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
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George Bancroft





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Main body of the page containing faint, illegible text.











*15/11/1*

# THREE TREATISES

THE FIRST  
CONCERNING ART

THE SECOND  
CONCERNING MUSIC  
PAINTING AND POETRY

THE THIRD  
CONCERNING HAPPINESS

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BY JAMES HARRIS ESQ.

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THE FOURTH EDITION  
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
1783?



## Advertisement to the Reader.

*IN the Treatises here published, there is the following Connection. The first treats of Art in its most comprehensive Idea, when considered as a Genus to many subordinate Species. The second considers three of these subordinate Species, whose Beauty and Elegance are well known to all. The last treats of that Art, which respects the Conduct of Human Life, and which may justly be valued, as of all Arts the most important, if it can truly lead us to the End proposed.*





TREATISE THE FIRST

A DIALOGVE  
CONCERNING ART

TO THE RIGHT HONOVABLE  
THE EARL OF SHAFTESBVRY

B

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

PHILOSOPHY 101

CONCERNING ART  
A DIALOGVE

TO THE RIGHT HONOVABLE  
THE EARL OF SHAFTESBVRY

MY LORD,

**T**HE following is a Conversation in its kind somewhat uncommon, and for this reason I have remembered it more minutely than I could imagine. Should the same Peculiarity prove a Reason to amuse your Lordship, I shall think myself well rewarded in the Labour of reciting. If not, you are candid enough to accept of the Intention, and to think there is some Merit even in the Sincerity of my Endeavours. To make no longer Preface, the Fact was as follows.

A FRIEND from a distant Country having by chance made me a Visit, we were tempted by the Serenity of a chearful Morning in the Spring, to walk from *Salisbury* to see Lord *Pembroke's* at *Wilton*. The Beauties of Gardening, Architecture, Painting, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat, were the Subject of great Entertainment to my Friend : Nor was I, for my own part, less delighted than he was, to find that our Walk had so well answered his Expectations. We had given a large Scope to our Curiosity, when we left the Seat, and leisurely began our return towards home.

AND here, my Lord, in passing over a few pleasant Fields, commenced the Conversation which I am to tell you, and which fell at first, as was natural, on the many curious Works, which had afforded us both so elegant an Amusement. This led us insensibly to discoursing upon ART, for we both agreed, that whatever we had been admiring of Fair and Beautiful, could all be referred

referred to no other Cause. And here, I well remember, I called upon my Friend to give me his Opinion upon the meaning of the word ART: A Word it was (I told him) in the Mouth of every one; but that nevertheless, as to its precise and definite Idea, this might still be a Secret; that so it was in fact with a thousand Words beside, all no less common, and equally familiar, and yet all of them equally vague and undetermined. To this he answered, That as to the precise and definite Idea of Art, it was a Question of some Difficulty, and not so soon to be resolved; that, however, he could not conceive a more likely Method of coming to know it, than by considering those several Particulars, to each of which we gave the Name. It is hardly probable, said he, that Music, Painting, Medicine, Poetry, Agriculture, and so many more, should be *all called by one common Name, if there was not something in each, which was common to all.* It should seem so, replied I.

What then, said he, shall we pronounce this to be? At this, I remember, I was

under some sort of Hesitation. Have Courage, cried my Friend, perhaps the Case is not so desperate. Let me ask you—Is Medicine the Cause of any thing? Yes surely, said I, of Health. And Agriculture, of what? Of the plentiful Growth of Grain. And Poetry, of what? Of Plays and Satires, and Odes, and the like.

And is not the same true, said he, of Music, of Statuary, of Architecture, and, in short, of every Art whatever? I confess, said I, it seems so. Suppose then, said he, we should say, *It was common to every Art to be a Cause*—Should we err? I replied, I thought not. Let this then, said he, be remembered, that *all Art is Cause*.

I promised him it should.

BUT how then, continued he, if *all Art be Cause*, is it also true, that *all Cause is Art*? At this again I could not help hesitating. You have heard, said he, without doubt, of that Painter famed in Story, who being to paint the Foam of a Horse, and not succeeding to his Mind, threw

threw at the Picture in Resentment a Sponge bedaubed with colours, and produced a Foam the most natural imaginable. Now, what say you to this Fact? Shall we pronounce Art to have been the Cause?

By no means, said I. What, said he, if instead of *Chance*, his Hand had been guided by mere *Compulsion*, himself dissenting and averse to the Violence? Even here, replied I, nothing could have been referred to his Art. But what, continued he, if instead of a *casual Throw*, or *involuntary Compulsion*, he had *willingly and designedly* directed his Pencil, and so produced that Foam, which Story says he failed in?—Would not Art *here* have been the Cause? I replied, in this case, I thought it would. It should seem then, said he, that *Art* implies not only *Cause*, but the additional Requisite of *Intention, Reason, Volition, and Consciousness*; so that *not every Cause is Art*, but only *voluntary or intentional Cause*. So, said I, it appears.



AND shall we then, added he, pronounce every intentional Cause to be Art? I see no reason, said I, why not. Consider, said he; Hunger this Morning prompted you to eat. You were then the *Cause*, and that too the *intentional Cause*, of consuming certain Food: And yet will you refer this Consumption to Art? Did you chew by Art? Did you swallow by Art?

No certainly, said I. So by opening your Eyes, said he, you are the *intentional Cause* of Seeing, and by stretching your Hand, the *intentional Cause* of Feeling; and yet will you affirm, that *these Things proceed from Art*? I should be wrong, said I, if I did: For what *Art* can there be *in doing, what every one is able to do by mere Will, and a sort of uninstructed Instinct*? You say right, replied he, and the reason is manifest: Were it otherwise, we should make all Mankind universal Artists in every single Action of their Lives. And what can be a greater Absurdity than this? I confessed that the Absurdity appeared

peared to be evident. But if nothing then, continued he, which we do by *Compulsion*, or without intending it, be *Art*; and not even what we do *intentionally*, if it proceed from mere Will and *uninstructed* Instinct; what is it we have left remaining, where *Art* may be found conversant? Or can it indeed possibly be in any thing else, than in that which we do by *Use, Practice, Experience* and the like, all which are born with no one, but are all acquired afterward by advances unperceived. I can think, said I, of nothing else. Let therefore the Words *Habit* and *Habitual*, said he, represent this Requisite, and let us say, that *Art* is not only a *Cause*, but an *intentional Cause*; and not only an *intentional Cause*, but an *intentional Cause founded in Habit*, or, in other Words, an *habitual Cause*. You appear, said I, to argue rightly.

BUT if *Art*, said he, be what we have now asserted, something *learnt and acquired*; if it be also a thing *intentional*

or *voluntary*, and not governed either by *Chance* or blind *Necessity*—If this, I say, be the Case, then mark the Consequences.

And what, said I, are they? The first, said he, is, that *no Events*, in what we call *the natural World*, must be referred to *Art*; such as Tides, Winds, Vegetation, Gravitation, Attraction, and the like. For these all happen by stated Laws; by a curious *Necessity*, which is not to be withstood, and where the *nearer and immediate Causes* appear to be *wholly unconscious*. I confess, said I, it seems so. In the next place, continued he, we must exclude all those admired *Works* of the *Animal World*, which, for their Beauty and Order, we *metaphorically* call *artificial*. The Spider's Web, the Bee's Comb, the Beaver's House, and the Swallow's Nest, must all be referred to another Source—For who can say, these ever *learnt* to be thus ingenious? or, that they were *ignorant by Nature*, and *knowing only by Education*? None, surely, replied I. But we have still, said he, a higher Consideration. And what, said I,

is that? It is, answered he, this——  
 Not even that *Divine Power*, which gave  
 Form to all things, *then acted by Art*, when  
 it gave that Form. For how, continued  
 he, can that Intelligence, which has *all  
 Perfection ever in Energy*, be supposed to  
 have any Power, *not original to its Nature?*  
 How can it ever have any thing to *learn*,  
 when it *knows all from the Beginning*; or,  
 being *perfect and complete*, admit of what  
 is *additional and secondary*? I should  
 think, said I, it were impossible. If so,  
 said he, then Art can never be numbered  
 among its Attributes: For *all Art* is some-  
 thing *learnt*, something *secondary and ac-  
 quired*, and *never original* to any Being,  
 which possesses it. So the Fact, said I,  
 has been established.

IF this therefore, continued he, be true;  
 if Art belong not either to the Divine  
 Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate  
 Nature,——to what Nature shall we say it  
 does belong? I know not, said I, unless  
 it be to the *Human*. You are right, said  
 he;

he; for every Nature else you perceive is either *too excellent* to want it, or *too base* to be capable of it. Beside, except the Human, what other Nature is there left? Or where else can we find any of the Arts already instanced, or indeed whatever others we may now fancy to enumerate? Who are Statuaries, but Men? Who Pilots, who Musicians? This seems, replied I, to be the Fact.

LET us then, continued he, say, not only that *Art* is a *Cause*, but that it is *Man becoming a Cause*; and not only Man, but *Man intending to do what is going to be done*, and *doing it also by Habit*; so that its whole Idea, as far as we have hitherto conceived it, is——*Man becoming a Cause, Intentional and Habitual*. I confess, said I, it has appeared so.

AND thus, said he, have you had exhibited to you a Sketch of Art. You must remember however, it is but a Sketch: there is still something wanting to make it a  
finished

finished Piece. I begged to know what this was. In order to that, replied he, I cannot do better, than remind you of a Passage in your admired *Horace*. It is concerning *Alfenus*; who (if you remember) he tells us, though his Tools were laid aside, and his Shop shut up, was still an Artist as much as ever.—

— *Alfenus vafer omni*

*Abjecto instrumento Artis clausâq. taberna,  
Sutor erat*——

I remember, said I, the Passage, but to what purpose is it quoted? Only, replied he, to shew you, that I should not be without Precedent, were I to affirm it not absolutely necessary to the being of Art, that it should be Man *actually becoming* a Cause; but that it was enough, if he had the *Power* or *Capacity* of so becoming. Why then, said I, did you not settle it so at first? Because, replied he, *Faculties, Powers, Capacities*, (call them as you will) are in themselves, abstract from Action, but *obscure and hidden* things. On the contrary *Energies and Operations* lie open to the Senses, and cannot

cannot but be observed, even whether we will or no. And hence therefore, when first we treated of Art, we chose to treat of it, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured somewhat farther. Repeat then, said I, if you please, the Alteration, which you have made. At first, answered he, we reasoned upon Art, as if it was only Man *actually becoming* a Cause intentional and habitual. Now we say it is a *Power* in Man of becoming such Cause; and that, *though he be not actually in the Exercise of such a Power.* I told him, his Amendment appeared to be just.

THERE is too another Alteration, added he, which, for the sake of Accuracy, is equally wanting; and that is with respect to the Epithet, *Intentional or Voluntary.* And what, said I, is that? We have agreed it, replied he, to be necessary; that all *Art* should be under the Guidance of *Intention* or *Volition*, so that no Man acting by *Compulsion*, or by *Chance*, should be called  
an

an *Artist*. We have. Now tho' this, said he, be true, yet it is not sufficient. We must *limit* this Intention or Vo'ition to a *peculiar Kind*. For were every little Fancy, which we may work up into Habit, a sufficient Foundation to constitute an Art, we should make Art one of the lowest and most despicable of things. The meanest Trick of a common Juggler might, in such case, entitle a man to the Character of an Artist. I confessed, that without some Limitation, this might be the Consequence. But how limit Intentions to a Kind or Species? What think you, replied he, if we were to do it by the *Number* and *Dignity of the Precepts*, which go to the directing of our Intentions? You must explain, said I, for your Meaning is obscure. Are there not Precepts, replied he, in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sowing? Are there not Precepts in Architecture, about Orders and Proportions? Are there not the same in Medicine, in Navigation, and the rest? There are. And what is your Opinion of these several



several Precepts? Are they *arbitrary and capricious*; or *rational and steady*? Are they the *Inventions of a Day*; or *well-approved by long Experience*? I told him, I should consider them for the most part as rational, steady, and well-approved by long Experience. And what, continued he, shall we say to their *Number*? Are they few? Or are they not rather so *numerous*, that in every particular Art, scarce any comprehend them all, but the several Artists themselves; and they only by length of time, with due Attendance and Application? I replied, it seemed so.

Suppose then We were to pronounce, that *to every Art there was a System of such various and well-approved Precepts*: Should we err? No certainly. And suppose we should say, that the *Intention of every Artist*, in his several Art, *was directed by such a System*: Would you allow this?

Surely. And will not *this limiting of Intentions* to such only, as are so directed, sufficiently distinguish Art from any thing else which may resemble it?—In other words,

words, Is it likely, under this Distinction, to be confounded with other Habits of a trifling, capricious and inferior Kind?

I replied, I thought not.

LET us then see, said he, and collect all that we have said, together. We have already agreed, that the *Power of acting* after a certain manner is sufficient to constitute Art, without the *actually operating* agreeably to that Power. And We have now farther held the *Intentions* of every Artift to be directed by a *System of various and well-approved Precepts*. Besides all this, we settled it before, that *all Art was founded in Habit*; and was *peculiar to Man*; and was seen by becoming *the Cause of some Effect*. It should seem then, that the whole Idea of ART was this—AN HABITUAL POWER IN MAN OF BECOMING THE CAUSE OF SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS.

I replied, That his Account appeared to be probable and just.

§ 2. AND now then, continued he, as we have gone thus far, and have settled between us what we believe Art to be; shall we go a little farther, or is your Patience at an end?

Oh! no, replied I, not if any thing be left. We have walked so leisurely, that much remains of our Way; and I can think of no Method, how we may better amuse ourselves.

My Friend upon this proceeded with saying, that if *Art* were a *Cause*, (as we had agreed it was) it must be the *Cause of something*. Allow it, said I. And if it be the *Cause of something*, it must have a *Subject to operate on*. For every Agent has need of some Patient; the Smith of his Iron, the Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship.

I answered, it was true. If then, said he, the Subjects of particular Arts be thus evident: What Idea shall we form of that *universal Subject, which is common to all Art?* At this Question, it must be confessed, I was a little embarrassed.

THIS

THIS induced him to ask me, How many sorts of Subjects I allowed of? Here I could not help hesitating again. There is nothing, continued he, so difficult in the Question. You must needs perceive, that *all Natures* whatever can be but either *contingent* or *necessary*. This may be, replied I; but even yet I do not comprehend you. Not comprehend me! said he; then answer me a Question: Can you conceive any *Medium* between *Motion* and *No-Motion*, between *Change* and *No-Change*?

I replied, I could not. If not, can you conceive any thing *in the whole Order of Being*, which must not be either *liable* to these, or *not liable*? Nothing.

Call those things therefore, said he, which are *liable to Change and Motion, contingent Natures*; and those which are *not liable, necessary Natures*: And thus you have a *Division, in which all things are included*. We have so, said I.

IN which therefore, said he, of *these Natures* shall we seek for this *common Subject* of Art? To this, I told him, I was unable to answer. Reflect, said he, a little. We have found *Art* to be a *Cause*.

We have. And is it not *essential* to every *Cause* to operate? or can it be a *Cause*, and be the *Cause* of nothing? Impossible.

Wherever therefore there is *Cause*, there is necessarily implied some *Operation*.

There is. And can there possibly be *Operation*, without *Motion* and *Change*?

There cannot. But *Change* and *Motion* must needs be *incompatible* with what is *necessary* and *immutable*. They must. So therefore is *Cause*. It must.

And so therefore *Art*. It must.

Truth therefore, said he, and Knowledge; Principles and Demonstrations; the general and intellectual Effences of Things; in short, *the whole immutable and necessary Nature* is no part of it reducible to a *Subject* of Art. It seems so, said I.

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IF therefore Art, said he, have nothing to do with the *steady, abstract, and necessary Nature*, it can have only to do with the *transient, the particular, and contingent one*. It is true, said I; for there is no other left. And shall we then say, replied he, it has to do with *all contingent Natures* existing in the Universe?

For aught, replied I, which to me appears contrary. What think you, said he, of those *Contingents of higher Order*? such as the grand Planetary System; the Succession of the Seasons; the regular and uniform Course of all superior Natures in the Universe? Has Art any Ability to intermeddle here? No certainly, said I.

These superior Contingents then, *which move without Interruption*, are, it seems, above it. They are.

And shall we say the same of *those of lower Sort*; those, *whose Course we see often interrupted*; those, *which the Strength and Cunning of Man are able to influence and controul*? Give Instances, said I, of what

you mean. I mean, said he, Earth, Water, Air, Fire; Stones, Trees; Animals; Men themselves. Are these Contingents within the reach of Art, or has Art *here* no Influence? I should think, said I, a very great one.

IF this, continued he, be true, it should seem that the COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF ART was—ALL THOSE CONTINGENT NATURES, WHICH LIE WITHIN THE REACH OF THE HUMAN POWERS TO INFLUENCE. I acknowledge, said I, it appears so.

THUS far then, said he, we have advanced with tolerable Success. We have gained some Idea of *Art*, and some Idea of its *Subject*. Our Inquiry, on the whole, has informed us, that ART is—an *habitual Power in Man of becoming a certain Cause*—and that its SUBJECT is—*every such contingent Nature, which lies within the reach of the human Powers to influence.*

§ 3. It is true, said I, this appears to have been the result of our Inquiry, and a full and ample one it seems to have been. A long one, replied he, if you please, but not a full and ample one. Can any thing, said I, be wanting, after what you have said already? Certainly, replied he, a great deal. We have talked much indeed of *Art*, considered as a Cause; and much of the *Subject*, on which it operates; but *what moves* these Operations to *commence*, and *where it is they end*, these are Topics, which we have as yet little thought of. I begged him then, that we might now consider them.

He was willing, he said, for his Part, and immediately went on by asking, What I thought was the *Beginning of Art*? I mean, said he, by *Beginning*, that *Cause for the Sake of which* it operates, and *which being supposed away, Men would be never moved to follow it*. To this, I told him, I was unable to answer. You will not

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think



think it, said he, so difficult, when you have a little more considered. Reflect with yourself——Was it not the *Absence* of Health, which *excited* Men to cultivate the Art of Medicine? I replied, it was.

What then, said he, if the *Human Body* had been so far *perfect and self-sufficient*, as never to have felt the *Vicissitudes of Well and Ill*: Would not then this Art have been wholly unknown?

I replied, I thought it would. And what said he, if we extend this Perfection a Degree farther, and suppose the Body not only thus *healthful*, but withal so *robust*, as to have felt no Uneasiness from *all Inclemencies of Weather*: Would not then the Arts of Building also and Cloathing have been as useless as that of Medicine?

I replied, it seemed they would. But what said he, if we bound not this Perfection of ours even here? What if we suppose, that not only Things *merely necessary*, but that those also *conducive to Elegance and Enjoyment* were of course all implied in the Constitution of Human Nature;

ture; that they were all *steady, constant, and independent from without*, and as inseparable from our Being, as Perspiring, or Circulation: In such case, would not the Arts of Music, Painting, and Poetry, with every other Art passing under the Denomination of *Elegant*, have been as useless, as we have held those others of Medicine, Clothing, and Architecture? I replied, It seems they would. It was then the *Absence of Joys, Elegancies, and Amusements from our Constitution, as left by Nature*, which induced us to *seek them in these Arts of Elegance and Entertainment*.

It was. And what, said he, are Joys, Elegancies, Amusements, Health, Robustness, with those several other *Objects of Desire, whose Absence leads to Art*, but so many different Names of that *complex Being called Good*, under its *various, and multi-form, and popular Appearances*? I replied, it seemed so.

If this then, said he, be granted, it should seem that the *Beginning or Principle*

ciple of Art was the *Absence of something thought Good*; because it has appeared that it is for the Sake of some such absent Good that every Art operates; and because, if we suppose no such Absence to have been, we should never have known any Art. I confess, said I, it seems so.

BUT how then, continued he? If it be true that *all Art* implies such *Principle*, it is reciprocally true, that every such *Principle* should imply *Art*? I see no Reason, said I, why not. Consider, said he. It might be thought a Good by some perhaps, to be as strong as those Horses, which are ploughing yonder Field; to be as tall as those Elms, and of a Nature as durable.—Yet would the Absence of Goods *like these*, lead to Art? Or is it not *absurd* to suppose, there should be an Art of *Impossibilities*? Absurd, said I, certainly. If so, said he, when we define the *Beginning* or *Principle* of Art, it is not enough to call it the *Absence of Something thought Good*, unless we add, that the *Good* be

be a Good Possible; a Thing attainable by Man; a Thing relative to Human Life, and consistent with Human Nature: Or does not this also appear a Requisite? I replied, I thought it did.

BUT still, continued he——Is it a sufficient Motive to Art, that the *Good desired* should be *attainable*? In other Words, does every *Absence of Good attainable* lead to *Art*, or is our Account still *too loose*, and in need of stricter Determination?

Of none, said I, which appears to me.

Reflect, said he; there are some of the *possible* Goods so *obvious* and easy, that every Man, in an ordinary *State of common natural Perfection*, is able to acquire them, *without Labour* or Application. You will hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting to eat, may be gathered; or a clear Spring, tempting to drink, may be drank at, by the mere Suggestions of *will and uninstructed Instinct*. I granted, they might.

It would be therefore impertinent, said he, to suppose that Goods, *like these*, should

should lead to Art, because *Art* would be *superfluous*, and in no respect necessary.

Indeed, said I, it seems so.

IF therefore, said he, neither *Impossibles* lead to *Art*, because *of such there can be no Art*; nor Things *easily possible*, because *in such Nature can do without Art*: what is it we have left, to which we may refer it? Or can it indeed be to any other than to that *middle Class of Things*, which, however possible, are still not so easy, but to be beyond the Powers of Will, and Instinct uninstructed? I replied, it seemed so.

That there are many such Things, said he, is evident past Doubt. For what Man would pay Artists so largely for their Arts, were he enabled by Nature to obtain whatever he desired? Or who would study to be skilled in Arts, were Nature's original Powers to be of themselves alone sufficient?

I told him, it was not likely.

IT should seem then, said he, according to this Reasoning, that the BEGINNING, *Motive,*

*tive*, or *Principle of Art*; that *Cause*, which first moves it to *Action*, and, *for the Sake of which* its several Operations are exerted, is—THE WANT OR ABSENCE OF SOMETHING APPEARING GOOD; RELATIVE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ATTAINABLE BY MAN, BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES.

I replied, I could not deny, but that the Account appeared probable.

§ 4. LET this then, said he, suffice, as to the *Beginning* of Art. But how shall we describe its *End*? What is it we shall pronounce this? My Answer, I replied, must be the same as often already; which was indeed, that I could not resolve the Question. It should seem, said he, not so difficult, now we have discovered what *Beginning* is. For if *Beginning* and *End* are *Contraries* and opposed, it is but to *invert*, as it were, the Notion of *Beginning*, and we gain of course the Notion of *End*. I asked him in what Manner?

Thus, said he, the *Beginning* of Art has been

been held to be *Something, which, if supposed away, Men would be never moved to apply to Art.* By *Inversion* therefore the *End* of Art must be *Something, which, while supposed away, Men would never cease applying to Art;* because, were they to cease, while the *End* was wanting; they would cease with *Imperfection*, and their *Performance* would be incomplete. To this I answered, That the *Account*, however true, was by far too general, to give me much *Intelligence*.

HE replied, If it was, he would endeavour to be more particular. And what, continued he, should we say, that every Art, according to its *Genius*, will of course be *accomplished* either in some *Energy*, or in some *Work*; that, besides these two, it can be accomplished in *Nothing* else; and consequently that *one of these must of necessity be its End?* I could not here but answer him with a *Smile*, That the *Matter* was now much *obscurer* than ever. I find then, said he, it is proper we should be more *explicit* in our *Inquiries*, and deduce our  
Reason-

Reasonings from some clearer Point of View. I told him, It was quite necessary, if he intended to be intelligible.

THUS then, said he. You will grant, that every *Art, being a Cause, must be productive of some Effect*; for instance, Music, of a Tune; Dancing, of a Dance; Architecture, of a Palace; and Sculpture, of a Statue.

It is allowed, said I. You will grant also, said he, that *in these Productions they are all accomplished and ended*: Or, in other Words, that as Music produces a Tune, so it is ended and accomplished in a Tune; and as Sculpture produces a Statue, so is it ended and accomplished in a Statue.

It is admitted, said I. Now these Productions, continued he, if you will examine, are not like *Units or Mathematical Points*; but, on the contrary, *all consist of a certain Number of Parts*, from whose accurate Order is derived their *Beauty and Perfection*. For example; Notes, ranged after such a Manner, make a Tune in Music; and Limbs, ranged after such a Manner, make a  
Statue



Statue or a Picture. I replied, They did.

If then the *Productions*, continued he, of every *Art* thus consist of *certain Parts*, it will follow, that *these Parts* will be either *co-existent*, or not; and if *not co-existent*, then of course *successive*. Assist me,

said I, by another Instance, for you are growing again obscure. *Co-existent*, replied he, as in a Statue, where Arms, Legs, Body, and Head *all subsist together at one individual Instant: Successive*, as in a Tune or Dance, where there is no such Co-existence, but where some *Parts* are *ever passing away*, and others are *ever succeeding* them.

CAN any Thing be said to *exist*, said I, whose *Parts* are *ever passing away*?

Surely, replied he, or how else exist Years and Seasons, Months and Days, with their *common Parent*, *Time* itself? Or indeed what is *Human Life*, but a *Compound of Parts thus fleeting*; a *Compound of various and multiform Actions*, which succeed each other in a certain Order? The Fact, said I, appears so.

THIS

THIS then, continued he, being the case, and there being this Difference in Productions, call every *Production*, the *Parts of which exist successively*, and whose Nature hath its Being or Essence in a Transition, call it, what it really is, a *Motion* or an *ENERGY*— Thus a Tune and a Dance are Energies; thus Riding and Sailing are Energies; and so is Elocution, and so is Life itself. On the contrary, call every *Production*, whose *Parts exist all at once*, and whose Nature depends not on a Transition for its Essence, call it a *WORK*, or *Thing done*, not an *Energy* or *Operation*.— Thus a House is a Work, a Statue is a Work, and so is a Ship, and so a Picture. I seem, said I, to comprehend you.

IF then there be no *Productions*, said he, but must be of *Parts*, either *co-existent* or *successive*; and the *one* of these be, as you perceive, a *Work*, and the *other* be an *Energy*; it will follow, *there will be no Production, but will be either a Work or an*  
D Energy.

*Energy.* There will not, said I. But every *Art*, said he, you have granted, is *accomplished and ended in what it produces?*

I replied, I had. And there are *no Productions*, but *Works or Energies?*  
None.

IT will follow then, said he, that EVERY ART WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR ENERGY.

To this I answered, That his Reasoning I could not impeach; but that still the Distinction of Work and Energy was what I did not well comprehend. There are several Circumstances, said he, which will serve sufficiently to make it clear. I begged he would mention some.

THUS then, said he——When the Production of any Art is an *Energy*, then the *Perfection of the Art can be only perceived during that Energy.* For instance, the Perfection of a Musician is only known, while he continues playing. But when the Production

duction of any Art is a *Work*, then *is not the Perfection visible during the Energy, but only after it.* Thus the Perfection of the Statuary is not seen during his Energies as a Statuary, but when his Energies are over, when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting, but the Statue is left as *the Result of all.*  
It is true, said I.

AGAIN, continued he,——in consequence of this, where the Production is an *Energy*, there *the Production is of Necessity co-eval with the Artift.* For how should the Energy survive the Man? the Playing remain, when the Musician is dead? But where the Production is a *Work*, then *is there no such Necessity.* The *Work* may well remain, when the Artift is forgotten; there being no more reason, that the Statue and the Artift should be co-eval, than the Man and the rude Marble, before it received a regular Figure. You seem now, said I, to have explained yourself.

IF then, said he, WORK and ENERGY be made *intelligible Terms*, you cannot but perceive the Truth of what we before asserted—*that every Art, according to its Genius, must needs be accomplished in one of these ; that, except in these two, it can be accomplished in nothing else ; and consequently that ONE OF THESE MUST OF NECESSITY BE ITS END.* I answered, That the Reasoning appeared justly deduced. So much then, replied he, for the *Ending or Accomplishment of Art* ; and so much also for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Disquisition.

§ 5. HE had no sooner said this, than I was beginning to applaud him ; especially on his having treated a Subject so copiously, started, as it were, by Chance, and without any apparent Preparation. But I had not gone far, before he interrupted me, by saying, That as to my Praises they were more than he deserved ; that he could pretend to no great Merit for having been, as I called

it, so copious, when he had so often before thought, on what at present we had been talking. In short, says he, to tell you a Secret, I have been a long time amusing myself, in forming an Essay upon this Subject. I could not hereforbear reproaching him, for having hitherto concealed his Intentions. My Reproaches produced a sort of amicable Controversy, which at length ended in his offering, That, to make me some amends, he would now recite me (if I pleased) a small fragment of the Piece: a Fragment which he had happened accidentally to have about him. The Proposal, on my part, was willingly accepted, and without farther Delay, the Papers were produced.

As to the Performance itself, it must be confessed, in point of Stile, it was somewhat high and florid, perhaps even bordering upon an Excess. At the time however of recital, this gave me less Offence, because it seemed, as it were, to palliate the Dryness of what had passed before, and in some sort

to supply the Place of an Epilogue to our Conference. Not however to anticipate, he began reading as follows :

“ O ART! Thou *distinguishing Attribute*  
 “ and *Honour* of *Human Kind*! who art  
 “ not only able *to imitate Nature* in her  
 “ Graces, but (what is more) even *to adorn*  
 “ *her* with Graces *of thy own*. Possessed of  
 “ Thee, the meanest Genius grows deserv-  
 “ ing, and has a just Demand for a Portion  
 “ of our Esteem. Devoid of Thee, the  
 “ Brightest of our Kind lie lost and uselefs,  
 “ and are but poorly distinguished from  
 “ the most Despicable and Base. When  
 “ we inhabited Forests in common with  
 “ Brutes, nor otherwise known from them.  
 “ than by the Figure of our Species; *Thou*  
 “ taughtest us to assert *the Sovereignty of our*  
 “ *Nature*, and to assume that Empire, for  
 “ which Providence intended us. Thou-  
 “ sands of Utilities owe their Birth to Thee;  
 “ thousands of Elegancies, Pleasures, and  
 “ Joys, without which Life itself would be  
 “ but an insipid Possession.

“ WIDE

“ WIDE and extensive is the Reach  
 “ of thy Dominion. No ELEMENT is  
 “ there either so *violent* or so *subtle*, so *yield-*  
 “ *ing* or so *sluggish*, as by the Powers of its  
 “ Nature to be superior to thy Direction.  
 “ Thou darest not the fierce Impetuosity  
 “ of FIRE, but compellest its Violence to  
 “ be both obedient and useful. By it Thou  
 “ softenest the stubborn Tribe of Minerals,  
 “ so as to be formed and moulded into  
 “ Shapes innumerable. Hence Weapons,  
 “ Armour, Coin; and previous to these,  
 “ and other Thy *Works* and *Energies*,  
 “ hence all those various Tools and Instru-  
 “ ments, which empower Thee to proceed  
 “ to farther Ends more excellent. Nor is  
 “ the subtle AIR less obedient to Thy  
 “ Power, whether Thou willest it to be a  
 “ Minister to our Pleasure, or Utility. At  
 “ Thy Command it giveth Birth to Sounds,  
 “ which charm the Soul with all the Powers  
 “ of Harmony. Under thy Instruction it  
 “ moves the Ship o’er Seas, while that  
 “ yielding Element, where otherwise we  
 D 4 “ sink,



“ sink, even WATER itself is by Thee  
 “ taught to bear us; the vast Ocean to pro-  
 “ mote that Intercourse of Nations, which  
 “ Ignorance would imagine it was destined  
 “ to intercept. To say how thy Influence is  
 “ seen on EARTH, would be to teach  
 “ the meanest, what he knows already,  
 “ Suffice it but to mention Fields of Arable  
 “ and Pasture ; Lawns and Groves, and  
 “ Gardens, and Plantations; Cottages, Vil-  
 “ lages, Castles, Towns; Palaces, Temples,  
 “ and spacious Cities.

“ NOR does thy Empire end in *Subjects*  
 “ thus *in-animate*. Its Power also extends  
 “ thro’ the various Race of ANIMALS,  
 “ who either patiently submit to become  
 “ thy Slaves, or are sure to find Thee an ir-  
 “ resistible Foe. The faithful Dog, the  
 “ patient Ox, the generous Horse, and the  
 “ mighty Elephant, are content all to re-  
 “ ceive their Instructions from Thee, and  
 “ readily to lend their natural *Instincts* or  
 “ *Strength*, to perform those Offices, which  
 “ thy Occasions call for, If there be found  
 “ any

“ any Species, which are serviceable when  
 “ dead, Thou suggestest the Means to in-  
 “ vestigate and take them. If any be so  
 “ savage, as to refuse being tamed ; or of  
 “ Natures fierce enough, to venture an At-  
 “ tack ; Thou teachest us to scorn their  
 “ brutal Rage ; to meet, repel, pursue, and  
 “ conquer.

“ AND such, O ART ! is thy amazing  
 “ Influence, when Thou art employed only  
 “ on these *inferior Subjects* ; on Natures *In-*  
 “ *animate*, or at best *Irrational*. But when-  
 “ e'er Thou choosest a *Subject more noble*,  
 “ and settest to the cultivating of MIND  
 “ itself, then it is Thou becomest truly ami-  
 “ able and divine ; the ever-flowing Source  
 “ of those sublimer Beauties, of which *no*  
 “ *Subject* but *Mind alone* is capable. Then  
 “ it is Thou art enabled to exhibit to Man-  
 “ kind the admired Tribe of Poets and of  
 “ Orators ; the sacred Train of Patriots and  
 “ of Heroes ; the godlike List of Philoso-  
 “ phers and Legislators ; the Forms of *vir-*  
 “ *tuous and equal* Polities, where *private*  
 “ Wel-

“ Welfare is made the same with *public* ;  
 “ where Crowds themselves prove dis-  
 “ interested and brave, and Virtue is made  
 “ a national and popular Characteristic.

“ HAIL ! sacred Source of all these  
 “ Wonders ! *Thyself* instruct me to praise  
 “ Thee worthily, thro’ whom whate’er we  
 “ do, is done with Elegance and Beauty ;  
 “ without whom, what we do, is ever grace-  
 “ less and deformed.—Venerable Power !  
 “ By what Name shall I address Thee ?  
 “ Shall I call thee *Ornament* of Mind ;  
 “ or art Thou more truly *Mind itself* ?—  
 “ IT IS MIND THOU ART, most perfect  
 “ Mind ; not rude, untaught, but fair and  
 “ polished ; in such Thou dwellest, of such  
 “ Thou art the *Form* ; nor is it a Thing  
 “ more possible to separate Thee from such,  
 “ than it would be to separate Thee from  
 “ thy own Existence.”——

My good Friend was now arrived to a  
 very exalted Pitch, and was pursuing his  
 Panegyric with great Warmth and Fluency ;  
 when

when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk being near finished. The People, as we went along, began to look at us with Surprise; which I, who was less engaged, having leisure to observe, thought it was proper to admonish my Friend, that he should give over. He immediately ceased reading; put his Papers up; and thanked me for stopping him at so seasonable a Time.

§ 6. WHAT remained of our Discourse passed off with less Rapture, and was indeed no more, than a kind of short Recapitulation.

HE observed to me, that our Inquiries had furnished out an Answer to four different Questions. For thus, said he, if it be asked us, *What Art is?* We have to Answer, *it is—*an habitual Power in Man, of becoming the Cause of some Effect, according to a System of various and well-approved Precepts. If it be asked us, On what Subject Art operates? We can answer,  
On

44                    Concerning A R T,

*On a contingent, which is within the reach of the Human Powers to influence. If it be asked us, For what Reason, for the sake of what, Art operates? We may reply, For the sake of some absent Good, relative to Human Life, and attainable by Man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed Faculties. Lastly, if it be asked, Where it is the Operations of Art end? We may say, Either in some Energy, or in some Work.*

HE added, That if he were not afraid of the Imputation of Pedantry, he could be almost tempted to say, That we had been considering Art, with respect to those *four Causes*, so celebrated *once* among Professors in the Schools. By these, upon Inquiry, I found that he meant certain *Causes*, called the \* *Efficient*, the † *Material*, the ‡ *Final*, and the || *Formal*.

BUT

\* P. 17.            † P. 22.            ‡ P. 28, 29.

|| P. 34, 36.

BUT here, without farther explaining, he begged for the present that we might conclude, being sufficiently, as he said, fatigued with the Length of what had passed already. The Request was reasonable I could not but own, and thus ended our Conversation, and soon after it our Walk.

*The* E N D.



TREATISE THE SECOND:

A DISCOURSE

On MUSIC, PAINTING,  
and POETRY.





# C O N T E N T S.

## CHAPTER the FIRST.

**I**NTRODUCTION—*Design and Distribution of the Whole—Preparation for the following Chapters.*

## CHAPTER the SECOND.

*ON the Subjects which Painting imitates—  
On the Subjects which Music imitates—  
Comparison of Music with Painting.*

## CHAPTER the THIRD.

*ON the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only thro' natural Media, or mere Sounds—Comparison of Poetry in this Capacity, first with Painting, then with Music.*

E            C H A P.

## CONTENTS.

## CHAPTER the FOURTH.

ON the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words significant; the Subjects being such to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is most perfectly adapted.—Its Comparison in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.

## CHAPTER the FIFTH.

ON the Subjects which Poetry imitates by Words significant, being at the same time Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either of the other Arts.—The Nature of these Subjects.—The Abilities of Poetry to imitate them.—Comparison of Poetry in respect of these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.

CHAP-

## CONTENTS.

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### CHAPTER the SIXTH.

*ON Music considered not as an Imitation, but as deriving its Efficacy from another Source.—On its joint Operation by this means with Poetry.—An Objection to Music solved.—The Advantage arising to it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united.—Conclusion.*

E 2

A




A DISCOURSE

On MUSIC, PAINTING,  
and POETRY.

CHAP. I.

*Introduction.—Design and Distribution of  
the Whole.—Preparation for the following  
Chapters.*

**A**LL Arts have this in common, Ch. I.  
that *they respect Human Life.*   
Some contribute to its *Necessi-  
ties*, as Medicine and Agriculture; others  
to its *Elegance*, as Music, Painting, and  
Poetry.

Now, with respect to these two diffe-  
rent *Species*, the *necessary* Arts seem to have  
been *prior in time*; if it be probable, that


Ch. I. Men consulted how *to live* and *to support themselves*, before they began to deliberate how *to render Life agreeable*. Nor is this indeed unconfirmed by Fact, there being no Nation known so barbarous and ignorant, as where the Rudiments of these *necessary Arts* are not in some degree cultivated. And hence possibly they may appear to be the *more excellent and worthy*, as having claim to a *Preference*, derived from their *Seniority*.

THE Arts however of *Elegance* cannot be said to want Pretensions, if it be true, that Nature framed us for *something more than mere Existence*. Nay, farther\*, if *Well-being* be clearly preferable to *Mere-being*, and this without it be but a thing contemptible, they may have reason perhaps to aspire even to a *Superiority*. But enough of this, to come to our Purpose.

§ 2.

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\* Οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείετα ποιητέον,  
Ἄλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Plat. in Critone.

§ 2. THE Design of this Discourse is to Ch. I.  
 treat of MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY;   
 to consider in what they agree, and in  
 what they differ; and WHICH UPON THE  
 WHOLE, IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE  
 OTHER TWO.

IN entering upon this Inquiry, it is first  
 to be observed, that the MIND is made  
 conscious of the *natural World* and its Af-  
 fections, and of other *Minds* and their  
 Affections, by the several *Organs of the*  
*Senses* (a). By the *same Organs*, these Arts  
 exhibit to the Mind *Imitations*, and imitate  
 either Parts or Affections of this *natural*

E 4

*World,*


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(a) To explain some future Observations, it will  
 be proper here to remark, that the MIND *from these*  
*Materials thus brought together, and from its own Ope-*  
*rations on them, and in consequence of them, becomes*  
*fraught with IDEAS*—and that MANY MINDS *so*  
*fraught, by a sort of COMPACT assigning to each IDEA*  
*some SOUND to be its MARK or SYMBOL, were the first*  
 INVENTORS and FOUNDERS of LANGUAGE. See  
 Vol. II. or *Hermes*, Lib. iii. cap. 3. 4.



## Ch. I.

*World*, or else the Passions, Energies, and other Affections of *Minds*. There is this Difference however between these *Arts* and *Nature*; that *Nature* passes to the Percipient thro' *all* the Senses; whereas these *Arts* use *only two* of them, that of Seeing and that of Hearing. And hence it is that the *sensible Objects* or *Media*, thro' which (b) they imitate, can be *such only*, as these two Senses are framed capable of perceiving; and these *Media* are *Motion*, *Sound*, *Colour*, and *Figure*,

PAINT-

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(b) To prevent Confusion it must be observed, that in all these *Arts* there is a Difference between the *sensible Media*, thro' which they imitate, and the *Subjects imitated*. The *sensible Media*, thro' which they imitate, must be always *relative to that Sense*, by which the particular *Art* applies to the *Mind*; but the *Subject imitated* may be *foreign to that Sense*, and *beyond the Power of its Perception*. Painting, for instance, (as is shewn in this Chapter) has *no sensible Media*, thro' which it operates, except *Colour* and *Figure*; But as to *Subjects*, it may have *Motions*, *Sounds*, *moral Affections* and *Actions*; *none of which* are either *Colours* or *Figures*, but which however are *all capable of being imitated thro' them*. See Chapter the second, Notes (b), (c), (d).

PAINTING, having the *Eye* for its *Or-* Ch. I.  
*gan*, cannot be conceived to imitate, but thro' the *Media* of *visible* Objects. And farther, its Mode of imitating being always *motionless*, there must be subtracted from these the Medium of *Motion*. It remains then, that *Colour* and *Figure* are the only *Media*, thro' which Painting imitates.

MUSIC, passing to the Mind thro' the *Organ* of the *Ear*; can imitate only by *Sounds and Motions*.

POETRY, having the *Ear* also for its *Organ*, as far as *Words* are considered to be no more than *mere Sounds*, can go no farther in Imitating, than may be performed by *Sound and Motion*. But then, as *these its Sounds stand by* \* *Compact for the various Ideas, with which the Mind is fraught*, it is enabled by this means to imitate, *as far as*  
*Lan-*

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\* See Note (a) Page 55.

Ch. I. *Language can express; and that it is evident*  
 will, in a manner, include all things.

Now from hence may be seen, how these ARTS agree, and how they differ.

THEY agree, by being all MIMETIC, or IMITATIVE.

THEY differ, as they imitate by *different Media*; PAINTING by *Figure and Colour*; MUSIC, by *Sound and Motion*; PAINTING and MUSIC, by *Media which are Natural*; POETRY, for the greatest Part, by a *Medium, which is Artificial (c)*.

§ 3.

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(c) A Figure painted, or a composition of Musical Sounds have always a *natural Relation to that, of which they are intended to be the Resemblance*. But a Description in Words has rarely any such *natural Relation to the several Ideas, of which those Words are the Symbols*. None therefore understands the *Description*, but *those who speak the Language*. On the contrary, Musical and Picture-Imitations are *intelligible to all Men*.

WHY


§ 3. As to that ART, which upon the whole is *most excellent of the three*; it must be observed, that among these various *Media* of imitating, some will naturally be *more accurate*, some *less*; some will *best* imitate one Subject; some, another. Again, among the Number of *Subjects* there will be naturally also a Difference, as to *Merit* and *Demerit*. There will be some *sublime*, and some *low*; some *copious*, and some *short*; some *pathetic*, and others *void of Passion*; some formed to *instruct*, and others *not capable* of it. Ch. I.

Now, from these *two* Circumstances; that is to say, from the *Accuracy of the Imitation*, and the *Merit of the Subject imitated*, the Question concerning *which Art is most excellent*, must be tried and determined.

THIS

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WHY it is said that Poetry is *not universally*, but *only for the greater part artificial*, see below, Chapter the Third, where what *Natural Force* it has, is examined and estimated.

Ch. I. THIS however cannot be done, without  
 a *Detail of Particulars*, that so there may  
be formed, on every part, just and accurate  
*Comparisons*.

To begin therefore with Painting.

CHAP.

## C H A P. II.

*On the Subjects which Painting imitates.—*

*On the Subjects which Music imitates.—*

*Comparison of Music with Painting.*

**T**HE FITTEST SUBJECTS FOR Ch. II.  
 PAINTING, are all such THINGS, ~  
 and INCIDENTS, as are \* *peculiarly cha-*  
*racterised by FIGURE and COLOUR.*

OF this kind are the whole Mass (a) of  
*Things inanimate and vegetable*; such as  
 Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landskips—  
 The various Tribes of *Animal Figures*; such  
 as Birds, Beasts, Herds, Flocks——The  
*Motions and Sounds peculiar* to each Animal  
 Species, when accompanied with *Configura-*  
*tions, which are obvious and remarkable* (b)—  
 The

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\* P. 57.

(a) THE Reason is, that *these* things are almost  
*wholly* known to us by their *Colour* and *Figure*. Be-  
 sides, they are as *motionless*, for the most part, in  
*Nature*, as in the *Imitation*.

(b) INSTANCES of this kind are the Flying of  
 Birds, the Galloping of Horses, the Roaring of Lions,  
 the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reason is, that  
 though

Ch. II. *The Human Body* in all its *Appearances* (as Male, Female; Young; Old; Handsome, Ugly;) and in all its *Attitudes*, (as Laying, Sitting, Standing, &c.)—*The Natural Sounds peculiar* to the *Human Species*, (such as Crying, Laughing, Hollowing, &c.) (c)—*All Energies, Passions, and Affections* of the *Soul*, being in any degree *more intense* or *violent*

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though to paint Motion or Sound be *impossible*, yet the Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an *immediate and natural Connection* with a certain *visible CONFIGURATION* of the *Parts*, the Mind, from a Prospect of this *Configuration*, conceives *insensibly* that which is *concomitant*; and hence it is that, by a sort of *Fallacy*, the *SOUNDS* and *MOTIONS* appear to be *painted also*. On the contrary, not so in such *Motions*, as the *Swimming* of many kinds of *Fish*; or in such *Sounds*, as the *Purring* of a *Cat*; because *here* is no such *special Configuration* to be perceived.—*Homer* in his *Shield* describing the *Picture* of a *Bull* seized by two *Lions*, says of the *Bull*—ὁ δὲ μακρὰ μεμυκὼς ἔελκετο—*He, bellowing loudly, was drag'd along*. Where *Eustathius*, in commenting on this *Bellowing*, says, ὡς ἰδήλα τῷ χήματι, as he (the *Bull*) made manifest (in the *Picture*) by his *Figure* or *Attitude*. Eust. in *J. Σ.* p. 1224.

(c) *THE Reason* is of the *same kind*, as that given in the *Note* immediately preceding; and by the *same Rule*, the *Observation* must be confined to *natural Sounds* only. In *Language*, few of the *Speakers* know the *Configurations*, which attend it.

*violent* than ordinary (*d*)—All *Actions* Ch. II.  
*and Events*, whose *Integrity* or *Wholeness*  
 depends upon a *short and self-evident* Suc-  
 cession of *Incidents* (*e*)—Or if the Suc-  
 cession be extended, then *such Actions* at  
 least, whose *Incidents are all along, during*  
*that Succession, similar* (*f*)—All *Actions*,  
 which being qualified as *above*, open them-  
 selves into a *large Variety* of *Circumstances*,

con-

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(*d*) THE Reason is still of the *same kind*, viz.  
 from their *Visible Effects* on the *Body*. They natu-  
 rally produce either to the *Countenance* a particular  
*Redness* or *Paleness*; or a particular *Modification* of its  
*Muscles*; or else to the *Limbs*, a particular *Attitude*.  
 Now all these *Effects* are *solely referable* to COLOUR  
 and FIGURE, the two grand sensible Media, *peculiar*  
 to *Painting*. See *Raphael's* *Cartoons* of *St. Paul* at  
*Athens*, and of his striking the Sorcerer *Elymas* blind:  
 See also the *Crucifixion* of *Polycrates*, and the *Sufferings*  
 of the *Consul Regulus*, both by *Salvator Rosa*.

(*e*) FOR of *necessity* every *PICTURE* is a *Punctum*  
*Temporis* or *INSTANT*.

(*f*) SUCH, for instance, as a *Storm at Sea*; whose  
*Incidents of Vision* may be nearly all included in *foaming*  
*Waves*, a *dark Sky*, *Ships* out of their erect  
*Posture*, and *Men* hanging upon the ropes.—  
 Or as a *Battle*; which from *Beginning* to *End* pre-  
 sents nothing else, than *Blood*, *Fire*, *Smoke*, and  
*Disorder*. Now *such Events* may be well imitated  
 all



Ch. II. *concurring all in the same Point of Time (g).*

— *All Actions which are known, and known universally, rather than Actions newly invented or known but to few (h).*

AND

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*all at once; for how long soever they last, they are but Repetitions of the same—Nicias, the Painter, recommended much the same Subjects, viz. a Sea-fight or a Land-battle of Cavalry. His reasons too are much the same with those mentioned in Note (g). He concludes with a Maxim, (little regarded by his Successors, however important,) that the Subject itself is as much a Part of the Painter's Art, as the Poet's Fable is a Part of Poetry. See Demetrius Phal. p. 53. Edit. Ox.*

(g) FOR PAINTING is not bounded in EXTENSION, as it is in DURATION. Besides, it seems true in every Species of Composition, that, as far as Perplexity and Confusion may be avoided, and the Wholeness of the Piece may be preserved clear and intelligible; the more ample the Magnitude, and the greater the Variety, the greater also, in proportion, the Beauty and Perfection. Noble instances of this are the Pictures above-mentioned in Note (d). See *Aristot. Poet. cap. 7.* 'Ο δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν φύσιν τῆς πράξεως ὁρᾷ, αἰεὶ μὲν, &c. See also *Characteristicks*, V. I. p. 143. and *Bosfu*, B. 1. cap. 16. *L' Achille d' Homère est si grand, &c.*

(h) THE Reason is, that a Picture being (as has been said) but a Point or Instant, in a Story well known the Spectator's Memory will supply the previous and the subsequent. But this cannot be done, where

AND thus much as to the Subjects of Ch. II.  
Painting. }

§ 2. IN MUSIC, THE FITTEST SUBJECTS OF IMITATION are all such THINGS  
and

*where such Knowledge is wanting.* And therefore it may be justly questioned, whether the most celebrated Subjects, borrowed by Painting from History, would have been any of them intelligible thro' the *Medium of Painting only*, supposing History to have been silent, and to have given *no additional Information*.

IT may be here added, that *Horace*, conformably to this Reasoning, recommends even to *Poetic Imitation* a *known* Story, before an *unknown*.

—————*Tuque*

*Rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in ætus,*

*Quam si proferres ignota, indictaque primus.*

*Art. Poet. v. 128.*

AND indeed as *the being understood to others*, either Hearers or Spectators, seems to be a *common Requisite* to all *Mimetic Arts* whatever; (for to those, who understand them not, they are in fact no *Mimetic Arts*) it follows, that *Perspicuity* must be *Essential* to them *all*; and that no prudent Artist would neglect, if it were possible, any just Advantage to obtain this End. Now there can be no Advantage greater, than the *Notoriety of the Subject imitated*.

