the Kdrikd and the
**j3*r?TRt
( 180 )
other passages which seem to allude to a subtile form of speci fic or gross elementary matter relate, according to VuxANi. BHIKSHU : ' Having abandoned gross body, a support is neces sary for the passage of rudimental body to other regions, and another species of body is established*.' This is more particu larly explained in the same writer's commentary on a some what obscure Sutra immediately preceding : " In the body, which is the receptacle of the receptacle of that (rudimental body) ; for the denomination of body is applied to one as it is to the other." That is, the receptacle or support of that rudi ment, which will be described as composed of the five elements, is supported or contained in body constituted of the six organic ingredients (bones, blood, &c.) ; to which the name body is applied, from the same being applicable to the sense of the word adhis/i hdna (delta, " body," being understood apparently in either case " containing" or " comprehending"). The cor poreity of the vehicle or receptacle (adhlshthdna) arises from its relation to the (aggregate) ling a ; the corporeity of gross body, from its being the receptacle of vehicular body. This is the meaning of the text. We have therefore three (kinds of) body established*!*.' Quoting a passage which appears opposed to this, and to intimate, as GAURAPADA has done, a twofold dis tinction only of bodies, the same writer observes, ' What is said in writings, upon the authority of the Ve'das, that there are but two (kinds of) bodies, arises from their identifying the rudimental and vehicular bodies as one, as they are mutually
ft I t c^faSRmq- ^1 asrerTfgJf: II cTST
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permanent and subtile*.' This is no doubt correct ; but it is very unlikely that the elder writers admitted any form of the gross elements to be equally permanent and subtile as the ru diments from which they proceeded. In the institutes of Hanu, for instance, although the doctrine there laid down is of a dif ferent tenor from that of tho Sankhya system, we have but two kinds of bodies, a subtle and substantial one, described; 'After deatli another body, composed of the five rudimental elements, is immediately produced, for wicked men, that may suffer the tortures of the infernal regions-)-.' Md-nii, XII 16. We have here, then, a body composed of the five rudimental elements. In the Bhagavad Glta it is intimated that soul retains the senses and mind in the intervals of migration : ' At the time that spirit obtains a body, and when, it abandons one, it migrates, taking with it those senses, as the wind wafts along with it the perfume of the flowers^.'
If VACHESPATI be correct in his interpretation of the word punusha, the Vdda makes one kind of subtile body of the size of the thumb : " YAMA drew forth violently the subtile body, as big as the thumb." — The specification of the size merely de notes minuteness ; extraction of soul would be absurd ; and therefore by puruslca must be meant " a subtile body," that which reposes in gross body||.' This, agreeably to the older doctrine, would be rudimental body ; according to later refine ment, vehicular. It is the latter which, as Mr. Colebrooke mentions (Tr. R, As. Soc. I. 33) in PATANJALI'S Yoc/a sastra,
t
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is conceived to extend, like the flame of a lamp over its \vick, to a small distance above the skull ; and which, according to M. Cousin, is " la fameuse pensee intracranienne. dont on a cru faire re'cemment une decouverte merveilleuse." Hist, de la Philosophic, I. 195.
The notion of some corporeal, however subtile envelopment of soul — the ei'&oAoy, umlmi, manes, simulacrum, spirit, or ghost — giving to invisible and intangible soul some visible and tangible materiality, " such," as Grood (Translation of Lucreti us) observes, " as will at least enable the soul to assume some degree of material configuration, and to be capable of corporeal feelings, however spiritualized and refined, even after its sepa ration from the body" — has prevailed in all times and in all ages. Nor was the doctrine confined to the people or the poets : such of the philosophers as maintained the immateria lity of soul, attaching to it, until its final purification, some portion of corporeal substance, or some substantial, though subtile investure, or o'x>;/xa, or vehicle. Thus Cudworth (vol. III. 517) states, that 'the ancient assertors of the soul's im mortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body, but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them ; as also they conceived this spirituous body to hang about the soul alse here in this life, before death, as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it when that other gross earthly part of the body is by death put off as an outer garment." It also appears, that " besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous body, the ancients held that there is a third kind, of a higher rank, peculiarly belonging to such souls, after death, as are purged and cleansed from corporeal affections, called by them crwjma avyoeiSe?, or a luciform body." The authorities quoted by Cud- worth for these opinions are new Platonists, or Christian writers of the fourth and fifth centuries ; and it seems not unlikely that they borrowed some of their notions from the doctrines of Christianity, They profess, however, to
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repeat the tenets of Pythagoras and Plato ; and Cudworth asserts, that the distinction of two interior vehicles or tu nicies of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the terrestrial body, is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists, but a tradition derived down from antiquity. Mosheim, in his translation of Cudworth, has entered, in a note, very fully into an inquiry as to the origin of the opinion of a subtile body investing soul, and concludes, " Yetus ha?c opinio aut si mavis superstitio, ab ipsis fere Gr.Tcorum haroicis temporibus ducta :" and Brucker, in reference to his observations on this subject, remarks, " Hoc vero magna doctrina et ingenio de- monstravit Mosheimius hac de vehiculo opinionem non demum in juniorum Platonicornm cerebro cnatam essc sed fuisse dogma cairn? antiquitatis." Hi*t. Pldlos. I. 714. Although, therefore, less clearly expressed than by the Hindu writers, the early Greek philosophers entertained similar notions of the nature of the subtile body, which was inseparable from soul until the period of its final exemption from transmigration.
n n s * n
XLII.
FOR the sake of .soul's wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it), like a dramatic actor ; through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature's influence.
( 184 )
f^i
BIIASHYA.
The purpose of soul is to be fulfilled, therefore nature proceeds to action. This (purpose) is twofold, apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense, and apprehension of the difference between qualities and soul. Apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense is enjoyment of sensual grati fication, as fragrance and the like in the spheres of Brahma and the rest : apprehension of the difference between the qua lities and soul is liberation. Therefore it is said, For the sake of soul's wish subtile person is active. Th.ru a-yU relation of iHeu'n* nn<l co'iiw<it!encex. — Mi'an* (or antecedents) are virtue and the like : conwqtH'nces are their results, such as their ascending to heaven and so forth, as we shall hereafter explain. By then' relation; their connection. I}'//// //»: <(id of ncbtW&v i rttlt'CiiC'' ;. of the influence of the chief one, nature. As a king in his own kingdom does what he wishes of his own authority, so by the application of the supreme authority of nature,
through the relation of means (or causes) and consequences, subtile body exhibits : that is, nature commands subtile body to assume different conditions, by taking different (gross) bodies. Subtile body is that which is aggregated of subtile atomic rudimental elements, and is possessed of thirteen in struments (or faculties and senses). It assumes various con ditions, by its birth, amongst gods, animals and men. How does (it exhibit) ? Like an actor, who when he enters upon the scene is a god, and when he makes his exit is again a mortal : or again, a buffoon. So the subtile body, through the relation of causes and consequences, having entered the womb, may become an elephant, a woman, or a man.
It was said (ver. 40), " Subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions." What those dispositions are is now described.
COMMENT-
The circumstances on which transmigration depends are here said to be the purpose of soul, enforced by the authority of nature.
Soul's purpose is either fruition or liberation ; and to accom plish one or other of these, subtile body passes through various conditions, assuming different exterior forms, as an actor puts on different dresses to personate one while Rama, another while Yudhishthira, or again, Vatsa*. The purpose of soul is enforced by the power, authority, or influence of nature*. Vibhutwa, as illustrated by GAURAPADA, means ' kingly or supreme authority.' VACHESPATI understands it as ' univer sality' rather, as in the text of the Pur ana : ' This wonderful vicissitude is from the universality of naturej ;' that is, from its invariable presence and consequent influence. But besides these motives, the purpose of soul and influence of nature, which may be regarded as the remote and proximate causes of
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( 186 )
transmigration in general, it is still necessary to have what may be regarded as a special, or exciting, or efficient cause J the reason of the particular migration ; the cause wherefore, in particular instances, subtile body should ascend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a god, or wherefore it should descend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a brute. This depends, then, upon the relation of certain occasional or instrumental means or causes, wi/mMas*, with their incidental consequences or effects, the naimitlikas't', as virtue and vice, which lead severally to reward and punishment after death ; that is, to regeneration in an exalted or degraded condition. Thus the Chandrikd explains the terms : ' Nimitta is virtue and the rest ; naimittika is the effect, having the nimitta for its cause, as gross bodies, &c. By the relation or connection of these two, subtile body, assuming the form of gods or other beings, performs its part}/ Professor Lassen has been needlessly perplexed by this verse, and has strangely rendered it as follows : " Corpusculum hocce propter genii causam effectum, ludionis instar se habet ad has modo ad illas originari- as et derivatas conditiones pronum, post conjunctionem pro- creatricis cum potestate sua."
XLIII.
ESSENTIAL dispositions are innate. Incidental, as virtue and the rest, are considered appurtenant to the
J
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instrument. The uterine germ (flesh and blood) and the rest belong to the effect (that is, to the body).
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f fa?
BHA'SHYA,
Dispositions (Ikdvas, ' conditions') of being are considered to be threefold, innate, essential, and incidental. The first, or innate, are those four which in the first creation were cognate
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with the divine sage KAPILA, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The essential are declared ; these were four sons of BRAHMA', SANAKA, SANANDANA, SAN A' TAN A, and SANJLT- KUMA'EA ; and these four dispositions were produced with them, who were invested with bodies of sixteen years of age (or perpetually juvenile bodies), inconsequence of the relation of causes and effects (or in consequence of merit in a former existence) : therefore these dispositions are called essential. Incidental are those derived through the corporeal form of a holy teacher ; from which (in the first instance) knowledge is incidentally obtained by such as we are ; from knowledge comes dispassion; from dispassion, virtue; and from virtue, power. The form of a teacher is an incidental product (of nature), and therefore these dispositions are termed incidental: " Invested by which, subtile body migrates" (ver. 40). These four dispositions are of the quality of goodness ; those of dark ness are their contraries : as above, " Virtue, &c. are its faculties partaking of goodness ; those partaking of darkness are the reverse" (ver. 23). Consequently there are eight dispositions, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, weakness. Where do they abide ? They are considered ap- purtenant to the instrument. Intellect is an instrument, and to that they are appurtenant ; as in ver. 23, " Ascertainment is intellect ; virtue, knowledge," &c. Effect; body. The uterine germ and the rest belong to it ; those which are born of the mother, the germ and the rest, or the bubble, the flesh, the muscle, and the rest, which are (generated), for the develop ment of the infant, in the union of the blood and the seminal fluid. Thus the conditions of infancy, youth, and old age are produced ; the instrumental causes of which are food and beve rage ; and therefore they are said to be attributes of the effect (or of the body), having, as the instrumental cause, the fruition of the sensual pleasures of eating and the like.
It was said (ver. 42). " Through the relation of means and consequences :" this is next explained,
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COMMENT-
We have here an explanation of what is to be understood by the term dispositions, used in a former passage (ver. 40).
