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THINKING WITH BLACKS:
DISCUSSION OF THE USE OF BLACK HUMAN FORMS
BY THE WHITE MIND



DANIEL M. BEGEL, M4

1972

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Thinking with Blacks:

A Discussion of the Use of Black Human Forms by the White Mind

Daniel M. Begel, M4

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I

The Study of Race Symbolization

The psychological study of race symbolization has focused on "prejudice" and "racism." "Prejudice" is defined by Gordon Allport as "an avertive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group" (Allport, 1954). "Racism," a concept often used interchangeably with prejudice and rarely defined by writers who study it, is usually thought of as prejudice in action. Kovel says "race prejudice...is clearly a causal agent in racism" (Kovel, 1970).

Although racist action presumably depends upon a hostile attitude associated with a belief in negative qualities, we should remember that it is possible for a person to have an ambivalent or even friendly attitude toward an objectionable object, or contradictory beliefs about an object of hostility. Robert Coles, for example, sensitively reports in his long and beautiful quotations from conversations with white Southerners the complex feelings of tenderness and anger, superiority and self-recrimination (Coles, 1964).

But on the whole the psychological literature on race divides the operations of the mind according to moral criteria. Where the question concerns whites thinking about blacks, five aspects have been identified. First, the black is evaluated negatively. Second, the white is evaluated positively. Third, there is a tendency toward avoidance and/or fourth, there is a tendency to-

ward domination. Fifth, there is a tendency toward hate. These are the criteria which alone or in some combination define an idea as "racist." This is the sense in which we will use the term in this paper.

Writers who are struck by the power and apparent ubiquity of such ideas in American society have tended to assert that the black embodies particular universal meanings for whites. Lawrence Kubie states that race prejudice has its roots in three "nearly universal" experiences of childhood (Kubie, 1965). The origin of anti-black prejudice he highlights is the child's oscillation between secret guilty pride in his body and a hidden aversion to it. A complex web of feelings--guilt, fascination, fear, and loathing--is associated particularly with feces. "We teach the child that his body is...a dirt factory...A child's buried feelings of disgust with himself is one of his later reactions against differences." The thought that "the other is dirty...(is) a defense against a conception of a dirty self." The other race represents feces and related symbols.

J.W. Hamilton follows Kubie in an interesting discussion of a Midwestern university town which reacted to an open housing drive with a cleanup drive and a crusade against homosexuals (Hamilton, 1966). He sees anti-black prejudice as a defense against the threat of the Negro, who represents feces, to anal compulsivity. He is slightly more rigid than Kubie about the black's meaning to whites and expands the list of associations. According to Hamilton, white represents up, breast, good, milk, God, heaven, and clean, while black represents all the opposites.

James Comer and Richard Sterba add to this list of meanings. They point out that blacks can represent the principals of the Oedipal situation. Sterba sees general anti-Negro feeling as being based on the representation of younger siblings by the black man (Sterba, 1947). He associates attacking behavior with "collective father murder" and the emergence of repressed father hatred. Comer adds that the black man can also represent the powerless self of the Oedipal situation, or the repressed aggressive self of that time (Comer, 1970). West seconds this idea: "Put into (the Negro) these (sexual) parts of yourself and you become a part of him as you now imagine him to be...Thus arises the secret wish that Negro men will actually transgress successfully against white women" (West, 1967). Pinderhughes states "The value orientation and psychology associated with a class or caste divisions are derived from projections of the body image" (Pinderhughes, 1969). "High-type" groups are associated with the head, the brain, and incorporation while "low-type" groups are associated with the genitals and anus, with expulsion, with what should be kept out by the bottom, including not only forbidden objects but forbidden thoughts.

There are important limitations to this approach to race symbolization. To begin with, a symbolic form is intrinsically ambiguous in meaning, as the wide range cited by the above authors suggests. The significance of an object of prejudice can vary from person to person. Ackerman and Jahoda, in a study of twenty-seven anti-Semitic patients, discuss the inconsistent stereotype of the Jew (Ackerman and Jahoda, 1948). They state "the specific selection that an individual makes out of this wealth of contrasting attributes can be understood only if this selection is discussed

simultaneously with the individual anti-Semite's attitude toward his own self." And as Coles' study shows, the significance can change by the moment for a single individual. That is, a prejudiced person, like anyone else, may be ambivalent.

True, the meanings of race derive in part from universal childhood experiences. But this does not distinguish race symbolization from any other symbolization of people. Childhood may be a necessary condition for race symbolization, but as an explanation of racism it is insufficient. For racism can emerge, disappear, and change content long after childhood is over. Brian Bird reported a two week episode of anti-Negro prejudice in a liberal, anxious, phobic, Jewish female with a highly developed sense of social conscience (Bird, 1957). During therapy she developed the belief that Negro men were inferior, were envious of whites, and would get out of control and try to elevate themselves by having sex with white women. These beliefs were coupled with hatred and fear. The patient was developing a positive transference at that time and wished to "cross the gulf" between herself and her analyst. Her prejudice was a "final defense" against the realization of these feelings in the face of the analyst's imagined resentment of her. It disappeared after these feelings were analyzed.

In another case study, Terry Rogers discusses a passive, obsessive white Southerner who became an active anti-Negro racist and subsequently dropped psychoanalysis to become a leader of a White Citizen's Council (Rogers, 1960). Rogers sees this development as a protection against emerging homosexual wishes, incestuous desires, and patricidal impulses, involving the "wholesale use of the defense mechanisms of projection and identification with the aggres-

sor." Like Sterba, he says "in the unconscious of white people, the Negro male represents the hated father, particularly the father at night."

The defense of projection is emphasized by virtually every student of race symbolization. Pinderhughes, for example, speaks of "projections of the body image." And Brian Bird speaks of "incorporation." He says the prejudiced individual or group "borrows imagined and feared indignation from a 'higher' race, and loans its own guilt (really repressed wishes) to the 'lower' race." Thus, a conflict is passed "right through" the ego. Bird's fine piece stresses the adaptive, ego-syntonic nature of prejudice. He sees it as giving vent to hostility as well as keeping aggressive thought from being acted out. Certain limitations to the notion of "incorporation" are suggested, however, by the generalizations Bird derives from this notion. For example, the statement that prejudice will not occur in "successful" people and groups is contradicted by the racist beliefs of Thomas Jefferson (Jordan, 1968) and the anti-Communism of numerous American Administrations (New York Times, almost any year).

The concept of projection has even more severe limitations, however, as an explanation of race prejudice or race symbolization. When used in the narrow sense of the attribution of one's own id impulses to another it fails to explain a whole host of qualities attributed to blacks, such as that blacks are musical, or natural, or lazy. When used in the broad sense of externalization, it only implies that external perceptions depend upon something known internally. In other words, the psychological source of racism is psychological.

Rubinfeld, in an unpublished doctoral dissertation done at Yale in 1963, attempted to prove six hypotheses based on the projection-prejudice hypothesis, with respect to sexual conflict. He used both the standard TAT pictures and a set of redrawings very similar to the standard set except the figures were black. The blacks in the redrawings were dressed the same as whites, had wavy hair, and were not very dark. Some of the results were interesting. For example, one standard picture elicited stories of sexual conflict from a majority of white subjects, but when redrawn elicited stories in which the male figure was seen as leaving to perform some aggressive act. Rubinfeld concluded that this was an artifact of the test because blacks are seen culturally as inherently rebellious. It could be argued, however, that blacks have many cultural meanings, one of which is that they argue a lot about sex. This meaning could have been selected but was not for reasons which are obscure but worth investigating. Regardless of the interpretation of this change, it is clear that blackness had an impact on the stories. However, none of the hypotheses based on the projection-prejudice notion could be verified. One hypothesis that failed, for instance, was that prejudiced people would project more sexual ideas onto Negro figures than white figures. Another was that in sexual arousal situations high prejudiced people would show a greater increase in sexual imagery in response to Negro cards than low-prejudiced people.

Experimentally, the projection-prejudice hypothesis doesn't bear fruit. Logically we should expect this, for to imply that the white's black man is needed only as a "bad man," however defined, suggests a peculiarly simple motivation operating in race

symbolization. There are other problems with the idea of projection onto blacks, to which we will return shortly.

First, however, we should discuss a work by Joel Kovel: White Racism, A Psychohistory (Kovel, 1970). This book deserves special mention for several reasons. First, it is the only book-length discussion in the psychological literature which deals exclusively with white symbolization of blacks. Second, it is widely read and regarded as an important work. Third, it demonstrates the inadequacies of the notions we have been discussing and extends them to a degree wisely avoided by other authors.

Kovel's idea is that race fantasies are generated in the universal setting of childhood and applied at second hand to races in a culture which uses them to handle its historical problems. The culture is both an outlet for and in part a projection of these fantasies. There is a "congruency (of the institution of racism) with the personalities of the people within society...Instinctual conflict, when projected onto culture, is one of the crucial determinants of historical power--in our case, of white men over black--(which) is the single most salient thread of history."

The psychological origins of racism develop during the anal phase when fantasies about dirt and property develop and first separation from the mother occurs. Excrement becomes associated with ambivalence around separation. Dirt becomes the recipient of the child's anger at separation; while the love of possessions becomes a substitute for the love of what has been separated from him. "Since racism involves the separateness of people, so must it be invested with anal fantasies" (emphasis mine, D.B.). In the phallic phase, the central themes are castration and fantasies about

genital activity with forbidden people in the setting of competition and envy. "The resolution of the Oedipus complex condenses all the previous stages of development...under one mental organization, the superego...By adjusting his superego to a set of cultural controls, a person adapts and becomes 'normal.' If he is a white American, it is likely that he will then find an outlet for some of his infantile fantasies about dirt, property, power, and sexuality in his culture's racism."

The "aversive racist" is one for whom anal fantasies are of primary importance. A split of infantile origins between good and bad body (the self and what is expelled) becomes generalized. Objects are sought to represent both. "For symbols of what is hated...the developing mind looks to see what can be associated with excrement," while property becomes the loved excrement.

The "dominative racist" has a harsher, more rigid superego than the aversive racist. Oedipal fantasies are more significant to him. Black symbolizes bad and white good. "The black man is the bad father who possesses the black mammy (who is herself impure) and has the genital power which forever excites the child's envy. He is also the bad child who lusts after the pure and utterly forbidden white mother...By making the rape fantasy the cornerstone of his culture, the white male only repeats in adulthood the central incest taboo of his childhood...The Southern white male simultaneously resolves both sides of the conflict by keeping the black man submissive and by castrating him when submission fails... he is castrating the father...and also identifying with him by castrating the son...Black man, white man, black woman, white woman--- each realizes some aspect of the oedipal situation; and in this

realization, the infantile impossibilities of the oedipal conflicts attain their perverted resolution by being projected onto split elements of culture." Further, "in accordance with the principle of multiple function, and for survival of the ego (in the face of the persistence of the original wish), some sense of realization is necessary...The solution devised by the ego..." is that it "will find a symbolic representation...that corresponds with some perception of the world."