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Ch. II. and INCIDENTS, as are most eminently\* characterised by MOTION and SOUND.

MOTION may be either *slow* or *swift*, *even* or *uneven*, *broken* or *continuous*—  
 SOUND may be either *soft* or *loud*, *high* or *low*. Wherever therefore any of these Species of *Motion* or *Sound* may be found in an *eminent* (not a *moderate* or *mean*) degree, there will be room for MUSICAL IMITATION.

THUS, in the *Natural* or *Inanimate World*, MUSIC may imitate the Glidings, Murmurings, Tossings, Roarings, and other *Accidents of Water*, as perceived in Fountains, Cataracts, Rivers, Seas, &c.—The same of Thunder—the same of Winds, as well the stormy as the gentle.—In the *Animal World*, it may imitate the *Voice* of some Animals, but chiefly that of singing Birds—It may also faintly copy some of their *Motions*.—In the *Human Kind*, it can also

also imitate some *Motions* (*i*) and *Sounds* (*k*); Ch. II.  
and of Sounds those *most perfectly*, which  
are expressive of *Grief* and *Anguish* (*l*).

AND thus much as to the Subjects,  
which Music imitates.

§ 3. IT remains then, that we *compare*  
*these two ARTS* together. And here in-  
deed, as to *Musical Imitation in general*, it  
must be confessed that—as it can, from its  
Genius, imitate *only Sounds and Motions*—  
as there are not *many Motions* either in the  
*Animal*

(*i*) As the *Walk* of the Giant *Polypheme*, in the  
Pastoral of *Acis* and *Galatea*.—See what ample *Strides*  
*he takes*, &c.

(*k*) As the *Shouts* of a Multitude, in the Corona-  
tion Anthem of, *God save the King*, &c.

(*l*) THE Reason is, that *this Species* of Musical  
Imitation *most nearly* approaches *Nature*. For *Grief*,  
in most *Animals*, declares itself by *Sounds*, which are  
not unlike to *long Notes in the Chromatic System*.  
Of this kind is the Chorus of *Baal's Priests* in  
the Oratorio of *Deborah*, *Doleful Tidings*, *how ye*  
*wound*, &c.

Ch. II. *Animal* or in the *Inanimate* World, which are *exclusively peculiar* even to any *Species* and scarcely any to an *Individual*——as there are no *Natural* Sounds, which characterise at least *lower than a Species* (for the *Natural* Sounds of *Individuals* are in every *Species* the *same*)——farther, as Music does but *imperfectly* imitate even these Sounds and Motions (*m*)——On the contrary, as Figures, Postures of Figures, and Colours characterise not only *every sensible Species*, but even *every Individual*; and for the most part also *the various* \* *Energies* and *Passions* of every *Individual*——and farther, as Painting is able, *with the highest Accuracy and Exactness*, to imitate all these Colours and Figures; and while Musical

Imita-

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(*m*) THE Reason is from the *Dissimilitude* between the Sounds and Motions of *Nature*, and those of *Music*. *Musical* Sounds are all produced from *Even* Vibration, most *Natural* from *Uneven*; *Musical* Motions are chiefly *Definite* in their Measure, most *Natural* are *Indefinite*.

\* See Note (*d*) of this Chapter.

Imitation pretends *at most* to no more, than Ch. II. the raising of Ideas *similar*, itself aspires to raise Ideas *the very same*—in a word, as Painting, in respect of *its Subjects*, is equal to the *noblest* Part of Imitation, *the Imitating regular Actions consisting of a Whole and Parts*; and of *such* Imitation, Music is *utterly incapable*—FROM ALL THIS it must be confessed, that MUSICAL IMITATION IS GREATLY BELOW THAT OF PAINTING, and that *at best* it is but an imperfect thing.

As to the *Efficacy* therefore of Music, it must be derived from *another* Source, which must be left for the present, to be considered of hereafter \*.

THERE remains to be mentioned Imitation by Poetry.

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\* Ch. VI.

## C H A P. III.

*On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only thro' natural Media, or mere Sounds—Comparison of Poetry in this Capacity, first with Painting, then with Music.*

Ch. III. **P**OETIC IMITATION includes every thing in it, which is performed either by PICTURE-IMITATION or MUSICAL; for its Materials are Words, and Words are \* Symbols by Compact of all Ideas.

FARTHER as Words, beside their being Symbols by Compact, are also Sounds variously distinguished by their Aptness to be rapidly or slowly pronounced, and by the respective Prevalence of Mutes, Liquids, or Vowels in their Composition; it will follow that, beside their Compact-Relation, they will

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\* See Note (a) Chap. I.

will have likewise a *Natural Relation* to all such Things, between which and themselves there is any *Natural Resemblance*. Thus, for instance, there is *Natural Resemblance* between all sorts of *harsh* and *grating* Sounds. There is therefore (exclusive of its Signification) a *Natural Relation* between the Sound of a vile Hautboy, and of that Verse in \* *Virgil*,

*Stridenti miserum stipulâ disperdere Carmen.*

or of that other in † *Milton*.

*Grate on their Scannel Pipes of wretched  
Straw.*

So also between the *smooth swift* Gliding of a River, and of that Verse in ‖ *Horace*,

—————*at ille*

*Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.*

AND thus in part even *Poetic Imitation* has its Foundation in *Nature*. But then

F 4

this

\* Ecl. 3. ver. 27.

† In his *Lycidas*.

‖ Epist. 2. l. 1. ver. 42, 43.



Ch.III. this Imitation goes not far: and taken without the *Meaning* derived to the Sounds from *Compact*, is but little intelligible, however perfect and elaborate.

§ 2. If therefore POETRY be compared with PAINTING, in respect of this its *merely Natural and Inartificial* Resemblance, it may be justly said that——In as much as of *this sort* of Resemblance, Poetry (like Music) has no other Sources, than *those two* of *Sound and Motion*——in as much as it often wants these Sources *themselves* (for Numbers of Words neither *have, nor can have* any Resemblance to those *Ideas*, of which they are the *Symbols*)——in as much as *Natural* Sounds and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates, are themselves but \* *loose and indefinite Accidents* of those *Subjects*, to which they belong, and consequently do but *loosely and indefinitely* characterise them——lastly, in as much as *Poetic* Sounds and Motions do  
but

but faintly resemble those of *Nature*, which are *themselves* confessed to be so imperfect and vague——FROM ALL THIS it will follow (as it has *already* followed of Music) that——POETIC IMITATION FOUNDED IN MERE NATURAL RESEMBLANCE IS MUCH INFERIOR TO THAT OF PAINTING, and *at best* but very imperfect.

§ 3. As to the Preference, which such POETIC IMITATION may claim before MUSICAL, or MUSICAL IMITATION before THAT; the Merits on each Side may appear perhaps *equal*. They both fetch their Imitations from † *Sound* and *Motion*. Now MUSIC seems to imitate *Nature* better as to *Motion*, and POETRY as to *Sound*. The Reason is, that in *Motions* (a) Music has

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† P. 57.

(a) MUSIC has no less than *five different Lengths of Notes* in ordinary use, reckoning from the Semi-brief to the Semi-quaver; all which may be *infinitely*

Ch. III. has a *greater Variety*; and in *Sounds*, those of *Poetry* approach nearer to *Nature* (b).

If therefore in *Sound* the *one* have the Preference, in *Motion* the *other*, and the *Merit* of *Sound* and *Motion* be supposed nearly *equal*; it will follow, that THE MERIT OF THE TWO IMITATIONS WILL BE NEARLY EQUAL ALSO.

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*nately compounded*, even in any *one* Time, or Measure.—POETRY, on the other hand, has but *two* Lengths or Quantities, a *long* Syllable and a *short*, (which is its Half) and *all the Variety of Verse* arises from such Feet and Metres, as these *two Species* of Syllables, *by being compounded*, can be made produce.

(b) MUSICAL Sounds are produced by *even* Vibrations, which *scarcely any Natural* Sounds are—on the contrary, *Words* are the Product of *uneven* Vibration, and so are *most Natural* Sounds—Add to this, that *Words* are far more *numerous*, than *Musical Sounds*. So that Poetry, as to imitation by *Sound*, seems to exceed Music, not only in *nearness of Resemblance*, but even in *Variety* also.

## C H A P. IV.

*On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words significant; the Subjects at the same time being such, to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is most perfectly adapted—Its Comparison in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.*

**T**HE *Mimetic* Art of POETRY has Ch IV. been hitherto considered, as fetching its Imitation from mere *Natural* Resemblance. In this it has been shewn much *inferior* to PAINTING, and nearly *equal* to MUSIC.

It remains to be considered, what its Merits are, when it imitates not by mere *Natural* Sound, but by Sound *significant*; by Words, the *compact* Symbols of all kinds of Ideas. From hence depends its genuine Force.