The translation of bh&va* adopted by Mr. Colebrooke in this place is ' disposition :' in the passage referred to he had em ployed, as above remarked, ' sentiment;' but it was there changed, in order to preserve consistency. Neither word per haps exactly expresses the purport of the original, nor is it easy to find one that will precisely correspond. In some res- pects c condition,' mode, or state of being, conditio, as rendered by Professor Lassen, is preferable, as better comprehending the different circumstances to which bhdva is applied ; although, as he has occasion subsequently to remark, it does not very well express all the senses in which bkdva occur. These cir cumstances or conditions, according to the obvious meaning of the text, are of two kinds, or intellectual and corporeal. The first comprise virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries ; the second, the different periods of life, or embryo, infancy, youth, and senility. They are also to be regarded as respectively cause and effect ; virtue, &c. being the efficient cause, or nimitta ; bodily condition the naimittika, or conse quence ; as VA'CHESPATI explains the object of the stanza, ' which,' according to him, ' distinguishes incidental cause and consequence, the latter being the incidental conditions of bodyf .'
But besides the division of conditions or dispositions into the two classes of intellectual and corporeal, they are also characterised according to their origin, as sdnsiddhika, prd- krita, and vaikrita, rendered in the text ' innate, essential, and incidental.' Prof. Lassen translates them conditiones absolute?, pendentes ab origins, pertin&ntes ad evoluta principia* Both the two first are innate, and some further distinction is necessary. c Superhuman' or ' transcendental' would perhaps
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best explain the first, as they are, according to the commenta tor, peculiar, to saints and sages. According to GAURAPADA, they occur only in one instance as the cognate conditions of the divine KAPILA, the author of the Sankhya system. The second class, which may be rendered ' natural/ agreeably to his view, which is a little mystical, originated with the four holy and chaste sons of BRAHMA. The third class, those which are incidental or constructive, vaikrita, belong to mortals, as they are produced in them by instruction. VACHESPATI re cognises but two distinctions, identifying, as in the translation, the innate (sdnsiddhika) with the essential (prdkrita) dis positions, they being both sw&bhdvika, inseparable, inherent,' not the production of tuition, and opposing to it the construc tive or incidental (vaikritika)*. A similar account of their origin as in the Bhdshya is given, but under these two heads only : * Thus in the beginning of creation the first sage, the venerable and great Muni KAPILA, appeared, spontaneously endowed with virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The incidental and unspontaneous dispositions were produced by the cultivation of the means (of producing them), as (the les sons of) -PKACHETASA and other great Rishis^J These dis positions or conditions are dependent upon the instrument, that is upon buddhi, or ' intellect,' of which they are faculties, as was explained in verse 23. The states or conditions of life depend upon the body, and are the immediate effects of gene ration and nutriment, the more remote effects of virtue, vice, &c.
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: II 88 II
XLIV.
BY virtue is ascent to a region above ; by vice, des cent to a region below : by knowledge is deliverance ; by the reverse, bondage.
BHA'SHYA,
— Having made virtue the efficient cause, it leads upwards. By upwards eight degrees are intended, or the regions of Brahma", Prajapati, Soma, Indra, the Gan- dharbas, the Yakshas, the Rakshasas, and Pisdchas \ the subtile body goes thither. Or if vice be the efficient cause, it mi grates into an animal, a deer, a bird, a reptile, a vegetable, or a mineral. Again ; by knowledge, deliverance : knowledge of the twenty-five principles ; by that efficient cause, deliverance, the subtile body ceases, and (soul is) called ' supreme spirit1
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(pammdtmd). By the reverse, bondage: ignorance is the efficient cause, and that (effect) bondage is natural (prdkrita), incidental (vaikdrika), or personal (ddkshina)^ as will be ex plained : " He who is bound by natural, incidental, or personal bondage is not loosed by any other (means than knowledge)." Next, other efficient causes are declared,
II
: us MI
XLV.
BY dispassion is absorption into nature ; by foul passion, migration : by power, unimpediment ; by the reverse, the contrary.
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( 193 ) BHASHYA.
If any one has dispassion without knowledge of principles then from such dispassion unpreceded by knowledge occurs absorption into nature, or when the individual dies he is re solved into the eight primary elements, or nature, intellect, egotism, and the five rudiments ; but there is no liberation, and therefore he migrates anew. So also by fowl passion ; as I sacrifice, I give gifts, in order to obtain in this world divine or human enjoyment ; from such foul passion proceeds worldly migration. By power, unimpediment. — Where eightfold power, as minuteness, &c. is the efficient cause, the non-ob struction is the effect. Such power is unimpeded in the sphere of Brahma, or in any other. By the reverse, the contrary. — The contrary of unimpediment is obstruction, which proceeds from want of power, every where obstructed.
Thus sixteen efficient causes and effects have been enume rated : what they comprehend (or amount to) is next described.
COMMENT-
In these two verses the efficient causes of the various con ditions of subtile body and their effects, or its conditions, are detailed.
These causes and effects are collectively sixteen, eight of each : the former are positive and negative, as diversified by the qualities of goodness and foulness (ver. 23); and the effects respectively correspond. They are accordingly.
Cause. Effect.
1. Virtue. 2. Elevation in the scale of being.
3. Vice. 4. Degradation in the scale of being.
5. Knowledge. 6. Liberation from existence.
7. Ignorance. 8. Bondage or transmigration.
9. Dispassion. 10. Dissolution of the subtile bodily form,
11. Passion. 12. Migration.
13. Power. 14. Unimpediment.
15. Feebleness. 16. Obstruction.
25
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By ' virtue/ dherma, both religious and moral merit are in tended. Ascent, going upward, is elevation to a more exalted station in another birth ; the term stkdna implying both place and degree. According to GAURAPADA, this ascent is eightfold, and the subtile frame may after death assume a new body amongst the various classes of spirits, Pisachas, Kakshasas, Yakshas, and Gandherbas ; or may attain a place in the heaven, of Indra ; of Soma, or the moon ; of the Prajapatis, or progeni tors of mankind ; or even in the region of Brahmd. It is a curious, though perhaps an accidental coincidence, that the Syrians and Egyptians enumerated also, according to Plato (Epinomis), eight orders of heavenly beings : their places, how ever, seem to be the planets exclusively. The author of the S. T. Kaumudi understands by ascent, or elevation, ascent to the six superterrestrial regions. Dyu, or Bhuvar loJca, the at mosphere ; Siver loka, the heaven of Indra; Mahar loka, Jana- loka, and Tapololca, worlds of sages and saints ; and Satya loka, of Brahma. By degradation he understands descent to the subterrene regions, Pdtdla, Rasdtahi, &c. These notions are, however, not incompatible, as rewards and punishments in heaven and hell are put temporary, and subtile body must even afterwards assume terrestrial form, and undergo a series of migrations before escape from the bondage of existence can be finally accomplished.
Bondage is said by the commentators to be of three kinds, intending thereby three different errors or misconceptions of the character of soul and nature ; the prevalence of which pre cludes all hope of final emancipation. ' These errors or bonds are, 1. Prdkritika ; the error or bondage of the materialists, who assert soul in nature (or matter) : 2. Vaikritika; the error of another class of materialists, who confound soul with any of the products of nature, as the elements, the senses, egotism or intellect : and, 3. Ddkshina ; the error or bondage of those who, ignorant of the real character of soul, and blind ed bythe hop e of advantage, engage in moral and religioui
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observances :' as VA'CHESPATI*. These errors confine the soul to its subtile material frame for various protracted periods ; as, for instance, in the case of those who identify soul with sense, for ten manwantaraa, or above three thousand millions of years (3,084,480,000).
By dispasslon occurs 'absorption into nature/ prakritl lay erf ; or, as the Kaumudi and Chandrikd express it, ' reso lution into the chief one and the restj.' GAURAPA'DA makes the meaning of the phrase sufficiently clear : according to him it signifies the resolution of even the subtile body into its constituent elements : but this is not in this case equivalent to liberation ; it is only the term of one series of migrations, soul being immediately reinvested with another person, and commencing a new career of migratory existence until know ledge is attained.
: 11
^I^r XLVI.
II S
THIS is an intellectual creation, termed obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. By disparity of influence of qualities the sorts of it are fifty.
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( 196 )
-IT
ir-
gfgt i ^f m^r^r ^r^r i ^r- f fe
BHASHYA.
This aggregate of sixteen causes and effects is called an in» telledual creation. Pratyaya means buddhi, ' intellect is as certainment," &c. (ver. 23). This intellectual creation is of four kinds, obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfect- ness. In this classification, doubt (obstruction) is ignorance ; as when any one beholding a post (at a distance) is in doubt whether it is a post or a man. Disability is when, even though the object be distinctly seen, the doubt cannot be dissipated. The third kind is called acquiescence ; as when a person de clines to doubt or determine whether the object be a post or not ; saying, What have I to do with this. The fourth kind is perfectness ; as when the delighted observer notices a creeper twining round the object, or a bird perched upon it, and is certain that it is a post. By disparity of influence o
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ties. — By the unequal (or varied) influence of the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, acting on this fourfold intel lectual creation, there are fifty modifications of it : and these kinds in which severally goodness, foulness, or darkness pre vails, and the other two are subordinate, are next parti cularized.
COMMENT-
In this and the five following stanzas the modifications of the causes and consequences, or the conditions of existence pro duced by the intellectual faculties, as influenced by the three qualities, are detailed and classified.
By ' intellectual creation,' pratyaya serga*, is to be under stood the various accidents of human life occasioned by the operations of the intellect, or the exercise of its faculties, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries. Pratyaya properly means ' trust,' but is here considered to be synonymous with buddhi. It may be understood as implying ' notion ;' and pratyaya serga is the creation or existence of which we have a notion or belief, in contradistinction to bodily or organic existence, of which we have an idea or sensible perception ; the bhuta sergcff, or ' elemental creation.'
Existence then, dependent on the faculties of the intellect and their consequences, is further distinguished as of four kinds : 1. ' Obstruction/ viparyaya, is explained by VACHES- PATI * ignorance' (ajndna), by GAURAPADA ' doubt' (sansaya) : 2. ' Disability,' asakti, is imperfection of the instruments or senses : 3. Tiisliti is ' acquiescence' or ' indifference :' and, 4. S-iddhi is * complete or perfect knowledge.' 'In the three first are comprised the seven intellectual faculties, virtue and the rest (see p. 88), all except knowledge, which is comprehen ded in perfectnessj.' S. Tatwa Kaumuctt. This is the col-
I J
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( 198 )
lective or generic division. Each genus is again divided so as to form fifty species, according as they are affected by the three qualities, or the predominance of one, and the depression of another*. The species are enumerated in the succeeding verse.
XL VII.
THERE are five distinctions of obstruction ; and, from defect of instruments, twenty-eight of disability : acquiescence is ninefold ; perfectness eightfold.
*frfT
STRFR i
BHA'SHYA.
Five distinctions of obstruction ; namely, obscurity, illusion extreme illusion, gloom, and utter darkness : these will pre sently be explained. There are twenty-eight kinds of disabi lity from defec tof instruments ; which also we shall describe. Acquiescence is ninefold, being the kinds of knowledge par-
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taking of the quality of foulness in an ascetic. Perfectncss is eightfold, which in holy men consists also of the kinds of knowledge partaking of the quality of goodness. These wiU all be explained in order ; and first of obstruction.