We have already discussed the assertion that a symbolic form "must" be invested with particular meanings and found it wanting. But in addition Kovel makes us wonder why projection should operate so ubiquitously in the case of race. His answer, that projection onto another race is necessary "for the survival of the ego," ignores the broad range of other defenses available to the mind. The "why" of projection is usually answered this way, in terms of some fundamental necessity. For example, Pinderhughes speaks of a "drive to dichotomize" (Pinderhughes, 1971). And Zilboorg, another student of racism, talks of a "herd instinct" (Zilboorg, 1947). He says that herds do not satisfy a need for togetherness, and are by nature aggressive. This aggression leads to guilt and anxiety which is dealt with by projection which increases fear of being alone which stimulates an attempt at passivity which arouses homosexual anxiety which leads to greater projection which starts the vicious cycle all over again. "The circle of this psychological economy is thus closed, perfect, and immutable...To defend his illusory security, man projects his herdness...Here lies the very secret of the tenacity and intensity of...prejudice." If this psychosocial "cycle" seems unconvincing in paraphrase, a reading

of the original is unlikely to clarify. "The narcissistic, anal-sadistic strivings to gain a sort of purely passive, intrauterine existence in the womb of the mass, or nature, are brazenly projected into the enemy and then aspired to and approximated by the projector who is himself the accuser."

By relying on such notions as "outlet" and "survival of the ego" we are able to avoid many questions. If repressed universal instinctual conflicts are what is projected, how do qualities that are not part of the conflicts as Kovel describes them, such as laziness or cunning, come to be projected? If what is projected is what is unacceptable and repressed, why is it that blacks represent "hated excrement" rather than the surely more unacceptable idea "loved excrement?" And why is it that castration anxiety drops entirely out of the picture Kovel draws (with the wish to castrate the father remaining) until the black man is actually castrated, an event far more infrequent than the prevalence of racism? Here, it suddenly reemerges by being "realized" through an equation of the black man with the evil child.

Another problem for this theory is posed by the existence of positive ideas about blacks, such as the idea that "blacks are kinder" (from an interview with a friend). To preserve his theory, Kovel would have to respond to this statement in one of several ways. First, it is a realistic perception, but therefore not a projection. Second, it is a reaction-formation against another idea. Again, it is not a projection since there is no conscious perception of the repressed idea in the external world. Third, it is a projection of a quality which is unconsciously unacceptable to the self, but acceptable in blacks. The reversal in this case

requires an explanation which is not suggested.

The fourth possibility is that this is a phenomenon which Kovel recognizes but does not attempt to explain. He seems to think there are four kinds of orientation towards blacks: the dominative racist, the aversive racist, the "metaracist" and "those who treat another person as he is...without the shackles of categories." If on the other hand Kovel admits of this fifth possibility, a positive orientation, then it can be excluded from discussion only by treating racism as a cultural phenomenon consisting of a miscellaneous amalgamation of attitudes selected on the basis of a value judgment. This precludes any psychological explanation which goes beyond the idea that if it's bad, it's got to be a projection.

We have seen that the unadulterated racism Kovel describes is only one possibility among many types of white orientation toward blacks. According to Coles, a self-respecting dominative racist may also love the man he calls black. Compare the quotations in Coles' book with Kovel's "Pattern: blackness is bad, what goes on in the dark comes from the dark; therefore, make the black man represent both father and son in their destructive aspects..." and so forth. Further, bits and pieces of Kovel's phenomenon can appear without the other elements, while racist beliefs can change, appear and disappear. In short, Kovel has explained a phenomenon which in a psychological sense does not exist by a "mechanism" which, when operative at all, itself requires an explanation.

The extension of such a theory leads to some dubious assertions. For instance, Kovel believes the white Southern female was made "sexless, in reality." This is a curious statement in light of the many generations of all white Southerners who were born--in

reality. Kovel considers this hypothesis "too well known to need documentation." And in fact, the only documentation for his theory at all is provided by secondary sources, with an occasional bit of distortion. For example, Kovel labels "virtually psychotic" a man he has never seen and whom Rogers, the man's therapist, describes as "passive" and "obsessive."

Similarly, he uses an excellent historical work by Winthrop Jordan (1968) primarily as a source of historical "facts," and gives the work a one-sided reading. There is no sense in Kovel's work that, as Jordan states, "provincial Americans...showed themselves pulled by opposing tendencies--the need to explain why Negroes looked both the same as and different from white men and the twin senses that man both is and is not an animal." Jordan talks about the "puzzle" of the Negro's color, and the "human relationships, continually driving home the common humanity of all" and "the push and pull of an irreconcilable conflict between desire and aversion for inter-racial sexual union." The point is not that Kovel misconstrues Jordan's conclusions about the dominant outcome of these tensions, but only that he is blind to Jordan's sense of development and conflict. Jordan, in studying white attitudes, allows himself to discern both sides of tensions at many levels of consciousness. He shows how, with the support of religious ideas, "scientific" notions, chance, cultural symbolizations, and slavery itself, the history of white attitudes grew and changed under the impact of the needs of Americans to know who they were, and to solve problems of mastery, control, and freedom. That the solution rested on a perception of difference and involved a measure of projection onto enslavable and enslaved men is clear. Had it involved only this,

Jordan's contribution to the psychological and historical understanding of the problem would have been trivial.

Many authors have asked themselves why ideas about race seem so powerful and so ubiquitous. The most important contribution to the psychological understanding of this problem has been the demonstration that the content of racism may be motivated by unconscious ideas derived from the experiences of childhood and may serve a defensive function. But this is true as well of symptoms, symptomatic acts, jokes, and fantasy life in general. The problem of race symbolization per se has been largely ignored. Recourse to the concept of "projection" merely raises the central question in a different way: Why projection onto an entire race of people?

This question has been almost defined out of existence by a moralistic decision. Theories which assume the universality of racism but ignore the positive stereotypes are free to ignore the process by which universal childhood experiences have different manifestations in adult race symbolization. Theories which treat racism as episodic focus on the manner in which the solution of particular psychological problems employ particular defense mechanisms. But since these theories also ignore positive ideas about another race, race symbolization can be treated as if it were only a matter of defense.

Robert Coles has hinted that what is important about the black person to whites is not that he has a particular universal meaning, but that he can universally mean something--in fact, anything. If this is true and if race symbolization is as widespread and powerful as so many of us believe, it may be that the various black people of the mind share, not a common meaning, but a common

symbolic process of creation.

To test this idea we must have some hypothesis about what this process might be. The purpose of this paper is to formulate such a hypothesis on the basis of experimental data.

The data we will use was gathered in a simple way. One white subject, an undergraduate male, was shown a set of fourteen Thematic Apperception Test cards. These were photographs taken specifically for this study. The fourteen consist of two sets of seven, one with all white figures (the W set) and one with one black on each card (the B set). In each set of seven, four of the cards show two figures and three show a single figure. For each card in the W set there is a card in the B set which corresponds to it in terms of age, sex, and relative position of the figures. The difference is in the substitution of a black figure for a white on each card in the B set. Thus, four of the cards in the B set show a white figure and a black figure, and three show a single black figure. (For a description of the cards together with the stories told to them see the Appendix.)

The subject was given a modification of the standard TAT instructions. He was told:

This test is part of a medical school thesis I am doing. Although I cannot explain the nature of the thesis to you beforehand, you will no doubt get an idea of the general area of the study as we go along. Please don't concern yourself too much with this while taking the test. After the test is over, I will be interested in discussing it with you.

Today I'll be showing you a series of pictures and would like you to tell an imaginative, dramatic story about each one. Tell what has led up to the event shown in the picture, describe what is happening at the moment, what the characters are feeling and thinking, and then give the outcome. Speak your thoughts as they come to your mind.

Although it is unlikely, you may become uncomfortable during the test, and if you wish to stop at any time, please

feel free to do so. Any questions? OK, here is your first picture.

The fourteen cards were scrambled in the order shown in the Appendix to conceal the pairing between the two sets of seven. I discovered after the test that the subject was not only unaware of the corresponding sets, but also unaware that the study dealt with some aspect of race. Nevertheless, he said he was conscious, at times, of the race of the figures.

The method of analysis will be discussed in the next section. A question may be raised about the sense in which the two sets are similar. It is true that the difference between any two corresponding cards will be greater than a mere racial difference. For example, card five shows a young black male sitting with a letter in hand while number eleven shows a young white male sitting with a telephone receiver in hand. Such differences are unimportant for this study for several reasons. First, the age and sex of the figures is identifiably similar. Second, the pictures are intentionally out of focus and highly ambiguous. The letter in picture five, for example, was perceived as a book. Third, our interest is primarily in the symbolic form in which very general types of ideas are embodied, and not in the subtleties of content. For this reason we tape recorded the subject's speech.

Let's now examine the impact of racial forms on the thought of one person.

II

The Impact of Black Human Forms

There are many ways to analyze a TAT protocol. At one end of a range there is TAT analysis done in conjunction with clinical work. Here the interest is in the particular woven texture of ideas which unknown to the patient have fed his suffering. The TAT is used diagnostically. At the other end lie those research studies in which a statistically significant variation is sought in the frequency of particular words or phrases, pre-selected on the assumption that their meaning will be the same for different people. The TAT is used almost as a questionnaire.

The method we will use owes something to both these techniques. The writers whose work was reviewed are all convinced that the strange and racist fantasies they study owe their formation to human passions and fears. In part I share this belief since I have witnessed such processes in my own mind and since psychoanalysis has shown that people are motivated to distort the humanness of others even though they sometimes know better. But since we are wondering about a general impact of the black on the white mind, it seems sensible to confine our investigation of the affective significance of any story to some general properties of conflict and defense.

In the next section we will define the notions of "conflict" and "defense" more clearly. Let us state here that we are not using the term "defense" in the traditional psychodynamic sense. That is, for the purposes of this paper a defense is not a mech-

anism employed to reduce the signal anxiety associated with intrapsychic conflict. Rather we are considering "defense" to be an intellectual operation upon intellectual ideas of "wishes," which structure a relationship of union between objects, and upon intellectual ideas of "fears," which structure a separation of objects. We assume that such ideas often have affective importance and are the elements of conflict. A defensive operation is successful insofar as it fulfills a wish or mitigates a loss.

In our analysis we will look at whether the manifest story deals more with wishes or with fears. This will not tell us much about defense, however. A story which expresses a threatening separation may serve to make loss tolerable. In therapy, a patient may defend against his fear of abandonment with an "I'll leave you before you leave me" fantasy. Therefore, we distinguish between surface structure and deep structure.

Surface structure is the particular system of relationships between the figures of the manifest story. It represents one particular arrangement of a set of underlying themes--the deep structure. We will identify these underlying themes by a comparison of the manifest themes of each pair of stories. Since we will pay particular attention to union and separation the "relative defensiveness" of each member of the pair may be discerned. This method is not, strictly speaking, an analysis of psychodynamics. Deep structure is analagous, but not identical with unconscious conflict, and we do not assume, therefore, that the subject actually experiences the conflicts we will identify. In fact, there are innumerable layers of wishes and fears. Our very general interpretations represent simply one way of conceptualizing structures

which are consistent with the stories.

In addition to this thematic approach we will be inspecting the organization of the speech and the use of particular words or phrases. Our hunch is that in order to investigate the questions raised in the previous section we will reasonably have to ask with what kind of constructions we are dealing.