Ch. IV. Force. And here, as it is able to find  
 ~~~~~ Sounds expressive of *every* Idea, so is there  
*no Subject* either of Picture-Imitation, or  
 Musical, to which it does not aspire; all  
 Things and Incidents whatever being, in a  
 manner, to be described by Words.

WHETHER *therefore* POETRY, in *this*  
*its proper Sphere*, be equal to the Imitation of  
 the other two ARTS, is the Question at pre-  
 sent, which comes in order to be discussed.

Now as *Subjects* are *infinite*, and the  
 other two Arts are *not equally adapted* to  
 imitate *all*; it is proposed, first to *compare*  
 POETRY *with them in such SUBJECTS*, to  
*which they are most perfectly adapted*.

§ 2. To begin therefore with PAINT-  
 ING. A SUBJECT, in which the Power  
 of this Art may be *most fully* exerted,  
 (whether it be taken from the *Inanimate*,  
 or the *Animal*, or the *Moral World*) must  
 be a SUBJECT, *which is principally and*  
*eminently characterised by certain Colours,*  
*Figures,*

*Figures, and Postures of Figures*—whose Ch.IV.  
*Comprehension depends not on a Succession of*  
*Events; or at least, if on a Succession, on a*  
*short and self-evident one*—which admits a  
*large Variety of such Circumstances, as all*  
*concur in the same individual Point of Time,*  
*and relate all to one principal Action.*

As to such a Subject therefore—In as much as POETRY is forced to pass thro' the Medium of *Compact*, while PAINTING applies immediately thro' the Medium of *Nature*; the one being understood to all, the other to the Speakers of a certain Language \* only—in as much as *Natural* Operations must needs be more *affecting*, than *Artificial*—in as much as Painting helps *our own rude* Ideas by *its own*, which are *consummate* and wrought up to the Perfection of Art; while Poetry can raise *no other (a)* than what every Mind is furnished with

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\* *Note (c)* p. 58.

(a) WHEN we read in MILTON of EVE, that  
*Grace was in all her Steps, Heav'n in her Eye,*  
*In ev'ry Gesture Dignity and Love;*

Ch. IV. with before—in as much as Painting shews all the *minute and various concurrent Circumstances* of the Event in the *same* individual Point of Time, as they appear in *Nature*; while Poetry is forced to *want* this Circumstance of Intelligibility, by being ever obliged to enter into some degree of *Detail*—in as much as this Detail creates often the Dilemma of either becoming *tedious*, to be *clear*; or if *not tedious*, then *obscure*—lastly, in as much as all Imitations more *familiar*, more *immediate*,

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we have an Image *not* of that EVE, which MILTON conceived, but of *such an EVE only*, as every one, by his own proper Genius, is able to represent, from reflecting on those *Ideas*, which he has annexed to these several *Sounds*. The greater Part, in the mean time, have never perhaps bestowed one accurate Thought upon what *Grace, Heaven, Love, and Dignity* mean; or ever enriched the Mind with *Ideas of Beauty*, or asked *whence* they are to be acquired, and by what *Proportions* they are *constituted*. On the contrary, when we view EVE as painted by an *able Painter*, we labour under no such Difficulty; because we have exhibited before us the *better Conceptions of an ARTIST*, the *genuine Ideas* of perhaps a TITIAN or a RAPHAEL.

*diate*, and more *intelligible*, are preferable to those which are *less* so; and for the Reasons above, the Imitations of *Poetry* are *less familiar*, *less immediate*, and *less intelligible* than those of *Painting*—From ALL THIS it will follow, that—IN ALL SUBJECTS, WHERE PAINTING CAN FULLY EXERT ITSELF, THE IMITATIONS OF PAINTING ARE SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF POETRY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IN ALL SUCH SUBJECTS THAT PAINTING HAS THE PREFERENCE.

Ch.IV.

§ 3. AND now to compare POETRY with MUSIC, allowing to *Music* the same Advantage of a *well-adapted* Subject, which has already been allowed to *Painting* in the Comparison just preceding.

WHAT such a SUBJECT is, has already been \* described. And as to *Preference*, it must

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\* See Chap. II. § 2.



Ch. IV. must be confessed, that——In as much as  
 MUSICAL IMITATIONS, tho' *Natural*,  
 aspire not to raise the *same* Ideas, but only  
 Ideas || *similar* and analogous; while POETIC  
 IMITATION, tho' *Artificial*, raises Ideas  
 the very *same*——in as much as the *Definite*  
 and *Certain* is ever preferable to the *Indefi-*  
*nite* and *Uncertain*; and that more especi-  
 ally in *Imitations*, where the principal  
 (b) Delight is in recognizing the Thing  
 imitating

|| P. 68, 69.

(b) THAT there is an eminent Delight in *this*  
 very RECOGNITION *itself*, abstract from any thing  
 pleasing in the *Subject* recognized, is evident from  
 hence——that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can be  
*highly charmed with Imitations*, at whose *Originals* in  
 Nature we are *shocked* and *terrified*. Such, for in-  
 stance, as Dead Bodies, Wild Beasts, and the like.

THE Cause, assigned for this, seems to be of  
 the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in  
 the *Sanity* and *Perfection*, but also in the *just* and *na-*  
*tural Energies* of our several *Limbs* and *Faculties*.  
 And hence, among others, the Joy in REASONING;  
 as being the *Energy* of that principal Faculty, our IN-  
 TELLECT or UNDERSTANDING. This Joy ex-  
 tends, not only to the Wise, but to the Multitude.  
 For all Men have an *Aversion to Ignorance and Error*,  
 and

*imitated*—it will follow *from hence* that— Ch. IV.  
 EVEN IN SUBJECTS THE BEST ADAPTED  
 TO MUSICAL IMITATION, THE IMITA-  
 TION OF POETRY WILL BE STILL MORE  
 EXCELLENT.

and in some degree, however moderate, are glad to *learn* and to *inform* themselves.

HENCE therefore the *Delight*, arising from these *Imitations*; as we are enabled, in each of them, to *exercise the REASONING FACULTY*; and, by *comparing the Copy* with the *Archetype* in our Minds, to *INFER* that THIS is SUCH a THING; and, THAT, ANOTHER; a *Fact* remarkable among Children, even in their first and earliest Days.

Τὸ, τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι, σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδῶν ἐστὶ, καὶ τέττα διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι, καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μεμήσεως τὰς πρώτας· καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. Σημεῖον δὲ τέττα τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων. Ἄ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρώμεν, τέττων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλις αἰρηθωμένας, χαίρομεν θεωρῶντες· οἷον θηρίων τε μορφῆς τῶν ἀγριώτατων, καὶ νεκρῶν. Ἀλλοῖον δὲ καὶ τέττα, ὅτι μαθαίνειν ἢ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδισον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινοῦσιν αὐτῆ. Διὰ γὰρ τέττα χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὀρώντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωρῶντας μαθαίνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, τὴ ἕκαστον· οἷον, ὅτι ἔτθ ἐκεῖνθ. Arist. Poet. c. 4.

## C H A P. V.

*On the Subjects which Poetry imitates by Words significant, being at the same time Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either of the other Arts—The Nature of those Subjects—The Abilities of Poetry to imitate them——Comparison of Poetry in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.*

Ch. V.

**T**HE MIMETIC ART of POETRY has now been considered in *two* Views—First, as imitating by *mere natural MEDIA*; and in this it has been placed *on a level* with MUSIC, but *much inferior* to PAINTING——It has been since considered as imitating thro' *Sounds significant by Compact*, and that in *such* Subjects respectively, where PAINTING and MUSIC have the *fullest Power* to exert themselves.

*Here*

Here to Painting it has been held *inferior*, Ch. V.  
but to Music it has been *preferred*.

IT remains to be considered—what *other Subjects* Poetry has left, to which the Genius of the other two Arts is less *perfectly adapted*—How far Poetry is *able* to imitate them—and whether from the *Perfection* of its Imitation, and the *Nature* of the Subjects themselves, it ought to be called no more than *equal* to its Sister Arts; or whether, on the whole, it should not rather be called *superior*.

§ 2. To begin, in the first place, by comparing it with Painting.

THE *Subjects of Poetry*, to which the Genius of *Painting* is *not adapted*, are—  
all Actions, whose (a) *Whole* is of so  
G 2 *lengthened*

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(a) For a just and accurate Description of *Wholeness* and *Unity*, see *Arist. Poet.* Ch. 7 & 8. and *Bossu*, his best Interpreter, in his *Treatise on the Epic Poem.* B. II. ch. 9, 10, 11.

Ch. V. *lengthened a Duration, that no Point of Time, in any part of that Whole, can be given fit for Painting; neither in its Beginning, which will teach what is Subsequent; nor in its End, which will teach what is Previous; nor in its Middle, which will declare both the Previous and the Subsequent.*—Also all Subjects so framed, as to lay open the *internal Constitution of Man*, and give us an Insight into *(b) Characters, Manners, Passions, and Sentiments.*

THE

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(b) FOR a Description of CHARACTER, see below, Note (d) of this Chapter.

AS for MANNERS, it may be said in general, that a *certain System of them makes a Character*; and that as these Systems, by being *differently compounded*, make each a *different Character*, so is it that *one Man truly differs from another.*

PASSIONS are obvious; *Pity, Fear, Anger, &c.*

SENTIMENTS are discoverable in all those Things, which are the *proper Business and End of SPEECH or DISCOURSE.* The chief Branches of this *End* are to *Affert and Prove*; to *Solve and Refute*; to express or excite *Passions*; to *amplify Incidents,*

THE *Merit* of these Subjects is obvious. Ch. V. }  
 They must necessarily of all be the most *affecting*; the most *improving*; and such of which the Mind has the *strongest Comprehension*.

FOR as to the *affecting Part*—if it be true, that all *Events* more or less *affect* us, as the *Subjects*, which they respect, are more or less nearly *related* to us; then surely those *Events* must needs be *most affecting*, to whose *Subjects* we are of all the *most intimately related*. Now such is the Relation, which we bear to *Mankind*; and Men and Human Actions are the Subjects, here proposed for Imitation.

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cidents, and to *diminish* them. It is in these things therefore, that we must look for *Sentiment*. See *Arist. Poet* c. 19.—ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν Διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τῆ λέγειν δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. Μέρη δὲ τούτων, τό, τε ἀποδεικνῦναι, καὶ τὸ λύειν, καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, —καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος, καὶ σμικρότητα.

Ch. V. As to *Improvement*—there can be none surely (to *Man* at least) so great, as that which is derived from a just and decent Representation of *Human Manners*, and *Sentiments*. For what can more contribute to give us that *Master-Knowledge* (c), without

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(c) ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ. But farther, besides obtaining this *moral Science* from the Contemplation of Human Life; an End *common* both to Epic, Tragic, and Comic Poetry; there is a *peculiar* End to *Tragedy*, that of eradicating the Passions of *Pity* and *Fear*. "Ἐστὶ ἐν τραγωδίᾳ μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας—δι' ἧλέως καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. Arist. Poet. c. 6. TRAGEDY is the Imitation of an Action important and perfect, thro' PITY and FEAR working the PURGATION OF SUCH-LIKE PASSIONS.

THERE are none, it is evident, so devoid of these two *Passions*, as those *perpetually conversant*, where the *Occasions* of them are most frequent; such, for instance, as the *Military Men*, the Professors of *Medicine*, *Chirurgery*, and the like. Their Minds, by this Intercourse, become as it were *callous*; gaining an *Apathy* by *Experience*, which no *Theory* can ever teach them.

Now

out which, *all other Knowledge will prove of little or no Utility?* Ch. V.

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Now that, which is wrought in *these Men* by the *real Disasters of Life*, may be supposed wrought in others by the *Fictions of Tragedy*; yet with this happy Circumstance in favour of Tragedy, that, without the Disasters being *real*, it can obtain the *same End*.


IT must however, for all this, be confessed, that an Effect of this kind cannot reasonably be expected, except among Nations, like the *Athenians* of old, who lived in a perpetual Attendance upon these Theatrical Representations. For it is not a *single* or *occasional* Application to these Passions, but a *constant* and *uninterrupted*, by which alone they may be lessened or removed.

IT would be improper to conclude this Note, without observing, that the Philosopher in this place by PITY means not PHILANTHROPY, *Natural Affection, a Readiness to relieve others in their Calamities and Distress*; but, by *Pity*, he means that SENSELESS EFFEMINATE CONSTERNATION, *which seizes weak Minds, on the sudden Prospect of any thing disastrous*; which, in its more violent Effects, is seen in *Scriekings, Swoonings, &c.* a Passion, so far from laudable, or from operating to the Good of others, that it is certain to deprive the Party, who labours under its Influence, of all Capacity *to do the least good Office*.



Ch. V. As to our *Comprehension*——there is nothing certainly, of which we have so *strong* Ideas, as of that which happens in the *Moral* or *Human* World. For as to the *Internal Part*, or *Active Principle* of the *Vegetable*, we know it but *obscurely*; because there we can discover neither *Passion*, nor *Sensation*. In the *Animal* World indeed this *Principle* is more seen, and that from the *Passions* and *Sensations* which *there* declare themselves. Yet all still rests upon the mere Evidence of *Sense*; upon the Force only of *external* and *unassisted Experience*. But in the *Moral* or *Human* World, as we have a Medium of *Knowledge* far more *accurate* than this; so from hence it is, that we can comprehend *accordingly*.

WITH regard therefore to the various *Events* which happen *here*, and the various *Causes*, by which they are produced——in other Words, of all Characters, Manners, Human Passions, and Sentiments; besides the Evidence of *Sense*, we have the *bighest*  
Evidence

*Evidence additional, in having an express* Ch. V.  
*Consciousness of something similar within; *  
 of something *homogeneous* in the *Recesses* of  
 our own *Minds*; in that, which constitutes  
 to each of us *his true and real Self*.

THESE therefore being the *Subjects*, *not*  
*adapted to the Genius of Painting*, it comes  
 next to be considered, *how far Poetry can*  
*imitate them*.

AND here, that it has *Abilities* clearly  
*equal*, cannot be doubted; as it has *that*  
 for the *Medium* of its *Imitation*, through  
 which *Nature* declares herself in the *same*  
*Subjects*. For the *Sentiments* in *real Life*  
 are only known by Men's \* *Discourse*.  
 And the *Characters, Manners, and Passions*  
 of Men being the *Prompters* to what they  
*say*; it must needs follow, that their *Dis-*  
*course* will be a *constant Specimen* of those  
*Characters, Manners, and Passions*.

*Format*

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\* P. 84, Note (b).

Ch. V. \* *Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad omnem*

*Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad iram :*

*Post effert Animi Motus, INTERPRETE LINGUA.*

NOT only therefore *Language* is an adequate Medium of Imitation, but in *Sentiments* it is the *only* Medium; and in *Manners* and *Passions* there is no other, which can exhibit them to us after that *clear, precise, and definite Way*, as they in *Nature* stand allotted to the various sorts of Men, and are found to constitute the *several Characters* of each (a).

§ 3.

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\* *Hor. de Arte Poet.* vers. 108.

(d) IT is true indeed that (besides what is done by *Poetry*) there is some Idea of *Character*, which even *Painting* can communicate. Thus there is no doubt, but that such a *Countenance* may be found by *Painters* for *Æneas*, as would convey upon view a *mild,*

§ 3. To compare therefore Poetry, in Ch. V. these Subjects, with Painting—In as much as no Subjects of Painting are \* wholly superior

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\* P. 57, 58. 75, 76.

*mild, humane, and yet a brave Disposition. But then this Idea would be vague and general. It would be concluded, only in the gross, that the Hero was Good. As to that System of Qualities peculiar to Æneas only, and which alone properly constitutes his true and real Character, this would still remain a Secret, and be no way discoverable. For how deduce it from the mere Lineaments of a Countenance? Or, if it were deducible, how few Spectators would there be found so sagacious? It is here, therefore, that Recourse must be had, not to Painting, but to Poetry. So accurate a Conception of Character can be gathered only from a Succession of various, and yet consistent Actions; a Succession, enabling us to conjecture, what the Person of the Drama will do in the future, from what already he has done in the past. Now to such an Imitation, Poetry only is equal; because it is not bounded, like Painting, to short, and, as it were, instant Events, but may imitate Subjects of any Duration whatever. See Arist. Poet. cap. 6.*  
 \* Ἐστὶ δὲ ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποῖά τις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἕκ ἑστὶ δῆλον, εἰ προαίρεται ἢ φύγει ὁ λέγων. See also the ingenious and learned Bossu, Book 4. ch. 4.

Ch. V. *perior* to Poetry; while the Subjects, here described, *far exceed the Power* of Painting— in as much as they are of *all* Subjects the most † *affecting*, and *improving*, and such of which we have the *strongest Comprehension*— further, in as much as Poetry can *most* ‡ *accurately* imitate them— in as much as, besides all Imitation, there is a *Charm* in Poetry, arising from its very *Numbers* (e); whereas Painting has Pre-  
tence

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† P. 85, &c.

‡ P. 89, &c.

(e) THAT there is a *Charm* in *Poetry*, arising from its *Numbers* only, may be made evident from the five or six first Lines of the *Paradise Lost*; where, without any Pomp of Phrase, Sublimity of Sentiment, or the *least Degree of Imitation*, every Reader must find himself to be sensibly delighted; and that, only from the graceful and simple *Cadence* of the *Numbers*, and that artful *Variation* of the *Cæsura* or *Pause*, so essential to the Harmony of every good Poem.

AN *English Heroic Verse* consists of ten *Semipeds*, or Half-feet. Now in the Lines above-mentioned  
the

tence to no Charm, except that of Imitation only——lastly, (which will soon be \* shewn) in as much as Poetry is able to *associate Music*, as a most powerful Ally; of which Assistance, Painting is utterly incapable——FROM ALL THIS it may be fairly concluded, that——POETRY *is not only Equal, but that it is in fact FAR SUPERIOR TO ITS SISTER ART OF PAINTING.*

§ 4. BUT if it exceed *Painting* in *Subjects*, to which Painting is *not adapted*; no doubt *will it exceed MUSIC* in *Subjects* to  
 Music

\* Chap. VI.

the *Pauses* are varied upon *different Semipeds* in the Order, which follows; as may be seen by any, who will be at the Pains to examine.

PARADISE LOST, B. I.

|         |   |                            |   |           |
|---------|---|----------------------------|---|-----------|
| Verse 1 | } | has its Pause<br>fall upon | } | Semiped 7 |
| — 2     |   |                            |   | — 6       |
| — 3     |   |                            |   | — 6       |
| — 4     |   |                            |   | — 5       |
| — 5     |   |                            |   | — 3       |
| — 6     |   |                            |   | — 4       |

Ch. V. Music *not adapted*. For here it has been  
 \* *preferred*, even in those Subjects, which  
 have been held *adapted the best of all*.

§ 5. POETRY IS THEREFORE, ON THE  
 WHOLE MUCH SUPERIOR TO EITHER OF  
 THE OTHER MIMETIC ARTS; *it having*  
*been shewn to be equally excellent* IN THE  
 † ACCURACY OF ITS IMITATION; *and to*  
*imitate* SUBJECTS, WHICH FAR SURPASS,  
 AS WELL IN ‡ UTILITY, AS IN || DIG-  
 NITY.

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\* Ch. IV. § 3. † P. 89. ‡ P. 86.

|| See p. 83, 84. and p. 64, Note (g). See also  
 P. 59.

## C H A P. VI.

*On Music considered not as an Imitation, but as deriving its Efficacy from another Source.—On its joint Operation by this means with Poetry.—An Objection to Music solved.—The Advantage arising to it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united.—Conclusion.*

**I**N the above Discourse, Music has Ch.VI. been mentioned as an \* *Ally* to Poetry. It has also been said to derive its † *Efficacy* from *another Source*, than *Imitation*. It remains, therefore, that these things be explained.

Now, in order to this, it is first to be observed, that there are various *Affections*, which may be raised by the Power of *Music*.

\* P. 93.

† P. 69.



Ch. VI. *Music.* There are Sounds to make us *cheerful*, or *sad*; *martial*, or *tender*; and so of almost every other Affection, which we feel.

It is also further observable, that there is a *reciprocal Operation* between our *Affections*, and our *Ideas*; so that, by a sort of *natural Sympathy*, certain *Ideas* necessarily tend to raise in us certain *Affections*; and those *Affections*, by a sort of Counter-Operation, to raise the *same Ideas*. Thus *Ideas* derived from Funerals, Tortures, Murders, and the like, naturally generate the Affection of *Melancholy*. And when, by any *Physical Causes*, that *Affection* happens to prevail, it as naturally generates the *same doleful Ideas*.

AND hence it is, that *Ideas*, derived from *external Causes*, have at *different* times, upon the *same Person*, so *different* an Effect. If they happen to suit the *Affections*, which *prevail within*, then is their Impression *most sensible*, and their Effect *most*

*most lasting.* If the contrary be true, then Ch. VI. is the Effect contrary. Thus, for instance, a Funeral will much more affect the same Man, if he see it when melancholy, than if he see it when chearful.

Now this being premised, it will follow, that whatever happens to be the *Affection* or *Disposition* of Mind, which ought naturally to result from the Genius of any *Poem*, the *same* probably it will be in the Power of some Species of *Music* to excite. But whenever the *proper Affection* prevails, it has been allowed that then *all kindred Ideas*, derived from external Causes, make the *most sensible Impression*. The Ideas therefore of Poetry must needs make the most sensible Impression, when the (a) Affections, peculiar to them, are already

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(a) QUINTILIAN elegantly, and exactly apposite to this Reasoning, says of *Music*——*Namque & voce & modulatione grandia elatè, jucunda dulciter, moderata*

Ch. VI. ready excited by the Musie. For here a  
 { double Force is made co-operate to one End.  
 A Poet, thus assisted, finds not an Audience  
 in a Temper, averse to the Genius of his  
 Poem, or perhaps at best under a cool *In-*  
*difference*; but by the Preludes, the Sym-  
 phonies, and *concurrent Operation* of the  
 Music in all its Parts, rouzed into *those*  
*very Affections*, which he would most  
 desire.

AN Audience, so disposed, not only em-  
 brace with Pleasure the Ideas of the Poet,  
 when exhibited; but, in a manner, even  
*anticipate* them in their several Imagina-  
 tions. The Superstitious have not a more  
 previous Tendency to be frightened at the  
 sight of Spectres, or a Lover to fall into  
 Raptures at the sight of his Mistress; than  
 a Mind, thus tempered by the Power of  
 Music,

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*moderata leniter canit, totaque arte consentit cum eo-*  
*rum, quæ dicuntur, AFFECTIBUS. Inſt. Orator. l. 1.*  
 cap. 10.

Music, to enjoy all Ideas, which are suitable to that Temper. Ch. VI.

AND hence the *genuine* Charm of Music, and the *Wonders* which it works, thro' its great Professors (*b*). A Power, which consists not in Imitations, and the raising *Ideas*; but in the raising *Affections*, to which Ideas may correspond. There are few to be found so insensible, I may even say so inhumane, as when GOOD POETRY IS JUSTLY SET TO MUSIC, not in some degree to feel the Force of so *amiable an Union*. But to the Muses Friends it is a Force *irresistible*, and pene-

H 2

trates

(*b*) SUCH, above all, is *George Frederick Handel*; whose Genius, having been cultivated by continued Exercise, and being itself far the sublimest and most universal now known, has justly placed him without an Equal, or a Second. This transient Testimony could not be denied so excellent an Artist, from whom this Treatise has borrowed such eminent Examples, to justify its Assertions in what it has offered concerning Music.

Ch. VI. trates into the deepest Recesses of the  
Soul.

— \* *Pectus inaniter angit,*  
*Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet.*

§ 2. Now this is *that Source*, from whence Music was † said formerly *to derive its greatest Efficacy*. And here indeed, not in (c) Imitation, ought it to be chiefly cultivated. On this account also it has been called a ‡ *powerful Ally* to Poetry. And farther, it is by the help of this Reasoning, that the *Objection* is solved, which is raised against the *Singing of Poetry* (as in Opera's, Oratorio's, &c.) from the want  
of

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\* *Horat. Epist. 1. l. 2. vers. 211.*

† P. 69.

‡ P. 93.

(c) FOR the narrow Extent and little Efficacy of MUSIC, considered as a MIMETIC or IMITATIVE ART, see Ch. II. § 3.

of *Probability* and *Resemblance to Nature*. Ch. VI.

To one indeed, who has no musical Ear, this Objection may have Weight. It may even perplex a Lover of Music, if it happen to surprize him in his Hours of *Indifference*. But when he is feeling the Charm of Poetry *so accompanied*, let him be angry (if he can) with that, which serves only to interest him *more feelingly* in the Subject, and support him in a *stronger* and *more earnest* Attention; which enforces, by its Aid, the several Ideas of the Poem, and gives them to his Imagination with unusual Strength and Grandeur. He cannot surely but confess, that he is a *Gainer in the Exchange*, when he *barters* the want of a single Probability, that of *Pronunciation* (a thing merely arbitrary and every where different) for a *noble Heightening of Affections* which are suitable to the Occasion, and enable him to enter into the Subject with double *Energy* and *Enjoyment*.

Ch. VI. § 3. FROM what has been said it is evident, that these two Arts can never be so powerful *singly*, as when they are *properly united*. For *Poetry*, when alone, must be necessarily forced to *waste* many of its richest *Ideas*, in the mere raising of *Affections*, when, to have been properly relished, it should have *found* those *Affections* in their highest Energy. And *Music*, when alone, can only raise *Affections*, which soon *languish* and *decay*, if not maintained and fed by the nutritive Images of Poetry. Yet must it be remembered, in this Union, that *Poetry* ever have the *Precedence*; its \* *Utility*, as well as *Dignity*, being by far the more considerable.

§ 4. AND thus much, for the present, as to † MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY,  
the

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\* Ch. V. § 2. p. 83.

† P. 55.

PAINTING, *and* POETRY.

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the Circumstances, in which they *agree*, Ch. VI.  
and in which they *differ*; and the PRE-  
FERENCE, DUE TO ONE OF THEM ABOVE  
THE OTHER TWO.

*The* E N D.

H 4





TREATISE THE THIRD;  
CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.



CONCERNING HAPPINESS,  
A DIALOGUE.

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PART THE FIRST.

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J. H. to F. S.

NATURE seems to treat Man, <sup>Part I.</sup>  
as a painter would his disciple,  
to whom he commits the out-  
lines of a Figure lightly sketched, which  
the Scholar for himself is to colour and  
complete. Thus from Nature we derive  
Senses, and Passions, and an Intellect,  
which each of us *for himself* has to model  
into a Character. And hence (the reverse  
of

**Part I.** of every Species beside) Human Characters alone are infinitely various; as various indeed, as there are Individuals to form them. Hence too, the great Diversity of Systems, and of Doctrines, respecting the Laws and Rules, and Conduct of Human Life.

IT is in the History of these, my Friend, you have so successfully employed yourself. You have been studious to know, not so much what *Greeks, Romans, or Barbarians* have *done*; as what they have *reasoned*, and what they have *taught*. Not an Epicure has more Joy in the Memory of a delicious Banquet, than I feel in recollecting, what we have discoursed on these Subjects.

AND here you cannot forget (for we were both unanimous) the Contempt, in which we held those superficial Censurers, who profess to refute, what they want even Capacities to comprehend. Upon the Faith of their own Boasting (could that be credited)

credited) Sentiments are exposed, Opinions Part I.  
 demolished, and the whole Wisdom of  
 Antiquity lies vanquished at their Feet.  
 Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage,  
 they can with ease dispatch a Lion, or dis-  
 comfit a whole Legion. But alas! were  
 they to encounter, not the Shadow, but  
 the Substance, what think you would be  
 the Event then?—Little better, I fear, than  
 was the Fortune of poor *Priam*, when the  
 feeble Old Man durst attack the Youthful  
*Pyrrhus*.

— \* *Telum imbelle sine ictu*

*Conjecit; raucō quod protenus ære repulsum.*

*Et summo Clypeine quicquam umbone pependit.*

AMONG the many long exploded and  
 obsolete Systems, there was one, you may  
 remember, for which I professed a great  
 Esteem. Not in the least degree con-  
 vinced by all I had heard against it, I  
 durst

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\* *Æneid. l. 2. vers. 544.*

Part I.

durst venture to affirm, that no System was more *plausible*; that grant but its *Principles*, and the *rest followed of course*; that none approached nearer to the *Perfection of our own RELIGION*, as I could prove, were there occasion, by *Authority not to be controverted*. As you, I knew, were the Favourer of an Hypothesis somewhat † *different*; so I attempted to support my own, by reciting you a certain Dialogue. Not succeeding however so happily in the Recollection, as I could wish, I have since endeavoured to transcribe, what at that time I would have rehearsed. The result of my Labour is the following Narrative, which I commit with Confidence to your Friendship and Candour.

§ 2. IT was at a time, when a certain Friend, whom I highly value, was my Guest. We had been sitting together,  
enter-

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† *Viz.* the PLATONIC.

entertaining ourselves with *Shakespear*. Part I:  
 Among many of his Characters, we had  
 looked into that of *Woolsey*. How soon,  
 says my Friend, does the Cardinal in Dis-  
 grace abjure that Happiness, which he was  
 lately so fond of? Scarcely out of Office,  
 but he begins to exclaim

*\*Vain Pomp and Glory of the World! I hate ye.*

So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary  
 with the Season; and that in Adversity we  
 are of one Mind, in Prosperity, of another.

As for his mean Opinion, said I, of  
 Human Happiness, it is a Truth, which  
 small Reflection might have taught him long  
 before. There seems little need of Distress  
 to inform us of this. I rather commend  
 the seeming Wisdom of that † Eastern Mo-  
 narch, who in the Affluence of Prosperity,  
 when he was proving every Pleasure, was  
 yet so sensible of their Emptiness, their In-  
 sufficiency to make him happy, that he  
 pro-

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\* SHAKESPEAR'S *Henry the Eighth*.

† *Tusc. Disp.* v. 7.



Part I. proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who should invent a new Delight. The Reward indeed was proclaimed, but the Delight was not to be found. If by Delight, said he, you mean some *Good*; *something conducive to real Happiness*; it might have been found perhaps, and yet not hit the Monarch's Fancy.

Is that, said I, possible? It is possible, replied he, tho' it had been *the Sovereign Good itself*—And indeed what wonder? Is it probable that such a Mortal, as an Eastern Monarch; such a pampered, flattered, idle Mortal; should have Attention, or Capacity to a Subject so delicate? A Subject, enough to exercise the Subtlest and most Acute?

WHAT then is it you esteem, said I, the *Sovereign Good* to be? It should seem, by your Representation, to be something very uncommon. Ask me not the Question, said he, you know not where it will carry us. Its *general Idea* indeed is easy and plain; but the *Detail of Particulars* is perplexed

perplexed and long—Passions, and Opinions for ever thwart us——a Paradox appears in almost every Advance. Besides, did our Inquiries succeed ever so happily, the *very Subject itself* is always enough to give me Pain. That, replied I, seems a Paradox indeed. It is not, said he, from any Prejudice, which I have conceived against it; for to Man I esteem it the noblest in the World. Nor is it for being a Subject, to which my Genius does not lead me; for no Subject at all times has more employed my Attention. But the Truth is, I can scarce ever think on it but an unlucky Story still occurs to my Mind. “A certain Star-gazer, with his  
 “ Telescope was once viewing the Moon;  
 “ and describing her Seas, her Mountains,  
 “ and her Territories. Says a Clown to  
 “ his Companion, *Let him spy what he*  
 “ *pleases; we are as near to the Moon, as*  
 “ *he and all his Brethren.*” So fares it alas! with these, our *moral* Speculations. Practice too often *creeps*, where Theory can *soar*. The *Philosopher* proves as *weak*,

Part I. as those, *whom he most contemns*. A mortifying Thought to such as well attend it.

Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your *general Idea of the Sovereign Good*. This is easy from your own Account, however intricate the Detail.

Thus then, said he, since you are so urgent, it is thus that I conceive it. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS THAT, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH RENDERS US HAPPY.

And how, said I, do we possess it? Is it *Sensual*, or *Intellectual*? There

you are entering, said he, upon the *Detail*. This is beyond your Question. Not

a small Advance, said I, to indulge poor Curiosity? Will you raise me a Thirst, and be so cruel not to allay it? It is not,

replied he, of my raising, but your own. Besides I am not certain, should I attempt to proceed, whether you will admit such *Authorities*, as it is possible I may vouch.

That, said I, must be determined by their Weight, and Character. Sup-

pose, said he, it should be MANKIND; Part I.  
 the *whole Human Race*. Would you not  
 think it something strange, to seek of *those*  
 concerning GOOD, who pursue it a *thou-*  
*sand Ways*, and many of them *contra-*  
*dictory*? I confess, said I, it seems so.

And yet, continued he, were there  
 a Point, in which such *Dissentients* ever  
 agreed, this *Agreement* would be no mean  
*Argument* in favour of its *Truth* and *Just-*  
*ness*. But where, replied I, is this  
 Agreement to be found?

He answered me by asking, What if  
 it should appear, that there were certain  
 ORIGINAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRE-  
 CONCEPTIONS OF GOOD, *which were NA-*  
*TURAL, UNIFORM AND COMMON TO ALL*  
*MEN; which all recognized in their various*  
*Pursuits; and that the Difference lay only*  
 IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICU-  
 LARS? This requires, said I, to be  
 illustrated.

As if, continued he, a  
 Company of Travellers, in some wide  
 Forest, were all intending for one City,

Part I. but each by a Route peculiar to himself.  
 The Roads indeed would be *various*, and many perhaps *false*; but all who travelled, would have *one End in view*. It is evident, said I, they would. So fares it then, added he, with Mankind in pursuit of *Good*. The Ways indeed are *Many*, but what they seek is *ONE*.

FOR instance: Did you ever hear of any, who in pursuit of their *Good*, were for living the Life of a Bird, an Insect, or a Fish? None. And why not?

It would be inconsistent, answered I, with their Nature. You see then, said he, they *all agree* in this—that what they pursue, ought to be *consistent, and agreeable to their proper Nature*. So ought it, said I, undoubtedly. If so, continued he, one *Pre-conception* is discovered, which is *common to Good in general*—It is, that *all Good is supposed something agreeable to Nature*. This indeed, replied I, seems to be agreed on all hands.

BUT again, said he,——Is there a Man Part I.  
 scarcely to be found of a Temper so truly ~~~~~  
 mortified, as to acquiesce in the *lowest*, and  
*shortest Necessaries of Life*? Who aims not,  
 if he be able; at something *farther*, some-  
 thing *better*? I replied, Scarcely one.

Do not Multitudes pursue, said he,  
*infinite* Objects of Desire, acknowledged,  
 every one of them, to be in no respect  
*Necessaries*?——Exquisite Viands, deli-  
 cious Wines, splendid Apparel, curious Gar-  
 dens; magnificent Apartments adorned with  
 Pictures and Sculpture; Music and Poetry,  
 and the whole Tribe of *Elegant Arts*?

It is evident, said I. If it be,  
 continued he, it should seem that they *all*  
 considered the *Chief* or *Sovereign Good*, not  
 to be that, *which conduces to bare Existence*  
*or mere Being*; for to this the *Necessaries*  
*alone are adequate*. I replied they were.

But if not this, it must be somewhat  
*conducive to that, which is superior to mere*  
*Being*. It must. And what, con-  
 tinued he, can this be, but *Well-Being*?

Part I. Well-Being, under the various Shapes, in which *differing* Opinions paint it? Or can you suggest any thing else? I replied, I could not. Mark here, then, continued he, another *Pre-conception*, in which they *all* agree——the *Sovereign Good* is somewhat *conducive, not to mere Being, but to Well-being*. I replied, it had so appeared.

AGAIN, continued he. What labour, what expence, to procure those rarities, which our own poor country is unable to afford us? How is the world ransacked to its utmost verges, and luxury and arts imported from every quarter?——Nay more——How do we baffle *Nature* herself; invert her Order; seek the Vegetables of Spring in the rigours of Winter, and Winter's Ice, during the heats of Summer? I replied, We did. And what disappointment, what remorse, when endeavours fail? It is true. If this then be evident, said he, it should seem, that whatever we desire as our *Chief* and  
Sove-

*Sovereign Good*, is something *which, as far as possible, we would accommodate to all Places and Times.* Part I. }  
 I answered, so it appeared.

See then, said he, another of its *Characteristics*, another *Pre-conception*.

BUT farther still——What contests for *Wealth*? What scrambling for *Property*? What perils in the pursuit; what sollicitude in the maintenance?—And why all this? To what *Purpose*, what *End*?—Or is not the reason plain? Is it not that *Wealth* may *continually* procure us, whatever we fancy *Good*; and make that *perpetual*, which would otherwise be *transient*?

I replied, it seemed so. Is it not farther desired, as *supplying us from ourselves*; when, without it, we must be beholden to the benevolence of *others*, and *depend on their caprice* for all that we enjoy?

It is true, said I, this seems a reason.

AGAIN——Is not *Power* of every degree as much contested for, as *Wealth*? Are not magistracies, honours, principalities, and



Part I. empire, the subjects of strife, and everlasting contention? I replied, They were. And why, said he, this? To obtain what End?—Is it not to *help* us, like wealth, to the *Possession of what we desire*? Is it not farther to *ascertain*, to *secure* our enjoyments; that when *others* would deprive us, we may be *strong enough to resist them*? I replied, it was.

OR to invert the whole—Why are there, who seek recesses the most distant and retired? fly courts and power, and submit to *Parcimony* and *Obscurity*? Why, all this, but from the *same* intention? From an Opinion that *small* possessions, used moderately, are *permanent*—that *larger* possessions raise envy, and are more frequently *invaded*—that the *Safety of Power and Dignity is more precarious, than that of Retreat*; and that therefore they have chosen, what is *most eligible upon the whole*? It is not, said I, improbable, that they act by some such motive.

Do

Do you not see then, continued he, two Part I.  
 or three more *Pre-conceptions* of the *Sovereign Good*, which are sought for by all, as  
 essential to constitute it? And what, ~  
 said I, are these? That it should  
 not be *transient*, nor *derived from the*  
*Will of others*, nor *in their Power to take*  
*away*; but be *durable, self-derived*, and (if  
 I may use the Expression) *indeprivable*.

I confess, said I, it appears so.

But we have already found it to be con-  
 sidered, as *something agreeable to our Nature*;  
*conducive*, not to mere Being, but to *Well-*  
*Being*; and what we aim to have *accommo-*  
*date to all Places and Times*. We have.

THERE may be *other* Characteristics,  
 said he, but these I think sufficient. See  
 then its Idea; behold it, as collected from  
 the *Original, Natural, and Universal Pre-*  
*conceptions of all Mankind*. THE SOVE-  
 REIGN GOOD, they have taught us, ought  
 to be something—AGREEABLE TO OUR  
 NATURE; CONDUCTIVE TO WELL-BEING;  
 ACCOM-

Part I. ACCOMMODATE TO ALL PLACES AND  
 TIMES; DURABLE, SELF-DERIVED, AND  
 INDEPRIVABLE. Your account, said  
 I, appears just.

It matters, continued he, little, how they *err* in the *Application*—if they covet that as *agreeable to Nature*, which is in itself most *Contrary*—if they would have that as *Durable*, which is in itself most *Transient*—that as *Independent*, and their own, which is most precarious and *Servile*. It is enough for us, if we know their *Aim*—enough, if we can discover, what it is they propose—the *Means* and *Method* may be *absurd*, as it happens. I answered, their Aim was sufficient to prove what he had asserted.

It is true, replied he, it is abundantly sufficient. And yet perhaps, even tho' this were ever so certain, it would not be altogether foreign; were we to examine, how they act; how they succeed in applying these *Universals* to *Particular Subjects*.

*jects*. Should they be found *just* in the Part I. Application, we need look no farther—  
 The true *Sovereign Good* would of course be *Plain* and *Obvious*; and we should have no more to do, than to follow the beaten road. It is granted, replied I. But what if they *err*? Time enough for that, said he, when we are satisfied that they do. We ought first to inform ourselves, whether they may not possibly be in the right. I submitted, and begged him to proceed his own way.

§ 3. WILL you then, said he, in this disquisition into Human Conduct, allow me this—That such, as is the Species of Life, which every one *chooses*; such is his *Idea* of *Happiness*, such his *Conception* of the *Sovereign Good*? I seem, said I, to comprehend You, but should be glad You would illustrate. His Meaning, he answered, was no more than this—If a Man prefer a Life of *Industry*, it is because he has an *Idea* of Happiness in *Wealth*; if he prefers a Life of *Gaiety*, it is from a  
 like

like *Idea* concerning *Pleasure*. And the same, we say, holds true in every other Instance. I told him, it must certainly.

AND can you recollect, said he, any Life, but what is a Life of *Business*, or of *Leisure*? I answered, None. And is not the great *End* of *Business* either *Power*, or *Wealth*? It is. Must not every *Life* therefore of *Business* be either *Political* or *Lucrative*? It must.

Again—Are not *Intellect* and *Sense*, the *Soul's* leading *Powers*? They are.

And in *Leisure* are we not ever seeking, to *gratify one or the other*?

We are. Must not every *Life* therefore of *Leisure* be either *Pleasurable*, or *Contemplative*? If you confine *Pleasure*, said I, to *Sense*, I think it necessarily must.

If it be not *so confined*, said he, we *confound all Inquiry*. Allow it.

MARK then, said he, the two grand *Genera*, the LIVES of BUSINESS and of LEISURE

LEISURE——mark also the *subordinate* Part I. *Species*; the POLITICAL and LUCRATIVE, the CONTEMPLATIVE and PLEASURABLE——Can you think of any other, which *these* will not include?

I replied, I knew of none. It is possible indeed, said he, that there may be *other* Lives framed, by the *blending* of these, two or more of them together. But if we separate with accuracy, we shall find that here they all terminate.

I replied, so it seemed probable.

IF then, continued he, we would be exact in our Inquiry, we must *examine these four Lives*, and mark their *Consequences*. It is thus only we shall learn, how far those, who embrace them, find that *Good* and *Happiness*, which we know *they all pursue*. I made answer, it seemed necessary, and I should willingly attend him.

§ 4. To begin then, said he, with the POLITICAL LIFE. Let us see the GOOD, usually

Part I. usually sought after here. To a *private*

*Man*, it is the favour of some Prince, or Commonwealth; the honours and emoluments derived from this favour; the court and homage of mankind; the power of commanding others——To a *Prince*, it is the *same* thing nearly, only *greater in Degree*; a larger command; a stricter and more servile homage; glory, conquest, and extended empire——Am I right in my description? I replied,

I thought he was. Whether then, said he, *all this* deserves the Name of *Good* or not, I do not controvert. Be it one, or the other, it affects not our Inquiry. All that I would ask concerning it, is this——Do you not think it a *Good* (if it really be one) *derived from Foreign and External Causes*? Undoubtedly, replied I.

It cannot come then from *ourselves*, or be *self-derived*. It cannot. And what shall we say as to its *Duration* and *Stability*? Is it so *firm* and *lasting*, that we cannot be *deprived* of it? I should imagine, said I, quite otherwise. You insist not

then,

then, said he, on my appealing to *History*. Part I.  
 You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites,             
 of Empires, and their Owners. I re-  
 plied, I did.

IF so, said he, it should seem that this  
*Political Good*, which they seek, corresponds  
 not to the *Pre-conceptions* of being *Durable*,  
 and *Indeprivable*. Far from it. But  
 it appeared just before, not to be *self-de-*  
*rired*. It did. You see then,  
 said he, that *in three of our Pre-conceptions*  
*it intirely fails*. So indeed, said I, it  
 appears,

BUT farther, said he—We are told of  
 this *Good*, that in the *Possession* it is attended  
 with *Anxiety*; and that when *lost*, it is  
 usually *lost* with *Ignominy* and *Disgrace*;  
 nay, often with prosecutions and the bit-  
 tereft resentments; with mulcts, with  
 exile, and death itself. It is frequently,  
 said I, the case. How then, said he,  
 can it answer that other *Pre-conception*, of  
*contributing to our Well-Being*? Can that  
 contribute



Part I. contribute to *Well-Being*, whose *Consequences* lead to *Calamity*, and whose *Presence* implies *Anxiety*? This, it must be confessed, said I, appears not probable.

BUT once more, said he——There are certain *Habits* or *Dispositions of Mind*, called Sincerity, Generosity, Candour, Plain-dealing, Justice, Honour, Honesty, and the like. There are. And it has been generally believed, that these are *agreeable to Nature*. Assuredly.

But it has been as generally believed, that the *Political Good*, we speak of, is often not to be acquired but by *Habits, contrary to these*; and which, if *these* are *Natural*, must of necessity be *unnatural*. What

*Habits*, said I, do you mean? Flattery, answered he, Diffimulation, Intrigue: upon occasion, perhaps Iniquity, Falshood, and Fraud.

It is possible indeed, said I, that these may *sometimes* be thought necessary.

How then, said he, can that *Good* be *agreeable to Nature*, which cannot be *acquired*, but by *Habits contrary to Nature*?

*Nature?* Your Argument, said I, Part I. seems just.

IF then, said he, we have reasoned rightly, and our Conclusions may be depended on; it should seem that the SUPPOSED GOOD, *which the POLITICAL LIFE pursues, corresponds not, in any Instance, to our Pre-conceptions of the SOVEREIGN GOOD.*

I answered, So it appeared.

§ 5. LET us quit then, said he, the *Political Life*, and pass to the LUCRATIVE. The Object of this is WEALTH. . . Admit it.

And is it not too often, said he, the Case, that *to acquire this*, we are tempted to employ some of *those Habits*, which we have just condemned as *Unnatural*? Such, I mean, as Fraud, Falshood, Injustice, and the like? It must be owned, said I, too often.

BESIDES, continued he——What shall we say to the *Esteem*, the *Friendship*, and *Love of Mankind*? Are they worth having?

Part I. Is it *agreeable*, think you, to *Nature*, to endeavour to *deserve* them? Agreeable, said I, to *Nature*, beyond dispute. If so, then to merit *Hatred* and *Contempt*, said he, must needs be *contrary to Nature*.

Undoubtedly. And is there any thing which so certainly merits *Hatred* and *Contempt*, as a mere *Lucrative Life*, spent in the uniform Pursuit of *Wealth*?

I replied, I believed there was nothing.

If so, said he, then as to *corresponding with our Pre-conceptions*, the *Lucrative Good*, in this respect, fares no better than the *Political*. It appears not.

AND what shall we say as to *Anxiety*? Is not both the *Possession* and *Pursuit* of *Wealth*, to those who really love it, ever *anxious*? It seems so. And why *anxious*, but from a Certainty of its *Instability*; from an Experience, how obnoxious it is to every cross Event; how easy to be lost and transferred to others, by the same Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it to ourselves?—This is indeed the tritest of  
of

all Topics. The Poets and Orators have long ago exhausted it. It is true, said I, they have. Part I. May we not venture then, said he, upon the whole, to pass the *same* Sentence on the LUCRATIVE LIFE, as we have already on the *Political*—*that it proposes not a GOOD, correspondent to those Pre-conceptions, by which we would all be governed in THE GOOD, which we are all seeking?* I answered, we might justly.

§ 6. IF then neither the *Lucrative Life*, nor the *Political*, said he, procure that *Good* which we desire: shall we seek it from the PLEASURABLE? Shall we make PLEASURE our *Goddeſs*?

*----- Pleasure,*  
*Whom Love attends, and ſoft Deſire, and*  
*Words*  
*Alluring, apt the ſteadieſt Heart to bend.*

So ſays the Poet, and plausible his Doctrine. Plausible, ſaid I, indeed.

Part I.

LET it then, continued he, be a *pleasurable World*; a Race of *harmless, loving Animals*; an *Elysian Temperature* of Sunshine and Shade. Let the *Earth, in every Quarter*, resemble our own dear Country; where never was a Frost, never a Fog, never a Day, but was delicious and serene.

I was a little embarrassed at this unexpected Flight, till recollecting myself, I told him, (but still with some Surprise) that, in no degree to disparage either my Country or my Countrymen, I had never found Either so exquisite, as he now supposed them. There are then, it seems, said he, in the *Natural World*, and even in our own beloved Country, such things as *Storms* and *Tempests*; as pinching *Colds*, and scorching *Heats*.

I replied, there were. And consequent to these, *Disease*, and *Famine*, and infinite *Calamities*. There are:

And in the *Civil or Human World*, we have *Discord* and *Contention*; or (as the

Poet

Poet better \* describes it)

Part I.

*Cruel Revenge, and rancorous Despise,  
Disloyal Treason, and heart-burning Hate.*

We have. Alas! then, poor *Pleasure!* Where is that *GOOD, accommodate to every Time; suited to every Place; self-derived, not dependent on Foreign External Causes?* Can it be *PLEASURE*, on such a *changeable, such a turbulent Spot, as this?* I replied, I thought not.

AND what indeed, were the *World*, said he, modelled to a *Temperature the most exact?* Were the Rigours of the Seasons never more to be known; nor Wars, Devastations, Famines, or Diseases? Admitting all this, (which we know to be *impossible*) can we find still in *Pleasure* that *lengthened Duration*, which we consider as an *Essential*, to constitute the *Sovereign Good?*—Ask the Glutton, the Drinker,

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the

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\* SPENCER'S *Fairy Queen*, B. 2. Cant. 7. Stanz. 22.

Part I.

the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether they know any *Enjoyment*, not to be cancelled by *Satiety*? Which does not hastily pass away into the tedious Intervals of *Indifference*?—Or yielding all this too, (which we know *cannot be yielded*) where are we to find our *Good*, how possess it in *Age*? In that *Eve of Life*, declining *Age*, when *the Power of Sense*, on which all depends, like the setting *Sun*, is *gradually forsaking us*?

I SHOULD imagine, said I, that *Pleasure* was no mean Adversary, since you employ, in attacking her, so much of your *Rhetoric*. Without heeding what I said, he pursued his Subject—Beside, if this be our *Good*, our *Happiness*, and our *End*; to what purpose *Powers*, which bear no *Relation* to it?—Why *Memory*? Why *Reason*? *Mere Sensation* might have been as *exquisite*, had we been *Flies* or *Earth-worms*—Or can it be proved otherwise?

I replied, I could not say. *No Animal*, continued he, *possesses its Faculties in vain.*

vain. And shall Man derive no Good Part I  
 from his *best*, his most *eminent*? From  
 That, which of all is *peculiar* to himself?  
 For as to *Growth* and *Nutrition*, they are  
 not wanting to the meanest *Vegetable*; and  
 for *Senses*, there are *Animals*, which per-  
 haps *exceed us* in them all.

§ 7. THIS seems, said I, no mean Ar-  
 gument in favour of CONTEMPLATION.  
 THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE gives *Reason*  
 all the Scope, which it can desire. And  
 of all Lives, answered he, would it surely  
 be the best, did we dwell, like *Milton's*  
*Uriel*, in the *Sun's bright Circle*. Then  
 might we plan indeed the most *Romantic*  
*Kind of Happiness*. Stretched at Ease,  
 without Trouble or Molestation, we might  
 pass our Days, *contemplating* the Uni-  
 verse; tracing its Beauty; lost in Wonder;  
 ravished with Ecstasy, and I know not  
 what——But here alas! on this *sublunary*,  
 this *turbulent* Spot, (as we called it not  
 long since) how little is this, or any thing  
 like it, *practicable*?——Fogs arise, which



Part I. dim our Prospects—the Cares of Life perpetually molest us—Is Contemplation suited to a Place, like this? It must be owned, said I, not extremely. How then is it the *Sovereign Good*, which should be *Accommodate to every Place?* I replied, it seemed not probable.

BUT farther, said he——Can we enjoy the *Sovereign Good*, and be at the same time *vexed, and agitated by Passion?* Does not this seem a Paradox? I answered, it did. Suppose then an *Event* were to happen—not an *Inundation*, or *Massacre*—but an Acquaintance only drop a *disrespectful Word*; a Servant chance to break a *favourite Piece of Furniture*—What would instruct us to endure this?—*Contemplation*, Theory, Abstractions? Why not, said I? No, replied he with Warmth, (quoting the Poet) not

———\* *Tho' all the Stars*

*Thou know'st by Name; and all the Etherial Powers.* For

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\* *Par. Lost*, B. 12. ver. 576.

For does not *Experience* teach us, abundantly teach us, that our deepest Philosophers, as to *Temper and Behaviour*, are as very *Children* for the most part, as the meanest and most illiterate? A little more Arrogance perhaps, from Presumption of what they know, but not a grain more of *Magnanimity*, of *Candour* and *calm Indurance*. Part I.

You are somewhat too severe, said I, in censuring of all. There are better and worse among Them, as among Others.

The *Difference* is no way *proportioned*, said he, to the *Quantity of their Knowledge*; so that whatever be its Cause, it can't be imputed to their *Speculations*.— Besides, can you really imagine, we came here only to *Think*? Is *Acting* a Circumstance, which is *foreign to Our Character*? — Why then so many *Social Affections*, which all of us feel, even in *spite of ourselves*? Are we to suppress them All, as *useless and unnatural*? The Attempt, replied I, must needs be found impracticable.

Part I. cable. Where they once *suppressed*, said he, the Consequences would be somewhat strange. We should hear no more of Father, Brother, Husband, Son, Citizen, Magistrate, and *Society itself*. And were this ever the Case, ill (I fear) would it fare with even *Contemplation* itself. It would certainly be but bad *Speculating*, among lawless Barbarians—Unaffiliated Animals—where *Strength* alone of *Body* was to constitute *Dominion*, and the Contest came to be (as \* *Horace* describes it)

—*glandem atque cubilia propter,  
Unguibus & pugnis, dein fustibus—*

Bad enough, replied I, of all conscience.

It should seem then, said he, that not even the BEST CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE, however noble its *Object*, was AGREEABLE TO OUR PRESENT NATURE, or *consistent with*

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\* Sat. 3. l. 1. ver. 99.

*with our present Situation.* I confess, Part I.

said I, you appear to have proved so.

But if this be allowed true of the *Best*, the most *Excellent*; what shall we say to the Mockery of *Monkery*; the Farce of *Friars*; the ridiculous Mummery of being sequestred in a *Cloyster*? This surely is too low a Thing, even to merit an Examination. I have no Scruples here, said I, you need not waste your Time.

§ 8. If that, said he, be your Opinion, let us look a little backward. For our memory's sake it may be proper to recapitulate. I replied, it would be highly acceptable. Thus then, said he—

We have examined the *four grand Lives*, which we find the Generality of Men embrace; the *Lucrative*, and the *Political*; the *Pleasurable*, and the *Contemplative*. And we have aimed at proving that—  
*to such a Being as MAN, with such a Body, such Affections, such Senses, and such an Intellect—placed in such a WORLD, subject to such Incidents—not one of these LIVES is*  
*pro-*

Part I. *productive of that GOOD, which we find all Men to recognize thro' the same uniform PRE-CONCEPTIONS; and which thro' one or other of these Lives they all of them pursue.*

§ 9. You have justly, said I, collected the Sum of your Inquiries. And happy, said he, should I think it, were they to terminate here. I asked him, Why? Because, replied he, to insinuate first, that *all Mankind* are in the wrong; and then to attempt afterwards, to shew *one's self* only to be right; is a Degree of Arrogance, which I would not willingly be guilty of. I ventured here to say, That I thought he need not be so diffident—that a Subject, where *one's own Interest* appeared concerned so *nearly*, would well justify every *Scruple*, and even the severest *Inquiry*. There, said, he you say something—there you encourage me indeed. For what;—Are we not cautioned against *Counterfeits*, even in Matters of meanest Value? If a Piece of Metal be tendered us, which seems doubtful, do  
we

we not hesitate? Do we not try it by the *Test*, before we take it for *Current*?—And is not this deemed *Prudence*? Are we not censured, if we act otherwise?—How much more then does it behove us not to be imposed on *here*? To be diffident and scrupulously exact, where *Imposture*, if once admitted, may tempt us to far worse Bargain, than ever *Glaucus* made with *Diomed*?

Part I.

What Bargain, said I, do you mean?


The Exchange, replied he, not of *Gold* for *Brass*, but of *Good* for *Evil*, and of *Happiness* for *Misery*—But enough of this, since you have encouraged me to proceed—We are seeking that *Good*, which we think *others* have not found. Permit me thus to pursue my Subject.

§ 10. EVERY Being on this our *Terrestrial Dwelling*, exists encompassed with *infinite Objects*; exists among *Animals tame*, and *Animals wild*; among *Plants* and *Vegetables* of a thousand *different Qualities*, among *Heats* and *Colds*, *Tempests* and *Calms*, the *Friendships* and *Discords* of  
*betero-*

Part I. *heterogeneous Elements*—What say you?  
 Are all these Things exactly the *same* to it;  
 or do they *differ*, think you in their *Effects*  
 and *Consequences*? They differ, said I,  
 widely. Some perhaps then, said he, are *Apt, Congruous, and Agreeable*  
 to its *Natural State*. I replied, they were.  
 Others are *In-apt, Incongruous, and Disagreeable*.  
 They are. And others again are *Indifferent*. They are.

IT should seem then, said he, if this be allowed, that to every *individual Being*, without the least *Exception*, the whole *Mass* of things *External*, from the greatest to the meanest, stand in the *Relations* of either *Agreeable, Disagreeable, or Indifferent*. I replied, so it appeared.

BUT tho' this, continued he, be true in the *general*, it is yet as certain when we descend to *Particulars*, that what is *Agreeable* to one *Species* is *Disagreeable* to another; and not only so, but perhaps *Indifferent* to

a *third*. Instances of this kind, he said, Part I. were too obvious to be mentioned. 

I REPLIED, it was evident. Whence then, said he, this *Diversity*?—It cannot arise from the *Externals*—for Water is equally Water, whether to a *Man*, or to a *Fish*; whether, operating on the one, it *suffocate*, or on the other, it *give Life and Vigour*.

I replied, it was. So is Fire, said he, the *same Fire*, however *various* in its Consequences; whether it *harden* or *soften*, give *Pleasure* or *Pain*.

I replied, it was. But if this *Diversity*, continued he, be not derived from the *Externals*, whence can it be else?—Or can it possibly be derived otherwise than from the *peculiar Constitution*, from the *Natural State* of every Species itself?

I replied, it appeared probable.

THUS then, said he, is it that *Every particular Species is, itself to itself, the Measure of all things in the Universe—that as Things vary their Relations to it, they vary*



Part I. *vary too in their Value—and that if their Value be ever doubtful, it can no way be adjusted, but by recurring with Accuracy to the Natural State of the Species, and to those several Relations, which such a State of course creates.* I answered, he argued justly.

§ 11. To proceed then, said he—Tho' it be true, that every Species has a *Natural State*, as we have asserted; it is not true, that every Species has a *Sense* or *Feeling* of it. This *Feeling* or *Sense* is a *Natural Eminence* or *Prerogative*, denied the *Vegetable* and *Inanimate*, and imparted only to the *Animal*. I answered, it was.

AND think you, continued he, that as many as have this *Sense* or *Feeling* of a *Natural State*, are *alinated* from it, or *indifferent* to it? Or is it not more probable, that they are *well-affected* to it?

Experience, said I, teaches us, how well they are all affected. You are right, replied he. For what would be more absurd,

absurd, than to be *indifferent* to their own *Welfare*; or to be *alinated* from it, as tho' it was *Foreign* and *Unnatural*? I replied, Nothing could be more. But, continued he, if they are *well-affected* to this their proper *Natural State*, it should seem too they must be *well-affected* to all those *Externals*, which appear *apt, congruous, and agreeable* to it. I answered, They must. And if so, then *ill-affected* or *averse* to such, as appear the *contrary*.

They must. And to such as appear *indifferent, indifferent*. They must,

But if this, said he, be allowed, it will follow, that in consequence of these *Appearances*, they will think some *Externals* worthy of *Pursuit*; some worthy of *Avoidance*; and some worthy of *neither*.

It was probable, said I, they should.

HENCE then, said he, *another Division* of Things *external*; that is, into *Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent*—a Division only belonging to Beings *Sensitive* and *Animate*, because all, *below these*, can neither *avoid*

Part I.

nor pursue.  
not.

I replied, They could

If, then, said he, *Man* be allowed in the Number of these *Sensitive* Beings, this Division will affect MAN—or to explain more fully, *the whole Mass of Things external will, according to this Division, exist to the Human Species in the Relations of Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent.* I replied, They would.

SHOULD we therefore desire, said he, to know what these things truly are, we must first be informed, what is MAN's truly NATURAL CONSTITUTION. For thus, you may remember, it was settled not long since—that *every Species was its own Standard, and that when the Value of Things was doubtful, the Species was to be studied; the Relations to be deduced, which were consequent to it; and in this manner the Value of Things to be adjusted and ascertained.* I replied, We had so agreed it. I fear then, said he, we are engaged

gaged in a more arduous Undertaking, a Task of more difficulty, than we were at first aware of—But *Fortuna Fortes*—we must endeavour to acquit ourselves as well as we are able.

Part I.

§ 12. THAT MAN therefore has a *Body*, of a *Figure* and *internal Structure* peculiar to itself; capable of certain Degrees of Strength, Agility, Beauty, and the like; this I believe is evident, and hardly wants a Proof. I answered, I was willing to own it. That he is capable too of *Pleasure* and *Pain*; is possessed of *Senses*, *Affections*, *Appetites*, and *Aversions*; this also seems evident, and can scarcely be denied. I replied, it was admitted.

We may venture then to range HIM in the *Tribe* of ANIMAL BEINGS. I replied, We might.

AND think you, said he, without *Society*, you or any Man could have been *born*?

Most certainly not. Without *Society*, when born, could you have been

Part I, *brought to Maturity?* Most certainly  
 not Had your Parents then had no

Vid.  
 Jambl.  
 Protrept.  
 56.

*Social Affections* towards you in that *perilous* State, that *tedious* Infancy, (so much longer than the *longest* of *other* Animals) you must have inevitably perished thro' Want and Inability. I must. You perceive then that to *Society* you, and every Man are indebted, not only for the *Beginning of Being*, but for the *Continuance*. We are.

SUPPOSE then we pass from this *Birth* and *Infancy* of Man, to his *Maturity* and *Perfection*—Is there *any Age*, think you, so *self-sufficient*, as that in it he feels no *Wants*? What *Wants*, answered I, do you mean? In the first and principal place, said he, that of *Food*; then perhaps that of *Raiment*; and after this, a *Dwelling*, or Defence against the *Weather*. These *Wants*, replied I, are surely *Natural* at all *Ages*. And is it not *agreeable to Nature*, said he, that they should at *all Ages* be *supplied*?

Affuredly,

furedly. And is it not *more* agreeable Part I.  
to have them *well* supplied, than *ill*?

It is. And *most* agreeable, to have  
them *best* supplied? Certainly.

If there be then any *one* State, *better* than  
*all others*, for the supplying these *Wants*;  
*this State, of all others, must needs be most*  
*Natural.* It must.

AND what *Supply*, said he, of these  
Wants, shall we esteem the *meanest*, which  
we can conceive?—Would it not be some-  
thing like this? Had we nothing beyond  
Acorns for *Food*; beyond a rude Skin, for  
*Raiment*; or beyond a Cavern, or hollow  
Tree, to provide us with a *Dwelling*?

Indeed, said I, this would be bad enough.

And do you not imagine, *as far as*  
*this*, we might *each* supply *ourselves*, tho'  
welived in Woods, mere solitary Savages?

I replied, I thought we might.

SUPPOSE then, continued he, that our  
*Supplies* were to be *mended*—for instance,  
that we were to exchange Acorns for

Part I. Bread—Would our *Savage* Character be sufficient *here*? Must we not be a little better disciplined; Would not some Art be requisite?—The *Baker's*, for example.

It would. And *previously* to the Baker's that of the *Miller*? It would. And *previously* to the Miller's that of the *Husbandman*? It would.

*Three Arts* then appear *necessary*, even upon the *lowest* Estimation. It is admitted.

BUT a Question farther, said he—Can the Husbandman work, think you, without his *Tools*? Must he not have his Plough, his Harrow, his Reap-hook, and the like? He must. And must not those other Artists too be furnished in the same manner? They must. And whence must they be furnished? From *their own Arts*?—Or are not the *making Tools*, and the *using* them, two different Occupations? I believe, said I, they are. You may be convinced, continued he, by small Recollection. Does *Agriculture*

ture make *its own* Plough, *its own* Harrow? Part I.

Or does it not apply to *other Arts*, for all Necessaries of this kind? It does.

Again——Does the Baker build *his own* Oven; or the Miller frame *his own* Mill?

It appears, said I, no part of their Business.

WHAT a *Tribe* of Mechanics then, said he, are advancing upon us?—Smiths, Carpenters, Mafons, Mill-wrights——and all these to provide the *single Necessary of Bread*. Not less than *seven* or *eight* Arts, we find, are wanting at the *fewest*. It appears so. And what if to the providing a *comfortable Cottage*, and *Raiment suitable to an industrious Hind*, we allow a *dozen* Arts more? It would be easy, by the same Reasoning, to prove the Number double. I admit the Number, said I, mentioned.

If so, continued he, it should seem, that towards a tolerable Supply of the three Primary and Common Necessaries, Food, Raiment,



Part I. *and a Dwelling, not less than twenty Arts were, on the lowest Account, requisite.*

It appears so.

AND is *one Man* equal, think you, to the *Exercise of these twenty Arts*? If he had even *Genius*, which we can scarce imagine, is it possible he should find *Leisure*?

I replied, I thought not. If so, then a *solitary, unsocial State* can never supply tolerably the common *Necessaries of Life*.

It cannot.

BUT what if we pass from the *Necessaries of Life*, to the *Elegancies*? To Music, Sculpture, Painting, and Poetry?—What if we pass from all *Arts* whether *Necessary* or *Elegant*, to the large and various Tribe of *Sciences*? To Logic, Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics?—Can one Man, imagine you, master all this? Absurd, said I, impossible. And yet in *this Cycle of Sciences and Arts*, seem included all the *Comforts*, as well as *Ornaments of Life*; included all conducive, either to *Being*, or to *Well-Being*.

It

It must be confessed, said I, it has Part I.  
the Appearance.

WHAT then, said he, must be done?  
In what manner must we be supplied?

I answered, I knew not, unless we made a *Distribution*—Let one exercise *one* Art; and another a *different*—Let this Man study *such* a Science; and that Man, *another*—Thus the whole *Cycle* (as you call it) may be carried easily into Perfection. It is true, said he, it may; and every Individual, *as far as his own Art or Science*, might be supplied *completely*, and as well as he could wish. But what avails a Supply in a *single* Instance? What in this case are to become of all his *numerous other Wants*?

You conceive, replied I, what I would have said, but partially. My Meaning was, that *Artist trade with Artist*; each supply where he is *deficient*, by exchanging where he *abounds*; so that a *Portion of every thing may be dispersed throughout all*. You intend then a *State*,  
said

Part I. said he, of *Commutation and Traffic*.

I replied, I did.

IF so, continued he, I see a new Face of things. The Savages, with their Skins and their Caverns, disappear. In their place I behold a fair *Community* rising. No longer Woods, no longer Solitude, but all is *Social, Civil, and Cultivated*—And can we doubt any farther, whether *Society* be *Natural*? Is not this evidently the *State, which can best supply the Primary Wants*? It has ap-

peared so. And did we not agree some time since, that this *State, whatever we found it, would be certainly of all others the most agreeable to our Nature*? We did.

And have we not added, since this, to the Weight of our Argument, by passing from the *Necessary Arts* to the *Elegant*; from the *Elegant* to the *Sciences*?

We have. The more, said he, we consider, the more shall we be convinced, that *All these*, the noblest Honours and Ornaments of the Human Mind, without that *Leisure, that Experience, that Emulation,*

lation, that *Reward*, which the *Social State* alone we know is able to provide them, could never have found *Existence*, or been in the least recognized. Indeed, said I, I believe not. Part I.

LET it not be forgot then, said he, in favour of *Society*, that to it we owe, not only the *Beginning* and *Continuation*, but the *Well-being*, and (if I may use the Expression) the very *Elegance* and *Rationality* of our *Existence*. I answered, It appeared evident.

AND what then? continued he.—If *Society* be thus agreeable to our *Nature*, is there nothing, think you, *within* us, to excite and lead us to it? No *Impulse*, no *Preparation of Faculties*? It would be strange, answered I, if there should not.

It would be a singular *Exception*, said he, with respect to all other *berding* Species—Let us however examine—Pity, Benevolence, Friendship, Love; the general Dislike of Solitude, and Desire of Company;

Part I. pany; are they *Natural Affections*, which come of themselves; or are they taught us by *Art*, like Music and Arithmetic?

I should think, replied I, they were *Natural*, because in every Degree of Men some Traces of them may be discovered.

And are not the Powers and Capacities of *Speech*, said he, the same? Are not all Men *naturally* formed, to express their *Sentiments* by some kind of *Language*? I replied, They were.

If then, said he, these several *Powers*, and *Dispositions* are *Natural*, so should seem too their *Exercise*. Admit it. And if their *Exercise*, then so too that *State*, where alone they can be exercised. Admit it. And what is this *State*, but the *Social*? Or where else is it possible to converse, or use our *Speech*; to exhibit Actions of Pity, Benevolence, Friendship or Love; to relieve our *Aversion to Solitude*, or gratify our *Desire of being with others*? I replied, It could be no where else.

You

You see then, continued he, a *Preparation of Faculties* is not wanting. We are fitted with Powers and Dispositions, which have only Relation to *Society*; and which, out of *Society*, *can no where else be exercised*. Part I.

I replied, it was evident. You have seen too the *superior* Advantages of the *Social State*, above *all others*. I have.

LET this then be remembered, said he, throughout all our future Reasonings, remembered as a first Principle in our *Ideas of Humanity*, that *MAN by Nature is truly a SOCIAL ANIMAL*, I promised it should,

§ 13. LET us now, said he, examine, what farther we can learn concerning Him. As *Social* indeed, He is distinguished from the *Solitary* and *Savage Species*; but in *no* degree from the rest, of a *milder* and *more friendly* Nature. It is true, replied I, He is not. Does He then differ no more from these

Part I. these several Social Species, than they, each of them, differ from one another? Must we range them all, and Man among the rest, under the same common and general Genus?

I see no Foundation, said I, for making a Distinction.

PERHAPS, said he, there may be none; and it is possible too there may. Consider a little—Do you not observe in all other Species, a Similarity among Individuals? a surprizing Likeness, which runs thro' each Particular? In one Species they are all Bold; in another, all Timorous; in one all Ravenous; in another, all Gentle. In the Bird-kind only, what a Uniformity of Voice, in each Species, as to their notes; of Architecture, as to building their Nests; of Food, both for themselves, and for supporting their Young? It is true, said I.

And do you observe, continued he, the same Similarity among Men? Are these all as Uniform, as to their Sentiments and Actions? I replied, by no means.

ONE

ONE Question more, said he, as to the Part I.  
 Character of Brutes, if I may be allowed  
 the Expression—*Are these, think you, what*  
*we behold them, by Nature or otherwise?*

Explain, said I, your Question, for  
 I do not well conceive you. I mean,  
 replied he, is it by *Nature* that the Swallow  
 builds her Nest, and performs all the Offices  
 of her Kind: Or is she taught by *Art*, by  
*Discipline*, or *Custom*? She acts, re-  
 plied I, by *pure Nature* undoubtedly.

And is not the *same* true, said he, of *every*  
*other* Bird and Beast in the Universe?

It is. No wonder then, continued he,  
 as they have so *wise* a Governess, that a  
*uniform Rule of Action* is provided for each  
 Species. For what can be more worthy the  
 Wisdom of *Nature*, than *ever to the same*  
*Substances to give the same Law*? It ap-  
 pears, said I, reasonable,

BUT what, continued he, shall we say  
 as to *Man*? Is He too actuated by *Nature*  
*purely*? I answered, Why not?

If



Part I.

If He be, replied he, it is strange in *Nature* that with respect to *Man alone*, she should follow so *different* a Conduct. The Particulars in other Species, we agree, she renders *Uniform*; but in *Our's*, every *Particular* seems a sort of *Model by himself*. If *Nature*, said I, do not actuate us, what can we suppose else? Are *Local Customs*, said he *Nature*? Are the *Polities* and *Religions* of particular Nations, *Nature*? Are the *Examples* which are set before us; the *Preceptors* who instruct us; the *Company and Friends*, with whom we converse, all *Nature*?

No surely, said I. And yet, said he, it is evident that by these, and a thousand *incidental* Circumstances, equally *foreign* to *Nature*, our Actions, and Manners, and Characters are adjusted. Who then can imagine, we are actuated by *Nature only*?

I confess, said I, it appears contrary.

You see then, said he, one remarkable *Distinction* between *Man* and *Brutes* in general—In the *Brute*, *Nature* does *all*; in  
*Man,*

*Man*, but *Part only*.  
said I.

It is evident, Part I.

BUT farther, continued he—Let us consider the *Powers* or *Faculties*, possessed by each—Suppose I was willing to give a *Brute* the *same Instruction*, which we give a *Man*. A Parrot perhaps, or Ape, might arrive to some small Degree of *Mimicry*; but do you think, upon the whole, they would be much *profited* or *altered*?

I replied, I thought not. And do you perceive the *same*, said he, with respect to *Man*? Or does not Experience shew us the very reverse? Is not *Education* capable of moulding us into any thing—of making us greatly *Good*, or greatly *Bad*; greatly *Wise*, or greatly *Absurd*? The Fact, said I, is indisputable.

MARK then, said he, the Difference between *Human Powers* and *Brutal*—The Leading Principle of BRUTES appears to tend in each Species to *one single Purpose*—to this, in general, it *uniformly arrives*; and

M

here,

Part I. here, in general, it as *uniformly stops*—it needs no *Precepts* or *Discipline* to instruct it; nor will it easily be *changed*, or admit a *different Direction*. On the contrary, the Leading Principle of MAN is capable of *infinite Directions*—is convertible to *all sorts of Purposes*—equal to *all sorts of Subjects*—neglected, remains ignorant, and void of every Perfection—cultivated, becomes adorned with *Sciences* and *Arts*—can raise us to excel, not only *Brutes*, but *our own Kind*—with respect to our *other Powers* and *Faculties*, can instruct us how to *use* them, as well as *those* of the *various Natures*, which we see existing around us. In a word, to oppose the two Principles to each other—The Leading Principle of *Man*, is *Multiform*, *Originally Uninstructed*, *Pliant* and *Docil*—the Leading Principle of *Brutes* is *Uniform*, *Originally Instructed*; but, in most Instances afterward, *Inflexible* and *Indocil*—Or does not Experience plainly shew, and confirm the Truth of what we assert? I made answer, it did.

You

You allow then, said he, the *Human* Part I. Principle, and the *Brutal*, to be things of different Idea. Undoubtedly. Do they not each then deserve a different Appellation? I should think so. Suppose therefore we call the *Human Principle* REASON; and the *Brutal*, INSTINCT: would you object to the Terms? I replied, I should not. If not, continued he, then *Reason being peculiar to Man*, of all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may we not affirm of Him, by way of Distinction, that He is a *Rational Animal*? I replied, We might justly.

LET this too then be remembered, said he; in the Course of our Inquiry, that MAN is by Nature a RATIONAL ANIMAL. I promised it should.

§ 14: IN consequence of this, said he, as often as there is Occasion, I shall appeal as well to *Reason*, as to *Nature*, for a Standard.

What, said I, do you mean by *Nature*?

Part I.

Its Meanings, replied he, are many and various. As it stands at present opposed, it may be enough perhaps to say, that *Nature* is *that, which is the Cause of every thing, except those Things alone, which are the immediate Effects of Reason*. In other words, whatever is not *Reason*, or the *Effect* of *Reason*, we would consider as *Nature*, or the *Effect* of *Nature*. I answered, as he so distinguished them, I thought he might justly appeal to either.

AND yet, continued he, there is a remarkable *Difference* between the Standard of *Reason*, and that of *Nature*? a Difference, which at no time we ought to forget. What Difference, said I, do you mean? It is this, answered he—In *Nature*, the Standard is sought from among the *Many*; in *Reason*, the Standard is sought from among the *Few*. You must explain, said I, your Meaning, for I must confess you seem obscure.

THUS

THUS then, said he——Suppose, as an Part I.  
 Anatomist, you were seeking the Structure  
 of some internal Part——To discover this,  
 would you not inspect a *Number* of Indi-  
 viduals? I should. And would you  
 not inform yourself, what had been dis-  
 covered by others? I should. And  
 suppose, after all, you should find a *Multitude*  
 of Instances for *one* Structure, and a  
*few singular* for a *different*: By which  
 would you be governed? By the Mul-  
 titude, said I, undoubtedly. Thus then  
 continued he, *in Nature the Standard*, you  
 see, *exists among the many*. I replied,  
 it had so appeared.

AND what, said he, were we to seek  
 the Perfection of Sculpture, or of Paint-  
 ing?—Where should we inquire then?—  
 Among the *numerous* common Artists, or  
 among the *few* and celebrated? Among  
 the Few, said I. What if we were to  
 seek the Perfection of Poetry, or Oratory—  
 Where then? Among the Few still.

What if we were to seek the Perfection of true Argument, or a sound Logic—Where then? Still among the Few. And is not true Argument, or a sound Logic, one of *Reason's* greatest *Perfections*? It is. You see then, continued he, whence the Standard of *Reason* is to be sought—It is from among the *Few*, as we said before, in contradistinction to the Standard of Nature. I confess, said I, it appears so.

AND happy, said he, for us, that Providence has so ordered it—happy for us, that what is *Rational*, depends not on the *Multitude*; or is to be tried by so pitiful a Test, as the bare counting of Noses. It is happy, said I, indeed—But whence pray the Difference? Why are the *Many* to determine in *Nature*, and the *Few* only, in *Reason*?

To discuss this at large, said he, would require some time. It might insensibly perhaps draw us from our present Inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the Reason, in as few words as possible; which should they chance to be obscure, be not

too solicitous for an Explanation.

Part I.

I begged him to proceed his own way.

THE Case, said he, appears to be this—  
 In *Natural Works* and *Natural Operations*,  
 we hold but *one Efficient Cause*, and that  
 consummately *wise*. This Cause in *every*  
*Species* recognizing *what is best*, and work-  
 ing ever *uniformly* according to this *Idea of*  
*Perfection*, the *Productions* and *Energies*, in  
 every *Species* where it acts, are for the  
 most part *similar* and exactly *correspondent*.  
 If an *Exception* ever happen, it is from  
 some *hidden higher Motive*, which tran-  
 scends our *Comprehension*, and which is  
 seen *so rarely*, as not to injure the *general*  
*Rule*, or render it doubtful and precarious.  
 On the contrary, in the *Productions* and  
*Energies of Reason*, there is not *one Cause*  
 but *infinite*—as many indeed, as there are  
*Agents* of the *Human Kind*. Hence *Truth*  
 being but *one*, and *Error* being *infinite*, and  
*Agents* infinite also: what wonder they  
 should oftener miss, than hit the *Mark*?—  
 that *Multitudes* should fail, where *one* alone



Part I. succeeds, and Truth be only the Possession  
 of the *chosen, fortunate Few*? You  
 seem to have explained the Difficulty,  
 said I, with sufficient Perspicuity.

LET us then go back, said he, and re-  
 collect ourselves; that we may not forget,  
 what it is we are seeking. I replied,  
 Most willingly. We have been seek-  
 ing, continued he, the *Sovereign Good*. In  
 consequence of this Inquiry, we have dis-  
 covered—that *all Things whatever exist to*  
*the Human Species in the Relations of either*  
*Pursuable, Avoidable, or Indifferent*. To  
 determine these Relations with Accuracy  
 we have been scrutinizing the Human  
 Nature; and that, upon this known  
 Maxim that *every Species was its own*  
*proper Standard; and that where the Value*  
*of Things was dubious, there the Species was*  
*to be studied, and the Relations to be deduced,*  
*which naturally flow from it*. The Result  
 of this Serutiny has been—that we have  
 first agreed Man to be a *Social Animal*;  
 and since, to be a *Rational*. So that if we  
 can

can be content with a descriptive, concise Part I. Sketch of *Human Nature*, it will amount to this—that MAN IS A SOCIAL RATIONAL ANIMAL. I answered, it had appeared so.

§ 15. IF then, said he, we pursue our Disquisitions, agreeably to this Idea of Human Nature, it will follow that all Things will be *Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent to Man*, as they respect the Being and Welfare of such a *Social, Rational Animal*. I replied, They must.

NOTHING therefore in the first place, said he, can be Pursuable, which is *destructive of Society*. It cannot.

Acts therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and all acquired by them, whether Wealth, Power, Pleasure, or any thing, are evidently from their very Character not fit to be pursued. They are not.

But it is impossible not to pursue many such things, unless we are furnished with some *Habit or Disposition* of Mind, by which

Part I. which we are induced to render to all Men their own, and to regard the Welfare, and Interest of Society. It is impossible.

But the *Habit or Disposition of rendering to all their own*, and of regarding the Welfare and Interest of Society, is JUSTICE. It is. We may therefore fairly conclude, that *Nothing is naturally Pursuable, but what is either correspondent to Justice, or at least not contrary.* I confess, said I, so it appears.

BUT farther, said he,—It is possible we may have the best Disposition to Society; the most upright Intentions; and yet thro' *Want of Ability to discern*, and know the Nature of Particulars, we may pursue many things inconsistent, as well with our Private Interest, as the Public. We may even pursue what is *Right*, and yet pursue it in such a manner, as to find our Endeavours *fruitless*, and our Purposes to fail.

I answered, it was possible.

But this would ill besit the Character of a *Rational Animal*. It would. It is necess-

necessary therefore, we should be furnished Part I.  
 with some *Habit or Faculty*, instructing us  
 how to discern the *real difference of all*  
*Particulars*, and suggesting the proper  
 Means, by which we may either *avoid or*  
*obtain* them. It is. And what is  
 this, think you, but PRUDENCE?

I believe said I, it can be no other.

If it be, said he, then it is evident from  
 this Reasoning, that *Nothing can be pursu-*  
*able which is not correspondent to Prudence.*

I replied, He had shewn it could not.

BUT farther still, said he—It is possible  
 we may neither want *Prudence*, nor *Justice*  
 to direct us; and yet the *Impulses of Appe-*  
*tite*, the *Impetuosities of Resentment*, the  
*Charms and Allurements* of a thousand flat-  
 tering Objects, may tempt us, in spite of  
 ourselves, to pursue what is both *Impru-*  
*dent*, and *Unjust*. They may. But  
 if so, it is necessary, would we pursue as  
*becomes our Character*, that we should be  
 furnished with some *Habit*, which may  
*moderate our Excesses*; which may temper  
 our

Part I. our Actions to the Standard of a *Social State*, and to the Interest and Welfare, not of a *Part*, but of the *Whole Man*.

Nothing, said I, more necessary. And what, said he, can we call this *Habit*, but the Habit of TEMPERANCE? You name it, said I, rightly. If you think so, replied he, then *Nothing can be Pursuable, which is not either correspondent to Temperance, or at least not contrary*. I replied, so it seemed.

ONCE more, continued he, and we have done—It is possible that not only *Resentment* and *Appetite*, not only the *Charms and Allurements* of external Objects, but the *Terrors* too, and *Dread* of them may *marr the Rectitude of our Purposes*. It is possible.

Tyranny and Superstition may assail us on one hand; the Apprehensions of Ridicule, and a *False Shame* on the other—It is expedient, to withstand these, we should be armed with some *Habit*, or our wisest, best Pursuits may else at all times be defeated. They may. And what is that

that generous, manlike and noble *Habit*, Part I. which sets us at all times above *Fear* and *Danger*; what is it but FORTITUDE?

I replied, it was no other. If so then, continued he, besides our former Conclusions, *Nothing farther can be pursuable*, as our Inquiries now have shewn us, *which is not either correspondent to Fortitude, or at least not contrary*. I admit, said I, it can not,

OBSERVE then, said he, the Sum, the Amount of our whole Reasoning—*Nothing is truly Pursuable to such an Animal as Man, except what is correspondent, or at least not contrary, to JUSTICE, PRUDENCE, TEMPERANCE and FORTITUDE*. I allow, said I, it appears so. But if nothing *Pursuable*, then nothing *Avoidable* or *Indifferent*, but what is tried and estimated after the same manner. For *Contraries are ever recognized thro' the same Habit*, one with another. The same Logic judges of Truth and Falshood; the same Musical Art, of Concord and Discord. So the same  
*Mental*

Part I. *Mental Habitudes, of Things Avoidable and Pursuable.* I replied, it appeared probable.

To how unexpected a Conclusion then, said he, have our Inquiries insensibly led us?—In tracing the Source of Human Action, we have established it to be those **FOUR GRAND VIRTUES**, which are esteemed, for their Importance, the very **HINGES OF ALL MORALITY.**

We have.

**BUT** if so, it should follow, that a *Life*, whose *Pursuings* and *Avoidings* are governed by these *Virtues*, is that *True and Rational Life*, which we have so long been seeking; that *Life*, where the *Value of all things is justly measured by those Relations, which they bear to the Natural Frame and real Constitution of Mankind*—in fewer Words, **A LIFE OF VIRTUE** appears to be **THE LIFE ACCORDING TO NATURE.** It appears so.

**BUT**

BUT in *such* a Life every Pursuit, every Part I. Avoiding, (to include all) every Action will of course admit of being *rationaly justified*.

It will. But *That, which being Done, admits of a Rational Justification, is the Essence or genuine Character of an Office, or MORAL DUTY.* For thus long ago it has been defined by the best \* Authorities. Admit it. If so, then A LIFE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE, is A LIFE ACCORDING TO MORAL OFFICES OR DUTIES. It appears so.

But we have already agreed it, to be a *Life according to Nature.* We have. Observe then: A LIFE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE, ACCORDING TO MORAL OFFICES, and ACCORDING TO NATURE, mean all THE SAME THING, tho' *varied* in the Expression. Your Remark, said I, seems just.

§ 16. WE need never therefore, replied he, be at a loss how to chose, tho' the

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\* By *Tully* in his Offices, and by other Authors of Antiquity.



Part I.

the Objects of Choice be ever so infinite and diversified. *As far as nothing is inconsistent with such a Life and such a Character*, we may justly set Existence before Death; prefer Health to Sickness; Integrity of the Limbs, to being maimed and debilitated; Pleasure to Pain; Wealth to Poverty; Fame to Dishonour; Free Government to Slavery; Power and Magistracy, to Subjection and a private State—Universally, whatever tends either to *Being*, or to *Well-Being*, we may be justified, when we prefer to whatever appears the contrary. And when our several Energies, exerted according to the Virtues just mentioned, have put us in Possession of all that we require: when we enjoy, *subjoined to a right and honest Mind, both Health of Body, and Competence of Externals*: what can there be wanting to *complete our Happiness*; to render our State *perfectly consonant to Nature*; or to give us a more *Sovereign Good*, than that which we now enjoy? Nothing, replied I, that I can at present think of.

THERE

THERE would be nothing indeed, said Part I.  
 he, *were our Energies never to fail*, were ~~~~~  
*all our Endeavours to be ever crowned with*  
*due Success.* But suppose the contrary—  
 Suppose the *worst Success* to the *most up-*  
*right Conduct*; to the wisest Rectitude of  
 Energies and Actions. It is possible, nay  
 Experience teaches us it is too often fact,  
 that not only the Pursuers of what is *con-*  
*trary to Nature*, but that those who pursue  
 nothing but what is *strictly congruous to it*,  
 may *miss of their Aims*, and be *frustrated*  
*in their Endeavours.* Inquisitors and Monks  
 may detest them for their Virtue, and  
 pursue them with all the Engines of  
 Malice and Inhumanity. Without these,  
 Pests may afflict their Bodies; Inunda-  
 tions o'erwhelm their Property; or what  
 is worse than Inundations, either Ty-  
 rants, Pirates, Heroes, or Banditti. They  
 may see their Country fall, and with  
 it their bravest Countrymen; themselves  
 pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or  
 N perishing

Part I. perishing with the rest in the general  
 Massacre.

—\* *cadit & Ripheus, justissimus unus*  
*Qui fuit in Teucris, & servantissimus æqui.*

It must be owned, said I, this has too often  
 been the Case.

OR grant, continued he, that these  
*greater* Events never happen—that the  
 Part allotted us, be not in the *Tragedy* of  
 Life, but in the *Comedy*. Even the *Comic*  
*Distresses* are abundantly irksome—  
 Domestic Jars, the ill Offices of Neigh-  
 bours—Suspensions, Jealousies, Schemes  
 defeated — The Folly of Fools; the  
 Knavery of Knaves; from which, as Mem-  
 bers of Society, it is impossible to detach  
 ourselves.

WHERE

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\* ÆNEID. l. 2. ver. 426.

WHERE then shall we turn, or what Part I. have we to imagine? We have at length placed HAPPINESS, after much Inquiry, in *ATTAINING the primary and just Requisites of our Nature, by a Conduct suitable to Virtue and Moral Office.* But as to *corresponding with our Pre-conceptions* (which we have made the Test) does this System correspond better, than those *others*, which we have rejected? Has it not appeared from various Facts, too obvious to be disputed, that in many *Times and Places* it may be absolutely *unattainable*? That in many, where it exists, it may *in a moment be cancelled*, and put irretrievably *out of our Power*, by *Events not to be resisted*? If this be certain, and I fear it cannot be questioned, our specious long Inquiry, however accurate we may believe it, has not been able to shew us a *Good*, of that Character which we require; a *Good Durable, Indeprivable, and Accommodate to every Circumstance*—Far from it—Our Speculations

Part I.

(I think) rather lead us to that *low Opinion* of Happiness, which you may remember you \* expressed, when we first began the subject. They rather help to prove to us, that instead of a *Sovereign-Good*, it is the more probable sentiment, *there is no such Good at all.* I should indeed, said I,

fear so. For where, continued he, lies the difference, whether we pursue what is *congruous* to Nature, or not *congruous*; if the *Acquisition* of one be as *difficult*, as of the *other*, and the *Possession* of both equally *doubtful and precarious*? If *Cæsar* fall, in attempting his Country's Ruin; and *Brutus* fare no better, who only fought in its Defence? It must be owned, said I, these are melancholy Truths, and the Instances, which you alledge, too well confirm them.

WE were in the midst of these serious Thoughts, descanting upon the hardships  
and

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\* See p. 121.

and Miseries of Life, when by an Incident, not worth relating, our Speculations were interrupted. Nothing at the time, I thought, could have happened more unluckily——our Question perplexed——its Issue uncertain——and myself impatient to know the Event. Necessity however was not to be resisted, and thus for the present our Inquiries were postponed. Part I.



CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

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PART the SECOND.

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**B** RUTUS *perished untimely, and* Part II.  
*Cæsar did no more*—These Words

I was repeating the next Day to myself, when my Friend appeared, and cheerfully bade me Good Morrow. I could not return his Compliment with an equal Gaiety, being intent, somewhat more than usual, on what had passed the day before. Seeing this, he proposed a Walk into the Fields. The Face of Nature, said he, will perhaps dispel these Glooms. No Assistance, on my part, shall be wanting,



Part II. you may be assured. I accepted his Proposal; the Walk began; and our former Conversation insensibly renewed.

BRUTUS, said he, *perished untimely, and Cæsar did no more.*—It was thus, as I remember, not long since you were expressing yourself. And yet suppose their Fortunes to have been exactly *parallel*—Which would you have preferred? Would you have been *Cæsar* or *Brutus*?

*Brutus*, replied I, beyond all Controversy. He asked me, Why? Where was the Difference, when their Fortunes, as we now supposed them, were considered as the *same*?

There seems, said I, abstract from their *Fortunes*, something, I know not what, *intrinsically preferable* in the Life and Character of *Brutus*. If that, said he, be true, then must we derive it, not from the *Success* of his Endeavours, but from their *Truth* and *Rectitude*. He had the Comfort to be conscious, that his Cause was a just one. It was impossible the other should have

have any such Feeling. I believe, Part II.  
 said I, you have explained it. ~

SUPPOSE then, continued he, (it is but merely an Hypothesis) suppose, I say, we were to place the SOVEREIGN GOOD *in such a Rectitude of Conduct—in the CONDUCT merely, and not in the EVENT.* Suppose we were to fix our HAPPINESS, *not in the actual Attainment* of that Health, that Perfection of a Social State, that fortunate Concurrence of Externals, which is congruous to our Nature, and which we have a Right all to pursue; but solely fix it *in the mere DOING whatever is correspondent to such an End, even tho' we never attain, or are near attaining it.* In fewer words—What if we make our Natural State *the Standard only to determine our Conduct;* and place our Happiness *in the Rectitude of this Conduct alone?*—On such an Hypothesis (and we consider it as nothing farther) we should not want a Good perhaps, to *correspond to our Pre-conceptions;* for this, it is evident, would be correspondent to them  
all.

Part II. *all.* Your Doctrine, replied I, is so new and strange, that tho' you have been copious in explaining, I can hardly yet comprehend you.

IT amounts all, said he, but to this— Place your *Happiness*, where your *Praise* is.

I asked, Where he supposed that?

Not, replied he, in the Pleasures which you feel, more than your Disgrace lies in the Pain——not in the casual Prosperity of Fortune, more than your Disgrace in the casual Adversity—— but in *just complete Action throughout every Part of Life, what ever be the Face of Things, whether favourable or the contrary.*

BUT why then, said I, such *Accuracy* about *Externals*? So much Pains to be informed, what are *Pursuable*, what *Avoidable*?

It behoves the Pilot, replied he, to know the Seas and the Winds; the Nature of Tempests, Calms, and Tides. They are the *Subjects*, about which his Art

is

is conversant. Without a just Experience of them, he can never *prove* himself an *Artist*. Yet we look not for his *Reputation* either in *fair* Gales, or in *adverse*; but in the *Skilfulness of his Conduct*, be these Events as they happen. In like manner fares it with this the *Moral Artist*. He, for a *Subject* has *the Whole of Human Life*—Health and Sicknes; Pleasure and Pain; with every other possible Incident, which can befall him during his Existence. If his *Knowledge* of all these be accurate and exact, so too must his *Conduct*, in which we place his *Happiness*. But if this *Knowledge* be defective, must not his *Conduct* be defective also? I replied, so it should seem. And if his *Conduct*, then his *Happiness*? It is true.

You see then, continued he, even tho' *Externals were as nothing*; tho' it was true, in their own Nature, they were neither *Good* nor *Evil*; yet an *accurate Knowledge of them* is, from our Hypothesis, absolutely *necessary*.

Part II. *necessary.*

Indeed, said I, you have proved it.

He continued—Inferior Artists may be at a stand, because they *want* Materials. From their *Stubborness* and *Intractability*, they may often be disappointed. But as long as *Life* is passing, and *Nature* continues to operate, the *Moral Artist of Life* has at all times, all he desires. He can never want a *Subject* fit to exercise him in his proper Calling; and that, with this happy Motive to the Constancy of his Endeavours, that, the crosser, the harsher, the more untoward the *Events*, the greater his *Praise*, the more illustrious his *Reputation*.

ALL this, said I, is true, and cannot be denied. But one Circumstance there appears, where your Similes seem to fail. The *Praise* indeed of the Pilot we allow to be in his *Conduct*; but it is in the *Success* of that *Conduct*, where we look for his *Happiness*. If a Storm arise, and the Ship  
be

be lost, we call him not *happy*, how well Part II. soever he may have conducted. It is then only we congratulate him, when he has reached the desired Haven. Your Distinction, said he, is just. And it is here lies the *noble Prerogative of Moral Artists*, above all others—But yet I know not how to explain myself, I fear my Doctrine will appear so strange. You may proceed, said I, safely, since you advance it but as an *Hypothesis*.

THUS then, continued he—The *End* in other Arts is ever *distant* and *removed*. It consists not in the *mere Conduct*, much less in a *single Energy*; but is *the just Result of many Energies*, each of which are essential to it. Hence, by Obstacles unavoidable, it may often be *retarded*: Nay more, may be so embarrassed, as *never possibly to be attained*. But in the *Moral Art of Life*, the very CONDUCT is the END; the very *Conduct*, I say, itself, throughout every its *minute* Energy; because *each* of these, however *minute*, partake as truly of *Rectitude*,

Part II. *Rectitude*, as the *largest Combination of them*, when considered collectively. Hence of all Arts is this the only one *perpetually complete in every Instant*, because it needs not, like other Arts, *Time* to arrive at that Perfection, at which in *every Instant* it is arrived already. Hence by *Duration* it is not rendered either *more* or *less* perfect; *Completion*, like Truth, admitting of no Degrees, and being in no sense capable of either *Intension* or *Remission*. And hence too by necessary Connection (which is a greater Paradox than all) even that *Happiness* or *Sovereign Good*, the End of this Moral Art, is itself too, *in every Instant*, *Consummate and Complete*; is neither *heightened* or *diminished* by the Quantity of its *Duration*, but is the same to its Enjoyers, for a *Moment* or a *Century*.

UPON this I smiled. He asked me the Reason. It is only to observe, said I, the Course of our Inquiries—A new Hypothesis has been advanced—Appearing somewhat strange, it is desired to be explained—

plained—You comply with the Request, Part II. and in pursuit of the Explanation, make it ten times more *obscure* and *unintelligible*, than before.

It is but too often the Fate, said he, of us Commentators. But you know in such cases what is usually done. When the Comment will not explain the Text, we try whether the Text will not explain itself. This Method, it is possible, may assist us here. The Hypothesis, which we would have illustrated, was no more than this—That the *Sovereign Good lay in Rectitude of Conduct*; and that *this Good corresponded to all our Pre-conceptions*. Let us examine then, whether, upon trial, this Correspondence will appear to hold; and, for all that we have advanced since, suffer it to pass, and not perplex us.

Agreed, said I, willingly, for now I hope to comprehend you.

§ 2. RECOLLECT then, said he. Do you not remember that *one Pre-conception* of the *Sovereign Good* was, to be *accommodate to all Times and Places*?

I remember it.

And



Part II.

And is there any *Time*, or any *Place*, whence *Rectitude of Conduct* may be excluded? Is there not a right Action in Prosperity, a right Action in Adversity?—May there not be a decent, generous, and laudable *Behaviour*, not only in Peace, in Power, and in Health; but in War, in Oppression, in Sickness and in Death? There may.

AND what shall we say to those *other Pre-conceptions*—to being *Durable, Self-derived, and Indeprivable*? Can there be any *Good* so *Durable*, as the Power of always doing right? Is there any *Good* conceivable, so intirely *beyond the Power of others*? Or, if you hesitate, and are doubtful, I would willingly be informed, into what Circumstances may Fortune throw a brave and honest Man, where it shall not be in his Power to *act bravely and honestly*? If there are no such, then *Rectitude of Conduct*, if a *Good*, is a *Good Indeprivable*. I confess, said I, it appears so.

BUT

BUT farther, said he——Another *Pre-* Part II,  
*conception of the Sovereign Good* was, to be *Agreeable to Nature*. It was. And  
 can any thing be more agreeable to a  
*Rational and Social Animal*, than *Rational*  
*and Social Conduct*? Nothing. But  
*Rectitude of Conduct* is with us *Rational and*  
*Social Conduct*. It is.

ONCE more, continued he——Another  
*Pre-conception of this Good* was, to be *Con-*  
*ducive*, not to Mere-being, but to *Well-*  
*being*. Admit it. And can any  
 thing, believe you, conduce so probably to  
 the *Well-being* of a *Rational Social Animal*,  
 as the right *Exercise* of that *Reason*, and of  
 those *Social Affections*? Nothing.  
 And what is this same *Exercise*, but the  
*highest Rectitude of Conduct*? Certainly.

§ 3. You see then, said he, how well  
 our Hypothesis, being once admitted, tal-  
 lies with our *Original Pre-conceptions* of  
 the *Sovereign Good*. I replied, it in-

O

deed

Part II. deed appeared so, and could not be denied.

But who, think you, ever dreamt of a Happiness like this? A Happiness dependent, not on the *Success*, but on the *Aim*?

Even common and ordinary Life, replied he, can furnish us with Examples. Ask of the Sportsman where lies his Enjoyment? Ask whether it be in the *Possession* of a slaughtered Hare, or Fox? He would reject, with Contempt, the very Supposition—He would tell you, as well as he was able, that the Joy was in the *Pursuit*—in the Difficulties which are obviated; in the Faults, which are retrieved; in the *Conduct* and Direction of the Chace thro' all its Parts—that the *Completion* of their Endeavours was so far from giving them Joy, that instantly at that Period all their Joy was at an End. For Sportsmen, replied I, this may be no bad Reasoning. It is not the Sentiment, said he, of Sportsmen alone. The Man of Gallantry not unoften has been found to think after the same manner.

—*Meus est amor huic similis; nam*

*Trans-*

*Transvolat in medio posita, & fugientia* Part II.  
*captat\*.*

To these we may add the Tribe of Builders and Projectors. Or has not your own Experience informed you of Numbers, who, in the *Building* and *Laying-out*, have expressed the highest *Delight*; but shewn the utmost Indifference to the *Result* of their Labours, to the Mansion or Gardens, when once finished and complete?

THE Truth, said I, of these Examples is not to be disputed. But I could wish your Hypothesis had better than these to support it. In the *serious View of Happiness*, do you ever imagine there were any, who could fix it (as we said before) not on the *Success*, but on the *Aim*?

More, even in this light, said he, than perhaps at first you may imagine. There are Instances innumerable of Men, *bad* as well as *good*, who having fixed, as their *Aim*, a *certain Conduct* of their own, have

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\* HOR. Sat. II. L. I. v. 107.

Part II. so far attached their Welfare and Happiness to it, as to deem *all Events* in its Prosecution, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to be mean, contemptible, and *not worthy their Regard*. I called on him for Examples.

WHAT think you, said he, of the *Affassin*, who slew the first *Prince of Orange*; and who, tho' brought by his Conduct to the most exquisite Tortures, yet *conscious of what he had done*, could bear them all unmoved? Or (if you will have a better Man) what think you of that sturdy *Roman*, who would have dispatched *Porfenna*; and who, full of his Design, and superior to all Events, could thrust a Hand into the Flames with the steadiest Intrepidity? I replied, That these indeed were very uncommon Instances.

ATTEND too, continued he, to *Epicurus* dying, the Founder of a Philosophy, little favouring of *Enthusiasm*—“ *This I write you* (says he, in one of his Epistles) “ *while the last Day of Life is passing, and* “ *that*

“ that a *HAPPY One*. *The Pains indeed of* Part II.  
 “ *my Body are not capable of being beigh-*  
 “ *tened. Yet to these we oppose that Joy of*  
 “ *the Soul, which arises from the Memory*  
 “ *of our past Speculations.*”——Hear him,  
 consonant to this, in another Place assert-  
 ing, that a *Rational Adversity was better*  
*than an Irrational Prosperity.*

AND what think you?——Had he not placed his *Good and Happiness* in the supposed *Rectitude of his Opinions*, would he not have preferred *Prosperity*, at all rates, to *Adversity*? Would not the Pains, of which he died, have made his Happiness perfect Misery?——And yet, you see, he disowns any such thing. The Memory of his past Life, and of his Philosophical Inventions were, even in the Hour of Death it seems, a Counterpoise to support him.

It must be owned, said I, that you appear to reason justly.

PASS from *Epicurus*, continued he, to *Socrates*. What are the Sentiments of that

Part II. divine Man, speaking of his own unjust  
 ~~~~~  
 Condemnation; “ *O Crito, says he, if it  
 “ be pleasing to the Gods this way, then be  
 “ it this way.*” And again——“ *Anytus  
 “ and Melitus, I grant, can kill me; but  
 “ to hurt or injure me, is beyond their  
 “ Power.*” It would not have been be-  
 yond it, had he thought his Welfare de-  
 pendent on any thing they could do; for  
 they were then doing their worst——  
 Whence then was it beyond them?——  
 Because his Happiness was derived not  
 from *without*, but from *within*; not from  
 the *Success*, which perhaps was due to the  
 ° Rectitude of his Life, but from that *Recti-*  
*tude* alone, every other thing disregarded.  
 He had not, it seems, so far renounced his  
 own Doctrine, as not to remember his  
 former Words; that——“ *To whom ever  
 “ all things, conducive to Happiness, are de-  
 “ rived solely, or at least nearly from him-  
 “ self, and depend not on the Welfare or  
 “ Adversity of others, from the Variety of  
 “ whose Condition his own must vary also:  
 “ He it is, who has prepared to himself the  
 most*