COMMENT.
We have here the fifty varieties of intellectual creation, or conditions dependent upon the faculties of intellect, simply enumerated under each head respectively.
The text in each case is limited to the enumeration of the number of the varieties, leaving their designations and des criptions to be supplied by the scholia : accordingly we have in the JBhdshf/a the five distinctions of obstructions specified. They are referred to in the text, in the succeeding stanza, for the purpose of enumerating their subdivisions, and it is un necessary therefore to enter upon the detail here.
•v fv
?T*?T
XL VIII.
THE distinctions of obscurity are eightfold, as also those of illusion ; extreme illusion is eighteenfold, and so is utter darkness.
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i <T*IT <jrf^g»FNpJ sgr* srffor
f%3
BHASHYA.
Obscurity is eightfold; final dissolution being so distin guished through ignorance ; as when a person thinks that soul merges into the eight forms of prakriti, or the five rudiments, egotism, intellect, and nature, and thence concludes, I am liberated : this is eightfold obscurity. The same is the num ber of kinds of illusion ; in consequence of which, Indra and the gods, being attached to the possession of the eight kinds of super-human power, such as minuteness and the rest, do not obtain liberation, but upon the loss of their power migrate again : this is called eightfold illusion. Extreme illusion is of ten kinds, accordingly as the five objects of sense, sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, are sources of happiness to the gods or to men. In these ten objects (or the five objects of sense twice told) consists extreme illusion, Gloom is eighteen/old. — The faculties of superhuman power are eight sources, and the objects of sense, human or divine, are ten, making eighteen ; and the feeling that makes men rejoice in the enjoyment of $ese eighteen, and given for the want of them, is gloom
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Utter darkness has in like manner eighteen varieties, origin a = ting with the eightfold superhuman power and the ten objects of perception ; but it applies to the profound grief felt by one who dies amidst the abundance of sensual delights in the season of enjoyment, or who falls from the command of super human faculties ; that is utter darkness. In this manner the five varieties of obstruction, obscurity and the rest, are sever* ally subdivided, making sixty-two varieties.
COMMENT.
The five kinds of obstruction, ignorance> or uncertainty, al luded to in the preceding stanza, are here specified, and their subdivisions enumerated.
* Obstruction/ viparyaya*, means, properly, whatever ob structs the soul's object of final liberation : it is consequently any cause of bondage, of confinement to worldly existence, or of perpetual migration, and is therefore one of the four ele ments of the creation of the world ; as, if spirit was not so confined, created forms would never have existed. So the Sutra of KAPILA has, ' Bondage is from obstruction;-)-' but libe ration depends on knowledge : bondage therefore arises from ignorance, and ignorance or error is obstruction. GAURAPADA accordingly uses sansaya^, ' doubt' or ' error/ as the synonyme of viparyaya ; and the specification of its sub-species confirms this sense of the term, as they are all hinderances to rural emancipation, occasioned by ignorance of the difference be tween soul and nature, or by an erroneous estimate of the sources of happiness, placing it in sensual pleasure or super human might.
The five varieties of obstruction or error are, ' obscurity/ tamas ; illusion/ moha ; extreme illusion/ mahdmoha ; ' gloom/ tdmisra ; ' utter darkness/ andhatdmisra. The distinctions
t ^ 26
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•are more subtle than precise, but their general purport is sufficiently obvious ; they all imply ignorance of self, and thirst of pleasure and power. Another enumeration, that of the Yoga, or Pdtanjala school, as repeated by VIJNANA BHIKSHU, calls the five species, ' ignorance' (avidyd), ' egoism" (asmitd), ' love' (r&ga), ' hate' (dwesha), and ' idle terror, (abhinive'sa), as fear of death and the like*. They are called also in the same system, ' the five afflictions^.' These are identified with the species named in the text. Obscurity is that ignorance which believes soul to be sealed in primary nature, or one of its first seven products ; and is therefore eightfold. Illusion is that egoism that exults in the appro priation of the eight superhuman faculties ; and is con sequently eightfold also. Extreme illusion, or love, is ad diction to sensual objects, as they are grateful respectively to gods and men: therefore this class of impediments to liberation is tenfold. Gloom, or hate, is of eighteen kinds ; ten as affecting the ten objects of sense, or the five divine and five human, as before distinguished, and termed by GAUKAPADA drishta,]. l seen,' perceived by men ; and anusra- vikd\\, ' heard traditionally,' by men, of the gods : and eight connected with the possession of the eight superhuman facul ties. The mental conditions here intended are those of fierce* ness and impatience, with which sensual enjoyments are pur sued, or superhuman powers are exercised. Utter darkness, or terror, is the fear of death in men ; and in gods, the dread of expulsion from heaven by the Asuras : in either case the loss of pleasure and power is the thing lamented ; and as their sources are eighteen, so many are the subdivisions of this condition. These distinctions are said to be the work of former teachers ; as in the S. Pravachana Bhdshya : ' The subdivisions are as
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formerly described : that is, the subdivisions of obstruction, which is said to be of five species, are such as were fully de tailed by former teachers, but are in the Sutra but briefly alluded to, for fear of prolixity*/
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I %\ II
XLIX.
DEPRAVITY of the eleven organs, together with in juries of the intellect, are pronounced to be disability, The injuries of intellect are seventeen, by inversion of acquiescence and perfectness.
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BHASHYA.
From defect of instruments there are twenty-eight kinds of disability ; this has been declared (ver. 47) : these are, depra vity of the eleven organs, or deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss of taste, loss of smell, dumbness, mutilation, lameness, con stipation, impotence, and insanity. Together with injuries of the intellect : as, together with these, there are twenty-eight kinds of disability, there are seventeen kinds of injuries of the intellect. By inversion of acquiescence and perfectness : that is, there are nine kinds of acquiesence, and eight of perfect- ness ; and with the circumstances that are the reverse of these (seventeen), the eleven above specified, compose the twenty- eight varieties of disability. The kinds of injury of the in tellect which are the reverse of (the sorts of) acquiescence and perfectness will be understood from the detail of their varieties.
The nine kinds of acquiescence are next explained.
COMMENT-
The various kinds of the second class of conditions or dis ability are here enumerated.
' Disability,' asakti, or incapability of the intellect to dis charge its peculiar functions*, is the necessary result of imper fection of the senses, or of any of the organs of perception and of action. But besides these, which are sufficiently obvious, such as blindness, deafness, and any other organic defect, there are seventeen affections of the intellect itself equally injurious to its efficiency. These are described as the contraries of the conditions which constitute the classes acquiescence and per fectness. Under the former head are enumerated, dissatisfac tion as to notions of nature, means, time, and luck, and addic tion to enjoyment of the five objects of sense, or the pleasures of sight, hearing, touching, &c. The contraries of perfectness
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are, want of knowledge, whether derivable from reflection, from tuition, or from study, endurance of the three kinds of pain, privation of friendly intercourse, and absence of purity or of liberality.
m: n ^ * n
L.
NINE sorts of acquiescence are propounded ; four internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to luck ; five external, relative, to abstinence from (en joyment of) objects.
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BHASHYA.
Five internal sorts of acquiescence. — Those which are in the individual are internal. They are said to relate to nature, to' means, to time, and to luck. The first is, when a person under stands what nature is, its being with or without qualities, and thence knows a principle (of existence) to be a product of nature ; but knows this only, and is satisfied : he does not obtain liberation : this is acquiescence in regard to nature. The second is, when a person, ignorant of the principles (of existence), depends upon external means, such as the triple staff, the water-pot, and other implements (used by ascetics) : liberation is not for him : this is acquiescence in regard to means. Acquiescence in regard to time is when a person satisfies him self that liberation must occur in time, and that it is unne cessary to study first principles : such a one does not obtain liberation. And in the same way acquiescence as relates to luck is when a person is content to think that by good luck liberation will be attained. These are four kinds of acquie scence. Five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of objects). — The external sorts of acquiescence are five ; from
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•abstinence from enjoyment of (five) objects of sense ; that I» when a person abstains from gratification through sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell ; such abstinence proceeding from observation of (the evils of) acquiring, preserving, waste, attachment (to sensual pleasures), and injuriousness. Acquir ing is pain (or trouble), for the sake of increase, by the pastur age of cattle, trade, acceptance of gifts, and servitude. There is pain in the preservation of what has been acquired ; and if they be enjoyed, they are wasted ; and waste, again, is vexa tion. When attachment to sensual pleasures prevails, the organs have no repose : that is the fault of such attachment Without detriment to created things there is no enjoyment (of sensible objects) ; and this is the defect of injuriousness. From observing then the evil consequences of acquiring and the rest, abstinence from enjoyment of the five objects of sense is practised ; and these are the five sorts of external acquiescence. From the variety of these internal and external kinds proceed the nine sorts of acquiescence. Their names are differently enumerated in other works, or ambhaSj salilam, ogha, vrishti, sutamas, pdram, sunetram, ndrikam, and anuttamdmbhasikam : and from the reverse of these kinds of acquiescence, constituting the varieties of disability, injuries of the intellect arise, named (according to the last mentioned nomenclature) anambhas, asalilam, and so on. From the contrariety of these, therefore, are inferred the injuries of the intellect.
Perfectness is next described.
COMMENT.
The different kinds of acquiescence, apathy, or indifference, are specified in this verse.
The kinds of acquiescence, content, or complacency, tushti, are of two descriptions ; internal or spiritual, ddhydtmiJca, and external or sensible, bahya. GAUKAPADA explains the former,
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* being in self or spirit*/ VACHESPATI defines them, ' Those kinds of acquiescence are called internal which proceed from discrimination of self, as different from naturef.' According to VIJNANA BHIKSHU> they are those principles or sentiments which preside over collected or composed soulj. Of the dif ferent species, the first, or that which relates to nature, ac knowledges it as the radical principle of all things, but expects that as every thing is but a modification of nature so nature will effect all that is necessary, even liberation, for example, and the individual / remains passive and completed. Another person, as the means of liberation, adopts a religious or mendicant order, or at least bears the emblems, as the staff, the water-pot, and the like : the term vividikd used in the Bhdshya is of doubtful import, and is perhaps an error. Others suppose that liberation must come in time, or at least by a long continued course of meditation. Others imagine it may come by good luck ; and contenting themselves with these notions or practices, omit the only means of being freed from existence, discriminative meditation. The five external kinds of acquiescence are self-denial, or abstinence from the five objects of sensual gratification ; not from any philosophic appreciation of them, but from dread of the trouble and anxiety which attends the means of procuring and enjoy ing worldly pleasures ; such as acquiring wealth, preserving it, spending it, incessant excitement and injury or cruelty to others. Besides the terms ordinarily significant of those divi sions of acquiescence, the Scholiasts specify other words, the usual sense of which is quite different, and which may there fore be regarded as the slang or mystical nomenclature of the
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followers of the Yoga,. There is some difference in the precise expressions, but they are of a similar purport in general. The first four, the synonymes of the internal modes of acquiescence . are alike in all the authorities ; or ambhas*, ' water ;' salila^, also ' water ;' ogha+, ' quantity ;' and vrishtill,' ' rain.' GAURA- PADA then has for the five exterior modes, sutamas§, ' great darkness ;' pdra^, ' shore ;' sune'tra**, ( a beautiful eye ;' nd- rika-ff, ( feminine ;' and anuttamdmbhisika+l, ' unsurpassed water/ VAGHESPATI makes them, p&ram, supdram\\\\, ' good shore ;' apdram§§, ' shoreless ;' amuttamambhas^ , ' unsur passed water ;' and uttamdmbhas*** , * excellent water.' The Chandrikdj has the same, except in the third place, where the term is pdrdpdrflftt, ' both shores ;' with which the 8. Prav. Bh. agrees. No explanation of the words is any where given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption.