"Thought," from the point of view we are taking, is an active process and is distinguished from "thoughts" or "ideas" which are structures. Ideas can be shaped by external patterns created independently of the mind's activity (thought in accommodation). And the mind can reorganize these external patterns and combine them with others in structured ways (thought in assimilation). Both processes can occur together (thought in equilibrium). These two functional activities transform thoughts and can be performed by any person capable of thought. As I write this paper, for example, daydreams of distant people and unspoken words frequently dovetail with activities conforming to the requirements which any medical school thesis must obey. The domination of either of these poles of activity over the other results in two relatively different products, identified by their more or less "dreamlike" properties.

The notion of "dreamlike" properties refers to the manifest properties of a symbolic product. It is an imprecise notion, and strictly speaking it says nothing about either thought processes or thoughts. It is suggestive, however, of the relative difference between the results of assimilation and accommodation. This relative difference, as intuitively obvious as that between dreams and imitation, defines a continuum on which the TAT stories lie. A more precise discussion of the creative processes themselves will be

postponed until the next section, after we have examined several stories in terms of this continuum.

In order to clarify this notion of dreamlike properties let's simply list some of the qualities of manifest dreams.

Dreams seem different from waking life. The dreamer pays little heed to the contextual relations of the real world. Unreal and strange things happen. The narrative sequence is fragile and subject to disruption and irrational leaps. Events may be repeated over and over, or sustained long after they should have been completed. It may be hard to know just what is going on in this world of now absurd, now mundane events.

The sense of temporal context is different in dreams. In waking life one can conceive of past, present, and future actions. In dreams, we draw upon the past for material but exist only within present time. There is no expression of conditionality, necessity, or wish in manifest dreams. Things just happen or they are. The expression is all in the indicative mood. Cause and effect cannot be expressed directly. There is no way to represent an action which has not yet occurred, and the events of a dream sequence are unimportant as soon as they cease to be immediately present.

The sense of spatial context is disrupted in dreams. An object may appear out of its normal place. The scene of dreams can shift from place to place with no explicit transition. Objects can change size and shape.

Dreams do preserve some sense of space, however, since they are visual. Present objects can be compared in terms of dimension, shape, and color, but not in terms of intangible qualities.

Contradiction does not exist in dreams. Opposites can exist side by side without conflict. People in dreams may possess rationally contradictory qualities without a sense of incompatibility. Internal conflict, therefore, does not exist in dream figures. Although the dreamer may have feelings and thoughts in his dream, the dream figures never self-reflect, think, or feel, though they may speak. They simply act, or exist.

People who are accustomed to thinking systematically about language may question the validity of drawing inferences about thought processes on the basis of linguistic features, mainly semantics and syntactics. Our analysis, let me say at this point, assumes a distinction between what is called linguistic "competence," the knowledge of the rules of a language, and linguistic "performance," the ways in which these rules are used and violated. Since our subject's knowledge of English probably did not change during the test in response to my grunts, nods, simple questions, and silence, we can view our analysis as an investigation into his performance. This performance, the variable use of linguistic competence, can be viewed as changing under the impact of the variable activity of the subject's thought.

The subject and I compared notes after the test. He was surprised to find out the experiment dealt with race, assuming that I was interested in the "male-female type" themes which abound in his stories. Like many theorists of race symbolization, he had difficulty imagining that one could be interested in the forms he used to embody particular themes. I admitted to a lingering doubt in my own head at the time, and stated the experiment was based upon unformulated hypotheses, or, more bluntly, a guess. Of the

several cards of which the subject said "it struck me," one was of "the guy and girl holding hands." Let's start, then, with the pair of which this story is a member.

Picture number nine: A young white woman with lowered eyes is turned slightly away from a young white man who is looking at her and has his hands on her shoulders.

Story number nine:¹ (long pause) The guy here has found out 1
 um that this girl doesn't care for him as much as uh he thought, 2
 possibly as much as she let him think, either consciously or un- 3
 consciously, and uh he's upset. It doesn't, it doesn't involve, 4
 say, her sleeping with another guy or something like that. It's 5
 just that uh she just doesn't give him as much as he wants and as 6
 much as he feels he gives her. And so (he) is in a position to 7
 be asked, is in a position of asking her to either--give more, 8
 treat him as he wants to be treated, as he feels their, you know, 9
 to in other words, to get in deeper, to uh let the relationship go 10
 as far as he thinks it could go. And she is, very indecisive, be- 11
 cause she she doesn't know where she stands as far with him. She 12
 doesn't know what she wants out of it um. She's got other commit- 13
 ments, not romantic type commitments, but she has other friends 14
 that she doesn't want to be, doesn't want to have to stop seeing 15
 because she's going to devote everything to him. uh, and so, she 16
 has to turn away. She can't look at him knowing how much he needs 17
 an answer, because she doesn't have it yet. She needs time. So 18
 she will just turn away and sort of walk off and--they'll separate 19
 uh this time, you know, before deciding anything, and have to 20

¹ Additions and nonverbal behavior are contained in brackets, ().
 Sentences are marked off intuitively.

come back together. It's not going to be resolved, uh, this 21
afternoon, and so its she's going to have to come back to him or 22
he's going to have to come back to her after a very short period 23
of time, after she's gotten things straightened out in her own 24
head. 25

Picture number two: A young black woman with lowered eyes is
turned slightly away from a young white man who is looking at her.
At the bottom of the picture a part of his hand, which is holding
her wrist, is visible.

Story number two: (long pause). It looks like there's been 1
um like the girl has had um some sort of a tough time, got some 2
bad news or something, and come together with this guy, who, she 3
knows fairly well. They know each other, and they're fairly 4
close, close enough to be touching, and she's looking for uh, 5
someone to talk to, someone to sympathize with her. It's not, it 6
hasn't been a fight between them. But it might be, she can be 7
coming with, something she's thought about their relationship, or 8
she's coming with, uh--something that's happened to her directly 9
that didn't involve him at all, uh, something bad to another 10
friend, or her mother died, or she got wiped out on a test, that 11
sort of thing. They're just sort of really nonverbally, because 12
their their relationship is beyond that really. They don't have 13
to talk just to be together. It comforts her. And uh from here 14
they'll go out and, not out necessarily, but they'll go on, and 15
on a very sort of calm level uh and be together for a while uh 16
not necessarily doing anything very exciting. uh (It's) just 17
their being together that matters to uh both of them. And so I 18
I just see them having a you know, either where they are or 19

someplace to eat or something, but just talking quietly in the 20
 next couple hours and sort of resting on each other, particu- 21
 larly her, you know, on the security that he's providing after 22
 the tough time she's had. 23

A preliminary comment on these stories in terms of the liter-
 ature is in order. It is obvious that although both stories may
 have forbidden thoughts lingering underneath, the notion of the
 "projection of id impulses" is useless in understanding the changes
 between the two stories. As far as the manifest story is concern-
 ed, the only characters who are in any sense "bad" are the pair in
 story number nine, particularly "the girl" who is leaving the guy,
 the central figure in the story. Sexuality is specifically mention-
 ed only in the story with white figures: "it doesn't involve, say,
 her sleeping with another guy or something like that." She's got
 "other commitments, not--romantic type commitments." Further, the
 references to giving, to getting in deeper, to letting the relation-
 ship go as far as he thinks it could go, are more suggestive of
 sexual themes than the "not necessarily doing anything very excit-
 ing" and the reference to "close enough to be touching" of story
 two. "The girl" of story two is a victim who needs and receives
 comfort. She is hardly the stupid, dirty, evil, harmful, dominated,
 avoided, promiscuous, et cetera object of the "universal racism"
 which so many writers have condemned. This is not to say that the
 impact of race does not enter the picture, nor that such fantasies
 as number two do not in some way contribute to racism. To under-
 stand this, however, we need to develop notions which are at least
 capable of encompassing the manifest story without distorting it
 beyond recognition.

The major themes of the two stories are roughly similar, yet they appear quite different because of a difference in their organization. Both stories deal with one person in need of another. Both depict a response by the other to that need. Both contain an idea of loss, separation, or a sustained hurt. Both suggest a relationship between a woman and people or events outside of her involvement with the guy. And both suggest that there is an impact of the outside relationship on the primary one.

The striking differences lie in the organization of these themes. In story number two, the woman is in need and the man responds positively. In nine the man is in need and the woman responds negatively. In two the woman sustains the hurt in an outside event, while in nine the man sustains the hurt in his relationship with the girl. In two the woman's negative relationship to the outside brings the two together. In nine, her positive relationship to the outside contributes to keeping them apart. The two stories can be thought of as mirror images of one another, each preserving an opposition between inside and outside, each expressing a loss of and preservation of some relationship. Thematically they are transformations of one another or of some underlying structure.

The result is that story two represents primarily the fulfillment of a wish and the continuance of a relationship characterized by friendship, closeness, and security "beyond" words. Number nine, by contrast, represents primarily a loss, a separation, a turning away. By removing the notion of loss from the level of the interaction between the two actors in number nine, to the level of the woman's relationship with some other event or object in number two,

the subject has masterfully turned story nine inside out. Although the loss and the need still relate to a single individual, as in nine, the subject has been able to preserve the idea and permit gratification of the need at the same time. In other words, fantasy number two has the characteristics of a defensive fantasy, including compromise formation, relative to story nine, which also has its defensive aspects.

It should be clear that closeness and unity pervade story number two, while number nine chronicles the-trouble-I'm-having-with-my-girl. The multiple use of "they" and "each other" replaces the "he and she" of nine. In nine, the only "they" is used in the phrase "they'll separate." The only "their" stands as an adjective with nothing to modify and the phrase of which it is a part is dropped and replaced.

We should also note that the subject, in number two, seems very unconcerned with the characteristics of the black image on the TAT card. Her two most obvious properties, blackness and womanness, are not manifestly used in this story. Although she is referred to as "she" occasionally, none of the words used to describe her are as suggestive of her biological sex as the "her sleeping with another guy" of story nine. (Though a man, the subject has little trouble identifying with her. In projective test terminology, she corresponds most closely to the "hero.") Further, the context of her life is obscure. As far as the subject is concerned the death of her mother and a bad experience with a test are both "that sort of thing." Although there is a sense of her outside world, it's nature is opaque to the subject. Her fundamental humanness, her need, her hurt, her looking for someone to talk to, her experience

of comfort and security, prevail. In a way, she is used as a formless pan-human being seeking and finding refuge in closeness. Her companion, of course, is even more devoid of particularity. He remains a simple human presence from beginning to end.

Use of the forms on the cards in this non-contextual way suggests a more dreamlike construction of story two as opposed to number nine. Keeping the manifest properties of dreams in mind, let's check on those aspects of speech which might reveal these properties.

A greater sense of uncertainty is conveyed in story two by the use of three expressions: "some" as in "some sort of," used nine times; "really" used twice; and "you know" used twice. By contrast, in story nine "some" is used once, "you know" once, and "really" not at all.

Notions of cause and effect are expressed six times in nine, including the "and so's" which are followed by consequences, and only one in story two, following an adverb in an ungrammatical way. The conditional phrase used in two is an expression of the subject's attitude toward the story, but not part of the story itself. In nine, a conditional phrase is used once in a similar sense, and once as part of the story (line 11). The imperative mood is used once in story two (line 14), but negatively, and six times in nine (lines 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23). The optative mood is never used in two, but is used four times in number nine (lines 6, 8, 13, and 15).

There are four references to time in number nine (lines 18, 20, 22, 24), and two in two (lines 16, 21). References to future actions are five in story two (lines 15, 15, 16, 20, 21), and five

in nine (lines 15, 19, 21, 22, 23). References to past action are two in nine and ten in story two.