“ most excellent of all Lives—He it is, who Part II.  
 “ is the Temperate, the Prudent, and the  
 “ Brave—He it is, who, when Wealth or  
 “ Children either come or are taken away,  
 “ will best obey the Wise Man’s Precept—  
 “ For neither will he be seen to grieve, nor  
 “ to rejoice in excess, from the Trust and  
 “ Confidence which he has reposed in himself.”

—You have a Sketch at least of his Meaning, tho’ far below his own *Attic* and truly elegant Expression. I grant, said I, your Example; but this and the rest are but single Instances. What are three or four in Number, to the whole of Human Kind?

If you are for Numbers, replied he, what think you of the numerous Race of Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have joyfully met Death, rather than desert their Country, when in danger? They must have thought surely on *another* Happiness than *Success*, when they could gladly go, where they saw Death often inevitable. Or what think you of the many Martyrs



**Part II.** for Systems wrong as well as right, who have dared defy the worst, rather than swerve from their Belief? You have brought indeed, said I, more Examples than could have been imagined.

BESIDES, continued he, what is that *Comfort of a GOOD CONSCIENCE*, celebrated to such a height in the Religion which we profess, but the Joy arising from a Conscience of right *Energies*; a Conscience of having done nothing, but what is consonant to our Duty? I replied, It indeed appeared so.

EVEN the Vulgar, continued he, recognize a *Good* of this very Character, when they say of an Undertaking, tho' it *succeed not*, that they are contented; that they have *done their best*, and can accuse themselves of nothing. For what is this, but placing their *Content*, their *Good*, their *Happiness*, not in the *Success* of Endeavours, but in the *Rectitude*? If it be not the *Rectitude* which contents them, you must  
tell

tell me what it is else.

It appears, Part II.

replied I, to be that alone.

I HOPE then, continued he, that tho' you accede not to this Notion of Happiness, which I advance; you will at least allow it not to be such a Paradox, as at first you seemed to imagine. That indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you.

§ 4. GRANTING me this, said he, you encourage me to explain myself—We have supposed the *Sovereign Good* to lie in *Rectitude of Conduct*. We have. And think you there can be Rectitude of Conduct, if we do not *live consistently*?

In what Sense, said I, would you be understood? *To live consistently*, said he, is the same with me, as *To live agreeably to some one single and consonant Scheme, or Purpose*. Undoubtedly, said I, without this, there can be no Rectitude of Conduct.

*All Rectitude* of Conduct then, you say, implies such *Consistence*. It does.

And does all *Consistence*, think you, imply such

Part II. such *Rectitude*? I asked him, Why  
 not?

It is possible, indeed it may, said he, for aught we have discovered yet to the contrary. But what if it should be found that there may be numberless Schemes, each in particular *consistent with itself*, but yet all of them *different*, and some perhaps *contrary*? There may, you know, be a *consistent* Life of Knavery, as well as a *consistent* Life of Honesty; there may be a *uniform* Practice of Luxury, as well as of Temperance, and Abstemiousness. Will the Consistence, *common to all of these Lives*, render the *Conduct* in each, *right*?

It appears, said I, an Absurdity, that there should be the same Rectitude in two Contraries. If so, said he, we must look for something more than *mere Consistence*, when we search for that *Rectitude* which we at present talk of. A *consistent* Life indeed is requisite, but that alone is not enough. We must determine its *peculiar Species*, if we would be accurate and exact. It indeed appears, said I, necessary.

NOR

NOR is any thing, continued he, more Part II.  
*easy* to be discussed. For what can that }  
*peculiar Consistence* of Life be else, than a  
 Life, whose several Parts are not only con-  
 sonant to *each other*, but to the *Nature*  
 also of the Being, by whom that Life has  
 been adopted? Does not this *last* Degree  
 of Consistence appear as requisite as the  
*former*? I answered, It could not be  
 otherwise.

You see then, said he, the true Idea  
 of right Conduct. It is not, merely *To*  
*live consistently*; but it is *To live consistently*  
*with Nature*. Allow it.

BUT what, continued he, Can we live  
*consistently with Nature*, and be at a loss  
 how to behave ourselves? We cannot.

And can we know how to behave  
 ourselves, if we know nothing of *what*  
*befals us*; nothing of those *Things* and  
*Events*, which perpetually surround, and  
 affect us? We cannot. You see  
 then,

part II. then, continued he, how we are again  
 fallen insensibly into that Doctrine, which  
 proves the Necessity of *scrutinizing*, and  
*knowing the Value of Externals*. I re-  
 plied, it was true. If you assent, said he,  
 to this, it will of course follow, that, *To*  
*live consistently with Nature, is, To live*  
*agreeably to a just Experience of those Things,*  
*which happen around us.* It appears so.

BUT farther still, said he.—Think you  
 any one can be deemed to live agreeably  
 to such *Experience*, if he *select* not, as  
 far as possible, the things most *congruous*  
*to his Nature*? He cannot. And by  
 the same Rule, as far as possible, must he  
 not *reject* such as are *contrary*? He  
 must. And that not occasionally, as  
 Fancy happens to prompt; but *steadily,*  
*constantly*, and without Remission.

I should imagine so. You judge, said  
 he, truly. Were he to act otherwise in  
 the least instance, he would falsify his  
 Professions; he would not live according  
 to that *Experience*, which we now sup-  
 pose

pose him to possess.  
would not.

I replied, He Part II.

IT should seem then, said he, from hence, as a natural Consequence of what we have admitted, that the *Essence of right Conduct* lay in SELECTION and REJECTION. So, said I, it has appeared.

And that such *Selection* and *Rejection* should be *consonant with our proper Nature*. It is true. And be

*steady and perpetual*, not occasional and interrupted. It is true. But if this be

the *Essence of Right Conduct*, then too it is the *Essence of our Sovereign Good*; for in such *Conduct* we have supposed this *Good* to consist. We have.

SEE then, said he, the Result of our Inquiry.—The SOVEREIGN GOOD, as constituted by *Rectitude of Conduct*, has, on our strictest Scrutiny, appeared to be this—  
TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS TO NATURE, AND REJECTING WHAT IS

CON-

Part II. CONTRARY, MAKING OUR END THAT  
 SELECTING AND THAT REJECTING  
 ONLY. It is true, said I, so it appears.

§ 5. BEFORE we hasten then farther, said he, let us stop to recollect, and see whether our present Conclusions accord with our former.—We have now supposed the *Sovereign Good* to be *Rectitude of Conduct*, and this *Conduct* we have made consist in a certain *Selecting* and *Rejecting*.

We have. And do you not imagine that the *Selecting* and *Rejecting*, which we propose, as they are purely governed by the Standard of *Nature*, are capable in every instance of being *rationally justified*?

I replied, I thought they were

But if they admit a *rational Justification*, then are they *Moral Offices* or *Duties*; for thus \* you remember yesterday a *Moral Office* was defined. It was. But if so, *To live in the Practice of them*, will  
 be

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\* Sup. p. 175.

be *To live in the Discharge of Moral Offices.* Part II.

It will. But *To live in the Discharge of these*, is the same as *Living according to Virtue*, and *Living according to Nature*. It is. So therefore is *Living in that Selection, and in that Rejection, which we propose.* It is.

WE need never therefore be at a loss, said he, for a Description of the SOVEREIGN GOOD.—We may call it, RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT.—If that be too contracted, we may enlarge and say, it is—  
 T O L I V E P E R P E T U A L L Y S E L E C T I N G A N D  
 R E J E C T I N G A C C O R D I N G T O T H E S T A N D A R D  
 O F O U R B E I N G.—If we are for still different Views, we may say it is—  
 T O L I V E I N T H E D I S C H A R G E O F M O R A L  
 O F F I C E S—T O L I V E A C C O R D I N G T O  
 N A T U R E—T O L I V E A C C O R D I N G T O  
 V I R T U E—T O L I V E A C C O R D I N G T O  
 J U S T E X P E R I E N C E O F T H O S E T H I N G S,  
 W H I C H H A P P E N A R O U N D U S.—Like  
 some finished Statue, we may behold it  
 every way; it is the same Object, tho'  
 variously



Part II. variously viewed; nor is there a View,  
 but is natural, truly graceful, and en-  
 gaging.

§ 6. I CANNOT deny, said I, but that as you now have explained it, your Hypothesis seems far more plausible, than when first it was proposed. You will believe it, said he, more so still, by considering it with more Attention.—In the first place, tho' perhaps it esteem nothing *really* GOOD but VIRTUE, nothing *really* EVIL, but VICE, yet it in no manner takes away the *Difference*, and *Distinction* of *other Things*. So far otherwise, it is for establishing their Distinction to the greatest Accuracy. For were this neglected, what would become of *Selection* and *Rejection*, those important Energies, which are its very Soul and Essence? Were there no DIFFERENCE, there could be no CHOICE.

It is true, said I, there could not.

AGAIN, said he. It is no meagre, mortifying System of *Self-denial*—It suppresses

no Social and Natural Affections, nor takes away any Social and Natural Relations—

Part II.

It prescribes no Abstainings, no Forbearances *out of Nature*; no gloomy, sad, and lonely Rules of Life, *without* which it is evident Men may be as honest as *with*, and be infinitely more useful and worthy Members of *Society*.—It refuses no Pleasure, not inconsistent with *Temperance*—It rejects no Gain, not inconsistent with *Justice*—Universally, as far as *Virtue* neither *forbids* nor *dissuades*, it endeavours to render Life, even in the *most vulgar* Acceptation, as chearful, joyous, and easy as possible. Nay, could it mend the Condition of Existence in any the *most trivial* Circumstance, even by adding to the amplest Possessions the poorest meanest Utensil; it would in no degree condemn an Addition even so mean. Far otherwise—It would consider, that to neglect the least Acquisition, when fairly in its power, would be to fall short of that *perfect* and *accurate Conduct*, which it ever has in view, and on which alone all depends.

P

AND

## Part II.

AND yet, tho' thus exact in every the minutest Circumstance, it gives us no Solitude as to what *Rank* we maintain in Life: Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy or poor; whether merged in Business, or confined to Inactivity, it is *equally consistent with every Condition*, and equally capable of adorning them all. Could it indeed choose its own Life, it would be always that, where most social Affections might extensively be exerted, and most done to contribute to the Welfare of Society. But if Fate order otherwise, and this be denied; its Intentions are the same, its Endeavours are not wanting; nor are the *Social, Rational Powers* forgotten, even in Times and Circumstances, where they can least become conspicuous.

It teaches us to consider *Life*, as one great important *Drama*, where we have each our *Part* allotted us to act. It tells us that our *Happiness*, as *Actors* in this *Drama*, consists not in the *Length* of our  
Part,

Part, nor in the *State and Dignity*, but in Part II.  
 the *just, the decent, and the natural Per-*  
*formance!*

IF its Aims are successful, it is thankful to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, derived from their *Success*, and feels them as fully, as those who know *no other Happiness*. The only Difference is, that having *a more excellent Good* in view, it fixes not, like the Many, its *Happiness* on *Success* alone, well knowing that in such case, if *Endeavours fail*, there can be nothing left behind but *Murmurings and Misery*. On the contrary, when this happens, it is then it retires into itself, and reflecting on what is *Fair*, what is *Laudable and Honest* (the truly *beatific Vision*, not of *mad Enthusiasts*, but of the *Calm, the Temperate, the Wise and the Good*), it becomes *superiour to all Events*; it *acquiesces in the Consciousness of its own Rectitude*; and, like that *Mansion* founded, not on the *Sands*, but on the *Rock*, it defies all the *Terrors of Tempest and Inundation*.

Part II. § 7. HERE he paused, and I took the Opportunity to observe, how his Subject had warmed him into a degree of Rapture; how greatly it had raised both his Sentiments and his Stile. No wonder, said he. Beauty of every kind excites our Love and Admiration; the Beauties of Art, whether *Energies* or *Works*; the Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or Inanimate. And shall we expect less from *this Supreme Beauty*; this *moral, mental,* and *original Beauty*; of which all the rest are but as *Types* or *Copies*?—Not however by high Flights to lose Sight of our Subject, the whole of what we have argued, may be reduced to this—

ALL MEN PURSUE GOOD, and would be *happy*, if they knew how; not happy for Minutes, and miserable for Hours, but *happy*, if possible, *thro' every Part of their Existence*. Either therefore *there is a GOOD of this steady durable Kind*, or *there is none*. If *none*, then *all Good must be transient*

*transient and uncertain*; and if so, an *Object of lowest Value*, which can little deserve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But if there be a *better Good*, such a Good as we are seeking; like every other thing, it *must be derived from some Cause*; and that Cause must be either *external, internal, or mixt*, in as much as except these three, there is no other possible. Now a *steady, durable Good*, cannot be derived from an *external Cause*, by reason all derived from *Externals* must *fluctuate*, as they *fluctuate*. By the same Rule, not from a *Mixture of the Two*; because the *Part which is external* will *proportionally destroy its Essence*. What then remains but the *Cause internal*; the very Cause which we have supposed, when we place the *Sovereign Good* in *Mind*; in *Rectitude of Conduct*; in just *Selecting and Rejecting*? There seems indeed no other Cause, said I, to which we can possibly assign it.

FORGIVE me then, continued he, should I appear to boast—We have

Part II. proved, or at least there is an Appearance  
 we have proved, that *either there is no  
 Good except this of our own; or that, if  
 there be any other, it is not worthy our Re-  
 gard.* It must be confessed, said I,  
 you have said as much, as the Subject seems  
 to admit.

§ 8. BY means then, said he, of our  
 Hypothesis, behold one of the fairest, and  
 most amiable of Objects, behold THE  
 TRUE AND PERFECT MAN: that Or-  
 nament of Humanity; that Godlike Being;  
 who, *without regard either to Pleasure or  
 Pain, uninfluenced equally by either. Prospe-  
 rity or Adversity, superiour to the World and  
 its best and worst Events, can fairly rest his  
 All upon the Rectitude of his own Conduct;  
 can constantly, and uniformly, and manfully  
 maintain it; thinking that, and that alone,  
 wholly sufficient to make him happy.*

AND do you seriously believe, said I,  
 there ever was such a Character? And  
 what, replied he, if I should admit, *there  
 never*

never was, is, or will be such a Character? — Part II.

that we have been talking the whole time of a Being, not to be found;

*A faultless Monster, which the World never saw?*

Supposing, I say, we admit this, what then?

Would not your System in such a case, said I, a little border upon the chimerical?

I only ask the Question. You need

not be so tender, he replied, in expressing yourself. If it be false, if it will not in-

duce the Test, I am as ready to give it up, as I have been to defend it. He must be a

poor Philosopher indeed, who, when he sees Truth and a System at variance, can ever

be solicitous for the Fate of a System.

BUT tell me, I pray——Do you object

to mine, from its *Perfection*, or from its *Imperfection*? From its being too excel-

lent for Human Nature, and *above* it; or from its being too base, and *below* it?

It seems to require, said I, a *Perfection*, to which no *Individual* ever arrived.

That very *Transcendence*, said he, is an



Part II. Argument on its behalf. Were it of a Rank inferior, it would not be that Perfection, which we seek. Would you have it, said I, *beyond Nature?* If you, mean, replied he, *beyond any particular or individual Nature*, most undoubtedly I would.—As you are a Lover of Painting, you shall hear a Story on the Subject.

“ In ancient days, while *Greece* was  
 “ flourishing in Liberty and Arts, a cele-  
 “ brated Painter, having drawn many ex-  
 “ cellent Pictures for a certain free State,  
 “ and been generously and honourably re-  
 “ warded for his Labours, at last made  
 “ an Offer to paint them a *Helen*, as a  
 “ Model and Exemplar of the most ex-  
 “ quisite Beauty. The Proposal was rea-  
 “ dily accepted, when the Artist informed  
 “ them, that in order to draw *one* Fair,  
 “ it was necessary he should contemplate  
 “ *many*. He demanded therefore a Sight  
 “ of all their finest Women. The State,  
 “ to assist the Work, assented to his Re-  
 “ quest. They were exhibited before  
 “ him ;

“him; he selected the most beautiful; Part II.  
 “and from these formed his *Helen*, more  
 “beautiful than them all.”——

You have heard the Fact, and what are we to infer?—Or can there be any other Inference than this—that the *Standard of Perfection, with respect to the Beauty of Bodies, was not* (as this Artist thought) *to be discovered in any Individual; but being dispersed by Nature in Portions thro’ the many, was from thence, and thence only, to be collected and recognized?*

It appears, said I, he thought so. The Picture, continued he, is lost, but we have Statues still remaining. If there be Truth in the Testimony of the best and fairest Judges, no Woman ever equalled the Delicacy of the *Medicean Venus*, nor Man the Strength and Dignity of the *Farnhesian Hercules*. It is generally, said I, so believed.

AND will you, said he, from this unparalleled and transcendent Excellence, deny these

Part II. these Works of Art to be truly and strictly *Natural*? Their Excellence, replied I, must be confessed by All; but how they can be called so strictly *Natural*, I must own a little startles me. That the *Limbs* and their *Proportions*, said he, are selected from *Nature*, you will hardly I believe doubt, after the Story just related.

I replied, it was admitted. The *Parts* therefore of these Works are *Natural*. They are. And may not the same be asserted, as to the *Arrangement* of these *Parts*? Must not *this* too be *natural*, as it is analogous we know to *Nature*? It must. If so, then is the *Whole Natural*? So indeed, said I, it should seem. It cannot, replied he, be otherwise, if it be a Fact beyond dispute, that the *Whole* is nothing more, than *the Parts under such Arrangement*.

Enough, said I, you have satisfied me.

If I have, said he, it is but to *transfer* what we have asserted of this *subordinate* Beauty, to Beauty of a *higher Order*; it is  
but

but to pass from the *External*, to the *Part II.*  
*Moral and Internal*. For here we say, by  
 parity of Reason, that no where in any  
*particular Nature is the perfect Character*  
 to be seen intire. Yet one is *brave*; an-  
 other is *temperate*; a third is *liberal*; and  
 a fourth is *prudent*. So that in the *Multitude of mixed imperfect Characters*, as be-  
 fore in the *Multitude of imperfect Bodies*, is  
 expressed that IDEA, that MORAL STAND-  
 DARD OF PERFECTION, by which *all* are  
 tried and compared to one another, and at  
 last upon the whole are either justified or  
 condemned—that Standard of Perfection,  
 which cannot be but *most Natural*, as it is  
 purely collected from *Individuals of Na-  
 ture*, and is the Test of all the Merit to  
 which they aspire. I acknowledge,  
 said I, your Argument.

I MIGHT add, said he, if there were  
 Occasion, other Arguments which would  
 surprize you. I might inform you of the  
 natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of  
*Specific Ideas*;—that every *Individual* was  
 but

Part II. but their *Type*, or *Shadow*;—that the *Mind* or *Intellect* was the *Region of Possibles*;—that whatever is *Possible*, to the *Mind* actually *Is*; nor any thing a *Non-entity*, except what implies a *Contradiction*;—that the genuine *Sphere* and genuine *Cylinder*, tho' *Forms* perhaps too *perfect*, ever to exist conjoined to *Matter*, were yet as *true and real* Beings, as the *grossest Objects of Sense*; were the *Source* of *Infinite Truths*, which *wholly* depend on them, and which, as *Truths*, have a Being most *unalterable and eternal*. But these are *Reasonings*, which rather belong to *another Philosophy*; and if you are *satisfied* without them, they are at best but *superfluous*.

HE waited not for my Answer, but proceeded as follows. It is thus, said he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my power, to give you an Idea of the *perfect Character*: a Character, which I am neither so absurd, as to impute to myself; nor so rigorous and unfair, as to require of others. We have proposed it only, as AN EXEM-

PLAR

PLAR OF IMITATION, which tho' *None* Part II. we think can *equal*, yet *All* at least may follow—an Exemplar of Imitation, which in proportion as we approach, so we advance proportionably in *Merit* and in *Worth*—an Exemplar, which, were we more *selfish*, we should be Fools to reject; if it be true, that *to be Happy*, is *the ultimate Wish of us all*, and that *Happiness* and *Moral Worth* so reciprocally correspond, that there can be no Degree of *the one*, without an equal Degree of *the other*. If there be Truth, said I, in your Reasonings, it cannot certainly be otherwise.

He continued, by saying—The *Proficiency of Socrates*, and indeed of every honest Man, was sufficient to convince us, could we be steadfast to our Purpose, that *some Progress at least* might be made toward this *Perfection*—How far, we knew not—The Field was open—The Race was free and common to All—Nor was the Prize, as usual, reserved only to the First; but All, who run, might depend on a Reward,  
having

Part II. having the Voice of Nature, would they  
 but listen, to assure them,

\* *Nemo ex hoc numero mihi non donatus  
 abibit.*

§ 9. HERE he paused, and left me to meditate on what he had spoken. For some time we passed on in mutual Silence, till observing me on my part little inclined to break it, What, said he, engages you with an Attention so earnest? I was wondering, said I, whence it should happen, that in a Discourse of such a nature, you should say so little of *Religion*, of *Providence*, and a *Deity*. I have not, replied he, omitted them, because not *intimately united to Morals*; but because what ever we treat accurately, should be treated separately and apart. Multiplicity of Matter naturally tends to Confusion. They are weak Minds indeed, which dread a rational Suspence; and much more so, when in the Event, it only leads to a surer Knowledge,

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\* ÆNEID. l. v. N. 305.

ledge, and often strengthens the very Sub- Part II.  
 ject, on which we suspend. Could I how-  
 ever repeat you the Words of a venerable  
 Sage, (for I can call him no other) whom  
 once I heard disserting on the Topic of  
 Religion, and whom still I hear, when  
 ever I think on him; you might accept  
 perhaps my *Religious* Theories as candidly,  
 as you have my *Moral*. I pressed him  
 to repeat them, with which he willingly  
 complied.

THE Speaker, said he, whose Words I  
 am attempting to relate, and whom for  
 the present I name *Theophilus*, was of a  
 Character truly amiable in every part.  
 When young, he had been fortunate in a  
 liberal Education; had been a Friend to  
 the Muses, and approved himself such to  
 the Public. As Life declined, he wisely  
 retired, and dedicated his Time almost  
 wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he  
 never forget the Muses, whom once he  
 loved. He retained in his Discourse (and  
 so in the Sequel you will soon find) a large  
 Portion



Part II. Portion of that rapturous, anti-prosaic Stile,  
 in which those Ladies usually choose to  
 express themselves.

WE were walking, not (as now) in the cheerful Face of Day, but late in the Evening, when the Sun had long been set. Circumstances of Solemnity were not wanting to affect us; the Poets could not have feigned any more happy—a running Stream, an ancient Wood, a still Night, and a bright Moonshine.—I, for my own part, induced by the Occasion, fell insensibly into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the Moon. From thence I wandered to other heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there, and Empires, and I know not what.

Who lives in the Moon, said he, is perhaps more than we can well learn. It is enough, if we can be satisfied, by the help of our best Faculties, that *Intelligence* is not confined to this little Earth, which we inhabit; that tho' Men were not, the World would not want Spectators, to contemplate  
 its

its Beauty, and adore the Wisdom of its Part II.  
Author.

“ THIS whole UNIVERSE itself is but  
“ ONE CITY or COMMONWEALTH—  
“ *a System of Substances variously formed,*  
“ and variously *actuated* agreeably to those  
“ *forms*——a System of Substances both  
“ immensely great and small, *Rational,*  
“ *Animal, Vegetable, and Inanimate.*


“ As many Families make one Village,  
“ many Villages one Province, many Pro-  
“ vince one Empire; so many Empires,  
“ Oceans, Wastes, and Wilds, combined,  
“ compose that Earth on which we live.  
“ Other Combinations make a Planet or a  
“ Moon; and these again, united, make  
“ one Planetary System. What higher  
“ Combinations subsist, we know not,  
“ their Gradation and Ascent it is impos-  
“ sible we should discover. Yet the ge-  
“ nerous Mind, not deterred by this Im-  
“ mensity, intrepidly passes on, thro’ Re-  
“ gions unknown, from greater Systems

Q

“ to

Part II. “ to greater, till it arrive at *that greatest*,  
 “ where Imagination stops, and can ad-  
 “ vance no farther. In this last, this  
 “ mighty, this stupendous Idea, it beholds  
 “ the UNIVERSE itself, of which every  
 “ Thing is a Part, and with respect to  
 “ which not the smallest Atom is either  
 “ foreign or detached.

“ WIDE as its Extent, is the Wisdom  
 “ of its Workmanship, not bounded and  
 “ narrow, like the humbler Works of Art.  
 “ These are all of Origin no higher than  
 “ *Human*. We can readily trace them to  
 “ their utmost Limit, and with accuracy  
 “ discern both their Beginning and their  
 “ End. But where the Microscope that  
 “ can shew us, from what Point Wisdom  
 “ begins in Nature? Where the Telescope  
 “ that can descry, to what Infinitude it  
 “ extends? The more diligent our Search,  
 “ the more accurate our Scrutiny, the  
 “ more only are we convinced, that our  
 “ Labours can never finish; that Subjects

“ inexhaustible remain behind, still un- Part II.  
 “ explored. 

“ HENCE the Mind truly wise, quit-  
 “ ting the Study of *Particulars*, as know-  
 “ ing their *Multitude* to be *infinite* and *in-*  
 “ *comprehensible*, turns its intellectual Eye  
 “ to what is general and comprehensive,  
 “ and thro’ *Generals* learns to see, and re-  
 “ cognize whatever exists.

“ It perceives in this view, that every  
 “ Substance, of every degree, has its *Na-*  
 “ *ture*, its proper Make, Constitution or  
 “ Form, by which it *acts*, and by which  
 “ it *suffers*. It perceives it so to fare with  
 “ every natural Form around us, as with  
 “ those Tools and Instruments by which  
 “ *Art* worketh its Wonders. The Saw is  
 “ destined to one Act; the Mallet, to an-  
 “ other; the Wheel answers this Purpose;  
 “ and the Lever answers a different. So  
 “ *Nature* uses the *Vegetable*, the *Brute*,  
 “ and the *Rational*, agreeably to the proper  
 “ *Form and Constitution of every Kind*. The

Q 2

“ *Vegetable*

Part II. “ *Vegetable* proceeds with perfect *Insensibility*. The *Brute* possesses a Sense of what is pleasurable and painful, but stops at mere *Sensation*, and is unable to go farther. The *Rational*, like the *Brute*, has all the Powers of mere *Sensation*, but enjoys superadded a farther transcendent *Faculty*, by which it is made conscious, not only of *what it feels*, but of the *Powers themselves*, which are the Sources of those very Feelings; a *Faculty*, which recognizing both *itself* and *all Things else*, becomes a *Canon*, a *Corrector*, and a *Standard Universal*.

“ HENCE to the *Rational alone* is imparted that MASTER-SCIENCE, of *what they are*, *where they are*, and *the End to which they are destined*.

“ HAPPY, too happy, did they know their own Felicity; did they reverence the Dignity of their own superior Character, and never wretchedly degrade themselves into Natures to them subordinate.

“dinate. And yet alas! it is a Truth too Part II.  
 “certain, that as the Rational only are  
 “susceptible of a Happiness truly excel-  
 “lent, so these only merge themselves  
 “into Miseries past Indurance.

“ASSIST us then, THOU POWER  
 “DIVINE, with the Light of that REA-  
 “SON, by which Thou lightenest the  
 “World; by which Grace and Beauty is  
 “diffused thro’ every Part, and the Wel-  
 “fare of the Whole is ever uniformly up-  
 “held; that Reason, of which *our own* is  
 “but a *Particle* or *Spark*, like some *Pro-*  
 “*metbean* Fire, caught from Heaven above.  
 “So teach us *to know ourselves*, that we  
 “may attain that Knowledge, which  
 “alone is worth attaining. Check our  
 “vain, our idle Researches into the Laws,  
 “and Natures, and Motions of other Be-  
 “ings, till we have learnt and can prac-  
 “tise those, which peculiarly respect our-  
 “selves. Teach us to be fit Actors in  
 “that general Drama, where Thou hast  
 “allotted every Being, great and small, its

Q 3

“ pro-

Part II. “ proper Part, *the due Performance of which*  
 “ *is the only End of its Existence.*

“ ENABLE us to curb DESIRE within  
 “ the Bounds of what is *Natural*. Enable  
 “ us even to *suspend* it, till we can employ  
 “ it to our Emolument. Be our *first*  
 “ Work, to have escaped from *wrong Opi-*  
 “ *nion, and bad Habit*; that the Mind,  
 “ thus rendered sincere and incorrupt, may  
 “ with Safety proceed to seek its genuine  
 “ Good and Happiness.

“ WHEN we are thus previously ex-  
 “ ercised, thus duly prepared, let not our  
 “ LOVE there stop, where it first begins;  
 “ but insensibly conduct it, by thy invi-  
 “ sible Influence, from lower Objects to  
 “ higher, till it arrive at that *Supreme*,  
 “ where only it can find what is adequate  
 “ and full. Teach us to love THEE, and  
 “ THY DIVINE ADMINISTRATION—  
 “ to regard the Universe itself as our true  
 “ and genuine Country, not that little ca-  
 “ sual Spot, where we first drew vital  
 “ Air.

" Air. Teach us each to regard *Himself*, Part II.  
 " but as a PART of this great WHOLE ;  
 " a Part which for its Welfare we are as  
 " patiently to resign, as we resign a single  
 " Limb for the Welfare of our whole  
 " Body. Let our Life be a continued  
 " Scene of ACQUIESCENCE and of GRATI-  
 " TUDE ; of Gratitude, for what *we enjoy* ;  
 " of Acquiescence, in what we *suffer* ; as  
 " both can only be referable, to that  
 " concatenated Order of Events which can-  
 " not but be *best*, as being by Thee ap-  
 " proved and chosen.

" IN as much as Futurity is hidden  
 " from our Sight, we can have no other  
 " Rule of Choice, by which to govern our  
 " Conduct, than *what seems consonant to*  
 " *the Welfare of our own particular Na-*  
 " *tures*. If it appear not contrary to Duty  
 " and moral Office, (and how should we  
 " judge, but from what appears ?) Thou  
 " canst not but forgive us, if we prefer  
 " Health to Sickness ; the Safety of Life  
 " and Limb, to Maiming or to Death.

Q 4

" But



Part II. “ But did we know that these Incidents,  
 “ or any other were appointed us; were  
 “ fated in that Order of incontroulable  
 “ Events, by which Thou preserveft and  
 “ adornest the Whole, it then becomes  
 “ our Duty, to meet them with Magna-  
 “ nimity; to co-operate with Chearfulness  
 “ in what ever Thou ordainest; that so  
 “ we may know no other Will, than thine  
 “ alone, and that the Harmony of our  
 “ *particular* Minds with thy *Universal*,  
 “ may be steady and uninterrupted thro’  
 “ the Period of our Existence.

“ YET, since to attain this Height, this  
 “ transcendent Height, is but barely pos-  
 “ sible, if possible, to the most perfect  
 “ Humanity: regard what within us is  
 “ *Congenial to Thee*; raise us above our-  
 “ selves, and warm us into *Enthusiasm*.  
 “ But let our Enthusiasm be such, as befits  
 “ the Citizens of Thy Polity; liberal,  
 “ gentle, rational, and humane—not such  
 “ as to debase us into poor and wretched  
 “ *Slaves*, as if Thou wert our Tyrant,  
 “ not

“ not our kind and common Father; Part II.  
 “ much less such as to transform us into  
 “ savage *Beasts of Prey*, sullen, gloomy,  
 “ dark, and fierce; prone to persecute, to  
 “ ravage, and destroy, as if the Lust of  
 “ Massacre could be grateful to thy Good-  
 “ nefs. Permit us rather madly to avow  
 “ Villainy in thy Defiance, than impiously  
 “ to assert it under colour of thy Service.  
 “ Turn our Mind’s Eye from every Idea  
 “ of this Character; from the Servile, Ab-  
 “ ject, Horrid, and Ghastly, to the Gene-  
 “ rous, Lovely, Fair, and Godlike.

“ HERE let us dwell;—be here our  
 “ Study and Delight. So shall we be en-  
 “ abled, in the silent Mirrour of *Contem-  
 “ plation*, to behold those *Forms*, which  
 “ are hidden to Human Eyes—that ani-  
 “ mating WISDOM, which pervades and  
 “ rules the whole—that LAW irresistible,  
 “ immutable, supreme, which leads the  
 “ Willing, and compels the Averse, to co-  
 “ operate in their Station to the general  
 “ Welfare—that MAGIC DIVINE, which

Part II. “ by an Efficacy past Comprehension, can  
 “ transform every Appearance, the most  
 “ hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit *all*  
 “ things FAIR and GOOD to THEE,  
 “ ESSENCE INCREATE, *who art of purer*  
 “ Eyes, than ever to behold Iniquity.

“ BE these our Mornīng, these our  
 “ Evening Meditations—with these may  
 “ our Minds be unchangeably tinged—  
 “ that loving Thee with a Love most dis-  
 “ interested and sincere; enamoured of  
 “ thy Polity, and thy DIVINE ADMI-  
 “ NISTRATION; welcoming every Event  
 “ with Chearfulness and Magnanimity, as  
 “ being *best* upon the Whole, because or-  
 “ dained of Thee; proposing nothing of  
 “ ourselves, but *with a Reserve* that Thou  
 “ permittest; acquiescing in every Obstruc-  
 “ tion, as ultimately referable to thy Pro-  
 “ vidence—in a word, that working this  
 “ Conduct, by due exercise, into perfect  
 “ *Habit*; we may never murmur, never  
 “ repine; never miss what we would ob-  
 “ tain, or fall into that which we would  
 “ avoid;

“ avoid; but being happy with that tran- Part II.  
 “ scendent *Happiness*, of which no one  
 “ can deprive us; and blest with that Di-  
 “ vine *Liberty*, which no Tyrant can an-  
 “ noy; we may dare address Thee with  
 “ pious Confidence, as the *Philosophic Bard*  
 “ of old,

“ *Conduct me, Thou, of Beings Cause Divine,*  
 “ *Where-e'er I'm destin'd in thy great Design.*  
 “ *Active I follow on: for should my Will*  
 “ *Resist, I'm impious; but must follow still.*”

IN this manner did *Theophilus*, said he, pursue the Subject, to which I had led him. He adorned his Sentiments with Expressions even more splendid than I have now employed. The Speaker, the Speech, the happy Circumstances which concurred, the Night's Beauty and Stillness, with the Romantic Scene where we were walking, all together gave the Whole such an Energy and Solemnity, as it is impossible you should feel from the Coldness of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for my

Part II. my own part, returned home sensibly touched, and retained the strongest Feelings of what I had heard, till the following Morning. Then the Business of the Day gently obliterated all, and left me by Night as little of a Philosopher, as I had ever been before.

§ 10. AND is it possible, said I, so soon to have forgotten, what seems so striking and sublime, as the Subject you have been now treating? It is HABIT, replied he, is all in all. It is *Practice and Exercise, which can only make us truly any thing.* Is it not evidently so, in the most common vulgar Arts? Did mere *Theory* alone ever make the meanest Mechanic? And is the *Supreme Art of Life and Manners* to be formed more easily, than such a one? Happy for us, could we prove it near so easy. But believe me, my Friend, good Things are not so cheap. *Nothing is to be had gratis*, much less that which is most valuable.

YET


YET however for our Comfort, we have Part II.  
 this to encourage us, that, tho' the Difficulty of *acquiring* Habits be great and painful, yet nothing so easy, so pleasant, as their *Energies*, when once wrought by Exercise to a due Standard of Perfection. I know you have made some Progress in *Music*. Mark well what you can do, as a Proficient this way—You can do that, which without Habit, as much exceeds the wisest Man, as to walk upon the Waves; or to ascend a Cliff perpendicular. You can even do it with Facility; and (lest you should think I flatter) not you yourself alone, but a thousand others beside, whose low Rank and Genius no way raise them above the Multitude. If then you are so well assured of this Force of Habit in one Instance, judge not in other Instances by your own present Insufficiency. Be not shocked at the *apparent Greatness* of the *perfect Moral Character*, when you compare it to the *Weakness* and *Imperfection* of your own. On the contrary, when these  
 dark,

Part II. dark, these melancholy Thoughts assail you, immediately turn your Mind to the Consideration of *Habit*. Remember how *easy* its Energies to those, who *possess* it; and yet how *impracticable* to such, as *possess* it not.

IT must be owned, said I, that this is a Satisfaction, and may be some kind of Assistance in a melancholy Hour. And yet this very Doctrine naturally leads to another Objection.—Does not *the Difficulty of attaining Habit* too well support a certain Assertion, that, *desend Virtue as we will, it is but a Scheme of Self-denial?*

By *Self-denial*, said he, you mean, I suppose, something like what follows—*Appetite* bids me eat; *Reason* bids me forbear—If I obey Reason, I *deny* Appetite; and Appetite being *a Part of myself*, to *deny* it, is a *Self-denial*. What is true thus in *Luxury*, is true also in other Subjects; is evident in Matters of Lucre, of Power, of Resentment, or whatever else we pursue

by

by the Dictate of any Passion. You Part II.  
 appear, said I, to have stated the Objection   
 justly.

To return then to our Instance, said he, of Luxury. *Appetite* bids me eat; *Reason* bids me forbear—If I obey *Reason*, I deny *Appetite*—and if I obey *Appetite*, do I not deny *Reason*? Can I act either way, without rejecting one of them? And is not *Reason* a Part of myself, as notoriously as *Appetite*?

OR to take another Example—I have a Deposit in my Hands. *Avarice* bids me retain—*Conscience* bids me restore. Is there not a reciprocal Denial, let me obey which I will? And is not *Conscience* a Part of me, as truly as *Avarice*?

POOR SELF indeed must be denied, take which Party we will. But why should *Virtue* be arraigned of thwarting it, more than *Vice* her contrary?—Make the most of the Argument, it can come but to  
 this—



Part II. this—If *Self-denial* be an Objection to *Virtue*, so is it to *Vice*—If *Self-denial* be no Objection to *Vice*, no more can it be to *Virtue*. A wonderful and important Conclusion indeed!

HE continued by saying, that the *Soul of Man* appeared not as a *single Faculty*, but as *compounded of many*—that as these *Faculties* were not always in perfect Peace one with another, so there were few Actions which we could perform, where they would be *all* found to *concur*. What then are we to do? Suspend till they agree?—That were indeed impossible.—Nothing therefore can remain, but to weigh well their several Pretensions; to hear all, that each has to offer in its behalf; and finally to pursue the Dictates of the *Wiseſt* and the *Beſt*. This done, as for the *Self-denial*, which we force upon the rest; with regard to our own *Character*, it is a Matter of Honour and Praise—with regard to the *Faculties denied*, it is a Matter of as small Weight, as to contemn the Noise and Clamours of a  
 mad

mad and senseless Mob, in deference to the Part II.  
 sober Voice of the worthier, better Citizens. And what Man could be justified, should he reject these, and prefer a Rabble?

§ 10. IN this place he paused again, and I took occasion to acknowledge, that my Objection appeared obviated. As the Day advanced apace, he advised that we might return home; and walking along leisurely, thus resumed to himself the Discourse.

I DARE say, continued he, you have seen many a wise Head shake, in pronouncing that sad Truth, *how we are governed all by INTEREST.*——And what do they think should govern us else? Our Loss, our Damage, our *Disinterest?*——Ridiculous indeed! We should be Ideots in such case, more than rational Animals. The only Question is, *where Interest truly lies?* For if this once be well adjusted, no Maxim can be more harmless.

Part II. “ I FIND myself existing upon a little  
 “ Spot, surrounded every way by an im-  
 “ mense unknown Expansion.—Where  
 “ am I? What Sort of a Place do I  
 “ inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated,  
 “ in every Instance, to my Convenience?  
 “ Is there no Excess of Cold, none of  
 “ Heat, to offend me? Am I never an-  
 “ noyed by Animals, either of my own  
 “ kind, or a different? Is every thing  
 “ subservient to me, as tho’ I had ordered  
 “ all myself? — No — nothing like it—  
 “ the farthest from it possible——The  
 “ World appears not then originally made  
 “ for the *private Convenience of me alone?*—  
 “ It does not.—But is it not possible so to  
 “ accommodate it, by my own particular  
 “ Industry?——If to accommodate Man  
 “ and Beast, Heaven and Earth; if this be  
 “ beyond me, it is not possible——What  
 “ Consequence then follows? Or can  
 “ there be any other than this—*if I seek*  
 “ *an Interest of my own, detached from that*  
 “ of

“ of others ; I seek an Interest which is *chimerical*, and can never have Existence ? Part II.