: \\ H i n
LI.
REASONING, hearing, study, prevention of pain of three sorts, intercourse of friends, and purity (or gift) are perfections (or means thereof). The fore-mention ed three are curbs of perfectness.
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BHA'SHYA,
Reasoning ; as when a person always reasons. What here is truth ? What is the future ? What is final felicity ? How may I attain the object (of my existence) ? and from reflecting in this manner, the knowledge is acquired that soul is different from nature ; that intellect, egotism, the rudiments, the senses, the elements, are several and distinct. In this manner know ledge of the (twenty-five) principles is attained, by which liberation is accomplished. This is the first kind of perfect- ness, called reasoning. Next, from knowledge acquired by hearing proceeds knowledge of nature, intellect, egotism, the rudiments, the senses, and the elements ; whence liberation ensues : this is pcrfectness by hearing. When from study, or the perusal of the Yedas and other (sacred) writings, know ledge of the twenty-five principles is acquired ; that is the third kind of pcrfectness. Prevention of the three kinds of pain. — When, for the purpose of preventing the three kinds of pain, internal, external, and saperhuman, a holy teacher has been attended, and liberation is derived from his counsel ; then this constitutes the fourth kind of perfectness. This is three- fold, with reference to the three different sorts of pain, and makes, with the three preceding, six varieties of perfectness. Next, 'intercourse of friend*>\u& when a friend, having acquired knowledge, obtains liberation : this the seventh kind of perfect- ness, Gift ; as when a person assists holy men, by donations
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of a dwelling, of herbs, of a staff, a wallet, food, or clothing ; and (in requital) receives from them knowledge, and thus ob tains liberation : this is the eighth sort of perfectness. In other books these eight kinds of perfectness are termed /dram, sutdram, tdrat&ram, pramodam, pramoditam, pramodamd-
nam, ramyakam, and sadfrpramuditam. From contrariety
to these, the injuries of intellect which occur, or causes of dis ability, are termed atdram, astitardm, &c. ; thus completing the twenty-eight kinds of disability, as in the text (ver. 49), " Depravity of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the intellect," &c. Thus the contraries of the sorts of acquiescence being nine, and the contraries of the kinds of perfectness being eight, they form seventeen injuries of intellect ; and these, with the eleven defects of the organs, constitute twenty-eight kinds of disability, as previously stated.
In this way the various kinds of obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness, have been affirmatively and negatively described. Again, the forementioned three are curbs of perfectness. — Forementioned; that is, obstruction, disability, and acquiescence; they are curbs of perfectness threefold curbs from their severalty. As an elephant is kept in check when restrained by a goad (or curb), so, impeded by obstruction, disability, and acquiescence, the world suffers ignorance : therefore abandoning them, perfectness alone is to be pursued ; for by a person having perfectness knowledge is attained, and thence liberation.
It was stated (ver. 40) that " subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions :" those dispositions were previously said to be virtue and the rest, eight in number, modifications (or faculties) of intellect ; which again have been described as modified by obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfect- ness. These (together) constitute intellectual creation, also called dispositional (or conditional) : but subtile body is called a rudimental (or personal) creation, extending throughout the fourteen sorts of created things. (See v. 53.) It then becomes a question, whether soul's purpose is accomplished by one kind of creation, or by both ? This is next explained.
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COMMENT.
Tho different kinds of perfectness are here specified.
By ' perfectness,' siddhi*, is here to be understood the means of perfecting or fulfilling the purpose of soul, or the conditions essential to its attainment ; the circumstances productive of knowledge ; the necessary consequence of which is exemption from future transmigration. ' f Reasoning, hearing, study, intercourse of friends, and gift, are secondary kinds of perfect- ness, as subsidiary to the prevention of the three kinds of pain, which constitutes a triple principal class : they are respectively distinguished as objects, and the means of effecting those objects/ S. Taiva Kaumudi. Reasoning, according to VACHESPATI, is ' investigation of scriptural authority by dia lectics which are not contrary to the scriptures :' and investi gation is defined, : refutation of dubious doctrine, and esta blishment of positive conclusions^.' ' Hearing is oral instruc tion, or rather the knowledge thence derived, or knowledge derived either from hearing another person read, or from ex pounding a work||.' 8. Pr. Bh. Intercourse of friends^ is explained in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi to signify ' dissatisfac tion with solitary inquiry, and discussion with a teacher, a pupil, or a fellow-studentHV VIJNANA BHIKSHU defines it ' acquirement of knowledge from a benevolent visitor, who, comes to give instruction**.' VACHESPATI and NARAYANA agree in rendering ddna-ff — which GAURAPADA explains by
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1 gift, liberality/ particularly to religious characters-by \suddhi*, ' purity ;' meaning the purity of discriminative knowledge ; deriving it from the root <iaipt, ' to purify ;' and not from rfdj, ' to give/ The former cites the authority of PATANJALI for this sense of one kind of perfectness : ' Undisturbedness of discriminative knowledge, that is, purity ; which is not attain ed except through long repeated and uninterrupted practice of veneration, That is also comprehended in discrimination by the term ddna\\. He also observes that others interpret it 'gift, by which a sage, being propitiated, imparts know ledge^' The S. Prav. Bh. gives this interpretation only!!". The term for ' curb,' ankusa**, is the goad or iron hook used to guide an elephant : it is here explained by nivdrana, 6 hinder ing ;' and ' as obstruction, disability, and acquiescence hinder perfectness, they are to be shunnedff /
L1I.
WITHOUT dispositions there would be no subtile per son : without person there would be no pause of dispo sitions : wherefore a twofold creation is presented, one termed personal, the other intellectual.
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( '215 )
BHASHYA.
Without dispositions, without intellectual creations, there ivoiM be no subtile person, no rudimental creation ; from the non-assumption of repeated successive bodily forms, without the necessary influence of anterior conditions (or dispositions). Withowitt person, without rudimental creation, there would be no pause of dispositions ; from the indispensability of virtue or vice for the attainment of either subtile or gross body, and from the non-priority of either creation, they being mutually initiative, like the seed and the germ. There is no fault in this, for (the relation) is that of species, it does not imply the mutual relation of individuals. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, one termed conditional (or intellectual), the other rudimental (or personal), Further —
COMMENT.
It is here explained that a double condition of existence, a twofold creation, necessarily prevails ; one proceeding from the intellectual faculties, the other from the rudimental elements ; each being indispensable to the other.
It was stated (ver. 40) that subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions : and it was then explained (ver 43, et seq.) what those dispositions or conditions were, viz. the conditions of the intellect (described in ver. 23), or virtue, vice, know ledge, ignorance, passion, dispassion, power, and debility. These were said ^(v. 46) to constitute an intellectual creation;
( -216 )
or a series of conditions originating in affections of buddhi, or the intellectual principle. But the effects of these dispositions, the consequences of virtue or vice and the rest, can only be manifested in a bodily state, and therefore require necessarily a creation of a different character, personal or rudimental creation, such as subtile body, investing the imperceptible products of nature ; intellect and its faculties included. Nor is such a creation indispensable for the existence or exercise of the intellectual conditions or sentiments alone, but it is equally necessary for their occasional cessation : thus virtue, vice, and the rest necessarily imply and occasion bodily condition : bodily condition is productive of acts of vice and virtue ; vice and virtue, again, occasion bodily condition ; and so on : like the seed and the tree, each mutually generative of the other : the tree bears the seed ; from the seed springs the tree, again to put forth seed ; and so on for ever ; neither being initiative, neither being final. But one result of bodily condition is knowledge ; knowledge is liberation, when soul is disengaged ; subtile body then resolves into its rudiments, and the dis positions or conditions of the intellect terminate. In this way there are two creations, the bhdvdkhya*, that termed ' con ditional ' or ' intellectual ;' and the lingdkhya'f, that called ' rudimental' or ' personal.' Both these seem to be considered by the text, as well as by GAUHAPA'DA and VA'CHESPATI, as varieties of one species of the Pratyaya sarga, or ' intellectual creation/ The commentator on the $. Pravachana so far agrees with them, but he seems to restrict the two kinds more closely to a creation of intellect, regarding the linga as buddhi itself, and the blidva as its conditions or dis positions. Thus, commenting on this verse of the Kdrikdt he observes, ' J3hAva signifies the modes of the apprehen sion (or the faculties) of intelligence, as the properties knowledge, virtue, and the rest. Linya is the great
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principle, or intelligence*.' He calls them both samashti sarga, ' a collective or generic creation.' By the other com mentators, however, the lingct is also called the tanmdtra, or ' rudimental creationf:' and it further seems to imply ' gross body ;' for fruition, which is one of soul's objects, cannot be accomplished without both bodies ; without the receptacle that enjoys, and the objects to be enjoyed^.' The author of the Chandrikd has accordingly adopted a totally different version of this passage, understanding by bhdvdkhya, not any reference to intellectual creation, but the creation of sensible objects, the object to be enjoyed ; lingdkhya, or * personal creation/ being the enjoy er : ' Without the bh&vas, or present objects of sense, the lingo,, or aggregate of imperceptible principles, intelligence and the rest, could not be means of fruition ; whilst without intelligence and the rest there could be no pause, no cessation, of the means of enjoying sensible objects. This is the purport of text||.' And he defines linga to be * that which is only indicated, which is actually not visible, as intel lect and the rest ;' and bhdva, * that object which is perceived or apprehended by the senses, the class of sensible objects§.'
The succession of the two kinds of creation, as mutually cause and effect, is said by VACHESPATI to be eternal, and with out a beginning, as even in the commencement of a kalpa bo dily existence results from the conditions of similar existence in a former
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3T5 fNjsq 1^ I^FT 4^*1 ¥RI% II
LIII.
THE divine kinds of eight sorts ; the grovelling is fivefold ; mankind is single in its class. This, briefly, is the world of living beings.
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BHASHYA.
Divine, of eight sorts ; Brahma, Prajapatya, Saumya, Aindra, Gandherba, Yaksha, Rakshasha, and Paisacha. Animals, deer, birds, reptiles, and immovable substances are the five grovel- ling kinds. MwnJcind is single. In this way there are four teen sorts of creatures, there being three classes in the three worlds. Which is supreme in each is next explained.
COMMENT. 1
The intellectual or rudimental creation hitherto described has been that of creation generally ; we now have an account of specific or individual creation, composed of fourteen classes of beings.