Contradictions of a previous idea occur three times in two (lines 9, 14, 19, 20), and not at all in number nine. Phrases of comparison of intangible qualities are used twice in number two (lines 13, 14, 22), and eleven times in nine (lines 2, 2, 6, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23).

A phrase suggesting reflective thought occurs once in story two (line 8), but is quickly denied. In nine, such phrases occur nine times (lines 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 20, 24). References to people feeling in number two are all in terms of actions, events, and consequences of actions. The girl doesn't explicitly feel bad, but she has had a "tough time," or got some "bad news." Explicit references to feelings occur three times in number nine (lines 3, 7, 9).

In transcribing from tape, it was necessary to arbitrarily and intuitively mark off sentences. I chose to mark them in such a way that each phrase has at least one noun phrase and one verb phrase, and consider phrases the subject corrects and phrases which disrupt grammaticalness as not being part of the sentence. One could argue about this highly primitive method and the particulars of grammaticalness. Nevertheless, by this method the ratio of words of four or more letters which are part of a grammatical sentence to words which are not part of a sentence is about 3 to 1 in story two. The ratio in story nine is about 6.5 to 1.

None of these differences are statistically significant since the total number of items is so small. But in every case but one they suggest a drift toward dreamlike thought in story number two.

(The one exception is the equal number of references to future action in the two stories.) Number nine uses more integrated, organized, discursive, relational, and complex speech. And just as dreams so often flee the memory when we awake, the subject seems distant from the unknown details of the guy and girl holding hands. He says "it looks like, it might be, she can be, I just see them." The trouble between the guy and the girl, however, has the immediacy of a real situation. The subject is still aware of painting a picture, but he fills the canvas with ease. Chunks of social reality are used with assurance. The outline of the story is clear from the initial declaration that "the guy here has found out um that this girl doesn't care for him as much as uh he thought." A story seems to suggest itself to the subject. Still, he volunteers that "the one with the guy and girl holding hands struck me," picture number two. Perhaps we could say that the subject was close to the meaning of a story of unknown details, while in nine he was distant from the meaning of a story with known details.

Story number two, then, is more defensive, more expressive of union, and more dreamlike than number nine. In addition, the black figure is used primarily for its personal human meaning, with little use made of its form. Let's now examine two stories in which the impact of race seems strikingly different, but which was similarly flagged by the subject after the test.

Picture number three: Two young white men are looking at each other. One has his hand on the door of a phone booth, and the other is several feet away, facing the first. It is night.

Story number three: (long wait).¹ These two guys have had a disagreement um and the one is stepping into the phone booth.² It's

a very decisive sort of a thing. And I'm not sure. I can't tell what it's about. But He's taking some action. that uh He's calling someone, perhaps a girl that they both know uh after disagreeing with the other guy, almost as a proof of of his superiority or uh his (proof) that he's going to to it despite what the other guy things. uh The other guy's obviously very upset. and he's un As soon as the guy gets into the phone booth, they're right now making their uh sort of glaring at each other, in a way of saying goodbye. uh The one's going to go in the phone booth and make his call and the other's going to leave, after this final confrontation.

D.B.: What does the guy who's going into the phone booth feel?

Subject: He-regrets having to do what he's doing because he seems to v-value his relationship with the other guy. He's they their they They've been friends and something uh I'll say a girl, has come between them and he is sorry it has to be the way it has to be. and uh he's and he doesn't He's sort of uh upset that things have to be a certain way, (and) that something is being forced on him that he would rather not have. But he's going to go through with with with the phone call. He's going to go through with it and um--sacrifice his friendship with the guy for um the object of the phone call.

Picture number eight: A young white man and a young black man are looking at each other. The white stands with his hand on a half-opened car door. The black is gesturing toward him from several feet away. It is night.

Story number eight: (pause, sits forward). Outside of a movie theater, or some some such place. A white guy has come out uh obviously with money. He's got rather fancy clothes on. The black

guy comes up uh has come up to spare change him, and knowing he can play on the other guy's white guilt, sort of that kind of feeling um knowing his advantage, and that it's it's increasingly hard for a white guy to turn down uh a poor looking black, and so he comes up. and ⁵The white is feeling very threatened. he's un ⁶Although he's uh enlightened (smile) in his racial views, he recognizes that the crime and uh that sort of thing that he reads about all the time, and therefore he's scared that this guy uh uh is wants more than just his spare change, that he might do him some harm. uh ⁷Meanwhile, the black guy knows, pretty much knows, what goes through the white guy's mind and uses it hoping that the guy will give him some spare change and uh take off. and ⁸But rather than do this, the white guy has his--security. ⁹He's got his car he can leap into and uh I think he's got--a girl in the car already who he feels responsible for. and ¹⁰It sort of doubles his fear but it also doubles his courage. and he just son't ¹¹He's just going to say no and get in the car and leave, um the black guy staying around to try um the next person that comes along.

This pair of stories presents an example of a racist transformation, according to one of the criteria presented in the last section. In story number eight, the avoidance behavior of the white is based on a belief about the likely intentions of a black man. The white reads the newspapers and knows that blacks commit crime, and therefore he feels threatened.

We could hardly understand this story by reference to some automatic mechanism of projection onto blacks or by labeling our subject an "aversive racist." To begin with, only particular elements of the standard collection of racist beliefs are selected.

Explicit ideas of domination, superiority, and sexual aggressiveness are absent. The black may be threatening, but he is smart. More importantly, our subject produced some nonracist stories with black figures. Story two is one example, and may suggest that the sex of the black figure is the significant factor for this subject. This conclusion is invalid, however, as evidenced by story number twelve (see Appendix). In twelve, a white man and a black man are "friends" and "colleagues" who "know each other." The black man "refreshes" the white who is "resting after delivering a lecture," and "both go on to finish the day in good spirits." But finally, I think our subject would be embarrassed to reread story eight. He seemed to sense its racist elements even in the telling, as his apologetic smile in the middle of the story suggests. The story, in fact, is unsettling as much for its bizarre conventionality as for its racism. It's hard to dismiss it as the probabilistic eruption of man's evil nature. But we can wonder how the mind uses the image of the black in ways as disparate as stories eight and two.

If we look into the themes of three and eight we find, once again, a similarity. In both stories two guys are in conflict. One guy, the central figure in each story, is leaving the other guy. The other guy doesn't want him to leave, at least not yet. The guy who's leaving is ambivalent. In number eight it is hard to turn down a poor looking black, while in three it is a question of friendship. Finally, the guy who's leaving has a girl waiting for him.

These similarities in the fantasied relations, and the discomfort of the hero in both stories permit us to view this pair as two different ways of solving one problem: the inherent contradiction

in sacrificing, or leaving a friend. In the TAT pictures, two men are together. Soon, our subject says, they will be apart. If it's friendship, why the sacrifice?

There are, no doubt, layers of related problems underlying this one, but the idea of leaving a friend is one way of identifying a deep structure of conflict which could surely be transformed into these two manifest stories. There are two primary ways to mitigate this sense of intentional loss. One is to make it appear as if leaving is being dictated by some outside force: it is not intentional. The other is to turn the friend into something else: it is not a loss. In the second part of story three (after my question), the first method is employed. "They've been friends, and something, I'll say a girl, has come between them...is being forced on him that he would rather not have." In the first part of the story the second method is used. The hero leaves the other decisively, while whatever friendship exists between them is not mentioned. Their relationship is characterized by glaring confrontation and disagreement over superiority, independence, and a girl.

Both methods are employed in eight. The hero is not only forced to leave but forced to "leap." And the motivating agent is no longer obscure: it is the friend of the last part of story three, who has now become a threatening black man. The self-willed loss becomes an achieved escape. The reward, in three "I'll say a girl" or "the object of the phone call," has become security, a car, and the responsibility of a girl.

Like story number two, this transformation is defensive. The manifest story, however, emphasizes the avoidance of a loss rather than realization of a union. At the same time, the separateness of

the two men is almost organic. No words are spoken. One is rich, one is poor. One is named "black guy," one is named "white guy." Neither knows the other's intentions. Suspicion prevails. They are strangers. There is none of the mutuality, the glaring at each other, the disagreement, the saying goodbye, the valued friendship that we see between the guys at the phone booth.

A glance at the use of language in this pair of stories leaves the impression of a less dreamlike, more vigorously textured, interracial fantasy. We may check this impression by tabulating speech elements of the same categories which differentiate two and nine. Thirteen categories have been defined. Larger totals in the first three of these suggest more dreamlike assimilatory thought. Larger totals in the remaining ten categories suggest more accommodative thought. The categories are as follows:

1. Phrases suggesting a conditional attitude of the subject toward his story.
2. References to past action.
3. Ideas which contradict previous ideas.
4. Cause and effect constructions.
5. Phrases expressing conditional relationships within the story.
6. Verb phrases expressing necessity.
7. Verb phrases expressing a wish.
8. References to time.
9. References to future action.
10. Comparisons of intangible qualities.
11. References to reflective thought.
12. References to feelings.
13. The ratio of words of four or more letters which are part of a

sentence to words which are not part of a sentence.

The scores for stories three and eight are shown in table I.

Table I

category	story 3	story 8
1	9	5
2	4	2
3	0	0
4	0	4
5	(2)	1)
6	(5)	0)
7	1	2
8	2	3
9	6	7
10	2	6
11	3	6
12	4	5
13	8	9

Ten of the categories suggest that story eight is less dreamlike than three. Two categories (five and six) suggest that eight is more dreamlike. And one (category three) is equivocal.

These results do not prove that eight is more imitation-like than three. The number of items in each is too small to establish significance. And as far as we know, no one has developed a precise method for determining degrees of assimilation in thought on the basis of speech alone. In fact, assimilation and accommodation can only be identified by their symbolic products alone in the extreme cases of dreams and imitation. The subject telling a TAT story fluctuates from moment to moment between these poles of thought and the symbolic product is an intermediate form.

But our interest is only in the exploration of a phenomenon, not in proof. We are faced with two stories which we would like to place on a continuum defined by formal properties. One way to decide their relative positions is by comparison with the defined position of dreams. Such a comparison suggests that, on the whole,

story three is relatively more dreamlike than story eight. Another way is to examine the stories one at a time, following more carefully the progress of the subject's organization of ideas as they are developed in speech, while paying closer attention to his experience of his own productions. That is, we may attempt a more direct inspection of his thought. Let us apply this method, beginning with story three.

The first sentence of three is a compound sentence, relating a past situation to a present action. It is unclear whether the "stepping into the phone booth" is a consequence of the disagreement, or of the disagreement now being over. We expect further development of this relationship in the story, but the subject for the moment seems primarily concerned with the act of stepping into the phone booth. He says "it's a very decisive sort of a thing," reflecting a certainty about the act which we would expect from the declarative and grammatical construction of the first sentence. He seems preoccupied with a general quality of the action and of the relationship with the other guy, both of which are known to him, and he has difficulty building up context. Not only is there a difficulty with context, but "I'm not sure. I can't tell what it's about" suggests that the subject experiences the figures in the picture as having a life of their own, with the facts being unavailable to him. He will have to make something up.

The subject tries by saying "he's taking some action that--," but the "some" already indicates uncertainty and the attempt is aborted. It is followed by recourse to the obvious, "he's calling someone," using clues from the picture and placing the act in the present tense, although even at the end of the story "he" has not

yet called. There is the tentative suggestion that he is calling "perhaps a girl they both know," followed by another reference to the as yet unelaborated context, "after disagreeing," of the call.