“ How then must I determine ? Have  
 “ I no Interest at all ?—If I have not, I  
 “ am a Fool for staying here. It is a  
 “ smoaky House, and the sooner out of  
 “ it, the better.—But why no Interest ?—  
 “ Can I be contented with none, but one  
 “ separate and detached ?—Is a SOCIAL  
 “ INTEREST joined with others such an  
 “ Absurdity, as not to be admitted ? The  
 “ Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of herd-  
 “ ing Animals, are enough to convince  
 “ me, that the thing is, *somewhere at*  
 “ *least*, possible. How then am I assured,  
 “ that it is not equally true of *Man* ?—  
 “ Admit it ; and what follows ?—If so,  
 “ then HONOUR and JUSTICE are my  
 “ INTEREST—then the WHOLE TRAIN  
 “ OF MORAL VIRTUES are my INTE-  
 “ REST ; *without some Portion of which,*  
 “ *not even Thieves can maintain Society.*

R 2

“ BUT

## Part II.

“ BUT farther still—I stop not here—  
 “ I pursue this *Social Interest*, as far as I  
 “ can trace my several *Relations*. I pass  
 “ from my own Stock, my own Neigh-  
 “ bourhood, my own Nation, to the *whole*  
 “ *Race of Mankind*, as dispersed through-  
 “ out the Earth.—Am I not *related to them*  
 “ *all*, by the mutual Aids of Commerce ;  
 “ by the general Intercourse of Arts and  
 “ Letters ; by that *common Nature*, of  
 “ which we all participate ?—Again—  
 “ I must have Food and Cloathing.—  
 “ Without a proper genial Warmth,  
 “ I instantly perish.—Am I not rela-  
 “ ted, in this view, to the very *Earth*  
 “ itself ? To the distant *Sun*, from  
 “ whose Beams I derive Vigour ? To that  
 “ stupendous *Course and Order of the infi-*  
 “ *nite Host of Heaven*, by which the Times  
 “ and Seasons ever uniformly pass on ?—  
 “ Were this Order once confounded, I  
 “ could not probably survive a Moment ;  
 “ *so absolutely do I depend on this common*  
 “ *general Welfare*.

“ WHAT

“ WHAT then have I to do, but to **Part II.**  
 “ enlarge VIRTUE into PIETY? Not  
 “ only *Honour* and *Justice*, and what I  
 “ owe to MAN, is my *Interest*; but *Grati-*  
 “ *tude* also, *Acquiescence*, *Resignation*, *Ado-*  
 “ *ration*, and all I owe to this great *Polity*,  
 “ and its greater GOVERNOR, OUR COM-  
 “ MON PARENT.

“ BUT if all these MORAL and DI-  
 “ VINE HABITS be my INTEREST, I  
 “ need not surely seek for a better. I  
 “ have an Interest *compatible* with the  
 “ Spot on which I live—I have an In-  
 “ terest which may exist, without *altering*  
 “ the Plan of Providence; without *mend-*  
 “ *ing* or *marring* the general Order of  
 “ Events.—I can bear whatever happens  
 “ with manlike Magnanimity; can be  
 “ contented, and fully happy in the *Good*,  
 “ which I possess; and can pass thro’ this  
 “ turbid, this fickle, fleeting Period, with-  
 “ out Bewailings, or Envyings, or Mur-  
 “ murings, or Complaints.”

Part II. **AND** thus my Friend, have you my Sentiments, as it were abridged; my Sentiments on that Subject, which engages every one of us. For who would be unhappy? Who would not, if he knew how, enjoy *one perpetual Felicity*? Who are there existing, who do not at every Instant seek it? It is the Wish, the Employ, not of the Rational Man only, but of the Sot, the Glutton, the very lowest of our kind. For my own System, whether a just one, you may now examine, if you think proper. I can only say on its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, it is a grateful Error, which I cherish and am fond of. And yet if really such, I shall never deem it so sacred, as not willingly, upon Conviction, to resign it up to Truth.

LITTLE passed after this worth relating. We had not far to walk, and we fell into common Topics. Yet one Observation of his I must not omit. It was  
 what

what follows.—When we are once, Part II.  
 said he, well *habituated* to this CHIEF, }  
 this MORAL SCIENCE, then LOGIC  
 and PHYSICS become two profitable  
*Adjuncts*: *Logic*, to secure to us the  
 Possession of our Opinions; that, if an  
 Adversary attack, we may not basely give  
 them up: *Physics*, to explain the Reason  
 and Oeconomy of Natural Events, that  
 we may know something of that Universe,  
 where our Dwelling has been appointed  
 us. But let me add a Saying (and may  
 its Remembrance never escape you) while  
 you find this great, this *Master-Science*  
*wanting*, value *Logic* but as *Sophistry*, and  
*Physics* but as *Raree-shew*; for both, assure  
 yourself, will be found nothing better.

It was soon after this that our Walk  
 ended. With it ended a Conversation,  
 which had long engaged us; and which,  
 according to my Promise, I have here en-  
 deavoured to transcribe.

T H E E N D.





## Advertisement to the Reader.

*THE Author has chosen to separate all Notes from his first and third Treatises, and thus subjoin them to the End, because those Treatises, being written in Dialogue, from their Nature and Genius admit not of Interruption. One of his Reasons for adding Notes was, to give Weight to his Assertions from the Authority of antient Writers. But his chief and principal Reason was, to excite (if possible) the Curiosity of Readers, to examine with stricter Attention those valuable Remains of antient Literature. Should he obtain this End, he shall think his Labours (such as they are) abundantly rewarded.*



N O T E S  
ON  
TREATISE the First;  
CONCERNING  
A R T.

**N**OTE I. p. 6. ALL ART IS CAUSE.] *Artis maxime proprium, creare & gignere.* Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 22. Ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν. *All Art is employed in Production, that is, in making something to be.* *Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 4.*

THE *active efficient Causes* have been ranged and enumerated after different manners. In the same *Ethics*, they are enumerated thus—*αἴτια γὰρ δοκῶσιν εἶναι Φύσις, ἡ ἀνάγκη, ἡ τύχη· ἔτε δὲ νῦν, ἡ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου.* *The several Causes appear to be Nature, Necessity, and Chance; and besides these, Mind or Intellect, and whatever operates by or thro' Man.* l. 3: c. 3. The Paraphrast *Andronicus*, in explaining this last Passage, Πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, adds οἷον τέχνην, ἢ ἄλλη τις πράξις, *as for instance, Art, or any other human Action.*

ALEX-

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS speaks of efficient Causes as follows: Ἄλλα μὲν τὰ κυρίως αἰτία πρῆπτικά, φύσις τι, καὶ τέχνη, καὶ προαίρεσις. *The Causes, which are strictly and properly efficient, are Nature, Art, and each Man's particular Choice of Action.* περὶ Τύχης. p. 160. B. Edit. Ald.

IN what manner ART is distinguished from the rest of these efficient Causes, the subsequent Notes will attempt to explain.

NOTE II. p. 6. OF THAT PAINTER FAMED IN STORY, &c.] See *Valer. Max.* l. 8. c. II. See also *Dion. Chrysostom. Orat.* 63. p. 590.

NOTE III. p. 12. ART IS MAN BECOMING A CAUSE, INTENTIONAL AND HABITUAL.] *Aristotle*, in his *Rhetoric*, thus accurately enumerates all the possible manners, either direct or indirect, in which Mankind may be said to *act* or *do* any thing. Πάντα δὲ πράττει πάντα, τὰ μὲν, ἢ δι' αὐτῶν· τὰ δὲ, δι' αὐτῶν· τῶν μὲν ἔν μὴ δι' αὐτῶν, τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχης πράττει, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ μὲν βίᾳ, τὰ δὲ φύσει· ὅτε πάντα, ὅσα μὴ δι' αὐτῶν πράττει, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης· τὰ δὲ φύσει· τὰ δὲ βίᾳ. Ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτῶν, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἰτίοι, τὰ μὲν δι' ἔθος, τὰ δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν· καὶ τὰ μὲν διὰ λογικῶν ὄρεξιν, τὰ δὲ δι' αλόγιστον. ἔτι δὲ ἢ μὲν βίᾳ, μίση λόγῳ ὄρεξις ἀγαθῶν—ἀλογοὶ δ' ὄρεξις, ὄργη καὶ ἐπιθυμία· ὅτε πάντα ὅσα πράττει, ἀνάγκη καὶ πράττειν δι' αἰτίας ἔπλα· διὰ τύχης, διὰ βίᾳ, διὰ

2

Φύσιν,

Φύσιν, δι' ἄθος, διὰ λογισμὸν, διὰ θυμὸν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.

*All Men do all Things, either of themselves, or not of themselves. The Things, which they do not of themselves, they do either by Chance, or from Necessity; and the Things done from Necessity, they do either by Compulsion, which is External Necessity, or by Nature, which is Internal. So that all Things whatsoever, which Men do not of themselves, they do either by Chance, or from Compulsion, or by Nature.*

*Again, the Things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves properly the Causes, some they do thro' Custom and acquired Habit, others thro' original and natural Desire. Farther, the Things done thro' natural Desire they do, either thro' such Desire assisted by Reason, or thro' such Desire devoid of Reason. If it be assisted by Reason, then it assumes the Denomination of Will,—on the contrary, the irrational Desires are Anger and Appetite.*

*Hence it appears that all Things whatever, which Men do, they necessarily do thro' one of these seven Causes; either thro' Chance, Compulsion, Nature, Custom, Will, Anger, Appetite. Arist. Rhet. i. 1. c. 10.*

It remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to consider with which of these Causes we ought to arrange ART.

As to CHANCE, it may be observed in general of all Casual Events, that they always exclude Intention or Design: But Intention and Design, are from  
Art

*Art* inseparable. Thus is the Difference between *Art* and *Chance* manifest.

AS TO EXTERNAL COMPULSION, we have it thus described—*Βίαιον δὲ ἢ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν. That is, an Act of Compulsion, the efficient Principle of which is from without, independent of the Doer. Ethic. Nic. l. 3. c. 1.* Again, in the same Treatise, l. 6. c. 4. we are told of the Works of *Art*, that they are such, *ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιῶντι, the efficient Principle of which is in the Doer or Agent.* Thus therefore is *Art* distinguished from *Compulsion*.

THESE two Causes, *Chance* and *Compulsion*, are mentioned and considered in the Dialogue, *Pages 6 and 7.*

NATURE, or rather NATURAL NECESSITY, is that Cause, thro' which we breathe, perspire, digest, circulate our Blood, &c. *Will, Anger, and Appetite*, are (as already observed) but so many Species of NATURAL DESIRE, considered either as assisted by Reason, or else as devoid of it. Now tho' *Natural Desire* and *Natural Necessity* differ, because in the one we act *spontaneously*, in the other *not spontaneously*, yet both of them meet in the common Genus of *Natural Power*. Moreover this is true of all *Natural Power*, that the *Power* itself is *prior* to any *Energies* or *Acts* of that *Power*. *Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῆ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκῆσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιον, ἔχουσις ἐχρησάμεθα, ἔχρησάμενοι ἔχομεν.* For [to instance in the natural Powers of Sensation] *it was not from often seeing, and often hearing,*

hearing, that we acquired those Senses; but on the contrary, being first possessed of them, we then used them, not through any Use or Exercise did we come to possess them. *Arist. Ethic. l. 2. c. 1.*

Now the contrary to this is true in the case of any Powers or Faculties not natural, but acquired by Custom and Usage. For here there are many Energies and Acts, which must necessarily precede the Existence of such Power or Habit, it being evident (as is said in the same Chapter) that ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ εἴξεις γίνονται, from similar and homogeneous Energies it is that Habits are obtained. So again, in the same Place, ἃ γὰρ διὰ μαθήσεως ποιεῖν, τὰυτα ποιεῖντες μαθάνομεν ὅτιον οἰκοδομῆντες οἰκοδομοὶ γίνονται, καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. *The Things which we are to do by having learnt, we learn by doing. Thus by building Men become Builders, and by practising Music they become Musicians.*

THUS therefore is ART distinguished from ALL NATURAL POWER OF MAN, whether Natural Necessity, Will, Anger, or Appetite. But ART has been already distinguished from CHANCE and COMPULSION. So that being clearly not the same with six of those seven Causes, by which all Men do all Things, it must needs be referred to the seventh, that is, to CUSTOM or HABIT.

IT must be observed, the natural Causes or Powers in Man, considered as distinct from Art, are treated in the Dialogue, Pages 8 and 9.

AND



AND now, as we have shewn *Art to be a certain Cause working in Man*, it remains to shew how it is distinguished from *those other Causes beside Man*, which we suppose to operate in the Universe. These are either such *Causes as are below him*, like the *Vegetative Power*, which operates in Vegetables, the *Sensitive* in Animals; or else such *Causes as are above him*, like GOD, and whatever is else of Intelligence more than human.

THE CAUSES BELOW us may be all included in the *common Genus of NATURE*; and of *Nature* we may say universally, as well of *Nature* without us as within us, that its several *Operations*, contrary to those of *Art*, are not in the least degree derived from *Custom or Usage*. Thus the Author above cited—  
 'Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται· ὅσον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος, ἢ ἂν ἐθισθεῖν ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ἢ ἂν μυρίακις αὐτὸν ἐθίξῃ τις ἄνω ρίπτων, ἢ δὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω. *None of those Things, which are what they are by Nature, can be altered by being accustomed. Thus a Stone, which by Nature is carried downward, can never be accustomed to mount upward, no, not tho' any one should ten thousand times attempt it, by throwing the Stone upward. The same may be said of accustoming Fire to move downward.* *Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 1.*  
 Again, in the *Works of Nature*, such as Trees, Animals, and the like, the *efficient Principle*, is vitally united to the *Subjects*, wherein it operates.—  
 ἐν αὐτοῖσι ἔχει τὰ ὅλα τὴν ἀρχὴν. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 4.* But in the *Works of Art*, such as Statues or Houses, the *efficient Principle* is disunited from the *Subjects*, and exists not in the *Things done or made*,  
 but

but in the *Doer or Artist*—ὄν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιῶντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ. *Ethic. Nic.* 1. 6. c. 4. It is indeed possible that, even in *Works of Art*, the *Subject and efficient Cause* may be united, as in the Case of a Physician becoming his own Patient, and curing himself. But then it must be remembered that this Union is κατὰ συμβεβηκός, merely *accidental*, and no way *essential* to the constituting of Art, considered as Art. By this therefore is ART clearly distinguished from NATURE; whose Definition informs us that it is—ἀρχὴ τίς καὶ ἀίτια τῷ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρῶτως, καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. *A certain Principle or Cause of moving and ceasing to move, in some Subject wherein such Principle exists immediately, essentially, and not by way of Accident.* *Arist. Natur. Aufc.* 1. 2. c. 1.

THE CAUSES, which are of Rank SUPERIOUR to Man, such as the DEITY, can have nothing to do with Art, because being (as is said in the Dialogue, p. 11.) *perfect and complete, and knowing all from the Beginning, they can never admit of what is additional and secondary.* Art therefore can only belong to Beings, like Men, who being imperfect, know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them by Helps secondary and subsequent. It was from a like Consideration that Pythagoras called himself a PHILOSOPHER, that is to say (according to his own Explication of the Name) *a Lover and Seeker of what was wise and good, but not a Possessor*, which he deemed a character above him. Consonant to this we read in Plato's Banquet, *Ἐἶναι*

ὁδὸς φιλοσοφεί, ἂδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γινῆσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ, &c. No GOD philosophizes, or desires to become wise, FOR HE IS SO ALREADY, Nor, if there be any other Being wise, doth he philosophize for the same Reason. On the other hand, neither do the Indocil philosophize; for this is the Misfortune of Indocility, without being virtuous, good or prudent, to appear to ones self sufficient in all these Respects. In general therefore, he who thinketh himself in no want, desireth not that, which he thinks himself not to need. Who then, said Socrates to Diotima, (the Speaker of this Narration) WHO ARE THOSE WHO PHILOSOPHIZE, if they are neither the Wise nor the Indocil? That (replied she) may be now conspicuous even to a Child. THEY ARE THOSE OF MIDDLE RANK, BETWEEN THESE EXTREMES. Plat. p. 203. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani.

HERE we see (agreeably to what is said in the Dialogue, pages 11. and 12.) that as to *acquired* or *secondary Habits*, some Beings are *too excellent* for them, and others *too base*; and that the DEITY above all is in the Number of those *transcendent*, and is thus, as a *Cause*, distinguished from ART. Vid. *Amm. περὶ Ἐγγύων*. p. 26. b. et omnino εἰς καλῆν. p. 127, 128.

THERE are, besides the *Deity* and *Nature* now spoken of, certain other *external Causes*, which are mentioned in the first Note as distinct from *Art*; namely *Chance* and *Necessity*. But of these hereafter, when we consider the *Subjeḱ* of Art.

NOTE

NOTE IV. p. 13. FACULTIES, POWERS, &c. ARE OBSCURE AND HIDDEN THINGS—ENERGIES AND OPERATIONS LIE OPEN TO THE SENSES.] \*Εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον τῶτων, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικόν, ἢ τί τὸ αἰσθητικόν, πρότερον ἐπισκεπτόν, τί τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· πρότεραι γὰρ καὶ σαφίτεραι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῶν δυνάμεων εἰσι αἱ ἐνέργειαι· προσεὶλυγχάνομεν γὰρ αὐταῖς, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπινοῶμεν. *If we are to explain what each of these things are, as for instance, what the intelligent Principle, what the sensitive, we must first inquire what it is to think, what to see, hear, and use the Senses. For with respect to us Men, the ENERGIES are PRIOR and MORE EVIDENT than the POWERS, because it is in the Energies we are first conversant, and comprehend the Powers from them.* Themist. in lib. 2. de Animâ, p. 76. Edit. Ald. Fol. Aristot. de An. II. 4.

NOTE V. p. 15. ARE THERE NOT PRECEPTS, &c.] Vid. Plat. in Min. tom. 2. p. 316, 17. Edit. Serran. et in Gorgia, tom. i. p. 465. A. ἐγὼ δὲ τεχνὴν ἢ καλῶ, ὃ ἂν ἢ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα.

As to those *low Habits* here mentioned, from which we distinguish *Art* by the *Number* and *Dignity* of its Precepts, they fall in general under the Denomination of *Μαλαιοτεχνία*, of which *Quintilian* gives the following Account. *Μαλαιοτεχνία quoque est quædam, id est, supervacua Artis Imitatio, quæ nihil sane nec boni nec mali habeat, sed vanum laborem: qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, ex spatio distante missa, in acum continuo & sine frustratione insererat; quem, cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur ejusdem*

*leguminis modio. Quod quidem premium fuit illo opere dignissimum.* Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 20.

NOTE VI. p. 17. AN HABITUAL POWER IN MAN OF BECOMING THE CAUSE OF SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS—]

THE *Peripatetic* Definition of Art is Ἐξίς μάλιστα Λόγῳ ἀληθῆς ποιητικῆ—*an efficient Habit, joined with sound and true Reason.* Aristot. Ethic. Nic. l. 6. c. 4.

THE *Stoic* Definition, as we find it in *Sext. Empir. adversus Logicos*, p. 392. is, Σύστημα ἐκ κατὰλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἔυχρησόν τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Thus translated by *Cicero* in *Dionides de Grammat.* l. 2. *Ars est Perceptionum exercitatarum collectio, ad unum exitum vitæ utilem pertinentium.* And again by *Quintilian*, Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 18. *Artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus & coexercitatis ad finem utilem vitæ.* The same Definition is also alluded to in the *Academics* of *Cicero*, l. 2. c. 7. where it is said—*Ars vero quæ potest esse, nisi quæ non ex una, aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?*

THERE is a third Definition of Art cited by *Quintilian* in the same place, and ascribed by him to *Cleanthes*—*Ars est potestas viâ (id est, ordine) efficiens.* The Greek, from which this Latin Definition is taken, is fuller and more philosophical. The Words are—Ἐξίς ἐδῶ βαδίζουσα μάλιστα Φαντασίας—*which may be rendered, an Habit, which proceeds in a Road or Method, having a Sense withal of what it is about.* The last

last Character distinguishes Art from the natural Energies of all things *insensitive*, which, tho' they proceed *methodically*, yet want a *Sense* of what they are doing. Vid. Niceph. Blemmid. Epit. Logic. p. 20.

Now if we compare these Definitions with that in the Dialogue, we shall find them all to correspond. *The Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Cause of some Effect*, is the same as *Ἐξίς ποιητική* in the *Peripatetic* Definition. According to a *System of various and well-approved Precepts*, is the same as *μῆλα λόγου ἀληθῆς*. For *sound and true Reason* must needs be the Basis of all such *Precepts*.

AGAIN, as to the second Definition—The Words *Σύστημα κατὰλήψεων* [*a System of Comprehensions, or of certain and evident Truths*] correspond to the latter Part of the Definition in the Dialogue—According to a *System of various and well-approved Precepts*. The Word *ἐργασματοσμένηων* [that is to say, *worked in by Habit and Exercise*] corresponds to the first Part, that *Art is a Cause founded in Habit*. And the rest [*πρὸς τὸ τέλος, &c.* that is to say, *a System which has respect to some useful and serviceable End or Purpose in Human Life*] shews the System here mentioned to regard *Practice and Action*, not *Theory and Speculation*. And thus does it correspond with the Definition of the Dialogue, where it is said that Art is an *Habitual Power* not of merely *contemplating and knowing*, but of *becoming the Cause of some Effect*. It is not indeed expressed in the Dialogue, that this Effect has respect to the *Utility of Human Life*, because this latter *Circumstance* is referred to the Definition of the *final Cause* of Art, given page 29.

As to the third Definition of Art, *potestas viâ efficiens*, a Power of operating methodically, it may be observed, that by being called an *operating Power*, it is distinguished from Powers *purely speculative*; and as it is said to *operate methodically*, or *in a Road and regular Process*, it is distinguished from *Chance* as well as blind *Necessity*. And thus far it corresponds with what is offered in the Dialogue. But it does not appear from this Definition, whether the Power therein mentioned be *Original and Natural*, or *Secondary and Habitual*, because Powers of *either sort* may operate methodically. And perhaps *Cleanthes* intended not to distinguish so far, but took *Art* in that *larger and more general Sense*, adopted sometimes by the *Stoics*; as when they describe *Nature herself* to be a Πῦρ τεχνητὸν ὄντων βαδίζον πρὸς γένεσιν, an *artificial Fire; proceeding methodically to Production or Creation*. For it is not to be imagined, they intended by this to insinuate that *Nature* was a *Fire*, which had learnt by *Habit* so to operate. On the contrary, by *artificial* it is probable they intended no more than some *active efficient Principle, working with Reason, Order, and Method*; of which Principle they considered *Fire* to be the *properest* vehicle, as being of all Bodies the most *subtle*, and that into which the rest are all *ultimately* resolvable, *Vide Diog. Laert. l. 7. Sect. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 22.*

NOTE VII. page 22. IT SHOULD SEEM THAT THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF ART WAS—ALL THOSE CONTINGENT NATURES, WHICH LIE WITHIN THE REACH OF HUMAN POWERS TO INFLUENCE.]

THE

THE CAUSE here treated is the MATERIAL, the "Τλη, or Ὑποκείμενον, or τὸ ἐξ ἧς γινέσθαι τι ἐνυπάρχον." Ⓞ.

OF a *Contingent* we have the following Definition — Λέγω δ' ἐνδέχεσθαι, ἢ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἔ μὴ ἄν Ⓞ ἀναγκαίως, τεθῆναι Ⓞ δ' ὑπάρχειν, εἰδὲν ἕσθαι διὰ τῆς ἀδύνατον. I call that a CONTINGENT, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such supposition. Arist. Anal. prior. l. i. c. 13. Diog. Laert. l. 3. § 10.

THAT this is true in Works of *Art*, is evident. It is not necessary, that a given Fragment of such a Rock should assume the Figure of *Hercules*: but there follows nothing impossible, if we suppose it so figured. It is for this reason, that the *Subject of Art* is in the Dialogue called a *Contingent*.

BUT however, to explain the whole of what is said in this Place, it is necessary to go backward, and deduce what we would say from some remoter Considerations.

THE *Peripatetics* held the *End* or *Aim* of their Philosophy to be the discovering and knowing the ἀρχή, the primary and creative Principle of all Things. They pursued this Inquiry, when they reasoned *analytically*, that is to say upwards, by beginning their Contemplation from those things, which are to us first in the Order of our Comprehension, and so ascending gradually to that which is truly first in the real Order of Beings. Ammon. 115 E. Φων. p. 36.



THE *first* and *original* *Objects* of our *Comprehension* are those nearer and more immediate, *viz. the Objects of Sense*, with which we are surrounded on every Side. *These Objects* we perceive to be *all in motion*; and the *Motions* are *multiform, various*, and often *opposite* to each other. The *Consequences* of this we perpetually behold. By *such Motions* we see that not only the mere *local Site* of these *Beings* is changed, but their very *Bulk*, and *Figure*, and *Qualities*; nay more than this, even *the Beings themselves* are made to *separate* and *perish*, while *new Beings* arise from the *Re-assembly* of the scattered *Parts*, which *Parts* different *Motions* can as well *bring together*, as *disunite*. The *Beings* or *Objects* of the Character here described, the *Peripatetics* denoted under the common Apellation of the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ φθάρια, *the Beings moving and corruptible*.

FROM these *moving and perishable Objects*, they passed to those *sublimier* and *more transcendent* *Objects of Sense*, which they saw *adorn the Heavens*. Here likewise they discovered *Motion*; but then this *Motion* was *uniform* and *constant*; *affecting not the Beings moved*, save in the relation of *local Site*. As therefore they beheld no *Change* in the *Form* and *Essence* of these *Beings*, they deemed them (*upon their Hypothesis*) *incorruptible*, and out of them established *another Class* of *Beings*, that is to say, the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ ἀφθάρια, *the Beings moving and incorruptible*.

FROM these *sublimier Objects of Sense*, they passed to *Objects of pure Intellect*; to *Bodies devoid of all Motion*, and of all *Quality*, save that inseparable one  
of

of Figure; such Bodies for instance as the Cube, the Sphere, and the rest of Bodies *mathematical*. From *mathematical* Bodies, and the Truths resulting from them, they passed to the Contemplation of Truth in general; to the Soul, and its Powers both of *Intuition* and *Sylogization*; to *Being universal*, and above both *Time* and *Place*; and thus at last to that *supreme Cause*, the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the same *immutable* and *eternal*. The several *Objects* of this *intellectual Comprehension* they stiled not merely ἀφθαρτα, but ἀφθαρτα καὶ ἀκίνητα, *Beings incorruptible and immoveable*. V. inf. Note xvij.

IN this manner did the *Peripatetics* speculate. And hence was it they established to themselves *three Species* of Philosophical Employment—one about Beings *motionless* and *eternal*; another, about Beings *moveable* and *eternal*; and a third, about Beings *moveable* and *perishable*. The first they held the proper Employment of the *Metaphysician*; the two last of the *Astronomer* and the *Naturalist*.

Διὸ τρεῖς αἰ. πραγματεῖαι· ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀκίνητου· ἡ δὲ, περὶ κινούμενου μὲν, ἀφθάρτου δὲ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ τὰ φθάρτα. Idcirco tres sunt tractationes; una, de immobili: altera de eo, quod movetur, quidem, sed est interitus expers; tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiiis. Aristot. Natural. Aufc. l. 2. c. 7. Διὸ καὶ τρεῖς αἰ. πραγματεῖαι· ἡ μὲν, περὶ κινούμενα καὶ φθάρτα· ἡ δὲ περὶ κινούμενα, ἀφθάρτα δὲ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ ἀκίνητα καὶ ἀφθάρτα. The-mistii Paraphrasis in loc.

THIS *threefold Subject* of Philosophic Inquiry is elegantly explained in the following Passage. Τὸ δὲ

τὸ

τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς Φιλοσοφίας; Φαμέν ὅτι γινῶναι τὴν πάσις ἀρχὴν, τὴν τῶν πάσις δημιουργὸν αἰτίαν, τὴν αἰεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν ἀποδείκνυσι γὰρ πάσις ἀρχὴν, καὶ ἀσάμαλον ἐξ ἐκείνης δὲ τὰ πάντα παράγεται. Τίνα δὲ τὰ ἀγνοῖα ἡμᾶς εἰς τῆτο τὸ τέλος; Φαμέν ὅτι ἡ διδασκαλία τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ μεταβολῇ ὑπαρχόντων τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ ἀπὸ γὰρ τέτων, διὰ μεσῶν μαθηματικῶν, ἀνάλογοι ἐαυτῶς ἐπὶ τὰ αἰεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ὑράνια καὶ ἔτι, μετὰ τὰς ἀσωμάτους ὑσίας, ἐπὶ τῆν πρῶτην πάσις ἀρχὴν. Πάσις γὰρ κινήσις ἢ κατ' ὑσίαν ἔσης, ἢ κατὰ ποιοῦν, ἢ κατὰ τόπον, τὰ μὲν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ κατὰ πάσις κινήσειν κινῆναι· τὰ δὲ ὑράνια κατὰ μόνην τὴν κατὰ τόπον. Διὸ χρὴ εὐλόγως ὁδεύειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολυτρόπως κινεμένων ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ μίαν, καὶ μόνην κινήσειν κινεμένα, καὶ ἔτις ἐπὶ ΤΗΝ ΑΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΕΙ ΩΣΑΥΤΩΣ ΕΧΟΥΣΑΝ ΑΡΧΗΝ. Αμμονίῳ εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας, p. 12. Edit. Venet. 8vo. 1545.

THE Author of the Dialogue has had Reference to this *threefold Division of Subjects*, as may be seen in that Part of his Dialogue, which gives occasion to the present Comment. He has chosen however to stile the τὰ Ὑράνια, or *Heavenly Bodies*, rather *Contingents of higher Order*, than *Beings necessary*, as imagining the former to be their truer Character.

IT may be here added, that the *Peripatetics* confined Φύσις, or *Nature*, for the most part, to this Earth of our's, where they considered her as the *active Principle of Life* in *Plants* and *Animals*. Hence therefore they distinguished not her *Effects* from those

of *Art*, by their *Necessity* (for the *Effects* of both they treated as *contingent*) but from the Cause in *Natural* Subjects operating *within*, in *Artificial* *without*, as has been already observed, p. 256, 257. See *Diog. Laert.* p. 459.

IT may be farther added, that they placed these *Effects* of *Art* and *Nature*, and indeed all other *Contingents* whatever, in a *middle* Rank between Things *Necessary*, and Things *Impossible*. The Reason was evident. Things *Necessary* could not *but* be; Things *Impossible* could not be; but *Contingents* were τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, that is, *were equally susceptible both of Being and Non-being*.

BUT still tho' all *Contingents* admitted on their Hypothesis both of Being and Non-being, yet they supposed some to have a greater Tendency to Existence, and others to have a less. The first Species of these they stiled τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, *the Things which happen for the most part*; the last, τὰ ἐπ' ἑλαττοῦ, *the Things which happen less frequently*.

Now as it is evident that both *Nature* and *Art* oftener obtain their *End*, than miss it (for complete Animals are more frequently born than Monsters, and the Musician, if an Artist, strikes oftener the right String than the wrong) hence it was, that they ranged the *Effects* of *Nature* and *Art* among those *Contingents* which were τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, *Contingents of greater Frequency*. But yet as these *Effects* were not from the Hypothesis *necessary*, and *contrary* to these upon occasion happened, hence it was, that whenever either *Nature* or *Art* became *Causes* of the τὰ ἐπ' ἑλαττοῦ, *those rarer Events*,

Events, in such case they (Nature and Art) were considered by these Philosophers as αἰτίαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, *Causes by way of Accident*, and not according to their own *Essence* and distinguishing *Character*. In such Instances it was, that they assumed the Names of Τύχη and Ἀυτομαίον, FORTUNE and CHANCE, Τύχη having mostly Reference to Works of Men, Ἀυτομαίον to Works of Nature. The Instances given by Themistius, in cases of *Chance* and *Fortune*, are as follow. A Tile falls from a House. The *End* of its falling is to arrive at that lower Place, whither *Nature* would carry it by the common Law of *Gravity*. In falling it strikes and wounds a Passenger. This *last* Event is from *Chance*. Again, a Man digs in his Garden, to plant. In digging, he discovers a hidden Treasure. This *last* Event is from *Fortune*. And thus, adds Themistius, ἡ αὐτὴ πράξις καὶ μία, ἀλλὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὴν αἰτία, ἀλλὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. *The same individual Action is the Cause of one Thing from its own peculiar Character, and of another Thing, by way of Accident*. And again, ἐστὶ μὲν ἓν καὶ τῶν ἕτως συμβαινόντων ἢ τὴν φύσιν ἢ τὴν προαίρεσιν αἰτίαν πῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔστι καθ' αὐτὴν ἔστι γὰρ τούτων χάριν ἕτερον προήλθεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ἕτερον ἢ κέραμις κατηνέχθη, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ συμβεβηκός.—*Of these Events we may call Nature or Human Will in a manner the Cause, but yet not so from themselves, and according to their own peculiar Essence; for it was not for the sake of what happened that either the Passenger WENT FORTH, or the Tile FELL DOWNWARD, but if any thing it was by Accident*. Themist. in lib. 2. Natur. Aufcult. p. 26. Edit. Ald. See also Aristot. Natur. Aufcult. l. 2. c. 4, 5, 6. *Ammon* in *Prædicam.* p. 113. b. This Doctrine came originally

originally from *Plato*, whose *Definition* of *Fortune* was, Συμπτωμα Φύσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως, a *Symptom*, or thing co-incident either with *Nature* or *Human Will*. *Vid. Suidam in Voc. Ἐιμαρμένη.*

It must be here observed, that *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* [by accident] means in no Part of these Quotations *accidental*, as standing for *casual*; for this would be mere *Tautology*, as to what is here said concerning *Chance*. It means rather something by way of *Appendage*; something *Adventitious*; in other Words, it means *Accident*, as adhering to *Substance*, without which it can have no Being, tho' suppose it absent or taken away, the *Nature* of *Substance* is no way affected. It was in this Sense the *Peripatetics* supposed *Chance* and *Fortune* to be *Accidents* or *Appendages* to *Nature*, and *Mind*. According therefore to them, the Supposition of *Chance* and *Fortune* was so far from excluding *Nature* and *Mind* from the Universe, that they demonstrably proved their Existence in it. For admitting their Account of *Chance* and *Fortune* to be just; if we grant the *Accidents* to exist, much more must we grant the *Subjects*, and this too with that *superior Dignity* and *Priority of Existence*, which is evidently due to all *Subjects* above their *Accidents*. Well therefore did the Philosopher conclude ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ Ἄνθρώπου, καὶ ἡ Τύχη τῷ Νῦ, καὶ τῆς Φύσεως. *Subsequent in Existence, are CHANCE and FORTUNE to MIND and NATURE.* *Aristot. Natur. Aufc. l. 2. c. 6.*

FROM what has been said, we see the Reason of that Enumeration of Causes mentioned in the Beginning of the first Note, where they are described to be NECESSITY, NATURE, MAN, and FORTUNE.

To

TO NECESSITY they referred all those Things and Events, which they supposed of necessary Existence; such as the Universe, the Heavenly Bodies, together with their uniformly regular Motions.

TO NATURE, MAN, and CHANCE, they referred all Contingents; to Nature, and Man, obtaining their End, all Contingents of greater Frequency; to the same Causes, either falling short of their End, or going beyond it, and thus becoming Chance or Fortune, those opposite Contingents of Existence less usual.

AND hence, as Art and Fortune were both conversant about the same Subjects (*viz.* such Contingents as respected Human Life) we find the Meaning of that Verse of *Agatho's*, cited by *Aristotle*, in his *Ethics*, l. 6. c. 5.

Τίχην τύχην ἔσερξε, καὶ τύχην τέχνην,  
*Art loveth Fortune; Fortune loveth Art.*

THE whole Chapter indeed is well worth perusal. But we shall not venture to lengthen this Note, which may be probably deemed too long already, and which can be only excused, as giving some Sample of a Philosophy, which, from its Rarity perhaps, may possibly furnish some Amusement.

NOTE VIII. p. 23. I MEAN, SAID HE, BY BEGINNING, THAT CAUSE FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH, &c.

As the CAUSE here spoken of, is that *Cause* usually called FINAL, it may be asked, how it comes in this Place to be considered as a *Beginning*. The Answer is, that what comes *last* in *Practice*, stands in *Theory first*; or in other Words, the Order of *Ideas* in the *Intellect* of the Artist is exactly *inverted*, with respect to the Order of his *Energies*.

THUS *Ammonius*—Καθόλη γὰρ τῆς, μὲν Θεωρίας τὸ τέλος γίνεται ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως· ἔμπροσθεν δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος, ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας· εἶον ὁ Ὀικοδόμος, ἐπιλαγείς οἶκον, λέγει καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἐπιτάγη οἶκον ποιῆσαι· ὅπερ ἐστὶ σκέπασμα, κωλυτικὸν ἔμβρων καὶ καυμάτων. τῆτο δὲ ἐκ αὐτοῦ γένοιτο, μὴ γινόμενης ὀροφῆς. Ἐντεῦθεν ἔν ἀρχίαι τῆς θεωρίας, προβαίνω δὲ φησὶν· Ἄλλα τῆτο ἐκ αὐτοῦ γένοιτο, μὴ γινόμενων τοίχων· ἔτοι δὲ ἐκ αὐτοῦ γένοιτο, μὴ υποβληθέντων θεμελίων· οἳ δὲ θεμελίοι ἐκ αὐτοῦ βληθεῖεν, μὴ ὀρυκθείσης τῆς γῆς. ἐνταῦθα κατέληξεν ἡ θεωρία. Εὐτεῦθεν ἔν ἀρχεται ἡ πράξις. πρότερον γὰρ ὀρύττει τὴν γῆν. εἰθ' ἔτω βάλλει τὸν θεμέλιον. εἶτα ἐγείρει τοίχους· καὶ ὑστέρον ἐπιτίθησι τὴν ὀροφὴν, ἥτις ἐστὶ τέλος τῆς πράξεως. ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, τέλος τῆς θεωρίας. Ἄμμ. εἰς κατηγ. p. 15. Edit. Venet. 8vo.

FOR in general the End of Theory is the Beginning of Practice; and so reciprocally, the End of Practice, the Beginning of Theory. Thus for instance: An Architect,



NOTES on TREATISE *the Firſt*.

*chitect, being ordered to build a Houſe, ſays to himſelf; I am ordered to build a Houſe; that is to ſay, a certain Defence, to proteſt againſt the Rains and the Heats. But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From this Point therefore he begins his Theory. He proceeds and ſays—But there can be no Roof, if there be no Walls; and there can be no Walls, without ſome Foundations; nor can there be laid Foundations, without opening the Earth. At this Point, the Theory is at an End. Hence therefore commences the Practice or Action. For firſt he opens the Earth; then lays the Foundation; then raiſes the Walls; and laſtly puts on the Roof, which is the End of the Action or Practice, [but Beginning of the Theory] as the Beginning of the Practice was the End of the Theory. See alſo Ariſt. Ethic. Nicom. l. 3. c. 3. et de Animâ, l. 3. c. 3.*

NOTE IX. p. 24. Was it not the Abſence of Health, &c.] *Vide Platon. de Rep. l. i. tom. 2. p. 341. Edit. Serrani. "Ὡςπερ (ἴφην ἐγώ) εἰ με ἔροιο εἰ ἔχαρξί σώματι, εἶναι σώματι, ἢ προσδεῖται τίν' αὐτῷ εἴποιμ' αὐτῷ, ὅτι παντάπασιν μὲν ἔν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὐρεμένη, ὅτι σῶμα ἐστὶ πονηρὸν, καὶ οὐκ ἔχαρξί αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. Quem-admodum, inquam, si a me quæreret, an satis sit Corpori, ut sit Corpus, an aliâ quâpiam re indigeat: responderem, omninò indigere. Atque hæc quidem de Causâ medicinæ ars nunc est inventa, quoniam Corpus per se proſtigatum eſt, neque ipſi ſatis eſt, ut ſit hujusmodi. So likewise the acute Scaliger—Moticnis enim Appetentia Cauſa eſt; Appetentia, Privatio. De Cauſ. L. Lat. l. 15. c. 114. p. 235.*

NOTE X. p. 26. OR IS IT NOT ABSURD TO SUPPOSE THERE SHOULD BE AN ART OF  
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IMPOSSIBILITIES?] What is here said concerning the Difference between those Things for which we may possibly wish, and those which we actually pursue, is expressed in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, l. 3. c. 2. Προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ ἐκ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις Φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοῖν αὖ ἡλίθιος εἶναι. βέλπεις δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. There is indeed no determined Choice of Action with respect to Things impossible; and if any one should say he had so determined, he would appear to be a Fool. But there may be a Willing or Longing after Things impossible; as for instance, never to die.

NOTE XI. p. 27. THE SUGGESTIONS OF WILL, AND UNINSTRUCTED INSTINCT.] Will, βέλπεις, or ὄρεξις λογιστικῆ; uninstructed Instinct, ὄρεξις ἀλόγιστος. See before, Note III.

NOTE XII. p. 29. THE WANT OR ABSENCE OF SOMETHING APPEARING GOOD; RELATIVE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ATTAINABLE BY MAN, BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES.]

THE CAUSE here described is the τὸ ἕνεκα, or FINAL.—Aristotle in his *Physics*, l. 2. c. 3. in enumerating the various Sorts of Causes, reckons among the rest—τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ τέλος, καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ γὰρ ἕνεκα βέλτερον, καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἰθὺς εἶναι. To these may be added that Cause, which is considered as the End, and Good of all the rest. For that, for whose Sake all the others are deemed

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deemed necessary, has just pretensions to be best, and to be the End of them all. To this he subjoins, consonant to what is said in the Dialogue—*διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν*—*Let it make no Difference whether we call this End, real Good, or only apparent Good.* So in the Beginning of his *Ethics*—*Πᾶσα τέχνη, καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθὸν τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. Διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφώνηται τ' ἀγαθὸν, καὶ πάντα ἐφίεται.* *Every Art, and every orderly Speculation, so likewise every Action, and determined Choice of Pursuit, appear all of them to tend toward some Good. Well therefore have they pronounced GOOD to be that, toward which all things tend.* See also Plat. in *Gorg.* p. 499. E. tom. I. Edit. Serrani.

In the Definition here treated, the Words [*relative to Human Life*] express that Part of the Stoic Definition of Art [*πρὸς τὸ τέλος εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.*] They were omitted in the Definition p. 17. as more properly belonging to the present Definition, which respects Art in its *final Cause*. See page 261.

THAT what is *perfect* and *self-sufficient* is above the *secondary Helps* of ART; that our own *Weakness* and *Insufficiency*, and the Prospect of procuring that *absent Good*, by which we all hope to supply ourselves, were deficient; that this is the Source not only of all *Arts*, but (joined to social Affection) is the *Origin* and *Cement* of HUMAN SOCIETY; see (besides the Place here treated) pages 11, 12; and of *the third Treatise*, p. 147 to p. 157.

Thus

Thus the Poet in *Stobæus*, p. 515.

Χρητὸν πάντ' ἰδιδάξει· τί δ' ἔχρητὸν κεν ἀνεύροισι;

Need all things taught : What cannot Need invent ?

AGREEABLY also to this, *Virgil*, in his first *Georgic*, having told us of the various Changes to the worse, which happened in the *natural* World immediately subsequent to the *Golden Age*, goes on to enumerate the several *Inventions* of Men, which were the *natural Result of this their newly indigent State*: He at last sums up the whole by saying—

*Tum variæ venere artes: labor omnia vicit  
Improbis, & duris urgens in rebus EGESTAS.*

WHERE (according to the Doctrine in the Dialogue) WANT is made the *Beginning or Origin* of ARTS. The Poet even refers this *Dispensation*, this Introduction of *Indigence, Care, and Solicitude*, to the immediate Will of PROVIDENCE, acting for the Good of Mankind; lest Plenty should lull them into slothful *Lethargy*, so as to forget their *noblest and most active Faculties*.

— *Pater ipse colendi  
Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem  
Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,  
Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno.*

NOTE XIII. p. 32. CO-EXISTENT, REPLIED  
HE, AS IN A STATUE, &c. SUCCESSIVE, AS IN

A TUNE or DANCE, &c.] This Division of Beings or Productions we find mentioned by Aristotle in his *Physics*, (l. 3. c. 8.) where explaining his Doctrine concerning *Infinite*, he says—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πολλὰκις τὸ εἶναι, ὡς περ ἢ ἡμέρα εἶναι, καὶ ὁ ἀγών, τῷ αἰεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γίνεσθαι ἔτω καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. In as much as BEING is manifold, such as is the Being of a Day or public Festival, (which exist by continually becoming something farther) such also is the Being and Nature of Infinite. The same Sentiment soon after is more fully explained and opened. Ὡς τὸ ἄπειρον οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν, ὡς τὸδε τίς, οἷον ἄνθρωπον, ἢ οἰκίαν· ἀλλ' ὡς ἡμέρα λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν οἷς τὸ εἶναι, ἐκ ὡς ἐστία τις γέγονεν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ. We are not to conceive of Infinite, as of a positive particular Substance, like a Man or a House; but rather as we pronounce Existence of a Day or public Festival, which have their Essence, not as sensible, individual Substances, but by a continued Procedure of Being and ceasing to be. Vid. Scalig. de Caul. Ling. Lat. 3. C. 72. p. 124. Aristot. Categ. Cap. 6. Ammon. Com. εἰς Καλ. p. 82. b. Scal. Poetic. Lr. 3. C. 1. p. 82.

NOTE XIV. p. 32. WHAT IS HUMAN LIFE, BUT A COMPOUND OF PARTS THUS FLEETING, &c.] It is not inelegantly said in the *Ethics* so often referred to—Ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνεργεῖα τίς ἐστίν, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τέτοις ἐνεργεῖ αἰεὶ καὶ μάλιγα ἀγαπᾷ· οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς, τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς, τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα· ἔτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. LIFE is a certain ENERGY, and each Man energizes about those Subjects,

*Subjects, and with those Faculties, for which he bath the greatest Affection; the Musician, with his Hearing, about Sounds harmonious; the Studious, with his Intellect, about Matters of Speculation; and in like manner each Man else of the various sorts beside.* Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. c. 4.

NOTE XV. p. 34. EVERY ART WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR ENERGY.] The CAUSE here treated is the FORMAL, called by various Names; the εἶδος, the λόγος, the τί ἐστίν, the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Vid. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. l. v. c. 113. p. 232. Imperfectum autem Græci, &c.

IN the Beginning of the above cited *Ethics*, after the Author has told us that every *Art*, and Human *Action* tend to some *Good* or *End*, he adds Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τέλων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνεργεῖαι· τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτάς, ἔργα τινά—*But there appears a Difference in Ends: For some are ENERGIES; some, over and above these Energies, are certain WORKS.* In *Quintilian's Institutes* the same *Distinction*, with respect to the End of Arts, is mentioned, l. 2. c. 18. Vid. *Plat. in Dio. Laert. l. 3. C. 84. p. 216. C. 100. p. 225.*

BUT here perhaps it may be asked, if all *Arts* are ended and accomplished in some *Energy* or *Work*, and this *Energy* or *Work* be almost universally that *absent Good*, towards which they all tend, and for the sake of which they are all exerted? (for a *Dance*, which is an *Energy*, and a *House*, which is a *Work*, are certain *absent Goods* or *Pleasures*, for the sake of which

certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it may be asked, whence then the Difference between the *Formal Cause* and the *Final*; the *Final*, as in *Note XII.* it has been already treated?

THE Answer to this is, that they *concur* and are the *same*. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ἕνεκα, ἐν ἑστὶ. *The Formal Cause and the Final are ONE.* *Arist. Nat. Aufc.* 1. 2. c. 7. If they differ, it is (as *Joannes Grammaticus* observes in commenting on this Place) a *Difference* rather in the *Time* and *Manner* of our viewing them, than in their own *Essence* and *Nature*. It may not perhaps be improper to transcribe his own Words. Ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ εἶδος, τῇ ὁμοίᾳ μόνῃ διαφέρου, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὡς γινόμενον, καὶ μήπω ὄν θεωρῆται, τέλος ἐστίν· ὅταν δὲ ὡς ἤδη γινόμενον, εἶδος. *The END and the FORM are numerically the same, differing (as has been said) in the RELATION only, and TIME. For thus the same Thing, while considered as in its Progress to Completion, but as not yet complete, is so long an END; when considered as aëually complete, is no longer an End, but a FORM.* And thus is this Question one way answered, by acknowledging that these two Causes co-incide, and differ not in their *Essence* or real Character, but rather in the *Time* and *Manner* of our contemplating them.

BUT there is another Answer, and that is derived from the *twofold Nature* of *final Causes*. According to this Doctrine, *Arts* have not only a *nearer* and *more immediate End*, (as a Ship is the End of Ship-building, or Navigation the End of Pilotry) but they have a still *remoter* and *higher End*, a τέλος τελικώτατον,

δικώταλον, that is to say, MAN, Human-kind, or (in other Words) the *Utility or Elegance of Human Life*. Thus the *Stagirite*. Ἔσμεν γὰρ πῶς καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος διχῶς γὰρ τὸ ἕν εκκ. For WE OURSELVES also are in some sort AN END; for the final Cause is twofold. Natur. Auscult. l. 2. c. 2. If therefore we have respect to this ULTIMATE END, these two Causes will be found to differ, and be really distinct from each other.

AND thus it is that in some respects they agree, and in others they differ, according to the above Distinctions established by this Philosophy.

NOTE XVI. p. 38. O ART! THOU DISTINGUISHING ATTRIBUTE, &c.] This alludes to a capital Distinction of ART, taken from a View of her different Ends. ART may in some respects be said to FINISH NATURE, in others TO IMITATE HER. She finishes her, where Nature, having given the Powers, is of herself unable to give them Perfection. It is thus of the *Gymnastic Arts*, Dancing, Riding, &c. finish the *Corporeal Powers*; while the sublimer Arts, Logic, Rhetoric, Moral Virtue, &c. finish the *Mental*. Where she does not finish Nature, she imitates her, as in Sculpture, Painting, Dramatic Poetry, &c.

ARISTOTLE expresses the above sentiment, as follows. Ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ, αὐτὴ ἢ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. *Physic. L. 2. C. 8.*



NOTE XVII. p. 44. THE EFFICIENT, THE MATERIAL, THE FINAL, AND THE FORMAL.] That is to say, τὸ κινῆσαι, ἢ ἴσχυς, τὸ ἕνεκα, τὸ εἶδος.