The fourteen classes of beings are, first, eight superhuman, or Brahma, that of BHAHMA and other supreme gods ; 2. PrA* japatya, that of progenitors, the Menus, the Rishis, or divine sages; 3. tiawnya, lunar or planetary; 4. Aindra, that of INDRA and divinities of the second order ; 5. Gdndhcrba, that of the demigods attendant on IXDRA, and of similar beings ;
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6. ltdkskasa, that of demons, foes of the gods ; 7. Ydkxhay that of the attendants of KUVERA ; 8. Paisacha, that of mischiev ous and cruel fiends. These are divine or superhuman beings. The ninth class is that of man, which contains but one species. We have then five classes of inferior beings ; or, counting from the preceding, 10. Animals, or domestic animals, pdsu; 11, Wild animals, as deer and the like, tnriga ; 12. Birds; 12. Keptiles, or creeping things, including fish sarisripa ; and 14. Sthdvara, fixed things, such as vegetables and minerals. These constitute the vyashti serya*, specific or individual creation ; or, as denominated in the text, the bhautika sarga, the creation of bliutas, ' beings ;' or elemental creation ; the forms of things requiring the combination of the gross elements.
II 18 II
LIV,
ABOVE, there is prevalence of goodness : below, the ereation is full of darkness : in the midst, is the pre dominance of foulness, from BRAHMA to a stock.
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BHASHYA.
Above: in the eight divine regions. Prevalence of goodness: the extensiveness or predominance of the quality of goodness. Above is goodness predominant, but there are foulness and darkness also. Below, the creation is full of darkness. — In animals and insensible things the whole creation is pervaded by darkness in excess, but there are goodness and foulness. In the midst, in man, foulness predominates, although good ness and darkness exist ; and hence men for the most part suffer pain. Such is the world, from BRAHMA to a stock ; from BRAHMA to immovable ^ things. Thus non-elemental creation, rudimental creation, conditional and elemental creation, in beings of divine, mortal, brutal, and (immoveable) origin, are the sixteen sorts of creation effected by nature.
COMMENT
The various qualities dominating in the different orders of beings are specified in this stanza.
The coexistence of the several qualities, with the predomi nance of one or other of them, in different beings, has been previously explained (p. 54), as well as the different orders or states of existent beings ; constituting, according to GAURA- PADA, sixteen forms or kinds of creation : that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings proceeds from four modifica tions of nature ; or, from the invisible principles, from the subtile rudiments, from the conditions or dispositions of in tellect, and from the gross elements.
IIXHII
( 221 ) LV.
THERE does sentient soul experience pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its person : wherefore pain is of the essence (of bodily existence).
BHASHYA.
: in the bodies of gods, men, and animals. Pain pro duced lay decay, and produced by death. Sentient soul: soul having sensibility. Experiences : soul experiences ; not nature, nor intellect, nor egotism, nor the rudiments, senses, nor gross elements. How long does it suffer pain ? this (tke text) dis cusses. Until it be released from its person. As long as it is in subtile body, composed of intellect and the rest, it is discrete (or individualized); and as long as migratory body does
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not rest, so long, in brief, soul suffers pain, arising from decay and death, in the three worlds. Until it be released from its person : until the discontinuance of subtile person. In the cessation of subtile body consists liberation ; and when libera tion is obtained, there is no more pain. By what means, then, can liberation be effected ? Whenever knowledge of the twenty- five principles, the characteristic of which is knowledge of the distinctness of soul and body, is attained ; or whenever a person knows that this is nature, this intellect, this egotism these are the five rudiments, these the eleven senses, these the five elements, and this is soul, separate and dissimilar from them all ; then from such knowledge proceeds cessation of subtile person, and thence liberation.
The object of the activity (or development of nature) is next explained.
COMMENT-
The presence of soul in these creations, and for what period, is here specified.
Having defined the different objects which form the twenty- five categories or tatwas of the Sankhya philosophy, the text now comes to the main object of that and of all Hindu systems, the final dissolution of the connection between soul and body. The rest of the Kdrika is devoted to the illustration of this topic. In this verse it is said that soul experiences pain in the different stages of existence, until its corporeal frame is discontinued ; for soul itself is not susceptible of pain, or of decay, or death : the site of these things is nature, but nature is unconscious,* insensible ; and the consciousness that pain exists is restricted to soul, though soul is not the actual seat of pain ; its experience of pain depends upon its connexion with rudimental person, of the material constituents of which, decay, death, and pain are concomitants. c Pain and the rest are from nature, they are properties of intelligence. How do they become connected with sense ? Soul (purusha) is that which reposes (s'cte) in body (puri) : subtile body is immediately con-
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nected with it, and becomes thereby connected with sense*.4 S. Tatwa Kaumudi. When soul is released from body, its susceptibility of pain ceases : pain is therefore of the essencet of its own nature ; that is, it is the inseparable concomitant of bodily creation, according to PATANJALI, as quoted in the S. Chandrikd : ' All is pain to the wise, through the conflict of opposite qualities, and by the sufferings arising from afflicting vicissitudes^;' that is, from dread of death and the reiteration of birth ; to which even the conditions of spirits, sages, and gods are subject. Thus the Sutra of KAriLA : t The pain of death, decay, and the rest^is universal!! ;' as explained in the S. Prav. Bhdshya : ' The pain of death, decay, and the rest is the common portion of all beings, whether above or below, from BRAHMA to immovable things§.' So also another Sutra : 1 It is to be shunned, from the connection of successive birth by the thread of regeneration^:' that is, according to the com mentator, ' since regeneration is unavoidable, even after ascent to the regions above ; and in consequence of the succession of births, that regeneration must be in an inferior condition ; even the world above is to be shunned**.7 GAURAPA'DA and VA'CHES- PATI take no notice of the expression, ' Pain is of the essence.' The S. Chandrikd explains it, ' Creation is essentially of 'the nature of painff.' RAMA KRISHNA calls it, ' Former acts ;'| the acts of a former life.JJ
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( 224 )
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LVI.
THIS evolution, of nature, from intellect to the spe cial elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively ; done for another's sake as for itself.
BHASHYA.
This (or c thus, this/ ifyesha} implies conclusivcncss and limitation (that is in this way all that has been hitherto des cribed). Evolution of nature : in the instrumentality or act of
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nature. Whatever evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements : that is, (the evolution) of intellect from na ture ; of egotism from intellect ; of the rudiments and senses from egotism ; and of the gross elements from the subtile. Is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively. — This evolution is effected for the liberation of each individual soul which has assumed body, whether brute, human, or divine. How (is it effected) ? It is done for another's sake as for self: as, for instance, a person neglecting his own objects transacts those of a friend, so does nature ; soul makes no return to nature. As for self; not for self: for the sake, in fact, of another is the apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense, or knowledge of the difference between soul and quali ties ; for souls are to be provided (by nature), in the three worlds, with objects of sense, and at last with liberation : such is the agency of nature ; as it is said, " Nature is like a utensil, having fulfilled soul's object it ceases."
It is here objected, Nature is irrational, Soul is rational ; then how can nature, like a rational thing, understand that by^ me, soul is to be provided in the three worlds with the objects of sense, and at last with liberation ? This is true ; but action" and cessation of action are both observedfin irrational things ; whence it is said —
COMMENT.
The object of nature's activity is here said to be the final liberation of individual soul.
Nature is properly inert, and its activity, its ._" motion" or evolution, takes place only for the purpose of soul, not for any object of its own. The term is drambha ' commencement,', successive origin or beginning,' as detailed in former passages : that is, of intellect from crude nature; of egotism from in tellect ; and so on. This is the spontaneous act of nature : '* it is not influenced by any external intelligent principle, such as the Supreme Being or a subordinate agent ; as BKAHMA, ife 29
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is without (external) cause*.' ' But it is objected, Nature being eternal, her works should be so too ; and forms once evolved should therefore endure for ever. To this it is replied, The work is done for a special purpose, the liberation of individual aoul ; and that when this is accomplished, nature ceases with regard to that individual, as a man boiling rice for a meal desists when it is dressedf/ 8. Tatwa Kaumudi. According to GAURAPADA, and to the text of the following stanza, nature so acts spontaneously ; but the incompetency of nature, an irrational principle, to institute a course of action for a definite purpose, and the unfitness of rational soul to regulate the acts of an agent whose character it imperfectly apprehends, constitute a principal argument with the theistical Sankhyas for the necessity of a Providence, to whom the ends of exist ence are known, and by whom nature is guided, as stated by VACHESPATI : ' But whether this (evolution) be for its own purpose or that of another, it is a rational principle that acts. Nature cannot act without rationality, and therefore there must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, though rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its character ; therefore there is an omniscient Being, the director of nature, tfhich is Iswara, or God?.' This is not inconsistent with the previous doctrine, that creation is the evolution of nature: it is so, but under the guidance of a ruling Power. The atheistical Sankhyas, on the other hand, contend that there is no occasion for a guiding Providence, but that the activity of nature, for the purpose of accomplishing soul's object, is an intuitive necessity, as illustrated in the ensuing passage.
qf% SUfrRfa'Tfi:^ ft^ffcT ^ SKW Wtffafa SffTTF R-
J ^f OT^ftcT
f^i IW
( 227 )
n
LVL
As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent (sub stance), to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief (principle) to liberate the soul.
BH^SHYA.
AS grass and water taken by the cow become eliminated into ) and nourish the calf ; and as (the secretion ceases) when the calf is grown ; so nature (acts spontaneously) for the libera tion of soul, This is the agency of an unintelligent thing.
COMMENT.
The intuitive or spontaneous evolution of nature, for soul's purpose, is here illustrated.
As the breast secretes milk for a purpose of which it is un- coEscious, and unconsciously stops when that purpose, the nutriment of the young animal, is effected ; so nature, though irrational, constructs bodily forms for the fruition and libera tion of soul ; and when the latter is accomplished ceases to evolve. The illustration is from KAPILA, as in the Sutra, « From irrationality the activity of nature is like (the secretion of) milk*.'
( 228 )
LVIII.
As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does the undiscrete (principle) to liberate the soul.
BHA'SHYA,
As mankind, being influenced bj desire, engage in acts of various kinds for its gratification or fulfilment, and desist when the object is accomplished, so the Chief one, active for the purpose of liberating soul, desists, after having effected the twofold purpose of soul ; one, cognizance of enjoyment of the objects of sense ; the other, cognizance of the difference be tween soul and qualities.
COMMENT-
' Another illustration is here give of the activity of nature.
According to VACHESPATI, this verse is an explanation of the phrase (in ver. 56), ' For another's sake as for self*;' assign ing, in fact, an object to nature, the accomplishment of its own wish ; ftutaukya being rendered by ichchhd, ' wish :' and this wish, which is, ' the liberation of soul, being gratified, nature desistsf.'
( 229 )
: 11 H * H
LIX.
As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the specta tor desists from the dance, so does nature desist- having manifested herself to soul.
BHASHYA.