The phrase beginning "almost as a proof of--" is syntactically ambiguous. Was "his" disagreeing with the "other guy" a proof of his superiority? Or is his calling someone a proof of his independence? Are they fighting over the girl at the other end of the line? None of these ideas are clear, despite the attempt to relate the actions of "the one" to his intentions, and to the disagreement. The attempt to make use of a secondary process, conceptual word "proof" has an ambiguous result. The context, sequence, and content of the disagreement and the act of stepping into the phone booth are subordinated to the meaning the act has for "the guy."

The other guy, we learn, is very upset, a fact "obvious" to the subject by looking at the picture. But while this meaning has an unquestioned reality, the attempt to develop it further, "and he's uh," fails, since there is nothing in the picture to offer a way. The subject appears bound by the notion of conflict and by the image of the card itself. An attempt to move temporally beyond the immediate picture and its meaning, "as soon as the guy gets into the phone booth," is again interrupted, and the subject finds himself back in the present, elaborating quality and meaning: "they're right now sort of glaring at each other, in a way of saying goodbye." The resultant sentence looks slightly ungrammatical.

The outcome statement of part I is a well-formed reference to future action. It is basically a summary statement, however, adding a small piece of off-hand new information, "the other's going to leave," and includes a last effort to clarify what just occurred

by strengthening its meaning: "this final confrontation."

The first part of three, then, is repetitive and makes use largely of simple sentences, the longer ones being syntactically ambiguous or slightly ill-formed. It is motionless in time, and context remains undeveloped though not distorted. Very little information not found in the picture is added, except the meaning of the scene, which the subject sees as embodied in the picture. The act of stepping into the phone booth is proof of a point of view, glaring is an expression of saying goodbye, and a look is a sign of being upset. There is a sense of distance from detail and certainty about the few known items, particularly the importance of the action to both figures. This sense of reality binds the subject to the few essential meanings the picture has for him. Thus, while context remains minimal, there is a complexity of meaning--superiority, independence, disagreement, saying goodbye--which define a conflict. This sense of reality and conflict, in an otherwise barren story, steers the subject away from the dreamlike assimilation of story two.

My question to the subject reflects the fact that at the time I thought it important to have a fuller knowledge of the subject. This wasn't helped, I think, by the administration of the test in the room where medical students are assigned for learning psychotherapy. With so much left out of this story, I responded as a puzzled student with an imprecise research interest might: I asked a question about feelings.

The subject introduced the ideas of regret, friendship, and an outside sacrificial force. The speech is correspondingly halting: "and uh he's and he doesn't he's sort of." Previously he focused

on the meaning of the one's actions in relation to the other. Now, he is attempting to get close enough to the story to identify the one's feelings, while remaining far enough to observe and express them. This change of stance is difficult and requires a change in ideas, expressed in a stammering way.

The speech of both parts I and II of this story is different from that of story eight. Let us examine story eight and pay particular attention to the use of the black figure. As we do so we should keep in mind that a reliance upon social reality is more indicative of imitative thought than is any set of indices one might devise.

The first sentence of eight is ungrammatical as it stands, and "some, some such place" suggests a conditional relationship of the subject to his story. However, the "movie theater" is more concrete than most elements of story three, and the subject now seems to be distant from a situation of known details.

"A white guy has come out, obviously with money. He's got rather fancy clothes on." The reference to white guy and black guy is consistent throughout the story. The subject is conscious of forms, images, and social groups. The past tense is used in this first sentence, and correct and consistent verb tenses are used throughout. The "obviously" is explained by reference to the picture, unlike the "obviously" in story three, which we only guessed was derived from the card. There is both an awareness of the details of the picture and a self-conscious sense of logic.

"The black guy...and so he comes up" is a rather long, slightly ungrammatical construction. The subject is attending to images and social groups. He is also self-conscious about his speech and

attuned to temporal context: "comes up uh, has come up." The grammar could have been improved by replacing "knowing" in each case with "he knows." Also, if the "knowing" phrases were intended to explain some further action or thought of the black guy, the repetition of "he comes up" in the tense rejected at the beginning of the sentence suggests this is difficult.

"To spare change him" is a noun phrase used as a verb phrase. Two things should be noted. First, its use and the assumption that I will understand depends upon a rather conventional sense of social reality, beyond the more dictionary meaning of words. The phrase is slang for panhandling. Secondly, although it ostensibly refers to the intention of the black, the phrase derives as much from the sought after possession of the white. The black's intentions are seen largely from the white guy's point of view in this story.

In the next phrases, it appears that the black guy's thoughts are seen from this point of view as well. Ostensibly "knowing he can play on the other guy's white guilt, sort of that kind of feeling..." is what the black is thinking. However, the sentence actually tells us more about a stereotype of the white guy. We learn of his "white guilt," which socializes him more than if the subject had said "the white guy's guilt." The phrase "increasingly hard" reflects an almost historical consciousness.

Such is the basis on which the black guy knows that he can play on the guilt. There is no consideration of what might be required of the black himself in order to approach the white. This is a stereotype not only of the black but also of the nature of the interaction. In addition, "feeling" is a manifestly inappropriate

word to describe the black's experience, which is in the realm of "knowing," and is more appropriate to "white guilt." The advantage cited, furthermore, is in terms of the white's difficult position, but it is intended as information about the black guy's thoughts. Indeed, "a poor looking black" can only refer to the perception of the white. This black guy apparently has no thoughts of his own. As far as we know, he doesn't need the money, he has no feelings, he has no life of his own, and no uncertainties about his act. He is just there, knowing exactly what the white guy thinks.

Next we hear that "the white is feeling very threatened," not that he feels guilty or generous. The meaning of the approach for the white as a person is different from the meaning for him as a member of a group. The subject knows what the black is up to since the story is based upon what he considers to be a socially repeated phenomenon. However, as soon as one gets to the feelings involved, it is the white guy who misperceives the black and interprets the approach as a threat: "he might do him some harm." The reason for this, we learn, is that the white guy reads about crime all the time and "that sort of thing." Although he's "enlightened" in his racial views, the implication is that blacks commit crime in the streets. His reaction is determined on the basis of newspaper reports and blackness, despite the unlikelihood (I think) of getting ripped off coming out of a movie theater. The smile near the beginning of the sentence is ambiguous. It could be interpreted either as a knowing comment on the unlikelihood of whites having "enlightened" racial views, the way one might react to a statement "I'm not prejudiced, but..." or as an apology for making such a statement.

The contrast is striking between the white's fear of harm, based on newspaper reports, and the black's actions, based on knowledge of the white. The white guy sees himself as a person with feelings and responds to an imaged act with socialized meaning. The black sees himself through white eyes, as an imaged actor with socialized meanings, and acts on this basis.

Sentence six is complex and well-formed. The "although" suggests knowledge of the relationship between ideas separated in the sentence. We learn a considerable amount about the life context of the white guy. There is a cause and effect construction, "and therefore," and a relationship expressed between current feelings and past activities. There is a recognition of conflicting thoughts, enlightenment versus knowledge of crime, and conditional and optative constructions are part of the story.

The next sentence is equally well-formed and contextual. However, the black guy now knows that the white is feeling threatened rather than guilty or generous. This is a remarkable man with mercurial knowledge of the white's feelings on which he "plays," no matter what they are, in the hope of getting spare change. The white guy knows nothing about the black, while the black's knowledge dovetails the white's feelings exactly. The black is consistent as a form, engaged in an act, and his meaning is a reflection of the meaning he has for the white. The subject is slightly aware of this, saying "pretty much knows," but he is not aware enough to construct a different story.

The last few lines deal primarily with the white's departure. The speech is slightly more halting and slightly less complex than the preceding sentences. The subject is mildly uncertain about one

element not pictured, "a girl," of whom the subject says "I think" rather than "I'll say," again reflecting, as in the first sentence, a distance from a story with known details. Sentence ten, "it sort of doubles his fear but it also doubles his courage" was spoken rapidly without fearful affect. It is a conventional expression, corresponding in speech to the subject's use of social context--the girl and the car--in thought. What is social now has the meaning of security. What is external supports at every turn the feelings and actions of the white guy.

Like the black woman in need, the black man participates in a defensive transformation. But the formal aspect of this transformation is of a very different type. It is an imitation-like shift to a contextually conventional and linguistically well-organized construction. The black figure is largely a personless social form. By contrast, the transformation from story nine to story two is a dreamlike transformation: The black figure is a meaningful but formless human being. It appears that a racial difference may assist to dominance either of two extremes: dreamlike imagination or imitation-like conventionality.

This impression is supported by an examination of the remaining five pairs of stories. Each story was scored separately in each of the thirteen categories we are using. Then the categories were taken one at a time and the stories were scored in succession. Each category required one trip through the entire protocol. The

results from the two methods were compared, and a final reading of the protocol reconciled the discrepancies. Table II shows the results of the scoring. The scores in each column have been corrected for the difference in the number of words between the members of each pair of stories. If x =the number of words in the shorter story and y =the number of words in its corresponding longer story, the raw scores for the shorter story have been multiplied by the factor y/x , except, of course, in category thirteen.

Table II

Cat.	2B	9W	8B	3W	10B	1W	12B	4W	5B	11W	13B	6W	7B	14W
1	18	5	5	9.9	3.2	13	8	4.4	21	10.2	5	14.6	(2.1	2)
2	10	2	2	4.4	2.1	5	4	3.3	10	7.3	0	6.2	4.2	5
3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2.1	0	1
4	1	6	4	0	6.4	3	1	2.3	0	8.7	4	2.1	5.3	5
5	0	1	(1	2.3)	(2.1	3)	0	1.1	0	4.4	(0	1)	(0	1)
6	1	6	(0	5.7)	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	1	0	(1.1	2)
7	0	4	2	1.1	4.2	0	0	1.1	0	1.5	1	0	(0	3)
8	2	4	3	2.2	4.2	2	0	1.1	4	5.8	5	2.1	5.3	4
9	5	5	7	6.8	(7.4	9)	(4	3.3)	2	13.1	8	4.2	10.6	8
10	2	11	6	2.3	10.6	3	1	4.4	(6	1.5)	(3	3.1)	6.4	6
11	1	9	6	3.3	6.4	4	1	2.3	4	5.8	(1	6.2)	5.3	4
12	0	3	5	4.4	(3.2	4)	(3	0)	0	4.4	4	3.1	4.2	4
13	3	6.5	9	8	20	5.5	2.5	9	(10	8)	14	9	9	4
	D	I	I	D	I	D	D	I	D	I	I	D	I	D

Since we are dealing with relative differences, every dreamlike transformation with black forms implies an imitation-like transformation with white forms. Similarly, every imitation-like transformation with black forms implies a dreamlike transformation with white forms. Thus, for each pair of stories we label one "I" for imitation-like and one "D" for dreamlike. The choice is determined by the frequency of shifts one direction or the other throughout the thirteen categories. Scores which contradict the overall trend for any pair are bracketed in table II. In no pair does the number of contradictory shifts exceed four. The pair two

and nine is the most clear-cut, with only one equivocal shift. The pair seven and fourteen presents the least degree of transformation, with four contradictory categories and no equivocal ones.