THUS Seneca in his 65th Epistle. *Causam Aristoteles putat tribus modis dici, Prima, inquit, causa est ipsa Materia, sine qua nihil potest effici. Secunda, Opifex. Tertia, Forma quæ unicuique operi imponitur, tanquam statuæ; nam hanc Aristoteles Idos (εἶδος) vocat, Quarta quæque, inquit, bis accedit, Propositum totius operis.*

QUID sit hoc, aperiam. *Æs prima statuæ causa est: nunquam enim facta esset, nisi fuisset id, ex quo ea funderetur, ducereturve. Secunda causa, Artifex est: non potuisset enim æs illud in habitum statuæ figurari, nisi accessissent peritæ manus. Tertia causa est Forma: neque enim statua ista Doryphoros aut Diadumenos vocaretur, nisi hæc illi esset impressa facies. Quarta causa est faciendi Propositum: nam nisi hoc fuisset, facta non esset. Quid est Propositum? Quod invitavit artificem quod ille secutus fecit. Vel pecunia est hoc, si venditurus fabricavit; vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen; vel religio, si donum templo paravit. Ergo hæc causa est, propter quam fit. An non putas inter causas facti operis numerandum, quo remoto factum non esset.*—

ARISTOTLE'S OWN Words are as follow. Ἐνα μὲν ἐν τρόποις αἰτιῶν λέγεται τὸ εἶς ἔσθ' ἔσθ' γίνεται τι ἐνυπαρχόντων. οἷον, ὁ χαλκὸς τῷ ἀνδριάντι, καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς Φιάλης, καὶ τὰ τέτων γένη. Ἄλλου δὲ  
τὸ

τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τῆτο δ' εἰνὶ ὁ λόγος  
ὁ τῷ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τέτα γένη· οἷον τῷ διὰ πασῶν  
τὰ δύο πρὸς ἓν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν  
τῷ λόγῳ. Ἔτι, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρῶτη,  
ἢ ἡ τῆς ἡρεμήσεως· οἷου ὁ βαλεῦσας, αἰτιον· καὶ ὁ  
παῖς, τῷ τέκνῳ· καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ ποιούμενῳ, καὶ τὸ  
μεταβάλλον τῷ μεταβαλλομένῳ. Ἔτι, ὡς τὸ τέλος  
τῆτο δ' εἰνὶ τὸ ἕνεκα· οἷον τῷ περιπατεῖν ἢ ὑγίαινα·  
διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; Φαμέν ἵνα ὑγιάινῃ, καὶ εἰπόντες  
ἤτως, οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἰτιον.

IN one manner that may be called a Cause, out of  
which, existing as a Part of it, any thing is made or  
compounded. Thus is Brass the Cause of a Statue,  
Silver of a Cup, and so also the higher Genera, in  
which these are included [as Metal, the Genus in-  
cluding Brass and Silver; Body, the Genus including  
Metal, &c. &c.] In another Way, the Form and Ex-  
emplar of any thing is its Cause; that is to say, in other  
Words, the Definition, the Detail or Narrative of its  
Essence [that which, characterizing it to be such a par-  
ticular thing, distinguishes it from all things else] and of  
this Definition the several higher Genera. Thus the Cause  
of the Diapason or Octave is the Proportion of two to  
one; and more generally than that, is Number; and is  
moreover the several Parts, out of which this Definition  
is formed. Add to this Cause, that other, from whence  
the original Principle of Change, or of ceasing to  
change; as for Instance, the Person who deliberates is  
the Cause of that which results from such Delibera-  
tion; the Father is the Cause of the Son; and in gene-  
ral, the Efficient, of the Thing effected; the Power  
changing of the thing changed. Besides these Causes,  
there

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there is that also, which is considered as the End; that is to say, the Cause, for the sake of which the thing is done. Thus the Cause of Exercising is Health. For if it be asked, Why does he use Exercise? We say, To preserve his Health; and having said thus much, we think we have given the proper Cause. Aristot. Natur. Auscult. l. 2. c. 3.

## ADDITION to NOTE III.

THE *Peripatetic* Definition of Nature, given p. 257, tho' in some degree illustrated p. 266, yet being still from its Brevity perhaps obscure, the following Explication of it is subjoined.

IN the first place, by NATURE the *Peripatetics* meant that *Vital Principle* in Plants, Brutes, and Men, by which they are said to live, and to be distinguished from Things *inanimate*. Nature therefore being another Name for *Life* or a *vital Principle*, the first Act of this Principle, throughout all Subjects, is universally found to be of the following kind; namely, to advance the Subject, which it enlivens, from a Seed or Embryo to something better and more perfect. This Progression, as well in Plants as in Animals, is called Growth. And thus is it that NATURE is a Principle of Motion.—But then this Progression or Growth is not infinite. When the Subject is mature, that is, hath obtained its Completion and perfect Form, then the Progression ceases. Here therefore the Business of the *vital Principle* becomes different. It is from henceforward no longer employed to acquire a Form, but to preserve to its Subject a Form already acquired. And thus is it that NATURE is a Principle of Rest, Stability, or  
Ceasing

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*Ceasing to move.* And such indeed she continues to be, maintaining, *as long as possible*, the *Form* committed to her Care, till *Time* and *external Causes* in the first Place impair it, and induce at length its *Dissolution*, which is *Death*.

AND thus it has been shewn how NATURE may be called A PRINCIPLE BOTH OF MOTION AND CEASING TO MOVE.

As to the rest of the Definition, namely, that NATURE is a *Principle*, which inheres in its Subject *immediately, essentially*, and *not by way of Accident*; no more is meant by this, than that the NATURE or *Life* in every Being, which hath such Principle, is *really and truly* A PART OF THAT BEING, and not *detached* and *separate* from it, like the Pilot from the Ship, the Musician from the Instrument. For to these *Subjects* tho' those *Artists* are *Principles of Motion and Rest*, yet do they in no sense participate with them in *vital Sympathy* and *Union*.

END of the NOTES on TREATISE *the First*.



# NOTES

O. N.

## TREATISE the Third; CONCERNING HAPPINESS.

**N**OTE I. p. 107. NATURE SEEMS TO TREAT MAN, &c.] *Ut Phidias potest a primo instituere signum, idque perficere; potest ab alio inchoatum accipere & absolvere: huic est sapientia similis. Non enim ipsa genuit hominem, sed accepit a natura inchoatum: hanc ergo intuens, debet institutum illud, quasi signum absolvere.* Cic. de Fin. IV. 13. p. 334. Edit. Davif.

NOTE II. p. 113. PRACTICE TOO OFTEN CREEPS, &c.] Sec p. 136. and Note X.

NOTE III. p. 114. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS THAT, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH RENDERS US HAPPY.] *Κτήσιν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαιμόνες, εὐδαιμόνες.* By the Possession of Things GOOD, are  
the

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*the Happy made HAPPY.* Platon. Conviv. p. 264: tom. 2. Edit. Serrani. *Phileb. Plat.* p. 60. B. See *Arrian Epict.* l. 3. c. 22. p. 453.

THE Reader will be pleased to observe, that, in all Quotations from the Dissertations of *Epicætetus* collected by *Arrian*, the Author refers to the late Edition in two Volumes *Quarto*, published by his learned and ingenious Friend, Mr. USTON.

NOTE IV. p. 115. CERTAIN ORIGINAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRE-CONCEPTIONS, &c.] The *Pre-conceptions* here spoken of, are called by the *Latins* *Prænotiones*, or *Anticipationes*; by the *Greeks*, *προλήψεις*, or *ἔννοιαι*, with the occasional Epithets of either *κοιναι*, *ἐμφυτοι*, or *εὐνοικαι*.

It is evident that all Men, without the least Help of Art, exert a kind of *Natural Logic*; can in some degree *refuse*, and *prove*, and *render a Reason*.

Now this cannot be (as the meanest Proficient in Logic well knows) without *general Ideas*, and *general Propositions*, because a Syllogism of *Particulars* is an Impossibility. There must be therefore some *natural Faculty* to provide us these *Generals*. This Faculty cannot be any of the *Senses*, for they all respect *Particulars* only. Nor can it be the *reasoning or syllogizing Faculty*, for this does not *form* such *Generals*, but *use* them when formed. There only therefore remains the *Faculty* called *Nῆς*, that is to say, the *Inductive Faculty*; the Faculty, which, by *Induction of similar Individuals*, forms out of the *particular*

*particular* and the *many* what is *general* and *one*. This Species of *Apprehension* is evidently our *first* and *earliest* Knowledge, because all Knowledge by *Reasoning* dates its Origin from it, and because, except *these two*, no other knowledge is possible.

As therefore *every* Ear, not absolutely depraved, is able to make some *general Distinctions* of *Sound*; and in like manner *every* Eye, with respect to Objects of *Vision*; and as this general Use of these Faculties, by being diffused through all Individuals, may be called *common* Hearing, and *common* Vision, as opposed to those *more accurate* *Energies*, peculiar only to *Artists*: So fares it with respect to the *Intellect*. There are Truths, or Universals of so *obvious* a kind, that *every* *Mind*, or *Intellect*, not absolutely depraved, without the least Help of Art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The *Recognition* of these, or at least the *Ability* to recognize them, is called Κοινὸς Νῆς, COMMON SENSE, as being a *Sense common to all*, except Lunatics and Idiots.

FARTHER, as this Power is called Κοινὸς Νῆς, so the several *Propositions*, which are its proper Objects, are called προλήψεις, or *Preconceptions*, as being *previous* to all other Conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said, that these προλήψεις, must be *general*, as being formed by *Induction*; as also *natural*, by being *common to all Men*, and *previous* to all Instruction. Hence therefore their Definition. "Ἐστὶ δ' ἡ προλήψις, ἔννοια Φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου." A PRE-CONCEPTION is the natural Apprehension of what is general, or universal." Diog. Laert.



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Laert. l. 7. f. 54. See also *Arrian. Epict.* l. 1. c. 22: l. 3. c. 6. *Cic. de Naturâ Deor.* l. 1. c. 16, 17. *Plut. de Placit. Philosoph.* 910. e. *Aristot. de Anim.* III. 11.

NOTE V. p. 115.—AND THAT THE DIFFERENCE LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS.] This was called Ἐφαρμογή τῶν προλήψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους ὑσείαις—τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους ὑσείαις. *Arri. Epict.* l. 1. c. 22. p. 114, 116. *Edit. Upt.* See an eminent Instance, illustrating the Truth of this Reasoning, in the same Author, l. 4. c. 1. p. 545: Ἐποῦμαι γὰρ, ὅτι, &c. *Boet. de Cons. L. 3. Prosa.* 2. p. 106.

NOTE VI. p. 120. WHY ARE THERE, WHO SEEK RECESSES, &c.] *Multi autem & sunt, & fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotiis publicis se removerint, ad otiumque persurgerint.*—*His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus; ut ne quâ re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur: cujus proprium est sic vivere, ut velis.* Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiæ cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis: alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant; alteri si contenti sint & suo, & parvo. *Cic. de OFFIC. l. 1. c. 20, 21.*

NOTE VII. p. 121.—THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, THEY HAVE TAUGHT US, OUGHT TO BE, &c.] The ORIGINAL PRE-CONCEPTIONS of the SOVEREIGN GOOD here recited, may be justified by the following Authorities, from among many which are omitted.

AGREE-

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AGREEABLE TO NATURE, — *Neque ulla alia in re, nisi in NATURA, querendum esse illud SUMMUM BONUM, quo omnia referrentur.* Cic. Acad. l. i. c. 5. p. 27. Edit. Davif.

CONDUCTIVE TO WELL-BEING. — *Epietetus* calls that *Truth or Knowledge, which respects our real Happiness* [τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας] the *Truth or Knowledge, which regards not mere Living, but which conduces to LIVING WELL* [ὃ τὴν περὶ τῆ ΖΗΝ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ΕΥ ΖΗΝ.] *Arrian* *Epiet.* l. i. c. 4. p. 28. *Edit. Upt.* 'Αἱ κοινὰ περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἔνοιαι — TO ZHN KATA ΦΥΣΙΝ, καὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ λέγουσι πρὸς δὲ τέτοις, TO ΕΥ ΖΗΝ, καὶ τὸ εὖ βίον, καὶ τὴν εὐζωΐαν, 'ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ φασὶν εἶναι. *Our common Pre-conceptions concerning HAPPINESS call it the LIVING ACCORDING TO NATURE; farther than this, they say it is Living or Existing well; THE LIFE OF WELL-BEING.* *Alex. Aphrod.* περὶ ψυχ. p. 157. *Edit. Ald.*

ACCOMMODATE TO ALL PLACES and TIMES — *Antoninus*, speaking of that *Happiness*, which he deemed our *Sovereign Good*, calls it something which was in our Power ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ καὶ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΩΣ, EVERY WHERE and PERPETUALLY. l. 7. s. 54.

DURABLE — and INDEPRIVABLE — *Nisi STABILIS & FIXUS & PERMANENTE BONO BEATUS esse nemo potest.* *Tusc. Disp.* l. 5. c. 14. p. 372. *Edit. Davif.*

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*Davis.* So immediately after in the same page—*An dubium est, quin nihil sit habendum in eo genere quo vita beata completur, si id possit amitti; nihil enim interarescere, nihil exstingui, &c.* Καὶ τίς αὐτῆ ἡ ἔυροια, ἣν ὁ τυχῶν ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, ἔ λέγει Καίσαρ ἢ Καίσαρος Φίλος, ἀλλὰ κόραξ, αὐλητής, πυρετός, ἀλλὰ τρισμύρια; ἢ ὁ ΕΥΡΟΙΑ ἐδὲν ἔτως ἔχει ὡς ΤΟ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΕΣ καὶ ΑΝΕΜΠΟΔΙΣΤΟΝ. *And what sort of Happiness is this, which any thing intervening may embarrass; I say not Cæsar, or Cæsar's Friend, but a Crow, a Piper, a Fever, a thousand things beside? HAPPINESS surely implies nothing so much, as PERPETUITY and BEING SUPERIOR TO HINDRANCE OR IMPEDIMENT. Arrian. Epict. l. 4. c. 4. p. 585. Edit. Upt. See also l. 2. c. 11. p. 227.*

SELF-DERIVED.—*Atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere TOTUM PONI IN POTESTATE SAPIENTIS: nam si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 27. p. 163.*—καὶ τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περιπέπλη ὡ ἀνθρωπῶ, ἐπ' αὐτῶ (οἱ θεοί] τὸ πᾶν ἔθελο. *That Man might not fall into real Evils, the Gods have put the whole in HIS OWN POWER. M. Ant. l. 2. f. 11. Τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ζητεῖ πᾶς ἀνθρωπῶ, Ευαθῆναι, εὐδαιμονῆσαι, ΠΑΝΤΑ ΩΣ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ, μὴ κωλύεσθαι, μηδ' ἀναγκάζεσθαι. For what is it, that every Man seeks? To be securely fixed, to be happy, TO DO ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO HIS OWN WILL, not to be hindered, not to be compelled. Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 1. p. 539, 540. Aristotle joins self-derived and indeprivable in his idea of*

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of Good. Ταγαθόν δὲ οἰκείον τι καὶ δυσσφαιρίστον εἶναι  
μαυνοόμεθα. *Eth. Nic.* l. i. c. 5.

NOTE VIII. p. 125. THE POLITICAL AND  
LUCRATIVE, THE CONTEMPLATIVE AND PLEA-  
SURABLE.] This *fourfold* Distinction of *Lives* is  
mentioned in *Aristotle's Ethics*, l. i. c. 5.

NOTE IX. p. 131.—PLEASURE  
WHOM LOVE ATTENDS, &c.  
alluding to *Homer, Iliad.* β. V. 214.

NOTE X. p. 136. SUPPOSE AN EVENT WERE  
TO HAPPEN—NOT AN INUNDATION, &c.] See  
*Arrian. Epict.* l. 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly  
addressed to the Seekers of *Leisure Retirement*, and  
*Study*. Part of it has been already quoted, p. 290.  
καὶ τίς αὐτῆ ἢ ἔυποια, &c. See also the same Author,  
l. 4. c. 1. p. 567. Πῶς ἀκρίσις, &c. and of the Dia-  
logue here commented, p. 113.

NOTE XI. p. 137.—IS ACTING A CIRCUM-  
STANCE, &c.] *Etenim cognitio contemplatioque na-  
turæ manca quodammodo atque inchoata fit, si nulla  
actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum  
commodis tuendis maxime cernitur.* Cic. de Offic. l. i.  
c. 43: The whole Chapter, as well as the Subsequent,  
is well worthy of Perusal.

NOTE XII. p. 140.—IF A PIECE OF METAL BE  
TENDERED US, &c.] See *Arr. Epict.* l. i. c. 10.  
p. 110. Ὁρατε καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ νομισματί, &c.

NOTE XIII. p. 144.—ARE ALIENATED FROM  
IT, OR ARE INDIFFERENT TO IT?] *Placet his, in-  
quit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum fit*  
U 2 *animal*

*animal (hinc enim est ordiendum) ipsum sibi conciliari, & commendari ad se conservandum, & suum statum, & ad ea, quæ conservantia sunt ejus statûs, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, iisque rebus, quæ interitum videantur afferre.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 5. p. 211. Edit. Davif. See also l. 5. c. 9. De Offic. l. 1. c. 4. Οικειύμεθα πρὸς αὐτὰς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι. Plut. Mor. p. 1038. b.

NOTE XIV. p. 155. LET IT NOT BE FORGOT THEN, SAID HE, IN FAVOUR OF SOCIETY, &c.] The whole Argument to prove *Society natural to Man*, from p. 147 to the page here cited, is taken from the second Book of *Plato's Republic*. See *Plat.* tom. 2. p. 369, &c. Edit. Serrani. See also the same argument hinted at in the *Protagoras* of *Plato*, p. 322. C. Edit. Serr. Tom. 1.

NOTE XV. p. 156. — ARE NOT THE POWERS AND CAPACITIES OF SPEECH, &c.] The Argument in favour of *Society*, from our being possessed of λόγῳ, or the *speaking Faculty*, seems to have been much insisted on by the best Authors of Antiquity.

Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, πάσης μελίττης καὶ πάντῳ ἀγελαίῃ ζωῆ μαῖλλον, δῆλον. Οὐθέν γὰρ, ὡς φάμεν, μάτῃ ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῶων. Ἡ μὲν ἔν Φωνὴ τῆ ἡδέῃ καὶ λυπηρῆ ἐστὶ σημεῖον· διὸ καὶ τοῖ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζωῆς μέχρι γὰρ τότε ἢ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθεν, ὡς εἰσθάνεσθαι τῆ λυπηρῆ καὶ ἡδέῃ, καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις. Ὁ δὲ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸ δηλῶν ἐστὶ τὸ σύμφερον, καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν· ὡς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον. Τέτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώ-

αὐθρόποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν, καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον αἰσθησιν ἔχειν· ἢ δὲ τῶν κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. *The Reason why MAN is a SOCIAL ANIMAL, more than any Bee, or any herding Species whatever, is evident from hence. Nature, we say, makes nothing in vain; and Man, of all Animals, is only possessed of SPEECH. Bare Sound indeed may be the Sign of what is pleasurable or painful; and for that reason it is common even to other Animals also. For so far we perceive even their Nature can go, that they have a Sense of those Feelings, and signify them to each other. But Speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what hurtful, and in consequence of this, what is just and unjust. It is therefore given to Men, because this, with respect to other Animals, is to Men alone peculiar, that of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, they only possess a Sense or Feeling. Now it is the Participation or Community of these, which makes and constitutes both a FAMILY, and a POLITY. Aristot. Polit. l. 1. c. 2.*

Ἐικόνες γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων [τὰ νοήματα]· αἱ δὲ φωναὶ τῶν νοημάτων εἰσιν ἐξαγγελτικά· καὶ διὰ τῆτο δίδουσαι ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, πρὸς τὸ δι' αὐτῶν σημαίνειν ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ νοήματα——ἵνα καὶ δυνώμεθα κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμπολιτεύεσθαι· κοινωνικὸν γὰρ ζῶον ὁ Ἄνθρωπος. *Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul; and Sounds are declarative of these Ideas. And for this reason were these SOUNDS imparted to us by Nature, not only that we might indicate to each other these Ideas, but that we might be enabled to COMMUNICATE and LIVE IN ASSOCIATIONS. For MAN is by Nature a SOCIAL ANIMAL. Ammon. in l. de Interpr. p. 16. b.*

THUS Cicero, speaking of *Human Nature*—*Omitto opportunitates habilitatesque reliqui corporis, moderationem vocis, ORATIONIS vim, quæ conciliatrix est humanæ maxime societatis.* De Legg. l. i. c. 9. p. 35. Edit. Davis,

AGAIN in his *Offices*—*Sed quæ natura principia sunt communitatis & societatis humanæ, repetendum altius videtur. Est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Ejus enim vinculum est Ratio, & ORATIO; quæ docendo, discendo, communicando, desceptando, dijudicando, conciliat inter se homines, conjungitque naturali quadam societate.* De Offic. l. i. c. 16.

THUS too in his *Treatise De Nat. Deor.*—*Jam vero domina rerum (ut vos soletis dicere) ELOQUENDI VIS quam est præclara, quamque divina? Quæ primum efficit ut ea, quæ ignoramus, discere, & ea, quæ scimus, aliis docere possimus. Deinde hæc cohortamur, hæc persuademus, hæc consolamur afflictos, hæc deducimus perterritos a timore, hæc gestientes comprimimus, hæc cupiditates iracundiasque restringimus: hæc nos juris, legum, urbium societate devinxit; hæc a vitâ immâni & ferâ segregavit.* De Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 59. p. 243. Edit. Davis.—See also *Quint. Inst.* l. 2. c. 16, and *Alex. Aphrod.* *περὶ ψυχ.* p. 155. b. Edit. Ald. *Sanctii Min.* l. 1. c. 2, p. 15. *Plat. in Sophistâ*, p. 260, A. Edit. Serr.

NOTE XVI. p. 166.—IT IS FROM AMONG THE FEW, &c.] *In omni enim arte, vel studio, vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute, optimum quodque rarissimum.*

*mum est.* Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 25. p. 158. *Edit. Dav.*  
Thus too *Aristotle* joins the rare and the excellent.—  
τὸ εὖ, καὶ σπάνιον, καὶ ἐπαινέτον, καὶ καλόν. *Eth. Nic.*  
l. 2. c. 9. τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὡς Εὐθύδημι, τίμιον. *Plat. in*  
*Euthyd.* p. 304. b. *Edit. Serr.*

NOTE XVII. p. 167.—WORKING EVER UNIFORMLY ACCORDING TO THIS IDEA OF PERFECTION, &c.]

Thus *Boetius*, addressing the Deity,

*O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,  
Terrarum cæl'que Sator, qui tempus ab ævo  
Ire jubes, stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri;  
Quem non externæ pepulerunt fingere causæ  
Materiæ fluitantis opus; verum INSITA SUMMI  
FORMA BONI, livore carens: Tu cuncta SUPERNO  
Ducis ab EXEMPLO, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse  
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.*

*Consol. Philos.* l. 3. *Met.* 9.

NOTE XVIII. p. 167.—FROM SOME HIDDEN HIGHER MOTIVE, &c.] *Μήποτε δὲ μήδε ταῦτα* [sc. τὰ τέρατα] *παρὰ Φύσιν εἰσὶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν μερικῇ Φύσει ἢ Φύσει, ἀλλὰ παρὰ Φύσιν τῇ δὲ καθόλου καὶ Φύσει καὶ κατὰ Φύσιν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ μερικῇ Φύσει ἐνὸς εἶδους σοχάζεται, καὶ μίαν εἴρησιν φέργει. Διὰ τῆτο τῇ μὲν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ Φύσει τὸ τέρας ἔτε Φύσει εἰσὶν ἔτε κατὰ Φύσιν τῇ δ' ὅλη Φύσει ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῷ παντὶ παρὰ Φύσιν (ὅθεν γὰρ κακὸν ἐν τῷ παντὶ) οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ Φύσιν, ἀλλὰ Φύσει καὶ κατὰ Φύσιν.* *Joannes Gram. in Aristot. lib. 2. Natural. Aufcult.* *Nihil enim fieri sine causâ potest: nec quicquam fit,*



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*quod fieri non potest: nec, si id factum est quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri.* Cic. de Divin. l. 2. c. 28. p. 189. Edit. Davis.

NOTE XIX. p. 169.—MAN IS A SOCIAL RATIONAL ANIMAL.] Ζῶον λογικόν, καὶ πολιτικόν, λογικόν καὶ κοινωνικόν, λογικόν καὶ ἡμερον, these are Descriptions of *Humanity*, which we meet in every Page of *Epicetus* and *Antoninus*.

IT seems indeed to have been a received Opinion of old, that so intimate was the *Relation* between these two *Attributes*, that wherever there was *Rationality*, *Sociality* followed of course. Thus *Antoninus*—ἔστι δὲ τὸ λογικόν, ἐκτὸς καὶ πολιτικόν. l. 10. f. 2. And again, more fully—καὶ τοίνυν πάν τὸ τῆς νοεῖας φύσεως μέτοχον, πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ὁμοίως σπένδει, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσω γὰρ ἔστι κρείττον παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, τοσάτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγκρινᾶσθαι τῷ οἰκίῳ καὶ συγκρίσθαι ἐτοιμότερον. l. 9. f. 9.

It is not perhaps foreign to the present Subject to observe, that were the *Eyes* of any two Men whatever to view the *same Object*, they would each, from their *different Place*, and their *different Organization*, behold it *differently*, and have a *different Image*. But were all the *Minds* in the Universe to recognize the *same Truth*, they would all recognize it as *one*, their *Recognition* would be *uniform*, and themselves in a *manner* would be *one* also. The Reason is, *Perception by the Senses* admits of *more* and *less*, better and worse; but *Perception by the Intellect*, like *Truth*, its Object, admits of *no degrees*, and is either nothing at all, or else *total, uniform, complete*, and *ONE*.  
Hence

Hence therefore one Source of the Society, and as it were Communion of all Minds, considered as Minds, namely, the Unity of Truth, their common Object.

AGAIN, every just and perfect Society stands on the Basis of certain Laws. But LAW is nothing more, than right and perfect REASON, seen in bidding and forbidding, according to the Nature and Essence of those Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefore this UNIVERSE be one WHOLE, or general Society, there must be some COMMON, GENERAL LAW for its Conduct and Welfare; and this Law must, of consequence, be some right and perfect REASON, which passes thro' all things, and extends to every Part. Well therefore might Antoninus say in the Beginning of this Note, that every thing rational, was of course social, since REASON and LAW appear to be the same, and Law to be the Support and Basis of all SOCIETY. Thus too Cicero—*sequitur, ut eadem sit in his [sc. Diis] quæ humano generi RATIO; eadem VERITAS utrobique sit; eademque LEX, quæ est recti præceptio, pravique depulso.* De Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 31. p. 180. See also the same Author, *De Legg.* l. 1. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. Edit. Davis. *De Fin.* l. 2. c. 14. p. 123. See also *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. f. 88. *M. Anton.* l. 5. c. 16. l. 6. c. 23. *Arist. Polit.* as quoted in Note XV.

NOTE XX. p. 169. NOTHING CAN BE PURSUABLE, which is DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY.] *Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliæ, aut violet alterum, dirumpi necesse est eam, quæ maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis Societatem.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 5.

NOTE

NOTE XXI. p. 173.—FOR CONTRARIES ARE EVER RECOGNIZED THROUGH THE SAME HABIT, &c.] Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι. *There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same Science, with respect to things contrary.* Arist. de Anim. l. 3. c. 3. This by *Themistius*, in his *Paraphrase*, is thus illustrated. Τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ μία ἄγνοια· ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἀφίλιμον γινώσκων, καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὅτι βλαβερὸν συνεπίσκαται· καὶ ὁ περὶ θάτερον ἐξαπατῶμεθα, ἐξαπαλᾶται καὶ περὶ θάτερον. *Of Things contrary there is one Science, and one Ignorance. For thus be, who knows Good to be something beneficial, knows Evil at the same time to be something pernicious; and he, who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other.* See the *Io* of *Plato*, p. 531. T. I. Edit. *Sorr.*

NOTE XXII. p. 174.—THOSE FOUR GRAND VIRTUES, &c.] *Stobæus* having told us, that of the *Virtues* some were *primary*, some *subordinate*, adds—πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, Φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρίαν, δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν μὲν Φρόνησιν, περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τῆ ἀνθρώπου· τὴν δὲ ἀνδρίαν, περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς· τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην, περὶ τὰς ἀπονομήσεις. *The primary Virtues are four; PRUDENCE, TEMPERANCE, FORTITUDE, and JUSTICE: Prudence is employed in moral Offices; Temperance, in Mens natural Appetites and Pursuits; Fortitude, in Endurings; and Justice, in Distributions.* *Ecl. Ethic.* p. 167.

THAT

THAT the Life according to VIRTUE, was deemed the Life according to NATURE, appears from what is said by the same Author, in the Page following—  
 Πασῶν δὲ τῶν τῶν ἀρεῶν τὸ τέλος εἶναι, τὸ ἀκο-  
 λάτως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ἐκάστη δὲ τῶν διὰ τῶν ἰδίων  
 παρέχεται τυχεῖανονία τὸν ἄνθρωπον. *The End of all  
 these Virtues is, to live agreeably to Nature; and each  
 of them, by those Means, which are peculiar to itself, is  
 found to put a Man in possession of this End.*

So likewise Cicero—*Etenim quod summum bonum  
 a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturæ vivere, id habet  
 hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, cum virtute congruere  
 semper. De Offic. l. 3. c. 3.*

NOTE XXIII. p. 174. THAT LIFE, WHERE  
 THE VALUE OF ALL THINGS IS JUSTLY MEASURED, &c.] See pages 143, 146, 168, 203,  
 204.

NOTE XXIV. p. 175.—THAT, WHICH BEING  
 DONE, ADMITS OF A RATIONAL JUSTIFICA-  
 TION.] In the Original it is—ὁ πραχθὲν ἔυλογον  
 ἴσχει ἀπολογισμὸν. *Diog. Laert. l. 7. f. 107. ὅσην  
 πραχθὲν ἔυλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογία. Sext. Emp. Adv.  
 Mathem. l. 7. Thus rendered by Cicero—Officium id  
 esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi  
 possit. De Offic. l. 1. c. 3. The Reason of its  
 Greek Name, καθῆκον, is given by Simplicius. Κα-  
 θήκονιά ἐστὶ τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ τὰ ἥκονία καὶ ἐπιβάλλ-  
 ῶντα—*Moral Offices are those things which are done  
 agreeably**

agreeably to what is fitting, and expedient. Simplic. in Ench. c. 37.

NOTE XXV. p. 176.—AND WHEN OUR SEVERAL ENERGIES, EXERTED ACCORDING TO THE VIRTUES ABOVE, HAVE PUT US IN POSSESSION OF, &c.] This was the *Idea* of HAPPINESS, adopted by the old Academy, or Platonics. *Secundum naturam vivere, sic affectum, ut optimè affici possit, ad naturamque accommodatissimè.* Cic. de Fin. l. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics, who were originally of the same School, held the same. Ἐὶ δ' ἴτω, τὸ ἀθρόωπον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίγνεται καὶ ἀρετὴν—τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην—ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. If this be admitted, it follows that HUMAN GOOD or HAPPINESS is, the energizing of the Soul according to the best and most consummate Virtue, in a perfect and complete Life. Ethic. Nic. l. I. c. 7. A perfect and complete Life, they explained to be such a Life as was no ways deficient either as to its Duration, its bodily Health, and its being attended with a proper Competence of external Goods, and Prosperity. By the best and most consummate Virtue, they not only meant that Virtue, which was in its kind most perfect, but which was the Virtue also of that Part, which is in each of us most excellent. For there are Virtues of the Body, such as Strength and Agility; and there are Virtues of the Senses, such as accurate Seeing, accurate Tasting; and the same of every Faculty, from the lowest to that which is supreme.

THE sovereign Good or Happiness here spoken of, is again repeated, in other Words, p. 179. where it

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is called, the *ATTAINING the primary and just Requisites of our Nature, by a Conduct suitable to Virtue and moral Office.*

THE PRIMARY AND JUST REQUISITES here mentioned, are all Things requisite to the Use and Enjoyment of our PRIMARY and NATURAL PERFECTIONS. These *Primary and Natural Perfections* mean the NATURAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS of both our MIND and BODY. They were called by the *Latins, Prima Naturæ, Prima secundum Naturam*; by the *Greeks, τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ Φύσιν, τὰ πρῶτα τῆς Φύσεως*. In them were included Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfect Sensations, Memory, Docility, Invention, &c. See *Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 163. Cic. de Fin. l. 5. c. 7. p. 364. A. Gell. l. 12. c. 5.*

A like *Sentiment of Happiness*, to this here spoken of, is that mentioned by *Cicero*—*Virtute adhibitâ frui PRIMIS a naturâ datis*. *De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113.* It is there called the Opinion of the *old Academics*, and *Peripatetics*. It is again repeated by the same Author. *Honeste vivere, fruentum rebus iis, quas PRIMAS homini natura conciliet*. *Acad. l. 2. c. 42. p. 240.*

It is to be observed that *Cicero*, speaking of this Hypothesis, says that it proposed an Idea of *Happiness*, which was not properly in our own Power. *Hoc non est positum in nostrâ actione: completur enim & ex eo genere vitæ, quod virtute finitur, & ex iis rebus quæ secundum naturam sunt, neque sunt in nostra potestate*. *De Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 287.*

HENCE therefore the DEFICIENCY of this *Doctrins*. However justifiable, however laudable its *End*, it could not insure a *due Success* to its *Endeavours*. And hence too the Force of what is objected to it in the *Dialogue*, from p. 177, to the End of the first Part.

NOTE XXVI. p. 185.—TO PLACE THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IN RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT, &c.] As the *Conduct* here mentioned implies a Conduct under the Direction of a befitting *Rule* or *Law*, and that, as opposed to *wrong* Conduct, which has either no rule at all, or at least one erroneous; it may not be an improper Place to enquire, what was the ancient Opinion concerning LAW UNIVERSAL, the *great* and *general* Law, which stood opposed to the *municipal* Laws of particular Cities and Communities.

EST quidam vera LEX, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat—nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia post-hac; sed & omnes gentes, & omni tempore una lex, & sempiterna, & immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, & imperator omnium Deus. Ille hujus legis inventor, disceptator, lator. Cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiamsi cœtera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit. Fragm. Cic. de Rep. l. 3.

LEX est ratio summa, insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. What follows is worth remarking. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata & confecta, lex est. Cic. de Legg. l. 1. c. 6. p. 22.

AGAIN. LEX vera—ratio est recta summi Jovis. To which he subjoins, as above, Ergo ut illa divina mens summa lex est; ita cum in homine est, perfecta est in mente sapientis. De Legg. l. 2. c. 4, 5. p. 88.

IT is in this Sense the *Apostle* tells us of the *Gentiles*, or *Mankind in general*, that they *shew the Work of the Law written in their Hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their Thoughts the mean while accusing, or else excusing one another.* Rom. i. 11.

As *Cicero*, in his *Book of Laws* above cited, follows the *Stoic Discipline*, so is it agreeable to their Reasoning, that he makes the *original natural LAW*, of which we here treat, to be the *SOVEREIGN REASON OF THE DEITY himself*. Thus *Chrysippus*—*Idem* [scil. *Chrysippus*] *legis perpetuæ & æternæ vim, quæ quasi dux vitæ & magistra officiorum sit, Jovem dicit esse.* Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 15. p. 41.

So by the same Philosophers in *Laertius*, we are ordered to *live according to Nature*, ἕδὲν ἐνεργῶντας ὡν ἀπαγορεύειν ἕθεν ὁ νόμος ἡ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὡν τῷ Διὶ, καθυγεμόνι τέτω τῆς τῶν ὄντων (φοῦ ὄλων) διοικήσεως ἀλλί, *doing nothing, forbidden by the UNIVERSAL LAW, that*



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that is to say, by that right Reason, which passeth thro' all Things, and which is the SAME with Jove himself, the Governor and Conductor of this universal Administration. Laert. l. 7. f. 88. Edit. Aldobrand.

AGREEABLY to this Reasoning, *Plutarch* corrects those, who made Δίκη, a Goddess, and the Assessor of Jove; for, says he, ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἔχει μὲν τὴν Δίκην πάρεδρον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς Δίκη καὶ Θέμις ἐστὶ, καὶ νόμων ὁ πρεσβύτατος καὶ τελειότατος, Jove has not Δίκη or RIGHT for his Assessor, but is himself RIGHT, and JUSTICE, and of all LAWS the most ANTIENT and PERFECT. *Moral.* p. 781. B.

THUS *Antoninus*—τέλος δὲ λογικῶν ζώων, τὸ ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ τῆς πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας τῆς πρεσβυτάτης λόγῳ καὶ θεσμῷ. *The End of Rational Animals is to follow the REASON and SACRED LAW of that City and most ancient Polity, [in which all rational Beings are included.]* l. 2. f. 16.

THE most simple Account of this Law, which the *Stoics* gave, seems to be that recorded by *Stobæus*; according to which they called it λόγον, ἐρθὸν ὄντα, προσακτικὸν μὲν τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ τῶν ἐπισητέων, RIGHT REASON, ordaining what is to be done, and forbidding what is not to be done. *Ecl. Ethic.* 178. See also the Notes of *Turnebus* and *Davis* upon *Cic. de Legg.* l. 1. c. 6.

HAVING premised thus much concerning Law universal, it remains to say something of that RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT, which is in this Part of the Dialogue

Dialogue proposed as our *Happiness*. RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT is intended to express the Term *Καλόρθωσις*, which *Cicero* translates *recta Effectio*. *Καλόρθωμα* he translates *Rectum Factum*. See *De Fin.* l. 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definition of a *Καλόρθωμα*, was *Νόμος πρόσαγμα*, a *Thing commanded by Law*; to which was opposed *ἀμαρτήμα*, a *Sin or Offence*, which was defined *Νόμος απαγόρευμα*, a *Thing forbidden by Law*. *Plut. Mor.* 1037. C. What *Law* is here meant, which thus commands or forbids; has been shewn above.

HENCE therefore may be seen the Reason; why we have said thus much on the Nature and Idea of *Law universal*; so intimate being the Union between *this* and *right Conduct*; that we find the latter is nothing more than a *perfect Obedience to the former*.

HENCE too we see the Reason, why in one view it was deemed *HAPPINESS*; to be void of *Error or Offence*, *ἀναμαρτήλου είναι*, as we find it in *Arrian. Epiēt.* l. 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus *inculpable* was the *necessary Result of Rectitude of Conduct*, or rather in a manner *the same thing with it*.

I cannot conclude this *Note*, without remarking on an elegant Allusion of *Antoninus* to the *primary Signification* of the Word *Καλόρθωσις*, that is to say, *καλὰ ὀρθῶς*, *right onwards, straight and directly forwards*. Speaking of the *Reasoning Faculty*, how, without looking farther, it rests contented in its own *Energies*, he adds—*Καθὸ καλορθώσεως αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις ὀνομάζονται, τὴν ὀρθότητά τῆς οὐδ' σημαίνουσαι.*

For which reason *Actions of this sort*

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are called RECTITUDES, as denoting the Directness of their Progression RIGHT ONWARDS. l. 5. f. 14. So again in the same Sense, εὐθεΐαν περιάγειν, to keep on, the straight Road. l. 5. f. 3. l. 10. f. 11.

ONE would imagine that our Countryman *Milton* had this Reasoning in view, when in his 19th Sonnet, speaking of his own Blindness, he says with a becoming Magnanimity,

————— Yet I argue not  
Against Heav'n's Hand or Will; nor bate one jot  
Of Heart or Hope; but still bear up, and steer  
RIGHT ONWARDS. —————

The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Perusal, being both sublime and simple.

NOTE XXVII. p. 185. — THE MERE DOING WHATEVER IS CORRESPONDENT TO SUCH AN END, EVEN THO' WE NEVER ATTAIN IT — ] Thus *Epicletus* in *Arrian*, speaking of Address to Men in Power, and admitting such Address, when justified by certain Motives, adds, that such Address ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery. Upon this an Objector demands of him, πῶς ἐν τύχῳ, ἔδωμαι; *But how then am I to obtain that, which I want?* — The Philosopher answers, Ἐγὼ δέ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ὡς ΤΕΥΞΟΜΕΝΟΣ ἀπέρχου. ἐχὶ δὲ μόνον, ἵνα πράξης τὸ σαυτῷ πρόπον; *Did I ever say to thee, that thou shouldst go and address, as tho' thou wert to SUCCEED; and not rather with this only view, that thou mightest DO THAT, which IS BECOMING THY CHARACTER?* — And soon after, when

when an Objection is urged from Appearance, and the Opinion of Mankind, he answers,—ἐκ οἷσθ' ὅτι ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι ποιεῖ τὰ δόξαι ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ΠΕΠΡΑΧΘΑΙ ΚΑΛΩΣ; *Knowest thou not, that a fair and good Man does nothing for the sake of Appearance, but for the sake only of having DONE WELL AND FAIRLY?* Arr. *Epicl.* l. 3. c. 24. p. 497, 498. This *Doctrine* indeed seems to have been the *Basis* of the *Stoic Morals*; the Principle, which included, according to these Philosophers, as well *Honour* and *Honesty*, as *Good* and *Happiness*. Thus *Cicero*—*Facere omnia, ut adipiscamur quæ secundum naturam sint, et si ea non adsequamur, id esse & honestum, & solum per se expetendum & summum bonum Stoici dicunt.* De Fin. l. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this is consonant that Sentiment of theirs in *Plutarch*—Τὴν μὲν φύσιν αὐτὴν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν, ἀγαθόν—And again—τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, τέλει εἶναι—τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀδιάφορα εἶναι. *Plut. Mor.* 1060. D. E. See below, *Note XXX.* *Socrates* was of the same Opinion, as appears from all parts of the *Platonic* and *Xenophontean Dialogues*. Take one Example out of many.—τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖτε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἂν ἀνὴρ πράττοι· τὸν δὲ εὖ πράττοντα, μακάριον τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. *Gorg. Plat.* p. 507. Edit. Serr.

NOTE XXVIII. p. 185.—WHAT IF WE MAKE OUR NATURAL STATE THE STANDARD ONLY TO DETERMINE OUR CONDUCT, &c ] It is in this sense we find it elegantly said in *Plutarch* by the last mentioned Philosophers—στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν—*that our NATURAL STATE and what is consonant to it, are the ELEMENTS*

of Happiness,—and just before, the same *natural State* is called τὸ καθήκον ἢ ἀρχὴ, ἢ ὕλη τῆς ἀρετῆς, the SOURCE of Moral Office; and the SUBJECT MATTER of Virtue. Plut. Mor. 1069. E. F. *Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, sequatur; idque initium esse naturæ accommodatum: nam aliter appetitio, &c. Cic. Acad. 1. 2. c. 8. p. 85, 86. Initia proponi necesse esse apta & accommodata naturæ, quorum ex se electione Virtus possit existere. De Fin. 1. 4. c. 17. p. 316. Cum vero illa, quæ officia esse dixi, proficiantur ab initiis naturæ; ea ab hæc referri necesse est: ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ; nec tamen ut hoc sit BONORUM ULTIMUM—De Fin. 1. 3. c. 6. p. 217.*

NOTE XXIX. p. 185.—WE SHOULD NOT WANT A GOOD TO CORRESPOND, &c.] *Plutarch* quotes the following Sentiment of *Chrysippus*, who patronized this Idea of GOOD—Τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, ὃν ἀλλὸς εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει, συμφωνότατον εἶναι φησι τῷ βίῳ, καὶ μάλιστα τῷ ἐμφύτῳ ἀπίσθαι προλήψεων. Plut. Mor. 1041. E.

NOTE XXX. p. 187.—YET WE LOOK NOT FOR HIS REPUTATION, &c.] What *Quintilian* says of *Rhetoric*, may with great propriety be transferred to *Morality*. *Noster orator, Atque a nobis finita, non sunt posita in EVENTU. Tendit quidem ad victoriam, qui dicit: sed, cum bene dixit, etiam si non vincat, id, quod arte continetur, effecit. Nam & gubernatur vult salvâ nave in portum pervenire: si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernatur, dicitque notum illud; dum clavum rectum teneam. Et medicus sanitatem ægri petit: si tamen*

aut valetudinis vi, aut intemperantiâ ægri, alioue quo casu summa non contingit; dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit, medicinæ fine non excidit. Ita oratori bene dixisse, finis est. Nam est ars ea—in ACTU posita, non in EVENTU. Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 17.

NOTE XXXI. p. 187.—HE FOR A SUBJECT HAS THE WHOLE OF HUMAN LIFE, &c.] ΟυσΙΑ τῆ ἀγαθῆ, προαίρεσις ποιά τῆ κακῆ προαίρεσις ποιά. Τί ἐν τὰ ἐκτός; ἴλας τῆ προαίρεσις, περὶ αἷ ἀνασρεφομένη τεύξεται τῆ ἰδίᾳ ἀγαθῆ ἢ κακῆ. *The Essence of GOOD, is a peculiar Direction of Mind; and the Essence of EVIL, is a peculiar Direction also. What then are EXTERNALS? They serve as SUBJECTS to the Mind's Direction, from conversing with which it obtains its proper Good or Evil.* Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 29. Again—Αἱ ὕλαι, ἀδιάφορα· ἢ δὲ χαῖσις αὐτῶν ἐκ ἀδιάφορο. *The SUBJECTS are indifferent, but not so the USE of them.* Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 5.

Thus HORACE:

*Non possidentem multa vocaveris  
 Recte beatum; rectius occupat  
 Nomen beati, qui Deorum  
 Muneribus SAPIENTER UTI,  
 Duramque callet pauperiem pati,  
 Pejusque leto flagitum timet:  
 Non ille, &c.*

Od. l. iv. 9.

EVEN the Comic Poet seems not to have been unacquainted with this Doctrine:

Ch. Quid narrant? Cl. Quid ille? miserum se esse.

Ch. Miserum? quem minus credere est?

Quid relinqui est, quin habeat quæ quidem in homine dicuntur bona?

Parentis, patriam incolumem, amicos, genus, cognatos, divitias:

Atque hæc perinde sunt ut illius animus, qui ea profidet:

Qui UTI scit, ei BONA; illi, qui non utitur recte, mala.

Heauton. Act I. S. 2. V. 18.

Vid. Platon, in Euthydemo, p. 281. Edit. Serr. ἐν καὶ Φαλαίῳ δ', ἔφην, ὃ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει:

NOTE XXXII. p. 189.—THE END IN OTHER ARTS IS EVER DISTANT, &c.] Sed in cæteris artibus cum dicitur Artificiosè, posterum quodam modo & consequens putandum est, quod illi ἐπιγυνημαλικὸν appellant; quod autem in quo Sapienter dicitur, id ad primo rectissime dicitur: quicquid enim a sapiente proficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim positum est id, quod dicimus esse expetendum. Nam ut peccatum est patriam proderè, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quæ sunt in effectu: sic timere, sic mæcere, sic in libidine esse, peccatum est, etiam sine effectu. Verum ut hæc, non in posteris & in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt: sic ea quæ proficiuntur a virtute, SUSCEPTIONE prima, non PERFECTIONE, recta sunt judicanda. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 228. Τὸ ἴδιον τέλος τυχεῖται [ἢ λογικὴ ψυχὴ] ὅπως ἀντὶ τῆ βίης πείρας ἐπισητὸν ἔχῃ, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ ἐρχήσεως καὶ ὑποκρίσεως καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀτελεῖς

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ἀτελής γίνεσθαι ἢ ὅλην πράξιν, εἰάν τι ἐγκόψῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάντος μέρους, καὶ ὅτε αὖ καλαλεφθῇ, πλῆρες καὶ ἀπροσδεῖς ἐαυτῇ τὸ προλεθὲν ποιεῖ ὥστε εἰπεῖν, ἐγὼ ἀπέχω τὰ ἐμά. M. Ant. l. 11. f. 1. *Et quemadmodum opportunitas (sic enim adpellemus ἐνοκαιρίαν) non fit major productione temporis (habent enim suum modum quacunque opportuna dicuntur) sic recta effectio (καλόρθωσιν enim ita adpello, quoniam rectum factum καλόρθωμα) recta igitur effectio, item convenientia, denique IPSUM BONUM, quod in eo positum est ut natura consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. Ut enim opportunitas illa, sic hæc de quibus dixi, non sunt temporis productione majora: ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda vita beata, si sit longa, quam si brevis: utunturque simili, ut, si cothurni laus illa est ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur, nec majores minoribus: sic quorum omne bonum convenientiâ atque opportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus, nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponentur. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 14. p. 242. See also Dio. Laert. l. 7. f. 101. M. Ant. l. 6. f. 23. l. 3. f. 7. Senec. Epist. 66.*

NOTE XXXIII. p. 191.—RECOLLECT THEN, SAID HE, DO YOU NOT REMEMBER THAT ONE PRE-CONCEPTION, &c.] In this, and the subsequent Pages, the general Pre-conceptions of Good are applied to the particular Hypothesis of Good, advanced in this Treatise. See before, p. 115, 121, 122.

NOTE XXXIV. p. 192.—AND IS THERE ANY TIME OR PLACE, WHENCE RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT MAY BE EXCLUDED?] ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΤ καὶ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΩΣ ἐπὶ σοί ἐσι, καὶ τῇ παρέσῃ συμβάσει θεοσεβῶς ἐναρξείν, καὶ τοῖς πα-



ῥῆσιν ἀνθρώποις κατὰ δικαιοσύνην προσφέρεισθαι.—  
M. Ant. l. 7. f. 54.

NOTE XXXV. p. 192.—WHERE IT SHALL NOT BE IN HIS POWER TO ACT BRAVELY AND HONESTLY.] Μήκέτι ἔν μοι λέγει, πῶς γένηται; ὅπως γὰρ αὖ γένηται, σὺ αὐτὸ θήσεις καλῶς, καὶ ἔσαι σοι τὸ ἀποβᾶν εὐλύχημα. Arrian. *Epicl.* l. 4. c. 10. p. 650.

NOTE XXXVI. p. 195.—THERE ARE INSTANCES INNUMERABLE OF MEN BAD, AS WELL AS GOOD, &c.] See a long Catalogue of these in *Cicero's Tusculan Disputations*; *Spartan Boys*; *Barbarian Sages*; *Indian Wives*; *Egyptian Devotees*, &c. &c. The whole Passage is worth reading. *Tusc. Disp.* l. 5. c. 27. p. 400, 401, &c.

NOTE XXXVII. p. 196.—THIS I WRITE YOU (SAYS HE IN ONE OF HIS EPISTLES) WHILE, &c.] Τὴν μακαρίαν ἀγούεις καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τῆ βίου, ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταῦτα· γραψυρίατε παρεκκολυθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη, ὑπερβολὴν ἐκ ἀπολείπουσα τῶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθυς· ἀντιπαρεβλάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τέτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρου ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγυότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμη—Dio. Laer. l. 10. f. 22. *Cum ageremus vitæ beatum & eundem supremum diem, scribebamus hæc. Tanti autem morbi aderant viscæ & viscerum, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem possit accedere. Compensabatur tamen cum his omnibus animi lætitia, quam capiebam memoriâ rationum inventorumque nostrorum*—Cic. de *Fin.* l. 2. c. 30. p. 173.