As a dancer (or actress), having exhibited her performances on the stage in dramatic representations, rendered interesting by the display of love and other passions, in situations drawn from history or tradition, and accompanied by music and sing ing, desists from acting when her part is finished, so nature, having exhibited itself to soul, in the various characters of intellect, egotism, the rudiments, senses, and elements desists.
What the cause of such cessation is, is next described.
COMMENT-
An illustration is here given of the discontinuance of nature's activity. Manga, properly a stage or theatre, is said in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi to imply also the audience*. A dancer is equally an actress, narttalci, at least was so in ancient times, The dancing girls of Hindustan are rather singers, than either actresses or dancers.
* np&ftr
( 230 )
I! ^ • II
LX.
GENEROUS nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish without benefit (to her. self) the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.
?T<f
f^Tf TfT ^ f%
BHA'SHYA.
By manifold means. — Nature is the benefactress of soul, of unrequiting soul. How ? By the characters of men, gods, and animals ; by circumstances involving pain, pleasure, and in sensibility ; by the properties of the objects of sense : in this way having by various means exhibited herself to soul, and shewn that ' I am one ; thou art another ;' having done this, nature desists. Thus she accomplishes the wish of that (soul) which is eternal, without benefit (to herself) : as a benevolent man gives assistance to all, and seeks no return for himself so nature pursues or effects the purpose of soul, without deri ving from it any advantage.
It was said above (ver. 59), " Having manifested herself, nature desists." It is next shewn what he does, having desisted.
( 231 )
COMMENT-
This verse may be considered as a further explanation of the expression in ver. 56, " Nature labours for the benefit of soul as if for self, but not for any advantage."
* Generous, benevolent*:' ' Not expecting a return ; for it is not true generosity to do good to another with the expectation of requitalf.' S. Chandrikd. ' Soul being devoid of qualities (ver. 19), is consequently devoid of action, and can therefore do nothing by way of return^.' Nature ' accomplishes, goes to', charati or dcharati, or ' effect,' kurute. The last word of the verse is differently read.
II
iu i n
LXI.
NOTHING, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul.
t i
( 232 )
??
: farrftfr
BHA'SHYA,
There is nothing in the world more soft (gentle, timid) than nature, in my opinion : for which reason (nature's) opinion consults another's advantage. Wherefore nature says to her self, " I have been beheld by that soul," and does not again present herself to the view of that soul ; that is, she disappears from the presence of soul. That indicates what the text means by gentle.
It (the next ?) declares Iswara (God) to be the cause of the world : thus ; " Let this ignorant, brute, godless (soul), for its own pleasure or pain, go to heaven or hell, sent (thither) by Iswara" Others say, spontaneity is cause: 4'By what (or
( 233 )
whom) the swan is created white, the peacock of many colours ;" that is, they arc so naturally (or spontaneously). Here, therefore, the Sankhya teachers have said, how can be ings endowed with qualities proceed from Iswava, who is de void of qualities ? or how from soul, equally devoid of qualities ? Therereforc (the causality) of nature is rendered probable. Thus ; from, white threads white cloth is fabricated ; from black threads black cloth : and in the same manner, from nature, endowed with the three qualities, the three worlds, endowed with the three qualities also, arc produced. This is determined, Iswara is without qualities : the origin of the three worlds en dowed with qualities, from him, would therefore be an incon sistency. By this (same reason) soul also cannot be cause. According to some, time is cause : a Time is the five elements ; time destroys the world ; time watches, when all things sleep ; time is not to be surpassed." There are but three categories, the discrete principle, the undiscrete principle, and soul ; arid by one of them time must be comprehended. Time, then, is a discrete principle; for nature, from its universal creative power, is the cause of them; spontaneity merges into it (nature) : and time, therefore, is not cause ; neither is spon taneity. Nature alone, therefore, is cause ; and there is no cause of nature. She does not again expose herself to the (jaze of so td. Therefore it is my opinion that there is no cause more gentle, more enjoyable, than nature, such as Isiva-iu and the rest.
It is said familiarly in the stanzas of the text, " Soul is liberated ; soul migrates :" on this it is observed —
COMMENT-
Nature being once properly understood by soul ceases to act,
Nature being once fully seen — that is, known or understood
—by soul : disappears, goes no more into its sight ; it ceases
to be, with respect to that individual soul. Why is this ?
Because it is the most soft, the most gentle or timid S-uku-
mdratara, of all things. The term ktwidra, properly imply-
30
ing ' soft' or ' young,* is explained by the Scholiasts to signify c bashful, modest, unable to bear the gaze of soul*.' VACHES- PATI, Sukumdratam saki-jja^, NAKAYANA and RAMA KRISHNA. In the S. Bhdshya it is rendered by subhogycdara^, < more fit to be enjoyed ;' but this refers less to the meta phorical illustration, than to the doctrine, of the text, and might be rendered, ' more plastic ;' there being nothing so suitable as nature (matter) for the cause or origin of sensible objects. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi amplifies and explains the illustration : ' Nature is like a woman of virtue and family : such a one, of retired habits and modest looks, may be, by some inadvertence, surprised in disabille by a strange man, but she takes good care that another shall not behold her off her guard. Nature being once fully seen by discrimination, has too much matronly decorum to allow herself to be looked at a second time||.' The S. Chandrikd has a similar exposition§, The S. PravadiUMU Bh. cites this verse in explanation of the Sutra. •' Upon the detection of her faults, there is no further approach of nature (to soul) ; like a woman of family'IY that is, ' When nature finds that soul has discovered it is to her that the distress, &c. of migration are owing, she is put to shame by the detection, and ventures no more near soul ; as a woman of family keeps aloof from a husband by whom she knows her faults to have been found out. And this is considered as an additional reason for the discontinuance of the activity of nature**.' This is my opinion^ refers to what has preceded,
t ft
wmr
If
I ft ?fift
( 235 )
there is nothing more yentle, as is shown by the termfti; also by the Bhdahya of GAURAPADA. It is clear, therefore, that the expression refers to the author ; such is his opinion 5 that is, he does not here dogmatise, and say that nature is actually more timid or soft than any thing else — for the phrase is merely a figure of speech, a metaphorical illustration — but that it seems so to him ; the words having the force of ' me- thinks, it seems :' c Nature, it seems to me, or methinks, is the most soft, timid, retiring, of all things, and cannot bear to be started at rudely : once seen, therefore, as she Is, she takes care, like a truly modest matron, to be seen no more.' Such is the obvious purport of the text, which is merely a further illustration of the idea conveyed in ver. 59. GAURAPADA has gone out of his way rather to discuss the character of a first cause; giving to sukumd- ratara a peculiar import, that of ' enjoyable, preceptible ;' which nature eminently is, and is therefore, according to him, the most appropriate source of all perceptible objects, or, in other words, of creation.
II ^ II LXII.
VERILY not any soul is bound, nor is. released, nor migrates ; but nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates.
( 236 )
BHASHYA.
Therefore, from that cause, soul is not bound, nor indeed is loosed, nor migrates ; for, because, nature, in relation to vari ous beings — in relation (or connection) with celestial, human, or brute forms, in the character of intellect, egotism, the rudi ments, senses, and gross elements — is bound, is liberated, or migrates. For soul is of its own nature loosed, and goes every where, and how therefore should it migrate ? migration being for the purpose of obtaining something not previously ob tained. The phrases, therefore, Soul is bound, Soul is loose or migrates, originate in ignorance of the nature of migration. From knowledge, the end of soul and existence, the real nature of soul is attained. The being manifest, soul is single, pure, free, fixed in its own nature. Consequently if there is no bondage there can be no liberation of soul. It is therefore said (see next verse), "Nature binds and liberates herself;" for where subtile body, composed of the rudiments, and having a triple cause, exists, such body is bound with triple bounds ; as it is said, " He who is bound by the bonds of nature," of nature's products or of works, c: cannot by any other be loosed"
( 237 )
(see Comment, ver. 45), Such a subtile body is affected by virtue, vice, &c.
Nature is bound, is loosed, and migrates, How is next described.
COMMENT.
The subjection of nature, not of soul, to the accidents of bondage, liberation, and migration is asserted in this verse.
The doctrine here laid down seems at variance with what has preceded, and with the usual purport of the notions that attach the accidents of bondage and liberation to soul. Appa rently, however, the difference is one of words only.
Soul is incapable of action, consequently is not liable to change. It cannot be bound, as the consequence of acts which it does not perform ; and as it is never in bondage, it cannot be set free. The application of these terms to soul, therefore, is to be understood in a relative not in a positive sense ; and their positive signification is properly restricted to nature. It is nature that is bound, nature that is liberated, nature that undergoes change or migration. When nature attaches her self to soul, when she separates from it, the converse is equally true, soul is attached to, or is separated from, nature ; and is consequently said to be bound, to be set free, to undergo change. But soul is passive in all these things ; it is nature that is active, that binds, loosens, or changes form. GAURA- PABAS explanation of these subtleties is not very clear, but such appears to be his understanding of the text. So also VACHESPATI : ' Soul is without qualities and exempt from vicissitude. How then can it be liberated ? To soul, not liable to change, there could apply none of the circumstances termed bondage, arising from acts, sufferings, or consciousness : nor could worldly change or migration, another name for which is death, affect soul, incapable of action*.' The same coinmenta-
( 238 )
tor adds, ' These circumstances, which are in truth the acts and conditions of nature, are ascribed to and affect soul as the superior, in the same manner that victory and defeat are attributed and relate to a king, although actually occurring to his generals ; for they are his servants, and the gain or loss is his, not theirs**' So NARAYANA explains the text : ' Binding is the confinement of nature, in the various forms of intellect , &c, ; and bondage and liberation are attributed to soul only through the contiguity of intellect, to which they belong, and not to soulf.' It is from ignorance only that bondage and liberation are ascribed to soul ; as by the Sutraf, as explained by the Scholiast, ' Binding and liberation, or endurance of, and exemption from pain, are not (conditions) of soul in reality or absolutely, but (are considered as such) from ignorance ; for the binding and liberation mentioned are (conditions) of naturej].' So also the Sutra§, ' From actual pain suffered by nature proceed binding and liberation, and from its attachments ; that is, from its being affected by virtue and the rest, which are the causes of pain ; like an animal ; that is, as an animal may be bound or loosed, when entangled in a ropeHV The distinction, after all, is little more than nominal, except as it is the necessary consequence of the inactivity attributed to the soul.
srercRr
?r*?wncfaicT ^ %^ =r 5 a^rccfrfa vim i J i
( 239 )
am
LXIII.
BY seven modes nature binds herself by herself . by one, she releases (herself), for the soul's wish.
BKA'SHYA.
^?/ seven modes. — These seveu have been specified, as virtue dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. These are the seven modes (or condtions) of nature by which she binds herself, of herself. And that same nature, having ascertained that soul's object is to be accomplished, liberates heself by one mode, or by knowledge.
How is that knowledge produced 1
COMMENT-
Nature is bound by seven modes, and liberated by one,
Nature binds herself by acts of whatever kind, especially by
the faculties of intellect, enumerated above (ver. 23). She
binds herself of her own accord. She frees herself by one
mode, by the acquisition of philosophical knowledge* ' Nature
( 240 )
binds herself (in her own work), like a silkworm in its cocoon*.' Siltra. Atman is here uniformly explained by viva, i own self.'