We are interested in whether black forms assist transformations toward opposite extremes of a continuum. If we were merely to compare the most extreme stories of both poles, with and without black forms, we could not determine whether the effects observed were a consequence of race or not, since we would be comparing stories told to figures of different age and sex. Neither could we simply average the scores from the B cards and compare these with the averages for the W cards. Extremes would cancel each other out by this method. We may, however, compare the group of dreamlike transformations with B cards and the group of dreamlike transformations with W cards by averaging the scores for each category within the group. Table III shows these results and the similar ones for imitation-like stories.

Table III

cat.	D		I	
	B	W	B	W
1	15.7	9.8	3.8	6.5
2	6	5.2	2.1	4.1
3	1.3	.8	0	0
4	.7	2.5	(4.9	5.6)
5	0	1.8	(.8	2.2)
6	.3	1.9	(.5	2.5)
7	0	1.0	(1.8	2.2)
8	2	2.6	4.4	3.6
9	3.7	7	8.2	7.1
10	3	3.7	6.5	5.6
11	2	4.4	(4.7	5.7)
12	1	3.9	4.1	2.7
13	5.1	6.6	13	7.6

For every category within the D group the B stories are more dreamlike than the W stories. And for the majority of categories within the I group, the B stories are more imitation-like than the W stories.

We see, however, that there are five categories in the I columns of table III which contradict the overall trend. Part of the difficulty here is in the selection of the indices of imitation. A construction which is "less dreamlike" is not necessarily "more imitation-like," since there is the third possibility that a construction may reflect "conceptual thought" as defined in the next section. And as we stated on page 38, a reliance upon social reality is the surest indicator of imitation.

Nevertheless, our main interest is in the relative potential of black and white forms to assist constructional divergence. We may compare, then, the changes from D to I within the set of B stories, to the corresponding changes within the set of W stories, as shown in table IV.

Table IV

cat	B			ΔW				
	D	I	ΔB	D	I	W		
1	15.7	3.8	11.9	9.8	6.5	3.3	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
2	6	2.1	3.9	5.2	4.1	1.1	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
3	1.3	0	1.3	.8	0	.8	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
4	.7	4.9	4.2	2.5	5.6	3.1	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
5	0	.8	.8	1.8	2.2	.4	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
6	.3	.5	.2	1.9	2.5	.6	(ΔB	$< \Delta W$)
7	0	1.8	1.8	1.0	2.2	1.2	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
8	2	4.4	2.4	2.6	3.6	1.0	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
9	3.7	8.2	4.5	7	7.1	.1	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
10	3	6.5	3.5	3.7	5.6	1.9	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
11	2	4.7	2.7	4.4	5.7	1.3	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
12	1	4.1	3.1	(3.9	2.7)	-1.2	ΔB	$> \Delta W$
13	5.1	13	7.9	6.6	7.6	1	ΔB	$> \Delta W$

There are no categories within the B set which contradict the general trend from D to I. There is one such contradiction within the more balanced W set. More importantly, in every category but one the degree of change in the B set exceeds the degree of change in the W set. It appears that black forms assist the loss of equilibrium in thought, as we will now discuss.

III

The Creation of Racial Opposites

In the last section we observed that fantasy life is transformed under the impact of race. A visual racial property of a photographic image enables thought to reach divergent extremes. The transformations are defensive in content and beyond self-awareness. To understand such facts we need an account of symbolic process which conceptualizes an interplay of external forms with patterned ideas and a relationship between alternative modes of construction. Jean Piaget, in his study of cognitive growth, has developed such an account.

Central to Piaget's theory is the notion that mental activity in interaction with the world of objects is both structured and structuring. From the moment of birth, individual patterns of activity--called "schema"--may be evoked, reinforced, and elaborated by the forms of the external world. That is, a child may actively "accommodate" schema to these forms. Alternatively a child may modify, or structure, external forms according to his own activity. That is, a child may "assimilate" external forms to a schema. Finally, a child may both modify and adjust to external forms simultaneously. In this case assimilation and accommodation--the two functional techniques for the transformation of structures--are said to be in "equilibrium." This is the state characteristic of adaptive intelligence. An example from Piaget's Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood illustrates these processes at the level of sensory-motor activity.

As we have just reminded our readers, intelligence tends towards permanent equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation. For instance, in order to draw an objective towards him by means of a stick, the child must assimilate both stick and objective to the schema of prehension and that of movement through contact, and he must also accommodate these schemas to the objects, their length, distance, etc., in accordance with the causal order hand-stick-objective... Imitation (the primacy of accommodation over assimilation) will reproduce the motion made by the stick in reaching the objective, the movement of the hand thus being determined by those of the stick and the objective (which is by definition accommodation), without the hand actually affecting the objects (which would be assimilation). There is, however, a third possibility, that of assimilation per se. Let us assume, for instance, that the stick does not reach its objective and that the child consoles himself by hitting something else, or that he suddenly becomes interested in moving the stick for its own sake, or that when he has no stick he takes a piece of paper and applies the schema of the stick to it for fun... In such cases there is a kind of free assimilation, without accommodation to... the significance of objects.¹

We should note in this passage that in addition to the assimilation of external objects to the schemas of prehension and movement, these two schemas are themselves coordinated with one another. That is, they are mutually assimilated. Similarly, if the child's activity is to be intelligent and tend toward equilibrium, the accommodations to the stick and objective must be coordinated by an assimilatory process. As intelligent as such activity is, however, it does not deserve to be called "representative activity," since it operates only upon objects within immediate perception. Nevertheless, the techniques illustrated are responsible for the gradual unfolding of more complex cognitive processes out of the matrix of sensory-motor activity. Cognitive growth, from this point of view,

¹Jean Piaget, Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood, translated by G. Gattegno and F.M. Hodgson, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1962. Brackets() are mine, D.B.

is conceived as the continuous elaboration of prior structures. Development is not merely the successive emergence of de novo abilities. And it is not the consequence of neurological development alone or of mysterious transfers from social life alone.

With these few simple ideas in hand, Piaget explores an enormously complex and subtle cognitive landscape. For the purposes of this paper it is only necessary to discuss two aspects of cognitive development: the emergence of representation and the characteristics of the child's egocentric thought.

Representative activity begins when the child becomes able to evoke an absent object or model. At a particular stage, a child becomes capable of "deferred imitation," based on "interiorized accommodation." That is, he becomes able to imitate an external model, say a parent clapping his hands, for the first time after the model has disappeared from sight. Coordination of the schemas for extension of the fingers and arm movement, and accommodation of these to the hand clapping has occurred internally, in the form of suggestions of action, rather than actual action. This accommodated schema is a virtual combination of movements. It is a "draft," "summary," or "negative" of the model. It is also a potential image, since the model can now be evoked, either as image or in later action, by utilizing the accommodated schema in some way.

Such accommodated schemas constitute a system of "signifiers" for the child's thought. By virtue of their differentiation from and persistence beyond actual performance, they acquire a certain mobility. They are the basis of the image and deferred imitation. Furthermore, they may be combined and coordinated with other past

and present signifiers, and thereby acquire symbolic meaning. The schemas of coordination--really, assimilation--provide the signifiers with meaning, and are defined as the "signified." By the differentiation of signifier from signified, the child's world expands in space and time. This is the symbolic function.

Consider a child attempting to dance. A record is playing as the child watches an older sister doing a step, which he attempts to imitate by jumping up and down. A number of assimilations and accommodations are in progress. The child is accommodating auditory schemas to the sound, and visual and motor schemas to the movements of the model. These accommodated schemas are signifiers. They must be mutually assimilated, however, to be united in meaning, that is, to form the child's sensory-motor notion of the dance. This assimilatory activity constitutes the signified.

Now, if the older sister stops dancing and the child stops also, and we assume that the child is unable to continue in the absence of the model, we cannot attribute representative activity to the child. The child appears able to accommodate to the model and assimilate the model to his schemas of movement only when the model is actually present. In other words, the signifiers--the schemas of accommodation to the sound and sight--and the signified--the schemas of assimilation of these to the child's activity are not sufficiently differentiated. There is no permanent image of the object apart from the perception of the model.

Now, suppose that the child was only watching the older sister dance, and when she sits down, the child begins to jump up and down to the music. Such an action exhibits representative activity. This activity consists of a twofold system of accommodations and

assimilations, past and present, in a relationship with one another. The first system was described above and is now assumed to have proceeded interiorly, and persist in the form of an integrated system of potential images. The second system consists of the child's assimilation and accommodation of the present objects--the music and the child's body--to certain schemas of movement.

These two systems are related to one another in thought. The present objects (the music and the child's body) are related to the past objects (the sister and the music) by means of assimilation of the music and body to the previously accommodated schema. This assimilation of present to past endows the present objects with meaning as dance. The signified schema is the assimilatory intermediary between the two sets of signifiers. It should be clear that this arrangement would be impossible if the system of signifiers and signified were not somewhat mobile and independent of each other. Assimilation of the present objects to the schema of dance, and accommodation of this schema to the present objects could not happen if accommodation to the model were simultaneously required, since the model is now absent.

When the representative activity of the prelogical child (called egocentric representation) is characterized by the primacy of assimilation over accommodation, the activity is manifest as symbolic play; or, in more extreme assimilatory activity, as dreams. If our dancing child now sits at the dinner table and bounces a glass up and down, saying "sister-dance," he subordinates his interest in the objective properties of the glass to his interest in the absent model. He is playing. He is distorting the qualities of the glass and the table to evoke the model of the sister dancing. In contrast

to the situation described above, the model of the sister dancing is not evoked by an imitative reproduction of it but by means of a weakly similar intermediate object to which the qualities of the signified model are attributed. This is symbolic play. It depends upon the union of imaged signifiers (accommodated schemas) which evoke the absent model, with a system of meanings by which these are related to present objects, also used as signifiers. These present signifiers and the accommodated schema to which they are assimilated together form the symbol.

The symbolization of dreams, and of egocentric "preconceptual" thought in general, involve what are called "motivated symbols." Signifiers are a substitute for what is signified. Assimilation of present objects to the schemas of past models depends upon some imagined resemblance, since at this level representation requires the assistance of images. What distinguishes this imaged symbolization from conceptual signification is not the relative dominance of assimilation or accommodation, which are merely two techniques available to thought on all levels. Rather, egocentric and conceptual thought are distinguished by the nature of the relationship between assimilating and accommodating structures.

Let us return to the child's schema of dance. A child who can recognize other members of his family as dancing by virtue of the similarity of their movements to those of the older sister, has formed a preconcept of "dance." The stability of the class of "dancing objects" depends upon the image of the sister dancing, which is a "privileged signifier" for the signified preconcept. This preconceptual structure accommodates and assimilates those objects with rather specific perceptual qualities, perhaps a certain sound, or

a repeating movement. Without some resemblance to a particular aspect of the model, another type of rhythmical movement to music may not be assimilated to the schema "dance." The sister doing a different step may not be dancing.

True generality is, therefore, not achieved by the preconceptual structure. Similarly, true individuality of the elements of the class "dancing objects" is not achieved, since a dance is appreciated as such only insofar as it is similar to the privileged signifier. Insofar as it is different, it is not a dance.