Soon after we have another Sentiment of *Epicurus*, that a rational *Adversity* was better than an irrational

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*Personal Prosperity.* The original Words are — κρείττον εἶναι εὐλογίῳσιν ἀτυχεῖν, ἢ ἀλογίῳσιν εὐτυχεῖν. Dio. Laert. l. 10. f. 135.

NOTE XXXVIII p. 198. O CRITO, IF IT BE PLEASING TO THE GODS, &c.] The three Quotations in this Page are taken from *Plato*; the first from the *Crito*, quoted by *Epicletus* at the End of the *Enchiridion*, and in many other Places; the second from the *Apology*, quoted as frequently by the same Author; the third, from the *Menexenus* or *Epitaph.* Plat. Opera, tom. 2. p. 248. Edit. Serran. see also *Cic. Tuscul.* l. 5. c. 12.

NOTE XXXIX. p. 199. IF YOU ARE FOR NUMBERS, REPLIED HE, WHAT THINK YOU OF THE NUMEROUS RACE OF PATRIOTS, &c.] *Sed quid duces & principes nominem; cum legiones soribat Cato sæpe alacris in eum locum profectas, unde redituras se non arbitrarentur? Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopyis occiderunt: in quos Simonides,*

*Dic hospes Sparta, nos te hic v' disse jacentes,  
Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur.*

*Tuscul. Disp. l. 1. 42. p. 101.*

NOTE XL. *Ibid.*——MARTYRS FOR SYSTEMS WRONG, &c.] That there may be a *bigotted Obsinacy* in favour of what is *absurd*, as well as a *rational Constancy* in adhering to what is *right*, those *Egyptians* above mentioned may serve as Examples. *Ægyptiorum morem quis ignoret? quorum imbutæ mentes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificinam prius subierint, quam ibim aut aspidem aut felem aut canem aut*  
crocæ-

*crocoditum violent: quorum etiam si imprudentes quidpiam fecerint, pœnam nullam recusent.* Tuscul. Disp: l. 5. c. 27. p. 402. See before, Note XXXVI.

NOTE XLI. p. 200.—CELEBRATED TO SUCH A HEIGHT, IN THE RELIGION, WHICH WE PROFESS, &c.] It is probable that some Analogies of this sort induced a *Father of the Church* (and no less a one than *St. Jerom*) to say of the *Stoics*, who made *moral Rectitude* the ONLY GOOD,—*NO-STRO DOGMATI IN PLERISQUE CONCORDANT.* *Vid. Menag. in D. Laert. l. 7. f. 101. p. 300.* and *Gatak. Præfat. in M. Anton.* See also of this *Treatise* p. 110. and below, Note XLIV.

NOTE XLII. p. 201. TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY, &c.] TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY is here explained to be LIVING ACCORDING TO SOME ONE SINGLE CONSONANT SCHEME OR PURPOSE; and our GOOD OR HAPPINESS 'is placed in such CONSISTENCE, upon a supposition that those, who live *inconsistently*, and without any such *uniform Scheme*, are of consequence *miserable*, and *unhappy*. Τὸ τέλει ὁ μὲν Ζήνων ἄτως ἀπέδωκε, τὸ ὁμολογημένως ζῆν τῆτο δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἓνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένων ζώων κακαδαιμονίων. *Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 171.*

THIS CONSISTENCE was called in *Greek* ὁμολογία, in *Latin* *Convenientia*, and was sometimes by itself alone considered as the END. Τὴν ὁμολογίαν λέγουσι τέλει εἶναι. *Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 172.* See also *Cic de Fin. l. 3. c. 6. p. 216.* See also in the same last named *Treatise*, c. 7. p. 220.—*Ut enim hiftri-*

oni actio, saltatori motus, non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus: sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus CONVENIENS CONSENTANEUMQUE dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinæ similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, & saltationi; ut in ipsa ARTE insit, NON FORIS petatur EXTREMUM, id est, artis effectio.

It is upon this Principle we find it a Precept in Cicero's Offices——In primis autem constituendum est, quos nos & quales esse velimus, & in quo genere vitæ——l. i. c. 32. So likewise in the Enchiridion of Epictetus, c. 33.——Τάξον τινὰ ἥδη χαρακτῆρα σαυτῷ καὶ τύπον, ὃν φυλάξῃς ἐπὶ τε σεαυτῷ ὦν, καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἐπιλυγχαίνων. Ordain to thyself some Character and Model of Life, which thou mayst maintain both by thyself, and when thou art conversant with Mankind.

So much indeed was rested upon this Principle of Consistence, that even to be any thing consistently, was held better than the contrary. Thus Epictetus.——Ἐνα σε δεῖ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτῷ, ἢ τὰ ἐκτὸς——It behoves thee to be ONE UNIFORM, MAN, either good or bad; either to cultivate thy own Mind, or to cultivate things external——Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does he express himself in a place subsequent; where having first counselled against that False Complaisance, which makes us, to please Mankind, forget our proper Character, and having recommended as our Duty a Behaviour contrary, he adds——Ἐἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρῆσει ταῦτα, ὅλα ἀπέκλινον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀναίσια· γυνῆ εἰς τῶν κιναιδῶν, εἰς τῶν μοιχῶν——Διάφορα δ' ἔτω πρό-

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πρόσωπα ἢ μίγνυται. ἢ δύνασαι καὶ Θεοσίτην ὑποκρίνασθαι καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα—Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 2. p. 580. *But if what I recommend to thee do not please, then turn thee totally to all that is contrary; become a profligate of the most prostitute kind—Characters so different are not to be blended; thou canst not act at once Thermites and Agamemnon.*

So too HORACE :

—Quanto CONSTANTIOR idem  
In vitiis, tanto levius miser, ac prior ille  
Qui jam contento, jam laxo fune laborat.

Sat. 7. l. 2. v. 18.

See also *Characteristics*, V. I. p. 131.

NOTE XLIII. p. 203.—IT IS NOT MERELY TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY; BUT TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY WITH NATURE.] Ὁμολογημένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν. Cleanthes in Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 171.—*Congruenter naturæ convenienterque vivere.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 7. p. 221. The first Description of our End [*to live consistently*] was deemed *defective*, and therefore was this *Addition* made. See *Stobæus* in the Place cited. Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 1. p. 352.

NOTE XLIV. p. 204.—TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY WITH NATURE IS TO LIVE ACCORDING TO JUST EXPERIENCE OF THOSE THINGS, WHICH HAPPEN AROUND US.] Τέλει ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογημένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν ὅπερ ὁ Χρῦσιππος σαφέστερον βεβλόμενος ποιῆσαι, ἐξήνεγκε τὸν τρόπον τῆτον, Ζῆν τὰ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. 171. Diog. Laert. l. 7. c. 87. *His verbis*  
[scil.

[scil. vivere secundum naturam] tria significari Stoici dicunt. Unum ejusmodi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quæ naturâ evenirent—De Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 286. See also the same Treatise, l. 3. c. 9. p. 227. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. where it is expressed—*Vivere cum intelligentiâ earum rerum quæ naturâ evenirent.*

NOTE XLV. p. 205.—TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS TO NATURE, AND REJECTING WHAT IS CONTRARY, MAKING OUR END THAT SELECTING, AND THAT REJECTING ONLY.]  
 Ὅ τε Ἀντίπαρτος, — τὸ τέλος κείσθαι, Ἐν τῷ διηκῆς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, ὑπολαμβάνει. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2. p. 497. Edit. Potter. This Sentiment was sometimes contracted, and expressed as follows—τὸ ἐυλογισεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς—sometimes, more concisely still, by the single Term τὸ ἐυλογισεῖν. See Plutarch 1071, 1072. Cicero joins this, and the foregoing Descriptions of Happiness, together. *Circumscriptis igitur his sententiis, quas posui, & si quæ similis earum sint, relinquitur, ut summum bonum sit, vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quæ naturâ eveniant, feligentem quæ secundum naturam, & quæ contra naturam sunt rejicientem, id est, convenienter congruenterque naturæ vivere.* De Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 227. See also De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. See also Diog. Laert. l. 7. c. 88.—*Serb. Ecl. Eth.* 171.

NOTE XLVI. p. 207. TO LIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF MORAL OFFICES.] Ἀρχιδημοῦ δὲ  
 [τέλος]

[τέλ<sup>⊕</sup> φσι] τὸ πάσι τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελεῖν ζῆν.  
 Laert l 7. c. 88.—Stob. Ecl. Eth. 171.—*Officia omnia—servantem vivere.* Cic. de Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 286.

SOON after we meet the Phrases—TO LIVE ACCORDING TO NATURE; TO LIVE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE. Ὁ Ζήνων—τέλ<sup>⊕</sup> εἶπε, τὸ ὁμολογεμένης τῆ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρίστην ζῆν. Laert. l. 7. c. 87.—*Consentire natura; quod esse volunt virtute, id est, honestate vivere*—De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. Where, as has been already observed page 174, and in the Note likewise on the Place, we find the Lives according to Nature and Virtue are considered as the same.

HOWEVER, to make this Assertion plainer, (if it be not perhaps sufficiently plain already) it may not be improper to consider what Idea these Philosophers had of VIRTUE.

IN Laertius (where he delivers the Sentiments of Zeno and his followers) Virtue is called Διαθεσις ὁμολογεμένη, a consistent Disposition; and soon after, ψυχὴ πεποιημένη πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. A Mind formed to Consistence thro' every Part of Life. Laert. 7. c. 89.

IN Stobæus (according to the Sentiments of the same School) it is called Διαθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφων<sup>⊕</sup> αὐτῇ πρὸς ὅλον τὸν βίον. A Disposition of Mind, consonant to itself throughout the whole of Life. Ecl. Eth. p. 167.

So Cicero in his *Laws*—*Constans & perpetua ratio vitæ, quæ est VIRTUS.*—l. I. c. 17. p. 55.

So Seneca in his 74th *Epistle*—*VIRTUS enim CONVENIENTIA constat : omnia opera ejus cum ipsâ concordant, & congruunt.*

THUS therefore *Consistence* being the Essence of *Virtue*, and upon the *Hypothesis* here advanced, the Essence also of *Happiness*; it follows first that a *Virtuous* Life will be a *Happy* Life. But if a *Happy one*, then of course a *Life according to Nature*; since nothing can be *Good*, which is *contrary to Nature*, nor indeed which is not *consonant*, in the strictest manner, to it.

AND here (as a proper Opportunity seems to offer) we cannot but take notice of the great *Similitude of Sentiments*, it may be even said the *Unanimity* of almost all *Philosophers*, on this important Subject concerning ENDS, and HAPPINESS.

THOSE, whose *Hypothesis* we have followed in this Dialogue, supposed it to be VIRTUE and CONSISTENT ACTION, and that without regard to *Fortune* or *Success*. But even they, who from their *Hypothesis* made *some Degree of Success* requisite; who rested it not merely on *right Action*, but on a proportion of *bodily Welfare*, and *good Fortune* concomitant, even these made RIGHT ACTION and VIRTUE to be PRINCIPAL.

THUS



THUS *Archytas*, according to the Doctrine of the *Pythagorean School*. 'Ευδαιμοσύνη χρᾶσις ἀρετᾶς ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ. *Happiness is the Use or Exercise of Virtue, attended with external good Fortune.* *Opuſc. Mytholog.* p. 678. Conſonant to this Sentiment, he ſays in the beginning of the ſame Treatiſe, ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ εὐθὺς· εὐδαιμόνων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ εὐδαιμόνων, καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ἐστίν. *The good Man is not of neceſſity Happy; [becauſe upon this Hypotheſis, external Fortune may be wanting;] but the happy Man is of neceſſity Good, [becauſe, upon the ſame Hypotheſis, without Virtue was no Happineſs.] Ibid.* p. 673. Again—'Αἰεὶ μὲν γὰρ κακοδαιμονοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν κακὸν, αἰεὶ ἔχει ὕλην (κακῶς τε γὰρ αὐτῷ χρῆſται) αἰεὶ ſπανίζοι.—*The bad Man (ſays he) muſt needs at all times be miſerable, whether he have, or whether he want, the Materials of external Fortune; for if he have them, he will employ them ill. Ibid.* p. 696. Thus we ſee this Philoſopher, tho' he make *Externals a Requiſite to Happineſs*, yet ſtill without *Virtue* he treats them as of no importance. Again—Δύο δ' ὁδοὶ τέμνονται ἐν τῷ βίῳ· ἡ μὲν ſκυθρωπότιρα, ἣν ὁ τλάμων ἐβιάζετο Ὀδυſſεύς· ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονότιρα, τὴν ἐπορεύετο Νέſτωρ. Τὰν ὡν ἀρετᾶν Φαμί δηλῆσθαι (lege δήλεσθαι, *Dorice pro Φίλειν*) μὲν τάυτην, δύνασθαι δὲ καὶ τήνην. *There are two Roads in Life diſtinct from each other; one the rougher, which the ſuffering Ulyſſes went; the other more ſmooth, which was travelled by Neſtor. Now of theſe Roads (ſays he) Virtue deſires indeed the latter; and yet is ſhe not unable to travel the former. Ibid.* p. 696. From which laſt Sentiment it appears, that he thought *VIRTUE*, even in any *Fortune*, was capable of producing at leaſt ſome degree of *HAPPINESS*.

As

As for the *Socratic* Doctrine on this Subject, it may be sufficiently seen by what is quoted from it, in the Dialogue pag. 198. 199. And as the Sentiments, there exhibited, are recorded by *Plato*, they may be called not only *Socratic*, but *Platonic* also. However, lest this should be liable to dispute, the following Sentiment is taken from *Xenocrates*, one of *Plato's* immediate Successors in the old *Academy* by him founded. *Ξενοκράτης* Φησιν, 'Ευδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· τὰύτην γὰρ ἰκάσω εἶναι Δαίμονα. *Xenocrates held that he was Eudæmon, or HAPPY, who had a virtuous Mind; for that the Mind was every one's Dæmon or Genius.* *Arist. Top.* l. 2. c. 6.

HERE we see VIRTUE made the Principle of HAPPINESS, according to the Hypothesis of the Dialogue. There is an elegant Allusion in the Passage to the Etymology of the Word 'Ευδαίμων, which signifies both [*Happy*] and [*possessed of a good Genius or Dæmon*]; an Allusion which in translating it was not possible to preserve. See below, Note LVIII.

As for the *Peripatetic School*, we find their Idea of HAPPINESS, as recorded by *Laertius*, to be in a manner the same with that of the *Pythagoreans*. It was *χρησις ἀρίστη ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*—*The Use or Exercise of Virtue in a complete and perfect Life.* *Laert.* l. 5. c. 30. We have already, in Note XXV, cited the same Doctrine (tho' somewhat varied in Expression) from the Founder of the *Peripatetics*, in his first Book of *Ethics*. So again we learn from him——ὅτι πράξις τις ἐν ἰσχυρίαι λίγισται

τὸ τέλος, that it is certain *Actions and Energies*, which are to be deemed *THE END*. *Ethic. Nic.* l. 1. c. 8. — And again—Ἐστὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. For it is the very *Rectitude of Action*, which is itself the *End*. *Ibid.* l. 6. c. 5. And again, Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργεια τις ἐστὶ—*Happiness is a certain Energizing.* l. 9. c. 9. And more explicitly than all these Passages in that elegant Simile, l. 1. c. 8.—Ὡσπερ δὲ ὀλυμπιάσιν ἐχ' οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι σεφάνηται, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τέτων γὰρ τινος νικῶσιν) ἔτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν Οἱ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΕΣ ΟΡΘΩΣ ἐπήβολοι γίγνονται. For as in the *Olympic Games*, not those are crowned, who are handsomest and strongest, but those who combat and contend, (for it is from among these come the *Victors*;) so, with respect to things laudable and good in human Life, it is the right *Actors* only that attain the Possession of them. Nay, so much did this Philosopher make *Happiness* depend on right *Action*, that tho' he required some Portion of *Externals* to that *Felicity*, which he held *supreme*; yet still it was *Honour* and *Virtue* which were its *principal* Ingredients. Thus speaking of the *Calamities* and external *Casualties* of Life, which he confesses to be *Impediments* to a *Happiness* perfectly complete, he adds—ὁμῶς δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δὲ ἀναληθίσαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὧν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. Ἐἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, ἴδεις ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἀθλιῶν; ἴδε ποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισθὰ καὶ φαῦλα. Τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐμφραμα πᾶσας οἰαίμεθα τὰς τύχας ἐνοσημόνως φέροντι καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν καθάπερ καὶ

ερα-

τρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι κρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολε-  
 μικώτατα, καὶ σκυτολόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυλῶν κάλ-  
 λιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰς ἄλ-  
 λας τεχνίτας ἀπαύτας. Ἐἰ δ' ἔστω, ἀθλιῶς μὲν ἡδέ-  
 πότε γένοι' αὖ ἡ ἰουδαίων. *And yet, even in such Inci-*  
*idents, the fair Principle of Honour and Virtue shines*  
*forth, when a Man with becoming Calmness endures*  
*many and great Misfortunes, and that not thro' Insensa-*  
*bility, but being brave and magnanimous. Nay more,*  
*if it be true, as we have already affirmed, that it is*  
*Actions, which are predominant in constituting a happy*  
*Life, then can no one be completely miserable, who is*  
*happy in his right Conduct, because he will never be the*  
*Actor of what is detestable and base. For it is our Opi-*  
*nion that the Man, truly wise and good, endures all*  
*Fortunes with becoming Decency, and from whatever*  
*happens to arise, still frames the fairest Actions; like as*  
*the good Commander uses the Army, which he happens to*  
*find, after the manner most agreeable to the Rules of*  
*War; and the Shoemaker, from such Skins as others*  
*provide him, makes a Shoe, the best that can be made*  
*from such Materials; and so in the same manner all*  
*other Artists beside. But if this be true, then he, who*  
*is happy in this Rectitude of Genius, can in no Instance*  
*be truly and strictly miserable. Eth. Nic. I. 1. c. 10.*

As for Epicurus, tho' he was an Advocate for  
 Pleasure, yet so high was his Opinion of a wise  
 and right Conduct, that he thought rational Adver-  
 sity better than irrational Prosperity. See Dial.  
 p. 197. Hence too he represented that Pleasure,  
 which he esteemed our Sovereign Happiness, to be  
 as inseparable from Virtue, as Virtue was from that.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδὴς ἕν, ἀνευ τοῦ Φρονιμῶς, καὶ καλῶς, καὶ  
 δικάως

δικαίως· ἀδὲ Φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, ἄνευ τῆ ἰδέως. *It is impossible to live pleasurable, without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; or to live prudently and honourably and justly, without living pleasurable.* Epic. in Laert. l. 10. l. 132.

To conclude the whole, our Countryman *Thomas Hobbes*, though he professedly explodes all this Doctrine concerning *Ends*, yet seems insensibly to have established an *End* himself, and to have founded it (like others) in a certain ENERGY or ACTION. For thus it is he informs us, in his Treatise called *Human Nature*, that *there can be no CONTENTMENT, but in PROCEEDING; and that FELICITY consisteth, not in HAVING—but in PROSPERING.* And again, some time after, having admitted the Comparison of *Human Life* to a *Race*, he immediately subjoins—*But this RACE we must suppose to have no other GOAL, nor other GARLAND, but being FOREMOST and IN IT.*

AND thus much as to the concurring Sentiments of *Philosophers* on the Subject of *Ends*, here treated.

NOTE XLVII. p. 208.—YET IT IN NO MANNER TAKES AWAY THE DIFFERENCE AND DISTINCTION OF OTHER THINGS.] *Cum enim virtutis hoc proprium sit, eorum rerum quæ secundum naturam sint, habere delectum; qui omnia sic æquaverunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti nullâ selectione uterentur, virtutem ipsam sustulerunt.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 4. p. 207.

QUID autem operius, quem, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quæ contra naturam sint, earum rerum quæ sint secundum naturam, tollatur omnis ea, quæ quaeratur

tur laudeturque prudentia? Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 227.

DEINCEPS explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone; nec ullum sapientiæ munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter eas res, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset; neque ullum delectum haberi oporteret. Itaque cum esset satis constitutum, id solum esse bonum quod esset honestum, & id malum solum quod turpe; tum inter hæc & illa, quæ nihil valerent ad beate miseræve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quo differrent, esse valuerunt, ut essent eorum alia æstimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. Ibid. l. 3. c. 15. p. 246.

CÆTERA autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia naturæ esse contraria: iis ipsis alia interjecta & media numerabat. Acad. l. 1. c. 11. p. 46. See Dial. p. 187.

NOTE XLVIII. p. 208. IT SUPPRESSES NO SOCIAL AND NATURAL AFFECTIONS, &c.] As much has been said concerning the STOIC APATHY, or *Insensibility with respect to Passion*, it may not be improper to inquire, what were their real Sentiments on this Subject.

Πάθος, which we usually render a *Passion*, is always rendered by Cicero, when speaking of a *Stoic*, *Perturbatio*, a *Perturbation*. As such therefore in the first place we say it ought always to be treated.

THE Definition of the Term πάθος, as given by these Philosophers, was ὄρεσις ὑπερβάουσα, translated by Cicero, *Appetitus vehementior*. Tusc. l. 4. c. 9. p. 273. Now this Definition may be more

## NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

easily explained, if we first inquire, what they meant by ὀρμή. Ὀρμή they defined to the Φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul toward something. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 175. A πάθος therefore, or Perturbation, must have been, according to their Definition, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul, which was excessive and beyond Bounds. Stobæus, from whom this Definition is taken, in commenting upon it observes, ἔ λέγει πεφουκῶτα πλεονάζειν, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐν πλεονάσμῳ ἔσται ἢ γὰρ δυνάμει, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνεργείᾳ— that Zeno (its Author) does not call a Πάθος something capable by Nature to pass into Excess, but something actually in Excess already, as having its Essence, not in mere Capacity, but in Actuality. Ecl. Eth. p. 159.

THERE is another Definition of the same Term, which makes it to be ἡ ἀλογὸς καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature. D. Laert. l. 7. f. 110. Andronicus Rhodius adds, to this latter Definition, the Words, δι' ὑπόληψιν κακῆ ἢ ἀγαθῆ, from the Opinion of something Good or Evil. Περὶ Πάθ. p. 523. So that its whole Idea is as follows. A Perturbation, or Stoic Passion, is a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature, arising from the Opinion of something Good or Evil. These last Words, founding the Πάθος or Perturbation on Opinion, correspond to what Cicero says, where he gives it as the Sentiment of the Stoic Philosophers, omnes perturbationes iudicio fieri et opinione, Tusc. l. 4. c. 7. p. 276. Laertius informs us, that they even made the Perturbations themselves to be Judgments. Δοκεῖ δὲ ἀνθρώποις τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι. Laert. l. 7. f. 111. He subjoins an Instance to illustrate. Ἦτε γὰρ Φιλιαργυρία ὑπόληψις ἐστὶ τῆ τοῦ ἀργύριου

χρῆσιον καλὸν εἶναι. For thus (says he) the Love of Money is the Judgment or Opinion, that Money is a thing good and excellent. Plutarch records the same Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample manner. Πάθος — λόγος πονηρός καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἐκ Φαυλῆς καὶ διμαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμη προσλαβών. A Perturbation is a vitious and intemperate Reasoning, which assumes Vehemence and Strength from bad and erroneous Judgment. Mor. p. 441. D. To these Testimonies may be added that of Themistius. — ἢ οὐ κακῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Ζηλώσεως, τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τῆ λόγου διαστροφῆς εἶναι τιθέμενοι, καὶ λόγῳ κρίσεις ἡμαρτημένους. Themist. Paraph. in Aristot. de Animâ, L. 3. p. 90. b. Edit. Aldinæ.

THE Substance of what is said above, seems to amount to this; that Πάθος, in a Stoic Sense, implied a Perturbation, and not a Passion, and that such Perturbation meant an irrational and violent Motion of the Soul, founded on Opinion or Judgment, which was erroneous and faulty.

Now from hence it follows, that THE MAN OF PERFECT CHARACTER (according to their Hypothesis) must of necessity be ἀπαθής, APATHETIC, OR VOID OF PERTURBATION. For such a Character, as has been shewn, implies perfect Rectitude of Conduct. But perfect Rectitude of Conduct implies perfect Rectitude of Judgment; and such Rectitude of Judgment excludes all Error and wrong Judgment: But if Error and wrong Judgment, then Perturbation of consequence, which they suppose to be derived from thence alone.

THAT this was the Sense, in which they understood APATHY, we have their own Authority, as



given us by *Laertius*. Φασι δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς, διὰ τὸ ἀνιμπήσιον εἶναι. *Laert.* l. 7. p. 117. *They say the wise Man is apathetic, by being superior to Error*—by being superior to **ERROR**, if they may be credited themselves; not, as for the most part we absurdly imagine, by being superior to all *Sense*, and *Feeling*, and *Affection*. The Sentence immediately following the foregoing, looks as if these *Philosophers*, had foreseen, how likely they were to be misunderstood. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθῆ τοῦ Φαῦλου, ἐν ἴσῳ λεγομένου τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀνιμπῶ—*There is also another sort of Apathetic Man, who is bad; who is the same in Character, as the hard and inflexible.* To the same Purpose *Epicetus*. Οὐ δεῖ γὰρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ, ὡς ἀνδριάνα, ἀλλὰ τὰς χάρις τηρεῖν τὰς Φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους, ὡς υἱοῦ, ὡς ἀδελφοῦ, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην. **FOR I AM NOT TO BE APATHETIC, LIKE A STATUE, but I am wilful to observe Relations, both the natural and adventitious; as the Man of Religion, as the Son, as the Brother, as the Father, as the Citizen.** *Arr. Epict.* l. 3. c. 2. p. 359.

**IMMEDIATELY** before this, he tells us in the same Chapter, Πάντῃ γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἐπιθέτως ἀπολυγχανύσης, ἢ ἐκκλίσεως περιπέπυσης, *that a Perturbation in no other way ever arises, but either when a Desire is frustrated, or an Aversion falls into that which it would avoid.* Where it is observable, that he does not make either *Desire* or *Aversion*, Πάντῃ, or *Perturbations*, but only the *Cause* of *Perturbations*, when erroneously conducted.

**AGREEABLY** to this, in the second Chapter of the *Enchiridion*, we meet with Precepts about the  
Con-

Conduct and Management of these two *Affections*——  
Not a word is said about lopping off either; on the  
contrary, *Aversion* we are directed how to employ  
immediately, and *Desire* we are only ordered to sus-  
pend for the present, because we want a proper Sub-  
ject of fit Excellence to excite it.

To this may be added, what the same Philoso-  
pher speaks, in his own Person, concerning himself.  
*Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 21. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἀρεῖμαι, ἂν ὀρέ-  
γωμαι καὶ ἐκκλίνω κατὰ φύσιν——I, for my part, am  
satisfied and contented, if I can DESIRE and AVOID  
agreeably to Nature. He did not remain it seems  
dissatisfied, till he had eradicated these *Affections*;  
but he was satisfied in reducing them to their natural  
Use.

IN *Laertius* we read recorded for a *Stoic* Senti-  
ment, that as the *vicious* Man had his πάθη, or *Per-  
turbations*; so opposed to these, had the *Virtuous* his  
Ἐυπαθείαι, his *Eupathies* or *Well-feelings*, translated  
by *Cicero Constantia*. The three chief of these were  
Βούλησις, WILL, defined ἔριξις ἰυλογῶς, *rational  
Desire*; Ἐυλαβεία, CAUTION, defined Ἐκκλισις  
ἰυλογῶς, *rational Aversion*; and Χαρά, JOY, defined  
ἔπαρσις ἰυλογῶς, *rational Exultation*. To these three  
principal *Eupathies* belonged many *subordinate* Species;  
such as ἔννοια, ἀγάπησις, αἰδώς, τίρψις, εὐφροσύνη,  
ἔρθυμία, &c. See *Laert.* l. 7. s. 115, 116. *Andron.*  
*Rhod.* περὶ πάθων. *Cic. Tusc.* l. 4. c. 6.

CICERO makes *Cato*, under the Character of a *Stoic*,  
and in explaining their System, use the following  
expressions. *Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur, in-  
telligi natura fieri, ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a*  
quo

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quo initio profectam communitatem humani generis societatem persequuntur. De Fin. l. 3. c. 19. The same Sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by Laetius. Φασὶ δὲ (οἱ Στωϊκοί) καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ τέκνα Φιλοσοφίας Φυσικὴν εἶναι αὐλοῖς—They say Parental Affection is natural to them. l. 7. f. 120.

AGAIN, soon after, in the same Treatise *de Finibus*. Quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit, ne cum infusa quidem voluptatum abundantia; facile intelligitur, nos ad conjunctionem congregationemque hominum, & ad naturalem communitatem esse nato. So Laetius. "Ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅσ' ἐν ἐρημίᾳ (Φασὶ) βιώσειαι ὁ σπουδαῖος κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει, καὶ πρακτικὸς. The virtuous Man (say they, the Stoics) will never be for living in Solitude; for he is by Nature social, and formed for Action, l. 7. f. 123.

AGAIN, Cicero, in the above-cited Treatise. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus; consentaneum est huic naturæ, ut sapiens velit gerere, & administrare rempublicam; atque ut e natura vivat, uxorem adungere, & velle ex eâ liberos. Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur—Ut vero conservetur omni homini erga hominem societas, conjunctio, caritas; & emolumenta & detrimenta—communia esse voluerunt. De Fin. l. 3. c. 20, 21.

IN Epictetus the leading Duties, or moral Offices of Man, are enumerated as follows. Πολιτεύεσθαι, γαμειν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, θεὸν σέβειν, γονέων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθέλεν ὑρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, ὀρμαῖν, ἀφορμαῖν, ὡς ἕκαστον

ΤΕΤΩΝ

τῶτων δὲ ἰσοειῶν, ὡς πεφύκαμεν. *Arr. Epist.* l. 3. c. 7. p 386. The same Sentiments may be found repeated both in *Stobæus* and *Laertius*,

I SHALL only add one more Sentiment of these *Philosophers*, and that is concerning *Friendship*. λέγουσι δὲ ἡ τὴν Φιλίαν ἐν μένοισι τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι—*They say that Friendship exists among the Virtuous only.* *Laert.* l. 7. f. 124.

THE Sum of these *Quotations* appears to be this; that the *STOICS*, in the *Character of their virtuous Man*, included *rational Desire, Aversion, and Exultation*; included *Love and parental Affection; Friendship*, and a *general Charity or Benevolence to all Mankind*; that they considered it as a *Duty*, arising from our very *Nature*, not to neglect the *Welfare of public Society*, but to be ever ready, according to our Rank, to act either the *Magistrate* or the *private Citizen*; that their *APATHY* was no more than a *Freedom from Perturbation*, from *irrational and excessive Agitations of the Soul*; and consequently that the *strange Apathy*, commonly laid to their Charge, and in the demolishing of which there have been so many *Triumphs*, was an *imaginary Apathy*, for which they were no way accountable.

NOTE XLIX. p. 209. IT REJECTS NO GAIN, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE ] The *Stoics* were so far from rejecting *Wealth*, when acquired fairly, that they allowed *their perfect Man*, for the sake of enriching himself, to frequent the Courts of *Kings*, and teach *Philosophy* for a *Stipend*. Thus *Plutarch* from a *Treatise of Chrysippus*—Τὸν μὲν σοφὸν

σοφὸν καὶ βασιλεύει συνίσταται Φησὶν ἕνεκα χρηματισμῶν,  
καὶ σοφισίῳ ἐκ' ἀργυρίου—Mor. p. 1047. F.

So likewise the *Stoic Hecato*, in his Treatise of *Officis*, as quoted by *Cicero*, *Sapientis esse, nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeque reipublicæ, Singulorum enim facultates & copiæ, divitiæ sunt civitatis.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 15.

NOTE L. p. 206—UNIVERSALLY AS FAR AS VIRTUE NEITHER FORBIDS NOR DISSUADES, IT ENDEAVOURS TO RENDER LIFE, EVEN IN THE MOST VULGAR ACCEPTATION, AS CHEARFUL, JOYOUS, AND EASY AS POSSIBLE.] *Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter naturæ vivere, id habet hanc (ut opinor) sententiam, Cum virtute congruere semper: cætera autem, quæ secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 3.

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, speaking of the *Stoic Doctrine* concerning the *external Conveniencies*, and common *Utilities of Life*, delivers their *Sentiment* in the following Words—ἀλλὰ καὶ δίχα κειμένων ἀρετῆς τε σὺν τέτοις καὶ ἀρετῆς μόνης, μηδέποτε ἂν τὸν σοφὸν τὴν κειχωρισμένην ἴλισθαι, εἰ ἔη αὐτῷ δυνατὸν τὴν μείζονα τῶν ἄλλων λαβεῖν. *Supposing there lay Virtue on the one side, attended with these Externals, and Virtue on the other side, alone by herself, the wise Man would never choose that Virtue, which was destitute and single, if it was in his Power to obtain that other,*  
which

which was accompanied with these Advantages. Περὶ ψυχῆ.  
p. 157.

NOTE LI. p. 209.—NAY, COULD IT MEND THE CONDITION OF EXISTENCE—BY ADDING TO THE AMPLEST POSSESSIONS THE POOREST, MEANEST UTENSIL, IT WOULD IN NO DEGREE CONTEMN, &c.] —*Si ad illam vitam, quæ cum virtute degatur, ampulla aut strigilis accedat, sumpturum sapientem eam vitam potius, cui hæc adjecta sint.*—De Fin. l. 4. c. 12. p. 300.

NOTE LII. p. 210.—COULD IT INDEED CHOOSE ITS OWN LIFE, IT WOULD BE ALWAYS THAT, WHERE MOST SOCIAL AFFECTIONS MIGHT BE EXERTED, &c.] *Itemque magis est secundum naturam, pro omnibus gentibus (si fieri possit) conservandis aut juvandis maximos labores molestasque suscipere, imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio cælestium conlocavit, quam vivere in solitudine, non modo sine ulis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus, abundantem omnibus copiis; ut excellas etiam pulchritudine & viribus. Quæcirca optimo quisque & splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic antepōnit.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 5.

NOTE LIII. p. *ibid.*—IT TEACHES US TO CONSIDER LIFE, AS ONE GREAT IMPORTANT DRAMA, WHERE, &c.] Thus *Aristo the Chian*—*Εἶναι γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ τὸν σοφῶν ὃς αὖτε Θεραΐτου αὖτε Ἀγαμέμνονος πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἐκάτερον ὑποκρίνεται προσωποῦντως.* *The wise Man is like the good Actor; who whether he assume the Character of Therpsites or Agamemnon,*

memnon, acts either of the two Parts with a becoming Propriety. D. Laert. l. 7. s. 160.

THIS Comparison of *Life* to a *Drama* or *Stage-play*, seems to have been a Comparison much approved by Authors of Antiquity. See *Epicæ Enchirid.* c. 17. and the Notes of the late learned Editor M. Upton. See also *M. Anton.* l. 12. s. 36. and the *Notes of Gataker.* Plat. *Gorg.* p. 512. T. 1. Ed. Serr.

NOTE LIV. p. 211.—IT ACCEPTS ALL THE JOYS DERIVED FROM THEIR SUCCESS, &c. IT FIXES NOT, LIKE THE MANY, ITS HAPPINESS ON SUCCESS ALONE, &c.] One of the wisest Rules that ever was, with respect to the Enjoyment of External good Fortune, is that delivered by *Epicættus*; to enjoy it, *ὡς δέδοται, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον δέδοται*, in such manner as it is given, and for such Time as it is given, remembering that neither of these Conditions we have the Power to command. See *Arr. Epicæ.* l. 4. c. 1. p. 556. See also p. 573. of the same.

NOTE LV. *ibid.* ON THE CONTRARY, WHEN THIS HAPPENS, IT IS THEN IT RETIRES INTO ITSELF, AND REFLECTING ON WHAT IS FAIR, WHAT IS LAUDABLE, &c.] See before, p. 322. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τέτοις διαλάμπει, &c.

NOTE LVI. p. 212. ALL MEN PURSUE GOOD, &c.] This is a Principle adopted by all the *Stoics*, and inculcated thro' every part of the Dissertations of *Epicættus*. Take an example or two out of many. Φύσις δ' αὐτῆ παντός, τὸ διώκει τὸ ἀγαθόν, φέγγει τὸ κακόν.—τῆ γὰρ ἀγαθῆ συγγενέστερον εἶναι. It is the Nature

Nature of every one to pursue GOOD, and fly Evil—  
for nothing is more intimately allied to us than GOOD.  
Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, l. 2. c. 22.  
p. 313. Παν Ζῶον ἕξει ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετὴν, ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ  
συμφερόντι. To nothing is every ANIMAL so intimately  
allied, as to its own peculiar WELFARE, and IN-  
TEREST.

So Cicero. Omnes enim expetimus UTILITATEM,  
ad eamque rapimur, nec facere aliter ulla modo possumus.  
De Offic. l. 3. c. 28. Platon. Gorg. p. 468. T. I.  
Edit. Serr. ibid. p. 499. E.

NOTE LVII. p. 213.—[ALL DERIVED FROM  
EXTERNALS MUST FLUCTUATE, AS THEY FLUC-  
TUATE.] See before, p. 126, 130, 133.

NOTE LVIII. Ibid.—[WHEN WE PLACE THE  
SOVEREIGN GOOD IN MIND.—] DEMON or  
GENIUS means every Man's particular MIND, and  
REASONING FACULTY. Δαίμων—ἕτερος ἐστὶν ὁ  
ἐκάστῳ καὶ λόγος. M. Anton. l. 9. p. 271. Ge-  
nium esse uniuscujusque animam rationalem; Et ideo esse  
singulos singulorum—Varro in Fragm. It is from this  
Interpretation of Genius, that the Word, which in  
Greek expresses HAPPINESS, is elegantly etymolog-  
ized to mean A GOODNESS OF GENIUS OR MIND.  
Εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶ δαίμων ἀγαθός. M. Anton. l. 7. f. 17.  
See Gataker on the Place. The SENTIMENT came  
originally from the old Academics. See before page  
321.

NOTE LIX. p. 214.—[BEHOLD THE TRUE  
AND PERFECT MAN: THAT ORNAMENT, &c.]  
Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans con-  
fiscitur



## NOTES ON TREATISE the Third.

*ficitur persona sapientis? Qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus, vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quæ invideri ab imperitis solent. Rectius enim appellabitur rex, quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit: rectius magister populi, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 22. p. 269. Ergo hic, quisquis est, qui moderatione & constantia quietus animo est, sibi que ipse placatus; ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec scienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futilli gestiens deliquescat; is est sapiens, quem quærimus, is est beatus: cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis lætabile ad exferendum videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum, &c. Tulse. Disp. l. 4. c. 17. p. 298.*

NOTE LX. p. 215.—WOULD NOT YOUR SYSTEM IN SUCH A CASE A LITTLE BORDER UPON THE CHIMERICAL? &c.] *Chrysippus* seems to have been sensible of this, if we may judge from a Passage of his, preserved in *Plutarch*. Διὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆτε μεγέθους καὶ τῆ κάλλους, πλάσμασι δοκῶμεν ὁμοία λέγειν, καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. For this reason, thro' the excessive Greatness and Beauty of what we assert, we appear to say things which look like Fictions, and not such as are suitable to MAN and HUMAN NATURE. MOR. 1041. F.

NOTE LXI. p. 216.—IN ANTIENT DAYS, WHEN GREECE, &c.] See *Cic. de Invent.* l. 2. c. 1. See also *Maximus Tyrius, Diff.* 23. p. 277. of the late Quarto Edition; and *Xenoph. Memor.* l. 3. c. 10.

NOTE

NOTE LXII. p. 219.—NO WHERE IN ANY PARTICULAR NATURE IS THE PERFECT CHARACTER TO BE SEEN INTIRE.] The Stoics themselves acknowledged, as we learn from *Clemens of Alexandria*, that their ὁ σοφός, or PERFECT MAN, was difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree; δυσεύρετος πάνυ σοφός. *Strom.* p. 438. *Sextus Empiricus* gives it as their Opinion, that they had never as yet found him, μέχρι τῆς νῦν ἀνευρέτη δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς σοφῆς. *Adv. Phys.* p. 582. Edit. Lipsienf.

WHAT *Sextus* says, seems to be confirmed by *Cicero*, who, speaking in his *Offices* the Language of a Stoic, has the following Expressions. *Nec vero, cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius Aristidesve justii nominantur; aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his justitiæ, tanquam à SAPIENTIBUS, petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum sic SAPIENS est, ut SAPIENTEM volumus intelligi. Nec ii, qui sapientes habiti sunt, & nominati, M. Cato & C. Lælius, sapientes fuerunt; ne illi quidem septem: sed ex mediorem officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant, speciemque sapientum. De Offic. l. 3. c. 4.* Again, in his *Lælius*, speaking of the same consummate Wisdom, he calls it, *Sapientia quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus.*

So too *Quintilian*. *Quod si defuit his viris summo virtus, sic quærentibus, an oratores fuerint, respondebo, quo modo Stoici, si interrogentur, an SAPIENS, Zeno, an Cleanthes, an Chrysippus, respondeant; magnos quidem illos ac venerabiles; non tamen id, quod natura ho-*  
 Z minis

*minis summam habet, consecutos.* Inst. Orat. l. 12. c. 1. p. 721, 722. Edit. Caper.

So likewise *Seneca*: Scis, quem nunc bonum virum dicam? Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse, tanquam phœnix, semel anno quingentesimo nascitur. Epist. 42.

NOTE LXIII p. 219.—I MIGHT INFORM YOU OF THE NATURAL PRE-EMINENCE, AND HIGH RANK OF SPECIFIC IDEAS.] See *Cicero* in his *Orator*, near the Beginning. *Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non, &c. &c.* See also the Verses of *Boethius* before cited, Note XVII. p. 295.

NOTE LXIV. p. 220, 221.—AN EXEMPLAR OF IMITATION, WHICH THO' NONE WE THINK CAN EQUAL; YET ALL AT LEAST MAY FOLLOW—AN EXEMPLAR, &c.] *Seneca* gives it as a general Confession of the greatest Philosophers, that the Doctrine they taught, was not *quemadmodum ipsi viverent, sed quemadmodum vivendum esset.* *De vitâ beatâ*, c. 18.

THERE appears indeed to be ONE COMMON REASONING with respect to all MODELS, EXEMPLARS, STANDARDS, CORRECTORS, whatever we call them, and whatever the *Subjects*, which they are destined to adjust. According to this Reasoning, if a Standard be *less* perfect than the Subject to be adjusted, such Adjusting (if it may be so called) becomes a *Detriment*. If it be but *equally* perfect, then

is

is the Adjusting *superfluous*. It remains therefore that it must be *more perfect*, and that to any *Transcendence*, any *Accuracy* conceivable. For suppose a Standard as *highly accurate*, as can be imagined. If the Subjects to be adjusted have a Nature *suitable*, then will they arrive, by such Standard, to a *degree of Perfection*, which thro' a Standard *less* accurate they could never possibly attain. On the contrary, if the Subjects be not *so far* capable, the Accuracy of the Standard will never be a hindrance, why they should not become as *perfect*, as their Nature will admit.

It seems to have been from some sentiments of this kind, that the *Stoics* adorned their ὁ σοφὸς, or *perfect Character*, with *Attributes so far superior to ordinary Humanity*. Ἐκείνῳ ὀλίγον, ἐκεῖνῳ ἀπροσδεής, ἐκεῖνῳ ἀυτάρκης, μακάριον, τέλειον—'Twas he was fortunate; 'twas he was above want; 'twas he was self-sufficient, and happy, and perfect. Plutarch. Mor. 1068. B. See Note LXII.

SOME *Philosophers* have gone so far, as not to rest satisfied with the *most perfect Idea of Humanity*, but to substitute for our *Exemplar*, even the *supreme Being*, GOD HIMSELF. Thus PLATO, in his *Theætetus*, makes the great Object of our endeavours, to be ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, the becoming like to GOD, as far as in our power. He immediately explains, what this resemblance is. Ὁμοίωσις δὲ, δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. It is the becoming just and holy, along with Wisdom or Prudence. Plat. tom. I. p. 176. Edit. Serrani. See this Sentiment explained by Ammonius, in *V. Voces Porph.* p. 5. See also *Aristotle's Ethics*, L. 10. C. 8. p. 465.

THE Gospel appears to favour the same Hypothesis. *Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect.* Matt. v. 48.

WHAT has been above said, will be, it is hoped, a sufficient Apology for the *Transcendence* of the Character described in the *Dialogue*.

NOTE LXV. p. 221. THE PROFICIENCY OF SOCRATES—WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVINCe US—THAT SOME PROGRESS, &c.] See *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. c. 91. p. 420. Τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν—τὸ γενίσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τὴν περὶ Σωκράτην, καὶ Διογένην, &c.

NOTE LXVI. p. *Ibid.*—NOR WAS THE PRIZE, AS USUAL, RESERVED ONLY TO THE FIRST; BUT ALL, WHO RUN, MIGHT DEPEND UPON A REWARD, HAVING, &c.] *Verum ut transeundi spes non sit, magna tamen est dignitas subsequendi.* Quintil. Inst. l. 12. c. 11. p. 760. *Exigo itaque a me, non ut aptimis par sim, sed ut malis melior.* Senec. de Vita beatâ, c. 17. Οὐδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι, καὶ ὁμως ἐκ ἀμελείῃ τῆ σώματι· ἐδὲ Κροῖσος, καὶ ὁμως ἐκ ἀμελείῃ τῆς κλήσεως· ἐδὲ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῶν ἄκρων, ἀφιστάμεθα. *For neither shall I be Milo, and yet I neglect not my Body; nor Croesus, and yet I neglect not my Estate; nor in general do we desist from the proper Care of anything, thro' Despair of arriving at that which is supreme.* Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 2. See also *Horat. Epist.* l. 1. l. 1. v. 28, &c.

NOTE

NOTE LXVII. p. 225.—THIS WHOLE UNIVERSE—IS ONE CITY OR COMMONWEALTH—] Ὁ κόσμος ἓστ' μία πόλις ἐστὶ—*Arr. Epiet.* l. 3. c. 24. p. 486. This was a *Stoic Doctrine*, of which *Epietetus* and the Emperor *Marcus* make perpetual mention. See of the last, l. 12. f. 36.

So *Cicero*, *Universus hic mundus una civitas communis Deorum atque hominum existimandus.* *De Legg.* l. 1. c. 7. p. 29. See *De Fin.* l. 3. c. 19. *De Nat. Deor.* l. 2. c. 62.

NOTE LXVIII. p. 227.—HENCE THE MIND TRULY WISE, QUITTING THE STUDY OF PARTICULARS, &c.] The *Platonics*, considering SCIENCE as something *ascertained, definite, and steady*, would admit nothing to be its *Object*, which was *vague, infinite, and passive*. For this reason they excluded all INDIVIDUALS, or OBJECTS OF SENSE, and (as *Ammonius* expresses it,) raised themselves, in their Contemplations, from *Beings particular* to *Beings universal*, and which as such, from their own Nature, were *eternal and definite*. The whole Passage is worth transcribing. Εἶρηξι ὅτι ἡ φιλοσοφία, γνῶσις πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα ἐστίν. Ἐζήτησαν ἔν. οἱ φιλόσοφοι, τίνα ἂν τρόπον γένωνται τῶν ὄντων ἐπισήμονες· καὶ ἐπειδὴ εἴρων τὰ κτλὰ μέρος γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ ὄντα, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπειρα, ἢ δὲ ἐπισήμη αἰδιώντε καὶ πεπερασμένων ἐστὶ γνῶσις (τὸ γὰρ γνωστὸν βέλεια ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως περιλαμβάνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀπειρον ἀπερίληπτον) ἀνήγαγον εὐλύεσ ἀπὸ τῶν μερικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου, αἰθια ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένα. Ὡς γὰρ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, Ζ 3 Ἐπισήμη

Ἐπισήμη εἶρηται, παρὰ τὸ εἰς Ἐπίσασιν ἡμᾶς καὶ ὄρον  
τινα προάγειν τῶν πραγμάτων τῆτο δὲ περιζόμεθα  
διὰ τῆς εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἀναδρομῆς. *Ammonius* in his  
Preface to *Porphyry's Isagoge*, p. 14. Edit. 8vo.

CONSONANT to this, we learn it was the Advice  
of *Plato*, with respect to the *Progress* of our *Specu-  
lations* and *Inquiries*, when we proceed *Synthetically*,  
that is to say, *from first Principles downwards*, that  
we should descend from those higher Genera, which in-  
clude many subordinate Species, down to the lowest Rank  
of Species, those which include only Individuals. But  
here it was his Opinion, that our *Inquiries should stop*,  
and, as to *Individuals*, let them wholly alone; because  
of these there could not possibly be any Science. Διὸ  
μέχρι τῶν ἐδικωλάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωλάτων καλίοντας  
παρεκλείψω ὁ ἰλάτων παύεσθαι—τὰ δὲ ἀπειρά  
Φησιν ἔαν. μὴ δὲ γὰρ ἂν ὡςτε γενέσθαι τῆτων ἐπισήμην.  
*Porphyr. Isagog. c. 2.*

SUCH was the Method of ancient Philosophy. The  
Fashion at present appears to be somewhat altered,  
and the Business of Philosophers to be little else, than  
the collecting from every Quarter, into voluminous  
Records, an infinite Number of sensible, particular,  
and unconnected Facts, the chief Effect of which is to  
excite our Admiration. So that if that well-known  
Saying of Antiquity be true, *it was Wonder which in-  
duced Men first to philosophize*, we may say that Phi-  
losophy now ends, whence originally it began.

NOTE LXIX. p. 228.—A FACULTY, WHICH  
RECOGNIZING BOTH ITSELF, AND ALL THINGS  
ELSE, BECOMES A CANON, A CORRECTOR, AND  
A STANDARD UNIVERSAL.] See before, p. 162,  
In

In *Epietetus*, l. 1. c. 1. p. 6. the Δύναμις λογικὴ or *reasoning Power*, is called the Power ἢ καὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖσα, καὶ τ' ἄλλα πάντα. So *Marcus*—Τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς· εἰαυτὴν ὁρᾷ, εἰαυτὴν διακεθροῖ, &c. *The Properties of the reasoning Soul are, it beholdeth itself; it formeth itself, &c.* l. 11. c. 1. So again *Epietetus*;—ὕπὲρ μὲν τῶ ὄραϊ καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ νῆ Δία ὑπὲρ αὐτῶ τῷ ζῆν, καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν πρὸς αὐτὸ, ὑπὲρ καρπῶν ξηρῶν, ὑπὲρ ὄνου, ὑπὲρ ἐλαίου εὐχαρίσει τῷ θεῷ· μέμνησο δ' ὅτι ἄλλα τί σοι δέδωκε κρείττον ἀπάντων τῶν, τὸ χρησόμενον αὐτοῖς, τὸ δοκιμάζον, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστου λογιέμενον. *For seeing, for hearing, and indeed for Life itself, and the various Means which co-operate to its Support; for the Fruits of the Earth, for Wine and Oil, for all these things be thankful to God: yet be mindful that he hath given thee something else, WHICH IS BETTER THAN ALL THESE; something which is to use them, to prove them, to compute the Value of each.* Arr. *Epiet.* l. 2. c. 23. p. 321.