I!
LXIV.
So. through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM, nor is auht mine, nor do I exist.
BHA'SHYA.
>S'o, by the order explained, the study of the twenty-five principles, knowledge of soul, or the discriminative know- ' ledge, this is nature, this is soul, these are the rudiments,
( 241 )
censes and elements/ is acquired. Neither I wn : I am not. JNot mine : not my body ; that, I am one < (thing), body is an other Nor do I exist : that is, exempt irom egotism. This is conclusive, incontrovertible.: free from doubt, Viparyayot, means ' doubt,' with the negative prefixed, ' absence of doubt ; and visuddha, ( pure;' pure through absence of doubt. Single. — There is no other (true knowledge). In this way the cause of liberation is produced, is manifested (individually). Know ledge means knowledge of the twenty-five principles, or of soul. Knowledge being attained, what does soul ?
COMMENT.
The knowledge that is essential to liberation is here de scribed.
It is acquired through study of the twenty-five principles, tatwdbhdsya ; familiarity with them; frequent recurrence to them.: it is finite or conclusive, aparisesha ; it leaves nothing to be learned.: it is perfect, as being without doubt, avipar- yayavisudha: and single, the one the thing needful, kevala. What sort of knowledge is this.? or what is the result it teaches ? The absence of individuality ; the notion of the abstract existence of soul. .Neither I am, nor is aught mine> nor do I exist : that is, there is no activity, nor property, nor individual agency. / am not precludes action only*. Indeed As, the root, together with bhu and kri, are said to signify action in general"}*. Ndsmi therefore signifies, not 'I am not,' but ' I do not.' The $. Tatwa Kaumudt then proceeds : •* Thus all acts whatever, whether external or internal, ascer tainment, consciousness, reflection, perception, and all others* .are denied as acts of soul : consequently, there being no active functions in soul, it follows that neither do I (as, an individual agent) exist, .Afiam here denotes "agent;" as, I know, I
31
( 242 )
sacrifice, I give, I enjoy- — or so on, implying uniformly the notion of an agent — nor is aught mine : an agent implies mastership ; if there be no agent there can be no abstract mastership (or possession)*.' The same authority gives also a different reading of the first expression n&smi, explaining it nd asmi, ' I am male ;' or purusha, ' unproductive of progeny/ of acts-f. The 8. Prav. Bh., commenting on this verse of the Karikd, has, ' Neither I am, denies the agency of soul ; nor (is aught mine), denies its attachment (to any objects) ; nor do I exist, denies its appropriation (of faculties)}.5 The Sutra is to the same effect : ' From relinquishment (consequent on) study of principles ; this is not, this is not|| :' that is, of all the objects proceeding from prakriti, not one is soul. The phraseology is ascribed to the Vedas, and a similar passage is thence cited : ' Hence comes the conclusion, it is not, it is not (soul), it is not (soul is not), from it : such is not so ; it is different, it is supreme, it is that very thing (that it is). It is riot, it is not, (means) soul. Such is (the phrase), It is not§,, &c. And the Chandrikd explains the terms similarly : ' / am not means I am not agent ; there I am distinct from the principle of intelligence. Not mine is pain : exemption from being the seat of pain and the rest is thence determined. Nor do I exist : by this, difference from egotism is ex- prcssedHV RAMA KRISHNA repeats the words of the Chan-
sm ^ sr 1 5R?ff : i t
i rrer ^ f KT: i
f % SJTH
( 243 )
By these expressions therefore, however quaint or questionable, we are not to understand negation of soul. This would be a direct contradiction to its specification as one of the categories of the system, one of the twenty-five essential and existent principles. It is merely intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feel ings. / am, I do, I suffer, mean that material nature, or some of her products, (substantially,) is, does, or suffers ; and not soul, which is unalterable and indifferent, susceptible of neither pleasure nor pain, and only reflecting them, as it were or seemingly sharing them, from the proximity of nature, by whom they are really experienced*: for soul, according to the Vedas, is absolutely existent, eternal, wise, true, free, unaffec ted by passion, universalf. This verse, therefore, does not amount, as M. Cousin has supposed, to " le nihillisrne absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme."
IK til
LXV.
POSSESSED of this (self-knowledge), soul contem plates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) de barred from prolific change, and consequently preclu ded from those seven forms.
SXET
( 244 )
fa
BHASHYA.
By that pure (absolute), single knowledge soul beholds na ture, like a spectator, at leisure and composed ; as a spectator seated at a play beholds an actress. Composed ; who stays (or is involved) in self ; or staying or abiding In one's own place. How is Prakriti ; debarred from prolific change ? Not pro ducing intellect, egotisrm, and the other effects. Consequently precluded from those seven forms : desisting from the seven forms or modes by which she binds herself, or virtue, vice, and the rest, and which are no longer required for the use of soul,, both whose objects (fruition and liberation) are effected.
COMMENT. ' "
Soul, possessed of the knowledge described in the preceding stanza, or divested of all individuality, becomes indifferent to, and independent of, nature, which therefore ceases to act.
Soul contemplates nature, like a spectator, preJcshaka, one who beholds a dancer or actress ; at leisure, avastkita, or with out action, niskriya ; and at ease sustha. This is also read swastha, * calm, collected in self* ;' or nirdkula, ' unagitated/
( 245 )
Nature consequently has nothing more to do. The objects of soul, fruition and liberation, having been effected by know ledge, the other faculties of intellect are needless.
LXVI.
HE desists, because he has seen her ; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.
Or? xn ^r ^ ^ ft: V
T:
( 246 )
BHA'SHYA.
One present at a play, as a spectator, (ceases to behold :) so one, single, pure soul desists. One (nature), knowing I have been seen by him, stops, ceases. Nature is the one, chief cause of the three worlds ; there is no second. Although form have terminated, yet from specific difference there is, even in the cessation of (the cooperation of) nature and soul, union, as a generic characteristic. For, if there be not union, whence is creation ? There being union of these two ; that is, of nature and soul ; there being union from their universal diffusion yet there is no further occasion for the world; from the ob ject of creation being terminated. The necessity for nature is twofold ; apprehension of the difference between qualities and soul : when both these have been effected there is no further use for creation ; that is, of further creation (of future regene ration) ; as in the case of a settlement of accounts between debtor and creditor, consequent on accepting what is given, when such a union is effected there is no further connection of object : so there is no further occasion for nature and soul. If upon soul's acquiring knowledge liberation takes place, why does not my liberation (immediately) occur ? To this it is observed. —
COMMENT. ; j
The final separation of soul from nature is here . indicated, as no further purpose is answered by their continued union.
The first part of its stanza repeats the illustrations given in preceding verses (61 and 65) : " Nature, having been fully seen or understood, ceases to act. — Soul, having seen or under stood, ceases to consider ;' becomes regardless, upekshaka. Consequently there can be no future reunion, no future creation. For mere union of soul and nature is not the cause of the development of the latter, constituting worldly existence : the motive is, the fulfilment of the objects of soul. The activity of nature is the consequence of her subserviency
( 247 )
to soul's purposes ; and when they are accomplished, all motive for action, all inducement to repeat worldly creation, ceases. ' The two objects of soul, fruition and discrimination, are the excitements to the activity of nature ; if they do not exist, they do not stimulate nature. In the text the term motive implies that by which nature is excited in creation (to evolve the world) : which cannot be in the nonentity of the objects of soul*.' VACHESPATI. So also NARAYANA : ' In the (mere) union of these two there is no motive for the production of the worldf.' With the accomplishment, therefore, of the objects of soul, individual existence must cease for ever.
LXVII.
I
BY attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless, yet soul remains a while invest ed with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirl ing from the effect of the impulse previously given to it.
ITR
jwff i
( 248 )
f R
SHASHYA.
Though perfect knowledge, that is, know-ledge >of the twenty- ifive principles, be attained, yet, from the effect of previous impulse, the sage continues in a bodily condition. How ? Like the whirling of a wheel ; as a potter, having set his wheel whirling, puts on it a lump of clay, fabricates a vessel, •and takes it off, and the wheel continuing to turn round. It does so from tJie effect of .previous impulse. — From the -attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the -rest have no influence upon one who is possessed of such knowledge. These seven kinds of bonds are consumed by perfect knowledge : as seeds that have been scorched by fire are net able to germi nate, so virtue and the rest are not able to fetter soul. These -then, virtue and the rest, not being (in the case of the 2/°5^> the causes (of continued bodily existence), body continues from the effects of previous impulse. Why is there not from -knowledge destruction of present virtue and vice ? Although they may be present, yet they perish the next moment) •and knowledge destroys all future acts, as well as those which •a man does in his present body by following instituted ubsei-
( 249 )
vances. With the cessation of the impulse the body perishes, and then liberation occurs.
What liberation, is next specified.
COMMENT.
A reason is assigned why pure soul is not at once set free from body.
This stanza may be considered partly as an illustration of the preceding, explaining the continued union of soul and body even after knowledge is attained. It is also a kind of apology for the human forms of KAPJLA and other teachers of the Sankhya doctrines, who, although in possession of perfect knowledge, lived and died as men. The sage, or Yogi, is no longer susceptible of the accidents of virtue, vice, passion, dis- passion, and the rest, which are the proximate causes of bodily existence ; and his continuance in the bodily form arises from the effects of virtue, &c. lasting after the cause has ceased ; like the whirl of a wheel after the impulse that set it going has been withdrawn. ' As, when the potter's work is done, the wheel, in consequence of the impulse or momentum given to it, continues revolving, but stops when the period under such influence has expired ; so virtue cmd vice, incident to body ini tiative and mature, constitute impulse*.* The effects of former acts of virtue and vice, then, cease when the impulse derived from them is worn out ; and the possession of knowledge pre» vents all future acts. GAURAPADA apparently suggests a difficulty with respect to acts done in the present body ; such as the observance of the ' Yoga, or performance of prescribed rites. These acts may be performed by a sage possessing per fect knowledge, and should therefore produce certain conse quences. They lead, however, to no results ; for as far as they
fireft ^IWT«
32
( 250 )
are themselves concerned, they are but of brief duration, perish ing as soon as performed ; and with regard to any future effects they are anticipated, prevented, or destroyed, by the possession of knowledge. Such seems to be the purport of the passage, but it is not very perspicuous.
urn ~~-^
LXVIII.
WHEN separation of the informed soul from its cor poreal frame at length takes place, and nature in re spect of it cease, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.
mn
BHASHYA.
When bodily separation is accomplished, by destruction of the effects of virtue, vice, and the rest. In respect of it, having accomplished its object, nature ceases : then absolute, certain — final, unimpeded — deliverance, liberation, consequent upon the condition of singleness. Soul obtains singleness (separation), which is both absolute and final
( 251 )
COMMENT.
This verse refers to the first stanza, and announces the accomplishment of what was there stated to be the object of inquiry, absolute and final liberation.