A conceptual structure, on the other hand, would accommodate these different forms of dance equivalently and reversibly, with the assistance of verbal signs. Each object would be involved in dance only by virtue, say of the rhythmical coordination of body with music. Comparison of one type of dance with another would not be necessary to identify both as dances. The existence of a general concept of dance would serve to preserve the uniqueness and integrity of, say, the "Penguin" alone or in comparison with the "Fox Trot." It would also serve to define certain activities as "dance" or "not-dance," regardless of the participation of the subject.

Prior to the development of such concepts the child's thought remains centered on his own point of view. Accommodation is primarily of new models which are both interesting to the child and identical or analagous to his own schema of assimilation. By virtue of being centered on the child's point of view, thought at this level always involves the real or imagined participation of the child. It is image-bound. When a volume of water is poured from one container into a container of a different shape, the preconceptual child will assert that the amount of water has changed. Lacking an adequate

conservational structure, he is unable to accommodate to both images simultaneously. He is unable to preserve different points of view and transcend his stance of the moment. For this reason equilibrium is unstable. The child continually swings back and forth between imitative accommodation and assimilatory play, alternately taking the point of view of social reality and personal reality. Intelligent adaptation is a transient way station lying between these oscillations of the mind. Equilibrium acquires stability only with increasing degrees of accommodation to reality, and therefore only with the development of increasingly mobile assimilatory structures. In other words, stable equilibrium becomes possible as thought becomes socialized.

From this notion of symbolic process, we can see that the dreamlike and imitation-like swings of racial fantasy constitute a "symbolic regression" to a more egocentric state of mind than is seen in the nonracial fantasy. Our subject thinks less intelligently with racially mixed forms than with all white forms. To understand why this can happen, we must examine the projective test situation in terms of Piaget's theory, and reconsider the process of defensive fantasy.

The projective test situation demands the suspension of intelligence in favor of pretense. The subject must think about photographic figures as if they are real. Since the figures are motionless images with intrinsically ambiguous meanings (different subjects tell different stories), accommodation to them contributes almost nothing to the story line. They are largely assimilated to previous signifiers which, in turn, have been assimilated to even earlier ones, and so on. Nevertheless, the assimilation of the figures to

human signifiers suggests a minimal accommodation to the properties of the figures on the card. Our subject did not tell stories about animals, plants, or rocks. His stories were built on past assimilations and accommodations of people, for which the present forms are "motivated" symbols by virtue of imagined similarity to them. The subject can then regard his story as being at least plausible in terms of his knowledge about people.

The stories cannot, however, become too plausible, and the subject must preserve a degree of pretense. On the one hand, he must avoid the experience of merely recounting memories of past events. On the other, he must avoid reducing his stories to simple descriptions of the cards. This requires the maintenance of a dual sense of difference. Initially, the difference is between the figures on the cards and the people who he knows. As thought proceeds, it becomes the difference between the assembled signifiers of his story and both of the initially distinct sets. This enables the subject to tell a story which is both real and make-believe. His extreme distortions become tolerable, and egocentric thought, centered on the subject's point of view, is free to proceed.

In this situation the subject creates stories lying between two extremes, corresponding to two alternative modes of construction and reflecting the relative dominance of assimilation or accommodation.

When assimilation is dominant, a dreamlike story is created. Bits and pieces of past experience are gathered together with disregard for context. The properties of the signifiers are subordinated to the meaning (the signified) the subject has in mind. In story number two, for instance, what is important is the girl's ex-

perience of a "tough time." The signifiers for the "tough time" run the gamut from an impossible test and a friend's problems to the death of her mother.

Despite the resultant incongruities, belief is preserved by the sense of important meaning and closeness to the subject's personal reality. The subject runs the risk, however, of the meaning becoming identical with the objects of the signified schema, the "privileged" signifiers. In story two the vague reference to "something she's thought about their relationship" is followed by a hasty retreat. Such an idea can be explicitly stated in story nine, and tolerated there since the basis of belief depends less upon the importance of meaning in that story. What rescues him in story two is an assimilatory spree, which reestablishes the uniqueness of his story and sustains artificiality. The confirmation of pretense relies upon the difference between the signified objects and the forms on the cards. This difference is used by the subject to unlock assimilation, and restore the difference between the characters of his story and the signified objects. The difference acquires meaning. Hence, in this type of story the cards can be used for their meaning value only if the subject remains anchored in his latent awareness of their formal properties.

At the other extreme is the imitation-like story created under the dominance of accommodation. The context of preexistent signifiers is preserved and well organized in accordance with social reality. Here it is not so much a question of selecting scattered details to fit a signified schema, but of selecting a schema of signification which may be embodied in social context. Such a story is believable because it relies so heavily on previous accommodations to social

reality.

At the same time, such reliance on accommodation continually threatens belief, since the difference between the TAT forms and the characters of his story is ever apparent. In story nine, for instance, the subject is always explaining himself. The white guy has money because "he's got rather fancy clothes on." He fears harm because of "crime and that sort of thing that he reads about all the time." The assertion of "enlightened racial views" requires an apology. Accommodation continually highlights the subject's awareness of his own creative acts, and, therefore, the personal source of his meanings. His explanations resocialize his thought by capitalizing on context and minimizing the difference between the cards and previously accommodated social reality. Hence, in this type of story the subject can use the pictures for their value as social forms, only by maintaining a latent awareness of the similarity between the photographic images and real people.

When assimilation is dominant, pretense threatens to be overwhelmed by belief. But when accommodation reigns, belief threatens to be overwhelmed by pretense. Both problems are solved by the use of formal context. Both solutions make use of human similarity and perceptual difference.

The creation of one or the other types of stories is a reflection of the concerns of the subject. To understand the nature of the alternative, we must redefine notions of conflict and defense in terms of symbolic process.

Conflicting ideas can be defined as those which lead to incompatible ends. Our subject, like everyone else, can imagine himself in relation to others. He has had this ability since the beginnings

of representative activity, and it emerged gradually from the sensory-motor object relations of infancy. Over the years of childhood, structured notions of gratifying relations to objects gradually unfold. These are "wishes." In addition, there is the structured elaboration, under the impact of interpersonal life, of various notions of loss. These are "fears." Contradiction and difficulty arise out of the assimilation of these effectively important schemas with one another.

The two simplest cases involve the assimilation of two conflicting wishes and the assimilation of a wish and a fear. In the first case, the imagined fulfillment of one wish creates a self-object situation which is different from the objective of the other wish. Similarly, in the second case assimilation of the object to either schema precludes assimilation to the other. In both cases, the conflict is only experienced when the objective properties of the object situation are taken into account. The conflict, then reduces to that between personal reality and perceived social actuality, between the assimilation of objects and the accommodations such objects demand. Loss only becomes a possibility when social reality is taken into account. When it is not important, as in dreams, wishes are fulfilled.

Psychoanalysis has studied the persistence of these conflicts throughout life. It has discovered that effectively significant structures of assimilation are forever nourished by instinctual drive, "the body's demand on the mind for work," yet forever deprived (at the preconceptual level) of true equilibrium with social forms. Furthermore, with each experience of conflict, new layers of structured signifiers are created, always built upon the founda-

tions of previous structures. These fantasies serve a defensive function. From our point of view, they resolve or mediate the discontinuity between personal and social reality. Their creation requires symbolic thought.

As always, there are two techniques available to the mind for the achievement of its defensive goal, and we may differentiate between defensive accommodation and defensive assimilation. Defensive accommodation entails the modification of all or part of an assimilatory schema (the imagined self-object-relationship) according to the pattern of an external relationship. By this technique, a separation becomes a distinction. An oversimplified example might be the late oedipal child's accommodation to the social situation of his family. The child modifies his behavior primarily on the model of one adult figure, under the impact of separation from another. In general, defensive accommodation replaces a difficult separation by a tolerable difference as the person becomes a participant in social structure.

This technique requires the subordination of distorting personalized meanings to rigid and conventional socialized meanings. For it to be achieved at all, however, the accommodated signifiers must be both similar to the signified objects, and yet different enough and general enough to mask the personalized meanings which would reawaken old conflict. It must be possible to detach meanings based on imaged properties from meanings based on secret schemas of assimilation. This is achieved by conscious utilization of formal differences, with an unconscious use of similarity. It amounts to a psychic cleavage of form and meaning. Schemas are accommodated to substitute objects and not to the original signifiers of conflict.

In defensive assimilation, these relationships are reversed. The properties and context of forms are disrupted in favor of assimilation to affectively important meanings. Social reality is subordinated to personal reality. Conventionally appropriate meanings are ignored in deference to the important individualized meanings. Objects are united with one another. They are used for their potential meaning, on the basis of imagined similarity to signified objects. At the same time, minimal accommodation to their objective properties preserves the underlying sense of difference from the objects of the assimilatory schema. Imagined ends, therefore, are no longer incompatible, since the schemas are applied to substitute objects. For instance, a child can take liberties with his dolls that he could hardly imagine taking with his family. But when the distinction between dolls and family breaks down, play is interrupted. Again, in defensive assimilation the form is detached from its socialized meanings, which remain in the background, holding form constant. Defensive assimilation gives signification to ideas of union, and it mediates personal and social reality.

In the pairs of stories discussed in the previous section, there is a movement toward one or the other of the defensive extremes. The transformation from story nine to story two is essentially a defensive assimilation. It establishes a union, it disrupts context, and it utilizes the black figure primarily as a formless person. The transformation from story three to story eight is a defensive accommodation. It preserves context, it utilizes the black figure primarily as a personless form, and it mitigates loss by restructuring separation. The imaged notion of a racial dichotomy has the peculiar potential to aid defense in either of its goals.

Whether the problems concerns a wish or a fear, black forms make the solution easier.

The cost is the violation of the black person's humanity. He becomes either the Human Being who is not black, or the black animate form who is not human. One transformation leads to fantasies of blacks as loving, genuine, beautiful, and God-like; the other to fantasies of blacks as animals, attackers, filth, and property. If interracial encounters seem so often to be unreasonably tense or unreasonably relaxed, at the preconceptual level they quite literally disrupt equilibrium. For defensive purposes, whites find blacks good to think with.

This derives from the common requirements of defensive assimilation and defensive accommodation, and the ability of racial forms to fulfill these requirements maximally. In both techniques of defense, personal and social reality must be signified. Since the black person is first of all a person, he may substitute for objects of any assimilatory schema of persons. He is a mobile symbolic vehicle. By virtue of a single imaged property, however, the black person as a signifier is always potentially different from signified objects.

It will be remembered that defensive assimilation requires a minimal degree of accommodation to formal difference for the preservation (in the TAT) of pretense. In a pinch, the subject can accommodate to a single visual property (blackness) and the sense of difference can easily be reinstated. The constancy of the external formal difference allows the maximal assimilation to that form to personal structures without reawakening conflict.

Defensive accommodation, on the other hand, requires a minimal

degree of assimilation, on the basis of similarity, to preserve belief. The accommodated difference can never become pure image, since it would then lose its general socialized meaning upon which belief depends. It must become a difference in groups of people. That is, the properties of the image-bound group must be assimilated to at least one human signified, which is accommodated to all members of the group. This is defensive accommodation at its maximum. It results in the notion that all blacks are different from whites in a particular respect.

Defensive assimilation, carried to its maximum, results in the notion that a black can be like a white in all respects but one. Together these two notions--that there is a single difference which is defined--amount to a preconcept of racial opposition. By preserving this preconcept the mind can swing in either direction without experiencing itself as regressing symbolically and without experiencing intolerable conflict between personal and social reality.