NOTE LXX. p. 228.—[THAT MASTER-SCIENCE, OF WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY ARE, AND THE END TO WHICH, &c.] See Arr. *Epiet.* l. 2. c. 24. p. 337.—See also l. 1. c. 6. p. 36. and *Perf. Satyr.* 3. v. 66.

NOTE LXXI. *Ibid.*—[AND NEVER WRETCHEDLY DEGRADE THEMSELVES INTO NATURES TO THEM SUBORDINATE.] See Arr. *Epiet.* l. 1. c. 3. p. 21. Δια τὴν ταύτην τὴν συγγένειαν, οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναυτες, λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίβουλοι καὶ βλαβεροί· οἱ δὲ λένισιν, ἀγριοὶ καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι· οἱ πλείους δ' ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες, &c. *Thro' this*



*Affinity* (he means our Affinity to the Body, or baser Part) *some of us, degenerating, become like Wolves, faithless, and treacherous, and mischievous; others, like Lions, fierce, and savage, and wild; but the greater Part turn Foxes, little, fraudulent, wretched Animals. Cum autem duobus modis, id est, aut vi aut fraude fiat injuria; fraus, quasi vulpecula, vis, leonis videtur.* Cic. de Offic. l. 1. c. 19. See also *Arr. Epiet.* l. 2. 9. p. 210. In our own Language we seem to allude to this *Degeneracy* of Human Nature, when we call Men, by way of reproach, *Sheepish, Bearish, Hog-gish, Ravenous, &c.*

NOTE LXXII. p. 229.—THAT REASON, OF WHICH OUR OWN IS BUT A PARTICLE, OR SPARK, &c.]—αἱ ψυχὰι μὲν ἕως ἴσιν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφείς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτῆ μόρια ἔσαι, καὶ ἀποσπάσματα.—*Arr. Epiet.* l. 1. c. 14. p. 81.—ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἐκάστῳ προσάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα αὐτῆ ἕτ' ἔστιν ὁ ἐκάστῳ νῆς καὶ λόγῳ. *Mar. Ant.* l. 5. f. 27. *Humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divinâ, cum nullo alio nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dicere) comparari potest.* Tusc. Disp. l. 5. c. 13. p. 371.

NOTE LXXIII. *Ibid.*—FIT ACTORS IN THAT GENERAL DRAMA, WHERE THOU HAST ALLOTTED EVERY BEING, GREAT AND SMALL, ITS PROPER PART, &c.] See before p. 210. and *Note LIII.* See also *Arr. Epiet.* l. 3. c. 22. p. 444—Σὺ ἥλιῳ εἶ δύνασαι, &c. The Passage is sublime and great, but too long to be here inserted.

NOTE

NOTE LXXIV. p. 230.—ENABLE US TO CURB DESIRE, &c. ENABLE US EVEN TO SUSPEND IT, &c. BE OUR FIRST WORK TO HAVE ESCAPED, &c.] Ἀπόχρη ποτὲ πανταπάσιν ὀρέξεως, ἵνα ποτὲ καὶ εὐλόγως ὀρεχθῆς. *Abstain for a time from Desire altogether, that in time thou mayst be able to desire rationally.* Arr. Epiēt. l. 3. c. 13. p. 414. Again the same Author—Σήμερον—ὀρέξει οὐκ ἐχρήσαμεν, ἐκκλίσει πρὸς μόνα τὰ προαιρετικά—*To day my Faculty of Desire I have not used at all; my Aversion I have employed with respect only to things, which are in my power.* l. 4. c. 4. p. 588. See also *Enchir.* c. 2. and *Charact.* V. III. p. 202. *Plat. Gorg.* p. 505. B. Tom. I. Edit. Serr. περι δὲ ψυχὴν—

HORACE seems also to have alluded to this Doctrine:

*Virtus est, vitium fugere; & sapientia prima,  
Stultitia caruisse*—Epiēt. I. l. I. v. 41.

NOTE LXXV. *Ibid.*—LET NOT OUR LOVE THERE STOP, WHERE IT FIRST BEGINS, BUT INSENSIBLY CONDUCT IT, &c.] See *Plat. Symp.* p. 210. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani. Δεῖ γὰρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τῷ πρώτῳ, ἀρχεσθαι, &c.

NOTE LXXVI. *Ibid.*—NOT THAT LITTLE CASUAL SPOT, WHERE, &c.] See *Arrian. Epiēt.* l. I. c. 9. p. 51. *Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, curjatam se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit: totius enim mundi se incolam & civem arbitrabatur.* *Tusc. Disp.* l. 5. c. 37. p. 427.

NOTE LXXVII. p. 231.—TEACH US EACH TO REGARD HIMSELF, BUT AS A PART OF THIS

## NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

THIS GREAT WHOLE; a PART, &c.] Πῶς εὖ λέγεται τῶν ἐκτίς τινα κατὰ φύσιν, &c. *In what Sense then* (says the Philosopher, since all is referable to one universal Providence) *are some things called agreeable to our Nature, and others the contrary? The Answer is, They are so called, by considering ourselves as detached, and separate from the Whole. For thus may I say of the Foot, when considered so apart, that it is agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free from Filth. But if we consider it as a Foot, that is, as something not detached, but the Member of a Body, it will behoove it both to pass into the Dirt, and to trample upon Thorns, and even upon occasion to be lopped off, for the Preservation of the Whole. Were not this the case, it would be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind should we conceive with respect to ourselves.—What art thou? A Man. If thou consider thy Being as something separate and detached, it is agreeable to thy Nature, in this View of Independence, to live to extreme Age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if thou consider thyself as a Man, and as the Member of a certain Whole; for the sake of that Whole, it will occasionally behoove thee, at one while to be sick, at another while to sail and risque the Perils of Navigation, at another while to be in want, and at last to die perhaps before thy time. Why therefore dost thou bear those Events impatiently? Knowest thou not, that after the same manner as the Foot ceaseth to be a Foot, so dost thou too cease to be longer a Man? Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 5. p. 191.*

NOTE LXXVIII. p. 231.—IN AS MUCH AS FUTURITY, &c.] Μέχρις αὖ ἀδελά μοι ἢ τὰ ἐξῆς, δεῖ τῶν εὐφρατέρων ἔχομαι, πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν,

Φύσιν· αὐτὸς γὰρ μ' ὁ Θεὸς τοιούτων ἐκλεκτικὸν ἐποίησεν· εἰ δὲ γε ἤδειν, ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθείμαρται πῦν, καὶ ὤρμων ἂν ἐπ' αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πᾶς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὤρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλᾶσθαι. *Arr. Epict.* l. 2. c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above Sentiment was of *Chryssippus*. In the *tenis Chapter* of the *same Book* we have it repeated, tho' in Words somewhat different. Διατέτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ Φιλοσοφοὶ, ὅτι, &c. So *Seneca*—*Quicquid acciderit, sic ferre, quasi tibi volueris accidere. Debuiſſes enim velle, si sciſſes omnia ex decreto Dei fieri.* *Nat. Quæst.* iii. in *Præfat.*

NOTE LXXIX. p. 232.—THAT WE MAY KNOW NO OTHER WILL, THAN THINE ALONE, AND THAT THE HARMONY OF OUR PARTICULAR MINDS WITH THY UNIVERSAL, &c.]—Εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ τῆς εὐδαιμόνου ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐροίας βίης, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τῆς παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τῆς ὅλης διοικητῆς βούλησιν. *The Virtue of a happy man, and the Felicity of Life is this, when all things are transacted in Harmony of a Man's Genius, with the Will of Him, who administers the Whole.* *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. c. 88. p. 418. This is what *Epicletus* calls τὴν αὐτῆς βούλησιν συνάρμοσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, *to attune or harmonize one's Mind to the things, which happen.* *Diff.* l. 2. c. 14. p. 242.

NOTE LXXX. *Ibid.* YET SINCE TO ATTAIN THIS HEIGHT—IS BUT BARELY POSSIBLE, &c.] See before, page 215, &c. See also *Notes LX.* and *LXII.*

NOTE LXXXI. p. 233.—SUCH AS TO TRANSFORM US INTO SAVAGE BEASTS OF PREY, SULLEN, &c.] See before, *Note LXXI.* NOTE

NOTE LXXXII. p. 233. THAT ANIMATING WISDOM, WHICH PERVADES, AND RULES THE WHOLE, &c.]—*This Power* is called by the Emperor *Marcus*—τὸν διὰ τῆς ἑσίας δὴκαίε λόγον, καὶ—εἰκοσιμῆνα τὸ πᾶν. l. 5. f. 32.

NOTE LXXXIII. *Ibid.*—THAT MAGIC DIVINE, WHICH, &c.]—καὶ τὸ χάσμα τῷ τῷ λέοντι, καὶ τὸ δηλητήριον, καὶ πᾶσα κακυργία, ὡς ἀκαθὰ, ὡς βόρβορος, ἐκίινον ἐπιγενήματα τῶν σιμῶν καὶ κελῶν μὴ ἔν αὐτῶ ἀλλότρια τῆτε, ἢ εἴβεις, φαυλάζε. ἀλλὰ τὴν πᾶντων πηγὴν ἐπιλογίζε. M. Ant. l. 6. f. 36.—See also l. 4. f. 44. l. 3. f. 2. Ὡσπερ γὰρ αἱ κωμῳδίαι (φῆσιν) ἐπιγράμματᾶ γελοῖα φέρουσι, ἀ καθ' ἑαυτὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαυλά, τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ ποιήματι χάριν πινὰ προσθήσιν· ἔτως ψέχειας ἀν αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς τῆς κακίαν, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἐκ ἀχρησός ἐστὶ. Chrysip. and Plutarch. p. 1065. D.

Οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σὺ δίχα, Δαίμων,  
 Οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πύλον, ἔτ' ἐπὶ πύλῳ,  
 Πλὴν ὅποσα ῥίξῃσι κακοὶ σφέτερον ἀνοίαις.  
 Ἄλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίσασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι,  
 Καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα· καὶ ἔ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἔστιν.  
 Ὡδε γὰρ εἰς ἐν ἅπαντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,  
 Ὡσθ' ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πᾶντων λόγον αἰὲν ἰόντων. forf. εἰούτα,

*Cleantes Hymn. apud Steph. in Poesi Philof. p. 49, 50,*

[THE Reader will observe that the fourth of the above Verses is supplied by the *Miscell. Observations Criticæ,*

*Critica*, Vol. VII. from a Manuscript of *Vossius* at *Leyden*.]

NOTE LXXXIV. p. 234.—WITH THESE MAY OUR MINDS BE UNCHANGEABLY TINGED, &c.] —βάπτεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν Φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ—*M. ANT.* l. 5. f. 16.

NOTE LXXXV. *Ibid.*——WITH A RESERVE, &c.] μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως. See *Epicl. Enchirid.* c. 2. *M. ANT.* l. 4. f. 1. l. 5. f. 20. *Seneca* translates it *cum exceptione*. See *De Beneficiis*, l. 4. f. 34.

NOTE LXXXVI. *Ibid.*——NEVER MISS WHAT WE WOULD OBTAIN, OR FALL INTO THAT WHICH WE WOULD AVOID, &c.] μήτε ὀρεγόμενον ἀποτυγχάνειν, μηδ' ἐκκλινούσα περιπίπτειν. *ARR. EPICL.* l. 3. c. 12. p. 404.

NOTE LXXXVII. p. 235.——CONDUCT ME, THOU, &c.

Ἄγε δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ἢ πεπρωμένη,  
 Ὡποί ποθ' ὑμῖν ἔμι διατεταγμένῳ.  
 Ὡς ἔψομαι γ' ἄοκνῳ ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω,  
 Κακὸς γενόμενῳ, ἰδὲν ἤτιον ἔψομαι.

*Cleanthes in Epicl. Ench. c. 52.*

Thus translated by *Seneca* :

*Duc me, parens, celsique dominatur poli,  
 Quocumque placuit : nulla parendi mora est :*

*Adsum*

NOTES on TREATISE *the Third.*

*Adsum impiger, fac nolle : comitabor gemens,  
Malusque patiar, quod bono licuit pati.*

Epiſt. 107.

NOTE LXXXVIII. p. 236. IT IS HABIT, RE-  
PLIED HE, IS ALL IN ALL. IT IS PRACTICE  
AND EXERCISE, WHICH CAN ONLY, &c. &c.  
to the End of the Paragraph ] — Ἀλλὰ πολλῆς ἔχει  
χρείαν παρασκευῆς καὶ πόου πολλῆ καὶ μαθημάτων.  
Τί ἐν; ἐλπίζεις, ὅτι τὴν μεγίστην τέχνην ἀπὸ ὀλίγων  
εἰς ἀπολαβὴν; — But (says one, with respect to  
the virtuous Character) there is need of much Pre-  
paration, of much Labour and Learning. And what?  
Dost thou expect it should be possible (answers the  
Philosopher) to obtain, by little Pains, the chiefest  
GREATEST ART? Arr. Epiſt. l. I. c. 20. p. 111.  
Ἄφνω δὲ ταῦρα εἰ γίνεσθαι, εἰ δὲ γενναῖον ἀνθρώπον  
ἀλλὰ δεῖ χειμασκήσθαι, παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ εἰκὴ  
προσπῆδᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ μηδὲν προσήκοντα. No robust and  
mighty Animal is complete at once; nor more is the brave  
and generous Man. It is necessary to undergo the se-  
verest Exercise and Preparation, and not rashly plunge  
into things, which are no way suitable. Ejusd.  
Differt. l. I. c. 2. p. 18. See also the same Author,  
l. I. c. 15. p. 86. l. 2. c. 14. p. 243. Sed ut nec  
medici, nec imperatores, nec oratores, quamvis artis  
præcepta perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum  
sine usu & exercitatione consequi possunt: sic officii  
conservandi præcepta traduntur illa quidem (ut facimus  
ipsi;) sed rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque  
desiderat. Cic. de Offic. l. I. c. 18. ἢ δ' ἩΘΙΚΗ  
ἐξ ἘΘΟΥΣ περιγίνεσθαι ὁθεὺ καὶ τῆνομα ἔσχηκε—  
Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 1.

NOTE

NOTE LXXXIX. p. 236. NOTHING IS TO BE HAD GRATIS, &c.] Προϊκα ἄδεν γίνεσθαι. *Arr. Epiēt.* l. 4. c. 10. p. 653. The same Sentiment is often repeated by the same Author.

NOTE XC. p. 241. ——— WE ARE ALL GOVERNED BY INTEREST, &c.] See of the *Dialogue*, p. 212, 246. See also *Notes* LVI. and XCII.

NOTE XCI. p. 243. ——— IT IS A SMOAKY HOUSE — Καπνός ἐστὶ ἀπέρχομαι. *M. Ant.* l. 5. c. 29. See *Arr. Epiēt.* l. 1. c. 25. p. 129.

NOTE XCII. *Ibid.* IS A SOCIAL INTEREST, &c.] As the Stoics, above all Philosophers, opposed a *lazy inactive Life*, so they were perpetually recommending a proper regard to the *Public*, and encouraging the Practice of every *social Duty*. And tho' they made the *original Spring* of every particular Man's Action, to be *Self-love*, and the prospect of *private Interest*; yet so *intimately united* did they esteem this *private Interest* with the *public*, that they held it *impossible* to promote the *former*, and not at the same time promote the *latter*. Τοιαύτην Φύσιν τῆ λογικῆ ζωῆ κατεσκεύασεν, ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν δύνηται τυχεῖν, εἰ μὴ τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀφελίμου προσφέρηται· οὕτως οὐκέτι ἀκοινωνήτου γίνεσθαι, τὸ πάντα αὐτῷ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν. *God hath so framed the Nature of the rational Animal, that it should not be able to obtain any private Goods, if it contribute not withal something profitable to the Community. Thus is there no longer any thing UNSOCIAL, IN DOING ALL THINGS FOR THE SAKE OF SELF.* *Arr. Epiēt.* l. 1. c. 19. p. 106.

THE



THE *Peripatetic* Doctrine was much the same Πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλόν, καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, κοινῇ τ' ἂν παντὶ εἴη τὰ δεόντα, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἔπιτ' ἢ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτος ἐστὶ ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθόν, δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐπίσταιται τὰ καλά πράττειν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὠφελήσεται. *Were all to aim jointly at the fair Principle of Honour, and ever strive to act what is fairest and most laudable, there would be to every one in common whatever was wanting, and to each Man in particular of all Goods the greatest, if Virtue deserve justly to be so esteemed. So that the good Man is necessarily a FRIEND to SELF: For by doing what is laudable, he will always himself be profited, as well as at the same time be beneficial to others.* Ethic. Nicom. l. 9. c. 8.

NOTE XCIII. p. 243.—[IF SO, THEN HONOUR AND JUSTICE ARE MY INTERESTS, &c.] Thus Cicero, after having supposed a *social common Interest* to be the *natural Interest* of Man; subjoins immediately—*Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturæ. Idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum lege naturæ prohibemur.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 6.

NOTE XCIV. *Ibid.*—[WITHOUT SOME PORTION OF WHICH NOT EVEN THIEVES, &c.]—*Cujus (sc. Justitiæ) tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula justitiæ vivere. Nam qui eorum cuiquam, quis una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ille autem qui*  
archi-

*archipirata dicitur, nisi æquabiliter prædam, &c. De Offic. l. 2. c. 11.*

— Ἄλλ' ἔστιν ἀνάγκη, Φυσικῆς ἕως τῆς κοινωνίας, εἶναι φύσει καὶ τὰ δίκαια, δι' ὧν ἔστιν ἡ κοινωνία. Ὅτι γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον συνέχει τὴν κοινωνίαν, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδικωτάτων εἶναι δοκύνων· ἔτοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ λησαί· οἷς ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης σώζεται τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Διὰ τε γὰρ τὸ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀλλήλους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸ κρείττονι δοκῆν, καὶ τὸ τὰ συκείμενα φυλάττειν, καὶ διὰ τὸ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀσθενετέροις, διὰ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους αὐτοῖς κοινωνία συμμένει· ὧν πᾶν τὸναντίον εἰς ἕξ ἀδικῶσι ποιοῦσιν. *It is necessary, SOCIETY being natural, that JUSTICE should be natural also, by which Society exists. For that Justice holds Society together, is evident in those, who appear of all the most unjust, such I mean as Robbers or Banditti, whose Society with each other is preserved by their Justice to each other. For by not aspiring to any unequal Shares, and by never falsifying, and by submitting to what appears expedient, and by justly guarding the Booty amassed together, and by assisting their weaker Companions, by these things it is, that their Society subsists; the contrary to all which they do by those, whom they injure. Alex. Aphrod. περὶ ψυχ. p. 156. Edit. Ald. See also Plat. de Repub. l. 1. p. 351. tom. 11. Edit. Serrani.*

NOTE XCV. p. 245. WHAT THEN HAVE I TO DO, BUT TO ENLARGE VIRTUE INTO PIETY? NOT ONLY HONOUR, &c.]

ALL manner of Events, which any way affect a Man, arise either from within *himself*, or from *Causes independant*. In the former case, he maintains an *active* Part; in the latter, a *passive*. The *active* Part of his Character seems chiefly to be the Care of VIRTUE, for it is Virtue which teaches us what we are to *act* or *do*; the *passive* Part seems to belong more immediately to PIETY, because by this we are enabled to *resign* and *acquiesce*, and *bear* with a manly Calmness whatever befalls us. As therefore we are framed by Nature both to *act* and to *suffer*, and are placed in a Universe, where we are perpetually compelled to both; neither *Virtue* nor *Piety* is of *itself* sufficient, but to pass becomingly thro' Life, we should participate of *each*.

SUCH appears to have been the Sentiment of the wise and good *Emperor*—ἀνῆκεν ὅλον ἑαυτὸν, δικαιοσύνη μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργήματα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβαίονσι, τῇ τῶν ἄλων φύσει. Τί δ' ἐρεῖ τις, ἢ ὑπολήψεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ πράξει καὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰδ' εἰς οὖν βασιλείαι, δύο τέτοις ἀρκέμεν, αὐτὸς δικαιοπραγεῖν τὸ οὖν πρᾶσσόμενον, καὶ φιλεῖν τὸ οὖν ἀπονεμόμενον ἑαυτῷ—*He* (the perfect Man) *commits himself wholly to JUSTICE, and the UNIVERSAL NATURE; TO JUSTICE, as to those things which are done by himself; and in all other Events, to the NATURE OF THE WHOLE. What any one will say, or think about him, or act against him, he doth not so much as take into consideration; contented and abundantly satisfied with these two things, himself TO DO JUSTLY what is at this instant doing, and to APPROVE*

PROVE and LOVE, what is at this instant allotted him.

M. Anton. l. 10. c. 11. Πάντα ἐπεινά, ἐφ' ἃ διὰ  
 περιόδου εὐχῆ ἐλθεῖν, ἤδη ἔχειν δόνασαι, εἰάν μὴ σαυτῷ  
 φθονῆς· τῆτο δὲ εἶεν, εἰάν πάν τὸ παρελθὸν καταλίπης,  
 καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐπιτρέψῃς τῇ προοίᾳ, καὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνην  
 ἐπειθῆς πρὸς ὍΣΙΟΤΗΤΑ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΤΗΝΗΝ·  
 ἐσιότα μὲν, ἵνα φιλήῃς τὸ ἀπονεμόμενον· σοὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἢ  
 φάσις ἔφερα, καὶ σὲ τῆτω δικαιοσύνην δεῖ, ἵνα ἐλευθέρως καὶ  
 χωρὶς περιπλοκῆς λέγῃς τε τ' ἀληθῆ, καὶ πράσῃς τὰ  
 κατὰ νόμον καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν.—All those things, at which  
 thou wishest to arrive by a road round about, thou  
 mayst instantly possess, if thou dost not grudge them to  
 thyself; that is to say, in other words, if every thing  
 pass thou intirely quit, if the future thou trust to Pro-  
 vidence, and the present alone thou adjust according to  
 PIETY and JUSTICE: according to Piety, that so thou  
 mayst approve, and love what is allotted, (for whatever  
 it be, is what Nature brought it to thee, and thee to it;) ac-  
 cording to Justice, that so thou mayst generously and with-  
 out disguise both speak the Truth, and act what is confor-  
 mant to [the general] Law, and the real Value of things.  
 M. Ant. l. 12. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 54. and Plato's  
 Gorgias, p. 507. Tom. 1. Edit. Ser. καὶ μὴν οὕτ  
 σέφρων. κ. τ. λ.

NOTE XCVI. p. 245.—I HAVE AN INTER-  
 EST WHICH MAY EXIST, WITHOUT ALTER-  
 ING THE PLAN OF PROVIDENCE; WITHOUT  
 MENDING, &c.] Παιδεύεσθαι.—τῆσι τὸ μαθηά-  
 ναι ἕκαστα ἕτω θέλειν, ὡς, &c. To be instructed—  
 what is to say, to learn so to will all things, as in fact  
 they happen. And how do they happen? As He, who  
 ordains them, hath ordained. Now he hath ordained  
 that there should be Summer and Winter, and Plenty

and Famine, and Virtue and Vice, and all manner of Contrarieties, for the Harmony of the Whole; and to each of us bath He given a Body, and its Members, and a Fortune, and certain Associates. Mindful therefore of this Order, ought we to come for Instruction, not indeed how we may alter what is already established, (for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better so to be;) but how, while things continue around us, just as they are, and as is their Nature, we may still preserve our Judgment in harmony with all that happens. Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 12. p. 74.

NOTE XCVII. p. 246. WHO WOULD BE UNHAPPY? WHO WOULD NOT, IF HE KNEW HOW, ENJOY ONE PERPETUAL FELICITY, &c.] — τάνης (sc. ευδαιμονίας) γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντες πάντα πράττομεν. *It is for the sake of Happiness, we all of us do all other things whatever.* Ethic. Nicom. l. 1. c. 12. sub. fin. — See before, of the Dialogue pages 212, 241. and Notes LVI and XCII. Plat. Protog. p. 358. T. 1. Ed. Serr.

NOTE XCVIII. *Ibid.* — IF IT HAPPEN TO BE ERRONEOUS, IT IS A GRATEFUL ERROR, WHICH I CHERISH, &c.] 'Εἰ δὲ ἐξαπατηθῆσα τιναῖδε μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπροαιρέτων ἔδεν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἤμελλον εὐρόως καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσασθαι. *Were a Man to be deceived, in having learnt concerning Externals, that all beyond our Power was to us as nothing; I, for my own part, would desire a Deceit, which would enable me for the future to live tranquil and undisturbed.* Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 4. p. 27.

NOTE XCIX. p. 247.—WHEN WE ARE ONCE, SAID HE, WELL HABITUATED TO THIS —MORAL SCIENCE, THEN LOGIC AND PHYSICS BECOME TWO PROFITABLE ADJUNCTS, &c.] *Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, Dialecticam etiam adjungunt & Physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine adpellant: alteram, quod habeat rationem ne cui falso adsentiamur, neve, &c.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 21. p. 265.

THE THREEFOLD DIVISION of PHILOSOPHY into *Ethics, Physics, and Logic*, was commonly received by most Sects of Philosophers. See *Laert.* l. 7. c. 39. See also *Cicero* in his Treatise *de Legibus*, l. 1. c. 23. and in his *Academics*, l. 1. c. 5. *Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, &c.* Plutarch de Placit. Philos. p. 874.



## ADVERTISEMENT.

*THE following Notes, chiefly taken from Greek Manuscripts, are added partly to explain, partly to give the Reader a Specimen of certain Works, valuable for their Rarity, as well as for their Merit.*





A D D I T I O N A L  
N O T E  
O N  
T R E A T I S E the Second.

PAGE 54.—THE NECESSARY ARTS SEEM  
TO HAVE BEEN PRIOR, &c.]

THE following Extract from a Manuscript of *Philoponus* may help to shew the *comparative* Priority of Arts and Sciences, by shewing (according to this Author) the order of their Revival in a *new formed* Society. Such Society he supposes to have arisen from scattered Individuals again assembling themselves, after former Societies had by various incidents of War, Famine, Inundation, and the like, been dissipated and destroyed.

HAVING spoken of the Effects of *Deucalion's* Flood, he proceeds as follows—Οὔτοι ἔν οι περιλειφθέντες, μὴ ἔχουσις ἄθεν αὐ τραφεῖεν, ἐπειθὺν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τὰ πρὸς χρείαν, οἷον τὸ ἀλέθειν μύλαις σῖτον, ἢ τὸ σπείρειν, ἢ τι τοιῶτον ἄλλο· καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπινοίαν σοφίαν, τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῶ βίης τὸ λυσιτελὲς ἐξευρίσκειαν, καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ἐπινοηκότα.

Πάλιν

Πάλιν ἐπερόησαν τέχνας, ὡς Φησὶν ὁ ποιητής,

— ὑποθημοσύνησιν Ἀθῆναις,

ἢ μὲν τὰς μέχρι τῆς εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνάγκης ἰσαμένας,  
ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι τῶ καλῆ καὶ ἀγαθῆ προΐουσας· καὶ τὴν  
πάλιν σοφίαν κεκλήκασιν, καὶ τὸν ἐννόησον σοφόν· ὡς τὸ,

———— σοφὸς ἤραρε τέκτων,

Ἐν εἰδῶς σοφίης —

— ὑποθημοσύνησι δ' Ἀθῆναις εἶπεν, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν  
ὑπερβολὴν τῶν εὐρημάτων εἰς θεῶν εὐνὴν τῶν ἐπινοῶν  
ἀνέφερον.

Πάλιν, ἀπέβλεψαν πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα,  
καὶ ἐξέουρον νόμους, καὶ πάντα τὰ συμφῶνα τὰς πόλεις·  
καὶ ταύτην πάλιν τὴν ἐπινοῶν σοφίαν ἐκάλεσαν· τοιοῦτοι  
γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ ἐπινοῶν σοφοί, πολιτικὰς τιμὰς ἀρετῆς εὐ-  
ρόντες.

Εἶτα λοιπὸν, ὁδῶν προΐουσαι, καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα,  
καὶ τὴν δημιουργοῦ αὐτῶν πρεσβυθὸν φύσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἐιδι-  
κώτερον φυσικὴν ἐκάλεσαν θεωρίαν, καὶ σοφὸς τὰς τὴν  
τοιούτην μετιόουσαι σκέψιν.

Τελευταῖον δ' ἐπ' αὐτὰ λοιπὸν ἔφθασαν τὰ θεῖα, καὶ  
ὑπερκόσμια, καὶ ἀμετάβλητα παντελῶς, καὶ τὴν τέτην  
Γνώσιν κυριωτάτην σοφίαν ὠνόμασαν.

THESE therefore, that were thus left, not having  
whence they could support themselves, began thro' ne-  
cessity to contrive things relative to immediate Want,  
such as the grinding of Corn by Mills, or the sowing  
it, or something else of like kind; and such Contrivance,  
dis-

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discovering what was conducive to the Necessaries of Life, they called *Wisdom*, and him a *wise Man*, who had been the *Contriver*.

AGAIN, they contrived *Arts* (as *Homer* says)

By *Precepts of Minerva*——

that is, not only those *Arts*, that stop at the Necessity of Life, but those also that advance as far as the *Fair* and *Elegant*; and this too they called *Wisdom*, and the *Inventor* a *wise Man*. Thus the *Poet* :

———*The Work*

'Twas a *wise Artist* fram'd, his *Wisdom* taught  
By *Precepts of Minerva*——

The last *Words* are added, because, from the *Transcendence* of the *Inventions*, they referred their contrivance to a *Divinity*.

AGAIN, they turned their *Eyes* to *Matters Political*, and found out *Laws*, and the several things that constitute *Cities*, or *civil Communities*; and this *Contrivance* in its turn they called *Wisdom*, and of this sort were those celebrated *Seven Wise Men*, the *Inventors* of certain *Virtues Political*.

AFTER this, still advancing in a road, they proceeded to *corporeal Substances*, and to *Nature*, their efficient *Cause*; and this *Speculation*, by a more specific *Name*, they called *Natural Speculation*, and those *Persons wise*, who pursued such *Inquiries*.

LAST of all, they attained even to *Beings divine*, *supramundane*, and wholly *unchangeable*; and the  
Know-

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*Knowledge of these they named* THE MOST EXCELLENT WISDOM.

A FEW Observations on this important Passage may not perhaps be improper.

OUR first Observation is, that tho' we give it from *Philoponus*, yet is it by him (as he informs us) taken from a Work of *Aristocles*, an antient Peripatetic, intituled, Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας, *Concerning Philosophy*. Some indeed have conjectured that for *Aristocles* we ought to read *Aristoteles*, because the last published a Work under this Title, which he quotes himself in his Treatise, *De Animâ*. Be this as it may, the Extract itself is valuable, not only for its Matter, but for being the Fragment of a Treatise now no longer extant.

OUR next Observation is, that by *Matters Political* in their third Paragraph, the Author means not the first Associations of Mankind, for these were prior to almost every thing else, and were not referable to *Art*, but to the innate Impulse of the social Principle: He means on the contrary those more exquisite and artificial Forms, given to Societies already established, in order to render them happy, and rescue and preserve them from tyrannic Power. Such was the Polity given by *Lycurgus* to the *Lacedemonians*, by *Solon* to the *Athenians*, by *Numa* to the *Romans*, &c. Those great and good Men, in meditating their Institutions, had the same Sentiment with *Alcidamas*, according to that noble Fragment of his preserved in the Scholiast upon *Aristotle's Rhetoric*—Ἐλευθέρως ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός. ἰδὲνα δ᾽ ἄλλον ἢ φύσις περιόηκεν. *God hath sent forth all Men free; Nature hath made no Man a Slave.*

OUR

OUR third Observation is, that by the *most excellent Science*, in the last Paragraph, is meant the Science of *Causes*, and, above all others, of *Causes efficient* and *final*, as these necessarily imply pervading Reason, and superintending Wisdom. This Science, as Men were naturally led to it from the Contemplation of *Effects*, which Effects were the Tribe of Beings *natural* or *physical*, was, from being thus *subsequent to these physical Inquiries*, called *Metaphysical*; but with a View to itself, and the transcendent Eminence of its *Object*, was more properly called ἡ πρώτη Φιλοσοφία, THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

OUR fourth Observation is on the *Order* of these Inventions, namely, *Arts necessary*; *Arts elegant*; *Arts political*; *Science physical*; *Science Metaphysical*; in all, *five Habits*, or Modes of Wisdom. *The necessary Arts* it is evident must on all Accounts have come first. When these were once established, the Transition to the *Elegant* was easy and obvious. Inventions of *Necessity*, by the Super-additions of Dispatch, Facility, and the like, soon ripened into Inventions of *Convenience*; and again these, having in their very nature a certain Beauty and Grace, easily suggested Inventions of pure and simple *Elegance*.

THAT the Legislators, tho' in Rank and Genius far superior to all natural Philosophers, should come before them in point of time, is owing to the Nature of their *Subject*, which had a more immediate Connection with *Man*, and *Human Happiness*. It was not indeed till Societies were thoroughly established, and Peace had been well secured both internally and externally, that Men had Leisure, or even Inclination, to reflect  
on

on the Objects round them, or to recognize that vast Mansion, in which they found themselves existing.

LASTLY, as the *tremendous* Part of *physical* Events led weak Minds, who could not explain them, into the Abyss of dark and dreary *Superstition*; so those *physical* Events, which had *Beauty* and *Order*, being in their turn equally striking, and equally Objects of *Admiration*, led strong and generous Minds into Principles the very reverse. They conceived it probable, as their own Views were limited, that, even where *Beauty* and *Order* were not to them apparent, they might still in other views have a most real Existence. Farther, as these Observers could perceive nothing done either by themselves, or those of their own Species, which, if it in the least aspired to *Utility*, or *Beauty*, was not necessarily the Effect of a *conscious* and *intelligent* Cause, they were, from the superior *Utility* and *Beauty* of *physical* Effects, induced to infer a *conscious* and *intelligent* Cause of these, far superior to themselves; a Cause, which from the *Universality* of these Events, as well as from their *Union* and *Sympathy*, was not, as are the Sons of Men, a *Multitude of limited Causes*, but a *simple Cause, universal and one*; a Cause too, which, from the never-ceasing of its Events, was not, like the same human Beings, an *intermittent* Cause, but a *Cause, ever operating, ever in Energy*.

WE see therefore the Reason why this FIRST PHILOSOPHY was *subsequent in point of Time* to *physical* Speculation, and why of course to the other Habits or Modes of Wisdom here enumerated, tho' in its own Dignity and Importance far superior to them all.

OUR

Our fifth Observation is, that as a Nation may be said to be in a State of Perfection, which is in the full Possession of all these Habits, or Modes of Wisdom; so those Nations are nearest to Perfection, that possess them in the greatest *Number*, or in a state of the greatest *Maturity*.

A MAN of Ingenuity might find rational Amusement from this Speculation, by comparing the same Nation as to these Matters, either with itself in different Periods, or with its Neighbours in the same Periods, either past or present. He might for example compare *antient Britain* with *antient Greece*; *present Britain* with *present Greece*; *Britain* in the Age of *Crusades*, with *Britain* in the Age of *Elizabeth*; *present Britain*, with her Colonies; with *Italy*, *France*, *Holland*, and the enlightened Countries; with *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Barbary*, &c. But this we leave, as foreign to our Work, and drawing us into a Theory, which merits a better place than an occasional Note.



ADDITIONAL  
NOTES

ON

TREATISE the Third.

PAGE 115.—AND THAT THE DIFFERENCE LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS.] So *Proclus* in his *Manuscript* Comment on the *first Alcibiades* of *Plato*, p. 139. Ἡ κρινὴ καὶ ἀδιάσφοτος ἔννοια τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῇ αὐταρκείᾳ χαρακτηρίζει· παρ' ὧν γὰρ τὸ εὖ, παρὰ τούτων καὶ τὸ αὐταρκές· καὶ ὁρᾷς δὴ πάλιν ὅπως ἐνταῦθα καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης κατορθοῖ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μείζονα, σφάλλεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐλάττωσαν πρότασιν. Συλλογίζεται γὰρ ἕτως· ἐγὼ διὰ σώμα, καὶ γένος, καὶ φίλους, καὶ πλεόντων εὐδαιμόνων· ὁ εὐδαιμόνων ἀνευδής· ἐγὼ (Φησὶν) ἀνευδής· εἰκὼν ὅτι μὲν ὁ εὐδαιμόνων ἀνευδής, ἀληθής· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὸς εὐδαιμόνων, ψευδής· τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα ψευδές διὰ τὴν ἐλάττωσαν· καὶ ἕτως εὐρήσεις καὶ τὸν Φιλήδονον, καὶ τὸν Φιλοχρήματον, διὰ ταύτην ψευδομένους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἠδονῆν, ὁ δὲ χρήματα τίθεται τὸ ἀγαθόν· ὅτι δὲ πᾶν τὸ ἐπιτόν ἀγαθόν, κοινόν

κοινόν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς. καὶ συνελόντι Φάναι, τὰς μὲν μείζους τῶν προτάσεων ἕκαστοι τιθέασιν, ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ τὴν λόγῳ ταύτας προβάλλουσι, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττω ἀπὸ Φυσιολογίας, ἀπὸ αἰσθησεως, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων προφέρομαι πάθων· διὸ καὶ ταύταις μὲν διαφέρονται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, ἐκείναις δὲ ὁμοφρονῶσι: τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη μερισμῶ καὶ διαστάσεως ἐστὶν αἰτία ταῖς ψυχαῖς· τίτανικὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ, καὶ διασπᾶ, καὶ σπαράττει τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν νῦν· ὁ δὲ λόγος κοινός ἐστι πάνσι, καὶ ἡ τὴν λόγῳ προβολή, καὶ διὰ τῆτο ΚΟΙΝΟΣ Ο ΕΡΜΗΣ, ἵνα δὴ καὶ ἠθικῶς αὐτῶ ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἐξήγησιν.

The UNIVERSAL and unperverted Idea of Man characterises HAPPINESS by SELF-SUFFICIENCY. For with whomsoever Well-being exists, with them the Self-sufficient exists also. You see therefore, how here again Alcibiades is right as to his MAJOR PROPOSITION, but mistaken as to the MINOR. For thus it is he syllogizes—"I, on account of my Person and Family and Friends and Wealth, am HAPPY.—The Person HAPPY is SUPERIOR TO WANT—therefore am I SUPERIOR TO WANT." Now, that, THE PERSON HAPPY, IS SUPERIOR TO WANT, is true; but that HE WAS HAPPY, was false. THE CONCLUSION therefore is FALSE thro' the MINOR PROPOSITION.

It is thus also You will find the Lover of Pleasure, and the Lover of Money, erring in their Reasonings, thro' the same Proposition. For one of them lays down the Good of Man to be Pleasure, the other to be Riches; but that every thing DESIRABLE is GOOD,

this they possess in common, and assent to on both sides.

IT may be said indeed universally, that all Individuals produce the GENERAL PROPOSITIONS; which they lay down, from their COMMON or UNIVERSAL IDEAS, and from the Faculty of REASON: but that their MINOR PROPOSITIONS are produced from IMAGINATION, from SENSE, and from irrational PASSIONS. And hence it is, that about these LAST they differ one with another, while in the FORMER they all agree. THE PASSIONS indeed may be considered within the Souls of Men as the Causes of Division and Distance; for they are TITANIC, and distract and tear our Intellect to pieces. But REASON is the same and common to all, as is also the Faculty of Speech, the Medium of its Promulgation. And hence it is, that HERMES (the Type of rational Discourse) is called COMMON and UNIVERSAL, if we may be allowed to give of him an Ethical Explanation.

P. 185.—FIX OUR HAPPINESS IN THE MERE DOING.] So Proclus—Πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ τῷ εὐδαίμονι πράξεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχουσιν τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐνεργητικῶς ἐν ἐνεργητικῶς ἢ διοικητικῶς, ἐν τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ τῷ τέλος ἔχει. All the Actions of the virtuous Man have reference to himself. When therefore he has energized beneficially and divinely, it is IN THE VERY ENERGY ITSELF THAT HE OBTAINS HIS END.—This from the same MS. Comment as the Note preceding.

P. 220.—THE GENUINE SPHERE AND GENUINE CYLINDER, &c.]—ἀλλ' ἦγε ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ σω-

λῶ καὶ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ καθαρώτερα τῶν Φαινομένων ἐπι-  
 ρρεῖν δύναται, καὶ γενναῦ· τὸν γ' ἔν Φαινόμενον κύκλον  
 ἐπιδιορθῆται, καὶ λέγει, καθόσον ἕτος ἀπολείπεται τῷ  
 ἀκριβέως, καὶ δῆλον, ὡς ὀρωτά τι τέτε κάλλιον ἄλλο καὶ  
 τελειότερον εἶδος· ἔ γάρ πως μηδενός ἐφαπτομένη, μηδὲ  
 εἰς τι καθαρώτερον βλέψασα, τῆτο μὲν ἔ Φησιν ὅτιως εἶναι  
 καλόν, τῆτο δὲ ἔ πάλιν ἴσον· αὐτῶ γάρ τῷ λέγειν ταῦτα,  
 δείκνυσθιν ὡς ὄρα· **TO ΠΑΝΘΙ ΚΑΛΟΝ καὶ ΠΑΝ-**  
**ΤΗ ΙΕΟΝ.** *Our Soul is able both to perceive*  
*and to produce Objects much more accurate and pure,*  
*than those which are visibly apparent. It corrects there-*  
*fore the apparent Circle, and says, how much that*  
*Circle wants of the Perfect one; and this it evidently*  
*does, by beholding some FORM, which is fairer than*  
*the visible one, and more perfect. It is not indeed*  
*possible, that, without connection with any thing else,*  
*or without looking upon something more pure, it should*  
*say that this is not really Fair, this is not in every re-*  
*spect Equal: For by these very Assertions, it proves that*  
**it beholds THAT WHICH IS IN EVERY RESPECT**  
**FAIR, AND IN EVERY RESPECT EQUAL.** From  
 the MS. Comment of Proclus on the *Parmenides*, Book  
 the Third.

Ibid.—[*The Source of infinite Truths, &c.*] The  
 Antients held *four Methods* or *Processes* in their *Dia-*  
*lectic* for the Investigation of Truth: First *the Divi-*  
*sive* (ἢ διασπαιτική) by which we divide and separate the  
 real Attributes of Being; next *the Definitive*, (ἢ ὀρι-  
 στική) by which we bring them again together, and by  
 a just arrangement form them into *Definitions*; thirdly,  
*the Demonstrative*, (ἢ ἀποδεικτική) in which we em-  
 ploy those *Definitions*, and by syllogizing descend thro'

*Additional Notes on Treatise the Third.*

them from Causes to Effects; and lastly the *Analytic* (ἡ ἀναλυτικὴ) in which, by an *inverse* Process we unravel Demonstrations, and so *ascend from Effects to Causes*.

Now to all these Methods they held ΕΙΔΗ, that is, SPECIFIC FORMS or IDEAS to be indispensably requisite, from their two important Characters of *Permanence*, and *Comprehension*.

HENCE it is that *Proclus*, in the fifth Book of his Comment on the *Parmenides*, having gone thro' the several Methods above mentioned, concludes with the following remark.

Εἰ ἄρα μὴ εἴη τὰ ΕΙΔΗ, οὐκ ἴσονται αἱ διαλεκτικοὶ μέθοδοι, καθ' ἃς τὰ ὄντα γινώσκομεν, ἐδ' ὅποι τρέφομεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξομεν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς, μάλιστα ποθέσα τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐπὶ τὰ ΕΙΔΗ καταφεύγει. *If therefore there are no SPECIFIC IDEAS or FORMS, there can be none of those Dialectic Methods, by which we come to the Knowledge of things, nor shall we know whither to direct our Discursive Faculty; for this is that Power of the Soul, which, desiring above all others the Cause or Reason of things, flies for that Purpose to FORMS or SPECIFIC IDEAS.*

P.226.—NOT THE SMALLEST ATOM IS EITHER FOREIGN OR DETACHED.]—ἐδὲν ἔν ἐστιν ἄτως ἄτιμον καὶ φαῦλον, ὃ μὴ μετέχει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, κακείθεν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν ὕλην εἴποις, εὐρήσεις καὶ ταύτην ἀγαθὸν· καὶ ἀπὸ τὸ κακὸν, εὐρήσεις καὶ τῷ μετέχον ἀγαθῷ τινός, καὶ ἐδὲ ἄλλως ὑποσηναὶ δυνάμενον, ἢ τῷ ἀγαθῷ χρωρῦμενον, καὶ μεταλαμβάνον ἀγαθῷ τινός· ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τῶν

τῶν ἀνθρώπων δοῦναι σμικρὰ καὶ εὐτελεῖ τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἐξ-  
 ἀπειν ἐξαισχύνονται, πρὸς τὴν τέτων ἀποβλέπασαι φύσιν,  
 ἔτι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν μειζόνων ἕσα  
 γεννητικὴ πολλῶν πλείον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐλασσόνων· οἱ δὲ οὕτως  
 φιλόσοφοι, πάντα ἕσα πᾶρ ἐσιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ με-  
 γάλα καὶ σμικρὰ προνοίας ἐξάψαντες, ἴδεν ἄτιμον,  
 ἰδοὺ ἀποβλεπῶν ἐν τῷ ἕκῳ τῷ Διὸς ὀφῶσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα  
 ἀγαθὰ καθέσθον ἐκ προνοίας Ἰφίστεκε, καὶ κατὰ, κατ'  
 αἰτίαν γεγονότα τὴν θεῖαν. *There is therefore nothing*  
*ignoble and base, which doth not participate of THE*  
*GOOD PRINCIPLE, and hath not from thence its Origin.*  
*Should you, even instance MATTER, you will find even*  
*that to be Good; should you instance EVIL itself,*  
*you will find that also participating of some Good,*  
*and no otherwise able to subsist, than as COLOURED BY*  
*GOOD, and partaking of it. The Opinions indeed of*  
*ordinary men are ashamed to refer little and contemptible*  
*Things to the [primary and] divine Cause, looking [in*  
*their reasonings] to the Nature of the Subjects, not to*  
*the Power of the Cause, and [to this necessary con-*  
*sequence] that if it be productive of the greater Ef-*  
*fects, much more so is it of the inferior. But those*  
*on the contrary, who are truly Philosophers, referring*  
*all Things both great and small, that exist in the Uni-*  
*verse, to a PROVIDENCE, behold nothing fit to be re-*  
*jected in this MANSION of JOVE, but all Things GOOD,*  
*as having been established by a PROVIDENCE, and*  
*FAIR, as having been produced by a CAUSE, WHICH*  
*IS DIVINE. Proclus in his manuscript Comment on*  
*the Parmenides of Plato.*

P. 234.—WHO ART OF PURER EYES, THAN  
 EVER TO BEHOLD INIQUITY.]— AN EAR, that was to  
 hear a musical Discord *alone*, would have Ideas of

Dissonance, unknown to that Ear, which, *along with* the Discord, was to hear its Preparation and Resolution. An Eye, that was to see *only* the Words—*venis & caeco carpitur*—would have Ideas of Absurdity, unknown to that Eye, which was to behold the *Verse entire* :

*Vulnus alit venis, et caeco carpitur igni.*

Numerous are the Ideas of Defect, Error, Absurdity, Falshood, &c. all referable to this Class; Ideas, which arise purely from *partial* and *incomplete* Comprehension, and which have no Existence, where the Comprehension is *universal* and *complete*. It seems to be from this reasoning, that *Themistius* asserts—*τις αλλοιως γαρ Νος, εχ ο τα ελατω σοων, αλλ ο τα αριστα.* THE MORE RESPECTABLE MIND is not that, which perceiveth the GREATER NUMBER of Objects, but THE BETTER and MORE EXCELLENT ones. *Them.* in *Aristot. de Anim.* p. 62. Edit. Ald.

## P O S T S C R I P T,

**W**E must not conclude, without saying a few words on the elegant Frontispiece, with which this Volume is adorned.

THE Figure in the middle represents NATURE; that, which is crowning her, VIRTUE; both after the antique. The several *Genii*, or *Youths*, represent the tribe of ARTS, all of which are seen in various manners attending upon NATURE, as having a necessary \* *Reference to her in all their Operations.*

OF ARTS (as has been † said already) some *imitate* Nature, others *cultivate* and *finish* her.

THE *Genii* or *Youths* in the fore-ground represent the *Imitative Arts*; He with the Lyre, *Music*; He with the Scroll, *Poetry*; He with the Tablet, *Painting*. A *Busto* stands near them, to denote *Sculpture*; and they are *grouped together* from their known *Affinity*.

If we proceed, we may imagine the *different Parts of the Column* to denote *Architecture*; the *Youth, plowing with Oxen*, to denote *Agriculture*; two Arts, which have this in common, that they exert their Powers on the ‡ *insensitive* Parts of Nature. Not so the *Youth, who is managing the Horse*: In Him we see the Force of Art, where Nature is living and || *sensitive*.

B b 4

ALL

\* P. 22. † P. 38. 279, ‡ P. 39. || P. 40.



## P O S T S C R I P T.

ALL these latter Arts are distinguished from the *imitative*, as being Powers, by which Nature is *adorned and cultivated*.

To the same Class we may refer those Arts, characterized by the *three Koubs*, placed *immediately over Nature*, of whom one holds a Basket of Flowers, which the others are *throwing upon her*; and to the *two below*, who are decorating her with a Festoon.

As these last *Koubs* by the *several* Employes appear to *co-operate* with the Figure representing *VIRTUE*, they may be supposed to *exhibit* those *higher Arts of Cultivation*, which peculiarly respect the *rational Nature*; those *Arts*, that *Virtus* presides over, by prescribing their Mode and Limits, and while these in an *inferior* Degree tender *Nature* more accomplished, *VIRTUE* with a superior dignity *places the Crown upon her Head*.

MR. STUART, the ingenious Designer of this Piece, has not only distinguished himself as a Painter in the *Disposition* of his Figures, and in their graceful *Attitudes*; but has contrived withal, that each of them should have a *meaning*; each *apply with Propriety* to some one of the *several Treatises*.

THE whole Design *taken together*, by exhibiting *NATURE* as a *passive Subject*, on which *ART* in all its Species is seen to operate as an *efficient Cause*, has an immediate reference to *THE FIRST TREATISE*, where *Art* is considered in a view the most *general and comprehensive*.

THE *three Youths*, that bear the Symbols of a Lyre, a Scroll, and Tablet, by denoting the MIMETIC or IMITATIVE ARTS, have reference to THE SECOND TREATISE, where those Arts in particular are examined and compared.

THE *two principal Figures* in the Design, one of which is seen crowning the other, as they shew the Honours and Pre-eminence that NATURE derives from VIRTUE, characterise very aptly the Subject of THE THIRD TREATISE, which professes to prove, that the Perfection and Happiness of Human Nature are only to be attained thro' the Medium of a moral and a virgulus Life.

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
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