When the consequences of acts cesfee, and body, both gross and subtile, dissolves, nature, in respect to individual soul, no longer exists ; and soul is one, single, free kevala, or ob tains the condition called kaivalyam. This according to VA- CHESPATI and NARAYANA, means ' exemption from the three kinds of pain*.' GAURAPA'DA gives no definition of the term, except that it is the abstract of hernia^. What the condition of pure separated soul may be in its liberated state, the San- khya philosophy does not seem to hold it necessary to inquire.
LXIX.
THIS abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly ex pounded by the mighty saint.
( 252 )
^ftraf^rr
BHASHYA.
Soul's object is liberation : for that (purpose) this abstruse, secret, knowledge (has been expounded) by the mighty saint, by the divine sage KAPILA. Wherein, in which knowledge, the origin, duration, and termination, the manifestation, continuance, and disappearance, of beings, of the products (or developments) of nature, are considered, are discussed. From which investigation perfect knowledge, which is the same as knowledge of the twenty-five principles, is produced.
This is the Bkdshya of GAURAPADA on the Sankhya doctrines, propounded, for the sake ol liberation from migra tion, by the Muni KAPILA ; in which there are these seventy stanzas.
COMMENT.
This verse specifies by whom the doctrines of the text were originally taught.
The commentary of GAUBAPA'DA closes here in the only copy of the MSS. procurable; and consequently omits all notice of ISWARA KRISHNA, to whom a subsequent stanza of the text attributes the Kdrikd. In the Bhdshya it is said that the work commented on is the Sankhya declared by KAPILA ; but that the Kdrikd is not the work of KAPILA, the other Scholiasts agree. It is also different from the Sutras of that teacher, as given in the Sdnkhya Pravachana, al though it follows their purport, and sometimes uses the same or similar expressions. GAUBAPA'DA may therefore probably only mean to intimate that its substance is conformable to
( 253 )
the doctrines of the Sutras, not that it is the work of the Muni. These doctrines, he adds, are contained in seventy stanzas ; of which, however, our copy has but sixty-nine. The verses of the Kdrikd, as usually met with, are seventy-two ; but there also reference occurs to seventy verses, as compri sing apparently the doctrinal and traditional part of the text, derived from older authorities. Either GAURAPA'DA thought it unnecessary to explain the concluding three verses of the Kdrikd, or there is some omission in the copy, or they do not belong to the work. The concluding verse is evidently in accurate, the metre of the third line of the stanza being defective.
The KAPILA to whom the Sankhya philosophy is attributed is variously described by different authorities. In a verse quoted by GAURAPA'DA, in his comment upon the first stanza of the text, he is enumerated amongst the sons of BRAHMA. VIJNA'NA BHIKSHU asserts him to have been an incarnation of VISHNU*. He refers also to the opinion of a Vedanta writer, that KAPILA was an incarnation of AGNI, or ' fire/ upon the authority of the Smritif ; but denies their identity. There does not appear to be any good authority for the notion. Kapila is a synonyme of fire, as it is of a brown, dusky, or tawny colour ; and this may have given rise to the idea of AGNI and the sage being the same. The identification with VISHNU rests on better grounds. The popular belief of the Vaishnavas is, that there have been twenty-four Avatdrds of VISHNU, and KAPILA is one of them. The earliest authority for this specification is no doubt the Rdmdyana, in which VASUDEYA or VISHNU is said by BRAHMA to assume the form of KAPILA, to protect the earth against the violence of the sons of SAGARA, searching for the lost steed intend-
t arm:
( 254 )
ed for their father's aswamedha. ' * BRAHMA having heard the words of the gods, who were bewildered with the dread of destruction, replied to them, and said, VASUDEVA is the Lord, he is M&dhaw, of whom the whole earth is the cherished bride ; he, assuming the form of KAPILA, sustains continually the world.' So also the Mdkabktirata : ' Then spoke incensed, KAPILA, the best of sages ; that VASUDEVA, indeed, whom the holy Munis called KAPiLAf.' According to the Bhdgavat, he was the fifth incarnation of VISHNU : ' The fifth Avatdra was named KAPILA, the chief of saints, who revealed to Asuiu the Sinkhya explanation of first principles which has been impaired by time^:.' Book I. s. 12. The latter half of the third book describes him also as an Avatar of VASUDEVA, but as the son of DEVAHUTI, the daughter of SAYAMBHUVA Menu, married to the Prajapati KERDDAMA,
far
irr:
( 255 )
LXX.
THIS great purifying (doctrine) the sage compas sionately imparted to A sum, ASURI taught it to PAN- CHASIKHA, by whom it was extensively propagated.
COMMENT-
Purifyiny ; that which purifies from the defects which are the cause of pain ',pdwna or pavitra. Great, chief, principal agryam, mvM.yam. This verse anticipates an objection that may be made to the authority of the text ; as it may be said, Although the words of KAPILA must command attention, of what weight are the lessons of an uninspired teacher ? The answer is, that they are the same which were originally taught by KAPILA himself to his pupil ASURI. According to the passage cited by GAURAPA'DA, in his notes on the first stanza (p. 1), ASURI is also a son of BRAHMA. He is mentioned else where as the pupil of KAPILA, and preceptor of PANCHASIKHA, but there are no details of his history. Of PANCHASIKH there is some account in the Makabhdrat, on occasion of his visiting JANAKA, king of MithiLd, and imparting to him the Sankhya philosophy. He is there also said to be named likewise KAPILA* ; which the commentator explains to mean that he was like KAPILA, being the disciple of his disciplef, as the text proceeds to call him ; ' He, the long-lived, whom they term the first disciple of ASURI+.' He is also called KAPILEYA from his being, it is said, the son of a Brahmani named KA PILA. ' ASURI went to the sphere in which that which is Brahmc, the mystic-named, and multiform, and eternal, is be held. His disciple was PANCHASIKHA, nourished with human milk : for there was a certain Brahman matron, named KAPILA,
( 25G )
of whom he became the son, and at whose bosom he was fed ; thence he obtained the denomination of KAPILEYA. and divine imperishable knowledge*.'
LXXI.
RECEIVED by tradition of pupils, it has been com pendiously written in Arya metre by the piously dis posed ISWARA KRISHNA, having thoroughly investiga ted demonstrated truth.
COMMENT-
' Succession or tradition of pupils,' sishyaparampard : each pupil becoming teacher in his turn, as is the case with the Pandits to the present day, It rarely, if ever, happens that any branch of Sanscrit literature is acquired by independent study : every science is studied under some teacher of emi nence, who can, not unfrequently, trace his traditionary in struction upwards for several generations. The interval be-
fw.
( 257 )
t\vcen PANOHASIKUA and ISWARA KRISHNA is not particularized, but was probably considerable, as no allusion to the author of the Kdrikd occurs in the older writings. If his commen tator GAURAPADA be, as is not unlikely, the preceptor of SANKARA ACHARYA, ISWARA KRISHNA must date anterior to the eighth century,
II
LXXIt
THE subjects which are treated in seventy couplets are those of the whole science, comprising sixty topics exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting contro versial questions
COMMENT.
We have here in the text reference to seventy stanzas, as comprising the doctrinal part of the Sankhya. In fact, how ever, there are but sixty-nine, unless the verse containing the notice of KAPILA be included in the enumeration ; and in that case it might be asked, why should not the next stanza at least, making mention of the reputed author, be also com prehended, when there would be seventy-one verses. The Scholiasts offer no explanation of this difficulty.
The sixty topics alluded to in the text are, according to the Raja Vdrtlika, as cited by VACHESPATI, 1. the existence of soul ; 2. the existence of nature ; 3, the singleness, 4. the objectiveness, and 5. the subservience of nature ; and 6. the multifariousness, 7, the distinctness, and 8, the inertness, of 33
< 258 )
soul ; 9. the duration of subtile, and 10. that of gross body. These are the ten radical categories. To them are to be added, the five kinds of obstruction, nine of acquiescence, twenty-eight of disability, and eight of perfectness ; making altogether sixty. Another enumeration specifies the sixty categories or objects : 1. soul ; 2. nature ; 3. intellect ; 4. ego tism ; 5 — 7. the three qualities ; 8. the class of the five rudi ments ; 9. that of the eleven senses or organs ; 10. that of the five element. These are the ten radical paddrtkas, or cate gories. The remaining fifty are the same as those previously enumerated. In consequence of comprehending all these topics, the Kdrikd is a system, a sdstra ; not a partial tract or treatise, or prakarana* ; although it omits the illustrative anecdotes and controversial arguments. The KdriJcd must consequently refer to the collection of KAPILA'S aphorisms called Sdnkhya Pravachana. This work is divided into six chapters, are adhydyas ; in the three first of which are con tained all the dogmas of the system furnishing the materials of the Kdrikd ; the fourth chapter is made up of short tales or anecdotes, dkhydylkds, illustrative of the Sankhya tenets ; and the fifth is appropriated to the refutation, rpavav&&a, of the doctrines of different schools. Exclusive of these two sub jects, ISWARA KRISHNA professes, therefore, to give the sub stance of the S. Pravachana, or of the Sutras of KAPILA assembled in that collection.
The Akhydyikds are in general very brief and uninteresting. The Sutras, in fact, supply only a subject for a story, which the Scholiasts may expand much after their own fan cies. Thus the Sutra, ' From instruction in truth, like the king's sonf.' On which ViJNANA BHIKSHU narrates, that * there was a king's son, who, being expelled in infancy from his native city, was brought up by a forester, and growing up
( 259 )
to maturity in that state imagined himself, to belong to th e barbarous race with which he lived. One of his father's minis ters having discovered him, revealed to him what he was, and the misconception of his character was removed, and he knew himself to be a prince. So soul, from the circumstances in which it is placed, mistakes its own character, until the truth is revealed to it by some holy teacher, and then it knows itself to be Brahme*.'
The controversial portion of the original Sutras is as brief as the narrative, and, from the nature of the subject, much more obscure. The argument is suggested, rather than advanced, and it remains for the Scholiast to amplify and explain it. A specimen of the mode in which this is effected will best ex emplify the darkness and difficulty of this part of our subject. Some modern followers of the Ve'danta assert that liberation is the attainment of (pure) felicity. To this it is replied : * Ma nifestation of felicity is not liberation, from its not being a property^.' Thus explained by the Scholiast : ' The condition of happiness, or that of attainment (or manifestation), is not a property of soul. The nature (of soul) is eternal, and is neither an object to be attained, nor the means of attainment. Therefore the attainment of happiness cannot be liberation. This is the meaning (of the Sutra^).' ' Attainment of happi ness in the region of BRAHMA and the rest is a secondary (or inferior) sort of liberation ; as to maintain the contrary would be in opposition to the text of the Ve'da, which says that a
( 260 )
I
wise man abandons both joy and sorrow.*' c Further ; if attain ment be a faculty of soul, what sort of faculty is it ? Is it constant or temporary. In the first case, there may be, even in the state of accomplishment, still the existence of the object of soul : in the last, inasmuch as there is perishableness of all that is engendered (or, that which has a beginning must have an end), then eternal liberation is subject to termination : therefore the attainment (or manifestation) of felicity is not chief or real liberation : and the assertion that it is so, is a false conclusion of the modern Vedantis : this is undeniable.!'
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