We may formulate a hypothesis. When the mind assimilates a perceptual group difference to structures of conflict, the conflict will be reduced and thought will be both less intelligent and more centered. Assimilation to a structure of union is defensive assimilation. Assimilation to a structure of separation is defensive accommodation. From a perceptual group difference the notion of racial opposition will emerge.

Appendix

Pictures and Stories

Picture one: An old white man is sitting at a desk. He is holding a pipe and his tie is loosened.

Story one: He's a professor because uh, you can tell from his office. It's not a very uh classy sort of an office. He's not a businessman at all. He's at ease, just uh sort of late in the day after work. He's settling back and taking in what went on during the day. uh I guess, you know, some sort of reflection before taking off for home. He's apparently not had a very unusual day. He's not overjoyed or distraught at anything. uh He's calm and ready to ready to end the day. Ready to go.

D.B.: What kind of things is he reflecting on?

S: I think probably more about how he's done. How in his class or uh in his class, you know, whether he was effective rather than worrying about a particular student or, I think a problem of that nature. It's sort of an evaluation of his own performance during the day rather than uh someone else's problem. uh A problem a student may be having or a colleague...It's just a little bit of judgment at the end of the day, as to how actually he did, how his particular courses are getting along, if he's where he should be, if uh he's, if the students are are getting what he things they should be getting. If not, you know, what in him is the cause of it and what will he be able to do to to remedy it, rather than you know their problem. His own sort of. Did I answer that?

D.B.: Yes, and the outcome?

S: (smiles) The outcome will be a sigh, putting on his coat,

straightening out the desk. You know, I mean just leaving the office sort of action and heading home.

Story and Picture two: See page 22.

Story and Picture three: See page 28.

Picture number four: A young white man is lying face down on the grass with his eyes closed. An old white man in a suit is crouched slightly toward him, several feet away.

Story number four: (finger tapping) This man, the old man, has um come up from far away and can't see very well (laughs). He's uh sort of nearsighted and he being sort of always conscious of crime and and this sort of thing that weren't so rampant in the good old days (when) they didn't think things he's unaccustomed to, he he's wants to make sure that this guy, who's asleep, is actually asleep and ok rather than um hurt in any way, or uh rather than overdosed. So he's approaching the guy and but carefully, so that if the guy's asleep he's not going to disturb him, and He'll realize, when he gets close enough to see him, you know, perceiving the guy's breathing, or whatever he he's looking for as a sign of life. Then, he'll sort of quietly walk on away.

D.B.: And the guy on the ground?

S: uh, He's just asleep. In the park.

Picture five: A young black man is sitting in a chair with a cigarette in one hand and an opened letter and envelope dangling from the other. There is a desk, a wastebasket, some books, and a poster.

Story five: This guy's in a familiar setting. He's in, he's been in, say, his college room and he studied. uh and Just right now he's after studying for a while. He's come across something

that is worth thinking about, is worth doing more than just learning, you know. It set him off on a tangent and he's just sort of, at the moment pondering whatever he's just run across in his book and uh, will fairly soon go on with the studying. So, it's nothing very, again, nothing very shocking to him, or it's just something, something that has struck an interest in him and um, he'll soon return to studying.

D.B.: What might it be?

S; uh...I think it's something in, whatever the subject, that relates much more closely to his own experience than the rest of the subject matter had. If it's uh is a novel or uh any type of literature, he has come across a character who's experienced a feeling that he's very recently had or is in a situation very similar to something he's had. um In a more, if it's a more scientific subject, he's it's it's a fact or an interpretation of the world or um some particular aspect of the world that he recognizes that he's sort of hand intuitively on his own and never seen really written and uh articulated very well. It's just It's something that he sort of intuitively agrees with and he's thinking through this. It's sort of a good experience to run across a thing like that. He's just thinking about about uh the relation between him and the book. It's closer than it was. He's finding more meaning in it than just an object for study.

Picture six: A young white woman is leaning against a pillar in front of a brick building. It is night.

Story six: (Rubs hand through hair). This girl's in a has come to a place that she's not familiar with. I'll say she's, I'll say she's run away from home just because it's a very institutional

sort of a building uh and she looks out of place in it. She's got a look on her face that's...lonely and sad and sort of reflective. She's come to this place uh without a direction, without knowing actually where she was coming, just heading somewhere, and has gotten here as an as an end almost or or now sees it as an end and is looking for somewhere to go on, somewhere to, well, looking for whether to go...to go back or to continue uh in whatever travel, well in her travels. She's, It's sort of the first time she's uh questioned her decision to leave her home. It's the first time she's felt badly and begun to wonder uh more about where she's going than where she's coming from. uh I think she'll probably go on rather than come back, rather than return to her home. It's not, it she's just beginning her trip. She's not uh very much beaten down by traveling life and she she's wondering where to go, pausing more than ending it, anything like that.

Picture seven: A young white man is standing next to an old black woman. He is turned toward her, while she is facing away from him. There is a table with a toaster.

Story seven: There's a young a black kid, child, uh and, pictured here are his mother and his uh this sort of old white kid that comes and uh takes him out. He and a group of four or five other kids uh they go do crafts, or the park, or YMCA, things like that. In other words, it's an older kid working with the younger kid. uh The younger kid has in his home caused a disturbance. He he's caused some trouble and uh while his white friend is there and while his mother is there together and its just beginning. The white guy feels very very uncomfortable, not knowing his role. He's uh he's there he's there and has been almost a father figure for the kid but now he's

in the home where the mother's been very definitely in control and he feels almost as if the kid might be testing him, uh and so uh He's going to wait and let the mother take the lead. He's not about to discipline the kid in his own home, not about to say anything. uh The mother's yeah, is used to the kid making trouble. uh She knows what he's doing and will handle it as soon as he gets out of hand. She 's just waiting, uh, but not nearly as uncomfortable as the other guy, as the guy. They're both looking at him.

D.B.: And the outcome?

S: (sits forward) The outcome is that the mother will uh, very soon step in, do what is necessary for that particular child. She will know what what the kid is up to, you know. If he's beating up on his little brother, she'll know how to stop it and will do so, uh, much to the white kid's great relief.

Picture and story eight: See page 29. (Paired with three).

Picture and story nine: See page 21. (paired with two).

Picture ten: An old black man in shirt and tie is sitting on the edge of a chair. He is slightly bent and has a soda in his hand. Behind him is a vending machine. (Paired with one).

Story ten: This is a guy uh taking a break from his work, not at the end of the day, but in the middle of the day, uh say mid-morning, and has a specific problem on his mind, uh that's bothering him pretty seriously, not like the professor in the first picture who's just evaluating his whole day. This guy's got a particular thing on his mind that's troubling him. uh Again I'll say he's a professor, and in this instance it's a class that just immediately preceded him coming out and taking his break. uh It's a small class and it it's just upset him very much since he knows the students on

an individual basis and can judge, therefore, how much work they're doing and the commitment they have to the course. that that They don't have the commitment he wants and uh when that's so it's useless to try and be a good teacher because, you know, even if you are a good teacher they're not going to benefit that much from it unless they are are good students and he's finding that the students are not in this particular class giving what he wants, and uh so that uh He'll come out of it with a resolve to uh improve his own teaching hoping that it will inspire the uh the uh students, rather than to sort of harangue them about you got to start reading the books. He will uh come out of it hoping to be able to inspire them to get more into that course. That's all.

Picture eleven: A young white man is sitting in a chair and holding a telephone receiver several inches off its base. His foot is on a book, and there are bookshelves behind him. (Paired with five).

Story eleven: This guy is uh has spent the last couple hours trying to study or trying to read, uh but he's got a personal problem on his mind, I mean a uh a problem about his relationship with a girl, and uh it's just really thwarting every effort he tries, you know, to study that he makes. He can't can't concentrate but he's been trying because, one, he just doesn't want to uh let the girl get him down right now, and two he he's feels that he should be studying this stuff for the next day's class. uh But finally with uh, he's sort of dropped his book uh here and has decided to go ahead and call the girl to work out what it is, what the problem is, and uh, by doing so sort of clear his head, so he can go on and study. He will, well uh, depending on the phone call. It it turns out to

be a bad call he might have to uh go out uh see the person, or or go out on his own, sort of walk around, that sort of thing. uh If things work out the way he hopes, then he'll be able to just settle back and do that studying that he wasn't able to do before. (laughs) I can't say which it would be, uh.

Picture twelve: A young white man with closed eyes is lying on his back on a couch. An old black man in a suit is standing over him with one arm outstretched. (Paired with four).

Story twelve: (long pause) Two uh colleagues, two friends, two teachers, that know each other uh and are friends. uh The one lying down has uh well he's resting. He's not asleep, but he's just resting after delivering a lecture and he's tired of standing up (laughs). The other comes in, that has come in, and uh sort of feeling pretty good uh for whatever reason, his own reason, either he had a good class or life looked good in the morning or whatever, and comes in, sort of going to slap the guy on the back, uh yeah uh, just getting ready for a greeting here. He's just walked in and they are good friends and he's just gonna sort of to refresh the guy that's lying down. It's just a very happy scene. Both will go on to uh finish the day in good spirits.

Picture thirteen: A young black woman is sitting on the steps in front of a brick building. It is night. (Paired with six).

Story thirteen: It's a woman uh outside of a building in which she works, waiting for a ride, uh to be picked up by uh. She's married uh, but her husband's not picking her up. It's a a friend of, a female type friend of hers, who's also married. uh And both are sort of upset (looks away from the picture) because their husbands are good friends and are always going out together without

uh uh paying a whole lot of attention to to the wives, the wives feel. And so they they're together fairly often in this situation where the husbands are are out. un and so She's she's waiting and she'll get picked up and they'll exchange, you know, hellos and little gossips and such things and then uh possibly get together uh for a for a little while before each goes home to uh, to take care of the kids. They both have very young children. They can't, they would like to be able to spend the evening and the night together, doing something like the husbands can, but they have to care for the kids, and they don't like it. She's very sad, so she'll go and commiserate for a little while with her friend. You know.

Picture fourteen: A young white man is standing several feet from an old white woman, who is sitting in a chair. He is facing her, while she is looking into the distance. There is a newspaper on the table beside her. (Paired with seven).

Story fourteen: A son and his mother. uh The son uptight over a decision he wants to make, concerning his future that's very important to him, and that his mother disapproves of. uh He's pretty much decided that he wants to uh drop out of law school and she has lived most of her life with a very distinguished lawyer and can't understand her son's wishes to uh not continue and be a lawyer himself, because they're new to him, or uh they're newly expressed by him. Although it means a great deal to him and has been sort of growing in his mind for a while, he never uh has never expressed much of it to her because they're simply not very close. uh If he was trying to decide whether to drop out of law school or not his mother would not be one of the first people he's turn to to talk about it with. And so she doesn't uh doesn't approve at all and is

upset that he's going to go ahead and do it. upset that he uh uh must incur his mother's disapproval uh which means. It doesn't mean anything like uh they're going to disown him or anything of that nature. It's not a very violent scene at all. uh They're both just upset with each other uh each other's attitude. He will go ahead and do it uh. She won't approve, and it'll just be one more strain or uh one more. They'll just be standing another foot apart. They just, just one more incident serving to uh undo any closeness they've had uh which means that he'll be even pushed more before he'll tell her anything in the future...But he'll go ahead and do it.

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